

THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAESAR AND CICERO
TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE CIVIL WAR

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Index

	Page
Abstract	
Chapter I	1
Introduction	
Chapter II	4
The Period Before the Coalition of Caesar and Pompey	
Chapter III	19
Under the Triumvirs	
Chapter IV	29
Cicero's Defection and Subsequent Retraction	
Chapter V	44
The Conflict	
Chapter VI	73
The Realist versus the Idealist	
Bibliography	

THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAESAR AND CICERO
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Chapter I

Introduction

-1-

The period of turmoil, anarchy, and bloodshed that brought to a close the Roman Republic set upon the stage of history two figures which seem to share the honors of the time. The names of Cicero and Caesar are almost synonymous with the last days of the Roman Republic. And yet these men in family, character, and ambition were the antithesis of each other. Marcus Tullius Cicero belonged to the equestrian class. (1) At Rome he was called a "novus homo", a man whose ancestors had not held any public offices (2) and one who naturally met the opposition of the great families. (3) This status affected his character, consciously or unconsciously, and put him on the defensive in his contacts with the aristocrats. As a young man he was a witness to the abuses of the power of the aristocracy in the terrible days of Sulla. (4) It was in the defense of Roscius who had suffered at the hands of this aristocratic tyranny that Cicero first came into the political limelight. (5) This bold stroke won for him the regard of the democratic party which was demonstrated in his successful canvass for the offices of the "cursus honorum" at

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- (1) Cicero - De Lege Agraria I, IX, 27; Livy 38, 7-9
(2) Cicero - De Lege Agraria II, 1, 1; II, 36, 11
(3) Sallust - Catiline, 23, 6
(4) Plutarch - Cicero 3, 2, 3
(5) Ibid.

the earliest possible age. (1) Impulsive, a man of vacillating temperament, afraid to commit himself in regard to persons and situations, but always supporting the principle of parliamentary government and constitutional usage, the greatest lawyer and orator of his day, this man of the people espoused the cause of the senate.

Gaius Julius Caesar, on the other hand, had the prestige of an illustrious family. (2) Not only was his family one of the oldest and purest of Roman stock, but also it was important politically. (3) Caesar, too, in his early youth came into contact with the tyrannical abuses of the Sullan regime. (4) He dared to defy the orders of Sulla, and, being connected by marriage with Marius, another "novus homo" but the champion of the masses, Caesar allied himself with the democratic party, (5) and though an aristocrat, with unwavering perseverance and ruthless purpose, he espoused the cause of the people.

It was inevitable that these two men, although drawn to each other by common tastes in literature and culture, and by the courtesy and generosity of Caesar, on the one hand, and the genuine patriotism of Cicero, on the other, should clash politically. (6) Caesar's thinly veiled plans and ambition

(1) Cicero - De Lege Agraria II 1, 3; 2, 3, 4
(2) Suetonius - Divus Iulius 6, 1
(3) Ibid. 9, 2; Velleius Paterculus II, 41, 2
(4) Plutarch, Caesar I, 1
(5) Ibid.
(6) Cicero, ad Fam. I, 9; ad Quint. II, 12

for a one man power were repeatedly assailed by Cicero, an opponent of all who desired power through unconstitutional means, a supporter of a free state.

Chapter II

The Period Before the Coalition of Caesar and Pompey

-4-

The political history of the last twenty-five years of the Roman Republic is mainly concerned with the public careers of the two men whose conflicting ambitions brought on the Civil War, Caesar and Pompey.

"As long as earth supports the sea and air
the earth; as long as his unending task
shall make the sun go round, and night
shall follow day in the heavens, each pass-
ing through the same number of signs,--so
long will loyalty be impossible between
sharers in Tyranny, and great place resent
a partner." (1)

Cicero's unwavering affection for and support of the Republic and his partisanship of Pompey whom he considered the Republic's champion exerted a great influence on his political relationship with Caesar. However, in the year 67 and 66 B.C. we find all three supporting the same measures although for diverse reasons.

In the year 67, the trade and commerce, (2) in fact the lives (3) of the citizens of Rome, were endangered by the daring of the pirates. This had been a menace for years and had been ineffectually combatted by previous generals. (4) Now,

(1) Lucan Book II, line 89-93; Translation by J. D. Duff, M.A.

---dum terra fretum terramque levabit
Aer et longi volvent Titana labores
Noxque diem caelo totidem per signa sequentur,
Nulla fides regni sociis, omnisque potestas
Impatiens consortis erit."

(2) Cicero - De Imperio Gn. Pompei XI, 30, 31

(3) Ibid. - XI, 31, 32

(4) Ibid. - XI, 33

Gabinus, a close friend of Pompey, (1) proposed a law to give Pompey absolute power over the sea in order to sweep it clear of piracy. (2) The need was urgent, but to give such power to one man was extreme. The people supported this measure; (3) the majority of the senate opposed it on the ground that such absolute control was a thing to be feared. (4) Caesar advocated the law. In this he seems to have been influenced by two things: one, a desire for popular favor; (5) the other, the advisability of establishing a precedent of extensive military power in the hands of one man. Cicero, also, gave the law his approval. As a justification for this approval by one who was a supporter of the senate and constitutional procedure, he claimed that the situation made it imperative. (6) The great admiration which he had at this time for Pompey was another factor which influenced him. Again the next year, after Pompey had justified the faith that his supporters had had in his ability to overcome the pirates, (7) it was proposed by the tribune Manilius to give him similar powers in the war with Mithridates. (8) Mithridates, king of Pontus, had been harrying the Romans on the eastern borders of their domain for many years. Several generals had been sent against him but with no permanent results. Pompey, the

(1) Plutarch - Pompey 25, 2

(2) Ibid. 25, 4

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Cicero - De Imperio Gn. Pompei XVII, 52

(7) Ibid. XII, 35

(8) Ibid.

outstanding military leader of the moment, seemed the man to send. So, when Manilius proposed the law to this effect, Caesar (1) and Cicero added their support. Cicero's speech was a eulogy of Pompey. In what better way could Cicero ingratiate himself with the people and win their support in his contemplated canvass for the consulship (2) than by supporting their hero? Caesar's purpose was the same as in the previous year. Dio says that he felt sure the bill would be passed, and, by approving it, paved the way for a similar bill in his own favor. (3) Caesar never failed to grasp an opportunity and kept his goal ever before his eyes. Pompey's popularity at this time may well have been pointing his supporter a lesson.

Not long did this outward unanimity on political questions last. During his aedileship in 65, Caesar took advantage of every opportunity which that office offered to secure the favor of the people. He built public buildings, adorned the Forum, and presented gladiatorial contests of greater size than had ever been shown before. (4) Relying on the popularity thus gained, Caesar now acted as Crassus's agent in a proposal to make Egypt a tributary dependency. (5) Caesar may have foreseen that, if this were to happen, it would be necessary

(1) Dio XXXVI, 43, 2

(2) Cicero - ad Att. I, 1; Dio XXXVI, 43; 4, 5

(3) Dio XXXVI, 43; 3, 4

(4) Plutarch - Caesar 4, 2; 5, 4

(5) Plutarch - Crassus XIII

to maintain an army there which later might be of great use to him if he were able to secure the governorship of Egypt. (1) Both men met with opposition: Crassus from Catulus; (2) Caesar from Cicero. (3) In this stand Cicero was guarding the interests of Pompey from whom, as I have said before, he hoped to gain support in his campaign for political office and whom, at this time, he seems to have sincerely admired.

The political office to which Cicero was now daring to aspire was that of consul, the highest position in the state. The plots and intrigues, known through history as the Catilinarian Conspiracies were already brewing, and, although they were a blot on the escutcheon of the Roman State, nevertheless they gave to Cicero the opportunity to earn for himself the title of Saviour of his Country. It is necessary to consider briefly the events of the three years prior to Cicero's consulship and the part that Julius Caesar played in those events in order that we may understand the situation in that famous year of 63. Catiline had been governor of Africa in the year 66, and, upon his return, intended to run for the consulship. He was thwarted in this intention by a prosecution for malversation of funds in his province. Autronius and Sulla were returned as consuls, but immediately disqualified

(1) Suet. XI

(2) Plutarch - Crassus XIII, 1

(3) Rice-Holmes Vol. 1, p. 227

for bribery. Thereupon Cotta and Torquatus, the defeated candidates, were declared consuls instead. A plot was contrived whereby Cotta and Torquatus were to be murdered and Autronius and Sulla reinstated. The plot misfired. (1) Just who were implicated in this plot it is impossible to state because of the great diversity of opinion of the ancient writers. Of them all, only two implicate Caesar: Suetonius and Asconius. Suetonius tells us that his sources of information are Tanusius Geminus, the edicts of Bibulus, and Gaius Curio, the elder. (2) Not much importance can be attached to these informants for all references of Tanusius Geminus to Caesar are hostile, (3) the edicts of Bibulus are worthless, (4) and the speeches of Curio not impartial. (5) Suetonius also says that Cicero in a letter to Axius hinted that Caesar was involved. (6) The letter is not extant and so we have no means of knowing the value of this hint. When we consider that Suetonius, Sallust, Dio, and Cicero all discuss this plot with only the above evidence against Caesar, we may conclude that if he did play a part in this drama, it was played behind the scenes. It is interesting to note that although this has been called the First Conspiracy of Catiline, three of the ancient sources omit any mention of his name. Catiline was brought to trial

(1) Cicero - Catiline I 6, 15; Sallust - Cat. XXIII;
Cicero - Pro Sulla IV 11, 12; Pro Murena 38, 82

(2) Suet. IX, 2

(3) Cambridge Ancient History Vol. IX p. 479

(4) Suet. XX, 2

(5) Suet. XLIX, 1; LII, 3

(6) Ibid. IX, 3

regarding his government of Africa and Cicero tells us in a letter to Atticus that he considers defending him. (1) With our knowledge of Catiline's subsequent acts, this statement comes as a shock. But we must remember that at this time Catiline stood in no worse light than the majority of Roman politicians. In 64, Catiline and Cicero were to be candidates for the consulship along with Gaius Antonius. (2) At first, Cicero, the "novus homo" looked upon Catiline, the aristocrat, as an advantageous colleague. But Catiline and Antonius were supported by Caesar and Crassus; (3) Cicero, on the other hand, was Pompey's man. (4) As the campaign drew to a close, the flagrant bribery of the electors by Catiline and Antonius became public talk. (5) Cicero, spurred on by the advice of the Handbook for Candidates, which his brother Quintus had sent him, to the effect that he should make every effort to defame the character of his opponent, delivered an invective against Catiline in which he charged him with complicity in the plot of the previous year and hinted at Crassus's guilt in this same conspiracy. (6) The charges brought by Cicero were followed by rumors of deeper villainy on the part of Catiline and turned the scales in favor of Cicero at the polls. The people realized that Cicero was a

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- (1) Cicero - ad Att.
 - (2) Cicero - ad Att. 1, 1, 1
 - (3) Ascon., ed. Clark p. 83
 - (4) Plutarch - Crassus 13, 1
 - (5) Ascon., ed. Clark p. 83
 - (6) Rice Holmes Vol I p. 240

staunch supporter of the Constitution and the Senate, both of which were being jeopardized by the acts of Catiline and his adherents, and they now gave Cicero their votes. He was elected by a great majority, with Antonius as his colleague. (1)

While Cicero had his eyes fixed on the consulship, Caesar was winning prestige and financial power for himself by securing the office of Pontifex Maximus left vacant by the death of Metellus Pius. (2) Although his competitors were men of importance and influence, (3) Caesar won the election. This was an important office. It was held for life and, owing to the way religion and government were involved in the Roman state, the chief pontiff wielded power in both spheres.

