Nationalist Crossroads and Crosshairs:

On External and Internal Sources of Albanian and Serbian National Mythology

Matvey Lomonosov
Department of Sociology
McGill University, Montreal
June 2018

A dissertation submitted to McGill University
in partial fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

Abstract

This dissertation employs comparative historical methods to investigate the development of Albanian and Serbian national identity over the last two centuries. More narrowly, it traces the emergence and evolution of two foundational national myths: the story of the Illyrian origins of the Albanian nation and the narrative of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. The study focuses on micro- and meso-level processes, the life course of mythmakers and specific historical situations. For this, it relies on archival data from Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as a wide body of published primary and secondary historical sources.

The dissertation is composed of four separate articles. In the *first article*, I offer evidence that the Kosovo myth, which is often seen as a "crucial" supporting case for ethno-symbolist theory, is a modern ideological construct. For evidence, the article focuses on temporal, geographical and cultural ruptures in the supposedly long-standing "medieval Kosovo legacy" and the way the narrative was promoted among South Slavs in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It finds that Serbian-speaking diaspora intellectuals from the Habsburg Empire and the governments in Belgrade and Cetinje played crucial roles imparting the Kosovo myth to the Balkan masses. Thus, it is hard to account for the rise of national identities and local conflicts in the Balkans without a closer look at foreign intervention and the history of states and institutions. On a separate note, the first article illustrates that studying the ways *how* national narratives were disseminated may help to establish *whether* they are historically rooted or recent.

The *second article* contributes to debates on the global spread of nationalism in the generalist, diaspora-studies and long-distance nationalism literatures. The article observes that the idea of Illyrian origins was brought to Albania from outside. It was elaborated, promoted and later officially codified in the newly established nation-state under the influence of the early Albanian-speaking diaspora. The nationalist mobilization of Albanian diasporics came as an outcome of their multi-dimensional Western experiences, not only because of alienation experienced in their host societies. This suggests that scholars should pay more attention to the agency of diaspora members and migrants in the global spread of nationalism.

The *third article* discovers that imperialist archaeologists significantly contributed to the construction of national identity and the establishment of the nationalist research tradition in Albania. Importantly, the forms and extent of their influences depended on the institutional context

in which the foreign scholars were working. These conclusions question the existing dichotomy between imperialist and nationalist archaeology in the critical archaeological literature and, more broadly, the opposition between imperialism and nationalism in the generalist scholarship.

Finally, the *fourth article* explores the emergence of an Albanian counter-myth in the 1980s and 1990s to the narrative of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. It offers evidence that the counter-myth emerged as a moral reaction of self-perceived "saviors of the nation" in Albania and Kosovo to the politicization of medieval history in Serbian intellectual circles. What mattered in this process was the moral commitment of Albanian mythmakers, who were trained to "defend their nation" in educational and research institutions under Communism. The emotional response would not have occurred if their Serbian colleagues remained reserved and if intellectual dialogue had continued. The article suggests that the literatures on nationalist mythology and national identity construction can benefit by focusing more on the moral dimension of nationalism, the relatively recent history of socialization institutions, and the interactive dynamics of identity politics.

Overall, this dissertation highlights the historical and culturally parochial face of nationalism. Analyzing the life course of nationalist mythmakers in specific historical situations, the dissertation finds that the social location of individuals and groups at the crossroads and crosshairs of alien and native influences breeds exclusionary nationalism. The mechanisms of this causal link are diverse: ideational, emotional, institutional and habitual. More broadly, the dissertation contributes to ongoing scholarly discussions on the role of ethnicity in nationalism, the worldwide spread of nationalism, the nature of the nation-state model, the relationship between imperialism and nationalism and the interactive, processual and dynamic character of nationhood. It suggests that imposing "big" nation-like rather than locally contained and fluid ethnicities in pre-modern times is anachronistic. Scholars may need to elaborate separate explanatory frameworks for the diffusion of the concept of national identity and the nation-state model. Diasporas and migrants played a particularly important role in the former process. Imperialism and nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often were closely interlinked rather than opposed. The identity of nations is formed from without as well as from within. Its construction involves dynamic and interactive intergroup process.

Résumé

Cette thèse se base sur les données des archives de l'Albanie, de la Bosnie, du Kosovo, du Monténégro et de la Serbie et sur un grand éventail des sources historiques publiées, tant primaires que secondaires. On y emploie la méthode des cas étendus et plusieurs méthodes historico-comparatives afin d'étudier le développement de l'identité nationale albanaise et serbe au cours des deux siècles passés. Notamment, la thèse expose l'émergence et l'évolution des deux mythes nationaux fondamentaux: le conte de l'origine autochtone illyrienne des Albanais et la narration de la Bataille du Kosovo de 1389. L'étude se focalise sur les processus historiques des niveaux micro- et méso, le parcours de vie des créateurs des mythes et les situations historiques spécifiques.

La thèse se compose de quatre articles. *Dans le premier article*, on découvre que le mythe du Kosovo qui est souvent traité comme le cas « crucial » supportant la théorie éthno-symboliste, est un construit idéologique moderne. Les ruptures temporelles, géographiques et culturelles dans le « patrimoine médiéval du Kosovo, » apparemment longtemps établi, et le mode au moyen duquel on a promu cette narration parmi les Slaves du Sud au dix-neuvième et au début du vingtième siècle, prouvent cela. Le rôle principal dans l'implantation du mythe du Kosovo auprès des peuples des Balkans appartient au intellectuels serbophones des diasporas dispersées à l'empire des Habsburgs et aux gouvernements de Belgrade et de Cetinje. Ainsi, c'est difficile de représenter la montée des identités nationales et les conflits locaux dans les Balkans sans un examen plus détaillé de l'intervention étrangère et de l'histoire des états et des institutions. Également, le premier article illustre que l'étude des modes *comment* les discours nationaux ont été disséminés peut aider à établir *si* ces discours *sont historiquement enracinés ou récents*.

Le deuxième article introduit la discussion sur la propagation globale du nationalisme qui se développe dans la littérature généraliste, celle consacrée aux études des diasporas et celle du nationalisme à longue distance. Cet article note que l'idée de l'origine Illyrienne a été apportée en Albanie de l'étrangers. Elle a été élaborée, promue et plus tard officiellement codifiée par l'état-nation récemment établi, sous l'influence de la première diaspora albanophone. La mobilisation nationaliste des représentants des diasporas albanaises découlent de l'adoption de leurs expériences multidimensionnelles occidentales, non seulement à cause de l'aliénation dans les sociétés hôtes. Cela suggère que les chercheurs doivent prêter plus d'attention à l'agentevité des membres de diaspora et des migrants à l'extension globale du nationalisme.

Le troisième article expose que les archéologues impérialistes ont contribué significativement à la construction de l'identité nationale et à l'établissement de la tradition de la recherche nationaliste en Albanie. Ce qui est important, c'est le fait que les formes et l'ampleur de leur influence dépendaient du contexte institutionnel dans lequel les chercheurs étrangers travaillaient. Ces conclusions mettent en question la dichotomie entre l'archéologie impérialiste et nationaliste existante dans l'étude critique en archéologie et, plus largement, l'opposition continuelle entre l'impérialisme et le nationalisme dans les sciences humaines générales.

Finalement, *le quatrième article* révèle que l'émergence du contre-mythe albanais sur la Bataille du Kosovo de 1389 à la fin des années 1980 – aux années 1990 est expliquée le mieux par la réaction morale des « saveurs de la nation » autodéclarés en Albanie et Kosovo face à la politisation de l'histoire médiévale dans les milieux intellectuels serbes. Ce qui était important au cours de ce processus, c'était la motivation morale des créateurs des mythes albanais qui étaient entraînés de « défendre leur nation » aux établissements d'enseignement et de recherches à l'époque de Communisme. Cette réponse émotionnelle n'aurait pas eu place, si leurs collègues serbes étaient restés réservés et avaient continué le dialogue intellectuel. L'étude de la mythologie du nationalisme et de l'identité nationale peut gagner, si on analyse soigneusement la dimension morale du nationalisme, l'histoire relativement récente des institutions de socialisation et l'évolution interactive des politiques de l'identité.

De façon générale, la thèse propose une explication originale de la face historique et culturellement paroissial du nationalisme. En analysant le parcours de vie des créateurs des mythes nationalistes dans de certaines situations historiques, la thèse découvre que la position sociale des individus et des groupes aux croisements et aux réticules des influences étrangères et nationales, fait naître un nationalisme exclusionnaire. Les mécanismes de ce lien de causalité peuvent être divers: idéationnels, émotionnels, institutionnels et habituels. Plus largement, cette thèse contribue au développement des discussions scientifiques sur le rôle de l'ethnicité au nationalisme, sur l'extension globale du nationalisme, sur la nature du modèle des états-nation, sur les rapports entre l'impérialisme et le nationalisme et sur la nature interactive, processuelle et dynamique du concept de l'identité nationale. On suggère que c'est anachronique de voir à l'époque prémoderne des « grandes » ethnies de type « nation » plutôt que des ethnicités localement bornées et mal distinguées. Les chercheurs ont besoin d'élaborer des systèmes d'explication séparés pour la diffusion des concepts de l'identité nationale et celle du modèle de l'état-nation. Les diasporas et

les migrants ont joué le rôle particulièrement important dans le premier cas. L'impérialisme et le nationalisme au dix-neuvième et au début du vingtième siècle étaient souvent étroitement liés, plutôt qu'opposés. L'identité des nations est formée de l'extérieur aussi que de l'intérieur. Sa construction implique le processus dynamique et interactif dedans un groupe.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would have never been finished without strong support from significant others. Thus, over the years of my scholarly pursuits I have become indebted to many. Crucially, I express the deepest gratitude to my supervisor Professor Matthew Lange for his careful guidance and patience during my years at McGill. If Matthew did not always stay close to me as a wise mentor, my graduate studies could have taken another, perhaps less desirable, turn. I feel very lucky to have benefited from his font of intellectual knowledge, life advice and role models. Matthew has profoundly influenced my development as a comparative historical sociologist, a researcher, an academic and a person.

My expertise in nationalism and ethnicity would be curtailed without the direction of Professors John Hall, Morton Weinfeld, Narendra Subramanian and Zoua Vang. I am very thankful to John, Morton, Narendra and Zoua for investing their time and energy in my professional development. Over my PhD years, I have vastly benefited from theoretical rigor of Professors Axel van den Berg and Thomas Soehl. I am thankful to both for their careful critique, to Axel for transmitting to me his encouraging and deeply Voltairian approach to social theory, and to Thomas for his unceasing enthusiasm in my work.

When I came to McGill, my understanding of sociology was rather naïve. Thus, without courses and numerous informal conversations with Professors Eran Shor, Elaine Weiner, Aniruddha Das and Shelley Clark, I would have a hard time matching the standards of decent sociological research. Many thanks to Eran, Elaine, Aniruddha and Shelley.

However, my research on Balkan nationalism did not start at McGill. This dissertation is a result of a decade-long academic pursuit. I repeatedly express my gratitude to Professor Alexander Kolobov, who exposed me to the studies of Balkan antiquity; to Professor Maxim Bulakhin, who showed that learning Eastern European languages is a must for studying the region; as well as to Professor Alexander Novik, my long-time supervisor, Belarusian friend and the Honorary Consul of Albania in Saint Petersburg, who set me on the path of Albanian studies.

My training as a specialist in Balkan nationalism was critically advanced at the Central European University and the University of Tirana. Many thanks to my former supervisor Professor Maria Kovacs, as well as Professors Rogers Brubaker, Florian Bieber, Andras Kovacs, Michael Miller and Szabolcz Pogonyi, all affiliates of the Nationalism Studies Program. At

That being said, the responsibility for any flaws and inconsistences in this dissertation rests entirely with me. If the reader has any questions, suggestions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me via e-mail: matvey.lomonosov@mail.mcgill.ca or matyas_86@mail.ru.

Table of Contents

Introduction

When I started working on this dissertation years ago, my intellectual attention was focused on each case study separately. The four papers that have come to constitute this manuscript were not meant to advance general theories of nationalism. Instead, my goal was rather modest and contextual. I wanted to account for the factors that have contributed to the development of collective memories in two nations whose fate was closely interlinked in the last two centuries – the Albanians and the Serbs.

As the work progressed, I have come to realize that my study may help answering the question that has puzzled theorists for decades: why does nationalism, being a fundamentally modern phenomenon, pay so much attention to history? The studies of Tom Nairn have dealt with the faces of the "Modern Janus" – how he calls nationalism – "looking backwards into the past as well as forward into the future" (Nairn 1997: 67). Similarly, Anthony Smith has made admirable efforts to explain the "double historicity" of nations: "their embeddedness in very specific historical contexts and situations, and their rootedness in the memories and traditions of their members" (Smith 2009: 30). Although these and many other scholars have inquired into the role of history in nationalism to explain its tremendous potential for popular mobilization and its propensity to violence, I can add to this list another important rationale. What often goes unnoticed is that the current theories of nationalism well explain its emergence, spread and existence only as a universal worldwide phenomenon (see: Hall 1993). However, they rarely provide detailed insight into why particular nationalism*s*, such as German, Hindu or Russian, emerge and persist. And, arguably, it is history that shapes specific cultural embodiments of the nationalist phenomenon.

1

As the reader will see, in a nutshell, I argue that the domination of historical themes in nationalism and cultural particularity of every nationalist movement are mutually interlinked. They come as a result of nationalist mythmaking and, even more importantly, both external and internal impulses behind it. The status of mythmakers as intermediaries located on the margins and frontlines of different societies may explain their fervent interest in "deep and primeval" cultural "roots." To substantiate my argument, the dissertation inquires into the life course of mythmakers. It goes to the micro- and meso-level to examine how the interplay of external and internal social forces mirrors personal experiences and shapes the national imagination.

Toward a Theoretical Contribution: Debates in the Literature

The existing explanations of the two interconnected issues – the nationalist obsession with history and the process of cultural dressing of particular nationalisms – are vulnerable to criticism in view of recent scholarship. Nairn (1997: 71) views the historical face of nationalism and its tradition-based cultural characteristics as outcomes of uneven modernization. For him, nationalism is "an effort by one "backward" culture and people after another to appropriate the powers and benefits of modernity for their own use" (Naim 1997: 71). Insofar as nationalism usually aims to transmute "a peasantry into a nation" (p. 91), "the spell of rurality" is what pushes nationalists to turn to the past. And it is peasant cultures that, being more than a "raw material," provide nationalism with distinct "ethnic characteristics" (p. 104–112).

This explanation is open to criticism because it is clear today that nationalist movements develop sequentially over a long period and start *before* peasant masses come into play. The comparatives studies of Miroslav Hroch (1993: 6–7; 2008: 9) distinguish three phases in the development of nationalism. In the first, scholarly *Phase A*, a limited number of educated

individuals research historical, cultural and linguistic attributes of what they see as a cultural group. In the second *Phase B* of agitation, a wider range of activists emerge. They elaborate the political doctrine of nationalism, group together in burgeoning organizations and institutions and strive to win over as many of their imagined co-ethnics as possible to the project of a future nation. Only in the mass *Phase C* does the majority of the population join a mass movement. In other words, history comes to galvanize nationalists many decades before progressing urbanization motivates them to "mobilise" "rural emigrants" who "look backwards as much as forward" (Nairn 1997: 91).

Allowing for the role of national myths that moderate the relationship between peasants and leading nationalists, Smith and his followers revise Nairn's views on uneven modernization and bottom-up contributions. They put forward the ethno-symbolist theory to account for both historical and cultural aspects of nationalism. Ethno-symbolists argue that all modern nations are built on pre-existing "cultural cores" of pre-modern ethnic communities. The identity of these communities persists over centuries due to powerful ethnic myths, memories and symbols. With modern transformations, elites turn the old "myth-symbolic complexes of ethnic groups" into national myths and symbols. It is these long-standing ethnic legacies that generate strong emotional appeal and broad mass support for elite-led nationalist movements. Thus, in the ethno-symbolist view, nationalists dwell on national history and culture for two simple reasons. On the one hand, morally, they feel an attachment to their ethnic community. On the other hand, politically, they realize that mass mobilization will be more successful if they employ pre-existing popular narratives and symbols to incite mass grievances.

The ethno-symbolist theory has been subject to severe criticism. Many scholars find that in contrast to small, territorially-bounded cultural communities, in pre-modern times, today's "big"

ethnic groups hardly existed, let alone were self-aware (Connor 1990; Eriksen 2002; Fine 2006; Halperin 1980, 2006; Karakasidou 1997; King 2002; Mazower 2000; Winland 1995). Furthermore, studies show that nationalists successfully construct and deploy unquestionably novel myths with no ground in historical reality or popular memories (see: Dimou 2009; Kolouri 2002; Kolsto 2005; Ozilkirimli 2003; Schwander-Sievers and Fischer 2002). Even apparently perennial myth-symbol complexes such as the Serbian one have been found to be nationalist inventions (Pantelić 2011).

While the theories of Nairn and Smith suffer from taking the historical claims of nationalists at face value, modernist explanations are vulnerable to criticism because they pay scant attention to the significance of history *in* and the cultural dressing *of* nationalisms. These explanations are usually deductive and functionalist rather than empirically based or genealogical. First, the "return to the roots" is taken by modernist scholars as a response to the challenges of modernization, such as the decline of religiosity and traditional social ties. It is viewed as an efficient means to forge the large communities of emergent nation-states to which all members must relate directly, that is, without the mediation previously offered by hierarchical political systems and nested social structures. Second, the novel versions of communal history that suggest the cultural specificity of newborn nations are seen as invented by elites for instrumental purposes, such as the rational pursuit of social status, power and wealth (Breuilly 1994: 55–69; Gellner 1983: 5–8, 58–63; Hobsbawm 1992: 9–14; Wimmer 2002: 42–83). In other words, modernists combine structural-functionalist and instrumentalist arguments to account for the role of history in nationalism. However, the functions of history and the instrumentalist motivations are usually assumed instead of being made an immediate object of study.

The modernist literature pays little attention to the historical obsession and cultural distinctiveness of nationalist movements largely because of its research focus. Modernists seek to explain nationalism as a universal phenomenon ("nationalism generally": Breuilly 1994: 1) – a powerful worldwide doctrine of political legitimacy and popular sovereignty. Therefore, they more willingly focus on universal changes in economy, technology and governance, such as the spread of long-distance communication, industrialization, the rise of mass politics and the nation-state (Breuilly 1994; Gellner 1983; Hall 1993; Hobsbawm 1990; Malešević 2013; Wimmer 2002). This neglect of inquiry into the historical face of the Modern Janus leads to significant limitations in the modernist literature. Namely, modernism offers little insight into why historical rhetoric dominates nationalist discourse and why particular local nationalisms based on this rhetoric develop. Clearly, industrialization, the development of communications, enfranchisement of the masses and the establishment of nation-state institutions make the idea of popular sovereignty more attractive and provide the necessary conditions for the entrance of mass culture into politics. However, all of these transformations in themselves neither select the historical and cultural markers of particular national identities nor make them socially thick.

Modernists run into contradictions when trying to account for the emergence of particular cultural boundaries. Despite their constructivist stance, analysts from the modernist camp usually resort to pre-modern "cultures" and "languages" (not explicitly *ethnies* or ethnic groups this time), which they see as bounded and self-perpetuating. On the one hand, the modernist scholars reject the nationalist view of nations as perennial, self-conscious and culturally homogeneous. The Herderian approach to nations comes under particularly severe intellectual attack (Anderson [1991] 2006: 6–7; Breuilly 1994: 55–63; Gellner 1983: 55). On the other hand, Gellner talks about pre-existing "cultures" and relatively consistent "cultural hollows" on the ground, whose

boundaries were employed by people negatively affected by industrialization to distinguish themselves from their exploiters and launch the process of political separation (Gellner 1997: 1–3, 33–36). Breuilly (1994: 121) and Hobsbawm (1990: 109) often mention dominant and non-dominant "cultural groups" (Germans, Poles etc.) whose members led rival nationalist movements. Similarly, in Anderson's ([1991] 2006: 37–46) account, print capitalism solidifies already distinguishable vernacular languages (a "variety of Frenches, Englishes and Spanishes": Anderson [1991] 2006: 44) and standardizes them into national ones, but does not create these "languages." Moreover, despite their generally constructionist stance, modernists tend to see some cultural groups (Armenians, Jews and Greeks: Gellner 1983: 101–112), but also others (Breuilly 1994; Hobsbawm 1990) as persisting over centuries. In his famous discussion of ethnic "navels," that is a direct continuity between pre-modern and contemporary cultural communities, Gellner (1997) admits that a number of nations have such navels. Accordingly, some "ethnic myths and memories of nations," although not under this name, are viewed by modernists as perennial (Hobsbawm 1990: 75–76; see the critique in: Pantelic 2011). And it is no surprize that the very same allegedly persistent myths are invoked by critics of the modernist approach (Armstrong 1982: 4, 283; Hastings 1997: 133; Hutchison 2005: 17–18; Smith 1999: 153–155).

All of these modernist interpretations have difficulty passing empirical scrutiny. Research documents that pre-modern "ethnicities" were locally focused and mutually overlapping. In other words, "big" cultural identities (e.g., German, Russian, Czech, Croatian, etc.) are themselves products of modern nationalism (Connor 1990; Eriksen 2002; Fine 2006; Halperin 1980, 2006; Karakasidou 1997; Kolsto 2005; King 2002; Mazower 2000; Winland 1995). Similarly, it is hard to talk about clearly distinguishable and bounded pre-modern "languages." Instead linguists point to continua of porous and overlapping idioms in that period. In Europe they distinguish West

Germanic, West Romance, Scandinavian and North and South Slavic continua, not particular "languages" (Chambers and Trudgill 1998: 4–7).

My explanation of the historical face of the Modern Janus combines the insights from both ethno-symbolist and modernist theories but aims to overcome some of their limitations. On the one hand, I adopt the ethno-symbolist idea that to account for the historical orientation and cultural specificity of modern nations, one must closely examine their most obvious sources: historical myths that form the backbone of national ideologies. I also follow the approach of ethno-symbolists, which explains the causes of national mythmaking genealogically through an understanding of specific historical situations, instead of deducing them in functionalist macro-sociological analyses (see: Hall 1993; Brubaker 2009). On the other hand, in accordance with modernist theories, I reject Nairn's idea about "the spell of rurality" and the ethno-symbolist view on – again, to paraphrase Nairn – the curse of pre-modern myth-symbol complexes. Instead I pay closer attention to the role of elites and the influence of modern processes in constructing boundary-setting national myths.

More specifically, my general theoretical argument is threefold. First, I suggest looking at nationalist mythopoeia in order to account for the historicity of the Modern Janus. Second, I focus on the experiences of leading nationalists to explain why particular myths have been constructed. Third, I analyze both external and internal sources of these experiences. Thus, in my interpretation, it is the positionality of mythmakers at the crossroads of external and internal influences that shapes particular national imaginations and identities.

The modernist scholarship points to external and internal developments while discussing nationalism: its emergence, global spread and penetration in different societies. These developments, however, are analyzed at the structural macro-level, often separately and with no

intention to explain the historicity of nationalism. Acknowledging the role of diffusion in the rise of nationalism, many scholars focus on the spread of ideology, discourses, institutions (e.g., schools, censuses and museums), legal traditions and administrative practices, often through immediate colonial intervention (Anderson [1991] 2006; Kertzer and Arel 2002; Kedourie 1993; Lange 2012; 2017: 61–81, 113–121; Mamdani 2001; Marx 1998; Uvin 2002). Other researchers, more concerned with the issue of popular reception, thoroughly analyze internal transformations such as industrialization, changing social stratification systems, state centralization and vigorous institution-building (Anderson [1991] 2006; Breuilly 1994; Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000; Hobsbawm 1990; Malešević 2013; Weber 1976; Wimmer 2002).

The scope of my analysis of the external and internal influences is at the same time more limited and more extensive. On the one hand, my four articles concentrate on the spread and reception of nationalist mythology among elites. Thus, my study of nationalism as a mass phenomenon (Connor 1990) stops at the top-down efforts to promote and popularize novel historical narratives. On the other hand, analyzing how external and internal influences are mirrored in the experiences of individual mythmakers, my dissertation portrays a richer picture of the interplay between different social forces. Instead of taking macro-sociological categories such "industrialization," "civil society" or "social stratification system" as my main heuristics, I look at more personalized social locations, experiences and interactions as the determinants of nationalist mythopoeia. This is why I more often talk about the life course of individual mythmakers: their geographical and family origins, networks, education, socialization, institutional involvement and participation in important historical events.

With all the critique I have voiced above with regards to the Nairnian, ethno-symbolist and modernist approaches to the historicity and cultural distinctiveness of nationalisms, these

approaches provide fertile ground for my own understanding of the issue. Here I would like to specify how my analysis utilizes and attempts to go beyond the existing scholarship.

My articles share the focus on intellectuals with the different versions of modernist and ethno-symbolist theories (Breuilly 1994; Gellner 1983; Malešević 2006; Smith 1990, 1999). However, in contrast to modernists, I do not view intellectuals as necessarily power-seeking (see similar position: Brubaker 1998; Malešević 2002; Varshney 2003). In contrast to ethno-symbolists, I reject the idea that the actions of mythmakers are constrained by pre-modern ethnic histories and myth-symbol complexes. Instead I look at the mythmakers as being positioned "betwixt and between" various societal, ideological and cultural influences (Eriksen 2002: 62–64). Thus, on the one hand, I show that history indeed can enter nationalist discourse because of the instrumental considerations of ethnic entrepreneurs. On the other hand, my research finds that the historical focus can be adopted by mere emulation and reinforced through the recognition by individual intellectuals of their cultural distinctiveness or geographical belonging. This realization of new identities is often very vague in the beginning (cf. Hall 2017). It does not necessarily happen because mythmakers want to capitalize on their "newly-found roots." Rather contrarily, increased attention to the "roots" can be conditioned by moral considerations or mere interest in non-mainstream cultural traits. Finally, historical mythopoeia can start as an unintended consequence of institutional pressures.

My approach resembles Wimmer's (2002: 19–41) analysis of modern "cultural compromise" wherein the political, social and cultural boundaries of the nation are negotiated between the competing groups of elites and masses. The outcome of this process of negotiation, according to Wimmer, determines the forms of national social closure. The notions of negotiation, compromise and interplay inform my analytical framework. However, in contrast to Wimmer, I

am answering a more specific question about the role of history and cultural diacritica in nationalist movements. Therefore, my approach is different in two ways. First, I better acknowledge the role of diffusion in the spread of nationalist ideas, and thus I examine external influences. Second, I look at the interplay of different social forces on the micro- and meso-level. In other words, instead of discussing how valuable resources, political power, civil society ties and persistent ethnic identities are distributed in different societies, I examine more specific life experiences of mythmakers. This helps me overcome the existing limitations in Wimmer's analytical framework: the liberal theory approach to ethnic conflict coupled with a groupist (if not perennialist) understanding of ethnicity (see, however, another study: Wimmer 2009).

The theory of the diffusion of nationalism in non-Western contexts by Partha Chatterjee informs my attentiveness to the interplay of both external and internal factors in shaping nationalist movements. In Chatterjee's (1993: 3–13) interpretation, the cultural variation in nationalisms and the nationalist obsession with primeval history can be explained by the fact that non-Western elites did not simply adopt the modular forms of nationhood coming from abroad. Instead, being connected to or living in geographically and culturally distinct societies, they adjusted the modular forms to local contexts. This was achieved through nationalists' creation of their own domain of sovereignty in the spiritual world of local society before the start of political battles in the material domain of the state. "The moral-intellectual leadership of the nationalist elite operated in the field constituted by a very different set of distinctions – those between the spiritual and the material, the inner and the outer, the essential and the inessential" (Chatterjee 1993: 10). Adopting the view of nationalists as intermediaries located "betwixt and between," I explore how this social location shaped mythopoeic action. At the same time, my dissertation does not focus on the creation of the

inner domain by elites, but offers a more detailed account of external and internal influences on their life courses.

In short, I align with the different versions of modernist and, to a lesser extent, ethnosymbolist theories in my inquiry into the behavior of intellectual elites. Following Wimmer, I understand the specific embodiments of nationalism as an outcome of "cultural compromise," that is, the interplay of multiple social forces in the process of negotiating the boundaries of nations. Agreeing with Chatterjee on problematizing the idea of diffusion, I look at the interactions between external and internal factors in the development of nationalism. This being said, my dissertation has its own specific twist. It pays closer attention to the micro- and meso-level dynamics and the life course of nationalist mythmakers.

Case Selection

The dissertation articles focus on two cases of Balkan nationalism: Serbian and Albanian. More specifically, I study the emergence and dissemination of the two important historical narratives which have laid the foundations for Serbian and Albanian national identities: the myth of the Battle of Kosovo and the myth of Abanians' pre-Roman Illyrian origins. These cases are selected for a number of theoretical, methodological and practical reasons.

First, the Balkans have been one of the main cases on which the leading theories of nationalism have been constructed and tested (Gellner 1983; Breuilly 1994; Hobsbawm 1990; Malešević 2006, 2013). The nationalist ideology in the Balkans has relied heavily on historical discourse (Dimou 2009; Kolouri 2002; Kolsto 2005; Mazower 2002). Importantly for my focus on the interplay of external and internal factors, the leading theorists recognize the decisive role of both extensive foreign involvement and local peculiarities (borderland peasant societies with

underdeveloped high cultures) in the evolution of Balkans nationalisms (Blumi 2003; Breuilly 1994; Gellner 1983; Glenny 2000; Hall 2017; Malešević 2013; Seton-Watson 1977).

Second, since my study engages with the debate between ethno-symbolists and modernists and traces the historical development of nationalisms, I follow the chronological principle. In doing so, I purposefully select nationalist cases oppositely placed in terms of timing. The Serbian nationalist movement is among the earliest, while Albanian nationalism is among the latest in the region. The scholarly phase of Serbian nationalism can be traced back to the eighteenth century. The First Serbian uprising started in 1804, thus, having preceded the Greek War of Independence. In contrast, Albanian nationalism is unanimously considered in the literature as a late-comer. For the first time Albanian political demands were voiced by the League of Prizren in the aftermath of the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War. The Albanian nation-state was officially established in 1912–1913, but barely had any significant infrastructural power until the late 1920s–early 1930s (Breuilly 1994: 137–139; Jelavich and Jelavich 1997; Hroch 1993: 8; 2003: 44–47; Mazower 2000; Misha 2008; Skendi 1967; Stavrianos 2000; Vickers 1997; see critique of this chronology in: Hall 2017; Malešević 2013).

Third, addressing the discussion on the real and imagined historical "roots" of nationalism, I select to study Serbian and Albanian cases because scholars locate them at the opposite ends of the historical rootedness scale.

The Serbian nation is often seen in the literature as having deep historical foundations or even being perennial. Allying with nationalist interpretation of the Serbian history many scholars assume that a strong sense of distinct Serbian identity had already existed in the medieval period and has been sustained until the present day through religious practices and epic traditions (Banac 1984: 68; Hastings 1997: 135; Hobsbawm 1990: 75–76; Stavrianos 2000; see critique in: Pantelic

2011). Accordingly, the origins of the Serbian Kosovo myth are often located in the Middle Ages (Bataković 1991; Ćupić 1991; Djordjević 1992; Gorup 1991; Jovanović 1990; Leshchilovskaia 1994; Mihailovich 1991: 141–147; Pitulić 2012; Redjep 1976, 1991; Tomashevich 1991; see also: Bakić-Hayden 2004; Bieber 2002; Belov 2007: 479–511; Čolović 2011; Duijzings 2000: 176–194; Kaufman 2003: 3–4, 30–31, 170–171; Mock 2012: 157–162; Smith 1999: 153–155). This makes the myth one of the "crucial cases" for ethno-symbolist theory, allegedly proving the existence of durable myth-symbol complexes that sustain nations' "ethnic cores" over centuries (Armstrong 1982: 4, 283; Hutchison 2005: 9, 17–18, 20, 22; Kaufman 2003: 3–4; Smith 1999: 153–155; 2011: 236).

On the contrary, Albanian nationalism is viewed in the literature as not only belated but also constructed by elites. Early generations of Albanian nationalists are praised for being able to overcome religious cleavages and to produce a unifying ideology based on linguistic similarity (Clayer 2009; Jelavich and Jelavich 1997; Misha 2008; Skendi 1967; Vickers 1997). Scholars find that many myths of Albanian nationhood are of relatively recent making (Schwander-Sievers and Fischer 2002; see also: Schmitt 2008). Thus, selecting two cases on opposite ends of the spectrum regarding historical rootedness allows me to problematize the theories of Nairn, ethno-symbolism, and modernism.

Fourth, the Serbian and Albanian cases are selected in view of their historical interdependence. This is because the scholarship finds rival nationalisms mutually reinforcing (see: Danforth 1995; Harrison 1995; Proeva 2010; Ross 2001, 2007; Triandafyllidou 1998) and this dissertation investigates the interplay between external and internal influences. Since the early periods of the Serbian nationalist movement, Albanians have been seen as the Other (Pavlović et

al. 2015). The same can be said about Albanian nationalism with regard to Serbs. This situation has often led to reactionary responses between the two nationalisms.

Fifth, the two cases are chosen in order to avoid my research being influenced by historiographical traditions that are themselves products of history. Rich scholarship points to the fact that the emergence of humanities and social sciences depended on nationalist projects. Nationalist ideologies have left a deep imprint onto existing research traditions (Abrahams 1993; Geary 2002; Kohl 1998; Trigger 1984). Therefore, scholars may run the risk of being influenced by the existing body of literature. Serbian history is one of the most thoroughly studied in the Balkans, while the Albanian past has received considerably lesser attention, both at home and abroad. My study extensively utilizes secondary sources, and having a variation in historiographical traditions helps control for the influence of older studies, which have been more susceptible to perennialist approaches. In addition, the relative scarcity of research on Albanian historical mythmaking allows me to make contributions to the area-specific literature.

Finally, I select the Serbian and Albanian cases because I conduct a detailed analysis of specific historical situations and the life course of individual mythmakers. Such an analysis is hardly attainable without considerable knowledge of local languages, historiography and archival collections. Thus, I heavily rely on my good command of Serbian and Albanian and my educational experiences in the region.

Methods and Data

The **methodological toolkit** of the dissertation includes the extended case study method as well as primary and secondary within-case comparative historical methods. The dissertation is organized as a sequence of separate articles on the following topics: the emergence and

dissemination of the Serbian Kosovo myth, the role of early diasporics in the making of an Albanian identity, the contribution of Western archaeologists to early Albanian nation-building, and the Serbian-Albanian mythopoeic contest over Kosovo during their last conflict. Each article addresses a specific debate in the literature and tests existing theoretical assumptions. The *extended case study method* provides a suitable methodological framework for conducting an in-depth analysis of concrete cases. At the same time, it allows me to extract general principles from specific observations and revise existing theories (Burawoy 1998; Tavory and Timmermans 2009).

For each iteration of the within-case analysis, I use a number of **primary within-case methods**. These methods enable me to generate empirical evidence, which later is analyzed by means of secondary within-case methods (Lange 2013: 55–61). I rely on the *historical narratives* to describe the initial structural conditions for mythmaking and assess the historical rootedness of Serbian and Albanian collective memories. The *internal temporal comparison* helps trace the institutional development in the two cases and the evolution of Serbian national ideology over time. The *qualitative prosopography* allows me to assess the motivations of early Albanian nationalists and Western archaeologists based on the details of their personal biographies.

Among **secondary within-case methods** I choose causal narrative, process tracing and pattern matching (Lange 2013: 42–55). The *causal narrative* involves ordering significant events through time. It analyzes complex causal sequences in order to gain insight into multiple causes of a particular social phenomenon. I employ causal narratives to explain why Serbian and Albanian myths were first produced by nationalist intellectuals and then became officially sanctioned. I also explore why certain institutional frameworks turned out to be more conducive to the emergence and the spread of the nationalist myths.

15

The *process-tracing* method focuses on how one specific cause produces one single outcome, leading to the discovery of causal mechanisms (on social mechanisms, see: van den Berg 1998). Using process tracing, I analyze how nationalist ideologies diffused from Western centers to Serbian and Albanian diasporas and ultimately penetrated the institutions of the two states. I also trace how the buildup of nationalizing institutions assured a smooth dissemination of the elite-produced nationalist myths among the masses, and how these institutions shaped motivations and interests of later generations of nationalists. Additionally, in the article on the role of Western archaeologists in early Albanian nation-building, I explore mechanisms of translating foreign technological, methodological and institutional influences into the local nationalist doctrine.

Finally, comparative historical sociologists employ *pattern matching* to see if the case matches the pattern predicted by a pre-existing theory. In the literature, this method is often used in a reversed way, allowing scholars to test whether a theory extracted from an in-depth analysis of a single case works under other circumstances. Following the latter approach, in two of my articles, I assess the generalizability of the theoretical findings, conducting supplementary case studies of Georgian, Filipino, Macedonian and Irish nationalisms.

The **corpus of data** analyzed in the dissertation comprises of secondary literature, published primary sources and archival documents. The access to all of these sources requires considerable familiarity with local languages, research traditions, historiographies and archival networks. My good command of Albanian, Serbian and other European languages as well as my previous education at Perm, Saint-Petersburg, Tirana, Ljubljana and Budapest served as solid stepping stones for completing the data collection and analysis. A significant portion of my data was gathered during my MA years at Tirana, Ljubljana and Budapest (2009–2012). Other sources were consulted at McGill through the system of Interlibrary Loan. Lastly, the empirical component

of my dissertation vastly benefited from my recent fieldwork in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia from June to August 2017.

The *secondary literature* analyzed in the dissertation includes the general overviews of Serbian and Albanian histories, works on the genesis of Balkan nationalisms and national identities, studies dealing with development of Balkan diasporas, and publications devoted to the major historical events. Rich data on the life course of individual mythmakers and on their roles in ideological and institutional transformations come from biographies of influential Serbian and Albanian politicians (e.g., Nikola Pašić, Ilija Garašanin, the Frashëri brothers and Pashko Vasa) and intellectuals (e.g., Vuk Karadzić, Antun Avgustinčić, Elena Gjika and Konstantin Kristoforidhi). Invaluable for tracing the historical trajectories of national myths and identities are the diachronic studies of literature, folklore, religious traditions, public commemorations, education systems and cultural practices in Serbia and Albania. Sociological, anthropological and political scientific works on the two post-communist societies foster my analysis of contemporary processes.

The *published primary sources* used in the dissertation mainly include mythopoeic works authored by leading Serbian and Albanian nationalists: historical and philological studies, novels and poetry, propagandistic pamphlets, journalistic pieces and textbooks. They also contain personal correspondence, memoirs, public speeches and proclamations. Over a dozen travelogues written by westerners who set foot in the Balkans in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries play an indispensable role in my account of mass identities and collective memories at the onset of nationalist movements.

Last but not least, my study relies on *archival data* from six archives. The unpublished sources on the development of Serbian historical mythology were drawn from the State Archives

17

of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo, the State Archives of Montenegro in Cetinje, the Kosovo Archives in Pristina and the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. The data that helps fill the gaps in my narrative about Albanian nationalism come from the Central State Archives and the manuscript division of the National Library in Tirana.

Contribution to Original Knowledge and Outline of Articles

In contrast to the most of the existing studies, my dissertation focuses on the interplay between external and internal sources in the development of nationalism. This focus helps me make three important contributions **on the general theoretical level**. First, I offer an original explanation for why nationalism, as the Modern Janus, flaunts its salient historical face to suggest the cultural uniqueness of each nation. Modernist theories rarely tackle this issue because they focus on the universal, cross-cultural components of nationalism, often reduced to the doctrine of popular sovereignty or a new form of governance advanced by nation-states. Other scholarship is marked by references to the "spell of rurality" or the inexorable power of pre-modern myth-symbol complexes, which are hardly supportable in view of empirical evidence. Critiquing the existing literature, I explain the historicity and cultural distinctiveness of nationalisms by the presence of boundary-making national myths. In turn, accounting for the construction of these narratives, I refer to the positionality of mythmakers located at the crossroads of external and internal influences. In my view, mythmakers turn to deep "roots" in response to outside ideological and institutional pressures and the challenges of modern transformations *coupled with* an awareness of cultural distinctiveness and geographical belonging. This turn and the adoption of new identities are often sequential and driven by life experiences. They are not instantaneous and instrumentally motivated.

Second, a closer look at the sources of nationalism at the meso- and micro-level helps me identify additional impulses behind the worldwide spread of nationalism. Specifically, I find that diaspora communities, Western archaeological institutions and intergroup mythopoeic contestations often play a significant facilitating role.

Third, the simultaneous analysis of external and internal influences advances the understanding of nationalism as an inherently intergroup phenomenon. On the one hand, the literature often acknowledges the importance of the Other in shaping national identities. On the other hand, most works on nationalism pay little attention to interactive and intergroup dynamics (see: Triandafyllidou 1998).

Each of the four articles in my dissertation resonates with the general theoretical framework. The first and second articles look at the positionality of the diaspora Serbian and Albanian speakers to explain the emergence and the spread of national myths. The third article analyzes the biographies and institutional experiences of foreign archaeologists in Albania and evaluates their contributions to local nation-building. Finally, the fourth article focuses on the participation of intellectuals in the symbolic contest over Kosovo. It suggests the theoretical importance of professional socialization in Communist countries and the interactive dynamics of nationalist mythopoeia.

In addition to advancing general theories of nationalism, each article makes **a contribution to more specific debates in the literature:**

Article No. 1. *"Ethnic Memories" from Above: The Promotion of the Kosovo Myth among the South Slavs (1830s–1930s)*

In the first article, I show that the Kosovo myth has been often considered as a "crucial" supporting case for ethno-symbolist theory, suggesting that modern nationalist narratives are

necessarily rooted in centuries-long ethnic memories. Thus, many theorists of nationalism as well as area scholars see this myth as either the direct continuation or creative reinterpretation of long-standing epic and liturgical tradition of the Slavic Orthodox population in the Balkans. Relying on secondary sources and archival data, in the first article I trace the processes through which the Kosovo myth emerged and was communicated to the masses. I argue that the Kosovo myth is a modern phenomenon.

First, the evidence shows that the medieval texts and epics referring to the Battle of Kosovo cannot be considered as genuine "ethnic memories." Moreover, cultural rupture and change rather than recurrence characterize the history of these scattered, rare and ambivalent legacies. Second, the dissemination of the Kosovo myth constituted a long, top-down and elite-led process instead of being provoked, welcomed or supported by the broad masses. This process was well organized and initially propelled by diaspora circles, and it began in a limited number of locations. The motivations of the mythmakers were modern, while the propagandistic materials did not *rely on* "ethnic memories" of the masses, but *explained to* the masses what those memories actually were. With the latter finding I make a methodological contribution to the literature. Namely, I suggest that studying the ways *how* particular communal narratives have been spread can help scholars to assess *whether those narratives are ancient or relatively recent*.

Article No. 2. *Longing for the Nation-State: Diasporic Myths and the Spread of Nationalism in Albania*

In the second article, I state that recent decades have yielded rich scholarship on diaspora, migration and migrant transnationalism. At the same time, new discussions have developed in the generalist theoretical scholarship concerning the diffusion of nationalism, the spread of the nation-state model and the contemporary rise of long-distance nationalism. Nevertheless, scholars have

paid only limited attention to the role of diasporas and migrants in the initial spread of nationalism and the creation of nation-states. Therefore, with the second article I aim to tie together a number of missing links between the different strands of existing scholarship.

I scrutinize published diasporic biographies, archival evidence and existing secondary literature and use the methods of agreement, process tracing and pattern matching. My analysis of Albanian and other supplementary cases shows that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, diasporas and expatriate communities served as important carriers of the modular social artifact of nationhood to non-Western countries. They played a significant role in the initial spread of nationalism, the establishment of nation-states and nation-building in diasporics' places of origin. In addition, the second article traces the life course of early Albanian diasporics. This procedure helps me discover the mechanisms by which nationalism was transmitted from the original centers to diasporics and, through them, to non-Western contexts. I also highlight the significance of the diasporic myths of homeland in nation-building in sending societies.

Article No. 3. *Imperialist Archaeologists and the Constraints of Institutions: On Unintended Contributions of Western Archaeology to Nationalism in Albania and Beyond*

My analysis in the third article also begins with a critical assessment of the existing literature. I find that following the famous typology of Bruce Trigger, many critical scholars distinguish between *imperialist* and *nationalist* archaeologies. They see only the latter as a powerful source of nation-building in non-Western societies. Furthermore, the literature tends to view archaeologists as akin to other ethnic entrepreneurs and nationalist intellectuals. The ability of archaeology as a particular social field with its own institutional scripts to resist and moderate external political influences lacks sufficient study. Therefore, in the third article I aim to overcome existing limitations in the critical research. I implement an extended case study of Western

21

archaeologists in Albania before the Second World War, relying on both archival and published sources.

My findings show that in Albania, *imperialist* archaeologists made significant contributions to the construction of *national* identity and the establishment of the *nationalist* research tradition. Furthermore, the specific influences that westerners exerted on Albanian nationalism were largely determined by the *institutional contexts* in which they were operating. Nevertheless, I find that compared to other occupations, archaeologists in Albania and abroad were latecomers to the politics of national identity. This is because the inescapable materiality of archaeological inquiry and high requirements for training tend to slow down the production of ideological narratives within the discipline.

Article No. 4. *Identity Construction as a Moral Response: Emergence of an Albanian Counter-Myth of the Kosovo Battle*

In my fourth article, I discover a number of contradictions and intellectually disturbing dichotomies in the scholarship. The literature on nationalism highlights the crucial role of salient historical myths in forging a national identity and triggering ethnic conflict, but pays scant attention to what motivates mythmakers. In this respect, first, ethno-symbolists and modernists tend to explain mythmakers' motivations through a dichotomy: they are either an outcome of a centuries-long ethnic past or a product of the current political context. Thus, nationalists are seen as either victims of long-lasting ethnic narratives or persistently rational calculators. Second, the literature tends to analyze nationalist mythopoeia primarily as a response to developments within a national community, be it the resurgence of long-standing ethnic memories or specific political configurations that create windows of opportunities.

My historical-sociological analysis of a case of Kosovar Albanian mythopoeia and two supplementary ones (Macedonia and Georgia) shows that nationalist narratives can initially emerge as counter-myths. These narratives often constitute ad hoc moral responses from the true believers, converted to defensive nationalism in professional institutions, to the politicization of the past by out-groups. Only after these glorifying myths are created may nationalists use them instrumentally. The findings of the fourth article show that existing dichotomies must be overcome to better capture the variety of nationalist mythopoeia cases. Specifically, I argue that in line with the ethno-symbolist argument, history should be taken seriously, but the relatively recent history of institution-building rather than perennial ethnic memories. Following the modernist approach, the instrumental motives need to be analyzed and exposed, but these motives should not be preconceived as time-invariant or inherent to all mythmakers. In addition, exposing the interactive dynamics of mythopoeia, I state that both schools can benefit from paying closer attention to national elites' moral reactions to outsiders' instrumental use of the past.

Contribution of the Author

All four articles are sole-authored by Matvey Lomonosov. Each of them is currently under review at peer-reviewed journals, including *Sociology, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Current Anthropology* and *Ethnic and Racial Studies*.

Bibliography

Abrahams, Roger D. "Phantoms of Romantic Nationalism in Folkloristics." *Journal of American Folklore* 106 (419).3 (1993): 3-37.

Anderson, Benedict R. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London: Verso, 2006.

Armstrong, John. *Nations before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

Banac, Ivo. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Baretto, Amilcar. "Nationalism, Collective Action and Rationality." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 18.3 (2012): 316–336.

Bataković, Dušan. "Značaj Kosovskog predanja u održanju srpskog naroda na Kosovu i Metohiji u 19. veku [The Significance of the Kosovo memories in Retention of Ser-bian People in Kosovo and Metohija in the 19th Century]." In: *Kosovska bitka 1389. godine i njene posledice*, edited by Nikola Tasić and Veselin Djuretić, 121–131. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1991.

Bieber, Florian. "Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo Myth from the 600th anniversary of the present." *Rethinking History* 6.1 (2002): 95–110.

Blumi, Isa. *Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: a Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen, 1878-1918*. Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003.

Brass, Paul R. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison.* New Delhi: SAGE, 1991.

Breuilly, John. *Nationalism and the State.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Brubaker, Rogers. "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35 (2009): 21-42.

Brubaker, Rogers. "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism." In *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, edited by John A. Hall, 272–306. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Burawoy, Michael. "The Extended Case Method." *Sociological Theory* 16.1 (1998): 4-33.

Chambers, J K, and Peter Trudgill. *Dialectology.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Clayer, Nathalie. *Ne fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e nje kombi me shumice myslimane ne Evrope [At the Beginning of Albanian Nationalism. The Emergence of a Nation with Muslim Majority in Europe]*. Tirana: Perpjekja, 2009.

Connor, Walker. "When is a Nation?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13.1 (1990): 92-103.

Ćupić, Drago. "Kosovski mit i Crna Gora [The Kosovo Myth and Montenegro]." In: *Kosovska bitka 1389. godine i njene posledice*, edited by Nikola Tasić and Veselin Djuretić, 111–119. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1991.

Danforth, Loring *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Dimou, Alexandra, ed. *"Transition" and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*. Gottingen: V&R UniPress, 2009.

Djordjević, Dimitrije. "The Tradition of Kosovo in the Formation of Modern State-hood in the Nineteenth Century." In: *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas Emmert, 309–330. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.

Duijzings, Ger. *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo.* New York: Columbia University, 2000.

Eriksen, Thomas. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives.* London: Pluto Press, 2002.

Fine, John V. A. *When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans: A Study of Identity in Pre-Nationalist Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia in the Medieval and Early-Modern Periods.* Ann Arbor, Mich: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2006.

Gat, Azar. *Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Geary, Patrick. *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nationalism*. New York: New York University Press, 1997.

Gellner, Ernst. *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*. London: Granta Books, 2000.

Gorup, Radmila. "Kosovo and Epic Poetry." In: *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas Emmert, 109–121. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.

Guibernau, Montserrat. *The Identity of Nations.* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010.

Hall, John A. "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained." *Daedalus* 122.3 (1993): 1-28.

Hall, John A. "Taking Megalomanias Seriously: Rough Notes." *Thesis Eleven* 139.1 (2017): 30-45.

Halperin, Charles J. "Rus', Russia and National Identity." *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 48.1-2 (2006): 157-166.

Halperin, Charles J. "The Concept of the *Ruskaia zemlia* and Medieval National Consciousness from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Centuries." *Nationalities Papers* 8.1 (1980): 75-86.

Harrison, Simon. "Four Types of Symbolic Conflict." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 1:2 (1995): 255-272.

Hastings, Adrian. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Hechter, Michael. *Containing Nationalism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Hobsbawm, Eric. Introduction to *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 1–14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Hroch, Miroslav. "From National Movement to Fully-fledged Nation." *New Left Review* 198 (1993): 3–20.

Hroch, Miroslav. *Małe narody Europy: perspektywa historyczna [The Small Nations of Europe: A Historical Perspective]*. Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2008.

Hutchinson, John. *Nations as Zones of Conflict.* London: SAGE, 2005.

Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920.* Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1997

Karakasidou, Anastasia N. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870-1990.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Kaufman, Stuart J. *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

Kertzer, David and Dominique Arel. "Censuses, Identity Formation, and the Struggle for Political Power." In: *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*,

edited by David Kertzer and Dominique Arel, 1–42. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

King, Jeremy. *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Kohl, Philip L. "Nationalism and Archaeology: On the Constructions of Nations and the Reconstructions of the Remote Past." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 27.1 (1998): 223-246.

Kolouri, Christina, ed. *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education.* Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, 2002.

Kolstø, Pål. "Assessing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society." In: *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, edited by Pål Kolstø, 1–35. London: Hurst & Company, 2005.

Lange, Matthew. *Comparative-Historical Methods.* London: Sage, 2013.

Lange, Matthew. *Educations in Ethnic Violence: Identity, Educational Bubbles, and Resource Mobilization.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Lange, Matthew. *Killing Others: A Natural History of Ethnic Violence.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017.

Malešević, Siniša. *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Malešević, Siniša. *Nation-states and Nationalisms: Organization, Ideology and Solidarity.* Chichester: Polity Press, 2013.

Malešević, Sinisa. "Rational Choice Theory and the Sociology of Ethnic Relations: A Critique." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25.2 (2002) 193-212.

Mamdani, Mahmood. "Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43.4 (2001): 651-664.

Marx, Anthony W. *Making Race, Making Nations: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Mazower, Mark. *The Balkans: From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day.* London: Phoenix, 2000.

Misha, Piro. *Arrtisja nga burgjet e historise. [The Break out of the Prisons of the History]*. Tirane: Toena, 2008.

Mock, Steven. *Symbols of Defeat in the Construction of National Identity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Nairn, Tom. *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*. London: Verso, 1997.

Ozkırımlı, Umut. "The Nation as an Artichoke? A Critique of Ethnosymbolist Interpretations of Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 9.3 (2003): 339–355.

