

DEPOSITED BY THE FACULTY OF
GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH



R U S S O - S O V I E T N A T I O N A L I S M

- by -

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Economics and Political Science, McGill University.

Montreal.

July, 1950.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is not easy, in present times, to write in an impartial manner on any topic involving the Soviet Union. One is quite liable to fall victim to his prejudices, pre-conceived opinions, notions, likes and dislikes, and, - to adopt momentarily a Marxist conception -, to be influenced by one's own social and economic background.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union and its official organs as well as representatives abroad are never over-anxious to volunteer information, even of what we would consider to be a general and harmless character. Consequently, it would not be difficult for an effort such as this to die of starvation for sources, even within a very short time after its conception.

The existing works on the Soviet Union, - the so-called secondary sources as far as this effort is concerned, can roughly be divided into four main sections which however, still lend themselves to a further sub-division. First of all, we have the pro-Soviet and the anti-Soviet sources, as well as (and also including) the reliable and unreliable ones. These, of course, can be arranged in a number of ways, and also degrees, such as the "reliable pro-Soviet" work, or the "very reliable anti-Soviet effort", and the "somewhat unreliable anti-Soviet criticism", etc. ad infinitum.

Unfortunately, the first division, that of the pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet efforts, applies most frequently

even in relation to such well-known and well-written scholarly efforts as F.L. Schuman's Soviet Politics (New York, 1946) or de Basily's Russia under Soviet Rule (London, 1938). To this, we must add the numerous journalistic efforts which, written under the duress of the moment and, of course, almost always with a pecuniary motive in view, are invariably, to use a colloquial expression, "paint jobs" - either highly red or snow-white. Instead, however, of criticising, it might be a more positive and constructive policy to give credit where credit is due.

Julian Towster's work, Political Power in the USSR (New York, 1948), is by far the most outstanding work on the general problem of the Soviet government that I have happened to come across. Besides its clarity of expression, scope of conception, and logic of arrangement, it is characterized by a notable desire for impartiality and is notably successful in achieving it. It was extremely useful in those parts of the Thesis in which the general structure of the Soviet state was traced, and the federal arrangements of the Soviet Constitution were pointed out.

J. Kucharzewski's The Origins of Modern Russia, N. Berdyaev's The Russian Idea, and the late Prof. S. Harper's works were invaluable in supplying the background to this modest undertaking. Certain useful deductions and facts were drawn from the very enthusiastic book, The Peoples of the Soviet Union, written by Corliss Lamont, Chairman of the National Council for American-Soviet Friendship.

The greatest credit, however, is due to a publication which occupies only a single, inconspicuous position in the bibliography. If its contribution to this work was to find adequate expression in the bibliography, then it should occupy at least as much space, if not more, as all the other works combined. It is no exaggeration to say, that this undertaking would almost have been impossible or, at the very best, would have had to rely on secondary and highly out-dated information if it had not been for the truly praiseworthy publication - The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, edited and published weekly by the Joint Committee on Slavonic Studies, under the guidance of such well-known experts on the Soviet Union as Philip E. Moseley, Merle Fainsod, R.J. Kerner and others. By providing a news-worthy and accurate digest of the Soviet press, it made possible not only the accumulation of highly useful facts, figures, and quotations, but also made possible a formulation of a general insight into the life, thought, and work of an average Soviet citizen. Its up-to-date coverage, matched only by the excellent choice of its selections, was instrumental in supplying this writer with the latest information on the Soviet Union from Soviet sources themselves.

And last, but not least, special thanks are due to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, for its generous and unmerited cooperation and assistance.

Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Abbreviations used:-

- USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- RSFSR - Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
- ASSR - Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
- VKP/b - Vsesoyunaya Komunisticheskaya Partia (bolshhevikov)
or
A-UCP/B - All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
- CC of VKP/b
or
CC of A-UCP/B - Central Committee of All-Union Communist
Party of Bolsheviks
- RKP/b - Russkaya Komunisticheskaya Partia (bolshhevikov)
or
Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (of the RSFSR)
- CEC- Central Executive Committee (as, e.g., in the
1924 Constitution)
- YCP or JCP
or CPY or CPJ - Communist Party of Yugoslavia

NOTE:

Quotations from the Soviet press, obtained through the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, are acknowledged in the following manner:

i - the name of the newspaper, and date;
ii - volume number, publication number, and page number of the Digest.
e.g. Pravda, March 18, 1950; 2:12-41.

INTRODUCTION.

An erect, martial figure astride a white horse, a glittering sword attracting the rays of the golden sun, a splendid uniform, an array of medals, and then the heavy thud of marching feet, the recoiling tremor of determined, thunderous steps... Battalion after battalion marches by... deadly-sharp bayonets pointing forward..... Above, on the horizon, the sky suddenly seems to fall victim to old age, wrinkles appear on its smooth surface. No, - it is the jet-propelled aircraft flying in formation. Their engines roar in unison, their wings almost touch... And then the armoured formations, the artillery, naval units - all pass in front of the reviewing-stand, where motionless figures are frozen in salute. And then the people... thousands of them, young and old, workers, intellectuals, peasant delegations, many nationalities.... carrying posters, pictures, flags. "Glory to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, standing guard over the peace and security of our motherland"¹ - so reads one sign. Others follow: "Long live the Soviet frontier-guards, vigilant sentinels of the sacred frontiers of our motherland", "Long live our great Soviet motherland - stronghold of friendship and the glory of the peoples of our country"¹. Then many more, calling for increased production

1. Pravda, Izvestia, Apr. 26, 1950.

in all fields of industry, appeals for intensified patriotism in education, for greater ideological emphasis in arts, etc. But all this is dominated by the display of armed might, the titanic giant on parade.

And that, in brief, is the May Day Parade in Moscow, the greatest holiday of the first proletarian state, which frowns upon all manifestations of "bourgeois-nationalism".

Nationalism, which we will attempt to define later, has been the stimulating force of European power-politics for the last century and a half; it is now in the process of sweeping the vast Asiatic continent, it has an exceedingly solid hold on the Latin republics in South and Central America, it has taken firm roots in the United States, it is being consciously and purposely developed and indoctrinated in Canada, it is not being forgotten in the Soviet Union - in short, it is still a dominant force throughout the world. Nationalism has played an important role in almost every war fought in the 19th and 20th centuries, it has found historical expression in the Treaty of Versailles, it is honoured by every wreath laid upon the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier - whether be it in Paris, Washington, or Warsaw.

Nationalism is the second religion taught to school-children from their very first day of class; the national language, the national history, the traditions, the customs

are all honoured, revered, and perpetuated. In every walk of life, the citizen is impressed by the all-embracing presence of this abstract and yet so concrete a force - whether he happens to be reading a daily newspaper, which almost always stresses the nationalistic angle (especially in foreign relations), or whether he be licking a postage stamp, which always, in one way or another, emphasizes the national features of his community. The national holidays are celebrated with as great, if not greater, solemnity and reverence as the most sacred religious rites; the martyrs of nationalism are certainly not less revered than the most martyred heroes of the Church; the national cemeteries of fallen soldiers, where many a mother weeps for her contribution to this new faith, are monuments which stir the hearts of all true citizens and inspire them to emulate, unto death if necessary, those civic virtues which have now become so fashionable.

This nationalism has added a new meaning and a wider scope to the concept of patriotism, which is usually associated with a territorially-definable area. It is more than a liking or attachment for a certain home or province, for well known hills and valleys where a man may have been born, brought up, where he lived, worked, and felt "at home". This nationalism is rather a will, shared by many, to live together as a political unit, based on some common characteristics, such as mutual traditions, culture, history, religion,

language, and others. That none of these factors is a basic one is well illustrated by the fact that, for instance, Swiss nationalism is certainly to be recognized despite four languages, two religions, and three cultural backgrounds while the Spanish-speaking South American continent is divided into some twenty republics, each highly chauvinistic - despite one language, one religion, and one predominant cultural heritage.

It is therefore, a spiritual, abstract, and highly emotional attachment to a political unit, usually symbolized by state institutions, that characterizes nationalism, and a passionate desire to live together in one common political association may thus be suggested as the chief criterion of nationalism. This desire for common statehood is also accompanied by faith in the future accomplishments of the community, acting as a unit, and by a sense of association of the individuals, composing the community, with the community's past. Nationalism is thus rationalized as a necessary stage in the social development of men. By creating the optimum conditions for a close integration of the individual with his community, and by frequently associating the individual's personal ambitions with the success of the community, nationalism makes imperative the total assertion of the community's alleged or assumed rights over all others. Hence nationalism's frequent intolerance.

This intolerance often develops a particularly unpleasant form of expression when the state contains within

it minority groups. The nationally conscious majority very frequently attempts, in the name of superior culture, nobler history, economic necessity, or for the sake of future accomplishments, based on united effort (some times called the national "mission"), to force the minority group to abandon its own national distinctiveness. It is always claimed that such a step benefits not only the majority, but invariably also the minority, which is thus said to be given greater scope for its ambitions and desires. This point is well illustrated by the fact that the first elements in minority groups to be assimilated by the majority are usually the more able and ambitious persons, whose personal scope of action is limited by the confines of the minority community.

Nationalism stepped into the breach created by Enlightenment and by the growth of urban centers - it stepped in to fill the role formerly played both by religion and by the home-craft industry. The Church was the bond which held feudal society together in a spiritual union; it was the emotional link, while the localized home-craft industry provided the economic, the material bond. The integrating function, so necessary to satisfy the social needs of man, was thus provided by these two forces. Furthermore, loyalty to the existing authority was enforced not only by the coercive organs of the royal and feudal rulers but was also strengthened by supernatural sanctions. In almost all the European states,

the Church either actively supported, or was employed by the rulers themselves (where they had the upper hand) to cement the structures of the regimes in power.

It was in the performance of religious rites, in the ceremonies, in the atmosphere of tradition - of the past united with the present and merging with the future - that men satisfied their inerent desire for common spiritual expression, for mutual emotional unity, that they felt they were a part of a greater whole, which was worth more than they, which was sacred and eternal. The Enlightenment, which followed shortly after the Protestant reformation, served to weaken further the already slipping hold of dogmatism on the intellectual classes (including the rising middle class) and necessitated the rise of a new "faith", a more suitable form of emotional appeal to provide the necessary social integration on a spiritual plane. A simultaneous decline in the homecraft industry meant that the home, the town, the local area were no longer able to fulfill the role of social integration in the face of developing commercial and industrial expansion. Something new was desired; something which like the home, was capable of drawing affection; something around which one's life would turn and onwhich it would depend for happiness, peace, and employment. The new "faith" and the new material source of integration - these two were combined in the Nation-State. It had the means to mould and direct the national character, it had the coercive power to impose its will-

education, propaganda, coercion were all at its disposal.

The closely-knit national community soon developed an acute sense of its own distinct personality, matched only by its firm conviction of its own inherent superiority as a corporate body, and that of its members as individuals over all other similar communities and their members. Such manifestations usually caused similar reactions in co-existing communities; a chain-reaction naturally followed. A vicious circle was thus easily developed with each manifestation stimulating the intensification of nationalistic feeling, reaching its culmination in national chauvinism.

This is particularly notable in totalitarian societies. The totalitarian state, by centering the focus of attention entirely on the proclaimed needs of the state, is a particularly devoted follower of nationalism. Nationalism enables it to submerge individualism in the name of national necessity. Nationalism makes possible the totality of its influence. A citizen of such a state, who proudly calls himself a nationalist, is one who admits the priority of his community over himself, and others like him, and who is willing to sacrifice all for the sake of his state. A totalitarian state cultivates, and attempts to develop, such citizens, and it is noteworthy that the USSR is classified as a totalitarian state.

It will be the object of this thesis to determine to what extent nationalism is a force in the Soviet Union.

In view of the multi-national character of the Soviet State, some preliminary thought will have to be given to its federal structure, which coordinates the nations and nationalities of the USSR within a state organism. The impact of the state upon the citizen will likewise have to be examined to determine what methods are used to achieve the social integration of the citizen in the community. Finally, an effort will be made to measure the purely Russian contribution to Soviet nationalism, and to determine its importance and the significance of its role in the fostering and inculcation of an over-all Soviet nationalism upon the inhabitants of the USSR.

CHAPTER I.

MARXISM AND THE MULTI-NATIONAL STATE

"Marxists carry on a decisive struggle
with nationalism in all its forms" ¹
- Lenin.

The State, the political community, and the Nation, the social community, are the foundations on which nationalism rests. Marxism condemns the first to the dust-bin of history, and limits the second to a mere cultural expression tolerated within the proletarian society. The State, according to Marxism, is the method, the machinery of exploitation and suppression employed by the dominating capitalist elite against the shackled working class. The forms of the state may differ, they may range from one extreme to another, but essentially they all perform the same role - that of denying to the labouring masses their rights.

The ruling classes, apart from their basic reliance upon violence, employ also emotional appeals to strengthen the existing state-structure. Nationalism, the appeal to the "political-national" instinct of the citizen, is the most typical weapon employed. The worship of the state is propagated, the natural patriotic instincts of man are channelled into blind adoration of this Leviathan, and the chains binding the worker are thus tightened by the

1. as quoted in Voprosy filogofii, Moscow, no. 2, 1948.
1:1-11 from Works, Russian edition, vol. XIV, XVI.

worker himself. The workers of the different political communities, instead of uniting for their common good, are driven to blood-shed on behalf of an institution which is subjecting them to the most cruel form of exploitation. Imperialism, the child of nationalism and the "highest stage of capitalism", is the obvious consequence of this vile religion of nationalism.¹

Marx lacked a clear formulation of the concept of the Nation. To him, the question of national movements and national rights was synonymous with tactical strategy; principles were not involved. It was on that basis that, for instance, Marx supported the Polish struggle for liberation. He did, however, deny any basic unity between the Nation and the State. This denial was obviously the logical consequence of his and Engels' assertion of the eventual withering away of the state, which would not necessarily be accompanied by the immediate disappearance of all national differences and characteristics. The nation, as a cultural entity, would continue to exist for some time, at least. Stalin defined the Nation as "an historically formed stable community of people which arose on the basis of a community

1. An interesting elaboration is provided in Pravda, June 7, 1949, by Liu Shao-chi, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in his article "On Internationalism and Nationalism": "Imperialism, proceeding from the bourgeois nationalist treatment of the national question will, of course, carry out aggression against other nations whenever possible; it is entirely unable to aid other nations in the cause of independence and freedom...."

of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up and which manifests itself in a common culture."¹

Obviously, the stable, historical community could maintain its cultural, national characteristics even within the proletarian content of the new society.

In this transitional stage, before the final achievement of world communism is completed, these national communities, distinct from a national viewpoint but still proletarian in content, would be tolerated. It was recognized that to attempt immediately to erase all national distinctions would in effect, hamper the work of the Revolution. "Proletarian internationalism recognizes that the national peculiarities of the development of individual peoples, historically formed national traditions exert a most substantial influence on the circumstances in which the class struggle of the working masses of the peoples goes on."² Hence for purely tactical reasons, the world proletarian community would remain divided into nationally conscious groups, operating on the basis of equality. Former privileges for specific national communities, as for instance the Great Russian hegemony, would be swept away and would become a thing of the past.³

1. Stalin, Works, Russian ed., vol. II, p. 296; Marxism and the National Question, p. 12, New York, 1942.
2. Voprosy filosofii, Moscow, no. 2, 1948, 1:1
3. "In order to overcome the mistrust of the toiling masses of the oppressed countries toward the proletariat of states that oppressed these countries, it is necessary to abolish any and all privileges of any national group whatsoever, to grant complete equality of rights to nations, to recognize the rights of colonies and of juridically unequal nations to state separation..." -
VKP/b, V Resolution, p. 295; J. Towster, p. 57, Political Power in the USSR, New York, 1949.

