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Norm Entrepreneurship: Canada's Tips to Tipping

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Abstract

Although the influence of normative ideas on the behaviour of states occupy an evermore significant place in political science and international relations, important questions remain with respect to how international norms come into existence. International norm scholars have been criticized for failing to demonstrate how actors might forge and change norms. How do norm entrepreneurs influence the process of norm development? Further, under what conditions are norm entrepreneurs likely to be successful in norm diffusion? To begin answering these questions, this paper draws on constructivist insights to present a model of norm evolution highlighting the role of the norm entrepreneur and conducts an interpretive case study methodology to provide an empirical illustration. It examines the evolution of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) norm with particular attention to the norm entrepreneurial role of Canadian foreign policy to highlight how norm-building processes are inextricably intertwined with agents who are engaged in fostering normative change.

The R2P is considered to be a normative breakthrough in international relations and has emerged as an important instrument for upholding and promoting human security. While Canada has been praised for its leadership in promulgating the R2P, there is little empirical scholarship that links the development process of the R2P norm to Canadian foreign policy. How has Canada, with no demonstrative material capability, been able to advance the R2P on the international stage? This thesis develops an understanding of how agents can shape an international norm by acting as a "tipping agent" in the process of norm creation. It concludes by identifying the possibilities and limitations of norm entrepreneurs to influence world politics.

Résumé

Bien que l'influence des idées normatives sur le comportement des états occupe une place de plus en plus significative en science politique et relations internationales, il reste des questions importantes quant à la naissance des normes internationales. Les spécialistes des normes internationales ont été critiqués pour leur échec à démontrer comment les acteurs peuvent forger et changer les normes. Comment les entrepreneurs de normes influencent-ils le processus de développement des normes? Sous quelles conditions est-il probable que ces entrepreneurs réussiront dans la diffusion des normes? Pour répondre à ces questions, la présente thèse s'appuie sur des arguments constructivistes pour présenter un modèle de l'évolution des normes qui souligne le rôle de l'entrepreneur de normes, et emploie la méthodologie d'une étude de cas interprétative pour fournir une illustration empirique. Elle examine l'évolution de la norme de la « Responsabilité de Protéger » (R2P) en portant une attention particulière au rôle entrepreneurial de la politique étrangère canadienne pour mettre en lumière la façon dont les processus de construction des normes sont inextricablement liés aux agents qui s'engagent à nourrir les changements normatifs.

La R2P est considérée comme une percée normative au niveau des relations internationales et a émergé comme un instrument important dans le soutien et la promotion de la sécurité humaine. Tandis que le Canada a été acclamé pour son leadership dans la promulgation de la R2P, il existe peu de savoir empirique établissant le lien entre le processus de développement de la R2P et la politique étrangère canadienne. Comment le Canada a-t-il, sans aucune capacité démonstrative matérielle, été capable de faire progresser la R2P sur la scène internationale ? La présente thèse développe la compréhension du rôle des agents qui agissent comme « tipping agent » dans le façonnage des normes internationales. En conclusion, elle identifie les possibilités et les limitations de l'influence des entrepreneurs de normes sur la politique mondiale.

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I dedicate this thesis to my little brother, Robert James Kennedy. You will always be my guide.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Although the influence of normative ideas on the behaviour of states occupies a significant place in international relations, important questions remain with respect to how international norms come into existence. How do norms enter into the international system and evolve over time? And why do certain norms become widely accepted while others do not? International norm scholars have been criticized for failing to demonstrate how actors might forge and change norms. How do actors influence the process of norm development? And, under what conditions are norm entrepreneurs more or less likely to be successful at norm diffusion? This study, using an interpretive case study methodology, will begin to answer these questions; its purpose will be to examine the evolution of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) norm with particular attention to the norm entrepreneurial role of Canadian foreign policy to highlight how norm building processes are inextricably intertwined with agents who are engaged in fostering normative change. It employs a constructivist approach to demonstrate that successfully strategic agents in facilitating international change are crucial to building consensus.

The R2P will be focused with the objective of contributing to knowledge about processes of norm development and to better understand the conditions under which norm entrepreneurs are likely to be successful in norm promulgation. R2P provides a normative framework for humanitarian intervention. The term was introduced in the 2001 report of the Canadian-supported International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), entitled *Responsibility to Protect*. The language of responsibility to protect entered into diplomatic discourse after the release of this report. The report argues that the

international community has a responsibility to protect civilians from massive human rights violations where their governments are unable or unwilling to provide security (2001). The R2P is considered to be a normative breakthrough in international relations and has emerged as an important instrument for upholding and promoting human security.

The R2P approach has had a genuine impact on the humanitarian intervention debate. During the 1990s controversy raged between supporters of a right to intervene and those who argued that state sovereignty prohibited interventions into the internal affairs of states. The new normative principle of the R2P aimed at bridging that debate. At the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in 1999, the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, challenged the international community to forge consensus around the basic principles and processes involved in humanitarian intervention: "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systemic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity" (1999). The Government of Canada, in 2000, established the ICISS to address the difficult and complex issues involved in the humanitarian intervention debate.

Beginning with its sponsorship of the ICISS and culminating most recently in the remarkable degree to which the R2P has been taken up by the international community and ultimately accepted by the United Nations, Canada is considered to be a key actor in moving the debate forward on humanitarian intervention through the creation and diffusion of the R2P norm (Badescu 2007, Banda 2007, Feinstein 2007). Table 1 illustrates the international documents in which the R2P norm has been embedded. The report was initially overwhelmed by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and "it seemed this

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principle would be relegated to the status of a well-intentioned period piece born of a forgotten time of relative international calm" (Feinstein 2007: 8). Therefore, it is surprising that the R2P norm has been endorsed by the international community with active support by many countries in Africa and with the backing of the global hegemon, the United States, which had also come to support the idea. While Canada has been praised for its leadership in promulgating the R2P, there is little empirical scholarship that links the development process of the R2P norm to Canadian foreign policy. How has Canada, with little demonstrative material capability, been able to advance the R2P on the international stage? Why was Canada able to play a meaningful role in the development of the R2P? Further, what mechanisms were employed as a means of norm diffusion? This thesis aims to examine the actual role of Canadian foreign policy in shaping the emergence of the R2P norm at the international level.

Before proceeding, a caveat must be added regarding the nature of this analysis. It must be acknowledged that the R2P norm is still in its developmental stages. Though the R2P is on the international agenda of policy-makers, the R2P principles have not effectively been translated into practice (Warner 2003, Day and Freeman 2005, Hamilton 2006, Badescu 2007). The current condition of the R2P norm lacks the necessary "robustness" to be an established international norm.[1] The pace of the R2P's normative development since its emergence in the ICISS has been relatively rapid; however, operationalizing it remains a major task (Holt and Berkman 2006). The central point is that unlike other studies on norms that have noted instances of well-developed adoption, this present case is one of nascent norm construction, whereby resolution is still forthcoming.

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[1] When an international norm becomes "robust" it comes internalized in a routine and non-reflective manner (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:900). Robustness can be determined by looking at its feasibility – whether or not the norm can be translated into action.

As such, there is an opportunity for the present research to analyze the possibility for further development of the R2P norm through a Canadian foreign policy lens.

In addition to making a policy contribution, this research aims to make both theoretical and empirical contributions. The theoretical aim of this study is to advance an analytical framework that draws attention to the pivotal role of the norm entrepreneur in norm evolution. Thereby gaining a greater understanding of the process of norm development and the role of norm entrepreneurs in that process. Further, this study attempts to provide empirical research on a relatively new international norm that has garnered little academic attention with respect to the role of agents in its actual emergence and evolution. Canada has been an active, resourceful and fairly successful norm entrepreneur in altering the existing normative structure. The ability of states lacking traditional hard power capabilities, such as Canada, to influence international politics challenges the conventional understanding that the great powers determine the pace, direction and end goal of international interactions. Therefore, this study adds new insights to conventional understandings of power and influence in world politics. It finds that Canada's intense norm advocacy through agenda-setting and diplomatic tactics contributed to the outcome of the R2P norm becoming embedded within the UN and gaining momentum in international discourse.

This study is divided into four chapters. In *Chapter One*, I have presented the research problems and the aims of the study. In *Chapter two* a literature review, drawing from constructivist research on international norms, is pursued to introduce the analytical model for norm evolution that identifies the norm entrepreneur as crucial to norm development. This is followed by a discussion on the methodological approach employed

in this study. The empirical *Chapter Three* provides an analysis of the norm emergence

stage of norm development by tracing the idea of R2P, and attempts to illustrate how

Canada acted as a catalyst for international normative change. *Chapter four* follows with a

discussion of norm diffusion to highlight how norm candidates are circulated. It illustrates

the interactive and dynamic process of norm diffusion by exploring Canada's efforts at

diffusing the R2P norm candidate through multi-track diplomacy, at the national, regional

and international level, and the use of high profile endorsement. It concludes with a

discussion on the impact of Canada's norm entrepreneurship. *Chapter five* is the

concluding chapter. It discusses the status of the R2P norm, the theoretical and empirical

insights gained from an examination of Canada's norm entrepreneurship, and elaborates on

the contribution of the constructivist perspective on norm evolution.

Table 1: A Short R2P Timeline

11/2001	ICISS releases its report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*
12/2004	High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP) endorses "the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect."
03/2005	The United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Kofi Annan, reaffirms the Panel's endorsement in his framing document for the "Millennium+5" Summit, *In Larger Freedom*.
09/2005	UN *World Summit Outcome Document* embraces R2P
04/2006	UN Security Council Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians reaffirms the World Summit commitment to R2P
08/2006	UN Security Council Resolution 1706 on Darfur made explicit reference to R2P by reaffirming the provisions of resolution 1674 and the UN *World Summit Outcome Document*.

CHAPTER 2

A Constructivist Account

Much research has focused on establishing that ideas and norms matter in IR. Less attention has been paid to the process of how norms evolve and the elements involved in norm evolution. To approach norm evolution, this study starts with an overview of constructivist literature in international relations with a focus on the main building blocks involved in norm development: norms, normative structures and norm entrepreneurs. In the next section, it introduces an analytical model for tracing norm evolution to identify the crucial role of the norm entrepreneur in the emergence and diffusion phases of norm development. It identifies the conditions that facilitate successful norm development and the key mechanisms employed by norm entrepreneurs. This chapter will guide the empirical analysis of Canada's norm entrepreneurial foreign policy and the development of the norm pertaining to "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P).

Constructivism and International Norms

The literature that guides the development of an analytical model of norm evolution is primarily derived from constructivism. The aftermath of the Cold War has proven to be a fruitful period for the analysis of the role of norms in international affairs. Many empirical and theoretical studies have appeared rendering the interpretation of phenomena in light of norms and ideas, a fertile ground for thinking about the relations among states. It has become intellectually fashionable to discuss the importance of norms in the field of International Relations (IR). Most theories of IR address the issue of norms in international politics to some extent. However, in the last decade, research on norms has taken a constructivist turn (Checkel 1997, 2001; Adler 1997; Finnemore and

Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995a; Adler 1997; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfenning 2000; Bjorkdahl 2002b). Applicable to this study is the burgeoning literatures on norms within the constructivist vein that have emerged in the field of IR.

Constructivist studies started to have a significant impact on the study of IR by the end of the 1980s, by taking the analysis of the discipline a step beyond that of the dominant theories of neorealism and neoliberalism. Constructivism[2] employs an ideational ontology (Krazenstein 1996). Whereas the prevailing mainstream IR theories focus on material constraints, and assume fixed preferences and interests, constructivist approaches unpack the notions of preferences, structures and interests by exploring the social meanings attributed to material objects and structural positions. For example, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005:39) argue that 'power' is not limited to coercive influence wielded by states, but includes logically prior social processes that constitute actors with differential capacities. Constructivism is not necessarily competing with the traditional IR theories, but rather complementary to them.[3] Constructivists seek to expand the traditional theoretical discourse as well as broaden the focus of the study of IR by placing ideational phenomenon under the analytical microscope. This trend of research is a fruitful way of analyzing the formation of norms in international relations.

Constructivism gives a more independent role to norms than other more traditional theories. Norms are regarded as crucial elements of the international system

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[2] It must be noted that constructivist IR theory is not a single unified movement, and it is impossible to engage in a lengthy exploration of its different approaches here. The underlying argument of constructivism is that reality is socially constructed, and ideas give meaning to the material world (Klotz 1995a; Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)

[3] The opinion that constructivism can play a complementing and supportive role with the traditional theories, instead of a competing role, is a common opinion that is shared by many academics. For example, see Adler 1997; Checkel 1997; Bjorkdahl 2002.

and the social construction of reality. According to Fearon and Wendt "constructivism is centrally concerned with the role of ideas in constructing social life" (2002:57). It emphasizes that the practices in statecraft and the identities of global actors are products of shared ideas, rather than, as the realists would have it, simply products of the objective or material structures of the international system. Constructivists focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and argument in politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or "intersubjective" ideas and understandings on social life (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Wendt 1992). The notion of intersubjectivity indirectly injects the concept of norms into IR theory which can be deemed as the most important empirical tool in the project of constructivism. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, an analysis of norm development links up with the constructivist program in the study of international relations.

Constructivist scholars have made a powerful case that understanding ideational and normative influences is essential in making sense of world politics. They have produced well-documented empirical studies showing the effectiveness of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:2). Norms matter by registering the "ought" of society and by reflecting what people do or want to do (Legro 1997:30; Kacowicz 2005:18). However, while constructivist scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the compliance by states with international norms, the earlier stages and processes before compliance have been relatively neglected. Additionally, there is scant attention given to the mechanisms through which norms develop. In effect, there remains to be little understanding about how norms actually develop and the elements that are involved in

this process.[4] Howard and Neufeldt (2000:14) detect that an "understanding of how norms are developed – remains underdeveloped and desperately needed."[5] This study attempts to contribute to this lacuna by focusing on the process of norm development. In doing so, this study draws on constructivist insights to conceptualize three elements central to norm development: norms, normative structures, and norm entrepreneurs.

Norms

Common definitions of norms are based on behaviour, prescription, and shared expectations. International norms carry a specific social content, and they are often independent from any given power distribution. For constructivists, international norms are broadly considered expectations of appropriate behaviour, which are shared within the international society (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). More specifically, norms can be defined as "a set of intersubjective understandings readily apparent to actors that makes behavioural claims on those actors" (Finnemore 1994:2).[6] Norms either define or constitute identities, prescribe or regulate behaviour, or they do both (Kratzenstein 1196:5). The expectations expressed by international norms pertain to proper action by states. In other words, norms communicate injunctions that prescribe certain actions but proscribe others (Kegley and Raymond 1990:14). They entail a collective evaluation and future expectations of behaviour.

Normative Structure

Norms must be analyzed in relation to an existing normative structure and in

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[4] Checkle 1998, makes this criticism; see also Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 400.

[5] Also see Denise Garcia 2006.

[6] Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) find that there "is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity." Legro (1997:33) defines norms as "collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors," and Gurowitz (1999: 417) indicates "standards of appropriate and legitimate behaviour. These norms may be consciously cultivated in international forums or result from common practice among states." Finally, Checkel (1998: 327) views norms as "collective understandings that make behavioural claims on actors."

competition with other norms. New norms enter into a context already defined by prevailing norms (Sikkink 1991:2, Florini 1996:376). Since norms are intersubjective, or shared, they cannot be classified as individual or idiosyncratic. Norms depend on a context of values: "international norms do not exist in isolation. They fit together in a complex mosaic of interrelated parts to form a normative order." (Raymond 1997:231). Therefore, new norms compete with other emerging norms or existing ones in a limited, normative space; as such, norms are subject to being challenged. Hence, the efforts to promote new norms often take place within an existing framework of "appropriateness". New norms must meet standards of appropriateness. According to Thomas Frank (1990:94-97), specific norms have a "pedigree if their rights and obligations can be linked with pre-existing norms." The fit between the norm and the existing normative structure increases the likelihood of norm diffusion. In effect, pre-existing normative structures may influence norm evolution.

The normative structure is important in analyzing norm development because already existing norms necessarily condition the types of norms promoted by entrepreneurs. While neglecting the role of agency, Steve Bernstein's (2000:464-512) discusses "social fit" between norms and the social structure in depth. The strength of this approach is in understanding why certain ideas get selected to become international norms. Berstein, among others, believes that normative structures contain their own logic of transformation. However, this structural approach to norm development is unable to explain change. Transformation depends on external elements outside the structure. According to Bjorkdahl (2002a:56), "specifying why a normative structure with internal contradictions changes at one point in time rather than another is dependent on an

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external element." The normative structure merely suggests certain limitations for introducing completely new norms. Thus, while the structure itself provides the environmental conditions for norm emergence, agents are needed to understand how change comes about.

Norm Entrepreneur

Despite the intuitive notion that actors play a role in establishing and altering normative structures, constructivists have been criticized for failing to demonstrate how agents influence norm dynamics. Constructivism contains assumptions about the relationship between social structures and actors. A major criticism from early constructivists was that structural realism had no theory of change (Ruggie 1986). The development of constructivism provided an opening to address this issue, which, in turn, involved a new way to view the agent-structure issue (Giddens 1984; Wendt 1999). Whereas previous theories privileged one at the expense of the other, that is, usually structure was privileged at the expense of the agent, constructivist theory emphasizes the equal status of agents and structures as mutually conditioning entities. This emphasis is derived from the fact that the constructivist position can be identified as an approach, according to which "the world ontologically is constituted by both social and material dimensions" (Checkel 1998:325). Agents, as well as structure, are constituted by this fact (ibid.). Structures are not external, objective, static objects to be encountered like building walls, but rather are social norms continually enacted and reenacted in the process of producing social meaning. This social meaning is the content of social structure, and it is shared between agents intersubjectively. Constructivism has drawn attention to the role played by both agents and structures; as such, the subject for analysis

is process itself.

Yet, constructivists tend to neglect agency in empirical research. It remains structure-heavy, offering more theories of how norms shape state's identities and actions and fewer theories of how states make those very structures. Jeffrey Checkel (1998:325) claims that "constructivism lacks a theory of agency," and "as a result, it overemphasizes the role of social structures and norms at the expense of agents who help to create and change them in the first place."[7] An agent-focused analysis is appropriate in light of the criticism that constructivists, despite arguing that actors and structures are mutually constituted, have tended to advance a structure-centered approach in their empirical work. Although this study will give analytical priority to agency, it will attempt to explore the relationship between the actor and structure,[8] seeking as it does to explore the role of the norm entrepreneur in the process of norm development.