Pantelić, Bratislav. "Memories of a Time Forgotten: The Myth of the Perennial Nation." Nations and Nationalism 17.2 (2011): 443–464.

Pavlović, Aleksandar, Adriana Zaharijević, Gazala Pudar Draško, and Rigels Halili, eds. *Figura neprijatelja: Preosmisljivanje srpsko-albanskih odnosa [Image of the Enemy: Rethinking Serbo-Albanian Relations]*. Beograd: IFDT & KPZ Beton, 2015.

Pitulić, Valentina. "Kosovska bitka izmedju istorijskih izvora i epske legende [The Battle of Kosovo between Historical Sources and Epic Legend]." *Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Prištini* (Pristina) 42:2 (2012): 99–112.

Proeva, Nade. "Savremeni makedonski mit kao odgovor na nationalne mitovi suseda: albanski panilirizam, bugarski pantrakizam i grčki panhelenizam" ["The Contemporary Macedonian Myth as a Response to National Myths of the Neighbors: Albanian Pan-Illyrianism, Bulgarian Pan-Thracianism and Greek Pan-Hellenism"]. *Zgodovinski časopis* 64.1-2 (2010): 176–219.

Redjep, Jelka. "The Legend of Kosovo." *Oral Tradition* 6.2-3 (1991): 253–265.

Redjep, Jelka. Prića o boju Kosovskom [The Tale of the Kosovo Battle]. Zrenjanin: Centar za kulturu, 1976.

Ross, Marc. *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Ross, Marc. "Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas: Identity Dynamics in Ethnic Conflict." *Political Psychology* 22.1 (2001): 157–178.

Roudometof, Victor. *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question.* Westport: Prager, 2002.

Schmitt, Oliver J. *Skënderbeu [Scanderbeg].* Tiranë: KetB, 2008.

Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie and Bernd J. Fischer, eds. *Albanian Identities: Myth and History.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nation and States: An Enquiry in to the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism.* London: Methuen, 1977.

Skendi, Stavro. 1967. *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878–1912.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Smith, Anthony D. "National Identity and Vernacular Mobilization in Europe." *Nations and Nationalism* 17.2 (2011): 223–256.

Smith, Anthony D. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach.* London: Routledge, 2009.

Smith, Anthony D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity.* Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991.

Stavrianos, Leften S. *The Balkans since 1543.* London: C. Hurst and Co, 2000.

Tavory, Iddo and Stefan Timmermans. "Two Cases of Ethnography: Grounded theory and the extended case method." *Ethnography* 10.3 (2009): 243-263.

Triandafyllidou, Anna. National Identity and the 'Other'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21.4 (1998): 593-612.

Trigger, Bruce. "Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist." *Man* 19 (1984): 355-70.

Uvin, Peter. "On Counting, Categorizing and Violence in Burundi and Rwanda." In: *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, edited by David Kertzer and Dominique Arel, 148–175. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Van den Berg, Axel. "Is Sociological Theory too Grand for Social Mechanisms?" In *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, edited by Hedström, Peter and Richard Swedberg, 204–237. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Varshney, Ashutosh. "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality." *Perspectives on politics* 1.1 (2003): 85-99.

Weber, Eugene. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Wimmer, Andreas. "Herder's Heritage and the Boundary-Making Approach: Studying Ethnicity in Immigrant Societies." *Sociological Theory* 27.3 (2009): 244-270.

Wimmer, Andreas. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity.* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002.

Winland, Daphne N. "" We Are Now an Actual Nation": The Impact of National Independence on the Croatian Diaspora in Canada." *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 4.1 (1995): 3-29.

Article 1. "Ethnic Memories" from Above: The Promotion of the Kosovo Myth among the South Slavs (1830s–1930s)

Abstract: The Kosovo myth is often seen as a crucial supporting case for ethno-symbolist theory, which argues that modern nationalist narratives are necessarily rooted in centuries-long ethnic memories. Thus, many theorists of nationalism as well as area scholars see this myth as either the direct continuation or creative reinterpretation of a long-standing epic and liturgical tradition of the Slavic Orthodox population in the Balkans. Relying on secondary sources and archival data, this article traces the processes through which the Kosovo myth emerged and was communicated to the masses. It argues that the Kosovo myth is a modern phenomenon. First, the evidence shows that the medieval texts and epics referring to the Battle of Kosovo cannot be considered as genuine "ethnic memories." Moreover, cultural rupture and change rather than recurrence characterize the history of these scattered, rare and ambivalent legacies. Second, the dissemination of the Kosovo myth constituted a long top-down and elite-led process instead of being provoked, welcomed or supported by broad masses of population. This process was well organized and began in a limited number of locations, and the motivations of the mythmakers were modern; the propagandistic materials did not *rely on* "ethnic memories" of the masses, but *explained to* the masses what those memories actually were. Methodologically, the latter finding suggests that studying the ways *how* particular communal narratives have been spread can help scholars to assess *whether those narratives are ancient or relatively recent*.

Introduction

The myth of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo has played a remarkable role in the political history of the Balkans, and it is considered one of the most persistent nationalist narratives in Modern Europe. It helped Slobodan Milošević assume political power in the 1980s and is often held accountable for the growth of Serbian nationalism and even ethnic cleansing in the former

Yugoslavia. Although the content of the Kosovo myth, its political uses and its social functions have been studied extensively (Belov 2007: 479–511; Bieber 2002; Čolović 2016; Djokic 2009; Duijzings 2000: 176–202; Emmert 1992; Malcolm 1998: 58–80; Mertus 1999; Popović 1998; Redjep 1976, 1991; Trgovčević 1999; Vujačić 2015 et al.), the question whether the narrative represents a modern ideological construct or a deep-rooted ethnic memory remains controversial. Following traditional historiography and primordialist theory, many scholars view the myth as a foundation of Serbian historical memory and claim that its modern interpretations are mere reincarnations of centuries-old patriotic narratives (Bataković 1991; Bojović 1989; Ćupić 1991; Djordjević 1991; Gorup 1991; Jovanović 1990; Mihailovich 1991: 141–147; Pitulić 2012; Redjep 1976, 1991 et al.). Another group of researchers takes an intermediate position, attributing the popularity and power of the Kosovo myth to its pre-modern religious and epic antecedents, even if the latter were substantially reinterpreted by nationalists (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Bieber 2002; Belov 2007: 479–511; Čolović 2011; Duijzings 2000: 176–194; Kaufman 2003: 3–4, 30–31, 170–171; Smith 1999: 153–155; Mock 2012: 157–162; Vujačić 2015: 130–138). Finally, revisionists emphasize cultural rupture, arguing that only scattered, not widely popular, memories of the medieval battle existed before the nineteenth century. These memories had never constituted an integrated set of patriotic beliefs and had not served as anchors of ethnic solidarities in the pre-nationalist period (Greenawalt 2001; Malcolm 1998: 58–80; Pantelić 2011: 447–448; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016).

The state of affairs in the literature on the Kosovo narrative reflects wider academic discussions in the studies of nationalist mythology and nation-building. And if primordialism in these fields has long been debunked, debates between ethno-symbolists and modernists are still ongoing. Ethno-symbolists argue that most modern nationalist myths are causally linked to and

have antecedents in the pre-modern memories and symbols of ethnic groups. Modernists tend to focus on conspicuous examples of "invented" history, saying that national leaders introduce completely novel narratives without taking pre-existing historical legacies into account.

This article concentrates on the Kosovo myth, which is often seen as "perennial" (see: Pantelić 2011). Instead of merely assessing pre-modern Serbian memories, I also look closely at the process of the myth's dissemination. I argue that studying *how* nationalist myths proliferated helps us assess *whether* their appeal and success were dependent on the memories of pre-modern ethnic groups. I conclude that the Kosovo myth is a modern phenomenon, as I find that its dissemination from the 1830s to 1930s was an organized, top-down process, which allowed nationalists to *create* "ethnic memories," not *reactivate* them.

The analysis is based on published primary and secondary sources as well as archival data. Its central chronological focus extends from the establishment of the autonomous Serbian polity to the beginning of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. Although my attention concentrates on Serbia, Montenegro and the Yugoslav state, the activities of Serbs living under Ottoman and Habsburg rule are also analyzed.

Literature Review and the Counterfactual Model

The myth of the Battle of Kosovo has been widely studied. Recent scholarship has usually focused on its political uses in the context of Yugoslavia's collapse, the rise of Serbian nationalism in the twentieth century, and the bloody wars of the 1990s (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Bieber 2002; Čolović 2011; Duijzings 2000: 176–202; Malcolm 1998: 58–80; Mertus 1999; Mock 2012; Šajkaš 2008; Vujačić 2007, 2015). Earlier studies, most of them published in Yugoslavia, have addressed the role of the Kosovo memories in what has been called the "national liberation" (Bataković 1991;

Bojović 1989; Ćupić 1991; Trgovčević 1999; cf. Djordjević 1991). The process through which the narrative of the battle emerged in the nineteenth-century fiction and historiography has been traced meticulously (Čolović 2016; Kosanović 1989; Ignjatović 2014; Mihailovich 1991; Popovich 1991; Vujačić 2015). Scholars have provided a detailed description of some governmental and church endeavors to commemorate the Battle of Kosovo, particularly its 500th anniversary in 1889 (Durković-Jakšić 1989; Kraljić 1991; Pavlović 1989; Pejin 1991; cf. Emmert 1992; Tomashvich 1991). It is difficult to overestimate the contribution of all of these works to the scholarship on Serbian history and symbolic representations. As readers can see, while adopting an opposite theoretical stance, this article relies heavily on concrete research done by previous generations of Serbian and foreign scholars.

Despite this admirably long research tradition, what remains highly debated in the literature is the origin of the contemporary Kosovo myth as a powerful nationalist narrative. On the one hand, it is clear that a significant number of liturgical sources and Serbian epic folksongs have referred to the medieval battle over several centuries. On the other hand, disagreements arise when it comes to the popularity of these legacies in pre-nineteenth-century "Serbian" society and their causal relationship to the modern Kosovo myth.

A number of traditionalist scholars see the nationalist narrative as an extension of the strong religious cult surrounding the leader of the anti-Ottoman forces, Prince Lazar, as well as the widely popular epics devoted to the battle. According to their view, the intellectual and political leaders of the Serbian national movement simply introduced an already existing and popularly held patriotic narrative into emerging modern high culture. Often this argument is combined with a conviction that the Orthodox Church has served historically as a guardian of Serbian cultural identity (Bataković 1991; Ćupić 1991; Djordjević 1991; Gorup 1991; Jovanović 1990;

Leshchilovskaia 1994; Mihailovich 1991: 141–147; Pitulić 2012; Redjep 1976, 1991; Tomashevich 1991; cf. Vujačić 2015: 130–132). The second group of analysts thinks that the narrative of the Kosovo battle was transformed significantly by nineteenth-century nationalists, who supplemented it with an imperative of struggle for national unity, affirmation and self-determination. At the same time, they admit that the historical rootedness of the narrative in the pre-existing cult of Lazar, epics and medieval monastic texts allowed new nationalist interpretations to appeal to wider masses (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Bieber 2002; Belov 2007: 479–511; Čolović 2011, 2016; Duijzings 2000: 176–194; Kaufman 2003: 3–4, 30–31, 170–171; Smith 1999: 153–155; Mock 2012: 157–162; Vujačić 2015: 130–138). Delving deeper into the past, Miodrag Popović's (1998) path-breaking work attempts to discover the roots of the Kosovo myth in pagan beliefs and the knightly oral tradition of the region. He attributes the success of the nationalist mythmaking in the nineteenth century to the fact that it strongly resonated with the *un*modernized irrational consciousness of Balkan peasants. Florian Bieber (2002) focuses on contemporary uses of the myth and stresses its evolution over time. However, he also tends to acknowledge the uninterrupted existence of popular memories about Kosovo over the centuries.

Notably, in many studies of the historical lineage and causality of the Kosovo myth, the tendency to admit path-dependent arguments comes from a methodological approach rather than substantial findings or theoretical preferences. Thus, the scholars in comparative literature and literary archaeology (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Gorup 1991; Mihailovich 1991: 141–147; Pitulić 2012; Redjep 1976, 1991; cf. Popović 1998; Čolović 2016) chiefly focus on the textual analysis of various manifestations of the Kosovo theme over time. Therefore, they simply pay insufficient attention to temporal and social ruptures in the circulation of these manifestations. Such an approach leads the narrative scholars to assume rather than to prove that the existence of historical

antecedents *should have caused* the popular acceptance of the Kosovo myth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Finally, a number of researchers deny the relevance of the liturgical and epic legacies altogether. They argue that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the cult of Saint Prince Lazar was dramatically weakened and preserved in only a tiny number of isolated religious sites, while the epic folksongs celebrating the Battle of Kosovo ceased to exist in most of the South Slavic territory. Even the few who still referred to the battle in epics, chronicles and church literature perceived the medieval personages not as patriotic warriors but as dynastic rulers, admirable saints or simply omnipotent mythological creatures bestowed with supernatural powers. Therefore, the argument goes, it was Serbian nationalists – unconstrained by pre-modern memories – who created the narrative of Kosovo in the nineteenth century, tailoring it for political purposes and freely using available cultural material as a toolkit (Greenawalt 2001; Malcolm 1998: 58–80; Pantelić 2007; 2011: 447–448; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016).

These debates in the literature on the Kosovo myth resemble disagreements present in the generalist scholarship on national mythology and historical memory, separating the proponents of ethno-symbolism and modernism.[1] Ethno-symbolists emphasize that politicians and intellectuals cannot mobilize the masses and achieve their goals without taking into account myths, legends and

---

[1] I should note the existing differences in the terminological tradition between academic literature published in English and Eastern European scholarship. The former usually places under the rubric of "national or nationalist myths" or "myths of nationhood," only interpretations of the past (e.g., Levinger and Lyttle 2001; Smith 1999). Arguably, such a practice ignores other important themes in nationalist rhetoric. By contrast, the latter refers to distorted and emotionally charged accounts of the communal past as "historical" "ethnocentric myths" or "ethno-genetic legends" (e.g., Mylnikov 1996; Shmirelman 2000). It does not necessarily link them to the construction of nationhood. Following the tradition of the English-language literature and trying to avoid excessively long names, I usually use the term "nationalist myth" to refer to the modern Serbian narrative of the Battle of Kosovo.

memories of pre-existing ethnic groups (Esman 1994: 9–21; Hutchinson 2005; Guibernau 2010; Schöpflin 2000: 98; Smith 1991, 1999; 2009; 2011). In other words, they put forward ethno-symbolism as an *explanatory theory*, which postulates a causal relationship between pre-modern ethnic communities and modern nations. Historical *ethnies* "*share*" "*widespread*" ethnic memories "*embedded in*" "*collective* cultural identities" and, thus, provide a strong "*popular* basis" for contemporary political collectivities mobilized through nationalist myths (Guibernau 2010: 14, 18; Hutchinson 2005: 13–15, 27, 29, 33; Smith 1991: 21–22; 1999: 10, 13–14, 105). Only the rootedness of modern national identities in "antecedent cultural ties and sentiments" makes these identities sustainable and explains why nationalism strikes a "*deep popular* cord" and has "*widespread*" "*mass* appeal" and "*popular* resonance" (Guibernau 2010: 18–19; Hutchinson 2005: 6, 37; Smith 1999: 9, 100; 2009: 31).[2] Contrary to ethno-symbolists, modernists usually view contemporary narratives of the national past as modern constructions, almost arbitrarily created by

---

[2] A number of logical contradictions exist within ethno-symbolist theory. For one, Anthony Smith (1991: 52–54; 2009: 52–57) recognizes that in pre-modern times, many *ethnies* were aristocratic and, thus, merely "lateral." However accurate this observation is, it contradicts one of the main theoretical arguments. If "cultural sentiments" and "ethnic memories" in pre-modern times were *shared* merely by a small group of elites and remained unknown to the masses, they can hardly be seen as "the *popular* basis" of modern nationalism (Smith 1999: 14) and certainly fail to explain the "mass appeal" of nationalist rhetoric. Similarly, Smith (2009: 1) sometimes suggests that ethno-symbolism "does not pretend to be a scientific theory," but rather "should be seen as a particular perspective… and a research program." Such a perspective could admit ruptures and discontinuities between pre-modern and modern identities, but is simply more interested in "reappropriation, continuity and recurrence" (Smith 1999: 110; 2009: 33–39). What seems to be suggested here is that ethno-symbolism should be treated as a *descriptive theory*, exploring various historical types of collective cultural identities and "the long-term processes by which nations are formed and *related* to earlier cultural and political *forms* of society in the same area" (Smith 2009: 17). However, despite criticizing the tendency of narrowly viewing ethno-nationalism as an *explanatory theory* postulating *causal, one-to-one* relationship between ethnic communities and nations, Smith (2011: 224) insists that only with ethno-symbolist lenses, we "have a chance of *explaining* the formation and development of national communities and their long-term appeal for many of their members."

political and cultural elites in their struggle for power (Hobsbawm 1992a, 1992b; Maiz 2003; Malešević 2006; Ozkırımlı 2003).

Many of these studies suffer from selection bias. Namely, ethno-symbolists focus on a number of apparently long-standing narratives, including the myth of Kosovo, and show how they *recur* over the *longue durée* (Archard 1995; Armstrong 1982; Guibernau 2010; Guibernau and Hustchinson 2004; Hutchinson 2005; Schöpflin 2000; Smith 1999, 2011; for a more qualified version, see: Berger 2009; Zubrzycki 2011: 25–29). On the contrary, modernists dwell on undisputedly recent myths and argue that the salience of the old ones can wax and wane as a result of manipulations by ethnic entrepreneurs (Brunnbauer 2004; Hobsbawm 1992a, 1992b; Kolstø 2005; Levinger and Lytle 2001; Maiz 2003; Ozkırımlı 2005; Shnirelman 2000).

Later sections of this article support revisionists who see the Kosovo myth as a modern construction, thereby opposing ethno-symbolists' views of the Kosovo myth as a "crucial" supporting case for their theory (Armstrong 1982: 4, 283; Hutchison 2005: 9, 17–18, 20, 22; Kaufman 2003: 3–4; Smith 1999: 153–155; 2011**:** 236). First, based on the existing literature, I show that "the Kosovo legacy" had been largely forgotten by the broad masses by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Second, I look at *how* the myth was disseminated to answer *why* it had popular success and *whether* pre-modern memories played any significant role in this process.

If the Kosovo myth indeed had popular pre-modern roots, as ethno-symbolists argue, then the actions of the mythmakers would be decidedly constrained and informed by cultural legacies of the past and popular responses from below. The myth's promotion would likely have the following features:

- Dissemination of the narrative would constitute *a loosely organzed process*. Instead of being tightly coordinated from above, from the very start, the promotion of the

39

nationalist narrative would involve multiple grassroots centers distributed evenly across territory and society.[3] Accordingly, the elite mythmakers would not need to work very hard to build propagandistic infrastructure prior to the dissemination of the myth, being able to rely on already present, popular mnemonic practices. In particular, many official articulations of the myth and public commemorations of it would likely occur in an improvised manner at spontaneous gatherings of the masses rather than in organized settings.[4] Just to illustrate, a number of scholars studying ethnic conflicts argue that masses sharing long-standing myths often install leaders instead of being controlled by them. For example, in Stuart Kaufman's (2003: 86–125) view, the "mass-led" conflict in Georgia was started by spontaneously emerging nationalist groups, which helped new elites led, by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, overthrow the incumbent Communist leadership. Mobilization happened at the local level and mass rallies all over Georgia warmly welcomed the openly chauvinist rhetoric of the new leaders, which strongly resonated with already salient ethnic

---

[3] Thus, despite a possible objection of folklorists who note that folksongs are usually kept alive by semi-professional bards (see below), not by the lay public, and often have a limited area of circulation, Smith (1999: 108–109) argues that "Homeric epics" constituted an important element of the "ethnic consciousness" and "collective identification" of the "Hellenic community." This statement assumes a widespread and popular appeal of Homeric epics in various ancient Greek lands. Otherwise, how could they serve as an anchor for *collective* identity of the whole *Hellenic community*?

[4] The statement about the "improvised manner" and "spontaneous gatherings" of masses in pre-modern context may seem debatable. Arguably, illiterate peasant (if not urban) populations remained largely isolated, immobile and passive at that time. This is exactly what Gellner (1983: 8–14) argues (see: Hall 1993). However, if we keep to the key assumptions of ethno-symbolist theory, "widespread ethnic memories and cultural sentiments" that strike a "deep popular chord" should entail a certain probability of popular mobilization from below. Indeed, ethno-symbolists often talk about "vernacular mobilization" (Smith 1991: 61–64, 2011: 233–234; cf. Hutchinson 2005: 33, 36–37, 43), which included "the reciprocal response and contribution of individuals and strata of 'the people'" (Smith 2011: 234).

myths. Similarly, Laura Silber and Allan Little (1995: 69–72) describe how in some cases even Slobodan Milošević was called on to deliver improvised speeches to crowds.

- The *motivations of the mythmakers* would originate in a pre-existing patriotic code and, thus, would be *historically rooted* themselves rather than being derivative of momentary external influences, such as the influx of new ideas or the struggle for power or social status. Ethnic memories, having served for centuries as markers of identity, would influence the behavior of early nationalists.[5] Thus, according to John Hutchinson (2005: 33), "once invoked ethnic memories have an independent force with which [nationalists] have to negotiate." Bruce Kapferer (1988: 45) finds that demotic Buddhist narratives in Sri Lanka had motivating power and could "constrain those who awoke them." Similarly, Steven Mock (2012: 232–234) stresses the crucial role of communal myths in the socialization of all community members, including the elites.

- The *content of propagandistic materials and elite rhetoric* would not need to include knowledge widely shared by the population, such as epic songs, church legends or basic information on the key protagonists of the Battle of Kosovo. Nationalists would be able to simply refer to the myth instead of narrating it in detail. For instance, by the late

---

[5] Ethno-symbolists admit that pre-modern sentiments were significantly transformed in the process of modernization. This leaves room for an assumption that originally vague feelings of cultural similarity and attachment to certain symbols and narratives, which had nothing to do with "patriotism" or "groupism," were politicized by nationalists. However, this is *not*, strictly speaking, what ethno-symbolists *argue*. For them, "in many periods ethnicity provides an important framework of collective identity and of collective *political* action" (Hutchinson 2005: 12). They see pre-modern "ethnocentric" views and "popular" "ethnic" sentiments against "foreign domination" as having "the long term affective power" and being "a causal force in the rise of nationalism" (Hutchinson 2005: 13, 30, 33, 72; also see: Smith 1999: 97–119). In other words, these historical ethnic "sentiments" and "cultural ties" are rendered by ethno-symbolists as *groupist*, *patriotic* and *salient*. Furthermore, ethno-symbolism, according to Smith (1999: 110), "does not prejudge the presence or absence of nations and national identities for any particular period."

1980s there was no need to explain to Serbs what happened in Kosovo in 1389, and so Slobodan Milošević did not recount the whole myth in detail but only mentioned the battle in his propagandistic speeches (see: Bieber 2001; Kaufman 2003: 21, 206). In an opposite case, when Macedonian elites started to trace the pedigree of the Slavic population back to ancient times, they needed to gather substantial "evidence" of deep ethnic roots and present it to the population via textbooks, propagandistic booklets, archaeological sites and massive architectural projects in the country's capital (Brunnbauer 2004; Vangeli 2011). Notably, as scholars of social memory argue, institutionally supported remembering most often begins when real popular memories fade away (Hobsbawm 1972; Nora 1989).

Contrary to this model, I find that the process of promotion of the Kosovo myth was well organized and began in a limited number of locations (Vojvodina, and capitals of Serbia and Montenegro), and motivations of the mythmakers were modern, while disseminated propagandistic materials did not *rely on* "ethnic memories" of the masses but *explained to* the masses what those memories actually were.

Memories of the Battle of Kosovo at the Dawn of the Nineteenth Century

Descriptions and interpretations of the Kosovo battle in Balkan culture have undergone dramatic changes over time (see: Čolović 2016; Popović 1998; Redjep 1976, 1991; Wachtel 1998; Vujačić 2015). I start this section with a description of the *modern* nationalist Kosovo myth. Expectedly, even this myth's content, significance and social meaning changed over the last two

centuries (Čolović 2016: 140–457; also see below). However, the literature identifies a number of central elements in it.[6]

Similar to other national narratives, the Kosovo myth links the past, present and future of the Serbian people and incorporates three major themes: the glory of medieval Serbia; the necessity of decisive struggle against tyranny and oppression; and the essential link between the Kosovo ethics and Christianity, which guarantees national resurrection. According to the myth, the mighty Kingdom of the Nemanjić dynasty, which existed from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, embodied the Golden Age of Serbdom. Under the rule of Emperor Stefan Dušan (1331–1355), its borders were expanded to Epirus, Danube and Central Bosnia. Prizren, located in Kosovo, became the imperial capital. The national Golden Age, however, did not last long. The empire came to an end on Saint Vitus Day (June 28), 1389, signifying a major national downfall.

The myth tells that the battle of Kosovo resulted in the crushing defeat of a relatively small Christian force led by Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović at hands of an enormous Turkish army under Murad I. The Serbian warriors showed outstanding military valor and self-sacrifice during the protracted and bloody battle, with Serbian nobleman Miloš Obilić distinguishing himself the most. Accused of treachery by influential lord Vuk Branković and suspected by Lazar, Miloš took an oath to prove his allegiance and do everything possible to bring about the victory of the Christians. On the day of the battle, Miloš managed to enter the sultan's tent and stabbed the enemy ruler. In revenge, he was immediately hacked to death by the deceived guards. Another Serbian

---

[6] Čolović (2016: 26–27) notes that some scholars deny the existence of any persistent "core" of the Kosovo myth. However, by this they mean that the myth is "internally dialogical, contested" and subject to multiple interpretations. In the end, they see it as a "*common* language of disagreement."

hero, courageous commander Jug Bogdan, also fell along with his nine sons (the *Jugović*s of the Serbian folksongs). Prince Lazar was killed in the course of a decisive frontal attack.

In addition to praising military heroism, the Kosovo myth suggests three causes of the defeat: the superior manpower and brutality of the Turks, important betrayals (most prominently that of Vuk Branković) due to discord in the Christian camp and a sacred Kosovo covenant between King Lazar and the Heavens. Allegedly, before the battle, Saint Mary offered Lazar two options: victory on Earth or in the Heavens. The king and, by extension, all Serbs chose the Celestial Kingdom. They went through martyrdom and death but ended in a major spiritual victory. Throughout centuries of foreign oppression, the exemplar of the martyrs fallen in Kosovo had come to motivate Serbian "patriots" to defend the nation and seek vengeance against the Turks. Thus, the myth suggests to new generations of Serbs to take the deeds of Lazar and Miloš as a charter to establish a celestial national kingdom on Earth (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Belov 2007; Bieber 2002; Djokic 2009; Duijzings 2000: 176–202; Emmert 1992; Greenawalt 2001; Malcolm 1998: 58–80; Trgovčević 1999).

Again, to repeat, this is only a modern nationalistic interpretation of the Balkan medieval history. As expected, it contradicts historical evidence. According to contemporary scholarship, the Empire of Dušan started to disintegrate right after his death, and the defeat of Slavic forces in the 1371 Battle of Maritsa, not the Battle of Kosovo, finally opened the doors to the Ottoman advance into the Balkans. Our knowledge of the Battle of Kosovo is largely limited and based on surprisingly few reliable sources. What it tells may be summarized in a few sentences. The battle was fierce and both sides experienced heavy losses. Prince Lazar and Sultan Murad were killed. There is no indication of treachery in the Christian camp during the battle, but a number of Slavic vassals fought on the Ottoman side. The result of the battle remained undecided, and the Ottoman

troops soon withdrew from the Central Balkans. The medieval Serbian statehood survived until the fall of Smederevo in 1459 (Ćirković 1990; Kalić 2002; Malcolm 1998: 58–80; Mihaljčić 1975).

The nationalist myth of the Kosovo battle is clearly identifiable in Serbian and Montenegrin fiction, historical literature, elite public speeches and official commemorations of the second half of the nineteenth century. However, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the memories of the Kosovo battle, which survived among the South Slavs, were few and disconnected from any aspirations for communal affirmation (ethnocentrism) and self-rule ("patriotism"). In addition, even the surviving accounts point to cultural rupture rather than continuity. Between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Battle of Kosovo was present in the literature of Dalmatia inhabited by Catholic Slavs before being reintroduced into Orthodox circles in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In the territory of the Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox cult of Saint Prince Lazar was preserved until the late seventeenth century only in his endowment, Ravanica monastery (today's Central Serbia). Religious services in the name of Lazar might have been held sporadically here and there. However, well into the nineteenth century, the day of the battle was marked in the Orthodox calendars as the day of Saint Amos, not Lazar. No frescoes of Prince Lazar appeared in Serbian churches in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Popović 1998: 58–61). Finally, almost all early monastic texts describing the events of 1389 and praising their Christian participants were completely forgotten in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Western-trained Serbian scholars rediscovered them only in the nineteenth century (see: Trifunović 1985; Petrović and Kusovac 1987; Redjep 1976, 1991). Ivan Čolović (2016: 34–36) notes that the original versions of these sources have not been preserved. Until the present day, adequate publications and translations of the earliest church literature are lacking.

In the meanwhile, the theme of the Kosovo battle enjoyed some popularity among the Catholic Slavic clergy on the Adriatic seacoast, where it gained political significance in the context of an ongoing anti-Ottoman struggle. In chronicles and travelogues written in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Catholic priests reinterpreted the battle as a major clash between Christianity and Islam. They downplayed the role of Lazar and focused attention on Miloš, whose figure resembling Western crusading knights became the epitome of a courageous and uncompromising warrior against Islam. The literature composed in the lands of the Catholic Slavs influenced local epics that also started to celebrate Miloš, silencing the glory of Prince Lazar (Čolović 2016: 81–95; Kalibarda 2013; Popović 1998: 43–66; see also: Belov 2007: 479–493; Redjep 1991).

In the aftermath of the War of the Holy League (1683–1699) a great number of Serbian-speaking Orthodox, who fought against the Ottomans, resettled in the southern lands of the Kingdom of Hungary after Austrian troops withdrew from the Balkans. In the Habsburg Empire these settlers were granted religious autonomy. The anti-Ottoman struggle rekindled the memories of Kosovo in the Orthodox ecclesiastical environment (Čolović 2016: 112–118; Belov 2007: 61–69; Leshchilovskaia 1994: 13–51). Monks of Ravanica brought the bones of Lazar to Vrdnik monastery, in today's Vojvodina. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, they composed *the Tale of the Battle of Kosovo*, based on earlier Adriatic Catholic interpretations, and it became familiar to the Orthodox clergy after they resettled into Habsburg territory. Although the narrative described the life of Lazar, deeds of Miloš, and treachery of Vuk Branković (Redjep 1991: 262–264), the significance of the *Tale* and other reminiscences of the Kosovo battle present in the literature and arts of the time should not be exaggerated or viewed as proof of a surviving "ethno-symbolic *mythomoteur*." First, instead of emerging organically from the Serbian liturgical

46

literature and folklore, these reminiscences appeared as a result of late Slavic Catholic influences (e.g., Mavro Orbini) and modernizing reforms in Austria. Second, this literature was small and was mainly consumed by closed local community of literate clerics and church-school students from Austrian territories. Third, with their attempts to reinvigorate memories of Kosovo in the eighteenth century, the Orthodox leaders in Vojvodina wanted to ensure the local Serbian population's obedience to both the Church and the Habsburg authorities by encouraging popular devotion without the promotion of national ideology (Čolović 2016: 112–118; Pantelić 2011; Stokes 1976).[7]

Similar to the written accounts, folk memories of the Kosovo battle had been largely forgotten by the beginning of the nineteenth century. When epic songs of the so-called Kosovo cycle were collected by famous Serbian folklorist and "national awakener" Vuk Karadžić between 1800s and 1820s, he recorded most of them on the tiny territory of Fruška Gora around Vrdnik monastery.[8] The rest were acquired from the old bards, who resettled into today's Central Serbia from Montenegro. These songs have been influenced by the religious accounts of the battle, which,

---

[7] Notably, Čolović (2016: 121–122) concedes that "in one dimension these versions of the Kosovo narrative [The *Tale* and contemporaneous *Tronoša Genealogical Chronicle*] anticipate their later integration into nationalist discourse." This is because the eighteenth-century chronicles start to mention the "Serbian" ethnic belonging of the Kosovo heroes. Thus, Čolović admits that a certain sense of ethnic distinctiveness or "proto-nationalism" was taking root among Orthodox South Slavic elites in eighteenth-century Austria. However, he views "this Serbhood of Lazar and his warriors" as an outcome of Western baroque influences in the literature and "a novel creation, a reflection of new political ideas and goals" in the context of Habsburg rule.

[8] Historically, popular epics were transmitted throughout the territory of the Balkan Slavs by wandering bards. These bards travelled from village to village singing folksongs to the accompaniment of *gusle – a Balkan single-stringed musical instrument. Guslars* were in fact capable of both reproducing the songs and composing new poems about heroes and historical events. In other words, the epics were not completely fixed, but subject to modification and reinterpretation remaining in verbal custody of the bards. This explains why contemporary folklorists usually find numerous, often conflicting variants of the same folksong (Ling 1997: 86–88; Smirnov 1987).

as I have shown, themselves constituted novelties composed under Catholic influences (Golenishchev-Kutuzov 1964: 213; Kalibarda 2013; Popović 1998: 90–105; Smirnov 1987). Furthermore, Karadžić often spent much time and energy to reach specifically the bards who knew "nationally significant" epics. He regularly selected and edited his materials to make them more appealing and resonant with the national cause. In other words, the folksongs from the Karadžić's collection were not representative of the living epic tradition (Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016: 361–370; also see: Čolović 2016: 142–143, 190–191). At least as late as the 1830s to 1870s, Serbian poet Sima Milutinović-Sarajlija and Russian folklorist Alexander Gilferding failed to find any songs of the Kosovo cycle in Kosovo and Montenegro (see: Djurković 1990; Gilferding 1873; Mrkaić 1990). Neither were these folksongs present in Bosnia (Čolović 2014; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016: 364–365). This is because epics celebrating the heroism of Lazar and Miloš had never been popular in the Slavic lands of the Ottoman Empire. Here a vassal of Sultan Marko Kraljević, who successfully managed to both cooperate with "the Turks" and defend destitute Christians in the time of sorrow, was the most celebrated personage (Greenawalt 2001; Kalibarda 2013; Pantelić 2011: 448).

Some analysts may point to the fact that references to the Kosovo battle and its protagonists survived in other folksongs, including the Marko Kraljević cycle. However, these scattered and isolated reminiscences conflicted with one another and hardly conveyed any clear message, let alone served an anchor of a sense of Serbian ethnic distinctiveness. Kosovo personages were intermixed with other epic figures and had ahistorical qualities (see: Pantelić 2011). It is equally true that the leaders of the First Serbian Uprising sometimes referred to Kosovo and Miloš Obilić in their speeches and correspondence. Yet those references were surprisingly rare, even compared to the invocation of other medieval figures. Furthermore, they reflected the themes of the

uprising's political propaganda rather than widespread popular beliefs (see: Čolović 2016: 126–127).[9]

In the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, travelers recorded people in Kosovo associating particular sites with Miloš and Lazar, whose life they could recount (for Kosovo: Batakovic 1989; cf. Gilferding 1873; Stanković 1910: 10–13, 55, 123–125). However, we can only speculate about their temporal origins and the circumstances under which these popular accounts were recorded. Scholarship finds that some of these "memories" were simply made up by "collectors." Furthermore, by the 1870s, the effects of schooling and nationalist propaganda might have been present (Čolović 2016: 190–191, 195–208).[10] It is clear that such memories, if they existed in the early nineteenth century, were not widely popular and maintained by the "Serbian *ethnie*" as a whole. Rather, they were geographically contained in certain areas of

[9] Often the invocation of the figure of Miloš Obilić is associated with *vojvoda* Miloš Stojićević Pocerac (e.g., Nenadović 1969: 164–165). The vojvoda referred to the local memories of his home region, which portrayed Obilić as a native of Pocerje. Importantly, Stojićević's reliance on the folk tradition is not without doubts. The vojvoda received a religious education in Radovašnica monastery which had historical connections with monasteries in Austrian Srem. Thus, directly or vicariously, he could have been influenced by the historical thought of Austrian Slavs. Furthermore, a recent ethnological study finds that the epic poetry and legends of Pocerje tended to fuse the figures of Miloš Pocerac and Miloš Obilić together. Folk stories of the local population mostly refer to warriors of the nineteenth century. "Every locality [in Pocerje] which includes in its name [the] pronoun Milošev does not originate from the Middle Ages, but from the period close to the First Uprising… The population of this part of Serbia is remarkably recent… [and] settled here during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, up until the end of the nineteenth century… This population maintained the legend which it brought to the region during the resettlement or which, as it often happens with epic folksongs, this population made up and developed along the lines of the *propaganda* of Serbian Uprisings." (Vušković 2012: 105).

[10] As late as the early twentieth century, Slovene folklorist Matija Murko was doing research on the epic tradition of Orthodox Slavs in Bosnia. Tellingly, when the scholar asked a local bard if he could perform some songs about the Battle of Kosovo, the bard replied, "No, I am illiterate" (cited in: Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016: 365). On the publication of "Bosnian" folksongs recorded from literate bards who simply learned the epics from the Karadžić's collections, see: Čolović 2016:195–197.

Kosovo and, perhaps, Western Serbia (which had close historical ties to Austrian Serm, the Vrdinik monastery in particular). Finally, evidence suggests that the Balkan peasants of pre-modern times perceived the heroes of the folksongs and monastic texts as distant, legendary creatures with magic powers. Rather than being patriotic exemplars to emulate or sources of national inspiration, they served as objects of superstitious veneration, along with the Ottoman sultan and Austrian emperor. In other words, for the peasant worldview, there was nothing specifically ethnic or national in these symbolic figures (Belov 2007: 530–531; Pantelić 2011: 446–447, 458).

Since pre-existing memories of the Kosovo battle had been mostly forgotten by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the leaders of burgeoning Serbian nationalism needed to put a lot of energy in propagating "the Kosovo ethics." First, they turned the scattered oral tradition and monastic literature into a clear-cut historical narrative with obvious nationalist meaning. Second, they developed an infrastructure of nationalizing institutions, such as publishing houses, cultural societies, museums and theaters. Having been established by top-down, coordinated efforts of the educated strata and Serbian government, these institutions were later used extensively for the promotion of the Kosovo myth.

The Development of the Kosovo Narrative

The introduction of the Kosovo narrative into Serbian high culture took about a century. Well into the late eighteenth century, the Battle of Kosovo did not occupy a significant place in the novel historical thought of the nascent Serbian Enlightenment. At the time, the references to 1389 were used by burgeoning amateur historians to show the readiness of the Orthodox Slavs to serve an enlightened monarch. Only after the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813) did the theme of Kosovo rapidly start to gain popularity within educated circles. In the late 1830s

and 1840s, the battle was singled out by emerging nationalist intellectuals as a pivot of national history. The narrative acquired its complete form and nationalist message. Lazar and Miloš now were celebrated as defenders of the "Serbian homeland." These developments roughly correspond to *Phases A* and *B* in the Miroslav Hroch's famous chronology of national movements (Hroch 1993: 6–7; 2008: 9, 44–47 (on Serbs); for more detail, see: Banac 1984: 28–29; Belov 2007: 529–538).

The scholarly phase of the Serbian national movement began in the mid-eighteenth century in the Habsburg Empire. By then, sharp differences in Westernization, education and economic development existed between the Orthodox Slavic communities living there and those in the Ottoman lands. In the 1720s, the Orthodox Metropolitanate of Karlovci began to build a network of schools, managing to employ fifty-three teachers by 1758. Although hundreds of children attended Orthodox schools, others entered Catholic and Protestant schools or traveled to Russia to receive education. Under Austrian influence, Serbian arts and architecture blossomed, and a new social stratum of wealthy traders and craftsmen emerged in more favorable economic conditions. Religious, military and economic elites of the Orthodox community now started to show q strong interest in knowledge and Western culture. Monastic and private libraries mushroomed, accumulating dozens to hundreds of books each (Leshchilovskaia 1994: 50–51; 61–67, 74–78). It was in this context that the first works on the history of Serbia appeared.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Battle of Kosovo was discussed in the books of the aspiring Serbian leader Count Djordje Branković (1739–1743),[11] Montenegrin metropolitan Vasilije Petrović-Njegoš (1754), an officer in the Russian Army named Pavle Julinac

---

[11] Here I use a shorter version of Branković's *Chronicles*, originally written in Romanian (Branković 1994).

([1765] 1981: 112–119) and an archimandrite of the Kovilj monastery in Bačka region, Jovan Rajić (1795 [1794], finished in 1768).[12] Their accounts of the battle, all heavily based on the literature of Catholic Slavs and the derivative *Tale,* are not nationalist interpretations. First, the battle does not occupy a significant place in the works, even in terms of pages. Second, the tone of the narratives is documentary rather than celebratory, and patriotic rhetoric is absent. Finally, at this point interpretations are far from being uniform: the battle is not yet seen as a pivotal event for the Serbian history, and its main protagonists (Lazar, Miloš, and Vuk Branković) receive inconsistence evaluations.

These inconsistencies and the unevenness in narration of the Kosovo battle did not betray the purposes of the eighteenth-century historians. Instead of writing a popular, uniform story of a national liberation struggle and downfall for mass consumption, they aimed to appeal to the ruling strata in Austria and Russia, describing how Orthodox Slavs were "historical people" who had been governed in the past by good Christian rulers and, therefore, currently deserved an enlightened Christian leadership, in the figure of either the Austrian emperor or the Russian tsar (Kalibarda 2013; Stokes 1976). Several authors argue that Branković, Petrović-Negoš, Julinac and Rajić already conveyed a certain *sense of ethnic distinctiveness*, patriotism or what would Hobsbawm call "*proto-nationalism*" in their works (Belov 2007: 90–135; Ekmečić 1991: 335; Leshilovskaia 1994: 47–49; cf. Čolović 2016: 96–111, 123–125). It is important to emphasize,

---

[12] Usually scholars focus on these four figures (Belov 2007; Stokes 1976). Čolović (2016:96 – 102) adds to the list the Catholic writer Andrija Kačić Miočić from Šibenik. Kačić Miočić is not discussed here because his work cannot be seen as an integral part of "the Serbian tradition." Indicatively, in Čolović's evaluations, the approach of this Dalmatian author to the Kosovo battle ("to glorify Slavic heroes" for imperial audiences) is not significantly different from that of the Orthodox South Slavic authors. This means that it is hardly something specifically "ethnic," let alone "national," in the work of the other four historians.

however, that the ethno-cultural sentiment and "proto-nationalism" they refer to, if it existed, was Slavic or, perhaps, "Slavo-Serbian" (Čolović 2016: 111; Stokes 1976).

An important innovation in the representation of the Kosovo battle happened after the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising, when it received increased attention in educated Slavic Orthodox circles, both within and outside the Habsburg Empire (Emmert 1992; Ekmečić 1991: 334–335; Mihailovich 1991: 147–151). Works like Gavrilo Kovačević's poem "Battle" (1805), Lukijan Mušicki's "Ode on Saint Vitus Day" (1817 [Leskovac 1972]) and Jovan Sterija Popović's epic tragedy Miloš Obilić ([1828] 1962), for the first time focused entirely on the battle, copying the folksongs and the church *Tale*. A powerful push toward the development of the Kosovo myth was given by philologist and language reformer Vuk Karadžić, who collected, "corrected" and published Serbian epic folksongs. These were soon distributed widely among the educated strata of the Balkans and beyond.

The language of Kovačević's, Mušicki's and Sterija Popović's opera is notably different from that of the previous literature. The battle is represented as a "rebellion" against foreign Turks and an exemplar of a tragic clash between heroism and treachery. Its negative outcome decisively marks the fall of the medieval Serbian empire, leaving "people" in "all Serbian lands" in deep sorrow. The heroes of the battle are now viewed as the "sons of Serbia." Moreover, Christian devotion is no longer at the core of their motivations: Lazar, Miloš and the others fight for the "Serbian homeland," "Serbian state" and "Serbian kind." Furthermore, in the introduction to their works, the authors speak about the need of a "patriotic" education.

"Patriotism" did not yet mean an outright readiness to struggle for complete independence and political self-determination but, rather, the necessity of cultural preservation and defence against the Ottomans. However, these "awakening" appeals were novel and now directed to all

educated individuals, not just a tiny layer of the governing elites (for a meticulous analysis of all these and other works of the period, see: Belov 2007: 493–511; Čolović 2016: 127–131, 143–146). At the time when these new fictional interpretations were coming out, another important break occurred in the historiography, which now proposed to divide the past of Serbia into the periods before and after the Battle of Kosovo (Branković 1828; Magaršević 1825). In short, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Kosovo narrative became an important ideological tool for Serbian *autonomist nationalism* (Čolović 2016: 140–142; on autonomist nationalism, see: Smith 1991: 72–79; Hall 1993).

As *secessionist nationalism* had started to acquire a powerful role in Serbian politics since the 1840s (Stokes 1976), the Kosovo battle finally became a symbol of the anti-Turkish *national liberation* struggle. Now the poems (e.g., Jovan Sterija Popović's "Commemoration of the Saint Vitus Day" ([1841] Leskovac 1972)), plays (e.g., Sima Milutinović'Sarajlija's *Tragedija Obilić* ([1837] 1987), Matija Ban's *Tsar Lazar* ([1854] 1987) and Jovan Subotić's *Miloš Obilić* ([1866] 1987)) and historical works (e.g., Maletić 1847) often referred to the oppressed "Serbian people" and personified Serbia weeping under Turkish subjugation, blaming centuries of the Ottoman "yoke." In addition, the literature stressed the idea of national democracy and popular sovereignty (for analysis, see: Čolović 2016: 146–156, 164–165). The Battle of Kosovo acquired the status of the most significant event in the Serbian past, and self-denying hero Miloš Obilić became the most celebrated figure, overshadowing Lazar (see also: Belov 2007: 511; Popović 1998: 165–168).

Gradually an idea of avenging Kosovo developed, and the nationalist literature began discussing concrete political measures that needed to be taken in the present. Most significant of all in this respect was the poem "Mountain Wreath," published in 1847 by the prince-bishop of Montenegro Petar Petrović Njegoš (Negosh 1988). This poem, which would become the most

widely read Serbian literary work in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not only praised the uncompromising ethics and courageous deeds of Miloš Obilić, but also suggested severe actions to be taken against Slavic-speaking converts to Islam. Njegoš explained that the noblest of acts was to kill the alien tyrants in revenge for previous misdeeds (for analysis, see: Čolović 2016: 162–174; Emmert 1992; Greemawalt 2001: 60–62; Kilibarda 2013; Mrkaić 1990; Mihailovich 1991: 147–151; Vujačić 2015: 136–137; for an alternative approach identifying condescending and Yugoslavist overtones in the poem, see: Wachtel 1998: 45–52).

The establishment of Serbia and Montenegro as independent states and the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 led to new interpretations of the Kosovo myth. In the context of now *irredentist nationalism*, it began to be used to motivate patriots to "redeem" unjustly occupied "Serbian lands under Austro-Hungary" (see: Jelavich 1990: 147–155). This message became even more salient after the complete annexation of Bosnia and especially with the beginning of the First World War. The famous Niš Declaration, drafted by the Serbian prime-minister Nikola Pašić in 1914, called for "the liberation and unification of all our enslaved brothers Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." It evoked not only Yugoslavist ideology, but also nationalist longing for the Serbian Empire, lost in the Middle Ages (Stanković 2007: 7; on Pašić and the Kosovo myth, see: Čolović 2016: 209–212). Furthermore, Serbian and Montenegrin officials referred to the battle and its heroes when they encouraged soldiers to fight the Austro-Hungarian enemy with determination.

In the interwar period, the narrative was again adjusted to the current political course. South Slav medieval states, such as the kingdoms of Nemanyids and Tomislav, were rendered as early parallel attempts at Yugoslav state formation. Zollfeld (*Gosposvetsko polje*) in Austrian Carantania, where a center of the first Slovene principality was located according to the Slovene

national narrative, was referred in the Yugoslav press as a "Northern Kosovo field." The Battle of Kosovo came to signify a common endeavor of South Slavic nations to defend their lands against foreign subjugators. The participation of Croatian and other Slavic troops on Lazar's side was emphasized despite being highly questionable historically. The state authorities made continuous efforts to turn annual Saint Vitus Day celebrations into a pan-Yugoslav event. In addition, a number of Croatian national narratives structurally similar to the Kosovo myth were endorsed by the government. Thus, state-sponsored Yugoslav historiography interpreted a seventeenth-century peasant revolt in Croatia and Slovenia led by Matija Gubec, a conspiracy of Ban Peter Zrinski and Marquis Fran Frankopan against the Habsburg emperor Leopold I and the 1389 battle as simple incarnations of one and the same centuries-long struggle of the South Slavs for freedom. Similar to Prince Lazar, quartered Gubec, and beheaded Zrinski and Frankopan became martyrs for the pan-national cause (Čolović 2016: 297–311; Troch 2012; Troch 2013: 784–791).

In sum, after almost four centuries of "forgetting" by followers of the Nemanyid Orthodox Church, the images of the Battle of Kosovo were first "remembered" and cultivated by a number of Enlightenment antiquarians, and then turned into a myth of a perennial struggle for the nation by emerging Serbian nationalist intellectuals. Between the 1800s and 1930s the meaning of the narrative was adjusted several times depending on how Serbian leaders saw the nation and whom they identified as foreign enemies. It served as an efficient ideological tool to promote and assert the politics of autonomist, separatist and irredentist nationalism and, later, integral Yugoslavism.

Building Nationalizing Institutions

The production of the nationalist Kosovo narrative in the first half of the nineteenth century was not a spontaneous process occurring all over Serbian territories and welcomed by masses. The

few and geographically contained cultural and political elites led this collaborative initiative. Initially the ideological center was situated in Vojvodina. In the 1840s, the capitals of the Serbian Principality and Montenegro began to play a prominent role. An overwhelming majority of the pioneering nationalist authors originated from or received education in Austrian lands. Their attention was focused more on each other than on the masses. They were representatives of the high culture, who viewed popular traditions as a raw material needing to be elaborated, often corrected or even invented. The nationalist intelligentsia held ongoing correspondence, exchanged works and referenced one another (see: Belov 2007: 493–511; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016; Popović 1998: 164–165). When Montenegrin leader Petar II Petrović Njegoš wrote his "Mountain Wreath" in the 1840s, he found inspiration not in the folklore but in the fictional works of his Vojvodina-educated teacher, Sima Milutinović Sarajlija. Furthermore, there were instances when intellectuals collaborated on outright fabrications of popular poetry (see in detail: Čolović 2016: 160, 169, 195–208; Djurković 1990; Kalibarda 2013; Radojević 1988; Bojović 1989: 394–395).

Also in the 1830s and 1840s, dozens of Austrian Serbs arrived in Belgrade to staff governmental and educational institutions (MacKenzie 1985: 45; Popović 1998: 164–165). Under their influence and an intellectual impact of Polish *émigrés*, in 1844, the minister of the interior Ilija Garašanin came up with the first Serbian national program, *Načertanije* (the "Draft"), which sought the "liberation" of all Ottoman Serbs and the "resurrection" of a powerful Serbian Empire in the Balkans (Čolović 2016: 191–195; MacKenzie 1985: 43–58; cf. Čubrilović 1958: 159–187). Soon Garašanin managed to persuade Montenegrin leader Petar II Petrović Njegoš to work together to realize the national program. From this point on, the two states became leading forces in the cultivation and promotion of the Kosovo nationalist narrative. In Serbia, a number of the mythmakers were coopted into the government and a secret intelligence network of agents and

propagandists (see: Čolović 2016: 194–197; MacKenzie 1985: 64–75). For example, Vojvodina-born intellectual Jovan Sterija Popović served as a professor of the state-sponsored Belgrade Lyceum, and then as the Serbian minister of education (1842–1848). Another prominent mythmaker Matija Ban worked as a tutor of Prince Alexander's daughter and became Garašanin's most trusted secret agent. A Catholic from Dubrovnik, he advocated for a broader understanding of Serbia's national goals, desiring complete unification of all South Slavs into a single state. This gave him a reputation as one of the founders of Yugoslavist ideology (MacKenzie 1985: 64–65).