The exploitation of one nation by another would disappear simultaneously with the disappearance of individual exploitation of man by man. As the class conflicts within nations abate, so would the synthetically stimulated international conflicts fade away and national subjugation would give way to international cooperation and equality. "The brotherhood of workers of all nationalities"¹ would finally become a reality. There would be no place or need for nationalism.

It must be emphasized again, that this enhanced position of national cultures would be merely a temporary, transitional arrangement. Lenin specifically condemned any attempts to create purely national cultures, based on tradition, state power, or sense of mission. An international community was, and remained the final ideal, and world progress was to be achieved on the basis of large-scale industrialized economies which would cut across national frontiers and would, in time, supplant national economies.² Consequently, should a conflict ever arise between the needs of the working class as a whole and purely national rights, the

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1. Lenin, Collected Works (New York, 1936), XX, book 1, p.144.
 2. This should not be interpreted to mean that purely economic considerations would be enough to do away with national divisions. "...In dealing with the national question one should not consider that economic unity is indispensable at all costs". - Lenin, Works, vol. XXIV, p. 154, Russian edition.
See also Lenin on Relations between Socialist States, Milovan Djilas, Belgrade, 1949, pp. 38-44.

latter would obviously have to bow to the former and adapt
itself to the new circumstances.¹

The growth of the proletariat, on an international level, would of necessity proceed to erase national peculiarities and distinctions. In time, after the purely national cultures had expanded to their capacity and had performed their historical role, an international culture, with even possibly a common language, would become universal. Thus the final stage in the "national-international" development of the proletariat would have been reached.

Lenin, and later Stalin, were destined to put the theories of Marxism to the severe test of practical application within the territories of the multi-national Tsarist Empire. When first formulating their revolutionary policy and sketching the outlines of a future proletarian community, the Russian revolutionaries, Lenin above all, had to take cognizance of several salient facts, which were bound to influence greatly any orthodox application of theory to fact.

They had to note, pay due attention to, and draw the proper conclusions from the fact that the Russian community, although dominant and numerically the strongest, was in the
minority in Tsarist Russia.² They had to be aware of the fact

1. Stalin, op. cit., XII Congress, RKP/b.

2. This has now changed in favour of the Russian community.

that Tsarist Russia contained within its confines peoples, like the Poles, Finns, Balts, who claimed cultural superiority over the dominant Russian nationality. The validity or lack of validity of this claim notwithstanding, their historical western orientation in a country where western culture, although possibly despised by some circles, was looked up to, certainly gave such people a degree of national prominence and enhanced their desire for national state independence. They were only too conscious of the co-existence of revolutionary parties within these nations - but, and this was highly important, they were, like the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) or the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party (RUP), highly nationalistic, and their first aim was separation from Tsarist Russia and not social revolution. The Russian Marxist leaders knew that the eastern and south-eastern domains of the Empire were illiterate, primitive, lacked entirely any "class consciousness". The remaining two major groups, the Ukrainians and the Byelo-Russians (the former already possessing small highly nationalistic cells) were just beginning to develop their national consciousness and their future direction was as yet uncertain.

To all this must be added the firm conviction held by Lenin, and shared by some of his colleagues, that the future revolution, although possibly originating in Russia, could not maintain itself unless its flames engulfed at least the adjoining areas. It had to be supplemented and supported by

revolutions in the more industrially developed areas of Europe.¹ Trotsky was especially fearful lest the Revolution, contained within the confines of Russia, became vitiated by the economically primitive, backward, and unprogressive Russian environment. In the meantime, of course, the Marxist leaders would do all that was in their power to defend the revolution and would proceed to establish the new society.

National self-determination could possibly retain for the Revolution nations which, hitherto, felt themselves to be oppressed. Even if it failed to retain Poland, it would certainly provide a counter-weight to any growing national sentiments in the Ukraine, Byelo-Russia, and the Caucasus,² and would tend to lessen national animosities.² It would make possible national dignity without absolute state sovereignty. "Although a really democratic centralized republic can give more freedom than a federal republic, the latter under certain circumstances can be considered a step forward."³ This again was a question of tactics. Rather than lose valuable territories, and large populations, the Russian revolutionaries

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1. "The absolute truth is that without a revolution in Germany, we shall perish" - Lenin, March 7, 1918;
"The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for any length of time is inconceivable" - Lenin, 1919.
As quoted in Shachtman, "The Struggle for the New Course," New York, 1943 (Trotskyite writer).
 2. Lenin recognized that "perfectly legitimate hatred" of formerly subjugated nations for the former oppressor would persist for some time after the Revolution; Collected Works, XIX, p. 299
 3. Lenin, The State and Revolution, rev. ed., p. 60

preferred to delay the setting up of a unitary state, and establish a federal union in order to entice the various nationalities of the former Empire into the proletarian state. "Time and again, given a real democratic order, a federation constitutes only a transitional step to a really democratic centralism"¹.

The failure of world revolution to materialize, the liquidation of Rosa Luxemburg, the smashing of the red regime in Bavaria, the failure of Bela Kun in Hungary, the Soviet defeat at the gates of Warsaw, and the internal exhaustion following the victoriously concluded Civil War, necessitated the abandonment of any plans for a rapidly expanding communistic society and the strengthening of the structure of the new Soviet state, which still contained important national minorities with a developing sense of national awareness. The national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples had to be compromised with the socialist content of the state. The solution arrived at combined suppression with toleration.

Nationalism, as such, was to be condemned as counter-revolutionary and extinguished. "The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts of 'one's own', 'national' bourgeoisie to undermine the Soviet

1. Lenin, March 28, 1918; Towster, p. 63.

system and to restore capitalism".¹ Such tendencies were most marked in the Ukraine and the Caucasian lands, but, in the early stages, even Great Russian chauvinism was severely attacked and criticised.² On the other hand, the development of local cultures was to be tolerated and even encouraged. Above all this, Soviet patriotism, supra-national and all-embracing, was to flourish, uniting the various nationalities of the Union in a common bond of allegiance.

This solution was duly implemented by the leaders of the Revolution. An important feature of this solution, and this has a bearing on the whole development of Soviet nationalism, was the fact that it was imposed by force on the leading non-Russian communities.³ The leading force in the entire Bolshevik movement, and this is frequently emphasized by the present Soviet press, was the Russian proletariat and it was the force that imposed its own solution of the nationality problem on the other nationally conscious groups in the Soviet Union.⁴

Russia, following the separation from the Empire of its

1. Stalin, Report to the XVII Party Congress; Problems of Leninism, p. 348, New York, 1942.
2. It is noteworthy, though, that the last major attack on Great Russian chauvinism took place as far back as 1930; it was never the cause of a mass purge, as for instance, in the Ukraine, where nationalist deviation was the object of severe police measures. See W.E.P. Allen The Ukraine, Cambridge, 1940.
3. The fate of the Byelo-Russian Rada, the Ukrainian Rada and Directorate, the Georgian socialist Republic, etc., is illustrative.
4. In the elections to Legislative Assemblies in 1918 the Bolsheviks polled many more votes in the Russian areas than in the Ukraine; in Moscow and Smolensk regions - 56%, in Tver - 54%, while in Poltava region - 4%, in Kiev - 3%, in Volhynia - 4%. The Ukrainian Quarterly, vol. V, no. 4, p. 333.

western domains, was economically the most developed area in the Soviet state; its proletariat was the backbone of the Revolution; its armies established and maintained the Bolshevik supremacy. By 1921 the time had come for the consolidation of victory. It was clear that the former policy of abject Russification could not be compromised with Marxist theory. Furthermore, such a policy would clearly cause a reaction, especially in the Ukraine, and also Georgia and Byelorussia. It was, therefore, considered much more expedient not only to tolerate these nationally conscious peoples but at the same time to offset them by the development of other, at that time nationally underdeveloped nationalities, especially in the south-east. By creating a multi-national union, without national suppression, but with a hard, central national core composed of the largest national group, internal stability, it was hoped, would be established and national dissension eliminated.

On that premise, the federal Soviet state was set up.

CHAPTER II

THE PATTERN OF SOVIET FEDERALISM

To deal effectively with the question of Russo-Soviet Nationalism, its component elements must be duly recognized. The federal state structure must likewise be outlined, as the limits of local autonomy have definite bearing on the growth of a common feeling of national identity. In this respect, primary attention will be paid to the provisions of the 1936 Constitution, following a mere sketch of the first two constitutional arrangements. The multi-national character of the Soviet Union is its particular feature, and some brief preliminary attention must be given to the general composition of the Soviet state.

The total population of the USSR is estimated at about 200 millions people of some 60 tongues and nationalities.¹ The largest ethnic group within the Union is the Russian, consisting of some 105 million inhabitants; the other leading nationalities being some 25 - 35 million Ukrainians,² 8.5 million Byelo-russians, 5 million Uzbeks, about 4 million Georgians and 4.5 million Tartars.

The largest unit in the present USSR is the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, containing about 114 million

1. See Appendix I.
2. The smaller figure is advanced by Ukrainian experts abroad, who claim that the Ukrainian population has decreased steadily under Soviet rule. See the testimony of L.E. Dobriansky, Prof. of Economics at Georgetown University, before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee. Feb. 9, 1950 (on genocide).

people, of which 84 million are Great Russians. The remaining 30 million odd inhabitants of the RSFSR belong to 31 officially recognized minorities, divided, according to Article 22 of the 1936 Constitution, into 16 Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, and 6 Autonomous regions.¹ The RSFSR is territorially the most imposing of the Union Republics, occupying $\frac{3}{4}$ of the entire area of the USSR, stretching from the western boundaries of the Byelo-Russian Republic to the Bering Sea. Its non-Russian population consists of such varied elements as the Finno-Ugrians in the north and the Kazan Tartars and the Kalmyks in the south. Until recently a German community existed on the Volga basin, but during the recent world conflict it was eliminated as a potential centre of subversive activity and its population was moved out, presumably in a northern direction.²

The second major unit, and the sore-spot of nationalistic tendencies, is the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, consisting of some 30 - 35 million people, 2/3 of whom are Ukrainians. The Ukrainians have a definite national tradition, customs, culture, literature, and history; they have become, over the last 30 years, acutely aware of their national identity and have, on several occasions, the most recent (1944 - till to-day) being

1. The German ASSR was abolished in 1941; the Kalmyk, Chechen-Ingush and Crimean ASSRs, and the Karachaev Aut. Region were abolished during and after the war for collaboration. Brief Soviet Encyclopedia, which spoke of these peoples in 1943, does not even mention them in 1948. The population is believed to have been deported; names of local towns and regions have now been changed.
2. See testimony of former Soviet prisoners, as e.g., in Sprawiedliwosc Sowiecka (Soviet Justice), S. Mora and P. Zwierniak, Rome, 1945.

the activity of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), forcibly expressed their desire for separate and independent statehood. During the years 1918-20, an independent Ukrainian state was actually set up and it waged armed struggle against the Polish Republic, and later against the advancing Red Army. A Ukrainian Government-in-Exile continues to exist till this day; nationalist Ukrainian organizations were extremely active in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the inter-war period. The industrial development in the last 20 years, coupled with the famine of 1930 and the elimination of the Kulaks, has introduced into the Ukraine a large non-Ukrainian population concentrated in the industrial centres (Kharkov, the Donbas, etc). This population, mostly Russian, is at the present time estimated at about 10 - 11 million people. This fact has, quite naturally, given rise to the assertion, frequently made abroad by Ukrainian leaders, that the Ukraine is being depopulated of its own ethnic group.

The Byelo-Russian Republic, on the western approaches of the Soviet Union, was witness in 1918-19 of some abortive attempts to establish an independent state. These efforts collapsed because of the advance of the Red Army westward, and Byelo-Russian national leaders moved abroad to continue their activities there. In Byelo-Russia itself, nationalism, on a scale such as that which developed in the Ukraine, did not manifest itself and the existence of the Byelo-Russian SSR has not been too severely threatened by indigenous nationalism.

The Baltic republics, the annexation of which has not been recognized by either the US or the UK, constitute a special case by themselves, and cannot be treated in the same category as the other units of the USSR. They have had a history of some 20 years of national independence, are definitely western in culture and civilisation, and can only be considered as an occupied territory, under foreign domination.

Georgia, the native soil of Josef Vissarionovitch Djughashvili Stalin, was seized by force in 1922 by the Red Army and established as a Soviet Socialist Republic some time afterwards. Local nationalistic tendencies, emphasized by national resistance, were eliminated in a purge, supervised personally by Stalin. In reference to this, Lenin wrote on Dec. 31, 1922: "It is of course necessary to hold Stalin and Dzerzhinsky responsible for all this out-and-out Great Russian nationalistic campaign."¹

The other republics of the USSR are now in the process of economic and political development and do not as yet constitute a major danger to the unity and stability of the Soviet state. They are under political and economic tutelage and only in time could they possibly develop separatist national tendencies.

Until the promulgation of the 1924 Constitution, the Soviet republics were joined together by a series of treaties concluded individually by the component republics with the RSFSR

1. Trotsky, Stalin, p. 361, New York, 1941.

but not with each other. Such functions as were delegated to a common authority were performed by existing Commissariats of the RSFSR. The People's Commissariat for the Affairs of the Nationalities, headed by Stalin, was given the function of representing and regulating the affairs of the various nationalities of the Soviet state, and of directing and hastening the process of sovietization through the creation of local cells of Communist Party workers from among the local population. The republics retained control over foreign affairs; the Ukraine, for instance, maintained separate legations abroad, and had foreign representatives accredited to it at Kharkov.

A central state apparatus and a formal constitutional division of powers were created by the 1924 Constitution, part I of which stated that the Union is "a voluntary association of peoples enjoying equal rights". The nationalities of the Union were guaranteed representation in the C.E.C. Council of Nationalities, equal representation being given to all the republics, and equal representation also being granted to all the national regions. This provision was particularly attacked by the Ukrainians, who felt that such an arrangement gave an disproportionately heavy representation to the RSFSR while relegating the other republics to a secondary position. They suggested instead that only those states which concluded the original treaties of union be represented, and only on an equal basis as entities. The Ukrainian suggestion was rejected, after vigorous criticism and stormy debate. The 1924 Constitution, as finally adopted, created the ground-work for the existing Soviet Con-

stitution of 1936. The two types of Commissariats, All-Union and Union-Republican, were established; definite division of powers arranged; a second chamber, based on the nationality principle, set up; common citizenship, again in spite of Ukrainian protests, accepted; and plans for the economic development of the more primitive areas formulated.

The 1936 Constitution of the USSR made no revolutionary changes in the federal pattern of the Soviet state. Since it is, however, the formal expression of existing Soviet state reality, a more careful analysis of its federal aspects will have to be made in this, and in the following chapter, to determine the scope of autonomy of its associated units.

Article 13 of the Constitution states: "The Union of Soviet, Socialist Republics is a federal state, formed on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights, namely "...the names of the Republics follow. The next article outlines the functions and jurisdiction of the central state apparatus, quite wide in scope and covering the essential fields of state activity.¹ The residuary power is left to the Union Republics, which have their own Constitutions drawn, however, "in full conformity with the Constitution of the USSR",² and which are, otherwise fully sovereign to the point of possessing the right to secede from the Union. By special amendment, passed by the Supreme Soviet on February 1st, 1944, the constitutional provisions

1. See Appendix II.

2. Article 16.

of article 14 were changed to permit the Union Republics the right of organization of their own military formations, and to set up local Ministries of Defense. Simultaneously, the People's Commissariat for Defense (the term Ministry is now used) was transformed from an All-Union into a Union-Republican People's Commissariat. On the same day, another amendment gave the Union Republics similar privileges in the field of foreign affairs and similarly transformed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs into a Union-Republican Commissariat. It was on the basis of the latter amendment that the Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian Republics qualified for membership in the United Nations Organization.

