

**Phenomenologies of Border and Humble Public Space Making:
Tactical Urbanism, Non-Compartmentalizing Urban Development, and
Guerrilla Gardening in Montréal, Canada**

Vladimir Mikadze

School of Architecture, McGill University, Montréal

July / 2018

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture

© Vladimir Mikadze, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	iii
Résumé	v
Acknowledgements	vii
List of Figures	x
Introduction	1
Research Subject	4
Contribution	7
Cases	13
Structure	16
Chapter 1: The Im/materiality of Constructed Space: Insights from Debates on Contestation	20
1.1 Gaining a Perspective	22
1.2 Taking Advantage of the Ambiguity of Belonging of Constructed Space: the Case of Guerrilla Gardening	32
1.2.1 The Need for the Ambiguity of Belonging: Edward Relph's Environmental Humility ..	38
1.3 Situating the Ambiguity: the Role of the Border	45
Chapter 2. Securing the Im/materiality of Constructed Space: Henri Lefebvre's Differential Space and the Concept of Liminal Space	54
2.1 Socio-political Dimension of the Im/materiality of Space: Henri Lefebvre's Production of Social Space and Difference	55
2.1.1 Lefebvre on Difference	57
2.1.2 The Concept of Differential Space and its Challenges	60
2.1.3 The Pertinence of Lefebvre's Differential Space	69
2.1.3 Differential Space: Changing the Scale	72
2.2 The Concept of Liminality and its Insights for Differential Space	77
Chapter 3. From Space to Spatiality: Introduction of Phenomenology	87
3.1 Differential Space and the Phenomenological Approach	89
3.2 Phenomenology	95
3.2.1 Husserl's Phenomenology	98
3.2.2 From Space to Spatiality: Heidegger's Application of Phenomenology	103
3.2.3 Heidegger's Application of Phenomenology and Liminal Space	109
3.3 Moving From Social Space to Phenomenological Spatiality	112
3.4 Problems With the Phenomenological Mode of Inquiry	117
Chapter 4. Research Design	123

4.1 Case Study and Sites	123
4.2 Research Questions	129
4.3 Methodology	131
4.3.1 Data Collection	132
4.3.2 Methods	134
4.3.3 Validity Criteria.....	142
Chapter 5. Making Three Public Spaces in a Single Location: Parc Jeanne-Mance, Tourne-Sol, Villa Compostela	144
5.1 Program	145
5.1.1 Parc Jeanne-Mance	148
5.1.2 Composting Site Tourne-Sol.....	153
5.1.3 Villa Compostela.....	157
5.2 A Social Space in Making and Developing	167
5.2.1 Spatial Practices of Stepping Outside of ‘the’ Space.....	168
5.2.2 Making Agency Meaningful	172
5.2.3 Representations of Spaces	176
Chapter 6. Space of Difference: Structure, Value, and Non-compartmentalizing Potential	184
6.1 Space of Difference	187
6.2 Liminal Space Making and its Non-compartmentalizing Logic: Structural Humility	192
6.2.1 Programmatic Sensitivity	195
6.2.2. Soft Rules and Soft Rulers	199
6.2.3 Bonding Elements.....	202
6.3 Liminal Space and Urban Development: Guerrilla Gardening and the Quartier des Spectacles as Examples of Distinct Intervention Models	204
Conclusion	216
Recapitulation and Summary	216
Pertinence of the Research	222
Contributions of the Research	226
Figures	232
Appendices	260
Appendix 1. Public Space: Accessibility and Inclusiveness	261
Appendix 2. Questions & Themes for Semi-Structured Interviews and Survey Questions	265
Appendix 3. Briefly, on Lawns in North America.....	272
References	274

Abstract

The present research primarily concerns two general topics: spatial justice and the right to the city. More specifically, it focuses on bottom-up tactical urban movements (*i.e.*, guerrilla gardening), while critically deconstructing the subjects of representations of nature in the city, urban governance, and collective agency building. The ultimate pursuit behind the research is to explore guerrilla gardening as a socio-spatial practice that, on the grounds of liminality, offers an alternative to the fragmenting urban space-making logic in favour of more flexible—non-exclusive—urban space formulation and structure.

What is so gripping about guerrilla gardening as a spatial practice is that it can contest without disrupting the meaning and functions of affected spaces. Instead, it makes multiple overlapping geographies of urban vegetation possible and simultaneously open for different modes of engagement, agency, and deliberation. In this manuscript, I explore the ways in which the creation of a series of guerrilla gardens in Montréal, Québec, laid bare the competition between three different contexts (and representations) for vegetation in the city: 1) an urban green space, itself an outcome of the 19th century Park Movement, 2) municipal initiatives for sustainable green practices and urban food production (*i.e.*, composting sites and community gardens), and 3) illegal activist-enacted challenges to the ways in which vegetation is allowed in North American urban settings. An overlap of these contexts enabled me to explore the terms on which distinct representations of vegetation simultaneously co-existed in a shared physical

location, yet each on their own terms: with distinct design and structure of spaces, systems of signs and meaning, functions, and agency.

The major outcomes of the present study are threefold. First, in analyzing contested sites as the space of phenomenological reduction (*i.e.*, due to the rejection of the established meanings of built form by guerrilla gardeners), I explore the results of contestation as instances of liminality. Second, I explore the resulting liminality of the contested sites as a spatial resolution of one's right to the difference and to the city on phenomenological rather than marxian terms. Third, practically, I turn to Edward Relph's concept of environmental humility in order to see beyond the illegal aspect of guerrilla gardening and to outline the terms on which the competing representations managed to co-exist. Fourth, politically, I consider revitalization effects that the studied guerrilla gardening sites aimed to create through one of the most recycled notions of urban development—that of 'catalyst'. I contrast the informal space of continuous contestation with a formal 'catalyst' project, and after articulating some of their striking similarities, I point out paradigmatic differences in terms of how they facilitate urban development.

Specifically at the human scale, the outcomes of the present study have the most direct implications for landscape urbanism and its preoccupation with the shift from fragmented and object-oriented understandings of urban development to a landscape-centred approach. Spaces that have no fixed territory are one way to witness and to explore the emergence of urban environments that encompass both human and non-human actors whose agency co-develops across various domains and scales while avoiding rigid hierarchies.

Résumé

La recherche actuelle concerne principalement deux sujets généraux: la justice spatiale et le droit à la ville. Plus spécifiquement, elle se concentre sur les mouvements urbains tactiques (c.-à-d. le guerrilla gardening), tout en déconstruisant de façon critique les sujets des représentations de la nature dans la ville, la gouvernance urbaine et la création d'organismes collectifs. Le but principal de la recherche est d'explorer le guerrilla gardening comme une pratique socio-spatiale qui, sur la base de la liminalité, offre une alternative à la logique fragmentaire de la création de l'espace urbain. Cette recherche explore les aspects de la pratique informelle et illégale de le guerrilla gardening qui pourrait faciliter le passage d'une compréhension de l'espace urbaine basée sur la fragmentation de la vie quotidienne en fonctions séparées vers les compréhensions de l'espace plus flexible dont l'importance augmente dans les études urbaines.

Ce qui fascine à propos du guerrilla gardening en tant que pratique spatiale, c'est qu'il peut contester sans perturber le sens et les fonctions des espaces affectés. Au lieu de cela, le guerrilla gardening rend possible de multiples géographies de végétation urbaine qui se chevauchent et qui sont simultanément ouvertes aux modes différents d'engagement, d'agence et de délibération. Dans ce manuscrit, j'explore les façons dont la création d'une série de jardins de guérilla à Montréal, Québec, a mis à nu la concurrence entre trois contextes (et représentations) différentes de la végétation dans la ville: 1) un espace vert urbain, lui-même le produit du Park Movement du 19^{ème} siècle, 2) les initiatives municipales pour des pratiques vertes durables et la production alimentaire urbaine (c.-à-d. les sites de compostage et les jardins communautaires) et 3) les contestations informelles et illégaux des façons dont la végétation est autorisée dans les milieux urbains nord-américains. Un chevauchement de ces contextes m'a permis d'explorer les termes selon lesquels des représentations

distinctes de la végétation coexistaient simultanément dans un lieu physique partagé, mais chacune à leur manière: conception et structure distinctes des espaces, systèmes distincts de signes et de signification, fonctions distinctes et les modes distinctes de l'agence.

Les principaux résultats de la présente étude sont triples. Premièrement, en analysant les sites contestés en tant qu'espace de réduction phénoménologique (c'est-à-dire en raison du rejet des significations établies de la forme bâtie par les jardiniers des guérilleros), j'explore les résultats de la contestation en tant que liminalité. Deuxièmement, j'explore la liminalité qui en résulte pour les sites contestés en tant que résolution spatiale du droit à la différence et à la ville de manière phénoménologique plutôt que marxienne. Troisièmement, je me tourne pratiquement vers le concept d'humilité environnementale d'Edward Relph afin de voir au-delà de l'aspect illicite du guerrilla gardening et de préciser les conditions dans lesquelles les représentations concurrentes ont réussi à coexister. Quatrième, politiquement, je considère les effets de revitalisation que les sites du guerrilla gardening étudiés visaient à créer à travers l'une des notions les plus recyclées du développement urbain: celle de «catalyseur». Je compare l'espace informel de la contestation continue à un projet formel de «catalyseur» et, après avoir articulé certaines de similitudes frappantes entre les deux, je souligne les différences paradigmatiques en termes de facilitation du développement urbain.

Spécifiquement à l'échelle humaine, les résultats de la présente étude ont les implications les plus directes sur l'urbanisme paysager (c.-à-d. landscape urbanism) et le souci de l'urbanisme paysager de passer d'une conception fragmentée du développement urbain à une approche centrée sur le paysage. Les espaces qui n'ont pas de territoire fixe sont une façon de témoigner et d'explorer l'émergence d'environnements urbains qui englobent à la fois des acteurs humains et non humains dont l'agence co-développe dans différents domaines et échelles, tout en évitant les hiérarchies rigides.

Acknowledgements

Since beginning my doctoral studies in 2011, working on the present manuscript has been a substantial and guiding part of my life. Now, when my studies are almost over, and the text below is an anticipated outcome, I would like to open it up with a few sentences of gratitude that I owe to people without whom this work would have been hard to accomplish.

I would like to thank my wife, Kirsten, for her tremendous support. Not only she was there for me in my moments of doubt, she also was a constant source of astute and thoughtful comments that would help me get back on track. Her deeply caring support meant everything to me.

I would like to thank my research advisor, Prof. Nik Luka, for all his guidance and support. It is hard to express the essential role that Nik played in the progress of my research in just a few words. Nik's involvement was all-encompassing, as he was not only guiding my research but also helping me to get as much academic experience as possible. This began with his early words of encouragement, when I was deciding whether or not the controversial topic of illegal space making would be a good fit for the rich and sophisticated realm of professional architecture. My interdisciplinary work, which draws from architecture, geography, planning and most closely aligns with urban design, would be much harder to accomplish without Nik's versatile and comprehensive knowledge and experience in architecture, planning, and geography, which he generously shared with me.

I would like to thank Prof. Annmarie Adams for all her support before and during her time as a member of my Advisory Committee. Annmarie's exceptional expertise in architectural research and remarkable sense of direction were tremendously energizing and inspiring. Her involvement and influence were critical at the early stages of my research. In this respect, I would also like to thank Prof. Natalie Oswin, at the Department of Geography, for her involvement with my research as a member of my Advisory Committee.

I would like to thank Prof. Ricardo Castro, for all his guidance and his warm support. This is not only in his capacity as a member of my Advisory Committee, but also prior to it, as an engaging professor at the School of Architecture. It was through his *Critical Writing* course that I took during the first year of my studies when I became truly fascinated with phenomenological inquiry. I am really glad that I had a chance both to take Ricardo's course and to work closely with him.

I would like to thank Prof. Sarah Moser, at the Department of Geography, who was a member of my Advisory Committee and whose active and critical involvement with my dissertation, paired with her upbeat attitude, were extremely valuable to me. Her countless excellent comments were highly engaging and contributed greatly to the progress of my work.

I would also like to thank Prof. David Covo, at the School of Architecture, Prof. Lisa Bornstein, at the School of Urban Planning, and Prof. Norma Rantisi, at the Department of Geography, Planning & Environment at Concordia University, for being a part of my oral defence committee, along with Prof. Helge Dedek, at the Faculty Law at McGill University, who served as a pro-dean, for their involvement with my work and their thoughtful questions during the defence. Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Soren Larsen, at the Department of Geography at

the University of Missouri for his incredibly detailed examination of my dissertation, his insightful and detailed comments, and his words of support that were very inspiring.

Outside academia, my greatest gratitude goes to the team of guerrilla gardeners without whom this project would not be possible. In this respect, I thank Nikolaos Gryspolakis, who agreed to my involvement with the project and who on so many occasions met with me in order to introduce me to different stages of the project and to answer my questions. I also would like to thank everyone whom I interviewed in relation to the guerrilla gardening project. I would like to thank Renée Daoust both for her time and for her engaging and detailed story regarding Daoust Lestage's work on the Place des festivals. In this respect, I would also like to thank both Prof. Adrian Sheppard, at the School of Architecture, for introducing me to Renée Daoust and a fellow Ph.D. student, Susane Havelka, for directing me towards Prof. Sheppard.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Tatiana and Yuri. They were neither directly involved with my research nor, living across the ocean, in close physical proximity. Yet, even at that great distance, I constantly felt both their keen interest in my studies and their support; their thoughtful advice and words of encouragement helped me through hard days.

List of Figures

Figures in Text:

Figure 1. A re-appropriated composting site in Parc Jeanne-Mance, Montréal, 2014.....	2
Figure 2. Seed bombs (often made of clay, compost, seeds, and water)	14
Figure 3. A painting, depicting a girl wearing leg braces, installed at Villa Compostela	158

Other Figures:

Figure 4.1 The Location and Elevation Appearances of the Composting Site/Villa Compostella at Parc Jeanne-Mance, Montréal, Spring— Winter 2014-2015	233
Figure 4.2 The Location of the Mile End Site, Montréal, 2014.....	235
Figure 4.3 Examples of Small Gardens at the Mile End Site, Montréal, 2014.....	236
Figure 4.4 The Creation of a Small Garden #20 at the Mile End Site, Montréal, 2014	237
Figure 4.5 Place des festivals, Montréal	238
Figure 5.1 Planting Day, Montréal, Summer 2014	239
Figure 5.2 Schematic View of Park Jeanne-Mance, Montréal, 2014.....	240
Figure 5.3 Composting Site Tourné-Sol, Montréal, Spring 2014	241
Figure 5.4 Municipal Communal Composting Bins, Montréal, 2014	242
Figure 5.5 A Plan of Villa Compostela, Montréal, 2014.....	243
Figure 5.6 Villa Compostela, Montréal, 2014-2015	244
Figure 5.7 Explanatory Signs for Villa Compostela and the Mile End Gardens	247
Figure 5.8 The Removal of the Composting Site and Villa Compostela, 2015	249
Figure 5.9 The First Attempt to Evict Villa Compostela and Shut Down the Site, 2015	251
Figure 6.1 Villa Compostela and Continuing Contestations, Montréal, Summer 2014	252
Figure 6.2 The Relocation of Municipal Planter on rue Maguire, Montréal, 2014	253
Figure 6.3 The Interrelation of the Park, the Composting Site, and Villa Compostela, 2015	254
Figure 6.4 Program Diagram of Villa Compostela according to Respondent r7, 2015	255
Figure 6.5 Place des festivals, Promenade des artistes, and the Parterre.....	256
Figure 6.6 Place des festivals; The “Event Mode” Appearance	258
Figure 6.7 Promenade des artistes with Musical Swings and a Space for Interchanging Art Installations	259

Introduction

In 2014, in Montréal, Canada, a group of residents launched a guerrilla gardening project in the municipal public space. A part of the action took place in Mile End—a vibrant, diverse, and street-life friendly neighbourhood of the city, where the group members used a number of municipal planters to plant vegetables. Their most noticeable work, however, took place in Parc Jeanne-Mance. In this park, the group appropriated a defunct and locked-down municipal composting site Tourne-Sol and “gave it back” to the public space of the park by turning it into a communal garden-driven space that they called Villa Compostela. Eventually and expectedly, municipal authorities reacted to the initiative and, in 2015, removed both the composting site and the garden. From the spring of 2014 until the garden’s decay and hibernation in the winter of 2014/15, the park, the composting site, and Villa Compostela co-existed in the same physical location. With the guerrilla gardening intervention, all three became an ‘overlay’ of spaces, each coming from its own context and yet all co-existing at the same physical location. Urban vegetation was one thing that they had in common, but each of them represented a distinct perspective on the role of greenery in the city. Yet, for a period of time all three not only co-existed but also mutually re-enforced each other. A question arising is *on what terms can urban space-making practitioners see beyond the illegal nature of this and similar instances of tactical urbanism in order to create more responsive and flexible urban environments?*



Figure 1. A re-appropriated composting site in Parc Jeanne-Mance, Montréal, 2014¹

This example, needless to say, is one among many. Graffiti art, non-commissioned street art installations, illegal bike lanes, unauthorized installation of street furniture (*e.g.*, benches), street trade and pop-up temporary street shops of all kinds as well as alternative uses of urban spaces (*e.g.*, occupying [purchasing] parking space for activities other than parking; re-appropriation of ruins, lost spaces, or abandoned sites, including squatting; making ad hoc changes to zoning and built form in order to accommodate one's cultural norms) are among them.² Beyond their immediate goals, these practices expose a rupture between formalized representations of urban space that professional design often produces and the needs of everyday life.³ While for some

¹ Here and after, unless otherwise specified, all credits belong to Vladimir Mikadze

² Chase, 2008; Chase *et al.*, 2008; Cresswell, 1996; Cruz, 2010; Dell, 2009; Deslandes, 2012; Doron, 2007; Dovey & Polakit, 2007; Franck & Stevens, 2007b; Hou, 2010; Larsen & Johnson, 2012; Mikadze, 2014; Pagano, 2013; Paravel & Sniadecki, 2010; Peretti, 2007; Pullan, 2011; Rael, 2012; Sheridan, 2007

³ Blomley, 2004a, 2004b; de Certeau, 1984; Doron, 2007; Gehl, 1996; Haydn & Temel, 2006; Hill, 2006; Lefebvre, 1991; Pagano, 2013; Trancik, 1986

this gap might be irrelevant or even be a sign of irresponsible use of urban environments, there are at least three major reasons for which the top-down formalization (and consequent programmatic rigidity) of urban space is a challenge.

First, it is a practical challenge of the deficit of physical space in increasingly densified and diversified urban environments in which the partitioning (*e.g.*, monofunctionalist) approach is a common and counterproductive tool of choice for top-down city building. This challenge is well reflected in the call for spatial justice that Ann Deslandes, a researcher and a community worker in Sydney, Australia, articulates in a paper on Do-It-Yourself urbanism:

What do the 'DIY urbanism' movement and homelessness have in common? Whether it's a temporary studio, a pop-up shop, a sleeping bag in a doorway or a tarpaulin under a bridge, all are informal responses to the scarcity of space for everyone's needs and ambitions. (Deslandes, 2012: n.p.).

Second, it is a socio-political challenge of ensuring the possibility for new agendas and pressing issues to become accessible for both deliberation and action. This might not always be the case in the presence of a variety of solidifying legal and professional frameworks that can substantially limit any new action. What is explored as unsettled space in geography (Blomley, 2004⁴; Keenan, 2010) and as ephemeral, indeterminate, porous, insurgent, loose, lost, or in-between space in architecture and urban design are an outcome of the tension between

⁴ *I want to suggest that the spaces of urban property may be definitionally and politically more ambiguous and varied than the ownership model supposes. This “unsettled” nature of property provides a basis for conflict over who has what and how they acquired it.* (Blomley, 2004, p.14)

formalized representations of space and lived spaces of emerging needs, issues, and demands that become increasingly relevant but continue lacking formal recognition and protection.⁵

Third, it is an age-old existential challenge of self-realization. Martin Heidegger (1977) draws attention to this challenge by making a distinction between dwelling and residing. Juhani Pallasmaa (2005b) translates this distinction into an argument-critique that modern architects are trained to build houses rather than homes. More broadly but in the same vein, Henri Lefebvre (1996) speaks of one's right to the city. As the works of Arendt (1958), Jacobs (1961), Sennett (1970), Bourdieu (1977), de Certeau (1984[1980]), Giddens (1984), Relph (1976, 1981) and many others suggest, one's agency cannot be regarded as being separate from social, economic, and political frameworks that are physically (*i.e.*, spatially) present. Consequently, to gain agency and a place for it is to gain them spatially as well, vis-à-vis these frameworks.

Research Subject

Combined, these three challenges broadly advocate for the need for urban space to remain versatile, sensitive to local issues and impacts, and locally (bottom-up) responsive to new programs. In short, urban space needs to be flexible. This has long been a focus in architecture, urban design, and related fields. My project contributes to the interdisciplinary praxis and theory

⁵ Doron, 2007; Fernando, 2007; Franck & Stevens, 2007; Gehl, 1996; Hou, 2010; Sheridan, 2007; Stavrides, 2007; Trancik, 1986

that have been articulated in these fields.⁶ More specifically, I approach this call through a focus on non-compartmentalization.⁷ In the context of this research, non-compartmentalization is the *process of simultaneous* co-presence of distinct spaces in the same physical location. Contestation-driven practices such as guerrilla gardening provide an insight for the ways in which this can be accomplished, and in light of a guerrilla gardening practice I further precise the process of non-compartmentalization on the basis of difference: the terms on which the physical matter of one space (*e.g.*, of bare soil as ‘mud’ in a public green space) affords a variety of interpretations that can trigger the emergence of a different space with a different program (*e.g.*, an illegal garden that emerges by turning ‘mud’ into plant beds). The exploration and discussion of the resulting structure, territoriality, design, and agency that the non-compartmentalized phenomena (*e.g.*, soil that is simultaneously mud in one space and plant bed in another), which come out of a guerrilla gardening intervention, comprise is the main objective of this research.

⁶ Blomley, 2004; Chase *et al.*, 2008; Cresswell, 1996; Dell, 2009; Doron, 2007; Keenan, 2010; Franck & Stevens, 2007; Gehl, 1996, 2006; Haydn & Temel, 2006; Herzberger, 1993; Hou, 2010; Larsen & Johnson, 2012; Lefebvre, 1996; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1996; Massey, 2005; Mitchell, 2003; Newman, 1973; Sennett, 2008, 2011; Stickells, 2011; Tschumi, 1994; Webber, 1978; and many others

⁷ As a counter-balance for compartmentalization, un-compartmentalization is an approach to accumulated path dependency on thinking of space as a container, or a volume, that can hold a certain number of things at a time. While the Newtonian understanding of space proved to be useful in physics, in social practices space-container is a rigid construct that efficiently serves only one purpose: to control. Robert Sack (1986) speaks of this kind of space in terms of human territoriality. Michel Foucault (1977) traces the emergence of space-container, further partitioned, down to the emergence of the capitalist society that embraced a value-exchange paradigm towards the world. Edward Relph (1981) further extends the analysis of the constructed space as a container towards the ideology of functionalism, as a form of partitioning of spatial practices. In this case, it is articulated not as a secured realm for certain activities (Sack, 1986) or as the fragmentation of a commodity for sale (Foucault, 1977) but via programmatic, planning, and stylistic simplifications, all for the same objectives: control and predictability.

One way to approach the possibility of simultaneous different interpretations of the the same phenomena is through the notion of ambiguity of belonging. A compelling and direct analysis of ambiguity of belonging comes from Milos Bobic's (2004) *Between the Edges: Street-building Transition as Urbanity Interface*. With the focus on physical edges of urban built form, Bobic explores ambiguity of belonging of these edges once they are 'caught' in the 'in-between': between different domains (e.g., public and private) and/or scales (e.g., house and street). Bobic's analysis of the subsequent capability of some of these grey areas to become de-familiarized and turn into "urbanity interfaces inviting new meanings and modes of behaviour" is highly illuminating.⁸ Most importantly, Bobic's analysis of this ambiguity of belonging and consequent liminality of certain edges is a grounded and systemic approach to contestation specifically as a work of interpretation rather than of occupation and elimination. To understand the contesting work of guerrilla gardening specifically in terms of re-interpretation rather than dispossession is critical for the subject of non-compartmentalizing constructed space.

Four research questions guide my inquiry into guerrilla gardening and its role in the un-compartmentalization of urban space. Why do guerrilla gardeners see a certain physical object as a border that should be crossed or eliminated? Why do people who are involved in guerrilla gardening continue working on a project despite its clear precariousness? These two questions addresses the intentional illegality of guerrilla gardening in many liberal democracies. On what

⁸ A short stairway that connects a building entrance with a street is an example of an urbanity interface. While legally there is nothing ambiguous about the belonging of the stairway, in daily practices a building resident and a passerby can equally see the stairway both as a part of the building, which function is primarily to facilitate access, and as a part of the street. Consequently, the stairway has the potential to become a space on its own, in which actions that draw from both the private and the public are possible: e.g., a temporary withdrawal from the street flow while having no connection to the building.

terms and to what extents are the spaces that result from guerrilla gardening are beyond control and order to the point of becoming disruptive rather than unsettling? Finally, how can the de-compartmentalizing potential of guerrilla gardening be both articulated and harnessed by architects in the realm of urban design? This is the most pertinent of the four questions, as its role is to ensure that the insights from the first three questions do not fall prey to yet another top-down formalization.

Contribution

My overarching architectural contribution is to the topic of liminal space making that I operationalize with the reference to Edward Relph's (1980) concept of environmental humility, which I will introduce in detail in Chapter 1, on the grounds of Henri Lefebvre's (1991) concept of differential space, which I will introduce and explore in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. From this perspective, first, empirically, my study contributes to the extensive research on public space. My exploration of this rich and challenging subject pushes further the argument for the irrelevance of understanding constructed space as *either public or private* (Duncan, 1996; Kilian, 1998; Mitchell, 2003). This argument rejects the possibility of public space as a defined type of built form in favour of understanding any constructed space as a flux of publicness-privateness. I further build on this flux (as distinct from a binary) approach to the publicness-privateness of a space in order to reflect on the general ambiguity of any constructed space, of which the condition of publicness-privateness is merely a well-recognized instance. In the context of my research this step is necessary for understanding informal and unauthorized interventions, such

as guerrilla gardening, as existentially unavoidable rather than merely illegal. In the realm of urban design, which by its very *raison d'être* attempts to combine different types of built form, scales, and programs, this premise is essential.

Second, while building on Bobic's (2004) approach to contestation as the work of re-interpretation in the presence of ambiguity of belonging, I go beyond his focus on physical edges of built form as the source of liminality. I use the condition of unsettled space that guerrilla gardening creates as a fitting premise for linking Bobic's notion of urbanity interface with a broad variety of perceived edges, both material and immaterial. I explore constructed space as an entity that is comprised of edges and borders rather than outlined by them. While this phenomenon is recognized theoretically, design-wise there is still a limited practical understanding of the capacity of border not only to contain agency, but also to be at the core of its inception.⁹ What is a margin of a space for some (*e.g.*, in terms of a particular behaviour, activity, or identity that a space maintains and that attenuates towards its borders) becomes a meaning-generating and context-unfolding centre for others. This is critical: the un-compartmentalization of urban space is not to achieve a homogenous socio-political domain, free from social, economic, and political differences. Instead, it is to embrace these differences (see Sennett, 1970). In this respect, my interest in border is specific to contestation as re-interpretation: that is, to capture the arresting and, then, provoking rather than dividing appearances of phenomena.

⁹ See bell hooks, 1984; Bobic, 2004; Franck & Stevens, 2007b; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992; Hertzberger, 1993; Ingram, 1997; Rael, 2012; Sennett, 2011; Weber, 2010

In this respect, third, methodologically, my contribution is a phenomenology-driven analysis of guerrilla gardening vis-à-vis un-compartmentalization of urban phenomena.¹⁰ While guerrilla gardening actors might not think of their actions in phenomenological terms, I turn mostly to Heidegger's phenomenology in order to analyze contested objects and the ways in which gardeners both identify "present-in-hand" (*i.e.*, no longer fitting, arresting, and therefore drawing attention) elements of a space and attempt to re-fit them. I approach the work of guerrilla gardening as a practice of clearing an appearance of a phenomenon that is no longer fit for a task. One of the most significant contributions of this approach to my research is the rejection of space as a neutral medium and its replacement with the *spatiality* of a task. This is the situatedness of a phenomenon (*i.e.*, its appearance and availability for care) in the logic of a task that shapes a specific perspective on a cared-for object. Tasks are not spaces, and they do not secure agency on the same terms. Distinctly, tasks can simultaneously emerge from a variety of contexts while targeting the same objects. As a result, their combined immediate spatial resolution is care (in Heidegger's terms of meaningful de-distancing) rather than a clear function or an identity.

Ultimately, the phenomenological focus on the appearance of space as a spatiality, corresponds my contribution to the topic of liminality a specific direction. It shifts attention from

¹⁰ As a movement in philosophy, phenomenology originates with works of Edmund Husserl and is closely connected to Gestalt psychology. Husserl (1964) articulates the role of phenomenology to provide a counter-balance and a safety check to the picture of the world that the positivist thought creates. Martin Heidegger (1996) similarly accentuates the existential nature of phenomenological inquiry the objective of which is to gain the understanding of a studied object that goes beyond its representation. Intentionality of perception is a critical concept in phenomenology. It points at the context- and position-dependent—situated—character of one's perception of an object. The ways in which this situatedness is expressed has been developed by different phenomenologists on different terms (*e.g.*, Käufer & Chemero, 2015).

understanding physical entities as separated objects in *the* space towards understanding them in terms of overlapping spatialities of simultaneous tasks that provide these physical entities with multiple simultaneous meanings. This is to recognize that any single object can 1) belong to different contexts, 2) become articulated through tasks that are congruent with these contexts, and 3) obtain different—yet shared in the same physical body—meanings and values in these contexts. In architecture and urban design, studies on loose space (*e.g.*, Franck & Stevens, 2007a), lost spaces (Trancik, 1986), and ‘empty’ spaces (Doron, 2007) recognize these premises for contestation in the presence of multiple observers. Yet, for a contested object to become un-compartmentalized (rather than merely contested) it also must remain ambiguous in the realm of everyday practices (*i.e.*, continuously resist being defined by any single representation). In this respect, one way to explore un-compartmentalization on the grounds of contestation as re-interpretation is to consider representations and programs as ‘overlying’ each other, both

spatially and temporally.¹¹ Using phenomenology, I focus not only on the changes in the appearance of a phenomenon that is being contested by a variety of representations¹² but *most importantly* on understanding the ways to *keep together* all these representations. I see this being achieved by the means of liminal space making where liminality needs to be understood as a socio-political (contestation-driven) rather than an anthropological and sociological (heterotopian) condition of being outside a certain framework of references. One way to articulate liminality on this term is to approach it as an instance of a continuous contestation that prevents any single representation from formulating a dominant appearance of a contested phenomenon. Consequently, a contested phenomenon is never quite in the ‘normal’ space and is

¹¹ Overlay is a way to recognize multiple meanings that the same physical objects can communicate. Ontologically, it reflects the postulation that physical matter of constructed space has no inherent meaning and can be interpreted in a number of ways. Epistemologically, in architectural studies, the recognition of this condition is best developed through the themes of architectural representation (Dovey, 1999; Hill, 2006; Norberg-Schulz, 1971; Pallasmaa, 2005a, 2005b), ephemeral architecture (Karandinou, 2013; Wigley, 1998; Zumthor, 2006), non-volumetric architecture (Aymonino, 2006; Brown, 2006; Jones, 2006; Morteo, 2006; Venturi *et al.*, 1972), marginalized identity (Adams, 1995, 2010; Hayden, 1997a; 1997b; 1980; Ingram, 1997), as well as porosity and transgression (Benjamin & Lacis, 1983; Franck & Stevens, 2007; Hertzberger, 1993; Tschumi, 1994) that directly deal with the interrelation of perception and agency. In geography and political studies, research on borders, transgression, and representations of space (Blomley, 2004, 2010; Cresswell, 1996; Dell, 2009; Massey, 2005; Mitchell, 2003; Rodaway, 1994; Sack, 1986; Whitehead *et al.*, 2007) similarly addresses the same issue. In urban planning, the works that touch on this subject most substantially are the ones that address issues of public participation (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1992; Innes & Booher, 1999; Painter, 1992; van Herzele & van Woerkum, 2008), tactical forms of urbanism (Chase *et al.*, 2008; Cruz, 2010), and temporality (Haydn & Temel, 2006).

¹² From various epistemological and methodological perspectives, this is explored and discussed in Chase *et al.*, 2008; Cruz, 2010; Doron, 2007; Dell, 2009; Franck & Stevens, 2007; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992; Jones, 2012; Walton, 2011, to name a few

never quite familiar. Instead, it remains different on terms that are neither purely ontological nor purely dialectical.

Consequently, fourth, my major theoretical contribution that travels beyond Montréal and guerrilla gardening, as a social-spatial practice, is the analysis of Henri Lefebvre's (1991) concept of differential space as a possible resolution of liminality on phenomenological terms. Lefebvre's framework for the production of social space to which the concept of differential space belongs is highly instrumental to the subject of liminality. In a nutshell, Henri Lefebvre's (1991) theoretical framework explores any constructed space as essentially in flux. Space is available as *a social* space that is a resolution of professional practices, political goals, ideological interpretations, and congruent with them built form. Most importantly, the framework articulates and analyzes the emergence of abstract space (of capitalism): an extreme form of a global social space that grows to dominate (through elimination and homogenization) all other spaces. Lefebvre does not see abstract space as a solution to un-compartmentalization of urban space. This is vis-à-vis abstract space that he develops the concept of differential space, albeit in rather general terms. Lefebvre claims a critical need for differential space as a manifestation of non-tamed (and non-taming) spatial practices and representations.¹³ In this research, with the focus on liminality, I explore the terms on which the spatial physicality of a contested object, withdrawn from any single representation, can be not only meaningfully understood via a phenomenological inquiry but also, while being understood phenomenologically, can gain socio-political ground as well in both making use and advancing our understanding of Lefebvre's concept of differential space and its application.

¹³ See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of Lefebvre's differential space

Cases

Guerrilla gardening is an activity whereby individuals use flowers and edible plants in order to create temporary, low-maintenance gardens in urban space. This is largely an ad hoc activity such that anyone with a handful of seeds, a seed bomb (**Fig. 2**), and a few basic instruments can make his or her care a visible part of the urban space.¹⁴ The gardens that are created often aim to challenge the perception of others on both what constitutes a green area (in terms of how participants use the agency of plants) and the means through which green areas can be created in a city (Reynolds, 2008). Instead of accepting the plots of land approved by municipal authorities—as is in the case with legitimate community gardening (*e.g.*, Parks, Forestry, and Recreation, 2014)—and, therefore, contributing to the existing order of things, guerrilla gardeners often aim at re-negotiating the rules for being in an urban space. They do so by challenging existing programs of space. Overall, guerrilla gardening is a fascinating activity that arises for a variety of reasons—from survival to political ones—and in a number of guises—from beautification actions at the individual level to complex collective gardens (Adams & Hardman, 2013, 2015; Crane *et al.*, 2013; McKay, 2011; Mikadze, 2014; Mitchell, 2003; Smith & Curtz, 2003; Zukin, 2010). Yet, the activity is not always seen ultimately positively in the academic literature (let alone by the municipal authorities who ‘police’ public space in the city), and certain studies

¹⁴ Despite its dramatic name, seed bombing is losing its strictly non-conformist flair. An article by Pokorny (2011) for *The Oregonian* discusses the distribution of seed bombs through candy dispensers installed in the streets and available to anyone who is willing to plant, guerrilla-style or not.

question the intentions of guerrilla gardeners (Adams & Hardman, 2015: on guerrilla gardening as essentially colonizing) or other DIY practices (Pagano, 2013).



Figure 2. Seed bombs (often made of clay, compost, seeds, and water)

Seed bombs can be used in areas with restricted access. Photo Credit: Anne Beck, Lost Coast Culture Machine.

First, however, this is primarily a study of an illegal space rather than of garden space. The study follows the conception and the development of two guerrilla gardening sites: 1) a former municipal composting site, located in Parc Jeanne-Mance, which operation was shut down but was later re-appropriated, re-designed, and named Villa Compostela by a group of residents and

2) a series of small illegal gardens in municipal planters and plant beds scattered across the neighbourhood of Mile End. While these two projects can be seen as almost independent from one another, they were maintained by the same group of people, who conceived the design of both sites, exchanged ideas, and helped each other. Overall, the case that this study follows is particularly engaging. First, it is compelling for the rich co-existence of contexts that have been built up in Parc Jeanne-Mance as well as in the Mile End neighbourhood. Second, it remains typical of many similar initiatives that take place in North American cities (*e.g.*, Eugene [OR], Detroit [MI], Kingston [ON], New York City [NY], Portland [OR], Toronto [ON], *etc.*). Third, that being stated, it represents a particular trend among them. Distinct from New York City of 1970s and Detroit of today, the studied case represents a subset of initiatives that take place in burgeoning urban settings. The studied case not only carries on some of the practice's general objectives and values (*i.e.*, community capacity building) but also presents more recent ones (*i.e.*, sustainable food production, re-evaluation of public space ideology).

In order to put the studied sites in perspective as a socio-political rather than an agricultural project, I also develop a minor focus on an urban farming enterprise in the south-east part of Montréal. Finally, I conclude my analysis of these two sites by situating them against a formally approved and professionally executed project by an architectural studio Daoust Lestage around Place des Festivals, which is a part of the Quartier des Spectacles initiative in downtown Montréal. This part of my analysis of the guerrilla gardening project is a discussion of the contribution that ephemeral informal spaces can deliver for urban development. Through an analysis of primary (an interview with Rénée Daoust) and secondary sources (reports, articles, and edited volumes on the project), I establish differences and, more importantly, similarities between these two paradigmatically different projects. Similar to the work done by the group of

guerrilla gardeners, Daoust Lestage was aiming to re-animate the local urban form and fabric while rendering it more accessible for a number of activities. In this respect, the comparison provides necessary ground for reflection on the ways in which the creation of flexible urban space can be facilitated in a number of ways.

Distinct from the volume of literature on guerrilla gardening that considers the practice itself either as an object for criticism or as a source of inspiration for social justice, this study focuses predominantly on the illegality of a created space as a major source of insight. Due to its unauthorized nature, a space that results from guerrilla gardening remains unavoidably ephemeral: being aware of their uninvited status, gardeners neither abolish the territoriality of an appropriated space (and consequently its program) nor solidify a new one.¹⁵ Consequently, this leads to a state of hybridity of two or more spaces that is possible due to the competition (*i.e.*, via an alternative interpretation) for the same physical elements of built form that guerrilla gardening initiates but cannot decisively bring to an end.

Structure

This dissertation consists of six chapters, progressing from a literature review to an analysis of the sites, and, finally, to the conclusion: non-compartmentalized space as liminal space, which territory remains dynamic, borders shift, and rigid rules are brought down to the minimum. In

¹⁵ In Chapter 1, I discuss in detail the difference between temporary and ephemeral constructed spaces. Briefly, ephemeral space is a type of a temporary space, which longevity is not secured. For this reason, it cannot enjoy a territoriality regime similar to a permanent or a temporary space. It remains suggestive rather than defining.

Chapter 1, I focus on the interrelation of informal interventions with urban space and borders, shaping this on the general liminality of constructed space. I explore the contribution of architects, geographers, and planners to debates on 1) public space, 2) ephemeral space, and 3) informal interventions with urban space. I explain the ways in which my research both challenges existing approaches to public space and tactical urbanism and contributes to the discussion. I also provide a brief outline of the studies on guerrilla gardening in terms of different aspects of this practice, its origins, rationales behind it, specific features, and concerns raised in relation to both the practice itself and the manners in which it is studied.

In Chapter 2, I both introduce Henri Lefebvre's (1991[1974]) theory of the production of space and focus on the concept of differential space: its role in Lefebvre's framework, its potential for the subject of flexible urban space, and challenges that it poses. In this chapter, I make two connections to the previous chapter. First, I situate the liminality of constructed space in a socio-political framework that approaches any constructed space as a malleable social space. Second, I discuss the possibility of understanding Lefebvre's differential space in terms of liminal space, as the kind of space that resists totalizing top-down formalization and partitioning homogeneity. I focus on the development of the concept in the context of Lefebvre's work on the production of social space, peculiarities of his specific approach to difference, and shortcomings of the concept in the realm of Lefebvre's epistemology. Most importantly, I explore the ways in which Lefebvre's concept of differential space shapes the quest for flexible urban space as a quest for a space that is capable of *sustaining* difference.

In Chapter 3, I make a connection between the concept of differential space and the advantages that phenomenology, as an epistemological approach, can offer for its advancement. While exploring Lefebvre's differential space as space that does not acquire any normalizing

representations, I consider the possibility to shift the focus from the dialectical understanding of difference (separate object-driven) towards the phenomenological one (situated perception-driven). I start with a discussion of the emergence of phenomenology and its delineation between space and spatiality. I subsequently focus on perception, intentionality, and agency that inform both the appearances and changes in the appearances of phenomena in phenomenological studies. Finally, I discuss the applicability of a phenomenological mode of inquiry and instances of its critique.

In Chapter 4, I ‘translate’ the works and concepts that I analyze in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 into research questions, methodological procedures, and data collection techniques. In this chapter, I outline the research design of my study.

In Chapter 5, I present the first part of the data analysis. In this chapter, I explore and analyze three different contexts (urban park, composting site, and guerrilla garden) that deliver distinct approaches to public space and justify the existence of the urban green space. The objective is to determine the presence of distinct social spaces, all of which nevertheless occupy the same physical location and manifest themselves through the same objects.

In Chapter 6, I continue with the data analysis, concentrating on the practical outcomes that the studied sites offer to architects and urban designers. Based on the analysis of the sites, I articulate and develop the elements and concepts that architect and urban designer need to take into consideration while looking at non-compartmentalizing spaces specifically as mechanisms for ‘bottom-up’ community engagement and urban form revitalization via the right to the city. More specifically, I approach the work of guerrilla gardeners as threefold. First, it is the phenomenological understanding of differential space that the analysis affords. The focus is on understanding the perception-driven liminality of constructed space as a socio-political act of

seeing a phenomenon differently and acting upon it. Second, it is a practical focus on the terms on which the ephemeral space of the gardens existed and sustained difference rather than eliminated it. Third, it is a comparative analysis of guerrilla gardening vis-à-vis a formal revitalization project around the Place des festivals in the Quartier des spectacles in Montréal during which I articulate similarities of these two paradigmatically different projects. By underlining these similarities I question and expand an omnipresent notion of urban ‘catalyst’ to include the work of the gardeners and illuminate those dimensions of revitalization that may seem challenging but are essential to flexible and democratic urban environments.

Chapter 1: The Im/materiality of Constructed Space: Insights from Debates on Contestation

There is a story that when Louis Sullivan lay on his deathbed in a little hotel room, someone rushed in and said, “Mr. Sullivan, your Troesch Building is being torn down.” Sullivan raised himself up and responded, “If you live long enough, you’ll see all your buildings destroyed. After all, it’s only the idea that counts.” (Holl, cited in Tschumi & Cheng, 2003, p.27).

It is not easy to find an architect who would reduce the entire profession solely to dreams. Yet, Sullivan was right: any constructed space comes down to an idea that a space realizes. What makes this story remarkable however is not a familiar contradiction of the material and the ideal. Instead, it is the necessity to keep in mind that constructed space ‘fluctuates’ between idea and matter, cannot be exclusively defined either in terms of an idea or in terms of matter, and comes to life at the point of their contact. The duality of constructed space—its simultaneous solidity (*i.e.*, physicality and dogmatism) and dynamism (*i.e.*, temporality and symbolism)—demands an analysis of the ways in which constructed space resists architects’, planners’, and other professionals’ attempts to associate firmly matter with a certain meaning or identity. In this chapter, I touch on a number of topics that shed light on the capacity of constructed space to resist a clear-cut definition. Yet, more specifically I explore the capacity of constructed space for

flexibility by affording a variety of meanings in a single physical object. My major focus is on guerrilla gardening.

In space-making terms, guerrilla gardening represents a spatial practice that helps to craft all that one may tentatively call the space ‘between’ programs. These are spaces that are no longer defined by any single program (*e.g.*, a spontaneous skateboard park under a viaduct) and are fruitfully studied under many names (*i.e.*, tactical urbanism, DIY urbanism, everyday urbanism, insurgent urbanism, *etc.*) in architecture, geography, urban design, and other disciplines.¹⁶ Informality and illegality are their common traits. At their face value, these are the spaces that come into being for the same reason: to bring forth instances of lived—experiential—space on an as-needed basis. This, however, is not an exhaustive description of their impact. In geography and law, Nicholas Blomley (2004), followed by Sarah Keenan (2010), captures some of these practices in terms of the conflict between spaces of belonging and spaces of property that represent institutions and legal frameworks rather than immediate needs.¹⁷ Both Blomley and Keenan perceive informal spatial practices through their unsettling capacities to challenge dominant frameworks (*i.e.*, property frameworks) and to put them under stress. In this capacity, informal space-making practices such as guerrilla gardening are contesting in a particular kind of way: they not only present the everyday needs, but also question both the universality and uniqueness of the original meaning of affected objects. Guerrilla gardening suggests that the meaning of physical objects is not innate but rather depends on one or another set of action

¹⁶ Chase *et al.*, 2008; Cruz, 2007; Cupers & Miessen, 2002; Dell, 2009; Deslandes, 2013; Doron, 2007; Dovey & Polakit, 2007; Franck & Stevens, 2007b; Hou, 2010; Jones, 2006; Larsen & Johnson, 2012; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1996; Pagano, 2013; Rael, 2012; Sheridan, 2007; Stavrides, 2007; Trancik, 1986

¹⁷ *cf.* Jones, 2006: spaces of refusal; Larsen & Johnson, 2012: spaces of affinity

possibilities that these objects contain and which specific appearance depends on a specific context/perspective.

In this chapter, with the focus on contestation and the border, I unpack the ways in which such contexts/perspectives are secured, solidified, and, then, contested. To accomplish this goal, I explore the topics of a) public space, b) ephemeral space, c) informal interventions with the urban space, and d) border-related practices. I also explain the ways in which my research both challenges existing approaches to public space and tactical urbanism and contributes to the discussion on both. Ultimately, the chapter conveys the following: practices such as guerrilla gardening are capable of bringing forth the fundamental flexibility of constructed space, while an expanded understanding helps to articulate this condition. Finally, I provide a brief outline of the studies on guerrilla gardening in terms of different aspects of this practice, rationales behind it, its specific features, and concerns that arise from it.

1.1 Gaining a Perspective

Take a mental look around and think of your immediate urban environment. Likely, some sort of public space will come to mind among other images. Public spaces are essential and ubiquitous. It might be a park, a square, or even a lively intersection. For the most part we quickly recognize many types of urban built form as undoubtedly public. Yet, while there is still strong conventional belief in well-defined types of public spaces (*e.g.*, an urban park), there is also substantial evidence that public space as a specific type of built form is a confusing belief at best, even when it comes to the municipal space. In constantly being a mesh of different and

competing perspectives on the right to be in, and the ways to be in, urban life brings under continuous scrutiny two guiding principles of public space—accessibility and inclusiveness (or visibility).¹⁸ Each perspective suggests its own vision for the both of these principles and for the resulting built form. Ted Kilian’s (1998; *cf.* Duncan, 1994) analysis of public *versus* private as a continuous dialectical relationship of two intents—to control and not to be excluded—provides an illuminating interpretation of the complexity of many of these competing interpretations. Kilian moves away from binary-driven interpretations of space (*i.e.*, private versus public) towards continuums (*i.e.*, an extent rather than a clear state: publicness of a space rather than a public space). More specifically, Kilian’s approach to accessibility and transparency of a space—that is, its public potential—defines them in terms of the *extent* to which 1) creators of rules as well as the rules themselves are visible and clear and 2) the rules are available for renegotiation by those who did not set them. While this might appear unnecessarily complex, Kilian’s approach is highly illuminating for certain paradoxes that those spaces that are defined as undeniably public—libraries, parks, and streets—produce. For example, in Montréal, Canada, most of the city parks are closed between midnight and six in the morning for any activity other than passing through. During this time, city parks ‘belong’ to the police who suddenly gains the power not only to establish order but also to make parks inaccessible for many activities that are available during the day. Supposedly, nothing changes, other than the time of the day, and, yet,

¹⁸ A realm of the Euro-American academic literature on public space, regardless of specific topics and epistemological approaches, most often explores public space in terms of openness (*i.e.*, permeability, accessibility, *etc.*) and community engagement. Etymologically, there is a well-established record of what the term “public” semantically outlines in the English language (also, in Old French) that also helps to trace the evolution of understanding public space specifically on these terms (see **Appendix 1** for a more detailed discussion).

everything changes: a park is no longer public. Kilian's approach points out that this contradiction is a result of an erroneous assumption about parks as a predefined type of public space, the publicness of which never changes. In fact, it is neither a purely public nor a purely private space. Its meaning fluctuates, and this has serious implications not only for accessibility but also for the meaning and appearance of its built form. A bench in a park that can serve as a private bed to a homeless person during the day, when the park is public, 'vanishes' at night although its physical parameters and the location remain the same.¹⁹ This is easily supported by other studies, such as Tim Cresswell's (1996) analysis of place as a stronghold of collective identity, Don Mitchell's (2003) distinction between public space as an institutionalized 'public' function and public space as created in a struggle for rights, or Gordon Ingram's (1997) account on "queerscapes", normative publicness of the street, and the necessity for architects to move away from the idea of a single space—single meaning. Ultimately, in being ubiquitous, public space is also the most ubiquitous manifestation of the flexibility of meaning of built form: while the ideas of inclusion and accessibility appeal to everyone, distinct groups have distinct ideas for the ways in which these ideas ought to be embodied. A built form that communicates publicness to one group might appear private and off limits for another. Public space is a 'mundane' example of the critical prevalence of terms on which access to the physicality of a space is established over the sheer fact of physical entry as a universal understanding of accessibility. To

¹⁹ Away from the poetics of space and towards its mundane regulation, problems around the interpretation of property is one particular example of that. The critique of the privilege of value-based over use-based foundation of property ownership in the Euro-American tradition has been raised by a number of authors, of which the works of Henri Lefebvre (1991), Robert Sack (1986), and Nicholas Blomley (2004) are arguably among most known across disciplines (see also, Chase *et al.*, 2008; Dell, 2009; Kenan, 2010; Mason, 1998; Sibley, 1994; Smith & Kurts, 2003; Wekerle & Classens, 2015; Zukin, 2010).

put this into a perspective, public space is a case of the general disjunction between matter and meaning. Architecture overcomes this disjunction by shaping a link between the two but struggles to eliminate the disjunction completely. It is possible to observe this process with the subjects other than public space at the scales other than a single type of built form.²⁰

Consider the advent of Modernism. At the dawn of the 20th century, László Moholy-Nagy and Le Corbusier, two influential figures of Modernism, strived to re-articulate architectural space so that new technologies—their capacities and demands—would not only be a part of the space but also shape its ideology and the agency that it corresponds. Their space ‘from’ flow sets

²⁰ From the perspective of (political) power: de Certeau, 1984[1980]; Cresswell, 1996; Dovey, 1999; Franck & Stevens, 2007; Hou, 2010; Kilian, 1998; Mitchell, 2003; Sack, 1986; from the perspective of property: Blomley, 2004, 2010; Keenan, 2010; Mason, 1998; Mitchell, 2003; Zukin, 2010; from the perspective of citizenship: Cruz, 2007; Fortier, 2010; Shachar, 2009; Sheridan, 2007; Weber, 2010; from the perspective of norm and deviation: Bataille, 1986; Cresswell, 1996; Douglas, 1966; Ingram, 1997; Oswin, 2008; from the perspective of scale and (professional) representation: Cosgrove, 1997; Debord [in Knabb, 1981]); Foucault, 1977; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992; Lefebvre, 1991; Rodaway, 1996; Sennett, 2008, 2011; Smith & Kurts, 2003; Sorkin, 1992; from the perspective of replica and the state of disrepair: Doron, 2007; Jackson, 1980; Jacobs, 1961; Relph, 2004; Richards, 1994; from the perspective of flow and fit (Alexander, 1970; Blomley, 2010; Debord [in Knabb, 1981], DeNora, 2000; Ellin, 2006; Jackson, 1980; Mcharg, 1969; Lefebvre, 1994; Last, 2012; Morse, 1990; Relph, 2004; Wunderlich, 2013).

a context from which capacities of humankind gain a certain appearance.²¹ The flow metaphor is exactly that link between matter and its meaning that can be further translated into built form. Yet, this cannot be done once and for all. The texts by Le Corbusier or Moholy-Nagy are profoundly functionalist and structuralist, as reflected in their understanding of flow. By contrast, the post-modern and post-structuralist text of Bernard Tschumi (1994), who wonders what lies beyond space if it has borders, reveals another perspective on flow and dance that is not about motion but rather about an individual rhythm (*cf.* Moholy-Nagy, 1948[1928]). Consequently, it is possible to witness two different understandings and realizations of space from flow: from *La ville contemporaine* to *Le parc de la Villette*.

Another fitting and highly pertinent to architecture example is the architects' preoccupation with the notion of atmosphere. It reflects an awareness of the fact that built form alone does not shape experiences of spaces that architects design.²² Mark Wigley (1998) argues that "atmosphere" is a term that was borrowed from planetary sciences in order to capture the

²¹ *A path for future architecture is indicated from this point of departure as well: the inside and the outside, the upper and the lower, fuse into unity. Openings and boundaries, perforations and moving surfaces, carry the periphery to the center and push the center outward. A constant fluctuation, sideways and upward, radiant, all-sided, announces to man that he has taken possession, in so far as his human capacities and present conceptions allow, of imponderable, invisible, and yet omnipresent space.* (Moholy-Nagy, 1947, p.181).