The educated circles of Vojvodina and the Serbian government led the efforts to establish nationalizing institutions, which provided essential infrastructure for the promotion of the Kosovo myth in the decades to come. In 1826, a group of wealthy traders and imperial bureaucrats established *Matica srpska* in Pest. Soon this major cultural institution came to coordinate cultural development of the Austrian Serbs by overseeing Slavic-speaking schools, distributing stipends for talented artists, opening reading rooms and printing propagandistic literature (including the famous *Books for the People* series). The gallery of *Matica srpska* was inaugurated in 1847, and the Matica-affiliated Serbian National Theatre opened its doors in 1861. Another important initiative taken by Vojvodina intelligentsia in the 1860s was the formation of the United Serbian Youth movement. The movement gathered most Serbian student groups in Austro-Hungary under its roof, and it soon became the mother organization for a number of gymnastic associations. Participants promoted the glorious Serbian past and national unity, and even designed clothes "Dušan and Lazar style." Its official journal demanded that people "break the chains of the five-century slavery," healing "the wound of Kosovo" and restoring the "valor of Obilić" (Čolović 2016: 184–188; Djordjević 1991: 316–317, 324; Ekmečić 1991: 339).

The Serbian and Montenegrin states joined the process of building nationalizing institutions in the 1830s. In 1830, the first publishing house was established in Serbia, and soon Petar II Petrović Njegoš made efforts to open another in Cetinje (Starčević 1997:11). These institutions enabled the unrestrained publication of agitation materials, which had been a difficult task because the Habsburg authorities exercized tight control over the content and only endorsed the Old Slavonic script. Put under state supervision, the two publishing houses quickly centralized both the printing and distribution of Serbian literature in the Ottoman lands. In 1841, Belgrade minister of education Jovan Sterija Popović established the Society of Serbian Letters and the first small theater, followed by the Serbian Museum three years later. In the late 1860s, Prince Mihailo Obrenović mandated the creation of a permanent Serbian National Theater.

State intervention was equally important in founding more independent nationalist organizations. In 1843, Miloš Popović, the editor of Serbia's official newspaper, *Serbian News*, proposed the founding of Belgrade's first reading hall. In the late 1840s, the halls were opened in Belgrade, Smederevo and Kragujevac with the help of the ministries of education and the interior and the respective municipal administrations (Ekmečić 1991: 336–337; Nešić 2008). Garašanin's trustee Matija Ban and other professors of the state Lyceum incited Serbian youth to form the Dušan Regiment in 1845. Two years later, the regiment was transformed into the Society of Serbian Youth. Its official inauguration took place on Saint Vitus Day to honor the sacrifice of "heroic predecessors… for freedom" (Djordjević 1991: 315–316; MacKeznie 1985: 65).

Principal Actors and Their Motivations

From the 1830s to 1930s, three principal actors played a decisive role in promoting the Kosovo nationalist myth: *the state machineries* of independent Serbia, Montenegro and (later)

Yugoslavia; the *intelligentsia*, grouped in various independent and semi-independent cultural and educational organizations; and the *Orthodox Church.*

Perennialist and ethno-symbolist theories assume that patriotic feelings of communal leaders are ever-present or originate in pre-modern ideas of group distinctiveness, which accumulate in centuries-old ethnic memories and symbols (Armstrong 1982; Guibernau 2010; Guibernau and Hustchinson 2004; Hutchinson 2005; Kapferer 1988; Mock 2012; Smith 1999, 2001). However, we have seen that widely shared "ethnic memories" of the Battle of Kosovo simply did not exist in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Moreover, evidence shows that patriotic motives were absent even in geographically contained and tiny folk and monastic reminiscences of the 1389 battle. Thus, the willingness of the state, intelligentsia and Church to produce and promote this novel narrative in the nineteenth century resulted from a number of modern and time-specific factors.

People operating within the institutional framework of the state, cultural societies and the Church shared motives for elaborating and promoting the Kosovo narrative. At the same time, historical conditions produced stimuli specific to each institutional context. The influence of Western cultural, educational and diplomatic efforts was universal for state officials, the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia and clerics. Largely under external influence, kings, ministers, diplomats, religious leaders and broader circles of the educated public developed truly nationalist convictions and cherished the idea of Serbia's "resurrection." Accordingly, they saw popular propaganda as valuable in itself and felt personally obliged to "awaken the people" (see, for example: Belov 2007: 528–539; MacKenzie 1985; Nielsen 2014: 22–40; Shemiakin 1998: 43–49; 280–347; Velikonja 2003: 93–97).

The conversions of the three social actors to nationalism occurred at different times. The leading force of nationalist thought, the Serbian intelligentsia of Vojvodina, was indoctrinated under Austrian and German influences. In the first half of the nineteenth century, its representatives bought Western literature, travelled to German cities and Vienna and exchanged correspondence with German nationalists (Belov 2007; Pantelić 2007; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016: 361–362). With the large influx of educated Vojvodina Serbs to Belgrade in the 1830s and 1840s, and the development of direct contacts between the Serbian government and Polish *émigrés*, secessionist and irredentist nationalism started to inform official policies in Serbia and, later, Montenegro (MacKenzie 1985: 45–58; Popović 1998: 164–165; Stokes 1976). Having embraced demands for the liberation of all Serbs from the "Turkish yoke," state officials were now more interested in actively promoting the Kosovo myth as opposed to the widespread popular tradition, which praised Marko Kraljević (or even the sultan). An additional factor why the mythmakers preferred Prince Lazar and Miloš Obilić over Marko was the latter's wicked character. His pagan code of behavior, lack of self-command, violence and insanity could not serve as exemplars for the developing bureaucratic culture of the emergent Serbian and Montenegrin states. In contrast, the Kosovo myth required citizens to obey national leaders elected by God and history (see: Čolović 2016:193) and be ready for complete self-denial in defense of the national cause.

The Orthodox Church as an institution staunchly refrained from nationalist interpretations of the Kosovo legacy in the first half of the nineteenth century. For a long period, the day of the battle was marked in religious calendars as Saint Amos Day. Only in the 1860s did the Church in Serbia and Montenegro slowly start to serve regular memorial services for the "Kosovo martyr" Lazar on Saint Vitus Day. It was followed by the Orthodox clerics in Vojvodina, Croatia and Bosnia (Čolović 2016: 189; Djordjević 1991: 310; Popović 1998: 157–159). Yet as late as the

1880s, many hierarchs still decisively opposed the idea of Saint Vitus Day becoming a national holiday accompanied by massive and joyful celebrations. They argued that true Christians needed to hold a modest memorial service and pay due respect to the fallen martyrs without engaging in patriotic demagogy. The final cooptation of the Church into state-sponsored commemorations of the Kosovo battle occurred under pressure from the government and intelligentsia in 1889. With this, Saint Vitus Day became an official ecclesiastical holiday in the early 1890s (Durković–Jakšić 1989: 365–370; Kraljić 1991: 133–136; Pejin 1991: 157–160; Popović 1998: 158–160; Velikonja 2003: 99–102).

Nationalism also had indirect effects on the decision of state officials, the intelligentsia and the Church to promote the novel narrative. Striving for national development and territorial expansion, the nascent Balkan states needed to build institutions and find educated cadres (MacKenzie 1985: 62–75). The official adoption of the Kosovo myth helped to attract educated individuals, who came from foreign and domestic schools already full of nationalist ideas. Similarly, by giving religious significance to the myth and using the figure of Lazar the martyr, governments expressed their allegiance to the Church, whose representatives were made honorable guests at every official commemoration since the 1880s (see: Durković–Jakšić 1989: 370; Kraljić 1991: 133–134; Popović 1998: 164–165). For the states, the Orthodox Church became one of the key institutions open to cooperation. Moreover, in areas like Bosnia and Kosovo, it represented the only powerful organization through which government propaganda could reach the masses.

The formation of an alliance between the state, the intelligentsia and the Church represented a two-way process, because – similar to the state – clerics and professionals had more immediate and material motivations in addition to their sincere nationalist beliefs. Churchmen strove to win the support of the state, particularly at times when donations from the Russian Royal

family proved insufficient and in areas where Orthodox religious institutions faced fierce competition with other confessional organizations (on the conditions of the Church, see: Kraljić 1991; Malcolm 1996: 126–130, 144–150; Velikonja 2003: 101–105, 150–153; Yovitchitch 1926: 44–48, 129). Monasteries and churches cultivating the Kosovo myth received generous financial help from the Serbian government, whose members often visited these places. The government money was used to decorate a number of church buildings with frescoes and even professional Romantic-style paintings of the Kosovo martyrs, such as *The Killing of Murad* (1871) by Nikola Aleksić or *The Death of Tsar Lazar* (1885) by Djordje Krstić (Popovich 1991: 237; 243–244; cf. Čolović 2016: 196; Yovitchitch 1925: 44–53, 64–65, 128–129). Limited opportunities for employment in Austria were a significant factor pushing Vojvodina intelligentsia to come to the Serbian principality in 1830s and 1840s (see: Belov 2007: 67–68). In later periods, the need for funds and self-actualization motivated educated professionals in Serbia, Montenegro and neighboring lands to collaborate with the emerging nation-states, and the nationalist intelligentsia was absorbed into the state bureaucracy, military, educational system and diplomatic and intelligence services.

In other words, in promoting the Kosovo myth, state officials, the intelligentsia and the Church were pushed by nationalist ideas and the desire to enhance their own power, status and wealth. This occurred in the context of nineteenth-century modernization and had nothing to do with pre-modern ethnic legacies.

Top-Down Dissemination in Operation

Two periods should be distinguished in the nationalist promotion of the Kosovo narrative. Before the late 1870s, the state and the intelligentsia were less active in their propaganda efforts,

since the autonomous status of Serbia and Montenegro under Ottoman sovereignty put certain restrictions on such activities. Indicatively, when the Serbian government invited poet Jovan Jovanović-Zmaj from Novi Sad to write a national anthem, he was warned against mentioning Saint Vitus Day explicitly in order to not offend the sultan (Djordjević 1991: 320). In these circumstances, the promotion of the Kosovo myth through patriotic literature and cultural institutions could barely reach the uneducated public. Until the late 1870s, nationalist propaganda still developed within the confines of *Phase B* of forging a national movement, focusing on literate circles.

This situation changed dramatically after the Congress of Berlin. After the congress, nationalists had a free hand in the territories of independent Serbia and Montenegro, whose governments soon provided popular education. Moreover, with the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, Belgrade and Cetinje came to understand that the national program could not be accomplished by mere diplomatic efforts and required the mass mobilization of the Orthodox population in the region (Mulić 2006: 355–364; Ljušić 2003: 287–313). Thus, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, propaganda of the Kosovo narrative assumed unprecedented proportions, signifying the start of the transition of Serbian nationalism to Hroch's *Phase C*.[13]

A. *State Propaganda*

---

[13] It is important to note that Hroch identifies *Phase C* as a moment when "the major part of the population came to set special store by their national identity" (Hroch 1993: 7; see also: Hroch 2008: 44–47). However, in this article, the start of *Phase C* means gaining access to the minds and hearts of still "nationally unaware" masses.

Official propaganda was the most important means of disseminating the Kosovo myth, which became a focal point of the state ideology in Serbia and Montenegro. The ministries of education played a key role, printing nationalist literature, sponsoring works of "patriotic" artists, supervising activities of cultural institutions and controlling the academic curricula. Serbian and Montenegrin authorities also paid increasing attention to public commemorations and celebrations of Saint Vitus Day. At decisive historical moments, monarchs and prominent state officials gave public speeches imbued with rhetoric about Kosovo. Given that in the first post-independence decade, over eighty percent of the population in Serbia and Montenegro remained illiterate,[14] mass commemorations, open-air events and visual representations served as indispensable vehicles of popular education (see: Zubrzycki 2011, 2013).

- Printing and Distributing Patriotic Literature

After its founding, the State Printing House of Serbia published a voluminous nationalist literature for the purposes of popular mobilization. Some of these materials were particularly instrumental in the promotion of the Kosovo myth. In 1836, Gavrilo Kovačević's *Battle* saw the light of day for the first time in the Ottoman territory. The book became one of the most widely read among the Serbian-speakers (Belov 2007: 493; Popović 1998: 165). Other relevant works included *Miloš Oblilić* by Jovan Sterija Popović (1962) and *Tsar Lazar* by Matija Ban (1987), as well as numerous textbooks (e.g., Jović 1914) and propagandistic speeches by state officials (e.g., Žujković 1919).

---

[14] As late as 1920, eighty-five percent of the Bosnian population was illiterate (Velagić 2007: 132).

The ministry of education controlled the process of literature distribution across schools, libraries and reading rooms. Among the books recommended for Bosnian students in 1919 was one by Milan Prelog on medieval history, which offered a Yugoslavist interpretation of the Kosovo battle.[15] That same year, the government financed the publication of an overview of Serbian, Croatian and Slovene history authored by a professor of the Sarajevo trade academy, Vasilij Popović. According to the author, the work emphasized "the highest power [of the Serbian medieval state] under Nemanjić dynasty" and included epic folksongs.[16]

- Promoting Nationalist Art

The Society of Serbian Letters (later the Royal Academy), National Museum and Belgrade National Theater were the key institutions of state control in the cultural sphere. The Vojvodina intelligentsia originally established the Serbian Theater in Novi Sad, but the theater in Belgrade also received sporadic financial help from the government and often exchanged ideas, actors and administrative cadres with its sister organization in Serbia.

Among the most popular plays in the repertoires of the two national theatres were the dramas of Sterija Popović, Ban and Subotić. In the 1880s, Miloš Cvetić triumphed with his plays

---

[15] Based on the available literature, it is hard to trace the whole process of distribution of educational literature throughout the Yugoslav state (see: Jordanović 2000). Therefore, I rely on local data from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Državni Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine (The State Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo; hereafter DABiH). Fond Zemaljske vlade za BiH [The collection of the Regional Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina]. Sign. ZVBH-2. 1919. Br. 67–12. I used a later edition of Prelog's works (Prelog 1920). The education department of the Bosnian Regional Government was subordinated to the Ministry of Education of the kingdom. An integrated syllabus was introduced in 1927 (Velagić 2007: 132–133).

[16] DABiH. Fond Zemaljske vlade za BiH. Sign. ZVBH-2. 1919. Br. 67-143. L. 2, 5. The book was eventually published in 1920 under the title *History of the Yugoslavs* (Popović 1920).

Lazar and *Dušan*, which remained on the stage in Belgrade for over twenty years. The growing popularity of new drama *The Death of the Mother of the Jugovićs*, written by Ivo Vojnović in 1907, once even caused an intervention of the Habsburg police. Just before the First World War, the Belgrade public watched the *Resurrection of Lazar* by Vojnović and *Kosovo Tragedy* by Žarko Lazarević (Čolović 2016: 255–263, 284–285; Ekmečić 1991: 339–340; Emmert 1992; Mihailovich 1991: 149–150; Pejin 1991: 162–164; Wachtel 1998: 54). Musical interpretations of the Kosovo theme began to appear at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1903, Petar Konjović, a young Serbian composer from Austro-Hungary, authored one of the first Serbian operas, *The Marriage of Miloš*. In the interwar period, his friend Miloje Milojević composed the symphonic poem *The Death of Mother of the Jugovićs* (1921) and the church choral *Saint Vitus Day Communion* (1929). Then Milojević started to collect popular melodies for a *Kosovo Suite*, which was finished in 1942 (Gordina 1975: 284).

Serbian Romantic painters who turned an increasing attention to the Kosovo battle since the 1870s were admitted to the state academy, supported by the National Museum, and personally encouraged by the royal family. Some of them originated from Serbia proper, but most came from the Austro-Hungarian lands of Vojvodina and Croatia. The medieval battle was reflected in the *Kosovo cycle* of paintings created by academicians Adam Stefanović, Pavle Čortanović, Anastas Jovanović, Paja Jovanović, Djordje Krstić and Uroš Predić. They portrayed the heroes of Serbian folksongs: Lazar, the Jugovićs brothers and Miloš Obilić. Even the names of the pictures were suggested by the epics: *The Last Supper of Prince Lazar, The Death of Murad,* etc. Appealing to the wide public, the painters imparted religious overtones by following traditional iconographic schemes. The most influential of all was Predić's work *Kosovo Maiden*. Completed in 1919, it depicts a dramatic scene known from the epic songs. A bride who lost her beloved in the battle

traverses the Kosovo battlefield to give the last rites to the fallen heroes (Popovich 1991: 242–244, 250–252).

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Kosovo myth gained popularity among Croatian and Slovenian artists inspired by ideas of Yugo- and Pan-Slavism. Avidly consuming "ancient" Serbian folksongs and nationalist literature, they looked at the primeval Slavic past as a charter for contemporary politics. Their work was "motivated by the discovery of a primitive heroic impulse in their own roots: spontaneous, inherently free and just, the Slavs were destined for greatness" (Pantelić 2007: 137). The most famous among these Yugoslavists were members of the Royal Academy Marko Murat, whose paintings covered Serbian medieval history, and Ivan Meštrović, who came up with an ambitious idea to build a Saint Vitus Day temple. The project was presented at the international exhibition in Rome but was never realized. Meštrović, however, managed to complete the sculptures of the *Kosovo Maiden, Miloš Obilić* and the *Mother of the Jugovićs* following the stylistic trends of Central European Secessionism. In the interwar period, his path was followed by Slovene sculptor Lojze Dolinar and his Croatian colleague Antun Augustinčić. The former created the terracotta sculpture *Kosovo Maiden* following the compositions of the Pieta, while the latter masterminded another unrealized project of a memorial in Kosovo (Aleshina 1988; Čolović 2016: 264–283; Ekemičić 1991: 339–341; Emmert 1992; Ignjatović 2014; Pantelić 2007; Pavlović 1989; Popovich 1991: 252–253; Raditsa 1983; Trgovčević 1999; Wachtel 1998: 54–59).

State support was central for early films with the Kosovo theme. The first Serbian film, *Coronation of King Peter I of Serbia*, included depictions of passing actors dressed as Prince Lazar and Miloš Obilić. In 1939, Belgrade producer Kosta Novaković received an order from the Yugoslav authorities to create a fully-fledged narrative film. He managed to film the

commemorations of 1939 and a number of scenes,[17] but had no time to finish the project before the Second World War (Kosanović 1989).

- Official Addresses and State-Sponsored Commemorations

From the 1870s onwards, the Kosovo myth was reified in numerous speeches, manifestos and appeals "to the nation" made by monarchs and key government officials on the occasion of decisive political events. In 1889, massive, state-wide celebrations of the battle's 500th anniversary were organized in Belgrade and Cetinje. One year later, the Serbian government proclaimed Saint Vitus Day a state holiday. Since then, state-controlled institutions and government-aided cultural societies regularly paid tribute to the Kosovo heroes. It is important to note that all of these manifestations, public pronouncements and commemorations occurred in organized settings, such as prearranged memory sites, educational institutions, military parades and army barracks. They never represented on-the-spot improvisations for enthusiastic and spontaneously gathered crowds.

In 1867, Montenegrin Prince Nicholas I, who had previously authored the influential poem *There, Over There* (Njegoš 1969), invoking ancient glory of the Dušan Empire and Miloš's military valor (see: Čolović 2016: 175–182), chose the month of June to declare war on the Ottoman Empire (Djordjević 1991: 314). Encouraging his army, the prince gave a speech on Saint Vitus Day:

> For almost five centuries the Turkish force has trampled members of our people
> and devastated the beautiful lands of our old and great state... I know that your knightly

---

[17] Some pictures of the 1389 commemorations and filmed scenes are available in: Arhiv Kosova (The Archive of Kosovo, Pristina; hereafter AK). F. 57. Zbirka Mihajla Kijametovića [The personal collection No. 57 of Mihajlo Kijametović]. LVII – K.2 – 378–398 – 1939.

chests are filled with a desire to struggle against the Turks, to avenge Kosovo and resurrect the ... freedom of the Serbian people buried long ago... Murad [I] conquered our Empire, now we must take it back from Murad [V]! (Njegoš 1968: 155–159)

After that, the Kosovo myth was articulated by members of the Njegoš, Obrenović, and Karadjordjević dynasties, ministers and army commanders on many occasions. Very similar speeches, pointing to the ancient roots of nationhood and the teleology of the liberation struggle, were pronounced at the proclamation of the Serbian Kingdom (1882), the 500th anniversary of the Kosovo battle (1889), the start of the First Balkan War and the takeover of Kosovo (1912), the declaration of war on Austro-Hungary and many other significant events (Karadjordjević 1991: 15–18, 26 50, 146; Njegoš 1968: 125; Stanković 2007: 7; Žujković 1919: 5–8; see also: Askew and Askew 1916: 199–200; Djordjević 1991: 318–322).

The most massive state-sponsored commemorations of the Kosovo battle before the Second World War included grandiose 500th and 550th anniversaries and a highly emotional memorial service for the medieval heroes on the newly captured Field of Kosovo in 1912.

The 1889 celebrations happened in the aftermath of a political crisis, which resulted in the abdication of King Milan. Under these circumstances, celebrations were used to strengthen the authority of the new ruler, Alexander. The main festivities were scheduled to take place in Lazar's capital, Kruševac, on Saint Vitus Day. Having dedicated the celebrations to all who "had fallen in wars for Faith and Fatherland," the government coopted a large number of academicians, military commanders and religious leaders. Invitations were sent to cultural institutions and numerous Orthodox parishes all over the Serbian lands. On the first day, the young king, escorted by government officials and high clergy, attended a memorial service in the church of Lazarica and listened to a solemn requiem for the Kosovo warriors. The metropolitan delivered a sermon asking

70

their glorious ancestors to help to restore the Empire and unify the nation. The king laid the foundations for a monument dedicated to the Kosovo heroes and established the Order of Prince Lazar. Then, the commemorations continued in the medieval Žiča monastery, where Alexander Obrenović was anointed as "the first king of the resurrected monarchy." In the same month, special memorial sessions were held in the Royal Academy and the Officers' Club in Belgrade. The press in Serbia, Montenegro and Austro-Hungary covered the commemorations closely. Numerous popular publications, dramas and poems dedicated to Kosovo saw the light of day (Čolović 2016: 220–224, 227–237; Djordjević 1991: 318–319, 323; Emmert 1992).

The 550th anniversary took place in the advent of the Second World War. The long-embattled government desperately tried to turn the event into a signifier of Yugoslav unity. The 1389 resistance was presented as a common initiative of all South Slavs, who defended European values and Christianity. Huge festivities were held in Kosovo, Vojvodina, Serbia proper and Dalmatia. The call for organizing the main commemorative event in Kosovo seemingly came "from below," that is, from the Association of the Kosovo Natives (*Udruženje kosovca*), founded in Belgrade in the 1930s. However, the leading members of that association included nationalist intellectuals, who in the early twentieth century, used their Ottoman citizenship, and administrative and teaching positions to coordinate *četnik* struggles and perform secret functions for the Serbian government in the "unredeemed" Balkan territories. In 1939, the Association of the Kosovo Natives relied on its connections within the government, Church and cultural circles to assure that Serbian elites worked in concert organizing the 550th anniversary. The Ministry of Transportation helped with vehicles and negotiated discounts for train and boat connections to Kosovo. The Ministry of Education opened school doors in the region to provide free accommodation for the participants and, together with the Ministry of Defence and numerous cultural societies, tried to

boost mass attendance. Eventually, King Petar II, Regent Pavle, almost the whole cabinet, influential city majors, cultural figures and Church hierarchs with the patriarch headed the 1939 commemorations. On the Field of Kosovo, a small monument dedicated to Miloš Obilić was erected.[18] Invoking the legendary Lazar's speech, the king proclaimed: "We shall neither submit, nor yield!" (Bieber 2002: 99; see: Čolović 2016: 316; Emmert 1992; Pavlović 1989: 423)

Commemorations of the battle in October 1912 were much smaller in scale. However, they electrified Serbian public opinion and were widely reported in the press. Finally, Kosovo had been "avenged" and Serbs could freely pay tribute to their glorious ancestors. Prior to the First Balkan War, famous poet Milan Rakić authored a short poem named *At Gazimestan* (i.e., the Kosovo Field) praising the Kosovo heroism. In months, the poem became astonishingly popular. Serving as a consul in Pristina (1905–1911), he buried a church bell on the Field of Kosovo, promising the Heavens to return. As hostilities erupted in 1912, Rakić immediately volunteered for irregular troops. His Tsar Lazar regiment was one of the first to enter the battlefield. The bell was unearthed and Rakić solemnly announced the long-awaited victory. Awe crept over the astounded soldiers. The Serbian commander Boža Janković ordered a memorial service, the first on the "liberated" Kosovo field in the last five centuries (Čolović 2016: 285–290; Djordjević 1991: 321; Tomić 1913: 120).

As expected, government promotion of public commemorations of the battle was not limited to these massive manifestations. Several measures were taken to ensure the transformation of the state-sanctioned celebrations into banal, grassroots practices. In 1892, Saint Vitus Day

---

[18] In contrast to the 500th anniversary, the 1939 commemorations have not been discussed in detail in the literature. Therefore, I rely on the following archival material: AK. F. Zbirka Mihajla Kijametovića. LVII – K.1 – 4 – 1961, LVII – K. 2 – 30 – 1939. L. 1–53.

became an official state holiday. In order to ensure popular awareness of the Kosovo myth, schools were obliged to end the academic year on June 15/28. Teachers had to organize student performances of patriotic songs, memorial services to the fallen "for the honored cross and golden liberty" and conversations on the national significance of Kosovo (Vukić 2003: 75). In Yugoslavia, Saint Vitus Day was celebrated in the schools all over the country to strengthen the unity of the South Slavs. For instance, in June 1919, students of *Montenegrin* educational institutions were lectured "about the significance of Saint Vitus Day for the *Serbian* people."[19] The army was another important institution that regularly celebrated Saint Vitus Day, which was done even during the evacuation in France in the years of the First World War (Žujković 1919: 5–8).

The state also tried to influence how Saint Vitus Day was commemorated and cultivated in non-institutional contexts. According to official prescriptions, churches were draped in black, black flags waved on houses and national standards hung at half-mast. All invitations had to be printed with black margins. Every year, various state-supported sports rallies took place in late June (Djordjević 1991; Ekmečić 1991: 339).

- Schooling

---

[19] Arhiv Države Crne Gore (The Archive of the State of Montenegro, Cetinje; hereafter ADCG). Fond Osnovne škole "Njegoš" [The collection of the Primary School *Njegoš*]. Fasc. 12. Br. 109. On commemorations of the Saint Vitus Day in a Serbian school in Pristina in 1914, see: AK. F. 199. Dimitrije Paramonović [The personal collection No. 199 of Dimitrije Paramonović]. Kutija 5. L. 7. For 1936, see: Državna realna gimnazija u Prištini 1936: 12, 15. All of these materials shed light on the intentions of the government and the course of commemorations, which usually involved a church service, singing or reciting epic and patriotic songs, public lectures on national significance of the Kosovo battle and the decoration of the most successful students. However, neither published yearly reports nor archival data, unfortunately, help in reconstructing the feelings and thoughts of the participants. In other words, it is hard to assess how the Kosovo myth was received based on this evidence.

Mass schooling was introduced in Serbian-inhabited regions of the Balkans relatively late, but it immediately became central to the promotion of the Kosovo myth. In 1880, the Serbian Parliament founded the Main Educational Council, composed of state officials, leading scholars and influential clerics, who were supervised by the ministry of education and religious affairs. Members of the council considered mass education central for achieving national unity and progress. Schools had to make "one soul and one goal in every part of the fatherland" a reality. Since as late as 1910, ninety-five percent of all students did not continue beyond the compulsory fourth grade, large efforts were made to assure that elementary education transmitted enough "patriotic" knowledge. Accordingly, in the elementary school curriculum, fifty percent of the classes were devoted to subjects dealing with Serbia, such as language, history, geography and the Orthodox faith (Jelavich 1990: 34–39).

After the establishment of the Yugoslav state, in the 1920s, the Main Educational Council recognized that the curricula and textbooks, which had been used so far in different parts of the country, were in contradiction with the current national goals. Therefore, it attempted to stimulate and regulate the publication of new textbooks by prescribing that all material should be approved before being used at schools. Usually the ministry published an extensive list of literature approved for elementary education (Troch 2012).

In the Kingdom of Serbia, the information about the Battle of Kosovo appeared in the textbooks and readers on geography and history. Geographical textbooks described "Old Serbia" (Kosovo) as a "sacred land" where "our kings and emperors resided." The authors paid attention to the battlefield near Pristina, Dušan's capitals of Prizren and Skopje, and the town of Peć with the seat of the Serbian patriarchate (Jelavich 1990: 145, 156). One of the most popular history textbooks, by Mihailo Jović, which had reached its thirty-sixth edition in 1913, devoted about

twenty percent of its pages to the "terrible battle" and the "fall of the Serbian Empire." The Tsardom of Dušan was characterized as a "more enlightened and more successful state" than many other countries of the period (Jović 1914: 65). After undergoing crisis under Uroš, the timid and unwise Dušan's heir, the state was reinvigorated by Lazar, who also managed to legitimize the independent Serbian Church. Nevertheless, the prince's efforts were thwarted in 1389, when the bravest Serbian heroes fell together with the Serbian Tsardom. In the aftermath of this "most significant event for the Serbian people," nobody in Europe could resist the Turkish onslaught any longer (Jović 1914: 81–103).

In the early 1920s, an adapted version of the Jović textbook was still in wide circulation in Yugoslav schools. Now, however, the battle had assumed the meaning of a Serbian struggle for a common cause of South Slav freedom. The author lamented that if all South Slavic brothers could join Lazar's forces, together they would have beaten the Turks and pushed them back to Asia. With the installation of the dictatorship, the Yugoslav authorities made additional efforts to emphasize an inclusive Yugoslav character in the 1389 events. New textbooks explained that back then, Serbs and Croats stood shoulder to shoulder fighting the common enemy. Moreover, Croats acquired their own "Kosovo," namely, the 1493 battle at Krbava field, where a Croatian army clashed with the Ottomans. Matija Gubec, the Croatian leader of a peasant rebellion, and Peter Zrinski and Fran Krsto Frankopan, conspirators against the Habsburg Crown, were all rendered as successors to Prince Lazar in the continuous holy liberation struggle (Troch 2012; cf. Popović 1920; Prelog 1920).

B.   *Propaganda of the Orthodox Church*

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the church was only sporadically involved in the construction and promotion of the Kosovo myth. Memorial services to the martyr Prince Lazar were held annually in June in the Vojvodina Vrdnik monastery. In other religious sites, they might have occurred at the initiative of individual patriotically minded priests but were not a regular practice. Only occasionally was the Battle of Kosovo invoked for political purposes, for example, by the newly elected patriarch Josip Rajačić at a popular assembly in Karlovci in revolutionary 1848 (Djordjević 1991: 316; see also: Bojović 1989: 397–398; Tomashevich 1991).

Since the 1870s, the Serbian state increasingly assumed control over ecclesiastical affairs, first through Belgrade metropolitan Mihajlo and then directly through lay delegates of the synod. Orthodoxy was proclaimed the official religion in the 1903 constitution (Perica 2002: 8–9; Velikonja 2003: 102). Under these conditions, the Church organization became a significant instrument in spreading the Kosovo myth. Parishes served as chief sites for mass celebrations of Saint Vitus Day, especially at the local level. In their sermons, clerics praised the Kosovo heroes as martyrs for "the honored cross and golden liberty," "Faith and Fatherland." Contemporary political leaders were represented as restorers of the past glory (Tomashevich 1991: 211).

The gradual transformation of the modest memorial services into nationalist manifestations in the late 1880s and 1890s helped boost the popularity of the Kosovo myth. The masses initially neither demanded for nor enthusiastically supported the celebrations. Top-down organizational efforts determined the onset of commemorations, their ideological rendering and popular turnout. In 1889, the battle's 500th anniversary in Bosnia was limited to short memorial services to Prince Lazar in separate parishes due to the lack of support from local church leadership and imperial authorities. Only in exceptional cases were they followed by mass gatherings and nationalist speeches. Alternatively, in Serbia proper, where the state assumed the leading role in the

organization of the holidays, and in Vojvodina, where strong societies of intelligentsia pressured the church and simply supplied the masses, the participants at times were in the dozens of thousands (see: Kraljić 1991; Popović 1998: 158–159; Pejin 1991).

In the Yugoslav period, the Kosovo myth became an integral part of the Church's nationalist ideology, known as *Svetosavlje* (the Cause of Saint Sava). This doctrine, whose most famous representatives were Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović and archimandrite Justin Popović, presumed a mystical unity of the collective and the individual in the Serbian nation and stressed the role of the Orthodox Church as a primeval guardian of the national spirit in the face of moral corruption coming from the West. Velimirović proclaimed that "the holy nationalism of the Gospel" was "the only appropriate path" (Velikonja 2003: 100). In 1933, he authored the short story *Tsar's Testament*, alluding to the "heavenly choice" and Lazar's supreme values. The battle was portrayed as a bulwark struggle of pristine Orthodox Christianity against cruel Turks representing "unbaptized Asia." Thus, the Serbs were rendered as saviors of European civilization (Velimirović 2006: 29–30).

C.   *Cultural and Educational Societies*

As mentioned previously, the first public associations in Serbian-inhabited lands were *Matica Srpska*, the United Serbian Youth in Vojvodina and the Society of the Serbian Youth in Belgrade. Both youth societies relied on sound state support. At the turn of the twentieth century, similar organizations mushroomed and played an important role promoting Serbian nationalism, particularly outside the two national states. Some of them bore the names of medieval rulers and religious leaders, for instance, *Obilić* choral (1883) and *Dušan the Strong* gymnastic (1892)

societies in Belgrade, *Obilić* gymnastic club in Mostar (1903) and *Dušan the Strong* student group in Pristina (Djordjević 1991: 317–318).

Since 1889, cultural societies actively participated in celebrations of Saint Vitus Day. Indicatively, the first project of the 500th anniversary festivities appeared in Novi Sad newspaper *Zastava* (The Banner). Soon, in early 1889, a formal organizational committee was established by the Vojvodina intelligentsia. The commemorations opened with a solemn requiem performed in the town of Ruma and then continued with a memorial service to the Kosovo heroes in nearby Vrdnik. Choral societies and the Orthodox flock from all over Austro-Hungary were invited to participate. In a competition, the organization committee selected two poems to be publicly recited: the "Hymn to Kosovo" and the "Farewell to the Fifth Centenary of Saint Vitus Day" (Djordjević 1991: 319–321; Emmert 1992). In the Yugoslav period, the activities of all cultural societies were regulated by a special decree and received state financial support. The organization of Saint Vitus Day commemorations became tightly coordinated with the government at this time.[20]

National societies continued to contribute to cultural development. The Gallery of *Matica srpska* acquired the second largest collection of Serbian art, which included Kosovo-focused

---

[20] Arhiv Jugoslavije (The Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade). Fond 66. Ministarstvo prosvete Kraljevine Jugoslavije [The collection No. 66 of the Ministry of Education of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia]. Fasc. 316. Br. 529. On cooperation of Sarajevan Cultural Society *Enlightenment* and state authorities during the celebrations of Saint Vitus Day in 1924, see: DABiH. Fond Ministarstva Prosvete. Odjeljenje za BiH u Sarajevu [The collection of the Ministry of Education. Bosnia and Herzegovina Division in Sarajevo]. Sign. MPRO. 1924. Fasc. 1. Br. 337, Fasc. 2. Br. 833, 1033; Fond "Prosveta" [The collection of the Cultural and Educational Society *Enlightenment*] Sign. PKD. 1929. Kutija 10. Br. 1585/ 29, 1587/ 2. On the 1930 commemorations organized by the *Serbian Kosovo* newspaper, which included staging on the Field of Kosovo several scenes depicting Serbian troops before the battle, the arrival of Miloš Obilić to the Turkish camp, and the cry of the Kosovo maiden, see: AK. F. 57. Zbirka Mihajla Kijametovića. LVII – K. 2 – 399–415 – 1930. On collaboration between the Association of the Kosovo Natives and the government during the 550-[th] anniversary in 1939, see: Ibidem. VII – K. 2–30 – 1939.

paintings and lithographs of Nikola Aleksić and Pavle Čortanović. Regular newspaper publications about the 1389 battle and illustrated calendars, which adorned many Serbian houses in final decades of the nineteenth century, also emerged as effective vehicles for the cultivation of the Kosovo myth (see: Bojović 1989: 395–406; Pejin 1991: 167–164). After the takeover of Kosovo in 1912, mass visits to the "liberated Holy Land" on Saint Vitus Day were organized by patriotic organizations (Djordjević 1991: 319–321; Emmert 1992).

Documents from Bosnia and Herzegovina provide interesting insight into the propagandistic activities of Serbian national societies. The Prosveta (Enlightenment) society, founded in Sarajevo in 1902, served as one of the main channels promoting Serbian nationalist mythology in the region until 1949. It organized regular meetings, supported schools, libraries and reading rooms, purchased and disseminated patriotic literature and helped commemorate national holidays, stage performances and exhibitions. In 1932, the society had 244 libraries and reading rooms all over Bosnia.[21] The entrance hall of its central library in Sarajevo was decorated with

---

[21] Interestingly, in the early 1930s, activists of the *Enlightenment* society produced an internal report entitled "What books are read the most?" They wanted to find which books enjoyed wide popularity to plan a purchasing policy for over 220 libraries across the country. The report documents that Bosnian readers preferred epic songs and folklore (fifty-five percent of the libraries) and historical literature (thirty-four percent). Practically oriented texts on agriculture were less popular (twenty-three percent) (estimated by the author based on: DABiH. Fond "Prosveta." Sign. PKD. 1934. Kutija 114. L. 61–69).

There remains a chance that the popularity of Serbian folklore among the masses was overestimated by the nationalistically-minded activists of the cultural society. Unfortunately, the archival material does not describe in detail the historical context in which the report was compiled. Nor does it identify the authors. However, one should bear in mind that the report was made for internal consumption and had never been made public. This suggests that the activists would be interested to reflect the actual situation in Bosnian society so that they could design further strategies accordingly. In addition, the activists of the *Enlightenment* society included traders and small businessmen, not only intellectuals. Being promoters of national ideology, the former were equally concerned with the development of local agriculture and, arguably, would not be prone to distort the facts regarding the advance of agronomical knowledge.

nationalist paintings. Portraits of the members of Serbia's ruling dynasty and acting politicians hung side by side with the *Coronation of Emperor Dušan* by Paja Jovanović and *Kosovo Maiden* by Uroš Predić.[22] Among the books distributed in the early 1930s were collections of epic folksongs by Novica Šaulić, the famous nationalist *History of the Serbian People* by Stanoje Stanojević (1926: 176–194, on the battle) and *Antiquities the Fruška Gora Monasteries* by Lazar Mirković (1931: 48–53), the latter of whom provided readers with essential information about Lazar's tomb in Ravanica monastery.

On the Content of Disseminated Materials

The assumption that widely-shared, pre-modern memories enabled the promotion of the Kosovo myth among the masses is hard to support with evidence. This is because instead of simply *pointing to the national significance of popular ethnic memories*, the mythmakers usually *described in full length what those memories actually were*. Most of the patriotic literature that they disseminated portrayed the events of 1389 in detail. Far from being a simple reinterpretation of subjects already known by the public, many fictional works of the nineteenth century meticulously traced the lives and deeds of the Kosovo heroes (e.g., Ban 1987; Popović 1962; Subotić 1987). Non-fiction books familiarized readers with the history of the medieval Serbian state, the course of the anti-Ottoman war and crucial historical sites (Magarašević 1825; Maletić 1847; Marković 1931). Some of these materials were accompanied by the complete texts of the Kosovo epic songs, while others incorporated extracts from the epic or monastic texts directly into the narrative.

---

[22] DABiH. Fond "Prosveta." Sign. PKD. 1934. Kutija 114. L. 58–59.

In their public speeches between the 1870s and 1930s, state officials often dwelled on what happened to Serbia at the end of the fourteenth century and carefully listed all of the sites in Kosovo that were supposedly dear to the Serbian heart (Djordjević 1991: 218–323).[23] Commemorations of Saint Vitus Day in churches were usually accompanied by "patriotic lectures" given by nationalist intellectuals, who aimed to educate the attending public on the issues of national history. These lectures, not memorial religious services per se, eventually came to be seen by Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman authorities in the period before the Second World War as threatening (see: Bataković 1991; Kraljić 1991; Pejin 1991). Teachers gave history lessons during school celebrations of Saint Vitus Day. In addition, according to government instructions, students were required to learn by heart and recite epic folksongs (Bojović 1989: 397–398, 406; Vukić 2003: 75). Most importantly, epic folksongs were included in historical schoolbooks in full length, and often occupied two or three times more space than the author's narrative (Jović 1914). Geographical textbooks and readers explained what historical sites existed in "Old Serbia" (Jelavich 145, 156). If the public already knew the epics and the tradition of the medieval church, all this information would have been redundant. In other words, "popular ethnic memories" of Kosovo were in fact a result of nationalists' top-down educational efforts.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article contributes to the long debate on the modernity of the Kosovo myth, a "crucial case" for testing the ethno-symbolist theory. I argue that the myth is a modern phenomenon. First,

---

[23] Notably, after their incorporation into the new independent states, some of these sites were renamed to convey their national significance. For example, the exact part of the Kosovo Field where the battle had supposedly occurred in 1389 was now officially called *Car Lazarovo Polje* (The Field of Tsar Lazar): AK. F. 49. Kolekcija geografskih mapa i karata [The collection of geographic maps]. XLIX–7–125/4 – 1943.

the evidence shows that the medieval texts and epics about Kosovo are not long-lasting ethnic memories. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, they were unknown to the overwhelming majority of people constituting the purported Serbian "*ethnie.*" Moreover, cultural rupture and change rather than recurrence characterize the history of these ambivalent and tiny "legacies." Second, the dissemination of the Kosovo myth constituted a long, top-down and elite-led process instead of being provoked, welcomed or supported by the public.

At the first stage, which roughly falls between 1830s and 1860s and corresponds to Hroch's *Phase B*, the Kosovo battle was recalled, singled out as a pivotal event in the national history and interpreted as an exemplar of struggle for national liberation from the "Turkish yoke." Officials established a set of institutions that became instrumental for nationalist propaganda and the reification of the national past in the minds of laypeople. In this process, the Orthodox intelligentsia from Vojvodina, influenced by Western ideas and current political developments, worked with the governments in Belgrade and Cetinje. Although in the beginning, the leading role was assumed by the intelligentsia, the Serbian and Montenegrin governments eventually came to support and coordinate the nationalist propaganda.

During the second stage, from the 1870s onwards, marking the start of Hroch's *Phase C*, the contribution of the state became even more powerful. The Kosovo myth was promoted through government-sponsored publishing, art projects, official rhetoric, public commemorations and schooling. The government also managed to exert growing influence on the Orthodox Church. Independent cultural societies founded by the intelligentsia relied increasingly on state support. It was these coordinated and collaborative efforts, in other words, *an institutional completeness* (see: Breton 1964) of the Kosovo mythopoeia, that assured popular acceptance of the novel nationalist narrative in the first decades of the twentieth century.

The motives of the Kosovo mythmakers were also modern and not encoded in ancient "ethnic memories" or "ethnocentric sentiments." The intelligentsia, state officials, bureaucracy and clerics were influenced by nationalism penetrating into the Balkans from cultural, educational and diplomatic contact with the West. Therefore, most of them genuinely believed in the cause of "national awakening." In addition, nationalism had indirect effects. As a result of sincere "patriotic" persuasions, national leaders aimed not only at "popular enlightenment," but also at strengthening nascent nation-states structurally and expanding them territorially. For effective state-building, they needed to develop institutions and aquire educated cadres. Using the Kosovo myth helped government officials attract qualified professionals, who came already indoctrinated. Similarly, by preaching the national significance of a religious figure like Saint Lazar, the state could effectively coopt the church, which in many regions represented the only channel through which official propaganda could be effectively delivered to the masses. At the same time, the intelligentsia and the Church responded positively to government appeals for cooperation, having found themselves in a desperate need for funds and official support.

Finally, the content of the propaganda disseminating the Kosovo myth suggests that the promoters did not assume the existence of a widely shared, pre-modern narrative. Instead of simply noting the national significance of "ethnic memories," the mythmakers usually explained in full length what those memories actually were. Most of the distributed literature and public addresses described the battle, its protagonists and the relevant geography in detail. The schoolbooks and propagandistic materials contained lengthy extracts from the Serbian epics of the Kosovo cycle.

While exposing the modernity of the Kosovo myth, this article challenges the ethno-symbolist theory in three ways. The presented evidence calls into question the main thesis of ethno-symbolists about the rootedness of modern nations in pre-modern *ethnies,* or at least challenges

the conclusion that the link between these two lies in the realm of myth. Importantly, I am not claiming to provide the ultimate evidence to deny any sense of what Hobsbawm (2002: 46–79) with reservations calls "proto-nationalism" and Smith (1999: 130–134) refers to as ethnocentrism, which *might* have existed among the Orthodox speakers of Serbian dialects in pre-modern times. With its limited focus, my study cannot cover the whole historical process of the evolution of collective identities in Serbia and adjacent lands. Some works criticizing the widespread assumptions of academics about perennial Serbian identity have already appeared (Pantelić 2011; also see: Stokes 1976).

Second, questioning the necessity of a link between widely shared "ethnic memories" and nationalist myths, I specifically raise doubts against ethno-symbolism as an *explanatory theory*, not a *"research program"* (Smith 2009: 1). Thus, if the existence of popularly shared ethnic memories and cohesive *ethnies* were not necessary for the "mass appeal" and "popular resonance" of nationalism, then one cannot argue that the appearance of particular nationalist narratives and the formation of modern nations were *conditioned by* pre-modern ethnic histories. The relationship between pre-modern folk antecedents and modern constructs was certainly not one-to-one. Rather, we should recognize that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nationalists had many options with regards to which cultural elements (of multiple vaguely defined "*ethnies*") to select as the fundamentals for new national identities (cf. Ozkırımlı 2003; Pantelić 2011). Nevertheless, even this finding does not invalidate research looking into *historical parallels* (but *not* causal links, as often stated) between pre-modern and modern social identities and collective representations. No scholar would disagree that nationalism is by definition a historicist ideology. Therefore, any inquiry into how nationalists deal with the past and select historical material constitutes an important endeavor.

Third, pointing to the fact that pre-modern Kosovo legacies did not have any significant popular spread and appeal at the turn of the nineteenth century, I offer a corrective to the practice of ethno-symbolists to treat historically traceable memories, narratives and signs as a "symbolic recourses" (Smith 2009: 14–16). Owing to Fredrik Barth (1969), we should distinguish between socially meaningful identities and "cultural stuff" that these identities enclose. Some elements of this "stuff" can be used for boundary maintenance, but others may remain completely irrelevant for social differentiation. Therefore, we should avoid the risk of uncritically treating historically existing cultural *material* as a *symbolic recourse* for mass mobilization and popular appeal. If some cultural elements are not widely shared and/or initially have no mobilizational or, at least, "thick" social meaning, much individual and collective effort is required to make them significant for national identities (see: Cohen 1985; Forest and Johnson 2002). This being said, the "cultural stuff" that identities enclose and at times put up as boundary markers has its own, often ancient history. Exploring the historical circumstances under which specific cultural materials, such as images, melodies, narratives, idioms and habits, appeared in a territory is a significant field of inquiry.

Lastly, by proposing the dissemination-focused approach, I am trying to advance the generalist studies of nationalist mythopoeia and showcase an important new way of assessing the temporal origins of foundational narratives. This article provides evidence that examining *how* nationalist myths are promoted helps to answer *whether* they are modern or historically rooted. Namely, I argue that *the spread of communal narratives with sound pre-modern roots* should constitute a process that is only loosely organized instead of being tightly coordinated from above. Motivations of the mythmakers should originate in pre-existing ethnic attachments and patriotic codes. The content of propagandistic materials and elite rhetoric should not include basic "historical" information widely shared by the population, nationalists being able to simply refer to

perennial ethnic memories instead of narrating them in detail. Alternatively, *the dissemination of the recent national myths without pre-modern roots* should develop as a top-down, well-organized process, originating in a limited number of locations. Motivations of the mythmakers should be modern and momentary, while disseminated propagandistic materials should be expected to teach the masses their "ethnic memoires."

References

Archival Sources

Arhiv Države Crne Gore (The Archive of the State of Montenegro, Cetinje).

Fond osnovne škole "Njegoš" [The collection of the Primary School *Njegoš*]

Arhiv Kosova (The Archive of Kosovo, Pristina).

F. 49. Kolekcija geografskih mapa i karata [The collection No. 49 of geographic maps]

F. 57. Zbirka Mihajla Kijametovića [The personal collection No. 57 of Mihajlo Kijametović].

F. 199. Dimitrije Parmonović [The personal collection No.199 of Dimitrije Paramonović].

Arhiv Jugoslavije (The Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade).

F. 66. Ministarstvo prosvete Kraljevine Jugoslavije [The collection No. 66 of the Ministry of Education of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia].

Državni Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine (The State Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo).

F. Ministarstvo Prosvete. Odjeljenje za BiH u Sarajevu [The collection of the Ministry of Education. Bosnia and Herzegovina Division in Sarajevo].

F. «Prosveta». Srpsko prosvjetno i kulturno društvo u Sarajevu [The collection of *Enlightenment,* Serbian Cultural and Educational Society in Sarajevo].

F. Zemaljska vlada za BiH [The collection of the Regional Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina].

Bibliography

Aleshina, Lilia. 1988. Antun Avgustinchich [Antun Augustinčić]. Moskva: Izobrazitelnoe iskusstvo.

Archard, David. 1995. "Myths, Lies and Historical Truth: a Defence of Nationalism." *Political Studies* 43.3: 472-481.

Armstrong, John. 1982. *Nations before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Askew, Alice and Claude Askew. 1916. *The Stricken Land: Serbia as We Saw It*. New York: Dood, Mead & Company.

Bakić-Hayden, Milica. 2004. "National Memory as Narrative Memory: the case of Kosovo." In: *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, edited by Maria Todorova, 25–40. New York: New York University Press.

Ban, Matija. 1987. "Car Lazar [Tsar Lazar]." In: *Istorijska drama XIX veka,* edited by Marta Frajnd. Knjiga I, 245–342. Beograd: Polit.

Banac, Ivo.1984. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 1969. Introduction to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The social organization of cultural difference,* edited by Fredrik Barth, 9–37. Bergen: Universitetsforlagen.

Bataković, Dušan. 1991. "Značaj Kosovskog predanja u održanju srpskog naroda na Kosovu i Metohiji u 19. veku [The Significance of the Kosovo memories in Retention of Serbian People in Kosovo and Metohija in the Nineteenth Century]." In: *Kosovska bitka 1389. godine i njene posledice*, edited by Nikola Tasić and Veselin Djuretić, 121–131. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.

Belov, Mikhail. 2007. *U istokov serbskoi natsionalnoi ideologii: mekhanizmy formirovaniia i spetsifika razvitiia (konets XVIII – seredina 30-h godov XIX vv.) [The Origins of the Serb National Ideology:*

The Mechanisms of Formation and Peculiarities of Development (From the End of the Eighteenth Century to the 1830s]. Sankt Petersburg: Aleteyia.

Berger, Stefan. 2009. "On the role of Myths and History in the Construction of National Identity in Modern Europe." *European History Quarterly* 39.3: 490-502.

Bieber, Florian. 2002. "Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo Myth from the 600th anniversary of the present." *Rethinking History* 6.1: 95–110.

Bojović, Jovan. 1989. "O Vidovdanu u Crnoj Gori [On Saint Vitus Day in Montenegro]." *Sveti knez Lazar: Spomenica o šestoj stogodišnjice Kosovskog boja, 1389–1989*, edited by Ljubomir Durković Jakšić, 391–406. Beograd: Sveti arhijerejski SPC.

Branković, Avram. 1828. *Pregled i letočisleno označenie u carstvu istorije, svemirne, od početka sveta do danas [An Overview and Chronology of History in the Empire, from the beginning of the World to the Present Day].* Budim: Pismeni Kraljevskog Universiteta Peštanskog.

Branković, Djordje. 1994. *Hronika Slovena Ilirika, Gornje Mezije i Donje Mezije [The Chronicles of the Slavs in Illyricum, Upper and Lower Moesia]*. Novi Sad: Prometej.

Breton, Raymond. 1964. "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants." *American Journal of Sociology* 70.2: 193-205

Brunnbauer, Ulf, ed. 2004. (*Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism,* edited by Ulf Brunnbauer. Munster: Lit Verlag.

Ćirković, Sima. 1990. "Kosovska bitka kao istorijski problem [The Kosovo Battle as a Historical Problem]." In: *Kosovska bitka u istoriografiji,* edited by *Sima Ćirković*, 109–118. Beograd: Istorijski institut.

Coakley, John. 2004. "Mobilizing the Past: Nationalist Images of History." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10.4:531–560.

Cohen, Anthony. 1985. *The Symbolic Construction of Community.* London: Routledge.

Čolović, Ivan. 2011. *The Balkans: The Terror of Culture: Essays in Political Anthropology*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Čolović, Ivan. 2014. "Sarajevski atentat i kosovski mit [The Sarajevo Assassination and the Kosovo myth]." *Peščanik.* URL: http://pescanik.net/sarajevski-atentat-i-kosovski-mit/, accessed March 10, 2018.

Čolović, Ivan. 2016. *Smrt na Kosovu Polju: Istorija kosovskog mita [Death on the Kosovo Field: A history of the Kosovo myth]*. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek.

