GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD THE FORTIFICATIONS IN CANADA DURING THE FRENCH REGIME

Adrian M. Nunes
Department of History

Master of Arts
April, 1970.

ABSTRACT

Prior to the War of the League of Augsburg the French government had no policy towards Canada's fortifications. The early works of defence were meant to withstand the Indian-type of warfare practiced by the Iroquois, the colony's main threat during the seventeenth century. After 1689, the British gradually replaced the Indians as Canada's main enemy. This new foe was accustomed to European-type of warfare, a sophisticated mode of fighting. Consequently, the French had to erect fortifications capable of resisting an attack carried out along these lines. As a result, the policy toward the fortifications consisted of providing adequate defences against two types of warfare. The French concentrated their efforts in that area of the colony which they thought would be faced with attack by a force using European-type warfare. By 1756, poor planning and engineering had resulted in inadequate fortifications. Afterwards it was too late to change the situation.

FORTIFICATIONS IN CANADA DURING THE FRENCH REGIME

GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD THE FORTIFICATIONS IN CANADA DURING THE FRENCH REGIME

by

Adrian M. Nunes

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

McGill University. April 1970.

INTRODUCTION

To date, historians dealing with Canada during the French Régime have failed to provide a comprehensive study of governmental policy toward the fortifications. What studies present an analysis of policy can be classified in two groups. In the first, one finds authors whose prime concern is with problems other than those related to the fortifications. For example, W. J. Eccles in Frontenac: the Courtier Governor, The Carleton Library, XXIV (Toronto, 1959), is not concerned with the works of defence per se, but in presenting the career of Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac as governor of New France. Furthermore, because of the biographical nature of this work, any analysis of the fortifications cease with Frontenac's death in 1698. Although George F. G. Stanley in New France: the Last Phase, 1744-1760, The Canadian Centenary Series (Toronto, 1968), presents a military account of Canada's last years under French dominion, he limits his analysis of the fortifications to just a few, mainly those in the Lake Champlain area.

Only rarely reference is made to those at Quebec and Montreal. By far the best treatment of any work of defence is found in C. P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: the Siege and the Battle (Toronto, 1959). In chapter two, the author briefly reviews the history of Quebec's walls. Once again, however, the interpretation is limited by the fact that Stacey is concerned with a different question, namely, the siege and capture of Quebec by the English in 1759.

In the second category, one finds works which deal only with governmental policy toward a specific area. These studies are of an editorial nature. In Royal Fort Frontenac, Champlain Society Publications, Ontario Series, II (Toronto, 1958), Richard A. Preston translated and Leopold Lamontagne edited some documents pertaining to the fort and preceded them with a brief outline of its history. Although Pierre-Georges Roy in Hommes et Choses du Fort Saint-Frédéric (Montreal, 1946), does not claim to be an editor, his work closely resembles that of one. He presents the founding and development of French settlements in the area of the fort. The author gives very little analysis of the policy which determined the construction, type of fortification and strengthening of this work of defence

after its erection. Roy included in his work many excerpts from the correspondence between colonial officials and the home authorities regarding the fort. However, these excerpts are poorly footnoted. Consequently, the scholar is not given the reassurance he is entitled to expect.

The most important part of New France during the French Régime was the Saint Lawrence River Valley and henceforth in this thesis the name Canada will be synonymous with this region. The writer has chosen to limit the geographical area under consideration to the above region because of its military importance. During hostilities, settlements in other areas were dependent on the Saint Lawrence River Valley for their supplies. With or without these settlements, Canada could be maintained. For example, the French posts around Hudson Bay and on Newfoundland were ceded to England by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. This action, however, did not affect French control of Canada.

Louisbourg was omitted from this study, for it could have been useful in the defence of Canada only in so far as the French could have maintained a powerful naval squadron there. Without these ships to dispute passage to an enemy force bound for the Gulf of Saint

Lawrence, the fortress was useless. The enemy could have just sailed past without being hindered. Unfortunately for the French, they were never able to station there the necessary squadron.

Throughout the French Régime, Canada was open to a sea invasion. An enemy force could enter the Saint Lawrence River through the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and then ascend the river until the Quebec region.[1] On the other hand, Canada could not be as easily invaded from the south. To the south of the Saint Lawrence River, nature had provided a natural defence in the form of the Appalachian chain of mountains extending from Gaspé to the Alleghanies, following the line of the Notre Dame mountains, the Green and White Mountains, the Adirondacks and the Catskills.

These natural defences were not impregnable since a number of gaps existed in the mountain ranges. The most prominent among these was the Richelieu River-Lake Champlain route to the Hudson River. Save for three portages one could travel by water all the way from Montreal to New York. From Montreal one went down river to Sorel. One then ascended the Richelieu to the foot of the Chambly rapids, where a short portage brought

---

[1]See map in manila envelope.

one to clear water at Saint-Jean. The route from there led down the 120 mile stretch of Lake Champlain to the outlet of Lake George. Here a portage was necessary to enter the lake, from whose southern end one could reach the Hudson River by means of a twelve mile portage.

Another important route of invasion was the Mohawk River-Oswego River route. Flowing west to east, the Mohawk River provided access by way of a short portage to the headwaters of the Oswego River to Lake Ontario. By following the shore-line of the lake, an enemy force arrived at the entrance of the Saint Lawrence River. From there, the enemy could either descend the river to Montreal or by crossing the river's narrow entrance reach the Cataracoui River and Bay of Quinte. From there the attacking force could take the water trails leading to the Rideau River and thence to the Ottawa River which descended to the Saint Lawrence in the Montreal region.

There were other possible routes of invasion. One of these was from the headwaters of the Connecticut River through Lake Megantic and the Chaudière River to Quebec. Although Benedict Arnold used this route in the War of the American Revolution, this route was useless for any extensive military movement because of the

difficult terrain. Another such possible but improbable route was the Lake Memphremagog-Lake Magog-St. Francis River route. It was so difficult that even the Indians seldom used it, although Major Robert Rogers did in 1759.[2]

Although Canada was generally well situated for military defence, one major flaw, however, was to cause every French commander nightmares. This was the fear of a two pronged attack via the Champlain-Richelieu and Gulf of St. Lawrence routes. Hence the majority of the fortifications constructed during the French Régime were centered along these two possible routes of invasion.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the governmental policy towards the fortifications in Canada during the period 1685-1756. The French government first began to concern itself with the colony's fortifications in 1685 when it realized the growing threat the English represented to Canada. Prior to this time the colony had only one enemy to contend with -- the Iroquois. Against the type of warfare practiced by the Indians, a relatively simple work of defence was

---

[2]Donald Fraser McOuat, "Military Policy and Organization in New France" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1948), pp. 2-3.

sufficient to ensure the defenders' safety. The War of the League of Augsburg introduced a new enemy and the threat of a new type of warfare. Gradually the British became Canada's main enemy. To properly defend the strategic areas against such a foe required the use of a more elaborate type of fortification to cope with his more sophisticated warfare. Until the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, the French policy was faced with the dilemma of providing adequate works of defence against two types of warfare and of trying to guess with which the strategic areas of the colony would be faced. The analysis ceases at 1756, after which year the great strain on French finances and human resources, created by the Seven Years' War, prevented any alterations in the colony's fortifications to enable them to withstand the type of attack to which they would be faced.

It is my pleasure to thank the following people for their help, which enabled the completion of this thesis: Miss Rose Shoore, for her valuable aid in the preparation of the illustrations; Mrs. Tony Deutsch and Miss Corry Klugkist, for their valuable comments and suggestions regarding the manuscript; and the staffs of the McLellan Library and the Public Archives of Canada. The writer would especially like

to thank M. Jean-Marie LeBlanc of the Pre-Confederation Section and Messrs. Curtney C. Bond and Lawrence Earl of the Map Division of the Public Archives of Canada for their aid in locating some documents, maps and plans.

I am, of course, deeply indebted to my director of studies, Professor Pierre H. Boulle for giving so generously of his time and learned advice, which has spared me numerous errors of omission and commission. Needless to say, I accept full responsibility for any errors which still exist. Above all, I wish to thank my parents for their encouragement and understanding.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAPS AND PLANS: INSIDE MANILA ENVELOPE ON INSIDE OF BACK COVER

MAP OF SAINT LAWRENCE RIVER VALLEY

PLAN NO. 1: FORTIFICATIONS OF QUEBEC (1690)

PLAN NO. 2: BEAUCOURT'S PLAN (1693)

PLAN NO. 3: LEVASSEUR'S PLAN (1700)

PLAN NO. 4: CHAUSSEGROS' PLAN FOR FORTIFYING QUEBEC (1718)

PLAN NO. 5: CHAUSSEGROS' PLAN FOR FORTIFYING MONTREAL (1717)

PLAN NO. 6: PLAN OF PROPOSED REDOUBT AT CROWN POINT (1731)

PLAN NO. 7: PLAN OF PROPOSED STONE FORT AT CROWN POINT (1733)

PLAN NO. 8: PLAN OF FORT SAINT-FREDERIC (1735)

ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Archives des Colonies
AE	Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
AG	Archives de la Guerre
AM	Archives de la Marine
APQ	Archives de la Province de Québec
BRH	Bulletin des Recherches Historiques
CHA	Canadian Historical Association
CHR	Canadian Historical Review
DFC	Dépôt des fortifications des colonies
NYCD	Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York
PAC	Public Archives of Canada
RAPQ	Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec
RHAF	Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique Française

CHAPTER I

WARFARE AND FORTIFICATIONS PRIOR TO 1690

The first construction in Canada with the sole purpose of defence was at Quebec. It was the product of Samuel de Champlain's ideas, and consequently reflected his fears and prejudices. Throughout his stay in New France, he had underestimated the Iroquois threat to the colony, claiming as late as 1634 that 150 soldiers could easily defeat them. On the other hand, he constantly feared an English or Dutch attack. The English threat materialized in 1629 with the attack and capture of Quebec by the Kirke brothers.[1]

What were the fortifications of Quebec during Champlain's lifetime? In 1620 he built Fort Saint-Louis, a simple wooden palisade situated on the cliff of Quebec. Upon his return from France in 1626, however, Champlain felt that this fort was too weak. Work was begun on a new one. Because of the natural

---

[1]Allana Gertrude Reid, "The Importance of the Town of Quebec, 1608-1703"(Unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1945), p. 34.

strength of the site, neither the location, nor the materials used, fascines, earth, turf and wood were changed. Only the architecture was more elaborate. Champlain, however, considered this structure to be only temporary. He wanted it covered with stones, which he claimed could be easily obtained in the neighbourhood.[2]

After Champlain's death, Charles Huault de Montmagny became the governor of the colony. Upon his arrival at Quebec, he proceeded to follow Champlain's designs for Fort Saint-Louis. The fort was covered with masonry, and the battery established in the Lower Town by his predecessor was strengthened. The work was completed in 1648 when a corps de logis was added. The fort then became known as the Chateau Saint-Louis.[3]

Thereafter, until the advent of royal government in 1663, no other purely military construction was done at Quebec. In case of danger, only temporary measures for defence were taken. These

---

[2]H. P. Biggar, gen. ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain (6 vols.; Toronto, 1922-1936), V, 205.

[3]Ernest Gagnon, Le fort et le chateau Saint-Louis (Montreal, 1912), p. 26; Pierre-Georges Roy, La ville de Québec sous le Régime Français (2 vols.; Quebec, 1930), I, 149-50.

consisted in strengthening local religious buildings by endowing them with embrasures, and in some cases, with a few small cannons, as in the case of the Jesuit Residence in 1653[4] and the Ursuline convent in 1660.[5]

Not only was there a lack of new permanent military works, but those already constructed were allowed to fall into disrepair. This point is accentuated by a report drawn up by Simon de Denis in 1660 regarding the condition of the Chateau Saint-Louis.[6] The parapets on the platform above the main gate as well as the guardhouse were in ruin; the grand bastion on the western side was in such a delapidated state that it had to be demolished and replaced by a new wall in the middle of which stood a square tower; the rampart from the above-mentioned bastion to the guardhouse situated on the northeast side was completely ruined from within; and the wooden stairs used for mounting to the rampart were rotten.

---

[4]McOuat, "Military Policy", p. 25.

[5]"Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, 25 juin 1660", Pierre François Richaudeau ed., Lettres de la Révérende Mère Marie de l'Incarnation (née Marie Guyard) Première Supérieure du Monastère des Ursulines de Québec (2 vols.; Tournai, Paris, Leipzig, 1876), II, 150.

[6]Quebec, September 30, 1660, APQ, Manuscripts relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France, Series 2, Vol. I, 475.

The poor condition of Quebec's works of defence could be attributed to the fact that the Company of One Hundred Associates, which governed New France during the period 1627-1663, was interested only in exploiting the fur trade and the fisheries. Since expenses, which might have diminished the profits, were frowned upon, little investment was made in colonization and the construction of fortifications. Moreover, Company officials at Quebec had been lulled into a sense of security by the fact that since its restitution to France in 1632, Quebec was spared any attacks. The French had established other settlements in the Saint Lawrence River Valley, such as at Three Rivers and Montreal which bore the brunt of the Indian attacks.

The Quebec fur merchants depended upon the yearly fur convoys of their Indian allies, the Hurons and Algonquins. It was therefore imperative to assure them a safe passage. The Iroquois would wait in the Lake St. Peter region, which could be reached by the Richelieu River, and ambush the convoys. The Algonquins felt that a fort in that area would protect them from such attacks. Champlain, agreeing with the request, ordered the construction of a small fort and

trading post at Three Rivers.[7]

This fort, situated on the site of an old Algonquin fort which had been destroyed by the Iroquois, was completed by the end of 1634. It consisted of wooden stakes firmly planted in the ground and was mounted with a few cannons.[8] Two years later the fort was enlarged with the addition of a store, two barracks and a platform, all of which were surrounded by a wooden palisade.[9]

In spite of Three Rivers the Iroquois attacks did not abate. Hence, for the first time the French decided to defend the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route, the enemy's main avenue of invasion. This was done in 1642 when Fort Richelieu was erected at the mouth of the Richelieu River. The fort consisted of a simple wooden palisade garrisoned by a small number of men and dependent on Quebec and Three Rivers for all its supplies. This was the fort's great weakness, for with the small manpower available in New France at the

---

[7]Benjamin Sulte, Histoire de la Ville des Trois-Rivières et de ses Environs (Montreal, 1870), p. 60.

[8]Ibid., p. 62.

[9]Abbé Etienne Michel Faillon, Histoire de la Colonie Française en Canada (3 vols.; Villemarie [Montreal], 1865-66), I, 296.

time, it was very hard to properly supply the fort or for its garrison to control anything beyond the immediate countryside. The Iroquois had no problem in by-passing it, thus rendering the fort useless. As a result, in 1645 it was abandoned and burned one year later by the Iroquois.

New France did not appeal only to merchants eager to sell French goods, but also to missionaries seeking Indian converts. In 1642 such a group of Frenchmen founded a small settlement on the island of Montreal, which they named Villemarie. Originally established as a bastion of the faith, Villemarie was soon forced by its geographical position to become the military bastion of New France against the Iroquois.

The question of fortification at Villemarie is an interesting one. For the first eleven years the inhabitants were confined to the limits of their fort. As originally constructed in 1643, it consisted of a wooden palisade surrounded by a moat. This was only a temporary measure, for with the arrival of Louis d'Ailleboust de Coulogne et d'Argentenay in the latter half of 1643, Villemarie gained a trained European soldier who also happened to have had some notion of engineering. He proceeded to draw the plans for a new

stone fort. When finished it was rectangular in shape with a bastion at each of the corners.[10]

Alongside the fort, there was another fortification which was typical of seventeenth-century New France. It consisted of a circular stone windmill with loopholes and machiculation, known as le moulin du fort.[11] Throughout the seventeenth century in New France, windmills served a dual function. Besides their normal purpose they were always built with an eye for defence.

Although well constructed, the fort was poorly situated. It was too close to the water's edge and hence suffered greatly from ice and floods. This implied frequent and costly repairs. Nonetheless, for the first eleven years, it was sufficient protection for the inhabitants. In order to work the land, the men always marched in armed groups to and from the fields, which were partially protected by redoubts.[12]

---

[10] A. Leblond de Brumath, Histoire Populaire de Montréal Depuis son Origine jusqu'à nos Jours (Montreal, 1890), pp. 21-22.

[11] Ibid., p. 46.

[12] Ralph Flenley, ed. and trans., A History of Montreal 1640-1672 from the French of Dollier de Casson, with a life of the author (London, Toronto, New York, 1928), p. 130.

The fact that the settlement was confined for such a long period of time within the walls of the fort, and the necessity of such organization for the simple tilling of the soil, is ample testimony of the Iroquois menace. This threat increased after the fall of Huronia in 1650, for then Villemarie became the westernmost outpost of the colony.[13]

Peace was attained between the French and the Five Nations in 1655. Even though the respite was only temporary, the settlers at Villemarie were freed from the fear of attack for a while. Thus began an era of expansion on the island of Montreal. The settlers began building houses for themselves outside the fort. They did not move into these new dwellings until they were completed. Between 1654-59 forty houses were constructed.[14] The idea of defence was never lost, since they were sturdily built out of wood, with strong doors and loopholed outer walls.[15] The houses were erected in parallel rows facing each other, so that in the event of an attack they could give supporting fire.

---

[13]George F. G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954: The Military History of an Unmilitary People (Toronto, 1954), p. 10.

[14]Faillon, Histoire, II, 239.

[15]Ibid., p. 192.

All new buildings, regardless of their primary purpose were erected in such a way as to serve as a fort in case of danger.[16]

By 1663 Villemarie was protected by a system of forts, fortified dwellings, redoubts as well as the original fort, Fort Sainte-Marie. The military value of this fort was rapidly diminishing, since with the expansion of the settlement, repairs on its walls were stopped. By 1675 it had deteriorated so far that it was demolished by the inhabitants themselves, seeking to use its stones and wood for the construction of the Notre Dame Church.[17]

Prior to 1663, it seems that French military policy was concerned largely with self-preservation. Under Company rule New France had neither the financial ability nor the manpower to do anything but remain on the defensive. The works of defence undertaken during that time were of good quality but of insufficient number to deter Indian incursions. An anonymous memoir, dated 1663, seems to substantiate this view. To remedy the situation, it suggests the building of a small fort or a well-stockaded redoubt

---

[16]McOuat, "Military Policy", p. 181.

[17]Faillon, Histoire, III, 381.

on the bank of the river facing Quebec. It next advises the construction, twelve leagues below Quebec, of two more forts equipped with cannon. At Three Rivers only a fort on the opposite side of the town was required. At Lake St. Peter another two forts should be constructed, one at the mouth of the Nicolet River, the other on the opposite shore. Both forts should be provided with artillery and built more strongly than the rest, although no regular, that is, European type of fortification would be required. The side facing the water should be in the form of bastions, the rest simple redoubts. Fort Richelieu should be reconstructed and furnished with artillery. The memoir concludes that Montreal had enough redoubts, but that they should be strengthened and better garrisoned.[18]

With the advent of royal government in New France, the colony was given the means to finally take the offensive against its old enemy, the Iroquois. These means took the form of increased immigration of settlers and the sending of the infantry regiment Carignan-Salières. In order to take the offensive, these troops were sorely needed since the habitant could

---

[18]"Mémoire de ce qui seroit à faire pour se fortifier contre les insultes des Iroquois en Canada", 1663, PAC, AC, Series C11A, II, ff. 46-47.

not cultivate the land and fight the Iroquois at the same time.

The regiment arrived in 1665 and was immediately employed in strengthening the colony against further attacks. Alexandre de Pourville, Marquis de Tracy, due to his position as lieutenant-general, was responsible for directing the French strategy. He was an experienced European soldier who had learned his trade during the Thirty Years War. He brought with him to the New World his ideas which he tried as best he could to enforce. By European rules of war, an attacking force could not allow its opponent to maintain a fortified position that could threaten its system of supply. This was the principle behind the French fortifications in Flanders. These were fortifications in depth, which forced an enemy to expose his system of supply to counter attacks. Tracy attempted to establish this system in the colony.

In order to stop the Iroquois incursions, it was imperative for the French to control the Champlain-Richelieu water route. Hence the very year of the regiment's arrival, a fort was constructed at the mouth of the Richelieu River near where the old Fort Richelieu had stood. Another three forts were erected within the

same year and a fourth in the following year. The first of this series, Saint-Louis, later renamed Chambly, was constructed at the foot of the Chambly rapids; the second, Fort Sainte-Thérèse, was erected opposite the island of the same name; the third, Saint-Jean, was situated near the head of the Saint-Jean rapids; and the fourth, Sainte-Anne was near the outlet of Lake Champlain.[19]

It is interesting to note that all five forts were simple structures whose main feature was a palisade of tree trunks. Bastions of various shapes jutted out from the main wall in order to provide flanking fire, while around the interior of the palisade ran a firing platform providing access to the loopholes.[20] The constructions were of wood, for this material, unlike stone, was abundant in the region. Furthermore, a wooden fortification was considered to be sufficient against the Iroquois.

---

[19]Benjamin Sulte, Le Régiment de Carignan, ed. by Gerard Malchelose (Montreal, 1922), pp. 31, 35-36. A sketched plan of these forts can be found in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791: The Original French Latin and Italian Texts, with English Translations and Notes (73 vols.; Cleveland, 1896-1901), XLIX, 266; and in Faillon, Histoire, III, 124.

[20]McOuat, "Military Policy", p. 38.

Tracy's strategy was better in theory than in practice, for the Iroquois had no notion of European warfare and had never been faced with the problems of logistics. He could portage around these forts although the journey became more difficult. Moreover, the problem of supplying these forts was enormous. Since the French, as yet, were not expert woodsmen, a journey by canoe from Three Rivers to the Chambly rapids, or further to the outlet of Lake Champlain, was a hazardous expedition even in time of peace. These forts suffered from the same shortcomings as the first Fort Richelieu. Tracy seems to have learned his lesson rather quickly, for in 1667 he advocated the abandonment of forts Saint-Jean and Sainte-Anne, on the grounds that it was almost impossible to properly supply these advanced bases.[21]

While in the colony, the regiment made three thrusts against the Mohawks. However, these campaigns failed to bring about a decisive engagement, and therefore the enemy's power remained undiminished. Although the Iroquois agreed to peace terms, the final encounter was only postponed.

During Tracy's stay in Canada, the French had

---

[21] "Mémoire sur le Canada", 1667, PAC, AC, Series C11A, II, f. 327.

concentrated their efforts in closing the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route of invasion, however, nothing had been done to prevent the Iroquois from using a western approach. As pointed out in the Introduction, an enemy could invade Canada by way of the Mohawk River-Oswego River route to Lake Ontario. In 1673, under the guidance of Governor Frontenac, the French attempted to block the western route of invasion, by erecting Fort Frontenac at the mouth of the Catarcoui River. Once again, although in theory the strategy involved was sound, in practice it left much to be desired. Fort Frontenac was an advanced post of the colony, depending for its supplies on Montreal 120 miles distant. Even in peace-time the problems of logistics were considerable. The fort could be supplied by either the Ottawa River-Rideau River-Cataracoui River route or the Saint Lawrence River. Both of these routes, however, were very difficult because of the numerous portages involved. In time of war, it became almost impossible to supply the fort. Since the Iroquois could set up ambushes along the supply route, only large forces could ensure the safety of each relief column. New France did not have enough manpower to afford such demands, hence the garrison was

dependent on the Iroquois' good will and in case of war would be prisoner within its own fort.[22] This is exactly the situation that arose in 1689, when the Iroquois' aim was to cut the French main lines of communication. Then the fort had to be abandoned.[23]

However, more than just military strategy was involved in the construction of Fort Frontenac. The fur trade was the wealth of the colony. With the rising competition it became necessary, instead of waiting for the Indians to bring in their furs, to go to the Indians and find new sources of supply. From a commercial point of view, the fort was well situated to trade with the Iroquois on the south shore of Lake Ontario, while at the same time it could serve as a base for further commercial expeditions to the West.

The fort, as erected by Frontenac, was constructed of wooden stakes. When in 1675 René-Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle was given command of Fort Frontenac, he began preparations for its strengthening. His plan provided for three of the four sides to be of stone. By 1684 this project does not seem to have been completed, for the governor of New France,

---

[22]W. J. Eccles, Canada under Louis XI., 1663-1701, The Canadian Centenial Series (Toronto, 1964), p. 82.

[23]Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 50.

Le Febvre de La Barre estimated the cost of completing the work at 10,000 livres,[24] and a plan of the place, dated 1685, shows only one side to be of stone.[25]

While the French were establishing themselves at the head of the St. Lawrence River, they were also extending their claims on the island of Montreal. With the peace brought about by the advent of royal government, the inhabitants of Villemarie spread out over in the Montreal area. Tracts of land along the St. Lawrence were given to any who requested them. Whereas, land in the interior of the island or west of it was given only to those who had proven themselves to be good soldiers and on the express condition that they construct on their land a fortified house that could act as a fort, should the need arise.[26] Usually such land was given to a group of persons rather than to individuals.[27] Thus, during the period 1662-1683 a number of small forts was constructed. All but two were built of wood.[28] Nonetheless, the town of Montreal

---

[24]Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 44.

[25]Faillon, Histoire, III, 467.

[26]Ibid., 337-38.

[27]Ibid., 227-28.

[28]Leblond de Brumath, Histoire Populaire de Montréal, p. 157.

was still open, for an enemy, such as the Iroquois, could by-pass these isolated forts.[29] They were too far apart to be able, in case of danger, to support each other. The massacre of Lachine in 1689, was to make this point very obvious. The governor of Montreal, Louis-Hector, Chevalier de Callières, was aware of this problem and suggested to the Minister of Marine, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Seignelay, the erection of a palisade that would enclose Montreal, while redoubts were to be built in threatened areas.[30]

In 1685 work on the palisade was begun. The inhabitants were asked to bring in, at their own expense, large stakes of cedar, which were then placed in position at the government's expense.[31] When finished in 1688, the palisade comprised a number of bastions, five gates and as many posterns.[32] In the seigneuries within his jurisdiction, Callières ordered

---

[29]Denonville to the Minister, Quebec, May 8, 1686, PAC, AC, Series C11A, VIII, f. 9; Denonville to the Minister, Quebec, November 16, 1686, ibid., f. 169v.

[30]"Mémoire pour Monseigneur le Marquis de Seignelay", October 20, 1685, ibid., VII, f. 125.

[31]Alfred Sandham, Montreal and its Fortifications (Montreal, 1874), p. 10; E. R. Adair, "The Evolution of Montreal under the French Régime", CHA Report, 1942, p. 35.

[32]Leblond de Brumath, Histoire Populaire de Montréal, p. 165.

the construction of redoubts with wooden palisades.[33]

While this work was being carried out at Montreal, very little, if anything, was being done at the other two centres of the colony. A plan of Three Rivers, dated 1685, shows that no new fortifications had been added since 1664, when the town was defended by a wooden palisade and a windmill connected to the palisade by a platform on which some cannons were mounted.[34] At Quebec things had reached the point where the town's only serious work of defence, the Chateau Saint-Louis, was falling into ruins. In 1681 Frontenac complained that the walls were crumbling and due to a lack of doors, anyone could enter whenever they pleased.[35] In 1682 La Barre had the same complaints. He did no repairs because of the prohibitive cost of skilled labour in the colony. His appeal for financial help and skilled workers from France fell on deaf ears.[36] This problem was to re-occur continually during the French era.

---

[33]"Mémoire du Chevalier de Callières gouverneur de lisle de Montréal à Monseigneur le Marquis de Seignelay", 1688, PAC, AC, Series C11A, X, ff. 148.

[34]PAC, Map Division, DFC, Plan No. 459.

