

THE GREEK QUESTION BEFORE  
THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
(1946-1954)

by

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## PREFACE

The subject of this thesis is a consideration of the Greek Question before the United Nations and more particularly the "threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece from 1946-1954". Three minor aspects of this topic, namely, the repatriation of the abducted Greek children, the detention of prisoners captured by the guerrillas, and the refugee problem, have not been considered since they were peripheral to the main subject and primarily involved international organizations other than the United Nations.<sup>(1)</sup>

My approach to the topic is largely institutional. The thesis begins with an historical background, proceeds to a consideration of the Greek problem by the Security Council and subsequent handling by the General Assembly and is followed by an assessment of the role of the United Nations in tackling this dispute.

It is not only my duty but the facts as well that compel me to express my gratitude to Dr. B. S. Steinberg for her invaluable overall direction and generous intellectual contribution

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(1) Although these problems were dealt with by the General Assembly, they involved more importantly such organizations as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, I. R. O. and others.

in preparing this thesis; suffice/<sup>it</sup>to mention that my competence in English is only a recent acquisition. I would also like to thank the staff of Redpath Library and particularly its United Nations department for their kind co-operation in the use of various documents. Finally, I wish to thank Miss N. Cooper for typing the thesis.

GLOSSARY

E. A. M.	Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon (National Liberation Front)
E. D. E. S.	Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos (Greek Democratic National League)
E. L. A. S.	Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (Greek People's Liberation Army)
K. K. E.	Kommounistikon Komma Ellados (Communist Party of Greece)
P. E. E. A.	Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis (Political Committee for National Liberation)

## CHAPTER ONE

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistikon Komma Ellados or K.K.E.) did not play a significant role in Greek politics until 1940. From its inception in 1918 until 1931, the leadership of the Party changed six times; a continuous internal struggle for power between the Leninist and Trotskyite factions characterized this embryonic phase of the K.K.E.. With the establishment of Metaxas' dictatorship in 1936, the persecuted movement was forced underground where it remained until the appropriate moment for its re-emergence.

The unprovoked attack of Mussolini's Italy against Greece in October 1940 caused further internal dissension between the "nationalist Communists" led by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Nicholas Zachariadis, who sided with the government to repel the invasion; and the "old Communists" who espoused Moscow's original policy of neutrality.<sup>(1)</sup> Both factions had the same ultimate aim -- the domination of the

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(1) Myrou, Ach. A.: "I Nea Epithesis Kata Tis Ellados" (The new attack on Greece); article written in Neoteron Enkyklopaidikon Lexikon (Modern encyclopedic lexicon), Athens, "Helios", Vol. 6, p. 449. It should be observed here that Zachariadis in so acting, disobeyed the decision of the Third Communist International held on 7 November 1939. Ibid., p. 448.

Greek political life, but they differed over the means of achieving it. The dissension, however, disappeared as soon as the Soviet Union declared war against Hitler's Germany. In the light of this development the entire party joined the War of Liberation and in September 1941 the National Liberation Front (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon or E.A.M.) was created and remained from its inception until its demise under the control of the Communists.<sup>(2)</sup> The nature of the communist control over E.A.M. was depicted by Professor Stavrianos in the following terms:

"It is apparent that the Communist control of the Ipefthinoi<sup>(3)</sup> ensured a Communist majority on the national central committee<sup>(4)</sup> although only about a tenth of the total E.A.M. membership were also members of the Communist party"<sup>(5)</sup>

From its inception, E.A.M. contained a heterogeneous membership -- even members of the clergy joined this organization. The reins of authority rested, however, in the hands of the Communist Party.

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- (2) Karalis records that this resistance group was created by four hundred communists most of whom had been released by the Germans under the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement.  
Karalis, Con.: "Istoria Ton Dramatikon Gegonoton Peloponnesou 1943 - 1949" (The history of the dramatic incidents of Peloponnesese 1943-1949), Athens, 1958, p.7.
- (3) Local chiefs: the word literally means "responsible".
- (4) Of the E.A.M.
- (5) Stavrianos, L.S.: "The Balkans Since 1453", (New York: Reinhart & Co. Inc., 1958), p. 793.



The military arm of the E.A.M., E.L.A.S. (Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos)<sup>(6)</sup> was formally established in December 1942. In the eyes of the Greek authorities, these two organizations and in particular the latter, composed the core of the "communist guerrillas", whereas in the eyes of the Soviet bloc these same organizations formed the "democratic" elements that fought against the "monarcho-fascist" Greek Government.

Owing to the rugged nature of the Greek terrain, and partly to the overwhelming military power of the occupation forces, a resistance movement could operate only in a "hit-and-run" fashion. Guerrilla warfare with its cellular organization was the only effective method of countering the enemy. Thus, many resistance groups appeared which were smaller in size than E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. and independent of its hierarchy -- E.D.E.S. (Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos)<sup>(7)</sup> led by Zervas, a group led by Psaros and Kartalis called E.K.K.A.<sup>(8)</sup>, and the so-called "X group" were examples. Some of these, E.D.E.S.

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(6) "Greek People's Liberation Army".

(7) "Greek Democratic National League". E.D.E.S. stood for a "republican, democratic, non-socialist regime. Its stronghold was Epirus.

Hugh Seton-Watson: The East European Revolution (New York, 1951): p.133.

(8) It also had a republican program similar to that of E.D.E.S. Ibid, p. 134.

for example, had been established even before E.A.M.. While Professor Stavrianos has exceedingly praised E.A.M. for its role in fighting the Germans and for its popular following, he deprecated the contribution of the other nationalist bands.(9)

To achieve their ultimate aim -- the seizure of power at the end of the occupation -- the K.K.E. presented E.A.M. as a truly national front devoid of any political affiliation. Thus, E.A.M. was able to attract the support of some four Socialist and Agrarian parties, the membership of six bishops, several hundred priests, virtually all the labour leaders regardless of their political beliefs, and thirty university professors, including the president of the Polytechnic School and two members of the National Academy.(10) Nevertheless, some other factors helped attract their heterogeneous membership. Karalis pointed out that many nationalists mistrusted the old parties and their leaders' directives not to join E.A.M..(11) Moreover, many were lured by Communist promises for a "new deal" after the war which would include action against poverty, redress from bureaucratic injustice and the advance of education which

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(9) Stavrianos, L.S.: op.cit., p. 788. In fact he identifies E.A.M. with the Communist controlled Partisans in Yugoslavia.

(10) Ibid, p.787.

(11) Karalis, Con.: Op.cit., p. 9.

the old regime, in practice if not in theory, had so largely denied them.(12) On the other hand it has also been alleged that some of the E.A.M.'s recruitment was accompanied by the actual or potential use of force.(13)

To consolidate its position E.A.M. attempted to discredit any other organization which was fighting the Axis powers.(14) According to Kyrou, it used violent as well as non-violent methods. He stated that Psaros' group -- E.K.K.A. -- was totally eliminated by E. L. A. S. while other nationalist bands were accused of collaboration with the occupation forces.(15) Another technique E. A. M. used was "the burning" -- in Greek "Kapsimo" -- according to which it informed the Germans and Italians of the location and movements of the other nationalist groups.(16) As a result, E.A.M. achieved a dominant position in the struggle for liberation. This ascendancy, however, in conjunction with the communist

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(12) Hugh Seton-Watson: Op.cit., pp. 137-138.

(13) Kyrou, Ach. A.: Op.cit., p. 452. General Sarafis, the military commander of E.L.A.S., a regular officer of republican sympathies, had been captured by E.L.A.S., and given the alternative of death or command of their forces. He had previously led his own band. Hugh Seton-Watson, Loc.cit., p.134.

(14) Hugh Seton-Watson: Loc.cit., p. 135.

(15) Kyrou, Ach. A.: Loc.cit., p. 452.

(16) Ibid., p. 452.

affiliation of the leadership of E.A.M. was profoundly disturbing to the Allies. What was feared by Great Britain and the United States was a communist takeover of the entire Balkan peninsula following Greece's liberation from Axis occupation. In a letter to Mr. A. Eden dated 4 May 1944 Sir Winston Churchill wrote:

"(1) A paper should be drafted for the Cabinet, and possibly for the Imperial Conference setting forth shortly -- for that is essential -- the brute issues between us and the Soviet Government which are developing in Italy, in Rumania, in Bulgaria, in Yugoslavia and above all in Greece...

(2) ... broadly speaking the issue is: are we going to acquiesce in the Communization of the Balkans and perhaps of Italy? ..."(17)

And again on the same day:

"Evidently we are approaching a showdown with the Russians about their Communist intrigues in Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece. I think their attitude becomes more difficult every day ..."(18)

On 31 May 1944, Churchill officially wrote the President of the United States. It is interesting to observe the difference in styles used in their communication as contrasted with that used between Churchill and Eden. Among other things the communication stated:

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(17) Churchill, W.S.: The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, Houghton Mufflin Co., 1953), pp. 72-73.

(18) Ibid., p. 73.

"There have recently been disquieting signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and the Russians in regard to the Balkan countries, and in particular towards Greece. We therefore suggested to the Soviet Ambassador here that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Soviet Government take the lead in Greek affairs, each Government giving the other help in the respective countries. Such an arrangement would be a natural development of the existing military situation since Rumania falls within the sphere of the Russian armies and Greece within the Allied command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean."(19)

Furthermore, Churchill assured President Roosevelt that the aim of such an arrangement would not be to "carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence" and that it would apply "only to war conditions". He added that this arrangement "would be a useful device for preventing any divergence of policy between ourselves and them (the Russians) in the Balkans."(20)

Although President Roosevelt feared the repercussions of such a move, he eventually agreed to the suggestion after an assurance on the part of the British Prime Minister that the project would be allowed "a trial of three months after which it must be reviewed by the three Powers".(21) Nevertheless, he made the reservation that no post-war spheres of influence should

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(19) Churchill, W.S., Op.cit. pp. 73-74.

(20) Ibid., p. 74.

(21) Ibid., p. 77.

be established which was accepted by Churchill.<sup>(22)</sup>

In April 1944 a serious mutiny took place among the Greek armed forces stationed in the Middle East. Shortly before this incident, E.L.A.S. -- the military arm of E.A.M. -- had proclaimed a provisional government in the mountains known as P.E.E.A. (Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis).<sup>(23)</sup> The mutinous forces demanded the postponement of the King's return to Greece<sup>(24)</sup> pending a plebiscite, a purge of "Fascist officers" in their ranks, and recognition of the E.L.A.S. provisional government in the mountains, as the provisional government of all of Greece.<sup>(25)</sup> The mutiny was quelled but was followed by an attempt to establish a National Unity Government. While this rebellion angered the Allied High Command, the British realized that internal dissension should be prevented in the future. With the blessing therefore of the Allies, George Papandreou -- a former Venizelist Liberal and a Social Democrat -- called a conference in Lebanon which was attended by representatives of all Greek political parties and resistance organizations.<sup>(26)</sup> A

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(22) Churchill, W.S.: Op.cit., p. 77.

(23) In English the title could be: "Political Committee for National Liberation".

(24) King George II had left the country on the invasion of Greece by the Germans and had established a Government in exile. (First in Cairo and later in London).

(25) Hugh Seton-Watson, Op.cit., p. 138.

(26) Stavrianos, L.S., Op.cit., p. 816.

National Charter, which was to serve as the basis for the establishment of the national coalition, was adopted by the conference late in May 1944. The Communists and E.A.M. received the ministries of labour, agriculture, public works, national economy, finance, and the deputy ministry of finance, all of which, observed Professor Stavrianos, "were useless as instruments of power manipulation." (27)

At the first meeting of the new government, on 12 June 1944, Prime Minister Papandreou announced that King George II accepted the suggestion that he remain in exile until a plebiscite

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(27) Stavrianos, L.S., Op.cit., p. 817. Professor Stavrianos distinguished the Communists from the "Eamites". It is not difficult to agree with him on this issue. The Communists were "formally" distinct from the E.A.M. although the latter was under their tight control. One might say that they formed the extreme left wing of the E.A.M. • E.A.M., therefore, must have contained certain moderate elements. This trend of logic is confirmed by the "Political Handbook of the World" for 1945 which defines the National Liberation Front -- E.A.M. -- at that time as being composed of liberal (republican) and left-wing parties. The Liberals, who under E. Venizelos were the largest political group in Greece at one time, were split into the various groupings existing in Greece in 1944. The Communist Party -- K.K.E. -- was described by the Handbook as an "influential party within the E.A.M." Mallory, W.H. (ed.), "Political Handbook of the World" (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1945) p. 84.

was held in a liberated Greece.<sup>(28)</sup>

In September 1944 the Germans<sup>(29)</sup> began evacuating Greece. In the same month a meeting of all political factions was called at Caserta (Italy) to discuss the possibility of landing British troops in Greece to hasten the evacuation and at the same time to fill in the vacuum left behind by the evacuating Germans. On 26 September 1944 both Saraphis<sup>(30)</sup> (the E.L.A.S. General) and Zervas<sup>(31)</sup> (the E.D.E.S. leader) gave their explicit assent to the "Caserta Agreement" which provided that:

"All guerrilla forces operating in Greece place themselves under orders to the Greek Government of National Unity. The Greek Government places these forces under the orders of General Scobie, who has been nominated by the Supreme Allied Commander as General-in-Command of the forces in Greece."<sup>(32)</sup>

The Greek Government returned to Athens on 18 October 1944. The most serious problem that it faced on its return was the demobilization of the resistance groups -- mainly E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. -- and their substitution by a National Guard which

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(28) Kyrrou, Ach.: Op.cit., p. 476.

(29) The Axis Powers that occupied Greece were (1) Italy, holding the greater part of the country and with garrisons in Salonika and Athens (especially early in the occupation), (2) Germany which held Crete, some other islands and the Evcos area on the Turkish frontier, and finally Bulgaria that held Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. By 1944, however, the Germans were the only Axis power occupying Greece. Hugh Seton-Watson, Op.cit., p. 131.

(30) See supra, p. 5 n.

(31) See supra, p. 3 .

(32) Stavrianos, L.S., Op.cit. p. 818.



would undertake to maintain order in Greece. After several discussions, all factions, including K.K.E. and E.A.M. agreed to the demobilization which was to take place on 30 November 1944.<sup>(33)</sup> The agreement was announced by the Prime Minister on 5 November 1944. Nevertheless, on 28 November 1944 Zevgos, a communist who was Minister of Agriculture in the National Unity Government, informed the Prime Minister that K.K.E. would no longer abide by the agreement unless certain changes were made. The K.K.E.'s most significant demand was for the simultaneous disarmament of the Rimini Brigade -- which at the time was fighting in Italy -- and the Sacred Squadron, another national contingent fighting abroad.<sup>(34)</sup> These demands were rejected and in consequence all but one minister<sup>(35)</sup> of the extreme left withdrew from Papandreou's Government. The crisis reached its peak on 3 December 1944 with a bloody demonstration in Athens.

At the end of December 1944 a conference of all factions and political parties was sponsored by the three major allies -- the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, E.A.M. was represented this time by Partsalidis

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(33) Kyrou, Ach.: Op.cit, p. 476.

(34) Ibid, p. 476.

(35) General Sariyannis.

who was an avowed communist.<sup>(36)</sup> K.K.E. repeated its previous demands and added some new ones. Its representatives claimed the portfolios of the interior, justice, and the office of deputy minister in the departments of the Armed Forces and External Affairs; furthermore they demanded the demobilization of the Navy, Air Force, and the National Guard as well as their original demand for the dissolution of the Greek Brigade of Rimini and the Sacred Squadron.<sup>(37)</sup> According to Kyrrou the increase in the demands of the Communists was the result of an overestimation of their actual strength.<sup>(38)</sup>

The incident of 3 December marked the beginning of a civil war between E.L.A.S. and the nationalist bands aided by British troops. A formal conclusion to that struggle was reached with the Varkiza Agreement of 12 February 1945 which provided for the following: the disarmament of E.L.A.S.; the retention of the Rimini Brigade under ~~arms control~~; the creation of a new army through the mobilization of age-groups; an amnesty for political offences but not for criminal ones; a purge of the

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(36) Until then, moderate members of E.A.M. had been allowed by the organization's top hierarchy to take part in such conferences and meetings.

(37) The Communists demanded the liquidation of all these groups because the latter's loyalty to the King and the existing Government was unquestionable.

