

CHINESE SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

by

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Master of Arts

**CHINESE SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS
IN THE THIRD WORLD, 1965 - 1971**

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RESUME

Les deux grands desseins de cette étude sont d'esquisser les modèles d'appui chinois pour les mouvements révolutionnaires du tiers-monde entre les années 1965 et 1971, et d'indiquer les variables déterminantes de cet appui. L'évaluation du soutien chinois pour tous les mouvements révolutionnaires du tiers-monde est suivie d'une analyse de douze cas particuliers qui fournit une explication aux modèles d'appui chinois.

Deux variables indépendantes sont utilisées afin de vérifier la validité d'une série d'hypothèses tirées d'écrits contemporains--traitant des affaires extérieures chinoises--et de l'idéologie révolutionnaire de la République Populaire. L'étude de ces hypothèses met en lumière une gradation de variables déterminantes de l'appui chinois. Plusieurs hypothèses nouvelles, sorties des données, sont formulées. Quelques indications sont fournies pour des études ultérieures.

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ABSTRACT

The major questions posed in this study are: What were the patterns of Chinese support for revolutionary movements in the third world from 1965 to 1971? and; What are the primary determinants of Chinese support for such movements? Chinese support for all third-world revolutionary movements is assessed and then a smaller group of case studies (twelve in total) are analyzed to provide an explanation for Chinese support patterns.

Two primary independent variables are used to test the validity of a series of hypotheses drawn from contemporary literature on Chinese foreign affairs and from modern Chinese ideology. The testing of these hypotheses suggests a ranking of the primary determinants of Chinese support, and new hypotheses, emerging from the data, are formulated. Some guidelines for future research are offered.

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CHAPTER I

A. INTRODUCTION

In many parts of the third world, revolutionary movements are attempting to overthrow established regimes and establish revolutionary governments. China has often been accused of backing the revolutionaries. It is difficult to determine empirically whether this accusation is based on actual Chinese support or on the propensity of governments to find external scapegoats for internal dissent. Secondly, if China has assisted these revolutionary movements, one wonders whether the pattern of Chinese support has remained consistent over time. Both the period immediately before and the period immediately after the Cultural Revolution represent different epochs in Chinese foreign policy, as does the more recent era begun by the so-called "ping-pong diplomacy" of this decade.

One cannot assume a priori that China has had a uniform strategy in supporting third-world revolutionary movements. Nevertheless we do assume that the Chinese have extended some measure of support to these movements.

The major purpose of this thesis is to present a systematic analysis of Chinese support, during the past ten years, for so-called revolutionary movements in the third world. This project draws both empirically and theoretically from the works of a wide variety of scholars and provides empirical data to examine the

levels and patterns of Chinese support. The basic questions we are attempting to answer are: (1) As a revolutionary great power, what are the patterns of support China has offered revolutionary movements? (2) Has the nature of this support during different periods of Chinese foreign-policy making been uniform or can we discover changes in the level of support? and, (3) If patterns of support can be determined, what conclusions can be drawn concerning Chinese actions and objectives in the third world?

B. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Most of the literature on one state's involvement in the internal strife of another has centered around the discussion of internal wars. Such wars have been defined in several ways: by Ted Gurr¹ as "large-scale, organized, focused civil strife, almost always accompanied by violence"; by R. A. Falk² as "sustained large-scale violence between two or more factions seeking to challenge in whole or in part, the maintenance of government authority in a particular state"; and by John Eley³ as "large scale focused civil strife, lasting at least thirty days and waged between two or more contending forces subject to the same de jure political jurisdiction." The focus of this project, while it could include any or all of the above definitions, is much broader. Our concern is with the movements themselves, and not the repercussions of their activity. For the purpose of this thesis a revolutionary movement may be defined as an organized attempt, comprising an institutional core, to

overthrow the de jure political regime to effect both ideational and structural change. Clearly, this definition is very general. Such a movement can attempt to effect change through violent or non-violent means, through institutionalized and accepted patterns or through a strategy condemned by an incumbent regime as "parapolitical". The only requirement beyond the desire for both structural and ideational change, is that a movement be institutionalized as a communist party or a peasant band, a trade union, or whatever. The nature of the revolutionary movement is one of the two main independent variables of this study. Though it is often useful to have a rigorously defined independent variable, in this instance a broader definition will permit a more extensive examination of the relationship between that independent variable and the patterns of Chinese support. In addition, the selection of revolutionary movements to be included in this study will include all movements whose longevity has spanned at least two of the three time periods, and whose efforts have merited the attention of either the Chinese or the Western press.

Chinese support comprises more than positive behavioural actions. In international relations theory several types of definitions of foreign policy actions have been offered. J. N. Rosenau⁴ and Patrick McGowan⁵ have described foreign policy as national adaptation, Charles McLelland⁶ and Kai Holsti⁷ have described it as situation response, and Charles Hermann⁸ and Rudolf Rummel⁹ have described it as discrete events. In this thesis, foreign policy

actions are defined as discrete acts towards, or articulated statements about, a foreign state emanating from those persons in decision-making posts in the operative government of a country. ¹⁰ Active behaviour and verbal behaviour can both be considered foreign policy action. Thus, Chinese arm shipments to the troops of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam and governmental statements in support of Bolivian guerrillas are both foreign policy actions. Both the dependent and one of the major independent variables in this study are action variables, and thus include verbal as well as active behaviour. (A description of the variables follows later in this chapter.)

C. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The theoretical foundations of this study have been drawn from general studies of external involvement in internal wars and specific studies of such Chinese involvement.

General Theories

In examining the very broad subject of one state's involvement in the internal strife of another, C. R. Mitchell ¹¹ suggests there are four categories of independent variables that must be examined. He maintains that in order to understand external involvement one must examine: (1) the factors within the strife-ridden state which tend to make it prone to violence and discord; (2) the factors in the intervening state which tend to create the so-called need for expansionist or interventive behaviour; (3) the factors linking the internal group seeking and/or receiving external

support and the external parties appealed to and involved; and (4) the factors in the international system which increase the likelihood of either internal war or external involvement. ¹² Through the study of the four categories, Mitchell suggests that the fallacy of assuming too much "external spillover" can be overcome. Two such assumptions plague the literature, according to Mitchell: intervention of some sort is more or less inevitable regardless of the context of the strife; and an appeal for aid, by one combatant at least, is a phenomenon so ubiquitous that it can be taken as, given. Though Mitchell's work does not offer a comprehensive theory of external involvement it does posit a theoretical relationship between external involvement (the dependent variable) and four primary groups of independent variables; as well it points out two theoretical assumptions which are generally accepted but which could quite possibly be erroneous--the inevitability of intervention and the ubiquity of the appeal for aid.

John W. Eley, in an ongoing study known as the World ¹³ Policeman Project, examines the policies of the United States towards internal wars from 1945 to 1970. Eley attempts to relate three dependent variables--the number of U.S. events involved in the war-torn system; the number of U.S. military assistance actions; and the total number of assistance actions--to six independent variables--the duration of the conflict; the volume of trade between the U.S. and the state in question; the number of treaties between the U.S. and the parties in the war-torn system; the

level of U.S. economic assistance; the level of previous U.S. military assistance; and the type of conflict. In preliminary findings, Eley has suggested that the type of conflict has the closest positive relationship with all three foreign policy measures, and that a state's reaction to internal wars is determined primarily by the nature of the conflict, rather than by previous relations with the war-torn system.

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There are several authors, such as Mortan A. Kaplan and Oran Young¹⁵ who have suggested that the reaction of a state to the internal strife of another can be explained through an examination of the positions of the two states in the international system. These systems theorists have agreed that superpowers react in an interventive fashion to internal wars in smaller powers within their so-called "sphere of influence". Though neither Young nor Kaplan have dealt with a power such as China, their work is relevant here because it posits a positive relationship between the action of a state (the dependent variable) and the position of that state in the international system (the independent variable).

Specific Theories of Chinese Involvement

Few studies have attempted a comprehensive treatment of Chinese involvement in the internal affairs of other states. Usually, authors have limited their analyses to a particular geographical region. Most of these studies have been descriptive historical analyses. While often illuminating and fascinating, they have not produced the focused theoretical generalizations more common to studies of superpower action.

Ernst Halperin and Cecil Johnson have both dealt with the support China has given revolutionary movements in Latin America. However, both of these studies are concerned primarily with pre-Cultural Revolution data. Halperin makes a major contribution in his emphasis on the role of the Sino-Soviet conflict in Chinese relations with Latin American communist parties and revolutionary groups. He suggests that warm relations between these parties and China are a function, at least in part, of the party's condemnation of the Soviet Union and the Soviet approach to revolution. Cecil Johnson concludes in his work that the Chinese have been trying to win over any and all communist parties and revolutionary groups without regard to the nature of the movement or the national situation in which a movement is operating. Though he recognizes the significance of the Sino-Soviet debate, he does not accord it the same significance as Halperin.

Bruce Larkin in a broad study of Chinese-African relations, has suggested that Chinese support for revolutionary movements is primarily a function of the type of political system of the state in question, and secondarily of the political leanings of the movement. He suggests that in those cases where a radical nationalist movement in a colonial area supports the Soviet Union internationally, Peking will support it only if there is no other viable movement within that same state. In other words, Peking generally offers support to the alternate movement even if it is smaller and less significant than the one receiving support from Moscow. Thus

within colonial Africa, it is the Sino-Soviet dispute which is the main explanatory variable in the allocation of Chinese support.

The literature on Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Asia is extensive, but most of these studies have concentrated primarily on the analysis of the war-torn states of the Southeast. Few theoretical insights have been offered.¹⁹

Peter Van Ness is the only author to deal with all geographical areas in the third world within the confines of a single study. Following a study of approximately forty movements in 1965, Van Ness suggests that the major explanation for Chinese support is the tenor of relations between the two states, as expressed by hostility of friendship by a third-world government towards China. Secondary variables such as the attitude of a revolutionary movement towards the Soviet Union and the nature of the state are additional factors in Van Ness's explanation, although he fails to deal systematically with the relative importance of these other variables.

The aim of this thesis is to determine the level and pattern of Chinese support and to offer an explanation of those patterns. The theories of Chinese support offered by other authors will be assessed, and hopefully the results will be useful in developing a more general theory concerning patterns of external involvement in the internal affairs of third-world states. This study can be seen in the context of three of C. R. Mitchell's categories of relevant foci,²¹ although the nature of the movements

we are interested in is more limited than Mitchell's all-encompassing "internal war". In essence, we are attempting to explain: (1) the factors in China which increase the tendency to support revolutionary movements; (2) the factors in the state of the revolutionary movement which tend to make Chinese support more likely; (3) the geographical and temporal factors which have in the past decade affected the support relationships between China and revolutionary movements. The attributes of the international system which might possibly increase or decrease the likelihood of Chinese support will not be examined directly although the conclusions of the thesis could suggest that these are important variables for future study.

Before examining the methodological foundations of this study, a short discussion of the Chinese model of revolution is in order as it forms the ideological prototype of what Peking considers an ideal movement. A discussion of this model is necessary since it forms the foundation for the construction of one of the independent variables.

D. THE CHINESE MODEL FOR "PEOPLE'S WAR"

The Chinese model for a successful revolutionary movement is based on the Chinese revolutionary experience modified by the conditions in the underdeveloped world. Aimed predominantly at colonial and so-called neo-colonial regimes, it is more than the direct application of the Chinese revolution to other countries. Instead, it provides movements with a number of important principles which should be adapted and used according to the particular

situation in which a movement operates. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to explain how the model was derived from the Chinese revolution and consequently modified; in any case, other analysts²² have already treated this subject extensively. This section will present an outline of the major tenets of a "people's war" as set forth by Lin Piao in 1965.²³ Though it may appear somewhat arbitrary to use a single article as the basis for the model, this article was distributed widely in China in 1965, and often referred to subsequently as the final word on the subject.²⁴ Even after the fall of Lin there has been no public refutation of the article and thus it appears that Lin Piao was presenting the official position of the Peking government. We are assuming here that this is in fact so, and there appears very little evidence to suggest that such was not the case. The model can very easily be broken down into component parts which represent separate elements or tenets of an ideal revolutionary movement even though Lin himself did not do so. All of these, as we shall now see, are rooted in the Chinese experience.

1. The revolution must be led by a communist party, analyzing the situation in its country by the use of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, as did Mao:

Basing himself on the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism and applying the method of class analysis, Comrade Mao Tse-Tung analysed; first, the mutual transformation of China's principal and non-principal contradictions following the invasion of China by Japanese imperialism; second, the consequent changes

in class relations within China and in international relations and; third, the balance of forces between China and Japan. This analysis provided the scientific basis upon which the political and military lines of the War of Resistance were formulated. 25

Whatever the particular circumstances in a country, the central communist party must use such an analysis to find the right strategy for victory. While the strategy itself can vary, it is only under the leadership of the party that sufficient understanding can be generated to produce a viable revolution.

2. The second requirement of a people's war is perhaps the most important; it is certainly the one element that has had the greatest impact on the history of modern China. It is to:

Apply the line and policy of the United Front . . .
In order to win a people's war, it is imperative to build the broadest possible united front and formulate a series of policies which will ensure the fullest mobilization of the basic masses as well as the unity of all the forces that can be united. 26

The workers and the peasants must be united in this front, as should all elements of the country that can be marshalled against the ruling government. In order to accomplish this some compromise in the form of policy adjustments is invariably needed, but "within the united front the Communist Party must maintain its ideological, political and organizational independence and initiative and insist on its leading role". In building this united front the worker-peasant alliance must be first established, "and only on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, it is possible to establish the

second alliance, form a broad united front and wage a people's war victoriously." ²⁷ The importance of this element can be seen in the

Chinese experience, for without it the revolution might well have faltered. ²⁸

3. Undoubtedly, the greatest Chinese adaptation of the Bolshevik revolutionaries' historical example to China was their shift in emphasis from the urban proletariat to the rural peasants. Similarly, very few countries in the third world can boast of a sufficiently developed economy to have a significant urban labour force. Therefore, in the Chinese model for a people's war, it is imperative "to rely on the peasants, build rural base areas and use the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities--such was the way to ~~victory~~ ²⁹ in the Chinese revolution". It is from the rural peasants that the strength of the movement must come in manpower, tactical advantage, and material resources.

4. Two basic elements comprise the fourth requirement which describes the correct nature of the revolutionary army. First, the army must be as oriented toward politics as it is toward fighting:

Political work is the lifeline of our army. True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement of its weapons and equipment and its military technique, but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons and technique; it relies mainly on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and courage of the commanders and fighters, on the support and backing of the masses. 30

Second, this army must be under the "absolute leadership of the Communist Party,"³¹ in fact a tool of the party, for it is mandatory that "the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed³² to command the Party."

5. Having established the nature of the revolutionary army, Lin explained the strategy necessary to defeat its enemy. Western scholars often maintain that the strategy of people's war is one of guerrilla warfare, Mao himself made it clear that a modern mobilized army is mandatory for success and that guerrilla tactics, while important, are nonetheless supplementary to this potent mobilized³³ force. Guerrilla warfare is necessary, however, for as Lin pointed out:

Guerrilla warfare is the only way to mobilize and apply the whole strength of the people against the enemy, the only way to expand our forces in the course of the war, deplete and weaken the enemy, gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, switch from guerrilla to mobile warfare, and finally defeat the enemy. 34

Thus, "the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold; to support³⁵ regular warfare and to transform itself into regular warfare."

Refusal to fight unless assured of victory, however small; tactical withdrawal in the face of superior forces; and surprise are the other tactics espoused by Lin for the people's army. Essentially, however, the tactics of people's war can be summed up as the mobilization of the population and the use of guerrilla warfare as a prerequisite to, and an adjunct of, a mobilized army.

6. The final tenet of Lin Piao's people's war is the adherence of the revolutionary movement to a policy of self-reliance. It is that: "The liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves, this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way." ³⁶ This is probably the most ambiguous of all the tenets, and in fact was never mentioned in earlier discussions of the theory of people's war, such as that of Lui Shao-Chi in 1949. This does not imply that China would offer no support for national liberation struggles, but rather that a self-reliant struggle must be waged in order to expect external support. Lin Piao dealt easily with this seeming difficulty in his summary of China's stance towards revolutionary movements:

As for revolutionary wars waged by the oppressed nations and peoples, so far from opposing them, we invariably give them fine support and active aid. It has been so in the past, it remains so in the present, and when we grow in strength as time goes on, we will give them still more support and aid in the future . . . Of course, every revolution in a country stems from the demands of its own people. Only when the people in a country are awakened, mobilized, organized, and armed can they overthrow the reactionary rule of imperialism and its lackeys through struggle; their role cannot be replaced or taken over by any people from outside. In this sense, revolution cannot be imported. But this does not exclude mutual sympathy and support on the part of revolutionary people in their struggles against the imperialists and their lackeys. Our support and aid to other revolutionary people serves precisely to help their self-reliant struggle. 37

Despite the fact that China has outlined the characteristics of an ideal revolutionary movement, the Chinese leaders have never said explicitly that a movement not subscribing to a required minimum of these would be denied support. In fact, in the same article by Lin Piao, three other attributes were mentioned: (1) a movement should be anti-colonial and anti-imperialist; (2) it should be oriented towards socialism and/or communism; and (3) it should be vigorously pursued with relatively strong popular support. In practice, if a movement fulfills the first six attributes it would also fulfill the last three. For China, these last three tenets can perhaps be seen as the necessary and sufficient conditions for a hypothetical member of the united front, despite the fact that such a movement might be a long way from meeting all other conditions. According to the Chinese theory, by presenting a world-wide front against a common enemy, victory will be easier; having overcome the principle enemy, attention can then be turned to purifying elements within the united front. In discussing the past wars of national liberation, several of which differed radically from the Chinese model, Lin said:

The classes leading these wars may vary, and so may the breadth and depth of mass mobilization and the extent of victory, but the victories in these people's wars have very much weakened and pinned down the forces of imperialism, upset the U.S. imperialist plan to launch a world war, and become mighty factors defending world peace. 38

This theory of people's war, with its six major and three minor tenets, forms the basis for the construction of one of the

independent variables, the "Revolutionary Index". We are assuming that this model is accepted by the Chinese government, and the methodology used to test our hypotheses is based on this premise.

E. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this thesis is an outgrowth of previous work used in other studies of Chinese behaviour and in more general events data research. Peter Van Ness, in his study of Chinese support for revolutionary movements in 1965, uses a comparison of two indicators, representing Chinese support and the hostility of a third-world government towards China, to examine whether China supports movements on the basis of intergovernmental hostility. At a time when China claimed to support a movement on the basis of its ideological nature, a study such as Van Ness's is naturally unsatisfactory, for it ignores possibilities alternative to its central hypothesis. Second, as his study covers only one year his generalizations require further testing. In this thesis we are trying to avoid such pitfalls by using three separate time periods and by setting up a series of variables which can be used to test a series of hypotheses.

We have attempted to draw from that genre of research that has been called events data research or events research in order to make this study more rigorous. According to Burgess and
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Lawson, the advances made towards building a more rigorous science by events data research have been due to a careful approach to data collection and organization. Studies of this nature

generally: (1) examine both unilateral and collective action; (2) use direct targets only; (3) break complex actions into discrete actions; (4) focus on all salient foreign policy actions; and (5) have a set time frame. This study fulfills all those criteria:

(1) Support granted a revolutionary movement by China with the co-operation of another country is treated as an action of support equivalent to Chinese unilateral support; (2) Only direct recipients of Chinese support are classified as targets; (3) An action of support for several movements is considered as a separate action of support for each movement; (4) It focuses on both positive verbal and active behaviour, and both are considered salient actions of support; and, (5) A set time frame consisting of three time periods has been established. Using consistent and controlled interpretation of data, it is hoped that generalizations drawn in conclusion will avoid the pitfall of comparing essentially incomparable data. This study falls short of much events data research in statistical sophistication, but this is a function of the narrowness of its focus and the concomitant problem of too small a sample size for such methodology. In any case, the only difficulty this entails is the necessity of interpreting the data intellectually rather than statistically; while the latter is useful when dealing with large populations, it is not clear by any means that it avoids the problems of less quantitative techniques of data interpretation.

The methodology involves a qualitative comparison of three principle variables; one dependent and two independent. One

secondary independent variable and one control variable are also included in the analysis. The principle variables are all composite indices composed of a series of relevant indicators. The results of the comparison will be used to test a set of hypotheses presented at the end of this chapter. The dependent variable, the "support index", describes the pattern of support China offers to all revolutionary movements considered. The two major independent variables, the "hostility index" and the "revolutionary index", will be used to try to explain the pattern of support described by the dependent variable. These two independent variables will be assessed for a limited number of movements as a complete analysis is well beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the movements chosen represent different types of situations and receive varying levels of support from China. Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that the generalizations drawn from the results are in fact valid. Though the number of movements considered is not large enough to justify a quantitative comparison of the indices through multiple correlation and regression analysis, essentially the methodology is a correlation of the major variables, albeit done intellectually. By relating the two primary independent variables to the dependent variable, their relative importance can be assessed. The computing of the dependent variable relates it automatically to the secondary independent variable, the geographical region of a particular state. The control variable, time, assesses the changes in Chinese support policy between 1965, 1969,

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and 1971, the three time periods of this project. We shall now proceed to explain the construction of the indices, then set out the hypotheses to be tested.

1. Construction of the "Support Index" (dependent variable)

Chinese support for revolutionary movements can take several forms. We have modified the sort of taxonomy found predominantly in the literature where a distinction is drawn between political, economic, diplomatic and military assistance.⁴⁰ Instead we have set up three broad categories of support. First, Chinese officials generally offer political support through praise of a revolutionary movement in the Chinese press. This can itself take several forms, all of which are grouped here as "public support". Second, military and economic support must be treated as the same type of support, for both demonstrate an important tangible commitment to the support of a movement. Thus, both are grouped under a classification called "tangible support". Finally, there is a type of support that gives open recognition to the revolutionary movement. This type of support, acting as a legitimizing agent for the movement, is diplomatic or "institutional support" where China has established formal ties with the movement.

(1) Public Support

There are four types of public support that will be examined: (a) statements of support for a movement emanating from Mao or other senior officials of the Chinese government; (b) similar

statements by lesser officials or major press articles backing a movement; (c) similar statements by the Chinese Communist Party or statements by the front organizations of the movements reprinted in the Chinese press; and, (d) general references of support in the Chinese press. In computing the support index, each of the indicators will be weighted in order to indicate its relative significance. In the case of public support for a government opposed by a revolutionary movement, the indicators will be weighted negatively, so as to signify negative support. The data for all four categories of public support are drawn from the Peking Review and the translated selections from the Chinese press published by the American Consulate in Hong Kong under the titles: Survey of China Mainland Press, Survey of China Mainland Magazine, and Current Background.

(ii) Tangible Support

Tangible economic or military support will be weighted along with the four indicators of public support. As economic or military support obviously connotes a strong commitment to a movement, it will be weighted heavily. As with the indicators of public support, when tangible support is granted to a national government instead of a revolutionary movement, it will be weighted negatively. (China has had, at various times, a policy of giving relatively small amounts of money to leaders of revolutionary movements for organizational purposes. In these cases the amount of money is so small that such an act will not be interpreted as

tangible support; usually this money is of little help other than providing funds for minor administrative purposes.) The data for this element are drawn primarily from secondary sources, although the Chinese themselves occasionally make certain information available.

(iii) Institutional Support

Some revolutionary movements have front organizations with permanent missions in Peking, and others send delegates to visit with Chinese officials from time to time. In cases where either or both of these two types of formal links exist, the movement will be deemed to have "institutional support", another indicator in the support index. Negative support will be accorded a movement when active formal diplomatic relations exist between Peking and the government of the country in question. The Peking Review, the Survey of China Mainland Press, and international yearbooks serve as the sources for this data.

The weightings of the indicators in the support index are based on the relative importance of each indicator in committing China to a position backing the revolutionary movement. As Peter Van Ness points out:

A statement by Mao Tse-Tung is the strongest kind of verbal support Peking can provide. Each statement is invariably accompanied by mass rallies . . . and propaganda campaigns throughout the country and abroad. Public support does not stop there; usually a statement of support by Chairman Mao implies a continuing Chinese interest in and commitment to the particular area chosen for endorsement. 41

Thus such a statement is accorded a relatively heavy weight. Chou En-lai and Lin Piao also have created parallel commitments by openly endorsing a movement, much more than either junior officials or the CCP. The lowest level of public support receives a low weighting, for while not as strong a statement as other levels, it is still significant: "when in official publications certain areas are designated as areas in which armed struggles against imperialism are being carried on, there is, at the very least, a strong implication of official Chinese endorsement." ⁴² Clearly, tangible economic or military support is as important as any statement and thus it is accorded the same significance as a statement by Mao and other senior officials. Institutional support, while a very positive act of support, cannot be considered of quite the same magnitude as actual tangible aid, and thus is accorded a slightly lower weighting.

The weightings of the indicators of the support index are therefore as follows:

SUPPORT INDEX

PUBLIC SUPPORT

Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL Support Index
4(-4)	2(-2)	2(-2)	1(-1)	4(-4)	3(-3)	Between 16 & -16

These values permit the construction of an index, applicable to all movement, which will yield a picture of relative levels of support.

2. Construction of the "Hostility Index" (independent variable)

A country's voting record in the United Nations General Assembly on the two resolutions of the annual China representation issue will be used as indicators of hostility or friendship towards China. Each year, up to and including 1971 when China's seat in the United Nations was finally given to the Peking government, a resolution, known as the "Albanian resolution", was voted on. This resolution proposed the replacement of the Taiwan representatives by those of Peking, and the restoration of China's lawful seat in the U.N. to the People's Republic of China. The United States sponsored, each year, a procedural resolution declaring the Albanian resolution an "important question" involving considerations of the U.N. Charter. This resolution made the representation issue subject to the rule that two-thirds of the General Assembly must be in favor of a resolution for it to be passed. Clearly, the firm supporters of China voted against the important question resolution and for the Albanian resolution. Adversaries of Peking did the reverse. A vote for the Albanian resolution will be considered an act of friendship, as will a vote against the U.S.-sponsored important question resolution. Votes opposed to these, or abstentions, will be considered acts of hostility.

Diplomatic relations between the country in question and Peking will be seen as an indicator of friendship; similar relations

with Taiwan will indicate hostility. Extensive trade with Peking (more than 5% of a country's total trade or more than U.S. \$50 million) will be used as an indicator of friendship; similar trade with Taiwan will be used as an indicator of hostility. Finally, a military defence alliance with China will be considered friendly, while one with Taiwan or the United States will be construed as an act of hostility. Most of the data for this variable can be found in the U.N. International Trade Statistics Yearbook, the Far Eastern Economic Review, and/or any national sources available.

The weightings of the indicators of the hostility index will be uniform; the index will nevertheless provide a measure of the relative intensity of hostility or friendship by governments towards China. No attempt is made to ascribe differing weights to the various indicators as it would be excessively difficult to determine relative importance, even through such techniques (which are themselves most questionable) as pair-scaling. As opposed to the support index, where different levels of public support clearly represent different degrees of commitment to a movement, we are assuming that the relative importance of each indicator is significant as it adds or subtracts from the final index figure to provide a comparison of the relative intensity of hostility or friendship of various governments towards China. Problems created by uniform weighting should be less than those created by differential weighting. The weighting is as follows:

HOSTILITY INDEX

U.N. voting on Important Question	U.N. voting on Albanian resolution	Diplomatic relations with Peking or Taiwan	Extensive trade with Peking or Taiwan	Military defence alliance with Peking or Taiwan or the west	TOTAL- Hostility Index
1(-1)	1(-1)	1(-1)	1(-1)	1(-1)	between 5 & -5

(negative values represent Hostility)

3. Construction of the Revolutionary Index (independent variable)

The indicators of this third variable consist of the elements of an ideal people's war as outlined in the last section of this chapter, and an indicator of a movement's stance on the Sino-Soviet rift. Although these were discussed previously, the main points will be outlined in order to explain the construction of this index.

(1) The six major tenets of an ideal people's war are the first six indicators of this index. The first of these requirements is that a revolutionary communist party be the principle front of the organization of the movement. Second, "In order to win a people's war, it is imperative to build the broadest possible united front . . ." consisting of a worker-peasant (and if necessary, an urban petit bourgeois) alliance. Third, though such an alliance is essential, it is imperative to rely on the peasantry in order to establish

rural bases. Fourth, essential to a people's war is the existence of an army subordinated to the Communist Party, and as interested in political work as military ventures. This party-led army should follow the strategy of mobilizing the population and use the tactics of guerrilla warfare. These two attributes comprise the fifth requirement of the Chinese model for revolution. The final tenet of Lin Piao's 'people's war' is the adherence of the revolution to a policy of self-reliance. The more closely a movement conforms to these six principles, the higher the score it will receive on the Revolutionary Index.

(ii) The three minor requirements, as pointed out earlier, demand that a movement: be anti-colonial, anti-feudal, and anti-imperialist; be oriented towards socialism and/or communism; and be vigorously pursued with some significant amount of popular support. These three indicators will be considered along with the first six to indicate the degree of ideological consistency between a revolutionary movement and the Chinese model.

(iii) Finally an annotation will be made to the numerical value of the revolutionary index indicating whether the movement in question supports China, supports the Soviet Union, or is uncommitted in the internationalization of the Sino-Soviet rift that has divided the communist world. This indicator is included to test the accuracy of some of the findings suggested by Halperin⁴³ and Larkin⁴⁴. As this element is of a distinctly different nature from the first nine, it will be added to the index in the form of a letter: "R" if the

movement supports the Soviet Union; "C" if the movement supports China; and "U" if the movement is uncommitted or split in its allegiance. This will enable us to assess the correlation of this element with the support index as separate from the correlation between the two composite indices.

The data for this index are gathered primarily from secondary sources, as primary research for even the selected number of movements would present an insuperable obstacle for a project of this size. In any case, the literature on revolutionary movements is, for the most part, sufficient to provide the necessary information.

The weights of the first nine indicators of the revolutionary index are uniform. The index is simply a measure of the degree of conformity of a given revolutionary movement to the Chinese prototype.