In the year 63, Cicero entered upon his consulship--a "novus homo" in the highest position in the state. This same year Caesar had finished his term as aedile and was praetor elect. His course ahead was charted in his own mind (4) and he intended to take advantage of every favorable wind to carry him toward his goal. (5) By agrarian legislation he saw a means of ingratiating himself with the plebeians and securing power for himself. Historians differ as to whether there were one or two agrarian measures proposed by Caesar: the first measure involving allotments of land from all over Italy,

(1) Plutarch - Cicero 10, 1; 11

(2) Plutarch - Caesar VII 1-3; Suet. XIII

(3) Plutarch - Caesar VII 1

(4) Suet. IX, 2

(5) Dio XXXVII 37, 3

exclusive of the Campanian Lands; the second providing for the distribution of the Ager Campanus and the Campus Stellas. The Ager Campanus had been public land since 211 B. C. and was the fertile farming country of Campania. The Campus Stellas was a section of the land north of Volturnus. It seems likely that there were two bills, the second including the Campanian land and plain of Stellas, proposed before the people after the first had been rejected by the Senate. At any rate, through the agency of the tribune Rullus, Caesar proposed agrarian measures. By the terms of these bills almost unlimited power was placed in the hands of a commission of ten. (1) These commissioners were to be elected, not by the thirty-five tribes in the customary manner, but by seventeen so that the support of nine tribes only would insure election. (2) Every candidate for a place on the commission must present himself in person. (3) This commission had the right to purchase private lands for allotment, (4) to take the Campanian land and the plain of Stellas for distribution, (5) to settle in these places the poor and the veterans. (6) The commissioners were to act as administrators and the money to purchase this land might be secured by them through the sale of land, of property, in fact by whatever means they pleased. (7)

(1) Cicero - De Lege Agraria II, VII, 16

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. IX, 24

(4) Ibid. I, V, 5

(5) Ibid. I, VI 18-22; In Pisonem II, 4

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid. II, XIV, 35-37

Cicero did not look upon an agrarian law in itself with disfavor (1) and when he first heard of such a proposed law he intended to support it, if it were of benefit to the plebeians. (2) When the bill was brought forward, he saw in it great danger to the authority of the senate in the great power invested in the ten commissioners and a direct slap to Pompey who was deprived of a place on this commission by the clause which required that a candidate must be present in person. (3) In pretense the bill offered to the people relief from poverty and an outlet for the surplus population of the city. In reality they would be substituting labor on the soil for corn doles and games. Cicero showed them that they would gain nothing and the commission everything. (4) It is easy to see that Caesar's bill had the ulterior motive of power for himself which would equal and even surpass that of Pompey with his supporting army. In the defeat of this bill, Cicero won a decided victory over Caesar, and, if he had not already done so, from now on Caesar must have realized that Cicero's oratory which could sway the people, influence juries, and cow his opponents, was a factor which must be taken into consideration.

Cicero's famous speeches against Catiline and the subse-

(1) Cicero - De Lege Agraria II, V, 10
(2) Ibid. II, V, 12
(3) Ibid. II, IX, 24
(4) Ibid. II, XI, 15

quent execution of the conspirators, which had such a disastrous result for him, occupied the final months of his consulship. (1) However, this plot had been some time in the making, for Sallust in his "Catiline" says that Catiline (2) first called his followers together in June 64. Catiline's defeat at the polls in the election for the consulship had not changed his objective although it necessarily altered his plan of campaign. What he had hoped to accomplish under cover of a political office he now determined to gain through open rebellion. As has been said, there is little to prove that Caesar played a role of importance in the Catilinarian conspiracies, still a contemplation of the political picture of these years offers ground for interesting conjecture. At this time Pompey through his successes over the pirates and in the Mithridatic War had acquired almost unbounded power. Also the senate's influence was strong as evidenced by the conviction of Autronius and Sulla and the subsequent election of Cotta and Torquatus. The possibility of a military dictatorship in the hands of Pompey and a strong senatorial power were distasteful to Caesar and Crassus who by 63 B. C. were termed the "leaders of the popular party." In this popular party were many malcontents who looked to their leaders for action to

(1) Dates of speeches Nov. 8, 9; Dec. 3, 5
Cicero - ad Cat. I-IV passim

(2) Sallust - Catiline 17

alleviate their position. However, Caesar was evidently not ready to declare himself openly, but, as has been seen in his Agrarian Proposals and will be seen later in the prosecution of Rabirius, he tried to dominate the situation through the agency of others. It is reasonable to suppose that he was aware of the designs of Catiline and his followers and stood ready to avail himself of his services if Catiline should be elected to the consulship. To this end he probably used his influence to gain this office for Catiline. However, when the schemes of the conspirators progressed from political intrigue into brigandage and even murder, Caesar and Crassus realized that the conspiracy had gone beyond the point at which it might serve their interests and both men gave Cicero information concerning the plot. If Caesar and Crassus gave their support to Catiline while he was canvassing for the consulship, Cicero, as an opposing candidate, must have been aware of what was going on. He must also have realized, as Caesar himself did, that open opposition from Caesar at this time would have drawn the senate and Pompey more closely together. Although Cicero would have looked with favor upon this alliance it certainly was not what Caesar wished. Caesar would not be deterred from his purpose by mere legalities, but

neither would he jeopardize his ultimate success and risk the loss of the popular favor which he then enjoyed. So when the question of the punishment of the conspirators was raised in the senate, Caesar's plea for leniency (1) only seems to indicate that he had been aware of the proceedings and at some time had given them his sanction, hoping to take advantage of any profitable situation which might arise. Whether this cognizance of the plans of the conspirators and his foresight concerning the possible result, in the event of failure, and his knowledge that the senatus consultum ultimum would be used by the senate in attempting to quell the uprising, prompted him to scheme the prosecution of Rabirius (2) or not, it is impossible to determine. At any rate, the conspiracy must have been already organized when Labienus, upon Caesar's instigation, had charged Rabirius with a crime which he had committed thirty-seven years before. This was not in the interests of justice, but to make a test case of the senatus consultum ultimum (3) under the protection of which Rabirius had committed the alleged crime. The denouement (4) of the affair placed it in the realm of farce as far as a legal case was concerned and indicated its unimportance as such. However, one wonders that this experience did not forewarn Cicero, for,

(1) Plutarch - Cicero 21; Caesar 7, 8; Sallust - Cat. 51

(2) Dio 37; 26, 8; Suet. - Div. Iul. 12

(3) Cicero - Pro Rabirio I, 2; II, 4

(4) Dio 37; 27, 3

at the time of the condemnation of the Catilinarian conspirators, he did not seem to realize that the passage of the senatus consultum ultimum did not protect a Roman who was acting under this decree from attack by his enemies. It was pleasing to Cicero, who was a staunch supporter of the senate, that the ultimate decree, which technically gave to the senate the power of a dictator, be maintained. That the senate should have this dictatorial power was not only displeasing to Caesar, the democrat, but might prove disconcerting to Caesar, the radical.

By the close of the year 63, Cicero had proved himself the outstanding lawyer in Rome and the greatest orator of his day; he had held the highest political position which the Roman Republic had to offer and, while in that position, had won the title of Saviour of his Country by his adroit handling of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. He had reached the goal toward which Caesar was directing his endeavors. But an event occurred in 62, which, although it must have been a sensational scandal in the Roman city, would, in itself have had little historical importance, had it not been for the weapon with which it armed Caesar to bend the recalcitrant Cicero to his will. As Caesar was Pontifex Maximus the religious rites of

the Bona Dea were held in his house. Publius Clodius, who was reputed to be carrying on an illicit affair with Caesar's wife Pompeia, entered the house in the disguise of a woman and profaned the ceremonies to which women only were admitted. (1) His presence was discovered and Caesar, in his official capacity as chief pontiff, had public charges of sacrilege brought against Clodius. (2) Although Caesar divorced Pompeia, he made no personal charges against Clodius relative to his affair with his wife. (3) The bill against Clodius for sacrilege, which was brought forward by the consul on decree of the senate, proposed that the praetor should have the selection of the jurymen and then use them for his panel. (4) Cicero fought for the bill but finally it was shelved (5) and a compromise, presented by Hortensius, was adopted. The trial followed. Clodius attempted to prove his innocence by an alibi which Cicero refuted. (6) Caesar pleaded ignorance of the situation. (7) The result was an acquittal by a small majority. (8) Without doubt Cicero's evidence was an honest statement of fact. Caesar must have had an ulterior motive. Although, of course, he could not foresee as yet the particular uses to which he might put

(1) Cicero - ad Att. I 12; I 13, 14; Plutarch - Caesar 9; 10 1-4; Plutarch - Cicero 28

(2) Dio 37; 45

(3) Plutarch - Caesar 10, 6; Cicero - ad Att. I, 13

(4) Cicero - ad Att. I, 14, 1; I, 16

(5) Ibid.

(6) Plutarch - Cicero 29, 1

(7) Plutarch - Caesar 10, 6, 7

(8) Plutarch - Cicero 29, 6; Caesar 10, 7

Clodius, and, even if, as Dio says, (1) his reason for failing to proffer charges was his opinion that Clodius, supported by his rowdies, could not be convicted, it seems reasonable to believe that Caesar saw in him a clever tool whom he might use to advantage and therefore, he refrained from incurring his enmity.

(1) Dio 37; 45

Chapter III

Under the Triumvirs

-19-

When Caesar returned to Rome in 60 B. C. from his pro-praetorship in Spain, he was ready to sue for the consulship. The most influential men in Rome at this time were Pompey and Crassus, (1) but between them there had been friction since their consulship in 70. (2) Caesar conceived the idea of reconciling these men to each other and allying them both to himself. (3) We learn from a speech of Cicero's that Caesar invited him to be one of the three men of consular rank most closely connected with him in affairs of state. (4) This seems to indicate that Cicero thought there was a place for him in the coalition had he been willing to assume it. We know that at this time Cicero and Pompey were on good terms for, in March of the year 60, Cicero writes to Atticus: "With him (Pompey) I have formed such an intimate connection that both of us have been strengthened in our policy and are surer in our political position through our coalition." (5) Crassus and Cicero were always at enmity. (6) By uniting all these disturbing factors to each other and to himself, Caesar hoped to incur the opposition of no one individual and to secure their common support. Cicero held aloof; the others

(1) Plutarch - Caes. 13, 2

(2) Suet. - Div. Iul. 19, 2; Plutarch - Caes. 13, 2;
Cras. 14, 1; Pomp. 47, 1

(3) Plutarch - Caes. 13, 2

(4) Cicero - De Prov. Cons. 17

(5) Cicero - ad Att. I, 19

(6) Plutarch - Cic. 30, 2

united with Caesar in what has been known as the First Triumvirate. By the terms of this coalition Caesar was to be consul in 59 and no step was to be taken by one of the members which was not advantageous to all. (1)

Just as had been the case in the first days of Cicero's consulship, so the subject of land laws held the attention of the legislators at the beginning of Caesar's term of office in 59. (2) The first bill was an agrarian law which had a two-fold purpose: first, to secure land for Pompey's veterans; second, to relieve the congestion of the population at Rome. (3) The majority of the Optimates resented the bill but offered no open opposition. (4) After frequent delays and postponements and persistent opposition from Cato, the bill was carried to the people and passed by them. (5) Although the bill had been proposed in December, 60, (6) the commission of twenty who were to carry out its proposals did not get to work until April. (7) The law did not prove satisfactory and a separate bill, *Ager Campanus*, was brought forward in May. (8) In spite of Cato's continued opposition the bill was passed and all the senators but one finally took an oath of obedience

