THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE QUEBEC INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

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Résumé

Ce mémoire évalue plusieurs théories sur les assises sociales du mouvement indépendantiste québécois. La plus répandue de ces théories affirme que l'appui le plus solide en faveur de l'indépendance du Québec provient de la nouvelle classe moyenne francophone. La perspective marxiste s'y apparente puisqu'elle affirme que le mouvement indépendantiste puise son appui dans la nouvelle petite bourgeoisie francophone. Une troisième théorie prétend que la nouvelle classe est à la tête des nouveaux mouvements sociaux dont le mouvement indépendantiste québécois. Enfin, une quatrième hypothèse soutient que les intellectuels francophones et l'intelligentsia professionnelle sont au premier rang des séparatistes.

Les résultats d'analyses par tableaux croisés et par régression logistique de l'appui à la souveraineté-association au référendum réfutent les hypothèses de la nouvelle classe moyenne et de la nouvelle petite bourgeoisie. L'analyse révèle un support considérable pour la souveraineté-association parmi une variante étroite de la nouvelle classe. Parmi cette variante, ou intelligentsia professionnelle francophone, l'appui à la souveraineté est fortement concentré chez les intellectuels francophones. Le facteur qui permet de mieux déterminer l'appui au séparatisme n'est pas la classe mais l'opposition entre les membres des professions intellectuelles et les propriétaires et cadres. Les résultats démontrent aussi que les fonctionnaires provinciaux sont très en faveur de la souveraineté alors que leurs collègues fédéraux y sont fortement opposés. Nous concluons que les intellectuels francophones ainsi que les fonctionnaires provinciaux québécois sont ceux qui ont été le plus en faveur de la souveraineté lors du référendum de 1980.

ABSTRACT

This thesis assesses several theories about the social basis of the Quebec independence movement. The most prevalent of these theories locates the core of support for Quebec independence in the Francophone new middle class. The Marxist perspective offers a closely related hypothesis, according to which the independence movement is based in the Francophone new petite bourgeoisie. A third theory sees the new class as at the helm of the new social movements, among which is the Quebec independence movement. Finally, a fourth hypothesis is that the Francophone intellectuals and professional intelligentsia are the foremost separatists.

The results of tabular and logistic regression analysis of data on referendum support for sovereignty-association refute the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses. The analyses indicate considerable support for sovereignty-association among a narrow variant of the new class. Within this narrow new class, or professional intelligentsia, support for sovereignty is most heavily concentrated among the Francophone intellectuals. The most discriminating predictor of separatism is not class, but the opposition between those in intellectuals vs. the business/managerial occupations. The findings also show employees of the Quebec government to be highly favourable to sovereignty, and federal government employees highly opposed, thus discounting a subsidiary argument of the new middle class theorists. We conclude that Francophone intellectuals, and employees of the Quebec provincial government, provided the most support for sovereignty around the time of the 1980 referendum.

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Dedicated to Ann and Harold Kowalchuk
(my mom and dad)

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INTRODUCTION

Few issues in Canadian politics have commanded as widespread attention as has the prospect of the independence of Quebec. An understanding of the separatists' demands undoubtedly depends on knowing who the separatists are. While anti-separatist rancor contributes to a misunderstanding of both of these questions in much of the popular discourse on Quebec-Canada relations, one would expect a discussion informed by thorough and objective investigation in the academic community. Yet many scholars of the Quebec independence movement have been surprisingly careless on the question of its social basis. Early sociological descriptions of Quebec independentists and their motivations were largely impressionistic and unsubstantiated. Unfortunately, not only have these early theories survived more or less unchanged by their authors from the mid 1960's to the present, but they have been accepted as evident truths by subsequent commentators in Canada and elsewhere. In subjecting these claims to empirical analysis, this paper should contribute to a better understanding of the independence movement in Quebec. In particular it will show that an analysis of the movement's social basis is well served by fine-tuning the categories that have usually been used to describe the social bases of this and other social movements -- especially socio-economic class.

Not all analysts of Quebec separatism explicitly operationalize the independence "movement" and what constitutes involvement in it. The present discussion regards as relevant the various expressions of support for independence that have been accepted and examined by other scholars. That is, it includes such expressions of support for Quebec independence as surveys of opinions on separation, and electoral support for the political party of the independence movement, the Parti Québécois, as well as Parti Québécois membership and candidacy. Also, some commentators consider the state as a nationalist actor on behalf or behest

of certain social groups, whom they characterize as nationalist.

Though this discussion will make use of empirical evidence relating to several forms of involvement in the independence movement, the main quantitative analysis takes intended and actual responses to the question posed in the 1980 referendum on Quebec sovereignty as the dependent variable. Clearly, voting is one of the least costly expressions of support or opposition to separatism. Indeed, in the case of support, it might be argued that such an effortless behaviour is really a form of mere "adherence" to the goals of the independence movement, rather than a type of active involvement or "constituency" (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1221).[2] Moreover, voting YES to a "mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association" (the referendum question) is not necessarily indicative of support for the independence of Quebec, or even for sovereignty-association.[3] But the referendum vote can arguably be considered an indicator of

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[1]An example is the Quebec Liberal Party under Jean Lesage, which in 1963 nationalized several private power companies to create what is now Hydro Québec. Albert Breton (1964) considers this an act of "political nationalism", that is, an assertion of ethnic identity. Where relations between ethno-linguistic communities is not an issue, such an action would more likely be viewed as a departure from liberal economic policy. In the context of an ethno-linguistically distinct entity such as Quebec, nationalization can arguably be considered an assertion of one community's sovereignty over the natural resources in its territory, vis-á-vis economic penetration by Anglophone Canadians or Americans.

[2]In the framework of McCarthy and Zald, adherents are those who "believe in the goals of the movement", whereas constituents are "those providing resources for it", including active participation.

[3]In fact according to the data to be analysed below, 23% of French Quebecers who opposed the independence of Quebec voted YES on the referendum.

"mobilization potential" for the independence movement.[4] Furthermore, it will be seen below that the referendum vote has its own distinct social basis, which simply becomes more marked at higher levels of involvement in the movement.

The first chapter is a review of the relevant literature on the separatist movement in Quebec. This includes the most common, though largely untested theories of the social bases of the independence movement, in particular the new middle class theory, as well as the theory of the new petite bourgeoisie, and the theory of the new class. The theory of intellectuals and the professional intelligentsia as nationalists will also be discussed. Chapter two will describe the data to be analysed, as well as the variables that will be used to test the major hypotheses of the basis of separatism. The results of tabular and regression analyses are presented in chapters three and four respectively. Chapter five is a discussion of findings and a conclusion.

A thorough explantion of my findings, in particular, of a greater concentration of support for independence among some groups than others, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Primarily this is because of the limitations of survey data, whereby the advantages of a large sample are conferred at the expense of richness in detail. But this loss is not so unfortunate considering that the descriptive matter of who supports Quebec independence clearly needs to be addressed before we can explain why they support it. The present findings should indicate the direction that future investigation should take.

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[4]As a dimension of support for independence, the referendum vote is analagous to Kriesi's use of sympathy for new social movements, in his index of "mobilization potential" for these movements (Kriesi, 1989).

Chapter One

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The New Middle Class Hypothesis

Of the untested hypotheses about the social bases of Quebec separatism, the most enduring has undoubtedly been that of the new middle class. The father of the new middle class hypothesis is Hubert Guindon ([1964] 1973; 1968; 1978)[5]. Contributing to its longevity have been Albert Breton (1964), Robert Boily (1969), Richard Ossenberg (1971), Sheilagh Hodgins Milner and Henry Milner (1973), Vera Murray (1976), R. Morris and C. Lanphier (1977), Neil Nevitte (1981), Philip Rawkins (1985), Kenneth McRoberts (1984; 1988), and Alain G. Gagnon and Mary-Beth Montcalm (1990). Though not all of these authors have explicitly cited Guindon, they have all accepted and expounded on essentially the same thesis. Like Guindon, the majority of these authors make no attempt to empirically substantiate their arguments. A choice illustration of unreserved acceptance of Guindon's thesis among analysts of separatism is seen in the work of Ossenberg. Citing Guindon's empirically unsupported work, he argues that the new middle class "has been properly identified" as the original class basis of the Quebec independence movement (1971, p. 108).

Definitions and Delineations of the New Middle Class

A standard conceptualization of the new middle class was articulated by C. Wright Mills. In White Collar, a historical portrait of the class structure of American society, Mills described the evolution of the white collar or new middle class of salaried employees from the old middle class of small rural and urban entrepreneurs. The latter, consisting of farmers and small businessmen as well as self-employed professionals, were the owners of the means of production of

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[5]Most of Guindon's papers have now been reprinted in a single volume (Guindon, 1988).

their income. Their numbers diminished with the gradual centralization of ownership, in turn the result of such social and economic changes as mechanization and the falling prices of agricultural goods. The gradual dispossession of the old middle class contributed to growing numbers of the new, employed middle class -- salaried professionals, office workers, salespersons and managers.[6] The new middle class is distinguished from the working class partly by the former's superior income, but more so by the non-material essence of its work with symbols and people. The crucial distinction between the new and the old middle class lies in the employed, dependent status of the former (Mills, 1951, chapter 4).

The understanding of the term "new middle class" varies widely from the standard definition, among adherents to the new middle class hypothesis. Even Albert Breton, the only one of the authors named above to cite and use Mills' occupational composition of the new middle class, appears to have misunderstood Mills' distinction between "new" and "old". For Breton, the new middle class refers merely to the newcomers in the middle class.[7] For the others, the definition of the new middle class is either too restrictive, tending to exclude lower occupational segments, or too broad, encompassing some elements of the old middle class. Guindon rightly distinguishes the new middle class from the old middle class by its employment status, but he additionally stipulates that the new middle class is "a bureaucratically employed white collar group with professional and semi-professional status"

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[6]According to Mills, between 1870 and 1940, the new middle class in the U.S. grew from 15% to 56%.

[7]He writes that "the new middle class is that group of individuals who were not previously in the middle class and who have only recently acceded to it (Breton, 1964, p 381 n. 14; see also p 378). See also Milner and Milner (1973, p 173) who do not make clear what is "new" about the new middle class.

([1964] 1973, p. 156,). But there seems no justification for the exclusion here of non-professional white collar workers, like clerks, salespeople, and managers. Conversely, Ossenberg's new middle class of "white collar occupations, ranging from clerical to academic" (1971, p. 107) is too large by its failure to specify employment status. Thus his new and old middle classes overlap, the latter including "chartered accountants, corporate directors [and] some university professors" p. 108), though clearly these groups are not self-employed.

Often the description of the separatist new middle class includes a specification as to its sectoral location. Guindon argues that the Francophone new middle class is characterized by an "overwhelming concentration in the public and parapublic sectors...[and by] its conspicuous absence in the large corporate private sector" (1978, p. 216). This is echoed by McRoberts (1988, p. 242), who defines the new middle class as "salaried professionals based primarily in the public sector: administrators and bureaucrats, intellectuals and teachers, social scientists, and mass media specialists".[8] Gagnon and Montcalm (1990, p. 106), citing Guindon, implicitly accept his claim that the new middle class is located in the public sector. It should be noted that none of these writers argues that within the new middle class, only those employed in the public sector favour independence. Rather, they make the dual claim that most members of the new middle class are separatist and publicly employed.[9]

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[8]One should note an inaccuracy here, since administrators and professionals are usually two distinct categories.

[9]An exception is Renaud (1984, p 154), who argues that it is only the "technocratic" segment of the new middle class, employed in the public sector, whose political interests are represented by a separatist political party.

The New Middle Class Hypothesis Spelled Out

The new middle class argument has two main components. Firstly, in its infancy, the Francophone new middle class is said to have clamoured for an increase in spending by the Quebec government in the areas of health, welfare, and education, where the new middle class was employed. Secondly, as a reaction against the blockage of its employment mobility in the upper levels of the private sector of the Quebec economy, and eventually in the provincial public sector as well, the new middle class's putative statism evolved into nationalism and secessionism. The relative emphasis on one or the other of these tenets of the hypothesis varies among its proponents.

The statism of the new middle class, according to Guindon, was the result of its preoccupation with the need to modernize the public institutions in which it was employed. From about 1945 to 1955, the new middle class struggled not against the English or the federal government, but against Duplessis, then premier of Quebec and leader of the Union Nationale. The Duplessis regime resisted raising the salaries and expanding the numbers of the new middle class bureaucrats. The new middle class became the main supporter of the Quebec Liberals, under whom their demands for modernization were fulfilled in the form of the Quiet Revolution. Then their chief complaint became the "promotional practices" of the federal civil service and of federal and private corporations (Guindon, [1964] 1973, p. 158), whence the independence movement was born.[10] In Guindon's view, separatism for the new middle class "in the final analysis, boils down to real or

[10]In Guindon's post-1964 essays, new middle class statism is described as concurrent with rather than antecedent to separatism, and as being precipitated, along with separatism, by the perception of blocked mobility.

imagined restricted occupational mobility" ([1964] 1973, p. 158).[11]

In the new middle class literature on Quebec separatism, elaboration of the specific mechanism by which secession is expected to unblock the new middle class's mobility is hard to find. The creation of a national Quebec state should mean more bureaucratic "job outlets", according to Guindon (1968, p. 51). McRoberts (1984, p. 77) argues simply that if the Quebec government as the only entity with the will and the means to address the mobility problem, must become stronger, it may as well become fully sovereign.

The Motivations of the New Middle Class

A principal theoretical underpinning of both the statist and independentist components of the new middle class hypothesis is that this class is motivated by the aspiration for, and deprivation of, prestigious jobs. It is asserted or implied by Breton and others (for example, Ossenberg, 1971, p. 119; Gagnon and Montcalm, 1990, p. 106) that expensive, publicly funded, nationalist measures by the Quebec government, like the 1963 creation of Hydro Québec, rewarded only the new middle class. "[J]obs which were previously occupied by English Canadians will now be occupied by French Canadian engineers and managers, and...new job opportunities will be created for [them]" (Breton, 1964, p. 384). Jobs, then, are the principal external incentives of separatism, according to the hypothesis.

As internal motivations, "grievances" (Guindon, [1964] 1973, p. 158), "relative deprivation" (Ossenberg, 1971, p.

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[11]See also Breton (1964), and McRoberts (1984), who explicitly echo both the statist and the twinned theses of blocked mobility and separatism articulated by Guindon, and Milner and Milner (1973, p 173), who accept the notion of blocked mobility. Renaud (1984) and Gagnon and Montcalm (1990) are mainly concerned with new middle class statism, rather than separatism.

108), and aspirations (Guindon, [1964] 1973, p. 158; McRoberts, 1984, p. 78), are variously named by new middle class theorists. Clearly these are distinct types of motives. Though in practice, social movements do indeed tend to be motivated by a mixture of aspirations and a broad range of grievances, the latter are painted with a very narrow brush by the new middle class theorists.[12] For example, Guindon dismisses, as a source of French Quebecers' grievances, their longstanding economic domination by the English. He asserts that the occupational hierarchy that arose between French and English after Britain conquered New France was mutually satisfying to both communities. The French, "economically conservative and technically unskilled" (Guindon, 1968, p. 56), cannot be said to have been deprived of access to the more prestigious and remunerative economic roles, for which they were, after all, unsuited.[13]

In other writings on the new middle class hypothesis, motivations for separatism other than career deprivations are simply neglected, or appear as seeming afterthoughts to the central notions of blocked mobility and job ambitions. McRoberts implies that the career aspirations of the new middle class went hand in hand with their desire to fortify the Quebec economy by stating that the new middle class had "perhaps a special concern over such conditions as uneven development and cultural division of labour" (1984, p. 77, emphasis added). Yet objectives other than the attainment of

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[12]See Pinard (1983) for definitions of deprivations and aspirations, and a discussion of their role in the motivations of collective actors.

[11]In a later essay, Guindon (1978, p 231) renounces the cultural explanation for French underrepresentation in the upper ranks of the Quebec economy, in favour of a more current and realistic approach to this disparity, which locates the cause not in French entrepreneurial incompetence, but in the sociological and political effects of the rerouting of trade after the British conquest.

Anglo-dominated corporate positions seem to be merely instrumental or coincidental to that goal: "[D]iversification and modernization of Quebec's industrial economy would bear the promise of new managerial openings for the Francophone new middle class" (McRoberts, 1984, p. 78). In later work, McRoberts soft-pedals the aspirational characterization of the new middle class. He writes that they should not "be seen as motivated solely by the rational calculation of class interest. Through training and professional experience, they simply had come to acquire a new conception of Francophone society and its needs" (1988, p. 151). But what were these needs? McRoberts provides no answer. Ossenberg (1971, p. 122) similarly mentions, without elaboration, "aspirations for cultural identity" on the part of the new middle class, but again this is dwarfed by the role of career ambitions in his account of new middle class separatism. While Milner and Milner are explicit in their discussion of grievances affecting the entire Francophone community in Quebec vis-á-vis the English, and though they identify the need to preserve Quebec's "cultural uniqueness" (1973, p. 99), they focus overwhelmingly on the career-based reasons for separatism.

A Critique of the New Middle Class Hypothesis

The theoretical foundations of the new middle class argument are fragile, with respect firstly to the new middle class as the harbingers of state-financed modernization. Daniel Salée (1991) objects to the attribution of social, economic and political modernization in Quebec since the Quiet Revolution, to the new middle class. In fact, Guindon was wrong in asserting that the new middle class was the core of support for the Quebec Liberals toward the end of the Duplessis era. Data analysed by Pinard show that high and equal proportions of <u>both</u> the old and new middle class, with the exception of small businessmen, intended to vote for the Liberals in 1962, and disdained the Union Nationale (Pinard,

1970, pp. 92-93).

Secondly, the thesis of blocked mobility relies in part on an erroneous conception of the Francophone new middle class's sectoral location. The Francophone new middle class has never been mainly publicly employed (Pinard and Hamilton, 1984, p. 40). In the data to be analysed below, only a third (34%) of the new middle class respondents are in the public or parapublic sector. This undermines the notion of statism as a prevailing political orientation of the new middle class. It is unlikely that expectations of better salaries, benefits, and working conditions, or more job security and promotions promised to state employees by bigger state budgets, are a formative influence on new middle class politics (Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1990, p. 382).[14]

The role of blocked mobility in the new middle class hypothesis has not been altered to reflect the improvement in Francophone representation in the upper levels of the private sector since the 1960's.[15] More importantly, given that Francophones continue to be underrepresented in the upper corporate sector (though less than previously), one might suggest that it is the <u>privately</u> employed new middle class

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[14]These are the interests imputed to public sector employees by writers on public choice theory, reviewed in Blais, Blake, and Dion.

[15]Marc C. Levine reports that 25.4% of Quebec corporate management in 1982 was Francophone, up from 19.3% in 1976 (Champagne, 1983, cited in Levine, 1990, p 193). It should be noted, though, that the Francophone presence appears to depend on ownership of the firm, and the centrality and status of the position. Francophones are more highly represented in Francophone- than Anglophone-owned firms, in branch plant offices rather than head offices, and in lower status than in higher status positions (Office de la langue français, 1980, and Bourhis, 1984, p 64, cited in Gagnon and Montcalm, 1990, p 178). Maurice Sauvé (1976) reported that only nine of the uppermost positions in the 91 biggest Anglophone-owned firms in Quebec in 1976 were held by Francophones, which is actually an increase since 1965!

that complains of blocked mobility. But this is of course quite the opposite of what the new middle class theorists have argued.

One would be justified in calling the increase in the Francophone corporate presence a modest one. But even given the small proportion of Francophones at the helm of Quebec's biggest corporations, the new middle class hypothesis rests on the untenable assertion of their fervent ambition to be corporate managers. It should be noted that according to the hypothesis, new middle class separatists do not only want to see these positions open to Francophones, but want to avail themselves of these openings. Beneath this is the cynical assumption that Francophones pursued non-corporate careers only as last resorts. This assumption is plainly stated by Guindon, who argues that the absence of linguistic barriers to becoming employed as public sector professionals, social scientists, M.BA.'s, and engineers was the primary basis for career choices by French Quebecers in these fields, making them a "path of least resistance" (1978, p. 216). McRoberts' explanation of the new middle class's executive ambitions is no more convincing: "The professional qualifications of the new middle class...constituted a claim to managerial positions within economic enterprises" (McRoberts, 1988, p. 150). But considering the diverse array of occupations that comprise the new middle class, both the capacity and the inclination for corporate management on their part are dubious.

Perhaps the most serious failing of the new middle class hypothesis is its unidimensional view of separatism as the interethnic competition for jobs. At its theoretical core the new middle class hypothesis, in fact, resembles the competition model of ethnic conflict.[16] As such it suffers

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[16]I thank Professor Pinard for pointing out to me this interesting parallel. The competition theory of ethnic conflict is explicitly discussed by Guindon (1968, p 58).

from the same attendant weaknesses, foremost of which is an incomplete account of the independentists' motives. According to the competition theory, ethnic conflict and ethnic movements are provoked by increasing interethnic competition for some scarce goods, especially for jobs, which is in turn the result of modernization.[17] Bélanger and Pinard (1991) suggest a revision of the theory. Firstly, interethnic competition leads to ethnic conflict if and only if the competition is perceived as unfair, in other words, if the comparative opportunities for jobs and promotions are perceived as unequal. Broad economic, political, or cultural inequalities will predispose members of the subordinate group to perceive competition as unfair. Secondly, for competition to lead to conflict, there must be no perceived interdependence of the ethnic groups. Finally, the objects of competition must be collective goods. Furthermore, as Bélanger and Pinard underline, studies of ethnic mobilization in the Western world have shown that the stimulus to ethnic conflict tends to be a set of goods wider than only jobs. Generally, "political rights and regional-ethnic power, regional or group ethnic parity in the economy, group status including the status of the group's culture and language", as well as "disagreements over the promotion of cultural differences" are the issues over which ethnic communities conflict (Bélanger and Pinard, 1991, p. 450). These issues are also found to be central motivators in the case of the Quebec independence movement, according to a study by Pinard and Hamilton (1986).

The new middle class hypothesis meets the first of the conditions under which ethnic competition ignites ethnic movements. Francophones in Quebec experienced inequalities in income, occupational prestige, and the status of their

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[17]For a succinct overview and bibliography of the competition model, see Belanger and Pinard (1991).

language relative to English Quebecers, as plainly evidenced by the Report by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1964. With respect to the perception of interdependence, Belanger and Pinard suggest that some occupational groups, like business owners and managers, are more likely to perceive interdependence than others, such as intellectuals (p. 455). But most importantly, though the new middle class hypothesis complies with the stipulation of collective goods as the object of competition between ethnic groups, jobs for the new middle class are a very narrow set of collective goods. As such, it is implausible that they are the primary impulse to separatism in Quebec. Surely, to use Guindon's words, it "boils down" to more than this.

Empirical Support for the New Middle Class Hypothesis?

