The Function of the Proxenia In Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece

by

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ABSTRACT

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The function of the proxenia in political and military intelligence is presented in this study in order to establish the fact that the collection of information and clandestine activity played a significant role in Greek history from the 5th to the mid 4th century B.C. This study is divided into six parts: Part 1 presents the problem; Part 2 offers the methods used in this work and a review of the literature relevant to the subject; Part 3 is a presentation of the evidence and a discussion of the specific examples which demonstrate the exploitation of the proxenia as an intelligence system; Part 4 offers an analysis of the evidence contained in the previous section; Part 5 includes a summary and indication of directions for further research regarding the use of intelligence systems after the fourth century B.C.; finally Part 6 contains the bibliography.

Résumé

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La function de la proxenia dans la cueillette de renseignements politiques et militaires en Grèce classique

La fonction de la proxenia dans le domaine du renseignement politique et militaire est exposée dans la présente étude afin de prouver le rôle significatif joué par la cueillette d'informations et l'activité clandestine dans l'histoire grecque du 5ième au milieu du 4ième siècle avant J.-C. Cette étude se divise en six parties: la première partie pose le problème; la seconde partie décrit les méthodes utilisées pour le solutionner et passe en revue les documents littéraires pertinents au sujet traité; la troisième partie en fait la preuve et offre une discussion d'exemples spécifiques démontrant l'exploitation de la proxénia comme système de renseignements; la quatrième partie présente une analyse des éléments de preuve fournis à la section précédente; la cinquième partie comprend un conclusion et des indices quant à l'orientation possible de futures recherches portant sur l'utilisation des systèmes de renseignements après le 4ième siècle avant J.-C.; enfin, la sixième et dernière partie renferme une bibliographie.

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Preface

The present study was made possible thanks to the efforts of several individuals who generously contributed their time and assistance. I have greatly appreciated the guidance and encouragement of my supervisor, Professor John M. Fossey, F.S.A. who gave me the benefit of his experience as a scholar. His suggestions and comments saw me through the most difficult stages of my thesis. I would also like to thank Professor M.J. Silverthorne for his support and for heading me in the right direction by suggesting the initial references.

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PART I

THE PROBLEM

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The use of the proxenia by the Greeks as a system of information gathering and as a medium for clandestine activity is a subject which has received very little attention from scholars. Indeed, the role of political and military intelligence in ancient Greece has largely been ignored by most historians despite the fact that from the earliest period of Greek history there are many instances of spying as well as of other types of intelligence activities. The numerous deeds of heroes recorded in the Iliad and Odyssey include feats of espionage and subversion. Dolon, the son of Eumedes, for example, disguised himself and made his way to the Greek camp in order to spy on the enemies of Troy (Iliad 10.314-348). His attempt was thwarted by Diomedes and Odysseus who proceeded to interrogate him about the Trojan defenses. Once they acquired the necessary information, Dolon was put to death - the traditional punishment for a spy (Iliad 10.360-456). In many ways, no better example of an intelligence agent exists than Odysseus, son of Laertes. Odysseus of many wiles, a master of disguise, spy, saboteur and expert liar, set the pattern for future professionals participating in clandestine operations. According to the Odyssey (4.241-256) Odysseus penetrated the formidable defenses of Troy, by disguising himself as a beggar, in order to reconnoitre the layout of the city; once he accomplished this

task he quietly slipped back to the Greek camp without being detected by the Trojans. The Trojan horse has become a term which is synonymous with the use of deception in warfare, for it demonstrated how a small group of men who employed subterfuge could accomplish what an army of men could not when simply using conventional warfare. This lesson was not forgotten by the Greeks who eventually developed safeguards against deception, safeguards which could be used by both external and internal enemies. Sparta was apparently the first Greek state in antiquity to employ a secret service as a security measure against her slave population. The *Krypteia* was designed as a security system whose purpose was to watch over the Helots in order to prevent them from organizing a rebellion against the Spartans (Plato. Laws. 633b; Plout. Kleomenes. 28.3).

We know from Herodotos that the Greeks employed misinformation as a weapon against their enemies. This tactic was to a large extent responsible for the brilliant victory of the Greeks at Salamis. The Greek commanders were uncertain whether they should fight the Persian fleet at Salamis or whether they should thence withdraw their fleet so as to face battle on the open sea (Hdt.8.74.1-75.23). Themistokles, for one, was convinced that the Greek fleet would be victorious at Salamis. Consequently, he dispatched one of his servants to inform Xerxes that if the Persians attacked the Greek fleet where it was situated, the Athenians would turn against their allies (Hdt. 8.74.1-75.23). This was simply a ploy used by Themistokles to prevent the Greek fleet from retreating. After

479 B.C. the Persians were on the defensive and continued the war by attempting to instigate discontent among the Greeks; this they did by employing Arithmios of Zeleia, (cf 3.3.1 below) the proxenos of Athens, as their agent for bringing gold into the Peloponnese and undermining the Greek alliance (Aiskhin. 3.258;Dem.9.42).

From the examples recorded above we can discern a common characteristic in those who participated in clandestine activities - they were prominent members of their society. Another interesing feature of these covert operations is that, with the exception of the *Krypteia*, intelligence work seems to have been organized on an ad hoc basis. On the other hand, an apparent need existed for the acquisition of consistent and reliable information as well as a system for organizing and carrying out clandestine operations. The absence of any real bureaucratic infrastructure may have forced the Greeks to adapt an existing institution to fulfill their intelligence needs. The institution which could easily have accomodated these objectives was the proxenia. Proxenoi were in an ideal position to collect military and political information and were suitably placed to conduct a wide range of clandestine activities.

It is the purpose of this study to demonstrate that the title of proxenos was at times given to certain individuals in exchange for the past, present or future conduct of intelligence work. Indeed, the title of proxenos designated someone who was given a mandate to look after the "interests" of a foreign state in his own city (IGi^2.118). This mandate was vague and usually

meant that the proxenos assisted his patrons over areas in which he had expertise. For example, a proxenos who was engaged in commerce might execute his duties by giving aid to the citizens of the state he represented in matters of trade and commerce when they visited his city (cf 1.1.2 below). On the other hand a proxenos who was a politician fullfilled his duties by facilitating better relations between his city and that of his patrons (cf 1.1.2 below).

A proxenos, by virtue of the goodwill he displayed toward the state which gave him the proxenia, declared himself a partisan supporter of that state and had to compromise to some extent his loyalty toward his own city. In time the allegiance of the proxenos shifted entirely to the state he represented and as we shall demonstrate many candidates for this office participated in clandestine activities.

Certain examples exist which strongly suggest that proxenoi became involved in gathering political and military intelligence and participated in clandestine operations. I believe that these instances are not simply isolated phenomena; rather they represent another dimension of the proxenia. I shall thus present a series of examples which will demonstrate that the proxenia was used by the Greeks as one means of information gathering and as a way of instigating different types of intelligence operations against their enemies.

1.2 ORIGINS OF THE PROXENIA

A proxenos was literally the guest-friend of a city-state. It was his duty to look after the interests of a foreign state in his own country; for example, the Spartan proxenos in Athens was an Athenian citizen. Since the city-states did not set up permanent embassies as such, the proxenoi, to a large extent, fulfilled the role of diplomatic residents.

The office of proxenos was an ancient one which was employed throughout the Greek world. Walbank (1978:4) suggests that from the earliest available records the word proxenos seems to have been associated with the concept of προστάτης," one who stands before or protests" (LSJ[9] s.v. προστάτης). The prefix προ indicates that the proxenos stood in place of his client the ξένος (Walbank 1978:4). The word ξένος implies "guest-friend" or "foreigner"; the general consensus among scholars, however, is that ξενία was associated with the ancient custom of "guest-friendship" (Monceaux 1885:1-5;Phillipson 1911:147;Pope 1935:49; Lambrechts 1958:137;Ehrenberg 1960:104;Adcock and Mosley 1975:11)[1]

During the early history of Greek city-states, domestic politics dominated the interests of citizens who had little use for diplomacy since Greek city-states were essentially self-centered and insular (Adcock and Mosley 1975:11). On the other hand, ties of friendship did exist between leaders of states

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[1] For a complete discussion on the concept of "guest-friendship" see Finley(1954:74-107).

and important families of other cities; this brought about an informal diplomatic avenue of communication (Phillipson 1911:148; Adcock and Mosley 1975:10-11). In time, this informal relationship evolved to the point where the concept of guest-friendship represented the association of an individual with a state; thus the proxenia took the form of a real contract with specific privileges and obligations (Phillipson 1911:148).

The earliest extant proxeny decrees date to the late seventh and early sixth centuries B.C. (IGix.1.858;SEGxi.1180a). According to Wallace (1970:190), the oldest document to employ the term "proxenos" is the Korkyraian grave epigram on the Cenotaph of Menekrates of Oianthea in Western Lokris (IGix.1.867), which dates to sometime in the middle of the sixth century B.C. The earliest reference to an Athenian proxenos is that of Alexandros of Makedonia (Hdt.8.136) who lived during the time of the Persian wars (Wallace 1970:199). It was not until the middle of the fifth century B.C. that the term proxenos became common throughout Greece; the establishment of the institution is documented by numerous inscriptions from the last third of the fifth century B.C. (Wallace 1970:193; Walbank 1978:4).

It was the prerogative of the assembly or council of a state to appoint the proxenoi who would represent that state elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Spartans did not permit their citizens to accept the proxenia of a foreign state, since it was the right of a Spartan king to select and appoint Spartan citizens who would act as proxenoi of a given state (Hdt.6.57.2). According to Walbank (1978:3), three stages existed in Athenian

proxenies; euergesia and canvass on the part of the candidate, the formal award of the title proxenos and usually that of euergetes, finally the grant of privileges over and above those already bestowed. In ancient Athens no set pattern existed for proxenia decrees (Walbank 1978:4). Inscriptions vary considerably from simple grants of the title of proxenos to more complex documents which praise the candidate. Variations occur insofar as concerns the right to have access to the magistrates, council or assembly of the state, and with regard to safeguards, grants, indemnities, special privileges, instructions for publication and invitations to public entertainment (Walbank 1978:4). The title of euergetes usually accompanied that of proxenos and, according to Walbank (1978:5), this implies that the proxenia was not awarded unless it had been earned through euergesia.

It is rather unfortunate that only about half of the Athenian proxenia decrees which have survived contain a clause describing services which had earned the title of proxenos (Walbank 1978:5). An examination of these documents suggests that, although the proxenia covered a wide range of activities on the part of the recipient, a large number of these documents falls into three categories: commercial, religious and political. Since the proxenoi to some extent fulfilled part of the duties of consulars these categories identify the most common areas for which a Greek state required permanent diplomatic representatives abroad.

THE COMMERCIAL ROLE OF THE PROXENIA

The evolution of the proxenia in Greece, before the classical period, was primarily the result of a growth in trade accompanied by an absence of international laws and treaties governing commercial relations between citizens of different states (Phillipson 1911:148;Hasebroek 1933:129-130;Walbank 1978:2;Hopper 1979:113). The laws and courts of a city-state did not recognize rights for non-citizens; consequently, it became the responsibility of proxenoi to plead in the courts or assemblies on behalf of the foreigners whom they represented (Xen.Hell.4.5.6;"Aristoteles" Ath. Pol. 58.2;Hicks and Hill 44;for a further discussion of these phenomena see Adcock and Mosley 1975:160ff;Walbank 1978:2). Occasionally the proxenoi functioned as commercial agents by performing various tasks such as verifying the identity of individuals who were about to receive money from bankers (Dem.52.4), acting as trustees (Dem. 52.24), and assisting merchants of their client-state for the purpose of trade (Pollux, Onomastikon 3.59). Numerous inscriptions serve as examples of the proxenia having been granted to individuals engaged in trade (eg. $Syll^3$.187;$Syll^3$.110; $Syll^3$.219;$Syll^3$.217;$IGii^2$.176;$IGii^2$.206;$IGii^2$.339) and other inscriptions conferred further privileges on those who had already received the proxenia (eg. $IGii^2$.229;$IGii^2$.252;$IGii^2$.343).

The establishment of inter-state judicial agreements (*symbola*) in the fifth century B.C. did not diminish the

commercial role of the proxenia, partly because the institution of *symbola* did not develop to any great extent; furthermore, the institutions of the *symbola* and the proxenia did not fulfill the same functions (Hopper 1979:113;Gauthier 1972:18).

THE RELIGIOUS ROLE OF THE PROXENIA

According to Monceaux(1885:39), the religious aspect of the proxenia was as important as the commercial function. Delphoi had perhaps the most extensive network of proxenoi who, as patrons of Pythian Apollo, maintained this god's authority in every Greek state (eg.Syll^3.267;Syll^3.268;Syll^3.269;Syll^3.270;Syll^3.308;Syll^3.309;Syll^3.378;Syll^3.448;Syll^3.449;Syll^3.450;Syll^3.477;Syll^3.478;Syll^3.516;Syll^3.517;Tod 182;cf lengthy discussion by Monceaux 1885:273 ff). At Delphoi, when a state wished to make an official sacrifice to Apollo, it sent special ambassadors called *Theotropes*; it was, however, the duty of the proxenos to present the sacrifice and commence the ceremony (Monceaux 1885: 41 -42). Furthermore, it was the responsibility of the proxenoi to announce to their respective client-cities forthcoming religious events at Delphoi (CIG, 1693) while the proxenoi representing the various Greek states at Delphoi fulfilled their responsibilities by providing hospitality for the citizens of their patron-cities visiting Delphoi (Euripides Ion 551;1039;Andromache 1103). The award of proxenia was usually bestowed on those individuals who could have used their influence to assist the sanctuary politically and financially (eg.Syll^3.404;Syll^3.448;Syll^3.449; Syll^3.452;Tod 182).

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE PROXENIA

It was the task of some proxenoi to receive ambassadors and other diplomatic officials from their client-states and to procure for these functionaries admission to the assembly, council, temples and theatres (Pollux, Onomastikon 3.59-60). Whenever a state wished to conclude a peace or to renew a truce it transmitted these wishes through the proxenoi (Thouk.5.59.4). It was not, moreover, unusual for the proxenos to take the iniative by proposing the conclusion of treaties (Thouk.5.59.4). Occasionally the proxenoi were sent as ambassadors to the states they represented; for example, Kallias, the proxenos of Sparta at Athens, was sent to Sparta on numerous occasions (Xen.Hell. 6.3.3-5) and Demosthenes, proxenos of Thebes at Athens, negotiated an alliance between Athens and Thebes (Aiskhin.141-3).

The proxenia served an important role in the international relations of Greek states and this international aspect revolved around the political character of the proxenia. The award of the title of proxenos was made to an individual as a result of a proposal by a politician. Consequently, this process often reflected the political sentiment of the candidate. It was not a coincidence that some of the most notable proxenoi were sympathetic to the political ideology of the faction which governed their client state; as a result of this they wished to pursue closer ties between their country and the city which awarded them the title of proxenos. Some examples of important

Athenians who served as proxenoi and were closely identified with the political ideology of the faction which controlled their patron-state were: Kimon, proxenos of Sparta (Andokides 3.3.); Nikias, proxenos of Syracuse (Diod.13.27); Kallias, proxenos of Sparta (Xen.Hell.6.3.3-5);and Demosthenes, proxenos of Thebes (Aiskhin.141.3).

The political aspect of the proxenia is further attested by the nature of privileges awarded to the candidates. A majority of these benefits were accorded in case the recipient suffered exile and was forced to seek political asylum in the state he had represented (Balogh 1943:46). When Alkibiades was forced to flee rather than return to Athens and face trial, he sought refuge in Sparta; as the proxenos of Sparta, he had every right to receive asylum (Thouk.5.43.2).

Another demonstration of the close political affiliation between a proxenos and a particular faction of the state he represented is perhaps demonstrated by the restoration of proxenia decrees, which had been erased by the Thirty Tyrants in 404-403 B.C. (eg.IGii^2.66 ;IGii^2.6;IGii^2.52;IGii^2.9;Walbank 1978: No.72). These decrees were awarded by the democrats, consequently it is probable that the Thirty wished to sever any tie which the Athenians may have had with individuals in other states who advocated the democratic cause.

A common clause in Athenian proxenia decrees is the harm clause, which protected the proxenos and occasionally his family from civil wrong (egIGii^2.56;IGii^2.61;IGi^2.59;IGi^2.149; IGi^2.72;IGi^2.146;IGii^2.32;IGi^2.118;IGii^2.48;cf Walbank 1978:5).

This clause was often supplemented with another one which instructs generals and other state officials to protect the proxenos and his family from murder or any other type of violence and to punish those who cause him harm (eg. IGi^2.27;IGi^2.28a;IGi^2.56;IGi^2.59;IGi^2.72;$IGii^2$.8;IGi^2.154;$IGii^2$.56;$IGii^2$.32). Certainly in the case of Athenian proxenoi, the proxenos became so closely identified with the patron-state that often his fate was tied to the fortune of his client. On occasion the Athenian proxenos became the target of hostility toward Athens. In 364 or 363 B.C., the island of Kos rebelled from the second Athenian Confederacy. This revolt, however, was preceeded by the murder of the Athenian proxenos ($IGii^2$.111). The island was soon recaptured by Khabrias and Kos was forced to sign a new treaty of alliance with Athens, one of the conditions of which was the execution of the man responsible for the death of the Athenian proxenos ($IGii^2$.111).

THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE OF THE PROXENIA

We shall now consider another aspect of the proxenia: the role of the institution in gathering information and in other intelligence activities. The proxenia could function as both an overt and a covert intelligence system. Representatives of this institution were indeed in an ideal position to collect and transmit political and military information, to organize political subversion and sabotage; they could also arrange the betrayal of besieged cities to the forces of their patrons. In the same manner as the proxenia was adapted to fulfill commercial, religious and political functions, so too it

was manipulated to serve a broad spectrum of intelligence activity. Evidence of this aspect of the proxenia is presented in Part 3.

1.3 DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE

The relationships of the Ancient Greek city-states constituted an intricate web of treaties, alliances, and secret agreements contributing to a precarious balance of power. This delicate balance existed among neighbouring states and often between confederacies of Greek cities. The most notable example was the co-existence of the Athenian Confederacy and the Peloponnesian League. When the equilibrium shifted from one side to another the result was war. The formation of the Athenian Empire led to conflict with the Peloponnesian League because the Spartans feared that unless Athens was checked she would grow too powerful and dominate all of Greece. It was necessary for the city-states to participate in international relations since they were economically inter-dependent. No Greek state could afford the luxury of existing in a vacuum. Successful involvement in the international affairs of Greece required that the government of the state have access to information. The pace of events from the middle of the fifth century B.C. on through the fourth century B.C. changed rapidly. The powerful leagues of Athens and Sparta rose and fell and new powers such as Thebes, Thessaly and Makedonia challenged the supremacy of the old. Consequently, alliances shifted with the tide of events.

Information, or the gathering of intelligence, is essential for any government in order to determine the political

and military direction of the state. It is characterized by the collection of data on the political, military, and economic movements of enemies and allies, both real and potential, and concerning internal organizations dangerous to the state.[1] In times of conflict, proper intelligence can obviously facilitate the war effort by providing details of the military disposition of enemy forces and fleets. Intelligence, however, covers a wider range of activity and the collection of different types of information by overt or covert means. A modern parallel is the proliferation of intelligence agencies in most countries, especially the United States. This is necessitated by both the quantity and the specialization of information, including not only military and political intelligence but economic, scientific, sociological and technological data. Spying, for example, is a covert means of gathering intelligence; whereas if information is provided by ambassadors and merchants while visiting other states, it is overt. It is, therefore, the means employed in acquiring information which are overt or covert and not the nature of the intelligence itself. This is an important distinction since most city-states possessed little which can be described as classified information. At best this would include shipbuilding, grain supply, and data on fortifications. The concept of military security, however, did exist and it is referred to in the funeral speech of Perikles (Thouk.2.39.1).

