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Anarchism and Civil Society

by

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Abstract

This thesis endeavors to render anarchist thought more appropriate to contemporary political life. It attempts to show that what is needed is not an overarching theoretical system, but rather explorations of new organisational forms. I will try to demonstrate that supported by anarchistic trends in social theory, anarchical organisational forms are taking place to some extent in practice. These transformations, it is maintained, are a desirable political response to contemporary technological change.

Résumé

La thèse suivante cherche à rendre la pensée anarchiste plus appropriée à la vie politique contemporaine. Elle tente de démontrer, à la lumière des tendances anarchisantes récentes dans la pensée sociale, que des rapports anarchiques se répandent et que l'exploration des nouvelles formes organisationnelles prime sur une théorie sociale globale. Ces transformations, selon cette étude, représentent une réponse désirable aux changements technologiques contemporains.

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Introduction

While anarchism has been strongly influenced by modern ideologies, it is not itself an ideology. It is not a complete, hermetically sealed system of thought. It is more accurate to consider anarchism to be an attitude. This study will attempt a partial reconstruction of anarchist thought. I will endeavour to render it more appropriate to contemporary political life. The dissertation will take into account contributions by both modern and postmodern critical theorists. I will question many of the perspectives of classical anarchism with respect to social theory, power, democracy, the use of social resources and the role of the state in international society. This study will be partially speculative in that it will explore the potential for spaces of anarchist life.

In the first chapter I will attempt to piece together a plausible contemporary anarchist position which takes into account the postmodern anarchistic attitude, but also different currents of classical anarchism. By postmodern outlook I simply mean one that does not view human agency metaphysically. It is curious that while some Marxists and post-Marxists have incorporated some of Nietzsche's perspectives into their work, this has rarely been the case with anarchist thinkers. With the exception of Goldman, Rocker and Sorel, who mentioned his work in passing, anarchists have been very critical of Nietzsche. In light of his ambiguous contribu-

tions to social theory this is entirely understandable. However, in this chapter I will endeavour to show the similarities between the Nietzschean and anarchist outlooks and why a Nietzschean attitude is in some respects, particularly well-suited to a perspective situated somewhere between modernism and postmodernism.

The current of anarchism which this thesis defends is not a revolutionary ideology but rather a form of radical reformism. This social vision, rather than calling for apocalyptic transformations, sees anarchy as one end of a continuum, the other being hierarchy. It is a view of the history of humanity as a constant ebb and flow of the infinite social variety which exists between these two poles. The mode of change for this variety of anarchism is social reconstruction. I will argue that new forms of political behaviour and attitudes prevalent in "new social movements" closely resemble an important tradition in anarchism. While these movements should not be regarded as coherent instruments of historical change, they may serve as an example as to how more coherent social actors could move out of their current impasse. If this anarchistic attitude became more widespread, it could partially undermine the forces which maintain state sovereignty by activating the autonomous networks of anarchist social spaces.

Anarchists have been particularly sensitive to the negative effects of concentrated power in the state and in the capitalist economy. In the second chapter I will argue that contemporary anarchists must develop a more positive, heterogeneous conception of power. According to this vision, rather than being state-centered, power is inevitable, even in stateless societies. Rather than abolish-

ing it, the anarchist project should attempt to make institutional power visible so that it can be dispersed. This outlook is critical of the Jacobin standpoint of revolutionaries with a unitary, instrumentalist approach towards power. Anarchists since Godwin have argued that the revolutionary overthrow of state power has resulted in a more concentrated and a more unaccountable form of power. The development of a positive conception of power could refine and enrich this antihierarchical approach towards politics.

Many anarchists oppose any form of democracy because of its constraints on individual autonomy. Most radical democrats seem hostile towards anarchism. They see the state as an "enabling institution" for the development of democracy. In chapter three I will make the case that anarchists should be the most radical and consistent democrats. Democracy need not lead to statism. On the contrary. Democratic transformation, I will argue, requires a more equal distribution of power. This would presume the growth of an anarchist civil society, at the expense of concentrated forms of power in the state and in the economy. According to this approach, the state, rather than being the guarantor of democracy and civil society, is inimical to both. Conservatives fear that too much democracy may lead to anarchy. They may be right. Anarchists have always emphasised the incompatibility of state and society. I will attempt to broach this question from a perspective which rejects the attribution of metaphysical qualities to society.

The anarchist project falls within the parameters of liberalism. It is a question of retrieving and extending the liberal discourse: the values of democracy, autonomy

and equality. While no single notion of the good life can be imposed on all, social anarchists can agree with Green that "the good life emerges only from the positive, active decisions of equally choosing human beings" (p. 270). They agree with Rousseau that economic dependency is corrosive of liberty. An egalitarian atmosphere is essential to maximise personal choice, to make power accountable, to maximise the quality of democratic decision making and to strengthen the sense of community and autonomy. In order to foster liberty, democracy and equality, a certain amount of social transparency is necessary. This does not imply the tyranny of the village feared by individualist anarchists because politics should not be based uniquely on territorial considerations. In agreement with the postmodern attitude, I will criticise the classical anarchist support for community censure.

A complex society requires some form of bureaucracy, authority and even sovereignty. In an anarchist society these practices would not disappear, but would be linked to functions rather than territory. The coercive force of state sovereignty would give way to new forms of power, obtaining their authority from voluntary obligation and persuasion, in much the same way as international organisations such as *Amnesty International*.

In order to promote pluralism and to avoid social stagnation and at the same time strengthen communitarian sentiment, a consistent anarchist position must attempt to combine individualist and social anarchist perspectives concerning the distribution of wealth, and try to go beyond the market versus planning dichotomy. The co-existence of some market-like mechanism and planning are vital to the

growth of a healthy civil society. In chapter four I will argue that market relations do not presuppose unlimited property rights and that the state is not a prerequisite for social planning. In a more dense civil society a compromise could be conceivable in the space between the market and community, without the state. A decommodified realm could gradually fulfill some of the functions now undertaken by the state, without abrogating its sovereign power. I will maintain that there must be a boundary between the public and private spheres, but that the nature of this demarcation should be subject to democratic debate. In effect, I will argue for a redefinition of the public-private partition which would place the market in the public sphere and hence subject to democratisation. A society in which power has been diffused may be more capable of reducing the tensions between the rights discourse, the participatory ethos and the ideology of private interests.

Traditionally anarchists have concentrated their critique of hierarchy on the state. This leaves them prisoners of the logic of statism. By fetichising this form of political power anarchists find themselves within the same intellectual paradigm as the "realists". Rather than confronting the state head on, the perspective put forward in this study will attempt to circumvent state-centered concerns, concentrating rather on "the social". In chapter five I will attempt to show that social transformation in the direction of global anarchism would not resemble the Hobbesian international anarchy perceived by the "realists" and "neorealists". On the contrary. The displacement of state sovereignty could lead to a form of global collectivism. I will argue that the sociopolitical space in international society is increasingly being

occupied by nonterritorial, transversal bodies which could replace the state as the principal form of international actor. I will make the case that in the past both anarchists and realists have been too state-centered. Just as other forms of power may have been responsible for global problems attributed to the state in the past, alternative counter-powers may transcend the states system in the future.

To sum up, this study will look at anarchistic trends in social theory. It will point to the gradually increasing occurrence of anarchical relationships and make the normative claim that these new organisational forms are appropriate to the contemporary world.

Chapter 1

Anarchism and Postmodernity

A Contemporary Anarchist Perspective

As a product of the Enlightenment, classical anarchism has adopted a rationalist account of human nature. As Ritter points out, the traditional anarchist vision of freedom is based on a "remarkably tenacious devotion to sovereign reason" (1980, p. 142). According to Godwin "[it] is to the improvement of reason...that we are to look for the improvement of our social condition" (p. 77). Freedom entails exercising the powers of reason. For Bakunin also, the development of liberty depends on "the gradual use of reason" (1964, p.94). "Human reason", he wrote, "is progressive by its nature" (ibid., p 171).

The epistemological anarchist Feyerabend criticises the classical anarchist conformity before the bar of scientific rationalism (p. 20):

> It is surprising to see how rarely the stultifying effect of 'the Laws of Reason' or scientific practice is examined by professional anarchists. Professional anarchists oppose any kind of restriction and they demand that the individual be permitted to develop freely, unhampered by laws, duties, or obligations. And yet they swallow without protest all the severe standards which scientists and logicians impose upon research and upon any kind

> of knowledge-creating and knowledge-changing activity. Occasionally, the laws of scientific method, or what are thought to be the laws of scientific method by a particular writer, are even integrated into anarchism itself.

According to Feyerabend, Kuhn and postmodern thinkers like Lyotard and Foucault, humanity is constituted by diverse rationalities. Lyotard explains that "[p]ostmodern knowledge refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable" (1979). This perspective Jameson writes (1984, p. viii), rejects

> realistic epistemology, which conceives of representation as the reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it - projects a mirror theory of knowledge and art, whose fundamental evaluative categories are those of adequacy, accuracy, and Truth itself.

Postmodern anarchists such as Deleuze and Guattari, for example, are also anti-rationalists. They characterise their standpoint as a "micro-politics of desire" (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1972 and 1980). While they reject an essentialist conception of human nature, the *désirants* come close to turning desire itself into a metaphysical essence. There is thus validity in Eagleton's castigation of postmodern anti-rationalists for whom modernity

> would seem nothing but a tale of terroristic Reason, and Nazism little more than the lethal terminus of totalising thought. This reckless travesty ignores the fact that the death camps were among other things the upshot of a barbarous irrationalism which, like some aspects of postmodernism itself, junked history, refused argumentation, aestheticized politics and staked all on the charisma of those who told stories (1987, p. 194).

The apocalyptic postmoderns often seem more insecure in a world without certainty than anybody else. The absence of foundations and an overarching social theory, they claim, ushers in a radically new era of arbitrariness and crisis. This fear of nihilism and lack of grounding reveals a trace of nostalgia for the positivistic model of rationality. As Searle writes (P. 78):

> The real mistake of classical metaphysicians was not the belief that there were metaphysical foundations, but rather the belief that somehow or other such foundations were necessary, the belief that unless there are foundations something is lost or threatened or just in question (quoted in Mouffe, 1988, p. 39).

Rather than repudiating critical modernism, oppositional postmodernism must acknowledge the validity of a healthy tension between the use of rationality and desire in order to resist contemporary statism. It must recognise the difference between theories of causation and having good reasons for action. Validity does not depend on origins. We can live with a fallible, pluralistic notion of the good, intersubjectively approximated, if we talk in terms of the plausible and recognise the possibility of diverse kinds of rationality. As Mouffe argues (1988, p. 37),

> Affirming that one cannot provide an ultimate rational foundation for any system of values does not imply that one considers all views to be equal...It is always possible to distinguish between the just and the unjust, the legitimate and the illegitimate, but this can only be done from within a given tradition, with the help of standards that this tradition provides; in fact there is no point of view external to all tradition from which we can offer a universal judgement.

Rather than reason, postmodern thought turns to discourse, that is, partial narratives about the world.

The postmoderns' attitude is highly ambiguous. On one hand their *angst* leads some to celebrate the political status quo, as Habermas has convincingly shown (1981). Postmodernism has often been criticised for its reactionary political tendencies. It celebrates the breakdown of the welfare state and the public sphere and the rise of particularism, privitisation, fragmentation and disorder. It rejects consensus as a political ideal and separates politics from argumentation. It has been claimed that postmodernism serves the interests of capitalism in the guise of a revolutionary posture. "Alternatively", as Hudson suggests (p. 157),

> postmodernity may be seen as a higher escapism centering on epiphenomenal changes, while fundamental determinants such as profit maximisation and the nation state remain in place...the contemporary discussion of postmodernity is basically a refusal of change: a refusal to acquire the global perspectives, the transdisciplinary horizons needed for an adequate engagement with the world now emerging.

Postmodernism can reinforce domination by glorifying commercial "vulgarity" and promoting "authoritarian populism" (Lash and Urry, p. 299). This is conducive to the brutal atmosphere of Darwinian self-promotion and self-help promoted by neoconservatism. As Wolin suggests (p. 180),

> the power that modern science has made available to the postmodern state exceeds all previous scales, but the political basis for it has steadily shrunk. We might say that the postmodern attack upon foundations has abetted a politics whose simulacrum is a pyramid of power resting on its apex.

On the other hand, the anti-hierarchical nature of postmodernism can be used to resist domination and promote radical democracy. Postmodern culture rejects the modernist cult of avant-gardism and elitism. Postmodern thinkers are anti-statist in that "they are incredulous about the idea of holding state power rationally accountable for a complex modern society" (Hoy, 1988, p. 34). Just as the postmodern artist is an egalitarian who democratises art by attempting to combine the taste of the masses with his own artistic satisfaction, these attitudes have been translated into the political sphere by critical movements.

Postmodern society, it is claimed, is apolitical; Manichean posturing has given way to a more flexible, less disciplined atmosphere. This society has no idols nor taboos, no mobilising project. Bloom (1988) criticises contemporary students for being too tolerant, for having no firm convictions or prejudices. He qualifies this attitude as "dogmatic relativism", as the "tyranny of tolerance". Extreme tolerance of irrationalism, he suggests, opens the door to intolerance of reason itself. Lipovetsky writes, "c'est désormais le vide qui nous régit, un vide pourtant sans tragédie ni apocalypse... La culture postmoderne... agence une culture personalisée permettant à l'atome de s'émanciper du balisage disciplinaire-révolutionaire" (p. 14). Postmodern consciousness is summed up as "la prédominance de l'individuel sur l'universel, du psychologique sur l'idéologique, de la communication sur la politicisation, de la diversité sur l'homogénéité, du permissif sur le coercitif" (p. 129). This culture of narcissism does not mean a total disengagement from politics, but rather, "la décrispation des enjeux politiques et idéologiques

(p. 15). If individuals are now absorbed primarily into the private sphere, this does not mean that they are no longer interested in the political system: "la désaffection politico-idéologique n'est pas contradictoire avec un consensus flou, vague mais réel sur les régimes démocratiques" (p. 145). In this post disciplinary society, equality and democracy are taken for granted. Democracy has become a second nature, an "*ambiance*" (p. 146).

Critical postmodernism must develop the anti-elitist, radical democratic elements in postmodern culture while rejecting *le faux clinquant*. Foster explains the difference between critical and conservative postmodernism (p. xii):

> A postmodernism of resistance, then, arises as a counter-practice not only to the official culture of modernism but also to the "false normativity" of a reactionary postmodernism. In opposition, a resistant postmodernism is concerned with a critical deconstruction of tradition, not an instrumental pastiche of pop - or pseudo-historic forms, with a critique of origins, not a return to them. In short, it seeks to question rather than exploit cultural codes, to explore rather than conceal social and political affiliations.

For the oppositional postmodernist, the appropriate response to uncertainty is not conservatism or indifferent toleration of all subjectivity, but rather the search for a form of political interaction that is not based on absolute principles. A radical democratic form of anarchism can prevent skepticism from turning into political passivity and impotence. It can accept many ideals of critical humanism, however, within a postmodern world-view. According to this perspective freedom, as the classical anarchists maintained, involves the use of reason as a guide to action.

Furthermore, individuals should be held responsible for their actions and for reciprocal agreements in which they have participated. However, the rationalist discourse lacks an account of how the above mentioned ideals can be realised in the context of a contingent universe with no independent grounds or absolute principles.

Some theorists see the debate between moderns like Habermas and postmoderns like Lyotard and Foucault as a debate between theories of consensus and dissensus. It is true that the latter criticise the argument which construes consensus as correctness. However, as Hoy points out, the values of dissent and consensus are not really contradictory.

> The consensus theory does not believe that people should be forced to consent or even that they are likely to reach consent in the real world; the argument is only that communication presupposes, perhaps counterfactually, that those who disagree with one another still presuppose the possibility of reaching consensus insofar as they continue to communicate and to believe that truths are at stake in the discussion (p. 34).

On the other hand,

> [w]hat any defender of dissent probably believes is that dissent should never be suppressed, and that a society lacking signs of dissent would not be an ideal but, on the contrary, could thereby be suspected of being massively repressive. The postmodern might thus think that the test of social justice is whether the social structures allow things other than what would be normally agreed on to be said or thought (p. 35).

The approach to anarchism taken in this study is situated somewhere between the critical modern outlook and oppositional postmodern perspectives. It

draws to an extent on some of Nietzsche's insights while rejecting his political conclusions.

Nietzsche and Anarchism

The anarchist Rocker wrote that Nietzsche's "inner disharmony and his constant oscillation between outlived authoritarian concepts and truly libertarian ideas all his life prevented him from drawing the natural deductions from it" (quoted in Bergmann, p. 83). According to Kropotkin Nietzsche was a "slave to bourgeois prejudice" (1970, p. 505). The antagonism was mutual. Nietzsche accused the anarchists of having the same herd mentality as the socialists. While Nietzsche hated le *petit bonheur bourgeois*, which equates, following Montesquieu, liberty with security and comfort, he considered socialism to be the worst form of utilitarianism because it sought to suppress all exceptions. It represented the end of the individual. Similarly Nietzsche characterised the social anarchists of his epoch as mouthpieces "of the declining strata of society" (quoted in Bergmann, p. 4). These powerless "*chiens errants*" could never realise their dream of leveling society. If they did, they would have to restore on the ashes of the state, a new monistic power which would merge with socialist totalitarianism (see Dupuy, p. 41).

Yet many thinkers have noted the similar "anti-political political" attitude of both Nietzsche and nineteenth century anarchists (Horowitz, p. 15). For Nietzsche, it was not through state institutions, but only through a flourishing political culture

that individual rights could be upheld. According to Warren, "by conceiving of rights as a cultural achievement based on the development of sovereign individuality, Nietzsche suggests an alternative to statist politics, one reminiscent of the anarchism of Godwin" (1983, p. 73).

Both Nietzsche and the anarchists saw an agonic relationship between the state and culture. Nietzsche called the creation of the state an "ineluctable disaster" (1967, p. 86):

> the welding of a hitherto unchecked and shapeless populace into a firm form was not only instituted by an act of violence but also carried to its conclusion by nothing but acts of violence - that the oldest "state" thus appeared as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine, and went on working until this raw material of people and semi-animals was at last not only kneaded and pliant but also formed.

In *Zarathustra* Nietzsche explains how the state replaces culture and undermines social custom. "'On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordering finger of God am I'. Thus roars the monster" (On the New Idol). "Culture and the state", Nietzsche wrote, "are antagonists: *Kultur-Staat* is merely a modern idea. One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. All great ages of culture are ages of political decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 509). As Bergmann explains (P. 4),

> [Nietzsche's] conception of politicisation foresaw the state's ability to absorb and manipulate the cultural life of the nation... the cultural sphere was being subsumed... by the state - the secular state now truly appeared to be the unchecked Leviathan. Nietzsche reversed the Politique's use of the term antipolitical to

> isolate and confine the new danger, the secular state in the name of culture".

For Nietzsche, the state embodies mediocrity and renders individuals dependent. The triumph of the state is the triumph of weakness which undermines free culture with its "herd mentality". State power forces people into a uniform mould and undermines the possibility of individual self-realisation (see Kaufmann, pp. 162-164). Furthermore, Nietzsche makes the link between the state and war: "war is a necessity for the state, just as the slave for society" (quoted in Dupuy, p. 77). Nationalism means war and modern warfare means conformism, not at all similar to the individualist warrior ethic he admired in the nomads. Nietzsche's critique of the state is an antitotalitarian critique. It suggests, Warren holds, "the primacy of Nietzsche's concern with the way that different societies empower or subvert individual powers... Nietzsche's comments suggest that all politically sustained hierarchies are inconsistent with the intersubjective space of individuation" (Warren, 1988, p. 223). Anticipating the critique of revolutionary statism by anarchists like Kropotkin and Goldman, Nietzsche claimed that at the roots of revolutionary totalism there is a thirst to reassert in amplified form state power over individuals (*Human, all too Human*, 473, 438, 449).

The interpretation of Nietzsche as anarchist goes furthest in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. For them "Nietzsche's *Schopenhauer as Educator* is perhaps the greatest critique ever directed against the image of thought and its relation to the state" (1986, p. 44). Nietzsche draws a parallel between the violence which

used to create territorial spaces dominated by state power and the violence and power from which reason and the humanist notion of truth originated. All reason is in a sense, a form of *raison d'Etat* (see Nietzsche, 1967, p. 61-62). According to this interpretation, in contrast to state thought, Nietzsche announces a "new politics" based on the nomadic discourse. Nietzsche's admiration for "the blond beast", the freedom loving nomad and warrior, leads Deleuze and Guattari to consider Nietzsche to be the philosopher of deterritorialisation *par excellence* (1980, pp. 434-527). For Deleuze, Nietzsche "made thought into a machine of war - battering ram - a nomadic force". The nomadic discourse is the opposite of "the rational, administrative machinery, whose philosophers would be bureaucrats of pure reason". Deleuze explains why postmodern anarchists should be indebted to Nietzsche (1977, p. 149):

> the problem for revolutionaries today is to unite within the purpose of the particular struggle without falling into the despotic and bureaucratic organisation of the party or state apparatus. We seek a kind of war machine that will not re-create a state apparatus, a nomadic unit related to the outside that will not revive an internal despotic unity.

This nomadic force is embodied in the resistance to the state's power of surveillance in the marginal behaviour of vagabonds, squatters, illegal aliens and participants in underground economies, black markets and in the decommodified sector of the economy. These individuals undermine the state system of political organisation because they circumvent the power of designation (see Donzelot and Hooke). For Deleuze (1977, p. 149) the nomad

> is not necessarily one who moves; some voyages take place *in situ*, are trips in intensity. Even historically, nomads are not necessarily those who move about like migrants. On the contrary, they do not move; nomads, they nevertheless stay in the same place and continually evade the codes of settled people.

According to Deleuze and Guattari (1980), it is especially in the quotidian politics of resistance of micro-movements that the nomadic, anarchistic attitude is embodied.

Genealogy versus State Thought

It is above all Nietzsche's genealogical approach which has interested postmodern anarchists and which should be of interest to all anarchists. The role of critical theory for the former, is to study the marginal resistances in the crevices of statist society. If one could imagine a continuum with anarchy at one extreme, hierarchy would be at the other. Being opposed to all hierarchical institutions and behaviour, a consistent critical anarchist must be anti-elitist in all domains. Just as Foucault's genealogical perspective has been embraced by some feminists because it meshes well with their anti-authoritarian stance (see Sawicki and Diamond & Quinby for example), it could also be highly useful for anarchist thought. According to this outlook, it is not the role of social theorists to speak for others, to tell them when to resist, what they can struggle for, or if it is fruitful to resist. Genealogy is anti-elitist and anarchical because it undermines the *raison d'être* of any political or theoretical avant garde to determine "what is to be done", or set out a utopian blueprint of future alternatives (see Foucault, 1980, p. 83).

The genealogical perspective is particularist, it criticises the totalising discourse of epistemological holism. Foucault insists that to resist totalitarianism we must reject the tyranny of globalising discourses" (1980, p. 83). He links global theories and totalitarian politics because the pretension to view the whole entails a desire for a transparent society with no refuge from surveillance (p. 80). Because of the price we have paid "for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation ... of the transparent and the communicable experience", Lyotard calls on us to "wage a war on totality " (1984, p. 82). Genealogists opt for specificity rather than generality because "intellectual resistance" entails "not general discourse but rather an analysis of the plurality of specific technologies of power which traverse it" (Balbus, 1988, p. 143). Genealogy, Dreyfus and Rabinow explain, "avoids the search for depth. Instead, it seeks the surface of events, small details, minor shifts and subtle contours" (p. 106).

This pluralistic understanding of truth is inimical to the social engineering attitude of self-styled revolutionary vanguards who claim to possess a superior understanding of history. The authoritarian impulse of creating a new polity by applying knowledge to people viewed as objects contrasts with Nietzsche's genealogy which sees a pluralistic notion of action itself as the basis of the political sphere. His opposition to the notion of truth as something which can be deduced and applied politically opposes the manipulative and potentially authoritarian conception of neutral truth claims. As Warren writes of Nietzsche's theory of truth (1988, p. 232):

> Each political application of truth claims destroys the intersubjective process of making truth claims upon

> which subjectivity depends; and thus destroys the individuation that Nietzsche values... his refusal to construe truth as something independent of practices leads, as Foucault intuits, to a sensitivity to the relation between conceptions of truth as something that can be discovered and applied in social sciences, and politically authoritarian and totalitarian practices.

Classical anarchism, in the tradition of critical humanism, criticises the present in the name of some past ideal which, it is prophesied, will be apocalyptically realised in some future utopia. However, some contemporary anarchists, like Levine, agree with classical conservatism on the dangers of utopian projects (P. 79):

> conservatives are right to emphasize that politics is a serious business and that wrong moves can have disastrous consequences... they demonstrated that utopian styles in politics are destined to result in unhappy outcomes.

For genealogists, utopian visions reproduce the same authoritarian politics they seek to eradicate. They appropriate from individuals the role of envisioning future alternatives. The genealogical perspective rather, helps "to empty out and leave the spaces of representation in the culture open to the people's own acts of self-determination and self-imagination" (O'Hara, p. 80).

However, the dominant postmodern interpretation of Nietzsche, what Taylor calls "Nietzschean voluntarism" (1988), which embraces random subjectivity and rejects any notion of truth, quickly falls into either the impasse of political paralysis or arbitrary willing (for example, Hegel's portrayal of terror in the French Revolution). Neo-Nietzscheans seek to show the arbitrary nature of discourse and interpretation.

The universal truths of the humanist discourse are rather seen following Nietzsche, "as a result of the contingent emergence of imposed interpretations" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 108). From this vantage point the postmoderns draw pessimistic conclusions. For Foucault, for example, there is no possibility of liberation, no "other community where we can be free". "To imagine another system", he writes, "is to extend our participation in the present system" (1977, p. 30). One resists not to establish a better order, but because resistance is the only choice other than passivity. Contestation is "an affirmation that affirms nothing... to contest is to proceed until one reaches the empty core where being achieves its limit and where the limit defines being" (p. 36).

In contrast, Nietzsche's genealogy has a theory of truth, albeit a pluralistic one, if by the term truth one means that we can have good reasons for adopting a particular interpretation in a specific situation. Nietzsche's position shows that anarchists can use genealogy to develop images of a future society; not as a blueprint to be politically applied, but as a thought experiment to show the feasibility of an anarchist position. This would not involve predicting the unknowable, but would simply be a speculative exploration of paths to anarchy.

Nietzsche's genealogical method is perspectival because it rejects any notion of fixed, universal truths. Genealogy itself is not considered to be the privileged approach, but merely one way to investigate truth. According to this conception of truth and value, no single perspective is complete. A "constellation" of perspectives may permit us to go beyond metaphysical reductionism by looking

at the object of knowledge from a variety of angles (see Adorno, pp 162-163). However, ultimately, Nietzsche's theory of truth is not arbitrary because it is based on a hierarchy of values.

The highest form of value for Nietzsche, according to Kaufmann, is sovereign individuality, reflexivity and the need for radical subjectivity. The immanent value in his philosophy is the notion of power as positive freedom, control over one's destiny and the capacity to project one's will into the future (see Kaufmann, p. 186). For Nietzsche individual empowerment is the standard of truth and hence the basis for political morality, but the attainment of this individual sovereignty is contingent. The striving for personal responsibility and autonomy is a constant agonic struggle. The individual is empowered when she resists both order and chaos to remake her own nature. It is possible, then to make distinctions between free and unfree societies (on the basis of Nietzsche's conception of positive freedom for example, see Nietzsche, 1967, pp. 57-60). As with Marx, for Nietzsche value is a practical question, historically contingent and with historically bound possibilities for realisation (see Warren, 1988, p. 99). However, this is a long way from the postmodern celebration of value-free positivism. This of course is only one side of Nietzsche, the side which can contribute to the development of a critical postmodern perspective. It suggests the possibility for political action in a world without metaphysical certainty. Nietzsche's political conclusions on the other hand, are of no interest to contemporary politics.