Čubrilović, Vasa. 1958. *Istorija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka [The History of Political Thought in the Nineteenth-Century Serbia]*. Beograd: Prosveta.

Ćupić, Drago. 1991. "Kosovski mit i Crna Gora [The Kosovo Myth and Montenegro]." In: *Kosovska bitka 1389. godine i njene posledice*, edited by Nikola Tasić and Veselin Djuretić, 111–119. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.

Djokic, Dejan. 2009. "Whose Myth? Which Nation? The Serbian Kosovo Myth Revisited," In: *Uses and Abuses of the Middle Ages: Nineteenth to Twenty First-Century*, edited by Janos M. Bak, Jörg Jarnut, Pierre Monnet and Bernd Schneidmueller. Munich: Wilhelm Fink. URL: http://research.gold.ac.uk/3455/1/Kosovomyth2.pdf, accessed March 10, 2018.

Djordjević, Dimitrije. 1991. "The Tradition of Kosovo in the Formation of Modern Statehood in the Nineteenth Century." In: *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas Emmert, 309–330. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Djurković, Živko. 1990. "Kosovska legenda u "Pjevaniji" Sime Milutinovića Sarajlije [The Kosovo Legend in *Pevanije* of Sima Milutinović Sarajlija]." In: *Kosovski boj u istoriji, tradiciji i*

stvaralaštvu Crne Gore, edited by Miroslav Babović, 143–153. Titograd: Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjetnosti.

Državna realna gimnazija u Prištini [The State Real Gymnasium in Priština]. 1936. *Izveštaj za školsku 1935–1936 god.[The Report for 1935–1936 Academic Year].* Priština: Jovan Kostić.

Duijzings, Ger. 2000. *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo.* New York: Columbia University.

Duković Jakšić, Ljubomir. 1989. "Ustanovljenje u vaskrsloj Srbiji Vidovdana za državni praznik [The Establishment of the Saint Vitus Day as a State Holiday in Resurrected Serbia]." *Sveti knez Lazar: Spomenica o šestoj stogodišnjice Kosovskog boja, 1389–1989*, edited by Ljubomir Durković Jakšić, 365–388. Beograd: Sveti arhijerejski Sinod SPC.

Emmert, Thomas. 1992. "The Kosovo legacy." In: *Kosovo*, edited by William Dorich and Basil W.R. Jenkins. Alhambra: Kosovo Charity Fund. URL: http://www.kosovo.net/sk/history/dorich_kosovo/kosovo11.htm, accessed March 10, 2018.

Esman, Milton. 1994. *Ethnic Politics.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Forest, Benjamin, and Juliet Johnson. 2002. "Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet–Era Monuments and Post–Soviet National Identity in Moscow." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92.3: 524-547.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gilferding, Akeksandr. 1873. *Sochineniia. T.3: Bosniia, Gertsegovina i Staraia Serbiia [Works. Vol.3: Bosnia, Herzegovina and Old Serbia]*. Sankt-Peterburg: Pechatnia V. Golovina.

Golenishchev-Kutuzov, Ilia. 1964. "Kosovskaia legenda [The Kosovo Legend]." *Izvestiia AN SSSR. Seriia literatury i iazyka.* 23.3: 213–228.

Gordina, Elena. 1975. "Koshana" Petra Konevicha [Košana by Petar Konjović]." In: Iz istorii muzyki sotsialisticheskikh stran Evropy, 282–322. Moskva: Muzyka.

Gorup, Radmila. 1991. "Kosovo and Epic Poetry." In: *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas Emmert, 109–121. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Greenawalt, Alexander. 2001. "Kosovo Myths: Karadžić, Njegoš and the transformation of Serb memory." *Spaces of Identity* 3: 49–65.

Guibernau, Montserrat, and John Hutchinson. 2004. "History and National Destiny." *Nations and Nationalism* 10.1-2: 1-8.

Guibernau, Montserrat. 2010. *The Identity of Nations.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, John A. 1993. "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained." *Daedalus* 122.3: 1-28.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1972. "The Social Function of the Past: Some Questions." *Past and Present* 55: 3–17.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1992a. "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–1914." In: *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 263–307. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1992b. Introduction to *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 1–14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hroch, Miroslav. 1993. "From national movement to fully-fledged nation." *New Left Review* 198: 3–20.

Hroch, Miroslav. 2008. *Małe narody Europy: perspektywa historyczna [Small Nations of Europe: The Historical Perspectives]*. Wrocław: Ossolineum.

Hutchinson, John. 2005. *Nations as Zones of Conflict*. London: SAGE.

Ignjatović, Aleksandar. 2014. "Images of the Nation Foreseen: Ivan Meštrović's Vidovdan Temple and Primordial Yugoslavism." *Slavic Review* 73.4: 828-858.

Jelavich, Charles. 1990. *South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Jordanović, Branislava. 2002. *Ministarstvo Prosvete i ministri Kralevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Kraljevine Jugoslaviji, 1918–1941 [The Ministry and Ministers of Education in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918–1941]*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej.

Jovanović, Radoman. 1990. "Kosovski mit u nacionalno-političkoj ideologiji i strategiji Crne Gore polovinom XIX vijeka [The Kosovo myth in the National Political Ideology and Strategy of Montenegro in the Mid-Nineteenth Century]." In: *Kosovski boj u istoriji, tradiciji i stvaralaštvu Crne Gore,* edited by Miroslav Babović, 17–22. Titograd: Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjetnosti.

Jović, Mihail. 1914. *Srpska istorija za narod [Serbian History for the People]*. Beograd: Državna štamparija.

Julinac, Pavle. 1981. *Kratkoje vvedenie v istoriju proishoždenija Slaveno-serbskago naroda [A Short Introduction to the History of the Slavo-Serbian People]*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.

Kalibarda, Novak. 2013. Amfilohije i kosovski mit [Metropolitan Amfilohije and the Kosovo Myth]. Podgorica: Pobjeda. URL: https://crnogorskapitanja.wordpress.com/amfilohije-i-kosovski-mit-novak-kilibarda-pobjeda/, accessed March 10, 2018.

Kalić, Jovanka. 2001. *Srbi u poznom sredńem veku [Serbs in the Late Middle Ages]*. Beograd: Službeni list SRJ.

Kapferer, Bruce. 1988. *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Karađorđević, Aleksandar I. Ujednitelj. 1991. *Govori [Speeches]*. Beograd: Lingva.

Kaufman, Stuart. 2001. *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kolstø, Pål. 2005. "Assessing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society." In: *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, edited by Pål Kolstø, 1–35. London: Hurst & Company.

Kosanović, Dejan. 1989. "Kosovski boj i filmska snjimanja [The Kosovo Battle and Film Production]." In: Ljubinković, Nenad, and Irena Arsić. *Kosovo u pamćenju i stvaralaštvu*, edited by Nenad Lubinković and Irena Arsić, 247–260. Beograd: Narodna biblioteka "Vuk Karadžić".

Kraljić, Tomislav. 1991. "Petstogodišnica Kosovske bitke u Bosni i Hercegovini [the 500th Anniversary of the Kosovo Battle in Bosnia and Herzegovia]." In: *Kosovska bitka 1389. godine i njene posledice*, edited by Nikola Tasić and Veselin Djuretić, 133–139. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.

Leshchilovskaia, Inna. 1994. *Serbskaia kul'tura XVIII veka [Serbian Culture in the Eighteenth Century]*. Moskva: AO "ISM."

Leskovac, Mladen, comp. 1972. *Antologija starije srpske poezije [The Anthology of Old Serbian Poetry]*. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.

Levinger, Matthew and Paula Franklin Lyttle. 2001. "Myth and Mobilization: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric." *Nations and Nationalism* 7.2: 175–194.

Ling, Jan. 1997. *A History of European Folk Music.* Rochester: University of Rochester Press.

Ljušić, Radoš. 2003. "Srpska, velikosrpska i jugoslovenska državna politika Srbije (1804–1918)" [Serbian, Grater Serbian and Yugoslav Policy of Serbia (1804–1918)]. In: *Velika Srbija: Istine, zablude, zloupotrebe,* edited by Milorad Ekmečić, 287–313. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.

MacKenzie, David. 1985. *Ilija Garašanin, Balkan Bismarck*. Boulder: East European Monographs.

Magarašević, Georgij. 1825. "Vydov dan. Kosovo [The Saint Vitus Day. Kosovo]." *Serbske letopisi* 1: 43–50.

Maiz, Ramon. 2003. "Politics and the Nation: Nationalist Mobilization of the Ethnic Differences." *Nations and Nationalism* 9.2: 195–212.

Malcolm, Noel. 1999. *Kosovo: A short history.* New York: Harper Perennial.

Malešević, Siniša. 2006. *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maletić, Djordje. 1847. *Istoričesko-kritičesko opisanie bitke Kosovopoljske, 1389 [Historical and Critical Description of the Battle of Kosovo Field, 1389]*. Novi Sad.

Maxwell, Alexander. 2010. "Typologies and Phases in Nationalism Studies: Hroch's ABC Schema as a Basis for Comparative Terminology." *Nationalities Papers* 38.6: 865-880.

Mertus, Julie. 1999. *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War.* London: University of California Press.

Mihailovich, Vasa. 1991. "The Tradition of Kosovo in Serbian Literature." In: *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas Emmert, 141–158. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Mihaljčic, Rade. 1975. *Kraj Srpskog carstva [The End of the Serbian Tsardom]*. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.

Milutinović-Sarajlija, Sima. 1987. "Tragedija Obilić" [Tragedy *Obilić*]. In: *Istorijska drama XIX veka*, edited by Marta Frajnd. Knjiga I, 42–147. Beograd: Polit.

Mock, Steven. 2012. *Symbols of Defeat in the Construction of National Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mrkaić, Blagota. 1990. "Kosovo u djelu Petra I Petrovića Njegoša [Kosovo in the Works of Petar Petrović Njegoš]." In: *Kosovski boj u istoriji, tradiciji i stvaralaštvu Crne Gore,* edited by Miroslav Babović, 125-134. Titograd: Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjetnosti.

Mulić, Jusuf. 2006. *Velika Srbija, Musljimani i Bosna [Greater Serbia, Muslimanji and Bosnia]*. Sarajevo: Jusuf Mulić.

Mylnikov, Aleksandr. 1996. Kartina slavianskogo mira: Vzgliad iz Vostochnoi Evropy. Etnogeneticheskie legendy, dogadki, protogipotiezy XVI – nachala XVIII veka. [Images of the Slavic World: A Look from Eastern Europe. Ethnogenetic Legends, Guesses and Inceptive Hypotheses in the Sixteenth–Early Eighteen Centuries]. Sankt-Peterburg: Peterburgskoie vostokovedenie.

Negosh, Petr. 1988. *Gornyi venets [Mountain Wreath]*. Moskva: Khudozhestvennaia literatura.

Nenadović, Matija. 1969. *The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenadović*, edited by Lovett F. Edwards. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Nešić, Staniša. 2008. "Novine Beogradskog čitališta [Newspapers of the Belgrade Reading Hall]." *Balkanski književni glasnik* 5.18. URL: http://www.balkanliteraryherald.com/broj18/stanisanesic18.htm, accessed March, 10, 2018.

Nielsen, Christian. 2014. *Making Yugoslavs: Identity in King Aleksandar's Yugoslavia*.

Njegoš, Nikola. 1968. *Govori [Speeches]*. Cetinje: Obod.

Njegoš, Nikola. 1969. *Pjesme [Verses]*. Cetinje: Obod.

Nora, Pierre. 1989. "Between Memory and History: Les lieux de mémoire." *Representations* 26: 7-24.

Ozkırımlı, Umut. 2003. "The Nation as an Artichoke? A Critique of Ethnosymbolist Interpretations of Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 9.3: 339–355.

Pantelić, Bratislav. 2007. "Designing Identities Reshaping the Balkans in the First Two Centuries: The Case of Serbia." *Journal of Design History* 20.2: 131-144.

Pantelić, Bratislav. 2011. "Memories of a Time Forgotten: the Myth of the Perennial Nation." *Nations and Nationalism* 17.2: 443–464.

Pavlović, Aleksandar and Srdjan Atanasovski. 2016. "From Myth to Territory: Vuk Karadžić, Kosovo Epics and the Role of Nineteenth-Century Intellectuals in Establishing National Narratives." *Hungarian Historical Review* 5.2: 357–376.

Pavlović, Dobroslav. 1989. "Spomenici kosovskim junacima na Gazimestanu [Memorials to the Kosovo Heroes at Gazimenstan]." *Sveti knez Lazar: Spomenica o šestoj stogodišnjice Kosovskog boja, 1389–1989*, 421–425. Beograd: Sveti arhijerejski Sinod Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve.

Pejin, Jovan. 1991. "Obilježavanje petstogodišnice Kosovske bitke u Ugarskoj i širinje kosovske legende [The Commemoration of the 500th Anniversary of the Kosovo Battle in Hungary and Spread of the Kosovo legend]" In: *Kosovska bitka 1389. godine i njene posledice*, edited by Nikola Tasić and Veselin Djuretić, 141–165. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.

Perica, Vjekoslav. 2002. *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Petković, Ratko and Nikola Kusovac, eds. 1987. *Kosovska bitka: mit, legenda, stvarnost [The Battle of Kosovo: Myth, Legend and Reality]*, edited by Ratko Peković and Nikola Kusovac. Beograd: KIZ "Litera."

Petrovič, Vasilij. 1754. *Istorija o Černoj Gori [History of the Black Mountain]*. Moskva.

Pitulić, Valentina. 2012. "Kosovska bitka izmedju istorijskih izvora i epske legende [The Battle of Kosovo between Historical Sources and Epic Legend]." *Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Prištini* 42.2: 99–112.

Popović, Miodrag. 1998. *Vidovdan i časni krst: ogled iz književne arheologije [Saint Vitus Day and the Cross of Honour: An Essay on Literary Archaeology]*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa.

Popović, Vasilj. 1920. *Istorija Jugoslovena [History of the Yugoslavs]*. Sarajevo: Knjižara J. Studničke i dr.

Popovich, Ljubica. 1991. "The Battle of Kosovo and Battle Themes in Serbian Art." In: *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas Emmert, 227–266. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Prelog, Milan. 1920. *Pregled istorije Južnih Slavena: Srba, Hrvata, Slovenaca [The Overview of History of the South Slavs: The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes]* Dio.1. Sarajevo: Bosanska pošta.

Raditsa, Bogdan. 1983. "Meštrović's Significance in the Formation of Yugoslavia in 1918." *Journal of Croatian Studies* 24. URL: http://www.studiacroatica.org/jcs/24/2409.htm, accessed March 10, 2018.

Radojević, Danilo. 1988. "O pojavi lika Miloša Obilića kao mitskog junaka u svijesti Crnogoraca [On the Emergence of the Figure of Miloš Obilić as a Mythological Hero in Montenegrin Consciousness]." *Ars* 1: 83-98.

Rajić, Jovan. 1795. *Istorija raznyh slavenskih narodov [The History of Various Slavic Peoples]*. Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografia korpusa chuzhestrannykh edinovertsev.

Redjep, Jelka. 1991. "The Legend of Kosovo." *Oral Tradition* 6:2-3: 253–265.

Redjep, Jelka. 1976. *Priča o boju Kosovskom [The Tale of the Kosovo Battle]*. Zrenjanin: Centar za kulturu.

Rusinow, Dennison. 2003. "The Yugoslav Idea before Yugoslavia." In: *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea*, edited by Dejan Djokić, 11–26. London. Hurst & Company.

Šajkaš, Marija. 2008. "From the Cradle of the Nation to the Most Expensive Serbian Word: Changes in Serbian Public Language in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century." *Nationalities Papers* 36.4: 625–640.

Schöpflin, George. 2000. *Nations, Identity, Power.* London: Hurst & Company.

Shemiakin, Andrei. 1998. *Ideologiia Nikoly Pashicha: Formirovanie i evoliutsiia, 1868-1891 [The Ideology of Nikola Pašić: Formation and Evolution, 1868–1891]*. Moskva: Indrik.

Shnirelman, Viktor. 2000. "Tsennost' proshlogo: etnotsentricheskie i istoricheskie mify, identichnost' i etnologiia [The Value of the Past: Ethnocentric and Historical Myths, Identity, and Ethnology]." In: *Realnost' etnicheskih mifov*, edited by Marta Brill Olcott and Alexei Malashenko, 12–33. Moskva: Gendal'f.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. 1995. *The Death of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin Books.

Smirnov, Yuriy. 1987. "Vuk Karadzhich i ego folklornoe sobranie [Vuk Karadžić and His Collection of Folklore]." In: *Serbskie narodnye pesni i skazki iz sobraniia Vuka Stefanovicha Karadzhicha,* 3–21. Moskva: Khudozhestvennaya literature.

Smith, Anthony D. 1991. *National Identity.* London: Penguin Books.

Smith, Anthony D. 1999. *Myths and Memories of the Nation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Anthony D. 2011."National Identity and Vernacular Mobilization in Europe." *Nations and Nationalism* 17. 2: 223–256.

Stanković, Djordje. 2007. *Sto govora Nikole Pašića. Knj. 2. [One Hundred Speeches of Nikola Pašić. Vol.2]*. Beograd: Rad.

Stanković, Todor. 1910. *Putne beleške po staroj Srbiji, 1871-1898 [Travel Notes from Old Serbia, 1971–1898]*. Beograd: Stamparija D. Muncá i M. Karića.

Stanojević, Stanoje. 1926. *Istorija srpskoga naroda [History of the Serbian People]*. Beograd: Napredak.

Starčević, Velimir. 1997. *Staro srpsko knjižarstvo [The Old Serbian Book Publishing]*. Beograd: Prosveta.

Sterija Popović, Jovan. 1962. "Miloš Obilić." In: Jovan Sterija Popović, *Celokupna dela. Knj.2,* 214–317. Beograd: Narodna prosveta.

Stokes, Gale. 1976. "The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics before 1840." *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 4.1: 77–90.

Subotić, Jovan. 1987. "Miloš Obilić" In: *Istorijska drama XIX veka,* edited by Marta Frajnd. Knjiga II, 61–153. Beograd: Polit.

Tomashevich, George Vid. 1991. "The Battle of Kosovo and the Serbian Church." In: *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas Emmert, 203–226. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Trgovčević, Ljubinka. 1999. "The Kosovo myth in the First World War." In: *Old Serbia and Albanians.* Belgrade: SAAS. URL: http://www.rastko.rs/kosovo/istorija/sanu/KOS_MIT.html, accessed March 10, 2018.

Trifunović, Djordje. 1985. *Najstariji srpski zapisi o Kosovom boju [The Oldest Serbian Scripts about the Battle of Kosovo]*. Gornji Milanovac: Dečije novine.

Troch, Pieter. 2012. "Between Yugoslavism and Serbianism: Reshaping Collective Identity in Serbian Textbooks between the World Wars." *History of Education* 41.2: 175-194.

Troch, Pieter. 2013. "Interactive Nationhood: the Relation between Croatian and Yugoslav National Identity in the Interwar Period." *Nations and Nationalism* 19.4: 781-798.

Vangeli, Anastas. 2011. "Nation-Building Ancient Macedonian Style: the Origins and the Effects of the so-called Antiquization in Macedonia." *Nationalities Papers* 39.1: 13-32.

Velagić, Adnan. 2007. "The Education System in Herzegovina during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–1929)." *Bosnian Studies* 1: 122–149.

Velikonja, Mitja. 2003. *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press.

Veljimirović, Nikolaj. 2006. "Carev zavet [Tsar's Testament], 1933." In: *Srpska književnost Kosova i Metohije. XI–XXI vek*, edited by Staniša Nešić, 29–30. Beogrda: Pravoslavno delo.

Vujačić, Veljko. 2007. "Elites, Narratives, and Nationalist Mobilization in the Former Yugoslavia." *Comparative Politics* 40.1: 103–124.

Vušković, Marija. 2012. "Miloš Obilić i Miloš Pocerac: toponimija o kosovskom junaku [Miloš Obilić and Miloš Pocerac: the toponymy of the Kosovo hero*]." Glasnik istorijskog arhiva u Valjevu* 46: 101–104.

Vujačić, Veljko. 2015. *Nationalism, Myth and the State in Russia and Serbia: Antecedents of the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vukić, Predrag, ed. 2003. *Letopisi osnovnih škola u Knaževini Crnoj Gori (1885-1908): zbornik dokumenata [Chronicles of the Secondary Schools in the Principality of Montenegro (1885–1908): collection of documents]*. Cetinje: Državni Arhiv Crne Gore.

Wachtel, Andrew. 1998. *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Yovitchitch, Lena. 1926. *Pages from Here and There in Serbia.* Belgrade: S.B. Cvijanovic.

Zubrzycki, Geneviève (2013). "Aesthetic Revolt and the Remaking of National Identity in Quebec, 1960–1969." *Theory and Society* 42.5: 423–475.

Zubrzycki, Geneviève. 2011. "History and the National Sensorium: Making Sense of Polish Mythology." *Qualitative Sociology* 34.1: 21–57.

Žujković, Jovan. 1919. *Otadžbina [Fatherland]*. Beograd: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.

Article 2. Longing for the Nation-State: Diasporic Myths and the Spread of Nationalism in Albania

Abstract. Recent decades have yielded rich scholarship on diaspora, migration and migrant transnationalism. At the same time, new discussions have developed in the generalist theoretical literature concerning the diffusion of nationalism, the spread of the nation-state model and the contemporary rise of long-distance nationalism. Nevertheless, scholars have paid only limited attention to the role of diasporas and migrants in the initial spread of nationalism and the creation of nation-states. This article aims to overcome a number of missing links between different strands of existing scholarship. It scrutinizes published diasporic biographies, archival evidence and existing secondary literature and uses the methods of agreement, process tracing and pattern matching. Albanian and other supplementary cases show that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, diasporas and expatriate communities served as important carriers of the modular social artifact of nationhood to non-Western countries. They played a significant role in the initial spread of nationalism, the establishment of nation-states and the start of organized nation-building. The article studies the mechanisms through which nationalism was transmitted from the original centers to diasporics, and through them, to non-Western contexts. The significance of diasporic myths of the homeland in nation-building in sending societies is highlighted.

Introduction

In his seminal work, Benedict Anderson (1991: 4) states that nationalism and nation-ness, "once created, became 'modular,' capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-

consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains." Despite an overall acceptance of this diffusionist perspective, Anderson and other major theorists of nationalism rarely analyze *who transplants nationalism from the original centers and *what motivates them*. In this respect, the scholar only talks about colonial officials and creole pioneers (Anderson 1991). In other literature, including path-breaking studies on the initial spread of nationalism and the nation-state model across the world, the carriers of nationalist ideology are simply identified as "nationalists" (Breuilly 1994; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Malešević 2013; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). In this article, I argue that more attention needs to be paid to diasporas and migrants.

The discussion on the global circulation of nationalist ideas and practices is not limited to the generalist theoretical literature. The students of diasporas and long-distance nationalism talk about transnational identities and their effects on group formation and social action. However, missing links remain in these three strands of research. While the generalist scholarship raises the question of the initial spread of nationalism and the nation-state model, it pays little attention to the role of diasporas and expatriate communities. The diaspora literature scrutinizes the long-lasting processes of diaspora construction and the historyicalcirculation of romantic ideas among expatriates, but it rarely elaborates on the contribution of diasporas to the spread of nationalism (Brubaker 2005; Butler 2001; Clifford 1994; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994; Morawska 2011; Nieswand 2012; Tishkov 2000). By contrast, works on long-distance nationalism closely examine the role of migrants in fostering nationalism in countries of origin, but lack historical depth (Anderson 1992; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Skrbiš 2000).

My argument in this article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the three strands of literature in detail and show how they inform my theoretical framework. Second, I move to my

case study and building on the constructivist critique of diaspora show that "Albania" and "Albanian identity" were highly fluid and malleable phenomena before the rise of nationalism. Third, I analyze how Albanian nationalism developed in the context of diasporization of Albanian-speaking migrants. The *Millian method of agreement* is applied to the study of *published diasporic biographies and archival documents* to discover what caused diaspora formation and the rise of expatriate nationalism in the Albanian case. Fourth, I use *process tracing* to analyze how diasporic ideology, particularly romantic myths of homeland, were instrumental in the spread of nationalism, the establishment of nation-state and nation-building in Albanian-speaking lands. Finally, I use the Albanian case as a heuristic to analyze diaspora contributions to the spread of nationalism and nation-state formation in Serbia and the Philippines. The study of supplementary cases through this *pattern-matching* procedure allows me to offer suggestions about the generalizability of my findings (on methods see: Lange 2013).

The early Albanian diaspora is selected as the main case because diasporic influences on Albanian nationalism are already discussed in the scholarship. Nevertheless, many area specialists, unfamiliar with the broader theoretical debates on nationalism and diaspora, tend to take the perennial existence of an Albanian identity and homeland for granted (Dërmaku 1983; Draper 1997; Gawrych 2009; Misha 2008; Skendi 1967; Vickers 1999; see, however: Clayer 2009). The area-studies literature also has a number of limitations in its analysis of the mechanisms behind the rise and spread of Albanian nationalism and diasporic mythmaking (Dërmaku 1983; Malcolm 2002; Skendi 1967). Some of these limitations I am trying to overcome below.

Scholarship on Nationalism and Diaspora: Missing Links

Here I focus on the three strands of literature most relevant to the problem addressed in

this article: the generalist literature on the spread of nationalism, diaspora studies and works on long distance nationalism. Relying on insights from and advancing discussion in these bodies of literature, I want to highlight an important mechanism in the global spread of nationalism, namely, the contribution of diasporas and migrants. Furthermore, while scholars in all three fields rarely pay attention to the effect of diaspora narratives on socio-political developments in people's places of origin, this article shows how diaspora myths of the homeland provide local nationalists with elaborated and readily available images of the nation, which are later used domestically and internationally for the promotion of a national project.

The rich generalist literature discusses multiple factors behind the emergence and global spread of nationalism and the nation-state model. All of these generalist explanations are complex and multi-causal. For instance, the generalist scholars talk about the collapse of imperial, royal and ecclesiastic legitimacy, the role of nationalist elites and national imagination, and the rise of mass politics and change in mass perceptions of concepts like temporality, space, and the social world. At the same time, theorists point to a number of factors as crucial. Ernest Gellner (1983; 1997) concentrates on industrialization. Benedict Anderson (2006) stresses "print capitalism" and the subsequent advance of mass literacy in the vernacular. The attention of John Breuilly (1994), Andreas Wimmer (2002), and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) is centered on the struggles of emerging social classes, wherein nationalism becomes an indispensible tool for political legitimization. Siniša Malešević (2013: 55–88) links the spread of nationalism and the idea of popular sovereignty with modern state-building. In his interpretation, the dispersal of the nation-state model happens before mass nationalism. Afterwards, nation-states penetrate society and shift micro-solidarities to national ones through the increasing bureaucratization of coercive power and centrifugal ideologization. Andreas Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein (2010) argue that nation-states multiply

when nationalist elites are able to take control over the state and promote their ideology among the masses because of favorable domestic and international power configurations, often helped by cascading creations of nation-states in the neighborhood.

Internal and external macro-sociological processes explain persuasively why nationalism and the nation-state model eventually take root in different societies. However, I argue that scholars must pay more attention to the role of diaspora and migrant communities in the initial spread of nationalist ideologies and the ideological design of nationalist projects. This focus is not radically new to the theoretical literature, but an analysis of diaspora contributions is still missing. In his famous dictum, Anderson (1991: 4) talks about modular nationhood, "capable of being transplanted… to a great variety of social terrains," but pays little attention to the carriers of this "transplantation" and their motivations. Gellner (1983: 101–9) explicitly stresses the decisive role of diasporas in the development of nationalism and nation-state formation in Israel and Greece. Yet he stops short of analyzing the contributions of diasporas in more detail, and he does not look beyond alienation and powerlessness in the host societies in finding factors behind diasporic adoption of a militant nationalist ideology.

Not only the generalists, but also the scholars of diaspora and long-distance nationalism do not discuss the decisive impact of expatriate communities on the *initial* spread of nationalist ideologies and the creation of nation-states. Some diaspora studies adopt a perennialist view of ethnicity and nationalism and see the commitment of emigrants to their ethno-cultural homelands as natural and ever-existing (Cohen 2008; Sheffer 2003, 2006; Tammaru et al. 2010; see also: Tölölyan 2000). This makes the issue of diasporic contributions to the homeland's nation-building and identity construction superfluous. Other works, accommodating the constructivist critique of diaspora concept, talk at length about diasporization and mobilization of expatriate communities,

but they do not analyze expatriates' transnational involvement in fostering the homeland nationalism (Brubaker 2005;Clifford 1994; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994; Morawska 2011; Nieswand 2012; Tishkov 2000). Finally, many studies, including vibrant scholarship on long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Skrbiš 2000), offer a rich picture of emigrant contributions to nation-building, international political advocacy and radical ethnic politics in home countries, but cover only *recent* periods (Axel 2002, 2004; Ben Rafael 2013; Biswas 2001; Lainer Vos 2010; Libaridian 1999; Schnapper 1999; Sökefeld 2006; Tölölyan 2000; Wahlbeck 2002; Winland 1995). In his book on Italian immigration to Canada, John Zucchi (1998) pays close attention to the transnational dimension of diaspora politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, he overcomes the two limitations of diaspora and long-distance nationalism studies: the overconcentration on diaspora mobilization in the host societies and the focus on recent decades. The scholar discusses the policies of the Italian nation-state, which aimed to create a unified overseas diaspora out of groups still cherishing regional rather than national identities. However, even Zucchi does not study the opposite process – the role of Italian-speaking expatriate communities in establishing the nation-state in Italy.

In other words, we can identify a number of missing links in the three stands of literature. While the generalist literature raises the question of the initial spread of nationalism and the nation-state model, it pays little attention to the role of diasporas and expatriates. The diaspora literature studies the long-lasting processes of diaspora construction and the evolution of romantic (pre-) nationalist ideas in expatriate communities. Yet it rarely discusses the contribution of diasporas to the spread of nationalism. By contrast, the works of long-distance nationalism look closely at the role of migrants in fostering nationalism in their countries of origin but lack historical depth.

Focusing on early Albanian diaspora nationalism, I engage with all three strands of the

literature: the generalist scholarship on nationalism, diaspora studies and works on long-distance nationalism. All of these bodies of literature help build my analytical framework. I re-enter the discussion on how and why nationalism and the nation-state model spread throughout the world. This article shows that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, diasporas and migrants served as influential carriers of the modular concept of nationhood to non-Western countries. They played an important role in defending burgeoning nation-states in the international arena and in fostering nationalist movements in their sending societies. Thus, I stress the significance of long-distance nationalism not only today, but also in earlier historical periods.

The existing scholarship on diaspora experience and the role of romantic homeland myths provides a solid stepping stone for my analysis connecting diaspora formation, expatriate mythmaking and the spread of nationalism. I give special credit to the model of diaspora development offered by William Safran (1991). For Safran, the retention of glorifying myths of the homeland is central to the maintenance of diaspora identities and pro-homeland orientation (see also: Butler 2001: 193–194, 204–5; Cohen 2008: 4–19; Kostantaras 2008; Nieswand 2012; Tölölyan 2000). Relying on his insight, I highlight the role of diaspora myths in spreading nationalism and nation-building. However, since Safran's original model does not accommodate the constructivist critique, I propose a revised model of diaspora-homeland relationship. The original framework assumes that ethno-national attachments and longing for the homeland are rooted in the real historical experiences of living in ancestral territories. In contrast, the revised model does not take ethnic, national or diaspora identities for granted. It admits that strong unifying identities can be absent for long periods in both places of origins and incipient migrant communities. I suggest that the processes of diasporization in host societies may lead to the cultivation of diasporic homeland myths, which, eventually, spread to places of origin and form a

strong basis for nationhood (Figure 1). There can be multipe causes of this diasporization, which pushes me to expand the scope of my analysis beyond the alienation in host societies most often discussed in the literature (Anderson 1992; Gellner 1983: 101–9; Morawska 2011: 1036–40; Safran 1991: 83–4; Sheffer 2006). In other words, the critical study of diaspora formation and pre-modern social and spatial identities leads me to reverse Safran's model. Often it is not the homeland that engenders diasporas, but the other way around (cf. Axel 2004; Sökefeld 2006: 273).

Figure 1. The Revised Model of Diaspora

Finally, my study draws on pre-existing literature on the history of Albanian nationalism and the diaspora. Compared to the most of this literature (Dërmaku 1983; Draper 1997; Gawrych 2009; Misha 2008; Skendi 1967; Vickers 1999), I pay closer attention to the role of Western ideas, external influences and the agency of ethnic entrepreneurs in triggering and shaping Albanian nationalism. I also refuse to take the centuries-long existence of Albanian identity and ethnic motivations beyond the diaspora activism for granted. In contrast to Clayer's (2009) most recent book on the issue, which is informed by a constructivist perspective, this article focuses more on diasporas and expatriates as carriers of nationhood. While Clayer (2009: 143) argues that three factors were crucial for the rise of Albanian nationalism – the involvement of *arbrësh* intellectuals, protestant influences, and social upheavals in the neighboring countries – I stress that the impact

of these three variables on Albanian nation-building were mediated by the emergence of a mobilized Albanian diaspora. The diasporization, mobilization and networking of Albanian-speaking expatriates in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries require explanation in themselves, but this is not the main focus of the otherwise very rich and insightful study undertaken by Clayer (2009: 173–4, 183, 189–192, 208–216).

The Vagueness of "Albania" and "Albanians" in the Pre-Diaspora Period

In tracing the population dispersal from "Albania," one should avoid essentializing the "homeland" by projecting modern national geographies into the past (cf. Ben-Rafael 2010; Cohen 2008; Sheffer 2003, 2006). Emigrants' understanding of "ancestral territory" and homeland attachments both change over time (Axel 2002, 2004; Clifford 1994; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994; Lainer Vos 2010; Libaridian 1999; Morawska 2011; Weinfeld 2011, 2015; Winland 2009). Before the establishment of modern states, the notion of "Albania" changed, as did the notions of many other places (see: Wolff 1994; Todorova 1997). As Stavro Skendi (1967: 31) remarks, what was considered Albania in the 1870s "is not easy to define." Neither a clear concept of "Albania" nor fixed ethnic Albanian identity existed at that time.

The lands inhabited by today's Albanians appeared in medieval and early modern historical documents as "Albania," "Arbanon," "Arberia," and "Arnavudluk" (Ivanova 2004: 71–72). However, the borders of these geographical entities were not precisely determined. Oftentimes "Albania" overlapped with "Epirus" and "Macedonia" (Demiraj 2010: 21–5, 41). Accounts of travelers who visited the Western Balkans do not offer much clarification. At times, Albania meant for them the northern part of today's country (LeQueux 1907: 24–6, 50; Trevor 1911: 350), where the "real," mountainous Albanians lived (Brown 1888: 56–7, Knight 1880: 119–120; LeQueux

110

1907: 24, 57, 62–3, 70, 75–6; Trevor 1911: 346). Scutari (Shodër) was often considered to be the virtual capital of Albania (Knight 1880: 89; Trevor 1911: 352), thus limiting the country's range to the northern territories. Sometimes the Zeta Plain, a fertile lowland to the north of Skadar Lake, was included into Albania; sometimes it was assigned to Montenegro. To simplify matters, travelers often referred to already existing Balkan states and "Turkey," omitting "Albania" altogether (Trevor 1911: 346).

On the ground, "Albania" appeared as a patchwork in the nineteenth century. The land in the Ottoman Empire inhabited by Albanian speakers was administratively divided into four *vilayets* (provinces): Iskodra (Shkodër), Kosova (Kosovo), Manastir (Bitola) and Yanya (Janina). Albanian speakers constituted a decisive majority of the population in only one (Shkodër). Society in these territories was spectacularly fragmented. The Shkumbini River, running south of Tirana, partitioned the country into two dialectically and culturally distinct regions. Tosks populated Southern Albania, called *Toskëri* (Albanian) or *Toskalik* (Turkish). Gegs, for their part, dwelled in Northern Albania, named *Gegëni* or *Gegalik*. Furthermore, "Albania" was fragmented into dozens of relatively isolated geographic regions or *krahinës*, each possessing their distinct idioms and tenors of life. In addition, Albanian speakers formed three different religious communities. Roughly over 1,000,000 were Muslims, 300,000 were Orthodox and 180,000 were Catholics (Clayer 2009: 22–4, 28–32, 53–116; Gawrych 2006: 21). After all these administrative, cultural, geographical, linguistic and religious divisions came tribal and clannish attachments. The clans identified themselves within the narrow area of their settlement, region or *bajrak*, and had very few spiritual, economic or intellectual ties with one another (Clayer 2009: 25–8). The central authorities held nominal control over all Albanian-speaking lands, but mountainous tribes often managed to achieve virtual independence. Overall, Ottoman rule did not forge significant

solidarity among Albanian speakers. Moreover, education in the Albanian language was strongly discouraged, before being banned altogether in 1903 (Gawrych 2006: 132). Over ninety percent of the population remained illiterate.

We can merely speculate how Albanian speakers perceived their identity and "homeland" at that time. The scholarship establishes that in the Ottoman Balkans, religion and belonging to officially recognized communities of faith (*millet*) served as one of the most important anchors of identity (Jezernik 2002; Mazower 2000; Mentzel 2009). Božidar Jezernik (2002: 221) explains that the Ottoman society was "organized into ecclesiastical communities (millets), to one of which every subject had to belong." Only religion served as a basis for these divisions, whereas language and culture (ethnographic distinctions) did not matter much. "A Bulgarian could become a Turk any time that he pleased by embracing Islam, just as a Greek could become a Bulgarian by joining the Exarchate and one of two brothers might enter the Romanian fold and the other the Serbian. Consequently, many people simply could not understand the question of nationality." Along with religion, people on the ground mostly identified with their family and clan (*fis*), the units of territorial organization (*bajrak*), narrowly understood locality (*dhe or botë*) or wider historical-geographical areas (*krahinë*) (Clayer 2009: 21–52; Ivanova 2004: 77–8, 84–5, 120–121; Misha 2008: 29). Cultural, linguistic and social divisions between northern Ghegs and Tosks were strong. Gegënia was mostly isolated and tribal, while in Toskëria the imperial structures penetrated deeper and social differentiation took root (Clayer 2009: 53–116). This resulted in mutual mistrust and even sporadic armed clashes (Blumi 2003: 25–9; see also: Gawrych 2006: 22). Indicatively, a number of leaders of anti-Ottoman resistance, who are celebrated today as Albanian national heroes, operated within a local code of values (Blumi 2003: 174–191).

The ambiguities and complexities of identity among Albanian speakers were documented

by Western travelers in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. In the travelogues, the word "Albanians" often stood for Christians (Brown 1888: 30; Knight 1880: 117–119; LeQueux 1907: 48–50, 62–3; Trevor 1911: 354) or, even more narrowly, for Catholics of the North (LeQueux 1907: 51, 75–6, 82–3; Trevor 1911: 350, 354). They were viewed as distinct from Muslim "Turks," irrespective of what language the "Turks" preferred to use in their everyday life. At times, the Catholic Northerners, unlike other dwellers of the Southern-Western Balkans, were referred to in the travelogues by specific group names used by the Ottoman authorities (*Arnauts*) or locals themselves (*Skiptars*) (Knight 1880: 119–120).[24] The accounts of the travelers not only contain etic assumptions about native identity but reflect the real situation on the ground. Several travelogues give voice to the locals who confuse Muslim religious affiliation and "Turkish" identity (Durham 1985: 42; LeQuex 1907: 50–51, 75–6, 83).

One of the most conspicuous cases of the conflation of religious and cultural identities was recorded by famous British publicist Mary Edith Durham (1904) in Montenegro: "[J]ust as every Mohammedan tells you he is a "Turk," and every one of the Orthodox that he is a Montenegrin, so does every Roman Catholic say that he is an Albanian; and three men who in feature, complexion, and build are as alike as three individuals can well be, will all swear, and really believe, that they all belong to different races." Durham (1985: 126, 254) also documented indicative stories of "conversion" from Serb into Albanian and vice versa by changing religious affiliation.

Along with pointing to the fluidity and ambiguity of native identities, the travelogues show the significance of territorial, local and tribal allegiances. Often only those living in the northern

---

[24] Today *Shqiptars* (Albanian: *shqiptarët*) are the self-given name of Albanians (Demiraj 2010).

mountainous areas of today's Albania were seen by both outsiders and insiders as the most authentic "Albanians" (Brown 1888: 56–57, Knight 1880: 119–120; LeQueux 1907: 24, 57, 62–3, 70, 75–6; Trevor 1911: 346). With regards to clannish divisions, Durham described how certain Albanian- and Slavic-speaking clans traced their origins back to alleged common ancestors and, therefore, did not intermarry, regardless of their linguistic and cultural dissimilarities (Durham 1985: 43–4).

If an overarching Albanian ethnic identity did not exist prior to the establishment of the nation-state, neither did the memories of a glorious national antiquity claimed as perennial by nineteenth-century Albanian diasporics. The knowledge of the ancient history was non-existent even among relatively educated strata. Travelers report that Ottoman officials recruited from the locals often did not have any notion of Ancient Greece and Rome. Even the presence of numerous ancient ruins in the Balkans failed to influence their worldview. Sometimes the monuments of Greco-Roman architecture were believed to be built by legendary ancestors; alternatively, the locals simply referred to devils and other mythological creatures. In any case, these constructions did not generate feelings of group pride and were largely neglected by the local population (see: Ceka 2005: 71; Knight 1880: 17; Mazower 2000: 46).

From Physical Dispersal to Self-Conscious Diaspora

If one defines pre-modern "Albania" as a certain locality in the South-Western Balkans with a high concentration of speakers of Albanian dialects, it is possible to identify several migratory waves and destinations. In the pre-modern period, Albanian speakers settled in the territories of today's Greece, Southern Italy, Turkey, Romania and Egypt. Migrations to the Peloponnese started in the thirteenth century (contemporary *Arvanites*). During and after the defeat

of the anti-Ottoman movement led by Scanderbeg in the second half of the fifteenth and in the sixteenth centuries, Albanian speakers migrated to Italian lands, particularly to Calabria and Sicily, coming directly or via Greece (Albanian: *arbreshë*). Under Ottoman rule, Albanian speakers, especially those who converted to Islam, served in imperial military and bureaucracy and moved throughout the whole empire. They were widely present in Istanbul, Alexandria, Cairo, Thessaloniki and the Danubian Principalities (Clayer 2009: 117–140; Dërmaku 1983: 9–25; Tirta 2006: 158–164).

However, it would be wrong to assume that Albanian speakers brought any ethnically motivated sense of togetherness to their host locations. Available evidence tells that until the nineteenth century, Albanian-speaking migrants and their descendants did not identify as Albanians and did not consider the whole of Albania as their homeland. Communities in the Kingdom of Sicily preserved the memories of the anti-Ottoman struggle under Skanderbeg, but local folklore referred to the Peloponnesus Peninsula as their place of origin (Elsie 1995). Similarly, Orthodox Albanian speakers in small peasant communities of Ukraine merged with Bulgarian speakers and identified Bulgaria as their ancestral land. Even though a certain sense of distinctiveness based on language existed, these settlers' Albanian origins were revealed to the locals by Soviet scholars as late as the 1930s and 1940s (Novik 2011; Ermolin 2012). Even educated migrants who had military and bureaucratic careers did not develop a sense of Albanian identity and homeland. The Albanian speakers of the Souli region brought to Saint-Petersburg in the aftermath of Russian naval expeditions failed to differentiate themselves from Greek-speakers (Ivanova 2004; on the religious "Greek" identity of Albanian-speaking expatriates also see: Clayer 2009: 117, 119–120, 122–26, 154).

The diasporization of Albanian speakers living outside the Western Balkans did not happen

until the nineteenth century. Only in the 1810s to 1830s did a number of antiquarians, who focused on the Albanian language and ethnic history and elaborated the myths of the homeland, appear in Southern Italy and the Romanian Principalities. Since the 1840s, and particularly with the advance of European revolutions, the writings of "out-of-country" Albanian-speaking activists assumed a more nationalist tone. The diasporics postulated the existence of a distinct Albanian ethnicity and language, calling for their recognition and promotion. In the late 1870s, the secret Central Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Albanian Nationality and the Society for the Publication of Albanian Writings were established in Istanbul. The members of these diasporic organizations widely participated in the League of Prizren (1878–81), a political organization that tried to defend the integrity of Muslim-inhabited territories lost in the aftermath of the Russian-Turkish war and later demanded the formation of an autonomous Albanian *vilayet* within the Ottoman Empire. After the military defeat of the League, cultural and promotional activities again took precedence within the circles of the mobilized Albanian diaspora. Branches of the Society for the Publication of Albanian Writing were opened in Romania and Egypt. Because of a ban issued by the imperial authorities for the Istanbul branch, the Society transferred to Bucharest in 1884, where new nationalist journal *Light* was inaugurated. In 1891, another Albanian cultural society, *Endeavor*, began operating in Sofia, and a few years later *Unity* was set up in Egypt. All these organizations maintained ties between themselves and with the "homeland," and published newspapers and literary, historical and geographical works in Albanian (Dërmaku 1983; Skendi 1967: 115–128; Vickers 1999: 44–8).

Many of the diasporics who participated most actively in constructing the image of an Albanian ethnic community located on a delineated historical homeland resided in the Italian cities of Naples (Angelo Masci), Palermo (Guiseppe Crispi), Cosenza (Geronimo de Rada, Vincenzo

Dorsa), Livorno (Demetrio Camarda), Trieste (Zef Jubani) and Florence (Dora d'Istia). Others were born or spent their adulthood in the Ottoman territories: Egyptian Alexandria (Ethim Mitko), Romanian Bucharest and Konstanţa, and Istanbul (Konstandin Kristoforidhi, Frashëri brothers, Pashko Vasa, Jani Vreto, and Ismail Qemali). The Albanian speakers of Italy were nationalist pioneers. Their glorifying works on Albanian language and history appeared in the late 1800s to 1810s and 1830s to 1850s. The following wave of diaspora mythmaking began in other localities in the late 1860s. The production of new narratives by diasporics accelerated particularly after the Russian-Turkish war and decisively shaped the Albanian national imagination until the Second World War.

Factors of Diasporization and the Adoption of Nationalist Doctrine

Most often, the literature discusses exclusion from, discrimination in and alienation by the host societies as the main causes of migrants' radicalization and their engagement in long-distance nationalist activities (Anderson 1992; Gellner 1983: 101–9; Morawska 2011: 1036–40; Safran 1991: 83–4; Sheffer 2006). Locating the first generation of Albanian diasporic activists territorially and temporarily helps to establish a number of commonalities in their biographies.[25] These commonalities help account for many other factors influencing diasporization, transnational nationalist militancy and diasporic mythmaking.

First, all early Albanian diasporics were exposed to Western education and adopted ideas from European revolutionary and nationalist movements. Angelo Masci (1758–1821) was an alumnus of the faculty of law at the reformed University of Naples. Before attending the same faculty in the 1830s, Geronimo de Rada received classical education at home and then graduated

---

[25] If not specified otherwise, the biographies of Albanian nationalists are drawn from: Lafe 2008–2009.

from the "Greek" (Byzantine Orthodox) religious College of Saint Adrian, which was known as a hotbed of Enlightenment and anti-Bourbon-revolutionary ideas (Clayer 2009: 154–5; Kastrati 1980: 17–23, 37–42).[26] Jani Vreto (1822–1900), Kostandin Kristoforidhi (1826–95), Naim (1846–1900) and Sami (1850–1904) Frashëri, and Ismail Qemal (1844–1919) studied in the famous Zosimaia School in Ioannina. The school was established in 1828 by the Zosimas brothers, who wanted to cultivate ancient civic virtue, spread Enlightenment ideology and promote the Greek national idea (Çollaku 1986: 12; Nërgjoni 2013: 74–89; Uçi 2015: 11–14). Reflecting these goals, the curriculum included classical languages, literatures, philosophy, European history and political geography (AQSh. F. 51, Ds. 31, ft. 1). Its teachers and students nurtured the ideas of ancient democracy and popular resistance to tyranny. Zef Jubani (1818–1880) was educated in Malta. Dora d'Istria (1828–1888) traveled to take university courses in Dresden, Vienna, Venice and finally in Berlin under the supervision of Alexander von Humboldt (Bala 1970: 9–12; Kondo 2002: 7–11).

Along with Western education, some diasporics were directly influenced by foreigners or based their works on Western philosophical and philological scholarship. In the 1840s to 1860s, Konstandin Kristoforidhi, Pashko Vasa (1825–92) and Zef Jubani worked respectively for the Austrian, British and French consuls, who were themselves interested in Albanian studies, often for political purposes. Kristoforidhi, who is now considered one of the founding fathers of the Albanian nation, did not show any particular interest in Albanian studies until having been persuaded by Austrian consul Georg Hahn. In the late 1850s, he worked at a Protestant seminary in Malta and translated the Bible into Albanian under contract with the British and Foreign Bible

---

[26] On the similar education trajectory of Demetrio Camarda and other arbrësh nationalists, see: Qiriazi 1997: 12–26; Clayer 2009: 155–162.

Society (Clayer 2009: 147–9, 189–92; Nërgjoni 2013: 26–34, 75, 88–95; Skendi 1967: 122).

Similarly, Jubani started to collect folksongs on orders from the French consul in Shkodër, Hyacinthe Hecquard. This task spurred Jubani's interest in Albanian traditions and history (Clayer 2009: 195–196, 210; Kastrati 1987: 21, 31–43). De Rada was initially prompted to gather *arbrësh* folklore by Italian revolutionary Rafael Vacontini. As a university student of modest financial means, de Rada collaborated with Neapolitan Romantic journals, passing his own verses as authentic folk poetry (Kastrati 1980: 39–43).

The books of de Rada, Dorsa, Camarda, d'Istria, Mitko and Vasa contained numerous direct references to the studies of Western scholars (see: Bala 1970: 26, 61, 76, 82; Bala 1979: 12–13, 57–8; Clayer 2009: 185; Haxhihasani 1962: 13, 39; Kondo 2002: 23–25; Qiriazi 1997: 30–32; Skendi 1967: 115–116). The Frashëri brothers led the enlightenment movement in the Ottoman Empire of the time, familiarizing Ottoman intellectuals with the achievements of Western science and arts (Çollaku 1986: 21–32; Xholi 1998: 152–62). It was in Western literature that early Albanian diasporics borrowed ideas about the pre-Roman indigenous origins of the Albanian language and people (Clayer 2009: 144–53).

Second, it is important to stress that close network ties reinforced the circulation of Western ideas among early Albanian diasporics. Through the exchange of letters, references and personal contacts with leading nationalist intellectuals, less educated and westernized expatriates gained access to the body of European knowledge about literature, folklore, history and politics (Table 1). The transnational intellectuals exchanged ideas about Albanian nationhood, corresponded about their studies and interactions with other thinkers and politicians and sent works to each other (see: AQSh. F. 59, Thimi Mitko, Ds. 17, ft. 1–4; Bala 1970: 9–12, 20–36, 57–58; Bala 1979: 12–13, 57–8; Kastrati 1980: 31, 93; Haxhihasani 1962: 6, 12–3, 57–58; Nërgjoni 2013: 55; Qiriazi 1997:

32; Uçi 2015: 5, 23–26). Indicatively, they often used foreign languages such as French, Italian, Greek and Turkish instead of Albanian in written communication (e.g., AQSh. F. 13, Ds. 3; F. 20, Ds. 3, ft.1; F. 21, Ds. 8; F. 30, Ds. 16; F. 59, Ds. 5; F. 61, Ds. 6).

At the center of transnational Albanian diaspora networks were de Rada, the key *arbrësh* thinker, and d'Istria, who also lived in Italy since the 1860s.[27] Both knew quite well most of the *arbrësh* activists and diasporics from Romania, the Ottoman territories and the West. This is why the diaspora writings, which contain a lot of cross-references, most often refer to d'Istria and de Rada. In addition, the two Italy-based transnational intellectuals maintained correspondence and face-to-face contact with European noble families, scholars, philosophers, writers and politicians. D'Istria regularly contributed to the famous Parisian *Revue des deux Mondes* and knew Garibaldi and Brazilian King Pedro II personally. D'Istria's fame as a female intellectual reached truly international proportions. By the end of her life, she was elected to a dozen scholarly societies, including the Archaeological Institute in Buenos Aires (Clayer 2009: 210–14; Bala 1970: 68–9). De Rada's network was particularly strong in Italy, where he knew former garibaldians, foreign diplomats and influential nationalist scholars such as philologist Noccolo Tomasseo and historian Cesare Cantu (Kastrati 1980: 88, 139). Among the books received by de Rada as gifts from authors were nineteenth-century Italian literature and historical scholarship, volumes on linguistics and popular culture and a number of works penned by Albanian-speaking diasporics (AQSh. F. 24, Ds. 48). The deep involvement with Western intellectual circles allowed de Rada and d'Istria to

---

[27] Clayer (2009: 210–213) places Dora d'Istria and Efthim Mitko at the center of Albanian diaspora networks because Mitko was prominent in *physical shuttle-diplomacy* between Egypt, Greece and Italy. Nevertheless, I view Geronimo de Rada as far more significant figure than Mitko. First, by mere count De Rada had more connections. Furthermore, de Rada's (and even Camarda's) links with non-Albanian nationalists were much richer. For the spread of Western ideas and diaspora mobilization, these connections were not less important than ties among Albanian activists.

continuously expand their knowledge and keep in touch with developing nationalist ideas.