(38) Kyrrou, Ach.: Op.cit. pp. 479-480.

civil service to remove those who had collaborated with the Germans; and finally, a plebiscite to be held to choose between monarchical and republican form of government, to be followed by elections to a Constituent Assembly.<sup>(39)</sup>

The agreement, however, was short-lived; each side accused the other of violations. Just over a year later the Greek communists formally started their long and bitter "struggle" against the Greek Government. The beginning was marked by a guerrilla attack on 26 March 1946 against the guards and inhabitants of Litokhoron which is located in the prefecture of Salonika in Macedonia.<sup>(40)</sup> Despite this serious incident elections took place as scheduled five days later, under American, French and British observers. The U.S.S.R. refused to participate on the ground that this action constituted an interference in Greece's internal affairs. The Greek communists along with some other small parties which were associated with them -- the so-called "fellow travellers" -- abstained from running for office.<sup>(41)</sup>

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(39) Hugh Seton-Watson: Op.cit. p. 320.

(40) Kyrrou, Ach.: Op.cit. p. 489.

(41) In spite of demonstrations and police clashes on previous days the elections were conducted quietly and were on the whole "free and fair". Of those registered 60% voted. The distribution of votes was as follows:

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Populist Coalition (Chiefly royalists)	557,909	53%
Centre Bloc	344,578	33%
Liberals led by Sophoulis	142,038	14%
Montague Bell, H.T. (ed.) : <u>The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the Year 1946</u> , (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1947), p. 260.		

It seemed obvious that the holding of elections before the constitutional question was put to referendum was a violation of the Varkiza Agreement. Britain, France and the United States, however, issued a statement in September 1945 expressing the belief that "the rapid growth of monarchism in the last months was only a temporary reaction against communism, and that time should be allowed for passions to cool, so that somewhat later the Greek people could decide, in a more peaceful atmosphere, whether they would prefer a monarchy or a republic".<sup>(42)</sup>

Finally, a plebiscite on the issue of a monarchy or republic was held on 1 September 1946 which resulted in a vote favourable to the return to Greece of King George II.<sup>(43)</sup>

The reaction of Greece's northern neighbours to her internal developments is worthy of a brief mention. In a speech delivered on 8 July 1945 by President Tito of Yugoslavia, the Greek "monarcho-fascist" regime was accused of alleged atrocities committed against the Slav-speaking minorities of Macedonia in particular, and against the "democratic" elements of Greece in

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(42) Hugh Seton-Watson: Op.cit. p. 323.

(43) The referendum resulted in:

1, 166,512 votes for the King's return

174,406 votes for a Republic

346,862 blank returns, and

3,812 spoiled ballots.

The total of the voters on the Register was 1,861,146.

Montague Bell, H.T. (ed.), Op.cit., p. 261.

general. Tito also claimed that thousands of Slavs from Greek Macedonia and numbers of Greek "democrats" had fled to Yugoslavia from the "monarcho-fascist" tyranny and were being hospitalized in Voidovina.<sup>(44)</sup> Similar statements by Bulgaria's Georgiev and Albania's Hoxha followed a little later with accusations of alleged persecution of minorities in Greece.<sup>(45)</sup> That the Soviet Union was also concerned at that time about the political situation in Greece was revealed in a speech made by Mr. Vyshinsky in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 October 1947. He said:

"Indeed as early as July 1945, in connexion with the Yalta declaration on liberated Europe, the Government of the U.S.S.R. submitted a memorandum at the Berlin Conference which described the situation in Greece as one in which there was no proper order, where laws were not respected, where a violent campaign of terror was being waged against the democratic elements ...

"The Government of the U.S.S.R. submitted another memorandum on the situation in Greece to the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London...

"...the constantly deteriorating political situation in Greece induced the Government of the U.S.S.R. to raise the question once more at the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in December 1945 in Moscow. At that time, the question of the presence of British forces in Greece had already assumed great importance..."<sup>(46)</sup>

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(44) Kyrou, Ach.: Op.cit. p. 487.

(45) Ibid.,: p. 487.

(46) United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol. I, p. 361.

Conclusions:

The foregoing has been an attempt to explain how and why Great Britain -- with the consent of the other Allies -- became involved in Greece in the nineteen-forties. The Government of the United Kingdom was determined to prevent the expansion of communist power to Greece, for this would have meant the expansion of Soviet influence in the entire Balkan peninsula. The possession of an outlet to the Mediterranean by the Soviets would have threatened considerably Britain's influence in the Middle East, and Africa. The tacit agreement<sup>(47)</sup> of the U.S.S.R. to the British intervention in Greece may be interpreted as having been motivated by two factors: firstly, that it meant de facto recognition by the West of Soviet pre-eminence in all the other Balkan countries; and secondly, the hope that local communists would soon prevail in Greece -- notwithstanding the British presence.

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(47) At a meeting between Churchill and Stalin held in Moscow on 9 October 1944, in a matter of minutes, the two leaders agreed upon a deal proposed by the former. The U.S.S.R. was to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania whereas Great Britain in accord with the United States were to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece. The responsibilities were to be shared equally by the two blocs in both Yugoslavia and Hungary, while the Soviet Union would have seventy-five per cent predominance in Bulgaria. Churchill, W.S.: Op.cit. p. 227.

CHAPTER TWO

THE GREEK QUESTION BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL

THE THREE SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE MAIN BODY

With the end of the War, the unanimity among the Great Powers began to falter and with it the principle upon which the machinery of the Security Council of the United Nations was based. The introduction of the Iranian Question in the Security Council on 19 January 1946 was sufficient to transplant the seeds of the cold war in the new World Organization. Two days later -- on 21 January 1946 -- the Soviet Union brought the situation in Greece to the attention of the Security Council. The main points of complaint were: that British military intervention in Greece's domestic jurisdiction had taken place; that this situation had given rise to extreme tension; that this tension carried with it the possibility of serious consequences both for the Greek people -- an internal matter -- and for the maintenance of peace and security on the international level.<sup>(1)</sup>

On 1 February 1946 the Soviet delegate, Mr. Vyshinsky, during the discussion of the above complaint in the Security

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(1) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: First Series, Suppl. No. 1, Annex 3.

Council, demanded "the immediate withdrawal of British troops from Greece".<sup>(2)</sup> Mr. Bevin, in presenting the British Government's views, expressed doubts about the Soviet accusation that British troops constituted any threat to the peace of the world. He promised that they would be withdrawn as soon as their functions had been performed. Finally, he asserted that the troops were there at the request of the Greek Government solely for the purpose of keeping order and preparing the ground for the coming general election -- scheduled to be held on 31 March 1946.<sup>(3)</sup>

On 5 February 1946, the five permanent members of the Security Council met in private but the deadlock was not resolved. Finally, a compromise was achieved, on the initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union delegates, which amounted to closing the matter through a statement by the President of the Security Council. Summing up the agreement the President stated:

"I feel we should take note of the declarations made before the Security Council by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom ... in regard to the question of the presence of British troops

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(2) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: First Series, No. 1, p. 79.

(3) Ibid., pp. 79-88. Also Montague Bell, H.T. (ed.), Op.cit. p.3.



in Greece, as recorded in the proceedings of the Council, and consider the matter closed." (4)

It is difficult to discern with absolute certainty the motives that led the U.S.S.R.'s decision-makers to change their uncompromising stand. It seems to me, however, that Western recognition of the new government in Rumania which took place on 5 February 1946 might have induced the Soviet leaders to adopt a moderate policy toward the United Kingdom and the United States. This recognition demonstrated the Western powers' acceptance of Rumania's presence in the Soviet orbit.

But the Greek Question was not left to rest for very long. It came to the attention of the Security Council just over six months later -- on 24 August 1946 -- in the form of a cable from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian S. S. R. In the tabled complaint it was alleged that:

"... as a result of the irresponsible policy of the present Greek Government, a situation has arisen in the Balkans which represents a grave danger to peace and security in this part of Europe...

"The cause of concern is above all due to the numerous border incidents on the Greek-Albanian frontier which are being provoked by the Greek armed units with the connivance and encouragement of the Greek authorities ... Greek armed groups penetrate into Albanian territory with the obvious

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(4) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: First Series, No. 1, pp. 171-172.

object of provoking an armed conflict with Albania which would serve as a pretext for the wresting of the Southern part of Albania in favour of Greece ...

"Persecution by the Greek Government of national minorities in Macedonia, Thrace, and Cyprus is likewise the cause of anxiety ...

"The principal factor conducive to the situation in the Balkans ... is the presence of British troops in Greece and the direct intervention of British military representatives in the internal affairs of this Allied country in behalf of aggressive monarchist elements, especially in the preparation of the referendum of 1 September 1946 which is to determine the form of Government in Greece ...

"I have the honour to bring to the attention of the Security Council this situation as being of the nature covered by Article 34 of the United Nations Charter ... "(5)

What presumably induced the Ukrainian S. S. R. to raise the matter in the Council was internal developments in Greece. With an overwhelming royalist victory in the March elections, (6) right-wing activities dealt heavy blows to the Communists and particularly in the first months of ~~the~~ Tsaldaris' government. Furthermore, the date set for the plebiscite on the monarchy-republic issue was approaching, and an attempt to discredit it was worth making.

The Ukrainian S. S. R. application was placed on the agenda of the Security Council on 3 September 1946 after a favourable

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(5) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, Suppl. No. 5, Annex 8.

(6) Supra: p. 13 n.

vote on the question.<sup>(7)</sup> The representative of Greece was invited, without objection, to the Council table, as was the representative of Albania, which was not a member of the United Nations. At a succession of meetings during September the Council rejected four resolutions on the subject.<sup>(8)</sup> The President then, at a meeting on 20 September 1946, ruled that the Ukrainian complaint against Greece should be removed from the agenda.<sup>(9)</sup>

The Greek Question was raised a third time in the first days of December 1946. This time the complainant was Greece; a letter dated 3 December 1946 drew the attention of the Security Council under Articles 34 and 35(1), to

"... a situation which is leading to friction between Greece and her neighbours, by reason of the fact that the latter are lending their support to the violent guerrilla warfare now being waged in northern Greece against public order and the territorial integrity (of Greece)"<sup>(10)</sup>

On 10 December 1946, the Security Council included the Greek complaint on its agenda and adopted the Netherlands' resolution for the participation in the Council's discussions of

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- (7) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 7, p. 197. The vote was 7 for the inclusion, 2 against it, and 2 abstained.
- (8) Montague Bell, H. T. (ed.), Op.cit., p. 180.
- (9) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 16, pp. 419-422.
- (10) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, Suppl. No. 10, Annex 16.

all disputants, i.e. Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. The participation of the latter two states was conditional on their acceptance of the obligations concerning pacific settlement of disputes provided for in the Charter. The President speaking before the Council on that subject said:

"I do not wish to convey the impression that the obligations of Bulgaria and Albania would be in any way limited, but that they would be bound to accept the obligations, wherever found in the Charter, for pacific settlement, and that they would be in no more favourable position than the other two parties to this case which are members of the United Nations. For that purpose, they should be on terms of equality."<sup>(11)</sup>

On 19 December 1946, the Security Council unanimously decided to set up a Commission of Investigation on the basis of a United States draft resolution as modified by Mexican, Polish, and British amendments. In submitting the draft resolution, the United States representative observed that all four Governments concerned had made allegations that border violations had taken place. These border violations could not be ignored by the Council and therefore it seemed to be:

"...the inescapable and self-evident duty of the Security Council to investigate the facts pertaining to these border violations without attempting at this time on the basis of present information to prejudice the issues."<sup>(12)</sup>

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(11) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 26, p. 608.

(12) United Nations, ST/PSCA/1, p. 389.

### General Observations on these Three Submissions

The first submission was introduced by a Great Power, the U. S. S. R., and had as its principal target another Great Power, the U. K., whom she charged with alleged intervention in a small power's internal affairs. The second submission was undertaken by a Communist member of the United Nations, the Ukrainian S. S. R., on behalf of Albania and the national minorities residing in Macedonia, Thrace and Cyprus; the subject matter of that complaint was the Greek Government's irresponsible and provocative policies sustained by the existence of British troops in Greece. Only the last submission was initiated by Greece, a party directly involved, whose Government maintained that the three neighbouring Communist states rendered their support to the rebels in Greece.

In all three submissions the word "situation" was used rather than "dispute". On this point, Goodspeed has written:

"It is possible that a member of the United Nations may claim a problem, no matter how serious, to be a situation and not a dispute, thereby not being obligated by the Charter to seek a pacific settlement before the Council intervenes."<sup>(13)</sup>

In other words, all the complainants were not legally

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(13) Goodspeed, S.S., "The Nature and Function of International Organization" (N. York, Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 172.

obligated to enter into direct negotiations in order to attempt to settle their differences peacefully. They preferred to seek the Council's intervention instead. Furthermore, the literal meaning of Article 32 of the Charter provides that non-members of the Security Council, and non-members of the United Nations if they are parties "to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate without vote, in the discussion...". That is to say, invitation of non-members to participate in the discussion would be made only when a "dispute" arises. During the consideration of the Ukrainian complaint, the Albanian Government asked that its representative be allowed to make a factual statement before the Council.<sup>(14)</sup> The point was made by the representatives of China and the Netherlands, however, that Albania could only be invited to participate in the case of a "dispute", which this was not, and that if Albania were invited to participate in the discussion of a "dispute" to which it was a party, its participation would not be limited to simply making a factual statement.<sup>(15)</sup> Despite this interpretation, the Albanian representative was later invited by the Security Council to make a factual statement.<sup>(16)</sup>

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(14) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 10, pp. 260, 267.

(15) Ibid., pp. 261-263.

(16) There were 9 votes for and 1 against the invitation of the Albanian representative; Australia's delegation abstained.

Another feature of the three complaints was the allegation in each case of foreign intervention. In the first two submissions the Soviet bloc argued that British intervention in Greece's internal affairs was a violation of Article 2(7) which, according to the Ukrainian S. S. R. representative, "denies other Governments the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a foreign country".<sup>(17)</sup> United Nations' intervention, on the other hand, so the Ukrainian representative maintained, would not be a violation of the above mentioned Article because "it is the duty of the Security Council to prevent intervention by a foreign government in the internal affairs of another country".<sup>(18)</sup> On the same subject, i.e. domestic jurisdiction, Greece's representative made the following statement on 5 September 1946:

"We regard as inadmissible any public discussion of our internal affairs, because under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, this constitutes intervention in the internal matters of a sovereign state, a proud and independent member of the United Nations..."<sup>(19)</sup>

At a subsequent meeting on 11 September 1946 in response to the Ukrainian accusations, the representative of the United

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(17) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 8, p. 209.

(18) Ibid., p. 209.

(19) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 9, p. 219.

Kingdom made it clear that the British action was not intervention of one nation in the internal affairs of another, since the latter had requested the former to maintain troops upon its territory.(20) He also emphasized that Article 2, paragraph 7 does not forbid a nation to intervene in matters coming within the domestic jurisdiction of another; but that "...it forbids the United Nations as a body from doing so."(21)

THE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING  
GREEK FRONTIER INCIDENTS

As early as 20 September 1946, in connection with the Ukrainian complaint against Greece, the United States representative had submitted a draft resolution to establish a commission of investigation under Article 34 of the Charter.(22) The draft, however, was not adopted; there were eight votes in favour, two against -- the U. S. S. R. and Poland -- and one abstention. The vote was preceded by a heated discussion as to whether the setting up of a commission for investigation was a procedural or a substantive matter. The Soviet representative maintained that the matter was substantive, on the basis of the

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(20) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council,  
First Year: Second Series, No. 12, p. 314.

(21) Ibid., p. 314.

(22) Ibid., p. 412.



San Francisco Conference which regarded "all proposals relating to investigation, as questions of substance and not of procedure".(23) The American delegate agreed with the Soviet interpretation.(24) Australia's representative, however, contended that that document (25) had no binding force on the Council. Moreover, in the document's second paragraph dealing with the items that may be covered by procedural voting, the Australian delegate continued, the establishment of "such bodies or agencies as it (the Council) may deem necessary for the performance of its functions" was included. (26)

On 19 December 1946, the Security Council decided to set up a Commission of Investigation on the basis of an amended United States draft resolution. There was a unanimous vote on the establishment of the Commission as a whole.(27) The relevant part of the adopted resolution read:

"Whereas there has been presented to the Security Council oral and written statements by the Greek, Yugoslav, Albanian and Bulgarian Governments relating to disturbed conditions in northern Greece along the frontier between Greece on the one hand

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(23) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 16, P. 410.

