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Peace building: The role of social work and law in the promotion of
social capital and political integration

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Abstract

The study suggests that two domestic conditions are critical to foster opportunities for sustainable peace between formerly conflicting societies. The conditions are defined as social capital and political integration. These are explored in the context of Israeli and Palestinian societies following the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 and through 1999, just one year prior to the outbreak of the *al-Aqsa Intifada*.

Social capital refers to networks of association. Strong networks of relationship are important because they are positively associated with a community and/or society's ability to foster social cohesion, to problem-solve and cope with growing uncertainty such as that exemplifying the period of transition from conflict to peace.

Income inequality is inversely related to social capital. Communities and societies characterized by growing income inequality are typified by diminishing social capital, hence receding capacity to weather the impact of major societal change.

The term political integration refers to the relationship between a government and its citizens. In politically integrated societies citizens share a sense that government is concerned with their welfare and hence their loyalty is expressed through support of the government, its programs and policies. Growing political fragmentation, a lack of abidance, and the breakdown of relationships between civil society and government mark politically disintegrated societies. Political integration is particularly relevant in the aftermath of the signing of a peace agreement when domestic sectarian divides threaten to undermine the national entity that must maintain the delicate balance attained by formerly conflicting societies.

Social capital and political integration are the outcome of greater or lesser human rights: social and economic, civil and political. The persistence of inequality, social and economic, civil and political, wears down the relationships between members of a society and between citizens and their government.

Analysis of standard social and economic indicators in Palestinian and Israeli societies suggests that despite the promised peace dividend social and economic inequality persisted and in some instances worsened between 1993 and 1999. Analysis of civil and political conditions in both societies suggests that political disintegration as opposed to growing integration characterized the six-year period.

Abrégé

L'étude se propose de démontrer que deux conditions intérieures sont cruciales pour accueillir une paix durable entre deux sociétés ayant vécu un conflit. Ces deux conditions sont : le capital social et l'intégration politique. Elles seront analysées dans le contexte social israélo-palestinien après la signature de l'accord d'Oslo en 1993 et pendant l'année 1999, un an avant l'éclatement de *Al-Aqsa Intifada*.

On désigne par capital social le réseau d'associations. Les réseaux solides de relations sont très importants car c'est par leur biais qu'une communauté ou une société se révèle capable d'assurer une cohésion sociale, de régler ses problèmes et de faire face à l'incertitude grandissante qui caractérise la période de transition entre la guerre et la paix.

Les écarts de revenus sont inversement reliés au capital social. Les communautés et les sociétés caractérisées par des écarts de revenus grandissants se démarquent par une baisse de leur capital social, ce qui entraîne une diminution de leur capacité à survivre aux changements sociaux majeurs.

On désigne par intégration politique le rapport entre un gouvernement et ses citoyens. Les citoyens des sociétés qui vivent l'intégration politique partagent le sentiment que leur bien-être est une des priorité de leur gouvernement. Ils éprouvent alors une certaine loyauté dont la manifestation serait l'appui offert aux programmes et aux politiques dudit gouvernement. Le morcellement politique grandissant, le manque de tolérance ainsi que la dégradation des rapports entre le gouvernement et la société civile caractérisent les sociétés politiquement désintégrées. L'intégration politique devient particulièrement importante quand on se penche sur les conséquences de la signature d'un accord de paix. Les divisions religieuses intérieures risquent alors de miner l'identité nationale, censée garder l'équilibre fragile de sociétés au passé conflictuel.

Le capital social et l'intégration politique forment l'aboutissement des droits humains, quelle que soit l'envergure de ces derniers (sociale et économique ou civile et politique). L'inégalité sociale et économique, civile et politique qui se perpétue mine les rapports entre les membres de la société eux-mêmes et entre le gouvernement et les citoyens.

L'analyse des indicateurs sociaux et économiques standards dans les sociétés israélienne et palestinienne indique que, malgré la promesse de paix, l'inégalité sociale et économique a persisté et même, par moments, empiré entre 1993 et 1999. L'analyse des conditions civiles et politiques dans lesdites sociétés suggère que la période de six ans (mentionnée ci-dessus) se démarquait par une désintégration politique par opposition à une intégration politique grandissante.

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Chapter 1

Peace Building:
Defining the nature and content of the domain

1.   Introduction

The field of peace building is relatively new and there are few, if any, models that have conceptualized what peace building might actually entail (Bertram, 1995). Over the last decade, however, various attempts have been made to define the domain (Boutros Boutros Ghali, 1992; Fisher, 1993; Bertram, 1995; Lederach, 1998; Mazurana & McKay, 1999). Social, economic, cultural and political reconstruction (Bertram, 1995), human rights (Mazurana & McKay, 1999; Reardon, 1988), sustainable development (MacLean, 1998), as well as community participation in the promotion of social justice (Moshe, 2001) have been defined as quintessential components of the field.

The changing nature of conflict in the post-cold-war world (MacLean, 1998) suggests that building peace requires far more than that which formal peace agreements signed by the governing elite alone can attain (Saunders, 1999). Shain and Sussman (1998) contend that the national recognition and autonomy afforded by peace agreements initiate a process of social change transforming the national struggle for sovereignty to domestic reconstruction efforts. Concepts such as "participation, group myths, community structures, authority, control patterns, and procedures for the use of values" (Reisman & Suzuki, 1976:414) are contested as sub-national identity groups who heretofore subjugated particular needs to promote the greater national cause now jockey to formalize their status in the newly emerging reality.

Reconciling competing domestic claims is paramount to post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Bertram, 1995). Competing values and claims are powerful forces that challenge

nation and state ownership (Horowitz, 1985; Pettman, 1996) and ultimately have bearing on outcomes such as sustainable sovereignty and enduring peace (Gil, 1998; Shain & Sussman, 1998). How claims, values and needs will be reconciled and by who contributes to a growing uncertainty that left unattended bears the potential to uproot opportunities for international peace.

In a seminal work Peter Marris (1996) maintains that the quest to manage the often-debilitating impact of uncertainty lends to the adoption of competitive self-preservation strategies that minimize commitment and responsibility towards others. Such strategies aim to ensure heightened freedom to maneuver in the face of evolving and unpredictable circumstances by revoking mutual patterns of interaction, trust and cooperation. These strategies are repeated at every level of power until the greatest burden of adjustment falls on those members of society who have the fewest resources to cope with burgeoning burdens.

Thus, for example, the reduction or abolishment of social and economic benefits in post-conflict reconstruction periods to enhance governmental freedom to maneuver capital simultaneously minimizes the freedom of action and security of those most dependent on government commitment for their survival. Consequently, those with the fewest resources remain the most vulnerable to the uncertainties of the post-conflict reconstruction period.

Correspondingly, newly emerging political orders that revoke civil and political freedoms so as to consolidate power, ultimately exclude those with the fewest resources from participation in post-conflict domestic reconstruction. Hence, opportunities to reconcile competing values and claims are minimized.

Far from creating greater certainty, retrenchment strategies reinforce sentiments of social mistrust and social alienation. Networks of association predicated on predictable sets

of reciprocity and trust break down and with them notions of social solidarity and a common sense of belonging and obligation to a community, a society and the evolving nation-state.

The outcome of such "wholesale social disintegration" according to Marris (1999) "is a world more than ever vulnerable to fanaticism, racism, and war" (p. 4). Social norms, the rule of law and ultimately peace are challenged as those with the fewest resources to cope with growing uncertainty develop sub-cultures to enhance a lost sense of belonging, personal respect, collective dignity and power to demand greater reciprocity and social inclusion (Marris, 1999; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Pinderhughes, 1995; Rex, 1988).

Consequently, governments that fail to respond to the welfare, values and claims of their citizens in the period of transition that follows the signing of a peace agreement may actually reinforce rather than dismantle the kinds of sentiments that lend to growing conflict. Alternatively, governments and societies that respond to citizen needs may be better positioned to command citizen loyalty and procure the demands that are often necessary to forge sustainable peace *between* societies. Hence, the manner is which relationships between civil and political spheres of society are redefined in the post-conflict period has far-reaching repercussions.

At the heart of this dissertation is a concern for the advancement of post-conflict peace building that promotes networks of relationship capable of withstanding the uncertainty that marks the transition from conflict to peace. Strong networks of association, what has been defined in the literature as "social capital" (Putnam, 2001; Coleman, 1990; Schuller, 2001; Woolcock, 2001; Fukuyama, 1996) are based upon notions of reciprocity and trust. Such networks generate individual and collective well being, sentiments of belonging

and social cohesion. all of which reinforce a nation (Durkheim. 1933: Marshall. 1964) and are particularly essential in periods marked by transition and uncertainty (Woolcock. 2001).

Similarly. the dissertation is concerned with the advancement of what has been called "political integration" (Jackman. 1972: Ake. 1967: Jacob & Teune. 1964: Gilbert & Specht. 1977). Political integration serves as a mechanism to amalgamate competing parochial and national interests that crop up in the aftermath of the signing of a peace agreement. The two dimensions. social capital and political integration mediate strategies that lend to growing social alienation. fragmentation and divisiveness by reinforcing opportunities to shape the public agenda and promote active citizenship (Lister. 1998. 2000).

Growing evidence suggests that heightened inequality lends to the breakdown of social capital. growing exclusion and the inability of individuals and groups to participate in social. economic and political arenas (Room. 1999). Growing inequality and political fragmentation suggests the adoption of retrenchment strategies less conducive to the management of uncertainty.

Alternatively. greater equality fosters growing opportunities to engage in reciprocal exchange and in the process secures relationships between citizens and between citizens and their governments (Gilbert. 1998). These in turn advance "a lively sense of responsibility toward the welfare of the community" (Marshall. 1964. p. 123) and contribute to the social solidarity that enhances the maintenance of a nation (Gilbert. 1998). Hence. governments that are keen on promoting sustainable peace *between* formerly conflicting neighbors should be concerned with the advancement of domestic equality and political unity in the period that follows the signing of a peace agreement.

Conducted within an interdisciplinary social work and legal framework the present study sets out to explore **trends in inequality in Palestinian and Israeli societies as a central indicator of growing or declining social capital in the six year period following the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993. Similarly the present study explores dimensions of political integration in each of the societies as indicators of growing or declining political integration.**

2. Research Rationale

The rationale for the current study is multidimensional. On a theoretical level, the study responds to two concerns. First, the call for the application of new ideologies and fresh paradigms to identify and address the conditions that foster the transition from conflict to peace (Emminghaus, Kimmel & Stewart, 1998).

The link between human rights and sustainable peace has been denoted in the literature (Reardon, 1988: Bertram, 1995: Mazurana & McKay, 1999). Social, economic, civil and political rights underpin notions of social capital and political integration (Ake, 1967: Jackman, 1972: Putnam, 1993b: Kawachi et al., 1997: Kennedy et al., 1998). This study goes one step beyond the existing literature to suggest how the promotion of human rights advances a framework for relationship-building (Nedelsky, 1996) integral to sustainable peace.

Second, while the study of peace has been defined as interdisciplinary (Toscano, 1998) and while a variety of disciplines have actively engaged in its scholarship (Reardon, 1988: Addams, 1922: Perkins, 1981: Burns & Aspeslagh, 1996: Center for Human Rights, 1994: Kelman, 1998: McMorrow, 1994), to date the study of peace building through an interdisciplinary legal and social work perspective has been minimal (Torczyner, 2000a:

Moshe. 2001)[1]. albeit the study of the relationship between each of the disciplines and peace (Perkins. 1981; Van Soest. 1994; Addams. 1922).

Both social work and law are rooted in notions of self-determination. equality and mutual interdependence. Both are keenly aware of the role of rights and relationships in the interactions between individuals. groups and government (Minow. 1990; Bateman. 1995). The pursuit of equality, justice and the realization of peaceful relationships are the raison d'être of each of the professions (Dominelli. 1997; Kendall, 1978; Lewis. 1982; Brieland & Lemmon. 1977; Chetkow-Yanoov. 1997).

Social work is concerned with the development of human potential and the social. economic and political conditions that make human development possible. particularly for vulnerable populations (Witkin. 1993). Relationship is at the core of social work practice. Relationship is the medium through which individuals and groups are empowered to access both internal and external resources affecting identity. human growth. development and participation. Inter-group work. mediation. conflict resolution. empowerment-based practice. community building and group-community problem solving efforts form the foundations of the discipline (Weil. 1996; Guitterez et al.. 1996). the goal being the promotion of social justice. greater equality and the enhancement of both individual. communal and inter-communal well being.

The rule of law is given life and meaning in the context of relationships. and particularly in the context of community. Law provides the necessary structure to govern and protect relationships. It outlines rights and obligations between individuals. groups and the state. Law articulates the expectations. patterns. mores and duties implicit in relationship.

While Van Soest (1994) focuses primarily on the relationship between social work and peace she incorporates Rawl's (1971) theory of justice without specifically defining an interdisciplinary practice for peace building.

those that are essential for individual, communal and inter-communal welfare. Legal

principles that inform human action can advocate for just and peaceful relationships and are

particularly important in ensuring appropriate forms of social structure in periods marked by

uncertainty.

Peace building requires an interdisciplinary approach that will on the one hand

promote relationships and institutions that strengthen individual and collective welfare, and

on the other will provide the necessary structure to govern and protect diverse societal

groups. Community building, the promotion of civil participation, and universal human rights

law, all of which address issues of individual and group rights, equality and justice are the

key aspects of social work and law that relate to peace building (Torczyner, 2000a; Moshe,

2001). Theoretical and practice dimensions of the two disciplines can be useful in promoting

the transition from conflict to peace.

The rationale for the application of the conceptual framework to the Israeli-

Palestinian context is twofold. First, a peace agreement signed by the governing elite of each

society in September 1993 indicates mutual recognition of the others right to exist and the

end of the conflict characterizing the historical relationship between the two peoples.

Nonetheless, despite the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords, violence continues to dominate

the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis even as this study is being written, nine

years after the ratification of the Accords.

The on-going conflict suggests that bi-lateral conditions addressed by the governing

elite, while a necessary condition for the promotion of peace, is not sufficient to ensure its

sustainability (Savir, 1998). The current study suggests that domestic conditions are equally

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important to forge the transition from conflict to coexistence. and that societies. not the governing elite alone, have a role to play in promoting peace.

The application of the interdisciplinary social work and legal framework to the domestic context of each society furthermore suggests that autonomy and self-determination. fundamental to coexistence, are as much a function of what transpires within a society as they are a function of that which occurs between societies. Securing the welfare of each society creates the groundwork for a relationship based upon interdependence as opposed to dependence. The application of the interdisciplinary framework to the Palestinian-Israeli context can help to define a peace building agenda for each society useful in extricating both sides from the current impasse.

Lastly. in terms of practice. the current study aims to advance peace-related activity around the globe by simultaneously addressing macro. structural conditions and micro. grassroots initiatives as integral components of peace building through the application of social work and legal practice approaches and skills. The current study seeks to contribute to the advancement of peace building efforts of governments and civil society alike by operationalizing an interdisciplinary practice approach reflecting the proposed theoretical framework.

3. Dissertation overview

The interdisciplinary social work and legal framework to peace building transcends the boundaries of each of the disciplines. The approach suggests that the combined effect of the essence of the two. human rights and relationship. by their very nature. transform individuals. communities and institutions. hence setting the stage for the transition from

conflict to peace building. The interplay between the two is found in both the notions social capital and political integration.

Social capital pertains to networks of relationship that link the individual to the state which reinforce connections between the individual, the collective and the state (Gilbert, 1998). Social capital is the glue that ensures social solidarity and social cohesion, both of which contribute to the on-going functioning of society and both of which are particularly important in periods of uncertainty.

Newly emerging research contends that there is a strong link between inequality, the breakdown of social capital and heightened violence and crime (Kennedy, et. al., 1998). These debilitate a society, lending to increasing uncertainty. In the period that marks the transition from conflict to coexistence, the promotion of social and economic rights and policies that foster greater equality can enhance domestic social cohesion (Gilbert, 1998), critical in weathering the dubiety of change.

Political integration pertains to the extent to which particular identity groups bound by primordialism and kinship are able to identify with a central polity (Ben-Dor, 1979; Geertz, 1967). Political integration according to Weiner (1967) "holds a society and a political system together" (p. 153), and is particularly keen on ensuring opportunities for participation for those groups traditionally marginalized from the mainstream. Politically integrated societies promote universal civil and political rights. Politically integrated societies are characterized by political unity, identification between civil society and the ruling elite and low incidence of crime (Ake, 1967).

Alternatively, political fragmentation and division characterize societies that are minimally integrated. Particular identity groups needs as opposed to universal issues emanate

lending to an inability to bridge the sectarian divide. Societies characterized by political fragmentation experience growing dissonance between the civil and political spheres of society.

Throughout the dissertation the interdisciplinary framework challenges the reader to explore the synergy between human rights and relationship as they pertain to the notions of social capital and political integration. Social work and legal scholars and practitioners in particular are challenged to enhance their understanding of each other's fields. They are invited to engender dialogue and interaction between them and to identify the manner in which the skills and practices of each can strengthen the labors of the other. Finally they are challenged to ascertain how the combined effect of the two disciplines address content and process issues, both of which are integral to the promotion of peace building and coexistence.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on the major themes that have dominated the discourse on peace building in the last decade. A brief overview of the concept of peace is then delineated. The chapter concludes with an outline of the components that need be addressed in the transition from conflict to peace.

Chapter 2 examines the notion of social capital. Theoretical approaches and empirical findings delineating the relationship between social capital and social and economic inequality, particularly as it pertains to the relationship between the individual and the community are presented. The link between these, social exclusion and peace building are addressed.

Chapter 3 explores the notion of political integration and its relationship to peace building. Key dimensions of political integration particularly as they relate to its capacity to mediate national and particular as well as civil and political identities are articulated.

Research findings are presented and the role of civil and political rights in promoting political integration and curtailing conflict is delineated.

Having developed the argument for the centrality of the two dimensions, the chapter outlines central principles common to social work and law that underpin the promotion of social capital and political integration and that are essential in establishing conditions for peace building. The chapter concludes with the delineation of exchange theory and the implementation of the three principles to foster opportunities for exchange enhancing social capital and political integration.

Chapter 4 addresses methodological aspects of the study. Indicators for the two dimensions are presented for each of the societies, Palestinian and Israeli. While some of the indicators are identical for the two societies, some differ. Differences in indicators are attributed both to the type of data available in regard to each society as well as to the particular and distinguishing attributes of the two societies.

In **Chapter 5** the findings on social and economic conditions in Israeli and Palestinian societies in the post-Oslo period are presented.

Chapter 6 presents the findings on conditions of political integration within both Palestinian and Israeli societies.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. Here I revisit the theoretical framework in light of the findings of the present study. Through a discussion of social work and legal theory and practice I offer concrete insights for the application of the theoretical framework together with recommendations for future research, practice, and policy as it relates to the peace building domain.

## 4.	Peace Building: Theoretical Considerations

Notions of peace, peacemaking, and peacekeeping have been fairly well delineated in the literature (Reardon, 1988; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Lederach, 1998). The concept of post-conflict peace building however remains more vague. Over the last decade, attempts to delineate both the definition and the core content of peace building have led to the articulation of two approaches most pertinent to this dissertation.

The first approach focuses on institution building and is concerned with institutional roles and provisions that lend to societal functioning. The second focuses primarily on the development of grassroots efforts to further prospects for peace. The distinction between the foci is critical. Each has implications regarding the content, process, actors and direction of peace building activity. The two are examined in this section. An approach that recognizes micro and macro change as integral components of a peace building agenda is articulated.

### 4.1.	Peace building as structural change

While not the first to address the structural nature of peace building activity, former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali has been credited with creating the momentum leading to the subsequent interest in the concept as well as its differentiation from other peace-related notions. In *An Agenda for Peace* Boutros Ghali (199) identifies post-conflict peace building as the creation of those conditions that will ultimately prevent the repetitive violence both among nations and among peoples. Peace building activities, according to Boutros Ghali (1992) address the conditions that are at the root of conflict among them, "economic despair, social injustice and political oppression" (p. 8). Bertram (1995) asserts that peace building entails full-scale efforts at nation building that "seek to remake a state's political institutions, security forces and economic arrangements" (p. 389).

Such visions suggest that peace building is a "top-down" process whereby the peace treaties forged by the governing elite become the blueprint for the peace building activities that will ensure their sustainability (Mazurana & McKay, 1999). And in fact, the notion of peace building as a "top-down" process is reinforced in the stated objectives of the United Nations peace building missions. These are defined as

> monitoring a ceasefire, disarming and mobilizing one or more armies as well as creating and training a new integrated national military and/or police force, and supervising or conducting national elections to install a new government (Bertram, 1995:388-389).

The United Nations further defines peace-building activities as

> relief and humanitarian assistance, food aid, water and sanitation, health, mine clearance, logistics, securing financial resources, rebuilding governmental administrative apparatus, disarmament, mobilization, and re-integration of ex-combatants, refugee reintegration, strengthening human rights, strengthening democratic governmental systems, elections, crime prevention, the administration of justice, reconstructing and enhancing transportation and energy systems, and the rehabilitation of civil society (Mazurana & McKay, 1999:60).

The macro-based structural agenda set forth primarily by the work of Boutros Ghali (1992) and supported by the United Nations is significantly influenced by forces outside the conflict. Top-down structural peace building efforts thus conjure up questions regarding notions of inclusion and exclusion in the processes that determine societal reconstruction, thus threatening to reiterate social, economic and political disparity. Such efforts have been criticized (Fetherston, 1995; Bush, 1995) particularly in that they exclude entire populations from participation in peace building processes (Mazurana & McKay, 1999). Moreover, such efforts have been charged with neglecting conditions "on-the-ground" that impact on the every day lives of those men, women and children most closely affected by conflict.

4.2. Peace building as process

Lederach (1998) provides one of the most comprehensive frameworks detailing the parameters of peace building, including a time frame, a matrix for peace building activity, participating actors and the process itself. One of the central contributions of the framework is that it suggests that peace be systematically constructed and as such recognizes peace building as both a goal and a process at one and the same time. The framework addresses the complexity associated with peace-related notions. This is important in that peace is often envisioned as a final state and the post-conflict status achieved by a peace agreement suggests that any and all elements of conflict have disappeared (Lederach, 1998). These perceptions lend to expectations for immediate movement from one conjuncture to the next, while the complexities of conflict and peace make this impossible (Bush, 1995). Instead the movement from conflict to peace must be envisioned as a transition within which the application of peace building activity secures its success.