Ultimately, Moholy-Nagy was inspired by new ways of perception brought by new technology (*e.g.*, airplane). Yet, he still tends to approach space as something objective that has its own laws and logic that are best appropriated through capturing motion.

²² Benjamin, 2008[1936]; Karadinou, 2013; Leatherbarrow, 2009; Pallasmaa, 2005b, 2014; Ruskin, 1981; Semper, 1989[1851]; Wigley, 1998; Zumthor, 2006

phenomenon of a physical form that emanates beyond its shape.²³ As he notes, “[t]he atmosphere occupies the space between a building and its context. Or, rather, it defines that space.” (1998, p. 24). Wigley dismisses architects’ ability to subordinate atmosphere to a precise “stenographic” line, drawn by a rational mind in the realm of a cool, calculating discipline (as Le Corbusier called for it in *L’esprit nouveau*). Similarly, in *Encounters*, Pallasmaa (2005b) admits that while architects are taught to design houses rather than homes, designing a home can hardly be a subject of architecture as a discipline (cf. Leatherbarrow, 2009).²⁴

Non-volumetric architecture is another area of practice that makes the disjunction between a physical volume and its spatial meaning pronounced (Aymonino, 2006; Brown, 2006; Jones, 2006; Morteo, 2006). In the introduction to the volume *Contemporary Public Space: Unvolumetric Architecture*, Brown (2006) notes that *Learning from Las Vegas* has become a critical text for architecture for its focus on signs and figures that carry a greater iconological weight than actual volumes. Venturi’s book coincided with the shift of the ideological focus of architecture from mass and volume towards what Louis Khan called a “thoughtful making of space” in the 1950s (in Brown, 2006)—an understanding of space as defined by intentionality rather than volume and surface.

²³ In this respect, Pallasmaa (2014) points out that “atmosphere” appears to be a more explicit objective in modes of thinking other than architectural (*e.g.*, cinematic, literary, or painterly). The famous “atmosphere is my style” that J.W. Turner once told to John Ruskin exemplifies both the subject matter and the means of expression.

²⁴ In line with Wigley and Pallasmaa, Zumthor (2006) is aware of the challenge of pinpointing and reproducing an atmosphere rather than built form. Yet, distinct from Wigley and Pallasmaa, his phenomenologically-minded work is still an attempt to operationalize the creation of the former.

The vernacular architecture and its own take on the dynamism of the form that follows a changing function is yet another recognition of a dynamic connection between matter and meaning.²⁵ Sullivan would be very surprised if he found out that his famous “form follows function” credo (1896)—a reductionist imperative for American architects at the dawn of Modernism—can be followed to the point. A rather radical example of architecture in motion comes from Prizeman (1998), who argues that built form—a static part of architectural creation—is just a ruin if there is no purpose that animates it.²⁶ Needless to say that purposes can vary, and Prizeman further notes that architects are taught that what they draw is what they will see in practice, although this approach is likely to result in banality or the loss of control over a created space.

Aside from these examples, there is another aspect of marrying matter and meaning to consider and that becomes particularly obvious when it comes specifically to informal space-making practices, such as guerrilla gardening. It is the process of securing a link between matter and meaning, and this process can be illustrated through a temporal dimension of constructed space. As Louis Sullivan would argue (and apparently did), all constructed spaces are temporary. Yet, consider those spaces that we specifically call temporary. A temporary space is a common occurrence that might include semi-permanent or even permanent structures that are erected for

²⁵ Adams, 1995; Adams & Sijpkes, 1995; Architecture for Humanity, 2012; Jackson, 1980, 1997; Krstic, 1998; McHarg, 1969; Mellin, 2006, 2009; Prizeman, 1998

²⁶ During a guest lecture at the School of Architecture at McGill University in 2013, Katherine Clarke, one of the members of *muf architecture*, described a research-driven design project that the studio conducted for a developer who purchased a brownfield and was interested in an architectural design that would draw from the ‘heritage’ of that parcel of land. *muf architecture* brought a group of children onto the site so that through playing and socializing children, in using the site’s current condition, could re-create a sense of the situatedness of the brownfield in a larger context.

festivals, celebrations, and a variety of special events. Some of the most striking examples of temporary spaces are the construction of buildings for Olympic Games and World Fairs. An ongoing example of a temporary space that requires a high degree of architectural mastery is the Ice Hotel in the Ville de Québec, Canada, that has been a recurring structure (and event) constructed of ice and snow every winter since 2001. The case of the Ice Hotel is a notable example due to the changes that are introduced to its re-appearing built form from one season to another. The hotel's program is permanent while its physicality is not. Another example of a temporary space is the "Lichtgrenze" (light border) project in Germany. In 2014, a line of 8,000 helium-filled spheres, each attached to a vertical pole, traced the demolished Berlin Wall for a stretch of 15 km in order to celebrate the 25th anniversary of its dismantling in 1989.²⁷

These are the examples of spaces with programs that are, most likely, developed by professionals and, most definitely, recognized by local authorities (*i.e.*, remain protected by existing property, safety, and zoning laws and regulations). Being temporary, they are subject to a scheduled expiry and termination, often along with their physical envelopes. Yet, there is a lot of permanence in their temporality. This permanence originates not from the physical endurance of the matter of a created space but rather from a variety of power structures that set grounds for a space and ensure its duration and its reoccurrence. The endurance of these spaces comes from beyond their borders. Importantly, this is not the case for all temporary spaces, and the same power structures can also perform the 'magic' of the disappearance of a space, even if it physically remains present. In planning, there is a certain understanding of the difference

²⁷ Hillburn, M. (2014) 8,000 Glowing Orbs Will Trace Route of Berlin Wall, Voice of America. Retrieved from <http://www.voanews.com/content/lichtgrenze-orbs-will-retrace-berlin-wall-25-years/2509554.html> on February 2nd, 2015.

between “temporary” and “ephemeral”. Rudolf Kohoutek & Christa Kamleithner (2006) associate temporary uses and spaces with the movement of programs that sequentially and completely replace one another within the confines of the same physical surface under the paradigm of a flexible use of space. Robert Temel (2006), on his part, explains the difference between temporal and ephemeral dimensions of space uses in terms of the irrevocability of their longevity:

‘Temporary’ refers to something that exists for a time, but there are different concepts of such temporariness: ‘Ephemeral’ is a term from biology that refers to creatures that live for only a day. Ephemerality is thus an existential temporality; the ephemeral has a short life, its existence cannot be extended. (Temel, 2006, p. 55).

Importantly, the non-secured component of certain temporary spaces, such as those of guerrilla gardening, makes them a whole different type of the temporary, beyond the factor of longevity. Illegal urban gardens, unauthorized bike lanes, ad-hoc markets, art installations, and the like are ephemeral rather than merely temporary spaces. Being transgressive, their programs and envelopes can both radically change and vanish (*e.g.*, be demolished) at any moment. Physically, these spaces exist, but they are not recognized by officials as truly present, which means that their forceful disappearance is not considered to be an act of destruction; what does not exist cannot be destroyed. To illustrate, Gill Doron's (2007) analysis of vacant or abandoned urban land plots, often seen as land outside of *the* urban space from the planning perspective, is illuminating. Doron argues that while vacant or abandoned plots lack a formal program, they are

neither empty nor missing. All sorts of different—new or alternative—activities can take place (cf. Sheridan, 2007). As Doron notes:

The association of a certain appearance with wasteland is, I would argue, reducing the whole debate about these spaces into indeterminacy. Why? Obviously, if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so is unsightliness. But more importantly, the seemingly disordered landscape cannot be examined just by its appearance since it is known to be harbouring various spatial, natural, architectural, and social qualities that cannot be found in, and are often actively excluded from, other urban spaces, including the formal public space. These qualities show that these sites are not a waste of land. (2007, p.15).

Once a formal program of such a plot is released, the site can become both a ‘hole’ in the space (of a given formal representation and its specific access to the ‘stuff’ of the world) and a collection of physical entities with a variety of spatial possibilities for others. The status of inaccessibility and invisibility of these plots is a matter of professional ordering of urban space rather than of universal fact. Doron’s analysis is emancipatory and focuses on the role of political power in making space visible. In this respect, Doron appears to understate a crucial point: an entity that remains saturated with a variety of activities, while disregarded as such by officials, has no precedence by default. One still needs to acquire both a context and a perspective that afford perceiving an abandoned site as a space—that is, to find a way to imbue matter with

meaning and to produce a space out of their connection.²⁸ In this respect, a practice such as guerrilla gardening provides a particular kind of insight. It creates a space that originates from the *re-appearing* disjunction between matter and meaning: in those instances where an established link between the two can be challenged and re-interpreted to give rise to a new one. In the next section, I will introduce and discuss the body of works that lead to this approach to informal and non-sanctioned space-making practices. First, however, a more detailed discussion of the guerrilla gardening practice is in order.

1.2 Taking Advantage of the Ambiguity of Belonging of Constructed Space: the Case of Guerrilla Gardening

Despite all the qualities that give the impression that guerrilla gardening is an organized political movement, it is important to remember that the practice is not a homogeneous activity with a single goal. The work of guerrilla gardeners often aims not to stake out a lasting political ground by institutionalizing a new form of public space (Mooallem, 2008; *cf.* Smith & Kurtz, 2003). Guerrilla gardening is comprised of different actors and different intentions towards the urban environment. Consequently, this practice can take multiple forms. It can range from noticeably organization-driven or loosely connected via social media to completely individual-driven and

²⁸ In the case of guerrilla gardening, for example, this context could be as simple as the lack of an individual's own private property for gardening and/or a complicated proposal submission process for community gardening. In Toronto, Canada, highly detailed rules for obtaining a lot to establish a community garden (Parks, Forestry, and Recreation, 2014) clearly demonstrate municipal authorities' determination to keep a firm grip over the appearance of urban green spaces.

off-radar, eschewing any organizational structure.²⁹ Nevertheless, there are basic defining features that are common across the practice.

First, guerrilla gardening is not legitimate community gardening (*i.e.*, accepted by the local municipal authorities and incorporated into existing structures of urban space), although certain guerrilla gardening initiatives are definitely community-focused.³⁰ An article by Mooallem (2008) explicitly illuminates the difference between the two in the context of present-day London, UK, where guerrilla gardening irritates municipal authorities for its illegality and unpredictability, although unofficially these authorities might be on the gardeners' side. Similarly, rules for community gardening in Toronto, Canada (Parks, Forestry, and Recreation, 2014) demonstrate that municipal authorities define both community gardening and its legitimacy on very specific terms. It is important to note that while nominally this activity and its spaces are illegal, certain space-making practitioners suggest using a different term—for example, “unregulated” (Loukaitou-Sideris and Mukhija, 2016)—for certain informal and non-sanctioned urban spatial practices that both sets them aside from criminal activities and more precisely outlines their nature. While I completely support the need for this nuanced delineation, I also find it necessary to use the term illegal in this research. As of today and definitely in relation to this project, in the eyes of many municipal authorities who do not recognize the right of guerrilla gardens to exist guerrilla gardening spaces are perceived as illegal and to be removed rather than unregulated and to be assimilated.

²⁹ See in Adams & Hardman, 2013, 2015; Brones, 2013; Crane, 2011; GuerrillaGardening.org; McKay, 2011; Toronto Public Space Committee; Victoria News, 2013; Walton, 2011; Wekerle & Classens, 2015; Zanetti, 2007; Zukin, 2010

³⁰ Adams & Hardman, 2013, 2015; Crane, 2011; Crane et al., 2013; McKay, 2011; Mooallem, 2008; Wax, 2012; Zukin, 2010

Safety concerns and property ownership legal frameworks are among the factors that legitimate community gardening needs to respect in order to secure its permanence. Yet, these are the factors that also limit its potential to challenge both the *status quo* and the privatizing effect that the status quo might have on urban environments (according to Kilian's [1996] framework). Guerrilla gardening does not have these and many other restraints as long as it remains "guerrilla". Consequently, most of the work done by guerrilla gardeners is ephemeral, even if gardeners undertake to protect their gardens.

Second, guerrilla gardening intervention should not be understood as merely another form of sustainable food production. While the practice can form a part of the ideology of sustainable food production (Brones, 2013; Crane *et al.*, 2013), its illegality, which does not win local official support, means that it is difficult for the practice to remain both "guerrilla" (*i.e.*, a subject to abrupt termination) and "sustainable" in a planned-out urban space. Also, the fact that guerrilla gardeners are willing to cross the municipal-private line creates a political statement that goes beyond a simple food production paradigm. Richard Reynolds, one of the most visible activists and promoters of guerrilla gardening in the UK, speaks of the practice as "gardening without boundaries; gardening land that isn't yours, without permission" (PIYN, 2013). That being stated, the practice nevertheless often involves growing edible plants for the purpose of providing free vegetables. Initiatives such as *Incredible Edible* (www.incredibleediblenetwork.org.uk) can be a part of either a legal initiative in community gardening or an illegal one of guerrilla gardening. The (food) sustainability intention of guerrilla gardening actions, therefore, cannot be dismissed, but the explanation of its existence requires a much more complex social and political context.

Third, it would be simplistic to portray this practice and the individuals who comprise it as deliberately focused on the issues of landscape architecture, urban design or urban space. Rather, individuals who are engaged in the practice appear to be preoccupied with a number of practical and other concerns. The overall impression gleaned from examining guerrilla gardening online forum discussions is that, above all, guerrilla gardening is a spatial practice that is a reflection of individuals who value easy access to knowledge and best practices in a non-formal and non-institutionalized way and whose interests are linked to gardening in urban space (Mikadze, 2015).

Academic and non-academic literature on guerrilla gardening (and urban agriculture, more broadly) explores this practice through a broad variety of lenses. First, given its activist nature and its general rootedness in gardening, some of these lenses take the predictable shape of hands-on guides (Reynolds, 2008; Tracey, 2011). Other lenses vary from critical analysis of urban gardening (McKay, 2011) to the studies that apply a Marxian framework (Crane, 2011; Crane *et al.*, 2013; McClintock, 2014) to those framed by political ecology (McLain *et al.*, 2014; Milbourne, 2012; Zanetty, 2007), ethnographic analysis (Adams & Hardman, 2013), social capital theory (Firth *et al.*, 2014), participatory action research (Crane, 2011), phenomenology (Walton, 2011), and resilience theory (Radywyl & Biggs, 2013).

More specifically, in comparing guerrilla gardening with community gardening Crane (2011) sets out to explore the relationship between space and sustainability in a situation where guerrilla gardening challenges capitalist understandings of space. Specifically in relation to illegal gardening on private property, Wekerle & Classens (2015) analyze the tension between ownership-based and use-based access to urban land (*cf.* Zukin, 2010, Chapter 6). McClintock (2014) explores the contribution of community gardening to neoliberal ideology, as gardeners do

not disrupt the dominant food production and consumption framework. In relation to this subject, McClintock (2014) also notes that marginalized groups are not always included in processes of conceptualization of green space in the city. Zanetty's (2007) account of guerrilla gardening in London is an application of both political ecology and Latour's (1988, 1999) actor-network theory in relation to a type of agency that is distributed among human and non-human actors as well as political representations of it. Zanetty's analysis of gardening explores an appearance of a plant as a factor of influence (*cf.* Power's [2005] recognition of the space-making capacity of a plant that appears as weed). Milbourne (2012) explores urban agriculture primarily from the position of fostering social ties with the focus on the changes to the quality of urban life that the spaces aim to produce. In the same fashion of social change, Radywyl & Biggs (2013) study urban agriculture (including guerrilla gardening) in relation to the quality of public space and its capacity to bring in social innovations. Conversely, Crane et al. (2013) consider guerrilla gardening to be a form of sustainability agenda that remains non-normative and reflexive of local needs. Similarly, McLain et al. (2014) approach foraging in cities as a subversive practice, capable of shifting the dominant understanding of sustainability. Firth et al. (2014) argue that there is no broad agreement on the instrumentality of measuring social capital and focus on urban agriculture in order to operationalize their social capital accumulation techniques. Distinctly, Walton (2011) focuses on the experiential impacts on non-involved observers of what she perceives as a guerrilla garden and the resemblance of these impacts to phenomenological *epoché*. Adams et al. (2014) focus on locals' opinions on the activity and the colonization of urban land effect that the illegality of guerrilla gardening creates when a specific group of people, whether homogenous or not, claims rights to the common—municipal—property for their own interests. In a similar fashion, Adams & Hardman (2013) earlier explore the influence

of the micro politics of gardening activism and the socio-economic profiles of activists on the outcomes of the practice.

General attitudes towards non-authorized space-making practices also take a number of perspectives: from municipal authorities' concerns with liability and vandalism (Pagano, 2013), to claims of rights to urban space (Reynolds, 2008), to alternative modes of dealing with emerging issues (*i.e.*, sustainability: Crane *et al.*, 2013; McLain *et al.*, 2014; care: Walton, 2011; Zukin, 2010; property tensions: Smith & Kurtz, 2003; Wekerle & Classens, 2015; survival: Dell, 2009, Deslandes, 2012), to yet another contribution to neoliberalism (McClintock, 2014).

To summarize, as an informal space-making practice, guerrilla gardening constitutes a much more complex urban phenomenon than a mere instance of urban disorder or of imposition on someone's else property. Yet, time after time, guerrilla gardeners encounter problems with the acceptance of their work by authorities. In part, municipal authorities ground their resistance to informal interventions with urban space in the fact that a representative democracy system has a particular way of addressing citizens' concerns (*cf.* Adams *et al.*, 2014). Generally, this is a valid argument since creators behind illegal and informal space-making practices do not necessarily take into consideration the interests of other actors in the urban space (Pagano, 2013). For example, papers by Firth *et al.* (2011) and Adams *et al.* (2014) specifically focus on testing the benefits of urban agriculture for a wider community. Adams *et al.* (2014), in particular, underscore that their research focuses on the potential harm, whether to the environment or to the broader community, that can originate with guerrilla gardening. While the paper provides scarce evidence of that damage, the researchers nevertheless emphasize a legitimate perspective on the subject. The desire of city officials to avoid chaos or intercept 'colonization' of municipal property by one or another group of residents creates another problem, however. As long as city

officials remain within normative frameworks into which these informal practices do not fit, they are bounded by the perception of these practices as ultimately damaging. This does not have to be the case, and there are means to step away from perceiving complex urban space-making practices as illegal towards seeing them as formally unregulated, if not desirable.

1.2.1 The Need for the Ambiguity of Belonging: Edward Relph's Environmental Humility

What is particularly illuminating about many informal and non-sanctioned urban space-making practices is that they occur in areas in which distinct representations (*e.g.*, vacant plot and patch of wild vegetation), domains (*e.g.*, public and private), and scales (*e.g.*, house and street) come into contact, create ambiguity of belonging and, consequently, set ground for imbuing the ambiguous matter with new meaning. This is reflected in a number of works, such as Cresswell (1996) on graffiti, Bobic (2004) on urban edges, Doron (2007) and Qviström (2007) on abandoned sites, Rael (2012) and Weber (2010) on the US-Mexican border. These are also the paper by Larsen & Johnson (2012) on spaces of affinity, DeNora's (2000) account of the characteristics of spaces unfolded by a musical tune, work by Peretti (2007) on the use of streets and speakeasies in New York City during Prohibition, Bobic's (2004) analysis of urbanity interfaces, Domosh's (1998) account of breaching socially acceptable forms of behaviour that were set for bourgeois women (*e.g.*, time and places when and where they could appear unaccompanied on Broadway), Hou's (2010) analysis of 'insurgent' public space, Franck & Stevens' (2007b) account of possibilities for different courses of action towards the same elements of built form in loose space, Dell's (2009) detailed account of tacit urbanism of minor

street trade in India, the similar account of Chase et al. (2008) of ‘inappropriate’ uses of space for small-scale activities in the United States, and Sheridan’s (2007) analysis of squatting practices in abandoned Berlin buildings. Combined, these works tap into two broad topics: 1) institutions and frameworks that establish specific links between matter and meaning (*e.g.*, urban green space regulations and property frameworks) and 2) practices that challenge these links (*e.g.*, guerrilla gardening). These works are for the large part emancipatory and shine a spotlight on dominant frameworks that enforce a specific context (as a frame of references) at the expense of others. For the purposes of my research, there is an important subset of texts that considers the state of indeterminacy from which many of these challenging practices emerge as a critical end in itself, as a possibility to avoid incapacitating overregulation.³¹ In this respect, I would like to focus on two works that pave ground for understanding the ways in which informal space-making practices, such as guerrilla gardening, commit to the same goal of imbuing matter with meaning, albeit on their own terms.

The first of these works is Franck & Stevens’ (2007b) discussion of loose space, specifically framed in terms of urban design, explores spaces where physical composition affords more than a single program. In fact, the notion of loose space reflects a variety of spaces in which formal program and function become re-defined on an as-needed basis. Franck & Stevens tie the capacity of a space to be loose down to the porosity of its borders, the creativity of actors who can discover new affordances in the existing built form, and the capacity of the space to retain this indeterminate quality. Overall, loose space can be as simple as a low-rise concrete fence that affords sitting on it, although it was not officially intended for such use. For this reason, Franck and Stevens (2007b) pay particular attention to physical edges and thresholds.

³¹ See Bobic, 2004; Chase *et al.*, 2008; Dell, 2009; Franck & Stevens, 2007a, 2007b; Gehl, 1986, 1996

Distinctly, while also focusing on edges (*i.e.*, physical dividers), Milos Bobic (2004) approaches these elements of built form as areas of ambiguity of belonging, some of which are capable of forming “urbanity interfaces” (p.86)—a territory on which new meanings and modes of behaviour can be born out of this ambiguity (*e.g.*, the use of porches by passers-by).³² Bobic’s discussion is particularly engaging for its focus on the interrelation of domains (*i.e.*, private and public) and scales (*i.e.*, house, street, and block). The extent of Bobic’s (2004) inquiry is broader than that of Franck & Stevens (2007b), and its capacity can be further extended. Edges that are capable of producing territories of creative contestations are likely to encompass a broader variety of elements that are not limited just to certain types of built form. With its focus on the complexity of urban life, the idea of the “urbanity interface” opens up a discussion on the structure of a territory for renegotiation via spatial contestation. This is a critical consideration for the *raison d’être* of non-secured spatial practices that re-negotiate meanings of urban spaces.

Yet, how do both Franck & Stevens’ loose space and Bobic’s urbanity interfaces stand against more strategic flights from the dictate of formalized spaces with predetermined programs—that is, into alternative rather than indeterminate programs? For instance, in acknowledging the capacity of spaces of affinity to be present on the grounds of a spontaneous action that overrides existing topographies of power that formal spaces solidify, Larsen & Johnson still wonder (2012, p.641):

³² Earlier, in a similar way, Gehl (1986, 1996) develops a notion of “soft edges” in the context of lively residential streets. Gehl explores the role of semi-private spaces, such as porches or front yards, that facilitate diverse uses of residential streets and engage a variety of users.

Once scale is deconstructed, then, the challenge becomes how to engage, manage, and think about connectivity from within an embedded, situated position [i.e., local values and needs] and therefore without recourse to a totalizing or reductionist geographical framework [i.e., global capital and power] ... without diminishing the place's connectivity and interactivity.

This is a critical issue. It rightfully points to the necessity for a space that challenges the validity of an established program to be more than just a 'playground' for an hour, a sanctioned heterotopia at most. From this perspective, the notion of loose space (that by its very definition avoids any definitive programming) falls short as a response to this question. As a predominantly descriptive rather than an operationalizing notion, loose space hardly sets a framework.³³ It remains a useful analytical technique, however, the role of which is to identify both traits and instances of indeterminate built form. Distinctly, Bobic's (2004) urbanity interface stands up to the challenge. Despite its limitations, Bobic's analysis of edges as potential indeterminate spaces intends to produce an operationalizing framework that relies on the indelible encounters of scales/domains. These encounters, capable of creating instances of the ambiguity of belonging (that open up existing physical form to re-interpretations), are within the reach of professionals who can plan and design for them, especially if it is possible to move beyond the limitations of Bobic's framework. In order to do so, a more thorough discussion of the border (of which 'edge'

³³ A paper by Fernando (2007) on pre-programmed open-ended spaces as an official 'loose space' is a clear illustration of the limits of the notion of loose space when it comes down to the professional practice of design.

is a particular manifestation) as a space of contestation is coming. First, however, there is still a piece that is missing from this discussion.

The need for practices that turn a re-appearing disjunction between matter and meaning into a new—overlying—space, rather than either ignore it or cover it up, has to be articulated. Specifically due to their contesting nature, practices such as guerrilla gardening provide a certain insight for a non-compartmentalising spatial logic, albeit carried out in an illegal manner. In order to go beyond the illegal component of the guerrilla gardening action and to explore a space that can be conceived on non-compartmentalising principles, I aim to operationalize the insight that comes out of the studied case with the concept of environmental humility (as developed by Relph, 1981; cf. Sennett, 1970). In *Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography*, Relph (1981) introduces the concept of environmental humility to point at the need for a mindset for city-making practitioners that facilitates a shift from prescriptive to more ‘descriptive’ planning strategies. Overall, environmental humility demands the practitioner to search for the necessary individuality of a place (*i.e.*, what constitutes its core) and to find the ways to incorporate this individuality into practice while, most importantly, avoiding any rigid articulations about the design and functionality of a place. In this respect, the present research engages with the concept through the analysis of an illicit practice—guerrilla gardening—that in searching for the meaning of the existing built form cannot, nevertheless, eliminate its previous meanings. This practice is a real-world insight of humble and, consequently, non-fragmenting space-making.

Relph’s analysis and critique of modernist and functionalist adherence to fragmentation of human environments are not an exception by any means. To varying extents, many influential works of the postwar time are a direct response to the modernist and functionalist landscapes and to their exponential growth in the 20th century (Arendt, 1958; Jacobs, 1961; McHarg, 1969;

Lefebvre, 1968, 1991; Mumford, 1964; Newman, 1973; Tuan, 1974;³⁴ Tuan, 1994). A common denominator of these works is a shared concern about an increasingly expertise-driven approach to place making. In some respects, this was what Relph (1981) would later call “hyperplanning”. In many other respects this would contribute to the creation of a unique phenomenon of the 20th century: placelessness. It is not that places were no longer a thing but rather that their character and value would no longer be primarily defined by local actors and forces. In *Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography* (Relph, 1981), Relph explores the phenomenon of modern function- and efficiency-driven places (*e.g.*, fast-food restaurants and suburban developments) as a perverted resolution of the principles of Enlightenment. He relates the source of the problem to a totalizing rational mind that privileges (economic) efficiency and temporal security (*i.e.*, predictability) as ultimate bottom lines of dealing with the world around. As Relph notes, “[m]any modern landscapes are almost too painfully honest—oil refineries and expressways and international airports can hardly be contrived or given a facade” (1981, p.73). Yet, while even these places can have their share of restorations and copying, Relph finds it impossible to find any feeling in them. Instead, he argues, it is as if the feeling is removed from them “with an almost surgical precision”. He further continues that modern fast-food restaurants are

certainly not garish and vulgar, but rather exemplars of that type of modern design which combines niceness, cleanliness, comfortable convenience and efficiency. ... But none of

³⁴ Years before the publication of the book titled *Topophilia* (1974), Tuan publishes an article *Topophilia* (1961) in which he discusses works of Gaston Bachelard who “is a physicist whose attention has turned from the measurable properties of matter to those which cannot be registered by instruments other than that ultimate instrument—man.” (1961, p.30).

them would exist were it not for highly efficient procedures of factory farming and the landscapes of broiler houses and feed lots. In these visual quality is of little concern, it is efficiency and maximum production per unit that matters. (1981, p.76-78).

Ultimately, Relph concludes the analysis of this and similar landscapes, such as modern suburbs, with an argument that it is not their faceless design and uniformity, or lack of humanism, that makes them a problem. Quite the opposite: it is

paternalistic humanism of planning and development which threatens to smother everything. What exists now is not planning so much as 'hyperplanning', enquiring into every detail, arranging things just so, eliminating the possibility of fundamental change, and drastically reducing the opportunities for individuals to become involved with their suburban places. (1981, pp.84-85).

From this perspective, the “removed feeling” is not that these suburban developments or fast-food family restaurants evoke no emotions. Rather, it is exactly the manifestation of excessive all-controlling “hyperplanning” that turns a place into a machine. While Relph (1981) sees environmental humility largely as a mindset, in *Modernity and the Reclamation of Place* (Relph, 1993) he points to a potential practical resolution of it: the need for imperfection. This is to acknowledge the co-presence of multiple actors (both human and non-human) who jointly co-create an environment which logic may or may not fit precisely into formalized frameworks for urban environments. Importantly, these actors are going to cross borders, both physical (*i.e.*, edges) and implied, that are imposed on them by formal frameworks. Both the ways in which

these borders become exposed and the manners in which they are crossed deserve a discussion that will take us beyond simple understanding of border and will have substantial implications for understanding the role of non-sanctioned practices in making non-compartmentalizing urban space.

1.3 Situating the Ambiguity: the Role of the Border

In the context of understanding the non-compartmentalizing capacity of guerrilla gardening—a practice that begins with contestation and crosses a variety of borders, the latter becomes an entity of critical importance. The goal is not to abolish border but to re-think its meaning.

Conventionally, the border is a manifestation of separation. In this capacity, geographically, border is a peripheral element of a space-compartment, and its genesis is a result of an imposition of dominant political, economic, cultural, legal, and professional frameworks on everyday practices. These frameworks are so fundamental, if not pervasive, to our existence that even a mere line on the ground might gain the power to separate, and in some cases this is all that it takes.³⁵ Moreover, border as a divider is one of those cases in which the physicality of built form alone corresponds a seemingly universal meaning (a concrete fence that blocks one's path, for example). Although, is it truly the case? As clear as this can be the border solely as a physical divider is a limited concept at best. Problems begin with the semantic ambiguity of the border when it comes to everyday practices. Combined, various definitions of the border point to

³⁵ See the study by Sarah Thomson (2005) on structuring children's behaviours during courtyard-based activities in an elementary school

the fundamental challenge of understanding a variety of border-related notions strictly in terms of a dividing function. To paraphrase Casey (2011, see below), border is always in the process of being absorbed into adjacent contexts.

To illustrate, the *Dictionary of Human Geography* (Gregory *et al.*, 2009) tends to associate border with a condition and boundary with a line (see also Van Hatum, 2005). Quite distinctly, Sennett (2008, 2011) speaks of boundaries as voids in the urban fabric. The major effect of this is the creation of compartments, since boundaries break the continuity of a particular experience not only by the fact of introducing a physical obstacle but also through distance (often not a physical but an experiential one) that comes with it. In this respect, Sennett's approach feeds into Jacobs' (1961) analysis of borders as edges of perimeters that nevertheless exercise active influence on the surrounding environment. From an urban design perspective, Gehl (1986, 1996) similarly focuses on the ability of certain (semi-private) edges (*i.e.*, front yards, porches, *etc.*) to act as engaging space in its own right. Somewhat similarly, geographers Newman & Paasi (1998) suggest that "[t]he boundary does not limit itself merely to the border area or landscape itself, but more generally manifests itself in social and cultural practices and legislation, as well as in films, novels, memorials, ceremonies and public events." (1998, p.196). In raising the question of borderlands (where national boundaries meet the border) in relation to hybridity, anthropologists Gupta & Ferguson (1992) also suggest that boundaries are conditions or situations (*e.g.*, national cultures) while borders are quite literally lines on the ground. In between, one can find a summarizing account (from a planning perspective) by Haselsberger (2014) who suggests understanding both border and boundary as lines that are, respectively, a divider (edge) and an outline of a single entity. Casey (2011) explores the border as a process of becoming boundary: "*There is something about a wall, we might say, that does not love itself—at least not enough to*

maintain itself as permanently inviolable. To say it in the primary terms of this talk: borders are always already in the process of becoming boundaries." (2011, p.393).

Work on heterotopias comprises one of the most recognizable approaches to this subjects of border and difference in which the border is called to act as a complex divider.³⁶ Heterotopias—spaces from which undesirable but indelible practices and functions are excluded (Foucault, 1967)—suggest an insight into the ways in which norm tolerates difference by keeping its presence compartmentalized. To illustrate, from an architectural perspective, Graham Shane (2005) turns to heterotopias in his framework for recombinant urbanism. According to Shane, the purpose of heterotopias can be the preservation of the purity of a given order as they can host deviance or they can ‘freeze’ time (*e.g.*, a museum space). Shane outlines that heterotopias can also constitute zones of experiment in which "actors can rapidly attempt various virtual or real combinations within these heterotopic zones without disrupting the entire system." (2005, p.267). Yet, the comparison of heterotopic space to museum space introduces a political digression from Graham’s utilitarian approach. The topic of “museum” in relation to the dominant norm or representation also appears in *The Production of Space* by Lefebvre (1991) in the much less innocent context of political neutralization.³⁷ A Cresswell’s (1996) discussion of the emergence

³⁶ Boyer, 2008; Cenzatti, 2008; Dehaene & de Caeter, 2008; Doron, 2008; Foucault, 1967; Lefebvre, 1991; Shane, 2005; Stavrides, 2007; Stickells, 2008; see also Benchelabi, 1998; Sheridan, 2007

³⁷ “The meanings conveyed by abstract space are more often prohibitions than solicitations or stimuli (except when it comes to consumption). Prohibition—the negative basis, so to speak, of the social order—is what dominates here. The symbol of this constitutive repression is an object offered up to the gaze yet barred from any possible use, whether this occurs in a museum or in a shop window.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p.319)

and the development of graffiti in New York similarly reveals the effect of political neutralization by the ‘museumification’ of graffiti art.

Distinct from Shane, Stavrides (2007) sees heterotopias primarily as spatio-temporal political entities that emerge at the border between the norm and the rejected (in relation to population exchanges between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s). Building on Foucault’s argument that heterotopias rely on the mechanism of opening and closing that makes them isolated and accessible at the same time, Stavrides suggests that heterotopias are socio-political necessities which presence needs to remain somewhat ephemeral:

Heterotopias may be reduced to the thresholds that connect them [heterotopias] to the rest of social space—time. We can speak then of heterotopic moments, moments of encounter with socially recognizable otherness, that become possible because of acts of perforating normality’s perimeter. Heterotopias assume a threshold character, being both present and absent in a different time, existing both as reality and potentiality. (2007, p.178).

This essential quality of heterotopias that Stavrides captures with the term “threshold” suggests an alternative understanding of the border: as an instance of contact. This can be more fully explored in a broader context of another border-related notion—the borderland. As Gupta & Ferguson (1992) argue, borderland is not a peripheral territory along a borderline. Instead, the borderland is an actual—meaning-producing—place, made by the locals and their encounters

rather than by topographies of power.³⁸ This argument is part of a broader discussion that the researchers convey on both the hybridity and the crisis of a clear alignment of a given culture with a particular politically defined territory (*cf.* Casey, 2011; Cruz, 2007; Jones, 2006; Rael, 2012; Weber, 2010).³⁹ In this case, the focus shifts towards the arresting capacity of that which performs as the border and the emergence of a context from which this performance is experienced. The borderland, therefore, is not only the space of an arresting object but also, and more importantly, the space of its re-interpretations.

To illustrate, Reece Jones (2006) examines the India-Bangladesh borderland as a complex practice that cannot be diminished to a strip of no man's land. Multiple farmers at the border have their plots of lands in between the border fences, access to which is facilitated by a multitude of small gates. The right to use those gates is at the discretion of border guards who

³⁸ From the planning perspective, Hasselsberger (2014) uses the term "border region" (p.509). As an adjacent to border area it can have its own unity that does not recognize the dividing presence of the border. Hasselsberger's take on the term, however, diverges from that of Gupta & Ferguson and merely recognizes the somewhat arbitrary nature of political borders.

³⁹ More broadly, studies that focus specifically on the experiential qualities border come from a variety of subjects: (political) representations and nature (Cosgrove & Daniels, 1988; Cronon, 1996; McHarg, 1969; Whitehead *et al.*, 2007), citizenship (Cruz, 2007; Ingram, 1997; Shachar, 2009; Weber, 2010), porosity (Benjamin & Lacis, 1983; Casey, 2011; Dovey & Wood, 2014; Ellin, 2006; Franck & Stevens, 2007; Hasselsberger, 2014; Jones, 2012; Rael, 2012; Sennett, 2008, 2011; Stavrides, 2007), transgression or resistance (Cresswell, 1996; DeNora, 2000; Domosh, 1998; Douglas, 1966; Hou, 2010; Mitchell, 2003; Peretti, 2007; Sibley, 1994; Tschumi, 1994), frontiers (Carbonella, 2009; Cronon, 1996; Pullan, 2011; Smith, 1992), contact with the other (Domosh, 2008; Ellin, 2006; Jackson, 1992; Power, 2005; Smith, 1993; Valentine, 2008), displacement (Benchelabli, 1998; Heynen & Loeckx, 1998; Sandercock, 2000; Stavrides, 2007; Sheridan, 2007), hybridity (Brubaker, 2005; Ellin, 2006; Gehl, 1996; Sheridan, 2007), and the tensions between the formal and the everyday (Chase, 2008; Franck & Stevens, 2007; Dovey, 1993; Dovey & Polakit, 2007; Doron, 2007; Haydn, 2006; Hayden, 1980; Massey, 2005; Sheridan, 2007; Tschumi, 1994; Wunderlich, 2013).

translate not so much the power of the State as their own. Moreover, the attitude of many borderland India Bengali or Bangladesh Bengali towards an artificial partition of their identity between two states creates a particular kind of space. Jones discusses this space as space of refusal: no resistance but also no acceptance. Overall, while there is an official border between the two countries, the appearance of this border is hardly a single physical artifact. The appearance of the border and its functioning differ greatly for state officials, the local farmers, border guards, and those Bengali who feel that their separation into two identities is an artificial construct.

In exploring the architectural potential of the US-Mexican border, Ronald Rael (2012) advocates for considering the border as an infrastructure project for adjacent communities. Rael argues that while conceptually the US-Mexican border is a reflection of politics (a line that is drawn in an abstract space) and from this perspective might be seen as solid, on the ground it is hardly a solid line. It has been breached many times, there is life all around it, and the border can be integrated into everyday practices. This is a combination of practices that define the border more than the actual fence (*cf.* Cruz, 2007; Weber, 2010).

Architect Teddy Cruz (2007) also discusses the phenomenon of the US-Mexican border. He approaches it from the perspective of an effect that the border has on some American cities while there is a growing demand for cheap service sector labour in the contemporary big-box development economy in the United States. The influence that immigrants (often illegal) bring with them to the mid-parts of American cities runs counter to the representations of space created by the US professional elites and implemented through a variety of building and zoning codes. Immigrants tend to override these codes in response to their own needs. Cruz does not explicitly associate these changes to built form with the border and the way in which so many needed

cheap-labour workers are compelled to cross it. One can question, however, whether all these effects together constitute a space of a borderland: at times physically continuous, at times fragmented, comprising a variety of physical elements and practices, and ultimately spreading far beyond the borderline itself.

In yet another study on the U.S.-Mexican border, Cynthia Weber (2010) speaks of the design initiative of the American architect Robert Ransick, who witnessed the problem of petty (survival-driven) vandalism of property of his friends by illegal migrants. He took this as an opportunity to create a blueprint for a shelter shed (“Casa Segura”) that landowners could build on their property and stock with food, clothes, and water for the migrants to use. By its mere existence, Casa Segura challenges the State’s right to define citizenship (*i.e.*, the relationship between citizens and outsiders): “As Ransick explains, ‘This project is about presenting alternative choices for individuals who have migrants crossing their land and understanding the complex situation from a humanist point of view and not so much about cloning Casa Segura along the border ...’ ” (pp.4-5). The design can be copied but this is not the point. The existence of Casa Segura challenges the interpretive power of the State:

... that demands that citizens and non-citizens abide by its laws, regardless of their human costs. In so doing, the state shapes not only the legal context of citizen/non-citizen interactions but also serves as a moral guide for how to negotiate these engagements. ... Casa Segura explores legal non-compliance with state guidance on citizen/non-citizen relations. (p.6).

In developing his project, Ransick realized that landowners had an abstract idea of who these migrants were. The landowners' perception of migrants was based on the information that was provided to them. This does not help with the humanization of these people and "[i]n so doing [building Casa Segura], it enables US citizens to redesign themselves through their ethical engagements with undocumented migrant non-citizens." (2010, p.8).

Ultimately, and to conclude, this discussion is necessary in order to show that the distinction of the border vis-à-vis the borderland is a distinction between imposition of a certain meaning and re-interpretation of that meaning in any given object. In some cases, such as the India-Bangladesh borderland (Jones, 2006), this re-interpretation (*e.g.*, via contestation) creates almost absurd spatio-temporal situations. In others, such as the survival of illegal migrants (Weber, 2010), one can witness truly moving resolutions of a border-driven space ("Casa Segura") and its influence on the space of citizenship. Overall, in this chapter I set the stage for a way to understand constructed space as a continuous effort to overcome disjunction between matter and meaning that can be performed not only by a variety of actors but also in a variety of manners. To articulate this argument is critical for the subsequent discussion of guerrilla gardening (among other similar informal and illegal space-making practices). Constructed space is essentially a disrupted one, and the search for new meanings never fully settles. The latter can be done rigidly, via meaning-solidifying frameworks and regimes. It can also be done dynamically, in a manner to which I refer as non-compartmentalizing and that I plan to unpack with the focus on a contesting and re-interpreting guerrilla gardening practice that results in an overlay of spaces with competing meanings for the same built form. In this respect, informal and non-sanctioned practices illuminate the instances in which the search for new meanings re-

occurs: at the points of contact of different scales, domains, functions, and realms some of which can be captured in terms of borders.

Chapter 2. Securing the Im/materiality of Constructed Space: Henri Lefebvre's Differential Space and the Concept of Liminal Space

In the previous chapter, first, with a reference to public space, and, later, through the prism of various architectural preoccupation and challenges, I discussed the disjunction between matter and meaning that is never fully resolved. Informal and non-sanctioned space-making practices are one evidence to that. Specifically in relation to one of them—guerrilla gardening—I build an argument that an intentionally non-sanctioned practice can be a socio-political contestation of a certain kind. This contestation is an alternative re-interpretation of the existing built form when the disjunction between matter and meaning re-appears. I ended the previous chapter with a discussion of borderland vis-à-vis border, as a manifestation of this kind of contestation.

In this dissertation, I focus on spatial contestation as a re-interpretive practice that takes advantage of the capacity of built form to allow for multiple meanings, each depending on a particular context from which built form is perceived. I see this capacity to be critical for my overarching focus on non-compartmentalizing space making. It is to explore spatial contestation as a multiplicity of meanings of the same built form via overlapping constructed spaces. The goal is not only to explore the spatial terms on which such a simultaneous multiplicity can exist (Chapter 3) but also, and primarily, to situate the need for this multiplicity in a broader socio-political context.

In the current chapter, I unpack contestation as a ground for non-compartmentalizing space making with the reference to Henri Lefebvre's (1991) framework for the production of space,

and, more specifically, his concept of differential space. I focus on the development of the concept in the context of Lefebvre's work on the production of social space, peculiarities of his specific approach to difference as the right to the city, and limitations of the concept within Lefebvre's epistemology. Finally, I introduce and explore the condition of liminality. While in the previous chapter I frequently referred to the ambiguity of belonging of built form as an instance of re-appeared disjunction between matter and meaning, it is time to pay greater attention to the ways in which this condition can be both theorized and applied. I see the condition of liminality as a medium that can be introduced into formal space-making practices while facilitating certain kinds of contestation as one's right to difference and to the city.

2.1 Socio-political Dimension of the Im/materiality of Space: Henri Lefebvre's Production of Social Space and Difference

It is not necessary to chronicle the contributions that Lefebvre's work (1991)⁴⁰ had made to the subject of spatial/social justice and the city, as this is explored and developed in detail elsewhere.⁴¹ Instead, in this and the next chapters I focus on this theoretical framework in ways that develop and make use of one of its key concepts—differential space—with the help of phenomenological epistemology. Yet, a brief introduction of the framework is in order.

⁴⁰ See also Lefebvre, 1996[1968], 2003[1970], 2008a[1968], 2008b[1981]

⁴¹ Brenner, 1997, 2012; Dimenbergh, 1998; Dovey, 1999; Elden, 2004; Harvey, 2000, 2008; Goonewardena, 2012; Kilian, 1998; Kipfer, 2008; Marcuse, 2012; Milgrom, 2008; Mitchell, 2003; Soja, 2010; Wolf & Mahaffey, 2016

In developing the theory of the production of space, Lefebvre takes a dialectical historicist approach and focuses on the space as a socially malleable entity that is both a precondition and an outcome of socio-economic practices. Social space emerges and is re-produced via the triad of 1) spatial practices (physical space that appears through daily routines: *i.e.*, built form, infrastructure, *etc.*), 2) representations of space (the conceived space by space-making professionals and institutions), and 3) representational space (the lived space that appears via subjects and objects that are charged with emotional rather than solely functional meanings). Lefebvre, thus, posits that space is inseparable from things that constitute it. In *Lefebvre without Heidegger: "Left-Heideggerianism" qua contradictio in adiecto*, Geoffrey Waite (2008) notes that, while different philosophical traditions fuel Heidegger's and Lefebvre's approaches to space, both see social relationships as mediated. Similar to Heidegger, Lefebvre refuses to see materiality, representation, and imagination as separate worlds.⁴² The phenomenological tandem of perception/representation is critical to the production of social space. In Lefebvre's framework, however, perception is a part of a socio-economic, rather than of cognitive or corporal, construct.⁴³ As a result, Lefebvre much more efficiently than Heidegger takes the

⁴² In *Henri Lefebvre and Urban Everyday Life: in Search of the Possible*, Klaus Ronneberger (2008) makes a distinction between Michel Foucault's and Henri Lefebvre's foci on space. Foucault (1977) focuses on space as an apparatus for politics and science during the transition from absolutist to disciplinary power; space is a manifestation of power that orients. Lefebvre (1991) argues that space is an inseparable part of an appearance of *any* thing and makes everything operational: an approach to space that is not far off of Heidegger's spatiality of equipment.

⁴³ In relation to an architectural drawing, Lefebvre would think of it as the one on a piece of paper produced by an architect in a certain manner that both the paper and architecture's training afford (spatial practice) in a specifically organized environment (representation of space) while the architect values one corner of the room over another (representational space). To perceive the sketch, therefore, is to perceive its social space.

subject of perception/space from an ontological dimension to a socio-political one, and this has consequences for informal and non-sanctioned urban practices.⁴⁴

In the light of Lefebvre's framework, guerrilla gardening can no longer be merely dismissed as an idiosyncratic 'attack' on *the* urban space. The manner in which guerrilla gardening re-purposes elements of built form suggests that guerrilla gardening, as a practice, has the potential to be recognized as a unique social space (via representations and spatial practices that specific to it) rather than an unsettling practice in the space. From this position, the contestation that it ignites and maintains, for the duration of its existence, becomes a 'dispute' between two or more social spaces, competing for the right to impose its own set of meanings on the contested matter. The goal, however, is not to help specifically guerrilla gardeners 'win' this competition and to replace one representation of space with another one. Neither it is to win municipal authorities' support for informal practices in the shape of designated plots. In the context of my research and its focus on flexible urban space via non-compartmentalization, it is to hold all these spaces together in a single physical location.

2.1.1 Lefebvre on Difference

In *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre (1991) speaks in detail of a particular socio-spatial phenomenon—abstract space—that the dominant economic system (*i.e.*, capitalism) ultimately

⁴⁴ As Lucasz Stanek points out (2011, p.193), Lefebvre's production of social space is not an attempt to come up with a formula. Instead, it is an analysis of socially produced relationships among these three "moments" of space (*i.e.*, representations of space, representational spaces, and spatial practices).

creates from any social space with which it comes into contact. Lefebvre outlines several common characteristics of abstract space: 1) it is quantifiable, 2) it is value-exchange oriented, and, consequently, 3) it secures certain spatio-temporal practices for the purpose of maintaining commodity production flows with as little obstruction as possible. The term that Lefebvre uses to capture the latter characteristic of abstract space is “homogeneity”, and it is a peculiar concept in the context of Lefebvre’s work. As Lefebvre develops this concept (and as it is discussed by Kipfer [2008] and Shmueli [2008]), homogeneity does not mean unity or uniformity. Rather, it means predictability that is achieved spatially through fragmentation and compartmentalization of socio-spatial practices and functions.⁴⁵ On these terms, a homogenized social space is not bereft of differences, but these are “minimal” (induced) differences (Lefebvre, 1991, p.372). They are either necessary variations that obey a major trend or tamed transgressions which game-changing potential is ‘defused’ even though their presence is kept.⁴⁶ Distinct from minimal differences, “maximal” differences (*ibid.*) stay outside (or ‘burst’ outside⁴⁷) of dominant

⁴⁵ In fact, Lefebvre sees the restoration of *unity* as a desirable opposite to the homogeneity of abstract space. As Lucasz Stanek argues in *Henri Lefebvre on Space: Architecture, Urban Research, and the Production of Theory* (2011, p.170), Lefebvre’s position on the unification of moments of space is close to the idea of unitary urbanism that was produced by Situationist International.

⁴⁶ Cresswell's (1996) description of turning graffiti from the street phenomenon (where it is a provocation) into the museum phenomenon (where it is a commodity) in New York City is an excellent example:

By the secular magic of displacement, graffiti is transformed from the wild, criminal, reviled, and despised product of the insane and deviant into the creative, inspired, and aesthetically pleasing product of the artist. In the process of the movement from the street and subway to the SoHo gallery, the ‘meaning’ of graffiti and the moral judgment of it are changed dramatically. (1996, p.52).

⁴⁷ On p.385 of *The Production of Space* (1991), Lefebvre turns to the subject of body and its ability to unsettle once established repetitive formal practices.

modes of representation of space and spatial practices.⁴⁸ Eventually, centres of power that homogenize a given social space will seek to absorb all maximal differences that emerge on the margins of what is homogenized (1991, p.373). Some of these differences will be converted into minimal ones, others eliminated.

Retaining specifically “maximal” differences may seem to be of little relevance, but Lefebvre turns to the subject of nature in order to justify the need for non-tamed maximal differences vis-à-vis abstract space (1991, p.397). In nature, the totality of life forms is not limited to a single kind and its close variations. Lefebvre poses a question whether it makes sense for any society to ignore the genius of nature by eliminating differences that do not fit a single form. To re-iterate this analogy, maximal differences are critical 1) ontologically, for putting to the test the adequacy of established professional and everyday norms and 2) epistemologically, by enabling a perception shift that becomes possible in the presence of a

⁴⁸ *Two inseparable distinctions have to be drawn in this connection: that between minimal and maximal differences, and that between induced and produced differences. The first of these distinctions belongs to logic, the second to the theory of dialectical movement. Within logico-mathematical sets, the difference between one and one (the first one and the second one) is strictly minimal: the second differs from the first only by virtue of the iteration that gives rise to it. By contrast, the difference between finite cardinal and ordinal numbers on the one hand and transfinite cardinal and ordinal numbers on the other is a maximal difference. An induced difference remains within a set or system generated according to a particular law. It is in fact constitutive of that set or system: for example, in numerical sets, the difference between the successive elements generated by iteration or recurrence. Similarly: the diversity between villas in a suburb filled with villas; or between different 'community facilities'; or, again, variations within a particular fashion in dress, as stipulated by that fashion itself. By contrast, a produced difference presupposes the shattering of a system; it is born of an explosion; it emerges from the chasm opened up when a closed universe ruptures. To a large extent, the theory of the production of differences is based on the theory of maximal differences: a given set gives rise, beyond its own boundaries, to another, completely different set. (Lefebvre, 1991, p.372)*

largely different spatial practice. This is Lefebvre's focus on difference. Maximal difference is not merely a distinction of any kind but the presence of a space and spatial practices that are paradigmatically distinct.

In *Right to the City* (1996[1968]) and *Urban Revolution* (2003[1970]), Lefebvre argued for the right of urban residents to have a spatial expression of their needs in the urban context. The right to the city is not only a Marxian manifesto but also a reminder that cities remain a subject to dwelling rather than residing only: they are neither machines nor solely capital generators. From an architectural position, maximal difference is the right to an overlooked—non-sanctioned—program: the one that represents a phenomenon whose presence is not officially desired while its relevance is nevertheless critical (*e.g.*, Casa Segura—a shelter for illegal migrants in the Southern Arizona desert [Weber, 2010]). It calls for a re-evaluation of existing norms, policies, and practices. In this respect, as Stephan Kipfer (2008) asserts, for Lefebvre the right to the city is an argument through which minimal difference can become maximal, as a way out of abstract space. Consequently, Kipfer underscores, the right to the city is a flip-side of the right to maximal difference.

2.1.2 The Concept of Differential Space and its Challenges

Putting so much stress on the appearance of difference and its role in the liberation of social practices, it is unsurprising that Lefebvre has a special place for it in its framework. Yet, a concept of differential space that Lefebvre develops appears to be more than a social space or a spatial signifier of something that differs:

The reproduction of the social relations of production within this space [abstract space] inevitably obeys two tendencies: the dissolution of old relations on the one hand and the generation of new relations on the other. Thus, despite — or rather because of — its negativity, abstract space carries within itself the seeds of a new kind of space. I shall call that new space 'differential space', because, inasmuch as abstract space tends towards homogeneity, towards the elimination of existing differences or peculiarities, a new space cannot be born (produced) unless it accentuates differences. It will also restore unity to what abstract space breaks up - to the functions, elements and moments of social practice. It will put an end to those localizations which shatter the integrity of the individual body, the social body, the corpus of human needs, and the corpus of knowledge. (1991, p.52).⁴⁹

Putting the equal sign between difference and one's right to the city makes the concept of differential space of critical importance in Lefebvre's framework regarding the work of de-homogeneization. Yet, from this very definition of the concept, a question emerges: Is differential space merely a social space that comes into being by taking advantage of an emerging difference or, if it is a "new kind of space", is it the space of that difference? In the context of Lefebvre's framework for the production of space there are consequences to either one of these options that I will consider in this chapter. First, however, as David Harvey (2000, p.182-183) argues in *The Spaces of Hope*, Lefebvre leaves spaces of alternative possibility (unless they are just a desired

⁴⁹ In the 4th volume of *De l'état* (in Lefebvre, 2009c), Lefebvre speaks of differential space as the "space of catastrophe". He speaks of it as "a space of differences, ... which represents for capitalism an antagonistic and ruinous tendency." (p.248).

utopia) frustratingly undefined and therefore never quite finished. Harvey briefly entertains the idea of heterotopia to be a version of a space of difference. Yet, he largely rejects this idea as just another form of exclusion and fragmentation rather than otherness.⁵⁰ Overall, Harvey argues that it is not going to be easy to create flexible landscapes due to the amount of work already done to install both the existing urban environments that are a part of abstract space in North America.⁵¹ Harvey does remain hopeful and turns to works by Roberto Unger that he discusses in light of

⁵⁰ This is not always the case, as the paper *Heterotopias and the Experience of Urban Porous Space* by Stavros Stavrides (2007) suggests. The author explores heterotopic moments of otherness that emerge specifically from exclusion and fragmentation.