REVOLUTIONARY INDEX

Led by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Communist Party	1	For C or U
Correct utilization of the "united front policy"	1	
Reliance on peasantry & the establishment of rural bases	1	
Communist party-led army, politically motivated & mass-backed	1	
Mobilized population & guerrilla warfare strategy & tactics	1	
Adherence to a policy of self-reliance	1	
Anti-colonial	1	
Anti-feudal and Anti-imperialist	1	
Oriented towards socialism and/or communism	1	
Vigorously pursued with significant popular support	1	
Stance on Sino-Soviet rift: "R"--pro-Soviet; "C"--pro-Chinese; "U"--uncommitted		
TOTAL- Revolutionary Index		
0 and 9 R, C or U		

(For example, if a movement fulfilled only the three minimum requirements and backed China in the Sino-Soviet rift, it would receive a rating of '3C' on this index.)

4. Analysis and Hypotheses

The analysis of the three principle variables will cover three time periods. This provides the possibility of testing for uniformity in Chinese policy across time. Time can, therefore, be considered as a control variable. The literature indicates that there have been four separate phases in Chinese foreign policy since 1963.⁴⁵ Though we shall analyze three of these four time periods, it has not been established that these phases have represented differing policies of support for revolutionary movements. The inclusion of time as a control variable will test this hypothesis. The first of these phases ended with the introduction of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and was marked by an effort to establish a mobilized group of third-world states opposed to both the United States and the Soviet Union, a real "third force". With the breaking up of the rather tenuous third force, primarily due to the overthrow of the pro-Chinese governments in such countries as Ghana, Indonesia, and Algeria, came the Cultural Revolution, which marks the second historical phase. As it represented a "turning-in"⁴⁶ or a preoccupation with internal affairs at the expense of relations with the outside world, we are not considering this era in this thesis. The third phase began at the "turning-out" of Chinese attention at the end of the Cultural

Revolution and appears to have lasted until the latter half of 1970. At that time China began to involve herself more and more in conventional diplomacy with western states together with renewed hostility with the Soviet Union. Therefore, we have chosen the years 1965, 1969 and 1971 to represent the first, third, and fourth eras. Of course, the results of this study may suggest that vast disparities between the periods do not exist and that the break-up of Chinese foreign policy into these phases is unjustified.

Separate analyses are conducted in this thesis for three geographical regions in order to test for deviations in patterns of support based on physical proximity to China. The three regions are Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and Asia. Hence, geographical proximity is an additional independent variable.

In summary, there is one dependent variable, three independent variables and a control variable. Of the independent variables, the hostility index and the revolutionary index are primary variables which are composites of various indicators, while geographical proximity is essentially a secondary or contextual independent variable. Time serves as a control variable. If neither of the primary independent variables appear to be correlated with the support index despite a consistent geographical and/or temporal pattern, the conclusions drawn from the analysis will be quite different from those drawn from a significant correlation between the primary variables. In the case where such a significant correlation does exist, region could still be significant,

if patterns exist but appear limited to geographical region.

Temporal variation within and across regions is possible regardless of the correlation between primary variables.

The results of this analysis will be used to test a set of hypotheses. The hypotheses to be tested are not meant to be either mutually exclusive or necessarily complementary; their testing should, however, illuminate the patterns of Chinese support for revolutionary movements and the explanation for those patterns. The hypotheses are:

1. The greater the geographical proximity of a state to China, the more likely China will be to take an interest in the indigenous movement and offer it support.
2. When directly confronting the United States or one of its so-called "imperialist tools" (e.g., U.N. forces, Israel) a movement is likely to receive a high level of support, greater than the revolutionary nature of the movement alone would dictate, regardless of the geographical proximity. (Chinese ideology)
3. A movement, in any geographical region, aimed at the overthrow of a government hostile to Peking is more likely to receive support than one aimed at the displacement of a friendly regime. (Van Ness)
4. When a regime is uncommitted in its dealings with China, China will hesitate to support an indigenous revolutionary movement, in hopes of broadening her international political bases, regardless of geographical proximity. (Van Ness, Larkin)

5. In Africa, a movement aimed at the overthrow of a colonial or apartheid regime will receive greater support than one merely aimed at a pro-western regime. (Larkin)

6. When a revolutionary movement supports the Soviet Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute, China will support either an alternate organization within that state, or, if one does not exist, no movement at all, regardless of the geographical proximity of that state to China or the tenor of relations between the governing regime and China. (Johnson, Halperin)

7. The greater degree of conformity of a given revolutionary movement to the Chinese prototype for people's war, the greater the support the movement will be accorded, regardless of geographical proximity or governmental hostility. (Chinese ideology)

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER II

CHINESE SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

This chapter will describe the support China offered revolutionary movements during the three time periods that we are considering in this project. There will be no attempt until later chapters to explain this support--we are simply interested here in computing the dependent variable. We shall examine each geographical area separately, assessing the support index for all the movements in each area (not just for the case studies analyzed in subsequent chapters). We shall first look at support offered Latin American movements, then at support offered African and Middle Eastern movements, and finally at support offered Asian movements.

Latin America

Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Latin America has been generally low-keyed. During 1965, the tempo of public support for movements increased in reaction to the very severe hostility expressed by Latin America as a whole to the intervention in the Dominican Republic by the United States. The American intervention sparked a massive anti-U.S. campaign in the Chinese press and a high level of support for the forces aimed at the overthrow of the pro-U.S. Dominican regime. In the middle of 1965 the Chinese published a map of Latin America outlining the areas of "anti-U.S. and anti-dictatorship armed struggles and guerrilla activities." Included in the map were twelve countries:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
 Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.¹

The Dominican struggle received a very high level of public support, including a statement by Mao himself supporting the Dominicans in their struggle "against U.S. imperialism". Yet this statement seemed not to focus on the actual events in the Republic as it analyzed the entire situation as an example of and a demonstration to the people of Latin America that the American claim to adherence to the principles of non-intervention was completely bankrupt. The American claim that the troops were there to defend freedom met with disdain from Mao:

What kind of freedom is this? It is the freedom to use airplanes, warships and guns to slaughter the people of other countries. It is the freedom to violate the sovereignty of other countries at will, the freedom to invade and occupy their territory at will. It is the freedom of pirates to loot and kill. It is the freedom to trample underfoot all the countries and peoples of the world. This is what the U.S. imperialists are doing in the Dominican Republic, in Vietnam, in the Congo (Léopoldville) and in many other places. 2

Even though subsequent manifestations of Chinese sympathy for the Dominican insurgents would lend us to believe that the Chinese leaders had "a high priority assigned to developments in
 the tiny Caribbean republic,"³ it seems as though this support is
⁴ high for two reasons. First and most importantly, it was seen as a movement that would, given growing Latin American wariness of the American behemoth, spread throughout Central and South America.

Second, it was related to the entire anti-U.S. propaganda campaign which was at a relatively high point at this time, hence the comparison to the Vietnamese situation and the civil strife in the Congo (Zaire) which had precipitated the arrival of U.N. troops in an essentially domestic conflict. An article in June, 1965, appearing in a Chinese journal explained the regional significance of the Dominican crisis:

The significance of the Dominican people's struggle far exceeds the border of Dominica. It has become a signal for a new tide of national democratic revolution in Latin America. The people of Latin American countries have all been under American imperialist oppression and exploitation. Any people's struggle in one Latin American country will light the fire of anti-American struggle in all of Latin America. 5

Though this is not central to the ascertaining of relative levels of support, it is included here to explain the Chinese view of the Dominican situation.

The Bolivian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Venezuela are cited by Van Ness as being given explicit support⁶ during 1965. With this group our model also requires that we include Brazil, Columbia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. In all of these cases the specific revolutionary organization⁷ was discussed; not merely the "people's struggle" as is usually the case in lowest level public support. Therefore, all these seven countries, plus Bolivia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic were the loci of movements given second level support by Peking.

At the third level, though the CCP made no significant support statements for parties or organizations during 1965, the communist parties of Peru, Brazil, and Columbia had major statements reprinted in the Peking Review.⁸

The delegation from the Communist Party of Venezuela was the only visit from members of Latin American revolutionary movements to Peking in 1965 except for an unpublicized visit from Elias Seman of the Argentine Communist Vanguard.⁹ There appears to be no evidence of any substantial aid granted any Latin American movements at this time (or in 1969 for that matter), but on the other hand none of the \$942 million of aid China granted to non-communist countries between 1956 and 1965 (inclusive) was given to Latin American states.¹⁰ Finally, in 1965, no Latin American country that we are considering had active diplomatic relations with China. Therefore, as we can see from Table II-1, which summarizes the evidence cited above, Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Latin America was, for the most part, low.

In 1969 levels of support were generally lower, although in some cases support was offered where in 1965 there had been none. As in 1965, the events in Latin America provided Peking with a volatile issue. Though of much less significance than American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Rockefeller's tour of several countries in Central and South America and his rather less than warm welcome was interpreted by the Chinese press as a major slap in the face for American imperialism.¹¹ The struggles of the

TABLE II-1

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1965

LATIN AMERICA

Country	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL - Support Index
Argentina				1		3	4
Bolivia		2	"	1			3
Brazil		2	2	1			5
Chile							0
Colombia		2	2	1			5
Dominican Rep.	4	2		1			7
Ecuador							0
El Salvador							0
Guatemala		2		1			3
Haiti				1			1
Honduras		2		1			3
Mexico		2	2	1			5
Nicaragua		2		1			3
Panama							0
Paraguay		2		1			3
Peru		2	2	1			5
Uruguay							0
Venezuela		2		1		3	6

peoples of Latin America were praised during the Rockefeller visit:

From their experience accumulated through long years of struggle in which they fought, failed and fought again the Latin American people have come to understand that liberation and freedom of the people cannot be granted by others but have to be won through a tenacious struggle. The fact that the people of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela drove the "god of plague" Rockefeller out of their countries once again shows that the surging struggle of the Latin American people against the U.S. Aggressors is irresistible. 12

Similar general references during June, coupled with analyses of both the world revolutionary movement and the Latin American movement in particular at the beginning of the year, comprise the major bulk of the low-level support for 1969. Two elements of the struggles were stressed; the tactical policies of the movements and their ubiquity.

The major policy stressed was that of the united front:

In Latin America, the student movement and the worker and peasant struggles were joining forces in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, etc., to become a new powerful storm assailing Yankee imperialism and dictatorial rule. 13

The outbreak of "powerful mass struggle" where general strikes and seizure of land were the mode were stressed by the Chinese in discussing the movements of the countries mentioned above as well as Ecuador and El Salvador. 14

During 1969 there were no major press statements by senior officials or leaders in Peking on Latin American affairs.

Slightly higher than the 1965 level was the frequency of reprinting of major articles of the specific organizations by the Chinese Press.

The Communist Party of Brazil, the Chilean Revolutionary Communist Party, the Argentine Communist Vanguard, the Peruvian Communist Party and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador all were granted the space to reprint manifestos or statements.

One very noticeable difference between press coverage of 1965 and 1969 is the greatly increased frequency of reprinted letters from revolutionary front organizations from all over the world to the government and people of China. Usually these are sent on the major occasions of the Chinese year: the anniversary of the People's Republic (China National Day), the opening of the CCP Congress, etc. Though these letters do not in themselves automatically imply that Peking supports the movement, when they appear regularly, they can be regarded as endorsement. Their reprinting by the Chinese does help to legitimize the organizations and thus is an expression by the Chinese of explicit support. This support, given the high level of frequency of these letters, as mentioned in Chapter I, should probably be weighted as support equivalent to explicit promotion of a movement by the CCP. The communist parties of Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Argentina and Ecuador all conducted this type of correspondence with China and had their letters reprinted.

As in 1965, there is no concrete evidence that Peking proffered any sort of tangible aid to either governments or movements, and had still yet to establish diplomatic relations with any one of these potentially revolutionary Latin American countries.

Consequently there were no references to Latin America other than in the context of revolutionary movements. The only relations of any sort on a semi-formal level was the visit to China of a delegation led by the former president of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch, who was received warmly. This naturally was an endorsement of anti-Government forces in Dominica, although the visit received relatively little fanfare. The articles in the Chinese press stressed the visit, not the struggle and the normal anti-imperialist theme.

In summary, Table II-2 shows us that the Brazilian, Peruvian and Bolivian movements had support quotients for 1969 equal to those of 1965. The quotients for the rest of the movements tended to have a fairly high deviation in 1969 from their pre-Cultural Revolution levels.

During 1971, the support offered the Latin American movements by China was considerably less than in either 1965 or 1969. Perhaps part of China's so-called "turning out" ¹⁷ the support pattern for 1971 shows a marked tendency towards the development of friendlier government to government relations between most Latin American states and China.

Perhaps the most significant element in Sino-Latin American relations was the normalizing of relations with Chile following Allende's victory. There was a stream of diplomats, sporting delegations, government officials, journalists and other "friends" flowing between the two countries after diplomatic relations were established in early January. ¹⁸ Thus Chile must be

TABLE II-2

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1969

LATIN AMERICA

Country	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL - Support Index
Argentina		2	2	1			5
Bolivia		2		1			3
Brazil		2	2	1			5
Chile		2	2	1			5
Colombia				1			1
Dominican Rep.				1		3	4
Ecuador		2	2	1			5
El Salvador				1			1
Guatemala							0
Haiti							0
Honduras				1			0
Mexico							1
Nicaragua							0
Panama							0
Paraguay							0
Peru		2	2	1			5
Uruguay				1			1
Venezuela				1			1

deleted from the 1971 analysis as the anti-government party that had been the recipient of previous support was now part of the government coalition. One might expect from the communist-socialist victory in Chile that China would be prone to assume that events were beginning to fall into the leftward swing of a historical dialectic in all of Latin America and offer increasing support to communist parties and revolutionary movements. Such was not the case.

The main theme of Chinese press attention to Latin America throughout the entire year was the conflict between many coastal countries and the United States over the question of sovereign waters. Most countries with either substantial fishing industries or off-shore mineral interests began a very heated campaign in 1971 to extend their de jure territorial limit for 200 nautical miles. As the United States very strongly opposed such a move, the Latin American countries were placed in a situation where the politics of the united front could justify Chinese support for reactionary governments. Though these governments were not revolutionary they were opposing American imperialism and thus received the blessing of Peking, although not at a very high level. Most Chinese statements concerning the sovereignty question were general news analyses which, according to the taxonomy of support can be classified as the lowest level of public support for the governments in power, and thus negative support for any revolutionary movements extant in those countries. The countries who were involved in this

challenge to U.S. hegemony in Latin America and were praised by the Chinese press were: Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the Panama. In statements of support, the Chinese stressed:

Over the past year, new progress has been made by the Latin America countries and peoples in their struggle to defend national independence and state sovereignty and oppose imperialist power politics. A united front to oppose the doctrine of hegemony is gradually taking place.

Colombia was also included in this united front although she was not active in the coastal waters issue.

While articles in the press were noticeably favourable in their treatment of Latin American governments generally, there were exceptions. Paraguay, Haiti and Guatemala were not once discussed, which is somewhat surprising considering the existence of revolutionary movements in all of them. The Dominican Republic was the focus of considerable attention, and support was offered to the anti-government movement that appeared increasingly strong. Both major news analyses and general references demonstrated that China would still support a revolutionary movement in a country that was as entrenched in the American empire as was Dominica.

Apart from that offered the Dominican Republic, the only support given any movement was in the form of the reprinting of congratulatory letters from communist parties on the CCP's 50th anniversary. The Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador, the Communist Party of Brazil, the Communist Party of Peru,

37

and the Communist Party of Honduras (M-L) were all granted this form of support. In the first three cases this conflicts directly with the support Peking gave to the governments of these states in their anti-imperialist struggle over the coastal waters issue. It is especially surprising in the case of Peru, who along with Mexico, and Colombia, was developing relations with China.

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With Peru, China seemed well on the road to the establishment of formal relations following trade agreements and fisheries agreements, while with Mexico the talks were more preliminary, being concerned only with trade. Only sporting delegations were exchanged with Colombia, yet this is nonetheless significant considering the unlikelihood of even this sort of friendliness two years earlier.

Table II-3 summarizes the data for the support China offered movements in Latin America in 1971, and demonstrates the vast differences from 1969 figures. Again, there is no evidence of any tangible military or economic aid to any Latin American movement and there certainly was none for governments.

Africa and the Middle East

Chinese support for revolution in Africa and the Middle East is considerably more confusing, more hidden, and generally more difficult to discern than support in the Latin American cases. This can be easily understood when one recognizes that while most of Latin America has always been considered a subsidiary of the monolithic United States, Africa was not clearly within one sphere of influence. As the African peoples moved from colonialism to

TABLE 11-1

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1971

LATIN AMERICA

Country	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CQZ statements and reprints of front organization statements	General Press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL Support Index
Argentina				-1			-1
Bolivia				-1			-1
Brazil			2	-1			-1
Colombia				-1		-1	-2
Dominican Rep.		2		1			3
Ecuador			2	-1			1
El Salvador				-1			-1
Guatemala							0
Haiti							0
Honduras			2				2
Mexico				-1		-4	-5
Nicaragua				-1			-1
Panama				-1			-1
Paraguay							0
Peru			2	-1		-3	-2
Uruguay				-1			-1
Venezuela				-1			-1

independence many methods and forms of change were used as a tool to help throw off the yoke of subordination of direct or indirect rule. In many cases the instruments of power were passed from the European overseers to the indigenous leaders peacefully without really upsetting anything much beyond the nominal power centres. In other cases violence forced the transfer of power, resulting oftentimes in revolutionary states and sometimes in military dictatorships. Still others have yet to win their independence. With few exceptions, the new states have been marked by unstable regimes, often trying desperately to consolidate a state from seemingly eclectic elements. The future has been far from certain. China thus has been presented with a much more complex set of issues than in Latin America. Certain countries could very well be extremely susceptible to revolution and certain groups and organizations could very well be the leaders of such a new series of future governments. Thus, China has had difficulty in choosing which groups to support and how, taking into account many difficulties inherent in the African political order. As we shall see in Chapter IV, a certain pattern does seem to be discernible.

In 1965 public support was granted fairly sparingly in terms of the number of recipient movements, although formal and tangible support was proliferated to a far greater extent than in Latin America.

Statements representing the highest level of support, that is, by the senior leaders of China, were, as in Latin America,

limited to topical issues, not general endorsements one might expect in policy statements. Mao himself, on behalf of the Chinese people, pledged support for the people of the Congo⁴¹ (referred to here as Congo (K) or as Zaire). This, of course, was in response to the 1964 Congo crisis and the subsequent havoc its repercussions were causing in the international system of Africa. There were many issues of serious contention at hand: the very nature of success-ionist movement; the right of foreign troops in the Congo (K); and the battle of Tshombe with the workings of the OAU Council of ministers. However, Mao addressed his statement simply to the propagation of a people's struggle in the Congo (K). This statement might have been precipitated, or at least its publication quickened, by the open denunciation of the Chinese by the Organization Commune Africaine at Malgache (OCAM) for assisting Ghana in the training of guerrillas for the revolutionary movements in the Congo (K) and other countries.⁴²

Endorsement through CCP support or statement republication was extended to all three struggles of national liberation in the Portuguese colonies as well as to the Congo Supreme Council of Revolution (CSCR), the organizational vanguard of the Congolese movement.⁴³ However, this is not to say that China supported equally all the liberation movements of the Portuguese territories. Though the major analysis of this problem follows in Chapter IV, it is worthy of note that the two Angolan movements, the Angolan People's Liberation Movement (MPLA) and the Angola National Liberation

⁴⁴
 Army both received third level public support ⁴⁵ although only the
 former sent a delegation to China in 1965. Similarly while all
 three Mozambique revolutionary organizations were given space in the
⁴⁶
 press only the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the
 Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) sent delegations to
⁴⁷
 Peking. The Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO) and
 the Guinean (Bissau) movement, the African Independence Party of
 Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), both were given public
⁴⁸
 support, but neither had formal or semi-formal relations with
 China..

The movements of the Portuguese colonies, the Congo,
 Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia (South-West Africa) and Basutoland
 (later Lesotho), Swaziland and Bechuanaland (later Botswana) were
 explicitly endorsed in a speech delivered by Nan Hanchen at the
⁴⁹
 Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in Algiers in February 1965.

Public support was also granted several countries of the
 Middle East area. This includes territory normally classified as
 West Asia but which falls into our category of Africa and the
 Middle East because the areas of the three regions of our breakdown
 are assumed to be internally somewhat homogeneous with respect to
 geographic proximity to China. Thus it makes more sense to see
 Aden (Southern Yemen), the Dhofar Area (Oman), and Turkey in the
 same grouping as Africa and Israel. Both Aden and the Dhofar Area
⁵⁰
 were displayed as sites of revolution in Chinese Maps, and Aden
 was also the recipient of special broadcasts of the New China News

51

Agency. The guerrilla war against Israel was given varying levels of support and the Palestine Liberation Organization was not only specifically mentioned frequently⁵² but also had a permanent mission in China. The only other missions in China were Asian although as mentioned above, delegation visits were made during 1965 by the SCCR⁵³ (Congo), and MPLA(Angola) and the FRELIMO and COREMO (Mozambique).

Though levels of tangible aid are always somewhat difficult to ascertain, it appears that the Angolan, Mozambique, Guinean and Congolese movements were the only struggles granted military arms and supplies. The Guinean movement under the leadership of the PAIGC and perhaps the most successful of all the movements, may not have been receiving aid from China in 1965, although there is sufficient evidence of aid immediately afterwards to include it with the aid-recipient countries.⁵⁴ The PLO of Palestine probably had not, by 1965, received aid.⁵⁵

Table II-4 summarizes the support for African and Middle Eastern movements in 1965. Included are movements not supported despite their relatively large size and revolutionary nature.

The year 1969 saw a pattern of support not markedly different from that of 1965. The major changes were the emergence of Palestine as an increasingly important issue and the relative quiescence of the Congo insurgents.

At the beginning of the year, Peking made it clear that the main areas of concern were still the three Portuguese territories and the Congo:

TABLE II-4

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1965

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Country	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL - Support Index
Colonial Africa:							
Angola		2	2	1	4	3	12
Basutoland				1			1
Bechuanaland				1			1
Fr. Somaliland						-3	-3
Guinea (B)		2		1	4		7
Mozambique		2	2	1	4	3	12
Swaziland				1			1
Apartheid Africa:							
South Africa				1			1
Namibia				1			1
Zimbabwe				1			1
Other Africa:							
Congo (Zaire)	4	2	2	1	4	3	16
Kenya					-4	-3	-7
Ethiopia							0
Middle East							
Israel-Palestine		2		1		3	6
Aden		2		1			3
Dhofar Area				1			1
Turkey							0

In Africa, the revolutionary people in Portuguese Guinea (Bissau), Angola, Mozambique and the Congo (K) having overcome all sorts of difficulties, kept up their armed struggle and in some areas there were even some very marked advances. A new theatre of armed struggle was opened up by the Zimbabwean people who rose to fight colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia. 58

Occasional references were also made to the South African and Namibian movements but generally it appears as though most of the movements granted only a low level of support in 1965 were no longer viable revolutionary areas by 1969. Lesotho and Botswana had replaced Basutoland and Bachuanaland when they achieved independence in 1966, and though neither had recognized the People's Republic of China, the movements within their national boundaries had become quiet with the advent of national sovereignty. Swaziland had gained her independence in 1968. Aden, or officially the Aden Crown Colony and Protectorate, proclaimed her independence with the withdrawal of the British in 1967, and the then unprotected sultans were quickly overthrown and a People's Republic of Southern Yemen was formed following a short stay by a UN mission. A gradual warming
59 of relations between the new Middle Eastern state and Peking ensued.

The movement of the Dhofar Area, however, remained active and was granted a chance to legitimize itself through the republication of its letters to the CCP and to the Chinese government in the
60 press, as were the organizations leading the Angolan struggle,
61 the Zimbabwean struggle, and the Congolese struggle. Curiously, no such statements were made on behalf of the Mozambique organizations or those of Portuguese Guinea although several articles of

relatively major size did offer them very substantial public support.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was the only other movement to receive second level support.⁶³

The Palestine situation, in fact, appeared to be the major concern of the Chinese press for the whole area of Africa and the Middle East. As can be seen from Table 5, the PLO received the highest amount of support of any movement. It was the only movement to be publicly supported by a senior Chinese leader. This endorsement came in the guise of a statement by Lin Biao during the 20th Anniversary celebrations in Peking.⁶⁴

The only major statements that were reprinted in the Chinese press was a combined statement of South Africa's Pan African Congress (PAC) with UNITA, COREMO and ZANU to officially attack the proceedings of the International Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements of the Portuguese Colonies and South Africa, which met in Khartoum in January, 1969. This joint statement, opposing the Congress which comprised most of the pro-Soviet revolutionary movements--African National Congress (ANC), South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), Zimbabwe Africa People's Union (ZAPU), and MPLA, FRELIMO, and PAIGC⁶⁵ --was distributed by the New China News Agency.⁶⁶ This is an example of the extremely complex problem of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Third World and its affect on Chinese support for revolutionary movements. This will be considered, as discussed in Chapter I, as a possible input to Chinese behaviour.

Military assistance appears to have been given to the government of no country where revolution was the aim of a significant sector. On the other hand a few movements did benefit from Chinese assistance, the most noticeable of these being Angola, Mozambique, and Palestine. UNITA was the most supported of the Angolan organizations while COREMO and FRELIMO received all of the Chinese aid earmarked for Mozambique. FRELIMO, based in Tanzania and at one time the only serious revolutionary group in Mozambique, left large areas open for the work of COREMO, which could operate out of Zambia.⁶⁷ PAC of South Africa, which had semi-formal relations with Peking in the guise of two missions, also appears to have received modest financial support as did ZANU and SWANU.⁶⁸ SWANU, the Namibian movement supported by China seems to have been secondary to SWAPO which, due to its strict adherence to the Moscow line, had no relations with China. In fact, it is quite possible that China supported SWANU only as a counter to the already extensive aid of the Soviets to SWAPO. The Congo, quiet in 1969, provided no prospect for revolution and thus received no tangible support. Turkey and the Dhofar Area, while still granted public support by China, were given little else. Similarly there appears to have been no geographical proliferation of support from 1965 to 1969 except in the case of Cameroon. The Cameroon movement⁶⁹ first granted support in 1967 was not mentioned at all in the Chinese press in 1969. It seems a fair assumption to state that by 1969 the Cameroon movement was, at best, the shell of a dying organization.

Thus, as can be seen from Table II-5, no drastic changes marked the pre- and post-Cultural Revolution periods. The differences were, for the most part, of degree, or can be specifically explained by major changes in the internal political order of each individual state except in Kenya.⁷⁰ No new group was introduced, and in fact some, such as the Eritrean Liberation Front, merited more intense non-support than in 1965.⁷¹

In 1971, the pattern of Chinese support for African revolutionary movements differed only marginally from that of 1969. Again the support that was given was mainly earmarked for either movements in the Portuguese colonies or the apartheid racist regimes of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. The one major exception to this was again the Palestine Liberation Organization, which received more support than any other African or Middle-Eastern movement. The Congolese struggle had by 1971 become inactive, and was not once mentioned by the Chinese press. Movements in French Somaliland, Kenya and Ethiopia were all indirectly repudiated by the Chinese through the tacit support granted by Peking to the de jure governments by friendly diplomatic relations. Yet while much of this is very similar to the picture in 1969, several interesting points do emerge from closer analysis.

In the Portuguese colonies a new movement had grown to the point where it gained the attention of both the other struggles and China. The islands of Sao Tomé and Príncipe in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Guinea (Conakry) are under the same political

TABLE II-5

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1969

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Country	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL - Support Index
Colonial Africa:							
Angola		2	2	1	4	3	12
Fr. Somaliland						-3	-3
Guinea (B)		2		1	4		7
Mozambique		2	2	1	4	3	12
Apartheid Africa:							
South Africa			2	1	4	3	10
Namibia		2		1	4		7
Zimbabwe		2	2	1	4	3	12
Other Africa:							
Congo (Zaire)		2	2	1		3	8
Kenya							0
Ethiopia						-3	-3
Middle East:							
Israel-Palestine	4	2		1	4	3	14
Dhofar Area		2		1			3
Turkey				1			1

structure as the mainland colonies and were, in 1971, the site of a growing nationalist movement led by the Committee of Liberation of Sao Tomé and Principle Islands. This group was praised in the Chinese press specifically,⁷² included in general press references⁷³ to ongoing people's struggles, and were invited to send a delegation to China in July.⁷⁴ The Islands, however, are very small, and the Committee of Liberation has never become a member of the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), or been the focus of major press statements of the African Liberation Committee (ALC) of the OAU. It is therefore very doubtful that China was involved in the granting of military or economic aid in 1971 as it had for the most part adopted a policy of supplying arms to most of the nationalist movements through the channels of the ALC. For example, the arms and material for FRELIMO, the largest recipient of Chinese aid in continental Africa, was all⁷⁵ distributed by the ALC.

In Mozambique, COREMO (which had subsumed UDENAMO) was becoming less significant in the face of an ever-growing FRELIMO and was no longer the subject of Chinese interest. It appears that China had ceased her attempt to assist the building of a movement that avoided the non-alignment policies of CONCP in favour of a very pro-Chinese stature. When COREMO began to falter, China simply switched all her attention on the Mozambique movements to FRELIMO, analyzing its victories,⁷⁶ constantly referring to its struggle in general review articles,⁷⁷ and reprinting its statements

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and the speeches of its leaders. A delegation from FRELIMO

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visited Peking and was greeted by Chou En-lai, a rare honour for such a movement.

The Angolan situation is perhaps the most interesting in 1971, for while the MPLA had received Chinese support in 1965 but not in 1969, it did again in 1971. Both the MPLA and UNITA were discussed generally⁸⁰ and praised specifically⁸¹ in the Chinese press and the former sent a delegation⁸² to visit China. However, only the latter was granted support through the reprinting of letters and policy statements,⁸³ as the MPLA still was regarded with some suspicion due to its new non-alignment policy in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In 1969 it had been one of the most pro-Soviet movements and was then firmly denounced for it.⁸⁴

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The PAIGC received the same support as it had in 1969; it still did not enjoy relations of any formal or semi-formal sort with Peking, nor did it have any letters or statements reprinted in the Chinese press. It appears that all three major movements (FRELIMO, UNITA and PAIGC) were still receiving military aid from China, even though distribution was becoming somewhat more indirect as greater use was made of the ALC.