(24) Ibid., p. 411.

(25) The San Francisco Statement on Voting Procedure.

(26) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 16, p. 412.

(27) The U. S. S. R. abstained twice during the item by item consideration of the draft resolution, while the U. K. abstained once.

and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, which condition, in the opinion of the Council, should be investigated before the Council attempts to reach any conclusions regarding the issues involved:

"The Security Council resolves (to) establish a Commission of investigation to ascertain the facts relating to the alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other."(28)

#### Composition of the Commission

From the outset, there was some controversy within the Council as to the size of the Commission. The original draft resolution introduced by the representative of the United States provided for a membership of seven -- the five permanent members of the Security Council, Brazil and Poland.<sup>(29)</sup> The representatives of Mexico and Egypt, however, opposed this idea on two major grounds: firstly, that in-coming members of the Security Council would be deprived of a direct knowledge of the situation, for they would not be represented on the Commission; secondly, that the Security Council would be setting a precedent "of the highest importance" for it would be bound in the future to create subsidiary organs of a similar size and composition

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(28) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council,  
First Year: Second Series, No. 28, pp. 700-701.

(29) Ibid., p. 676.

excluding thus some of the non-permanent members. The representatives of the two states, therefore, suggested that the membership of the Commission be increased to eleven.<sup>(30)</sup> Poland and the U. S. S. R., on the other hand, accepted the original proposal, since both were to be represented on the Commission. The argument put forward by the Soviet delegate was that the Commission, if composed of eleven members, would lack the efficiency that it badly needed. He did not press the issue, however, to extremes. The Polish representative added that, unless the original resolution were adopted, the Council would never be able to set up any commission consisting of less than eleven members.<sup>(31)</sup> Notwithstanding the Polish and Soviet points of view, the Security Council decided by eight votes against two with one abstention, "that the Commission be composed of a representative of each of the members of the Security Council as it will be constituted in 1947."<sup>(32)</sup>

On the basis of this resolution representatives from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were invited to sit on the

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(30) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 28, pp. 676-678. It is obvious that the objecting states were claiming "equality" with the privileged permanent members of the Security Council.

(31) Ibid., p. 680.

(32) Ibid., p. 681.

Commission. Furthermore, representatives from the states involved were allowed to participate in the Commission's work in a "liaison capacity" as the Council's resolution put it.<sup>(33)</sup> Later on, the Commission decided that the liaison representatives should be present in all open meetings and be invited to make statements whenever the Commission deemed it necessary. In actual practice they were allowed to interrogate witnesses, during the open sessions of the Commission, make suggestions as to methods of investigation, places to visit and witnesses to be heard, and present documentation on behalf of their respective governments. The attendance of liaison representatives at private sessions was agreed to in principle, but rarely occurred.<sup>(34)</sup>

To aid the Commission in its work, a sizable staff was supplied by the United Nations Secretariat, which consisted of a number of secretaries, administrative officers, interpreters and stenotypists.<sup>(35)</sup>

#### Functions of the Commission

Under the terms of its 19 December resolution the Security

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(33) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 28, p. 695.

(34) Puryear, F. E. (Jr.), Soviet Methods of Negotiation: A case study of the Un. N. Security Council Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1959), p. 40.

(35) United Nations, S/360/Rev.1, Vol. II, p. 161.

Council provided:

"That the Commission shall have authority to conduct its investigation in northern Greece and in such places in other parts of Greece, in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as the Commission considers should be included in its investigation in order to elucidate the causes and nature of ... border violations and disturbances ..."

"That the Commission be invited to make any proposals that it may deem wise for averting a repetition of border violations and disturbances in those areas." (36)

On the basis of this resolution, the main body of the Commission visited Mouries, Axioupolis, and Skra in Greek Macedonia, (37) Dorian, Stroumitsa, and Gevgeli in Yugoslav Macedonia, and Petrich in Bulgaria. (38) In addition the Commission visited Sofia, Bulgaria, from 26 to 28 March 1947, and Belgrade, Yugoslavia, from 30 March to 2 April 1947. An investigating team of the Commission was allowed to visit Konispol, Trestenik and Korche, located within Albania. (39) Thus, practically, the Commission was given the opportunity to visit all the states involved in the dispute -- Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

The Commission carried out its fact-finding function by compiling evidence from field investigations, from documents

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(36) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 28, p. 700.

(37) Mouries, Axioupolis, and Skra are specifically located in the Greek prefecture of Kilikis near the Yugoslav and Bulgarian borders.

(38) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 10.

(39) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. II, pp. 197-198.

presented by the four states involved, from written and oral statements made by the liaison representatives and in general from examining individuals and non-governmental organizations.<sup>(40)</sup> On the whole, the Commission and its seven investigating teams heard some 256 witnesses or statements, and accumulated approximately 20,000 pages of evidence and other materials.<sup>(41)</sup>

#### Anatomy of the Commission

The Commission, in order to facilitate its work and benefit from the principle of "division of labour", set up certain subsidiary organs. These subsidiary organs did not have any direct connection with the Security Council, being creations of and dependent upon the Commission. They were part of the internal structure of their parent body and were not to replace it.

##### 1. The Committee of Experts:

For an accurate description of the composition of the Committee of Experts two phases in its activities should be distinguished. In its first phase, the Committee was composed of members of the delegations of Colombia, Poland, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., and the U. S. A. It was presided over

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(40) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 10.

(41) United States Department of State, Bulletin, 1947, Vol. 16, No. 418, p. 15. In fact nine teams were established; two of them, however, were subordinate to their parent teams.

by the Principal Secretary of the Commission, who served also as Rapporteur. Occasionally, the Chairman of the Commission attended and presided over this subsidiary body. The Committee held six meetings and its decisions were reported to the Commission for decision.<sup>(42)</sup> What might be observed here is that in its first phase the Committee was composed not of the heads of delegations, but of their assistants. There were two from the Communist bloc and three from the Western bloc. Furthermore, the Chairman was a member of the staff and not a particular representative of any of the member states.

On 25 February 1947, the Committee was reorganized to expedite further the work of its parent body. It was decided that the chiefs of the five delegations were to compose the Committee of Experts and that they would be presided over by the Chairman of the main Commission. On 4 March 1947, the representative of France was added.

The Committee's major function was to make recommendations to the Commission on such matters as the planning of its work, the examination of communications submitted to the Commission and the selection and scheduling of witnesses to be heard. It was not a "steering committee" since it dealt only with matters specifically referred to it by the Commission.<sup>(43)</sup> By 12 April

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(42) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p.6.

(43) Ibid., p. 6.

1947, the Committee of Experts had completed its work and ceased to function any longer.

2. Investigating Teams:

As part of its terms of reference -- "to elucidate the causes and nature of ... border violations and disturbances" -- the Commission set up a number of investigating teams whose membership varied in size and composition. On all except two teams the five Great Powers were represented.<sup>(44)</sup> Chairmanship rotated among the small Powers with the exception of the first team<sup>(45)</sup> which was presided over by Mr. W. G. Shearer, Assistant Secretary of the Commission.<sup>(46)</sup>

To the members of the Investigating Teams liaison representatives were added in order to maintain direct connection with the four states involved -- Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. On only one occasion did Greece refuse to attach any representatives to the Investigating Teams. The refusal came as a reaction to the Commission's decision to send Team B2 to interview the leader of the guerrilla bands -- Markos Vafiadis.<sup>(47)</sup>

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(44) France and China were not represented on Teams B and B2.

(45) Team 1.

(46) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. II, pp. 159-173.

(47) Despite the fact that "Markos" himself invited the Commission to hear his oral evidence, the leader of the guerrillas failed to show up at the agreed location. As a result the majority of Team B2, which was sent by the Commission to meet "Markos", decided to return to its base - in Salonika. The delegates of the U.S.S.R. and Poland, however, along with the liaison representatives of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia refused to follow the majority of the team and achieved to meet "Markos" whose statements they later inserted in the Commission's reports. U.N. S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 104 and Vol. II, p. 197. Also see Kyrou, Ach.A. Op.cit. p. 495.



The Investigating Teams interrogated people within the territories of the four countries involved in the dispute and inquired into frontier incidents. Thus Team 1A visited Konispol, Trestenik~~and~~ and Korche, located within Albania, on the request of the Albanian Government. The object of these visits was to inquire into the Cham<sup>(48)</sup> question, and into a particular frontier incident.<sup>(49)</sup> Teams E and F visited Skoplje and Bulkes respectively, which are situated in Yugoslavia. They interrogated refugees from "Aegean Macedonia" and other witnesses presented by Greek and Yugoslav representatives. Team D paid a visit to Lubimets, which is located in Bulgaria, to inquire into incidents which occurred at posts 10 and 11, near Gornoiorovdski, Orets and Korimvos. However, the bulk of team visits took place within Greece in Piraeus, Athens, Salonika, Syros, Ikaria, and basically in northern Greece.<sup>(50)</sup> The Commission was able to benefit from these Teams because the latter operated while the main body was functioning elsewhere.

In all, the period in which the Investigating Teams operated was less than two months; the first visit of an Investigating Team took place on 17 February 1947, the last on 2 April 1947, just before the Commission left for Geneva to draft its report.

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(48) Albanian ethnic minority.

(49) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. II, pp. 197-198.

(50) Ibid., pp. 196-198.

### The Subsidiary Group

The establishment of a subsidiary organ to replace the Commission, which was to draft its report in Geneva, was suggested to the Security Council by the representative of the United States on 28 March 1947.<sup>(51)</sup> The Commission, the American delegate observed, had full authority to leave representatives in Greece by the resolution that created it. It was also implicit in this resolution, he added, that the Commission would continue in existence until the Council disposed of the Greek case or expressly provided otherwise.<sup>(52)</sup> On 18 April, the Council passed a resolution empowering the Commission to set up the Subsidiary Group.<sup>(52)</sup> Accordingly, the Subsidiary Group was established consisting of a representative and an assistant for each member of the Council. Furthermore, it was provided that liaison representatives would be attached to it. Only Greece, however, implemented this part of the resolution, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria having decided to boycott the operations of the Subsidiary Group.<sup>(53)</sup>

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(51) United Nations, ST/PSCA/1, p. 183.

(52) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 37, pp. 799-800. There were 9 votes in favour and 2 abstentions -- the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

(53) United Nations, Yearbook 1946-1947, p. 364. See also, United Nations; S/AC.4/252 (Albanian letter); S/AC.4/253 (Yugoslav letter); S/AC.4/256 (Bulgarian letter).

Functions of the Subsidiary Group: The resolution empowering the Commission to establish the Subsidiary Group provided that the latter will "continue to fulfill such functions as the Commission may prescribe".<sup>(54)</sup> The terms of reference of the Group were further clarified by the decision of the Commission that set it up. According to this decision the Group was to perform the same functions as its parent body<sup>(55)</sup> with the following qualifications: firstly, it was to investigate only such incidents <sup>as</sup> ~~which~~ had occurred since 22 March 1947; secondly, it was not to hear evidence which was or could have been available to the main Commission; and thirdly, no incident was to be investigated or evidence heard except by formal decision of the Group.<sup>(56)</sup>

Not only the functions of the Subsidiary Group were subject to controversy, but even its very existence. At a Council meeting on 12 May 1947, the Soviet representative contended that

"the Commission decided to delegate to the Subsidiary Group, automatically and fully, the functions assigned to it as a Commission ... (The) establishment of the Subsidiary Group would (thus) lose its meaning since ... (it) would, in fact, be another Commission."<sup>(57)</sup>

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(54) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 37, pp. 799-800.

(55) Functions that were stated in the 19 December resolution of the Security Council; see supra, pp. 30-32.

(56) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement No. 11, Annex 26 (S/337).

(57) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 39, p. 828.

On this issue, the 18 April Council resolution would seem to be clear. It empowered the Commission to confer its terms of reference either in full or in part. The scope of the conferred powers was left to the Commission to decide. Furthermore, the Group was to be a continuation of the Commission set up by the 19 December resolution. The need for the Group's existence was suggested by the fact that the Commission was unable to carry out its functions from the time it left Greece and met in Geneva on 7 April 1947. Moreover, the Commission, in its decision to set up the Subsidiary Group, included three qualifications which by no means made the transfer of jurisdiction from the Commission to the Subsidiary Group as "full" as it was contended<sup>to be</sup> by the Soviet delegate.

Nevertheless, there was one argument put forward by the Soviet representative which was difficult to refute. He said that the mandate given to the Subsidiary Group extended to future incidents, whereas the Council had only authorized the Commission of Investigation to inquire into those incidents to which the Greek Government had drawn the attention of the Council.<sup>(58)</sup>

The Subsidiary Group differed from its parent body in many respects. In addition to the aforementioned three qualifications with regard to the kinds of incidents to be investigated by the

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(58) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 39, pp. 828-829.

Group, the Australian representative, at a Council meeting on 22 May 1947, discerned two more differences between the two bodies: firstly, the Group was not to report to the Security Council, as was the case with the Commission, but to the Commission only; and secondly, the Group had neither right nor authority to make any proposals or recommendations.<sup>(59)</sup>

By the middle of September 1947, when it was dissolved, the Subsidiary Group had held 122 meetings, had received written and oral evidence from more than 130 witnesses and accumulated about 4,000 pages of material. Owing to the refusal of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to allow the members of the Subsidiary Group to conduct investigations within their territories, the Group confined its operations within Greece.<sup>(60)</sup>

Term of Office of the Subsidiary Group: The Group was created by the Commission on 30 April 1947. It left Geneva for Salonika on 6 and 10 May 1947. The duration of its life was left open by the Security Council. It was, in fact, implied in the debates which occurred in the Council on this issue, that the term of the Subsidiary Group would terminate with that of the Commission. Thus, the French delegate observed on 22 May 1947,


"... (the duration of the Subsidiary Group) cannot exceed that of the Commission in conformity

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(59) United Nations, ST/PSCA/1, p. 391.

(60) It operated from Salonika, Damaskinon, Sidirokastron, Ormenion, Milia-Therapio, Koula and Metaxades on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier; from Mikrovryssi and Mouries on the Greco-Yugoslav borders; and from Yannina and Lithari on the Greco-Albanian frontier. United States Department of State, Bulletin, 1947, Vol. 17, No. 440, p. 1129; also Keesings's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p. 8720A.

DIAGRAM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MACHINERY  
WITH REGARD TO THE GREEK CASE



with the provisions of its terms of reference. The powers of the Subsidiary Group will therefore expire at the same time as those of the Commission."(61)

About the same subject the Polish delegate clearly stated that practically all the representatives on the Council had agreed that the life of the Subsidiary Group could not exceed that of its parent body.(62)

On 15 September 1947, the life of both the Commission and the Subsidiary Group came to an end as a result of an affirmative vote on a resolution introduced by the United States representative which provided that the Greek case be removed from further consideration by the Security Council.

#### The Report of the Commission

The report of the Commission, submitted to the Security Council on 27 May 1947, consisted of three volumes.(63) Volume I which contained the crux of the report, was divided into: Part I, an analysis of the work of the Commission; Part II, a survey of evidence submitted to the Commission; Part III, the conclusions of the Commission; and Part IV, the proposals made by the

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(61) United Nations, ST/PSCA/1, p. 208.

(62) Ibid., p. 208.

(63) There were two drafting committees set up in order to prepare the report of the Commission. The first, under the chairmanship of the representative of China prepared drafts of Part I of the first volume of the report, whereas the second, under the chairmanship of the representative of Colombia, prepared Parts II and III of the same volume.

Commission to the Security Council. Volume II of the report contained: the composition of the Commission in Annex I; the Teams of the Commission in Annex II; a list of witnesses heard by the Commission and its Teams in Annex III; a bibliography of Commission documentation in Annex IV; field investigation of the Commission and its Teams in Annex V; comments and oral statements made by the liaison representative of Albania on Parts II and III of the report in Annex VI; comments and oral statements made by the liaison representative of Bulgaria on Parts II and III of the report in Annex VII. Volume III of the report consisted of: comments and oral statements made by the liaison representative of Greece on Parts II and III of the report in Annex VIII; comments and oral statements made by the liaison representative of Yugoslavia on Parts II and III of the report in Annex IX.