Norm entrepreneurs are actors that are active in the promotion of norms. A norm entrepreneur is an agent of social change with an ability to shape the collective behaviour of others. They are agenda setters or problem-solvers introducing new ideas into the international debate. This often involves efforts to change the constraints and recognize opportunities of social interaction (Bjorkdahl 2002a:45). When opportunities arise, norm entrepreneurs present a norm candidate on the political agenda as an ideal solution to the problem. Norm entrepreneurs, utilizing Annika Bjorkdahl's (2002a:46) definition, can be conceptualized as follows: "By identifying opportunities, actors committed to a particular idea set out to change the existing normative context and alter the behaviour of others in

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[7] See also Howard and Neufeldt (2000:31) who suggest that "future work on the evolution of norms needs to focus on the activities... of actors that allow a norm to emerge..."

[8] This point will be highlighted in the discussion on the interaction process between the norm entrepreneur and the normative structure in terms of the norm entrepreneur's attempts to "fit" the emerging norm with the already established normative structure.

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the direction of the new norm." They are actors who are strongly committed to an idea and seek to bring the idea to an international level. In essence, the main impetus for norm development resides on the actor promoting ideational change.

The identity of the norm entrepreneur is crucial to the selection of potential norm candidates, the choice of diffusion strategies and the arenas favoured for the norm entrepreneurial activities. A large body of literature in IR attests to the importance of identity in world politics (Wendt 1994; Katzenstein 1996). A number of different types of actors can be norm entrepreneurs. Some constructivist scholars have sought to understand how actors operate and the conditions that might contribute to their success. However, much of this research has focused on the role of activists,[9] international organizations,[10] and epistemic communities.[11] Empirical research has identified the agenda-setting and pre-negotiating phases when national governments try to formulate their position in multilateral negations as particularly conducive for the impact of advocacy groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995; Price 1995). However, non-state actors are less likely to be influential in the actual negotiating processes. Although the trend of the literature on norms focuses on nongovernmental organizations and social movements, Howard and Neufeldt (2000:31) demonstrate that scholars who "ignore states and state actions miss significant factors in the process of norm creation."[12] Insight can be gained into the process of norm emergence from a state perspective.

Depending on the issue area, it is possible that the state plays the key role in transforming the normative structure by promoting new norms for IR. In the area of

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[9] See for example: Keck and Sikkink 1999, Wapner 1996, Klotz 1995.
[10] For example, Finnemore 1993, 1996; Alder 1998
[11] For example, Goldstein and Keohane 1993.
[12] Also see, Franceschet and Knight who claim, "states are usefully conceived as norm entrepreneurs" (2001: 51).

international security, a number of studies demonstrate that states have been the driving force, for example, in establishing non-proliferation regime nuclear weapons and developing norms of neutrality and alliances (Bjorkdahl 2002a:47). States still determine most of the rules of the game, which reaffirm them as the primary actors on the world stage. This study focuses on state actors as norm entrepreneurs and investigates the role they can play in fostering the emergence and evolution of international norms.

Analytical Model of Norm Evolution: An Agent-Focused Analysis

The theoretical aim is to advance an analytical framework that identifies the crucial role of the norm entrepreneur in the phases of norm development. Constructivists' insights based on the above conceptualization of norms, norm structures and norm entrepreneurs can produce general insights about the emergence and evolution of international norms. This section is divided according to the main underpinning themes within the research on norms and relevant to the literature reviewed here: the overall conditions for norm building, an assessment of the mechanisms of norm diffusion, and the norm-building stages.

Facilitating Conditions

Previous scholarship on norm evolution has drawn attention to conditions that facilitate norm development. Scholars mainly point to world time-context and the intrinsic characteristics of the norm candidate. However, they alone do not explain the necessary conditions required for norm development. The possession of norm entrepreneurial attributes held by actors promoting international norms is a crucial condition facilitating successful normative transformation.

The first condition for the development of norms is identified as world time-

context (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). World historic events such as major wars and economic crises may clear the way for the search for new norms and ideas. Structural changes due to exogenous shocks, crises, or dramatic policy failures may invoke demands for new norms (Haggard and Simmons 1987:506-507). The perception of a crisis or shock can work as a crucial factor in precipitating ideational or normative change. However, while this condition is conducive to understanding the origins of norms, it fails to emphasize the process of evolution once a window of opportunity for a new norm has opened. As illustrated earlier, the evolution and diffusion of norms rely on the ability of the norm entrepreneur to recognize and ultimately "take advantage" of the opportunity to promulgate new norms at the international level.

The second enabling condition is related to the intrinsic characteristics of the norm. The strength of a norm depends primarily on its robustness. Robustness is determined by looking at the following characteristics of a norm: durability, feasibility, applicability and persuasiveness (Legro 1997:34; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:906; Bjorkdahl 2002a:41-43).[13] Durability refers to how long a norm has existed and if the norm can be regarded as having long-standing legitimacy. Feasibility refers to whether the norm can translate into action. Applicability refers to how broadly it can be accepted. Norms that are more universally encompassing are more likely to be accepted. "Norms making universal claims… have more expansive potential than localized and particularistic normative frameworks" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:907). Finally, persuasiveness refers to how well the norm reverberates in the norm followers. If the norm characteristics are persuasive, the norm has expansive potential. Related to the robustness of a norm, is the

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[13] While not an attempt to measure norms, these attributes will be employed to determine the overall robustness of the international norm in the case study of this thesis.

"normative fit" of the norm to the existing normative structure.

This research recognizes that "fit" of new norms with existing ones are useful for understanding the facilitating conditions under which some ideas are more likely to emerge and become politically significant over others. Fit or congruence between ideas and circumstances appears to be consistently important theme in the literature on norms (Bernstein 2000:4661; Berman 2001:236; Garcia 2006:22). As Sikkink (1991:2) illustrates, "new ideas do not enter an ideological vacuum. They are inserted into a political space already occupied by historically formed ideologies. Whether or not consolidation occurs often depends on the degree to which the new model fits with existing ideologies." Norms that "fit" with extant norms gain persuasiveness, while norms that do not "fit" with underlying social values are unlikely to find support among norm followers. However, the intrinsic characteristics of a norm in isolation do not explain the rise to prominence of ideas. International norms do not garner adequate attention on their own but rather they must be championed by actors capable of persuading others to consider the ways they think and act (Berman 2001:235). Therefore, because it is not the inherent properties of ideas which are decisive for their successful diffusion, "it becomes particularly important to study the concrete mechanisms which give some ideas rather than others a life of their own" (Bjorkdahl 2002a:27-28). Agency is identified as playing a crucial role in the emergence and evolution of international norms.

The characteristics and identity of the norm entrepreneur tends to affect norm followers and can facilitate norm development, as norm promulgation is an interactive process. Norm entrepreneurship is about influence and interaction. In recent years,

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scholars in international relations have been re-examining the definition of power and have begun to focus on how states exercise influence in ways that do not conform to strictly economic and military capabilities. Instead, viewing the international system as fragmented and anarchic, "a new wave of scholarship examines how states become socialized into an international community" (Ingebritsen 2002:11). Norm entrepreneurs represent a key source in the socialization process that leads to international normative change.

Norm entrepreneurs may or may not possess traditional power resources; however, soft power resources are becoming increasingly important. Constructivists embrace a conception of the exercise of power as the ability to reconstruct discourses and shape practices. International norms develop through a political process where material forces influence but do not determine which norms diffuse and ultimately prevail. Conceptualizing power is relevant to exploring state's influence, or lack there of, in international settings. This study utilizes the popular concept of "soft power" as a valuable addition to traditional conceptualizations of power (Manners 2002; 2006). The concept of soft power rests on the power of ideas and norms. It is often associated with actors that have limited traditional power resources such as military capabilities (Sjursen 2006). Soft power is conceptualized as a norm-generating and norm-spreading capability exercised in order to change normative convictions and to set normative standards through processes of norm entrepreneurship. A state's power and influence potential at a given time, although material forces influence, ultimately depends on intangible assets. Three broadly classified intangible assets that provide possibilities for norm entrepreneurs to influence international politics are legitimacy, organizational platform

and leadership.

Legitimacy, as a resource, enhances the norm entrepreneur's ability to promulgate international norms. The state's image abroad can be a valuable asset or a serious handicap to influencing international politics. The adoption of new norms will depend largely on the perceived legitimacy of the source of new ideas by relevant actors (Bernstein 2000:465). Attraction of norm entrepreneurs "soft power," or "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments" (Nye 2004: 5) is conditioned by the perceived external legitimacy of the given actor. The norm entrepreneur must look beyond their own interests and concerns, to the interests of the wider group, for example, the norm followers, in order to be perceived as legitimate (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896-899). Thus, norm entrepreneurs perceived as impartial and not pursuing any direct self-interest are more influential than those unable to project such disinterest.

A norm entrepreneur's ability to influence is dependent on legitimacy of the norm entrepreneur derived from trust and confidence. Legitimacy comes from reputation based on repeated interaction, meeting obligations and behaving consistently with existing international norms (Bjorkdahl 2002a:49). Legitimacy comes from "good behaviour" from abiding by norms. An important aspect is that "good behaviour" confers influence in related issues. Those who have followed the norms in the past have more influence in pronouncing what norms are appropriate in a situation where ambiguity arises (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950). The reputation of a "good international citizen", as both "moral" and "responsible" provides states with the leverage other states do not enjoy. Building up a sort of moral arsenal can be effectively used in future interactions with other states. This

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reputation benefits norm entrepreneurs by giving them influence in specific areas. An actor gains legitimacy and, therefore, can specify further norms. This study recognizes that the possibilities and limitations of norm entrepreneurs to influence world politics are dependent on the state's reputation within the international system.

Organizational platforms provide norm entrepreneurs with political opportunities to shape norm development. Organizational connections can assist them in their norm promoting activity (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:11-13; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:899). The international institutional environment in which the norm entrepreneur operates determines both their access to political actors and their ability to form advocacy coalitions. Institutions do not simply reduce transaction costs or provide rules of appropriate behaviour. According to Thomas Risse (2004:313), they also serve as "discourse arenas enabling deliberative processes geared toward problem-solving." They do so in part by establishing relationships of trust among actors which are deemed crucial for processes of consensus building. Keohane and Nye (1997:36) note that institutions "allow small and weak states to pursue linkage strategies," to have a voice in what is put on the international agenda, and to form potential coalitions in world politics. Greater linkages created within organizational platforms are a positive factor in successful norm diffusion. Norm entrepreneurs benefit from frequent interaction over time and closeness of communication with norm followers, as there will be more opportunities to build strong relationships based on trust and confidence. Whether or not the norm entrepreneur has access to organizational platforms affects the norm entrepreneur's ability to influence international politics.

In terms of political resources, an important asset for the exercise of influence is a

state's leadership. Entrepreneurial leaders are well-equipped to encourage the development of new norms. Leadership entails recognition of open windows for norm advocacy and opportunities for social interaction. Successful norm promulgation is facilitated by state leaders' and diplomatic representatives' ability to use the tangible and intangible assets at their disposal to maximize the favorable response from other states. "Leaders address themselves to followers' wants, needs, and other motivations," and thus they serve an independent force in building international consensus (Burns 1978:20). As explained by Riddell-Dixon (2005:1069), "entrepreneurial leadership entails forming like-minded coalitions, engineering agreements, and facilitating the negotiation of compromise solutions." Leaders use skilled experts to generate the powerful political energy needed to move a norm to the international arena. Norm entrepreneurs must possess the diplomatic skills necessary to convince norm followers. In essence, the main impetus for norm development resides on the actor promoting normative change. This normative change requires that norm entrepreneurs possess leadership capabilities.

Mechanisms

Norm entrepreneurship is a strategy to gain influence often used by otherwise powerless actors. The bulk of what norm advocates do can be termed persuasion in order to convince other actors to share their normative convictions (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Bjorkdahl 2002a, 2008). In the literature pertaining to norm entrepreneurship there is a debate whether norms established through coercive means, such as arm-twisting, shaming or moral sanctions and require constant monitoring to ensure compliance can be considered authentic norm adoption (Risse *et al*. 1999; Crawford 1993). This study perceives norm entrepreneurship as a form of non-coercive, persuasive argumentation.

Power can be defined in social as well as material forces. It is an attempt to add complexity to existing accounts of norm entrepreneurship by exploring how states lacking traditional power resources may gain a constructive and effective influence on international issues by using persuasion – agenda-setting and diplomatic tactics - and thus playing a crucial role in the norm evolution process.

The evolution of international norms depends on the norm entrepreneur's ability to alter the dynamics of interacting agents toward intersubjective agreement. Constructivists assume that intersubjective understandings are transformed through interaction; therefore, they are concerned with the various processes employed to achieve outcomes. Understanding the evolution of norms involves an investigation into the process of interaction between the norm entrepreneur and the norm follower. This process-oriented analysis is necessarily actor-oriented. According to constructivists, norms can change as an aggregation of agent-oriented processes (Wendt 1987, 1993; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Kratzenstein 1996; Ruggie 1998).

Critics of constructivism often claim that constructivism negates rationality. Although including actors in the understanding of norm evolution, Florini (1996) perceives actors as hosts for norms who unconsciously transmit norms from one actor to another through a process similar to that of inheritance. However, this perception fails to recognize that rational actors play a prominent role in normative transformation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In their actions, norm entrepreneurs, though attempting to change the prevailing norms, such as the preferences of norm followers, are highly rational and strategic. Norm entrepreneurs are here assumed to be conscious, knowledgeable and self-reflecting actors. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (Ibid.)

norm entrepreneurs are rational actors who "engage in… strategic social construction: these actors [make] detailed means-ends calculations to maximize their utilities." In effect, processes of social construction (normative creation) and strategic bargaining (rationality) are deeply intertwined.

Norm entrepreneurs utilize political strategies to secure agreement on new norms. This study argues that norm entrepreneurs employ and facilitate communicative acts to achieve norm acceptance. The diplomacy of communicative action, according to Thomas Risse (2004:288), "is as goal-oriented as strategic interactions but this goal is not to attain one's fixed preferences, but to seek a reasoned consensus." Communicative action is a significant tool employed by norm entrepreneurs to change actor preferences and to challenge and create new collective meaning. It is particularly desirable when norm entrepreneurs lack the power resources to bargain in alternative fora. This type of action is usually referred to as persuasion in the constructivist literature and identified as the centrally important mechanism for constructing social facts (Finnemore 1996:141; Payne 2001:38; Bjorkdahl 2008:141). Norm entrepreneurs persuade others to accept new norms through argumentation and deliberation. These acts of communication represent learning mechanisms by which actors acquire new information, evaluate their interests vis-à-vis new knowledge, and can collectively assess the validity claims of standards of appropriate behaviour. By engaging in and facilitating opportunities for communicative action, norm entrepreneurs contribute to norm development.

Norm entrepreneurs rely on normative strategies in communicative interactions. Communicative action through persuasion relies on the norm entrepreneur's ability to use reform strategies in matching the norm to the normative structure and the norm to the

norm followers. To influence audiences responsive to ethical considerations, norm entrepreneurs select and frame issues to resonate with prevailing norms, appeal to accepted moral principles, and engage in other forms of normative persuasion. The norm entrepreneur must strategically construct a normative fit with the normative structure and the new norm. As discussed earlier, claims about the "fit" of norms do not carry much explanatory power, since "fit" does not just happen, but is created. The match between new norms and existing norms is actively constructed rather than simply in the norms themselves. Laffey and Weldes (1997: 203) find that "if there is a compatible relationship between a moral principle and the environment in which that principle is to be applied it is more likely that an effective norm will arise." This means that entrepreneurs seeking to build and promulgate norms must remain cognizant of the manner in which emergent norms fit with the existing normative structure and how these norms fit with norm followers' convictions.

Communicative action may work through logical arguments about consistency of the norm with established norms and beliefs that the target already adheres to and arguments from legal precedent (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:912-13). "Norm entrepreneurs must speak to aspects of belief systems of like worlds that transcend a specific cultural or political context" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:907). New norms that "fit" within the existing narratives and conceptual frameworks are more easily instantiated than those that challenge the coherence of the whole. Reform strategies are less threatening and more adaptable.

The promotion of normative change is a strategic interaction. Constructivists often neglect to consider cases where norm entrepreneurs meet "principled norm

resistance" and "active opposition" against the introduction of new ideas that compete for resources and attention (Elgstrom 2000:458). Constructivist accounts of how norms develop often refer to emulation or imitation through a relatively simple learning process that is hastened by persuasion and information sharing (Price 1995:83; Checkel 1997). This process presented by constructivists based on emulation, imitation and learning is largely seen as problem-free and non-conflictual. However, targets of persuasion respond with arguments and strategies of their own. As illustrated above, norms never enter into a normative vacuum. They have to compete with existing values and existing norms that are often change-resistant. Elgstrom (2000:457-8) illustrates that "norms are translated rather than imitated. This translation process involves compromise and shared as well as competing objectives: it is a negotiation process." Norm promulgation may lead to norm negotiation and contestation, rather than to a smooth, near-automatic diffusion. Elgstrom argues that "we cannot expect the convinced advocate's version of the norm to come through this process of norm-building unaffected. They are adapted to the organizational context, often diluted, by a negotiation process" (2000:461). Thus, new norms are created in a highly contested process. Actors must engage in political interaction in struggles to define normative change.

Analytical Framework for Norm Development

Discerning how norms emerge and spread at the international level has been a challenging enterprise. However, the norm "life cycle" of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) is a relatively recent constructivist framework that has a great deal of potential for understanding the emergence and evolution of norms in the international system. In tracing the norm evolution process, the Finnemore and Sikkink model is useful in

identifying the role of the norm entrepreneur and the mechanisms these entrepreneurs employ to facilitate norm spread at different norm phases. The three stages in the life cycle are "emergence", "diffusion", and "internalization." In the first stage, a norm emerges largely due to the efforts of norm entrepreneurs. In the second stage, the norm begins to spread to other members of the international system, until "a critical mass of states... become norm leaders and adopt new norms, [at which point] the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point" (901).[14] Ultimately, the process reaches a point of internalization, whereby "norms... achieve a taken-for-granted quality that makes conformance within the norm almost automatic" (904).[15] A norm achieves prominence through the efforts of a norm entrepreneur. Thus, norm emergence and diffusion is a directed process in which the norm entrepreneur promotes a given norm. This study will discuss and elaborate upon the emergence and diffusion stages since they represent the life of the norm before norm compliance.[16] Elaboration of these stages will involve an analysis of the mechanisms employed by norm entrepreneurs to facilitate international normative change.