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[1] For the internal threat to city-states by subversive groups an excellent account is provided by L.A. Losada, The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War (1972). An interesting discussion on the dangers of subversive activities in cities under siege is given by Aineias the Tactician (2.1-13).

For the most part, intelligence establishments are the prerogative of specialized agencies and organizations at the disposal of governments. In the period of the ancient Greek city-states there is no evidence for the existence of an intelligence organization along modern lines. An examination of the sources, moreover, does not reveal which part of the government was directly involved with the gathering of information.

The intelligence systems that were in use functioned without an umbrella organization to direct them. They took many forms and originally may not have been intended for specific use as intelligence apparatus. For example, merchants travelled for the purpose of trade and could be used to provide political and military information. Ambassadors also furnished valuable intelligence yet this was not their primary function. In these cases, gathering information was merely a byproduct of an existing institution which was not essentially intended to serve as an intelligence system. The same may be said for many institutions and professions used as a cover for intelligence work. It is not uncommon today for intelligence agencies to employ journalists, lawyers, businessmen, athletes, students, actors, doctors, and even priests to serve as spies or simply to report back what they have seen while travelling behind the Iron Curtain. Naturally the bulk of intelligence work is done through embassies and individuals possessing diplomatic immunity (Agee 1975:50-52).

It is important to mention that these types of systems

at best provide low grade intelligence. The employment of merchants, actors, doctors, envoys, ambassadors, and so on, as spies has a limited value. Their movements can be placed under control and close scrutiny and they can be supplied easily with misleading information. In 416 B.C. the Athenians dispatched a delegation to Egesta in order to verify that this state had sufficient resources to finance a joint offensive with Athens (Thouk.6.6.3). According to Thoukydides (6.46.3-5), the Athenian representatives were deceived by the Egestaians who manipulated their resources in a way designed to make the Athenians believe that they had considerable wealth. The deception worked and the envoys, upon their return to Athens, strongly recommended Athenian intervention in Sicily (Thouk.6.8 1-3). Consequently, control over the movements of ambassadors limited their potential as an intelligence source. An interesting example is found in Thoukydides (2.12.1-2). Just before the beginning of hostilities between the Athenians and the Spartans, the Spartan king sent an envoy to Athens to see if the Athenians were likely to come to terms. The Athenians, however, refused the envoy's admission to the city, and sent him back with an escort to prevent him from making contact with anyone.

Other possible sources of information were deserters and political refugees. Intelligence from such sources proved valuable yet short-lived. Once these individuals reported what they knew they could not be sent back for more information. A notable exception is Alkibiades; not only did he supply the Spartans with information but also showed them how to defeat

the Athenians in Sicily.

An integral part of an intelligence programme must be the capability of instigating political disruption and revolution in enemy states. This means having a system which establishes contacts with potential revolutionary groups in a rival state and a method of directing their actions. In practical terms, at least as far as the city-states were concerned, political factions aiming at the overthrow of a government could render invaluable assistance in several ways. One method was the opening of the gates of a city under siege. Another was to make it possible for enemy forces to enter the besieged city under the cover of darkness. An excellent example of this is provided by the siege of Plataia. According to Thoukydides (2.2.1-3) a force of three hundred Boiotians entered the city at night with the aid of Nauklides and his friends who opened the gates for them. Upon victory those same groups become essential in keeping control of the captured city. Contact with subversive organizations yields further advantages by providing access to potential traitors who may be privy to reliable information. Furthermore, these groups are capable of carrying out the assassination of state officials and members of rival factions on behalf of another state. An early instance of political assassination is provided by the death of Ephialtes in 462-1 B.C. That a political faction was responsible is implied in "Aristoteles" Ath.Pol. (25.4) and explicitly stated by Ploutarkhos (Per.10.7). Intelligence, therefore, has a dual function; the gathering of information and clandestine activity.

Both of these tasks are controlled by operatives who perform two different functions.

a) They collect information from various sources.

In ancient Greece the use of spies, perhaps, is the best example but other sources were equally productive: political exiles, deserters, and paid informers.

b) They take charge of clandestine sources.

The capture of walled cities was a particularly thorny problem for Greek armies since they lacked both the technical ability and the equipment to overcome fortifications. There were only two options; first, to starve the defendants to submission, a lengthy process at best, and second, to obtain the assistance of a subversive group inside the besieged city. In this respect the clandestine aspect of intelligence paid off if its operatives were either inside the city or had contact with individuals prepared to betray the town.

In the absence of a central intelligence network in ancient Greece, how could both of these activities be accomplished? The Greeks solved the problem by adapting the proxenia to function as an intelligence system. This is characteristic since, quite often in antiquity, institutions created to serve one purpose were later modified to cope with new situations. The high command of the Athenian army, for example, was entrusted to a board of ten generals. When the Athenians created a navy, in the beginning of the fifth century B.C., they did not establish a corresponding board of admirals but adapted the board of generals to take charge of the navy. The men elected to the board of generals had to be capable of commanding both a fleet

and a field army.

The proxenia could function as both an overt and a covert intelligence system. Representatives of this institution had access to the political power centres of the city-states and were in an ideal position to contact subversive groups on behalf of the state they represented. Proxenoi, moreover, could easily participate in sabotage, betrayal of besieged cities, and political subversion.

The intensification of tensions between Athens and Sparta in the latter half of the fifth century B.C. created the need for the extension of intelligence networks. The struggle between these two states was further enhanced by factional fighting within the cities of their allies which created a schism in the Greek world, with the adherents of democracy appealing to Athens, and the followers of oligarchy looking to Sparta for protection. Consequently, governments and factions turned to the proxenia, since this institution could easily be adapted to serve in an intelligence capacity.

PART 2

THE METHODS

2.1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Very little attention has previously been paid to the importance of the proxenia and information gathering in Ancient Greece. In reality only five authors have touched upon the matter and their results may be briefly summarized to give the background to this study.

2.1.1 MEIGGS, RUSSELL, "A Note on Athenian Imperialism" *The Classical Review* 63 (1949) 9-12.

This article is the first to suggest that the Athenians manipulated the proxenia to serve the interests of Athenian imperialism. Meiggs argues that the Athenians adapted the proxenia as a means of keeping watch over their reluctant allies. He supports his discussion by presenting a series of inscriptions ($IGi^2.56$;$IGi^2.27$;$IGi^2.28$;$IGii^2.32$) which contain clauses guaranteeing protection for proxenoi and sometimes for their families as well. Penalties or punishments against anyone who harmed or murdered a representative of Athens were also included in several of these documents. Meiggs reinforces this assertion in his book, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), through his discussion of several proxenoi who were used as instruments of the empire. Meiggs, moreover, comments on the fact that the Athenian proxenoi, in return for the honour of public recognition by Athens, were eager to defend the interests of Athens and could have been used as an excellent source of political intelligence.

2.1.2 PERLMAN, S. "A Note on the Political Implications of the Proxenia in the Fourth Century B.C.", *The Classical Quarterly* 8 (1958) 185-187.

Perlman examines the political role of the proxenia and discusses a further dimension by suggesting that the award of proxenia was closely identified with the external policy of the state. Perlman's presentation is confined to the fourth century B.C. and he traces the activities of several proxenoi who used their influence to further the interests of the state they represented as well as the foreign policy of their own city (for example, Ekphantos of Thasos [cf. 3.42 below] and Klearkhos of Sparta [cf. 3.3.2 below]). In this light, Perlman argues that the proxenia was a vital instrument used to extend a state's influence abroad and to provide a link between the ruling faction of one city and a faction of similar political ideology in another state.

2.1.3 LOSADA, LUIS A., *The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War* (Leiden, 1972).

The betrayal of cities by individuals and factions has been frequently attested in literary sources and has received the attention of various scholars. Losada provides a complete study of this subject during the period of the Peloponnesian war. According to Losada, fifth columns operated throughout the entire course of the war and in all parts of the Greek world. The motives of those engaged in this type of activity did not revolve around the traditional political division between oligarchs and democrats but depended on social, economic, psychological and political factors. The technical and economic conditions of warfare

in the Classical period, moreover, led each side, during the Peloponnesian war, to seek the support of fifth columns. Losada suggests that the success or failure of these groups was a decisive factor in the outcome of the conflict. Significantly, some of the fifth columns examined by Losada were organized and led by proxenoi. This was the case with the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene (cf3.4.3 below) and the Korinthian proxenoi in Korkyra (cf.3.5.1 below).

2.1.4 STARR, CHESTER, *Political Intelligence in Classical Greece* (Leiden, 1974).

This study examines the role of intelligence in the history of ancient Greece between 500-336 B.C. Starr presents numerous examples of intelligence activity in an effort to prove that problems of political intelligence really did exist in ancient Greece. He concludes by suggesting that the Greeks made use of virtually every mode of intelligence which was available; they failed, however, to evaluate the information properly. He includes with his survey of espionage activity, two examples of proxenoi, Arithmios of Zeleia (cf.3.3.1 below) and Polydamos of Pharsalos (cf3.2.5 below) who supplied their clients with information and who took part in clandestine work. Starr's work is essentially a broad outline of the different uses of political intelligence made by the ancient Greeks and it is not intended to be a complete study of any particular intelligence activity.

2.1.5 ENGELS, D., "Alexander's Intelligence System", *The Classical Quarterly* 30(1980)327-340

Although this article does not talk about the proxenia as such it deals with phenomena so closely related to the following discussion that it represents an important part of the background development of thought relevant to this study. The purpose of this work is to provide an analysis of the methods which Alexander the Great used to obtain and evaluate military and political information and the counter-intelligence which he employed against his enemies. Engels suggests that throughout Alexander's campaigns, diplomatic envoys were used as spies to provide strategic and tactical intelligence. Another important source of intelligence was the interrogation of high-ranking officials from one nation to obtain information about the neighbouring nations, which Alexander planned to conquer.

According to Engels, when the Makedonian army was moving, it could only collect supplies within a sixty to eighty mile radius. Consequently, it was essential for Alexander to obtain precise intelligence concerning harvest dates, the location of suitable routes, transport facilities and the districts of agricultural production in territories through which the army would march. Alexander acquired this type of information from native guides, scouts, deserters and prisoners. At the same time, Alexander went to great lengths to prevent information about Makedonian strategic and tactical planning from reaching his opponents. One method employed was to restrict the individuals permitted to attend military conferences to important and trusted commanders. Alexander, furthermore,

employed an organization of agents and informants within his army to report on suspicious activities among his own officers and troops.

2.2. THE APPROACH TO, AND METHODS OF THIS STUDY

The primary evidence presented in this study is based on literary and epigraphic sources. In some instances it has been possible to correlate proxeny decrees, which describe the intelligence activity of an individual,with events mentioned in literary sources. These episodes demonstrate the effect that the intelligence role of the proxenia had on the course of Greek history between the fifth century B.C. and the first part of the fourth centry B.C.

Examples of proxenoi functioning as intelligence agents are presented in chronological order and by region. This is a logical division since it permits, in some cases, an analysis of the activities of proxenoi of more than one state in a given region. A map is included (endpage) to demonstrate that the distribution of proxenoi engaged in intelligence activity covered some of the most strategically important areas of the Greek world.

An attempt has been made to present the historical background of events which reveal the intelligence activities of proxenoi and link their participation to a specific episode involving the collection of information or any other type of intelligence activity. In some cases it has been possible to provide the complete historical context of events depicting the intelligence role of the proxenia and identifying the category of intelligence activity which the proxenos performed. Other

cases require some degree of speculation. This is due to the absence of complete extant sources surrounding a particular event or period of Greek history and the fragmentary nature of some of the epigraphical evidence. Consequently the approach of this study is not based only upon the individual examples cited but also upon the cumulative effect of the evidence presented. It would be wrong to place too much emphasis on the interpretation of one or two isolated incidents; the cumulative weight of the incidents analysed in the following section seems to suggest that we may be dealing with something more general than a few isolated phenomena.

PART 3

THE EVIDENCE

3.1 Introduction

One of the earliest grants of proxenia in the 5th century B.C. was given to Alexandros I of Makedonia (Hdt.8.136.1-3). There is some debate as to the exact date of his proxenia but it served both the interests of Alexandros and of the Athenians. Wallace (1970:199-200) and Walbank (1978:66) link Alexandros' proxenia to the late 480's B.C. If this is the case, the closer ties with Alexandros coincide with the Themistokleian ship-building programme and the need for large shipments of timber from Makedonia. Indeed, as a vassal of the great king, Alexandros had access to the plans of the Persians and was in an ideal position to assist the Greeks as well as the Athenians with valuable information. According to the account of Herodotos (9.45-46) just before the engagement at Plataiai Alexandros secretly rode up to the Greek lines and informed them of the Persian plan of battle. This event is dismissed by Bury and Meiggs (1979:184) as being improbable. On the other hand, what gives it a ring of truth is that of all the Greek armies present at Plataiai it was the Athenians to whom Alexandros went directly. Logically Alexandros should have transmitted his information to Spartan troops. This would have made sure that his information got to the Spartan king, Pausanias, the commander of the combined Greek forces, as quickly as possible. In fact, Herodotos (9.45.4-7) quotes Alexandros telling the Athenian soldiers:

"Ανδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παραθήκην ὑμῖν τὰ ἔπεα τάδε τίθεμαι, ἀπόρρητα ποιεύμενος πρὸς μηδένα λέγειν ὑμέας ἄλλον ἢ Παυσανίην, μή με καὶ διαφθείρητε· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγον, εἰ μὴ μεγάλως ἐκηδόμην συναπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

Does Herodotos imply that Pausanias can count only on the Athenians to keep a secret and not on his own soldiers? This is very unlikely. A more plausible explanation is that Alexandros was sure that his information would be accepted as reliable by the Athenians, whereas the rest of the Greeks might have been very sceptical of what a vassal of Persia told them.

The Athenians, on the other hand, would have had good reason to trust Alexandros, especially if he was already an Athenian proxenos. This is only conceivable if the proxenia of Alexandros is dated before the battle of Plataiai. Unfortunately, it is possible for Geyer (1930:44), Lombardo (1931:480-84), and Hammond (OCD[2] s.v. Alexander [1]) to argue that Alexandros became an Athenian proxenos only after the Persian wars. If that is the case the Athenians may have honoured Alexandros for his assistance during the Persian wars, thus maintaining a close friendship with someone who was situated in a strategic position in northern Greece. Persia may have been defeated but she still posed a formidable threat. Another major factor was the supply of timber for Athenian ships from northern Greece.[1] At this time

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[1] For the importance of the Makedonian timber supply to the Athenian navy and mercantile marine see Thouk. 4.108.1; Xen. Hell. 6.1.11; SIG[2] 587,66,304; SIG[3] 248 N.7. In 407 B.C. another Makedonian king, Arkhelaos, was made proxenos and benefactor (IGi[2].105).

moreover, the interests of Athens were greatly expanded, especially in northern Greece and the northern Aegean. For Alexandros the proxenia meant close ties with an emerging power and a counterforce to Persia.

If Alexandros was not, in fact, the first proxenos to provide information it may at least be that his case was one which led to the adaptation of the proxenia to such a purpose. Despite the ambiguities over the exact date of the proxenia of Alexandros, there is every indication that the Athenians after this began to manipulate the "intelligence" potential of the proxenia. Unfortunately, there does not exist a complete record of all of the Athenian proxenies issued or, for that matter, of those of any other Greek city-state. What does remain, though, provides an indication of the use made of the proxenia by the different Greek governments. The poverty of evidence, however, narrows the scope of this discussion to only a few of the Greek states.

3.2 NORTHERN GREECE

3.2.1 Nymphodoros of Abdera

In the struggle between Athens and Sparta in the latter half of the 5th century B.C., the proxenia began to play a vital role. Just after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war the Athenians wanted to bring Sitalkes, king of the Odrysians in Thrake, into an alliance with them (Thouk.2.29.1-7). Since Sitalkes was at this time the enemy of Athens, the Athenians made Nymphodoros of Abdera their proxenos in ca. 431-30 B.C. to conduct negotiations (Thouk.2.29.1). According to Thoukydides (2.29.1), Nymphodoros had a great deal of influence with Sitalkes who had married Nymphodoros' sister.

Nymphodoros, in fact, not only induced Sitalkes into an alliance with Athens; he also brought about a reconciliation between Perdikkas of Makedonia and the Athenians (Thouk.2.29.7). As a result of Nymphodoros' efforts, Perdikkas immediately joined forces with the Athenians under Phormio and took the field against the Khalkidians (Thouk.2.29.7).

The question which must be asked now is whether the actions of Nymphodoros were the result of diplomatic negotiations or of an intelligence activity. On the surface it appears to be a diplomatic achievement. The Athenians needed to turn their enemy Sitalkes into an ally and used his brother-in-law to accomplish this. On the other hand, why should Nymphodoros have assisted the Athenians and was it necessary for the Athenians

to grant Nymphodoros the proxenia? As far as the motives of Nymphodoros are concerned, we can only assume that he stood to gain something from his association with Athens. The inscription of his proxenia does not survive so we can not ascertain what privileges were attached to it. This could include any number of privileges and benefits: the right to own land and a house in Athens, exemption from taxes (ἀτέλεια), the right to pay the same taxes as an Athenian (ἰσοτέλεια) and protection as well as compensation to his family in case of his death.

What is interesting is that according to Thoukydides (2.29.1), Nymphodoros was first made proxenos and then summoned to Athens; during his visit there, Nymphodoros was persuaded by the Athenians to use his influence on Sitalkes. Whatever transpired in Athens, it was more than enough to gain Nymphodoros' friendship. He not only agreed to bring Sitalkes over to the Athenian camp, but he further promised to end the war in Thrake and to persuade Sitalkes to send the Athenians a force of Thrakian cavalry and peltasts (Thouk.2.29.5). All of this Nymphodoros accomplished and it must be kept in mind that it was for the benefit of Athens. Nymphodoros' type of intelligence activity is plainly overt.

The motives of the Athenians, in giving Nymphodoros the proxenia, are quite clear. On the one hand they gain a valuable ally in Sitalkes and on the other they have a permanent agent in Thrake. They could, moreover, depend on Nymphodoros to report on any activity in Thrake detrimental to Athenian interests in the future. As events were later to show,

it was imperative for the Athenians to have a proxenos in the area to keep them informed. Perdikkas of Makedonia played a double game between Athens and Sparta, the details of which are discussed by J.W. Cole (1974:55). At one time he helped the Khalkidians against Athens (Thouk.1.57.1-6); at another he sided with Athens against her rebellious allies (Thouk.2.29.6). In 429 B.C. combined operations had been planned between Athens and Sitalkes against Perdikkas. Nymphodoros perhaps had a hand in persuading Sitalkes to move against Perdikkas. As the Athenian proxenos, Nymphodoros would have done everything in his power to look after Athenian interests. In 429 B.C. Sitalkes mustered a large Thrakian army and invaded Makedonia. The territory was laid waste, but for some reason which Thoukydides (2.101.1) does not adequately explain, the Athenian contingent did not arrive, and Sitalkes withdrew.