⁵¹ This argument bounces off of the note that Lefebvre (1991) includes with a tint of a puzzlement in *The Production of Space*. This refers to the “silence of users” (p.365) who prefer experts to speak on their behalf:

When the interested parties – the “users” – do not speak up, who can speak in their name or in their place? Certainly not some expert, some specialist of space or of spokespersonship; there is no such specialization, because no one has a right to speak for those directly concerned here. The entitlement to do so, the concepts to do so, the language to do so are simply lacking. How would the discourse of such an expert differ from that of the architects, 'developers' or politicians? The fact is that to accept such a role or function is to espouse the fetishization of communication – the replacement of use by exchange. The silence of the 'users' is indeed a problem - and it is the entire problem. (1991, pp.364-365).

Further, Lefebvre explains this paradox as follows:

The quest for a 'counter-space' overwhelms the supposedly ironclad distinction between 'reform' and 'revolution'. Any proposal along these lines, even the most seemingly insignificant, shakes existing space to its foundations, along with its strategies and aims - namely, the imposition of homogeneity and transparency everywhere within the purview of power and its established order. The silence of the 'users' mentioned earlier may be explained as follows: consumers sense that the slightest shift on their part can have boundless consequences, that the whole order (or mode of production) weighing down upon them will be seriously affected by the slightest movement on their part. (1991, p.383).

latter's inclination (distinct from Lefebvre's) to look for a piecemeal approach (rather than a totalizing one) to resolving the problem of abstract space.⁵² At the end, however, Harvey equates Lefebvre and Unger due to their shared romantic desire to keep possibilities in a space always open while neither one of the thinkers provides instructions for the ways in which this can be done.

While Lefebvre does not explain the ways in which differential space can be sustained whether as a social space or a distinct kind of space, he does provide ideas for the ways in which differential space can come into existence. First, he refers to the interruptions that originate with the corporality of one's existence. Regardless of routines that are put in place, a body remains a source of its own rhythms and practices that can never completely reconcile themselves with those of abstract space. Second, and most importantly, Lefebvre uses a pronouncedly dialectical approach to difference: from a socio-spatial juxtaposition. Lefebvre articulates this in the 3rd volume of his *Critique of Everyday Life* (2008, p.111); when he suggests that differences are born out of the spatial confrontation of particularities that are shaped throughout history and involve various social formations. Consequently, in *Totality, Hegemony, Difference: Henri Lefebvre and Raymond Williams* Andrew Shmuelly (2008) argues that Lefebvre's idea of difference is unlike those of his post-structuralist counterparts who attempt to set difference as an *a priori* category. For Lefebvre, difference is both a social and a relational entity. In this respect and in relation to the emergence of maximal difference, Lukazs Stanek (2011, pp.179-191) discusses Lefebvre's analysis of the space and design for Nanterre university that became a

⁵² Unger, R. (1987), *False Necessity: Anti-necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy*. Cambridge.

Unger, R. (1987), *Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task*. Cambridge.

centre of student unrest in France in 1968. It was not only a place in which new—postwar functionalist—architecture epitomized the homogenizing (*i.e.*, compartmentalizing) effect of both the State and capitalism, but also a place set next to shantytowns that students could easily observe through large windows of modern university buildings. It was thus where two distinct social spaces came into close proximity, and contradictions of spaces became contradictions in space. From the juxtaposition of abstract space that defined the university and the maximal difference of the surrounding ghettos (whose ‘transgression’ was not yet eliminated or converted) a revolt emerged.

As Kipfer (2008) outlines, Lefebvre is aware of the challenge that defining difference vis-à-vis a decisive socio-spatial transformation creates. Kipfer argues that Lefebvre anticipated the failure of spontaneous street revolts, given that all the energy of a short-term mobilization was not backed up by a sustained strategy for transformation.⁵³ Kipfer further continues that

oppositional strategies have counterhegemonic potential only if they transform (rather than only assert) the minimal differences of commodified festivity, multiculturalized ethnicity, and racialized suburban marginality (2008, p.205).

While in the context of Lefebvre’s framework a strategic transformation is a potentially desired goal behind acting on a difference, whether a minimal or a maximal one, a question emerges: what is a space that comes out of a successful transformation? Does a successful revolt produce a space that is any less ‘abstracted’?

⁵³ In *Toward an Open Sense of Place: Phenomenology, Affinity, and the Question of Being*, Larsen and Johnson (2012) approach the same dilemma from a phenomenological perspective.

In fact, the answer is all too obvious: the result is just another social space that, with time, can become just as intolerant to non-fitting differences. Consider the following case. In exploring the roots of the conflict between students and the university authorities around People's Park at the University of California in *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space*,⁵⁴ Don Mitchell (2003) turns to the framework of Lefebvre around the production of space and suggests two dialectical relationships between the elements that constitute this production:

If these two visions of public space indicate that differing definitions of the right to the city are at stake, then they also correspond more or less with Lefebvre's (1991) distinction in The Production of Space between representational space (appropriated, lived space; space-in-use) and representations of space (planned, controlled, ordered space). Public space often, though not always, originates as a representation of space, as for example a courthouse square, a monumental plaza, a public park, or a pedestrian shopping district ... But as people use these spaces, they also become representational spaces, appropriated in use. Public space is thus socially produced through its use as public space. In the case of People's Park, however, the standard chronology was in many ways reversed. People's Park began as a representational space, one that had been taken and appropriated from the outset. (2003, pp.128-129).

⁵⁴ The University of California in Berkeley purchased a plot of land with residential buildings on it, demolished the buildings in order to proceed with its own plan, and for a number of reasons had to put the project on pause while keeping the land in a state of a brownfield. Not all university students were content with what happened with the local urban fabric in the first place, and when the project was put to rest without much explanation, students declared that the university built a 'swamp', invited everyone to come and transform the vacant plot into a garden, and a contestation over the land began (Mitchell, 2003).

In this case, given completely different contexts from which the actions of the university authorities and students originated, it is possible to advance beyond a mere typology towards a clash of two potentially distinct social spaces. It is possible to wonder if the latter ‘type’ of public space making—the students’ garden—is an example of differential space. It used not only a distinct mode of emergence, but also asserted itself as a maximal response to the maximal difference of the brownfield vis-à-vis the rest of the campus and the demolished buildings.

Aside from the different order in which elements of the production of space contributed to the emergence of a given space, conceptually there is hardly any difference. In the case of student garden’s “space taken” (Mitchell, 2003), a dialectical relationship of the elements of the production of space marks the emergence of a social movement with its own social space that collides with the social space of the university. Within Lefebvre’s framework, this collision is a struggle of two social spaces, each with its own spatial practices that are congruent with their own representations of space (conceived space) and representational spaces (lived space). They are not paradigmatically different from each other. Being a classic example of a struggle for the right to the city that, according to the best wishes of Lefebvre, not only started out of maximal difference but also was carried on for years, it also demonstrates (as Mitchell continues exploring its evolution) that appropriation alone does not make People’s Park a differential space (merely a different one). By the same logic, it is possible to reverse the order and argue that attempts of the university authorities to take that land back from the students mark an emergence

of differential space as well. There is a perceived difference between two social spaces, but this difference emerges only when both of them are present.⁵⁵

As Mitchell (2003) articulates, (claimed) rights become powerful by becoming institutionalized (pp.26-27). Consequently, a new space—regardless of how different it is—is destined to lose its potential of being differential rather than relatively different the more it becomes established and institutionalize on new terms: that is, the more it eliminates or tames all the traces of all other social spaces within it. While it might remain different in relation to

⁵⁵ The story of People’s Park, as many similar stories of bottom-up re-appropriation, is a striking manifestation of another idea of Lefebvre—“autogestion”—on which he focused in a series of works during the 1960s and the 1970s (Brenner, 2001; Elden, 2004; Lefebvre, 2009a[1979]; Lefebvre, 2009b[1966]). *Autogestion* is a condition that emerges when a group of users takes a hold of a property that is misused by an official proprietor. Importantly, *autogestion* raises use value over exchange value, and in the moment of doing so it challenges an established order of things that no longer can validate the primacy of the latter over the former (expectedly, Lefebvre’s original foci are on capitalism and the State). As Elden (2004) notes, *autogestion* has direct implications for grassroots democracy, and *autogestion* reflects the ability of a given society to prove its democratic constitution by embracing conflicts (Lefebvre, 2009a). *Autogestion* arises from emerging contradictions and clears out a way for the re-organization of the society (Lefebvre, 2009a) by creating an openness towards the possible: “[o]nly through autogestion can the members of a free association take control over their own life, in such a way that it becomes their work [oeuvre]. This is also called appropriation, de-alienation” (Lefebvre, 2009b, p. 150). Elden (2004) further points out that *autogestion* is linked to Lefebvre’s work on everyday life, as opposed to abstract space. It is a continuous struggle borne out of contestation. Wolf and Mahaffey (2016) focus on *autogestion* from a design perspective, as a way out of excessive professional top-down design towards co-design with actual users of everyday spaces. They see *autogestion* (or “co-production”, although Lefebvre [2009a] points out that autogestion is not co-production) as a spontaneous and continuous method of design. Importantly, while Wolf and Mahaffey accentuate a link between *autogestion* and differential space through contestation and the openness to the possible, the solution that they propose also reveals limitations of this link. Ultimately, *autogestion* can be a prerequisite for the emergence of differential space, but the space that comes out of *autogestion* is not necessarily destined to remain differential.

adjacent social spaces, the logic of its production is going to be the same and, eventually, despite being different in relation to surrounding spaces, it will acquire its own homogenizing—fragmenting—representation of space. This is not the worst-case scenario once we consider something like People’s Park and its values. Yet, this is the scenario that compels me, after David Harvey (2000), to question how utopian the concept of differential space is, if we do not consider any other—non-relational—factors that define the existence of difference *within* a space.

To summarize the problematique of Lefebvre’s take on difference and its space, as a social space that is different from an adjacent one differential space can hardly be considered as a space *of* difference (merely as a space *from* difference). A space that appears as relatively different can be just as homogenizing within its confines as an adjacent social space. Neither it is an event of a revolt or a conflict that emerges out of an accumulated difference, since revolt, as a response, yet needs to find its finite spatial resolution that can, once again bring it to a new homogenizing order. At best, at the end of the day this might result in a multitude of spatially delineated social spaces that are maximally different from one another, but, for the time being, have no reason to tolerate maximal difference within. Every once in a while some of them would undergo transformations into different social spaces due to internally accumulated differences. Perhaps, for the very duration of this transformation its spatial manifestation is what constitutes Lefebvre’s differential space. It is highly unclear however, why Lefebvre would choose to emphasize such a transformation with yet another term instead of using one of those he already brings in (*e.g.*, a space or an event of contestation). It is unsurprising, therefore, that Lefebvre’s discussion of differential space seems to confuse more than it clarifies.

2.1.3 The Pertinence of Lefebvre's Differential Space

As the subject of differential space proves to be rather confusing, we need to consider the following. The interest in difference is not exclusive to Lefebvre, and there are other influential works that developed the subject at the same period of time. In *Purity and Danger*, Mary Douglas (1966) approaches the subjects of territoriality, compartmentalization, and difference via focus on “dirt” that she defines not only in terms of hygiene, but also in terms of the pattern and the disorder of a pattern (*i.e.*, dangers and powers that come together with potentialities of the undefined; the possibilities of extending one’s influence that originate from wandering the uncharted territories of the mind and beyond the confines of a society). Her work is anthropological and sociological, while the focus is on power—whether personal or collective—and the elements that sustain or produce that power.⁵⁶ The subject of difference—as a transgression of a taboo—also emerges in *Erotism: Death & Sensuality* by George Bataille (1986[1962]). Bataille’s focus on eroticism, violence, and transgression aims to demonstrate the complexity of repetitive social practices in the composition and re-production of which transgression is an important positive factor. This makes Bataille’s work thematically similar to the work by Douglas. Distinctly, Bataille’s contribution to the subject is to demonstrate the origins and value of transgression as necessarily subordinate to an existing order of things. Transgression of a taboo is largely a temporary phenomenon that loses its power with the abolishment (*i.e.*, absence) of the norm.

⁵⁶ In relation to the subjects of place and identity, Cresswell’s *In Place/Out of Place* (1996) is an application of some of the principal arguments that Douglas (1966) developed.

Richard Sennett's *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity & City Life* (1970) is another work that brings up the subject of difference in a uniquely illuminating way. Distinctly from the previous three texts, Sennett's focus is urban-centred. In this work, Sennett explores individual and communal rationales behind the elimination of irregularities. A fair part of his analysis revolves around the subject of identity and, in some respects, complements the work by Douglas (1966; cf. Cresswell, 1996). Through the subject of difference, Sennett explores the phenomenon of maturity of an individual (or of a community) that varies in response to individual or group's attempts to create a purified experience of a social space. For Sennett, it comes down to authenticity that he unpacks as a manifestation of one's ability to face irregularities without negating them. This topic defines Sennett's preoccupation with the notion of difference specifically at the level of a single actor, despite Sennett's frequent references to the role of a community.

Treatise on Nomadology in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) is another major work on the production of social space in which difference appears as a contradiction. Similar to Lefebvre, Deleuze and Guattari explore conceived and constructed space not only as a precondition for a social, economic, and political action. Distinct from Lefebvre, in developing the concepts of smooth space and striated space, Deleuze and Guattari engage much more profoundly with the role of a phenomenon in hand (e.g., a desert) in the formation of a representation of (social) space rather than serving to the physical appearance of the latter only.

These works are critical to the subject of difference and in certain respects they address it much more succinctly than Lefebvre does. That being stated, in the context of the present study, the concept of differential space as a part of the theoretical framework put forth by Lefebvre

remains engaging and illuminating for three main reasons. First, in ways that are distinct from Douglas and Bataille, Lefebvre distinguishes maximal and minimal differences, and while Lefebvre grounds the relevance of maximal difference into a largely Marxian agenda of social and spatial justice as well as the general critique of capitalism, it does not need to be defined only by that. More broadly, and largely in accordance with Sennett (1970), the right to the city (or the right to difference, as Kipfer [2008] re-iterates) is the right to oneself: that is, one's own ability to claim an unconventional issue and have it appear as a socio-political (*i.e.*, spatial) phenomenon. Second, distinct from Sennett, Lefebvre's fundamental contribution is spatial. While similarly focusing on the paradox of the contradiction that often accompanies an emerging and irregular phenomenon, Lefebvre does not stop at acknowledging the importance of having difference; in claiming that any thing has a spatial appearance, Lefebvre asserts that difference has one as well. Although he remains vague about the composition of this space, within his triad of spatial practices, representations of space, and representational spaces he provides direction (if not an outline) for all subsequent attempts to address this issue. Arguably, it is accurate to describe Lefebvre's contribution to the notion of difference as epistemological in relation. While claiming differential space as a remedy to abstract space (*i.e.*, as a remedy to fragmenting and totalizing top-down frameworks), Lefebvre explores in detail the production of social space and its evolution into abstract space. In doing so, he situates the concept of differential space in the very specific task of negating abstract space. He also makes it critical to think of the emergence and constitution of differential space in terms that are compatible with the production of abstract space and the work of homogenizing that it performs.

Consequently, third, in light of Lefebvre's thorough analysis, abstract space is more than just a spatial manifestation of a certain socio-economic order. Rather, it is a likely manifestation

of any socio-economic order that reaches a certain level of maturity and, thus, demands predictability. Intolerance to non-sanctioned difference is one of its defining characteristics. Lefebvre's critique of abstract space is not merely a critique of capitalism: his reference to the nature that produces both types of difference and that should serve us as a guide is telling. It is the critique of spatial regimes that become increasingly inflexible and irrelevant.⁵⁷

2.1.3 Differential Space: Changing the Scale

To go back to my question—Is differential space merely a social space that comes into being by taking advantage of an emerging difference or, if it is a “new kind of space”, is it the space of that difference?—and to accept that differential space is not a regular social space, is it still possible to consider it as a particular kind of space that is not merely an ephemeral space of transformation (from one social space to another)? Differential space is called upon to restore unity where abstract space has tended to homogenize through top-down formalized

⁵⁷ In an edited volume *Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge*, Saward's (2006) chapter on political representations of nature is particularly engaging vis-à-vis Lefebvre's analogy. Saward suggests thinking of political realm as a metaphorical territory which space is finite. For this matter, certain representations of nature that get recognition in this space leave no room for other representations, no matter how valuable the latter can be. Consequently, this and similar works point at a question on the ways in which this deficiency can be addressed.

fragmentation.⁵⁸ This is a critical part of the definition because it sets differential space apart from a social space that eventually tames internal differences. A number of additional questions arise. What is the relationship between differential space and social space? What is the structure of differential space if it is not a (regular) social space? What is the logic behind its production? Finally, how is it even possible to accentuate differences constantly and continuously? This latter question is where Harvey's (2000) critique fits, and while Harvey's critique of the endlessly open for a change differential space is obviously valid, it might not be the source of problems with the concept. Being born from a struggle and depending on a constant and continuous spatial juxtaposition of conflicting social formations in order to maintain the difference, differential space does not easily fit with the rest of Lefebvre's epistemology. Supposedly, in order to resolve this problem and to turn differential space into a graspable concept in Lefebvre's framework, one can still argue that differential space is a distinct kind of space that is indeed a space of a conflict, except this conflict *never* comes to a rest. This argument, however, needs a spatial resolution congruent with Lefebvre's focus on the spatial expression of any phenomenon that gains socio-economic significance. In this case, differential space, as a spatial entity *of* difference, needs to be understood in terms of a representation of space that never gains a dominant position, and this, arguably, points at the direction to at least one source of problems with the concept: the scale at which differential space is expected to appear (collective expectations *vs.* direct involvement).

⁵⁸ *I shall call that new space 'differential space', because, inasmuch as abstract space tends towards homogeneity, towards the elimination of existing differences or peculiarities, a new space cannot be born (produced) unless it accentuates differences. It will also restore unity to what abstract space breaks up - to the functions, elements and moments of social practice. (Lefebvre, 1991, p.52)*

Lefebvre himself provides certain insights for this change of scale by focusing on the role that body plays in the making of maximal (non-tamed by totalizing frameworks) differences. Representational space⁵⁹ is an element of the triad of the production of social space that connects a socio-political space with a body. Moreover, while representational space is a part of the triad of elements that produce a social space, along with representations of space and spatial practices, it also falls out of this framework of production. It occurs when an individual encounters a phenomenon (whether a material artefact or not) that does not necessarily follow the logic of an established social space and makes a choice for how to act upon it. The scale at which this choice is made is distinct from the scale at which a social space, as a collective whole, is produced, even if an individual does choose to stick to the established representations. As such, representational spaces belong to the logic of a collective social space as much as they belong to an individual who either keeps perceiving and acting upon a phenomenon within an established schema or comes to recognize the possibility of alternative contexts that might follow an observed phenomenon. That being stated, distinct from Anthony Giddens' (1984) research on the interrelation of repetitive everyday practices and one's agency, in *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre (1991) seems to underestimate the role that an individual actor can play by choosing either to reproduce the established arrangements that routinize his or her life in a repetitive manner or to negate these arrangements. This is also evident in light of Lefebvre's connection

⁵⁹ “space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users', but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe. This is the dominated — and hence passively experienced — space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects. Thus representational spaces may be said, though again with certain exceptions, to tend towards more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs.” (1991, p.39)

with the Situationists (McDonough, 2002; Milgrom, 2008; Ross, 2002) and Lefebvre's argument for the limitations for the role that an individual can play in the production of a social space that eventually led to a break-up between Lefebvre and the Situationists.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, it is highly critical for the vitality of differential space specifically as its own kind of space to acknowledge that Lefebvre's position was not entirely antagonistic to that of the Situationists. Both Lefebvre and Debord were clearly preoccupied with the same phenomenon of daily life in the modernist urban environment (Ross, 2002). As Milgrom (2008) points out, in the preface to Phillippe Boudon's *Lived-in Architecture: Le Corbusier's Pessac Revisited*⁶¹ Lefebvre praises both the architect (Le Corbusier⁶²) for creating the built form that can be appropriated by residents and the residents who actually did it and "actively" altered the original form according to their needs rather than resided "passively" in the units. This praise brings Lefebvre close not only to the Situationists but also to Lucien Kroll and those architects of the time who advocated

⁶⁰ The subject of creating moments that eventually brought Lefebvre and Situationists together (Ross, 2002) was never alien to Lefebvre. Yet, his approach to the creation of moments was largely different from the one that Situationists attempted to cultivate (Ross, 2002). Expectedly, Lefebvre's position was a historicist one, and he insisted on the logic behind the creation of moments to be a historical force that sets in over generations (*e.g.*, one's love for an individual —something that appeared only during the Middle Ages, as distinct from passion that existed in Antiquity). For this reason, Lefebvre could not share the Situationist argument that virtually anyone can establish a new lasting reality out of a moment (*e.g.*, of connecting urban areas that are spatially disconnected). It takes time and, ultimately, the social scale.

⁶¹ Boudon, P. (1979[1969]). *Lived-in Architecture: Le Corbusier's Pessac Revisited* (G. Onn, Trans.). London: Lund Humphries.

⁶² Le Corbusier was commissioned to design a neighbourhood in a suburb of Bordeaux and did so in a profoundly modernist manner.

for socially responsible architecture that produces built form in such a fashion that anyone can find a way to fit in.⁶³

As Milgrom (2008) further notes, similar to the Situationists and their idea of unitary urbanism, at the time, differential space was Lefebvre's attempt to overcome fragmentation (as division in the form of dichotomies [e.g., work/leisure] or monofunctionalism) that contemporary urban regimes privileged. Whether this attempt was feasible is hard to judge in light of my earlier discussion of differential space as a social space, Harvey's concerns (2000), and Lefebvre's (1991) own explanation of the "silence of users".⁶⁴ It is hard both to imagine and to create a spatial formation in which functions and identities are clear and predictable but differences are never settled and formalized. Yet, the question of the scale of perception at which an individual encounters a phenomenon and chooses its 'destiny' remains relevant and definitive of one's right to difference. More precisely, at the scale of direct involvement with the matter of constructed space, perception and interpretation belong both with a representation that either mediates the perception or, due to a conflict, fails to correspond a seamless perspective on things in hand and with an individual (or a group of like-minded individuals) who has to decide what is it that he or she sees. This, however, demands a step away from Lefebvre's epistemology while

⁶³ Kroll's (1984) work on a university residence project in Brussels in 1968 coincides with Ian McHarg's *Design with Nature* (1969) and Cullen Gordon's *The Concise Townscape* (1971).

⁶⁴ *The quest for a 'counter-space' overwhelms the supposedly ironclad distinction between 'reform' and 'revolution'. Any proposal along these lines, even the most seemingly insignificant, shakes existing space to its foundations, along with its strategies and aims - namely, the imposition of homogeneity and transparency everywhere within the purview of power and its established order. The silence of the 'users' mentioned earlier may be explained as follows: consumers sense that the slightest shift on their part can have boundless consequences, that the whole order (or mode of production) weighing down upon them will be seriously affected by the slightest movement on their part.* (Lefebvre, 1991, p.383)

not losing sight of 1) his framework for the production of social space and 2) the task that differential space would have to fulfill: to be a space that resists *any* top-down fragmentation and abstraction.

2.2 The Concept of Liminality and its Insights for Differential Space

In line with Lefebvre's approach to difference in terms of spatial dialectic, (maximal) difference is still the one that has to be noticed against a 'regular' spatial practice. That being stated, while dialectical difference demands the co-presence of paradigmatically distinct spatial practices, it belongs with neither one of them. Primarily, it still belongs with an observer who recognizes the difference, and the position from which it is done can hardly be understood in purely spatial terms. Consider the following. The works by Douglas (1966), Bataille (1986), Sennett (1970), and Deleuze and Guattari (1987), which were produced in the same time period when Lefebvre published *The Production of Space* (1991[1974]) and against which I explored Lefebvre's approach to difference, have one feature in common with Lefebvre's take on difference: the understanding of difference is for the most part representation-driven and for that matter remains predominantly relational, whether spatially or temporarily. More recent studies on the subject provide a counter-balance. Massey's (2005) *For Space* is an engaging effort not only to highlight the deficiencies of separating time from space, which representation-driven approaches to phenomena and agency tend to do, but also to suggest a way to address this deficiency in the face of the need for politics to remain real, for future to be open, and therefore for space to remain open as well. In Massey's work, it is the focus on "trajectory"—primarily a temporal

aspect of changes in a phenomenon that nevertheless also suggests spatial multiplicity of changing phenomena—rather than on space (neither dialectical nor given *a priori*). This is a critical difference from Lefebvre's approach, as Massey rejects the search for difference as primarily a spatial phenomenon and, instead, develops the idea that difference cannot be spatially outlined (and potentially excluded) since everything is the subject to non-synchronized change and, consequently, to difference:

Now, here again — as in the case of the first proposition — there is a parallel with the conceptualisation of space. Not only history but also space is open. In this open interactional space there are always connections yet to be made, juxtapositions yet to flower into interaction (or not, for not all potential connections have to be established), relations which may or may not be accomplished. Here, then, space is indeed a product of relations (first proposition) and for that to be so there must be multiplicity (second proposition). However, these are not the relations of a coherent, closed system within which, as they say, everything is (already) related to everything else. Space can never be that completed simultaneity in which all interconnections have been established, and in which everywhere is already linked with everywhere else. A space, then, which is neither a container for always-already constituted identities nor a completed closure of holism. This

is a space of loose ends and missing links. For the future to be open, space must be open too. (2005, pp.11-12).⁶⁵

Massey's work further points out the problématique of Lefebvre's differential space and its precise 'location'; it re-emphasizes that Lefebvre's differential space does not fully belong with the rest of his framework. In this light, I would like to go back to Bobic's (2004) analysis of the ambiguity of belonging of built form. As discussed, in *Between the Edges*, Bobic (2004) analyses the capacity of certain physical edges (*e.g.*, building façades that separate a building from a street, artifacts that separate private and public domains, *etc.*) to generate ambiguity of belonging: an urban space of new meanings and modes of behaviour that grows out of the ambiguity and confusion. For example, Bobic's (2004) analysis of daily fluctuation of available public space in an Amsterdam neighbourhood is one example of the 'grey' area of ambiguous belonging that public and private domain create while exercising their power over the same built form. Bobic captures this dynamism with the concept of liminal space in which neither one of contesting forces loses its defining powers and yet neither one of them can eliminate the other. The result is a space for which parameters and proposed agency are transitory and are never to become quite certain, while some people will choose to perceive private as public and act upon it accordingly. Whether this kind of space both performs the scale shift and meets Lefebvre's

⁶⁵ In this respect her brief analysis of Jacques Derrida's interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta (Massey, 2005, p.52: on Derrida's *Positions*) is illuminating for Massey's general approach: the interview revolved around the distinction between negative difference and positive heterogeneity and was more than a dispute over semantics. It was an attempt to move past negative connotations of exclusion and expulsion that the notion of difference had no other choice but to carry around in the realm of representation-driven approaches to spatiality and temporality.

aspirations for differential space is a question worth exploring, and illicit guerrilla gardening suggests a perfect case for the task.

Two of the defining characteristics of a guerrilla garden are its precariousness and transitory character. These emerge not only with the illegality of the action, but also with the fact that guerrilla gardeners both recognize and take advantage of perceived ambiguity of belonging of a piece of land that can expose certain affordances for gardening (*e.g.*, bare soil) and yet be a part of a completely different program. A resulting illegal garden continues to re-produce this ambiguity in new ways, and the concept of liminality is definitely one possibility to capture not only the structure of this space but also the kind of never-ending oddity it sustains as long as it exists. First, however, before I tackle with this task in the subsequent chapters, two critical questions need to be raised that go beyond a mere application of the concept: 1) What is the current state of debate on the liminal? and 2) How is liminality articulated as a space?

Deriving from the Latin “limen”—threshold—the term “liminal” was introduced by anthropologist Arnold van Gennep (1960[1909]) in *The Rites of Passage*. In this work, van Gennep studied the process of transition and transformation of a social status of an individual in archaic society. A liminal rite was one of three phases—rites of separation, transition (or liminal) rites, and rites of incorporation—of an orchestrated social transition. As Thomassen (2009) notes, van Gennep did not create a theory of social transformations. Rather, it was an observation of some of the ways in which certain transitions in certain (traditional) societies occur.

Until the second half of the 20th century Van Gennep’s analysis of social practices remained somewhat overlooked,⁶⁶ when a British anthropologist Victor Turner (1967) brought it

⁶⁶ See Thomassen’s [2009] discussion of the tensions between van Gennep and Émile Durkheim

back to the spotlight with the interest specifically in the liminal stage of social transformations in pre-industrial societies. Turner focused on liminality as a realm of tangible physical reality that was nevertheless stripped of any familiar social meanings and in which individuals who go through a social transformation find themselves outside of familiar social references and hierarchies (no social status) and re-discover their culture:

Van Gennep pointed to the many symbols of birth, death, and rebirth found in the liminal stage in many societies and religions. But for me the essence of liminality is to be found in its release from normal constraints, making possible the deconstruction of the "uninteresting" constructions of common sense, the "meaningfulness of ordinary life," discussed by phenomenological sociologists, into cultural units which may then be reconstructed in novel ways, some of them bizarre to the point of monstrosity (from the actors' own "emic" perspective). Liminality is the domain of the "interesting," or of "uncommon sense." This is not to say that it is totally unconstrained, for insofar as it represents a definite stage in the passage of an initiand from status A to status B in a ritual belonging to a traditional system or sequence of rituals, liminality must bear some traces of its antecedent and subsequent stages. To use Robert Merton's terms, some symbols must accord with the "manifest" purposes of the ritual (to transform a boy into a man, a girl into a woman, a dead person into an ancestral spirit, etc.). But others have the "latent" capacity to elicit creative and innovative responses from the liminars and their instructors. (Turner, 1977, p.68).

Overall, Turner's (1967) work marks the basic ground for the subject of liminality as a transitory—in-between—condition that is associated with a specific space or an experience.⁶⁷ This, however, is bereft of nuances, and more recent works on the subject need to be considered. A study by Olwig (2005) on seasonal time of gardening and farming as opposed to the linear time points out that *limen* is not an ordinary threshold: it separates qualitatively different phenomena (cf. Bobic, 2004: on physical edges between different domains and scales; Jacobs, 1961: on urban borders; Jones, 2012: on national borderlands; Mugerauer, 1993: on porches). A number of scholars focus on the non-uniform manner in which one experiences liminality as associated with certain localized experiences such as beaches (Preston-Whyte, 2008), hotels (Pritchard & Morgan, 2006), specific festivals (St. John, 2001), and even less obvious ones, such as Shortt's (2015) "transitory dwelling spaces" of hairdressers who seek instances of privacy, away from dominating professional settings, in otherwise mundane spaces (*i.e.*, staircases, back alleys, and storage rooms). It is specifically for their repetitiveness and mundane character, which keeps them aside from (nudist) beaches and Las Vegas hotels, that Shortt insists on a different term for this kind of liminal experiences. In this respect, Shortt's (2015) work departs from both van Gennep's (1960) and the initial Turner's discussion of liminality as a *socially*

⁶⁷ See Atkinson & Robson, 2012 (on spaces of social and emotional transformation for preschool children); Beech, 2011 (on the uncertainty of professional identity in organizational settings); Bobic, 2004 (on physical edges); Franklin & Schuurman, 2017 (on spaces for retiring animals); Land et al., 2014 (on learning challenges and frame of references' shifts); Mugerauer, 1993 (on porches and balconies); Olwig, 2005 (on linear and seasonal time); Preston-Whyte, 2008 (on different kinds of beaches and experiences that they provide); Pritchard & Morgan, 2006 (on hotels); Shortt, 2015 (on spaces that provide an escape from professional settings); St. John, 2001 (on temporary festivals); Tempest & Starkey, 2004 (on temporary workers and the precariousness of their position in a host organization); Thomassen, 2009 (on the evolution of the concept of liminality)

orchestrated experience outside the usual and that largely falls out of the mundane structure of the everyday life. Correspondingly, Beech (2011) points out the idealism of Turner's original approach to liminality that does not take into consideration the presence of changeable environment and multiple fashions in which liminality can emerge and be practiced in modern societies. Indeed, while in some cases the presence of physical thresholds, marked by the ambiguity of belonging, and the transitory nature of their functions are rather obvious (Beech, 2011; Bobic, 2004; Mugerauer, 1993; Preston-Whyte, 2008), in other cases there is no specific line on the ground or even a space that can be firmly associated with a transitory experience. In this respect, Preston-White (2008) describes experiences of being out-of-normal to be as different as being at a nudist beach (*i.e.*, liminality in a space) and in a short-lived moment of wave surfer's adrenaline rush as a wave breaks (*i.e.*, liminality in a moment of time). Yet, even when it comes to liminal as a place, Preston-White underlines that while the visitors of (nudist) beaches might experience them as liminal spaces, this perception is not necessarily shared by lifeguards whose approach to the work on these beaches remains business-as-usual. In the same fashion of adding indeterminacy to the manifestation of liminality, Bynum (2012) speaks of Turner's perspective on liminal and transforming experiences as structured around male points of view. These are in addition to the fact that in any capacity liminality is never free of its own fundamental ambiguity: in being a space of freedom for some, it is also a space of uncertainty and discomfort for others. Pritchard & Morgan (2006) illustrate this with the exploration of modern hotels that took over from beaches the role of places in which mundane social norms and structures are neglected or challenged by visitors. Yet, in this capacity hotels are not the same experiences for relaxing tourists and for the staff who have to deal with the former. Disorientation and discomfort on the grounds of rupture between constraints and possibilities is a

flip side of the transitory stage during which an individual can or is forced to step outside both the normal and the expected. In this respect, Thomassen (2009) reminds of the importance of understanding the ways in which liminality is re-integrated and closed: that is, its out-of-ordinary practices are routinized and brought into the everyday life.⁶⁸

Ultimately, the research that focuses on modern societies reveals liminality as a complex concept, characterized not only by in-betweenness, but also by the abundance of appearances and by a variety of socio-spatial structures through which this in-betweenness emerges. Shortt's (2012) liminal but also not quite liminal "transitory dwelling space" is one of them. St. Jones (2001) focus on liminal as essentially heterotopic is a somewhat different approach to modern liminalities of festive experiences such as *ConFest* in Australia and *Burning Man* in the United States. In this capacity, they may be transgressive and resistant to dominant representations (*cf.* transitory dwelling space), but in being so they remain a licensed and controlled form of transgression: with clear spatial and temporal outlines.

The distinction in what liminal means in traditional societies and modern ones when it comes to social transitions is critical and did not escape Turner's attention and analysis. In a paper *Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual: an Essay in Comparative Symbolology* (1974), Turner recognizes this distinction between pre-industrial societies (with fixed rituals and rigid social structures) and transitory experiences in modern societies by suggesting a particular manifestation of liminal for the latter: "liminoid". This was a major departure from the original discussion of liminality and it was critical for testing and ensuring the relevance of the concept in

⁶⁸ That being stated, Turner's (1978) analysis of Christian pilgrimage is an exploration of situation in which liminality can be sustained indefinitely in an everyday ritual, a journey and, physically, a transition. The same can be said about monastic culture in general (Turner, 1969). Bobic's (2004) analysis also suggests a 'perpetual' liminal space, out of the unresolved (cognitively) ambiguity of belonging.

modern societies. Yet, it has not been without its own challenges and caveats. Thomassen (2009) points out that both instances of liminality in modern societies and Turner's take on them (*i.e.*, the evolution of liminal into liminoid) are subjects to four major issues at least. First, liminoid, as a distinct type of liminal, carries a risk of creating a dichotomy of traditional and modern symbolic systems. Second, it manifests itself mostly through art and leisure. Third, it marks only optional—playful—transforming experiences that do not ensure social or individual transition. Forth, modern liminal experiences remain largely a-political, staying clear of lasting social transformations. At large, these conditions of liminality in modern societies remain valid (although not always accurate) and are depicted in a variety of works on gentrification, new urbanism, and artfully policed public spaces, to name a few. Yet, this critique is not to discredit the concept of liminality in modern societies. Instead, both the very need for distilling a new type of liminal experiences specifically for modern societies and the abundance of works that explore transitory and in-between experiences of modernity point at the continuing need for understanding of certain phenomena as out-of-ordinary rather than completely different (*i.e.*, which appearance is stipulated by temporal rather than spatial factors), when one's revision of dominant representations and socio-spatial norms in a constructive way is seriously undermined (*cf.* Lefebvre's "silence of users").

To conclude this section and this chapter, there is one more question to be raised. Works on liminality in modern societies do not suggest any specific locations or periods of time in which liminality is most certainly encountered and experienced by anyone who steps in. Instead, they reveal the role of one's positionality that governs the appearance of a perceived phenomenon as a part of an out-of-ordinary experience. As Bobic (2004) suggests, not every single edge, even

among those ones that are meeting points of different domains or scales, creates a kind of interface in which ambiguity of belonging translates into a creative liminal experience with new modes of behaviour and meanings. Liminality is not an inherited function of a physical object, it is not an occurrent parameter, and it needs to be realized by a cognizing individual. A space that is liminal, by definition, is not a social space and, instead, is the one in which any single representation of space is challenged but not eliminated. This creates a premise for the analysis of such a mode of constructed space in which its structure is flexible because no single representation can have a definite hold of it. That being stated, while the concept of liminality can be insightful for the concept of differential space and the latter can turn liminality from a peculiar sociological phenomenon into a critical element of urban development, the question to be raised and addressed in the subsequent chapters is as follows: How are instances of liminality discovered and turned into space?

Chapter 3. From Space to Spatiality: Introduction of Phenomenology

I ended the previous chapter with the proposition that the condition of liminality could be both insightful and engaging for the concept of differential space that puts the subject of urban spatial contestations into the perspective of gaining the right to the city through the right to do things unfamiliarly differently. As such, differential space is a powerful concept that not only situates informal and non-sanctioned practices in a pertinent socio-political context but also further situates the pursuit of flexible urban space specifically on non-compartmentalizing grounds. That being stated, Lefebvre's framework for the production of social space remains deeply representation-shaped and this makes the concept of differential space confusing: it is not clear whether differential space is a process of transformation or a distinct (maximally different) social space. In the previous chapter I negate the latter and question the former for the supplementary role that it suggests for differential space and that, in a long run, does not respond to the task of differential space to counterbalance the fragmenting work of abstract space.

In this respect, the condition of liminality can provide a promising escape route for understanding both the emergence and the constitution of differential space. That being stated, as I discussed in the previous chapter, the challenge of liminal space as a *contemporary urban* phenomenon is that it is a largely ephemeral and subjective condition and its contribution to the concept of differential space demands that we step away from a purely socio-political and dialectical approach to space. As the discussion of the liminality in the previous chapter reveals, liminality, as a contemporary urban phenomenon, is characterized not by the lack of unifying representations but by the lack of the clarity for which of them is a dominant one. Therefore, the

use of liminality provides the possibility to consider an instance of conflicting (due to their mutual maximal difference) spatial practices as a liminal overlay rather than a compartmentalized heterotopic instance. In this respect, the goal of this chapter is to set the ground for testing the feasibility of differential space as an instance of liminal space on phenomenological terms. This is not to step into egocentric space but to articulate the difference between space and spatiality.

I ended the previous chapter with a question about how instances of liminality are discovered. Liminal space, as a space free from the rule of any single representation, suggests that whatever is subject to it has been taken out of the context of a single representation. Liminal space is a spatial response to this liberation. More specific to the case studied here, the work of guerrilla gardening is an interpretive space that is composed of objects that are taken from a different space. On the one hand a guerrilla gardening space appears to have all the traits of a well-structured space. On the other hand, its interpretive—ephemeral and ‘overlaid’—position breaks away from Lefebvre’s approach to a social space that ultimately needs to secure its territory. A phenomenological approach offers a resolution to this contradiction and grounds the confusing multitude of ‘overlying’ spaces in a multitude of spatialities. Each spatiality manifests a presence of a specific context (that I explore in terms of Heidegger’s “for-the-sake-of”) from which an appearance of a phenomenon and a specific set of actions towards it becomes possible.

In this chapter, I introduce the rationale for a phenomenological inquiry. I explore the ways in which a phenomenological inquiry can help clarify the concept of differential space as well as to secure its presence in spatial terms, without turning differential space into yet another social space. In introducing phenomenology, I discuss its development specifically through the prism of

the particular understanding of space that it suggests. Finally, I discuss certain challenges that phenomenological inquiry produces.

3.1 Differential Space and the Phenomenological Approach

In *Henri Lefebvre on Space: Architecture, Urban Research, and the Production of Theory* (2011), Lucasz Stanek puts forth an engaging argument regarding the rationale behind Lefebvre's framework. According to Stanek, this rationale is about the possibility of a change to the ways that a society mitigates a variety of economic, social, and political issues, which is also done through the production of built form. Stanek turns to an interview that Lefebvre gave to the journal *Actuel* in 1972 and speaks of Lefebvre's satisfaction with the success of "architectural *avant-gardes* of the early twentieth century [who] discovered the possibility of producing space rather than isolated objects in space" (2011, p. 247). From the houses on *pilotis* by Le Corbusier to Yona Friedman's cities in space, Lefebvre saw their potential for introducing new representations of space that would break away from then-current land ownership and space regulation regimes. Lefebvre was looking for ways of introducing representations through the possibility of different—unfamiliar—spatial practices.

In this respect, if it is possible to recognize practices such as guerrilla gardening as a part of a specific social space,⁶⁹ then the most powerful insight that guerrilla gardening can offer is the fact that a guerrilla garden, as a spatial practice, intertwines with rather than 'sits' next to

⁶⁹ The works of Mitchell (2003) and Crane (2011) consider informal and illegal gardening spaces through the prism of Lefebvre's production of space.

other spatial practices. While a guerrilla gardening space might not be differential space *per se*, the manner in which this space emerges—by overlaying (*i.e.*, appropriating) elements of other constructed spaces—suggests a situation in which an appearance of affected built form and its space are never settled as long as such an arrangement persists. In this case, it is that contested phenomenon rather than a juxtaposition of social spaces that becomes both the source and the embodiment of difference. Ultimately, this is a phenomenological difference in the midst of a dialectical production of social spaces,⁷⁰ and there are two engaging aspects to this turn of events.⁷¹

Phenomenologically, in following Mélanie Walton's (2011) argument that guerrilla gardening triggered a kind of *epoché*—a suspension of previous preconceptions towards a perceived object—in her encounter with an illegal small garden in a parking lot,⁷² I am specifically interested in how a phenomenon (*e.g.*, built form) presents itself as detached from a particular—familiar—representation and invites new interpretations and actions towards it. Phenomenology, therefore, suggests a scale (*i.e.*, one's cognition of an object) and a 'space' (*i.e.*, a specific task or a situated perspective rather than a representation) of an entity that is different. That being stated, the use of phenomenological inquiry in conjunction with Lefebvre's

⁷⁰ Soja (1996, 2000) discusses Lefebvre's framework for the production of space as a trialectical one.

⁷¹ It is necessary to keep in mind that Lefebvre was aware of the work that was done by phenomenologists. In *The Production of Space* (1991), Lefebvre turns to their works in order to outline the relevance of his own methodological approach to space, as distinct from phenomenological one.

⁷² In *Re-creation: Phenomenology and Guerrilla Gardening* (2011), Walton discusses her experience with the work of unknown guerrilla gardeners as a spatialized means of *epoché* (*i.e.*, a conscious withdrawal from familiar perceptions of a phenomenon). She describes a mundane encounter with a generic parking lot that suddenly acquired its own emplaced individuality and significance, beyond its expected placeless function. This was due to a patch of daffodils that were planted there by anonymous gardeners.

differential space presents at least two substantial epistemological challenges. First, it is essential to consider Lefebvre's critique of Martin Heidegger's approach to space that he puts forth in *The Production of Space* (1991: "Social Space"). The point of the critique is Heidegger's non-historical approach that does not consider space as a social *product*:

And, even if Heidegger asks questions about its origin, even if he poses 'historical' questions in this connection, there can be no doubt about the main thrust of his thinking here: time counts for more than space; Being has a history, and history is nothing but the History of Being. This leads him to a restricted and restrictive conception of production, which he envisages as a causing-to-appear, a process of emergence which brings a thing forth as a thing now present amidst other already-present things (1991, pp. 121-122).

As Lefebvre continues, his disagreement with Heidegger's approach comes largely from the fact that Heidegger explores the world more as a philosopher than as a historian or "an analyst of societies" (p. 242). Lefebvre, then, goes on to criticize not only Heidegger's, but also Gaston Bachelard's, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's, Jean Piaget's, and Christian Norberg-Schulz's

approaches (1991: “Contradictory Space”, pp. 297-298).⁷³ Lefebvre’s critique remains similar: he is not content with the depth of their analysis of space that he sees as a strictly social phenomenon, As Lefebvre notes,

The ultimate effect of descriptions of this kind is either that everything becomes indistinguishable or else that rifts occur between the conceived, the perceived and the directly lived — between representations of space and representational spaces. The true theoretical problem, however, is to relate these spheres to one another, and to uncover the mediations between them. (p. 298).

This is a valid concern for Lefebvre, who asserts that space is both a product of and a necessary precondition for social relationships, but it does not necessarily signify a complete incompatibility between phenomenological inquiry and Lefebvre’s framework. While the former cannot claim a truly historicist approach to space, this does not preclude phenomenology from addressing specific aspects of Lefebvre’s framework. Phenomenological analysis is not

⁷³ This part of his critique is perplexing. While it is largely possible to agree that the focus of Heidegger’s work is ontology rather than dialectics, it is also largely difficult to agree that all of the criticized authors adopt a somewhat Cartesian understanding of space, of which Lefebvre accuses them:

What can be clearly seen by reading such authors is the way in which technicizing, psychologizing or phenomenologically oriented approaches displace the analysis of social space by immediately replacing it with a geometric — neutral, empty, blank — mental space. Consider for instance how Norberg-Schulz, a theoretician of space, defines a centre, namely as the point made by the pencil on a blank sheet of paper. From this perspective the marking-out of space has no aim or meaning beyond that of an aide-mémoire for the (subjective) recognition of places (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 298).

incapable of illuminating socio-political issues specifically through the lens of their physical and spatial appearance.⁷⁴

The second challenge is the notion of difference itself. For Lefebvre, difference is a dialectical concept, and its emergence is a result of a conflict and a struggle; differences are social and relational. This suggests that difference is a manifestation of a particular relationship of a set of phenomena whose co-existence as entities that are open to comparison occurs on socio-political terms. As discussed in Chapter 2, this points to difference as a relational rather than an ontological concept. The challenge, therefore, is as follows. Is it possible to capture a space of a difference phenomenologically and not to sever it completely from Lefebvre's framework, thus, depriving it of its original meaning and intention?

An answer to this question comes from hermeneutics and, more specifically, the search of architecture for itself as an existentialist rather than a positivist discipline, with its own unique language. Just like the divided position of architecture, Lefebvre's framework that firmly delineates minimal and maximal differences as paradigmatically distinct entities might similarly belong to two worlds. Karsten Harries' (1997; in following Alberto Pérez-Gómez [1983]) delineation of aesthetical and ethical approaches in architecture strongly resonates with Lefebvre's division of difference into two kinds: minimal and maximal. The former reflects the same dilemma: the distinction between architecture as the work of ornamentation (and nothing else; the aesthetical approach) and the duty of architecture to transcribe and communicate one's place in the world and one's aspirations to be whole (the ethical approach): a task that is destined

⁷⁴ To illustrate, in *Toward an Architectural Vocabulary: The Porch as Between* (1993), Robert Mugerauer turns to phenomenological inquiry for the socio-political analysis of porch as a built form. Similarly, on phenomenological terms, Sarah Ahmed (2006) explores racial and homophobic issues.

to create maximal differences, once situated into the Lefebvre's framework.⁷⁵ As discussed in the previous chapter, while Lefebvre develops the concept of differential space in conjunction with the production of a social space, from an epistemological point of view it is possible to consider that the framework and the concept do not belong together. In a manner similar to the ethical

⁷⁵ Remarkably, Harris opens up *The Ethical Function of Architecture* (1997) with a confession that architecture drew his attention as being itself a compromised art: one that needs to take place in the world ruled by other than aesthetic concerns. In this ambiguity of belonging of architecture Karsten sees a great potential for tackling some of the essential challenges of modernity. In following Pérez-Gómez, Harris grounds his theory of architecture in hermeneutics and its capacity to become a language that would help architecture to remain a binding force for the Western mindset at a time when tradition and religious worldviews are irrelevant, God remains unknown, and the future is uncertain and scary. Human mortality is an essential part of it, and this brings Harris to a scrupulous examination of Heidegger's dwelling: an attempt to draw a link between specifically human existence, human mortality, and the built form. Mortality is a reminder of the finitude of human life and its endeavours. According to Heidegger (1977a; 1977b), it is a reminder of the necessity of coming into existence and dying as an embodied and emplaced human being rather than as an (dis)embodied ego, caught in a play of economic, social, and political forces.

With the help of hermeneutics, the role of architecture as a major factor in the production of spaces becomes existential: to give a sense of direction beyond current fashions. This is a bold ambition for a discipline that is fully immersed in the re-production of contemporary social spaces. Unsurprisingly, this view has come under critique. In *The Hermeneutics of Sacred Architecture* (2000), Lindsay Jones argues that one's understanding of built form is always socially and personally mediated. This is a notable attack on hermeneutics in architecture as a pursuit of a universally shared meaning in built form. To counterbalance this argument, one might turn to the works by Christopher Alexander (1977, non-phenomenological), Christian Norberg-Shulz (1971; grounded into the works of Kevin Lynch [1960], Martin Heidegger, and Gestalt theory), Robert Mugerauer phenomenological analysis of the porch (1993; cf. Thiis-Evensen's [1989] language of architecture), or even Walter Benjamin's (1983) exploration of porosity of buildings in Naples. Ultimately, in enabling the possibility of an ethical approach in architecture, hermeneutics assists architectural practice to establish a counterbalance to positivism and to set architecture on an existentialist pursuit of directions for both personal and collective growth, which cannot be fully accounted for by a positivist outlook.

function of architecture, the concept of differential space demands a distinct epistemological approach in order to be grasped and realized. The choice of phenomenology for this task is not accidental. If differential space is indeed a space *of* difference that never comes to rest, then there is a way to re-formulate this definition: it is a space of a phenomenon which appearance is never settled in any single representation. This is in line with David Seamon's (2017) understanding of the aim of phenomenological hermeneutics, which he draws from Henri Bortoft's (2012) *Taking Appearances Seriously*. It is to find ways that provide a text with a kind of space that makes that text as completely present on its own terms as possible. This is not to 'protect' text from reading, but to insure that no single reading of the text becomes a totalizing one.

3.2 Phenomenology

First and foremost, phenomenology would not be possible without the following two stepping stones: 1) the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano that set the ground not only for phenomenology but also for Gestalt psychology;⁷⁶ and 2) the concept of intentionality.⁷⁷ The link between Brentano and Gestalt psychology had a direct influence on phenomenology and its focus on cognition, which needs to be understood in terms of the perception of an object in its self-givenness rather than via formal knowledge of its properties. This begins with the notion of

⁷⁶ Carl Stumpf—one of Brentano's students and also one of the pioneers of Gestalt psychology—was a supervisor of Edmund Husserl's philosophical dissertation.

⁷⁷ This is the "directedness" of perception that signifies a cognizing subject who always takes a position, both literal and figurative.

intentionality that Brentano took from scholastic thought in order to override certain limitations of Descartes' delineation between physical and mental entities. In founding phenomenology, Edmund Husserl made intentionality one of its central concepts, and this helped him to step away from the binary of the subject-object. In Husserl's view, an intentional act is that which facilitates an appearance of an object. Consequently, an intentional act requires a context, in which a given intention can be both meaningful and desired and in which an object appears.⁷⁸

As the fountainhead of phenomenology in the 20th century, Husserl and his seminal works outline and shape its essential objectives and epistemology.⁷⁹ Husserl's original pursuit of a universal foundation for pure logic initially had little to do with what is currently known as Husserl's phenomenology.⁸⁰ It was not until 1907, when in a series of five lectures the he delivered in Göttingen (later published as *The Idea of Phenomenology* [1964]), Husserl clearly established phenomenology as a distinct branch of philosophy that dealt with the subjects of being and reality on their own terms. The transformation of intuition in an intentional act marks the first evolution of phenomenology: in *Logische Untersuchungen*, intuition is a direct analysis of an essence of a phenomenon (*i.e.*, one of the ways in which it appears in one's consciousness

⁷⁸ Hence, the specific phenomenological approach to space (*i.e.*, space itself is a phenomenon that appears in a certain context and in a certain intentional act).

⁷⁹ The term phenomenology turns up more than once in the history of science. According to Spiegelberg (1975), although Edmund Husserl coined it for the branch of philosophy he was developing, in 1764 the term "phenomenology" appeared in *Neues Organon*—a work by Johann Lambert in relation to a part of his theory of knowledge that differentiates truth from illusion. In addition, from the beginning of the 19th century until the first decade of the 20th century the term was associated with Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and its own Phenomenological Movement that grew out of it.