Some scholars furnish data from surveys on support for independence, or on the composition of separatist Parti Québécois (PQ) and its predecessors, in support of the new middle class hypothesis. One of the most common problems with these analyses is that, firstly, in arguing for a heavy concentration of separatism in the new middle class occupations, they neglect the distinction between employed and self-employed in one or more of their occupational groups. Typical in this regard is the survey analysis by Cuneo and Curtis, who define the new middle class as "professionals, semi-professionals, managers and officials" (1974, p. 2, n. 1). But they admit that they are unable to separate "proprietors" from others. Equally problematic is their (unmentioned) failure to distinguish between the employed and self-employed among their professionals and semi-professionals. Thus, Cuneo and Curtis really only measure support for independence among two occupational segments of the upper middle class -- professional and managerial. They do not compare the separatism of the new to the old middle class. Similarly invalid operationalizations of the new

middle class also characterize the work of Boily (1969, pp. 111, 120-22), and Ornstein, Stevenson, and Williams (1978).[18]

Often, presentations of empirical support for the hypothesis are also weakened by a lack of specificity in delineating the occupations that comprise the new middle class. For example, the occupational groups that according to Pelletier, comprised the largely new middle class Rassemblement pour l'Independence Nationale (RIN) -- students, teachers, civil servants, and private sector employees -- do not include other salaried white collar occupations, like employed health care professionals, or employed managers (Pelletier, 1974, p. 15). Similarly, Murray's definition of the new middle class is not specific enough to locate white collar private sector employees, or employed managers. If the managers are absent from her calculation of new middle class representation among PQ candidates, this may explain the new middle class's apparent prevalence in the PQ relative to the other provincial parties (Murray, 1976, pp. 30-36).

Finally, the data presented by some scholars clearly contradict their assertions of new middle class predominance in the independence movement. For example, the fact that "commerçants" were more than twice as prevalent in the R.I.N. as in the provincial Liberals, as Boily's data show (1969, p.

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[18]In Boily's analysis of the class composition of the Rassamblement pour l'Independence Nationale, and Nevitte's analysis of the PQ (1981), the employment status of the semi-professionals and the professionals, respectively, is not clear. An investigation of the occupational categories used by Ornstein, Stevenson, and Williams (which they borrowed from Pineo, Porter, and McRoberts, 1977) reveals that their "semi-professionals and technicians" encompass several self-employed occupations. Moreover, when Ornstein et al do test the effect of employment status on support for independence, they do not at the same time control for occupation.

120-122), does not support the new middle class hypothesis.[19]

To my knowledge, the only empirical investigation of the hypothesis that I have seen whose operationalization of the new middle class is true to the standard definition, is by Rudy Fenwick. He defines the new middle class as all employed persons in the professions, management, administration, sales, and clerical positions (Fenwick, 1978, p. 136). Fenwick's work, however, refutes the new middle class hypothesis.[20]

The New Petite Bourgeoisie Hypothesis

Appearing in more numerous versions, but with less empirical substantiation than the new middle class hypothesis, is the neo-Marxist perspective on the Quebec independence movement that places the new petite bourgeoisie at its core. The adherents of the new petite bourgeoisie hypothesis include Gilles Bourque and Nicole Laurin-Frenette (1972), D. Monière (1977), Gilles Bourque (1978), Alfred Dubuc (1978), Marcel Fournier (1978), Henry Milner (1978), Jean-Marc Piotte and Pauline Vaillancourt (1978), and Jorge Niosi (1980). Some of these scholars argue for nationalist or separatist alliances between the new petite bourgeoisie and other classes. Niosi (1980, p. 71-86) locates PQ activists and supporters not only in the new petite bourgeoisie but also among certain parts of the traditional petite bourgeoisie.[21] Whereas Niosi (1980,

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[19]"Commerçants" are shopkeepers, tradespeople, and merchants -- clearly old middle class.

[20]The zero-order correlation coefficients for support for independence among the new middle class, old middle class, working class, and farmers, were, respectively, .083 (the only one significant at the .001 level), .002, -.052, and -.038. None of the coefficients of the four occupational groups were significant at either the .001 or .01 levels in the multivariate model.

[21]Thus, Niosi adds liberal professionals and administrators of rural cooperatives, to teachers, civil servants, and other language workers, as the foremost

p. 74-86) asserts that the Francophone bourgeoisie fears the loss of Canadian markets that separation would portend, others have seen some commonalities between the interests of the bourgeoisie and the new petite bourgoisie (for example, Bourque, 1978, p. 196 ff; Bourque and Laurin-Frenette 1972, p. 196; Dubuc, 1978, p. 11; M. Fournier, 1978, p. 180 ff; Piotte and Viallancourt, 1978, p. 49). No single explanatory premise for new petite bourgeoisie separatism is shared by all of these writers, but career ambitions, and more generally, the pursuit of class hegemony within Quebec society, are objectives commonly attributed to this class. The expansion of the activities of the Quebec state is also frequently posited as an intermediate goal of the new petite bourgeoisie.

Definitions and Delineations

In terms of its occupational composition, the new petite bourgeoisie is, according to a standard definition, identitical with the new middle class. Discussion of the new petite bourgeoisie differs from the theory of the new middle class by its explicitly Marxist focus on a class's relationship to capital, specifically, on how much and what kind of property that a class possesses. Nicos Poulantzas (1975) explained that the new petite bourgeoisie, though it is exploited for its labour capacity, differs from the working class because it does not produce a surplus value. He pointed out that the petite bourgeoisie should not be thought of as differing only in magnitude from the bourgeoisie; the former "is not chiefly involved in exploiting" wage labour. Moreover, unlike the bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie adds its own labour to its capital in the production process (Milner, 1978, p. 57). Poulantzas distinguished between the traditional petite bourgeoisie of small-scale producers and owners, independent craftsmen, and traders, and the new petite

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separatists.

bourgeoisie of non-productive wage earners, implying that whereas the former are self-employed, the latter are salaried (pp. 204, 211, 151-53). The new petite bourgeoisie is further distinguished from the old, by the primarily cultural composition of its capital, that is, by its "educational accreditation and professional or technical expertise" (Milner, 1978, p. 57).

Among proponents of this hypothesis is great variation in the occupational enumerations of the new petite bourgeoisie. Some do not define it at all (for example, Piotte and Vaillancourt, 1978; Dubuc, 1978). As with the new middle class hypothesis, some demonstrate a misunderstanding of the critical adjective "new". For example, Bourque and Laurin-Frenette claim that the Francophone new petite bourgeoisie is composed of a technocratic and a neo-capitalist fraction. But their neo-capitalist fraction encompasses entrepreneurs, who belong to the traditional bourgeoisie or traditional petite bourgeoisie (Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, 1972, p. 196).[22] Similarly, Milner (1978, p. 94) seems to include liberal professions in his list of new petite bourgeoisie occupations.[23]

Occupational delineations of the new petite bourgeoisie are also at times insufficiently inclusive. Authors present inexhaustive lists of jobs that comprise the class, without suggesting that these lists are merely exemplary. Thus it is not apparent where, for example, the educational or media

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[22]Their technocratic new petite bourgeoisie work as managers and administrators of public enterprises and organizations, like "Hydro Quebec, the CBC, government ministries, universities, and trade union organizations". The neo-capitalist fraction consists of "entrepreneurs in industry, commerce, and services, financiers, and upper echelon executives in large private corporations" (Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, 1972, p 196).

[23]The term Milner uses is "'older' professions" (1978, p 94).

professions would fit in the categories outlined by Bourque and Laurin-Frenette (1972, p. 196) or by Bourque (1978, p. 194).[24] It should be noted that all of the neo-Marxist writers on the class basis of separatism who specifically define the new petite bourgeoisie occupations leave out lower level white collar workers, like clerks and sales personnel. Yet, as non-productive wage earners, these groups meet the definitive criteria of the new petite bourgeoisie.

Apart from its occupational composition, the general characterizations of the new petite bourgeoisie are also diverse. Employment in the public sector features occasionally in portraits of the Francophone new petite bourgeoisie. This is true of Piotte and Vaillancourt, though they do not make clear whether they believe that the entire new petite bourgeoisie is publicly employed and in favour of independence, or that only the publicly employed segment of the new petite bourgeoisie favours independence (1978, p. 49). Bourque and Laurin-Frenette (1972, p. 195 ff), and Milner (1978, pp. 94-99), on the other hand, clearly specify that only the publicly employed or "technocratic" new petite bourgeoisie wants separation.[25]

Objectives and Motivations of New Petite Bourgeoisie Separatism

Though there is no single explanation for new petite bourgeoisie separatism, a unidimensional account of motivation

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[24]Bourque, who accepts Fournier's analysis, offers no definition of the new petite bourgeoisie. But he suggests that its interests are tied primarily to state enterprises and to institutions of health and education.

[25]By the "state" fraction of the new petite bourgeoisie, Milner does not only mean state-employed, but more broadly, all the occupations "linked to government apparatus, either through funding, certification, direct employment, or its participation in central legitimating institutions" (1978, pp 94-99).

in terms of socio-economic self-promotion unites all versions of the hypothesis. As for the putative objectives of the new petite bourgeoisie independentists, there are two main strands of the discussion. One of these is sweeping: for the new petite bourgeoisie, Quebec's independence will ensure its ascendance as a class, according to Monière (1977, p. 334) and Bourque and Laurin-Frenette (1972, p. 198). The latter authors reason that independence promises to strengthen the Quebec state, which will in turn bring about "state monopoly capitalism", thereby ensuring new petite bourgeoisie dominance (1972, p. 198). The rewards of Quebec's secession are also stated in more specific terms in the new petite bourgeoisie literature. Simply, separatism is strategic to the pursuit of jobs for the new petite bourgeoisie. One version of this argument, which sees the new petite bourgeoisie as the employee of the state, regards separatism as the natural extension or ultimate expression of statism (Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, 1972; Bourque, 1978, Milner, 1978; Piotte and Vaillancourt, 1978). New petite bourgeoisie careers are expected as the winfall of a stronger, larger Quebec state, in particular, of state intervention in the economy and in sectors of health and education. A more subtle argument for the career-centred objectives of the new petite bourgeoisie is couched in terms of cultural concerns. The new petite bourgeoisie is said to be interested in the greater use of the French language as an outcome of independence, but only because the new petite bourgeoisie, as word workers, expect independence to enlarge the market for their cultural capital (Fournier, 1978, pp. 188-89).[26]

[26]See also Niosi (1980, p 86), who accepts Fournier's designation of the new petite bourgeoisie as language workers, and also presumably accepts the motives for separatism that Fournier imputes to the new petite bourgeoisie.

A Critique of the New Petite Bourgeoisie Hypothesis

In its account of the motives for separatism, the new petite bourgeoisie hypothesis suffers from the same materialist reductionism as the new middle class hypothesis, in its explanation for the motives of that class. Also, like the advocates of the new middle class hypothesis, the neo-Marxist writers do not detail the new petite bourgeoisie's vision of how its aspirations would be realized by the secession of Quebec from Canada. It is not at all clear that the power, status and wealth of the entire new petite bourgeoisie would be augmented through the growth of state capitalism, as Bourque and Laurin-Frenette argue. After all, only a few elements of the new petite bourgeoisie are involved in managing state corporations. It could as easily be argued (and indeed, it has been suggested by those who claim the existence of an independentist class alliance) that the Francophone bourgeoisie (as opposed to the new petite bourgeoisie) stands to gain the most from policies of the Quebec government to promote the growth of Francophone entrepreneurship. Nor is it explained why the linguistic objectives of the new petite bourgeoisie would necessitate the independence of Quebec. Indeed, following the passage of Bill 101, a feeling among the French that their language could be adequately protected within Confederation, has probably contributed to a dimunition of separatist sentiment (Dion, 1992, pp. 91-92, 117-120).[27]

The new petite bourgeoisie hypothesis is also empirically

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[27]So reassuring was Act 101, according to McRoberts (1988, in Dion, 1992, p 91) that it contributed to a defeat of the YES side in the 1980 referendum. According to Dion, the perception of protection of the French language is to a considerable extent affirmed by reality -- knowledge of French among the English in Quebec grew by 16% between 1971 and 1986, and the percentage of allophone students in elementary and secondary schools grew from 39% to 73% between 1980 and 1989 (Conseil de la langue francaise du Quebec, April 1991, in Dion, 1992, p 91-92).

weak. The only quantitative dimension of the social basis of separatism mentioned by these authors concerns the composition of the membership and electoral support of the Parti Québécois. Some scholars like Dubuc (1978, p. 11) and Piotte and Vaillancourt (1978, p. 49) present no data to support the asserted new petite bourgeoisie prevalence among PQ voters and members. Others state incomplete lists of new petite bourgeoisie occupations that are overrepresented in the PQ, and yet cite no source on which these assertions are based (Niosi, 1980, p. 76; Monière, 1977, p. 337). Another problem is a lack of clear distinction between the new and the traditional petite bourgeoisie. Fournier (1978, p. 184) employs data on the composition of provincial parties in Quebec in the 1970's to point out that the representation of businessmen, administrators and liberal professionals in the PQ is 15% smaller than in the Liberal Party. But considering the possibility that employed administrators are among this group, this information does not support the hypothesis. Fournier (1979, p. 187) and Milner (1978, p. 158) present data to argue that the new petite bourgeoisie or new middle class (Milner uses the terms interchangeably) comprises the majority of PQ candidates. But neither author indicates the complete occupational composition of the aggregate that they call the new petite bourgeoisie, so that one cannot know whether the entire new petite bourgeoisie is overrepresented in the party.

The New Class Hypothesis

Though to my knowledge there is no "new class" theory of the social basis of Quebec separatism, the literature on the new class and new social movements is relevant to the present discussion, because it is said to explain the movements of the 1960's and 1970's. Writers on the new class include David D. Bazelon (1967, cited in Bruce-Briggs, 1979), Alvin Gouldner (1979), Irving Kristol (1978), Peter L. Berger (1979), B. Bruce-Briggs (1979), Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich

(1977, cited in Inglehart, 1981), Andrew Hacker (1979), Everett C. Ladd (1979), Norman Podhoretz (1979), Ronald Inglehart (1981), Eliot Freidson (1986) and John McAdams (1987). The new social movements are discussed by, among others, Ronald Inglehart (1981) Karl-Werner Brand (1983, cited in Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow, 1987), Klandermans and Tarrow (1987), Claus Offe (1987), Hanspeter Kriesi (1989) and Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton (1989).

The New Class Defined[28]

Beyond a narrow consensus on certain of its occupational constituents, there are virtually as many definitions of the new class as there are people writing on it. All of these authors concur that the new class includes what are sometimes called "social and cultural specialists" -- salaried professionals and semi-professionals in artistic and social scientific occupations.[29] Conversely, they agree that the new class excludes business proprietors, as well as the lower white collar stratum of clerical and sales personnel.[30] The new class is widely agreed to be highly educated.

The most common, and often overlapping, distinctions employed in operationalizing the new class seem to concern the presence or absence of salaried business managers, included by Inglehart (1981, p. 893-95), Ladd (1978, in Brint, 1984, p.

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[28]See Eliot Freidson (1986, chapter 3) and B. Bruce-Briggs (1979, chapter 1) for an overview of various theories of the new class, its politics and its historical development.

[29]This is how Kriesi (1989, p 1082) defines the social and cultural specialists. Brint's use of the term differs slightly by including liberal professionals, and excluding non-university teachers (Brint, 1984, p 46).

[30]Eliot Freidson's inspection of the U.S. Census categories on which the "professional managerial class" concept of Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1977) is loosely based, makes clear that they include some self-employed business people in that class.

34), Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1977, in Brint, 1984, p. 34), and Bazelon (1967, in Bruce-Briggs, 1979, pp. 6-7), but excluded by Kriesi (1989, p. 1082), Gouldner (1979), and Kristol (1978); the human services occupations, included by Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1977, in Brint, 1984, p. 36), Ladd (1978, in Brint, 1984, p. 36), and Kriesi (1989), but excluded by Gouldner (1979) and Kristol (1978); and, finally, the self-employed professions, implicitly included by Kristol (1978), but excluded by Bazelon (1967, in Bruce-Briggs, 1979, p. 6-7), Gouldner (1979), and Kriesi (1989, p. 1082).

To compare the new class to the properly defined new middle class or new petite bourgeoisie, the former is narrower since it excludes at least the lower level white collar personnel, as well as, in the more restricted definitions, business managers.[31] Definitions of the new class that ignore employment status are of course broader on that dimension than the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie categories.

A number of scholars discount the utility of the new class concept. Hacker argues that although the occupations said to comprise the new class may be new, these groups are as dependent and powerless vis-á-vis their employers as the working class. Therefore, he reasons, there is no new class (Hacker, 1979). Brice-Briggs points out that though quantitatively, certain aspects of the new class have increased in recent decades in American society, in particular the number of people with high educational attainment, the highly educated new class "still constitute[s] only a tiny proportion of the population" (Bruce-Briggs, 1979, pp. 222-223). A more serious problem with the new class is underlined by Daniel Bell (1979). He argues that too often the new class

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[31]As discussed above, many of the writers on the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses of separatism implicitly but erroneously exclude lower level white collar workers.

is defined both structurally, in terms of its constituent occupations, and in terms of its attitudes. It is this which makes the new class a "muddled concept" for Bell; a class cannot be a mindset. Furthermore, Bell (1979) and Eliot Freidson (1986, ch. 3) argue that the occupational components of the new class are too disparate in their levels of education, income, and prestige, as well as their political interests, to behave with the unison of a social class; the new class concept is a "salad" (Freidson, 1986, ch 3).[32] But clearly, without analysing the attitudes or behaviours of a structurally defined new class to determine whether they are internally similar, and at the same time dissimilar from those of other occupational groups, none of these scholars has adequately refuted the existence of a new class.

The New Social Movements Defined

Linking the new class to the present discussion is a literature which envisions the new class as the most ready participant in the new social movements, which may be considered to include the Quebec independence movement. The new social movements, according to Klandermans and Tarrow (1987, p. 7), "have broken with the traditional values of capitalist society". They are concerned primarily with issues that are less economic than cultural (Kriesi, 1989, p. 1079) and moral (Offe, 1987, p. 63). Whereas the "old politics" were dominated by concerns for "economic growth, distribution and security", according to Offe, the new politics or new

[32]Freidson is referring to the class definition of Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1977), that relies on the U.S. Census categories of "professional, technical, and kindred workers", and "managers and administrators", and which is much broader than, for example, Kriesi's new class concept. But Freidson convincingly argues that even this professional category alone, in the U.S. Census, is implausibly broad as a class aggregate, encompassing groups as diverse as Supreme Court judges and night club singers.

social movements emphasize "autonomy and identity (with their organizational correlates, such as decentralization and self-government), and opposition to manipulation, control, dependence, bureaucratization, regulation, and so on" (Offe, 1987, pp. 67, 70). Secessionist movements could clearly be encompassed by this cluster of values.[13] More specifically, the new political issues addressed by the new social movements include the state of the environment, peace, nuclear disarmament, greater sexual freedom, the right to abortion, changing gender roles, diminishing the role of religion, -- issues having to do with the "quality of life" (Pinard and Hamilton, 1989, p. 78).

For some authors, the new social movements are further distingushed by their social basis in either the new middle class (Brand, 1983, cited in Klandermans and Tarrow, p. 7; Offe, 1987), or a new class (Kriesi, 1989; Inglehart, 1981). Writers on the new social movements also highlight the "field" and the "mode" of action, and their form of organization, as aspects that differentiate them from traditional kinds of collective action (Canel, 1992, pp. 31-34).[14]

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[13]McAdams (1987), who shares with Offe a focus on the new class, argues obversely for that class's interest in an expanded role for government in economy and society. But his characterization may not be irreconcilable with that of Offe. Secessionists may demand the reduction, if not the elimination, of the involvement of a central government in the activities of the ethnic community, while strengthening the local government of the ethnic territory.

[14]See Canel (1992) for a review of literature on the theory of the new social movements.

The New Class and the New Social Movements: Empirical Investigation

The extent of new class participation in, or adherence to the values associated with the new social movements, appears to depend crucially on how the class variable is operationalized. It seems that, in spite of the consensus on university-level education as a characteristic of the new class, education alone is not very predictive of "new liberalism" (Ladd, 1979).[35] Occupation as it is widely used to define the new class, also proves to be too broad to predict new left (or for that matter, old left) values. Brint (1984, p. 48-51) finds that the supposedly most definitive new class attitudes are not highly concentrated in the occupations said to comprise the new class.[36] Similarly, Inglehart (1981, p. 893) finds that post-materialism prevails over materialism among his professional-managerial new class only in the youngest (under 35) age group. An attempt to combine the professional occupations with high education and public sectoral employment as the structural dimensions of the new class, yields a mixed outcome on a new class worldview.[37]

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[35]Ladd seems to have misinterpreted his own data. He argues that education produces a greater differentiation in support for new liberalism than his other variables, including occupation. But one sees a greater difference between the percentages of "word workers" and "businessmen and officials" in the quintile most supportive of the new liberalism than between post-graduates and those with a highschool education.

[36]The new class disposition in Brint's view is characterized especially by opposition to the business class (stemming from a denunciation of limitless economic growth) and egalitarianism. Brint's new class occupations are "salaried managers", "technical professionals", "social and cultural specialists", and "human services professionals" (Brint, 1984, pp 45-46).

[37]McAdams' new class worldview, relative to the worldviews of the traditional middle and working classes, consists of the most liberal attitudes toward social, economic and moral issues, criticism of the political system, and high political

McAdams (1987, table 8) finds the new class worldview is significantly higher among publicly employed professionals than any other group. But the professional category by itself loses its effect on political attitudes, net of his education variable.

The strongest substantiation for the new class hypothesis of new social movement orientation appears in analyses in which the new class is operationalized in fairly narrow occupational terms. Kriesi's new class, a subset of the new middle class proper, is one of the narrower conceptualizations in the literature. It is comprised of such "social and cultural specialists" as the "semi-professionals and professionals in medical services, teaching, social work, arts, and journalism" (Kriesi, 1989, p. 1082). It excludes not only the lower status white collar occupations, but also self-employed professionals, salaried managers, and all other "technocratic" middle class occupations.[38] Kriesi finds that the new class has a higher mobilization potential for the new social movements than the other new middle class occupations, though of the old middle class, the liberal professions' potential is just about as high. Kriesi's new class is also the principal participant in each of the five movements. In a regression analysis in which education and age have significant effects on mobilization potential, the effect of the new class variable net of the other variables retains its significance (Kriesi, 1989). A concentration of new class

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interest, information, and participation (pp 29-36).

[38]The technocratic occupations are distinguished from the new class social and cultural specialists by the orientation of the former to the running of organizations, whereas the new class is oriented either to its clientele or to "the body of knowledge of the disciplines they belong to". In Kriesi's occupational framework, the technocratic occupations include managers, the protective services, technical scientists like engineers, and "craft specialists", who can also be considered skilled workers. (Kriesi, 1989, p 1081-82).

attitudes among Brint's socio-cultural specialists corroborates Kriesi's findings (Brint, 1984, pp. 48-51).

The Intellectuals/Intelligentsia Hypothesis

Much theoretical and empirical work suggests that the social basis of nationalist movements may be somewhat more specific than the narrowly defined new class. Intellectuals or the intelligentsia are seen by many authors as the leaders and foremost participants of nationalist movements (Joseph Schumpeter, 1950; Ernest Gellner, 1964; James Coleman, 1965; Charles Taylor, 1965; Anthony Smith, 1971, 1979, 1981; Edward Shils, 1972; William R. Beer, 1977, 1980; and Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, 1981, 1984, 1989).[39] Intellectuals and/or the intelligentsia receive the passing attention of some advocates of the other major class hypotheses, such as Guindon (1964, p. 155, 156), Ossenberg (1971, p. 108), Milner and Milner (1973, p. 173), Fournier (1978, p. 188), Milner (1978, pp. 96, 100, 162), and Niosi (1980). These writings, however, bear no resemblance to the intellectuals hypothesis.