3.2.2 Aristonos of Larissa

The Athenians, however, did not restrict their intelligence activities only to the court of Sitalkes. In 431 B.C., the first year of war, the Peloponnesians invaded Attika. The Athenian hoplites were kept behind the walls by Perdikkas and only a few columns of cavalry were sent out by the Athenians to engage the enemy. One of these columns, composed entirely of Thessalians, was commanded by Aristonous of Larissa (Thouk.2.22.3). An inscription has survived (IGi^2.55) which bears the name of a certain Aristonós granting him the title of proxenos and benefactor. Furthermore, the decree includes provisions for Aristonos to have access to the court of the Polemarkhos if he suffers civil injury. There may also have

been a clause which included compensation to be paid if Aristonos was killed. Unfortunately, at this point the text of the inscription is missing. A strong case has been made (Walbank 1978: 166) that Aristonos, the proxenos, is the same as Aristonous, the commander of the Thessalian cavalry column mentioned by Thoukydides (2.22.3).

This may be another glimpse into the diplomatic and intelligence efforts of the Athenians in Thrake and Thessalia. As an Athenian proxenos Aristonos would be valuable in providing the Athenians with information as well as acting as a middleman between Athens and mercenary forces of cavalry in Thessalia. It is interesting that in an obscure passage of Aeneias the Tactician (22.29) the contractor of mercenary forces is referred to as a proxenos. It is not, however, clear if Aeneias the Tactician is referring to a traditional type of proxenos or if he means that the contractor is the proxenos of the mercenaries, that is, their representative.

3.2.3a Strophakos of Pharsalos (and 3.2.3b Three Illyrians)

When Brasidas was trying to make his way through Thessalia in 424 B.C. to get to Thrake, he ran into some resistance. It was partly due to his abilities as a diplomat and partly on the advice that he may have received from several of the Thessalians accompanying him that he got through. Before proceeding to Thessalia, Brasidas had taken the precaution of including with his staff several of his friends from Pharsalos in Thessalia. One of these Thessalians, Strophakos,

was the proxenos of the Khalkidians (Thouk.4.78.1). In this instance, Strophakos, a Thessalian, was acting on behalf of the Khalkidians by supplying valuable intelligence to Brasidas on how to proceed through Thessalia. No doubt, the grant of proxenia to Strophakos had paid its dividends to the Khalkidians.

Brasidas marched through Thessalia unmolested and followed up with a victorious winter campaign (along with the aid of Perdikkas of Makedonia) in Thrake. The Athenians did not take any military action to check Brasidas. According to Bury and Meiggs (1979:281) the inactivity of the Athenians was due to two causes. First, the disaster of Delion had disheartened them; second, the peace party represented by Nikias and Lakhes took this opportunity to work towards peace. Instead, taking advantage of the one year truce which was concluded with Sparta, they concentrated on improving their position in the area.

In the summer of 423 B.C., Brasidas was obliged to join Perdikkas and march against Arrhabaios, king of the Lynkestians. This expedition against the Lynkestians served no purpose to the interests of Sparta, but it was important to Perdikkas. Since Perdikkas was contributing to the pay of the Peloponnesian army it was necessary for Brasidas to co-operate. The combined forces of Brasidas and Perdikkas defeated the Lynkestians. Then, events took a different course. Perdikkas was expecting a force of Illyrian mercenaries to join up with him but the Illyrians betrayed him and instead joined up with Arrhabaios (Thouk.4.125.1). Fortunately, (3.2.3b on the map) we have a surviving inscription (IGi^2.72), in a fragmentary

condition, which may shed some light on the betrayal by the Illyrians. According to Walbank (1978:235), the inscription is a record of the granting of a proxenia to three Illyrians, who may have been related, for their services to the Athenian people and army. Furthermore, a clause was added which offered compensation if any of them were murdered at any place under Athenian control. Both Walbank (1978:237) and Hiller (IGi^2.72) place the date of this inscription ca. 421-20 B.C. and argue that the granting of the proxenia was related to the campaigns of Brasidas and Perdikkas in 423 B.C. Unfortunately, there is no way of determining if the three individuals referred to in IGi^2.72 were instrumental in persuading the Illyrians to abandon Perdikkas. It would not, however, be illogical for the Athenians to have used the same approach with the Illyrians as they had done with Nymphodoros and the Odrysians of Thrake. Only in this case the grant of proxenia would have been made after the recipients had performed some kind of service for the Athenians. If that service was persuading the Illyrians to support the Athenian cause it paid off handsomely. The appearance of the Illyrians on the side of Arrhabaios caused panic in the Makedonian army and forced Perdikkas and Brasidas to retreat (Thouk.4.125). Ultimately, this episode led to a breach between Brasidas and the Makedonians (Thouk.4.128.5).

3.2.4 Kallipos of Gyrton (Thessalia)

Shortly after this, Perdikkas changed sides again and, in order to prove his loyalty to Athens, he prevented the Lakedaimonian

from reinforcing Brasidas in Thrake (Thouk.4.132.1). Perdikkas accomplished this by convincing his friends in Thessalia not to permit Lakedaimonian forces to cross their territory (Thouk. 4.132.1-3). Perdikkas, however, may not have been the only one who wanted to prevent the Thessalians from allowing the Lakedaimonians to cross Thessalia. Another inscription has survived which records the grant of proxenia to Kallipos of Thessalian Gyrton ($IGii^2$ 27). According to the text of the document, the board of generals recommends that Kallipos be praised for his good will towards Athens and that he be recognized, together with his sons, as proxenos and euergetes. Walbank (1978:353) suggests that Kallipos' services may have been of a military nature. It is quite conceivable that Kallipos was given the proxenia for his part in persuading the Thessalians not to permit the Peloponnesians to cross their country. If the efforts of the three Illyrians (3.2.3b) mentioned in the decrees of proxenia (IGi^2 72) of ca. 421-20 B.C. as well as those of Kalipos are related to the events in Thrake, it may offer an insight into the covert activities of the Athenians. Even if Meritt (1939:63-69) is right in placing the proxenia of Kallipos in 416-415 B.C., this still does not preclude the possibility that Kallipos was made proxenos for his services in 423-422 B.C.

3.2.5 Polydamos of Pharsalos

In the fourth century events took a different turn in Thessalia and both Athens and Sparta had to contend with a new power for control of northern Greece. During the fifth and early fourth centuries B.C., Thessalia comprised numerous cities which were in a constant state of hostility or war. By the time of the *Peace of Kallias* (371 B.C.) Thessalia was unified into a powerful state under the hegemonia of Iason of Pherai. Iason was a capable general and diplomat and it was these abilities which helped him to control Thessalia. His ambitions, however, were not confined to this region; he aimed at hegemonia over Greece and at leading a crusade against Persia (Xen. Hell. 6.1.12-13). As master of Thessalia he had the best cavalry in Greece at his command and the means of raising a powerful army to accomplish his aims. A serious obstacle to Iason was Sparta, the most powerful state in Greece at this time. To overcome this Iason allied himself with Thebes, and with the Second Athenian Confederacy (Tod 1948:2.67-68).

In July 371 B.C. the Spartan army was routed at the battle of Leuktra by the Thebans. When the news of the Theban victory reached Iason he set out immediately with his army to join his allies. The presence of the Thessalian forces compelled the Spartans to accept a truce with the Thebans instead of waiting for their reinforcements to arrive and attempting to resume the battle (Xen.Hell.6.4.22-26). The Spartans were now confronted with a formidable coalition of Boiotia and Thessalia. Thebes, up until the battle of Leuktra,was not considered to be

a major military power. The reorganization of her army by Epaminondas and Pelopidas led to the victory at Leuktra and made Thebes a power to be reckoned with.

The Spartans were kept abreast of the events in Thessalia early enough to prevent the ascendancy of Iason and ultimately to rob the Thebans of a powerful ally. According to Xenophon (Hell.6.1.2), the Spartan proxenos in Pharsalos presented the Spartan assembly with a detailed report of the situation in Thessalia outlining the dangers Iason was posing for them. Polydamos of Pharsalos was a prominent man in his own city and all over Thessalia (Xen. Hell.6.1.2). He was in an ideal place to observe the situation in Thessalia and when he felt that the interests of Sparta were threatened he did not hesitate to inform her government of the state of affairs. Xenophon (Hell.6.1.4-5) quotes his words to the Spartan assembly:

> Ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρόξενος ὑμῶν ὢν καὶ εὐεργέτης ἐκ πάντων ὧν μεμνήμεθα προγόνων, ἀξιῶ, ἐάν τέ τι ἀπορῶ, πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰέναι, ἐάν τέ τι χαλεπὸν ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ Θετταλίᾳ συνιστῆται, σημαίνειν. ἀκούετε μὲν οὖν, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, καὶ ὑμεῖς Ἰάσονος ὄνομα· ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ καὶ δύναμιν ἔχει μεγάλην καὶ ὀνομαστός ἐστιν.

Polydamos then proceeded to give the Spartan assembly the political and military details of Iasons' actions in Thessalia (Xen.Hell. 6.1.5-13):

1) the alliances of Iason in Thessalia.
2) the strength of Iasons' army, six

thousand mercenaries.
3) the alliances of Iason with the Markians, Dolopians, the King of Epeiros and the Thebans.
4) the future plans of Iason to:
   a) build a navy and raise an army of ten thousand hoplites.
   b) cut off the Athenians from their naval supplies in Makedonia.
   c) subdue Greece and conduct a war against Persia.
5) the need for Iason to conclude an alliance with Pharsalos, Polydamos' city, in order to complete his hold over Thessalia.

Furthermore, he urged the Spartans to send an army to Thessalia, assuring them that its presence would cause the rebellion of the cities allied with Iason.

This is an excellent example of a proxenos functioning as an intelligence agent. Polydamos had the qualifications which enabled him to have access to information not available to many individuals. The prestige and prominence he enjoyed made this possible. For example, a great deal of what he reported to the Spartan assembly he learned from Iason himself (Xen. Hell.6.1.4-5), and the rest from other sources. In his report (Xen. Hell.6.1.8), Polydamos indicated that he was able to verify part of what he picked up from Iason, although he did not specify how he could do so. We can assume, however, that he also had contacts in other Thessalian cities keeping him informed.

Despite his warnings and advice the Spartans did not take the initiative and eventually had to face a powerful and united Thessalia, hostile to them. Polydamos returned to his city and if we consider his past performance we may assume that he kept on informing the Spartans about the situation in

Thessalia. According to Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.34-33), after Iason's assassination in 370 B.C. his brother Polyphron took over the hegemonia of Thessalia and executed Polydamos. Xenophon does not give the reason for Polydamos' death but we can safely assume that his association with Sparta was part of it.

3.3 THE HELLESPONT AND PROPONTIS

3.3.1 Arithmios of Zeleia

Athens had shown interest in the Hellespont as early as the first half of the fifth century B.C. The importance of this region lay in its access to the Black Sea area with its grain. It would be natural for the Athenians to establish proxenies there, if only to safeguard their economic interests. One such proxenia was given to Arithmios of Zeleia (Aiskhin.3. 258-279). Arithmios, however, betrayed his office and instead of serving the interests of Athens he decided to work for the Persians. Sometime between 480 - 460 B.C., on behalf of the Persians, Arithmios brought gold to the Peloponnese (Aiskhin.3. 258; Dem. 9. 42) in order to instigate discontent amongst the Greeks. When the Athenians learned of his activities they declared him ἄτιμος and an enemy of the Athenian people and their allies (Dem.9,42; Dein. 2.24-5). The condemnation of ἀτιμία meant that Arithmios was now regarded as an outlaw and he was stripped of all the privileges he had enjoyed in Athens. As an Athenian proxenos, Arithmios had the perfect cover to travel to the Peloponnese without arousing any suspicion, or for that matter, anywhere in Greece. The Persians would have been hard pressed to find a better agent to carry their gold. Furthermore, they could trust Arithmios because they could always threaten him with exposure, at least up to the time when his treachery was discovered.

There is a record of at least one other proxenia in the Hellespont, dated to the middle of the fifth century B.C., naming Pythagoras of Selymbria as the proxenos of Athens (IGi^2 1034; Wallace 1970:203). He, together with Arithmios of Zeleia and Alexandros of Makedonia, are the earliest recorded proxenoi in the fifth century B.C. (Walbank 1978:4).

3.3.2 Klearkhos of Sparta

The basic strategy of the Spartans, during the Peloponnesian war, was to try to force the Athenians to commit their army to battle. The Spartans thus, ravaged Attika with the object of inducing the Athenian hoplites to defend their land. If they could achieve this, they were confident that their superbly trained army would easily defeat the Athenians. This tactic, however, failed to achieve its purpose. The Athenians, ever appreciative of the capability of the Spartan army, remained behind their walls. This they did secure in the knowledge that the fleet could keep Athens supplied as long as necessary.

The critical point of the Athenian grain supply was the Hellespont. As long as Athens controlled this region she could maintain a secure access to her food supply in the Black Sea area. By 411 B.C. the Spartans realized the futility of their strategy. According to Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.35), King Agis of Sparta, while stationed at Dekeleia, could actually see the Athenian ships carrying grain to Peiraieus. Agis, therefore, resolved to gain control of the Hellespont in order to cut off

the Athenians from their food supply (Xen. Hell.1.1.35). Accordingly, an attack was planned on Khalkedon and Byzantion (Xen. Hell.1.1.35). The assault on Byzantion, however, was co-ordinated to coincide with a revolt inside the city (Thouk. 8,80.2). A faction in Byzantion wanted to withdraw the city from the Athenian alliance and had made overtures to the Spartans for assistance (Thouk.8.80.2). Considering the circumstances, it is not surprising that Agis gave the command of the Spartan forces to Klearkhos, son of Rhamphias. What is unique about Klearkhos is that, among other things, he was the proxenos of Byzantion at Sparta (Xen. Hell.1.1.35). When the Spartan forces reached Byzantion, the revolt took place and the Spartans occupied the city (Thouk.8.80.3).

What we must ask here is, if Byzantion was taken with the aid of fifth columnists, of what significance was the proxenia of Klearkhos. I believe there are two factors to consider. First, the faction within Byzantion most probably made contact with the Spartans through the proxenos, Klearkhos. We know from Thoukydides (8.80.1) that Klearkhos during that same summer was in the area, for he had been sent by the Spartans to Pharnabazos, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Thouk.8.80.1); both Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes, satrap of Sardis, were urging the Spartans to begin operations in the Hellespont. It is thus not inconceivable that he was met by representatives from Byzantion and informed of the potential coup. Second, the Spartans had to consider their position in Byzantion after its capture. This city had been a loyal ally of Athens and it still

was a strategic point in the Hellespont region. It would be imperative, therefore, that the city be placed under the command of someone who enjoyed the confidence of the ruling faction and who could prevent any attempt at a counter coup. The Spartan meeting these qualifications most admirably was Klearkhos.

3.3.3 Polykles, Peraieus, and Aristoboulos of Byzantion

The Hellespont, as we have seen, figured prominently in the strategic considerations of Athens and Sparta. One of several documents which pertain to this is a record of three men of Byzantion being praised for their services to Athens IGi^2.106). Polykles, Peraieus, and Aristoboulos are honoured for their past services and present usefulness to the city and the army and are granted exemption from the metic tax at Athens (IGi^2.106.1-10). If, moreover, we accept Wilhelm's restoration of line ten (of the decree) they were also granted enktesis of house and land (IGi^2.106;Walbank 1978:426). Pecirka, (1966:13-17) agreed that this restoration was possible, but noted that there is no parallel for a grant of both house and land. In cases of exiles it was usual to give grants only for houses. In any case, there is a strong implication that these men were exiles and may have suffered this fate because of their association with Athens. One, or all three of them, may have been exiled from Byzantion after the city rebelled from the Athenian Alliance (Thouk.8.80.3) in 411 B.C.

According to the document, the generals at Athens were instructed to send the exiles on a trireme by the quickest and

safest route, to join the generals in the Hellespont. The generals in the Hellespont were also instructed to accept their advice and work with them towards the best interests of Athens (IGi^2.106.20-23).

The historical context of this document is most likely to be the period between 411-408 B.C., when Athens was trying to restore her position in the Hellespont (Walbank 1978:430). It is not certain that the decree is a granting of proxenia - the surviving fragments do not mention either proxenia or euergesia. According to Walbank (1978:431), however, the extant sections strongly suggest that these men were already Athenian proxenoi or were gaining this office because of their assistance to Athens. By coincidence, when Athenian operations intensified in the Hellespont in 409 B.C., two cities, Selymbria and Byzantion, were taken with the aid of fifth columnists. Is there any relationship between this and the arrival of Polykles, Peraieus, and Aristoboulos in the Hellespont to "advise" the Athenian generals? We will never know, but the possibility is tantalizing.

3.3.4 Apollodoros of Selymbria

We know from Xenophon (Hell.1.3.16) Ploutarkhos (Alk. 31.2-6) and Diodoros (13.66.6-7) that both Byzantion and Selymbria were taken by betrayal. In 407 B.C. a decree was passed at Athens ratifying the conditions upon which Selymbria was restored to the Athenian Alliance (IGi^2.116). The decree itself is in two parts, the second being a clause added by Alkibiades (who captured Selymbria) which, among other things, grants the proxenia

to Apollodoros and another man, whose name survives only in part. Certainly these men were made proxenoi because of their services to Athens. Considering that Selymbria was, until recently, at war with Athens, the granting of the proxenia to Apollodoros and the other man may well have been as a result of the part which they took in the betrayal of the city.

3.3.5 Arkhelios and Heraklides of Byzantion

From Xenophon (Hell.1.3.16) we are better informed about the events in Byzantion. After Alkibiades captured Selymbria in 408 B.C.[1] (Xen. Hell.1.3.10;Diod.13.66) he moved his forces and besieged Byzantion (Xen.Hell.1.3.14). Finding that his efforts to take that city by force were getting him nowhere, Alkibiades decided on a clandestine course of action. According to Xenophon (Hell.1.3.16) he managed to persuade some of the people of Byzantion to betray their city to him. From Xenophon we have the names of those who participated in the plot: Kydon, Ariston, Anaxilaos, and Lykourgos (Xen.Hell.1.3.18-19).All of these men were exiled when the Spartan forces under Lysandros again occupied Byzantion in 405 B.C. (Xen.Hell.2.2.1). The city remained in Spartan control until 390-389 B.C., when it was taken by Thrasyboulos with the aid of an internal coup (Dem.20.60;Xen. Hell.4.8.27). According to Demosthenes, the men who handed the city over to Thrasyboulos, Arkhelios and Herakleides , were banished from Byzantion because of their association with Athens (Dem.20.60). In turn, the Athenians made both of them proxenoi and benefactors (Dem.20.60). Arkhelios and Herakleides had proven

1 There is some debate about the exact date.

their value to Athens, since by their actions they enabled Thrasyboulos to capture Byzantion without an assault. A protracted siege would have cost the Athenians a great deal in terms of time, effort, men, and money.

3.3.6 Philinos of Byzantion

After the *Peace of Antalkidas* (386 B.C.) the people of Byzantion remained loyal to Athens (Isokr.14.28) and in 377 B.C. ($IG ii^2.43$) were among the first to join the Second Athenian Confederacy. One year prior to this Byzantion had entered into a separate alliance with Athens (Tod 1948:2.56). Among the envoys of Byzantion sent to Athens for the conclusion of the Alliance was Kydon, the pro-Athenian who helped betray his city to Alkibiades (Xen.Hell.1.3.18). When Lysandros captured Byzantion, Kydon fled to Pontos and later to Athens where he received citizenship (Xen.Hell.2.2.1).