The genealogists' rejection of an essentialist conception of human agency contrasts with the position of classical anarchists. For contemporary anarchists in that tradition, like Chomsky, a "vision of a future just society" must be based "on some firm and humane concept of the human essence or human nature" (in Elders, p. 140). There is a tension in classical anarchist thought between two views of human nature. According to one account, humans are basically aggressive, therefore no one can be entrusted with power over others. Another school of anarchist thought holds that human nature is good but has been corrupted by state tyranny. Though contradictory, both visions are based on a fixed notion of human nature.

Postmodern anarchists avoid referring to deep structures or underlying notions of the self. They endorse neither the atomistic nor the utopian conceptions of the individual. Both social and postmodern anarchists reject methodological individualism. Nietzsche's vision of the state precipitating the decimation of peoples by appropriating the fabric of social custom and by attempting to occupy the vacuum left by the last culture (see *Zarathustra*, "On the New Idol"), parallels to some extent the social anarchists' constitutive conception of the relationship between the individual and society.

Taylor quite rightly criticizes the atomism and "delusion of self sufficiency" of libertarians like Nozick (1985b, pp. 187-210). Nozick's framework for utopia is a soulless world of micro-societies where individuals owe nothing to their respective societies and can change communities as they change their clothing (see Nozick,

pp. 323-324). This form of individualist anarchism is opposed to social and postmodern anarchism.

Railing against the liberal theory of social contract, Bakunin held that "the individual, his freedom and reason are products of society and not vice versa" (1964, p. 158), to the extent that revolt against society is inconceivable.

> A radical revolt by man against society would be just as impossible as a revolt against nature...and an individual who would want to rebel against society, that is against Nature in general and his own nature in particular, would place himself beyond the pale of real existence, would plunge into nothingness, into an absolute void, into lifeless abstraction (p. 157).

People for Kropotkin are by definition social animals as is evident in his statement "man did not create society; society existed before man" (1973, p. 12). According to this perspective individuals are defined, in part, by the communities to which they belong. The true essence of the human being is to be found in community, as Aristotle explains at the beginning of *The Politics*. As the anarchist Burns-Gibson writes, "individuality and community are equally constitutive of our idea of human life" (p. 1). To oppose the state is to opt for a collectivism which has much in common with conservatism. Wolff echoes Burke's celebration of the bonds of society in a way which libertarians would abhor.

> It is indeed the greatest virtue of society, which supports and enfolds the individual in a warm, affective community stretching backwards and forwards in time and bearing within itself the accumulated wisdom and values of generations of human experience (1968, p. 142).

Although he rejects any utopian conception of human essence, individuation for Nietzsche as well is a collective achievement. As we have seen, for Nietzsche, culture and social custom are necessary conditions for the development of the sovereign individual. Although "the identities and values of individuals can and should transcend their social origins... aspects of community have value as essential means of self-constitution" for Nietzsche (Warren, 1988, p. 233). For neo-Nietzscheans like Foucault, the atomistic view, based on the contractarian myth of autarkic power possessed by the presocial individual, is part of the juridical model of power relations.

Postmodern anarchists distinguish themselves from their classical counterparts in rejecting the utopian view of the individual. As Hooke writes, "the utopian view implies that life's goal for individuals is a self-realisation that is harmonised with society and its members; it assures a belief in potential unity". For Nietzsche and the neo-Nietzscheans this yearning for unity could lead to totalism and "forced integration of differences" (p. 40). An alternative anarchist account would not claim that we have a fixed essence.

While neo-Nietzscheans have been criticised for rejecting the category of the subject, the same cannot be said of Nietzsche's genealogy. It rather asks how the subject comes to exist in different forms. In *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche appears to reject the subject *tout court* when he writes, "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming: 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed - the deed is everything" (p. 45). However, as Bové (1986a, p. 23) comments, Nietzsche

attempts merely to reposition the subject "as a social reality constituted by will and authority, no longer as a given origin or ground... the subject is always a sign for a configuration of forces, discourses, interests and institutions that can be genealogically analysed". The subject is not situated at the center of history, but decentered and fragmented. Subjectivity and identity depend on conflictual relations, changing according to various social or personal situations. Since power creates reason for Nietzsche, notions of the self vary according to altering power relations. Nietzsche asks what kinds of power relations make possible subjective power (see Warren, 1988, p. 11). Sawicki explains that the genealogical perspective sees the relationship between the individual and the social

> not as one of univocal determination but as one of conflict and ambiguity. Individuals are the vehicles as well as the targets of power... identity is fragmented and shifting... Eschewing the notion of core identity, the genealogist attempts to mobilise the many sources of resistance made possible by the many ways in which individuals are constituted (p. 175).

For example, for Foucault, one form of individuality which resists modern power based on disciplinary knowledge, is the anonymous individual. This was not always the case and may not be in the future.

For classical anarchists, there is a hidden, harmonious order that will prevail once the atomising forces of the state are negated; anarchy is order. Anarchism, Kropotkin wrote, "strives to maintain and enlarge the precious kernel of social customs without which no animal society can exist" (1970, p. 137). He maintained that when society is dominated by authoritarian bureaucracy, the autonomous

institutions nurtured by voluntary cooperation will survive and stave off the collapse of society. The incompatibility of the state and society is a constantly recurring theme in anarchist literature. The importance of conserving the bonds of society has been further developed by contemporary anarchists. Goodman emphasizes the force of society in the face of obstacles. People live mainly under anarchist principles even under the yoke of authoritarian states. Many other anarchists recognize the wisdom of the conservative critique of those who wish to uproot society in a spirit of revolutionary *tabula rasa.* They respect the conservative's reverence for the organic bonds of society. The difference of course, is that for conservatives hierarchy is necessary to prevent social atomism while for anarchists equality is the prerequisite. In the words of Goodman,

> Edmund Burke had a good idea of conservation; that existing bonds are destroyed at peril; they are not readily replaced, and society becomes superficial and government illegitimate (Quoted in Woodcock, 1985, p. 67).

Woodcock explains that anarchists have never sought to destroy existing society in order to substitute something new. Anarchism is "conservative in the sense that the successful outcome of the revolution is seen in terms of the preservation and renewal of something that already exists ". Anarchists propose

> to clear the existing structures of coercive institutions so that the natural society which has survived in a largely subterranean way from earlier, freer and more originative periods can be liberated to flower again in a future society (1985, p. 57).

Ward also looks for elements within existing society that can be preserved and nurtured; "an anarchist society... is always in existence, like a seed beneath the snow, buried under the weight of the state" (1973).

For postmodern anarchists there is no underlying order, no natural harmony waiting to be uncovered. Anarchy may be chaos, but it is creative, life-affirming chaos, whereas state thought represents conformity and negation of life. The approach taken in this study will not reject the traditional anarchist theme that contrasts natural society to the artificial state; however, it will not take it for granted either. This perspective rules out then, the traditional anarchist doctrine that the state and society are *necessarily incompatible*. It sees a more complex relationship between the two forces. The state may not represent all that is evil and society may not be inherently good.

The genealogical outlook is more useful for contemporary anarchists. According to this approach, order is precarious because it is imposed. Genealogists understand the production of order to be the recurring clash of multiple wills and powers. They are, Ashley explains, "particularly disposed to be attentive to the historical emergence, bounding, conquest and administration of social spaces". For example, the "divisions of territory and population among nation states", the imposition of boundaries and practices to produce and maintain "the normalised division of practical space" (1987, pp. 409-410). Genealogy seeks to uncover not only the violence that occurred to discipline territorial space, but the violence and power behind all notions of *raison d'Etat*, state thought, and reason and truth in

general. This distanced perspective looks at community from afar. It seeks to uncover a plurality and diversity of communities. According to this view of community, in contrast to Bakunin, Kropotkin and social anarchists, diversity is more important than unity. Community in the postmodern world does not naturally exist under the surface of state oppression. It must be continually remade as must our human nature.

Most anarchists, modern and postmodern, are skeptical of teleological notions of historical progress or linear development. Bakunin's philosophy of history, influenced by Hegel, in which the admirable is the historically inevitable, is in stark contrast to the position of the majority of anarchists. The most representative anarchist conception of history is to be found in the work of Malatesta. He emphasizes the ebb and flow of the principles of state and society. Following the latter, Walter stresses that "the principles of state and society are in perpetual opposition. The tension is never resolved; the movement of mankind is now in one direction, now in another" (p. 7; see also Malatesta, pp. 28-30). Even Godwin, according to Philp, in his later years, became more skeptical of the linear development of humankind (p. 202). Similarly, postmodern anarchists, in the spirit of Nietzsche, stress discontinuity, recurrence and repetition; "the previous contents of life in new forms" (Nietzsche quoted in West, p. 135). If there is continuity, it is in domination and development, in the triumph of a particular kind of reason instead of the "march of reason as such" (Balbus, 1988, p. 156). Rather than the development of truth and progress, political theory is the contingent result of a series of

accidents, lies, violent events, force relations and political manoeuvres. It is, as Tully writes, "the language of war - tactics, strategies, opponents, battles, controversies and so on - rather than the language of rational debate" (1983a). Skinner's work in the history of ideas shows "the extent to which those features of our arrangements which we may be disposed to accept as timeless truths are in fact contingencies of our particular history and social structure" (1969, see also 1976). According to this perspective, the struggle over the very meaning of power in society is a political battle. The realist discourse, for example, is seen as a power manoeuvre which helps to maintain the state form of political order. The genealogical perspective makes us more sensitive to the variegated strategies of power by which practices and discourses are fabricated, excluded and reinvented. The major difference between the modern and postmodern anarchistic perspectives then, is that the latter do not recognise the Manichean opposition between the principles of society and the state.

Rather than a unitary vision of values and of the subject, contemporary anarchism posits a pluralist perspective which sees diverse subject-positions possible for each individual. The rise of religious fundamentalism clearly indicates that irrationalism has not been and probably never will be rooted out of politics. A critical postmodern anarchist perspective could perhaps better cope with political irrationalism. Against elitist rationalism on one hand and senseless irrationalism on the other, anarchist social theory calls for sensible argumentation from within our discursive traditions. More importantly, it calls for organisational forms which make

the harmful impact of both rationalist and irrationalist political movements less dangerous. Instead of being concerned with building a complete theoretical system, anarchist social theory concentrates on looking at possibilities for new organisational structures from the local to the international level. This theoretical view leads to a pluralist paradigm of anarchic organisational forms and movements.

Critical Movements: The Reconstruction of Social Space

The political counterpart to conflicting rationalities in the present conjuncture is to be found in the autonomous voices of critical movements. The term social movement is used here in a non-rigorous manner, as does Falk, "to cover the range of normative pressure mounted against the state from within civil society" (1987a, p. 27). A plurality of powers and rationalities necessarily provokes a plurality of resistances. The multiple micro-movements in the contemporary world reject the notion of a master discourse. These social movements consist of autonomous, competing and sometimes contradictory groups which celebrate radical difference. This pluralist perspective is not a "version of bourgeois pluralism". Rather, it attempts to show how "building from a micropolitics of oppositional movements, whether derived from production relations or not, a new historical bloc may emerge" (Aronowitz, 1981, p. 127). Engaged in a struggle to rearticulate and redefine political space, critical movements act on the margins of power, in the cracks of the dike of the global state system. They seek to create and expand free spaces by

resisting micro-powers of daily life. While relations of power may not be overcome, these micro-movements can dramatically increase the kinds of resistance to the multiple forms manifested by power relations, by opening up spaces for resistance and self-creation. Since no power formation is complete, new movements can exploit the interstices, the points of weakness within states and on a global scale.

The Nietzschean view of freedom as continual resistance, meshes well with this agonic, local form of political praxis. This is evident in the frequent references to Nietzsche in the literature published by these movements in Europe. Kariel (p. 172) writes

> They follow Nietzsche... by treating everything, especially themselves, as idiosyncratic and contingent, as free from unconditional, transhistorical meaning or truth, free from whatever might tie them to some universal nature or autonomous necessity. Engaged in politicking, playing and performing, their works, like Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, are enactments - actualisations of the interminable process of politics. Their politics is not something that takes place outside their projects: it simply is their project... [Politics is] simply not useful and therefore intolerable within a utilitarian; instrumentalist society. Sheer play, such politics is but the exhilarating exercise of enhancing knowledge, a joyous way of doing epistemology, a gay science, in Nietzsche's phrase. Such politics, such poetics, gives alien interests shelter within its infinitely contradictory structures.

Foucault provides a theoretical basis for the political action of new social movements. His critique suggests sharpened widespread revolt in all spheres of life rather than the revolutionary institution of a new society. As Rajchman points out, Foucault attempts to replace an "idealist philosophy of final emancipation with

a nominalist philosophy of endless revolt" (1985, p. 93). Foucault uses the term "transversal" when he refers to these "new anarchistic struggles" that are "not limited to one country" (1983, pp. 211-212). These resistances are anarchistic because they oppose immediate enemies and seek immediate solutions, rather than concealed enemies and total solutions. However, they are "uncompromising and nonreformist" only to the extent that they "refuse any attempt at arriving at a new disposition of the same power with, at best, a change of masters" (1977, p. 216). These transversal forms of resistance differ from transnational ones in that the former transcend the confines of the state, while the latter still recognise its authority (see Ashley, 1986, p. 428).

The values of new social movements concern environmentalism, human rights, dissent, sexual politics, autonomy etc.. These are the issues of the 'life world': the quality of everyday life, the right to live differently, the body, the neighborhood, human survival and so on. These conflicts, in the opinion of Offe, are situated in a new political paradigm. While the old paradigm (both on the Left and on the Right) focused on utilitarian questions of economic stability and growth, "the new paradigm is defined by its defensive struggles against the irrationalities of modernization" (1985, p. 857). These new movements do not identify with Left-Right distinctions nor with socioeconomic groups (i.e. bourgeoisie/proletariat, urban/rural). Each movement usually identifies with a single issue. The social base of these movements is composed of three distinct segments of society: "the new middle class", "elements of the old middle class" and people in the non-commodified

sector of society: unemployed, students, welfare recipients, retired people etc. (1985, p. 832). Critical movements do not reject the values of the Enlightenment. Their approach consists rather, of "a modern critique of modernisation...a selective radicalisation of modern values" (p. 849). They work within the framework of the juridical discourse. The rights discourse is used to extend rights and transplant practices from one sphere of society to another, from one structure of power to others (see Bowles and Gintis, pp. 94-95).

These new forms of struggle seek to overcome the dichotomies between direct and indirect democracy. Representative institutions should not be rejected, it is maintained, but combined with other democratic practices. The struggle goes on in civil society; expanding networks of autonomous institutions, creating new solidarities and public spaces and revising old democratic forms (See Cohen, 1985). This attitude has much in common with the Gramscian strategy of gradually occupying "all those positions occupied by the state in social institutions" (Mouffe, 1979, p. 5). These new forms of conflict are self-limiting, but although the demands are nonrevolutionary, they are not negotiable and unlike trade unions they have nothing to barter.

In contrast to traditional social movements, which were concerned with interest articulation, the mode of political interaction of the new movements is both instrumental and expressive (see Habermas, 1980, Cohen, 1985 and Offe, 1985b). Lipovetsky, Barel, Maffesoli and Renaud point to their neo-tribalism which in some respects echoes Kropotkin's "belief in a social tribal ethic" (Miller, M., p. 195).

Renaud explains the difference between the atomised individual of present civil society and the emerging "post-social" individual plugged into micro-groups.

> La repli sur soi n'est pas d'abord fait de l'individualism qui a nourri la progrès social. Il est plûtot repli groupal ou tribal dans lequel se forge une solidarité de base qui seule permet à la vie de perdurer à l'encontre d'un pouvoir, devenu étouffante...Le "post-social" succède au social par la mise en oeuvre d'un procès de personnalisation groupale ou tribale (p. 84).

Too often, new movements are treated as coherent social agents of historical change, as a substitute for the proletariat. However, as Melucci explains, these movements do not have a life of their own. They cannot be represented as characters, as subjects endowed with an essence". Contemporary collective action is rather "a social product...a set of social relationships" (1988, p. 247). It manifests itself as almost invisible networks "submerged in everyday life" in which "alternative frameworks of sense" of perceiving and naming the world" are generated:

> conflict takes place principally on symbolic ground, by means of the challenging and upsetting of the dominant codes upon which social relationships are founded in high-density informational systems (p. 248).

This form of latent action becomes visible in a punctual fashion. It is characterized by changing alliances, ideological flexibility and in the words of Turner, "a studied absence of formal lines of communication" (p. 91). Participation in these struggles is irregular. Participants in one conflict may retreat, only to later show up in another field of struggle (see Melucci, 1981 and Thériault, p. 123). There is no formal membership or discipline. This lack of continuity corresponds to a deep-seated

anti-authoritarianism. The comparison between the manipulatory behaviour of the *groupuscules* in Paris in May, 1968 and the leadership of the student movement unleashed by the children of the *soixante-huitards* in November, 1986 is revealing of this mistrust of formal leadership (see Touraine, 1987).

In social formations with strong civil societies new social movements push for a post-bourgeois civil society by defending and democratising the public sphere:

> the new movements seek to build on the achievements of past democratic movements, namely, civil society and a formally democratic state, while creating new solidarities, public spaces and additional democratic forms (Cohen 1985, p. 107).

These emergent new counter hegemonic forces, claims Boggs, could "revitalize civil society against incursions of the bureaucratic state, commodity production and the spiraling arms race (1986, p. 222). This new model of political action "will challenge the old dichotomous choice between vanguardism (sectarian isolation) and structural reformism (assimilation)" (p. 249). This "radical reformism" synthesises the strategies of social democrats and anarchists; at the same time expanding and further democratising the practices of liberal-pluralism and stressing prefigurative local activity against all forms of domination. This entails "broadening representative institutions, processes and norms rather than their abolition - and at the same time giving rise to local forms of politics" (p. 238). The boundaries between state and civil society have become more fluid and porous, so too has the demarcation between reform and revolution been blurred. There is no desire to wrest power which is being exercised by others. This reflects the heterogeneous

conception of power and the attempt to disperse it more equally by developing new counter-powers.

These critical movements make a distinction between violence and power. "Nonviolence is increasingly seen as precisely a form of power that makes creative political practice possible", writes Walker in this regard (1988a, p. 92). They act on the periphery of power, "engaged in a potentially far reaching struggle to rearticulate the character of political space" (p. 84). The role of contemporary conflicts is to uncover invisible power, to create spaces where power is rendered visible, to transform authoritarian regulations into political relationships. This entails

> introducing systems of exchanges and procedures of negotiation which by means of confrontation and mediation of interests produce decisions, whereas before there were only mechanisms for authoritatively transmitting regulations by means of power (Melucci, 1988, p. 51).

Both Boggs and Offe hold that the key to social transformation depends on the convergence between new social movements and the union movement. The junction of the two would require a revitalisation of the latter. This could be realized if the union movement rejected its traditional productivist paradigm and its ensuing corporatist practices to embrace problems of social atomisation, bureaucratisation, political and economic centralisation, militarism and the environment. By adopting a new language of critical discourse, the values of the union movement would be shifted from instrumentalism and productivism toward an ethos of autonomous praxis. This in fact implies a return to the anarcho-syndicalist sources of the union

movement, before it was contaminated by the social democratic and Marxist ideologies of centralisation and domination of nature. It means a reemphasis of the "forgotten agenda" of the workers' movement, a revitalisation of the "noninstitutional forms of politics that were characteristic of earlier periods of the working class movement" (Offe, 1985, p. 836). The only road out of the present impasse, according to Offe, is to revitalize the union movement by incorporating the attitudes and practices of the new social movements. A good example of the postmodern ethos of critical movements spreading to the workplace, can be seen in the widespread shopfloor revolts in the West in the 1970's. The "decentered ethos " of these revolts, write Lash and Urry, "was radical democratic rather than class ideological" (Lash & Urry, p. 299).

Ironically, it is in actually existing socialist countries that union movements, such as *Solidarity* in Poland and spontaneous wild cat actions throughout the Soviet Union, have most embraced the values of Western critical movements. These workers movements strive for freer markets as opposed to bureaucratic relations of production and distribution, but at the same time call for a more egalitarian society. As Kropotkin predicted, because they monopolise all political and economic activity, actually existing socialist states are far more bureaucratic and pervasive than liberal democratic states. Yet these bureaucratic socialist social formations may arrive at more anarchical relationships sooner than anywhere else. The reason is that the cultural and political hegemony of the ruling layers of these societies is very weak. The official discourse that these states are workers states is such an obvious lie

that marked instability of political spaces in these social formations is inevitable. Because the privileges of the elite in these countries are bureaucratic and not rooted in capital as in the West, their continued dominance is much less assured. The official discourse in these so called workers states has empowered workers movements to a degree not imagined in the West. This is especially true in Poland where the free union movement is on the brink of state power. Until recently the goal of *Solidarity*, as Schell explains, was "to create new power where none had existed before...not to seize political power from the state but to build up society" (Schell, 1986, p. 61, see also Touraine, 1983b and 1985). While circumstances may cause a change in attitude, the spirit of this kind of movement points more towards anarchical relationships, than bureaucratic socialist or capitalist ones. The same could be said for the Chinese student movement for democracy of 1989. It put into relief the sickening nature of authoritarian elitism. On one side of that confrontation in Tianamen square there was an anti-elitist, non-violent attitude, a desire for the liberal ideals of freedom, equality and democracy, but pushed to their logical conclusions. Political activity was primarily expressive. There was a spontaneous, makeshift approach to politics. There was a studied avoidance of hierarchy and leadership. Spokespersons were rotated daily. On the other side the world saw the outcome of an elitist politics based on instrumental reason, in all its ugliness, violence, untruthfulness and successfulness. Leninists have traditionally claimed that while they and anarchists had the same goals, Leninism worked whereas the anarchist road to statelessness was not feasible. Had Leninists not succeeded in

seizing state power in several countries, from the Soviet Union to Vietnam? In retrospect, anarchists could ask, succeeded to do what? Nothing could be further apart than the goals of Leninism and anarchism. Furthermore, judging from developments in Poland and the Soviet Union the Leninist victory might be shortlived, as it may also be in China. The media's central role in the Tianamen Square events underscored the postmodern nature of the Chinese student movement for democracy, and the globalisation of the social. By taking the global electronic stage, the protesters demonstrated the increasing power of spontaneous action and public opinion. These events indicated that the days when covert actions were decisive may be over. In the age of telecommunications, the more overt and spontaneous the action the more effective it is. If there is any parallel to be drawn with the contest between *Solidarity* and the Polish state, the movement for democracy in China will be heard from again.

If real social actors accept the outlook and practices of new forms of collective action, anarchic trends in society could be deepened. Although political life at the state level may be transformed as a result of this new autonomous praxis, it goes unnoticed by theorists who analyse political life only at the state level. In fact, as Walker notes, many of these movements "are explicitly concerned with avoiding premature or visible institutionalisation in order to avoid early identification and elimination (Walker, 1988a, p. 90). These transformations extend beyond the state arena as well. Hegedus suggests that the transversal scope of this praxis, combined with its

> essential local organisation, undergirded by millions of grassroots groups coordinated through regional, national, and continental networks, is creating a new transnational public sphere and simultaneously constituting a new social fabric both within and beyond national boundaries. In short, civil society is developing a new capacity to debate openly the stakes and choices that are critical to its future,... and acquiring a new freedom and capacity for action that is no longer defined by a national framework (p. 199).

This new radicalism is anarchistic because it sees militarism and statist structures as anachronistic power formations.

Genealogy can assist these anarchist movements by helping to combat "the constraining effects of totalistic theories and the juridico-discursive model of power in which they operate" (Sawicki, p. 173). This can be done by looking at power relations from the bottom up and from the inside. The goal of genealogy is to lay bare power relations, to discover how power functions and what occurs when power is used. Genealogy, Foucault writes, is "an economy of power relations". It consists of employing resistances to forms of power in order to uncover their application and the strategies used. Power relations are analysed "through the antagonism of strategies". Exploring invisible connections and daily routines could challenge power "not only where it is most effective but also where it can be the most fragile" (Walker, 1988a, p. 91). An anarchist vision of power is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 2

The Anarchy of Power

The Unitarian Conception of Power

Anarchists have often embraced an oversimplified vision of the relationship between freedom and power. In orde" to recover community identity, many anarchists call for the dissolution of all forms of power. A more realistic goal would be to work towards a rearticulation of freedom and power. The proponents of a negative conception of freedom would agree with Hobbes that the stronger the state, the freer we are, provided the scope of authority is limited. Most anarchists, modern and postmodern, do not share the libertarian celebration of negative liberty (freedom from constraint). They do not agree with Hayek's claim that "we must recognise that we may be free and yet miserable" (p. 16). They embrace rather, a positive, empowering notion of liberty (freedom as a power or capacity). Freedom for these anarchists entails the capacity to exercise meaningful choice and control over one's life, that is, freedom from powerlessness. Power and freedom are seen as relations between people. Liberty they hold, means nothing in the abstract, only in a social context.

The social anarchists' notion of freedom as choice enlargement is more complex than either simple positive or negative freedom, however, their portrayal of power often weakens this understanding of freedom. While the zero-sum conception of power and freedom is valid to some extent, it should not be universalised. There are other forms of power which are not related to freedom in the same manner.

Anarchists, like liberals and Marxists, have been guilty of adopting a unitary conception of power. While Marxists hold that power originates in social classes, for liberals, power and politics are limited to the domain of the state. Anarchists have also been too absorbed by the devastating effects of state power, paying little attention to other forms. The assumption behind a simple notion of power is that if some have more, then others will have less. It can be neutralised by abolishing the state and other forms of concentrated power. This instrumental, intentional view of unitary power is perhaps most evident in Bakunin. "Together with the state must perish all that is known as law, the whole structure of law-making and government, from the top downward, for its sole aim has been the establishment of the systematic exploitation of the people's labour for the benefit of the ruling classes" (Bakunin, 1974, p. 175, quoted in Clark, 1984, p. 231). Anarchists can learn much from those who have developed alternative accounts of power.

Nietzsche: The Anarchy of Power

Nietzsche's theory of power should be highly interesting for anarchists because he introduces the idea that power is anarchical. According to this pluralistic notion, there is as Schacht explains, a "power-struggle among myriad power-centers, resulting in a shifting array of power relationships and in modifications of the constitution and changes in the very identity of these power centers" (p. 221). For Nietzsche, power is not derived from the state, nor is it based on principles of legitimacy. As Rajchman explains, according to Nietzsche, laws, morals, customs and punitive techniques "suppose and establish relations of domination for which there is no founding principle".

> Rather the relations of domination are distributed in many different heterogeneous places, where, through confrontation of forces, legal, institutional, or political structures are re-appropriated, overturned, reversed, re-interpreted...The hazards of battle becomes a better metaphor for the exercise of power than the establishment of law. Not even the individual of political theory is immune from the operations of domination; power is infra-individual...Nietzsche is the first philosopher to think power without enclosing it within a political theory (1978, p. 96).

Nietzsche used power in the classical sense as potency or *puissance.* "The pleasure of power", he wrote, "is explained by the hundredfold experience of displeasure at dependence and impotence" (quoted in Kaufmann, p. 286). Kaufmann interprets the will to power as a striving for positive freedom. The individual "wants not freedom from something but freedom to act and realise [oneself]". To

have power, Nietzsche wrote, is to be autonomous, to be a "sovereign individual", to have a "good conscience", that is, to be conscious of "the extraordinary privilege of responsibility...this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate" (1969, p. 60).

For Nietzsche, all human activities are expressions of power relations. As Kaufmann explains, "the highest degree of power consists in self-mastery" (p. 252). Power means overcoming impotency. "The good life is the powerful life, the life of those who are in full control of their impulses and need not weaken them" (p. 280).

This anarchical theory of power can be quite useful to anarchists if it can be detached from Nietzsche's antidemocratic elitism and sexism. As Bataille (1978) explains, this conception of power should induce a high regard for political orders that make possible individual sovereignty and power. Warren holds that Nietzsche's philosophy of power "leads to political insights, possibilities and problems that he himself did not entertain" (1985, p. 187). Nietzsche's reactionary and ridiculous political speculations do not originate in his theory of power. Warren shows that when Nietzsche draws political conclusions from his philosophy of power, "he does so metaphysically rather than critically". In these aphorisms Nietzsche construes power

> as an essence from which empirical manifestations follow: in this case, political acts of domination are deduced from a posited essence of life... his procedure falls prey to the same kinds of criticisms he levels against the metaphysical tradition (Warren, 1988, p. 223).