Definitions of the Intellectuals and the Intelligentsia

As with the terminology of the previous hypotheses, there is no standard conceptualization of intellectuals or the intelligentsia. Some writers on the intellectuals (for example, Smith, 1981; Coser, 1970, preface; and Shils, 1972,

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[39]In Guindon's earliest writing on the subject, he first describes separatists as "intellectuals", only to abandon that appellation in favour of his new middle class framework (Guindon, 1964, pp 155,156). Similarly undeveloped references are made by Ossenberg (1971, p 108) and Milner and Milner (1973, p 173).
It is not clear whether Fournier regards the petite bourgeoisie as interchangeable with the highly separatist "travailleurs du langage" (1978, p 177-8), but Niosi clearly does not equate the new petite bourgeoisie with word workers, which, he argues, are present in both the new and in some parts of the traditional petite bourgeoisie.

p. 3, in Pinard and Hamilton, 1981, p. 6) have described them in terms of deep personal proclivities, qualities of mind that have no socio-economic boundaries. Typical in this respect is Smith's view of the intellectuals as those who create ideas and paradigms, but have no interest as to the consequences of their practical application (Smith, 1981, pp. 107-108). High educational attainment is also used to characterize the intellectuals (Shils, 1972, p. 389) and the intelligentsia (Gellner, 1964, pp. 169-170; Taylor, 1965, p. 153).[40] Shils' intellectuals, and Taylor's and Smith's intelligentsia, encompass all of the professions. Some writers on the intellectuals explicitly exclude the liberal professions from that category (Schumpeter, 1950, pp. 146-47; Lipset, 1960, p. 311, in Pinard and Hamilton, 1981, p. 5).

Accepted here will be the definitions used by Pinard and Hamilton. For them, the intellectuals are "engaged in occupational roles concerned with the creation and transmission of culture", such as, for example, "art creators and performers", "scientists and scholars", "teachers and professors", and "news workers". Pinard and Hamilton regard the intellectuals as a subset of the professional intelligentsia, which also includes such professionals as doctors, lawyers, and engineers. These members of the professional intelligentsia are more properly considered practitioners of culture than creators or transmitors thereof. Pinard and Hamilton point out that because it is based on (readily identifiable) roles, their definition of intellectuals is more amenable to quantitative analysis than the possibly more authentic conceptualizations that insist on purely qualitative characteristics. At the same time, their

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[40]For Shils, the "modern intellectuals" of developing countries are all those "with an advanced modern education". The Francophone intelligentsia of Quebec, according to Taylor, consists of people who have completed at least a collège classique education.

definition is restricted to those roles that most closely draw on the traits of "intellectuals proper", such as inquisitiveness, contemplation, and the drive to express their thoughts externally. In any case, they argue, one can expect a truer reflection of these qualities among people in the more academic intellectual roles (Pinard and Hamilton, 1984, p. 22).[4]

The Motivations of the Intellectuals

The theoretical grounds of the intellectuals hypothesis of nationalism range from narrow and self-interested motivations to some rather selfless and visionary value orientations. Career aspirations are among the motives attributed to intellectual nationalists. According to Schumpeter (1950, p. 145-55), the intellectuals' "hostility to the capitalist order" owes to an overproduction of intellectuals in capitalist societies, who then remain either "unemployed or unsatisfactorily employed". The resulting frustration of aspirations is especially acute for the intellegentsia of ethnic minorities, according to Smith, since their ethnic identity becomes the basis for their "blocked mobility" (Smith, 1979, pp. 28-31; 1981, pp. 116-122). The notion that nationalism is ignited among intellectuals by blocked mobility is reiterated by Shils (1972, p. 400), with regard to the state bureaucracies of pre-independence Africa and Asia, and by Taylor (1965, p. 158) in the context of Quebec.

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[4]Intellectuals as defined by Pinard and Hamilton, together with other professionals, semi-professionals, and technicians, comprise the professional intelligentsia. Though in occupational terms the professional intelligentsia overlaps with the new middle class (and new petite bourgeoisie), the former is not a subset of the latter, since the professional intelligentsia includes self-employed as well as employed, and excludes salaried managers. The professional intelligentsia is the equivalent of the new class defined to exclude managers, but which does not exclude the self-employed.

Another strand of the utilitarian explanation for the nationalism of the intellectuals or the intelligentsia, is the argument that they simply have little to lose. According to this view, they are motivated by the low selective costs that their participation in an independence movement will incur, relative to other segments of society or relative to other kinds of collective action. Shils points out that because the African and Asian intellectuals typically came from wealthy families who were bound by norms of kinship to support them financially, nationalist activism did not jeopardize their material survival (Shils, 1972, p. 393). Pinard and Hamilton argue that movements of communal autonomy attract intellectuals in part because, unlike working class movements, they do not imply the redistribution of wealth away from the intellectuals toward some lower status group (Pinard and Hamilton, 1989, pp. 82-83).[42] This, however, is only part of their reasoning, the other aspect being the resonance of nationalism with the intellectuals' political convictions (discussed below). Furthermore, the intellectuals are less conscious than other groups, particularly entrepreneurs and managers, of the "material interdependence" of ethnic groups (Bélanger and Pinard, 1991, p. 455). Hence their enthusiasm for secession is not dampened by economic disincentives to the fulfillment of nationalist goals.

Whereas the other hypotheses of the social basis of separatism fail to address non-material motives, theories of the nationalism of the intellectuals and the intelligentsia

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[42]It seems that Pinard and Hamilton are referring only to those intellectuals who are members of the ethnic group whose national independence they promote. Considering that, as they point out, movements for ethnic autonomy may be partly based on material grievances vis-á-vis the majority, one wonders whether the perceived net cost of participation in movements on behalf of ethnic groups different from their own should be higher, and whether this would present a disincentive for intellectuals' involvement.

talk of ephemeral, visionary, and generous objectives. These tend to be recondite explications of complex motivational mechanisms, the kernel of which is the desire for identity and belonging. In Taylor's view, the Francophone intelligentsia in Quebec, by virtue of being well-educated, is in contact with members of many different ethnic communities. At the same time they consider their own social, economic, and political systems to be inferior. It was from the drive to reform and control these institutions that the Quebec independence movement was born (Taylor, 1965, p. 159-62). Whereas in Smith's view (1979, p. 26-28; 1981, pp. 105-107), the decline of religion in the late eighteenth century inspired the intellectuals' search for community and identity in the ethnic group, for Shils (1972, p. 397) it was in order to replace the traditional and foreign authority structures which the intellectuals had rejected, that they turned to the nation and the national party.

Finally, an affinity of political and moral values is also offered in explanation for the intellectuals' attraction to secessionist movements. In this respect it is noteworthy that not only are the intellectuals often described as the foremost critics of the social and political status quo, but also that in the present century their adversarial tendency has usually been a leftist one (Pinard and Hamilton, 1989, p. 74). Why this should be so is something that Pierre Bourdieu touches on in his comparative discussions of the different systems of beliefs and opinions of socio-economic groups. Bourdieu identifies a diametric opposition of political values between intellectuals and business elites that is reflective of the striking chasm between these two groups in their support for separation found by Pinard and Hamilton (see below). According to Bourdieu, the leftist outlook of the intellectuals, who occupy the cultural pole of the upper class, conflicts with the right-wing views of corporate owners at the economic pole. "The propensity to vote on the right

increases with the overall volume of the capital possessed and also with the relative weight of economic capital" (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 176, 438). It is the composition of their capital -- specifically, the large ratio of cultural to economic capital -- that makes the intellectuals the economically subordinate fraction of the upper class. Consequently, according to Bourdieu, the intellectuals will seem to share the political attitudes of the subordinate classes, in opposition to the business elites in their own socio-economic stratum.[43]

On the dissensus between intellectuals and business owners and managers, a revision of Bourdieu's explanation is suggested by Pinard and Hamilton. They contend that it is not the composition of capital that shapes respective political orientations of the economic and cultural class fractions. Rather, one must look at whether the "values and preoccupations" concomitant with the occupations at either pole are "cultural and non-material", as in the case of the intellectuals, or "economic and material" as with managers and proprietors (Pinard and Hamilton, 1981, p. 28).[44] In their view, the non-material orientation of the intellectuals predisposes them to support movements for communal autonomy such as the Quebec independence movement, and other new left movements. But at the same time, the intellectuals' relative affluence and prestige as a professional group curbs their

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[43]Cultural capital refers to educational qualifications, whereas economic capital consists of property. According to Bourdieu, in survey data the intellectuals display a leftist "discourse" that should not be mistaken for the underlying "ethos" evident in certain of their responses, which reveal a lack of empathy for workers' struggles (Bourdieu, 1984, pp 420-21).

[44]They point out that in the upper classes there is no occupational sector whose capital is overwhelmingly either economic or cultural. Therefore, that dichotomy cannot be a key to explaining the divergence of views on independence held by different elements of the Francophone middle class.

promotion of social change associated with the old left, in particular, for changes with redistributive implications.

A Digression on the Motivations of the Intellectuals

In support of their notion of a self-interest barrier to the intellectuals' economic leftism, Pinard and Hamilton review evidence suggesting that though intellectuals may be more left-leaning than most other segments of the population on economic matters, they are moderately rather than radically so. Furthermore, on issues where their material self-interests would be directly threatened, they could even be described as conservative compared to lower status groups (Pinard and Hamilton, 1989, pp. 78-80). But these data are not entirely persuasive as evidence that intellectuals are bound by their self-interest to be economic conservatives. Either the data do not tap directly into the intellectuals' readiness to sacrifice personal well-being to poorer groups, or, when they do, they reveal conflicting findings of both right- and left-wing attitudes.[45]

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[45]In studies by Ladd and Lipset (1975, chapter 10), high academic status is negatively related to liberalism regarding faculty unionization. This does indeed suggest an unwillingness among privileged intellectuals to sacrifice personal wealth and prestige for the sake of equity with their colleagues. According to Lichter and Rothman (1981) and Lichter, Lichter, and Rothman (1983), a majority of intellectuals in media occupations were opp*35^^^S ^^*the idea of income ceilings, and in favour of a direct relationship between income and talent. But a majority of these same respondents also favour government action to decrease societal inequality. Moreover, both of these sets of findings point to conservatism among only elite elements of the intellectuals -- high status academics, and professionals at the most successful media outlets. Thus they suggest that, at most, the intellectuals are economically conservative under the specific condition of high prestige and affluence. Finally, the social and cultural specialists that constitute Brint's new class, which include some intellectuals, lean more to the right than the rest of the population with respect to

The political issues by which intellectuals are especially engaged may not be only or primarily new left issues. There are reasons to expect that intellectuals will be more favourable to old left and new left issues than other segments of society. In the first place, the new vs. old left, or materialist vs. post-materialist dichotomy, is arguably an artificial one, conceived of by scholars like Inglehart, in societies where major class- and civil rights issues have (perhaps temporarily) ceased to be crises. It is a dichotomy that suggests a ubiquitous evolution in the nature of social problems from the fundamental to the frivolous, the latter characterizing contemporary society. Its issues of survival resolved, modern society gives rise to the post-materialists who, enjoying relative comfort and material security, have the luxury to address higher-order needs. But if political and economic inequality can be considered unjust, then the old left issues have as much a "moral tinge" as the new left issues. Furthermore, environmentalism and nuclear disarmament, classified as new left movements, do not merely seek to improve the "quality of life"; they address the fundamental right to life and physical safety on a large scale.

It is true that redistributive movements are distinct from other kinds of movements by their direct, potential threat to the relatively large share of the economic pie enjoyed by middle class groups, including most intellectuals. But the intellectuals' political culture at least acts as a counterweight against the self-interest barrier to economic leftism to which all privileged groups are disposed. People in intellectual occupations simply have more information than

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redistributive policies (Brint, 1984, p 48-51). But this category includes clergy, liberal professionals, and "nonacademic social scientists" at the same time that it excludes teachers. So it is not a pure measure of the intellectuals' views.

other occupational groups on the causes and consequences of social problems. As Bélanger and Pinard state (1991, p.455), "Intellectuals...are especially sensitive to unequal opportunities in the competition for collective economic position, status, and power". The intellectuals may be distinguished from other social segments by a vision of justice, and broad collective entitlement, on economic as well as non-economic matters.

Undoubtedly the political views of intellectuals vary across disciplines, as well as with income and prestige, as the analyses of Ladd and Lipset (1975), Lichter and Rothman (1981) and Lichter, Lichter and Rothman (1983) suggest. Furthermore, participation in social movements does not depend only on belief in certain values and objectives. As Doug McAdam concludes from his analysis of the "Freedom Summer" activists, the type and quantity of personal and organizational associations separate mere adherents from participants (McAdam, 1986). It remains an empirical question whether intellectuals constitute the core activists on behalf of so-called "old left" social change. But there is some evidence that intellectuals become integrally involved in redistributive social or political movements. Intellectuals have dominated leftist revolutionary movements and governments in recent times, such as that in Nicaragua. There, the Sandinista National Liberation Front that in 1979 overthrew the 45- year-old, right wing Somoza dictatorship represented a broad coalition of social classes. But students, intellectuals and the intelligentsia have been an important basis of its leadership and militant membership. The Sandinistas' objectives were primarily to establish democracy and pointedly not to replace capitalism with communism, but they did implement rural land redistribution, confiscated Somocista property, and nationalized the financial system and some foreign-owned extractive industries (Hodges, 1986, pp. 184ff, 264ff 296; Vilas 1986, pp. 112-114, 153ff). One may

argue that because intellectual leaders of redistributive movements stand to lose none of their own property through the realization of their objectives, such activism is not incompatible with the assertion of a self-interest barrier to economic leftism. But under a military dictatorship, any kind of collective action that is perceived by authorities to be politically adversarial, can incur risks to material security and physical safety. Latin American intellectuals have been expelled from universities, exiled, emprisoned, and murdered for their involvement on behalf of economic equality and human rights.[46] Further investigation is needed to determine the comparative prevalence of the intellectuals in redistributive social movements in developed and undeveloped societies. But the intellectuals may be one of the few groups whose political culture disposes them to support not only "post-materialist" social change, but also movements of a class or economic nature. Certainly within the middle class the intellectuals are the occupational group whose political orientation is most likely to countervail the economic conservatism of the relatively affluent.

Empirical Support for the Intellectuals Hypothesis

Analyses that isolate at least some of the intellectual occupations from other professions, substantiate the hypothesis of intellectuals as the social basis of nationalism. Pinard and Hamilton (1989, p. 93-97) review studies in which the intellectuals, especially educators, constitute the single biggest occupational group in nationalist movements in North America and Western Europe.

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[46]Intellectuals may not be the foremost activists in repressed societies where peasants and workers are also highly organized and vocal, in other words, where egalitarian movements are popular and diffuse. But as leaders or spokespeople of such movements, the intellectuals make themselves highly conspicuous and vulnerable.

This is no less true of Quebec, where the upper echelons of the independentist political party have been dominated by intellectuals, according to data on the Parti Québécois presented by Pinard and Hamilton (1984, table 5, p. 35). Their analysis of data on the vote intention of Francophone Quebecers on the eve of the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association shows that a higher proportion of intellectuals than any other group intended to vote YES. The intellectuals were followed by other semi-professionals and technicians, and thirdly, the liberal professions; the lowest support for sovereignty association came from managers and proprietors.[47] These data on the managers are consistent with, though slightly higher than those of a survey conducted in January 1980 by the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses on its Quebec members, of whom 31% said they intended to vote YES in the referendum (Le Devoir, March 20, 1980).

The findings of Pinard and Hamilton have numerous implications for the politics of the intellectuals and other middle class occupations. They confirm the pattern of dissensus within the middle class predicted by Bourdieu.[48] Though the effect of employment status is not dealt with in

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[47]Of the occupational groups, the proportions intending to vote YES were as follows: intellectuals 67%; other semi-professionals and technicians 61%; liberal professions 56%; managers and proprietors 38%; clerical and sales workers 49%; workers 45%; farmers 39% (Pinard and Hamilton, 1984, pp 24-25).

[48]Based on their 1980 findings, Pinard and Hamilton point out that the middle class occupations line up in acordance with Bourdieu's theory, with intellectuals most strongly in favour of the YES option, owners and managers least in favour, and other professionals, semi-professionals, and clerical and sales workers in the middle. But as Pinard and Hamilton also point out, Bourdieu's claim for a convergence of views between intellectuals and workers is not supported by their data, which show that workers are in fact closest to managers in their support for the YES option (Bourdieu, 1976, p 17, in Pinard and Hamilton, 1981, p 26).

the study by Pinard and Hamilton, these findings nonetheless cast some doubt on the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses, as well as on a new class theory of new social movements that regards managers as new class components. In particular, they begin to erode a basis for assuming that intellectuals and managers comprise the same class aggregation. That even a new class defined more narrowly to exclude managers is less discriminating a predictor of separatism than the intellectual occupations, is suggested by the higher support for the YES option found among intellectuals than professionals and semi-professionals. Moreover, when high educational attainment is considered a proxy for the new class, that hypothesis is inferior in another respect to the intellectuals hypothesis. Pinard and Hamilton find that the effect of occupation, that is, the difference between the intellectuals and managers, remains strong even among the most highly educated (Pinard and Hamilton, 1984, pp. 30-32). This finding also affirms the definition of intellectuals used by Pinard and Hamilton, in the face of a direct attack against the hypothesis by McRoberts. He points to an analysis of referendum voting to assert that the intellectuals are not the most separatist social segment, except among the young (McRoberts, 1988, p. 328).[49] But the analysis to which he refers has no category of intellectuals per se; it employs a variable for years of schooling only (Blais and Nadeau, 1984).

Finally, the suggestion by Pinard and Hamilton that the proclivities and concerns of intellectuals become increasingly distinct the more they are oriented by their occupational roles to intellectual activities, is confirmed by findings on support for separation, and PQ composition. The higher status

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[49]See also Taylor (1965, p 163), who points to findings by the Groupe de Recherche Sociale (in MacLeans, Nov. 2, 1963) in which the level of education is strongly related to separatism, as evidence of his intelligentsia hypothesis.

intellectuals are more in favour of separatism, and more highly represented in the PQ than lower status intellectuals (Pinard and Hamilton, 1984, p. 23, 34-35).

These findings clearly suggest that support for Quebec independence is based in the Francophone intellectuals. But in order to compare the intellectuals hypothesis with the other, broader class theories, we need to test the relationship between support for Quebec sovereignty and variables that adequately represent the hypothesized class aggregates. This task is undertaken in the quantitative sections of this thesis.

Chapter Two
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

In order to test the various hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter, I will rely on a quantitative analysis of data collected in five telephone surveys conducted by the Montreal polling agency Sorecom, and its subsidiary for field-work operations, the Information Collecting Institute (INCI). The first survey was carried out in May 1980, about two weeks before the Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association, for Le Soleil, Le Devoir, and The Toronto Star. It was directed by Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, and the field work was executed by the INCI. The other four surveys, conducted in August 1980 for The Gazette, and Le Soleil, in March 1981 (two) for Le Soleil and The Gazette, and April 1983 for private clients, were directed by Sorecom, Maurice Pinard acting as consultant. The respective number of interviews were 1020, 787, 761, 766, and 743 (see Appendix A, Table 1).[1] The data from all of the surveys have been merged into one data set, for an overall sample size of 4077.

Each survey used a systematic stratified random sample drawn from a provincial telephone directory; each sample is proportionally representative of ten administrative regions of the province of Quebec. Up to seven call-backs were made to households for which no interview was obtained on the first try. The overall rate of successfully completed interviews was approximately two thirds (somewhat lower for the Montreal region). Though originally each data set was weighted for representativeness according to certain demographic characteristics, these procedures have not been employed for the final, merged data set.

In addition to finding basic demographic information, the

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[1]The empirical analysis of the referendum vote by Pinard and Hamilton (1984) discussed above, is based on the results of the first of these surveys.

survey questions tapped the respondents' opinions and feelings on the political situation in Quebec and Canada. Respondents were read a selection of ranked or categorical responses to each question, from which they were asked to choose one. The only open-ended question obtained information on the respondents' occupation.

Some 19 variables were created with the merged data set, based on the survey questions that touched on the basic political issues and the basic demographic information of interest. Recoded versions of many variables were created where it made sense to do away with some detail. Of these 19 variables, I use nine in my data analysis (see Appendix A, table 2, for source and wording of the questions on which my variables are based).

The Dependent Variable

The intended or actual vote on the Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association is the dependent variable for this analysis. This variable is originally categorized into responses of: YES, NO, DON'T KNOW/REFUSE, and OTHERS. "Others" consists of missing answers due mainly to respondents who, for various reasons, did not vote. Respondents to the first survey (the only one conducted before the referendum) can be expected to have known what the upcoming referendum question would be, since this was made clear by the phrasing of a prior question in that survey. A question about attitudes toward independence (as distinct from actual or intended selection on the referendum on sovereignty-association) was only asked in surveys 1 and 4. The practical disadvantage to the use of this question would be a reduction in sample size sufficient to render results non-significant. But at any rate, the vote variable is a better measure of support for independence, in that it measures opinion that was put into action, however modest that level of action is.

The Independent Variables

1. Ethnicity

In confirmation of previous studies, ethnicity is the most discriminating factor in support for independence. A variable for ethnicity enables selection for only the Francophone cases in the sample. It is because Quebec separatism is clearly a political movement of a particular ethnic group that non-Francophones are not included in the analysis.[2] The ethnicity variable is categorized as French, English, and others. Selecting only for the French reduces the number of cases from 4077 to 3510.

2.Occupation

A test of the intellectuals/intelligentsia hypothesis is, in effect, a test of the effect of occupation on the referendum vote. Occupation is used by itself as an independent variable, as well as in combination with other variables in this analysis. The question on which this variable is based refers to the present or last occupation of the head of the household or its main earner. The wording of this question has a few advantages. That respondents were pressed to name the last occupation of those heads of household who were unemployed, retired, or otherwise inactive at the time of the survey, yields the greatest number of respondents classifiable in some occupational category. Using the occupation of the head of the household instead of the respondent's also aims at obtaining the largest number of cases, since household heads by definition are more likely to have had employment at some time than respondents in cases where respondents were not classifiable in any occupation.

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[2]Only 8% of the non-French in this sample voted YES in the referendum, compared with 41% of the French. But in terms of occupations, a pattern of support similar to that of the French is also found among the non-French.

This procedure is based on the assumption that the household votes as a unit. It appears that with this method, the distortion of the effect of occupation on the referendum vote is negligible.[3] Finally, this procedure has no solution to the problem of heads of households who have apparently never worked, other than to code them as missing values. These cases are, however, a small proportion of the sample.[4]

Responses to the occupational question were coded into the following categories:

intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians[5]
administrators and owners of large and medium-sized enterprises administrators and owners of small enterprises
clerical and sales personnel
skilled workers
semi-skilled workers
unskilled workers

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[3]When the status of the respondent as head of household is used as a control in crosstabulation, there appears to be a dimunition of the effect of occupation on vote among those respondents who are heads of households. Specifically, in contrast with all other tabular analyses where control variables are used along with effect of occupation, the intellectuals are supplanted by the professionals as the group most supportive of the YES option. But when gender and age, respectively, are introduced as additional controls, among the respondents who are the heads of household, the effect of being an intellectual is suppressed only among the females, and the oldest. One may well guess that the older and female intellectual heads of households work in roles where the qualities of the "true" intellectual are relatively unnecessary, for example, as lower level school teachers.