Another of the Byzantine envoys was Philinos (Tod 1948: 2.57) who at about this time was granted the title of proxenos and benefactor by the Athenians ($IG ii^2.76$), not only for his good will in the present but also for his past services to the Athenians ($IG ii^2.76.10-13$). All the previous proxenies given to the citizens of Byzantion, which have been discussed, were granted to men who had more than demonstrated their devotion to the Athenian cause. Individuals, such as Arkhelios and Heraklides were banished from their city because of their association with Athens. In turn, the Athenians rewarded them with the proxenia (Dem.20.60). To the Athenians these men had proven their loyalty as well as

their value. Philinos, to receive the proxenia, must have gained the trust of the Athenians, perhaps not in the same manner as Arkhelios and Heraklides, but to the same degree. As the Athenian proxenos in Byzantion, Philinos was charged with looking after the interest of the Athenians and providing assistance and hospitality to Athenian envoys coming to his city.

3.3.7 Phanokritos of Parion

Athens, slowly recovering from her defeat during the Peloponnesian war, had formed an alliance with Thebes, Korinthos and Argos against Sparta (395-4 B.C.). During the course of the conflict which ensued (the Korinthian war) Athens was restored as an independent power in Greece. By 386 B.C. the Athenian fleet, under the command of Iphikrates and Diotimos, had blockaded the Spartan fleet,under Nikolokhos at Abydos (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-8). Antalkidas, the Spartan general was negotiating in Asia Minor with the Persians to bring them into the war on the side of the Spartans (Xen.Hell.5.1.25). When he discovered what had occurred, he went to Abydos and took command of the fleet. Antalkidas with the fleet sailed out of the harbour to Perkote on the Asiatic coast, after spreading the rumor that he was going to Khalkedon (Xen.Hell.5.1.25-26). The Athenian generals,deceived by the ruse, moved their fleet to the Propontis in the hope of catching up with the Spartans. Antalkidas, however, having avoided the Athenians, returned to Abydos unharmed. He was able, moreover, to capture eight triremes which had arrived to join up with the Athenian fleet (Xen.Hell.5.1.26-27).

This gave the Spartans superiority of numbers and control of the sea, which enabled them now to prevent ships coming in or out of the Black Sea (Xen.Hell.5.1.28). The end result was that the Spartans were able to cut off the Athenians from their supplies. Shortly after this, Athens and her allies were forced to come to terms with Sparta and Persia and signed the *King's Peace* in 397-86 B.C.

What is remarkable about this episode is that it demonstrates the valuable role that military intelligence can play in warfare. The failure of the Athenian generals to perceive that Antalkidas was passing them false information cost them the loss of eight triremes and ultimately control of the sea. On the surface it appears that the Athenian generals, picking up the rumours spread by Antalkidas, had no other alternative but to assume that they were true. This, however, was not the case. M.N. Tod (1948:2.47) and E.L. Hicks and G.E. Hill (1901:188) agree that an inscription dating to 386 B.C. is related to the events that led to Antalkidas' evasion of Iphikrates in the Hellepont.

In this inscription ($IGii^2$.29) we are told that Phanokritos of Parion informed the Athenian generals about the enemy fleet and if the generals, according to the document, had acted upon this information, they would have captured the Spartan triremes ($IGii^2$.29.11-15). The failure of the Athenian commanders to utilize the information brought to them by Phanokritos cost Athens control of the sea, so vital to her interests. Furthermore, the Athenians would have remained

ignorant of Phanokritos' deed if he had not gone to Athens and informed them of his potential service to the Athenian cause. The Athenians, recognizing the value of good intelligence, decided to reward Phanokritos anyway. For his potential service to Athens, therefore, he was made proxenos and benefactor and given a monetary reward ($IGii^2$.29.10-20).

The motives of the Athenians are quite clear: although Phanokritos' service was of no use this time, it had potential for the future. As an Athenian proxenos, any intelligence he now brought would be taken far more seriously by the Athenian authorities, and it may be that his information about the Spartan fleet was not accepted by the Athenian generals because they did not have any reason to trust what he reported or they may have suspected his motives. E. Balogh (1943:46) suggests that the Athenians were more generous to proxenoi than to metics living in the city. They could afford to do this because most of the time the proxenoi, since they did not reside in Athens, could not make use of their privileges. He further maintains that the privileges of the office were twofold: to honour the recipient, and to provide refuge in case he was forced to leave his city. The proxenia also gave Phanokritos an ideal cover for making frequent visits to Athens and entertaining Athenians in Parion and in this manner he could transmit any information he had. It could hardly be considered irregular by anyone if an Athenian proxenos in Parion made frequent contact with Athens or Athenians. The office also offered Phanokritos political asylum if his association with Athens forced him to leave

Parion. The unusual privileges granted with the proxenia, interestingly enough, only came into play if a proxenos was banished from his homeland. If that occurred, an Athenian proxenos was assured of refuge as well as certain rights and privileges in his new home.

3.3.8 Philiskos of Sestos

The circumstances of Phanokritos' proxenia bear a strong similarity to the granting of another proxenia to someone from the Hellespont region thirty years later. Philiskos of Sestos was made proxenos and benefactor by the Athenian assembly because he passed on information to the Athenians about the fleet of Byzantion during the hostilities of 356 B.C. ($IGii^2$.133). The document is dated to 355-4 B.C. by Dittenberger ($Syll^3$.199) and to 356-55 B.C. by Kirchner ($IGii^2$.133). Both, however, attribute the proxenia of Philiskos to the events of 356 B.C. in the Propontis.

In 378-7 B.C. the Athenians had organized a second league, only this time they emphasized the defensive nature of the alliance. During the next eight years Athens prosecuted a naval war against the Lakedaimonian Confederacy with considerable success. The strain on her resources and the growing jealousy of Thebes combined to induce her to come to terms with Sparta in 371 B.C. (*The Peace of Kallias*). In the following years the Athenians began to extend their power throughout the Greek world and to rebuild their maritime empire. Before long the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy were again trying

to break away from Athenian hegemonia. In 364 B.C. Byzantion openly rebelled, followed by Rhodos, Khios, and Keos. The rebellion was put down, but by 357 B.C. the same states again defied Athenian domination. Among all the members of the Confederacy, Khios was the most powerful and the Athenians immediately dispatched their forces to subdue the island. Despite a combined land and sea assault, the Athenians failed to take Khios (Diod.16.7.3 ;Nepos.Chabrias;Plout.Phokion). This encouraged further defections of Athenian allies, among them Sestos and other cities of the Hellespont. The Athenians, in 356 B.C.,sent their forces out again, this time to capture Byzantion in order to secure the supply route to the Black Sea. An indecisive naval battle took place in the Hellespont but the Athenians failed to take the city (Diod.16.21.1-4).

It was during these activities that Philiskos went to the Athenian commanders and gave them information about the fleet of Byzantion. Unfortunately, the inscription of Philiskos' proxenia (Syll^3.199;IGii^2.133) does not give exact details of the information he brought to the Athenians. We cannot ever be sure what value it may have had for the Athenian commanders in the Hellespont. The fact that they failed to capture Byzantion may imply that they either ignored Philiskos' information or were not in a position to take advantage of it. According to Diodoros (16.21.3) a sudden storm made naval operations extremely difficult. Both Iphikrates and Timotheos were reluctant to engage the enemy under these circumstances. Khares, the third Athenian commander, ignored their warnings and having

convinced the trierachs (ship captains) and sailors to follow him, attacked the enemy fleet. The result was indecisive and the Athenians were forced to retire. Another consideration is that Philiskos may have been viewed with suspicion by the Athenian authorities since his city, Sestos, had joined the rebellion. What is significant is that Philiskos passed on intelligence about the fleet of Byzantion. His action was even more remarkable in view of the fact that his own city of Sestos had joined the rebellion. To the Athenians, Philiskos not only proved his value but also his loyalty. As a proxenos he now had an official status with the Athenians as well as protection. The proxenia offered many privileges but more importantly it bestowed on the recipient honour and prestige. The title of proxenos elevated Philiskos from an informer to a trusted friend of the Athenian people. The decree granting the proxenia further stipulated that Philiskos was to be safeguarded from harm by the Athenian authorities in the Hellespont (IGii^2.133). This was necessary because any friend of Athens would have been viewed with hostility by the population of Sestos. In 352 B.C. Sestos was captured by Khares, the Athenian general, and forced back into the Athenian Confederacy. A large number of the inhabitants were then slaughtered or enslaved (Diod.16.34.3). Philiskos, therefore, could easily be the target of any anti-Athenian feeling. Close association with Athens often resulted in banishment or at times even death for a proxenos. It was in the interests of these individuals to report any activity detrimental to Athens. Part of their motivation was that the decline of

Athenian influence over their own state threatened their safety and security. The revolt of Kos in 364 or 363 B.C. was preceded by the murder of the Athenian proxenos and the exile of the pro-Athenian faction ($IGii^2.111$). The island was soon recaptured by Khabrias (SIG.173.N.8) and a new treaty was signed. One of its stipulations was the execution of the man responsible for the death of the Athenian proxenos ($IGii^2.111$).

3.4 THE AEGEAN ISLANDS AND ASIA MINOR

3.4.1 Apemantos of Thasos and His Sons

The effects of the Peloponnesian war and the disaster of the Sicilian expedition gave the oligarchs in Athens the opportunity to seize control of the state in 411 B.C. The new regime in Athens formulated a policy which favoured the establishment of oligarchic government in the states of their allies (Thouk.8.48.5). They had hoped by this attitude to encourage those states who had rebelled against Athens to return to the alliance. This policy would also guarantee the loyalty of those states who had remained with the Athenians. Phrynikhos, one of the Athenian oligarchs, disagreed with this notion and warned his colleagues that a constitutional change in Athens did not necessarily affect the attitude of past and present allies, since either way the allies would remain under Athenian domination (Thouk.8.48.5-7). Despite Phrynikhos' warnings the Athenian oligarchs proceeded with this policy and during the summer of 411 B.C. Dieitrephes was dispatched to Thasos and abolished its democratic constitution (Thouk.8.64.2).

It did not take long for the Thasians to prove Phrynikhos right. Two months after Dieitrephes' departure, the newly established oligarchic government fortified the city and turned to the Spartans for assistance (Thouk.8.64.3). In 411 B.C. with the support of the Korinthian commander, Timolaos, the Thasians successfully broke away from the Athenian Empire

(Hell.Oxy.2.4). Losada (1972:87) points out that the Athenians worked against their own interests by removing the Thasian democrats since they were the one group which would have opposed a change of allegiance for Thasos. This is made evident by the subsequent events in Thasos in which the members of the democratic faction persisted in their support of Athens and once again the proxenia played a prominent role.[1]

Among the pro-Athenian elements in Thasos it was the proxenoi who took the lead in maintaining contact with Athens and they ultimately paid a dear price for their loyalty to another state. The Thasian oligarchs quickly realized the potential threat that the Athenian proxenoi offered to their regime and took action accordingly. About 411 B.C., Apemantos, the Athenian proxenos in Thasos, was exiled and his property confiscated (IGxii.8.263.6). Unfortunately, the text of the inscription referring to Apemantos' exile does not cite the reason for this harsh measure. We can safely assume, however, that Apemantos' presence and his association with Athens were considered too dangerous by the Thasian oligarchs. Despite this, Apemantos' family continued to maintain pro-Athenian sentiments and five of his sons were awarded the proxenia sometime before the Thirty came to power in Athens (IGii^2.6). It is interesting that these proxenies were revoked by the Thirty along with many other proxenies which were granted by previous

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[1] From 411 B.C. the history of Thasos is plagued with difficulties. It is not clear from our sources whether the pro-Spartan oligarchic regime was continuously in power until Thrasyboulos recovered Thasos in 407 B.C. (Xen.Hell.1.4.9;Diod.13.72.1) or if it was deposed more than once between 411 to 407 B.C. For a complete discussion of this problem see Losada, 1972:88.

democratic regimes (Tod 1948:2.5). Consequently, when the democrats returned to power they renewed numerous proxenies repealed by the Thirty. Unfortunately, the original decree confirming the proxenia on Apemantos' sons does not survive and we only have the text of the renewed proxeny. This inscription (Tod 1948:2.5) only contains details of reinstatement and does not refer to the context of the original grant. We can only speculate on the reasons for the granting of the proxenia to Apemantos' sons but one thing is certain: Apemantos' sons had, in some manner, demonstrated their loyalty to the Athenian cause.

It is evident from our sources that the Thasian oligarchs were quite concerned about plots being hatched against their regime. A Thasian inscription dated 411-409 B.C. (Meiggs and Lewis 1969:83) offers rewards for information about subversion, revolutionary and treasonable activities in Thasos and the colonies. Their concerns were justified because by 407 B.C. Thasos was torn by civil strife (Xen.Hell.1.4.9). J. Pouilloux (1954:139-62, No. 18), and H.W. Pleket (1963:75 -77) assign the inscription to the Thasian oligarchic regime of 411 - 407 B.C.; while F. Chamoux (1959:348-58) attributes the decree to 430-400 B.C. R. Meiggs and D.Lewis (1968:254) seem inclined toward Chamoux's argument. In the same year, Thrasyboulos captured the island and forced the restoration of a democratic constitution and the recall of the pro-Athenian exiles (Xen.Hell.1.4.9;Diod.13.72.1). The situation dramatically changed after the battle of Aigospotamoi (405 B.C.). In 403 B.C. Lysandros, the Spartan general, took Thasos and treacherously

massacred those who were associated with the Athenian cause (Polyainos 1.45.4). Afterwards he placed Thasos under the rule of a harmost and a dekarkhia of pro-Spartan Thasians (Plout. Lys. 13.5).

3.4.2 Ekphantos of Thasos and His Associates

In 390-89 B.C. Thrasyboulos took Thasos for a second time; according to Demosthenes (20.59) this was possible because the pro-Athenian democratic faction of Thasos managed to expel the Lakedaimonian garrison and to admit Thrasyboulos and his forces inside the city. Demosthenes (20.59) adds, however, that the Thasians who assisted Thrasyboulos were the followers of Ekphantos, the Athenian proxenos.

Ekphantos was one of the members of the democractic faction in Thasos who had fled from Thasos in 404-403 B.C. and subsequently had been made proxenos by the Athenians (Dem.20. 59-62;Pouilloux 1954:201-203). During his exile in Athens he may have served as a link between the Athenians and the Thasian democrats who still remained in Thasos and who eventually turned over their city to Thrasyboulos in 390-89 B.C. The capture of Thasos by Thrasyboulos, consequently, gave Ekphantos the opportunity to return to his island and take up the duties of proxenos on behalf of the Athenians (IGxii.p.79). After the *Peace of Antalkidas* (386-5 B.C.), however, the oligarchs returned to power in Thasos and one of their first acts was to banish Ekphantos again, with men who had assisted Thrasyboulos (Dem. 20.59-61). This occurred regardless of the fact that the

oligarchic regime of Thasos pursued a pro-Athenian policy and ultimately joined the Second Athenian League in 377 B.C. (IG_{ii}^{2}.43).

Just as in 404 - 403 B.C., the Thasian exiles sought refuge in Athens and, according to Demosthenes (20.60), not only were they given asylum but they were also made proxenoi of Athens, as had been the case earlier with Ekphantos. Indeed, a similar pattern took place. Ekphantos was forced to leave Thasos in 404 - 403 B.C. because of the democratic sympathies which motivated him to serve the interests of Athens; in recognition of his past and potential future services the Athenians granted him the proxenia. In 390 - 389 B.C. his associates, who were probably still in contact with Ekphantos, handed Thasos over to Thrasyboulos; these men were also later banished by an oligarchic regime and awarded the proxenia by the Athenians. We can surmise from this that the Athenians expected that the exiled Thasians would one day return to Thasos and pursue the interests of the Athenians, as had Ekphantos. Otherwise the granting of the proxenia to the Thasians would have been a pointless gesture, since, as the proxenoi of Athens, they could only execute their duties in Thasos.

The episodes of Apemantos (cf 3.4.1), Ekphantos and his associates afford us a rare opportunity to study the covert and overt intelligence activities of several successive Athenian proxenoi in Thasos from 411 to 385 B.C. It is evident from the events in Thasos that the proxenoi of Athens were closely identified by the Thasian oligarchs with the democratic faction, and with subversion and revolution. The proxenia had come to represent

Athenian intervention and had played a significant role in each of the political upheavals in Thasos from the period of 411 to 385 B.C. The oligarchs of Thasos recognized this and took steps to protect themselves by passing legislation against subversion and offering rewards for information about such activities; as a further security precaution they banished the proxenoi of Athens.

3.4.3 Athenian Proxenoi in Mytilene

By 431 B.C., at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, Khios and Mytilene constituted the only members of the Delian League who still maintained a degree of independence within the Athenian dominated alliance. Mytilene in particular enjoyed a special status whithin the League. Mytilene was in fact one of five city-states on the island of Lesbos. The others, Antissa, Eresos Pyrrha and Methymna were also members of the Delian League though they were not as large nor as powerful as Mytilene. As an island city, Mytilene relied on the sea for commerce and thus had developed a powerful navy to protect her interests. This enabled her to maintain a distinct profile within the Confederacy since,with the exception of Athens, Mytilene was the most powerful member. According to Thoukydides (3.3.1), when the Athenians began to receive reports that the Mytileneans were making plans to extend their control over the island of Lesbos, they at first did not respond, afraid to antagonize such a powerful ally. The Athenians were very apprehensive about the possible unification of Lesbos under the control of the Mytileneans since this would create a new state more powerful and more difficult to control

as a League member. Another relevant aspect is that Mytilene was governed by an oligarchy (Thouk.3.27.3;3.39.6) and in this she was unique among the members of the Delian League. Generally the Athenians supported democratic regimes and occasionally were called upon to provide assistance to democratic revolutions. They did not, however, make it a policy to instigate political upheavals in the cities of their allies (Isokr. 4.104;12.99). On the whole they were inclined to coexist with the established order and only interfered if circumstances forced their hand to assist a revolution already in progress (de Ste. Croix 1954:passim). As long as the prevailing regime of a state maintained its allegiance to the Confederacy it had little to fear but once a government rebelled from the alliance the city-state was usually compelled to adopt a democratic constitution.

Despite the lack of interference from Athens with their system of government and the good relations they enjoyed within the Confederacy, the leaders of the Mytilenean oligarchy decided to secede from the Delian League. Their motives according to Thoukydides (3.2.3;3.10.4) were twofold: they wanted to extend their control over the island of Lesbos but were prevented from accomplishing this by the Athenians, and they feared that Mytilene would eventually be reduced to a tributary status within the Confederacy. These factors led the Mytileneans along with all of the other cities in Lesbos, except for Methymna, to rebel against the Athenian Confederacy in 428 B.C. The Mytileneans had actually made an earlier attempt before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war but their overtures to Sparta

for assistance went unheeded and they postponed their plans (Thouk. 3.2.1). There is no precise knowledge of the political systems employed in the other cities of Lesbos. A.W. Gomme (1956.2.252) describes Methymna, one of the cities in Lesbos, as a democracy and R.P. Legon (1968:200) suggests that there is a good probability that this was the case. A complete discussion of the historical background to the political events in Lesbos surrounding the rebellion of Mytilene is given by D. Gilles (1968:200), T.J. Quinn (1971:405) and M. Cogan (1981:1). In any case, the Athenians, after initial consternation, acted with speed and resolution and by 427 B.C., forced the Mytileneans and their allies to surrender.