The Nature of the Complaints Involved:

Greece's charges against her three neighbours, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia could be broken down into three main categories. Firstly, the Greek Government accused Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia of lending support to the guerrillas in Greece.<sup>(64)</sup> This support took the form of providing guerrillas with weapons and supplies; dispatching guerrilla detachments across the frontier into Greece; crossing by guerrillas from

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(64) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. 1, pp. 14-46.



Greece into the three northern countries; hospitalizing wounded guerrillas; and training refugees for the purpose of sending them back to fight the legitimate Greek Government forces.

According to the Albanian liaison representative, about 23,000 Greeks had fled to Albania because of persecutions and terror on the part of the Greek authorities.<sup>(65)</sup> The Bulgarian liaison representative maintained that the accusations made by the Greek Government had "no real basis", and labelled the witnesses supplied by the Greek authorities as "false". These false witnesses, he added, consisted of "Bulgarian and Yugoslav fascists" who had found "a hospitable shelter in Greek territory".<sup>(66)</sup> The point of view of the Yugoslav liaison representative was that the documents of the Greek Government were "unreliable" and "that their statements are therefore founded on misleading information".<sup>(67)</sup>

The second Greek complaint was that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were interfering in the internal affairs of Greece and aimed at the seizure by violence of Aegean Macedonia and Western Thrace from Greece.<sup>(68)</sup> Bulgaria, the Greek liaison representative charged, was promoting "intensive propaganda in favour of the incorporation of Greek Macedonia in the Federal Yugoslav State of

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(65) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1. Vol. I, p. 16.

(66) Ibid, p. 28.

(67) Ibid, p. 31.

(68) Ibid, pp. 46-53.

Macedonia" in return "for Yugoslav support of Bulgaria's design on the Greek province of Western Thrace".(69)

In attempting to refute these accusations, the Bulgarian representative stated

"... while Bulgaria's interest in an outlet on the Aegean Sea remained active, 'this must be achieved solely by pacific procedure, through amiable agreements or international decisions'."(70)

For his part the Yugoslav representative remarked that the "Autonomist Great Macedonian" movement was not of Yugoslav origin.(71)

A third charge levelled by Greece was that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia provoked numerous border incidents.(72) Albania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, were accused of allowing their border guards to fire against those of Greece; of attacking Greek localities; of attempting clandestine crossings of the frontier; of incidents involving the theft of cattle or crops;(73) of border violations of Albanian soldiers; and of Bulgarian flights over Greek territory. The Greek complaints voiced against Yugoslavia were of a more general character and involved mainly the covering of retreating guerrillas and their hospitalization.(74)

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(69) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, pp. 46-47.

(70) Ibid., p. 48.

(71) Ibid., p. 52.

(72) Ibid., pp. 53-56.

(73) Wood was also mentioned in the Bulgarian case.

(74) Ibid., pp. 61-66.

In an attempt to refute these charges, the Albanian liaison representative asserted that the frontier incidents were caused by those who were under the orders of the Greek authorities; that "the Greeks alone had the technical equipment necessary to undertake frontier violations by sea and air"; and that only Greece, which considered herself at war with Albania, had a direct interest in the provocation of frontier incidents.<sup>(75)</sup> The Bulgarian liaison representative, on the other hand, maintained that "partizans" were in control of Greek territory in the frontier region and that "the origin of the disturbances in Greece had nothing to do with the frontiers and frontier incidents".<sup>(76)</sup> The liaison representative of Yugoslavia spoke in the same terms. He added only that the frontier was "insufficiently guarded by the Greek authorities" and that "the absence of guards deprived the Greek authorities of the possibility of knowing the exact situation on the frontier".<sup>(77)</sup>

Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia, for their part, presented counter-accusations, in which the incumbent Greek Government was held responsible for the grave situation in the Balkans. Five major charges were laid. The first charge was that the Greek Government was responsible for a state of "civil war" raging throughout Greece and not in her northern district alone.<sup>(78)</sup>

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(75) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 54.

(76) Ibid., p. 60.

(77) Ibid., p. 61.

(78) Ibid., pp. 67-80.

Presenting the point of view of the Greek Government, its liaison representative stressed the internal nature of the question and consequently the incompetence of the Commission to inquire into the "domestic policy or the political complexity of any of the four Governments concerned." (79)

The second charge involved the issue of persecution of ethnic minorities -- Macedonians and Chams. (80) As a result of "terrorism by the gendarmerie, army and right wing bands" Macedonians and Chams were forced "to leave their homes and take refuge in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia." (81)

Commenting on this charge the Greek liaison representative declared before the Commission that "the Albanian speaking minority (the Chams) of 17,000 persons turned traitors and collaborators" during World War II. Despite the efforts made by Mr. Lambert, of the International Red Cross, he added, to convince them to stay in Greece, towards the end of the German occupation, most of these people fled into Albania. (82) With regard to the "Macedonian minority", the Greek liaison representative maintained,

"... the Bulgarian representative ... preferred not to mention the thousands of Slav-speaking emigrants who crossed into Bulgaria in the fall of 1944 at the time of or just after the retreat

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(79) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 74.

(80) Ibid., pp. 67-80.

(81) Ibid., p. 76.

(82) Ibid., p. 78.

of the German troops whose close collaborators those emigrants had been." (83)

Furthermore, he pointed out that of the two million Greeks living in Macedonia and Thrace only four per cent were Slavophones and that Yugoslavia did not have the right to claim for herself to be the protector of all the Greeks in Macedonia or even of the Slavophone minority.

The third charge laid against Greece was that her Government conducted a policy of provocation on the borders of her neighbours. In defence of Greece, her liaison representative confined himself to reiterating the charges brought by Greece against the three northern neighbours. (84)

The fourth charge was that the Greek Government conducted a policy of provocation by maintaining on its territory "quislings" as well as subversive activities by those "quislings" with respect to Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. (85) The charge added that these elements were being encouraged by Greek authorities to "organize a conspiracy against the regimes in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia".

In a letter dated 25 March 1947 and addressed to the representative of the United States, the Greek liaison representative gave detailed information about the number and location of

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(83) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, pp. 78-79.

(84) Ibid., pp. 80-85.

(85) Ibid., pp. 85-98.

Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav refugees in Greece, and stated:

"The Greek Government would be very happy, with due regard to the international custom of shelter to political refugees, if it could be arranged for these persons to return to their native country. In any event, while their stay in Greece continues, any political activity on their part is strictly forbidden."(86)

The final charge against Greece was that the Government of that country was conducting an expansionist foreign policy which was a provocation to its northern neighbours.(87)

In reply to this charge the Greek liaison representative expounded the following arguments. In relation to Albania, Mr. Alexis Kyrou in his address of 17 February, declared that

"the Union of Northern Epirus (South Albania), the mother country, constitutes one of the most ardent desires of all the Greek people ... Let us state also in passing that even the Committee of E.A.M. has proclaimed it on many times ... Nobody in Greece (however) has ever thought of occupying Northern Epirus by force ..."(88)

Later on, the Greek representative supplied the Commission with the argument that Albania with a population of hardly one million inhabitants, maintained an army of 65,000 men including the militia.(89) With regard to Bulgarian charges of Greek chauvinism the Greek delegate retorted that his country had been attacked by Bulgarian armies three times since 1913.(90)

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(86) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 95.

(87) Ibid., pp. 98-103.

(88) Ibid., p. 102.

(89) Ibid., p. 103.

(90) Ibid., p. 102.

He also added:

"... Bulgaria which by the Peace Treaty just signed is supposed to maintain a total force of troops and gendarmerie not exceeding 55,000 men has actually under arms 120,000 men in regular army, 50,000 in the militia, 20,000 in the frontier and 50,000 in Trudovak battalions. That makes a total of 240,000 men." (91)

With regard to Yugoslavia, the Greek liaison representative declared on 17 February 1947:

"There is no secret connected with the fact that at the present moment when the Greek State is facing seditious bands, the total of the Greek armed forces does not exceed 130,000 men. But according to the most conservative estimates, the Yugoslav government is keeping under arms 400,000 men in the regular army; 100,000 in the OZNA Secret Police; 50,000 in the militia and to these should be added 100,000 men in the military labour battalion. That makes a total of 650,000 men." (92)

It is significant that the delegation of the U. S. S. R. was opposed to the inclusion of the above figures as irrelevant because it felt the size of the armed forces was not the Commission's concern.

A tabular comparison of the charges laid down by both sides suggests a striking similarity of content:

Greek Charges	Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Charges
1. A <u>guerrilla movement</u> supported by the northern states existed on the borders.	1. A <u>civil war</u> caused by the irresponsible policies of the Greek Government was being waged all over Greece.

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(91) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 103.

(92) Ibid., p. 103

Greek Charges

Albanian, Bulgarian and  
Yugoslav Charges

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 2. <u>Provocation</u> on the borders stemmed from the northern states.                   | 2. <u>Provocation</u> on the borders originated in the Greek Government. |
| 3. <u>Guerrillas</u> were taking refuge in the northern states.                          | 3. <u>Quislings</u> were taking refuge in Greece.                        |
| 4. The aim of the northern states was to <u>detach Macedonia and Thrace</u> from Greece. | 4. The aim of Greek policies was <u>expansion to the North</u> .         |

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commission

The conclusions reached by the majority of the Commission<sup>(93)</sup> found Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia primarily responsible for the tense situation on their borders with Greece. It was stated in these conclusions that "on the basis of the facts ascertained by the Commission, --- Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria, had supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece."<sup>(94)</sup> Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were also found guilty of reviving and promoting a separatist movement among the Slavo-Macedonians in Greece.<sup>(95)</sup> Under International

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(93) Eight members -- Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- subscribed to these conclusions. The U.S.S.R. and Poland did not agree to the majority conclusions and presented their own, while France abstained from giving her approval to these conclusions.

(94) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 106.

(95) Ibid., p. 110.



Law, these countries had the duty to "prevent" and even "suppress" subversive activity in their territory aimed against another Government. The majority of the Commission, however, did not ignore the disturbed domestic situation in Greece. Discrimination and persecution of minorities and political opposition groups were mentioned in their conclusions and were depicted as the result of the civil war of 1944-1945 and communist propaganda. Yet these internal conditions did not bear a direct relation to the situation investigated by the Commission.<sup>(96)</sup>

The Soviet delegate presented his own conclusions which were endorsed by his Polish colleague and rejected by the other nine members -- including France. The pith and substance of these minority conclusions was the denial of any Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav interference in Greece's domestic affairs and the affirmation of the existence of a civil war which was raging throughout Greece and which alone was causing the tense situation on the borders. A large scale persecution of "democratically-minded citizens and national minorities by the gendarmerie, regular troops and right wing bands" was also asserted in the minority conclusions.

The French delegate abstained from approving the majority conclusions, but did reject those presented by the Soviet Union and Poland. He criticized the Commission's conclusions on the

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(96) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 114.

(97) Ibid., p. 144.

ground that a "judgement" on the issues involved was pronounced therein. Only the Security Council, he said, had the right to decide between who was "right" and who was "wrong" in the case investigated by the Commission.(98)

The delegations of Belgium and Colombia, although subscribing to the majority conclusions made the following statement:

"In spite of the numerous presumptions which fit each other, tending to substantiate the charges brought by Greece against her northern neighbours, the Belgian and Colombian delegations consider that it is not for this Commission, which was set up in the spirit of conciliation of Chapter VI of the Charter, to give any decision as to the possible responsibility of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments."(99)

In keeping with its general conclusions, the Commission proposed that the Security Council recommend to the four Governments that they establish good-neighbourly relations; abstain from all action, direct or indirect, likely to increase or maintain the tension and unrest in the border areas; and rigorously refrain from any support, overt or covert, of elements in neighbouring countries aiming at the overthrow of the lawful Governments of those countries.(100) The Commission also attempted to clearly define "threat to the peace". Thus, its

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(98) The task of the Commission for the French delegate should aim at pacification and reconciliation. United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 150.

(99) Ibid., p. 147.

(100) Ibid., p. 154.

report stated, inter alia,

"... future cases of support of armed bands formed on the territory of one State and crossing into the territory of another State, or of refusal by a government in spite of the demands of the State concerned to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive such bands of any aid or protection, should be considered by the Security Council as a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations." (101)

Thus the Security Council would have to establish only the fact of such "illegal support" to have an automatic existence of "threat to the peace".

A second proposal made by the majority of the Commission's members provided for the Security Council to "recommend" to the Governments to take positive action for the regulation and control of their common frontiers by entering into new conventions along the lines of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention of 1931.

A third proposal suggested the creation by the Security Council of a Commissioner or a small Commission to assist the four Governments to restore normal conditions and establish good-neighbourly relations. If the body was to consist of a single Commissioner, he and his staff should be nationals of states who were neither permanent members of the Security Council nor had any direct connection or interest in the affairs of the four countries concerned. If the body was a small commission

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(101) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 154.

it should be composed of representatives of the governments concerned. Among the functions which such a body would perform would be to assist the four Governments concerned in the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of the new frontier conventions envisaged; and to undertake to study and make recommendations to these Governments with respect to additional bilateral agreements between them for the pacific settlement of border disputes.<sup>(102)</sup> The projected commission would undertake the observation of the frontier area and the investigation of any frontier violations. A progress report would be submitted to the Security Council or whenever the commission deemed necessary. Other suggestions that dealt with the proposed commission stipulated that its term ought to be at least two years, with the possibility of its continued existence being reviewed by the Security Council.<sup>(103)</sup>

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(102) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, pp. 154-155

(103) On 27 June 1947, a resolution introduced in the Security Council by the United States representative provided for a "Commission of Good Offices and Investigation", which in substance did not differ from that projected in the Commission's majority report. Whereas the United States, the United Kingdom and France maintained that the Security Council, under Article 34, was empowered to enforce an enquiry upon parties to a dispute regardless of the latter's consent, the Soviet Union and Poland rejected the binding force of such an enquiry. The resolution was not adopted, nine votes being in favour and two against -- one of them was that of the U.S.S.R. See United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 66, p. 1612 for the results of voting.

The fourth proposal dealt with the problem of political refugees in all four countries. The majority report suggested that political refugees be removed "as far away as possible from the area from which they came" physical and practical conditions being taken into consideration. Furthermore, the Commission recommended that the Governments concerned should place these refugees in camps or otherwise segregate them and "ensure that they should not be permitted to indulge in any political or military activity." If "practicable", an international body authorized by the United Nations would supervise these camps.

The Commission's final recommendation was that the Security Council propose to the Governments concerned a study of the "practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities".(104)

France, notwithstanding her objection to the conclusions reached by the majority of the Commission, subscribed to the above recommendations. This was because the formulation of these recommendations did not involve apportioning responsibility.

The Soviet and Polish delegates, however, rejected the majority proposals for they were not in line with their own conclusions. The first Soviet argument for rejecting these proposals was the absence of any link between the proposals and

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(104) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, pp. 155-156.

the facts and documents gathered by the Commission. The proposals, according to the Soviet delegate, were based merely on the "unfounded assertions of the Greek Government regarding aid to the guerrillas by the northern neighbours". The second ground on which the Soviet representative based his rejection was that the recommendations suggested the possibility of future frontier incidents, conflicts and even acts of aggression in the relations between Greece, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania on the other. The third argument of the Soviet delegate was that evidence submitted to the Commission indicated that the tense situation and disorders were due to Greece's internal developments and hence, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania should not be subject to the measures contemplated by the Commission. The fourth Soviet objection was that proposals for the establishment of a permanent frontier commission or body representing the Security Council, as contemplated in the proposals, as well as the conclusion of conventions and agreements between Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, were tantamount to a limitation of the sovereign rights of these states in settling their relations among themselves. (105)

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(105) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 156. It should be noted, however, with regard to the fourth Soviet objection, that the projected body would have acted under Article 33 of the Charter, and more particularly would have been a body of "good offices", which implies no constraint upon the sovereign rights of a state. Furthermore, the conclusion of conventions and agreements between the four Governments was a mere "recommendation" which would have left it to the four states either to accept or reject it. Supra, pp. 52-53.