(1) Suet. - Div. Iul. 19, 2; Plutarch - Caes. 14, 1

(2) Appian - B. C. II, 10; Plutarch - Cato 32, 1; Caes. 14, 1

(3) Dio - 38, 1-7; Cicero - ad Att. II, 3

(4) Cicero - ad Att. II, 23, 2; Plutarch - Caes. 14, 1;
Appian B. C. II 10, 34-35; Dio 38, 2, 1

(5) Dio 38, 2, 3; 38, 7, 3

(6) Cicero - ad Att. II, 3

(7) Ibid. II, 15

(8) Ibid. II, 16, 1; Dio 38; 7, 3

to the law. (1) The support of Pompey and Crassus for the agrarian measure was guaranteed by the coalition. (2) But what was Cicero's attitude? When one recalls the active opposition which he offered to Caesar's previous agrarian legislation, (3) one cannot help asking the reason for his silence now. He seems to give us the answer himself in a letter to Atticus, dated December, 60, where he states his political attitude. (4)

"For either I have got to resist the agrarian measure strongly, which would mean something of a fight, though I should gain prestige by it; or I must hold my peace, which is equivalent to retiring to Solonium or Actium; or else I must assist the measure, and that is what they say Caesar expects me to do, beyond a doubt. For Cornelius paid me a visit--I mean Balbus, Caesar's great friend. He assured me that Caesar will take my own and Pompey's opinion on everything, and that he will make an effort to reconcile Pompey and Crassus. On this side of the sheet may be placed an intimate connection with Pompey and, if I like, with Caesar, too; reconciliation with my old enemies, peace with the populace, and ease in my old age."

Cicero evidently decided to "hold his peace" on the agrarian question, at least. This was not in accord with Caesar's wish, however, and when Cicero in his defense of Antonius (5) made derogatory remarks concerning the times, Caesar apparently felt no confidence in Cicero's support and little assurance

(1) Cicero - ad Att. II, 18; Dio 38, 7, 1, 2

(2) Pompey's support - Dio 38, 5, 4; Plutarch - Pomp. 48, 1
Crassus's support - Dio 38, 5, 5; Plutarch - Caes. 14, 5

(3) In 63 B. C. - See p. 9-11

of his quiet acquiescence. Accordingly Caesar began to look about to see what pressure he could bring to bear on Cicero.

Before long there were reports that Clodius was already aiming at the tribuneship. (1) By April of the year 59, through the efforts of Caesar, as Pontifex Maximus, Clodius had become a plebeian and was eligible for the office of tribune. (2) In that same month Cicero hinted at an attack upon him by Clodius and expressed hope that Clodius and the Triumvirs would quarrel. (3) Clodius himself still smarted under the sting of Cicero's damning evidence in his trial for sacrilege and Cicero unwisely continued to jeer at him in public. (4) It is a question, however, whether, left to his own devices, Clodius would have taken any steps of retaliation against Cicero. As the year of Caesar's consulship drew to a close and Caesar noticed Cicero's persistent rejection of his advances and determination not to yield to the pressure of the Triumvirs, (5) more drastic measures seemed inevitable. At the end of his term of office, Caesar was to assume the pro-consulship of Gaul. (6) What was to prevent Cicero from at-

(1) Cicero - ad Att. II, 1

(2) Cicero - ad Att. II, 7; Suet. - Div. Iul. 20, 5;
Dio 38; 12, 2

(3) Cicero - ad Att. II, 9

(4) Ibid. II, 1

(5) Cicero had refused a seat on Caesar's land commission, a legatio on his staff in Gaul, and a legatio libera - Cicero - De Prov. Cons. 41; ad Att. II, 18, 3; Plutarch - Cicero 30, 3

(6) Suet. - Div. Iul. 22, 1; Plutarch - Cic. 30

tacking the questionable legislation of Caesar's consulship (1) during his absence and, by means of his oratorical skill and invective, nullifying his important acts? Caesar had both seen and felt the force of Cicero's opposition (2) and was not the man to belittle the power of his opponents. Therefore he took steps through Clodius to remove the threat to his plans. (3)

So on the first of January, Clodius brought forward four bills. (4) Three were designed to protect himself and his laws, and the fourth, although it was directed against all who should put or had put a Roman citizen to death without condemnation of the people, was aimed specifically at Cicero. (5) Of course Cicero frantically opposed the bill. Clodius declared in the Senate and in the Assemblies that he was acting with the approval and support of Caesar and Pompey. (6) When the passage of the bill seemed certain, Cicero assumed the attire of mourning and sought the assistance of his friends. (7) All failed him in his need. Caesar, not wishing to acknowledge his part of the plan, declared that all knew his attitude on the matter from his speech which he delivered in the senate when the question of the disposition of the conspirators was raised. How-

(1) Suet. - Div. Iul. 22, 1; Cic. - ad Att. II, 9; II, 19, 2; Dio 38, 1-5

(2) Cicero - De Lege Agraria and other political speeches

(3) Dio 38; 14, 3

(4) Dio 38; 12, 13, 14; Plutarch - Cicero 30, 4

(5) Dio 38; 14, 5; Plutarch - Cicero 30, 4; Velleius Paterculus II, 46

(6) Dio 38; 14, 7; Cicero - Pro Sestio 17

(7) Plutarch - Cicero 30, 4

ever, as this was all past, he would advise no action on the matter. (1) It is interesting to note that as late as July Cicero says that Caesar had asked him to go to Gaul as his lieutenant. (2) If Cicero had accepted this post and his conduct could have been guaranteed by his presence with Caesar in Gaul, no more stringent measures would have been necessary. Pompey's protestations of friendship (3) and his minimizing of the danger from Clodius (4) encouraged Cicero and he felt that he could withstand the attack through the help of his friends. (5) But when the final blow fell and Cicero looked to Pompey for aid, Pompey avoided the issue by betaking himself to one of his country estates. (6) This indeed must have been a bitter blow to Cicero. Not only had Pompey given him assurances of affection and support during the recent months but he had also expressed to him his dissatisfaction with the political situation. (7) Now, deserted by the Triumvirs (8) and denied help by the consuls, (9) at the insistence of his friends and family, (10) Cicero left the city. Cicero's attitude during his exile, as shown by his correspondence, (11) does not enhance our estimate of his character. His fate was

(1) Dio - 38; 17, 1-3

(2) Cicero - ad Att. II, 19

(3) Ibid. II, 19; 20

(4) Ibid. II, 21, 22, 24

(5) Ibid. II, 18, 19

(6) Plutarch - Cicero 31, 2

(7) Cicero - ad Att. II, 23

(8) Cicero - ad Quint. I, 4, 4

(9) Plutarch - Cicero 31, 4

(10) Cicero - ad Quint. I, 4, 4; Plutarch - Cic. 31, 4

(11) Cicero - ad Att. Book III in toto; ad Quint. I 3, 4

unbearable and his letters to his friends were pleas and entreaties for them to help him secure a recall. During Cicero's absence, Clodius, like many of his kind, by going to extremes, defeated his own purpose. Not content with Cicero's exile, Clodius wrought further vengeance upon him by burning his house and villas and confiscating his property. (1) Not satisfied with this, he antagonized Pompey. (2) Tigranes, King of Armenia, who had surrendered to Pompey after Pompey's successful campaign against Mithridates, King of Pontus, had been in Pompey's triumph and, at this time, was in custody at the house of Lucius Flavius. Clodius was instrumental in securing his escape. (3) Pompey apparently thought that Clodius had gone too far; at any rate, he took up the cudgels on Cicero's behalf. (4) He sought the approval of Caesar, however, before he made a definite move. (5) When Caesar had gone to Gaul, he had left agents at Rome to look after his interests and to inform him of the popular temper. (6) The sympathy of both the Senate and the people was so strongly in favor of Cicero by this time and the affair had occasioned such disorder and even bloodshed in the city that Caesar evidently

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- (1) Dio - 38; 17, 7; Plutarch - Cicero 33, 1; Cicero - Post Reditum in Senatu 7, 18
(2) Dio - 38; 30, 2-3; Plutarch - Cicero 33, 1-2
(3) Cicero - ad Att. III, 8; Dio 38; 30, 2-3
(4) Dio - 38; 30, 3
(5) Cicero - ad Att. III, 19
(6) Suet. - Div. Iul. 23, 2

thought it wise to agree to the return of Cicero. (1) So, in December, at Pompey's instigation, a law was proposed by Lentulus to this effect. (2) Its passage was delayed by hostile tribunes and Quintus Cicero was dragged from the platform when he attempted to speak in his brother's favor. (3) But Pompey, backed now by Caesar's consent, gave the bill his support openly, not only in the city, but also in the outlying towns. (4) So in July, with Clodius's gang held in check by a similar mob headed by Milo, the bill for Cicero's recall was passed. (5) The welcome which Cicero received upon his return must have done much to heal his wounds. (6)

Prompted by his gratitude to Pompey for his help in effecting his recall, Cicero, on the day after his return to Rome, took steps to repay him. His opportunity to do this came from a shortage in the grain supply on that particular day. (7) Clodius, still vindictive, blamed Cicero for this shortage, saying that the great throngs in the city of those who had come to welcome him had occasioned it. (8) Meetings were held to consider the matter and Cicero proposed that Pompey be put in charge of the corn supply. (9) By the pas-

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- (1) Cicero - Post Reditum in Senatu 3, 7; Plutarch - Pomp. 49; 1, 2; Cic. 33, 3
(2) Cicero - Post Reditum in Senatu 3, 5; Post Reditum in Quirites 5, 11
(3) Cicero - Pro Sestio 61, 129; Plutarch - Cicero 33, 2
(4) Cicero - De Prov. Cons. 18, 43; In Pisonem 32, 80
(5) Dio 39; 8, 2-3
(6) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 1; Velleius Paterculus 45, 3
(7) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 1
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.; Plutarch - Pomp. 49, 4 & 5; 50, 1

sage of this law Pompey acquired great power both on land and sea. (1)

Cicero had scarcely been in Rome eight months when he again made a move which was bound to arouse Caesar's ire. What had occurred between his return in July and his reopening of the Campanian question in March which gave him the encouragement to take this most hostile step? This whole interval was occupied with violence and rioting. Clodius was attempting to bring Milo to trial. (2) Pompey was supporting Milo, a move not destined to meet the approval of Caesar. (3) When Pompey arose to speak in Milo's behalf, Clodius's rowdies used every insult and means of abuse to deter him. (4) Pompey even accused Crassus of plotting against his life. (5) An action for rioting was brought against Sestius, (6) and as Sestius had worked for his recall (7) and his brother Quintus had urged him to keep on good terms with him, (8) Cicero took up his defence. In this speech he made an attack upon Clodius, Caesar's tool, and, in his cross examination of Vatinius, (9) another henchman of Caesar, he delivered a slanderous invective on him. He received from Vatinius taunts upon his friendship

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- (1) Plutarch - Pomp. 49; 5
(2) Cicero - ad Quint. II 3, 1
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid. II 3, 3-4
(6) Ibid. II 3, 5
(7) Cicero - Pro Sestio 33; ad Att. III, 23
(8) Cicero - ad Quint. II 3, 7
(9) Ibid.

with Caesar, now that Caesar was successful. (1) Cicero, persuaded by these indications of distrust and dissension among the Triumvirs, and flushed by his courtroom successes (2) and popularity, (3) began to show traces of rebellion. In reply to Vatinius he said he preferred the luck of Bibulus, Caesar's impotent colleague in his consulship, which Vatinius regarded as sheer ruin, to the triumphs and victories of them all; and before the same man in another part of his speech, he declared that those who prevented Bibulus from leaving his house during his consulship and those who forced him, Cicero, to leave his were the same persons. (4) Not content with these unwise comments, in March he made the inexcusable blunder of attacking Caesar's land laws. He proposed that the question of the Campanian land be laid before a full senate. (5) The motion was carried (6) and with it went the remnants of Cicero's freedom.