⁸⁰ This were *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, published in 1891, and the first volume of *Logische Untersuchungen*, published in 1900.

as self-given).⁸¹ This early descriptive phenomenology, however, lacks the methodological apparatus: the phenomenological reduction that Husserl introduces in his series of lectures from 1907.

Despite Husserl's early expectations, his phenomenology did not develop as the only kind of phenomenology. Instead it became a point of departure for a number of other highly influential phenomenological traditions. The relationship of these traditions to each other is not adversarial; they are after the same goals with the same focus on intentionality and its role in the appearance of phenomena. They differ in their approaches to the role of phenomenology and the ways in which engagement with worldly objects should be understood (*i.e.*, via direct appearance in consciousness, Dasein and care, body and its agency, affordances, or freedom of choice). Even the definition of phenomenon can vary from one phenomenological approach to another. Both Husserl (1964) and Heidegger (1996) define a "phenomenon" as that which appears and which appearances need to undergo exploratory scrutiny in order to understand what, why, and how causes the emergence of these particular appearances. Merleau-Ponty's (1962) use of the term is somewhat different. He defines a phenomenon as a passing appearance that leads to an identified thing. Being only a passing appearance on the way to a thing, a phenomenon is dismissed by consciousness once that thing is grasped by perception (*e.g.*, an approximate contour in a distance that later becomes identified as a tree). These different interpretations were anticipated by Husserl, however, and in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl makes a note of the problem with the term "phenomenon":

⁸¹ This kind of analysis marks "descriptive phenomenology" which differs from empirical psychologism in its focus on describing distinct types of psychological acts rather than causal explanations.

The word “phenomenon” is ambiguous in virtue of the essential correlation between appearance and that which appears. Φαινόμενο (phenomenon) in its proper sense means that which appears, and yet it is by preference used for the appearing itself, for the subjective phenomenon (if one may use this expression which is apt to be misunderstood in the vulgar psychological sense) (1964, p. 11).

The term “phenomenon,” which is at the core of phenomenology, requires attention not only for the outlined semantic differences and inherited confusion with the use of the term. Phenomenon is also a critical concept in phenomenism. Phenomenism is an epistemological philosophical theory, in which phenomena are the *objects* that *are fully available* through a variety of systems of sensation to which a reference needs to be made. Phenomenology differs from this by making a difference between that which presents itself, but remains largely unknown and unavailable, and its appearances (*i.e.*, one’s interpretations of that which presents itself). Consequently, the pursuit of that which presents itself becomes a subject of specifically phenomenological investigation through the analysis of the appearances of that which presents itself and the intentional structure (of the consciousness) towards a phenomenon that results in given appearances (something that phenomenism overlooks). From this perspective, in the following, I review some of the major ways that phenomenological investigations can be carried specifically in relation to space as a phenomenon.

3.2.1 Husserl’s Phenomenology

The premise for Husserl's phenomenology can be narrowed down to his tacit dispute with Descartes regarding the notion of a natural belief in reality that surrounds a perceiving individual. Ultimately, Husserl rejects Descartes' identity of immanent and transcendent through the workings of God. This identity suggests the existence of *a priori* given knowledge of immanent and universally valid mental representations that provide a truthful description of everything encountered. In following Kant, Husserl insists on a disjunction between the process of thinking (*cogitatio*), which is given and immanent, and cognition—an *intentional* grasping of *cogitatio*: the objectification of *cogitatio* through the application of judgements, presuppositions, and meanings. In the example of the blind man, with which Husserl opens his series of five lectures on phenomenology (1964 [1907]), he illustrates this fundamental mismatch by arguing that a blind man cannot experience seeing despite the existence of a variety of theories on colour and vision. A blind man cannot ever possibly grasp seeing, as it is not given to him as immanent. While this example points to something that might be obvious, what was much less obvious at the time, according to Husserl, was the societal confidence in the ability of the natural sciences to explain the reality.⁸² For Husserl, the natural sciences and, to a certain extent, mathematics, which operate via hypotheses and theories for establishing truth, can similarly confuse the experience of seeing with knowledge about seeing. In *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1964), Husserl starts with the statement that “the method of the critique of cognition is the phenomenological method, as the general doctrine of essences” (1964, p. 1). What this means is that all cognition that belongs to the natural sciences, to the “sciences of culture”, and to mathematics is transcendent: in other words, it is not genuinely immanent or self-given. A

⁸² He later continues this line of argument in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1970 [1954])

question that Husserl poses as a consequence of this argument is whether it is possible to grasp the being of the transcendent with the use of transcendent entities. Husserl's own answer to this question is a negative one, and as the first step to deal with the finding of "absolute data"—in an act of pure "seeing" of a phenomenon that is given immanently—Husserl proposes the paradigm of phenomenological reduction.

Phenomenological reduction is not only a critical part of Husserl's phenomenology but also that part that distinguishes his philosophy from any other. Since the Ancient Greeks, there were many philosophies that questioned the validity of familiar appearances. Yet, Husserl's phenomenology was the only one that did not try to replace one set of appearances with another. It simply required suspending any presuppositions or beliefs about a perceived object for the period of a phenomenological inquiry: an analysis of the intentional structures of consciousness and cognition. As Husserl sets it out, phenomenological inquiry consists of three major steps: 1) an epistemological (transcendental) reduction (*epoché* or bracketing out) that requires the suspension of all previous knowledge of a research subject; 2) an eidetic reduction that takes into account only essential structures of a given act of perception (eidetic variations); and 3) a careful consideration of all aspects and elements that constitute a *complex* appearance of a studied object. Finally, there is one factor that brings these three steps together. Since all consciousness is a directed consciousness of something, Husserl's exploration of intentionality—that which gives a reason to perceive—is his ultimate phenomenological anchor.⁸³

⁸³ More concretely, this means that while being at a museum and observing a painting for the most part means enjoying its subject matter, from the phenomenological standpoint the same act of perception has to include everything that goes into it (*e.g.*, reflections of light on the paint, strokes, the position of the observer, surrounding sounds, the frame, the canvas, *etc.*). Ultimately, it is the perception of the entire context of the painting that is experienced in all of its spatio-temporal complexity rather than just the image itself.

Subsequent works (*i.e.*, Heidegger, 1996; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Sartre, 1956) accept intentionality as a fundamental concept in phenomenology. They also accept the overarching objective of phenomenology⁸⁴ and its core method—phenomenological reduction. These works further advance the understanding of the appearance of a phenomenon as largely perceived through intentionality. Distinct from Husserl’s early idealistic phenomenology,⁸⁵ however, these works largely reject Husserl’s overarching objective for phenomenology to focus solely on

⁸⁴ Merleau-Ponty defines phenomenology as “a study of the advent of being into consciousness, instead of presuming its possibility as given in advance” (1962, p. 61). This is opposed to mere reflection—and employs terms that are very similar to those of Husserl.

⁸⁵ In criticizing the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of the possibility of cognition in natural thinking, Husserl argues that “all cognition of the natural sort, and especially the prescientific, is cognition which makes its object transcendent. It posits objects as existent, claims to reach matters of fact which are not ‘strictly given to it,’ and not ‘immanent’ to it” (1967, p. 27). In *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1964[1907]) he speaks of a ‘natural attitude’ as a scientific attitude that operates through hypotheses and theories, which are ultimately in line with the Galilean principles of scientific thought that regard the world as a thing in itself that can become known (through quantitative modes of inquiry) by a human subject who is present in the world. In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1970[1954]), however, Husserl’s definition of the natural attitude broadens. In this work (his last), Husserl recognizes the natural attitude as the one that is prior to any theory or scientific paradigm, including any of the Ancient Greeks. He formulates it in terms of “a natural primordial attitude” (1970, p. 281) which is prior to any critical reflection. This—new—definition of the natural attitude is a recognition of a pragmatic outlook on the world that is not naïve but is always goal-oriented towards the things around rather than is seeking for the absolute truth. What unites these two seemingly different definitions of the natural attitude in Husserl’s works? It is taking the world for granted. This is a lived world, which is always already there and into which even the outcomes of scientific thought constantly ‘leak’ and become a part of it. The development of the concept of the lived world in *The Crisis of European Sciences* (1970) is a major point of departure for Husserl from his previous formulation of the objective of phenomenology as a strictly consciousness-driven exercise for establishing the nature of that which presents itself. He moves away from his original position of transcendental idealism towards a position of a more situated encounter with phenomena in the realm of a pre-given entity.

immanent experiences of a perceived object in one's consciousness. Instead, they shift the focus towards the situatedness of intentionality that constitutes a medium of perception.

This shift can be also explained with a reference to James Gibson's ecological psychology and, more specifically, his theory of affordances (Gibson, 1979).⁸⁶ Gibson, whose work was influenced by Gestalt theory and who was also aware of the phenomenological work by Merleau-Ponty (1962), argues that physical objects are available to an observer according to their physical characteristics in relation to an observer's personal abilities and specific intentions. This is a threefold relationship that includes an observer, an observed, and a particular intention in mind. Together, they constitute a possibility for action that is either recognized in an observed object or not. For example, a smooth vertical surface does not *appear* as if it would *afford* a person to sit. Yet, the not-for-sitting appearance of that surface is situational rather than permanent: a pedestrian, a rock-climber with proper equipment, and a fly would all see this wall differently. An appearance, therefore, is not inherent in a phenomenon; it is situated rather in a particular context, and only from that context can it be both noticed and acted upon. While it might seem that Gibson had a limited goal in grounding the appearance of worldly objects in actions, similar arguments can be found in the phenomenological works of Heidegger (1996), Merleau-Ponty (1962), and even Sartre (1956).⁸⁷ All that said, phenomenological reduction—*epoché*—has

⁸⁶ See also Chemero, 2000; Galvao & Sato, 2005; Gaver, 1996; Maier *et al.*, 2009; Norman, 1990; Pickering, 2000; Reed, 1996; Stoffregen, 2000; Withagen *et al.*, 2012

⁸⁷ That being stated, in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre (1956) delineates perception and action as non-identical: "action is nevertheless perceived as a future efficacy which surpasses and transcends the pure and simple perceived" (1956, p. 424). A gap remains between the perception of an object as affording a certain action and the actual act of acting upon this affordance. On similar terms, in relation to Gibson's (1979) theory of affordances, Gaver (1996) discusses sequential affordances: to be completed, an intentional act consists of a series of actions that comprise it.

remained a cornerstone of phenomenology and its role in many respects can be interpreted specifically in terms of revealing a context by ‘stepping out’ of it. This has substantial value for the subject of difference. To see something as different is not only to recognize its difference (by performing *epoché*) but also to accept its ‘right’ to be different (becoming aware of the physicality of that which *epoché* uncovers and that is always there). While Husserl speaks of *epoché* as a conscious act of analysis, in line with Walton (2011) and her encounter with daffodils in a parking lot (*i.e.*, a parking lot that emerges as a place on its own terms rather than as a car-related placeless function), it is also possible to speak of spatio-temporal triggers for *epoché*.

3.2.2 From Space to Spatiality: Heidegger’s Application of Phenomenology

Heidegger’s application of phenomenology towards both phenomenon and intentionality arguably provides the most engaging insight for ‘space’ as an appearance of a phenomenon that comes out of phenomenological reduction. As Stephan Käufer & Anthony Chemero (2015) note,

[t]he difference between being directed at objects in consciousness and being at grips with equipment in a purposive engagement is the most salient respect in which Heidegger may have intended to claim that Being and Time was written “against” Husserl (2015, p. 58).

In the context of my research, the usefulness of Heidegger’s work is twofold. First, it is a specific application of Husserl’s phenomenology that led Heidegger to a particular development of

phenomenological inquiry. Second, and consequently, it is his phenomenological investigation of the human being that *dwells in de-distancing* for the sake of creating purposeful *equipment*.

In *Being and Time* (1996), Heidegger avoids traditional terms such as object or *res* and instead uses the German “Zeug,” which can be approximately translated as “equipment.” This is the foundation of Heidegger’s phenomenological exploration of the being of the human being—Dasein. Dasein dwells (*i.e.*, meaningfully exists) in purposeful interaction with equipment (rather than just objects) that, in turn, is organized in a wholistic manner “for-the-sake-of.” Heidegger elucidates two forms of engagement with objects as equipment: practical engagement (ready-to-hand; objects that ‘disappear’ in the familiarity of a task) and thoughtful awareness (present-at-hand; “broken”—emerged—equipment that does not fit a task and that broke out of context). Moreover, while Heidegger argues that both are *simultaneous* ways of the being of things, he insists that occurrent (present-in-hand) characteristics of an object do not shape its appearance. In residing out of any *meaningful* context, these characteristics provide no reference for the meaning of a given object. Instead, an object is always primarily understood in terms of the familiarity of the equipment. For this reason, occurrent characteristics are not even immediately available to a cognizing individual as long as an object remains fit for a task at hand. They become clear only once one turns a purely inquiring gaze on them. A hammer is perceived according to its occurrent characteristics when it becomes unusable and “obstinate” (*i.e.*, unfamiliar) in the context of a task for which it is supposedly intended:

In associating with the world taken care of, what is unhandy can be encountered not only in the sense of something unusable or completely missing, but as something unhandy which is not missing at all and not unusable, but “gets in the way” of taking care of things. That

to which taking care of things cannot turn, for which it has “no time,” is something unhandy in the way of not belonging there, of not being complete. Unhandy things are disturbing and make evident the obstinacy of what is initially to be taken care of before anything else (Heidegger, 1996, p. 69).⁸⁸

This primordial familiarity of a dwelling Dasein with the world evokes Husserl’s (1970) late take on the natural attitude as a pragmatic intention towards the world. For Heidegger, however, this yields an approach to intentionality that defines both the appearance and spatiality of phenomena according to the *meaningful action* of a caring Dasein rather than one’s detached consciousness. Heidegger does not reject any self-givenness of transcendental objects. Rather, distinct from Husserl’s works, *Being and Time* is not so much the development of phenomenology as it is its application, as a framework, to a particular subject: human being. Yet, similar to Husserl, phenomenology for Heidegger is first and foremost a way of access to that which would become a theme of ontology, as ontology is possible only phenomenologically (1996, p. 33):

Essentially nothing else stands “behind” the phenomena of phenomenology. Nevertheless, what is to become a phenomenon can be concealed. And it is precisely because phenomena

⁸⁸ Heidegger’s use of the term “skill” is another angle for the same approach to the ontology of Dasein—familiarity. When we skillfully use a hammer, we are not blind or unconscious: we are oriented for a task and are at ease. Heidegger refers to this specific kind of sight that guides skillful use as “circumspection.” Yet, in addition to circumspection that guides a skill, Heidegger also uses “disclosedness”. Disclosedness of equipment is its availability for a certain action: we are not attempting to sit on walls because they do not appear as affording this kind of engagement.

are initially and for the most part are not given that phenomenology is needed. Being covered up is the counterconcept to “phenomenon”(1996, p. 34).⁸⁹

Heidegger, therefore, turns to phenomenology by focusing on the ways (and reasons) that the being of things remains concealed. For Heidegger, Cartesian ontology is the ontology of occurrentness, which he rejects in large part because a cognizing subject is always practically engaged with the world prior to and during the act of cognizing.

In this respect, the discussion of a phenomenon and its constitution is critical for Heidegger. Beginning with an analysis of the Greek origin of the word, meaning “*to show itself*” (1996, p. 25), Heidegger writes extensively on the ways in which showing itself occurs. More specifically to the present research, Heidegger points out that the appearance of a phenomenon is possible through a different phenomenon (*e.g.*, that which appears as red does so through the phenomenon of redness: “Appearing is a *making itself known* through something that

⁸⁹ The argument that phenomena are initially not given and for this reason the phenomenological mode of inquiry is critical is in line with Eugene Fink’s (1970) *The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism*. Edmund Husserl’s assistant at one point, Fink discusses the origins of what Husserl identified as the positivistic “natural attitude,” which is responsible for our limited yet replicable perception of phenomena. Fink (1970) questions and explores the innate (intramundane) quality of natural attitude as “a believing in the world” that is stipulated by the default self-awareness of humans as *being in* the world rather than *facing* the world and its being as completely separate. Fink further continues:

After the first and necessarily provisional determination of the essence of the natural attitude as a believing in the world, as the universal flowing apperception of the world which is carried out on its own terms (i.e. upon the basis of this belief itself), what is of decisive importance is the awakening of an immeasurable astonishment over the mysteriousness of this state of affairs (Sachlage). To accept it as a self-evident fact is to remain blind to the greatest mystery of all, the mystery of the being of the world itself (Fink, 1970, p. 109).

shows itself.” [1996, p. 26] and “this self-showing essentially belongs to the wherein in which something makes itself known. Accordingly, phenomena are never appearances, but every appearance is dependent upon phenomena” [1996, p. 26]). In speaking of appearances and also semblances, Heidegger firmly grounds a pursuit of any phenomenon in the necessity of looking for a phenomenon as self-showing, although a phenomenon cannot be encountered as such directly (its presence is always mediated):

Both appearance and semblance are themselves founded in the phenomenon, albeit in different ways. The confusing multiplicity of ‘phenomena’ designated by the terms phenomenon, semblance, appearance, and mere appearance, can be unraveled only if the concept of phenomenon is understood from the very beginning as the self-showing in itself. (1996, p. 27).

Heidegger emphasizes that phenomenon can be approached in a vulgar way—that is, via the notion of gaining access: “If by the self-showing we understand those beings that are accessible” (1996, p. 27). Yet, he also argues that such an approach, while being legitimate, is not the phenomenological concept of phenomenon. As Heidegger develops this subject, he states:

The phenomenological concept of phenomenon, as self-showing, means the being of beings – its meaning, modifications, and derivatives. This self-showing is nothing arbitrary, nor is it something like an appearing. The being of beings can least of all be something ‘behind which’ something else stands, something that ‘does not appear’ (1996, p. 31).

From this perspective, Heidegger's examination of the *covered up* state of being of a phenomenon (1996, p. 32) is critical to the phenomenological concept of phenomenon. A phenomenon can be generally undiscovered (where no knowledge of it exists), or a phenomenon can be submerged (having been discovered but then covered up again and resting in resemblance: "It is possible for every phenomenological concept and proposition drawn from genuine origins to degenerate when communicated as a statement" [1996, p. 32]).

The discussion of the constitution of a phenomenon through its appearances is directly related to Heidegger's approach to intentionality. Heidegger captures intentionality through the notion of care that should be understood in terms of handiness, concern, and obtrusiveness, rather than in terms of compassion. While by means of a phenomenological investigation Heidegger argues that being is a situated phenomenon, he unpacks this situatedness and its consequent spatiality with an argument that Dasein essentially dwells in de-distancing.⁹⁰ De-distancing through care, rather than through the Cartesian space of occurrent characteristics, is the ultimate mode of one's encounter with other beings. Heidegger makes it very clear that de-distancing is not a physical concept, but an ontological one. It reflects the fact that being in the world is based on the totality of activities, and things are *discoverable* and de-distanced to varying degrees.

The most compelling part of Heidegger's phenomenology is its insights for agency and space. Together, "circumspection" and "disclosedness" bring Heidegger's take on intentionality

⁹⁰ *De-distancing means making distance disappear, making the being at a distance of something disappear, bringing it near. Dasein is essentially de-distancing. As the being that it is, it lets beings be encountered in nearness. De-distancing discovers remoteness. Remoteness, like distance, is a categorical determination of beings unlike Dasein. De-distancing, on the other hand, must be kept in mind as an existential [i.e., as an ontological term – my comment] (1996, p. 97).*

through care and de-distancing close to Gibson's (1976) "affordances." In both cases, we see an attempt to move away from a sharp distinction between subject and object towards an intertwined co-presence of the two in meaningful action, situated in a particular context. Yet, distinct from Gibson, Heidegger is more pronouncedly ontological, and this has direct implications for his approach to space. In his view, places are not geographical entities. Instead, they are a direct manifestation of de-distancing in the realm of a "for-the-sake-of" of a certain task. As Edward Casey notes, in analyzing Heidegger's approach to place and space (1997, p. 251), if "position" is the "residue" of place, the the Cartesian "space" is the region "in the realm of present-at-hand" (*i.e.*, when space, *as equipment*, becomes "broken" and "obstinate"). This situation, however, is specific to 'bare' space. A ready-to-hand thing—fit for a task—appears not in the Cartesian—bare and "broken"—space but through spatiality that for the most part remains concealed in the familiarity of the task.

3.2.3 Heidegger's Application of Phenomenology and Liminal Space

In the context of the present research and specifically in relation to the subject of space, an important issue to consider is the interrelation of the condition of liminality and Heidegger's notion of "uncanny". This is both to highlight similarities and, equally importantly, to draw the line between two states of being out of the ordinary for the sake of gaining a perspective. This is also to situate further liminal space as a concept that draws from several epistemologies.

In Section 40 (*The Fundamental Attunement of Anxiety as an Eminent Disclosedness of Dasein*) of Chapter 5 (*Being as Such*) in *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1996) speaks in detail of

“uncanny” in relation to anxiety. As long as attunement reveals how one is [lost in the familiarity of the world], in anxiety one has an “uncanny” [“unheimlich”] feeling (1996, p.182). For Heidegger, the uncanny is a condition of being in the existential mode of being-in: when the everyday familiarity collapses, Dasein is both fetched back out of the entangled absorption into the world and becomes individualized as not-being-in-home. (1996, p.182). Heidegger finishes this thought up by concluding that “the talk about “uncanniness” [“Unheimlichkeit”] means nothing other than this”: that is, the exclusion, no matter how temporary, into the present-in-hand mode of being, when Dasein is forced to face itself (1996, p.183). The state of Dasein as “uncanny” makes the direction of the flight of Dasein [into familiarity] more clear: it is not from innerworldly beings, but, on opposite, towards them, into the entangled being-in-home (familiarity of tasks and of taking care of—that is, into the ready-in-hand mode of existence). As Heidegger notes, “[t]his uncanniness constantly pursues Dasein and threatens its everyday lostness in the they [*i.e.*, in being in tune and collectively with others while being lost in taking care of], although not explicitly” (1996, p.183).

In this respect, the condition of the uncanny most certainly reveals resemblance with the condition of liminality. As discussed in Chapter 2, liminality is a similar state of unfamiliarity amid the familiar that, in some cases, can specifically pursue the goal of putting under scrutiny taken-for-granted appearances of phenomena as well as the frames of references into which they are placed. Similar to Heidegger’s more general context of authentic being-towards-death in relation to which he introduces and discusses the condition of the uncanny, the traditional experience of liminality aims to be not only distressing but also transforming, albeit as an orchestrated socio-cultural experience rather than an individualistic ontological pursuit. The latter is a crucial nuance that draws the most obvious line between the conditions of the uncanny

and liminality, which, otherwise, can be observed as kindred in many ways. Distinct from pre-industrial societies, contemporary examples of liminality, such as (nudist) beaches (Preston-Whyte, 2008), hotels (Pritchard & Morgan, 2006), and even less obvious liminal experiences, such as Shortt's (2015) "transitory dwelling spaces", reveal a greater proximity between the individual liminal experiences and the uncanny. Modern liminal experiences can even be a voluntarily flight *into* the unordinary (vis-à-vis a task in hand), once it is a flight from the ordinary that is overly dominating (see Shortt, 2015). Ultimately, liminal experiences appear to suggest a version of the engagement with the unfamiliar that Heidegger captures with notion of the uncanny, and, as discussed in Chapter 2, while being a source of unsettling de-familiarity, liminality does not necessarily lead to the profound state of the uncanny, as a manifestation of existential anxiety of Dasein.⁹¹

Overall, based on the current state of the debate on modern liminal experiences, it is possible to consider liminality, especially in its modern sense, as an appearance of the state of feeling uncanny in several different ways: from a playful escape from the everydayness to an undefined social identity to more reflexive experiences such as a quasi-existential pursuit of disentangling and clearing appearances (*i.e.*, certain aspects of the work of guerrilla gardening). While they overlap to varying extent with the concept of the uncanny, none of them can be fully understood in terms of Heidegger's involvement with the existential and ontological condition of

⁹¹ *The everyday way in which Dasein understands uncanniness is the entangled turning away which "dims down" not-being-at-home. The everydayness of this fleeing, however, shows phenomenally that anxiety as a fundamental kind of attunement belongs to Dasein's essential constitution as being-in-the-world, which, as an existential, is never objectively present, but is itself always in the mode of factual Dasein, that is, in the mode of an attunement. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon.* (Heidegger, 1996,p.183)

one's being-in-the-world and facing oneself. In this respect, a distinction between liminality and the uncanny remains relevant. In the present study, liminal space is specifically a manifestation of that quasi-existential pursuit that in bringing forth some of the aspects of Heidegger's discussion of the authentic way of being-towards-death, makes this a socio-political (*i.e.*, spatialized) action, distinct from a purely existential one.

3.3 Moving From Social Space to Phenomenological Spatiality

Aside from Heidegger's work, contextuality of intention is a critical element of all phenomenology. In this section, I would like to focus specifically on the ways in which phenomenological inquiry operates with the spatiality of a phenomenon rather than with its 'bare' space. In this respect, phenomenological studies can be classified according to three main objectives that each of them pursues.

The first objective is to focus on the wholistic perception of a studied object in a a Husserlian manner of "pure seeing" of an entity in its self-givenness. In *Doing Phenomenology: Essays on and in Phenomenology* (1975), Herbert Spiegelberg emphasizes that the bottom line of phenomenology—the famous Husserl's "Zu den Sachen" ("Go to the things")—is to counteract objectivist simplification or partitioning of the world (p. 58).⁹² Studies that follow this objective (*e.g.*, Nogué i Font, 1993; Pallasmaa, 2005b; Relph, 2004;⁹³ Riegner, 1993; Stefanovic, 1998;

⁹² In *The Poetics of Space* (1994[1958]), Gaston Bachelard notes: "In this dynamic rivalry between house and universe, we are far removed from any reference to simple geometrical forms. A house that has been experienced is not an inert box. Inhabited space transcends geometrical space." (p. 47).

⁹³ Relph, however, eventually turns to Heidegger's take on phenomenology in this paper.

Tuan, 1994; Zumthor, 2006) do so in order to demonstrate the meaning of a studied phenomenon in a lived space—that is, being experienced temporarily rather than spatially. This is a task that can be more fruitfully accomplished if the meaning is considered as non-divisive across a variety of disciplines, fields of study, and even periods of time. To illustrate, in *Toward a Holistic Understanding of Place: Reading a Landscape Through its Flora and Fauna* (1993), Mark Riegner observes natural patterns of plant morphologies in order to see how various parts of plants are related rather than isolated. Rather than focusing on a typology, Riegner emphasizes the necessity of focusing on a phenomenon (*e.g.*, shade, light intensity) that reveals itself through different shapes of plants. With a different subject of study, in *Toward an Architectural Vocabulary: The Porch as Between* (1993), Robert Mugerauer analyzes the phenomenon of the porch as a space between two domains: that of inside and that of outside. Mugerauer considers the porch as an architectural—spatial—appearance of a particular form of being: a threshold. In its physical appearance as a well-defined architectural element whose function is to facilitate a transitional type of access, either into a house or out of one, experientially the porch embodies a particular kind of an encounter: an encounter of an individual with others and the world. In order to focus on this encounter, rather than on the porch’s function of facilitating access, Mugerauer explores this encounter as a phenomenon for which the porch stands as an appearance.

The second objective is the fundamental critique of all sorts of dichotomies and rigid representations of reality, which follows from the very *raison d’être* of phenomenology.⁹⁴ In an introduction to a collection of phenomenologically-focused essays—*Dwelling, Seeing, and*

⁹⁴ Bachelard, 1994; Dovey, 1993; Harman, 2010; Howett, 1993; Larsen & Johnson, 2012; Pallasmaa, 2005a; Relph, 1993; Rodaway, 1996; Seamon, 1993.

Designing (1993), David Seamon calls for using phenomenological inquiry in order to deal with dichotomies that he recognizes as too privileged in the Cartesian-Kantian philosophical tradition:

But what if these divisions are not the most accurate way of marking out our situation as human beings? ... If we split the world into a series of parts that may not really be in touch with what the world is, how can any real understanding or change happen, either intellectually or practically? Might one be able to by-pass these taken-for-granted dichotomies and to find new ways to differentiate the parts without isolating them or converting them into things they may not be? (1993, pp. 14-15).

In *Modernity and the Reclamation of Place* (1993), Edward Relph argues for the need for imperfection in urban place-making. He sees the phenomenological approach as a form of resistance against clear—fragmenting—definitions that are created by abstract representations, which rely on a visual manner of cognition. He proposes that an emplaced and somewhat spontaneous approach to space making reflects the encounter with the being of others. Imperfection, in this view, is not the lack of expertise but rather the desire to understand urban environments in terms of *the being* of a wide variety of entities behind the encounters and complexities of life that their intertwined beings create, which can appear as chaos and imperfection. Similarly, in *“If Doors of Perception Were Cleansed”*: *Toward an Aesthetics for Designed Landscape* (1993), Catherine Howett explores architect’s capacity to facilitate the appearance of things (in this case, nature) in a particular manner: “A corollary of this commitment to environmental design that reveals the true nature of places is a shift away from

thinking of the designed landscape as a product in favor of a celebration of both landscape and design processes [that remain continuously visible to an observer].” (1993, p.70).⁹⁵

The third objective is to show the ways in which one’s perception of constructed reality either enables or disables an intentional act (Ahmed, 2006; Dovey, 1993; Walton, 2011). In *Re-creation: Phenomenology and Guerrilla Gardening* (2011), Walton starts with the reminder that phenomenology demands the suspension of all presuppositions. Consequently, this opens up possibilities for new modes of perception and behaviour towards objects that otherwise are familiar to the point of ‘disappearing’. Once freed from familiarity, they can re-appear for re-appropriation. Walton discusses her own experience with guerrilla gardening as a spatialized means of *epoché*. She describes a mundane encounter with a generic parking lot that suddenly acquired for her its own individual appearance and significance due to a patch of daffodils that were planted there by anonymous gardeners. This unexpected combination of automobile parking space and gardening led to the emergence of the parking lot as a place on its own terms from a placeless function. As she notes,

In the natural attitude, the daffodils on a street corner do not constitute a garden: who owns them? The flowers, thus freed from justification and definition, seem to be a poor example in the advocacy of guerrilla gardening as a phenomenologically inspired environmental recreation. But, if we, without bias, openly approach the ownerless patch of

⁹⁵ Howett’s inquiry into both perception and the transformations of space that different modes of seeing create resonates with Rodaway’s *Sensuous Geographies* (1996), Pallasmaa’s *The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and the Senses* (2005a), and Zumthor’s in *Atmospheres: Architectural Environments, Surrounding Objects* (2006).

daffodils, we can then hear how they call to us to step outside of our narrow egoism, how they call us to the phenomenological attitude (2011, p. 75).⁹⁶

For the same objective—the construction of one’s reality for one’s agency, in *Queer Phenomenology* (2006), Sarah Ahmed uses phenomenology towards the subjects of racism and sexuality. The goal is to understand how both racism and sexuality appear as phenomenological ‘spaces’: that is, what bodies “can do.” Ahmed takes advantage of Heidegger’s focus on familiarity of the world for an individual. Familiar things appear as the equipment (in Heidegger’s terms) that, if works as intended, puts at ease one’s agency towards specific goals for the sake of which this equipment exists. In following Heidegger’s focus on intentionality as directional, Ahmed outlines that “to orient oneself can mean to adjust one’s position, or another position, such that we are ‘facing’ the right direction: we know where we are through how we position ourselves in relation to others” and “when orientation ‘works’, we are occupied” (2006, p. 51). The context that is meant to orient a particular kind of body (*i.e.*, white and heterosexual) produces a set of tasks and equipment for that facilitates that kind of body (*i.e.*, spatiality) and that can appear as unfamiliar—present-in-hand and ‘bare’—space (disorienting, confusing, and ultimately arresting) for other kinds.

Overall, phenomenological studies pay specific attention to the link between an appearance of an entity and a perceiver. While a perceived entity is always given behind its appearance, a

⁹⁶ Walton’s approach to this encounter is most illuminating not only in light of Fink’s (1970) focus on *epoché* as a phenomenological procedure of detachment, but also in light of Heidegger’s (1996) unique phenomenological approach. In Heidegger’s terms, what causes Walton’s *epoché* is the competition of two “regions”: 1) that to which daffodils belong; and 2) that to which a generic parking space belongs. This competition puts the surface of the parking lot in the “present-in-hand”—“broken equipment”—mode that requires one’s re-engagement with what the contested surface stands for.

phenomenological study cannot assume that the appearance is given in universal terms and, consequently, is the same from all possible directions and states of Newtonian space. Everything that contributes to the constitution of an appearance of a phenomenon must be taken into consideration as a particular context in which a given appearance exists. Briefly, in phenomenological inquiry, appearing means being situated, and phenomenology captures and explores this situatedness via intentionality of either perception or action, or will.

3.4 Problems With the Phenomenological Mode of Inquiry

As any other epistemology, phenomenological inquiry comes with its own set of deficiencies and contradictions. Kim Dovey's critique of phenomenology in *Framing Places* (1999) presents the general epistemological challenge for phenomenological inquiry. Dovey points out that in relation to contemporary theory, phenomenological inquiry poses a risk of obscuring the socially constructed nature of many experiences.⁹⁷ According to Dovey, the focus on essentials (as universals) can lead to a reductionist sense of place and give little attention to social forces that are in play. That being stated, while Dovey refuses to believe that there is a set of archetypical meanings that a form can convey regardless of any social constructs (*cf.* Norberg-Schulz, 1971, 1980), he does acknowledge that essentials cannot be ignored completely.

In addition to this challenge concerning the general applicability of phenomenological inquiry, there is a series of more specific challenges. Spiegelberg (1975) provides a

⁹⁷ In *The Production of Space* (1991), Lefebvre articulates this deficiency of phenomenological inquiry in discussing its non-historicist approach to space.

comprehensive account of several of these. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all of them, it is critical to focus on those that are directly pertinent to my research. To start with the most obvious one, I take as a point of departure Heidegger's phenomenology and the subjects of care and de-distancing *vis-à-vis* space. Although Heidegger does note that bringing near is not about an egocentric space, his definition of care clearly demonstrates a subjectivity of distance.⁹⁸ Together, they are at odds with the logic of distance in Newtonian, object-centred space.⁹⁹ It is critical, therefore, for a phenomenological study that operates with Heidegger's concepts of care and de-distancing (or similar concepts) to reconcile subject-centred and object-centred approaches to space in order not only to avoid creating yet another binary, but also to keep increasingly idiosyncratic results in check. Another specific challenge is phenomenology's focus on essences. As Spiegelberg (1975) formulates it, the issue is threefold: 1) what constitutes an essence of a phenomenon; 2) how reliable is self-evidence (via intuitive self-presentation) as a criterion of phenomenological knowledge; and 3) how genuine is one's intuition in relation to others. This is the challenge of a detailed methodological apparatus. Spiegelberg (1975) insists on developing a rigorous approach to conducting a phenomenological study. The discussion of whether a study can be qualified as phenomenological if it is missing a direct encounter with a

⁹⁸ "When *Dasein* in taking care brings something near, this does not mean that it fixes upon something at a position in space which has the least measurable distance from a point of its body. To be near means to be in the range of what is initially at hand for circumspection. Bringing near is not oriented toward the *I*-thing encumbered with a body, but rather toward heedful being-in-the world" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 100).

⁹⁹ Dovey (1993) makes this disjunction particularly clear in using the phenomenon of distance as one of the examples of paradigmatically different definitions of things in the lived space of the everyday and the geometric space of planning and design.

phenomenon is a part of this challenge.¹⁰⁰ As Seamon (2000) puts it in *A Way of Seeing People and Place: Phenomenology in Environment-Behavior Research*:

The ultimate aim of phenomenological research, however, is not idiosyncratic descriptions of the phenomenon, though such descriptions are often an important starting point for existential phenomenology. Rather, the aim is to use these descriptions as a groundstone from which to discover underlying commonalities that mark the essential core of the phenomenon (2000, p. 159).

Ultimately, it remains difficult to decide whether or not Heidegger's demand for securing a (phenomenological) method that would encompass 1) the point of departure of the analysis, 2) the access to the phenomenon, and 3) the passage through the prevalent coverings (1996, p. 32) was ever accomplished in a systemic and comprehensive manner. Even if the acceptance of a variety of essences is not feasible, is it possible to consider a competing multitude of essences as an inevitable outcome of a phenomenological mode of inquiry? This question is in line with at least some of the objectives of phenomenological inquiry (*i.e.*, the critique of the positivist approach to a phenomenon). Moreover, a rigorous methodological apparatus in phenomenology is more than just a matter of looking for a single common denominator. Husserl, as well as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, makes it clear that even once all presuppositions are suspended, conducting eidetic variations in order to arrive at the pure seeing of a studied entity and its essence is no simple task, since each observer takes a position.

¹⁰⁰ In the chapter "Phenomenology through vicarious experience," Spiegelberg (1975) discusses the possibility of an indirect encounter with a phenomenon via experiences of others.

This creates another specific challenge for phenomenological inquiry: the risk of falling into story-telling, especially if phenomenological inquiry remains grounded into Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.¹⁰¹ Spiegelberg (1975) captures this challenge as follows:

One of the most common and most fundamental criticisms of phenomenology has always been: What can a science of mere phenomena tell about reality itself? It may tell us what we take to be real. But does this in any way guarantee that the supposedly real is actually real? How can phenomenology decide the truth of what we mean? Is not this the end and a rather quick end of every phenomenology? (p. 130).

Ultimately, Spiegelberg argues that the cure against subjectivity is “more and better subjectivity, more discriminating subjectivity, and more self-critical subjectivity, which will show the very limits of subjectivity” (p. 78). Objects of the phenomenological investigation are inevitably subject-related, but this does not make them subject-dependent. Instead, this subject-relatedness creates a premise for a non-resolvable conflict around a multitude of claims for finding the ‘true’ essence of a studied object by different phenomenologists, which may or may not be a critical problem at this point. Phenomenology is not a positivist outlook and does not offer any verifiable result-testing process. To date, even with this major subjectivity-driven challenge, phenomenology has already established itself as a part of the emancipatory research paradigm. In this capacity, it fruitfully challenges positivist dichotomies and representations via its focus on the ontology and existential indivisibility of studied objects.

¹⁰¹ See Johnson (1983) and Spiegelberg (1975)

To conclude, despite a number of unresolved questions and concerns, phenomenology has enough to offer in order to be a viable mode of inquiry. As Spiegelberg (1975) observes, in addition to differences between phenomenology and positivist studies, in contrast to rationalism, phenomenology focuses on an intuitive verification of all formal concepts and claims that, unavoidably, have a tendency to diminish the role of a situated experience in the appearance of worldly entities. In contrast to empiricism and (post)positivism, phenomenology does not restrict the experiential data to the range of sense-experience and hierarchical causal links but assumes a range of experienced entities on equal grounds. In contrast to linguistic analysis, phenomenology does not limit its discovery of a phenomenon to its appearances in texts or ordinary language. In contrast to analytic philosophy and its inclination to ‘refine’ regarded complexities into overarching definitions, phenomenology resists such an exchange of an observed for an interpretation. Phenomenology, therefore, is indispensable in those studies that aim for a perception shift (*e.g.*, Ahmed, 2006; Harris, 1997; Larsen & Johnson, 2012; Mugerauer, 1993; Walton, 2011), and this is the major reason behind my engagement with the phenomenological mode of inquiry. It is to understand difference not from the position of a unifying representation, distinct from others and not even from the position of spatiality of a distinct task. It is to understand that which is capable of appearing distinctly and simultaneously in a variety of tasks and yet, in the midst of it, remaining on its own terms: that is, being different by its capacity to avoid any single interpretation. In relation to the present study specifically, the phenomenological approach makes possible an alternative reformulation of four overarching research questions that I introduced in Introduction into two phenomenological questions that help to shed light specifically on an understanding of the emergence (*i.e.*, the discovery) of liminality as a socio-political phenomenon with implications for the production of social space:

1. On what terms does the resulting space of guerrilla gardening become an act of re-interpretation and re-connection rather than a mere instance of vandalism or colonization? Phenomenological inquiry, in following Heidegger and his development of its basic principles, is well equipped to illuminate both the instances of context interruption and the emergence of contested objects as the broken equipment that needs to be re-fit. While phenomenological inquiry does not reject the possibility of either vandalism or colonization, it concentrates on a contested object as subject to multiple tasks and their spatialities that co-exist on somewhat different principles than Lefebvre's social spaces and yet do not negate the latter: this is potentially a much more illuminating focus.

2. On what terms do guerrilla gardeners recognize a certain object as subject to re-interpretation? In following Walton's (2011) phenomenological exploration of her encounter with an illegal patch of daffodils in a parking lot, it is possible to recognize and explore certain objects and even spaces as triggers of expulsion from the familiar in terms of a phenomenological *epoché*. In the next chapter, I associate these triggering instances with the phenomenon of the border: its encountering and crossing.

Chapter 4. Research Design

There are two overarching—guiding—questions behind this research. First, on what terms does the resulting ephemeral space of guerrilla gardening become an act of re-interpretation and re-connection rather than a mere instance of vandalism or colonization? Second, on what terms do guerrilla gardeners recognize a certain object as a subject to re-interpretation? Since I expect the presence of coherent narratives—i.e., supporting of their action—from both gardeners and authorities that come into a spatial clash, one expects to see a socio-spatial entity that comprises at least two social spaces that for the time of contestation cannot eliminate one another. Consequently, this sets a focal point for the terms on which the resulting space is un-fragmented. In articulating methodology for the analysis of guerrilla gardening sites, I pay specific attention to the territoriality regime that the gardeners produce, modes of agency that they use and develop, and the built form that supports the former.

4.1 Case Study and Sites

In this study, I employ an embedded single-case approach.¹⁰² In *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, Yin (1993) describes an embedded single-case research as focusing on a single context (e.g., tactical spatial interventions) in which a given single coherent phenomenon (e.g., a guerrilla gardening) are explored through more specific units of analysis (e.g., distinct sites). According to Yin, the strength of a single-case approach is particularly pronounced when it helps to test a well-formulated theory while illuminating its either critical or extreme aspects. In light of Lefebvre's (1991) theoretical framework, I consider guerrilla gardening to be both a critical case for the concept of differential space and an extreme case of social space-making: illegal and non-secured. An embedded single-case design for my research is a variation of the 'classic' version that also includes a unit of analysis (the site of La place des festivals; see below) that does not belong with the practice of guerrilla gardening but provides an illuminating perspective on certain aspects of the latter. Whether intentionally or not, guerrilla gardening carves out new spaces by the means of non-sanctioned re-interpretation of the meanings of the material stuff that constitutes existing spaces. In geography and law, Blomley (2004), followed by Keenan (2010), captures some of these practices in terms of the conflict between spaces of belonging and spaces of property—one of the rigid space-ordering frameworks. In this context, both Blomley and Keenan capture informal spatial practices as “unsettling”: ‘messing’ with the formally established spaces both by challenging dominant frameworks (e.g. property) that shaped these

¹⁰² The case-study approach is pertinent for three major reasons. First, in formulating my questions I both draw from and expect to contribute to an existing theoretical framework. A research that is carried out as a case study promises the richest insight. Second, the conditions under which these questions need to be answered are dynamic and non-controllable, while the research subject remains highly context-dependent. Third, the analysis of the data with the purpose of answering research questions relies on multiple sources of information and a variety of contexts in which these sources are situated.

spaces and, as a consequence, by putting the universality (and normality) of meanings and agency that these frameworks produce under scrutiny. In constructing the case for my research, I specifically take advantage of the unsettling nature of guerrilla gardening in order to understand the complexity, advantages, and drawbacks of its non-compartmentalizing logic of urban space making. I do so through the lenses of external and internal ‘unsettlement’.

External unsettlement: Detailed examination of two sites of guerrilla gardening was undertaken in Montréal, Québec, Canada, in 2014. The first site was located in Parc Jeanne-Mance on site of a defunct composting site in Le Plateau-Mont-Royal borough (see **Fig. 4.1**). Opened in 2004 as a part of Eco-Quartiers initiative and intended for use by residents of Jeanne-Mance and Mile End neighbourhoods (Regroupement des Eco-quartiers, 2010), the composting site had been locked down and out of operation by the spring of 2014 when a group of Montréal residents appropriated it, turned into a community gardening space, and named it Villa Compostela (VC)¹⁰³. This was done illegally and the radical temporality of both Villa Compostela and Mile End gardens shapes the first aspect of the external ‘unsettlement’ of this case. The second aspect is shaped by the locations of the gardens. On its eastern flank Villa Compostela borders the Hôtel-Dieu, an important convent and hospital that was built on this site in 1861, now protected by municipal and provincial heritage-conservation controls. Moreover, the garden is located within the Parc Jeanne-Mance, which is an extension of the expansive

¹⁰³ In the summer of 2015, the composting site was disassembled by municipal authorities despite an attempt of some of the members of the group to restore the garden in the spring. I discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 5.

Mount-Royal Park originally designed by Frederick Law Olmsted.¹⁰⁴ Although not completed according to Olmsted's master plan, Mount-Royal Park was nevertheless one of his first built projects, fulfilling his vision of public green space that was needed in the industrial city in the 19th century. Remarkably, while both green spaces—Mount-Royal Park and Villa Compostela—rely on plants as a medium and a condition of publicness, the narratives behind these spaces are different and the future of the VC site was dictated by the heritage status of Mount-Royal Park. The same goes for Mile End gardens that took advantage of street furniture and spaces that was reserved for a completely different kind and purpose of vegetation. Mile End gardens is a series of small illegal gardens scattered across the Mile End neighbourhood in the same borough of

¹⁰⁴ Until 1990, Parc Jeanne-Mance was officially known as Fletcher's Field and was renamed to commemorate Jeanne Mance (1601-1673), the founder of l'Hôtel-Dieu that outlines a part of the park on its east side (Ville de Montréal, 2017). While currently Parc Jeanne-Mance and Mount-Royal belong to different administrations (municipal and provincial respectively), Olmsted saw Fletcher's Field as an auxiliary part of his Mount Royal Park project. In relation to Mount-Royal, Olmsted spoke of it as follows:

..I will merely observe that you have in addition to the ground which I thus far considered, a small area of a different character, and that it is fortunately situated to serve as a foil, through its natural amenity and the simple quiet, secluded and pastoral character which can be given it, to the grandly bold and rugged heights and declivities of the main body." (Olmsted, 1874, p.10).

At the time of the assessment, Fletcher's Field had a golf course (Ville de Montréal, 2017). Currently, there are beach volleyball courts in the northern part of the park. The composting site and, subsequently, Villa Compostella were located south of the volleyball courts and just north of Duluth street.

Montréal.¹⁰⁵ Originally, the same group of residents created 33 small gardens of various sizes (see **Fig. 4.2** & **Fig. 4.3**). With the exception of a small garden #20 (see **Fig. 4.4**) the development of which I closely followed, as its evolution provided a rich insight for the subject of un-fragmented urban space, the role of the Mile End site is to support my exploration of the external unsettlement of the studied guerrilla gardening case. More specifically, with the focus on this site I capture the work of those members of the group who were not substantially involved with the creation of Villa Compostela but who shared the same ideas and intents towards urban space. Being set in the busy streets, these small gardens provide a somewhat different context (from the park) for both the appearance and the disappearance of the illegal gardening space. While these gardens do not share the same location, I consider them to be a part of the same site for a number of similarities: 1) their conception, 2) their size, 3) their general location in a neighbourhood which is deemed to foster public spirit: to invite and celebrate cultural diversity, and 4) their specific locations such as municipal planters, both raised and on the street level. Practically, external unsettlement appears as a conflict of guerrilla gardeners with municipal authorities who believe that Mile End gardens were a subject to contained soil and public hazard while the unsanctioned garden in the park both sit at odds with Olmsted's vision of what a green public space should be and blocked the view of a heritage monastery wall. Basically, they all were out of place, and this is in addition to being non-sanctioned and border-crossing.

¹⁰⁵ Mile End is not an official jurisdictional entity; the neighbourhood is defined by a vibrant social atmosphere, the presence of different cultural and religious groups, many small shops, cafés, and restaurants. While it is rather difficult to speak of its exact boundaries, the core of Mile End can arguably be pinpointed to the streets Fairmount, St. Viateur, and Bernard (running east to west) between Boulevard St. Laurent and Avenue du Parc (running south to north).

Internal unsettlement: Villa Compostela and the small gardens of the Mile-End district are manifestations of the ways in which guerrilla gardeners are challenging the established design conventions and intended agency for urban green space and public space. Montréal, like many cities, has come to be increasingly marked by projects, events, and narratives based on tourism, paid-for public festivities, and other forms of leisure (Hannigan, 1998; Luka *et al.*, 2015). The claimed public space potential of the guerrilla gardening space is therefore examined in relation to a formal revitalizing intervention of Place des festivals (designed by Daoust Lestage Studio; see **Fig. 4.5**). This downtown public space is a part of the Quartier des spectacles—a conglomerate of long-established and newly-built public and semi-public spaces, event venues, and spaces of cultural production that have been brought together in the last 15 years under the umbrella of a city-led partnership for the purpose of revitalizing this part of downtown Montréal. The fabric of this part of the city was disrupted by postwar megaprojects such as the Place-des-Arts complex that includes Montreal Symphony Orchestra and Museum of Contemporary Arts, the Place Desjardins shopping and business complex, as well as the construction of the Montréal metro system.

The Place des festivals bears no direct relation to the guerrilla gardening sites. There are key points of convergence and contrast, however. The official mandate of the Place des festivals (and the Quartier des spectacles in general) is clearly articulated in terms of promoting dynamism, creativity, and accessibility in a variety of ways (Luka *et al.*, 2015). The strength of bringing the Place des festivals into play, therefore, is that it enables exploration of similarities, differences, and narratives behind two paradigmatically different interventions into pre-existing spaces that are no longer deemed responsive: 1) a neglected composting site in the middle of a park / ‘wasted’ patches of soil in the urban streets that could engage and instead either superficially

entertain or collect garbage and 2) dull ‘lost’ space surrounding megaprojects. Yet, in the first case we witness an unsettled ephemeral public space that is assembled from elements of other programs, the territoriality and composition of which are highly dynamic. In the second case, there is a large-scale professionally-designed and programmed public space that is secured in this capacity.

4.2 Research Questions

The preoccupations and objectives of this research are detailed through four specific research questions that unpack the two guiding questions as follows. **Why do guerrilla gardeners see a certain physical object as a border that needs to be crossed or eliminated?** The first of these four questions addresses the illegality of guerrilla gardening in many liberal democracies as a result of contestation of something seen as quite literally broken. This shapes the major point of departure for my specifically phenomenological inquiry that I intend to carry on Heidegger’s terms of taking care of things as equipment in the spatiality of tasks. On these terms, to see something as border (*i.e.*, an obstacle or an interruption) is to witness a phenomenon which appearance places the phenomenon outside the context from which it is perceived. For example, this can be grass that is a plant and that, in the context and the task of gardening, emerges as an obstacle in the way to soil because it makes up a lawn that has nothing to do with gardening. This is to further engage with the major claim of the present research: the essential im/materiality of constructed space that affords a variety of interpretations from a variety of contexts. This question therefore entails two subquestions:

- a) What constitutes a border?
- b) How do guerrilla gardeners act on a certain physical object as a border in order to ‘repair’ the ‘broken’ part that disrupts the continuity of a context?

Why do people who are involved in guerrilla gardening continue working on a project despite its clear ephemerality? This is a largely socio-political question that also tackles with some of key aspects of urban design, related to public participation and public space making. I address this question through the examination of representations of spaces that guerrilla gardeners both create (in Villa Compostela and in Mile End gardens) and reject (the dominant representation of nature in the city) and the types of agency they hope to instil with their space.

My third question is critical for the subject of flexible urban space where predictability is no longer secured by one or another compartmentalizing regime. **How chaotic are the spaces that result from guerrilla gardening?** This questions builds on the works of Sennett (1970), Sack (1986), Relph (1981), Tschumi (1994), Cresswell (1996), Massey (2005), and Pallasmaa (2005b) regarding the constitution of modern space and its dependence on rigid representations (hence, compartmentalization regimes). This is not only a matter of legibility and accessibility, but also an issue of uncontrollable expansion of a representation and/or program that has been imposed rather than inserted and contained. I answer this question in examining the ways in which gardeners reshape and reconnect the physical elements that constitute an affected program.

The final question grapples with the ways in which guerrilla gardening offers insight for the production of flexible urban space, overcoming the issues identified by Harvey (2000) vis-à-vis Lefebvre’s concept of differential space—a concern demanding more practical (instrumental) exploration. **How can the de-compartmentalizing potential of guerrilla gardening be both articulated and harnessed?** This is the most pertinent of the four questions, bringing insights

that arise from the first three questions. These insights are to bypass the illegal nature of guerrilla gardening without destroying its de-compartmentalizing potential through institutionalization. To address this question, I focus on 1) a specific role that plants play in the territoriality (ephemeral and fluctuating, yet also perennial) of the resulting space and 2) the manner in which the space is produced—*i.e.*, overlay and imposition—that suggests a specific regime of liminality via publicness for the resulting place. The articulation of terms on which a phenomenon-border either emerges with its own space (and what form it takes; *i.e.*, differential space) or merely corresponds a new—un-fragmented—quality to built form (and to what extent) completes the analytical framework for my study.

4.3 Methodology

The primary research presented here is both site-specific and site-based—a qualitative exploration of an emancipatory nature that relies on in-depth analysis of detailed data. The data is collected from key-informant interviews and a small, non-randomized sample of respondents in Montréal, Canada, in 2014. These were supplemented by photographs, drawings (typology studies), and archival work.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ These and similar methods can also be found in Crane (2011: on community gardening [CG] and guerrilla gardening in London, ON); Crane *et al.* (2013: on guerrilla gardening in London, ON), David & Hardman (2013, 2015: on guerrilla gardening in UK), Firth *et al.* (2011: on CG in UK), Radywil & Biggs (2013: on CG and guerrilla gardening in NYC), and Zanetti (2007: on guerrilla gardening in London, UK).