Table 1. Mail Networks in Early Albanian Diaspora

Diasporics	Interlocutors
Dora d'Istria (1828–1888)	*Arbrësh intellectuals:* **Geronimo de Rada,** Demetrio Camarda, Giuseppe Serembe, Leonardo de Martiono and Anton Santori. *Albanian diasporics outside of Italy:* Efthim Mitko, Jani Vreto, Zef Jubani and Konstandin Kristoforidhi. *Politicians and diplomats:* Giuseppe Garibaldi, Pedro II of Brazil and Johann Georg Hann. *European scholars:* Niccolo Tommaseo, Paolo Mantegazza, Bartolomeo Cecchetti, E. Artomi (Italy), Lois Benloew, Edgar Quinet (France), Adam Wolf, Johann Georg Hahn (Austria), Ion Ghica, Ion Heliade Raduleskku, Bogrdan Patricesku and Gheorghe Asachi (Romania). *Western poets and painters:* Felice Schiavoni (Italy), Josephine de Knorr (Austria) and Henry Longfellow (U.S.). (AQSh. F. 24; F. 59, Ds. 4–5; Clayer 2009: 210–214; Bala 1970: 9–13, 26–97; Kastrati 1987: 54–61; Kondo 2002; Qinirazi 1997: 28)
Geronimo de Rada (1814–1903)	**Dora d'Istria** *Arbrësh intellectuals:* Demetrio Camarda and other *arbrësh* intellectuals (e.g., Giuseppe Schiro, Giuseppe Serembe, Anton Santitori, Pietro Chiara, Leonardo de Martino and A. Cullariotti. *Albanian diaspora outside of Italy:* Konstandin Kristoforidhi, Jani Vreto, Efthim Mitko, Zef Jubani, Pashko Vasa, Sami Frashëri, Faik Konica. *Italian nationalist scholars:* Niccolo Tommaseo, Cesare Cantu, Basilio Puoti and Giovanni Emanuele Bidera. *European poets*: Alphonse de Lamartine and Frederic Mistral (France), Josephine de Knorr (Austria) and Ion Heliade Raduleskku (Romania).

	Functionaries in the Italian ministry of education. (AQSh. F. 24, Ds. 48, 55; F. 51, Ds. 4; Bala 1970: 27–89; Haxhihasani 1962: 5–6; Kastrati 1980: 45, 47, 91, 93, 139; Kondo 2002; Uçi 2015: 26).
Demetrio Camarda (1821–1882)	**Dora d'Istria, Geronimo de Rada,** Efthim Mitko, Jani Vreto, Slovenian Romantic poet Urban Jarnik and German philologist Gustav Meyer (AQSh. F. 59, Ds. 5; Qiriazi 1997: 28, 89–92; Uçi 2015: 26).
Konstandin Kristoforidhi (1826–1895)	**Dora d'Istria, Geronimo de Rada,** Jani Vreto, Efthim Mitko, the Bucharest diaspora (e.g., Nikolla Naço), Alex Thomson from the Bible Society, Austrian diplomat and philologist Johann Georg Hahn, Gustav Meyer and Italian and French intellectuals (AQSh. F. 29, Ds. 11, 12; Bala 1970: 62; Clayer 2009: 189–192; Nërgjoni 2013: 26, 31, 74–75).
Efthim Mitko (1820–1890)	**Dora d'Istria, Geronimo de Rada**, Demetrio Camarda, other arbrësh intellectuals (Giuseppe Crispi, Giuseppe Schiro, Cullariotti), Jani Vreto, Konstandin Kristoforidhi, Urban Jarnik and Gustav Meyer (AQSh. F. 21, Ds. 7; F. 24, Ds. 48; F. 59, Ds. 4, 5, 8; Haxhihasani 1962: 5–6, 29; Uçi 2015: 26).
Jani Vreto (1822–1890)	**Dora d'Istria, Geronimo De Rada,** Demetrio Camarda, Konstandin Kristoforidhi, Efthim Mitko and the Bucharest diaspora (e.g., Nikolla Naço) (AQSh. F. 21, Ds. 7; F.29, Ds. 11; Uçi 2015: 26)
Sami Frashëri (1850–1904)	**Geronimo de Rada** and Abdyl and Naim Frashëri (AQSh. F. 51, Ds. 4–5; Xholi 1978).
Ismail Qemali (1844–1919)	Diasporics in Bucharest, Paris and Boston (e.g., Dhimitër Bala, Kristo Dako), nationalists in Albania (e.g., Luigj Gurakuqi, Lef Nosi, Esad Toptani) and British diplomats (AQSh. F. 20, Ds. 3–5; F.30, Ds. 16).

Third, the social location of Albanian-speaking expatriates influenced their diasporization and mobilization. Many diasporic mythmakers represented rising middle classes. Jubani, Kristoforidhi, Mitko and Vreto came from powerful trading families and later pursued careers as entrepreneurs (Nërgjoni 2013: 66, 90–91; Haxhihasani 1962: 5; Uçi 2015: 5–11, 21–23). Many

others belonged to the privileged social strata, whose significance in old imperial and dynastic states was already in decline (cf. Kostantaras 2008). Thus, these diasporics represented the first generation of those who managed to "exchange" their old privileges for education and make a career in emerging bureaucracies. The ancestors of de Rada, Dorsa and Camarda were clerics of the Italian Eastern Catholic Church (Kastrati 1980: 17–20; Qiriazi 1997: 22), whose position was weakened by the conflicts between the Southern Italian kings and the Pope and subsequent reforms under the Austrian and then French influences (see: Hanlon 2000: 340–50; Kondo 2002: 28; Salvatorelli 1970: 31–8). The Frashëri family claimed a long ancestry of *timar* holders and prominent state officials, though by the mid-nineteenth century appeared to be of modest financial means (Frashëri 1990: 39–43; Gawrych 2006: 13; Xholi 1978). Dora d'Istria (Elena Ghica) came from a prominent family of Phanariote nobles and princes of the Holy Roman Empire who, since the 1820s, struggled vehemently for the throne in the Danubian principalities. By the 1870s, with the election of Carol I as the ruling prince, the Ghicas' aspirations were thwarted and their political significance gradually declined. At the same time, the pro-Albanian activism of Dora d'Istria secured her recognition by many Albanian nationalists as an "uncrowned queen" of Albania. After that, the idea of seizing power in Albania continued to occupy the Ghica family, and in the early twentieth century, Albert Ghica (1868–1928) voiced his demands for the Albanian throne (Bala 1970: 7–11; Dërmaku 1983: 43–50; Hitchins 1994: 29–34; Michelson 1998).

Fourth, Albanian diasporics lived and created in a period of huge societal transformations, when modernization reforms were implemented and nation-building projects started to take root. In such a setting, ethnicity, which was usually ascribed externally based on language and religion, increased in importance. In the Ottoman Empire, the Tanzimat reforms (1839–76) in the army and administration gradually evolved into a state ideology known as "Ottomanism." Officials

promoted the notions of the Ottoman community and motherland. At the same time, cultural, linguistic and religious differences also started to be recognized, even though an overarching Ottoman patriotism was expected to override them (Clayer 2009: 193–8; Gawrych 2006: 16–17). Italy underwent a process of national unification. The ideology of Risorgimento swept through the Apennines. The federalist solution was rejected, and Giuseppe Mazzini's idea of national unity based on the imagined ethnic affinity of all Italians predominated (Clayer 2009: 153–54, 183; Salvatorelli 1970: 110–82). In Romania, nation-building began with the country's unification in 1859 and accelerated after independence was fully achieved in 1881 (Hitchins 1994: 11–154; Stavrianos 2000: 344–51, 483–8).

Many first-generation Albanian mythmakers took part in reformist and revolutionary movements while abroad. In 1847 to 1849, Pashko Vasa traveled to Italy, where he fought for the short-lived Venetian Republic of San Marco. During his stay, he got to know the key figures of the Italian irredentism (Mazzini, Garibaldi and Tommaseo) and was introduced to the ideas of Polish and Romanian nationalists such as Adam Mickiewicz and Nicolae Bălcescu (Bala 1979: 11–13). Calabrese Romantic philosopher and leader of the anti-Bourbon movement Domenico Mauro educated young Geronimo de Rada, who kept secret contacts with Mazzini's agents later in life (Clayer 2009: 161; Kastrati 1980: 21–22, 31, 41, 47, 57, 60, 88). Similarly, Demetrio Camarda stayed in Palermo during the Sicilian revolt of 1848 and was soon evicted from the kingdom by the Bourbon police, who suspected him of collaborating with the rebels (Qiriazi 1997: 26). Efthim Mitko, whose uncle died in the Greek War of Independence, was exposed to nationalist ideas during his stay in Austria in the early 1850s (Haxhihasani 1962: 5–9). Sami Frashëri was an influential ideologist of Ottomanism, promoting the Ottoman language and motherland in his literary and lexicographic works (Clayer 2009: 193–8; Gawrych 2006: 8–13). Memebers of the

Ghica family directed the cabinet ministers in the formative years of the unified Romanian state (Bala 1970: 31–32; Michelson 1998).

To summarize, the biographies of the early Albanian diasporics clearly show that exposure to Western nationalist ideologies served as a prerequisite for the diaspora's emergence. At the same time, Albanian-speaking migrants were influenced by political and social developments in their countries of residence. Modernization processes resulted in the uprooting of old dominant social groups. Moreover, externally ascribed ethnicity became meaningful with the launch of state-sponsored nation-building projects. Foreign diplomats, who competed over influence in the Balkans, also played their part in the mobilization of the Albanian diaspora. Finally, early Albanian mythmakers were attracted by opportunities to take part in the framework of modern nation-states.

The Diasporic Myths of Homeland and Albanian Indigeneity

The existing scholarship recognizes the role of historical myths in ethno-national boundary-making. These myths enable one to imagine the nation as a culturally and territorially distinguishable community (Coakley 2004; Guibernau 2010; Kolstø 2005). According to Anthony Smith (1999), the myths of ethnic origins and glorious antiquity occupy a special place in national imagination and nation-building. These myths allow locating and re-rooting the community in its own historic space and establishing a sense of continuity across generations. As William Safran (1991) shows, in the diaspora's eyes, the "homeland" appears as a place invested with a specific and admirable history.

In the Albanian case, the imagined national antiquity played an exceptional role. Albanian speakers, unlike the members of paradigmatic diasporas (see: Cohen 2008; Sheffer 2003; Weinfeld 2011, 2018: 16–41, 274–306), did not have religious or chronographic texts that would locate the

cultural community on a demarcated geographic area in the past. In contrast to their Balkan fellows, Albanian nationalists also could not refer to medieval kingdoms or empires bearing "national" names. Therefore, mobilized Albanian-speaking diasporics concentrated on the ancient past and the period of Scanderbeg (Misha 2008).

The first attempts to present the homeland as a distinguishable ethnic territory existing from time immemorial were undertaken by Angelo Masci in his work, *A Word about Origins, Traditions and Current Situation of Albanians in the Kingdom of Two Sicilies* (1807). Advocating for the autonomy of the Byzantine Catholic Church in Italy, Masci traced Albanian origins to a legendary Pelasgian population of the Southern Balkans, known from ancient Greek literature as pre-Greek inhabitants of the Peloponnese. He portrayed Albanians as autochthonous inhabitants of an extensive territory in the ancient Western Balkans, where Greeks, Slavs and Turks settled much later. Through the centuries, Albanians were known under the names of Peasgians, Illyrians, Macedonians and Epirotes. Albanians, in Masci's view, had always been distinguished by their haircut, costumes and language (Thengjilli 2008: 43–4).

On Albanians, authored by Vincenzo Dorsa (1847), offers another conspicuous example of mythmaking in the Italian Albanian-speaking diaspora. The author portrayed Albanians as one of the oldest European races and emphasized their internal purity. In addition, he appropriated the figures of Alexander the Great and his father Philip denying their Greek identity (also see: Clayer 2009: 157–9). In the 1860s and 1870s, the ideas of the first *arbrësh* diasporics were supported enthusiastically by Demetrio Camarda (1864) in his work on Albanian grammar, by Thimi Mitko (1981: 41–42) in a series of articles published in an Athenian Greek-language newspaper and by Dora d'Istria, whose studies on "Albanian nationality" appeared in many European languages (Kondo 2002: 84–9, 120–33, 146–67; Nërgjoni 2013: 34; Thengjilli 2008: 52–3; see also: Bala

1970: 36–47, 61; Haxhihasani 1962: 17–32; Kastrati 1980: 134; Qiriazi 1997: 77–78).

The ancient origins of Albanians and their admirable antiquity served as an underpinning for autonomist claims raised in Pashko Vasa's (2010) *The Truth on Albania and Albanians*, published in French in the years of the Prizren League. Writing in a volatile political context, Vasa claimed Albanian indigeneity in the Balkans since the second millennium BC and emphasized the glorious traditions of Albanian statehood. He portrayed Greeks and Slavs as late arrivals to the Balkans and wrote that soldiers of Alexander the Great spoke a uniform Pleasgian language, which later evolved into contemporary Albanian. In view of Vasa, the distant history had to serve as a charter for modern nation-building: the common ancient origins of all Albanians were invoked to override contemporary religious divides (see: Bala 1979: 100–102).

The ideas voiced by Pashko Vasa found even more vigorous expression in what is today considered the manifesto of Albanian nationalism. In a small book published in 1899, Sami Frashëri (1962) habitually stressed the Pelasgian origins of Albanians. However, he went even further, arguing that that practically all pre-Roman Balkan tribes – Illyrians, Macedonians, Epirotes, and even Thracians – were descendants of Pelasgians and ancestors of Albanians. Thus, the ancestral Albanian "ethnoscape" was expanded to the whole Balkan Peninsula and Western Anatolia. Then, Frashëri claimed Albanian ownership over all possible embodiments of ancient statehood in the region of Ancient Macedonia, the Empire of Alexander the Great, the Kingdom of Pyrrhus in Epirus and the Illyrian realms of Gentius and Teuta. Furthermore, the ancient ancestors of Albanians merited special admiration because they resisted Roman encroachments on their political freedom for centuries and defended democratic governance.

From Diasporic to National: Promoting the Myths of Indigeneity

The Albanian diaspora played the leading organizational and ideological role in the nationalist movement and the establishment of the nation-state. Since the late 1870s, the myths of the homeland produced by Albanian-speaking expatriates were turned into propaganda tools used on the ground in political and military struggles. The League of Prizren is usually considered as the first decisive political manifestation of an autonomous and internally integrated Albania. A brainchild of famous diaspora activists, including the Frashëri brothers, Pashko Vasa and Jani Vreto, its organizing committee was founded in Istanbul (Clayer 2009: 208–10). The diasporic myths of Albanian antiquity and indigeniety formed a solid foundation for the nationalist platform of the League (Belegu 1939). The first projects and memoranda presented Albania as a strictly defined geographical entity inhabited by a distinct race, which preserved its language, unity and identity throughout centuries of brutal foreign rule. Since the late 1870s, an increasing number of diasporic publications appeared in European languages to put forward historical, cultural and linguistic arguments in favor of Albanian nationhood for Western publics (Gawrych 2006: 53–60; Skendi 1967: 44–53).

No doubt, the Great Powers' balance of power and internal developments in Albanian-speaking lands were crucial for the recognition of Albania's independence, a fact analyzed extensively in the literature (Duka 1997; Skendi 1967; Swire 1971). However, it must be highlighted that within the first Provisional Government of Albania, established in November 1912, the prime minister, Ismail Qemal, and four out of ten ministers, Myfid bej Libohova, Petro Poga, Mid'hat Frashëri and Pandele Cale, were educated and spent their adulthood outside the Albanian-speaking territories. Two other members, Mehmet Pashë Derralla and Luigj Gurakuqi, each spent over a decade "abroad." Gurakuqi, who headed the ministry of education, studied under

the supervision of Geronimo de Rada at Saint Adrian's Colledge in Cosenza, thus directly borrowing nationalist ideas from the key diasporic thinker.

After the First World War, the diaspora organizations from the U.S., Romania and Turkey were vocal at the Paris Peace Conference, where they joined the official delegation of the post-war provisional government in order to defend embattled Albanian independence and territorial integrity. Since the Albanian delegation was excluded from the decision-making process dominated by the five major powers, it could only send petitions and proposals (Çami and Verli 2015: 292–336). Trying to offset Greek, Serbian and Italian claims to the nation's territory, the delegation circulated a special brochure prepared by prominent American Albanian Kristo Dako (see: F.30, Ds. 7, ft. 70). The text referred to Albanians as direct descendants of Pelasgians, Illyrians and Macedonians, "the most ancient existing race in Europe," and "autochthonous inhabitants" who had ruled the Balkans before the arrival of "barbarians" such as Slavs and Greeks. Following the diasporic narrative, Dako invoked the figures of Alexander the Great, Phyrrus and Scanderbeg in his attempt to convince Western diplomats of Albanians' ability to govern themselves (Dako 1918: 4).

As expected, the diasporic myths of the glorious national past had an effect on the high-level government officials and influenced their views on nation-building. The first prime minister, Ismail Qemali, noted in his memoirs: "Dwelling in a sort of isolation, [Albanians] were variously grouped under the generic name of Macedonians or Illyrians, according to caprice of the conquerors. But they themselves [remained] profoundly indifferent to these arbitrary arrangements, which did not interfere with their race, their language or their national character" (Kemal bey Vlora 1997: 356–357). Conforming to these beliefs, the schools in the newly established state relied extensively on the history textbook first published by Naim Frashëri in

Bucharest in the late 1890s. The textbook conveyed to Albanian students the vision of the national ancient past elaborated by the diaspora (Frashëri 1922: 3–15, 35–38).

After the First World War, the First Congress on Education in 1920 officially recognized inculcating the "national spirit" into the minds of Albanian youth as the primary goal of schooling (Spahiu 2011: 304–307). A special course on "moral and civic education" entered the secondary school curricula. Students were required to meticulously examine Giuseppe Mazzini's *Duties of Man*. History had to "encourage [their] pride and love of the homeland." Admirable national antiquity was invoked to achieve this high goal (Ministria e Arsimit 1925: 3–6, 14). The domestic intellectual life being in its incipient stage and the country lacking powerful educational centers, the Albanian government continued to rely on the historical expertise of the diaspora. In 1921, the minister of education, Sotir Peçi, asked American-Albanian Kostë Çekrezi to author new schoolbooks. By that time, Çekrezi had already distinguished himself popularizing the historical views of previous diasporic generations in the American community (F. 55, Ds. 4, ft. 1). The diasporic imagination of the ancient past influenced domestic historical writing (e.g., Hondres 1918) and museum policies. By the late 1920s, the newly opened National Museum in Tirana organized an exhibition of Illyrian artifacts and encouraged student visits (Biblioteka Kombëtare 1931: 15).

Thus, the diasporic myths of indigeneity were instrumental to nation-building in three ways. First, they were used to appeal to influential Western politicians and broad audiences and, thus, to defend the "Albanian cause" internationally. Second, the diasporic imagination provided solid groundwork for the concept of an Albanian identity, which was institutionalized in the new nation-state and communicated to the masses via schooling and commemorative practices. Third, the ideas of indigeneity helped people imagine largely disintegrated and undemarcated Albanian-

130

speaking territories as a unified and historically rooted ethno-national homeland.

The Albanian Case as a Heuristic

Historically, emergence of many ethno-political entities and corresponding national identities resulted from migrants' adoption of a militant diasporic stance. In this section, I employ a purposive *diverse case* method of selection to achieve variance on the dependent variable and highlight different causal paths of diaspora contributions to the spread of nationalism. The purpose of this case-selection method is illustrative and exploratory rather than confirmatory (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 300–301). The section focuses on a very proximate case – Serbia, which is located in the Balkans and thus situated in similar geographical, historical and international context – as well as one distant case – the Philippines, where geopolitical setting and historical legacies differed from the Albanian situation.

The history of Serbian nationalism and state-building neatly complies with the suggested trajectory. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the identities of the population residing on the territories that would later constitute the Serbian state were primarily kin-based, local and religious. Even though the self-appellation "Serb" existed, it was neither universal nor socially significant. The geographical notion of *Serbia/Servia* often overlapped with literary medieval (*Rascia*, *Bosnia* and *Trivalia*) and locally spread place names (*Šumadija*, *Pomoravlje* etc.). The memories of the medieval Nemanyid kingdom, the Battle of Kosovo, old tsars and saints were largely forgotten in the Ottoman lands (Belov 2007: 530–31; Pantelic 2011; Popović 1998: 43–66, 90–105; see also: Leshchilovskaia 1994: 3–13).

Meanwhile, the Habsburg retreat from the Ottoman territories in the aftermath of the War of the Holy League (1683–99) led to the resettlement of thousands of Orthodox families into

Habsburg domains, where they were granted religious autonomy and referred to collectively as *Rascians* or *Illyrians*. Under European and Habsburg influences, education and cultural life in the Rascian community blossomed (Belov 2008: 52, 61–69; Leshchilovakaia 1994: 13–51, 61–67, 74–78). In this favorable context, enlightened Orthodox clerics started to excavate the "glorious" history of medieval Balkan kingdoms. All medieval states located in the territories of today's Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Macedonia were presented as "Serbian." The great "Serbian Empire" of Dušan the Strong and the 1389 Battle of Kosovo between Ottoman and "Serbian" troops were invoked to prove that the Rascian community and its religious chiefs possessed an admirable tradition of statehood and since time immemorial had participated in the common Christian struggle against Islam. At the turn of the nineteenth century, a number of Western-educated Habsburg Rascians adopted Serbian nationalist doctrine. As the First Uprising broke out in the neighboring Belgrade *paşalık* in 1804, they started to use the narratives produced by the previous generation of Orthodox antiquarians to create nationalist myths (Belov 2007; Leshchilovskaiia 1994: 13–51; Pantelić 2011; Popović 1998).

With the establishment of the semi-independent Serbian principality (1817–30), many educated Serbs from the Habsburg Empire were absorbed into the administrative structures of the new political entity. These diasporics served as a leading force in founding the national academic society, museum, theater, reading halls, newspapers and nationalist youth movement. In the new state, which achieved full independence in 1878, originally diasporic myths became cornerstones of the official ideology and national identity. The "liberation of all Serbian ancestral lands," including Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and later Croatia and Montenegro, became a priority of Serbian foreign policy (Belov 2007: 67–68, 493–511; Jelavich 1990: 34–39, 145–146; MacKenzie 1985: 62–75; Popović 1998).

Like in Albania and Serbia, political and symbolic struggles of the emergent "diaspora" played a crucial role in the formation of nationhood in the Philippines. However, the circumstances of the Filipino diaspora formation and mobilization differed due to the overseas colonial context. Neither a strong sense of popular nationalism nor an organized national movement had existed in the Philippines until the late nineteenth century. Throughout the Spanish colonization, the Philippines remained culturally, geographically and politically fragmented (see: Fischer 1970: 10–13; Mahajani 1971: 21–36). Mass revolts, which occurred at times during this period, were always economically motivated and locally contained. Moreover, "the alignment of the opposite forces [in these revolts] was not strictly drawn between the indigenous and the alien" (Mahajani 1971: 34).

The 1863 Education Decree allowing the native elites to send their offspring to foreign universities, the 1869 inauguration of the Suez Canal and the development of transportation and trade all facilitated the formation of permanent migrant communities from the Philippines in Spain, European democratic countries, Hong Kong and Japan. The secular and Western-educated youth, who came to be known as *ilustrados*, were initially completely drawn into Spanish culture and emphasized their Spanishness. Soon, however, severe struggles between liberals and conservatives in Spain (1868–75), which translated into highly inconsistent policies from the colonial administration in the Philippines, sensitized ilustrados toward European nationalist projects. In the 1880s, they initiated the Propaganda Movement, campaigning in Spain for autonomy and all-encompassing liberal reforms in the Philippines. The Spain-based outlets of the ilustrados, such as *La Revista del Circulo Hispano-Filipino* and *La Solidaridad*, and popular Spanish-language novels by prominent *propagandistas* portrayed the Philippines as a unified, ancient nation of high culture being destroyed by malicious and immoral Catholic friars. Indicatively, the formation of the

Filipino national movement and nationalist myths among the diaspora was prompted by growing Catalan nationalism. Migrants from the Philippines actively participated in Catalan nationalist organizations, cultural institutions and masonic lodges. *La Solidaridad*, founded in 1888, closely collaborated with Catalonian *La Publicidad* and *La Vanguardia*, while *La Liga Filipina*, established by Jose Rizal in 1892, was simply modeled on *La Liga de Catalunya* (Cano 2012; Fischer 1970: 19–23; Go 2016: 128–135, 142; Mahajani 1970: 37, 47–62).

As the Spanish imperial government failed to address grievances voiced by ilustrados, their Philippines-based associates founded a secret revolutionary organization, *Katipunan*, in 1892, which strove to end the Spanish rule and achieve complete independence. From this moment on, the Filipino nationalism came to be dominated by residents of the Philippines rather than expatriates, even though the Philippine revolution (1896–98) and the First Philippine Republic had their auxiliary bases in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the ideology professed by the famous ilustrados informed the policies of Katipunan and later the *Nacionalista* party. The names of famous ilustrados were sanctified in the local education institutions already under American rule. In the independent Philippines, their works were codified as treasuries of national wisdom, pride and identity (Cano 2012; Coloma 2013; Fischer 1970: 111–18; Go 2016: 136–140; Mahajani 1970: 64–79, 86–107).

Other cases of the initial spread of nationalism, nation-state formation and national identity construction comply with the model suggested above to varying degrees. Thus, for example, migrants' adoption of a militant "diaspora" stance and diasporic mythmaking preceded the formation of national identities, contemporary geopolitical imaginary and statehood in Greece and Israel (Gellner 1983: 101–18; Kimmerling 2001: 1–79; Smith 1999: 203–21). By contrast, in Ireland, a clear notion of the country, elements of statehood and an indigenous nationalist

movement predated the large migrations of Irish inhabitants abroad. At the same time, scholars find that the emigrant condition of the Irish led to the spread of nationalist ideas among broader masses and sustained the "physical force" nationalism movement in the homeland, which ultimately led to the proclamation of the Irish Republic in 1916 (Boyle 2001; Cronin 1980: 1–110; Ranelagh 1995: 66–151, 182–210; Stewart and MacCovern 2013: 1–27; Welehan 2012: 11–69).

Discussion and Conclusion

The analysis of diasporic contributions to nation-building in Albania and other countries helps draw attention to diasporas and migrants as influential carriers of the modular social artifact of nationhood across the world. The role of diasporas and migrants in this process receives inadequate study in the generalist literature. Besides, in contrast to the existing studies on diaspora and long-distance nationalism, this article highlights the impact of diaspora expatriates on the initial spread of nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

There existed several ways by which Western nationalist ideas and practices were communicated to expatriates: Western education, exposure to modern literature, personal acquaintance and mail correspondence with influential nationalist thinkers, witnessing and direct participation in the European nationalist and revolutionary movements and, finally, the emulation of Western organizational and political initiatives. Importantly, all of these factors also caused the mobilization of migrants and led to their adoption of a militant "diaspora stance." As the Albanian case illustrates, the rise of nationalism could happen in the context of diasporization, rendering the two processes factually, if not analytically, indistinguishable.

The diaspora literature identifies the cultivation of glorifying homeland myths as a key characteristic in the process of diasporization. At the same time, the theoretical literature on

135

nationalism shows the importance of mythmaking to nation-building. Connecting and revising the two literatures, I point to three mechanisms through which diasporic narratives facilitated the diffusion of nationalism and the nation-state model in migrants' places of origin. First, glorifying diasporic mythopoeia was often used to defend the "national cause" internationally by appealing to influential Western politicians and broader audiences. Second, diasporic imagination provided solid groundwork for the concept of national identity, which became institutionally sanctioned and communicated to the masses after the establishment of nation-states. In other words, the diasporic myths of homeland were often turned into governing national narratives. Third, diasporic narratives helped one imagine largely disintegrated and undemarcated territories as unified ethno-national homelands with admirable historical pedigrees. Importantly, the symbolic validation of national membership through historical mythmaking was not the only way through which expatriates contributed to the spread of nationalism and nation-building in sending societies. Some of them actively participated in international public advocacy or even physically returned "home."

My study is informed by the model of the diaspora-homeland relationship offered by William Safran (1991). Building on Safran's ideas, I revise this model by prioritizing contingent diaspora formation in host societies over the experiences of living in ancestral lands as fundamental for ethno-national identities in migrant populations. The examination of the Albanian and other supplementary cases offers evidence that diaspora contributions to the initial spread of nationalism are, as expected, more widespread in peripheral and colonial contexts. Specifically, *the revised model of diaspora-homeland relationship* (Figure 1) better describes histories of nationhood in non-industrialized societies with incomplete social structure, lacking sustained traditions of elite self-governance and indigenous formal education. Under such conditions, diaspora often produces homeland, not the other way around.

136

In line with *the original Safranian model*, when a territory has a continuous tradition of self-governance reinforced by a set of formal institutions (e.g., diets, autonomous churches, schools and colleges), local nation- and state-building may happen without the help of migrants, and may even occur well before the development of a unified national identity and the adoption of a diaspora stance in expatriate communities. Yet when indigenous high culture, the social establishment and elements of statehood are lacking, the diasporization of migrants and their long-distance political activism are likely to predate the formation of a national homeland, becoming the main vehicle for the transmission of nationalism from the West. Finally, *an intermediate scenario* may unfold, when national movements emerge nearly simultaneously in the countries of origin and expatriate communities, but from different sources. This may lead, in turn, to the emergence of alternative and even conflicting visions of the state and nation, turning identities of the local population into a battleground between diasporic and home-grown nationalists (see the case of the Kabyle and Kabylia in Algeria: Maddy-Weitzman 2011: 42–49, 66–84).

Last but not least, I hope that this study advances the discussion in the specialized literature on Albanian nationalism. Echoing Clayer (2009: 116–140, 153–216), it traces diaspora mail networks and provides a systematic analysis of the factors leading to the appearance of nationalist ideas in early Albanian diasporic circles (Table 1). It also adds to the work of Noel Malcolm (2002), who analyzes nationalist mythopoeia among American Albanians in the early twentieth century but does not cover other communities.

References

Archival Sources

Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (AQSh) – The Central State Archive, Tirana, Albania

Fondi 13. Faik Konica.

Fondi 20. Ismail Qemali.

Fondi 21. Jani Vreto.

Fondi 24. Jeronim de Rada

Fondi 29. Konstandin Kristoforidhi.

Fondi 30. Kristo Dako.

Fondi 51. Sami Frashëri.

Fondi 55. Sotir Peçi.

Fondi 59. Thimi Mitko.

Fondi 61. Pashko Vasa.

Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict (1991). *Imagined Communities.* London: Verso.

Anderson, Benedict (1992). *Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics.* Amsterdam: CASA.

Axel, Brian (2002). "The Diasporic Imaginary." *Public Culture* 14 (2): 411-428.

Axel, Brian (2004). "The Context of Diaspora." *Cultural Anthropology* 19 (1): 26-60.

Bala, Vehbi (1970). *Jeta e Elena Gjikës (Dora d'Istrias) [The Life of Elena Gjika]*. Prishtine: Rilindja.

Bala, Vehbi (1979). *Pashko Vasa: Portret-monografi*. Tiranë: 8 Nëntori.

Belov, Mikhail (2007). *U istokov serbskoi natsionalnoi ideologii [The Origins of the Serb National Ideology]*. Sankt Petersburg: Aleteyia, 2007.

Ben-Rafael, Eliezer (2013). "Diaspora." *Current Sociology* 61 (5-6): 842–861.

Biblioteka Kombëtare (1929). *Vepërij e Bibliotekës Kombëtare gjatë vitit 1928 [The Activities of the National Library in 1928]*. Tiranë: Shtamperija teknike.

Biswas, Bidisha (2004). "Nationalism by Proxy: A Comparison of Social Movements among Diaspora Sikhs and Hindus." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10 (2): 269-295.

Blumi, Isa (2003). *Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen, 1878-1918*. Istanbul: Isis Press.

Boyle, Mark (2001). "Towards a (Re) Theorisation of the Historical Geography of Nationalism in Diasporas: the Irish Diaspora as an Exemplar." *International Journal of Population Geography* 7 (6): 429-446.

Brown, Hugh (1888). *A Winter in Albania*. London: Griffith, Farran Okeden & Welsh, 1888.

Brubaker, Rogers (2005). "The "Diaspora" Diaspora." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (1): 1–19.

Camarda, Demetrio (1864). *Saggio de grammatologia comparata sulla lingua albanese [An Essay on*

Comparative Grammatology of Albanian language]. Livorno: Successore di Egisto Vignozzi, 1864.

Çami, Muin and Marenglen Verli (2015). *Shqipëria në Konferencën e Paqes (1919–1920) [Albania in the Peace Conference]*. Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë.

Cano, Gloria (2012). "Cataluna y el Movimento de Propaganda Filipino Catalonia and the Filipino Propaganda Movement]" *Humanities Diliman* 9 (2): 58–88.

Ceka, Neritan (2005). *Ilirët [The Illyrians]*. Tiranë: Ilar.

Clayer, Nathalie (2009). *Ne fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e nje kombi me shumice myslimane ne Evrope [At the Beginning of Albanian Nationalism: The Emergence of a Nation with Muslim Majority in Europe]*. Tirana: Perpjekja.

Coakley, John (2004). "Mobilizing the Past: Nationalist Images of History." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10 (4): 531–560.

Cohen, Robin (2008). *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.

Coloma, Roland Sintos (2013). "Care of the Postcolonial Self: Cultivating Nationalism in the Philippine Readers." *Qualitative Research in Education* 2 (3): 302-327.

Connor, Walker (1990). "When is a Nation?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13 (1): 92–103.

Cronin, Sean (1980). *Irish nationalism: A History of Its Roots and Ideology*. Dublin: The Academy Press.

Dako, Christo (1918). *Albania's Rights and Claims to Independence and Territorial Integrity.* Boston.

Demiraj, Bardhyl (2010). *Shqiptar [Albanian].* Tirane: Naimi.

Dërmaku, Ismet (1983). *Rilindja kombëtare shqiptare dhe kolonitë shqiptare të mërgimit në Rumani dhe në* Bullgari [The Albanian National Awakening and Albanian Colonies in Romania and Bulgaria]. Prishtinë: Enti i teksteve dhe i mjeteve mësimore.

Dorsa, Vincenzo (1847). *Su gli Albanesi ricerche e pensieri [On Albanians: Studies and Thoughs]*. Napoli: Trani.

Draper, Stark (1997). "The Conceptualization of an Albanian Nation." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20 (1): 123–144.

Duka, Valentina (2007). *Histori e Shqipërisë [A History of Albania]. 1912–2000*. Tiranë: Kristalina-KH, 2007.

Durham, Edith (1904). *Through the Lands of the Serb*. London: Edward Arnold. URL: http://njegos.org/durham/chapter6.htm, accessed March 20, 2018

Durham, Edith (1985). *High Albania*. London: Virago Press.

Elsie, Robert (2005). *Albanian Literature: A Short History*. London: I.B.Tauris.

Ermolin, Denis (2012). "Etnograficheskoe izuchenie abantsev Priazovia : etapy, itogi, perspektivy [The Ethnographic Studies of Albanians in the Azov Region: Phases, Results, and Perspectives]" *Ennograficheskoe obozrenie* online. URL: http://journal.iea.ras.ru/online/2012/2012_1_213_220_Ermolin.pdf, accessed March 20, 2018

Fischer, Georges (1970). *José Rizal, Philippin, 1861–1896: un aspect du nationalisme modern [José Rizal, Filipino, 1861-1896: An Expression of Modern Nationalism]*. Paris: François Maspero.

Frashëri, Kristo (1990). *Abdyl Frashër (1839–1892)*. Tirana: 8 Nentori.

Frashëri, Naim (1922). *Istori'e Shqiperise [History of Albania]*. Korçë.

Frashëri, Sami (1962). *Shqipëria ç'ka qenë, ç'është e ç'do të bëhet? [Albania: What she was, what she is, and what will become of her]*. Tiranë: Naim Frashëri.

Gawrych, George (2006). *The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and Albanians, 1874–1913*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Glick Schiller, Nina, and Georges Eugene Fouron (2001). *Georges Woke up Laughing: Long-distance Nationalism and the Search for Home*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Go, Julian (2016). "*Ilustrado* Transnationalism: Cross-Colonial Fields and Filipino Elites at the Turn of the Twentieth Century." In: *Filipino Studies: Palimpsests of Nation and Diaspora*, edited by Manalansan, Martin F, and Augusto F. Espiritu, 128–150. New York: NYU Press.

Guibernau, Montserrat (2010). *The Identity of Nations.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hanlon, Gregory (2000). *Early Modern Italy, 1550-1800*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Haxhihasani, Qemal (1962). *Thimi Mitko (1820-1890)*. Tiranë: Naim Frashëri.

Hitchins, Keith (1994). *Rumania, 1866-1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hondres, Thimi (1918). *Antiku shqiptar [Albanian Antiquity]*. Tiranë.

Ivanova, Irina (2006). *Albantsy i ih sosedi [The Albanians and Their Neighbours]*. Moskva: Nauka.

Jelavich, Charles (1990). *South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Jezernik, Božidar (2002). [Comments on Robert M. Hayden, "Antagonistic Tolerance"], *Current Anthropology,* 43: 221–222.

Kastrati, Jup (1980). *Jeronim De Rada: Jeta dhe vepra [Jeronim de Rada : his life and works]*. Prishtinë: Rilindja.

Kastrati, Jup (1987). *Zef Jubani: jeta dhe veprat [Zef Jubani : his life and works]*. Tiranë: 8 Nëntori.

Kemal Vlora, Ismail (1997). *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Vlora and his Work for the Independence of Albania,* edited by Renzo Falaschi. Tirana: Toena.

Kimmerling, Baruch (2001). *The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara (1994). "Spaces of Dispersal." *Cultural Anthropology* 9 (3): 339–344.

Knight, Edward (1980). *Albania: A Narrative of Recent Travel*. London: S. Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington.

Kolstø, Pål (2005). "Assessing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society." In: *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, edited by Pal Kolsto, 1–34. London: Hurst & Company.

Kondo, Ahmet (2002). *Dora d'Istria per ceshtjen kombetare shqiptare [Dora d'Istria on the Albanian National Question]*. Tiranë: Flesh.

Kostantaras, Dean (2008). "Idealisations of Self and Nation in the Thought of Diaspora Intellectuals." *Nations and Nationalism* 14 (4): 700-720.

Lafe, Emil, ed. (2008). *Fjalor enciklopedik shqiptar[Albanian Encyclopedic Dictionary]*. Vëllimi 1. A–Gj. Tiranë: Toena, 2008.

Lafe, Emil, ed. (2009). *Fjalor enciklopedik shqiptar [Albanian Encyclopedic Dictionary]*. Vëllimi 3. N–Zh. Tiranë: Toena.

Lafe, Emil, ed. (2008). *Fjalor enciklopedik shqiptar [Albanian Encyclopedic Dictionary]*. Vëllimi 2. H–M. Tiranë: Toena, 2008.

Lange, Matthew (2013). *Comparative-Historical Methods*. London: Sage.

LeQueux, William (1907). *The Near East: the present situation in Montenegro, Bosnia, Servia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Turkey and Macedonia*. New York: Doubleday.

Leshchilovskaia, Inna (1994). *Serbskaia kul'tura XVIII veka [The Serbian Culture in the Nineteenth Century]*. Moskva: AO "ISM", 1994.

Libardian, Gerard (1999). *The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking since Independence.* Watertown: Blue Crane Books.

MacKenzie, David (1985). *Ilija Garašanin, Balkan Bismarck*. Boulder: East European Monographs.

Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce (2011). *The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States*. Austin: University of Texas Press,

Mahajani, Usha (1971). *Philippine Nationalism: External Challenge and Filipino Response, 1565-1946*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Malcolm, Noel (2002). "Myths of Albanian National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed in the Works of Albanian Writers in America in the Early Twentieth Century." In: *Albanian Identities. Myth and History,* edited by Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, 71–87. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Mazower, Mark (2001). *The Balkans.* London: Phoenix Press, 2001.

Mentzel, Peter (2000). "Millets, States, and National Identity." *Nationalities Papers* 28 (1): 199–204.

Michelson, Paul (1998). *Romanian Politics, 1859-1871: From Prince Cuza to Prince Carol*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies.

Ministria e Arsimit (1925). *Programa e gjimnazevet shtetnore me 8 klasë (klasik e real) [The Program of the State Gymnasia (Classical and Real)]*. Tiranë.

Misha, Piro (2008). *Arrtisja nga burgjet e historise. [Escape from the Prisons of the History]*. Tirane: Toena.

Morawska, Ewa (2011). "'Diasporas' Representations of Their Homelands: Exploring the Polymorphs." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*34.6 (2011): 1029-1048.

Nergjoni, Fatbardha (2013). *Kristoforidhi, Një vështrim rinjohës [Kristoforidhi : A Re-assessing Inquiry]*. Tiranë: Naimi.

Novik, Alexander (2011). "Samosoznanie albantsev Ukrainy: istoricheskii, lingvisticheskii i ekstrakingvisticheskii konteksty [Self-Consciousness of the Albanians of Ukraine: Historical, Linguistic and Extra-linguistic aspects]." *Etnograficheskoe obozrenie* 5: 75–90.

Pantelić, Bratislav (2011). "Memories of a Time Forgotten: The Myth of the Perennial Nation." *Nations and Nationalism* 17 (2): 443–464.

Popović, Miodrag (1998). *Vidovdan i časni krst: ogled iz književne arheologije [Saint Vitus Day and the Cross of Honour: An Essay on Literary Archaeology]*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa.

Qiriazi, Dhori (1997). *Dhimitër Kamarda*. Tiranë: Botimet Toena.

Ranelagh, John (1995). *A Short History of Ireland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Safran, William (1991). "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return." *Diaspora* 1 (1): 83–99.

Salvatorelli, Luigi (1970). *The Risorgimento: Thought and Action*. New York: Harper & Row.

Schnapper, Dominique (1999). "From the Nation-State to the Transnational World: On the meaning and usefulness of diaspora as a concept." *Diaspora* 8 (3): 225-254.

Sheffer, Gabriel (2003). *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sheffer, Gabriel (2006). "Transnationalism and Ethnonational Diasporism." *Diaspora* 15 (1): 121-145.

Skendi, Stavro (1967). *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878–1912*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Skrbiš, Zlatko (2000). *Long-distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Smith, Anthony D. (1999). *Myths and Memories of the Nation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sökefeld, Martin (2006). "Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora." *Global Networks* 6.3: 265-284.

Spahiu, Dritan (2011). "Reforma arsimore e realizuar në periudhën e Mbretërisë Shqiptare (1928–1939) [The Education Reform Implemented at the Period of the Albanian Kingdom]."In: *Monarkia Shqiptare, 1928-1939: Përmbledhje studimesh,* edited by Marenglen Verli and Beqir Meta, 303–

318. Tiranë: Botimet Toena.

Stavrianos, Leften (2000). *The Balkans since 1453*. London: C. Hurst.

Steward, Patrick, and Bryan P. McGovern (2013). *The Fenians: Irish Rebellion in the North Atlantic World, 1858–1876*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Swire, Joseph (1971). *Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom*. New York: Arno Press.

Tammaru, Tiit, Kaja Kumer-Haukanõmm, and Kristi Anniste (2010). "The Formation and Development of the Estonian Diaspora." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36 (7): 1157-1174.

Thëngjilli, Petrika (2008). *Shqiptarët midis Lindjes dhe Perëndimit. Fusha Politike I [The Albanians between the East and the West. Political Issues 1]*. Tiranë: EXTRA.

Tirta, Mark (2006). *Etnologjia e shqiptarëve [Ethnology of Albanians]*. Tiranë: GEER.

Tishkov, Valerii (2006). "Istoricheskii fenomen diaspory [The Historical Phenomenon of Diaspora]." *Etnograpicheskoe obozrenie*. 6: 43–63.

Todorova, Maria (1997). *Imagining the Balkans.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Tölölyan, Khachig (2000). "Elites and Institution in the Armenian Transnation," *Diaspora* 9 (1): 107–136.

Trevor, Roy (1911). *My Balkan Tour*. London: John Lane.

Uçi, Alfred (2015). *Jani Vreto dhe Rilindja Kombëtare [Jani Vreto and the Albanian Awakening]*. Tiranë : Akademia e Shkencave e Shqiperise.

Vasa, Pashko (2010). *E vërteta për Shqipërinë dhe shqiptarët [The Truth on Albania and the Albanians]*. Tiranë: Argeta–LMG.

Vickers, Miranda (1999). *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Wahlbeck, Östen (2002). "The Concept of Diaspora as an Analytical Tool in the Study of Refugee Communities." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28.2: 221-238.

Weinfeld, Morton (2011). "Canadian Jews, Dual/Divided Loyalties, and the Tebbit "Cricket" Test." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 43.3: 59-80.

Weinfeld, Morton (2014). "If Canada and Israel are at War, Who Gets My Support? Challenges of Competing Diaspora Loyalties: Marshall Sklare Award Lecture." *Contemporary Jewry* 34.3: 167-187.

Weinfeld, Morton (2018). *Like Everyone Else but Different: The Paradoxical Success of Canadian Jews*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2018.

Whelehan, Niall (2012). *The Dynamiters: Irish Nationalism and Political Violence in the Wider World, 1867-1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Winland, Daphne (1995). ""We Are Now an Actual Nation": The Impact of National Independence on the Croatian Diaspora in Canada." *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 4.1: 3-29.

Wolff, Larry (1994). Inventing *Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Xholi, Zija (1978). *Sami Frashëri: monografi*. Prishtinë: Rilindja.

Xholi, Zija (1998). *Naim Frashëri midis së kaluarës dhe së sotmes [Naim Frashëri between the Past and Present]*. Tiranë: Luarasi.

Zucchi, John (1998). *Italians in Toronto: Development of a National Identity, 1875-1935*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Article 3. Imperialist Archaeologists and the Constraints of Institutions: On Unintended Contributions of Western Archaeology to Nationalism in Albania and Beyond

Abstract: Following the famous typology of Bruce Trigger, many critical scholars distinguish between *imperialist* and *nationalist* archaeologies. They see only the latter as a powerful source of nation-building in non-Western societies. Furthermore, the literature tends to view archaeologists as akin to other ethnic entrepreneurs and nationalist intellectuals. The ability of archaeology as a particular social field with its own institutional scripts to resist and moderate external political influences remains the object of too little study. This paper aims to overcome existing limitations in the critical research. It represents an extended case study of Western archaeologists in Albania before the Second World War and is based on both archival and published sources. The findings show that in Albania, *imperialist* archaeologists made significant contributions to the construction of *national* identity and the establishment of *nationalist* research tradition. Furthermore, the specific influences that westerners exerted on Albanian nationalism were largely determined by the particular *institutional contexts* in which they were operating. Nevertheless, compared to other occupations, archaeologists in Albania and other countries were latecomers to the politics of national identity. This is because the inescapable materiality of archaeological inquiry and high requirements for training slow down the production of ideological narratives within the discipline.

Introduction

The critical archaeological literature of recent decades has moved beyond understanding archaeology as wholly impartial, "scientific" discipline. It has shown how archaeology has been instrumental to national identity construction over the last two centuries. Since national identity involves the self-understanding of individuals as members of historical collectivities (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Smith 1999; Poole 1999), this identity is constructed and maintained through a number of myths extolling ancient ethnic origins, ancestral homelands and lost Golden Ages (Berger 2009; Coakley 2004, Kolstø 2005; Levinger and Lyttle 2001; Smith 1999; Shnirelman 2000; Štih 2006). It is amateur and professional historians, archaeologists, ethnologists, folklorists, philologists and artists who tailor, flesh out and cultivate national myths (Smith 1999: 61–69).

The critical scholars argue that archaeology occupies a central place in national imagery for several reasons. First, archaeological evidence helps fill gaps and ruptures in national narratives in the absence of written sources. Second, the findings from excavations are voiceless and subject to endless interpretations. At the same time, their materiality helps convey to the masses the appearance of highly persuasive "hard facts." Third, archaeological artifacts are visible and touchable objects. Their images can be easily promoted by the media and used in official symbols, stamps and coins, as well as commercial products. Archaeological findings often form a core collection in national museums. Finally, archaeological sites connect the nation directly to the land by mapping national territory and manufacturing ethnoscapes. These sites become centers for tourism and interactive education. They may also be employed to ground land claims. When needed, archaeological excavations can domesticate territory, erasing landscapes that do not fit national narratives (Crooke 2000; Elon 1997: 37–40; Kohl 1998: 225–226, 240–242, Kohl and

Fawcett 1995; Meskell 1998: 2–5, 2002: 279–283; Parkins 1997; Ratnagar et al. 2004; Shnirelman 2013; Silberman 1997: 62–67).

Acknowledging these important insights, I identify two limitations in the scholarship. First, following Trigger (1984), many researchers distinguish between imperialist and nationalist archaeology. They view only nationalist archaeology as instrumental in nation-building. Its emergence is commonly operationalized as the introduction of local control over archaeological activities after the establishment of an autonomous national polity (Bernhardsson 2005; Diaz-Andreu 2007; Goode 2007; Knapp and Antoniadou 1998; Kostakis 1998). In other words, the existing literature recognizes the contributions of archaeology to local nationalisms only when they are purposful and direct. Such an approach largely overlooks the often-unintended influences that Western *imperialist* archaeologists may exert on the formation of *nationalist* research traditions and the construction of national identities in peripheral regions. Second, when analyzing the construction of national identities, critical scholars often view archaeologists as akin to other nationalists, and they regard archaeology as a mere political tool that helps transmit nationalism from the level of power politics and grand ideological contests to broad audiences. Thus, archaeologists are considered to be highly susceptible to political agendas (Bahn 2005: 136–139; Bernhardsson 2005; Crooke 2000; Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996; Kaiser 1995; Meskell 1998; Smith 1999: 61–99). Consequently, they disregard the ability of archaeology as a specific social field with its own norms, rules and expectations to resist, filter and moderate external influences. Furthermore, the internal constraints that different institutions and established practices within each basic type of archaeology place on individual practitioners also go unexamined.

In this article, I show how imperialist archaeologists contributed to the emergence of the nationalist research tradition and eventually to the construction of national identity in Albania

before the Second World War (cf. Pula 2008; Hall 2017). Furthermore, I argue that the influences of individual Western scholars on local developments were largely conditioned by the concrete institutional forms of archaeology in which they were operating. First, I provide an extensive review of the literature on archaeology and nationalism to better identify existing insights and limitations. That section is followed by an explanation of my theoretical framework. Then, the article moves to exploring how ideas and actions of imperialist archaeologists were shaped by four different institutional contexts: (1) *antiquarianism of travellers*, (2) *targeted excavations*, (3) *foreign archaeological missions*, and (4) *the national museum*. Finally, I analyze how archaeologists in Albania and other countries have differed from other occupations in terms of their contributions to the construction of national identities. I conclude by saying that the internal norms and rules of archaeology in general and the constraints of specific archaeological institutions in particular usually have a moderating effect on the spread of nationalism. In addition to providing general insight, the article also contributes to the country-specific literature. Area scholars have discussed the influence on nationalism of archaeology in Albania, but only in the interwar and the Communist periods. The history of imperialist archaeology in preceding periods has not been analyzed.

Theoretically, the article relies on Bourdieusian theory of social fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97–101; Webb, Schirato and Danaher 2002: 21–28) and on the framework of the new institutionalism (Brubaker 1994; Nee 1998), which both advance a choice-within-constraints approach to the analysis of human behavior. I use the typology of nationalist myths of ethnic descent elaborated by Anthony Smith (1999) and the chronology of national movements suggested by Miroslav Hroch (1993) to better capture the manifold influences that imperialist archaeology has exerted on local nationalisms. Methodologically, the study employs the method of process

151

tracing, widely practiced in comparative and historical research (Lange 2013). Empirically, it is based on the analysis of published travelogues and archaeological works, archival collections from the Central State Archives and the National library in Tirana and secondary sources on Albanian archaeology and political history.

Chronologically, I cover the period from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the Second World War. This is because in the wartime and post-war periods, archaeology in Albania experienced radically new developments. During the Second World War, all research in the country was tightly controlled by Italian government. Ancient history was used extensively in political propaganda, but properly archaeological studies and excavations were neglected. By contrast, in the Communist period, the archaeological discipline swiftly blossomed and was purposefully employed in nation-building. Foreign archaeologists visited Albania only sporadically.