The Polish delegate endorsed the Soviet objections to the recommendations of the majority of the Commission and added two more: firstly, some of the proposed measures, he argued, did not take into account that diplomatic relations did not exist between Greece, on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Albania on the other; and secondly, he concluded, the choice of recommendations should be left to the Security Council.(106)

The report of the Commission was presented to the Security Council on 27 June 1947 when the delegate of the United States proposed a resolution in accordance with the recommendations of the majority of the Commission.(107) This draft resolution of the United States was not adopted due to a Soviet veto. Another attempt to implement the recommendations of the majority of the Commission was made on 6 August 1947 when the Australian representative proposed in the Council that Greece, on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, should be directed to enter into direct negotiations at once in an endeavour to relieve tension and with a view to the resumption of normal and peaceful relations.(108) Observers would be appointed to ensure the implementation of this decision, their duty being to report directly to the Council. The Council did not adopt the proposal, however, since a permanent member -- the U. S. S. R.--voted against it on 19 August 1947.

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(106) United Nations, S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, p. 157.

(107) See supra, p. 53n.

(108) United Nations, ST/PSCA/1, p. 189.

Conclusions:

A "situation" arose in 1946 which threatened international peace and security in the Balkans. There was no actual "dispute" involved in the complaints of those who took resort to the Security Council. The "situation" which threatened the international status quo in the Balkan area was alleged by the communist bloc to be the result of British -- and later American -- intervention in Greece's internal affairs. Rebel forces were waging war against the established government in Greece. British intervention, the Soviet bloc alleged, assisted the illegitimate and "monarcho-fascist" Government to subdue the "democratic forces" that were fighting for their freedom. The disturbances had reached the extent of "civil war" raging throughout the country. It was a purely internal matter and Greece's northern neighbours, so the communist delegates claimed, had nothing to do with the causes of that civil war.

Greece, on the other hand, presented the matter as originating from other than internal causes. Her Government claimed that the problem arose from Greece's border relations with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These countries, Greece maintained, were lending support to the guerrillas -- to illegitimate political forces within Greece -- and thus were automatically violating International Law. British troops were in Greece on the request of that country's legitimate Government and



consequently there was no question of foreign illegal intervention.

Interestingly enough, no large-scale aggression was ever undertaken by Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria against Greece, nor did Greece ever undertake such action against her northern neighbours. Irredentist claims and movements had existed for a long time in the Balkan region. Yugoslavia hoped to possess Aegean Macedonia, whereas Bulgaria looked to Western Thrace for an outlet to the Mediterranean. Greece regarded Southern Albania as an integral part of her territory. Bulgarian and Yugoslav irredentist claims directed against each other were kept dormant in order to present a common irredentist strategy against Greece.

CHAPTER THREE

THE GREEK QUESTION BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

"The Security Council

(a) Resolves that the dispute between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the other, be taken off the list of matters of which the Council is seized; and

(b) Requests that the Secretary-General be instructed to place all records and documents in the case at the disposal of the General Assembly."<sup>(1)</sup>

Article 10 of the Charter empowers the General Assembly to "discuss" any questions or any matters coming within the scope of that document. A limitation, however, is imposed upon the Assembly's freedom of action. The General Assembly may not always make recommendations. According to Article 12,

"While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."

At a Council meeting on 15 September 1947, the United States representative declared that since the Greek case had been placed on the Assembly's agenda<sup>(2)</sup> the Security Council should assist

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(1) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, No. 89, p. 2401.

(2) By a letter dated 20 August 1947 (United Nations, A/344), the acting representative of the United States at the seat of the United Nations requested that the

the plenary body to bring about an improvement in the Balkan situation by giving it an explicit authorization to make any recommendations it deemed fit.<sup>(3)</sup> The Soviet delegate, however, did not agree with the American proposal, on the grounds that the Council had primary responsibility for maintaining international peace. He remarked that if the resolution introduced by his American counterpart were adopted, it would mean that the Security Council was voluntarily abstaining from carrying out its duties. Accordingly, the Soviet delegation cast a negative vote on the American resolution -- forestalling its acceptance. The only way open to the Western Powers was therefore the removal of the case from the Council's agenda -- this being a procedural matter.<sup>(4)</sup> It was the second time the Council took a question off its agenda in order to permit the Assembly to recommend measures on a particular question.<sup>(5)</sup> The first time the Council took a similar action was with regard to the Spanish Question on 4 November 1946.

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following item be included in the Assembly's agenda of the second session:

"Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece."

See United Nations, Yearbook 1947-1948, p. 63.

(3) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year: No. 89, p. 2365.

(4) Ibid., p. 2405.

(5) Goodrich, L.M., and Hambro, E., Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents, rev. ed. (Boston: World Foundation, 1949), p. 171.

In presenting his case before the General Assembly, on 17 September 1947, the American delegate called the attention of the member states to "the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" which were in danger.<sup>(6)</sup> He stressed particularly the external source of the threat, its instigators being Greece's northern neighbours -- Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. The Polish representative, on the other hand, contended that the threat was rooted within Greece and that the policies of the "illegitimate" Government which ruled Greece were aimed at destroying international peace and security.<sup>(7)</sup>

The failure of the Western bloc to set the enforcing machinery of the Security Council into motion to cope with the Greek problem, induced the United States and its allies to make another attempt to embody the majority recommendations of the Commission of Investigation in a General Assembly resolution. Thus, on 25 September 1947, the American delegation to the First Committee submitted a draft resolution to the effect that the General Assembly: firstly, call upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to cease and desist from rendering any further assistance or support in any form to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek Government; secondly, call upon Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia

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(6) United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,  
Second Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol. I, pp. 19-20.

(7) Ibid., p. 32.

and Greece to co-operate in the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means;<sup>(8)</sup> and thirdly, establish a Special Committee to observe the compliance by the four Governments concerned with the foregoing recommendations and to assist them to implement these recommendations.<sup>(9)</sup>

Two days later the U. S. S. R. countered with another draft resolution. Its delegation underlined the disturbed internal situation in Greece which was "the main causative factor in the acute situation in the northern frontier regions" of that country. This internal situation, the Soviet representative added, was to a great extent due to foreign interference in Greece and the existence of a "fascist" regime. The Soviet Union, therefore, recommended the withdrawal of foreign troops and foreign military personnel from Greece and the establishment of a commission for the supervision of economic aid.<sup>(10)</sup>

On 21 October 1947, after a prolonged debate, the General

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- (8) Through (1) the establishment of normal diplomatic relations and good-neighbourly relations, and the conclusion of frontier conventions, (2) the peaceful settlement of refugee problems, and (3) the study of the practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities.
- (9) United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, First Committee, Summary Records of Meetings: 16 September - 19 November, 1947, pp. 591-592 (doc. A/C. 1/191).
- (10) Ibid., pp. 595-596 (doc. A/C. 1/199). A similar resolution was presented by the Soviet delegate to the Security Council in April 1947.

Assembly adopted by 40 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions, Resolution 109(II), which was, in substance, the above mentioned American draft resolution.<sup>(11)</sup> This resolution provided, inter alia that:

"The General Assembly ...

Establishes a Special Committee

(1) To observe the compliance by the four Governments concerned with the foregoing recommendations;<sup>(12)</sup>

(2) To be available to assist the four Governments concerned in the implementation of such recommendation ...

Recommends that the four Governments concerned co-operate with the Special Committee in enabling it to carry out these obligations; ..."<sup>(13)</sup>

THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL  
COMMITTEE ON THE BALKANS

Composition and Personnel

The General Assembly resolution 109(II) provided that the

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(11) United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol. I, p. 462.

(12) The recommendations were as follows:

"The General Assembly ... calls upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the one hand and Greece on the other to co-operate in the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means, and to that end recommends:

(1) That they establish normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations among themselves as soon as possible.

(2) That they establish frontier conventions ...

(3) That they co-operate in the settlement of the problems arising out of the presence of refugees in the four States concerned ...

(4) That they study the practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities ..."

(13) United Nations, A/519, p. 12.

Special Committee consist of representatives of Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, places being held open for Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The reason for these two vacant places was the refusal of Poland and the U. S. S. R. to participate in the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans -- hereinafter referred to as U.N.S.C.O.B.-- on the grounds that its establishment was "illegal".<sup>(14)</sup> The Soviet delegate speaking in the First Committee on 9 October 1947 declared that the terms of reference of U.N.S.C.O.B. were incompatible with the sovereign equality of states and the principles contained in the United Nations Charter. For this reason the U.S.S.R. delegation could participate neither in the election of U.N.S.C.O.B., nor in its work.<sup>(15)</sup> Yugoslavia's representative, addressing the First Committee, stated that the creation of the U.N.S.C.O.B. constituted a violation of the sovereignty of his country.<sup>(16)</sup> Similar statements followed from the Albanian and Bulgarian Governments. They all emphasized the incompatibility of U.N.S.C.O.B. with the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and the concept of **state** sovereignty.<sup>(17)</sup>

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(14) United Nations, A/AC. 1/SR. 72, pp. 3-4.

(15) United Nations, Yearbook 1947-1948, p. 70.

(16) United Nations, A/574, p. 5.

(17) United Nations: A/AC. 16/53/Rev. 1, Annex II; A/AC. 16/54; A/574, p. 5.

The membership of U.N.S.C.O.B. remained the same from its inception in October 1947 until its dissolution in December 1951. Legally, the Committee consisted of eleven members, but in practice there were only nine participants since the Soviet bloc never accepted its legal existence.

Liaison representatives of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were invited to assist in the work of U.N.S.C.O.B.. Greece alone, however, agreed to co-operate with U.N.S.C.O.B. in this respect. Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia rejected the invitation for the reasons previously mentioned.<sup>(18)</sup>

Resolution 109(II) also provided for a staff for U.N.S.C.O.B. . The Assembly requested the Secretary General to assign to the Committee a "staff adequate to enable it to perform its duties." Accordingly, the Secretary General initially appointed twenty-five persons.

#### Anatomy of U.N.S.C.O.B.

In order to facilitate its work U.N.S.C.O.B. established (1) Observation Groups, (2) Sub-Committees, and (3) Ad-hoc Committees.

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(18) See supra, p. 64. In fact, the non-co-operative attitude of these states towards the United Nations decisions could be traced back to the beginning of May 1947 when Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia refused to co-operate with the Subsidiary Group. Supra, p. 36 and 36n.



1. Observation Groups.

On 26 November 1947 it was unanimously decided by U.N.S.C.O.B. that groups be established to observe the compliance of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia with the recommendations of the General Assembly. The system of Observation Groups was originally initiated on an ad hoc basis with personnel and equipment largely supplied by the nations represented on U.N.S.C.O.B. . This was, to a large extent, due to the absence of adequate budgetary resources. In January 1948, seven members of U.N.S.C.O.B. -- Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States -- supplied some observers. By August 1949, the size of the Observation Groups was enlarged and included thirty-four observers.<sup>(19)</sup> The United Nations Secretariat provided these Groups with persons to act as secretaries. The enlargement of the observation system was due to specific United Nations funds allotted for the essential needs of U.N.S.C.O.B. .

By the end of May 1948, U.N.S.C.O.B. had been able to

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(19) There were:

- 8 observers from the United Kingdom
  - 7 observers from the United States
  - 7 observers from France
  - 4 observers from China
  - 4 observers from the Netherlands
  - 2 observers from Brazil
  - 2 observers from Mexico.
- United Nations, A/935, p. 21.

establish only five of the six planned<sup>(20)</sup> Observation Groups owing to insufficient personnel. Group 1 was exclusively occupied with the situation on the Albanian-Greek frontier; it was stationed at Yannina (Epirus). Groups 2 and 3 observed conditions on the Greek-Yugoslav frontier; they were located at Florina and Kilkis (Greek Macedonia). Groups 4 and 6 were concerned with the Greek-Bulgarian frontier and had their headquarters at Kavalla and Alexandroupolis (Macedonia and Western Thrace).<sup>(21)</sup> It had been originally intended that the Observation Groups would be stationed on both sides of the frontiers of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia with Greece.

As a result of the refusal of the communist states to cooperate, however, the Groups were not allowed to make any observations in these countries, except in one case. Group 6 was allowed to enter Bulgarian territory<sup>(22)</sup>-- the island of Maritsa in the Evros River -- and met Bulgarian officers on 29 April 1948. The Bulgarian letter inviting the Observation Group did not carry with it a "recognition" of U.N.S.C.O.B. .It merely

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(20) United Nations, A/574, p. 3.

(21) United Nations, A/574, p. 21. Group 5 was to observe, according to the map attached to the same document, the Greco-Bulgarian frontier and its zone was located between the zones of Groups 4 and 6. See ibid., Annex 5.

(22) In a letter to the Chairman of U.N.S.C.O.B. the Greek liaison representative objected to considering the island of Maritsa Bulgarian territory, for possession of the island was disputed. See U.N., A/AC. 16/373.

said,

"We have been informed that you have been charged by the United Nations to make enquiries on the spot regarding an incident." (23)

Later on, on 16 May 1948, for greater certainty, a communiqué of the Press Directorate of the Bulgarian Foreign Office declared:

"... Bulgaria has not changed her attitude towards the United Nations Balkan Committee which she continues to regard as unlawful, and does not consider it possible to co-operate with it. In the above mentioned case the Bulgarian frontier authorities admitted certain members of the Balkan Committee to Bulgarian territory, because, firstly, the investigation was arranged by the United Nations as a result of the request of the Bulgarian Government for the return of the three abducted Bulgarian frontier guards, and secondly, because the United Nations Secretariat, to which the Bulgarian Government referred itself, entrusted ad hoc these members of the Balkan Committee with carrying out the investigation." (24)

The observation group system was supervised by a Chief Observer appointed by U.N.S.C.O.B. . The Chief Observer with the Secretariat of U.N.S.C.O.B. operated from headquarters in Salonika and administered the observation groups from a technical point of view. He was the sole channel of communication between individual delegations and observers on matters relating to their duties. (25)

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(23) United Nations: A/574, p. 6; A/AC. 16/SC. 1/OG. 6/7/S-1, Annex B.

(24) United Nations: A/574, p. 7; A/AC. 16/W. 23; A/AC. 16/254.

(25) United Nations, A/935, p. 22.

The duties of the Observation Groups emanated in broad terms from the Assembly's resolutions. For greater certainty, however, U.N.S.C.O.B. issued, in 1949, a "Handbook for Observers" (26) including general instructions, a standard form for observation group reports, as well as how the groups were to be organized and administered. (27) The "Handbook for Observers" was, as U.N.S.C.O.B. put it, the result of experience gained in 1948 demonstrating the need "to clarify and define the scope of the United Nations observation work so that this new form of international machinery could function in the most impartial and objective manner possible." (28) The observers were accordingly instructed, inter alia:

"(a)... (to) observe and report whether any assistance or support, and in what form, is being rendered from outside Greece to armed groups fighting against the Greek Government, including the use of non-Greek territory as a base for the preparation or launching of armed action and to this end, shall:

(i) Investigate incidents as instructed by the Special Committee;

(ii) Examine at their discretion incidents brought to their attention on behalf of any of the four Governments concerned or by their own observations or information;

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(26) United Nations: A/AC. 16/SC. 1/56 and A/AC. 16/SC. 1/57 and corrigenda and addenda thereto; these two documents have been derived from A/935, p. 22n.

(27) United Nations, A/935, p. 22.

(28) Ibid., p. 22.

"(iii) Interrogate witnesses selected at their own discretion or brought to their attention by liaison officers of any of the four Governments concerned.

(b)... (To) observe and report:

(i) On compliance with frontier conventions for the regulation and control of common frontiers and the pacific settlement of frontier incidents and disputes and with such customary frontier practice as may exist along the northern frontiers of Greece and also

(ii) On such other special problems as may be directed from time to time by the Special Committee."(29)

Owing to the refusal of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to co-operate, U.N.S.C.O.B., through its Observation Groups, had been able to examine only those witnesses presented by the Greek Government -- in addition to those chosen at random by U.N.S.C.O.B. while it operated in Greece.(30) U.N.S.C.O.B., furthermore, found itself in the position of having to report that some of its observers had been fired upon by communist guards. On 6 July 1949, for example, United Nations observers flying over Greek territory in an observation aircraft bearing United Nations markings were fired on from gun positions clearly located in Albania.(31) Yet the Albanian authorities attempted to deny that such incidents had occurred. In a cable dated 18 November 1949 to the Secretary-General, the Albanian Deputy

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(29) United Nations: A/935, p. 22; A/AC. 1/56, p. 4.

(30) See for example, United Nations, A/574, p. 21.