Likewise

> Nietzsche accounts for institutional power in terms of an underlying will to domination. In these cases, he uses the concept of power metaphysically, as if it denoted an underlying essence, an essence manifesting itself in domination. Thus when Nietzsche extends his critical, postmodern account of human agency to modern institutional life, we find he often violates his own critique of modernist metaphysics. This means, in effect, that his postmodern conception of power lacks a political theory (p. 12).

While Nietzsche's understanding of subjective power is interesting for anarchists, his comprehension of institutional power in the market and in bureaucracies is premodern. In contrast to Bakunin and especially Weber, as Warren notes,

> Nietzsche did not understand the manner in which bureaucratic organisations can attain a subtle power and life of their own, likewise perpetuating individual experiences of powerlessness and producing individual 'weakness' (1988, p. 243).

Furthermore Nietzsche's political conclusions are inconsistent; at times he even extols the virtues of the agonic equality of the Greek Polis, which he thought, was based on reciprocal relations of respect. This equal capacity to will and this mutual respect, were seen by Nietzsche as an integral part of the configuration of power in this political culture (see Warren, 1985). Nietzsche also toys with the idea of mutual recognition and equality in section 112 of *The Dawn*.

Embracing some elements of Nietzsche's conception of power does not mean that the Enlightenment project of freedom and equality for all must be abandoned. Individual empowerment entails control over one's life, which is

impossible in a situation of unequal power relations. Where there is domination there can be no individual sovereignty. The power of self-realisation for all must clearly support the value of mutual respect. A critical anarchist position should not go so far as Nietzsche in proclaiming power as *the* criterion of truth and morality. Individual empowerment is essential for dignity and self-esteem, however, as for the relationship between truth and power, critical anarchistic movements oppose the manner in which power and knowledge are portrayed as truth. The fact that power is tied up with truth claims today should be deemed an unfortunate circumstance which probably can never be totally overcome. Rather than claiming that all roads lead to power, anarchists should aim for a society where truth and power are less intertwined. It is preferable that power be derived from political forms of morality (normative power), rather than the opposite. In contemporary political life, within a given regime of truth, one should be able to distinguish, as Mouffe holds, "between those who respect the strategy of argumentation and rules and those who simply want to impose their power" (1989, p. 38). In anarchical power relationships, where power is dispersed more equally, argumentation should play a greater role in establishing political morality between discursive traditions than it does today.

Foucault: The Ubiquity of Power

Anthropologists have shown that in primitive, acephalous societies, power generates community identity; it holds together society (see Clastres). This diffusion of power gives it a distinctive character. As Pasquinelli explains, it is more

> a duty than a right: it is the exercise of a social activity aimed at strengthening cooperation and community bonds rather than a mere exercise of force - a productive power, defined more by the ability to do, than by the possibility of forbidding (Pasquinelli, p. 81).

According to Clastres, no societies can exist without power. Hierarchical power located in the state is not "the model of true power, but simply a particular case...The political can be conceived apart from violence" (Clastres, p. 14). Leadership in primitive societies is a complex process that counteracts the formation of concentrated, stable power to the advantage of immanent relations. For Clastres, power in primitive societies is "good" because it is diffuse and visible. In Western societies, the state, acting as an intermediary of power, hides it.

Influenced by the insights of Nietzsche and Clastres, Foucault develops a similar notion of power in modern society. Following these thinkers, Foucault disassociates power from the state. "One impoverishes the question of power", he writes, "if one poses it... in terms solely of the state and the state apparatus" (Foucault, 1980, p. 158). The vision of politics as an accumulation of power within the confines of the state is an antique image. The state "can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The state is superstructural" (p.

122). Foucault rejects the juridical model of power which presupposes that preso-cial individuals possessed power, that power is centrally located in the state, the economy and the law and that power is above all a repressive force. For Foucault, as Rajchman explains, "we are not born free; we are always already thrown into some configuration of power" (1983/1984, p. 15, quoted in Bird, p. 87). Foucault attempts to elaborate a diffuse notion of power in order to contrast manipulative conceptions of domination with a more plausible account. In his noninstrumental model, juridical institutions have ceased to be sovereign. The real problem is the continuous expansion of nonjuridical power relations. The continual focus on state sovereignty, Foucault argues, masks the real changes in the functioning of power which occurred with the coming of the modern state: the consolidation of the technology of disciplinary power.

In contemporary societies the administration of power is anonymous, it is "a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised" (Foucault, 1980, p. 156). Foucault also speaks of power in a productive sense. As Bird explains, this

> positive view of power goes with the rejection of the human subject as the point of origin, and the abolition of the concepts of repression and ideology. If there is no pre-given human subject upon whom society works its controls - whose desires are repressed and whose real interests are ideologised away, but potentially recoverable - then there is no need for a view of power which concentrates primarily on its negative effects (p. 88).

In many ways the relations of power in modern, complex societies more closely resemble those in primitive societies than those in the early modern states. In the confines of the absolutist state, relations of power could be reduced to a zero-sum game. A fixed measure of disposable force was exerted to counter and eliminate opposing forces. On the other hand modern power is "self-amplifying", rather than eliminating counter forces it feeds on them (Foucault, 1980, p. 160). Instead of originating in a single source as in the *ancien régime*, power circulates throughout society via the "micropractices" of daily life (pp. 104-105). As in the primitive world, modern power is diffused everywhere in a capillary manner. However, contrary to these social formations, rather than being regulated by social expectations and roles, power is dispersed in a chaotic and unpredictable fashion. It is less visible and more efficient than in primitive societies or in the absolutist state. The effectiveness of power is enhanced as its visibility decreases. There is also a parallel between the rule of law in primitive and contemporary societies, as Clark indicates (1984, p. 235):

> law for Foucault is a 'norm' only in a very limited sense: it has power to 'qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchise'. It acts upon the population rather than through it, as part of the cultural tradition (and is thus the diametrical opposite of primitive 'law' -as a consequence, both primitive and modern society are in a significant sense the most 'lawless' societies imaginable).

The juridical discourse hides this lawlessness.

This exposure of modern power in the nonjuridical sphere reminds us that in complex societies, as Melucci explains, "no one is responsible any longer for the goals of social life". Rather than being a metaphysical entity endowed with an essence, some forms of power are "transformed into a set of signs which are frequently concealed, interwoven with procedures, or crystallised in the undifferentiated consumption of the great media market" (1988, p. 250). For Foucault, power is not something which can be possessed by some to the exclusion of others. It is exercised rather than possessed. It generates a variety of tactics and strategies on the part of the often overlapping groups of controllers and those subject to controls. Since power is a maze with infinite dimensions, the relation between the subject and the system depends on the former's location on various axes (see Clark, 1984, p. 237).

This view of power spread throughout society resembles superficially the conservative pluralist conception of power prevalent in the United States in the nineteen fifties. The difference, however, is that in the pluralist model, the multiple sources channeled their power back to the apex in the upper echelons of government as a means of aggregating interests. In Foucault's vision there is no refunneling of power back to the center. While the American pluralists were concerned with the "dispersion of power to the extremities of the political system", Foucault is interested in the exercise of power "at the extremities" (Walzer, 1983a, p. 483). He sees no relationship between interest groups and power.

Foucault warns of the dangers inherent in "all projects that claim to be global or radical" (1984, p. 46). His vision of power rules out the capture and overthrow of state power in complex societies. Since power affects us more through social relations and practices than through ideology, the notion of the political must be broadened to encompass mundane micro-practices. For Foucault, the point of engaging in political struggles is to alter the complex labyrinth of shifting power relations, of which everyone is a vehicle. Power relations are constituted within a field of conflict in which both the potentials of domination and liberation exist.

In Foucault's account of power force plays a central role. Power should be understood, he contends, "as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organisation" (1976, p. 92). His linking of disciplinary domination, subjectification and subjection echoes the postmodern preoccupation with the growth of technologies of control and the subsequent normalisation of a society, where the powers of surveillance have increased dramatically. Foucault stresses throughout his work the relationship between modern power and individuation. People should resist the established order, he suggests, "not only to liberate the individual from the state, but also from the type of individualisation which is linked to the state" (1983, p. 212). Central to the success of modern power is its capacity to accumulate knowledge of individuals. This is the power to designate and individuate the subject in accordance with bureaucratic standards. According to Foucault, since regimes of truth are connected to power, validity and power cannot be separated.

While Foucault transcends the simple, negative understanding of power, his conception nevertheless appears undifferentiated. He denies the ideal of self-determination because the autonomous individual on which these theories are based, "is heteronomously constituted by power" (Dews, 1987, p. 161). We cannot talk of "good power" and "bad power" because, Fraser suggests, Foucault "has no basis for distinguishing...forms of power which involve domination from those which do not" (p. 286). While the idea of self affirmation is central in Nietzsche's anarchism of power, according to Foucault's interpretation affirmation is no longer possible. For Nietzsche, power is life affirming, for Foucault, it is mundane. As Rajchman explains (1977, p. 101),

> within and through the many heterogeneous battle grounds of power Foucault postulates forces of domination and forces of resistance, strategy against strategy, severe, black, calculating, in an endless series of confrontations...but the two sets of forces, if equally anarchical, are not entirely symmetrical: there is nothing like the *State* on the side of the resisting forces, nothing that would resemble a coming-into-power or a taking of power. The forces of resistance resist; their triumph, their affirmation, is not a possibility Foucault entertains...The anarchism of domination is unabashedly displayed in cynicism; the anarchism of resistance must do otherwise to meet it.

According to this view, the transformation of economic and state structures of domination will not significantly alter the modern configuration of power.

Foucault's model of productive power undermines statism and economism but it could also undermine political critique. In an interview in 1976 Foucault claimed that the surveillance techniques in the U.S.S.R. were a logical extension of

the disciplinary methods developed in the West: "Just as the Soviets adopted the principles of scientific management...they also adopted our disciplinary technique, adding one new weapon, party discipline, to the arsenal we have perfected" (1976b). This statement is ambivalent in that he seems to equate one form of power with another, yet he does seem more critical of these manifestations than of those which come out of daily micro-pratices. The ambiguity of Foucault's perspectivism is also apparent in a phrase previously quoted where he writes of power "as a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised" (1980, p. 156). This does not appear to be an equal relationship to which we can be indifferent. There do seem to be some normative implications. In spite of Foucault's criticisms of negative conceptions of power as repression or coercion, the passages discussed above suggest that either he is making a distinction between positive and negative power, or that he is still within the paradigm of a negative conception of power.

Foucault's analysis could be useful to those who wish to further democratise society if, in spite of the omnipresence of power, we do not consider it untouchable. This approach could enable the uncovering of power hidden by the rationality of administrative procedures if, as Dews suggests (1987, p. 151),

> Foucault is taken as describing not power *tout court*, but the productivity and efficiency of those purposive-rational forms of organisation which Weber detected in modern bureaucracies and in the capitalist organisation of the labour process.

For the notion of power to have any critical significance, there has to be some entity or force which power represses, and whose liberation from this domination would be considered as a desirable goal. A purely positive portrayal, as Dews explains, is no "account of power at all, but simply of the constitutive operation of social systems" (1987, p. 162). It is like God: everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Dews claims that because Foucault holds that "all subjectivity is a product of power", any theory espousing intersubjective communication between equals as a model of resistance must be ruled out. However, if we can make normative distinctions between various forms of power, this is not necessarily so. The notion of power as community identity has its place in free anarchist spaces. While this concept of power is not present in the work of Foucault, it is the kind of power that is essential for anarchy. As previously mentioned with respect to Nietzsche's vision of power and morality, one can accept with Foucault that it is impossible to separate completely validity and power without accepting that all value claims are equal.

Anarchist Approaches to Power

Without slipping into crude statism or economism, it should be possible to develop a polymorphous conception of power which nevertheless differentiates it into a variety of forms. The approach of Bowles and Gintis would appear to be a step in this direction. They outline a heterogeneous model of power which takes Clastres and Foucault into account but which distinguishes between different forms

of power. They see power as a "structure of rules empowering and restraining actors in varying degrees" (p. 94). These structures, embodied in institutions, customs and notions of property and rights, are difficult to perpetuate. They are built or destroyed most often by "a complex society-wide web of everyday individual action and compliance". Our lives are usually governed by several different structures of power which are linked "in a common process of social reproduction". They may be mutually supportive or destructive. The experience gained within one field of power can often be used to make possible advances in others. Bowles and Gintis point to the "clash of rights", the ability of democratic movements "to extend rights from one sphere of society to others" as "the most important historical example of this transportation of practices from one social realm to another" (pp. 94-95). In this conception of power, domination is defined as a "form of socially consequential yet democratically unaccountable power" (p. 101). An actor employs consequential power when it "substantively affects the lives of others" (p. 66). While power is dispersed throughout society, never in history, claim Bowles and Gintis, has so much unaccountable power been placed in the hands of so few people.

In Gramsci also, power is not located uniquely in the state apparatus but "is exercised at all levels of society" (Mouffe, 1979, p. 201). In terms similar to Foucault, Bobbio writes that the state "is just one power elite among others and not necessarily the strongest one at that" (1987, p. 127).

> The impotence of the state, when confronted with controversies between the powerful interest groups that have taken up positions within it, is reminiscent of the impotence of the U.N. when faced by controversies

> between states...while people are calling for a strengthening of the states's power to influence dealings between nations, we are witnessing a steady weakening of the state's power in individual nations (pp. 135-136).

The neo-Gramscians' strategy for change as a war of position in the institutions of civil society stems from their heterogeneous view of power.

The converging approaches of these diverse social theorists and the political practices of new movements, point to the multiplication of centers of power in society. Although the existence of power may be inevitable and even desirable, the sovereign power of contemporary states constitutes a smaller part of the total picture than was the case with pre-modern states. These accounts of power suggest that the partial "anarchisation" of society may be underway. After the trauma of the sovereign state and the capitalist colonisation of the 'life-world', the increased complexity of contemporary society is based on a configuration of power highly similar to primitive, stateless communities. As Pasquinelli explains, "they both have to do with forms of power independent of the state and its apparatuses". Civil society seems to be "regaining some of those spaces that had been taken away from it during the development of the capitalist state" (p. 92).

A consistent anarchist position must go beyond the juridical state-centered discourse and build on the polymorphous conception of power. It is not a question of eliminating power, but of rendering it visible and accountable. To control power it must become transparent. "Power which is recognisable is also negotiable, since it can be confronted" (Melucci, 1988, p. 250). Rather than attempting to overthrow

old power, contemporary anarchists seek to build up new, democratic powers, thereby indirectly shedding away established seats of concentrated, unaccountable power.

This new power could be seen in an Arendtian, positive sense. Arendt, following Montesquieu, contends that power and freedom are inseparable. The political sphere must be constituted in a manner which makes possible the combination of power and freedom (see Arendt, 1965, p. 150). Violence, manipulation, coercion and other kinds of force are incompatible with this good power which "springs up whenever people get together to act in concert" (Arendt, 1969, p. 52). For Arendt, power is only present in compulsion-free spheres of communication. Power cannot be generated from the top down. As Habermas notes, according to Arendt, the "weakness of the powerful" is that "they have to borrow their power from those who engender power" (1986, p. 183).

Some anarchists have employed a similar notion of power. Clark, referring to the positive nature of power, explains why this makes more understandable "the deaf ear which the oppressed often turn towards messages of their possible liberation...Vague images of fulfillment in a possible world must contend with immediate and constant satisfactions flowing from the strategies and tactics integral to one's existing form of life" (1984, p. 237). The libertarian feminist Bartky explains the ambiguous nature of power by giving the example of the technologies of feminine embodiment. One of the reasons for the success of these disciplinary technologies of power, is that by teaching the skills of sexuality identified as central

to femininity, they empower the subject and subjugate her simultaneously. New images of muscular women also convey conflicting messages: possibilities of resistance or new forms of enslavement (p. 77). Samuels points out that although "some of the worst evils of concentrated power may be moderated" in anarchy, the "diffusion of power will not prevent... the consequences of power so anathema to the anarchist mind" (p. 47).

On the other hand, for some anarchists, perhaps the majority, power is purely negative. According to Wieck (p. 230),

> Anarchists insist upon a careful distinction between society and state in order to indicate that in seeking the abolition of the latter... they do not seek the breakup of human society but rather an order constituted freely through manifold agreements, contracts, negotiations that can avert the actualization of those personally and socially destructive tendencies that situations of power trigger.

Other anarchists have contradictory positions. Goodman writes that "free natural power is the only source of existence" (1962, p. 10). He makes the distinction between 'good power' and domination. However, although he as most anarchists, is highly sensitive to power relations, his perspective becomes confused when he puts forth the traditional anarchist view that we have a human nature and that it is dark indeed (1977, p. 271):

> People are as corrupt as hell, therefore don't give anybody any power, because that's where the trouble comes from, because people who have power are not going to be any better than other people. In fact we know by experience the more power people have the more corrupt they become.

Here Goodman claims that all power is evil. It would be more fruitful for anarchists to stop speculating about our true human nature. The postmodern conception of power is interesting because it is not based on any conception of fixed essences. The anarchist perspective developed here will do likewise.

A contemporary anarchist vision of power must make a normative distinction between self-amplifying power; both bureaucratic and the power of individuals in free public spaces on the one hand, and forms of domination which can still be reduced to zero-sum relationships on the other. The relationship between various forms of power must also be clarified. Galtung's vision of a "multidimensional power balance" where several sources of power are "evenly balanced" appears to be a good point of departure. According to this model, as zero-sum power ("power-over-others") decreases, self-empowerment ("positive-sum power") grows. However, zero-sum power does not have to "decrease to zero for power-over-oneself to start growing" (1980, p. 66). A society which has neutralised relations of power as domination will not be "power flat". Power would be related to individual personality traits rather than to structural or resource advantages. "[This] is already largely the case in many places, particularly at the top of the world, in countless meetings and committee rooms and other forms of social encounters where the ability to project what is inside a person is what counts" (p. 66). Galtung, who has been influenced by classical anarchism, characterises this as "normative power".

A contemporary anarchist approach must establish the relationship between power, freedom and community identity in a manner which goes beyond a critique of the state. The image of politics as the accumulation of power within the state is antiquated. The goal of anarchism is to empower individuals by increasing their freedom. Liberty, "whose maximisation", as Keane holds, "requires the maximisation of complex equality [1] among citizens", depends on the division of various powers in the broadest variety of social spheres" (Keane, 1988, p. 13). For the egalitarian, as Green suggests, "the issue is not what mode of political economy is most efficient, or most humane, but how power is distributed" (p. 128). Anarchists are not so utopian as to believe in the possibility of a powerless society or that through politics we will achieve a good society. They just want to make life more

1 Anarchist equality does not mean uniformity. It seeks to diminish hierarchy and domination by increasing pluralism and diversity. Anarchists do not espouse simple equality where every individual has equal wealth because it would require the continual intervention of a strong state and would rule out pluralism. The anarchist notion of equality is rather closer to Walzer's "complex equality". He defines this kind of equality as meaning "that no citizen's standing, in one sphere, in, regard to one social good, can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard to some other good" (Walzer, 1983b, p. 17). While contemporary Western societies have diverse value systems, some hierarchies (the economy and political power) determine the others. A society based on complex equality would also be composed of diverse value systems, but with distinctly autonomous hierarchies which would not influence each other. Power and goods could not be converted from one sphere of distribution to another. "Though there will be many small inequalities, inequality will not be multiplied through the conversion process. Nor will it be summed across different goods, because the autonomy of distributions will tend to produce a variety of local monopolies, held by different groups of men and women". The resistance to conversion, Walzer holds, would be sustained by ordinary individuals "within their own spheres of competence and control, without large-scale state action". This form of equality could conceivably be maintained in an anarchist society. Approximate equality can only ensure the enlargement of choice where there is a variety of discrete political and social spheres with different hierarchies of values.

tolerable by striving for less asymmetrical power relations. Complex equality should ensure the maximum dispersal of power. Anarchists agree with Aristotle that the equality of power is a better safeguard against excessive coercion than the inequality of power. This does not mean that power is equally shared, which would imply the obligation to participate in social decisions. It is rather as Walzer writes, "the opportunities and occasions of power" that should be shared (1983b, p. 310). "Every citizen is a potential participant" if he or she so wished. In the political sphere, some individuals will no doubt be more eloquent and influential and hence have more power than others. The alternative would be to abolish political discussions in order to ensure simple equality. But as Walzer suggests, it is "more satisfying to share in...debates, even if unequally" (p. 309).

Relations of power can be based on violence and repression; this is negative power. However, power and violence are not synonymous. Positive power should be seen as a way of acting on others' action. Negative power eliminates the possibility of action whereas positive power is exercised only over a person who acts so a field of responses is possible. "Nonviolence", as Walker writes, "is increasingly seen as a form of power that makes creative political practice possible" (1988a, p. 92). According to this perspective, daily democratic resistances "challenge power where it is most invisible and thus most powerful".

For the vast majority of anarchists violence is ruled out as counterproductive in the developed world, East and West. The goal of anarchism is to overcome domination, not to seize state power. The critique of total revolution and the seizure

of power has been central to a significant strand of anarchist thought. Godwin abhorred the authoritarian nature of the French Revolution. "Revolution is engendered by an indignation against tyranny, yet is itself even more pregnant with tyranny" (Godwin, p. 269). There was, he wrote, no other period "more at war with the existence of liberty" (p. 270). During revolutions "the unrestrained communication of opinions... is trebly fettered" (p. 270). He criticised proponents of revolution for having an "excess of virtuous feeling" (p. 281). "Is slavery", he asked, "the best project that can be devised for making men free?" (p. 27). The political realm cannot be destroyed by revolutionary intervention. With the spread of the normative power of public opinion the state would fade away on its own. Political institutions, he thought, would gradually be dissolved until all interference with undisturbed conversation has been removed (pp 238-248).

For anarchists, the emphasis is on the building up of autonomous institutions in society, rather than a frontal attack on the state. As Goodman explains (1977. p. 208),

> In anarchist theory, "revolution" means the moment when the structure of authority is loosened, so that free functioning can occur. The aim is to open areas of freedom and defend them. In complicated modern societies it is probably safest to work piecemeal, avoiding chaos which tends to produce dictatorship.

The state can be undermined gradually by the reconstruction of social life. This appears to be the prevailing view in contemporary anarchist thought (see Miller, 1984a, Ritter, 1980, Carter and Samuels).

Bakunin had a more ambiguous position concerning power and the state. In some respects, his understanding of the state is interesting and should be developed. According to Bakunin, rather than certain groups using the state as an instrument of domination, as Marx would have it, the state uses us. It has a power and dynamic of its own. Thompson has applied this notion of power to the motley of power relations operating in the military-industrial complex on a global scale (see Thompson and Tully, 1983b). However, in "Letters to a Frenchman", Bakunin puts forth a totalistic vision of man and society which comes from the same mold as the Marxist conception, and which has few qualms about drawing a distinction between means and ends. While elsewhere he had taken up the traditional anarchist position which advocates the harmony of means and ends, here Bakunin adopts a Jacobin vision of revolution. It is the spirit of *tabula rasa* that Godwin had criticized so vigorously: absolute dictatorship was the prerequisite for absolute liberty. In order to begin anew existing society had to be destroyed. The ideal of unity was to be realized through the purifying destructive forces of violent revolution, "a war of destruction, a merciless war of death," (Godwin, p. 184, see also p. 204). Elsewhere, Bakunin urged "to destroy, not to build: others who are better, and more intelligent, and fresher than us will build" (Quoted in Kelly, p. 144). Kelly argues quite forcefully that in order to realize his ideal, where civil society and the political realm would be unified, Bakunin advocated a dictatorship in which the former would be submerged by the latter (pp. 291-292). However this Jacobin position, as Kelly admits, was "in contradiction with the premises of his anarchism." (Ibid., p. 211).

Bakunin's contradictions traverse the work of some contemporary anarchists as the following quotation from Bookchin demonstrates (1982, p. 127):

> Revolution is thus confronted not only with the task of smashing the state and reconstructing administration along libertarian lines; it must also smash society as it were, and reconstruct human consociation itself along new communal lines.

However, this vision of revolution goes against a consistent thread of anarchist thought which traverses the work of Godwin, Proudhon, Kropotkin, Landauer, Walter and contemporary anarchists like Carter, Ward, Ritter and Taylor. Landauer for example, in the tradition of La Boetie, held that "the state is not something which can be destroyed by a revolution, but is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently" (Quoted in Miller, 1984a, p. 151). According to these anarchists, the goal of a totalistic, perfectly unified humanity is unattainable and undesirable. Anarchy may never be integrally realised but only approximated. The process of social reconstruction entails respect for the democratic institutions of the public sphere which must be strengthened, not smashed. For these theorists, the movement towards anarchy was always based on a prefigurative politics where the means correspond to the ends. The correspondence of means and ends cannot be an iron-clad rule. Even within the liberal democratic discourse, as Miller writes, "violence is sometimes a uniquely effective way of achieving political objectives" (1984b, p. 409). There is a major difference, however, between the postmodern politics of contemporary terrorists, who see random violence as an end in itself, and

another form of postmodern politics in the anti-teleological tradition of Nietzsche, for whom past violence can never be condoned to justify the present. Because it does not envisage an impossible ideal of unity which sacrifices the present generation for future generations, the anarchist ideal, as Ritter points out, can be undertaken without much danger of havoc:

> Anarchism used as a guide to the partial reconstruction of society offers the safety which is (reformism's) strong point while keeping prospects for augmenting welfare through systematic transformation alive (1980, p. 155).

Integral anarchy is unlikely, but the movement towards this goal is as important as the end itself. Although it was the social democrat Bernstein who made this approach toward politics famous, it was deeply influenced by the anarchist Landauer (see Berman and Luke). Since the question of power includes but also transcends the state, an anarchist outlook, then must have a place for power. Anarchists aim for a system of power which differs from the present configuration. They must realise, however, as Samuels notes, that "private or local mutual coercion may have the same deleterious effects on individuals as does legal or centralized power" (p. 43). In anarchy people's life chances will still be influenced by the power of others.

> The anarchist world will be a world of power play. Power built up and nourished from below... will still be power. The individual will continue to be caught up in the vortexes of power and power play. The individual, after all is said and done, will not be an autonomous decision maker; individual choice will be interrelated with group choice... the operation of the principles of power will still swamp the individual (p. 47).

However, power relations in anarchical society should be less harmful because with the absence of domination, they will be more egalitarian. In a field of chaotic, random power relations, the same individuals and groups will not exercise power in several spheres of influence, as was the case when centrally derived power followed more predictable patterns. Furthermore, normative power may outweigh power based on force in anarchy.

In contemporary society power is often not what nor where it appears to be. Exploring invisible connections and daily routines could challenge power "not only where it is most effective but also where it can be the most fragile" (Walker, 1988a, p. 91). The ability to redefine the notion of political power itself, constitutes an important contribution to altering present configurations of political power. The redefinition of political space on other levels than that of the state should be regarded as an effective use of positive power. A contemporary anarchist position should, in agreement with Foucault and Nietzsche, find the image of a myriad of clashing micro-powers on a variety of dimensions a better description of power in modern societies than state-centered representations. If power is inevitable, then anarchic power should be seen as preferable to power with structural foundations. Power would be more anarchic in anarchy since, the breakdown of the remaining seats of concentrated power would render power relations more egalitarian, less predictable and hence more chaotic. To recognise power as community identity, not with the state but in anarchist relationships beyond the reach of the state is to recognise the anarchy of power and the power of anarchy.

Chapter 3

Anarchism and Democracy

While anarchists have often hypostatised the negative aspects of state power, contemporary democratic theorists fetichise its positive features. In this chapter I will present recent arguments of radical democrats concerning democracy and the state before addressing the anarchist position.