Act I: Norm Emergence

Norm emergence is characterized by the norm entrepreneur's ability to initiate the agenda-setting process which, in turn, stimulates the norm framing processes. These are processes of communicative action based on strategic construction. Norm entrepreneurs exploit windows of opportunity to get the ideas they advocate on the agenda to get actors to pay attention to the issue (Kingdon 1995:3). Advocating a norm candidate, norm

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[14] Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) assert that this tipping point occurs when 1/3 of all states adopt a norm.
[15] The completion of the life cycle is not an inevitable process. Many emerging norms fail to gain broad support, are rejected, or fail to become fully institutionalized. "It is, however," according to Bjorkdahl (2002:62), "rare for one set of norms either to diminish to extinction or dominate completely."
[16] As stated previously, the earlier stages and processes before compliance have been relatively neglected.

entrepreneurs must call attention to issues, set agendas and fight for increased norm awareness. This involves the generation of knowledge about the issue and the dissemination of information (Haas 1992; Price 1995; Garcia 2006). Agenda-setting involves convincing actors that there is a problem that needs to be solved cooperatively (Risse 2000:2). In addition, in order to develop, transmit and promote norms, norm entrepreneurs help to achieve international change by signaling their own commitment to change within international settings (Sunstein 1996:914). Norm advocacy requires norm entrepreneurs who may be dissatisfied with an existing state of affairs or actors behaviour to introduce an alternative way of behaving or a new standard of conduct.

Norms cannot emerge if those who would promote them cannot be persuasive. Entrepreneurs must try to convince norm followers that it is in their own interests to adopt the proposed norm or persuade them of the moral superiority of the norms. Thomas Risse notes that persuasive processes and argument are "necessary to mobilize the international community" into accepting a new international norm often occurring via transnational advocacy networks (Risse 1990). In doing so, norm entrepreneurs will serve as facilitators and hosts for meetings, conventions and conferences about a particular issue in order to raise its salience.

The goal of the norm entrepreneur in the norm emergence stage is to make the norm followers perceive the proposed norm as legitimate and appropriate. Once an idea is selected, the norm entrepreneur must translate the idea to become a norm candidate.[17] They invest energy in developing a norm. The ultimate success of this strategic construction depends on its persuasiveness with an audience. Therefore, the crucial step

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[17] According to Bjordakhl (2002a: 49), an idea is more likely to be selected by the entrepreneur if it matches the norm entrepreneur's own values, beliefs and practices and if the attributes of the idea match the characteristics of the problem the norm entrepreneur intends to address. Also see Sikkink 1991: 26.

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for the norm entrepreneur is to frame the idea in a persuasive way to construct a potential norm that may gain widespread acceptance. The frame concept has become relevant for understanding discursively constructed problem definitions, the structuring of alternative solutions, and the shaping of individual and collective preferences. According to Barnett (1999:25), a frame is a persuasive device "used to help fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems." Framing denotes an "active, process-derived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of social reality" (Bjorkdhal 2002a:86). In essence, norm entrepreneurs strategically engineer frames for international public dialogue. Strategic framing involves activities to define reality by placing issues in a context that favour certain interpretations and promote particular ideas over others and thereby modify and change the ideational framework (Bjorkdhal 2002a:49). Frames are therefore seen as a key means by which entrepreneurs inject social knowledge into their communicative acts.

To influence audiences, norm entrepreneurs frame issues to resonate with prevailing norms and appeal to accepted universal principles. Since resonance is paramount, new norms need to have the potential to become the "property" of the community rather than of the individual (Legro 2000). A norm is more likely to be accepted if it is framed to link to an issue of great common concern on the international agenda (Keck and Sikkink 1998:17). Additionally, a norm framed in commonly held values in order to fit with the existing normative framework and the normative convictions of potential norm followers is more likely to be accepted. Norm entrepreneurs direct their efforts "toward persuading foreign audiences, especially foreign

elites, that a particular [normative] regime reflects a widely shared or even universal moral sense, rather than the particular moral code of one society" (Sustein 1996:916). Carefully constructed frames may enable norm entrepreneurs to construct a persuasive new norm that resonates with their audience. Framed in such a way, the norm candidate may be diffused by the norm entrepreneur. This norm entrepreneurial role in emergence is significant; norm entrepreneurs give meaning to the norm creating process. In essence, the main impetus for norm development resides on the actor promoting ideational change. This viewpoint stresses the importance of agency in norm-building processes.

Act II: Norm Diffusion

Once an emerging norm enters into the diffusion stage, its ability to survive and become an intersubjectively shared norm depends to a large extent on the ability of the norm entrepreneur to build a community of norm followers. Norm entrepreneurs consciously cultivate the norm in international settings and build coalitions to wield more support for the norms they intend to "sell" (Bjorkdahl 2002a:100). Persuasion, the core of politics and the central aim of political interaction, has been identified as an important strategy for establishing new norms. In the diffusion stage, norm entrepreneurs must persuade norm followers to adopt favorable attitudes towards the new norm. The first to become norm followers are often likeminded actors who share the norm entrepreneur's identity. As norm followers, they may help to persuade other actors to adopt the new norm candidate, which creates a momentum or bandwagoning effect to occur within the diffusion process (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This is in an effort to create the "critical mass". A norm community is built by the norm entrepreneur with the specific intent of bringing about normative change.

The entrepreneur tries to recruit other states to become followers of the new norm through the use of organizational platforms. Norm entrepreneurs, therefore, engage in strategic forum-shopping to identify international platforms that can assist them in their norm promoting activities (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:11-13; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:899). Organizations serve as rudimentary transnational alliances from which governments can, in turn, engage with in their efforts to build consensus. NGO communities provide such a platform for norm advocacy (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Engaging civil society allows norm entrepreneurs to take advantage of their extensive intellectual capital and expertise. Organizations represent an arena to exchange ideas, advance norms and increase consensus building.

The norm entrepreneur brings the norm to the international arena, where it is institutionalized in any number of international organizations. However, organizations themselves reflect a set of dominant ideas and norms translated into their structures and procedures (Bjorkdahl 2002a:50; Elgstrom 2000:461). As a result, the norm may be shaped by the agenda and culture of the organization. The norm must fight its way into institutional thinking, which requires a process of strategic negotiation. "To get organizational blessing, a norm has to go through the formal decision-making machinery, and then needs to be verbalized in a text" (Elgstrom 2000:461). Norm entrepreneurs will use negotiations to initiate organizational and procedural changes, suggest new policies and programs and provide rhetorical maintenance of the norm. In most cases, for an emergent norm to be diffused, it must become institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organizations, for example the United Nations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1999:251). For norm survival, norms must diffuse within international institutional settings.

Norm diffusion leads to a tipping process that pushes the norm toward universal acceptance as international organizations, states, and transnational networks join the norm community. The norm begins to diffuse to other members of the international system, until "a critical mass of states... become norm leaders and adopt new norms, [at which point] the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point" (901). As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:901) suggest, norm tipping rarely takes place before one-third of total states in the system adopt the norm. To achieve this tipping point, norm entrepreneurs must convince international, regional and national institutions to incorporate the norm. This could take the form of a UN resolution, a UN convention, or any other international instrument. After institutionalization, norm entrepreneurs attempt to keep the norm "alive". They are the sites of conventions and seminars, and many "experts" on the norm come from the state conducting the norm entrepreneurship.

The "life cycle" provides the theoretical tools that can help explain where norms come from and how they evolve over time. Finnemore and Sikkink's model involves a process whereby agents, norm entrepreneurs, seek to promote norms that incorporate behavioural precepts that the norm entrepreneur considers appropriate and desirable. The identification of this role in the process of norm development is useful in understanding the evolution of international norms.

Conclusion

Norm emergence and diffusion occur through processes of persuasion where the norm entrepreneur is identified as the crucial mechanism of normative change. The framework for norm development presented here is consistent with the overall social constructivist approach and draws on rational choice theory. It explores and models the

concept of norm entrepreneurs and investigates their role in fostering the emergence and diffusion of international norms. This analytical model suggests that norm entrepreneurs are crucial to norm development and therefore differs from evolutionary models that are structure-oriented and those that view norm evolution as a mechanical and inevitable process. By more fully incorporating the actors behind norms and devoting attention to actor-centered processes of norm creation and diffusion that unfold before norms have been fully internalized, this study makes an important contribution to the now robust discussion on the conditions under which certain norms emerge and evolve. Rethinking the role of agency highlights potentially important factors in the dynamics of norm development that could inform empirical studies. The analytical model presented in this study provides an attractive conceptual framework to conduct empirical research because it explicitly addresses both the emergence of norms and contains within it the mechanism of norm entrepreneurship to explain the change of norms over time.

Methodology

This study employs a structured case study of the evolution of the R2P norm by using interpretive and qualitative methods. In tracing the development of a norm, it would be difficult to justify using other methods as norms are inherently interpretive and would be difficult to measure as anything other than qualitative data. In addition, the methods that will be employed to conduct this study are logically interconnected through the constructivist approach. Constructivists have suggested that studies of international norms have been missing "process tracing and case research needed to explore actual diffusion

mechanisms" (Checkel 1997:473).[18] Thus, the methods of case study and process tracing will be utilized in this study to conduct an empirical analysis on the role of Canadian foreign policy in the R2P norm development process.

Case Study

Constructivist research by Wendt (1992; 1994) and Onuf (1989) amongst others, has been severely criticized in the past for neglecting to illustrate any empirical applications (Bjorkdahl 2002a:32); that is, social constructivist research often lacks observable evidence. An interpretive case study addresses exactly this problem as it allows for an in depth look into one particular case of norm promotion. The singe-case method is useful for empirical studies of complex political phenomenon (Yin 1984:23; Bryman 2001:47). It allows the researcher to study a phenomenon intensively, interpret how theoretical elements are related to each other and thereby arrive at a better understanding of complex problems and processes such as norm evolution. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to advance a theoretically informed argument for why a certain theoretical approach can be sufficient in illuminating a particular research problem.

The methodological route of this study is explorative, aimed at advancing theory and breaking new empirical ground by studying the evolution of the R2P norm. Limited research has been designated to explore this norm's transformation. This study provides a rich and detailed descriptive picture of the role of Canadian foreign policy in the process of the R2P norm development. A case study is useful when looking at one particular actor over a period of time (Bjordkhal 2002:32). A case study review of Canadian foreign policy

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[18] Also see, Farrell 2001:73.

efforts to consolidate the R2P norm will allow the identification of the tools and strategies employed by the norm entrepreneur.

Choosing this case study was motivated by an interest to explore the growing political attention to the R2P, combined with an opportunity to study the Canadian norm entrepreneurial efforts in this process. Although a state actor is accentuated, this study challenges the realist hegemon theory of norm evolution, as norms do not need to be imposed by the hegemon, or by any great powers accompanied by traditional power resources. Instead, the analysis focuses on a state lacking traditional power trying to exercise its norm entrepreneurship foreign policy to influence international politics. A single-case study is valuable, as it can demonstrate the usefulness of a constructivist approach to norm evolution and contribute to new theoretical and empirical insights.

Process Tracing

For this case study, process tracing is employed as the main method to allow the researcher to trace the process of Canadian foreign policy initiatives and the development of the R2P at the international level. Process tracing involves retrospective tracing that reconstructs the sequence of main events and decisions in an evolutionary process.[19] The process-tracing methodology, which emphasizes discourse and justification in terms of policy advocacy, allows for the disaggregation of the case and subsequent ability to understand both the moments of progress and the periods of failure (Risse-Kappen 1995). This strategy allows observation of Canada's involvement, actions and influence in the development of the R2P norm.

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[19] Considerable research in the constructivist tradition within the diffusion paradigm has been devoted to process-tracing. See, for example, Finnemore 1996; Checkel 1998; 2001.

To guide this analysis, three questions were used to trace the R2P norm evolution process: 1.) What was the status of the R2P norm before Canada's involvement? 2.) What did Canada do to promulgate the norm? 3.) What was the impact of Canada's actions? This methodology is used to assess the history of norm emergence related to R2P and will involve: the identification of Canada as a norm entrepreneur and how they diffuse the norms (mechanisms) and influence other actors regarding them.

Indications of the emergence and existence of norms can be found in organizational and procedural changes as well as in discourses surrounding a particular behaviour. The degree of internationalization of the R2P norm is assessed through key relevant international consensus achieved by UN GA resolutions and reports. The level of international attention to the emerging norm will be determined primarily through assessing whether an international instrument has been negotiated and, second, if multilateral meetings are being held in order to accelerate the international norm-building process. Such tracing will involve an analysis of the adoption of the R2P language indicated by policy statements and official speeches. Emerging norms are often articulated and possible to trace in the discourse.

To study Canadian norm entrepreneurship efforts, those who act in the name of the state are the central focus. The diplomatic corps, for example, is perceived as a conveyer of ideas across borders (Der Derian 1996:85; Bjordhakl 2002a:47). Weldes (1996:281) claims that individuals who "inhabit offices in the state play a special role in constructing the national interest." Foreign-policy elites are expected to act as entrepreneurs in international politics where states are still the most important actors, at least in certain areas such as international security (Cerny 2000:435-463). The notion of foreign policy

elite is employed in this study to denote the circle of diplomats, politicians and officials representing Canada on the international stage.

Canada's norm entrepreneurship efforts are traced through formal documents such as declarations, press releases, public statements, articles, speeches and briefs. This study relies mainly on formal documents, such as UN reports, statements, resolutions and speeches in the General Assembly as well as official summaries of the Security Council debates. In addition, internal non-classified material such as memoranda, background papers and internal briefs are used. Additional information about the process is found by interviewing officials who participated in the meetings and discussions.

Limitations and Scope of Study

Three important limitations in the scope of the study need to be explicitly stated. First, as discussed in the introduction, it is not argued here that there exists a full-fledged international R2P norm that has achieved a taken-for-granted status. The R2P norm, or rather norm candidate, is still in its earliest evolutionary stages. Second, this study disregards the use of coercive strategies in norm advocacy. Thereby, it falls short of exploring potentially interesting dynamics of combining hard and soft powers to promote international norms. Third, although this study investigates Canada's contribution to the evolution of the R2P norm, it is not argued that Canada was the only actor in advocating the R2P. A broad range of actors have shown a growing interest in the idea and has contributed to its advancement on the international stage. However, Canada is an interesting actor to analyze. Being a state with limited traditional power resources and a traditionally internationalist vision and active foreign policy, analyzing Canada's efforts provides insights into a norm entrepreneur's ability to influence international politics.

CHAPTER 3

Norm Emergence

This chapter commences the empirical analysis of norm evolution by providing a contextual background that facilitated the window of opportunity for the emergence of the R2P norm candidate. In addition, this chapter considers how ideas surface and gain broad support; specifically, it focuses on the idea of R2P and how it gained attention and was selected by the Canadian foreign policy elite. It aims to demonstrate how Canada acted to initiate and push the process of normative change, which is part of its role as a norm entrepreneur, by constructing the political environment in which a norm candidate could emerge.

The norm entrepreneur is central to the process of norm development. If the inherent properties of the norm candidate are perceived as theoretically and morally appealing, it tends to be persuasive. However, it is not only the intrinsic characteristics of the idea that will persuade. If a match can be constructed between the attributes of the norm and the characteristics of the problem the actor is addressing, the likelihood for norm emergence increases (Kingdom 1995:109-115). Furthermore, if a fit with the norm entrepreneur's own values, beliefs and practices can be constructed, the idea is more likely to be selected. However, no matter how timely a norm, it needs promotion to emerge. Thus, the ability of the norm entrepreneur to translate the norm candidate into a

norm is significant. If selected by a skillful and "prominent" entrepreneur the norm candidate's chances to succeed improve. By appropriating the strategy of persuasion via agenda setting, norm entrepreneurs catalyze and influence the norm development process.

Window of Opportunity

As in any ideational manifestation, one basic condition for success of norm emergence is the availability of an opportunity in terms of temporal conditions. Norm candidates may emerge at a certain point in time when there is a demand for new ideas and a potential for them to gain influence. These windows of opportunities are sometimes referred to as defining moments in time, triggered by epoch-making events. The emergence of the notion of R2P can be understood in the context of the events of the 1990s and the changing conceptions of the scope and nature of sovereignty and security. It emerged both from the hard experience and from the political debates about "humanitarian intervention" in the 1990s.[20]   A debate on intervention was ignited in the closing years of the last century by the critical gap between the needs of the victims in Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenia and East Timor, the growing acceptance of human security as an alternative for security policy, and the codified instruments and modalities for managing world order (Thakur 2004). This debate highlighted the need to balance respect for sovereignty of states with the perceived responsibility of the international community to intervene when the rights of individuals were being threatened on a mass scale.

The appearance of the idea of responsibility to protect emerged on the international security agenda as a result of the challenges, failures and lessons of the

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[20] Justification of warfare on "humanitarian" grounds is as old as the state itself – only the terminology is new. Sources abound on humanitarian intervention and debates regarding its legality, history and efficacy. See for example, Crawford 2002; Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003; Lang 2002; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 2004.

1990s. While the end of the Cold War had made the UN Security Council (UNSC) more able and willing to intervene in internal conflicts with the goal of protecting civilians, "it did so inconsistently, haphazardly, and ineffectively" (Banda 2007:8). The post-Cold War period witnessed calls for humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. In each case, troops sent to mitigate human suffering met with only limited success (Holt and Berkman 2006:25). The Council's record on the protection of civilians greatly compromised the organization's credibility and legitimacy, especially in developing countries. In 1994, as the Council withdrew its peacekeepers from Rwanda, 800 000 people were brutally killed within 100 days of genocide.[21] In Srebrenica, Serb forces massacred roughly 7 000 Muslims in a UN "safe area" as Dutch peacekeepers looked on, even though NATO close air support was nearby (Holtman and Berk 2006:26). The tragic lessons of the 1990s revealed that both traditional humanitarian action and traditional peacekeeping had a limited ability to effectively protect civilians. These high profile failures catalyzed calls for a reassessment of the use of force and effective international responses.