Within its own territory the Union Republics have jurisdiction over education (there is no analogous Ministry in the central government), social insurance, local industry, motor transport, and communal economy. They share jurisdiction with the central government on matters involving light industry, finance, and health. The control of heavy industry is retained by the central authorities. In the realm of the administration of justice, the Union Republics possess their own Supreme Courts, Territorial and Regional Courts, Courts of Autonomous regions and Area Courts, elected by local populations, which administer laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The state entities are, furthermore, guaranteed a voice in the central state organs of the USSR through their

participation in the electoral process on an equal basis. Thus the Soviet of Nationalities, which shares equal powers with the Soviet of the Union, is elected on the basis of "twenty-five deputies from each Union Republic, eleven deputies from each Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each Autonomous Region and one deputy from each national area."¹ In addition to this, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in practice, includes in its body a number of Vice-Presidents corresponding to the number of Union Republics, each Republic being represented by one. Although there is no set practice, the Council of Ministers of the USSR usually includes in its number members from the various nationalities of the Union.

In the above manner, the letter of the Constitution seems to guarantee to the Union Republics a certain, even if limited, area of autonomy and self-government and, at the same time, establishes central state organs within which the aspirations of the national communities can again find due expression and play a role in the formulation of state policy. It is on that foundation that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics includes itself in the category of federal states.

The widely advertised official Soviet nationalities policy, which has given rise to such glowing descriptions as, for instance, Lamont's The Peoples of the Soviet Union, finds

1. Article 35.

its roots in Marxist denunciation of national suppression, in expediency, and in the provisions of the 1936 Constitution. It must be, however, admitted, that in some respects great strides have been made and some improvements achieved. The official policy of Russification, typical of the Tsarist times, has given place to the official development of local cultures in the hitherto primitive and illiterate districts. Local languages have been codified (witness, for instance, the first edition of a Georgian dictionary, containing some 125,000 words) and local literatures encouraged. "Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR are published in the languages of the Union Republics over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR"¹. Court proceedings are conducted in local tongues and illiteracy,² generally speaking, is in the process of elimination. The official nationalities policy lays claim to the stimulation of national consciousness of the various peoples of the Union. Discrimination is combatted and eradicated. Newspapers, magazines, books appear in many languages, and local theatres and cinemas, featuring local films, have been established. Education is conducted in the national language, and national

1. Article 40.

2. This however is not as complete as Soviet propaganda would have the world believe. P. Yudin, in Soviet Culture, Moscow, 1943, admitted that 60% of the population over 50 years of age was still illiterate.

universities have been established in the Union Republics.

Economic inequality is said to be in process of elimination as a result of the great strides towards industrialization being made in all the Union Republics. Economic development, by which is meant the growth of the industrial proletariat, is the primary Marxist criterion for equality between the various communities. Hence the policy of industrialization was to provide the necessary basis for a real spirit of cooperation and self-respect between the national units of the Union. The former colonization by a dominant majority was to be replaced by the development of a local industrial class, working and managing its own industrial potential, and exploiting its own natural resources. The Republics, through a planned economy, were to advance immediately from a primitive economic condition into socialist society, avoiding entirely the evil consequences of capitalism as an intermediary stage.

The official Soviet nationalities policy, while supporting the development of local cultures and autonomy, at the same time combats any manifestations of nationalism, which, as already pointed out, are severely attacked. In the Ukraine, for instance, the policy of "Ukrainization" during the NEP period was not accompanied by any slowing down of the elimination of those elements which supported separation from the Union. The official nationalities policy tolerates cultural development

as long as it does not infringe upon the integrity of the Soviet Union. Officially by the ultimate aim of the Soviet society, is the flowering of the national cultures, tolerant and friendly to one another, and enriching their joint heritage, just as the colours of the rainbow enrich their joint span.

CHAPTER III

THE LOCUS OF POWER IN SOVIET FEDERALISM

Soviet federalism, through its constitutional provisions, guarantees to the associated national communities not only cultural autonomy but a definite sphere of political action. The units are granted both self-government and the opportunity of participation in the central government. The USSR Constitution, according to Stalin, proceeds from the proposition that "all nations and races, irrespective of their past and present position, irrespective of their strength or weakness, shall enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, social, political and cultural life of society."¹

It will be the object of this chapter to estimate² the realities of federalism. The question whether the Soviet state actually tolerates local autonomy on a large scale, is bound to affect the development or lack of development of a Soviet nationalism, embracing all nationalities. A trend towards greater centralization would be bound to promote conflict with the more highly developed national communities, and would necessitate a greater reliance on the support of the dominant national group in the Soviet Union.

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1. Stalin, Nov. 25, 1936, Extraordinary Eighth Congress of the Soviets of the USSR; Problems of Leninism, p. 388.
 2. See also Towster, Political Power in the USSR, and J. Hazard's concise analysis in Foreign Governments, edited by F.M. Marx, New York, 1949, entitled "The Socialist State: The Soviet Union and Its Orbit."

The Union Republics, in their internal constitutional organization, are patterned on the central government. Their state institutions are organized like the analogous offices operating in Moscow. The powers which they are officially granted are in fact in many respects left in abeyance or exercised on their behalf by the central organs of the USSR.

The privilege of maintaining diplomatic relations with foreign states has not been enjoyed by a single Union Republic, including the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia, which have been limited only to participation in the United Nations Organization. No foreign diplomats are accredited to any of the Union Republics and no effective Commissariats for Foreign Affairs have been established in any of the Union Republics. The same is true in relation to Defense. Although the right of organizing military formations has been hailed as an increase in local autonomy and a concession to national aspirations, not a single Union Republic has seen fit to appoint a Commissar for Defense and to set up a military apparatus of its own.

The constitutionally guaranteed right of secession (Art. 17) takes on a dubious validity when it is considered that in a number of trials of "bourgeois nationalists" and "counter-revolutionaries" one of the charges made against the accused was plotting to secede. Stalin, furthermore,

1. e.g. trials of Ukrainian "nationalists", 1930-33 (see Chapter XI) and the purge of 1937.

has made numerous reservations to this right and has indicated that the Communist Party would in fact oppose any attempts to secede.¹

Central control of decentralized branches of government is maintained through the loophole provided by Article 76 of the Constitution.² The list of enterprises in question is decided by the Central government of the USSR and direct administration of enterprises coming under the competence of Union Republics can be and is achieved in that manner. Thus for example in the Shoe Industry, which is a light industry and hence theoretically under the Union Republics, 71 million out of the total of 175 million pairs of shoes provided for in the Five Year Plan will be produced by agencies controlled directly by the central government. The Union Republics have no control over the industrial power; Azerbaijan has no control over the development of Baku, the Ukraine has little to do with Dnepropetrovsk or Krivoi Rog and Georgia does not exploit its manganese iron ore deposits.

In the field of finance, the Union Republics' budgets are mere shadows of the sections of the All-Union budget

1. Stalin, op. cit., XII Congress of RKP-b.
2. "The Union-Republican People's Commissariats, as a rule, direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them through the corresponding People's Commissariats of the Union Republics; they administer directly only a limited and definite number of enterprises according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR." - art. 76 of the USSR Constitution.

relating to the Union Republics. The Minister of Finance of the USSR, in his annual report, announces the distribution of the budgetary provisions for the individual Republics, and the Republican budgets adjust themselves to that distribution. The Republics, furthermore, collect the turn-over tax on behalf of the central authorities and are granted a certain percentage of it for their own state budgets.

The control of motor transport diminishes in importance when it is considered that main reliance in the sphere of communications in the USSR is still on the railroads and that the development of motor transportation is still lagging behind. Also, motor transport, when viewed from a strategic point of view, becomes the domain of the military authorities of the USSR which assume control over the construction of strategic roads. In fact, the control over motor transport given to the Union Republics degenerates into the obligation to supervise and maintain the roads in good condition; a form of corvee is usually imposed on communities bordering the roads, the responsibility for the condition of the road being shouldered by the community.

Although education falls within the administrative scope of the Union Republics, and People's Commissars of Education have been appointed by the Union Republics (art. 83), Article 14 of the Constitution gives the "highest organs of state authority and organs of government" of the USSR juris-

1. e.g., Report by USSR Minister of Finance, A.G. Zverov, on USSR State Budget for 1950. Pravda and Izvestia, June 14, 1950. 2:24-18.

diction over the "establishment of basic principles in the spheres of education..." By a special decree passed in 1935, which criticised "unsatisfactory" text-books in non-Russian schools, the Commissariats of Education of the Union Republics were furthermore prohibited from making any changes in approved test-books. As additional limitation of control of the local state organs over education occurred when the Union-Republican Ministry of Higher Education was established, which clearly gave the central government an increased say in the management and direction of educational institutions throughout the Soviet Union.

The Central Government of the USSR controls all the contacts of the USSR with the outside world. It speaks, through its Ministry for External Affairs, for the entire Union; through the All-Union Ministry of Foreign Trade, the foreign commercial policy of the Union is crystalized and formulated. Individual Union Republics have no trade relations with foreign countries. Their economic development is patterned on the five Year Plan, prepared by the Gosplan Commission for the entire Union, on which the individual Union Republics base their own smaller five-Year Plans, as mere sections of the over-all undertaking. The planned distribution of the industrial

1. e.g. "The Soviet Government and the Communist Party are giving much attention to public education in the Estonian Republic. A sharp struggle is being waged against survivals of the old bourgeois society, against reactionary teaching concepts..." Izvestia, Apr. 18, 1950 2:16-57

centers, and the frequent separation of manufacturing plants from the sources of raw materials makes unlikely the achievement of complete economic self-sufficiency by any Union Republic. The administration of heavy industry by the All-Union Ministries means that the central government is in effective control of the most important sphere of Soviet economic life. The Soviet drive for industrialization is relying entirely on the development of heavy industry, and this falls within the administrative sphere of competence of the central state organs. In early 1949, the Council of Ministers of the USSR contained some 38 economic ministries and of these 28,¹ mostly heavy industry, were All-Union Ministries.

The effective police control is centralized in the Union-Republican Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and in the Union-Republican Ministry of State Security (MGB), agents of which penetrate every walk of life and are employed as co-workers in all the economic enterprises of the Soviet system. Their omnipotence is best measured by the fact that every ministry in the Republics has a special section, consisting of representatives of the MGB, responsible only and directly to the MGB, which performs a supervisory function over the political reliability of the Republican ministry.² The arbitrary power of arrest and detention without trial up to a period of 5 years

1. Fainsod, "Recent Developments in Soviet Public Administration", The Journal of Politics, Nov. 1949, p. 686, op.cit.
2. Ibid, p. 689, op. cit.

granted by decree to those coercive organs of the state,¹ serves to enhance further their position and to diminish local autonomy.

In addition, the Constitution grants the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR the power to annul "decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and of the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics in case they do not conform to law,"² and "the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR has the right, in respect of those branches of administration and economy which come within the jurisdiction of the USSR, to suspend decisions and orders of the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics, and to annul orders and instructions of People's Commissars of the USSR"³. During the war, sections "e" and "f" of art. 14⁴ have been interpreted as giving the central authorities the right to abolish existing constitutionally recognized communities and the Volga German ASSR, the Kalmyk ASSR, Chechen-Ingush ASSR and Crimean ASSR, and the Karachaev (Karachai) Autonomous region were abolished by decree. The existing national communities were simply eradicated and extinguished.

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1. Ibid. p. 711, op. cit. See also Sprawiedliwosc Sowiecka, Chapter II.
 2. Art. 49e of the USSR Constitution.
 3. Art. 69 of the USSR Constitution.
 4. See Appendix II.

It is thus to be seen that the locus of power of the Soviet federalism lies definitely within the organs of the central administration, but in which the federal units are still represented - as, for instance, in the Soviet of Nationalities. An argument may, therefore, be made in favour of the asserted autonomy or at least in favour of the supposed participation of the federal units in the central organs of the administration. This argument fades when faced by Soviet reality. A most superficial examination of the role of the Supreme Soviet in administration and in the legislative process indicates what a minor role this body plays in Soviet politics. Its sessions are extremely brief; legislation is passed en masse unanimously; no criticisms of the government are ever made; no amendments to government legislation, and there is no other kind, proposed. It is truly a rubber-stamp in the full meaning of the word.

The body which in effect rules the Soviet Union, directs its policy, and imposes its will on every sphere of Soviet life is the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, briefly mentioned in article 126 of the USSR Constitution as the organisation in which "the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite.." It "is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop

the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." Its decisions are the decisions of the government, its Congresses are the most important assemblies in the Soviet Union. Many of the government decrees are countersigned by the Secretary of the Party on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. All public events stress the importance of the Party, not only as a integrating and leading body but as the directing and supreme organism in the State. The Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, General S.M. Shtemenko was merely emphasizing the reality when in making his May Day speech, he started his address by stating: "In the name of and on the instructions of the Soviet government and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I greet you and felicitate you on the first of May."¹ The Communist Party effectively reasserted its supremacy over the Army immediately after the conclusion of hostilities and at the present time there is no rival in the Soviet Union to challenge its supremacy.²

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) is not organized on the federal pattern. Although it uses the state divisions for its own organizational structure, it does so as an administrative expediency. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a unitary body and not a federation.

1. Pravda, May 2, 1950 2:18-29.
2. An illuminating remark was once made by Marshal I.S. Konev when asked to explain his military successes: "For my military skill I am indebted to the great Party of Bolsheviks", USSR Information Bulletin, Feb. 9, 1946, p. 122.

It will be seen later on, what national group carries the main responsibility and in what proportion, but it may here be stated that the Communist Party of the RSFSR is numerically and proportionately the strongest and contributes the largest number of members to the leadership elite. The formal federal pattern in the state structure is here replaced by a highly disciplined, hierarchical pattern with the line of command flowing from the top down. "Intra-Party Democracy" permits a limited amount of discussion but only on specific topics, prior to the final decision, which truly is final. Uniformity of thought and action between the central authorities and the local units is assured by the fact that the branches of the central and state governments are controlled and staffed by Party members, whose allegiance is to the Party and who orders they have to obey explicitly.

The highest decision-making and policy-formulating body is the Politburo of the Communist Party. It is a small organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party but wields the supreme power of the Soviet state. It is presided over by Stalin, and includes the leading personalities of the Soviet Union. The All-Union Congress of the Party has been notably subservient to the Politburo since the Trotsky eruption, and faithfully follows in its footsteps. The Politburo's membership is not chosen, needless to add, on a federal basis, and its national composition does not correspond to the national composition of the Soviet Union.

The locus of power in Soviet federalism is thus to be found not in its federal arrangements but within a highly centralized organization which performs the role of the leadership elite in Soviet life. The powers granted to the Union Republics and the Autonomous Republics, although already severely limited by constitutional provisions, are further diminished by administrative practice and by the existence, almost outside of the official constitutional structure, of an omnipotent political organization which denies through its own administrative machinery the existence of a federal arrangement, and centralizes all power within a single organ of its Central Committee, situated in Moscow.

The organs of the federal units are relegated to the performance of purely local functions - a form of glorified municipal government, and find themselves at the complete mercy of the central authorities. The disciplinary and coercive measures taken against any recalcitrants tend to discourage local opposition to centralization. The serious accusation of "bourgeois-nationalist deviation" hangs, like the sword of Damocles, over the heads of any local leaders who should wish to emphasize too strongly or too energetically their local aspirations. The occasional purges, of which more will be said later, of the nationalist leaders in the Ukraine, and also in the Caucasus, serves as a timely reminder to local administrators not to insist too much even on the letter of the Constitution, and not to take too seriously their "sovereign rights".

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPACT OF THE STATE ON THE CITIZEN

The development of the State has been accompanied and hastened by the intensification of national consciousness. Nationalism, on the other hand, has been stimulated by the increased penetration of the private life of the individual by the growing functions of the state. Both processes are intertwined and both influence each other. The state, being constantly a part of the every-day life of the citizen, proceeds to develop in him, by both positive and negative stimuli, an acute feeling of identity with that state and an intense awareness of nationalism. This emotionalism, in turn, proceeds to make demands on the state; it demands that it be strong, great, glorious, and superior to others. The state and nationalism, the Nation-State, become man and wife, so devoted to each other that, when separated, each is deprived of the real meaning of its existence.