According to Lederach (1998) implicit in peace building efforts are both immediate actions and long term outcomes that must be simultaneously addressed and integrally related. In other words, every desired long-term outcome serves as the basis for the operationalisation of short-term activity. And, every short-term effort reflects the desired outcome.

Weiner (1998) suggests that attempts to advance desired outcomes are "predicated on the belief that all efforts *will* eventually pave the way toward greater consensus, cooperation, reconciliation, and a generosity of spirit..." (p. 20). Peace building as a process seeks to identify the role of societal actors in post-conflict reconstruction, particularly those who have either been marginalized from peace building efforts or those whose efforts have not been recognized as central to the realpolitik of mainstream peace endeavors.

A grassroots or "bottom-up" approach to peace building enhances relationship building and has been incorporated by women to transcend sectarian divides (Heenan, 1997; Mazurana & McKay, 1999). Such efforts emphasize the importance of recognizing peace building as an all-encompassing effort that must seek to include not only governmental actors, but grassroots players as well. MacLean (1998) supports this claim noting the role that civil society and non-governmental organizations have played in promoting solutions to conflicts that have erupted in recent years.

5.   Defining the peace building domain

There is, according to Reardon (1993) "no single, universal definition of peace" (p. 4). Nevertheless, a clear distinction between the notion of 'negative peace' or the absence of war, and that of 'positive peace' has been delineated and the vastness of the components entailed in the notion of positive peace has been articulated.

The concept of positive peace has been aligned with a proactive agenda that seeks to promote human dignity, enabling all people to reach their full potential and experience "authentic human development" (McMorrow, 1994:48). Bess (1993) cites the Italian activist Dolci, who foresaw the operationalization of genuine peace through "the eradication of hunger, poverty, ignorance, exploitation, unemployment, and all manner of structural obstacles to the fruition of life" (p. 182). Quinney (1995) states that positive peace, defined by Barash (1991) as a "condition of society in which exploitation is minimized or eliminated altogether, and in which there is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of structural violence" (p. 8), can only exist "when the sources of crime - including poverty, inequality, racism, and alienation are not present. Positive peace requires social justice" (Quinney, 1995:155). Reardon (1988) refers to positive peace as the building of a new reality

realized through social justice, economic equity, ecological balance and political participation. Peace, according to Reardon (1993) "requires the transcendence of the full range of social and economic discrimination that impedes human development" (p. 6) and includes the recognition of both individual and collective rights as well as social, economic and political justice (Reardon, 1993; Shivji, 1989). The literature suggests that attention to human needs, human rights, equality and the inclusion of diverse voices are integral to the creation of a more just social order and coexistence. These then must be addressed in a peace building agenda.

6.   Peace building: Integrating micro and macro perspectives

The Webster (1988) dictionary defines peace as "freedom from civil disturbance; a state of security or order within community provided for by law or custom...harmony in personal relations" (p. 865). Three central notions emanate. First there is a link between civil society and peace (Weiner, 1998). Second, peace is as much a function of that which occurs *within* communities as it is a function of that which occurs *between* them (Moshe, 2001). Finally, law is instrumental to the construction of peaceful relationships (Perkins, 1981; Freud, 1960).

Building, according to Webster (1988), is defined as "to form by ordering and uniting materials by gradual means into a composite whole; to cause to be constructed; to develop according to a systematic plan, by a definite process...to progress toward a peak" (p. 186). Building entails active engagement in construction. It is a process in progress guided by a systematic plan promoted through the gradual uniting of parts into a more diverse and complex whole that simultaneously moves towards a common goal. Building creates a multidimensional and paradoxical task that seeks on the one hand to enhance enough

commonality to proceed towards a higher pinnacle, yet on the other welcomes increased diversity and complexity. Affixing the two, peace and building, thus entails attention to parameters of relationship, community, civil society, custom and law in a manner that systematically and simultaneously structures opportunities for both diversity and commonality.

Peace building emerges as a complex task seemingly touching upon every aspect of relationship, and every societal sphere. At the heart of peace building activity is the struggle for social, economic and political change that would enhance opportunities for coexistence between members of diverse identity groups (Lederach, 1998). The term peace building appears to connote not only state-oriented perspectives such as those elicited in political theory, but social and community-based perspectives as well. Peace building implies not only a macro or "top-down" orientation, but a micro or "bottom-up" approach as well (Weiner, 1998; Lederach, 1998; Torczyner, 2000b; Moshe, 2001). An integrated approach to peace building suggests that both structural and relational changes are part and parcel to the transition from conflict to peace. These will be addressed in the following chapters.

Chapter 2

Social capital and peace building: Managing uncertainty in the transition from conflict to coexistence

1. Introduction

This chapter examines domestic social capital as a central dimension of peace building. Social capital is defined as "networks. norms. and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam. 1995. p. 67). The concept suggests that it is the power of association that enhances individual and collective capacity and well being. Reciprocal networks of relationship diminish uncertainty because as Marris (1996) contends, the greater part of uncertainty arises from the behavior of others (p. 98). Strong networks of association can be particularly useful in mediating periods marked by change (Woolcock. 2001).

Social capital is promoted through relationships within and between communities as well as between citizens and government (Putnam. 1993). A predominant viewpoint set forth in the literature is that greater equality reinforces social capital (Kennedy. et al.. 1998: Kawachi. et al.. 1997). Greater equality heightens individual and communal autonomy to engage in more egalitarian patterns of exchange. Such patterns of exchange subsequently lend to more egalitarian social ethics and growing interdependence (Wilkinson. 1997). thus serving to further reinforce networks of collective action (Woolcock. 2001).

Inequality subjects individuals and communities to dependency on collective power and control (Nedelsky. 1996). Dependency hinders opportunities for autonomous action (Howard. 1995) and egalitarian participation in social. economic and political exchange (Room. 1999). Consequently. inequality lends to the exclusion of whole communities from

the social fabric of society contributing to the breakdown of social bonds, collective values and social capital (Silver, 1994).

Growing inequality and the breakdown of interdependent relationships have far-reaching implications not only for the socially excluded but also for society as a whole (Marris, 1996; Silver, 1994). Societies characterized by growing inequality and social exclusion experience increasing divisiveness and fragmentation (Woolcock, 2001; Torczyner, 2000a). The "social glue" (Gilbert, 1998) that holds a society together as a coherent entity diminishes. Deteriorating networks of social solidarity are further compounded as those who are marginalized employ resistance measures to counter social, economic and political exclusion (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Pinderhughes, 1995; Gurr & Harff, 1994). Thus, a society that cannot protect its most vulnerable populations ultimately becomes self-defeating even towards its most powerful (Kennedy, in Friedman, 1999; Marris, 1999; Nedelsky, 1996).

Growing domestic inequality and the breakdown of social capital have bearing on relationships between societies as well. Gil (1998) reinforces the nexus between domestic inequality, the breakdown of mutually beneficial relationships and the odds for international peace.

> Societies that initiated relations of domination and exploitation and conditions of injustice, on small scales and local levels, tended to extend these relations and conditions also beyond their populations and territories. Such oppressive practices and tendencies intensified gradually and acquired momentum as a result of cycles of resistance by victims and reactive repression by perpetrators, as well as through competition for dominance among different oppressive and unjust societies. Eventually, relations of domination and exploitation, and conditions of injustice, perpetrated and permeated most branches of humankind all over the globe (p. 5).

Governments that fail to respond to citizen welfare invite growing despair. alienation and insulation. The breakdown of domestic social capital hampers the ability of a government to enlist citizen loyalty to support the demands that maneuver the transition from conflict to coexistence (Gil. 1998: Forsythe. 1991). Alternatively, post-conflict societies whose ruling elite commits itself to the promotion of greater equality and domestic well-being may well strengthen networks of relationship capable of weathering the demands necessary to forge sustainable peace *between* societies.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first focuses on theoretical explorations of social capital. particularly in regard to its capacity to mediate the relationship between the individual. the collective and government. The relationship between inequality. social exclusion and social capital is explored and empirical findings delineated.

The second section discusses the relationship between inequality. the breakdown of social capital and conflict. In the third section human rights. in particular social and economic rights are considered as a medium to abate growing inequality and promote social capital.

The fourth section of the chapter discusses some of the limitations of social capital. Finally. the fifth section summarizes and concludes the chapter.

2.   Social capital: Theoretical considerations

In less than a decade social capital has emerged as one of the foremost researched topics across a wide variety of disciplines. among them sociology. political science. education and economics (Woolcock. 2001: Schuller. 2001: Kennedy et al.. 1998: Putnam. 1993: 1995: 2001: Coleman. 1990: Kawachi. et al.. 1997: Wilson. 1997). In general the term is defined as networks. norms and relationships that promote collective action (Schuller.

2001). Social capital has been characterized as people's ability to work together in groups and collectives in order to achieve a common purpose (Coleman, 1990). Moreover, it has been described as the social resources with which a community is endowed and that ultimately lend to increasing community welfare (Glaeser, 2001).

Social capital is understood as a relational variable (Woolcock, 2001). The concept suggests that it is the quality of relationships in any given social unit that serves as the medium to support individual capacity and collective sustainability (Foley & Edwards, 1999; Fukuyama, 1995; Veenstra, 2001). Unlike human capital predicated on individual assets (Schuller, 2001), social capital is not akin to a particular individual. Rather it is nurtured in the collective or communal context.

Strong social capital appears to be significant within communities, between communities and for society at large (Woolcock, 2001; Lang & Hornburg, 1998; Briggs, 1998; Gilbert, 1998). For example, on an intra-communal level social capital appears to strengthen groups and communities through its capacity to bond (Woolcock, 2001), to function as social support (Briggs, 1998) and as "social glue" (Lang and Hornburg, 1998). Such bonds enhance a sense of belonging and foster greater interdependence between the individual and the collective.

On an inter-communal level, strong social networks place groups and communities in a stronger position to engage in processes of exchange or "bridging" (Woolcock, 2000; Lang & Hornburg, 1998) with other communities; processes that contribute to the advancement of collective welfare. For example, the ability of diverse groups and communities to unite around common issues, such as the promotion of environmental sustainability, the accretion of women's rights and the advancement of peace (Gallagher, 1997; Stamatopoulou, 1995;

Heenan, 1997. Kaul, 1988; Lovett et al., 1994; Plou, 1998) have led to transnational results that might otherwise have been thwarted were it not for powerful networks of association.

Finally, as a resource promoting "social leverage" (Briggs, 1998) social capital fosters access to the opportunities and entitlements that a society has to offer (Veenstra, 2001). Cohesive communities may be more capable of acting to secure access to rights and entitlements (Schuller, 2001), socially, economically and politically, than communities unable to harness social capital, because they are better positioned to mediate their claims with the aspirations of the political order.

Berger and Neuhaus (1996) suggest that dense networks of association serve as "mediating structures" linking private and public spheres (Joyce & Schambra, 1996), citizens and governments. They define mediating structures, as those institutions that stand between the individual in his or her private life and the larger institutions that are the expression of public life (p. 158). Voluntary associations, the church, neighborhoods (Berger & Neuhaus, 1996, p. 159) and community centers are all examples of mediating structures. Such structures promote opportunities for inclusion, association and active expressions of citizenship (Lister, 1998).

Mediating structures negotiate the dichotomy between public and private spheres of life, a dichotomy exacerbated by modernization and change (Berger & Neuhaus, 1996; Friedman, 1999; Durkheim, 1933; Gilbert, 1998), and one that has been identified with growing inter-communal conflict in the post-cold-war-world (Friedman, 1999; Bauman, 1998; Barber, 1996). The ability of the two spheres to coexist, the private expressed as the impetus to preserve tradition, kinship, community and identity (Friedman, 1999; Bauman, 1998; Barber, 1996) and the public, characterized by the struggle for development,

modernization and growing interdependence between communities (Friedman. 1999;
Bauman. 1998: Barber. 1996). is critical to weathering the competing claims that surface in
post-conflict societal reconstruction.

Berger & Neuhaus (1996) suggest that mediating structures arbitrate the tension
between the two. On the one hand they serve to integrate the individual into society and as
such preclude social isolation. On the other hand, mediating structures mediate "the threat of
alienation to the public order" (p. 159). Such structures provide a medium enabling the
individual to remain grounded in expressions of the private sphere such as norms, tradition,
and beliefs, while simultaneously linking to a larger more universal societal entity. Hence,
they promote social cohesion and social solidarity.

The breakdown of collective networks of association impact upon the individual.
Such a breakdown leaves the individual detached from notions of community and
interdependence. Emile Durkheim (1951) in his classic study of suicide details the rise of
suicide in societies where socially cohesive networks of association are impaired and little
stands between the state and masses of individuals.

Moreover, such a breakdown of association has implications for the greater society as
well. Without networks of association. the gap between public and private spheres and
citizens and government are so great that political orders become detached from the values,
realities and claims that are the essence of the private sphere. Such detachment deprives the
political order of its moral foundation and as such it is "delegitimated" (Berger & Neuhaus,
1996. p. 159). For the political order the resulting consequence is the forfeiture of the loyalty
of its constituents and ultimately the breakdown of nations (Durkheim. 1933: Gilbert. 1998:
Berger & Neuhaus. 1996).

Alternatively, dense networks of association can subsequently promote social cohesion and the maintenance of a nation (Durkheim, 1933; Gilbert, 1998; Berger & Neuhaus, 1996). Networks of association ensure that the individual is integrated into the public sphere where the gap between the political order, the collective and the individual is reconciled (Durkheim, 1933). Socially cohesive communities foster solidarity and expanding systems of social networks. This ultimately counters social alienation, marginalization and exclusion, all of which lend to the breakdown of the social fabric that constitutes a society.

2.1.   Inequality, social exclusion and social capital

While it appears that social capital is a readily available resource, Edwards and Foley (1998) suggest that social capital is dependent upon matters of context, distribution and access for its realization. Like other forms of capital substantially shaped by "inequalities of social location" (p. 129), so too social capital. In other words, just as access to and distribution of other forms of capital are configured by class, gender, ethnicity and race relations, social capital is as well. Greater economic equality, particularly where income distribution is concerned, appears to foster expanding social capital, while economic inequality is associated with its demise (Kawachi et al., 1997; Kennedy et al., 1998). Inequality undermines social capital because it creates multiple parallel social differences. These increase the gaps between ethnic groups and between social classes limiting opportunities for "bridging" and fostering social disorganization and social break down.

Contemporary discourse on inequality focuses on the notion of social exclusion (Room, 1999; Cronin & De Greiff 1998; Barry, 1998; Lister, 1998; Holman: 1998; Beresford & Wilson, 1998; Cheethem & Fuller: 1998; Jordan, 1996; Rodger, 1992; Room, 1999; Olsen, 1982; Minow, 1990). Diverging from the discourse on poverty and emphasis on class and

distribution issues alone as the major focal point of inequality, the concept of social

exclusion looks at the interrelationship between inequalities of power and control generated

by social location, issues of distribution and processes of marginalization and exclusion

(Williams, 1998). Like social capital, social exclusion is considered to have a relational focus

(Room, 1999). Social exclusion means "inadequate social participation, lack of social

integration and lack of power" (Room, 1999, p. 169).

Poor educational facilities and subsequent educational failure, inadequate training and

skills for the job market, poverty, poor housing and sickness work together to foster

marginalization and exclusion for whole communities from the mainstream of society

(Room, 1999). Severed from the mainstream, individuals and communities are excluded from

the relationships and opportunities, the processes and the resources that a society has to offer

(Barry, 1998).

Correspondingly, the excluded are at a qualitative disadvantage in regard to access to

the status and channels that influence decision-making processes that impact upon

subsequent distributions and conditions affecting capital. Those without resources have no

voice and little opportunity to influence relationships (Suu Kyi, 1995). Room (1999)

contends that social exclusion can be understood as a process that lends to "a catastrophic

discontinuity in relationships with the rest of society" (p. 177).

Social exclusion emerges as a complex web of consequences that ultimately hinders

the ability of marginalized individuals and collectives to be treated as and to act as citizens

(Lister, 1998; Silver, 1994). The socially excluded are excluded from "equality before the

law: participation in the democratic process: public goods: the nation or the dominant race:

the family and sociability: humane treatment, respect..." (Silver, 1994, p. 541). These limit

opportunities to access the rights and entitlements of citizenship (Miller, 1993) and to act in a reciprocal manner with the society that grants those rights. As a result, notions of citizenship, membership and loyalty to the nation are subsequently impaired and so too social solidarity (Gilbert, 1998; Marshall, 1964).

According to T.H. Marshall (1964) citizenship is founded upon a sense of community and a sense of loyalty. Freedom, rights and equal protection before a common law form the basis for community power or "might" (Freud, 1960) and loyalty (Marshall, 1950). It is these that reinforce social solidarity and have the ability to channel human aggression and violence into non-violent outcomes (Freud, 1960).

Social exclusion however, limits opportunities to access freedom, rights and equal protection before the law. The results of such processes of disentitlement are personal estrangement, community fragmentation and the breakdown of the rule of law (Torczyner, 2000a; Freud, 1960).

Exclusionary measures thus hinder opportunities for the kinds of exchange that develop social capital (Room, 1999), reinforce social cohesion (Edwards & Foley, 1998) and foster sentiments of membership in a common entity worthy of one's loyalty. Inequality erodes "ethos of egalitarianism" (Kawachi, et al., 1997:56) and notions of community (Putnam, 1993b). Notions of fairness, justice and social protection, fundamental to the development of trust, social capital and social cohesion (Gilbert, 1998) are severed as growing inequality turns growing numbers of individuals and communities away from opportunities to engage in mainstream society.

Alternatively, greater equality affords increasing opportunities for interdependent action (Howard, 1995). Greater equality enhances opportunities to influence and share

control over resources. initiatives and decision-making processes (Barry. 1998). to satisfy human needs and access rights and entitlements.

2.2.   Inequality and social capital: Empirical explorations

Putnam's (1993a) seminal work on social capital has contributed to an abundance of research into the relationship between social capital and an array of other conditions. such as health. mortality. crime and inequality (Veenstra. 2001: Kennedy. et al.. 1998). The overriding evidence illustrates that strong social capital is positively associated with a community's productive potential (Putnam. 1993a; Wilson. 1997) and has important implications for social and economic development. for health and well-being and for the reduction of crime (Heller. 1996: Kawachi. et al.. 1997; Wilkinson. 1997).

A substantial amount of the research on social capital has focused on civic engagement and participation in secondary organizations as a central indicator (Putnam. 1993a. 1993b. 1995. 2001: Veenstra. 2001: Kawachi. et al.. 1997). Civic engagement and participation in secondary organizations suggest a degree of citizen commitment to their communities and has been measured by determining rates of community membership in associations and groups that promote shared interests (Kennedy. et al.. 1998: Kawachi. et al.. 1997).

A second indicator that has been defined as a core construct of social capital is the level of mutual trust among community members (Kennedy. et al.. 1998: Kawachi. et al.. 1997). Mutual trust has been assessed through responses to items included in General Social Surveys (Kennedy. et al.. 1998: Putnam. 1993b. 1995: Kawachi. et al.. 1997). Items questioned perceptions of fairness. for example the degree to which people thought that others would take advantage of them as opposed to treating them fairly. In addition. items

questioned the degree to which people felt that others could be trusted as opposed to perceptions of social mistrust.

Over the last decade a growing body of research has demonstrated the relationship between social capital and inequality (Woolcock, 2001; Veenstra, 2001; Wilson, 1997; Kawachi, et al., 1997; Kennedy, et al., 1998). Growth in income disparity between social strata lends to declining levels of social capital, social cohesion and social trust (Kawachi, et al., 1997; Kennedy, et al., 1998; Wilkinson, 1997; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Veenstra, 2000). Brehm and Rahn (1997), for example, found that growing income inequality was a significant factor predicting declining trust in others. And, declining social trust was a significant predictor of decreasing group membership and levels of association.

The research suggests that societies high in income inequality are low in social cohesion (Veenstra, 2001; Putnam, 2001). Greater inequality appears to lead to declining levels of participation in the public sphere and declining levels of social trust (Kawachi, et al., 1997; Kennedy, et al., 1998). These in turn impact upon social solidarity. Increasing gaps in the distribution of income (greater income inequality) lends to the breakdown of social relationships, mutual trust, association and social organization (Kennedy, et al., 1998). Alternatively, where the social capital index is higher, economic inequality and civic inequality are lower (Putnam, 2001).

Strong social capital has been associated with a variety of other outcomes as well: among them tolerance (Veenstra, 2001), tolerance for equality and civil liberties (Putnam, 2001), reduced violence (Kennedy, et al., 1998), obedience to the rule of law (Wilson, 1997; Putnam, 2001) and educational and employment outcomes (Case & Katz, in Putnam, 1993b).

Correspondingly, higher levels of education appear to impact on levels of social capital (Glaeser, 2001; Willms, 2001).

Findings overwhelmingly suggest that strong networks of association mediate the detrimental effects of inequality (Kennedy, et al. 1998; Kawachi, et al., 1997) and that these produce positive outcomes for human welfare. Willms (2001) sums it up in the following manner. "People from less advantaged backgrounds are vulnerable, but people from less advantaged backgrounds who also live in less advantaged communities are particularly vulnerable" (p. 59).

For those who are already at a disadvantage in accessing the assets that a society has to offer social capital appears to make a difference in determining the outcomes of disadvantage (Putnam, 1993b). Given the outcomes associated with expanding social capital, Woolcock (2001) suggests that social exclusion can be overcome by marginalized groups specifically because of the unique social resources that they possess; resources that can be transformed into the kinds of power that impact upon issues of access and distribution. bell hooks (1988, 1990) reinforces such an approach noting how existence on the margins facilitates the development of unique perspectives and resources that when commonly pooled empower marginalized groups. Veenstra (2001) adds by suggesting that social capital can be strengthened to mitigate the cleavages that fragment a society by creating networks of association that introduce individuals to different perspectives (Veenstra, 2001).