(31) United Nations: A/935, p. 9; A/AC. 16/SC. 1/OG. 2/37/S-1.

Minister for Foreign Affairs maintained:

"The Government of the People's Republic of Albania categorically rejects the accusation brought against it for tendentious purposes by the Special Committee. The accusation is entirely false and unfounded. Albanian frontier guards never fired on the Committee's observers." (32)

It should be added, in conclusion, that the movement of Observation Groups was severely hampered by guerrilla control of certain areas and by the extensive placement of land mines throughout the entire frontier area. (33)

## 2. The Sub-Committees

On 10 December 1947, U.N.S.C.O.B. established three sub-committees. The first Sub-Committee was to be concerned with Observation Groups; the second with political problems; and the third with refugees' and minorities' problems. (34) On 24 February 1948, the number of these Sub-Committees was reduced to two. Sub-Committee 1 was henceforth to deal with Observation Groups (35) and budgetary matters, while Sub-Committee 2 was to deal with political and administrative problems, in addition to the questions of political refugees and minorities. (36) A

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(32) United Nations, A/C. 1/550

(33) United Nations, A/574, p. 21.

(34) Ibid., p. 4. Also, United Nations: A/AC. 16/SR. 12, pp. 2-6; A/AC. 16/SR. 13; A/AC. 16/15/Rev. 2; A/AC. 16/SR. 14.

(35) It was responsible, more specifically, for organizing the work of these Groups and for examining their reports.

(36) United Nations: A/574, p. 4; A/AC. 16/SR. 42, p. 4; A/AC. 16/SR. 44; A/AC. 16/555; A/AC. 16/SR. 131.

Technical Sub-Committee was created in 1949 and 1950 by Sub-Committee 1, to study measures necessary for the implementation of decisions relating to the work of the observation system and to make recommendations on certain technical questions.<sup>(37)</sup> It was an advisory body on which each delegation was represented.<sup>(38)</sup> All these Sub-Committees were replaced by four Ad-hoc Committees in 1951, as will be shown in the following section.

### 3. Ad-hoc Committees

The Ad-hoc Committees established by U.N.S.C.O.B. fell mainly into three categories. Firstly, in March 1951, U.N.S.C.O.B. decided to abolish Sub-Committees 1 and 2, and the Technical Sub-Committee and to set up in their stead four Ad-hoc Committees which were assigned the following duties:

"Ad-hoc Committee A -- to conduct interrogations of witnesses and other forms of investigation of the exact nature of the aid and assistance rendered from abroad to the Greek guerrilla movement;

Ad-hoc Committee B -- to interrogate international refugees;

Ad-hoc Committee C -- to study and report on broadcasts on behalf of the Greek guerrilla movement and radio propaganda against Greece emanating from the "Free Greece Radio" Station;

Ad-hoc Committee D -- to maintain liaison with the observer corps, through the Chief Observer, in relation to problems of organization and administration, and to report thereon to the Special Committee."<sup>(39)</sup>


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<sup>(37)</sup>United Nations: A/935, p. 22; A/1307, p. 3.

<sup>(38)</sup>United Nations, A/935, p. 22.

<sup>(39)</sup>United Nations, A/1857, p. 4.

DIAGRAM OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MACHINERY  
WITH REGARD TO THE GREEK CASE



————> Authority

-----> Accountability



The second category included Ad-hoc Committees created to replace the main body while it drafted its reports. Examples of these were the Ad-hoc Committee established by U.N.S.C.O.B. on 27 May 1948 to sit in Salonika during the latter's absence in Geneva,<sup>(40)</sup> and the other Ad-hoc Committees established by U.N.S.C.O.B. in subsequent years. These Committees were:

"To carry on the normal routine work connected with reports from the observation groups, to deal with any emergency concerning the groups, pending a decision of the Special Committee, and to draw the attention of the Special Committee to all questions within its competence."<sup>(41)</sup>

The third category included the Ad-hoc Committees set up by U.N.S.C.O.B. in May 1949 to make a detailed inspection of the frontier areas before drafting its report. There were three of these Committees, each composed of three delegations. They presented preliminary surveys on 23 May 1949, at a meeting held in Salonika.<sup>(42)</sup>

#### The Terms of U.N.S.C.O.B.

As ~~it~~ has already been mentioned, albeit briefly, U.N.S.C.O.B. was created on 21 October 1947 by Resolution 109(II) of the General Assembly -- which was adopted by forty votes in favour, six against, with eleven abstentions -- and lasted until December

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(40) United Nations: A/574, p. 4.

(41) Ibid., p. 4; A/AC. 16/267/Rev. 1.

(42) United Nations, A/935, p.2.

1951. Its life was annually<sup>(43)</sup> extended by the General Assembly on the recommendation of U.N.S.C.O.B. . By December 1951 the situation in Greece's northern frontiers had clarified; large-scale guerrilla fighting had ceased and, as a result, the continuation of a large body to supervise the frontier area started to diminish. Accordingly, the Assembly decided to dissolve U.N.S.C.O.B. and replace it by a body<sup>(44)</sup> attached to the Peace Observation Commission, which had been created by the "Uniting for Peace Resolution".<sup>(45)</sup>

#### Functions and Powers of U.N.S.C.O.B.

U.N.S.C.O.B. was assigned to act as an observer and conciliator. The Assembly's resolutions empowering this Committee to carry out its functions were based on the majority recommendations of the Commission set up by the Security Council. It had been found, by a majority of that Commission, that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had given assistance to the guerrillas within Greece, and that the relations between these

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(43) The life of U.N.S.C.O.B. was extended through the following resolutions:

Resolution 193(III) of 27 November 1948 adopted by 45 votes to 6 with no abstentions.

Resolution 288(IV) of 18 November 1949 adopted by 50 votes to 6 with 2 abstentions

Resolution 382(V) of 1 December 1950 adopted by 53 votes to 6 with 1 abstention.

(44) Under the name "Sub-Commission on the Balkans of the Peace Observation Commission.

(45) Goodspeed, S.S.: Op. cit. p. 206.

three States and Greece were by no means friendly. It was to be, therefore, the task of U.N.S.C.O.B. to observe the compliance of the Assembly's recommendations calling upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia "to do nothing which could furnish aid and assistance" to the guerrillas, and to offer its "good offices" to all four countries involved in order to find lasting solutions to their differences.

U.N.S.C.O.B. was to have its principal headquarters in Salonika, and was to perform its functions -- with the co-operation of the four Governments concerned -- in "such places and in the territories of the four States as it may deem appropriate."<sup>(46)</sup> In other words, the legal authority of the Committee to conduct its observation was limited by the necessity to obtain the consent of all four Governments. Only the Greek Government, however, allowed U.N.S.C.O.B. to enter its territory<sup>(47)</sup> and provided it with the necessary facilities for its functioning.<sup>(48)</sup> The hostility of the Soviet bloc states to U.N.S.C.O.B. was ceaseless and unrelenting from the inception of the Committee in October 1947 until its dissolution in December 1951.<sup>(49)</sup> On

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(46) United Nations, A/519, Resolution 109(II).

(47) With the exception of Observation Group 6 that was allowed entry in Bulgarian territory. See *supra*, pp. 67-68.

(48) United Nations: A/644, p. 1; A/574, p. 4; A/935, p. 3; A/1307, p. 4; A/1857, p. 5.

(49) United Nations: A/574, pp. 4-9; A/644, p. 1; A/935, p. 3; A/1307, p. 4; A/1857, p. 5.

the occasion of the signing of the "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Aid" of 16 December 1947 between Albania and Bulgaria, a communiqué was published stating that:

"The two delegations consider that ... (U.N.S.C.O.B.) was created in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and in violation of the State sovereignty of the Balkan nations and that therefore, the two Governments cannot admit it to their territory." (50)

A similar attitude had been taken in the joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the conclusion of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Alliance of 27 November 1947. (51) Moreover, in a communication to the Secretary-General from the Yugoslav Government it was stated:

"The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers the resolution on the formation of the Balkan Committee as a violation of the principle of unanimity of the great Powers and as an act infringing on the sovereignty of the Balkan peoples. Moreover, the Balkan Committee can represent a danger to peace by creating possibilities for further provocations on the part of the Greek regime. Therefore, ... (the Yugoslav) Government will not extend any co-operation to the Committee or to its observation groups and will not permit their entry into Yugoslav territory." (52)

This remained the attitude of the Soviet Bloc throughout the life of U.N.S.C.O.B.

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(50) United Nations: A/574, p. 5; A/AC, 16/53/Rev. 1, Annex II.

(51) Ibid., also A/AC. 16/105.

(52) United Nations: A/574, p. 5; A/AC. 16/25.

A 1948 General Assembly resolution<sup>(53)</sup> broadened the terms of reference of U.N.S.C.O.B. slightly, by enabling it "in its discretion to appoint, and utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons whether or not members of the Special Committee". This additional power was basically due to the General Assembly's desire to draw the four involved States closer to each other.<sup>(54)</sup> A 1949 General Assembly resolution further increased the functions of U.N.S.C.O.B. by one more item. The resolution authorized

"the Secretary General to arrange, through the Special Committee or other appropriate United Nations or international agency, the extension of any feasible assistance to the Governments concerned in making and carrying out arrangements for the repatriation to Greece or resettlement elsewhere of Greek guerrillas and other Greek nationals who have been involved in the guerrilla warfare."<sup>(55)</sup>

At the fifth session, the terms of reference of U.N.S.C.O.B. were preserved unchanged by Resolution 382(V).<sup>(56)</sup> Each of these successive resolutions was the product of reports submitted by U.N.S.C.O.B. to the General Assembly. The reports were

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(53) Resolution 193(III) "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece."

(54) In fact, as it will be later seen, the General Assembly established two Conciliation Committees, entirely independent from U.N.S.C.O.B., in the period 1948-1949. See *infra*, pp. 93-97.

(55) United Nations, A/1251, Resolution 288(IV).

(56) United Nations, A/1775.

approved by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority due to the fact that the Soviet Bloc mustered only six votes at that time -- U.S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R., Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia.

In drafting its reports U.N.S.C.O.B. followed a consistent outline. Most reports opened with an introduction, followed by distinct chapters on the creation and organization of U.N.S.C.O.B., its attempts at conciliation, its observations, its conclusions, and finally its recommendations. Having dealt with the creation and the organization of the Committee, a few comments about the remaining chapters of the reports of U.N.S.C.O.B. would seem to be in order.

#### Conciliation

From its inception U.N.S.C.O.B. regarded its function as primarily of a "conciliatory nature". In its own report of 1951 the Committee stated, inter alia, that it

"has always borne in mind the primary importance of the mission of conciliation entrusted to it by the General Assembly in 1947." (57)

The General Assembly instructed the Committee to avail itself to the four Governments concerned for the implementation of the Assembly's recommendations. The first duty of the Committee was to assist Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the one hand,

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(57) United Nations, A/1857, p. 5.

and Greece, on the other, "to establish normal diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations among themselves as soon as possible." (58)

As far as Yugoslavia and Greece were concerned, there was no need for establishing diplomatic relations, since such relations existed at that time. Nevertheless, these relations were by no means "good-neighbourly" due basically to the guerrilla warfare in Greece and to Greek charges that Yugoslavia supported the guerrillas. By 1950, however, it was reported by the Committee that the two Governments were moving closer to each other. An agreement for exchanging Ministers was reached on 21 May 1950 followed by agreements on postal services, rail traffic, air transport, and trade, concluded in 1951. (59) It would be wrong, however, to regard this rapprochement as an achievement of U.N.S.C.O.B.. Yugoslavia still refused even to recognize the Committee as a legally established body. (60)

With regard to Albania and Bulgaria on the one hand, and Greece, on the other, the Committee noted the absence of any diplomatic relations. Albania was still in a state of war with Greece. In a communication to the Secretary-General, (61) dated

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(58) United Nations, A/519, Resolution 109(II).

(59) United Nations, A/1857, p. 5. The major shift in Yugoslavia's attitude towards Greece was due to the former's quarrel with Moscow in the late 1940's. See infra, pp.103-105.

(60) Ibid., p. 5.

(61) United Nations, A/AC. 16/268. The communist Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, notwithstanding their refusal to co-operate with U.N.S.C.O.B.,

2 May 1948, the Albanian Government stated that its Greek counterpart still remained at war with Albania and continued to insist on its "absurd territorial claims" to Northern Epirus (South Albania). The Greek authorities were also accused of carrying on a bitter Press campaign against Albania and of intensifying frontier provocations. The communication indicated, in conclusion, that the Albanian Government, "prompted by the desire to put an end to the state of tension on the Albanian-Greek frontier, ... would be ready to resume discussion of the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Greece, if the Greek Government should indicate a similar desire."<sup>(62)</sup> The conditions put forward by the Albanian Government were obvious. The existing state of war between the two countries and the irredentist claims of the Greek Government would have to be eliminated before diplomatic relations could be resumed. The Greek Government, on the other hand, confirmed the de jure and de facto existence of a state of war between the two states, repeated its claims to Northern Epirus and projected, as a

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submitted to the Secretary-General communications on various subjects and in particular on border violations. Requests transmitted to them by U.N.S.C.O.B. were usually answered through the Secretary-General -- generally in the negative. See for example, United Nations: A/644, pp. 2-3; and A/935, p. 8.

(62) United Nations, A/574, p. 12.



condition for entering into negotiations with the Albanian authorities, the immediate cessation of moral and material aid supplied by the Albanian Government to the guerrillas operating in Greece. (63)

Bulgaria also attached conditions to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Greece. She demanded that the Athens Government "renounce its annexationist aims towards Bulgaria" and "take the necessary steps to put an end to violations of the Bulgarian frontier and the war-mongering campaign carried on in Greece against the Bulgarian people and the People's Republic of Bulgaria". (64) In replying to these accusations, the Greek liaison representative stated, in a letter of 4 May 1948, that it was

"surprising that an ex-enemy State which has invaded and occupied Greek territory on three occasions during the last thirty years, which caused thousands of victims and incalculable damage during the late war, that a State which has signed a treaty whose provisions it does not observe, which despite its signature of a peace treaty continues to put forward territorial claims on Greece and furnished substantial aid to the guerrillas operating in Greece, should venture in its recent reply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to attribute to Greece 'warlike intentions', 'incitements to war', 'provocations' and even 'invasions of Bulgarian territory'". (65)

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(63) United Nations: A/574, p. 12; A/AC. 16/272.

(64) United Nations: A/574, p. 11; A/AC. 16/224.

(65) United Nations: A/574, p. 11; A/AC. 16/244.

The Greek representative demanded an end to Bulgarian aid for the guerrillas and repeated the readiness of the Greek Government to re-establish normal good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

The second duty assigned to U.N.S.C.O.B., as part of its conciliatory role, was to assist the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and Greece, on the other, in the establishment of frontier conventions "providing for the regulation and control of their common frontiers and for the pacific settlement of frontier incidents and disputes". It was reported by the Committee in 1949 that meetings concerning frontier incidents had been held, on occasion, in 1948 and 1949 between the frontier authorities of Greece and those of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. As far as Albania and Greece were concerned, the Committee reported the complete absence of frontier contacts. (66)

The third portion of the conciliatory role of U.N.S.C.O.B. was to assist the four Governments to settle "the problems arising out of the presence of refugees in the four States concerned through voluntary repatriation wherever possible". A Sub-Committee was established by U.N.S.C.O.B. on 10 December 1947 to study problems of refugees and minorities. (67) Only Greece

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(66) United Nations, A/935, p. 7.

(67) United Nations, A/574, p. 13.

co-operated with the Committee in this respect<sup>(68)</sup> and, as a result, the latter was able to solve a part of the refugee problem in Greece. In 1949, the Committee recommended that the refugee problem be turned over to a competent agency of the United Nations.<sup>(69)</sup>

The fourth aspect of the conciliatory function of U.N.S.C.O.B. was to assist the four Governments in the study of "the practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities". As a result of the non-co-operation of the communist states, the Committee completely failed to be of any practical assistance.

It is obvious, therefore, the U.N.S.C.O.B. failed in the performance of its conciliatory role. The refusal of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to co-operate with the Committee was fatal; it prevented U.N.S.C.O.B. through its good offices from achieving a "rapprochement" even between Yugoslavia and Greece which were both members of the United Nations, and which maintained diplomatic relations.<sup>(70)</sup> Yugoslavia's closure of her frontiers with Greece in July 1949 and her withholding of large scale assistance from the Greek guerrillas operating in Greece, however welcome, could not be regarded as a by-product of U.N.S.C.O.B. .