Radical Democracy and the State

While the democratic ideal was a political platitude for liberals in the first half of the twentieth century, for many neo-liberals and neo-conservatives, democracy is once again tinged with negative connotations, as it was until the end of the nineteenth century. Not only is the state overloaded, claims the New Right, more importantly it is now too weak to carry out its purpose: to govern. This crisis in governability stems from the fact that people are now taking democracy seriously. For Huntington, this "democratic distemper" began when marginal sectors of society, like blacks in the U.S.A. for example, began to participate in the political process.

Huntington agrees with the critical theorists' view that democracy is precipitating a crisis in capitalism. In his section of the Trilateral Commission report, *The Crisis of Democracy,* Huntington adopts the fundamental supposition of a contradiction between the accumulation and the legitimation functions of the capitalist state. Increasing demands for social justice and substantive equality have pushed regimes to the edge of a subversive, egalitarian precipice. He argues that only less democracy can rescue democracy. "There are... desirable limits to the extension of political democracy. Democracy will have a longer life if it has a more balanced existence." (1975a, p. 22). "Problems of governance" in the West "stem from an excess of democracy". The smooth operation of democracy "requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement" (1975b, p. 36). For Brezezinski, who was at the time the director of the Commission, it would be necessary "increasingly [to] separate the political system from society and to begin to conceive of the two as separate entities" (Quoted in Steinfels, p. 269). Basic decisions must be depoliticized by removing them from democratic control and placing them in the exclusive hands of experts. Such a society would be democratic, according to Brezezinski,

> in a libertarian sense; democratic not in terms of exercising fundamental choices concerning policy making but in the sense of maintaining certain areas of autonomy for individual self-expression (p. 270).

According to this view, popular government is pregnant with the danger of totalitarianism. Democracy must be tempered by private property, the market and natural rights.

The degeneration of the democratic practice reflected in this Right-wing postmodernist discourse has given rise to a response which defends political modernity and calls for a radical democracy. According to these theorists (Bowles, Gintis, Barber, Sullivan, Green, Pateman, Pierson, Keane, Held, Frankel, Carnoy, Shearer, Cohen, Rogers, Bobbio, Boggs, Mouffe, Bachrach), democratic growth is more vital than economic growth. The expansion of democracy requires a more egalitarian society. They argue that far from being economic stimulants, most forms of inequality are archaic barriers to democratic progress. In spite of the immense advances accomplished in the past century, democracies are still far from obtaining their objectives. The democratisation of society is now seen as highly subversive by all poles of the political spectrum. In the words of Bacharach, "democracy taken seriously, disrupts the existing distribution of power" (p. 250).

For radical democrats, social change will come about through the expansion of democratic practices into larger spheres of life, notably through the democratisation of the economy (see Carnoy & Shearer, Bowles & Gintis, Cohen & Rogers, Bachrach and Sullivan). The putative pluralist nature of capitalist society is called into question by these critics of liberal democracy. Cohen & Rogers criticize the unitary control of property as surplus and as production in the capitalist economy. In order to save democracy they contend, it must be extended into the economy

and other spheres of our lives. This requires the abolition of capitalism because of "its structural denial of freedom" (p. 169). In their vision of economic democracy, control of property is pluralistic. "Investment decisions are subject to public debate and administration. Control over the organisation of work is subject to workplace democracy" (p. 165). For these theorists, the poverty of Western democracy stems from the supposedly private nature of the market. For Bachrach, a democratic revolution would entail "the abolition of the distinction between the large private corporation and public space, and between worker and citizen" (p. 258; see also Bowles & Gintis, p. 66). A postliberal democracy, according to Bowles and Gintis, would "continue the expansion of personal rights and...render the exercise of both property rights and state power democratically accountable". The democratic control of production and investment, they hold is a prerequisite for popular sovereignty (democratic control of government). This conception of economic democracy would replace property rights by "democratic personal rights". They propose "novel forms of power independent of the state; namely, democratically accountable, chartered freedoms in community and work" (p. 177). This would entail "democratic communities standing between the individual and the state" (p. 205). This vision of popular sovereignty does not favor participatory political activity at the expense of representation. It rather seeks to "devise institutions rendering power more accountable" (p. 183).

Radical democrats criticize the superficial nature of liberal democracy. Barber deplores not only the restricted sphere in which democracy functions, but

also the "thinness of liberal democracy", in both its juridical and pluralist forms. He cites the theoretical work of Rawls and Dworkin as typical of the jurisprudential perspective. This form of democracy, Barber holds, corrodes citizen activity and undermines the legislative process because it "reintroduces independent grounds into the political realm - in this case disguised as natural right, higher law and the constitution" (1984, p. 142). The theory of juridical democracy is far too deferential to the arbitration powers in a juridical hierarchy in the opinion of Barber. He criticizes the pluralist perspective, defended by the mainstream of American political thought,

> because it relies on the fictions of the free market and of the putative freedom and equality of bargaining agents; because it cannot generate public thinking or public ends of any kind; because it is innocent about the real world of power;...because it uses the representative principle and reintroduces into politics a covert independent ground - namely, the illusions of the free market (p. 144).

Barber blames the thinness of liberal democracy for "majoritarian tyranny, mass society, and totalitarianism" (p. 92). The theory of individual rights and liberties, which was designed to defend people from power has in reality left them isolated, defenseless and "easy targets for authoritarian collectivism" (p. 101). On this point Barber cites the conservative Nisbet:

> The genius of totalitarian leadership lies in its profound awareness that human personality cannot tolerate moral isolation. It lies further, in its knowledge that absolute and relentless power will be acceptable only when it comes to seem the only available form of community membership (Nisbet, p. 204).

For Bobbio the democratization of civil society in the West entails not only the distribution of power but also its control. It is no longer of question of "who votes" but rather "where does one vote?" What counts is not an increase in the number of those who participate in decision making, but rather "the number of contexts or spaces in which they can exercise this right" (1987a, p. 32). He calls for a "transition from political to social democracy" rather than to direct democracy. Since the democratization process has made no inroads into the two major power complexes in developed societies, bureaucracy and big business, this process is far from complete. Bobbio suggests that

> if the advance of democracy will in future be measured in terms of the infiltration of spaces still occupied by non-democratic centers of power, these spaces are so numerous and so large, and their importance so great, that a fully realized democracy ... is still a long way off (p. 57).

In a similar Foucauldian manner Boggs holds that the break with the logic of domination ("specialized knowledge") will be "far more complicated and subversive than the overthrow of capitalist forces of production" (1986, p. 222). For these contemporary Gramscians the notion of hegemony implies political pluralism. It furnishes the framework for a democratic socialism which seeks to avoid the dangers of reformism in its Stalinist and social democratic varieties.

Mouffe and Laclau explicitly attempt to relate the Gramscian tradition to the politics of postmodernism. Mouffe calls for the abandonment of both the liberal and civic humanist conceptions of the unitary subject in favour of "a political philosophy

aimed at making possible a new form of individuality that would be truly plural and democratic" (1988, p. 44). She rejects both the notion of the "unitary unencumbered self" and the "unitary situated self":

> we are in fact always multiple and contradictory subjects, inhabitants of a diversity of communities...constructed by a variety of discourses and precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of those subject-positions (p. 44).

Laclau and Mouffe see postmodernism as a way to account for the development of radical democracy. The rejection of foundations or universals leads them to posit radical democracy as the only alternative to nihilism. In contrast to what they view as the authoritarianism intrinsic to essentialism in its Marxist and liberal forms, radical democracy is seen as a result of the movement from social relations rooted in a fixed vision of human nature, to discursive relations which rather see political activity as a product of hegemonic struggles (see Laclau and Mouffe, pp. 149-193). Mouffe writes of the "radical indeterminacy" characteristic of contemporary democracy. "Radical democracy demands that we acknowledge difference - the particular, the multiple, the heterogeneous" (1988, p. 36). She calls for the "multiplication of democratic practices, institutionalizing them into ever more diverse social relations, so that a multiplicity of subject-positions can be formed through a democratic matrix" (p. 41). She invokes not individual rights, but rather "democratic rights", "rights which, while belonging to the individual, can only be exercised collectively and presuppose the existence of equal rights for others" (p. 44).

In recent discussions of democratic theory most "post-Marxists" and "postliberals" suggest that the state in fact is an "enabling institution" (Pierson, p. 144). Much of this new attitude towards the state stems from the work of Poulantzas. He rejected the traditional Marxist position that it was necessary to destroy the state, in favour of a war of position within the state apparatus. This echoes, in some respects, the attitude of Gramsci (see Poulantzas, p. 256). Poulantzas makes no real separation between state and civil society. The state is a continually changing relationship of forces rather than a distinct entity standing apart from civil society. Following this logic, as Boggs explains (1986, p. 78),

> popular struggles would not seek to control or attack the state apparatus as much as to work through it with the aim of reconstituting the entire political system on egalitarian and democratic foundations.

For Giddens, "the state can in some part be seen as an emancipatory force" (p. 250). Urry writes that the state is a product, not of the interests of capitalism "but of that of wage laborers" (p. 113). According to Gorz the presence of the state is "the essential prerequisite to the autonomy of civil society" (p. 112). Held and Keane hold that

> without the protective, redistributive and conflict-mediating functions of the state, struggles to transform civil society will become ghettoised and divided, or will spawn their own forms of inequality (p. 176).

The state is seen as an essential component of advanced society. It is "the guarantor of the independence of institutions that must flourish within [civil society]" (Pierson, p. 144).

Keane, in his "socialist theory of public life", describes the growth of autonomous public spheres which, through an "extended process of decentralization of decision-making power" enhances "the possibility of subjecting both state and corporate organizations to transformation from below" (1984, p. 6). The difference between capitalist and bureaucratic socialist regimes, according to Keane, is that while the latter are based on "the disappearance and repression of autonomous forms of public action", the bureaucratic networks in the former "both repress and precipitate autonomous public spheres at the same time (p. 2). The ambiguous nature of welfare state capitalism stems from the fact that it has not been able "entirely [to] obliterate the distinction between society and the state". The road to socialism for Keane entails "not the abolition of the contractarian distinction between civil society and the state, as Marx would have it, but, rather, the deepening of this distinction" (p. 217). Because "pluralism, the multiplication of decision-making centres and spaces for individual and group autonomy, tends constantly to generate "anarchy", Keane holds that "sovereign state power is an indispensable condition for the democratisation of society" (1988a, p. 22). The state is necessary to coordinate centralised planning and to settle competing conflicts of interest and claims originating in civil society by means of universally applied laws.

In a similar fashion, Cohen suggests that the institutions of civil society "do not exclude the possibility of a socialist and pluralist civil society." (1982, p. 228). She views the practices of the labour movement as "an attempt to introduce the elements of civil society into the last untouched bastion of ascribed privilege and

power - the economy" (p. 226). The reconstitution of social space implies the institutionalisation of civil society. This would allow for various democratic forms (not only direct democracy or workers' councils which include the inactive) which could function "as countervailing powers *vis-à-vis* one another." (p. 227). However Cohen, in agreement with Keane, also considers the state as an inevitable institution.

Frankel believes that equity, civil liberties and democracy would not survive the demise of state institutions. "Healthy democratic, post-industrial socialist public spheres", he holds, "require all the corresponding legal, cultural, educational and administrative structures which guarantee adjudication, mediation, representation, and checks and balances" (1987, p. 263).

> [A] society which has no national institutions, also has no real chance of a democratic public sphere. If one believes...that administration and social planning will be necessary to maximise equality, preserve environments and support all those unable to do paid work,...that disputes between individuals and groups will require a system of rules and rights, then either one places all humanity's hopes in a world government, or else one acknowledges the necessity for national institutions (p. 192-3).

Without the state there would be no public sphere, Frankel maintains.

There appears to be a common thread in the work of all these post-Marxist theorists. Their ideal centers around the idea of a self-regulated civil society in which the state is reduced to limited and precise functions. They optimistically contend that the existing state apparatus can be used to protect civil society, to

extend individual and social rights and to extend democracy into new spheres of life (see Gamble).

I will argue that a consistent anarchist outlook can incorporate many ideas of radical democrats, without accepting the "vital role" of the state. The critical theorist Offe provides anarchists with powerful arguments which demonstrate how democracy subverts the state.

Statism and the Crisis of Democracy

Offe points to the antagonism between the forces of democratization and the ethic of capitalism. He shows how the unpolitical class relations and the formalistic emphasis on bourgeois politics represented only a brief, rather unusual stage of early capitalism. He notes that while both Marx and Tocqueville, from different points of view, stressed the incompatibility of mass democracy and the market economy, both Lenin and the pluralists denied this tension (1984, p. 179). Lenin assumed that there was an inherent harmony between the rule of capital and bourgeois democracy which was merely the most effective, cheapest and reliable form of class rule under capitalism (Lenin, p. 54). Offe explains how the pluralists provided the mirror image of this analysis by claiming that the tension between the market and the political system had been eliminated. Capitalism and democracy were considered to be interdependent while class and political power were, they thought, totally unrelated.

Tipping his hat to Marx and Tocqueville, Offe maintains that both the Leninist and the pluralist perspective overlook major incompatibilities between mass democracy and the market which were conjuncturally mitigated in the first part of the twentieth century, but which reappeared in full force in a different form in late capitalism. He claims that it was the mutual contamination of the economic and political subsystems which temporarily permitted the co-existence of the market economy and the mass democracy. "Compatibility was achieved by infusing the notion of competition into politics (mass political parties) and the authoritative allocation of value into the economy" (Keynesianism) (1984, p. 202). However, the increasing lack of demarcation between the economic and political subsystems which is characteristic of late capitalism leads to problems of the survival of the system as a whole. Offe points to the growing feeling amongst the Left and the Right that both the party system and Keynesianism have outlived their usefulness (pp. 146-161).

The non-political class domination of liberal capitalism gives way to a re-coupling of the economic and political subsystems. The re-politicisation of the accumulation process leads in a sense, to the refeudalisation of the relations of production. On the other hand, the state is de-politicized. The mass political party is no longer the dominant form of participation. The state must obtain "diffuse mass loyalty", without mass political activity. This social engineering is justified by the new technocratic ideology. Science and technology have a life of their own to which

people must submit. The superstructure is no longer the pale reflection of the economic base.

Offe's theory of systemic crisis is based on the relationship between his three organisational principles of society. According to this approach, capitalism becomes crisis prone when the demarcation of the economic subsystem from the political and socialization subsystems becomes too porous. This increasing lack of demarcation is evident in welfare state capitalism.

In the latest phase of capitalism Offe sees a withering away of the relative autonomy of the state with the increasing dissolution of the boundaries between subsystems brought on by corporatism (1984, p. 249). The "refeudalisation" of the relations of production implies the re-introduction of pre-capitalist methods of informal, functional representation which lacks democratic legitimation (neo-corporatism). Because the state depends on the actors in the monopoly sector whose compliance is functionally indispensable to the maintenance of the system as a whole, it is forced into triangular arrangements which discriminate in their favour. In order to avoid a rationality crisis, public policy making authority is farmed out to para-parliamentary and para-bureaucratic organisations. "By replacing democratic procedures of consensus building by such other methods of conflict resolution, government elites avoid the official institutions of politics in a constant search for non-political forms of political decision-making" (p. 168). Conflict-ridden liberal politics is replaced by the technocratic politics of the authoritarian state. "Majority

rule in capitalist democracies is diluted and bypassed through a series of mechanisms that allow its egalitarian mechanism to become empty" (1983, p. 746).

Offe explains corporatism neither in terms of "social class" nor through the pluralist paradigm. He sees the corporatisation of unions in terms of the "restraint it is designed to impose" rather than the pluralist notion of delegation (see Panitch, p. 150). The repressive discipline of this state-induced class collaboration contributes to the elimination of substantive democracy.

Since corporatist arrangements rely on "empirical results rather than any form of democratic theory or ideology", their legitimacy is very weak (Offe, 1984, p. 250). This lack of legitimacy is amplified by the asymmetrical nature of these ad hoc mechanisms. In capitalist society unions are much more legitimate representatives of their members than are employers' associations. Furthermore, whereas the right to strike has been virtually abolished in many sectors in many countries, private capital continues to do as it pleases in the market place. Agreements are thus not equally binding on both sides. This skewed relationship "constantly tends to disrupt the empirical consensus necessary for the functioning of corporate mechanisms" (p. 291).

At the other end of the spectrum individuals recognize the meaninglessness of catch-all parties. The mass political party is replaced by corporatist mechanisms in the core sector of society and new social movements in the marginal sector. The "constitutional bridge" is giving way to "an unmediated opposition between the individual and the state and...extreme forms of political alienation" (p. 285).

The re-politicisation of the relations of production does not restore the political form of the class relationship between labour and capital. Offe questions the centrality of labor in classical Marxism. He suggests that the "work role is only partly determinate of social existence". He also rejects the idea of the homogenizing effects of labour (p. 283). The evolution of late capitalism, Offe asserts, requires a fundamental modification of Marx's theory of class conflict and social revolution. As the state becomes increasingly dependent on the players in the monopoly sector, the latter can "externalize class conflict" by corporatist deals which give them "structurally determined privileges". The "original conflict zone" can only be immunized by displacing the costs onto vulnerable groups and regions. The traditional class conflict is no longer the motor of social change. It is replaced by a "horizontal pattern of inequality". On the one hand, the centralisation of the core area means that fewer and fewer workers get higher and higher wages. On the other hand the poorly organized periphery is expanding in the regional and social senses. There is increasing misery among blacks, youth, the elderly, women, the handicapped etc., especially in the inner cities and marginal regions. The consequences of exporting problems to those not present at the bargaining table means inflation, regional disparities, the fiscal crisis of the state and more strikes in the public sector. There are more social conflicts as one moves from the monopoly to the residual sector and consequently more state repression. The more groups are peripheral to the system, the more they are subject to repression (see Offe, 1984, ch. 1).

As in pre-capitalist social formations, politicized relations of production increase the need for legitimation. The replacement of exchange relations by administrative power, which distorts the law of value, must be masked. In the liberal-capitalist social formation the market was sovereign; it was self-legitimating. The conflict over goods and services was mediated by the invisible hand. However in late capitalism increasing state intervention and corporatism stimulates greater public scrutiny of decisions relating to the accumulation of capital. With respect to use-values produced in the public sector, the "peace-making function of the market mechanism is absent". There is no universally accepted formula to determine what is to be taught in schools, etc. Government policy in all sectors erodes the principles of market forces. Income is increasingly a function of state policies which can be called into question. The "classical factors of production - capital, labour and land - are no longer to be taken as given, but are allocated by specific state policies." The state becomes "the arena of conflict and the focus of questions concerning the utilization of resources" (1984, p. 175). The undermining of the ideology of "possessive individualism" means reduced margins of utilitarian behaviour oriented towards the private appropriation of wealth. The overloading of the socialization system thus leads to a "motivational crisis" (developed in Habermas, 1975).

The economic system requires ever expanding state assistance which becomes less and less effective. The state must increase the "use value of capital" by providing collective commodities; unproductive public consumption, smoothing out of bottle necks, amelioration of the infrastructure, research grants, welfare state

activities and the qualification of labour power. The re-establishment of boundary maintenance between the subsystems would be increasingly dangerous for the system as a whole. However, while the state reproduces capital, it simultaneously decreases "exchange commodification".

> The more the state is forced to rely on state regulating mechanisms, the more it is faced with the problem of survival against the inner dynamics of the encroaching mechanisms, which increasingly call into question the exchange principle (Offe, 1984, ch. 8).

This "subversion of the logic of capital" is a manifestation of the self-paralyzing tendencies of late capitalism.

The displacement of crises from the economic onto the political and socialization subsystems complicates their nature, making them ever more dangerous. In this process, "social phenomena and structural elements which are functionally irrelevant for the continuation of the economic system" are systematically produced (ch. 1). These by-products endanger the boundary maintenance of the subsystems, increase the problems of mutual contamination and consequently further disrupt the dominant economic subsystem.

Economic crisis leads to corporatist arrangements which provoke among other things a fiscal crisis - an increasing gap between the amount of public money received through taxation and the amount required by the government to maintain the functioning of the economic system. The fiscal crisis leads to a rationality crisis. The state administrators find it more and more difficult to pick their way between the rocks and keep the double function of the state going at the same time. Whereas

Weber claimed that instrumental rationality (where the choice of means to attain ends necessitates the interpretation of reality according to a cause - effect schema), predominates in the highest stage of capitalism, Offe counters that in late capitalism, with the repoliticisation of the relations of production, a baffling permutation of instrumental and pre-capitalist modes of rationality is generated, not only by the movements who oppose the state, but from within the state structure itself.

"Environmental turbulence" is internalized and amplified within the state apparatus. Rationality crises are shifted onto the socialization system so that "supplies of legitimation" compensate for rationality deficits. But the break-down of steering mechanisms, the undermining of market forces, cut-backs and the ensuing host of problems in the competitive sector and the discontentment among state employees and peripheral groups leads to a withdrawal of legitimation. Since most economic and political resources have already been used up in warding off previous crises, legitimation resources, based on apathetic diffuse mass loyalty become more and more crucial. But they are also drying up (ch. 12). As the basic bourgeois ideology of fair exchange collapses, the incentive to work has been undercut and the "notion of need replaces the commodity form". The legitimation deficits allow a political vacuum to take shape which could permit the emergence of anti-capitalist forces among the growing marginal population. This explains the increasing repressiveness of modern states, especially in those sectors least functionally relevant for the maintenance of the productive forces. "Welfare state capitalist systems tend ever more to subject all life activity to detailed regulation" (p. 297).

The latent possibility of labour-capital conflict could also be re-kindled by new social movements. However, in all probability, according to this view, the survival of capitalism will depend on non-capitalist forms of power and conflict. "What the state is required to do becomes evidently impossible to accomplish unless either the private character of accumulation or the liberal democratic character of the polity are suspended" (Offe, 1985a, p. 244).

Democratic Anarchism

In recent discussions of anarchism, some authors have emphasised that anarchism is incompatible with democracy and participatory politics. Miller claims that from Godwin to the present, anarchists eschew democracy because it encroaches on private judgement (1984a, p. 20). According to Ritter, active citizenship is incompatible with the anarchist vision because it is "injurious to the independent, particularised sort of individual that it is a main purpose of that society to promote" (1980, p. 145). Libertarian socialists like Chomsky who call themselves anarchists are not really anarchists, Ritter claims, but democrats.

> Any theory such as libertarian socialism which, far from excluding democratic institutions from its vision of the good society, regards them as indispensable, cannot possibly be called anarchist (1980, p. 131).

According to Barber, "it is the anarchist disposition more than any other that leaves liberal democracy so incomplete" (1984, p. 10).

There is no doubt concerning the anti-democratic stance of libertarian anarchists like Nozick and Rothbard (see for example Nozick, pp. 280-292). For these thinkers democracy leads to statism. Ritter expresses the attitude of a current of communitarian anarchists who oppose democracy because of its constraints on individual autonomy. They are opposed to direct democracy because of its homogenising effects and because of the negative record of soviet style democracy. They eschew activist totalism, the integral politisation of the populace, where everything becomes political. They contend that the participative ethos must not be imposed on individuals; the idea of the total citizen is as repugnant to these anarchists as the totalistic state. The tyranny of the majority is in no way preferable to that of a dictator. Since Godwin anarchists have been even more critical of representative democracy. They agree with Rousseau that when we are represented we alienate our freedom. They point to the demagogy and deception which characterise representative democracies.

However, there is a significant current in anarchist thought since Godwin which sees anarchism as the expansion of democracy. These anarchists, including Godwin, Kropotkin and contemporary figures like Goodman, Bookchin, Guérin and Taylor have been influenced by Rousseau. This is also the case with radical democrats like Pateman, Green, Barber, Bowles and Gintis whose standpoint buttresses the anarchistic outlook Anarchism as Goodman once wrote, is not an ideology but an attitude. Since it is not a complete system like Marxism, there is

room for different positions with respect to democracy. The radical democratic perspective is a perfectly legitimate current in the anarchist tradition.

In spite of their vigorous attacks on bourgeois democracy, even such intransigent individualists as Stirner recognised its relative progressiveness. Proudhon and Bakunin agreed with Godwin that the most imperfect democracy was a thousand times better than the most reasonable monarchy (see Guérin, 1970, p. 23). Bookchin and Guérin advocate forms of direct democracy which were exercised during revolutionary periods (see Guérin, 1973, pp. 15-40 and Bookchin, 1973, pp. 143-169). While Wolff and Ritter may disavow democracy, their vision of anarchism as "rational deliberation" and dialogue in an intimate and transparent public space sounds suspiciously democratic.

Since Godwin this democratic anarchist temperament has been apparent. He held that it is only through the "freedom of social communication" and the extension of the public sphere that reason and truth will spread (p. 289). As Philp has shown, Godwin's intellectual experience with his group of friends influenced his notion of democracy. Philp's view of Godwin as a democrat conforms to Woodcock's earlier observation that Godwin envisages a form of "extreme democracy" (Woodcock, 1962, p. 83), and is contrary to Miller's claim that Godwin was opposed to democracy (Miller, 1984a, pp. 18-22). Godwin's view of politics sees anarchism as unimpeded conversation.

> The rules of debate for this group were simple: no one has a right to go against reason, no one has a right to coerce another's judgment, and every individual has a right - indeed, a duty - to call to another's attention his

> faults and failings. This is a highly democratic discourse, and it is essentially non-individualistic: truth progresses through debate and discussion and from each submitting his beliefs and reasoning to the scrutiny of others (Philp, p. 128).

Public discussion and social intercourse are prerequisites for the anarchical transformation of society. Godwin saw the possibility of a public sphere replacing the state. This realm would be more public than private because it would exclude none, yet it would be more private than the state since it would be a noncoercive forum for determining what the private-public distinction should entail.

In many ways the teleological politics of Godwin, his vision of ever expanding, anarchist spaces of free social communication, anticipates the Habermasian concept of counter public spheres. Habermas depicts the public sphere as "coming into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body" (1974, p. 49). Citizens behave as a public body "when they confer in an unrestricted fashion - that is, with the guarantee of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions". This public sphere emerged for the first time, not in the framework of liberal capitalism, but during 17th century absolutism. The duality of the civil society and the state precedes the separation of state and economy in modern capitalism. As Cohen explains, this means "that the presence of an independent private sphere does not hinge on an unregulated capitalist economy, and a future repoliticisation of the economy need not entail the abolition of the private sphere and the liberties guaranteed thereby" (1979, p. 76). In this vein, many eastern European intellectuals call for a socialist civil society

(Bahro, Havel, Szelenyi, Konrad et al) as do such theorists as Arato, Cohen , Keane and Offe.

For Habermas, the public sphere mediates between civil society and the state. Its function is to permit the rational discussion of public problems, free of any constraint. As an example, Habermas cites the 18th century British and French clubs organized around newspapers and critical journals. Public authority was kept in check by this rational form of public opinion which operated much like the international intellectual community does today. Following Arendt and Wolin, Habermas initially stressed the depoliticisation and degeneration of the public sphere. State intervention, he claimed, had profoundly changed economic and political life. The public sphere is now bypassed. Rather than argument and discourse, it is now economic and political power, "the compromise of conflicting private interests" (Habermas, 1974, p. 54), which determines policy formation. Public opinion loses its critical function and is cut off from real power (see Habermas, 1975).

However, against Arendt, Habermas remains within the Marxian tradition because he insists that the social question cannot be separated from the potential for political democratization (see Habermas, 1977). But Habermas shifts the paradigm in Marxism, from production to communication. In a later work (1979), Habermas claims that there is a telos that directs us to overcoming distorted communication. It anticipates a form of life in which social justice, truth and freedom are possible. The idea of an idealized "life world" replaces Marx's goal of a free

association of producers and the "ideal speech situation" becomes the normative model for political organization. By life world as Cohen explains, "Habermas means culturally ingrained background knowledge, on the one hand, and social institutions around culture, socialization (personality) and integration" (Cohen, 1982, p. 210).