A decisive factor in the failure of Mytilene was the timing of the rebellion. It is apparent from Thoukydides (3.4.2) that the Mytileneans were forced to act before they had adequately prepared for war. This was a direct consequence of the intelligence activities which took place before the commencement of hostilities and in which the proxenia played a significant part. As soon as the Mytileneans made the decision to secede from the Confederacy the Athenians were quickly informed. In turn, the Mytileneans were made aware that Athens was privy to their plans and this forced them to accelerate their preparations (Thouk.3.3.5). Their defenses, however, were not made ready in time and they did not receive any assistance from Sparta. Reinforcements from Sparta were a key element in the plans of the Mytileneans. According to Thoukydides (3.2.3) they had made their plans for rebellion in concert with the Spartans. The premature timing of the revolt, however, negated any serious military aid from

Sparta since the Athenian fleet effectively blockaded Mytilene.

This episode presents us with a rare insight into the use of intelligence by two Greek city-states and its application to both political and military policy. According to Thoukydides (3.2.3), the Athenians received reports about the situation in Lesbos from their allies in Tenedos and Methymna and from their proxenoi in Mytilene. To prepare for the ensuing hostilities, the Mytileneans were blocking their harbours, constructing fortifications, building ships, hiring archers and gathering supplies (Thouk.3.2.2). The Athenian allies in Tenedos and Methymna could easily observe these preparations and pass on warnings to Athens, but more precise intelligence came from the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene. They informed the Athenians that the leaders of the Mytiliean oligarchy had entered into secret negotiations with the Lakedaimonians and planned to unify Lesbos under their control (Thouk.3.2.3). The Athenians at first were reluctant to take any action against Mytilene but when negotiations failed to persuade the Mytileneans to cease their attempts to unify Lesbos they opted for a military solution.

The task of reducing Mytilene was formidable, requiring both naval and land operations, and a costly siege. The Athenians, however, were soon presented with an ideal opportunity to capture Mytilene by surprise and to avoid a costly assault. According to Thoukydides (3.3.3), the Athenians were informed that there was a festival of Apollo which took place outside the fortifications of Mytilene and that if they acted quickly they could catch the Mytileneans off-guard, forestalling any military

action. Unfortunately, Thoukydides does not relate who provided the Athenians with this timely intelligence. If we consider the examples presented so far of proxenoi functioning as intelligence agents, it is fair to speculate that it may have been the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene who provided the information. Losada (1972:81) also concludes that it was the proxenoi who informed the Athenians about the festival since they were the same individuals who revealed the Mytilenean plans for rebellion.

We must keep in mind that up to this point neither side had formally declared war. The Athenians were hoping to send a fleet to Lesbos in order to capture Mytilene without the use of force and to avoid the embarrassment of war with one of their allies (Thouk.3.3.3). It seems, however, that the Mytileneans were also well informed about the Athenian intentions. In this case the Mytileneans found out about the Athenian expedition and the plan to catch them by surprise outside their walls from someone who came to Mytilene from Athens (Thouk.3.3.5). Consequently, they celebrated the festival of Apollo inside their fortifications and the Athenians were forced to declare war (Thouk.3.3.5-6).

Thoukydides does not reveal the identity of the man who informed the Mytileneans or for that matter the names of the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene despite the consequences of their actions. According to Aristoteles (Politics 5.3.3., 1304a), one of the Athenian proxenoi was a certain Doxandros, who turned informer because he was rejected in his attempt to marry his sons to the daughters of a member of the oligarchy. Grote (1849-1850:5.143.N.1) and Busolt (1897-1904:1005,N.2) accepted the

Aristolelian account while Gomme (1956:2.252-253) suggests a stronger motive than revenge. Legon (1968:204) assumes that the proxenoi were democrats or potential democrats sympathizing with the Athenian cause.

After the beginning of the hostilities we do not hear anything more about the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene except for one instance. When the Athenians arrived at Mytilene they drove back the ships which came out against them and the Mytileneans asked for terms. An armistice was subsequently arranged and an embassy was sent to Athens to negotiate peace (Thouk.3.4.4). One of the Mytileneans who went with the embassy was an Athenian proxenos who, according to Thoukydides (3.4.4), repented of his previous actions. It seems very unlikely that an Athenian proxenos who had betrayed his people would now have a change of heart and betray Athens, especially since he must have realized that at this time Mytilene stood little chance of success. At best, a rehabilitated traitor enjoys limited credibility and no influence with his compatriots. Why would a man sacrifice the security and honour he enjoyed as a proxenos of Athens for limited benefits in a state facing defeat? A more plausible explanation is that by becoming a member of the embassy our repentant proxenos had an opportunity to escape from Mytilene and thus avoid the uncertain fate of Athenian sympathizers. Meanwhile, negotiations between the Mytilenean embassy and the Athenians failed and hostilities resumed. Throughout the remaining period of the siege no reference is made by Thoukydides to the fate of the Athenian proxenoi nor is any mention made of them

after the surrender of Mytilene early in 427 B.C. Both Legon (1968:210) and Losada (1972:81) surmise that the Athenian proxenoi were killed.

Intelligence played a decisive role in the military and political policy of Athens and Mytilene. Before the commencement of hostilities there existed a kind of "cold war" between these two states. It was, in the beginning, in the interest of both cities to avoid any military conflict until they were ready to seize the initiative at a time of their choosing. As long as the Athenians were kept informed of the situation in Mytilene, they preferred to avoid the use of force and relied on negotiations in order to control the situation. By receiving constant and adequate intelligence they could afford to delay taking any military action unless the situation changed dramatically. If, for example, they discovered that the Spartans were sending military aid to Mytilene they would have ample time to intercept and destroy the Spartan fleet since Athens enjoyed naval superiority in the Aegean.

Their reluctance is understandable, since at this time a plague had broken out in Athens decimating the ranks of her soldiers and sailors; this, combined with the demands made by the Peloponnesian war, placed a great strain on Athenian resources (Thouk.3.3.1). It was hardly a propitious moment to mount a military expedition against Mytilene. The Mytileneans, on the other hand, had their own difficulties. They did not desire a conflict with Athens until their defenses were adequately prepared and until they had received reinforcements from Sparta

(Thouk.3.4.2). What precipitated the conflict, which both sides wished temporarily to avoid, was the opportunity presented by the Athenian intelligence agents in Mytilene. According to these sources if the Athenians surprised the Mytileneans while they were celebrating the festival of Apollo outside their walls, the Athenians could achieve victory at a very small cost. In effect, it was this timely intelligence which pushed the Athenians to action. Furthermore, once the Mytileneans were informed that the Athenians were mounting an expedition against them and were party to their plans for rebellion, they decided it was pointless to delay an armed conflict any longer. In order for the Mytileneans to avoid war at this stage they had to accept Athenian terms which would effectively cripple their military capability to attempt any rebellion in the future, for, according to Thoukydides (3.3.3), the Athenians insisted on the surrender of the Mytilenean fleet and the destruction of the city's fortifications This the Mytileneans would not do and they sealed their fate.

It is fair to say that intelligence was a key factor in the Athenian victory; without it the Mytileneans would have had ample time to prepare and the outcome may have been different. The Athenians were not only adequately kept up to date but were supplied with an excellent opportunity to strike a decisive blow on the occasion of the festival of Apollo. The attempt failed but it forced the Athenians to act quickly and this ultimately was the key to their success.

.3.4.4 Apollophanes of Kolophon

Kolophon was an Ionian settlement in Asia Minor and one of the smaller members of the Delian League. As was the case with many of the Greek cities in the last quarter of the fifth century B.C., Kolophon was torn by factional fighting. We are not told by Thoukydides (3.34.1) the exact nature of the political divisions in Kolophon but we can surmise that to some extent one of the prime causes may have been Kolophon's continuation as a member of the Delian League. This is substantiated by the fact that one of the factions, with assistance from the Persians, took control of Kolophon. Meiggs (1972:315) assigns this event to 430 B.C., while Gomme (1956:2.295) suggests that Kolophon and Notion were separate communities from 454 B.C., since both towns were assessed separately for their share of the tribute to the Delian League. The Persian-assisted takeover was hardly an action acceptable to the Athenians, or for that matter to a large segment of the population of Kolophon, since the majority of the citizens chose to abandon their city and settled in Notion, the harbour town of Kolophon (Thouk.3.34.1). It is not clear from Thoukydides (3.34.1) but it seems that Kolophon now passed under the control of the Persians and we can assume that it ceased to be a member of the Delian League. It is not improbable, in fact, that, when the Persians were called in for assistance, they took advantage of the opportunity and established themselves permanently at Kolophon.

The loss of their city, however, did little to remove the political divisions among the Kolophonians now residing at

Notion. In 430 B.C. the anti-Athenian faction engineered admittance into the citizenship of Notion for the Greeks who had remained at Kolophon and, with mercenaries obtained from Pissothnes, the satrap of Sardis, took control of Notion (Thouk. 3.34.2). Members of the pro-Athenian faction, in the meantime, had secretly made their escape and managed to call in Pakhes, the Athenian commander, who promptly expelled the mercenaries and delivered Notion back to the pro-Athenian faction (Thouk.3.34.2).

To stabilize the situation the Athenians sent a colony of their citizens to Notion and a commission to establish a democratic government in the city. Despite these arrangements the Athenians took extra measures to secure the harbour area of Notion, Dios Hieron. This is understandable since Kolophon was still in Persian hands and threatened Notion. Consequently, Apollophanes, one of the pro-Athenians at Notion, was granted the proxenia and, according to the decree, he was instructed to keep watch over those guarding the harbour area (IGi^2.59). Both Kirchner (IGi^2.59) and Walbank (1978:210) assign the inscription to 427-6 B.C. while Gomme (1956:2.295) assumes that Apollophanes was one of the pro-Athenians who summoned Pakhes. As a member of a faction loyal to the Athenian cause, Apollophanes was ideally suited to serve as a proxenos of Athens. This is evident from the first clause of the inscription (IGi^2.59.14-15) which praises Apollophanes for his service to the people and soldiers of Athens and it may substantiate the assertion of Gomme (1956: 2.296) that Apollophanes was one of those at Notion who called in Pakhes. In the same clause (IGi^2.59.14-19), Apollophanes is

instructed to keep watch over those guarding the harbour in order that it remain safe for the Athenians. It is thus clearly indicated that Apollophanes was directly responsible to Athens and that the security of the harbour area was identified with the interests of the Athenians and not those of the Kolophonians.

From the wording of IGi^2.59 it is evident that Apollophanes was not placed in charge over those who guarded the harbour area but instead he was instructed to observe their actions. In effect, he was responsible for tactical intelligence and it became his duty to report any activity which compromised the security of the harbour area. This kind of information gathering was not intelligence on a grand scale since it was restricted to the acquisition of specific data of a military nature. Primarily, Apollophanes' role as an intelligence agent was a defensive one. His main responsibility lay in providing information to the Athenians if any one of those who were in charge of the harbour area jeopordized its security either through negligence or betrayal. As long as the Athenians retained control of the harbour area they could effectively intervene to support the democratic government of Notion against any attempt by the Persian-dominated Kolophon to reclaim the harbour town. More importantly, safe harbours on the Ionian coast were vital as supply bases to the Athenian fleet.

The other interesting aspect of this example is that the appointment of Apollophanes as the Athenian proxenos precluded the need for a garrison. We can safely assume that the harbour area was guarded by Kolophonians from Notion, and not by Athenian

troops. It would have been most unusual for the Athenians to appoint Apollophanes to watch over their own troops. The absence of a garrison enabled the Athenians to avoid the expense of maintaining troops at Notion and the appearance of keeping the city in the League by force. This was true to some extent but the absence of an Athenian garrison also depended upon another factor. After 430 B.C. Notion was controlled by a pro-Athenian faction whose security depended on Athenian support and the establishment of an Athenian colony at Notion (Thouk.3.34.4). Under these circumstances there was hardly a need for a garrison.

The question we must ask is why was a Kolophonian given the responsibility of watching over those who guarded the harbour area and not one of the Athenian colonists. As a native of the area Apollophanes was better suited for the task than an Athenian. He was familiar with the terrain and the people of Notion. If, therefore, there were any attempts at betrayal Apollophanes would be in a better position to discover them and exert his influence over the people of Notion to remain loyal to Athens.

3.4.5 Nikias of Gortyn (Krete)

Thoukydides (2.85.1-6) provides us with an interesting episode concerning the activities of an Athenian proxenos at Gortyn, a city in Krete. In 429 B.C., Phormio, the Athenian admiral, with only twenty ships, had defeated a more powerful Peloponnesian fleet in the Gulf of Korinthos (Thouk.2.84.1-5). After the battle the Peloponnesians retreated to build up their strength for another engagement and Phormio sent an urgent request to Athens for reinforcements.

Despite the urgency of the situation the reinforcements, rather than immediately joining Phormio, were diverted to Krete. According to Thoukydides (2.85.5), it was Nikias the Athenian proxenos in Gortyn who persuaded the Athenians to divert Phormio's much needed reinforcements to Kydonia, another city in Krete. Nikias was able to accomplish this because he promised the Athenians that Kydonia, which was hostile to Athens, could be taken with his help (Thouk.2.85.5-6). Thoukydides,however, informs us (2.85.5) that Nikias was playing a double game. He was not as much interested in assisting the Athenians as he was in helping the citizens of Polikhene in their war against Kydonia. It is very doubtful that Nikias was not acting in good faith. If indeed he was, Thoukydides (2.85.5-6) does not say what action the Athenians took against Nikias for his duplicity. It would seem remarkable under the circumstances that the Athenians would fail to chastise a proxenos if he was manipulating their forces to his own ends. Walbank (1978:175) dismisses Thoukydides' assertion that Nicias was playing a double game arguing that it was merely Thoukydides' opinion and not substantiated by any facts. Meiggs (1972:217) attributes the diversion of the Athenian ships to Kydonia to strategic considerations and makes no reference to Nikias' double-dealing.

As it turned out, Nikias and the Athenian contingent failed to take the city. The attempt, however, was worth the gamble. Kydonia was an Aiginetan settlement and had the best harbour on the direct route to Egypt. Access by sea to Egypt and Libya was important to Peloponnesian trade and Athenian

triremes based at Kydonia would be able to pose a continuing threat to Peloponnesian merchantmen (Meiggs 1972:217) and assure some Athenian access to the Egyptian corn supply routes.

This illustrates two aspects of Nikias' proxenia as an example of intelligence activity: the immediate and direct access that Nikias had to Athenian authorities, an important prerequisite for an intelligence agent, and the integration of a proxenos within strategic designs of the Athenian military, in this case on a covert mission. The close association that Nikias enjoyed with the Athenian authorities was so encompassing that they risked endangering their fleet in the Gulf of Korinthos in order to send its reinforcements to Kydonia - soley, it must be kept in mind, on the word of their proxenos that he could facilitate the capture of this important city. Despite the failure of the mission there is no mention by Thoukydides that Nikias was held responsible in any way or that he was deprived of the proxenia.

The other aspect of Nikias' proxenia which we must consider is its relationship to the military strategy of Athens and its relevancy to intelligence activity. Nikias was the proxenos of Athens in Gortyn, not in Kydonia, and as such he looked after the interests of Athens in his city. According to Thoukydides (2.85.5), however, Nikias also pursued Athenian interests in Kydonia. His promise to bring Kydonia over to the Athenian side implies that he had contacts in that city who were prepared to betray it. Nikias had obviously cultivated contacts in a state distant from his own. The curious part of this is that Nikias had

established his contacts with citizens of a city extremely hostile to Athens. This, I believe, implies two possibilities. On the one hand, Nikias not only looked after Athenian interests in Gortyn but was also responsible for keeping watch over other cities in Krete: a factor may have been that at this time the Athenians did not have many proxenoi in the city-states of Krete. On the other hand, since Kydonia was hostile to Athens one way of making contact with a faction friendly to the Athenian cause was to use an intermediary, in this case, Nikias. As a citizen of Gortyn it was far more simple for Nikias to travel in and out of Kydonia then it was for an Athenian.

Another consideration is that the expedition to Kydonia placed a non-Athenian in command of Athenian forces. This has prompted W.R. Connor (1976:61) to question the validity of the passage in Thoukydides describing this episode, and to suggest an alternate reading. Connor's proposed changes would make Nikias of Athens, the well known politician, the proxenos of Gortyn and not the other way around. Walbank (1976:175-76) dismisses Connor's alterations, arguing that it would require the acceptance of two separate levels of corruption in the passage. It would also imply, moreover, that the Athenian Nikias enjoyed such influence with the Kydonians that he could persuade them, or at least one faction, to join the Athenian empire. This requires the assumption that an Athenian, who was the proxenos of Gortyn, would somehow have contacts with Kydonia, a city at a considerable distance from Gortyn. Another consideration which casts strong doubt on Connor's hypothesis is that the

Athenian Nikias was the proxenos of Syracuse (Diod.13.27.3-4). As far as it can be determined it was not customary for a man to hold the proxenia of more than one city-state.

Covert activities, such as the capture of a city by betrayal, played an important role in the warfare of the Greeks. It provided not only the surest method of taking a fortified town but the cheapest in terms of casualties and time.[1] As previous examples have shown, the proxenos, on some occasions, played an essential role. Along with supplying the state which he represented with information relevant to its interests, a proxenos was ideally placed to facilitate covert activities. He was very familiar not only with the political situation in his own city but also with that in the surrounding states. At times, as in the case of Nikias, the proxenoi had access to cities where the state they represented did not. They were in the best position to make contact with political factions and to arrange for the betrayal of a city. In effect this is what Nikias of Gortyn attempted to do for the Athenians.

[1] According to Adcock (1957:57), in ancient Greece, down to the first phase of the Peloponnesian war, there is no record of a Greek city being stormed by Greeks.

3.5. THE IONIAN ISLANDS

3.5.1 The Korinthian Proxenoi in Korkyra

There existed a coherent balance of power in the Greek world (Fliess 1966:15) between the defeat of the Persians in 479 B.C. and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war in 431 B.C. ~~(Fliess 1966:15)~~. This balance of power was formally recognized by the Athenians and the Peloponnesians in 446-5 B.C. when both parties concluded what has been called the *Thirty Years Peace*. All the allies on both sides were acknowledged in the treaty, and it was stipulated that neither the Athenian Confederacy nor the Peloponnesian League could admit into their alliance any ally of the other (Thouk.1.115;Diod.12.7.1;Plout.Per.22.3).

The spirit, if not the letter of this agreement, was undermined by the defensive alliance concluded between Korkyra and Athens in 433 B.C. (Thouk.1.44.1;Diod.12.33.1-4). Technically, the Athenians had every right to accept any uncommitted state into their Confederacy. The Korinthian envoys who were dispatched to Athens with the express purpose of preventing an alliance between Athens and Korkyra conceded as much when they presented their objections to the Athenian Assembly (Thouk.1.40.2). The inherent threat to the status quo was characterized by two factors. Korkyra and Korinthos were at war and as an ally of Korkyra, Athens was bound to be drawn into hostilities with Korinthos and ultimately with the Peloponnesian League. More importantly, if Athens implemented the alliance to its full

potential, the combination of the Korkyraian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes with the powerful Athenian fleet, could decisively upset the balance of naval power (Hammond 1959:319; Fliess 1966:68). Conscious of the momentous decision to be made, the Athenian Assembly debated the proposed alliance with Korkyra for two days and finally accepted a defensive alliance with Korkyra (Thouk.2.44.1-3;Diod.12.33.1-4).