In apartheid Africa, the pattern of support was again somewhat similar to 1969. All the movements granted support in 1969⁸⁵ (ZANU in Zimbabwe,⁸⁶ SWANU in Namibia,⁸⁷ and PAC in South Africa) were again discussed in major press articles and references to the people's struggles included in more general reviews,⁸⁸ and PAC had

60.
89

at least one major policy statement reprinted by the Chinese.

However, of these movements, only the Namibian was invited to send
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delegations to China and there is no evidence that tangible
economic or military aid had decreased. We can assume that the 1971
level of tangible support is parallel to that of 1969. Though this
is a very dangerous sort of assumption, as PAC, SWANU, and ZANU all
continued in their press releases and statements to support China
and align themselves with Peking, it appears reasonable to assume
that China had not halted the flow of aid, meagre as it was in any
91
case.

The Palestine Liberation Organization was very extensively
supported by China. Chou En-lai pledged Chinese support in the fight
92 93 94
against Israel, and the plethora of major news articles, books,
95
and general press references to the Palestinian cause was more
voluminous than those on any other revolutionary movement except
for the Vietnamese conflict. A delegation from the PLO was given
exceptional treatment in China, with mass celebrations, dinners with
senior officials, and even a "Palestine International Week" in
96
China. In fact the only type of support not granted the PLO was
reprinted policy statements or CCP support.

Elsewhere, Chinese support was noticeably non-existent.
97
Though the Dhofar struggle was once mentioned, other active move-
ments were not. Both of the two movements in French Africa (Front
de Libération de la Côte des Somalis and Mouvement de Libération de
Djibouti), were given negative support by virtue of Chinese friendly

relations with France. The movements in Kenya (Odinga) and Ethiopia (Eritrean Liberation Front) suffered the same treatment or worse.

Though many other countries were the sites of small movements, China supported none of them.

Table II-6 summarizes the pattern of Chinese support for African and Middle Eastern revolutionary movements in 1971.

Asia

The third and final region of the Third World with which we concern ourselves here is Asia. Logically one would expect Chinese interest in Asian movements to be more volatile than in other regions, and Chinese support for revolutionary movements more intense. China shares borders with India and Burma that have not always been acceptable boundaries and such disputes have led, in one case, to open war, and in another, to hostile skirmishes. Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam lie in the strategic Southeast, perhaps the most painful thorn in China's side, for they represent a continuing war against encroaching "U.S. imperialism". Malaysia, the Indonesian archipelago and the Philippines, scattered across the periphery to the South and the East of Asia, form with Taiwan a threatening crescent of islands and territory which could be a constant area of confrontation with the U.S.-supported states of the region. Thus China has a lot more to gain, or to lose, in Asia than she does in Africa or Latin America. From this we would then assume (as many have) that she would endorse and tangibly support any pro-Chinese movement in Asia. Yet this is too simple,

TABLE II-6

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1971

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Country	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL - Support Index
Colonial Africa:							
Angola		2	2	1	4	3	12
Fr. Somaliland						-3	-3
Guinea (B)		2		1	4		7
Mozambique		2	2	1	4	3	12
Sao Tomé		2		1		3	6
Apartheid Africa:							
South Africa		2	2	1	4		9
Namibia		2		1	4	3	10
Zimbabwe		2		1	4		7
Other Africa:							
Congo (Zaire)							0
Kenya	-4					-3	-7
Ethiopia						-3	-3
Middle East:							
Israel-Palestine	4	2		1	4	3	14
Dhofar Area				1			1
Turkey							0

for it can be maintained that it is in China's interest to cultivate the friendship of Asian states, regardless of their ideology, in order to create a friendly buffer zone between herself and the threatening talons of the West. In any case, it is evident that Chinese interest in the internal affairs of Asian states is paramount; we shall now examine the extent of her support for revolutionary movements.

The South Vietnam National Liberation Front (NLF) received total Chinese support. In 1965 it was the only revolutionary organization specifically endorsed by Mao or a senior government

leader. ¹⁰⁰ Its exploits were constantly lauded in the Chinese press ¹⁰¹ and its statements were frequently reprinted as major articles.

The Vietnamese struggle was naturally mentioned by Nam Han-chen in his speech at the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar at Algiers along with ¹⁰² Laos, North Borneo and the four African movements mentioned above.

As Van Ness points out, even on the Chinese maps of World Revolution, the symbol representing armed struggle appeared larger for Vietnam ¹⁰³ than for any other state.

It is beyond question that China furnishes a great deal of aid to the NLF. In fact, it is one of the very few movements for which China openly and proudly announces this fact. Witness the stand taken by Chou En-lai in 1965:

It is all the more the bounden international duty of every socialist country to give all-out support to the fraternal Vietnamese people. Therefore, whether or not a socialist country firmly supports the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in their just stand against U.S. aggression and for national

salvation whether or not it constantly exposes and combats the peace talk scheme of U.S. imperialism, and whether or not it genuinely gives the Vietnamese people effective and practical material aid in good time constitute an important criterion for judging whether its anti-imperialism is real or sham and whether its help to the Vietnamese people is real or sham. 104

Finally the NLF had already established a permanent mission in 105

Peking, an honour shared with only one other Asian movement, the 106
Thailand Patriotic Front.

The case of Laos is an extremely interesting one. Chinese press gave a considerable amount of space to the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), the revolutionary organization leading the Pathet Lao 107
movement, which was in control of much of Laos. Statements by Prince Souphanouvong on behalf of the NLHS were reprinted in the Chinese press and even the Chinese Foreign Ministry pledged support 108
for Souphanouvong's organization. There is also no doubt that in 1965 the NLHS was receiving military aid from the Chinese, 109
although most of this was distributed through North Vietnam.

Finally China conducted relations with the Pathet Lao through a Chinese Economic and Cultural Mission in liberated territory. Yet despite all of this China maintained relations with the neutralist government under Souvanna Phouma. Lui Shao-ch'i even communicated with the Royal government on the Laotian National Day in fairly 110
warm terms. Though Van Ness interprets this as paradoxical, when we remember the tripartate division of political power in Laos the paradox vanishes. The phrasing of Chinese support for the neutralist

government does not suggest non-support for the NLHS. Indeed, were we to assume that Chinese support for Phouma's government was non-support for the revolution, the support quotient would be lower. However, we must remember that the Pathet Lao is aimed not at the neutralist government but at the right wing forces. The neutralist government, supposedly a coalition of all three factions was not particularly opposed to the NLHS except inasmuch as Phouma wished to employ peaceful means for change. All Chinese support of Phouma's government was phrased as support for the "Laotian people," and adherence to the 1962 Geneva agreements which established this government. It is clear that China saw the right wing faction as the abrogator of the accords, and the return to violence by the left wing as an understandable and necessary retaliation. Thus I do not consider support of the neutral regime as non-support, although Lui Shao-ch'i's letter to the Royal Government could be so considered. However, as shown in Table 6, this non-support is not included because there seems to have been only one such example; moreover, this support came from Lui who fell from power just a year later after making other similar statements which were considered to be beyond his authority.

111

Due to the Chinese conception of Malaysia as an illegal and unnatural state, it will be treated as two separate areas. The first, North Borneo (alternately North Kalimantan or Sarawak or Sabah), led by the North Kalimantan Unitary State Revolutionary Government (NKUSRG), was the subject of attention in the Chinese

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113 press and sent a delegation to China during 1965. 114 Similarly
the Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan National Liberation
League (MNLL) were supported by analytical articles in the press, 115
and the MNLL was invited to set up a permanent mission in Peking. 116
Both movements were given space to reprint organization statements.
Though there have been suggestions that China has aided the revolu-
tionary movements in Malaysia, most of these assertions are based on
the existence of aid from the PKI in Indonesia before the coup in
1965, and on the existence of strong links between the Chen Ping
movement in the Malay peninsula and the Chinese-supplied movement in
Thailand. 117 There is no evidence of direct aid from China to
either the movement in North Borneo or the movements in Malaya and
Singapore. (Though some aid may indeed have existed, during any or
all of the time periods we are considering, we must assume that
there was none as one of the assumptions we are working under in
this project is that significant tangible aid does not exist if
there is no concrete evidence of its existence.) Despite Singapore's
withdrawal from Malaysia, China continued to treat the struggles of
Malaya and Singapore together trying to break the artificial unity
of the state of Malaysia.

Thailand was the only other country in Asia with a movement
supported strongly by China. Though somewhat young, by 1965
guerrilla warfare on a large scale had been launched against the
Bangkok government. As was mentioned above, both the Thailand
Patriotic Front (TPF) and the Thailand Independence Movement merged

under the former in 1965, had relations with China. Press support
 118
 was forthcoming at all levels except the highest and there is no
 question that the Thai people's movement received a substantial
 amount of military aid from China, although its quantity was to
 119
 increase considerably with the passage of time after 1965.

The struggle in the Philippines was also given public
 120
 support although only at the lowest level. Revolutionary
 activity there was quite minimal. The Indian movements were not
 supported, for China had relations with India, as it did with Burma.
 While there was no public support for the Indian government, there
 was for the Burmese. Aid had been given to Burma in 1961 and payment
 was still outstanding. General implicit support was granted Ne
 Win's government many times by the discussion of improving relations
 between the two countries. At least one major article supporting
 the government in Rangoon followed Ne Win's Peking visit in July of
 121
 1965. The White Flags and the Red Flags were left in the cold.

Chinese support for Asian revolutionary movements in 1965
 is summarized in Table II-7.

Levels of support in 1969 differed only slightly for those
 movements who had received high support in 1965. The major change
 was with the movements of non-support and the introduction of another
 movement, that of Indonesia.

South Vietnam's NLF continued to serve as a paradigm of
 total support. Statements of support by Lin Piao, Chou En-lai and
 122
 Mao, Chou and Lin together pledged total support to the Front.

TABLE II-7

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1965

ASIA

Country	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL - Support Index
Burma		-2		-1	-4	-3	-10
India						-3	- 3
Laos		2	2	1	4	3	12
Malaya & Singapore		2	2	1		3	8
North Borneo		2	2	1		3	8
Philippines				1			1
South Vietnam	4	2	2	1	4	3	16
Thailand		2	2	1	4	3	12

Major articles on the events in South Vietnam, glorifying the NLF

123

and its successes were commonplace, and the re-printing of NLF

124

statements was equally frequent. During 1969 the Provisional

Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam was

established, but as it was an arm of the NLF it shall not be con-

sidered separate from the Front. As far as military aid is con-

cerned, there is no evidence to suggest that it had lessened in

volume since 1965; on the contrary, existing reports seem to imply

an increase. The NLF retained its mission in Peking and delegations

from South Vietnam, as high up as President Nguyen Huv Tho of the

125

Provisional Government, were constantly visiting Peking.

The Laotian Patriotic Front (NLHS) also appears to have

received maximum support during 1969. Lin Piao on the event of the

126

twentieth anniversary of the NLHS, offered congratulations and

127

Chou En-lai pledged support to Prince Souphanouvong later in the year.

The Chinese press was constantly extolling the exploits of the forces

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129

of NLHS and many statements by Souphanouvong were reprinted.

China maintained its mission in the Laotian territory under the

control of revolutionary forces and several delegations came from

Laos to Peking during the year. Chinese aid had decreased from the

1965 level but only because China had, by 1969, conceded to North

Vietnam principal jurisdiction over the distribution of aid to the

130

Lao revolutionary forces.

The Thailand movement received in 1969 relatively the same

degree of support as they had in 1965. No statement of support was

made by senior Chinese leaders, although a very large number of articles appeared in the press either supporting the Communist Party of Thailand ¹³¹ or republishing its statements and manifestos. ¹³²

The CPT retained its mission in Peking and covert support activities of weapon supply, guerrilla training programs and financial assistance continued. ¹³³

Similarly, both the North Borneo movement (NKUSRG) and Malayan Singapore organizations mustered the same levels of support from Peking as they had in 1965. The Chinese press continued its support for the two movements through a large propaganda campaign for the North Kalimantan Forces in Sabah, and for the CPM, the MNLL, ¹³⁴ the Party Rakyat and Barisan Socialis of Malaya and Singapore.

Both central movements published a great deal of material in the Chinese press. ¹³⁵

During 1969 a radio station was set up which called itself the "Voice of Malayan Revolution" and broadcasted programs dealing with both the North Borneo movement and the Malayan and Singapore movements. Considerable Chinese press ¹³⁶ attention was given these broadcasts. A delegation from the

North Kalimantan movement visited China during the year and the Malayan National Liberation League maintained its permanent mission in Peking. There was still no evidence to suggest a flow of

Chinese aid. It is possible that some external aid was flowing ¹³⁷ across the Thai-Malaysian border, but there is no evidence that this aid emanated from Peking rather than from the Thai movement.

The year 1969 saw the beginning of Chinese support for the Indian revolutionary movement under the leadership of the CPI (M-L), or the Maoist faction of the CPI-M, which broke from that party in 1967, often associating itself with the Naxalites. Though China maintained relations with India, the achievements of the Indian revolutionaries were heralded¹³⁸ and their statements were occasionally republished in the Chinese press, although only very indirectly.¹³⁹ There is no evidence of aid to the rather small band of revolutionaries and no effort was apparently made towards the establishment of formal or semi-formal relations.

The Communist Party of Burma also by 1969 had gained Chinese support while the Chinese press no longer praised, or even politely mentioned the Burmese government. The CPB, or the White Flags as they are alternately known, were praised in their armed struggle not only by the press in general,¹⁴⁰ but also by the CCP.¹⁴¹ In March Chou En-lai received a delegation from the Central Committee of the CPB¹⁴² although formal (but cold) diplomatic relations still existed between the two governments.

The PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) emerged as an anti-government revolutionary organization in the aftermath of the Gestapu of 1965. However, due to the virtual annihilation of the Communists at the hands of the right wing elements in the 1965-66 backlash against Aidit and his party, Chinese support had little focus. Nevertheless a delegation from the PKI did remain in Peking¹⁴³ and the Chinese press carried several of its statements.

In general reviews of world revolutionary forces published early in 1969, all the above movements were supported, except the Indian movement, which received similar support in later articles. 144

Table II-8 summarizes Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Asia during 1969.

The year 1971 saw several interesting changes in the pattern of Chinese support for Asian revolutionary movements. The biggest change came as a result of the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in April of 1970 and the consequent formation of the National Union Front of Cambodia aimed at liberating Cambodia from the United States and General Lon Nol. Though there had been a small guerrilla movement before who were opposed to Sihanouk, this movement (known as the Khmer Rouge) joined with the Prince to oust the U.S.--propped military dictatorship. The new NUF government, which like the PRG of South Vietnam, was (and still is) a provisional government, met at the end of April in 1970 in China with the leaders of the Pathet Lao, the PRG of South Vietnam, and the North Vietnamese and presumably also the Chinese. Here they agreed to co-operate against the United States and its puppets with an informal joint military command, while at the same time maintaining that:

. . . inspired by the principle that the liberation and defence of each country is the affair of its own people, the different parties undertake to do everything possible to render mutual support in accordance with the desire of the interested party and on the basis of mutual respect. 145

146

This did not appear to be a formal military alliance but rather a

TABLE II-8

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1969

ASIA

Country	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL - Support Index
Burma		-2	2	1		-3 +3	5
India		2		1		-3	0
Indonesia			2	1		3	6
Laos	4	2	2	1	4	3	16
Malaya & Singapore		2	2	1		3	8
North Borneo		2	2	1		3	8
Philippines				1			1
South Vietnam	4	2	2	1	4	3	16
Thailand		2	2	1	4	3	12

position similar to that of Lin Piao in 1965: a united front was necessary and helpful but at the same time the struggles had to primarily be based upon the indigenous people. All were willing to help each other where they could, and this naturally involved North Vietnamese and some Chinese military assistance in the NUF fight against Lon Nol and the U.S. Elsewhere in Asia, military assistance almost certainly continued to the Thai Patriotic Front, as well as to the South Vietnam NFL and the Pathet Lao.

As in both 1965 and 1969 China's most senior officials, including Mao, pledged support for the NLF. Both the Pathet Lao and the NUF of Cambodia were granted this support, and all these had policy statements and letters reprinted in the Chinese press, as well as many long press analyses of the successes of the three movements. Sihanouk maintained his government in Peking and while the South Vietnamese movement did have a permanent mission in Peking, it also sent many other delegations to visit the Chinese capital, as did the Pathet Lao. The other Asian movements who had either permanent missions in China or delegations visit during 1971 were the PKI of Indonesia, the Thailand Patriotic Front, and the Communist Party of Burma. However, this support given to the Burmese movement was nullified by the visit of both minor governmental officials and of Ne Win to China during the improvement of Sino-Burmese relations in the latter half of the year. Similarly support of the Malaya movement and the North Borneo movement was negated by the visit of the Malaysian trade delegation to Peking and the subsequent warming

of Sino-Malaysian relations. However, the successes of both the
 162 163
 Malaya movement and the North Borneo movement were praised
 strongly in the Chinese press, as were the movements in the
 164 165 166
 Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia (along with the three
 larger movements mentioned above). All of these movements had either
 167
 policy statements or letters published in the Chinese press and
 all were mentioned along with Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam in
 168
 one of the several general articles on Asian movements.

The Philippine movement had grown substantially over the
 last two years, and this induced the Chinese to offer it the greater
 public support than in 1969. However at the same time, China
 invited a trade delegation from the Philippine government to visit
 169
 China, a move which can be classified as negative support for the
 Philippine New People's Army, the revolutionary movement supported
 publicly in China.

The Indian case is an interesting deviation from 1969 even
 though the only support or non-support offered the Communist Party
 (M-L) was the continuing diplomatic relations with Delhi. Through-
 out 1971, relations with India seemed to be improving: gone were
 the frequent attacks found in the press of earlier years, and the
 warming of relations and growing friendliness was actually praised
 170
 in general articles on Asian affairs. However, when the Indo-
 Pakistani war erupted, China lashed out at the Indian government.
 This in itself is not surprising; however, not once during all the
 abuse and vilification of Indian actions was the CPI-ML or the

struggle of the Indian people mentioned. It appears that the Chinese had decided to minimize such support, perhaps in the interest of
171
"turning west"; this assertion is supported by the opening of semi-formal relations with Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, and the improvement of Sino-Burmese relations to the point where General Ne Win was actually praised as a great leader of the
172
Revolutionary Council of Burma.

Table II-9, which summarizes Chinese support for Asian movements in 1971, demonstrates the disparity between the support offered different movements, a disparity that was not as clearly evident in 1969.

In the following three chapters, the dependent variable, as described in the nine tables, will be analyzed in terms of the two independent variables in hopes of unearthing the reasons behind such support.

TABLE II-9

SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1971

ASIA

	Statements by Mao or other senior officials	Statements by junior officials or major press analyses	CCP statements and reprints of front organization statements	General press references of support	Tangible economic or military support	Institutional support	TOTAL - Support Index
Burma		-2	2	1	0	+3 -3	1
Cambodia	4	2	2	1	4	3	16
India						-3	-3
Indonesia		2	2	1		3	8
Laos	4	2	2	1	4	3	16
Malaya & Singapore		2	2	1		-3	2
North Borneo		2	2	1		-3	2
Philippines		2	2	1		-3	2
South Vietnam	4	2	2	1	4	3	16
Thailand		2	2	1	4	3	12

FOOTNOTES

1. Map published in Jen-min jih-pao (JMJP), May 27, 1965, p. 4; analyzed in Van Ness, op. cit., pp. 90-91, 93-94.
2. Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 3457, May 12, 1965, p. 28. Quoted also in Cecil Johnson, Communist China & Latin America, 1959-1967, Columbia University Press, New York, 1970, p. 258.
3. Cecil Johnson, op. cit., p. 259.
4. To give an example of the size of the support generated on May 12 there was a rally in Peking with a large proportion of the then hierarchy of the Chinese government; Chou En-Lai, Lui Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Chu Teh, etc., SCMP, No. 3458, 1965, p. 27-8.
5. "Dominica," Shih-chieh Chih-shih (SCCS), June 1965, as quoted in Cecil Johnson, op. cit., p. 259.
6. New China News Agency (English) May 20, 1965, and JMJP, July 22, 1965, p. 4 in Van Ness op. cit., p. 91.
7. Communist Party of Brazil: JMJP, May 23, 1965, p. 5. Communist Party of Columbia: JMJP, Aug. 13, 1965, p. 3. National Liberation Army (Columbia): JMJP, Mar. 23, 1965, p. 5. Frente Unido del Pueblo (Columbia): Peking Review (PR), No. 11, 1966, p. 28. June 14 Revolutionary Movement and Dominican People's Movement: JMJP, Dec. 25, 1965, p. 4. Alejandro de Leon, November 14 Revolutionary Movement (Guatemala), SCCS, 1965, No. 21, p. 19. Revolutionary Liberation Movement (Honduras): SCCS, 1965, No. 18, p. 22. Sandino National Liberation Front (Nicaragua): SCCS, 1965, No. 19, p. 29. Commander Lopez Guerrilla Force (Paraguay): SCCS, 1965, No. 17, p. 29. Peruvian Communist Party: JMJP, Dec. 16, 1965, p. 4. Movement of the Revolutionary left (Peru): JMJP, June 22, 1965, p. 5. Revolutionary Students Front (Peru): JMJP, August 6, 1965, p. 4. Communist Party of Venezuela, National Liberation Armed Forces, and Movement of Revolutionary Left (all Venezuela): SCCS, 1965, No. 1, pp. 12-14. Compiled by Van Ness, op. cit., p. 148.
8. "Political Report and Resolution of the Peruvian C.P." P.R. Jan. 17, 1966, p. 20. "Revolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil; 'The Domestic Situation in Brazil and the Task of the Communist Party of Brazil,'" P.R., May 28, 1965, p. 21, and "Political Revolution of the 10th Congress of the Colombian Communist Party," P.R., August 20, 1965, pp. 21-22.

9. See, Johnson, op. cit., p. 140 for Seman's visit. Poole, P. A., "Communist China's Aid Diplomacy," Asian Survey, 6(11), Nov. 1966, pp. 622-629.
10. It perhaps should be stated that this variable is, due to its inherently secretive nature, extremely difficult to research. Though there is no apparent evidence supporting the assertion that Chinese aid was given to certain movements, there is always a possibility that aid was in fact forthcoming. The aid of which we speak is obviously more substantial than the nominal financial support granted movements in an effort to assist the associations in organizational activity. See, for example, Ernest Halperin, "China and the Latin American Communists," China Quarterly, January-March, 1967, p. 140.
11. See, for example, SCMP, No. 4448, 1969, pp. 27ff.
12. SCMP, No. 4436, 1969, p. 15.
13. P.R., January 3, 1969, p. 18.
14. P.R., January 3, 1969, pp. 23-24.
15. Brazil: P.R., June 20, 1969, p. 21. Chile: P.R., January 3, 1969, pp. 26-27. Argentina: P.R., July 4, 1969, pp. 20-21. Peru: P.R., October 10, 1969, p. 23. Ecuador: P.R., July 4, 1969, p. 21.
16. Communist Party of Brazil: SCMP, No. 4348, 1969, p. 19.
 Bolivian Communist Party: SCMP, 1969, No. 4352, p. 21.
 Chilean Revolutionary Communist Party: SCMP, No. 4397, 1969, p. 24. Peruvian Communist Party: SCMP, 1962, No. 4406, p. 53.
 Argentine Communist Vanguard: SCMP, No. 4412, 1969, p. 21.
 Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador: SCMP, No. 4414, 1969, p. 19.
17. Tretiak, op. cit.
18. See, for the establishment of relations, SCMP 4817, 1971, p. 55.
19. P.R., May 21, 1971, pp. 19-20, and P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
20. SCMP, No. 4918, 1971, p. 50. P.R., May 21, 1971, p. 19, and P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
21. P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12, but Chile is not included in the 1971 analysis.
22. P.R., May 21, 1971, pp. 19-20, and P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.

23. P.R., April 30, 1971, p. 19 and P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
24. P.R., April 30, 1971, p. 19.
25. SCMP, No. 4919, 1971, p. 129.
26. P.R., April 2, 1971, p. 22-23.
27. P.R., May 21, 1971, pp. 19-20 and P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
28. P.R., April 2, 1971, pp. 21-22.
29. P.R., May 21, 1971, pp. 19-20 and P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
30. P.R., April 30, 1971, p. 19; P.R., May 21, 1971, pp. 19-20; and SCMP, No. 4918, 1971, p. 75.
31. P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
32. SCMP, No. 4887, 1971, p. 153.
33. SCMP, No. 4895, 1971, p. 89. P.R., April 2, 1971, p. 2.
34. P.R., August 13, 1971, p. 14; SCMP, No. 4938, 1971, p. 269.
35. SCMP, No. 4936, 1971, p. 135.
36. SCMP, No. 4946, 1971, p. 225.
37. SCMP, No. 4938, 1971, p. 275.
38. P.R., May 21, 1971, p. 23; SCMP, No. 4892, 1971, p. 186; SCMP, No. 4894, 1971, p. 49; SCMP, No. 4924, 1971, p. 182.
39. SCMP, No. 4970, 1971, p. 113.
40. SCMP, No. 4882, 1971, p. 107.
41. Publication on the people's struggles of Vietnam & the Congo, Peking. Peoples' Press; cited in Van Ness, op. cit., p. 90. This was a statement by Mao.
42. Revolutionaries from several countries were being trained in Ghana by Ghanaian and Chinese instructors. As will be seen shortly such action is interpreted as below a low-level endorsement of a movement and not equivalent to a general statement in the Chinese press. For more on the OCAW resolution see Wallerstein, I, Africa: The Politics of Unity, pp. 91-92.

43. CSCR: P.R., Aug. 27, 1965, No. 35, p. 5.
44. MLPA: SCMP, No. 3447, 1965, p. 27, and ALNA: JMJP, Aug. 13, 1965, p. 4; cited in Van Ness, op. cit., p. 140.
45. Delegation visit from the Angola People's Liberation Movement: SCMP, No. 3447, 1965, p. 27, in Van Ness, op. cit., p. 90.
46. Mozambique Liberation Front: SCMP, No. 3436, 1965, p. 34. Mozambique National Democratic Union: JMJP, May 31, 1965, p. 3, Mozambique Revolutionary Committee: SCMP, 3510, 1965, p. 32, in Van Ness, ibid.
47. FRELIMO: SCMP, No. 3436, 1965, pp. 34-35, COREMO: SCMP, No. 3510, 1965, ibid.
48. PAIGC: JMJP, August 13, 1965, p. 4, ibid.
49. Nan Han-chen's speech was reprinted in P.R., March 5, 1965, No. 10, pp. 16-26.
50. World Map, SCCS, 1966, Nos. 2-3, as cited in Van Ness, op. cit., p. 91.
51. NCNA (English Broadcast), May 20, 1965, ibid.
52. Perhaps more often than specific references to the PLO were general statements supporting the Arab cause against the Israeli imperialists; for an example of explicit specific support see SCMP, No. 3425, 1965, p. 37.
53. See note 22 above.
54. See Bruce Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970, pp. 71-74, pp. 186-193.
55. Again, concrete evidence is lacking for 1965, but there is not sufficient proof to assume that such aid was forthcoming, despite the existence of the Office of PLO in Peking.
56. Kenya received a \$15 million credit from China in May 1964, Larkin, op. cit., p. 94, and had relations with China since 1963. The movement (Odinga) there was small but it was active, even though peaceful.
57. Though many claims have been made that China has supported the Eritrean Liberation Front (Larkin, op. cit., p. 186) there seems little concrete evidence of this. Ethiopia has retained an aloof posture from China and until the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970, very little interchange of any sort took place between the two states.

58. P.R., January 3, 1969, p. 18.
59. See SCMP, Nos. 4461, 4483, 4484, 1969, for Souther Yemen--China rapprochement.
60. See, for example "Dhofar Friends Acclaim Victorious Closing of Chinese Communist Party Congress, SCMP, No. 4409, 1969, p. 19.
61. National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (subsumed the Angola National Liberation Army): SCMP, April 27, 1969, No. 4407. Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU): SCMP, April 12, 1969, No. 4397, p. 27. Congolese Patriotic Armed Forces: SCMP, No. 4501, 1969, p. 16.
62. See for example P.R., February 27, 1969, pp. 15-16.
63. P.R., January 10, 1969, p. 11.
64. Reprinted in P.R., October 9, 1969, p. 16.
65. Even though these last two are supported both by Moscow and Peking.
66. NCNA, No. 4008, January 23, 1969, p. 12, quoted in Larkin, op. cit., p. 187.
67. Larkin, op. cit., pp. 189-191.
68. The amounts offered PAC appear to have been pitifully small and the use of such funds is not determined. For a discussion of this see Larkin, op. cit., Chapter 8, Note 53.
69. JMJP, January 14, 1967, p. 5. See Van Ness op. cit., p. 218.
70. Kenya suspended diplomatic relations with China in 1967. Though there had been many claims as to Chinese aid in the training of guerrillas and in the backing of Odinga no real revolutionary movement was present and no overtures were made to support what little there was during 1969.
71. Although formal relations were not established between Ethiopia and China until 1970, talks and conferences were under way in 1969. It was evident that it would only be a matter of time. This can only be seen as a blow to the Eritrean Liberation Front who must have at least hoped for some outside support.
72. SCMP, No. 4935, 1971, p. 109.
73. SCMP, No. 4930, 1971, p. 33; P.R., May 28, 1971, pp. 12-13.