4.3.1 Data Collection

Preparatory work (pre-interview discussions), interviews, surveys, and photo/drawing documenting were carried out between January of 2014 and July of 2015. The pre-interview phase included several unstructured interviews with street artists, guerrilla gardening activists, and professional urban designers. Covered topics ranged from the subject of public space and space making in general to specific moments of design decisions and choices in the cases of interventions with the municipal space. This phase of the research helped me to formulate my detailed interview questions and to check them against topics identified in secondary sources.

Overall, I conducted 19 semi-structured interviews (excluding follow-ups) and received three completed questionnaires. While conducting formal interviews, I gave no deliberate priority to a particular gender or age group other than that all participants had to be of age 18 or older. Due to the in-depth qualitative nature of my research as well as the nature of the research subject, I did not rely on mass recruiting and, instead, invited participants via networking, using a snowball-sampling technique. This was based on connections made with several formal and informal activist groups.¹⁰⁷ The semi-structured interviews were guided by four sets of questions that through the focus on border address the following themes (see **Appendix 2** for detailed questions): 1) narratives (representations & appearances) for plants, green space, public space, accessibility, use/misuse, garbage, and dirt; 2) agency and manifestations of power (*i.e.*, rules, ownership, *etc.*); 3) direct experiences with borders during the production of the studied spaces,

¹⁰⁷ These agencies and groups included *The Concordia Green House*, *Santropol Roulant*, *Cuisine de Peuple*, and *Montréal Incredible Edible*

and 4) composition of intended (by officials) and resulting (guerrilla gardening and Place des Festivals) space and its structure. Interviews were carried out in locations that were chosen or approved by respondents. These locations varied from McGill campus, to respondents' homes, to offices, and to public areas (such as cafés and parks). While all interviews were recorded, I also took notes during these interviews. In several cases, I followed up on the original interviews after a post-interview analysis of the discussions. Each interview took over one hour on average to complete. I also conducted two side-surveys in order to provide supplementary means for bias control. First, I developed a short questionnaire for business owners in the Mile End neighbourhood (see **Appendix 2**). Certain small gardens (#6, #7, and #13, see **Fig. 4.2**) were created next to buildings with the permission of business owners who occupied the buildings. While gardeners noted that the owners agreed to look after these small gardens, I used the questionnaire to survey these business owners regarding their attitudes and extents of involvement with the sites. Second, I also conducted two interviews with a founder and a volunteer in a legal urban farming plot in the Notre-Dame-de-Grâce borough of Montréal in the summer of 2014. These two interviews were loosely structured and focused on the goals behind the plot and types of activities involved. Both interviews took place on the site and each lasted under one hour. This side-survey provided additional information for the reflection on similarities and differences between informal and illegal urban agriculture at Villa Compostela and Mile End sites and formal and legal urban farming.

The site-specificity of this research demands exploratory site analysis. Over the course of my data collection in 2014, I documented the emergence and evolution of the sites with photographs, as well as completing a follow-up series of photographs of Villa Compostela in the spring-summer of 2015. In addition, I created a set of drawings that included: 1) a map of the gardens

that I examined, 2) the evolution in the configuration of certain sites, and 3) a plan of Villa Compostela garden as the most complex of them all.

Given the phenomenological approach of my research, it was vital to document my personal involvement and experiences with the sites, gardeners, and others involved as well. I therefore sought to engage as a researcher with certain activities associated with the gardens and to record my reflections on these activities in terms of my direct experience. Initially, I drew inspiration from the possibilities for insights that Crane (2011) acquired via the use of Participatory Action Research methodology in the work on the subject of guerrilla gardening. That said, my primary goal behind personal engagement was more in line with Walton's (2011) argument for the ability of a personal encounter with difference to put oneself into the mode of phenomenological *epoché*. For this reason and in line with my research goals, I specifically focused on those encounters that provided a sense of discomfort and transgression. Also, the priority of personal encounters was given to those instances that helped me to reflect on some of the statements of guerrilla gardeners regarding the purpose of their actions and the agency-shaping experiences with the plants.

Finally, a range of historical materials and secondary sources were used to supplement the site-specific work. In collecting data on Place des festivals, Parc Jeanne-Mance, and the Mount-Royal Park, I worked with the archives of the *Canadian Centre for Architecture* as well as the *Archives nationales du Québec*.

4.3.2 Methods

The ensemble of research methods used and the choice of sites (including formal Place des festivals) sought to understand the ways in which these public-space interventions build on border-making and border-dissolving practices through visions of public space, particular to each situation (*i.e.*, what public space stands for, its structure, and its design). A major premise of my research is the irreducible liminality of public space as a manifestation of encounters of different contexts and programs that make use of the same built form. Phenomenological inquiry enables me to capture and to articulate this process of encounter and intertwinement in a single physical object.

In the previous chapters, I outline my general approach to guerrilla gardening by arguing that in modifying certain elements of an existing space, guerrilla gardeners contest the meaning of existing built form rather than claim ownership over it. Walton (2011) captures this distinction with a reference to phenomenological *epoché*: a discord (*i.e.*, an instance of a break of references in a given representation of space) between a parking lot and a small gardening plot triggers suspension of previous assumptions in order to understand what is it that she sees. The same logic can be applied to a guerrilla gardener who is looking for the ‘right’ spot for an intervention. This marks my engagement specifically with Heidegger’s (1996) approach to intentionality of perception via “concern” and “care” as responses to the breach in references.¹⁰⁸ Once the chain of interpretations for the sake of a particular goal is broken, something either presents itself (*i.e.*, emerges) or disappears (*i.e.*, gets covered up due to a missing reference). In addressing the question “*On what terms do guerrilla gardeners see a certain object as a border (i.e., a context-*

¹⁰⁸ *When Dasein in taking care brings something near, this does not mean that it fixes upon something at a position in space which has the least measurable distance from a point of its body. To be near means to be in the range of what is initially at hand for circumspection. Bringing near is not oriented toward the I-thing encumbered with a body, but rather toward heedful being-in-the world ...* (Heidegger, 1996, p.100)

terminating obstacle)?”, I focus specifically on this breach of reference that causes a distortion of an appearance and, consequently, a discord. Phenomenologically, I capture it as the “present-in-hand”—“obstinate”—mode of a phenomenon that appears as a border. Practically, the focus is on how a certain phenomenon acquires an appearance of border and becomes a threshold: a borderland rather than a boundary.¹⁰⁹

Phase 1 (Data Composition): In choosing phenomenological inquiry, I take advantage of transcendental and hermeneutical approaches that originate, respectively, with the works of Husserl (1964, 1970) and Heidegger (1996). Both philosophers are largely preoccupied with the same goals—establishing the conditions on which an individual perceives the being of phenomena. They largely agree on how to carry out this task, as illustrated by Husserl’s (1964) phenomenological reduction:

1. To exclude interpretive frameworks (*e.g.*, theories and judgements) that entangle one’s perception of a phenomenon
2. To gain access to a phenomenon as experienced (‘seen’ in its unity, separate from other phenomena) by an individual
3. To proceed through (*i.e.*, reveal and depict) the variety of appearances of a phenomenon.

¹⁰⁹ This understanding of threshold builds on Mugerauer’s (1993) phenomenological analysis of the porch (as previously discussed in Chapter 3). Instead of considering the porch as a boundary that connects/separates the interior and the exterior of a house, Mugerauer approaches this built form as a liminal territory that makes a unique kind of encounter with the world possible. While functionally it contributes to a border (among other things), phenomenological inquiry assists with understanding its role as a threshold rather than a just a divider.

While there is a critical difference between these two approaches,¹¹⁰ I find it possible to turn to both (albeit more to the hermeneutical approach than to the transcendental one) in order to understand the ways in which public space makers understand and re-construct (*i.e.*, “repair”) the continuity of access as a major condition of publicness of a space. Combined, these two approaches were operationalized in order to construct my primary research (semi-structured interviews; see **Appendix 2** for more details):

- *The relation of the project to the subject of public space (e.g., How do you think you project contributes to the creation of public space?).* This is a set of control questions that open up a discussion with a respondent with the topic on (in)accessibility. My knowledge of the subject of public space both conceptually and practically provides me with the sufficient ground to believe that respondents will touch on this topic, each in a particular manner.

¹¹⁰ which is discussed in detail by others (*e.g.*, Harman, 2010; Larsen & Johnson, 2012; Spiegelberg, 1975). The core of the Husserlian (transcendental idealistic) approach takes us to the “pure data” of border: its constitutive elements in one’s consciousness, situated via a perspective and an intention. The core of the Heideggerian (hermeneutic) approach is subtly but critically different: What is it that a border covers up as an appearance? Ultimately, the latter approach is not only an inquiry into what it is exactly that we perceive in a phenomenon, but also into the specific context of a task in which a phenomenon is both situated and available for action on given terms. For instance, one is barely aware of a pencil in one’s hand as long as it works. Once broken, the pencil emerges for awareness through making an action impossible: in an inquiring manner one becomes aware of *a thing* in the hand and also of a task into which it is no longer fit. According to Heidegger, the constitution of a pencil is not only its presence in one’s consciousness, but also and to a larger extent its presence in one’s action in the realm of a specific—pencil-using—task.

- *Identification of obstacles/ borders (e.g., What are the most essential borders that you encountered during your project?).* This set of questions seeks to identify and analyze the elements of urban fabric that participants see as borders.
- *Identification of differences and similarities between different experiences of border (e.g., How did you personally experience it (come in contact with it [Similarities, differences]?).* The intent is to examine the ways in which participants' direct experiences with the affected urban space shape their perception of incapacitating rules.
- *Focus on access (e.g., How did you notice this site/space was not public (inaccessible)? After your intervention, how and why do you think it became different?).* The intent is to determine how contesters utilize borders in order to “move” an element from one representation of urban space to another¹¹¹.

In articulating these meta-questions which shaped themes of conversation rather than precise questions during the interviews, I build on the use of three techniques of phenomenological

¹¹¹ In answering each question, participants were encouraged to use the following set of instructions (articulated by van Manen, 2011): Could you please describe the experience as much as possible as you live(d) through it? Please avoid causal explanations, generalizations, or abstract interpretations. Could you please describe the experience from the inside, as it were-almost like a state of mind: the feelings, the mood, the emotions, etc.? Could you please focus on a particular example or incident of the object of experience: describe specific events, an adventure, a happening, a particular experience? Could you please try to focus on an example of the experience which stands out for its vividness, or as it was the first time? Could you please attend to how the body feels (felt), how things smell(ed), how they sound(ed), etc.? Please try to avoid trying to beautify your account with fancy phrases or flowery terminology.

The purpose behind these instructions is to provide rich contextual material that remains focused and does not limit the richness of an experience to a statement.

inquiry (as discussed and/or applied in Ahmed, 2006; Heidegger, 1996; Husserl, 1964; Käufer & Chemero, 2015; Mugerauer, 1993; Spiegelberg, 1975; van Manen, 2011; Walton, 2011):

- Descriptive technique: bracketing out all judgments and preconceptions in relation to the analyzed phenomenon. This approach, as applied to the posed questions, helps to convey the answers in the following manner: 1) *How is this topic actually experienced* and 2) *What are examples of possible incidents or events that resonate with your choices and decisions in identifying a border*. These guidelines will not only help to reveal the direct experience of a phenomenon but also will help to identify what may obstruct or distort such an experience.¹¹²
- Eidetic reduction technique: enabling a respondent (with my help) to probe the phenomenon for typical (essential) structures that also could persist across all three cases, I encouraged participants to think of their answers in the following manner: “*What makes this experience uniquely different from other similar experiences?*”¹¹³
- Constitutive phenomenological technique: helping the researcher to understand how a phenomenon becomes established in the consciousness of participants.¹¹⁴

¹¹² The purpose of this approach is to understand and isolate 1) all conceptual and generalizing contributors to a phenomenon that surround a particular experience as well as 2) the ways in which they become associated with it.

¹¹³ The purpose behind this approach is twofold. First, it is to compel respondents to analyze their understanding of a phenomenon and make sure that they focus specifically on the subject of borders and public space as related to a given urban environment and within the context of their project. Second, it is to find differences and commonalities in responses across the three cases.

¹¹⁴ The main purpose of this approach is twofold: 1) to understand how the perception of a phenomenon develops (e.g., from noticing specific elements to its coherence); 2) to understand what influences a particular development of this phenomenon in a given context and environment.

Phase 2 (Data Analysis): During the interviews, respondents had to think of physical objects with an obstinate presence that they noticed and with which they had intervened specifically as borders that they had to cross or to obliterate (*i.e.*, either literally or figuratively: breaking a norm). Particular attention is given to the rationales behind these transgressions, as in order to be more than just instances of opportunism guerrilla gardeners had to reveal their actions as a result of *care*. This, ultimately, defines the terms on which guerrilla gardens are a spatial practice of a distinct social space rather than an act of encroachment. *Care* on Heidegger's terms suggests de-distancing that follows a certain directionality: a framework for orientating objects according to a specific "for-the-sake-of". The point of departure for my methodological analysis is the condition of a spatial overlay that, for a period of time, creates a hybrid spatio-temporal entity that consists of several programs. Consequently, I was looking for points of multiple meanings. These are phenomena which appearances are contested. Phenomenological analysis of contestation via appearances of border enables me to articulate my analysis specifically in terms of un-fragmentation of space rather than a mere conflict of ideas. This advises a particular approach to the research questions as follows.

1. Why do guerrilla gardeners see a certain physical object as a border that needs to be crossed or eliminated? Consequently, what constitutes a border? How do guerrilla gardeners act on a certain physical object as a border in order to 'repair' the 'broken' part that disrupts the continuity of a context?

In addressing this question and its sub-questions, I pay particular attention to the ways in which the same phenomena (*e.g.*, plants, green space, public space, surface, garbage, dirt, *etc.*) appear in the narratives of guerrilla gardeners, municipal authorities, professional architects (*i.e.*,

Daoust Lestage), and urban farmers. Ultimately, the themes of mis/use, in/accessibility, and dis/appearance guide this part of the analysis for the purpose of understanding broader contexts behind divergent perceptions of the same phenomena. Heidegger's focus on un/covering a phenomenon plays a particular role in structuring this part of the analysis. The objective is to go beyond the mere physical accessibility of a phenomenon as the vulgar evidence of its appearance in the space towards ontological terms that constitute its dis/appearance and congruent with its spatiality of that phenomenon.

2. Why do people who are involved in guerrilla gardening continue working on a project despite its clear ephemerality? In this case, the focus shifts towards differences in expectations (*i.e.*, activities and agency) that result from divergent ideologies towards the constitution of an urban (public) space. This is the analysis of the interrelation of representations of space and representational spaces (Lefebvre). The objective behind this part of the analysis is to probe the spatial practice of guerrilla gardening as part of a *valid* constructed space not only in Heidegger's ontological terms of care and subject-object situated spatiality, but also in terms of Lefebvre's socio-political terms of the production of social space. That being stated, Heidegger's focus on the submergence of a phenomenon serves as a tool of critique and control for the ability of either party to move towards a dominant and dominating representation of space (and therefore away from differential space).¹¹⁵

3. How chaotic are the spaces that result from guerrilla gardening? This part of the analysis is guided by the need to explore the non-compartmentalizing capacity of a resultant space against

¹¹⁵ Heidegger divides this state into two parts: accidental coverings and necessary coverings (*i.e.*, "It is possible for every phenomenological concept and proposition drawn from genuine origins to degenerate when communicated as a statement." [1996, p.32]).

the ultimate concern of city officials: the creation of an out-of-context and out-of-control environment. For this reason the focus is defined by the themes of transgression, mis/use, in/accessibility, and ownership. Heidegger's concept of care is the ultimate benchmark against which I explore experiences of transgression, resulting space structure, established and broken rules and borders, as well as the development of new types of agency.

4. How can the de-compartmentalizing potential of guerrilla gardening be both articulated and harnessed? The focus of this part of the analysis is on the non-secured condition of guerrilla gardening space. An attempt of guerrilla gardening to address problems of an existing space can be perceived as a homogenizing work of guerrilla gardening's social space. Equally, authorities do the same. Therefore, I focus on those qualities of specifically ephemeral space making that can retain difference rather than eliminate it. I plan to explore 1) the territoriality regime that the gardeners produce, 2) the presence and conditions of ambiguity of belonging, 3) built form that manifest them, and 4) the overall conditions of ephemerality of the resulting space. Ultimately, I consider whether un-fragmentation of urban space is a type of work over existing constructed spaces or it is an appearance of differential space which territoriality secures impossibility of any single overarching representation.

4.3.3 Validity Criteria

The methodology used here is based on a non-positivistic and emancipatory research paradigm. Nevertheless, it has to respond to the same criteria of research validity as any empirical study (see in Groat & Wang, 2002; Yin 1993). First, I rely on triangulation as a way to maintain the

credibility of the data. In focusing on guerrilla gardening sites, I also collected data regarding the sites and the information provided by guerrilla gardeners from other sources such as urban gardeners involved in non-guerrilla forms of public space-making, municipal authorities, planning and design professionals, my personal accounts, and secondary literature. Second, the *transferability* of the data is provided by the choice of open-ended questions for semi-structured interviews as well as the situatedness of these questions vis-à-vis the relevant literature. Third, the *dependability* of the data is addressed by a) focusing on well-identified topics related to guerrilla gardening and public space, b) with the variety of sources, while c) probing for the same elements—constitution of border, transition of border into threshold, constitution of access, and constitution of continuity—from one site or source to another one. Finally, I provide the *confirmability* of the analysis through the use of identified phenomenological techniques. Lefebvre's theory of the production of space maps onto this research by positioning flexible urban space as an antagonist vis-à-vis abstract space and the rigidity of its regimes. I approach the practice of guerrilla gardening as a spatial practice of a particular social space. My focus on representations behind the produced space is therefore not entirely phenomenological; it draws substantially from Lefebvre's argument for the inevitability of social and political dimensions of any task, its context and its spatiality.

Chapter 5. Making Three Public Spaces in a Single Location: Parc Jeanne-Mance, Tourne-Sol, Villa Compostela

In this chapter, I set out to explore the features that make the urban green space of Parc Jeanne-Mance, the composting site Tourne-Sol, and the guerrilla community garden Villa Compostela distinct spaces that support programs and agency regimes specific to each of them. The existence of both Villa Compostela and Tourne-Sol was eventually terminated by the authorities, but this does not negate the fact that the three spaces successfully co-existed for an extended period of time, despite major differences among them. To understand this requires an analysis both of the differences that make these spaces distinct (the present chapter) and of the points of integration that helped turn conflicting co-presence into co-existence (the next chapter).

To establish the presence of different spaces that nevertheless simultaneously share the same physical location is critical for understanding contestation as a work of interpretation that gives way to a number of spatialities to which contested objects belong. The major argument that drives the action of contestation, as well as any counter-action, relates to the misuse of both public and green spaces in the city. Since the publicness of the contested green space is the point of entry into the dispute, misuse is primarily the perception of (in)accessibility of the contested space. Since appearance is subject to perception and interpretation from a situated perspective, it is worth asking: What is accessibility in physical terms? First, this is an issue of the different contexts from which either party perceives an object. Second, it is specific to the intentionality of perception of each context. Both guerrilla gardeners and municipal authorities/employees focus

on community, accessibility, transparency, and care. Yet, they do so often on paradigmatically different terms.

Ultimately, in the realm of tactical urbanism, contestation disputes are articulated via practices of trespassing (*e.g.*, resistance), appropriation, and even colonization. More profoundly, however, none of these practices is possible without the initial emergence of a state of ambiguity that affords primarily the work of re-interpretation rather than the work of property re-possession (especially since the guerrilla gardeners never treated the re-appropriated composting site as their property). In this chapter, I analyze the factors that make liminality possible from the overlap of a park, a composting site, and an illegal community garden, while all three remain distinct (social) spaces. I explore 1) the contexts that advise different programs of the three spaces, 2) the different agency regimes that these contexts suggest, and, finally, 3) the different values and representations of space that, combined, contribute to the emergence of these divergent interpretations.

5.1 Program

On a sunny cold Sunday back in March 2014, I came to participate in an event in the Mile End neighbourhood of Montréal, Canada. Hosted by a group of local residents, as a part of the “Incredible Edible” movement, the event was advertised as follows:

Workshop/activity for the preparation of seedlings for guerrilla gardening and incredible edible planting project.

If you have ever thought that all this public space in parks and sidewalks could be used to produce local, organic food then this is the project for you.

A group of citizens is preparing to turn a big part of the Plateau¹¹⁶ into an edible public garden and is inviting you to participate. Come share your knowledge on gardening, permaculture and plants while preparing seedlings for the big planting day next May.

While searching for an entrance to the building, I noticed a woman who, I later learned, came from a small town outside Montréal for the same event. She was interested in learning more about gardening, as she planned to use these skills back home and start an “Incredible Edible” project in a local park. The woman was waiting in the lobby for her friend. I approached her, we talked, and I decided to wait as well. If I had not struck up a conversation with this woman, my whole involvement with this project could have started very differently or perhaps not at all. This minor episode influenced the course of my research in a particular way. From that very point of ‘pre-involvement’ onward, this project demanded more than once that I step outside of my comfort zone into the unfamiliar.

As we entered a bright studio with an informal but disciplined atmosphere, many people of all ages were busy. There were bags of soil mix and small containers to be filled with both soil and seeds and to be distributed among the participants who would take care of seedlings. On June 7, what was called *Planting Day— Le jour de plantation*—(**Fig. 5.1**), these containers were brought together one more time to the heart of the Mile End neighbourhood to be planted out along sidewalk curbs in municipal planters and in tree-beds in the area. Some of these plants were brought to one particular spot outside of the neighbourhood: a defunct composting site at

¹¹⁶ A part of the Plateau-Mont-Royal borough of the City of Montréal.

Parc Jeanne-Mance that was undergoing a transformation at the time. Earlier that spring, the site was appropriated by the group of residents and gradually turned into a guerrilla garden-driven public space: Villa Compostela. Opened in 2004, the composting site—Centre de compostage communautaire Tourne-Sol¹¹⁷—was a project that Le Regroupement des éco-quartiers (REQ) carried out in collaboration with McGill University (REQ, 2010).¹¹⁸ By the spring of 2014, the composting site had been locked and was no longer operating. This was when the group of Montréal residents appropriated it and turned it into a community gardening space.

Broadly speaking, what happened in the spring of 2014 was nothing extraordinary. Despite the scale of the *Planting Day* activities, which spread over two neighbourhoods, it followed the same general pattern as many similar events across the globe: the identification of an opening for a garden space and an intervention on it with or without local authorities' permission.¹¹⁹ An 'assault' on public parks is not a new phenomenon either.¹²⁰ In general, an urban park is different from an urban street, which is also a public space but one that is arguably more structured, busier, more functional, and, consequently, less forgiving to a lasting transgression. While the

¹¹⁷ trans.: Community Composting Centre “Sunflower”

¹¹⁸ REQ is a city-wide network, managed by the Environment Division (“*Division de l’environnement*”) of the City of Montréal. It unites a variety of groups and NGOs with the mission to promote and accommodate environmentally sustainable urban lifestyles (<https://www.eco-quartiers.org/notremission>). The program “Ruelle verte” (“Green Back-alley”) as one of its initiatives.

¹¹⁹ Adams & Hardman, 2013, 2015; Brones, 2013; Crane, 2011; Crane et al., 2013; McKay, 2011; Mikadze, 2015; Mitchell, 2003; Reynolds, 2008; Smith & Kurtz, 2003; Walton, 2011; Zanetti, 2007; Zukin, 2010.

¹²⁰ In the introductory chapter of *Radical Gardening: Politics, Idealism and Rebellion in the Garden* (2011), George McKay brings up a substantial list of examples of political events and actions that took place specifically in urban parks in Britain since the 18th century. Ultimately, McKay argues that “[p]rotest is a normative use of the green cityscape” (p. 18).

guerrilla gardening group that I followed created an illegal garden space both in the park and in the streets, it was the park where their impact had an opportunity to gain in scale and maturity:

Respondent: ... *last minute we were told [by local municipal authorities in regards to the Mile End site] that we don't get the planters anymore. So the plan had changed. And it made sense to change it to corners [of the street; curbs] because no one was watching them. ... You know what I mean, it is like Villa Compostela because no one is really watching it, and we could've done what we wanted; it's not really a big deal. ... I personally don't think that the Jour de plantation is necessarily... I think it is a socio-political act, but I think that it is a very small temporary thing. I don't think it's sustainable: just because it is so dispersed, and not everyone is going to take care of it. And it is not as integrated as Villa Compostela, where people put up their art and their flowers, and there are colours, and there are all different kinds of plants in one spot* (respondent r8).

Parc Jeanne-Mance, the composting site in the park, and Villa Compostela (as well as Mile End gardens) are each a result of a particular interpretation of vegetation in the city, and an exploration of these interpretations is in order.

5.1.1 Parc Jeanne-Mance

With two big lawns, dedicated spaces for sports activities (*i.e.*, soccer, softball, tennis, and beach volleyball), and groups of trees, Parc Jeanne-Mance (see **Fig. 5.2**) would be a typical urban green space, if not for two reasons. First, south of Duluth street, it is adjacent to l’Hôtel-Dieu, an important convent and hospital that was built on the site in 1861, now protected by municipal and provincial heritage-conservation laws. The convent wall that extends along the east side of this part of the park is cherished by the municipal authorities. Second, on the west, the park borders Avenue du Parc, a major thoroughfare, which separates the park from another heritage site—Frederick Law Olmsted’s Mount Royal Park (see Fig. 5.2). As previously noted, until 1990, Parc Jeanne-Mance was officially known as Fletcher’s Field and was renamed to commemorate Jeanne Mance (1601-1673), the founder of l’Hôtel-Dieu (Ville de Montréal, 2017). While Parc Jeanne-Mance and Mount Royal Park currently belong to different administrations (municipal and provincial respectively), Olmsted saw Fletcher’s Field as an auxiliary part of his Mount Royal Park project (Olmsted, 1874, p.10), and the planning for the two was done in conjunction. At the time of Olmsted’s assessment, Fletcher’s Field had a golf course (Ville de Montréal, 2017). Currently, there are beach volleyball courts in the southern part of the park. The composting site and, subsequently, Villa Compostela were located between the volleyball courts and Duluth street.

The actual signification of the park, however, lies beyond this immediate multi-functional appearance. When several of the municipal authorities that I interviewed in relation to Villa Compostela reasoned that its presence in the park obstructed the view of the convent wall, whether knowingly or not they were following the same logic as Andrew Jackson Downing, one of the fathers of landscape architecture in North America, and his *Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening* (1841). In North America, a typical contemporary green space

is a direct outcome of the Park Movement, and its constitution was shaped primarily by the works and influence of Downing, followed by Olmsted.¹²¹ Both advocated for the introduction of specifically structured and composed green space in the city, both brought this conviction from Europe, and both believed that it had to be done for certain reasons.¹²² It was not merely the presence of vegetation or wild nature in the artificial man-made environment that interested these two pioneers of landscape architecture in the New World. What one sees right away in a typical urban green space—grass, ground, and trees—is hardly to be taken at face value. Downing and Olmsted saw the possibility of using nature in the city as a means of bringing people of different classes together. After a visit to Frankfurt, Downing (2012) described a local public park that he admired for the fact that it was open to everyone in town (people of all classes, neatly dressed, who had come to spend their free time there) at municipal expense, while nothing in the park was broken or damaged, as though it were each person’s private garden: “Well, out of this enjoyment of public grounds by all classes grows also a social freedom, and an easy and agreeable intercourse of all classes, that strikes an America with surprise and delight.” (Downing, 2012, p. 218). In a similar vein, Olmsted saw the necessity of introducing a break for people from

¹²¹ An illuminating fact is that Calvert Vaux—a long-term business partner of Olmsted—was discovered and brought from England by Downing to assist him with the architectural part of his projects. After Downing’s death, Olmsted invited Vaux to work with him on the Central Park project in NYC, a work that was carried out largely on Downing’s principles (Twombly, 2012).

¹²² Downing, 1841, 1846, 2012 [1848]; Olmsted, 1992 [1868], 1997a [1868], 1997b [1870], 1997c [1851], 1997d [1881].

industrialized and fast-growing American cities.¹²³ For both, it was the focus on propriety, taste, and gentility that new urban developments needed to cultivate in citizens. Downing's focus remained on republican institutions that had to surpass European ones in all respects (Twombly, 2012). As Robert Twombly (2012) elaborates in his "Introduction" to Downing's *Essential Texts*, Downing's ultimate objective was to render the United States a complete republic where both artistic and intellectual growth could be nurtured by its political institutions, of which universally accessible urban parks were a part. For Olmsted, a similar focus on public education was stipulated by the internal political situation in the United States. The North with its focus on industry sought to surpass the South with its focus on agriculture in its gentry quality. The latter was one of the Souths' pro-slavery arguments (Beveridge & Rocheleau, 1995, p. 21).

Consequently, social cohesion and active citizenship were leisure-tailored objectives that created the context in which nature could legitimately appear in the city, as an urban park. In an interview on parks and cemeteries, Downing (2012, p. 223) speaks of the duty to see the "Beauty" that is just as eternal as "Truth" or the "Good," and that it is the work of writers and the press to help those who are slow to perceive how the Park Movement contributes to bettering the conditions of people as good citizens. Very much in Lefebvre's terms, the writing elite had to create a representation of nature in the city. What would be a part of that representation? As one would expect, it would be an urban park, but for both Downing and Olmsted it was about the grace that nature in the city was to exude. Grass, ground, and lawn had to communicate the

¹²³ *Consider that the New York Park and the Brooklyn Park are the only places in those associated cities where, in this eighteen hundred and seventieth year after Christ, you will find a body of Christians coming together, and with an evident glee in the prospect of coming together, all classes largely represented, with a common purpose, not at all intellectual, competitive with none, disposing to jealousy and spiritual or intellectual pride toward none, each individual adding by his mere presence to the pleasure of all others, all helping to the greater happiness of each* (Olmsted, 1997b, p. 186).

message in a specific way. In the “Treatment of Ground” chapter of *Landscape Gardening* (1921), Downing speaks of ground as a surface to be dealt with in order to please the eye in a sophisticated manner: topography should be modified or articulated in such a way as to avoid straight roads that would lead directly to an estate from a highway. Ultimately, the goal was to achieve pleasing soft lines for the ground. Downing states that a leveled ground is valued not for its beauty but for evincing art, as expressive of power. He criticizes those people who think that leveling the ground is an act of beautification. Downing sees beauty in the nature that does not tolerate straight lines and flat grounds. In relation to this, lawn acquired a certain meaning as well (desired by Downing and Olmsted, taken-for-granted by present-day urban authorities, and offensive to guerrilla gardeners). In the first issue of *The Horticulturist, and Journal of Rural Art and Rural Taste* (1846), Downing speaks of grass as that which is “thrown like a smooth natural carpet over the swelling outline of the smiling earth” (p. 201) to explain our love for soft turf. For Downing, the “ideal of grass is a lawn” (p. 202).¹²⁴

In this very context, it is unsurprising that one of the municipal employees (respondent r12) whom I interviewed noted that the space of Villa Compostela did not contribute to the publicness of the park for two major reasons. First, it did not fit with the design of the park (*i.e.*, the plant beds were improvised). Second, its gardening function also did not fit. In more conceptual terms, another municipal employee (respondent r11) noted that there was a difference between “la terrain de la ville” (municipal property) and “l’espace public” (public space). Public space is the space where people can intervene and change; it is a matter of use. For a city employee, however, this is a matter of work on the public *land*, where certain planned-out functions (*e.g.*,

¹²⁴ See also **Appendix 3** for an extended discussion of the similarities between front yard lawns and urban parks’ lawns.

sitting, reading, passing) might lead to the creation of public space, if people incorporate them into a public activity. On the whole, Parc Jeanne-Mance remains a professionally designed green space that is not public-made as much as it is made public on certain terms that appear to communicate certain values and goals and that resonate with certain common expectations.

5.1.2 Composting Site Tourne-Sol

Remarkably, the establishment of the composting site—Tourne-Sol (see **Fig. 5.3**)—in the park followed the same premise as the organization and appearance of other urban green spaces in North America: education via curated vegetation. That being stated, the physical appearance of the site as well as its function were not necessarily well-received by municipal authorities:

Respondent: The location of this large industrial composting machine actually is a heritage site and it's not a particularly well-suited location for a large industrial structure in front of a centuries-old wall in the designated heritage site of Mount Royal. There is a whole lot of history of the City of Montréal [that] is exemplified by that wall and by the convent, the Hôtel-Dieu hospital, Jeanne-Mance park, and Mount Royal across the street from it. There are many things that detract from it including the Park Avenue, in a way that it was converted into a highway that divides the park, and I wouldn't deny any of that but then to say that it's perfectly fine for citizens to decide that they are going to dig up and start planting potatoes in a space like that... I think it's more questionable because of the considerable heritage value of the location. It's not

the best possible location to do that. Even though they are not touching the wall. ... Should the composter ever be put there in the first place? ... There are better locations that could be found for such an apparatus. The [compost] location is poorly chosen because it should be as accessible as possible to as many people as possible and yet it's not in the centre of a neighbourhood, it's off to the side and [is] actually removed from houses at a considerable distance and there is no base from which to draw to the West or the immediate North, or the immediate South. It's only from the East, where you find the housing stock. For logistical reasons, for heritage reasons, it's not a particularly great place to have that composter. [Here, a short a description of a better suiting location: in an under-path of St. Laurent Boulevard, along the railroad tracks]. But it's extremely valuable public space that affords views of the mountain, that is criss-crossed by many people. Now it's been disguised a bit with planting [i.e., Villa Compostela] but planting doesn't bear any relationship to what's around it. That disguised something that is kind of out of place in general with the park, with trees, sunflowers, and things, but there is a logic to that space that was conceived by Frederick Law Olmsted, and his vision extends right down to Jeanne-Mance park (respondent r9).

On the whole, there is not much to say about the composting site except that it represented a shift in Montréal municipalities towards a more environmentally sensitive approach to waste management. This particular initiative was carried out in partnership with the *Regroupement des Éco-quartiers* (REQ)—a collective of local organizations that implement environmental programs—and McGill University. The latter also provides part of its downtown campus for another food-related initiative. Specifically, in partnership with *Santropol Roulant*—a Montréal-

based NGO—McGill accommodates the organization’s gardens for its *Meals on Wheels* food-delivery program. The purpose of both collaborations is both practical and educational. With the focus on urban agriculture, these on-campus gardens as well as the composting site are instances of education through everyday contexts, which is one of REQ’s major objectives:

Over the years, the eco-quartiers have developed expertise in environmental education that is field-project based and that aims to maximize both the acquisition of know-how and the transfer of knowledge in the variety of everyday contexts.¹²⁵

The establishment of this composting site and its subsequent shut-down are critical for the appearance of Villa Compostela, specifically in Parc Jeanne-Mance. This initiative, which catered to residents of Plateau Mont-Royal and Mile End neighbourhoods had the goal of promoting more environmentally sustainable urban living. While some of the municipal authorities whom I interviewed criticized the choice of the location for the site, the rationale for its location was not necessarily about the accessibility of the composting function. The choice of the spot for the site in the middle of the park was

[I]deal for attracting the attention of passers-by and arousing their interest. This location [was] perfect for starting discussions with people, for engaging them with the problem of

¹²⁵ Original: “Au fil des ans, les éco-quartiers ont développé une expertise en éducation relative à l’environnement axée sur une approche par projet terrain visant à maximiser l’acquisition des savoirs et le transfert des connaissances dans une diversité de contextes du quotidien.” (<https://www.eco-quartiers.org/notremission>)

*waste management, and for presenting affordable alternatives to landfill waste disposal.*¹²⁶
(REQ, 2010, p. 34).

While at odds with the design and logic of the green space of the park, the location of the site remained in line with the park's public agenda: education through physical co-presence. Tourne-Sol became a pilot centre for the composting initiative in Montréal that, on an industrial scale—with three composting mills—was believed to serve about 150 families in the area at the peak of its operations (The McGill Daily, 2009; REQ, 2010, p. 35).

Neither Tourne-Sol's program (engagement with sustainability via food production via composting) nor its objective were obliterated by the appearance of Villa Compostela. The food-driven program of Villa Compostela was rather accelerated and advanced by the fact that the defunct composting site structurally and programmatically remained intact:

Respondent: ... *So we went to figure out immediately whether they [turbines; gardeners' term for composting mills¹²⁷] worked or not. That's the really obvious one. In terms of, I guess,.. discovering all the tools in the shed; the vision came down much quicker because we had all the tools, including a water tap. The fact that we had all the tools, I*

¹²⁶ Original: "idéale pour attirer le regard des passants et susciter leur intérêt. C'est l'endroit parfait pour amorcer des discussions avec les gens, les sensibiliser à la problématique de la gestion des déchets et leur présenter des alternatives abordables à l'enfouissement" (REQ, 2010, p. 34)

¹²⁷ In some respects, their choice of the term reflects specifically on the appearance of composting mills: black ribbed horizontal cylindrical structures that could easily fit several people inside them and that were rotated by electric power.

think, enabled the initiative to be much quicker and to set things up really fast, to start digging the beds, and things like this (respondent r8).

When the Tourne-sol site was shut down and new—much more portable—means of composting (see **Fig. 5.4**) were introduced in the borough, the site became neglected but not entirely forgotten. It disappeared akin to a ‘dead’ space, described by Doron (2007). Due to the economic irrelevance of its function at this location it disappeared for the municipal authorities, but its built form and its link with a different kind of vegetation remained.

5.1.3 Villa Compostela

A City of Montréal web-page, dedicated to community gardening, contains the following information:

... Eighteen boroughs offer plots of land to their citizens for gardening. In some boroughs, a gardening instructor visits the garden regularly to give advice to gardeners. Some boroughs offer adapted gardens for persons with reduced mobility. Materials provided include soil, a water source, tool shed or toolbox, tables, fences, sand, paint and flowers. Each community garden elects a volunteer committee to oversee administrative matters. (Ville de Montréal, 2017).



Figure 3. This painting, depicting a girl wearing leg braces, was installed by one of the members of the group on the site. It says: “She did not know it was impossible. So, she did it.”

This description is ironic in light of the respondents’ account of the preparedness of the defunct composting site for re-appropriation as a community garden (see **Fig. 5.5**). This, however, did not stop the future eviction of Villa Compostela and a complete removal of the site by the authorities. While the illegality of the re-appropriation was the principal reason for authorities to reject Villa Compostela, it was also the most peculiar reason. A lot of what guerrilla gardeners did with the composting site was remarkably in line with Tourne-Sol’s food-related

program and the general mission of the REQ (see **Fig. 5.6**).

That being stated, Villa Compostela, just like the composting site, comes from its own interpretation of nature in the city,

through the narrative of food production (rather than food disposal).

Similar to the park and composting site, Villa Compostela was part of a larger context of vegetation in the city. This context also includes individuals and organizations who were not directly involved with this particular project or who worked on their own projects of a somewhat

similar nature.^{128 129} The presence of such a network of like-minded proponents of the cause—under a shared umbrella of urban agriculture—suggests a broader sustainability framework that includes not only professionals, but also grassroots practices and their proponents (*e.g.*, Crane *et al.*, 2013; Hess & Winner, 2007).¹³⁰ This also resonates with my earlier exploration of discussion threads on a global guerrilla gardening website, which shows that the movement goes beyond its narrow “guerrilla” (*i.e.*, illegal and upsetting) definition (Mikadze, 2015).

¹²⁸ This includes an urban farming project in the Notre-Dame-de-Grâce (NDG) area of Montréal as well as several other guerrilla gardening initiatives. These included an under-path in the same area, which a group of locals tried to turn into a more welcoming place in 2013 with the help of murals inside and guerrilla gardening outside. In the summer of 2014, a workshop took place in the under-path involving people from the NDG urban farming project, the guerrilla gardening project that I followed, as well as other interested parties.

¹²⁹ Most of the guerrilla gardening respondents whom I interviewed expressed views on lawns and urban agriculture that are very similar to those that activist Heather Flores (2006) articulates in *Food Not Lawns: How to Turn Your Yard Into a Garden and Your Neighborhood Into a Community*. In the beginning of the book, two of her arguments are particularly illuminating. First, in relation to ‘transparency’ of food production—a subject that came up a number of times in my interviews—Flores points out that “[g]rowing your own food is a step to healthier and more self-reliant life. Those who control our food source, control our lives” (2006, p. 2). Second, more specifically to lawns, Flores explains the name of the book (that follows from the name of the group that she and several other activists created in Eugene, Oregon, in 1999) as follows: “Why Food Not Lawns? Most obviously, the name was a natural evolution from Food Not Bombs [the founders of the FNL groups started out by cooking for FNB]. But more importantly, we called ourselves Food Not Lawns because the more we learned about food, agriculture, and land use, the more the lawns around suburban Eugene began to reek of gross waste and mindless affluence.” (2006, p. 10). It is notable that the second chapter of the Food Not Lawns organization was established in Montréal in 2000, just a year after its foundation in Eugene, Oregon.

¹³⁰ This advocacy stems from the need to avoid the transformation of the concept of sustainability into yet another totalizing representation formulated by professionals and experts.

As discussed in Chapter 1, illicit guerrilla gardening cannot be understood in terms of sustainability in the same way as legitimate community gardening, since the foundation of the former is more political than economic: cultivating land without boundaries, without permission. That being stated, one of the respondents, involved in an urban farming project at the time rather than in a guerrilla gardening one, elaborated on both as follows:

Respondent: *I like to think of them [guerrilla gardens and community gardens] as the same thing, and, in fact, sustainable guerrilla gardening can only exist when you have the community being involved.*

Interviewer: *Can it be guerrilla if it is sustainable?* Respondent: *Of course. I would define guerrilla gardening as gardening in public space without asking.*

Interviewer: *So, this is where the question of sustainability comes along.* Respondent: *Right. So, I made this garden with a couple of residents who live on the street where we did it: on the corner of [Ave. de] Melrose and [Boul. de] Maisonneuve. There is an under-path that goes underneath the road, underneath the tracks, and comes out on the other side. I haven't had time this year to go back to this space, but I see that someone else is taking the initiative to fill the garden boxes that I had put on the structure of the under-path with flower and with tomato plants. It's like you can't do it by yourself and expect that it will be sustainable, especially if you don't live right outside of it. You need to get members of the immediate vicinity [be] involved into that project. You need to make them aware of it, you need to make them aware of what they can do to help the project, to help with the gardens, to water, to pull weeds out, to know what to pull—what*

are weeds and what are plants—and I think that so far the garden that I have installed at the under-path is sustainable: it is not me doing all the work (respondent r1).

Community engagement and capacity building are at the core of both guerrilla gardening and community gardening (or urban farming, as a particular embodiment of it), but there is a critical difference between the two. For urban farming projects, food—the produce—is the deliverable that dictates respect for property regulations (see also Mikadze, 2015).¹³¹ For guerrilla gardening, in both Villa Compostela and Mile End, urban agriculture is a premise and a framework for the revision of public space’s function, structure, and appearance. This is a different kind of sustainability that goes beyond food production. Indeed, even among the participants of the guerrilla gardening project, the goals justifying their involvement were not always the same. While growing food in a transparent manner (*i.e.*, knowing what goes into food production) is definitely one goal, this was not the principal rationale for every respondent. Fostering a community of care—rather than of leisure—and engaging urban residents (including the participants themselves) with urban space in new ways was another critical rationale. In this respect, growing food is a reason to get engaged that is hard to argue with, as one of the respondents stated:

¹³¹ That being stated, in response to my question about getting a stable piece of land for farming, the respondent (respondent r1) in the urban farming project that consists of a series of gardens in other people’s backyards explains that the project is not primarily about commercial gain. Instead, it is about showing people the ways of using urban space for growing food: one does not need a big farm in order to grow food. The respondent believes that there is enough space in the city to grow food for people who live there and that there is no need to clear more forest.

Respondent: *I don't know if it [Villa Compostela] creates [public space]; it modifies. It creates more interaction, more options to have an action outside your private space. ... People have more occasions to go to public space because you can harvest things. So, you'll have more opportunities to spend time in a place where you can meet people and interact with people. ... I used to interact with people who ask for money, who'd have a hidden agenda. People expect an interaction to be driven by something, and in this case it seems to be more general [ideologically] than usual. So, they are more easily opened to the idea, and it is also a kind of a perfect idea because it is hard to be against it: it's free, there is no obligation, there are no rules. I've usually never met anyone who criticizes this kind of projects. It's a perfect project: it's free food. This is one of the basic needs. And it's food, it's free, and that's good (respondent r5).*

Food—a particular appearance of vegetation—remains a common denominator for all of these rationales that distinguish the guerrilla gardening space from both the composting site and especially from the leisure-driven Parc Jeanne-Mance. The breadth of connotations that respondents associate with food include the observation that it is, first of all, a basic necessity, the production of which needs to be transparent; second of all, that it is something that we all need and understand, and, additionally, that it is something that can bring us together, especially when it is free. And yet, it is not all about food. It remains a political and social project of engagement and education:

Respondent: *It's not big [the project], I guess, but it is giving some ideas to some people... After all, I see the Mile End project [to be] more about communication on gardening*

[the respondent believes that gardening is more efficient if you do it in your own garden in one spot]. ... *I went there because I wanted to get involved in an interesting political project.*

Interviewer: *Why is it political?*

Respondent: *It's a positive way of criticizing market society. It is a positive way of saying [that] we have to change our way of life. Everybody agrees that capitalism is not the best way, but this is a proposition: you can grow your garden and you will see that you need, maybe, less money, to work less, to have more time with your family. It's more of a proposition of something that people can do with their lives ...*

Interviewer: *So, you say that it was about communication. So, for communication purposes, for example, you can print out big billboards saying that these are the vegetables that you can grow ...*

Respondent: *It's not this meaning of communication. ... Here it's stronger because you see for real how easy it is, how it is here... (respondent r5).*

The name Villa Compostela also alludes to the socio-political character of the project. As respondent r6 explained, while part of the name comes from the Spanish city, Santiago de Compostela, which reminded one of the gardeners of the word 'compost', the 'villa' part comes from Villa Amalia in Athens—a squat that held various political and cultural events and that was active from the 1990s until its closure by police eviction in 2013 (Ekathimerini.com, 2013; Wikipedia, 2017). As one of the respondents (r8) argued, after the group re-united the defunct composting site with the park, the manifestation of this act—Villa Compostela—made people aware that this space could actually belong to them [rather than be locked down, away from

them].¹³² According to the respondent, this demonstration is important because today we are “segregated” in terms of what is private and what is public: even when we are in *public* space, we often actually remain in private space in terms of the ways in which we socialize in our small private spaces, physically and in our minds. This is the strongest part of the food-related vegetation agenda behind Villa Compostela and, to a lesser extent,¹³³ the Mile End gardens. This agenda goes beyond nutrition and environmental sustainability. It aims to effect a perception shift for which plants are agents that mediate change:

Respondent: *And I think that the most important thing is that you get to interact with your environment: you get to put your hands in the soil, and you get to dig stuff, and you get to plant stuff, and you get to watch it grow. It's like you're really interacting with your environment, as opposed to just going to a shop, buying stuff. You've been a part of an entire process.*

Interviewer: *Is this how you feel at Villa?*

Respondent: *Yeah! Absolutely! Seeing it from the beginning to where it is now is incredible. I don't know if you'd seen it before anything happened ... It was just nothing! It was just*

¹³² This, unfortunately, needs to be taken with a grain of salt: while the gardeners put a sign on the fence (“plant, water, harvest, compost, create, share, respect the creations of others” [Fig. 5.7]), another respondent pointed out that the sign did not explicitly invite anyone to come inside the site. Somewhat similarly, my side-survey of small gardens next to business fronts in Mile End also showed no engagement of business owners with these gardens. That being stated, the business owners supported the initiative and did not mind the emergence of the gardens.

¹³³ Group members were hardly unanimous about the impact and value of the Mile End gardens. First, not all of them were involved to the same extent with both sites. Second, not all of them believed that the Mile End gardens were as effective a space as Villa Compostela.

the turbines [i.e., composting mills], the fence, weeds, and that was it. It was nothing,.. there was nothing there. ... Mostly, you are eating the good food and you [are] being a part of it from the beginning to the end. I think it is a really satisfying thing for humans, in general, like it's a form of accomplishment. And especially with nature and the environment, there is something really indescribable about it. It's not like finishing an art piece; it's not the same. It's like there is something really beautiful and deep about planting a tomato in the ground, watching it grow, harvesting the tomato, and eating [the] tomato. You know, there is something really nice about that.

Interviewer: *And you think it's important?*

Respondent: *Very important. Because I think it goes back to what we were talking about before about segregation [see above]. We don't know how to use our hands anymore. People don't have good hand-writing here because we are all keyboarding. We are all typing stuff. You know... Things like this! People aren't good at... you know... washing dishes [chuckles], because there are dishwashers. People don't want to plant stuff, because they don't need to plant stuff.*

Interviewer: *Why is it important? There will be robots doing these things for us. [chuckles]*

Respondent: *Exactly. So, [they] aren't able to use their hands and [aren't] able to use our natural... It's just decreasing the distance of that dis-connectivity. It's not only [about] coming back to ourselves because we are coming back into our bodies in terms of being able to understand what our worth and what our capabilities are, but also [about] being able to use them in our outside—external—environment [in order to] to see that it can also be impactful, as opposed to being in this really private world with technology and just really banal... situations. Like going to the shop! Maybe there will be something*

huge that's gonna happen; another day it's just banal. Maybe you will run into your friend and, who knows, something 'exploded', but it's not the same.

Interviewer: *Why not?*

Respondent: *I think specifically because you are interacting with nature in a city environment. It ultimately has more credit than solely being in a city environment, interacting with city structure.*

Interviewer: *What do you mean by "nature" by the way?*

Respondent: *Anything that is not the city: trees, grass, plants, dirt, soil, rain, wind, all that stuff.*

Interviewer: *What about a garbage site outside of a city? Will it be a part of nature?*

Respondent: *No, because essentially that site was created by the city. Everything in it is a by-product of the city, of living in the city. There is nothing natural about it. Anything that's not man-made, right?" (respondent r8).*

This need for physical engagement with the world that obeys rules that are not human-made and that the respondent expressed in surprisingly phenomenological terms happens outside one's private space. This is critical. Similar to the urban farming project (albeit more radical), the comfort of controlled predictability is not the defining condition for Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens. Instead of fitting itself into a mesh of established practices and representations, this act of gardening draws from a different context, one that demands its own set of values, representations, and everyday practices.

To conclude this section, whether looking at Parc Jeanne-Mance and Mount Royal Park, the composting site Tourne-Sol, or Villa Compostela, it is possible to notice certain

correspondences. First, and most obviously, all three advocate for a social change that can be achieved (to different extents) through the agency and presence of plants in the city. From this shared general context, each suggests a distinct paradigm shift in terms of the ways in which individuals engage with one another and the urban space. Second, all three attempt to employ distinct spatial practices in order to achieve social change. Finally, there is a clear inter-connection between these three spaces: Tourne-Sol occupied a part of the park because of its public co-presence agenda, whereas Villa Compostela developed a mission that the REQ carries on through its own spatial practices (even defunct ones), such as the composting site. In spite of this, at the present time, since the removal of the site in 2015, only the lawn remains (see **Fig. 5.8**). The illegality of Villa Compostela was a major factor that triggered the response from the municipal authorities to shut down the garden and what remained of the composting site. Yet, Villa Compostela could still have been accepted by the authorities as just another community garden location in the city.¹³⁴ The exploration of the three distinct contexts in which these three different spaces belong and are meaningful suggests that illegality was not the only factor that truly mattered.

5.2 A Social Space in Making and Developing

¹³⁴ As another municipal authority (respondent r10) noted, neither Tourne-Sol nor Villa Compostela were any more obstructing than Avenue du Park—a major thoroughfare that separates two parks—or the volleyball courts that remain at the present time approximately 100 metres south from where Villa Compostela used to be. Moreover, since nuns used to grow food in the monastery, just across the wall, there was a certain consistency in having these food-related spaces in this location.

Regardless of the differences of the contexts from which the park and the guerrilla gardening space respectively originate, for city officials the guerrilla sites in the park and in the streets of the Mile End neighbourhood were an uninvited spatial practice in *the* urban space—the only one possible. In what follows, I challenge this perspective and discuss aspects of the sites' inception and development, which suggests that they are spatial practices that come with their own space. This discussion is based on Lefebvre's (1991) framework for the production of social space. This step is necessary for two reasons. First, it establishes the divergent interpretations of vegetation in the city as distinct representations of different social spaces. Second, understanding competing interpretations as overlapping social spaces is critical for a subsequent discussion of guerrilla gardening in light of Lefebvre's concept of differential space and its relevance for a non-compartmentalizing logic of urban development.

5.2.1 Spatial Practices of Stepping Outside of 'the' Space

Crossing a border is one way to capture the presence of a different social space, but this border is no ordinary line on the ground:

Respondent: *Because you are starting to put your plants in this case on a piece of land that hasn't been really used for this reason. It's always been used just for plants that are for looking at, that the City would change. A patch of land that was kind of outside of your control. So when you start putting the plants, you also start accessing this land. So maybe that's the boundary that we crossed.*

Interviewer: *And the land which is not yours?*

Respondent: *Yes, not yours. So you are accessing it for the first time, and you are inviting others to access it, too* (respondent r6).