[35]Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, November 2, 1681; PAC, AC, Series C11A, V, f. 272v.

[36]La Barre to Seignelay, 1682; ibid., VI, f. 62.

This was the condition of the colony's fortifications on the eve of the War of the League of Augsburg. The historian is struck by the lack of European fortification techniques. Some simple works such as bastions, ditches and half-bastions existed in Canada, but there was a lack of any finer points. How can we account for this? The location of a fortification is determined by geographical necessity and its form of construction by the type of warfare waged. The criterion for an efficient fortification is whether it successfully defends its occupants from attack, hence it has to be geared to the enemy's mode of warfare. In order to understand the type of fortification used in seventeenth-century Canada, we must therefore look at the type of warfare waged during that period.

With the exception of the works of George F. G. Stanley and Donald Fraser McOuat already cited, most accounts of warfare in North America during the seventeenth century spend considerable time describing the fate of prisoners of war but little in analyzing the warfare. At best they describe the native as a skulker, expert in surprise and ambush, who in small numbers waited to surprise the unwary settler. Although this might apply generally to the North

American Indian's tactics after the establishment of permanent European settlements, it would be interesting to learn the type of warfare practiced in North America at the beginning of the seventeenth century and follow its evolution.

Since the Indian had no tradition of written records, we have to rely on the writings of early explorers for what little knowledge we possess on this subject. Champlain, one of the most helpful to historians, left many descriptions. His skirmishes with the Iroquois in 1608, 1610 and 1615, were atypical of later military engagements. Their interest lies in the reactions of these opponents to strange and unfamiliar modes of fighting.

On July 29, 1608, the first encounter between the French and Indians took place.[37] The historian is struck by the formality which was soon to disappear. Meeting the Iroquois near a promontory on Lake Champlain as twilight was approaching, it was decided by mutual consent to postpone the battle until sunrise. While Champlain's Indian allies stayed in their canoes which they had lashed together and kept on the lake, the Iroquois, as was their custom, erected a fortified

---

[37]Biggar, Works, II, 95.

camp. Next morning, the two forces advanced toward one another, with a gravity and calm which amazed Champlain. What is important to note here, is the absence of ambush or hit and run tactics by the Indians for which they later became famous.

The following two skirmishes took place when the Iroquois attempted a stubborn defence of their fortifications in the face of the Franco-Indian force of Champlain. These fortifications were strongly constructed and earned Champlain's praise.[38] However, in the last encounter, largely due to the Indian's nature the French explorer was defeated. An Indian admired only force and endurance, and believed death was the logical fate of the vanquished. A prisoner was usually taken only to be tortured to death. This explains why the Indian fought to the death, preferring to die in battle rather than at the stake. The Indian could grasp the essence of a good plan, he could follow a forceful leader, but he was unable to follow a previously co-ordinated plan with unswerving obedience.[39] Champlain portrayed him as being

---

[38]Biggar, Works, II, 128; III, 70. For a good discussion of Indian fortifications, see Aristide Beaugrand-Champagne, "La Strategie, la Tactique et l'Armement des Anciens Iroquois", Les Cahiers des Dix, X (1945), 25-29.

[39]McOuat, "Military Policy", p. 10.

individualistic, easily discouraged and fickle-minded:

> Mais il faut les excuser, car ce ne sont pas gens de guerre, & d'ailleurs qu'ils ne veulent point de discipline, n'y de correction, & ne fontque ce qui leur semble bon.[40]

In making this comment, Champlain was using European warfare as his criterion. This warfare was an exacting science requiring great discipline by all ranks. In North America, the utilization of Indian allies made it impossible to maintain the same criteria. To an Indian, campaigning was strictly voluntary. He could go on a war party, fight and retreat whenever he wanted to, without accounting for his actions to anyone.

If this was the type of warfare practiced at the turn of the seventeenth century, how can we account for its change? It is reasonable to suppose that the coming of the White man, with his superior weaponry and discipline, forced the Indian to change his tactics. Instead of standing in the open and getting shot down, the Indian chose to use guerrila tactics. This changeover was facilitated by his ability to live off the land, his expert woodmanship, individualistic character and weaponry. The Indian's main weapon was his tomahawk, which was light enough to be carried anywhere and strong enough to enable its owner

---

[40]Biggar, Works, III, 70.

to crack an enemy's skull with a single blow. After 1624 the Iroquois was able to buy muskets from the Dutch at Albany. This new weapon gave the Iroquois an added advantage for his ambushes. To be accurate with a bow and arrow, he would have to approach an enemy very closely, whereas with firearms he had a greater range, which added to the element of surprise. Although the Indian was able to adapt himself quickly to the use of the musket, he always retained his fear of artillery. In the vast American wilderness the successful soldier had to fight nature as well as man. This truism was understood by the Indian. Hence one can assume that even if he could have equipped himself with cannons, he would not have used them since they were hardly adaptable to his type of warfare.

The Indian's use of guerrila tactics and his inability to adapt himself to artillery, determined the mode of construction of French forts during the seventeenth century. Not having to fear a European type of siege except at Quebec, French forts were usually built out of wood and equipped with some cannons, the latter being excellent deterrents against an all-out attack on the given post.

The seventeenth century was one long war,

interrupted by truces, between the Iroquois and the French. It was marked by a series of raids and counter raids. Much bloodshed occurred without any conclusive result, since the Iroquois had failed to drive the French into the Atlantic Ocean, and the French had failed to decisively defeat their enemy. The Iroquois attack in 1689 upon Lachine began another phase of this century-long war. When news of the Glorious Revolution and the war between France and England in Europe reached the English colonies, the English encouraged the Iroquois to make an all-out attack upon New France. In previous wars the Iroquois had fought alone, but now they had the assurance of active English help. War with the English colonies represented a new threat to New France, that is, the possibility of active intervention by England. In the event of a British enterprise, regular troops and the necessary artillery would be used. Since the French fortifications in Canada in 1689 could not have withstood a determined attack utilizing artillery, they would have to be strengthened.

CHAPTER II

THE BIRTH OF A SET POLICY OF FORTIFICATION

Although open hostilities between the English colonies and New France did not break out until 1689, enmity already existed. The French were sure that the English had for quite some time instigated the Iroquois against them. Since the establishment of the Hudson Bay Company in 1670, rivalry in the fur trade had accentuated the English threat. The French had come up with various plans to dispose of this threat. In 1679 the Intendant Jacques Duchesneau suggested the conquest of the English colony of New York by means of a combined sea and land assault. Two years later he modified his plan to urge the purchase of the colony.[1] In 1685 Governor Jacques-René de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville pointed out to Seignelay, the growing English threat:

> . . . Nous avons parlé de l'ennemy déclaré de la colonie (les Iroquois) les moyens de s'en pouvoir defaire. Il est bon de voir sy l'Anglois n'est pas aussy et mesme plus à

---

[1]Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 35.

> craindre à l'advenir, et sy nous ne devons pas prendre autant de soing de nous guarantir. . . .[2]

In 1687 Callières stressed the need for the conquest of New York and suggested a plan of campaign. This plan was accepted in 1689 after having been modified. It called for a French naval force to blockade and bombard New York city, while a force from Canada would attack it by land. The plan, however, never got off the ground.[3]

The cries of alarm raised by these colonial officials, arose in Seignelay concern for the colony's fortifications. Until 1685, the French government had left the construction of works of defence up to various individuals in the colony, irrespective of their engineering skill. However, the Minister now considered it time to send an engineer from France to help strengthen the colony's fortifications. Sébastien Leprestre, Marquis de Vauban, the chief French engineer of that period, was approached by Seignelay and asked to nominate an engineer for service in the

---

[2]"Memoire sur le Canada, par Monsieur De Denonville", Quebec, November 12, 1685, Collection de Manuscrits Lettres, Mémoires, et autres Documents Historiques Relatifs à la Nouvelle-France Recueillis aux Archives de la Province de Québec, ou Copiés à l'Etranger (4 vols.; Quebec, 1883-1885), I, 348-49.

[3]Eccles, Frontenac, pp. 201-202.

colony.[4] Vauban suggested Robert de Villeneuve. The choice was not due to merit, but to the fact that Vauban could not spare one of the regular engineers.[5] Seignelay must have decided that Villeneuve was better than no engineer at all, and consequently approved the nomination.[6] Thus Villeneuve became the first official engineer in Canada.

He arrived in New France in 1686 and quickly proved to everyone his lack of ability. Governor Denonville, disgusted with his new engineer, made the following comment:

> . . . très bon et très fidel dessineur mais pour le reste il n'a pas l'esprit assez arrangé et l'a trop court pour pouvoir donner aucune veues pour l'establissement d'un poste et pour en avoir la conduite de son chef.[7]

Villeneuve remained for two years in the colony before being recalled.[8] He was replaced by Jean-Baptiste-Louis Franquelin, a good cartographer, but who seems

---

[4]Louise Dechêne, ed., La Correspondance de Vauban relative au Canada (Quebec, 1968), pp. 9-10.

[5]Vauban to Seignelay, March 29, 1685, ibid.

[6]Seignelay to Vauban, April 2, 1685, ibid., p. 10.

[7]Denonville to the Minister, Quebec, May 8, 1686, PAC, AC, Series C11A, VIII, f. 11.

[8]"Ordre du Roy pour faire repasser le Sieur de Villeneuve, Ingenieur, en France", Versailles, March 8, 1688, PAC, AC, Series B, XV, f. 33v.

to have lacked any experience whatsoever as an engineer.[9] Thus Canada entered the War of the League of Augsburg without a competent military engineer. However, now that hostilities had commenced, Seignelay's apprehension for the colony's fortifications was enhanced. He wanted to send a first rate engineer to the colony, but since France was engaged in a bitter war with most of Europe, it was impossible to spare one. At this moment, Vauban once more recommended Villeneuve for duty in Canada. He did so, because of a sense of charity and fear that Villeneuve, driven by despair, might desert.[10] Thus, almost two years to the day of his recall, he was ordered back across the ocean.[11] However, Villeneuve did not reach Quebec until 1691,[12] leaving the colony without an engineer during the summer of 1690, a

---

[9]M. W. Burke-Gafney, "Franquelin, Jean-Baptiste-Louis", Dictionary of Canadian Biography (2 vols.; Toronto: 1966-69), II, 228-29.

[10]Vauban to Seignelay, Paris, August 12, 1690, Dechêne, La Correspondance de Vauban, pp. 13-14.

[11]"Autre Ordre du Roy", Versailles, March 16, 1690, PAC, AC, Series B, XVI, f. 27v.

[12]Villeneuve claimed to have returned to Quebec in 1691: "Memoire du Sieur de Villeneuve sur les fortifications de Quebec où il arriva en 1691", PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 355. Burke-Gafney in "Franquelin", supports this claim. See also Francis Parkman, Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV (Boston, 1877), p. 247; Eccles, Canada under Louis XIV, p. 176. Both these authors, in discussing the work of fortification carried

critical moment for that town.

In retaliation for the French raids on the New England posts of Salmon Falls and Fort Loyal on Casco Bay and the town of Schenectady in the colony of New York, during the winter of 1689-1690, the English were planning in 1690 a two-pronged attack on New France. Montreal was to be attacked by an Anglo-Indian expedition, while a force from New England, was to attack Quebec by sea.[13]

In October of that year, Sir William Phips, in command of the New England expedition, arrived at Quebec, hoping for an easy victory. What were the town's defences? Until 1690 Quebec was not enclosed by a wall of any sort but had relied for defence on a number of separate buildings. The moment the rumour of the impending attack began to circulate, the Town Major of Quebec, François, Sieur de Prévost, tried to make up the deficiencies in the fortifications of the town.[14] A stockade, consisting of posts driven into the ground

---

out at Quebec in 1690, attribute the direction of the construction to the Town Major of Quebec and not to Villeneuve, as would have been the case, had the engineer been present.

[13]Parkman, Count Frontenac and New France, p. 247; Eccles, Canada under Louis XIV, p. 176.

[14]See Plan No. 1 [in manila envelope].

and banked breast-high with earth, was hastily erected.[15] At frequent intervals, flanking stone towers had been erected.[16] This palisade extended from the Intendant's palace beside the St. Charles River and ascended toward Cape Diamond. It did, however, not include the Cape, but passed around its base to the cliff edge. In the other direction, it followed the strand to where it narrowed below the Sault au Matelot. Moreover, it continued in a westerly direction until it completed a circle at the foot of what is now Citadel Hill.[17] Since there had been no time to bring over iron gates from France, the gates of the town were barricaded with heavy beams and hogs-heads filled with earth and mounted with small guns known as pedereros.[18] The Rue de la Montagne, the only road connecting the Lower Town with the Upper, was intersected by three barricades consisting of sandbags and barrels filled with earth.[19]

---

[15]"Narrative of the most remarkable occurrences in Canada, 1689, 1690", NYCD, IX, 477.

[16]Parkman, Count Frontenac and New France, p. 272.

[17]McOuat, "Military Policy", p. 105.

[18]"Narrative of the most remarkable occurences in Canada, 1689, 1690", NYCD, IX, 485; Reid, "The Importance of the Town of Quebec", p. 118.

[19]Jean-Baptiste-Antoine Ferland, Cours d'Histoire du Canada 1534-1759 (2 vols.; Quebec, 1861-65), II, 220.

There were two batteries above the Sault au Matelot, one near Cape Diamond, two in the Lower Town near the water's edge, and one near the Palace gate facing the St. Charles River. Each battery, except for the one near the Chateau Saint-Louis, consisted of three cannons. In addition there were several smaller pieces scattered about Quebec, some, as mentioned above, at the barricaded gates, and others on an eminence known as Windmill Hill.[20]

With the given materials and the limited time, it is remarkable that Prévost accomplished so much. By European standards, however, Quebec's defences were very weak. Phips' hopes for an easy victory would have been realized had the projected attack on Montreal materialized and had he been in command of a trained force. The English hoped that the campaign against Montreal would draw a considerable French force into the area, thus reducing the number of men available for the defence of Quebec. Fitz-John Winthrop of Connecticut had been put in command of this army of invasion. However, he never had the opportunity to lead his men to their objective, for he never had a unified force. Discord and small-pox ravaged and weakened his

---

[20]McOuat, "Military Policy", p. 105.

men. Furthermore, the promised number of Iroquois, essential for such an enterprise, failed to report. Faced with such problems, Winthrop ordered the abandonment of the project. The campaign was not a complete waste, for Captain John Schuyler received permission to lead a small war party on La Prairie.[21] However, instead of tying down a great number of Frenchmen, the campaign resulted only in the death or capture of twenty-five habitants, the burning of a few buildings and the slaughter of some cattle.[22] The failure of this campaign, the poor preparation of Phips' troops, and his own inadequacies saved Quebec.

When Villeneuve finally arrived at Quebec, he was shocked by the weakness of the town's defences. The walls were composed of small redoubts which gave insufficient protection to the wooden curtains. Moreover, these curtains were so low, that an enemy would have had no problem in scaling them. Another great weakness was that Cape Diamond, the strategic key to the town's defence system was unfortified. The main defence of the Lower Town was a gun platform whose construction had cost over 12,000 livres, however, it

---

[21]Parkman, Count Frontenac and New France, pp. 268-69.

[22]Ibid., p. 270.

was so poorly done, that it had been almost destroyed by the winter ice. To remedy these defects, Villeneuve suggested that the Upper Town, facing the countryside, be enclosed by a solid work of masonry flanked by good bastions. He admitted that such a work would be costly, however, it would provide better protection and eliminate the expense of repeatedly repairing the wooden stakes. He suggested that a strong redoubt, complete with powder magazine and separate from the town's walls, be erected on Cape Diamond. He claimed that it would be unnecessary to caponier the road between this redoubt and the main fortification since the terrain offered natural defence. Moreover, he suggested that the gun platform in the Lower Town be redone.[23] Although the engineer considered the implementation of his suggestions very important for the town's defence, he had no authority to begin work. Therefore he limited himself to carrying out a few repairs on a gun platform at Quebec and a few other small works.[24] At the same time he drew up a plan for a new fortification of Quebec.

---

[23]"Memoire du Sieur de Villeneuve sur les fortifications de Quebec où il arriva en 1691", PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 355.

[24]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Comte de Frontenac, et de Champigny, Lieutenant Général et Intendant de la Nouvelle France", March 1693, PAC, AC, Series B, XVI, f. 231V.

At the end of 1692 Villeneuve returned to France to press for the acceptance of his new plan of fortification. Except for a few additions, it was based on his earlier suggestions to the Minister of Marine, Louis Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain. It was unrealistic for it viewed Quebec as a fortress in Flanders, and did not take into account the town's real need of fortification. The implementation of such a project would have required many years and a considerable expense, luxuries that the French government could not afford. The safety of Quebec demanded that the town be enclosed by a solid fortification. Time was at a premium, for the French government did not want to be faced with another situation such as existed in 1690. At that time, works of defence had to be rapidly improvised, resulting in a poor fortification. Consequently, Quebec still lacked good works of defence. Since there was a lack of time, no extensive masonry works could be begun. The government suggested that the town be enclosed by a solid work of earth, fascines and wooden stakes.[25] This would be inexpensive and safeguard Quebec against another such

---

[25]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Comte de Frontenac et Champigny, Lieutenant Général et Intendant de la Nouvelle France", March, 1693, PAC, AC, Series B, XVI, f. 231.

attack as carried out by Phips in 1690. Once peace was attained, a stronger fortification could be erected.[26] Since France was engaged in a European war that was draining her treasury, it was essential that colonial expenses be kept down. Thus expensive fortification projects were ruled out. When Villeneuve returned to France, it marked the last time he crossed the Atlantic, for when his plan was reported to Louis XIV, the King decided that the colony needed a better qualified engineer. But who was he to choose? The intendant of New France, Jean Bochart de Champigny, recommended Josué du Boisberthelot de Beaucourt, an infantry captain already serving in Canada.[27] However, the King did not want to experiment any longer with officers who did not have formal training as engineers. Therefore after examining a list of possible candidates, he chose Denis Levasseur de Néré, an engineer who had some European experience. Although Levasseur received his commission in 1693, he did not reach Quebec until the following year.[28]

---

[26] Ibid., f. 231v.

[27] Champigny to the Minister, Quebec, November 10, 1692, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XII, f. 88v.

[28] "Liste des Officiers et autres qui Doivent passer en Canada auxquels le Roy a accordé leur passage sur la fluste la Charente", Versailles, April 24, 1694, ibid., Series B, XVII, f. 62.

The government's wish to see Quebec dotted with proper works of defence at the earliest, was justified in 1693 when Frontenac was informed that a naval squadron was being prepared in London. This force was to be joined by one from Boston, and together they were supposed to attack Quebec.[29]

Upon receipt of this news, Frontenac ordered that all works of fortification be carried out with the maximum of haste. Due to the absence of the newly appointed engineer, Beaucourt was left to direct the work. An anonymous memoir dated 1693 suggests that it was Beaucourt's intention to enclose Quebec on the countryside, by means of a bastioned line of earthworks and wooden stakes supported on the town's left by a redoubt on Cape Diamond.[30] Although he did not finish his plan that year, Cape Diamond was fortified with a square stone redoubt complete with guardhouse and powder magazine of masonry and guns at the four angles.[31]

---

[29] "A Monsieur le Comte de Frontenac", Versailles, February 14, 1693, ibid., XVI, f. 179.

[30] "Devis de touttes les fortifications que l'on a fait a Quebec en l'année 1693 avec un projet de ce qu'on croit le plus necessaire a faire marque en jaune", 1693, PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 357. For a plan of this work, see Plan No. 2.

[31] "Devis de la Redoutte du Cap au Diamant faitte à Quebec en 1693", PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 357.

Quebec was enclosed across the promontory by a bastioned earthen wall supported by fascines. The cavalier on Windmill Hill was covered with masonry and the great battery in the Lower Town was re-inforced. The Upper Town had a great weakness in that the bastions were lower than usual. It was claimed that this was done so as to better take advantage of the terrain and to keep down the expense.[32]

Frontenac believed that the colony in 1693 was also in danger of an invasion through the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route. Consequently he ordered that Montreal, Three Rivers, Sorel and Chambly be put in a good state of defence.[33] Montreal was the base of all French attacks against the Iroquois and the English colony of New York. Yet despite this obvious military importance, its defences were very weak. The wall of wooden stakes built under Callières' direction in 1688, had begun to decay and a small hill at the eastern end of the town and overlooking it, had been left unfortified. To remedy this sad state of affairs, Callières proceeded in that year to fortify the small

---

[32]"Devis de touttes les fortifications que l'on a fait a Quebec en l'année 1693 avec un projet de ce qu'on croit le plus necessaire a faire marque en jaune", ibid.

[33]Frontenac and Champigny to the Minister, Quebec, November 4, 1693, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XII, f. 208.

hill with a bastioned fort of wooden stakes.[34]

Three Rivers was in worse condition. In 1691 a new palisade was begun and in 1693 was extended to enclose the governor's house.[35] The little work done is explained by the continuously decreasing strategic importance of this town. With Sorel and Chambly guarding the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route and Montreal guarding the western end of the colony, the military importance of Three Rivers had been minimized. Its decline was accelerated by the fact that Montreal had also become the center of the western fur trade. Thus Three Rivers lost the importance that had made Champlain originally order its construction.

Sorel and Chambly had their wooden walls renewed.[36] This work was imperative due to the strategic position of these two forts, especially the latter, which increased in strategic importance in direct proportion to that of Montreal. Chambly was to become more and more an outer fort of Montreal, its bastion on the route of invasion from the south.

---

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

Luckily for New France, the British squadron which was to attack Quebec had been defeated in the West Indies and at Placentia, Newfoundland. The remaining vessels returned to England. The New Englanders, deprived of active British aid, shelved their plan. Had the invasion been carried out, it is doubtful whether the French colony could have successfully resisted.

All these works, constructed out of great fear, had been done hastily and without prior approval from the French government. They, had moreover, been very costly, amounting to 71,539 livres. Frontenac and Champigny asked for approval of the construction already done and especially for funds to finish the remaining work.[37] Presented with a "fait accompli", the government had no recourse but to deplore the excessive cost and hope that the little remaining work at Quebec would be finished shortly. The small fort built by Callières at Montreal was approved. It was now hoped that the government's repeated urgings to reconstruct the town's palisade which was considered to be of great importance would be finally obeyed.[38]

---

[37] Ibid., f. 208v.

[38] "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Comte de Frontenac et de Champigny", May 1694, PAC, AC, Series B, XVII, f. 68v.

Levasseur arrived in the colony in 1694 and promptly began a long rivalry with Beaucourt whose work at Quebec he criticized. Beaucourt's line of defence of that part of the Upper Town facing the countryside had run into a problem which was to confront future engineers. The manner in which the ground in that area sloped towards the north meant that each successive bastion from south to north was lower than the one preceding it. Furthermore, the northern end of the line was actually commanded by the higher ground outside it to the south.[39] Levasseur criticized Beaucourt for having constructed his wall in a manner whereby it was enfiladed by the neighbouring higher ground. He disapproved not only of the strategic location of the work, but also of its mode of construction. He claimed that it was only a rampart lacking talus in certain places and the necessary banquettes in others. The whole work was so poorly done that it had already started to crumble in certain places. Levasseur claimed that to complete and correct the work begun by Beaucourt would involve great expense. He stated that it would be necessary to raise the fortification in numerous places so as to compensate

---

[39]Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 28.

for the faulty location. The cost would be exhorbitant since in some places this elevation would have to be considerable. Levasseur suggested that the line of defence be moved forward to occupy these dominating heights rather than remain at their base, especially since the cost of so doing would be half as great as that of repairing Beaucourt's mistakes.[40] This was to be the essence of Levasseur's arguments in favour of a new plan for fortifying the Upper Town.

Although Levasseur did approve of the redoubt on Cape Diamond, he found it to be too small. He began to enlarge the cavalier on Windmill Hill in 1695 which he hoped to finish in the following year. After all the work and money spent in perfecting the great battery in the Lower Town, Levasseur found it worthless and in need of repairs. The other battery in the Lower Town would need some small alterations, while the réduit of the Intendant would have to be repaired since the tides had destroyed part of the wall. With respect to Montreal, he found its fortification reasonably good except for the fort built by Callières in 1693. This fort was so badly constructed, that within two years it

---

[40]"Fortifications de Quebec", 1695, PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 360.

had crumbled.[41]

Levasseur implied that a considerable sum of money would have to be spent to properly fortify Quebec. The idea of increasing the cost of fortification must have scared Pontchartrain who knew that the French treasury could ill afford it. Hence the Minister reminded Levasseur of Villeneuve's mistake in devising a plan that was too ambitious. He also asked him to work diligently but with the minimum of expense, so that the fund for fortifications would not be exceeded.[42]

It appears that the French financial difficulties during the War of the League of Augsburg stifled the construction of proper fortifications in New France. Consequently the limited funds should have been utilized in the most important projects. However, Frontenac's second term as Governor General of the colony was marked by the dubious importance given by him to certain constructions. Fort Frontenac and Chateau Saint-Louis are perfect examples.

Frontenac returned to the colony in 1689 just in time to hear of the destruction of Fort Frontenac,

---

[41] Ibid.

[42] "Au Sieur Le Vasseur de Nêré", Versailles, May 27, 1696, PAC, AC, Series B, XIX, f. 113v.

ordered by the previous governor, Denonville. From that time on, Frontenac never relinquished the idea of re-establishing the fort, ostensibly because of its strategic value. At the same time Champigny constantly opposed such a move on the grounds that it had no such strategic importance:

> . . . ce fort à justement parler est une prison pour renfermer une garnisom qui n'empesche pas les ennemis d'aller et venir sy ce n'est à la porté du fuzil. . . .[43]

He also objected to the great expense that its re-establishment and maintenance would entail.[44] Nonetheless, by 1694 Frontenac was ready to send a force under the command of Chevalier Crisafy to re-establish the fort. The enterprise had to be abandoned in favour of Pierre LeMoyne d'Iberville's expedition to Hudson Bay.[45] However, this proved to be only a temporary delay. In the following year the old governor had the satisfaction of seeing his wish come true.[46] One year later it was used

---

[43]"Memoire instructif sur le Canada", joined to the letter Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, May 10, 1691, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XI, f. 263v.

[44]The expedition of 1695 cost 16,580 livres; Champigny to the Minister, Quebec, November 6, 1695, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XIII, f. 360v. In 1694 Champigny had estimated the cost of maintaining the fort at at least 15,000 livres yearly; Champigny to the Minister, Quebec, October 24, 1694, ibid., ff. 83-83v.

[45]Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 55.

[46]Ibid., p. 56.

stop-over for Frontenac's expedition against the Onondagas. However, for the remainder of the war no other large scale enterprise used the fort's facilities. Montreal remained the center from which the war against the Iroquois was waged. As a result of its dubious military value, the fort's future remained uncertain. In 1696 Louis XIV expressed the desire that the post once more be abandoned,[47] but in the following year he seemed to have changed his mind and was willing to see the fort maintained provided that the cost of its maintenance would not exceed that of Chambly or Three Rivers.[48] The future of the fort hung on the King's changing annual whim, until finally in 1699 it was decided once and for all that it would be maintained.[49]

Within the wooden confines of the Chateau Saint-Louis, the Governor General's residence, was stored Quebec's ammunition supplies. Prior to 1690 it also served as the town's main fortification. Since his return to the colony in 1689 Frontenac continually clamoured for its reconstruction of masonry. Due to a

---

[47]"A Monsieur de Frontenac", Versailles, May 26, 1696, PAC, AC, Series B, XIX, f. 100v.

[48]"Memoire du Roy pour les Sieurs Comte de Frontenac et de Champigny sur les affaires de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, April 27, 1697, ibid., f. 242.