74. SCMP, No. 4935, 1971, p. 109; SCMP, No. 4939, 1971, p. 42.
75. Paul Whitaker, "Arms and the Nationalists: Where and on What Terms do they Obtain their Support and how Important is External Aid to their Revolution." Africa Report, May 1970, p. 14.
76. SCMP, No. 4970, 1971, p. 113.
77. P.R., January 15, 1971, p. 15; P.R., May 21, 1971, p. 18; P.R., July 2, 1971, p. 33; P.R., July 16, 1971, p. 29.
78. SCMP, No. 4979, 1971, p. 83; SCMP, No. 4973, 1971, p. 36.
79. SCMP, No. 4976, 1971, p. 186.
80. P.R., January 15, 1971, p. 15.
81. P.R., February 2, 1971, p. 22.
82. SCMP, No. 4939, 1971, p. 25.
83. SCMP, No. 4940, 1971, p. 100.
84. See Note 64 above.
85. P.R., December 10, 1971, p. 20.
86. P.R., September 3, 1971, p. 14.
87. SCMP, No. 4869, 1971, p. 129.
88. P.R., July 2, 1971, p. 33; P.R., July 16, 1971, p. 29; P.R., December 3, 1971, pp. 8-13.
89. SCMP, 4898, 1971, p. 242.
90. SCMP, No. 4935, 1971, p. 109.
91. See Larkin, op. cit., p. 188.
92. P.R., May 14, 1971, p. 9.
93. P.R., January 15, 1971, p. 13; P.R., January 22, 1971, p. 15; P.R., May 7, 1971, pp. 12-13; SCMP, No. 4826, 1971, p. 45; SCMP, No. 4897, 1971, p. 214.
94. The Palestinian and Other Arab People Will Win. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971.

95. P.R., January 1, 1971, p. 8; P.R., April 23, 1971, p. 21; P.R., December 3, 1971, pp. 8-13; SCMP, No. 4905, p. 36.
96. SCMP, No. 4985, 1971, p. 101; SCMP, No. 4897, 1971, pp. 197-214; SCMP, No. 4598, 1971, pp. 258-161; SCMP, No. 4899, 1971, pp. 46-48.
97. P.R., January 1, 1971, p. 21.
98. See, for example, SCMP, No. 4832, 1971, p. 191; SCMP, No. 4863, 1971, p. 81; Chow even expressed his support for Kenyatta. SCMP, No. 5038, 1971, p. 79.
99. For example: Niger; Rwanda; Gabon; and Malawi.
100. Publication on the people's struggles of Vietnam and the Congo (statement by Mao), Peking, People's Press, cited in Van Ness, op. cit., p. 90.
101. In the case of Vietnam, it is almost meaningless to give specific cases. One only need to pick up any copy of Peking Review to find such articles and statements. More than one week in three during 1965 saw some comment on the people's struggle in Vietnam.
102. P.R., March 5, 1965, No. 10, pp. 16-26.
103. Van Ness, op. cit., p. 90 and Note c.
104. Chou En-Lai, Speech given in Peking, December 20, 1965. P.R., December 24, 1965, No. 51, pp. 5-6. Reprinted in Schurmann, Franz and Schell, Orville, Communist China, The China Reader No. 3, pp. 592-596.
105. Jen-min shou-ts'ue, 1965, p. 226, cited in Van Ness, op. cit., page 34.
106. Until December 1965, the Thailand Patriotic Front and the Thailand Independence Movement were separate. They each had missions in China and both sent delegations to visit Peking during 1965. P.R., Nov. 5, 1965, No. 45, p. 31. SCMP, No. 3442, 1965, p. 38. However, in December the two groups merged under the name of the Thailand Patriotic Front. For the analysis here, the Thailand groups will be considered to have been one throughout 1965.
107. See, for example P.R., June 25, 1965, p. 11.
108. An article on the CFM statement can be found in P.R., January 23, 1965, p. 4.

109. See Bernard Fall, "The Pathet Lao, A Liberation 'Party'" in Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia, 2nd Edition, pp. 187-188.
110. Cited in Van Ness, op. cit., p. 136; for the text of this letter see SCMP, No. 3457, 1965, p. 37.
111. See Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Second edition, pp. 555-556.
112. Though the Malaysian Federation was somewhat disintegrated by the withdrawal of Singapore during 1965, China almost ignored this event because their image was of one state of Malaya, including Singapore, and another of North Borneo.
113. SCMP, No. 3555, 1965, p. 38.
114. SCMP, No. 3551, 1965, p. 39.
115. Malayan Communist Party: P.R., May 7, 1965, p. 6; Malayan National Liberation League: P.R., January 28, 1966, p. 3. See Van Ness, op. cit., p. 137.
116. Van Ness, ibid.
117. See Stainer, Frances, "Communism in Singapore and Malaysia: A Multifront Struggle," in Scalapino, op. cit., pp. 234-268. For a discussion of Indonesian aid to guerrillas in the Sarawak region see Simon Sheldon, W., The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta and the PKI, pp. 32-36. Also Van der Kroef, J. M., "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership," Orbis, Summer 1964, pp. 342-344.
118. P.R., October 15, 1965, pp. 8-9. Republishing of Statements made through "The Voice of the Thai People," in JMJP, cited in Van Ness, op. cit., p. 137.
119. Lovelace, Daniel D., China and 'People's War' in Thailand, 1964-1968, pp. 48-50.
120. World map in SCCS, 1966, Nos. 2-3. Van Ness, op. cit., p. 91.
121. Van Ness, op. cit., p. 225 (on aid), P.R., July 30, 1965, pp. 6-8.
122. Statement by Chou En-Lai: P.R., June 20, 1969, pp. 5-6; by Lin Piao: SCMP, No. 4363, 1969, p. 24; and by Mao, Chou and Lin: P.R., December 26, 1969, p. 5. These are only examples for many other similar statements were made.

123. For example, P.R., Oct. 17, 1969, pp. 10-13, and SCMP, No. 4363, 1969, p. 25.
124. For example SCMP, No. 4523, 1969, p. 27.
125. SCMP, Nos. 4519, 1969, p. 54; 4520, 1969, pp. 32-35; 4521, 1969, p. 45; 4522, 1969, pp. 34-35.
126. SCMP, No. 4345, 1969, p. 18.
127. SCMP, No. 4520, 1969, p. 25.
128. For example, SCMP, No. 4564, 1969, p. 25.
129. For example, SCMP, No. 4523, 1969, p. 21.
130. Fall, Bernard, B., "The Pathet Lao: A 'Liberation' Party", Scalapino, op. cit., p. 187. China was also building a road from China to Muon Sai, 30 miles into Laos with hope of connecting it with the Dienbienphu-North Vietnam Highway. Zasloff, Joseph, J., "Laos: The Forgotten War Widens," Asian Survey, X(1), January 1970, pp. 71-72.
131. For example P.R., January 17, 1969, p. 19-22. SCMP, Nos. 4452, 1969, p. 29. The author counted more than 20 such articles in SCMP alone.
132. For example, SCMP, No. 4560, 1969, p. 15; P.R., October 17, 1969, p. 23.
133. Lovelace, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
134. NKUSRG: SCMP, No. 4330, 1968, p. 34. CPM: SCMP, No. 4339, 1969, p. 21. MNLL: SCMP, No. 4477, 1969, p. 18. Party Rayat: SCMP, No. 4345, 1969, p. 21. Barisan Socialis: SCMP, No. 4430, p. 31.
135. For example, P.R., October 17, 1969, pp. 23-4 and SCMP, No. 4386, 1969, p. 26.
136. For example, SCMP, Nos. 4554, 1969, pp. 33-34; 4555, 1969, p. 33, 4564, 1969, p. 26.
137. Lovelace, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
138. "Indian People Embark on Revolutionary Road of Armed Struggle." SCMP, No. 4415, 1969, p. 25. This marked the beginning of many articles. See also SCMP, No. 4530, 1969, p. 21.

139. SCMP, No. 4460, 1969, p. 15. This is a reprinting of an article from "Liberation". This is not considered sufficient to merit third level public support.
140. For example: SCMP, Nos. 4359, 1969, p. 20; 4480, 1969, p. 20.
141. For example, SCMP, No. 4479, 1969, p. 25. (Article entitled "Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Sends Message of Greetings to Central Committee of Communist Party of Burma.")
142. SCMP, No. 4384, 1969, p. 17.
143. For example, SCMP, No. 4383, 1969, p. 21. P.R., October 17, 1969, pp. 26-7.
144. P.R., January 3, 1969, pp. 11-17 and P.R., May 16, 1969, p. 18.
145. P.R., May 8, 1970, p. 3.
146. See the news analysis by Wilfred Burchett in The Guardian, 6 June 1970, and Jean Lacouture in Foreign Affairs, July, 1970, pp. 626-628.
147. Documented by Banning Garrett in "The National Union Front of Cambodia," in J. S. Grant, L. A. G. Moss and J. Unger (eds.) Cambodia: The Widening War in Indochina. New York: Washington Square Press, 1971, p. 131.
148. As in 1969, most of the aid for the Laotian and Vietnamese movements probably was distributed in the context of North Vietnam's policies and with North Vietnamese help, although some was certainly directly given, such as the road-building in Northeastern Laos in liberated territory. Arthur J. Domman, Conflict in Laos, Second Edition, New York: Praeger 1971, pp. 284-286. See also, Paul Langer and Joseph Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, for an historical analysis of this relationship
149. P.R., December 3, 1971, pp. 8-13; SCMP, No. 4872, 1971, p. 56; SCMP, No. 5044, p. 190.
150. P.R., January 15, 1971, p. 3; SCMP, No. 4817, 1971, p. 56; SCMP, No. 4828, 1971, p. 24; SCMP, No. 4889, 1971, p. 31.
151. P.R., January 29, 1971, p. 3; December 3, 1971, pp. 8-13; SCMP, No. 4868, 1971, p. 73.

152. NLF: P.R., February 12, 1971, p. 13 and p. 14; P.R., February 19, 1971, pp. 19-20; SCMP, No. 4934, 1971, p. 53; Pathet Lao (NLHS): P.R., February 12, 1971, pp. 9-10; P.R., February 19, 1971, pp. 17-19; SCMP, No. 4957, 1971, p. 41; NUF: P.R., January 29, 1971, p. 9; P.R., February 19, 1971, pp. 8-13 and pp. 20-21; SCMP, No. 4811, 1971, p. 36; SCMP, No. 4813, 1971, p. 130; SCMP, No. 4818, 1971, p. 76.
153. For example, NLF: P.R., January 8, 1971, pp. 13-15; SCMP, No. 4868, 1971, p. 87. Pathet Lao: P.R., December 31, 1971, p. 21; SCMP, No. 4869, 1971, p. 132. NUF: P.R., January 29, 1971, p. 8; SCMP, No. 4857, 1971, p. 28.
154. P.R., February 12, 1971, p. 15; P.R., May 7, 1971, pp. 6-7.
155. For example, P.R., January 22, 1971, p. 9; SCMP, No. 4827, 1971, p. 72.
156. P.R., May 7, 1971, pp. 6-7; SCMP, No. 4871, p. 26.
157. P.R., May 7, 1971, pp. 6-7.
158. The Thailand Patriotic Front appeared to have maintained its permanent mission in Peking.
159. P.R., May 7, 1971, pp. 6-7.
160. SCMP, No. 4954, 1971, p. 130; SCMP, No. 4958, 1971, pp. 81-85; SCMP, No. 5020, 1971, p. 75.
161. SCMP, No. 4904, 1971, p. 44; SCMP, No. 5003, 1971, p. 140.
162. SCMP, No. 4910, 1971, p. 147; SCMP, No. 4913, 1971, p. 99-102.
163. SCMP, No. 4952, 1971, p. 37.
164. P.R., April 23, 1971, p. 14.
165. P.R., January 22, 1971, p. 18; P.R., August 27, 1971, p. 19.
166. P.R., July 2, 1971, pp. 34-35.
167. Malaya: P.R., June 4, 1971, pp. 16-17; P.R., June 18, 1971, p. 12; P.R., July 23, 1971, p. 17; SCMP, No. 4873, 1971, p. 96. SCMP, No. 4896, 1971, p. 150. North Borneo: SCMP, No. 4963, 1971, p. 161. Philippines: P.R., August 13, 1971, p. 13; SCMP, No. 4941, p. 197. Thailand: P.R., June 18, 1971, p. 11; P.R., July 23, 1971, p. 16; SCMP, No. 4871, 1971, p. 254.

168. P.R., January 1, 1971, p. 8; P.R., April 9, 1971, p. 21; P.R., April 16, 1971, p. 22; and SCMP, No. 4844, 1971, p. 128.
169. SCMP, No. 4899, 1971, p. 50; SCMP, No. 4900, 1971, p. 95.
170. SCMP, No. 5024, p. 93.
171. See Jim Peck "Why China 'Turned West'", Ramparts, May, 1972, pp. 34-41.
172. SCMP, No. 5024, 1971, pp. 93-94.

CHAPTER III

THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE STUDIES

Most of the governments of Latin America have been, for many years, allies of the United States and very much part of the so-called American bloc. Thus, most of these governments have acted in a manner antithetical to the behaviour of an ally of China. We will examine whether or not this hostility has formed an input in Chinese decisions to support Latin American revolutionary movements. As in the subsequent chapters on the other geographical regions, this chapter will compute the two independent variable indices, and test preliminarily some of the hypotheses presented in Chapter I on the basis of the data from the single region.

The case studies chosen for the Latin American regions are Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador. As there is no logical separation between groups of states in Latin America as there is in the Africa and Middle East region (colonies, apartheid regimes, independent African states, and Middle Eastern states) the case studies have been chosen on the basis of the level of support offered by China to the incumbent revolutionary movements. These levels of support, according to the support index for the three time periods, were as follows:

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1971</u>
Argentina	4	5	-1
Brazil	5	5	1
Dominican Republic	7	4	3
Ecuador	0	5	1

As these levels offer a fairly diverse selection of Latin American cases (relative to the population--see Tables II-1, II-2 and II-3), an analysis of these cases should provide insight into the determinants of Chinese support for revolutionary movements in all of Latin America.

First the hostility index will be computed for all four case studies and then each case will be examined separately to assess the degree of conformity between a movement and the Chinese prototype for a people's war. Finally, an attempt will be made to explain Chinese behaviour towards the Latin American movements through the testing of some of the hypotheses presented in Chapter I.

A. Hostility Index

Both in 1965¹ and 1969² the four countries almost completely supported the stand taken by the United States and Taiwan in the voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Albanian Resolution and the Important Question Resolution. Ecuador, the only exception, abstained on the Albanian Resolution in 1969, and, as we mentioned in Chapter I, any action short of voting for the Albanian Resolution can be considered an act of hostility to China. As a matter of fact, this pro-Taiwan attitude was so pervasive that not one other of the Latin American countries considered in Chapter II--the population of which this selection of four countries represents--abstained. In 1971, the situation was only slightly different. Though Brazil and the Dominican Republic continued to support Taiwan

by voting against the Albanian Resolution and for the Important Question Resolution, Argentina abstained on the Albanian Resolution. This was only a token break from the pro-American stance, however, as Argentina did vote in favor of the Important Question Resolution. Ecuador was the only real exception to the norm. Voting against the Important Question and for the Albanian Resolution, Ecuador was the only Latin American country apart from Cuba and Chile to vote against the United States on both resolutions.

All four countries maintained diplomatic relations with the government of Chiang Kai-shek during all three time periods. Though Ecuador did not maintain an embassy in Taiwan, active relations existed until 1971, when, due to the pro-Chinese stance of the government of Dr. Jose Maria Valasco Ibarra, they declined in intensity. No formal break was made between the two states. Because of the lack of active relations in 1971, however, Ecuador can be considered to have had no active diplomatic relations with either Taiwan or China. (The military coup of early 1972 presaged the formation of a pro-Taiwan government and the re-establishment of more active relations.)

Most of the countries of Latin America have only modest trading relations with Asian countries. Consequently the trade conducted with China and Taiwan is rarely of a significant level (which, as was pointed out in Chapter I, is defined here as 5% of a country's total trade or U.S. \$50 million). Neither the Dominican Republic nor Ecuador had significant trade with either

Taiwan or China in 1965, 1969 or 1971. Though the figures for 1971 are still not clear for Brazil (somewhere in the neighbourhood of U.S. \$18 million exports and imports with Taiwan), it does not appear as though Brazil's trade was significant. Argentina, on the other hand, sold U.S. \$83,700,000 in grain to China in 1965, but conducted no other significant trade with China or Taiwan in 1969 or 1971. Thus, only Argentina's grain-sale to China in 1965 was of sufficient scope to be considered an act of friendship to China.

All four states were (and still are) members of the Organization of American States (OAS) which, by virtue of its charter signed in 1948, pledges all member nations to collectively "defend⁶ their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence." Membership in this organization cannot be considered per se as a military defence alliance with the United States. For example, Cuba is not excluded from membership, yet it is excluded from OAS activities by virtue of a 1962 decree. Thus it would make more sense to consider only those members receiving military purchases and credits from the United States as having such an alliance. The United States maintained military sales and credits with all four countries considered here in all three time periods with the exception of Ecuador in 1971. Ecuador, along with several other Latin American states, claims 200-mile jurisdiction of coastal waterways. The United States maintains that 12 miles is the legal limit. Thus, when Ecuador continued to seize and fine U.S. fishing boats which were fishing without license inside the 200-mile limit, the United

States, in January, 1971, suspended military sales and credits. These remained suspended until after the military coup a year later.⁷ Therefore, Ecuador in 1971 can be considered as the only state which did not have a military defence alliance with the United States.

Table III-1 summarizes the hostility expressed towards China by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador for 1965, 1969 and 1971 as measured by the hostility index.

B. Revolutionary Index

The computing of the revolutionary index for the four movements considered here will be based on a brief analysis of each movement. No attempt is made to give a complete historical background to the movements as such narratives are well beyond the scope of this project. (The bibliography suggests work where such discussions can be found.) Instead, we will examine each movement to see how closely it conforms to the tenets of the Chinese model for people's war, and to discover the movement's attitude towards the Sino-Soviet dispute.

1. Argentina

The movement in Argentina supported by the Chinese has been the Communist Vanguard of Argentina. An offshoot of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Argentina, the Communist Vanguard (or the Communist Vanguard Party⁸ as it is sometimes referred to) has not had the success that the pro-Soviet party has. Nonetheless, the

TABLE III-1
HOSTILITY INDEX
LATIN AMERICA

	U.N. voting on Important Question Resolution	U.N. voting on Albanian Resolution	Diplomatic relations with Peking or Taiwan	Extensive trade with Peking or Taiwan	Military defence alliance with Peking or Taiwan or West	TOTAL - Hostility Index
1965						
Argentina	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	-3
Brazil	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Dominican Republic	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Ecuador	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
1969						
Argentina	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Brazil	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Dominican Republic	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Ecuador	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
1971						
Argentina	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Brazil	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Dominican Republic	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Ecuador	1	1				2

Communist Party of Argentina has concentrated on weakening the Communist Vanguard. The Central Committee of the pro-Soviet party condemned the links between the Chinese and the Communist Vanguard:

The principle result of these divisive activities of the Chinese is to have attracted a few unstable elements especially from the petty-bourgeois circles, to have united with them counter-revolutionaries who were exiled from the ranks of Communist Parties for anti-Party activity, with nationalist bourgeois intellectuals, and with Trotskyites. 9

Elias Seman, Political Secretary of the Communist Vanguard, visited China in 1965, as mentioned in Chapter II. He returned to Argentina as an extremely vociferous proponent of Maoist ideology, appealing primarily to members of radical student groups and groups of self-styled revolutionaries.¹⁰ The major proportion of Seman's polemic, and that of the Vanguard as a whole, has been directed against the Communist Party of Argentina and its patron state, the Soviet Union. Cecil Johnson points out that during the Cultural Revolution, Seman and his party closely followed the events in China¹¹ and had their own version of the Cultural Revolution. They closely followed edicts from Peking in order to carry out "ideological revolutions to remold the thinking of revolutionaries and apply Mao¹² Tse-tung's thought to their political line." Despite the polemic, there is little evidence to suggest that there was any effort made to put the accepted ideology into practice.

The Communist Vanguard of Argentina has been one of the weakest revolutionary organizations supported by China in Latin America. Founded in 1964 around a small group of revolutionary

intellectuals, it has never commanded more than the most limited popular support. Though it has paid tribute to the theory of people's war as espoused by Lin Piao, the Vanguard has ignored some of the tenets of such a theory and has abrogated others.

In 1965, the Communist Vanguard of Argentina was indeed a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist communist party, trying, through its appeal to students and intellectuals, to spread its message. However, there was no evident attempt to appeal to the workers to build a united front, nor was there any effort to appeal to the alienated peasants in the formation of rural bases. Indeed, the activities of the Vanguard have never extended far beyond Buenos Aires, where its publication (appearing irregularly) No Transar¹³ is published. There is certainly no evidence of any sort of army, led by the Vanguard or any other group with ties to the Vanguard. In 1964, the national gendarmerie surrounded and captured a series of guerrilla groups in the Northwest corner of Argentina near the Bolivian border. These guerrillas, all claiming to be part of the "national left" appeared to have absolutely no connection to either the Communist Vanguard or the Communist Party.¹⁴ Whether or not the Vanguard adhered to a policy of self-reliance appears to have been an irrelevant question in 1965, simply because of the lack of activity. As the Vanguard did not seem to have much support in 1965, it only met the requirements that it be anti-colonial and anti-imperialist,¹⁵ that it be led by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist communist party, and that, therefore, it be oriented

toward communism.

By 1969, little progress had been made. Still consisting of a small group of intellectuals with a following drawn mostly from students, it appears to have had no support from farmers and peasants and practically none from industrial workers. Though there had been an effort during the intervening years to ally the Vanguard with John William Cooke and the extremist branch of the Peronist movement, the National Liberation Alliance, the effort failed, despite the latter's claim to be a united front aimed at social revolution and national liberation. The National Liberation Alliance had adopted a Castroist strategy and was supported by the Organization for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS), a group very much in Cuban hands by 1969. Considering the violent attacks on China by Cuban leaders at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966, it is not surprising that the Vanguard's attempt to ally with Cooke failed. Despite the increasing political violence in Argentina against the Organia regime, such as the fourteen deaths during the Cordoba strikes of May 1969, there is no reason to suspect that the Communist Vanguard was in any way instrumental in the strike movement. Therefore, we can assume no change between 1965 and 1969 in the level of conformity of the Communist Vanguard to the Chinese model for people's war.

In 1971, the Communist Vanguard was probably weaker than in the previous two periods. The growing strength of the Peronist movement meant the adoption of the Peronist line by many who other-

wise might have been members of more radical groups. Second, the law imposed by President Onganía in 1967, insisting on the registration of all communists and imposing severe limits on the activities of communist groups, was enforced strictly under Presidents General Levingston and Lt. General Lanusse. This surely hampered the already irregular activity of the Communist Vanguard. Though there have been suggestions that the Vanguard was more or less defunct in 1971, it appears that the movement was essentially unchanged since 1969 despite its relative inactivity. Therefore, the movement conformed to the same three tenets of the Chinese model for people's war as it did in 1965 and 1969.

2. Brazil

The Communist Party of Brazil has been formally divided into two parties since 1962; the pro-Soviet Brazilian Community Party (BCP) under the leadership of Luiz Carlos Prestes and the Communist Party of Brazil (CPB) under Mauricia Grabois and João Amazonas, which was the recipient of Chinese support. As in the case of Argentina, the pro-Chinese party was originally a splinter group of the pro-Soviet party and has never managed to command the same level of popular support as the party from which it broke away. The CPB appealed to both Cuba and China for aid and apparently received Cuban aid until March, 1963, when pro-Soviet elements in Havana persuaded the Cubans to terminate the aid relationship.

Since that time the CPB has been openly pro-Chinese. Its principle publication A Classe Operaria has tried, in its infrequent appearances

to demonstrate parallels between the Brazilian situation and the pre-revolutionary situation in China:

The conditions of struggle in Brazil are in some respects similar to those of the Chinese people's struggle before they defeated their enemies and gained final victory. That is why in the light of Brazil's specific conditions, the road travelled by the Chinese Communist Party is a reliable chart for the Brazilian people in their struggle for national and social emancipation. 24

This rhetoric was coupled with action; just after the split between the CPB and the Brazilian Communist Party the CPB appeared to be putting the Chinese model to the test. A training centre was set up for guerrillas but was quickly overrun by police and military forces. According to Luis Merciers Vega, "the Communist Party of Brazil tried to establish terrorist cells and to get what was subsequently called the 'Uberlândia Movement' going, in the mining triangle." 25 This was an attempt to appeal to the workers and to ally the forces of the CPB with some of the groups opposing the new military regime that had ousted the Goulart government in April, 1964.

In 1965, the Communist Party of Brazil was clearly a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist communist party espousing the Chinese theory of people's war. 26 It was attempting to correctly utilize the "united front policy" in its efforts to oppose the post-Goulart military government in the mining triangle with an alliance with non-communist anti-government workers and peasants. Some attempt was made to establish rural bases in the State of Minas Gerais though there appeared to be little, if any, attempt to rely on the

peasants as the foundation of the movement. The rural niches were terrorist hideouts and camps rather than the established territory of the movement which could serve as the bases for movement operations. The army and the police forces under the government of President General Humberto Castelo Branco were too strong and too far reaching for the construction of the type of rural bases integral to the Chinese theory of people's war. Clearly, by 1965, there was no army led by the CPB and the population was not, by any stretch of the imagination, mobilized in its support. Without an advanced movement, the question of whether or not it was following a policy of self-reliance is not a relevant one. The CPB in 1965 was clearly anti-feudal and anti-imperialist and oriented towards communism, and it also appeared to have a significant level of popular support, considering it was only three years old.

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By 1969 there had been little significant change in the party. Cecil Johnson points out that during the Cultural Revolution in China, the CPB and many of its pro-Chinese counterparts elsewhere in Latin America were in a sort of ideological "limbo". Such a situation somewhat hampered their desire to start a full-scale people's war immediately. In any case, the military governments of Arthur de Costa e Silva and General Emilio G. Medici carried out policies of severe repression of communist groups, forcing the actions of the Communist Party further underground. Despite the lack of evidence and the relatively common assertion that time was working against the movements there seems to be no evidence that

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the CPB suffered any setbacks. Considering the continuing nature
of CPB rhetoric,³¹ it seems reasonable to suggest that the nature of
the movement in 1969 was similar to that of 1965 and that the
movement conformed to the same tenets of the Chinese model for a
people's war as it had in 1965.

In 1971, the activities of the Communist Party of Brazil
were still clandestine. However, it appears to have suffered set-
backs as a result of continual activity by the successive military
governments in the rounding up of subversive groups. The CPB still
maintained that the "only road for the liberation of the Brazilian
people is the road of a people's war" that has to be waged "in the
countryside with the broad masses of peasants as its mainstay,"
and an urban worker-student alliance "in close combination with the
armed action in the interior."³² Deriving most of its support from
the alienated northeast of the country it seems that the CPB had
not continued its attempt to build a worker-student alliance and
that it had, more or less, abandoned the idea of building a united
front.³³ Its activities in 1971 appeared very limited. Therefore,
in 1971, the same minor tenets of the Chinese model for a people's
war seem to be fulfilled as in 1969. However, the CPB does not seem
to have been attempting to implement a united front policy. Though
the amount of support that the CPB commanded is very unclear, it
seems reasonable to assume that it had sufficient popular support in
the northeast³⁴ to conform with the last tenet of the Chinese proto-
type for people's war; the requirement that a movement be vigorously
pursued with popular support.

3. The Dominican Republic

The case of the Dominican Republic is substantially different from the cases of Argentina and Brazil. The support that China offered the revolutionary movement in the Caribbean state was offered not only to one organizational centre of the movement but to three; the Dominican People's Movement (MPD), the June 14 Revolutionary Movement (JRM), and to the Dominican Revolutionary Party of Juan Bosch (PRD). In addition, the MPD has at times been split into as many as four separate parties.

Originally formed in 1956 the MPD was consolidated as a political party in 1963 under the leadership of Maximo Lopez Molina who attempted to use his party to start a guerrilla war in 1963. The MPD under Lopez was a major proponent of the Chinese theory of people's war, as were the main splinter groups under Alfred Toussent Jean and Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado. Though a comparison and analysis of these divisions is beyond the scope of this analysis, it is interesting to note that all of the divisions claimed to be the sole propogator of true Marxist-Leninist doctrine as interpreted by Mao. Each accused the others of revisionism, counterrevolutionary activity and personal corruption. All claimed to be organizing and directing "the revolutionary fight of the people against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys at home, turning to armed struggle as the only way out and taking the countryside as the chief arena of struggle."

The June 14 Revolutionary Movement (JRM) was in a position very similar to that of the MPD. Continued factionalism, and

oscillation between pro-Castro and pro-Chinese positions, created in
the party no set policy and very little unity. 38

Finally, the PRD was not a proponent of Chinese ideology, nor did it claim to be communist. What is most significant is that the PRD under Juan Bosch was the main organization supported in the Chinese press, and, although both the others were not without support, it was Juan Bosch who was invited to visit China in 1969.

In 1965, the majority of Chinese support for the Dominican Movement, as we saw in Chapter II, came in the form of public support for the forces crushed by the Dominican military forces and the American military intervention. Though there was support for Bosch from the MPD and JRM at the time of the American invasion, these parties were not the direct target of the Chinese support. These two groups were merely part of the uprising and reaction of the Dominican people in general against the American action; neither played a significant central role. Despite the Chinese hope that these parties, or at least one of them, could help lead the movement to a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist stand, the movement which the Chinese praised was popularly supported by many non-communists. 39

Therefore, the conformity to the Chinese prototype of the movement as a whole must be assessed. Led as it was, primarily by the PRD, it is clear that it did not have a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party as its vanguard. Nor did it fulfill any of the other six primary tenets of an ideal people's war, except for perhaps the second, for it did indeed represent a cross-section of Dominican

society, a real united front. The PRD was, with a doubt, anti-imperialist and commanded significant support, but it was not definitively oriented towards communism or the Chinese model of people's socialism.⁴⁰

By 1969, the ideological battle between the MPD and the JRM was in full force. Juan Bosch and the remnants of the core of the PRD which he still commanded (many had fled the ranks to join the forces of Joaquin Balaguer)⁴¹ had apparently given up hope of returning to power through the electoral process, and were advocating mass struggle and violence. This was coupled with an ideological shift to the left, for Bosch no longer attempted to appeal to a wide range of political views but instead espoused the creation of a socialist republic to be achieved through the mobilization of the masses.⁴² It was probably this stance that earned him the invitation to Peking during October. This new element in the Dominican situation meant new possibilities for people's war. Despite the changes in the movement between 1965 and 1969, it was still not led by a Marxist-Leninist communist party, and the only tenets of the Chinese model for people's war that it fulfilled were the three minor tenets: it was anti-imperialist; it was, unlike 1965, definitively oriented towards socialism; and it appeared to command increasing popular support in both rural and urban areas.⁴³

Between 1969 and 1971 very little changed in the nature of the revolutionary movement in the Dominican Republic. The one major difference is that the debate between the MPD and JRM appeared

to be over; by this time the MPD was in full ideological debate with
 the smaller pro-Soviet Communist Party of the Dominican Republic.