According to Habermas, the problem in modernity is the imbalance between systemic (technical) rationalization (which is presently superior) and communicative rationalization of the life world. The bureaucratic "colonization" of the life world has consumed the substance of traditional forms of life without replacing it with a postmodern rationality. However, we are at the point, in the eyes of Habermas, where "the uncontrolled growth of autonomous systems has begun to undermine its own foundations, by commodifying and bureaucratizing life world activities which are intrinsically bound to communicative action" (Dews, 1986, p. 15).

New social movements have developed as a defensive reaction to this colonization of the life world. They arise, writes Habermas, "at the seam between system and life world" (1980, p. 36). They are fighting a protracted "border conflict" along those loci in society which are affected by the colonization process.

With the broadening of new social movements, Habermas is much more optimistic about the repoliticisation of the public sphere. His new understanding as Weiner explains, "abandons the structure of the early liberal and bourgeois public sphere as an ideal pattern...[it] is now conceptualized on a preinstitutional level, rather than on the level of already instituted, and by now heavily bureaucratized, voluntary and professional associations" (p. 120). Habermas now sees the public

sphere as being polarized into "official desiccated sectors directed from above, and into local subcultures...which have become the core of autonomous counter-public spheres" (Habermas, 1986, p. 180). He has shifted his focus to the institutional innovations of these new movements. Democratization will take the form of "counter-public spheres...centres of concentrated communication which naturally arise out of the micro-domains of everyday practice" (p. 47). Habermas explains that the practices of the new movements have shown how the plurality of values to be found in civil society is essential to any real process of democratization. Although he leans towards a universalist position on justice, Habermas concedes that no consensus can ever be reached on different conceptions of the good life (p. 245).

In Godwin's linear conception of history as progress towards truth, there could come a time when democracy would give way to private judgement. However, in order to arrive at this point, the radical extension of democracy was necessary.

> Democracy restores to man a consciousness of his value, teaches him, by the removal of authority and oppression, to listen only to the suggestions of reason, gives him confidence to treat all other men with frankness and simplicity, and induces him to regard them no longer as enemies against whom to be upon his guard, but as brethren whom it becomes him to assist (Godwin, p. 490).

If democracy had not yet achieved social justice, it was due to an underestimation of the power of truth which made democracies cling to the political myths of positive institutions. The state, political parties and positive law hindered the functioning of democracy. It could best be served by public opinion, "the castle, or rather the

temple, of human nature (p. 556). "If laws", asserts Godwin, "were a sufficient means for the reformation of error and vice...the world, long ere this, would have become the seat of every virtue" (p. 559). The excellence of one's wisdom is proportional to one's independence. Rather than counting on positive regulations to achieve truth, it would be necessary to "calmly wait till the harvest of opinion is ripe" (p. 565). By opinion Godwin means "the inspection of every man over the conduct of his neighbors". This form of censure "would depend upon its freedom, not following the positive dictates of law, but the spontaneous decisions of the understanding" (p. 561).

Godwin set out a very clear argument for censure rather than state coercion as a means of social control. Public censure, he argued, by cultivating self-consciousness, develops individuality. Censure gives an individual feedback on his or her conduct and helps to build a strong self image. It also stimulates individuality as Ritter comments on Godwin, "by providing a rich store of thoughts and feelings that are the materials from which the self develops" (Ritter, 1980, p. 14). This reliance on social influences entails a high degree of transparency in society. For Godwin, increasing social visibility is a prerequisite for democracy. The emphasis on transparency shares much in common with Rousseau's vision of democracy (see Starobinsky).

This puritanical belief in the goodness of public censure in a transparent community also has much in common with classical conservatism. By invoking public opinion to discourage antisocial behaviour, Godwin, Bakunin and Kropotkin

embraced a kind of coercion which is perhaps worse than state power. Proudhon went even further, prescribing vigilante justice including private execution. Vigilance would be ensured by self-appointed morally pure "*justiciers*" (see Ritter, 1969). Orwell criticised the "totalitarian" conformity "implicit in the anarchist vision of society".

> When human beings are governed by "thou shalt not", the individual can practice a certain amount of eccentricity; when they are supposedly governed by "love" and "reason", he is under continuous pressure to make him believe and think in exactly the same way as everyone else (quoted in Woodcock, 1967, p. 85).

While some contemporary social anarchists such as Woodcock, have rejected public censure because of its authoritarian implications, others like Ritter and Taylor consider it to be more gentle albeit more unpredictable than the rule of law (see Ritter, 1980 and Taylor, 1982).

For postmodern anarchists on the other hand, social transparency is intolerable. As we have seen, Lyotard abhors the transparent society that not only public censure, but a politics of consensus would necessitate (see Lyotard, 1984). Postmoderns criticise the tyranny of the village in much the same way as does Nozick. Foucault compares the Rousseauian dream of social transparency to Bentham's project of the Panopticon. It is the dream of "an all-seeing power", of a "transparent society, visible and legible in each of its parts", of "there no longer existing any zones of darkness" (1980, p. 152). Public censure is a kind of collective pastoral power whose gaze follows every individual. Surveillance for Foucault, as

Balbus notes, "recognises individuals only as more or less interchangeable parts of the power machine" (1988, p. 154). Foucault suggests that anonymity increases freedom by enabling the individual to augment the scope of acts not open to public inspection. Individual anonymity also resists modern power based on disciplinary knowledge. As Hooke explains (p. 58),

> Anonymous individuality incites a type of self-consciousness insofar as it seeks to offer a resistance to those forces that proliferate through their ingenuity of finding a name for everything we do and designating a place for everything we see.

Democratic anarchists must make a distinction between the public scrutiny of economic and social institutions on one hand, and the censure of individuals on the other. In an anarchical context, the boycotting and shunning of tyrannical societies would be legitimate and effective ways to protect individuals, and move these societies towards anarchistic relations. However, public censure is inconsistent with respect for the individual. A radical democratic attitude seeks to uncover power relations of domination, but must tolerate the opacity of micropowers. The effectiveness of institutional power increases as its visibility decreases. Institutional power in the economy and the state must become more transparent to be diffused. But complete social transparency implies a suffocating atmosphere in which individuals have no place to hide from public surveillance. Rather than the arbitrariness of censure or the monopolisation of the law by the state, disputes between individuals could be settled with the help of peers if so desired, or with the help of competing judicial advisors who derive their authority from their reputation for

impartiality. Presently more and more private and commercial disputes are being settled outside of the courts. Negotiation, mediation or arbitration are seen as more appropriate because they are faster, cheaper and generally more efficient than the courts in the vast majority of cases. But the main problem with the rights discourse is that it undermines common deliberation. Rather than encouraging political decisions through public debate, the rights discourse incites people to let the courts decide. As Taylor argues, there is a tension between the participatory model and the rights model (1985a, pp. 289-318). The centralisation of society leads to a greater emphasis on "juridical redress". While libertarians are rights oriented, and speak of rights outside of the context of society (in the state of nature for example), the anarchist perspective developed here favors decentralisation, voluntary participation and political dialogue at the expense of the atomising rights discourse.

The promotion of spaces free from surveillance should not be confused with the stigmatisation of envy in the work of liberals such as Nozick. Even Rawls who calls for a "union of social unions", maintains that in order to overcome envy, societal transparency should be reduced. A "well ordered society" should be fragmented into a multitude of relatively hermetic associations, "each with its secure internal life" (Rawls, p. 536). Since members of one association would not be aware of the situation of members of others, differences would be downplayed, thereby reducing envy:

> These features of a well-ordered regime diminish the number of occasions when the less favored are likely to experience their situation as impoverished or humiliating (p. 537).

On the contrary. Envy may be the deadliest of the deadly sins, but it is a vital part of the democratic process. It is a manifestation of the insatiable passion for equality, as Tocqueville observed in his study of American political culture. There is a difference between public scrutiny of all our actions and the envy arising from economic inequalities. It is the passion for equality, not apathy, that is necessary in a democratic ambience.

Although critical of Rousseau on many points, Godwin bears the stamp of this influence. This is evident in his criticism of representation and the use of the ballot as the worst form of democracy. He agrees with Rousseau's objections to the delegation of authority (Godwin, p. 232). Godwin's position with respect to political parties also appears to be close to that of Rousseau. Rousseau opposed political parties because they represented only the particular interests of party supporters rather than the general interest. Political organisations also simplify public opinion. Partial societies reduce the number of points of view, prevent citizens from hearing all possible opinions on a subject and thereby diminish the quality of public debate (Rousseau, Book 2, Chapter 3). In the same vein, political associations according to Godwin, rather than "promoting the growth and diffusion of truth, tend only to check its accumulation, and render its operation, as far as possible, unnatural and mischievous" (p. 285).

Godwin is also critical of decision by lot. While the "ballot teaches us to draw a veil of concealment over our performance" of our duty, sortition teaches us to desert it (p. 628). Rather than "acting unobserved" and making "a mystery of our

sentiments", public duty should be discharged by "open vote" (p. 629). Social decisions should be decided by "common deliberation". This would lead to "an improvement of the character of individuals" and an understanding that "all private considerations must yield to the general good" (p. 235). Godwin is influenced by Rousseau's democratic theory because they both agree that equality is a prereq-uisite for liberty and that the fundamental goal is human independence or self empowerment.

In contrast to Rousseau, however, according to Godwin, we are not bound by the social contract. If we join in common deliberation it is because we foresee "that some authority will be exercised and because this is the best chance that offers itself for approximating the exercise of that authority, to the dictates of his own understanding" (p. 234). But individuals are not bound by this deliberation. If we conform to social decisions with which we are in disagreement, it is for the same prudential reasons that one yields to a despot. However, the chances that a faulty judgement of "a whole people" will be corrected are far greater than the error of an autocrat. Thus a nation, Godwin wrote, "should exercise undiminished its function of common deliberation is a step gained, and a step that inevitably leads to an improvement of individuals" (p. 235).

Godwin's position concerning political obligation is highly problematical (as is Wolff's). For these anarchists no promise is binding (see Wolff, 1976 for example). However, voluntary obligation is not in any way contradictory with anarchism. As McKercher suggests, "even if a libertarian would not consent to

predetermined authority relations as a matter of duty, he or she would without doubt be obligated in the moral sense to fulfill contracts or promises freely made" (p. 105). Pateman, who criticises the philosophical anarchism of Wolff, sets out an exhaustive social libertarian theory of obligation (see Baugh, p. 212). Her "non-statist political community", based on voluntary obligation is in the tradition of social anarchists like Kropotkin whom she quotes approvingly (Pateman, p. 141). In agreement with Pateman, Taylor writes that only in an anarchist society with equal and extensive participation "do individuals owe political obligations and they owe them not to the state but to each other". Taylor's vision of anarchism as a "participatory political order" is he suggests, "not far from the political association which Rousseau's 'social contract' was to found" (1982, p. 10). According to this perspective, privacy is not a form of freedom. The anarchist position developed here accepts the notion of voluntary obligation, but rejects as we have seen, obligatory transparency in all social spaces and also rebuke as a form of sanction. Obligation must be facultative. The options of privacy and anonymity must be available.

For Rousseau and Marx, representation is the opposite of social engagement. This vision of a totally transparent society where participation is obligatory leaves no place for a distinction between public and private realms. While participation should be encouraged in a democratic society, it should not be considered an absolute value, whatever the costs in time (in meetings or in obtaining the necessary information to participate effectively) as some councilist anarchists argue. Compulsory participation favors the strong at the expense of the weak (see Gutmann, pp.

183-186). Obligatory democratic involvement would render it trivial. As Walzer suggests, the "casual or arbitrary exercise of power won't generate self-respect; that's why push-button participation would make for a morally unsatisfactory politics" (1983b, p. 310). A genuine democracy must recognise the prerogative of people not to participate directly in some institutional decisions. The option of not participating will become more functionally obvious, Sirianni explains, as the number of associations to which we adhere multiplies.

> The necessity for calculating the relative importance of participation time increases with the expansion of the number of units of which one is a "member". Hence the more pluralist the work and life options available to people, the more likely that democracy will imply restricted participation rights of various sorts, though the latter by no means rules out recourse to general participatory controls when appropriate (1981, p. 62).

Since compulsory direct democracy as a primary mode of political interaction would most probably always lead to statism, the fears of most anarchists concerning democracy are understandable. However, a form of democracy based on voluntary, conditional obligation to stateless organisational arrangements could be quite compatible with anarchist principles. Participation should be optional and could combine direct and representative forms. There could be direct, facultative participation concerning very local, territorially based issues. But a far greater proportion of political activity would probably be carried out by representatives to conflicting power groups. One could choose to be represented by any number of a matrix of competing organisations, ranging from the local to the global level. Furthermore,

representation could take the form of sortition to prevent the demagogy and manipulation of contemporary politicians. Contrary to the belief of Godwin, representation by lot would be more democratic than the ballot, or an open show of hands, since elections, direct or indirect, are inevitably manipulated by extraordinarily powerful groups or individuals. Rather than being represented by lawyers and actors, societies' representatives would be the mirror image of the general population. Becoming a representative through the device of facultative sortition leaves no room for professional politicians and no *raison d'être* for demagogy and duplicity. Such a system would better approximate a fully participatory democracy without evoking the syndrome of the total citizen. "If democracy is a matter of maximum popular participation in public decisions" Burnheim suggests, designation by lot "would vastly increase the opportunities of ordinary people to participate" (1985, p. 229).

Pennock agrees that the egalitarian nature of democratic anarchism could lead to devices of sortition and rotation "for all governmental positions" (Pennock, 1979, p. 475). Democracy pushed to the limit, he further agrees, is anarchism. Barber's vision of a strong participatory democracy, which closely resembles social anarchism, also maintains that "the rotation of responsibilities among citizens" chosen by lot "is a powerful symbol of genuine democracy" (Barber, 1984, p. 293). Representation by lot could enable us to avoid the pitfalls of both direct and representative democracy. It would permit some citizens to represent others without the skewing effects of electoral politics. It would not oblige people to

participate as does direct democracy. Although the device of self-selection may lead to a measure of elitism, it would not exclude inactive members of society in the way that a direct democracy does. Sortition, Barber sums up, would neutralise

> the effect of wealth on public service, spread public responsibilities more equitably across the entire population, and engage a great many more citizens in making and administering policy as office-holders than generally have that opportunity in a representative system...Since the nurturing of political judgement does not require that every citizen be involved in all decisions, the lot is a way of maximising meaningful engagement in large-scale societies (p. 291).

While decision by lot may be a useful technique of democratic empowerment, it should not be seen as a panacea. It is only one form that democratic anarchism may employ. It is the voluntary participatory ethos which is most vital. One could conceive of a combination of direct and representative democracy, as did the Robespierriste constitution of 1793, which was formulated as a concession to the political pressure of the communards but never implemented (see Guérin 1973, p. 19). In this schema, decisions taken by representatives at superior federative levels would be subject to veto in local assemblies of all concerned citizens. Representatives could also be chosen by a combination of sortition and electoral methods. At the local level representatives could be designated by lot. At higher federative echelons representatives could be elected.

Radical Democracy without the State

Democratic anarchism presupposes the end of the state and of the private ownership of the resources of production, but it does not entail the end of government authority. As Kropotkin once wrote, "the state idea means something quite different from the idea of government" (1973, p. 10). While the state implies "the existence of a power situated above society...a territorial concentration as well as the concentration of many functions of the life of societies in the hands of a few" this was not necessarily the case with respect to government. As for authority, the ideal for anarchists, as Ritter explains, is that control of behaviour be based on "reasoned argument". However, since this may never be totally possible, "some authority is legitimate" if it allows "as much rational deliberation as possible, while also successfully protecting peace" (Ritter, 1978, pp. 134-135). Just as anarchy cannot be defined as absence of power, it cannot be defined as absence of authority either (see Taylor, 1982, p. 24). Authority, however, cannot be based on coercion.

An example of a possible path to democratic anarchy is the model of "demarchy" advanced by Burnheim. According to this arrangement, public services and productive resources would be vested in trustee bodies. These trustee committees would be chosen by lot or statistical sample, of those with a vested and expressed concern in the responsibilities of these bodies, after a process of self-selection (the pool from which candidates are chosen would be composed of

volunteers). These instances would be transparent and the principle of rotation would ensure a high turn-over.

Because the specialised authorities proposed by Burnheim would statistically represent the population affected by their choices, they would, he holds, be "responsive to informed public debate" (1985, p. 143). Such a system could represent competing groups better than the state apparatus which presently monopolises all governmental functions in a given territory. No individual can expect all of his or her concerns to be represented by any one body. One's concern for the preservation of nature for example. would be much better represented by a specialised authority which is preoccupied uniquely with ecological questions and which is sovereign with respect to them. The same person may be also wish to improve his standard of living through the development of a new technology. The conflict and resolution resulting from the interaction of the two specialized authorities involved would far better approximate one's own competing concerns than the muddling through, arm twisting and log rolling that goes on in state bureaucracies. It would in many ways resemble the dialogical deliberation foreseen by Godwin. Since these authorities would be sovereign in their domain and since the debates between the competing powers represented by conflicting authorities would be entirely transparent, the quality of decisions should be correspondingly better than those reached in the secret confines of state executives. The difference with Godwin's vision, however, is that rather than being power-flat, a postmodern

anarchy would be power-charged. This contrast is evident in the following quotation from Pennock:

> The democratic ideal...keeps pushing the democratic reality in the direction of equality not only of access to power but also of the exercise of power, participation...The logical limit of this process would seem to be a society in which no individual or group exercised power over others. It would be anarchy, after the fashion of William Godwin (1979, p. 475).

The democratisation of production is a prerequisite for democratic anarchy. However, simple "economic democracy" is too narrow a forum in a pluralist civil society. As Sirianni notes, "both equality and plurality of work and life options imply a prior status for global democratic forms".

> People have concerns and interests wider than those directly related to their role as producers. And nothing about the particular workplace makes it an especially favored or primary arena for the thematisation and discussion of general issues and values and of integral needs (1931, p. 60).

Plurality and equality do not require that productive units be totally democratised either. In some ways the integral democratisation of production could be incompatible with the larger democratic public sphere. Equal control over our lives does not entail equal "control over each particular institutional sphere in which one is involved" (p. 62). To premise community on every place of work being a "*Gemeinschaft* of holistic commitments" is as Sirianni suggests, "both unimaginative and unrealistic at this stage of urban civilisation" (1984, p. 492). The same

principle should apply to the public sphere as a whole. "The hallmark of a politically egalitarian society", writes Green,

> is not that everyone runs around doing political things all the time, but that everyone can engage in citizenship activities when struck by the need or interest, with as much chance of success as anyone else (p. 200).

While it is obvious that democratic anarchism would privilege amateurs rather than experts much more than do capitalist and statist social formations, a complex democracy requires a certain level of bureaucracy. However, we need not succumb to Weberian pessimism concerning the inevitable "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality. As Sirianni observes, "relative scarcity necessitates economisation and hence, an unavoidably uneven distribution of knowledge" (1981, p. 65). Bureaucracy does not inevitably lead to domination, "rather, one of its most basic roots is social complexity" (1984, p. 499). Rather than the Weberian view of complexity as technical dehumanisation, complexity can foster not only a rich variety of personal choice and social interaction but also substantive equality:

> complexity can be viewed just as well from the angle of the richness of life and work options and of forms of social interaction in a technologically advanced and communicatively dense society.

The participatory institutions of an egalitarian and pluralist democracy could keep bureaucracy accountable. The existence of a bureaucracy does not imply the existence of a state. In Burnheim's model of demarchy, the role of the democratically constituted bodies of amateurs would among other things involve monitoring bureaucracies. They would surely lose some of their Kafkian dimension without the

power of state backed coercion. Just as contemporary anarchists should concur with Foucault that power relations are inevitable, they should have no trouble agreeing with Habermas that even in an emancipated society there will always be a distinction between life-world and system. Some structures will never be fully appropriated by the life-world. Furthermore, anarchy may in part, be brought about by bureaucratic means. There may always be tensions between market mechanisms, bureaucracy and democratic forms of accountability.

I believe that radical democracy is crucial because it best fosters the value of human dignity. If there are no other universals, this should be seen as one. However, since even this view of political morality may not be shared by all, the value of democracy can be adduced, in an anarchist perspective, from the practice of contemporary political movements. These movements in various kinds of societies throughout the world call for democracy as their principal demand. This argument can be made now because contemporary political praxis does coincide with radical democratic values. If most new political movements were fascistic, other arguments would need to be found.

Radical democracy, the pluralist dispersal of power, could lead to the gradual dissolution of various forms of concentrated power. In anarchy the links between sovereignty, territory and coercion would be uncoupled. One could construe radical democracy in anarchy then, as a multiplicity of conflicting identities, affinities and rationalities in approximate equilibrium.

Chapter 4

Anarchy, Markets and the Social

In this chapter, after examining the concept of civil society, I will put forth an anarchist perspective. I will show that while political authority and central planning may be indispensable, they need not presuppose state power (the monopoly of coercion in a delimited territory) or any other kind of concentrated power, but rather "a multiplicity of democratically constituted nonstate public spaces" (Bowles and Gintis, p. 66). I will maintain that markets are necessary but must be complemented by decommodified spheres.

The Concept of Civil Society

The term *civil society* was used by Locke and Rousseau to describe governed society as opposed to the state of nature. The 18th century Scottish and English economists and philosophers made a distinction between civil society and the state. While Hegel's notion of civil society was based on Adam Smith's portrayal of modern society as an institution of exchange, Hegel attributes a superior ethical role to the state. The state was the ideal, higher realm, civil society being the lower. "The creation of civil society", Hegel wrote, "is the achievement of the modern

world...In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is nothing to him...others are means to the end of the particular member" (1953, p. 226). However, while the point of departure for civil society is a system of needs, it is a necessary source of individuality and provides a counterpoint to the need for community which is consummated in the state. As Smith points out with respect to Hegel's conception: "[t]he particular virtue of civil society is that it provides a complex, articulated social structure within which human abilities can develop" (p. 136). It provides "the context within which one cannot only find fulfillment in one's work, but can help to forge satisfying corporate and communal ties with others" (p. 137). Hegel was searching for a middle ground between the market, in which people were considered uniquely as private persons, and the state, which considered only the public role of citizen virtue (see Avineri, 1972, p. 83). However, Hegel was wary of the role of public opinion, and there was no place for democratic interaction in his conceptualization of civil society. Rejecting the radical politics of the French Revolution, Hegel rejected democracy *tout court*. It was rather the corporations he thought, which would play a mediating role between the state and civil society. By countering the atomized and egoistic elements of civil society, they comprised the space in which political education took place, enabling the individual to become a citizen.

Following Hegel, Marx also grappled with problems concerning the relationship between the individual and community, notably the separation of civil society and political life. Marx, like Hegel, rejected the French revolutionaries' desire to

return to the classical unification of state and society. He shared Hegel's critique of the "undifferentiated substantiality" of the Greek polis, where "civil society was a slave to political society" (Marx, 1980, p. 73). The problem in the modern world he thought, was the opposite. While Hegel assigned priority to the state, for Marx it was civil society and ultimately the forces of production which had precedence (see G. Cohen). Yet he had a narrower conception of the nature of civil society than did Hegel.

One prevalent view maintains that Marx returned to the pre-Hegelian notion of civil society as a system of needs, identical to capitalist domination (see Gouldner, p. 21 and Cohen, 1982). According to Cohen, Marx thought that the overthrow of capitalist social relations required the "destruction of civil society as the precondition for the realisation of substantive freedom" (Cohen, 1982, p. 49). In *On the Jewish Question* Marx explains that the personal and the collective must be reunited (1978, pp. 39-63). This has lead many critics to the conclusion that Marx wished to abolish the distinction between private and public spheres and to do away with politics. Poulsen holds that since for Marx, conflicts of interest were rooted in the contradictions of the market, in a unified society particular interests would not exist. Democracy is not seen as a conflict-resolving mechanism. The transparency of social relations would ensure that separate political interests would not emerge (see Poulsen). Some critics claim that in his debate with Bakunin, Marx implied that in communist society the absence of competition would allow humanity to dispense with the burden of politics altogether (Marx, 1978, p. 563). Howard notes that this

vision of "revolutionary politics becomes ideological when it seeks to destroy the structure that makes its politics possible and necessary" (1985, p. 236).

However, other theorists dismiss this "orthodox " view of Marx. Nordahl argues that while Marx wanted to do away with the distinction between state and civil society, he did not want to abolish the division between private and public. The abolition of the state apparatus should not be construed to mean the abolition of mediating political institutions separate from daily life: "structures for policy-making and for resolving disagreements", but rather that "people should collectively control their institutions" (Nordahl, pp. 764-65). Decisions concerning the allocation of resources would inevitably engender conflicts. By "abolishing the particular" according to Nordahl, Marx meant "abolishing the society of isolated egoists who advance their interests at the expense of others". By abolishing the state Marx meant "establishing a democratically structured community" (p. 772).

In his critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* Marx does seem to indicate that political institutions will exist in socialist society. What Marx criticises in Hegel's state - civil society partition is the absence of community and especially the undemocratic character of Hegel's intermediary bodies (Marx, 1975, pp. 30-31 and 89-93). Based on what he believes to be Marx's insight in *Capital*, Urry has come up with a precise model of civil society. It is, he believes, a distinctive element of capitalist society linking economy, state and society. For Urry (p. 69), the sphere of circulation is part of both the economy and civil society. As Rodger elaborates, the "circuit of money is the medium through which relationships between the

spheres of production and circulation are established, reproduced and connected to the state through struggles in civil society" (p. 201). While the sphere of circulation is the precondition of civil society, within the latter "there is a plethora of social practices which in various ways are all responsible for constituting and reproducing human subjects" (Urry, p. 69). Urry identifies two other spheres of civil society; that of reproduction and that of struggle (p. 73). The law is the medium, which connects civil society to the state through the circuits of power and ideology.

What is most important in the work of Marx on civil society was his redefinition of the public and the private. In *On the Jewish Question,* Marx made a fundamental distinction between "mere political emancipation" and human emancipation. As citizens we participate in an abstract community which mystifies the fact that it is only in civil society that we are real concrete beings (see Kolakowski, p 20, for a good explanation of this point). This mystification is new to the capitalist mode of production. In feudal society the divisions were reflected in the realm of politics. In capitalism, civil society is depoliticized because of the ideological smoke screen of bourgeois politics. The market is portrayed as the impartial arbitrator. The main point for Marx was to stress that social production is in the public sphere. There is nothing private about the capitalist economy. Since it belongs to the public realm, it must be democratised. Democratic anarchists should be indebted to Marx for this fundamental reconstitution of the private - public distinction (see Schwartz, p. 261). Whatever Marx "really meant", control of the means of production can be regarded as a social relationship without accepting the Platonic dream of perfect unity.

Some later Marxists went back to a more Hegelian conception of civil society. According to Gramsci the latter belongs to the superstructural moment. It consists of "the complex of ideological and cultural relations, spiritual and intellectual life, and the political expression of these relations" (Carnoy, p. 69). After expanding Marx's vision of the private sphere, Gramsci then posits the primacy of civil society (consensus) over political society (force). By consensus he means, as Mouffe explains, an "unreflecting participation in an established form of activity" (1979).

Whereas for Marx, the withering away of the state occurred in the structural moment (the suppression of class antagonisms), in Gramsci this process occurs in the superstructure. The suppression of the state implies the "enlargement of civil society until it is universal" or that is to say the "reabsorption of political society in civil society." (Bobbio, 1979, p. 91). In social formations where civil society is weak, revolution is an instrumental military undertaking (as in the Russian Revolution). In social formations with well established public spheres the state is "merely an outer trench" behind the powerful institutions of civil society. As Femia observes, for Gramsci "revolutionary change in the West implied a long march through the institutions of civil society" (p. 126). Ideologies are not considered merely as a justification of established power. They are rather perceived as forces which form a "new power" (see Bobbio, 1979, p. 36).

Gramsci attributed primacy to the superstructure because he saw that outmoded social relations could survive thanks to the ideological institutions of civil society. As Femia remarks, "it is at this moment that hegemony becomes decisive,

either in maintaining or destroying the existing order" (p. 120). Hegemony, which Gramsci defines as cultural leadership and socialisation, is exercised in civil society. In order to erode bourgeois hegemony it is necessary to wage a war of position on the cultural front. It is not simply a matter of exchanging hegemonies. Rather, interprets Femia, "the principle of hegemony must be transformed from a principle that mystifies exploitation to one that exposes and supercedes it" (p. 53). The main struggles would take place not only in the factories, but in the public sphere. Ideological confrontation would become more and more crucial.