Social capital appears to be associated with beneficiary consequences that have positive outcomes for the individual as well as the collective. The fostering of trust and social connectedness appear to contribute to social stability and harmony that organize a society rather than lending to increasing fragmentation.

Inequality lends to the breakdown of social capital and social fragmentation. Alienation from the societal domain lends to estrangement from societal norms, mores and patterns of justice. The resulting societal fragmentation threatens opportunities for peace and coexistence. Several theorists note the development of alternative moral and value systems by those marginalized from the mainstream (Pinderhughes, 1995; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).

3.   Inequality, the breakdown of social capital and conflict

Cross-national studies show that economic inequalities are related in complex ways to domestic disharmony (Gurr, 1967; Gurr & Harff, 1994; Park, 1986; Sigelman & Simpson, 1977; Blau & Blau, 1982). Inequality, social exclusion and limited opportunities and "life chances" (Sherraden, 1991) stifle the expression of desired goals, values, needs and identity (Gurr, 1967, 1970; Gurr & Harff, 1994; Park, 1986; Sigelman & Simpson, 1977; Blau & Blau, 1982; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Sites, 1973; Burton, 1990; Galtung, 1980; Azar, 1986), addressed not only through resource distribution, but in the context of relationship and association as well (Gurr, 1970; Burton, 1990).

When opportunities for inclusion in mainstream society are consistently hindered alternative networks of association offering a sense of belonging, dignity, purpose and identity are constructed (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Torczyner, 2000a). Such networks provide an alternative to the norms and mores imposed by the "alien majority" (Blau & Blau, 1982, p. 115). They help to make sense of growing "injustice, discontent and distrust" (Blau & Blau, 1982, p. 119) generated by the growing gaps between the values and norms expressed by the mainstream and the social experiences of the excluded (Blau & Blau, 1982).

For many of these sub-networks, adherence to the norms and laws of the majority become inconsistent with life experiences. Hence, loyalty to a particular moral and legal

order or "social bond" is severed. For some, deviance and acts of violence become the medium through which sub-networks structure increasing purpose and social cohesion (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Sigelman & Simpson, 1977; Blau & Blau, 1982; Marris, 1999).

Delinquency, crime, acts of violence and political violence have been characterized as manifestations of growing inequality, social exclusion and limited opportunities (Gurr, 1967, 1970; Gurr & Harff, 1994; Park, 1986; Sigelman & Simpson, 1977; Blau & Blau, 1982; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Sites, 1973; Burton, 1990; Galtung, 1980; Azar, 1986), all of which are expressions of retrenchment and diminishing reciprocity. Marris (1999) suggests that "since most people will not willingly accept an exercise of authority over which they have no control, they muster whatever power they can to demand reciprocity" (p. 5).

In the face of growing inequality and subsequently growing social exclusion, acts of violence and resistance express the demand for reciprocity and inclusion. Freud (1960) contended that "brute force is overcome by union" (p. 201), and that rights or law enacted by a community are the expression of its strength. Consequently, a human rights agenda has been recognized as central to the promotion of peace (Doyle, 1986; Osaghae, 1996; Chipman, 1993; Stavenhagen, 1987).

4.   Human rights, social and economic rights and the building of social capital

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants that followed[2] are predicated on notions of freedom, equality and peace for all humankind. Human rights legislation seeks to redress societal imbalances that lend to inequality between the privileged and the marginalized. As a framework defining what one is rightfully entitled to universal human rights law transforms those traditionally contingent on the system to autonomous

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[2] International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

rights claimants capable of advocating for themselves. In the process individuals and collectives are empowered to demand greater reciprocity within the context of the law and the community (Moshe, 2001).

The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defines entitlements such as the right to health care, the right to education, to employment, to housing, to equal payment for equal work, to social security and more. These are entitlements that are closely linked to notions of social capital and social exclusion (Room, 1999). While they remain indivisible from civil and political rights, it has been asserted that without these particular rights "gross inequalities in wealth, education and status render civil and political rights highly theoretical" (Wharf Higgens, 1997, p. 289).[3]

The promotion of social and economic rights has been linked to the building of networks of association even across sectarian divides (Kaul, 1988: Heenan, 1997). Studies in Northern Ireland have reported on women's networks that have "transcended political differences" (Heenan, 1997, p. 90) to address social policy issues concerning health, unemployment and education. Within Israeli society the promotion of social rights can forge strong networks of association between Arabs and Jews, new immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia and Israeli-born citizens (Torczyner, 2000a). Similarly, Heller (1996) reports on high levels of social capital within a religiously diverse community in Kerala, India.

The exercise of rights structures opportunities for association. Such a process creates a context for dialogue fostering a sense of membership in an entity greater than the self. Eliasoph (1996) suggests that through this process of association people become good citizens and the accountability of both citizens and government expand (Moshe, 2001: Heller,

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[3] See also Steiner & Alston (1996. p. 894). The authors similarly discuss the impact of women's social and economic conditions around the world upon women's status within the international human rights regime.

1996). A balance between what Chapman (1996) refers to as "rights *and* responsibilities" (p. 14) becomes a mechanism to forge networks of association capable of bridging sectarian divides (Heenan, 1997) and to promote a common sense of belonging. Rights and the pursuit of rights become a medium to promote greater opportunities to forge equality and simultaneously to forge social capital.

5.   Social capital: Limitations

Despite the abundance of literature, both theoretical and empirical lendingcredence to the wide range of benefits associated with social capital, the term is not without "a dark side" (Schuller, 2001, p. 18).

For example, while a marked proportion of the literature focuses on networks of association as promoters of both innovation and social cohesion. Schuller (2001) and Woolcock (2001) contend that strong networks of association can be dysfunctional and far from fostering productivity and innovation, may stifle them. Moreover, strong networks of association may be driven by negative norms and exclusionary measures, detrimental to both members and society at large (Schulier, 2001; Edwards & Foley, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 1996). Social capital then can be a liability as well as a blessing (Woolcock, 2001).

Both conceptual and empirical criticisms surround the concept. Social capital has been envisioned differently by different people lending to reproach in that it has become all things to all people (Woolcock, 2001). For example Putnam's (1996) conceptualization of social capital has focused specifically on "civic engagement," while others have incorporated other kinds of networks of association as constitutive of social capital (Glaeser, 2001; Willms, 2001).

Bourdieu (1986) focused on "membership aspects of social capital," or what it *is*, while Coleman (1990) defined social capital by its function or consequences, or what it *does*. Still others have been driven by an understanding of social capital that goes beyond social relations and networks of association to include levels of trust, honesty and reciprocity, while some suggest that it narrow its definition solely to membership dimensions (Woolcock, 2001).

The conceptualization and measurement of social capital have also been criticized in that to date the trajectories of the concept have not been fully captured. Schuller (2001) for example suggests that despite the efforts to do so, "social capital is not something that can be evaluated in simple linear terms; that is, the more the better" (p. 22). As a dynamic concept social capital requires multidimensional measurements.

In some studies, social capital is treated as an independent variable while in others it is defined as the dependent variable (Foley & Edwards, 1999). Across disciplines, the term is defined differently. For example, Edwards and Foley (1998) report that sociologists focus on the concept as a social structural variable and focus on the networks of association between the individual and organizations. For political scientists, economists and psychologists on the other hand, social capital refers to attitudes measured primarily by survey responses. Such measurements are criticized in that they reflect individual subjective states and not the density of relationships within a given group (Edwards & Foley, 1998).

6. Conclusion

Despite criticism, social capital is regarded across disciplines as a positive resource (Putnam, 1995; Schuller, 2001; Wilson, 1997; Coleman, 1990). The implications of declining social capital on individual and collective well being, particularly in periods

marked by uncertainty and social division. raises critical questions regarding the role of policy and law vis-a-vis the structuring of reciprocal and inclusive relationships.

Schuller (2001) profiles four key benefits for the utility of social capital as a policy concept. First. the concept takes into account "the complexities and interrelatedness of the modern world" (p. 20). In doing so it expands on existing social policy too narrow to address multiple and diverse realities as they emerge.

Second. the concept of social capital focuses on the notion of relationship and social cohesion. As such it addresses not only individual development such as that promoted through increasing human capital. but collective well being as well. In a world that is increasingly interrelated. notions of the collective cannot be abandoned.

Third. social capital requires a long-term policy-making perspective. It must be developed and nurtured over time. As such it suggests long-term commitment between a government and its citizens. Finally. "social capital reintroduces a moral dimension into policy thinking...[suggesting that] the quality of relationships in any given social unit will determine its sustainability" (p. 20).

Social capital appears to ensure that both the individual *and* the collective are the focus of social policy and legal constructs. In the period that marks the transition from conflict to coexistence law and policy that forge strong networks of association can counter the uncertainty and breakdown of familiar norms and mores evoked by social. economic and political upheaval.

Chapter 3

Political integration and peace building: Managing uncertainty in the transition from conflict to coexistence

1.   Introduction

The promotion of social and economic rights counters inequality and social exclusion while simultaneously fostering networks of association. or social capital. These in turn strengthen social solidarity and social cohesion particularly rudimentary in periods of uncertainty.

Social capital however. cannot develop in a vacuum. A context that suppresses civil and political liberties hampers freedom of association and expression and consequently the exchange of information and ideas that make the proliferation of social capital possible (Woolcock. 2001). Thus. while a necessary condition contributing to peace building. social and economic rights alone are not sufficient. Notwithstanding their centrality to a peace building agenda. they must be coupled with civil and political rights. People must have opportunities to "have a say" in the societal reconstruction that marks the transition from conflict to peace in order to forge sustainable coexistence.

This chapter then focuses on the concept of political integration as a quintessential dimension of peace building that underpins the exercise of universal civil and political rights (Ake. 1967). Political integration refers not only to the exercise of rights. rather. and perhaps most importantly. to *how* and *by whom* rights are exercised.

In a politically integrated society the exercise of rights is characterized by a predictable and reciprocal flow of exchange between political actors (Ake. 1967). This means that political actors commit themselves to agreed upon patterns of exchange. Similarly.

politically integrated societies foster the active participation of diverse identity groups and traditionally marginalized communities in the exercise of rights. Hence, an active civil society.

In post-conflict societies commitment to such a political and civil culture is complicated by competing claims voiced by diverse identity groups. The signing of a peace agreement secures political recognition and paves the path to political sovereignty. Ake (1967), Foltz (1967) and Lipset (1963) contend that once the conditions for political sovereignty have been secured, national consensus essential for its endurance, weakens. Ethnic, professional, religious and social interest groups heretofore-subordinated in deference to the national cause now maneuver to consolidate political influence essential to promote their claims and values. These must be recognized in the post-conflict reconstruction process as dimensions of a legitimate exchange process.

Concurrently, post-conflict reconstruction necessitates the solidification of some form of national solidarity and universal identity. This necessitates the mobilization of diverse identity groups into a political order that recognizes national solidarity as a legitimate dimension of the exchange process. The exclusion of either from the emerging political order lends to growing polarization between the two, the universal and the particular, and can in turn lead to the breakdown of political culture, civil society, political stability and political integration.

The signing of a peace agreement and the societal construction and reconstruction that follow awaken what Geertz (1967) refers to as "two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives..." (p. 167). On the one hand "long-standing ties of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition" (p. 167).

reinforce a sense of identity, recognition and autonomy, providing a medium to weather change and uncertainty amidst newly emerging realities (Marris, 1999; Barber, 1996; Bauman, 1998; Friedman, 1999). The primordial or particular identity (Ben-Dor, 1979; Geertz, 1967) renders meaning and demarcation in a world marked by incertitude.

On the other hand, the "demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice" (Geertz, 1967, p. 167) and increased inclusion in the national and international arena require that some form of universal structure bridge diversity, creating a more universal identity (Barber, 1996; Bauman, 1998; Friedman, 1999). As Geertz (1967) notes, "possibilities for social reform and material progress" (p. 168) are increasingly dependent on "being enclosed in a reasonably large, independent, powerful, well-ordered polity" (p. 168).

The capacity of a political system to undertake and engineer the large-scale post-conflict social change entailed in societal reconstruction necessitates a balance between the two forces (Lipset, 1963; Foltz, 1967). Building a coherent political society from what Ake (1967) refers to as "a multiplicity of 'traditional' societies" (p. 96), increasing value consensus and eliciting individual and communal loyalty to the claims of the state (Ake, 1967) requires full-scale social mobilization to advance new patterns of exchange. Yet, as diverse interest groups within society struggle to defend particular needs, and as the dominant order struggles to foster *one* identity, the threat of societal fragmentation endangers the political unity necessary to secure the promotion of sustainable peace. Ake (1967) notes

> An atmosphere in which every interest group is trying to insulate itself against exploitation not only endangers the solidarity of the nationalist movement but also stimulates previously inarticulate interest groups to seek political influence. The net effect of all of this is the proliferation of political parties and the weakening of the nationalist movement (p. 20).

Politically integrated societies concurrently promote the particular and the universal through the inclusion of diverse identity groups in the civil and political channels that foster national reconstruction. Politically disintegrated societies on the other hand are characterized by the exclusion of particular identity groups from civil and political channels. In politically disintegrated societies civil and political freedoms are not universal. Politically disintegrated societies are fragmented and divided.

This chapter begins by defining key dimensions of political integration particularly as they relate to its capacity to mediate national and particular identities. The second section focuses on empirical indicators of the concept of political integration. Research findings are articulated. The third section discusses the role of civil and political rights in promoting political integration and curtailing conflict.

The chapter concludes with the articulation of principles common to social work and law that serve to structure the exchange processes that underpin social capital and political integration. This final section bridges the theoretical discussion of social capital and political integration and the measurement of societal trends operationalized in the subsequent methodology chapter.

The major thesis to be advanced in this chapter is four-fold. First, diverse identity groups and marginalized communities must be recognized as integral partners to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Recognition relieves the threat of suppression of particular groups in favor of the newly emerging and as yet unknown national identity (Horowitz, 1985). Second, advancing civil and political rights of diverse identity groups in the post-conflict period contributes to greater reciprocity and participation in the construction of a newly emerging collective identity. Third, the exercise of civil and political rights in the post-

conflict period promotes greater political integration between civil and political spheres and hence enhances opportunities for sustainable peace.

Finally, social capital and political integration embody processes of exchange. The outcomes of such processes are expressed in greater or lesser inequality and more or less political integration. Structured by principles common to social work and law, such processes can advance growing certainty in the relationship between a people and its governing polity and in civil and political spheres in a period marked by uncertainty.

2. Political integration: Theoretical explorations

A review of the literature suggests a variety of definitions for the term political integration. Despite this variance, there is an overriding consensus that political integration is concerned with that "which holds a society and a political system together" (Weiner, 1967, p. 163).

Jacob and Teune (1964) refer to political integration as "a relationship of *community* among people within the same political entity" (p. 4). They suggest that "integration is based on strong cohesiveness within a social group; and *political* integration is present when a *political*-governmental unit of some sort is cohesive" (p. 4).

According to Ben-Dor (1979)

> what is involved in the process of integration is the complicated task of attempting to bring together groups divided from each other by different sources of 'primordialism' and (1) to substitute for the different sources one common, central source; and/or (2) to introduce simultaneously with the existing sources a central source superseding them, thus linking the various groups together by a stronger source, but without attempting to break up the existing groups. The central, new source of 'primordialism' may be a 'nation,' 'state,' 'civil order,' or 'humanity itself.' (p. 26).

Ben-Dor (1979) posits that political integration is a two-pronged process. On the one hand diverse primordial identities must be protected and respected. This necessitates

recognition, both by the state and between diverse communities. Recognition in turn affords opportunities to gain entry into political relations (Bot, 1968). Recognition warrants inclusion in decision-making forums where policies affecting the needs and rights of particular identity groups are determined.

On the other hand, Ben-Dor's (1979) definition of political integration flags the necessity for some type of universal framework that is accepted by and links diverse primordial identities to a greater whole. That greater whole must be an entity that simultaneously recognizes and values the particular while binding the particular to an additional source. Together, the two dimensions of political integration reflect the necessity for recognition and inclusion of both the particular and the universal, rather than the bifurcation or dichotomization of the two. Both are integrally linked to peace building.

Jacob and Teune (1964) contend that "the essence of the integrative relationship is seen as *collective action to promote mutual interests*" (p. 5). Accordingly, the authors suggest that political integration depends upon the ability to actively promote what is common and in the process transcends both the particular and the universal. Their approach suggests that defining commonalities that address particular and universal needs simultaneously, promotes opportunities to enhance political integration.

Ake (1967) posits that promoting political integration requires significant social mobilization. While potentially disruptive to the political order in the short turn, greater social mobilization contributes to the long-term stability of a political system. Ake delineates four characteristics of a political system that ultimately contribute to its stability and integration.

First, he suggests that a political system should be authoritarian. He qualifies his argument by articulating three sources of government power: citizen esteem, the economic resources and information that a government controls, and the nature of the exercise of a government's constitutional rights and citizen response to its exercise of rights.

Ake's qualifications suggest that the degree to which a polity commands political integration is dependent upon the nature of its relationship with its constituents. A polity that fails to enlist citizen loyalty, that is severely limited in resources and that fails to exercise its rights in a manner that is deemed legitimate by its citizens, is limited in its ability to promote the social mobilization and change necessary to construct peaceful relationships with former enemies.

Furthermore, Ake posits that political stability and integration require a paternal form of leadership. Innovative leadership, the introduction of new norms and ideologies, renewed patterns of relationship, and the ability to empower citizens are primary characteristics of paternal leadership and essential to weathering the uncertainty that social mobilization and integration breed. Hence, while advocating for government monopolization of power, Ake simultaneously recognizes the necessity of addressing issues such as citizen participation in decision-making processes as an antidote to combat feelings of helplessness and alienation brought on by a sense of loss of control in the wake of major change.

Ake does not attempt to reconcile between what appears to be contrary components of political integration. Rather he suggests that both are essential to enhance the ability of a political system and a society to hold itself together. Hence the necessity to establish a balance between them.

A third characteristic of an integrated polity is expressed in its ability to promote a "mutual identity between the political class and the governed" (Ake. 1967. p. 108). Open channels of communication between the political order and civil society promote an atmosphere of reciprocity. A government that responds to the needs of the governed fosters identification and hence less need for coercion. This contributes to greater political stability.

Finally. Ake suggests that a stable and integrated polity is consensual. This means that the polity is characterized by solidarity and that "the hegemony of the political class is not threatened by a counter-elite" (p. 111). To maintain solidarity Ake proposes the implementation of policies that have broad-based support. as well as a collective sharing of responsibility by the political elite. To counter the threat of a counter-elite he suggests that the political class be comprised of a coalition representing the diverse identity groups of society. Consensual political systems can mediate the politically divisive effects of social cleavages.

Weiner (1967) proposes that the term political integration can be used to define five specific domains. The first coincides with notions of primordial and civil identities (Geertz. 1967). while the second domain refers to territorial parameters within which a government can integrate political units and exercise authority. Weiner goes beyond these however to define an additional three domains where integration is crucial to ensure societal reconstruction. Among these he notes a process of integration between the rulers and the ruled. a process whereby citizens are integrated into a common political process and. finally. a process whereby individuals are integrated into organizations that share common purposes and activities.

While the domains of the term political integration are diversified. Weiner suggests that what unites them are common efforts to foster social solidarity. Social solidarity is advanced within a context that encourages on-going interaction between a government and its citizens.

Teune (1964) defines political integration through notions such as the merging of political institutions, amalgamation of resources for common purposes, mutual consent to share facilities and consultation on differences and the avoidance of confrontation that is detrimental to either party to the interaction (pages 247-248).

Political integration increases when citizens identify with the state and determine that the state deserves their loyalty. Loyalty is promoted when a state recognizes and addresses the values and claims of its citizens, and respects diversity. A deepening sense of loyalty to the state enables identity groups to bridge between particular sub-group identities and the more universal national identity.

Societies in which the identity of the particular is threatened, or where particular groups are favored over others on the other hand, in fact contributes to growing suspicion and the breakdown of loyalty. In such instances political organizations and parties proliferate seeking to optimize power and avoid discrimination and threat. In such societies conflict and political disintegration are dominating motifs.

2.1.   Identity and political integration

Identity is at the heart of the concept of political integration. There is growing awareness of the power of identity groups to hold the allegiance of those who belong to them and in turn to profoundly influence political unity or disintegration. Burton (1987) asserts

that "effective political power rests finally with identity groups (ethnic. cultural. language. class and other) and not with authorities" (p. 23).

Threat to identity can be the impetus for conflict (Marris. 1996: Burton. 1987). Social environments that attempt to marginalize or destroy identity through policies and practice that repress the expression and recognition of particular values and claims, produce sentiments of frustration that lend to acts of resistance (Burton. 1990). Far from creating greater identification with a more universal identity. such policies serve to reinforce loyalty to the particular.

Horowitz (1985) contends that it is through collective social recognition that diverse communities are able to preserve identity without fear of subordination or retribution. It is the political system that renders the primary channel to attain social recognition. Inclusion in the polity advances "claims to group legitimacy..." (Horowitz. 1985. p.186). Inclusion in the polity advances the exercise of rights and entitlements critical to addressing group claims and values.

Identity. rights and entitlements are intertwined (Marris. 1996) and have bearing on political integration. The extent to which an identity group or community is recognized and respected has bearing on the rights and entitlements afforded by the larger society (Miller. 1993). Groups and communities that command greater recognition and societal respect. concurrently command greater rights and entitlements (Miller. 1993). Those who command less are simultaneously excluded from the rights and entitlements that a society has to offer and hence marginalized from the political order.

Promoting a context to structure participation in the polity creates recognition of the inherent worth and dignity of diverse identity groups. Identity groups that are able to access

the political system are likely to secure commensurate policies and treatment. lending to a growing sense of inclusion and expanding relationships within the larger polity. Those unable to access the political system are likely to be excluded from commensurate policies and treatment. provoking feelings of illegitimacy.

Hence. a society that promotes opportunities for the inclusion of particular identity groups in the exercise of civil and political rights ultimately reinforces expanding political integration and nation building. Concern for the particular ultimately benefits the society at large because it promulgates an atmosphere of reciprocity (Anghie. 1992). Moreover in periods of transition such as that that marks the post-conflict period opportunities for participation can help "to integrate people who otherwise are split and isolated by the processes of change" (Baker. Draper & Fairbairn. 1991. p.13).