The article focuses on Albania for two reasons. First, the Albanian case is representative of the development of archaeology and nationalism in non-Western contexts. Like in other colonized and semi-colonized regions, archaeological explorations in this Balkan country were launched by Western travelers. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, archaeology in Albania was practiced by foreigners with similar purposes in mind and in similar organizational forms. Second, the existing critical literature on the Albanian case well mirrors the generalist scholarship in the field. Thus, Albania can be viewed as an instructive extended case for the critical study of archaeology (Burawoy 1998; Tavory and Timmermans 2009).

Literature on Nationalism in Archaeology: Bridging Ideas

Literature in the field of critical archaeology has offered profound socio-political analysis of the history of the discipline. However, a number of links are still missing in this scholarship. In his path-breaking article, Bruce Trigger (1984) discovered the ideological underpinnings of national traditions in archaeological research. He suggested distinguishing between nationalist, colonialist and imperialist archaeology. According to Trigger, nationalist archaeology is directly related to nationalism and national identity construction. It is practiced by local archaeologists who celebrate historical achievements and the ancient glory of the nation, justify land claims and call for due recognition of the nation in the international community. "The primary function of nationalist archaeology is… to bolster the pride and morale of nations and ethnic groups" (Trigger 1984: 360). Colonialist archaeology is practiced by a colonizing population that has no historical ties with native peoples. "By emphasizing the primitiveness and lack of accomplishment of these peoples," it seeks to justify poor treatment of them and legitimate the power of the colonizers (360). Finally, imperialist archaeology is associated with European imperial powers. It justifies the global reach of European domination by denigrating the achievements of "static" and "slow-paced" non-European cultures. By extension, imperialist archaeology claims Western European ownership over dynamic and mighty civilizations of the ancient Mediterranean and the Near East, presenting modern Western European societies as contemporary paragons of universal progress.

Trigger's typology is widely used in critical archaeological scholarship (e.g., Bernharsson 2005; Diaz-Andreu 2001, 2007; Haber 2011; Kohl 1998; Kohl and Fawcett 1995; Meskell 2002; Silberman 1997). At the same time, the field acknowledges its limitations. Trigger (1984: 368) himself finds both colonialist and nationalist tendencies in contemporary Israeli and Mexican archaeology. Elizabeth Crooke (2000: 59) urges going beyond the "simplicity" of Trigger's

typology, noting that colonialist and nationalist interpretations may develop in a country contemporaneously. Philip Kohl (1998: 226–227) and Diaz-Andreu (2007: 67–77, 104–107) show how in revolutionary France, the inauguration of the civic nation was rendered as a restoration of the spirit of ancient Mediterranean civilizations, whose territories were soon conquered by Napoleon. Colossal artifacts from ancient civilizations were transformed into national symbols. Magnus Bernhardsson (2005) and James Goode (2007: 67–97, 168–228) describe the process of the evolution of archaeology in the Middle East from its imperialist to nationalist iterations.

Quite surprisingly, these qualifications have been rather cursory and do not constitute a systematic critique of Trigger's typology. Furthermore, they fail to identify another significant limitation of the model: its failture to recognize the important contributions of Western imperialist intellectuals on nationalist archaeology and the construction of local identities. Scholars tend to associate only nationalist archaeology with fostering local nationalism and nation-building. And they equate the emergence of nationalist archaeology with the birth of autonomous national polities and the installation of local control over excavations (e.g., Bernhardsson 2005; Diaz-Andreu 2007: 106, 204; Goode 2007: 1–3, 80–86, 97). In other words, the influence of archaeology on local nationalism and identity construction is only recognized when it is direct and intended. Diaz-Andreu (2007: 9, 104, 112–114, 123–129, 143, 200–201) occasionally mentions a number of indirect effects of imperialist archaeology on non-Western nationalisms and nationalist research traditions. Specifically, she discusses the education of the first local specialists by Western scholars and the native post-colonial practices of appropriating the historical discourses of the colonizers. With all their merits, such observations remain rare in the scholarship and are not seen as challenging the theory. Thus, my first goal in this article is to identify the particular ways that

Western imperialist archaeology affected the construction of an Albanian national identity and provided groundwork for the development of an Albanian nationalist archaeology.

Second, I argue that the impact of imperialist archaeologists on the construction of an Albanian national identity depended on the institutional contexts in which the Western explorers were working. Critical archaeological literature tends to talk about the unidirectional influences of ideologies and politics on archaeology. According to this interpretation, rising nationalist and imperialist ideologies directly motivate archaeologists to advance nation-building or colonial domination. Thus, archaeology is seen as a sort of transmission belt for nationalism and imperialism from the level of high politics to mass audiences at home and abroad. Lynn Meskell (1998: 2–3) considers the discipline of archaeology as a "stepchild" of nationalism and imperialism (Meskell 1998: 2–3), while Bernard Knapp and Sophia Antoniadou (1998: 12) speak of its "overtly political role." Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1996: 3) argue that European nationalism of the nineteenth century stimulated the establishment of archaeology as a discipline and is "deeply embedded in the very concept of archaeology, in its institutionalization and development." Bernhardsson (2005: 6, 287) states that archaeology has developed "hand and hand with the politics of imperialism and nationalism" that have influenced "the kinds of questions archaeologists have been willing to ask" and "what sort of historical sites to excavate and uncover."

Only implicitly and cursorily do the critical scholars recognize that archaeologists are somewhat unlike other nationalists. For example, Crooke (2000: 68, 152) at times switches to a softer language. She says that archaeologists were "*not immune* to the impact of nationalism" and sees the progress of archaeology and nationalism as merely "interwoven." Elaborating on these caveats, I look at how the internal resistance of archaeology as a particular social field and occupational practice may serve as a moderating variable in the link between power politics,

ideology and nation-building. Particularly, I explore how the inherent materiality of the discipline and the various institutional forms in which it is practiced shape the actions of archaeologists.

Notably, the critical scholarship on Albanian archaeology mirrors the limitations of the existing theoretical literature, even though Trigger's framework is not used. The area scholars tend to focus on the unidirectional influences of ideology and politics on archaeological practices in Albania and cover only the twentieth century. Like the generalists, the critical students of Albanian archaeology identify its inception directly with the installation of the Communist regime (Cabanes 2004; Galaty and Watkinson 2004; Galaty 2011). Oliver Gikles and Lida Miraj (2000) and James Schryver (2009) focus on the Italian archaeological missions in Albania in the interwar period. However, they consider these archaeological endeavors in the context of Italian rather than Albanian nationalism. My article aims to overcome these existing limitations of the area-studies literature.

Theoretical Framework

Along with the rich literature in critical archaeology, several other research traditions provide important theoretical insights for my analytical framework. In the studies of national myths, Anthony Smith suggests that scholars distinguish between narratives of ideological and genealogical descent. Ideological myths trace descent through cultural, ideological and ethical affinity with presumed ancestors and epochs. These narratives may portray contemporary nations as "genuine spiritual descendants" of glorious ancient populations. By contrast, the genealogical myths draw on a more strictly genealogical pedigree and alleged blood ties (Smith 1999: 70–71). The discussion of geneological myths predominates in the literature, while the importance of ideological myths of descent is overlooked. However, they often play an important auxiliary role

156

in nation-building. For example, when it comes to the highly controversial issue of the relationship between ancient and modern (Slavic) Macedonians, nationalists in Macedonia often alternate between boldly genealogical and more persuasive ideological narratives (Graan 2013; Vangeli 2011).

Another important framework promoting a more nuanced understanding of foreign archaeology's effects on local nationalisms is Miroslav Hroch's sequential account of national movements. According to Hroch's observations, one can hardly mark the precise birthdate of nationalism in a society. Rather, the elaboration of nationalist doctrine and the spread of nationalism develop in three phases: scholarly exploration, patriotic agitation and mass movement. During the scholarly *Phase A*, a small group of interested individuals starts exploring cultural, linguistic, social and historical attributes of a non-dominant group or ethnic category in order to raise awareness of its existence. During *Phase B*, that of national agitation, the number of activists grows, their network expands and they make an increasing effort to win over as many of their alleged ethnic kin as possible to the project of nation creation. The beginning of *Phase C* signifies the masses' entrance into the national movement (Hroch 1993: 6–7). Arguably, the contributions of Western archaeologists may be mapped onto the development stages of local nationalism. Foreign research activities and intellectual legacies will bear a causally and qualitatively different significance for the different stages of a national movement.

While the scholarship on national mythopoeia and the sequential spread of nationalism better captures the divergent effects of imperial archaeology on the construction of national identities, other theories better explain them. Specifically, the Bourdieusian concept of a social field can enrich the understanding of the moderating effects of archaeology in comparison to other disciplines and practices. Through Bourdieusian lenses, archaeology can be seen as a particular

field with its own social institutions, rituals, conventions, hierarchies and rules of the game that produce and authorize certain discourses and activities. The players in this field, archaeologists, take the game seriously and struggle for accumulation of field-specific capital, not only general economic, social or cultural capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97–101; Webb, Schirato and Danaher 2002: 21–28). Echoing Bourdieu, occupational sociology recognizes that occupational practices impose enduring sets of normative and behavioral expectations, principles of organization and self-reinforcing identities (see: Moore 1970: 5–8, 76–78).

Not only general disciplinary, but also institution-specific effects within the archaeological social field can be better analyzed in view of the new institutionalism. Compared to traditional theories, the new institutionalism attributes more agency to actors situated within structural contexts. It advocates for a choice-within-constraints approach. This theory does not claim that institutions are cast in stone, but views them as certain negotiable scripts of action and webs of interrelated formal and informal norms governing social relationships (Nee 1998).

Bourdieusian theory and the new institutionalist framework have been employed heuristically by Rogers Brubaker (1994) in his analysis of nationalism in post-Soviet states. According to Brubaker, institutionalized multinationality in the former Soviet Union over time became a force that shaped the interests, expectations and choices of political and intellectual elites in their dealings with ethnic heterogeneity. In this article, I show how the practice of archaeology as an established script of action and the internal dynamics of particular archaeological institutions influenced the work of imperialist scholars in Albania and determined their outcomes for local nationalism.

Antiquarianism of Travelers

Among the first antiquarians who surveyed archaeological remnants in Albania in the nineteenth century were diplomat François Pouqueville (1770–1838), military topographer William Martin Leake (1777–1860), physician Henry Holland (1788–1873), noble and politician John Hobhouse (1786–1869) and historian Leon Heuzey (1831–1922). Notably, they all shared common life experiences.

The antiquarians belonged to higher social strata; they thus acquired extensive knowledge in Classics and Mediterranean history though home schooling, university education and leisurely intellectual pursuits. They graduated from the constituent colleges and medical and military schools. Illuminist and Romanticist influences in the education of the time led to an obsession with exemplars from Greek and Roman history and incentivized the youth to visit famous Italian ruins (e.g., Pompei and Heculameum). The "Grand Tour" journey to Italy was often regarded as "a rite of passage to educated and cultured adulthood" (Diaz-Andreu 2007: 43; see also: Bahn 1996: 53–59). Furthermore, good-mannered people were expected to celebrate philosophical thinking and look for "romantic places" and "occasions for reflection" (Barthel 1996: 350–351). Classical ruins, which could satisfy the yearning for an idyllic, preindustrial past, were considered ideal in this respect (Bahn 1996: 54, 95–96).

As Schnapp (2008: 394–398) argues, antiquarianism should not be regarded as a merely personal and unsystematic pursuit. Instead, we must acknowledge the existence of a particular "antiquarian discipline" in Modern Europe. Antiquarians formed a network of the like-minded, who followed "recognized practices" and galvanized public attention. They studied Latin, Greek and Hebrew, focusing on material objects, art pieces and "curiosities" that symbolized political power, religious devotion and a deep commitment to learning. Material legacies of the Great

Civilizations received the highest symbolic status. Antiquarians often had strong support in noble circles and were expected to publish their work. Topographic surveys became one of the main tools of presenting their findings.

Along with the common educational patterns and shared ethos of antiquarianism, the amateur nature of their archaeological activities placed additional constraints on the first explorers in Albania. All of them were visiting foreigners who fulfilled their primary duties in the Balkans as diplomats and intelligence officers. Thus, the antiquarians had limited time for archaeological activities and possessed only scarce information about sites in Albania.

The inherent characteristics of amateur antiquarianism as an established social practice determined what the first explorers wanted to or could accomplish. They were mainly interested in and, in fact, could only reach the remnants of Greek and Roman architecture. Because of the bias toward the Classics, those remnants were considered the most significant. Access to the ruins was also relatively easy. Many were located on the Adriatic and Ionian seacoast or only few miles away. The others could be reached by following the Roman road Via Egnatia, which antiquarians knew from ancient sources. Besides, all the ruins were visible and known to the local population.

Pouqueville (1820: 19–29), Holland (1815), Hobhouse (1858: 148–152) and Heuzey (1876: 285–411) left the descriptions of former Roman and Greek colonies on the Albanian seacoast: Dyrrachium, Apollonia, Oricum and Buthrotum. The explorers noted that the "lofty ruins" of ancient temples, fortifications and houses still appeared above the earth. Their travelogues included more or less detailed commentaries on the topographic characteristics of the sites, as well as the dimensions, dating, style and material composition of the ruins. Pouqueville and Hobhouse wrote about the ancient sculpture, terracotta and inscriptions they saw, while Heuzey catalogued the collection of archaeological treasures from Saint Mary monastery in

160

Apollonia and even managed to send some objects to the Louvre. As imperialists, all early antiquarians in Albania shared condescending attitudes towards the local population. They clearly separated the admirable and universal legacies of Classical antiquity from the backward and parochial local culture. The connections between the famous ancient cities and the contemporary native inhabitants of Albania and the contributions of indigenous populations to the ancient urban civilization were unthinkable. In terms of archaeological research methods, the antiquarians did not go beyond fieldwalking and surveying.

Perhaps the involvement of foreign antiquarians in incipient archaeological research in Albania can be best illustrated by the story of a graduate from the Royal Military Academy, William Martin Leake (1777–1860). In 1804, Leake was sent by the British government to study the coast of Albania and Epirus with the view of assisting the Ottomans against French attacks. Over the course of his duties, Leake not only gathered information on local geography, culture and politics, but also visited numerous archaeological sites. Motivated by his education, Leake wanted to locate historical events and places that he knew from the Classical literature. He also suggested how to find and unearth yet-undiscovered sites mentioned in ancient the sources. This approach helped to strengthen his appeal to the readership, which was galvanized by the Classical tradition at the time. Leake followed ancient routes, including the Via Egnatia, which ran through Dyrrachium and central Albania to reach Thessaloniki. Following the Via Egnatia, the British topographer managed to survey not only the seacoast sites (Apollonia, Aulona, Buthrotum, Dyrrachium, and Phoenice), but also some ancient Greek localities in the close hinterland (Amantia and Bullis) (Leake 1835: 1–10, 20–21, 33–35, 66–75, 91–101, 307–380; also see: Hoxha 2007).

Thus, the archaeological explorations of the amateur antiquarians in Albania remained clearly imperialist and only covered ancient Greek and Roman sites. Nevertheless, even these activities bore important long-term consequences for Albanian nationalism and nationalist archaeology. First, foreign travelers discovered considerable symbolic capital on Albanian territory. With the publication of their widely-read reports, the European public learned about Albania, which thus far had been viewed as a dark corner of the Ottoman Empire. Second, this symbolic capital began to be catalogued and mapped, which laid the groundwork for subsequent nationalist archaeologists. Third, the work of Pouqueville, Leake and their colleagues was later used by Albanian intellectuals and politicians to construct nationalist myths of Albanians' ideological descent from the ancient Great Civilizations.

The process of the nationalist appropriation of ancient Greek and Roman urban centers took many decades and was, as expected, mediated by influential Albanian figures and institutions. In the early twentieth century, Albanian nobles started to buy Classical antiquities found in the country for their personal collections, while emergent nationalist archaeologists lamented the foreign expropriation of the artifacts from Apollonia, Dyrachium and other sites (see: Gjeçovi 1920: 183). In the 1920s, ancient Greek and Roman objects formed a significant part of the collection in the newly established National Museum (Biblioteka Kombëtare 1931: 15).

This tendency toward administrative and ideological nationalization was strengthened under the Communist regime. In 1947, the new government of Albania issued a circular entitled *On Archaeological Treasures*, which mandated the centralization of all archaeological collections under the auspices of the state, now treating them as part of the national heritage (AQSh. F. 513, ds. 30, ft. 2–10, 18, 22). Finally, in the early 1970s, in a report to the government, the national Academy of Sciences committed itself to studying the ancient Greek and Roman colonies "in full

force" and "as an integral part of Illyrian [i.e., ancient Albanian] history" (AQSh. F. 508, ds. 3, ft. 7). Those, who drafted the report, declared that the Roman "ethnic element merged into indigenous culture" and contributed to the formation of the Albanian ethnic group (AQSh. F. 508, ds. 16, ft. 5). Albanian archaeologists now stressed that the economy, political system and cultural life of the colonies and the surrounding Illyrian population were deeply integrated and that Illyrian natives constituted a sizable proportion of the inhabitants of ancient Balkan cities (e.g., Toçi 1978). Thus, with time, Albanian nationalists elaborated not only ideological, but also more genealogical-seeming hybridization myths to appropriate the country's ancient Greek and Roman artifacts.

In short, the institutional context of travelers' antiquarianism allowed them to lay the groundwork for the national agitation phase of Albanian nationalism. In this sense, the antiquarian explorations can be provisionally considered as a part of the early scholarly *Phase A*. In contrast to Hroch's understanding, the unintended excavation of national identity, which in the long run became an additional source of Albanian nationalism, was propelled by the antiquarians, members of the out-group. It developed in parallel with the exploration and cultivation of "ethnic" culture by Albanian-speaking scholars in the first half of the nineteenth century (see: Clayer 2007: 144–172).

Targeted Excavations

More or less systematic excavations in nineteenth-century Albania were conducted after foreign consulates were established in Albanian-speaking territories. Their employees became interested in the history, ethnography and archaeology of the region. For some, these explorations were conducted out of mere personal interest in academic exercises. Others thought that scholarly

pursuits had direct political relevance; ethnographic maps and historical arguments were routinely used in international debates in that period (Blumi 2007; also see: Hall 2017).

The early semi-professional excavators shared a number of important common characteristics. In contrast to the amateur antiquarians, they acquired professional training in diplomacy and oriental languages and, thus, were somewhat less attached to Classical civilization. As permanent residents in Albania, they had much more time for their explorations and could overcome the difficulties of geographic inaccessibility. The diplomats also possessed considerable financial and logistical resources and developed strong local networks over time. Importantly, these networks allowed them to acquire information about promising archaeological sites unknown in the Classical literature.

The main figures in these targeted excavations were the French consul in Shkodër, Alexandre Degrand (1844–1911), and his Austrian colleague, Theodore Ippen (1861–1935). Their archaeological work constituted a watershed in the intellectual impact of foreign archaeology on the construction of an Albanian identity. They, for the first time, constructed genealogical myths backed by archaeological material. This occurred because of a significant shift in research geography. Interested in local culture and possessing more time, resources and information, Degrand and Ippen decided to survey and excavate yet-unknown and hardly accessible sites. Their targeted excavations in the Albanian hinterland quickly led them to discover a number of "archaeological anomalies," i.e., novel findings and sites that clearly could not be attributed to ancient Greek and Roman or even Byzantine cultures.

As the French consul in Shkodër (1893–1899), Degrand frequently visited medieval churches and ancient ruins. Soon he learnt about a promising archaeological site at the Dalmaca fortress, close to the village of Koman. His archaeological team found many burial sites containing

164

a rich collection of arms and decorations. Bewildered by the difficulties of interpretation, Degrand (1901: 249–269) attributed his findings to pre-Roman Pelasgians, whom he believed to be Albanian ancestors. The excavations in Koman were soon continued by Ippen. In the study of Albanian prehistory, Ippen followed his compatriot and diplomatic colleague Johann von Hahn, who earlier suggested the provenance of Albanians as the indigenous tribes of ancient Illyrians. Ippen argued that the design of the Koman artifacts was similar to unmistakably Illyrian patterns from the ancient tumuli already discovered in Bosnia. The very same ornamental patterns, he continued, could be found in the culture of contemporary Albanian mountaineers (Ippen 2002; also see: AQSh. F. 78, Ds, 14, ft. 1). Thus, the Austrian diplomat became a pioneer in providing systematic archaeological arguments in favor of the genealogical continuity between Illyrians and Albanians. It should be noted, however, that both Degrand and Ippen elaborated only weak versions of Albanian genealogical myths. They pointed to the links between Albanians and pre-Roman Balkan cultures but did not celebrate those cultures as glorious and admirable.

These long-term intellectual and ideological effects were not the only influences of these archaeologists on the development of an Albanian nationalist archaeology and the construction of an Albanian identity. Another indirect but immediate impact was increased local awareness of archaeological treasures.

The key intermediary in bringing the ideas of Western archaeology to Albanian public discourse was the founding father of the nationalist archaeology, Shtjefën Gjeçovi (1874–1929). Educated in a Franciscan seminary in Bosnia, Gjeçovi was then sent to Northern Albania in 1896. From 1905 to 1920, he carried out his religious duties among highland Albanian tribes, studying local customs and folklore. His interest in local history, archaeology and culture and his commitment to the national education was facilitated by intense personal contact and

correspondence with Ippen. Ippen gave Gjeçovi advice, financial support and important contacts with foreign scholars (AQSh. F. 58, ds. 25, ft. 3–10, ds. 95/35, ds. 96; F. 78, ds. 8, ft. 1–4, ds. 15). Traveling through the northern region, the Catholic friar surveyed heretofore unknown archaeological sites in the deep mountainous hinterland. He conducted numerous amateur excavations in ancient fortresses (Gajtan, Koman, Mount of Sha Ndout, Troshan), churches (Milaj, Shën Kollë) and tumuli (Kishëza të Planejës, Kolëm in Has të Zymit, Kodër Bogëz-Laç Sebaste, Kalaviç, Koman, Peshkash, and Shalë). Over the years, Gjeçovi gathered a rich collection of Roman, Byzantine and indigenous artifacts in the Franciscan College in Shkodër and staged several exhibitions. He also helped visiting foreign archaeologists and advocated zealously for the popularization of archaeological knowledge among the Albanian masses (AQSh. F. 58, ds. 25, ft.10; ds. 26, ds. 32, ft. 1–6, ds. 33; ds. 95/20, ft.2; Shukriu 2003).

In sum, the institutional features of targeted excavations pushed Western archaeologists to facilitate Albanian nationalism to an extent usually characteristic of the transitional period between *Phases A* (scholarly exploration) and *B* (patriotic agitation). Directly and vicariously (through Gjeçovi), they influenced the elaboration, institutionalization and popular spread of Albanian foundational myths. They also contributed to the creation of a nationalist network in the country.

Foreign Archaeological Missions

Foreign archaeological missions started their work in Albania during the First World War and kept operating throughout the 1920s and 1930s. They were headed by famous archaeologists from Austria, France and Italy: Camillo Praschniker (1884–1949), Arnold Schober, Leon Rey (1887–1954) and Luigi Ugolini (1895–1936). The institutional characteristics of long-term archaeological missions and the context in which they operated set certain benchmarks for their

members. Directing an archaeological mission required a solid professional education in ancient archaeology and prehistory. Praschniker, Schober, Rey and Ugolini were professional archaeologists with a broad knowledge of diverse ancient cultures. Compared to their predecessors, all four were much less constrained by time, resources and logistical difficulties, and they were expected to yield massive and spectacular results. With the support of their governments and extensive local contacts, they could take the issue of educating locals and popularizing the discipline more seriously. The work of foreign archaeological missions was also more visible and thus elicited much a stronger reaction in Albanian society.

As Western-trained archaeologists interested in acquiring material artifacts for European museums, Praschniker, Schober, Rey and Ugolini focused their attention primarily on Classical sites. Praschniker and Schober traveled widely through Albania, surveying the ruins of Shkodër (Scodra), Lezha (Lissus), Durrës (Dyrrachium), Elbasan (Scampa), and Bullis, and finally set their tents in Apollonia. The French archaeological mission under Rey also carried main excavations in this ancient city. Ugolini conducted most of his research in Buthrotum and Phoenice. The archaeologists meticulously mapped research sites and used modern methods such as stratigraphy to unearth city walls, temples, theatres, dwellings and tombs. Found artifacts were carefully catalogued and photographed. Many of them ended up in foreign museums.

Nevertheless, despite their Classical bias, the nature of work in foreign missions pushed Praschiker, Schober, Rey and Ugolini to make a number of discoveries important for the development of Albanian nationalist myths of genealogical descent. Unconstrained by resources and influenced by their previous experience excavating Canaanite and Israelite settlements in Palestine, Praschniker and Schober took several months to survey ancient fortified settlements in the hinterland locations of Gajtan, Margëlliç, Peza and Zgërdhesh (Albanopolis). Like Ippen, they

concluded that these settlements were similar to the Bosnian sites and belonged to Albanian ancestors. However, their study provided yet wider ground for nationalist mythopoeia. Because the hinterland fortresses were dated as ancient, they could now be used by nationalists as a proof of indigenous Illyrian urbanism and civilization (Praschniker and Schober 1918: 75–77, 85–94; see also: Ceka 2000: 10–11).

The ideas of Praschniker and Schober were soon echoed by Rey, who researched Northern and Central Albania intensely and briefly excavated Illyrian tumuli and fortresses in the mountainous northern region of Puka (AQSh. F 792, ds. 24, ft. 3–22; Gilkes and Minaj 2000: 112–113; Ceka 2000: 13–14; Elsie 2010: 385; Ziso 2005: 128–129). The case of Ugolini is even more illustrative of the role of institutional factors. In Phoenice, which had already been surveyed but not yet excavated, Ugolini had a luxury to conduct thorough, long-term research. As a result, he discovered not only Classical antiquities, but also artifacts from the Iron Age. These discoveries enabled the archaeologist to claim that some of the Phoenice findings belonged to the ancient Illyrian population, while others resembled indigenous archaeological cultures in Italy. Trying to appeal to the Italian government, he emphasized the deep historical connections of Albania to Italy and even presented on this topic in a prestigious public lecture in Rome, which was attended by the education minister (Ceka 2000: 11–13; Gilkes and Miraj 2000: 109–114; Schryver 2009).

Along with their ideational influences, the foreign archaeological missions also contributed to the spread and institutionalization of archaeological knowledge in Albanian society. This, in turn, fostered the construction of Albanian nationhood. Every mission required massive physical labor and numerous well-educated assistants. Praschniker, Schober, Rey and Ugolini always employed locals. The number of Albanian workers under the direction of Ugolini sometimes neared 100 (Gilkes and Manaj 2000: 117). One of them was Hasan Ceka (1990–1998), who

completed his studies of Classical archaeology in Vienna. Working with Ugolini and later with Rey, Ceka acquired important practical skills and the topographical knowledge of Albanian archaeological sites. In the 1920s and 1930s, he was hired as an inspector by the ministry of education and as a research fellow by the national museum. In the Communist period, Ceka successfully raised through the ranks, becoming one of the most famous nationalist archaeologists in Albania (Biblioteka Kombëtare 1931: 15; Ceka 2003: 13; AQSh. F. 513, ds. 20, ft. 76; F. 792, ds. 49, ft. 20–87).

During excavations, Rey and Uglolini collected numerous archaeological materials and stored them in special depots. Both archaeologists sought persistently to popularize their work, at least among foreigners and the Albanian social elite. They organized several group excursions for Albanian officials and Western diplomats to the sites of Apollonia and Buthrotum and invited them to improvised archaeological museums in Fier and Saranda (AQSh. F. 792, ds. 42, ft. 1–8; Gilkes and Minaj 2000: 112–113). This would not be possible if the heads of the archaeological missions lacked important contacts, financial resources, means of transportation and, ultimately, official support. In 1936, Rey inaugurated the first public archaeological museum in the presence of numerous government officials, foreign scholars and diplomats. Located in Vlora, the museum occupied a two-story building of over 200 square meters and hosted rich Apollonian collection of bronze, ceramic and marble artifacts. Importantly, the archaeological collection was not the only exhibition. A special room was devoted to the 1912 declaration of Albanian independence (AQSh. F. 792, ds. 19, ft. 2–12; Ziso 2005: 130). In his inaugural speech, Rey said that "the ancient world [did] not belong exclusively to Greeks and Romans, but to all citizens" [of contemporary states]. Despite this, the speech showed that he remained ambivalent toward the nationalist myths of ideological descent from the Great Civilizations (AQSh. F. 792, ds, 19, ft. 13).

The employment of locals and purposeful promotion were not the only ways the missions fostered interest in excavations and ancient artifacts among Albanians. The long presence and visibility of Western archaeologists often fueled a sense of ethnic competition and irritated local intellectuals. In 1916, the capture of artifacts in the Apollonia monastery by the Austrian mission caused a vigorous protest among patriotic Austrian army recruits. As a result, three Albanian officers were executed (Ceka 2000: 10). In the 1920s and 1930s, rich Albanians adopted the practice of collecting archaeological materials, some of which were later donated to the national museum.

During that period, Gjeçovi became the spokesperson of those who advocated for tight state control over all archaeological activities. His private notes lament the ignorance of his compatriots, writing that archaeological objects are a "precious treasure," and "the biggest and unforgivable sin of our Albanians is selling to foreigners even those [few] ancient objects that are discovered" (AQSh. F.58, ds. 26, ft.3). In 1920, Gjeçovi published a manifesto of Albanian nationalist archaeology. He described his many experiences excavating the primeval roots of Albanians and proclaimed that the main duty of an archaeologist was "to enrich the hidden treasure of the nation" by reconstructing "the chronology of national history through the use of ancient materials" (Gjeçovi 1920: 181). For this purpose, the author urged the government to impose restrictions on foreign excavations, centralize private archaeological collections and establish a museum.

While advocating for a nationalist approach to archaeology, Gjeçovi further developed his ideas on the ancient pedigree of Albanians. He drew parallels between the artifacts found in the ancient graves and vessels and decorations used by local highlanders. This made the scholar date his findings as much as four thousand years old and conclude that they belonged to Pelasgo-Illyrian

forebears (Gjeçovi 1920, 2003; Shukriu 2003). Gjeçovi was so obsessed with foreign encroachments and so committed to the idea of "correcting" history in the name of the nation that in 1923, he chaired a special government commission with the goal of eliminating foreign place names from Albanian territory (AQSh. F. 58, ds. 27, ft. 1–2).

To summarize, the Western scholars working within the institutional framework of foreign missions strengthened the ideational foundations of Albanian genealogical myths and contributed to *Phase B*, the agitation of the national movement. They facilitated the creation of networks among dedicated patriots in Albania and accelerated the spread of nationalist ideas by educating and irritating locals.

Foreign Archaeology in the National Museum

In the early 1920s, the Albanian government decided to take a more active role in the management of archaeological research. That was a time of relative political stability. Therefore, several initiatives to advance nation-building were undertaken in the new country. The ministry of education considered inculcating the "national spirit" into the minds of Albanian youth its primary goal and embarked on a path of comprehensive school reform (Spahiu 2011: 304–307). A law on antiquities was contemplated. This was the context in which the National Museum opened its doors in 1923. Officials from the ministry decided to invite famous Austrian scholar Carl Patsch (1865–1945) as a consultant. Patsch was the only foreign archaeologist working in the Albanian National Museum, where he helped establish and then headed the section on archaeology and history.

Unlike other institutional forms and practices discussed so far, the national museum was purposefully created to foster nation-building. As Crooke (2000:9) shows, the public museum conveys a message of power, serving as a "psychological and ideological weapon" in the hands of

nationalists. Thus, as expected, the inauguration of the National Museum caused a nationalist fever in the Albanian press. Intellectuals contemplated how the institution could protect national treasure and bolster national pride. They suggested that the museum should prove Albanian provenance from ancient Illyrians to help overcome the collective sense of inferiority vis-à-vis neighbors (Clayer 2012: 96–97).

Importantly, the operation of a national museum involves upholding a particular "social script" derived from the key nation-building functions of this institution (Crooke 2000: 14). In the case of Albania, the process of hiring already presupposed some level of commitment of the selected candidates to local nationalist ideas. Furthermore, once hired, employees had to follow the institution's officially stated and implied nationalist goals. One of these goals was the purposeful dissemination of national feelings through public education. Last but not least, museum employees could rely on official support through public funding, legal enforcement and direct government contacts, even though in the formative years of the still-weak Albanian state, all these resources were limited.

The ministry of education selected Patsch because by the 1920s, he had already established himself as an authority in Balkan indigenous archaeology and was known for his popularizing projects. At the turn of the twentieth century, he did extensive research on ancient Illyrian sites in Bosnia and Albania and served as the curator of the Land Museum in Sarajevo, established by Austro-Hungarian authorities to strengthen the sense of a separate Bosnian identity. Thus, being clearly an imperialist archaeologist, Patsch had proven himself instrumental to the development of local nationalisms and genealogical myths.

It is insightful to see how the ideas and activities of Patsch changed after he accepted the offer from the National Museum. It seems that as an established researcher, he initially planned to

172

model the Tirana institution on the Sarajevan Land Museum and push it into a more research-oriented direction. However, the government allocated limited resources for research and continuously declined requests for additional funds. As a result, once at the museum, Patsch had to focus on promoting public education and claiming state ownership over already discovered archaeological treasures (Clayer 2012; Kolobov 2007).

Through the ministry, Patsch sent letters to prefectures and municipalities requesting to survey, catalogue and supervize archaeological materials and sites under local jurisdiction. The museum strongly encouraged private donations and, with government help, received a portion of artifacts unearthed by Rey and Ugolini. In his appeals to bureaucrats and citizens alike, Patsch often relied on nationalist rhetoric, referring to donors as "national benefactors" (Biblioteka Kombëtare 1932: 12; Clayer 2012). In 1924, he urged the government to take immediate care of ancient remnants in Dyrrahium, arguing that current negligence could harm the international image of Albanians (Patsch 2005: 216, 218). As with other countries, claiming intellectual and material ownership over archaeological artifacts was a means for the Albanian state to control the political future. By physically owning the past, politicians and institutions publicly proved their commitment to the national cause (see: Crooke 2000: 149–150).

Patsch's affiliation with the National Museum shaped not only his understanding of personal duties, but also his views on Balkan history. Beginning work in Tirana, the scholar thought that all epochs from the Albanian past should be given equal attention in research and museum expositions. Months later, however, he encouraged his collaborators to make more efforts to document and explore nationally significant periods such as the epoch of Scanderbeg and Illyrian antiquity. The shift in focus and rhetoric in his studies is even more telling. Surveying Albanian territory at the beginning of the twentieth century, Patsch (1904) published a travelogue

173

with topographic and chronographic descriptions. He mostly focused on Greek and Roman colonies such as Appolonia, Oricum, Amantia and Bullis. At that time, he refrained from far-reaching historical interpretations of archaeological material.

By contrast, as an employee of the National Museum, Patsch contributed to a popular book series for "school and home." His work *The Illyrians*, published in Albanian in 1923, constituted the first comprehensive nationalist interpretation of Illyrian history. Another book published by Patsch in Albanian two years later incorporated the local archaeological material to document the ethnic continuity between Illyrians and Albanians (Clayer 2012: 97, 99–100). These accounts, for the first time in archaeology, offered a strong version of the Albanian genealogical myth. Illyrians were not presented simply as blood ancestors, but as glorious and highly civilized people. Despite some reservations regarding the level of Illyrian social development, the interpretative framework suggested by Patsch would eventually serve as a stepping stone for later generations of local nationalist scholars.

In his first book, Patsch presents Illyrians as glorious Albanian ancestors. Illyrians occupied the massive and populous territories of the whole Western sector of the Balkans. Their livelihood depended on a powerful agricultural economy, whose products were widely known in the ancient world. Illyrians were skillful warriors and sailors. They managed to control marine communications in the Adriatic Sea and often scared Rome, preserving their independence for centuries. Several Illyrian tribes, such as Ardiaeians and Dardanians, developed the strong traditions of statehood and urban life. The courts of their kings Agron, Teuta, Genti and Monun could boast their own diplomatic services and coinage. Illyrians courageously resisted Roman encroachments but were eventually subjugated. Under Roman domination, freedom-loving and stubborn Illyrians kept to the traditions of their ancestors and resisted assimilation. At the same

174

time, their innate skills allowed them to rise through the ranks of the empire. Some Illyrians became Roman emperors, including Diocletian, Constantine the Great and Justinian. Many others made successful careers as generals, officers, bureaucrats and religious leaders (Patsch 2004).

Working on his books, Patsch also produced a large map of *Albania in Ancient Times* for the museum exhibition. This was the first map that claimed the ancient heritage for independent Albania. Patsch marked the locations of ancient Illyrian tribes, roads, Greek and Roman colonies and settlements he considered to be indigenous urban centers, such as Albanopolis and Scodra (BK. ArH 1/29E). Thus, the contemporary borders of the Albanian state were graphically imposed on Classical and indigenous antiquity.

The institutional context of the National Museum not only incentivized the formerly imperialist archaeologist Patsch to become one of the founders of the Albanian nationalist research tradition, but also broadened his impact on identity construction. His books, published under the auspices of the museum in the local language and delivered to public libraries, became available to a broad readership (see: AQSh. F. 513, ds. 53, ft. 1–16). Specifically, these works informed the studies of the influential nationalist archaeologist Hasan Ceka, whose professional growth was helped by the Austrian archaeologist personally (Clayer 2012: 104). By the early 1930s, the archaeological exhibition in the museum, which included both Classical and indigenous artifacts, hosted 5,000–10,000 visitors annually. Most of these visitors were Albanian students (Biblioteka Kombëtare 1931: 4, 15; 1932: 4, 12). As Patsch (2004: 61) had envisioned, popular education became one of the main areas of work for the National Museum. To summarize, under the institutional constraints of the National Museum, this originally imperialist archaeologist helped bring about the mass *Phase C* of Albanian nationalism. He offered the first strong version of

Albanian genealogical myths and promoted the idea of ancient ancestry among Albanian population.

Archaeologists as Latecomers to National Identity Politics

As I mentioned, the literature tends to view archaeologists as akin to other nationalists and to treat the discipline as a transmission belt for nationalist ideology from the level of high politics to mass audiences (Bahn 2005: 136–139; Bernhardsson 2005: 6; Crooke 2000: 9, 68, 149–154; Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 3; Kaiser 1995: 99–100, 112; Meskell 1998: 2–3; Smith 1999: 61–99). However, we should not disregard the internal rules of the archaeological social field. These rules often put the brakes on hasty mythopoeic action. The occupational requirements of archaeology presuppose a relatively high level of formal education, extensive experience and a necessary focus on material objects. The inescapable materiality (Meskell 1998: 2) of the discipline delays the entrance of archaeologists into mythmaking. Until observable "proofs" are excavated, archaeological narratives glorifying the community's past cannot be constructed.

In the Albanian case, the first *strong* version of a genealogical myth was constructed in the 1840s by Vincenzo Dorsa. This Albanian Orthodox cleric from Italy claimed that his kin originated from Pelasgian autochthons of the Balkans, who were once known for their high culture and developed statehood. In Dorsa's view, ancient Pelasgian polities included Macedonia and Epirus and, thus, even Alexander the Great was a blood ancestor of Albanians. By the late 1890s, Albanian intellectuals further elaborated genealogical myths and laid their symbolic claim to the Illyrian legacy, including the ancient kingdoms of Teuta and Gent (Thëngjilli 2008: 46–58; also see: Dzino 2014; Sotirović 2013). By contrast, in archaeology the *weak* versions appeared only after Degrand and Ippen discovered material "anomalies" in the Albanian hinterland during the 1890s. Faced

with the problems of interpretation and dating, these scholars attributed the discoveries to Pelasgians and Illyrians. However, they did not, strictly speaking, celebrate cultural and political achievements of these Albanian ancestors. *Strong* archaeological versions of Albanian genealogical myths had to wait until the early 1920s, when Patsch and Gjeçovi published their works praising anceint Plasgian and Illyrian societies.

The myths claiming Albanians' ideological descent from Greek and Roman civilizations were never fully endorsed by archaeologists in Albania before the Second World War. Providing a stepping stone for the future mythopoeia in this field, the archaeologists, including Patsch, remained skeptical. Rey's speech at the inauguration of the Vlora Museum suggests that he drew a distinction between "the history of your [Albanian] nation" and Classical history (AQSh. F. 792, ds. 19, ft. 13). The former included the declaration of independence and, perhaps, the Scanderbeg period, but certainly not the past of Greek and Roman colonies in Albania.

Only partially can the resistance of Western archaeologists be explained by their own ethnic identities and imperialist beliefs. Despite being a nationalist Albanian archaeologist, Gjeçovi remained salient about cultural and ethnical connections between ancient Greeks, Romans and the autochthons in his works. The fact is that until the Communist period, archaeology remained fairly ignorant of the economic, political, cultural and demographic exchanges between Illyrians and Classical civilization. It simply lacked material findings in this area. Thus, the late entrance of archaeologists to the construction of Albanian ideological myths can arguably be seen as a consequence of the disciplinary focus on material objects.

The Albanian case is rather typical for understanding in what sequence the representatives of different occupational groups and intellectuals from different fields enter the process of national identity construction. In most independent European countries, archaeologists were latecomers

(Diaz-Andreu 2007). In a colonial and semi-colonial context, the situation might differ. For instance, in Ireland and Greece, nationalist ideas and myths became popular before archaeologists started to contribute to their formation (Crooke 2000: 68–75; Kostakis 1998). In Thailand, the articulations of Thai nationalism, since its inception, included references to the material artifacts discovered by French scholars and local amateur antiquarians (Shookongdej 2008: 388–393). In Egypt and Iraq, similar to Europe, local archaeologists tailored nationalist myths many years later than writers and historians. However, nationalism in these countries developed as a response to Western imperialist archaeology. Claims to the ownership over antiquity became central to Egyptian and Iraqi nationalist discourses in their formative years (Bahrani 1998; Berhardsson 2005: 159–164; 172–185, 211–213; Goode 2007: 72–74, 82–86).

Discussion and Conclusion

While providing important insights into political biases in archaeological research and close connections of archaeology with nationalist and imperialist ideologies, the critical scholarship has overlooked two significant issues. First, the scholars divide historical traditions in archaeology into imperialist and nationalist, associating only the latter with the construction of national identities. Thus, the influences of imperialist archaeology on the foundation of nationalist research and on the development of local nationalisms in non-Western countries are not systematically analyzed. Second, the existing literature tends to disregard the ways in which archaeology as an established practice with its particular institutional forms can resist and filter external political and ideological influences. Therefore, archaeologists are assumed to be like other ethnic entrepreneurs and nationalist intellectuals. Finally, the impact of institutional constraints in archaeology remains the object of too little study.

My article represents an attempt to overcome these limitations. Pursuing my study, I have discovered mechanisms through which imperialist archaeology influenced Albanian nationalism before the Second World War. Furthermore, I have found that the strength and quality of these influences were determined by the established archaeological practices and institutions within which the imperial archaeologists were working. Finally, the study has revealed that in Albania, archaeologists entered the process of national identity construction with a 50-year delay. This is because archaeology is focused on material objects and requires years of training and experience. In other words, even under political pressure, the inescapable materiality of archaeology and its occupational norms slow down the development of ideological narratives within the discipline.

The more detailed findings are presented in Table 1. In short, the table shows mechanisms through which imperial archaeologists facilitated Albanian nationalism and specific ways their influences were shaped by four institutional forms of archaeology: (1) antiquarianism of travellers, (2) targeted excavations, (3) foreign archaeological missions, (3) the national museum. The contributions of imperialist scholars were mostly indirect and unintended, but nevertheless significant. On the one hand, foreign archaeological explorations might have left no effect in Albania if local nationalists did not follow the steps of the westerners. Imperialist archaeologists provided an additional incentive for Albanian nationalism, but they certainly did not manufacture it. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine the successful development and mass spread of the foundational Albanian myth of ancient origins without the intellectual and infrastructural foundations provided by foreign archaeologists. Equally, it is hard to disregard the role of the westerners in the establishment of the nationalist archaeological tradition in Albania. Among its three founding fathers, Shtjefen Gjeçovi, Carl Patsch and Hasan Ceka, one was a foreigner and

initially an imperialist archaeologist, while the two others were trained and strongly supported by

Western scholars.

Table 1. Imperialist Archaeologists, Institutional Constraints and Their Effects on Albanian Nationalism

The Mechanism	Types of Institutions and Established Practices in Foreign Archaeology			
	Antiquarianism of Travellers	Targeted Excavations	Archaeological Missions	National Museum
1. Institutional Characteristics				
Upbringing and Education	Classics (amateur and professional)	Diplomacy and Middle Eastern languages (professional)	Archaeology and pre-history (professional)	
Available Resources	Scarce	Medium	Abundant	
Networks in Albania	Sparse	Medium	Dense	
Government Support for Explorations	None	Weak foreign	Medium foreign and local	Strong local and weak foreign
2. Constraining Effects on Ideas and Actions of Imperialist Archaeologists				
Focus of Interest	Classical culture	Indigenous and Classical culture	Classical and indigenous culture	Indigenous and Classical culture
Geographic Reach	Coastline and main roads	Coastline and close hinterland	Coastline and deep hinterland in certain regions	The whole territory of the country
Education of Locals	None	Sporadic, only elites	Systematic, only elites	Institutionalized, elites and masses
Opposition from Locals	None	Sporadic	Systematic	None
3. Outcomes for Albanian Nationalism				
Creation of the National Narrative	Groundwork for the myths of ideological descent from the Classical civilization			
	None	Weak versions of myths of genealogical descent from ancient indigenous populations		Strong version of genealogical myths
Spread of Nationalism (in Hroch's typology)	Groundwork for the scholarly *Phase A*	Facilitation of the transition to the agitation *Phase B*	The agitation *Phase B*	Facilitation of the transition to the mass *Phase C*

The approach to nationalism offered by Hroch (1993) helps us better assess the contributions of Western archaeology. Hroch suggests that the emergence of a national movement should be understood not as a one-time event, but rather as a long-term sequential process. Minor developments in its initial phases (scholarly exploration and mass agitation) can bear enormous consequences in the subsequent mass stage if reinforced by other factors. In this sense, the influences of imperialist archaeologists should be evaluated in view of the temporal context in which they occurred. For example, apparently minor effects that the imperialist archaeologists involved in targeted excavations had on the formation of Albanian nationalist networks (*Phase B*) cannot be discarded in a period when the whole international community of Albanian nationalist intellectuals counted only several dozens individuals scattered across Europe and the Ottoman Empire (Clayer 2008: 153–306). The ideas and practices developed by early Albanian nationalists in their close exchanges with foreigners formed the backbone for the concept of Albanian nationhood, which would be promoted zealously under the Communist regime. This explains why archaeology took center stage in Albanian identity politics in the post-Second World War years. In that period, Albanian nationalist archaeologists only considered Pelasgian and Illyrian theories of ethnic origins and completely rejected other interpretations, which had had currency prior to the twentieth century (Thëngjilli 2008: 11–139).

While assessing my Bourdieusian argument skeptics may ask: Weren't period effects and personal ideological beliefs all that mattered? My answer is negative. Temporally, the actions of archaeologists working in different institutional contexts often overlapped. For example, Alexandre Degrand and Leon Heuzey explored Albanian archaeological sites in roughly the same period (1870s–1890s). However, their findings had very different implications for Albanian nationalism. Indicatively, as a member of the French School at Athens at the same time, and not

simply an antiquarian traveller in Greece, Heuzey contributed to the development of Greek national mythology (Kostakis 1998: 46). Similar to Degrand and Heuzey, Patsch and Rey harbored different ideas about the Albanian past. Rey supported only weak versions of Albanian genealogical myths and remained more skeptical toward Albanian government's appropriation of Classical antiquity. The museums, which the two foreign scholars helped establish, conveyed different messages. The Vlora Museum mostly extolled the universal value of Classical antiquity, while the National Museum primarily promoted the myth of the Illyrian roots of the Albanian nation. These and other examples show that the constraints of archaeological institutions tend to override temporal tendencies as motivational forces.

Personal ideological beliefs and political agendas cannot be completely discarded while analyzing the actions of individual archaeologists. Thus, serving as an Austrian consul in Shkodër, Ippen implemented the Vienna policies of invigorating Albanian nationalism. He maintained connections with main nationalist figures and distributed money for the publication of patriotic literature (Clayer 2009: 375–378). Therefore, the general political line of Austrian diplomacy might have motivated Ippen to continue excavations in Koman and eventually offer a weak version of Albanian genealogical myths. Similarly, Ugolini's interpretation of the Phoenice findings was influenced by his ideological mission in Albania. His work aimed to justify the growing political influence of Italy by invoking the notion of the Roman civilizing mission in the Balkans and by stressing historical connections between Albania and Italy. Following this political line, Ugolini presented the "noble *Illirica gens*" as historically tied to the Roman metropolis (Gilkes and Minaj 2000: 112–113). Despite these seemingly confirming examples, we should not forget that the archaeological explorations of Degrand and Ippen bore very similar consequence for Albanian nationhood. Moreover, if Ippen had political and ideological reasons for claiming the ancient

origins of Albanians, Degrand did not. Similarly, while the selection of Phoenice by Ugolini was determined by the desire to foster Albanian national sensitivities, the decision of his French colleague Rey to explore tumuli and fortresses in the northern region of Puka was dictated by simple interest in unusual sites and new discoveries (Ceka 2000: 13–14; Elsie 2010: 385). In short, the evidence makes me conclude that the internal characteristics of the archaeological social field and its particular institutional forms can offset or moderate the impact of both sincere individual ideological beliefs and external political pressures.

References

Archival Sources

Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (AQSh) – The Central State Archive, Tirana, Albania

Fondi [Collection] 58. Shtjefen Gjeçovi.

Fondi 78. Theodor Ippen.

Fondi 508. Komiteti i kulturës dhe arteve [The Committee on Culture and Arts]

Fondi 513. Akademia e Shkencave [The Academy of Sciences]

Fondi 792. Leon Rey.

Biblioteka Kombëtare (BK) – The National Library, Tirana, Albania

ArH 1/29E. Patsch, Carl. *Shqipnija në kohën e vjetër* (Hartë) [*Albania in Ancient Times* (Map)]

Bibliography

Bahn, Paul, ed. *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Archaeology.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Bahrami, Zaibab. "Conjuring Mesopotamia: Imaginative Geography and a World Past." In *Archaeology under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, edited by Lynn Meskell. 159-74. London: Routledge, 1998.

Barthel, Diane. "Getting in Touch with History: The Role of Historic Preservation in Shaping Collective Memories." *Qualitative Sociology* 19. 3 (1996): 345-64.

Berger, Stefan. "On the Role of Myths and History in the Construction of National Identity in Modern Europe." *European History Quarterly* 39.3 (2009): 490-502.

Bernhardsson, Magnus. *Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.

Biblioteka Kombëtare. Vepërij e Bibliotekës Kombëtare gjatë vitit 1930 [The Work of the National Library in 1930]. Tiranë: Mbrothësija, 1931.

Biblioteka Kombëtare. Vepërij e Bibliotekës Kombëtare gjatë vitit 1931 [The Work of the National Library in 1931]. Tiranë: Mbrothësija, 1932.

Blumi, Isa. "Seeing Beyond the River Drin: Sarajevo, Ottoman Albanians and Imperial Rivalry in the Balkans after 1878." *Kakanien Revisited* 9 (2007): 1-9.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Loic Waquant. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. "Beyond "Identity"." *Theory and Society* 29.1 (2000): 1-47.

Brubaker, Rogers. "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-

Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account." *Theory and Society* 23.1 (1994): 47-78.

Burawoy, Michael. "The Extended Case Method." *Sociological Theory* 16.1 (1998): 4-33.

Cabanes, Pierre. "Archéologie et identité nationale en Albanie au XXe siècle." *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 30.1 (2004): 115-22.

Ceka, Neritan. *Ilirët [The Illyrians]*. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese e Librit Universitar, 2000.

Clayer, Nathalie. "Carl Patsch et Le Musée National de Tirana (1922-1925). Construction nationale et expertise muséologique." *Revue germanique internationale*, no. 16 (2012): 91-104.

Clayer, Nathalie. *Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja ë një kombi me shumice myslimane në Evrope [At the Origins of Albanian Nationalism. The Emergence of a Nation with Muslim Majority in Europe]*. Tirana: Perpjekja, 2008.

Coakley, John. "Mobilizing the Past: Nationalist Images of History." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10.4 (2004): 531-60.

Crooke, Elizabeth M. *Politics, Archaeology, and the Creation of a National Museum in Ireland: An Expression of National Life*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2000.

Díaz-Andreu, Margarit, and Timothy Champion. "Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe: An Introduction." In: *Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe*. 1-23. London: UCL Press, 1996.

Díaz-Andreu, Margarita. "Nationalism and Archaeology." *Nations and Nationalism* 7.4 (2001): 429-40.

Díaz-Andreu, Margarita. *A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology: Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Dzino, Danijel. "Constructing Illyrians: Prehistoric Inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula in Early Modern and Modern Perceptions." *Balkanistica* 27 (2014): 1-40.