No anarchist has discussed the concept of civil society with the sophistication of the authors surveyed at the beginning of this chapter. However, a common attitude held by many social anarchists, leads us to a view of civil society which can be enriched by the above-mentioned theorists. With Hegel, anarchists can agree that civil society is a necessary source of individuality. As Marx suggests, a reconstituted civil society must move the ownership of productive resources from the private sphere into the public realm. The economy should be considered part of the public domain because of the socially consequential and unaccountable power which it harbours. This does not, however, necessarily entail the abolition of the market. An anarchist vision of civil society could accept many of the proposals of market socialists.

Civil Society and Market Anarchism

Since Hegel, it has been widely assumed that the market system requires the state to function successfully. Market socialists and post-liberals believe that the state is a necessary counterpoint to the egoism of the market. The state, they hold, must assume the essential function of redistribution to ensure approximate equality. The market is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a flourishing, pluralistic civil society. According to Nove, "the state would have to play a vital role" (p. 26). Miller contends that "recourse to a central authority" is inevitable if the egalitarianism of a small group is to "be translated into equality across a large society" (1984a, p. 167). It seems that the capitalist market cannot live without the state (see Offe, 1985a). However, an anarchist market, where economic power is dispersed and democratised, may be able to function with alternative institutions to the sovereign state.

There has been a wide disagreement between libertarian and communitarian anarchists concerning the distribution of social wealth. The former wish to base all spheres of life on the model of market relations. They believe that private ownership is the ultimate guarantor of freedom. It is the state, they claim, which cultivates and perpetuates the concentration of power in the capitalist economy. With state functions reduced to the absolute minimum (to safeguard liberty), market mechanisms would foster free competition between small producers and inhibit the creation of monopolies (see Nozick, Rothbard and Lemieux). Libertarians have a

utopian, teleological faith in the well-ordered universe, maintained by the invisible hand. This is a profoundly antidemocratic attitude which is blind to the devastating effects of unequal power distribution in society.

Anarcho-communists, on the other hand, seek to abolish all market mechanisms without replacing them with the bureaucratic relations of the Soviet style command economy (see Kropotkin, 1970, pp. 46-79 and Bookchin, 1987, pp. 77-97). Market socialists quite rightly suggest that the anarcho-communist conception is as utopian and unrealisable as the libertarian vision. As Nove explains, there are only two methods of distribution, the horizontal links of the market or the hierarchical relations of the central plan. There is no other known possibility (Nove, 1985; see also Miller, 1984a, p. 171).

Individualist and social anarchists have become increasingly mutually hostile. While there was polite discussion between these two poles in the nineteenth century, today they virtually ignore each other. This is unfortunate because a combination of market libertarian and communitarian perspectives concerning allocation for production and distribution could generate promising possibilities. In order to guarantee pluralism and to avoid stagnation while at the same time strengthening the bonds of community, a consistent anarchist position must draw on perspectives from the opposing approaches.

A pure capitalist market economy is incompatible with the values of equality, freedom (as power over one's life), community and democracy. Undiluted market society bars equal access by all to the means of production and fails to furnish public

goods. With respect to common goods like clean air or a safe environment, pure market forces result in a prisoner's dilemma situation known as the "tragedy of the commons" (see Hardin). This is a situation, as Lane explains, where "market calculations of individually earned deserts lead to lower productivity" (Lane, p. 400). The capitalist market has built in features which undermine collective interests. One important example is the way in which capitalist markets fragment and distort the free flow of information. As Elson explains (p. 32):

> Profit seeking enterprises linked by the cash nexus have an incentive to conceal information about their productivity, costs of production and innovations. An advantage of the market is the way that it permits the dispersal of initiative: but a disadvantage is the way that it creates barriers to the sharing of information.

Access to information is prevented in the interest of private profit, this necessitates the duplication of information gathering, thereby wasting social resources.

At this point I will briefly outline an anarchist perspective on the notion of interests. Classical liberalism uses the term *interest* in a subjective sense. This is part of an instrumental view of political action. This perspective supposedly takes people as they are; through their political participation, it is maintained, their interests will be articulated. On the other hand, Marxists have an objective notion of interests. People's desires, it is argued, are the result of a system which undermines their real, latent interests (for a discussion of the notion of objective and subjective interests, see Balbus, 1971). According to approaches which introduce the notion of false consciousness, the individual, as Taylor writes, "cannot be the final authority

on the question whether his desires are authentic, whether they do or do not frustrate his purposes" (1985b, p. 216). Pluralists link power to the articulation of group interests. For Marxists, as Poulantzas explains, power is "the capacity of a social class to realise its specific objective interests" (1973, p. 104). The problem with both the liberal instrumental and the Marxist model is that both presuppose that interests are always exogenously given. For liberals these are seen in a relativistic light, as individual preferences, for Marxists, as historically determined class interests. This similarity is related to both models of action, which posit behaviour, as Bowles and Gintis explain, as aimed at the "satisfaction of ends existing prior to social action, rather than resulting from it" (p. 150). Liberals stress individual instrumental behaviour, while in the Marxist model, there is no place for individual choice. The notion of agency for most liberals is translated as negative liberty rather than collective or personal empowerment. On the other hand, for Marxists, agency is the collective project of a social group. Both perspectives are problematic. The latter leaves no room for individual choice. In the Leninist version, collective options will be determined by the revolutionary vanguard. The liberal instrumental conception of human behaviour has difficulty accounting for such simple aspects of human behaviour as the act of individual voting. The model of the purely egoistic, self-interested person encounters much greater problems when trying to explain the heroic, self-sacrificing or suicidal behaviour of some social movements and terrorist groups.

While Foucault's declaration that interests do not exist is not very helpful (1980, p. 188), Aronowitz's claim that the postmodern outlook understands interest as a "standpoint from which to view reality" (1988, p. 51), is persuasive but vague. The perspective put forward by Bowles and Gintis seems most appropriate for contemporary anarchism. They see "practices as constitutive of interests" (p. 223). Behaviour is not only directed at achieving ends, they hold, it also creates character. They call this a constitutive conception of action ("becoming by acting"). "Action expresses identity and influences personal development; but action also is identity and is personal development" (p. 151). According to this model of "learning through choosing", people

> participate not merely to meet pre-existing ends, but also to constitute themselves, or to reaffirm themselves as persons... preferences are as much formed as revealed in the exercise of choice. Individuals choose in order to become, and the nature of the opportunities given for the expression of choice affects the formation of wills" (p. 138).

In contrast to Liberal and Marxist models then, Bowles and Gintis put forward a "vision of people free to be the architects of their own personal and social behaviour" (p. 70).

This conception of the relationship between behaviour and interests seems closest to contemporary anarchism, which emphasises voluntary political action. While some interests may be fixed in advanced, others are ever changing in the course of political practice and can only be expressed in action. The indeterminacy of interests can best be protected by the indeterminacy of radical democracy. But

this approach does not ground democracy in interests or in anything else. For many reasons people do not always act in accordance with what may be seen as their own interests. I believe that the vast majority of the population has an interest in anarchy. However, I cannot rightfully determine someone else's interests for them.

For early proponents of market society like Mandeville, Smith and Burke, the reconciliation of individual interests and the common good was based on the traditional codes of morality (see Macpherson on Burke and Winch on Smith). However, the unchecked growth of market relations in capitalist society has, as Sullivan explains, undermined "those social relations which have historically restrained and modified self-interested competition" (p. 28). The solvent effects of atomising market forces undercut the traditional solidarities and moral codes which provide the foundations for market relations (see F. Hirsch). The domination and power which have skewed the market place have undercut the basis of trust and the feeling of community, on which the bourgeois ideology of fair exchange is founded (as pointed out above in the discussion on Offe, p. 88). Purely self-interested behaviour decreases overall economic efficiency. The ideal type capitalist economy, based on a high level of marketness and a high level of instrumental behaviour, would lead to disastrous results. Block has suggested that "we owe the economic benefits that capitalism has produced to lower levels of marketness and greater levels of embeddedness of behaviour" (p. 27). As the marketness of economic behaviour decreases, transactions are embedded in a more complicated network of social interaction. That our economic activity, like our political action, is

not purely instrumental, but rather embedded, is evident in the existence of non-opportunistic behaviour. Block explains that the efficiency of even the largest capitalist firms, is often more dependent on embedded, rather than instrumental behaviour. The exclusive dependency on the market also discourages democratic political participation. When one has the option to exit this undermines the commitment to voice one's opinion. It reduces "the opportunity costs of not participating" (Bowles & Gintis, p. 135, see also Block). Yet virtually all contemporary radical democrats feel that some form of market mechanism is essential to allocate resources in a world where scarcity may always be with us. The command economies of presently existing socialist societies have not been able to motivate production by either terror or moral incentives. They seem to have recognised that material self-improvement in a market society is an incentive that cannot be ignored. A market environment is necessary to coordinate the activities of various productive units, to make production responsive to the needs of consumers and to enable the highly specialised production which is a prerequisite for an advanced economy. An industrial economy, as Miller suggests, "is inconceivable without a vast network of exchange between different enterprises." (1984a, p. 171). This is not to say that productive units will not be smaller and more decentralised. On the contrary. But the more decentralised the units of production, the more important a network of exchange becomes.

Consumer democracy is perhaps as important as other aspects of democracy. It would appear to require the maximisation of personal choice made possible by market mechanisms. As Sirianni observes (1984, p. 496),

> no complex social division of labour, operating under conditions of relative scarcity (which will always exist), can eliminate markets altogether without: (1) severely curtailing the freedom of workers; (2) tyrannising consumers in its inability to respond adequately to personal consumption needs - or even social consumption; and (3) wasting human and natural resources in a democratically uncontrollable spiral of inefficiency.

Of course, he holds, the market must be "subject to various forms of democratic regulation" (p. 494). The command economy leaves no place for civil society. It atomises individuals to a far greater extent than does the market in the West.

As Arneson suggests, a cooperative market which excludes the hiring of labour would probably "do better on the score of community" than any "set of socialist institutions" (Arneson, p. 225). Rejecting a notion of community based on a common vision of the good, he stresses the diversity of community connections to which members of market cooperatives would belong, ranging from "universal community sentiment" to "localised and intense forms of association". The human need for community he holds, "turns out to be a compound of desires for diverse sorts of community." (p. 224).

Market socialists such as Miller advocate a form of market socialism where unearned income and the transfer of capital across generations is barred (1987, p. 183).

> In this system, the means of production are socially owned. The state administers them, leasing capital to groups of workers associated in corporations, who then produce and trade in a relatively free market. Incomes depend on the market performance of each cooperative.

Miller suggests that this form of production and distribution would satisfy most socialists' requirements concerning distribution according to need. It would represent a "reasonable compromise between the claims of social justice and efficiency." (1977, p. 480).[1] Nove admits that since a market entails competition, there will be losers and gainers and "some inequality". It would be possible to overcome natural causes of inequality (location, soil fertility etc.) by some form of "rental payments" or similar form of transfer.

> This would leave differences due to skill, effort, ingenuity, knowledge of market conditions (and inevitably also luck). One cannot eliminate these without eliminating material incentives...excesses of inequality can be moderated by personal and corporate taxes but, true enough, inequalities cannot be eliminated any more than one can decree equilibrium in a dynamic economy (1985, p., 25).

Miller emphasises the conservative nature of an integrally communist non-market society. There would be "no impetus for producers to foster new needs"

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1 Other theorists of a market system somewhere between capitalism and socialism include Liska and Meade. Liska proposes to modify existing socialism with a form of entrepreneurial socialism, in which everyone would be guaranteed a minimum standard of living, but would also be provided "with the seed corn of socialist entrepreneurship", which would be used to "bid competitively for the rental of state owned capital goods" (Nuti, pp. 8 and 4). From the other end of the economic spectrum Meade proposes a modification of existing capitalist organisation which he calls "Agathotopia" (a good place to be rather than a utopia -to be found nowhere; see Nuti, pp. 6 & 7, and Meade).

(1987, p. 197). Communist society, he holds, "lacks any institutions with an in-built dynamic thrust; it cannot plausibly be seen as the inheritor of capitalism's revolutionary character" (p. 198). While stressing the undoubtedly more efficient nature of egoistic rather than altruistic behaviour in allocating resources, Miller admits that "the problem of community is the gravest difficulty which faces market socialists". He nevertheless feels that the value of "efficiency, freedom of choice, creativity, social justice and community" can be best reconciled in a market socialist system (1977, p. 489).

Most market socialists, in agreement with Carling, hold that a decentralised market system requires "the political inequalities inherent in the state to restrict the growth of economic inequalities between communities... a decent egalitarian society would very likely need states, markets and communities" (p. 111; see also Nove and Miller, 1984). Market socialists appear to maintain that the Prisoners' Dilemma situation and the free rider problem will prevail, not only within communities but also between communities. In agreement with Hobbes, they feel that the deterrent force of the impartial state is required for communities to interact in a public-spirited manner. Anarcho-communists adopt the other solution. They rely on the transformation of human nature or the rediscovery of our "true human nature". People and communities would no longer be primarily self-interested.

Taylor's vision of an anarchist economy tries to find a middle ground between these two classic positions. He does not think that human nature or society can be transformed so radically that contributions to the collective good will always be

pleasurable. In the spirit of hard-nosed economic realism, he takes people as they are, rather than counting on radical value transformations (see Taylor, 1987, pp. 30-31). Taylor also criticises the Hobbesian solution to the Prisoners' Dilemma as no solution at all, since deterrence itself is a common good, it requires the resolution of another Prisoners' Dilemma (p. 163). Taylor proposes rather, a decentralised network of conditional cooperation based on what is called a "supergame" (p. 60). The Prisoners' Dilemma is played off infinitely into the future with decreasing returns. Everyone has an interest in future payoffs, but present benefits outweigh long term concerns. In this complex framework, rather than the simple choice between tolerating free riders or foregoing the advantage of cooperating, people can cooperate conditionally, with an underlying possibility of withholding mutual aid in the future. As Carling points out (p. 107):

> Conditional cooperators are less vulnerable than unconditional cooperators, because they need no longer suffer being taken for a ride. But the lesser vulnerability of cooperation implies the lesser attractiveness of non-cooperation, for would be free riders will pretty soon find no public good exists on which to ride. If all this can be foreseen, and each of us values future payoffs sufficiently in relation to the current incentive each of us retains to take advantage of our fellows, then long term cooperation can be rational and stable...It is superficial to think that a joint interest in cooperation is always sufficient for free individuals to cooperate and thereby create community. But there are at least some conditions under which free and rational individuals will found a community of equal participation in the absence of the state.

The same rationale can be applied to the relationship between communities. According to this model, common values and notions of the good are not essential in order for communities and long term cooperation to exist. However, as we have already seen, in another work Taylor's vision of community is much more Rousseauian (see Taylor, 1982). Here, rather than mutual vigilance, the deterrent to the free ride resemble's Hobbes' solution. In place of the gaze of the ever-watchful sovereign, Taylor extols the virtues of public surveillance through the practices of shaming and gossip, based on common beliefs and customs. Taylor's revised vision of anarchy and community seems more realistic.

The question of needs has not been adequately addressed by social anarchists. The anti-utilitarian bent of communitarian anarchists has lead them to embrace Rousseau's critique of false needs. They were more concerned with social justice than with pinning hopes of progress on the continual expansion of society's productive forces. Like the peasants and the artisans, their vision of justice was that of "a just sharing of austerity rather than a dream of riches for all" (Hobsbawn, p. 82). This critique of Promethean economic expansion and distrust in the beneficence of technology led the Bakunists to criticise the productivist affinity between the Marxists and the bourgeoisie (see Gouldner, p. 170). This is a vital impulse; respect for equality, autonomy and nature must come before economic expansion. However, the Rousseauian and Stoic conception of freedom as coincidence of capacities and needs would result in a stultifying social atmosphere. When freedom is judged by the match between one's desires and the ability to

satisfy them, the obvious solution is to criticise the proliferation of needs and pare them down. To a certain extent, freedom must be related to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs and wants. However, the anarchist vision of complex freedom should be in part also comprised of Constant's redefinition of freedom as a function of available possibilities (see Taylor, 1985b, p. 319). The maximisation of meaningful choice may mean that at times, as Constant held, freedom and frustration are related (see Holmes). The Nietzschean critique of utilitarianism, which presently manifests itself in the postmaterial values of postmodern anarchists, is a less dangerous form of anti-utilitarianism because it is not totalistic.

In agreement with Proudhon's view that the good life is based on the at once cooperative and antagonistic activities of bargaining and discussion, anarchists must support market mechanisms in order to maintain a society with pluralistic notions of the good life. The market is a vital part of the social. As Newman writes (p. 145),

> [b]ecause the market is largely indifferent to personal qualities, it is highly tolerant of personal differences. It therefore offers the basis for peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic social universe.

Burnheim advances a left-Hayekian position which advocates the abolition of the private ownership of productive resources. In order to prevent the concentration of power and economic exploitation they would, as already mentioned, be vested in democratically constituted non-state trustee bodies. The function of these bodies would be to "feed into the market mechanism relevant public needs" (1985, p. 143).

They would not be involved in production themselves, but would lease natural and accumulated resources to cooperatives, with respect for the environment and posterity taken into account. The public revenue thereby generated would replace taxation. The trustee committees would be required to disburse these public funds "to various fixed commitments" (1987, p. 229). This system would combine the flexibility and responsiveness of the market with safeguards against monopoly and exploitation.

In this form of market anarchism as in market socialism, the resources of production would be socially owned. While the specialised authorities which would administer them would have some state-like qualities (bureaucracy, hierarchy, expertise), they would not necessarily be linked to a territorial base, would not be backed by coercive force and would not monopolise sovereignty. That is to say, these authorities would only be sovereign with respect to their own competence. This is far from pure anarchy. However, as previously pointed out, anarchists realise that their ideal can only be approximated and never integrally realised.

As in market socialism, capital and productive resources would be leased to co-operatives ranging in size from family based concerns to global organisations. Galtung explains why it would be preferable to move from multinational corporations to global co-operatives rather than nationalised corporations (1980, p. 353):

> globalisation differs from nationalisation, for nationalisation may also be an important tool in international competition of an unhealthy kind, by giving more power to the state, however much it supercedes unhealthy domestic competition.

These global co-operatives may even be monopolies. Recently economists have shown that industries with monopolies are often more efficient and waste less valuable social resources than industries with several producers, providing that markets are contestable. "A contestable market is one into which entry is absolutely free, and exit is absolutely costless" (Baumol, p. 3; this is the seminal article on the subject). The specialised agencies which feed into the market should be contestable in the same way.

In contrast to capitalist markets, in anarchist markets there would be no incentive to conceal information. "Invisible handshakes" could, as in Elson's vision of socialised markets, be transformed into "public information networks" (Elson, p. 32). A publicly financed "electronic marketplace" could permit the "dispersal of initiative" as in capitalist societies, but it would also be transparent. It would not set up barriers to the free flow of information and new incentives to contribute to the collective good could be stimulated. Elson explains why such voluntary public information networks would result in more "public-spirited decision-making" (p. 34):

> Buyer-seller networks would enable some of the inter-dependencies of decision-makers to be manifested before decisions are taken; so that individual units could make their decisions in a more public-spirited way, considering the implications of their decisions for others, as well as themselves.

This could increase global economic efficiency. With this view of anarchy and markets, I return to respond to the concerns of the preceeding chapter. While some form of market relations may be inevitable, their atomising effects could be

countered by the development of a complementary, non-commodified sphere in civil society. This informal sector would supply the sense of community necessary to offset the egoistic nature of the market place and also to prevent the market from undercutting itself.

Decommodification and the Social

Political currents of all stripes call for the diminution of the role of the state in favour of other arrangements. The critical theorists, Habermas and Offe suggest that the new movements have grown as a reaction to the same contradictions in advanced industrial society which have stimulated neoconservatism: the fiscal crisis of the state, an opposition to bureaucracy and proliferating government regulation, manipulation and control. However, the neoconservative response to these problems diverges from that of the new movements. In response to "overloaded government" they propose a "minimal state" and the extension of the market to larger spheres of life (Hayek, Nozick). Their political program supports privatisation and deregulation.

Hayek was the first to stress the dangers of the progressive absorption of civil society by the state. He held that any form of state planning inevitably led to the totalitarian destruction of individual liberty (see Hayek, pp. 88-100). Following Hayek's lead, the neo-liberals wish to "rectify" the boundaries between civil society and the state, to restore the equilibrium in civil society at the expense of the state

(see Jacquillat, p. 28). However, this does not mean weakening the state as a whole. By "minimal state" the protagonists of the New Right mean a minimal police state. The neoconservative project seeks a weak government and a strong state by restoring the nonpolitical basis of civil society: property, the market, the work ethic etc. (see Offe, 1985b, pp. 817-821 and Habermas, 1986, pp. 57-72 and 131-149). Far from the withering away of the state as a whole, the dismantling of the welfare network frees resources for refurbishing the repressive apparatus of the state. The strengthening of the repressive pole assures internal cohesion and respect of the moral order, rendering society governable once again. As Held explains, the neo-liberals' commitment to the market has another side, "a commitment to strong government to provide a secure basis upon which, it is thought, business, trade and family life will prosper." (1986, p. 22, see also Bobbio, 1986, p. 116, Offe, 1984a, p. 290, Burnheim, 1985, p. 34). Keane notes the irony of this reaction against bureaucracy, which "at the same time involves a defense of corporate and state organisations whose planning operations strongly contribute to this general bureaucratisation process" (1984, p. 254).

The neo-liberal and neo-conservative conception of civil society is reduced to the market. This narrow definition ignores the point made by Polanyi that "to allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of the human beings... would result in the demolition of society" (p. 73). For the neo-liberals, "revalorization" of the individual implies further social atomization by the twin pincers of the strong state and the free market. However, the attempt to depoliticize once more

the relations of production by recommodifying state functions has as Offe demonstrates, so far met with failure.

In the tradition of Constant, Toqueville and Durkheim, many French social theorists are preoccupied by the relationship between the state, the individual and the institutions of civil society. Baudrillard asserts that the institutions which set the stage for "les progrès du social" (urbanisation, concentration, production, medicine, education, social security, etc.), produce and destroy the social at the same time. They simulate the social while devouring the "substantifique moelle du social", "le social régresse à mesure même du développement de ses institutions." (Baudrillard, 1982, p. 70). Baudrillard contrasts Marx's dream of reabsorbing the economy into the transformed social with the present reality. "Ce qui nous arrive, c'est la résorption du social dans l'économie politique (banalisée): la gestion pure et simple" (p. 86).

In the same vein Rosanvallon blames the welfare state for the loss of "organic solidarity" (1984, p. 48). It "liberates" the individual by dissolving the complexity of the social tissue. In this vicious circle, atomisation and the strengthening of the state feed upon one another (see Maffesoli, pp. 210-230). The social structures which limit the autonomy of the individual are destroyed. Autonomous self-help networks are replaced by a myriad of experts and social engineers; professionals of the social. The asocial recipient, cut off from traditional networks of self-help becomes the hostage of the welfare state. The community networks which blocked social control in traditional societies are rationalized. Renaud suggests that civil

society becomes totally dependent on the state: "à terme ce social entraine la mise à mort d'un être-ensemble vidé d'une conscience collective qui n'arrive plus à se mettre en forme ailleurs que dans l'état." (p. 76).

Rosanvallon stresses that it is the "societal suicide" precipitated by the welfare state which has provoked the fiscal crisis. By replacing organic solidarity with the mechanical solidarity of the welfare state, social costs soar: "la professionalisation de ces services collectifs, qui croit naturellement quand les métiers du social se développent, ne fait en outre qu'accentuer ce coût de la solidarité mécanique. He concludes, "il n'y a plus assez de 'social' entre l'Etat et les individus" (Rosanvallon, p. 48). Enriquez also emphasizes the inseparable link between "massification" and "individualisation" (p. 439). The ensuing apathy, where people withdraw into their private worlds, permits the state to consolidate its power. But this is an illusory victory, "car l'absence d'adhésion frappe, à terme, l'Etat d'immobilité... des processus de désinvestissement léthal inaugurant l'effritement de l'Etat" (p. 445). The more totalitarian and unified the political world becomes, the more it provokes dissident behaviour, zones of turbulence and resistance. The more the state apparatus attempts to crush civil society, the more the latter affirms itself. The more spaces the state invades, "plus les peuples s'inventent de nouvelles zones de liberté" (p. 446).

The participants in these new forms of conflict call for the withdrawal of the state from many functions to let voluntary associations and user-controlled organisations take its place. They seek to rebuild a civil society independent from

encroaching normalisation, regulation and control by repoliticising social institutions and creating a multitude of new autonomous institutions. All of these perspectives imply the need to expand the role of civil society and reduce the role of the state. They all see some role for the market in a revitalised civil society.

This theme was addressed by Kropotkin in *Mutual Aid,* where he describes the effects of state organisation on voluntary cooperation and altruism. Communitarian anarchists like Kropotkin hold that the modern state is predicated upon the social isolation of individuals. A centralised state led to the destruction of social solidarity and to social atomisation. According to this account, communities were deliberately disempowered by the modern state. Kropotkin points to the destruction of the decentralised power of cities, towns and communes by nascent states, hostile towards all bodies between the individual and the state (1973, p. 40). In the ensuing social vacuum the state replaces the lost organic ties (1970, p. 137). Political and social life outside the confines of the state disappeared. In the West a wide swath was cut through traditional societies and forms of community, leaving the space between the individual and the state barren, except for one form of association, the capitalist corporation. It and the state have continually expanded to fill the vacuum, accumulating unprecedented power in the process.

> The state... alone must take care of matters of general interest, while the subjects must represent loose aggregations of individuals, connected by no particular bonds, bound to appeal to the government each time they feel a common need... The absorption of all social functions by the state was necessarily favoured by the development of an unbridled, narrowminded individualism. In proportion as the obligations toward the

> state grew in numbers the citizens were evidently relieved from their obligations towards each other (Kropotkin, 1920, p. 197).

By weakening local communities at the expense of the state, the spirit of altruism and cooperation wither away. This further strengthens the state which in turn can further weaken local community. Modern states "systematically weeded out" all institutions of "mutual aid".

However, Kropotkin perceived a reversal of this process. He marvelled at the dynamism of voluntary associations in all spheres of life in the Europe of his time.

> We see these societies rising in all nooks and corners of all domains: political, economic, artistic, intellectual. Some are as shortlived as roses, some hold their own for several decades, and all strive - while maintaining the independence of each group, circle, branch or section - to federate, to unite across frontiers as well as among each nation: to cover all the life of civilised men with a net, meshes of which are intersected and interwoven (1970, p. 132).

These voluntary societies invaded everything and were "only impeded in their development by the state" (p. 133). They "already begin to encroach everywhere on the functions of the state, and strive to substitute free action of volunteers for that of a centralised state" (p. 137). Several contemporary social theorists suggest that this process has greatly accelerated in the twentieth century. They point to the efficiency of a decommodified sector composed of voluntary associations compared to the wastefulness of the state. State functions, they maintain, could gradually be replaced by the informal sector. According to Lash and Urry, "there has been an

extensive expansion both in the number and range of voluntary associations and socio-political groupings". This means "that civil society is structured on a progressively horizontal rather than vertical basis" (Lash and Urry, p. 311).

It is Offe who demonstrates most forcefully the increasing decommodification of society. Not only are market forces skewed in the monopoly sector, they organize less and less total life time of the population. In response to the decline of the work ethic and the "looming obsolescence of the labour market", Offe foresees the institutionalization of a "decommodified" sphere. This would imply a revival of socially "useful activity" outside the labour market. He claims that the "widespread motivational rejection of life-long dependence upon labour for income in the market" precipitates the need for "solidaristic sources of energy for social labour" (1985a, p. 77). Offe envisages a "partial uncoupling of income and employment" and the generation of "non-monetary use-values" in "communal, co-operative and public spaces" between the spheres of "employment and consumption, workplace and household" (Offe et al., 1988, p. 240).