[49]Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 57.

lack of funds it had been in a state of disrepair since his first term and had so remained. Frontenac claimed that in its present condition the Chateau was a permanent fire hazard and as such, a menace to the town. He had also hoped that it could be utilized as a citadel in a last stand in the event of attack.[50] In 1691 Champigny informed Pontchartrain that the implementation of the governor's wish would cost about 20,000 livres.[51] This was considerable since that same year he had estimated the combined cost of the fortifications at Quebec, Montreal and Three Rivers to amount to at least the same sum.[52] Frontenac, on his part, insisted that the expense would not amount to more than 13,639 livres, a sum which he claimed was only a fraction of the yearly cost of the fortifications.[53] The governor was allocated a fund of 12,000 livres which he was to receive in annual amounts of 3,000 livres, beginning in 1692. He was warned not to exceed it, for

---

[50]"Lettre du Gouverneur de Frontenac et de L'Intendant Bochart Champigny au Ministre", Quebec, November 9, 1694, RAPQ, 1927-28, p. 198.

[51]Champigny to the Minister, Quebec, May 10, 1691, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XI, f. 260.

[52]Ibid.

[53]"Lettre du Gouverneur de Frontenac et de 1'Intendant Bochart de Champigny au Ministre", Quebec, November 4, 1693, RAPQ, 1927-28, p. 171.

under no circumstances would the excess be paid by the government.[54] In 1696 it stated, with the proverbial last words, that this would be the last year in which such a grant would be given.[55] Two years later, however, when the grant was renewed, these same words were repeated.[56] By the time it was completed, this project had consumed over 20,000 livres. One can wonder why so much was spent when the colony was still at war with the British and the fortification of Quebec incomplete. It is reasonable to assume that this pet project of Frontenac's, along with his restoration of Fort Frontenac did not alleviate the burden on the French treasury.

In early 1697, Pontchartrain, having heard rumours regarding an English enterprise against Newfoundland, feared that this force might be tempted to attack Quebec. Hence Frontenac was told to be

---

[54]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Comte de Frontenac, et de Champigny, Lieutenant Général et Intendant de la Nouvelle France", PAC, AC, Series B, XVI, ff. 232v-33.

[55]"Memoire du Roy pour le Gouverneur de Frontenac et l'Intendant Bochart de Champigny", Versailles, May 26, 1696, RAPQ, 1928-29, p. 305.

[56]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Comte de Frontenac et de Champigny en réponse de leur lettre du 19 Octobre 1697", Versailles, May 21, 1698, PAC, AC, Series B, XX, f. 78v.

prepared for any eventuality.[57] With this information in hand, the governor urged that Quebec be put in a good state of defence. Levasseur took this opportunity to begin implementing some of the ideas expressed by him in 1695. In the Upper Town facing the countryside, he advanced the line of defence by constructing an ouvrage à corne and a small fort known as Fort de la Glacière on Cape Diamond in front of the already existing redoubt. These works were done with earth, gabions and fascines. Levasseur claimed that since they covered the approach to the town's walls, themselves worthless as works of fortification, they were of prime importance. The work begun in 1695 at the St. James and St. Louis Bastions was partially completed. The cavalier on Windmill Hill was enlarged to cover the Royal Bastion and another demilune to cover the right flank of said bastion and the left of the St. John Bastion. In the Lower Town, the parapets, ramparts and banquettes of the little gun platform were completed.[58]

---

[57]"A Monsieur de Frontenac", Versailles, March 6, 1697, PAC, AC, Series B, XIX, ff. 165-65v.

[58]"Memoire concernant les ouvrages de la fortification de Quebec faits en 1693, 1695, 1697 et qui reste à faire en 1700", 1700, PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 365.

After awaiting the English attack in vain, Levasseur returned to France for reasons of health. While there, he presented the King with a memoir and plan of the necessary fortification of Quebec.[59] Although he had tried to compensate for Beaucourt's errors, he was unable to remedy the situation completely. This was particularly true of the St. James and St. Louis Bastions. Hence he proposed that the line of defence be moved forward to occupy the surrounding heights. The construction of the little Fort de la Glacière and the ouvrage à corne on Cape Diamond was hastily completed in 1697. Levasseur suggested that this work and a new wall should be of masonry. He placed more emphasis on these outer works than on the walls, which he claimed could still be maintained for a few more years with proper care. He estimated the cost of a new wall at 130,000 livres. Levasseur felt that the Cape Diamond redoubt was reasonably well built. However, the logements within it, since they were not bomb proof and hence a distinct hazard, would have had to be filled with earth. In the Lower Town he wanted to construct a wall extending from the foot of the cliff beneath the Cape Diamond

---

[59] See Plan no. 3.

redoubt to the foot of the Sault au Matelot. This wall was to enclose that part of the town which was submerged during high tide, including the Cul-de-Sac. The engineer claimed that since the latter served as a refuge for small boats, the shipowners and merchants would contribute half of the estimated cost. He evaluated the rest of the work at 109,500 livres. Levasseur claimed that this construction would serve to increase Quebec's defences as well as enlarge the Lower Town itself. He hoped to cover part of the cost by selling the land that would be thus enclosed. To complete the fortification of the Lower Town, he proposed the reconstruction of a wall to enclose the reduit of the Intendant. Thus the Intendant's Palace, the King's stores and the basin used by the larger ships would be protected. To round out the fortification of Quebec, Levasseur suggested that the powder magazine, situated in the confine of the Chateau Saint-Louis, be moved near to the cavalier on Windmill Hill. Since the magazine would now be more centrally located, it would be easier to supply the various points of defence in the event of an attack. The engineer also asked that a deep well be dug in the Upper Town. This was of great importance for at the

present time it was dependent upon the Lower Town for its water supply. Levasseur concluded that the total cost of the project, excluding the wall enclosing the Upper Town on the countryside, would amount to the fantastic sum of 235,552 livres, of which the King would have to pay only 95,400 livres. The rest would come from the colony.[60]

On the theoretical level this plan, particularly the fortification of the Upper Town, was very good and appealed to the King, however, he was sceptical about Levasseur's arithmetic. The opinions of the new governor of the colony, Callières, and the Intendant Champigny were sought. They were given permission to start the work immediately if they were in agreement with the plan.[61]

Levasseur returned to the colony in 1700 and discussed the feasibility of his plan with Callières and Champigny. They agreed with the theory of the

---

[60] "Memoire relatif au plan donné par le Sieur Levasseur de Néré, Ingenieur en Canada en l'année 1699 concernant la scituation de Quebec, sa fortification et les ouvrages qu'il seroit à propos d'y faire pour le mettre en bon estat", 1699, PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 362.

[61] "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Chevalier de Callières, Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général, et de Champigny Intendant de Justice Police et Finances dans les pays de la Nouvelle France", PAC, AC, Series B, XXII, ff. 112v-13.

plan, but recommended the postponement of that part regarding the Lower Town. They considered it highly improbable that anyone would buy any of the land that the engineer hoped to sell.[62]

The engineer, agreeing with the officials' opinion,[63] decided to concentrate on his plan for fortifying the Upper Town. He planned to begin construction as early as the spring of 1701 and hoped to be finished within four years. The only work he still wanted done in the Lower Town was the repair of the great gun platform which he felt to be in danger of crumbling.[64]

The King, accepting the opinion expressed by Callières and Champigny, granted a yearly fund of 20,000 livres from 1701 until the completion of the fortification of the Upper Town. Remembering the effect on the treasury of Frontenac's strong views regarding certain works, the King reminded Callières and Champigny to use this fund for no purpose other than that for which it was intended. He hoped that

---

[62]Levasseur to the Minister, Quebec, November 7, 1700, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XVIII, f. 346.

[63]Ibid.

[64]"Memoire concernant les ouvrages de la fortification de Quebec en 1700", Quebec, November 6, 1700, ibid., f. 350.

with that year's fund and the help to be derived from the corvée, the construction would be well underway.[65]

This was the first time that the French government approved a plan for fortifying Quebec with works of masonry. It would involve a great expense and about five years of construction. When Villeneuve advocated a large scale plan calling for a stone fortification at Quebec, he was dismissed. Therefore, how can we account for Levasseur's plan being accepted by 1701? This question can be partially answered by the exchange of letters in 1699 between Vauban and Jérôme Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain who later that year became Minister of Marine. This exchange began as an academic discussion on the future of French colonies. Vauban wanted to see the French government resume a vigorous policy of settling New France with soldiers. In order to rapidly increase the colony's population, he hoped to start planned families. Vauban wished that the colony's main centers be properly fortified for two main reasons. These were the deterring of attacks and the proper policing of the

---

[65]"Memoire du Roy au Sieur Chevalier de Callières, Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté et de Champigny, Intendant de Justice, Police et Finances de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, May 31, 1701, PAC, AC, Series B, XXII, f. 250v.

colony.[66] Pontchartrain stressed that he did not consider Vauban's views as purely academic and assured him that since France was now finally at peace, the government would do something about the fortifications in New France.[67] This was the prevailing attitude when Levasseur presented his plan. Theoretically it was solid and Vauban approved it. He must have also appreciated the fact that Levasseur took into consideration the urban expansion which was to result from planned families. In view of the correspondence between Vauban and Pontchartrain it can be safely assumed that when the plan was submitted to the King, it had the backing of two very influential persons. The fact that France was at peace meant that the King could consider fortifying Quebec with works that would ensure a proper defence against any type of attack. Furthermore, since these works were to be of masonry, they were to be more enduring and hence would cost less to maintain than the present works.

Levasseur began work on his plan in 1701. At

---

[66] Vauban to Pontchartrain, Lille, January 7, 1699, Dechêne, La Correspondance de Vauban, pp. 23-30.

[67] Pontchartrain to Vauban, Versailles, January 21, 1699, ibid., p. 33.

first great optimism existed on both sides of the Atlantic. In the colony, Callières and Champigny were satisfied with Levasseur's work, and in France, the King was happy with the progress.[68] However, the plan quickly ran into financial difficulty which hampered its scheduled progress. In 1703 the Intendant François de Beauharnais' request for the fund for fortification to be augmented was denied. Since the King was already complaining about the increasing cost of the war in North America, Beauharnais was advised to make do and not to exceed his funds.[69] France's involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession and the resulting drainage of her treasury caused a harassed Louis XIV to look for means to economize. The expense of fortifying Quebec was turning out to be greater than originally anticipated. As a result of the capture by the British in 1704 of the ship carrying the year's funds for New France and the consequent hardship in the colony,[70] no

---

[68]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Chevalier de Callières, Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général en la Nouvelle France, en réponse de ses dépesches et celles du Sieur de Champigny, cy devant Intendant dudit pays des 5 et 31 Octobre 1701", PAC, AC, Series B, XXIII, f. 62v.

[69]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Chevalier de Callières Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté et au Sieur de Beauharnois en la Nouvelle France", June 20, 1703 PAC, AC, Series B, XXIII, f. 200.

[70]"MM de Vaudreuil et de Beauharnois au Ministre", Quebec, November 17, 1704, RAPQ, 1938-39, p. 50.

works of fortification could be undertaken during the following year.[71]

Levasseur submitted the first of his many suggestions on how to raise some of the necessary funds in the colony in the same year as Beauharnais made his request.[72] These plans were highly unrealistic. They lost touch with reality in direct proportion to the increasing financial problems of France and the colony. His first suggestion was the sale of unused land in the Lower Town the proceeds of which were to be used to fortify Quebec.[73] Beset by increasing financial problems, the King asked Philippe de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, governor of the colony, and the newly appointed Intendant, Jacques Raudot, to study Levasseur's idea and see what, if anything, could be done along this line.[74] In 1705 Levasseur informed Pontchartrain that the fortification of Quebec was in

---

[71] Ibid., p. 61.

[72] "Au Sieur Le Vasseur de Nêré", Versailles, June 14, 1704, PAC, AC, Series B, XXV, f. 151v.

[73] "Le Ministre à MM. de Vaudreuil et Raudot", June 24, 1705, RAPQ, 1938-39, p. 73; "Addition aux Instructions de Monsieur de Vaudreuil et Raudot", Versailles, June 24, 1705, PAC, AC, Series B, XXVII, f. 87.

[74] Ibid.

great danger of never being completed unless the fund for fortification was increased, or his plan, presented in 1702, was enforced.[75] At about this same time he came up with another device for raising some of the much needed money. He suggested a sales tax on some of the goods sold in Quebec.[76]

Faced with these alternatives, the King ordered Vaudreuil and Raudot to re-examine the situation and to enforce any workable solution.[77] The latter condemned Levasseur's plans as impossible. They were in favour of giving to the present owners of vacant land in the Lower Town of Quebec a period of grace until the end of the summer of 1707, at which time the land would be put up for sale. However, due to the location of this land, they feared that there would be no buyers.[78] They rejected Levasseur's plan for a sales tax, claiming that the colonials were too poor to be able to afford it.[79]

---

[75]Levasseur to the Minister, Quebec, October 18, 1705, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XXII, ff. 348-49.

[76]"Le Roi à MM. de Vaudreuil et Raudot", Versailles, June 9, 1706, RAPQ, 1938-39, p. 132.

[77]Ibid., pp. 132-33.

[78]MM. de Vaudreuil et de Raudot au Ministre", Quebec, November 3, 1706, RAPQ, 1938-39, p. 150.

[79]Vaudreuil and Raudot to the Minister, November 1706, PAC, AC, Series C11G, III, f. 67.

Beaucourt was left in charge of directing the work of fortification in 1706 when Levasseur, for reason of health, returned to France on a leave of absence.[80] While in France he stressed the importance of greater funds, without which the work was in danger of lasting indefinitely. Confronted on one hand with the possibility of never seeing the work completed, and on the other, with a European war that was increasingly depleting its treasury, the French government ordered Vaudreuil and Raudot to find a way by which the colonials would share in the expense. To that effect they were urged to put up for sale any land in the Lower Town of Quebec that had been forfeited to the Crown. Upon Levasseur's return to the colony they were to consult with him and try to devise other plans for aiding the French treasury.[81]

The government's wish was obeyed and the land in the Lower Town which had not been constructed upon, was expropriated in favour of the Crown. The fact that this land was inundated at high tide rendered any construction upon it very expensive. Vaudreuil and

---

[80]Vaudreuil to the Minister, April 28, October 30, November 1 and 4 (sic) 1706, RAPQ, 1938-39, p. 111.

[81]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Vaudreuil, Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général et Raudot Intendant de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, June 30, 1707, PAC, AC, Series C11G, I, ff. 84-84v.

Raudot feared that even if the land were given away, there would be no takers. In 1707, Levasseur was consulted by these two officials with respect to his idea of raising funds in the colony. They walked away convinced more than ever that Levasseur's schemes were totally unfeasible. All of his plans called for some tax increase at a time when the colony was in no position to afford an augmentation of the present taxes.[82]

It was rumoured in 1707 that a powerful British squadron re-inforced by a force from New England, was to attack Quebec.[83] This news caused consternation amongst the Crown officials responsible for the town's defence, for Quebec was still poorly defended. Levasseur had gone by the book, and as in Europe, had begun with the outer bastions. Because of the plan's financial difficulties these bastions had not been completed by 1707, and their curtain was practically non-existent. Hence, Beaucourt, who had been left to direct the erection of the town's fortification, had to fall back on his 1693 line of defence. The breaches

---

[82]"MM. de Vaudreuil et Raudot au Ministre", Quebec, November 14, 1708, RAPQ, 1939-40, pp. 448-49.

[83]Louvigny to the Minister, Quebec, November 6, 1707, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XXVII, f. 19.

in the old walls were repaired.[84] The wooden platform for the town's batteries, having rotted away, had to be redone.[85] Since the English fleet was defeated at Port Royal,[86] Quebec was spared a test which it is doubtful that it could have passed.

When Levasseur returned to the colony, he was surprised and angered by Beaucourt's work. He vehemently accused Beaucourt and the officials who had approved of the latter's work of incompetence. He could not understand why his line of defence, which was strategically situated, had been abandoned in favour of one that was enfiladed by the higher terrain. Levasseur claimed that the retrenchments and bastions which he had erected assured the town of an advantageous line of defence. He criticized the work done on the batteries as useless, for the embrasures were done in such manner, as to render the defenders' fire impossible while permitting the enemy's to do great damage. Beaucourt had reasoned that the line of defence provided by the old walls could be more easily defended with the

---

[84]"MM. de Vaudreuil et Raudot au Ministre", Quebec, July 16, 1707, RAPQ, 1939-40, p. 379.

[85]"MM. de Vaudreuil et Raudot au Ministre", Quebec, November 14, 1708, RAPQ, 1939-40, p. 448.

[86]Vaudreuil and Raudot to the Minister, Quebec, July 16, 1707, PAC, AC, Series C11G, III, f. 78.

available manpower. Levasseur dismissed this line of argument by stating that the difference was negligible, in fact, only 100 men. Moreover, Quebec and the surrounding area had enough men to supply the necessary garrison in case of attack. Levasseur concluded that Beaucourt's work was a useless expense which was going to delay his own plan.[87]

Vaudreuil and Raudot were rebuked for having permitted such a needless expense and not having awaited more reliable information regarding the menacing attack.[88] This expense made the French government more receptive to Levasseur's last great scheme for raising the needed funds. This time, the engineer suggested that he construct yearly for one sixth more than the fund of fortification. That is, if the fund for one year was 30,000 livres, work was to be done for 35,000 livres. In return, he requested 2,000 pounds of fine gunpowder for blasting, one soldier from every company, to be paid daily at the rate of twelve sols, and the necessary utensils from the King's stores, which were to be returned in the same condition as

---

[87]Levasseur to the Minister, Quebec, November 12, 1707, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XXVII, ff. 22-23v.

[88]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Vaudreuil, Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général, et Raudot Intendants de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, June 21, 1708, ibid., Series C11G, I, f. 106v.

received. The King, desperate to find the means to help out his harassed treasury and save the plan of fortification, approved of this idea. Vaudreuil and Raudot were asked to study it thoroughly. If found workable, they were to enforce it without awaiting further orders from France.[89]

Vaudreuil and especially Raudot, who as intendant was responsible for the administration of the colony's finances, resented the King's criticism of the work which they had approved in 1707 at Quebec. They claimed that they had done only what was felt to be imperative and with the minimum of expense. They admitted that this work would slightly delay that of Levasseur. They could not understand, however, why the King made such a fuss over the 15,840 livres they had spent, since the really expensive work was being done by Levasseur. They gave as proof the fact that this engineer had used 10,000 livres in 1708 on a bastion that already had consumed 41,000 livres and whose completion would require an additional 15,000 livres.[90]

Raudot was unimpressed by Levasseur's last plan to raise funds for the fortification. He pointed

---

[89]"Le Roi à MM. de Vaudreuil et Raudot", Versailles, June 30, 1707, RAPQ, 1939-40, pp. 363-64.

[90]"MM. de Vaudreuil et Raudot au Ministre", Quebec, November 14, 1708, RAPQ, 1939-40, p. 448.

out that Quebec's fortification was allotted only about 18,000 livres yearly. According to Levasseur's plan, this fund would be increased by 3,000 livres. However, the cost of the gunpowder demanded by the engineer amounted to 2,500 livres. The colony lacked good soldiers, hence, it would be difficult to spare the number of soldiers required. The intendant concluded that the cost of the gunpowder and the soldiers' pay would leave little, if anything, of the increased fund to use for the fortification.[91]

In 1709 an English prisoner reported to Governor Vaudreuil that an English force of 6,000 men was being prepared to attack Quebec. Thus informed, Vaudreuil urged that the town's fortification be speeded up.[92] Since the work of fortification had progressed very little,[93] Quebec was, at the time, in no better position to sustain an attack than it had been in 1707. When Levasseur refused to cooperate with

---

[91] "Memoire sur la proposition du Sieur Levasseur Envoyé en 1708 à Monseigneur", Quebec, November 9, 1708, PAC, AC, Series C11G, VI, ff. 65-66.

[92] "Autre lettre de M. Raudot fils concernant les ouvrages et les partis faits à cause des menaces des Anglais", Quebec, June 30, 1709, PAC, AC, Series C11G, IV, ff. 204v-205.

[93] PAC, Map Division, H 3/340 Quebec-1709; DFC, Plan No. 375.

the intendant in matters of fortification, the latter, by then completely disgusted with the engineer's actions, wrote a lengthy memoir to the Minister of Marine regarding the poor state of Quebec's fortification. Raudot complained that Quebec had no solid continuous fortification, only pieces here and there. This was attributed to the fact that Levasseur worked according to the technique he learned in Europe. According to it, a good engineer was first required to construct the fortress' outer works, the inner ones could then be done even during a siege. This was permissible in Europe, where the supply of manpower was sufficient. However, in Canada, which lacked manpower, this approach was impossible. In view of the danger threatening the colony's capital and the lack of fortification, Raudot advocated to Levasseur the consolidation of Beaucourt's wall erected in 1693. This could have been done quickly and would have assured the town of some means of defence. Levasseur refused to do so or to even draw a plan of what he felt was necessary for a good state of defence. Furthermore, Levasseur was accused of being unable to estimate the time, money and men needed for the fortification. In 1709 he had asked for 600 men and an equal number of

wooden stakes, but by the end of the year, he had used four times as many men and 6,000 wooden stakes. To make matters worse, after thus greatly overshooting his original estimate, this engineer still had not completed the work he had begun that year. The intendant estimated that another two months were necessary to finish this work. Raudot resented the fact that with respect to fortifications the engineer acted as if he were second in command after God. Levasseur neither listened to any advice, nor was he careful with the King's money. Moreover, to the chagrain of Raudot he viewed the intendant only as a clerk who had to approve all the expense bills presented by the engineer. A harassed Raudot concluded that Levasseur had to be disciplined.

Raudot complained that he could not appeal to Vaudreuil for any help in disciplining Levasseur, for the governor always sided with the engineer. Vaudreuil, he explained, like everyone in the colony, was in awe of the engineer's connections in France. Furthermore, Vaudreuil was paranoic about the threat of an English attack on the colony. Whenever he would hear of a rumoured attack, without first verifying his information, he would send a large war party in the

direction of this supposed attack. Meanwhile he would urge Levasseur to hasten his work of fortification. Raudot rightly claimed that this was a contradiction, for the governor spent large sums and occupied men which could have been used to better advantage on the fortification. When the intendant rebuked Vaudreuil for this behaviour, the latter claimed that the government would be happy to spend one million livres provided the colony was saved.[94] With such an attitude on the part of the two men most responsible for the fortifications in the colony, it is small wonder that Raudot despaired of ever seeing Quebec properly fortified. Luckily the British force that was to attack Quebec was diverted at the last moment to Portugal.

When the King received Raudot's complaints, he was at a loss as to what course to take. He had placed great confidence in both Levasseur's plan and his ability. However, due to financial difficulties the plan now seemed unrealistic. Vaudreuil and Raudot

---

[94]"Autre lettre de M. Raudot fils concernant les ouvrages et les partis faits à cause des menaces des Anglais", Quebec, June 30, 1709, PAC, AC, Series C11G, IV, ff. 203-42; Raudot wrote another letter stressing Levasseur's high-handed manner with respect to the financial aspect of his work: Vaudreuil and Raudot to the Minister, Quebec, November 11, 1709, ibid., ff. 105-107.

were asked to call a Council of Fortifications to discuss the problem and come up with a detailed course of action which was to be enforced to the letter.[95]

In 1709 Levasseur again left the colony, ostensibly for reason of health. As usual in such occasions, he was replaced by Beaucourt. The following year, the latter presented a new plan for fortifying the Upper Town of Quebec. To enclose it on the country-side, he wanted to construct a bastioned wall of masonry starting from the crown work on Cape Diamond, which would follow the line of defence devised by him in 1693, until the bastioned redoubt of the Palace, facing the St. Charles River. This bastioned redoubt was to be linked to the Gate of the Seminary by a wall. A wall had also to be erected between the Cape Diamond redoubt and the battery of the Chateau. Beaucourt estimated the cost of his plan at 102,753 livres.[96]

The Council of Fortifications, composed of the main officers and Crown officials, met at Quebec in October 1710 and recommended that Levasseur's plan be

---

[95]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Vaudreuil Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté, et Raudot, Intendant de justice, police et finances en la Nouvelle France", May 10, 1710, ibid., V, ff. 8v-9.

[96]"Estat estimatif des ouvrages a faire pour fortifier la Ville de Quebek en 1710", Quebec, October 25, 1710, PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 376.

dropped in favor of Beaucourt's. They stated that the latter's plan was by far the cheaper since it called for the minimum amount of construction possible. The Council also called for the demolishing of the work done by Levasseur at the St. Louis Bastion and the curtain connecting the Cape and La Glacière Bastions. The reason invoked was the impossibility of filling with earth the St. Louis Bastion without incurring a heavy cost. With regard to the curtain, its levelling was to provide a better line of fire to the cannons in the Cape Diamond redoubt.[97] Thus after nine years and great expense in trying to implement Levasseur's plan, the Council suggested that in the best interest of Quebec, it was advisable to drop and replace it with one whose estimated cost was about the same as Levasseur's had been in 1700. The King lamented the loss in time and money but accepted the Council's recommendations. He approved of Beaucourt's plan, but asked that a wide ditch be added.[98]

---

[97]"Procés verbal des ouvrages a faire a Quebek", Quebec, October 30, 1710, ibid., Memoir No. 381.

[98]"Memoire du Roy au Sieur Marquis de Vaudreuil Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France en réponse des depesches ecritent en Commun parluy et par le Sieur Raudot cy Devant Intendant du dit pays des 14 Novembre 1709 et 2 Novembre 1710", Marly, July 7, 1711, PAC, AC, Series B, XXXIII, f. 306.

This emphasis was in accordance with eighteenth-century siegecraft. To protect its walls from an enemy's gunfire, a fortress was encircled by a ditch, the primary purpose of which was to conceal the walls. (See figure One on the following page). A besieging army used a system of trenches, known as the parallel approach, to enable it to establish breaching batteries on top of the glacis. (See figure Two on the following page). Because of the hard rock upon which Quebec is situated, this would have been a lengthy and difficult procedure. At the same time the town's garrison would have had many opportunities to sally against the enemy and hinder his moves. Given the relatively short warm season in Canada, it would have been very difficult for a besieging force to breach and storm the walls before the winter season would force it to retreat.

Thus the plan, which began with great optimism from everyone concerned, was finally dropped. We have seen the primary role played by financial difficulty and the technical and human relation problems which emerged.[99] There was another important reason for the

---

[99]For a more detailed discussion on the financial problems of New France during this period and the impact of the War of the Spanish Succession on them, see Guy Frégault, "Essai sur les Finances Canadiennes (1700-1750)", RHAF, XII (1958-59), 307-22, 459-63.

fig. 1



CROSS SECTION OF A FORT

fig. 2



REGULAR

MEANS

---

[100]These diagrams have been adapted for this thesis from designs in W. H. Bau, "Fortifications", Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1966, IX, 640.

project's failure, namely manpower. When the plan was first devised, it seems that its author had intended to rely almost solely on the corvées and soldiers for his source of labour.[101] This was a risky hope, for in case of war, it was likely to prove impossible. The colony had only twenty-eight companies of troupes de la marine, its total force of regulars. In case of war, they would have to be spread over the entire colony, thus leaving few to work on the fortification of Quebec. Moreover, the habitant could be called out on the corvée only once a year without payment. Since the King had stopped an active policy of colonization in 1672, the stream of immigrants to the colony had slowed to a trickle. As a result, there were not enough able-bodied men to simultaneously work on the fortifications, cultivate the land, and go out on war parties. Since there were few qualified professionals due to this lack of immigration, the pay scale in New France was considerably higher than in France.[102] Hence when Levasseur had to hire professionals to work on the

---

[101] "Extrait de la despence a faire pour les ouvrages projetée à la basse et haute ville de Quebek en 1700", PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 366.