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- (1) Cicero - ad Fam. I, 9, 7
 - (2) Cicero - ad Att. IV 2, 1
 - (3) Cicero - ad Quint. II 5, 7; II 4, 6
 - (4) Cicero - ad Fam. I 9, 7
 - (5) Ibid. I 9, 8
 - (6) Ibid. I 9, 9

Chapter IV

Cicero's Defection and Subsequent Retraction

-29-

From Crassus, whom he met at Ravenna, Caesar learned of Cicero's defection. (1) A few days later these two joined Pompey at Luca. All were annoyed at Cicero's action. (2) He had broken the promise which had been made to Pompey by Quintus, under the terms of which Caesar had given his consent for Cicero's recall. The question of the Campanian land was important to Pompey as it would provide a place for his veterans, and, for the same reason, it would be vital to Caesar when he returned from Gaul. (3) Even more important than the question of this particular measure, however, was the evidence it gave of Cicero's attitude. It was obvious to all three that Cicero's tongue must be restrained and Pompey was assigned the task of bringing him into line again. (4) Before we consider the results of this rebuke to Cicero, let us look again at the agreement of the Triumvirs at Luca.

According to this agreement, Pompey and Crassus were to stand for the consulship in the year 55 and when their term of office was over, the former should be proconsul in Spain and the latter in Syria for a period of five years. Caesar's proconsulship in Gaul was to be extended for another five years.

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. I 9, 9

(2) Ibid.

(3) Caesar - Bellum Civile I 14, 4

(4) Cicero - ad Fam. I, 9, 9

At the close of his term as governor of Gaul, he was to be allowed to step directly from his province to the consulship. (1) Taken on its face value, this division of power seemed just, providing, as it did, each member with the consulship and the proconsulship together with the army such an office entailed. After the meeting Caesar returned to Gaul, (2) and Pompey set forth for Sardinia, there to see Quintus Cicero and charge him with his brother's disloyalty. (3)

Crowds, both of the common people and those of senatorial rank, had thronged to the meeting of the Triumvirs at Luca. However, their session was private and the terms of their agreement were kept secret for some time. (4) Perhaps the first repercussion was felt when Cicero heard from Quintus after Pompey's visit to him. Cicero had talked with Pompey in Rome after the motion concerning the Campanian land had been passed in the house and Pompey had given him no intimation of his annoyance. (5) Although it seems hard to believe that Cicero thought such a move on his part would go unchallenged, still Pompey's silence would have quieted his qualms. It was not long before the blow fell in the form of the rebuke through Quintus and a visit from Vibullus. In his talk with Quintus Cicero, Pompey stated the Triumvirs' requirements in regard to

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. I 9, 9
(2) Caesar - B. G. III 7, 1; 9
(3) Cicero - ad Fam. I 9, 9
(4) Plutarch - Pomp. 41, 3-5
(5) Cicero - ad Fam. I 9, 9

Marcus in a straightforward way. (1) There could be no doubt in Cicero's mind as to what was expected of him. He must make no hostile moves against Caesar's acts. If he found it impossible to support them, he must refrain from attack. Pompey made it very clear that Cicero had been allowed to return from exile on this understanding only. This had been the condition agreed upon by Caesar and Pompey. (2) Cicero must have realized that, henceforth, as long as Caesar and Pompey remained in agreement and dictated the republic's policies, he must conform to their wishes if he expected to be allowed to remain at Rome. If we recall his reactions to his banishment and realize that he had reason to believe he might be exiled again, we are not surprised that he determined to "try to win the affection of those who have some influence." (3) Faced with this necessity, he held, in a letter to Lentulus, an imaginary conference with the state, trying to explain his change of front and, it seems, trying to convince himself that he had taken the better part. He argues in this manner.

"For my part, if I saw that the State was in the hands of unscrupulous and abandoned citizens, as we know occurred in the days of Cinna as well as other times, not only should I not be tempted by the prospect of material benefits, which have but little weight with me, but neither could I be

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. I 9, 9

(2) Ibid.

(3) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 5

forced by any considerations of danger--and yet the most intrepid of men are affected thereby--to espouse their cause, no, not though their services to me were proved to be exceptionally great. When, however, the leading man in the state was Gnaeus Pompey, a man who had gained such power and eminence as he has by the highest political services and the most brilliant military achievements, one whose claims I had conspicuously supported from my youth upwards, and as conspicuously promoted both in my praetorship and in my consulship; when, moreover, he had himself given me the help of his advice and exertions; and when he regarded my enemy as his one great enemy in the state, I really did not think I had any reason to dread very much the imputation of inconsistency if in the expression of some of my opinions I made a slight change in my political attitude, and contributed my moral support to the advancement of a most illustrious man who had laid me under the greatest obligations. In this determination I was obliged, as you must see, to include Caesar, the policy and position of the two men being so intimately connected. Here I attached great weight as well to the long standing friendship, which, as you yourself are aware, my brother Quintus and I had with Caesar, as to Caesar's courtesy and generosity, which even in this short time I have recognized and acknowledged both in his letters and his acts of kindness to me. I was profoundly influenced too by the interests of the state, which seemed to me to demur any quarrel with those great men, especially after Caesar's extraordinary successes, and indeed emphatically to forbid it." (1)

One wonders if this argument convinced the state. It seemed

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. I 9, 11

hardly to convince Cicero, himself, for later in this same letter he admitted that he had been impelled most strongly by the pledge which Quintus had given to Pompey in his name. To make this rightabout face evident to those most closely concerned he seems to have taken four definite steps. First he supported the motion regarding the pay for Caesar's soldiers and the appointment of the ten lieutenants. (1) Second he abandoned the Campanian land measure when it came up on the fifteenth of May. (2) The third was his palinode, (3) mentioned in a letter to Atticus, and the fourth, the speech on the consular provinces. Just what the palinode was and when it was composed has been a question of historical debate. T. Rice Holmes has made a study of the evidence and the dates, and concludes that the palinode was a letter which Cicero wrote to Pompey after he received the visit from Vibullus. (4) Although written to Pompey, the letter would seem to be in the light of a personal explanation to Caesar who, by this time had gone back to his war in Gaul. His public recantation was the speech on the consular provinces. The question before the senate was the matter of the distribution of these provinces. Cicero spoke against the supplanting of Caesar in Gaul, but his speech was more a eulogy of Caesar and the public restate-

(1) Cicero - De Prov. Cons. 11

(2) Cicero - ad Quint. II 8, 2

(3) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 5

(4) T. Rice Holmes - The Roman Republic Vol. II p. 292 -
Cicero's palinode and questions therewith connected

ment of the arguments he had presented to himself in his talk with the state. It was his admission that he had bowed to the exigencies of the times and the importunities of the Triumvirs. He admitted that throughout his political career he had been of different opinion from Caesar in affairs of state but without any interruption of friendly intimacy. (1). But now that Caesar and the senate were in agreement, since the senate had decreed a thanksgiving in Caesar's name, now that the senate had changed and was favoring Caesar, so Cicero favored him too. (2)

By these acts, Cicero cast in his lot with Caesar and Pompey. In his letters, he frequently seemed to be trying to convince himself that he was contented with his position. (3) He stayed away from the city and devoted himself to his literary pursuits. (4) He felt that public affairs were in the hands of Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus and he looked for no change in this status during his generation. (5)

Amidst rioting and bloodshed, Pompey and Crassus were elected to the consulship for 55 as had been planned by the Triumvirs. (6) Domitius, who had threatened to bring an inquiry into the acts of Caesar's consulship, was the only man intrepid enough to oppose the candidacy. (7) With his defeat,

(1) Cicero - De Prov. Cons. X; XXII

(2) Ibid. X

(3) Cicero, - ad Fam. I, 9, 18; I, 9, 21; ad Att. IV 8a

(4) Cicero - ad Att. IV 13, 2

(5) Cicero - ad Fam. I, 8, 2

(6) Suet. - Div. Iul. 24; Plutarch - Pomp. 52; Cras. 15;
Dio 39, 27-36

(7) Plutarch - Pomp. 52; Dio 39, 31

this danger was removed from Caesar temporarily. In due time the Trebonian Law, (1) by which Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus received the provisions stipulated at Luca, was passed in spite of great opposition, especially by Cato. (2) At the end of their consulship, Crassus set out for Parthia (3) with the expressed purpose of waging war with the Parthians. (4) Before he left, by the wish of both Pompey and Caesar, he and Cicero were reconciled. (5) At any rate in accordance with their request, Cicero made the friendly gesture of having Crassus at his house for dinner on the evening before he left. The friendship which existed between Cicero and young Publius Crassus probably tipped the scales in favor of a reconciliation with the youth's father. (6) One cannot feel that Cicero's real feelings toward Crassus had altered much and this act of his was just further evidence of his determination to steer a straight course. Although both Crassus and Pompey had held levies of soldiers during their consulships to use in their provinces, Pompey remained in Italy and sent his lieutenants with his troops to Spain. (7) He spent much of his time, now that affairs had quieted down a bit, with his young wife Julia to whom he was devoted.

The elections for the year 54 were hot beds of bribery

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- (1) Plutarch - Pomp. 52; Dio 39, 33
 - (2) Dio 39, 34, 2
 - (3) App. II 3, 18
 - (4) Plutarch - Crassus 16
 - (5) Cicero - ad Fam. I, 9, 20
 - (6) Cicero - ad Quint. II, 9
 - (7) Plutarch - Pomp. 53

and intrigue.. (1) There were indications of an interregnum or even a dictatorship as delay followed delay. (2) Finally Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus and Appius Claudius Pulcher were elected. In this year occurred the death of Julia, Pompey's wife and Caesar's daughter. (3) Julia seems to have been an estimable woman to whom both of these men were devoted and her death broke one of the strongest ties which bound them together. (4) The fact that the people buried her with pomp and honor in the Campius Martius instead of allowing Pompey to bury her on one of his estates showed the regard the populace had for the absent Caesar.