Though it is not clear whether the JRM and the MPD resolved their
 differences or merely turned to more pressing matters, the MPD seems
 to have been the only active Marxist-Leninist party adhering to
 Chinese doctrine. The JRM, inactive during 1971, had reverted to
 its somewhat more pro-Castroite stand, but appeared to have lost its
 central position in the movement. Pro-Bosch forces were still
 strong and the revolutionary movement as a whole remained fragmented.
 Thus the Dominican movement can be considered to have remained con-
 sistent with the three minimum tenets of the Chinese model for
 people's war.

In all three time periods, the Dominican revolutionary
 movement was uncommitted in the Sino-Soviet debate. Despite signifi-
 cant blocs of pro-Chinese sentiment within the movement from time
 to time, together the MPD, the JRM, and the PRD (which is the "move-
 ment" which China supported) never had a unified policy on the
 matter.

4. Ecuador

As in most Latin American states, the most noticeable
 element in the communist movement in Ecuador over the past decade
 has been the ongoing conflict between the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese
 parties. Until 1963, there existed only one party, but with the
 emergence of the debate between China and the Soviet Union, the pro-
 Soviet elements expelled those who backed China, blaming virtually

all of its problems on the relationship such members had with

✓ Peking:

The CP of Ecuador can affirm that all which was undertaken to isolate it from the general line of the world Communist movement, all the maneuvers which have aimed at decapitating it in order to seize upon its leadership organs, all the attempts at schism, have obtained the direct support of the Chinese leaders. 46

Though there appears little evidence for such accusations it is evident that the Sino-Soviet dispute had as severe repercussions in Ecuadorian communist circles as in Brazil and Argentina. However, there was one major difference. The split in the Communist Party of Ecuador did not come to a head until November, 1965, when the Central Committee of the party ratified the expulsion of Jose Rafael Echeverria Flores and his followers for scheming against the leadership of the party. This ratification appeared to be the final step in the Schism which had begun with the less formal expulsions of a year earlier.⁴⁷ Unlike other communist movements which had split in reaction to the growing hostility between the Soviet Union and China, by 1965 there were not already two established parties in Ecuador. It was not until 1966 that the expelled group banded together to form a pro-Chinese communist party. The new party, known as the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador was the party that was offered Chinese support in 1969 and 1971.

In 1965 the communist movement in Ecuador was in a state of immense internal upheaval. It carried on very little activity and restricted itself mainly to the resolution of its own ideological

conflicts. There was certainly no continuing antigovernmental
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 struggle led by the Communist Party in 1965, and there appears no
 evidence in secondary literature to suggest that the movement fulfilled any of the major tenets of the Chinese model for a people's war. In fact, the movement only fulfilled two of the minor tenets. The movement was, without a doubt, both oriented towards communism and very much opposed to imperialism, yet it enjoyed very little
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 popular support.

For the purposes of this analysis, we can assume that the Ecuadorian movement was, in 1965, uncommitted in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Though the Communist Party of Ecuador was officially pro-Soviet, it was this very issue that divided the party. As the movement as a whole was not therefore led by the pro-Soviet party, and as no alternative party had yet emerged, the movement must be classified as uncommitted. If we were considering the Communist Party of Ecuador alone, we would have to classify it as pro-Soviet, but the dissension in the movement precludes such classification.

By 1969, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador had emerged as the pro-Chinese counterpart to the older Communist Party of Ecuador. Under the leadership of Rafael Echeverria, it had suffered factionalism of its own during 1966 and 1967, when a splinter group under Jorge Arrellano, a close colleague of Echeverria in the old party, split off because of Echeverria's intransigence in opposing pro-Castro elements within the new Marxist-Leninist

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party. As this internal debate preoccupied the pro-Chinese party much as it had preoccupied the pro-Soviet party in 1964 and 1965, few advances were made in the activities of the party. The movement was now led by a Marxist-Leninist communist party, yet few of the other tenets of the Chinese model for a people's war were fulfilled. Though it did espouse Chinese theory, there is no evidence to suggest that it conformed closely to the Chinese model in action. It was, as in 1965, anti-imperialist and oriented towards communism, and it had increased its popular support. The major difference in the Ecuadorian movement between 1965 and 1969 was the stance on the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador stood firmly behind the Chinese, refusing to accept either pro-Soviet or Castroite members.

Between 1969 and 1971, very little activity had been carried out by Echevarria's party. It was active in anti-governmental activity in 1971, especially in the widespread student demonstration, even though it did not claim any credit for the organization of the demonstrations. The party remained firmly within the pro-Chinese camp, a stance which it made clear through the visit of a delegation led by Politburo member Camila Almeida to Albania during the year. Yet, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador had made no progress, if indeed it had attempted to, in the implementation of the major tenets of the Chinese model for a people's war. We can assume that the nature of the Ecuadorian

movement supported by China did not change substantially between 1969 and 1971.

Summary

Table III-2 summarizes the conformity of the four case-study movements to the Chinese model for a people's war, as measured by the revolutionary index.

C: Preliminary Analysis of the Latin American Case Studies

Not all of the hypotheses presented in Chapter I can be assessed given the Latin American data alone. However, that data does allow preliminary examination of all of those hypotheses except for the first and the fifth. One major difference between this preliminary examination and the more complete examination to be offered in Chapter VI is that geographical proximity of a state to China cannot yet be considered, since that entails a comparison of the data from all three regions.

These hypotheses will be tested through the comparison of the two primary independent variables and the dependent variable. Table III-3 summarizes that data for the Latin American case studies. (The hypotheses are numbered according to the list in Chapter I.) We should remember that the conclusions suggested here are not the final conclusions of this thesis, as they are subject to reconsideration when the data for all three regions are considered.

Hypothesis No. 2: When directly confronting the United States or one of its so-called "imperialist tools" a movement is likely to receive a high level of support, greater than the revolutionary

TABLE III-2

REVOLUTIONARY INDEX

LATIN AMERICA

	Led by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Communist Party	Correct Utilization of the "united-front policy"	Reliance on peasantry and the establishment of rural bases	Communist party-led army, politically motivated and mass-backed	Mobilized population and guerrilla warfare, strategy and tactics	Adherence to a policy of self-reliance	Anti-colonial anti-feudal and anti-imperialist	Oriented towards socialism of communism	Vigorously pursued with significant popular support	Stance on Sino-Soviet rift R:pro-Soviet. C:pro-Chinese. U:uncommitted	TOTAL - Revolutionary Index
1965											
Argentina	1	1					1	1	1	C	3C
Brazil	1	1					1	1	1	C	5C
Dominican Rep.		1					1	1	1	U	3U
Ecuador											2U
1969											
Argentina	1						1	1	1	C	3C
Brazil	1	1					1	1	1	C	5C
Dominican Rep.	1						1	1	1	U	3U
Ecuador										C	4C
1971											
Argentina	1						1	1	1	C	3C
Brazil	1						1	1	1	C	4C
Dominican Rep.	1						1	1	1	U	3U
Ecuador	1						1	1	1	C	4C

TABLE III-3
SUMMARY OF THREE INDICES
LATIN AMERICA

	Support Index	Hostility Index	Revolutionary Index
1965			
Argentina	4	-3	3C
Brazil	5	-4	5C
Dominican Republic	7	-4	3U
Ecuador	0	-4	2U
1969			
Argentina	5	-4	3C
Brazil	5	-4	5C
Dominican Republic	4	-4	3U
Ecuador	5	-4	4C
1971			
Argentina	-1	-4	3C
Brazil	1	-4	4C
Dominican Republic	3	-4	3U
Ecuador	1	2	4C

nature of the movement alone would dictate.

It appears that this hypothesis is upheld by the data. The one movement in Latin American case studies that was interpreted by the Chinese as directly confronting the United States was the Dominican movement in 1965. When we compare the support index for that movement with that of other movements opposing regimes with hostility indices similar to the 1965 Dominican, we find an exceptionally high figure. This relatively high level of support cannot be explained by the revolutionary nature of the Dominican movement. This revolutionary index indicates a degree of conformity between that movement and the Chinese prototype for a people's war which in other movements is coupled with a lower level of support.

Hypothesis No. 3: A movement aimed at the overthrow of a government hostile to Peking is more likely to receive support than one aimed at the displacement of a friendly regime.

The data are insufficient to test this hypothesis. As there is only one case in twelve where a governing regime has a positive rating on the hostility scale--Ecuador in 1971--it would be premature to comment.

Hypothesis No. 4: When a regime is uncommitted in its dealings with China, China will hesitate to support an indigenous revolutionary movement, in hopes of broadening her international political base.

Without a single case where a regime is rated near "0" on the hostility index, we cannot judge the validity of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 6: When a revolutionary movement supports the Soviet Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute, China will support either an alternative organization within that state, or, if one does not exist, no movement at all, regardless of the tenor of the relations between the governing regime and China.

Hypothesis No. 6 appears to be partially validated. China offered no support to any movement that backed the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In several cases there existed a pro-Soviet party that was considerably stronger than the pro-Chinese one, yet China invariably offered support for the latter. In situations where a movement was uncommitted in the dispute, the data is less clear. Apart from the Dominican movement, which was seen as directly confronting the United States in 1965 and one of its "imperialist tools"--the Balaguer regime--in 1969 and 1971, the only movement uncommitted in the Sino-Soviet debate was the Ecuadorian movement in 1965. That movement received no support from China. Perhaps the data from the other two regions will shed further light on this matter.

Hypothesis No. 7: The greater the degree of conformity of a given revolutionary movement to the Chinese prototype for people's war, the greater the support the movement will be accorded, regardless of governmental hostility.

The data tend to support the assertion that Chinese support is, at least partly, a function of the degree of conformity between

a revolutionary movement and the Chinese model for a people's war. Of the movements which backed China in the Sino-Soviet dispute, there appears to be some relationship between the support index and the revolutionary index for 1965 and 1969, and perhaps for 1971 (although the support index figures are substantially lower). For example, in 1971, the two movements receiving a rating of 4C on the revolutionary index received a rating on the support index of 1, while the movement receiving only a rating of 3C on the revolutionary index received a -1 on the support index. However, due to the small number of movements and the large number of combinations of different ratings on the two scales, conclusions on the validity of the seventh hypothesis should be reserved until data for the other regions has been presented.

Apart from the testing of the hypotheses, one other conclusion can be drawn. It is evident that there is a marked difference in the figures of the support index between the first two time periods and the third time period. Chinese policy towards Latin American revolutionary movements appears to have been substantially different in 1971 from her policies in 1965 and 1969. As there is relatively little change in the primary independent variables when we examine them across time, we can conclude that the change in policy was a function of something other than the hostility expressed by Latin American governments toward China or the nature of the revolutionary movements. The data for the other two geographical regions should enable us to judge whether or not this was a more

general phenomenon. Hopefully then we will be able to suggest some explanation for such a shift in policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. New York Times. 18 November 1965, p. 2.
2. New York Times. 11 November 1969, p. 4.
3. New York Times. 26 October 1971, p. 1.
4. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1966-1967, 1970-1971, 1972-1973. London, St. Martin's Press, MacMillan, 1966, 1970, 1972.
5. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969 and 1971, New York, United Nations, 1971 and 1973. For an analysis of China's trade with Latin America, see the now somewhat dated study by George Ginsburgs and Arthur Stahnke. "Communist China's Trade Relations with Latin America." Asian Survey. September, 1970. pp. 803-819.
6. "Charter of the Organization of American States." signed in 1948. reprinted in The Statesman's Yearbook, 1964-1965. London, St. Martin's Press, 1964.
7. On 15 January, 1972, Valasco was ousted by a military revolt which put General Guillermo Rodriguez Laza in power.
8. Cecil Johnson attaches significant importance to the difference, claiming that the word "party" signifies a greater support for the movement when used in the Chinese press. I do not accept this reasoning for it appears as though the party itself has oscillated between the use of the two names. c.f. Johnson, op. cit., p. 244.
9. Branco Lazitch, "Repercussions of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on the Latin American Communist Parties." Est et Ouest, January, 1965, reprinted in Translations on Communist Development. Joint Publications Research Service, No. 693, p. 11.
10. (Unsigned) "The Present Situation of the Argentine Communist Party." Est et Ouest, May, 1966, reprinted in Translations on Communist Developments. Joint Publications Research Service, No. 857, p. 25.
11. Cecil Johnson, op. cit., pp. 272-273.
12. NCNA, 29 October, 1967, quoted in Cecil Johnson, op. cit., p. 272.
13. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1966, edited by Milarad M. Drachkovitch, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1967, p. 184.

14. Mercier Vega, Guerrillas in Latin America: The Technique of the Counter-State, London, Pall Mall Press, 1969, pp. 115-117.
15. NCNA, 4 October, 1965, quoted in Cecil Johnson, op. cit., p. 271.
16. Peter Ranis, Five Latin American Nations: A Comparative Political Study, New York, MacMillan, 1971, p. 138.
17. Mercier Vega, op. cit., p. 117.
18. Ibid., p. 45. See also Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1968, edited by Richard Allen, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1969, p. 20.
19. Mercier Vega, op. cit., p. 44.
20. Peter Ranis, op. cit., p. 143.
21. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1972, edited by Richard F. Starr, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1973, p. 311
22. New York Times, 9 August, 1971, p. 10.
23. Ernst Halperin, op. cit., p. 140.
24. Quoted in Peking Review, 30 August, 1963, p. 27.
25. Mercier Vega, op. cit., p. 142.
26. See "Resolutions of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil: 'The Domestic Situation in Brazil and the Tasks of the Communist Party of Brazil'." Peking Review, 28 May, 1965, p. 21. See also "Political Resolutions of the 6th National Conference of the Communist Party of Brazil." Peking Review, 16 December, 1966, pp. 28-32.
27. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1966, edited by Milarad M. Drachkovitch, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1967.
28. Cecil Johnson, op. cit., p. 206.
29. See, for example, J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1971, p. 248.
30. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1970, edited by Richard F. Starr, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1971, p. 356.

31. SCMP, No. 4348, 1969, p. 19.
32. NCNA, 3 January, 1970, quoted in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1972, edited by Richard F. Staar, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1973, p. 323.
33. Ibid.
34. New York Times, 26 September, 1971, p. IV 3, see also Cecil Johnson, op. cit., pp. 206-207.
35. For an analysis of the confusion in the political parties in the Dominican Republic see Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos" in Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics, edited by Arpad von Lazar and Robert R. Kaufman, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1969, pp. 34-58.
36. Florangel Cardenas. "The Crisis in the Dominican Popular Movement: Division among the Dominican Communists." Ahora, August, 1966, reprinted in Translations on Communist Developments, Joint Publications Research Service, No. 879.
37. Yearbook on Communist Affairs, 1968, edited by Richard Allen, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1969, p. 188.
38. See Cardenas, op. cit., for a more extensive examination.
39. For a general discussion of the 1965 Dominican affair see Theodore Draper, "Dominican Crisis", Commentary, December, 1965, pp. 33-68.
40. Theodore Draper, op. cit.
41. Stanley Plastrik, "Bosch and Lalaguer: Dominican Roulette", Dissent, November-December, 1970, pp. 521-522.
42. Ibid., p. 522.
43. Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, New York, Harper and Row, 1970, pp. 210-211.
44. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1972, edited by Richard F. Staar, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1973, pp. 363-365.
45. New York Times, 28 August, 1971, p. 2, and November 9, 1971, p. 49.
46. Quoted in Lazitch, op. cit., p. 19.

47. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ecuador, "Resolution on Organization", El Pueblo, November, 1965, reprinted in Translations on Communist Developments, Joint Publications Research Service, No. 788.
48. Van Ness, op. cit., p. 221.
49. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1966, edited by Milarad M. Drachkovitch, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1967, p. 219.
50. Cecil Johnson, op. cit., pp. 244-246.
51. Peking Review, 4 July, 1969, p. 21.
52. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1970, edited by Richard F. Staar, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1971, p. 412.
53. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1972, edited by Richard F. Staar, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1973, p. 369.

CHAPTER IV

THE AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN CASE STUDIES

Unlike Latin America, Africa cannot be considered an essentially uniform bloc of states. There is much greater diversity in types of political systems, patterns of alignment, stages of development, and types of economic organization. Thus, rather than choosing a selection of movements on the basis of the variation in support received from China, the selection can be made on the basis of the nature of the state in which the movement operates. In Chapter II, when examining the support China offered African and Middle Eastern movements, we suggested that there existed a natural four-group typology for the separation of the states in this region. The first of these groups comprises those areas of Africa still under formal colonial rule. The second group consists of those states in southern Africa whose political and social organization is based on racial discrimination; the regimes pursuing the policy commonly known as apartheid. The independent states of Africa and the states of the Middle East are the logical two remaining groups. It is on the basis of this four-group typology that the selection of case studies for the Africa and Middle East region is made. One state or colony from each group will be analyzed: Angola from the colonial territories; Ethiopia from the independent African states; South Africa from the apartheid areas; and Israel-Palestine from the Middle East.

The four movements selected provide a much more varied choice of movements than the Latin American case studies both in terms of the nature of the struggle, and in terms of the support offered the movements by China. As we saw in Chapter II, the levels of support these movements received during the three time periods, according to the support index, were as follows:

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1971</u>
Angola	12	12	12
Ethiopia	0	- 3	- 3
Israel-Palestine	6	14	14
South Africa	1	10	9

In this chapter, as in Chapter III, the hostility index will be computed for all four case studies first, and then the revolutionary index will be computed for each of the four movements separately. Finally, some of the hypotheses presented in Chapter I will be tested to provide a preliminary explanation of Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Africa and the Middle East.

A. Hostility Index

State to state relations cannot be considered in the case of Angola. Though the colonial regime does act as the ruling government in many cases of domestic administration, it is the government of Portugal that determines policy for Angola, through a system of direct rule. It is therefore necessary to consider the metropolitan government of Portugal when computing the hostility index. Portugal, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, voted with the United States and Taiwan on the Important Question

Resolution and the Albanian Resolution in 1965.¹ In 1969, Portugal abstained from all voting on the representation issue and remained silent throughout the debate.² This was not to remain Portugal's policy. In 1971, during the voting which finally allowed China to regain her lawful seat, Portugal broke this pattern of hostility. She voted for the Important Question Resolution as she had in the past, but then reversed her earlier stance and voted for the Albanian Resolution.³ This act was not surprising; several countries did exactly the same thing. When it was clear that the United States and Taiwan were going to lose on the issue of representation (when the Important Question Resolution was defeated, the outcome was evident since there had been a plurality of votes for the Albanian Resolution a year earlier) many countries jumped on the bandwagon. Only for 1971 can Portugal be accorded a positive rating on either of the voting indicators of the hostility index. As we pointed out in Chapter I, by abstaining on either or both issues, a state did not befriend China. As far as the Chinese were concerned, anything short of a vote in favour of legitimate Chinese representation was an act of hostility. In 1965, Portugal was considering establishing diplomatic relations with China, although no formal meetings between the two states ever took place.⁴ For unexplained reasons, Portugal did not pursue the matter, and maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan during all three time periods.⁵ Portugal did not conduct sufficient trade with either China or Taiwan in any of the three time periods to merit attention on the hostility index.⁶ As the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization is very clearly a defence alliance of western states led primarily by the U.S., Portuguese membership in that body will be considered as an indicator of hostility towards China.

Ethiopia, homeland of the Eritrian Liberation Front, has generally been friendly to China during the past decade. Her record of voting on the representation issue in the General Assembly at the United Nations shows no deviation from the pro-Peking line. Not once, in any of the three time periods, did Ethiopia break from the pattern of voting against the Important Question Resolution and for the Albanian Resolution.⁷ Ethiopia has not been a party to any military alliance with either Peking or the west, and has never had much trade with the far east. No Ethiopia-China or Ethiopia-Taiwan trade is recorded in the U.N. compilations of statistics of international trade for any of the three years.⁸ The issue of diplomatic relations is an interesting one. Though Chou En-lai visited Ethiopia in 1964, it was not until 1971 that formal diplomatic relations were set up between the two countries.⁹ The reasons for this long delay are not clear, but in any case, Ethiopia did not maintain relations with Taiwan. Her official stance during 1965 and 1969 was non-recognition of both.

In the case of Israel-Palestine, though we are trying to explain the support offered the Palestine Liberation Organization and Al Fatah, we must assess the hostility index for the Israeli government, as these organizations are aimed at its overthrow.

Israel presents a pattern of hostility similar to, but less intense than that of Portugal. Voting in the United Nations General Assembly for the Important Question Resolution and against the Albanian Resolution in both 1965 and 1969, Israel reversed her attitude on the Albanian Resolution in 1971.¹⁰ As might be expected, Israel's trade with the far east has always been extremely small, and her trade with either China or Taiwan nonexistent.¹¹ Israel has no diplomatic relations with either Taiwan or Peking, despite the fact that she recognizes the Peking regime as the legitimate and operative government of China. Though there is no formal military alliance between Israel and the United States or other western countries, we can assume for the purposes of the computation of the hostility index that such an alliance did indeed exist. Israel relies very heavily on members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for military sales and credits, especially the United States and France. In the middle 1950's Israel had actually tried to join NATO, and when unsuccessful, had attempted to enter into a joint defence treaty with the United States alone. It was U.S. fears that such a treaty would jeopardize relations with Arab countries that put an end to Israeli efforts.¹² Yet the lack of a formal treaty has not created a situation where Israel is not a close ally, de facto if not de jure, of the United States. Thus, we have little choice but to compute the Hostility index as if a formal alliance existed.

The final case study of this region is South Africa. South Africa has been the most consistently hostile to China of any of the four countries we are considering here. In the United Nations, South Africa voted in favour of Taiwan on both resolutions in all three time periods.¹³ Diplomatic relations with Taiwan have been maintained by South Africa since 1949 and trade links have been established between the two for many years, even though they never¹⁴ reached what we have defined as a significant level. Finally, as in the case of Israel, the lack of a formal military alliance with the United States or the west must be overlooked in the light of a tacit alliance with Great Britain. South Africa has been a recipient of British military aid. Thus, it must be considered as strongly aligned militarily as Portugal, which is an actual member of a regional security alliance. Table IV-1 summarizes the hostility of the governments of our four African and Middle Eastern case studies, as measured through the hostility index. We shall now proceed to compute the revolutionary index for each of the cases.

B. Revolutionary Index

As we mentioned in our examination of the Latin American case studies, the purpose of this section is to explain the reasoning behind the computation of the revolutionary index. The only background information on the movements that will be included is that which is relevant to the understanding of the elements of the movements which are important in this index. The bibliography suggests where more detailed historical analyses can be located.

TABLE IV-1

HOSTILITY INDEX

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

	U.N. voting on Important Question Resolution	U.N. voting on Albanian Resolution	Diplomatic relations with Peking or Taiwan	Extensive trade with Peking or Taiwan	Military defence alliance with Peking or Taiwan or West	TOTAL Hostility Index
1965						
Angola	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Ethiopia	1	1				2
Israel-Palestine	-1	-1			-1	-3
South Africa	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
1969						
Angola	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
Ethiopia	1	1				2
Israel-Palestine	-1	-1			-1	-3
South Africa	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4
1971						
Angola	-1	1	-1		-1	-2
Ethiopia	1	1	1			3
Israel-Palestine	-1	1			-1	-1
South Africa	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4

1. Angola

Angola, the site of an ongoing civil war since 1961, has experienced nationalist uprisings against the Portuguese since the Europeans' arrival in the sixteenth century. Most of the early anti-colonial movements were based on tribal unity and thus remained eclectic and generally short-lived in the face of the better-organized and unified colonizers. The modern movements are natural offspring of the tribal groups of earlier periods, and it is perhaps this legacy that has created so much of the internal difficulty in the Angolan movement since 1961, when the war of liberation began.

As we saw in Chapter II, in 1965 China supported primarily an organization called the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA); in 1969 an organization called the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); and in 1971 both of these groups. A brief discussion of the background of these movements in the context of the overall Angolan struggle is necessary to explain the revolutionary nature of each organization.

The MPLA was founded in 1965 as a clandestine nationalist party. It originally grouped a series of smaller radical organizations with the Angola Communist Party, and was primarily confined to the urban areas of the colony. Led by intellectuals, it made little attempt to appeal to the peasants in the rural parts of the colony, and therefore when Portugal began a campaign of mass arrests in 1959, the MPLA was forced into exile. It regrouped in France and

then returned to Africa to establish its headquarters first in Brazzaville and then in Lusaka. Viriato da Cruz, Mario de Andrade and Agostinho Neto were the principle leaders of the movement which espoused a policy of struggle uniting tribal groupings against the Portuguese. (Andrade was actually one of the organizers of the African Revolutionary Front for National Independence (FRAIN) which was an inter-territorial united front.)¹⁸ However, the MPLA

membership consisted almost entirely of Kimbundu and Ovimbundu, the two peoples who had flocked to the cities to trade and cooperate with the Portuguese, adopting the metropolitan religion and many European social forms.¹⁹ That the MPLA was limited primarily to these peoples (and more to the Kimbundu than the Ovimbundu) was not a function of policy but of circumstance; the movement had been vigorously suppressed before it had had much of a chance to spread its influence in non-urban areas, and other groups were organizing themselves specifically around tribal lines in the countryside.

The Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) was one of these tribal organizations. Set up first in Kinshasha, and then in Accra and Lusaka, it really was little more than a Bakongo movement, despite multi-tribal leadership until the mid-1960's. The Bakongo, a northern people, are split between Zaire (Belgian Congo) and Angola by the colonial boundary. Holden Roberto, leader of GRAE, appealed for support through a non-ideological nationalist stance. He was denounced by President Kasavubu as a communist; by the All-African People's Congress in Ghana as an American tool; and

by other Angolan nationalists as a Bakongo rather than an Angolan nationalist. The other Angolan nationalists claimed that Roberto actually followed a policy of racial genocide; that he ordered the liquidation of all non-Bakongo elements in the forces of GRAE. It was this issue that precipitated the withdrawal of Jonas Savimba, an Ovimbundu and a senior official, from GRAE to form UNITA.

UNITA was founded by Savimba in 1966. Despite its relative youth, UNITA was the largest and most successful of the Angolan organizations by 1971. Founded inside Angola (unlike the other groups) UNITA did establish an office outside of the country, at Lusaka in Zambia. In 1967 UNITA forces sabotaged the Zambia-Angola railway and were thrown out of Lusaka by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda. When Savimba attempted to organize MPLA, GRAE, and UNITA into a united front, Holden Roberto demanded the dissolution of UNITA and the merging of its forces under the leadership of GRAE. This was clearly not acceptable to Savimba. Mario de Andrade of the MPLA answered with armed attacks against the military wing of UNITA, the Liberation Armed Forces (FALA), which, however, were repulsed. Though some analysts have charged that UNITA was the divisive force, it is clear that UNITA is the one multi-ethnic organization and has been the main proponent of unity of the three groups. For example, despite the attacks on FALA by the MPLA, UNITA did not cease in its efforts to unify the divided movements. In reaction to the participation of the MPLA as the sole voice of the Angolan people's liberation movement at the Rome conference on the Portuguese colonies,

the foreign secretary of UNITA condemned the efforts of the Soviet Union to influence the structure of the Angolan movement through MPLA:

History has demonstrated that no foreign country big or small, has ever succeeded in imposing solutions upon other countries and peoples without their full and conscious consent. Only the Angolan people are masters of their own struggle and destiny. Therefore, to determine a priori that only MPLA represents the Angolan people is no more, no less, than wishful thinking and mere mental exercise. This does not represent the objective conditions inside Angola. 25

By 1971, the fratricidal struggle had lessened in intensity, and both the MPLA and UNITA had turned their attention to the fight against Portugal. There is some evidence of a formal pact between the two groups, 26 and both the rhetorical and the armed clashes ceased. The MPLA modified its pro-Soviet stance to the point where it accepted the theory of the united front, as evidenced by leader Agostinho Neto's visit to China in July, 1971. 27

In 1965, the MPLA was a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party which was leading a struggle that fulfilled almost all the tenets of the Chinese prototype for a people's war. It had established rural bases in the Cabinda area of the north; 28 it had mobilized the population and was using the tactics and strategy of guerrilla warfare; and it certainly was anti-colonial, oriented towards communism, vigorous in the pursuit of its objectives, and it had widespread, extremely popular backing. There is one questionable element which is always somewhat ambiguous; the sixth requirement of a people's

war--"adherence to a policy of self-reliance". Though the MPLA was aided by China and other external organizations, we would still have to assert that the Angolan movement was indeed the "business of the masses . . . and carried out primarily by their own efforts."²⁹

Therefore, there are only two tenets that the Angolan movement did not adhere to in 1965. The MPLA did not pursue a united front policy; in fact it fostered factionalism. Second there was no communist party-led army. The clashes with the Portuguese by the guerrillas were the only confrontations with the colonial forces. The MPLA was not committed to either side in the Sino-Soviet debate, even though it was to shortly align itself with pro-Soviet elements in other countries in condemning China.

By 1969, UNITA had emerged as a powerful pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist communist party. It received all the Chinese support for Angolan organizations in 1969. Operating primarily in southern and central Angola, the movement it led fulfilled all the attributes of an ideal people's war. UNITA created, in 1967, a military wing, called the Liberation Armed Forces (FALA) which conducted both guerrilla warfare and more conventional armed clashes with the Portuguese forces. Unlike the MPLA in 1965, it pursued the policy of building a united front. Though the MPLA and GRAE were to thwart UNITA's efforts, it was very much part of UNITA's programme. (Actually, the similarity between the movement led by UNITA and the Chinese revolution is quite striking: FALA cadres and political officers work with medics in opening schools and clinics

and social service centres, and UNITA has tried to preserve whatever it can of the existing communal society while working to gain the confidence and support of the peasants.)