[4]6% of the Francophones in this sample report no occupation at all. One way around this would have been to ask for the occupations of the fathers of the household heads in these cases, as Kriesi does (1989). Yet this would undoubtedly lead to some distortion of the effect of occupation on the dependent variable.

[5]Since intellectuals are a subset of either the professionals or the semi-professionals and technicians, "other" in this context refers to those professionals, semi-professionals and technicians not in intellectual occupations.

farmers
students
the retired
housewives
welfare recipients
respondents with no stated occupation

(See Appendix B for illustrative definitions of each occupational category).

Except for the students, all of these categories that do not represent an outside occupation per se are recoded as missing data for most of the analyses presented below.[6] Students are of interest because, although they are not necessarily on their way to becoming intellectuals by occupation, they nevertheless participate, at least temporarily, in intellectual activities.[7] They receive culture more than they transmit it, but their role is not one of passive appreciation; they also synthesize and re-create culture out of that which they absorb. Students' attitudes toward sovereignty-association should reflect those found among the intellectuals. Because of the small differences in their support of the YES option (see chapter 3), the Francophone administrators and workers, respectively, are often recoded into single categories. Professionals and semi-professionals are also often coded together for the same reason.

3.Employment status

Particularly relevant for this thesis is the employment status of the heads of household. As it measures whether one is employed or self-employed, this variable allows one to

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[6]Given the design of the question on occupation, technically there should be no retirees. Those that appear in the data may be due to a lack of rigour on the part of the interviewers, or because the term may have been used loosely by older people who never had an outside occupation.

[7]I thank Professor Pinard for this conception of students as "temporary intellectuals".

distinguish the new middle class from the old middle class, and to test accurately the new middle class hypothesis. As noted earlier, such a test has almost never been conducted. Employment status is used by itself as an independent variable in order to compare the effects of occupation and employment status on the referendum vote, particularly within the middle class. It is of interest whether, in the middle class occupations, the effect on the referendum vote of being employed vs. self-employed (that is, of being in the new vs. old middle class), is as the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie theorists predict. For the employment status variable, the very few (1%) who reported being partly employed and partly self-employed are recoded together with the self-employed. The assumption is that their partial self-employment would make them act like the self-employed.

Class Aggregates

Class variables based on the major hypotheses of the social bases of Quebec separatism are created here by combining categories of the occupation and employment status variables. All of these class variables are comprised by Francophones only. The new middle class/new petite bourgeoisie is operationalized here as all employed professionals, semi-professionals and technicians, intellectuals, administrators, and clerical and sales workers. A variable for the old middle class/traditional petite bourgeoisie consists of the self-employed members of these middle class occupations. An "upper" new middle class/new petite bourgeoisie and an "upper" old middle class/traditional petite bourgeoisie are comprised, respectively, by all the employed and all the self-employed professionals, semi-professionals and technicians, intellectuals, and

administrators and owners.[8] This implies that the clerical and sales people constitute the lower middle class. These variables are based on the common though erroneous tendency of writers on the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie to exclude the lower level white collar occupations from the new or old middle class in their discussions of the basis of separatism. It should be noted that the upper new middle class corresponds with the new class as conceived of by Ladd as cited by Brint (1984), and Bazelon as cited by Bruce-Briggs (1979).[9] It therefore also constitutes the "broad" new class.

I also create variables for the whole middle class irrespective of its employment status, as well as for the working class and farmers. These variables are designed to test the effect of class or occupation in keeping with the operationalizations of several analysts of the basis of support for separatism or the PQ, for example, Carlos, Cloutier and Latouche (1976), Carlos and Latouche (1976), and Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche (1992). These analyses, discussed in Chapter 3, set out to dispute the notion that the independence movement is concentrated in any socio-economic group.

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[8]One may question whether all of the small administrators belong to the upper middle class, or whether they should instead be regarded along with clerical and sales personnel as a part of the lower fraction of the middle class. But a similar objection might also be raised about the inclusion of all the technicians in the upper middle class. Since that group cannot be separated from the semi-professionals in our data, we are resigned to including both the technicians and the small managers in the upper middle class.

[9]For Ladd, as cited by Brint (1984), the new class professionals and managers are only those with higher level university degrees. In contrast with this work, in his 1979 article he offers no definition of the new class in terms of occupation or any other structural factor. He concludes in that article that no structural variables except for education are strongly associated with the new class political attitudes.

A notion often put forward by new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie theorists is that only the publicly employed members of these classes support independence. To test this assertion, a variable for the publicly employed new middle class is created, consisting of those employed in the public sector as professionals, semi-professionals and technicians, intellectuals, managers, and clerical and sales personnel. Identical to this, but without the clerical and sales people, is a publicly employed upper new middle class variable. This variable is based on data from only the third, fourth, and fifth surveys, which were the only ones that contained a question on employment sector. The public new middle class is also disaggregated into its municipal, provincial, and federal level components.

A variable for the professional intelligentsia is comprised by professionals, semi-professionals and technicians, and intellectuals. This variable, which corresponds to Kristol's version of the new class, excludes salaried managers but includes self-employed professionals (Kristol, 1978, pp. 25-31, 171-77).[10] It will therefore be considered the "narrow" new class.

A block diagram illustrating the composition of the class aggregates in terms of occupation, employment status and employment sector appears at the end of this chapter.

Background Variables

Those structural variables that are known to be

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[10]Neither the new class delineations of Kriesi (1989) nor of Gouldner (1979) can be tested with our data. Kriesi excludes technicians and traditional professions from his new class. Gouldner, on the other hand, includes technicians but excludes human service workers. Neither technicians nor human service workers are isolated from the professionals or semi-professionals in our data. Apart from the exclusions just mentioned, Kriesi's new class resembles the professional intelligentsia of Pinard and Hamilton (1984).

significantly related to the referendum vote are considered relevant and necessary control variables. (They have also been found to be significantly related to our main independent variable, occupation). These variables are introduced in tabular and regression analysis, both in order to investigate their own effects on the referendum vote, and as a check against possible spuriousness of the effect of the class and occupational variables.[11]

1.Employment sector

This variable distinguishes those in the private sector (self-employed or employed) from those in the public sector. Within the public sector, it distinguishes people according to the level of government: municipal, provincial, or federal. These distinctions are clearly finer than the simple public vs. private dichotomy alluded to by new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie theorists. Of interest is the effect of this variable alone, in particular whether the level or the sector of employment is related to support for sovereignty-association. It is conceivable that employees of the provincial public sector may be more favourable to independence than those at the federal level whose occupations could be dependent on the continuted existence of federal institutions in Quebec. Employment sector may also important for its effects as a control variable in the analysis of referendum vote by occupation.

2. Age

Age can be expected to be related to separatism as well as to occupation. Many analyses have consistently pointed out youth as a factor in support for Quebec independence or for

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[11]The results of a more recent analysis of support for Quebec independence by occupation and other socio-structural variables will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

the PQ (for example, Lemieux, Gilbert and Blais, 1970, cited in Carlos and Latouche, 1976, p. 195; Carlos and Latouche, 1976, p. 197; Pinard and Hamilton, 1982; Blais and Nadeau, 1992). Further, one might expect to find younger people in the professions and related occupations than among farmers, since the former are comparatively recent roles, requiring a type of training whose accessibity is relatively recent.

3. Education

Education is another factor that could be expected to be related to occupation and the referendum vote. In particular, certain occupations clearly require a level of education that others do not. Support for Quebec independence or for the PQ has been widely found to increase with the years of schooling completed (Carlos and Latouche, 1976, p. 198; Carlos, Cloutier and Latouche, 1976, p. 217; Pinard and Hamilton, 1984).

Previous research leads one to expect a possible interactive effect of age and education on the referendum vote. This effect is tested in logistic regression, where the respective effects of age and education alone, net of their interaction, can also be seen.

4. Gender

The introduction of this variable is based on previous analyses that find men more supportive than women of the PQ (Carlos and Latouche, 1976, p. 197), and of sovereignty-association (Pinard and Hamilton, 1982, p. 30).[12]

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[12]Carlos and Latouche (1976, p 196) suggest that the women they surveyed prior to the 1970 provincial election were merely more reticent than men about their support for the PQ. Carlos, Cloutier, and Latouche (1976) find a lesser tendency among men than women to vote for the PQ in 1973, just the reverse of the gender relationship found by the other authors mentioned.

5. Region

Separatism has been found to be concentrated mainly in the Montreal, Lac St-Jean and the North Shore, and the Quebec City regions (Carlos, Cloutier, and Latouche, 1976, p. 216; Pinard and Hamilton, 1982, p. 30-31). The detailed regional variable in this study divides the province of Quebec into nine regions. The recoded regional variable divides the province into the Montreal region, the Quebec region, the combined Lac St-Jean and North Shore regions, and the rest of the province.

Tabular Analysis

In the next chapter, crosstabulations are performed on the zero-order relationships between referendum vote and each of the major class variables outlined above, as well as with the intellectuals, workers, and farmers. This is the most straightforward comparison of the capacity of the major hypotheses to predict support for the YES option. It is expected that intellectuals will have the biggest effect on the YES vote.

In order to see the disaggregated effect of each occupation on the referendum vote, a tabular analysis of vote by detailed occupation is also carried out, for Francophones only. Further, a crosstabulation of referendum vote by occupation and employment status should reveal whether for each occupational component of the middle class, the new middle class (salaried) is more supportive of YES than the old (self-employed).

Employment sector, age, education, gender, and region, respectively, are introduced in tabular analysis as controls on the relationship between occupation and employment status on the one hand, and the referendum vote on the other.

Analysis of Variance

The ANOVA procedures here are intended to complement and

clarify the results of the tabular analyses. As a further test of the major class hypotheses, ANOVA is carried out on each of the class variables described above. The objective of these procedures is to determine whether the behaviour of the different occupational segments of these groupings warrants their aggregation into single class entities. Of interest is whether and to what extent each occupational component of the class aggregate deviates in its support for sovereignty from the overall support for the YES option for the entire class. It is expected that the components of all but the narrowest of the aggregated class variables will be significantly different from each other, especially in light of findings reviewed above, in which the intellectuals were well above managers and clerical and sales workers in their support for the YES option.

Regression Analysis

Cross-tabulation does not permit a determination of the magnitude and significance of the effects of the main independent variables net of all background variables. Logistic regression is used for a multivariate analysis of the referendum vote by the class aggregates as well as by occupation alone, controlling in both instances for the concurrent effects of the background variables. This will be done in chapter four.

NEW MIDDLE CLASS



OLD MIDDLE CLASS



UPPER NEW MIDDLE CLASS / WIDE NEW CLASS



PUBLIC SECTOR NEW MIDDLE CLASS



PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA / NARROW NEW CLASS



Chapter Three
BASIC ANALYSIS:
CROSS-TABULATION AND ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

In this chapter, tabular analyses of referendum support for sovereignty-association is used to test the major hypotheses of the basis of Quebec separatism. I begin by examining the zero-order relationships between the hypothesized classes or occupational groups, and support for sovereignty. As a further test of the class hypotheses, a one-way ANOVA is carried out on the class variables associated with these hypotheses, with results presented in table 3.3. Significant heterogeneity of opinion among the occupational components of the class aggregates would undermine their appropriateness as independent variables affecting sovereigntist sentiment. Afterwards, socio-demographic factors are introduced to the relationship between the referendum vote and the occupational variables.

Table 3.1 is a summary of the the percentages of the hypothesized class or occupational groups voting YES, NO, and the other responses. In each panel of this table, results are presented for the theoretical class, and the class or occupational aggregate with which it is implicitly contrasted. (For example, the upper new middle class implies the existence of an upper old middle class; the public sector new middle class implies a contrast with the private sector new middle class, and so on). This represents the first step in assessing the capacity of the major hypotheses to predict support for the YES option. Many of the results in table 3.1

are repeated in subsequent tables; their presentation here is for the purpose of summarizing the findings. It is expected that the class aggregates will be, for the most part, poor predictors of support for sovereignty-association. On the other hand occupation, and in particular, being an intellectual, should have the biggest effect on the YES vote. The referendum results for the disaggregated occupations are presented in table 3.2.

The New Middle Class

How do the hypothesis of the new middle class/new petite bourgeoisie and its variants fare? According to the results in table 3.1, 11% more of the new middle class voted YES than the old middle class. Excluding the lower status white collar personnel hardly enhances the contrast implied by the new middle class hypothesis; the difference between the new and old components of the upper middle class is 12%. Clearly the new middle class in either its inclusive or exclusive version is more sovereigntist than the old middle class. At first glance, the sectoral location of the new middle class also appears to make a difference. Eight percent more of the public sector new middle class than their private sector counterparts voted YES.

But turning to the ANOVA results in table 3.3, it is apparent that all versions of the new middle class, except the public new middle class, contain at least two occupational

groups that differ significantly at the .05 level in the proportion voting YES. In all versions of the new middle class except the public new middle class, the intellectuals differ significantly from the small administrators. That the public new middle class is an exception in this regard does not necessarily imply that managers and intellectuals in the public sector hold similar views on sovereignty-association -- it may be the reduced size of the occupational categories of classes constructed with the employment sector variable (due to their basis on data from only the last three of the five surveys) that makes for non-significant results. Indeed, the public sector new middle class is quite heterogeneous, ranging from 61% support for YES among the intellectuals, to 35% among the small administrators (results not shown). These are the first indications that the new middle class construct, several occupational components of which do not appear to vote as a class on the question of sovereignty-association, is not a very sensible one.

The New Class

As with previous analyses of the class basis of the new social movements, here the predictive capacity of the new class hypothesis depends on how the class is delineated. Specifically, it seems to turn on whether the definition of the new class includes the management-related occupations. In table 3.1, the broader new class, which includes salaried

administrators, is considerably less in favour of YES than the narrower version of that class. At 55%, the proportion voting YES in the "narrow" new class, or, as it is also termed here, the professional intelligentsia, is fully 18% higher than among managers and proprietors, and 7% higher than among the broader new class. Of all the hypothesized class groups (that is, those which aggregate several occupations), the narrow new class is strongest supporter of sovereignty at the zero order.

The analysis of variance shows that in the broader version of the new class, which is also the upper new middle class, the intellectuals again differ significantly from the managers. Though the overall support for the YES option among the narrower new class/professional intelligentsia is quite high, within this group the semi-professionals and technicians differ from the intellectuals.

The heterogeneity that turns up in both the new middle class and new class aggregates, even the narrow new class, may be characterized as the difference between a "technocratic" orientation, and a "specialist" one. Looked at this way, these results are consistent with Kriesi's finding that the new middle class's mobilization potential for new social movements varies significantly according to organizational assets, which distinguish the technocratic members of this class, as well as occupational segments (Kriesi, 1989, p. 1095).

The Effect of Occupation

The results of tabular analysis of the vote by detailed occupations of Francophones are presented in table 3.2. Though they do not strictly constitute an occupation, results for the Francophone students are also presented, for reasons discussed in the second chapter. Emerging in the table is a pattern nearly identical to that observed by Pinard and Hamilton (1984) for the first of the five surveys merged for this data set, and similar to the pattern they observed in many previous studies (Pinard and Hamilton, 1984, table 2). Intellectuals are clearly the occupational group most in favour of sovereignty-association, with 64% voting YES. The intellectuals' support for YES is exceeded only by the students'.[1] Following the intellectuals are the other professionals, and the semi-professionals and technicians, of whom 50% vote YES. These three groups, comprising the professional intelligentsia, also have the lowest proportions voting NO on the referendum. Conversely the smallest proportion voting YES, 34%, is found among the farmers. But only slightly higher are the large and small administrators and owners, with 37% and 38% respectively, voting YES. The highest proportions voting NO are also found among the farmers and small administrators, as well as the large administrators

[1]The students in our data were only the ones who were the heads of their household. The small number of students in our sample should be kept in mind when considering the reliability of this finding.

and unskilled workers. Manual and clerical workers fall in the middle with respect to the YES vote. For the manual workers there is little variation in support for the YES option according to the level of skill. These findings point to the intellectuals as the core adherents to sovereignty-association, with close allies in the rest of the professional intelligentsia.

Conventional Class Distinctions

Taken together, the results of the referendum vote by occupation undermine the claims made by some analysists that occupation alone is of minimal importance as a structural precipitator of support for the independence movement. Such conclusions tend to be based on socio-economic aggregates that hide the variation between occupational groups. For example, some managers and professionals are grouped together in the study of provincial vote intention by Carlos and Latouche (1976, p. 199), and the analysis by Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche (1992, p. 132) of Quebecers' attitudes toward constitutional options. In the first of these studies (p. 200), as well as in another study of vote intention, Carlos, Cloutier, and Latouche (1976, pp. 215-216), merely dichotomize occupation into white and blue collar workers. It is hardly surprising that support for the Parti Québécois, or for sovereigntist constitutional options, varies little with

occupation in these studies.[2] The results for middle class variable in table 3.1, and for all workers in table 3.2, indicate that when occupation with the present data is likewise crudely operationalized, a similar levelling effect results. The middle class is only three percentage points above the workers in their support for the YES option. Clearly the middle class, quite heterogeneous in its attitude toward the question of sovereignty-association, is an inappropriate independent variable in this case.

Referendum Vote by Occupation and Employment Status: The New Middle Class and Old Middle Class Disaggregated

The results of tabular analysis of the referendum vote by occupation (for the middle class only) and employment status are presented in table 3.4. Of interest is whether for each occupational component of the middle class, the new middle class (salaried) is more supportive of YES than the old (self-employed or both). Because of the similarity of their proportions voting YES, professionals are coded together with

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[2]Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche (1992) conclude from their analysis, which barely goes beyond the zero-order level, that the greatest support for sovereigntist options in 1990 was concentrated in the semi-professionals and medium level managers, and further, that occupation in 1990 was the third most important structural variable associated with the sovereigntist vote, after age and education. But in fact their data on option by occupation show very little difference between semi-professionals and medium managers, who constitute one category, and other occupational groups, in support for independence and sovereignty-association. The semi-professional & medium managerial stratum is actually less in favour of independence than skilled workers in 1991.

semi-professionals and technicians; likewise for the large and small administrators.

What is the effect of employment status on the referendum vote? The salaried segments of the professionals, managers, and clerical and sales workers are, as the new middle class hypothesis would predict, more supportive of the YES option than the self-employed. But more striking is the reversal of this pattern among the intellectuals. 79% of the self-employed intellectuals, compared to 61% of salaried intellectuals, vote YES. Intellectuals of the old middle class -- freelance artists, writers, academics, and the like -- are more supportive of the YES option than any other salaried or self-employed occupational group. The effect of employment status on the intellectuals is not significant, according to the chi-square statistic produced by a crosstabulation of the referendum vote by employment status, for the intellectuals only (not shown). But it should be noted that the same effect is seen in separate analyses of the data from each of the five surveys comprising this data set. Though small numbers in each case impede the significance of these findings, their accumulation suggests that this impact of employment status on the intellectuals' support for sovereignty is not to be dismissed. Furthermore, it is among the self-employed intellectuals like novelists, free-lance artists and writers and the like, that one can conceivably expect to find the deepest engagement in the creation and

transmission of culture, in other words, the characteristics of the most "genuine" intellectuals. This expectation would be consistent with the finding by Pinard and Hamilton (1984, p. 23) of greater support for Quebec independence among higher stratum Francophone intellectuals, like artists and academics, than among lower level school teachers.

The Public Sector New Middle Class

Employment sector is argued by many advocates of the new petite bourgeoisie and new middle class hypotheses to be related to support for the independence movement among the Francophone new middle class. State employees are elsewhere theorized to differ in political attitudes and behaviour, particularly in their attitudes toward the role of the state, from those working in the private sector. They have been found to be somewhat more inclined to vote on the left (Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1990). Some of the writers on the Francophone new middle class or new petite bourgeoisie imply or assert that this class is mainly publicly employed and the most separatist segment of Francophone society, while a few specify that it is only the publicly employed new middle class/new petite bourgeoisie that is strongly independentist. Is the Francophone new middle class more publicly than privately employed? Data from the last three of these surveys indicate that it is not; 54% of the new middle class in this group works in the private sector, compared to 46% in the public

sector.

The question of whether the publicly employed new middle class/new bourgeoisie is more separatist than the rest of Francophone society is addressed in table 3.5a. Looking for the moment only at the comparison between the public and the private sector new middle class, it is clear that the former is more supportive of the YES option than the latter. But as table 3.5b shows, this pattern is reversed among managers and people in clerical and sales occupations. It is only in the professional intelligentsia that there is any difference to speak of between support for YES in the public and private sectors. The publicly-employed intellectuals and the rest of the public professional intelligentsia, respectively, are 37% and 15% more favourable to sovereignty-association than their private sector counterparts. Furthermore, while the proportion of the public new middle class voting YES is 8% higher than in the private new middle class, the public new middle class is only 3% more favourable to the YES option than all public employees. The public new middle class, then, can hardly be considered a bastion of support for sovereignty-association.

An important dimension to consider is the variation in support for sovereignty across levels of employment within the state sector of the labour force. Table 3.5b shows that it is only, first, the provincial, and second, the municipal new middle class, that are highly favourable to the YES option.

Federal middle class employees are lower in their support for the YES option than not only the privately employed middle class but also the old middle class. Clearly, the level of employment is a more discriminating predictor of attitudes toward sovereignty-association than the employment sector itself. It seems that working for the Quebec government is conducive to nationalist sentiment. The greater support for sovereignty in the public new middle class than in the private, then, is really just a muddy reflection of the attitudes of the provincial and municipal middle class. Moreover, the same relative impact of employment level and employment sector is observed in all occupational components of the middle class except the intellectuals (though, with only three cases, this can hardly be considered an exception to the pattern), as well as for workers and farmers. Although many of these results are not significant at the .05 level, the magnitude of the differences found between levels of employment begins to undermine the employment sector caveat of the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses.

It is a separate question where (that is, in which class or occupational group) sovereigntist sentiment is concentrated, within the provincial and municipal levels of the public sector. In other words, what effect does controlling for employment sector have on the relationship between occupation and the YES vote? Clearly the highest proportion voting YES is not found in the provincial or

municipal middle class as a whole. At the municipal level, the intellectuals are slightly surpassed by the managers, but this finding, based on only seven intellectuals, is not very reliable. In the provincial sector the intellectuals are the most supportive of sovereignty -- 8% higher than in the provincial middle class as a whole -- followed closely by the rest of the professional intelligentsia. The gap between the intellectuals and the other occupational groups becomes narrower with the introduction of the three levels of government. Yet the intellectuals remain, along with the rest of the professional intelligentsia, more sovereigntist than the managers. The effect of occupation when employment sector and other, non-occupational variables are silmultaneously controlled remains to be seen. At this point, though, it seems that the provincial sector, in addition to the intellectual occupations, is an important basis of support for sovereignty. But it does not seem to account for the effect of being an intellectual on the referendum vote.