In February of 54, we learn from Cicero's correspondence that arrangements were under way for Quintus Cicero to go to Gaul to serve under Caesar. (5) From this date on, although he laments the political situation, (6) we find in his letters constant expressions of affection and esteem for Caesar (7) and references to Caesar's deep regard for him. (8) Trebatius Testa, a young lawyer in Rome, was serving under Caesar in Gaul. Trebatius was an intimate friend of Cicero and was highly recommended by Cicero to Caesar. The whole tone of the

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- (1) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 15, 16, 17; ad Quint. II 15b;
Plutarch - Pomp. 54, 1-3
(2) Cicero - ad Att. IV 18, ad Quint. II 15a; III 2, 3; 8, 4;
App. II 3, 20
(3) Dio 39, 64; App. II 3, 19; Plutarch - Caes. 25, 4; Pomp.
53, 4; Vell. Pater. II 46, 2
(4) Lucan - Bk II 1 111-118
(5) Cicero - ad Quint. II, 12
(6) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 18
(7) Cicero - ad Quint. II, 15a; III 1, 18
(8) Cicero - ad Fam. VII, 17; ad Att. IV, 17; IV 19; ad Quint.
II 15a, III, 1

letter of recommendation is one of regard and friendly intimacy. The letter begins: "Observe how I take it for granted that I have in you a second self, not only in what concerns me personally, but also in what concerns my friends." (1) Not only in this letter to Caesar himself, but also in his correspondence with Trebatius there is a vein of affection and an indication of a happy relationship. "How earnestly I have written to Caesar about you, you know yourself; how often I alone know. But now, I confess, I have broken off correspondence, for fear I should be thought to distrust the friendly feeling of one so generous and so fond of me." (2) And again in a later letter he says, "After the change in my plans, observing that Caesar was treating me with marked honour and exceptional regard, and recognizing the man's amazing liberality and uncommon sincerity, I introduced and recommended you to him with all the gravity and earnestness in my power. What I said he accepted in the same spirit, and he has often indicated to me in his letters and shown you too by word and deed that he was deeply impressed by my recommendation." (3) Caesar had two opportunities at this time of which he might take advantage to maintain this feeling of goodwill and to further ingratiate himself with Cicero. He made use of each. He welcomed Quin-

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. VII, 5, 1

(2) Ibid. VII, 10, 3

(3) Ibid. VII, 17, 2

tus on his staff in Gaul (1) and gave him preferment. (2) Cicero was devoted to his brother Quintus and consequently any favor shown to him was an even greater one to Marcus. Furthermore after his return to Rome from exile, Cicero was in straightened circumstances financially (3) and a loan which Caesar made him to assist in the restoration of his property, damaged by Clodius and his gang, did much to blot out the memory of the role Caesar played in his banishment and to cement their subsequent friendship. It has been pointed out that too much dependence cannot be put on his extravagant praise of Caesar and his expressions of his own devotion to him, voiced in his letters to Quintus, as it was quite possible that these letters might fall into the hands of Caesar. (4) Some allowance, too, must be made for Cicero's tendency to be fulsome. (5) But, in his letters to Atticus, to whom he talks as if to himself, we find repeated statements of his regard for Caesar. From November of 54 to May of 51, when he was on his way to Cilicia to serve his proconsulship, there are no extant letters from Cicero to Atticus. Probably they were both in Rome during this period. The few letters which we have

(1) Cicero - ad Quint. II, 12

(2) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 19; ad Quint. III, 1

(3) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 1; V, 13

(4) Cicero - ad Quint. III, 1, 21; 8, 2; 9, 3

(5) Cicero - ad Quint. III, 6, 4 - "----that in all the world I have found in Caesar the one man to love me as I could wish, or even (as others think) one man who had any wish to do so."

for this interval are to unimportant people and do not help us to explain Cicero's change of feeling for Caesar which took place during this time. A consideration of events in Rome and of Caesar's situation in Gaul may throw some light on the problem.

In view of the friendly relationship between Caesar and Cicero at this time and Cicero's obvious desire to conciliate Caesar in every way, it is not so surprising that he consents, at Caesar's request, to defend Vatinius whom he had so bitterly attacked a few years before. (1) He succeeded in securing an acquittal for him. Shortly after this, Gabinius was faced with three prosecutions upon his return from Syria. Although Gabinius called Cicero "exile" (2) in a verbal altercation in the senate, Cicero did not yield to his natural inclination to undertake his prosecution. Pompey was using every means to have Gabinius acquitted. We recall that at this time Pompey was theoretically proconsul in Spain, but, after sending his troops ahead under his lieutenants, he had remained in Italy. So he could not enter the city himself without incurring censure, but his agents worked hard for Gabinius's acquittal. Of course Cicero realized that Pompey would resent any opposition from him. In a letter to Quintus he wrote:

(1) Cicero - ad Quint. II 16, 3

(2) Ibid. III 4, 2

"Pompey would not have thought he was having a struggle with me for Gabinius's salvation, but for his own position; he would have entered the city and it would have ended in our becoming enemies." (1) In spite of the fact that Cicero did not oppose Gabinius in his trial, he barely escaped conviction. In a later trial Cicero yielded to Pompey's insistence and acted as Gabinius's counsel. (2) He did not secure an acquittal. So Cicero bowed to the wishes of Caesar and Pompey and won success in his case for Caesar but suffered defeat in his case for Pompey.

The elections for the year 53 were delayed; L. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala were finally returned as consuls. Two events occurred in this year that tended to hasten the split between Caesar and Pompey. (3) Crassus's army suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of the Parthians and Crassus was killed. Caesar made a move to cement the alliance anew by offering to Pompey his niece Octavia in marriage. Pompey's refusal of this offer was an acknowledgment that he was ready to abandon the partnership and stand by himself.

For the elections of the year 52 Milo stood for the consulship and Clodius for the praetorship. Cicero was a strong supporter of Milo and solicited the aid of his young friend

(1) Cicero - ad Quint. III 4, 2
(2) Dio 39, 63, 5
(3) Lucan Bk II 1 103-111

Curio to this end. In a letter to him, he said, "I doubt if any man has ever been so concerned for his own security and worldly wealth as I am for Milo's promotion to office, upon which depends, I am convinced, all I have in the world, and I realize that you are the one man who can, if you will, help him so much that he would not need any further assistance." (1) Curio was a friend of Clodius and did not yield to Cicero. The elections were delayed and the streets made perilous by the armed gangs of the competitors. One day Milo set upon Clodius outside the city; when he took refuge, Milo dragged him out and murdered him. (2) Cicero undertook his defence and tried to convince the jury that Clodius had been the aggressor, but the presence of Pompey's armed soldiers, stationed to keep the peace, unnerved Cicero and his speech was a fiasco and Milo went into exile. (3) During the confusion incident to the affair of Milo and Clodius, Pompey had been appointed sole consul and had been authorized to raise troops to quell the disorder. (4)

By this time Caesar was beginning to see that it was essential that he pass directly from the office of proconsul of

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. II, 6

(2) Plutarch - Cicero 55, 1; Dio 40, 48, 23; App. II 3, 21; Vell. Pater. II 46, 4-5; Note Cicero's interpretation in his speech

(3) Dio 40; 54, 1 & 2

(4) Plutarch - Pompey 54; Vell. Pater. II 46, 2; App. II 3, 23
A detailed study of the laws which Pompey passed while consul for the third time and subsequently is irrelevant to this paper, but the mention of the measures by which Pompey attempted to deprive Caesar of his army, his province, and his consulship is essential.

Gaul to that of consul of Rome, so when he met Cicero at Ravenna, Caesar requested him to have one of the tribunes, Caelius, propose a bill for him. (1) This bill, known as the Law of the Ten Tribunes, authorized Caesar to stand for the consulship while absent. (2) The first move in retaliation which Pompey made was to bring forward a law that any citizen who chose to do so might call for an account from anybody who had held office from the time of his first consulship up to the present. (3) This was, in effect, an invitation for someone to bring a charge against Caesar for the acts of his consulship which fell within the limits of the law. Then, in spite of the fact that he himself had disregarded its terms when he was made sole consul, Pompey now revived the law that commanded those who sought office to present themselves before the assembly. (4) Also he had passed a law which provided that those who had held office should not be sent to a province until five years after their term of office had expired. (5) Both of these laws were disastrous to Caesar. The first annulled the Law of the Ten Tribunes. The second made it possible for a successor to be sent to Gaul at any time, which was contrary to the agreement made at Luca in accordance with the Sempronian Law. Pompey himself changed the first law by

(1) Cicero - ad Att. VII 1, 4; VIII 3, 3
(2) Plutarch - Pomp. 56; Dio 51, 2 & 3
(3) App. II 3, 23
(4) Dio 40, 56, 1
(5) Suet. - Div. Iul. 28, 3; Dio 40, 30, 1

inserting a clause which made it ineffective in the case of persons to whom special permission had been given. (1) This did not remove the danger of an immediate successor, however. The law concerning the consular provinces affected Cicero, also, and sent him to Cilicia in 51 as proconsul. (2) Certainly now Pompey was showing his hand; the rupture between Caesar and Pompey was evident.

(1) Dio 40, 56, 2, 3

(2) Plutarch - Cicero 26

Chapter V
The Conflict

-44-

After Pompey's consulship terminated, motions detrimental to Caesar were continuously brought forward in the senate. In July, the question of a successor to Caesar was raised. (1) This question was postponed by the motion that "Pompey should return to the city as soon as possible so that the succession to the provinces might be dealt with in his presence." (2) On two occasions after that a quorum was lacking in the senate. (3) Finally on the 30th of September in the year 51, the senate voted to instruct the consuls of the year 50 that, after the first day of the month of March, they should bring forward a measure concerning the consular provinces and that they should decree that after that date it should take precedence. (4) Curio, one of the tribunes, who, prior to this time, had been an opponent of Caesar, now began to talk in his favor. (5) Curio had been deeply in debt. Caesar, who now especially needed strong supporters, had paid his debts (6) and secured for himself a willing champion. (7) Curio cleverly dissembled at first (8) but finally brought forward a bill that all per-

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. VIII 4, 4

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. VIII, 9, 2

(4) Ibid. VIII, 4, 5

(5) Ibid. VIII, 6, 5

(6) Plutarch - Caes. 29, 3; Suet. 29, 1

(7) Dio 40; 60, 2, 3, 4

(8) Vell. Pater. II 48, 4, 5

sons in arms must lay these aside and disband their legions or else they should not strip Caesar of his weapons and expose him to the forces of his rivals. (1) In this year Caesar was deprived of one of his legions on the pretext that it was needed for a Parthian War that was threatening. (2) When Caesar was hard pressed during his Gallic Campaign, Pompey had lent him a legion. (3) Now he was asked to return this and also to send one of his own for the anticipated war. (4) This war did not materialize and Pompey kept the two legions in Italy established at Capua. (5) It is interesting to speculate what the story of the next six years would have been, had the senate been forced to send one of these men with an army to quell the Parthian threat in the East. Caelius apparently saw this possibility as a solution of the problem, for, writing to Cicero in Cilicia in August of the year 50, he said, "Well, unless one or the other of them goes to fight the Parthians, I see the imminence of violent feuds, which only the sword and force will settle. Each of the two is well prepared in resolution and resources." (6) Pompey was seriously ill at this time and there have been conjectures upon the outcome of events had he succumbed. The circumstances of his life after this year certainly brought no added glory in history. Spurious

(1) App. II; 4, 27; Plutarch - Pomp. 58

(2) Caesar - B. G. VIII 54; B. C. I, 2; Plutarch - Pomp. 56, 3; Dio 40, 65; App. II 4, 29

(3) Plutarch - Caesar 29, 3

(4) App. II, 4, 29

(5) Caesar - B. G. VIII 35; App. II 4, 30

(6) Cicero - ad Fam. VIII, 4, 4

reports were brought back to Rome by those who went to Gaul concerning the legions for the Parthian War. They said that Caesar's troops were longing for home and even that they were ready to come over to Pompey. (1) We know from their loyalty to their commander later that this was not true and evidently designed to throw disfavor on Caesar and belittle his strength. In April, a motion that Caesar should quit his province on the 13th of November was vetoed by Curio. (2) Pompey was determined not to allow Caesar to be elected consul unless he had given up his army and his province. (3) Caesar was firmly convinced that he could not safely do this. (4) He did, however, offer a compromise; namely, that both should deliver up their armies. (5) In the elections for 49, Caesar's candidate was defeated and his enemies, Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus, were elected consuls. Antonius, whom Caesar had won over to him, was elected tribune. Antonius read a letter from Caesar relative to this compromise before the people. (6) Then followed a proposal by the consul Marcellus that a successor be sent to take command of Caesar's province as his term was now expiring. (7) Curio seconded this motion but added a rider to the effect that Pompey should resign his army and his province too. (8) Pompey's term of office was not over so the

(1) App. II; 4, 30; Plut. - Caes. 29, 3 & 4

(2) Cicero - ad Fam. VIII, 11; VIII, 13

(3) Ibid. VIII, 14

(4) Ibid.