Between 1969 and 1971 the only major change was the termination of the struggle between the MPLA and UNITA. The movement now supported by China was once again uncommitted in the Sino-Soviet debate. Though UNITA was still pro-Chinese, the MPLA was, despite formal relations with China, probably more closely aligned with the Soviet Union. Both UNITA and the MPLA had made great advances in gaining territory from the Portuguese forces.

Table IV-2, appearing after the discussion of the other three case studies, summarizes the conformity of the Angolan movement to the Chinese prototype for a people's war.

2. Ethiopia

In 1952, Eritrea, once an Italian colony, was federated into Ethiopia as a semi-autonomous state. Ten years later the once independent Red Sea state was incorporated completely into Ethiopia as the 14th province. An act of the United Nations in 1952 had removed Eritrea from the administration of Britain, under which it had been ruled since its liberation from Italy during the second world war. Three years previous to the United Nations resolution, a national movement for total autonomy had begun lobbying both in Eritrea and in the United Nations. It was not until 1962 and the end of Eritrea's semi-autonomous status that the leaders of the nationalist movement began to think in terms of an armed struggle.

Yet the efforts to obtain independence through non-violent means were not abandoned--the Eritrean Liberation Front still maintains a lobby at the U.N. in New York. However, the major efforts of the front are now violent; there has been an almost continuous armed confrontation between Ethiopian soldiers and Eritrean guerrillas since 1966.

China did not support the Eritrean Liberation Front in any
 32
 of the three time periods, as we saw in Chapter II. Though the Eritrean Liberation Front toyed briefly with the rhetoric of Marxist-
 33
 Leninist movements, its main platform has been to work towards the total independence of Eritrea and the establishment of an autonomous government and political structure. Due to the dearth of secondary literature on the Eritrean movement, we have had to rely on more
 34
 general sources on Ethiopian politics and newspaper references to determine the conformity of the movement to the Chinese prototype.

In 1965, the Eritrean Liberation Front was not a revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist party. Nor was it to become one by 1971. It was a nationalist party with the objective of sovereignty. Armed clashes with the Ethiopian army were infrequent until 1966, when guerrilla warfare started in earnest. The two tenets of the Chinese model for a people's war that the Eritrean Liberation Front fulfilled in 1965 were anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and vigorous pursuit of its objectives. It appears also that the ELF was following a united-front policy. We must remember that a policy of united front refers to construction of a worker-peasant alliance,

and then, if possible, a broader alliance of all people in the country opposed to the incumbent regime. Though the ELF leadership was composed primarily of intellectuals, it derived support from both the urban areas along the Red Sea and from the more sparsely populated farming areas of the interior. Therefore, we can assume concordance with this second element of a people's war.

By 1969, the ELF was engaged in guerrilla warfare with the Ethiopian forces. Due to the increased suppression of ELF sympathizers, the front became active primarily in the interior.

Appealing to the Eritrean peasants, it established clandestine rural bases from which it could operate. ³⁵

Though there have been some suggestions that there was a flow of external aid coming across the Red Sea for the Eritreans, we can still assert that the ELF was adhering to a policy of self-reliance. There is no evidence of any assistance except material aid, and this does not preclude the possibility that the war was conducted primarily by the efforts of the Eritreans. ³⁶

Despite some rhetoric in 1967 concerning the establishment of a people's socialism ³⁷ the Eritrean Liberation Front was not, at any time, definitively oriented towards socialism as a post-independence form of government. In its attempt to maintain the broadest possible united front, the ELF appears to have ignored almost entirely the issue of post-independence organization.

In the period between 1969 and 1971, very little changed in the Eritrean independence movement. Popular support appeared to

have increased along with the size of the guerrilla army--the ELF³⁸ claimed to have 40,000 men. Haile Selassie was extremely concerned about the increasing success of the independence movement, and had assigned more than a third of his armed forces to what he called his "bandit suppression" programme. The Eritrean Liberation Front never committed itself to one side or the other in the Sino-Soviet debate; it generally tried to avoid such contentious issues entirely.

3. Israel-Palestine

The revolutionary movement confronting Israel is an excellent example of a movement receiving a high level of support from China without a high degree of conformity to the Chinese model of people's war.

Though the Palestinian movement consists of several different organizations, China has supported only the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Al Fatah, both of which China considers as part of the Palestine Liberation Organization. China also considers such groups as the Arab Liberation Front in Iraq to be part of the same organization. While these and other fedayeen are often affiliated, there are some clear differences between them which China does not recognize. This failure to differentiate is a real deviation from the usual Chinese pattern of supporting the one "vanguard" of the movement when more than one organization exists.

The Palestinian movement is remarkably non-ideological. None of the major organizations seem to have a well-developed stand

on post-victory organization. Their one pre-eminent goal is the destruction of the state of Israel. The PLO, operating primarily out of the south (originally out of the Gaza strip) has firmly stated that it is not interested in ideological debate:

Doctrines whether political, social or economic shall not occupy the people of Palestine from the primary duty of liberating their homeland . . . Palestinians have three mottoes: National unity; National mobilization; and Liberation. Once liberation is completed, the people of Palestine shall choose for its public life whatever political, economic or social system they want. 39

Similarly, Al Fatah has made its goal the liberation of Palestine, 40 not the establishment of any particular sort of state. Almost all official statements have carefully avoided espousing any particular political ideology to maximize the popular base of the guerrilla-led movement. Witness the stand taken by Yaser Arafat, leader of Al Fatah:

We have formed very strong ties with the liberation movements all over the world--in Cuba, in China, in Algeria and in Vietnam. We must not forget that in a war of liberation we should make use of every available source and means that will help us reach our ultimate goal--that is the liberation of our homeland. 41

Arafat stresses how Vietnam's National Liberation Front had managed to include twenty-three organizations "ranging from the Catholics to 42 the Buddhists to the Communists." According to the Chinese theory of people's war a comparison between the National Liberation Front of Vietnam and Al Fatah produces more differences than similarities. While the National Liberation Front is a communist party actively

utilizing the united-front policy; the PLO and Al Fatah are not communist parties. The Arab organizations use the concept of a united front not as a policy aimed at marshalling all possible support for a worker-peasant alliance, but rather as a policy aimed at marshalling support external to Palestine. At the headquarters of the Iraq-supported ⁴³ Arab Liberation Front, which claims affiliation with the PLO and Al Fatah, it is asserted that the Palestinian guerrillas carved "for the revolution a new path under the banner of the revolutionary Arab creed based on a national organization incorporating Arab fighters from all parts of the Arab homeland." ⁴⁴ Unfortunately, neither this nor any of the other guerrilla organizations seem to be willing to make explicit what is meant by this "revolutionary Arab creed". Abu Shehab, leader of the Arab Liberation Front, claims that the movement's ideology "is based on Arab nationalism and the socialism of progressive struggle." ⁴⁵ That it is indeed based on Arab nationalism one cannot dispute, but the "socialism of progressive struggle" seems to be an inversion of the Chinese concept of the "progressive socialist struggle".

Although much of the operation of the Palestinian guerrilla movement is in rural territory, there has not been a real attempt to rely on the peasantry and to establish rural bases. The rural bases that do indeed exist are not in Israel, but in neighbouring states. This would clearly not be equivalent to Chinese emphasis on reliance on the peasantry and the establishment of rural bases within the state to be liberated; it is only from the national countryside that one can gain sufficient strength to surround and capture the cities.

In 1965 guerrilla activity was slight. Until after the Six-Day War of 1967 very little was accomplished in the mobilization of the population and the adoption of guerrilla warfare strategy and tactics. The Palestinian movement in 1965 conformed to only minor tenets of the Chinese model of people's war. As the PLO and Al Fatah were attempting to destroy the state of Israel, they established themselves as anti-imperialist; China views Israel as an imperialist tool of the United States. As these organizations were opposing Israel, we can assume, for the purposes of computing the revolutionary index, that the Palestinian movement was, according to the Chinese, anti-imperialist. Finally, the Palestinian movement was vigorously pursued and did have significant popular support among the Palestinian Arabs.

The only difference between 1965 and the later two time periods is that in 1969 and 1971 the guerrilla operations had grown substantially. Al Fatah had begun to use guerrilla tactics, which it had not used in 1965. Despite the setbacks suffered by the guerrillas in the 1970 Jordanian civil war, the activities of the guerrilla bands were pronounced again in 1971. The one tenet of a people's war that is always somewhat ambiguous, as we have seen in our discussions of other movements, is the requirement that a movement adhere to a policy of self-reliance. In the case of the PLO and Al Fatah, we would have to judge that they indeed were not adhering to such a policy. Without the support of Arab governments, their existence would be in jeopardy. While it is not impossible to

receive external support while adhering to a policy of self-reliance (as we discussed in Chapter I), when the existence of a movement depends on the backing of neighbouring governments it is apparent that self-reliance can hardly be an attribute of that movement. Therefore, in both 1969 and 1971, the Palestinian movement continued to conform to the two minor tenets of the Chinese model for a people's war, and to one major tenet, as it had adopted the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare.

In all three time periods the Palestinian movement backed China in the Sino-Soviet debate. The PLO, as we saw in Chapter II, had established a permanent mission in Peking during 1965 and was vociferous in its support for China from that time forward. ⁴⁶ (The reason for this support was not an ideological one, for, as we have seen, the ideological convergence between the Palestinian movement and China was quite slight. Instead, this pronounced affiliation with China's stance in the Sino-Soviet debate was probably due to an unhappiness with Moscow's so-called "peaceful approach" to the conflict in the Middle East. We shall return to this point in Chapter VI.)

4. South Africa

As in the case of so many movements in the third world, the movement supported by China in South Africa--the Pan African Congress--was originally an offshoot of a movement associated with a Soviet supported Communist Party. The South African Communist Party, a predominantly white organization espousing multiracialism,

allied itself with several other organizations in the 1950's to form the Congress Alliance.⁴⁷ The arm of this alliance which represented the struggle of the black people of South Africa was the Africa National Congress (ANC) which split in 1959 on the issue of racial organization. The rebels, who formed the Pan African Congress (PAC) were opposed to the insignificant role the black masses were playing in the Congress Alliance. The aim of the new organization was to work towards the building of a United States of Africa, which would be a "union of free, sovereign, independent democratic states."⁴⁸ The first leader of the PAC was Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, who advocated non-violence as a means for social change and for the construction of political democracy. Sobukwe and PAC condemned the patronising attitude of the South African Communist Party to the black and coloured groups in the Congress Alliance, stating that the African people should:

by themselves formulate policies and programmes and decide on the methods of struggle without interference from either so-called left-wing or right-wing groups of the minorities who arrogantly appropriate to themselves the right to think and plan for the Africans. 49

Immediately after its founding in 1959, PAC began to actively implement its programmes of defying the pass laws and paralyzing South Africa by leaving the factories and crowding the jails with those arrested. This was the theory behind the now famous Sharpsville tragedy. Hundreds were killed by both police and military forces, and the South African regime tightened its repression,

outlawing both ANC and PAC. The face of PAC changed quickly. Sobukwe was jailed and leadership of the organization was taken over by Potlako Leballo. Violence became the accepted means of change, and PAC moved its headquarters into Basutoland (now Lesotho). PAC turned its efforts to the building of a people's war as prescribed by the Chinese. In 1963 PAC was repressed by the British administration in Basutoland and was forced underground. Leballo fled the following year to Dar es Salaam and began to reorganize the movement from there. Since 1964, PAC has operated from Tanzania and Zambia, conducting its activities from large enclaves near the South African borders and smaller bases within South African territory. 51

PAC has never been a communist party. It does not now claim, nor has it ever even pretended, to be working towards the construction of a communist state. Its ideology has been that of Africanism. According to PAC's first leader, Sobukwe, Africanism is not necessarily socialist:

Africanists reject totalitarianism in any form and accept political democracy as understood in the West. We also reject the economic exploitation of the many for the benefit of a few. We accept as policy the equitable distribution of wealth, aiming, as far as I am concerned, to equality of income (sic) which to me is the only basis on which the slogan of "equal opportunities" can be founded. 52

At the beginning, PAC did not pursue a united front policy. Its appeal was to the black workers in and around South Africa's urban areas. In 1966 the Coloured People's Congress dissolved and integrated its members into PAC. It also began to shift its 53

attention away from its exclusive preoccupation with the urban areas to the rural areas as well, attempting to build a worker-peasant alliance. Due to the industrialized nature of South African society, Leballo claimed that PAC should rely on the peasantry and establish rural bases on one front, while massing support in the cities amongst the workers at the same time. Though this is clearly not exactly what the Chinese theory of people's war postulates, it is an adaptation of the theory which Lin Piao himself suggested might be necessary.⁵⁴ As PAC was relying on the peasantry in its attempt to build rural bases in 1969 and 1971, we would have to judge that its simultaneous struggle in the cities was not in conflict with the Chinese model of a people's war.

Leballo, in a speech in 1967, summed up the PAC's policy on the importance of a self-reliant struggle, stating that self-reliance was an absolute necessity for success. The stated policy is very similar to the Chinese stance on the need for self-reliance:

A party that . . . looks to the outside world for assistance, financially and militarily, before it has shown what it has achieved by relying on its own efforts, is not practising revolutionary self-reliance. 55 (emphasis added)

The case of PAC is a very interesting one. In both 1969 and 1971 it fulfilled all but three tenets of the Chinese model for a people's war. The three that it did not fulfill were those related to the ideological leanings of a prototypical movement. PAC was certainly not a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party; it was not even oriented towards communism or socialism. Finally, there naturally was no communist party-led army.

In 1965 PAC had not committed itself to a stand in the Sino-Soviet debate. While it had repudiated the Soviet leanings of the ANC-SACP axis, it was not until 1967 that it committed itself to the Chinese side. PAC aligned itself with eight other African nationalist organizations to condemn the CPSU-sponsored Cairo seminar on "African National and Social Revolution".⁵⁶ Throughout 1969 and 1971 PAC remained firmly pro-Chinese, condemning pro-Soviet organizations for their insistence on class rather than national struggle.⁵⁷

Summary

Table IV-2 summarizes the conformity of the four case-study movements to the Chinese model for a people's war, as expressed through the revolutionary index.

C. Preliminary Analysis of the African and Middle Eastern Case Studies

As we did in Chapter III for the Latin American case studies, we will now offer a preliminary analysis of Chinese support on the basis of the data for the African and Middle Eastern region alone, testing those hypotheses presented in Chapter I that are relevant to this geographical area. The hypotheses that we will look at here are the last six listed in Chapter I. These hypotheses will be tested through a comparison of the three indices computed for the case studies. Table IV-3 summarizes the data for the two independent variables and the dependent variables for the African and Middle Eastern case studies.

TABLE IV-2

REVOLUTIONARY INDEX

AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST

	Led by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Communist Party	Correct Utilization of the "united-front policy"	Reliance on peasantry and the establishment of rural bases	Communist party-led army, politically motivated and mass-backed	Mobilized population and guerrilla warfare, strategy and tactics	Adherence to a policy of self-reliance	Anticolonial anti-feudal and anti-imperialist	Oriented towards socialism of communism	Vigorously pursued with significant popular support	Stance on Sino-Soviet rift R:pro-Soviet. C:pro-Chinese. U:uncommitted	TOTAL - Revolutionary Index
1965											
Angola	1				1	1	1	1	1	U	7U
Ethiopia		1					1		1	U	3U
Israel-Palestine					1	1	1		1	C	2C
South Africa							1			U	4U
1969											
Angola	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	C	9C
Ethiopia		1	1		1	1	1		1	U	6U
Israel-Palestine		1	1		1	1	1		1	C	3C
South Africa											6C
1971											
Angola	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	U	9U
Ethiopia		1	1		1	1	1		1	U	6U
Israel-Palestine		1	1		1	1	1		1	C	3C
South Africa			1		1	1	1		1	C	6C

TABLE IV-3
SUMMARY OF THREE INDICES FOR
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

	<u>Support Index</u>	<u>Hostility Index</u>	<u>Revolutionary Index</u>
1965			
- Angola	12	-4	7U
Ethiopia	0	2	3U
Israel-Palestine	6	-3	2C
South Africa	1	-4	4U
1969			
Angola	12	-4	9C
Ethiopia	- 3	2	6U
Israel-Palestine	14	-3	3C
South Africa	10	-4	6C
1971			
Angola	12	-2	9U
Ethiopia	- 3	3	6U
Israel-Palestine	14	-1	3C
South Africa	9	-4	6C

Hypothesis No. 2: When directly confronting the United States or one of its so-called "imperialist tools" a movement is likely to receive a high level of support, greater than the revolutionary nature of the movement alone would indicate.

The data appear to suggest that this hypothesis is valid.

The Palestinian movement aiming at the destruction of the state of Israel was accorded a much higher level of support than would have been suggested by the conformity of the movement to the Chinese revolutionary model. In the two periods after the 1967 Middle Eastern war, the Palestinian movements received close to total Chinese support ('14' rather than '16' on the support index) despite relatively low levels on the revolutionary index. The theory suggested by Peter Van Ness--that support is a function of hostility towards China expressed by the government, against which the revolutionary movement is working-- appears to have little validity in this one case. Movements directed against governments which were more hostile to Peking than Israel received lower levels of Chinese support. Though it was not considered here, the Congo (Kinshasha)--now Zaire-- situation provides even more evidence for the validation of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 3: A movement aimed at the overthrow of a government hostile to Peking is more likely to receive support than one aimed at the displacement of a friendly regime.

On the basis of the Ethiopian data, the third hypothesis appears to be upheld. Despite significant conformity between the

Eritrean Liberation Front and the Chinese model ('6' out of '9' on the revolutionary index in 1969 and 1971) China supported the Ethiopian government. Such lack of support for a movement cannot be explained by the ELF's stance on the Sino-Soviet debate, for several other movements in Africa were uncommitted in the dispute and yet received high levels of support. In Chapter VI we shall be able to examine this hypothesis on the basis of the data for all three geographical regions.

Hypothesis No. 4: When a regime is uncommitted in its dealings with China, China will hesitate to support an indigenous revolutionary movement, in hopes of broadening her international political base.

The data do not allow consideration of this hypothesis. As in the Latin American analysis, we uncovered no case which received an uncommitted rating on the hostility index.

Hypothesis No. 5: In Africa, a movement aimed at the overthrow of a colonial or apartheid regime will receive greater support than one merely aimed at a pro-western regime.

The data for 1969 and 1971 uphold this assertion, the data for 1965 do not. The low level of support offered the South African, Namibian, and Zimbabwean movements clearly invalidate this hypothesis for 1965. However, given that it remains accurate for the last two periods, and for colonial Africa in 1965, we can suggest that it is partially validated. In Chapter IV, we shall suggest a reformulation of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 6: When a revolutionary movement supports the Soviet Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute, China will support either an alternate organization within that state, or, if one does not exist, no movement at all, regardless of the tenor of relations between the governing regime and China.

China supported one movement that was pro-Soviet in Africa. Though not considered in our case studies, the PAIGC of Guinea (Bissau) was the only revolutionary organization within that state. Hypothesis No. 6 does not appear to be validated. China did indeed offer support to one movement that was pro-Soviet, which suggests the following reformulation of this hypothesis: When a revolutionary movement supports the Soviet Union in the International Sino-Soviet debate, China will support that movement only if an alternate organization does not exist, regardless of the tenor of relations between the governing regime and China.

Hypothesis No. 7: The greater the degree of conformity of a given revolutionary movement to the Chinese prototype for people's war, the greater the support the movement will be accorded, regardless of governmental hostility.

The variety of situations presented in Table IV-3 invalidate the last hypothesis. For movements aiming at the overthrow of a colonial or apartheid regime, the revolutionary conformity to the Chinese model for a people's war appears to be a determinant of the relative level of support. For other movements, such appears not to be the case.

Rather than compare the results of this preliminary analysis to those suggested in Chapter III, we shall now turn to the case studies for Asia, returning to these results in Chapter VI when all the data for the three regions has been gathered.

FOOTNOTES

1. New York Times, 18 November, 1965, p. 2.
2. New York Times, 11 November, 1969, p. 4.
3. New York Times, 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
4. John K. Cooley, East Wind Over Africa, New York: Walker, 1965.
5. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1966-1967, 1970-1971, 1972-1973, London: St. Martin's Press, MacMillan, 1966, 1970, 1972.
6. Some trade was reported with Taiwan but at a very insignificant level. See Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969 and 1971. New York: United Nations, 1971 and 1973.
7. New York Times, 18 November, 1965, p. 2; 11 November, 1969, p. 4; and 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
8. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969 and 1971, op. cit. Nor was any such trade mentioned in editions of Far Eastern Economic Review.
9. Bruce Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 1.
10. New York Times, 18 November, 1965, p. 2; 11 November, 1969, p. 4; and 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
11. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969 and 1971, op. cit.
12. Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967, New York: Pegasus, 1969, pp. 105, 108.
13. New York Times, 18 November, 1965, p. 2; 11 November, 1969, p. 4; and 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
14. Less than 1% of South Africa's trade was with Taiwan, in any of the three time periods. As 5% or \$50 million is our level of significance, South Africa is assumed to have trade with neither Taiwan nor China. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969 and 1971, op. cit.

15. See David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels (eds.). Portuguese Africa: A Handbook, New York: Praeger, 1969. Chapter 1, for a good historical account of the situation.
16. John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, pp. 43-44.
17. Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule, London: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 211-212.
18. Ibid., p. 215.
19. Abshire and Samuels, op. cit., pp. 4-7.
20. Richard Gibson, op. cit., pp. 225-231.
21. J. A. Valentim, Qui Libère l'Angola. Brussels: Coppers, 1969, pp. 11-12.
22. This fact is a source of great pride to UNITA, as it demonstrates the commitment of its members to the internal struggle.
23. For example, Douglas Wheeler and René Pélissier, Angola, London: Pall Mall, 1971, p. 225.
24. Organized by the Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Only pro-Soviet groups were invited.
25. Quoted in Richard Gibson, op. cit., p. 242.
26. New York Times, 12 March, 1971, p. 12.
27. SCMP, No. 4939, p. 25.
28. United Nations, A Principle in Torment: The United Nations and Portuguese Administered Territories, New York: United Nations, 1971, pp. 47-48.
29. Lin Piao's sixth tenet of people's war; Peking Review, 3 September, 1965, p. 22.
30. Richard Gibson, op. cit., p. 238.
31. New York Times, 7 June, 1971, p. 8; and 15 October, 1971, p. 5.

32. Despite reports to the contrary New York Times, 3 March, 1967, p. 49. Claims that China trained and supplied the members of the ELF have never been substantiated.
33. Peking Review, 15 July, 1966, p. 52.
34. Christopher Clapham, Haile Selassie's Government, London: Longman's, 1969; W. H. Lewis, "Ethiopia: The Quickening Pulse" in "Africa 1968", Current History, February 1968, pp. 65-101; and Barbara A. Alpert, "The Ethiopian Perplex" in "Africa 1971", Current History, March, 1971, pp. 129-168.
35. New York Times, 15 December, 1971, p. 12.
36. See footnote 29.
37. New York Times, 3 March, 1967, p. 49.
38. Ethiopian government sources say the ELF has 1,000 men, independent sources suggest this is grossly understated, the number being closer to three to five times that figure. New York Times, 15 December, 1971, p. 12.
39. Articles 9 and 10 of the "National Covenant of the Palestinian Liberation Organization" reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader, edited by Walter Laqueur. Second Edition, Toronto: Bantam Books, 1965, pp. 374-379.
40. "The Seven Points, passed by the Central Committee of Al Fatah, January 1969", reprinted in Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 379-380.
41. "An Interview with 'Abu Amman'", Ibid., p. 382.
42. Ibid.
43. New York Times, 7 January, 1971, p. 12. Iraq apparently was disenchanted with Moscow's "peaceful approach" to the Middle Eastern conflict.
44. Ibid. This is a quotation from a tract espousing the ideals and aims of the movement.
45. Ibid.
46. See SCMP, No. 3425, p. 37.
47. The Congress Alliance included the African National Congress, the Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, the SACP, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU).

48. Quoted in Richard Gibson, op. cit., p. 87.
49. Ibid., p. 87.
50. The predominant assumption in the west is that the SACP was running the non-violent resistance movement which resulted in the Sharpeville massacre. This is clearly wrong, for the SACP actually condemned PAC proposals for non-violent marches in defiance of the pass laws. See Mary Benson, The Struggle for a Birthright, London: Penguin Books, 1966, pp. 220-223.
51. See David Sibeko, "Sharpeville, the Turning Point" in 10th Anniversary of Sharpeville, Dar es Salaam: PAC, 1970, quoted in Richard Gibson, op. cit., p. 96.
52. Quoted in Richard Gibson, op. cit., p. 85.
53. Mathew Nkoana, Crisis in the Revolution, London: Mafube Publications, 1969, pp. 50-52. Nkoana himself announced this move as the head of the London office of PAC. (He opposed Leballo's leadership)
54. Lin Piao, Peking Review, 3 September, 1965, pp. 15-16.
55. Quoted in Richard Gibson, op. cit., p. 101.
56. Richard Allen (ed.), op. cit., p. 528.
57. See Richard Gibson, op. cit., p. 105, and New York Times, 24 October, 1971, p. 13.
58. Van Ness, op. cit., pp. 157-184.
59. The Conseil Supreme de la Révolution was not a Marxist-Leninist communist organization, nor did it fulfill many of the tenets of a Chinese model for a people's war. It was, however, in conflict with U.N. forces which, according to the Chinese, are a tool of U.S. imperialism, and thus the movement received total Chinese support ('16' out of '16' on the support index--see page 58). For an analysis of the Congo rebellion see Crawford Young, "Rebellion and the Congo" in R.I. Rotberg (ed.) Rebellion in Black Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 208-245.

CHAPTER V

THE ASIAN CASE STUDIES

Our computation of the support index for the revolutionary movements of Asia in Chapter II demonstrated that Chinese interest in these movements is greater than that in movements elsewhere in the world. Asian movements received a higher level of support than those in any other geographical region in all three time periods. This support included both tangible aid and verbal support by senior Chinese leaders. We shall first compute the hostility index for all of the four case studies, and then examine each revolutionary movement separately to determine the conformity of that movement to the Chinese model for people's war. A preliminary testing of some of the hypotheses presented in Chapter I will follow.

Compared to the other two geographical regions, the total population of movements considered in Chapter II for Asia is very small. In 1971, we considered only ten movements which is, however, two more than in 1965. Despite this, we have still chosen four case studies to represent the Asian region. The war torn states of Southeast Asia considered in Chapter II--South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand--are all involved in intense internal struggles. In choosing these case studies, we are limited to the last two, Laos and Thailand. Cambodia cannot be considered, as the internal struggle did not begin until after the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the establishment of the Lon Nol regime, in April of 1970. South

Vietnam, where a movement receiving the highest level of support from China possible for all three time periods, is not helpful as a case study. Preliminary examination of South Vietnam produced the highest level possible on the revolutionary index and the most intense level of hostility possible on the hostility index. Therefore, it would be impossible within the confines of this study to determine the reasons for such a high level of Chinese support. It could be a function of either the conformity of the South Vietnamese movement to the Chinese model for people's war, or the level of inter-governmental hostility. The data would not allow differentiation; that is, both the independent variables and the dependent variable are as high as possible and invariant over time.

In addition to Laos and Thailand, the other movements chosen as case studies are Burma and India. Burma is an example of a de jure government of a state receiving a very high level of support during 1965 despite the existence of a revolutionary movement. India is a rather special case due to the history of Sino-Indian relations, and the lack of Chinese support for indigenous Indian movements.

The levels of support granted by China to these four movements for the three time periods were, according to our computation of the support index in Chapter II, as follows:

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1971</u>
Burma	-10	5	1
India	- 3	0	- 3
Laos	12	16	16
Thailand	12	12	12

We shall proceed to assess the hostility expressed by the governments of these four states to China.

A. HOSTILITY INDEX

In the United Nations General Assembly voting on the Chinese representation issue, Burma was one of the most consistent advocates of restoring China's legal seat to Peking. In 1965, 1969, and 1971, Burma opposed the U.S.-sponsored Important Question¹ Resolution and supported the Albanian Resolution. Though formal diplomatic relations were maintained between Burma and China throughout all three years, between 1967 and 1970 these relations were not active. Burmese representatives were withdrawn from Peking in response to the recall of the Chinese delegation from Rangoon.² Sino-Burmese trade was significant in 1965 (approximately 7% of Burma's total trade), but by 1969 there was³ virtually none. Analyses of Chinese trade in 1971 suggest that the trade links⁴ between Rangoon and Peking had not yet been restored. The government of General Ne Win, since it ousted U Nu in 1962, has been attempting to remain non-aligned internationally. It has thus avoided any sort of military alliance with any major power. Generally, Burmese relations with China have been friendly--earning Burma a positive rating on the hostility index for all three time periods.

India, despite the war in 1962 and various hostile interchanges with China on a less belligerent level, has generally been friendly towards China. Indian representatives in the United Nations

supported Chinese attempts to regain representation every year considered here, and active diplomatic relations were maintained throughout. India has not had significant trade with either Taiwan or China, and has avoided military alliance in an attempt to maintain her policy of non-alignment.

In Laos, more ambiguous a situation existed. The neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma has not been the primary adversary of the Laotian revolutionary movement supported by China, the Laotian Patriotic Front (known as the Pathet Lao or NLLS). In 1962 the Geneva Agreement set up a three-faction coalition government combining the opposing forces of the NLLS, the right-wing royalist forces and the neutralists under Phouma. When this compromise collapsed, Phouma remained in power and the two other more extreme groups engaged in the civil war that is still raging. As we pointed out in Chapter 11, it is not satisfactory to consider Chinese statements of support for the coalition government to be negative support for the NLLS, despite the fact that ultimate victory for the Pathet Lao would result in the termination of Phouma's rule. This creates a problem in the computation of the hostility index. Though it is tempting to avoid assessing the index for the neutralist government and analyzing instead the hostility expressed by the right-wing forces, there are several reasons why we should not do so. First, after initial attempts to repair the broken alliance had failed, the neutralist government became, through

entropy if not intent, more aligned with the royalist forces. Second, friendliness of the neutralist government towards China could, hypothetically, lead Peking to push for a compromise solution to the Laotian civil war, and therefore the variable should be assessed for the neutralist government. Third, and most importantly, in our later analysis of the data presented through the three indices, we can easily make allowances for the fact that the hostility index applies only to the centrist element; if we do not assess this index for the de jure government (and there is no question that Phouma's government has been the legal government) we a priori preclude the examination of this relationship which is the major theoretical concern of this study.