The institutionalization of an "intermediate sphere" of "informal labour" between the private and the public presupposes its economic and organisational development. These "new forms of self-employment" would help alleviate problems of unemployment, underemployment and the fiscal crisis of the state. Decentralised self-help groups, cooperatives and voluntary associations would be more efficient and effective than state run agencies (1985a, p. 75). The welfare functions of the

state would increasingly be appropriated by the autonomous practices of an expanded civil society.

In this arrangement, individuals would be able to alternate freely between the labor market and sabbatical leaves for the social reconstruction of society. The boundary between the realm of commodified labour and the non-market social sphere would be porous "in such a way as to allow it to be traversed in both directions by all, according to their prevailing preferences" (p. 66).

Sirianni foresees a "broad range of alternative time cycles for achievement and fluid career commitments" in order to ensure the "egalitarian transformation of the division of labour". Without such a system

> opportunity would continue to cluster disproportionately around full-time continuous-service positions; the costs and risks of career discontinuities would be too high to encourage the more privileged to accept greater flexibility in the interests of broader access to opportunity (1984, p. 495).

Such a "sabbatical program" would allow individuals to take time off from salaried work throughout one's lifetime, not just at the age of retirement. Burnheim also sees the emergence of an informal non-market sphere. It would be composed not only of recognised trustee bodies, but also of a myriad of voluntary and self-help groups. He suggests that there may be points of relative equilibrium between the two sectors of such an economy; "a rough balance of power between the forces that tend to undercut monetary rewards too drastically and those that tend to

increase them at the expense of natural and common resources" (Burnheim, 1985, p. 149).

As an alternative to the welfare state, Rosanvallon calls for a dynamic of socialisation (debureaucratisation), decentralisation ("accroître les tâches et les responsabilités des collectivités locales dans les domaines sociaux et culturels") and autonomisation ("transferer à des collectivités non publiques des tâches de service public" 1984, p. 112). This does not mean handing over public services to market forces, but rather to diverse associations of service users, foundations, neighbourhood groups and self-help networks in civil society ("services publics ponctuels d'initiative locale" p. 115). Social solidarity can be neither created artificially by the state, nor automatically by market mechanisms. It can only be stimulated in a "société civile plus épaisse" (p. 115). Reducing the demand for state services and encouraging social solidarity by increasing the visibility of social relationships go hand in hand. This social visibility is also necessary for the development of democracy (p. 127).

That such diverse social thinkers should stress the resurgence of a variety of allegiances and practices temporarily monopolised by the state is not fortuitous. The point is rather, how far will this process go? I agree that the decommodified realm could gradually fulfill some of the functions presently under the auspices of the state, without abrogating its sovereign power. This will be especially true in Western societies with rapidly aging populations. There will be dramatically increas-

ing numbers of people no longer dependent on wage labour who, far from being a social burden, could make important contributions to the vitality of an informal sector.

An anarchist society would require a much higher degree of organisation and complexity than capitalist and statist social formations. As Frankel observes, in "the history of humanity", excepting catastrophes, there "are no examples of societies reverting to much simpler and less complex organisational forms of life" (1987, p. 237). Anarchy would be no exception. The resurgence of mediating institutions is a sign that at least the partial "anarchisation" of society is taking place.

Miller stresses the importance of maintaining a boundary between the realm of the market and the political arena so that the egoistic behaviour does not contaminate the polity. However, if one sees the market as part of the public sphere, then this demarcation becomes problematical. Rather than the liberal private/public, economy/state partition, a democratic anarchist vision must agree with the proposition that "a sphere of social life is to be considered public if its operation involves the socially consequential exercise of power" (Bowles and Gintis, p. 66; see also Pateman, 1979, pp. 129-133). The public realm is comprised of "those spheres of social life over which the twin norms of liberty and democracy apply". According to this redefinition of the public - private partition, the market and the democratically constituted bodies which regulate it would be in the public realm. The basic issue, contend Bowles and Gintis, concerns the proper organisation of the market "as a public space". The private sphere would encompass all that concerns conditions of liberty but not power, hence where democratic norms do not

apply: freedom of association, choice, expression and individual conscience. The network of voluntary societies in the informal sector would act as a bridge between the public and the private. Our hankering for individuality and community could be satisfied by this arrangement without the capitalist market or the state.

A possible scenario for an anarchist civil society can be outlined from the perspectives summarised in this chapter. It would entail growing islands of free public spaces on the one hand and decommodified spheres on the other. These spheres of anarchist life would serve as points of connection between sovereign authorities vested with the resources of production and a free market with actors ranging from global co-operatives to small entrepreneurs, who would vie for the use of these resources. An anarchist civil society would be self-governing and pluralist. It would be composed of a thickly textured matrix of public spheres, overlapping communities, clashing micro-powers and voluntary associations. It would be dense and complex but market relations would be transparent. This transparency would render centers of power less harmful. The dispersal of power should enhance competition and bargaining on one hand and the quality of democratic decisions on the other. The clear delineation between civil society and the state would give way in anarchy to a hybrid complex of authorities fulfilling some of the functions of the state but in the public sphere. In contrast to the state, this public sphere would be open to all, yet participation would be strictly voluntary. Judging from opinion polls, it seems evident that a democratically controlled market economy would be much more concerned with post-industrial values, such as respect for the environment

and social justice between generations, than with the productivist values of contemporary multinationals. Rather than accentuating global inequalities as does the present world market system, a democratised international anarchist market would obviously consider social justice on a global scale as the priority. In the next chapter I will investigate the anarchist perspective on global issues.

Chapter 5

Anarchy and World Order

In this chapter I will explore the question of the state and anarchy in the international context. I will first examine the state-centric paradigm both in its realist and world statist variants. I will then show how classical anarchism has influenced a competing world outlook which calls itself "global humanism" or "postrealism". I will then attempt to demonstrate how the genealogical perspective can bolster the anarchist outlook before presenting images of global anarchy.

The State-Centric Paradigm

Political Realism: Anarchy versus Community

Realists point to the remarkable resilience of the state form of political organisation and the dramatic growth of its role. Bull argues that "for the first time the sovereign state is the common political form experienced by the whole of mankind" (Bull, 1982, p. 62). For realists, the state is the political form which has claimed obligation and legitimacy because through it, the goals of human community and personal security from violence have converged. The state is considered to be the basic form of political organisation because in the final analysis,

human community stems from the need for security. The nation-state represents the paradigm of this union.

Critics of the state system hold that it cannot assure security and peace, that war is the inevitable product of such an arrangement. They also argue that this system blocks the attainment of social justice on a global scale and that it prevents us from reaching an ecological balance. Realists such as Bull reply that economic injustice, war and environmental mismanagement have more profound causes than those found in any specific political system.

> Violence, economic injustice, and disharmony between man and nature have a longer history than the modern states system. The causes that lead to them will be operative, and our need to work against them imperative, whatever the political structure of the world (Bull, 1982, p. 64)

To those who talk of the decline of the state system due to the growing importance of transnational relations, Bull replies that state involvement in the management of migration, trade, culture, science and sports has ended the previous "autonomy of transnational relations" (p. 62).

The realist discourse takes certain basic assumptions for granted. The ultimate goal of political realism is to preserve the stability of the present state system. According to this highly conservative standpoint, known anarchy is better than unknown anarchy. The state is reified into an unquestioned fact of international life, frozen in time. The state is considered to be a unitary actor which operates with unified objectives for the collective interests of its citizens. Curiously, this basic

unit of analysis, the state, is considered to be a black box. As Walker observes (1986):

> for purposes of theory, the state must be treated as an unproblematic unity: an entity whose existence, boundaries, identifying structures, constituencies, legitimations, interests and capacities to make self-regarding decisions can be treated as given, independent of transnational class and human interests, and undisputed (except, perhaps, by other states).

According to this paradigm the state is viewed atomistically as a legal person which ontologically precedes international society. By considering the state to be entirely self-sufficient, political realists duplicate at a global scale the atomistic outlook of methodological individualists at the societal level. The state replaces the individual, but the approach is the same. Individuals are considered to be egoistic and aggressive. This essence is then attributed to the state. According to this account, any signs of international society are ephemeral byproducts of the state system. As Ashley argues, the realist paradigm "implicitly imposes and denies recognition to those class and human interests which cannot be reduced to concatenations of state interests or traditional coalitions of domestic interests" (1986, p. 271). However, inroads are being made within the realist tradition which question this attitude. For example, Ruggie holds that the sovereign state, "far from creating modern international society, presupposes international society's production of the sociopolitical space within which sovereignty could flourish" (1983). Carried further this outlook could call into question the fundamental realist distinction between domestic and international politics.

Wight articulates well this inside-outside distinction between community at the domestic level and anarchy at the global level.

> Anarchy is the characteristic that distinguishes international politics from ordinary politics...while in domestic politics the struggle for power is governed and circumscribed by the framework of law and institutions, in international politics law and institutions are circumscribed by the struggle for power. This indeed is the justification for calling international politics 'power politics' *par excellence*. (Wight, 1978, quoted in Roy, 1987).

Within the confines of the state reign the values of community, civil society, democracy, reason, morality and progress. On the other hand, international politics is the realm of naked power, conflict, contingency and relativism. The state represents the dividing line between community and anarchy. International anarchy is seen as an inevitable evil. At best, the state system has held "anarchy at bay" (Bull, 1982). Domestic politics is the sphere of "the good life" whereas international politics is "the realm of recurrence and repetition" (Wight, 1966, p. 27). The geopolitical space between states is the arena of *realpolitik* where the pursuit of security and power must be waged at any cost. Survival is the supreme value in this realm.

The domestic-international dichotomy is the central theme of political realism. This schism involves what Ashley calls a "double move". At the domestic level realists adopt the prevailing notion of community in "Western rational discourse". They "interpret community ahistorically and monistically as a fixed thematic unity, a kind of essence, an identity transcending and uniting manifest

differences in the world of human practices" (Ashley, 1987. p. 413). According to this standpoint community and pluralism are opposites. It is then declared that the geopolitical space between states does not meet the criteria of the traditional occidental notion of community. International politics is designated as the realm "wherein the realisation of community must be deferred". The concept of the state, as Walker notes, is an abstraction that reifies "both the moment of difference between communities and the moment of identity within communities" (1986, p. 501).

According to this perspective, international relations cannot be the subject of a critical social investigation because a critical approach presupposes the background of shared beliefs and political life. Without a unitary vision of community and morality, critical discourse is impossible. What are claimed to be signs of global community: international trade, international law, diplomatic norms, moral codes concerning human rights, are in reality contingent and transient. In the realist tradition of Morganthau, Carr and Aron, as Ashley explains, "there is no international society worthy of the name community. Rather, there are multiple political communities, each circumscribed by the political reach of a sovereign state" (1987, p. 404).

What is fundamental in international politics for realists, is power, zero-sum power. There is no place for normative power in this paradigm. Only physical and material resources are considered in this matrix of power calculation. Power is linked to violence. The power of public opinion of organisations such as *Amnesty*

International is considered to be merely a "psychological factor". Since it is "contemptuous of normative power...powerful actions based on normative or non-material strength are difficult to understand from the realist perspective" (Rubinstein, p. 531).

The goal of the realist paradigm is to impose order out of chaos. Reliance on the invisible hand of the balance of power between states, a form of global checks and balances, has given way to another attitude. An egalitarian, multipower arrangement is now considered highly unstable and dangerous. The more hierarchically concentrated power becomes, the greater the possibility of realising world order (see Waltz).

According to realists, "the idea that the right to engage in war should be confined to certain public authorities and should not be generally available to self-appointed political groups of all kinds is one of the most vital barriers we have against anarchy" (Bull, 1982, p. 69). All the violence manifest in the state system would be more horrible still without it, they claim. Realists play down the relationship between the creation of the state and the arms race. It is ironic that the notion of sovereignty, which was developed in order to prevent bloodshed, also precipitated the arms race. Bull writes, "the causes of war lie ultimately in the existence of weapons and armed forces and the will of political groups to use them", rather than any specific political structure such as the state". However, it is obvious that only states or state-like structures could support the sophisticated machines of violence of modern warfare.

While the state's *raison d'être* is to provide security for its citizens, contemporary military capacity has made the state system the seedbed of insecurity. Some sociobiologists present the case that while nationalism and state sovereignty may have been evolutionary adaptations to our aggressive instincts in the past, the state form of social organisation is now outmoded and counterproductive . The development of the military-industrial complex has entailed surrendering democratic participation in questions concerning life and death to the technical judgement of specialists and experts (see Schell, 1982). "State security", as Walker writes, "threatens global insecurity. The more security is defined in terms of the interests of the citizens of states, the more it is undermined for the inhabitants of the planet" (1986, p. 492). The problem stems from the distinction between domestic politics and international politics.

The pervasiveness of this discourse can be seen in Walzer's view of community. Walzer writes that "statelessness is a condition of infinite danger" (p. 32). He equates the state with the political community and suggests that the only alternatives are "global libertarianism" where political communities would not exist or membership in a "single global state" (p. 35).

> The politics and the culture of modern democracy probably require the kind of largeness, and also the kind of boundedness, that states provide...to tear down the walls of the state is not...to create a world without walls, but rather to create a thousand petty fortresses (p. 39).

Ethnic and sectional subcultures would be forced to become more rigid without state protection because the "distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon

closure". Without state sovereignty over a given territory neighborhoods and communities would lose their cohesiveness. Voluntary obligation would not be strong enough to counter the forces of deracination. While anarchists can agree with Walzer that "the primary good we distribute to one another is membership in some human community", they do not see any unequivocal link between statehood and community identity.

One could imagine an anarchical society which redefines security in a manner that stresses "both its local immediacy and global reach" (Walker, 1986, p. 501). This would necessitate an approach which sees anarchy as community. Of all the realists, Bull probably comes closest to this notion when he refers to the "anarchical society" (1982). He argues that "anarchy (in the sense of absence of government) is not only compatible with the existence of international society but constitutes the form of organisation most appropriate to it" (Nardin, p. 40). Yet his vehement defence of the idea of muddling through with the state leads one to the conclusion that he is among the "true believers who would rather perish with their sinking statist paradigm than cast themselves adrift" (Falk, 1983, p. 13). To break away from the state-centric discourse would mean disavowing the arbitrary distinction between community on the inside and anarchy on the outside. It would entail embracing the notion of an anarchical community which spans the gamut from the global manoeuvres of power politics to the micropowers of everyday experience. According to this view of community, diversity is more fundamental than unity. One

could say that anarchy is not only compatible with the existence of community but constitutes the form of organisation most appropriate to it.

Many realists hopefully anticipate the eventual advent of a global community and a world state. Presently international relations is a field of anarchy, however, someday prudent statesmen may achieve universal community. Their position resembles that of Kant in some respects. For Kant, in spite of the terrible calamities brought on by war, "it is one further spur for developing to the highest pitch all talents to minister to culture" (1970, p. 90). Against our natural inclinations, war and revolution ensure the peopling of the entire earth and the development of human potential. The effect of war is not wealth, but insecurity, toil and sacrifice. Yet the advance of technology also has peaceful applications which make possible higher standards of living. As instrumental reason develops the means of destruction, the horrors of "the catastrophe of war" force states to face the same dilemma that individuals in the state of nature faced in the past concerning the creation of political society: self destruction or "perpetual peace" by way of a world confederation, a "cosmopolitan republic".

World State Proponents

Some opponents of the states system call for the creation of world government now. They propose the transferal of state sovereignty to a world body with state like qualities. This vision of world order is situated within the realist state-centric paradigm. It is critical of the negative impact of the state system on

humankind but reproduces statist logic at the global level. It sees the emergence of a universalist, unitary world community which would concentrate all sovereignty in one central authority. These world order theorists see on a world scale what realists see at the state level: a monistic notion of community, deep identity, universal truth and moral progress (see for example Boulding and Jaguaribe).

According to this view, although a world community does not yet exist, certain forces are working in this direction, especially the unifying effects of technology. Radically expanded communications and travel capacities have actualised the "global village". These technological advances are instrumental in forming a common *Weltanschauung*, the basis of a unitary society. Advocates of world government hold that increasing functional integration will lay the foundations for an integrated world polity thereby "moving the international community from a society of means to a society of ends" (Roy, 1987, p. 303). The creation of a world government will complete the construction of world community.

One major assumption of this outlook is the linear view of history:

> The ideal and material unification of history is an irreversible fact. The installation of a politico-juridical system of world order...represents nothing more than the institutionalisation of an order which appeared empirically as soon as the camps of division were unified. It is necessary simply to convert de facto order into a situation of law (Jaguaribe, p. 212, quoted in Roy, 1987).

This utopian, idealistic tradition in world order thinking could generate greater tyranny than the present world system. While realists may not savour anarchy, at

least they see it as inevitable in a global context. World government proponents seek to root out anarchy everywhere. Their vision, as Kariel points out, is that of "a global state which will be self-sustaining and self-ratifying, all knowing and all embracing" (Kariel, p. 149). In many ways the geopolitical space between states is the last uncolonised social sphere. As Ashley claims (1987, p. 428), it is perhaps in part thanks to "realist practices" that international geopolitical space remains pluralistic. There are spaces within this dimension where alternative practices have "escaped the totalising normalisation of Western rationalist discourse...resistant practices and movements that bear positive, productive potential for the opening of alternative spaces, for the constitution of alternative spaces, for the constitution of alternative subjects, for the making of alternative worlds". It is in this spatial context that voluntary, anarchistic practices have the best chance of survival. The world state discourse has the effect of colonising this last frontier.

Anarchism and Postrealism

A growing current of thought in world-order studies is influenced by Kropotokin's vision of anarchism. These theorists call themselves "global humanists" or "postrealists". In the tradition of Bakunin and Kropotkin, global humanists detach the notion of community from the state. The emphasis is on voluntary, nonterritorial associations based on function. Traditional anarchist propositions have been reworked in light of contemporary developments.

Bakunin advocated a "universal world federation...directed from the bottom up, from the circumference to the centre" (1972, p. 98).

> It is absolutely necessary for any country wishing to join the free confederations of peoples to replace its centralised, bureaucratic, and military organisations by a federalist organisation based on the absolute liberty and autonomy of regions, provinces, communes, associations and individuals.

According to this confederal vision of a variety of overlapping associations, accountability would always flow back to the local units. However, Bakunin's vision was too unitary. As in other aspects of his thought, unity was more important than diversity in his approach to international politics. Kropotkin pointed to the spontaneous growth of "private initiative" in voluntary institutions such as the *Red Cross* and the *Life Boat Association* wherever spaces conducive to their emergence existed (1970, p. 65). As is clear from his examples, he thought these unimpeded spaces existed more often than not at the global level, in the social vacuum between states. The idea of a criss-crossed network of nonterritorial bodies is evident in a passage previously quoted where Kropotkin speaks of voluntary societies federating and uniting "across frontiers as well as among each nation; to cover all the life of civilised men with a net, meshes of which are intersected and interwoven" (p. 132). He notes the emergence of "thousands upon thousands of free combines and societies growing up everywhere for the satisfaction of all possible and imaginable needs" (p. 167). The notion of confederal organisation on the basis of function rather than territory is anticipated in his vision of society regenerated by "federations of trade

unions for the organisation of men in accordance with their different functions... What formerly belonged ...to the functions of the state... enters now into the domain of free organisation" (p. 169). The founding of international relations in local community was also articulated in Ghandi's vision of "ordered anarchy".

> In this structure composed of innumerable villages, there will be ever-widening, never-ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the circle of villages, till at last the whole becomes one life composed of individuals , never aggressive in their arrogance but even humble, sharing the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they are integral units. Therefore the outermost circumference will not wield the power to crush the inner circle but will give strength to all within and derive its own strength from it...No one...[shall] be first and none last (quoted in Roy, 1987, p. 317).

The rethinking of international relations along these lines has been continued by theorists such as Kohr, Falk, Galtung and Roy. They attempt to carry this perspective further. In the tradition of Kropotkin, they view the state and community as opposing forces. Falk, for example, writes in direct contrast to Walzer that the state is "both inhumanly large in its bureaucratic dimensions and inhumanly small in its territorial and exclusionary dimensions" (1978, p. 82). He argues that global statelessness would be a much less dangerous alternative to the present volatile combination of technical expertise and narrow-minded nationalism embodied in contemporary state formations. According to Falk, "the anarchist vision...of a fusion between a universal confederation and organic societal forms of a communal

character lies at the very center of the only hopeful prospect for the future world order" (p. 75).

However, Falk criticises traditional forms of anarchism for suffering from the same tendency as other speculative philosophical currents during the era of the statist paradigm, "namely, a concentration upon the national question and the assumption that the global question will disappear when all nations have correctly resolved their own domestic problems" (1983, p. 291). What is lacking is a "globally oriented formulation of anarchist response". This is what the postrealists attempt to undertake.

Global humanists see a world characterised by growing interdependence and "increasing functional interpenetration", a world where "power is becoming more diffuse" (Sakamoto, p. 199). For these thinkers also, the fundamental factor which has created the preconditions for this transformation is the rapid growth of transportation and communication capacity and speed, which, until the early nineteenth century had remained basically constant.

> The system of territorial actors developed in the first phase with spatial contiguity as a basic and undisputed assumption. With slow mobility contiguity was a necessity. That the ensuing exponential growth of transportation/communication should lead to the emergence of nonterritorial actors is hardly strange, but it should be pointed out that we are just at the beginning of this process (Galtung, 1975, p. 158).

These developments pushed the world in two different directions, ecumenicity and at the same time a new tribalism or neo-primitivism as McLuhan puts it. State

structures developed and were shaped by factors which have become obsolescent in the present world system:

> nonhierarchical patterns of organisation become increasingly possible as a result of modern informational technology, which is capable of both decentralising decisional activity and coordinating widely scattered inputs into an overall decisional process (Falk, 1982, p. 558).

These technological advances permit the possibility of a neo-tribal world order. Kohr, one of the pioneers of this perspective, proposes a world federation of little units divided along "traditional tribal frontiers" (p. 241). They would be of roughly equal size, thus enabling symmetrical interaction. Contemporary theorists in this tradition detach the notion of community from territory. Galtung proposes a model world order based on communities much smaller than contemporary states. While these communities would be based on territory, they would be linked together by a "strong web of nonterritorial organisations...putting everyone in community with local neighbors as well as distant neighbors" (1980, pp. 92-94, 344-352). In a world with such a telescoped time-space dimension, the ties of community, he contends, will naturally eclipse territorially based states.

Whereas traditional world-order scenarios make a sharp contrast between anarchy and world government, global humanists "seek to explore the numerous intermediate world-order options, as well as many variants of world government and anarchy" (Falk, 1982, p. 544). They anticipate organisational solutions which would involve the simultaneous decentralisation and centralisation of authority and power

among and within states. Falk's vision of a preferred world system anticipates the functional integration of many spheres of human activity: the conservation of resources, disarmament, the use of space and the ocean, health services, the protection of the environment and business operations. These "superagencies would enjoy competence only in relation to their functional domain" (p. 555). The increased profile of these transnational political structures freed from the state system would assure the coordination of functional activities and the upholding of normative priorities. Functional globalisation would ensure rational planning on a planetary scale, equitable resource allocation, ecological balance, demilitarisation and the linking of production to basic needs.

The idea of voluntary associations based on functions has also influenced Burnheim's model of "demarchy". His conception of trustee authorities would have different geographical boundaries or none at all, there would be no concentration of sovereignty as in state power. These authorities would have no coercive power, much less the monopoly of legitimate violence, but rather the moral authority of organisations like *Amnesty International* and the *Red Cross.* As Brown points out, many facets of transportation, communication, trade policy, health and international law are already to some degree regulated by such bodies (Brown, p. 238 and Brown et al, pp. 197-203, see also Burnheim, 1986, p. 221). These specialised authorities would derive their legitimacy from "global democratically generated recognition" (Burnheim, 1986, p. 227). They would enforce their decisions by the use of sanctions, and could coordinate moral pressure with other recognised authorities.

According to the postrealist perspective, international organisations such as the *United Nations* are too closely linked to the state system. Galtung writes that a "highly centralised and strong world government may be one more instrument of structural violence and of extreme direct violence out of power and self-righteousness" (1975, p. 187). This scenario does not see the future world as the modern state writ large but rather as a global system "represented by people acting individually and collectively through voluntary institutions" where "normative initiatives" would produce "new creative space" (Falk, 1982, p. 563). Galtung calls for a future world composed not of states and supernational organisations linked to the state system, but of transnational associations and subnational minorities (1975, p. 187):

> a complex world with nonterritorial organisations cross-cutting self-sufficient territorial units; nonterritorial units so strong they can serve as a base for a world central authority with the capacity not only to articulate problems and conflicts transcending these territorial units but also to solve them.

He describes the difference between territorial and nonterritorial actors:

> membership in a territorial actor is based on location in geographical space; membership in a nonterritorial actor on location in some sociofunctional space...In the first case vicinity is the guiding principle, in the second case affinity (p. 305).

Galtung predicts that transnational affinities would become stronger than territorial ones. He provides as a classic example, national identity in contrast to state citizenship. The nation, he argues, is the most fundamental transnational organisa-

tion. He cites the interaction of the international scientific community where "the dissolution of national emphasis has gone quite far" as paradigmatic for transnational activity (p. 309). He anticipates a global public sphere of noncoercive communication. Confident that the nonterritorial system will prevail, Galtung writes that today territorial forms of organisation are stronger, "tomorrow they may be equal; the day after tomorrow the nonterritorial system may carry the burden of political articulation and decision making" (p. 383). He sees "criss-crossing nonterritorial actors growing like mushrooms". In Ghandian fashion he writes of

> a world where each part is a center, spun together in a dense network of nonexploitative, participatory organisations of various kinds. This would be the world of our dreams: many smaller units (today's problem being the macro-state rather than the mini-state), woven together in a web of multilateral ties, substituting for the bilateral approach to global cohesion a much more multilateral approach (1980, p. 382).

This vision of international society is not utopian claims Galtung, since it already exists. He gives as an example the federation of India. As a nation-state the Indian continent functions poorly, but it is a highly successful international system. While the separate states are visible, "there are overriding concerns and loyalties criss-crossing with them (1975, p. 184).

Global humanists reject the realist equation of community and statehood. As the hold of the state system loosens, they envisage the creation of a diversity of new community identities detached from spatial confines and combined with global identity.

> The forms of human identity, now pinpointed upon national symbols, would be dispersed to include global human solidarity on the one hand, and increased sub-national identification and participation in political and economic decisions on the other (Johansen, p. 211)

Their vision of community is facultative and transient. Sakomoto writes, "man's personal identification with the community of his own choosing will be linked to his identification with humanity without falling victim to the depersonalising effects that a big global organisation such as the U.N. might bring forth" (p. 210). Galtung also opposes an obligatory, permanent notion of community. "The world should be able to harbour the hermit...who prefers solitude". As do all traditional anarchists, Galtung rejects "enforced participatory democracy" because it imposes "uniformity rather than diversity". This of course entails the "freedom not to participate in decision making if one does not want" (Galtung, 1980, p. 92). "Citizenship in a society" Galtung argues, "should be like membership in an association, to be discarded when there is no longer any commitment" (p. 73). Although global humanists are generally less atomistic than libertarians, Galtung leans heaviiy toward the notion of the self-sufficient individual and community. In some respects his outlook resembles Nozick's libertarian view of community and world-order. Galtung anticipates a world where cheap transportation enables a new nomadism. Mobility, he predicts, will be the "great equaliser" (1980, p. 331). His ideal vision of the future world is one of "small social units, self-reliant and nonexploitative with high mobility between them" (1975, p. 184).

Postrealists do not claim that violence will disappear in their preferred world. With the transcendence of simple spatial organisation, the increased complexity of a neo-tribal, nomadic order, based on functional organisation could result in more small-scale violence than before. What has been gained in the realm of international relations may to some extent, be sacrificed locally. Kohr admits that a world composed of small units may be constantly experiencing mini-wars as in the Middle Ages. However, he notes, these conflicts were usually wars of manoeuvre involving little or no bloodshed because they were on such a small scale. In this period "war as well as peace was divisible".