Elon, Amos. "Politics and Archaeology." In *The Archaeology of Israel: Constructing the*

Past, Interpreting the Present, edited by Neil Asher Silberman and David Small, 34–47. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997.

Elsie, Robert. *Historical Dictionary of Albania*. Plymoth: Scarecrow Press, 2010.

Galaty, Michael L, and Charles Watkinson. "The Practice of Archaeology under Dictatorship." In *Archaeology under Dictatorship*, edited by Michael Galaty, 1-17. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004.

Gilkes, Oliver, and Lida Miraj. "The Myth of Aeneas: The Italian Archaeological Mission in Albania, 1924–43." *Public Archaeology* 1.2 (2000): 109-24.

Gjeçovi, Shtjefen. "Një argjim arkeologjik [An Archaeological Endeavoir]." *Zani i Sha Ndout* 1 (1920): 109–113, 182–187.

Gjeçovi, Shtjefën. *Trashëgime thrako-ilirjane [Thracian-Illyrian Legacies]*. Tiranë: Ora, 2003.

Goode, James. *Negotiating for the Past Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007.

Graan, Andrew. "Counterfeiting the Nation? Skopje 2014 and the Politics of Nation Branding in Macedonia." *Cultural Anthropology* 28.1 (2013): 161-179.

Haber, Alejandro. "Indigenous archaeology and peasant power." In: *Indigenous People and Archaeology in Latin America,* edited by Cristobal Gnecco and Patricia Ayala, 29–37. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2011.

Hall, John A. "Taking Megalomanias Seriously: Rough Notes." *Thesis Eleven* 139.1 (2017): 30-45.

Hobhouse, John. *Travels in Albania and Other Provinces of Turkey in 1809 & 1810* London: John Murray, 1858.

Holland, Henry. *Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, Macedonia. During the Years 1812 and 1813*. London: Longman, Hurst, 1815.

Hoxha, Shpresa. *Kontributi i Uilljëm Martin Likut në fushën e studimeve albanologjike [The Contribution of William Martin Leake to the Field of Albanian Studies]*. Prishtinë, 2007.

Ippen, Theodor A. *Shqipëria e Vjetër [Old Albania]*. Tiranë: K & B, 2002.

Kaiser, Timothy. "Archaeology and Ideology in Southeast Europe." In *Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice of Archaeology*, edited by Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett, 99-119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Knapp, Bernard, and Sophia Antoniadou. "Archaeology, Politics and the Cultural Heritage of Cyprus." In *Archaeology under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, edited by Lynn Meskell. 12-43. London: Routledge, 1998.

Kohl, Philip, and Clare Fawcett. "Archaeology in the Service of the State: Theoretical Considerations." In *Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice of Archaeology*. 1-18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Kohl, Philip. "Nationalism and Archaeology: On the Constructions of Nations and the Reconstructions of the Remote Past." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 27.1 (1998): 223-246.

Kolobov, Aleksandr. "Tri portreta na fone arheologii i politicheskoi istorii Bosnii i Gertsevoniny [Three Portraits on the Backdrop of Archaeology and Political History of Bosnia-Herzegovina]." *Vesnik Permskogo Universiteta. Seriia "Istoriia."* 3 (2007): 143–8.

Kolstø, Pål. "Assessing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society." *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, edited by Pål Kolstø, 1 - 35. London: Hurst & Company, 2005.

Kostakis, Kostas. "The Past is Ours: Images of Greek Macedonia." In: *Archaeology under*

Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, edited by Lynn Meskell, 1-12. London: Routledge, 1998.

Lange, Matthew. *Comparative-historical Methods*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013.

Leake, William Martin. *Travels in Northern Greece*. Vol. 1. London: J. Rodwell, 1835.

Levinger, Matthew, and Paula Franklin Lytle. "Myth and Mobilisation: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric." *Nations and Nationalism* 7.2 (2001): 175-194.

Meskell, Lynn. "Archaeology Matters." In *Archaeology under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, 1-12. London: Routledge, 1998.

Meskell, Lynn. "The Intersections of Identity and Politics in Archaeology." *Annual Review of Anthropology* (2002): 279-301.

Moore, Wilbert Ellis. *The Professions: Roles and rules*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970.

Nee, Victor. "Sources of the New Institutionalism." In: *The New Institutionalism in Sociology*, edited by Mary Brinton and Victor Nee, 1–16. London: Russell Sage, 1998.

Parkins, Helen. "Archaeology and Nationalism: Excavating the Foundations of Identity." *Nations and Nationalism* 3: 3 (1997): 451–458.

Patsch, Carl. "Një letër për ruajtjen e vlerave arkeologjike te qytetit të Durrësit [A Letter on Preservations of Archaeological Treasures in the City of Durrës]." *Dyrrah* 4 (2005): 216–218.

Patsch, Carl. *Das Sandschak Berat in Albanien [The Sancak of Berat in Albania]*. Wien: A. Hölder, 1904.

Patsch, Karl. *Ilirët [The Illyrians]*. Tiranë: Uegen, 2004.

Poole, Ross. *Nation and Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Pouqueville, François. *Travels in Epirus, Albania, Macedonia, and Thessaly*. London: Sir

R. Phillips and Co, 1820.

Praschniker, Camillo, and Arnold Schober. *Archaölogische Forschungen in Albanien und Montenegro [Archaeological Studies in Albania and Montenegro]*. Wien: A. Holder, 1919.

Pula, Besnik. "Becoming Citizens of Empire: Albanian Nationalism and Fascist Empire, 1939–1943." *Theory and Society* 37.6 (2008): 567-596.

Schnap, Alain. 'Between Antiquarians and Archaeologists: Continuities and Ruptures." In: *Histories of Archaeologies: A Reader*, edited by Tim Murray and Christopher Evans, 392 – 404. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Schryver, James. "Ugolini's Presentation of Butrint to the Italian Public: Exploration, Poetics, and Politics." *Expedition* 51.3 (2009): 21-23.

Shnirel'man, Victor. "Nationalism and Archaeology." *Anthropology & Archaeology of Eurasia* 52.2 (2013): 13-32.

Shookongdej, Rasmi. "The Impact of Colonialism and Nationalism in the Archaeology of Thailand." In: *Selective Remembrances*, edited by Phillip Kohl, Mara Kozelsky, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda., 379–394. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Shukriu, Edi. "At Shtjefën Gjeçovi – Arkeolog dhe mbrojtes e trashëgimisë kulturore [Father Shtjefën Gjeçovi as an Archaeologist and the Defender of Cultural Treasures]." *Vjetar* 20 (2003).

Silberman, Neil Asher. "Structuring the Past: Israelis, Palestinians, and the Symbolic Authority of Archaeological Monuments." In *The Archaeology of Israel: Constructing the Past, Interpreting the Present*. 62-81. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997.

Smith, Anthony D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Sotirović, Vladislav. "National Identity: Who Are the Albanians? The Illyrian

Anthroponymy and the Ethno-genesis of the Albanians." *History Research* 1.2 (2013): 5-24.

Spahiu, Dritan. "Reforma arsimore e realizuar në periudhën e Mbretërisë Shqiptare (1928–1939) [The Education Reform Implemented at the Period of the Albanian Kingdom]." In: *Monarkia Shqiptare, 1928-1939: Përmbledhje studimesh,* edited by Marenglen Verli and Beqir Meta, 303–318. Tiranë: Botimet Toena. 2011.

Štih, Peter. *"Miti in stereotipi v nacionalnem videnju starejše slovenske zgodovine"* ["Myths and Stereotypes in National Vision of Ancient Slovenian History"]. *Nova revija* XXV (2006): 244–267.

Tavory, Iddo, and Stefan Timmermans. "Two cases of ethnography: Grounded theory and the extended case method." *Ethnography* 10.3 (2009): 243-263.

Thëngjilli, Petrika. *Shqiptarët midis Lindjes dhe Perëndimit. Fusha Politike I [The Albanians between the East and the West. Political Issues 1]*. Tiranë: EXTRA, 2008.

Toçi, Vangjel. "Popullsia ilire e Dyrrahut në driten e të dhënave historiko-arkeologjike [The Illyrian Population of *Dyrrahium* in Light of Historical and Archaeological Data]." In: *Studime ilire*, 333–339. Prishtinë: Rilindja, 1978.

Trigger, Bruce. "Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist." *Man* 19 (1984): 355-70.

Vangeli, Anastas. Nation-building ancient Macedonian style: The Origins and the Effects of the So-called Antiquization in Macedonia. *Nationalities Papers* 39.1 (2011): 13–32.

Ziso, Dahira. "Misioni arkeologjik francez i kryesuar nga Leon Ley ne dokumentet arkivore [The French Archaeological Mission under Leon Rey in Archival Documents]." *Arkivi shqiptar* 6.1–2 (2005): 128–132.

Article 4. Identity Construction as a Moral Response: The Emergence of the Albanian Counter-Myth of the Kosovo Battle

Abstract: The literature on nationalism highlights the crucial role of salient historical myths in forging a national identity and triggering ethnic conflict. However, it pays scant attention to what motivates mythmakers. In this respect, first, ethno-symbolists and modernists tend to explain mythmakers' motivations in a dichotomous way as either an outcome of the centuries-long ethnic past or a product of the current political context. Thus, nationalists are seen as either victims of long-lasting ethnic narratives or all-time rational calculators. Second, the literature tends to analyze nationalist mythopoeia primarily as a response to developments within the national community, be it the resurgence of long-standing ethnic memories or specific political configurations that create windows of opportunities. A historical sociological analysis of a Kosovar Albanian mythopoeia case and two supplementary cases (Macedonia and Georgia) shows that nationalist narratives can initially emerge as counter-myths. These narratives constitute ad hoc moral responses by the true believers, converted to defensive nationalism in professional institutions, to the politicization of the past by out-groups. Only after these glorifying myths are created may nationalists use them instrumentally. The findings show that existing dichotomies need to be overcome to better capture the variety of nationalist mythopoeia cases. In line with the ethno-symbolist argument, history should be taken seriously, but this is the relatively recent history of institution-building rather than perennial ethnic memories. Following the modernist approach, the instrumental motives need to be analyzed and exposed, but these motives should not be preconceived as time-invariant or inherent to all mythmakers. Both schools can benefit from paying closer attention to moral reactions of national elites to an instrumental use of the past by outsiders.

Introduction

In recent decades, the scholarship on nationalism and social memory has thoroughly discussed the role of salient historical myths in forging national identities and triggering ethnic conflict. At the same time, the issue of what motivates social actors to create and promote these myths has been addressed only in a cursory fashion in the debate between ethno-symbolists and modernists. This debate revolves around two dichotomies. First, factors influencing the actions of mythmakers are usually seen by ethno-symbolists and modernists respectively as either rooted in the ancient past or very recent and contextual developments. Second, scholars depict leading nationalists as either perennially rational or always governed by sincere and historically persistent beliefs in the common cause of a cultural group. In addition, both sides of the debate tend to study mythopoeia in each country separately and, thus, subscribe to methodological nationalism, whereby the nation state is accepted as a natural unit of analysis. Comparative studies in the field are few, and works analzing the interactive dynamics of mythopoeia are fewer still.

This paper offers a critique and theoretical elaboration of the existing literature. I argue that socialization of influential nationalist leaders in academic and educational institutions, which uphold a nationalist moral code, is what often causes national identity construction. Therefore, in order to understand mythmakers' motivations, attention needs to be paid not to centuries-long myth-symbol complexes, but to decades-long processes of nation- and institution-building. Exclusive historical visions can first emerge as moral responses of elite "true believers." However, after the glorifying narratives are created, they can be used instrumentally. In other words, instrumental motives are often acquired or learned by mythmakers, instead of being inherent and perennial. Finally, the mythopoeic moral responses of in-group leaders usually depend on the

behavior of out-group elites, not on widespread ethnic memories circulating or windows of political opportunities opening within the community. In this sense, the creation and promotion of historical identity is an interactive and transnational (intergroup) process and, therefore, needs to be analyzed beyond the confines of one nation.

To address these issues, my article provides a historical analysis of factors leading to the emergence of the Albanian counter-myth of the Kosovo battle in the late 1980s–early 2000s. For this I use both primary and secondary sources. Supplementing the in-depth analysis of the Kosovar case, I extrapolate my findings, matching similar causal patterns in two abbreviated case studies of Macedonia and Georgia.

The narrative develops as follows: First, I briefly discuss the divide between ethno-symbolists and modernists in the literature on national identity construction and mythmaking. Second, introducing readers to the case, I compare Serbian and Albanian interpretations of the Kosovo battle. Third, I analyze which factors led to the development of the Albanian Kosovo counter-myth. At this point, I show that – contrary to ethno-symbolist theories – deeply rooted "ethnic memories" of the Kosovo battle did not exist among Albanians prior to contemporary mythmaking; Albanian leaders did not feel any patriotic attachment to the events of 1389 until very recently. Then, I argue that instrumentalist explanations also do not work. Rather than being an outcome of a calculated action, the novel Albanian counter-narrative emerged in the late 1980s as a *moral* response from intellectuals and politicians in Tirana and Pristina to the politicization of historical mythology by Serbian nationalists. Only *after* it was created was the new myth employed instrumentally in schooling and public diplomacy. Finally, following the logic of the extended case study method (Burawoy 1998; Tavory and Timmermans 2009), I show how moral responses to an

instrumental use of history by out-group elites resulted in the emergence of novel nationalist historical narratives in Macedonia and Georgia.

Debates on National Identity Formation and Mythmaking: Ethno-Symbolism and Modernism

The existing literature firmly establishes that the historical visions of community provide the groundwork for national identity. Many examples show how visions of the past are used to inculcate the masses with a salient collective identity. Numerous studies highlight how politics influence representation of the past in schoolbooks, public commemorations and the media (Archard 1995; Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov 2004; Calhoun 1997: 58–61; Coakley 2004; Eriksen 1993: 59–77; Esman 1994: 9–21; Forest and Johnson 2002; Gellner 1983; Guibernau 2011; Guibernau and Hutchinson 2004; Hale 2004; Hobsbawm 1992; Hutchinson 2005; Kapferer 1988; Kaufman 2001; Kolstø 2005, 2014; Levinger and Lyttle 2001; MacDonald 2002; Mock 2012; Olick 1999; Smith 1991; 1999; 2011; Schöpflin 2000: 80–88; Swartz 1996; Štih 2006; Zerbubavel 1995). Several works analyze the structure of nationalist historical narratives and propose a number of typologies (Coakley 2004; Kolstø 2005; Levinger and Lyttle 2001; Smith 1999; Schöpflin 2000: 80–88; Štih 2006; Subramanian 2013). In addition, numerous studies pinpoint the crucial role of salient historical "myths," "psycho-cultural narratives" and "ethno-histories" in legitimizing national movements and upsurges of intergroup hostility. Self-praising and exclusive historical interpretations are seen as a necessary or even sufficient cause for ethnic conflict and violence. Some scholars argue that effective conflict management and reconciliation are unachievable without constructing unifying identities through the promotion of inclusive interpretations of history (Coakley 2004; Eriksen 1993: 59–77; Foster and Johnson 2002; Kapferer

195

1988; Kaufman 2001; Levinger and Lyttle 2001; MacDonald 2002; Ross 2001, 2007; Zerubavel 1995). At the same time, the question remains how nationalist narratives emerge, and how they become collectively shared and salient. In this respect, no consensus has been reached.

A number of scholars simply do not tackle this issue directly because they assume that memories of dramatic communal experiences are always salient (Archard 1995; Kapferer 1988; Ross 2001, 2007). These scholars also tend to produce "groupist" interpretations without strictly differentiating between elite and mass mythopoeia. Thus, Marc Howard Ross (2007) discusses how diametrically opposed interpretations of the past have triggered, sustained and exacerbated interethnic confrontation in Northern Ireland and the Middle East, but does not explain the origins of these interpretations. Similarly, David Archard (1995) defends collectively shared national myths as a means of communal preservation and self-organization but remains silent about their origins.

Other analysts, mostly from the ethno-symbolist camp, argue that communal historical narratives are deeply rooted in centuries-long ethnic memories and pre-modern sentiments of group distinctiveness. According to this view, leaders can only reactivate and reinterpret these group beliefs; they cannot create them. Thus, the core of nationalist mythology does not need to be introduced into the collective memory of modern societies, and if mythmakers fail to base novel narratives on deeply-seated ethnic memories, they may lose popular support (Esman 1994: 14–16; Guibernau 2011; Guibernau and Hutchinson 2004; Hutchinson 2005; Kaufman 2001; Smith 1988, 1991; 1999; 2011; Schöpflin 2000: 80–88).

A number of modernist scholars take a different position. They claim that particular historical events become known to the masses and acquire national significance only as an outcome of purposeful actions taken by various ethnic entrepreneurs (Coakley 2004; Eriksen 1993:

59–77; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992; Kolstø 2005, 2014; Özkırımlı 2003, 2005: 183–187; MacDonald 2002). In this process, national history can be simply invented and constructed out of nothing. Thus, Thomas Hyllard Eriksen (1993: 103) talks about nationalists in nineteenth-century Norway inventing "primeval" customs, folktales and cultural legacies that were "neither ancient, nor Norwegian." Umut Özkırımlı (2003: 387) illustrates that Mustafa Kemal often appealed to the pre-Islamic past, "something that hardly any Turk was aware of, let alone could remember."

In addition to these debates, another disagreement exists among those researchers who recognize the decisive role of elites in identity politics. Namely, the proponents of the elite-focused approach express conflicting opinions regarding what motivates leaders to activate or invent ethno-historical narratives. Sometimes it is said that the mythmakers fall prey to their own deeply-seated ethnic identities (particularly, see: Hutchison 2001: 10–16; 45–54). They may experience an identity crisis in times of rapid social change (Smith 1991: 93–97; Chapman, McDonald and Tonkin 1989: 2) or follow general popular outrage caused by widely shared and historically rooted governing narratives (Kapferer 1988: 31, 33, 45). In such a case, long-standing myths serve as a means of socialization and push all "insiders," including elites, to perpetuate mythopoeia (Mock 2012: 232–238).

Other influential explanations of elite actions are instrumentalist and point to the momentary and very recent interests of mythmakers, such as the hunt for power or pursuit of economic and social goods (Coakley 2004; Eriksen 1993: 59–77; Hobsbawm 1992; Kolstø 2005, 2014; Levinger and Lyttle 2001; MacDonald 2002; Özkırımlı 2003, 2005: 183–187). Finally, many followers of ethno-symbolist and "symbolic politics" approaches admit that elite mythmakers may be instrumentally oriented but claim that elites are constrained and can only use

197

narratives that are already salient and widespread (Esman 1994: 9–21; Guibernau 2011; Guibernau and Hutchinson 2004; Kohl 1995; Smith 1991; 1999; 2011; Schöpflin 2000: 80–88).

All of these approaches to nationalist mythopoeia have a number of limitations. First, they suffer from a dichotomy between the pre-modern and the modern. As such, mythmakers' motives are perceived as either rooted in centuries of history or obviously recent. Alternative explanations, even if invoked, remain remarkably underdeveloped. Thus, Stuart Kaufman (2001: 108) glosses over the role of the Orthodox Church and Serbian intelligentsia in promoting the Kosovo narrative before the political ascent of Slobodan Milošević. Instead he sticks to an omnipresent and seemingly timeless Serbian myth-symbolic complex (Kaufman 2001: 204–206). John Hutchinson (2005: 13–25) and Anthony Smith (1991, 1999, 2011) argue that certain social institutions cultivate feelings of distinctiveness, which serve as preconditions for nationalist actions. Surprisingly, however, their analysis stops at medieval churches, nobility organizations, and imperial legal systems. On the contrary, a modernist scholar Pål Kolstø (2014) shows how nation-building in socialist Yugoslavia provided Balkan societies with certain narratives, symbols and rituals, which were later "used as tools" by post-Communist nationalists for political mobilization of receptive publics (see a similar interpretation suggesting that post-Communist leaders were "reading popular sentiment" to capitalize on it: Forest and Johnson 2002). However, he does not talk about how the Balkan nationalists, nor societies at large, might have been themselves affected by Yugoslav nation-building.

Second, the existing literature's depiction of elite motives can also be critiqued for using a dichotomous analytical frame. Scholars render mythmakers either *constantly* calculative or *always* governed by internalized popular narratives. Instrumentalist motives can be neither acquired nor lost. Thus, Siniša Malešević (2006) thinks that top politicians of Yugoslavia's successor states are

self-conscious manipulators who need to be held accountable for the 1990s wars (see, however, his other work: Malešević 2002). Along these lines, Amilcar Barreto (2012: 316) concludes that "few scholars question strategic thinking of nationalist leaders." Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson admit that politicians of recent decades and "power-seeking intellectuals" of the mid-nineteenth century were motivated by momentary interests, but they explain the actions of the first generation of romantic nationalists as resulting from philosophical influences and a sense of ethnic affiliation (Hutchinson 2005: 45–51 cf. Kedourie 1993; Smith 1999: 31–33; 2011: 235–236). Stuart Kaufman (2001: 22) divides nationalists into "martyrs," "fanatics," "true believers" and "believers of convenience," instead of saying that motivations of *the same* individuals may change over time. Even when the complex considerations of the same mythmakers are assumed or mentioned (Coakley 2003; Esman 1994: 9–21; Forest and Johnson 2002; Guibernau 2011; Guibernau and Hutchinson 2004; Levinger and Lyttle 2001; Roudometof 2001; Smith 1991; 1999; 2011; Schöpflin 2000: 80–88), the process of how their motivations change is not traced.

Third, methodological nationalism (see: Wimmer and Schiller 2002) strongly influences the study of national identity construction and nationalist mythmaking. Comparative studies are few (Brubaker and Feischmidt 2002: 701); works analyzing the interdependence of in- and out-group national narratives are even fewer. Surprisingly, on the one hand, scholars acknowledge that nationalist mythologies always deal with the image of nation vis-à-vis the Other. On the other hand, intergroup and interactive dynamics in nationalist mythopoeia are rarely discussed (Triandafyllidou 1998). An overwhelming majority of existing studies remain focused on narratives developed in a single country. George Schöpflin (2000: 86) remarks that the process of mythmaking tends to be "dynamic, polarizing, and once started hard to break," but does not elaborate on this point. In addition to these limitations, even those works that describe conflicting

narratives in several societies still locate the sources of motivations of nationalist mythmakers within their national community.

In the ethno-symbolist account, long-standing myths, symbols and memories circulating *within* an *ethnie* are prioritized as motivating forces. Nationalists pay close attention to and shape their rhetoric in tune with these historical legacies in order to strike a "deep popular cord" and secure "mass appeal" and "popular resonance" for their political projects (Guibernau 2010: 18–19; Hutchinson 2005: 6, 37; Smith 1999: 9, 100; 2009: 31).

According to modernist interpretations, nationalists oppose the narratives of the out-group in order to respond to changing domestic political configurations, and prove their leadership competence by providing historical explanations for new geopolitical positioning of the country (e.g., Europe vs. the East) and current international disputes (e.g., Macedonia vs. Greece and Ukraine vs. Russia) (Brubaker and Feischmidt 2002; Danforth 1995: 11–27, 142–184; Roudometof 2001: 29–82; Tolz 2002; Vangeli 2011; Snyder 1995). Anna Triandafyllidou (1998), who looks specifically at how Greek and Macedonian nationalists are caught in a game of reacting to each other's historical claims, argues that nationalist mythopoeia is used by elites to distract public attention from pressing economic and social issues.

This paper proposes a different understanding of mythopoeic action based on the analysis of an episode from late-twentieth-century Serbian-Albanian struggles and two abbreviated case studies. First, I argue that the socialization of mythmakers in pre-existing institutional cultures and the internalization of institutional moral norms shapes the decision to introduce new narratives. Mythopoeic actions can therefore be better characterized as non-instrumental *moral endeavors* "in defence of the nation."

Thus, scholars highlight the crucial role of mass education in forging national feelings (Jelavich 1990; Kolstø 2005; Koulouri 2002; Lange 2012; Weber 1976: 303–338). Socialization in academic institutions and professional organizations often has similar effects. At work, communal leaders come to believe in visions of the nation as a community of brotherhood and social friendship, which make them feel morally obliged to do "all they can" for the "common cause" (Yack 2012: 44–59). Any perceived threats to national well-being lead intellectuals, who now see themselves as "national defenders," to believe that they are failing to fulfill the moral obligations of "true patriots." This provokes a feeling of powerlessness and shame, which triggers anger and spontaneous symmetrical responses to enemy encroachments (see: Scheff and Ratzinger 1991: 3–19). Thus, the motivations of mythmakers result from factors that are neither ancient nor completely recent. The chances of being socialized in a nationalistically oriented academic institution depend on previous nation-building efforts and decades-long cultural policies.

Second, moral responses to perceived national denigration are only part of the story. As conflict disrupts communication between opponents, new myths can be used instrumentally. At this point, mythmakers further elaborate national narratives and adjust them to current political needs. Thus, instrumental motives are context-dependent rather than perennial.

Third, nationalist mythopoeia is better understood as an interactive and transnational (intergroup) process. Elites from one national community monitor behavior of elites from rival communities and react accordingly. Their reactions can be rational and calculated or moral and emotional. They can primarily constitute a response to the current domestic political configurations and opening windows of opportunities, but often derive from the self-understanding of mythmakers as "saviours of the nation."

In this article, I focus on the Albanian myth of the Battle of Kosovo as an example of a narrative that initially emerged as a moral response to out-group mythmaking. It was produced and promoted in the late 1980s to early 1990s to counter the similar Serbian national narrative in the context of mounting ethnic tensions in Kosovo.

A Comparison of Serbian and Albanian Myths of the Battle of Kosovo

The Serbian myth represents Serbs and Turks as the main protagonists of the battle,[28] highlights the heroism and valor of the Christian warriors and blames vicious enemies and traitors for the defeat. It describes how the battle was fought between Christian forces under the leadership of Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and an enormously powerful Turkish army under Murad I in the *holy Serbian land* of Kosovo. Small Christian troops suffered a crushing defeat despite the outstanding courage and self-sacrifice of the Serbian warriors. The heroic acts of Serbian noblemen Miloš Obilić, Jug Bogdan and Lazar were particularly distinguishable. Proving his allegiance to the Faith and Fatherland, Miloš managed to enter the sultan's tent by deception. He stabbed the enemy leader with a poisoned dagger before being hacked to death in revenge.

To account for the causes of their defeat, the Serbian myth points to several key factors: the superior manpower and unscrupulous nature of the Turks; discord in the Christian camp, which resulted in the betrayal of influential lords (often personified in the figure of traitor Vuk Branković); and a sacred covenant between "holy tsar" Lazar and the Heavens. It also instructs "true patriots" to take inspiration from Kosovo heroism, join the national cause and seek revenge on the Turks and their Muslim allies, such as Albanians or Bosniaks (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Bieber

---

[28] In the times of Yugoslavia, the myth sometimes pointed to other Yugoslav nations, namely, Croats and Bosnians, as participants of the battle (Bieber 2002: 99).

2002; Duijzings 2000: 176–202; Judah 2000; Mertus 1999; Trgovčević 1999). This myth is still present in Serbian schoolbooks (Nakarada and Vasović 2012: 6–10; Stojanović 2004: 334–335).

An opposite representation of the Kosovo battle can be found in the major Albanian historical text *History of the Albanian People* and schoolbooks used in Kosovo. The Albanian counter-myth of the Kosovo battle emphasizes the role of Albanians, highlights their heroism and self-sacrifice and blames Serbs for the defeat.[29]

According to the Albanian counter-myth, a wide Balkan coalition confronted Turkish forces in late June, 1389. This coalition included Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, Hungarians and Romanians. Albanian forces were well-organized, and their commanders enjoyed great authority and respect. The ruler of Central Albania, Gjon Kastrioti, was one of the most influential figures and rivaled Lazar in terms of authority and esteem. The myth depicts the election of the Serbian ruler as a chief commander as merely occasional. Christian Albanian nobles from today's states of Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro (i.e., almost all territories claimed by contemporary Albanian nationalists) sent their troops to fight in the battle.[30] As the battle took place in the *ancient Albanian land*, Kosovo or Dardania, the autochthonous Albanian population also participated widely.[31] While operating under the supreme command of Kosovo Serb ruler Vuk Branković, local Albanians had their own supervisors, usually minor nobles such as Miloš Obilić (who is now called Milosh Kopiliqi). Thus, the myth claims that Albanians supplied a substantial

---

[29] On the counter-myths, see: Zerubavel 1995.

[30] Among Albanian commanders were Gjergj II Balsha, Theodor Muzaka, Dhimiter Jonima, Gjon Kastrioti and Andrea Gropa. Note that the ethnicity of Gjergj Balsha/Djuradj Balšić is contested by Serbian-Montenegrin and Albanian historians (Šćepanović 2002: 58–60).

[31] The Kosovar Albanians prefer to trace their origins back to the paleo-Balkan Illyrian tribe of Dardanians, thus claiming everlasting demographic domination and autochthony in Kosovo (Malcolm 1999: 22–40, 2002).

part of the ethnically diverse coalition forces.[32] Their most courageous and patriotic member was Milosh, who stabbed the Turkish sultan.

The Albanian counter-myth describes the defeat as the result of the superior manpower of the Ottoman army as well as discord in the ranks of selfish Serbs. Ironically, the counter-myth reestablishes one of the central points of the Serbian romantic historiography of the nineteenth century – the treachery of Vuk Branković. Here the trope is used to highlight the Serbs' ambivalent role in the Battle of Kosovo, instead of warning against the danger of national treason[33] (Instituti i Historisë 2002: 324–325; Myziri and Zeka 1996: 43–44; Rexhepi and Bicaj 2004: 88).[34] In sum, the Albanian myth of the Kosovo battle, which has been promoted in Kosovo's and, to a lesser extent, Albania's education system in recent decades, stands in stark opposition to the Serbian myth.

Visions of the 1389 Battle in Socialist Kosovo and Albania: On the Rootedness of Historical Narratives and Mythmakers' Motivations

Explanations of mythopoeia, which describe nationalist narratives as rooted in deeply seated ethnic memories and argue that mythmakers are themselves affected by centuries-old representations of history, do not hold for the Albanian Kosovo myth for two reasons. First,

---

[32] Some schoolbooks even give a proportion – "one-fourth" (Rexhepi and Bicaj 2004: 88).

[33] This highly nationalized account of the Kosovo battle is also included in a monumental monograph *Kosova,* which serve as a major state-approved representation of Kosovo's past and present (Xhufi 2011: 189)

[34] In my analysis I focus on two of the three textbooks used in Albanian Kosovo schools in 2000–2004. These books cover "the history of Albanian people" taught in the eighth grade. Albanian history, however, is scattered through the schoolbooks for other grades. For a more representative sample consult the study of Nakarada and Vasović (2012: 7), whose analysis cursorily addresses all national myths present in Serbian and Albanian schoolbooks in Kosovo. See also Lellio (2009: 4), who notes that a new nationalistically reinterpreted version of the Kosovo battle dominates Albanian schoolbooks.

memories of the Kosovo battle among Albanians until were minuscule until recent decades and can be hardly seen as truly "ethnic." Second, for a long period, Albanian elites did not know about such "memories." From the start of the nationalist movement in the mid-nineteenth century well into the 1980s, they simply ignored the Battle of Kosovo as irrelevant to national history. If any references to the event appeared in Albanian literature before the 1980s, descriptions were cursory and mainly followed Serbian interpretations.

Even though an oral tradition describing the battle of 1389 existed among Albanians, its spread was very limited. This disproves the status of folksongs as popular memories of previous collective deeds, maintained by an ethnic group as a whole. All Albanian songs about the Kosovo battle known so far have been recorded in Kosovo, Albanians from other territories being unfamiliar with the tradition. Moreover, even in Kosovo these folksongs were not very popular. In the twentieth century, folklorists made painstaking efforts to collect as little as eight to ten variants (Arapi 1986: 200–231; Lellio 2009: 3–6; 50–169; Malltezi 1989: 88–89).

Until the 1970s and 1980s, most Albanian intellectuals, including historians, were unacquainted with these epics. Even when collected variants of the folksongs were published in Pristina and Tirana, they did not occupy much place in the volumes devoted to popular epics (Arapi 1986; Haxhihasani 1983: 50–65; Shala 1973). Albanian historical mythology since the national revival movement *Rilindja* did not include the battle of Kosovo (Ljubonja 2002; Malcolm 2002; Misha 2008; Skendi 1967). Throughout the Communist period, political and intellectual elites in Albania and Kosovo paid little attention to it. The event was neither seen as nationally significant nor employed as a marker of identity. Moreover, Albanian scholars and educators instead recognized the status of the 1389 battle as a glorious turning point in Serbian national history and tended to present the event in accordance with Serbian historiography.

Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha, who frequently invoked historical arguments in his public pronouncements (Fischer 1995: 39–48), never referred to the 1389 battle. Propagandistic booklets issued by the Albanian Labor Party in the 1950s and used in party schools throughout the country omitted the event, focusing instead on the alleged ancient origins of Albanians, the "anti-Turkish war" under Skanderbeg and the communist resistance in the Second World War (Partia e Punës së Shqipërisë 1951). Schoolbooks rendered the Battle of Kosovo a military clash between Turkish and Serbian armies, cursorily mentioning it among historic events preceding the struggle of medieval Albanians against "the Turkish subjugators" (Curri 1977: 12).

The description of the battle in the canonized *History of Albania*, which served in the socialist republic as a university textbook and starting point for further research, was slightly more nationalized. It mentioned a small Albanian contribution and pointed to the consequences of the battle for the nation. In the view of the authors, the threat of Turkish invasion in the late fourteenth century was equally perceived by "Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian and Romanian feudal lords." Therefore, they managed to "temporally overcome long-lasting quarrels" and mount a coalition. Despite heroic resistance, the Turkish army crushed the allies. While mentioning Albanian participation, the Tirana authors did not interpret the battle as an all-Albanian national resistance struggle. They acknowledged the leading role of Serbian Prince Lazar and the heroism of a "Serbian warrior" who assassinated the sultan. Only those "feudal lords" from the northern and central territories of the twentieth-century Republic of Albania were listed among participants. Moreover, Serbia and Bosnia were believed to have suffered the most in the aftermath of the defeat (Islami and Frashëri 1959: 241–242).

Kosovar Albanian historians maintained a similar view of the Kosovo battle between the 1950s and 1980s. Three generations of schoolbooks authored by the dean of Kosovar

206

historiography, Ali Hadri, spoke about the Turkish campaign "against Serbia" and the leading role of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović. In Hadri's view, Serbs with their Bosnian allies and "some Albanian feudal lords" were defeated because of the superior manpower of the Turkish army. In the aftermath, the Turks imposed vassalage on Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania and formerly Byzantine territories (Hadri and Prekaj 1960: 25; Hadri 1966b: 18–19; Hadri and Avramovski 1980: 104–105).[35]

It is worth mentioning that Hadri's decision to talk about the minimal Albanian military contribution to the Serbia-led coalition was hardly motivated by nationalist feelings. Educational plans in socialist Kosovo openly stipulated to situate Albanian history in a broader context of the past of other Yugoslavian peoples. The authors were expected to show a long pedigree of cooperation between the ethnic groups. According to government instructions, the Battle of Kosovo had to be represented at schools as an exemplar of the common, pan-Balkan "anti-Turkish struggle" (see: Hadri 1966a).

In an another truly all-encompassing narrative of the history of Kosovo, authored by a group of Albanian and Serbian scholars and published to mark the anniversary of the communist anti-Nazi resistance in the province, the Kosovo battle was rendered in full accordance with the Serbian interpretation (Maletić 1973: 120–121).

One could argue that during the communist period, Kosovar Albanian historians were not able to challenge the Serbian viewpoint because of censorship or peer pressure from their Slavic colleagues. Yet even under the condition of censorship, some influential scholars from Pristina publicly protested against "misconceptions" about the Albanian past in the multilingual Yugoslav

---

[35] The book authored by Hadri and Prekaj (1960) represented the first general text and the first schoolbook in Kosovo devoted to Albanian history. Its two initial editions were published in 1957 and 1960 (Hadri 1966a: 749–750).

press. Nevertheless, while challenging Serbian interpretations of many chapters in Balkan history, they omitted the Battle of Kosovo (Hadri 2003: 96–98; Tërnava 1982: 479–480; 1990: 123). Moreover, the revisionism was not reflected in Albanian-language media, where Yugoslavian censorship usually was more lenient (Pavkovic 1996).

Indicatively, the mainstream historians in Kosovo were not the only ones to neglect the topic. Participants of underground anti-Serbian movements also made no attempt to appropriate the Battle of Kosovo. In the late 1940s and later, they traditionally praised the Albanian provenance from the autochthonous ancient Illyrians, celebrated Skanderbeg's anti-Ottoman struggles and lamented the cruelty of Serbian "colonialism" in Yugoslavia (Osmani 2008: 13–16; Pettifer 2012: 34–56).

The disinterest of Albanian political and intellectual elites to retell the story of the Battle of Kosovo in nationalized form is even more striking when one considers that representations of many other events from the Balkan past experienced drastic changes between the 1940s and 1980s. Historical interpretations in Kosovo and Albania at that time heavily depended on the current party line and the needs of ongoing nation-building projects (Gashi 2004; Kosotovicova 2004; Lubonja 2002; Misha 2008; Pajo 2002; Stipčević, s.a.).

In sum, the development of Albanian historical thought surrounding the Kosovo battle calls into question the explanations identifying deeply rooted pre-modern causes of nationalist mythopoeia. As I have shown, centuries-long "ethnic memories" of the 1389 battle did not exist and, therefore, could not motivate elite mythmaking. For a long time, the Albanian intellectual and political establishment did not perceive the event as nationally significant.

The Albanian Counter-Myth of the Kosovo Battle as a Moral Response to "National Denigration"

Two factors pushed Albanian intellectuals and politicians to turn the Serbian Kosovo myth upside down: (1) their self-understanding as "defenders of the nation," which was an outcome of professional socialization in nationalistically oriented academic institutions, and (2) the instrumentalization of medieval history by Serbian elites.

To understand the socialization of Albanian mythmakers in the Communist educational and research institutions, it is helpful to consider the notions of habitus and interpretative schemes, introduced by Pierre Bourdieu (1992: 120–122) and Anthony Giddens (1979: 83–84). These two concepts point to the fact that the ability of individuals to act in a particular social sphere depends on their familiarity with its pre-existing rules, norms and social relations. Socialization and experience of operation in particular spheres result in the adoption of certain schemata of thinking, perceiving and behaving, all of which channel and constrain social action.

The Yugoslav state actively promoted and institutionalized official multi-nationality. This made ethnic belonging one of the most powerful mechanisms of social closure. The ethnic composition of the country was reflected in the federal system and a strict quota system introduced in the party, administration, army and education. Cultural production was organized along ethnic lines. Ethno-national identification became a public matter and determined the life chances of individuals. The concept of an ethnic nation was continuously reified in the minds of Yugoslav citizens (see: Brubaker 1993, 1996: 13–54; Connor 1984: 43–67, 128–172; Malešević 2002: 209). With its "state-of-siege" nationalism, Albania constituted an even more extreme case of the official reification of ethnicity. Albanian institutions actively promoted the image of the nation as a

hermetically sealed fortress surrounded by unscrupulous enemies (Draper 1997; Fischer 1995: 46–48).

The two communist regimes prioritized the formation of so-called "organic intellectuals," who would be linked tightly to a social group and would direct its ideas and aspirations (Gramsci 1971: 142–143). Created with state support practically out of nothing, from its very inception the new intelligentsia was required to affirm the collective interests of the working class, socialist state and society. After the end of Communism and eclipse of the class doctrine, the imperative of allegiance to the working class was dropped, giving way to collectivist, ethno-national loyalties (Brunnbauer 2004: 174; Fischer 1995: 39–48; Malešević 2006: 196–203; Pipa 1990).

In addition, the institutional cultures in Yugoslav and Albanian universities and research institutes were conducive to nationalist mythmaking. Scholars studying academic institutions in the Balkans show how formal and informal rules, codes and power structures profoundly influence approaches employed by scholars. Most historians see "serving the nation" as their mission, and they do not oppose doctoring the past according to "national needs." They think that historical writings should be patriotic and uncover "national identity" in order to educate younger generations. It is believed that "serious" studies of national history are best done by insiders, since outsiders often do not feel the "mentality" of a particular ethnic group and fail to "understand the internal logic" of its history (Brunnbauer 2004:169–176; Pichler 2009: 222–223).[36] Accordingly,

---

[36] Ironically, it was only in these institutions that Kosovar Albanian scholars learned that the Albanian folksongs about the Battle of Kosovo existed. It was Belgrade folklorists who first discovered the Albanian oral tradition. In the 1920s and 1930s, they published results of their studies in Serbian, suggesting that the main character of the epics, the knight Miloš, might have had Albanian origins (Elezović 1923; Čajkanović 1923; Kostić 1934). Much later, in the 1970s Albanian folklorists from Pristina, who became familiar with the Serbian scholarship as graduates of Yugoslav educational institutions, republished the folksongs and repeated the thesis about the Albanian identity of the knight Miloš (Pllana 1978; Shalla 1973).

the socialization of Albanian intellectuals and politicians in educational and academic institutions imbued with nationalist ideas imposed moral codes upon them to oppose any outside attempt to undermine national unity and dignity (see: Yack 2012).

As various analyses show, the obsession of nationalist leaders with "national affirmation and defense" becomes particularly strong in times of interethnic strife. Ethnic conflict usually boosts the salience of ethnic identity and the sense of national belonging (Esman 1994: 9–13; Ross 2001: 159). In a volatile political context, actors tend to make an emotional investment in apparently "unimportant matters" (Ross 2013: 160), increasing the salience of communal identity and divisions (Smithney 2013). The socio-psychological mechanism of mythopoeia in such situations is likely to be as follows: When "defenders of the nation" witness aggressive attempts of outsiders to deprive their collectivity of certain rights and goods, they first feel helpless and ashamed for being unable to prevent "enemy encroachments." And if then the communication with rivals is interrupted and the shame over violating the "national moral code" remains repressed, anger and largely symmetrical counter-reaction may arise (see: Scheff and Ratzinger 1991: 3–16; on morality, shame and anger: Turner and Stets 2006).

Serbian mythmaking in the context of growing ethnic tensions led Albanian intellectuals to produce the counter-myth of the Battle of Kosovo as a reactionary moral response. They took the initial steps in the early 1980s. In the aftermath of the 1981 mass protests in Kosovo, the Yugoslav government resorted to large-scale arrests, firings and party purges, while Serbian intellectuals started to buttress these repressive measures with historical evidence. Kosovar Albanians were portrayed as newcomers and illegal occupants of ancestral Serbian territory (e.g., Djaković 1984). In response, scholars from Tirana and Priština made vigorous efforts to prove

the presence of an indigenous Albanian population in Kosovo from time immemorial (Pulaha, Manasaku and Gjergji 1982; Pulaha 1984).

Following the lead of their colleagues in validating Albanian autochthony on the disputed territory, two influential folklorists from Tirana, Qamil Haxhihasani and Fatos Arapi, turned their attention to the Albanian oral tradition about the Kosovo battle. Haxhihasani (1983: 3, 15–21) vehemently defended the reliability of the Kosovo epics as historical documents and a "clear expression of history and national character." He claimed that the folksongs were composed right after the defeat. Therefore, they could have been seen as proof of Albanian presence in Kosovo since pre-Roman times and a good indicator of a perennial ethical desire to defend the ancient homeland. The heroism of the Albanian warrior Milosh, according to Haxhihasani, had nothing to do with his allegiance to the Serbian aristocratic elite. Instead, the knight was motivated exclusively by sincere concerns with the fate of ordinary Kosovar Albanian brethren (Haxhihasani 1983: 15–21). Adding to positive Albanian self-stereotypes, Arapi (1986) stated that Serbian aristocrats, who dominated the alliance, were bogged down in disagreements and, thus, hesitated to resist the Turks. The Christian coalition was forged only under pressure from patriotic Albanians.

Notably, these initial attempts at reinterpreting and appropriating the Battle of Kosovo appeared in scholarly monographs but remained largely unnoticed. Many Albanian intellectuals refrained from revisionism, and later the folklorists were even criticized by their colleagues for poor research standards (see: Malltezi 1989a: 47–48). Looking at nationalist mythopoeia as an interactive intergroup process helps explain why this happened. Even though Serbian intellectuals used historical evidence to justify Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosovo in the beginning of the 1980s, the Serbian Kosovo myth was downplayed. Historiography in Serbia remained

212

deconstructivist and critical of any attempts to glorify the Kosovo battle (e.g., Mihaljčić 1975, 1984). Because the Serbian narrative did not directly threaten the national dignity, the majority of Albanian intellectuals did not feel obliged to deal with it. This situation changed in the late 1980s.

In the fall of 1987, Serbian leadership started to prepare constitutional changes that would substantially limit Kosovo's autonomy. Interethnic relations deteriorated in a matter of months. Mass protests broke out in the region, and a state of emergency was declared by the federal authorities. At the same time, nationalist intellectuals in Serbia, starting from the publication of notorious *Memorandum* of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Mihajlović and Krestić 1995: 12–13), increasingly relied on historical arguments in their calls for the complete restoration of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo.

The rise of Serbian nationalism coincided with the preparations for the sixth centenary of the Kosovo battle. An explosion of historical and pseudo-historical publications hit the Yugoslav press. Serbian scholars republished medieval chronicles and folksongs about the battle in luxurious coffee-table editions (e.g., Ljubinković and Arsić 1989; Peković and Kusovac 1987; Reljić 1989; Trifunović 1985). The academy of sciences and the Serbian Orthodox Church organized conferences whose participants rejected the findings of critical historiography and emphasized the perennial significance of the 1389 battle for Serbian national identity (e.g., Tasić and Djuretić 1991). Renowned scholars openly embraced the views of romantic historiography. They claimed that the Battle of Kosovo was continuing, alluding to ethnic tensions in Serbia's southern province (Bogdanović 1986: 285–286; Fotić, Kusovac and Milošević 1991; Samardžić 1990).

Slobodan Milošević further politicized the medieval past. His instrumentalist use of the Kosovo myth culminated in a famous speech delivered on the 600th anniversary of the battle. In front of almost one million Serbs gathered on the Kosovo field, Milošević praised the restrictions

placed recently on Kosovo autonomy. Invoking the self-sacrifice of the medieval warriors, he called for national unity and urged compatriots to be prepared for new struggles (Milošević 2004: 17–23). Following Milošević, the press trumpeted the epochal significance of the Kosovo battle, emphasizing the role of the Serbs as defenders of European values against Islam and the Orient. At the same time, Albanians were presented as desecrators of the Serbian patrimony and accused of always allying with adverse "forces of chaos," such as the Ottoman Turks (Šajkaš 2008).

The growing insturmentalization and politicization of the Kosovo myth in Serbia initially took Albanian nationalist elites by complete surprise. At first they recognized the principal significance of the Kosovo battle for Serbian national history and were reluctant to engage in a symbolic struggle over it. For example, in his early interviews in 1988 and 1989, famous Kosovar writer and prospective political leader Ibrahim Rugova objected to the emerging "new myth of Kosovo" characterizing glorification of the battle in Serbian public sphere as a provocation. At the same time, he emphasized that the event was "well-known" and dear to all descendants of participants in the medieval struggle: not only Serbs, but also Albanians and Hungarians. Therefore, in view of Rugova, it should have served as a source of unity, not division, for all nations of Yugoslavia (Rugova 2005: 9–10, 75, 87). Similarly, Rexhep Qosja, another prominent Kosovar leader, recognized the significance of the battle for Serbian culture and popular poetry, adding that other peoples of Yugoslavia – namely Bosnians, Croats, and Albanians – also participated. He expressed disappointment with the "surprising position" of Serbian intellectuals, concluding: "The Battle of Kosovo is now subdued under the command of Serbian politics and the Serbian Orthodox Church… I would never believe that Serbian intellectuals… could be as easily attracted by romantic celebrations…." In Qosja's view, the 600th anniversary should have initiated fruitful academic discussions instead of triggering the publication of "pseudoscientific panegyrics"

(Qosja 1990: 308–309). Similar to their Kosovar colleagues, Tirana researchers in the Institute of History were equally shocked by the repressive political measures in Kosovo and by how they were legitimized by the Serbian myth of the Kosovo battle. They planned to organize an international conference in Tirana, which would serve as a forum for all Balkan scholars to discuss the events of 1389. The initiative, however, did not find official support (Thëngjilli 2008: 500–502).

The behavior of Albanian nationalists in the initial period of the symbolic struggle over the Battle of Kosovo disproves instrumentatist explanations of mythmaking. As the evidence shows, the mythmakers were guided by feelings of embarrassment and shame, not rational calculations. If the Albanian elites acted rationally from the very start, they would not have initially accepted interpretations highlighting the centrality of the battle for Serbian national history and would not have solicited discussions on the topic.

Since commemorations of the 600th anniversary and mass manifestations were seen by the masses of Kosovar Albanians with suspicion, late 1988 and early 1989 provided the best opportunity for Albanian nationalists to immediately "unmask" Serbian historical claims as fraudulent and present their own counter-narrative. Slobodan Milošević, for instance, was very quick in this respect. It took him days, if not hours, to "expose" any "affront" to Serbian national dignity, denouncing it with his own counterarguments and staging supportive media campaigns (see: Silber and Little 1995: 36–48, 60–73; Šajkaš 2008). Alternatively, Albanian nationalists waited months before organizing their moral response. An additional factor that contributed to their decision to engage in the symbolic struggle was the disruption of communication with Serbian elites in the beginning of 1989 (Vickers 1998: 234). Furthermore, in early 1989, the Yugoslav security services started to literally "isolate" hundreds of Kosovar intellectuals, sending

them to confinement in recreational facilities (Qosja 1990: 460–461). A dialogue, which could have allowed Albanian intellectuals to assert their role as honorable representatives and "defenders of the nation," had never started. Therefore, the Albanians chose to react in similar fashion to the myth brandished by their Serbian colleagues.

In late 1989 and 1990, a number of articles in Tirana's chief historical journal offered new interpretations of the Kosovo battle, which looked like a total rebuttal of the Serbian representations. First, the Albanian authors harshly criticized their Serbian colleagues for the negation of academic ethics, methodological incompetence and the politicization of the past. Second, they blew the role of Albanians in the battle out of all proportions. Third, some made attempts to expose the ethnic cleavages behind the catastrophic defeat and to praise Albanian participants as more generous, heroic, freedom-loving and resilient.

Serbian scholars were denounced for their distortion of historical reality and invocation of the "outdated Kosovo myth" for openly political purposes. The Albanian historians condemned them for using Slavic and Byzantine historical sources, which were "very unreliable" and largely distorted by "artistic imagination." Instead, the Tirana scholars advocated for using Ottoman chronicles and Albanian epics, which all mentioned Albanians as participants of the battle.

In their opinion, what happened in Kosovo in 1389 was not a Serbian-Turkish confrontation but a genuine "battle of peoples." Not only Serbs, but also Albanians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Hungarians and Romanians fought for the Balkan coalition, while the Turkish army was joined by Serbian and Bulgarian traitors. The role of Lazar and Serbia was allegedly exaggerated by partisan Serbian historians and politicians in order to negate the autochthony and ever-presence of Albanians in Kosovo. In fact, it was said, the Albanian-Bosnian alliance formed

the "backbone of the coalition." Prince Lazar did not rule even over the whole of Serbia, and, thus, could not forge the alliance without receiving active and generous support of Albanian lords.

The readiness of Albanian rulers to fight, in view of Tirana scholars, did not originate from a feudal allegiance to the Serbian prince. On the contrary, their motivation had entirely different sources: the perception of a common threat and the desire to preserve the wellbeing of the Albanian broad masses by any means. Since medieval Albanian states had reached their apex just before the battle, in the mid-fourteenth century, neither the nobility nor ordinary people desired to lose the hard-won independent statehood and national freedom. Therefore, the call for participation in the liberation struggle had a wide appeal throughout all Albanian territories. The lords from all over today's Republic of Albania, Kosovo and the northern regions of Greece supplied troops. It is important to note here that such an extensive geography of Albanian participation represented a radical departure from the previous representations of the Kosovo battle. The Tirana scholars for the first time projected the "ethnic map" of contemporary Albanian nationalism onto the medieval past.

In view of Serbian historical claims to Kosovo's territory, special attention was paid to the role of Kosovar Albanians in the battle. The Tirana scholars emphasized that Albanians had dominated the ethnic structure of Kosovo since ancient times, and, therefore, could not sit back while the Ottoman attacked their ancestral homeland. Furthermore, such idleness would contradict Albanian ancient customs and primeval patriotism. This is why Milosh Kopiliqi gave a traditional oath *besë* to his patron Lazar and all Kosovar people, and paid with his life to kill the sultan.