The effects of the failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica set in motion a series of developments that ultimately facilitated the endorsement of the R2P. R2P builds on the broader conception of "protection of civilians" (POC), first identified as a "humanitarian imperative" by the Security-General in 1998.[22] The next critical step was taken by the UN security Council (UNSC) in 1999, which issued a Presidential Statement on the

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[21] The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) established by UN Security Council Resolution 872 (1993), S/RES/872 (5 October 1993), originally mandated to help implement the Arasha Peace Agreement of August 1993, actually saw its troop size reduced in the midst of the ongoing genocide (United Nations 1999). See *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* (15 October 1999) for an in-depth discussion of the international community's failure to prevent massive human rights violations in Rwanda.
[22] See S/1998/318-A/52/871

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"protection of civilians in armed conflicts" after an open debate convened by the Canadian presidency (S/PRST/1999/6) and then approved unanimously two resolutions on POC.[23] The Council's two resolutions – SCR 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) – were a landmark in the institutionalization of the POC at the UN. By signaling that targeting civilians may in itself constitute a threat to international peace and security, the Council opened the possibility for coercive action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

With the above legal developments, toward the end of the decade, the chances for peace after brutal conflicts in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Kosovo, East Timor, and elsewhere, shifted international support towards military interventions, peace operations, and efforts to protect civilians. Within one month of the adoption of SCR 1265, the Council authorized its next mission, in Sierra Leone, to "take the necessary action to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" (S/RES/1999/1270). From that point forward, this provision was included in the mandates of all UN-led peacekeeping missions. Regional bodies also employed the Council's justification for military intervention, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone and NATO in Kosovo.

These new patterns of intervention pointed to changing normative understandings sovereignty and security. Concern for vulnerable civilians deepened within and beyond the human rights communities, emerging as a political and normative force among international leaders and policymakers. The Secretary-General's Special Representative on International Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, first suggested "sovereignty-as-responsibility" in 1995 (Weis 2005:21). Canada's former Foreign Minister, Lloyd

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[23] The Council also approved six statements on POC and passed related resolutions on Women and Children and Armed Conflict, Peace and Security, and Conflict Prevention. The UNGA Millenium Declaration too recognized POC (A/RES/55/2).

Axworthy, anchored his policy initiatives in the "human security" doctrine (McRae and Hubert 2001; Axworthy 2003). In an attempt to deal with the growing surge in civil wars, the UN Security Council has broadened the threats to the security to include gross violation of human rights, apartheid, genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape and most violent conflict that could spill over into a particular region or sub-region. It is pointed out that states are often a source of insecurity rather than protection, and domestic rather than interstate conflicts are a greater threat to most individuals' security in today's world. Clearly, the working definition of international security expanded to more fully include individuals residing within states.

The incapacity of some states to exercise effective control and authority over their territories and populations has challenged the state sovereignty/non-intervention norm.[24] State sovereignty in such cases has become little more than a legal fiction for failed or quasi states. Indeed, failure to carry out the obligation of statehood can be considered a violation of the UN Charter's Article 4. The cases of Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia illustrate how the absence of a functioning government can result in violence and chronic disorder.[25] Under those conditions, innocent lives are at risk, human security is threatened, and individuals are forced to become refugees or internally displaced persons. Intervention by external agents, therefore, may be the only means of restoring some sense of order and stability and allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Within the international community, there was a growing consensus that sovereignty was not

[24] The state sovereignty/non-intervention norm begins from the premise that individual states are autonomous actors each with a private and depoliticized domain of action within which citizens may exercise their autonomy through their constitutional structures. Since the state is sovereign and not answerable to any higher power, matters that are within its domestic jurisdiction is not to be interfered with by outside agents. More importantly, that norm guards against the use of external military force to interfere with domestic politics that individual governments and their citizens make.

[25] See Jackson 1990; and Zartman 1995.

absolute but rather contingent on the basic norms of humanity.

Despite growing normative consensus pertaining to security and sovereignty, the controversy over Kosovo signaled that the consensus was not universally accepted. NATO's "humanitarian war" in March 1999 bypassed the Council and brought the long-standing controversy over humanitarian intervention to a head. The clash between what was considered necessary and legitimate and what was permissible under the UN Charter framework was highlighted. According to the *Independent International Commission on Kosovo* (2000)[26], although the military intervention led by NATO into Kosovo lacked formal legal authority in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate, the advocates of intervention claimed that the intervention was humanitarian and thereby had a moral legitimacy and reflected the rise of new international norms, not accounted for in the UN Charter. This raised questions about the legitimacy of military intervention in a sovereign state. If intervention in the internal affairs of a state for humanitarian reasons is considered an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, then how should the international community respond to situations like the ones in Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, East Timor, and Sierra Leone? The essence of the problem can be traced to the dilemma inherent in the perception that humanitarian intervention is irreconcilable with the norm of state sovereignty/non-intervention which provides structure, order and predictability in the international system. The events of the 1990s brought this dilemma to the operational context for the United Nations.

The failures to act in order to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the debacle in

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[26] The *Independent International Commission on Kosovo* was formed on the initiative of the Prime Minister of Sweden, Goran Persson, and endorsed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The Committee's Kosovo Report *inter alia*: 1) analyzed the relationship between international law and humanitarian intervention; and 2) suggested solutions for the future status of Kosovo.

Srebrenica in 1995, and the controversy surrounding the US-led NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999 are all exemplars of the political, practical, legal and theoretical problems of intervention (Bellamy and Williams 2005:57). At the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in 1999, the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, challenged the international community to forge consensus around the basic principles and processes involved in humanitarian intervention: "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systemic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity" (SG/SM/8125). The United Nations General Assembly failed to reach a consensus in 1999 on this emerging norm.[27] Many states, particularly southern countries, view sovereignty as their principle safeguard against incursions from the much more powerful north (Riddell-Dixon 2005:1074). In light of these divergent views, it was clear that the issue was not going to be resolved within the UN. Therefore, in a less politically charged environment, the Government of Canada, in September 2000, established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to address the difficult and complex issues involved in the humanitarian intervention debate.

The developments of the 1990s provided the crucial impetus for normative change. The challenges to the norm of state sovereignty/non-intervention can be seen as a type of norm contestation, with an emerging right to intervene norm clashing with an established norm. Such normative contestation reflects the reality that the international normative architecture is polymorphic rather than isomorphic (Knight 2001). Any

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[27] Confidential interview with Senior DFAIT official, April 4, 2007.

emerging norm must make the convincing case that it is congruent with the existing

normative structure and environmental conditions (Florini 1996:377-78). Policy makers

were faced with the need to develop knowledge and new ideas about how to deal with

civilian protection and security threats.

The Norm in Question: Responsibility to Protect

During the 1990s controversy raged between supporters of a right to intervene and

those who argued that state sovereignty prohibited interventions into the internal affairs

of states. The "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) concept aims at bridging that debate. The

ICISS began its work with an immediate background animated by inconsistency: failed

interventions, failures to intervene, and an instance of intervention conducted without UN

authorization. In face of these challenges, the three goals set for the ICISS were: (1) to

promote a comprehensive debate about humanitarian intervention; (2) to foster a new

political consensus on how to reconcile the principles of international and state

sovereignty; and (3) to translate that consensus into action (Welsh *et al.* 2002:490-491).

The ICISS held eleven regional roundtables and national consultations with the objective

of ensuring the Commission heard "the broadest possible range of views during the

course of its mandate" (Ibid.). The Commission was co-chaired by Gareth Evans, a

former foreign minister of Australia, and Mohamed Sahnoun, a senior Algerian diplomat

and former special advisor to the United Nations secretary general.[28] An international

research team also supported the Commission's work and a bibliography on intervention

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[28] The other commissioners came from diverse regional backgrounds and perspectives: Gisele Cote-Harper (Canada), Lee Hamilton (United Sates), Michael Ignatieff (Canada), Vladimir Lukin (Russia), Klaus Naumann (Germany), Cyril Ramaphoso (South Africa), Fidel V. Ramos (Philippines), Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland), Eduardo Stein Barillas (Guatemala), and Ramesh Thakur (India).

issues was compiled.[29] According to the ICISS, the broad consensus reached by this

process reflects "the shared views of all Commissioners as to what is politically

achievable in the world as we know it today" (viii). The Government of Canada released

the Commission's final report, entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*, on the December

18th, 2001.[30]

The R2P approach has had a genuine impact on the humanitarian intervention

debate. It introduces the language of responsibility. It makes a conceptual shift from

"sovereignty as authority" to "sovereignty as responsibility." In effect, R2P emphasizes a

normative fit rather than a normative clash. As the report of the ICISS (2001:8)

demonstrates: "The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does

not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own

people." It adds that "sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally – to respect the

sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the

people within the state" (Ibid.). Ultimately, the central normative principle of the ICISS

Report is that states must accept their primary obligation of sovereignty. This obligation

is the responsibility to protect the people within their borders. However, if the state fails,

the responsibility is transferred to the international community to intervene and protect

the citizens. Effectively articulated by Taylor (2005-2006:146), "the R2P imbued state

sovereignty with a legitimacy derived from a state's ability to provide human security."

The non-intervention principle cannot be an absolute shield against outside involvement

in matters of human rights abuses. Thus, the R2P framework for humanitarian

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[29] The bibliography is available online: ICISS,
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Supplementary%20Volume.%20Bibliography.pdf

[30] See ICISS news release entitled "Canada launches report of the international commission on intervention
and state sovereignty" (18 December 2002): ICISS, http://www.iciss.ca/press2-en.asp.

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intervention aims to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who could abuse them.

The R2P report is a significant modification of the traditional dilemma of state sovereignty. "It reformulates the problem and, by changing the formation of the dilemma, the Commission has made a significant advancement in international relations" (Warner 2003:154). It encapsulated a much-needed redefined balance between the contents of state sovereignty and the non-interference in the internal affairs of states: these concepts are two fundamental principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Thus, the ICISS Report has refocused the debate on humanitarian intervention from a preoccupation with state sovereignty to concerns for protecting civilians. "Humanitarian intervention" has given way to the language of responsibility to protect which explicitly embraces a non-state-centric human security lexicon. The R2P norm is fundamentally based on human protection. Not only is the R2P theoretically and morally appealing but it also encompasses attributes that match the characteristics of the problem the ICISS is trying to address. Such attributes increase the potential for the R2P norm to emerge and gain widespread acceptance.

The ICISS Report was a landmark in the evolution of the doctrine of R2P, designated to address the key political debates, legal issues and operative obstacles. ICISS tried to de-politicize the North-South argument and shift the focus from a "right to intervene" to a "responsibility to protect." It calls for re-evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those in need of support and underscores that the primary responsibility lies with the state in question. Furthermore, the R2P challenges policy-makers to not only reconsider the legitimate reasons for violating a state's sovereignty but also the mandate

and commitment of states to prevent genocide and mass human rights abuses and to help rebuild a country after conflict. This formulation indicates that the responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities – to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. Therefore, the R2P encompasses a continuum of responsibility from pre- to post-conflict situations with the use of force as a last resort option. The R2P effectively illustrates the range of possible options for intervention beginning with preventive strategies that are less intrusive and coercive than military intervention.

As a ground-breaking doctrine, the R2P document lays out the justification and criteria for humanitarian intervention. The R2P formulation of the principles governing the legitimate use of force follows the Just War tradition. In extreme circumstances, coercive peace enforcement would be considered legitimate in order to halt genocide and other massive violations of human rights. When extreme circumstances do provoke "the responsibility to *react*" militarily, the ICISS argues that six "threshold criteria" must be met to justify intervention: just cause, right intention, reasonable prospects, proportional means, right authority and last resort. Thus, the R2P report provides a rules-based framework for military action. However, this does not mean an automatic trigger for military intervention. Such interventions are to be used in rare occasions and after all other measures have been exhausted.

By getting past the polemics and the impasse in the intervention debate, the Commission sought to strengthen the prospect for obtaining action to save civilians, on a collective and principled basis (ICISS 2001:74). The ICISS attempted to identify the "right authority" for intervention. It argued that the UNSC "should be the first port of call on any matter relating to military intervention for human protection purposes. But the

question remains whether it should be the last" (ICISS 2001:53). Beyond suggesting that the P5 refrain from the use of the veto, the Commissioners warned that if the UNSC "fails to discharge its responsibility to protect… concerned states *may not rule out other means* to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation" (Ibid.: viii, emphasis added). A lack of UNSC authorization, therefore, could not be a bar to action in genuine crisis, as Ramesh Thakur (2003:175), one of the Commissioners, confirmed: "Nowhere did we find an absolute and uncompromising rejection of international under all circumstances. On balance, the desire to avoid another Rwanda was greater than to avoid another Kosovo."

The "fit" of new norms with existing ones facilitates norm emergence. The method employed by the ICISS was to revisit the traditional concepts of the discourse on intervention, reinterpret them, and then reinsert them into a newly forged discourse. The R2P doctrine builds on the formidable expansion of human rights law that has progressively come to prohibit and criminalize genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The progress of the R2P can be conceptualized as being parallel with the Genocide Convention: the R2P, to some extent, generalizes an obligation to act beyond the specific crimes of genocide, which makes it possible to argue that if crimes against humanity, widespread ethnic cleansing, or mass killing are going on, there is a requirement to act (Badescu 2007:4). The humanitarian debates of the 1990s did not work as no agreement was reached on the question of how to protect civilians in extreme humanitarian emergencies. The window created by the Genocide Conventions was too narrow; and, consequently the R2P became the necessary standard for action.

From the legal standpoint, the ICISS claimed that on the basis of international customary

law, human rights treaties, as well as growing state practice and the Council's resolutions on POC that R2P was an "emerging principle" of law. The R2P norm emerged at a propitious moment when changes in the international security environment began to support other compatible emerging norms. The ICISS report attempts to develop a normative fit between state sovereignty/non-intervention and the responsibility to protect by framing the new R2P idea as fitting within the existing normative structure.

In sum, the contribution of the R2P norm to international politics is that (1) it reconciles the needs and rights of the individual with the duties of the international community and the rights of the sovereign states, reinforcing human security as a priority; (2) it establishes a basis for accountability not only for the state's failures but also for those for those of the international community; and (3) it codifies the responsibility of the international community to prevent as well as to react to massive violations of human rights (Deller and Chatpar 2006). Both scholars and practitioners describe the R2P development in positive words, based on an assessment of the topic in historical terms. Indeed, the evolution of the "responsibility to protect" concept from an idea in the ICISS report to what might now be described as "an accepted emerging international norm, familiar enough to have its own acronym, is an extremely encouraging story" (Evans 2006). As will be demonstrated, the R2P has enjoyed broad endorsement from the international community. It is recognized as a normative breakthrough in international relations and has emerged as an important instrument for upholding and promoting human security.

Canada as a Norm Entrepreneur

Canada's identity as a middle-sized, neutral state in international relations has guided its foreign policy and contributed to its internationalist vision and strong support of multilateralism. As such, Canada possesses the norm entrepreneurial attributes that facilitate successful international norm promulgation. For Canada to become a norm entrepreneur could be viewed as a way to yield influence in international politics, in a time when soft power merits attention. Canada uses soft power to impose itself as a leader in the domain of international humanitarian law but also to remain a significant player on the multilateral scene (Knight 2001).

Canada emerged as an actor in international relations in earnest after the Second World War: "In planning for the postwar world, Canadian foreign policymakers put great emphasis on participation in international organizations... where a middle power could find a useful and effective role" (Fox 1996:5). Surrounded by Great Powers, such as Britain and the United States, Canada sought refuge in a rule-based structure where it could "dilute the otherwise overpowering influence these states exercised on Canada's foreign policy" (Fox 1996:5). International organizations and multilateralism could act as effective counterweights to these influences. In general, two fundamental principles of Canadian foreign policy have become paramount since the end of the Second World War: multilateralism and international engagement (Kirton 2007:293). Multilateralism provides a means for a medium power state to exert influence in global politics; and international engagement is seen as a vital part of national interest. Canadian foreign policy traditionally backs the role of international law and regime formation to deal with specific international policy issues.

Lacking requisite hard power, most countries are the image they project abroad. Their room to maneuver is affected by this image. As a middle power, Canada, dwarfed as it is in North America by the United States and with only limited ability to dominate the international arena through its military or economic might, must be aware of its image. It is an essential part of Canada's "strategic equity" (Peter van Ham 2001:3). Reputation, goodwill, and credibility are keys to wielding political influence. Thus, Canada's ability to influence other states depends increasingly on factors that transcend raw economic or military power. This is what scholarly observers in the early 1990s referred to as Canada's ability to demonstrate intellectual leadership and be a "good dancer" on the international policy stage (Cooper *et al.* 1993).

Canada could be perceived to have developed an identity as a norm entrepreneur, capitalizing on past experiences as a vocal supporter of international humanitarian law. Canada has long considered itself a state that abides by core principles of international law (Franceshet and Knight 2001). For Canada, adherence to international law is a public demonstration of good international citizenship. In Robert Greenhill's study of *External Views on Canada's International Impact* (2005:19), he found that "Canada's international personality is clear to others. Canada is seen as an internationally engaged country that supports a rules-based international system that constrains the ability of states to terrorize other states or their own citizens."[31] Canada is seen around the world as a country that has been exemplary in upholding international law and humanitarian

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[31] This report, funded by the Canadian International Council (formerly Canadian Institute for International Affairs), aimed to assess where Canada has made a significant difference since 1989 and to identify where Canada could make a difference in the future, by drawing upon the expertise and perspective of experienced practitioners and thinkers about international relations. Some 40 individuals from 20 countries were interviewed during the second half of 2004.

principles. This traditional position of Canada is widely accepted providing it with an image of a legitimate state that is both responsible and moral.

Canadian foreign policy has, over the years, been animated by concerns about what is right and good at the level of the international community. Canadian policies abroad contain strong elements of moral values and normative commitments. Canadian foreign policy tends to be embraced as policy by "do-gooders"; Dean Acheson once described Canada as the "stern daughter of the voice of God" (quoted by Robinson 2005). According to Tucker (1980:1), Canada embraces common values: "the enhancement of interests and values commonly shared with others outside of Canada, with a view to helping create a sustain a better world order." The projection of Canada's values abroad, the quintessential expression of diplomacy, has been promoted as the "third pillar" of Canada's foreign policy since a parliamentary review in 1995.[32] Prime Minster Harper summarizes Canada's core values as follows: "projecting our values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law" (Harper 2006). Canada's internationalist engagement is, therefore, congruent with Canada's values.