[102] Jean Hamelin, Economie et Société en Nouvelle France, Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire (Quebec, 1960), p. 115.

fortifications, he was asked for what he rightly felt to be astronomical wages. His attempt to overcome this problem by requesting that masons be sent from France was thwarted. Pontchartrain claimed that, due to the European war in which France was engaged, the expense of sending out French masons to the colony would be the same as the cost of hiring the local ones.[103] When in 1706, after a one year layoff, the fortification of Quebec resumed, Louis de la Porte de Louvigny, the commandant at Quebec who was in charge of supervising the construction, ran into numerous labour problems. Some of the habitants were loath to do their work and Louvigny was obliged to confine a few of them to the local prison, so as to help them to regain their strength. The Recollets refused to contribute their share on the corvées, claiming exemption from such labour, as did some of the Crown officials. The children of the upper clan, such as those of François Madeleine Ruette d'Auteuil, used the construction sites as a playground, thus damaging some of the work done. Louvigny, at the end of his wits, had to ask the Minister of Marine to discipline these people.[104] The following year,

---

[103]"Au Sieur Le Vasseur de Nêré", June 20, 1703, PAC, AC, Series B, XXIII, f. 236v.

[104]Louvigny to the Minister, Quebec, October 21, 1706, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XXV, ff. 18-21v.

despite the threat of a British attack, Levasseur reported the same uncooperation of the colonials. He claimed that at Quebec, most of the well-to-do were named officers in the militia so as to be exempt from work on the fortifications. However, whenever there was a war party to be formed, these people refused to join, claiming other exemptions. Levasseur feared that this abuse would result in the poor being the only ones working on the corvées. He claimed that such a situation was highly dangerous, for not only was the fortification slowed down, but the poor were grumbling and might even go as far as rebelling.[105] The shortage of manpower was so acute in 1709 that the sailors aboard ships in Quebec harbour were hired to work on the fortification,[106] while the intendant had to forbid private persons from hiring certain professionals such as carpenters and masons, who were supposed to work only on the fortification.[107] Levasseur's plan was clearly unfeasible because the financial difficulty of the government assured no solution to the labour problem.

---

[105] Levasseur to the Minister, Quebec, November 12, 1707, ibid., XXVII, f. 24.

[106] "Autre lettre de M. Raudot fils concernant les ouvrages et les partis faits a cause des menaces des Anglais", June 30, 1709, ibid., Series C11G, IV, f. 211.

[107] Hamelin, Economie et Société, p. 115.

During the War of the Spanish Succession, the French spent little time on any fortifications outside Quebec. In fact, until about 1709 very little was done. To better understand the reason for this, one has to look at the strategy involved with respect to the colonies in North America. New France seems to have entered the war reluctantly. The instructions received from France seem to have encouraged a defensive attitude. At the outbreak of the war, the Minister Pontchartrain informed the governor of the colony, Callières, that he should attempt an offensive against the English colonies only if he felt sure of a decisive victory at little cost to the Crown.[108] However, Franco-Iroquois relations implied that such campaigns could be carried out only against New England. The last war with the Six Nations had ended only one year prior to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. The peace attained then had put an end to almost a century-long war filled with horror and hardships for New France. The French government stressed to the colony's governor, Callières, the necessity of keeping the Iroquois' friendship and of inducing them to remain neutral in the upcoming

---

[108]Pontchartrain to Callières, May 10, 1702, PAC, AC, Series B, XXIII, f. 105.

war.[109] Since the Iroquois' territory was a buffer between the English colony of New York and New France, Pontchartrain's instruction was tantamount to asking Callières to remain neutral with New York, and attack New England. Callières felt that the colony was too weak to mount a serious offensive, which he calculated would cost between 50,000 and 60,000 livres, hence he preferred to send out only small war parties against New England, while proceeding with the fortification of Quebec.[110] In 1703 the governor died and was succeeded by Vaudreuil, who received the same instructions with respect to hostilities with the English colonies.[111] For the remainder of the war, Vaudreuil tried his best not to renew the war with the Iroquois. Hence a policy of neutrality resulted towards the colony of New York. Until 1709 this policy was so well carried out, that in certain circles it was believed that Vaudreuil had come to a real agreement with the

---

[109] Pontchartrain to Callières, May 6, 1702, ibid., f. 73v; Francis H. Hammang, The Marquis de Vaudreuil, New France at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century (Bruges, 1938), p. 172.

[110] Callières to Pontchartrain, Quebec, November 4, 1702, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XX, f. 160v.

[111] "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Vaudreuil et de Beauharnois Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté et Intendant de justice police et finance de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, June 10, 1704, PAC, AC, Series C11G, I, f. 4.

governor of New York, Edward Hyde Lord Cornbury.[112] As a result, until 1709 New France really had only one enemy to contend with. The only easily accessible route of invasion available to it was down the St. Lawrence River, with Quebec its objective. Since New England was militarily incapable of generating a serious offensive against New France, it asked England for military assistance.[113]

As stated above, the truce between New York and the French colony was possible only as long as the Iroquois remained neutral. Neither the English nor the French wanted to renew hostilities without first assuring themselves of at least the Iroquois' friendly neutrality. By heavy bribes and many promises, Major Peter Schuyler of Albany was able by 1707 to impress on some members of the Six Nations the need to resume war with the French. Within two years, he was able to get a promise of active Indian participation in a future English offensive.

Once the Iroquois were restless, the French felt the need of intensifying their watch on the probable

---

[112]"Board of Trade to the Queen on the right of Sovereignty over the Five Nations", June 2, 1709, NYCD, V, 74; Hammang, The Marquis de Vaudreuil, p. 1178.

[113]Ibid., p. 138.

route of invasion, the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route. Hence, the strengthening of Chambly was advocated.[114] By 1709 Vaudreuil was able to convince Raudot that this could be best achieved by having Chambly reconstructed in stone. Without waiting for approval from France, they ordered that this work be begun in the spring of 1710. It was hoped that the walls would be finished that year, the inner buildings in the following.[115] Since it was believed that only a force of colonials and Indians could come by that route, and that this force could not bring cannon greater than four pounders, it was hoped that now Chambly would be able to withstand such attack.[116] Presented with another "fait accompli", the government approved of this construction.[117]

In 1709, because of Vaudreuil's fear of an attack on Montreal, the town's walls were extended

---

[114]The Minister to Vaudreuil, Versailles, June 30, 1707, PAC, AC, Series B, XXIX, f. 64v; The Minister to Raudot, Versailles, June 6, 1708, ibid., f. 346v.

[115]Vaudreuil and Raudot to the Minister, Quebec, November 14, 1709, ibid., Series C11A, XXX, ff. 19-20.

[116]"MM. de Vaudreuil et Raudot au Ministre", Quebec, November 14, 1709, RAPQ, 1942-43, p. 423.

[117]"Memoire du Roy au Sieur Marquis de Vaudreuil Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France en reponse des depesches ecritent parluy et par le Sieur Raudot cy Devant Intendant du dit pays des 14 Novembre 1709 et 2 Novembre 1710", Marly, July 7, 1711, ibid., Series B, XXXIII, f. 306.

by one third, to include within the fortification the strategic little hill, Coteau St. Louis, which Levasseur had recommended be fortified in 1704. Raudot found fault with the work done. He claimed that instead of the wooden redoubt erected there, a stone one with a covered way would have been much more appropriate. Furthermore he found the town's walls overextended. This, he claimed, was done so as to please certain persons who had buildings outside the old walls.[118]

Thus on the eve of the greatest British military threat to Canada, except for the fort of Chambly, the strategic places of the colony were rather weakly fortified. After about nine years spent in trying to implement Levasseur's plan the French government had only managed to waste a vast sum of money and time.

---

[118]Raudot to Pontchartrain, Quebec, November 1, 1709, PAC, AC, Series C11G, IV, ff. 195-96.

CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT AND REVERSAL OF THE POLICY TOWARD THE FORTIFICATIONS

The threat of active British military intervention in North America arose for the first time during the War of the League of Augsburg. However, this action did not materialize until 1711, when the English government devised a plan for the conquest of Canada. The French colony was to be attacked by sea and land. The command of the sea campaign was entrusted to Admiral Hovenden Walker, who was to attack Quebec with a powerful British naval squadron and eight battalions of regular troops.[1] The land invasion, via the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route, was to be a colonial enterprise. Colonel Francis Nicholson was to lead 1720 colonials and 800 Iroquois against Montreal and Three Rivers.[2] If the assault on these towns was repulsed, Nicholson was to blockade them until the fall of Quebec.[3] Fortunately for the French, fate once

---

[1]Gerald S. Graham, ed. and introd., The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 1711, Navy Records Society Publications, XCIV (Toronto, 1953), p. 270.

[2]Ibid., p. 310.

[3]Ibid., p. 273.

more prevented the English forces from attaining their goal. Admiral Walker, an inexperienced sailor, lost a number of his ships in a violent storm in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and promptly returned to London. Meanwhile, Nicholson was experiencing great difficulty in carrying out his project. His army was beset by smallpox and further weakened by the desertion of the Iroquois allies. When news of Walker's fiasco reached him, Nicholson felt that to carry alone the attack on Canada would have probably ended in disaster, consequently he abandoned the campaign.

The threat presented by the British action during 1711 justified the emphasis the French government put on the fortification of Quebec. During the remaining years of the war, the government of Louis XIV made great financial efforts to fortify that town.[4] Since this war had completely exhausted the French treasury, France, with the advent of peace in 1713, was forced to embark upon a policy of austerity. This implied that colonial expenses, including the rate of the fortification of Quebec, had to be restricted. The project did not diminish in importance, since the

---

[4]"A M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil", Versailles, July 4, 1713, PAC, AC, Series B, XXXV, f. 324v.

French government still believed that Quebec, in an upcoming war, would be the object of a British attack. The engineer in charge, was instructed to limit construction to the amount permitted by the yearly funds.[5]

When the Conseil de Marine received the progress report on the fortification of Quebec, it was astounded to find that the plan being implemented was faulty. The government saw no reason for increasing the defences of the Lower Town, and the line of defence in the Upper Town suffered from two cardinal weaknesses. Firstly, there was no ditch to protect the walls.[6] Beaucourt's plan had been accepted in 1710 on the express condition that a ditch be dug. Beaucourt disregarded his order, claiming that he had not had the necessary time to comply in 1711 or during the following year. Since the governor of the colony, Vaudreuil, believed that the town was in constant danger of being attacked, he urged the engineer to complete the defences. Faced with the alternative of erecting walls or digging the ditch, Beaucourt opted for the former. He increased

---

[5] "Au Sieur de Beaucours Capitaine et Ingenieur", Versailles, July 1, 1713, ibid., f. 302.

[6] "Memoire du Conseil de Marine sur le service que le Sieur Chaussegros Ingenieur doit rendre dans le voyage qu'il va faire en Canada", Paris, June 23, 1716, ibid., XXXVIII, ff. 247-48.

the thickness of the bastions' walls and erected some bastioned towers. With the return to normality, the government's order remained unheeded. The engineer justified his disobedience by claiming that the above-mentioned construction had removed the necessity of having a ditch.[7] Secondly, the Upper Town facing the countryside was protected by a line of defence which was very weak at its two extremities. The left flank of the Cape Diamond Redoubt, -- the one facing the Saint Lawrence River -- was open and unprotected. Since there was enough space between this work and the cliff's edge to allow for the passage of a small attacking force, the redoubt could have easily been taken. In this event, the town would have been unable to resist, for the enemy would have been in possession of a height which dominated the line of defence. The fortification at the Coteau de la Potasse, at the other extremity of the line, was so poorly situated, that it was unable to give supporting fire to the works located to its left.[8]

The Conseil de Marine, realizing that the plan

---

[7]"Explication du plan de Quebec", November 14, 1713, PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 388.

[8]"Memoire du Conseil de Marine sur le service que le Sieur Chaussegros Ingenieur doit rendre dans le voyage qu'il va faire en Canada", Paris, June 23, 1716, ibid., AC, Series B, XXXVIII, f. 247.

of construction had to be modified, was anxious to have an impartial and accurate report on the needs of Quebec. However, in the past it had been difficult to obtain such information. Consequently, it was decided in 1716 to send an engineer, Gaspard Chaussegros de Léry, from France to investigate the situation. Before leaving for the colony, Chaussegros was briefed on the situation of Quebec's defences. He was requested to make detailed plans on the state of the fortifications and to suggest any new works he considered necessary. He was specifically instructed to sound the terrain where he thought a ditch ought to be dug.[9] He was required to report personally to the Conseil in 1717, at which time a decision would be taken with respect to the implementation of a plan. Until this decision was made, all works of fortification at Quebec were to cease. Only those repairs which were strictly necessary were to be undertaken. The Intendant, Michel Bégon, was asked to preserve all funds destined for fortifications until a definite plan for same was accepted.[10]

Chaussegros found the fortification of Quebec

---

[9]"Memoire du Conseil de Marine sur le service que le Sieur Chaussegros Ingenieur doit rendre dans le voyage qu'il va faire en Canada", Paris, June 23, 1716, PAC, AC, Series B, XXXVIII, ff. 248-48v.

[10]"Le Conseil de Marine à MM. de Vaudreuil et Bégon", Paris, June 23, 1716, RAPQ, 1947-48, p. 314.

to be in a worse state than the progress report had suggested. He claimed that the Lower Town was sufficiently defended by the batteries existing there. The only construction necessary at Quebec was across the promontory, which was without any effective defence. The walls were dominated by a height known as the D'Artigny Windmill and the existing works were breached in many places. Moreover some were unconnected to the main line of defence making it impossible to provide assistance in the event of an attack. Many areas were low enough to easily be escalated.[11] Chaussegros designed a new plan of fortification for the Upper Town.[12] The line of defence was to be moved forward to completely enclose Cape Diamond and the area in which the La Glacière Bastion was situated. A cavalier located in the latter would dominate the D'Artigny Windmill and cover any approach to the walls.[13] Chaussegros estimated the cost of such construction to

---

[11]"Estat de la fortification et sçituation de la Ville de Quebec Capitale du Canada", Quebec, October 15, 1716, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XXXVI, ff. 185-87.

[12]See plan no. 4.

[13]"Memoire touchant le nouveau projet de fortification pour la Ville de Quebec", Quebec, October 15, 1716, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XXXVI, ff. 182-82v.

be between 378,000 and 400,000 livres.[14] His plan, slightly modified by the Conseil de Marine so as to include within the line of defence the D'Artigny Windmill, was accepted in 1718.[15] Chaussegros returned to the colony in that year to implement it.[16]

In 1711 the threat of attack also forced the French colonial officials to reassess Montreal's fortification. The governor of the town, Claude de Ramezay, complained to Pontchartrain, that Montreal's wooden walls were crumbling.[17] It was getting progressively more difficult and expensive to repair the wooden stakes, since trees large enough to be used were becoming rare in the area.[18] As a remedy to this situation, Ramezay suggested that the town be enclosed by a stone wall. The French government was then too poor to afford the luxury of subsidizing more than one project of fortification at the same time. The

---

[14]"Estimation du nouveau projet mis en Jaune pour la Ville de Quebec",,Quebec, October 15, 1716, ibid., ff. 179-81.

[15]PAC, Map Division, Ph/340-Quebec-1716.

[16]"A M. de Vaudreuil et Bégon", July 15, 1718, PAC, AC, Series B, XL, f. 508v.

[17]The Minister to Ramezay, June 25, 1712, ibid., XXXIV, f. 348v.

[18]"Enceinte de la Ville de Montreal", April 28, 1715, ibid., Series C11A, XXXVI, ff. 231v-232.

government was not particularly concerned with the state of Montreal's defences, therefore, it concentrated its resources in the pursuit of its main objective, the fortification of Quebec. Since Ramezay's request was a reasonable one, Pontchartrain approved it on condition that the colonial officials devise the means by which the town pay for the project. They were to exhort the inhabitants to assume the cost, since the new walls were to be for their own protection and convenience.[19] The Intendant Bégon suggested that the new fortification be financed by means of a yearly tax of 6,000 livres levied on Montreal. Both the inhabitants and the religious orders were subject to taxation. The Saint Sulpice Seminary, as the seigneur of the whole island, was to contribute one third of the sum. Officers and Crown officials who did not own houses were exempt, however.[20] The French government readily accepted this proposal.[21] In 1715 Beaucourt began implementing a plan which was now considered to be faulty, consequently a new project was designed in Paris. In 1716

---

[19]The Minister to Ramezay, Marly, June 25, 1712, PAC, AC, Series B, XXXIV, f. 349.

[20]"Enceinte de la Ville de Montreal", April 28, 1716, ibid., Series C11A, XXXVI, ff. 239v-40.

[21]W. B. Lindsay, ed., Edits Ordonnances Royaux, Declarations et Arrêts du Conseil d'Etat du Roi Concernant le Canada (3 vols.; Quebec, 1854), I, 355-56.

Chaussegros was asked to visit Montreal and see whether this project could be implemented. Because the government did not attach great importance to the town's fortification, the engineer was given the authority to effect any necessary changes without awaiting further instructions.[22] The final design, which had been only slightly modified by Chaussegros, was accepted in 1718.[23] Montreal was to be enclosed by a bastioned wall three feet thick and twenty feet high. The side facing the countryside was to have the added protection of a ditch thirty feet wide and ten feet deep.[24]

The French treasury had not as yet recuperated from the strain it had suffered during the wars of Louis XIV, found the cost of fortifying Quebec very high. The scheme's acceptance reflected France's diplomatic position as well as her desire to continue the policy of fortification devised during the last reign. Article six of the Treaty of Utrecht forced

---

[22]"A Mrs. de Vaudreuil et Bégon", Paris, June 23, 1716, PAC, AC, Series B, XXXVIII, ff. 214v-15.

[23]"Memoire du Conseil de Marine pour le Sieur de Chaussegros ingenieur à Quebec", Paris, July 6, 1718, ibid., XL, f. 494v. See plan No. 5.

[24]"Devis des ouvrages de fortification pour l'enceinte de la Ville de Montreal", Montreal, April 1, 1717, PAC, DFC, Memoir No. 471.

King Philip V of Spain to renounce all claims to the French throne. The Regent of France, Philippe Duc d'Orleans, feared that should Louis XV, then a mere child, die, the Spanish monarch would be tempted to break the above mentioned article. Consequently, France, forced to reassess her diplomatic policy, sought England's friendship against Spain.[25] This co-operation removed the danger of another colonial war, and, therefore, the urgency to fortify Quebec. The Conseil de Marine hoped to use this period of peace to complete the town's fortification. The government's limited financial resources rendered the new plan a long term one, however, as long as the cost was kept within what the Conseil de Marine felt to be a reasonable limit, the government considered itself able to support such a project. Since efficiency in the yearly construction had to be ensured, the procedure by which this work was to be carried out was carefully outlined. To minimize the damages that could be created by the rugged Canadian weather, the engineer was required to complete one section of the fortification at a time.[26] Under no circumstance whatsoever was

---

[25]Arthur McCandless Wilson, French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726-1743 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936), p. 5.

[26]"Memoire du Roy à Mrs. de Vaudreul et Bégon", May 29, 1719, PAC, AC, Series B, XLI, f. 528v.

Chaussegros to alter any part of the plan without previously obtaining governmental consent.[27] If during a given year, any part of the fund for construction remained unused, it was not to be diverted but retained for the following year.[28] By means of these regulations, the government hoped to control the yearly expense.

In spite of these precautions, Chaussegros' plan ran into financial difficulties which finally led to its shelving. The Conseil de Marine had hoped to accumulate a sizeable fund by prohibiting construction while the plan was being formulated. This would have enabled the engineer to start work immediately upon receiving instruction to do so. This expectation never materialized, for Bégon had diverted a considerable part of the funds. In 1716 he used the 30,000 livres sent that year for fortification on the reconstruction of the Intendant's Palace.[29] Two years later he was forced to use 24,441 livres of the fund to pay for the colony's expenses since the ship carrying the colony's

---

[27] "Memoire du Conseil de Marine pour le Sieur Chaussegros ingenieur à Quebec, July 6, 1718, ibid., XL, f. 495v.

[28] "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs de Vaudreuil et Bégon", Paris, June 26, 1717, ibid., XXXIX, f. 226v.

[29] "Mrs. de Vaudreuil et Bégon", Quebec, October 14, 1716, ibid., Series C11A, XXXVI, f. 274.

funds did not reach Canada that year.[30] It was not until 1720, two years after the plan had been approved, that the engineer was able to begin its implementation.[31] He had barely begun work, when the lack of finances forced him to halt.[32] Chaussegros revised his estimate for completing the work. He claimed that it would cost the staggering sum of 529,252 livres and asked for a yearly grant of 60,000 livres.[33] The government, having just devaluated the French currency, was unable to send any funds for fortification. It tried to supply the requested sum through credit in the colony. However since Canada lacked hard currency, this attempt failed.[34] Therefore the Conseil de Marine was forced to order the cessation of construction until it would be able, once more, to finance the project. In the meantime, Chaussegros was to proceed only with works of repair and the construction of a new wing in the Chateau Saint-Louis

---

[30]"Memoire du Roy à Mrs. de Vaudreuil et Bégon", May 29, 1719, ibid., Series B, XLI, f. 527v.

[31]"Lettre du Conseil du 7 Juin 1720", PAC, AM, Series B, LV, p. 189.

[32]Ibid., pp. 189-90.

[33]Ibid., p. 191.

[34]Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Conseil de Marine, Quebec, October 26, 1720, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XLII, f. 58.

at Quebec.[35]

The French government now decided to use the limited financial resources available for fortifications in Canada for the erection of Montreal's walls.[36] This change in allocation of funds can be attributed to the failure of the plan for financing the new fortification of Montreal. The project had been approved on condition that the town assume the cost. It quickly became obvious that the Montrealers were not anxious to pay a tax which they greatly resented. The Saint Sulpice Seminary led the opposition. It resented the fact that its quota was higher than any other single Order or individual. At first, the tax was accepted as an unavoidable but temporary evil. However, by 1720, seeing that the project had hardly begun, the Seminary feared that the construction, consequently the tax, was going to be eternalized.[37] When it withheld its share, the Conseil de Marine threatened to deduct it from the annual Royal pension given to the Order.[38] The story

---

[35]"A Mrs. de Vaudreuil et Bégon", Paris, May 27, 1722, ibid., Series B, XLV, ff. 775v-76.

[36]Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Robert, Versailles, June 6, 1724, ibid., XLVII, ff. 1212-13.

[37]"Les Ecclesiastiques du Seminaire de Saint Sulpice Etablis à Montreal", April 23, 1720, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XLI, ff. 269-70.

[38]"A M. L'Eschassier", Paris, March 26, 1721, ibid., Series B, XLIV, f. 505v.

was different when it came to collecting from the inhabitants. During the period 1716 to 1720, they had paid only about thirty-seven per cent of their quota.[39] This greatly limited the engineer's work.[40] The intendant, therefore, decided to force the payment of the tax still in arrears. In 1720 he instructed the Crown Prosecutor of Montreal, Sieur Raimbault, to seize and sell the goods of recalcitrants. So as not to arouse the population's ire and prevent disorder, Raimbault was instructed to prosecute only four offenders at a time, beginning with the richest. He was to continue in this manner until all outstanding accounts were paid. The measure backfired. The seizure had no effect on the remaining culprits, and the Prosecutor became the center of the population's hostility. In certain cases, the bailiff had to call upon the troops for his protection. Of about 10,000 livres owed, only 200 livres was collected.[41] To make matters worse, in 1720 the clerks responsible for drawing up the tax-roll refused to do so. Thoroughly

---

[39]Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Conseil de Marine, Quebec, October 26, 1720, ibid., Series C11A, XLII, ff. 51-51v.

[40]Ramezay to the Conseil de Marine, Quebec, October 14, 1722, ibid., XLIV, f. 413.

[41]Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Conseil de Marine, Quebec, October 26, 1720, ibid., XLII, ff. 52-53v.

disgusted with such behaviour, the intendant suggested to the Conseil de Marine that it revoke the tax and assume the full cost of the fortification.[42] In 1721 Montreal experienced a devastating fire. Because of this calamity, the inhabitants were granted a three year moratorium on their tax. However, the Saint Sulpice Seminary was still required to pay 1,000 livres yearly.[43] Since the inception of the project, the Conseil de Marine had been deluged with warnings that nothing short of substantial governmental financial aid would be sufficient to prevent the work from eternalizing itself.[44] Faced with the choice of either seeing Montreal without any defence for a lengthy period of time or granting some financial aid, the government opted for the latter.[45] This did not imply a change in policy, but was meant to be only a temporary measure until taxation would resume. France's international

---

[42]Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Conseil de Marine, Quebec, October 26, 1720, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XLII, ff. 53v-54.

[43]Lindsay, Edits, Ordonnances Royaux, I, 463.

[44]Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Conseil de Marine, Quebec, October 20, 1717, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XXXVIII, f. 25; ibid., November 6, 1720, ibid., XLII, f. 104v.

[45]Chaussegros to the Conseil de Marine, Quebec, October 17, 1722, ibid., XLIV, ff. 424v-25; "Extrait des Comptes rendus par les Commis des Trésoriers Généraux de la Marine à Quebec", Quebec, October 20, 1727, ibid., XLIX, ff. 368-68v.

and financial situations were responsible for this choice. Alliance with England had removed the urgency to fortify Quebec. Since financial resources available to the government for the fortifications in Canada were limited, the Crown decided to use the available amount at Montreal.

In 1724 an unforseen act by the French government led to a change in France's diplomatic position in Europe, which in turn affected the fortifications in Canada. In December 1723 the Regent of France died. The affairs of the country were entrusted to Louis Henri, Duc de Bourbon. He arranged for the repudiation of the betrothed of Louis XV, the Infanta of Spain.[46] This offence to the Spanish Crown led to an alliance between Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, whose aim was the dismembering of France.[47] Thus France was threatened with a war on two fronts. This forced her to maintain a large standing army and made her even more dependent on England's friendship. It was not until 1729 that this threat was removed.[48]

---

[46]Wilson, French Foreign Policy, p. 33. Bourbon's action was motivated by a purely selfish interest. If the Infanta was removed, the Duke hoped that Louis XV would marry a member of the Bourbon family.

[47]Ibid., p. 39.

[48]Ibid., p. 210.

During these anxious years the French government could not afford to finance the fortification of Quebec as planned by Chaussegros. When the Conseil de Marine stopped the engineer's work, it hoped that this would only be a temporary measure. However, by 1729 the government made it obvious that the project had been scrapped and that its policy towards the fortifications had been changed. Until the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession, only works of repair were permitted at Quebec.[49] In 1727 Claude de la Boische, Marquis de Beauharnais, the governor of New France became alarmed by the construction by the English colony of New York of Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario. Fearing that this action could lead to war with England and knowing that Quebec was poorly defended, he asked Chaussegros to draw up a plan for a new fortification.[50] The design, submitted to the Minister of Marine, called for a citadel on Cape Diamond. This

---

[49]"Memoire du Roy pour servir d'instruction au Sieur Hocquart Commissaire général de la Marine ordonnateur de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, March 22, 1729, PAC, AC, Series B, LIII, f. 475; "A Mrs. de Beauharnais et Hocquart", Versailles, April 17, 1731, ibid., LV, ff. 493-93v; "A M. Hocquart", Versailles, April 19, 1735, ibid., LXIII, f. 482.