> The small-state world with its incredible parcellation of sovereign territories allowed conflicts to remain localised and, whenever war did break out, prevented its spread across the entire continent. The numerous boundaries acted constantly as insulators against the expansion of conflict...The paradoxical result of the constant occurrence of warfare during the Middle Ages was the simultaneous prevalence of peace (Kohr, p. 62).

Local violence between small communities would be less dangerous. Galtung's scenario is not as optimistic as the Ghandian view of the relationship between many worlds of variegated communities.

> The common anarchistic belief [is] that if the basic units are all right, then the rest will take care of itself, through 'oceanic circles' of solidarity and cooperation...[but] nobody so far has found a formula that guarantees that small units will remain nonaggressive. At most, we can trust that when they make wars they will tend to make small ones (1980, p. 105).

However, the overlapping communities brought on by a new nomadic existence would make modern modes of warfare unpracticable. "Explosives...presuppose low entropy in the spatial distribution of people". In a spatial arrangement where enemy and friend are mixed, bombs become unusable. Major wars would not be feasible in a world of high "loyalty entropy and geographical entropy" (1975, p. 185). Most terrorist demands involve the question of statehood. It is doubtful that there would be much terrorist activity if the notion of statehood became obsolete, and the publicity, leverage and potential for financial gain obtained from attacking citizens of large states did not exist

The question of defence in decentralized societies has recently been addressed by Sharp. He shows how a coordinated network of social defence and non-violent resistance to invasion could make small communities unconquerable. The ideal of simultaneous statelessness is utopian. However, even if states with military apparatuses continue to exist in certain parts of the world, decentralised civil defence tactics could make the resources needed for military control too vast to be worthwhile (see Sharp, 1973 and 1985). It is much easier to take over and control a territory with an existing state apparatus than one with a variety of decentralised, overlapping authorities and associations, none of which are backed by force (see Burnheim, 1986, p. 223 and 1985, p. 23). The long term control of public life by a conqueror in such a situation would be much more difficult.

The influence of classical anarchism on this approach to world order is obvious. However, a genealogical perspective can also contribute to a contemporary anarchistic approach toward international relations.

Postmodern Peace: The Genealogical Perspective

According to the genealogical vision of international politics, the statist paradigm is an arbitrary spatial categorisation which has temporarily dominated political discourse. For the postmoderns, the state is not taken as the basic unit of analysis in international relations. In spatial terms this approach looks at the discourses which have imposed an arbitrary world order based on the modern state. For genealogists the boundaries between states, "far from demarcating the limits of community, are plastic divisions of political space" (Ashley, 1986). In the present world system "patterns of geopolitical space" are no longer Cartesian (Ashley, 1988). The contemporary world eludes political practices conceived when spatial contiguity was more relevant.

There are certain similarities between the genealogical attitude and the geopolitical outlook of realists. Both are wary of approaches which attribute a fixed essence, a deep truth or continuity to any aspect of international relations. Both disavow any derivative notion of global political life. They see international society as an uncompleted and precarious social space, the product of a plurality of interpretations and historical practices. For genealogists, as for realists, interna-

tional politics is "the realm of recurrence and repetition". It is the space in which the "repetitious competition for relative means" takes place (Ashley, 1986, p. 420). Both perspectives recognize that "every practice, including the search for international community", is to be understood "as part of the unceasing struggle for power".

However, this is where the similarities end. Whereas realists employ traditional, unitary notions of community at the state level, genealogists reject the domestic-international dichotomy. They seek to show how the realist discourse has neutralised more inclusive discourses "based on spatial and cultural differentiations not articulated within a mental geography of inside and outside" (Klein, p. 392). Realists attempt to reconcile their skepticism concerning the international geopolitical dimension with teleological politics at the state level. They retain their "commitment to the modernist narrative of universalising progress" while simultaneously engaging "in the ritual criticism of this narrative's historical limits" (Ashley, 1987, p. 422). For genealogists political realism is an instrument and a discourse of power in contemporary political life. The realist "double move" of defining community in one sense and then excluding international relations from this notion of community is a case in point. This manoeuvre is considered by postmoderns to be a particularly cynical "ritual of power...a form of power politics with historical consequences". It limits geopolitical understanding to "forms that can find expression [only] by way of the modern state" (p. 420)

The genealogical perspective consists of a skeptical attitude regarding all forms of political interaction, including those within the confines of the state. The

postmodern attitude toward community criticises the "historical and monistic understanding of community" dominant in the West (Ashley, 1986, p. 407). It questions the state's claim to "monopoly over the meaning of human community and human identity" (Walker, 1988a, p. 103). Genealogists critically view the notion of community from a distance. This *distanciation* is called a "geopolitical outlook" (Ashley, 1986, p. 407). From a distanced genealogical vantage-point, the discourses and practices of international and domestic community are seen as objects of strategy and domination. Genealogists attempt to counter the presumption that "diversity can only be tolerated after a unified community has been constructed" (Walker, 1988a, p. 137). They reject the dichotomies of deep structure and surface structure or identity and difference with respect to the values of community. The internal-external schism, the doctrines of exclusion and inclusion are disavowed in favour of a pluralist conception of community. The genealogical attitude questions the claim that community can be reduced to either a matter of state nationalism or global cosmopolitanism. Rather, they see alternative notions of community both beyond and below the modern state. They envisage

> new forms of political community and political practice that are open to the variety of people's experiences and histories, not closed off by either the claims of the state or claims of hegemonic universalism (Ashley, 1988).

Genealogists contend that "diversity is a precondition for any sense of community" (Walker, 1988a, p. 165).

Three main themes shape this conception of community:

> 1) a recognition of the global connections that have developed at this moment of history and which are increasingly powerful determinants of people's lives everywhere...2) a recognition that global structure and connections do not imply any easy universalism that generates a reading of History as a move from fragmentation to integration, from states to global community. On the contrary...global structures represent quite specific forms of dominance and...the claims of such structures to universality involve explicit principles of exclusion...3) in spite of global structures and awareness, people actually live, work and play in specific places in a great variety of concrete circumstances (p. 102).

This perspective sees the possibility of a variety of world orders existing simultaneously. It recognises the need for solidarity and global unity on one hand and pluralism, localism and specificity on the other. A common sense of global identity "can only be realised in the plural" (p. 165). The genealogical approach takes into account the links between micro-powers and global structures.

> The possibility that the future might just as easily involve greater pluralism, greater fragmentation, greater difference does not necessarily imply the impossibility of global community or the other way around. It is just as possible that forces of change in international politics might arise from fragmented and peripheralised local and grassroots movements around the world as from states or transnational structures (p. 165).

Postmodern theorists of international relations consider the micropractices of everyday life and global manoeuvers of power politics in the same strategic field of power relations. They see political activity migrating from the spatial context of the state, branching out to both global and local levels. This entails the disarticulation

of political space into diverse planes both below and above the state. Genealogists contemplate "a range of spatial commitments not confined to...a global structure of world order" (Klein, p. 312). According to this perspective the term *local* may "refer to social and political space as well as to territory or geography, involving, for example, working within the space of civil society" (Walker, 1988a, p. 85).

As is the case with global humanists, genealogists do not believe it is fruitful or possible to capture state power in the developed world. They propose a "diremptive" approach to world politics which rejects grand strategies and grand solutions. "The grand strategy of the single revolution gives way to tactics of multiple changes" (p. 154). Strategy is not "about something out there that has to be responded to", it is rather "an effect, an outcome of specific practices and power relations" (Klein, p. 311). The genealogist looks for weak links, spaces for intervention. This involves scrutiny from below and within practices of resistance because there is much more activity visible from the inside. Power, which is seen as operating not only from the top down, but as also embedded in social practices, is more transparent from this perspective. The opportunity exists in the study of international relations to locate the "dispersed endangered species of resistant practices and explore how, under what conditions of crisis, they may be strengthened" (Ashley, 1986, p. 428). Genealogists would agree with Falk, that "there exists positive political space to defend against encroachment, within existing structures of world order" (1987a, p. 17).

The diremptive strategy calls for a rearticulation of political space. It seeks a "permanent balkanisation" of the world and proposes a radical rethinking of notions of security, notably, "the changing spatial context of security" (Walker, 1988, p. 122). This perspective disavows "the modernist aspiration for security and the certainties of peace" (Klein, p. 313). It accepts the "uncertainties and ambiguities that are entailed by being human" (p. 314). A diremptive politics anticipates a more turbulent and unpredictable future than proponents of a positive peace imagine.

> The politics of such an enterprise is one of permanent unsettlement, the ongoing 'diremption' or forcible severing of apparent unities and of established patterns and practices. This entails a search not for certainty or 'security' but a tolerance for uncertainty, ambiguity and insecurity (p. 311)...[The] search for unambiguous certainties flies in the face of contemporary politics, where life as an ongoing process is inherently incomplete and peace less a final structure than an image worth continually aspiring and building for. In a postmodern mode, incompleteness, fragmentation, incoherence and the celebration of difference become more realistic and more politically responsible goals than the promise of a coming new Enlightenment where the certainties of peace - whether by deterrence or revolution - will be manifest (p. 313)

According to the genealogical perspective, by contesting the realist discourse, "the sphere of realist power politics loses its power".

> It loses its capacity historically to define and enforce observance of the margins of modernist narrative, the legitimate span of state sovereignty, the boundaries of domestic political life. These boundaries and states they define, become themselves the objects of open and even violent political contest (Ashley, 1986, p. 422).

The genealogical attitude is a powerful tool which buttresses the anarchistic attitude at all levels.

Images of Global Anarchy

Traditionally anarchism, as is the case with most modern theories of reform and revolution, has focussed its attention on domestic politics. As Falk writes, "anarchism suffers from the tendency of other traditions of philosophical speculation generated during the statist era, namely, a concentration upon the national question and the assumption that the global question will disappear when all nations have correctly resolved their own domestic problems" (1983, p. 291). A more global orientation is obviously necessary. In fact world politics is a domain in which anarchists should feel most at home. Bakunin and Kropotkin made some references to global politics which could be developed and others that are incompatible with a postmodern anarchist standpoint.

Kropotkin's account of the development of the state as a deliberate plot to disempower the free states and communes has greatly influenced subsequent generations of communitarian anarchists. This is a plausible account; many anarchists accept this instrumental, conspirational vision of the development of the state. However, recently, political theorists have argued that the formation of the modern state was in part, an unconscious response to the unpredictability and many-sidedness of individuals fully integrated into their community. The catalyst for change

was the violence and destruction caused by the religious civil wars of the sixteenth century (see Hirschman and Keohane). Elias stresses that the state is the unintended result of social actions. The monopoly of physical violence wielded by the state is "a human invention which developed without planning in the course of many generations" (p. 179). This process is continual and has "by no means" reached the final stage". Elias points to the equivocal nature of this socio-technical invention. Notwithstanding the negative effects of concentrated power, it must be remembered that "never before in the development of humankind have so many millions of people lived together so peacefully - that is, with the considerable elimination of physical violence - as in the large states and cities of our time (p. 178). It would, I believe, be more useful for anarchists to accept this more nuanced, unintentional account of the development of the state and the distribution of power.

Both Bakunin and Proudhon saw the state as a necessary civilising instrument which had outlived its usefulness. Bakunin wrote

> the state is an evil, but a historically necessary evil, as necessary in the past as its complete extinction will sooner or later be, as necessary as primitive bestiality and man's theological ramblings have been (quoted in Miller, 1984a, p. 171).

The state system has no doubt played a civilising role to some extent at domestic and international levels. However, while the sociopolitical space in international society was, in the past, enlarged through interaction between states, this sphere is increasingly being occupied by transversal blocs which could supercede the state as the principal form of international actor. Global anarchism would not resemble

the Hobbesian chaos described by realists. It would rather be "anarchical society" at the local and global level without the mediation of the state.

We have already seen how Kropotkin has influenced the "postrealist" vision of a global web of societies based on function rather than territory (1973, p. 55). Another interesting aspect of Kropotkin's work on the origin of the state is his attempt to show the feasibility of anarchism in a preslate context. He brings to life the vitality of tribal anarchy and the vibrant society of free cities and village communes which existed before the creation of the modern state system. He considered struggles and conflict within the context of anarchy to be "the very guarantee of a free life" (p. 30). He saw "a renewal, a new impetus towards progress after each one of these struggles". These forms of conflict were among those which "drove humanity forward". However, to associate tyranny uniquely with the centralised state, and to emphasise the lack of oppression in decentralised medieval Europe, is much too simplistic. Kropotkin ignored the question of coercion in small communities; the compulsion stemming from ritual and tradition in tribal societies, and the severity of community pressure in the medieval commune, where breaches of custom were punished by maiming or death. As Avrich points out, Kropotkin "failed to emphasise that during the Middle Ages the great mass of peasants lived in poverty and bondage and that serfdom was eliminated only when the state increased its power at the expense of the feudal nobility" (p. 77). The modern notion of the individual is linked to the creation of the modern state (see Siedentop). Notwithstanding the negative aspects of community life in the Middle Ages, the similarities between aspects of

medieval society and modern society were perceptively compared by Kropotkin. His cyclical view of history led him to see the seeds of a neo-tribal, neo-medieval anarchy within the voluntary associations of his day. He saw "new life starting again in thousands of centers on the principle of the lively institutions of the individual and groups and that of free agreement (1970, p. 167).

A neo-medieval order would have no central authority and no sovereign states. It would in the words of Bull, be "a secular incarnation of the system of overlapping or segmented authority that characterised medieval Christendom" (1977, p. 264). This could come about, he explains, through some kind of regional integration (such as the European Common Market) which sapped the state sovereignty of its members without shifting this sovereignty to any regional level. Authorities would then exist at the European, national and local levels, but would have neither jurisdictional priority over others nor superior claims to individual loyalty. Identities and loyalties would be variegated, ranging from global, local to transversal. Of course Bull shrugs this image off as ludicrous, but posimoderns (Lipovetsky, Deleuze, Guattari) and postrealists (Falk, Galtung), tout the emergence of a neo-medieval, neo-primitive, neo-tribal or neo-nomadic order.

Anarchists do not wish to return to the life of primeval anarchic hordes, nor to the parochial face-to-face politics of the agora. For anarchists, decentralism does not mean leaving the city or breaking up large demographic centers. On the contrary, it may mean leaving the suburbs which are not decentralist communities to recolonise the cities. It would mean organising the cities in a different manner.

As Goodman suggests, decentralisation "is a kind of social organisation: it does not involve geographical isolation, but a particular sociological use of geography" (1965, p. 15: see also *Communitas* and Bookchin, *The Limits of the City*, for anarchist proposals for the reorganisation of large cities).

> Decentralising is increasing the number of centers of decision-making and the number of initiators of policy; increasing the awareness by individuals of the whole function in which they are involved (Goodman, 1977, p. 185).

Since most communities would be based on affinity rather than territory, the decentralisation of function would play the largest role in anarchical society.

This does not exclude the possibility for national identity. There is no reason why nationhood must be based on statehood. There are only 11 countries in the world where this is the case today. In the vast majority of cases state apparatuses have been involved in the destruction of nations. This ethnocide has resulted in the loss of countless different views of the world. As Taylor stresses, fission was the traditional method of conflict avoidance within communities (1982). The state system prohibits this avenue of conflict resolution. Those minorities that resist absorption are repressed and often liquidated. The state system relentlessly destroys particularity and cultural minorities to the point where the world is becoming a homogenised, uniformised planet of rootless individuals (see Luard). Statehood is not in our genes, for by far the greatest part of our existence humankind lived in anarchic, egalitarian communities. The problem with nationalist movements today is that, being caught in the statist paradigm, they continue to wish to reproduce the

state. The link between nation and state is the first that must be severed to overcome state thought.

While anarchist society would not prevent the feeling of national identity, it would of course lessen the probability of inter-ethnic conflict. While individuals of the same nation would share common ends with respect to the preservation of their culture, on other questions (for example productivism versus ecology) they may share common ends with members of other nations and disagree with some members of their own culture. The decentralized nature of anarchy would also lessen tension.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Anarchists seek to replace monopolistic and coercive relations with voluntary ones. In this tradition I have attempted a synthesis of modernist and postmodernist anarchist discourses. This entails pursuing the goals of modernity, taking the liberal democratic discourse to its logical conclusions for example, without presumptions of grounding them. But in contrast to postmodernism, this perspective puts forth a vision of the future. In place of "political correctness", the anarchist position expounded here lets individuals decide for themselves what is best for them. Nevertheless, I have tried to demonstrate why I believe that an anti-hierarchical, anti-authoritarian vision of political morality is superior. Rather than a unitary vision of values, I have put forth a pluralist perspective which rules out states or state-like organisations determining what constitutes morality. Rather than relying on immutable values, individuals in anarchy would have to make many personal choices and decisions, and I have given my reasons for believing that these would be made to some extent, on the basis of reasonable or plausible argumentation. I have tried to show how an anarchist social theory leads to a pluralist paradigm of anarchistic organisational forms. Rather than a complete theoretical system, this approach

attempts to recover utopian perspectives in the context of new organisational structures in local and international spaces, both below and above the state level.

The anti-elitism of this standpoint best interprets and supports the push for radical democracy. According to this perspective, the value of radical democracy is not derived from foundational principles, nor is it justified by way of "transcendent categories". It is simply adduced from the self-evident practices of contemporary social movements. The one issue which unites the political imagination of political movements throughout the world today is the demand for democracy. In non-liberal social formations the demand is for simple democracy, although in the case of actually existing socialist countries democracy is understood as extending to the economic sector. In Western societies, where the democratic discourse often coincides with an empty shell in practice, social movements and political theorists call for radical democracy to counter the Right-wing postmodernist attack on the idea of democracy. I have attempted to show that the anti-hierarchical, spontaneous and agonic comportment of critical movements is paradigmatic of contemporary anarchical political praxis.

Radical democracy is anarchistic because it emphasises diversity and conflict. It accepts the Enlightenment ideal of freedom and equality so much bandied about, but so little acted upon in the contemporary states system. While the anarchist conception of radical democracy advanced here takes the above mentioned values more seriously than modernist accounts, it does not derive them from reason or virtue but simply accepts that radical democracy is impossible

without the triumph of these values. In a world without certainty or universals, this perspective points to radical democracy as the alternative to political skepticism and nihilism.

In this study I have emphasised that contrary to the belief of classical anarchists, power is probably inevitable in any form of social relationship. However, I have refuted theories of power based on structural foundations, or any other theory of power. I consider Nietzschean and neo-Nietzschean interpretations as better representations of many aspects of contemporary power: its ubiquity, its kaleidoscopic and anarchic qualities. However, I do not agree that power should determine truth and morality, although this is unfortunately the case today. I have argued that while concentrated forms of power in the state and in the economy still exist, there are a multitude of embryonic micropowers which anticipate anarchy. The distribution of power in anarchy, I maintain, will be more chaotic and less predictable than it is today. However, power relations will be more transparent. Furthermore, there is no reason why normative power, based on what is agreed upon as political morality within a particular discursive tradition or constellation of communities, may not be the dominant form of power (the normative power of *Greenpeace* for example). Indeed it is to be hoped that this would be the case. Since anarchical power relationships will be more egalitarian than they are today (excluding domination and the transfer of power from one sphere to another for example), I consider them to be more desirable.

This vision of power excludes the classical revolutionary notion of seizing state power or of abolishing all forms of power. I adopt rather a diremptive approach which seeks unstable political spaces for intervention and tries to defend positive political spaces which are already anarchical. This gradual buildup of counter-powers and counter-hegemonies could be called radical reformism.

The decline of formal democracy in state sponsored institutions in the West exposes the widening gap between the promises of modernity and what is actually being delivered. The alarming number of states crushing democratic movements in non-liberal societies indicates that far from enabling democracy, the state system either impedes its advance or favors its demise. Statism inhibits radical democracy because democratic pluralism and political monopoly are inimical. Economic monopolies may be efficient, political monopolies are not. I have argued, against many anarchists, in agreement with Godwin, that the purest form of democracy is anarchical. Compulsory direct democracy is incompatible with the pluralist goals of anarchism because it leads to a unitary vision of the good. Electronic direct democracy or instantaneous teledemocracy (as proposed by Arterton for example) are travesties of the democratic ideal because they sacrifice content for panache. Anarchical democracy would rather entail a form of voluntary and conditional obligation to stateless organisational arrangements that, for the most part, would assume representative forms. Representatives could be designated by lot, elections or a combination of these methods. What is important is the practice of frequent rotation of political representatives and the absence of structures which

monopolise political power. To the objections of Wolff (1976) that majority rule, or even unanimous direct democracy and voluntary obligation are incompatible with the principles of philosophical anarchism, one could argue that in anarchy nobody would be forced to belong to any community or participate in any political functions. Provision could even be made for those who choose to be hermits.

All proponents of radical democracy call for some kind of market mechanisms for the distribution of social wealth. Market relations are a vital part of the social. Workers' movements for democracy in Eastern Europe and wild cat strikers in the Soviet Union call for the setting up of markets or market-like mechanisms. Consumer democracy is an integral part of the democratic ideal. The nub of the idea of radical democracy concerns the extension of democratic relations into the economic sector. While market distribution is more democratic than bureaucratic distribution, the social justice necessary for an environment of dignity and self-respect is also a prerequisite for effective democracy. This calls for the regulation of the market by democratically controlled institutions which feed into the market. These institutions would be designed to articulate ecological and productive concerns, as well as to assure a climate of social justice not only within communities but between communities and across generations. Market anarchism would continue the trend towards the deterritorialisation of production. However, rather than exploitative multinationals, local and global cooperatives in a democratically controlled world market system would combine economic efficiency with social justice. The very survival of life on earth dictates that the ideology of productivism must give

way to post-industrial values. A decommodified sector connecting the political to the economic realms would play a vital part in an anarchical economic system.

The diremptive approach toward international politics attempts "to rescue the centrality of violence from the hands of those managers of security who have, for decades now, offered us little more than an alternative between different structures of organised peacelessness" (Klein, p. 314). One of the greatest dangers to world peace and stability today is the power base which the state system affords irrational political movements which capture state power. Anarchist social theory is the best defence against state terrorism because it undermines the statist discourse. It weakens confrontational attitudes because it accepts the inevitability of diverse rationalities. Anarchist pluralism recognises that what is acceptable in one society is not in another. It does not seek to impose the same set of values on the whole world. This is not to say that this perspective is indifferent to the form political regimes take. Obviously authoritarian regimes are further from anarchy than liberal democracies. But political tyrannies should be confronted with arguments, not arms. Without the support of the international states system and without the fortress of state power, authoritarian movements would have a difficult time maintaining monolithic control over a population. In a relatively noncoercive world environment it is unlikely that relations of domination would last very long in microsocieties. In agreement with Nozick's "framework for utopia", no individual should be forced to remain a member of a community. Since complete autarky is more difficult in a microsociety than in a state protected social formation, this provision could be more

effectively enforced by non-violent forms of persuasive action on the part of other communities and public authorities than is the case today. If atomism can be overcome by intimate, voluntary communities, it is unlikely that anyone having experienced anarchical relationships would crave hierarchy and domination.

Beirut is often cited as an example of the anarchy and chaos which occur when central state authority breaks down. It must be recognised, however, that the scale of violence there would be unthinkable without the participation of the surrounding states. Every faction is state-backed. Violence and coercion would still exist in anarchy, but they would occur on a much smaller, less systematic scale. While most major manifestations of violence in the world today are related to questions of statehood, the role of the state should not be fetichised. The occurrence of the state form of political organisation should be seen as an epiphenomenal, unintentional event in the history of hierarchical relations. The state system is not the root cause of coercion and domination, but merely the latest and hopefully the last form of these relations. The disappearance of the state should not be regarded as a panacea that will solve the world's problems. The anarchist perspective advanced here does not counterpoise "natural society" to the "artificial state". Nor does it associate with the former all that is good and with the latter all that is evil. I do not see a zero-sum "all or nothing" battle between the forces of civil society and the forces of the state. While the state should not be considered a necessary guarantor of civil society, it must be recognised that these spheres were perhaps interdependent in the past. However, the sociological trends observed in

the course of this study indicate the gradual decline of the state form of political organisation. While recognising the "civilising" role of the states system in the past, I see it as an outmoded form of political organisation better suited to the industrial revolution than to the age of a nuclearised "global village". Political space is being disarticulated onto a variety of transversal planes both below and above the state level.

I have alluded to the deterritorialisation of political power and explored the possibility of political power gradually being further transferred to deterritorialised organisational structures, similar to the embryonic forms seen in contemporary social movements and organisations such as *Greenpeace*. These organisational structures point in the direction of anarchy. In an anarchical polity the basic units of political identity would revolve around affinity rather than territory. While there would be some associations based on territory, this would not necessarily be the primary focus of identity. There would be no monopoly of coercion at the territorial or any other level. A great deal more political power would be normative and persuasive than is the case today. Political interaction would hopefully take the form take of noncoercive communication and negotiation between a multitude of clashing micropowers and diverse rationalities in agonic equilibrium. It is the articulation of these anarchistic forms, I believe, which best complements "the global perspectives, the mathematical and scientific literacy, the transdisciplinary horizons needed for an adequate engagement with the world now emerging" (Hudson, p. 157). In the anarchist tradition this ideal is to be approximated but will probably

never be integrally realised. It could be construed as an exemplary fiction in a manner similar to Habermas's free speech situation. Consensus can be a goal as long as it is recognised to be a contingent, ever-changing approximation of the truth. This anarchical vision was to some extent anticipated by Godwin, although he envisaged anarchical society as power free. Radical democracy presupposes a transparent economy but it need not presuppose a totally transparent polity. A free speech situation should leave refuge for autism. There must be private spaces to hide from public surveillance if one so wishes. Anarchical democracy must be voluntary, not totalistic.

The future growth of industrial societies will be in the domain of knowledge-intensive service industries, based on microtechnology and telecommunications. This will make possible increased individual freedom, but at the cost of a more fragmented society. The post-industrial person may work on a small scale (the "electronic cottage for example"), thus spelling the end of the traditional union movement as we know it. Anarchical interaction is an appropriate political response to these decentralising tendencies. Neo-tribal and neo-nomadic proclivities counter the atomism of modernist culture. A shrinking integrated world economy and a dramatically reduced time-space distanciation between people could lead to a global network of public spheres composed of highly selective, intimate and competitive clans. Since they would be transversal and highly cosmopolitan, they would avoid the danger of narrow parochialism.

The perspective advanced here rejects any notion of human nature. It also rejects a unitary conception of the individual or community. Each individual has a diversity of subject-positions and we all identify with a plurality of overlapping communities. An anarchist planet would be composed of a multi-layered, criss-crossed web of social groupings, some local, others regional or international. Rather than seeing themselves as belonging to a single total society at any level, people would identify with a diversity of overlapping, specialised partial communities, operating in an open network of relations. The lack of total identification with any single body could be offset by a rich diversity of partial communities and partial loyalties detached from spatial confines. This would make possible the dispersal of power in the most highly complex societies. Based on function rather than locality, these communities could tackle problems that arise in modern technological societies in a much more flexible manner than could the state. The larger the membership of these bodies, the better. As Green puts it (p. 223):

> Madison was surely right to argue that the larger the scope of a polity, the more diverse and more balanced will be the interests contained within it; the smaller the scope, the greater the potential for tyranny.

In an anarchist world, political identity would encompass more than the neighbourhood or the workplace or the nation. Each individual would share the common ends of the communities to which he or she belonged. It is unlikely, however that any two individuals would be involved in the same permutation of partial communities. This rules out any unitary notion of the good; it would vary across communities.

Presently our daily relationships already resemble this conception of community. Most individuals identify with diverse overlapping communities in different localities with no exact boundaries concerning geography or membership. Even the sense of political community cannot be fully realized in any single unitary body. This is why anarchists are federalists, not just with regard to territory, but also with regard to function. Global anarchy would consist of a multitude of stateless powers. An anarchist world would be composed of a matrix of transversal blocs which would transform our understanding of political space.

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