Canada is viewed as a source of engaged moral leadership. According to interviewees of the *External Views on Canada's International Impact*, "Canada has provided moral authority", "Canada is trusted" and "Canada exemplifies moral leadership... a reputation for ideas, an open mind, independence, capacity, and idealism" (2005:20). At its best, Canada is seen as being capable of first-rate initiatives that

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[32] Projecting Canada's values abroad has been a consistent feature in Canada's foreign policy since 1995. It originated as a third pillar in the government statement entitled *Canada in the World* during the Chrétien government's tenure and featured in Martin's *International Policy Statement*. Canada's core values of appeared in Stephen Harper's "Turning a New Leaf" *Speech to the Throne*. Furthermore, Harper acknowledged that "Canadian state visits play an important role in promoting Canada's interests and projecting a positive image of contemporary Canada and Canadian values" (Government of Canada, "Prime Minister Harper Announces State Visit of Governor General to Africa," 24 October 2006, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1376, accessed 12 March 2008).

combine morality with pragmatism. Canada is a world leader in promoting the development of international humanitarian norms. A strong image of Canadian diplomacy extending back to the post-World War era has been that of a go-between or helpful fixer, mediating either on an inter- or intra-bloc basis. The imperative has traditionally been to support, manage, and reproduce the rules of the game within the international system (Cooper *et al.* 1993:22-32). It has proposed more resolutions than any other state at the Commission on Human Rights and has been active in promoting the establishment of norms on a broad range of issues, including women's rights, children's rights, freedom of expression, impunity, indigenous peoples, and gender mainstreaming (Riddell-Dixon 2007:150). Canada has a reputation for creating international norms and facilitating international agreements. As such, Canada has gained the respect and confidence of many on the international arena.

Given its material limitations, Canada is well suited to make a difference in international normative change. Canada has extensive demographic links and an extraordinary set of international relationships (G8, Commonwealth, Francophonie Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation, Organization of American States, amongst others). Not only do they allow Canada to be present at the multiple sites of international negotiation, such as the UN world conferences, but they make it possible for Canadian representatives to play a comfortable insider role, blending routine activity with attention to particular issues (Cooper 2004:9). Due to Canada's strategic situation and historical role, Canada is a credible multilateralist state capable of effectively bridging the state system and civil society (Greenhill 2005:19). Canada is able to turn an issue of intersection in *ad hoc* groups of NGOs and international organizations into a more concrete element of

international politics. In effect, Canada links many of the states and groups whose participation is required for norm development. Furthermore, "Canada occupies a role as a donor state to international financial institutions, a core Western state, an active member of NATO and the G8, giving it considerable access to the corridors of power" (Howard and Neufeldt 2000: 15). Thus, Canadian foreign policy actions that promote the ideas behind a new norm have the capacity to generate the necessary support among critical actors. As a medium power state, Canada's extensive organizational platforms provide a means to exert influence in international politics.

Canada has a reputation for exercising skillful entrepreneurial leadership. Leadership in exercising soft power in support of foreign policy goals, particularly in the area of human security, and with a reputation as a coalition-builder has provided Canada with strong norm entrepreneur attributes. Canada appears to possess the mode of operation, and assortment of skills, most appropriate to take advantage of the post-Cold War period. The advent of the post-Cold War period has accelerated processes of globalization, changed power constellations and ignited a growing international commitment to common values. The 21st Century has added the September 11, 2001 assaults on the United States and the pervasiveness of global terrorism around the world. According to Cooper (2004:282), "given its much-used tool kit of skills and reputational attributes, Canada is well placed to take advantage of the premium the new world has placed on diplomatic flexibility and speed." The repertoire of Canada involves quick and responsive forms of diplomacy, a reliance on the selective mobilization of like-minded groupings, avoidance of being isolated, and an emphasis on problem-solving (Cooper 2004:9). This repertoire has increased Canada's channels for diplomatic interaction.

Unlike in the Cold War era, post-Cold War security concerns have forced Canadian foreign policy to tackle such transborder global problems as drug trafficking; terrorism; human rights abuses; child labour; and the trafficking, sale and abuse of women. These pursuits, in Canada's case, are propelled by soft-power. Lloyd Axworthy perceived soft power as a superior mode of power projection than "hard power" primarily based on military assets. He called upon Canada to make use of its soft power resources in order to pursue an internationalist agenda focused on human rights and the rule of law (1998). Joseph Nye, who coined the original term, voiced concerns that "soft power" had to be seen as a supplement to rather than a replacement of "hard power". From then onwards, human security provided a focal point for Canadian foreign policy to achieve some remarkable successes on the international stage.

Canada has historically worked with NGOs, international organizations and other small states to strengthen peace and advance humanitarian goals. It has long been considered a leader in mobilizing mid-size and smaller nations for human rights initiatives, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Treaty to Ban Landmines, and the Protocol on Child Soldiers (Welsh 2004:28). Thus, Canada understands the process of coalition building and using this alliance to build momentum for the acceptance of the norm among other, perhaps less-convinced, actors. Coalition building on issue-specific basis was Canada's forte. Persuasion as a form of soft power rather than traditional hard power continues to be Canada's tactic of choice.

On a day-to-day basis and leaving out the need to project hard power during crises such as in Kosovo and now in Afghanistan, the contemporary foreign policy agenda of a medium-sized power such as Canada runs in large part on soft power, which, in turn, is

exercised through the strategic use of diplomacy to forge coalitions with like-minded countries and build alliances with civil society. Canada has developed the skills of strategic diplomatic tactics and altered the existing international normative structure through the use of soft power. Canada's strategic use of its diplomatic assets enabled it to act as a knowledge broker and to influence others. By working in partnership with Canada's allies, "Canada has become a vital and respected member of the world community" (Arbour 2001:2). Canada has a voice and influence more substantial than its political and military might would suggest. Canada possesses the entrepreneurial skills necessary to change the structure of international politics and essentially to drive other states to embrace new normative standards. Canada is well positioned to advance the concept of the R2P.

Canada's Norm Entrepreneurial Role in the R2P Evolution

It is worth considering why the Canadian government should have taken such an active and prominent role in developing and promulgating the R2P norm from a constructivist perspective. The political and ideational environment of the 1990s played a decisive role in Canada's norm entrepreneurship. Bill Graham, former Canadian Foreign Minister, states that there are various factors that are motivating Canada's entrepreneurship on the R2P norm. However, Graham identifies the most decisive factors for Canada's involvement: Canada's interest in the human security agenda and the Kosovo campaign.[33]

Canada is recognized on the world stage as a pioneer of the human security agenda. Particularly, Lloyd Axworthy, who undertook the development and administration of the

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[33] Interview with Bill Graham, Member of Parliament for Toronto Centre and former Canadian Foreign Minister, on February 23, 2007.

ICISS as the then Canadian Foreign Minister, is recognized for his global leadership in promoting human security through "humanist activism and ground-breaking public diplomacy" (Lee 2000:1). He popularized a "new" approach in international politics that emphasized the importance of protecting individuals and communities from political violence.

The diplomatic culture of Canadian foreign policy has long incorporated an idealistic streak that cohabits with a dominant pragmatic, status-quo tradition (BLACK) There is a long tradition of impressive practitioners who have embraced what Cooper and Hayes (2000) term "mission-oriented diplomacy." In the 1990s, this tendency was given a robust political lead by Lloyd Axworthy and a compelling ideational rationale in the "human security agenda" that he championed. Axworthy (2000:19) has argued, in and out of office, for the need to expand the notion of security "beyond the level of the state and toward individual human beings." Although human security declined conceptually as soon as Lloyd Axworthy left Ottawa in 2000, its agenda did not entirely lose momentum. As a normative concept it has continued to inform a number of Canadian foreign policy domains and is still well-entrenched in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. The human security agenda has been criticized on the grounds that it is merely "ear candy" (see, for example, Nossal 2005). However, it has gained political popularity and has provided a robust justification for an activist foreign policy on a range of normative campaigns. This has given Canada a reputation for leadership in mobilizing nations for human rights initiatives, including the International Criminal Court, the Treaty Ban Land Mines, and the Protocol on Child Soldiers.

The human security agenda that is embedded within Canadian foreign policy seeks

to reconstruct the international system. Mission-oriented diplomacy focuses Canadian foreign policy initiatives on a few select issues that can make an appreciable difference to the benefit of both Canada's national interest and international society as a whole. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has selected issues of human security and peacebuilding as focal points for these foreign policy initiatives.[34] As a result, DFAIT is an active promoter of ideas that promote human protection. Axworthy has articulated the utility of the human security agenda as an ideational alternative for the international system: "it is an effort to construct a global society in which the safety and well-being of the individual is an international priority and a motivating force for international action" (quoted by Howard and Neufeldt 2000:13). Axwothy has initiated a policy of norm creation through which Canada actively promotes, legitimizes and diffuses international norms. According to Howard and Neufeldt (2000:15), "Axworthy focuses on issues of human security, continuing the tradition of constructing rule-based international structures, and maximizing Canada's ability to influence international politics beyond its material capability." This ideational environment was propitious for the Canadian instigation of the ICISS as a direct response to Kofi Annan's challenge to the world governments.

A critical enabling factor behind the norm entrepreneurship of the Canadian government was the Canadian experience with Kosovo. In the wake of the intervention in Kosovo, and the failure to intervene in Rwanda, Axworthy (2003:186) concluded that military intervention can be a necessity: the "ultimate test for a human security policy was a willingness to exercise military force to uphold the principles of protection."

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[34] Confidential interview with Senior DFAIT official, April 4, 2007.

Thus, "Kosovo proved an opportunity to substantially advance the credibility of the concept of human security" (Ibid:183). NATO's air campaign served to dispel the misconception that military force and the human security agenda are mutually exclusive. Rejecting the absolute sanctity of state sovereignty, intervention could be justified as a means for human protection. As Axworthy (Ibid.), who says he initially "anguished over" the idea, explains, "you can't allow dictators to use the façade of national sovereignty to justify ethnic cleansing." There was clear evidence of mass killings in Kosovo but the UNSC was paralyzed because Russia was going to veto. As a result, NATO was engaged to conduct the intervention. Axworthy (2005) revealed in a speech that "I didn't like the fact there were no rules. The decision was *ad hoc*. It bypassed the UN, so there wasn't a collective judgement." Frustrated with the Kosovo campaign, Axworthy (2003:191) believed that "the issue of intervention needed to be addressed so that next time there would be a road map to follow." Norm advocacy requires norm entrepreneurs who may be dissatisfied with an existing state of affairs and who feel strong enough about it to introduce an alternative way of behaving or a new standard of conduct. Canada fit this profile. Since Axworthy (2003:157) thought that humanitarian protection superceded national sovereignty, he held discussions during his tenure with the UN Secretary-General, "who expressed strong concerns on the intervention issue." It was from the Kosovo campaign and Canada's commitment to human security that a sense of Canadian "ownership" of the R2P principle mainfested and was sustained through persistent diplomatic advocacy.

Setting the Agenda

Establishing the ICISS bore the hallmarks of the Axworthy era: creative "initiativemanship" on high profile ethical issues. The ICISS was announced at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000 by Canada's prime minister, Jean Chretien, and received funding, thought leadership, and organizational support from the Canadian government.[35] Successful norm entrepreneurs commit resources for norm development. Such resources include "time and efforts of workers, money, diplomatic reach and presence and/or the provision of space and logistics for meetings" (Howard and Newfeldt 2000:15). The Canadian government explicitly took on the task of norm development at the outset and established the ICISS and committed significant resources. The norm could be fostered in a supportive environment established by a committed norm entrepreneur. Canada played a significant role as a catalyst and facilitator in order to generate political energy around a particular issue.

The initiatives that led to the ICISS and the report itself embody the Canadian government's efforts to influence normative developments in international society. Canada played an active role in advancing the POC agenda even before its sponsorship of the ICISS (Holt and Berkman 2006:23). Its entrepreneurial efforts in this context are noteworthy, especially since the promotion of the R2P concept builds on these. Canada pursued two-track diplomacy on the POC. The first was through the Security Council, during Canada's non-permanent membership in the Council in the years 1999 and 2000. Effective Canadian initiatives at the Security Council influenced the adoption of two UN resolutions on the need to protect civilians, namely Security Council Resolution 1265 and 1296 (Badescu 2007:9). Canada was influential in introducing concerns about the safety

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[35] Other funders included the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Simons Foundation.

of civilian population, and human rights law and international humanitarian law into discussions at the Security Council level. The second main track on the POC – directly related to the future agenda on promoting the R2P – referred to defining the terminology and to finding a way to bring the diametrically opposed concepts of sovereignty and humanitarian imperatives closer together (Badescu 2007). It is in this context that Canada decided to launch the ICISS. With the basic structure already in place, the R2P could build on earlier projects on human security which were gradually "[recalibrating public policy for the protection of individuals" (Axworthy 2005:42). The creation of the ICISS had the effect of drawing attention to the particular issue of humanitarian intervention and human security in general.

The Canadian government provided the space necessary for the issue-framing process that could occur via communicative interaction. "Canada played a central role in selecting the commissioners and in providing an organizational home for the commission at Canada's foreign affairs headquarters in Ottawa" (Chueng-Gertler 2007:595). Axworthy realized early on that the commission's effectiveness would require an unprecedented amount of global discussion, documentation, and analysis. "The work on landmines was seen as a kind of bible for these efforts, but the commission would have to far exceed it – we had to go to the very heart of issues of state sovereignty" (Axworthy 2005: 157). Given the supposedly wide disparity of views across the North-South divide, the commission was co-chaired by two highly experienced statesmen, Garth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, and Mohammad Sahnoun, former Algerian Ambassador to the US and the UN. The twelve member commission consisted of "weighty and respected figures" from five continents, and from many different

intellectual backgrounds (Roberts 2003:143). In addition to Evans, the "North" included

Lee Hamilton (USA), Michael Ignatieff (Canada), Klaus Naumann (Germany), Cornelio

Sommaruga (Switzerland), and Gisele Cote-Harper (Canada). In addition to Sahnoun, the

"South" included Ramesh Thakur (India), Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa), Fidel Ramos

(Philippines), and Eduardo Stein (Guatemala). Russia's Vladimir Lukin completed the

group.[36] The diversity of the composition of the ICISS was a source of strength, enabling

the commissioners to identify possible dimensions of an international consensus.

Furthermore, Canada understood that a "network of academic, policymaker and scholarly

linkages can build a network of comprehension and knowledge to build alliances of the

like-minded in Canada and abroad. This is the essence of soft power..." (Stephens

1999:8).

The ICISS, initiated by Canada, provided a forum for consensus building around

issue of humanitarian intervention. The commission held roundtable discussions with

more that 200 people from governments, inter-governmental and nongovernmental

institutions, and academia and research from all around the world (ICISS 2001, xi).

According to Thomas Weiss (2007:99), "Ottawa ensured that the topic and the work of

the commissioners were not relegated to coffee tables and bookshelves." Ten

consultations were held in both the Southern and Northern hemispheres to expose the

views of governments, scholars, NGOs and journalists. Ramesh Thakur (2004), the senior

vice-rector for the UN University's and Governance Program and a commissioner of the

ICISS, stated that "these worldwide and genuine consultations were crucial features to

reaching common ground." The consultations were intended to take the issue beyond the

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[36] For an insider's account and advocacy by a commissioner, see Thakur, *United Nations, Peace and Security*, especially Chapter 1.

confines of Western Liberal internationalism and to ensure a broader consensus on the commission's findings (Welsh *et al.* 2002:491). The composition and working methods of the ICISS made it likely that the result would be an effective contribution to international politics.

Conceptually strong links exist between the human security and the norm of R2P. Axworthy (2005) claimed that "the notion of human security has morphed into a new concept called responsibility to protect". Human security provides an important lens through which the evolution of humanitarian norms regarding the safety and security of the individual can be promoted. A great deal of the Commission's language and concepts reflect the human security agenda that was so prominent a part of Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1990s. Consequently, the Commission's findings fit with the ideas and values of Canada. Thomas Weiss (2005:22), the head of the research team for the ICISS, claimed "the new twist for independent commissions of this type was the behind-the-scenes role of a sympathetic government, Canada - a model subsequently replicated for the Human Security Commission, with Japan in the lead." By offering to sponsor the ICISS, Canada thrust itself into a leadership role on the issue of intervention for human protection. "As the primary sponsor of the ICISS, Canada was credited with engineering a new formula for human security" (Cheung-Gertier 2007:595). It was an example of entrepreneurial leadership that led to a process by which the R2P emerged onto the international agenda through consultations and open dialogue. It created the necessary attention to the issue of humanitarian intervention in order to gain a broad consensus for the R2P's normative principles.

Conclusion

This empirical chapter on norm emergence offers an understanding of how ideas are translated into norm candidates by norm entrepreneurs. Canada played a key role in the emergence stage of the R2P norm. It contributed to the shaping of the agenda by bringing a particular issue to the forefront and being instrumental in providing an arena to address international security concerns. Canada recognized a window of opportunity to put the issue of human security at the top of the global agenda. By establishing the ICISS, Canada had the opportunity to reinvigorate the idea of protection of civilians and to introduce it in the intervention debate. Canada signaled its commitment to developing a new norm that would reconcile the normative clash between the right to intervene and state sovereignty/non-intervention.

It was possible to match the R2P concept to Canada's foreign policy identity. The sponsoring of the ICISS, which, in turn, produced the R2P norm candidate, could be listed as one of the most significant human security initiatives of the Canadian government. The R2P agenda appears to be a logical step in a foreign policy process that aims at fostering international norms. The norm candidate emergence was possible, not only because the idea matched the internationalist Canadian foreign policy vision, but also because it was perceived as fitting with the existing normative structure. To some extent, the norm was regarded as revitalizing the POC idea to address the new and urgent international problem of humanitarian intervention. The ICISS provided a crucial arena for communicative interaction to occur between state and non-state actors. Strategically, Canada ensured that the norm candidate reflected universal terms to resonate with a global audience.