[50]Dupuy to the Minister, Quebec, October 20, 1727, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XLIX, ff. 314-14v.

project was to cost 325,290 livres.[51] The government's reason for refusing it was that Quebec was no longer seen as the primary strategic area. In an upcoming war with England, the French government believed that the British would attack Canada by land, in the Lake Champlain area. The possibility that the invasion would be by sea at Quebec, was ruled out on two counts: the high cost and failure of past English attempts, and the impossibility of carrying out a regular siege at Quebec because of the hard rock upon which the town is situated.[52] The government's reasoning was foolish, for past failures were due only to circumstances, not to the strength of Quebec's walls. Since the town did not have a regular fortification, there was no need for an enemy to proceed with a regular siege. Once in front of Quebec, an enemy would only have to set its batteries in place for the town to be taken. The government had not yet completely ruled out the construction of some sort of fortification, provided that it was inexpensive and took into consideration only the town's vital needs of defence. Since the

---

[51] "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général et Dupuy Intendant de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, May 14, 1728, ibid., Series B, LII, f. 512.

[52] Ibid., f. 512v.

government felt that Quebec would be threatened only by a surprise attack, the defence would have to be strong enough to cope with only such a situation.[53] The King wanted to have a design of such work and its estimated cost. It was made very clear that even if the project would find royal approval, it would not necessarily be implemented immediately.[54] Whatever plans to this effect were submitted, were received unfavourably.[55]

When, during the War of the Polish Succession, the threat of a conflict with England arose for the first time since 1713, the government maintained its policy. It believed that in the event of hostilities breaking out, the British government would not mount a naval expedition against Canada, but invade the colony from the south. Hence it claimed that the real need of

---

[53]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général et Hocquart Commissaire général de la marine ordonnateur en Nouvelle France", Versailles, April 19, 1729, ibid., f. 525.

[54]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général et Dupuy Intendant de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, May 14, 1728, PAC, AC, Series B, LII, f. 512v.

[55]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général et Hocquart Commissaire général de la marine ordonnateur en Nouvelle France", Versailles, April 19, 1729, ibid., LIII, f. 524v; "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France et Hocquart Intendant aud. Pais", Versailles, April 27, 1734, ibid., LXI, f. 534v.

fortification existed in that area. Should the British, nonetheless, decide to attack Quebec, the French government believed that it would be forewarned and Governor Beauharnais would receive whatever aid the government would think fit to send.[56] Although the form of assistance was left unspecified, it could be safely assumed that, due to the proximity of the attack, only soldiers and supplies would have been sent. Beauharnais vainly tried to impress the Minister of Marine, Jean-Frédéric Phélippeaux, Comte de Maurepas, and Louis XV with the foolishness of their lack of action at Quebec. The governor claimed that in case of war with England, Quebec would be attacked. Because of the poor state of the town's fortification, there was little likelihood of an English failure to capture the town. Since capture of Quebec was tantamount to conquest of the whole colony, the question of expense had to be dismissed. With that town in their possession, the British would have been able to prevent any direct communications between the colony and the mother country. Consequently, it would have been impossible for France to supply her colony. Left on its own, very likely Canada would have soon had to surrender. It was

---

[56]"A M. le Marquis de Beauharnais", Versailles, May 10, 1735, ibid., LXIII, ff. 504-504v.

fallacious to hope that the English record of past failures would deter an attack. Only a strong fortification could guarantee the town's safety.[57] Since the government prohibited such a construction, Beauharnais felt that the best defence of the town lay in the bayonets of his troops. The only hope of victory would lie in preventing the enemy from landing and assaulting the walls.[58]

Prior to the revision of its policy in 1729, the French government found itself forced to increase its financial assistance to the project of fortifying Montreal. The Crown had originally provided such aid to enable the work to continue while the Montrealers recuperated their losses suffered during the fire of 1721. The French Crown had hoped that at the end of the three-year moratorium collection of the tax would resume and all accounts still in arrears would be settled. The latter expectation proved to be false. The tax was just as difficult as ever to collect.

---

[57]Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 10, 1734, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXI, ff. 303-303v; Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 14, 1733, ibid., LIX, ff. 201v-202.

[58]Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 10, 1734, ibid., LXI, ff. 308-308v.

Beauharnais claimed in 1728 that the amount still owed to the Crown amounted to 16,000 livres and that he despaired of ever seeing it collected.[59] Consequently, to rely solely upon the tax for financing the construction would have endangered the progress of the work. Thus, despite the fact that as of January, 1725, collection of the tax was resumed,[60] the government gradually increased its assistance.[61] By 1729, the yearly fund amounted to 17,250 livres, of which the government was paying about three quarters.[62] Because of the new French policy, Montreal suddenly found itself in what the Crown considered to be the colony's main strategic area. Because of the tax's shortcoming, the government continued to pour money into the project. Thus in 1731, in addition to its yearly fund, Montreal was granted 20,000 livres.[63] During the War of the

---

[59]Beauharnais and D'Aigremont to the Minister, Quebec, October 1, 1728, PAC, AC, Series C11A, L, ff. 35-35v.

[60]Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Minister, Quebec, November 2, 1724, ibid., XLVI, f. 32.

[61]"A M. de Chaussegros", May 30, 1724, ibid., Series B, XLVII, f. 1122; The Minister to Chazel, Versailles, May 22, 1725, ibid., XLVIII, ff. 809-10.

[62]Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 25, 1729, ibid., Series C11A, LI, f. 245.

[63]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 12, 1731, ibid., LIV, f. 146.

Polish Succession, when the possibility of war again arose, the government pressed for the rapid completion of this construction.[64] Considerable funds were given to the engineer Chaussegros to carry on the work.[65] The King was happy to learn in 1741 that the fortification of Montreal was at long last completed.[66] The total cost, of which the Crown had paid 329,617 livres 6 sols 6 deniers, had amounted to 445,141 livres 10 sols 3 deniers.[67] The government had continued

---

[64]"A M. le Marquis de Beauharnais", Versailles, May 10, 1735, ibid., Series B, LXIII, f. 504; "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France et Hocquart Intendant au même pays", Versailles, May 15, 1736, ibid., LXIV, f. 441; "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général en la Nouvelle France et Hocquart Intendant aud. Pays", Versailles, May 10, 1737, ibid., LXV, f. 426v.

[65]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général et Hocquart Intendant de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, May 12, 1733, PAC, AC, Series B, LIX, f. 474v; "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général et Hocquart Intendant en la Nouvelle France", Versailles, April 11, 1735, ibid., LXIII, f. 465v; Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 28, 1735, ibid., Series C11A, LXIII, f. 208.

[66]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté et Hocquart Intendant en la Nouvelle France", Marly, May 12, 1741, ibid., Series B, LXII, f. 385v.

[67]"Arrest qui accorde aux habitants de Montreal la remise de la moytié des avances faites pour l'etablissement de l'Enceinte de la ville, et ordonne que sur la moytié restante, pour le payement de laquelle l'ymposition de 6000 livres sera continuée, seront pris les fonds necessaires pour la depense des reparations de cette enceinte", Versailles, May 1, 1743, ibid., LXXVI, f. 406.

subsidize the construction only to ensure a more rapid completion. This was particularly necessary when the threat of war with England arose. Now that the project was completed, the government wanted to be at least partially reimbursed. To collect the full amount would have been a very lengthy process, which, judging by past reaction to the taxation, would have aroused much opposition. Consequently, the government decreed that the taxation was to continue until the Crown would have recovered only one-half of its investment. Any repairs were to be paid from this continuing levy.[68]

As a result of its new policy towards the fortifications, the French government decided in 1731 to construct a wooden fort at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure, present day Crown Point.[69] The location was of great strategic importance. Here Lake Champlain narrows into a river-like body of water. No enemy force intending to invade Canada could have by-passed this area. Until 1731 the French had relied solely upon Fort Chambly to guard the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route of invasion. By 1730 French colonial officials, alarmed

---

[68] Ibid., f. 406v.

[69] "A Mrs. de Beauharnais et Hocquart", Versailles, April 8, 1732, ibid., LVII, f. 634.

by English penetration in the Lake Ontario region, asked the Minister of Marine to allow the erection of a fort at Crown Point so as to prevent a similar encroachment in the Lake Champlain area.[70] In view of the French government's belief regarding the direction of attack in an upcoming war, the government, realizing the necessity of strengthening French control in the region, authorised the fort's construction. Beauharnais, ever fearful of war with England, constantly urged Maurepas to allow the construction of either a redoubt with machicolations or a regular stone fort.[71] In 1734, because of the possibility of war, the government finally gave its consent to the erection of the redoubt.[72] The choice of this fortification was determined by the advice sent from the colony. The engineer Chaussegros

---

[70]"Memoires concernant l'etat présent du Canada en l'an 1730", PAC, AC, Series C11A, LII, ff. 274v-75; La Corne to the Minister, Montreal, October 11, 1730, ibid., LIII, ff. 363-63v; Stanley, New France, p. 87.

[71]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, November 14, 1731, ibid., LIV, ff. 338-38v.; Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 1, 1733, ibid., LIX, ff. 67-67v; Roy, Hommes et Choses, p. 22. For plan of suggested redoubt see plan no. 6; for plan of fort, see plan no. 7.

[72]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France et Hocquart Intendant aud. Pays", Versailles, April 27, 1734, PAC, AC, Series B, LXI, f. 543.

believed that the British were most likely to attack in winter.[73] Because of the relatively heavy snowfall in this area, the effectiveness of a regular fort with ditch and covered way would have been hampered. Its artillery would have been snowed under, and drifts of snow would have covered its ditch and reached half way up to the rampart, thus making it very easy for an enemy to escalate the walls. Furthermore, because of the great cold, it would have been necessary to change the guard often. Thus, the fort would have required a considerable garrison to ensure its safety. In theory a redoubt with machicolations, defended by a ditch and covered way had no such disadvantages. The artillery as well as the garrison would continuously be protected from the elements. Consequently the redoubt would have needed a comparatively smaller garrison and the cost of its construction was estimated to be much lower than that of a fort.[74] However, Chaussegros claimed

---

[73]"Memoire touchant la construction du petit fort proposé a faire à la pointe à la Chevelure", October 1, 1733, ibid., DFC, Memoir No. 509.

[74]The redoubt was estimated to cost 54,000 livres, while the fort was supposed to cost 167,202 livres 14 sols 5 deniers. Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, November 14, 1731, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LIV, f. 341. "Estat estimatif des ouvrages a faire au fort proposé a faire à la pointe à la Chevelure", Quebec, October 1, 1733, ibid., DFC, Memoir No. 508.

that because of the nature of the terrain, he could not circumvalate the redoubt with a ditch.[75] Since this fortification would have had to face a British attack, the lack of that work would have rendered the redoubt's defence impossible. Once the enemy would have set up its batteries, the French would have had to surrender. To offset this disadvantage, the engineer Chaussegros suggested that the redoubt be enclosed by a small bastioned stone fort. This addition was authorized on the assurance, given by Governor Beauharnais and the intendant, Gilles Hocquart, that this alteration would not entail an increase in the cost of construction.[76] The work was completed in 1737,[77] but the final cost amounted to a little over 123,000 livres, more than twice the estimate.[78] To alleviate the logistics problem,

---

[75]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 28, 1735, ibid., Series C11A, LXIII, f. 208.

[76]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France et Hocquart Intendant au même pays", Versailles, May 15, 1736, ibid., Series B, LXIV, ff. 441-41v; for design of plan accepted, see plan no. 8.

[77]Chaussegros to the Minister, Quebec, October 28, 1737, ibid., Series C11A, LXVIII, f. 249.

[78]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France et Hocquart Intendant au même pais", Versailles, May 1, 1739, ibid., Series B, LXVIII, f. 300.

the Crown advanced the idea that habitants should be induced to settle on seigneuries that would be created in the fort's shadow. The farms thus established would supply the fort with foodstuffs.[79] The government was happy to hear by 1740 that some Canadians had settled in the designated area.[80] The new fort, known as Saint-Frédéric, replaced Fort Chambly as the key post on the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route. The government reduced the garrison of Fort Chambly to only eight men.[81] Although in the English colonies the former post enjoyed the reputation of being a powerful outpost of Canada,[82] neither its condition nor its site warranted such fame. In 1740 Chevalier Claude de Beauharnais inspected the fort and was appalled. In his report he stated:

---

[79]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 11, 1737, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXVII, f. 31v.

[80]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté et Hocquart Intendant en la Nouvelle France", Marly, May 13, 1740, ibid., Series B, LXX, f. 363.

[81]"Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France et Hocquart Intendant aud. pays", Fontainebleau, April 30, 1742, ibid., LXXIV, f. 507v.

[82]"Mr. Golden Answers to the Queries of the Lord of Trade", Province of New York, February 14, 1738, NYCD, VI, 125; Stanley, New France, p. 89.

> Fortifications without ditches and without ramparts, simply curtained on the inner side with clay . . . embrasures without platform for the recoil of the cannon.[83]

For a fortification of such great strategic importance as Fort Saint-Frédéric, its artillery, consisting of only six field pieces and eleven swivel guns, was inadequate. Since there was no well within the fort's confines,[84] in case of attack, it would have been very hazardous, if not impossible, for the garrison to get its water supply from Lake Champlain. The fort was dominated by a rise within 500 feet of the walls. From the fort itself it was impossible to perceive the enemy advancing by boat along the western shore of the river. In 1739, partially to offset these disadvantages, the French built a windmill on top of the rise.[85] From that point they had a clear view of any approaching force.[86]

---

[83]G. O. Coolidge, "The French Occupation of the Champlain Valley from 1609-1759", Vermont Historical Society (1938), pp. 258-59; Stanley, New France, p. 88.

[84]Stanley, New France, p. 88.

[85]Roy, Hommes et Choses, p. 53.

[86]Adolph B. Benson, ed., The America of 1750: Peter Kalm's Travels in North America; the English Version of 1770 (2 vols.; New York, 1966), I, 392.

The Anglo-Spanish war begun in 1739 raised the distinct possibility of France going to war with England.[87] From that year until the outbreak of war between the two in 1744, the Minister Maurepas repeatedly informed Governor Beauharnais of the political situation in Europe and exhorted him to prepare the colony for any eventuality.[88] Without deviating from the government's policy,[89] Beauharnais used this period to consolidate the fortifications of the colony. He supervised the completion of Montreal's fortification and had Fort Saint-Frédéric strengthened by establishing some gun platforms and reveting the interior walls.[90] In his quest to strengthen the defence of the southern route of invasion, Beauharnais had Fort Chambly repaired.[91] With respect to Quebec, the governor had to content

---

[87] Wilson, French Foreign Policy, p. 321.

[88] "A M. le Marquis de Beauharnais", Versailles, August 12, 1739, PAC, AC, Series B, LXVIII, ff. 317-17v; "A M. le Marquis de Beauharnais", Versailles, February 25, 1741, ibid., LXXII, f. 334; Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, September 24, 1743, ibid., Series C11A, LXXIX, f. 153v.

[89] "A M. le Marquis de Beauharnais", Versailles, March 30, 1744, ibid., Series B, LXXVIII, f. 342v.

[90] "A MM. de Beauharnais et Hocquart", Versailles, April 15, 1743, ibid., LXXVI, f. 370v.

[91] "Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnais Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général pour Sa Majesté en la Nouvelle France et Hocquart Intendant au même pais", Versailles, May 1, 1739, ibid., LXVIII, f. 300.

himself with readying the town's artillery and the existing fortifications.[92] Moreover, Beauharnais was forced to order the strengthening of Fort Frontenac, which since 1713 had been only a supply depot for the western posts. Chaussegros was sent to carry out the necessary repairs, which, however, were not completed before the outbreak of hostilities.[93] Thus on the eve of the War of the Austrian Succession, the French government relied for the safety of Canada on the above-mentioned fortifications and on the hope that it had accurately guessed British strategy for the upcoming war.

---

[92]"A Mrs. de Beauharnais et Hocquart", Fontainebleau, April 17, 1742, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXIV, f. 447.

[93]Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 70.

CHAPTER IV

PREPARATION FOR THE FINAL STRUGGLE

Beauharnais lived in dread of war between England and France since it would raise the threat of a regular attack against Quebec, whose defences he considered insufficient. Upon being informed in June 1744 that a state of war existed between the two countries, the governor's apprehension increased. He quickly ordered the construction of some simple works of defence. This work was limited to the erection of a retrenchment of wooden stakes near the St. Charles River to prevent an easy passage from the Beauport shore and the establishment of a double barbette battery above the Chateau St. Louis Battery. The town's artillery was put in a state of readiness.[1] This work, however, did not ease the governor's fear, for he still considered Quebec unable to withstand the powerful

---

[1] "A Mrs. de Beauharnais et Hocquart", Versailles, March 31, 1745, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXI, f. 252; Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 8, 1744, ibid., Series C11A, LXXXI, ff. 140-41v; Stanley, New France, p. 12.

attack which he now expected. Maurepas was informed that only the strictest minimum had been done in 1744. Since these defences would be unable to offer more than a token resistance, a regular stone fortification was needed to ensure the town's safety.[2]

When news of Louisbourg's investment by Sir William Pepperell and Commodore Peter Warren reached Quebec in the summer of 1745, the governor of New France ordered the erection of a retrenchment with fraise across the promontory of Quebec to safeguard the Upper Town. The work was hardly completed, when news of Louisbourg's surrender reached Quebec.[3] The report caused great consternation in the capital, where many an inhabitant already saw the enemy before the town. Beauharnais was deluged from all sides with demands for the construction of a regular fortification across the promontory, which was to be paid by the French government.[4] Although personally Beauharnais wanted to see such a fortification erected, he hesitated to embark upon such a course of action which he knew to be

---

[2]Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 8, 1744, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXI, ff. 141-41v.

[3]Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, September 24, 1745, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXIII, f. 184.

[4]Ibid., f. 184v; "Extrait des Registres tenus au Bureau du Controle de la Marine à Quebec", Quebec, August 12, 1745, ibid., LXXXIV, ff. 218-218v; Guy Frégault, "Essai sur les Finances Canadiennes", RHAF, XIII (1959-60), 162.

contrary to the government's wishes. The Intendant Hocquart, better acquainted with the government's financial difficulties, was outright hostile to these requests.[5] Unwilling to make a decision on his own, the governor called together a council of the most important officers and inhabitants of Quebec to discuss the problem. At the meeting, the demand for a stone fortification was reiterated. Hocquart's suggestion that they wait for the Crown's opinion was overruled by the majority who believed that such action would consume too much time. It was claimed that any delay would jeopardize the town's safety.[6] Consequently it was agreed to begin work immediately on the plan drawn up by Chaussegros de Léry a couple of days prior to the meeting.[7] The new walls were to be eighteen feet high and six feet thick,[8] with an estimated cost of 398,381 livres.[9] Work proceeded at a brisk pace,

---

[5]Frégault, "Essai sur les Finances Canadiennes", p. 162.

[6]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 19, 1745, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXIII, ff. 39-40.

[7]"Memoire de M. de Léry sur l'Enceinte de Quebec", Quebec, August 10, 1745, ibid., LXXXIV, f. 226.

[8]"Extrait des Registres tenus au Bureau du Comtrole de la Marine à Quebec", Quebec, August 12, 1745, ibid., ff. 220-20v.

[9]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 19, 1745, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXIII, ff. 39-40.

and by the time bad weather forced cessation of construction for the year, Beauharnais was able to report that the foundations had been done and the walls raised to a height of five feet.[10]

The events at Quebec greatly surprised and angered the Minister of Marine. He had never expected Beauharnais to order such work without first having received instructions to do so. However, what really set Maurepas' blood boiling, was the financial aspect of the project. When news of the plan being implemented at Quebec reached Maurepas, France had been waging a costly war for four years. The numerous campaigns fought by the French army had strained the treasury, and now the government was being presented with a very expensive fait accompli! Furthermore, in the past, such construction was spread over a number of years, and consequently so was the expense. It was thus easier for the government to pay for the work. This time, however, the construction was proceeding with such speed that the yearly expense was enormous.[11]

---

[10] Ibid.

[11] In 1745 the construction consumed 245,170 livres 14 sols 2 deniers and another 201,431 livres 8 sols 1 denier during the following year. "Bordereau de la recette et dépense faite en Canada pendant l'année 1746 dirigé suivant les Titres employés dans l'Etat du Roy Expedié sur cet Exercice", Quebec, October 24, 1751,

In view of the great expenses incurred in the European theatre of war, Maurepas felt that the aid he could give Quebec in the event of a determined attack, would have to be limited to sending a force to bolster the town's garrison. Thus when such a threat arose in 1746, Admiral Jean-Baptiste Louis Frédéric de La Rochefoucauld, Duc d'Anville, commanding a powerful squadron, was sent to North American waters with orders to rush to Quebec's defence in the event that the threat materialized.[12] However, for lack of funds the government was forced to disassociate itself from Beauharnais' plan for fortifying Quebec. Maurepas ordered the immediate cessation of construction and the calling of another assembly of notables and officers to discuss the future of the fortification. Beauharnais was to make it very clear to all those assembled that the government could not, and would not, assume the cost of the project. The assembly was to study whether it was not better to halt and tear down what had been done rather than to

---

ibid., CXV, ff. 324v-25; "Bordereau des dépenses employées dans l'addition au compte rendu à Monsieur de Georville Trésorier général de la marine pour l'Exercice 1746", Quebec, August 15, 1752, ibid., f. 358.

[12]"A M. le Duc d'Anville", Versailles, April 15, 1746, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXIV, f. 100; for an account of this expedition, see Guy Frégault, "L'Expedition du Duc D'Anville", RHAF, II (1948-49), 27-52.

continue. If the colonials were convinced of the necessity of such fortification, they were to find the means to finance it and proceed with the construction without awaiting further instructions from France. Irrespective of the assembly's decision, the government wanted to be reimbursed in full the amounts spent. This would have to be done by means of taxation, the nature of which, the colonials were left free to choose.[13]

At the end of July of 1746 a council composed of some of the main officers in Canada, representatives from the clergy, and the merchants of Quebec met in that town. The governor had hardly finished presenting the government's views, that a heated discussion began. Most of the merchants, who hitherto had been staunch advocates of the new fortification suddenly became strongly opposed to the continuation of the project. On the other hand, the clergy and military officers were determined to see the work completed. Beauharnais, seeing that tempers were red hot, decided to postpone an official vote for four days, during which time the officers who had been unable to attend were to express their views in writing. The rest of the persons

---

[13]"A Mrs. de Beauharnais et Hocquart", Versailles, March 7, 1746, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXIV, ff. 261-61v.

present, as well, would have had some time to consider carefully. At the following meeting, all the military officers, with one exception, voted for the continuation of the project. These votes, joined by those of the clergy and some of the merchants won a narrow victory. However, the question of a tax to defray the cost remained unsolved for tempers were still heated.[14] Thus the rapid construction, which by the summer of 1746, had been responsible for a good part of the walls being finished, came to a halt.[15] After much argument it was decided to increase the duty on alcoholic beverages. It was hoped that this increase would result in a yearly revenue ranging between 30 and 40,000 livres.[16] However, the merchants of Quebec remained unconvinced of the necessity to resume the construction. Consequently, the work could not proceed until they had agreed on a mode of financing the project.

---

[14]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 10, 1746, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXV, ff. 74-74v; "Procès verbal ou résultat de l'Assemblée au sujet des fortifications de Quebec 1746", Quebec, July 30, 1746, ibid., ff. 76-76v, 77v-78; Pontbriand to the Minister, Quebec, November 10, 1746, ibid., ff. 266-66v; Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 1, 1746, ibid., f. 329; Frégault, "Essai sur les Finances Canadiennes", p. 163; Roy, La Ville de Québec, II, 180.

[15]Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 31.

[16]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 10, 1746, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXV, f. 75.

The government acted quickly on this suggestion in January of 1747. The duty on alcoholic beverages was increased by one-third for three years.[17] Maurepas saw this law as temporary, until the full amount spent on the new fortification would be known. Since this sum was believed to be very high, the Minister did not think this new duty to be sufficient.[18] It was very important for the government to recuperate the full amount as soon as possible, for financial difficulties were increasing drastically. The war effort seemed to be prolonging itself into eternity. Since England had entered into the fray, the cost of maintaining Canada grew by leaps and bounds, to the point where Maurepas complained that the colony was absorbing most of his department's budget.[19] Consequently the Minister asked

---

[17] Lindsay, Edits Ordonnances Royaux, I, 589.

[18] "A Mrs. de Beauharnais et Hocquart", Versailles, January 23, 1747, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXV, ff. 174-174v.

[19] "A M. Hocquart", Versailles, April 3, 1747, ibid., f. 207; "A M. Hocquart", Versailles, March 13, 1747, ibid., f. 192. In 1745 the colony's expenses amounted to 1,301,723 livres and in the following they increased to 2,943,421 livres, "Mémoire au sujet de la situation des Finances du Canada de l'année MVII[c] quarante cinq", Quebec, October 30, 1748, ibid., Series C11A, CXV, f. 252v; "Balance des fonds ordonnés par les Etats du Roy et Recettes Extraordinaires pour les Exercices de 1746, 1747, 1748 et 1749 avec les Dépenses faites dans la Colonie sur ces Exercices, et du Montant de ces

that a new duty be levied so as to insure the rapid recuperation of the amount involved. Without trying to interfere in the heated debate in the colony over the new fortification of Quebec, Maurepas ventured to suggest that a duty on imports and exports of merchandise previously exempt would go a long way to fulfil the government's wish. Furthermore, Maurepas pointed out that this would be a very equitable form of taxation, since everyone would contribute.[20]

Although eight months had passed since work on the fortification had been stopped, no concrete decision had been reached with respect to the fate of the construction. At the previous assembly held on July 30, 1746, those in favour of continuing the work had won a narrow victory at the ballot box; unfortunately their victory was meaningless without the ability to raise the necessary funds. Thus the consent of the merchants

---

Dépenses avec les remises faites par les Trésoriers généraux au Trésorier particulier de Ladte. Colonie, au moyen de l'acquittement des Lettres de changes qu'il a tires sur Eux en Consequence de ces Dépenses", Quebec, October 27, 1750, ibid., CXVI, f. 332. Furthermore, the budget set by the government was constantly exceeded by large sums. For the period 1744-1746 inclusive, these excesses amounted to about 904,916 livres, Frégault, "Essai sur les Finances Canadiennes", p. 172.

[20]"A Mrs. de La Jonquière et Hocquart", Versailles, March 20, 1747, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXV, f. 198.

was essential. The latter, however, seemed more concerned about their pocket-books than with the safety of Quebec. Finally after almost a year spent in arguments, Beauharnais received unanimous consent and work on the fortification resumed in July of 1747.[21] To defray the cost, a three per cent duty was to be levied on imports and exports previously exempt from such taxation.[22] This legislation, passed in February of 1748, applied to 305 articles of import and 59 of export.[23] In agreeing to the resumption of construction the colonials asked for a deferrment of the new duty until the end of the war. The colony was going through a financially difficult period, since the war was responsible for a marked increase in the cost of living.[24] Because of English control of the sea lanes, goods were scarce in Canada,[25] and commerce was at low.

---

[21]Léry to the Minister, Quebec, October 10, 1747, ibid., Series C11A, LXXXIX, f. 198.

[22]Lindsay, Edits Ordonnances Royaux, I, 591-92.

[23]Frégault, "Essai sur les Finances Canadiennes", p. 164.

[24]Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, September 24, 1747, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXVIII, ff. 21-21v; Guy Frégault, François Bigot Administrateur Français (2 vols.; Ottawa, 1948), I, 311.

[25]Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, September 24, 1747, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXVIII, f. 22.