This having been said. Cavanaugh (2000) notes. that in cases of protracted conflict "hegemonic control is exercised by the dominant political groups(s) and the state remains unresponsive to the needs of minority or subgroups. thereby impeding the nation-state building process" (67). Gurr and Harff (1994) add credence to this claim in their study of inter-communal conflict. They report that "nearly 80 percent of the politicized ethnic groups identified in 1990 lived with the consequences of historic or contemporary economic discrimination... or political discrimination... or both" (p. 6). According to their study "most [groups] are poor and are politically underrepresented compared with the majority groups in their societies" (Gurr & Harff. 1994. p. 6).

Ethnic. racial. religious and other cleavages hamper political integration and as such "compete with the nation-state as the ultimate focus of political loyalties" (Hayward. 1974. p. 175). Economic. social and political reconstruction requires the mobilization of citizen

loyalty. Securing the integration of particular identity groups in decision-making processes in the post-conflict period appears to be beneficial to the reconstruction process. Participation serves as a channel through which identity groups are able to advance human needs. The process of advocating for one's own needs is instrumental in redefining the relationship between powerful and powerless identity groups in society. It encourages the reconstruction of the relationship between citizens and government. Participation is empowering. It creates a sense of autonomy in that one no longer functions solely through dependency on the system. It enables identity groups, previously marginalized, to become active partners in the narration and construction of life. As such, a sense of control over one's destiny is strengthened, combating feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness that lend to social alienation.

Participation builds relationships and interactions that in and of themselves have the power to empower. Riger (1990) argues that both a sense of connection and empowerment "are integral to human well-being and happiness and to well-functioning communities..." (p. 287). Shils (1991) suggests that the practice of civil and political rights enhances one's ability to regard "other persons, including one's adversaries, as members of the same inclusive collectivity, i.e., as members of the same society, even though they belong to different parties or to different religious communities or to different ethnic groups" (Shils, 1991: 13).

Participation enhances affiliation and as such contributes to the development of community. Pitkin (1981) claims that "actual participation in political action, deliberation, and conflict may make us aware of our more remote and indirect connections with others..." (p. 347). She claims that participation promotes social change driving us

> To transform "I want" into "I am entitled to," a claim that becomes negotiable
> by public standards. In the process, we learn to think about the standards

themselves. about our stake in the existence of standards. of justice. of our community. even of our opponents and enemies in the community; so that afterwards we are changed (Pitkin. 1981:347).

3.   Political integration: Empirical explorations

A variety of indicators have been defined to operationalize the concept of political integration (Ake. 1967; Hayward. 1974). For example. Ake (1967) defines seven empirical indicators to operationalize the concept.

The legitimacy score indicates the degree to which citizens "identify with the state as an embodiment of their interest and therefore concede that it deserves their loyalty and the authority to exercise certain powers over them" (Ake. 1967. p. 8). The legitimacy score is measured through attitude survey research methods (Ake. 1967). The legitimacy score is an indication of the extent to which citizens sense that government addresses their needs and demands.

Using a series of survey questions designed to identify orientations to the national government Hayward (1974) explored parameters ranging from strong negative orientations to strong positive orientations towards government. The correlates of political integration included recognition of the national government as an important entity. the degree to which there is a sense of belonging to the national political system. and the extent to which government functioning is reflective of individual's values. Hayward (1974) found a relatively strong relationship between positive feelings towards the government and higher levels of integration.

A second empirical indicator of levels of political integration is what Ake (1967) refers to as the extraconstitutional behavior score. The score determines the "frequency distribution of the preferences of political actors between constitutional and

extraconstitutional actions" (p. 8). A system is considered to lack political integration when extraconstitutional measures such as arbitrary arrest, political assassinations of opponents and terrorist activity used to overthrow elected governments are employed. A politically integrated system is not prone to employ such actions. While Ake does not provide a score for extraconstitutional actions he does suggest that a high incidence of such actions indicates a lack of commitment and/or consensus regarding the ground rules of political competition.

The political violence score, a third indicator of the degree of political integration identifies the extent to which political violence is used to secure demands. In a politically integrated system commonly accepted norms and patterns of behavior govern political interaction. The political violence score suggests that frequent use of political violence infer that such a normative culture is yet to be developed. Moreover it is considered to be an expression of political actors' ambivalence to the existing normative culture.

A fourth indicator, the secessionist demand score refers to "an absence or withdrawal of commitment to the existing political system by members of the secessionist movement" (p. 9). Ake asserts that the number of secessionist groups and the strength of their following is an indication of the degree to which a political system is considered to be integrated or disintegrated. Societies with increasing numbers of secessionist groups and strong followings are considered to be less politically integrated.

The alignment pattern score analyzes the extent to which major competing political parties are able to draw support from diverse ethnic, religious, social and economic groups, as well as from different regions within a country. Analyses that major political parties enjoy support from a diversity of sociocultural and regional groups suggest a more highly integrated polity. Ake notes that it is an indication of "some consensus among disparate

sociocultural groups about the desirability of certain collective goals and the necessity for some degree of concerted effort" (p. 10).

The bureaucratic ethos score measures "the extent to which loyalty of the members of the political system is focused on the office rather than on the charismatic appeal of the holder of the office" (p. 10). Ake suggests that in a highly integrated political system, the members of the polity give their loyalty to the to the state and to its elected office holders in spite of personal sentiments towards the holder of the office. While charisma may be key in inducing loyalty to the office, such loyalty must be geared towards the office itself to remain stable. Hence, constituent support for a particular political leader that is not reinforced through support for the leader's party indicates that citizen loyalty is more heavily focused on the charismatic appeal of the leader.

The final indicator, the authority score of the state, refers to the degree to which the ruling polity is determined to be legitimate and effective in rendering constitutionally prescribed duties. A state that is incapable of carrying out its prescribed duties may fail to receive the respect for its authority by its constituents, lending to decreasing commitment to the polity. Ake suggests that a high incidence of the breakdown of law is indicative of lower levels of political integration.

Coleman and Rosberg (1964) discuss the centrality of bridging the gap between the elite and the masses through the development of a "participant community" (p. 9) as an additional indicator of political integration. The authors however did not attempt to define empirical referents for political integration.

4.   Civil and political rights and political integration

Civil and political rights underpin political integration. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights addresses notions of arbitrary arrest, liberty, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of association, the right to "take part in the conduct of public affairs," protection from discrimination and more. Where rights are repressed, marginalized identity groups will engage in alternative means and norms of exchange to secure their claims and protect their identity (Burton, 1990). Hence, levels of political integration, or the ability "to hold a society together" are threatened.

Various theoretical approaches examine the relationship between the exercise of civil and political rights, political integration and conflict. For example, the McAdam political-process model (1982) an evolution of the resource mobilization literature which holds that the central explanatory variable for political violence is the *organization* of discontent, or the degree to which dissident groups are able to develop effective organizations to secure collective goods (Muller, 1985), emphasizes three variables influencing collective political dissidence. The variables are: 1) the degree of organization in dissident groups; 2) dissident group belief in the likelihood of the success of collective action; and 3) the availability of political opportunities for dissident groups to achieve their demands (Muller, 1985; Muller & Seligson, 1987).

From the perspective of the political-process model, the level of repressiveness of the political order is a key indicator of the degree to which political opportunities are available to dissident or marginalized groups. Similarly, levels of regime repressiveness simultaneously impact upon the other variables as well. Muller (1985) and Muller and Weede (1990) suggest that extremely repressive regimes or "closed"-regime structures provide little opportunity for

dissident group collective action. Under an extremely repressive regime. dissident groups will experience difficulty in forming cohesive networks and. as Muller (1985) contends, "belief in the likelihood of success of collective protest probably will be low" (p. 48).

"Open" regime structures on the other hand. provide considerable opportunities for marginalized groups to actively participate in the political process (Muller, 1985; Muller & Weede. 1990). The belief in the likelihood of success of collective action is enhanced and as Muller (1985) suggests. since the rights of citizen participation are enshrined in law the plausibility of collective protest and violence is minimal, "since there are many feasible nonviolent alternatives" (p. 48).

Muller (1985) contends that "it is under a regime structure of intermediate repressiveness that collective violence should be most likely" (p. 48). Under such polities, opportunities for organization are made available. collective action is not too costly and yet the opportunity to effectively participate in the polity is restricted. Muller and Seligson (1987) suggest that semi-repressive polities may actually promote *pseudo-participation* (p. 430). Characteristic of such polities are media censorship. a non-independent judiciary. arbitrary arrests and detention. all of which are controlled by "the whim of the executive" (p. 430). Similarly. such regimes "erect a facade of participatory institutions but do not permit popular input to significantly influence government output" (Muller & Seligson. 1987. p. 430). Muller (1985) and Muller & Seligson (1987) assert that in such circumstances citizens may regard civil disobedience and violence as both an effective and necessary strategy to advance their claims to a fair share of influence and reciprocity in regard to political decisions.

Diverging from the societal level to the communal sphere, Gilbert and Specht (1977) conducted a study of citizen cohesion and political participation in 147 Model Cities programs. They found a relationship between the two variables and community outcomes such as cooperation and conflict. For example, in 56% of the cities surveyed, resident cohesion and political participation were low. In these cities there was little evidence of citizen collective action. Plans for the neighborhood were developed and carried out by officials and agencies without consultation with the residents of the neighborhood.

In 18% of the cities surveyed, residents organized several cohesive and militant organizations. In these neighborhoods while residents dominated planning processes they were not active participants in the community political arena. These neighborhoods were marked by conflict.

In 26% of the cities residents were well-organized and cohesive and experienced a high-degree of political integration. Gilbert and Specht (1977) report that in these cities residents and agencies worked together, the outcome expressed in expanding resources for all.

Study results suggest three modes of community behavior that emerge from the interaction between cohesion and political integration. First, when social cohesion and political integration are low, communities respond with apathy and alienation. The second, in communities where cohesion is high and political participation low, citizens respond through collective protest and ultimately conflict. Third, increased cohesion and opportunities for political participation enhance reciprocal exchange between citizen and the polity (Brager, Specht & Torczyner, 1987).

Brager, Specht and Torczyner (1987) suggest a fourth mode of community behaviour emerging from varying levels of social cohesion and political integration. They contend that in communities where cohesion is low and integration is high "the consequence may be competition among residents (i.e., community 'representatives' end up serving their own interests because there is no organized constituency)" (p. 82).

The mobilization of traditionally marginalized identity groups into a polity to exercise civil and political rights reconstructs relationships. Participation in the making of the polity satisfies needs for recognition, self-determination, autonomy, security, national and cultural identity and more (Streeten, 1981). These in turn have bearing on the ability of the governed to identify with the larger polity.

5.   Principles of Exchange: Advancing social capital and political integration

Taken together, social capital and political integration express the indivisibility of economic, social and political rights, rights that are essential to sustainable peace (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 1966; International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966). Furthermore the two dimensions, social capital and political integration demonstrate how rights operate as a form of social relations (Chapman, 1996; Nedelsky, 1996).

Three principles, common to social work and law underpin the promotion of social capital and political integration and simultaneously structure social relations. The three have been identified as fundamental to the promotion of coexistence (Torczyner, 2000a).

The first principle is universality. Universality refers to "benefits made available to an entire population as a social right" (Gilbert & Specht, 1974, p. 55). The principle states that regardless of differences among people, there must be a framework that provides for basic

human needs and rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948). Universality is an outcome of legislative efforts that make resources available to entire populations. According to Gilbert (1998) universal programs link the individual to the broader polity and as such contribute to social cohesion and sentiments of trust.

The second principle is reciprocity. Reciprocity means that individuals and groups have equal opportunities to influence each other (Torczyner. 2000a). Reciprocity is an outcome of legislation that ensures that people have resources to influence each other. Societal decisions are enhanced when all stakeholders have sufficient levels of resources to respond to the needs and concerns in society. Torczyner (2000a) notes that reciprocity fosters a sense of "commonality. and feelings of security" (p. 130). This in turn contributes to the social glue that reinforces the social fabric of a society.

The third principle is inclusion. Inclusion means that every person. regardless of individual differences. has the right to share in that which a society has to offer. The principle of inclusion goes beyond reciprocity to recognize that some people require special measures to be able to influence others. Inclusion is an outcome of legislation that provides additional resources to particular groups. Societies that are more inclusive are likely to be more equitable.

Taken together the three principles provide a framework by which one can structure more equitable exchange relationships critical to the promotion of social capital and political integration. Exchange theory explains how relationships between governing polities and constituents operate.

5.1. Exchange

The concept of exchange as it pertains to the relationship between governments and societal sectors and among sectors posits that there are limited resources in societies and hence no one can reasonably satisfy needs or realize goals without some form of exchange (Ilchman & Uphoff, 1969; Torczyner, 1978; Blau, 1967). Exchange is predicated on interdependence and posits that resources provide its impetus. The more one has the more freely one can engage interdependently. Where resources are limited so too are opportunities for exchange, the satisfaction of human needs, and the realization of goals.

Governments make choices as to how to appropriate resources and to whom. Governments are more apt to respond to the needs of those with more resources because governments require resources from these sectors that can only be attained through the exchange process. This means that those who have more resources influence decisions regarding the flow of more resources. Those who have less are excluded from opportunities to participate in exchange and influence resource distribution processes. The resulting imbalance means that those with more resources direct the exchange process and define the options for others (Marris, 1996).

Inequitable exchange both advances and mirrors economic, social and political inequality. Growing inequality reduces opportunities for autonomy and interdependence. Widening gaps between those who have more resources to exchange and those who have less foster growing exploitation, social divisiveness and increasing alienation, all of which are inversely related to social capital and political integration.

Social capital and political integration can be explained in terms of exchange theory in that those groups that are more cohesive and have greater opportunities to participate in

the polity have greater resources to influence the exchange process. Social capital asserts that socially cohesive networks can impact upon decision- making processes (Room, 1999). This means that those groups with more social capital are likely to be more politically integrated.

Governments use law and policy to reinforce or modify existing inequality by favoring particular groups over others (Rodger, 1992; Sherraden, 1991; Gallagher, 1997) and as such contribute to increasing or decreasing levels of social capital and political integration. Governments promote greater social capital and political integration through more equitable resource distribution and through actions that advance the unity of civil and political spheres.

For example, programs that strengthen economically and socially marginalized communities can simultaneously enhance networks of association between them. This in turn reduces isolation, enabling groups of people to organize to further the promotion of supplementary rights and entitlements. Consequently, such efforts simultaneously advance greater reciprocity, greater inclusion and more universal rights. Fostering more equitable exchange promotes social cohesion and political integration.

To recapitulate, more equitable exchange promotes the reduction of inequality, socially, economically and politically. Influence and choices are expressed through the exchange process and ultimately enshrined in social policy and legislation, the outcome of which is observed in greater or lesser inequality and greater or lesser political unity.

6.   Conclusion

Social capital and political integration are two dimensions that influence the exchange process. The greater the social capital and political integration the more likely the opportunity to influence the exchange process and thus ensure more equitable distributions of resources. Communities high in social capital and political integration reinforce notions of

reciprocity. More equitable exchange promotes the reduction of inequality, both in resources and power, fundamental to the promotion of social, economic and political inclusion.

Charlotte Bunch (1995) expresses the outcome of societal processes that fail to promote social capital and political integration.

> The exclusion of any group...involves cultural definitions of the members of that group as less than fully human. That definition of certain people as less human, as not deserving human rights or full participation in society, becomes the basis upon which violence against them is tolerated and sometimes even state supported. Further, as long as any group can be denied its humanity, we are all vulnerable to human rights abuse (p. 12).

In the period of reconstruction that characterizes post-conflict transitions the manner in which the relationship between citizens and between civil society and the political sphere are redefined will have bearing on the advancement of sustainable peace. In the following chapter, the methodology chapter, societal trends indicative of social capital and political integration are defined, bridging the theoretical discussion of social capital and political integration and the findings as presented in the two subsequent chapters.

Chapter 4

Methodology

1. Introduction

The research posits that societies in which social capital and political integration are high are characterized by decreasing levels of social and economic, civil and political inequality because there is greater opportunity for groups to influence the exchange process and thus ensure a more equitable distribution of power and resources. Decreasing levels of inequality and increasing opportunities for groups in society to influence the exchange process suggests that greater reciprocity, greater inclusion and greater promotion of universal rights characterize the society. These in turn foster a sense of belonging to the greater polity (Gilbert, 1998) enhancing the ability of the governing elite to advance sustainable peace between formerly conflicting societies.

This chapter defines the methodology employed to identify trends in social and economic inequality and trends in the relationship between civil and political spheres in Israeli and Palestinian societies between 1993 at the time of the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords and 1999. Analysis of trends in the seven-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords and preceding the outbreak of the *al-Aqsa Intifada*[1] provides an opportunity to determine whether the suggested conditions for the promotion of peace between the societies were advanced within each of the societies in the post-conflict period.

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[1] The *al-Aqsa Intifada* is the name that has been given to mark the second major Palestinian uprising in September 2000.

2.   Methodology

The research reviews indicators as they pertain to social capital and political integration in Israeli and Palestinian society and identifies trends in these indicators in the period between the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and through 1999. The study does not directly measure these conditions, as this would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather the study reviews through secondary data analysis the major research findings regarding social and economic and civil and political indicators as gathered by researchers and scholars in each of the societies.

Similarly, given that the two societies are substantially different, the study does not review precisely the same indicators in each society. Rather the study identifies indicators as they pertain to social capital and political integration in each of the specific societies.

There is considerable literature that examines components of inequality as it relates to social capital. For example, Boswell and Dixon (1990) and Kawachi et al. (1997) measured income inequality by the concentration of income in the top and bottom percentiles of the population. Based upon data from the U.S. Census, Kennedy et al. (1998) measured annual household income for 25 income intervals. In the same study poverty was measured by the percentage of households within a given state that fell below the federal poverty index.

This study goes beyond income inequality to explore trends in poverty. It looks at factors such as unemployment, education, including higher education and health as well. These components are deemed necessary because they are affected by and simultaneously affect income inequality (Kawachi et al., 1997; Wilkinson, 1997) and are related to social exclusion and societal fragmentation (Room, 1999), both of which erode social capital (Putnam, 1993b).

The literature also examines components that relate to political integration. Political integration is concerned with the relationship between a governing polity and its constituents. the civil sphere. The exercise of civil and political rights, voting trends, public perceptions of the polity, adherence to the rule of law and accounts of non-governmental organizations are some of the indicators that express the nature of the relationship between civil and political spheres (Ake, 1967; Jackman, 1972). These are the focus of this study.

In relation to this study, the following indicators were identified to explore trends in social and economic inequality in both Israeli and Palestinian societies:

1. Income distribution rates
2. Poverty rates
3. Unemployment rates
4. High school dropout rates
5. Rates of entitlement to high school matriculation certificates

In addition, the following indicators were explored specifically in Israeli society:

1. University enrollment rates
2. Rates of university degree recipients
3. Household expenditures on health

In relation to this study, the following indicators were identified to explore trends in political integration in Israel:

1. National voting trends particularly as they relate to marginalized population groups.

In regard to Palestinian society the following additional indicators of political integration were identified:

1. Incidence of arbitrary arrest and detention.
2. Incidence of media censorship.
3. The degree of integration between the Palestinian National Authority and civil society organizations.
4. Public perceptions of the polity.

2.1. Data sources and collection methods

Data sources for each of the indicators differed in each society. Table 1 and Table 2 detail the study indicators and the sources of data for each of the indicators as it applied to Palestinian and Israeli societies.

Table 1
Indicators of Inequality and Data Sources

Indicators	Israel	Palestine
Income Distribution	Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999; Swirski, et al., 1999	Heiberg, M. & Ovensen, G., 1993/1994; World Bank, 2001; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 1998
Poverty	Israel National Insurance Institute, 1995/1996; 1999/2000; Swirski, et al., 1999	Heiberg, M. & Ovensen, G., 1993/1994; World Bank, 2001, 2000
Unemployment	Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994; 1995; 2000	Heiberg, M.& Ovensen, G., 1993/1994; World Bank, 2001, 2000; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 1998
High School Drop-Out	Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995, 1999, 2000	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994/1995, 1998/1999
Entitlement to High School Matriculation Certificate	Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000; Swirski et al., 1999	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994/1995, 1998/1999
University Enrollment	Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994, 2000	-
University Degree Recipients	Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994, 2000	-
Household Expenditures on Health	Brammli-Greenberg, S: Gross, R.,1998, Swirski et al., 1999, 2001	-

Table 2
Indicators of Political Integration

Indicators	Israel	Palestine
National voting trends in selected population groups	Arian & Shamir, 1999, 2000; Kimmerling, 1999; Yishai, 1998; Elazar & Ben Mollov, 2001; Bick, 1998; Kaufman & Israeli, 1999; Shafir & Peled, 1998; Yiftachel, 1997	-
Public perceptions of the polity	-	Friedman, 2000
Degree of integration between the Palestinian National Authority and civil society organizations	-	Shadid, 2000; Shain & Sussman, ; Hilterman, 1991; Barghouti, 2000; Shikaki, 1996; Torczyner, 2000b; Salem, 2000; Dajani & Sullivan, 2000; Roy, 2001; Giacaman, 2000; Jibrawi, 2000; Latif, 2000
Incidence of arbitrary arrest; detention; media censorship	-	Amnesty International, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 1998; The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment[2] 1998; Lein & Capella, 1999; Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights, 2000

[2] Commonly referred to as LAW Society

Formal data collection took place during the months of August and September 2001.

Within Israeli society a research assistant visited the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, the Israel National Insurance Institute, the Adva Center[3] and the JDC-Brookdale Institute[4] to obtain the data. The primary researcher collected data from LAW Society, Amnesty International and B'tselem[5] and gathered selected data from published literature. Similarly, within Palestinian society a research assistant visited the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and representatives of selected non-governmental organizations to obtain the relevant data. World Bank data and the Fafo[6] Survey were collected from the World Bank and Fafo websites by the principal researcher.

2.2. Limitations of the Methodology

The study methodology is marked by a number of limitations. First, the study does not directly measure two core constructs of social capital; namely levels of mutual trust among community members and levels of civic engagement (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993a,b, 1995; Kennedy et al., 1998). Rather, it explores trends in related indicators that have been identified as significant to the presence or absence of social capital (Kennedy et al., 1998; Kawachi et al., 1997).