In 1965 and 1969, Laos voted for the Important Question Resolution and abstained on the Albanian Resolution. In 1971 the Laotian representatives voted for the Albanian Resolution while abstaining on the procedural issue. The neutralist government maintained active diplomatic relations with Peking throughout all three time periods. Due to the widespread effects of the civil war, Laos conducted very little external trade and has published no trade figures for several years. According to Figures released by Peking and Taiwan, there has been no significant trade in any case. Despite the presence of United States forces in Laotian territory supporting the right-wing forces in their struggle with the Pathet Lao, Laos cannot be considered to have been a member of a military alliance with either Peking or the west.

The final case, Thailand, is an example of relatively intense governmental hostility towards China. Supporting Taiwan's claim that Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of all China, Thailand consistently voted for the Important Question Resolution and against the Albanian Resolution in the annual China representation issue in the United Nations General Assembly.¹² Thailand maintained, during all three time periods,¹³ active diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Thailand has been a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization since its creation in 1954. This alliance pledges its members, amongst whom are included both the United States and Great Britain, to collective defence. Thailand did not receive the most intense rating of hostility possible only because her trade with Taiwan was not significant in any of the three time periods.¹⁴ Table V-1 summarizes the hostility expressed by the governments of Burma, India, Thailand and Laos for 1965, 1969, and 1971, as measured by the hostility index.

B. REVOLUTIONARY INDEX

As we mentioned in Chapters III and IV, the assessment of the revolutionary index is not a complete historical analysis of the revolutionary movements in question. This section is merely meant to describe the conformity between these movements and the Chinese model for people's war, and to assess the attitudes of the movements towards the Sino-Soviet dispute.

1. Burma

Though there has been a fairly eclectic group of communist, quasi-communist, and other revolutionary organizations in Burma for

TABLE V-1

HOSTILITY INDEX

ASIA

	U.N. voting on Important Question Resolution	U.N. voting on Albanian Resolution	Diplomatic relations with Peking or Taiwan	Extensive trade with Peking or Taiwan	Military defence alliance with Peking or Taiwan or West	TOTAL - Hostility Index
1965						
Burma	1	1	1	1		4
India	1	1	1			3
Laos	-1	-1	1		-1	-1
Thailand	-1	-1	-1			-4
1969						
Burma	1	1				2
India	1	1	1			3
Laos	-1	-1	1		-1	-1
Thailand	-1	-1	-1			-4
1971						
Burma	1	1	1			3
India	1	1	1			3
Laos	-1	1	1			1
Thailand	-1	-1	-1		-1	-4

15
decades, the pattern of the overall communist movement is similar to others. There is a pro-Chinese party, known as the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) or the White Flags, and there is a pro-Soviet party, known as the Red Flags. Unlike movements in other countries (which generally split in the 1960's), this division dates as far back as 1946, when the original Burmese Communist Party split on similar ideological issues to those that were to divide the communist world almost twenty years later.

The Red Flags, under Thakin Soe (who perceived himself as the only true modern communist thinker following in the tradition of Marx and Lenin and Stalin), have attempted to maintain a stance of ideological purity. 16 The White Flags, on the other hand, were led by Thakin Than Tun who, until his death in 1969, advocated the widest possible anti-governmental coalition under the strict leadership of the BCP. The White Flags have commanded significant popular support from time to time and have received all Chinese support. It is therefore this party, not the small and ineffectual Red Flags, in which we are interested.

The White Flags, in occasional alliance with various non-communist groups and ethnic organizations, conducted a civil war with the Burmese government both before and after the fall of U Nu 17 in 1962. The new government under General Ne Win began peace talks in 1963, encouraged by the Chinese government which had a vested interest in friendly relations with the Burmese government as well as an ideological commitment to the Burmese Communist Party. 18

Represented at the peace negotiations were the White Flags, the government, and the National Democratic Union Front (NDUF) which was a union of the four left-wing factions of the Karen, Mon, Kayal, and Chin ethnic minorities.¹⁹ The peace negotiations broke down in the autumn of 1963 and in 1964 Ne Win outlawed all political parties except his own, the Burma Socialist Program Party. Not surprisingly, this precipitated a renewal of the civil war. During 1964, the White Flags underwent an internal struggle because of disagreement on the strategy of confrontation to be adopted. The result was the adoption of a Maoist approach to revolution:

Mao Tse-tung's thought is the guiding principle for all revolutionary work in Burma. In particular, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theories on the building of a proletarian revolution and a people's war are the beacon light for the victory of the revolution in Burma. 20

Despite such claims, it does not appear that the White Flags indeed attempted to implement the specific elements of a people's war until 1967. During the winter of that year Thakin Than Tun took advantage of his newly consolidated power to proclaim the beginning of a Burmese "cultural revolution" parallel to that of China. The two major proponents of a less-Maoist revolution for Burma, Thakin Ba Thein Tin and Yebaw Htay (both members of the BCP Politburo) were²¹ ordered assassinated by Than Tun. Following a purge which eradicated supporters of these two Politburo members from the rank and file of the White Flags, the party's military activity against the government²² increased and guerrilla warfare spread across southern Burma.

The internal factionalism threatened the strength of the Burmese revolution, for it alienated many of the members of the National Democratic Union Front, which had aligned itself with the White Flags in early 1966. This factionalism was not alleviated until 1969, when Thakin Than Tun himself was assassinated and replaced by the more moderate Thakin Zin. Thakin Zin managed to restore the alliance with the National Democratic Union Front. The White Flags also gained the support of large proportions of the Kachins and the Shans, built an affiliation with the powerful Karen National Defence Organization and constructed an alliance with a worker movement in Rangoon.

In terms of conformity to the Chinese model for a people's war, the White Flags in 1965 fulfilled several of the basic tenets. The BCP was indeed a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist communist party, as it has been since it was founded in 1939. Despite a stated policy of establishing the broadest possible anti-governmental coalition, intense internal factionalism rendered such a policy inoperative. There was no effort to rely on the peasantry or to seriously construct rural bases. In 1965, the White Flags were still operating primarily in the southern parts of Burma where government forces could readily counter moves made by the revolutionaries; this limited guerrilla strategy to quick-strike activity. Clearly, there was no possibility of establishing a communist party-led army, despite support from the Karen and Mon peoples for their sporadic military activities. Receiving virtually no support from outside Burma, the

BCP could not help but follow a policy of self-reliance. Finally, there is no doubt that the Burmese movement fulfilled the three minor tenets of a people's war; it was anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, it was communist in orientation, and it was vigorously pursued with an active membership of at least several thousand.²⁵

By 1969, under the leadership of Thakin Zin, the BCP approximated more closely the Chinese model for a people's war. In the face of failures in the delta area in southern Burma, the White Flags had moved north into the Kachin and Shan areas where they were able to construct rural bases and claim victories against government forces.²⁶ In the north the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare could be implemented while in the south such activity had been seriously circumscribed. Apart from these two changes, the revolutionary nature of the BCP did not alter radically between 1965 and 1969.

Similarly, there were few changes between 1969 and 1971. Still increasing its popular support (which had been as high as 15,000 direct supporters in 1969),²⁷ the BCP remained active both in armed confrontations with the forces of the Burmese government and in the political mobilization of the farmers and peasants of the north.²⁸

Throughout all three time periods, the White Flags were consistent in their pro-Chinese attitude in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Table V-2 shows a relatively high conformity to the Chinese ideal for a people's war by the Burmese revolutionary movement, which

seems surprising given the lack of support from Peking. The reasons for this apparent anomaly will be discussed later.

2. India

The only Indian revolutionary movement which was supported by China was the Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) in 1969. The CPI-ML was an offshoot of the Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPI-M) which in turn had broken away from the Communist Party of India (CPI).

The CPI had participated in the Indian nationalist movement since the independence struggle was fought against the British in the 1930's and 1940's. Its ideology precluded acceptance of Chinese revolutionary strategy or friendly relations with Peking. First, the CPI has supported the ruling Congress Party in its clashes with China--the three wars with Pakistan and the Tibet crisis of 1962. Second, the CPI has been firmly committed to the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet dispute. After the war with China in 1962 over the Tibet issue, a group within the CPI objected to the pro-Congress Party stance of the party's Central Committee. This faction broke away from the CPI in 1964 to form the CPI-M, claiming that the older party had become "the tail of the Congress Party."

Yet this new party was not willing to follow the path taken elsewhere by so many renegade factions of established pro-Soviet parties in adopting the Chinese approach to revolution. The CPI-M remained neutral in its attitudes towards the division in the communist world, claiming that there was only one road to follow in

the Indian revolution; a Marxist-Leninist revolution based solely on the objective factors in India adopting neither the dogmatism of the CPSU or the CCP.³⁰

The CPI-M experienced factional conflict just as the older CPI had. Of those who had formed the CPI-M, there was a pro-Chinese group who had hoped that the new party would adopt an ideology similar to that of the Chinese. However, the CPI-M continued to stress legal electoral struggle based on election strategies that were markedly like those of the CPI.³¹ The more militant pro-Chinese groups, usually found at the state committee level rather than in the India-wide party, were unhappy with this parliamentary line and welcomed the Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal in 1967. Led by two men who interpreted the organization of the Naxalbari movement (often referred to as the Naxalite movement)

as a revolutionary uprising in the spirit of the Chinese revolution, Charu Mazumbar and Kanu Sanyal, the CPI-ML split away from the CPI-M.³²

Though it did manage to attract a large percentage of the CPI-M into its ranks, the CPI-ML was not able to marshal the support of all the so-called Maoist organizations in India. The

Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee, the largest of these autonomous groups,³³ never affiliated itself with Mazumdar's

party. Instead there has been a great deal of ideological debate between these two groups over revolutionary strategy. Essentially, the major military strategy of the larger CPI-ML has amounted to little more than sporadic terrorism in isolated villages of West

Bengal and, since 1971, similar activity in the Calcutta area.³⁴

Though this action was supposed to be one of "annihilation of class enemies,"³⁵ it has always been denounced by the Andhra Pradesh movement as illegitimate terrorism in the fact of the failure to construct a true peasant movement.

Having thus looked, however briefly, at the recent pattern of inter-group struggle that has so marked the Indian communist parties, we are in somewhat of a dilemma. Which organizations do we choose to assess the revolutionary index? In 1969, there is no question, for as we pointed out in Chapter I, whenever China supports a movement, we should assess the index for the organization (if any) which is given support, as we are attempting to determine why movements are given support. For 1971, we will again assess the revolutionary index for the CPI-ML, to determine why a movement given support in 1969 should be denied such support two years later. In 1965 we must assess the index for the movement as it existed before the CPI-ML split away from the CPI-M. As there was no support by China of any Indian movement in 1965, we could assess the index for the CPI or the CPI-M. It seems more logical to choose the latter. Preliminary examination has shown a similar rating for both in terms of their conformity to the Chinese prototype for people's war. As the CPI-M would be the more logical party for the Chinese to support given the CPI's openly pro-Soviet stand and anti-Peking rhetoric, we will consider only the uncommitted party in our computation of the revolutionary index for 1965.

36 Powerful especially in Andhra, Kerala, and West Bengal, in 1965 the CPI-M did not conform very strongly to the Chinese model of a people's war. Its leadership was fragmented, there was no attempt to build a united front, establish rural bases while appealing to the peasantry (both the CPI-M and the CPI have been urban-oriented) or to initiate anything that might resemble a guerrilla war. Both the CPI and the CPI-M were anti-imperialist and opposed colonialism, and both were clearly oriented towards communism. There was substantial backing for the two parties and the fact that they held a number of elected seats in legislatures, especially at the state level, demonstrates that these parties were indeed vigorously attempting to gain electoral strength.

By 1969, the CPI-ML had appeared and was publicly supported by the Chinese. The CPI-ML was a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist communist party. It fulfilled all three of the minor tenets of an ideal people's war but few others. It had mobilized the peasants in West Bengal and it had adopted guerrilla warfare as its major military strategy, even though this guerrilla warfare was to quickly deteriorate into sporadic terrorism when the state security forces responded with effective repressive measures. The CPI-ML made no attempt to build a united front--in fact its leaders refused to affiliate with the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee, 37 under Nagi Reddi, which was ideologically very similar to it. It seems most unlikely that Charu Mazumdar would have been a proponent

of a broader worker-peasant alliance. The CPI-ML did not attempt to build rural bases, nor did it lead a politically active army--because it failed to accept the protracted nature of a people's war. The CPI-ML was unquestionably pro-Chinese in its attitude towards the Sino-Soviet debate--an issue that was very salient in its ideological confrontation with the other communist parties and groups in India.

Two years later, China no longer supported any movement in India. The overall movement was in much the same situation that it had been in 1965. The CPI-ML had ceased its guerrilla warfare in the Naxalbari areas and had moved its focus of activity to the urban areas--especially Calcutta. The pro-Chinese party was wracked by internal dissension, and appeared to have lost much of its strength in West Bengal. ³⁸ It undoubtedly still fulfilled the three minor tenets of the Chinese model for a people's war, and it was still a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist communist party. However, it had abandoned its attempts to mobilize the population in rural areas along with its previous efforts to begin a guerrilla war. The Chinese claimed that its support stopped because of these changes.

3. Laos

The situation in Laos has been often compared to the situation in China during the revolution. ³⁹ Frequent attempts to construct a neutral government have only been interludes in the continuing civil war between the broad united front of the Pathet Lao, and the increasingly unpopular U.S.-supported right-wing forces.

The Pathet Lao maintains control over a large proportion of Laos, and gradually appears to be encircling the urban footholds of its enemy on its road to final victory. The Laotian struggle dates back to the Japanese invasion during the second world war and to the anticolonial movement against France. It is not possible here to look at much of this history⁴⁰ but there are some interesting points that demonstrate a fascinating similarity between the Pathet Lao (or the Neo Lao Hak Sat) and the Chinese revolution.

Aided by the forces of Ho Chi Minh, Prince Souphanouvong, the founder of the NLHS, crossed from North Vietnam into the highlands of Laos in 1953 to begin building the protracted struggle that is still going on today. Though originally dependent on the military presence of the North Vietnamese (the battle of Dien Bien Phu was fought so that the North Vietnamese would not overrun Laos)⁴¹ once Ho's forces had handed over the captured province of Houa Phan (and its capital at Sam Neua) to Souphanouvong, the NLHS began its own struggle in earnest. It gained control of another northern province, Phong Saly, and was granted jurisdiction over these (as well as a connecting corridor) in the 1954 Geneva accords. Immediately, the NLHS began political and social programmes that were aimed at the construction of the widest possible united front through which the right wing Royalist government could be challenged. A political administration was established which linked the central committee of the central communist party, the Phak Pasason Lao, to the people of the provinces under Pathet Lao control. The administrative system

was (and still is--the organization of the Pathet Lao has remained the same throughout all the provinces where it has won either complete or partial control)⁴² founded on a system of committees arranged hierarchically from the Central Committee--the Provincial Committees, District Committees, Township Committees, and finally Village Committees.⁴³ This structure "though on a much reduced scale" (is) similar to that of the Chinese Communists in 1945 . . . "⁴⁴ Farmers' groups, organizations of women, and youth parties and groups all are incorporated into the administrative structure as affiliated groups.

The rank and file membership of the NLHS is by no means exclusively communist. The Pathet Lao has been very successful in constructing a united front, across both ethnic and class lines. Though it originally appealed to the northern peoples (the Khmu,⁴⁵ the Meo and the Neua especially) who were the focus of discrimination by colonial and post-colonial administrations in Vientiane (who favoured the low-land Lao), it has gradually expanded its base of support to include almost all the peoples of Laos. Though not strictly a worker-peasant alliance, the Pathet Lao is a movement that has had very little chance to operate in urban areas. Workers in the towns of the NLHS-controlled provinces are fully incorporated members of the movement and comprise a small but significant proportion of the military arm of the Pathet Lao, the Unités Combattantes Pathet-Lao (UCPL).⁴⁶

Politically, the Pathet Lao has been willing to broaden the united front to allow the establishment and operation of neutralist governments. The failures of the compromise governments of 1955, 1958 and 1960 were due not to the intransigence of the NLHS but instead to the realization by the right-wing military forces that the electoral procedures favoured the leftists because of their growing popular support. Each government fell by the sword of the right-wing Royalists. During the 1960's the situation in Laos became more and more polarized, increasingly circumscribing the freedom of action of the neutralist government. As the Soviet Union had been supporting the neutralist troops of Kong Le, when the Sino-Soviet dispute developed the Pathet Lao became increasingly suspicious of the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma. The result has been a coalition between the right-wing and the neutralist forces and a new-found NLHS intransigence in refusing to co-operate with Phouma.⁴⁷ (For example, the Pathet Lao refused to take part in the January, 1972 elections, even though in past attempts to find a peaceful solution to the civil war Souphanouvong and his followers⁴⁸ had always promoted compromise.)

For the purpose of computing the revolutionary index, it is unnecessary to look at all three time periods. There was little change in the nature of the Pathet Lao from 1960 to 1971, except for the progress it made in gaining territory from the right-wing forces. (The activity of the United States in Laos helped the Pathet Lao to increase its popular support and undermine the

political base of the neutralist government and the right-wing forces.)⁴⁹ We can therefore look at the Pathet Lao generally over the three time periods to determine its conformity to the Chinese model of a people's war.

The Neo Lao Hak Sat has been (and still is) led by the Phak Pasason Lao, a Marxist-Leninist communist party. One of the Pathet Lao's central aims, as espoused in a twelve-point programme of the NHLHS in 1969, has been the construction of a broad united front.⁵⁰ The NHLHS has always relied on the peasants in the establishment of rural bases (by 1969, the so-called "rural bases of the Pathet Lao consisted of more than half of the entire territory of Laos.)⁵¹ The UCPL is an example of an armed force entirely consistent with the Chinese notion of a communist party-led army. Rather than being merely a guerrilla force, the UCPL has demonstrated over the past decade that it is a modern mobilized army, capable of conducting both guerrilla and conventional warfare. Its political activity includes the training of cadres in military schools and working with the masses in the setting up of social programmes.⁵² The one element that is somewhat ambiguous, as we have seen throughout this study, is the final tenet of the Chinese prototype for people's war--"adherence to a policy of self-reliance." At the beginning of the Pathet Lao's struggle, Souphanouvong relied heavily upon the North Vietnamese and the Chinese for military support. By 1965 the North Vietnamese troops were still aiding the NLHS and in 1969 some reports have suggested that there were as many

as 45,000 North Vietnamese in Laos. However, these North Vietnamese troops were not actively involved in the armed confrontation with the right-wing forces but rather with action in the war in Vietnam (the Ho Chi Minh trail goes directly through Laos). Given the large number of active troops in the UCPL and the vast popular support enjoyed by the Pathet Lao, we must conclude that the Laotian struggle was indeed "the business of the masses . . . and carried out primarily by their own efforts."⁵⁴ It is clear that the NLHS fulfills the three minor tenets for a people's war.

Finally, the Pathet Lao has always supported China in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

4. Thailand

Thailand historically has not been the locus of many revolutionary movements. Until the 1960's it appeared to be immune to the violent uprisings and conflicts that were sweeping across most of southeast Asia. Though a communist party had existed in Thailand as early as the 1930's--the official founding of the now violent Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was in 1942, but other parties existed already at that time--violence was not accepted as a means for social and political change by the Thai leftists until the 1960's.

In 1962, the United States moved troops to Thailand under the SEATO treaty in response to the growing difficulties U.S. policies were facing in Southeast Asia. The reaction in Thailand's communist and left-leaning groups was slow and uncoordinated. The

CPT was hardly in a position to do anything openly; its legal status was at best precarious.⁵⁵ Yet in the northeast of the country violence broke out against the Royal Thai government, even though it was not part of any large organized movement. The CPT reacted to these demonstrations of unrest with a call to any and all groups and individuals who opposed the government to form with the CPT a "patriotic, democratic united front to challenge the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys . . . "⁵⁶

In December, 1964, the radio station "Voice of the People of Thailand" announced the formation of the Thailand Independence Movement (TIM) under the leadership of Mon Kon Nonakon. The manifesto it broadcast outlined the programme of the TIM:

(1) Chase the American imperialist aggressors from Thai soil; (2) Overthrow the Thanom traitorous dictatorial government, establish a government formed by patriotic, democracy-loving political parties and personalities which carries out neutral, peaceful policies; (3) Struggle to preserve and save the true democratic rights of the people; (4) Struggle for the policies of neutrality, peace, democracy, prosperity and the people's happiness. 58

Clearly, this was an attempt to appeal to the broadest possible spectrum of people in Thailand without denying the possibility of a united front with more ideologically rigorous groups such as the CPT.

In January, 1965, the establishment of a Thai Patriotic Front (TPF) was announced under the leadership of Phayom Chulanont. Again broadcast by the Voice of the People of Thailand, the announce-

ment of the establishment of this third group stated that the TPF wished to join with other groups and "all Thai people who love peace and democracy irrespective of political or religious affiliation."⁵⁹ At the end of the year, the TPF and the TIM merged under the name Thai United Patriotic Front (although it still used the name Thai Patriotic Front ~~in most~~ of its operations).

Many organizations were united in the new TPF. Industry-wide workers' unions, national labour unions, women's groups and professional associations all pledged their support for the TPF.⁶⁰

Some observers have suggested that these groups, as well as the TIM and the TPF were all creations of the CPT to give the appearance of a united front.⁶¹ Though this is not beyond the realm of possibility, there is no evidence for this assertion except the absence of factionalism--hardly sufficient proof for the existence of a communist master plan. As both the new TPF and the CPT continued to maintain separate organizations, and as they both claimed leadership of the Thai movement, we can conclude that the TPF was⁶² more than the creation of the CPT.

In 1967, however, Phayom Chulanont, leader of the TPF, announced that the CPT had assumed leadership of the Thai people's armed forces and declared himself to be "a new pupil of Chairman Mao."⁶³ Eighteen months later these forces joined together in the Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF), under the "absolute"⁶⁴ command of the CPT. This was the final act in the construction

of a united front that began in 1965. No further changes were made between then and the end of 1971.

In a very short period of time, the revolutionary movement in Thailand made very substantial advances. From a situation in 1964 where armed confrontation with the Thai government and American forces was limited to sporadic guerrilla activity in the northeast of the country, in 1971 there was an ongoing guerrilla war in the south (where the TPLAF forces also worked in aiding the Malayan revolutionary group Chen Ping). In the north, the mobilized forces of the TPLAF had succeeded in capturing territory that was later designated "liberated".⁶⁵

In 1965 the Thai revolutionary movement was not led by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist communist party. It was not until 1967 that the movement coalesced under the leadership of the CPT, even though the CPT had been active earlier. Throughout all three time periods the most notable element in the structure of the Thai movement was the adherence to a united-front policy. The participation of the major organizations, such as the TPF, the TIM and the CPT, as well as the smaller groups, such as the Thai Patriotic Youth Organization, the Federation of Patriotic Workers, the Thai Monks' Group and the Patriotic Teachers' Group, demonstrates a firm and widespread belief in the need to build a united front.⁶⁶

Although Thai intellectuals formed the core of the CPT there was still great emphasis placed on the reliance of the movement on the peasantry; the bulk of the CPT support comes from the peasants.

Rural bases were established during 1965 on the Malay Peninsula (some shared by Chen Ping) as well as in several regions of the northeast. By 1971, substantial areas of the northern highlands were under the control of the TPLAF; government programmes of massive genocide and suppression of sympathetic Meo tribesmen only increased popular support of the revolutionary movement.⁶⁷

The tactics of guerrilla warfare and attempts to mobilize the population have always been central to the strategy of the Thai movement. As in other cases we have looked at, the presence of external support for the indigenous movement does not detract from the self-reliance of the movement. Apart from the fact that the struggle of the Thai movement was carried on primarily by Thais with substantial popular support, Chinese military assistance has never been sufficient to sustain the level of revolutionary struggle by itself.⁶⁸

Throughout all three time periods the CPT supported the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet debate. In 1965, before the merger of the TPF and the CPT, the TPF also supported the Chinese.⁶⁹

Table V-2 summarizes the conformity of the Asian movements to the Chinese model for a people's war as measured by the revolutionary index.

C. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE ASIAN CASE STUDIES

The hypotheses that we can examine on the basis of the data gathered from the Asian case studies alone are the same five that we considered in Chapter II in the preliminary analysis of the

TABLE V-2

REVOLUTIONARY INDEX

ASIA

	Led by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Communist Party	Correct utilization of the "united-front policy"	Reliance on peasantry and the establishment of rural bases	Communist party-led army, politically motivated and mass-backed	Mobilized population and guerrilla warfare, strategy and tactics	Adherence to a policy of self-reliance	Anti-colonial anti-feudal and anti-imperialist	Oriented towards socialism of communism	Vigorously pursued with significant popular support	Stance on Sino-Soviet rift R: pro-Soviet. C: pro-Chinese. U: uncommitted	TOTAL - Revolutionary Index
1965 Burma India Laos Thailand	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	C U C C	5C 3U 9C 7C
1969 Burma India Laos Thailand	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	C C C C	7C 6C 9C 9C
1971 Burma India Laos Thailand	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	C C C C	7C 4C 9C 9C

Latin American data. We shall test these hypotheses more definitively in the following chapter, when all the data for all three geographical regions are considered. It is useful, however, to examine their validity within the Asian context. The data for the Asian case studies as summarized through the three indices are presented in Table V-3.

Hypothesis No. 2: When directly confronting the United States or one of its so-called "imperialist tools," a movement is likely to receive a high level of support, greater than the revolutionary nature of the movement alone would dictate.

Unlike the other two geographical regions, the Asian data are not conclusive in the testing of hypothesis No. 2. According to the Chinese, both in Laos and Thailand revolutionary movements were confronting U.S. troops and "lackeys of U.S. imperialism". Both received a high level of support yet both also received high ratings on the revolutionary index. While in Burma and India movements were not opposing U.S. or so-called imperialist troops, the low level of support offered them could be explained by their lack of conformity to the Chinese model for people's war. We cannot, on the basis of the Asian data alone, consider this hypothesis either validated or rejected. In no case does the support index indicate a high level of support, despite a low degree of conformity of the movement to the Chinese prototype.

Hypothesis No. 3: A movement aimed at the overthrow of a government hostile to Peking is more likely to receive support than one aimed

TABLE V-3

SUMMARY OF THREE INDICES

ASIA

	<u>Support Index</u>	<u>Hostility Index</u>	<u>Revolutionary Index</u>
1965			
Burma	-10	4	5C
India	-3	3	3U
Laos	12	-1	9C
Thailand	12	-4	7C
1969			
Burma	5	2	7C
India	0	3	6C
Laos	16	-1	9C
Thailand	12	-4	9C
1971			
Burma	1	3	7C
India	-3	3	4C
Laos	16	1	9C
Thailand	12	-4	9C

at the displacement of a friendly regime.

The hostility expressed by a government towards China does not appear to be a major determinant of the level of support offered by Peking to the Asian movements. In Laos, despite only moderate hostility towards Peking in 1965 and 1969 and a friendly attitude in 1971, the Pathet Lao was given an extremely high level of support. Similarly, in Burma in 1969, the White Flags were offered a moderate level of support despite the pro-Chinese attitude of Ne Win's government. Hypothesis No. 3 is invalidated in the Asian context.

Hypothesis No. 4: When a regime is uncommitted in its dealings with China, China will hesitate to support an indigenous movement, in hopes of broadening her international political base.

There is little data that is relevant to the testing of hypothesis No. 4. Laos is the only country where the government was relatively uncommitted in its dealings with China. While the data suggest that the hypothesis is rejected--despite moderate attitudes on the part of the Laotian government a high level of support was granted the Pathet Lao--one case is really insufficient for the testing of a hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 6: When a revolutionary movement supports the Soviet Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute, China will support either an alternative movement within that state, or, if one does not exist, no movement at all, regardless of the tenor of relations between the governing regime and China.

This hypothesis appears to have some validity. China supported no movement that backed the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet debate. As we considered no case (here or in Chapter II) where an Asian country was the locus of only a pro-Soviet revolutionary movement, the latter part of the hypothesis is irrelevant in Asia.

Hypothesis No. 7: The greater the degree of conformity of a given revolutionary movement to the Chinese prototype for people's war, the greater the support the movement will be accorded, regardless of governmental hostility.

Despite a high correlation between the support index and the revolutionary index for the Laotian and Thai cases, a similar index comparison for the Indian and Burman cases suggests that the final hypothesis cannot be validated as it stands. Actually, when considered year by year, there appears to be some correlation between these two indices. In 1969 and 1971, the movement least conforming to the Chinese prototype received the lowest level of support, and the movement most closely adhering to that prototype received the highest. The Burmese case in 1965 is the only real exception to this pattern. In any case the hypothesis cannot be validated in its present form.

The variation in Chinese support across time seems to have been minimal in the southeast Asian cases and more pronounced in the Indian and Burmese cases. While the changes in the Indian case seem to mirror changes in the revolutionary index, the pattern

in Burma is not consistent. Rather than proceeding at this point to determine the reason for these various patterns and apparant inconsistencies with Asian data alone, we will examine these hypotheses with data for all three geographical regions.

FOOTNOTES

1. New York Times, 18 November, 1965, p. 2; 11 November, 1969, p. 4; 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
2. For an analysis of Sino-Burmese relations see Robert A. Holmes, "Sino-Burmese Relations: Bellwether of Chinese Diplomacy." Current Scene, Vol. X, No. 5, May 1972.
3. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969, New York, United Nations, 1971.
4. Editor, "China's Foreign Trade in 1971", Current Scene, Vol. X, No. 10, October 1972, pp. 1-17.
5. New York Times, 18 November, 1965, p. 2; 11 November, 1969, p. 4; 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
6. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1966-1967, 1970-1971, 1972-1973, London, St. Martin's Press, MacMillan, 1966, 1970, 1972. For an example of Sino-Indian relations, see N. Maxwell, "China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute", China Quarterly, No. 43, July-September, 1970.
7. Editor, "China's Foreign Trade in 1971", Current Scene, Vol. X, No. 10, October, 1972, pp. 1-17.
8. New York Times, 18 November, 1965, p. 2; 11 November, 1969, p. 4; 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
9. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1966-1967, 1970-1971, 1972-1973, London, St. Martin's Press, MacMillan, 1966, 1970, 1972.
10. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Far East, 1970, New York, United Nations, 1972.
11. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969, New York, United Nations, 1971, and Editor, "China's Foreign Trade in 1971", Current Scene, Vol. X, No. 10, pp. 1-17. The Far Eastern Economic Review has not mentioned any trade either.
12. New York Times, 18 November, 1965, p. 2; 11 November, 1969, p. 4; 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
13. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1966-1967, 1970-1971, 1972-1973, London, St. Martin's Press, MacMillan, 1966, 1970, 1972.
14. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969, New York, United Nations, 1971; and Editor, "China's Foreign Trade in 1971", Current Scene, Vol. X, No. 10, pp. 1-17.