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(68) United Nations: A/574, p. 13; A/644, p. 4.

(69) United Nations, A/935, p. 15.

(70) Greece did not maintain diplomatic relations with either Albania or Bulgaria at that time.

Rather it appeared to reflect that country's breakaway from the Cominform. Yugoslavia continued to ignore the legal existence of U.N.S.C.O.B. and to vote together with the Soviet Bloc every year against its continued existence.

#### Observation

In depicting the results of the observation carried out by U.N.S.C.O.B. from 1947 to 1951, two phases may be distinguished.<sup>(71)</sup> The first, lasting from 1947 to mid-1949 was characterized by direct general assistance by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria to the guerrilla fighting. Yugoslavia's pre-eminence in assisting the guerrillas was remarked upon by U.N.S.C.O.B. during this period. The assistance given to the guerrillas in Greece by the three communist states basically consisted of: free access to Albanian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian territory; medical assistance to wounded guerrillas; the return of hospitalized

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(71) There are basically four reasons that led me to regard the year 1949 as the dividing line between the two phases. Firstly, Yugoslavia's closure of frontier with Greece was announced by Tito on 10 July 1949 in a speech he made at Pola. (United Nations, A/AC. 16/771). Secondly, the support given to the guerrillas by certain States not bordering upon Greece, particularly Rumania, was emphasized in the report of U.N.S.C.O.B. of August, 1949. (United Nations, A/935, p. 18). Thirdly, Albania's emergence as the mainstay of the Greek guerrillas after the defection of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. (United Nations, A/935, pp.8 and 17). Fourthly, the reported elimination of organized guerrilla resistance along the northern borders of Greece marking a turning point in the evolution of the Greek problem (United Nations, A/981).

guerrillas back to the fighting ranks in Greece; the maintenance of camps for the guerrillas; provision of supplies and the collaboration with the guerrillas in the removal, retention and recruitment of Greek children.<sup>(72)</sup> Furthermore, the Committee observed "firing" emanating from the territories of Albania and Yugoslavia.<sup>(73)</sup> The three states were reported by U.N.S.C.O.B. to have given moral support to the guerrillas mainly through radio broadcasts, the Press in those countries, statements made by officials, and by the setting up of "Aid Committees" to help the "Democratic movement" in Greece.<sup>(74)</sup> The Committee, however, noted that none of the three communist states formally recognized the rebel Government.<sup>(75)</sup>

The second phase of the Greek Question before U.N.S.C.O.B. started in mid-1949 and lasted until December 1951. During this second period, frontier crossings by Greek guerrillas still took place at the border lines of all three communist states.<sup>(76)</sup> In a

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(72) United Nations: A/574; A/644; A/935.

(73) United Nations, A/574, pp. 22 and 24.

(74) United Nations: A/574, pp. 14-18; A/935 pages 9, 11 and 13.

(75) On 24 December 1947, the communists in Greece set up the "Provisional Democratic Greek Government" headed by the leader of the guerrillas, Markos Vafiadis. See United Nations, A/574, pp. 14-15.

(76) U.N.S.C.O.B. reported in 1950 that it had cognizance of two alleged instances of Greek guerrillas crossing into Yugoslavia. The first occurred on 12 January 1950 at Kapra, when a Greek Army patrol came into contact with a group of Greek guerrillas who retreated across the Greek-Yugoslav frontier under pressure. The United Nations' observers expressed the opinion that the

letter from the Chairman of U.N.S.C.O.B. to the Secretary-General, dated 17 May 1950, it was stated that the Committee was not yet in a position to determine whether Albania and Bulgaria had ceased their assistance to the Greek guerrillas. This was due to the fact that

"the main bulk of the guerrillas are no longer in Greece and the States who are harbouring them have not as yet complied with the recommendation of the General Assembly<sup>(77)</sup> to the effect that the disarming and disposition of the guerrillas should be verified by an international agency."<sup>(78)</sup>

Both Albania and Bulgaria asserted that they had disarmed Greek guerrillas who had entered their territory. The Committee, however, reported that these states sanctioned the rearming of groups selected from the aforesaid guerrillas and their subsequent infiltration across the borders with Greece.<sup>(79)</sup> In

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crossing, if actually made, had been effected without the knowledge of the Yugoslav authorities and added that no Greek or Yugoslav frontier posts in that area were manned, owing to the severe winter weather (United Nations, A/AC. 16/0/G-Y/1 and Annex A, witnesses Y/1/T1, 2 and 3). In the second case, three members of the Greek M.E.A. (Home Guard), interrogated by United Nations' observers on 21 April 1950, stated that, on 14 April, while on a routine patrol in the vicinity of Sokol, they had encountered three Greek guerrillas. After an exchange of fire, the guerrillas retreated across the frontier into Yugoslav territory. As in the previous instance, Greek and Yugoslav frontier posts were not manned in this area. (United Nations, A/AC. 16/0/G. Y/6/Annex A, witnesses Y/6/T22, 23 and 24). See Ibid., p. 12.

(77) United Nations, A/1251, Resolution 288(IV), paragraph 4(b)

(78) United Nations: A/1307, p. 13; A/1857, p. 20.

(79) United Nations, A/1857, p. 20.

sum, the disarming was temporary and could not be interpreted even as a partial compliance with the Assembly resolution (288, IV, 4b). Albania and Bulgaria, however, continued to permit free access to their territory by the Greek guerrillas<sup>(80)</sup>. Channels of communication between the guerrillas in Greece and their associates in Albania and Bulgaria were still being reported by U.N.S.C.O.B.<sup>(81)</sup>

During the same period, a new element came to the fore. Communist states not bordering on Greece lent substantial assistance to the guerrilla movement. First it was Rumania, to be followed by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. They were found by U.N.S.C.O.B. to have provided training facilities to the guerrillas and to have aided them in their return to Greece for the ~~purpose~~<sup>ur</sup> of fighting against the Government there. The Committee, reviewing the situation in 1951, observed:

"Detailed evidence has been made available ... of this new type of aid rendered by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which shows clearly that a widespread and carefully co-ordinated system now exists for selecting, training and eventually smuggling armed subversive groups into Greece across the Albanian and Bulgarian frontiers."<sup>(82)</sup>

To obtain information, U.N.S.C.O.B. used a variety of methods such as direct observation, the interrogation of Greek guerrillas,

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(80) United Nations, A/1857, pp. 12-13 and 15.

(81) United Nations, A/1307, p. 14.

(82) United Nations, A/1857, p. 11.

international refugees, escaped Greek National Army soldiers and Greek civilians.<sup>(83)</sup> Other sources of evidence also included captured war material as well as monitored radio broadcasts and newspaper articles.<sup>(84)</sup>

### Conclusions and Recommendations

In its reports, U.N.S.C.O.B. emphasized the correlation between rebel activity in Greece and the assistance given to the guerrillas by the communist states, and alleged that the guerrilla movement would not have been able to survive all those years of large-scale warfare against the Greek authorities without foreign support. Thus, the Committee reported in 1948:

"So long as events along the northern border of Greece show that support is being given to the Greek guerrillas from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the Special Committee is convinced that a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity will exist, and international peace and security in the Balkans will be endangered."<sup>(85)</sup>

In a similar fashion U.N.S.C.O.B. concluded in 1949:

"Albania and Bulgaria have directly encouraged and incited the Greek guerrillas in their attempts to overthrow the Greek Government by official declarations in the Press and in radio broadcasts from Government-controlled stations, by visits of officials to the camps for guerrillas and by the continued activities of 'Aid Committees' which were established in 1947 and 1948 for the collection of money, food and clothing".<sup>(86)</sup>

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(83) United Nations, A/1857, p. 12.

(84) United Nations, A/935, p. 8.

(85) United Nations, A/574, p. 28.

(86) United Nations, A/935, pp. 17-18.



In 1950 the Committee recommended that the General Assembly take note of the assistance given to the Greek guerrillas by Albania and Bulgaria, in particular.<sup>(87)</sup> Finally, in 1951, U.N.S.C.O.B. recommended to the General Assembly that it

"... take note of the evidence concerning the existence in Eastern and Central Europe of a network for the training and clandestine re-introduction into Greece of Greek guerrilla agents for the purpose of conducting subversive activities, espionage, sabotage, propaganda and underground re-organization of the Greek guerrilla movement in Greece in preparation for an attempt to overthrow the Greek Government by force."<sup>(88)</sup>

#### Reaction of the General Assembly to the Reports of U.N.S.C.O.B.

On the basis of the reports and recommendations of U.N.S.C.O.B., the General Assembly passed a number of resolutions which aimed at improving the situation in the Balkan area. One might discern three basic characteristics common to all these resolutions. Firstly, all resolutions dealing with the reports of the Committee and its very existence were backed by over forty votes which constituted, at the time, more than a 2/3 majority. Secondly, the resolutions were marked by their recommendatory nature. Thus, in its 1947 resolution, the Assembly "called upon" Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to cease any assistance to the

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(87) United Nations, A/1307, p. 28.

(88) United Nations, A/1857, p. 31.

guerrillas; it also "called upon" the Governments of the four States to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to that end "recommended" that they co-operate with U.N.S.C.O.B.<sup>(89)</sup> Similarly, in 1948, the General Assembly repeated these "recommendations" and added a new one "calling upon" all members of the United Nations and all other States to "refrain from any action designed to assist directly or through any other Government any armed group fighting against the Greek Government."<sup>(90)</sup> In 1949, the Assembly passed Resolution 288(IV) -- by fifty votes to six with two abstentions -- in which the previous appeals to the Governments concerned were once again repeated. All members of the United Nations and all other States were again "called upon" to abide by the 1948 recommendation in addition to the following:

"... to refrain from the direct or indirect provision of arms or other materials of war to Albania and Bulgaria until the Special Committee or another competent United Nations organ has determined that the unlawful assistance of these States to the Greek guerrillas has ceased;

"... to take into account, in their relations with Albania and Bulgaria, the extent to which those two countries henceforth abide by the recommendations of the General Assembly in their relations with Greece."<sup>(91)</sup>

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(89) United Nations, A/519, Resolution 109(II) adopted by 40 votes to 6 with 11 abstentions.

(90) United Nations, A/810, Resolution 193(III) adopted by 45 votes to 6 with no abstentions.

(91) United Nations, A/1251.

The same resolution added an appeal to "all States harbouring Greek nationals, as a result of the Greek guerrilla operations, against Greece, to facilitate the peaceful repatriation of all such individuals who desire to return and live in accordance with the law of the land." The wording of a subsequent recommendation was even more emphatic:

"The General Assembly

Urges all the Members of the United Nations and other states harbouring Greek children<sup>(92)</sup> to make all necessary arrangements in consultation and co-operation with the International Red Cross organizations for the early return to their homes ..."<sup>(93)</sup>

In 1950 the General Assembly again urged the early return of these Greek children to their parents and called upon the states harbouring these children, "whenever necessary, to allow the International Red Cross free access to their territories for this purpose".<sup>(94)</sup>

The third characteristic common to these recommendations was their application to both United Nations members and non-members alike. An examination of the above listed resolutions reveals that recommendations were addressed to "Members of the United Nations", "other States", and "all other States". Some

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(92) Estimated to exceed the 25,000. See United Nations, A/935, p. 16.

(93) United Nations, A/1251.

(94) United Nations, A/1775, Resolution 382(V), adopted by 53 votes to 6 with 1 abstention.

of these resolutions seemed to have been drafted in the spirit of Chapter VII of the Charter and in particular Articles 40 and 41. The General Assembly in its 1948 resolution called upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia "to cease forthwith rendering any assistance or support in any form to the guerrillas."<sup>(95)</sup> This was a measure falling within the meaning of Article 40 of the Charter.<sup>(96)</sup> The provisions of that Article apply only to the "parties concerned". The Assembly, therefore, in its attempt to restore peace in the Balkans in a more effective way called upon

"all Members of the United Nations and ... other States ... (to) refrain from any action designed to assist directly or through any other Government any armed group fighting against the Greek Government."<sup>(97)</sup>

This measure apparently falls within the terms of Article 41 of the Charter. An explicit recommendation by the General Assembly for an "arms embargo" directed to Albania and Bulgaria was made in 1949. The Assembly in this resolution called upon all Members of the United Nations and all other States

"to refrain from direct or indirect provision

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(95) United Nations, A/810, Resolution 193(III).

(96) Esfandiary, M.S.: "The Role of the General Assembly in Dealing with Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression" (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1960), pp. 114-115.

(97) United Nations: A/810, Resolution 193(III); A/1251, Resolution 288(IV).

of arms or other materials of war to Albania and Bulgaria until the Special Committee or another competent United Nations organ has determined that the unlawful assistance of these States to the Greek guerrillas has ceased."(98)

Yugoslavia was intentionally excluded from the effects of that embargo due to its refusal to support the Greek guerrillas by 1949.

Prior to consideration of the main subsidiary organs that dealt with the Greek Question following the dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, it seems desirable to analyze the role of the two Conciliation Committees which were set up during the third and fourth sessions of the General Assembly by a unanimous vote.

#### The Conciliation Committees

Given the acknowledged inability of U.N.S.C.O.B. to effect a rapprochement between the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and Greece, on the other, the First Committee unanimously resolved on 10 November 1948 that a Conciliation Committee be established. The circumstances were favourable for such an undertaking, for the representatives of all four Governments were in Paris during the third session of the General Assembly. The Committee consisted of the President of the General Assembly (Dr. Evatt), the Secretary-General

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(98) United Nations, A/1251, Resolution 288(IV).

(Mr. Trygve-Lie), the Chairman of the First Committee (Premier Paul-Henri Spaak in Paris, and Ambassador Fernand van Langenhove in New York), and the Rapporteur of that Committee (Ambassador Selin Sarper of Turkey).<sup>(99)</sup> This body was

"to act in the capacity of conciliators jointly, to convene immediately in Paris a meeting of representatives of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia to explore the possibility of reaching agreement amongst themselves as to methods and procedure to be adopted with a view to resolving present differences between them."<sup>(100)</sup>

A sizeable number of meetings took place in Paris and New York. On 19 May 1949, the Chairman of the Conciliation Committee made a statement in which he said that with one exception, full agreement had been reached among the parties. The point on which disagreement had arisen was Albania's demand that Greece formally de jure -- recognize the existing boundaries between the two countries as definitive. This demand was not accepted by the Greek Government.<sup>(101)</sup> The points on which full accord was reached among the four Governments were: the renewal of diplomatic relations, the revision or making of frontier conventions in order to prevent incidents, and the establishment of joint frontier commissions to act as conciliatory bodies in the event of disputes arising from incidents on the borders. The chairman

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(99) United Nations, A/C. 1/385.

(100) Ibid.

(101) United Nations, A/935, p. 24.

noted, however, that the acceptance of the proposals by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were contingent upon Albania's acceptance as well. With the close of the third session of the Assembly, the Conciliation Committee ended its work and a copy of the Chairman's statement was sent to U.N.S.C.O.B..

On 29 September 1949, the First Committee unanimously decided to re-establish the Conciliation Committee, this time composed of the President of the General Assembly (Mr. Carlos P. Romulo), the Secretary-General (Mr. Trygve-Lie), the Chairman of the First Committee (Minister for External Affairs L. B. Pearson), and its Vice-Chairman (Ambassador Selim Sarper).<sup>(102)</sup> It was assigned "to continue the work of the Conciliation Committee appointed at the third regular session in an endeavour to reach a pacific settlement of existing differences between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, to make any necessary recommendations thereto, and to consult in its discretion with other Powers which might be able to assist."<sup>(103)</sup> On the basis of its terms of reference the Committee invited -- in addition to the Balkan States -- the United Kingdom, the United States and the U. S. S. R. to assist it in the task of finding a feasible solution. The Committee felt that its predecessor's work should be taken as a basis for a new attempt to

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(102) United Nations, A/C. 1/506.