Norm Diffusion

International norm diffusion is an interactive and dynamic process involving the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers that may shape and reshape the norm. This stage highlights the means by which norm candidates are circulated. The major formal component of this activity hinges on diplomatic mechanisms. Diplomacy provides the transmission belt from which norm candidates are diffused within the international system. The norm entrepreneur has a good sense of how support for a norm can be generated both informally and formally. This stage of norm development relies on the norm entrepreneur's ability to employ diplomatic tactics, under the rubric of persuasion, to ensure the survival of the norm.

Exemplifying exceptional norm entrepreneurship, Canada answered Kofi Annan's calls to member states for a compromise on humanitarian intervention in the first place, took the initiative to sponsor the ICISS, and further along lobbied for advancing the R2P principles. According to Howard and Neufeldt (2000:15), "Canada actively promotes emerging international norms, seeking to tip these norms into a cascade – acting as a tipping agent." In the case of the R2P norm, Canada played a decisive role in the creation of the R2P norm and acted as a catalyst to bring about a tipping point through its foreign policy practices. Norm diffusion was achieved through Canada's strategy of multi-level diplomacy that broadened the base of support for the R2P and promoted a mainstreaming of its normative language within the international system. Canada utilized transnational advocacy and high-profile endorsements as persuasive mechanisms to ensure norm diffusion.

From December 2001, when the ICISS released its R2P report, to September 2005, Canada actively promoted the R2P. A diplomatic success occurred when the principle of R2P was captured in the final report of the UN's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. Furthermore, during the September 2005 session on UN reform, the world's heads of states accepted the central idea of R2P in the UN *World Summit Outcome Document*. It was then reaffirmed by the Security Council in its resolutions on the POC in armed conflict. Thus, the norm of R2P has been articulated and at least formally endorsed. As discussed in Chapter 3, the R2P presents a fundamental challenge to structural imperatives that have long shaped international law and politics. Given the history of debates around humanitarian interventions, and the possible implications of the R2P concept for sovereignty/non-intervention, "its inclusion in the Summit Document is astonishing" (Brunnee and Toope 2005:122). The international endorsement of the R2P is a symbolic victory- one that vindicated Canadian efforts during a five-year period at championing the R2P norm candidate; and illustrated that Canada, a medium-sized state lacking traditional power capabilities, can indeed have a meaningful and principled influence in international politics.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the context in which the diffusion phase of the R2P norm development took place. It then highlights Canada's multi-track diplomacy at the national, regional and international level with a discussion of high-profile endorsements in promulgating the R2P norm candidate. The chapter concludes with an overview of Canada's norm entrepreneurship impact of the diffusion process.

Setting the Stage for Norm Diffusion

Following norm emergence, a new norm candidate is portrayed by the norm entrepreneur as both attractive and necessary for the international community. The Canadian government promptly acknowledged and supported the R2P as a new political, legal and operative principle upon the release of the R2P report. However, the ease at which norm candidates are diffused at the international level is often contingent on the political environment in which it is introduced. According to Thakur *et al.* (2005:12), "the immediate policy impact of ideas flowing from international commissions could fall flat due to poor timing of the initial release."[37] This fragility in terms of the receptive conditions and fortunes of the norm candidate implies that norm advocacy is a significant factor in ensuring the successful diffusion of new norms.

In the case of the R2P, the circumstances in December 2001, when the R2P report was released, were not the most conducive to consensus building about the subject of international intervention to protect human rights. A major contextual danger was the challenge posed by the events of 11 September 2001. The world's attention was captured by the attacks on New York and Washington. Undoubtedly, these events and their aftermath affected the pace of the response to the ICISS findings (Welsh *et al.* 2002:509). By late 2001, the "war on terror" was launched and human rights risked being relegated to the second division which hard security occupied the first. "The reassertion of a hard security agenda in this post-post Cold War era significantly challenged to the survival of the R2P norm candidate" (Ibid.). Indeed, in the forward to the report, the Commission was forced to distinguish the kind of military action it was analyzing (military action in

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[37] For example, the immediate policy impact of the 1980 Brandt Report, with its notion of a grand social pact between North and South, was impeded by a hostile political environment defined by the end of détente and ascendancy of the new vigorous wave of neo-conservatism (Takur *et al.* 2005:12).

another state for human protection purposes) from the war in Afghanistan (an act of self-defence designed to respond to terrorist attacks in one's own state). Military action in Afghanistan was based on self-defence and approved by the Security Council. However, "the blanket authorization for Afghanistan can now be seen as a prelude to the Bush administration's determination to take on Iraq with or without Security Council approval" (Weiss 2007:123). In 2003, the Iraq war was launched without council approval. In effect, consensus building around R2P must be seen in this context.

With wars in Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq (March 2003), few governments were willing to discuss military intervention. Specifically, the US-led war against Iraq significantly affected the overall perception of the concept. The inapplicability of the R2P concept to Iraq is evident (see, for example, Takur 2004; Hoffman and Weiss 2006; Weiss 2007). A rigorous application of R2P criteria refutes any attempt to justify the invasion of Iraq on humanitarian grounds. However, as Thakur (2006:262) suggests "ill-considered rhetoric of pre-emptive strikes and [using] Iraq as an example of humanitarian intervention risk draining support from R2P rather than adding to the legitimacy of such enterprises." Others have assessed that the inconsistently argued humanitarian justification for the war in Iraq "almost choked at birth" an emerging norm justifying intervention on the bases of the principle of R2P (Evans 2006). The use of humanitarian arguments by the US and UK also reinforced suspicions on the part of developing states that a norm of humanitarian intervention would be used by the strong states against the weak ones (see, for example, Chandler 2002; Ayoob 2004; Wheeler 2005).

While the new counterterrorism agenda reduced the North's political willingness and military capacity to conduct humanitarian missions, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq produced a "new hostility" in the global South to embrace the R2P norm candidate (Roberts 2006; Weiss 2004:143; Weiss 2007:129). Canada sought to embed the R2P norm candidate at the UN and regional level to ensure a timely reaction by the UNSC and regional organizations to emerging conflicts and to develop principles within the UNGA on state responsibility and the use of force. However, the UNSC was not interested in taking up the subject of R2P, while the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) blocked Canada's procedural resolution on R2P at the UNGA in late 2002 (Weiss 2007:128). Furthermore, countries that earlier would have supported the R2P concept subsequently became reluctant or hostile toward unilateral humanitarian intervention outside Security Council decision making. At a 2003 Progressive Governance Summit of left-of-centre government leaders, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and British Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to quote the basic principles R2P in the draft communiqué and to urge a continued discussion at the United Nations. However, Argentina, Chile, and Germany strongly objected and a supportive passage was removed (Bellamy 2005:32). Ultimately, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, it was "hard to see what contemporary interests would impel states to go beyond their many existing human rights commitments by openly accepting R2P" (Roberts 2003). Yet, an intervening factor significantly improved consensus building around the R2P norm candidate: Canada's norm entrepreneurship employing diplomatic tactics of transnational advocacy and high-profile endorsements.

Canada's Norm Entrepreneurship: "Tipping" the R2P

Since ICISS issued its report, Canada has acted as a norm entrepreneur in an effort to build consensus around the R2P norm candidate. Riddell-Dixon (2005:1069) identifies Canada as the "the world's principle proponent of the responsibility to protect." There were two main aspects to Canada's plans with regard to the ICISS Report. The first was operational, focusing in particular on having the Security Council refer to the key aspects of the Report in its work, as well as other documents and resolutions that commit UN member states to respond to emerging crises. The second objective of the Canadian government emphasized the normative development, in particular the concept that sovereign nations have responsibilities including the "responsibility to protect." The ultimate goal of these efforts was deeper engagement by the Security Council and by sovereign states in response to situations that meet the threshold criteria in the ICISS Report (Axworthy 2003:197). Canada initiated several foreign policy actions to promote the norm candidate. After the initial failure at the UNGA, Canada changed its tactics: it approached likeminded states, regional groups, and civil society, while the then Prime Minister, Paul Martin, significantly increased the international advocacy of R2P. To achieve diffusion, norm entrepreneurs must convince international, regional and national institutions and actors to embrace the norm. To this end, Canada engaged in concerted transnational advocacy. Canada has done more than any other country to generate support for the R2P among UN officials, foreign governments, and the NGO community, both within Canada and abroad.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

The National Process

The Government of Canada sought to ensure that the R2P gained traction at the national level. Canada had to establish full support within its own political system in order to solidify the normative understanding of R2P through awareness raising and research initiatives with the objective of helping to propel Canada as an international leader on the R2P. The R2P became embedded within Canadian foreign policy and, thus, had a high level of visibility within the Canadian government. As indicated in Canada's 2005 *International Policy Statement- A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, the government employs "focused diplomatic and civil society outreach and advocacy as well as policy-relevant research concentrated on: the promotion of and strengthening of Responsibility to Protect norm" (DFAIT 2005). As diplomats rotated and politicians moved in and out of office, the need for education on the R2P was ongoing.[38] The commitment to the R2P became embodied within Canadian foreign policy. In fact, the R2P officially became a priority area of the Canadian government: "the R2P is a key component of Canada's human security agenda" (DFAIT 2007). Canadian officials regularly employed the language of R2P to promote its normative principles at all levels of diplomatic engagement. Further, Canadian embassies abroad conducted briefings on the responsibility to protect (Riddell-Dixon 2005:1075). According to David Malone, "DFAIT officials engaged in an extensive range of consultations that included other

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[38] Confidential Interview with DFAIT Official, 17 April 2007.

countries, the UN, regional organizations and NGOs" (interview, 2007).[39] At these

meetings, Canadian officials regularly promoted the responsibility to protect and

advocated the adoption of its recommendations. Such strategies allowed Canada to

identify like-minded actors that could assist in the norm promoting activities.

Furthermore, the information gathered and disseminated by DFAIT officials was crucial

to the development of international norms.

The Intergovernmental Process

The Canadian government consistently ensured that the R2P maintained a

prominent position on the international agenda. Canadian officials played a leading role

in the intergovernmental process on this issue (Evans, interview, 2007).[40] The ICISS

Report was introduced as a UN document, resulting in its distribution to all UN Members

States. It was also placed on the formal agenda of the UN General Assembly. In May

2002 the Security Council held a retreat, during which a session was held on *The*

Responsibility to Protect. Kofi Annan is a strong supporter of the report and he regularly

incorporates its language into speeches. In the fall of 2002, Canada's Permanent

Representative to the UN, Paul Heinbecker, held consultations on a technical resolution

to ensure that the report is given further consideration by the member sates and that the

Secretariat facilitates this consideration. From the consultations, it was evident that even

such a modest resolution would face resistance from some southern countries, which

argues that the issues raised in the report require further discussion. As a result, Canada

intended to engage in a long process of deliberation before moving to formalize any

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[39] Interviews with David Malone, High Commissioner of Canada to India and President of the International Peace Academy, 12 April 2007 and 17 July 2007.
[40] Interview with Gareth Evans, Former Foreign Minister of Australia, co-chair of ICISS and currently the Director of International Crisis Group, 13 October 2007.

aspect of the R2P. Canada organized events in New York to facilitate further discussions before officially tabling a resolution on R2P. For example, on 7 April 2003, Canada and Rwanda co-hosted a symposium at the UN in New York to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, which was attended by 60 UN member states (Riddell-Dixon 2005:1074). The symposium offered a fertile opportunity for Canada to promote the R2P norm and engage in traditional state-to-state diplomacy.

Given resistance to humanitarian intervention discussions within the UNGA, Canada engaged in diplomatic efforts that involved regional negotiations, bilateral meetings, and holding conferences outside of the UN system as a means to gather support for the R2P norm. Canada worked to engage parliamentarians through international networks such as Parliamentarians for Global Action. As part of a broader-based strategy of greater global consensus on the R2P, Canada provided support for a November 2002 conference of international parliamentarians to explore the specific role of elected officials in promoting the R2P (DFAIT 2002:7). Some 100 parliamentarians from around the world attended this gathering to discuss ways of codifying R2P principles. In addition to such efforts, at the Sea Island G8 Summit in the summer of 2004, Canada worked to add Darfur, as a case requiring the application of R2P, to the agenda and have the G8 issue a warning to the government of Sudan (Kirton 2007:193). Furthermore, Canada pushed the R2P doctrine at the Francophone summit in Burkino Faso in November 2004. Its communiqué endorsed the idea that the UN needed to reform to improve the protection of human rights. Additionally, Canada used its position within the "Group of Friends for UN Reform," to draft and negotiate a cross-regional paper on R2P (DFAIT

2005).[41] This report called for R2P guidelines to be adopted by the UN (Group of Friends 2005). Canada strategically used its organizational platform to build broad consensus in order to persuade the UN to accept the R2P norm candidate.

By encouraging deliberation at the UN and through bilateral consultations on the R2P norm candidate, the Canadian government was able to identify likeminded states. The pro-R2P governments are easily identified by their outspoken advocacy of the norm in international forums, such as the UNGA. Furthermore, Canada secured support for the R2P norm amongst the member states belonging to the informal Human Security Network (HSN).[42] Their cooperation was facilitated by years of joint efforts to construct other governance regimes, like the ICC, the Kimberly Process, and the Kyoto Protocol. At the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the HSN held in May 2004, HSN reaffirmed "its commitment to raise and promote the debate at the international level on the Report of the ICISS entitled *Responsibility to Protect*" (HSN 2004). Additionally, this meeting transferred formal chairmanship from Mali to Canada for the period of one year. Canada identified emerging security issues such as the R2P as a priority for its leadership (Government of Canada 2004). R2P was a priority for Canada, and the Network representing an influential organizational platform of likeminded states played an important role in its promotion. Addressing the UN in Canada's capacity as the chair of

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[41] In April 2004, the President of Mexico invited his counterparts of Germany, Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Spain, Japan, Kenya, New Zealand, Netherlands, Pakistan, Singapore and Sweden, to form a group of countries that would promote an integral reform of the United Nations. This group of 15 governments holds common positions on UN Reform which are set out in 14 short reports (R2P report being one of them). http://www.un.int/mexico/index_reform.htm (accessed 12 November 2007).

[42] HSN was formed in 1998, at the initiative of Norway and Canada, for the purpose of acting in collaboration to resolve issues directly affecting human security. Network members include: Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (observer), Switzerland, and Thailand. The group convenes once a year at the level of foreign ministers, and the ministers meet every year during the Session of the UNGA (HSN). http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php (accessed 23 April 2008).

the HSN, Senator Mobina Jaffar incorporated the R2P concept in a UN Security Council open debate on women, peace and security (HSN 2004). By occupying the formal position of HSN Chair the Canadian norm entrepreneurial activities were provided with improved opportunities.

The Regional Process

Regional organizations were targeted by the Government of Canada to build consensus around the R2P norm candidate. Regional groups were necessary to sustain the R2P beyond the ICISS Report. These organizations provide a forum for norm advocacy. They allow the norm entrepreneur to build alliances that can be used to influence governments. By using non-coercive strategies, persuasion may contribute to the willingness of potential norm followers to consider the proposed norm candidate and reflect upon it in relation to their own normative convictions. Fitting the normative convictions of the norm followers to the norm and forming international public opinion in support of it was essential to Canada's norm entrepreneurship activities. Regional organizations provided the avenue to persuade others of the universalistic characteristics inherent in the R2P norm candidate.

Canada raised the issue of the R2P within regional organizations and facilitated consensus building at the regional level. For example, at the March 2004 Canada-EU summit Canada actively promoted the R2P norm candidate and was successful in having a R2P reference in the summit declaration (Riddell-Dixon 2005:1074). Such norm advocacy displayed by Canada was essential for getting the R2P norm noticed. Furthermore, the Canadian government "committed outreach funds to support

conferences, symposia and workshops at the regional level (Africa, Asia, Latin America) to raise awareness about R2P" (DFAIT Official, interview, 2007).[43]

According to DFAIT officials, Canada recognized the need to engage countries that were most likely to experience humanitarian crisis in order to gain international acceptance for the R2P principles. Canada worked closely with the African Union (AU) to identify concerns and common responsibilities during and after the ICISS. The AU provided a likeminded ally for Canada to promote the R2P. The AU was considerably further ahead than the UN in embracing the normative principles of the R2P. The AU charter had more permissive language: the AU Founding Act establishes "the rights of the Union to intervene in Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (2002:Art. 4). This principle worked in favour of advancing the R2P at the normative level.

Considerable cross-regional support for the norm strengthened the position of those promoting the R2P on the world stage. In 2004, Mali held a regional forum on this theme, organized by Project Ploughshares, Africa Peace Forum, and the Malian government, with financial support of the Canadian government (HSN). In addition, Canada supported a year-long project (September 2003 to 2004) on building consensus in East and West Africa on the R2P through its Human Security Fund. Taking the R2P as a starting point, "the project aimed to stimulate reflection on and interpretation of the R2P in a regional context by the most relevant local actors; and build a broader international base of support for both the values and norms embodied in the R2P " (Project

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[43] Also expressed by Bill Graham in an interview.

Ploughshares 2004:2).[44] Briefing sessions with the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa were undertaken to report on the results of the consultations and encourage attention to the issue in the context of the new security responsibilities of the AU (Ibid.). Canada actively sought to facilitate events that would allow the exchange of information within regions among those seeking to develop common messages and strategies. These events were also instrumental in bringing together government officials, academia and civil society representatives.

The Civil Society Process

While Canada's efforts included close coloration with likeminded governments, Canadian foreign policy also aimed at promoting R2P among civil society groups, including NGOs. Recognizing that only states can hold diplomatic conferences and draft treaties for consideration of other states, Canada strategically aimed at persuading civil society to embrace the R2P norm candidate. Canada's goal was to convince other countries to support the R2P norm candidate. However, disappointed by resistance and slow paced deliberations within the UNGA, Canada employed more discrete diplomatic actions to complement the traditional state-to-state diplomacy in order to champion the R2P norm and generate critical international public support. This was the maximum attainable in the post 9/11 environment where the R2P consensus seemed week and limited (Banda 2007). As indicated by the ICISS Report, "NGOs have a crucial and ever increasing role... in contributing information, arguments, and energy to influencing the decision-making process, addressing themselves both directly to policymakers and indirectly to those who, in turn, influence them." (ICISS 2001:71). By directly soliciting

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[44] Also see DFAIT Human Security Fund, "Responsibility to Protect", http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/cip-pic/responsibilitytoprotect-en.aspx (accessed 12 January 2008).