Control Variables: Age and Education

1. Age

Age is introduced in tables 3.6a and 3.6b, divided into four groups: 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 54, and 55 and over. The effect of age on support for sovereignty-association is generally an inverse one, but it is not perfecly linear. It will be noted that among the intellectuals and the rest of the

professional intelligentsia, the effect of age is curvilinear, peaking in the second youngest age group. For the managers and the clerical and sales personnel, the 18 to 34 year olds are the strongest YES-voters. The impact of age is greatest among the intellectuals, for whom there is a 40% increase in the proportion voting YES from the oldest to the youngest, compared to an increase of only 25% for the clerical and sales workers, 21% for the managers, and 16% for the rest of the professional intelligentsia. In the oldest group, those 55 and over, the effect of occupation (the difference between the intellectuals and the managers and other professionals, respectively) virtually disappears. In no other age group is this occupational effect greatly altered. Thus, there is an interaction effect of age and occupation -- of being young (up to about age 54) and being an intellectual -- on the YES vote, which will be further investigated using logistic regression, in the next chapter.[3]

Table 3.6b shows the concurrent effects of the middle class occupations, employment status, and age on referendum vote. An interaction between employment status and age is apparent in all of these occupations. Among the intellectuals, the effect of being self-employed is greatly

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[3]Some of the younger respondents would not have been old enough to have voted in the referendum. To see whether their responses alter the relationship between age and the YES vote, we coded as missing the 18 to 24 year olds interviewed in the fifth survey. It turns out that the proportions change very little, and the patterns described here are the same.

increased in the youngest age group, the 18 to 24 year olds. It is clear from these results, though, that the old middle class intellectuals are not much more sovereigntist than the new middle class intellectuals in the 25 to 54 year age range. As for the managers and owners, the oldest and youngest do not conform to the new middle class theorists' expectations about employment status, since there is no difference between new and old middle class business people at these extremes.

3. Education

Next, the relationship between vote and occupation is analysed while controlling for education. Table 3.7a shows the relationship between vote and the middle class occupations, controlling for education broken into four categories: 11 years of schooling or less, 12 to 13 years, 14 to 15 years, and 16 or more. The second panel of table 3.7a shows the results for the disaggregated managerial and professional categories. Firstly, to consider the effects of education alone: its biggest impact is felt in the groups comprising the professional intelligentsia. Among the intellectuals and the rest of the professional intelligentsia, respectively, the proportions voting YES increases by 30% and 32% respectively, from the least to the most educated. This change is considerably smaller in the managerial and clerical groups.

It will be noted that the effect of education on the YES

vote is markedly curvilinear for the semi-professionals and technicians, the large managers, and the clerical and sales personnel. In these groups, support for sovereignty drops before the maximum educational attainment. In the case of the large administrators, the most highly schooled are the least sovereigntist. It is possible that high education generates a distinct political outlook in these groups. Based on the high level of their cultural capital, one might guess that they work in large firms or organizations, quite possibly ones that are oriented to a large Canadian or even international clientele, and that their interests, as occupants of prestigious positions, are closely tied with those of their organization. They may be especially perceptive and fearful of the material repercussions of Quebec independence. It will be noted the relationship between education and the referendum vote is not curvilinear among the professionals. When one compares those professionals with 15 years of schooling or less to those with 16 or more (an aggregation made necessary by the small number of cases across the four educational categories), it is clear that increasing schooling continues to increase the professionals' tendency to favour sovereignty-association. The apparent difference between the professionals and semi-professionals in this respect may have to do with the dichotomy between the technical and the socio-cultural orientations theorized by Kriesi (1989, p. 1081). The professionals may be more concerned with their clients'

welfare, and to the expertise associated with their discipline, than to the smooth functioning of the organizations in which they work. Moreover, professionals are less likely than semi-professionals and technicians to work in profit-making enterprises. Perhaps because they are less burdened by fear of economic reprisals of separation, the highly educated professionals vote YES in greater proportions than the equally educated semi-professionals and technicians.

One might expect the managers to be particularly concerned with the deleterious economic consequences of independence. Table 3.7a shows that the highly educated, large Francophone administrators are the least in favour of the YES option compared not only to the other large managers, but to almost all other occupational groups at all levels of education. They are even less supportive of YES than the least educated members of the lower classes, the workers and farmers. The interaction of education and occupation in this case may point to a category of "true" managers -- those who work in the biggest enterprises, with the most educational credentials and, in all likelihood, the most wealth and prestige. Lending validity to this speculation is the finding of a similarly curvilinear relationship between the income of middle class groups, and support for sovereignty-association, by Pinard and Hamilton (1982, McGill typescript, p. 76).[4]

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[4]Between those with a yearly household income of $20,000 to $24,999, and $25,000 and over, the proportion of those intending to vote YES in the referendum drops from 75% to 66%

They find that the proportion intending to vote YES decreases from their middle to their highest income categories. Moreover, the restraining impact of high income on support for sovereignty is seen primarily among the highly educated.[5]

Table 3.7b suggests that the true managers may be additionally characterized, like their counterparts among the intellectuals, by self-employment. Though the number of cases prohibits splitting the highly educated, self-employed large and small managers, this table nonetheless shows that whereas the effect of education on the salaried managers is linear, it is curvilinear among the self-employed managers. The interesting aspect of this curvilinearity is that at the highest level of education, support for sovereignty among the self-employed managers drops by 9% relative to those with 14 to 15 years of schooling. It is understandable that among administrators, the independent ones, in particular, eschew ambitions for a sovereign Quebec; they not only perceive market losses and perhaps recession as the repercussions of separation, but they probably also see their own fortunes as the most immediate casualties of this economic fallout.

It appears, then, that the upper level managers (and

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among the professional intelligentsia (a category that includes the intellectuals), from 45% to 40% among managers and proprietors, and from 63% to 49% among clerical and sales workers (Pinard and Hamilton, 1982, p 76).

[5]This finding, not discussed in the 1982 manuscript of Pinard and Hamilton, comes from their analysis of the same data set, that is, from data obtained in the May 1990 survey.

perhaps especially the owners) of large Francophone corporations represent a pocket of resistance to sovereignty-association. This is consistent with recent findings by the Conseil du Patronat du Québec (CPQ) on the attitudes of Quebec corporate elites toward sovereigntist political options. In an internal survey conducted in 1992 by the CPQ, only 13% of their respondents -- the (mostly French-speaking) "patrons et cadres superieurs" of Quebec's largest enterprises -- were in favour of sovereignty-association (The Gazette, June 12, 1992).[b]

Table 3.7a shows that the effect of schooling on the intellectuals' support for sovereignty, in contrast with most other middle class groups, is directly proportional (without introducing employment status). In table 3.7b the disparity between what I have refered to as the "genuine" managers and the "genuine" intellectuals (who, like the managers, may also be characterized by high education) stands out in high relief; the latter are 56% more favourable to sovereignty than the

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[b]The CPQ comprises enterprises with 1000 or more employees. The results of CPQ's June 1992 survey reveal a considerable diminution of separatist sentiment among big business leaders in Quebec since February 1991, when, in a similar poll they conducted, 31% favoured sovereignty-association (La Presse, February 19, 1991). One suspects that the more recent of the CPQ's surveys, better reflects the mood of the large corporate managers throughout most of the time period to which our data relates. By mid-year 1992, nationalist passions that had exploded at the time of the Meech lake demise had begun to cool down; likewise the independence movement saw considerable demobilization in the three years following the defeat in the referendum on sovereignty-association in 1980.

former.

What happens to the effect of occupation with the introduction of education? A few reversals occur in the difference between the intellectuals and other occupational groups. Table 3.7a shows that at 14 to 15 years of schooling, both the semi-professionals and technicians, and the clerical and sales personnel, surpass the intellectuals in their proportion of YES voters. Also, among the least educated, the salaried managers are slightly more sovereigntist than the salaried intellectuals, as seen in table 3.7b. With respect to the second of these reversals, the salaried intellectuals with little schooling are probably the least intellectual members of their occupational category. They are most likely employed as lower level school teachers, and in other minimally academic careers. That the lower ranking professionals, and clerical and sales people with 14 to 15 years of schooling are more sovereigntist than the intellectuals by 10% and 5%, respectively, is more puzzling. It is perhaps less serious in the case of the semi-professionals, since, as members of the professional intelligentsia, they can always be expected to be relatively close to the intellectuals. Apart from these reversals, the intellectuals always show the highest support for sovereignty, independent of education. This indicates that overall, the intellectuals' support for sovereignty is not explicable in terms of their education.

Other Control Variables

The respective introduction of gender and region to the analysis does not change the effect of occupation. In keeping with previous findings mentioned in chapter two, the men were slightly more likely than the women to vote YES. Among all of the administrative regions, residents of the Lac St-Jean the North Shore, Montreal, and the Quebec regions were the strongest supporters of the YES option.

Conclusion

The analyses in this chapter make clear that at the zero-order, none of the class aggregate variables proves as good a predictor of support for sovereignty-association as, firstly, the intellectual occupations and secondly, the rest of the professional intelligentsia. Significant heterogeneity between the occupational components of almost all of these class groups also indicates that they are inappropriate independent variables in an analysis of support for sovereignty.

The new middle class/new petite bourgeoisie hypothesis implies predictions about the relationship between support for sovereignty-association on the one hand, and employment status and sector on the other. The effect of employment status, in the case of the intellectuals, turns out to be the reverse of

that predicted by the new middle class, new petite bourgeoisie theorists. Among the other middle class occupations, the salaried or new middle class segments are, as predicted by that hypothesis, more sovereigntist than the old middle class segments. But quite often, with the introduction of control variables, these disparities diminish considerably. Furthermore, among none of the middle class occupations is the difference between the salaried and self-employed segments (where there are enough cases on which to base interpretations) as great as the zero-order difference between the intellectuals and the managers. Finally, the employment sector caveat of the new middle class/new petite bourgeoisie hypothesis imprecisely locates strong sovereigntist sentiment in the state fraction of the new middle class. This clouds the real sectoral antagonism between federal employees on the one hand, and provincial and municipal employees on the other, not between the private and public new middle class. For the most part, sovereigntist feeling is stronger among employees of the Quebec government than in any other sector of the labour force.

According to the analyses carried out thus far, the intellectuals constitute the occupational core of sovereigntist sentiment. The professional intelligentsia, or narrow new class, to a large extent shares the intellectuals' orientation to the question of sovereignty-association. The three- and four-way crosstabulations indicate that the

strength of support for sovereignty among the intellectuals relative to the other occupational groups cannot be accounted for by either employment sector, age, education, gender, or region alone.

The relationship between support for sovereignty-association on the one hand, and occupation and the other hypothesized class aggregates on the other, net of all other structural factors, remains to be seen. To this end, a multivariate analysis is presented in chapter four, using logistic regression.

table 3.1
REFERENDUM VOTE BY FRANCOPHONE CLASSES
(See end of Chapter three for delineation of classes)

Class	N	YES %	NO %	DK %	NA %
New middle class/ New petite bourgeoisie	1280	46	38	9	7
Old middle class/ Traditional petite bourgeoisie	316	35	45	10	10
Upper new middle class/ "Broadest" new class	964	48	37	9	6
Upper old middle class	298	36	45	10	9
Public new middle class	333	50	35	6	10
Private new middle class	385	42	44	6	9
Pro. intelligentsia/ Narrow new class	531	55	29	8	7
Administrators and owners	739	37	46	10	6
Intellectuals	211	64	24	8	5
Middle class	1607	44	39	9	7
Working class	1547	41	31	11	9
Farmers	152	34	46	11	9
All Francophones in the labour force	3332	42	39	10	8

Table 3.2
REFERENDUM VOTE BY FRANCOPHONE OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Occupation	N	YES %	NO %	DK %	NA %
Intellectuals	211	64	24	8	5
Professionals	94	50	30	9	12
Semi-professionals and technicians	226	50	34	8	8
Professionals, semi-professionals and technicians	320	50	33	8	9
Large administrators and owners	93	37	41	13	10
Small administrators and owners	646	38	47	10	6
All administrators and owners	739	37	46	10	6
Clerical and sales personnel	339	40	41	10	9
Skilled workers	673	40	38	13	10
Semi-skilled workers	407	43	38	10	9
Unskilled workers	467	39	40	10	10
All workers	1547	41	31	11	9
Farmers	152	34	46	11	9
Students	26	73	15	-	12
All Francophones in the labour force	3332	42	39	10	8

Table 3.3
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE -- DEVIATIONS FROM THE GRAND MEAN AND SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR YES AMONG OCCUPATIONAL COMPONENTS OF FRANCOPHONE CLASS AGGREGATES

Class Aggregates	Deviations from the grand mean	Deviations significant at the .05 level
Professional intelligentsia/ "Narrow" new class (grand mean=.55)	.13**	
1. professionals	-.05	
2. semi-professionals and technicians	-.05	-intellectuals
3. intellectuals	.08	-semi-professionals and technicians
"Upper" new middle class/ "Broadest" new class (grand mean=.48)	.17***	
1. professionals	.06	
2. semi-professionals and technicians	.05	
3. intellectuals	.13	-small administrators
4. large administrators	-.06	
5. small administrators	-.08	-intellectuals
New middle class (grand mean=.46)	.16***	
1. professionals	.08	
2. semi-professionals and technicians	.07	
3. intellectuals	.15	-small administrators -clerical and sales
4. large administrators	-.04	
5. small administrators	-.06	-intellectuals
6. clerical and sales	-.05	-intellectuals

Public new middle class (grand mean=.50)	.21**	
1. professionals	.02	
2. semi-professionals and technicians	.09	
3. intellectuals	.12	
4. large administrators	-.14	
5. small administrators	-.12	
6. clerical and sales	-.10	
Old middle class/ Traditional petite bourgeoisie (grand mean=.35)	.28***	
1. professionals	.04	
2. semi-professionals and technicians	-.13	-intellectuals
3. intellectuals	.44	-semi-professionals and technicians, large administrators
4. large administrators	-.14	-intellectuals
5. small administrators	-.03	-intellectuals
6. clerical and sales	-.02	

table 3.4
PERCENTAGE OF FRANCOPHONES VOTING YES IN THE REFERENDUM BY OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS (% OF [])

	Intellectuals	Professional semi-professional & technicians	Managers	Clerical & sales
Employed	[179] 61	[279] 53	[506] 40	[316] 41
Self-employed	[24] 79	[41] 32	[233] 32	[18] 33
	-18	21	8	8

table 3.5a
PERCENTAGE OF FRANCOPHONES VOTING YES IN THE REFERENDUM BY CLASS OR OCCUPATION, AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND SECTOR (% OF [])

Group	Self-employed	Employed	
		Private	Public
Middle class	[181] 32	[385] 42	[333] 50
Intellectuals	[8] 75	[12] 25	[78] 62
Professionals semi-professionals and technicians	[24] 38	[64] 42	[103] 57
Managers	[139] 29	[203] 42	[86] 37
Clerical and sales	[10] 30	[106] 42	[66] 39
Workers	[90] 34	[597] 41	[174] 43
Farmers	[73] 32	[385] 43	-
All Francophones (in labour force)	[346] 33	[989] 41	[507] 47

The data for tables 3.5a and 3.5b come from the last three of the five merged surveys.

table 3.5b
PERCENTAGE OF FRANCOPHONES VOTING YES IN THE REFERENDUM BY CLASS OR OCCUPATION AND LEVELS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (8 of [])

Group	Level of Public Sector		
	Municipal	Provincial	Federal
Middle class	[39] 44	[229] 56	[66] 29
Intellectuals	[7] 43	[69] 64	[3] 67
Professionals semi-professionals and technicians	[5] 40	[81] 62	[17] 42
Managers	[20] 45	[38] 45	[28] 21
Clerical & sales	[7] 43	[42] 45	[17] 24
Workers	[35] 43	[88] 50	[52] 33
All Francophones (in public sector)	[74] 43	[318] 55	[117] 31

table 3.6a
PERCENTAGE OF FRANCOPHONES VOTING YES IN THE REFERENDUM BY OCCUPATION AND AGE (% OF [])

Age	Intellectuals	Professional semi-professional & technicians	Managers	Clerical & sales
	[32]	[54]	[106]	[69]
18 to 24	69	43	49	48
	[76]	[128]	[183]	[113]
25 to 34	76	66	49	48
	[81]	[93]	[294]	[100]
35 to 54	58	43	31	37
	[21]	[45]	[156]	[52]
55 & over	29	27	28	23

table 3.6b
PERCENTAGE OF FRANCOPHONES VOTING YES IN THE REFERENDUM BY OCCUPATION, EMPLOYMENT STATUS, AND AGE (% OF [])

18 to 24	Intellectuals	Professionals semi-professionals & technicians	Managers	Clerical & sales
Employed	[20] 60	[46] 42	[75] 49	[65] 48
Self-employed	[4] 100	[6] 50	[31] 48	[4] 50
	-40	-8	+1	-2
25 to 34				
Employed	[112] 76	[67] 70	[128] 53	[105] 49
Self-employed	[9] 78	[16] 44	[55] 38	[7] 43
	-2	+26	+15	+6
35 to 54				
Employed	[72] 57	[79] 47	[202] 34	[93] 38
Self-employed	[9] 67	[14] 21	[92] 25	[5] 20
	-10	+26	+9	+18
55 and over				
Employed	[19] 21	[40] 30	[101] 29	[50] 24
Self-Employed	[2] 100	[5] 0	[55] 27	[2] 0
	-79	+30	+2	+24

table 3.7a
PERCENTAGE OF FRANCOPHONES VOTING YES IN THE REFERENDUM BY OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION (% of [])

Years of Schooling	Intellectuals	Professionals semi-professionals & technicians	Managers	Clerical & sales
11 or less	[22] 41	[54] 22	[304] 34	[127] 34
12 to 13	[32] 63	[71] 47	[223] 37	[139] 37
14 to 15	[45] 60	[75] 65	[107] 39	[46] 65
16 or more	[110] 71	[117] 54	[102] 44	[22] 50

Years of Schooling	Professionals	Semi-professionals & technicians	Large managers	Small managers
11 or less	[12] 0	[42] 29	[18] 33	[286] 35
12 to 13	[10] 50	[61] 46	[29] 45	[194] 36
14 to 15	[11] 36	[64] 70	[22] 41	[85] 39
16 or more	[60] 62	[57] 46	[24] 25	[78] 50

table 3.7b
PERCENTAGE OF FRANCOPHONES VOTING YES IN THE REFERENDUM BY OCCUPATION, EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND EDUCATION (% of [])

Years of Schooling	Intellectuals	Professional, semi-professional & technicians	Managers	Clerical & sales
11 or less				
	[17]	[45]	[184]	[120]
Employed	35	27	38	34
Self-employed	[5] 60	[9] 0	[120] 29	[6] 17
	-25	+27	+9	+17
12 to 13				
	[22]	[62]	[160]	[130]
Employed	59	50	38	39
Self-employed	[9] 78	[9] 22	[63] 36	[7] 14
	-19	+28	+2	+25
14 to 15				
	[38]	[70]	[79]	[42]
Employed	55	66	40	64
Self-employed	[5] 100	[4] 60	[28] 36	[4] 75
	-45	+6	+4	+9
16 or more				
	[100]	[100]	[80]	[21]
Employed	69	56	49	48
Self-employed	[17] 83	[6] 41	[22] 27	[1] 100
	-14	+15	+22	-52

DELINEATION OF CLASSES IN TABLE 3.1

New middle class/new petite bourgeoisie
all employed:
intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians
large administrators
small administrators
clerical and sales personnel

Old middle class/traditional petite bourgeoisie
all self-employed:
intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians
large administrators
small administrators
clerical and sales personnel

Upper new middle class/"broadest" new class
all employed:
intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians
large administrators
small administrators

Upper old middle class
all self-employed:
intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians
large administrators
small administrators

Public new middle class (last three studies only)
all publicly employed:
intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians
large administrators
small administrators
clerical and sales personnel

Private new middle class (last three studies only)
all privately employed:
intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians
large administrators
small administrators

clerical and sales personnel

Professional intelligentsia/"narrow" new class
all employed and self-employed:
intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians

Middle class
all employed and self-employed:
intellectuals
other professionals
other semi-professionals and technicians
large administrators
small administrators
clerical and sales personnel

Working class
all skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers

Chapter Four
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Logistic regression was chosen for the multivariate analysis since it can accommodate a categorical dependent variable. As before, only Francophones are included in the analysis. Referendum vote, the dependent variable, is coded as a dummy signifying that respondents voted YES as opposed to NO. The undecideds and non-voters are excluded from the analysis.[1] For the gender and regional variables, women, and the rest of the Quebec regions (excluding the Montreal and Quebec regions and the combined Lac St-Jean and North Shore regions) constitute the omitted reference categories. The coefficients signify changes in the ratio of the log of the odds of voting YES, relative to the reference category in the case of categorical variables, or relative to a one-unit increase in the the continuous variables. Of primary relevance to a test of the intellectuals/intelligentsia hypothesis is the effect of occupation, particularly the difference between the intellectual and the business categories, independent of the non-occupational variables. The impact of the new middle class and the new class, and their respective variants, on the probability of supporting sovereignty-association, are subsequently examined. The effects of the non-occupational factors -- education, age, gender, and region -- are also discussed.

The Effect of Occupation and the Intellectuals Hypothesis

Tables 4.1a and 4.1b show the results of multivariate logistic regressions to which occupation, employment status, age, education, gender and region, have been successively

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[1]The exclusion of undecideds and non-voters in the analysis does not increase the significance of the intellectuals' coefficient, and therefore does not strengthen the intellectuals hypothesis.

entered. Except for age and education, all the variables have been entered as a set of categorical variables.[2] The owners and managers (large and small grouped together) and the self-employed are the designated reference categories for occupation and employment status respectively. Because the middle class occupations are of primary interest, the managers as a basis of reference facilitates the interpretation. The professionals and manual workers are respectively disaggregated in table 4.1b. Based on results of cross-tabulation, positive coefficients are generally expected for all of the occupational variables except the farmers, at least in the first stage of the model.

In support of the primary hypothesis, the intellectuals are significantly much more likely to have voted YES in the referendum than the managers. This difference, moreover, remains almost as strong, and highly significant independent of the effects of all other socio-structural variables. The effect of being an intellectual falters slightly when education is introduced, but does not lose any of its significance. At the last stage of the model, no other occupational group stands out in its support for the YES option to the extent that the intellectuals do.[3]

The rest of the professional intelligentsia is also significantly more favourable to sovereignty-association than the managers, standing second only to the intellectuals in

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[2]Tables 3.6a and 3.7a pointed to non-linearity in the effects of age and education on the referendum vote. But in logistic regression, the introduction of age and education as categorical variables, each broken into four categories, results in the same occupational pattern of support for sovereignty as obtained in tables 4.1a and 4.1b. The effect of being an intellectual is still large and significant at the .001 level.

[3]The reader interested in the predicted probabilities of voting yes that are associated with the coefficients for the intellectuals, managers, and the class aggregates, may refer to Appendix C.

this regard. The size of the coefficient for the professional intelligentsia, however, is relatively more reduced by controls than it is for the intellectuals. In table 4.1b it is apparent that the professionals are more sovereigntist than the semi-professionals and technicians, independent of the other variables in the model. Undoubtedly it is because there are relatively few of them that the professionals' coefficient drops below the conventionally lowest limit of significance once age is added to the model.

While the samples merged here contain few students -- they took only those students who were heads of households -- the results indicate that these "temporary intellectuals" were much more likely to be YES-voters than any other occupational group. With education and other controls, however, this results loses its significance at conventional levels. All in all, these results provide strong support for the hypothesis that membership in the intellectuals/intelligentsia strata is a strong incitation to support the independence option.

After the intellectuals and the other professional intelligentsia, the manual workers are the third most supportive of the YES option, net of all other factors in the model. Of these workers, it is the semi-skilled stratum that provides the strongest support for the sovereigntist option. Clerical and sales people are slightly more likely to have voted YES than managers, but the coefficients decrease with controls and are, at any rate, never significant. Though farmers were less likely to vote YES than the managers, the difference between these groups is also not significant; it even reverses direction when other variables are added.