(5) Suet. 29, 2; Cicero - ad Fam. VIII, 14; Plut. - Caes. 30, 1, 2

(6) Plutarch - Caes. 30, 2

(7) App. II, 4, 27

(8) Ibid.

senate had no right to deprive him of his office and this proposal met with opposition. Curio then moved that both men resign. By this motion he won the approbation of the people but the ire of the consul Marcellus who went to Pompey and, on his own initiative, authorized him to take up arms against Caesar. (1) Curio was powerless to act in this instance as Pompey was outside the city and therefore outside the scope of tribunician power. As his term of office was almost over, Curio set forth to Caesar at Ravenna. (2) After this meeting with Curio, Caesar decided to make one more effort for peace and dispatched Curio back to Rome with the proposition that he should be allowed to keep Cisalpine Gaul and two legions. (3) This was rejected by the senate. A proposal by Scipio that Caesar should disband his army before a fixed date, and, that, if he failed to do so, he should be declared a public enemy was adopted by the senators but vetoed by Antonius and Caelius. (4) Piso and the tribune Roscius proposed to go to Ravenna to report these measures to Caesar and requested that time be allowed them to make this journey. (5) This permission was refused. The senate, on the 7th of January, passed the ultimate decree.

"The consuls, the praetors, the tribunes, and all the proconsulars who are near the city shall take measures that the state

(1) Plutarch - Pomp. 58; App. II, 4, 31; Dio 40; 64, 4

(2) App. II, 4, 31; Dio 40, 66, 1

(3) Caesar - B. C. I, 9; Suet. 29; Vell. Pater. II 59, 4;
Plutarch - Pomp. 59; Caesar 31; App. II 5, 32

(4) Caesar B. C. I, 2

(5) Ibid. I 1, 3

incur no harm." (1) Antonius, Cassius, Curio, and Caelius went to join Caesar at Ravenna. On the following days measures were passed in the senate that a levy should be held throughout Italy and money should be granted Pompey. (2) When a report of these happenings came to Caesar, he called the Thirteenth Legion to him, explained the situation and appealed to their loyalty. He then proceeded to Ariminum where he met the tribunes. (3) The Civil War had virtually begun. However, L. Caesar and Roscius were sent to Caesar by Pompey to urge him to abandon his design against the state. After he heard the report of these men, he made one more effort for peace and sent the following ultimatum to the consuls and Pompey at Capua: "Let Pompey go to his own provinces, let us disband our armies, let everyone in Italy lay down his arms, let fear be banished from the state, let free elections and whole control of the republic be handed over to the senate and the Roman People. That this may be done more easily and on definite terms and be ratified by an oath, let Pompey himself come nearer or allow me to approach him. In this way a conference will settle all disputes." (4) Pompey countered with the demand that Caesar should return to Gaul, quit Ariminum, and disband his forces; if he did this, Pompey would go to the Spanish provinces. (5)

(1) Caesar B. C. I, 5

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. I, 1, 7, 8

(4) Ibid. I, 9

(5) Ibid. I, 1, 10

Caesar rejected the offer and started south with his forces.

While this struggle was going on at Rome, how had Caesar been faring in his conquest of Gaul? His first five years in the province were marked by military successes with practically no serious reverses. The story of the next five years is a different one. In the summer of 54 he made his second expedition to Britain; (1) he returned in the fall to find Gaul in a state of unrest. (2) In the winter that followed occurred the defeat of the Romans at the hands of the Eburones and the disaster at Atuatuca. The remainder of the year was spent in repressing one revolt after another. (3) Although Gaul was momentarily quiet when Caesar left to hold the courts in Cisalpine Gaul, it was by no means conquered. The year 53 saw further revolts and Caesar's expedition to Germany. The rebellion of Vercingetorix with the subsequent siege of Alesia followed. That was a desperate struggle and, when it was finally over, Caesar remained in Gaul for the winter instead of returning to his usual winter quarters. This was well for before the final conquest of the year 51, he was called upon to quell other rebellious tribes. (4) When all Gaul was quiet and he had made every effort to keep it peaceable by addressing the states in friendly manner, by bestowing honor and presents upon the chiefs,

(1) Caesar - B. G. V 1-23

(2) Ibid. V, 26

(3) Ibid. V 26-58

(4) Ibid. VIII, 1

and by imposing no new burdens, he went to Cisalpine Gaul to look out for his own interests.

We know that in accordance with a law passed by Pompey which stated that the proconsuls should assume the duties of provincial governors five years after their term of office had expired, Cicero had been obliged to become governor of Cilicia. For three years prior to his departure, there are no extant letters from him to Atticus. Also there are no letters to Quintus after December of 54. In his last letter to Atticus before the two and one half year gap in correspondence, Cicero refers to his "really delightful association with Caesar." (1) When one considers this and other more flattering and frequent references to Caesar in earlier letters, one is impressed with the fact that there is so little mention of him in Cicero's letters from Cilicia. Although he was kept informed in detail of the political situation in Rome by the letters of Caelius, he makes only cursory allusions to it in his letters to Atticus. He did refer to the debt that he owed Caesar and to his eagerness to have it paid. (2) We should perhaps take into consideration that Cicero was much concerned with his own affairs at this time. He hated to be away from Rome and his letters are full of pleas to his various friends to do all in their power to

(1) Cicero - ad Att. IV, 19

(2) Ibid. V 6, 10; 6, 13

prevent any extension of his term of office. After his successful military campaign, he becomes possessed with the idea of a triumph and makes every effort to put this matter before influential people to secure their support. When he arrived in Athens on his return trip, he seemed to awake to the situation, and he said to Atticus:

"For myself, I seem to foresee a terrific struggle, (unless, indeed, the same god who wrought above my boldest hopes in freeing us from a Parthian War, take pity on the state) anyhow, such a terrific struggle as there never has been before. True, the calamity would fall not only on me, but on every one. I don't ask you to consider the wider problem; solve my own little case, I entreat. Don't you see that it is you who are responsible for my friendship with both Pompey and Caesar? Ah, would that I had listened to your friendly admonitions from the outset.

'Thou couldst not sway the spirit
in my breast.' (1)

But, at last, however, you persuaded me to be friendly with the one, because he had done so much for me; with the other, because he was so powerful. Well, I did so, to both of them. For my idea was this. Allied with Pompey, I should never have to be guilty of political impropriety; and siding with Caesar, I should not have to fight with Pompey. So close was the alliance of these two. But, now, on your own showing and in my view there threatens a dire struggle between them. Each of them counts me his friend unless perhaps Caesar is dissembling; for Pompey has no doubt, rightly supposing that his present politi-

(1) Odyssey IX, 33

cal views have my strongest approval. But both have sent me letters (which came with yours) in terms that would appear to make more of me than of anyone at all. But what am I to do? I don't mean in the long run. If the matter is to be fought in the field, I see it would be better to be beaten with Pompey than to win with Caesar. But what about the points in debate on my arrival--refusing the claims of the candidate who is away from Rome and ordering the disbanding of his army. There is no chance of evasion. I speak against Caesar? Where then the pledge of plighted hands? For I assisted in getting Caesar privilege on these two points, when I was asked by him personally at Ravenna to approach Caelius, the tribune, to propose a bill. Asked by him personally, do I say? Yes, and by our friend Pompey, in that immortal third consulship." (1)

This letter seems worth quoting at length because it sets forth Cicero's position at this time so clearly. After Cicero made his recantation in 56 and allowed himself to forget political difficulties and come under the sway of Caesar's friendly advances and his charm, he refused to face the possibility of a disastrous rupture between the two men. This must have been his attitude since he was silent on all the news of political strife which Caelius reported to him while he was in Cilicia. However, between their meeting at Ravenna and the end of 50, Caesar must have fallen into disfavor with Cicero either by doing something against him or by failing to do something for him, for he says to Atticus, "You do well not to doubt my at-

(1) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 1

titude to politics; and you can rightly judge that Caesar has not been liberal to me considering my services, and considering his lavishness toward others." (1) We might recall here that in the Gallic correspondence, he mentioned honors that Caesar wanted him to have. At the time he claimed that he cared nothing for honors or glory. (2) Cicero's character would rather refute these assertions. It may be possible that in the stress of circumstances Caesar, sometime between the end of 54 and Cicero's departure for Cilicia, dampened Cicero's ardor in his behalf by failing to promote his honor. (3) Did Caesar ask more of him at the meeting at Ravenna than he was willing to give, something that might be detrimental to Pompey? Did Caesar's reverses and his critical situation in Gaul in 52 lead Cicero to fear his downfall and influence him to go over more closely to Pompey? All these are mere suppositions; we have no direct evidence for his changed attitude. Whatever may have changed Cicero, outwardly, at least, Caesar maintained pleasant relations with Cicero for we learn from Cicero himself that he had received friendly letters from Caesar during his stay in Cilicia and upon his return. (4)

On November 24 of the year 50, Cicero arrived back in Brundisium. In Caelius's last letter to him, written on or

(1) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 3

(2) Cicero - ad Quint. II 15a; III 6

(3) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 3

(4) Ibid. VII, 1; VII, 3

before the tenth of August, he warned him again of the coming struggle and the dangers of it. (1) Cicero had come back with the imperium and was waiting outside the city still hoping to secure his triumph. (2) The fact that he was not ready to commit himself and cast in his lot with either Pompey or Caesar may have had some weight in urging him to stay away from the senate and withhold his vote. He saw grave danger ahead and determined to urge Pompey to peace. (3) On the tenth of December, he had an interview with Pompey. Pompey encouraged him concerning his triumph and urged him not to go to the senate. (4) Pompey hinted at war and said that the split between himself and Caesar had recently widened by the fact that Hirtius, Caesar's close associate, had come to Rome and had not called on him. Cicero drew a little comfort from the hope that, if Caesar's term of office was renewed and he gained the supreme power, he would not risk everything in war. (5) From this conference with Pompey until a second meeting late in December, Cicero expressed himself as on the side of Pompey, (6) but felt that all would prefer to yield to Caesar's demands rather than to fight. (7) At this second meeting Cicero learned that Pompey's desire was not for peace but for war and that he held Caesar's forces in contempt. (8) Cicero seems to have been

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. VIII, 14

(2) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 3

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid. VII, 4

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid. VII, 8

(7) Ibid. VII, 6

(8) Ibid. VII, 8

swayed by Pompey's persuasiveness at this meeting for he complained to Atticus of the inconvenience of paying his debt to Caesar since he wanted the money for his triumph. The debt must be paid because "it is bad form to owe money to a political opponent." (1) From December 27 to January 17, Cicero did not write to Atticus but we know that important events were following each other in rapid succession. The senatus consultum ultimum had finally been passed, the tribunes had joined Caesar, and on January 11, Caesar had crossed the Rubicon and sent his ultimatum to Pompey. Pompey offered his counter proposal which Caesar rejected. (2) Pompey deserted Rome and retired to Capua to the two legions which he had taken from Caesar. (3) Cicero was horrified at the desertion of Rome by Pompey and the report that town after town had gone over to Caesar. (4) Cicero had been asked by Pompey to undertake the supervision of the levy on the Campanian coast and he assumed this "peaceful task." (5) He continued to rail at Pompey's policy or rather lack of policy. (6) Disgusted with Pompey's actions, he seemed to vacillate for a moment and question whether he should join the party that "held the field." (7) Yet the very next day he exulted over the desertion of Labienus, one of Caesar's most valued lieutenants, and con-