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the collaboration of NGOs, which are more likely to share and support Canada's

humanist objectives, Canada could convince other states through public pressure to

embrace the R2P norm.[45]

The Canadian government's strategy was to be directed towards attracting civil

society to promote the R2P. In the view of the Government of Canada, "as governments

begin to look at the concepts of the ICISS Report, civil society has a critical role to play

in helping to determine whether and how to carry specific ideas forward" (WFM 2003).

Civil society involvement in the evolution of norms that will move the international

community beyond their reservations about "humanitarian intervention" would be critical

in framing the debate (Ibid.). Thus, the Canadian government funded civil society

roundtable discussions all over the world, each year, beginning with 2001 (Axworthy

2003:192).

Canada allied itself with NGOs engaged in ensuring greater protection for

civilians. Canada encouraged the establishment of NGO networks similar to those that

existed for the landmines campaign. As part of the effort to involve civil society

organizations in the process of promoting the R2P concept, the Government of Canada

held a roundtable meeting with NGOs to discuss the future of the ICISS Report. Having

received an affirmation that NGOs are likely to be interested in promoting the R2P

concept, Canada approached World Federalist Movement (WFM) to become actively

involved in reaching out to NGOs and other civil society actors in the next phase of norm

diffusion (R2PCS 2007).[46] Foreign Affairs Canada sponsored WFM which established

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[45] Kathryn Sikkink (1998) provides an insightful analysis of this dynamic.

[46] R2P-CS is working with civil society partners "to deepen the debate, promote international norms and monitor the responses of governments, the Security Council and other international bodies." The project

the Responsibility to Protect-Engaging Civil Society Project (R2P-CS) with the express

purpose of promoting the R2P. Canada also supported the Canadian NGO, Project

Ploughshares, whose work included developing a series of consultations in Africa on the

R2P (DFAIT 2003).[47] Canada recognized that effective advocacy for the R2P norm

required cultivating support from civil society. Canada facilitated strategic cooperation

for advocacy within the NGO community on building consensus on the R2P norm

candidate.

High Profile Endorsement

Notable examples of norm entrepreurship were the diplomatic skills of Canadian

officials. High profile endorsement of an international norm is particularly important for

building international consensus. These figures provide additional credibility and stature

to the R2P norm on the international stage. Canadian prime ministers and ministers of

foreign affairs promoted the R2P report at the UN and in multilateral and bilateral

settings. According to Peter and Neufeldt (2000:37), "formal diplomatic correspondences

by high-level Canadian officials are difficult to ignore." After the release of the R2P

report in 2001, Prime Minster Chrétien highlighted the ICISS report and its

recommendations in his General Assembly address, and both he and the then Foreign

Minister Graham raised the issues highlighted in it with many of their counterparts

(Graham, interview, 2007). Moreover, Prime Minster Martin significantly stepped up the

international advocacy of R2P and explicitly stated it as a Canadian policy (Riddell-

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has received financial support from the Canadian and UK governments, as well as the MacArthur
Foundation. See www.responsibilitytoprotect.ca.
[47] Also see, Riddell-Dixon 2005; DFAIT 2007.

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Dixon 2005). [48] Martin articulated the need to embrace the R2P normative principles to

the United Nations on September 22, 2004:

> there is still no explicit provision in international law for intervention on
> humanitarian grounds. The "Responsibility to Protect" is intended to fill
> this gap... The responsibility to protect is not a license for intervention;
> it is an international guarantor of political accountability. [49]

Reportedly, Paul Martin raised the R2P concept with US President George Bush in

November 2004 (Wheeler *et al.* 2006:64). From the start of his time as prime minister,

Martin was a forceful developer of the evolving R2P norm using his position as leader of

Canada to promote the norm within organizational forums at the international level.

Rhetorical commitments to the normative principles of the R2P provided it with

international visibility. Romeo Dallaire and Lloyd Axworthy played a key role promoting

the R2P in Canada (as well as abroad) and, thus, sought to create R2P recognition with

the domestic populace. Public endorsements by politicians and well-known public figures

with a clear commitment to the norm, such as Dallaire and Axworthy, attract public

interest and media attention. Dallaire has engaged in a passionate campaign against

international indifference, particularly towards the suffering of "conflict-affected"

Africans, and for the R2P (See, for example, Dallaire 2003). In front of an audience of

100 at the University of Winnipeg, Axworthy commented: "nothing can be more

powerful than a new idea to change the world... the R2P is Canada's great new idea"

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[48] This point was also stressed in interviews with Canadian diplomats involved in the promotion of the R2P.
[49] DFAIT links to Paul Martin's address direct to the webpage of the current Prime Minister Harper. However, the Paul Martin's address at the United Nations on September 22, 2004 in New York and his address on the occasion of his visit to Washington, D.C. on April 29, 2004 in Washington where he also promoted the R2P are available at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/government_statements/207. (R2P-CS).

(quoted by Baumel 2005). High profile endorsements and skillful Canadian diplomats were instrumental in the diffusion phase of the R2P.

Impacts of Canada's Norm Entrepreneurship

Canada was committed to promoting follow-up efforts based on the R2P after the release of the ICISS Report at the national, international and regional level within the UN and civil society. These parallel processes enriched the knowledge base and increased the momentum of the R2P norm up-take. By making the R2P an issue of diplomatic priority, Canada raised the issue from one of low politics to one of "high politics." The forcefulness with which Canada has pushed the R2P report has resulted in a gradual process of tipping the norm. According to Kate White, the executive director of the United Nations Association in Canada (UNAC): "Canada has made progress on profoundly important issues, R2P being one of those" (quoted by DFAIT 2005). Canada's efforts raised awareness of the R2P and garnered support for it. Thus, Canada played a decisive role in the creation of the R2P norm and acted as a catalyst to bring about a tipping point through its foreign policy practices.

R2P has been "mainstreamed" into the Canada's institutional structure. Foreign Affairs officials in Canada who worked, and are currently working, most directly on R2P are based within the Human Security Policy Division - Human Rights and Human Security Bureau, Global Issues Branch (DFAIT Official, interview, 2007; Graham, interview, 2007; Malone, interview, 2007). R2P is reflected in other areas, including conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and START (Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force) Secretariat (DFAIT Official, interview, 2007). According to David Malone,

despite the change in government, "R2P is a mainstream concept with mainstream status within the government departments" (interview, 2007).

While the former Prime Minster, Paul Martin, was a vocal supporter of the R2P and constantly promoted it at every level, newly elected Conservative Prime Minister Harper has not given any indication of such support for the R2P doctrine and the national or regional level. However, Prime Minister Harper upheld his Liberal predecessor's commitment to R2P in his address to the UN on September 21, 2006 (Banda 2007). Nonetheless, changes in top-level leadership appear to have partly altered the political priorities, which suggest that personal commitment by political leaders and high-level officials affected the prominence of the norm. This, however, does not imply that the current leadership is uninterested in the issue, merely that somewhat different political priorities now guide the foreign policy. On the other hand, if the previous government has been a vocal supporter of the normative development of the R2P, it did not increase the number of Canadian armed forces, something that the present government did. Indeed, over the two years, 2006-2008, $5.3 billion was allocated to Canadian armed forces, for recruiting 23, 000 forces, and also for investment in infrastructure and equipment (Government of Canada 2008). In effect, if there is an international call, from the UN, to put the R2P into practice, Canada might be more prepared to do so.

The R2P is gaining international consensus. Adding real weight to the enforcement of the R2P, the UN has begun to embrace the framework. Thus, the norm of R2P is experiencing a cascading effect. Canada achieved formal consideration of the R2P at the UN in the context of UN reform. R2P became a central theme in the recommendations of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World:*

Our Shared Responsibility, in 2004 as recommended by Canada in its submission to the panel (DFAIT 2005).[50] Its sixteen members from all around the world, endorsed what they described as an "emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect" (para. 203). The fact that a representative international body such as the High-Level Panel would find this degree of consensus demonstrates the importance of the emerging R2P norm.

After consultations with governments and UN officials, the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan published, on March 21, 2005, his own report entitled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.* Similar to the High-Level Panel, the Secretary-General emphasized the need of governments to take action against threats of large scale of violence against civilians. He called on governments to embrace the R2P. *In Larger Freedom* separates the normative aspects of the responsibility (the assertion of the responsibility to protect as a basis for collective action) from the discussion of the use of force. Annan made clear that the issue was not merely about the use of force, but rather about a normative undertaking requiring a state to protect its own civilians. The language in Annan's report was clearly influenced by the R2P report and, and in turn, he acted to further promote its normative principles. Canada had an influential role in the panel's submission and the Secretary General's report.

After the publication of the R2P the Canadian government lobbied relentlessly to persuade states to endorse the concept and to adopt it at the 2005 World Summit. According to Wheeler, "there was a significant body of international opinion led by Canada and other concerned states that worked hard in the months before the summit to

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[50] HSN and the AU made a submission supporting the R2P in the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

reassure those developing states who were nervous and hesitant about endorsing the responsibility to protect" (2005:103). At the World Summit, Canada acted as the lead-negotiator on R2P at the World Summit while Kofi Annan's report, *In Larger Freedom*, which incorporated the core recommendations of the ICISS served as a basis for the Summit's discussion on UN reform. The success of Canada's, Kofi Annan's and other supporting countries' efforts prior to and during the UN Summit was that the two key aspects that have been identified by the R2P report, state sovereignty as responsibility and international responsibility in cases of egregious circumstances, made it into the 2005 UN Summit *Outcome Document*, as was advised in the ICISS Report.[51] The provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document have marked the first unanimous endorsement of the concept, in principle, at the UN level. According to Gareth Evans, "this formal embrace [at the UN Summit] by the international community of the new concept of R2P... has been a major breakthough, and a fascinating piece of intellectual history in its own right" (2006). The UN Summit strengthened the R2P's position by revealing the extent of the consensus on intervention for human protection. The inclusion of the R2P translates into universal acknowledgement of the doctrine by all 192 member states. As Kofi Annan presents it, "member states made a solemn pledge to protect" (quoted by Ducet, BBC News, 2006). The embracement of the R2P in this forum represents a significant step forward at the normative level.

The remarkable consensus that was produced at the 2005 World Summit was partly the product of the approach taken by the Canadian Government to sell the concept

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[51] In the UN Summit Outcome Document, governments agreed that there is a national and international "responsibility to protect" populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing (United Nations, General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, 31, par. 138, 139, September 15, 2005).

on the international stage. As noted above, Paul Martin was a vocal supporter of the R2P, and constantly promoted it at every level, which culminated with his successful efforts to convince reluctant states of the validity of the concept. The negotiating dynamic featured a small group of "deeply recalcitrant member-states" (Iran, Egypt, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Jamaica) that strongly resisted any reference to R2P phrase. The US was generally supportive, but sensitive to any language that limited its military options. Thus, all language on use of force in relation to R2P was absent. The Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) chair Mauritius and also South Africa illustrated a strong sense of African support for the R2P principle. China was silent, and ultimately acquiescing (Weiss 2007:128).[52] The outcome document had to bridge these positions.

Adjustments in language were made during the negotiations at the World Summit in order to accommodate a wide divergence of positions. To address American concerns, Canada accepted a move from "we accept our shared responsibility" to "we are prepared to take collective action" (Malone 2006:89). Further, each of the P5 expressed reservations over the Canadian proposal that the P5 not use their vetoes in cases relevant to the R2P principle. Although many in the negotiations supported the Canadian approach, eventually it was dropped. Late in the negotiations, delegations essentially deadlocked in the text, which at the UN, would mean no inclusion of any reference to R2P. On advice of Allan Rock, Canada's Permanent Representative in New York, Prime Minster Martin in the final 48 hours made personal phone calls to five heads of the most

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[52] In a significant breakthrough for the growing acceptance of the new norm, China's official paper on UN reforms and the Gringrich-Mitchell task force commissioned by the US Congress both endorsed the R2P. *Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reform* (Beijing, 7 June 2005), available at http://news.xinhaunet.com/english.2005-06/08/content_3056817_3.htm, Part III, "Responsibility to Protect"; *American Interests and UN Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2005), 15.

opposing governments in the General Assembly (Kirton 2007:193). As a result of these

discussions, in at least three of the five cases, the Permanent Representatives in New

York indicated the following day that they were under instructions from their capitals to

change their position on 'the responsibility to protect' concept at the UN Summit in

September 2005 (Malone 2006:88).[53] The involvement of Canadian leadership allowed

the will of the majority at the UN to prevail, with R2P enshrined in the outcome

document. According to David Malone, "these personal interventions had an effect that

surprised even the most veteran observers of Summit-level contacts" (Ibid.). Thus, the

role played by the former Canadian Prime Minister, Paul Martin, had an enormous

impact on the diffusion of the R2P norm.[54]

The political wrangling during the World Summit produced a weakened text.

Alex Bellamy argues that the consensus was possible only by "watering down" the

ICISS's original version by emphasizing that the Security Council alone must act and that

the host state had the primary responsibility to act (2006). Nonetheless, the adoption

strengthened the R2P's position by in two ways: by revealing the extent of the consensus

on intervention and by embedding it in a soft-law document (Weiss 2007:122). This

reflects an extraordinary contribution to peace and global welfare by the Canadian

government. In an interview, Paul Heinbecker acknowledged Canada's contribution to

the human security discourse embedded in the *World Summit Outcome Document* and

suggested that "the R2P agenda is the most significant policy work in 50 years of

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[53] Additionally, several other capitals were contacted by senior Canadian officials (Malone 2007:88).

[54] Also see, Badescu 2007; Riddell-Dixon 2005. In addition, this point was stressed in interviews with Canadian diplomats involved in the promotion of the R2P.

collective peace and security progress."[55] Further, he reinforced the strength of the R2P

agenda by illustrating that "in 2001, no UN Member States signed on to the process, but

by 2005, 171 Member States had signed on." He suggested that Canada can take great

pride in this accomplishment. Given the endorsement of the R2P norm at the UN level,

Canada played a key role in diffusing the R2P norm.

The diffusion of R2P norm is evident by its transformative impact on the

international system. Norms contain an expectation directed at actors on the

appropriateness of behaviour. Thus, norms have a power to get actors to comply very

independently from their interests. According to Axworthy, the "R2P helped motivate the

Security Council to refer the material of alleged crimes against humanity in Sudan to the

International Criminal Court, despite the resistance of the Bush Administration" (quoted

by Baumel 2005). Moreover, the World Summit embedded the R2P in a "soft-law

document (UN General Assembly Declaration), which was then reaffirmed by the

Security Council in two recent resolutions. *The Security Council Resolution 1674 on the*

Protection of Civilians, adopted on April 28, 2006, "reaffirms the provisions of

paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document regarding the

responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and

crimes against humanity" (S/RES/1674). This was the first official Security Council

reference to the R2P. What makes this Security Council resolution so important for the

normative development of the R2P is that it is legally binding, unlike all previous

incarnations of the R2P principles. The second resolution is the *Security Council*

Resolution 1706 on Darfur, which further promotes the R2P by using this language in

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[55] Interview with Paul Heinbecker, former Canadian Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the UN and Director of the Laurier Centre for Global Relations, April 21, 2007. In an interview, David Malone stated that Paul Heinbecker played a key role in the development and promotion of the R2P. April 17, 2007.

Security Council resolutions on individual countries. On August 31, 2006, the Council passed Resolution 1706 that demanded a rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers in Sudan. The resolution also made explicit reference to R2P, by reaffirming the provisions of Resolution 1674 and the provisions of paragraph 138 and 139 of the 2005 UN World *Summit Outcome Document* (SC/8821). These two Security Council resolutions, along with the *World Summit Outcome Document*, provide vital new tools to hold governments and the international community accountable when they manifestly fail to respond to grave threats to humanity.

The R2P language has become embedded within diplomatic discourse. As noted earlier, the Canadian government embraced the R2P vocabulary. By doing so, "speech can persuade; it can change people's minds about what goals are valuable in social life and, thus, it is doing important social construction work by creating new understandings and new social facts that reconfigure politics" (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:402). The language of the R2P is a normative breakthrough because of its power to reframe the deeply divisive and inherently confrontational language of humanitarian intervention. Canada has focused its efforts on this normative development. (Graham, interview, 2007). Efforts, thus, far have been fairly successful. Axworthy claims that the R2P "is now becoming a part of the vocabulary" (quoted by Baumel 2006). Hamilton observes that "the R2P report has gained enough significance that its framing of the issues and the language it employs now infiltrate almost all discussions of humanitarian crises" (2006:289). Increasingly, support for the R2P is coming from some of the larger human rights NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, and Oxfam who regularly cite R2P in their statements and country reports (Holt and Berkam

2006:30). As of February 14th 2007, there have been 229 NGOs that have expressed their

support for R2P principles in public letters, reports or policy statements (R2P-CS 2006).

Such a broad base of support from civil society organizations further legitimizes an

international norm. As Finnemore and Sikkink note, "the strength of norms depend on the

extent to which it is shared by the units within a social system" (1998:901). Thus, the

norm of the R2P is gaining strength through its establishment in the international

vocabulary.

The R2P language is being mainstreamed within the UN through resolutions and

intergovernmental meetings. Despite opposition from a handful of states and difficulties

with implementation, there is a growing acceptance of both the R2P concept and

terminology (Holt and Berkman 2006:30). The R2P discourse provides a guide for

acceptable behaviour. As statements provided by governments reflects the international

system creating a new notion of appropriate sate behaviour. This is the very process by

which norms work (Finnemore 1996). The concept of R2P has become more acceptable

at the international level than "humanitarian intervention." Evidence of such a

transformation is clear by comparing positions from 1999 and 2000 when the member

states failed to reach a consensus on humanitarian intervention with statements from

countries at the UN summit in 2005, which suggested support for an emerging

international responsibility to protect.[56] The South Summit brought together heads of

states of the Group of 77 (G77), now 133 countries, who, in the *Declaration of the South*

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[56] For a complete list of statements, see the Responsibility to Protect-Civil Society website, "R2PCS-Chart: Government Positions on R2P," 11 August 2005, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil_society_statements/?theme=alt3; and "What Governments said about R2P at 2005 UN Summit", "State-by-State Positions on the R2P," 14 November 2005, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.ph/civil_society_statements/?theme=alt3 (accessed 10 October 2007).