The citizen finds within the Nation-State a welcome and comprehensible form of social integration. Here, at last, he develops a feeling of identity and unity with society; here his problems of personal adjustment can most easily be solved. The Nation-State can be loved, admired; it also loves, gives, and takes, punishes and rewards, glorifies and degrades. It is an entity of emotion and reality, a combination of the tangible with the intangible.

In a western society the citizen, although always a part of the Nation-State, usually finds competing organisms which seek to attract his allegiance. The Church, the political party, his own commercial enterprise, the Trade Union, the home - all make demands of their own and insist that due regard be given to their needs or even threats. In a society such as exists in the Soviet Union, the situation is altogether different. The state is omnipotent; the state is totalitarian. Competing institutions, social, political, economic and religions, have either been smashed and abolished or actually integrated into the state structure. The state has no rival in its courtship of the citizen's affections; the citizen has no choice but to give them.

This is further emphasized if the state in question is surrounded by a hostile, or a merely distinct and different society. Rousseau wrote that strangers should be regarded with hostility;¹ the natural tendency of man is to regard them with at least suspicion. A state, the political and economic structure of which is totally unlike that of its neighbours, develops a form of psychological complex - be it superiority or inferiority - which pushes it away from such neighbours. A sense of mission, a desire to impose its own pattern on others, is often developed. Internally, a greater emphasis on its own distinctiveness makes its appearance, and the distinct features of the

1. Emile, book I, p. 7, Everyman's Edition, op. cit.
"Letters à Usteri", Apr. 30, 1763, Rousseau's Political Writings, Vol. II, p. 166, Vaughan's edition, op. cit.

Nation-State are all the more treasured. It is on that account that reformers in primitive societies find it so exceedingly difficult to introduce foreign innovations, no matter how beneficial to the native community.

The Soviet citizen, whether living in Karaganda or in Smolensk, in Igarka or Astrakhan, is still under the direct administrative control of the central organs of the Soviet state. The Soviet state gives him education, dogmatic training, employment, social benefits, holidays, and a feeling of participation in society; it can, and often does, imprison him, deprive him of his liberty, put him to forced labour, and finally destroy him. The Soviet citizen knows that his state is often more severe than just, but he has been taught to believe that it can never be wrong.

The impact of the state on the citizen in the USSR is unlimited, and it manifests itself on every step. There is no place or institution where the influence of the state is not to be felt, where the Soviet citizen could forget for a minute that he is a Soviet citizen.

The Soviet citizen is working under pressure of the "norm" not only set by the ambitious Five-year Plan, but often arbitrarily increased by the plant manager, or forced upon the worker by the officially encouraged "socialist competition". The press is full of slogans for increased production, appeals

1. See Chapter III.

for an improved quality of goods, praise for the Stakhanovite workers, and criticisms, all of which are usually followed by more effective measures against those who are falling behind. Everyday the press carries new pledges from the workers of individual enterprises to exceed their quota by a certain percent; letters to Stalin from every corner of the Union, reporting new successes in the race for industrialization, are prominently displayed in the newspapers. The slogan is "reach and exceed America!" Rewards and decorations go to the "heroes of socialist labour"; special rest privileges and bonuses go to those who spectacularly overfulfill their quota. Many of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet are former Stakhanovites - it is both a distinction and a reminder to others.

Compulsory military service "is law" (art.132). The Army not only provides military training to the recruit, but serves also as a centre in which national feelings are stimulated by all the visible forms of national symbolism: uniforms, flags, displays, parades, etc. The recruit is posted in far-away districts, and begins to lose his merely local consciousness. Military service is coupled with the annual call-up of some 800,000-1 million young men for industrial training in the State Labour Reserves.¹

Frequent state loans must be over-subscribed; the

1. Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Oct. 2, 1940.

launching of state loans is a holiday of increased work. The worker is impressed by special Party agitators with the need to work more, to produce more and to contribute more. Moral pressure is brought to bear on those who hesitate to contribute a sizable portion of their income; resolutions are frequently adopted at mass open meetings, presided over by Party workers, to subscribe a given portion of the employees' wage to the loan.

The Communist Party maintains constant touch with the citizen through specially trained agitators, through participation and direction of all organized activity. Party "actifs" organize special "Red corners" and "Lenin corners", where Party publications, pamphlets and slogans are prominently displayed and where workers are expected to spend their leisure time. The "actifs" help to draw up plans for increased output, they enforce punctuality and punish tardiness, they watch over discipline and loyalty. Monthly meetings are organized, and the employees are obliged to attend political lectures, are urged to suggest improvement and to denounce "saboteurs".

All forms of artistic expression, be it music, letters, or art, operate under administrative regulations and control, and must conform to the purposes of the Soviet state. The writers have been coordinated, since 1932, in a "Union of Soviet Writers", organized under the inspiration of Maxim Gorky. Even scientific research is subject to close scrutiny and must con-

form to the principles of Marxism.

The national holidays are manifestations of unity of purpose and expressions of the great joys of Soviet life. The press, the Party prepare the citizen for this event weeks in advance; official slogans are announced and printed in the newspapers (see p. 5). Editorials and feature articles discuss the importance and significance of the given event, not only from an over-all point of view, but also from the point of view of the special interests of given groups of citizens. Trade-Union newspapers, Komsomol journals, agricultural publications, all emphasize some particular aspects of the approaching celebration. A national mobilization truly occurs, and the participation of millions is assured. Mass parades, red emblems, slogans, songs - all serve to stimulate the citizen and to increase his national fervour.

"The Marxist-Leninist world outlook of the pupils is formed as the result of the basic principles of the sciences and as a result of acquisition by the pupils of a harmonious body of scientific ideas. The formation of a correct materialist outlook on the world, on nature and society and on the past, present and future of mankind is a long and complicated process of concept-forming and assimilating laws, theories, etc. When this process is supervised in concord by the whole teaching staff of the school and when every science is presented from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint, the task of the ideological-political education of the pupils is successfully met." 1

1. "This is how the World Outlook of the Pupils is Formed", Kiev Girls' Secondary School No. 78, Uchitelskaya gazeta, April 26, 1950. 2:16-15

Marxism-Leninism is not something you can see, touch, feel or smell. It is a theory, a dogma and as such it must be taught and learned. The citizen must not only act as a member of a communist society should act; he must also understand the motives and dynamics of his actions. That is why the Soviet state, when seeking to give the greatest momentum to its impact on the citizen, puts such special emphasis on education, and political education.

Lenin stated that ceaseless war must be waged on illiteracy, without the liquidation of which the process of sovietization would not only be delayed but seriously hampered. The citizen must understand the political issues and his reactions to them must be stimulated by the profundity of his political training. The Commissariats of Education have been officially described as the state organs for the propaganda of communism, and an intensive drive was made, and is being maintained, to give education to the entire population.

The educational apparatus is further aided by the existence of a parallel indoctrinating structure maintained by the Communist Party. The Young Communist League embraces some 9 million members who are considered the cream of the

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1. There are still some 8 - 10 million children in the USSR not receiving any education. According to Soviet statistics, in 1941, the following number of children were attending school: General schools - 29.3 million, higher schools - .7, Specialized and technical - 1.2, FZO - 1.8. Total - 33 million. No. of children of school age - about 41 - 44 million. USSR Information Bulletin, June 1950, p. 325, reported that in the first quarter of 1950 some 36.4 million Soviet children were attending school. It is also noteworthy, that, in the 1950 Council of Nationalities, 35.6% of the Deputies have no secondary education. Izvestia & Pravda, June 15, 1950, 2:24-25

Soviet youth. "The Young Communists wrote the best papers and the best answers in examinations. The examinations showed the Young Communists' general knowledge, political orientation, moral qualities and high character: several years of work in a Young Communist organization leaves a deep imprint on students' personalities." 1

The members of the Young Communist League can be expected to increase greatly in the near future as the older generation, whose life span exceeds that of the Soviet Union, disappears, and gives place to a new generation, born and reared in the Soviet climate.

An exceedingly illuminating passage on the role of the Pioneers (the junior youth organization) in the Soviet process of indoctrination appeared in the somewhat outdated (1927) but still in many respects timely work of the late Prof. Harper, Civil Training in Soviet Russia, - which is worth quoting in full:

"While helping the mother in the housework, the Pioneer must talk about such institutions as the community laundries, and the cooperative dining rooms, of which he has learned from the brigades (discussions and excursions. Where the parents are illiterate, the Pioneer talks them into learning to read and write. Also he helps his younger brothers and sisters to read, and takes them occasionally to the Pioneer club or brings them into the Little Octobrist movement. Bringing newspapers and pamphlets home, and reading them to the family, the Pioneer agitates for regular subscription to a newspaper and for the purchase of books. The Pioneers try to have their parents subscribe to the various voluntary civic organizations. Finally, the Pioneer is to persuade the parents always to participate in

1. M. Kropacheva, Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Pravda, June 22, 1949 1:26-59.

revolutionary celebrations and holidays. To further these activities the Pioneer is urged to set up a little political corner in the home, with newspapers, pamphlets, posters, and mottos. If possible, the Pioneer is to put a picture of Lenin on the wall, next to the sacred image. In this way, and by emphasizing revolutionary holidays in opposition to the religious feast days, the Pioneer is to combat the "prejudices of religion" in family life. On all activity, and especially in the family, the Pioneers are expected to report regularly at the brigade meetings." 1

The Party and the Komsomol combine with the state educational institutions in achieving unity of educational policy. The Komsomols, in particular, are exceedingly active, as it is realized that their activities embrace the Soviet youth in its formative period, when the young mind is most apt to be influenced and specific mental patterns established for life. About 90 youth newspapers with a circulation of about 5 million and 22 magazines with a circulation of about 1 million, ² serve to provide a constant flow of properly assembled information to every Komsomol cell in the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that for every three Komsomols two copies of Komsomol publications are provided, and, in view of the character of the Soviet state, read. It is an exceedingly high percentage, and speaks well for the importance attached to the power of the press.

The Komsomol, jointly with the Communist Party, organize special courses, dealing with Marxism, the Party, its leader, and with Soviet life in general. The following figures, assembled at random, illustrate the intensity of the process of indoctrination and indicate the extent of the impetus that the impact of Soviet life must have on the average Soviet citizen.

1. p. 77
2. Tass, op. cit.

In the Moscow district alone 164, 000 Russian students studied in Young Communist League courses in 1948-49.¹ In Kiev during the same period more than 17,500 Kiev students attended 977 political study groups, and 11,931 attended 648² political schools and 15 borough Party evening schools.

It is also of interest to examine some figures for the Ukraine as a whole, it being the second largest Union Republic and traditionally the centre of resistance to central authority and the hot-bed of nationalistic activity.

During the year 1949, 9,984 political schools were operating, 14,860 study circles for the biography of Lenin and Stalin, and 23,396 study circles for the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and 978 evening Party Schools were also functioning. Within these institutions, more than 1 million received instruction.³ Some 19 special universities of Marxism-Leninism were in existence in the Ukraine, and some 474,000 persons were engaged in the process of Party education.⁴

The Communist Party itself maintains special cadres of field-agitators for the purpose of additionally stimulating the above activity, and supplementing it among those who are unable to attend such special courses. Pravda, for instance, reported

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1. Pravda, July 25, 1949 1:30-60
 2. Ibid, June 22, 1949 1:26-46
 3. Ibid, Nov, 14, 1949 1:47-43
 4. Ibid, Sept. 24, 1949 1:40-37

in 1949: "There are now 8,000 agitators and 10,000 propagandists and lecturers at work in the Ukraine."¹ In the Tartar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the total population of which is a mere 3 million people, some 56,000 Party agitators were reported by the Soviet press,² to be active in the rural areas at the end of 1949. The agitators are experts in dialectic, and the true purposes of their activity cannot be expressed any better than by this enlightening and somewhat boastful statement: "We have trained agitators who can skillfully answer the questions of the working people."³

A rather active organization, cooperating closely with the Party in the sphere of agitation, is the Society for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. Its activity embraces the entire territory of the Soviet Union, and its members, numbering at present 165,000 and organized into 4,044 primary units, are obligated by their membership pledge to give at least two lectures a year. Thus the total number of lectures given annually is well above 300,000 of which in 1949 about 100,000 were on international affairs and foreign policy. They were attended by an estimated 39,000,000 listeners. In the first quarter of 1950, some 20 million were reported to have attended such lectures.⁴

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1. Pravda, July 16, 1949. 1:29-50
 2. Ibid, Dec. 28, 1949. 2:1-43
 3. Ibid, June 21, 1949. 1:26-46
 4. Izvestia, Apr. 25, 1950. 2:17-51

It is thus seen that the Soviet citizen cannot escape the impact of the State which not only overwhelms him in all respects but actually moulds a new personality within him and develops a particular type of mental process. These endeavours will be much facilitated as the resistance of the older generation disappears together with it. This change is most marked in the Party itself. A new type of Communist is making his appearance, representing a definite social type.¹ The old members of the Party have mostly disappeared; by 1938 they were already a minority. The following comparison of the composition of delegates to the 17th and 18th Party Congresses, held in 1934 and 1938 respectively, illustrate this process:

<u>1934</u>		<u>1938</u>
22.6 %	of the delegates in Party before 1917	2.4 %
17.7 % since 1917	2.6 %
80 % since 1919 or earlier	14 % - ²

The purges, of course, hastened this natural process.

1. "In their political psychology they represented a new type. Most of them leaned toward authoritarian thinking; the high leadership above (Stalin and those closest to him) has to decide on right and wrong; what the leadership decides is incontrovertible, absolute. Thus the complete devotion to Stalin... Their interest was not in social problems, but in the strong state that built up the national economy."
- Shachtman, a Trotskyist, p. 227.
2. Ibid, p. 229.

The state not only stimulates the citizen to specific types of activity but also stimulates specific types of response. The citizens are given a semblance of participation in the governing process by playing an active part, for instance, in the electioneering and vote-casting comedy. It is also a form of political education, accompanied by speeches, mass-meetings, parades, and merry-making. The Soviet citizen lives and sees only the state. The Soviet citizen cannot possibly imagine himself outside of the state. It becomes as much a part of him as his own mental reflexes or his limbs. The impact of the Soviet state upon the citizen thus develops a proper candidate for a devoted nationalist.

CHAPTER V

STALIN AND THE INTEGRATING FUNCTION

A visitor could spend a long holiday (the term is used loosely) in the USSR merely visiting a growing number of urban centres bearing a strikingly similar name: Stalino, Stalingrad, Stalinogorsk, Stalinsk, Stalinsi, Stalinbad, etc. and lately he could even find the largest port of Bulgaria, formerly known by the bourgeois name of Varna, now proudly joined with the above in the same alphabetical arrangement.

Stalin has been the object of an unprecedented campaign of glorification, adoration, and adulation.¹ Public events commence and end by outbursts of praise for Stalin from among the most important Soviet leaders. The 18th Party Congress heard Zdanov exclaim: "long live the genius, the brain, the heart of the Bolshevik Party, of the whole Soviet people, of the whole progressive and advanced humanity - our Stalin". Mikoyan, on the same occasion, declared loftily: "He is a mountain eagle, fearless in struggle", and Beria stated with the firmness and finality typical of a secret police chief: "the greatest genius of all mankind."²

1. Pravda, May 30, 1949, commenting on Stalin's political writings: "J.V. Stalin is a great proletarian strategist... the wise leader of the peoples of the USSR, the leader of the Soviet state... the organizer and creator of the mighty socialist industry... the organizer and creator of the collective farm systems... the leader and teacher of the Bolshevist party, the worthy continuer and the cause of Lenin, the symbol of the greatness and wisdom of the party... the great theorist of communism, a supreme luminary of science..."