Consequently, to have levied the tax at that time would have increased the misery of the Canadians while the revenue would have been negligible. Meanwhile Maurepas, uneasy about the destination of certain armaments being readied in England,[26] began to fear for Quebec's safety. Maybe Beauharnais had been right all these years when he clamoured for a stone fortification at Quebec? One month prior to resumption of the construction at Quebec, the man chosen as interim governor of New France for the captive Pierre-Jacques de Taffanel, Marquis de La Jonquière, Roland-Michel Barrin, Comte de La Galissonière, was briefed by Maurepas on the history of the new fortification of Quebec, and ordered to determine its value. If he thought such fortification to be truly necessary, he was to resume work on the construction but with the greatest economy.[27] Shortly after La Galissonière's departure from France, the Minister of Marine received the news that the colonials had agreed to resume construction of the new fortification. Naturally, the

---

[26]Minister to M. de Barrailh, Pontchartrain, June 14, 1747, ibid., Series B, LXXXVI, f. 358v.

[27]"A. M. le Cte. de La Galissonière", Pontchartrain, June 13, 1747, ibid., f. 357.

report made him jubilant for now his department would not be saddled with the bill for a fortification which by then was considered to be necessary on both sides of the Atlantic. The French government readily acceded to the request to begin collecting the new duty at the conclusion of the war.[28] In the meantime, the cost of the work was to be met by the increased duty on alcoholic beverages and governmental subsidies.

By the time La Galissonière reached Quebec, work on the town's fortification had resumed. He proceeded to inspect the construction site and readily agreed to the need of such defence.[29] The fact that the colony was still at war made him stress the need of early completion of the work.[30] By the end of 1749, the governor's wish seemed well on its way to being realized. The French government was advised that most of the work had been completed.[31] One man, the new

---

[28]Lindsay, Edits Ordonnances Royaux, I, 608-609.

[29]"A M. le Cte. de La Galissonière", Marly, January 23, 1748, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXVII, f. 188v.

[30]La Galissonière to the Minister, Quebec, October 21, 1747, ibid., Series C11A, LXXXVII, f. 257v.

[31]La Jonquière and Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, October 23, 1749, ibid., XCIII, f. 46v; "A Mrs. de La Jonquière et Bigot", Versailles, May 19, 1750, ibid., Series B, XCI, f. 256; Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 31.

intendant of New France, François Bigot, failed to be impressed by this work. Since his arrival at Quebec in 1748, he had received little, if any, cooperation from Chaussegros. The engineer was very slow in reporting the yearly sums used in the construction, thus delaying the drawing up of the colony's yearly budget.[32] However, Bigot's main criticism was directed at the manner in which the transportation of necessary materials was paid. Payment was made for the cartload, but no record was kept of the individual quantities carted. Each driver received one chestnut per trip undertaken. The officials in charge were corrupt, giving more than the required number of chestnuts, and not checking whether the habitant had a full load or not. Since chestnuts were readily available, forgery was very easy.[33] The result was an expensive chaos. The cost of transportation in 1748 amounted to 125,229 livres 7 sols 6 deniers, when under ordinary circumstances the sum should not have exceeded 50,000

---

[32]Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, November 7, 1749, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCIII, ff. 422v-23.

[33]Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, November 3, 1748, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCII, ff. 177-77v. Chaussegros was sixty-six years old at the time: Pierre-Georges Roy, ed., Inventaire des de Lery-conservés aux Archives de la Province de Québec (3 vols.; Quebec, 1939-40), III, 80.

livres.[34] To support his accusation, the intendant stated that in the month of July of that year the transportation costs had exceeded those of the preceding month by 4,818 livres 2 sols, although the number of carts used had been greatly reduced.[35] Bigot was incensed by the engineer's refusal to mend his ways. The intendant attributed this refusal both to the engineer's involvement in the business of supplying carts for public works,[36] and to Chaussegros' tendency, now that he was well in his sixties, to shun work:

> M. de Léry rejette ma proposition de toiser les terres . . . cela donne de l'ouvrage à l'ingenieur au lieu que payant par maron il n'y en a nul.[37]

Because of his advanced age, Chaussegros did not have the energy and vigilance of a youth. Since he had become very lax in his approach to his work, he was taken advantage of and thus the Crown's service suffered. For example, the engineer did not seem to notice, or to care, that workers hired by the day worked the first

---

[34]La Galissonière and Bigot to the Minister, September 26, 1748, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCI, f. 39.

[35]"A Mrs. de La Jonquière et Bigot", Versailles, April 11, 1749, ibid., Series B, LXXXIX, f. 220.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, November 3, 1748, ibid., Series C11A, XLII, ff. 178-178v.

hour on the fortification and the rest of the day on private contracts. Bigot wondered whether it would not have been better to retire Chaussegros.[38]

The intendant's reports upset the new Minister of Marine, Antoine-Louis Rouillé, Comte de Jouy. His department had received such accusations in the past, but no attention had been paid to them. Bigot's statements confirmed the previous ones,[39] making Rouillé wonder about the quality of the fortification. If the engineer was so careless about the funds and his method of working, was he really more efficient in devising plans? The Minister severely castigated Chaussegros for his attitude,[40] yet this action did not ease his apprehension. But what could he do? He thought for a moment to implement Bigot's suggestion and retire the engineer, but he had to abandon this idea for lack of a suitable replacement.[41] Rouillé finally found a solution. He decided to send a qualified engineer from France to study the situation and then report back

---

[38]Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, October 12, 1749, ibid., XLIII, f. 286.

[39]"A M. Bigot", Versailles, April 11, 1749, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXIX, f. 218.

[40]"A M. de Léry", Versailles, June 7, 1750, ibid., XCI, f. 280v.

[41]"A Mrs. de La Jonquière et Bigot", Versailles, May 19, 1750, ibid., f. 261v.

personally to himself. The high rank and record of the man appointed, Lieutenant Colonel Louis Franquet, is proof of the importance attached to his mission. At the time of his appointment Franquet was fifty-three years old and had thirty years of experience as a military engineer. He had been chief engineer in Italy in 1736, and during the War of the Austrian Succession had taken part in the siege and capture of two of the strongest European fortresses, Bergen op Zoom in 1747 and the following year, Maestricht.[42] Franquet was to arrive at Quebec in 1751 and study the project being implemented. If there was need for any corrections, he was to draw the plans.[43] However, it was obvious to the Minister that the service would benefit if there was another qualified engineer in Canada. Since one could not be sent from France, Rouillé hit on the idea of having a good Canadian officer sent to France to be trained as an engineer. Although this process would take at least two years, it was believed to be better than doing nothing. The officer chosen, Michel Chartier Lotbinière, left for France in

---

[42] PAC, AG, Service technique du Génie, article 3, Dossier Louis Franquet.

[43] "A M. le Cte. D'Argenson", Versailles, February 20, 1750, PAC, AC, Series B, XCII, f. 80.

1750.[44] Rouillé, feeling that he had done his best, eagerly awaited Franquet's report. The Minister had to wait longer than anticipated, for the engineer did not reach Quebec until July of 1752.[45] This waiting period was made agonizing by the rapidly increasing cost of the fortification, which by the end of 1751 reached the fantastic sum of about 1,288,318 livres.[46] Furthermore,

---

[44]La Jonquière to the Minister, Quebec, September 16, 1750, ibid., Series C11A, XCV, f. 214.

[45]"A M. Rouillé", Quebec, October 30, 1752, PAC, AG, Bibliothèque du Génie MS In fo. 205b, f. 108.

[46]"Bordereau général de la recette et dépense faite en Canada pendant l'année 1746 dirigé suivant les Titres employés dans l'Etat du Roy Expedié sur cet Exercice", Quebec, October 24, 1751, PAC, AC, Series C11A, CXV, ff. 324v-25; "Bordereau des dépenses employées dans l'addition au compte rendu à Monsieur de Georville Trésorier général de la marine pour l'Exercice 1746", Quebec, August 15, 1752, ibid., f. 358; "Fortifications 1747 sur l'Exercice 1748", Quebec, October 15, 1747, ibid., CXVII, f. 163; "Fortifications 1748 sur l'exercice de la de. année", Quebec, November 3, 1748, ibid., CXVI, f. 74; "Bordereau Général de la Recette et Dépense faittes en Canada pendant l'année 1749. Dirigé suivant les Titres employés dans l'Etat du Roy arrêté le 10 May 1749", Quebec, October 21, 1751, ibid., ff. 234v-35; "Bordereau des Recettes et Dépenses employés dans le Compte rendu par le Sieur Imbert à M. Guillaume Pierre Tavernier de Boullogne Trésorier général des Colonies pour Dépenses faites en Canada pendant l'année 1750", Quebec, August 12, 1752, ibid., CXIX, f. 356v; "Bordereau Général de la dépense faites en Canada pendant L'année Mil Sept Cent Cinquante et Un, dirigé suivant les titres employés dans l'Etat du Roy expedié sur cet Exercice", Quebec, October 18, 1752, ibid., ff. 424v-25.

the criticism levied against the new walls of Quebec must have worried the Minister even more. It was claimed that they would be unable to withstand a regular attack for any length of time. Only powerful artillery could ensure a proper defence. Unfortunately Quebec lacked this, and furthermore, the existing batteries were in very poor condition.[47]

Shortly after having arrived at Quebec, Franquet confirmed Bigot's complaints. The engineer was disgusted and saddened by the prevalent poor attitude towards work for the Crown and the widespread corruption.[48] Before his arrival in Canada, Franquet had hoped to be able to study the fortification at Quebec together with Chaussegros and arrive at a mutual decision in the mode of construction and possible additions.[49] After having inspected the construction, Franquet concluded that Chaussegros was a mediocre engineer. Consequently Franquet offered to aid him in drawing the plans for the work still remaining to be done.[50] In spite of Franquet's willingness and his

---

[47]Chevalier Le Mercier to the Minister, Quebec, November 1, 1750, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCVI, ff. 168-68v.

[48]"A M. de Régemorte", Quebec, November 1, 1752, PAC, AG, Bibliothèque technique du Génie, MS In fo. 205b, f. 114.

[49]"A M. le Marquis de La Jonquière", Louisbourg, October 15, 1750, ibid., f. 20.

[50]"A M. Rouillé", Quebec, October 30, 1752, ibid., f. 111.

tact in offering to help,[51] Chaussegros refused to co-operate.[52] With respect to Bigot's report regarding abuses in the transportation of materials for the fortification, Franquet found that the old irregularities had been replaced by new ones. The engineer complained of the lack of proper quarries for supplying the necessary earth. In order to shorten their travelling time, the cart drivers would gather their load from any area they chose, the closer to the construction site the better. Thus some habitants were known to take earth from one construction site and cart it to an adjacent one,[53] while others ruined the King's highways in their quest for a quick cargo.[54] In order to do away with these irregularities Franquet suggested the enactment of a law forbidding the carting of earth in areas within approximately 120 feet from the glacis. No holes were to be dug in the process, but rather the

---

[51] Ibid.

[52] "A Mrs. Duquesne et Bigot", Versailles, June 8, 1753, PAC, AC, Series B, XCVII, f. 258.

[53] "Mémoire des corrections les plus urgentes à faire aux Ouvrages de cette Ville, et sur d'autres objets de rapport à la fortification", Quebec, July 25, 1753, PAC, MG 18, Series K, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, I, 246.

[54] Ibid., p. 247.

material was to be taken from the many rises in front of the line of defence. Furthermore, no earth was to be taken within approximately 180 feet from each side of a highway,[55] nor was it to be excavated within the city limits.[56] Franquet's criticism did not stop at the quarrying of earth, but included also its usage. Apparently it was not properly packed, and therefore, the embankment erected one year would partially collapse during the following, resulting in a constant expense and in prolongating work.[57] With respect to the fortification itself, Franquet ascertained that the walls as well as the counterscrap had been erected.[58] However, he was concerned over the lack of a proper ditch.[59] Apparently Chaussegros had never bothered digging one. Whatever such work may have existed was the result of his erecting a small counterscrap from

---

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., p. 248.

[57] Ibid., p. 246.

[58] Ibid., p. 234.

[59] Ibid., p. 238.

ground level.[60] Although Franquet claims that a counterscrap along the line of defence had been erected, the veracity of his statement is questionable, for he does not mention the existence of other works associated with a counterscrap, such as glacis and covered way. His statement is disputed by Sieur de Pontleroy, the engineer who succeeded Chaussegros in 1757. Pontleroy claimed that the fortification had no counterscrap.[61] Colonel Louis-Antoine de Bougainville reported that Quebec was without fortification,[62] implying that there was a total absence of a ditch and any work associated with one. Franquet may have been referring himself to just one area of the defences, for British records of 1759 indicate that a ditch and accompanying earthworks existed only north of St. John's Gate, at the extreme right of the line of fortification.[63] By not digging

---

[60]"A M. Rouillé", Quebec, October 30, 1752, PAC, AG, Bibliothèque de la Section technique du Génie MS In fo. 205b, f. 111; "Mémoire des Corrections les plus Urgentes a faire aux Ouvrages de cette Ville, et fur d'autres objets de rapport à la fortification", Quebec, July 25, 1753, PAC, MG 18, Series K, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, I, 238.

[61]Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 31; Allana Gertrude Reid, "The Development and Importance of the Town of Quebec 1608-1760" (Unpublished PhD. thesis, McGill University, 1950), p. 99.

[62]Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 31.

[63]Ibid., p. 32.

the required ditch before erecting the walls, Chaussegros repeated Beaucourt's mistake of 1712. Since the nature of the ground around Quebec is too rocky to enable the creation of a ditch by digging alone, blasting is necessary. Once the walls were erected, there was no way, without endangering them of making a ditch.[64] Therefore, Quebec's fortifications did not have the necessary protection from the effects of direct artillery fire. According to Franquet, in 1753 work still remained to be done on the terreplein and banquettes, furthermore the stone revetment of the interior parapet as well as the passage to the sentry boxes could be completed only in three or four years, to allow the earth to get firm. The engineer suggested modifications to these two areas as well as to the embrasures.[65] This was another serious weakness of the fortification. In eighteenth-century siegecraft, successful defence depended upon preventing the enemy from establishing his batteries on top of the fortress' glacis. This could be achieved

---

[64] Ibid.

[65] "Mémoire des Corrections les plus Urgentes a faire aux Ouvrages de cette Ville, et fur d'autres objets de rapport à la fortification", Quebec, July 25, 1753, PAC, MG 18, Series K, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, I, 234-36.

by sorties and powerful gunfire. Chaussegros, however, had his own theory about ensuring a good defence. In a manuscript treatise on fortification which he wrote and completed in 1714, he claimed that the only effective means of hindering an enemy's siegework, was through sorties to destroy his batteries. He did not seem to have any faith in the ability of the besieged to carry on a prolonged artillery duel with the attackers.[66] As a result, Quebec's fortification was designed according to this belief. Thus most of the embrasures were situated in the bastions' flanks, rather than in the faces.[67] Therefore, the French had the possibility of directing a very heavy flanking artillery fire in case an enemy attempted to scale the walls. However, with the exception of sorties, there was little they could have done to prevent an enemy from getting near enough to breach the walls which were not even defended by all the necessary earthworks. This weakness remained uncorrected throughout the French

---

[66] PAC, MG 18, Series K, "Traité de Fortification divisé en huit livres", pp. 421-22; Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 33.

[67] "Nombre d'embrasures qu'il y a au front du corps de la place de la fortification de la ville de Quebec et de l'artillerie à envoyer de France pour la garnir", Quebec, October 23, 1749, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCIII, ff. 224-24v; Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 33.

Régime.[68]

While Franquet was studying Quebec's defences and measures to improve them, across the Atlantic, at Versailles, it occurred to Rouillé that perhaps his department had been concentrating in fortifying one area of the town to the detriment of all others. Since 1716 it had been assumed that the Lower Town was properly defended by the existing batteries and thus needed no further strengthening. Rouillé, however, did not share this belief. He had deducted that the English would be tempted to repeat Phips' landing on the Beauport shore, and attack Quebec from that exposed area, rather than by-pass the town, land their troops and march down the Plains of Abraham. Consequently the Minister wanted the Lower Town rendered capable of withstanding an attack, and the Upper Town fortified against an attack launched by an enemy already in possession of the Lower Town. Franquet was informed of the Minister's wish and asked to devise plans for its implementation. The engineer also received a plan for the defence of the Lower Town which had been drawn up by a resident of Quebec and presented to Rouillé. Its main concern was the erection of a redan on

---

[68]Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 33.

Pointe à Carcy. The guns established there would command the roadstead, the mouth of the St. Charles River, as well as most of the shoreline of the Lower Town.[69] Franquet was quick to perceive the advantages of the redan, and incorporated it into his own two plans. The first of these, which he favoured, called for the construction of a wharf with a parapet on top facing the St. Lawrence River. All parts of this work were to flank one another. The line of defence for the Lower Town, facing the basin and mouth of the St. Charles River, was to enclose the docks and the Intendancy.[70] The second project consisted of erecting the line of fortification in front of the suburb St. Roch, to follow the same alignment as the work erected there in 1744 on Beauharnais' order.[71] In order to protect the Upper Town from attack by an enemy already in possession of the Lower Town, Franquet's plan called

---

[69]"A Mrs. de la Jonquière et Bigot", Marly, May 15, 1752, PAC, AC, Series B, XCV, f. 208.

[70]"A M. Rouillé", Quebec, October 30, 1752, PAC, AG, Bibliothèque de la Section technique du Génie MS In fo. 205b, f. 109.

[71]Ibid., f. 110; for more information on these two projects, see Louis Franquet, Voyages et Mémoires sur le Canada [1752-53] (Quebec, 1889), pp. 205-209.

for a wall. This work would have provided protection for the defenders' riflemen and the lines of communication.[72] In the summer of 1753, a tired and sick man, Franquet returned to France to present his report to the Minister of Marine.

While Franquet was preparing for his return home, financial difficulties were making Rouillé doubt whether he would ever be able to implement any of the engineer's suggestions, irrespective of their importance.[73] Since the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession, the expenses incurred by the Ministry of Marine in the maintenance of Canada were extremely heavy.[74] The cessation of hostilities in 1748 brought no relief to the department's strained treasury. Any hopes harboured by Maurepas and Rouillé to see the expenses substantially diminish proved to

---

[72]Franquet, Voyages et Mémoires, pp. 203-204; for moreinformation on the plan, see pp. 202-205.

[73]"A Mrs. Duquesne et Bigot", Versailles, June 8, 1753, PAC, AC, Series B, XCVII, f. 258v.

[74]"Balance des fonds ordonnés par les Etats du Roy et Recettes Extraordinaires pour les Exercices de 1746, 1747, 1748 and 1749 avec les Dépenses faites dans la Colonie sur ces Exercices, et du Montant de ces Dépenses avec les remises faites par les Trésoriers généraux au Trésorier particulier de Ladte. Colonie au moyen de l'acquitement des Lettres de changes qu'il a tires sur Eux en Consequence de ces Dépenses", Quebec, October 27, 1750, ibid., Series C11A, CXVI, f. 332; "Tableau des Dépenses jusques et compris l'année 1760", PAC, AE, Mémoires et Documents, Amérique, XI, f. 97.

be false. Only in 1749 had expenses been cut, but this amount was only of about 33,000 livres.[75] To the department's dismay, the decade begun in 1750 saw the expenses reach new and unthought of heights.[76] Since his appointment as Minister of Marine, Rouillé had asked repeatedly for the sums to be reduced, for his department could not support such costs.[77] In vain did he point out that he had a total of only five million livres with which to meet the cost of maintaining all the French colonies,[78] Canada's expenses in 1752 reached a new record of 4,099,028 livres.[79] Rouillé realized

---

[75]"Balance des fonds ordonnés par les Etats du Roy et Recettes Extraordinaires pour les Exercices de 1746, 1747, 1748 et 1749 avec les Dépenses faites dans la Colonie sur ces Exercices, et du Montant de ces Dépenses avec les remises faites par les Trésoriers généreaux au Trésorier particulier de Ladte. Colonie, au moyen de l'acquittement des Lettres de changes qu'il a tires sur Eux en Consequence de ces Dépenses", Quebec, October 27, 1750, PAC, AC, Series C11A, CXVI, f. 332.

[76]"Tableau des Dépenses faites en Canada Depuis 1750 jusques et compris l'année 1760", PAC, AE, Mémoires et Documents, Amérique, XI, f. 97.

[77]"A M. Bigot", Versailles, June 14, 1750, PAC, AC, Series B, XCI, f. 281; "A Mrs le Mis. de la Jonquière et Bigot", Versailles, June 6, 1751, ibid., XCIII, f. 184; "A M. Bigot", Versailles, February 28, 1752, ibid., f. 199v.

[78]"A Mrs. Duquesne et Bigot", Versailles, April 9, 1753, ibid., XCVII, f. 227v; Frégault, François Bigot, II, 73.

[79]"Tableau des Dépenses faites en Canada Depuis 1750 jusques et compris l'année 1760", PAC, AE, Mémoires et Documents, Amérique, XI, f. 97.

the need of properly fortifying Quebec, but where was he to get the money? The cost of the new fortification of Quebec was to be met by duties levied in Canada. However, if the government thought that the construction costs could be met by revenue from taxation, by 1753 it became clear that this notion was only an illusion. As can be seen by the figures in Table 1 in the Appendix, taxation revenue was never sufficient to meet the great cost of the fortification. As a result, Rouillé found himself in a financial squeeze. As far as the Minister could see, the great expenses incurred in Canada were responsible for the difficult situation in which he was presently. If these expenses were to diminish, then there would have been enough funds for the fortification of Quebec. Therefore he appealed to the governor of New France to do his utmost to reduce the cost of sustaining the colony.[80] While the Minister was anxiously awaiting the result of his request, he studied Franquet's suggestions. When Rouillé was informed of the amount of the expenses incurred by Canada in 1753, he was shocked. They exceeded, by over 300,000 livres, the total budget allotted that year for all the French

---

[80]"A M. le Mis Duquesne", Versailles, June 30, 1753, PAC, AC, Series B, XCVII, ff. 267-67v.

colonies.[81] There now was no way to finance Franquet's plan which the Minister had just approved. He was unwilling, however, to abandon the hope of eventually being able to implement the project. Maybe if he were to wait a year, the financial situation would change, especially if the colonial officials were to finally heed the yearly demands of the Minister for reducing the expenses.[82] Consequently the governor and intendant of New France were informed that no orders would be given with respect to Franquet's project until 1755. In the meantime the two officials were to see that only the minimum work possible was done on the existing walls.[83] This order was complied with, but whatever work was done was of poor quality.[84] Rouillé's hope of seeing the expenses diminish was realized in 1754.

---

[81]"Tableau des Dépenses faites en Canada Depuis 1750 jusques et compris l'année 1760", PAC, AE, Mémoires et Documents, Amérique, XI, f. 97.

[82]"A M. Bigot", Versailles, June 14, 1750, PAC, AC, Series B, XCI, f. 281; "A Mrs le Mis. de La Jonquière et Bigot", Versailles, June 6, 1751, ibid., XCIII, f. 184; "A M. Bigot", Versailles, February 28, 1752, ibid., f. 199v.

[83]"A Mrs. Duquesne et Bigot", Versailles, June 6, 1754, ibid., XCIX, f. 214.

[84]Franquet to Lotbinière, Louisbourg, January 4, 1755, PAC, MG 18, Series K, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, I, 274.

The amount spent was still very high, almost four and one half million livres, but this at least was a reduction of about sixteen per cent over the previous year.[85] However, the new Minister of Marine, Jean-Baptiste Machault D'Anouville, was unable to follow his predecessor's plan. During the year 1755 the English were active on the high seas and in North America, where they sent Major-General Edward Braddock with two regiments of British regulars.[86] Although war had not yet been officially declared, Machault's department had to make expensive preparations to counteract those of the British. Consequently Franquet's project of fortification was shelved. On the eve of the official declaration of war in 1756, the Intendant Bigot remarked that the fortification of Quebec was still incomplete and that lack of funds forced cessation of the construction.[87] Thus at the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, Quebec, which was to be able to withstand a regular

---

[85]"Tableau des Dépenses faites en Canada Depuis 1750 jusques et compris l'année 1760", PAC, AE, Mémoires et Documents, Amérique, XI, f. 97.

[86]Stanley, New France, p. 91.

[87]Bigot to Lotbinière, Quebec, April 10, 1756, PAC, MG 18, Series K, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, I, 313.

attack, had defences incapable of so doing. The Lower Town was open, its defences no better than in 1744, obviously vulnerable to an attack from the Beauport shore. The Upper Town, although enclosed by a stone wall, was not much better defended. The fortification was overly exposed to enemy gunfire, and the embrasures were improperly situated.

While the French government was spending so much time and money in trying to properly fortify Quebec, little was done to strengthen the colony's other fortifications. At the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession Governor Beauharnais was concerned with the safety of Montreal and the southern frontier. For the past decade, the Minister of Marine had claimed that in case of war with England, the enemy would concentrate its efforts along the southern frontier. In that case, Beauharnais felt that Montreal and Fort Saint-Frédéric, the main defences of this frontier, had to be strengthened, since he rightly did not think them to be a serious deterrent to a determined enemy.[88] However, what if the area was to be raided by war parties in the tradition of Indian warfare? The raiders might slip past Saint-Frédéric and by fire and

---

[88]Stanley, New France, p. 12.

scalping terrorize the habitants. These farmers had to have the assurance that, in case of a raid, they would have a safe refuge. Consequently the governor ordered the restoration in all the settlements of the old forts and even the construction of new ones.[89] To strengthen Montreal's defences, a battery was erected on the Coteau Saint-Louis, and gun platforms were placed in the fortification's flanks.[90] Unfortunately artillery was a luxury. The new works had to remain partially unarmed, since the town's total number of guns amounted to only thirty-eight.[91] Maurepas beset by the problem of sustaining the war effort on many fronts, was unable to fulfill the request for eighty-seven guns, twenty-six swivel guns and three mortars, which were felt to be necessary for the colony's defences.[92] By the end

---

[89]Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 8, 1744, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXI, ff. 142-42v; Stanley, New France, p. 12.

[90]"A Mrs. de Beauharnais et Hocquart", Versailles, March 31, 1745, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXI, f. 252v.

[91]Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 8, 1744, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXI, f. 143v.

[92]"Etat de l'artillerie nécessaire pour les villes et Forts de la colonie", Quebec, October 17, 1744, ibid., f. 52.

of the shipping season in 1746, only twenty pieces of artillery had been received in Canada.[93] Five years after the completion of the battery and platforms, the Minister of Marine was still besieged by demands for guns to properly equip Montreal.[94] No work other than some small repairs to the town's gates and walls was done.[95] At Fort Saint-Frédéric, repairs carried out were to the buildings rather than the walls.[96] Beauharnais may have wanted to strengthen the walls, an enterprise which would have been long and costly, but time and money were luxuries which the governor could not afford. Guns were still the best deterrent to a raid. All war parties were comprised to Indians who, in awe of the effects of gunfire, usually refused to attack a place equipped with artillery. Consequently at the outbreak of hostilities, Beauharnais proceeded to increase the fort's artillery. Due to lack of

---

[93]"Estat de l'artillerie, armes et autres munitions de guerre reçues à Quebec jusques au premier Octobre 1746", Quebec, last day of October, 1746, ibid., f. 269.

[94]"A la ville de Montreal", Quebec, October 23, 1749, ibid., XCIII, f. 226v.

[95]"Dépenses à l'occasion de la guerre 4 dernier mois 1746 et 8 premier mois 1747", Montreal, September 1, 1747, ibid., CXVII, f. 150v.