Education has a small but highly significant effect net of occupation and employment status. But it seems to have different effects on the occupational groups. The workers' and farmers' support for the YES option is increased by more schooling, while the intellectuals', professionals' and semi-professionals' is dampened. The effect of being a student

becomes non-significant when education is considered. This is to say that much of the professionals' and the students' support for sovereignty-association can be attributed to the effect of education alone. On the other hand, workers, especially the semi-skilled and skilled ones, are a strong basis of support for sovereignty-association once their low level of education is taken into account. These findings indicate that the effect that controlling for education has on the effect of occupation. They do not indicate whether there are any interaction effects between education and occupation. Interaction effects are considered below.

The effect of education seems to be partly due to youth. The introduction of age greatly reduces the size of the educational coefficient and the significance of its effect. It also restores some of the prior occupational pattern of support. This indicates that defining the intelligentsia in occupational terms is much more relevant than defining it terms of education.[4] Age itself, however, retains a highly significant effect in the expected direction, net of all other factors. That is, being young increases one's probability of voting YES. The effect of age in interaction with education, and net of this interaction, is discussed below.

For all occupations together, employment status seems to have a significant effect on support for sovereignty-association. On the whole, those who work for someone else are more likely to vote YES than the self-employed. But a test of the new middle class hypothesis, which considers the effect of employment status on only the middle class, requires a regression model with variables for only the middle class occupations. This is discussed below.

The first table also shows that gender and region have the anticipated effects on support for sovereignty-

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[4]When education in introduced into the model before occupation (results not shown), these results are not altered.

association. Men were more likely to vote YES in the referendum than women. The Francophones of the Lac St-Jean and North Shore regions are more favourable to sovereignty than anywhere else in the province. They are followed by those living in the Montreal region, and by residents of the Quebec region.

To summarize, the results of the first multivariate analysis indicate that the intellectuals are the occupational basis of support for Quebec sovereignty, independent of the effects of education, age, gender, and region. Theirs is the highest and most significant probability of voting for sovereignty-association. They are followed by the rest of the professional intelligentsia, as seen in table 4.1a. All occupational groups have a higher likelihood of voting YES than the managers, though this is not significant in the case of the clerical and sales personnel and the farmers.

These results confirm the findings of Pinard and Hamilton (1984). In particular they show that the great differential in support is not between the higher and lower classes, but within the middle class itself. There the opposition is between the intelligentsia and the business-managerial stratum. It remains to be seen whether this division within the middle class is more important than the new vs. old division of the middle class so often stressed in the literature.

Some Interaction Effects: Age and Education

To examine how education interacts with occupation, separate regression models are built that test the effect of education and the other variables for certain occupational groups. Table 4.2 shows the results of four regression analyses, for the professional intelligentsia, large managers, small managers, and workers and farmers together. It will be recalled that tabular analysis indicated little positive effect of increasing education on the referendum vote of the

managers as a whole; additional schooling beyond 11 years actually appears to decrease the large managers' support for sovereignty-association. On the other hand, table 3.7a shows that education has its biggest impact on the professional intelligentsia. In this multivariate analysis it is clear that education has a negative, though non-significant effect on the large managers' likelihood of voting YES, net of age, gender, and region. It is only among the professional intelligentsia that the effect of education is positive, strong and quite significant. In other words, being both highly educated and being a member of the professional intelligentsia increases one's probability of voting YES in the referendum. These findings fail to support the assertion, by writers like Taylor (1965), that the highly educated are the main supporters of Quebec sovereignty. Clearly not all of the highly educated are likely to have voted in support of sovereignty-association. These results also suggest that education has its positive effect through only certain occupational groups.

Studies in the past have shown that college and university education in some disciplines such as the social sciences and humanities, is more likely to produce leftist orientations than in other areas, like management (Lipset, 1972, pp. 82ff; see also Pinard and Hamilton, 1984, p. 38). Whether or not a similar educational effect is at work here is an interesting question that cannot be pursued with these data.

The effect of age is negative and significant in all four of the occupational groups in table 4.2. But being young has its greatest effect on the large managers, followed by the professional intelligentsia, the small managers and clerical

and sales workers, and the manual workers and farmers. Youth appears to account for some but not all of the effect of education on the professional intelligentsia. On the other hand, among the workers and farmers, age appears to account for all of the effect of education on the probability of voting YES.

It will be noticed that gender, that is, being male, has a greater effect on the large managers than on the other groups in this model. The effects of the regional variables also differ according to occupational group. For instance, the effect of living in the Montreal region is non-significant, but is reversed among the professional intelligentsia and the large managers, relative to the first regression model. In the Lac St-Jean and North Shore regions, only the workers and farmers are more likely than residents of other regions to vote for sovereignty-association.

Table 4.3 shows an investigation of the three-way interaction between education, age, and occupation. It will be recalled that, according to results presented in tables 3.6a, age has its biggest impact on the intellectuals, and that the effect of occupation on the YES option is only observed among the "younger" referendum voters (those under 55). It is also known that an increase in education affects the occupational groups in professional intelligentsia more than any other group. The intention behind this logistic regression is to see the effect of occupation on support for sovereignty, in particular, the attitudes of the professional

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[5]These results are not exactly comparable to those in table 3.6a, where it is seen that age has its greatest effect on the intellectuals. In that table, the intellectuals are separated from the rest of the professional intelligentsia, and the small and large managers are grouped together. The coding scheme in this multivariate model is geared to determining whether the impact of education on the large managers found in table 3.7a is negative, net of the other variables.

intelligentsia groups relative to the managers, controlling for the interaction of extremes of age and education. For this logistic regression, I divide age into those 44 or under, and 45 or over. Education is divided into those with 13 years of schooling or less, and 14 or more. Managers are the occupational reference category. The effect on occupational differences in support for sovereignty are examined for four combinations of age and education: the youngest and least educated, the youngest and most educated, the oldest and least educated, and the oldest and most educated.

The results show that occupation has its strongest effect on the likelihood of voting YES among the youngest and/or the most educated. In particular, in the first three models, the occupations of the professional intelligentsia are significantly more likely than the managers to have voted YES. (That the coefficients for the higher ranking professionals become non-significant is probably because there are few of them). In all four groups except the oldest and least educated, the intellectual and the semi-professional and technical occupations have a strong effect on the probability of voting YES. Of these two groups, the intellectuals' support for sovereignty is the stronger and the more significant, except among the oldest and most educated, where they are surpassed by the lower ranking semi-professionals and technicians, and also even by the clerical and sales personnel, though the latter coefficients are not significant. The effect of the intellectual occupations is resilient to the interaction of age and education except in their least conducive combination, the oldest and least educated. Among these voters, no occupational group is significantly more likely to support sovereignty than the managers. However, even here the intellectuals are the only group with a positive coefficient; all the others are less favourable to the sovereigntist option (though not significantly so) than the managers.

The Traditional Class Distinctions in Multivariate Analysis

The bearing of conventional socio-economic distinctions on support for sovereignty is subjected to multivariate analysis in table 4.5. The occupations are regrouped into the middle class, working class, and farmers, with the working class as the omitted reference category. This operationalization is in keeping with the analysis by writers like Carlos, Cloutier and Latouche (1976), who conclude that occupation has little bearing on support for the Parti Québécois. As the tabular analysis (tables 3.1 and 3.2) would lead one to expect, table 4.5 shows that the middle class is not significantly more likely than the working class to have voted YES net of age, education, and the other variables in the model. The second stage of the model shows that the middle class as a whole is actually significantly less favourable to sovereignty than the working class when education is considered, though this difference becomes non-significant once age is introduced. These results further emphasize the error of applying a conventional class framework to the analysis of the social basis of separatism. It is erroneous because it suppresses the variation in support for sovereignty between middle class groups, as seen in table 4.1a and 4.1b. It may be noted that without the finer distinctions between occupational groups as in the first regression model, the effect of education remains highly significant. This indicates that education acts through certain occupational groups.

The New Middle Class in Multivariate Analysis

I begin to test the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses indirectly, with two regression analyses incorporating employment status and the middle class occupations. It was seen in table 4.1 that overall, being employed as opposed to being self-employed appears to have a

significant, positive effect on the probability of supporting sovereignty-association. The effect of employment status among only the middle class occupations is seen in table 4.6. Once again, managers are taken as the reference category for occupations, and the old middle class (that is, the self-employed) is the reference category for the employment status variable. As in the first regression model, the intellectuals are far more likely than managers to vote YES. Net of occupation, the new middle class are significantly more in favour of the YES option than the self-employed. But the reader should note immediately that even without further controls, the coefficient for the new middle class (.31) is much smaller than those for the intellectuals (1.17), the professionals (.67) or the semi-professionals (.50). In addition, in contrast to what is observed for intellectuals and semi-professionals, the new middle class effect becomes non-significant once education and other controls are introduced. This counters the assertion implied by the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie theorists, that the middle class is mainly divided in its attitude toward Quebec sovereignty by employment status.

Table 4.7 shows a regression model in which each middle class occupation is divided into its salaried and self-employed components. The self-employed or old middle class intellectuals are the occupational reference category. All of the occupational coefficients should be negative; in other words, support for sovereignty among the self-employed intellectuals should surpass all other groups' support. The model allows an examination of interaction effects between occupation and employment status, when the effects of all the other variables are controlled. If, as the tabular analysis suggests, there is an interaction between being an intellectual and being self-employed, the new middle class intellectuals should be significantly less supportive of the YES option than their old middle class counterparts. This

model also affords an indirect test of the effect of the new middle class vs. the old middle class. According to the new middle class hypotheses, the new middle class occupations should all be significantly more likely than the old middle class intellectuals to have voted YES. Furthermore, there should not be much variation in the probability of voting YES within either the new or old middle class, according to the new middle class hypothesis.

As expected, all the occupational coefficients in table 4.7 are negative, meaning that no occupational group in the new or old middle class is as likely to support sovereignty as the old middle class intellectuals. It is also clear that the intellectuals are the most likely in both the new and the old middle class to have voted YES in the referendum. But the difference between the new and old middle class intellectuals does not attain significance at the .05 level. Perhaps the effect of employment status would be significant with a greater number of self-employed intellectuals; there are only 22 here. The direction of the effect of employment status on the intellectuals is at any rate instructive, suggesting as it does, a reversal of the pattern implicitly predicted by new middle class theorists.

Contrary to what the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses predict, table 4.7 shows that, net of the other variables, most of the new middle class is significantly less supportive of sovereignty than the old middle class intellectuals. Only the salaried professionals and intellectuals are exceptional in this respect: while the signs of the coefficients are consistent, they are not significant. Furthermore, considerable variation in both the new and old middle class groups is apparent. In line with the new middle class hypothesis, however, the negative coefficients for the new middle class categories are smaller than those for the old middle class categories in each of the following occupations: professionals, semi-professionals and

technicians, managers\entrepreneurs, and clerical and sales personnel. But note that except for the semi-professional category, the differences are not very large. Again, the main distinction is with the intellectuals, especially those of the old middle class.

A third, more direct test of the new middle class hypothesis is shown in table 4.8. The new middle class (consisting of the salaried members of all of the middle class occupations), the working class, and farmers, are each compared to the old middle class (the self-employed members of the middle class occupations) which is made the omitted reference category. Without consideration of any non-class factors, the new middle class is significantly more in favour of sovereignty-association than the old middle class. The coefficient for the farmers is negative, as table 3.1 would lead one to expect, though not significant. But whereas an increase in education raises the probability that the working class votes YES, it has the opposite effect on the new middle class. By the last stage of the model, the new middle class is still significantly more in favour of sovereignty than the old middle class. But strikingly, with this breakdown of the occupational categories which lumps together managers and the intelligentsia, the working class appears as the strongest supporter of separatism.

A multivariate analysis of a different version of the new middle class hypothesis is shown in table 4.9. This refers to the upper new middle class (also the broadest new class) hypothesis, in which the new middle class is operationalized to exclude clerical and sales employees. This class, and variables for the clerical and sales workers, manual workers, and farmers, are all compared to the upper old middle class. In the last stage of this model, the significance of the enhancement of the upper new middle class's chances of voting YES relative to its self-employed counterpart is slightly more significant than the entire new middle class compared to the

old middle class, but their p values -- .0098 for the upper new middle class, and .0141 for the new middle class -- are not very different. In other words, cutting off the lower new middle class does not lead to much more support for the new middle class hypothesis. Moreover, the working class is almost as supportive of sovereignty-association as the upper new middle class; its coefficient (.37) is not much smaller than that of the upper new middle class (.40), and with a p-value of .0128, is only slightly less significant than that of the upper new middle class.

To summarize the findings on the new middle class hypothesis so far, both the new middle class and the upper new middle class are significantly more supportive of sovereignty-association than their old middle class counterparts. But they are surpassed or closely rivalled by the working class. Moreover, it is really only when the middle class occupations are not disaggregated that the new middle class appears to have a significant effect on voting YES. When the separate effects of the new middle class occupations are considered, as in table 4.6, being employed as opposed to being self-employed no longer has a significant effect on the probability of voting YES. This seriously undermines the claims of the new middle class theorists.

Another subsidiary assertion made by new middle class\new petite bourgeoisie theorists is that it is the state fraction of the Francophone new middle class or new petite bourgeoisie, in particular, that constitutes Quebec's foremost separatists. I test this assertion in table 4.10. Data on sectoral location comes only from the third, fourth, and fifth surveys. In table 4.8, variables are created for the private sector old middle class, the private sector new middle class, the public sector new middle class, the workers, and the farmers, with the old middle class as the reference category. This version of the new middle class turns out to produce a fairly large and highly significant coefficient for the public new middle

class, net of the other variables. Second to the public new middle class are the workers, whose coefficient, in fact, is considerably larger and more significant than that of the private sector new middle class. This finding further highlights the flimsiness of the general new middle class hypothesis; more than half the members of the new middle class in the last three surveys (those working in the private sector) are surpassed by the blue collar referendum voters in their support for sovereignty.

The size and strength of the public new middle class coefficient might appear to suggest that the public sector caveat crucially qualifies the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses, and points accurately to the class and sectoral core of Francophone separatism. But table 4.10 fails to introduce an important distinction: in what level of government do the public new middle class employees work? Tabular analysis points to a strong relationship between employment in certain levels within the public sector, and support for sovereignty-association, with federal employees the least in favour, and provincial employees the most favourable to the YES option. In table 4.11 are the results of a regression model in which the public new middle class is disaggregated into the municipal, provincial, and federal new middle class. Once again, the old middle class is the reference category. It is apparent that it is not the entire public sector new middle class that stands out in its tendency to vote YES. Rather, it is only the provincial new middle class whose coefficient is not only very large and positive, but highly significant net of all other variables in the model. It should especially be noted that within the middle class, the federal employees are the least favourable to the sovereigntist option, even less (though not significantly) than the old middle class. This seriously questions the widely accepted speculations about the role of the public sector in the Quebec independence movement. Together with the

small and non-significant coefficient for the private sector new middle class, the apparent opposition to sovereignty-association in the federal new middle class stands on its head the theory of blocked mobility as articulated by Guindon, who argues that "promotional practices" of the federal civil service and of private corporations that discriminated against the Francophone new middle class, were the main incitation to separatism (1964 [1973], p. 158). These findings indicate, moreover, that the seeming effects seen earlier of the public new middle class, the new middle class as a whole, and the upper new middle class, are really reflecting the effect of the provincial middle class employees on support for sovereignty-association.

The New Class in Multivariate Analysis

The last hypothesis to consider is that of the new class, in its wide and narrow variants. As the results in table 4.9 reveal, the new class defined to include managers turns out to be more sovereigntist than the upper old middle class and working class in that model. But this effect is undermined by the non-significance of employment status net of the effects of education and the disaggregated middle class occupations, as seen in table 4.6. In table 4.12, the results of logistic regression based on a comparison of the narrower new class or professional intelligentsia to the managers are presented. This new class has a much higher probability of voting YES than the managers, independent of the other variables in the model. There is also a greater gap between this version of the new class, and the working class, whose coefficient is less than half that of the new class. This suggests that the closer the delineation of the class to the intellectuals, the more discriminating it is as a predictor of support for sovereignty. But distinguishing intellectuals proper from the rest of the intelligentsia is even more discriminating, as we have seen.

The Intellectuals and the Effect of Employment Sector

These regression analyses supply more compelling evidence for the intellectuals hypothesis than for any of the other theories of the basis of support for Quebec sovereignty. But the strength of the provincial employees' support for sovereignty suggests the need to examine the effect of occupation while controlling employment sector. In table 4.13, the employment sector variable is entered into a regression model after the occupational variables, with the private sector disaggregated into the self-employed and the employed, and the public sector into the municipal, provincial and federal levels. The federal level is made the reference category for that variable. Not surprisingly, those employed by the provincial government are much more favourable to sovereignty-association, and highly significantly so, than the federal employees. Municipal and private sector employees are also more inclined to vote YES than those at the federal level, but their coefficients are smaller than those of the Quebec government employees; moreover they are not significant. Conversely, self-employed people (in the private sector, necessarily) are not distinct from the federal public employees.

It is noteworthy that the effect of being an intellectual on the referendum vote is greatly weakened by the introduction of employment level to the regression model. This might appear to suggest that the intellectuals' support for sovereignty-association is partly accounted for by their employment by, and presumably identification with, the provincial or municipal government. Most of the intellectuals in the sample work in para-provincial institutions, especially, for example, in schools and universities: 69 of the 95 Francophone intellectuals in the last three surveys are employed in the provincial level of the public sector.

Yet, independently of the effect of employment level, the intellectuals are still significantly more likely to vote YES

than the managers. This significant result stands despite the fact that we have fewer intellectuals in any of the other employment categories than the provincial one. A larger sample than just the last three studies would be needed here to ascertain whether the reduction in the coefficient observed here holds generally. It must also be remembered that in the whole sample, the self-employed intellectuals stand out from all occupational groups, including the new middle class intellectuals, as the strongest supporters of sovereignty-association. They are even more in favour of the YES option than the salaried intellectuals, who include (and are probably comprised mainly by) those employed directly or indirectly by the provincial or municipal governments. If, as previous results suggest, the freelance intellectuals are the "genuine" intellectuals, it is unlikely that employment sector or level accounts for the intellectuals' separatism.

Moreover, intellectuals are prominent in the leadership of other kinds of social movements whose values and objectives, unlike those of ethnic secessionism, are unlikely to occasion a cleavage between national and regional state employees. According to evidence reviewed by Pinard and Hamilton (1989), the intellectuals constitute the core activists of several peace, ecology, and feminist movements in western societies. This is suggestive of an affinity between certain kinds of movements (the "new left" or "new social" movements, if one prefers), including Quebec separatism, and intellectuals qua intellectuals, not qua provincial employees. For these reasons, and because there are far fewer intellectuals in the last three surveys than in the entire Francophone sample, the results in this table should not be read as a disconfirmation of the intellectuals hypothesis.

Conclusion

The results of the multivariate analysis indicate that the hypothesis receiving the strongest support is the intellectuals hypothesis. The effect of being an intellectual remains large and significant net of all other socio-structural factors, with the exception of the effect of the provincial public sector. In that case, though, the intellectuals' effect is not completely shaken, and for reasons we have discussed, the hypothesis is not undermined. The wider professional intelligentsia also proves to be a strong foundation of support for sovereignty. This lends support to the narrow new class hypothesis. Yet within the professional intelligentsia or narrow new class, the intellectuals are the core of mass support for sovereignty. On the other hand, the evidence for the new middle class or new petite bourgeoisie is flimsy in the face of distinctions between the middle class occupational variables, which, when disaggregated, are stronger and more significant than the effect of employment status. Neither is the argument for the public sector new middle class as the basis of separatism a very precise on either the class or sectoral dimension. The variation between levels within the state sector is great. In short, this analysis points to two bases of support Quebec sovereignty either not considered or not clearly articulated by the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie theorists -- the intellectuals and the employees of the Quebec government. These will be discussed at greater length in the final chapter.

Multivariate Logistic Regression -- voting YES vs. NO
*statistically significant, p < .05
**statistically significant, p < .01
***statistically significant, p < .001

Table 4.1a
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY OCCUPATION (ALL COMPARED TO MANAGERS [N=612]) EMPLOYMENT STATUS, EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS"
(N=2692)

	1	2	3	4	5
Constant	.36*** (.09)	.33 (.14)	-.53** (.19)	.83** (.26)	.91*** (.26)
Intellectuals (n=181)	1.22*** (.19)	1.17*** (.19)	.93*** (.19)	1.02*** (.20)	1.04*** (.20)
Professionals, semi-professionals and technicians (n=262)	.60*** (.15)	.55*** (.15)	.37* (.16)	.42** (.16)	.42** (.16)
Clerical and sales workers (n=272)	.20 (.15)	.13 (.15)	.15 (.15)	.06 (.15)	.07 (.15)
Manual workers (n=1224)	.26** (.10)	.20 (.10)	.38*** (.11)	.24* (.11)	.25* (.11)
Farmers (n=118)	-.07** (.20)	.11 (.21)	.33 (.22)	.25 (.22)	.29 (.22)
Students (n=23)	1.76** (.56)	1.67* (.80)	1.47 (.81)	1.43 (.83)	1.49 (.83)
Employed (n=2160)		.30** (.11)	.24* (.11)	.24* (.12)	.25* (.12)
Education			.18*** (.03)	.07* (.03)	.06 (.03)

[6]In order to keep students in the model, all of the 37 francophones with identifiable occupations who did respond to the employment status question had to be included in the analysis. In subsequent tables, models without students exclude all cases without values for employment status. The number of cases for the reference categories in this model are as follows: self-employed or both: 495; women: 1411; other regions: 671.

Age	-.24***	-.24***
	(.03)	(.03)
Gender (n=1281)		.18*
		(.08)
Montreal region (n=1286)		.36***
		(.10)
Quebec region (n=511)		.27*
		(.12)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=224)		.47**
		(.16)

Table 4.1b
FRANCOPHONE'S REFERENDUM VOTE BY DETAILED OCCUPATION (ALL COMPARED TO MANAGERS [n=612]), EMPLOYMENT STATUS, EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[7] (N=2692)

	1	2	3	4	5
Constant	.31***	.27	-.58	.78**	.85**
	(.07)	(.15)	(.20)	(.26)	(.27)
Intellectuals (n=181)	1.22***	1.17***	.93***	1.02***	1.04***
	(.19)	(.19)	(.19)	(.20)	(.20)
Professionals (n=74)	.70**	.67**	.38	.49	.49
	(.25)	(.25)	(.26)	(.26)	(.26)
Semi-professionals and technicians (n=188)	.57***	.50**	.37*	.40*	.40*
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.18)	(.18)
Clerical and sales workers (n=272)	.20	.12	.15	.06	.07
	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)
Skilled workers (n=525)	.28*	.22	.36**	.23	.22
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)
Semi-skilled workers (n=328)	.31*	.26	.46**	.28	.28
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.15)	(.15)
Unskilled workers (n=371)	.18	.10	.35*	.22	.24
	(.13)	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Farmers (n=118)	-.07	.11	.33	.25	.29
	(.20)	(.21)	(.22)	(.22)	(.22)
Students (n=23)	1.76**	1.67*	1.47	1.43	1.49
	(.56)	(.80)	(.81)	(.83)	(.83)
Employed (n=2160)		.31**	.25*	.25*	.25*
		(.11)	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)
Education			.18***	.07*	.06
			(.03)	(.03)	(.03)

[7]The number of cases in the reference categories in this model are as follows: self-employed or both: 495; women: 1411; other regions: 671.