To prevent a general conflict with the Peloponnesians, the Athenians restricted their participation in the alliance with Korkyra to a token force of ten ships (Thouk.3.45.1). The commanders of the Athenian naval contingent were given strict instructions to commit their forces to battle only if the Korkyraians were routed and if the Korinthians attempted to land troops on Korkyra (Thouk.1.45.3;Plout.Per.29). Events took an unforeseen course and in August or September of 433 B.C. (Hammond 1959:319) the Korinthians near Sybota, engaged and defeated the Korkyraian fleet. Initially the ten Athenian ships abstained from the battle but when the Korinthian victory made a landing on Korkyra imminent, the Athenian ships were committed (Thouk. 1.50.3-5).

Although the engagement of Athenian and Korinthian ships at Sybota did not lead to war, the withdrawal of the Korinthians from western Greece had far-reaching consequences. The Greek world at that time depended upon three districts for most of its grain supply: the area around the Black Sea, Egypt, and Sicily. Before 433 B.C., the Athenians dominated the access to the Black Sea region. After the defense treaty with Korkyra,

the Athenians had the means of potentially controlling the corn supply from Sicily. The Athenian presence in Korkyra, moreover, further aggravated the commercial rivalry between Athens and Korinthos for the markets of the West. According to G.B. Grundy (1948:1.322-30) the possession of Korkyra by Athens meant that one power now controlled the two most valuable sources of foreign corn and the Megarian decrees showed to the Peloponnesians the kind of use which Athens would be capable of making of such a situation.

Despite the dramatic shift in the balance of naval power that occurred after 433-32 B.C. and the enhancement of the economic position of Athens vis-à-vis trade with the West, war was averted for another twelve months. At the same time the relative weakness of the Peloponnesian naval forces in comparison to those of the Delian League made military action by the Korinthians against Korkyra difficult. On the other hand, increased interference in the western markets by Athens and the potential threat to the Sicilian grain supply by an Athenian fleet, based at Korkyra, presented serious economic and strategic problems for the Korinthians as well as for the other Peloponnesian states. The strategic importance of Korkyra was dramatized in 415 B.C. when it was used by the Athenians as an assembly area for the Sicilian expedition (Thouk.6.30.1).

The key to the strategic situation in the West was Korkyra, since a great deal depended upon the future relationship between the Korkyraians and the Athenians. The basis of the alliance between these two states was defensive inasmuch as it

did not require either state to participate in offensive operations instigated by the other partner (Thouk.1.44.1). Consequently, as a non-aligned power in a strategic location, Korkyra became a target of Athenian and Peloponnesian pressure to commit herself to one of the respective confederacies. The Korkyraians were determined to maintain an illusionary neutrality and resolved to continue their defensive alliance with Athens and renew their friendship with the Peloponnesians, after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Thouk.3.70.2). Unfortunately, such a position left the Korinthians, and to some extent the Athenians, only one option - to use subversion as a means of forcing the Korkyraians to abandon their neutrality. This option would have been particularly attractive to the Korinthians since Korkyra's defensive alliance with Athens made a military solution difficult.

The Korinthians devised a covert operation with the express purpose of undermining the government of Korkyra and placing in power men sympathetic to the Peloponnesian cause. This operation originated just after the battle of Sybota and was conceived in order to implement what the Korinthian fleet had failed to accomplish, namely the realignment of Korkyraian foreign policy.[1] During this battle the Korinthians either executed or sold into slavery all their Korkyraian prisoners except for two hundred and fifty (Thouk.1.55.1). These particular prisoners, according to Thoukydides (1.55.1), belonged

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[1] A dispute over Korinthian interference in Epidamnos, a colony of Korkyra, had led to war between these two states but the scope of the conflict was elevated to international status when the Korkyraians concluded a defensive alliance with Athens.

to some of the most influential families in Korkyra and the Korinthians planned to use these men in order to bring Korkyra over to their side. Thoukydides does not offer any reasons why the Korinthians believed that they could prevail upon their Korkyraian prisoners to work in the interest of Korinthos. Release from captivity and fear for their lives may have been powerful incentives for the Korkyraians but these would not have ensured their loyalty to Korinthos once they returned to Korkyra. It is probable that the Korinthians had other inducements to attract the Korkyraians to their cause. According to Herodotos (3.49.1-5), there had always been close ties between Korinthos and the first families of Korkyra of which the two hundred and fifty Korkyraian prisoners were members. Ties of friendship either between a state and an individual or a group of individuals and a given state were not uncommon; furthermore, these relationships were held in great esteem and thus the Korinthians could expect some co-operation from their Korkyraian friends. Was this enough to motivate the Korkyraian prisoners to work against their state? Indeed not; these prisoners had themselves ambitions of ruling Korkyra and were prepared to accept an alliance with the Peloponnesians, since it would have been in their interest to assist the Korinthians. Regardless of their motives, the Korkyraian prisoners agreed to work for the Korinthians and to detach Korkyra from her alliance with Athens (Thouk.3.70.1).

What followed next was a calculated act of subversion perpetrated by the agents of one state upon another. An

important element of the Korinthian plan was the role played by the Korinthian proxenoi in Korkyra, but even more significant were the efforts of an Athenian "volunteer proxenos" in Korkyra, to preserve and expand the defensive alliance with Athens. The struggle, moreover, between the agents and proxenoi of Korinthos and the "volunteer proxenos" of Athens was a contributing factor to the civil strife which ultimately tore the society of Korkyra apart.

According to Thoukydides (3.82.1), the savagery of this *stasis* was the first of its kind and it eventually spread to other states in the Greek world since in each state the leaders of the democratic factions were at odds with the oligarchs. What Thoukydides omits to mention, is that the *stasis* in Korkyra originated not only from ideological differences between the factions but from the Korinthian efforts to bring Korkyra over to their side. A recent interpretation of the origins of the civil strife in Korkyra is put forth by M. Cogan (1981:1-21) who asserts that by the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war international relations between the Greek states were based upon ideological grounds and this was a determining factor in the occurence of *stasis* . Both the Athenians and the Peloponnesians exploited ideology as a means of detaching the allies of the other.

The Korinthians waited for six years to implement their covert operations against Korkyra. A possible explanation for their delay is that the Korinthians wanted a suitable opportunity to execute their plan. In 427 B.C. the Korinthians

arranged for the release of their two hundred and fifty Korkyraian prisoners (Thouk.3.70.1) and the conspiracy to subvert Korkyra began. The timing was excellent, since the Athenians were occupied with blockading Mytilene, which had rebelled from the Athenian alliance in 428 B.C. The Athenians would, therefore, be slow to react against the establishment of a pro-Peloponnesian government in Korkyra. A setback for the Athenians in Korkyra and the Mytilenian rebellion might induce other states to abandon Athens and join the Peloponnesians. Another consideration regarding the timing of the release of the prisoners may have been the considerable success Athens enjoyed in the West, and the possibility that the Korkyraians might be induced to accept an offensive alliance while they could still get favourable terms from Athens.

From the beginning of the war the Athenians were victorious in the West. In 431 B.C. they took Kephallenia and Sollion with little difficulty (Thouk.2.30.1-3). In 429 B.C. Phormio, the Athenian general, won two brilliant naval engagements in the Gulf of Korinthos against the Peloponnesian fleet, and this further enhanced the reputation of the Athenian navy (Thouk.2. 84.1-5;2.90-92). This made it necessary for the Peloponnesians to check the growing prestige of Athens and to redress the naval imbalance in the West. Adding the Korkyraian fleet to the Peloponnesian forces would have fulfilled a part of these requirements.

Considering the impotence of the Korinthian navy or, for that matter, of the fleets of the other Peloponnesian states, subversion was the only means by which the Korinthians could effect changes in Korkyra. It became the task of the Korinthian

proxenoi in Korkyra to arrange for the return of the Korkyraian prisoners who had agreed to work for Korinthos. According to Thoukydides (3.70.1), they accomplished this by raising a sum of money which was required for ransoming the Korkyraian prisoners. This was a ploy, because if the Korkyraian prisoners held by the Korinthians were released without ransom it would have caused suspicion. The Korinthian proxenoi were, furthermore, the only individuals who could have served as intermediaries between the Korkyraian conspirators and Korinthos. As the official representatives of that city, the proxenoi could travel frequently to Korinthos without causing suspicion. Their most important function may have been to supervise and observe the activities of the Korkyraian conspirators. Without reports from these proxenoi, the Korinthians would have had no way of knowing if their former prisoners had fulfilled their part of the bargain. If this became the case, the Korinthian proxenoi could always threaten to expose the Korkyraian conspirators to their fellow citizens. On the other hand this backup did not prove necessary since, from the moment when the Korkyraian prisoners returned to Korkyra, they went from citizen to citizen attempting to rouse support for a move to renounce the alliance with Athens (Thouk.3.70.1). These efforts bore some fruit since the government of Korkyra did renew the former treaty of friendship with the Peloponnesians although maintaining the defensive alliance with Athens (Thouk. 3.70.2). This was a partial victory for the Korinthians and the other Peloponnesian states. The returned prisoners did not detach Korkyra from the defensive treaty with Athens but they

were successful in preventing the Korkyraians from moving any closer to Athens.

The next step taken by the Korkyraian conspirators was to erode the influence and goodwill which the Athenians enjoyed in Korkyra. To this end, they used the courts to attack the most influential friends of Athens and those who were closely identified with the Athenian cause. Accordingly, the returned prisoners, who had become the agents of Korinthos, brought Peithias, the "volunteer proxenos" of the Athenians and leader of the democratic faction, to trial, charging him with attempting to assist the Athenians in enslaving Korkyra (Thouk.3.70.3).

3.5.2 Peithias of Korkyra

The term ἑθελοπρόξενος is mentioned only by Thoukydides (3.70.3)with regard to Peithias and is not found anywhere else. It is a curious term because the proxenia essentially was conferred on one who had volunteered his services in the first place. According to Gomme (1956:2.360), a "volunteer proxenos" referred to an individual whose proxenia was not officially recognized by the state he attempted to represent, or to an individual whose appointment was not confirmed by his own state. It would have been remarkable, under these circumstances, for Athens to avoid making the leader of the Korkyraian democratic faction their official representative if he had volunteered his services. It was not necessary for the appointment of a proxenos to be confirmed by his own state, since a proxenos did not have any special privileges there which required recognition. A

plausible explanation is that Peithias had become a candidate for the proxenia but his appointment had not become official by the time of his trial.

To what extent were the charges against Peithias true? Thoukydides (3.70.6)does not reveal the answer to this question; he does, however, maintain that Peithias was determined to convince the Korkyraians to conclude an offensive alliance with Athens. In this respect, Peithias was working for the interests of Athens since the Korkyraians would be dragged into a war - should they sign such an alliance - and war, at this time, would not have been in the best interest of Korkyra. In 433 B.C., the Korkyraians had lost considerably in their conflict with Korinthos (Thouk.1.54.2) and a new war would further drain Korkyra's resources.

Despite our lack of knowledge of Peithias's motives, he was considered by the agents of Korinthos as the first target of their covert operation. We may speculate, therefore, that Peithias was perhaps working for the Athenians in the same capacity as the Korkyraian conspirators were for the Korinthians.

The struggle that broke out in Korkyra between the adherents of the official alliance with Athens and those who advocated closer ties with the Peloponnesians originated from the attempts by the agents of Korinthos to prosecute Peithias. Their attempt failed and Peithias, acquitted of the charges brought against him, counter-attacked by instigating suits against five of the wealthiest of the Korkyraian conspirators, charging them with cutting the vine-poles from the sacred

precincts of Zeus and Alkinous (Thouk.3.70.4). Peithias, by his attack on the wealthiest and presumably the most powerful of the Korkyraian conspirators, challenged the very heart of his opposition. He was successful and five of the Korkyraian conspirators were convicted and fined one stater for each stake cut (Thouk.3.70.4-6). Thoukydides (3.70.5) informs us that the amount of the fine was so excessive that it would have financially crippled the five conspirators; they, therefore, took refuge at the temples as supplicants and pleaded to pay their fines by instalments. Peithias, however, responded by persuading the assembly, of which he was a member, neither to amend the law, nor to permit payment by instalments (Thouk.3.70.5). This was a serious setback for the Korkyraian conspirators. Not only did five of their number face financial ruin but they had to contend with the real possibility that Peithias' recent victory might increase his prestige with the citizens of Korkyra and convince them to accept an offensive alliance with Athens. Shortly after this, the fears of the Korkyraian conspirators were confirmed when they were informed that Peithias intended to persist in his attempt to bring about a comprehensive alliance with Athens (Thouk.3.70.6). Consequently, the five condemned conspirators, along with many of their associates, entered the assembly and killed Peithias as well as sixty of his followers (cf 3.70.6). The few that managed to escape took refuge in an Athenian trireme which was docked in the harbour of Korkyra (cf 3.70.6). This in itself is a significant indication of the close relationship Peithias and his followers had with Athens: those who

survived did not turn to their fellow citizens for protection - after all they were the victims of an unlawful act - but to the armed forces of Athens. We may conclude from this that Peithias and his followers had served the interests of Athens faithfully and quite naturally expected protection from the Athenian trireme in the Harbour. Peithias' followers, however, not only found refuge on the Athenian ship but were transported to Athens (Thouk.3.70.6). The Athenians may have believed that Korkyra had passed under the control of the pro-Peloponnesian faction and they wished to confer with Peithias' followers on what action to take.

After the assassination of Peithias, the pro-Peloponnesian faction, which included the agents of Korinthos, attempted to set up a government and rally the population to their side. They did not renounce the defensive treaty with the Athenians and they adwocated a foreign policy of neutrality for Korkyra (Thouk. 3.71.1). Furthermore, the pro-Peloponnesian faction sent envoys to Athens, hoping to persuade those Korkyraians who had taken refuge there, not to do anything prejudicial against them, in order that Athens would not take any action against Korkyra (cf.3.71.2). Clearly then, the pro-Peloponnesian faction, at least for the time being, desired to maintain the status-quo in their relations with Athens. This may indicate that the Korkyraian conspirators, the agents of Korinthos, only formed part of the pro-Peloponnesian faction and could not by themselves implement a dramatic shift in Korkyra's foreign policy.

On the other hand, the Athenians did not accept the new government of Korkyra and arrested the envoys sent by the pro-

Peloponnesian faction as soon as they arrived in Athens (Thouk. 3.72.1). Since the envoys represented the new government of Korkyra, an independent state, the Athenian action was a provocative gesture, suggesting that the Athenians were prepared to intervene and establish a government in Korkyra which would be sympathetic to them. This further implies that the surviving followers of Peithias were brought to Athens in order to assist the Athenians in planning the overthrow of the oligarchic faction in Korkyra. As members of the democratic faction and closely identified with the interests of Athens, Peithias' followers had every reason to throw in their lot with the Athenians. The enemies of Peithias and his followers were in control of Korkyra; they themselves would, therefore, be in a precarious position if they ever returned home.

At the same time, an attempt was made by the Athenians to end hostilities between the factions in Korkyra by a compromise. Nikostratos, an Athenian general, arrived in Korkyra with twelve triremes and managed to reconcile the two opposing factions by making them agree to an offensive alliance with Athens and by punishing only twelve of the pro-Peloponnesian conspirators (Thouk.3.75.1). If the surviving followers of Peithias were loyal citizens of Korkyra and not the agents of Athens, they would have returned to Korkyra to participate in the negotiations between the factions. Their presence, however, was not required because they were too closely identified with the interests of Athens. As events were later to demonstrate, a compromise was not possible in Korkyra. As soon as a Peloponnesian ship

arrived, the political situation in Korkyra deteriorated and the country was plunged into a savage civil war (Thouk.3. 81.1-5).

These events provide us with an excellent example of the use of subversion through the proxenia. It was the Korinthian proxenoi in Korkyra who arranged the release of the two hundred and fifty Korkyraian prisoners who had agreed to work in the interests of Korinthos. Their participation was also necessary since they were the only link between Korinthos and the conspirators. According to Losada (1972:92), not only were the Korinthian proxenoi part of the conspiracy, it is also very likely that some of the oligarchs in Korkyra were also involved. In this sense the conspiracy to subvert the government of Korkyra would have assumed an ideological dimension which may have masked the connection between the returned prisoners and Korinthos.

The foreign policy of Korkyra and Korinthos before the Peloponnesian war was not guided by oligarchic or democratic sentiments. This was demonstrated by the support which the democratic government of Korkyra gave to the oligarchs in Epidamnos while oligarchic Korinthos supported its democratic faction (Thouk.1.24.5-7;1:25.1-4). The conspiracy against Korkyra was, therefore, not implemented by the Korinthians to assist the oligarchic faction in Korkyra; rather it was based on strategic considerations. In the beginning only the Korinthian proxenoi and those Korkyraians who had agreed to work for Korinthos participated in subversive activities in Korkyra (Thouk.3.70.1).

According to Thoukydides (3.70.3), it was the returned prisoners from Korinthos who brought Peithias to trial and of these only five, with some followers, killed him. It seems that it was only later, after the death of Peithias and the refusal of the Athenians to recognize the new government in Korkyra, that the conspirators were joined by all the members of the oligarchic faction. When a Korinthian ship arrived in Korkyra, presumably as a show of support to the new regime, the oligarchs took advantage of the presence of this Peloponnesian force and attacked the democrats (Thouk.3.72.2). This would not have been possible unless most of the oligarchs had joined the conspirators to make the assault.

It is interesting that the Athenian involvement in Korkyra resembled closely the actions of the Korinthians. The focal point of their intelligence operation was the Athenian "volunteer proxenos", Peithias. While the Korinthians used their proxenoi to supervise operations and to provide a link between the Korkyraian conspirators and themselves, the Athenian proxenos maintained a high profile and operated in the open. Peithias' persistant attempts to bring Korkyra into an offensive alliance with Athens, a policy designed to satisfy Athenian interests, clearly demonstrated that the interests of Korkyra came second. Despite the tensions that Peithias' pro-Athenian policy caused in Korkyra, he was determined to assist Athens at any cost. In this respect the charge invoked by the agents of Korinthos against Peithias, namely of attempting to help the Athenians enslave Korkyra, was to a certain degree true.

The events in Korkyra provide us with an excellent account of the agents of two waring powers, the Athenian Confederacy and the Peloponnesian League, carrying out subversive activities in order to push Korkyra into the camp of their respective masters. The role of the proxenia was a sideline in the Korinthian effort, while it was an essential element of the Athenian operation in Korkyra. In both cases we have been able to demonstrate an interesting aspect of the proxenia when it was used in an intelligence role. It seems that, at least in the example of Korkyra, the Korinthian proxenoi were employed as intelligence officers and were not used to gather intelligence nor to execute covert operations directly. They maintained a low profile by operating behind the scenes and by directing those who were employed to gather intelligence and to execute covert operations.