[96]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 11, 1744, ibid., LXXXI, ff. 10-10v.

artillery in the colony, he had to strip Fort Chambly of its guns in order to equip Saint-Frédéric. This move, in addition to increasing the garrison, was as much as the governor felt able to do.[97] Although this strengthening was sufficient against Indian warfare, what if the enemy was to attempt a more serious enterprise? Beauharnais did not think the fort able to sustain a determined attack.[98] In order to prevent such a threat from materializing, the governor decided to resume the policy of frontier raids.[99] He hoped that the Franco-Indian war parties would be able to force the enemy to concentrate in defending his own frontier rather than launch any attacks. This policy was successful, and for the rest of the war Saint-Frédéric was utilized as a base for these parties.[100] The fort depended for its supplies on Montreal. Since it took up to three days for goods to reach the fort

---

[97]Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 8, 1744, ibid., f. 142v.

[98]Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 8, 1744, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXI, f. 142v.

[99]W. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760, Histories of the American Frontier Series (Montreal and Toronto, 1969), p. 151.

[100]Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 31, 1747, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXVIII, f. 194v.

and the war parties consumed great quantities of supplies, it was decided in 1746 to use Fort Chambly as a depot.[101] However, the logistics problems of Saint-Frédéric still remained great. Consequently, to alleviate them and to shorten the communication with Montreal, construction was begun in 1748 on Fort Saint-Jean. The fort was situated above the Saint-Jean rapids to allow the barge carrying the goods to Saint-Frédéric to dock nearby. In order to shorten the time needed for reinforcements to reach Saint-Frédéric, a road connecting Saint-Jean to La Prairie was constructed. Now the fort could receive aid within forty-eight hours.[102] When completed the new fort consisted of stone bastions at the angles and wooden curtains.[103] However, if attacked, it is doubtful whether the fort could have put up much of a resistance, since it had a poor field of fire and lacked a water supply within the confines.[104]

---

[101]Beauharnais to the Minister, Quebec, October 28, 1746, ibid., LXXXV, ff. 224v-225.

[102]La Galissonière and Bigot to the Minister, September 26, 1748, ibid., XCI, ff. 38-38v; Stanley, New France, p. 34.

[103]Franquet, Voyages et Mémoires, p. 125.

[104]Ibid., p. 126.

During the period following the War of the Austrian Succession and the outbreak of the Seven Years' War nothing was done to strengthen the colony's forts, with the exception of some small repairs. The government maintained that the forts were in a good state of defence against a surprise attack,[105] which could be carried out only by war parties. The French government now believed that in a future war with England, Indian warfare would predominate on Canada's southern and western frontier. In such an event, the government was right in thinking these defences to be appropriate. The government's faith in the defences of Montreal and the colony's forts was shared by such high ranking officers as La Jonquière, Ange de Menneville, Marquis Duquesne and Franquet. However, they doubted whether these defences would be able to resist a determined enterprise. This belief is reflected in the reports received in France depicting the condition of these fortifications.

---

[105] "Memoire du Roy pour servir d'instruction au Sieur Mis. de La Jonquière Chef d'Escadre des armées navales Gouverneur Lieutenant Général de la Nouvelle France", Versailles, April 30, 1749, PAC, AC, Series B, LXXXIX, f. 253; "Memoire du Roy pour servir d'Instruction au Sieur Mis. Duquesne Capitaine de vaisseau Gouverneur et Lieutenant Général de la Nouvelle France", Marly, May 15, 1752, ibid., XCV, f. 215.

During his stay in the colony, Franquet visited Montreal and the forts guarding the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route. He was particularly shocked by the poor condition of Fort Saint-Frédéric and Montreal. The former was dominated by a nearby height and the walls could withstand only musket fire. Furthermore, the lack of a well would have made it extremely difficult for the garrison to sustain a siege.[106] With respect to Montreal, he found the flanks to be too small and the flanking angles too large.[107] The battery built on Coteau Saint-Louis in 1744, the main work done to strengthen the town's defences during the War of the Austrian Succession, was looked upon by Franquet with derision:

> Indépendement de ces ouvrages [the town's walls], est la batterie royale . . . construite moins en vue d'augmenter la deffense de la place, que pour y faire les saluts et rejouissances publiques.[108]

To Franquet's account was added those of Governors La Jonquière and Duquesne. Upon arriving in Canada in 1749, La Jonquière was amazed that the western approach to Montreal was defended by such a work of

---

[106] Franquet, Voyages et Mémoires, pp. 164-65.

[107] Ibid., p. 117.

[108] Ibid.

defence as Fort Frontenac. This fort, like the rest of the colony's fortifications, had been strengthened during the War of the Austrian Succession. The work begun here by Chaussegros prior to the outbreak of hostilities was continued. This consisted of opening a few loopholes and erecting a wooden palisade to prevent a direct scaling attack.[109] However, this did not change the fact that the fort could not resist a determined attack. Furthermore, it was too badly situated to prevent an enemy from going on to attack Montreal.[110] La Jonquière claimed that the fort needed much repairing before it could be considered to be in a good state of defence.[111] The governor did not consider it worthwhile to undertake the expense of strengthening the walls since this work would not have improved the fort's ability to deter an invasion of Canada through the west. To do so, a more advantageous location would have to be chosen. In view of this and the poor state

---

[109]Beauharnais and Hocquart to the Minister, Quebec, October 11, 1744, PAC, AC, Series C11A, LXXXI, f. 9; Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 70.

[110]La Jonquière to the Minister, Quebec, October 31, 1749, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCIII, ff. 208v-209; Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 70.

[111]La Jonquière to the Minister, Quebec, October 31, 1749, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCIII, ff. 208v-209.

of the colony's finances, La Jonquière wondered whether it would not have been better to abandon the fort.[112] After reconsidering the situation, the governor realized that the true value of the post was as a supply depot for the western posts and a harbour for the ships supplying Fort Niagara.[113] He decided that these were sufficient reasons to maintain Fort Frontenac. To further safeguard the line of communication between Frontenac and Montreal, La Jonquière readily agreed to the project presented to him by the Abbé François Picquet to establish a mission at the mouth of the Oswegatchie River, the French La Présentation. To obtain Rouillé's permission for this project, the governor pointed out three advantages. Firstly, the mission would entice Iroquois to settle there and thus reduce the number of Indians available to the English war parties.[114] This was crucial since the success of these parties depended upon the presence of Indian allies. Secondly, it would prevent the English colonials

---

[112] Ibid.; Sylvain Girerd, L'oeuvre militaire de La Galissonière au Canada (Saint-Etienne, 1902), p. 34.

[113] La Jonquière to the Minister, Quebec, October 10, 1750, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCV, ff. 278-78v.

[114] Stanley, New France, p. 41.

from occupying the area and thus sever direct communication with Fort Frontenac. Thirdly, it would attract some trade away from the English Fort Oswego.[115] In 1750, with governmental approval, the engineer Sieur de La Morandière, was put in charge of constructing a small wooden fort at La Présentation.[116] The fort was equipped with five small guns.[117] This was strictly for psychological reasons. These two-pounders were almost without any value against a determined attack, but in the Indian mind, anything that had cannons was considered to be a very strong fortification.[118]

La Jonquière's comments on Fort Frontenac were not the last to be made on the state of defence

---

[115]La Jonquière to the Minister, Quebec, October 31, 1749, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCIII, ff. 51-52; Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Vol. V: Zones of International Friction; the Great Lakes Frontier, Canada, the West Indies, India, 1748-1754 (New York, 1942), p. 103; Stanley, New France, p. 41.

[116]La Jonquière and Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, October 24, 1750, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCV, f. 104v.

[117]La Jonquière and Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, October 31, 1749, ibid., XCIII, f. 53; Gipson, The British Empire, V, 103; Stanley, New France, p. 84.

[118]Stanley, New France, p. 84.

of a fort which guarded an important frontier. La Jonquière's successor, Marquis Duquesne, was particularly concerned about Fort Saint-Frédéric. Although the new governor had probably been informed by Franquet of the fort's weaknesses, he was really shaken by the report made by the masons, in 1754, sent to carry out some repairs. They were afraid to work on the platforms, lest the vibrations caused by their hammering would cause parts of the walls to crumble.[119] These masons were convinced that the guns could not be used without endangering the walls' very existence.[120] This news came at a particularly bad time, for the new governor feared that the mounting friction between French and English in the Ohio Valley would result in war. With the southern frontier guarded by a dilapitated fort, Duquesne was understandably worried.[121] However, he lacked the funds with which to repair this strategic work. In order to obtain the financial resources, he suggested to the Minister stopping the construction of Quebec's fortification. He claimed that

---

[119]Duquesne to the Minister, Quebec, October 10, 1754, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCIX, f. 268.

[120]Stanley, New France, p. 89.

[121]Duquesne to the Minister, Quebec, October 10, 1754, PAC, AC, Series C11A, XCIX, f. 268.

this work was close to completion and therefore the funds could be used more advantageously at Saint-Frédéric.[122] This suggestion was shelved by a Minister who at the time was more concerned with Quebec's defences rather than with that of the southern frontier. During the period he still remained in Canada, Duquesne had time to reconsider the defence of the southern frontier. He concluded that Saint-Frédéric had too many weaknesses to really be worth repairing, and that it was better to erect a new one a little further south, at Ticonderoga, where the waters of Lake George flow into those of Lake Champlain. Thus when in 1755 he departed for France, he recommended to his successor, Pierre de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil-Cavagnal, to proceed with such a work.[123]

Meanwhile the situation in the Ohio Valley was rapidly deteriorating. In July of 1755, in an attempt to expel the French from that area, General Braddock with his regiments of regular infantry marched against Fort Duquesne. His campaign came to an abrupt halt with his unexpected defeat at the Monongahela.

---

[122] Ibid., f. 270.

[123] Stanley, New France, pp. 89-90; Roy, Hommes et Choses, p. 103.

News of his defeat along with some captured documents reached Quebec later that year. These papers revealed that Braddock's expedition was part of a larger offensive aimed at pushing the French out of areas which the English claimed as their own.[124] Braddock's campaign marked the first time that the English had used regular troops against Canada. However, of even greater significance were the events on Canada's southern frontier. There an English colonial army led by Sir William Johnson and equipped with heavy artillery set out to capture Saint-Frédéric.[125] Although Johnson defeated the French troops sent against him, his campaign failed to reach its objective. This campaign marked a precedent in the annals of the wars between the French colony and her southern neighbours. Never before on the Canadian frontier had colonials marched with siege artillery against an enemy post. The upcoming

---

[124]Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Vol. VI: The Great War for the Empire; the Years of Defeat, 1754-1757 (New York, 1946), 71; Stanley, New France, p. 92.

[125]"Captain Eyre to Robert Napier", Camp near Albany, July 27, 1755, Stanley McCrory Pargellis, ed. and introd., Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle (New York and London), p. 128; Gipson, The British Empire, VI, 165-66.

war was going to be different from previous ones. The enemy was no longer seeking a few scalps, or to burn a number of dwellings. Both sides were looking for decisive results, and in an attempt to achieve them, were going to use European troops and methods. Although Indian warfare still continued to be used by both sides, it was no longer the primary mode of fighting. The use of regular troops ensured that important campaigns were conducted along European lines. On the eve of the Seven Years' War, the French found themselves with works of defence which were not geared for the type of attack to which they would be exposed.

The new governor of New France, Vaudreuil, had arrived at Quebec shortly before the French victory at the Monongahela and promptly found himself in a dilemma. In order to put all of the colony's fortifications into a good state of defence, he would have had to order just about their reconstruction. This was out of the question because of the lack of time, human and financial resources. It was obvious to Vaudreuil that he had to concentrate only in the area he considered to be in greatest danger. He thought that the southern frontier demanded his immediate attention. Johnson's victory had opened the road to Saint-Frédéric. It was

clear to the governor that the fort's walls, only two and one half feet thick,[126] would not have withstood the English guns.[127] Vaudreuil recalled that Duquesne had advised the erection of a new fort at Ticonderoga. As a result the engineer, Lotbinière, was sent to inspect the region. He agreed with Duquesne's choice.[128] Without seeking the approval from France, in the autumn of 1755, Vaudreuil ordered the engineer to proceed immediately with the work.[129] Due to the lack of time and labour force, the new fort, named Vaudreuil, later renamed Carillon, was constructed of wood.[130] The following year the work was considered sufficiently advanced for the fort to receive its artillery.[131]

---

[126]Le Chevalier Le Mercier to the Minister, Quebec, October 20, 1755, PAC, AC, Series C11A, C, f. 170.

[127]Vaudreuil to the Minister, Montreal, October 31, 1755, ibid., f. 137.

[128]Vaudreuil to the Minister, Montreal, September 25, 1755, ibid., Series F3, XIV, f. 157.

[129]Vaudreuil to the Minister, Montreal, September 25, 1755, PAC, AC, Series F3, XIV, f. 157v; Vaudreuil to Lotbinière, Montreal, September 29, 1755; ibid., MG 18, Series K, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, I, 295; Stanley, New France, p. 104.

[130]Lotbinière to the Minister, Carillon, October 31, 1756, PAC, AC, Series C11A, CI, f. 333v.

[131]"Canada", July, 1756, ibid., ff. 378v-79.

However, in spite of Vaudreuil's continual pleas to rapidly complete the construction,[132] the chief engineer in Canada, in the winter of 1758, had to report that the fort was still unfinished.[133] Furthermore, it seems that the fort had been poorly done. Since the gun platforms were too narrow and badly placed, the defenders were able to oppose only two cannons to each enemy battery. The fort had no ditch, covered way or counterscrap. Two half-moons covered the most exposed fronts, however, their parapet was too high, thus blocking the line of fire from the fort's embrasures.[134] Moreover, the fort was poorly sited.[135] This work of defence was considered to be so insufficient, that by 1758 the need for a new and better sited fort, was brought forward. Because of the cost incurred by the war, the construction was to be carried out only at the conclusion of hostilities.[136]

---

[132]Vaudreuil to Lotbinière, Montreal, November 18, 1755, ibid., MG 18, Series K, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, I, 301-302; Vaudreuil to Lotbinière, Montreal, January 27, 1756, ibid., p. 306; Vaudreuil to Lotbinière, Montreal, June 24, 1757, ibid., p. 355.

[133]Pontleroy to the Minister, Quebec, December 1, 1758, PAC, AC, Series C11A, CIII, f. 404v.

[134]Maurice Sautai, Montcalm au Combat de Carillon, 8 juillet 1758 (Paris, 1909), p. 35.

[135]Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, p. 174.

[136]Anonymous memoir, Carillon, August 1, 1758, PAC, MG 18, Series K, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, I, 398.

Fort Carillon was the only extensive work of defence which the French were able to undertake on the eve of the Seven Years' War. At Quebec the batteries were readied, while at St.-Frédéric the artillery was increased.[137] With respect to Fort Frontenac, the troops camped there erected some retrenchements.[138] Considering the fort's condition and location:

> . . . Les Murs non pas deux pieds depais et ne sont pas revetu ny terrassés, le Terplain du rampart est fait avec des Madriées etanconnés, quand on tirre une des pieces de Canons qui y sont tout Le fort sen ressent il est en general très mauvais par la Situation et la Construction . . .[139]

these retrenchements were the most that could be done.

During the Seven Years' War, with the exception of the work done at Carillon, no major construction was done to enable the colony's fortifications to withstand a regular attack. The reason for this is to be attributed to the lack in the colony of three necessary

---

[137] Vaudreuil to the Minister, Montreal, September 25, 1755, PAC, AC, Series F3, XIV, f. 157v.

[138] Ibid., f. 159v; Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 73.

[139] "L'Adjuant Malartic au Comte D'Argenson", PAC, AG, Archives Anciennes, Correspondance, Vol. 3405, pièce 119, pp. 211-24, Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 443.

elements: manpower, funds and engineers. Canada did not have enough men to send out on the numerous campaigns necessary, cultivate the land and work on the fortifications. To transform the existing works of defence into first class ones would have entailed much work and a considerable amount of time and money, impossible luxuries during that period. As of 1755, Canada's expenses increased by leaps and bounds with every passing year. The French treasury, burdened with the task of financing a war waged on three continents, was unable to keep pace.[140] When it came to the allocation of the yearly sums received from France, fortification projects could not be placed at the top of the priority list. Throughout the war there was also a lack of engineers in the colony.[141] It seems that the French government was unable to spare enough engineers from the other theatres of war. Unable to properly strengthen the fortifications, the French concentrated their efforts in attempting to prevent the enemy from reaching the walls of their fortifications.

---

[140]"Tableau des Dépenses faites au Canada Depuis 1750 jusques et compris l'année 1760", PAC, AE, Mémoires et Documents, Amérique, XI, f. 97.

[141]Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, April 12, 1756, PAC, AC, Series F3, XIV, f. 236v; Desandrouins to the Minister, Montreal, August 28, 1756, ibid., Series C11A, CI, f. 351; Pontleroy to the Minister, Quebec, October 28, 1758, ibid., CIII, f. 401v.

However, the only extensive such work was done at Quebec and in defence of the western and southern approaches to Montreal. With respect to the former, field fortifications were carried out on the Beauport shore to prevent an enemy from landing. New batteries were erected,[142] and fire ships prepared.[143] In 1759, while English troops marched towards Montreal via the Lake Champlain and down the St. Lawrence river, the French erected some works of defence on Ile-aux-Noix,[144] at the northern entrance to Lake Champlain and constructed Fort Lévis on Oracointon Island, a little above La Présentation.[145] In their attempt to defend their poor fortifications, the French counted on their troops to defeat the enemy before he could reach the defences. As long as French troops were victorious on the battlefield, the fortifications were secure. However, when these troops were defeated, or too few in numbers to prevent the enemy from reaching the works of defence, these were surrendered, abandoned, or destroyed by the French themselves. Thus in the summer of 1758 Fort Frontenac,

---

[142] Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 36.

[143] Ibid., p. 38.

[144] Stanley, New France, p. 237.

[145] Ibid., p. 220.

lacking troops to defend the approach to it, surrendered within forty-eight hours of being attacked by the troops of Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet.[146] The following year, after Montcalm's defeat at the Plains of Abraham, the French army retreated west and five days later Quebec surrendered.[147] As a result of the lack of troops to oppose the English army invading Canada from the south, the French destroyed Saint-Frédéric and Carillon.[148] With the exception of forts Lévis and Ile-aux-Noix, all the forts guarding the approaches to Montreal were destroyed or abandoned by their occupants.[149] By September 1760 Vaudreuil saw three British armies approach Montreal and set up camp before the town's walls. In view of the poor fortification and the insufficient number of French regulars, Vaudreuil surrendered the town and with it, New France.[150]

---

[146]Preston and Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac, p. 79.

[147]Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Vol. VII: The Great War for the Empire; the Victorious Years, 1758-1760 (New York, 1949), 424.

[148]Ibid., pp. 363-364; Pieree Hêliot, "La Campagne du Régiment De La Sarre au Canada 1756-1760", RHAF, III (1949-1950), 526.

[149]Stanley, New France, pp. 254, 256; Gipson, The British Empire, VII, 450.

[150]Stanley, New France, p. 258.

CONCLUSION

French governmental policy towards the fortifications in Canada was concerned with providing adequate defences against two distinct enemies, that is, on one hand Indians and English colonials, and on the other British regulars. Since these used two different types of warfare, the French colony required two types of fortification. A simple, but well-constructed wooden fort mounted with a number of cannons was sufficient to resist an attack by Indians or English colonials who used Indian warfare. Since a British enterprise, on the other hand, would involve artillery and trained troops, the work of defence would have to be constructed along European notions of fortification. Such works, unlike the simple wooden fort were extensive and thus required vast expenditures of money, manpower and time. After the almost century-long war between the French and the Iroquois had ended in 1701, the British threat to the French colony gradually became primary. Consequently the need for a European-type fortification in that area

thought to be in danger of a British attack grew accordingly. Therefore, the French government concentrated its efforts in fortifying that area, while fortifications in the rest of the colony were left to make do with whatever could be spared from the main effort. From 1700, the year when the first plan for a European-type fortification was accepted, until the end of the French Régime, the government shifted its main effort from Quebec to Montreal and the southern frontier and back to the former.

After 1690 Quebec was believed to be the most likely to face a regular attack and hence the government concentrated its efforts in fortifying that town. Although its reasoning was correct, the government proved to be short-sighted in the plans it tried to implement. These projects called for a great amount of construction and consequently created the need for vast funds. These plans were accepted at times when the persons responsible for their acceptance should have realized that France would be unable to meet such financial commitments.

When Minister Pontchartrain accepted Levasseur's plan in 1700, he committed his government to sustain a long-term and costly program of construction. At the

time, it was obvious to most European diplomats that the imminent death of the Spanish monarch, Charles II, would result in a European war. Pontchartrain should have known that his country's interest in the Spanish succession would involve her in the hostilities. Consequently French financial and human resources would not be available for the colony. For these reasons, he should have rejected Levasseur's project. By doing the opposite he was condemning it to eternalizing itself. When France was finally again at peace, the French government pursued its main aim of fortification, that is, that of Quebec. Once more it embarked upon a vast project which would have required large sums. The government should have realized that its treasury, exhausted by the previous war would be hard-pressed to provide the necessary funds. The further deterioration of the financial situation, forced the stoppage of the construction very shortly after its acceptance.

By the time the French treasury was able to pay for this fortification, the government had changed its policy. The French government hoped that in the event of war with England it could isolate the latter. The advantage of such action would have been that England would have had to concentrate her efforts in

Europe, thus limiting her ability to intervene in North America. The expense and hardship involved in an attack on Quebec, coupled with the above-mentioned diplomatic goal, led the French government to rule out the probability of such an enterprise. It believed that England's role in an attack on Canada would be limited to sending an army to help her colonials in a land invasion. The government was foolish to dismiss the need of fortifying Quebec. With that town in their possession, the British would have been able to render New France untenable to the French. Direct communication with and supplies from France would have had to come to a stop. The only link with the mother country would have been by way of Louisiana. This route was too long and hazardous to enable passage of the necessary supplies for sustaining the colony. Left on its own, it is doubtful whether New France could have withstood the English attack that was bound to follow the fall of the colony's capital.

Since the French government now believed a British invasion via the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route probable, it concentrated its resources in the completion of Montreal's walls and the erection of Fort Saint-Frédéric. However, these two fortifications were

constructed in such manner that they would not have been able to withstand such an attack. With respect to Montreal, the government was heavily subsidizing a fortification which originally was not meant to fulfill the role now bestowed upon it. When the project was accepted in 1717, it was out of convenience rather than strategic necessity. At that time, trees necessary for repairing the wooden stakes with which the town was enclosed, were becoming scarce. Since the government did not believe then that in an upcoming war British troops would attack the town, it approved the erection of walls only three feet thick. These would have been ample protection against a colonial or Indian attack, but could not have resisted concentrated artillery fire. This construction was to be financed by the town. In 1721 Montreal was devastated by fire. Montrealers, with the exception of the Saint Sulpice Seminary, were granted a three year moratorium on their tax. In spite of the fact that financial difficulties were forcing the government to halt the fortification of Quebec, it proceeded to finance the construction at Montreal. Albeit the government thought its financial intervention to be only temporary, there was no reason for this action. In time of war Quebec, rather than Montreal,

was still considered to be the object of a British attack. Consequently the government should have saved whatever funds it was ready to spend at Montreal, until France's economic situation would have permitted the resumption of Quebec's fortification. In 1729, when the government changed its policy towards the construction of fortifications, Montreal's walls were half completed. In order to enable the town to withstand the British attack that the French government now believed would be forthcoming in an upcoming war, the fortification already erected should have been demolished, and replaced with a new stronger one. Instead, great sums were advanced in order to complete the construction already begun.

The construction of Fort Saint-Frédéric was justified by the fact that during the 1730's an invasion of Canada by British troops was believed probable. The great expense incurred in implementing this project should have guaranteed a formidable fortification. Unfortunately, the engineer in charge of the work proved to be incompetent. He did not take advantage of the terrain, nor did he provide the fort with a well. Thus the garrison was forced to depend on Lake Champlain for water. During peace time this was annoying, but in case

of attack it would have been an exceedingly difficult and dangerous task. There was no ditch to protect the walls from direct artillery fire. Furthermore the walls were not strong enough, and within a few years, some parts were in danger of crumbling. The fort was in no position to withstand a concentrated attack.

As a result of the above change in policy, Quebec lacked a fortification capable of withstanding a regular attack when England entered into the War of the Austrian Succession. The fall of Louisbourg in 1745 raised the threat of an imminent such attack on Quebec. Financial difficulties forced the French government to disassociate itself from the expensive project of fortification which had begun to be implemented in 1745. Thus construction came to a halt while the colonials discussed the means by which they were to pay for this project. Work finally resumed in 1747. The government had been assured that the colonials would assume the full cost of a fortification which by then was considered by both sides to be essential. This promise was never kept, and a Ministry of Marine, burdened with the rising cost of maintaining Canada, had to defray the expense of Quebec's fortification. By the outbreak of the Seven Years' War,

financial difficulties forced the construction to come to a halt, with the fortification still incomplete. This work of defence was of little value against a regular attack for the lack of a proper ditch and associated works, rendered the town's walls very vulnerable to enemy gunfire. Furthermore, the poor location of embrazures made it very hard for the defenders to successfully use their artillery to prevent the enemy from reaching the walls. As we have seen, the Upper Town of Quebec was poorly defended in 1756. The Lower Town was in no better condition. The reason was that the plans for the fortification of Quebec accepted prior to 1753, had always aimed at fortifying the Upper Town. It was assumed that the Lower Town was properly defended by the existing batteries. This view was foolish. An enemy could have landed on the Beauport shore, and from there crossed the St. Charles River and marched into the town. By the time the government had realized the need to strengthen that part of Quebec, financial difficulties had made it impossible. Consequently, at the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, although well over one million livres had been spent since 1745 in an attempt to render Quebec able to withstand a regular attack, the town was

not in a much better position to do so then than ever before.

When the fortification of Quebec became, once more, the government's main concern, no further strengthening of the colony's other works of defence was undertaken. Once again, it was believed that, with the exception of Quebec, Canada would be attacked only by a mixed force of colonials and Indians fighting according to Indian warfare. Braddock's march into the Ohio Valley in 1755 and Johnson's campaign in the Lake Champlain area shattered this belief. In the upcoming war with the English, they would devote considerable efforts to conquer New France. The English colonies would no longer fight alone against the French, they would have the active support of the British army and navy.

Unfortunately the French fortifications guarding the avenues of invasion were incapable of withstanding a determined attack. It was now too late to properly strengthen these works of defence. To do so, would have probably required their reconstruction. This was out of the question, for now that war with the English had broken out, the necessary men and money were needed elsewhere. Since at the outbreak of

hostilities, the Lake Champlain area was considered in immediate danger of an English invasion, the French concentrated their efforts in erecting Fort Carillon, which it was hoped would properly seal off this avenue of invasion. This hope proved to be illusory, for the fort was poorly sited and constructed. The rest of the colony's fortifications had minor work done to strengthen them. Throughout the war, the French lacked the financial and human resources to properly fortify the various strategic areas. To defend their poor fortifications, the French relied upon some small works of defence erected to prevent the enemy from reaching the fortification and on the ability of their troops to defeat an enemy force before it could reach its target. When the French army was unable to fulfill this role, the colony's fortifications became untenable.

The government was hampered in its attempt to provide Canada with proper fortifications by unqualified engineers. Except for Levasseur de Néré, the colony had never had good engineers. Levasseur's work, however, was hampered by lack of funds due to France's involvement in European wars. Moreover, poor health forced him to be absent a few years from the construction site. From 1716 until the outbreak of

the Seven Years' War, one man, Gaspard Chaussegros de Léry, was responsible for the colony's fortifications. However, he proved to be incompetent. Franquet, in his tour of inspection in 1752-53, demonstrated that none of the works directed by de Léry were solid or had been well-planned. By this time, however, it was too late to remedy the situation. Even with a competent engineer to direct the construction, the lack of finances alone would have prevented any extensive work from being done.