(1) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 8

(2) Caesar B. C. I, 5

(3) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 11; Caesar B. C. I, 14

(4) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 11

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid. VII, 12

(7) Ibid.

sidered him a hero. (1) His letter to Atticus on this day reflected his gloomy outlook. He looked for the worst from Caesar, if Rome fell into his hands. He saw no hope from Pompey. To Atticus he summed it up as follows: "But the time of compromise is passed. The future is obscure. We, or our leader, have brought things to such a pass, that having put to sea without a rudder, we must trust to the mercy of the storm." (2) By the 25th of January, Cicero had gone on to Capua where he met with the consuls. By this time Pompey's counter proposal had gone to Caesar and the Pompeians were awaiting his reply at Capua. All hope of peace depended on Caesar's response and all hoped it would be favorable and war would be averted. (3) Cicero himself felt that Caesar would yield and withdraw his garrisons. While he was waiting for Caesar's reply to Pompey, Cicero received a message from Caesar through Trebatius in which Caesar requested Cicero to remain near the city. (4) Cicero replied to Trebatius that he was remaining on his country estates and taking no active part. To Atticus he added the proviso that this was his stand only so long as peace lasted. (5) By February 3rd, Cicero had learned of Caesar's rejection of the terms and his spirits were very low. (6) Indications pointed to flight on Pompey's

(1) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 13

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. VII, 15

(4) Ibid. VII, 17

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid. VII, 19

part and Cicero was in a quandary. "The winter, my lictors, the improvidence and neglect of the leaders prompt me to stay; my friendship with Pompey, the cause of the loyalists, the disgrace of association with a tyrant prompt me to flee." (1) A letter from Caesar urging peace and a message from Dolabella, an adherent of Caesar and Cicero's son-in-law, and from Caelius stating Caesar's satisfaction with Cicero offer him little consolation. (2) During the blockade of Eomitius in Corfinium and his appeals to Pompey for aid, which was never given, (3) and during Pompey's retreat to Brundisium, (4) Cicero's spirits rose and fell and his decision to join Pompey wavered or strengthened in proportion as the news was favorable or unfavorable to the Pompeian cause.

If Cicero disapproved when Pompey left Rome, he violently objected to his proposed flight from Italy. (5) To his mind no general had ever been guilty of more disgraceful conduct. (6) He had been torn by indecision as to his stand while Pompey remained in Italy; his flight greatly complicated his decision. In referring, in a letter to Atticus, to his remark that he would prefer to be conquered with Pompey rather than to conquer with Caesar, he stated that that was the old Pompey, his hero or ideal, not this new Pompey who fled before the enemy. (7)

(1) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 20

(2) Ibid. VII, 21

(3) Ibid. VIII, 12a

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid. VIII, 2

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid. VIII, 7

During this period, Cicero was in correspondence with both the generals. Letters from Caesar approved of and encouraged his neutrality. (1) Pompey, on the other hand, wanted Cicero to join him. (2) While Caesar was pursuing Pompey to Brundisium, he captured Magius, Pompey's chief engineer. This man Caesar sent to Pompey to ask that he might have a conference with him in the interests of the state and their common welfare. (3) He received no reply from Pompey, but, even after he had started operations for the siege of Brundisium, he again asked for a meeting. (4) Offering as an excuse the absence of the consuls, Pompey refused to meet him. Prior to this Cicero received a letter from Balbus which might well have been prompted by Caesar. In it he begged Cicero to act as intermediary between Caesar and Pompey, and assured him that Caesar was willing and ready come to terms. (5) Cicero declared that it was not Pompey who was urging him to go but the attitude of the loyalist party who felt that he should make this move. (6) Then came a letter from Balbus and Oppius in which they assured Cicero that, if Caesar attempted a reconciliation with Pompey, he was the man who should carry it on as he had connections with both parties. (7) On the other hand, if Caesar persisted in waging war, Cicero's better part was to remain neutral and not to take sides against

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- (1) Cicero - ad Att. VIII, 11
 - (2) Ibid. VIII, 11a, 11c
 - (3) Caesar, B. C. I, 24
 - (4) Ibid.
 - (5) Cicero - ad Att. VIII, 15a
 - (6) Ibid. VIII, 16
 - (7) Ibid. IX, 7a

Pompey to whom he owed so much or to fight against Caesar. They also told Cicero that they would secure for him Caesar's approbation of his neutrality. This letter was followed immediately by another from Balbus alone, which reiterated the sentiments of the previous letter and enclosed a letter written to Oppius and Balbus by Caesar. Caesar declared it was his intention to act with moderation and to do everything possible to effect a reconciliation with Pompey. (1) As the possibility of a conference with Pompey failed, Caesar thought to bring about his purpose through Cicero and to this end he desired a meeting with him. He wrote to Cicero and stated that he wished to take advantage of his advice, his influence, his position, and help of all sorts. (2) This statement Cicero challenged and in a letter asked Caesar outright what he meant by it. He told him frankly that if he wanted his assistance in the interests of peace, he considered himself suited to the task. He reminded Caesar that, as in the past he had upheld his rights, so now was concerned with Pompey's rights. He declared that Caesar and Pompey were his closest friends and begged that Caesar would make it possible for him to discharge his debt of gratitude to Pompey and bring about a general peace. (3)

Surely Cicero was in a difficult position. The very struc-

(1) Cicero - ad Att. IX, 7c

(2) Ibid. IX, 11

(3) Ibid. IX a

ture of the Republic was being threatened by two men for both of whom he had professed, in days gone by, a deep affection. The conflict which years before he saw on the horizon but upon which he had closed his eyes, was now being waged. Pompey headed the party to whom he claimed allegiance, but to Cicero's thought Pompey's entire plan of campaign had been wrong. He had deserted Rome, he was planning to desert Italy, he had not sent aid to Domitius, he had failed in military strategy. On the other hand, Caesar whose forces Cicero had at first considered inadequate, had swept down the peninsula, carrying all before him. Cicero's belief that Caesar would stop at no cruelty must have been shaken by Caesar's clemency towards all the loyalists who fell into his hands. His confidence in Pompey's early victory waned as he saw Caesar's success. He was harassed by doubts regarding the expediency of adhering to the loyalists' cause and he was troubled by the consideration of what his position should be in the event that Caesar was victorious. Cicero seems to be quite a pathetic figure at this time rather than the object of contempt which many seem to consider him. He was no longer young; he had served as consul and just returned from his proconsulship of Cilicia. His political aspirations had been satisfied but the innate love of

glory still glowed in his breast. He had been surprisingly successful in his military activities in his province and the hope of a triumph still dazzled his eyes. Affairs at Rome were in turmoil and the question of Cicero's triumph was pushed into the background. Meanwhile wherever he went, Cicero was accompanied by his lictors until they came to be an embarrassment to him. (1) Perhaps it was not so much the hope of a triumph, although he was keenly disappointed when Cato succeeded in quashing the proposal for his triumph in the senate, that prompted him to keep his lictors as it was the excuse they afforded him to remain away from the senate. It had always been difficult for Cicero to come to a decision. Certainly this was the most difficult decision of his life (2) and that quality of vacillation still beset him.

In the midst of their struggle for supremacy the attitude of Cicero toward their respective causes loomed important to both leaders. Pompey from the first urged Cicero to join him and, as will be remembered, asked him to attend to the levy of the troops in Campania. Cicero nominally assumed this task but took no actual part in the levy. Caesar's attitude toward Cicero was probably governed by Cicero's attitude toward him, and his rightabout face from the time when he expressed such

(1) Cicero - ad Fam. II, 16

(2) Ibid. IV, 2

devotion to him while his brother was with Caesar in Gaul. Of course it would have been gratifying to Caesar to have been able to count Cicero in his camp which had not been too greatly augmented by men of high repute. Since this seemed impossible, he did everything in his power to secure his neutrality and urged him to act as an intercessor for peace. Cicero, however, convinced that Pompey was determined on war and lacking confidence in Caesar's integrity, refused to play this role.

Meanwhile the siege of Brundisium continued and, on the 17th of March, Pompey made his escape and, on the 18th, Caesar entered the town. Almost immediately he set out for Rome. (1) A few days later, March 28, he and Cicero met at Formiae. Before his arrival, Cicero was most upset; disturbed because he had deserted Pompey in his flight; troubled over what his attitude should be when he met Caesar and what demands Caesar might make of him. At the conference Caesar's paramount request was that Cicero should go to Rome to attend the coming meeting of the senate. Cicero was adamant. He asserted that he would go only on the condition that he should counsel peace and lament Pompey's fate. They parted with the request from Caesar that Cicero reconsider his decision. (2) Cicero derived no encouragement for peace from the interview and, when it was

(1) Cicero - ad Att. IX, 15

(2) Ibid. IX, 18

over, he felt sure that Caesar was annoyed with him. (1)

Three days later in a letter to Atticus, he painted a gloomy picture of the future, prophesying tyranny and wicked civil war. He announced his decision to follow Pompey. His reasons for this, he said, were twofold: first, because he feared he might be charged with ingratitude toward one who had done so much for him; secondly, because he could not bear to be a mere witness of what was happening and was going to happen. (2)

By this time, Caesar had arrived at Rome on the first day of April and called the meeting of the senate. At this meeting Caesar set forth his grievances in detail. He then urged the senators to govern jointly with him; if they were unwilling to do this, he stated that he would administer the state himself. (3) He also proposed that envoys be sent to Pompey to bring about a settlement. (4) Although this move was approved by the senators no one was found who was willing to undertake the task. (5) Caesar then seized the treasury in spite of the opposition of Metellus (6) and leaving affairs at Rome in charge of Aemilius Lepidus and those in Italy in charge of Marcus Antonius, he set out for Spain. (7)

Cicero did not come to Rome to attend the meeting of the

(1) Cicero - ad Att. IX, 18

(2) Ibid. IX, 19

(3) Caesar B. C. I, 32

(4) Ibid.; Plutarch - Caes. 35

(5) Plutarch - Caes. 35; Caesar B. C. 32

(6) Appian II, 6, 40; Plutarch - Caes. 35; Dio IV, 41, 17

(7) Appian II, 6, 41; Dio IV, 41, 18

senate but remained firm in the decision he had given Caesar when they had met at Formiae. He was, however, most eager to hear what was done at the session and he besought Atticus for a report. (1) Even before this report came, he had a letter from Caesar in which he excused him for his failure to attend the session of the senate. If Cicero was relieved of any anxiety he may have had in this matter, his relief was short lived. A report came to him that his nephew, Quintus Cicero, who seems to have had little loyalty (2) and much greed, (3) had sent letters to Caesar and was afterwards summoned to his presence. (4) There he had contrasted his own views with those of his father and uncle and disclosed Marcus's proposed departure from Italy. (5) Cicero feared that this treacherous betrayal of his plans would arouse Caesar's anger, but a call from Curio reassured him that Caesar was still friendly and gave him hope that the report of Quintus's disloyalty was exaggerated. (6) Curio's outlook was gloomy, however; (7) he had no confidence that Caesar would refrain from cruelty and, when Cicero said that he was looking for a solitary retreat, he urged him to this end, remarking that he was of no use to Caesar in Italy if he refused to attend the senate. (8) A few days later, Cicero wrote to Atticus that he had made up

(1) Cicero - ad Att. X, 1; X, 2

(2) Ibid. X, 6; X, 7

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid. X, 4

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid. X, 5

(8) Ibid. X, 4

his mind to go and only awaited favorable weather. (1) Within a few days, however, something caused him to change his mind. He declared it was all right for Atticus to remain neutral; but he was "under the bond of an obligation." (2) This was a struggle for the constitution and it was between two men both of whom wished to be king. As yet he did not anticipate actual participation in the fight but he did intend to join Pompey. In this same letter he informed his friend that Curio had reported to him that Caesar was losing popular favor. Perhaps this news stirred up Cicero's sense of obligation and made it easier for him to pay his "debt of gratitude." Ten days later, however, he was back in the valley of indecision. Should he wait for the outcome of the Spanish campaign? Could he remain neutral if the Pompeians were defeated in Spain? He propounded question after question. Then he confessed to Atticus what was at the bottom of his indecision.