The Athenians used their proxenos in a somewhat different manner. Their attempt to change the foreign policy of Korkyra was conducted as an overt operation. Peithias, the Athenian proxenos, proceeded by legitimate means to influence the foreign policy of Korkyra. It was, nonetheless, still an intelligence operation since it is the means of conducting intelligence which are covert or overt and not what they attempt to accomplish. Both the Korinthians and the Athenians wanted to change the foreign policy of Korkyra, but while their ultimate aim was the same the means which they employed were different. The Korinthians proceeded by covert means to accomplish their purpose and organized a conspiracy to undermine the government of Korkyra.

The Athenians, at first, did not desire to undermine the established regime in Korkyra, only to influence its foreign policy. Later on, when the government of Korkyra was controlled by the oligarchic faction and the Athenian "volunteer proxenos" was murdered by the agents of Korinthos, the Athenians changed their tactics. They evacuated Peithias' followers to Athens and may have intended to use them against the new government in Korkyra. It is interesting that Peithias' followers were granted the political asylum which Peithias would have had if he had survived the attempt on his life. Peithias and his followers did not engage in subversion, but like the agents of Korinthos who did attempt to undermine the government of Korkyra, they wanted the foreign policy of their country to serve the interests of another state. In this respect another dimension was added to the proxenia in Korkyra. The recipients of this prestigious office were employed to subvert the interests of Korkyra and advance the cause of their patron-states.

PART 4

THE ANALYSIS

Part 4.1 Categories

4.1.1 The Appointment of Proxenoi

Examples of proxenoi functioning as intelligence agents which have been presented in this study fall into three distinct categories: a) individuals who have been given the proxenia as a reward for providing intelligence services; b) those individuals who, while serving as proxenoi, functioned as intelligence agents; c) those who were designated proxenoi specifically so that they would carry out intelligence work.

In the first category we include: Apollodoros of Selymbria (cf 3.3.4), Arkhelios and Heraklides of Byzantion (cf 3.3.5), Phanokritos of Parion (cf 3.3.7), Philiskos of Sestos (3.3.8), Ekphantos' associates (cf 3.4.2), and Peithias of Korkyra (cf 3.5.2). These men were appointed because of their prior participation in intelligence activity and we can assume that they continued to supply their clients with information and that they performed other clandestine work on behalf of their patrons.

Documentary evidence has also been provided in this study for proxenoi belonging to the second category. This group includes: Strophakos of Khalkidice (cf 3.2.3), Polydamos of Pharsalos (cf 3.2.5), Nikias of Gortyn (cf 3.4.5), the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene (cf 3.4.3), Ekphantos of Thasos (cf 3.4.2), and the Korinthian proxenoi in Korkyra (cf 3.5.1).

An example of a proxenos who is classified in the third category is Nymphodoros of Abdera (cf 3.2.1). He was awarded the proxenia by the Athenians in order to improve their strategic position in Thrake. As a result of Nymphodoros' efforts, Sitalkes, king of the Odrysians in Thrake, became an important ally of the Athenians and one who supplied Athens with a force of Thrakian cavalry and peltasts. Other proxenoi such as Polykles, Peraieas, and Aristopoulos of Byzantion (cf 3.3.3) were also given the proxenia for the specific purpose of conducting intelligence work. These men were sent to join the Athenian forces in the Hellespont as advisors to the Athenian commanders. The most remarkable evidence of a proxenos belonging to this category is found in the episode of Apollophanes (IG i^2. 59; cf 3.4.4.). He is praised for services which he rendered to the people and soldiers of Athens and is awarded the proxenia. Apollophanes was then instructed to keep watch over those guarding the harbour area of Notion. The interesting aspect of this example is that the task of watching over those guarding the harbour was not given to an Athenian; rather it was the responsibility of Apollophanes, a native of the region. The absence of an Athenian garrison suggests that the presence of Apollophanes was considered sufficient to ensure the security of the harbour.

4.1.2 Subdivision of Intelligence Activity

A fine line exists between the function of an intelligence agent and the work of a spy. An intelligence agent is employed to process information and to organize various types of clandestine activity. A spy is an individual who collects the information by

covert means and participates directly in intelligence operations. Proxénoi were often individuals who enjoyed a great deal of prestige and prominence in their cities; this enabled them to intervene effectively on behalf of their patrons, by transmitting information and by participating in various types of intelligence work. If the proxenoi were employed merely to act as spies, they would have lost their credibility and their actions would have been under close scrutiny; if this was the case they would have been of little assistance to their patrons.

Intelligence activity falls into two categories, active and passive. Active intelligence requires the use of political intervention by the agent of one state to subvert the interests of another state. This occurs in many fashions but the most common are assassination, sabotage, subversion, and the instigation of political disruption and revolution. Passive intelligence involves essentially the collection of pertinent political and military information through overt and covert means.

4.1.2a Information Gathering (Passive Intelligence)

It is significant that the activities of the proxenoi discussed in this study, can be classified into well-defined types of intelligence work. Polydamos of Pharsalos (cf 3.2.5), clearly defined his role as the proxenos of Sparta by stating that it was his duty to bring to the attention of the Spartans any information which was pertinent to the military and political interest of Sparta. Xenophon (Hell. 6.1.4), quotes his words to the Spartan assembly:

> Ἐγω, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρόξενος ὑμῶν ὢν καὶ εὐεργέτης ἐκ πάντων ὧν μεμνήμεθα πρόγονων, ἀξιῶ, ἐάν τέ τι ἀπορῶ, πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰέναι, ἐάν τέ τι χαλεπὸν ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ Θετταλίᾳ συνιστῆται, σημαίνειν.

Polydamos gave the Spartans valuable information about Iason's plans (Xen. Hell. 6.1. 5-13) but he also evaluated the intelligence he collected and made useful recommendations for Sparta's future course of action in Thessalia. Xenophon (Hell. 6.1.2) informs us that Polydamos was a prominent man in Thessalia who enjoyed the confidence of the Spartans. This is how Polydamos was easily able to acquire information about Iason's plans. In this way, his role as a proxenos was not that of a spy, rather he functioned as an intelligence agent. The term "intelligence agent" did not exist in the Greek world but the function of this term is synonymous with the employment of proxenoi in information-gathering and other activities of intelligence work.

Phanokritos of Parion (cf 3.3.7) was awarded the proxenia by the Athenians because he brought valuable information concerning the movements of the enemy fleet. The text (IGii^2. 29) reads: "...ἐπειδὴ π[α|ρ]ήγγειλε τοῖς στρατηγοῖς περὶ [τῶν| ν]εῶν τὸ παραπλο, καὶ εἰ οἱ στρατ[ηγο]-[ι]ἐπίθοντο, ἐάλωσαν ἂν α[ι] τρ[ι]ήρε[ι]ς[ι]αὶ πολέμιαι..." The verb παρήγγειλε derives from παραγγέλω "to pass on or transmit a message" (LJS^9 s.v. παραγγέλω) and it may suggest that Phanokritos did not go in person to present his intelligence information; rather he transmitted the information via other means. We may speculate on how he acquired the information in the first place. He may

have used spies or other payed informants; by so doing Phanokritos would be the intermediary between the source who collected the data and the Athenian commanders who received the intelligence information.

A parallel example exists in the case of Philiskos of Sestos (see 3.3.8), who was granted the proxenia for his service to Athens: "ἀνὴρ Ἀγ]-[α]θὸς ἐγένετο [περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθην]αίων μηνύσας τ[ὸν τῶν Βυζαντίων στόλ (?)]ον,... (IG ii^2. 133). In this instance the use of the word μηνύσας indicates that Philiskos provided information to the Athenians regarding the location of the fleet of Byzantion. The participle μηνύσας derives from the verb μηνύω "to disclose what is secret, reveal, make known" (LJS^9 s.v. μηνύω), and the adjective μηνυτήρ means "informer, guide, one who shows, reveals" (LJS^9 s.v. μηνυτήρ). This clearly indicates the covert nature of Philiskos' actions with regard to the information he brought to the Athenians.

When the Mytilenean oligarchs decided to rebel against the Delian League the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene informed their patrons of the plans of the oligarchs. According to Thoukydides (3.2.3):

> ... Πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων, μηνυταὶ γίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ξυνοικίζουσι τε τὴν Λέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βίᾳ καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἅπασαν μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπείγονται· καὶ εἰ μή τις προκαταλήψεται ἤδη, στερήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Λέσβου.

It is interesting that Thoukydides employs the noun μηνυταί to describe the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene and thus indicates the covert nature of their actions.

It is possible to conclude from these examples that the

Greeks used the proxenia for both covert and overt types of intelligence. The information presented by Polydamos (cf 3.2.5) to the Spartan assembly was probably a combination of both overt and covert intelligence as was the information Phanokritos of Parion (cf 3.3.7) delivered to the Athenians. The terminology exmployed to describe the actions of Philiskos of Sestos (cf 3.3.8) and of the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene certainly defines the covert nature of the service which they provided to their patrons.

4.1.2b Political Intervention (Active Intelligence)

Political intervention in the form of subversion, assassination, or instigation of revolution played a significant part in the international relations of the Greek States. In many instances the proxenia served as the instrument for one state to interfere in the external and internal affairs of another; the role of proxenos thus often resembled that of an "agent provocateur".

The Athenians made Nymphodoros of Abdera (3.2.1) their proxenos; as a result he used his influence upon Sitalkes, the king of the Odrysians in Thrake, to persuade him to become an ally of Athens (Thouk. 2.29.1). Nymphodoros was able to provide further assistance to the Athenians by bringing about a reconciliation between them and Perdikkas of Makedonia; in addition he arranged to send the Athenians a force of Thrakian cavalry and peltasts (Thouk. 2.29.5-7). In this instance the Athenians supplemented their diplomatic efforts in northern Greece by using the influence of Nymphodoros to acquire the alliances of Sitalkes

and Perdikkas. Nymphodoros, moreover, happened to be the brother-in-law of Sitalkes and was thus in a position to exert a great deal of influence on the king (Thouk. 3.29.1). As the proxenos of Athens, Nymphodoros became a partisan supporter of the Athenian cause and the representative of Athenian influence at the court of Sitalkes.

The Athenians recognized the value of political intervention as a form of warfare and often utilized the proxenia for this purpose. According to Demosthenes (20.60):

> τοῦτο δ''Αρχέβιον καὶ 'Ηρακλείδην, οἳ Βυζάντιον παραδόντες Θρασυβούλῳ κυρίους ὑμᾶς ἐποίησαν τοῦ 'Ελλησπόντου, ὥστε τὴν δεκάτην ἀποδόσθαι καὶ χρημάτων εὐπορήσαντας Λακεδαιμονίους ἀναγκάσαι τοιαύτην, οἵαν ὑμῖν ἔδόκει, ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην; ὧν, ὦ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐκπεσόντων ἐψηφίσασθ' ἅπερ, οἶμαι, φεύγουσιν εὐγέρταις δι'ὑμᾶς προσῆκε, προξενίαν, εὐεργεσίαν, ἀτέλειαν ἁπάντων (see 3.10).

In 429 B.C. the Athenians diverted a fleet whose objective was to reinforce Phormio's fleet in the Gulf of Korinthos. This diversion to Krete was the result of a recommendation by Nikias (3.4.5), the Athenian proxenos in Gortyn. Thoukydides (2.85.5) informs us that: "Νικίας γὰρ Κρὴς Γορτύνιος πρόξενος ὢν πείθει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι, φάσκων προσποιήσειν αὐτὴν οὖσαν πολεμίαν". Another example of active intelligence used as a means for political intervention is the case of Thrasyboulos (3.4.2) capturing Thasos for the second time in 390-389 B.C. with the assistance of the pro-Athenian faction (Dem. 20.59). After the *Peace of Antalkidas* (386-385 B.C.) the oligarchs returned to power in Thasos and one of their first acts was to banish

the men who had assisted Thrasyboulos and Ekphantos, the Athenian proxenos (Dem. 20.59-60). Consequently, the Athenians made these men proxenoi and benefactors of Athens (Dem. 20.60). The potential threat of political intervention through the use of the proxenia was a major factor in the exile of Apemantos of Thasos (3.4.1), the Athenian proxenos (IG xii.263-6), in 411 B.C.; it may also have been the cause for the murder of the Athenian proxenos in Kos when the island rebelled from the Athenian Alliance in 364 B.C. (IG ii^2.111)

The Korinthians, sometime in 433-432 B.C., devised a covert operation with the defined purpose of undermining the government of Korkyra and of placing men in power who were sympathetic to the Peloponnesian cause (3.5.1). The plan originated after the battle of Sybota and, according to Thoukydides (1.55.1), the Korinthians intended to use some of their Korkyraian prisoners to accomplish this: "πεντήκοντα δὲ καὶ διακοσίους δήσαντες ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐν θεραπείᾳ εἶχον πολλῇ, ὅπως αὐτοῖς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀναχωρήσαντες προσποιήσειαν." An important element of the Korinthian plan was the role played by the Korinthian proxenoi in Korkyra. It became their task to arrange the return of the Korkyraian prisoners by raising the sum of money required to pay the ransom (Thouk. 3.70.1). After their release the Korkyraian prisoners, who had agreed to work as the agents of Korinthos, began to stir up hostility toward Athens and, as a result of their efforts, Korkyra fell into a state of revolution. According to Thoukydides (3.70.1):

Οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι ἐστασίαζον, ἐπειδὴ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι ἦλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον ναυμαχιῶν ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀφεθέντες, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ὀκτακοσίων ταλάντων τοῖς προξένοις διηγγυημένοι, ἔργῳ δὲ πεπεισμένοι Κορινθίοις Κέρκυραν προσποιῆσαι.

The first part of the Korinthian plan was successful; although the Korkyraians did not sever their ties with Athens they agreed to renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians while maintaining the defensive alliance with the Athenians (Thouk. 3.70.2). Consequently, the agents of Korinthos intensified their efforts to bring Korkyra over to the Peloponnesian camp by attacking in the courts Peithias, the ἑθελοπρόξενος of Athens (3.70.3-4). They accused Peithias of "...Ἀθηναίοις τὴν Κέρκυραν καταδουλοῦν", but he was acquitted of the charges and he brought counter suits against five of the wealthiest Korinthian agents, who were found guilty and condemned to pay a ruinous fine (Thouk. 3.70.5).

At the same time Peithias persisted in his efforts to persuade the Korkyraians to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians (Thouk. 3.70.6). Consequently, the agents of Korinthos in order to avoid paying the heavy fine and to prevent an offensive alliance between Korkyra and Athens broke into the Korkyraian boule and murdered Peithias along with sixty of his followers (Thouk. 3.70.6).

The use of political intervention by the Korinthians and Athenians in Korkyra depicts two different facets of active intelligence. The Korinthian approach used political intervention, through their intelligence agents, as an extension of warfare; what the force of arms failed to accomplish for the

Korinthians against Korkyrà, the use of subversion almost achieved. The Korinthians, through their proxenoi made it possible for the Korkyraian prisoners to return and thus initiate their plot against the government of Korkyra. According to Thoukydides (3.70.1), the Korkyraian prisoners upon their return began to agitate against Athens: "ἔπρασσον οὗτοι ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν μετιόντες, ὅπως ἀποστήσωσιν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν". The Korinthian proxenoi, however, once they had raised the money for ransoming the Korkyraian prisoners, receded into the background and worked behind the scenes. We can speculate that they continued to play a prominent part in the conspiracy by transmitting messages between the Korkyraian prisoners and Korinthos so that the conspiracy to undermine the government of Korkyra proceeded according to plan.

The Athenian approach to political invervention in Korkyra did not represent an extension of warfare, as in the case of the Korinthians. Rather it characterized another dimension of Athenian foreign policy. The interests of Athens in Korkyra were actively pursued by Peithias by means which, in their overtness, contrast with the clandestine efforts of the Korinthian proxenoi and the Korkyraian prisoners. This difference of approach arose from the fact that Korinthos had been in a state of war with Korkyra and the memory of that conflict was still fresh in the minds of most Korkyraians. Consequently, the Korinthian proxenoi were vulnerable to charges of collusion with the Korinthians; they were thus forced to remain behind the scenes in the conspiracy.

Part 4.2. Historical Development

4.2.1 Distribution of (Intelligence) Proxenoi in the Hellespont Region

By the end of the Peloponnesian War, control of the corn supply became a major objective of internal and external Athenian policy (Hopper 1979:54). According to Hasebrock (1933:146), the importation of corn by individuals was always regarded as a special service and as a patriotic act. The Athenians, in addition to military safeguards, frequently passed legislation to protect their supplies. We know from Demosthenes (34.37) that it was against the law for an Athenian resident to export corn to another city and that two-thirds of the grain which entered the Piraeus had to remain in Athens (Arist. Ath. Pol. 51.4). It was, moreover, illegal for an Athenian to lend money to a merchant involved with the importation of corn to any state other than Athens (Dem. 35.51). Indeed, the entire food supply in Athens was controlled by a special board of officials called *sitophylakes* who were responsible for controlling prices and distribution of the grain imports (Arist. Ath. Polit. 51.3; Lys. 22.5). In this sense, Athens serves as an example of the problems facing many Greek city-states who were dependent upon foreign imports for their food supply.

An important element for the well-being of most Greek states was not only guaranteed access to grain but also a secure route to other strategic supplies, such as timber for shipbuilding.

Domination of the trade routes to wheat and timber markets represented an important advantage in the international relations of the Greeks (Pouilloux 1954: passim), since the city which controlled the sea wielded a powerful weapon against potential enemies. In fact, control of the corn and timber supplies gave the Athenians the instrument by which they could dominate other states (Hopper 1979:53). This Athenian advantage was to a large extent dependent upon secure access to the Black Sea region with its abundant supplies of grain and lumber (Hopper 1979:53-55). Athenian interest in this area almost coincided with the emergence of Athens as a major power in the Greek world.

Unfortunately, very little is known about the cities in the Euxine district, but the discovery of Athenian red figure pottery is one way of knowing that this area lay within the sphere of Athenian trade (MacDonald 1979:49). Bailey (1940:62-64) suggests that the presence of Athenian black figure ware at Troy indicates that the Athenians began to show interest in this area as early as ca. 607 B.C. and started trading for corn and timber by 594 B.C. Hopper (1979:53) maintains that Athenian involvement with the Black Sea region originated sometime after the Persian wars (490-479 B.C.) and Noonan (1973:231-242) postulates that the Euxine district only became a major source of trade in the fifth century B.C.

The Athenian concern with this region required a great deal of effort in safeguarding the trade routes to the Black Sea area and in times of war in preventing access to these

routes by other states (MacDonald 1979:4). To this end, the Athenians placed a special group of officers called *hellespontophylakes* (ca.430 B.C.) at Byzantion to control shipping through the Hellespont (IGi^2.57.32-56) and, according to Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.36), they also maintained a squadron of triremes in the area in order to guard their merchant ships.

The importance of this region is also demonstrated by the fact that a large proportion of Athenian proxenoi who functioned as intelligence agents operated in this area (cf 3.3.3; 3,3,4; 3.3.5; 3.3.6; 3.3.7; 3.3.8). Byzantion, because of her strategic importance, served as the focal point of numerous military campaigns and the setting for several intelligence operations (cf 3.3.2; 3.3.5; 3.3.6). This was also the case with other states in this region since the major Greek powers struggled for control of the north eastern Aegean and the Hellespont from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War to the middle of the fourth century B.C. Consequently, the cities located in this region became ideal places for the employment of proxenoi engaged in information gathering and the battleground for clandestine operations (cf 3.3.4; 3.3.7; 3.3.8; 3.4.1; 3.4.2).