As a result of the governmental policy towards the fortifications and the general poor quality of engineers resulted in that the French colony never had any fortifications able to withstand a regular attack. During the Seven Years' War, England's determination to conquer Canada resulted in the use of British regulars against the French colony. Since its fortifications were able to withstand an attack only by troops using Indian warfare, they were unable to resist that of trained European troops.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

Year	Cost of work done (1)			Revenue from taxation (2)		
	livres	sols	deniers	livres	sols	deniers
1745	245,170	14	2			
1746	201,431	8	1			
1747	62,780	16	4	17,829	5	11
1748	291,761	17	11	33,906	17	
1749	235,654	7	1	162,841	7	6
1750	153,244	2	2	*		
1751	74,086	4		61,794	9	11
1752	110,000	**		*		
1753	100,000	**		*		
1754	*			*		

Legend:

* No figures were found for the period after 1753 becau

** Amount Bigot estimated would be spent.



TABLE 1

)	Revenue from taxation (2)			Sum advanced by government (3)		
s	livres	sols	deniers	livres	sols	deniers
				245,170	14	2
				201,431	8	1
	17,829	5	11	44,951	10	5
	33,906	17		257,855		11
	162,841	7	6	72,812	19	7
	*			?		
	61,794	9	11	12,291	14	1
	*			?		
	*			?		
	*			?		

for the period after 1753 because of lack of material in the PAC.

would be spent.

SOURCES FOR TABLE 1

(1) These figures have been taken from: "Bordereau de la recette et dépense faite en Canada pendant 1'année 1746 dirigé suivant les Titres employés dans 1'Etat du Roy Expedié sur cet Exercice", Quebec, October 24, 1751, PAC, AC Series C11A, CXV, ff. 324v-25; "Bordereau des dépenses employés dans 1'addition au compte rendu à Monsieur de Georville Trésorier général de la marine pour 1'Exercice 1746", Quebec, August 15, 1752, ibid., f. 358; "Fortifications 1747 sur 1'Exercice 1748", Quebec, October 15, 1747, ibid., CXVII, f. 163; "Fortifications 1748 sur 1'exercice de la de. année", Quebec, November 3, 1748, ibid., CXVI, f. 74; "Bordereau Général de la Recette et Dépense faittes en Canada pendant 1'année 1749 Dirigé suivant les Titres employés dans 1'Etat du Roy arrêté le 10 May 1749", Quebec, October 21, 1751, ibid., ff. 234v-35; "Bordereau des Recettes et Dépenses employées dans le Compte rendu par le Sieur Imbert à M. Guillaume Pierre Tavernier de Boullogne Trésorier général des Colonies pour Dépenses faites en Canada pendant 1'année 1750", Quebec, August 12, 1752, ibid., CXIX, f. 356v; "Bordereau général de la Recette et Dépense faites en Canada pendant L'année Mil Sept Cent Cinquante et Un, dirigé suivant les titres employés dans 1'Etat du Roy expedié sur cet Exercice", Quebec, October 18, 1752, ibid., CXIX, ff. 424v-25; "Projet de 1'Etat du Roy pour les Dépenses de la Colonie de Canada pendant 1'année mil sept cent cinquante deux", Quebec, October 20, 1751, ibid., f. 453v; "Projet de 1'Etat du Roy pour les Dépenses à faire pour le service de Sa Majesté en Canada pendant 1'année mil sept cent cinquante trois", Quebec, October 31, 1752, ibid., f. 463.

(2) These figures have been taken from: "Fortifications 1747 sur 1'Exercice 1748", Quebec, October 15, 1747, PAC, AC, Series C11A, CXVII, f. 163; "Fortifications 1748 sur 1'exercice de la de. année", Quebec, November 3, 1748, ibid., CXVI, f. 74; "Bordereau Général de la Recette et Dépense faites en Canada pendant 1'année 1749 Dirigé suivant les Titres employés dans 1'Etat du Roy arrêté le 10 May 1749", Quebec, October 21, 1751, ibid., ff. 215v-16; "Bordereau général de la Recette et Dépense faites en Canada pendant L'année Mil Sept Cent Cinquante et Un, dirigé suivant les titres employés dans 1'Etat du Roy expedié sur cet Exercice", Quebec, October 18, 1752, ibid., ff. 405v-406.

(3) These figures have been derived from the substraction of the annual taxation revenue from the annual cost of the work done.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I (a) Primary Sources: Manuscript

These sources are transcribed or microfilmed copies, found in the Public Archives of Canada, of originals located in various French archives. In almost all cases, the material consulted was on microfilm.

Archives des Colonies.

Series B, Lettres envoyées, Vols. XV-XVII, XIX-XXIX, XXXIII-XXXV, XXXVIII-XLI, XLIV-XLV, XLVII-XLVIII, LII-LIII, LVII, LIX, LXII-LXV, LXVIII, LXX, LXXII, LXXIV, LXXVI, LXXVIII, LXXXI, LXXXV-LXXXIX, XCI-XCIII, XCV, XCVII, XCIX.

Series C11A, Correspondance générale, Vols. I-II, V-XIII, XVIII, XX, XXII, XXV, XXVII, XXX, XXXVI, XXXVIII, XLI-XLII, XLIV, XLVI, XLIX, L-LIV, LIX, LXI, LXIII, LXVII-LXVIII, LXXIV, LXXXI, LXXXIII-LXXXV, LXXXVII-LXXXIX, XCI-XCIII, XCV-XCVII, XCIX-CI, CIII, CXV-CXIX.

Series G11G, Correspondance Raudot-Pontchartrain et correspondance générale du Domaine d'Occident et de l'île Royale, Vols. I, III-VI.

Series F3, Collection Moreau Saint-Méry, Vols. II, VI-XIV.

Dépôt des fortifications des colonies, Cartons 6-9.

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

Series Amérique, Vol. XI.

Archives de la Guerre.

Service technique du Génie, article 3, Dossier Louis Franquet.

Bibliothèque de la Section technique du Génie, MS In fo. 205b.

Archives de la Marine.

Series B1, Délibérations du Conseil de Marine, Vol. LV.

Series B2, Ordres et dépêches, Vol. VIII.

Pre-Conquest Papers.

Series K, French Officers, Michel Chartier Lotbinière Papers, Vols. I-II; "Traité de Fortification divisé en huit livres" written by Gaspard Chaussegros de Léry in 1714.

The following source, to be found in the Archives de la Province de Québec, is a volume of transcriptions of originals located in various French archives.

Manuscrits relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle France, Series 2, Vol. I.

I (b) Primary Sources: Printed

Biggar, H. P. gen. ed. The Works of Samuel de Champlain. 6 vols.; Champlain Society Publications. Toronto, 1922-1936.

Benson, Adolph B. ed. The America of 1750: Peter Kalm's Travels in North America; the English Version of 1770. 2 vols.; New York, 1966.

Charlevoix, [Pierre-François-Xavier] de. Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle France, avec le journal historique d'un voyage fait par ordre du roi dans l'Amerique Septentrionale. 3 vols.; Paris, 1744.

Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France receuillis aux Archives de la Province de Québec, ou copiés à l'Etranger. 4 vols.; Quebec, 1883-85.

"Correspondance échangée entre la cour de France et le gouverneur de Frontenac, pendant sa seconde administration (1689-1699)." Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec, 1927-28; 1928-29. Quebec, 1928; 1929, pp. 3-211; 247-384.

"Correspondance entre M. de Vaudreuil et la Cour." Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec, 1938-39; 1939-40; 1942-43; 1946-47; 1947-48. Quebec, 1939; 1940; 1943; 1947; 1948, pp. 10-179; 355-463; 399-443; 371-460; 137-339.

Courville, Louis de. Mémoires sur le Canada depuis 1749 jusqu'à 1760. Quebec, 1838.

Dechêne, Louise ed. La correspondance de Vauban relative au Canada. Quebec, 1968.

Flenley, Ralph ed. and trans. A History of Montreal 1640-1672 from the French of Dollier de Casson with a life of the Author. London, Toronto, New York, 1928.

Franquet, Louis. Voyages et Mémoires sur le Canada, [1752-53]. Quebec, 1889.

Graham, Gerald S. ed. and introd. The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 1711. Navy Records Society Publications, XCIV; Champlain Society Publications, XXXII. Toronto, 1953.

Innis, Harold A. ed. Selected Documents in Canadian Economic History, 1497-1783. Toronto, 1929.

Le Roy de Bacqueville de La Potherie [Claude-Charles]. Histoire de l'Amérique septentrionale. 4 vols.; Paris, 1722.

Lindsay, W. B. ed. Edits ordonnances royaux, déclarations et arrêts du Conseil d'état du roi concernant le Canada. 3 vols.; Quebec, 1854.

Myrand, Ernest ed. 1690, Sir William Phips devant Québec: histoire d'un siège. Quebec, 1893.

Nish, Cameron ed. and trans. The French Régime. Canadian Historical Documents Series, Vol. I. Scarborough, 1965.

O'Callaghan, E. B. and Berthold Fernow eds. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq. 10 vols.; Albany, 1853-1887.

Pargellis, Stanley McCrory ed. and introd. Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1756: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle. New York and London, 1936.

Preston, Richard A. trans. and Leopold Lamontagne ed. Royal Fort Frontenac. Champlain Society Publications, Ontario Series, II. Toronto, 1958.

Roy, Pierre-Georges ed. Inventaire des Papiers de Léry conservés aux Archives de la Province de Québec. 3 vols.; Quebec, 1939-1940.

Shortt, Adam ed. Documents Relating to Canadian Currency, Exchange and Finance during the French Régime. 2 vols.; Ottawa, 1925-1926.

Thwaites, Reuben Gold ed. The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791: The Original French, Latin and Italian texts, with English Translations and notes. 73 vols.; Cleveland, 1896-1901.

Trudel, Marcel. Atlas historique du Canada Français: des origines à 1867. Quebec, 1961.

II (a) Secondary Material: Monographs

Bau, W. H. "Fortifications", Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1966. Vol. IX.

Bird, Harrison. Battle for a Continent. New York, 1965.

Bonnault, Claude de. Histoire du Canada Français, 1534-1763. Paris, 1950.

Brumath, A. Leblond de. Histoire Populaire de Montréal Depuis son Origine jusqu'à nos Jours. Montreal, 1890.

Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 2 vols.; Toronto, 1966-1969.

Dictionnaire National des Canadiens Français 1608-1760. 3 vols.; Institut Généalogique Drouin. Montreal, 1965.

Doughty, A. G. The Fortress of Quebec, 1608-1904. Quebec, 1904.

-----. Quebec under Two Flags. London, 1903.

Eccles, W. J. Canada under Louis XIV, 1663-1701. The Canadian Centenary Series. Toronto, 1964.

-----. Canadian Society during the French Regime. Montreal, 1968.

-----. Frontenac: The Courtier Governor. The Carleton Library XXIV. Toronto, 1959.

-----. The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1750. Histories of the American Frontier Series. Montreal and Toronto, 1969.

Faillon, Abbé Etienne Michel. Histoire de la Colonie Française en Canada. 3 vols.; Villemarie [Montreal], 1865-1866.

Ferland, Jean-Baptiste-Antoine. Cours d'Histoire du Canada, 1534-1759. 2 vols.; Quebec, 1861-1865.

Filion, Maurice. Maurepas: Ministre de Louis XV, 1715-1749. With a Preface by Frédéric Mauro. Ottawa, 1967.

Frégault, Guy. François Bigot Administrateur Français. 2 vols.; Ottawa, 1948.

Gagnon, Ernest. Le Fort et le Chateau Saint-Louis. Montreal, 1912.

Garand, P. S. The History of the City of Ogdensburg. Ogdensburg, New York, 1927.

Garneaux, F.-X. Histoire du Canada depuis sa découverte jusqu'à nos jours. 4 vols.; 1ére édition; Quebec, 1842-1852.

Gipson, Lawrence Henry. The British Empire Before the American Revolution. Vol. V: Zones of International Friction; the Great Lakes Frontier, Canada, the West Indies, India, 1748-1754. New York, 1942.

-----. The British Empire Before the American Revolution. Vol. VI: The Great War for the Empire; the Years of Defeat, 1754-1757. New York, 1946.

-----. The British Empire Before the American Revolution. Vol. VII: The Great War for the Empire; the Victorious Years, 1758-1760. New York, 1949.

Girerd, Sylvain. L'oeuvre militaire de la Galissonière au Canada. Saint-Etienne, 1902.

Groulx, Lionel. Notre grande aventure: l'empire français en Amérique du Nord, 1534-1760. Montreal and Paris [1958].

Hamelin, Jean. Economie et société en Nouvelle-France. Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire. Quebec, 1960.

Hamilton, Edward Pierce. The French and Indian Wars. Garden City, New York, 1962.

-----. Fort Ticonderoga. Boston, 1964.

Hammang, Francis H. The Marquis de Vaudreuil: New France at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century. Bruges, 1938.

Lamontagne, Roland. La Galissonière et le Canada. Montreal, 1962.

Lanctôt, Gustave. A History of Canada. 3 vols.; Toronto, 1963-1965.

Le Jeune, Louis. Dictionnaire général de biographie, histoire, littérature, agriculture, commerce, industrie et des arts, sciences, moeurs, coutumes, institutions, politiques et religions du Canada. 2 vols.; Ottawa, 1931.

Louis-Jaray, Gabriel. L'empire français d'Amérique, 1534-1803. Paris, 1938.

McLellan, J. S. Louisbourg from its foundation to its Fall, 1713-1758. London, 1918.

Parkman, Francis. Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV. Boston, 1877.

-----. A Half-Century of Conflict. 2 vols.; Cottage edition. Toronto, 1901.

Pell, S. H. P. Ticonderoga: A Short History. Ticonderoga, 1957.

Priestly, Herbert Ingram. France Overseas through the Old Régime. New York and London, 1939.

Roy, Pierre-Georges. Hommes et Choses du Fort Saint-Frédéric. Montreal, 1946.

-----. La Ville de Québec sous le Régime Français. 2 vols.; Quebec, 1930.

Roy, Régis, and Gérard Malchelosse. Le régiment de Carignan: son organisation et son expédition au Canada, 1665-1668: officiers et soldats qui s'établirent au Canada. Montreal, 1925.

Saintoyant, J. La colonisation française sous l'Ancien Régime. 2 vols.; Paris, 1929.

Salone, Emille. La Colonisation de la Nouvelle France: Etude sur les origines de la nation canadienne française. Paris, 1906.

Sandham, Alfred. Montreal and its Fortifications. Montreal, 1874.

Sautai, Maurice. Montcalm au combat de Carillon, 8 juillet 1758. Paris, 1909.

Stacey, C. P. Quebec, 1759: the Siege and the Battle. Toronto, 1959.

Stanley, George F. G. Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954: the Military History of an Unmilitary People. Toronto, 1954.

Stanley, George F. G. New France: the Last Phase, 1744-1760. The Canadian Centenary Series. Toronto, 1968.

Sulte, Benjamin. Histoire de la Ville des Trois-Rivières et de ses Environs. Montreal, 1870.

-----. Le Fort de Chambly. Edited by Gérard Malchelosse. Montreal, 1922.

-----. Le régiment de Carignan. Edited by Gérard Malchelosse. Montreal, 1922.

Trudel, Marcel. Histoire de la Nouvelle-France. 2 vols.; Montreal, 1963-1966.

Wilson, Arthur McCandless. French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726-1743. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936.

Williamson, James A. A Short History of British Expansion: The Old Colonial Empire. London, 1965.

Wrong, George McKinnon. The Rise and Fall of New France. 2 vols.; New York, 1938.

II (b) Secondary Material: Articles

Adair, E. R. "France and the Beginning of New France", CHR, XIII (Sept., 1944), 246-278.

-----. "The Evolution of Montreal under the French Régime", CHA, Report, 1942, pp. 20-41.

Beaugrand-Champagne, Aristide. "La strategie, la tactique et l'armement des anciens Iroquois", Les Cahiers des Dix, X (1945), pp. 21-40.

Burt, A. L. "The Frontier in the History of New France", CHA, Report, 1940, pp. 93-99.

Eccles, W. J. "Frontenac: New Light and a Reappraisal", CHA, Report, 1954, pp. 20-27.

-----. "Frontenac and the Iroquois", CHR, XXXVI (March, 1955), 1-16.

Eccles, W. J. "Frontenac's Military Policies, 1689-1698: a Reassessment", CHR, XXXVII (Sept., 1956), 201-224.

Ferland-Angers, Albertine. "La citadelle de Montréal, 1658-1820", RHAF, III (1949-1950), 493-517.

Frégault, Guy. "Essai sur les finances canadiennes (1700-1750)", RHAF, XII (1958-1959); XIII (1959-1960), 307-322, 459-463; 157-176.

-----. "L'expedition du Duc D'Anville", RHAF, II (1948-1949), 27-52.

Girouard, Desiré. "Les anciens postes du Lac Saint-Louis", BRH, I (Oct. 1895), 165-169.

Héliot, Pierre. "La campagne du régiment De La Sarre au Canada 1756-1760", RHAF, III (1949-1950), 518-536.

II (c) Secondary Material: Typescript

Eccles, W. J. "Jean Bochart de Champigny, intendant of New France, 1686-1702." Master's thesis, McGill University, 1951.

McOuat, Donald Fraser. "Military Policy and Organization in New France." Master's Thesis, McGill University, 1948.

Reid, Allana Gertrude. "The Development and Importance of the Town of Quebec, 1608-1760." Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1950.

-----. "The Importance of the Town of Quebec, 1608-1703." Master's Thesis, McGill University, 1945.

SAINT LAWRENCE RIVER VALLEY



RIVER VALLEY



Plan No. 1: Fortifications of Quebec (1690)

PAC, Map Division, H3-339-Quebec-1690; DFC, Plan No. 354.

ns of Quebec (1690)

ebec-1690; DFC, Plan No. 354.

Plan No. 1: Fortifications of Quebec (1690)



PAC, Map Division, H3-339-Quebec-1690; DFC, Plan No. 354.

:bec (1690)

); DFC, Plan No. 354.

Plan No. 2: Beaucourt's Plan (1693)



Explication

Les Espaces remplis de Lignes de niveau, sont Les Isles de maisons des particuliers
Casemens publics et des communautés. Le fond, de Lignes perpendiculaires; le reste
sont que ponctuez.
Les grosses Lignes marquent des clostures de murailles, et Les autres de simples
Doubles Lignes des remparts, qui sont de terre soustenue par de dans de gazons et en dehors
que le Talus
A terre en qu'grande Sa haulte marée. 1. Le cul de sac ou L'on recoit Les nauires
appellé Le grasse, 3. petit bois.
B, Bastion appellé Le place formez avec quatorze Canons montez 4 autres Batteries de
autre de quatre 6 Deux petites de chacunne une pierrier, 7 une autre de deux pierriers
C La paroisse basse dite nostre Dame des Victoires
D Le place au centre de laquelle est un puits de deux pas Le Basse du Roy
E chemin qui monte a la haulte ville. 8 Escalliers qui gangnent ce chemin. 9 chemin



Explication des marques

ns des particuliers; les
; le ceux imparfaits ne

de simples palissades, les
ns et en dehors de pieux

oue les navires. n. le port

bes batteries de six canons. s.
. dedens pieces

Roy

. 9 chemin par dehors

F. Le grand Cavallier apellé la citadelle qui aura un logem.t un magasin et six canons.
G. moulin fortifié ou l'on peut manier quatre canons.
H. petit cavalier dans le bastion du magasin qui a six embrazures
J. plattes formes pour des mortiers
L. La Cathedralle. : : Le Cemetiere
M. Le palais ou la brasserie; c'est le lieu ou se rend la justice, ou est le magasin e
ou loge m.r l'intendant
N. La maison de m.r le gouverneur avec sa galerie en terrasse devant. 10 batteri
de huit pieces montées, et autre de neuf. Le bastiment dans la gorge du bastion
la poudriere
O friches . . . glacieres . . . bois
P Jardins . . . ⊕ moulin a vent.

·DESSINÉ·PAR·C
·JUILLE
collection de



des marques

F. Le grand Cavallier apellé la citadelle qui aura un logem^t un magasin et six canons.
G. moulin fortifié ou l'on peut manier quatre canons.
H. peut canalier dans le bastion du magasin qui a six embrazures
J. plattes formes pour des mortiers
L. La Cathedralle. : : Le Cemetiere
M. Le palais ou la Brasserie; lieu ou l'on rend la justice, ou est le magasin et ou loge m^r l'intendant
N. La maison de m^r le gouverneur avec sa galerie en terrasse devant. 10 batterie de huit pieces montées. 11 autre de neuf. Le bastiment dans la gorge du bastion est la poudrerie.
O frisches . glaciere ::: bois
P. Jardins . moulin a vent.

· Dessiné · par · Charles · Baudouin ·
· Juillet · 1920 ·

Plan No. 2: Beaucourt's Plan (1695)





000 toises de Large et 25 Brasses de profondeur

n des marques

F. Le grand Canallier apellé la cittadelle qui aura un Logem.t un magasin et Six canons.
G. moulin fortifié ou l'on peut mettre quatre Canons.
H. petit canalier dans le Bastion du magasin qui a Six embrazures
J. plattes formes pour des mortiers
L. La Cathedralle. ‡ ‡ Le Cemetiere.
M. Le palais ou la Brasserie; Cest le Lieu ou se rend la justice, ou est le magasin et ou loge m.r l'intendant.
N. La maison de m.r le gouverneur avec sa galerie enterrasse devant. 10 batterie de huit pieces montées. 11 autre de neuf. Le Castiment dans la gorge du bastion est la poudriere.
O. fraiches..... a glacieve ..... ||| Bois
P. Jardins..... ◉ moulin a vent.

·DESSINÉ·PAR·CHARLES·BAUDOUIN·
·JUILLET·1693·

Plan No. 3: Levasseur's Plan (1700)





Plan de lau
de quebek

Table pour l
des parties

1 Vieille enceinte
2 Redoute du cap aux diam
3 B.on S.t Jacques
4.5 Ouurages a corne et petit for
6 B.on S.t Louis
7 Caualier dumoulin et mag
8 B.on Royal
9 chemin couuert Seruant d
10 demy lune terrain mauua
11 demy S.t Jean
12 B.on du costeau pres lynten
13 chemin couuert le long du
14 Redoute
15 auant face
16 fort S.t Louis
17 magazin ou sont les poud
18 Logis du gouuerneur gen
19 glaciere
20 Vieille grange a mettre des f
21 Corps de garde pour la ga
23 gallerie
27 maison et jardin a M.r p
28 maison au S.r Roussel
29 glaciere a Monsieur l'Eues
30 Enceinte qui Separe M.r l'Eue
31 Sault au matelot
32 petitte batterie
33 petits flancs pour dispute
41 grande platteforme
42 ouurages projetté a la basse

Levasseur



Plan de La ville et chau de Quebek 1700,

Table pour L'jntelligence des parties de la fortificaon

1 Vieille Enceinte
2 Redoute du cap aux diamants
3 B.on S.t Jacques
4.5 Ouurages a corne et petit fort de la glaciere
6 B.on S.t Louis
7 Caualier du moulin et magazin a poudre projetté
8 B.on Royal
9 chemin couuert Seruant de fosse au B.on Royal
10 demy lune terrain mauuais
11 demy S.t Jean
12 B.on du costeau pres Lyntendance
13 chemin couuert le long dud.t costeau
14 Redoute
15 auant face
16 fort S.t Louis
17 Magazin ou sont les poudres
18 Logis du gouuerneur general
19 glaciere
20 Vieille grange a mettre des fourages
21 Corps de gardes pour la garnison dud.t fort
23 gallerie
27 maison et jardin a M.r prouost
28 maison au S.r Roussel
29 glaciere a Monsieur l'Euesque
30 Enceinte qui separe M.r l'Euesque dauec le seminaire
31 Sault au matelot
32 petitte batterie
33 petits flancs pour disputer le passage d'un chemin
41 grande platteforme
42 ouurages projetté a la basse Ville

Levasseur, Ceney

Plan de la ville et Cáu de quebek 1700,

Table pour l'intelligence des parties de la fortifiCáon

1 Vieille Enceinte
2 Redoute du cap aux diamans
3 B.on S.t Jacques
4.5 Ouvrages a corne et petit fort de la glaciere
6 B.on S.t Louis
7 Caualier du moulin et magazin a poudre projetté
8 B.on Royal
9 chemin couuert Semant de fosse au B.on Royal
10 demy lune terrain mauuais
11 demy S.t Jean
12 B.on du costeau pres l'intendance
13 chemin couuert le long du.t costeau
14 Redoute
15 auant fort
16 fort S.t Louis
17 Magazin ou sont les poudres
18 Logis du gouuerneur general
19 glaciere
20 Vieille grange a mettre des fourages
21 Corps de garde pour la garnison du.t fort
23 gallerie
27 maison et jardin a M.r prouost
28 maison au S.r Roussel
29 glacier a Monsieur l'Euesque
30 Enceinte qui Separe M.r l'Euesque dauec le seminaire
31 Sault au matelot
32 petite batterie
33 petits flancs pour disputer le passage d'un chemin
41 grande platte forme
42 ouuragea projetté a la basse Ville



Profil

des ouurages du nouueau projet.

43 Cul de sac
46 Reduit de lintendance
48 Espece de bassin
49 Logis de lintend.t
50 La petasse
51 Nouuelle Enceinte projettée
52 B.on de la glaciere
53 B. S.t michel
54 B. terrain mauuais
55 B. S.t Jean
56 B. du costeau pres Lintendance
57 B. de l'hospital
Q Ouurages par ou on doit commencer a trauailler

Les ouurages Exterieurs ont esté faits en 1697 par le S.r Le Vasseur dencre qui ne les fit construire qu'auec pieux, gabions, terre et facines parce qu'on Neut aucun de la cour que les anglois tenoient a quebek. ces Ouurages furent faits auec beaucoup de precipitation aussy prennent ils fin

Les ouurages marquez en noir denottent tout ce qui est fait de terre et de gazon, en rouge la maconn.rie et en jaune + + ce qui reste a faire

Plan No. 4: Chaussegros' Plan for Fortifying Quebec (1718)



PAC, Map Division, H3/340-Quebec-1718; DFC, Plan No. 395.


TAURINI

Plan No. 5: Chaussegros' Plan for fortifying Montreal (1717)



PAC, Map Division Ph/340-Montreal 1717; DFC, Plan No. 472.

Plan No. 5: Chaussegros' Plan for fortifying Montreal (1717)

PAC, Map Division Ph/340-Montreal 1717; DFC, Plan No. 472.



Plan No. 6: Plan of Proposed Redoubt at Crown Point (1731)



PAC, Map Division, Ph/1252-Pointe-à-la-Chevelure 1731;
DFC, Plan No. 506.

Plan No. 6: Plan of Proposed Redoubt at Crown Point (1731)



PAC, Map Division, Ph/1252-Pointe-à-la-Chevelure 1731; DEC, Plan No. 306.

Plan No. 7: Plan of Proposed Stone Fort at Crown Point (1733)



PAC, Ph/1252-Fort Crown Point-1733; DFC, Plan No. 507.

Plan No. 7: Plan of Proposed Stone Fort at Crown Point (1733)



PAC, Ph/1252-Fort Crown Point-1733; DFC, Plan No. 507.

Plan No. 8: Plan of Saint-Frédéric (1735)



PAC, Map Division, Ph 1252-Fort Crown Point-1735; DFC, Plan No. 510.

Plan No. 8: Plan of Saint-Frédéric (1735)



PAC, Map Division, Ph 1252-Fort Crown Point-1735; DFC, Plan No. 510.