One might argue that the study of trends in related indicators is not sufficient. This study however contends that identifying whether inequality has persisted in Palestinian and Israeli societies in the six year period following the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 is sufficient to provide initial insights in regard to relationships among members of each society.

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[3] The Adva Center researches and disseminates information on equality and social justice
[4] The Joint Distribution Committee-Brookdale is a research and action-oriented Institute
[5] The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories
[6] European Institute for Applied Social Sciences

The first independent census survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics took place in 1994/1995. Prior to 1994. data concerning the study indicators was not collected by Palestinian sources, but rather by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

To avoid the possible bias of an Israeli initiated census of Palestinian society, data for the period preceding 1994 data was collected from non-Israeli sources such as the World Bank and the European-based Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science. In some cases the available data focuses on 1992 and not 1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed. While a serious limitation with regard to the parameters of the present study, it does provide a starting point from which it is possible to determine the overall persistence or absence of inequality in the subsequent period.

Some of the available data does not provide trends in indicators over the defined six-year period of this study. In these cases the findings focused on a specific period of time within the six-year period.

The study does not explore trends in inequality between religious and secular Jews, two primary populations in Israel. Data regarding trends between the two is not available in the census data.

Various authors have defined and operationalized political integration in a variety of ways (Ake. 1967: Hayward. 1974: Ben-Dor. 1979). These have been elaborated on in the third chapter. Ideally this study should have looked at each of these.

Having said this, significant variations in the development of each of the societies and limitations in available and appropriate data led to this study's focus on only some of the indicators. In Israeli society, the study focused solely on national voting trends in selected population groups in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords as a

measure of political integration. In Palestinian society, the study focused on public perceptions of the polity, the degree of integration between the Palestinian National Authority and civil society organizations, incidence of arbitrary arrest, detention and media censorship. While not a comparative study and hence greater leeway to focus on distinct indicators, the variance between the indicators in each of the societies is important to note.

Finally, it is difficult to assess from the available data the extent to which conditions of arbitrary arrest, detention and media censorship increased or decreased between 1993 and 1999. Hence, the study results reporting on the persistence of such incidents.

3.   Data analysis

The purpose of the analysis was two-fold. First, to determine whether levels of inequality have increased or decreased in Palestinian and Israeli societies since 1993. Second, to determine trends indicating increasing or decreasing levels of political integration.

Data was analyzed on the basis of a series of questions pertaining to each set of variables. In regard to those variables relating to levels of inequality, the set of questions pertaining to both Palestinian and Israeli societies was as follows:

1. Did the gap in income levels between the uppermost and the bottom income deciles increase or decrease between 1993 and 1999?
2. Did the percentage of the population living in poverty increase or decrease between 1993 and 1999?
3. Did unemployment levels increase or decrease between 1993 and 1999?
4. Did high school dropout rates increase or decrease between 1993 and 1999?
5. Did the percentage of high school students who passed the matriculation exam increase or decrease between 1993 and 1999?

An additional specific set of questions was asked in regard to Israeli society.

6. Did the percentage of students enrolled in universities increase or decrease between 1993 and 1999?
7. Did the percentage of students obtaining university degrees increase or decrease between 1993 and 1999?

8. Is a greater percentage of the population purchasing health care coverage in 1999 than in 1993?

In regard to those variables relating specifically to political integration in Israeli society the question was:

1. What were the voting trends of specific population groups, particularly those identified as marginalized, in Israeli national elections between 1993 and 1999?

The set of questions relating specifically to political integration within Palestinian society included:

1. Did the incidence of arbitrary arrests, detention and media censorship persist between 1993 and 1999?
2. How has the relationship between the Palestinian National Authority and civil society organizations been defined since the signing of the Oslo Accords?
3. What were the trends in terms of popular trust of Palestinian figures and religious and national political factions?

General data describing the indicators present overall trends for each society for the period between 1993 and 1999. Specific data is then presented to illustrate how particular groups in each society have fared since 1993.

Within Israeli society analysis of specific data focused on trends in inequality within the Jewish population and included males and females, Jews of Ashkenazi[7] and Mizrahi[8] origin, and trends in inequality between central and peripheral regions. Specific data also analyzed trends in inequality between the Jewish and Arab populations.

Specific analysis of trends in political integration in Israeli society focused on Jews of Ashkenazi and Mizrahi origin, Arabs, religious Jews, Jews of low and high socioeconomic status and locality.

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[7] The term Ashkenazi refers to Jews of Eastern European descent
[8] The term Mizrahi refers to Jews of Asian and African descent

Within Palestinian society. analysis of specific data focused on trends in inequality between males and females. between refugees and non-refugees and between the West Bank and Gaza.

4. Conclusion

The central proposition set forth in this thesis is that relationships between members of a society as well as between members of a society and their governing polity matter and that they are the foundation for the advancement of sustainable peace between nations.

Furthermore. the research suggests that these relationships are structured by law and policy. the outcome of which is reflected in trends in social and economic inequality. actions that advance the unity of civil and political spheres. legal obedience. as well as public perceptions of the governing polity's performance.

The following two chapters present the findings as they relate to the relationships between members within Israeli and Palestinian society and between the members of the Palestinian and Israeli societies and their respective governments in the period following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and through 1999.

Chapter 5

Persistence of inequality in Israeli and Palestinian societies

1.   Introduction

This chapter reports the findings of the data analysis as it pertains to trends in

inequality in both Israeli and Palestinian societies. Overall, the findings suggest that

inequality persisted in each of the societies between 1993 and 1999. More specifically,

within Israeli society, ethnic, gender, population and regional disparity were sustained.

Within Palestinian society analysis of the data points to persistent inequality between

regions, localities, men and women and refugee and non-refugee populations.

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first examines trends in inequality in

Israeli society. The second focuses on trends in Palestinian society.

2.   Trends in Israeli society

2.1.   Income inequality

The Israeli Income Survey, conducted annually since 1965 reports on income for

heads of households who are either self-employed or employed by others, as well as heads of

households who are unemployed.

Analysis of the 1999 Income Survey indicates that since the signing of the Oslo

Accords gaps in income inequality have widened. In 1993 the uppermost income decile had

25.1% of the wealth. The bottom decile had 2.7% of the wealth. In 1999, the highest decile

accumulated 27.8% of the wealth. The bottom decile had 2.4%. Analysis of the data shows

that the wealth of the uppermost decile was 9.3 times more than that of the bottom decile in

1993. In 1999, the income gap between the uppermost decile and the bottom decile grew to

11.6 times more. Between 1993 and 1999 the income of the uppermost decile grew by 2.7%.

while the income of the bottom decile decreased by 0.3%.

The Gini index points to a similar trend. The Gini index measures the gap between

absolute equality and extreme inequality. The value of the index ranges from zero, when

income distribution is absolutely equal, to one hundred, when inequality is at its most

extreme level (Sharon, 1996).

In 1993, the Gini idex for income inequality stood at 34.3 (Income Survey, 1999). In

1999, the Gini index stood at 37.9. A comparison of the two shows that between 1993 and

1999, the gap in income inequality grew by 3.6. Table 3 summarizes the findings on income

inequality among the Israeli population between 1993 and 1999.

Table 3
Earned Income by Uppermost and Bottom Deciles

	1993	1999
Uppermost	25.1%	27.8%
Bottom	2.7%	2.4%

Sources: Israel Income Survey, 1999, Swirski, et al., 1999

Gaps in income inequality between various populations widened between 1993 and

1999. Analysis of the average earned income of Israeli-born Jews of Ashkenazi origin,

Israeli-born Jews of Mizrahi origin, and Arab citizens was conducted. In 1993, Arabs earned

25% less than the average income for urban wage earners. Mizrahi Jews earned 11% less

than the average income. Ashkenazi Jews earned 29% more than the average.

In 1999. Arabs earned 44% less than the average income. Israeli-born Jews of

Mizrahi origin were earning 8% less than the average income. Jews of Ashkenazi origin were

earning 39% more than the average income.

Between 1993 and 1999 income for Jews of Mizrahi origin improved while the

earned income for Arab citizens deteriorated lending to growing gaps between the Mizrahi

and Arab populations.

Table 4 shows the earned income of the three population groups in 1993 and 1999.

Table 4
Earned Income By Origin

	1993	1999
Ashkenazi Origin	÷29	÷39
Mizrahi Origin	-11	-8
Arabic Origin	-25	-44

Sources: Israel Income Survey. 1999: Swirski et al., 1999

Further examination of income inequality reveals that despite an overall increase in

women's and men's wages between 1993 and 1999. income gaps between men and women

widened. A comparison of the monthly wages of men and women in 1993 shows that on

average. women's monthly wages were 58% those of men. A comparison of monthly wages

between women and men in 1999 shows that women's monthly wages were 60% those of

men (Swirski. et al., 1999; Swirski & Konur-Atias, 2001). Between 1993 and 1999 the gap between women's and men's monthly wages decreased by 2%.

Many women work part-time and this may explain some of the gap in monthly earnings. However, hourly wage figures show that women earn less than men (Swirski. et al., 1999). In 1993 women's hourly wages were on average 80% those of men. In 1999, women's hourly wages were on average 81% those of men. Between 1993 and 1999 the gap between women's and men's hourly wages decreased by 1% (Swirski. et al., 1999; Swirski & Konur-Atias. 2001). Table 5 presents the differences in monthly and hourly wages of women and men in 1993 and 1999.

Table 5
Monthly and Hourly Wages of Women and Men

	Year	Gender	Salary in NIS[1]	% of women's salary in relation to men's
Per month	1993	Men	5.856	
	1993	Women	3.404	58%
	1999	Men	7.833	
	1999	Women	4.714	60%
Per hour	1993	Men	31.1	
	1993	Women	25.0	80%
	1999	Men	40.5	
	1999	Women	32.6	81%

Sources: Swirsky. et al., 1999; Swirski & Konur-Atias, 2001

New Israeli Shekels

2.2. Poverty

Poverty in Israel is relative to the median net income. The poverty line per person is defined as 50% of this income (National Insurance Institute, 1995; 1999). In 1993, the poverty line was NIS 630 per person. The percentage of poor individuals stood at 17.6% in 1993. In 1999 the poverty line was NIS 1.272 per person. The percentage of poor individuals was 19.5%. Between 1993 and 1999 the percentage of individuals living below the poverty line grew by 2.1%.

In addition to measuring the poverty line per person, the National Insurance Institute has developed a method of measuring family poverty. In families the poverty line is calculated by dividing the total net family income² by the number of members in the family. Should the outcome fall below the poverty line per individual, the entire family is considered to be poor.

The percentage of families living below the poverty line grew between 1993 and 1999. In 1993 16.7% of the total population of families in Israel lived below the poverty line. In 1999 the incidence of poverty among families grew to 18%. This represents a 2.7% increase in the percentage of families living in poverty between 1993 and 1999 (Israel National Insurance Institute, 1999).

Additional analysis conducted to determine the extent of poverty rates between different groups in society reveals that the percentage of Arab families living below the poverty line was 35.3% in 1993. In 1993 the percentage of Arab families living below the poverty line was 18.6% higher than that of the total population of Jewish families living in poverty. In 1999, 42.3%, almost half of the total population of Arab families lived below the

poverty line. Table 6 summarizes these findings by illustrating the poverty rates for the total

population, individuals and families.

Table 6

Poverty Rates: Individual and Family By Population

	1993	1999
	Total Population	
Individual	17.6	19.5
Family	16.7	18.0
	Arab Population	
Family	35.3	42.3

Source: National Insurance Institute. *Poverty Report.* 1995; 1999

Research addresses the acuteness of poverty and disparity in Israel's peripheral areas

(Swirski, et al., 1999; Swirski & Konur-Atias, 2001; Peled, 1998). These areas are commonly

referred to as development localities and are primarily located in the South of the country.

Regional disparity in 1994 shows that the geographic locations with the highest

concentrations of impoverished families were the peripheral regions. In the North, 22.8% of

the total population of families lived in poverty. In the South, 24.5% lived in poverty. In the

development localities, 21.4% of the total population of families lived in poverty. This

compares to 15.9% poverty in Tel Aviv. In 1999, peripheral areas such as the North and the

South once again had the highest concentrations of poverty. Poverty reached a total of 21%

in the South. Development towns in the South had a higher incidence of poverty than the

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⁻ After transfer payments and direct taxes

overall national average: 20% as compared to 18% after transfers and direct taxes (Israel National Insurance Institute. 1999).

2.3.   Labor force participation

In 1993 the total percent of unemployed persons was 10%. In 1999, the total percent of unemployed persons was 9%. At first glance, these figures suggest that unemployment rates fell between 1993 and 1999. However, a closer look reveals significant change in the seven-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords.

Between 1993 and 1996, in the initial period following the signing of the Accords, the total unemployment rate dropped by more than 30% to 6.5%. In the subsequent three-year period however, unemployment rates crept back up to 9%.

The signing of the Oslo Peace Accords was accompanied by an overall shift in the economic relations between Israel, the Arab countries and the international market. Many of the Arab countries lifted their embargoes and prospects for economic exchange took hold. These developments coupled with decreasing unemployment levels created a reality that reinforced the seemingly unlimited benefits of peace. Decreasing unemployment trends however were short-lived. Rising unemployment from 1996 through 1999 initiated a new dimension into the post-Oslo period as the economic reality worsened for a growing percentage of the Israeli population.

Further analysis reveals that reductions in unemployment were entirely attributable to increased employment of women between the period of 1993 through 1999. Female unemployment decreased significantly from 12% in 1993 to 9.5% in 1999. Male unemployment on the other hand while decreasing from 8.5% to 5.8% between 1993 and 1996, returned to 8.5% in 1999. While increasing female employment reduced overall

unemployment levels. much of this decrease is attributable to part-time labor as discussed earlier. Figure 1 illustrates unemployment trends for the total population, for men and women between 1993 and 1999.

Figure 1
Unemployment Rate of Civilian Labor Force By Sex

Unemployment rate of civilian labor force, by sex

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Abstracts. 2000

Additional unemployment gaps within the Jewish population were also evident. The Israel Census Bureau provides two measures from which to determine differences in unemployment rates within the Jewish population. The first examines unemployment rates according to the continent of birth of the unemployed. specifically Israel. Asia-Africa. and Europe-America. The second examines unemployment according to the continent of the father's birth. these being the same as mentioned above. This measure captures the large

numbers of Mizrahi Jews who immigrated to Israel in the 1950s and who experienced considerable distress integrating into Israeli society. Much of this distress continues to be expressed in the experiences of their children.

Jews of Mizrahi origin whose fathers immigrated to Israel prior to 1989 accounted for 13.2% of the total unemployed population in 1993. This was 32% higher than the overall percentage of unemployment (10%). Jews of Ashkenazi origin whose fathers immigrated to Israel prior to 1989 accounted for 4.9% of the total unemployed population. Unemployment for Mizrahi Jews was more than 50% higher than unemployment for Ashkenazi Jews in 1993. In 1999, Jews of Mizrahi origin constituted 11.2% of the total unemployed population. Ashkenazi Jews constituted 5.4% of the total unemployed population. Unemployment for Mizrahi Jews remained more than 50% higher than unemployment for Ashkenazi Jews.

A comparison of unemployment rates between Tel Aviv (8.1%), considered to be the center of Israel and the Southern district (12.2%), considered to be the periphery, shows that unemployment in the South was 4.1% higher than in Tel Aviv. Looking at the development localities, the majority of which are located in the South, unemployment is even higher and stood in 1993 at 13.6%. It is the Mizrahi Jews who were settled in the development localities in the 1950s. Forty years later it is this population that remains excluded from the social fabric of Israeli society. In 1999, gaps in unemployment rates between the center and the periphery remained. In Tel Aviv unemployment stood at 7.9%, while in the South unemployment stood at 11.5%. Development localities continued to have the highest rates of unemployment at 11.9%.

Further analysis reveals that Arab unemployment was higher than Jewish unemployment in both 1993 and 1999. In 1993, Arab unemployment stood at 13.5%. Jewish

unemployment stood at 9.5%. In 1999. Arab unemployment stood at 11.4% while Jewish unemployment was 8.5%. Levels of unemployment decreased in both Arab and Jewish populations between 1993 and 1999. The gap in unemployment rates between the two populations also decreased between 1993 and 1999. Notwithstanding this decrease, Arab unemployment was 2.9% higher than Jewish unemployment in 1999, indicating the persistence of a gap in unemployment between the two populations in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords.

Table 7 summarizes unemployment trends among Jews and between different regions.

Table 7

Unemployment By Continent of Origin, District of Residence. Type of Locality and Population Group

	Unemployment by continent of origin, district of residence. type of locality and population group	
	1993	1999
	Continent of origin	
Asia-Africa	13.2	11.2
Europe-America	4.9	5.4
	District of residence	
Tel Aviv District	8.3	7.9
South District	12.2	11.5
	Type of locality	
Development Localities	13.6	11.9
	Population group	
Jews	9.5	8.5
Arabs and others	13.5	11.4

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstracts. 1995, 2000

2.4. Education

Education in Israel is compulsory through grade ten although high school continues through grade twelve. An analysis of the extent of drop-out rates for ninth to eleventh grade students in 1992/1993 and 1998/1999 found the following:

In general the total percentage of high school student drop-outs between the ninth and eleventh grades decreased from 7.6% in 1993 to 7.3% in 1999. While this suggests a positive trend, a closer look reveals that while drop-out rates for the Jewish population are decreasing, drop-out rates for the Arab population are increasing.

Looking at the Jewish population, one finds that the drop-out rate was lower than the national average and decreased substantially from 6.7% in 1993 to 6% in 1999. For Arabs the drop-out rate increased from 13% in 1993 to 13.8% in 1999. Arab drop-out rates were approximately 100% higher than drop-out rates for Jews: 13% for Arabs as compared to 6.7% for Jews in 1993 and 13.8% for Arabs in contrast to 6% for Jews in 1999 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995; 1999; 2000).

Students in Israeli high schools are required to complete matriculation exams. The exams are a prerequisite to higher education and are usually taken when students are 17 years old. Students are eligible to take the exams if they complete the necessary prior academic requirements.

Analysis of the data shows that in 1993, 62% of the total population of Jewish high school students who took the matriculation exam passed. 61% of the total population of boys and 64% of the total population of girls passed. In 1999, 65.5% of the total population of Jewish students who took the exam passed. In 1999, 69.5% of the total female population who took the exam passed as compared to 62% of the total male population.

Further analysis within the Jewish population reveals gaps in matriculation exam pass rates between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi students. In 1993, 70% of the total population of students of Ashkenazi origin who took the matriculation exam passed, making them eligible for the matriculation exam certificate. Fifty-three percent of the total population of students

of Mizrahi origin who took the exam passed. This represents a 17% gap in examination pass rates between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi students in 1993. In 1999, 69.8% of the total population of Ashkenazi students tested in the matriculation exam passed. This compares to 59.2% of the total population of students of Mizrahi origin who passed. The gap in pass rates between the two groups decreased by 6.5% between 1993 and 1999. Nevertheless, the gap in pass rates in the matriculation exam between the two groups, and hence eligibility for the matriculation exam certificate, stood at 10.6% in 1999.

Disparities in matriculation exam pass rates and eligibility rates for the matriculation certificate between central and peripheral regions decreased between 1993 and 1999. In 1993 63% of the total population of Tel Aviv students who took the exam passed and were eligible for the matriculation certificate. Forty-nine per cent of the total population of Northern region students who took the exam passed making them eligible for the matriculation exam certificate. Fifty-two per cent of the total population of Southern region students who took the exam were eligible for matriculation certificates. In 1993, matriculation exam pass rates and eligibility for exam certificates were 14% higher for students living in Tel Aviv as compared to students living in the North and 11% higher as compared to students living in the South.

In 1999, 66.4% of the total population of students living in Tel Aviv who took the exam passed. In the Northern region, 63% of the total population of students who took the exam passed, and in the Southern region 61% passed making them eligible for exam certificates. Matriculation exam eligibility rates were 3.4% higher for students living in Tel Aviv than for students living in Northern regions and 2% higher than for students living in Southern areas.

A further analysis of the eligibility rates for matriculation exam certificates between Jewish and Arab students also shows significant gaps. In 1993. 62% of the total population of Jewish students who took the exam passed. Among Arab students 43% of the total population who took the exam passed. making them eligible for exam certificates. This was a 19% gap in matriculation exam eligibility between the two populations. In 1999. 65.5% of the total population of Jewish students was eligible for the exam certificate as compared to 51.7% of the total population of Arab students. Notwithstanding an 8.7% increase in eligibility for the Arab population as compared to a 3.5% increase for the Jewish population between 1993 and 1999. a 13.8% gap in certificate eligibility between the two populations remains.

The data shows that between 1993 and 1999 gaps in eligibility for matriculation exam certificates narrowed. Notwithstanding these improvements the data indicates that significant gaps in matriculation exam eligibility persist between different population groups and districts. Table 8 illustrates the percentage of pupils entitled to matriculation certificates upon passing the matriculation exam by gender. continent of origin. district and population group.

Table 8

Pupils Entitled to Matriculation Certificates by Gender, Continent of Origin, District and Population Group

	Percentage entitled to matriculation certificates	
	1993/94	1999
	Totals	
Arab education	43.0	51.7
Hebrew education	62.0	65.5
Boys	61.0	62.0
Girls	64.0	69.5
	Continent of origin	
Asia-Africa	53.0	59.2
Europe-America	70.0	69.8
	District	
Tel Aviv	63.0	66.4
Northern	49.0	63.0
Southern	52.0	61.0

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1995; 2000

In Israeli high schools, students are stream-lined into an academic stream and a technological stream. Students in both streams are eligible to take high school matriculation exams if they complete the necessary academic requirements. Students in the academic stream typically have a higher percentage of students entitled to take the exam than the

technological stream. Data obtained about the relative performance of Jewish and Arab students in each of these streams reveals that among Jewish students in 1993 70% of the total population in the academic stream who took the exam passed. Among the total population of students studying in the technological stream who took the exam, 45% passed. Among Arabs, success rates are lower. In 1993, among the total population of Arab students in the academic stream who took the exam 48% passed. In the technological stream, 30% of the total population who took the exam was eligible for a certificate. The success rates for Arabs in the academic stream is comparable to those of Jews in the technological stream. Arabs in vocational programs who are eligible for the matriculation exam have the lowest success rates (1 in 3).