As the same respondent stated, when asked about crossing a border, just by turning ‘dead’ into ‘live’ (*i.e.*, living and growing plants) gardening is already an act of crossing a border (respondent r6). Another respondent (respondent r8) noted that the lawn hides the soil, and to free the soil was the greatest creative act that the group could do in the city. Both comments are particularly illuminating for pointing out different types of borders that exist between social spaces. As the participants expressed, this was something that they were not supposed to do: gardening on municipal property was not what they were expected to do by the general public and the authorities and to break through the lawn could be a disrespectful thing to do since somebody had planted this grass. Group members were keenly aware of this and, yet, they felt compelled. Alternative agency demanded an alternative set of meanings for existing objects that had to be re-interpreted and re-situated. This was a crucial part of encountering and crossing

borders: that is, in the process of the creation of a new social space.¹³⁵ To perceive the ground as soil, hidden beneath concrete or a lawn, to be freed and to be made accessible requires a context from which this perception and the need for it are meaningful. Consequently, breaking through concrete or a lawn are then not only an illegal action, but also an act of freeing a phenomenon from a misleading appearance in order to bring it back to a chain of references to which it arguably belongs. To a certain extent, municipal authorities recognize this:

Respondent: Essentially the public does preserve the right at all times to landscape its property as it sees fit, but citizens can have through their own direct action initiatives solitary effect on public landscapes. And when this time comes to make a decision about the public space that has been re-appropriated through a direct action by citizens, that should all be kept in mind. And that in some cases it is undoubtedly better to bow in favour of a citizen's initiative and the way that citizens by their own initiative beautified

¹³⁵ While photo-documenting the development of Villa Compostela in the summer of 2014, I was constantly disturbed by the lack of contrast between the lawn and the plant beds: everything was green and even the texture was often the same. Being a point of my frustration, this fact invites a reflection. Visually, the mute and motionless two-dimensional space of a photograph illuminated the fact that both the lawn and the plant beds were covered with the same kind of organic life. The soil that constituted both the lawn and the plant beds knew no difference between the two. Regardless of the ways the plants looked and of the purposes that they served, they were the same to the soil. Also, when I received a set of photographs that one of the members of the group took on the day of appropriating the composting site, at first I was surprised that there was only one more or less panoramic shot of the group members at work (**Fig. 4.3**). To perceive the composting from afar was a concept somewhat alien to the group, as they engaged with the site on a different scale, physically rather than visually. All other photographs were proximity shots. They captured the distance that mattered and that differed significantly from authorities' focus on freeing a visual perspective or improving the clarity of the structure of Parc Jeanne-Mance and its integration with Mount Royal Park.

the landscape. And we should have a general, even a favourable, prejudice to the artisanal and that which is spontaneous and artisanal in our society. That having been said, it would not be necessarily always one decision or the other. ... And we can't... we have to be careful not to be overly sentimental when we make our decision. But there may be good arguments that I am open to hearing, that there is something precious that should be preserved here, so as to disregard the prevailing view of the municipality which is that it is not. That's my assessment. Does that... [sigh] You know, I'm.. they are all legitimate points. You shouldn't be particularly against citizen re-appropriation of public space per se. You shouldn't, I don't think, but we have to be willing to challenge it every time it takes place and question whether it is truly in the public interest. That's our duty (respondent r9).

As discussed in Chapter 1, public space as a type of built form can be confusing, if not misleading. In fact, with both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens, it is possible to see something distinct from the mere creation of a public space: the modification of the *publicness* of all resulting spaces in the process of challenging the status quo of a particular representation of urban green space as *the* green public space. In line with Kilian's (1998) and Mitchell's (2003) discussions of making space public, it was not the improvement of the park or of the streets but the introduction of alternative meanings and contexts to both that supposedly changed the overall publicness, and this was done by virtue of the re-definition of borders rather than by crossing or eliminating them (as some of the gardeners insist).¹³⁶ Both the Mile End gardens and Villa

¹³⁶ As respondent r7 noted, as a result of turning the composting site into Villa Compostela, both the composting site and the park could once again work together and respect each other.

Compostela took advantage of preexisting programs and contexts. Yet, they did so in a way that avoided a rigid structure. As respondent r5 articulated, there was a difference between community gardening and Villa Compostela. Community gardening is full of rules, and the fact that Villa Compostela remained simple was important for the group's objectives. The group wanted to challenge these usual rigid rules, but the gardeners most definitely made some new ones, although not all of them were ready to admit this. The same respondent did not think this made Villa Compostela, as a space, necessarily more accessible. Before, it had been an abandoned—ambiguous—space into which anyone could have gone and done a variety of things. With the creation of Villa Compostela, once again, it became someone's project. This could be re-iterated. Before the intervention, the defunct composting site, unleashed from the official program of the park, was a space the structure and context of which were suspended. With the establishment of Villa Compostela, both a structure and a context were re-introduced. In both Parc Jeanne-Mance and Mile End, gardeners recognized this condition with the introduction of signs (see **Fig 5.7**) that explained the gardens and invited participation. Yet, the very presence of the signs articulated new borders.

5.2.2 Making Agency Meaningful

What does this border separate? The gardeners were keenly aware of the potential of destroying other people's work (*i.e.*, the lawn) and, for the most part, did not enjoy the destructive aspect of their actions (aside from feeling the soil). Yet, with the objectives of fighting alienation in formal, top-down municipal public spaces, which are accessible mostly for visual interactions, it was

easier for them to cross the borders that they identified.¹³⁷ As respondent r4 asserted, the resulting space became more public: they planted “useful” plants, and this justified the irregularity of the action. The respondent felt a greater sense of ownership, more responsibility, and more reason to be in those appropriated places. In this vein, at least for some of the gardeners, bringing the (public) space back (respondents r3, r4, r7, and r8) became one of the principal objectives that drove their counter-action. However, bringing the space back—making it accessible again—is a peculiar objective in this case, since the matter of the space had not vanished nor had it become truly inaccessible. The significance of this is illustrated by one of the respondents in relation to the Mile End site:

Respondent: *The spaces [sidewalks and intersection corners in Mile End] were just boring plants that the City planted with wood chips on them. They were at the corners and people were not noticing them or anything like that. So they were technically accessible because you could just look at them, but because of the way it was structured it was like “leave it for the City to water”, you know, “leave it for the City to take care of it and trim it, and all the stuff”.*

Interviewer: *Why?*

Respondent: *Because it was in the cement border, it was in the corners. It’s part of the way the urbanization is: you recognize, you know where each bus stop is gonna be. It’s kind of the same thing as these plants. It’s just part of the way the City makes it look nice, and the patterns are really recognizable. So, I think it’s quite easy for people generally to [recognize that] that’s part of the City and it’s not some person who planted those*

¹³⁷ As Respondent r3 articulated, on the political level the main paradigm was alienation from everything;, while this project could bring people together.

plants and made it look that way because it's so sterile. Because they [the plants that they planted on the corners] are different from boring plants that are there, analogous to lawn for the corners [and] the plants that they plant [there].

Interviewer: *Why is it analogous? They are so different looking.*

Respondent: *Yeah, but structurally it's the same. You know what you can and cannot do with them and you know what you can and cannot do in that space.*

Interviewer: *How do you know that?*

Respondent: *It's the way the corners are meant to look in the City, depending on where you are [and] especially in Mile End. It's very structured: every corner of every main block has it, and you know that it's taken care by the City because it's all so clean. It's so clean and it's all of the patterns of planting, and different kinds of plants are the same. That kind of homogeny fits in with a lot of homogeny that exists in our lives. So we know how to react and regulate ourselves within that homogeny because it's the same system [in which] we socialize, right? A certain pattern, a certain regulation, a certain way of being. It's just a direct physical expression of how we are supposed to be (respondent r8).*

This is institutional city space that in some instances is accessible specifically through visual engagement only, although anyone can pick a city-planted flower, take care of a plant, or even vandalize it. It is all possible, but there is a certain invisible line to be crossed in order to do so:

Respondent: *I think those corners are just white noise for us, they are just white visuals.*

And because it's white noise, I think, it is less accessible in that kind of way. It's not

necessarily marketing itself [as]: 'Hey, interact with me!' It's more like 'Hey! Look at me. I have this and that.' The fact that there are wood chips makes it harder. It's not like lawn. A lawn, you can just dig [it]. You can even get through with your hands. With chips you can as well but I feel that there is some kind of... And they [wood chips] have practical reasons as well like keeping in the moisture. But it's a more professional look. It looks cleaner and because of that there is this immediate thought: 'Oh, I shouldn't be touching this' (respondent r8).

There is also a relationship between perception and action: what is out of reach for action becomes noise. This is not sensory invisibility. Rather, it is closer to a particular sense of disengagement: lack of meaningful action clues in an 'alien' frame of references.¹³⁸ Several of the respondents noted that there were plenty of places for sports but not for growing food. There is a difference between the two: while both spaces engage, the terms of engagement are not the same. I experienced this myself when I decided to spend a few hours at an improvised patio at Villa Compostela. My original plan was to sit at the table, read a book, and spend an evening in the park at the garden. This simple plan began to fall apart once I noticed that several tomatoes, growing in a plant bed nearby, were touching the ground (generally, not a good thing). At first, I decided to ignore them. A few minutes later, I found myself looking for sticks and leaves to support the tomato stems and protect the tomatoes. A few minutes later, I was talking to a passerby who noticed me and stopped to talk about gardening and Villa Compostela.

¹³⁸ Sarah Ahmed (2006) explores this sort of loss of agency in detail in her phenomenological analysis of disorientation in queer and racial daily experiences.

References to public space as a space where people can connect and act together through taking care of that which demands care is critical for understanding both guerrilla gardening as a space with a particular agency and the perception of ‘white noise’. Moreover, there is a bizarre counter-point to those accounts of municipal authorities who were not able to get over the obstructing work of Villa Compostela or the Mile End gardens and, arguably, perceived them as ‘white noise’ as well. From the perspective of Lefebvre’s (1991) framework of the production of space, this mutual ‘blindness’ is not all that bizarre and is an indication of distinct social spaces.

5.2.3 Representations of Spaces

As one of the city officials (respondent r12) argued, Villa Compostela enriched only those people who were involved with its construction. To respondent r12, Villa Compostela always seemed strange (“étrange”) and disconnected: something that came across almost as “extraterrestrial” vis-à-vis the rest of the park. This is despite the fact that the site was green again (because of the gardening), just like the rest of the park, and was much less isolated from the park. Still, to respondent r12, the conception of Villa Compostela’s space was spontaneous and plant beds were improvised, while the site kept blocking the view of the heritage wall and remained at odds with Mount Royal Park. Importantly, while several of the municipal respondents reflected on the disruptive presence of Avenue du Parc or the volleyball courts in relation to the continuity of the space of Olmsted’s vision, only one of them suggested that it created a precedent for keeping Villa Compostela: it was no more out of context than a major street artery (Avenue du Parc,

which separates Mount Royal Park from Parc Jeanne-Mance) or the adjacent volleyball courts.¹³⁹ Combined, the selective dissatisfaction with Villa Compostela, coupled with a general sympathy towards the gardeners and their aspirations, point at the existence of established preconceptions and expectations of the ways in which urban green space should be. More importantly, in interpreting both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens primarily as a colonization and a lawless act illuminates authorities' disinclination to reflect on their own critique as *a* representation of urban green space, one among many.

The neglect of the site—its transformation into a space of “nothing”, a disappeared space—was the major premise for the intervention from the guerrilla group's perspective. The defunct composting site became a ‘broken’ (to use Heidegger's term, awkwardly “present-in-hand” rather than readily fit for a task) part of the public green space: locked away and inaccessible for public activities. Group members broadly perceived it as an ‘illegal’ act of the municipal authorities, who made public space private not through a legal property framework but through the breakdown in the frame of references. More specifically, while municipal authorities were still aware of the public ownership of the composting site, which was ‘put on hold’ but remained a part of the municipal capital, for the creators of Villa Compostela this was not evident, as they based their judgment not on land use and ownership maps but on that which was present in hand. For gardeners, operating with a different set of values, practices, and representations, the ‘broken’ state of the site, which had been released from its previous context, corresponded with the condition of its ambiguity: old definitions could be challenged. This, in part, explains why the gardeners did not merely demolish the site and plant grass in its place in order to restore the

¹³⁹ Several municipal authorities whom I interviewed reflected on the possibility to move these courts for the same reason as VC. Yet, the courts have been there for years and still remain while VC has been removed.

lawn. The perception of the ‘broken’ condition of the site—its present-in-hand mode—became possible from a specific perspective:

Respondent: [in relation to how VC contributed to the creation of PS] *Where we did it was already a public space, but we defined a new public space in the public space that was different, and I think it brings it up because it’s not just a public space where you pass by or you just sit. There is sharing and exchange that happens, so I think it’s more than just a public space.*

Interviewer: *So, are you saying that there is now public space within public space?*

Respondent: *It was already a public space because it is Parc Jeanne-Mance but, yeah, we created another dimension in the park (respondent r7).*

Further evidence of distinct representations of space arises from the topic of waste and contamination. For municipal authorities, one of the major problems of Villa Compostela specifically, and of non-sanctioned urban gardening in general, is the quality of soil on municipal land:

Respondent: *They [the gardeners] asked us if they could plant vegetables in the “saillies” [in French, parts of a sidewalk around trees and at road corners with bare soil], but here we have a position that we don’t know the type of soil that there is in the saillies. So, we don’t know if it is [a subject to] contamination. We don’t like [when] people plant in the saillies but we see it in Rosemont the mayor is for that, so gave some saillies to people to plant vegetables, but we [the borough of Plateau-Mont-Royal]*

prefer pots for people to plant vegetables and soil, we know, is not contaminated
(respondent r11).

For the gardeners, it is the topic of garbage on the site and waste (of land):

Respondent: [In relation to how the project contributes to the creation of public space]
Mainly, through the opening of the eyes of people who pass by or other people who hear about it: that we can take public space—labeled public space—and actually make use of it. We don't even ask about it. If it's public it means that the public can go and use it for the benefit of all.

Interviewer: *What do you mean by “making use of it”?*

Respondent: *Making use of it, as opposed to [it] being a dump that it was. It was covered in garbage. ... Make people involved. Make them feel that they have a right and an opportunity [to empower themselves].*

Interviewer: *And how would it be different from a dumpster, having a right to an opportunity to create a dumpster?* [respondent laughing] *I know, it sounds stupid, but...*

Respondent: *No, no, I think there are dumpsters already... Because there is degradation with dump. With garbage, [it is] degradation: an objective degradation of the ecosystem, of the life of people. It's a point of possible pollution and infections, and bad smells. These are negative—objectively negative—things* (respondent r3).

The subject of pollution is also connected to respect for the professional arrangements that are planned in advance for existing spaces (*e.g.*, municipal plants and their selection that are

prepared for planters and municipal plant beds in the Mile End neighbourhood). This concern is particularly important to municipal employees and authorities due to the need to respond to constituents' demands, as was the case with St-Joseph Boulevard:

Respondent: [Local residents say that] *it's not nice, we know that you don't want to clean, you don't have the time, you are always cutting, and I pay more taxes, and it's not nice and it devaluates my building [i.e., the presence of wild plants—weeds—instead of the City work] ... When we did la terre-pleine St. Joseph, it was terrible and I worked a lot with my boss and with the mayor, with everybody to say no-no-no... And we provided information ... to educate people why we needed those types of aménagement [here, fr.. for design] [because] it's boring. [We need] biodiversity for the animals, the bees, only to have something different, because life is everything. We cannot have only one type of design...* (respondent r11)

Municipal authorities remain responsible to constituents: if the locals want 'nice' flowers because they show a proper use of their tax money, municipalities cannot say that the space is already taken (respondents r10 and r11). This responsibility goes beyond taxes. Specifically in relation to soil contamination, one of the city workers (respondent r11) noted that in public space (*i.e.*, on municipal property) the city was responsible as it did not necessarily know what goes into the

ground (*e.g.*, chemicals such as salt or animal excrement).¹⁴⁰ ¹⁴¹ As for guerrilla gardeners, their general approach to what they saw as misuse was not that different from that of municipal authorities. For guerrilla gardeners, the subject of pollution plays a substantial role in defining appearances of misuse and the reasons (design strategies) for an intervention. As respondent r3 pointed out, you can take a ‘labeled’ public space and actually use it for the benefit of all, as opposed to allowing it to remain a dump with garbage, dog waste, and scratchy weeds. The reference to a state of neglect as a sign of pollution of the composting site was common among those respondents who worked closely with it. One of them (respondent r7) used the word

¹⁴⁰ In an adjacent borough—the Rosemont-La Petite-Patrie—certain “saillies” [designated sidewalk areas with bare soil] are available to residents for planting (“à verdir”). The borough’s webpage at the Ville de Montréal’s website contains an interactive map with the help of which residents can chose “les espaces publics à verdir”: http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/portal/page?_pageid=7357,142051406&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

¹⁴¹ The subject of contamination in this project became surprisingly revealing for me personally. On one or two occasions, members of the group asked me if I wanted to taste a growing plant (*e.g.*, a mint). They would just pick it, eat it while going about their business, and offer me some. And each time, even just for a moment, I had to fight through my hesitation: what do I know about the quality of the soil on which it grows? I fully realized that a tiny bit of mint could hardly damage my health. Moreover, from time to time, I forage fruit trees in the city without thinking too much about the quality of the soil. So, why then? I came to realize that it was the context that was making me aware of the issue more than usual. I was accustomed to the idea that, as a rule, food *should* come from designated areas, most of which are non-urban areas, despite the fact that I have little knowledge of the chemicals that are used in those locations or of any side-contamination that might come from adjacent traffic (*e.g.*, highways). Despite this, I was used to the way things were and, as I came to realize, I had considerable trust in the spatial practices of food growing. The fear of contamination brought the issue of this trust into the spotlight, as it was not really contamination that I became aware of, but rather that I became aware of stepping out of a familiar context into a space which suspended—no longer universal (“present-in-hand”)—mode emerged for me via my unexpected fear of contamination. What should I do in this new space? Without making a single move I made a journey.

“scary” to describe the condition of the site prior to its re-appropriation. This is thought-provoking specifically for the reason that an easily observable parcel of land, the size of an average living room, in a well-used part of the park is obviously not scary. According to the respondent, its scariness came from its general appearance as grey, closed, empty, and uninviting. Similar to authorities, narratives around pollution and contamination (*i.e.*, the same animal waste) point to the rejection of certain actions and outcomes as well as the space that makes them possible.¹⁴²

To conclude, in October 2014, several members of the group that created Villa Compostela gathered outside the composting site to meet with elected municipal authorities and a city employee. This meeting followed an earlier attempt by authorities to evict the garden (see **Fig. 5.9**) that failed because of the unexpectedly strong support for the Villa Compostela initiative that the municipal authorities encountered. During the meeting, the group was told that the site would be eventually shut down. Villa Compostela could not remain there because of the property issues and also because of the inability of the municipal authorities to keep the garden in the park. The city employee added that the preservation of Villa Compostela in the park could lead to its uncontrollable spread. In return, the officials offered to work with the group in locations and at times designated by the authorities. It was uplifting that the officials were willing to support the group and its zeal for urban gardening. It was also quite evident that they had no desire to

¹⁴² A consistent presence of the subject of dirt and pollution greatly resonates with Mary Douglas’ (1966) anthropological analysis of transgression and the interchangeability of morals and pollution: pollution articulates borders that are not to be crossed. It does so by equating that which can be acquired across these borders to dirt that poses danger to the purity (*i.e.*, integrity) of the original space. Accused of ‘polluting’, a transgressor can be judged and stripped of the authority that the knowledge that is acquired ‘beyond the limits’ can provide.

recognize or support their work in the park, which went beyond gardening.¹⁴³ Yet, this was a critical aspect of the garden in the park. In contrast to formal revitalization interventions, Villa Compostela was a kind of interpretation that produced non-excluding results and relied on an ambiguity of belonging to deliver and keep these results. I started this chapter with a note that despite some radical differences, three spaces—urban green space, a composting site, and a guerrilla garden-driven community space—managed to co-exist for an extended period of time. In answering the question of how it was possible for municipal authorities not to recognize the intertwining of spaces that mutually reinforced one another, the present chapter shows that the officials failed to recognize the guerrilla intervention as a coherent social space rather than a gardening practice. In the next chapter, I take advantage of the observed overlap and a consequent intertwining of the social spaces in order to explore both their composition and relevance for the subject of non-compartmentalized urban environments. It is also possible to reformulate this objective as a question: On what terms was this remarkable compatibility of three spaces that mutually reinforced one another carried out?

¹⁴³ It is important to stress that the municipal authorities whom I interviewed were not blindly dismissive of the practice. As one of them (respondent r11) noted, they would like to know why residents preferred the spots that they used. The respondent added that this type of vision was very interesting because the city wanted people to participate in their communities. Yet, this has to be done in a certain way and that is why it is important to know the reasons for which this particular initiative took place. Contamination remains the respondent's biggest consideration.

Chapter 6. Space of Difference: Structure, Value, and Non-compartmentalizing

Potential

During one of the interviews that I conducted, a City employee questioned whether acknowledging spaces such as Villa Compostela would mean planning for practices that create them: for example, leaving designated spaces for bottom-up spontaneous space making. In my opinion, while fixing the illegal aspect of the practice, this would also be a major misunderstanding of a principal reason for the appearance of both Villa Compostela and even the Mile End gardens. Both sites aimed to re-interpret the meaning of the contested built form and what kind of action it affords rather than to clear up some room for themselves. It is critical to understand what the intended contestation via a non-controlled by the officials action delivers and how this can be achieved in a legal way without losing sight of the action's spirit and objectives.

In this respect, the non-sanctioned part of the action has two critical aspects that make the guerrilla space insightful rather than simply illicit. First, it established a certain fashion of re-interpretation. The illegal space of both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens relied on the re-purposing of what already existed rather than on the dis-possession of a plot of land and the termination of an existing program. In effect, this aspect of the guerrilla undertaking illuminates a particular kind of the structure of a space in which new 'owners' remain humble because the rules that they create for a re-appropriated space can never get set in stone.

Second, the guerrilla action created an overlap of social spaces. In the previous chapter I explored the possibility of understanding Parc Jeanne-Mance, the composting site, and Villa Compostela (together with the Mile End gardens) as distinct social spaces that create distinct conditions on which vegetation appears and facilitates human agency in the city. To consider them as basically the same (*i.e.*, as competing social spaces) was pivotal for exposing these spaces as equally situated perspectives that present competing appearances and modes of agency to the same physical objects. Once treated as a ‘fair fight’, their continuous competition, rather than elimination of one space by another, creates a particular—liminal—kind of space that eludes a rigid definition because no single social space, and, consequently, no single representation of space, can fully claim the contested objects. Combined, it is hard to underestimate the importance of these two aspects—humility and liminality—for the subject of non-compartmentalizing logic of urban development that aims to step away from rigid and exclusive frameworks. In this chapter, I closely look at both of them.

In this chapter, I take a close look at the terms on which the existence of a ‘mesh’ of spaces becomes possible specifically on the ground of a never-to-be-completed interpretation. Ultimately, I focus on three major themes that come out of the ephemeral guerrilla gardening space and that can be easily overshadowed by its most disturbing—illegal—appearance. First, it is the ‘catalyst’ quality of the guerrilla gardening intervention that contributed to the revitalization of a part of the park. I develop a discussion of Villa Compostela as a catalyst vis-à-vis the formal catalyst project of Place des festivals (by Daoust Lestage) in the core of Quartier des Spectacles, also located in Montréal. While the two projects differ immensely in scale and complexity, both emerged to address a similar problem of dissipating public space and lost urban fabric. The modes of two interventions are strikingly different, however, and this brings me to

the second theme. It is the uninvited nature of Villa Compostela's catalyst effect that, as a space, manifests itself through the logic of ephemerality and structural humility. I explore both through the lens of Edward Relph's (1981) concept of environmental humility. The concept provides a key for moving beyond the illegality of guerrilla gardening and helping to focus on it as a unregulated spatial practice, therefore, distinguishing it from the criminal aspects of illegality (*cf.* Loukaitou-Sideris, 2016). In the presence of this unregulated practice, to understand the factors that contribute to the non-compartmentalized quality of the encountered overlap of spaces becomes both possible and critical. This, in turn, brings me to the third theme that the present chapter addresses. It is to move away from comprehending both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens as primarily an illegal space (although this aspect should not be neglected) and, instead, to focus on its value as an instance of liminal space which creation and maintenance depends on a different set of techniques. In this case, liminal space is not defined by physical edges that might contribute to the ambiguity of belonging (Bobic, 2004). Rather, it is defined by phenomenological *epoché* for the identification of new meaning-potent 'ruptures' in established representations of built form. This is a manifestation of an actor claiming his or her right to the city by choosing to situate perceived phenomena in an alternative context with alternative modes of behaviour. To accept instances of liminal space as a spatial manifestation of social capital building that breaks through formalized top-down and fragmenting representations of space is to recognize one's right to the city rather than to elected officials and experts only. Consequently, to recognize one's right to the city through instances of liminal space is to think of design in terms that give these instances both instrumentality and value.

6.1 Space of Difference

The condition of liminality that the act of uninvited re-interpretation brings forth is one way to see beyond the illicit nature of guerrilla gardening. In the case of Villa Compostela, this starts with the fence that was crossed (but not obliterated) in order to convert the shut-down composting site into a community gardening public space at the public park. Even before being crossed the fence had already been somewhat ambiguous for the gardeners: appearing not only as an articulation of the composting site but also as a relic, guarding a program that no longer functioned or was accessible. The dual appearance of the fence (and of the site in general) was interpreted by the group members as a rupture in the publicness of the park: the gardeners recognized a zone of ambiguity that was ‘outlined’ by a clash of public and quasi-private domains. What the gardeners perceived was a part of the park—with the compost bins, soil, grass, and all other plants—having become ‘privatized’ by a sanctioned ‘disappearance’ from the public realm into the realm of municipal capital on hold (*cf.* Cuthbert, 2017), while the fence that once was an envelope of *Tourne-Sol* re-emerged as a notice about this transformation and, as such, as a barrier. Although this sort of recognition is perfectly in line with Bobic’s (2004) analysis of instances of liminal space as zones of ambiguity of belonging at the edges of domains or scales, there is a particular—phenomenological—connotation to it that eludes Bobic’s approach and that is critical for understanding the work of guerrilla gardening and other quasi-spontaneous contesting spatial practices. This is the work of *epoché*: a phenomenological procedure that signifies a suspension of all presuppositions towards the appearance of an observed phenomenon. Why would it be plausible to think of gardener’s recognition of the ambiguity of the fence as *epoché*? This kind of *epoché* is different from Husserl’s original use of

the term: a conscious intent to detach oneself from all presuppositions and judgements towards a perceived entity for the duration and purposes of a phenomenological inquiry. Instead, it is much closer to Walton's (2011) discussion of *epoché* that stems from her unexpected encounter with daffodils in a parking lot.¹⁴⁴ The major premise is the same: *epoché* begins with the realization of the disjunction between a phenomenon and its appearance. In this particular case several of the interviewed group members perceived the defunct composting site as a breakdown of the public space in the park rather than a composting site. As one of them specified (Respondent r8), "*there was nothing there*", while there was clearly something. While phenomenological reduction does not eliminate positionality of perception, it does make it both visible and available for reflection, and phenomenology encounters a number of ways in which positionality of perception manifests itself and can be revealed via *epoché*. This is in line with Heidegger's (1996) phenomenological take on worldly entities that have two simultaneous modes of existence: useful or "ready-in-hand", which is *situated* in the context of a task, and broken or "present-in-hand", emerged and available for re-appearance. While it was always the same composting site, the gardeners chose to consider its state as "broken", which resulted in the "present-in-hand" mode in a particular way: the composting site disappeared as a meaningful entity and presented itself as something else, yet to be observed and defined, albeit from another situated position. A deliberate drawing of the "equipment" out of an agreed-upon context into the "present-in-hand" mode, available for care, was an act of *epoché*. In the present case, however, *epoché* was not a result of an epistemological exercise. It was a manifestation of a different context from which the composting site could be perceived as broken and re-defined. A possibility of a distinct (from the park) context—vegetation as the food in the city—enabled group members with a position from

¹⁴⁴ See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion

which they gained a particular perspective towards the defunct composting site: first, as “nothing” and, then, as a community garden. Both the location of the composting site and its composting function played a great role in making this latter context an applicable option. From this context, the gardeners were prepared not only to perceive the composting site in the present-in-hand mode, but also to know how both to re-interpret and to re-fit it into the ‘proper’ public green space.

Similar to Downing and Olmsted, the group members did not see grass primarily as a plant (*e.g.*, as a form of organic matter)¹⁴⁵ and a lawn that covers the park grounds as a lot of this plant. In the context of food in the city, grass is anything but a plant (at most, it is a *useless* plant: *e.g.*, grass is green [Respondent r6]; grass is a waste, a carpet [Respondent r7]; one cannot do a lot with grass [Respondent r8]). The lawn is perceived as an alien element that obstructs gardeners’ agency and hides soil (in the most literal Heidegger’s sense, by making soil stay behind the lawn [Respondent r8]). The appearance of green and public space surface as grass rather than as soil is

¹⁴⁵ Also, they were just as likely as the officials to talk about certain plant species as weeds.

limiting in terms of actions that this appearance affords (*i.e.*, sitting, playing sports, *etc.*).¹⁴⁶ Ultimately, grass becomes not only a false appearance of soil, but also, in this capacity, it becomes a border that makes soil inaccessible. In this respect, lawn, both as a misleading appearance and a border, is a version of Bobic's (2004) edge that separates one representation of urban nature from another. In a fashion similar to Bobic's (2004) physical edges that dis/connect scales or domains, a context-driven 'edge' is a phenomenon that causes *and* hosts an unresolved dispute of different contexts over its belonging to one context or another and its 'proper' appearance.

To illustrate, consider the fence that outlined the composting site Tourne-Sol. After the appropriation of the site by the group, while the fence structurally and functionally remained the same physical object, it became an integral part of the space of Villa Compostela: the major structural element that gave a new space some sort of permanence and protection. This did not change the fact that the fence remained an envelope of the composting site. Whether defunct or not, the composting site was the only legitimate space at this location. The fence, therefore,

¹⁴⁶ This was not only the case of Villa Compostela. In Mile End, with a somewhat similar emphasis on exposure and education, the group aimed at a similar goal of giving people a concrete frame of reference for the realization of alternative ways in which interested observers can provide for themselves and spend their daytime. This sentiment, however, was not necessarily supported by every single group member. For example, Respondent r4 expressed doubts that the display of growing vegetables alone could cause a major paradigm shift. This was in addition to the fact that the group was late with introducing explanatory signs in the Mile End gardens. Instead, the respondent saw a greater benefit of the action in its organizational component that enabled people both to participate and to learn. In some respects, this does add to the concerns with the colonization of urban space in which plants may or may not be neutral agents. The gardeners, just like the authorities, were willing to differentiate good and bad plants. The fact that the both shared the sentiment of creating the 'right' natural environment in the city that would secure a certain representation cannot be overlooked (*cf.* Caminero-Santangelo & Myers, 2011; Power, 2005).

became a key element in two different spaces, and through this fence these two spaces could simultaneously co-exist. The same can be said about plants (including the lawn) and soil. In this respect, the observed overlay of spaces of Parc Jeanne-Mance, Tourne-Sol, and Villa Compostela was producing liminal space of a phenomenological rather than of a dialectical character. This is particularly clear vis-à-vis Bobic's (2004) edges of built form that rely on *adjacent* domains or scales and, in this respect, are much more in line with Lefebvre's dialectical understanding of difference.

In this state of affairs, the existence of Villa Compostela was particularly intriguing. On the one hand, it was one of the spaces that formed the overlay. On the other hand, it was the space that emerged in response to an overlay of Parc Jeanne-Mance and the composting site. Is it possible that Villa Compostela was the only actual liminal space that came out of the tension between the park and the composting site? Villa Compostela undoubtedly became the result of re-interpretation and re-appropriation that manifested the ambiguity of both belonging and meaning created by the tension between the publicness of the park and the privateness of the defunct composting site. In this capacity, Villa Compostela was an ephemeral—non-secured—entity with all the traits of a social space, although without a clear territory. It was a space that was structured and concrete and yet contingent upon the condition of liminality, stipulated by the tension between the context of an urban green public space and the cancelled context of a composting site. Yet, the recognition of Villa Compostela solely and exclusively as a liminal space would run counter to gardeners' own arguments that with the creation of Villa Compostela the undefined space of the defunct composting site once again became someone's defined and structured project.

That being stated, Villa Compostela was definitely not just another social space with secured territoriality (in Sack's [1986] terms). Its interpretive and precarious nature put it in the unique position of articulating and holding together a complex arrangement of three different representations of vegetation in the city. More specifically, in this arrangement a plant becomes a phenomenon that continues to be open for re-discovery and re-definition: while brought into the process of re-interpretation by the creation of Villa Compostela, it never received a new definite appearance due to the illegality of the action. Is it a piece of organic decay that can be turned into fertilizer? Is it lawn? Is it a growing vegetable? In fact, due to the work of the group it is all three and, for that matter, never just one of them. A re-interpretation that is never completed ensures the dominant presence of difference merely because the dominant norm is never set. Going back to Lefebvre's differential space (1991), this is not to argue that the quest for differential space is completed. Instead, when it comes to re-interpretive space-making practices, a phenomenological approach reveals the capacity of liminal space to live up to Lefebvre's expectations of differential space. In this case, its scale is predominantly human and the method of inception is phenomenological rather than dialectical.

6.2 Liminal Space Making and its Non-compartmentalizing Logic: Structural Humility

Disorder to an urban environment that unsanctioned space-making practices can bring is a big concern for the officials. Is the ephemeral and unsettling space of guerrilla gardening a chaotic one? Does it re-interpret with a particular logic, structure, and types of built form in mind? Or is it merely out of balance and pushes everything else out of balance as well? The story of Villa

Compostela suggests that the creation of an illegal garden solved (certainly on its own terms) the problem of an abandoned and no longer public part of the park. To explore the space of Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens specifically as a constructed space remains critical for understanding the ways in which new contexts and new urban agendas can emerge and be integrated into urban fabric rather than be feared. The goal is to see whether an unsettling space can possess the logic that takes it beyond its unprofessional and even disturbing immediate appearance towards its re-interpretive potential. This means addressing a set of more specific questions. How clearly does the space of Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens reflect its function? How coherent is the structure of the space? How does it interact with its immediate surroundings? Does it attempt being pleasing to the eye (*i.e.*, striving for communication, acceptance, or for sheer pragmatism) and, if so, on what terms? How does it express any particular message? These are essential questions for the analysis of a constructed space. Yet, the space of Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens is no ordinary constructed space. Not only is it informal and unsanctioned, it is also a somewhat liminal space. While these questions remain pertinent, their application to the case needs to be construed specifically through the condition of liminality of the studied case. What is the spatial composition of this liminality? Or, more specifically, on what terms is Villa Compostela not just another ‘compartment’ in *the* urban space and instead emerges as a non-compartmentalized, but not destructive, space?

The non-sanctioned creation of both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens resulted in a particular spatial structure, contingent upon the inability of the group both to abolish the territoriality of a ‘colonized’ space and to acquire its own fixed territory. Participants had to come to realize that they were not entitled to the land, their rules were not respected by default, and

their creation was not secured.¹⁴⁷ In spatial terms, this can be captured as structural humility, in both drawing from and contributing to Relph's (1981) concept of environmental humility (see Chapter 1), and in this section I explore its constitution. The concept of environmental humility is a particular response to a broad call for the need for urban environments to remain versatile, sensitive to local issues and impacts, and responsive to new programs. The purpose of the concept, in which "humility" is a key part, is to introduce a set of principles for city-making practitioners that facilitates a shift from prescriptive to more 'descriptive' planning and design strategies. As I discuss in Chapter 1, it is specifically against the problem of "hyperplanning" that Relph (1981) introduces and develops the concept of environmental humility. Relph draws extensively from Heidegger's notion of appropriation and argues for the necessity to recognize and accept an ensemble of actors in an existing place (or a place in making) that would essentially constitute the driving force behind its development. While for the most part Relph leaves the concept at the level of a mindset, rather than a clearly developed framework, its principal goal is plain: it is for a professional to consider a design intervention with a clear understanding that things would get out of control once the work is done. Relph is not a prophet

¹⁴⁷ In some cases this means accepting the possibility that something can get destroyed. In Villa Compostela, one of the plant beds got severely damaged by taggers who wanted to get to the monastery wall. Some of the furniture was taken away. Another accident which was also quite specific to Montréal (a bilingual city in a predominantly French-speaking province), involved the use of the English language at Villa Compostela. An anonymous tag—"Quebec français"—painted in blue on the monastery wall is a recurring problem for municipal authorities in the park. This political act affected Villa Compostela as well, as at one point the same message appeared on one of the design elements of the garden and, later, the same blue paint was used to paint over the list of the English part of the list of the rules that were explaining the space (**Fig. 6.1**)

of chaos, however, and in a paper *Modernity and the Reclamation of Place* (Relph, 1993)¹⁴⁸ he indirectly provides a much more graspable anchor for the concept—the need for imperfection (to be either recognized or fostered). This is to acknowledge the co-presence of multiple actors (both human and non-human) whose co-existence composes a given place. Little can be argued against this claim, although the application of the concept in formalized top-down urban environment appears to be challenging. In this section, I focus on those aspects of both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens that the concept of environmental humility illuminates and that could be translated into comprehension and design of liminal spaces. It is critical that the gardeners did not necessarily want to be humble. In this case, humility is not a notion of ethical quality. It is humility of a space that was shaped by the group’s acceptance of its insecurity that nevertheless followed a bold act of re-appropriation.¹⁴⁹ There are three aspects to this kind of humility.

6.2.1 Programmatic Sensitivity

¹⁴⁸ It was published in a thematic phenomenological volume *Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology* (Seamon, ed., 1993).

¹⁴⁹ In this respect, I find it necessary to emphasize that the ‘humility’ of the guerrilla gardening space is somewhat distinct from one’s own humility for which Relph advocates in his work. This distinction is not a paradigmatic one, however. While Relph’s approach is humanistic and, therefore, subject-centred, the structural humility of the guerrilla gardening space is an object-tailored quality. Yet, the latter would hardly be possible without the former: the survival of Villa Compostela would be much less possible without the acceptance of a humble outlook by its creators in the first place. The illegal nature of the space urges its creators to embrace a humble space-making approach but by no means the space comes already equipped with it.

In order to remain guerrilla, which means to keep doing what they find necessary rather than what is officially prescribed, the group members have to accept that neither an envelope nor a composition of their space is secured. As discussed, the garden creators made use of the fence that outlined the composting site as a protector and a major structural element of Villa Compostela, but they also knew that the fence was never theirs. Moreover, in the presence of this constant reminder of another and legitimate program, it became only more difficult to set their own rules. On the one hand, this insecurity was a principal part of the conception of the space:

[in relation to how this project is different from community gardening] Respondent: *Community gardening is regulated by the City. So there is certain control, while here it's not really regulated by anyone. It's a collective movement and everybody brings their ideas, and they try to create something and maintain whatever is created by someone. And that makes it interesting because day by day you go there, and there is something new, and I'm just amazed.* (Respondent r6).

On the other hand, humility becomes a matter of survival for an uninvited space, embedded into another space (of a park) with its own program for public space:

Interviewer: *With the people who slept on the site, what was the border in that case?*

Respondent: *You see, there, I felt uncomfortable with that because one of the people just came out of jail a few days ago. Two other people are rubbing alcohol addicts. So they are people who can easily be targeted by the police and easily the police can say: "Oh, the site got to close down as the site becoming a squatting site for these people." But*

that again, that's probably psychological. I will never... It doesn't belong to me, it is a public space, that's what public is. It is the same thing that happened to me at "Occupy": there were discussion on how we would control and not accept dangerous people. Who am I to judge who is dangerous? I might be more dangerous than anybody else. So, it's not up to me. I am just wishing... As I told you, the only thing we told them: "We hope you will be respectful of what we are doing here", and that's it.

Interviewer: *Well, how did you feel when you discovered these people first time?*

Respondent: *Uncomfortable. Because it was a space that I had only seen used... You know, when you invest yourself, your time, and your friends', and people [that] you don't know who come and invest theirs, it feels [as] a part of you. And if it is a public space, it feels somehow as an extension of your private space. Acknowledging it... You have no rights over it, but psychologically it feels as an extension. It's something that you have nurtured, that you have given part of yourself, so you are scared that it might get destroyed."* (Respondent r3)

To keep the formally unregulated space going means to exercise other modes of regulation. In this case, one of the most principal of them is to remain sensitive to preexisting and adjacent programs. A good example comes from the Mile End gardens where, in one of the locations, the gardeners used a series of municipal planters for their vegetables (**Fig. 6.2**). Due to a nearby construction that occurred shortly after, the City kept moving the planters through the summer without removing the growing vegetables. At one point along this dynamic restructuring of the guerrilla gardening space, the gardeners added signs into the planters, explaining the contents, thus remaining active in this particular garden. Conversely, a situation with the Mile End library

whose planters the gardeners tried to use is exemplary for the results that a lack of sensitivity can deliver. At this location, the initiative of the gardeners was particularly irritating for authorities due to the civic function of the library and long-term plans of the municipality to keep the library's façade and immediate surroundings pleasing to the eye. The actions of the group were taken as inconsiderate and disrespectful of these ongoing plans and of the people who came up with these plans. The authorities asked those participants who were working on this site to dig out their plants and to leave.

All this is not to say that in being sensitive and dynamic the spaces of guerrilla gardening are destined to remain auxiliary and vernacular at best or shoddy at worst. In fact, in relation to the question of whether specifically the design (rather than the function) of Villa Compostela expresses any particular message, the answer is positive, and the message comes with its most important building material: Villa Compostela is all about soil. Similar to what concrete was to Le Corbusier, soil is not only a matter of choice for the gardeners, but also a material that goes beyond sheer utility and calls for a distinct appearance of conceived urban space. As one of the respondents (Respondent r8) pointed out, it was not enough to create a set of plant beds; for passers-by they could simply appear as piles of dirt. The garden creators had to strategize and make sure that before they created a new plant bed, a stock of vegetables was already growing on an existing one. This way, the continuity of a purpose and an intended appearance was carried out from one plant bed to another, assuring both the coherence and the integrity of the space as an aesthetically expressive entity rather than merely a utilitarian one. This logic balances out the critique of one of the municipal employees (Respondent r12) who stressed that the informal look of the plant beds contrasted with that of the park. While the design of Villa Compostela was indeed informal, it was neither casual nor sloppy. Just as concrete, which was called to bring up

new geometries and new modes of agency for living in the industrial city, soil was brought up along with the plants and in contrast with the lawn (as a different way of having plants) to create its own geometries and possibilities. Even more exemplary, in Parc Jeanne-Mance, the police interfered with an attempt of several group members to plant three cherry trees across the path that separated the composting site on its west side from the rest of the park. A part of the reason for planting these trees was to create the experience of a passage, where the growing trees on one side would, with the time, match the tree and the fence of the other side (Respondent r3). The fact that it takes years for trees to survive the winter and pruning and to mature did not stop the involved group members. It was an act of incepting a pure idea of a space that makes me think of a series of light beams directed vertically into the sky: a message that is as articulate as it is immaterial.

6.2.2. Soft Rules and Soft Rulers

As noted, the gardeners did consider the conditions of informality and non-security as a part of their design strategy: to create community-driven—“free of rules”—public space. Despite the rule-free agenda for Villa Compostela, rules did exist, and a sign that the group installed in the garden (Fig. 5.7) to provide suggestive instructions for the new space was a clear evidence to that. New rulers existed as well, but they were non-human actors. In order to gain access specifically to the space of both Villa Compostela (rather than the composting site) and the Mile End gardens (rather than municipal sidewalk planters) and, consequently, to a mode of agency that it afforded, one needed to come to respect the logic of growing plans. Most group members

realized that both the Mile End gardens and Villa Compostela created new borders rather than solely eliminated old ones. As Respondent r5 articulated, there was a difference between community gardening, which is full of rules, and Villa Compostela, the rules of which were flexible. The respondent also knew that such an understanding of Villa Compostela was somewhat idealistic. With the inception of the garden, an ambiguous nobody's space of the defunct composting site once again became someone's project; it became defined. Nevertheless, both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens is a space that reflects the desire of participants to rely on multiple interventions that are co-organized by a common cause rather than by a common command centre.¹⁵⁰

Expectedly, this raises the question of whether the development of Villa Compostela was a finite process. Villa Compostela provides an illuminating case for exploring one of the most critical concerns for the authorities: the potential of an unsettling space for uncontrollable growth (**Fig. 6.3**). Once the group members overcame the initial mental border of digging through the lawn, they could easily spread the garden as far as the lawn stretched. This did not happen,

¹⁵⁰ In an interview with a group member:

Interviewer: *Do you think that Villa Compostela, at this stage, creates some sort of possibilities for social or political engagement?*

Respondent: *Yes, for sure, because it gives the opportunity to people to do something, and it shows that it's possible that we decide how we create something for ourselves, for everyone.*

Interviewer: *Ok, how?* Respondent: *...we do that?* Interviewer: *Yes.*

Respondent: *We grow food and people can participate: they can taste, they can give. Even people from the streets [homeless people], they come, and they help, and they garden. It is like when I go there and there are a few homeless guys: they come and they take care of the garden because they worked before in the fields in their countries. So, they know a lot about it and they come and help. At the same time, it is a nice space for them. I know that sometimes they sleep there, because it's a nice environment.* (Respondent r7)

however. Both the initial configuration and the size of the composting site influenced not only the structure and program of Villa Compostela but also its own size. The ratio of the length of the developed space of Villa Compostela south of the site to the length of the site is evidence of that. From the plant bed closest to the fence, to the one that was the farthest (Fig. 5.5), the length of the appropriated lawn was approximately equal to the length of the composting site. In the spring of 2015, some of the members of the group attempted to re-create Villa Compostela and added two new plant beds south of the composting site. These beds were placed parallel to the southern border of the site and no farther than the outmost southern plant bed that was created the previous year. In short, the gardeners attempted to give a finitude to their intervention in the park lawn by enclosing a part of it that, in size, was close to the size of the composting site. The presence of ‘natural’ borders—the path to the west, the volleyball courts to the south, the street (Duluth) to the north, and the monastery wall to the east—also played an essential role in confining the space of Villa Compostela. Additionally, while some respondents (Respondent r4) spoke of crossing the path and making plant beds on the other side, others (Respondents r6 and r7) spoke of the fact that it was becoming logistically difficult to create new plant beds too far from the site and simply impossible to do so too close to the volleyball courts. Equally, the group decided not to integrate the monastery wall into the space of Villa Compostela in order to avoid negative reaction from the authorities. Importantly, the gardeners had to deal with their own fears of chaos that uncontrollable growth of space could create. As Respondent r4 noted, the part of the park that lied west of the path was more open and vast and was not as contained. Yet, with new opportunities for expansion it also promised a new level of unwanted complexity for Villa Compostela.

All this is not to say that Villa Compostela could never take over the park (it was a space out of re-interpretation of grass and soil, among other things, after all), but rather to point out that its growth was stipulated by a variety of factors that potentially left room for control over its growth. When I asked the respondents to describe some of the elements of Villa Compostela that were critical to its existence, they pointed at the fence, the trees, the pole, the path, and the growing plants. With the exception of the plants, every other major element that they named existed before the emergence of Villa Compostela. In creating Villa Compostela, Guerrilla gardeners did override the meaning of the structure and of the physical elements of other spaces without any permission to do so. From an architectural (rather than a legal) perspective, the fact that there was no prior permission is important for one reason only: the group created a space that was functional, internally coherent, and yet, with the exception of the re-appropriated fence, missing its own territoriality and a clear site.

6.2.3 Bonding Elements

The third aspect of the structural humility of the resultant garden-compost-park overlay of spaces stems from the reliance of Villa Compostela on pre-existing—‘borrowed’—physical objects. Villa Compostela builds on the composting function of the site: the garden’s space fluctuates with the appearance and disappearance of plant beds but never completely vanishes, in large part because of the fence that marks a pre-existing program. The fence therefore not only outlined the composting site but also remained one of the most fundamental structural elements for Villa Compostela (although almost all the plant beds were located outside of the site), along with the

compost mills and the plant beds. It is illuminating that trees at the corners of the composting site that gave it a nature-related envelope and plant beds that were the essence of a new space were as relevant to Villa Compostela as the fence that the gardeners had to break through in order to start their work. With the emergence of Villa Compostela, the fence no longer faced the lawn directly and instead, anywhere where it was possible, its contact with the lawn was mediated by plant beds that would connect the site with the lawn of the park around it. In acting as a support for plants it became one of the most prominent displays of the space of Villa Compostela, a vertical dimension of that which it represents. The fence became co-integrated.

Similarly, in the presence of functioning compost mills, the original function of the site—composting—was re-introduced in the space of Villa Compostela, although it was no longer the defining function of the site. The gardeners re-opened the composting site for the locals. Yet, their attitude towards the mills (or turbines, as they called the mills) was in some respects close to that of the authorities who saw the capacity of the composting site to be out of scale for the actual needs of the area. A part of the park lawn also became integral to the space of Villa Compostela. South of the fence, semi-enclosed by plant beds, a portion of it was integrated into Villa Compostela as a gardening-free ‘room’ of the community space of Villa Compostela (rather than of the park only). Overall, it is hard to understand the function of Villa Compostela without reference to the ‘underlying’ space of the composting site. The toolbox, a direct link to the soil that compost creates, the presence of still functioning composting mills, and the general mission of the composting site substantially structured the development of the space of Villa Compostela and its function.

With all this in mind, it would be erroneous to understand the space of Villa Compostela as strictly utilitarian and garden-related. Because of the work of the gardeners and the existence of

both the composting site, which the gardeners kept intact, and the park, Villa Compostela consisted of several different interrelated functions: in addition to gardening, it took on composting and it also included a space for leisure and non-gardening activities south of the site (*i.e.*, the re-integrated lawn). There, the group added a table with a couple of chairs and also arranged plant beds in a way that gave a part of the lawn a sense of an enclosure with a wooden sculpture in the centre of it (**Fig. 6.4**). This part of the space of Villa Compostela was later used for free yoga classes, led by one of the group members. All the gardeners whom I had a chance to interview regarding the experiential composition of Villa Compostela differentiated the parts of Villa Compostela according to different rhythms and sensations that they evoked. To illustrate, Respondent r7 noted that the garden itself (*i.e.*, everywhere where the plants, but not the lawn, were) brought a more meditative rhythm, while inside the fence the rhythm changed to fast-paced because of the work and the tools, and the the part of Villa Compostela with a lawn, the sculpture, and the table with the chairs suggested relaxation (Fig. 5.6). This is to emphasize the complexity of Villa Compostela as a carefully conceived and informally executed space that built on the fusion of three different contexts and programs and that cannot be brought down to a mere gardening plot.

6.3 Liminal Space and Urban Development: Guerrilla Gardening and the Quartier des Spectacles as Examples of Distinct Intervention Models

The structure of the space of Villa Compostela and Mile End gardens that I explore in the previous section poses a question: What are the practical benefits of having such a space?

Importantly, this is not to accept illegality as a reasonable way to create a dynamic space but, instead, to understand illegality (or, rather, irregularity) as an appearance, one among many, of a specific spatial phenomenon: liminal space. It is therefore to distinguish non-regulated spatial practices from plainly criminal ones. One way to understand the usefulness of a non-regulated space and its objectives is to consider it as a ‘catalyst’ of urban revitalization, albeit incepted through an act of re-interpreting contestation. In urban design, catalyst is a frequently used metaphor for those intervention projects that aim at revitalization of urban fabric. The metaphor suggests thinking of an urban area in question as ‘stagnating’ or ‘regressing’, and the role of an intervention project is to revert the trend. This is a general understanding of a catalyst project into which the creation of Villa Compostela appears to fit well. With the focus on revitalizing the public space of the park, Villa Compostela became an intervention project that brought back into operation the composting site and re-integrated it into the park. While the interviews revealed a certain controversy around the improved publicness of this part of the park, as I discuss in Chapter 1, public space as a *type* of built form can be confusing, if not misleading. In fact, with both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens, it is possible to see the modification of the *publicness* of all affected spaces via the possibility of having multiple independent decision-makers in each of them, yet working together.¹⁵¹ In line with Kilian’s (1998) and Mitchel’s (2003) discussions of making space public, it was not the improvement of the park or the streets but the introduction of alternative meanings and contexts to the both that supposedly increased their overall publicness. In this respect, the most effective way to recognize guerrilla gardening

¹⁵¹ As Respondent r7 noted, as a result of turning the composting site into Villa Compostela both Villa Compostela and the park could both work together and respect each other.

as a revitalization intervention project is vis-à-vis another revitalization project that was carried out formally and by professionals.

In Montréal, the work around the re-integration of the Place des arts (more specifically, the Place des festivals, Promenade des artists, and the Parterre, designed by Daoust Lestage; **Fig. 6.5**), as one of the nodes of the Quartier des spectacles, is a highly fitting example. It shares many common features with Villa Compostela despite a different mode of emergence: sanctioned, professionally executed, and technologically complex, while all of that done at a completely different scale. Despite these striking differences, the objectives behind the project were familiar. These were to repair alienated urban fabric, to create a multipurpose space, and to introduce new modes of engagement for users with local built form and with one another. The Place des arts has become one of the core elements of the Quartier des spectacles that, in turn, is a complex ensemble of exterior and interior public and private spaces that, under the guidance of the City and an overseeing collective body (Partnership of the QdesS), are a cultural destination for locals and tourists to come to festivals and to other events in the downtown part of Montréal (Fig. 4.5). In a nutshell, the emergence of the Quartier des spectacles (QdesS) in its current location was triggered by the need (put forth by l'ADISQ¹⁵²) to promote show venues in downtown Montréal and to buttress the recognition of the city as the cultural capital of Canada (PduQdesS, 2004). More specifically, the choice of the location was also stipulated by the loss of high quality public space in this part of the city and by the abundance of space left 'dead' by major transportation arteries and mega-projects of the postwar development period: a community housing block (Habitations Jeanne-Mance), the high-rises of Complex Desjardins, the Museum of Contemporary Arts, and others, all poorly interrelated (Luka, 2013). Remarkably, as

¹⁵² L'Association québécoise de l'industrie du disque, du spectacle et de la vidéo

Schwartzwald (2015) notes, the very same postwar development targeted a similar goal of giving this area a look that it deserved by being located in the heart of the city. In addition, the Quartier des spectacles in which the Place des arts is one of the most critical nodes (Thibert, 2015) also grew out of a variety of local venues and events, many of which were cultural.¹⁵³

The presence of a formalized vision for the area most certainly did not free the project from political tensions, and initially there were competing plans for the embodiment of the vision. Thibert (2015) speaks of Frank Zampino's (the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the City of Montréal at the time) attempt to implement his own plan in collaboration with SHDM,¹⁵⁴ which entailed substantial vertical development of the area. Conversely, the project that Daoust Lestage Studio proposed for the revitalization of the Place des festivals, the Promenade des artistes, the Parterre, and a stretch of Ste-Catherine street between the Desjardins Complex and the

¹⁵³ Josianne Poirier (2015) both reflects on prewar cabarets and casinos of Montréal and asserts that a festive vocation of the neighbourhoods that comprise QdesS existed for over a century. Moreover, as Poirier develops, from 1947 to 1954, an artist Robert Roussil with a group of peers revitalized a space at 1199 rue de Bleury and named it Place des arts. It was both a collective studio that was open to artists and a space for a film-club and neighbourhood committees of debate and exhibition, where they discussed Communism, among other things. Municipal authorities grew increasingly suspicious of the group and eventually evicted the studio for hygienic reasons in 1954. The termination of this first Place des arts and the creation of the second one were practically simultaneous: in 1954, mayor Jean Drapeau brought together influential economic stakeholders to propose the construction of a show venue. Poirier (2015) notes that there was a substantial gap between the original—socialist—Place des arts and the second one—often accused of serving economic interests of business elites. Yet, it was around that time that artists started to invest into the area that was being left by textile and publishing enterprises. In the beginning of 1980s, more and more big artists established their studios in the area (Poirier, 2015). Poirier (2015) also notes that at the time of official launch of the creation of the QdesS the number of artists had stabilized.