"You will say I might surely have crossed the sea with Pompey. It was altogether impossible. It is to reckon the days: but nevertheless (for let me confess the truth; I do not even sugar my confession) supposing I could, I was mistaken over a point which perhaps ought not to have misled me; but it did. I thought that peace might be made; and if it should be, I did

(1) Cicero - ad Att. X, 6

(2) Ibid. X, 7

not want Caesar to be angry with me, when at the same time he was friendly with Pompey. For I had realized how exactly they were alike. That fear of mine led me to delay. But I gain all now by haste, and, if I delay, I lose all." (1)

He reiterated his conviction that Caesar's position was tottering and his reign could not last more than a year. (2) On the heels of this decision came a letter from Antony in which he said he had heard a report that Cicero had contemplated leaving Italy. He assured him that Caesar reckoned him as one of his friends and urged him strongly not "to rely on the honor of the man who for the sake of conferring a kindness first did you a wrong, and on the other hand, not to flee from a man who, although he will not love you, which is out of the question, will always wish you to be safe and in high distinction." (3) On the same day there came a letter from Caesar himself. He, too, had heard the rumor of Cicero's departure. He besought Cicero not to take a step now, when Caesar's fortune was in the ascendancy, which he had hesitated to take before. He pointed out that the cause had not been changed and that, if Cicero took sides now, he would be implying that he condemned some act of Caesar's. He stated clearly that any position except a neutral one would do serious injury to their friendship. (4) Nothing daunted by these letters, Cicero

(1) Cicero - ad Att. X, 8

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. X, 8a

(4) Ibid. X, 8b

determined to go to Malta, which he felt he could do and still fulfill the requirements of Caesar's letter. In justifying his change of plan to Atticus he offered as an excuse the entreaties of his relatives and the request of Caelius who had urged him not to run the risk of going to Pompey and endangering not only himself but also his whole family. (1) Caelius's letter, which Cicero sent on to Atticus, is a powerful plea. Moreover, Antony did more than advise; he informed Cicero that Caesar had authorized him to allow no one to leave Italy and that an exception could not be made in his case. He said that if Cicero wanted to go, he must obtain permission from Caesar himself. (2) From this time on, Cicero prepared secretly for his journey and even in his letters to Atticus made no mention of the details of his plan. In spite of the fact that he heard through Falbus that even his plan for going to Malta was not acceptable to Caesar, (3) on the 7th of June, having secured a good ship, Cicero set sail for Greece to join Pompey. (4)

After months of painful indecision, harassed by his sense of duty, and inevitably moved by expedience, Cicero went to join the "good citizens." (5) Three factors influenced him; his loyalty to his political ideals, his sense of gratitude

(1) Cicero - ad Att. X, 9
(2) Ibid. X, 10
(3) Ibid. X, 18
(4) Cicero - ad Fam. XIV, 7
(5) Cicero - ad Att. VII, 7

to Pompey, his fear of Caesar and his tyranny if he should win. Not once in the letters which he wrote from the time Pompey fled from Rome until he himself left Italy, did he express any feeling of friendship for Caesar. All the devotion and affection of which he talked so much five years before are gone. Not only has Caesar disappointed him but Pompey also. After the Pompeian forces were defeated at Pharsalus, Cicero decided to assume again the neutrality he had cast aside when he fled from Italy to Pompey's camp. Surely neutrality is a misnomer for the attitude of Cicero during any part of the Civil War. He could hardly have been called neutral at the outset when he undertook the superintendence of the troops in Campania. Did he consider his temptations to abandon Pompey at those various intervals during which he feared Caesar might win neutrality? And now that the Pompeians had suffered a defeat, Cicero wanted to be considered neutral again. It was certainly no wonder that after his return to Brundisium he was tortured with doubts and fears as to what Caesar's attitude toward him would be. During the conquest of Italy, although Caesar had asked him to be present at the meeting of the senate, he had freely forgiven his absence and only required that he take no part in the struggle. Caesar

had asked to no avail; Cicero had fled to Pompey. Now Pompey was defeated and Cicero was destined to plead for mercy from Caesar. The vacillating quality in his character still harassed him. He questioned the advisability of his return to Italy (1) and worried over his position in the event the Pompeians might possibly win. (2) He waited months for Caesar's arrival-- months of fear for his own safety, anxiety over his daughter Tullia's frail health (3) and unhappy marital situation, (4) and sorrow over his estrangement from his brother Quintus (5) who had already made his own peace with Caesar. (6) Then, too, his relations with his wife Terentia were no longer amicable owing to her disapproval of his attitude in the war (7) and his complaints of her handling of money matters while he was in Cilicia. (8) To Atticus he wrote "There is absolutely nothing wanting to make me the most miserable of men." (9) And yet, beside these tangible sorrows he must also have been tormented by a sense of embarrassment and shame that he should now ask for mercy from one from whom he had turned away. When Caesar finally arrived in Brundisium on August 12th in the year 47, one of his worries at least was dispelled. Caesar

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- (1) Cicero - ad Fam. XIV, 12
 - (2) Cicero - ad Att. XI, 15
 - (3) Ibid. XI, 6; ad Fam. XIV, 9
 - (4) Cicero - ad Att. XI, 12
 - (5) Ibid. XI, 5
 - (6) Ibid. XI, 6
 - (7) Ibid. IX, 6
 - (8) Ibid. XI, 24
 - (9) Ibid. XI, 15

met him in friendly fashion, embraced him, and talked quietly with him. (1) This was his reception by the man from whom he had feared base cruelty. From that time on Caesar showed him "honor and kindness." (2) Perhaps Caesar realized that Cicero was a "scholar in politics" as Ferrero calls him, and no match for practical politicians. The Republic was dead; Caesar, the aristocrat, who had won his ascendancy through the people, had attained the supreme power. Cicero, the "novus homo" who had always supported the republican constitution, left the field of politics and retired to his literary pursuits.

Cicero was by no means the only "Loyalist" to profit by Caesar's kindness and forgiving spirit. Many Pompeians were freely pardoned by him. This display of magnanimity which was certainly not expected by Pompey's followers and which was a quality many of his own adherents had not attributed to him won Caesar at least temporary approbation. Cicero, who was present in the senate when that body interceded with Caesar for the recall of Marcus Marcellus, could no longer maintain his silence when Caesar yielded to their entreaties. Marcus Marcellus had long been a thorn in Caesar's flesh. It was he who had made the motion in the senate to deprive Caesar of his command in Gaul (3) and in the Civil War he had fought on Pompey's side

(1) Plutarch - Cicero 39, 3

(2) Ibid. 39

(3) Dio XL, 59, 1

until after the battle of Pharsalia. After his return to Italy and his welcome by Caesar, Cicero had determined to keep away from the Forum and take no part in politics. However, impelled by gratitude to Caesar for the recall of Marcellus and moved by the hope of the reestablishment of the Republic because of Caesar's deference to the Senate in the matter of Marcellus's recall, Cicero rose in the Senate and delivered a speech. This speech has been called the "Pro Marcello," but it is in reality a eulogy on Caesar's attitude toward his erstwhile opponents. Also by this speech Cicero conveyed to Caesar that his hope for the maintenance of a republic still lived. His praise of Caesar is unstinted; he says, "For I cannot by any means pass over in silence such great humanity, such unprecedented and unheard-of clemency, such moderation in the exercise of supreme and universal power, such incredible and almost god-like wisdom." (1) So, for a time, at least, Cicero's hope for his beloved Republic revived and he looked to Caesar for the fulfilment of this hope. And yet it was this same Cicero who now showered such extravagant praise on Caesar who two years later rejoiced over Caesar's assassination. Although it is not the intent of this paper to discuss the closing episodes in the lives of these two men, a word in regard to the change in Cicero's feeling toward Caesar

(1) Cic. - Pro Mar. 1

is not irrelevant. Two factors accounted for the great bitterness he manifested at the time of Caesar's death. Primarily this attitude was due to the increasing power which Caesar had been usurping since his return to Italy after the Spanish Campaign (1) and the consequent ebb of Cicero's hope for the restoration of the Republic. In the second place, Cicero's domestic tragedy had warped his outlook. He had divorced his wife; (2) a second marriage, contracted soon afterward, was a failure; (3) his beloved daughter Tullia had died. Cicero who had never been heroic under adverse circumstances was crushed by this loss. Tullia had been his comfort and solace when political cares had weighed down his spirit; now he brooded alone. In this frame of mind he exulted in the death of the tyrant until he realized that, even though Caesar was dead, the tyranny still lived. (4)

(1) Suet. - Div. Iul. 41, 21, 78, 1; Dio XLIII, 47; XLII, 2; XLIV, 5, 6, 7; Cic. - ad Att. XIV, 6; Plut. - Caes. 60

(2) Cicero - ad Fam. IV, 14

(3) Ibid.; Plut. - Cic. 41, 3

(4) Cicero - ad Att. XIV, 10; 11; 14

Chapter VI

The Realist versus the Idealist

-73-

The sharp contrast between these two outstanding Romans has made the study of their careers doubly interesting. In family, in politics, and in character they were the antithesis of each other. Upon the Republic Cicero lavished all his loyalty and devotion. In the service of this Republic he had risen from obscurity to eminence and to preserve it he was willing to sacrifice all. Cicero was not an astute politician and often his own personal vanity blinded his eyes. His irresolution jeopardized his position and was one of his greatest weaknesses. Cicero's nature was extremely sensitive. He craved approbation and shrank from criticism. He possessed genius; the genius of a lawyer, an orator, and a philosopher, but not the genius of a politician. He admired and had affection for Caesar the man, but feared and hated Caesar the politician.

Caesar was a man of very different calibre. His whole career was marked by resolution, a steadfast purpose and indomitable will. These are qualities of a good statesman and soldier and Caesar was both. Combined with these stern qualities were the charm and wit which won him friends. Cicero was

among these friends and to Caesar he was a friend valued for his other virtues but not for his political acumen. Caesar was a keen judge of character; he knew Cicero's strength; he realized his frailties and was fond of him notwithstanding them, but he put little dependence upon him in public matters. In their attitude toward the state Caesar and Cicero were diametrically opposed. The preservation of the Republic was to Cicero the end and aim of life. To Caesar the Republic was a ladder upon which he meant to climb to fame and glory. If the ladder broke beneath his weight, it was of little consequence to him. Circumstances placed these two great Romans in the same political arena. The character of the men and their divergent views in affairs of state destined them to become opponents in the political struggle which terminated in the dissolution of the Republic.

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