In comparison with the 1993 data, the 1999 data shows that success rates for Jewish students in the academic stream remained constant at 70% and the success rate for Jewish students in technological streams increased by 7% from 45% to 52%. Similarly, Arab students also had higher rates of success. In both academic and vocational streams, Arab success rates rose by 5% and more from 48% to 56% and from 30% to 35% respectively. Notwithstanding these improvements, the data indicates that significant gaps in matriculation exam success rates between Jewish and Arab students persist. In 1999, the gap in matriculation exam success rates between the Jewish and the Arab populations stood at 17% in both the academic and the technological streams (Israel Central bureau of Statistics, 2000).

Figure 2 illustrates examinees entitled to matriculation certificates in academic and technological streams in Hebrew and Arab education.

Figure 2

Examinees Entitled to Matriculation Certificates in Academic and Technological Streams in Hebrew and Arab Education

Matriculation certificate entitlement by examination profile

Legend:
—◆— Jewish tech.   --▨-- Jewish acad
--▴-- Arab tech.   Arab acad

Weinblatt et al. (2000) point to changing trends in enrollment in vocational studies in post-primary schooling. In the Jewish sector enrollment in vocational programs is decreasing while enrollment in academic programs is increasing. In the Arab sector. enrollment in vocational programs is increasing while enrollment in academic programs is decreasing. Weinblatt et al. (2000) question whether this trend is favorable in the Arab sector in that it can render an obstacle to higher education and thus lend to inequality in the labor force. Similar concerns are voiced by Abu Sa'ad (1998) who points to the relationship between low levels of primary and post-primary education in the Arab sector and subsequent stratification between Arab and Jewish sectors in higher education. in income and in the workforce.

2.5.   Higher education

Students who successfully pass their matriculation exams are eligible for university enrollment. Jewish men and women required to serve in the army for a mandatory period of three years for men and one year and nine months for women following high school graduation. University enrollment is therefore postponed until after the completion of army service.

In 1993, 8.8% of the total Jewish population between the ages of 20-29 were enrolled in universities. In 1999, 9.9% of the total population of Jewish students between the ages of 20-29 were enrolled in universities.

An analysis of university enrollment by gender shows that, in both 1993 and 1999, the percentage of women enrolled in university was higher than that of men. In 1993, 10.1% of the total female population in the 20-29 age group was enrolled in university. Of the total male population in the 20-29 age group, 7.8% was enrolled. In 1999, 11.7% of the total female population in the 20-29 age group was enrolled in university. Of the total male population in the 20-29 age group, 8.2% was enrolled.

Further analysis of the Jewish population shows that 4.7% of the total population of Mizrahi origin in the 20-29 age group enrolled in universities in 1993. Almost three times that number, 14.8% of the total population of Ashkenazi origin in the 20-29 age group, enrolled. In 1999, 6.5% of the total population of Mizrahi origin in the 20-29 age group enrolled. Of the total population of Ashkenazi origin in the same age group, 10.7% was enrolled. Between 1993 and 1999, the gap between the percentage of the total population of students in the 20-29 age group of Ashkenazi origin and the percentage of the total population of students in the 20-29 age group of Mizrahi origin enrolled in higher education

decreased by 5.9%. Despite this decrease. Ashkenazi students still constitute more of the student population enrolling in universities than Mizrahi students. Table 9 illustrates enrollment of Jewish students in universities among the 20-29 age group by gender and origin.

Table 9

Enrollment of Jewish Students in Universities Among the 20-29 Age Group by Gender and Origin

	Percentage of Population Ages 20-29	
	1993	1999
Total	8.9	10.0
Men	7.8	8.2
Women	10.1	11.7

	Continent of origin	
Father born in:		
Asia-Africa	4.7	6.5
Europe-America	14.8	10.7

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. 1995. 2000

A comparison between the Jewish and the Arab populations reveals marked differences in university enrollment rates between the two groups. In 1993, 94.7% of the total number of students attending universities were Jewish. Only 5.3% of the total percentage of students were Arab. In 1999. 91% of the total number of students studying in universities were Jewish. Of the total amount 9% were Arab. Between 1993 and 1999, the percentage of

Jewish students enrolled in university decreased while the percentage of Arab students enrolled in higher education increased. Despite changes between 1993 and 1999, Jewish enrollment in higher education remains higher than that of Arab enrollment.

An analysis of university degree recipients in 1993 and 1999 shows that in 1993, of the total number of students receiving university degrees, 52.5% were women. In 1999, the gap between male and female recipients of university degrees increased by 5.3% as women constituted 57.8% of the total number of university degree recipients.

Finally, in 1999, 94.3% of the total number of students receiving degrees were Jewish and 5.7% were Arab. Among the Jewish students receiving degrees, Jews of Ashkenazi origin constituted almost twice as many as students of Mizrahi origin.

Trends indicate that between 1993 and 1999 gaps in enrollment rates in higher education decreased between Jews of Mizrahi origin and Jews of Ashkenazi origin. Notwithstanding this trend, Jews of Ashkenazi origin continue to constitute the majority of the student body between the ages of 20-29 who are entering Israeli universities.

Within the Jewish population, women continue to constitute a larger proportion of the entering and graduating classes than men. Finally, while overall university enrollment rates among Jewish students decreased between 1993 and 1999, and while university enrollment rates among Arab students increased, the gap between the two population groups continues to persist.

2.6.   Health

The National Health Insurance Law came into effect in 1995. The law ensures a standardized basket of medical services for all citizens of Israel. It is funded in part by a progressive tax requiring families in the upper income deciles to pay a higher health tax than

they did prior to the implementation of the law, while families in the lower income deciles pay a lower tax.

Since 1992, and subsequent to the implementation of the law, an increasing percentage of Israeli households have augmented basic health entitlements through the purchase of supplemental health insurance (Brammli-Greenberg & Gross, 1998: Swirski et al., 1999). In 1998 and 1999, co-payments were imposed by the Israeli Government, to subsidize eroding government health care financing. Those who are able purchase additional health insurance. Those who find the payments a financial burden must manage with the services provided within the framework of the health insurance law.

The National Health Insurance Law was intended to ensure universal health care coverage for all Israeli citizens. In effect, however, eroding government health care financing and the purchase of additional health insurance by those able to afford it has lead to selective benefits, resulting in widening service disparity between upper income and lower income deciles (Brammli-Greenberg & Gross, 1998: Swirski et al., 1999).

In 1992, the household expenditure for health (excluding the health tax) in the upper income decile was 2.3 times more than for families in the fifth decile and 4.6 times more than for families in the bottom decile. In 1997, households in the uppermost decile spent 2.7 times more than families in the fifth decile and 5.1 times more than families in the bottom decile. By 1999, households in the top decile were spending 7.1 times more than families in the bottom decile on health insurance. Figure 3 illustrates the trends in average household expenditure on health among the lowest, fifth and highest decile between 1992 and 1999. Figure 4 illustrates the household expenditure ratios between the highest and lowest deciles and the highest and middle deciles.

Figure 3
Household Health Expenditures, 1992-1999

Household health expenses for years 1992-

Expenditure on health, NIS

800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

year

◆ 10th highest decile ■ 5th decile 1st lowest deci

Figure 4
Household Expenditure Ratios

Household expenditure ratios

expense ratios

8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

highest /lowest   highest / middle

2.7.   Summary

The signing of the Oslo Accords by the Israeli Government and the Palestinian National Authority was accompanied by the promise of the "peace dividend." A period of growth for the entire Middle East characterized by a booming economy, growing prosperity, and ample resources to promote development and reduce inequality in both the Israeli and Palestinian societies were synonymous with the Oslo Accords[3]. This was the benefit that was to make the entire peace process worthwhile.

An analysis of trends in Israeli society demonstrates that in certain areas there was some overall decrease in the gaps between different population groups and localities. This is particularly evident in eligibility rates for matriculation exam certificates and enrollment in higher education. Nevertheless and despite decreasing gaps, trends point to the persistence of gaps in income, poverty and unemployment between different population groups and localities, as well as in higher education and household health expenditures in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords. Despite the promised peace dividend analysis of the data suggests that inequality within Israel persisted in the six-year post-Oslo period.

3.   **Trends in Palestinian society**

3.1.   Inequality

Data of actual earned income in Palestinian society is difficult to obtain. Fear of taxation, and skepticism towards those who inquire about economic affairs lends to both the concealment and under-reporting of assets (Heiberg & Ovensen, 1993, 1994; The World Bank, 2001).

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[3] Shimon Peres, Israel's Foreign Minister at the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords, spoke of these in terms of the "New Middle East," a period of advancement for the entire region in the post-Oslo period.

To circumvent this limitation, the Fafo Institute[4] constructed a wealth index. The wealth of a household was defined as the "net balance of economic assets" (Heiberg & Ovensen, 1993, 1994, p. 1) and is comprised of income savings, inheritance, or other household economic assets. To construct the index, the Palestinian population was divided into three equal-sized groups, thus yielding a low, middle and high wealth group. A region or socioeconomic group was considered to be under-privileged, relative to the occupied territories on average, when its share of households in the lowest wealth group exceeded 1/3 and its share in the upper wealth group was less than 1/3 (Heiberg & Ovensen, 1993, 1994, p.1).

An analysis of the wealth index in 1992 shows substantial regional disparity in household wealth. Gaza was the region with the least accumulation of wealth, characterized by over-representation in the lower wealth group, and under-representation in the higher wealth group. East Jerusalem had the highest concentration of household wealth and was over-represented in the higher group and under-represented in the lower group. The high concentration in household wealth in East Jerusalem is explained in part by the high rate of Palestinians who are recipients of social benefits from the Israeli Government.[5] Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of household wealth in Gaza, the West Bank and Arab Jerusalem.

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[4] Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Norway

[5] Residents in East Jerusalem, unlike those in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are entitled to social security benefits.

Figure 5

Household Wealth by Region

Percent

Upper third
Middle third
Lower Third

Gaza | West Bank | West Bank | Arab Jerusalem

Source: Heiberg & Ovensen. 1993. 1994

Further analysis of the data shows marked disparity between central and peripheral areas. Within the West Bank, central sub-regions such as Ramallah and Bethlehem scored high on the wealth index and comparably to East Jerusalem. The wealth scores of the Northern and Southern peripheries were almost identical and lower than that of the central West Bank region. Within the Gaza region, the Northern area, dominated by Gaza city, scored higher on the wealth index than the Southern region. where the towns of Rafah and Khan Yunis are located. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of wealth by region in the West Bank and Gaza.

Figure 6
Distribution of Wealth By Region in West Bank and Gaza

Different types of localities are found within both Gaza and the West Bank. Among the different localities. refugee camps have the lowest concentration of wealth. Figure 7 shows the distribution of household wealth in Gaza and the West Bank by type of locality.

Figure 7
Distribution of Household Wealth by Type of Locality

Source: Heiberg & Ovensen, 1993, 1994

Disparity between refugees and non-refugees in Palestinian society is evident.

Refugees residing in the camps. the majority of which are located in Gaza. scored the lowest

on the wealth index.

In 1992. more than 60% of the UNRWA[1] refugees lived outside refugee camps. In

both Gaza and the West Bank. household wealth is higher for refugees living outside the

camps than for those residing inside the camps. Among refugee and non-refugee households.

Gaza refugee households outside the camps score lower on the wealth index than non-

refugees. In the West Bank. there is no difference in the concentration of wealth between

non-refugees and refugees living outside the camps. Overall. West Bank households have

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[1] Two out of every five persons residing in the Palestinian territories are recognized as UNRWA refugees or descendants thereof from the 1948 war. Two out of three persons residing in Gaza are recognized as UNRWA refugees. In the West Bank one out of four persons is recognized as a UNRWA refugee (Heiberg: Ovensen. 1993. 1994).

higher wealth scores irrespective of refugee status. Low concentrations of wealth among both

camp and non-camp refugees in Gaza together with the large population of refugees among

the total Gaza population pull the average household wealth for Gaza downwards. Figure 8

illustrates the distribution of wealth among refugees and non-refugees and among camp and

non-camp dwellers in the West Bank and Gaza.

Figure 8
*Distribution of Wealth Among Refugees and Non-Refugees and Camp and Non-Camp
Dwellers in West Bank and Gaza*

The World Bank (2001) report on poverty in the West Bank and Gaza identified

trends in income inequality. Measurements based upon the Gini coefficient show that.

between 1996 and 1998. gaps in income inequality decreased. In 1996, the inequality gap

stood at 33.2 for the total Palestinian population. In 1998, the gap was 31.8. The decline in

inequality was greater in Gaza than in the West Bank. Notwithstanding this decline.

inequality in Gaza remains higher than inequality in the West Bank. In 1996, inequality in

Gaza was measured at 33.8 as compared to 31.5 in the West Bank. In 1998, inequality in was

31.0 in Gaza and 30.7 in the West Bank.

Data analysis of Palestinian average daily wage income shows that, in comparable

fields of employment, Palestinians from the West Bank earned higher daily wages than

Palestinians residing in Gaza. Based upon an average Israeli daily wage of 100, Palestinians

residing in the West Bank earned 57.6% of the average daily wage and Palestinians living in

Gaza earned 47.5% of the average daily wage.

3.2.   Unemployment

Palestinian unemployment levels increased between 1993 and 1999. Between 1990

and 1993 unemployment rates stood at an average of 5.6%. Fluctuations in unemployment

rates show that between 1995 and 1997 unemployment rates were at their highest in the six-

year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords, increasing from 18.2% to 21.5%.

Between 1997 and 1999 unemployment levels dropped from 21.5% to 11.6%. Nevertheless

and despite this drop, unemployment remained 6% higher in 1999 than in 1993 (The World

Bank, 2001, p. 14).

Further analysis shows regional disparities in unemployment rates. Unemployment

rates were higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. In 1992, the unemployment rate among the

male population was four times higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. In Gaza,

unemployment rates reached 12%, while in the West Bank unemployment stood at 3%.

Overall unemployment rates among Palestinian women stood at 9%. In 1996 both male and

female unemployment rates were higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. In Gaza

unemployment rates stood at 33.5% for males and 31.2% for females. In the West Bank,

unemployment rates were 19.7% for males and 16.2% for females. Unemployment was

particularly high in the Southern region of Gaza where a large percentage of the population maintains refugee status (Heiberg & Ovensen, 1993, 1994).

Overall, labor participation is lowest among refugees in Gaza, where it stands at 63%. This compares to labor force participation among non-refugees in Gaza reaching 82%. Comparable gaps are evident among refugees residing in Gaza as compared to those residing in the West Bank. In the West Bank labor force participation among refugees is comparable to that of non-refugees, reaching approximately 82% (Heiberg & Ovensen, 1993,1994).

Finally, there are strong regional disparities in women's labor force participation. Between 1995 and 1997, up to 17% of women in the West Bank participated in the labor force. In Gaza, only 8% participated in the labor force.

3.3.   Poverty

A great deal of data is available on the conditions of poverty among the Palestinian people. While poverty figures vary depending upon the data, there is agreement among the various sources that poverty is extensive. The National Commission for Poverty Alleviation in Palestine defines the poor as those who cannot afford a basic basket of goods including food, clothing and housing, as well as a minimum of other needs such as health care, transportation and education. The poverty line between the poor and the non-poor is defined as the 30th percentile of the consumption of the reference households. A household with 2 adults and 4 children was considered to be poor if its monthly consumption was below NIS 1,292 in 1996, NIS 1,390 in 1997 and NIS 1,460 in 1998 (The World Bank, 2001).

In general, poverty rates decreased between 1996 and 1998. In 1996, 26.9% of the total Palestinian population lived in poverty. In 1998, 23.2% of the total population lived below the poverty line (The World Bank, 2001).

The data shows gaps in poverty rates between the West Bank and Gaza. In 1996, poverty rates in Gaza were two and one half times higher than the poverty rates in the West Bank. Poverty in the West Bank stood at 17.5%. In Gaza, they stood at 46.1%. In 1997, poverty rates remained two and one half times higher in Gaza at 41.3% than they were in the West Bank at 17.1%.

Central and peripheral disparity is found in both the West Bank and Gaza regions. In 1997, poverty rates in Gaza were highest in the south at 55.3% and, within the refugee camps, at 39.3%. In the West Bank, poverty rates were highest in the North at 30.2% and in the South at 26.6%. Table 10 shows the poverty rates in different localities in the West Bank and Gaza (The World Bank, 2001).

Table 10
West Bank and Gaza, Poverty By District, 1997

Region	District	Poverty Rate (%)
West Bank		17.1
	Jenin	30.2
	Tulkarim/Qalqilya	16.3
	Nablus	12.8
	Ramallah	9.9
	Jerusalem	2.6
	Bethlehem/Jericho	16.5
	Hebron	26.6
Gaza		41.3
	Jabalya	35.4
	Gaza City	33.8
	Khan Yunis	39.3
	Rafah	55.3

Source: The World Bank, 2001

Additional analysis shows marked differences in poverty rates between male and female headed households. In 1998. 26% of the female headed households lived below the poverty line as compared to 20% of the male headed households. The gap in poverty levels between male and female-headed households is greater in the West Bank than in Gaza. In Gaza, poverty in female- headed households is 4% higher than in male-headed households. In the West Bank. female poverty rates were twice that at 8% higher than male poverty rates.

3.4.   Education

High school in Palestine continues through grade 12. An analysis of the extent of drop-out rates for eleventh and twelfth grade students in 1993/1994 and 1997/1998 found that. in general. the total percentage of high school student drop-outs between the eleventh and twelfth grades decreased slightly from 13% in 1993/1994 to 12.59% in 1997/1998 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 1999). Despite this decease. analysis of the total population of drop-outs points to growing gaps between male and female drop-out rates. In 1993/1994. 5.3% of the total male student population in grades eleven and twelve dropped out of school. In the same year. 7.61% of the total eleventh and twelfth grade female population dropped out. In 1997/1998. male student drop-out decreased slightly and stood at 4.31%. Drop-out rates for female students increased to 8.28% in the same year.

Regional disparity in educational attainment is also apparent. In 1992. the Fafo population survey noted that the highest concentration of the total population who had completed between 10 and 12 years of schooling resided in Gaza and the refugee camps. Thirty-two percent of the total population residing in Gaza completed between 10 and 12 years of schooling. Among the population residing in East Jerusalem. 28% had completed

between 10 and 12 years of schooling. In the West Bank, only 24% of the total population completed this level of education.

One further distinction within the Palestinian population illustrates that in 1992 those students who attended UNRWA[2] schools remained in school somewhat longer (10.2 years) than those students who attended government schools (9.7 years). This trend remained steady in 1997/1998. In that year, of the total population of students enrolled in the eleventh and twelfth grades in the West Bank, 7.94% dropped out of school. In Gaza, the drop out rate was half that at 3.77% (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999).

UNRWA has served Palestinians of refugee status, the majority of whom continue to reside in Gaza, since 1950. Non-refugee status students are enrolled in the education system that has come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority in the post-Oslo period. Lower drop-out rates among students enrolled in UNRWA schools suggest that throughout 1998 the education system under the jurisdiction of the PNA was not yet positioned to prevent student drop-out to the extent that the UNRWA schools succeeded in doing so.

At the end of 12 years of schooling, students take the General Secondary Education Certificate Examination (the tawjihi exam). Pass ratios on the exam show that between 1994/1995 and 1996/1997, the percentage of the total population of students who passed the exam decreased. In 1994/1995, 63.51% of the total student population who took the exam passed. In 1996/1997, the percent of the total student population who passed the exam decreased to 52.58%.

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[2] The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established in 1950 to provide direct relief and work programs for Palestinian refugees of the 1948 Israeli War of Independence.

An analysis of success rates in the exam shows that both in 1994/1995 and in 1996/1997 female success rates were approximately 15.5% higher than male success rates in the General Secondary Certificate Examination.

3.5.   Summary

Data analysis of trends in Palestinian society in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords point to widening gaps in income by region and status (refugee/non-refugee) and persistent regional disparity in unemployment, poverty and education.

4.   Conclusion

Economic growth and development were expected to distinguish the Middle East in the period succeeding the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. These in turn were anticipated to have a positive impact upon the everyday lives of Palestinians and Israelis alike. Analysis of the data presented in this chapter suggests a mixed picture regarding the positive impact of the peace accords on the lives of each of the populations. While in certain cases gaps within each population decreased, overall, gaps in inequality between populations and regions in both Israeli and Palestinian societies persisted between 1993 and 1999. The "heralded peace dividend" targeted particular populations in each of the societies, resulting in far greater marginalization of those populations traditionally excluded from the benefits bestowed upon the mainstream than either of the societies had known in the period preceding the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords.

Persistent gaps in inequality, particularly at a time of immense expectation for expanding opportunities, can lend to the breakdown of social relationships (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). Considering such trends in Israeli society, Shatil (2002) suggests that they

create "a void which hurts the disempowered communities primarily. As a result, these populations feel increasingly alienated from the government and its institutions. and from the Israeli democracy, which are perceived as indifferent to their needs. their rights and their place in political, economic, social and cultural discourse" (p. 1). Similar trends in Palestinian society suggest that the same may be held true, lending to the breakdown of social relationships and social capital.

The following chapter presents data relating to trends in political integration in each of the societies, Palestinian and Israeli.

Chapter 6

Political integration:
Trends in Palestinian and Israeli societies

1.   Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of trends in political integration within
Palestinian and Israeli societies between 1993 and 1999. Overall, the findings suggest
that conditions favorable to political integration decreased in each of the societies in the
post-Oslo period. More specifically, within Israeli society the period between 1993 and
1999 was typified by increased fragmentation of the political vote. Within Palestinian
society analysis of the data points to consistent civil and political rights violations,
domestic crime and the breakdown of the relationship between civil and political spheres.

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first examines trends in Palestinian
society. The second focuses on trends in Israeli society.