1:22-51

2. Ranney & Carter, The Major Foreign Power, New York, 1949, p.611.

The Soviet Army fliers are "Stalinist falcons", the Army commanders are "faithful pupils of Stalinist strategy", the industrial developments are "Stalinist undertakings".
"....And now the irrigated Hungry steppe is becoming a fertile, prosperous, in a word Stalinist steppe..."¹ The press devotes numerous articles to that subject and, for instance, in one week in December, 1949, on the eve of Stalin's birthday, the following instructive headlines appeared over articles devoted entirely to Stalin: "Life's Joy", "Great Leader and Teacher", "The People Glorifying the Great Stalin", "Love of the People for Stalin", etc.

The Stalin Prize is the highest award for individual achievement in the field of arts and sciences in the USSR.² Gold medals bearing his image have been awarded to the winners of the International Stalin Prizes on his birthday. His birthday itself has given additional impetus to the efforts of his faithful followers. Busts of Stalin have been set up on more than 30 of the highest mountain summits of Central Asia,³ the State Publishing House printed some 3 million posters, bearing such inscriptions: "Stalin is the happiness of the People", "Our Banner of Victory, our Stalin", "Glory to the Great Stalin", etc. The State Music Publishing House issued 45 songs on Stalin,

1. This remark, greeted by "stormy applause" was made in a speech by L.M.Kaganovich on the 25th Anniversary of the Uzbek Republic; Izvestia & Pravda, Jan.21, 1950 2:4-13
2. S.T.Nyaga, author of the "Song of Stalin", has recently been awarded the Stalin Prize for it. Izvestia & Pravda, March 8, 1950. 2:10-1
3. Pravda, Dec. 20, 1949. 1:52-61

such as the "Cantata on Stalin", "You are our Hero", "Thanks, Great Teacher", etc. The Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge devoted 20,000 lectures¹ to Stalin alone. Special museums dedicated to Stalin were also established; motion pictures distributed, socialist competitions in his honour declared, and new pledges made. The December 21, 1949, issue of Pravda was devoted entirely to Stalin, carrying articles of varying lengths by the leading² personalities of Soviet life.

This seemingly foolish and naive display of pretended love and adoration for the leading personality of the Soviet state has a deeper meaning and a greater significance than would appear on the surface.

The Communist system has been established in a land where absolutism has held sway for centuries; where men have been taught to obey and not to think, to prostrate themselves and not to assert themselves, to bow and not to shake hands. The Tsarist system has embedded in the Russian subject a respect for authority, a belief that the government "knows best."

1. Izvestia, April 25, 1950. 2:17-51
2. Malenkov - 3,600 words, Molotov - 5,000, Beria - 5,000, Voroshilov - 5,000, Mikoyan - 6,000, Kaganovich - 5,000, Bulganin - 4,200, Andreyev - 2,500, and about 15,000 words by others (Shvernik, Poskrebyshv, etc.)
It would be interesting to know whether quality or quantity was the standard.

The Tsars, the representatives of God on earth, had to be loved and respected by the masses, for they symbolized the eternal character of Russia itself, and were the annointed deputies of the Supreme Power. The Russian was, in the full sense of the word, the subject of the Tsar, his pawn, to be used and eventually even sacrificed for the good of Russia .

Stalin is the successor to the mantle of the Tsars. He might well be described as a combination of Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, and the supreme Legislator of Rousseau. He is both the autocrat and the teacher, the ruler and the father. The principle and tradition of personal leadership is combined in Stalin's, as the Soviet press would make it ¹ very versatile personality.

The totalitarian character of the Soviet state necessitates not only the complete submersion of the citizen in the activity of the state, but also a visible form of leadership, integrating the entire community in a single pattern. The citizen cannot act independently of the state, but is carried along with it in a tidal wave. The leader provides him not only with the guiding light but also, and this is important from a psychological point of view, with a sense of confidence that the state is right, that it is led by a

1. See footnote 1, p.

"genius" who will always direct it to greater victories and more magnificent successes. The totalitarian conditions of society, as well shown by Italy and Germany, and even by the emergence of leaders, highly publicized, in the democratic political parties, necessitate the appearance of a single, living symbol of infallibility and greatness to provide the citizen with the conviction that his society, and thus he himself, is marching in the right direction. The pattern of totalitarian society is such that its collapse is total collapse, and its defeat is the citizen's defeat.

The Communist Party cannot, because of its own collective non-personal character, and because of the Russian historical tradition, provide either that confidence or that symbol. The Communist Party provided the integrating machinery, but it cannot win affection, it cannot be photographed kissing small children, or wearing a generallissimo's uniform, or delivering an address, or signing orders of the day to the troops. The Soviet society is a monolithic organism, and needs a concretely visible form of leadership. Stalin's personality and background, particularly his non-Russian national origin, make him a suitable symbol for the development and sensory representation of Soviet nationality. His much publicised direction of the Commissariat for Nationalities is employed to emphasize his national impartiality, his essential lack of any great-Russian chauvinistic tendencies.

All small children like to think that their fathers are the strongest, wisest, etc. fathers in the world. In fact, they are convinced of it, for the father is always able to demonstrate to his child his versatile talents and his physical strength, and the impact of the constant association of the child with the father cements that belief into a firm conviction. The child develops a sentiment and a respect for the father, knitting close together his family association and developing in him an attachment to his family and a feeling of unity with it. This, of course, is only one phase in the development of family feeling, but it still is an important phase. The feeling of nationalism is in many ways akin to the emotional family ties, and the role of leadership is not totally unlike that of the father.

The impact of the state on the citizen, as pointed out in Chapter IV, develops in him all the earmarks of a nationalist by stimulating a close sense of identity with the state. That sense of identity is further heightened by the systematic stimulation of emotional attachment to the leader, to the supreme personality of the state. It is, of course, extremely difficult to judge the sincerity of any feelings for Stalin displayed by the masses. They could possibly be similar to those held formerly for the Tsars; loved when alive but not regretted when dead. Be as it may, the development of an over-all Soviet national consciousness is closely related to the conscious policy of associating the personality of the "Vozd" with the entire community.

It is considered by many that the death of Stalin will tend seriously to disunite the Soviet state. This may quite possibly be true, but from a nationalistic point of view, Stalin will remain an asset. The politically immature Soviet community will still be polarized around a symbol which, with its physical expression preserved in a more static position in a mausoleum, will still continue to perform the useful function of national integration. Viewed in that light, the glorification of Stalin becomes more comprehensible and purposeful. Apart from its traditional Russian idolatry, it becomes also a matter of state policy executed with a definite and a fixed end in view. The development of a Soviet "patriotism" (this word being used in the Soviet Union in a very wide sense) is thus not linked merely by coincidence with Stalin's rise to, and exercise of the supreme powers of the Soviet state.

CHAPTER VI

SOVIET "PATRIOTISM"

Nationalism is rejected and combatted in the Soviet Union as a bourgeois manifestation, harmful to the interests of the proletariat. The natural attachment of the individual to his community is, however, tolerated under the guise of a Soviet "patriotism" which is officially encouraged. The Soviet press, books, magazines, radio, school - all glorify the Soviet society and inculcate in the Soviet citizen an ardent devotion to the Soviet way of life. That devotion is defined as "patriotism" and is considered the proper attitude of a good and loyal citizen.

This conception of "patriotic" attachment to the Motherland, and this word is used with increasing frequency, was not prevalent in the first years of the existence of the Soviet state. With the rejection of nationalism (see Chapter I) and the assertion of the final, although not immediate, disappearance of national antagonisms, the Soviet state assumed in its early years the role of an international movement, denying vehemently any purely national motives for its undertakings.

In keeping with this theoretical background, the Soviet state not only proclaimed its intention of transferring the Tsarist "Prison of the Peoples" into a voluntary association of nations, but also emphasized energetically the assumed international character of the Soviet state and its guardianship

1. See Chapter I.

over the interests of the world proletariat. The arrests, for instance, of labour leaders in foreign countries were viewed by the Soviet state in the early twenties as a matter involving its interests, and Soviet protests indicated that the Soviet state considered itself the spokesman of the entire international labour movement. Rykov stated on one occasion in 1927 that the Soviet state considered itself not only responsible to the Soviet people but also to the entire world proletariat.¹ It was likewise in the early years that Russian nationalism was severely attacked and criticised on the same level as Ukrainian chauvinism or anti-Semitism.² Stalin, speaking at the XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party, emphasized the tactical importance of the above, by proclaiming that the future orientation of the East depended on the Soviet ability to solve the national question in keeping with the principles of Marxism.

The tendency towards greater national emphasis, and greater stress on the fostering of a national awareness among the Soviet masses was caused by the necessity for the integral economic development of the Soviet Union, by the Trotsky crisis and hence by the need to emphasize the Stalin thesis as contrasted with that of Trotsky, and by the successful elimination of the internal class opposition and the consequent practical abandonment of purely proletarian superiority.

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1. Harper, op. cit. p. 265, Civil Training in Soviet Russia, Chicago, 1929.
 2. e.g. Bukharin at the 1928 Congress of the Komsomol.

The failure of the "capitalist encirclement " to disappear, the growing Fascist threat, the need for a powerful military striking force, and the realization that only force will accomplish the communist aims meant that the state itself would have to be strengthened. Nationalism, it is recognized, plays an important role in the cementing of a state structure, and consequently it was quite logical and natural to proceed to develop in the Soviet citizen an ardent devotion to his homeland.

A Soviet nationalism (this is a much more suitable word than "patriotism") would tend, it was hoped, by not emphasizing any single national group, to bind together the peoples of the Soviet Union in a common allegiance to their state and would diminish the force of disruptive local antagonisms. It is characteristic that the expression "Soviet people" is used now much more frequently than the former "peoples of the Soviet Union". The recent war, officially called "The Great Patriotic War", has certainly given additional impetus to Soviet efforts to assert their own "patriotism", and to develop their own national consciousness. A greater appreciation of the abstract values of the nation is taking place, and the customary technique of stimulating nationalistic responses are being employed.

"Soviet national pride is based on the understanding of the great and unequalled superiority of Soviet culture, ideology, science and morals." - 1

The Soviet propaganda machine is now working overtime to develop in the Soviet citizen a firm belief in the unsurpassed qualities of all the features of his state. The Soviet citizen is told daily that the material conditions of his existence are far superior to those of his counterpart in the West; that they are furthermore, improving much more rapidly than anywhere in the world; that starvation is prevalent not only in Europe but also in the United States; he is also told that the USSR is the sole defender of peace and democracy; that the eyes of the freedom-loving peoples of the world are turned on the Soviet state and its leader, Stalin; that Western warmongers are planning and plotting an aggressive war against the hard-working and peace-loving Soviet people; that the U.S. is making preparations to atom-bomb the USSR urban centres, etc., ad infinitum.

The Soviet people, "the most revolutionary and heroic people in the world."² are urged to demonstrate their patriotism by strengthening their state against potential aggression.

"The great patriotic feelings of millions of Soviet people are

1. Bolshevik, Moscow, No. 18, 1947.

2. Ibid, March 15, 1949.

embodied in real deeds and in the succession of labor feats dedicated to the glory of the socialist motherland." ¹ At the same time, extreme emphasis is laid on the international prestige of the USSR as a prominent and leading world power; the touchiness of the Soviet leaders on that point is well illustrated by Molotov's demonstrative exit from the official reviewing stand during a Paris military parade because he considered the place allocated to him as inferior to that given to the Foreign Ministers of some other powers.

An extensive progress in the development of national symbolism has taken place in the Soviet Union. An old-time Bolshevik would most certainly be shocked beyond words to see a Soviet dignitary, dressed in a resplendent uniform with gold epaulettes and buttons, at a diplomatic reception, representing the proletarian state. The Soviet Civil Service has reintroduced not only the old titles, ranks, but also the insignia and uniforms. The Soviet diplomat abroad wears a uniform, not entirely unlike the one Ribbentrop and his colleagues in the Foreign Ministry on Wilhelmstrasse of the late Third Reich, used to display at one stage in their somewhat short-lived careers. Special titles go also to individuals outside the government service, as for instance, the title of a "Peoples' Artist", "hero of socialist labour" etc.

1. Pravda, Feb. 7, 1950.

Symbolism is further employed to stimulate mass participation; mass parades of the army on special holidays remind the people of the might of the Soviet state. Numerous war-memorials recall to the Soviet people its military prowess and the need to remain prepared to fight again. Slogans, banners, the new national anthems, and even state funerals - all serve the cause of Soviet nationalism.

These patriotic rituals are supported and emphasized by the constant nationalistic campaign maintained by the press. The Soviet achievements are constantly glorified; foreign undertaking disparaged. A particular feature of the Soviet nationalistic campaign is the assertion that the USSR alone defeated the German aggression, and carried the entire burden of the recent war on its shoulders. The following quotations from the Soviet press is one of the less extreme and demagogic ones, but as it carries the signature of one of the most important Soviet military leaders, it is more authoritative from the point of view of the Soviet public than the more provocative ones which appear much more frequently: "The Anglo-American troops landing on the European continent encountered trifling resistance from the Hitlerite army, since the chief German forces were concentrated on the Soviet-German front." The fourth celebration of the conclusion of hostilities was part-

1. Pravda, May 9, 1949, from an article by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Sokolovsky. 1:19-25

icularly marked by such attitude. At the same time, it gave the Soviet press an added opportunity to stress its nationalistic campaign, and the following headlines were in evidence in the most important Soviet papers: "National Demonstration of Soviet Patriotism"¹, "Vivid Demonstration of Soviet Patriotism"², "The Celebration of the Greatness and Glory of our Motherland"³, etc.

This role of the Soviet press is highly significant, as it still remains the basic medium of propaganda in the Soviet Union. Its machinery is highly centralized, with the main load being carried by Pravda and Izvestia, copies of which are circulated throughout the Soviet Union. The extent to which the Soviet press is prepared to go in its campaign against potential foreign aggression which naturally, as a reaction, tends to cause greater national integration, was shown recently by a news-item reporting that the German Admiral Friedeburg is organizing a German Navy for the West, forgetting entirely the fact that the above admiral committed suicide in 1945.⁴

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1. Pravda, May 6, 1949. 1:19-22
 2. Izvestia, May 6, 1949. 1:19-22
 3. Izvestia, May 9, 1949. 1:19-27
 4. Izvestia, May 1, 1950. 2:18-55

The work of the press is supplemented by radio and the cinema. The radio has recently given much greater emphasis to programmes stressing the history, achievements, and endeavours not only of the Soviet Union but even of Tsarist Russia and is making a constant appeal to the citizen's patriotism and national sense. The Soviet motion film industry, non-existent in 1920, has developed rapidly; to-day almost all the films shown are Soviet productions. The duty of Soviet films is to "encourage bravery, resourcefulness, boldness, love and boundless devotion to the Motherland."¹

The educational policy has been amended to adjust itself to the new trend. The older economic determinism has given way to the discovery that all science is influenced by history, by the national form, by the cultural milieu. "From the foregoing one cannot fail to see the tremendous significance which questions of national priority have in the history of science."² Accordingly, a new emphasis on the national past is given in education,³

1. Literaturnaya gazeta, no. 99, Dec. 11, 1948, p. 3. 1:1
2. Voprosy filozofii, no. 2, 1948. 1:1
3. An interesting comparison on the Soviet attitude to the role of education can be drawn from the following two statements:
"The aim of all workers in the sphere of public education will be to instill into the growing generation socialistic ideas and thereby to increase the ranks of those who are fighting for the establishment of the socialistic state. The aim is, so to speak, the indoctrination of the youth in the proletarian philosophy" - A.P. Pinkevitch, president of the 2nd State University of Moscow, 1929.
"The chief moral and political aim of the school is the training of the pupils in the spirit of Patriotism" - V.P. Potemkin, RSFSR Commissar of Education, 1943.
Communism in Action, p. 113. House Document, 1946, no. 754.