¹⁵⁴ La Société d'habitation et de développement de Montréal (SHDM)

Place des arts relied mostly on open and flat space ideology.¹⁵⁵ Eventually, the City chose the ideology that was proposed by Daoust Lestage. Thibert (2015) points out that two major principles behind the PPU for the area (*i.e.*, “Programme particulier d’urbanisme” or Planned Unit Development) were “[1] to rebuild the city starting from the public space and [2] to organize this space so that to let others animate it.” (2015, p.17).¹⁵⁶ Basically, it was to create a catalyst for the sector of the Place des arts, in a manner similar to Quartier international around the Centre de commerce mondial. As intended, and as Renée Daoust, at Daoust Lestage, expressed in an interview that I conducted for this study, it was great that the redesigned public space had become a catalyst for nearby development: many projects had been completed since. Much more specifically, an official guide to QdesS explains that the Quartier des spectacles offers conditions for the implantation of businesses of promotion, production, creation and dissemination of culture (PduQdesS, 2004). The Partnership of the QdesS manages the process, while local streets are the space of discovery, where ground floors are filled with commercial cultural businesses (PduQdesS, 2004, p.6).

The structure of the QdesS was envisioned as an ensemble of axes and nodes, while these nodes and axes, including the Place des arts with adjacent streets, were charged with the task to emerge specifically as catalysts of the revitalization of the local urban fabric. In this respect, the project by Daoust Lestage set out to achieve an ambitious goal of creating a double program for the Place des festivals and adjacent spaces. Yet, first, they had to address the same issue that the group of gardeners faced in Parc Jeanne-Mance: to repair a break in the continuity of the urban

¹⁵⁵ Indirectly reflecting on this competition of visions, Harel (2015; *cf.* Luka, 2013) notes that Montréal aims at urban development that prioritizes the densification at the human scale.

¹⁵⁶ My translation of: “[1] rebâtir la ville à partir de l’espace public et [2] aménager cet espace pour permettre à d’autres de l’animer.”

fabric along the stretch of Jeanne-Mance street (not the park!) between Ontario street and Ste-Catherine street. In this area, multiple big streets, intersections that they created, and parking spaces effectively were arresting any possibility of pedestrian enjoyment of the neighbourhood. Throughout our conversation, Renée Daoust kept going back to this issue: it was not a user-friendly space (*i.e.*, comfortable, secure, animated, interesting, defensible space in itself) that could be easily adopted by users and, therefore, “activated”.

As for the main—double program—plan, by design, the space had to become an urban theatre for special events (such as Jazz Festival) that would be capable of hosting 20,000 people on occasions and still remain an engaging space for the daily use (see **Fig. 6.6**). Daoust spoke of these two distinct programs in terms of two modes: an event mode and an urban mode that would invite flaneurs, relaxation on a bench, and either general observation of or engagement with local streets and commercial life. The creation of pedestrian-friendly Promenade des artists with its musical swings and room for interchanging art installations (see **Fig. 6.7**), the creation of all-grass-covered Parterre, distinct from stone-paved Place des festivals (on the other side of the The Place des arts), blurring out borders between sidewalks, bike lanes (on the northern side of the Museum of Contemporary Arts) and between sidewalks and car roads on Ste-Catherine and Jeanne-Mance, as well as the creation of surface-level jet fountains at Place des festivals was all part of this double-program challenge. This was not only the vision put forth Daoust Lestage, but also a principal objective for the entire Quartier des spectacles that had to rise as a whole via the consolidation of different spaces and functions (PduQdesS, 2004).

In this respect, similar to the ‘triple-space’ intervention in Parc Jeanne-Mance although not to the same extent, the ambiguity of belonging and meanings became a necessary part of making a catalyst space with two overlapping programs. This resulted in dealing with a familiar

challenge: the acceptance of the hybrid program by various official bodies. As Renée Daoust elaborated on strip-shaped restaurants along Jeanne-Mance street (between the street and the Museum of Contemporary Arts), there was no commission on these restaurants when the studio started the work, and Daoust Lestage had to convince various stakeholders to accept the design as it would help animate the open space of the Place des festivals. While Daoust Lestage had some supporters at the City, there was also considerable resistance to the idea for the sheer unfamiliarity of this type of restaurant design. Similarly, there was a problem with grass-covered surfaces. While grass was not a desirable material for the event mode of a space that had to host thousands of people, the capacity of a lawn to “soften things” (as “mineral surfaces are hard”) was a desirable choice for the urban mode of the Place des arts (and it also became the dominant type of surface at the Parterre that hosts smaller events). This created a major challenge, as festival operators insisted on using asphalt. The operators did not want the trees around the venues either, as the trees would block the view, and Daoust Lestage had to push for the need to keep at least some elements of green landscape, since the vision of the sustainable city is not only about bringing people back downtown, but also about having green hosting environment, to say the least. Yet, according to Renée Daoust, at one point the festival operators still cut down some of the trees.

Quite similarly to Villa Compostela, the intervention around the Place des arts was not entirely seamless, although, distinctly from the guerrilla gardening space, the Place des arts project was desired and anticipated by the officials and stakeholders while being delivered by professionals, renown in their field of work. In this case, the problem was neither the illegality of the action nor the fear of uncontrollable growth. In fact, to exude a positive influence on the local urban life and commercial activities that would come from the repaired and re-connected spaces

around the Place des arts was one of the mandates for the space. The problem was the necessary ambiguity of belonging and meaning that was brought by the double program for the space. This quality brings two paradigmatically distinct spaces—the Place des arts and Villa Compostela—close to each other, but does not make them the same. The major source of distinction does not stem from differences in scale, design, technical artifice, and legal statuses. Instead, it is the softness of the rules.

A particular element of the revitalization project around the Place des arts that Daoust Lestage carried out was an emphasis on activation. For Daoust Lestage this meant to create comfortable, secure, animated, interesting, and defensible space into which users would feel invited to come and which they would find exciting to use. Importantly, this has been an objective for the entire QdesS project of which the Place des arts is one of the structural nodes, and at this scale activation is curated rather than expected. A special entity—Partenariat du Quartier des spectacles, which consists of representatives from different sectors, oversees activity proposals for some of the spaces at QdesS.¹⁵⁷ While certain selection criteria apply, the composition of the Partnership aims to ensure that a diverse variety of stakeholders have a say in what events occur in open spaces of QdesS. Being a heterogeneous conglomerate of spaces (from the Place des arts to the Place d'Émilie-Gamelin and from Ste-Catherine street to Quartier Latin), QdesS strives to remain both a visual whole, via a complex use of projected light installations

¹⁵⁷ *Created in 2003, the Quartier des Spectacles Partnership is a not-for-profit organization that brings together some 60 members who are active on its territory. Its board is composed of representatives from the cultural, institutional, educational and business sectors, the city of Montreal as well as local residents. The Quartier des Spectacles allows the key stakeholders on its territory to combine their efforts and act in concert. It is supported by the City of Montreal as well as diverse partners.* (Retrieved from <http://www.quartierdesspectacles.com/en/about/qds-partnership/> on August 9th, 2017)

and displays, and a democratic space. In this respect, the Place des arts and the work of Daoust Lestage around the Place des festivals, Promenade des artistes, and the Parterre are exemplary (Luka, 2013; PduQdesS, 2004, 2006). Overall, similar to many other public-private partnerships (PPP) or even to privately owned public spaces (POPS), the focus remains on boosting up local financial and social capitals while rendering affected parts of an urban environment once again accessible and desirable. In this respect, catalyst-aiming design interventions, such as the one carried out by Daoust Lestage, is a positive digression from straightforward beautification and gentrification interventions that serve mostly business and landowners.¹⁵⁸

That being stated, a disbalance of power that one can find in many PPPs and POPS and to which Sharon Zukin (2010) plainly refers as the rule of the oligarchy can not be easily dismissed even in the case of carefully carried out QdesS. Regardless of the commercial incentives for business owners who participate in the public realm of QdesS, its very complexity, both compositional and technical, and scale that must rely on the work of professionals suggest a particular—controlled—involvement of people with its spaces. In this respect, Luka et al. (2015; see also Schwarzwald, 2015; Thibert, 2015) discuss QdesS as a conglomerate of ludic spaces for tourist class, which character of the carnival comes in two types: 1) moments of connection among different people and artists and 2) more elitists meetings of “festivaliers” and local populations. As a result, the advertised publicness of spaces such as the Place des arts, the Place

¹⁵⁸ See al Shehhi, 2014; Body-Gendrot et al., 2008; Kohn, 2004; Zukin, 2010. The complexity of navigating the public dimension of these private-public spaces is well reflected in Zukin’s (2010) account of the revitalization of the Union Square in NYC. While it started as a PPP (a business-improvement district, to be precise) in order to refurbish the square, it ended with protests of city residents over the decision of the local businesses to convert an old speaker’s platform (albeit mostly neglected) in the local park into a restaurant.

des festivals, the Promenade des artists, and others is not certain: non-programmed and truly spontaneous (*i.e.*, non-secured and non-regulated) events are not permitted. The QdesS remains primarily a ludic space, similar either to Dundas Square in Toronto or to Times Square in NYC.

This is not to dismiss the value of QdesS as a public space in general and the work by Daoust Lestage around the Place des arts in particular. Rather, it is to contrast two distinct types of revitalization-aiming spatial interventions. The project by Daoust Lestage relies on a technically complex and vast expertise for the revitalization of urban environments. Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens rely on non-finalized re-interpretation and structural humility in order to achieve a similar set of objectives. The engagement of each projects with the rhetoric of design and presentation, which remain critical for a successful realization of a development project and upon which a development project is judged (Shannon & Banerjee, 2017), is equally distinct. There is a stark disjunction between a plethora of clear plans, diagrams, schemes, computer-rendered images of various parts of QdesS that are instantly familiar to designers, planners, developers, and politicians, on the one hand, and almost no such imagery and tools for the guerrilla gardening project, on the other hand. The latter, while relying on social media, photographs, and a schematic map of gardens in the Mile End neighbourhood, failed to break free from its oddity and informality, in emphasizing intimacy, spontaneity, and simplicity of the proposed intervention. Yet, the both projects are after the same goals: the regeneration of the urban fabric, cultural and social capital building, and community engagement. The both projects combined several intertwined programs, and the both projects faced a degree of resistance for the unfamiliarity of certain spatial practices that they aimed to introduce. And while the guerrilla project fails to excite at the large scale, it has something else, equally important, to offer for the accomplishment of these goals: a much more direct

involvement of urban dwellers with the redevelopment process. To consider spaces such as Villa Compostela or the Mile End gardens as well as the manner in which they are carried out is to accept the fact that intervention catalysts come in a variety of guises for a variety of reasons, one of which is residents' right to the city rather than to elected officials and to city-making professionals only.

To conclude this chapter, I would like to dwell specifically on the kind of catalyst that Villa Compostela was, especially when compared with the similar in scope but paradigmatically different in scale and expertise Place des festivals. Although illegal, Villa Compostela became an example of a space that served as 1) a trigger for the renewal of another space, 2) an action-driven re-evaluation of the publicness of a municipal green space, and 3) a manifestation of residents' right to the city rather than to elected city officials and experts. Overall, guerrilla gardening and other similar contestation practices that appear to render urban environments more non-compartmentalized respond remarkably well to Richard Sennett's (1970; 2008; 2011) advocacy for increased levels of disorder in the city. In this respect, both Villa Compostela and the Mile End gardens emerged from a type of a conflict that aims to re-contextualize for the sake of relevance rather than to dispossess or to confuse. This is critical, and in this chapter I explored the hermeneutical aspects of this tactical urbanism practice, the translation of these aspects into design, and its relevance for urban development. Combined, they suggest a particular understanding of the kind of revitalization project that Villa Compostela appeared to be. As noted, the notion of "catalyst" is frequently used in urban re-vitalization strategies: manifesting themselves as zoning changes, as the construction of infrastructure to bring a development site together as a whole, as the construction of specific infrastructural elements in built-up areas, as

the construction of specific buildings, and so on.¹⁵⁹ Importantly, as a metaphor that comes from chemistry, “catalyst” suggests an understanding of an intervention that accelerates and changes without being changed itself. In this respect, although capturing rather well the mandate of many of revitalization interventions, including the case of the Place des festivals, “catalyst” is not well suited to describe the revitalization effect that Villa Compostela produced. Instead, the latter could be best described with a different metaphor—“synergist”.¹⁶⁰ It suggests not a one-way effect of one space on adjacent ones but a compound change that is brought from within all participating spaces.

¹⁵⁹ In *Urban Design*, Jon Lang (2005) speaks of some of these strategies in terms of plug-in urbanism (2005, Chapter 10).

¹⁶⁰ At McGill University (School of Architecture and School of Urban Planning), Professor Nik Luka speaks of the distinction between these two metaphors and possible types of intervention with urban space in the *Urban Design Seminar* course.

Conclusion

Recapitulation and Summary

I would like to begin this section with a brief digression. I have been living in Canada for the last 15 years, and when I had just arrived, two things happened. First, I started my M.A. thesis research at the University of Ottawa. Second, I became closely acquainted with inner-city highway infrastructure: high-speed and efficient to a point, away from the city street network, with ‘exits’ rather than crossroads, minimal speed limits, and often no room to pull over. This kind of infrastructure was just emerging in Russian cities at the time. Although it was still just a road for cars, each time I drove on one, I was so disoriented that I felt as if I had somehow left the familiar surroundings of the city and was hurtling through outer space. This unfamiliarity of the familiar, and my place in it, became a point of reflection for me.

My thesis research was developing, meanwhile. While factoring in a variety of socio-economic characteristics, I set out to explore whether economic self-reliance that built on one’s ethnic social or applicable cultural capital could help certain groups of newcomers find their legs in the Canadian reality, especially if they did not speak English or French well. At some point during this time my personal first impressions and my research subject converged: whether it is a stretch of a highway or an entire city, shared familiarity does not translate into a shared space. How do these newcomers experience their new reality? This question was beyond the scope of my largely quantitative master thesis research, but it spurred me to begin thinking of individual, cultural, and social forms of capital as space-shaping factors rather than as commodities or skills in a universally experienced space-reality. My subsequent employment in the field of socio-

economic research, especially that concerning the effects of chronic poverty, further piqued my interest in the interrelation of space, cognition, and agency, especially when it comes to marginalized identities.

Some say we are what we eat—that the food that we choose constitutes our bodies. Our backgrounds create situated perspectives that condition our lives: clues and limits to what we can see and to how we can engage with others. These perspectives shape our agency and give us space. This is a profoundly phenomenological approach, and it became the foundation for my doctoral research, which I undertook at McGill’s School of Architecture. The School’s attention to phenomenological research, as well as architects’ general appreciation of the subjectivity of space, was critical. Understanding space as a situated perspective is not a new topic. Nevertheless, it remains a critical premise for research on post-functionalist and post-colonialist organizations of (urban) environments, which leads us away from any single representation of space. Recognizing this multiplicity of representations, while exploring the terms on which any one of them can avoid becoming totalizing, is a challenge that has emerged from the existing research in these areas.

This pursuit is critical in urban studies, since increasingly diversified and densified urban environments in North America need to remain inclusive, engaging, and sustainable. In short, they need to be flexible. To address issues of spatial justice, to introduce unconventional spatial practices that represent emerging issues, and to give people possibilities to shape their agency is to ensure that whatever is already in place is not rigidly formalized. This is also a political pursuit for the democratic city in which the “right to the city” cannot be confused with the right to elected officials and experts only. One way to accomplish this is to explore the ways in which

established spatial practices remain open to spontaneous (i.e., informal) re-interpretations from different contexts.

In the present research, I formulated this task as a question pertinent to my research subject of illegal and informal public-space making practice of guerrilla gardening: How can practitioners go beyond the illegal nature of this and similar instances of tactical urbanism in order to create more responsive and flexible urban environments? This question set a path for my exploration of the ways in which the creation of a series of guerrilla gardens on municipal property in Montréal, Québec, laid bare the competition between three different representations of vegetation in the city. My focus was on exploring the terms on which competing representations shared a single territory due to contestation over the same physical objects (their meanings and the agency they can afford).

The most important part of this research was to uncover an illuminating condition of these instances of contestation that provides insights for non-compartmentalizing approaches to space making. In this work, I set out to explore the non-compartmentalizing logic of urban space structure on the basis of difference: the ways in which a phenomenon simultaneously affords acting on multiple interpretations of itself while being perceived from different contexts. My overarching objective was to explore whether the normative condition of flexible urban space can be achieved with the possibility of overlaying programs that belong to distinct spaces and that nevertheless co-exist in the same physical objects. Lefebvre's concept of differential space as one that never settles for any single representation of space became my theoretical point of departure. Just like other researchers who approached the concept, I had to grapple with the fact that Lefebvre left it developed in rather inconclusive terms, open to many approaches and conclusions. In this research, I explore the concept as a particular resolution of liminal space on

phenomenological terms: rather than out of a juxtaposition of distinct spaces, I focus on difference as a result of an overlap of multiple situated *spatialities* that make use of the same contested objects. In this context, liminality is a means both to understand difference as a consequence of one's situated perspective, one among many, and to give this multitude of perspectives a spatial resolution.

The major outcomes of this research are threefold. First, theoretically, in exploring differential space as the space of phenomenological reduction (in which perceived phenomena are freed of any established meanings), I develop the subject of liminal space as a spatial manifestation of one's right to difference and to the city that begins with a quasi-phenomenological *epoché*: the perception of a phenomenon out of an intended context rather than an analytical suspension of all familiar preconceptions and judgments towards a perceived phenomenon. Second, practically, I explore the structure of a resulting liminal space as a design-specific manifestation of Edward Relph's concept of environmental humility. I outline the terms—re-appropriation, programmatic sensitivity, soft rules and 'humble' rulers, and bonding elements—on which none of the competing representations can eliminate all others. Third, politically, I critically approach the topic of urban revitalization. I contrast the informal space of continuous contestation with a formal urban revitalization project, and, after articulating some of their striking similarities, I also point out paradigmatic differences in terms of how they facilitate urban development.

While this manuscript opens with a brief introduction of a guerrilla gardening space to be explored and to be analyzed, it is not until Chapter 4 (Methodology) that I look into it in detail. The first three chapters are on the subjects that are critical for situating the case, its significance, and its contribution to my overarching subject—flexible urban space. I explore the capacity of

the constructed space for liminality by affording a variety of meanings in a single physical object. The chapters convey the following: practices such as guerrilla gardening are capable to bring forth the fundamental liminality of the constructed space, while border—an appearance of a phenomenon in a present-in-hand (*i.e.*, “broken”, on Heidegger’s terms) mode—is a means to grasp an instance of a liminal mode of the affected space. The ability to recognize a phenomenon as a border, arresting or terminating the continuity of a particular context, is a phenomenological task. This approach to border stems from a long-standing argument of phenomenologists, gestalt theorists, and environmental psychologists that it is not the visibility of occurrent parameters of physical objects but rather possibilities for an action that these objects afford and that are perceivable from a specific perspective. In this context, border is not a legal or a political entity. Primarily, it is an action-arresting appearance of a phenomenon that signals its capacity to make a variety of contexts meet and converge. In recurrently turning to the subject of the publicness of a space, as well as the problems and challenges with notion of border itself, I developed my analysis of an illegal and informal space-making practice and its contribution to inclusive urban development on the grounds of non-compartmentalizing logic of space.

To conclude this section, I would like to review certain peculiarities of applying a specifically phenomenological approach to my case study. At the end of Chapter 3, I discuss some of the challenges that phenomenology, as an epistemological tool, poses for a researcher. Among them one can find (extreme) subjectivity, the lack of a coherent and universally accepted methodological apparatus, and problems with the validity of findings. In the present research, I avoided most of them, as it would be more correct to call this study phenomenology-advised rather than strictly phenomenological. It was a story of the creation of a series of gardens, but it was not my story to tell. This, however, created its own challenge. It proved to be a substantial

challenge to bring respondents into the phenomenological mode of thinking about their work and their engagement with the urban fabric, the composting site, the lawn, the planters, and the gardens. While I had prepared for this as much I could have foreseen (see Chapter 4 on methodology and the interview questions), this challenge had an effect on the scope of the study: due to time and availability limitations, it was not feasible to engage respondents with a broader variety of topics without a preliminary preparation of respondents for a phenomenological investigation. The latter, however, similarly requires time and willingness of respondent to commit to the study. My somewhat estranged—non-immersed—position in relation to the group and the creation of the gardens kept catching up with me and made me reflect on the effects of my own position towards the project, the kind of perspective on the group and their work it corresponded to me, and the kind of effect it had on my analysis. I discuss some of the most prominent of these reflections in a series of digressions and footnotes in Chapter 5. In this respect, one of the most striking discoveries was the inadequacy of photography to capture all desired aspects of the group's work. This was not only due to the same colour of plants in the park, in the planters, and in the gardens (I discuss this in Chapter 5) but also due to the different nature of involvement with all of them: close, direct, and physical, as distinct from detached observation. Highly detailed conversations with group members were of primary importance, but the situation with photography as a representational tool was sobering and, for the duration of my fieldwork, kept me aware of the reasons for which phenomenology came into being. That being stated, the use of phenomenology obscured some other important epistemological considerations such as a more detailed engagement with the analysis of non-human and more-than-human modes of agency in the studied case. While plants appeared to play a noticeable role in my research, and in the guerrilla gardening space they became prominent actors, I engaged with the

analysis of their influence only marginally, mostly treating them as passive actors. In part, this is a limitation of a phenomenological approach and in part it was the choice that I made in order to avoid making my research even more theoretically complex.

Pertinence of the Research

In Chapter 6 of this manuscript I argue that the studied case is a particular type of a re-development intervention, distinct from those that are devised formally by professionals. While the goal is the same—socio-economic cohesion of local fabric and community—its foundation is nevertheless more political than economic. In this respect, Montréal, Canada, is one among a handful of urban environments in North America marked by a great deal of both informal and unregulated spaces. The Champ des possibles—a previously neglected plot of land in the Mile End neighbourhood, located near Canada Pacific railroad tracks and with chaotic vegetation and ad-hoc paths that first became a site for a variety of informal cultural activities and now has the protected status of a biodiversity patch—is a highly fitting illustration of this, one among many. Due to this initial predisposition towards the informal and “bricolage”, Montréal is an illuminating environment in which the chance for projects with an alternative urban development agenda to increase in scale and maturity is quite high.

What is the value of ‘political’ spatial interventions? In the context of urban design, it is to provide both weight and consideration to those subjects of urban life that otherwise would be shadowed by more practical and commercial concerns. To illustrate, Ryerson University in Toronto, Pratt Institute in New York City, and the University of California at Berkeley quite

uniformly emphasize that the focus of their urban design programs is on the relationship between design, regulatory frameworks, and financial or marketing considerations. This is in response to students' demands to graduate with a degree that is readily applicable at the job market. This is common for many other programs in urban design as well, and while this focus sets one priority clear, it risks leaving certain others behind, even if they remain a part of the program. In this respect, Banerjee (2016) and Cuthbert (2017) speak of the fact that while an increasingly commercialized approach to urban development has a lot to offer for urban design practitioners, the quality of these interventions is not necessarily the best. They do not necessarily address a variety of humanitarian, social, citizenship, and ecological issues (Butina Watson, 2016), in acting locally, do not necessarily situate larger—metropolitan and global—concerns (Whitzman, 2016), or, conversely, do not show appreciation for informal and profoundly local uses of urban public space that nevertheless reflect larger socio-economic and political realities (Loukaitou-Sideris & Mukhija, 2016). In part, this also has to do with some long-standing issues that are specific to urban design. While the latter is still searching for its place in the built form academia, both as a discipline and as a profession (Biddulph, 2012; Banerjee, 2016; Cidre, 2016; Marshall, 2012), it has expanded immensely since its inception half a century ago. It is offered not only in a variety of formats, from undergraduate degrees to post-professional and doctorate degrees, but also incorporates a growing body of topics. Nevertheless, urban design still suffers from professional elitism that Banerjee (2016) discusses in terms of Platonic (*i.e.*, hero-driven) *versus* Aristotelian (*i.e.*, community-driven) traditions in architecture and design. In the same vein, Loukaitou-Sideris and Mukhija (2016; *cf.* Cruz, 2010; Linovski & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2013) discuss the lack of interest in informal uses and programs in public (*i.e.*, municipal) urban space. From a specifically educational perspective, Butina Watson (2016) reminds us that despite the

increasing diversity and complexity of urban design, “[t]he basic structure of the pedagogic delivery of urban design education today at the Masters level is still based on a similar structure as when it was first established, comprising theory and history of urban design, methods and practice” (2016, p.545). In this respect, a variety of practitioners speak of the necessity for studio syllabi to fuse traditional on-campus classes with work in urban settings. This can take the shape either of “living labs” (Butina Watson, 2016)¹⁶¹ or of outdoors studios that demand students revisit and engage with both the spaces of everyday life and socio-economic practices that comprise them (Loukaitou-Sideris & Mukhija, 2016), or of another format that similarly merges theory and practice through specific intervention projects. This is particularly pertinent for humanitarian and socially charged projects that not only deal with a complex mesh of stakeholders, issues, and challenges, but also cannot always be easily expressed in familiar professional representations and rhetorics (Shannon & Banerjee, 2017).

The studied case, just as tactical urbanism in general, points specifically at this “wicked problem” of urban development: the clash between representations of space and lived spaces that is thoroughly discussed design-wise by Dovey (1993) and the results of which, once the balance

¹⁶¹ Watson (2016) describes one of these “living labs” as follows:

At the Harvard Graduate School of Design (Boston, MA), urban design academic staff and students work on a variety of challenging ‘live projects’, both in the USA and in many international settings. One such project is the post-hurricane Sandy intervention in New York, where the ‘living lab’ group proposed creative solutions to minimize the negative impacts of the storm. This and other similar projects are firmly underpinned by relevant urban design theory and practice, delivered through lectures and seminars whilst allowing students to experience real-life professional working. In these projects students are guided, assisted and challenged by the team of experts, including the local community groups. This is very much a new type of pedagogy based on collaborative learning and co-creation of real-life urban design scenarios. (2016, p546).

is disturbed, are explored by Lefebvre (1991), with the focus on abstract space, Relph (1981), with the focus on “hyperplanning” (Relph, 1981), and Sennett (1970, 2008, 2011), with the focus on disorder. Whether the solution is, respectively, differential space, as a medium, environmental humility, as a course of actions, or one’s peace with disorder and one’s own humility, as a mindset, is of secondary importance. More importantly, the debate around the obligation of urban designers, architects, and planners to step outside their professional silos in order to create harmonic environments for dwelling rather than residing does not begin with guerrilla gardening. Any institutionalized normative stance becomes political. Any attempt to re-evaluate an institutionalized norm has no other choice but to become political as well. In this respect, Biddulph’s (2012) paper on the problems with thinking for urban design is one of the most illuminating as, similar to an earlier paper by Loukaitou-Sideris (1996), it reflects on the responsibility of urban design to face political challenges, even if the profession lacks the means to solve them single-handedly:

How can the urban design profession address this call¹⁶² for a more humane, context-sensitive and socially responsible built form? What is the role and power of the urban designer for the mending of cracks in the city¹⁶³? The profession should stop eschewing

¹⁶² *Even though I do not have specific prescriptions to suggest for the construction of an 'American urbanism' (after all, such prescriptions would defy my premise that urban design should be collaborative instead of expert orientated), I would like to extend a cry against imported paradigms or forms, and a call for solutions informed by the specificities of the American urban reality. (1996, p.102)*

¹⁶³ *These are the gaps in the urban form, where overall continuity is disrupted; the residual spaces left undeveloped, under-used or deteriorating; the physical divides that purposefully or accidentally separate social worlds; the spaces which development has passed by, or where new development has created fragmentation and interruption. (1996, p.91)*

questions of politics, but bring them to the surface, understand and cope with them.

(Loukaitou-Sideris, 1996, p.102).

In this respect, the present research aims to tease out the role of urban residents for whom all this action and debate is supposedly put forth. While Lefebvre's call for the right to the city is explored in a variety of ways, this work addresses a particular aspect of it: what it is to design with the idea of the right to the city in mind. As the research explores, bottom-up and uninvited practices, such as guerrilla gardening, that produce spaces such as Villa Compostela can be highly insightful despite the lack of any formal space-making training.

Contributions of the Research

The major contribution of the present research is the phenomenological approach to both the concept of the right to the city (as spatialized difference) and its design. What makes unsettling space-making practices a "wicked problem" is the fact that the clash between formal representations of space and the dynamic practices of lived spaces cannot be decisively resolved, and the lived space cannot be harnessed by professionals. From this perspective, it is critical to adopt space-making practices that use non-fragmenting spatial logic. In the present research I pay specific attention to an illegal and informal spacial practice that produces a space of continuums rather than of types. The challenge of public space is one particular example of it, and as both Duncan (1996) and Kilian (1998) argue, it is the extent of the publicness of a space that matters rather than public space as a type. Similarly, liminal space is even a broader

manifestation of non-discrete logic of the lived space that rejects voids and, instead, ‘breaks through’ moments of ambiguity out of which urban development takes on a new turn.

At the end of Chapter 6, in comparing the redevelopment effects produced at the Place des festivals and the guerrilla gardening project, I suggest thinking of them in two different ways: as a catalyst and as a synergist. These are metaphors, from chemistry and biology respectively, that accentuate two distinct approaches to design and urban development: either an object-driven one or a system-driven one. While the former is a highly developed manifestation of both modernism and functionalism, the latter is an attempt to bring ecological perspectives towards the complexity, interconnectedness, and indeterminacy of environments into design. In architecture, the burgeoning field of landscape urbanism attempts to reach this goal with the focus on landscape as distinct from a type of built form. While a detailed review of the emergence and the development of landscape urbanism was done elsewhere (Corner; 2006; Gandy, 2016; Steiner, 2011; Thomson, 2012; Weller, 2006, 2008), I would like to articulate those aspects of landscape urbanism with which the present research and its outcomes resonate the most, and, expectedly, this begins with the site. Specifically in connection with landscape urbanism, Czerniak (2006) reflects on the conventional ordering of architectural intentions over the surface on the ground as a clear-site thinking that dismisses the possibility of conceptualizing a site in more complex terms (p.107).¹⁶⁴ In a similar vein, Weller (2006) asserts that despite the fuzziness of landscape

¹⁶⁴ In this respect, I would like to re-cite my earlier footnote: During a guest lecture at the School of Architecture at McGill University in 2013, Katherine Clarke, one of the members of muf architecture, based in UK, described a research-driven design project that the studio conducted for a developer who purchased a brownfield and was interested in an architectural design that would draw from the ‘heritage’ of that parcel of land. muf architecture brought a group of children onto the site so that through playing and socializing children, in using the site’s current condition, could re-create a sense of the situatedness of the brownfield.

urbanism as a field of knowledge and practice, in its realm landscape emerges as a interdisciplinary sensibility that helps to understand how to connect architecture and landscape, fields and objects, instrumentality and art (p.72). This is not to treat landscape as just another type of built form and, even less so, not to approach landscape through the lens of a pastoral or bucolic image. In a paper on unintentional landscapes, Gandy (2016; *cf.* Doron, 2007) asserts that in an illuminating way, spaces with ‘uninvited’ nature in the city can be approached as landscapes that are marked by non-designed complexity and uncertainty. Gandy explains that unintentional landscapes can be seen as a kind of a space in which, with the help of nature, new social and cultural meanings are produced. This can serve as a basis for re-evaluating the entire approach to what landscape is and how it can influence the practice, rather than being dismissed as a wrong kind.¹⁶⁵

As Thomson (2012) summarizes, landscape urbanism is about what things do rather than what they look like; it makes the invisible visible (*cf.* Howett, 1993) in a way that it de-‘sanitizes’ space by keeping its structure and its interconnectedness with other spaces not hidden away; and, of course, it embraces ecology and multi-actor complexity. Yet, in following Weller (2006), Steiner (2011) argues that landscape urbanism remains largely theoretical to date. And while the situation might be changing, a suburban development project by Weller (2008) clearly shows not only achievements, but also limitations and challenges of an ecological—landscape-driven—approach to design within largely functionalist and capitalist frameworks. Nevertheless, landscape urbanism remains a highly potent field of conceptualization of future

¹⁶⁵ Antrop (2013) provides a compelling account of the evolution of the concept of landscape in the Euro-American thought and varying definitions of landscape from one time period to another and from one organization and its mandate to another.

design that needs not only embrace sustainability and spatial justice concerns, but also to make true sense of scientific and social advancements of the 20th century that emphasize interconnectedness, uncertainty, and, at times, paradoxical disorderedness of the world that contains geometries of space that are not immediately recognizable. Ultimately, it needs to make sense of the world that is not ordered by overly rigid frameworks of which binaries of sorts are definitely a part. Corner (2006) outlines four major themes of landscape urbanism, and the first of them stems specifically from the fundamental incapability of linear, mechanistic models to deal with ecological systems in which an individual agent can work across a broad field of operation to produce incremental and cumulative change that shapes the environment over time (2006, p.29). The temporal dimension of the constructed space that a landscape-driven approach brings forth is critical and landscape urbanism has the potential both to supersede the dependence of design on flat or linear representations and to help architecture move away from object qualities of space to systems that condition the distribution and density of urban form (Corner, 2006). Paradoxically, this corresponds with the preoccupation of landscape urbanism with the phenomenon of horizontal surface, across a range of scales, when the ground and the roof become the same and the distinction between street and building is blurred (theme 2). This, of course, should not be interpreted literally, as a task of eliminating layers, and this poses a major challenge for landscape urbanism that Corner articulates as its third theme—operation of working method: “How does one conceptualize urban geographies that function across a range of scales and implicate a host of players?” (2006, p.31). In addition to this challenge, there is also a critical subject of imagery (theme 4) that needs to facilitate a paradigm shift for accepting a new

model for urban space.¹⁶⁶ All these themes call for what Corner believes is the need for *terra fluxus*, as opposed to present practices of *terra firma*. This is rather ironic in light of an objective for landscape urbanism to move away from binaries. In fact, however, this unintended binary of *terra fluxus vs. terra firma* suggests that it does not have to be one or the other. It is to recognize the need for a distinct way of thinking about urban space, its composition and design. This is critical in light of Thomson's (2012) concern that the rejection of binaries can contribute to the creation of another beast: a monotonous undifferentiated hybrid environment with no escape from it.

Overall, it is evident that the present study produced several insights that are illuminating for Corner's major themes of landscape urbanism. Despite the fact that the observed co-existence of municipal green space, a composting site, and a guerrilla gardening space took place at a local scale and enjoyed neither technological complexity nor substantial ecological significance, it became one of those instances of space making that attempt to address the critical challenges of landscape-driven design practically. Ultimately, they reveal and bring up the political dimension of the action that does not go away with the fully legal status of an intervention (*i.e.*, as discussed in relation to the Place des festivals; *cf.* Weller, 2008). In the context of this study, to think of design in terms of the right to the city is not only to focus on what can open up an instance of ambiguity of belonging, constitute instances of structural humility, or correspond traits of flexibility (*e.g.*, via ephemerality) to a given design intervention, but also to go back to the recognition of the obligation to accept the political dimension that a design intervention


¹⁶⁶ This is remarkably similar to Dowing's call for writing elite to create powerful and alluring images of urban green space. It is hardly a coincidence that Corner also brings it down to urban public spaces that, to him, are containers of collective memory and desire and are not a token of compensation ("recreation") for the lack of imagination in modernist planning and architecture.

“between buildings” often reveals in bringing together different scales, domains, and actors with the goal of creating vibrant and truly lived spaces.

Figures


Figure 4.1 The Location and Elevation Appearances of the Composting Site/Villa Compostella at Parc Jeanne-Mance, Montréal, Spring—Winter 2014-2015

Fig. 4.1.1. Location of composting site/Villa Compostella on the map:



Map Data: 2018 Google Canada

Fig. 4.1.2. Areal view (South-North) of the composting site: the ‘corner’ of Ave. Duluth W. & the wall of Hôtel-Dieu:



Imagery: 2018 Google Canada

Fig. 4.1.3. The view of the composting site (Spring of 2014), facing South-East. The creation of Villa Compostela has just begun:



Fig. 4.1.4. The view of the composting site/Villa Compostela in 2014, facing North-East:




Fig. 4.1.5. The view of the composting site/Villa Compostela in the winter of 2015, facing East:



Figure 4.2 The Location of the Mile End Site, Montréal, 2014

Fig. 4.2.1. Location of the Mile End Site on the map, in relation to the composting site/Villa Compostela:



Map Data: 2018 Google Canada

Fig. 4.2.2. Locations of small gardens at the Mile End Site, shown on the flyer that was produced by gardeners:




Figure 4.3 Examples of Small Gardens at the Mile End Site, Montréal, 2014

Fig. 4.3.1. Site 18:



Fig. 4.3.2. Site 14:



Fig. 4.3.3. Site 26:



Figure 4.4 The Creation of a Small Garden #20 at the Mile End Site, Montréal, 2014

Fig. 4.4.1. Site 20, facing South (Spring 2014):




Fig. 4.4.2. Site 20, facing North (Summer 2014):




Figure 4.5 Place des festivals, Montréal

Fig. 4.5.1. Location of Place des Festivals on the map of Montréal, in relation to Quartier des Spectacles, 2017:



Map Data: 2018 Google Canada

Fig. 4.5.2. Location of Place des Festivals, downtown Montréal, 2017:



Imagery: 2018 Google Canada

Figure 5.1 Planting Day, Montréal, Summer 2014

Fig. 5.1.1. Surrounded by boxes with seedlings, members of the group and volunteers are standing on the steps of St. Michael's and St. Anthony's Catholic Church in the Mile End:



Figure 5.2 Schematic View of Park Jeanne-Mance, Montréal, 2014

Fig. 5.2.1. An aerial view of Parc Jeanne-Mance (highlighted). The park is asymmetrically divided by Ave. Duluth (and is separated from Mount Royal Park by Ave. du Parc. From left to right, the park contains tennis courts and two softball fields, a soccer field, a general purpose lawn and a children playground, the defunct composting site, and beach volleyball courts:



Imagery: 2018 Google Canada

Fig. 5.2.2. The interrelation of Parc Jeanne-Mance (light green), the eastern part of Mount Royal Park (dark green), the Hôtel-Dieu (yellow), and Villa Compostela (red):



Imagery: 2018 Google Canada

Figure 5.3 Composting Site Tourné-Sol, Montréal, Spring 2014

Fig. 5.3.1. The view of the composting site shortly after it was re-appropriated by the group (Photo by: Nikolaos Gryspolakis):



Fig. 5.3.2. South of Ave. Duluth, the site was located between the wall of Hôtel-Dieu and a path through the park. Black cylinders in the back are composting mills and a wooden box in the left corner was used to keep gardening tools in it (there was some minor gardening activity happening on the premises of the site when it was functioning):



Figure 5.4 Municipal Communal Composting Bins, Montréal, 2014

Fig. 5.4.1. These bins are intended for local use. The bins are locked, but nearby residents have keys to the locks:



Fig. 5.4.2:





Figure 5.5 A Plan of Villa Compostela, Montréal, 2014



1. The wall of Hôtel-Dieu with a trench in front of it
2. Toolbox (as a part of the composting site)
3. Composting mills (as a part of the composting site)
4. Garbage bins (as a part of the composting site)
5. 'Nursery' for seedlings (the box, as a part of the composting site)
6. Plant beds
7. Wooden sculpture
8. Wooden pole with a drawing
9. Sidewalk
10. Path
11. Lawn

Figure 5.6 Villa Compostela, Montréal, 2014-2015

Fig. 5.6.1. A north-western corner of the composting site after the site was re-appropriated and cleaned by the group:



Fig. 5.6.2. The view of Villa Compostela from Duluth Av., facing south. The work of turning Tourné-Sol into a guerrilla garden had just begun:



Fig. 5.6.3. The view of a corner of Villa Compostela from Duluth Av. facing west. Behind the corner of the site, it is possible to see a lawn that is located between Hôtel-Dieu and Ave. du Parc and, farther, a part of the slope of Mount Royal:



Fig. 5.6.4. The view of Villa Compostela from Ave. du Parc, facing east. It is possible to see the heritage wall of Hôtel-Dieu behind the site as well as a part of Duluth Av. (on the left) and a part of one of the volleyball courts in the right part of the image (i.e., an opening covered in sand):



Fig. 5.6.5. The view of Villa Compostela from the south, facing Duluth Av. One can see three plant beds, a patio, and a wooden sculpture in the middle, made by one of the group members:



Fig. 5.6.6. Guerrilla gardeners at work. One of the gardeners is connecting a hose from the toolbox on the site to a water faucet in the ground that is used by the park services to water the lawn. The view of Villa Compostela from the Duluth Av., facing Hôtel-Dieu and the volleyball courts:



Figure 5.7 Explanatory Signs for Villa Compostela and the Mile End Gardens

Fig. 5.7.1. The group members strived for their sign at Villa Compostela not to look formal and potentially intimidating:



Fig. 5.7.2. The sign reads “free space VILLA Compostela”:



Fig. 5.7.3. In addition to the name of the re-appropriated site the gardeners also created a set of 'instructions' that inform other people of what is happening on the site. It reads "For ALL from ALL: plant, water, harvest, compost, share, respect the creations of others". The English text copies the French one:



Fig. 5.7.4. In the Mile End gardens, the group took a much more modest (and also delayed) approach to describing their gardens with a laminated piece of paper that provided a map of the area with ID'd gardens on it. One could look up what was growing on an observed site by looking it up on a dedicated website:



Figure 5.8 The Removal of the Composting Site and Villa Compostela, 2015

Fig. 5.8.1. In the summer of 2015 the fence of the site was still in the park although the site was completely empty inside and Villa Compostela was gone:



Fig. 5.8.2. A panoramic view of a disappearing composting site vis-à-vis the wall from the Ave du Parc, facing Hôtel-Dieu. Wall-blocking volleyball courts remain up and running:



Fig. 5.8.3. The remaining part of the site in the spring of 2015. Bushes on the corners are gone. Surrounding the fence plants keep growing and later this year they will climb the fence one last time (see above). Without the program of Tourné-Sol and the presence of Villa Compostela this is once again a part of a public park that is locked away, awkward as such, and open for re-interpretations:



Figure 5.9 The First Attempt to Evict Villa Compostela and Shut Down the Site, 2015

Fig. 5.9.1. The sign appeared at the end of August: “We ask you to remove all equipment that was illegally installed on public property before the 2nd of September. In case of failure, everything will be taken away by the borough. Information: 514 672-3744. If you would like to do community gardening, inform yourself at 514 872-8836. Le Plateau-Mont-Royal, Montréal”:



Figure 6.1 Villa Compostela and Continuing Contestations, Montréal, Summer 2014

The humble character of the intervention means accepting the possibility that something can get destroyed. A most striking example of it, which is also quite specific to Montréal, is the problem with the use of the English language at Villa Compostela. A unanimous tag—“Quebec français”—painted in blue on the monastery wall is a recurring problem for municipal authorities in the park. This political act affected VC as well, as at one point the same message appeared on one of the design elements of VC (Fig. 6.1.1) and, later, a blue paint was used to erase the list of rules for the space that were written in English (Fig. 6.1.2). The group members re-wrote the rules on top (Fig. 6.1.3):



Fig. 6.1.1



Fig. 6.1.2



Fig. 6.1.3

Figure 6.2 The Relocation of Municipal Planter on rue Maguire, Montréal, 2014

1. June 2014: Municipal planters (in red) on rue Maguire just got occupied by Guerrilla Garden



2. July 2014: Due to construction on the site partially occupied by the planters, they were moved



3. August 2014: Planters are relocated to the other side of the street. Vegetables remain; Guerrilla Gardeners add info signs to the planters



Figure 6.3 The Interrelation of the Park, the Composting Site, and Villa Compostela, 2015

Fig. 6.3.1. An aerial view of Parc Jeanne-Mance (green) and Hôtel-Dieu (yellow). The composting site is shown as a yellow rectangular. The Villa Compostela's outline is in orange to its outmost (perceived) point to the south-east:



Imagery: 2018 Google Canada

Figure 6.4 Program Diagram of Villa Compostela according to Respondent r7, 2015

Fast-paced rhythm inside the composting site (blue) changes to a mediative rhythm of the garden (green) and a relaxing rhythm of the lawn to the south of the composting site:





Figure 6.5 Place des festivals, Promenade des artistes, and the Parterre

Fig. 6.5.1. A plan view of the Place des festivals, Promenade des artistes, and the Parterre, surrounding the Place des arts:



Map Data: 2018 Google Canada

Fig. 6.5.2. An arial view of the Place des festivals, Promenade des artists, and the Parterre, surrounding the Place des arts:



Imagery: 2018 Google Canada

Figure 6.6 Place des festivals; The “Event Mode” Appearance

Facing South (towards Ste-Catherine Street):



Figure 6.7 Promenade des artistes with Musical Swings and a Space for Interchanging Art Installations

Fig. 6.7.1. Facing East (towards Saint-Urbain Street):



Fig. 6.7.2. Facing West (toward Jeanne-Mance Street):



Appendices

Appendix 1. Public Space: Accessibility and Inclusiveness

Etymologically, there is a well-established record of what the term “public” semantically outlines in the English language. Originating from classical Latin “*publicus*” (“of or belonging to the people as a whole, common to all, universal, of or affecting everyone in the state, communal, authorized, provided, or maintained by the state, available to or enjoyed by all members of a community, in post-classical Latin also conspicuous, clear (4th cent.) ...”¹⁶⁷), the term has retained both of these semantic aspects—shared by a community and being visually present. Originally Latin, it re-appears in Old French (e.g., “*lieux publiques*”) and in Anglo-Norman as referring to an official document or a public office person (in Anglo-Norman’s “*instrument publik*”, 13th century and earlier; “*persoine publique*”), or relating to people as a whole (in Old French’s “*public*”, 13th century), or being in the open, without concealment (both in Anglo-Norman and in Old French, 14th century). Since then, while changing morphologically, the term has shown little semantic flexibility:

1) visual openness, exposure (“open to general observation, view, or knowledge; existing, performed, or carried out without concealment, so that all may see or hear” since the 14th century¹⁶⁸, “in a public place; before spectators or onlookers; publicly, openly, without concealment” since the 15th century, “of a person: in the public eye; prominent, well-known” since the 17th century);

¹⁶⁷ The Oxford English Dictionary: “public, *adj.* and *n.*”

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, here and in the following semantic definitions of the term “public” in this sub-section

2) relation to a community of people (“of or relating to the people as a whole”, since the 15th century), representing a community (“authorized by, serving, or representing, the community (cf. sense A. 4b); carried out or made on behalf of the community by the government or State”, since the 15th century), available to an entire community (“open or available to all members of a community, or all who are legally or properly qualified (as by payment); not restricted to the private use of a particular person or group; (of a service, amenity, etc.) provided by local or central government for the community and supported by rates or taxes”, since the 16th century), and a relevant to our ‘digital’ modern society (“a collective group regarded as sharing a common cultural, social, or political interest, but who as individuals do not necessarily have any contact with one another” since the beginning of the 20th century).

Overall, in the realm of the Euro-American academic literature on the subject, regardless of their specific topics, the definition of public space explicitly or implicitly follows either one or both of these two meanings. From the perspectives that these studies put forth, one can convey a general argument: the space that is public is physically accessible to a wide variety of individuals. Yet, this rather simple definition of public space that one might know by its most frequent material manifestation—an open (municipal) space between buildings—is not exhaustive. As the majority of in-depth works on public space reveal, what is often considered as public space is often much more exclusive than one would expect.

Jürgen Habermas (1989) argues that constitutive elements of public space are 1) its inclusive character (at least to the degree that brings a group above a clique) and 2) the common

concern that is resolved in shared interactions (*e.g.*, discussions or common practices). This, however, is only a point of departure; Habermas aside (who himself notes that public space is not universally inclusive), there is enough evidence to reject a utopian vision of public space that can be embodied in a type of built form. As this evidence reveals, public space, despite its mandate to bring different people together, is not free from exclusion and inequality. (Blomley, 2004; Carmona, 2010a; Cresswell, 1996; Dell, 2009; Dovey, 1999; Hayden, 1997a, 1997b; Hou, 2010a; Ingram, 1997; Mitchell, 2003; Oswin, 2008; Ruppert, 2006; Zukin, 2010).

Moreover, Habermas' theoretical approach to public space through the prism of communicative action via a process of rational negotiations is only one among many. Equally important are the approaches that one can learn from Hannah Arendt (1958: public space as the space in which the man-made world [*i.e.*, civilization] is possible as it both brings peers together and yet outlines their individuality), Richard Sennett (1970: public space as the space of personal and communal growth due to an encounter with and tolerance towards difference), Henri Lefebvre (1991[1974]: public space as the space which composition is defined by a dominant socio-economic formation), Michel Foucault (1977: public space as a space of power and mutual surveillance), Michel de Certeau (1984: public space as an embodiment of everyday practices, both strategic and tactical), Michael Sorkin (1992: a critique of public space as a spectacle-shaped experience of an encounter with the other), Tim Cresswell (1996: public space as a clash between the norm and the other), and Don Mitchell (2003: public space as a spatial manifestation of political resistance and claiming rights), to name a few.

An encouraging aspect of this palette of different approaches to the subject of public space is that, similar to Habermas, these works focus on inclusiveness, exposure, and common concern that shape our understanding of public space. These works also make it clear that the

inclusiveness, common concern, and even transparency of a space cannot be defined universally and, therefore, cannot be triumphantly translated into specific standards and codes for built form (Carr, 1992). The most essential and the most challenging element of ‘public space’ is actually the ‘space’ itself, the capacity of which is either public or non-public (*i.e.*, private, parochial, indeterminate, of changing accessibility, social, *etc.*)¹⁶⁹ and is only partially contingent on its hard design.

¹⁶⁹ As Arendt (1958) insists, while sharply dividing the public realm of antiquity and the social realm of modern societies

Appendix 2. Questions & Themes for Semi-Structured Interviews and Survey

Questions

The following questions serve as guides (themes) for a discussion and therefore these questions should be taken neither as invariable nor as exhaustive. Depending on each discussion, the order of these questions could vary, some of these questions could be addressed without asking or were raised in different words.

Set 1 (for Guerrilla gardeners; 8 individuals were interviewed):

The relation of the project to the subject of public space

- How do you think your project contributes to the creation of public space?
- Can you describe this contribution in terms of created possibilities for social and/or political engagement of urban residents?
- How did doing this with others help?
- What is access to you?

Identification of obstacles/ borders

- What are the most essential borders that you encountered during your project?
- What objects represent them and why?

Identification of differences and similarities between different experiences of border

- How did you personally experience it (come in contact with this border)? Similarities, differences

- Why did you want to challenge this border?

Focus on access

- How did you notice this site/space was not public (inaccessible)? Focus on physical objects and your thoughts, feelings, ideas toward them

- After your intervention, how and why do you think it became different?

- Do you think you created new borders?

Set 2a (for municipal authorities regarding the Guerrilla gardening sites; 3 individuals were interviewed: two of them who are responsible for the management of the borough in which Guerrilla gardening sites reside and one of them who is responsible for management of municipal vegetation):

The discussion with these individuals was largely shaped by my previous interviews with Guerrilla gardeners. Consequently, these were reflection interviews that were structured by the following meta-questions that were also supported by a variety of detailing questions, varying with each discussion:

- What is public space to you? Accessibility? Transparency?

- What is the contribution of projects such as Villa Compostella to public space?

- Did Guerrilla gardeners make the space more accessible?

Set 2b (for municipal authorities regarding Parc Jeanne-Mance; 1 person who is related to the development of the park from the urban planning perspective was interviewed):

- What is public space to you?
- How do you think Parc Jeanne-Mance contributes to public space now?
- What are the plans? How will it contribute to public space after? What is accessibility of this space to you before and after?

- How does the city plans to integrate it back into Mount-Royal Park, on what terms (property, accessibility, transparency, care)?

- How do you think the plan will help to make Parc Jeanne-Mance more accessible or how it will make it slightly less accessible?

- How do you see Villa Compostella and its contribution to public space and the spaces of parks Mount-Royal/Jeanne-Mance (*i.e.*, border)?

- How do you personally experience Villa Compostella /Parc Jeanne-Mance (in terms of transparency, accessibility, care, orientation)?