2.   Emerging Trends in Palestinian Society

2.1.   Arbitrary arrest, detention and media censorship

Trends in Palestinian society following the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in
1993 suggest that the quest to secure territory and advance subsequent peace agreements
hindered the development of civil and political rights (Shain, & Sussman, 1998; Amnesty
International, 1998a). Shain and Sussman (1998) note that since the formation of the
Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian society has witnessed increasing tension
"between the need to secure Palestinian territorial sovereignty and build strong central
authority, on the one hand, and demands to nourish and maintain bastions of open civil
society on the other" (p. 276).

Kodmani-Darwish (1996) suggests that the necessity to "inaugurate its sovereignty and establish its authority" (p. 29) has led the Palestinian National Authority to suppress anyone considered to be a rival to its authority. The outcome of such a stance has been the indiscriminate and illegitimate use of authority.

Striking the balance between civil and political freedoms and national security needs and the maintenance of public order is one of the greatest challenges facing newly emerging political entities such as the Palestinian national entity (Ake, 1967; Shain & Sussman, 1998). Human rights organizations, both international and Palestinian among them, contend that the pursuit for peace, an expression of national security needs, has compromised basic civil and political rights despite the stated commitment of the Palestinian National Authority to counter human rights abuses. Some maintain that the implementation of the peace agreements diametrically opposes the upholding of human rights law. For example, Amnesty International (1998a, b). The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment-LAW Society (1998a) and Human Rights Watch (1998) openly criticized the Wye Memorandum[1] in that it subordinated human rights standards to security concerns.

The implications of such an approach were immediately witnessed in the Palestinian territories. While the Palestinian community responded through demonstrations and a general journalist strike, the Palestinian National Authority initiated an arrest campaign against Islamic opposition. Correspondingly, the PNA ordered the closure of Islamic welfare organizations and women's groups in the aftermath of the signing of the Wye Agreement (LAW Society, 1998b).

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[1] Israel and the Palestinian National Authority signed the Wye River Memorandum on October 23, 1998.

Reports submitted by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International

(1998a, b), LAW Society (1998a, b), LAW Society and B'tselem[2] (1999), Human Rights

Watch (1998) and the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights (2000)

attest to on-going human rights violations committed by the Palestinian National

Authority. Overall, human rights organizations express a sense that the Palestinian

National Authority has violated the balance between national security needs, the

maintenance of public order and civil and political rights. Table 11 presents the data.

Table 11
Human Rights Violations-Palestinian National Authority-1995-1999

	Arbitrary Arrest	Detention Without Charge or Trial	Media Censorship
1995 AI[3]	"Mass arbitrary arrests"	Several hundred Palestinians held without charge or trial, some for as long as four years	-
1996 AI	"Hundreds of suspected political opponents"	"Hundreds of suspected political opponents"	-
1997 AI	At least 400 Palestinians suspected opponents of the PNA, including prisoners of conscience	"more than 115 political detainees arrested in previous years, including possible prisoners of conscience, remained in detention without charge or trial"	-
	At least 1200 people arrested on security grounds	Most of the 1200 people arrested were released without charge after having been held for up to 11 months	

1998 LAW Society	November: 48 Palestinians illegally arrested	November: 240 Palestinians detained	December: 3 Ramallah based radio and television stations. Radio Peace and Love. Wattan TV and Nassar TV closed by PNA
Human Rights Watch	Serious violations by the Palestinian Authority	Serious violations by the Palestinian Authority	"Increased restrictions on journalists"
1999 AI	450 people arrested on political grounds including prisoners of conscience	More than 500 political detainees arrested in previous years, including prisoners of conscience, remained in detention without charge or trial	-
LAW Society and B'tselem	Arbitrary detention	Violations of the right to due process	
PICCR[4]	Arbitrary arrest carried out on individual and collective basis	No official statistics: estimated 150 detainees are held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.	Violations of freedom of expression and freedom of the press in particular: Closure of press offices: Al-Amai television station. Al- Ru'at television station. Al-Risalah weekly paper, annulment of the licenses of 10 newspapers and 34 magazines. Detention and harassment of journalists, confiscation of films and videotapes: journalist self- censorship due to fear

[4] The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights

Analysis of the data suggests that following the signing of the Oslo Accords and throughout 1999 civil and political rights violations were characteristic of the interaction between the Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian citizens. The six-year period saw the persistence of arbitrary arrest and detention and media censorship.

As set forth in chapter three, political integration or the relationship between a government and its citizens is balanced by its ability to maintain public order and national security. The protection of civil and political rights by the governing polity is an expression of a government's commitment to foster reciprocity and inclusion. When governments violate these rights, agreed upon patterns of exchange are disrupted, trust and confidence-building measures are shattered, opportunities to identify with the polity are interrupted and hence, political integration is hampered.

2.2. Integration between civil society and the Palestinian National Authority

In the period preceding the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994 and in the absence of a governing national polity, Palestinian non-governmental organizations created a network of social, political and professional services to advance the interests of the Palestinian people. Beyond fulfilling many of the functions traditionally performed by the state, these networks contributed to the development of civil society, strengthening the Palestinian social fabric through participation, mutual aid and democratic processes (Shadid, 2000: Shain & Sussman, 1998: Hilterman, 1991: Barghouti, 2000: Shikaki, 1996: Torczyner, 2000b).

The emergence of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the post-Oslo period has triggered a host of issues concerning the nature of the relationship between the political entity and the civil sphere. Some of the issues have included the division of

power between the two (Salem, 2000), democracy building and civil and political rights (Dajani & Sullivan, 2000). Giacaman (2000) suggests that of primary concern has been the ability of the PNA to "make the transition from a national liberation movement in exile, to a government accountable to people on issues that had not been faced before" (Giacaman, 2000, p. 17).

The manner in which the relationship between the two spheres is reconciled has had and will continue to have tremendous implications for political integration and state-building efforts (Shain & Sussman, 1998). Available data suggests that to date the relationship between the Palestinian National Authority and the NGO community is "hostile" (Roy, 2001, p. 370) as PNA President Yasser Arafat sought to consolidate political power and weakened civil society organizations. Shain & Sussman (1998) note that the PNA chose to pass over local NGO actors and instead to establish its power through "local social elites and PLO exile returnees" (p. 285).

Such processes have left many NGOs with a strong sense of marginalization and exclusion (Shadid, 2000). In his analysis of the relationship between the Palestinian National Authority and the NGO community, Salem (2000) characterizes the relationship as competitive and lacking clearly defined boundaries. He defines the PNA's approach to the NGOs as patronizing, seeking to exclude the NGO community from decision-making processes.

Barghouti (2000) contends that two contradictory forces have driven the divisions between civil society and the government. One strives for a democratic civilized Palestinian state characterized by the prevalence of the rule of law. The other strives to

preserve conservative systems of power whereby government exercises absolute power and citizen rights remain unclear.

Far from creating a relationship based upon notions of reciprocity and inclusion, both political and civil spheres within Palestinian society have sought to monopolize state reconstruction efforts (Jirbrawi, 2000), the result being growing divisiveness between the two. Shain and Sussman (1998) note

> As we have seen, the gap between the desire to liberate Palestinians and Palestinian territories, and the expectation of establishing 'democratic authority', has widened as a result of the PNA's tendency to exploit the struggle for liberation in order to suppress political critics. These actions undermine civil society agencies and frustrate democratic practices" (p. 305).

In 1999 the Palestinian NGO Law was passed by the Executive Council and an NGO Ministry established to address the needs of the NGO community and the on-going development of civil society. The Law has been met with criticism in that it is accused of attempting to regulate the work of the non-governmental organizations, vital for the development of civil society and the relationship between the PNA and the Palestinian people. Abdel Latif (2000) suggests that the NGO Law and the NGO Ministry will ultimately serve to limit the freedom of the NGO community in that the PNA is interested in consolidating rather than diffusing its power.

Analysis of the data documenting the integration between the Palestinian National Authority and civil society suggests that between 1993 and 1999, the relationship can best be characterized as tense. It remains unclear how the PNA will proceed either to nurture or suppress the on-going development of Palestinian civil society and to what extent civil society organizations will be included in decision-making processes affecting Palestinians.

Correspondingly, it remains unclear how the NGO community will reconcile with the authority of the Palestinian National Authority. In was in the absence of the PNA that civil society organizations were able to consolidate their power. The emergence of the PNA has necessitated a division of power, together with a distinctly new delineation of roles and responsibilities.

2.3.   Public opinion polls

Between 1993 and 1999 the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC) conducted annual opinion polls to identify popular trust in political figures and party factions. Popular trust in political figures and parties is an important and necessary condition influencing state and nation building, and impacting upon democratization processes and social order (Khatib, 2000). He states

> Confidence in political figures and factions promotes public compliance
> with state demands, organization and mobilization of the population for
> specialized tasks, the search for improvement and reform from within
> rather than without the burgeoning political system, and popular
> legitimization of the state's symbols and myths. Public trust also
> encourages the popular participation and political competition upon which
> democracy is based (p. 2).

Table 12 exhibits levels of popular distrust in Palestinian figures. Table 13 exhibits levels of popular distrust in Palestinian and religious factions.

Table 12
Popular Distrust in Palestinian Figures

1996	1997	1998	1999
20.5%	24.2%	25.4%	26.8%

Source: Friedman, 2000 - Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre

Popular political trust is important for mass political undertakings. yet trends in Palestinian public opinion polls suggest that large portions of the Palestinian population experienced growing distrust in political figures between 1996 and 1999.

Table 13
Popular Distrust in Palestinian Political and Religious Factions

1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
6.4%	29.4%	31.2%	28.9%	31%

Source: Friedman. 2000 - Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre

Analysis of the data suggests that while there was a change in trends of distrust between 1997 and 1998. the overall trend between 1995 and 1999 exhibits increasing levels of popular distrust in Palestinian political and religious factions.

Popular distrust has been attributed to what is perceived as the failings of the Palestinian Authority. For example. special investigations of the Palestinian Authority in 1997 revealed widespread corruption and ineptitude (Friedman. 2000). Moreover. the Palestinian Authority's extensive violations of civil and political rights have impacted upon popular trust. Finally. widespread economic distress has affected the popular trust in Palestinian figures and factions (Friedman. 2000).

2.4.   Summary

Within Palestinian society overall trends suggest that conditions necessary for the promotion of political integration declined in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords. Far from strengthening the relationship between the Palestinian

Authority and the Palestinian people, the events of the post-Oslo period appear to have

eroded the relationship

3. Emerging trends in Israeli society

3.1. National voting trends particularly as they relate to marginalized groups

3.1.1. *Overview*

In the six year period between 1993 and 1999 Israeli citizens voted in national

elections twice, in 1996 and then again in 1999. A significant number of Israeli scholars

have addressed the 1996 elections as a critical point in Israeli history. These particular

elections brought to the fore internal societal divisions, which had previously remained

dormant (Arian & Shamir, 1999; Kimmerling, 1999; Yishai, 1998; Elazar & Ben Mollov,

2001). Arian and Shamir (1999) suggest that the 1996 elections signified "the emergence

of sectarian interests" (p. 6), particularly those of the Arab parties, the religious parties

and the party representing new immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In their

analysis of right-left self-identification on the political continuum from as early as 1962

and throughout 1996, Arian and Shamir (1999) found that "the 1996 election exhibited

the highest level of polarization" (p. 17) within Israeli society.

The 1996 election occurred against the background of two extraordinary, albeit

very different events. The first was the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

carried out by a Jewish extremist in November 1995. The second witnessed the first

direct elections for Prime Minister (Elazar & Ben Mollov, 2001). The 1996 elections

enabled Israelis to vote for the first time through a system of split ballots. The Israeli

public was thus faced with the opportunity to vote directly for the Prime Minister *and* to

vote for the political party of their choice for representation in the Israeli Parliament. The

split meant in essence that domestic issues such as social policy, education, health and the relationship between religion and state, issues that in the past had been subordinated to those of national security (Bick, 1998) were addressed independently.

According to Kimmerling (1999) the outcome of the split vote was that "the electorate was suddenly able to express its more particularistic, ethnic, cultural, or religious preferences and interests, by voting for a smaller party, without endangering its collective identity" (p. 32). The result has been that Israeli society has restructured itself internally along six distinct societal subcultures: the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) religious community, the National Religious community, the Oriental Traditionalistic community, the Jewish secularist culture, the Russian community and the Arab community. Each of these subcultures seeks to reinforce its particular identity and further particular needs that have been sidelined by Israel's collective identity.

For example, in her analysis of "Yisrael Ba'Aliyah,"[5] in the 1996 elections, Bick (1998) suggests that beyond social and economic discontent with Israel's two main parties, Labor and Likud, the Russian Party's platform expressed the building of community pride and communal institutions as key tenets. This as a response to what many of the Russian immigrants encountered not only as Israel's inability to meet the challenges of mass Soviet immigration, but in addition as an alternative to what many experienced as exclusionary attitudes on the part of veteran Israelis.

Israel's internal restructuring reflects, according to Kaufman and Israeli (1999), divisions along ethnic, religious, cultural, economic and national lines, in light of domestic dissonance facing Israeli society. At the same time the Israeli collective identity

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[5] The Russian Immigrant Party

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vis-a-vis its relationship with its neighbors remained committed to the struggle for "peace with security"[6] reflected in the election of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud party leader.

Shamir and Arian (1999) suggest that the 1996 elections reflected the nexus between "internal" identity or "the nature of society, state and citizenship" (p. 48), and "external" identity concerning "the state's borders..." (p. 48) to an unprecedented degree. Kimmerling (1999) contends that at the heart of the 1996 election was the struggle between two basic orientations: the first, a " 'primordial identity,' a mixture of religious and nationalistic orientations" (p. 27). The second identity, " 'civil,' composed of universalistic conceptions of human and citizenship rights" (p. 27). The four years of the Labor-Meretz[7] reign preceding the 1996 elections had seen a revolution in the "secularization" (p. 31) or "civilization" (p. 31) of Israeli society and politics. As Kimmerling (1999) notes, "the Israeli state and society's basic 'Jewish' identities became, side by side with the Palestinian problem, the hottest public issue bringing the whole society to the brink of a culture war" (p. 31-32).

Shafir and Peled (1998) suggest that the peace process was "part and parcel of a profound and wide-ranging process of economic, social, political and cultural transformation" (p. 408) of the Israeli State. It was within the context of the "gradual transformation from a colonial to a civil society, and concomitantly in the gradual replacement of its republican citizenship discourse by a liberal discourse" (p. 408) that Israeli leaders conducted the peace negotiations. This transformation, according to Shafir and Peled (1998), not only enabled Israeli leaders to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization and advance the withdrawal from Palestinian territories as defined in the

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[6] "Peace with security" was the campaign slogan employed by the Netanyahu camp.
[7] Meretz is a left-wing political party best known for its struggle for the promotion of civil rights.

Oslo Peace Accords but, in addition, advanced the emancipation of the most marginalized ethnic groups within Israeli society. The erosion of the republican citizenship discourse, discriminatory on the basis of ethnicity and gender, and its gradual replacement by the liberal discourse, advanced the emergence of sub-group identities that heretofore had been repressed in the Israeli domestic discourse. Hence, the emergence of sub-groups identities in the 1996 and 1999 elections thus can be seen as part of a broad liberalization process that left the domestic domain increasingly fragmented and divided. In fact Shafir and Peled (1998) contend that opposition to the peace process reflects to a great extent the Israeli publics' apprehensions regarding liberalization.

Kimmerling (1999) contends that the results of the 1996 elections provided "legitimacy and recognition to the process of politico-cultural segmentation of the Israeli state" (p. 42). Both of the two major Israeli political parties, Labor and Likud lost political clout (Yiftachel, 1997; Arian & Shamir, 2000). Instead sub-communities, parties who represented what Yiftachel (1997) refers to as "Israel's social and ethnic peripheries" (p. 377) received increased autonomy and greater salience. Particularly for the religious and more nationalistically motivated components of the Israeli population, among them, the Mizrachi population, ultra-Orthodox and Arab voters it was a certain victory after the marginalization suffered in the reign of the previous Labor Government (Elazar & Ben Mollov, 2001).

Politico-cultural segmentation does not come without a price. Kimmerling (1999) warns that

> The new Israeli political and cultural map is by no means a multicultural
> state or society. It is not supported by any normative or ideological
> background that this social segmentation should be a desired goal. On the
> contrary, this division is viewed as a result of the failure of Zionist

ideology, as a beginning of the de-Zionization (or post-Zionization) of Israeli society, the increase of individualism and hedonistic materialism, and the decrease of the power and mobilization capabilities of the Israeli state" (p. 42-43).

While the emergence of Israel's sub-state collective identities may give the appearance of a more politically integrated system accessible to all of its citizens, far from becoming more politically integrated the results of the 1996 and 1999 elections verified that Israel is becoming more fractionalized (Nachmias & Sened, 1999; Arian & Shamir, 2000; Yiftachel, 1997). The overall picture as presented by leading Israeli scholars suggests a breakdown in political integration. The Israeli publics' abandonment of the two major political parties for smaller interest parties suggests that the relationship between the polity and its citizens is far from satisfactory.

Yiftachel (1997) refers to the 1996 election trends and the emergence of sub-state collective identities as representative of "deeper forces of resistance to state control" (p. 377). He suggests that "Israel's character as a settler and settling state, and its central project of Judaising contested territories" (p. 371) enabled the primarily Ashkenazi elite "to create a political geography of 'fractured ethnic and social regions'... achieved by dispersing minorities and legitimising segregation and inequality, all in the name of the 'national interest'" (p. 371). The backlash of these processes fifty odd years later are expressed according to Yiftachel (1997) in

> growing levels of anti-state protest, the surge of non-Zionist parties among Palestinian-Arabs, the rising militancy of Jewish and Muslim fundamentalists, the rise of anti-Labor (and often politically independent) local leaders in development towns, or the strengthening of the Sephardi Orthodox identity among the Mizrahi poor (p. 377).

The rise in support for parties representing Israel's socially and ethnically marginalized populations and the decline in support for Israel's two major political parties

in the 1996 elections suggests a process of emancipation from state control among "Mizrahi. religious. Haredi. and Arab voters" (Yiftachel. 1997, p. 377).

Finally. in both the 1996 and the 1999 elections Israelis made a clear distinction between the political leader and the political leader's party, voting for a particular leader without giving his party support. For example, in the 1996 election the Labor Party won more Knesset seats than the Likud Party yet lost the prime minister race (Arian & Shamir, 2000). The multiplicity of elected political parties complicated the ability of the Prime Minister to construct a politically integrated entity capable of reaching beyond particular interests to address the greater social. economic. political and cultural transformation characterizing Israeli society.

3.1.2. *Voting patterns among specific groups in the 1996 and 1999 elections*

This section explores the voting patterns of groups traditionally marginalized from mainstream Israeli society. The section does not analyze the voting results of the entire gamut of Israel's marginalized groups as that would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather. two specific groups are explored as examples of the broader voting patterns of Israel's marginalized communities and as indicators of declining political integration in Israeli society as presented in the above section.

3.1.3 *Arab-Palestinian[8] voting trends*

In their analysis of electoral trends. Kaufman and Israeli (1999) suggest that Arab-Palestinian voters residing in Israel have traditionally made less than effective use of their voting power. They cite the a priori exclusion of the Arab-Palestinian population from Zionist ideology together with minimal recognition of minority influence on a

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[8] Identifying with the struggle of the Palestinian people, many Arabs residing in Israel have begun to identify themselves as Arab-Palestinians.

Jewish majority controlled political establishment as primary rationale for their sense of inefficacy.

The 1996 elections were a turning point for the Arab-Palestinian voters. The 1996 split vote enabled Arab-Palestinian voters to elect for the first time a total of eleven Arab members to the Knesset (Kaufman & Israeli, 1999), while simultaneously supporting the left-wing Labor Party agenda for peace. Arab representation in the 14th Knesset thus increased by three seats as compared to the eight held in the 13th Knesset. And, as Frisch (1998) notes, "for the first time in the history of the state, the number of Arab and Druze[9] representatives in the Knesset were almost proportionate to their percentage in the actual electorate" (p. 104).

Of particular interest is the Bedouin[10] community vote. Frisch (2001) notes that among the Bedouin residing in the south of Israel

> some 74.5 percent voted for the three Arab parties, higher than the average for the Arab sector as a whole. In the 1992 elections they were the most conservative in their electoral preferences among the Muslims and Christians. In the 1992 elections, 60.1 percent voted for Jewish parties and only 39.4 percent voted for either the DFPE[11] and the United Arab List.

Frisch suggests that the Bedouin's community departure from the Jewish parties "must be seen as a protest vote". The Bedouin are, according to Frisch (2001), "the most disadvantaged sub-sector in Israeli society by almost every criterion." (p. 51). Table 14 shows the voting results in the 1996 and the 1999 elections by the Bedouin community. The Bedouin vote in the 1996 and 1999 elections represented a position that can be summed up in the notion of "taking care of one's own."

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[9] The Druze are a particular sect of the Arab population, residing primarily in the North of Israel.
[10] The Bedouin are a particular sect of the Arab population.

Table 14

A Comparison of Knesset[12] Results in the Bedouin Sector for Major Parties, 1996-1999
(in percent)

	1996	1999
One Israel (Labor party)	14.9	4
Hadash	2.3	4.8
Likud	1.5	0.7
Meretz	5.1	6.2
United Arab List	64.2	67.5
UDA (Balad)	-	2.2
Shas	0.5	3.4

Source: Frisch, 2001

The Arab victory in the 1996 elections was a victory for minority representation within the hegemonic majority. At the same time it was a victory within the Arab-Palestinian community itself for it marked an end to what had been a 20-year trend whereby the Arab vote was increasingly fragmented (Frisch, 1998; Kaufman & Israeli, 1999). In other words the 1996 elections afforded the Arab-Palestinian community greater internal cohesion, while simultaneously securing greater political representation.

In and of themselves each of these processes can be viewed as a positive advancement towards greater political integration. Increasing internal group cohesion has secured greater representation in the Knesset for previously marginalized groups. However, it has simultaneously led to the prioritizing of particular group interests often over a more universal agenda capable of attending to the state of societal transformation that characterizes Israel in the aftermath of the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords.