Although this is most noticeable in the North-Eastern Aegean and the Hellespont, a similar pattern seems to have taken place in other areas which were strategically important to the corn routes. This was the case with the Athenian (cf 3.52) and Korinthian (cf 3.5.1) proxenoi in Korkyra and the Athenian proxenos (cf 3.4.5) in Crete (Gortyn). Surely it cannot be a

mere coincidence that in both instances the proxenia was employed as an intelligence system whose representatives were situated in areas which were significant to the grain routes of Sicily and North Africa.

4.2.2 The Effect of Intelligence Activity on the Credibility of the Proxenia

From the earliest period of Greek history until the first half of the fourth century B.C, the office of proxenos represented an ancient and honourable relationship between a private citizen and a foreign state. This relationship, for the most part, was accepted and respected by the home state of the proxenos since every city depended on the same courtesy for her own proxenoi. On the other hand, the proxenia was open to abuse and, as we have demonstrated, it was adapted by some states to serve their political and military interests. The Athenians in particular realized the potential of the proxenia as an instrument of empire and, by the middle of the fifth century B.C., created a new office, the *episkopia*, which may have served as an intermediary between the Athenian proxenoi abroad and Athens.

An *episkopos*, according to Meiggs (1972:213), was an Athenian visiting commissioner sent to investigate, report and take action if necessary against any subject ally of Athens. The term *episkopos* was not employed by any Greek state other than Athens and does not seem to be used again by the Athenians after the fifth century B.C. Unfortunately, references from our sources regarding the office of *episkopos* are limited. Two

inscriptions (IGi^2.10; IGi^2.66† ML.46), one of which deals with Erythrai, and a passage in Aristophanes' Birds (1021) offer a glimpse into the activities of the *episkopoi*. In the case of the Erythraian decree (IGi^2.10) the *episkopoi*, are employed by the Athenians to supervise the establishment of a democratic council in Erythrai while the *phrourarchos* is made responsible for safeguarding the new government: [Ἀπο]-κυαμεῦσαι[ι Δ]ὲ καὶ κατὰσ[τ]ῆσαι νῦν μὲν τὲν βολὲν τὸς [ἐπισκ]-ό[π]ος καὶ[τὸν] Φρ[ό]ραχον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὲν βολὲν καὶ τὸν [φρόρ]-αρχον. It is suggested from the text of IGi^2.10 that the mission of the *episkopoi* was of a limited duration and their residence in Erythrai temporary; the permanent Athenian representative was the *phrourarchos*. According to the other document (IGi^2.66†ML. 46) the *episkopoi* are to ensure that the tribute be collected and brought to Athens each year:

> ...Κλενί[ας εἶπε τὲ] μ|β-
> ολὲν καὶ τὸς ἄρχ[οντας ἐν] τῆσ-
> ι πόλεσι καὶ τὸς [ἐπισκό]πος ἐ
> πιμέλισθαι hόπ[ος ἂν χσ]υλλέ-
> γεται ho φόρος κ[ατὰ τὸ ἔ]τος h-
> έκαστον καὶ ἀπά[γεται] Ἀθένα-
> ζε...

Meiggs (1969:119) stipulates that this decree was an attempt by the Athenians to regulate the collection of tribute, eliminating incomplete and inconsistent payments from their allies. The reference in Aristophanes' Birds (1021) is even more tantalizing. According to this passage, when the *episkopos* arrives in "Cloudcukoobury" to supervise the new constitution,

his first question is: "Ποῦ πρόξενοι." The implication of this question is that the *episkopos* wants to find the proxenoi of Athens in order to get an up-to-date report on the political situation in "Cloudcukoobury".

Based on this evidence it is not possible to draw any definite conclusion about the relationship of the proxenoi to the *episkopia*. This will depend upon further research and the discovery of more inscriptions describing the activities of *episkopoi* but the evidence which does exist suggests that this office was created, in part, to facilitate better contact between Athens and her proxenoi abroad. The *episkopoi*, moreover, may have been the Athenian response to the need of acquiring more information quickly about the external and internal affairs of allies. The proxenia was an office which did not carry a salary and the rewards and privileges to the recipients became available only when the proxenos was forced to seek asylum in the city he represented. Consequently, the proxenoi would have incurred the expense of travel to their patron states in the execution of their duties. The employment of *episkopoi* may have been one means of facilitating the transmission of information collected by the proxenoi and of assuring a consistent and regular flow of intelligence to the Athenians. This was particularly prevalent when the proxenos was swayed by functional considerations. As Perlman (1958:185-101) has demonstrated, the proxenia, at least by the fourth century B.C., did not so much represent the foreign and internal policies of a state as much as they represented the faction dominating that state. Candidates

for the proxenia were usually sponsored by politicians representing oligarchic or democratic factions (Perlman 1958: 186). Occasionally, some of the proxenoi were themselves leaders of factions in their own cities. This was the case with: Kimon (cf pp.10-11), Kallias (cf pp. 10-11), Nikias (cf pp. 10-11), Alkibiades (cf pp.10-11), Demosthenes (cf pp.10-11), Peithias of Korkyra (3.5.2) and Ekphantos of Thasos (3.4.2). According to Chroust (1954:280-288), loyalty to a political faction often transcended allegiance to the city-state. This point is demonstrated by the activities of the proxenoi which we have discussed in this study.

The attachment of the proxenos to the faction of his own city and to the faction of the state which he represented became more prevalent from the second half of the fifth century B.C. and coincided with the use of some proxenoi as intelligence agents. The Peloponnesian war accelerated the process as more and more proxenoi cast aside all pretence of loyalty to their home states and threw in their lot with their "patrons". We have presented a series of examples (3.2.1 to 3.5.2) which have demonstrated that the proxenia was used as an extension of warfare (Active Intelligence cf 4.1.2b) and as a means of gathering political and military information (Passive Intelligence cf 4.1.2a). The participation of proxenoi in these types of intelligence activities and their association with political factions debased the office of proxenos from a position of honour and prestige to that of a mere reward to an informer, an "agent provocateur" and an award for a foreign lobbyist.

Xenophon, for example, was made proxenos of Sparta because of his pro-Lakadaimonian sympathies and his services to the Spartan king (Diog. Laert. 2.51-52). He was not made, however, the representative of the Spartans in Athens but their proxenos at Skillos (Diog. Laert. 2.51-52). This appointment resulted from the fact that Xenophon was banished from Athens and as such he could not have served as the Spartan proxenos in his home state. Consequently, another suitable city was found for him. Since it was customary to grant the proxenia to a native of the city who was usually a prominent citizen, the appointment of Xenophon was a deviation from normal practice. The award of proxenia to Xenophon was simply a reward for his commitment to the Spartan cause. As a relative stranger in Skillos his usefulness to the Spartans was limited, since he did not have the contacts amongst the citizens of Skillos or the knowledge of the region to execute effectively his duties as the representative of Sparta. In this instance the proxenia became the means by which the Spartans expressed their gratitude to Xenophon and formally recognized his ideological commitment to their state. This politicization of the proxenia was a factor in the eventual decline of the prestige accorded this office since it came to be regarded as a title which was given out generously and indiscriminately.

It is not surprising, therefore, that by the middle of the fourth century B.C. the title of proxenos is associated with factional politics and becomes synonymous with treachery and bribery. Aiskines (2.141) accused Demosthenes of treachery

as well as being the proxenos of Thebes:

> ...ὑπολειπομένης δ'ἔχθρας φανερᾶς Φιλίππῳ πρὸς Θηβαίους καὶ Θετταλούς, τότε ἀπώλοντο αἱ πράξεις οὐ δι'ἐμέ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν σὴν προδοσίαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους προξενίαν.

He adds to his argument by stating:

> Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄν δεινὰ πάθοιμι, εἰ κατηγοροῦντος μὲν Δημοσθένους τοῦ Θηβαίων προξένου καὶ πονηροτάτου τῶν Ἑλλήνων, συναγορευόντων δέ μοι Φωκέων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἁλοίην;...

Earlier in the speech Aiskhines (On the Embassy 89-90), defending himself against charges of negligence by Demosthenes and Timarkos, states that:

> εἴρηκε δὲ οὗτος πρὸς ὑμᾶς, παρὰ τοῦτο διαφθαρῆναι τὰ Κερσοβλέπτου πράγματα, ὅτι τῆς πρεσβείας ὢν ἡγεμὼν ἐγὼ καὶ κατευημερηκὼς παρ'ὑμῖν, αὐτοῦ κελεύοντος εἰς Θράκην ἡμᾶς ἰέναι Κερσοβλέπτου πολιορκουμένου, καὶ διαμαρτύρασθαι Φιλίππῳ ταῦτα μὴ ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἠθέλησα, ἀλλ'ἐκαθήμην ἐν Ὠρεῷ, καὶ οἱ συμπρέσβεις, προξενίας κατασκευαζόμενοι.

Deinarkhos (1.44) charged Demosthenes with manipulating the grant of Athenian citizenship and the proxenia to foreigners as a means of lining his own pockets:

> ἢ τὸ γράψαι Ταυροσθένην Ἀθηναῖον εἶναι,<τὸν> τοὺς μὲν αὐτοῦ πολίτας καταδουλωσάμενον, τῆς δ'Εὐβοίας ὅλης μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Καλλίου προδότην Φιλίππῳ γεγενημένον; ὃν οὐκ ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι τῆς Ἀθηναίων χώρας ἐπιβαίνειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔνοχον εἶναι κελεύουσιν οἷσπερ ἄν τις τῶν φευγόντων ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου κατίῃ. καὶ τοῦτον οὗτος ὁ δημοτικὸς ὑμέτερον ἔγραψε πολίτην εἶναι. περὶ τούτων οὖν μάρτυρας ὑμῖν δεῖ καλεῖν, ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσους οὗτος γέγραφε προξένους εἶναι καὶ Ἀθηναίους; <εἶτα>, πρὸς τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, οἴεσθ' αὐτὸν ἀργύριον μὲν χαίρειν λαμβάνοντα, χρυσίου δ'εἴκοσι τάλαντ'οὐκ ἂν λαβεῖν;

In 353 B.C. the exiled democrats of Rhodos appealed to Athens for help but failed to convince the Athenians. Demosthenes

(15.15-16), took up their cause again in 351 B.C. but he emphasized that, although he pleaded their cause, he was not the proxenos of Rhodos: "καὶ ταῦτ'οὐδεπώποτ'εἶπον ἄν, εἰ τῷ Ῥοδίων δήμῳ μόνῳν ἠγούμην συμφέρειν· οὔτε γὰρ προξενῶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὔτ'ἰδίᾳ ξένος αὐτῶν οὐδείς ἐστί μοι."

Demades, a pro-Makedonian Athenian politician tried to assert his influence in Athens by moving numerous decrees of which many were grants of proxenia (Perlman 1958:188-189). In 336 B.C., for example, Demades pushed a decree through the Athenian assembly granting the title of proxenos to a Makedonian in Philip's court (IGii^2.240). At about the same time he proposed to award the proxenia to Euthykrates, the pro-Makedonian commander of the Olynthian cavalry who in 349 B.C. betrayed Olynthos to Philip (Dem. 8.40; 19.341; Diod. 16.53). The decree was passed but Hyperides (Frag. 19) entered a "γραφὴ παρανόμων" against Demades and accused Euthykrates of being Philip's agent:

> Ἃ μὲν γὰρ οὗτος εἰσκεκόμικεν, οὐκ ἔχει τὰς ἀληθεῖς αἰτίας τῆς προξενίας· ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ δεῖ πρόξενον ὑμῖν αὐτὸν γένεσθαι, δι'ἃ τούτου τεύξεται γράψας εἰσφέρω. (ἔπειτα τὸ ψήφισμα εἰσφέρει·) δεδόχθαι αὐτὸν εἶναι πρόξενον, ὅτι τὰ Φιλίππῳ συμφέροντα καὶ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ,...

It is quite possible that once the proxenia became so closely identified with the political factions and the loyalty of the proxenos shifted entirely to his clients, the intelligence role of this office diminished. Indeed, after the fourth century B.C. there is no evidence of proxenoi participating in any kind of intelligence activity. The value of a proxenos functioning as an intelligence agent depended on the trust and prestige the recipient enjoyed in his home state. It was these attributes

which allowed a proxenos to have the freedom of action to collect information, to take part in other clandestine activities and to provide these services on behalf of the state he represented.

One of the most controversial activities conducted by certain intelligence organizations in peace time is subversion. Ominous connotations arise from the fact that subversion indicates a form of interference by one country in the internal affairs of another. The necessity for such interference derives from the need to undermine the stability of a government without resorting to war. In wartime, subversion is also an effective weapon used by one state to bring about the collapse of a government of another state in order to avoid a prolonged and costly conflict.

The ancient Greeks did not hesitate to use subversion since it constituted an effective means of breaking up alliances or weakening an enemy from within. This was particularly evident when outright hostilities existed between confederacies of cities, for often a change of government meant a realignment of foreign policy. The proxenoi were ideally suited to engage in subversive activities and several examples of this have been presented (cf 3.3.1; 3.3.2; 3.3.3; 3.3.4; 3.3.5; 3.4.2; 3.4.3; 3.5.1). The danger which subversion posed to the established regimes of the city-states was equally understood by the Greeks and some attempts were made to combat this threat (cf p. ; 3.4.1; 3.4.4).

The use of the proxenia as a means of gathering information and instigating subversion came to an end when the recipients

of this office could not maintain the same degree of credibility as they had previously enjoyed. Their movements, especially during times of war, would have been placed under close scrutiny and under these conditions their usefulness as intelligence agents declined. It is quite possible that the Greeks devised a new method of acquiring political and military information and exploited different approaches to other clandestine activities. This proposition, however, is beyond the scope of the present study and will have to depend upon future research.

PART 5

CONCLUSIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

The role of the proxenia in political and military information gathering as well as the use of this institution in other clandestine activities has an important place in the study of Greek history. To some extent the examples we have discussed in this work have uncovered another dimension in the international affairs of Greek city-states. At times, proxenoi acquired, through overt or covert means, vital information for their patrons (cf 3.3.1;3.24;3.2.5;3.3.3;3.3.6;3.3.7; 3.3.8), information which provided the client state with a definite military or political advantage. A great deal of time and money was saved by proxenoi who served their patrons by facilitating the betrayal of cities (cf 3.3.4;3.3.5;3.4.2;3.4.3; 3.4.5). Certain proxenoi, in order to assist the aims of the city they represented, instigated subversion against their own state (cf 3.4.2;3.5.1;3.5.2). An interesting case is that of Apollophanes of Kolophon (cf 3.4.4) who was granted the title of proxenos so that he would provide military intelligence to the Athenians. The Athenians exploited the full intelligence potential of the proxenia, furthermore, they employed their proxenoi as another check on their reluctant allies. The trade route through the north eastern Aegean and the Hellespont region to the Euxine was of primary concern to Athens since she depended upon this route for a great deal of her food and supplies

(cf 4.2.1). The proxenoi thus became another safeguard used by the Athenians to protect their interest in this essential region. The Peloponnesians were equally aware of the usefulness of proxenoi as intelligence agents and they accordingly employed certain representatives to serve in this capacity (cf 3.2.3; 3.2.5;3.3.2).

From the earliest period of Greek history the proxenia was a reflection of the political preference of both the candidate and the state he represented (cf 1.1.2). Eventually the proxenia became associated with the political ideology of an individual and an instrument of factional politics. The Peloponnesian War provided a fertile ground for intelligence activity and covert operations; it forced certain proxenoi, furthermore, to become partisan associates with political groups and not "guest-hosts" of the entire city which they in fact officially represented. The office of proxenos offered the incumbent neither monetary reward nor salary. In essence, the only compensation which the proxenos enjoyed was that of political asylum in the state he represented. Why then did they risk their lives and reputations to engage in clandestine work? The answer is that proxenoi served the political and military interests of a foreign power in the name of ideology and faction. It is of little wonder that, when individuals provided unsolicited political and military information, they were awarded the title of proxenos; no doubt they subsequently continued to provide these services (cf 3.3.4;3.3.5;3.3.7;3.3.8;3.4.2).

The award of this office allowed the client state to

maintain close ties with useful individuals and, in special cases, it served to protect the incumbent from murder and other forms of violence. This "harm clause" was particularly prevalent in the case of Athenian proxeny decrees after the middle of the fifth century (cf 1.1.2). By the middle of the fourth century B.C., however, the proxenoi became associated and clearly identified as instruments of interference by a foreign power (cf 4b.2.2). Indeed, by the end of the fourth century B.C., the proxenia was awarded generously and almost indiscriminately and the title thus declined in prestige and value. Consequently, the role of the proxenia in intelligence activity diminished once the bearers of this title became suspect of engaging in subterfuge; they could thus no longer effectively intervene on behalf of their clients.

5.2 Directions for Further Research

The function of the proxenia in information gathering and clandestine activity is but one aspect of the use of intelligence by the Greeks. A great deal more research remains to be done on other facets of operational intelligence and the collection of information in ancient Greece. To a great extent, the case of the proxenia has enabled us to see that organized intelligence work was exploited as an extension of diplomacy and as another dimension of warfare. Further research is required to reveal what mechanism was employed by the proxenoi to acquire political and military information and how this was transmitted to their "employers". More importantly we require a better understanding of what replaced the proxenia as an intelligence

system after the fourth century B.C.,and how the new system in itself functioned.

We have some epigraphical evidence which suggests that new powers such as Boiotia may also have employed their proxenoi in an intelligence capacity. Some inscriptions from the fourth century B.C. imply that Boiotia may have implemented a policy with the proxenia similar to that pursued by the Athenians. Among those who contributed money to assist Boiotia during the Second Sacred War was Athenadoros of Tenedos, the Theban proxenos (IGvii.2418). One of the ways in which the Thebans extended their influence abroad and circumvented their enemies may have been the proxenia. Around the middle of the fourth century B.C. we find Theban proxenoi in Byzantion (IGvii.2408) and as far away as Carthage (IGvii.2407)[1]. Again it may be possible to link these proxenies to naval activities in the north Aegean in connection with the grain routes (Fossey 1979). Indeed, these and the numerous Boiotian proxenia decrees from the Hellenistic period may offer an interesting glimpse into the diplomatic efforts of the Boiotians.[2] Research into the use of the proxenia by the Boiotians and other Greek states may reveal how much the information gathering aspect of that institution was expanded or utilized by other areas following Athenian and Peloponnesian precedent.

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1 A recent study of the Theban Hegemonia is provided by John Buckler (1980).

2 For a complete record of these documents see John M. Fossey (1976:passim).

As warfare and international relations became more complex after the second half of the fourth century B.C., the need was created for sophisticated intelligence networks. The development of siege engines, for example, eliminated the use of betrayal as a normal means of capturing fortified cities. The use of large armies by the Greeks and Makedonians required extensive reconnaissance operations to acquire reliable data on food and water supplies which were available in the territories which these armies crossed. The use of cavalry and specialized units on the battlefield, such as the *hypaspists* established the necessity for tactical military intelligence. In turn, the gathering of political information remained a key factor in international relations but required the employment of espionage networks of professional agents who developed secret signaling as a means of transmitting intelligence. These aspects too must be carefully investigated before we have a complete picture of Greek intelligence systems.

PART 6

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

Fig. 1: Distribution of Proxenoi Engaged in Intelligence Activities