Age	-.24*** (.03)	-.24*** (.03)
Gender (n=1281)		.18* (.08)
Montreal region (n=1286)		.36*** (.10)
Quebec region (n=511)		.27* (.12)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=224)		.47** (.16)

Table 4.2
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, REGION, AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS [N=2669][8]

1. Professional intelligentsia (n=443)
2. Large managers (n=72)
3. Small managers and clerical and sales personnel (n=812)
4. Farmers and workers (n=1342)

	1	2	3	4
Constant	.87	3.26	.63	.39
	(.67)	(1.66)	(.38)	(.29)
Education	.24**	-.05	.03	.09
	(.09)	(.23)	(.05)	(.04)
Age	-.40***	-.79**	-.25***	-.16***
	(.08)	(.23)	(.05)	(.04)
Gender	.01	.64	.15	.19
	(.22)	(.57)	(.15)	(.11)
	[226]	[35]	[359]	[650]
Montreal region	.16	-.14	.38*	.43**
	(.27)	(.66)	(.19)	(.14)
	[226]	[40]	[426]	[583]
Quebec region	-.05	.35	.40	.23
	(.32)	(.84)	(.23)	(.17)
	[86]	[13]	[159]	[250]
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore region	.75	-.14	.01	.68**
	(.51)	(1.42)	(.33)	(.21)
	[31]	[3]	[53]	[136]

[8]The number of cases in the reference categories in the respective models are as follows: women: 217, 37, 453, 692; other regions: 100, 16, 174, 373.

Table 4.3
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY OCCUPATION (ALL COMPARED TO MANAGERS), GENDER, AND REGION, BY GROUPS COMBINING AGE AND EDUCATION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS (N=2669)[a] [n]

	[n=547] Youngest, most educated	[n=1299] Youngest, least educated	[n=106] Oldest, most educated	[n=717] Oldest, least educated
	1	2	3	4
Constant	.89***	.31*	-.57	-.61***
	(.15)	(.13)	(.36)	(.15)
Intellectuals	1.27***	1.27**	1.32*	.22
	(.30)	(.45)	(.58)	(.56)
	[112]	[30]	[24]	[15]
Professionals	.62	.47	.95	-.39
	(.35)	(.93)	(.85)	(.84)
	[53]	[5]	[8]	[8]
Semi-professionals and technicians	.62*	.63*	1.59*	-.77
	(.29)	(.32)	(.74)	(.46)
	[92]	[51]	[11]	[34]
Clerical and sales personnel	.73*	.01	1.60	-.11
	(.36)	(.21)	(.85)	(.31)
	[52]	[149]	[8]	[63]
Skilled workers	.73*	.18	-.88	.30
	(.37)	(.17)	(1.13)	(.23)
	[49]	[323]	[11]	[142]
Semi-skilled workers	.12	.26	–	.28
	(.49)	(.19)		(.27)
	[20]	[225]		[83]
Unskilled workers	.71	.18	.74	.23
	(.53)	(.19)	(1.32)	(.24)
	[20]	[211]	[3]	[137]
Farmers	.66	-.15	–	.13
	(.73)	(.30)		(.33)
	[10]	[56]		[52]

[a]The number of cases in the reference categories in the respective models are as follows: managers: 139, 249, 41, 183; women: 249, 715, 44, 391; other regions: 117, 337, 16, 193.

Gender	.48* (.19) [298]	.11 (.11) [584]	-.51 (.46) [62]	.19 (.16) [326]
Montreal region	.29 (.24) [269]	.32* (.14) [593]	.38 (.71) [63]	.58** (.20) [350]
Quebec region	.55 (.30) [114]	.13 (.17) [246]	.52 (.84) [19]	.33 (.24) [129]
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions	.45 (.40) [47]	.44* (.22) [123]	.89 (1.03) [8]	.71* (.34) [45]

Table 4.4
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY DETAILED OCCUPATION (ALL COMPARED TO MANAGERS [n=612]), EDUCATION, AGE, EDUCATION BY AGE (INTERACTION), GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[10]
(N=2692)

	1	2	3	4	5
Constant	.31***	-.56***	-1.04***	-.11	-.05
	(.07)	(.15)	(.16)	(.27)	(.27)
Intellectuals (n=181)	1.22***	.96***	1.05***	1.02***	1.05***
	(.19)	(.19)	(.19)	(.20)	(.20)
Professionals (n=74)	.70**	.40	.51	.43	.42
	(.25)	(.26)	(.26)	(.27)	(.27)
Semi-professionals and technicians (n=188)	.57***	.42*	.45**	.42*	.42*
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.18)	(.18)
Clerical and sales workers (n=272)	.20	.21	.12	.11	.12
	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)
Skilled workers (n=525)	.28*	.41***	.28*	.30*	.29*
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)
Semi-skilled workers (n=328)	.31*	.51***	.33*	.36*	.36*
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.15)
Unskilled workers (n=371)	.18	.41**	.29*	.29*	.31*
	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Farmers (n=118)	-.07	.19	.11	.05	.09
	(.20)	(.21)	(.21)	(.21)	(.21)
Students (n=23)	1.76**	1.49**	1.23*	.98	1.03
	(.56)	(.56)	(.56)	(.57)	(.58)
Education		.18***	.07*	-.18**	-.20**
		(.03)	(.03)	(.07)	(.07)

[10]The number of cases in the reference categories in this model are as follows: women: 1411; other regions: 671

Age	-.24***	.06	.06
	(.03)	(.07)	(.07)
Education by age (interaction)		.07***	.07***
		(.02)	(.02)
Gender (n=1281)			.17*
			(.08)
Montreal region (n=1286)			.37***
			(.10)
Quebec region (n=511)			.25*
			(.12)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=224)			.49**
			(.16)

Table 4.5
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY CLASS (ALL COMPARED TO WORKING CLASS [N=1224]), EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[11]
(N=2669)

	1	2	3	4
Constant	-.04 (.07)	.91*** (.12)	.37 (.21)	.44* (.21)
Middle class (n=1327)	.06 (.08)	-.24** (.09)	-.11 (.09)	-.11 (.09)
Farmers (n=118)	-.32 (.19)	-.23 (.20)	-.17 (.20)	-.14 (.20)
Education		.22*** (.03)	.12*** (.03)	.11*** (.03)
Age			-.22*** (.03)	-.22*** (.03)
Gender (n=1270)				.18* (.08)
Montreal region (n=1275)				.35*** (.10)
Quebec region (n=508)				.26* (.12)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=223)				.47** (.16)

[11]The number of cases in the reference categories of this model are as follows: women: 1399; other regions: 663.

Table 4.6
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY MIDDLE CLASS OCCUPATION (ALL COMPARED TO MANAGERS [n=612]), EMPLOYMENT STATUS, EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[12] (N=1317)

	1	2	3	4	5
Constant	.33***	.23*	-.69**	1.17***	1.24***
	(.07)	(.09)	(.23)	(.34)	(.35)
Intellectuals (n=173)	1.22***	1.17***	.93***	1.04***	1.07***
	(.19)	(.19)	(.20)	(.20)	(.20)
Professionals (n=74)	.70**	.67**	.39	.49	.47
	(.25)	(.25)	(.26)	(.27)	(.27)
Semi-professionals and technicians (n=188)	.57***	.50**	.37*	.38*	.38*
	(.17)	(.17)	(.18)	(.18)	(.18)
Clerical and sales workers (n=270)	.20	.12	.15	.02	.02
	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.16)	(.16)
New middle class[13] (n=1064)		.31*	.24	.28	.30
		(.15)	(.15)	(.16)	(.16)
Education			.17***	.05	.04
			(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Age				-.32***	-.33***
				(.04)	(.04)
Gender (n=613)					.20
					(.12)
Montreal region (n=690)					.30*
					(.15)
Quebec region (n=254)					.32
					(.18)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=87)					.22
					(.26)

[12]The number of cases in the reference categories of this model are as follows: old middle class: 253; women: 704; other regions: 286.

[13]The new middle class status refers to the salaried category of the employment status variable.

Table 4.7
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY SALARIED AND SELF-EMPLOYED MIDDLE CLASS OCCUPATIONS (ALL COMPARED TO SELF-EMPLOYED INTELLECTUALS [N=22]), EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[14]
(N=1317)

	1	2	3	4
Constant	.22 (.12)	-.72** (.24)	1.14** (.35)	-.36 (1.77)
Salaried intellectuals (n=152)	-.95 (.65)	-1.10 (.65)	-.97 (.66)	-.94 (.66)
Salaried professionals (n=59)	-1.25 (.68)	-1.41* (.68)	-1.30 (.69)	-1.34 (.69)
Salaried semi-professionals and technicians (n=174)	-1.38* (.64)	-1.41* (.64)	-1.39* (.65)	-1.41* (.65)
Salaried managers (n=424)	-1.95** (.63)	-1.85** (.63)	-1.84** (.64)	-1.87** (.64)
Salaried clerical and sales (n=257)	-1.84** (.63)	-1.70** (.64)	-1.82** (.64)	-1.84** (.64)
Self-employed professionals (n=15)	-1.71* (.81)	-1.91* (.81)	-1.84* (.82)	-1.92* (.83)
Self-employed semi-professionals and technicians (n=14)	-2.76** (.86)	-2.65** (.86)	-2.62** (.87)	-2.66** (.87)
Self-employed entrepreneurs (n=188)	-2.28*** (.64)	-2.09** (.64)	-2.13** (.65)	-2.16*** (.65)

[14]The number of cases in the reference categories are as follows: women: 704; other regions: 286.

Self-employed clerical and sales (n=14)	-2.13** (.82)	-2.06* (.83)	-2.21* (.84)	-2.28** (.84)
Education		.18*** (.04)	.06 (.04)	.04 (.04)
Age			-.32*** (.04)	-.33*** (.04)
Gender (n=613)				-.18 (.12)
Montreal region (n=690)				.31* (.15)
Quebec region (n=254)				.35 (.18)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=87)				.24 (.26)

Table 4.8
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY CLASS (ALL COMPARED TO OLD MIDDLE CLASS [n=253]), EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[15]
(N=2659)

	1	2	3	4
Constant	-.07 (.06)	-.95*** (.12)	.35 (.21)	.42* (.21)
New Middle Class (n=1064)	.44** (.14)	.32* (.14)	.35* (.14)	.36* (.14)
Working Class (1224)	.30* (.14)	.49*** (.14)	.38** (.14)	.39** (.15)
Farmers (n=118)	-.03 (.22)	.26 (.23)	.21 (.24)	.25 (.24)
Education		.21*** (.03)	.11*** (.03)	.10*** (.03)
Age			-.22*** (.03)	-.22*** (.03)
Gender (n=1263)				.19* (.08)
Montreal region (n=1273)				.35*** (.10)
Quebec region (n=504)				.27* (.12)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=223)				.47** (.16)

[15]The number of cases in the reference categories are as follows: women: 1396; other regions: 659.

Table 4.9
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY CLASS (ALL COMPARED TO UPPER OLD MIDDLE CLASS [N=238]), EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[16]
(N=2659)

	1	2	3	4
Constant	-.04 (.05)	-.94*** (.13)	.40 (.21)	.47* (.21)
Upper new middle class (n=807)	.49*** (.15)	.34* (.15)	.39* (.15)	.40** (.15)
Clerical and sales workers (n=272)	.24 (.18)	.24 (.18)	.16 (.18)	.17 (.18)
Workers (n=1224)	.30* (.14)	.48** (.15)	.36* (.15)	.37* (.15)
Farmers (n=118)	-.03 (.23)	.25 (.23)	.19 (.24)	.23 (.24)
Education		.21*** (.03)	.10*** (.03)	.10** (.03)
Age			-.23*** (.03)	-.23*** (.03)
Gender (n=1263)				.18* (.08)
Montreal region (n=1273)				.36*** (.10)
Quebec region (n=504)				.28* (.12)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=223)				.47** (.16)

[16]The number of cases in the reference categories are as follows: women: 1396; other regions: 659.

Table 4.10
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY CLASS (ALL COMPARED TO PRIVATE SECTOR OLD MIDDLE CLASS [n=147]), EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[17] (Last three studies only)
(N=1504)

	1	2	3	4
Constant	-.08	-.92	.66*	.74*
	(.07)	(.17)	(.30)	(.30)
Public new middle class (n=279)	.77***	.58**	.64**	.66**
	(.20)	(.21)	(.22)	(.22)
Private new middle class (n=329)	.33	.29	.29	.31
	(.20)	(.20)	(.21)	(.21)
Workers (n=686)	.45*	.62**	.49*	.49*
	(.18)	(.19)	(.13)	(.19)
Farmers (n=63)	.05	.26	.13	.16
	(.31)	(.31)	(.32)	(.32)
Education		.19***	.07	.06
		(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Age			-.26***	-.26***
			(.04)	(.04)
Gender (n=724)				.12
				(.11)
Montreal region (n=723)				.20
				(.13)
Quebec region (n=290)				.25
				(.16)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=123)				.40
				(.22)

[17]The number of cases in the reference categories are as follows: women: 780; other regions: 368.

Table 4.11
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY CLASS (ALL COMPARED TO PRIVATE SECTOR OLD MIDDLE CLASS [n=146]), EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[18] (Last three studies only) (N=1504)

	1	2	3	4
Constant	-.07 (.08)	-.92*** (.18)	.70* (.31)	.78* (.32)
Private new middle class (n=329)	.35 (.20)	.31 (.20)	.31 (.21)	.32 (.21)
Municipal new middle class (n=33)	.48 (.39)	.38 (.39)	.34 (.40)	.33 (.40)
Provincial new middle class (n=199)	1.05*** (.22)	.83*** (.23)	.91*** (.23)	.94*** (.24)
Federal new middle class (n=48)	-.01 (.34)	-.11 (.34)	-.04 (.35)	-.01 (.35)
Workers (n=686)	.46* (.19)	.63** (.19)	.50** (.19)	.50** (.19)
Farmers (n=63)	.06 (.31)	.26 (.31)	.13 (.32)	.17 (.32)
Education		.18*** (.04)	.06 (.04)	.05 (.04)
Age			-.26*** (.04)	-.27*** (.04)
Gender (n=724)				.13 (.11)
Montreal region (n=723)				.22 (.13)
Quebec region (n=290)				.25 (.16)

[18]The number of cases in the reference categories are as follows: women: 780; other regions: 368.

Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=123)	.38 (.22)

Table 4.12
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY CLASS (COMPARED TO MANAGERS [N=612]), EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[19]
(N=2669)

	1	2	3	4
Constant	.04 (.05)	-.78*** (.13)	.61** (.22)	.68** (.22)
Narrower New Class/ Professional intelligentsia (n=443)	.84*** (.13)	.61*** (.13)	.68*** (.14)	.69*** (.14)
Clerical & sales (n=272)	.20 (.15)	.21 (.15)	.12 (.15)	.13 (.15)
Workers (n=1224)	.26** (.10)	.44** (.10)	.30** (.11)	.31** (.11)
Farmers (n=118)	-.07 (.20)	.20 (.21)	.12 (.21)	.16 (.21)
Education		.19*** (.03)	.08** (.03)	.07* (.03)
Age			-.23*** (.03)	-.23*** (.03)
Gender (n=1270)				.18* (.08)
Montreal regions (n=1275)				.36*** (.10)
Quebec region (n=508)				.26* (.12)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=223)				.48** (.16)

[19]The number of cases in the reference categories are as follows: women: 1399; other regions: 663.

Table 4.13
FRANCOPHONES' REFERENDUM VOTE BY OCCUPATION (ALL COMPARED TO MANAGERS [n=359]), EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND SECTOR (ALL COMPARED TO FEDERAL SECTOR [n=88]), EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER, AND REGION: COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS[20] (Last three studies only) (N=1500)

	1	2	3	4	5
Constant	.12 (.06)	.07 (.09)	-.71*** (.19)	.95** (.32)	1.00** (.33)
Intellectuals (n=84)	1.05*** (.26)	.68* (.28)	.50 (.28)	.62* (.29)	.64* (.29)
Professionals (n=46)	.79* (.32)	.66* (.33)	.43 (.33)	.55 (.34)	.53 (.34)
Semi-pro. & technicians (n=115)	.55* (.22)	.32 (.23)	.19 (.23)	.20 (.23)	.19 (.23)
Clerical & sales workers (n=151)	.19 (.19)	.05 (.20)	.06 (.20)	-.02 (.21)	-.02 (.21)
Skilled workers (n=289)	.34* (.16)	.29 (.16)	.41* (.16)	.27 (.17)	.25 (.17)
Semi-skilled workers (n=180)	.39* (.18)	.32 (.19)	.51** (.19)	.31 (.20)	.30 (.20)
Unskilled workers (n=213)	.19 (.17)	.07 (.18)	.28 (.19)	.17 (.19)	.17 (.19)
Farmers (n=63)	-.10 (.28)	.16 (.29)	.32 (.30)	.16 (.30)	.19 (.31)
Self-employed (n=276)		.04 (.26)	.14 (.26)	.11 (.27)	.09 (.27)
Privately employed (n=805)		.41 (.23)	.47* (.23)	.43 (.24)	.43 (.24)

[20]The number of cases in the reference categories are as follows: women: 777; other regions: 366.

Municipal sector (n=61	.46 (.34)	.50 (.34)	.47 (.35)	.42 (.35)
Provincial sector (n=270)	.86*** (.26)	.85** (.26)	.84** (.26)	.83** (.26)
Education		.17*** (.04)	.04 (.04)	.03 (.04)
Age			-.27*** (.04)	-.27*** (.04)
Gender (n=723)				.11 (.11)
Montreal region (n=722)				.21 (.14)
Quebec region (n=289)				.27 (.16)
Lac St-Jean/ North Shore regions (n=123)				.37 (.22)

Chapter Five
CONCLUSION

The main established notions as to the basis of support for the Quebec independence movement, in particular, the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses, are not only theoretically implausible but are not supported by my data analysis. The narrow, career-based motivations for separatism that are imputed to the Francophone salaried middle class do not make these arguments very persuasive, considering the breadth of issues that underly separatist sentiment, and considering also the diversity of occupational orientations and interests that comprise this class. To my knowledge, no argument for the new middle class as the core of the separatist movement is adequately empirically substantiated.

This analysis of referendum support for sovereignty-association is one of a very few that properly operationalizes the class variables in order to test these new middle class hypotheses. The results largely disconfirm the hypotheses. At the zero-order, the new middle class is not much more favourable to Quebec sovereignty than the Francophone labour force as a whole. The multivariate analyses reveal that the new middle class's probability of supporting sovereignty-association, relative to the old middle class, is actually less significant than that of the working class. Little enhancement of that probability is gained by excluding the lower new middle class of clerical and sales workers. These findings are not surprising considering the heterogeneity of opinion among the occupational groups that make up the new middle class, as indicated by the ANOVA procedure, and by the multivariate analysis in table 4.9, in which the effect of employment status for the middle class occupations is non-significant. It appears that Friedson's succinct evaluation of the new class concept can be as aptly applied to the new middle class. It, too, is a "salad". At least in the case of the Quebec independence movement, it is an inappropriate

aggregation of groups that have little internal consensus, and that, as a class, do not surpass all other classes in supporting sovereignty-association.

The public sector caveat of the new middle class is also damaged by our findings. The concept of the public new middle class muffles the intensity of the provincial and municipal new middle class support for sovereignty by aggregating these groups with the federal new middle class, who are one of the groups most opposed to sovereignty in the whole sample. Independent of the effect of the intellectual occupations, the effect of the provincial sector on the referendum vote is very strong and significant. This finding suggests the need to consider dissensus between federal and provincial employees in any future investigation of support for separation.

As discussed in chapter four, it is unlikely that the separatism of the Francophone intellectuals derives from their employment by the Quebec government. Rather, the provincial public sector in Quebec seems to be an important basis of sovereigntist sentiment separate from and in addition to the Francophone intellectuals. We have too few cases with information on employment sector to know whether the effect of intellectuals, in particular, the self-employed intellectuals, is as significant as that of the provincial public sector. But some empirical and theoretical considerations that uphold the intellectuals hypothesis have been discussed in chapter four. Furthermore, the motivations underlying the intellectuals' and the other provincial employees' support for sovereignty are probably different. It should be kept in mind that many (close to 30%) of the provincially-employed intellectuals in our sample work in para-public (as opposed to public) institutions, undoubtedly mainly in universities and schools. These institutions receive their funding primarily from the province, but are in other respects autonomous from the Quebec government. Because they do not implement government policy, teachers and professors do not stand to

gain from independence in the same way that direct provincial employees might. They cannot expect an expansion of their functions with the transfer of federal jurisdictions to a national Quebec government.

So, while grievances related to language and ethnic identity may motivate both direct and indirect provincial employees to favour sovereignty, the former are likely to harbour aspirations for greater job security, better chances of advancement, and higher pay. These are the kinds of materialist, career-related motives that according to public choice theory, produce a tendency among bureaucrats to vote on the left (André, Blake, and Dion, 1990). They are also the kinds of incentives imputed by writers like Albert Breton (1964) to the Francophone new middle class as Quebec's foremost nationalists. Breton's argument, it will be recalled, is that the new middle class were the only ones who stood to benefit from the nationalization of hydro-electric companies to create Hydro-Québec, through the provision of new middle class jobs. Yet as the data in table 3.5b suggest, the provincial/federal sectoral cleavage affects not only the Francophone middle class but also the working class. It appears, then, that the argument for the state fraction of the new middle class does not go far enough on either the occupational or employment sector dimension, in identifying the basis of support for the independence movement.

The case for a new class hypothesis of Quebec separatism depends on how the class is defined. As we have seen, the new class as conceived of by Inglehart (1981), Ladd (1978), and Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1977), which includes salaried managers, is more sovereigntist than the upper old middle class, but not much more than the working class. The evidence is stronger for the narrower new class as defined by Kristol (1978). A considerably higher proportion of the narrow new class, or professional intelligentsia, voted YES in the referendum than the managers or the working class, independent

of the other variables. Still, relative to the other occupational groups, there is a greater enhancement of the intellectuals' support for sovereignty than that of the professional intelligentsia.

The narrow new class hypothesis is not as precise in identifying the core of mass support for sovereignty as the intellectuals hypothesis. But our data suggest that of the other class or occupational groups, the narrow new class is the most probable ally of the intellectuals in the independence movement. We may speculate that, like the intellectuals, the professional intelligentsia are probably largely unburdened by preoccupations over the economic repercussions of separation. As practitioners of culture, they may also share with the intellectuals a concern for the preservation of the French language and identity.