Given the "fierce competition for hegemony" (Shafir & Peled, 1998, p. 422) being waged in Israel it is difficult to know whether it will be possible to construct a

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[12] Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.

universal identity that will, on the one hand, unite diverse sub-group identities within a common entity and, on the other, will preserve sub-group identities and ensure inclusion for those groups traditionally excluded from full benefits (Shafir & Peled, 1998). In the interim the internal war is expressed in coalitions. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for example was elected in 1996 by a coalition of traditionally marginalized and excluded Jewish groups, including Mizrahi Jews, religious Zionists and the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community (Shafir & Peled, 1998).

Given the above, it appears that in the period between 1993 and 1999 Israel's domestic state and its ability to move towards a final peace settlement can best be characterized as a "catch 22" relationship. On the one hand, internal divisiveness hindered necessary support to meet the demands of the evolving peace process. On the other hand, the uncertainty of a secure peace further polarized internal forces making it impossible to promote a more rather than less universally accepted agenda, both domestically and with the Palestinians. The results of this "catch 22" are visible in the Israeli Governments' retraction of its commitment to the Oslo Accords (Peled, 2002) as well as in domestic socioeconomic retrenchment strategies, the outcomes of which were presented in the previous chapter.

3.1.4 *Ethnicity, class and voting trends in the 1999 elections*

Studies of electoral behavior in Israel have traditionally focused on ethnic and religious cleavages, placing little emphasis on class divisions as a factor structuring voting trends. Shalev, Peled and Yiftachel (2000) however explored the impact of inequality on election trends in the 1999 elections.

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[2] The Knesset is the Israeli Parliament.

Voting patterns for Statistical Areas defined either by types of locality or their

social composition revealed that in the 1999 election the Prime Ministerial ballot and

support for the Shas Party[13] in the Knesset vote were characterized by a wide gap

separating the most and least affluent quintiles of the Statistical Areas. Table 15 presents

the aggregate results for 1,968 predominantly Jewish Statistical Areas (except for class

composition, which excludes kibbutz and ultra-Orthodox localities, n=1,491).

Table 15
Vote by Type of Location (In percent)

National total (Jewish	Netanyahu	Shas
	49	14
Type of settlement		
Kibbutzim	10	1
Moshavim: Ashkenazi-dominant	22	2
Development Towns	60	22
Moshavim-Mizrahi-dominant	68	29
Settlements (occupied territories)	83	12
Locally "dominant" social groups		
Ashkenazi	33	5
"Russians"	51	11
Mizrachi-North Africa	67	31
Mizrachi-Asia	68	29
Ultra-Orthodox	78	20
Class composition		
Affluence: highest 20%	25	4
Affluence: lowest 20%	68	28

Source: Shalev, Peled and Yiftachel (2000), p. 6.

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[13] Shas is the political party representing primarily Mizrahi [religious] Jews.

Voting trends for the Prime Minister were extremely homogeneous in particular localities. Among kibbutz voters, 90% supported the candidate of the left. Among Jews living in the Occupied Territories and those residing in ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods approximately 80% supported the candidate for the right, Benjamin Netanyahu.

Class and ethnic voting were particularly evident in relation to the Shas party. As opposed to Ahkenazi communities, Mizrahi communities supported the Shas party by a margin of roughly six to one. In relation to affluence the gap separating the vote between the most and the least affluent was similar. Shalev, Peled and Yiftachel (2000) explain the impressive Mizrahi, lower socioeconomic status vote for the Shas party by their ability to address the socioeconomic interests of this disadvantaged community while simultaneously reinforcing primordial identity. Hence, the Shas Party serves to buffer the effects of the market where the Mizrahi community is at an obvious disadvantage[14] while concurrently challenging the dominant Israeli [Ashkenazi] identity.

The 1995 Israeli census identifies a correlation between the standard of living in Statistical Areas and ethnic dominance of the area (Shalev, Peled and Yiftachel, 2000). Given this correlation the researchers were able to determine the joint effects of ethnic and class composition on voting trends across Statistical Areas. Chart 1 presents class, ethnicity and voting in the 1999 election.

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[14] See study results as reported in chapter six.

Chart 1
Class. Ethnicity and Voting in 1999

Netanyahu

Likud

Shas

Meretz

Source: Shalev. Peled and Yiftachel. 2000, p. 21
The top line in each graph represents the Ashkenazi population and the bottom line is representative of the Mizrahi population. save for the Shas graph. where the top line represents the Mizrahi population and the bottom line the Ashkenazi population.

Analysis of the data suggests two findings particularly relevant to this study. The first, ethnic voting was universal. In each of the cases presented there was a sizeable gap between the Ashkenazi and the Mizrahi vote.

The second, class voting is evident. Moving from poorer to richer areas the results show that support for the left rises. yet declines in relation to Benjamin Netanyahu and the Shas party. The vote for the Likud Party is the exception. In the 1999 election the Likud Party lost its longstanding advantage among the poor. particularly the Mizrahi poor who placed their vote in the Shas party.

3.1.5. *Summary*

The 1996 and 1999 Israeli elections can been seen as what Gurr & Harff (1994) refers to as an act of political mobilization by marginalized groups to break out of their marginalized positions. Yet. as the data suggests. such mobilization can "breed and institutionalize divisions on specific goals and strategies. particularly with a protracted national conflict in the background" (Kaufman & Israeli. 1999. p. 109). Hence. while political mobilization in and of itself can be a powerful tool of empowerment for traditionally marginalized groups. it can correspondingly weaken the public arena due to politicized social divisions, intra and inter-party splits and competition. Such seems to be the case in the post-Oslo period in Israel.

4. Conclusion

Overall. the study results suggest that in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords. both Palestinian and Israeli societies experienced a paucity of political integration. In each of the societies. study results suggest that the relationship between the state and its citizens was characterized by tension and growing fragmentation.

In Palestinian society the Palestinian National Authority and the NGO community failed to create a working partnership. Moreover. data suggests that the Palestinian National Authority was less than supportive of the NGO community and its activity. In addition. civil and political rights violations persisted within the Palestinian territories under Palestinian National Authority rule.

Within Israeli societies voting patterns suggest that while the country was able to rally around the national peace and security agenda, domestic divisions led to the proliferation of particularistic political parties and particularistic voting patterns.

In the following chapter these results will be revisited in the context of the study's theoretical framework.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

1.   Introduction

The theoretical framework set forth in this study states that the accumulation of domestic social capital and the political integration of members of a society are two conditions that contribute to peace-building efforts. The accumulation of social capital and enhanced political integration enables diverse groups within a society to engage in and influence exchange relationships. particularly crucial in periods of major social. economic and political change and uncertainty such as that characterizing the transition from conflict to peace.

Social. economic. civil and political rights underpin social capital and political integration. The two dimensions. social capital and political integration. underscore the universality and indivisibility of human rights and their centrality to peace-building efforts.

Social and economic inequality and civil and political exclusion undermine social capital and political integration. Persistent inequality and enduring political fragmentation impair exchange relationships among members of a society and a society and its governing elite. Inequality and exclusion lend to growing polarization. insulation and the breakdown of social solidarity. all of which diminish a society's ability to weather post-conflict reconstruction.

Analysis of standard socio-economic indicators show that overall in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords. inequality in both Israeli and Palestinian societies persisted. Furthermore. study results show that political fragmentation as opposed to growing integration distinguished the domestic condition of each of the societies.

Concurrently, political blunders, violence and the struggle to gain greater territorial sovereignty (Shain & Sussman, 1998) characterized the Palestinian-Israeli relationship in the post-Oslo period. Reflecting on the link between domestic and inter-communal conditions, Pinker (2002) contends that on-going political violence and war "invariably reverses the processes by which the civil, political and social rights of citizenship gradually evolve..." (p. vi). Consequently, such trends set in motion "complex counter processes of decivilization, disenfranchisement and desocialization" (p. vi). These counter-processes in turn provoke a reality whereby a society "faced with the threat of internal insurgency and secession, cannot be expected to concede part of its territory..." (Pinker, 2002, p. vi). Hence, the pursuit for universal civil, political, social and economic rights are subordinated to "a singular and over-riding preoccupation" (p. vi), with the struggle for land, land being the symbol of welfare aspirations and rights of citizenship (Pinker, 2002).

Ultimately, Palestinian and Israeli partners will return to the negotiation table to renew efforts towards resolution of the conflict. However, this study suggests that these efforts will continue to be undermined if parallel to inter-communal negotiations, unconstrained attempts to foster greater domestic social, economic, civil and political equality and integration are sidelined. Today, ten years after the signing of the Oslo Accords, facts on the ground suggest that these conditions have not only persisted, but have significantly worsened in some areas (Lior, 2002).

This chapter revisits the theoretical framework in light of the study results and addresses the role of social work and law in promoting policy and practice to advance equality and enhance inclusion within Israeli and Palestinian societies. This at the very same time that inter-communal relations between the two continue to deteriorate.

2.   Cleavages in Israeli and Palestinian societies

Study results suggest that overall in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords, inequality and political fragmentation persisted in both Israeli and Palestinian societies. Within Israeli society four cleavages are particularly apparent. They are expressed in gaps between Jewish and Arab populations, gaps between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews, inequality between central and peripheral localities and finally, between men and women.

As a whole, the Jewish population in Israel remains at a clear advantage over the Arab population. Gaps in educational levels, employment and income persist and hence the opportunities that higher education and higher income present.

Within the Jewish population inequalities between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews persisted in the six-year period following the signing of the Oslo Accords. Ashkenazi Jews continue to command greater educational success through high school, greater access to higher education and higher income. Jews of Ashkenazi origin are less likely than their Mizrahi counterparts to find themselves unemployed.

Gaps continue to be apparent between central and peripheral localities of the country. Unemployment rates remained persistently higher in peripheral localities as compared to the center of the country. While gaps between central and peripheral areas appear to be narrowing in eligibility rates for matriculation exam certificates, overall trends suggest that residents of the center of the country still fare better than those living in peripheral localities.

Finally, among men and women, women continue to earn less on both an hourly and a monthly scale than males. This despite the fact that between 1993 and 1996 women's entrance into the labor force contributed to a significant decrease in unemployment rates.

Persistent inequality between diverse population groups converges to create stratification within Israeli society. There is ample evidence to suggest that the cleavages identified in this study are not a new phenomenon, but rather have been institutionalized since the establishment of the State (Smooha, 1993), excluding particular population groups from opportunities to engage in exchange relationships with the broader society. However, with the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people and the promise of a "new Middle East"[1] persistent inequalities contributed to a sense that Israeli governments were not attuned to domestic needs and hence were not worthy of constituent allegiance.

The results of voting trends in Israeli elections in 1996 and 1999 illustrate that the two major political parties, Labor and Likud, heretofore successful in rallying the Israeli public, lost support. In their place, particularistic parties promoting platforms on ethnic, religious and economic agendas gained the support of the Israeli public. This trend can be viewed as a rejection of the establishment, both right and left wing, having failed to meet the needs of particular population groups, and the desire of those same groups to take an active role in determining their futures. While in and of itself a positive initiative questions remain as to whether particularistic parties can find common ground to forge much-needed partnership, lest particularistic interests will continue to polarize Israeli society.

Study results suggest that Palestinian society fared no better in the aftermath of the signing of the Oslo Accords. Divergent conditions were identified between regions, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, between central and peripheral localities within each region, between Palestinians of refugee and non-refugee status, and between camp and non-camp dwellers.

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[1] Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister at the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords, spoke of the economic opportunities that would be made available in the "new Middle East" with the signing of the

Overall, study results illustrate that between 1993 and 1999, Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem enjoyed a higher accumulation of wealth than those residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip experienced the highest level of unemployment and similarly, the least accumulation of wealth. Within the West Bank the central region accumulated a higher percentage of the wealth than the northern and southern peripheries. In the Gaza Strip, the southern region remains the poorest. The lowest accumulation of wealth in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is found in the camps.

Interestingly enough, lower high school dropout rates were found in the Gaza Strip and among refugees than were reported in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. The rates may be attributed in part, to a differentiated school system. Refugees attending UNWRA schools had lower dropout rates than students attending government schools.

The relationship between the Palestinian National Authority and the Palestinian people did not render favorable results in the post-Oslo period. Roy (2001) describes "governmental hostility toward the Palestinian NGO sector" (p. 370), as well as "the PA's increasing authoritarianism, repression, and disdain for the law and for human and civil rights" (p. 370) as characteristic of the interaction between the two. Study results reveal that overall, violations of civil and political rights persisted, crime rates rose, popular distrust in Palestinian figures increased and the relationship between the NGO community and the Palestinian National Authority deteriorated.

Israeli and Palestinian leaders credited the signing of the Oslo Accords with the ushering in of a new era, economically, socially and politically, both domestically as well as between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. Facts on the ground in the six-year period following the signing of the Accords proved otherwise. Domestic realities, in conjunction

Accords.

with far from ideal relations between the two parties. reinforced a dynamic making it almost impossible to maintain hope for the future given evolving realities on the ground.

Given this complex reality, and recognizing that the return to the negotiating table is outside of the realm of this study, the following section questions what social work and law, bound by common principles, can do domestically to promote rights and relationships capable of weathering the current reality.

3. Promoting social capital and political integration: Practice and policy implications

Social work and law share a deep concern for individual and collective welfare (Maypole. 1984). Both social work and law recognize the importance of creating opportunities for greater equality, inclusion and exchange (Minow, 1990; Torczyner. 2000a). The two are committed to the values of positive peace.

Law and social policy structure human relationships through the delineation of individual and collective rights and entitlements (Miller. 1993; Barak. 2002). Particularly when cycles of violence and warfare threaten to promulgate on-going injustice and human rights violations. legislation can serve to provide a normative framework and guidelines for action (Barak. 2002). In periods of social. economic and political change. such as that which characterizes the post-Oslo period. legislation that reinforces greater equality enhances social solidarity and as such can serve to mediate the uncertainty of the times by strengthening rather than polarizing relationships. In turn. such legislation can assist in retaining the allegiance of the population to the polity (Smooha. 1993).

Legislation can be influenced through individual and communal action. Shivji (1989) suggests that human rights legislation be viewed as a "standard-bearer around which people struggle from below" (p. 71). The advancement of human rights and the development of a

healthy civil society to ensure its practice are synonymous and are integral to peace building efforts (Torczyner, 2000a; Moshe, 2001). It is the role of civil society to link the notions of rights and relationships (Nedelsky, 1996) both between different members of the same society, as well as between society and government. Shils (1991) states

> A civil society is a society where law binds the state as well as the citizens. It protects the citizens from arbitrary and unjust decisions of high political authorities, bureaucrats, the police, the military, and the rich and the powerful. A civil society is one where the law prevails equally against the impulses of citizens to seek their own immediate advantage. The effectiveness of the laws both in the state and in civil society-and the family-depends in part on the civility of individuals (p. 16).

Civil society can foster the accumulation of social capital and political integration by empowering citizens to actively ensure that their governments employ policies that promote greater universality, inclusion and reciprocity. Binding both the state and its citizens to principles of justice, particularly in periods of great uncertainty fosters a sense of trust amidst the unknown. Furthermore, advancing a human rights agenda can enable diverse groups both within and between societies to work towards a shared objective. Kotze and Du Toit (1995) refer to this process as "a wide range of civic bodies [that] mesh to form the basis for the politics of moderation, tolerance and compromise" (p. 28).

3.1.   Human rights advocacy: A combined social work and legal practice approach

Human rights advocacy practice is characterized by a combination of both legal and popular action. It is a collective form of organizing implementing principles of law and social work, participatory democracy, community organizing and membership that is based largely upon the desire to restore justice through collective advocacy efforts (Bateman, 1995). It is oftentimes those who risk "social exclusion or other unfair treatment" (Bateman, 1995, p. 4) due to disentitlement who are actively engaged in human rights advocacy efforts.

Community organizing, a method of social work practice is founded upon principles of empowerment and participation. The predominant ideology underlying the community organizing approach is rooted in notions of self-determination and collectivity (Torczyner, 1991). Community organizing and human rights advocacy share a common value base and common objectives. Torczyner (1991) notes

> Self-determination takes place through a democratic and collective process. The objectives of community organizing are to promote the collective good, to involve a wide range of people affected by the problem in its solution, and to develop viable democratic structures to achieve these ends. If self-determination is a goal, participation is a process by which it is achieved. Participation also enhances the individual, develops solidarity among members and promotes greater reciprocity among community members and between citizens and social institutions. The social conditions that community organizers seek to influence involve the allocation of scarce resources such as social provisions, privilege or power. Groups may seek a greater portion of goods and services, a change in law or policy, or greater authority in decision-making processes (p. 122).

Human rights advocacy and community organizing practice enhance the foundations for civil society. They ensure that the formulation of legislation reflects principles of universality, inclusion and reciprocity, principles shared by the social work and legal professions (Torczyner, 2000a). Joint practice can provide the basis for interdependence amongst communities both within and between societies as they identify parallel inequalities that can be rendered through interdependent efforts to secure greater justice.

3.2. Policy implications

The study suggests that governments interested in securing international peace must be simultaneously committed to advancing domestic conditions amenable to peace. Stated simply this means that governments must be dedicated to promoting policies and procedures

that work to reduce inequality and exclusion. Such policies must be integrated into peace agreements and followed up by domestic procedures.

In practice, such policies and procedures have not characterized the post-Oslo period. Both Human Rights Watch (1998) and Law Society (1998) cite the implementation of the Wye Memorandum. signed by the two parties in October. 1998. as action that far from protecting human rights. encourages their violation in the name of security, particularly within Palestinian society. Within Israeli society, even as this study is being completed nine years after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the most recent budget cuts. targeting those most dependent on government support. have led to what appears to be the end of the Israeli welfare state. Such measures are the antithesis of what this study is suggesting.

Transformation of the current state of affairs in each society entails a fresh approach enabling both policy makers and grassroots organizations to strengthen the link between human rights practice and peace initiatives. This would entail educational efforts as well as the creation of opportunities that would promote the integration. socially. economically and politically of those groups from each of the societies who have been marginalized due to prevailing policies. Such opportunities carry the potential to create greater reciprocity between members of each society as well as between government and its citizens. In practical terms the following policy considerations are recommended:

1. Peace and welfare must be tied together. Policy makers must be made to understand that achieving peace is as much a domestic issue as it is an inter-communal one. A government can recognize the concessions that its people make to forge peace with former enemies by structuring policy incentives that enhance social and economic mobility. This means enlarging rather than withdrawing the responsibility of the state particularly in regard to those populations and areas identified in this study who have the least resources to cope in periods of social. economic and political change. To further this end political ideology must be targeted towards long-term development in education. job-creation and training within Palestinian and Israeli societies.

2. Peace and democratic participation must be linked. Both Israeli and Palestinian society must work hard to recognize its diversity from within. Moreover, each society must be committed to ensuring that national power coalitions do not exclude particular groups because of their diversity and hence fail to recognize particular needs.

3. Notions of rights and relationships must be linked in the consciousness of policy-makers and the Israeli and Palestinian publics. Entitlements enable individuals and groups to participate in exchange relationships, and as such promote greater opportunities for social cohesion. No matter what may happen between the two societies, every attempt must be made to promote justice from within. Peace begins at home.

4. Coupled with the recognition and inclusion of the particular, each society, Palestinian and Israeli alike, must formulate a national social, economic and political agenda around which each nation can rally yet not at the expense of the other. For both Israelis and Palestinians this would mean defining the nature of the state as well as the relationship between the state and the larger global context. For both societies this would entail a process of inner transformation in order to "make peace" between those streams in society that call for greater liberalization, and those that demand more tradition and more religion.

An-Na'im (1995) points out that inner transformation can lend to increasing intersections of conflict. Yet dialogue has the potential to create a constructive context that transforms conflict into opportunity to foster growth and development. The actual process of communal dialogue creates new and renewed perspectives. Participation in dialogue can strengthen self- understanding and identity within a particular culture, by enabling communities to reconstruct meanings and meaning systems, making them relevant to their lives.

Internal dialogue that remains pluralistic and recognizes diversity and sameness from within has the ability to enhance recognition of other persons. Or as stated by An-Na'im (1995) "the appreciation of our own ethnocentricity should lead us to respect the ethnocentricity of others" (p. 24). Creating both internal and cross-cultural dialogue may provide the greatest opportunity to enhance universal, inclusive and reciprocal relationships.

by recognizing that "universality is not synonymous with uniformity [and that] real inclusion of all human beings requires attentiveness to their specificities" (Brems, 1997:164). On the other hand, specificity without a universal framework endangers the whole of humanity. As Deacon (1997) notes "...respect for cultural diversity and respect for the right to seek different paths towards human needs, does not, we believe, mean endorsing inhumanity, accepting injustice, or denying people's rights to a creative and full life" (p. 212).

4. Future research

The theoretical framework set forth in this study is applied to one particular case study. Further application of the framework to other cases around the globe where mutual agreement to put an end to conflict has been reached, is necessary in order to further determine the centrality of such an approach to peace building.

Within the Israeli-Palestinian context future research might focus on a qualitative component to the present study to determine the extent to which the theoretical framework is an expression of the sentiments of the peoples of both societies.

5. Study contributions

The present study may seem to suggest that the preservation of human rights is sufficient to ensure a smooth transition from a conflict to a post-conflict state. In its application to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict it might then be easily accused of reducing the multi-dimensional aspects of the conflict to one particular cause. This is certainly not the intent of the study. The study does not attempt to define persistent inequality and political disintegration as the *cause* of the current impasse between the two societies. Instead the study contends that persistent domestic inequality and political fragmentation, when associated with deteriorating inter-communal relations, impairs a society's ability to promote post-

conflict reconstruction and hence the peace building process. As such the study advances existing peace building literature by delineating the contribution of domestic conditions to inter-communal peace.

Moreover, the study goes beyond the documented association between human rights and peace to define how rights or the absence thereof domestically, impacts upon exchange relationships critical to post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. As such the present study contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between human welfare and sustainable peace. While not sufficient to ensure a smooth transition from conflict to peace, attention to the human condition is an essential element of peace building.

Finally, the study provides a channel to work towards the realization of peace even when the impasse in inter-communal relations appears to be insurmountable. Inter-disciplinary social work and legal practice and theory provide a framework to both structure and exercise the kinds of relationships that are necessary to cope with the uncertainty of change that the transition from conflict to peace incurs.

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