Summit in April 2000, rejected the notion of humanitarian intervention: "We reject the so-called 'right' of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law"(Art. 54).[57] In contrast, the President Festus Mogae of Botswana, a member of G77, who claimed at the UN Summit in 2005 that "We can no longer afford to stand back if a country fails to protect its citizens against grave human right abuses. In this respect, we embrace to concept of responsibility to protect."[58] This appears as indicated evidence for the transformation from a lack of any agreement on humanitarian intervention, in 2000, to an acceptance of the R2P model in 2005. The R2P discourse has become embedded within the international vocabulary, as evident by the R2P endorsement by civil society and states. The great achievement, thus far, is that no one can now say that massive human rights violations and genocide are nobody else's concern. The R2P, with Canada's assistance, has become entrenched at the international level.

The Canadian efforts are noteworthy, given that Canada did not have many state allies, particularly in the post-9/11 context, in promoting the R2P, hence the more difficult and demanding task in advancing the concept.[59] Riddell-Dixon explicitly notes that "in promoting the R2P, Canada did not have a lot of state allies... while some countries were supportive of the responsibility to protect in bilateral talks, most, with the exception of the UK, were reluctant to advocate it on the international stage" (2005:1075-1076). Given this reality, Canada has played an essential role in norm creation of the

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[57] Also, in September 1999 G77 rejected the right to humanitarian intervention. See: "Ministerial Declaration."

[58] "R2PCS—Chart: Government Positions on R2P" August 11, 2005. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil_society_statements?theme=alt3.

[59] Via norm advocacy, Canada recognized the Nordic countries, the UK, several other members of the EU, and a few southern countries, including Rwanda, Mali, Nigeria and Mozambique (Riddell-Dixon 2005:1075).

R2P. As for the UK's norm advocacy, "the Iraq war has undermined the standing of the UK as a norm carrier" (Bellamy 2005:36).[60] The UK's involvement in Iraq and its linking humanitarian intervention with the situation in Iraq reinforced southern fears that the R2P could be used as justification for violating sovereignty.[61] Thus, states and civil society actors may hesitate to work explicitly with the UK (and U.S) on R2P advocacy.

Canada's significant "soft power assets, a reputation as an honest broker with no colonial past, [and] a tradition of multiculturalism" gives Canada the ability to persuade developing nations often wary of "Western" imposed norms (Axworthy 1998:453). Thus, as a Western country lacking both the colonial heritage of European countries or the U.S's reputation as the global hegemon, Canada was well-positioned to bring other actors on board by dispelling concerns that R2P is simply another Western imperial ambition. Canada was in a unique position to bridge the divide that could have separated the emerging consensus on the R2P norm.

Conclusion

Canada played a catalytic role in bringing the R2P to international attention by exercising its diplomatic skills to persuade actors to embrace the R2P norm candidate. Canada has pursued a policy of coordinated action at the national, regional and international levels. Such examples of promoting the R2P culminate with the Canadian efforts to advance the concept at the UN level. By embracing its stewardship of the ICISS

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[60] One specific illustration of the UK's diminished role as a legitimate norm entrepreneur, as discussed earlier, was at the 2003 Progressive Governance Summit when the UK and Canada's communiqué regarding a supportive R2P passage was removed due to strong objections from Argentina, Chile and Germany.

[61] See "Speech Given by the Prime Minister in Sedgefield, Justifying Military Action in Iraq and Warning of the Continued Threat of Global Terrorism," 5 March 2004, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/o.12956,II62991,00.html (accessed 10 September 2007).

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report and working to bring its findings into the public realm, Canada energized the political process aimed at building consensus around the R2P norm candidate.

Canada's norm entrepreneurial activities had a decisive impact on the diffusion of R2P. Canada's goal was to convince other countries to support the R2P norm candidate. However, disappointed by resistance and slow paced deliberations within the UNGA, Canada employed more discrete diplomatic actions to complement the traditional state-to-state diplomacy in order to champion the R2P norm and generate critical international public support. Canada engaged in concerted transnational advocacy consisting of multi-track diplomacy and high-profile endorsements.

Organizational platforms increased the possibilities for norm entrepreneurial activities by the Canadian government. Canadian action within various organizations and groups of likeminded states and NGOs provided leadership. Through working with the likeminded states and in consultation with the NGO coalitions and experts, Canada facilitated the development of an informal alliance. This support was crucial in the face of opposition from states. Canada's efforts provided the leadership necessary to drive the norm diffusion process by successfully securing critical support of likeminded governments and civil society actors prior to its role as a lead-negotiator at UN World Summit. Furthermore, high profile endorsements and skillful Canadian diplomats have pushed the idea of R2P forward, creating a specific point around which support could congeal. This point became the tipping point for the new norm. To some extent the Canadian norm entrepreneurial efforts were successful, and a norm community supporting the R2P norm can be seen to have emerged.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

This study has traced the evolution of a norm pertaining to the Responsibility to Protect. The focus on a relatively recent and prominent norm illustrates the incremental process of evolutionary change and the influence of the norm entrepreneur in that process. This study concludes that an international norm embodying the Responsibility to Protect is evolving. Its long-term influence is, however, conditional by its internalization and implementation. Although Canada is only one actor promoting R2P, analyzing its efforts provides insights into a norm entrepreneur's ability to influence world politics. In view of this conclusion, this final chapter begins with an assessment of the robustness of the R2P norm. The second section discusses the theoretical and empirical insights gained from an examination of Canada's norm entrepreneurship. The third section discusses the utility of the constructivist framework.

The R2P Norm

The R2P experienced a norm cascade when a critical mass of actors embraced it as an emerging norm, thus creating a tipping point of widespread acceptance. Through the intergovernmental negotiation process, the R2P idea became translated into an international norm and became embedded within the World Summit Outcome document. This document is highly significant as it represents a direct challenge to the absolute concept of state sovereignty (Malone 2007:89). The outcome was welcomed as giving the international community a new tool to hold governments accountable for the treatment of their citizens. An assessment of the international debate since the late 1990s illustrates that the international consensus on the R2P is growing. R2P's support base includes the

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vast majority of the world's nations. However, despite some encouraging normative developments of the concept of R2P, it has not developed into a full-fledged international norm. This prevents it from completing the life cycle of an evolving norm. As discussed in Chapter 2, when an international norm becomes "robust" it comes internalized in a routine and non-reflective manner (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 900). Robustness can be determined by looking at its persuasiveness, durability, feasibility, and applicability.

The R2P is norm persuasive. It is constructed as a remedy to the humanitarian intervention debate and prescribes appropriate actions. The humanitarian imperative inherent in the emergent R2P norm is persuasive. Human suffering in war-torn societies provides the impetus for the moral imperative of R2P. Thus, it is a hard to oppose the R2P on moral grounds. As the emergent norm is concerned with the protection of civilians and maintaining peace and stability of the international community, it speaks to a wide audience transcending specific cultural and political contexts. The R2P reinforces the suggestion that norms aimed at protecting civilians are among the persuasive norms that resonate with a global audience.

The persuasiveness of the R2P norm is weakened by its inherent ambiguity. The adoption of the R2P in the Outcome document, though a triumph for the human rights community, produced a weakened text that is open to interpretation. The recommendations under the R2P continue to generate intensive debates regarding the specific roles of the international community in protecting civilians. Military personnel, UN officials, and NGOs offer numerous and varied understandings of the concept of civilian protection (Holt and Berkman 2006). There is a lack of consensus not only about the range of activities considered "protection" but also about the "who" and the "how" of

protection. This lack of consensus illustrates the ambiguities inherent in the World Summit Outcome document and underlines a continued need to advocate, refine and implement the version of R2P that is both robust enough to ensure early and effective enough to respond to mass human right violations.

The recentness of the norm of R2P necessitates that it is relatively callow as compared to older norms, such as the norm of sovereignty. Yet, norms are rarely created in isolation. As illustrated in this study, the R2P fits with the existing normative structure. The notion of R2P is familiar and many beliefs inherent in the norm are widely shared. The familiar elements can be regarded as having long-standing legitimacy, indicating durability of the notion of R2P; but, as a norm the R2P is a recent feature in the international normative context.

In international relations, symbolism and substance are often different issues. Norms may endure, but they may fail to become robust and to have impact on practice. Demonstrating the feasibility and applicability of the R2P norm by translating theory into practice is fundamental to the completion of the norm life cycle. The pace of the R2P's normative development since its emergence in the ICISS has been relatively rapid; however, operationalizing the R2P remains a major task. According to David Black (2007:19), "norm-promotion at the abstract level of international conferences and text drafting is challenging and exacting diplomatic work to be sure; it is, however, low-risk compared with the difficult work of giving life to the principles in question." R2P has become a necessary condition for legitimate action, although not a sufficient one, since normative permission does not equate with action.

The problematic feature of the R2P report is translating protection norms into

operational realities. Without detracting from what has been accomplished on gaining acceptance of the R2P, there are two limitations to what has been achieved: lack of political will and lack of operational capacity. These main factors prevent the R2P norm from completing the life cycle and, ultimately, becoming internalized within the international system. Establishing threshold criteria for humanitarian intervention is insufficient without the political will or the operational capacity to respect them and to carry them out (Wheeler 2005; Thakur 2006; Evans 2006).

The challenge not addressed by the ICISS is how to invoke R2P action in humanitarian crises that occur where the prospect of intervention is not aligned with strategic or economic interests. The R2P relies on the Security Council as the primary source of authorization for interventions (ICISS 2001). However, the realpolitik driving actual decision-making of the Security Council member states provides a barrier since the veto can be used against intervention where there are vital interests involved. Thus, implementing the R2P is still connected with the politics of the UN system, especially with the geo-strategic interests of the permanent five members of the Security Council. In the case of a Security Council deadlock, the ICISS recommends other sources of authorization from the General Assembly or regional organizations (2001). However, there is no reason to assume that states will respond differently than the realpolitik calculations of the five member states. As Malone (interview 2007) indicates, "the reality of power politics will always influence how R2P is applied where the interests of great powers are engaged (and even when they are completely absent - in such situations it may not be possible to do a great deal)." The R2P framework endorsed at the 2005 World

Summit does not confront how the R2P can adapt to the political reality that rhetorical endorsement of the R2P norm does not necessarily translate into the political will to act.

Another barrier to the R2P's completion of the norm cycle is the operational capacity problem. Operational capacity is a strategic issue that must be at the center of discussions when determining whether or not to intervene. Those states with the most advanced military capabilities may be preoccupied with other situations that require deployments elsewhere (Evans 2006). Moreover, interveners may lack the capacity to deploy force of the kind required for humanitarian protection. According to Luttwak (2006:265), interveners often "adopt passive self-protective tactics that prevent them from actually keeping the peace or protecting civilians." Soldiers are not specifically trained for humanitarian protection.

There is not enough analysis on the actual implementation of the R2P. Ultimately, a discussion on the relevance of the R2P from an operational point of view needs to consider how the military culture and practice translate the R2P into practical guidelines for troops on the ground. Holt and Berkman (2006:12) argue, in their comprehensive study on operationalizing the R2P, that "few militaries have considered the operational implications of protection of civilians mandates in detail, or have outlined the necessary steps for making it a reality." This observation is confirmed by the fact that Canada's Department of National Defence has not fully integrated civilian protection requirements into peacekeeping policy planning. The potential of unmet expectations without follow-up due to lack of political will and lack of operational capacity is a problematic barrier to the development of the R2P norm.

In discussing the implementation of the R2P, one must consider Darfur. The starkest example of where the international community is failing to protect a population from mass atrocities is in Darfur. There is no question that it is a situation where the R2P doctrine should apply: the state manifestly failing to protect its population. According to David Malone (interview 2007), "there are several contemporary situations crying out for an R2P approach, Darfur being one." The Security Council Resolution 1706, discussed earlier, illustrates that there is agreement on this. Evidence of the need for action in Darfur has been clear with UN officials labeling it as "one of the world's worst humanitarian crises" (Schneider 2006). Furthermore, numerous articles have linked Darfur directly to the R2P.[62] In this context, Darfur has been labeled as a "test case" for the R2P doctrine where the conflict has intensified, the number of casualties have increased, and the R2P has failed to materialize.[63] The atrocities in Darfur illustrate the difficulty of mobilizing the necessary political will to act in an R2P situation. However, the complexities of the Darfur crisis cannot be understated. There seems to be agreement among scholars and practitioners that an intervention would be problematic. As Thakur (2006:282) encapsulates the problem: "The size of Sudan, the historical roots of the crisis, and the ease with which any Western intervention can be exploited as yet another assault on Arabs and Muslims, means that the prospects of a successful outcome... are questionable." Moreover, few states are committed to sending troops in this environment. The tragedy points to the limitations in relying on military force to resolve a crisis of human protection.

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[62] See, for example, Schneider 2006; Lynch 2006; Reynolds 2006; Black 2007.

[63] See, for example, address by Louise Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, on the Occasion of the 2nd session of the Human Rights Council. http://www.unpo.org/article.php?id=5454. Accessed February 3, 2007.

Despite the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions on the R2P, the Council has yet to consider how these resolutions will be implemented in response to specific cases. Darfur is one of the first, but also an extremely difficult test for the R2P. Some have argued that as long as there is no real action on Darfur, the R2P looks like little more than humanitarian hypocrisy (see, for example, Feinstein 2006). However, implementing the R2P in the context of Darfur is an extremely difficult task, as contradictory and potentially devastating consequences have to be carefully weighed. There is no easy political solution. Ultimately, a decision to intervene in Darfur has to be tested against all the criteria advanced in the ICISS Report, including the one discussing "reasonable prospects" of success. The failure to stop the atrocities in Darfur illustrates the significant difference between the development of the R2P norm, on the one hand, and the ability of the international community to operationalize it, on the other hand. As the international community seeks to apply R2P in Darfur, it does so without having an international system that is equipped to take up this task. For this reason an international movement in support of R2P is crucial: to work toward the establishment of a more coherent system to prevent, to react and ultimately guide rebuilding after mass atrocities.

In the UN context, the emergent norm of R2P can be considered to have reached a tipping point where a majority of the UN member states accept the norm, at least on the rhetorical level. The challenge facing the international community is to translate the notion of R2P into coherent practices. At the same time, however, pockets of resistance can be found among member states. The opposition is tenuous and concentrated in a small number countries nervous about their sovereignty whom continue to interpret R2P as a threat to the norm of non-intervention. Despite obstacles, such as a lack of

understanding and different interpretations of the emerging norm, R2P is becoming accepted among a widening group of actors in the international community. Nonetheless, the normative support for the R2P doctrine must be coordinated with a political commitment to undertake the necessary reforms to make R2P operational. If not, the norm of R2P may never attain requisite functionability and, thus, it will fail to complete the norm cycle.

Canada's Norm Entrepreneurship

Tracing the process of Canadian contributions to the evolution of the R2P provides significant theoretical and empirical insights. By focusing on actors, this study avoids a common constructivist pitfall of overemphasizing structure. The focus on actors assists in analyzing the pivotal role of the norm entrepreneur. This study finds that a state that possesses less hard power relative to other states can instead use soft power and diplomatic savvy to induce states to accept normative change. Norm entrepreneurs' ability to influence international politics is contingent on their legitimacy, organizational platform and leadership. Given Canada's possession of necessary norm entrepreneurial attributes, Canada was capable of forging links between nations and NGOs, setting the agenda and maintaining synergy in negotiations.

Canada presented a striking example of norm entrepreneurship in promulgating the R2P norm. Canada sought to change the international system and went outside the traditional negotiation process to achieve this change. Analyzing Canada's foreign policy actions illustrates a state's ability to influence the norm development process by recognizing opportunities for social interaction and employing a multi-level strategy of norm advocacy and high-profile endorsements.

The acceptance of the R2P norm is due, in large part, to the hard work and leadership of Canada: a country committed to humanitarian protection. This norm entrepreneur had the precedence of existing normative principles to support its case for R2P. Through an innovative commission and diplomatic battle at the UN, Canada helped encourage the world to adopt the R2P in September 2005 at the World Summit. The endorsement of the concept of R2P in the Summit document was achieved "against the predictions of almost everyone inside the UN and outside and is testament to the power of a good idea, presented well and defended to the last" (Malone 2007:86). Continued campaigning and leadership by Canada created momentum for the endorsement and eventual acceptance for the R2P.

Even though Canada initiated the R2P and was a key player in its endorsement at the UN, there has been an evident attenuation of momentum dedicated to the issue. Canada's leadership is vital if the R2P norm is to be transformed from a cascading norm into a fully "tipped" norm of internalization and realization. Canada's can ensure that the idealism of R2P is translated into real protection. With increased efforts in developing the R2P norm, Canada can continue to have a meaningful and principled influence in world politics. This study, however, suggests that Canadian norm entrepreneurship was instrumental in adopting R2P in the UN and that such advocacy can be an important way for smaller states to alter existing normative structures.

A Constructivist Account of Norm Evolution

This study has demonstrated the utility of the constructivist approach in understanding the complicated dynamic processes of norm evolution. The case provides an illustration that indicates the relevance of the constructivist analytical framework of

norm evolution. It demonstrates the crucial role of the norm entrepreneur in the evolutionary process, and can therefore contribute to further understanding of the relationship between the norm entrepreneur and norm followers. The leadership displayed by Canada is an illustration of constructivism in action. "It is all about how to stretch states' interests and preferences so as to produce in greater quantities the collective goods that the political marketplace of interstate behaviour otherwise under-produces." Constructivism provides a solid framework to explain this behaviour. Applying this insight to the study of international norm evolution is advantageous as it can assist in understanding how new norms emerge and evolve over time.

Norms do matter in international politics. War and intervention are continually and consistently expressed in normative language, as the rhetoric surrounding wars consist of frequent references to the profound values at stake such as freedom, security and survival. Norms cannot be ignored or neglected in the study of international politics. Taking norms seriously, this study has demonstrated the emergence of a norm pertaining to the R2P. The Responsibility to Protect is not merely a visionary or abstract idea; rather, it is considered an emergent international norm.

The importance of Canadian norm entrepreneurship highlights the importance of agency in the process of norm creation. Further research on the evolution of norms needs to focus on actors that allow a norm to emerge and diffuse. By providing an empirical illustration of the analytical framework derived from constructivist literature, this research enhances the understanding of the evolution of international norms in the field of peace and security. Norms matter in international relations. They affect the reaction, or lack thereof, of states and international organizations to conflicts around the world.

Norms, in general, and the forces shaping decisions, in particular, are in need of greater understanding.

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