The intellectuals hypothesis is the one that is best supported by our data. Several questions might be raised as to the relevance of our results to the Quebec independence movement. Firstly, what do data about selections on a referendum allow us to say about actual involvement in the independence movement? And considering that intellectuals comprise only 7% of the Francophones in our sample, and only 10% of the Francophone YES-voters, how important can their role in the movement be, even if no other class or occupational group is more favourable to sovereignty than they are? In fact, as an indicator of "mobilization potential" for the independence movement, to use Kreisi's term (1989), the surveys of referendum voting are instructive. An analysis of the composition of the Parti Québécois by Pinard and Hamilton (1984) provides some reason to expect that the relatively inactive manifestation of the intellectuals' support for the sovereigntist option in the referendum is not only translated into action, but also magnified in the independence movement. The intellectuals are increasingly overrepresented in the higher levels of participation in the PQ, comprising 50% of PQ

candidates in 1981, 51% of the party's deputies, and 67% of the Cabinet Ministers in 1982. Yet intellectuals made up only 7% of candidates in the provincial Liberal Party in 1976 (Pinard and Hamilton, 1984, pp. 34-35). Furthermore, the intellectuals' small share of the Francophone labour force does not warrant their dimunition as a factor that is strongly associated with support for independence. We would not dismiss age or education on such grounds. Finally, and most importantly, the intellectuals are arguably a special element in a community, more so than the small sub-groups of the young or the highly educated. Because they specialize in the formulation and articulation of ideas, their opinions may be particularly influential. In short, if there is any group that can mobilize popular support around a given issue, drawing allies to its own camp, it is the intellectuals. The success of the Francophone intellectuals in this respect will be considered below.

Perhaps a more serious concern is the question of how an analysis of data that is nine to twelve years old, is relevant to the independence movement of today. It is reasonable to wonder whether changes in Quebec's political climate since our data were collected, particularly those wrought by Quebec's continued absence from the Constitutional fold, have altered the character and constituency of the independence movement.[1] Evidence of a recent intensification of nationalism in Quebec is apparent in the 1990 creation of the first separatist party at the federal level, the Bloc Québécois, and in the muting of

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[1]The Quebec government was the only provincial government not to give its assent to the repatriated Constitution in 1982. Since then, one attempt to garner Quebec's approval of the Constitution, known as the Meech Lake Accord, failed to gain the legislative approval of two of the other nine provinces in time for the deadline in June 1990. This failure, perceived in Quebec as a rejection of mild demands put forth by a federalist provincial government, led to a resurgence of nationalist sentiment in Quebec.

the formerly clear federalist position in the Quebec Liberal Party. At the mass level, opinion polls chart a recent leap in support for sovereignty-association. Poll data shows support lapsing between 1980, when it stood at 42%, and 1985, when 34% of respondents to a single survey taken that year said they would vote for sovereignty-association. However, by 1989 it was back up to 40%, and in 1991 the average, based on seven polls, was 58% (Pinard, 1992).[2]

This expansion in support for sovereignty has been accompanied by a diffusion of support along several dimensions, relative to the period when our data was collected. The relationship between age and education on the one hand, and sovereigntist feeling on the other, has diminished. Between 1985 and 1991, support for sovereignty grew disproportionately among the older and less educated segments of the population, according to polls by Sorecom and Multi-Réso (Pinard, 1992, n. 49). There has also been a change in the occupational pattern of support. In table 5.1 are results of a panel study carried out in 1991 by Multi-Réso. The Multi-Réso results group those highly and mainly favourable to sovereignty-association according to occupational groups. For convenient comparison, the analagous figures from the data analysed in this thesis, some of which had not been presented earlier, are also given.[3]

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[2]Support for sovereignty was so low that no surveys on the matter, that we know of, were carried out from 1986 through 1988. Quebec nationalism was probably really re-ignited in 1987, as the result of criticism of the Meech Lake Accord that began to rumble in English Canada immediately after the Accord's approval by the nine provincial Premiers (Pinard, 1992).

[3]The Multi-Reso results are not selected for ethnicity, so that they include non-Francophones. But given that, according to our data, the occupational pattern of support in among Francophones and non-Francophones is the same, their inclusion should not hinder a comparison with our findings. Results for farmers are not presented in this table.

Table 5.1
PERCENTAGE FAVOURABLE TO SOVEREIGNTY-ASSOCIATION BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS (% of [])

	Professionals & technicians[4]	Managers	Clerical employees	Workers	Students
June 1991	[203] 64	[64] 59	[169] 56	[299] 58	[62] 62
Sept. 1991	[142] 66	[45] 63	[117] 67	[218] 66	[49] 68
Merged data (French only)	[531] 55	[739] 37	[339] 40	[1547] 41	[26] 73

Relative to the data from our sample, higher levels of support for sovereignty-association are found in all groups except the students in these 1991 surveys. Support has increased most notably among the managers, clerical and manual workers. Of these increases, perhaps the most surprising is that of the managers. In my data they were second lowest only to the farmers in support for sovereignty. One may speculate that if fear of negative economic consequences of separation used to restrain the managers' support for the sovereigntist option, those fears were largely allayed by the summer of 1991. In other words, business owners and administrators may feel a new confidence in the economic prospects for an independent Quebec. According to Stéphane Dion, expert testimony before the Belanger-Campeau Commission in 1990-91 could have left Quebec business people with the impression that the province could fairly painlessly weather a rupture from Canada. This, and the reports to the Commission of substantial strides in Quebec's economic performance, may well

[4]This group corresponds with our professional intelligentsia.

have nourished the optomism as to the feasibility of independence, that was revealed in a 1990 poll of top business people (Dion, 1992, pp. 101-102).[5] The Multi-Réso data on managers contrasts dramatically with the 1992 survey of top administrators by the Conseil du Patronat du Québec, in which only 13% of those respondents favoured sovereignty-association (see Chapter Three). Though their managerial category is broader than (and therefore not exactly comparable with) that of Multi-Réso, it raises the question of the consistency of the managerial opinion on Quebec sovereignty over time. So does the fluctuation in the managers' support for straightforward independence (sovereignty without association) in the Multi-Réso survey -- the managers' support for this option was at 49% in June, but dropped by 9% in three months. Further surveys would be needed in order to establish the stability of the managers' support.

What is most striking in Table 5.1 is the dramatic dimunition of the gap in support for sovereignty-association between the professional group (or the professional intelligentsia) and the others, relative to our data. There is virtually no variation between these groups now. This is remarkable in light of the stability in the occupational pattern of support for independence from 1963 to 1980, documented by Pinard and Hamilton (1984, p. 44). While these data do not permit a comparison between the intellectuals disaggregated from the professional intelligentsia, and the other groups, this disparity is undoubtedly less than a third of what it was in the early 1980's vis-á-vis the managers, and

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[5]Dion cites data in Les Affaires, May 12, 1990. 48.5% of chief executives surveyed believed that independence would be good for Quebec.

even smaller for the lower middle class and working class.[6]

As a snapshot of mass support for the independence movement, the 1991 occupational data indicate that none of the hypotheses examined in this paper adequately identifies the present basis of support. In effect, as of the most recent investigation, there is no such basis. But this moment in the life of the separatist movement does not tell us very much. It certainly does not justify discarding or ignoring the picture of potential participation in the independence movement that emerged in our analysis and in previous studies, in which the intellectuals were consistently at the foreground. Rather, it is a matter of putting the two pictures together and seeking some explanation for the change that has occurred.

The crucial, general factors that precipitate recruitment into collective action, or that promote adherence to the objectives of a social movement, are the subject of some scholarly dissensus. While this is not the place to review theories of collective action, it is a sound assumption that as with all social movements, the mobilization of support for Quebec independence has been affected by social and political organization, human and material resources, beliefs and ideologies, and motivational factors. The relative importance of these factors has varied with fluctuations in the character and strength of the movement.[7]

Motivations, in particular, have undoubtedly played a crucial role in the newest re-awakening of sovereigntist feeling, and its diffusion through all occupational strata in

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[6]This speculation is based on the zero-order level of support for sovereignty-association among intellectuals that our data reveals (64%), which is unlikely to have decreased since the early 1980's.

[7]See Pinard (1992) for an analysis of the dynamics of support for sovereignty since the appearance of the movement in the early 1960's to its most recent come-back.

Quebec. Pinard and Hamilton (1986) find that ethnic grievances, collective economic incentives, and the expectation of the success of the YES-forces in the 1980 referendum, were all positively related to support for the YES option among intended Francophone voters. At least two of these types of motivations are involved in the present dynamic of the independence movement. The 1990 failure of the Meech Lake Accord represents an escalation of ethnic grievances sufficient to push many Quebecers, even those in the business and working classes who previously were more opposed to sovereignty-association than in favour of it, into the sovereigntist camp. Secondly, whereas to say that more Francophones now anticipate an improvement in Quebec's economy to result from secession would be an exaggeration, there is generally less fear of the economic disincentives to independence now than previously. The proportion of those anticipating a deterioration of Quebec's economy to accompany secession decreased from 63% in 1970 to 47% in 1992, while, conversely, the proportion expecting an improvement increased from 14% to 25% (Pinard, 1992, p. 28).

Apart from these motivational aspects, or indeed we might say, beneath them, further psychological and structural changes in Quebec society have provided a foundation for the latest resurgence of separatism. Francophone Quebecers' attachment to Canada has been declining steadily since 1970, eclipsed, it appears, by their increasing self-identification as Québécois (Pinard, 1992, pp. 30-31). Furthermore, the transformation within the Quebec provincial and federal political structure mentioned above not only demonstrates strong separatist convictions but may also ignite and nourish them (Pinard, 1992, pp. 32-34).

It is true that the nationalist intellectuals have always had some allies in other classes (Pinard and Hamilton, 1982, p. 45). But the role of the intellectuals in articulating and drawing attention to grievances and collective incentives (or

more accurately, the decrease in disincentives) should not be dismissed, especially as federalist voices among Francophone intellectuals have grown fainter in recent years. It could be that the recent augmentation of political grievances has enhanced the persuasive capacity of Quebec's independentist intellectuals.[8]

Time and further investigation will tell whether the apparent diffusion of sovereigntist sentiment among the formerly weakly supportive occupational groups is a stable phenomenon, or a temporary response to the charged political climate in Quebec. It is also an important matter of further study whether the homogeneity of attitudes across and within classes is reflected in the composition of movement activists. In other words, have the intellectuals succeeded in forging alliances with the workers and the business class at the level of participation, such as, for example, in the personnel of the Parti Québécois? Further research should be directed not only at the descriptive issue of the class composition of support for the independence movement, and whether and how this has changed, but also at the related psychological questions. In particular, do the incentives, expectations, and reservations that underly Francophones' views of Quebec sovereignty differ according to their occupation or class?

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[8]The Francophone intelligentsia's influence on Quebec's political agenda may be anecdotally illustrated by Le Devoir editor Lise Bissonnette's unambiguous reaction to a new constitional package cobbled together by the provincial Premiers (excluding the Quebec Premier), territorial and aboriginal representatives on July 7, 1992. On July 9, Bissonnette's editorial was, in super-enlarged script, the word "NON". One of the aspects of the package that nationalist commentators in Quebec seemed to find most objectionable was the "Triple-E" Senate (equal, elected, and efficient). According to results of a poll by Angus Reid-Southam News published on August 10 (The Gazette, pp. A1-A2), 47% of Quebecers found the proposed Triple-E Senate unacceptable. While it is a matter for speculation whether the opinions of the media elites fuel or simply reflect mass opinion, the former possibility should not be dismissed.

For instance, do managers and intellectuals who support sovereignty-association want the same thing? This should involve a reformulation of the old question about Quebec nationalism popularly posed by outsiders, "What does Quebec want?", to "Who wants what, and why?"

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Appendix A
DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Table 1
DESCRIPTION OF SURVEYS

	Date	Direction of Survey	Consultant	Number of completed interviews
Survey 1	May 4-9 1980	Maurice Pinard & Richard Hamilton	-	1020
Survey 2	August 16-25 1980	Sorecom	Maurice Pinard	787
Survey 3	March 18-22 1980	Sorecom	Maurice Pinard	761
Survey 4	March 30 - April 5 1980	Sorecom	Maurice Pinard	766
Survey 5	April 21-25 1983	Sorecom	Maurice Pinard	743
			Total of completed interviews	4077

Table 2
SOURCE OF VARIABLES USED IN DATA ANALYSIS

Variables	Survey Questions 1	2	3	4	5
Referendum vote	Q30+Q32	Q16+Q17	Q17	Q17	Q23
Occupation of head of household	Q39	Q41	Q22	Q22	Q28
Employment status	Q40	Q42	Q23A	Q23A	Q29+Q30
Employment sector	-	-	Q23B	Q23B	Q29+Q31
Age	Q37	Q39	Q20	Q19	Q25
Education	Q38	Q40	Q21	Q20	Q26
Ethnicity	Q41	Q43	Q24	Q24	Q32
Gender	Q47	Q48	Q30	Q28	Q35
Region	Cover, col. 9	Cover, col. 11	Cover, col.11	Cover, col.11	Cover, col. 11
Regional sectors	Cover, col. 10	Cover, col. 12	Q32	Q30	Q33

Referendum vote
Survey 1
Q30. "If the forthcoming referendum were held today, how would you vote, YES or NO?" Yes
No
D.K.
Q32 (if D.K. on Q30) "Maybe you are still undecided, suppose you had to make a choice today, how would you be tempted to vote, YES or NO?"
Yes
No
D.K.
(Q24 of this survey asks "If in the present referendum, instead of asking for a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association, you were asked to give a mandate to realize sovereignty-association, would you vote or would you be tempted to vote YES or NO?")

Survey 2
Q16. "Did you happen to vote on referendum day?"

Yes
No
Refuse/No answer

Q17 (if YES on Q16) "Did you vote YES or NO to the referendum question?"
Yes
No
Don't know/refusal
Void ballot
No answer

Survey 3,4,5
"To complete this series of questions, would you tell me if, in the May 1980 referendum you voted for the YES or the NO side?
I voted Yes
I voted No
I didn't vote
DK/refusal

Ethnicity
Surveys 1,2
"Are you a French-Canadian, English-Canadian, or a Canadian or some other origin?"
French Canadan
English Canadian
Other origin

Survey 3-5
"What is your mother tongue?"
French
English
Other

Occupation of head of household
Surveys 1-5
"What is the main occupation of the head of the household or its main earner/breadwinner? Specify in detail."
Instruction to interviewer: "If unemployed, retired, inactive, on welfare, or deceased", what was his/her last occupation?"

Employment Status
Surveys 1-4
"Is that (was that) an occupation for someone else or a self-employed occupation?"
Working for someone else
Self-employed
Partly someone else and partly employed

Survey 5
Q29 "Is he (was he) working for a private enterprise, a public

enterprise, or a para-public enterprise?"
Private
Public
Para-public

Q30 (if private) "Is that (was that) an occupation for someone else or a self-employed occupation?"
For someone else
Self-employed
Partly someone else and partly self-employed

Employment Sector
Surveys 3,4
"Is that occupation for private or public enterprise or for indirectly public administrations?"
Instruction to interviewer: "If not clear, take down in detail place of work"
Private enterprise
Municipal public enterprise
Provincial public enterprise
Federal public enterprise
Indirectly public under: municipal
provincial
federal
Other or not clear

Survey 5
Q31 (if public or parapublic on Q29) "To which level of government does that enterprise belong? Is it the:
Municipal level
Provincial level
Federal level

Age
Surveys 1-5
"Which age group do you belong to?"
18 to 20
21 to 24
24 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 and over

Education
Surveys 1-5
"How many years of schooling have you completed?"
5 years or less
6 or 7
8 or 9
10 or 11
12 or 13
14 or 15

16 or more

Gender
Surveys 1-5
Sex of respondent:
Male
Female

Region
Surveys 1-5
Region:
Bas St. Laurent/Gaspesie
Saguenay/Lac St-Jean
Quebec
Mauricie
Cantons de l'Est
Montreal
Outaouais
Nord Ouest (Abitibi)
Cote Nord

Regional Sectors
Surveys 1-5
Montreal and Laval East
Montreal and Laval West
North Shore
South Shore
Quebec City and suburb
Rest of Quebec region
Rest of province

Appendix B
LIST OF OCCUPATIONS[1]

1. Intellectuals

Artist
Author
Biologist
Bishop
College Classique teacher
Editor
Geologist
Interpretor
Journalist
Librarian
Professor
School inspector
Singer

2. Other Professionals

Accountant
Actuary
Architect
Dentist
Engineer
Judge
Lawyer
Optometrist
Pharmacist
Surgeon
Veterinarian

3. Other Semi-Professionals and Technicians

Airline host/hostess
Athlete
Computer programmer
Community organizer
Dental hygienist
Designer
Insurance adjuster
Laboratory technician
Nurse
Pilot
Radiologist

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[1]This occupational coding scheme has been widely used in Quebec. A more detailed definition of the occupational categories is available from Professor Maurice Pinard upon request.

Social animator
Social worker

4. Owners and Managers of Large and Medium-sized Enterprises

Company president
Contractor
Departmental bureau chief
Manager or owner of - bank
caisse populaire
large store or restaurant
hotel
industrial enterprise
etc.
Mayor
Member of Parliament
Military officer
Police officer

5. Owners and Managers of Small Enterprises

Archivist
Insurance agent
Merchant
Manager or owner of - small store
small hotel
etc.
Military captain or lieutenant
Personnel director
Placement officer
Police captain or lieutenant
Publicity agent
Real estate agent

6. Clerical and Sales Personnel[2]

Bailiff
Bank clerk
Cashier
Civil servant
Customs officer
Secretary
Telephone operator
Unchartered accountant
Usher
Warehouseman

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[2]It should be noted that many of the sales personnel fall into the category of small administrators.

7. Skilled Workers

Baker
Barber
Dressmaker

Esthetician
Florist
Land surveyor
Mechanic
Piano tuner
Police agent
Prison guard
Shoemaker
Welder

8. Semi-skilled workers

Assembler
Barman
Breeder
Dispatcher
Gardiner
Miner
Sailor
Taxi-driver
Toolmaker
Train conductor

9. Unskilled workers

Brakesman
Carpetlayer
Concierge
Dishwasher
Gravedigger
Housekeeper
Nurse's aide
Packer
Railwayman
Shipper
Waiter/waitress

Appendix C
A COMPARISON OF OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROBABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS

The coefficients generated by logistic regression can be "translated" into estimates of the probabilities of voting for sovereignty-association. Estimated probabilities for given class or occupational groups can be compared with the observed proportions of YES-voters in those groups, with the same non-occupational characteristics. In the following set of tables are the probability estimates for these groups, net of age and education effects, for a few illustrative cases. Only age and education are considered because the determination of the percentages of YES-voters, beyond specifications as to two or three non-occupational variables, is either unreliable or impossible. There simply are not enough actual cases of intersection of all of the variables in our sample. This means that there are no observed probabilities with which to compare our estimates for the later stages of the regression models.

It is apparent in tables C.1 through C.5 that the probabilities predicted for almost all of the class and occupational groups by the regression models are higher than the observed proportions of YES-voters in these groups. As well, the differences in probabilities between the hypothesized class aggregates and the reference groups in each case are underestimated. Three possible causes may be suggested in explanation for the consistent upward distortion of the likelihood of voting YES predicted by all of these logistic regression models. The models may be overidentified due to multicollinearity involving some of the occupational variables. It is conceivable that the effects of the occupations comprising the professional intellegentsia (and all class aggregates that include them) may be so closely related to education and/or other variables that the concurrent inclusion of all these variables falsely boosts

these groups' support for sovereignty. On the other hand, the coefficients in these regression models do not demonstrate the sensitivity to alterations in model specification -- the introduction of new variables, the reduction of the sample size when data from only the last three surveys are analysed -- that one would expect to see with multicollinearity (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977, p. 92). Therefore, even without having carried out the appropriate diagnostics for multicollinearity, one can be reasonably certain that it is not posing a grave problem among these variables.

At the other end of the occupational spectrum, the over-prediction of the managers' support for sovereignty may result from a failure to account for the interaction between occupation and education that showed up in tables 3.7a and 4.2, and the curvilinear effect of schooling on the large managers' support for the YES option. The large managers' support for sovereignty, it will be recalled, diminishes at the highest level of education. Lending validity to this speculation are the findings presented in table C.6. This table shows the probability of voting YES generated by the regression model in table 4.2, which tests the different effects of education on different occupational groups. Here the predicted probabilities of voting YES for both the professional intelligentsia and the large managers are much closer to the observed proportions. Though the observed percentage of large managers voting YES is based on only nine cases, the proportion of the professional intelligentsia, based on a reliable number of cases, is not overestimated by the regression model, but is in fact slightly underestimated. This indicates that controlling for interaction effects leads to more accurate probability predictions.

Alternatively, the excessively high probabilities estimated by the regression models could reflect a mis-specification bias, resulting from the omission of some variable not measured in the data. For example, it is known

that separatist sentiment drops among the highest earning members of the middle class (see Chapter three). The introduction of income (which was not measured in four of the five surveys) might reduce the support for sovereignty among the middle class occupations that is predicted by these regression models. Given that the patterns that emerge in these probability estimates is generally consistent with that of the observed proportions of YES-voters, the results of these regression analyses are sufficient for the present purposes. But future investigation of the basis of support for sovereignty should take into account the possibility of multicollinearity and misspecification.

Table C.1
ESTIMATED AND OBSERVED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING YES
FOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
(based on regression model in table 4.1b)

Stage of regression model	Intellectuals P	Intellectuals P	Managers P	Managers P
Stage 1, with No non-occupational variables considered	.82	[184] 73	.58	[615] 45
Stage 3, with: Employed, 12 to 13 years of schooling	.82	[20] 65	.64	[130] 46
Stage 4, with: Employed, 12 to 13 years schooling, 35 to 44 years of age	.81	[6] 65	.60	[33] 36

Table C.2
ESTIMATED AND OBSERVED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING YES
FOR NEW MIDDLE CLASS, OLD MIDDLE CLASS, AND WORKERS
(based on regression model in table 4.8)

Stage of regression model	New Middle Class P	New Middle Class P	Old Middle Class P	Old Middle Class P	Working Class P	Working Class P
Stage 3, with: 12 to 13 years of schooling, 35 to 44 years of age	59	[67] 46	51	[13] 31	60	[41] 41

Table C.3
ESTIMATED AND OBSERVED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING YES
FOR UPPER NEW MIDDLE CLASS, UPPER OLD MIDDLE CLASS, AND WORKERS
(based on regression model in table 4.9)

Stage of regression model	Upper New Middle Class P	Upper New Middle Class P	Upper Old Middle Class P	Upper Old Middle Class P	Working Class P	Working Class P
Stage 3, with: 12 to 13 years of schooling, [41] 35 to 44 years of age	60	[48] 46	51	[10] 30	60	42

Table C.4
ESTIMATED AND OBSERVED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING YES FOR NARROW NEW NEW CLASS/PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA AND MANAGERS
(based on regression model in table 4.12)

	Narrow New Class/ Professional Intelligentsia		Managers	
Stage of regression model	P_e	P_o	P_e	P_o
Stage 3, with:				
16 years of schooling or more,		[54]		[26]
35 to 44 years of age	71	72	56	50

Table C.5
ESTIMATED AND OBSERVED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING YES FOR MUNICIPAL, PROVINCIAL, AND FEDERAL NEW MIDDLE CLASS
'based on regression model in table 4.11)

	Municipal New Middle Class		Provincial New Middle Class		Federal New Middle Class	
Stage of regression model	P_e	P_o	P_e	P_o	P_e	P_o
Stage 2, with:		[13]		[48]		[12]
12 to 13 years of schooling	59	46	69	65	47	25

Table C.6
ESTIMATED AND OBSERVED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING YES FOR PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA AND LARGE MANAGERS
(based on regression models in table 4.2)

	Professional intelligentsia		Large Managers	
Stage of regression model	P_e	P_o	P_e	P_o
Stage 2, with:				
16 years of schooling		[101]		[9]
or more,	69	75	44	44
25 to 34 years of age				