15. See John H. Badgley, "The Communist Parties of Burma", in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements. Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969, pp. 309-328.
16. Ibid., p. 327, Note 13.
17. See Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia--The Politics of Survival, Lexington, Mass, D. C. Heath, 1971, pp. 96-98. Also note r. p. 98.
18. Ibid., p. 99.
19. The Karen National Union Party, the New Mon State Party, the Kayal Progressive Party, and the Chin Supreme Committee. See Richard Allen (ed.), Yearbook of International Communist Affairs, 1968, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1969, p. 60.
20. Quoted in Robert A. Holmes, op. cit., p. 8.
21. Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 104-105.
22. Ibid., p. 105.
23. Milarad M. Drachkovitch (ed.), Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1966, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1967, pp. 345-346.
24. Richard Allen (ed.), loc. cit.
25. Milarad M. Drachkovitch (ed.), op. cit., p. 346.
26. Robert A. Holmes, op. cit., p. 6. See also Peking Review, 10 March, 1970, p. 27.
27. Robert A. Scalapino, "Communism in Asia: Toward a Comparative Analysis", in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements. Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969, p. 36.
28. Deidre M. Ryan, "The Decline of the 'Armed Struggle' Tactic in Chinese Foreign Policy", Current Scene, Vol. X, No. 12, December, 1972, p. 4. See also New York Times, 3 January, 1971, p. 9.
29. Gaigi Dutt, "Peking, The Indian Communist Movement and International Communism, 1962-1970", Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 10, 1971, p. 986.

30. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "China and Indian Communism", China Quarterly, No. 50, April-June, 1972; pp. 281-282.
31. Ibid., pp. 282-283.
32. For a more complete discussion of the factionalism, see Mohan Ram, "Maoism in India: Two Tactical Lines", The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, January, 1971, and his earlier study Indian Communism, Split with a Split, New Delhi, Vikas, 1969.
33. Richard F. Staar (ed.), Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1972, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1973, pp. 505-506. The figure quoted is 6,000 for the Andhra movement compared with 10,000 for the CPI-ML.
34. Ibid., pp. 605-607.
35. B. S. Gupta, op. cit., pp. 284-285.
36. Gaigi Dutt, op. cit., p. 988.
37. Richard F. Staar (ed.), op. cit., p. 506.
38. Ibid.
39. For example, see A. Halpern and H. Fredman, Communist Strategy in Laos, Santa Monica, Rand, 1960.
40. For a more complete study, see Bernard B. Fall, "The Pathet Lao: A 'Liberation' Party", in Scalapino (ed.), op. cit., pp. 185-211; and also, Arthur J. Dommer, Conflict in Laos, Second Edition, New York, Praeger, 1971.
41. B. Fall, "The Pathet Lao: A 'Liberation' Party", op. cit., p. 193.
42. Ibid., pp. 194-196.
43. Ibid., p. 195.
44. Halpern and Fredman, op. cit., p. 4. Though this analysis was written before even our first time period, the similarity has not changed.
45. B. Fall, op. cit., p. 197.
46. See Richard Allen (ed.), op. cit., pp. 362-372.

47. See Joseph J. Zasloff, "Laos: The Forgotten War Widens", Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 1, January, 1970, pp. 65-72.
48. Richard F. Staar (ed.), op. cit., p. 540.
49. Roger M. Smith, "Laos", in George Kahin (ed.) Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1964.
50. For the text of the programme see Richard Allen (ed.), Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1969, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1970, p. 549.
51. Scalapino, op. cit., p. 38.
52. B. Fall, op. cit., p. 195.
53. Scalapino, op. cit., p. 34.
54. See Chapter I, p.
55. M. Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 11-15.
56. CB, No. 744, 1964, p. 35.
57. The "Voice of the People of Thailand" was one of several extra-national radio stations set up in China for broadcasting into countries by rebel groups.
58. Quoted in M. Gurtov, op. cit., p. 13.
59. Daniel D. Lovelace, China and "People's War" in Thailand, 1964-1969, Chinese Research Monographs, Berkeley, University of California, Centre for Chinese Studies, 1971.
60. Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 May, 1966, p. 327.
61. M. Gurtov, loc. cit.
62. D. Lovelace, op. cit., p. 56 quotes the NCNA as differentiating between the two very specifically.
63. Ibid., p. 57.
64. Ibid., p. 59.
65. D. Ryan, op. cit., p. 5. The links with Chen Ping are reported in Richard F. Staar (ed.), Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1972, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1973, p. 384.

66. Scalapino, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
67. Clark D. Meher, "Thailand: The Politics of Continuity", Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 2, February, 1970, pp. 163-164.
68. Lovelace argues that the levels of Chinese assistance have been too low to provide the Thai movement with "effective support", op. cit., p. 86.
69. Peking Review, 23 July, 1971, p. 30.

CHAPTER VI
EXPLANATION OF CHINESE SUPPORT
FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Having computed both the dependent and the independent variable indices we can now attempt an explanation of Chinese support for revolutionary movements in the third world. Though we glanced at some of the possible patterns at the end of each of the three previous chapters, we have not yet determined the validity of the hypotheses that we presented in Chapter I. In this chapter we will examine these hypotheses in light of the data presented in Chapters II, III, IV, and V. We will attempt to determine their validity and we will reformulate those that need adjustment in order to better explain the data. Having discussed the hypotheses, and in so doing offered an explanation for Chinese behaviour, we will then turn to a brief look at some of the problems and prospects facing research in this and related areas.

A. TESTING AND REFORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis No. 1: The greater the geographical proximity of a state to China, the more likely China will be to take an interest in the indigenous movement and offer it support.

Geographical region has been treated in this study as a secondary variable, in order to test what many analysts have merely assumed; that China offers greater support to movements in Asia than in other areas of the world. Without examining the primary

determinant(s) of levels of support in individual cases, we can readily see that there is some truth to this hypothesis. If we look at Table VI-1 we can clearly see that the Latin American movements have generally been offered less support than certain African and Middle Eastern and Asian movements. The ratings on the support index for the Latin American movements are generally closer to zero than those ratings for movements elsewhere. (This is further seen if we look back at Tables II-1 to II-9--even in cases of negative values on the support index.) Consideration of subsequent hypotheses will suggest the reasons for this disparity. However, on the basis of this observation alone, we can suggest a reformulation of the hypothesis in the form of a descriptive proposition:

1a. Chinese support for Latin American movements generally has not been as great as support for movements in other areas of the third world.

However, as we shall now see, only certain types of African and Middle Eastern and Asian movements have been offered higher levels of support than Latin American movements.

Hypothesis No. 2: When directly confronting the United States or one of its so-called "imperialist tools", a movement is likely to receive a high level of support, greater than the revolutionary nature of the movement would dictate, regardless of the geographical proximity of a movement to China.

The Chinese have maintained that one of the reasons for supporting revolutionary movements is to present a united front

TABLE VI-1

SUMMARY OF DATA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Support Index</u>	<u>Hostility Index</u>	<u>Revolutionary Index</u>
<u>1965</u>			
Argentina	4	-3	3C
Brazil	5	-4	5C
Dominican Republic*	7	-4	3U
Ecuador	0	-4	2U
Angola	12	-4	7U
Ethiopia	0	2	3U
Israel-Palestine*	6	-3	2C
South Africa	1	-4	4U
Burma	-10	4	5C
India	-3	3	3U
Laos*	12	-1	9C
Thailand *	12	-4	7C
<u>1969</u>			
Argentina	5	-4	3C
Brazil	5	-4	5C
Dominican Republic	4	-4	3U
Ecuador	5	-4	4C
Angola	12	-4	9C
Ethiopia	-3	2	6U
Israel-Palestine	14	-3	3C
South Africa	10	-4	6C
Burma	5	2	7C
India	0	3	6C
Laos*	16	-1	9C
Thailand*	12	-4	9C
<u>1971</u>			
Argentina.	-1	-4	3C
Brazil	1	-4	4C
Dominican Republic	3	-4	3U
Ecuador	1	2	4C
Angola	12	-2	9U
Ethiopia	-3	3	6U
Israel-Palestine*	14	-1	3C
South Africa	9	-4	6C
Burma	1	3	7C
India	-3	3	4C
Laos*	16	1	9C
Thailand*	12	-4	9C

* Movements confronting U.S. imperialism, according to Chinese perceptions.

against imperialism. Therefore, if practice were to follow theory, movements opposed to the United States, either directly or indirectly through regimes perceived by the leaders in Peking as "imperialist tools" of the United States, would receive higher levels of support than similar movements in other situations. This second hypothesis tests the congruence between Chinese theory and practice.

If we compare the support index (see Table VI-1) for movements opposed to those regimes which, according to the Chinese, fall into the category of "U.S. imperialism", we find this hypothesis to be validated. The levels of support offered to the movement in the Dominican Republic in 1965, to the Palestinian movement, and to certain movements we did not consider in detail (such as the Congolese movement in 1965) support this hypothesis. These movements all received a relatively high level of support, despite low degrees of conformity to the Chinese model for a people's war. The hostility expressed towards China by the regimes in question does not seem to have been sufficiently more intense than in other cases where lower levels of support were offered to explain the disparity in the support given (see the discussion of the third hypothesis below).

However, the Asian cases seem to present data less clear on this issue. In southeast Asia, movements opposed to U.S.-supported regimes did receive a high level of support. Yet the movements that were granted this high level of support also scored well on the revolutionary index; the conformity of these movements

to the Chinese model for a people's war could equally well explain the high levels of support. On the other hand, given lower levels of support offered other movements, regardless of the degree of conformity to the Chinese model, we can suggest that this hypothesis is indeed valid across regions. The movement in Burma, as well as two movements that we did not examine in depth in this project, those in North Borneo and in Malaya and Singapore (these are clearly separated movements despite the fact that they both operate within the federated states of Malaysia) never received as high a level of support as did those movements in southeast Asia that were opposing regimes and forces that were perceived in Peking as part of U.S. imperialism.

Therefore we can validate the hypothesis for all geographical regions:

2a. A revolutionary movement confronting the United States or one of its so-called "imperialist" will be offered greater support by China than the conformity of that movement to the Chinese ideal for a people's war would otherwise indicate, regardless of geographical region.

Thus, Chinese action adheres to Chinese ideology, at least with respect to the idea of building a united front to oppose imperialism.

Hypothesis No. 3: A movement, in any geographical region, aimed at the overthrow of a government hostile to Peking is more likely to receive support than one aimed at the displacement of a friendly regime.

Despite its popularity in the literature, as we saw in Chapter I, both quantitative and qualitative testing clearly demand the invalidation of this hypothesis.

Basically, this hypothesis posits a relationship between the support index and the hostility index. If we use a simple statistical technique to assess the correlation between the variables we can test whether or not such a relationship exists. Through the computation of Spearman's Rho for the two indices in each of the three time periods, we find that there exists no significant relationship.*

Similarly, a qualitative consideration of the two indices within geographical regions produces the same conclusion. In Latin

* Spearman's Rho is a rough equivalent to r , used to measure the correlation of data according to ranking of two variables for a set universe. It is a product-moment correlation coefficient for ranked data.

In the testing of the correlation between the support index and the hostility index, the movements were ranked according to the values on the indices. The difference between the ranking on the support index and the ranking on the hostility index was measured by simply subtracting one rank from the other to produce D. Then Spearman's Rho, X, was computed using the following formula:

$$X = 1 - \frac{D^2}{N(N^2-1)}$$
 where N equals the number of movements considered. The significance of X was assessed by the use of standard t tables, computing t in the following manner:

$$t = \frac{X}{\sqrt{1-X^2}} (\sqrt{N-2})$$
 At the .05 level of significance t should be greater than 2.23. For the twelve movements we considered here, the following t values emerged:

1965	$t = 2.04$
1969	$t = 1.17$
1971	$t = 1.42$

As none of these values is significant at the .05 level of significance, we can assert that there is not a significant relationship between the support index and the hostility index.

America, the support offered movements fluctuated in a manner that bore no similarity to the fluctuation of the hostility index; the government of Ecuador was friendly towards China in 1971 and yet the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador was still supported by Peking--while in Argentina in the same year the exact opposite was the case. In the African and Middle Eastern region, the Ethiopian case appears, on the surface, to support the hypothesis. However, on closer inspection, we see that Ethiopia falls into the category of independent African states (as opposed to colonial territories and apartheid countries) and no independent African state was the locus of a Chinese-supported movement, except in the case of Congo (Zaire) in 1965 where China supported the movement opposing the U.N. forces and the Kinshasha government. As the U.N. forces were perceived by the Chinese to be an extension of U.S. imperialism, we may suggest that except in cases where movements were actively opposing the United States or one of its so-called "imperialist tools", independent Africa has not been the site of Chinese-supported movements. In Asia, as we pointed out in Chapter V, the cases of Laos and Burma invalidate any hypothesis which posits governmental hostility as a primary determinant of Chinese support.

The consideration of this data suggests two propositions. The first emerges from a comparison of the hostility index and the support index, and the second is drawn from this data and the construction of hypothesis No. 2a. The first proposition refutes hypothesis No. 3:

3a. The hostility expressed by the government of a state towards China is not a major determinant of the level of support offered by Peking to a revolutionary movement opposing that government.

The second proposition refers to the level of support China has offered revolutionary movements in independent countries. Such support has been very severely restricted. In not one of the three time periods did China offer tangible support to a movement challenging a de jure independent regime except in apartheid Africa and in those cases where the Chinese leaders perceived the movements as struggles against U.S. imperialism: in those countries where U.S. troops were actively involved in combat (South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and the lack of tangible support notwithstanding, the Dominican Republic); in cases where a movement was confronting U.N. forces, which China perceived as tools of U.S. policy (Congo); and in the one case where China perceived the United States to have established a beach-head for imperialist expansion (Israel). No movement received public endorsement from Mao or other senior leaders unless it was perceived to be one of these struggles against U.S. imperialism, or opposed to an apartheid government in Africa. We can therefore suggest the following proposition:

3b. China refrains from offering either tangible support or high-level endorsement to movements whose aim is the overthrow of non-apartheid independent regimes, except when the movements are considered by China to be actively opposing U.S. imperialism.

Clearly this proposition is consistent with proposition No. 2a. As we shall see in the consideration of hypothesis No. 5, this is a most significant finding, for it not only contradicts earlier findings extant in the literature, but it also suggests a much greater restraint in Chinese behaviour than is usually assumed. We shall return to this point shortly.

Hypothesis No. 4: When a regime is uncommitted in its dealings with China, China will hesitate to support an indigenous revolutionary movement, in hopes of broadening her international political base, regardless of geographical proximity of a movement to China.

This is essentially a corollary of hypothesis No. 3. It is refuted by the invalidation of the hypothesis positing a primary relationship between governmental hostility and Chinese support. Despite its popularity in the literature, it merits no further attention here.

Hypothesis No. 5: In Africa, a movement aimed at the overthrow of a colonial or apartheid regime will receive a greater level of support than one merely aimed at a pro-western régime.

Our case study analysis appeared to validate this hypothesis, with two minor exceptions. First, this hypothesis appears true for the last two time periods only, as the movements in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were not offered much support in 1965. Second, there is one deviant case throughout all three time periods in colonial Africa. The revolutionary movement opposing the French colonial regime in French Somaliland, during all three time periods

we considered, was repudiated by Peking through Chinese support of France. Curiously enough, the explanation of this exception lies in a corollary of proposition No. 2a. France had established diplomatic relations with China in 1964, and had demonstrated its opposition to American imperialism through its withdrawal from the military arm of NATO and its condemnation of the U.S. involvement in southeast Asia. Thus, by supporting the revolutionary movement in French Somaliland, China would have been opposing a country, all the more important because of its place in Europe and erstwhile unqualified alliance with the United States, that was demonstrating itself to be anti-imperialist. Given the importance the Chinese attach to the construction of a united front against imperialism, Peking did not support the movement in French Somaliland. The pattern of Chinese support in Latin America in 1971 provides further evidence for suggesting that when a state challenges the United States, Peking will likely reduce its support of a movement aimed at its overthrow. Many Latin American countries challenged the United States in 1971 on the issue of territorial waters. This was hailed in China, as we saw in Chapter II, as a major reversal for U.S. imperialism in Latin America. The consequence of this shift was to alter Chinese attitudes towards Latin America generally, and to reduce support for revolutionary movements. We can suggest a new proposition, which is consistent with proposition No. 2a:

2b. China will offer less support to revolutionary movements aimed at the overthrow of regimes perceived

in Peking as opposed to U.S. imperialism, than to movements aimed at the overthrow of regimes not so committed.

Returning our attention to hypothesis No. 5, we find that we can now assert its validity, except for apartheid Africa in 1965:

5a. In Africa, China generally offers a high level of support to movements aimed at the overthrow of colonial regimes and, since 1965, to movements aimed at the overthrow of apartheid governments.

Our findings point to an explanation of Chinese support that is generally antithetical to the conclusions most other analysts of Chinese foreign policy have drawn. Despite Sino-American rapprochement on the diplomatic level, Chinese attitudes towards the United States do not appear to have changed substantially. Even after the beginning of the period of so-called "ping-pong diplomacy" which marked a shift away from ideology in favour of pragmatism in Chinese foreign affairs, the importance of the anti-imperialist struggle as a determinant of Chinese support for revolutionary movements continues to be paramount. This is an important point to which we shall return when all the hypotheses have been discussed.

Hypothesis No. 6: When a revolutionary movement supports the Soviet Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute, China will support either an alternative organization within that state, or, if one does not exist, no movement at all, regardless of the geographical proximity of that state to China or the tenor of relations between

the governing regime and China.

As we saw in the case study analyses, there are two issues here that must be considered before we can reject or confirm this hypothesis. First, there is one deviant case, although we did not examine it in our case studies. In Guinea (Bissau), China supported the PAIGC, a pro-Soviet movement aimed at the overthrow of Portuguese colonial rule. No alternate organization in Guinea (Bissau) existed as in Mozambique and Angola. Therefore we can suggest that China has not been as unequivocally opposed to supporting pro-Soviet revolutionary movements as has been suggested in the literature. Second, several of the movements we considered in Chapters III, IV, and V were rated as uncommitted in the Sino-Soviet dispute. These movements did not appear to have received markedly lower levels of support than their pro-Chinese counterparts. For example, in neither Angola nor in the Dominican Republic did an uncommitted stance on the part of the revolutionary movement affect the support China offered. Angola provides additional evidence: between 1969 and 1971 the support granted the independence movement by China did not change, despite the shift from a pro-Chinese to an uncommitted attitude. We can thus suggest a reformulation of hypothesis No. 6:

6a. When a revolutionary movement supports the Soviet Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute, China supports either an alternate movement within that state, or, if one does not exist, no movement at all, except in the case of colonial Africa where China is willing to

grant support to a pro-Soviet organization when no alternative exists. China does not refrain from supporting uncommitted movements.

While the stance of a movement on the Sino-Soviet issue is an important variable in the determination of Chinese support, it certainly does not appear to be the exclusive or critical determinant of Chinese support, as some analysts have maintained.

Hypothesis No. 7: The greater the conformity of a given revolutionary movement to the Chinese prototype for people's war, the greater the support the movement will be accorded, regardless of geographical proximity or governmental hostility.

Given the reformulated hypotheses above, this last hypothesis cannot be validated. However, while the degree of conformity between a revolutionary movement and the Chinese model for a people's war is not the primary determinant of support (as might be expected if one interpreted Chinese revolutionary theory as practice), it is quite possible that it comprises an input into Chinese action.

If we use the statistical technique we used in the comparison of the support index and the hostility index above (Spearman's Rho) we can test this hypothesis quantitatively. Through such a test for correlation between the revolutionary index and the support index we find that there is no significant relationship between the two variables.*

* As in the earlier test, the acceptable level for t at the .05 level of significance, for 10 degrees of freedom ($N - 2$), is 2.23. For the twelve movements we considered here, the following t values emerged:

1965	$t = 1.79$
1969	$t = 1.42$
1971	$t = 1.27$

Given these low values, we can assert that there is no significant relationship between the support index and the revolutionary index.

The degree of conformity between a given revolutionary movement and the Chinese prototype may have been a determinant of levels of support when other variables remained constant. This assumption of ceteris paribus posits that a change in the revolutionary nature of a movement will change the support it receives, if all other variables remain constant. There is not a great deal of data with which we can test the validity of this relationship. The data for Ecuador between 1965 and 1969, the data for India for all three time periods, and the data for South Africa between 1965 and 1969, as we can see in Table VI-1, all seem to point to the conclusion that, ceteris paribus, there is a relationship between the revolutionary index and the support index. Yet there appears some contrary evidence as well. The revolutionary movements in Thailand and Angola received a higher rating on the revolutionary index in 1969 than in 1965, without any change in their ratings on the support index (the hostility index figures remained constant). Thus there is certainly not a direct primary relationship between the indices.

However, to reject this last hypothesis completely would be to obscure a general relationship that might be suggested by a simple examination of the covariance of the support and revolutionary indices for a smaller group of movements than the twelve we considered above. For example, if we were to use the Spearman's Rho to assess the relationship for all the movements except those perceived by the Chinese leaders as actively confronting U.S. imperialism (the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Israel-Palestine

case, Laos and Thailand during all three time periods) we would be able to determine whether or not there was a significant relationship between the two indices for all movements not involved in an anti-imperialist struggle. Yet the exclusion of such anti-imperialist movements would reduce the number of movements to a point where the results of such a test could no longer be relied upon. (Ten is the smallest universe for which one can use Spearman's Rho.) However, if we simply omit the Israel-Palestine case study--as we have seen this is the clearest example of a movement supported primarily because of its opposition to a regime perceived in Peking as an "imperialist tool" of the U.S.--and use Spearman's Rho to test for correlation between the two indices for the remaining eleven movements, we find that there is indeed a significant correlation.*

As we have already determined that the Palestinian movement received a high level of support because it was confronting a tool of U.S. imperialism, this finding allows us to reformulate hypothesis No. 7, albeit in rather qualified terms:

7a. Other things being equal, the greater the conformity between a revolutionary movement and the Chinese prototype

* For 9 degrees of freedom ($N - 2$) the acceptable level for t at the .05 level of significance is 2.26. For the eleven movements here considered, the following t values emerged:

1965	$t = 2.47$
1969	$t = 2.85$
1971	$t = 2.89$

Given that all three of these values are greater than 2.26, we can assert that there is a significant correlation between the revolutionary index and the support index.

for a people's war, the higher the level of support China will offer that revolutionary movement.

This variable, the degree of conformity between a revolutionary movement and the Chinese model for a people's war, is clearly subordinate to the nature of the state--see propositions No. 3b and No. 5a--and the perceived political affiliation of the incumbent government which the movement is challenging--see propositions No. 2a and No. 2b.

Summary

The propositions presented above imply a hierarchy of significance among the variables determining Chinese support for revolutionary movements.

The most important variable is the perceived ideological affiliation of the regime challenged by any particular movement.

If the Chinese perceive that the regime (or the forces of that regime) is directly or indirectly (through U.N. forces, for example) aimed at the maintenance and expansion of U.S. imperialism, the movement is very likely to receive a high level of support. In the opposite case, where a movement is opposed to an anti-imperialist regime, China will not offer it support.

The second most important variable is the political nature of the state in question. In colonial and apartheid countries and territories, China is very likely to support a revolutionary movement, except in the rare case where the regime has established its opposition to the imperialist policies of the United States (as in

the case of French Somaliland). Movements in independent, non-apartheid, non-imperialist countries have never been supported by China beyond a certain point; they have never been offered tangible aid or high-level endorsement.

Third, the ideological affiliation of the movement can preclude Chinese support. In cases which do not fall into either of the categories considered above (confronting imperialism, or confronting apartheid or colonial regimes), China will not support a movement which backs the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Fourth, the nature of the movement, as determined by the degree of conformity to the Chinese model for a people's war, will determine the approximate level of support, given the predominance of the first three variables.

Finally, geographical region sets limits in the variation of levels of support. China has not supported movements in Latin America beyond a certain point; a Latin American movement has never received military or economic assistance, while certain movements in the other two regions have.

Chinese policy has not undergone the massive changes one might have expected since 1965. The Cultural Revolution did not have as great a lasting effect on Peking's support for revolutionary movements as certain scholars have indicated. ⁵ With few exceptions (which are noted in the reformulated propositions), the three time periods seem to be very much a part of the same pattern of Chinese support for revolutionary movements.

Most surprising in these findings is the relative unimportant role of the Sino-Soviet dispute when compared with the importance of the confrontation with U.S. imperialism. Despite the frequently repeated assertion that Chinese leaders have resolved to improve relations with the United States and her allies in order to concentrate on the struggle with the Soviet Union, the results of this study suggest that such assertions are, at best, exaggeration. Though there has certainly been a normalization in relations with many western countries, China has made no attempt to repudiate the ideological primacy of the anti-imperialist struggle. Whether this phenomenon applies only to the support of revolutionary movements, or more generally to Chinese foreign policy, is a subject for further investigation. This finding does imply, however, that there has been an overemphasis on the Sino-Soviet dispute as a determinant of Chinese foreign policy behaviour.

B. GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Certain suggestions can be made on the basis of this study relating to both theoretical and methodological problems and strategies for future research, in both the area of Chinese foreign policy and more general studies of external involvement in internal war.

Focus of Research

In order to further understand the reasons that China might support (or not support) revolutionary movements today, and

presumably in the future, the addition of still another time period would be very useful. Since 1971, China has continued the effort to establish diplomatic and trade relations with a much larger number of countries than ever before. While it is clear that this has been a function primarily of the decreasing intransigence of many countries to abrogate the anti-China stand propagated by the United States, it would be interesting to see if this increasing openness has been reflected in China's policy towards revolutionary movements. Our study suggests that this policy is not related to the so-called "normalization" process in Chinese relations with the western world; the inclusion of data from 1973 could serve to test the validity of this assertion.

We have concerned ourselves only with Chinese behaviour--that has been the focus of our inquiry. The variables we examined suggest that Chinese behaviour towards revolutionary movements is determined by phenomena very different from the explanatory variables established by other analysts in examinations of other states' involvement in internal war. These studies have had dependent variables that have been differently constructed--usually comprising less explicit actions of support than the indicators in our support index. It would further understanding of the differences between Chinese behaviour and the behaviour of other states--the USSR and the United States especially--if their policies towards internal wars were studies using the same sort of composite index we used in describing Chinese action. The differences between our

support index and the dependent variables presently used by analysts of Soviet and American behaviour make comparison of results impossible.

Methodological Questions

Clearly, theoretical advancement is related to methodological considerations of the conditions necessary to produce results that are comparable. Improvements in the methodology used in this study would permit a more fruitful comparative analysis.

First, the categories used in this study are intrinsically related to specifically Chinese phenomena and must be modified in order to examine the policies of other states. For example, we stated that the most important determinant of Chinese support was the manner in which Chinese leaders perceived the ideological affiliation of the regime challenged by a movement. We would have no difficulty adapting to American perceptions, searching perhaps for an "anticommunist" predilection comparable to the "anti-imperialist" element in Chinese perceptions. Similarly, our second independent variable index, which measures the degree of conformity of a given movement to the model derived from Chinese ideology, could be replaced by a composite index measuring the ideological similarity between a party in an internal war (either governmental or otherwise) and the prevalent American conception of an ideal third-world state; the same could be done for the Soviet Union.

Aside from the methodological adaptations necessary for comparative research, some additions to the present methodology would be useful in order to provide a more rigorous analysis. First,

further quantitative analysis of the indices would be very useful to determine whether or not there were indeed covariances and relationships that we were unable to discern from our largely qualitative examination of the variables. This quantitative analysis should not replace the qualitative comparison, but rather complement it. While the first provides the statistical rigour to guarantee comparable results, the other can often provide insight based on individual observations which can so easily become obscured by sophisticated statistical technique. Though we would obviously have to increase the size of the sample of case studies treated in depth, this would not be an insurmountable obstacle in a larger study. Second, a more rigorous coding method for indicators comprising the indices could be devised. This study is not particularly vulnerable to coding errors because of its attention to data drawn from a relatively homogeneous population and because only one analyst was coding. However, in using more than one analyst in the examination of the behaviour of more than one state, a more rigorous approach to coding would be an absolute necessity. Third, through the use of statistical tools the composite indices could be broken down to test the importance of each and every combination of indicators in the explanation of behaviour.

C. CONCLUDING REMARK

This thesis has been an attempt to describe and explain the policies of the People's Republic of China towards revolutionary movements in the third world. Despite certain methodological

shortcomings due to its limited size, this project has hopefully increased the understanding of Chinese foreign policy, and suggested a viable approach to the study of a particular category of interstate behaviour.

FOOTNOTES

1. This was Peter Van Ness's primary finding. Van Ness, op. cit., p. 189.
2. See Bruce Larkin, op. cit., concluding chapter.
3. This period is usually interpreted to have begun during the latter half of 1970 and the first half of 1971, culminating with the American announcement of the impending visit of President Nixon to China.
4. For an example of this attitude, see Ernst Halperin, op. cit.
5. See Robert A. Holmes, op. cit., pp. 7-9; and W. A. C. Adie, op. cit., p. 11.
6. Even Peter Van Ness suggests that this sort of shift appeared to be taking place with the termination of the Cultural Revolution. Van Ness, op. cit., pp. 251-252. One only has to pick up any newspaper editorial written during Nixon's visit to China to see how paramount this attitude really is. See also Daniel Tretiak, op. cit., pp. 224-229.

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