Soviet "patriotism" is developed "scientifically" through the process of education, and the child from its very first day of class is brought into contact with the national past. His education, for instance, emphasizes "the great role played by Russian and Soviet scientists in the development of advanced science and the struggle against bourgeois anti-scientific "theories". This inculcates in the pupils a feeling of national pride and Soviet patriotism.¹ In the first grade a young Pioneer is given for his readings, among others, an anthology of Russian Folk Tales; in the second grade - Russian Tales and Tolstoy's "Russian Folk Tales"; in the third - "Tales of Soviet People", "Borodino", "Stories about Lenin", "Army Post Office"; in the fourth - "Children of the Underground", "Volodya Ulyanov", "The Brave Partisan"; in the fifth - Russian folk songs, proverbs, sayings, "A Soldier of the Guard"; in the sixth - "I serve the Fatherland - Stories of a Pilot", "Alexander Suvorov", "We Soviet People"; in the seventh - "The defense of Stalingrad",² "On the map of the Fatherland", etc.

History must be viewed and studied from the point of view of "raison d'etat", for "an impermissible spirit of political indifference, impartiality and academic neutrality results in the distortion of historical truth".³ "Objectivism and the impartial assembling of economic facts is inadmissible."⁴

1. Uchitelskaya gazeta, April 26, 1950.
2. Pravda, May 13, 1949.
3. Kultura i zhizn, August 29, 1947.
4. Bolshevik, no. 13, 1947.

1:20-10

Those educators and historians who fail to heed the above are severely criticized and called to task for "distorting" history. A Soviet history text-book, for instance, was harshly condemned because, when writing on the 1st World War and "describing the victories of the Entente and American armies, the author does not indicate by a single word that it was actually the existence of Soviet Russia - a revolutionary rear - and the struggle of the Soviet peoples against the German occupation that largely prevented Germany from defeating the Entente".¹ The nationalistic tendencies in education are best summed up by the following passage:

"The most important task of Party organizations is to foster Soviet patriotism - boundless love for the Soviet socialist Motherland and hatred of her foes. To educate people who have a deep love for their Soviet motherland, for her social and state regime, her culture, the national traditions of her people, to educate people capable of rejoicing at the great historical creative task of their compatriots and to live with the feeling of Soviet national pride - this means to educate real patriots, active builders of Communism." -2³

Soviet nationalism has penetrated into the cultural activities of Soviet society and is moulding it to its own regimented pattern.³ Soviet cultural activities most actively glorify the Soviet motherland and must serve as uniting force

1. Voprosy istorii, Aug. 1949. 1:47-8
2. Bolshevik, no. 4, Feb. 28, 1949. 1:15-9
3. "Under the conditions of Soviet life, this culture, though national in form, becomes socialist in content. It is this fact which united and transforms the various national cultures into a single, uniform, Soviet socialist culture."
Soviet Culture, Moscow, 1943, p. 4.

for all the national groupings within the Soviet Union. Hence the Soviet composers are forced to reject abstract themes and forms, and are directed to produce concrete and ideological works representing the actual Soviet reality. The Reforestation programme has thus given rise to Shostakovitch's "Song of the Forests", while the campaign of national glorification has inspired Ye. Zhukovsky to compose "Hail, my Native Land" and G. Popov - "Glory to the Fatherland". Prokofiev, unfortunately, failed to respond in a properly patriotic manner to the tasks set before him and was criticised because "the spiritual world of the Soviet man who performs miracles of courage and heroism for love of the Motherland"¹ is ignored in his work. Playwright V. Vishnevsky, however, realized his patriotic shortcomings and issued the following statement to the Soviet press, which illustrates the conditions under which Soviet creative geniuses operate:

"For four years I edited the journal "Znamya" and authorized the publication of articles by Borshchagovsky, Altman, Danin and other cosmopolitans. I regret that I did not perceive their methods, particularly since for two decades they have attacked my plays. And since I committed these errors, this means that I had elements of liberalism and near-sightedness, and I speak about this bluntly. I regret that I committed this error." - ²

The Soviet press carries frequent appeals to Soviet artists not to forget their specific mission; A. Gerasimov,

1. Pravda, Jan. 4, 1949, p. 3.
2. Pravda, Feb. 26, 1941

1:1
1:8-61

President of the Academy of Arts of the USSR, wrote, for instance, in an article, entitled "For Soviet Patriotism in Art", that "the Party calls upon Soviet artists to study life carefully and to reproduce on canvas and in sculpture the images of Soviet patriots, in such a way that all their spiritual majesty and noble moral character is unfolded before the spectator"¹. Soviet sport writers have been criticised for alleging on one occasion that Soviet athletes do not at all times compete in and think only of the Motherland. Applied art is used almost exclusively for national propaganda. Embroidery picturing Soviet Army men, paintings representing sessions of the Supreme Soviet, portraits of the great Soviet leaders, are everywhere available. In brief, "Soviet culture is filled with an awareness of its superiority."²

As a natural corollary to the above, an intense campaign of disparagement and depreciation is conducted against Western influence and achievements. It manifests itself in all ways, from the most significant to the most trifling. The Soviet humour magazines, Krokodil, for instance, carried an article, quite delightfully written, against foreign names for dishes at Soviet restaurants. Another Soviet publication attacks American films which, according to it, have only one theme:

"A young man meets a girl who has a manic-depressive psychosis; the girl's father is a sadist, her mother is

1. Pravda, Feb. 10, 1949.
2. Ibid, April 11, 1949.

1:6-71
1:15-25

subject to catalepsy. The young man is a psychiatrist. He loves the girl and uses insulin shock therapy to cure her, but she has been suffering from a guilt-complex and tries to kill him - finally the man marries the girl."-1

The same publication satirizes those Soviet technicians who dare to suggest that some industrial processes abroad may be superior to those utilized in the Soviet Union.² A new Soviet film, "The Court of Honour", attacks the concept of scientific cooperation with the West, and portrays an imaginary Soviet scientist, who exchanged some information with the West, as a traitor to the Motherland. A more drastic expression of this attitude is found in the Soviet campaign to limit, through legal obstacles, all contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners.³ Soviet citizens are prohibited from divulging even the most harmless information, and any contacts with foreigners must be channelled through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or of Foreign Trade.⁴ Foreigners are described as spies and depraved black-marketeers plotting against the Soviet Union.⁵

1. Novy mir, no. 12, Dec. 1948. 1:4
2. Ibid, Dec. 12, 1948. 1:5
3. State Secrets Act, June 1947 and the supplementary decree of December, 1947.
4. See "Cultural Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union", U.S. Department of State, April 1949.
5. e.g. the revelations of Annabelle Bucar, a former employee of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who resigned her post. Among other things, the U.S. Ambassador is accused of low moral standards, black-market operations, etc.

The formerly frequent and frightening accusation of being a "counter-revolutionary" has been replaced by the sinister description of a "cosmopolitan anti-patriot". "Cosmopolitanism is a reactionary ideology preaching renunciation of national traditions, disdain for the distinguishing features in the national development of each people, and renunciation of the feelings of national dignity and national pride. Cosmopolitanism preaches a nihilistic attitude of the individual toward his nationality - toward its past, present and future... The ideology of cosmopolitanism is hostile to, and radically contradicts, Soviet patriotism - the basic feature of which characterizes the world outlook of Soviet man." ¹ The Soviet scholar is called upon to search within the Soviet state for his guidance and inspiration; those who fall under foreign influence must either amend their ways or give place to those capable of appreciating the inexhaustible fountain of Soviet learning.

"Not all Soviet scholars have shaken off the disease of servility and deference to things foreign" ² but some, fortunately, have realized their mistakes and are prepared to readjust themselves to the requirements of Soviet nationalism. "...I wish to protest most strongly against the dark hints of the war instigators to the effect that I am a man 'of western orientation' ". Today, in the present historical circumstances,

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1. Voprosy filosofii, no. 2, 1948. 1:1-3
 2. From a speech by the USSR Minister of Higher Education Kultura i zhizn, March 22, 1949. 1:13-55

that would mean being a counter-revolutionary, an anti-soviet traitor to the working class...."¹

Soviet nationalism, - for the above are certainly expressions of rampant nationalism, asserts most emphatically the sovereign rights of the Soviet state. The conception of a world government is viewed by the Soviets as a direct threat against the USSR² and as an attempt to deprive it of its independent existence. The spurring on of a vigorous feeling of nationalism is bound, if effectively achieved, to strengthen the internal position of the USSR and to cement its state structure. For ideological reasons, however, it is impossible to admit nationalism into Soviet life, and the word "patriotism" becomes a most suitable substitute.

Marxism, which came to Russia from the West, is now shutting its gates to the West. This fear of Western influence is quite understandable, when regarded from the point of view of the Soviet leaders. They are quite aware that it was exactly that Western influence which contributed to the fall of the Tsarist regime and to the growth of independent thought within the confines of the Tsarist Empire. This danger was further emphasized by the return of millions of Soviet servicemen, with tales of the superiority of the Western way of life. The Soviet totalitarian society cannot afford such

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1. From a recantation by E. Varga, an economist, Pravda, March 15, 1949. 1:10-45
 2. Zdanov, op. cit., Voprosy filosofii, no. 2, 1948. 1:1-3

situations to develop; coercion, ridicule, and contempt are, therefore, employed against all manifestations of Western influence.

Soviet "patriotism" is not a mere attachment to local areas or territory (see Introduction). It is a political consciousness, an awareness of one's assumed superiority and distinctiveness. It is nationalism, and shows itself in a violent assertion of its own national excellence and in the conviction of the inferiority of other national communities. The Soviet state thus assumes a position not of equality with other nations, but claims for itself the first and leading place.

CHAPTER VII

EXTERNAL MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVIET NATIONALISM, I.

The attitude taken by the Soviet Union towards the Western nations could possibly be explained, by stretching facts and slightly distorting reality, as an attitude of self-defence against "capitalist encirclement" and potential war, and not as a manifestation of nationalism in Soviet foreign relations. It is, therefore, more just to the Soviet Union to examine its relations with the states surrounding it, which are already "enjoying" the blessings of regimes friendly to, and supported by the USSR. The Soviet Union finds itself in a relationship not only with friendly governments but actually with entire national communities which are being patterned on the example set by the USSR. The Soviet Union finds itself surrounded by proletarian states controlled by the "proletariat", and consequently a "brotherhood of workers" of all the states and of the Soviet Union could be expected.

As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Soviet Union considered itself the spokesman of the entire world proletariat. Being the only proletarian state in the world, it felt its duty to be the defense of the interests of the working class against capitalist exploitation. The workers of the capitalist world "have no country"; their obvious ally was only the Soviet Union and its representatives. It was on

that theoretical basis that the Communist Parties throughout the world considered it proper to submit to Moscow's direction through the Komintern, and to consider Soviet interests as their own interests. "The internationalist is he who without reservation, without wavering, without stipulations, is ready to defend the USSR"¹. It was felt, and rightly so, that the Communist Parties could only achieve their aims through co-operation with the Soviet Union, which was the only force in the world willing and capable of giving them help. The Soviet Union, therefore, assumed quite openly the role of leadership in the world struggle for communism. From a theoretical point of view, again, this did not violate the principles of Marxism; theoretically, the Soviet Union was helping the world proletariat achieve its own salvation. Tactical expediency necessitated central direction; that direction was supplied by the only self-sufficient proletarian organism in the world.

As the sphere of influence of the communist society expanded, so would the proletarian society. The Communist Parties in the world would find a growing basis of support, moral and material, and the Soviet Union would cease to be the only proletarian community in the world. In keeping with the principles of Marxism, the Soviet Union would then no longer be the only source of inspiration and direction for the

1. This remark by Stalin was repeated last year in May (1949) in Bucharest by Marshal Voroshilov to a Rumanian mass-meeting; doubtlessly, the point was well taken...

Communist Parties throughout the world; these Communist Parties would now rely on the entire proletarian community for support. Within that proletarian community, national equality would prevail, mutual cooperation would reign, and general international amity would characterize these new socialist states. National antagonisms would proceed to fade away, and each nation would enjoy the same rights and privileges.

The successful establishment, facilitated by the Teheran and Yalta agreements, of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, and the recent victory of Mao-Tse-Tung in China, have led to the setting up on a Marxist pattern of a number of state structures, which have been officially designated as "People's Democracies". The Communist Parties in these states have assumed the role of a leadership elite and are now in the process of communizing these hitherto "capitalist" communities. It should, therefore, be expected that these Communist Parties would now proceed to operate on a basis of equality with the VKP/b as they have already successfully overthrown "bourgeois capitalism".

This, however, conflicts with the leadership role of the Soviet Union and with the ambitions of Soviet nationalism. But a denial of equality could lead to a conflict between theory and practice and this no Marxist could possibly allow. Such a conflict is inadmissible from the point of Marxist theory, and dialectic is immediately employed to resolve any such difficulties.

The method used is highly ingenious and solves the problem without denying the basic national and economic equality of these new communities. The concept of a "People's Democracy" is merely redefined to mean a society in which "there have arisen new, higher forms of democracy as compared with the old, bourgeois-parliamentarian democracy. These countries have so developed and expanded democracy as to give the workers and peasants a significant part in the state administration, and make the benefits of democracy accessible to the broadest masses. Thus, new forms of state polity have been created which are a big step forward in comparison with the bourgeois-democratic states, and which offer possibilities for further progress by these countries in the economic and political fields."¹ The "People's Democracies" are thus said to be moving "a big step forward" to socialism, but, as they have not yet achieved it, the leadership of the USSR can still be maintained. It is noteworthy, however, that the Soviet Union has never been said officially to have passed through such an intermediary stage. "Soviet theoreticians permitted the Soviet Union a period of 20 years for the building of Socialism without denying it the character of a Socialist State."²

1. Bolshevik, no. 6, 1947.

See "On People's Democracy in Yugoslavia, E. Kardelj, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, chapter I, Belgrade, 1949.

2. E. Kardelj, On People's Democracy in Yugoslavia, 1949, Belgrade, p. 18.

"The Stalinist principle of equal rights for large and small nations, the principle of fraternal cooperation, is the basis of all the treaties and agreements concluded by the Soviet Union with the countries gravitating toward socialism." -12

The Soviet government has, since the cessation of hostilities against Germany, concluded a series of treaties and conventions with the countries under its political tutelage. These agreements range from military alliances, through economic and commercial treaties, to declarations of mutual fondness and eternal friendship. The entire so-called Soviet Bloc is tied together by that series of pacts, usually made for a long duration. The quotation preceding this paragraph makes one important point, which emphasizes again the theoretical distinction between the Soviet Union and the "People's Democracies". It speaks of agreements between the Soviet Union with states "gravitating toward socialism". It is thus again pointed out that the USSR remains the only truly socialist state in the world and by necessity performs the leadership function in the struggle for socialism.

The countries of this so-called Soviet Bloc are placed under political tutelage. The Soviet Union, and particularly the VKP/b (as will be seen in the next chapter), claims for itself the role of the supreme interpreter of Marxism and considers it necessary to give the "People's Democracies" advice and direction on their way to socialism. Soviet experts are,

therefore, frequently placed in strategic positions in the "People's Democracies", Soviet technicians perform a supervisory role in the industrial development of these countries, and the political leaders of the "People's Democracies" are expected to consult Moscow on their policy decisions. The appointment of Marshal K. Rokossovsky to the post of the Defence Minister in the Soviet Polish government is merely the outstanding example of the political tutelage the "People's Democracies" are undergoing.

This state of affairs gives the Soviet Union an absolutely unilateral right of supervision over the process of Marxist development in the "People's Democracies". This supervision is extremely marked in the field of history, and there the presence of purely Russian nationalism is manifest. Two examples might serve to illustrate this point: recent Polish history test-books are attacked for suggesting that the Poles played the leading role in the Battle of Grunwald, and that the Russian detachments fled...; ¹ a Czech History of Czech Literature is criticized as a "shameful, unscholarly work" for failing to note that "Czech literature developed under the beneficial influence of progressive Russian literature."²

Soviet nationalism refuses to tolerate local nationalisms since they would inherently resist such political tutelage.