(103) United Nations, A/C. 1/493.

achieve an agreement. A document entitled "Tentative suggestions for draft agreements between Greece and each of its northern neighbours, based on conversations with the Parties concerned" was prepared by the Conciliation Committee. This document suggested that the parties: exchange diplomatic representatives; agree not to use force against each other's territorial integrity or alternatively, for the purpose of changing their existing boundaries; immediately start negotiations for drawing up a frontier convention and establish mixed Frontier Commissions with mediatory functions to assist them and to prevent border incidents.<sup>(104)</sup> Albania again tried to amend the draft in such a way as to include a final acceptance by Greece of the existing Greco-Albanian frontiers.<sup>(105)</sup> Greece, on the other hand, refused to accept this condition.

Notwithstanding minor disagreements on the composition and terms of reference of the proposed mixed Frontier Commissions, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria accepted the "Tentative suggestions" in principle.<sup>(106)</sup> A crucial reservation was inserted, however,

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(104) United Nations, A/C. 1/506, Appendix 3.

(105) United Nations, AC/. 1/506, Appendix 4.

(106) United Nations, AC/. 1/506, Appendices 6 and 7. Bulgaria, however, stressed the disturbed internal situation in Greece and expressed the opinion that "it would be necessary to arrive at a general pacification inside Greece", through the proclamation of a general amnesty and "by the holding of democratic elections" if the Conciliation was to succeed.



in their communications, revealing their close link and co-operation with Albania. The Yugoslav communication contained, inter alia, the following:

"Being convinced that the question of relations between Greece and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia are an integral part of the general political relations in the Balkans, the delegation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia reserves its right to make its decision on the final acceptance of the above-mentioned text when it has been sufficiently informed on the point of view of the other interested States."(107)

Similarly Bulgaria's communication signed by her representative, Mr. Mevorah, contained the following reservation:

"It is understood that an agreement between my Government and the Government of Greece could only be achieved within the framework of a general agreement between the interested Balkan Countries."(108)

Thus, the Conciliation Committee could not achieve the purposes for which it was set up, despite the fact that it was independent from the structure of U.N.S.C.O.B. . The Committee embodied an attempt by the First Committee to cope with the non-co-operative attitude of the Communist states concerned towards U.N.S.C.O.B. .

THE BALKAN SUB-COMMISSION OF THE PEACE  
OBSERVATION COMMISSION

The General Assembly after giving its approval to the report submitted by U.N.S.C.O.B., at the end of 1951, decided

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(107) United Nations, A/C. 1/506, Appendix 6.

(108) United Nations, A/C. 1/506, Appendix 7.

to terminate the operation of U.N.S.C.O.B. by 48 votes to 5 with one abstention. Nevertheless, it was felt by the General Assembly that vigilance over the disturbed area was indispensable. It resolved, therefore, that the Peace Observation Commission (P.O.C. hereinafter) established by it in 1950<sup>(109)</sup> be requested to set up a Balkan Sub-commission to undertake the Special Committee's observation duties. Accordingly, on 23 January 1954, the P.O.C. set up a branch in the Balkans and provided that it be composed of "not less than three nor more than five members" and that its seat be the United Nations Headquarters. The newly-established Sub-commission was composed of one representative each from Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden and the United States. At its first meeting in Paris on 31 January 1952, the Sub-commission requested each member state to provide an observer. The United Kingdom was, in addition, requested to make an observer available to the Sub-commission to serve as the principal observer<sup>(110)</sup>. The membership of the new commission remained the same in subsequent years. Only the number of its observers was reduced on

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(109) United Nations, A/1775, Resolution 337A(V) "Uniting for Peace". By this resolution the Peace Observation Commission was established in order to "observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security".

(110) United Nations, Yearbook, 1952, p. 291.

21 December 1953 to three plus the Chief Observer -- made available by the United Kingdom -- on the suggestion of the Greek Government. (111)

The terms of reference of the Balkan Sub-commission were provided for in Resolution 508(VI) of the General Assembly. They were:

"(a) To dispatch such observers as it may deem necessary to any area of international tension in the Balkans on the request of any State or States concerned, but only to the territory of States consenting thereto;

"(b) To visit, if it deems necessary, any area in which observation requested under sub-paragraph (a) is being conducted;

"(c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and to the Secretary-General for the information of Member States." (112)

The outstanding feature of this resolution was the emphasis placed upon the "consent" of the States which contained the "area of international tension". Of the three parties to the frontier incidents, only Greece allowed the observers to visit her territory. The terms of reference of the observers were strictly confined to the provisions of the above mentioned resolution. The

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(111) United Nations: Yearbook, 1953, p. 249; A/CN. 7/SC. 1/52, a letter from the permanent representative of Greece to the Secretary-General dated 26 November 1953.

(112) United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20, pp. 9-10.

observers were instructed to report on incidents which the Greek Government called to their attention and incidents which had been the subject of complaints by Albania and Bulgaria.<sup>(113)</sup> Accordingly, the observers submitted periodic reports to the Balkan Sub-commission from 1952 to August 1954 on the situation at the frontiers, in addition to special reports on sporadic occasions.<sup>(114)</sup> The Balkan Sub-commission never transmitted these reports to its parent body -- P.O.C.,<sup>(115)</sup> It merely took note of the incidents.

By the middle of 1953, signs of a "rapprochement" emerged between Albania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Greece on the other. In a letter to the Secretary General dated 6 May 1953,<sup>(116)</sup> Greece's permanent representative to the United Nations reiterated his Government's proposal for the setting up of a Mixed Greek-Bulgarian Frontier Commission with or without the participation of United Nations' representatives. The task of the proposed Commission was "the replacement of the pyramids marking the Greek-Bulgarian frontiers".<sup>(117)</sup> The Secretary General forwarded this communication to the Bulgarian Government. On 23 June 1953, he received a reply<sup>(118)</sup> accepting the proposal made by the Greek

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(113) United Nations, Yearbook, 1952, p. 291.

(114) United Nations: See for example: A/CN. 7/SC. 1/17; A/CN. 7/SC. 1/29; A/CN. 7/SC. 1/35.

(115) United Nations: Yearbook, 1952, p. 291; Yearbook, 1953, p. 249.

(116) United Nations, A/CN. 7/SC. 1/42.

(117) United Nations, Yearbook, 1953, p. 248.

(118) United Nations, A/CN. 1/47.

Government and confining the membership of the new Commission to representatives of the two states only -- i.e. without the participation of United Nations' representatives. An agreement was reached and signed by Greece and Bulgaria to this effect in Salonika on 3 December 1953 -- exactly seven years after the tabling of the Greek complaint in the Security Council!

Indicative of the improving relations between Greece and Albania, as well, was the suggestion made by the former, on 26 November 1953, that the Observer Mission be terminated as of 31 July 1954.<sup>(119)</sup> The suggestion was accepted by the Balkan Sub-Commission.<sup>(120)</sup>

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(119) United Nations; Yearbook 1953, p. 249 and 249n; A/CN. 7/SC. 1/52.

(120) There is some indication from the 1958 Yearbook of the United Nations that the Balkan Sub-commission itself lasted until 1958, with the same membership of Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden and the United States. See Appendix 11, p. 515.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CONCLUSIONS

The emergence of a tight bipolar system in the aftermath of the Second World War had important repercussions on political developments in Greece. A friendly Greek Government was desired by both blocs. A communist Greece would have provided the U.S.S.R. with an outlet to the Aegean Sea as well as solving her problem of insecure passage through the Dardanelles. A Greece allied to the West, on the other hand, would have hampered communist expansion to the Middle East and the African continent. Inevitably perhaps, the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain both made every effort to attract Greece to their respective sides.<sup>(1)</sup> In tactical terms

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(1) The United States entered the Balkan scene only after the war with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. The rivalry for influence in Greece was, until that time, basically between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Walter Lippmann interpreted the situation in 1946 in the following terms:

"... there is little doubt that Iran, (and) Greece... are incidents of a much broader question. It is of course, the ancient question which has made Britain and Russia rivals for at least a hundred and thirty years, of the hegemony of the Middle East ..."

"... In the first World War Russia was very nearly conquered because she did not have access to the sea. The Keys to the main door to Russia have been in the hands of weak or unfriendly states which would not or could not keep the door open ..."

The Gazette (Montreal), 29 January 1946, p. 8.

this meant British support for the incumbent Greek Government and Soviet bloc support for guerrillas opposing the existing Government. Thus, the British Government landed its troops in Greece in 1944 and helped the Greek Government restore peace and order within the country, while Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, according to the majority of the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents and its successor, U.N.S.C.O.B., lent assistance to the guerrillas who were fighting against the legitimate Government in Athens.(2)

Yugoslavia was found by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans to have provided the main source of support to the Greek guerrillas until late in 1948, when it broke away from the communist bloc. This schism had serious repercussions for the relationships between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and Albania, on the one hand, and between Yugoslavia and the Greek guerrillas on the other hand.

By 1949 relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had deteriorated to the extent that "the atmosphere on both sides of the

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(2) One could perhaps single out two major factors that induced the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to support the guerrillas in Greece: firstly, the devotion to a common ideology linking the regimes of these states with the guerrilla bands; and secondly, geopolitical interests since all three states had some territorial problems to settle with Greece -- the possession of Aegean Macedonia, Thrace, and Northern Epirus.

frontier", as Hugh Seton-Watson put it, "was as hostile as in the days of King Boris and Alexander."<sup>(3)</sup> On 1 March 1949, "Free Greece Radio"<sup>(4)</sup> broadcast a resolution of the K.K.E. — sponsored "Macedonian Revolutionary Organization"<sup>(5)</sup> calling for the creation of an "independent united Macedonia". It was clear that the resolution promoted the concept of a Balkan Federation -- the South Slav Federation -- which aimed at a Bulgarian hegemony stretching from the Alps to the Black Sea at the expense of Yugoslav aspirations.<sup>(6)</sup>

Albania represented another threat to Yugoslavia. Hoxha's regime depended on the countries of the Cominform and more specifically on the Soviet Union for its supplies. This dependence meant that it could be counted upon to oppose very sharply Yugoslavia's independence.

The second effect of the Moscow-Belgrade quarrel was felt by the guerrillas in Greece. A shift of power within the leading ranks of the guerrilla movement occurred early in 1949. Markos Vafiadis, who was not prepared to regard the service of Moscow

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(3) Seton-Watson, H: Op.cit., p. 357.

(4) The guerrilla supporting radio station.

(5) Known as N.O.F.

(6) From 1947-1949, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had agreed on a common policy with regard to the Macedonian question. Chandler, G.: "Greece: Relapse or Recovery?", International Affairs, Vol. 26 (1950), p. 183; Seton-Watson, Loc.cit., p. 357.



as a paramount obligation, was removed from the leadership of the communist movement in Greece on grounds of "ill health" at the end of January 1949. At the same time, Nicholas Zachariadis, who was regarded as favouring Moscow's side in the dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, became chairman of the newly-constituted Political Bureau of K.K.E.<sup>(7)</sup> This reshuffle acted as a feedback upon Tito's attitude towards the Greek guerrillas. In mid-1949 Yugoslavia closed its frontiers with Greece and deprived the Greek guerrillas of both material help and political asylum.

By 1949, U.N.S.C.O.B. reported that Albania had replaced Yugoslavia as the major source of support for the Greek guerrillas. Albania, however, began to cut back her support early in the 1950's due to her fear that the Greek Army might attempt an invasion of her territory.<sup>(8)</sup> By then, Bulgaria had become the mainstay of the guerrillas in Greece, albeit on a substantially reduced basis due to the fact that the Greek Army backed by American aid had considerably defeated the guerrillas. The improvement in the relations between Bulgaria and Greece in the mid-fifties led to

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(7) Calvocoressi, P. et al., Survey of International Affairs 1949-1950 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 120; see also Chandler, G., Op.cit., p. 183.

(8) Calvocoressi, P. et al., Loc.cit., p. 122n.

the cessation of all support to the guerrillas.

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The creation of a Commission of Investigation was the first attempt ever made by the Security Council to implement its powers provided for in Article 34 of the Charter. In creating the Commission, the Council undertook to "inquire" into the Greek complaint of 3 December 1949. It was a preliminary step towards determining whether a "dispute" or a "situation which might give rise to a dispute", in the Balkan area, called for further action by the Council. The result of the investigation carried out by the Commission clearly indicated the dichotomy of interests between East and West. While the Western majority on the Commission endeavoured to depict the guilt of the allies of the Soviet bloc -- Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia -- the Soviet group emphatically put the blame on the internal situation in Greece caused by the combined efforts of the Greek Government and of foreign aid extended from the West. It was precisely due to this division in the Commission's membership that all aspects of the problem were given a thorough airing. Indeed the Commission of Investigation set up by the Security Council seemed to have succeeded in the performance of its function of investigation; that is until the Commission withdrew to Geneva to draw up its reports on 7 April 1947. The enunciation of the "Truman

Doctrine" by the United States in March 1947 caused considerable dismay to the Soviet bloc. Their attitude was reflected in a Soviet draft resolution presented to the Security Council on 7 April 1947. The proposed resolution called for the establishment of a special commission of the Security Council to supervise the proper use of the American aid in the "interests of the Greek people".<sup>(9)</sup> The resolution as a whole was rejected by two votes in favour -- Poland and the U.S.S.R. -- to nine against.<sup>(10)</sup>

In sum, the Security Council was able to carry out only a small part of its "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." The division of the Council into two blocs, prevented that body even from determining whether a "dispute" or a "situation" existed in the Balkan region.

The attempt to keep the Greek case on the agenda of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, while empowering the latter to make recommendations, failed because of the use of veto by the Soviet Union.<sup>(11)</sup> According to the Charter, the General Assembly "may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any ... questions or matters."<sup>(12)</sup> The Charter further empowers the General Assembly,

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(9) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year: No. 33, p. 701.

(10) United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year: No. 69, p. 1730.

(11) See supra, p. 60. On 15 September 1947 the issue was removed from the agenda of the Security Council.

(12) Article 10.

under Article 14, to

"recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."

The Assembly used in full its powers referred to above, when it dealt with the Greek question. All its resolutions were of a recommendatory nature just as the Charter had provided. Peaceful means, not force, were employed in an effort to restore lasting peace in the Balkan region and curb the unco-operative attitude of the Communist States. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Assembly confined its role to observation and conciliation. In October 1947, the General Assembly set up the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans which was assigned to observe the situation on the border areas and to attempt a conciliation among the disputants.

With regard to its observation role, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans was unable to perform its functions beyond the northern frontiers of Greece. Certainly, the absence of the Soviet bloc from the Committee's membership, as well as the lack of co-operation by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, could raise the suspicion that the observation was one-sided. Nevertheless, crossing of frontiers by guerrillas, and locating

of radio stations which supported the guerrilla movement could hardly be dismissed as unfounded evidence.

It was the intention of the Assembly resolutions to give primary importance, however, to the conciliatory role of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. Indeed this role was the sole feature that distinguished the Committee from the subsidiary organs of the Security Council, the Commission of Investigation and the Subsidiary Group.<sup>(13)</sup> Conciliation, however, could only have succeeded through the co-operation of the parties to the dispute. Co-operation, in its turn would have required the consent of these parties, in order to establish the body that would have undertaken this conciliation. In the Greek case, the conciliatory organ, U.N.S.C.O.B., was created despite the disapproval of one side of the disputing parties. The Conciliation Committees that were subsequently established by the First Committee of the General Assembly, achieved

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(13) In one of the 1948 reports of U.N.S.C.O.B., the Australian delegate inserted a reservation with regard to the functions of this Committee, which clearly emphasized the distinction. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, the reservation stated, was primarily a mediatory and conciliatory body, in contrast with the Commission of Investigation which was appointed by the Council "to ascertain the facts relating to further incidents". United Nations, A/574, Annex 4.

a partial rapprochement between Greece and her northern neighbours, because of two main reasons. Firstly, the Committees were established by a unanimous vote, which meant that all the parties to the dispute consented to the creation of these Committees. Secondly, the Conciliation Committees were independent of U.N.S.C.O.B. which was regarded by the communist states as "illegitimate".

Rather than through the efforts of the United Nations Organization, a solution to the Greek problem was primarily effected through a combination of two major factors: firstly, the successful efforts of the Greek Army backed by Anglo-American support; and secondly, the rupture between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union which in turn improved relations between Greece and Yugoslavia. The inability of the subsidiary organs of the United Nations to effect an improvement in the relations between Greece and her northern neighbours suggested a pattern which was to be repeated on many subsequent occasions, namely that where the Great Powers are divided over a course of action, the United Nations is likely to have only limited success.

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