Following the nationalist logic, the Albanian mythmakers explained their ancestors' defeat in the battle as a result of the selfishness of Slavic members of the coalition and their prejudices against the Albanian fighters. While Albanians were determined to defend freedom, the Serbian

217

lords pursued narrow individual interests, awaiting deals the Turks could offer. As a result, Serbian leader Vuk Branković not only withdrew his troops, but also conspired against the Albanian noble Milosh Kopiliqi. In the end, the lack of cooperation among the allies predetermined the battle's failure. Furthermore, after the battle, a bitter discord within the ranks of Serbian nobility led to the final collapse of the Serbian anti-Turkish resistance, while the unanimity of patriotic and cooperative Albanians allowed them to continue struggling for another century (Malltezi 1989a, 1989b; Pulaha 1990; Thëngjilli 1989; Xhufi 1989).

This new representation of the Kosovo battle by historians from the Republic of Albania, who turned the Serbian myth upside down, was acclaimed by Kosovar intellectuals. In the early 1990s, historians from Tirana and Pristina decided to work together to include the new narrative in joint school curricula.

Further Promotion and Elaboration of the Albanian Counter-Myth: A Case for Instrumentalism

As I have shown so far, a historical approach to nationalist mythopoeia offers an insightful analytical framework. At least, the proponents of ethno-symbolism are right in saying that examining history improves understanding of national identity construction. It has been argued, however, that attention needs to be paid to the decades-long institutional history of previous nation-building rather than the centuries-long past of *ethnies*. Equally, the instrumentalist approach should not be completely debunked. In the case analyzed here, it was a reaction to the unprecedented *instrumental use* of medieval history by Serbian nationalists that provoked the moral response by Albanian academics and political leaders. Moreover, the subsequent actions of Albanian elites

aiming to promote and elaborate the counter-narrative *once it was created* are also better understood as instrumentally driven.

In the late 1980s, Kosovar Albanian intellectuals engaged in a political struggle against rising Serbian nationalism and publicly refused to recognize Serbia's sovereignty over the province. Albanian members of the Kosovo Writers' Union and faculty of Pristina University joined the oppositional Democratic League of Kosovo and Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms in calling for Kosovo's liberation. A consensus soon emerged concerning how to achieve common national goals, and Kosovar leaders decided to start a nonviolent campaign (Clark 2000: 46–69; Clark 2013: 279–290; Judah 2000: 61–73; Malcolm 1999: 347–350).

In the 1990s and 2000s, the counter-myth of the Kosovo battle was used by the Kosovar elites in their nonviolent struggle. Usually, nonviolent ideology aims to appeal to the enemy and third parties in ways that highlight the moral superiority of the oppressed and their respect for human rights, autonomy and dignity. In addition, leaders of nonviolent movements attempt to provoke resentment among co-nationals and to frame injustices as no longer tolerable (Atack 2012: 6–30; Schock 2005: 7–8, 27–28; Sharp 2012: 184, 200–202, 297–298). Accordingly, the ideologists of Kosovo's nonviolent movement made continuous efforts to validate Albanian self-worth, victimize the Albanians and emphasize their high moral standards (Clark 2000: 67–68). In this context, the new counter-myth helped ground the claims of Kosovar nonviolence resistance historically, as if continuity and teleology existed in the Serbian unscrupulousness and Albanian sincerity. In view of the mythological interpretation, Serbs had always discriminated against and betrayed Albanians, even when the two peoples had common goals. Albanians, on the contrary, had always been generous, collaborative and patriotic. In the political context of the time, the

message of the new narrative suggested that the international community had to promote a new Albanian nation-state or at least to reconcile Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. The only absolutely necessary thing was the separation of Kosovo from perennially xenophobic Serbia.

By the mid-1990s, the revised interpretation of the Kosovo battle was included in school curricula. Leading historians from Albania and Kosovo started to work on a new generation of schoolbooks in the early 1990s under the auspices of the Albanian Ministry of Education, and they decided to concentrate their efforts on a volume devoted to the "history of Albanian people" taught in the eighth grade. This overview had become an important means of "patriotic education" in "all Albanian lands" (Myziri and Zeka 1996: 3). The textbook was published in 1994 and 1996 in Tirana and Pristina, respectively, after years of consultations in a joint National Council for History. In Kosovo it was used in the "parallel" system of education. Silencing the role of Serbian commanders, and even Lazar, the text listed the 1389 coalition members from various "Albanian lands" and talked about the heroism of "Albanian warrior Milosh Kopiliqi" (Myziri and Zeka 1996: 43–44).

During the Kosovo War, the mythopoeic efforts of Albanian historians were supported by famous Albanian writer Ismail Kadare, who enjoyed a strong international reputation. In his numerous speeches and commentaries to domestic and foreign audiences, Kadare accused Serbian politicians and intellectuals of abusing history for political purposes. He emphasized that some Slavic troops fought on the Ottoman side, blasting the self-representation of Serbs as perennial defenders of Christianity (Kadare 2005: 23–24).[37] In 1998, Kadare published his internationally acclaimed *Three Elegies for Kosovo,* which were soon translated into English, French and Turkish.

---

[37] Interestingly enough, Kadare was reluctant to accept the very existence of Miloš Obilić/Kopiliqi.

The battle here is depicted as the reckless attempt of a Balkan coalition to thwart the Ottoman offensive, thus preventing the conquest of the whole Europe. Despite its heroism, the joint Christian forces fail because of over-confidence, unceasing internal quarrels and ethnic hatreds. After the defeat, Albanian and Serbian bards wander across Europe fearing to return to Kosovo. Becoming friends on their long route, they almost agree that the failure was equally disastrous for both peoples. Nevertheless, the deeply rooted sentiments of ethnic hatred and animosity push the bards to compose mutually hostile historical epics (Kadare 2005).

As the war in Kosovo escalated and issue of the province's final status gained attention, Albanian historians further nationalized the events of 1389. Now for the first time, the Kosovo battle became the central focus of several monograph volumes in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. These books were particularly detailed in diminishing the role of Serbs and exaggerating the contribution of Albanians. Albanians from Western Macedonia, where an insurgency broke out in 2001, were now added to the list of participants. The army of Serbian commander Vuk Branković, who ruled over medieval Kosovo, was seen as completely composed of ethnic Albanians. The mythmakers started to describe Milosh Kopiliqi as the "first glorious son of Drenica region" and a direct precursor to the famous commander of the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army, Adem Jashari. Finally, now not only Miloš but several additional figures of Serbian folksongs turned out to be Albanians: for instance, Ivan Kosančić became Gjon Kosaniçi and Banović Strahinja became Ban Strahini (Dalipi 2002; Malltezi 1998; Qeriqi 2003; see also: Frashëri 1995). Some of these novelties were introduced in the 2002 Kosovar schoolbooks, discussed earlier in this article.

While instrumentalism helps explain why the counter-myth of the Kosovo battle was used and adapted in the 1990s and 2000s, i.e., *after* it was created, it must be emphasized that this approach fails to account for the initial motivations of the Albanian mythmakers. If the initial

mythopoeia is not understood as an outcome of a moral response to escalating Serbian-Albanian memory wars, then two principal problems arise. First, it remains unclear why Albanian intellectuals did not challenge old historiographical interpretations and did not employ the new narrative from the start, when an apt opportunity existed. Second, it fails to explain why mythmakers in Tirana and Pristina decided to turn the Serbian narrative upside down, while other, more popularized and appealing national narratives were available for instrumental use.

By the late 1980s, school education, public commemorations and other government-sponsored "mnemonic practices" made a number of historical narratives widely known to masses in Kosovo and Albania. Indeed, during the conflict, Albanian leaders often referred to millennia-of the national history, Albanian autochthony on the contested Balkan lands and wars of "national liberation" under the medieval ruler Skanderbeg (Kostovicova 2005). Besides, historical narratives of victimhood at the hands of Yugoslav authorities appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s and were more relevant for both mass mobilization and attracting international attention (Gashi 2004).

Nationalist Counter-Myths in Other Countries

The Albanian myth of the Battle of Kosovo is hardly unique. In fact, many identity narratives initially emerge as counter-myths. The above discussion reveals the mechanism that causes the production, elaboration and dissemination of these counter-myths. In societies that have already undergone the process of nation-building, ethnic identity becomes meaningful for social actors. A set of nationalizing institutions emerge, producing social groups who feel obliged to defend and celebrate the nation. In such a context, an increased sensitivity of the elites to national questions develops, and national mythology gets routinely elaborated. In times of political crisis,

committed in-group intellectuals and politicians stay alert and react to the instrumental uses of history by the out-groups.

By the early 1990s, ethno-nationalism had become entrenched in Macedonia and Greece. National mythology and symbolism in both societies served as a particular language of public communication and political competition, a means by which the worth of the community was established. The historiographies assumed both a defensive and affirmative role. Cultural, educational and research institutions boosted notions of national glory (Brunnbauer 2004; Kostakis 1998; Pichler 2009; Poulton 1996; Roudometof 2002). After the declaration of independence, a new flag was designed in the Republic of Macedonia. To avoid internal contestations between Macedonians and Albanians over which symbols should be used, the parliament voted in favor of what seemed neutral at the time – the Star of Virgina, which was associated with the royal family of Ancient Macedonia. Soon Greek state officials and nationalist groups protested vehemently against the "usurpation" of ancient Greek legacies and place names by the "Skopian republic." At the same time, they initiated an international campaign of non-recognition and established an economic blockade of the newborn state, fearing potential border disputes with the new republic and refuting its claim to speak on behalf of the trans-border "Slavophone populations." The history of Ancient Macedonia was used extensively by the Greek establishment to invalidate Skopje's claims for international recognition. Countering the Greek mythopoeia, Macedonian elites soon elaborated their own narratives of national antiquity. They started to talk about spiritual and genealogical links between the ancient and contemporary Slavic Macedonians and portrayed the Kingdom of Philip II and Alexander the Great as a precursor to modern Macedonian statehood (Brown 1994; Brunnbauer 2004, 2005; Danforth 1995; Roudometof 2002; Vangeli 2011).

In Transcaucasia, nationalism was highly institutionalized in the Communist period. Nationality assumed particular significance in the framework of a hierarchical system of Soviet federalism. Ethnic culture and traditions were widely propagated (Brubaker 1993, 1996: 13–54; Connor 1984). The humanities developed in view of designing "just" nationality policies. Therefore, historians, archaeologists, linguists and cultural figures saw defending the rights of their nations as a personal duty. In Soviet Georgia, continuous debates took place between Georgian and Abkhazian intellectuals and politicians. Two particularly contested topics were the ethnic demographics of today's Western Georgia in antiquity and the history of the early medieval Kingdom of Abkhazia. The discussants rarely voiced radical positions at that time. While trying to prove the leading role of their respective ethnic groups in the past, they principally agreed on the historically multiethnic character of the region. With Georgia's bid for independence, nationalist politics escalated. Georgian was soon made the official language of the whole republic, and the central government began to abolish the territorial autonomy of ethnic minorities. From 1991 to 1993, wars erupted in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, Georgian elites employed historical myths glorifying Georgian nation and vilifying minorities. Contemporary Abkhazians were now portrayed as newcomers, descendants of mountainous Caucasian tribes without any connection to the dwellers of the medieval Kingdom of Abkhazia. Reacting to the radicalized views of their Georgian opponents, Abkhazian leaders first attempted to rely on old Soviet narratives pointing to the historically mixed population of the Black Sea coast and the significance of the medieval kingdom for several ethnic groups. As ethnic tensions in the republic escalated and inter-elite dialogue failed to occur, the Abkhazians decided to turn Georgian historical narratives upside down. They depicted Georgians as newcomers to Abkhazian ancestral lands and claimed the Kingdom of Abkhazia as an early national state where ethnic minorities

played no significant role (Shnirelman 2003: 368–434). Thus, the case of Macedonia and Georgia resemble that of Kosovo because Macedonian and Abkhazian elites introduced new narratives of ancient origins and ancestral territory as a moral response to Greek and Georgian nationalists' increasingly instrumental use of the past. Similarly, before producing uncompromising counter-myths, the Macedonians and Abkhazians tried to negotiate, as they were reluctant to nationalize the remote history completely.

Conclusion

The aim of this article has not been to disprove ethno-symbolism and modernism altogether by providing an ultimate test. Instead, I have shown how to increase the heuristic power of these theories in explaining a wider variety of cases of nationalist mythopoeia. A fuller analysis of the rather common situation when mythmaking begins as an ad hoc moral response and then continues as a means of mass mobilization and winning international support requires overcoming the existing dichotomies. It suggests revising the literature along the following lines:

Ethno-symbolists are right in saying that history matters. However, for a better understanding of nationalist mythmaking, we must pay more attention to the decades-long legacies of nation-building and institutional cultures rather than to centuries-old ethnic symbols and memories (cf. Brubaker 1996; Brubaker and Feischmidt 2000; Forest and Johnson 2002; Hall 1993; Malešević 2002).

Modernists, in turn, are right to point to the instrumental motives of mythmakers. However, instrumentalism offers only a partial explanation. Instrumental motives are a neither inherent nor persistent quality of nationalist leaders. They may wax and wane, be learned and forgotten. In

addition, new historical narratives can be the result of a purely emotional reaction by those who perceive themselves on the frontlines of the national cause against out-group mythmaking.

In addition, I argue that both ethno-symbolists and modernists can strengthen their analytical insights by applying a comparative approach (Brubaker and Feischmidt 2002) and looking to the interactive and intergroup dynamics of nationalist mythopoeia (Schöpflin 2000: 86; Triandafyllidou 1998). The sources of motivation for mythopoeic action can be located outside of the national community. Often communal narratives are tailored in response to symbolic attacks from out-group elites. At this point, nationalists may be pushed to act by their self-perception as "saviors of the nation," disregarding domestic political configurations and ripe moments for the attainment of personal capital.

More broadly, the interactive analytical perspective can offer two important insights for the studies of nationalism. First, by documenting moral motivations behind elite mythmaking, it makes clear that sincere nationalist feelings, once rooted in a society, may influence the behavior of not only the masses, but also the leaders. This observation is important in light of an ongoing debate on the power of nationalism (see: Mann 2013; Wimmer 2009).

Second, this perspective helps highlight that many national narratives initially appear as counter-myths but then persist and come to define the *content* of national identity. It is important to distinguish between the narrow act of national *categorization* and broader national *self-understanding*; in other words, to differentiate between the social boundary-setting and self-affirming *intent* of a national identity and its rich and multilayered *content* (on these nuances in analyzing "identity," see: Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Tajfel 2010). My findings illustrate that even when a national categorization is propelled by community leaders, the specifics of this national self-understanding may have out-group sources. The ideational and cultural *material* that

a national identity *encloses* often emerges ad hoc in the context of transnational mythopoeic contestations. In many cases, certain ideas and images would not come to imbue national identities had these contestations not taken place.

Bibliography

Arapi, F. (1986). *Këngë të moçme shqiptare: studime [Old Albanian Songs: essays]*. Tiranë: Naim Frashëri.

Archard, D. (1995). Myths, Lies and Historical Truth: A Defence of Nationalism. *Political Studies*, 43(3), 472–481.

Atack, I. (2012). *Nonviolence in Political Theory.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bakić-Hayden, M. (2004). National Memory as Narrative Memory: the case of Kosovo. In: Todorova, M. (Ed.), *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory* (pp. 25–40). New York: New York University Press.

Baretto, A. (2012). Nationalism, Collective Action and Rationality. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,* 18(3), 316–336.

Bieber, F. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo Myth from the 600th anniversary of the present. *Rethinking History,* 6(1), 95–110.

Bogdanović, D. (1986). *Knjiga o Kosovu [A Book on Kosovo]*. Beograd: SANU.

Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L. (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Brown, K. (1994). Seeing Stars: Character and Identity in the Landscapes of Modern Macedonia. *Antiquity*, 68, 784–796.

Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond "Identity". *Theory and Society*, *29*(1), 1-47.

Brubaker, R., & Feischmidt, M. (2002). 1848 in 1998: The Politics of Commemoration in Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 44(04), 700-744.

Brubaker, R., Loveman, M. & Stamatov, P. (2004). Ethnicity as Cognition. *Theory and Society*, 33(1), 31-64.

Brunnbauer, U. (2004). Historiography, Myths and Nation in the Republic of Macedonia. In Brunnbauer, U. (Ed.), *(Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism* (pp. 165–200). Münster: Lit Verlag.

Čajkanović, V. (1923). Motivi prve arnautske pesme o boju na Kosovo [The Motifs of the First Albanian Folksong about the Battle of Kosovo]. *Arhiv za arbanasku starinu, jezik i etnologiju*, 1-2, 68–77.

Calhoun, C. (1997). *Nationalism.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cana, Z. (1990). *Populli shqiptar në kapërcyell e shekullit XX [Albanian People at the Turn of the Twentieth Century]*. Prishtinë: Instituti Albanologjik.

Chapman, M., McDonald, M. & Tonkin, E. (1989). Introduction to E. Tonkin, M. McDonald & M. Chapman, *History and Ethnicity* (pp. 1–21). London: Routledge.

Clark, H. (2000). *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*. London: Pluto Press.

Clark, H. (2013). Kosovo: Civil Resistance in Defence of the Nation, 1990s. In M. Bartkowski (Ed.), *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles* (pp. 279–296). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Coakley, J. (2004). Mobilizing the Past: Nationalist Images of History. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 10, 531–560.

Connor, W. (1994). *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Curri, Ikbal. (1977). *Historia e Shipërisë [History of Albania]*. Tiranë: Botimi i librit shkollor.

Dalipi, Q. (2002). *Inkursionet osmane ne trevat shqiptare deri me 1402 [Ottoman Military Expeditions in Albanian Lands until 1402]*. Kercove: Feniks.

Danforth, L. (1995). *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic nationalism in a Transnational World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Di Lellio, A. (2009). *The Battle of Kosovo 1389: An Albanian Epic.* London: I. B. Tauris.

Draper, S. (1997). The Conceptualization of Albanian Nation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20(1), 123–144.

Duijzings, G. (2000). *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo.* New York: Columbia University.

Elezović, G. (1923). Jedna arnautska pesma o Boju na Kosovu [One Albanian Folksong about the Battle of Kosovo]. *Arkiv za arbanasku starinu, jezik i etnologiju*, 1-2, 54–67.

Eriksen, T. (1993). *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.

Esman, M. (1994). *Ethnic Politics.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Fischer, B. (1995). Albanian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. In P. Sugar, *Eastern-European Nationalism in the Twentieth* (pp. 21–54). Washington: The American University Press.

Forest, Benjamin, and Juliet Johnson (2002). Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 92 (3), 524-547.

Fotić, A., Kusovac, N. & Milošević, D. (1991). *Propast Srpskog carstva, 1371–1389 [The Fall of the Serbian Empire]*. Beograd: KIZ "Litera."

Frashëri, Kristo. (2005 [1995]). Shqiptarët në Betejën e Kosovës [Albanians in the Battle of Kosovo]. In L. Malltezi (Ed.), *Beteja e Kosovës: përmledhje studimesh [The Battle of Kosovo: collection of works]* (pp. 113–122). Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë.

Gashi, I. (2004). The Development of Kosovar Historiography after the Fall of Communism. In U. Brunnbauer, *(Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism* (pp. 317–332). Munster: Lit Verlag.

Geary, P. (2002). *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Giddens, A. (1979). *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in social analysis*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks.* New York: International Publishers, New York.

Greenawalt, A. (2001). Kosovo Myths: Karadžić, Njegoš and the transformation of Serb memory. *Spaces of identity,* 3, 49–65.

Guibernau, M. & Hutchinson, J. History and National Destiny. *Nations and Nationalism,* 10 (1-2), 1-8.

Guibernau, M. (2010). *The Identity of Nations.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hadri, A. & Avramovski, Z. (1980). *Historia.* Prishtinë: Enti i teksteve mesimore.

Hadri, A. & Prekaj, M. (1960). *Pasqyrë e historis nacionale shqiptare [An Overview of Albanian National History]*. Prishtinë: Rilindja.

Hadri, A. (1966). Disa çeshtje nga historia shqiptare nacionale [Some Issues of Albanian National History]. *Përparimi* 9–10, 749–763.

Hadri, A. (1966). *Pregled istorije Albanaca [An Overview of the History of Albanians]*. Priština: Zavod za udžbenike.

Hadri, A. (2003). *Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-jugosllave [The Albanian-Yugoslavian Relations]*. Prishtnë: Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve të Kosovës.

Hale, H. (2004). Explaining Ethnicity. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(4), 458–485.

Hall, John A. (1993) Nationalisms: Classified and Explained. *Daedalus,* 122 (3), 1-28.

Haxhihasani, Q. (1983). *Epika historike [Historical Epics]*. Vol. 1. Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave.

Haxhihasani, Q. (1989). Beteja e Fushë-Kosovës (1389) në epikën popullore shqiptare [The Battle of Kosovo Field, 1389 in Albanian Popular Epics]. *Studime historike*, 4, 163–168.

Hobsbawm, E. (1992). Introduction to Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (1992). *The Invention of Tradition* (pp. 1–14). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hutchinson, J. (2005). *Nations as Zones of Conflict*. London: SAGE.

Instituti i Historisë. (2002). *Historia e popullit shqiptar. Vëllimi I. Ilirët, Mesjeta, Shqipëria nën Perandorinë Osmane gjatë shek. XVI-vitet 20 të shek. XIX [History of the Albanian People. Vol.1. Illyrians, the Middle Ages, Albania under the Ottoman Empire from 16th Century until the 1820s]*. Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave të Shqipërisë.

Islami, S. & Frashëri, K. (1959). *Historia e Shqipërisë [History of Albania]*.Vol. 1. Tiranë: Instituti i Historisë dhe i Gjuhësisë.

Judah, T. (2000). *Kosovo: War and Revenge.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kadare, I. (2005 [1994]). Parathënie [Foreword] to Rugova, I. *Cështja e Kosovës [The Kosovo Issue]* (pp. 7–32). Prishtinë: Faik Konica.

Kadare, I. (2005 [1998]). *Tri këngë zie për Kosovën [Three Elegies for Kosovo]*. Tiranë: Onufri.

Kapferer, B. (1988). *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Kaufman, S. (2001). *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kedourie, E. (1993). *Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Kolouri, C. (Ed.) (2002). *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education*. Thesaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.

Kolstø, P. (2005). Assessing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society. In Kolstø, P. (Ed.) *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe* (pp. 1–35). London: Hurst & Company.

Kolstø, P. (2014). Introduction to Kolstø P. (Ed.) *Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in South Eastern Europe* (pp. 1–18). Farnham: Ashgate.

Kostić, Dragutin. (1934). Miloš Kopilić – Kobilić – Obilić. *Revue Internationale des Etudes Balkaniques*, 1-2, 232–254.

Kostovicova, D. (2005). *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space.* London: Routledge.

Kotsakis, Kostas (1998). The Past is Ours: Images of Greek Macedonia. In Meskell, L. (Ed.) *Archaeology under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East* (pp. 44–67). London: Routledge.

Lange, M. (2012). *Educations in Ethnic Violence: Identity, Educational Bubbles, and Resource Mobilization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levinger, M. & Franklin Lyttle, P. (2001) Myth and Mobilization: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric. *Nations and Nationalism*, 7(2), 175–194..

Ljubinković, N.& Arsić, I. (Eds.) (1989). *Kosovo u pamćenju i stvaralaštvu [Kosovo in Memory and Arts]*. Beograd: Narodna biblioteka "Vuk Karadžić."

Lubonja, F. (2002). Between the Glory of Virtual World and the Mystery of Real Word. In Schwander-Sievers, S. & B. Fischer (Eds.). *Albanian Identities. Myth and History* (pp. 91–103). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

MacDonald, D. (2002). *Blakan Holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian victim-centered propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Malcolm, N. (1999). *Kosovo: A Short history.* New York: Harper Perennial.

Malcolm, Noel. (2002). Myths of Albanian National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed in the Works of Albanian Writers in America in the Early Twentieth Century. In Schwander-Sievers, S. & B. Fischer (Eds.). *Albanian Identities. Myth and History* (pp. 71–87). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Malešević, S. (2002). Rational Choice Theory and the Sociology of Ethnic Relations: A critique. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 25(2), 193-212.

Malešević, S. (2006). *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Malltezi, L. (1989). Beteja e Fushë-Kosovës (1389) dhe kontributi i shqiptarëve [The Contribution of Albanians in the Battle of Kosovo Field, 1389]. *Studime historike*, 4, 139–148.

Malltezi, L. (1998). *Beteja e Fushë-Kosovës dhe shqiptarët, 1389 [The Battle of Kosovo Field and the Albanians, 1389]*. Tiranë: Eurolindja.

Malltezi, Luan. (1989). Mbi pjesëmarrjen e shqiptarëve të Kosovës ne betejën e vitit 1389 dhe përkatësinë etnike shqiptare të Milosh Kopiliqit [On the Role of the Kosovar Albanians in the Battle of 1389 and Albanian Ethnic Identity of Milosh Kopiliqi]. *Studime historike*, 3, 79–99.

Mann, Michael. (2013). Role of Nationalism in the Two World Wars. In J.A. Hall & S. Malešević (Eds.), *Nationalism and War* (pp. 255–276). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mertus, J. (1999). *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War.* London: University of California Press.

Mihajlović, K. & Krestić, V. (1995). *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answers to criticism.* Belgrade: SANU.

Mihaljčić, R. (1975). *Kraj Srpskog carstva [The End of the Serbian Kingdom]*. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.

Mihaljčić, R. (1983). *Lazar Hrebeljanović: istorija, kult, predanje [Lazar Hrebeljanović: History, Cult, Heritage]*. Beograd: Nolit.

Misha, P. (2008). *Arrtisja nga burgjet e historise. [The Break out of the Prisons of the History]*. Tirane: Toena.

Mock, S. (2012). *Symbols of Defeat in the Construction of National Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Myziri, H. & Zeka, O. (1996). *Historia e popullit shqiptar: për klasën e 8-të [History of the Albanian People for the 8th grade]*. Prishtinë: Enti i teksteve dhe i mjeteve Mësimore.

Nakarada, R., Vasović, M. et al. (2012). *Etnički stereotipi i nacionalni mtovi kao prepreke pomirenju: albansko-srpski odnosi. Izveštaj projekata [Ethnic Stereotypes and National Myths as Obstacles to Reconciliation: Albanian-Serb Relations. Project report]*. Belgrade: Center for Peace Studies. 2012. Unpublished manuscript.

Olick, J. (1999).Collective Memory: The Two Cultures. *Sociological Theory* 17(3), 333–348.

Osmani, J. (2008). *Organizata Nacional-Demokratike Shqiptare të mësuesve të Llapit [The Albanian National Democratic Organization of Teachers in Llapi]*. Podujevë: Qendra e Kulturës.

Özkırımlı, Umut. (2003). The Nation as an Artichoke? A Critique of Ethnosymbolist Interpretations of Nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, 9(3), 339–355.

235

Özkırımlı, Umut. (2005). *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement.* New York: Palgrave.

Pajo, Erind. (2002). Albanian Schoolbooks in the Context of Societal Transformation: Review Notes. In C. Koulouri (Ed.), *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education* (pp. 445–461). Thesaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.

Pantelić, B. (2011). Memories of a Time Forgotten: the Myth of the Perennial Nation. *Nations and Nationalism*, 17(2), 443–464.

Partia e Punës së Shipërisë. (1951). *Shqipëria, Atdheu ynë [Albania, our Motherland].* Tiranë: Botim i Partisë së Punës së Shqipërisë.

Petković, R. & Kusovac, N. (Eds.) (1987). *Kosovska bitka: mit, legenda, stvarnost [The Battle of Kosovo: Myth, Legend and Reality].* Beograd: KIZ "Litera."

Pettifer, J. (2012). *The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948–2001.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Pichler, Robert (2009). Historiography and the Politics of Education in the Republic of Macedonia (1991–2008). In A. Dimou, *"Transition" and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe* (pp. 214–247). Gottingen: V&R UniPress.

Pllana, Sh. (1976). Epika popullore shqiptare mbi Luftën e Kosovës (1389) [Albanian Epic Folksongs about the Battle of Kosovo]. I. Ajeti (Ed.), *Seminari i kulturës shiptare për të huajt* (pp. 111–128). Prishtinë: Universiteti i Prishtinës.

Pllana, Sh., Berisha, R. & Fetiu, S. (1978). *Këngë popullore të Rilindjes Kombëtare [Popular Songs from the Period of the National Revival].* Prishtinë: Instituti Albanologjik.

Poulton, H. (1995). *Who are the Macedonians?* London: Hurst and Company.

Pulaha, S. (1984). *Popullsia shqiptare e Kosovës gjatë shek. [Albanian Population in Kosovo in 15th and 16th Centuries]*. Tiranë: 8 Nëntori.

Pulaha, S. (1990). Shqiptarët dhe Beteja e Fushë-Kosovës e vitit 1389 [Albanians and the Battle of Kosovo Field, 1389]. *Studime historike,* 4, 163–181.

Pulaha, S., Mansaku, S. & Gjergji, A. (Eds.) (1982). *Shqiptarët dhe trojet e tyre [Albanians and their Lands]*. Tiranë: 8 nëntori.

Qeriqi, A. (2003). *Milush Kopiliqi: serb apo shqiptar? [Milush Kopiliqi: Serbian or Albanian?]*. Prishtinë: Radio Kosova e Lirë.

Qosja, R. (1990). *Populli i ndaluar [The Forbidden Nation]*. Prishtinë: Mega–Medium.

Qosja, R. (1998 [1994]). *Cështja shqiptare: Historia dhe politika [The Albanian Issue: History and Politics]*. Tiranë: Toena.

Redjep, Jelka. (1991). The Legend of Kosovo. *Oral Tradition,* 6 (2-3), 253–265.

Relić, Lj. (1989). *Kosovska legenda u narodnom stvaralaštvu [The Legend of Kosovo in Folk Art]*. Beograd: Etnografski muzej.

Rexhepi, F. & Bicaj, I. *Historia 9: për klasën e nëntë orietuese [History 9: for the 9th grade with specialization]*. Prishtinë: Shtëpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor.

Ross, M. (2001). Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas: Identity Dynamics in Ethnic Conflict. *Political Psychology,* 22(1), 157–178.

Ross, M. (2007) *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roudometof, V. (2002). *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question*. Westport: Prager.

Rugova, I. (2005). *Pavarësia dhe demokracia: Intervista dhe artikuj [Independence and Democracy: Interviews and Articles]*. Prishtinë: Faik Konica.

Šajkaš, M. (2008). From the Cradle of the Nation to the Most Expensive Serbian Word: Changes in Serbian Public Language in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century. *Nationalities Papers*, 36(4), 625–640.

Samardžić, R. (1990). Kosovsko opredeljenje: istorijski ogledi. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.

Šćepanović, Ž. (2002). *Kratka istorija Crne Gore [Short History of Montenegro]*. Podgorica: CID.

Scheff, T. & Retzinger S. (1991). *Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts*. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.

Schock, K. (2005). *Unarmed Insurrections: People Movements in Non-Democracies.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Schöpflin, G. (2000). *Nations, Identity, Power.* London: Hurst & Company.

Schwartz, B. (1996). The Expanding Past. *Qualitative Sociology*, 19(3), 275–282.

Shala, D. (1973). *Këngë popullore historike [Historical Folksongs]*. Prishtinë: Enti i teksteve dhe i mjeteve mësimore i KSAK

Sharp, G. (2012). *Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Shnirelman, V. (2003). *Voiny pamiati: Mify, identichnost i politika v Zakavkaz'e [Memory Wars: Myths, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia]*. Moskva: Akademkniga.

Silber, L. & Little, A. (1995) *The Death of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin Books.

Skendi, S. (1967). *The Albanian National Awakening, 1978–1912.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Smith, A.D. (1991). *National Identity.* Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Smith, A.D. (1999). *Myths and Memories of the Nation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, A.D. (2011). National Identity and Vernacular Mobilization in Europe." *Nations and Nationalism*, 17 (2), 223–256.

Smithney, L. (2013). Identity Formation in Nonviolent Struggles. In M. Bartkowski (Ed.), *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles*, 31–47. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Snyder, T. (1995). National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania, 1989-1994. *East European Politics and Societies*, *9*(2), 317-343.

Štih, P. (2006). Miti in stereotipi v nacionalnem videnju starejše slovenske zgodovine [Myths and Stereotypes in National Vision of Ancient Slovenian History]. *Nova revija,* XXV, 244–267.

Stipčević, A. The Question of Illyrian-Albanian Continuity and its Political Topicality Today. Kosova Crisis Center. http://www.alb-net.com/illyrians.htm, Accessed April, 5 2017.

Stojanović, D. (2004). Construction of Historical Consciousness: the case of Serbia history textbooks. In Todorova, M. (Ed.), *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory* (pp. 327–338). New York: New York University Press.

Subramanian, Narendra (2013). "Myths of the Nation, Cultural Recognition, and Personal law in India." In: Bouchard, Gerard (ed.) *National Myths: Constructed Pasts, Contested Presents* (pp. 259–275). London: Routledge.

Tajfel, Henri. (2010) *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tasić, N. & Djuretić V. (Eds.) (1991) *Kosovska bitka 1389. godine i njene posledice [The Kosovo battle, 1389 and its Consequences]*. Beograd: Balkanološki institut SANU.

Tërnava, M. (1982). Megrimet e popullsisë ne territorin e sotëm të Kosovës gjatë shekujve XIV–XV [Population Migrations in the Territory of Contemporary Kosovo throughout 14th–16th centuries].

In Pulaha, S., Mansaku, S. & Gjergji, A. (Eds.) *Shqiptarët dhe trojët e tyre* (pp. 452–480). Tiranë: 8 Nëntori.

Thëngjilli, P. (1989). Vlera e burimeve osmane për Betejën e Fushë-Kosovës [The Value of the Ottoman Sources for the Battle of Kosovo Field]. *Studime historike,* 4, 155–161.

Thëngjilli, P. (2008). *Shqiptarët midis Lindjes dhe Perëndimit. Fusha Politike I [Albanians between the East and the West. Political Issues 1]*. Tiranë: EXTRA.

Tolz, V. (2002). Rethinking Russian–Ukrainian relations: a new trend in nation-building in post-communist Russia? *Nations and Nationalism*, *8* (2), 235-253.

Trgovčević, Lj. (1999). The Kosovo Myth in the First World War. In *Old Serbia and Albanians*. Historical Institute of SANU. http://www.rastko.rs/kosovo/istorija/sanu/KOS_MIT.html Accessed May, 10 2018.

Triandafyllidou, A. (1998). National Identity and the 'Other'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21(4), 593-612.

Trifunović, Dj. (1985). *Najstariji srpski zapisi o Kosovom boju [The Oldest Serbian Scripts about the Battle of Kosovo]*. Gornji Milanovac: Dečije novine, 1985.

Trigger, Bruce. "Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist." *Man* 19 (1984): 355-370.

Turner, J. & Stets, J. Moral Emotions. In J. Stets & J. Turner. (Eds.) (2006). *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions* (pp. 544–566). New York: Springer.

Vangeli, A. (2011). Nation-building ancient Macedonian style: the Origins and the Effects of the so-called Antiquization in Macedonia. *Nationalities Papers*, 39(1), 13–32.

Vickers, M. (1998). *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Vladisavljević, N. (2004). Grassroots groups, Milošević or dissident intellectuals? A controversy over the origins and dynamics of the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s. *Nationalities Papers*, 32(4), 781-796.

Vujačić, V. (2007). Elites, Narratives, and Nationalist Mobilization in the Former Yugoslavia. *Comparative Politics*, 40(1), 103–124.

Weber, E. (1976). *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Wimmer, A, and Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks,* 2(4), 301–334.

Wimmer, A. (2009). Herder's Heritage and the Boundary-Making Approach: Studying Ethnicity in Immigrant Societies. *Sociological Theory* 27(3), 244-270.

Xhufi, P. (1989). Shqiptarët e Jugut në Betejën e Fushë-Kosovës [Southern Albanians in the Battle of Kosovo Field], *Studime historike*, 4, 149–153.

Xhufi, P. (2011) Mesjeta [The Middle Ages]. In R. Ismajli (2011). *Kosova: vështrim monografik [Kosova: a Monographic Survey]* (pp. 179–189). Prishtinë: Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve e Kosovës.

Yack, B. (2012) *Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Zerubavel, Y. (1995). "The Multivocality of a National Myth: Memory and Counter Memories of Masada." *Israel Affairs* 1(3), 110–128.

Conclusion

This dissertation relies on archival data from the former Yugoslavia and Albania as well as a wide body of published primary and secondary historical sources. It employs comparative historical methods to investigate the development of an Albanian and Serbian national identity over the last two centuries, specifically the emergence and evolution of two foundational national myths: the story of the autochthonous Illyrian origins of Albanians and the narrative of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo.

The dissertation provides important insight into the rise and transformation of nationalism. I offer evidence that the Kosovo myth, which is often seen as a crucial supporting case for ethno-symbolist theory, is a modern ideological construct. For evidence, the article focuses on temporal, geographical and cultural ruptures in the supposedly long-standing "medieval Kosovo legacy" and the way the narrative was promoted among South Slavs in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It finds that Serbian-speaking diaspora intellectuals from the Habsburg Empire and the governments in Belgrade and Cetinje played crucial roles imparting the Kosovo myth to the Balkan masses. Thus, it is hard to account for the rise of national identities and local conflicts in the Balkans without a closer look at foreign intervention and the history of states and institutions. Similarly, the idea of Illyrian origins was brought to Albania from outside. It was elaborated, promoted and, ultimately, institutionalized in the newly established nation-state by Albanian-speaking diasporics and European researchers. This suggests that scholars need to pay more attention to the agency of diaspora members, migrants and foreign intellectuals in the global spread of nationalism. Finally, the counter-myth to the Kosovo battle emerged as a moral reaction of self-perceived "saviors of the nation" in Albania and Kosovo to the politicization of medieval history

in Serbian intellectual circles. What mattered in this process was the moral commitment of Albanian mythmakers, who were trained to "defend their nation" in educational and research institutions under Communism. The moral response would not have occurred if their Serbian colleagues remained reserved and if intellectual dialogue had continued. This dissertation suggests that the literatures on nationalist mythology and national identity construction can benefit from a greater focus on the moral dimension of nationalism, the relatively recent history of socialization institutions and the interactive dynamics of identity politics.

The dissertation studies micro- and meso-level processes. It focuses on the life course of mythmakers and specific historical situations. Now, the time is ripe to highlight how my modest intellectual enterprise enriches the major theories of nationalism, most of which deal with macro-level implications.

Answering the call of Tom Nairn (1997) and Anthony Smith (1991, 1999) to explain the obsession of modern nationalist movements with history and cultural distinctiveness, my dissertation finds that the social location of individuals and groups at the crossroads and crosshairs of alien and native influences breeds exclusionary nationalism. The particular mechanisms of this causal link can be multiple: ideational, emotional, institutional and habitual. The involvement in mythmaking and other types of nationalist activities is not always a rational choice.

To elaborate on the metaphor of crossroads and crosshairs, many studies of nationalism have been concerned with the effect of communication. However, their primary focus has often been placed on either territory-bounded or global communication. Karl Deutcsh (1953) and Benedict Anderson ([1991] 2006) look at the growing information exchanges within states, societies and linguistic communities as prerequisites for national consciousness. John Meyer and his collaborators (1997) as well as Elie Kedourie (1993) and Benedict Anderson ([1991] 2006)

argue that the Western templates of nation, national determination and nation-state were imposed globally though colonialism and the exercise of unmatched power by the core countries. And this is what explains nationalism.

My dissertation makes a case for a middle-ground position. It shows that the focus on interaction *between* states, groups and communities instead of territory-bounded or global exchanges has equally considerable heuristic power (cf. Hall 1993, 2017; Tilly 1994). It is true that nationalist feelings and motivations arise when relatively efficient communication between states, societies and social collectivities exists. My four papers show that the mobilization of Serbian- and Albanian-speaking expatriates, institution-building and European research pursuits in the Balkan countries and Serbian-Albanian symbolic contests over history would not occur if wars, diplomatic struggles, trade relations, ideational flows, educational connections and intellectual contacts were less intensive. However, established communication is only a necessary precondition for nationalism. Conversion to nationalist ideology is more likely to happen at moderate levels of interaction; this is when the "ideal situation" of communication (Habermas 1984: 25) is absent, when communication is subject to frequent interruptions and marred by inequalities, power imbalances and cultural misunderstandings. The four stories told in the dissertation well illustrate this point: Serbian- and Albanian-speaking diasporas could have been less prone to political and even cultural nationalism had they acquired broader knowledge of European thought, wider networks, and better social opportunities both in their places of origin and abroad. Similarly, Karl Patsch could have been more willing to continue his studies of Greek and Roman antiquity in the Balkans if he had been given enough resources not only in Vienna, but also in Tirana. The Albanian counter-myth of the Kosovo battle could have never been constructed

had Serbian intellectuals decided to continue open and protracted dialogue on national history and had the Belgrade authorities restrained from physically isolating those perceived as dissidents.

To tackle the issue of middle-level interactions from yet another theoretical perspective, studies of ethnic group relations have for decades revolved around contact and competition hypotheses. For some authors, intergroup contact decidedly combats prejudice and conflict (Allport 1954; Pittigrew and Tropp 2006). For others, intergroup contact amplifies prejudice and often leads to violent competition (Olzak 1994; see also: Denis 2015). What seems to matter more in view of some recent studies is the quality, valence and context of the contact (see: Denis 2015; Graf, Paoplini and ubin 2014). In other words, intergroup contact can lead to social closure rather than tolerance if the Allportian "optimal conditions" for exchange are not met. Notably, these "optimal conditions" – equal status, common goals, cooperation and institutional support – bear striking resemblance to the Habermasian "ideal situation." My dissertation turns attention to the middle levels of contact and hampered communication. Adopting a sociological rather than a socio-psychological perspective, it shows that transitional social situations and limbos of mobility moderate social exchanges; in other words, communicative crossroads and crosshairs serve as hotbeds of nationalism. In this sense, I find common ground with the arguments already advanced by researchers of blocked mobility (Arel 1995; Gellner 1983; Hall 2017; Laitin 1998; Lange 2012, 2017), "betwixt-and-between" socialization (Eriksen 2002), uneven modernisation and development (Gellner 1983; Hechter 1975, 2000; Horowitz 1986; Laitin 1998; Nairn 1997) and overseas colonialism (Chatterjee 1993; Lange 2017; Mamdani 2001).

Insofar as my micro- and meso-level perspective draws attention to the crossroads and crosshairs of internal and external influences and proposes an original explanation for boundary-

setting historical and cultural dimensions of nationalism, the findings of each article also signal significant macro-theoretical contributions.

The first article calls in question the link between purported pre-modern *ethnies* and modern nations, even in such a "crucial" case as the Serbian one. This conclusion must be evaluated within the context of broader debates on the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism. Thus, for some scholars, ethnicity is malleable and certainly does not matter for nation-building. For others, trivializing the role of culture and tradition in nationalism seems unthinkable. Despite the rise of the constructivist perspective, many sociologists and political scientists studying ethnicity in North American, colonial and post-colonial, post-Communist and indigenous contexts keep perpetuating essentialist and groupist understandings (Brubaker 2004, 2009).

In view of the first article, it is crucially important not to conflate two phenomena. Cultural dissimilarities, diacritica and indicia certainly do matter for nationalism. Different cultural backgrounds determine the life choices of nationalists. Cultural markers and symbols are always used for national boundary work. However, there is no one-to-one relationship between modern nations and what is often erroneously seen today as pre-modern "ethnic communities." Similar to nation-building, the construction of a stable and thick ethnicity involves a certain politicization and institutionalization of vague and fluid cultural differences (Barth [1969] 1998; Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1996; Greenfeld 2001). Therefore, the existence of today's "big" ethnicities, be they Albanian, Serbian, Russian, Filipino or French-Canadian, and their uniform languages is an outcome of modern nation-building. Assuming the presence of these "ethnicities" in premodern times and then trying to trace a link between them and contemporary nations is an anachronism (Geary 2002). It is true that cultural differences have existed from time immemorial. Yet it is

equally true that a multitude of small-scale, localized and socially bounded ethno-cultural groups and a myriad of linguistic idioms thrived in pre-modern times on the territory of each of today's "ethnicities" endowed with a nation-state or institutional recognition. Thus, the first article advocates for inquiry into the role of specific cultural distinctions in national identity construction and endorses contextual constructivism (see: Brass 1991; Kohl 1998). However, it also challenges the continuous practice to overstress the role of "ethnic solidarity" in nationalist movements for "groups" that have never, in fact, existed, let alone been single-minded or solidary, until very recently (see: Brubaker 2004, 2015; Malešević 2013; Wimmer 2009).

My second article highlights the role of diasporas in the spread of nationalism and the establishment of the nation-state. Dealing chiefly with the ideological influences of the diaspora, it suggests that terminological clarity can enhance scholarly understandings of various nationalist phenomena. Nationalism is protean, but this means that ambitious attempts to explain it as a whole are as analytically risky as they are phenomenologically tempting (Brubaker 2009; Hall 1993, 2017). Scholarship tends to lump together ideological developments, transformations of identities, social movements, political struggles, institution building and everyday activities under the rubric of nationalism (see: Brubaker 2009; Greenfeld 2001; Smith 1991). In the studies on the spread of nationalism, some scholars talk about ideological diffusion, while others trace the worldwide acceptance of the nation-state institutional model. Furthermore, sometimes nation-state is narrowly understood as a relatively centralized, institutionally uniform, bureaucratic, citizenship-based state at least ostensibly grounded in the concept of popular sovereignty. It is contrasted with historical empires and city-state polities. Within this framework, almost every contemporary state can be seen as a nation-state (Meyer et al. 1997; Wimmer 2002, 2012; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010; see critique: Breuilly 2017; Hall 2017). Often, however, scholars contrast nation-states with

multinational ones, thus implying that nation-states must also have a high degree of ethno-cultural homogeneity (Arel 1995; Brubaker 1996, 2011; Connor 1994; Hall 2011, 2017; Kymlicka 1995, 2011; Malešević 2013, 2017). My article on the contribution of the early Albanian diaspora to nation-building in the Balkans suggests that we may need to construct separate explanatory frameworks to account for the spread of various embodiments of nationalism: ideology, form of politics, nation-state model, identity and habitual everyday practice. By extension, it can be hypothesized that explanations for worldwide diffusion of the nation-state model should, arguably, differ whether scholars mean by nation-state an ethno-culturally homogeneous community or merely an institutionally uniform bureaucratic polity.

A growing strand of literature in political sociology questions the traditional analytical dichotomy between nation-states and empires. This scholarship finds that imperial policies – but not grassroot mobilization – have been more important for the rise of nationalist politics (Hall 2011, 2017; Malešević 2017; Pula 2008). In this sense, empires have served unintentionally as their own gravediggers. My third article deals with the contribution of Western imperialist archaeologists to nation-building in Albania and resonates with these recent theoretical discussions. John Hall (2011, 2017) finds that one of the ways in which empires fostered nationalism was by creating ethnicities and nationalities in the context of divide-and-rule policies and Great Power competition. In the *short* run, the new communities were *purposefully* evoked to enhance internal political stability and international standing. However, in the *long* run, an *unintended* consequence of this social engineering was imperial dissolution. I further elaborate on the idea of fortuitous causation and unintended consequences. I show that empires participated in the unintentional construction of new identities in non-Western societies through international

involvement of imperialist intellectuals, diplomatic efforts, and spread of ideas and export of institutions.

Finally, the last dissertation article, which analyzes the creation of the counter-myth of the Kosovo battle by Albanian intellectuals and politicians, considers national identity construction and nationalist politics as a transnational, intergroup process. On the one hand, scholarship recognizes the importance of the Other for national imagination and the nationalist doctrine (see: Triandafyllidou 1998) and talks at length about the dynamic nature of nationhood (see: Brubaker 2009). On the other hand, concrete empirical studies of intergroup processes and interdependences in national identities remain relatively rare (e.g., Brubaker 1996; Brubaker and Feischmidt 2002; Danforth 1995; Roudometof 2002; Triandafyllidou 1998; Troch 2012). My article is set to fill this void. I suggest the need to distinguish between the boundary-setting, self-affirming *intent* of a national identity and its rich and multilayered *content* (see: Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Tajfel 2010). The case of the Albanian counter-myth illustrates that even when the othering intent of a national identity is propelled by community leaders, the specifics of its content may appear as a reactive response to the actions of out-groups. The ideational and cultural *material* that a national identity *encloses* often emerges ad hoc in the context of transnational mythopoeic contestations. In many cases, certain ideas and images would not come to imbue national identities had these intergroup contestations not taken place.

Bibliography

Allport, Gordon. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Boston: Beacon, 1954.

Anderson, Benedict R. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 2006.

Arel, Dominique. "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?" *Nationalities Papers* 23.3 (1995): 597-622.

Barth, Fredrik. Introduction to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture difference*, edited by Fredrik Barth, 9–39. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1998.

Brass, Paul R. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison.* New Delhi: SAGE, 1991.

Breuilly, John. "Modern Empires and Nation-States." *Thesis Eleven* 139.1 (2017): 11-29.

Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. "Beyond "Identity"." *Theory and Society* 29.1 (2000): 1-47.

Brubaker, Rogers, and Margit Feischmidt. "1848 in 1998: The Politics of Commemoration in Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44.4 (2002): 700-744.

Brubaker, Rogers. "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35 (2009): 21-42.

Brubaker, Rogers. "Nationalizing States Revisited: Projects and processes of nationalization in post-Soviet states." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34.11 (2011): 1785-1814.

Brubaker, Rogers. *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Calhoun, Craig. "Nationalism and Ethnicity." *Annual Review of Sociology* 19.1 (1993): 211-239.

Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Connor, Walker. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Danforth, Loring *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Denis, Jeffrey S. "Contact Theory in a Small-Town Settler-Colonial Context: The Reproduction of Laissez-faire Racism in Indigenous-white Canadian Relations." *American Sociological Review* 80.1 (2015): 218-242.

Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. *Nationalism and Social Communication. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953.

Eriksen, Thomas. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives.* London: Pluto Press, 2002.

Geary, Patrick. *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Gellner, Ernst. *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Graf, Sylvie, Stefania Paolini, and Mark Rubin. "Negative Intergroup Contact is More Influential, but Positive Intergroup Contact is More Common: Assessing contact prominence and contact prevalence in five Central European countries." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 44.6 (2014): 536-547.

Greenfeld, Liah. "[Nationalism:] Etymology, Definitions, Types." *Encyclopedia of Nationalism,* edited by Alexander Motyl. Vol. 1, 251-265. Cambridge: Academic Press, 2001.

Habermas, Jürgen. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Vol.1. *Reason and the Rationalization of Society.* London: Heinemann, 1984.

Hall, John A. "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained." *Daedalus* 122.3 (1993): 1-28.

Hall, John A. "Taking Megalomanias Seriously: Rough notes." *Thesis Eleven* 139.1 (2017): 30-45.

Hall, John A. "Empires, Ancient and Modern." *British Journal of Sociology* 62.3 (2011): 542-550.

Hechter, Michael. *Containing Nationalism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hechter, Michael. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

Kohl, Philip L. "Nationalism and Archaeology: On the Constructions of Nations and the Reconstructions of the Remote Past." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 27.1 (1998): 223-246.

Kymlicka, Will. "Multicultural Citizenship within Multination States." *Ethnicities* 11.3 (2011): 281-302.

Kymlicka, Will. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Laitin, David D. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Lange, Matthew. *Educations in Ethnic Violence: Identity, Educational Bubbles, and Resource Mobilization.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Lange, Matthew. *Killing Others: A Natural History of Ethnic Violence.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017.

Malešević, Siniša. "Empires and Nation-States: Beyond the Dichotomy." *Thesis Eleven* 139.1 (2017): 3-10.

Malešević, Siniša. *Nation-States and Nationalisms: Organization, Ideology and Solidarity.* Chichester: Polity Press, 2013.

Mamdani, Mahmood. "Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of colonialism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43.4 (2001): 651-664.

Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. "World Society and the Nation-State." *American Journal of Sociology* 103.1 (1997): 144-181.

Nairn, Tom. *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*. London: Verso, 1997.

Olzak, Susan. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Pettigrew, Thomas F., and Linda R. Tropp. "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90.5 (2006): 751–783.

Pula, Besnik. "Becoming Citizens of Empire: Albanian Nationalism and Fascist Empire, 1939–1943." *Theory and society* 37.6 (2008): 567-596.

Roudometof, Victor. *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question.* Westport: Prager, 2002.

Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity.* Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991.

Tajfel, Henri. *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Tilly, Charles. "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492–1992." *Theory and Society* 23.1 (1994): 131-146.

Triandafyllidou, Anna. "National Identity and the 'Other'". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21.4 (1998): 593-612.

Wimmer, Andreas, and Yuval Feinstein. "The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001." *American Sociological Review* 75.5 (2010): 764-790.

Wimmer, Andreas. "Herder's Heritage and the Boundary-Making Approach: Studying Ethnicity in Immigrant Societies." *Sociological Theory* 27.3 (2009): 244-270.

Wimmer, Andreas. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Wimmer, Andreas. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.