1. Voprosy istorii, April, 1949.
2. Slavyanye, Nov. 1949.

1:38-15
2:1-29

Nationalism in the "People's Democracies" is therefore combated. The Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, for instance, condemns nationalism because it "is manifested in hostility toward the Soviet Union, in belittling its successes, in non-recognition and denial of the world-wide historical significance of the October Socialist Revolution.... Nationalism is high treason... We must strengthen, broaden and safeguard Bulgarian-Soviet friendship as the apple of our eye and educate the Party in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which in our time finds its most vivid expression in devotion to the Soviet Union, its Communist Party and Comrade Stalin." Special agitation is conducted against the last remaining open vestiges of nationalism. Elements of a rather undesirable type are pushed to the front and given extreme powers to speed up the process of political education of these lands. That such tendencies often tend to weaken the Communist Parties is well shown by the criticism in the Soviet press of the Party organization in Latvia (a Soviet Republic) where eleven out of every twenty-five district Soviet executive chairmen have no secondary education; eight have a secondary education; three have an incomplete secondary education; and only three have a higher education.

1. Vulko Chervenkov, as in Izvestia & Pravda, Feb. 12, 1950
2:8-22
2. Izvestia, Aug. 9, 1949. 1:33-56

Soviet nationalism demands from the "People's Democracies" not only obedience to its political direction but also humility, subservience and affection. The Soviet Union is to be portrayed as an elder brother, a guardian, and a teacher. A Hungarian film, "A Woman goes Abroad", is praised by the Soviet press for the following idyllic scene: "The war is over. A cart rumbles along the road. A woman leads the horse, while a little boy sits atop the household goods loaded on the cart. Another little boy follows behind. A sudden jolt and the wheel breaks loose. What will happen? Will they have to spend the night in the open? Who will help them? Then, from afar, they hear a Russian marching song. Confidently, one of the little boys addresses the Russian officer: 'Uncle Russian, help us please'. With this moving truthful and symbolic scene the film opens"¹. Months of Soviet culture are organized with great pomp in all the "People's Democracies". Marxist museums become symbols of friendship with the Soviet Union.² Stalin is idolized everywhere; his birthday was a special holiday in all the "People's Dem-

1. Pravda, April 28, 1950. 2:18-57
2. "The Lenin Museum in Cracow will be a centre from which Marxist-Leninist ideology will radiate all over Poland. It will be a symbol of the eternal friendship of the Polish nation with the nations of the Soviet Union, of the people's Poland with the motherland of Socialism - Soviet Russia" - Trybuna Ludu, Apr. 21, 1950.

ocracies." ¹ Expressions of great sentiment for the Soviet Union are prominently featured in the press, on the radio, etc. Such atmosphere recently stimulated the President of the Czechoslovak Union of Writers to write an article in Pravda, entitled "I love the Soviet Union." ²

The "People's Democracies" are expected to launch intensive drives to acquaint their population with the official language of the USSR - Russian. In Czechoslovakia, following the liberation of the country, the study of Russian became compulsory in the public, secondary, and special schools as well as in gymnasia. ³ "The press reports the immense popularity of the recently-organized people's courses in the Russian language. The courses...are attended by more than 800,000 working people... A special text-book for the people's course, "The Russian language is the International language of Peace and Progress", has been published..." ⁴ The same compulsory learning of Russian has been adopted in Polish

1. e.g., "On Dec. 15th already enthusiastic work is going on in hundreds of factories and plants throughout the country. Everywhere they are getting ready for the Stalin Shift. In this festive spirit, the working people are undertaking additional pledges, they are offering more and better work, higher records than ever before, in order to make the 70th anniversary of Generalissimo Stalin's birth unforgettable with their attainments." Hungarian Bulletin, Budapest, no. 66 1949, p. 21
2. Pravda, Dec. 5, 1949. 1:50-33
3. Slavyanve, August, 1949 1:38-29
4. Pravda, Nov. 13, 1949. 1:47-33

schools. Some 5,000 courses in Russian have been organized in Poland, with an enrollment of some 100,000. Furthermore, some 10,000 courses for the "mass reading of the Soviet press" are being planned during 1950.¹ Already some 340,000 copies of Soviet newspapers are being circulated in Poland.² This emphasis on the learning of Russian has not been forgotten in China. An All-China Sino-Soviet Friendship Society has been set up, and courses in the Russian language have been organized in Peking and in Shanghai, where a Soviet bookshop has recently been established.³

The cultural primacy of the USSR in the "People's Democracies" has been accompanied by steady economic exploitation. In the Balkan countries, joint stock enterprises are operating (in Rumania, for instance, in petroleum, transportation, and steel), the character of which is best analyzed by this Yugoslav statement:

"In 1946, the Yugoslav Government and the USSR Government had signed agreements by which two companies had been formed, a shipping company and an air transport company. A much larger number of such companies had been formed in other People's Democracies. But Yugoslavia realized that the activities of such companies would be prejudicial to Yugoslav economy and had not wished to increase their number, in spite of the insistence of the USSR Government."⁴

The trade of the "People's Democracies" is being channelled

1. Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw, March 25, 1950.

2. Ibid, May 5, 1950.

3. Pravda, April 19, 1950.

4. Provisional Summary Record, 2nd Committee, UNO, Oct. 7, 1949

in unprecedented proportions into the Soviet Union. This process bears a striking resemblance to the internal Soviet policy of denying to the Union Republic total economic self-sufficiency within the borders of individual Union Republics. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is functioning under the influence and direction of Mikoyan, the USSR Minister for Foreign Trade, and the process of economic integration is proceeding.

Soviet nationalism indicates throughout its relations with the "People's Democracies" a feeling of superiority and a desire to exploit its preponderant position for its own material gain. Soviet nationalism denies the principles of national equality and replaces them with the unequivocal national supremacy of the Soviet state. The theoretical and dialectical machinations, aimed at supplying a Marxist basis for Soviet supremacy, only indicate the reality of that supremacy.

Soviet nationalism becomes mixed with traditional Russian foreign policy in relation to Eastern Europe, and both develop a strikingly dogmatic variety of chauvinism which threatens the very national existence of "friendly" communities. Soviet nationalism reaches a high pitch of intolerance, not by directly disparaging local national feelings but by asserting its own nationalism to such an extent that local national feeling retains no scope of expression.

"The belittling of the histories of other nations and the achievements of other nations, of various scientific achievements, the non-Marxist glorification of the whole of the pre-revolutionary Russian history and so forth; the distortion of contemporary history of other nations, the belittling of the revolutionary force and conscience of the international proletariat, and the negation of its ability to understand correctly in each country separately the science of Marxism-Leninism and to apply it in the specific conditions of its own country - these are a few of the revisionist deviations which you can find in the daily Soviet Press. It is most wrong to judge loyalty to the science of Marxism-Leninism by blind submission to the Great State conception of the All-Union Communist Party leaders." -1

Soviet nationalism, especially through its relations with the "People's Democracies", contradicts the Marxist approach to the national question. By claiming political leadership, cultural direction, and economic priority, Soviet nationalism ranks itself with the typical "bourgeois" nationalism it so severely condemns. Lenin's Imperialism - the highest stage of Capitalism finds an unexpected answer in this external manifestation of Soviet nationalism.

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1. Tito, as interviewed in the Yugoslav Fortnightly, Belgrade, January 13th, 1950.

CHAPTER VIII

EXTERNAL MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVIET NATIONALISM, II.

"The Soviet Union has no other interests in Yugoslavia but to live on the very best terms with our country and to give it all the help it can to rebuild and develop the country." - 1

- Tito, June 10, 1945.

"All the Cominform noise against Yugoslavia, and particularly on the part of the USSR, about the alleged straying of our country into the capitalist camp, into capitalism, is an ordinary disguise for the non-Socialist aims of the Great State ambitions of the USSR leaders, at the expense of the small nations." -2

- Tito, Jan., 1950.

The undisputed sway of Soviet power over Eastern Europe received a sudden jolt by the refusal of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership to submit to undisputed Moscow direction. This refusal placed the leadership of the Soviet state face to face with the problem of defining its attitude toward states which claim to pursue the same aims as the Soviet Union but which deny its primacy. The stand taken by the USSR is too well known to be recounted in detail; some aspects of it, however, bear examination in so far as they are indicative of the influence that nationalistic factors have on Soviet policies.

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1. "The Correspondence between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)" (VKP-b), Belgrade, 1949, p. 5
 2. Yugoslav Fortnightly, Jan. 13, 1950, Belgrade.

It is interesting to note that as early as June the 5th, 1945, the Soviet Government in an official note denounced Tito and Kardelj for alleged indications of their anti-Soviet attitude and warned them of the consequences that might follow should they persist. The Yugoslav leaders made immediate amends and the matter was closed temporarily, but not entirely forgotten. The Soviet Government was particularly irked by a Yugoslav request for increased discipline among Soviet troops in Belgrade immediately after the liberation. Soviet nationalist feelings were aroused by this slur on the dignity of the Soviet Army, and when the rift with Tito came out into the open, this became immediately one of the points raised against the Yugoslav leadership as additional proof of their alleged anti-Soviet attitude.

The expulsion of the Tito regime from the Cominform, and the failure of the Tito government in Yugoslavia to collapse in consequence, created a serious obstacle to undisputed Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe. The purge of Rajk, Kostov, and Gomulka indicated group dissatisfaction among even the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe with the dominant position held by the VKP/b, and the need for a more precise definition of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the "People's Democracies."

The Yugoslav stand, which Soviet nationalism had to challenge if it was to retain its special position, was based

on the Marxist denial of inequality between nations which have achieved socialism. The Yugoslavs find support for their interpretation in the early Soviet writings, particularly in Stalin's, which stressed specific national conditions in the application of Marxism. The Yugoslavs felt, first of all, that they, like the Soviets, had achieved the social revolution by their own efforts (this is denied by the Soviet side, which maintains that Yugoslavia was liberated through the efforts of the Soviet Army), and, therefore, that there was no need for political tutelage and submission to the USSR. The Yugoslavs felt that equality of the "People's Democracies" with the Soviet Union was the necessary feature of the Eastern Bloc, and that the Soviet insistence on USSR leadership was a nationalist deviation.

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1. "It is flagrant revisionism when the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) try to impose upon the international working-class movement the view that decisions and judgement passed by the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), even concerning other parties, are infallible. Furthermore, according to views expressed in the Soviet Communist Party letters to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, it would appear that a revolutionary transformation is impossible without the assistance of the Red Army. In other words, the ability of the progressive movements of other countries to win for themselves a better social order with their own forces is denied, the faith of the proletariat in its own revolutionary forces is killed and non-Marxist views are imposed in its stead...."

Tito, Jan., 1950.

Yugoslav Fortnightly, Jan. 13, 1950.

The Soviet Union attacked the Yugoslav position as a demonstration of "bourgeois nationalism" and a betrayal of socialism. The Soviet Union, through the absolute identification of socialism with the Soviet Union, demonstrated the acuteness of its nationalism by the violence of its innuendoes against the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership. The workers of the world were told that their main duty was to "defend and support unconditionally the VKP/b and the USSR"¹ and that "the real cause of the deterioration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia is the hostile policy of the Yugoslav government towards the Soviet Union... The Yugoslav government has forfeited the right to expect a friendly attitude from the Soviet government inasmuch as the Yugoslav government is engaging in activities hostile to the Soviet Union since it has established in Yugoslavia an anti-communist and anti-democratic terrorist regime."² The Soviet Union again stressed its interpretation of the position of the "People's Democracies" in the Marxist community and claimed for itself the leadership role.

Until the open break, the USSR enjoyed a privileged position in Yugoslavia, and the commercial relations

1. Pravda, June 12, 1949.

2. Soviet note to the Yugoslav government, May 31, 1949.

between these two states were certainly not unfavorable to the USSR. In 1948, for instance, some 72% of Yugoslav blister copper, 72% of mercury, 100% of iron, 97% of raw zinc, etc. went to the USSR and the "People's Democracies." In the joint stock shipping company¹ in which the USSR invested only about 10% of its required share, "the director appointed by the USSR Government had directed the activities of the company in a manner which had served primarily the interests of the USSR economy."² Similar tendencies manifested themselves in the cultural field. While no Yugoslav films at all were shown in the USSR, some 557 Soviet films were shown in Yugoslavia.³ Works by Soviet authors represented about 75% of the total translation into Yugoslav (279 were translated in 6 months of 1948) while only 3 Yugoslav works were translated into Russian.⁴

With the dissolution of Soviet-Yugoslav friendship, the Soviet government and its satellites proceeded to isolate Yugoslavia, both politically and economically. The Friendship Treaty of April 11, 1945, was declared by the USSR as null and void; the satellites likewise denounced their treaties and agreements with Yugoslavia. Virulent attacks on Yugoslavia as an enemy, as "bourgeois nationalist", and as an ally of the "monarcho-fascists" began to appear in the entire Communist press. Anti-Tito Yugoslav papers were published and are published in Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Bucarest, and Warsaw.

1. See p.
2. Provisional Summary Record, UNO, 2nd Committee, Oct.7, 1949.
3. Political Report, Marshal Tito, Apr. 9, 1949, Belgrade, p.15.
4. Ibid, p. 18.

The Yugoslav government was accused of imprisoning Soviet citizens, of instituting a police regime, and of conducting a terror campaign against supporters of the Cominform resolution. While condemning the Yugoslav government, the Soviet press, however, never failed to point out the great love the Yugoslav people, as distinct from its leadership, are alleged to have for the Soviet Union. Signs "Long, live the Soviet Union, Bulwark of Peace and Democracy" are supposed to appear daily on Yugoslav mines and factories.¹

The Yugoslav leaders are accused of fostering acute nationalism within Party ranks and of conducting a vituperative campaign against the USSR. "A clique of Yugoslav social-nationalists have broken away from the mighty anti-imperialist front of socialism, from the international family of Communists. They have forsaken the principles of Marxism-Leninism, betrayed the banner of internationalism and disgraced the Yugoslav people's feelings of love and attachment to the USSR... There is no doubt that the Y.C.P. and the working class will be able to get rid of this treacherous clique."² Soviet national pride seemed particularly hurt because the Yugoslavs in Macedonia were reported to be changing Russian sounding names to more typical Yugoslav endings ("ow" changed to "ski").³

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1. Pravda, Jan. 27, 1950. 2:5-26
 2. Voprosy ekonomiki, Jan., 1949. 1:18-7
 3. Izvestia, Dec. 3, 1949. 1:50-32

The special position that Soviet nationalism arrogates to itself is well shown by the correspondence between the Central Committee of the VKP/b and the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee just prior to the Cominform resolution. The Yugoslav Communist Party is accused of not accepting the "fraternal" criticisms of the Central Committee of the VKP/b and of regarding them as an invasion of their sovereignty, thus indicating a nationalist-deviation. The Yugoslav leaders were further accused of criticizing the Soviet Union.