- What will be the major elements of the Parc Jeanne-Mance's space (principal points, points of assembly/void; compartments; rhythms; function; intrusion; perceived borders of the space and their mechanism of establishment)

- How will it correspond to Olmsted's vision (perhaps, in terms of a) consistency of experience in a landscape as a poem, b) main points of interest and neglect (e.g., roads, upper plateau, water bodies, views), c) preserving/developing promenades/pedestrian traffic, d) situation with the vegetation (following Olmsted's advise), and e) division into sites?

Set 3 (for Daoust Lestage architectural studio; 1 person was interviewed):

- What is public space to you? Accessibility? Transparency?

- How do you think PdesF contributed to the creation of public space? (focus on defining enjoyment; space for festivals)

- If you had to describe PdesF with a brief phrase, what's the purpose of the space, its function or essence as you see it?

- How did you know the boundaries of the space to work with?

- What are the most essential limitations, obstacles that you encountered during the project (accessibility, transparency, continuity, integration, heritage)? What was removed, what stayed?

- Why did you want to challenge them?

- What makes these borders similar and different?

- What particular elements drew your attention in the context of the project?

- What's your approach to other actors in the space?
- What elements that used to be obstacles, limitations turned into thresholds and passages?
- What did you find the most helpful and challenging in the integration of PdesF

- What are grass and concrete to you? What is your favourite material to work with, why?
- What are the most essential elements of PdesF space?
- What are points of assembly and voids?
- Of how many spaces does PdesF consist, in your opinion? What is the rhythm of each?
- What are the limits of the PdesF? How can it expand and why? (expansion, integration, continuity)

- How do you think PdesF made this part of the city more accessible (try to look for specific details)?
- What do you think new borders are?

Set 4 (specifically for the design and the structure of the Guerrilla garden at Parc Jeanne-Mance; 6 people—Guerrilla gardeners who were involved with the garden—were interviewed):

The purpose of this set of questions was specific to Villa Compostella as a conceived space

1. Can you define the function/ purpose of the space? What is the purpose of the space if you had to define it in one brief phrase?
2. What elements of this space make it a coherent whole, are systemic to it?
3. What are the elements that you think are associated the strongest with the space: its design, its function, and its purpose?
4. What are the perceived limits of the space that you created and how far do you think they could stretch?
5. What do you think are the major points of space assembly and, on opposite, what are the major voids in space?
6. What do you think creates the rhythm of this place (if you had to think of it as a tune) and how do you define its major motive?
7. Which elements of the design became thresholds? Which elements you think our borders?
8. How does the ephemerality of this space make you feel?

Set 5 (for business owners in the Mile End neighbourhood; 3 people were surveyed):

Questionnaire # _____ Location Code: _____

1. Did you give anyone permission to grow edible plants at this location? Y/N
2. Were you asked to water these plants or to otherwise take care of them? Y/N
3. Do you look after these plants (e.g., watering)? Y/N Why / Why not? _____
4. How does it make you feel that these plants have been placed in front of your business by someone other than yourself and the city authorities ?

5. Do you feel differently about these plants knowing that they are edible rather than decorative (e.g., flowers) or unintentional growth ('weeds')?

6. Do you plan to harvest these edible plants? Y/N Why / Why not? _____

7. Design-wise, are there any aspects of this planted area that you particularly like or dislike?

8. Do you talk to others (customers, friends, family) about this planted area? Y/N Why / Why not? _____

9. Do you plan to plant edible plants yourself at this location next year? Y/N Why / Why not? _____

10. Are you curious about why people have put these plantings here? Y/N Why / Why not? _____

11. Having seen this example of edible plants in the city, do you now find yourself noticing and/or thinking about other locations in the city where edible plants could be put? Y/N Why / Why not? _____

12. What do you think are the major benefits of this practice?

13. Comments: _____

Appendix 3. Briefly, on Lawns in North America

It is unsurprising that a century after the groundbreaking work of Downing and Olmsted, J.B.Jackson argues that

[t]he true reason why every American house has to have a front yard is probably very simple: it exists to satisfy a love of beauty. Not every beauty, but beauty of a special, familiar kind; one that every American can recognize and enjoy, and even after a fashion recreate for himself. (Jackson, 1982b, p.178).

This front yard lawn—reminiscent of Downing’s and Olmsted’s parks—is, according to Jackson, a particular response to wilderness and nature that set upon most of Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire: “[o]ur lawns are merely the civilized descendants of the medieval pastures cleared among the trees. In the New Forest in England a “lawn” is still an open space in the woods where cattle are fed.” (Jackson, 1982a, p.349). So, what is this familiar beauty that for some of us goes beyond mere value of the space that was re-appropriated back from ‘wild’ Nature? It actually goes back in time, beyond the works of Downing and Olmsted, towards the rural origins of the lawn. Pasture was not only a production unit in the medieval rural economy, but also a place of leisure and sports for peasants. As Jackson notes, cricket originated on the green in England, but before cricket there was archery, yet another sport on the green that was widely available and heavily promoted by the authorities. Sports, therefore, might belong with the green, even if they block the view.

Both Downing and Olmsted make reference to activities on the green that touch both on lawn's role as a town commons, inviting the co-presence of all classes, and on the playful social activities that a lawn can host. This is, however, for a professional designer to create such a lawn:

A Promenade may, with great advantage, be carried along the outer part of the surrounding groves of a park; and it will do no harm if here and there a broad opening among the trees discloses its open landscapes to those upon the promenade. But recollect that the object of the latter for the time being should be to see congregated human life under glorious and necessarily artificial conditions, and the natural landscape is not essential to them; though there is no more beautiful picture, and none can be more pleasing incidentally to the gregarious purpose, than that of beautiful meadows, over which clusters of level-armed sheltering trees cast broad shadows, and upon which are scattered dainty cows and flocks of black-faced sheep, while men, women, and children are seen sitting here and there forming groups in the shade, or moving in and out among the woody points and bays.” (Olmsted, 1997b, pp.185-186).

References

- Adams, A. (1995). The Eichler Home. *Gender, Class, and Shelter: Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture*, V, 164-178.
- Adams, A. (2010). Sex and the Single Building: The Weston Havens House, 1941-2001. *Buildings & Landscapes: Journal of the Vernacular Architecture Forum*, 17(1), 82-97.
- Adams, A., & Sijpkens, P. (1995). Wartime Housing and Architectural Change, 1942-92. *Canadian Folklore Canadien*, 17(2), 13-29.
- Adams, D., & Hardman, M. (2013). Observing Guerrillas in the Wild: Reinterpreting Practices of Urban Guerrilla Gardening. *Urban Studies*. doi: 10.1177/0042098013497410
- Adams, D., Hardman, M., & Larkham, P. (2015). Exploring guerrilla gardening: gauging public views on the grassroots activity. *Local Environment*, 20(10), 1231-1246. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2014.980227
- Ahmed, S. (2006). *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Al Shehhi, A. (2014). *Planning for Privately Owned Public Spaces: Improving POPS in Community District Five*. New York: GSAP.
- Alexander, C. (1970). The Goodness of Fit and its Source. In H. Proshansky, W. Ittelson & L. Rivlin (Eds.), *Environmental Psychology: Man and His Physical Setting* (pp. 42-56). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Alexander, C., Ishikawa, S., & Silverstein, M. (1977). *A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Alexander, C. (1979). *The Timeless Way of Building* (Vol. 1). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Antrop, Marc. (2013). A Brief History of Landscape Research. In P. Howard, I. Thompson & E. Waterton (Eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Landscape Studies* (pp. 12-22). London, UK; New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
- Architecture for Humanity (Ed.). (2012). *Design Like You Give a Damn*. New York; London: Abrams.
- Arendt, H. (1958). *The Human Condition*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Atkinson, S., & Robson, M. (2012). Arts and health as a practice of liminality: Managing the spaces of transformation for social and emotional wellbeing with primary school children. *Health & Place, 18*(6), 1348-1355. doi: 10.1016/j.healthplace.2012.06.017
- Aymonino, A. (2006). More Spaces, Less Volume: a Story in Movement. In A. Aymonino & V. Mosco (Eds.), *Contemporary Public Space: Un-volumetric Architecture* (pp. 15-24). Milano, Italy: Skira Editore S.p.A.
- Bachelard, G. (1994). *The Poetics of Space* (M. Holas, Trans.). Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press.
- Banerjee, T. (2016). The Brave New Urban Design Pedagogy: Some Observations. *Journal of Urban Design, 21*(5), 540-544. doi: 10.1080/13574809.2016.1220107
- Bataille, G. (1986). *Erotism: Death & Sensuality* (M. Dalwood, Trans.). San Francisco: City Lights Books.
- Beech, N. (2011). Liminality and the practices of identity reconstruction. *Human Relations, 64*(2), 285-302. doi: 10.1177/0018726710371235

- bell hooks. (1984). *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. Boston: South End Press.
- bell hooks. (1990). *Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics*. Toronto: Between the Lines Press.
- Benchelabi, H. (1998). Cultural Displacement in Brussels with Maghrebi Women. *Journal of Architectural Education*, 52(1), 3-10.
- Benjamin, W. (2008). The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (J. A. Underwood, Trans.) *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*. London: Penguin Group Ltd.
- Benjamin, W., & Lacis, A. (1983). Naples (E. Jephcott, Trans.). In W. Benjamin (Ed.), *Reflections* (pp. 163-173). New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Beveridge, C., & Rocheleau, P. (1995). *Frederick Law Olmsted: Desinging the American Landscape* (D. Larkin Ed.). New York: Rizzoli.
- Blomley, N. (2004). *Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property*. London: Routledge.
- Blomley, N. (2004). Un-real Estate: Proprietary Space and Public Gardening. *Antipode*, 36, 614-641.
- Blomley, N. (2010). Cuts, Flows, and the Geographies of Property. *Law, Culture and the Humanities*, 7(2), 203-216.
- Bobic, M. (2004). *Between the Edges: Street-building Transition as Urbanity Interface*. Bussum [Netherlands]: Thoth Publishers.
- Body-Gendrot, S., Carré, J. C., & Garbaye, R. (2008). *A City of One's Own: Blurring the Boundaries between Private and Public*. Aldershot, England: : Ashgate.
- Bortoft, H. (2012). *Taking Appearance Seriously*. Edinburgh: Floris.

- Boudon, P. (1979). *Lived-in Architecture: Le Corbusier's Pessac Revisited* (G. Onn, Trans.). London: Lund Humphries.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Boyer, M. C. (2008). The Many Mirrors of Foucault and their Architectural Reflections. In M. Dehaene & L. de Cauter (Eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (pp. 53-73). London and New York: Routledge.
- Brenner, N. (1997). Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre's Geographies of Globalization. *Public Culture*, 10(1), 135-167.
- Brenner, N. (2001). State Theory in the Political Conjuncture: Henri Lefebvre's "Comments on a New State Form". *Antipode*, 33(5), 783-808. doi: 10.1111/1467-8330.00217
- Brenner, N. (2012). What is Critical Urban Theory? In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse & M. Mayer (Eds.), *Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City* (pp. 11-23). London; New York: Routledge.
- Brones, A. (2013). Guerilla Gardening Across Europe... 9 Countries, 5,000 Miles by Bicycle. Retrieved February 1st, 2014, from <http://foodieunderground.com/guerilla-gardening-across-europe-9-countries-5000-miles-by-bicycle/>
- Brown, D. (2006). Foreword. In A. Aymonino & V. Mosco (Eds.), *Contemporary Public Space: Un-volumetric Architecture* (pp. 9-14). Milano, Italy: Skira Editore S.p.A.
- Brubaker, R. (2005). The 'Diaspora' Diaspora. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(1), 1-19.
- Butina Watson, G. (2016). An international perspective on urban design education. *Journal of Urban Design*, 21(5), 545-547. doi: 10.1080/13574809.2016.1220134

- Bynum, C. W. (2012). Women's Stories, Women's Symbols: a Critique of Victor Turner's Theory of Liminality. In C. W. Bynum (Ed.), *Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion* (pp. 27-52). New York: Zone Books.
- Caminero-Santangelo, B., & Myers, G. (Eds.). (2011). *Environment at the Margins: Literary and Environmental Studies in Africa*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
- Carbonella, A. (2009). Structures of Fear, Spaces of Hope. *Anthropologica*, 51(2), 353-361.
- Carr, S. (1992). *Public space*. Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
- Casey, E. (1997). *The Fate of Place: a Philosophical History*. Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press.
- Casey, E. (2011). Border versus Boundary at La Frontera. *Environment & Planning D: Society and Space*, 29, 384-398.
- Cenzatti, M. (2008). Heterotopias of Difference. In M. Dehaene & L. de Caeter (Eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (pp. 75-86). London and New York: Routledge.
- Chase, J., Crawford, M., & Kaliski, J. (Eds.). (2008). *Everyday Urbanism*. New York: The Monacelli Press.
- Chemero, A. (2000). What Events are. *Ecological Psychology*, 12(1), 37-42.
- Cidre, E. (2016). How emergent is pedagogical practice in urban design? *Journal of Urban Design*, 21(5), 535-539. doi: 10.1080/13574809.2016.1220158
- Cosgrove, D. (1985). Prospect, Perspective, and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series*, 10(1), 45-62.

- Cosgrove, D., & Daniels, S. (1988). *The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design, and Use of Past Environments*. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Crane, A. (2011). *Intervening with Agriculture: a Participatory Action Case Study of Guerrilla Gardening in Kingston, Ontario*. (Master's), Queen's University, Kingston, Ont.
- Crane, A., Viswanathan, L., & Whitelaw, G. (2013). Sustainability through intervention: a case study of guerrilla gardening in Kingston, Ontario. *Local Environment*, 18(1), 71-90. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2012.716413
- Cresswell, T. (1996). *In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Cronon, W. (1996). The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature. In W. Cronon (Ed.), *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*. New York: WW Norton.
- Cruz, T. (2007). From Washington, D.C., to the Emergent American Neighborhood: Strategies of Surveillance, Tactics of Encroachment. *Perspecta*, 39, 150-161.
- Cruz, T., & Tate, J. (2010). Design Ops. A Conversation Between Teddy Cruz and Jonathan Tate. In E. Choi & M. Trotter (Eds.), *Architecture at the Edge of Everything Else*. Cambridge, Mass.; London: The MIT Press.
- Cupers, K., & Miessen, M. (2002). *Spaces of Uncertainty* (W. James, Trans.). Wuppertal: Müller und Busmann.
- Cuthbert, A. (2017). Urban decay and regeneration: context and issues. *Journal of Urban Design*, 22(2), 140-143. doi: 10.1080/13574809.2017.1288873

- Czerniak, J. (2006). Looking Back at Landscape Urbanism: Speculations on Site. In C. Waldheim (Ed.), *The Landscape Urbanism Reader* (pp. 105-124). Princeton NJ: Princeton Architectural Press.
- de Certeau, M. (1984). *The Practice of Everyday Life* (S. Rendall, Trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dehaene, M., & de Caeter, L. (2008). Heterotopia in a Postcivil Society. In M. Dehaene & L. de Caeter (Eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (pp. 3-10). London and New York: Routledge.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. I. (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Dell, C. (2009). *Tacit Urbanism: Hawkers and the Production of Space in Everyday Kolkata*. Rotterdam: Post Editions.
- DeNora, T. (2000). *Music in Everyday Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Deslandes, A. (2012). What Do Pop-up Shops and Homelessness Have in Common? *The Global Urbanist*. <http://globalurbanist.com/2012/02/14/diy-urbanism-homelessness>
- Dimenber, E. (1998). Henri Lefebvre on Abstract Space. In A. Light & J. M. Smith (Eds.), *Philosophy and Geography II: The Production of Public Space*. Lanham; Boulder; New York; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Domosh, M. (1998). Those “Gorgeous Incongruities”: Polite Politics and Public Space on the Streets of Nineteenth-Century New York City. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 88(2), 209-226.
- Doron, G. (2007). ...badlands, blank space, border vacuums, brown fields, conceptual Nevada, Dead Zones, derelict areas, ellipsis spaces, empty places, free space liminal spaces, nameless

spaces, No Man's Lands, polite spaces, post architectural zones, spaces of indeterminacy, spaces of uncertainty, smooth spaces, Tabula Rasa, Temporary Autonomous Zones, terrain vague, urban deserts, vacant lands, voids, white areas, Wasteland... SLOAPs. *field.*, 1, 10-23.

Douglas, M. (1966). *Purity and Danger*. New York, Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers.

Dovey, K. (1993). Putting Geometry in its Place: Toward a Phenomenology of Design Process. In D. Seamon (Ed.), *Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Dovey, K. (1999). *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form*. London; New York: Routledge.

Dovey, K., & Polakit, K. (2007). Urban Slippage: Smooth and Striated Streetscapes in Bangkok. In K. Franck & Q. Stevens (Eds.), *Loose Space. Possibility and Diversity in Urban Life* (pp. 113-131). New York: Routledge.

Dovey, K., & Wood, S. (2014). Public/private urban interfaces: type, adaptation, assemblage. *Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability*, 8(1), 1-16. doi: 10.1080/17549175.2014.891151

Downing, A. (1841). *A Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening: adapted to North America; with a view to the improvement of country residences. Comprising historical notices and general principles of the art, directions for laying out grounds and arranging plantations, the description and cultivation of hardy trees, decorative accompaniments to the house and grounds, the formation of pieces of artificial water, flower gardens, etc. With remarks on rural architecture*. New York; London: Wiley and Putnam.

- Downing, A. (1846). A Chapter on Lawns. *The Horticulturist, and Journal of Rural Art and Rural Taste*, 1(5), 26-29.
- Downing, A. (1921). *Landscape Gardening* (F. A. Waugh Ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Downing, A. (2012). A Talk About Public Parks and Gardens. In R. Twombly (Ed.), *Andrew Jackson Downing: Essential Texts* (pp. 213-226). New York, London: W.W.Norton & Company.
- Duncan, N. (1996). Renegotiating Gender and Sexuality in Public and Private Spaces. In N. Duncan (Ed.), *BodySpace: Destabilizing Geographies of Gender and Sexuality* (pp. 127-145). London: Routledge.
- Ekathimerini.com. (2013, August 2nd, 2013). Villa Amalia to be Revamped with EU Funds, Mayor Says. Retrieved March 15th, 2017, from <http://www.ekathimerini.com/148351/article/ekathimerini/news/villa-amalia-to-be-revamped-with-eu-funds-mayor-says>
- Elden, S. (2004). *Understanding Henri Lefebvre*. London; New York: Continuum.
- Ellin, N. (2006). *Integral Urbanism*. New York: Routledge.
- Fernando, N. (2007). Open-Ended Space: Urban Streets in Different Cultural Contexts. In K. Franck & Q. Stevens (Eds.), *Loose Space. Possibility and Diversity in Urban Life* (pp. 54-72). New York: Routledge.
- Fink, E. (1970). The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism (R. O. Elveton, Trans.). In R. O. Elveton (Ed.), *The Phenomenology of Husserl* (pp. 73-147). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Firth, C., Maye, D., & Pearson, D. (2011). Developing “community” in community gardens. *Local Environment*, 16(6), 555-568. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2011.586025

- Flores, H. (2006). *Food Not Lawns: How to Turn Your Yard Into a Garden and Your Neighborhood Into a Community*. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Pub. Company.
- Fortier, A.-M. (2010). Proximity by design? Affective citizenship and the management of unease. *Citizenship Studies*, 14(1), 17-30.
- Foucault, M. (1967). Of Other Spaces (M. Dehaene & L. De Caeter, Trans.). In M. Dehaene & L. De Caeter (Eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (pp. 13-30). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (A. Sheridan, Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Franck, K., & Stevens, Q. (2007a). *Loose Space: Possibility and Diversity in Urban Life*. Guernsey, GY, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Franck, K., & Stevens, Q. (2007b). Tying Down Loose Space. In K. Franck & Q. Stevens (Eds.), *Loose Space. Possibility and Diversity in Urban Life* (pp. 1-34). New York: Routledge.
- Franklin, A., & Schuurman, N. (2017). Aging animal bodies: horse retirement yards as relational spaces of liminality, dwelling and negotiation. *Social & Cultural Geography*, 1-20. doi: 10.1080/14649365.2017.1392592
- Galvao, A., & Sato, K. (2005). *Affordances in Product Architecture: Linking Technical Functions and Users' Tasks*. Paper presented at the IDETC/CIE 2005 ASME 2005 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences & Computers and Information in Engineering Conference, Long Beach, California, USA.
- Gandy, M. (2016). Unintentional Landscapes. *Landscape Research*, 41(4), 433-440. doi: 10.1080/01426397.2016.1156069

- Gaver, W. (1996). Situating Action II: Affordances for Interaction: The Social Is Material for Design. *Ecological Psychology*, 8(2), 111-129.
- Gehl, J. (1986). "Soft Edges" in Residential Streets. *Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research*, 3(2), 89-102. doi: 10.1080/02815738608730092
- Gehl, J. (1996). *Life between Buildings: Using Public Space* (J. Koch, Trans. 3rd ed.): Arkitektens Forlag.
- Gehl, J. (2006). Life, Spaces, Buildings and in Said Order Please. In M. Moor & J. Rowland (Eds.), *Urban Design Futures* (pp. 70-75). London: Routledge.
- Gibson, J. J. (1979). *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Goonewardena, K. (2012). Space and Revolution in Theory and Practice: Eight Theses. In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse & M. Mayer (Eds.), *Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City* (pp. 86-101). London; New York: Routledge.
- Gupta, A., & Ferguson, J. (1992). Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference. *Cultural Anthropology*, 7(1), 6-23.
- Harel, S. (2015). Le Quartier des spectacles, témoignage d'une architecture horizontale montréalaise ? . In S. Harel, L. Lussier & J. I. Thibert (Eds.), *Le Quartier des spectacles et le chantier de l'imaginaire montréalais* (pp. 157-184). Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval.
- Harman, G. (2010). Technology, Objects and Things in Heidegger. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 34(1), 17-25.
- Harries, K. (1997). *The Ethical Function of Architecture*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Harvey, D. (2000). *Spaces of Hope*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2008). The Right to the City. *New Left Review*, 53, 23-40.
- Haselsberger, B. (2014). Decoding borders. Appreciating border impacts on space and people. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 15(4), 505-526. doi: 10.1080/14649357.2014.963652
- Hayden, D. (1980). What Would a Non-Sexist City Be Like? Speculations on Housing, Urban Design and Human Work. *Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 5(3), S170-S187.
- Hayden, D. (1997). *The Power of Place*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Hayden, D. (1997). Urban Landscape History: The Sense of Place and the Politics of Space. In P. Groth & T. Bressi (Eds.), *Understanding Ordinary Landscapes* (pp. 111-133). New Haven; London: Yale University Press.
- Haydn, F. (2006). A Material that Never Comes to Rest. In F. Haydn & R. Temel (Eds.), *Temporary Urban Spaces: Concepts for the Use of City Spaces* (pp. 67-74). Basel: Birkhäuser.
- Haydn, F., & Temel, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Temporary Urban Spaces: Concepts for the Use of City Spaces*. Basel: Birkhäuser.
- Healey, P. (1992). Planning through Debate: The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory. *The Town Planning Review*, 63(2), 143-162. doi: 10.2307/40113141
- Heidegger, M. (1996[1953]). *Being and Time* (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hertzberger, H. (1993). *Lessons for Students in Architecture* (I. Rike, Trans. 2 ed.). Rotterdam: Uitgeverij 010 Publishers.
- Hess, D., & Winner, L. (2007). Enhancing Justice and Sustainability at the Local Level: Affordable Policies for Urban Governments. *Local Environments*, 12(4), 379-395.

- Heynen, H., & Loeckx, A. (1998). Scenes of Ambivalence: Concluding Remarks on Architectural Patterns of Displacement. *Journal of Architectural Education*, 52(2), 100-108.
- Hill, J. (2006). *Immaterial Architecture*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hillier, B. (1996). *Space is the Machine: A Configurational Theory of Architecture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hou, J. (2010). Not Your Everyday Public Space. In J. Hou (Ed.), *Insurgent Public Space: Guerrilla Urbanism and the Remaking of Contemporary Cities* (pp. 1-19). New York: Routledge.
- Howett, C. (1993). "If Doors of Perception Were Cleansed": Toward an Aesthetics for Designed Landscape. In D. Seamon (Ed.), *Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Husserl, E. (1964). *The Idea of Phenomenology* (W. Alston & G. Nakhnikian, Trans.). Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology; an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Husserl, E. (1982). *Cartesian Mediations: An Introduction to Phenomenology* (D. Cairns, Trans.). Hague, Boston, London Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Ingram, G. (1997). Marginality and the Landscapes of Erotic Alien(n)ations. In G. Ingram, A.-M. Bouthillette & Y. Retter (Eds.), *Queers in Space: Communities, Public Places, Sites of Resistance* (pp. pp. 95-125, photographs: 197, 198, 111, 112.). Seattle, Washington: Bay Press.

- Jackson, J. B. (1980). *The Necessity for Ruins, and Other Topics*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Jackson, J. B. (1982). Front Yards. In S. Kaplan & R. Kaplan (Eds.), *Humanscape: Environments for People* (pp. 175-177). Ann Arbor: Ulrich's Books Inc.
- Jackson, J. B. (1997). The Future of the Vernacular. In P. Groth & T. Bressi (Eds.), *Understanding Ordinary Landscapes* (pp. 145-156). New Haven; London: Yale University Press.
- Jackson, P. (1992). The Politics of the Streets: A Geography of Caribana. *Political Geography*, 11(2), 130-151.
- Jacobs, J. (1961). *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Random House.
- Jencks, C. (1998). Post-Modern Architecture. In M. Hays (Ed.), *Architecture Theory Since 1968* (pp. 308-316). New York: The Trustees of Columbia University.
- Johnson, L. (1983). Bracketing Lifeworlds: Husserlian Phenomenology as Geographical Method. *Australian Geographical Studies*, 21, 102-108.
- Jones, L. (2000). *The Hermeneutics of Sacred Architecture: Experience, Interpretation, Comparison* (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jones, R. (2012). Spaces of Refusal: Rethinking Sovereign Power and Resistance at the Border. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 102(3), 685-699.
- Jones, W. (2006). Un-volumetric Architecture and the Emergence of the Architectural. In A. Aymonino & V. Mosco (Eds.), *Contemporary Public Space: Un-volumetric Architecture* (pp. 95-102). Milano, Italy: Skira Editore S.p.A.
- Juniper, A. (2003). *Wabi Sabi: the Japanese Art of Impermanence*. Boston: Tuttle Pub.

- Karandinou, A. (2013). *No Matter: Theories and Practices of the Ephemeral in Architecture*.
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Käufer, S., & Chemero, A. (2015). *Phenomenology: an Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Keenan, S. (2010). Subversive Property: Reshaping Malleable Spaces of Belonging. *Social & Legal Studies*, 19(4), 423-439.
- Kilian, T. (1998). Public and Private, Power and Space. In A. Light & J. M. Smith (Eds.), *Philosophy and Geography II: The Production of Public Space* (pp. 115-134). Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kipfer, S. (2008). How Lefebvre Urbanized Gramsci. Hegemony, Everyday Life, and Difference. In K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom & C. Schmid (Eds.), *Space, Difference, Everyday Life. Reading Henri Lefebvre* (pp. 193-211). New York & London: Routledge.
- Knabb, K. (Ed.). (1981). *The Situationist International Anthology*. Berkley, California: Bureau of Public Secrets.
- Kohn, M. (2004). *Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space*. New York: Routledge.
- Kohoutek, R., & Kamleithner, C. (2006). Temporary Uses, Deregulation and Urbanity. In F. Haydn & R. Temel (Eds.), *Temporary Urban Spaces: Concepts for the Use of City Spaces*. Basel: Birkhäuser.
- Kroll, L. (1984). Anarchitecture. In R. Hatch (Ed.), *The Scope of Social Architecture* (pp. 167-181). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
- Krstic, V. (1998). Constructing the Ephemeral: The Notions of Binding and Portability in Japanese Architecture. In M. Toy (Ed.), *Ephemeral/Portable Architecture* (pp. 11-15). New York: John Willey and Sons Ltd.

- Land, R., Rattray, J., & Vivian, P. (2014). *Learning in the liminal space: A semiotic approach to threshold concepts* (Vol. 67).
- Lang, J. (2005). *Urban Design: A Typology of Procedures and Products*: Architectural Press.
- Larsen, S., & Johnson, J. (2012). Toward an Open Sense of Place: Phenomenology, Affinity, and the Question of Being. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 102(3), 632-646.
- Last, N. (2012). Flow's Socio-Spatial Formation. *thresholds*, 40, 40-46.
- Latour, B. (1988). *The Pasteurization of France*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Latour, B. (1999). On Recalling ANT. In J. Law & J. Hassard (Eds.), *Actor Network Theory and After*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Le Corbusier. (1970). Towards a New Architecture: Guiding Principles. In U. Conrads (Ed.), *Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-century Architecture*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Le Corbusier. (1987). *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Leatherbarrow, D. (2009). *Architecture Oriented Otherwise*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (1991). *The Production of Space* (D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Lefebvre, H. (1996). The Right to the City. In E. Kofman & E. Lebas (Eds.), *Writings on Cities* (pp. 147-159). New York: Blackwell.
- Lefebvre, H. (2003). *The Urban Revolution* (R. Bononno, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (2004). *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life* (S. Elden & G. Moore, Trans.). London; New York: Continuum.

- Lefebvre, H. (2008). *Critique of Everyday Life: Foundations for the Sociology of the Everyday* (J. Moore, Trans. Vol. 2). London; New York: Verso.
- Lefebvre, H. (2008). *Critique of Everyday Life: From Modernity to Modernism (Towards a Metaphilosophy of Daily Life)* (J. Moore, Trans. Vol. 3). London; New York: Verso.
- Lefebvre, H. (2009). Comment on a New State Form (1979) (G. Moore, N. Brenner & S. Elden, Trans.). In N. Brenner & S. Elden (Eds.), *State, Space, World. Selected Essays* (pp. 124-137). Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (2009). Theoretical Problems of Autogestion (1966) (G. Moore, N. Brenner & S. Elden, Trans.). In N. Brenner & S. Elden (Eds.), *State, Space, World. Selected Essays* (pp. 138-152). Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Linovski, O., & Loukaitou-Sideris, A. (2013). Evolution of Urban Design Plans in the United States and Canada: What Do the Plans Tell Us about Urban Design Practice? *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 33(1), 66-82. doi: 10.1177/0739456x12454174
- Loukaitou-Sideris, A. (1996). Cracks in the City: Addressing the Constraints and Potentials of Urban Design. *Journal of Urban Design*, 1(1), 91-103.
- Loukaitou-Sideris, A., & Mukhija, V. (2016). Responding to informality through urban design studio pedagogy. *Journal of Urban Design*, 21(5), 577-595. doi: 10.1080/13574809.2015.1071650
- Luka, N. (2013). Urban spectacular: A bold series of downtown plazas reintroduces vibrant urban life into spaces left over from postwar mega-projects. *Canadian Architect*, 58(2), 18-22.
- Luka, N., Gendron, P.-E. t., Cudmore, J., & Mikadze, V. (2015). Pour un urbanisme des possibles dans le Quartier des spectacles. In S. Harel, L. Lussier & J. l. Thibert (Eds.), *Le Quartier des*

- spectacles et le chantier de l'imaginaire montréalais* (pp. 185-202). Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval.
- Maier, J., Fadel, G., & Battisto, D. (2009). An Affordance-based Approach to Architectural Theory, Design, and Practice. *Design Studies*, 30, 393-414.
- Malpas, J. (1999). *Place and Experience: a Philosophical Topography*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Marcuse, P. (2012). Whose Right(s) to What City? In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse & M. Mayer (Eds.), *Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City* (pp. 24-41). London; New York: Routledge.
- Mason, H. (1998). The Rights of Rights of Way. In A. Light & J. M. Smith (Eds.), *Philosophy and Geography II: The Production of Public Space* (pp. 179-188). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Massey, D. (2005). *For Space*. London: Sage.
- McClintock, N. (2014). Radical, reformist, and garden-variety neoliberal: coming to terms with urban agriculture's contradictions. *Local Environment*, 19(2), 147-171. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2012.752797
- McDonough, T. (2002). Situationst Space. In T. McDonough (Ed.), *Guy Debord and the Situationst International: Texts and Documents* (pp. 241-266). Cambridge; London: The MIT Press.
- McHarg, I. (1969). *Design with Nature*. Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press.
- McKay, G. (2011). *Radical Gardening: Politics, Idealism and Rebellion in the Garden*. London: Frances Lincoln.

- McLain, R. J., Hurley, P. T., Emery, M. R., & Poe, M. R. (2014). Gathering “wild” food in the city: rethinking the role of foraging in urban ecosystem planning and management. *Local Environment, 19*(2), 220-240. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2013.841659
- Mellin, R. (2006). Conservation in Tiliting, Newfoundland: Rugged Landscape, Strong People, Fragile Architecture. *Journal of Preservation Technology, 37*(2-3), 13-21.
- Mellin, R. (2009). The Edible Landscape of a Newfoundland Outport. *Open House International, 34*(2), 96-106.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of Perception* (C. Smith, Trans.). New York: Humanities Press.
- Mikadze, V. (2015). Ephemeral Urban Landscapes of Guerrilla Gardeners: A Phenomenological Approach. *Landscape Research, 40*(5), 519-529. doi: 10.1080/01426397.2014.939617
- Milbourne, P. (2012). Everyday (in)justices and ordinary environmentalisms: community gardening in disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods. *Local Environment, 17*(9), 943-957. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2011.607158
- Milgrom, R. (2008). Lucien Kroll: Design, Difference, Everyday Life. In K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom & C. Schmid (Eds.), *Space, Difference, Everyday Life. Reading Henri Lefebvre* (pp. 264-281). New York & London: Routledge.
- Mitchell, D. (2003). *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Moholy-Nagy, L. (1947). *The New Vision, 1928 : 4th rev. ed., and, Abstract of an Artist* (D. Hoffman, Trans. 4th, revisioned ed.). New York: Wittenborn, Schultz.
- Mooallem, J. (2008). Guerrilla Gardening. Retrieved February 1, 2014, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/magazine/08guerrilla-t.html>

- Morse, M. (1990). An Ontology of Everyday Distraction: the Freeway, the Mall and Television. In P. Mellencamp (Ed.), *Logics of Television*. Indiana; London: Indiana U.P. and British Film Institute.
- Morteo, E. (2006). Architecture & Volume (working on the intermediate scale). In A. Aymonino & V. Mosco (Eds.), *Contemporary Public Space: Un-volumetric Architecture* (pp. 55-62). Milano, Italy: Skira Editore S.p.A.
- Mugerauer, R. (1993). Toward an Architectural Vocabulary: The Porch as Between. In D. Seamon (Ed.), *Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Newman, O. (1973). *Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City*. London: Architectural Press.
- Nogué i Font, J. (1993). Toward a Phenomenology of Landscape and Landscape Experience: Example Catalonia. In D. Seamon (Ed.), *Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Norberg-Schulz, C. (1971). *Existence, Space and Architecture*. London: Studio Vista.
- Norberg-Schulz, C. (1980). *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture*. New York: Rizzoli Press.
- Norman, D. A. (1990). *The Design of Everyday Things*. New York: Doubleday.
- Olmsted, F. L. (1874). Report on Mount Royal Park. New York.
- Olmsted, F. L. (1992). Preliminary Report upon the Proposed Suburban Village at Riverside. In D. C. Schuyler, J. Turner (Ed.), *The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted, Vol. VI: The Years of Olmsted, Vaux & Company*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Olmsted, F. L. (1997). The Psychological Effect of Park Scenery: Address to the Prospect Park Scientific Association. In C. Beveridge (Ed.), *The Paper of Frederick Law Olmsted* (Vol. I, pp. 147-157). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Olmsted, F. L. (1997). Parks and City Planning: Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns. In C. Beveridge (Ed.), *The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted* (Vol. I, pp. 171-205). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Olmsted, F. L. (1997). The People's Park at Birkenhead, near Liverpool. In C. Beveridge (Ed.), *The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted* (Vol. I, pp. 69-78). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Olmsted, F. L. (1997). A Consideration of the Justifying Value of a Public Park. In C. Beveridge (Ed.), *The Paper of Frederick Law Olmsted* (Vol. I, pp. 331-349). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Olwig, K. R. (2005). Liminality, Seasonality and Landscape. *Landscape Research*, 30(2), 259-271. doi: 10.1080/01426390500044473
- Osborne, B., & Swainson, D. (1988). *Kingston: Building on the Past*. Westport: Ontario: Butternut Press Inc.
- Oswin, N. (2008). Critical Geographies and the Uses of Sexuality: Deconstructing Queer Space. *Progress in Human Geography*, 32(1), 89-103.
- Pagano, C. (2013). DIY Urbanism: Property and Process in Grassroots City Building. *Marquette Law Review* 335, 97(2). Retrieved from <http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol97/iss2/5/> website:
- Painter, M. (1992). Participation and Power. In M. Munro-Clark (Ed.), *Citizen Participation in Government* (pp. 21-36). Sydney: Hale and Iremonger.

- Pallasmaa, J. (2005a). *The Eyes of the Skin. Architecture and the Senses* (2nd ed.). Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons.
- Pallasmaa, J. (2005b). *Encounters: Architectural Essays* (D. Tullberg & M. Wynne-Ellis, Trans.). Helsinki, Finland: Rakennustieto Oy.
- Pallasmaa, J. (2014). Space, Place and Atmosphere. Emotion and Peripheral Perception in Architectural Experience. *Lebenswelt. Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience*, 4, 230-245.
doi: <https://doi.org/10.13130/2240-9599/4202>
- Paravel, V., & Sniadecki, J. P. (Writers). (2010). Foreign Parts [film]. In V. Paravel & J. P. Sniadecki (Producer). USA.
- Parks, Forestry, and Recreation. (2014). Community Gardens. Retrieved February 1st, 2014, from <http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=8148dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD>
- PduQdesS (Partenariat du Quartier des spectacles). (2004). *Le quartier des spectacles une destination culturelle : vivre, créer et se divertir au centre ville*. Montréal: Partenariat du Quartier des spectacles.
- PduQdesS (Partenariat du Quartier des spectacles). (2006). *Identity concept: Developing a Neighbourhood Image, Iconography and Signage*. Montréal: Partenariat du Quartier des spectacles.
- Peretti, B. (2007). *Nightclub City: Politics and Amusement in Manhattan*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Pérez-Gómez, A. (1983). *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

- Pérez-Gómez, A., & Pelletier, L. (1997). *Architectural Representation and the Perspective Hinge*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Pickering, J. (2000). On the Proper Treatment of Affordance: Formality or Mutuality? *Ecological Psychology*, 12(1), 71-77.
- PIYN. (2013). Gardening Without Boundaries. Retrieved February 1st, 2014, from <http://piyn.net/events/gardening-without-boundaries/>
- Poirier, J. (2015). " Tu ne peux pas te promener avec des feuilles de plywood pendant le Festival de Jazz. ". In S. Harel, L. Lussier & J. I. Thibert (Eds.), *Le Quartier des spectacles et le chantier de l'imaginaire montréalais* (pp. 77-94). Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval.
- Pokorny, K. (2011). Guerrilla Gardeners Lob Seed Bombs Bought From Candy Dispensers. Retrieved February 1st, 2014, from http://blog.oregonlive.com/kympokorny/2011/08/guerilla_gardeners_lob_seed_bo.html
- Power, E. (2005). Human-Nature Relations in Suburban Gardens. *Australian Geographer*, 36, 39-53.
- Preston-Whyte, R. (2008). The Beach as a Liminal Space *A Companion to Tourism* (pp. 349-359): Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Pritchard, A., & Morgan, N. (2006). Hotel Babylon? Exploring hotels as liminal sites of transition and transgression. *Tourism Management*, 27(5), 762-772. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2005.05.015>
- Prizeman, M. (1998). Intensity: Portable Architecture as Parable. In M. Toy (Ed.), *Ephemeral/Portable Architecture* (pp. 22-30). New York: John Willey and Sons Ltd.
- Pullan, W. (2011). Frontier Urbanism: the Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities. *The Journal of Architecture*, 16(1), 15-35.

- Qviström, M. (2007). Landscapes out of Order: Studying the Inner Urban Fringe Beyond the Rural-Urban Divide. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 89(3), 269-282. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0467.2007.00253.x
- Radywyl, N., & Biggs, C. (2013). Reclaiming the Commons for Urban Transformation. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 50, 159-170. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.12.020>
- Rael, R. (2012). Boundary Line Infrastructure. *thresholds*, 40, 76-82.
- Rapoport, A. (2005). *Culture, Architecture, and Design*. Chicago: Locke Science Pub. Co.
- Reed, E. (1996). *Encountering the World: Toward an Ecological Psychology*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Regroupement des Eco-quartiers, R. (2010). La Pertinence Environnementale du Programme Eco-Quariter. Montréal: Regroupement des Eco-quartiers.
- Relph, E. (1976). *Place and Placelessness*. London: Pion.
- Relph, E. (1981). *Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography*. London: Croom Helm.
- Relph, E. (1993). Modernity and the Reclamation of Place. In D. Seamon (Ed.), *Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology* (pp. 25-40). Albany: SUNY Press.
- Relph, E. (2004). Temporality and the Rhythms of Sustainable Landscapes. In T. Mels (Ed.), *Reanimating Places* (pp. 112-121). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Reynolds, R. (2008). *On Guerrilla Gardening: a Handbook for Gardening Without Boundaries*. New York: Bloomsbury.
- Richards, J. (1994). *Facadism*. London: Routeledge.

- Riegner, M. (1993). Toward a Holistic Understanding of Place: Reading a Landscape Through its Flora and Fauna. In D. Seamon (Ed.), *Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Rodaway, P. (1994). *Sensuous Geographies: Body, Sense, and Place*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Ronneberger, K. (2008). Henri Lefebvre and Urban Everyday Life: in Search of the Possible. In K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom & C. Schmid (Eds.), *Space, Difference, Everyday Life. Reading Henri Lefebvre* (pp. 134-146). New York & London: Routledge.
- Ross, K. (2002). Lefebvre on the Situationists: An Interview. In T. McDonough (Ed.), *Guy Debord and the Situationist International: Texts and Documents* (pp. 267-284). Cambridge; London: The MIT Press.
- Rowe, C., & Koetter, F. (1978). *Collage City*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Sack, R. (1986). *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*. Cambridge: The University Press.
- Sandercock, L. (2000). Unsettling "Home" in Settler Societies. *thresholds*, 21, 6-11.
- Sartre, J.-P. (1956). *Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (H. Barnes, Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library.
- Saward, M. (2006). Representation. In A. Dobson & R. Eckersley (Eds.), *Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge* (pp. 183-199). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Schwartzwald, R. (2015). Quand un quartier devient un Quartier: que peut la fiction ? In S. Harel, L. Lussier & J. I. Thibert (Eds.), *Le Quartier des spectacles et le chantier de l'imaginaire montréalais* (pp. 67-76). Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval.
- Seamon, D. (1993). *Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing : An Introduction* (pp. 1-24). Albany: State University of New York Press.

- Seamon, D. (2000). A Way of Seeing People and Place: Phenomenology in Environment-Behavior Research. In S. Wapner, J. Demick, T. Yamamoto & H. Minami (Eds.), *Theoretical Perspectives in Environment-Behavior Research: Underlying Assumptions, Research Problems and Methodologies*. New York: Cluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers.
- Seamon, D. (2017). Hermeneutics and Architecture: Buildings-in-Themselves and Interpretive Trustworthiness. In B. Janz (Ed.), *Place, Space and Hermeneutics* (Vol. 5, pp. 347-360). Electronic Edition: Springer.
- Semper, G. (1989). *The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings* (H. Mallgrave & W. Herrmann, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sennett, R. (1970). *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity & City Life*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Sennett, R. (2008). The Open City. In R. Burdett & D. Sudjic (Eds.), *The Endless City* (pp. 290-297). London: Phaidon Press Ltd.
- Sennett, R. (2011). Boundaries and Borders. In R. Burdett & D. Sudjic (Eds.), *Living in the Endless City : the Urban Age Project by the London School of Economics and Deutsche Bank's Alfred Herrhausen Society* (pp. 324-331). London: Phaidon Press Ltd.
- Shachar, A. (2009). *The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Shane, G. (2005). *Recombinant Urbanism: Conceptual Modelling in Architecture, Urban Design, and City Theory*. Chichester: Wiley-Academy.
- Shannon, B., & Banerjee, T. (2017). Dialectic of design, rhetoric of representation. *Journal of Urban Design*, 22(3), 326-346. doi: 10.1080/13574809.2016.1273743

- Sheridan, D. (2007). The Space of Subculture in the City: Getting Specific about Berlin's Indeterminate Territories. *field*, 1(1), 97-119.
- Shmueli, A. (2008). Totality, Hegemony, Difference: Henri Lefebvre and Raymond Williams. In K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom & C. Schmid (Eds.), *Space, Difference, Everyday Life. Reading Henri Lefebvre* (pp. 212-230). New York & London: Routledge.
- Shortt, H. (2015). Liminality, space and the importance of 'transitory dwelling places' at work. *Human Relations*, 68(4), 633-658. doi: 10.1177/0018726714536938
- Sibley, D. (1994). The Sin of Transgression. *Area*, 26(3), 300-303.
- Smith, C., & Kurtz, H. (2003). Community Gardens and Politics of Scale in New York City. *Geographical Review*, 93(2), 193-212.
- Smith, N. (1992). New City, New Frontier: The Lower East Side as Wild, Wild West. In M. Sorkin (Ed.), *Variations on a Theme Park: the New American City and the End of Public Space* (pp. 61-93). New York: Hill and Wang.
- Smith, S. (1993). Bounding the Borders: Claiming Space and Making Place in Rural Scotland. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series*, 18, 291-308.
- Sorkin, M. (1992). *Variations on a Theme Park: the New American City and the End of Public Space*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Soja, E. (1996). Margin/Alia: Social Justice and the New Cultural Politics. In A. Merrifield & E. Swingedouw (Eds.), *The Urbanization of Injustice* (pp. 180-199). London, UK: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Soja, E. (2000). *Postmetropolis. Critical Studies of Cities and Regions*. Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.

- Spiegelberg, H. (1975). *Doing Phenomenology. Essays on and in Phenomenology*. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
- St. John, G. (2001). Alternative Cultural Heterotopia and the Liminoid Body: Beyond Turner at ConFest. *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, 12(1), 47-66. doi: 10.1111/j.1835-9310.2001.tb00062.x
- Stanek, L. (2011). *Henri Lefebvre on Space: Architecture, Urban Research, and the Production of Theory*. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Stavrides, S. (2007). Heterotopias and the Experience of Urban Porous Space. In K. Franck & Q. Stevens (Eds.), *Loose Space. Possibility and Diversity in Urban Life* (pp. 174-192). New York: Routledge.
- Stefanovic, I. (1998). Phenomenological Encounters With Place: Cavtat to Square One. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 18, 31-44.
- Steiner, F. (2011). Landscape ecological urbanism: Origins and trajectories. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 100(4), 333-337. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2011.01.020>
- Stickells, L. (2008). Flow Urbanism: The Heterotopia of Flows. In M. Dehaene & L. de Caeter (Eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (pp. 247-258). London and New York: Routledge.
- Stickells, L. (2011). The Right To The City: Rethinking Architecture's Social Significance. *Architectural Theory Review*, 16(3), 213-227.
- Stoffregen, T. (2000). Affordances and Events. *Ecological Psychology*, 12(1), 1-28.
- Sullivan, L. (1896). The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered. *Lippincott's Magazine*, March, 403-409.

- Temel, R. (2006). The Temporary in the City. In F. Haydn & R. Temel (Eds.), *Temporary Urban Spaces: Concepts for the Use of City Spaces* (pp. 55-66). Basel: Birkhäuser.
- Tempest, S., & Starkey, K. (2004). The Effects of Liminality on Individual and Organizational Learning. *Organization Studies*, 25(4), 507-527. doi: 10.1177/0170840604040674
- Thibert, J. I. (2015). Une autobiographie (incomplète) du Quartier des spectacles. In S. Harel, L. Lussier & J. I. Thibert (Eds.), *Le Quartier des spectacles et le chantier de l'imaginaire montréalais* (pp. 1-28). Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval.
- Thiis-Evensen, T. (1987). *Archetypes in Architecture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Thomassen, B. (2009). The uses and meanings of liminality. *International Political Anthropology*, 2(1), 5-27.
- Thompson, I. (2011). Ten Tenets and Six Questions for Landscape Urbanism. *Landscape Research*, 37(1), 7-26.
- Thomson, S. (2005). 'Territorialising' the Primary School Playground: Deconstructing the Geography of Playtime. *Children's Geographies*, 3(1), 63-78.
- Trancik, R. (1986). *Finding Lost Space: Theories of Urban Design*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
- Tschumi, B. (1994). *Architecture and Disjunction*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Tschumi, B., & Cheng, I. (2003). *The State of Architecture in the Beginning of the 21st Century*. New York: Monacelli Press.
- Tuan, Y.-F. (1974). *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values*. New York: Prentice-Hall.

- Tuan, Y.-F. (1994). *Sense of Place: Its Relationship to Self and Time* In T. Mels (Ed.), *Reanimating Places: a Geography of Rhythms*. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate.
- Turner, V. (1967). *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Chapter IV: Betwixt-and-Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage)*. Ithaca (N. Y.); London: Cornell University Press.
- Turner, V. (1969). *The Ritual Process*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Turner, V. (1974). Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual: An Essay in Comparative Symbology. *Rice Institute Pamphlet - Rice University Studies*, 60(3), 53-92. doi: <http://hdl.handle.net/1911/63159>.
- Turner, V. (1977). Process, System, and Symbol: A New Anthropological Synthesis. *Daedalus*, 106(3), 61-80.
- Turner, V., & Turner, E. (1978). *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Twombly, R. (2012). Introduction: Architect and Gardener to the Republic. In R. Twombly (Ed.), *Andrew Jackson Downing: Essential Texts* (pp. 15-44). New York, London: W.W.Norton & Company.
- van Gennep, A. (1960). *The Rites of Passage* (M. B. Vizedom & G. L. Caffee, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Van Herzele, A., & van Woerkum, C. M. J. (2008). Local Knowledge in Visually Mediated Practice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 27(4), 444-455. doi: 10.1177/0739456x08315890

- van Manen, M. (2011). Phenomenology Online: A Resource for Phenomenological Inquiry. Retrieved April 10th, 2014, 2014
- Veiller, L. (1905). The Housing Problem in American Cities. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 25, 46-70.
- Venturi, R. (1966). *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*. New York: Museum of Modern Art.
- Venturi, R., Scott Brown, D., & Izenour, S. (1972). *Learning from Las Vegas*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Victoria News. (2013). Guerrilla Gardener Landscapes Admirals Road With Marijuana. Retrieved February 1st, 2014, from <http://www.vicnews.com/news/217437291.html>
- Ville de Montréal. Community gardens. Retrieved February 28th, 2017, from http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/portal/page?_pageid=5977,68887600&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
- Ville de Montréal. (2017). Parc Jeanne-Mance. from http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/portal/page?_pageid=7297,74541590&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
- Waite, G. (2008). Lefebvre without Heidegger: “Left-Heideggerianism” qua contradictio in adiecto. In K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom & C. Schmid (Eds.), *Space, Difference, Everyday Life. Reading Henri Lefebvre* (pp. 94-114). New York & London: Routledge.
- Walton, M. (2011). Re-creation: Phenomenology and Guerrilla Gardening. In F. Clingerman & M. Dixon (Eds.), *Placing Nature on the Borders of Religion, Philosophy and Ethics* (pp. 67-78). Burlington: Ashgate.
- Wax, E. (2012). ‘Guerrilla Gardeners’ Spread Seeds of Social Change. Retrieved February 1st, 2014, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/guerrilla-gardeners-spread-seeds-of-social-change/2012/04/14/gIQArAA6HT_story.html

- Webber, M. (1978). A Difference Paradigm for Planning. In R. S. Burchell, G (Ed.), *Planning Theory in the 1980's* (pp. 155-162). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University: Center for Urban Policy Research.
- Weber, C. (2010). Introduction: Design and citizenship. *Citizenship Studies*, 14(1), 1-16.
- Wekerle, G. R., & Classens, M. (2015). Food production in the city: (re)negotiating land, food and property. *Local Environment*, 20(10), 1175-1193. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2015.1007121
- Weller, R. (2006). An Art of Instrumentality: Thinking Through Landscape Urbanism. In C. Waldheim (Ed.), *The Landscape Urbanism Reader* (pp. 69-86). Princeton NJ: Princeton Architectural Press.
- Weller, R. (2008). Landscape (Sub)Urbanism in Theory and Practice. *Landscape Journal*, 27(2), 247-267.
- Whitehead, M., Jones, R., & Jones, M. (2007). *The nature of the state excavating the political ecologies of the modern state*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Whitzman, C. (2016). 'Culture eats strategy for breakfast': the powers and limitations of urban design education. *Journal of Urban Design*, 21(5), 574-576. doi: 10.1080/13574809.2016.1220157
- Wigley, M. (1998). The Architecture of Atmosphere. *Daidalos*, 68, 18-27.
- Withagen, R., de Poel, H., Araújo, D., & Pepping, G.-J. (2012). Affordances Can Invite Behavior: Reconsidering the Relationship Between Affordances and Agency. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 30, 250-258.
- Wolf, G., & Mahaffey, N. (2016). Designing Difference: Co-Production of Spaces of Potentiality. *Urban Planning*, 1(1), 59-67. doi: 10.17645/up.v1i1.540

Wunderlich, F. (2013). Place-Temporality and Urban Place-Rhythms in Urban Analysis and Design: An Aesthetic Akin to Music. *Journal of Urban Design*, 18(3), 383-408.

www.lizchristygarden.us. Houston between Bowery & Second Avenue. Retrieved February 1st, 2014, from <http://www.lizchristygarden.us>

Zanetti, O. (2007). *Guerrilla Gardening: Geographers and Gardeners, Actors and Networks: Reconsidering Urban Public Space*. (Master's), Queen Mary University of London, London, UK.

Zukin, S. (2010). *Naked City: the Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Zumthor, P. (2006). *Atmospheres: Architectural Environments, Surrounding Objects*. Basel; Boston: Birkhäuser.