In its letter of Mar. 27th, 1948, the Central Committee of the VKP/b attacks the Yugoslav political leaders for circulating statements that "in the USSR there prevails a Great Power chauvinism", that "the USSR tends to conquer Jugoslavia economically", and that "socialism in the USSR has ceased to be revolutionary."¹ In their letter of May 4th, 1948, the Central Committee of the VKP/b attacks the Yugoslav government for considering the USSR ambassador "as being on the same scale as any of the bourgeois ambassadors, as being the same as any of the common officials of a bourgeois state."² The letter goes on to ask whether the Yugoslav leadership fails to grasp "that such a relationship with the Soviet Ambassador means the same as the denial of friendly relations between the USSR

1. "The Correspondence between the Central Committee of the C.P. of Jugoslavia and the Central Committee of the VKP/b" (A-U C.P.-b in English), Belgrade, 1949, p. 25.
2. Ibid, p. 45.

and Yugoslavia." ¹ In the same letter the Yugoslav leadership is attacked for conducting "the same policy towards the Soviet Union as it is conducting towards the imperialist States, towards Great Britain and the U.S.A." ¹ In their final letter, the Central Committee of the VKP/b, dated May 22nd, 1948, the following statement is to be found: "the Politburo of the Central Committee of the C.P.J. and notably Comrade Tito should know that by their anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy which they have been applying in recent times in daily practice, they have done everything to undermine all confidence that the Communist Party and the Government of the USSR had placed in them". ²

Soviet nationalism indicates a striking lack of tolerance in dealings with communities which wish to emphasize their own national statehood. Soviet nationalism demands, in the name of socialism, total submission to Soviet directives, and insists on the primacy of the USSR in the economic, political, and cultural relations with the "People's Democracies". The Yugoslav case demonstrated the extent of the superiority complex which Soviet nationalism is developing, and the campaign of vilification, ³ against the Yugoslav Communist leadership

1. Ibid, p. 46.
2. Ibid, p. 68.
3. Yugoslavia is now portrayed as the country with most Quislings, where the resistance was carried on by German (?) partisans. - Borba, Oct. 2, 1948, op. cit. from Soviet press.

shows that the Soviet Union does not desire equality in the struggle for socialism, or even after its attainment.

Soviet nationalism, through its insistence on the special position of the USSR and on Soviet leadership, has embroiled the Soviet state and the entire communist community in a dangerous theoretical crisis. The denial of specific national conditions in the process of achieving Marxism, and insistence on the superior position of the Soviet Union, is shown in the following statement:

"The assertion that every country advances towards Socialism along its own specific path cannot be recognized as correct as well as the contention that there are as many roads in this direction as there are countries. To utter this means to deny the international portent of the Bolshevik experience. The general laws of transition from capitalism to Socialism, discovered by Marx and Engels, and tested, put to concrete use and developed by Lenin and Stalin on the basis of the experience of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state, are binding upon all countries." - 1

This contradicts completely the former Soviet attitude on this question, put forth by Stalin in Marxism and the National Question² and Leninism and the National and Colonial Questions.

1. Bolshevik, no. 17, 1948, p. 51.
See On People's Democracy in Yugoslavia, Kardelj, Chapter 1.
2. See also p.15 quotation from Vaprosy filosofii.

The external manifestations of Soviet nationalism thus serve to indicate not only the extent to which nationalism has become a reality in the Soviet Union but they also indicate the existence of a serious ideological revolution within the Soviet Union. The Marxist conception of national equality upon the attainment of socialism seems to be replaced by a hierarchy of nations, based not on economic development but on historic priority, quite accidental in character. A special position is claimed for the Soviet Union on the basis of greater experience and maturity, on its achievements and attainments. The Soviet Union is said to be the leading socialist state, and all actions of the proletarians must be guided by their utility to the USSR. This vivid demonstration of nationalism is thus not only indicative of its influence on Soviet policies, but is also an important lesson for the non-communist national communities.

CHAPTER IX

MILITARISM.

Nationalism finds its most vivid expression and attains its most striking symbolism in militarism. The concept of nationalism contains within it definite elements of struggle and conflict, even of violence in relation to others. Nationalism, as it becomes more acute, cannot avoid creating areas of tension with other nationalisms and usually resorts to arms in order to assert its position. Nationalism, by aiming at the conservation of its distinctiveness, must always be prepared to defend it against those who wish to deny it. Nationalism, by being convinced of the righteousness of its cause, frequently tends to impose its special features on weaker communities. Nationalism thus breeds, by its very nature, a constant clash of interests, which stimulates both an acute development of nationalism and also a tendency towards incompatibility, unwillingness to compromise, and war.

This characteristic of nationalism, particularly in the age of specialization, develops in the community a specific caste devoted to the task of giving violent expression, on an organized pattern, to the demands of the national community in respect to other communities. This caste, the military organization, is used basically for defensive purposes; a defensive purpose, however, always

seems to be involved in all military operations, even the most openly aggressive. This military organization, being in the constant service of the nation, develops a specific type of individual, a particular esprit de corps, which is characterized by acute nationalism. Militarism finds its basis in nationalism; thence comes its moral justification and material foundations.

The stimulation of nationalism bases itself to a high degree on militarism. The symbolic value of the military in achieving nationalistic responses is not to be underestimated. It is not by accident that both Fascist and Nazi regims employed military patterns, on a grandiose scale, in stimulating the nationalist reflexes of the citizen. The mass parades, the uniforms, the banners, even the discipline, all have impact on the citizen, impress him with the nation's strength, fill him with a conviction of his own personal might as a part of this great machine. Even the negative features of military service serve to impress the individual with the fact that, above all else, it is the Nation to which everything must be subordinated. The glorification of military heroes, often to the point where other non-military but equally splendid achievements are forgotten, develops in the citizen a particular regard for the professional soldier - the uniformed nationalist.

"The proletariat as the ruling class, if they want to and do come to power, must manifest its will by creating a military organization...." - 1

- Lenin.

The proletariat can only achieve the revolution by violence. In the words of Marx: "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with the new". The capitalists will not resign themselves to the glories of communism without a struggle, and the proletariat must possess an iron fist to assert its will. Only direct and violent activity of the proletariat can overthrow the oppressors and establish the proletarian community. In the period, however, of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, when the process of elimination of the former oppressors has not yet been completed, a "military organization" will have to be maintained by the proletariat to defend itself against counter-revolution.

The organized and armed expression of the proletariat's will shall also be maintained to give effect to the revolution in areas where the local proletariats are not potent enough to assert themselves. The military organization of the proletariat, therefore, will have a double function: (a) to defend the Revolution where it has been successful; and (b) to carry the torch of the Revolution to areas which still remain under bourgeois domination.

1. Works, vol. XXIV, p. 122.

This, however, did not mean the acceptance of militarism per se. Militarism as such, with all its accompanying characteristics, was rejected. The professional soldier was described as a robot, manipulated by the capitalists, as a tool of oppression. He was to be eliminated and replaced by the armed proletarian, ideologically conscious and politically aware. The military organization was to be non-professional in character and socialist in content.

The failure of the Revolution to spread, and the subsequent containment of Communism within the frontiers of the USSR by "capitalist encirclement", made necessary the establishment of a permanent "military organization" to defend the USSR. This military organization, however, became associated not with a proletarian community embracing many nations, but with a single state entity, acutely aware of its distinctiveness. The Soviet Armed Forces serve the Soviet state and the Soviet people, and not in fact the entire world proletariat. Furthermore, the need for specialization meant that a specific professional military organization had to be developed. In these circumstances, the creation of a permanent military force was unavoidable.

The Soviet state is permeated with the atmosphere of violence; violence will achieve the revolution abroad and violence will defeat counter-revolution at home.¹

1. It is remarkable to see to what an extent war metaphors are daily employed in Soviet life: "the coal front", "the grain front", "the shock brigades", "heroes of the Soviet Union", etc.

In such an atmosphere, Soviet militarism easily developed. The growth of Soviet nationalism, the emphasis on Soviet distinctiveness and superiority embraced the armed services, and new emphasis was given to them as a symbol and vivid expression of the power and might of the state.

The old Tsarist title of guards regiments and guards divisions, as a special distinction for crack units, have been restored; distinctions for officers, both in uniform and salary, have been reestablished, and discipline tightened. Military decorations, as the Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Alexander Nevsky, recall great national, particularly Russian leaders.

Suvorov, the Russian general of the Napoleonic period, is particularly hailed as an example of military prowess and skill to be emulated by all Soviet officers. His recent sequicentennial anniversary was marked by vivid tributes to his memory, to his battles, and - and this is significant, to the military abilities of the Russian people. The following quotations from the Soviet press indicate the Russian influence on Soviet militarism, and are startling demonstrations of purely Russian nationalism:

"Suvorov's victorious campaigns demonstrated the immeasurable superiority of Russian military science." - 1

1. Pravda, May 18, 1950.

"Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov is one of the best expressions of the Russian people's military genius." -1

The Soviet press quotes with emphasis Suvorov's remark: "I am proud to be a Russian"¹ while the State Publishing House for Cultural and Educational Literature has issued special posters to commemorate Suvorov's death. An All-Union Committee, appointed to perpetuate his memory, has arranged for postcards with his image to be printed, exhibitions opened, war trophies displayed, his letters released for public consumption, and a mausoleum dedicated to him in Leningrad. The celebration embraced not only Russia, but such clearly non-Russian areas as the Ukraine,² where a Suvorov museum was opened, and the Caucasus, where special festivities were held. Military Cadet schools for future officers are called Suvorov Military Schools; Suvorov's name has become synonymous with military glory and service to the Motherland.

Numerous societies exist to support the Soviet Armed Forces and to instill in the citizen an ardent admiration for the armed services. "The Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army", with a special flag and anthem of its own, as well as the "Voluntary Society for the Cooperation with the Navy", are to acquaint the citizen with the armed forces and

1. Pravda, May 18, 1950.
2. Izvestia, May 6, 1950.

2:20-10
2:19-65

to maintain close liaison between them. Its members are given military training, as shown by the following news item: "2,000 members of the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army in Moldavia participated in the rifle matches."¹ Furthermore, regiments are often "adopted" by factories and the Young Communist League organizations.

The Armed Forces are glorified by special service holidays. Aviation Day was marked by the discovery that the Russians were the first to discover the helicopter, balloon, flying boat and jet plane. The press carried headlines stressing the holiday: "Glory of Stalinist Aviation", "Celebration of the Power and Glory of Stalinist Aviation." In the Navy Day celebration "particularly effective was the demonstration of 6,000 swimmers, who at a signal jumped from ships and swam to the water basin, trailing over their heads a colorful arrangement of banners bearing Stalin's portrait."² Press stories were headlined: "Russian Naval Glory", "The Great Soviet State's Navy Day." Tank Corps Day was given additional emphasis by the fact that the Russians were the first to discover the tank. The press headlined the story: "Pride of the Soviet People." Stories on Artillery Day were headlined: "Glorious Stalinist Artillery", "Mighty Stalinist Artillery", etc.

Public speakers never fail to assert the "Herculean might of the Soviet people";² Stalin calls for "eternal glory to

1. Pravda, Feb. 19, 1950.
2. Izvestia, July 5, 1949.

2:9-50
1:28-65

the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland...¹", Malenkov asserts that a third war will mean the total defeat of capitalism and a glorious victory for the USSR. Monuments, plaques, even the Moscow subway stations emphasize the military achievements of the Soviet Union. A most convincing proof of the extent of militaristic feelings inculcated in the Soviet citizen is supplied by a group of Soviet school children who, when asked to write why x was their favourite hero, wrote mostly² on national military heroes.

This development of militarism in the Soviet Union is the natural consequence of the communistic theory of violence. The Soviet state has as its foundation the Revolution, its structure was built through the class struggle, its aim is the defeat, by violence, of capitalism. In such an atmosphere, and with the necessity of maintaining internal order and of providing for national defense against potential enemies, a militaristic attitude easily developed. The containment of the Revolution within a single state, the war with Germany, the return to historicism in Soviet life, all tend to give this militarism a high-pitched nationalist flavour, based almost entirely on purely Russian military achievements. The victorious conclusion of the death struggle with Germany enhanced the prestige of the military within the Soviet Union,

1. The Great Patriotic War, Order of the Day, Nov. 7, 1944, p. 147, J. Stalin, New York, 1945.
2. Sovetskaya pedagogika, April, 1949. 1:24-3

and gave further impetus to the growth of a militaristic fervour. This, however, by no means challenges the supremacy of the Communist Party, but rather strengthens the hierarchy of command within the state by glorifying discipline, distinctions, and organized integration. The glorification of the military past gives the citizen a feeling of national pride, together with a conviction and confidence, highly important in a totalitarian society, in the might of the state and its ability to defeat all others.

The emphasis on Russian military achievements recalls to the largest popular unit their dominant past, and stirs them to an awareness of their national identity, and to a realization of the importance of their role in world affairs. This mixture of the communist atmosphere of violence and Russian military glory combine to breed a Soviet militarism based on faith in might and force as a solution to all difficulties. Soviet militarism through this process, and in spite of its official rejection, rears its martial head in the USSR, and the professional soldiers now become¹ the glorified defenders of the Revolution. Thus the Soviet Armed Forces, drawing on the rich resources of Russian military history, well serve the cause of Russo-Soviet Nationalism.

1. An illustrative example is the play, "The Front", which, while satirizing the old-type revolutionary commanders, heaped praise on the efficient Soviet officers.

CHAPTER X.

"OPIUM OF THE PEOPLE" - AN IMPLEMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY

The Russian Orthodox Church has frequently been a tool of the Russian state. The state used the Church as a means of uniting around itself the Russian population through its spiritual appeal, and the Church served to strengthen the state structure by giving it its religious blessings and sanction. In its policy of expansion the Russian state made extensive use of the Orthodox Church and intensive efforts were made to convert local populations to the Orthodox faith as a corollary of the process of Russification.

Internally, the Orthodox Church enjoyed a special position and was supported morally and materially by the state. Its predominant position, bordering almost on monopoly, developed tendencies towards internal stagnation and corruption, and the general quality of the Orthodox clergy declined considerably. The Church, meeting no religious competition, ignored social activity and began to lose touch with the masses. The simultaneous growth of a generally non-confessional intelligentsia served further to weaken the position of the Orthodox Church in Russia.

The Revolution of 1917 led naturally, in keeping with the principles of Marxism, to the fall of the Orthodox Church. Materialism, which is the foundation of the Marxist metaphysics, could not possibly tolerate the existence of a

dogmatic body stressing purely spiritual values. The Church's close association with the Tsarist state meant that the state's collapse was followed by the collapse of the Church. The Communists, furthermore, hastened this process by a series of decrees, aimed at the total eradication of the Church in the new Soviet state. An intensive campaign of violence was launched against the Church which, speaking broadly, persisted till about 1930 and again, for a brief spell, in 1937-38. The Church was denied legal existence in the Soviet state, the clergy were persecuted, the churches destroyed, converted into anti-religious museums or garages. This active policy of persecution became much milder in 1930; direct vilification and violence became rarer, and some religious activity, on a very restricted scale, was tolerated.

This latter policy came to a sudden end in 1937, during the great purge; again mass arrests of the clergy took place, churches were closed down, etc. Anti-religious propaganda was given greater impetus. The appearance of war-clouds on the horizon necessitated, however, the mobilization of all the forces within the USSR for the support of the State. Greater stress on patriotism, the rapid development of nationalist propaganda, meant that the Orthodox Church could be

1. A reliable and thorough account can be found in N.S. Timasheff's Religion in Soviet Russia, New York, 1942.

utilized for the purposes of the Soviet state. As an institution, operating under governmental supervision, the Orthodox Church could be channelled in a useful direction and serve the interests of the USSR. The former denunciations were thus now directed mostly against the Catholic Church, which was declared to be an espionage agency under foreign and hostile direction. The process of increased toleration reached its culmination during the war years, when the Orthodox Church obediently served the state, and called upon all the faithful to resist the German aggression.

During the war years, the Church was particularly useful in tending to prevent collaboration with the Germans on religious grounds; served as a propaganda mouthpiece abroad by frequent appeals for a second front; supported the Soviet policy against the Vatican; and favourably impressed public opinion in the West towards the Soviet Union.¹ In Moscow region some sixty clergymen were awarded decorations for war service,² as was also the Metropolitan of Leningrad for his efforts to boost morale during the siege. The Church

1. e.g. the Patriarch Sergius collaborated in the editing of a well-illustrated book, "The Truth about Religion in Russia," distributed abroad but never circulated within the USSR.
2. USSR Information Bulletin, Oct. 9, 1946, p. 3.

conferred its blessings on Stalin as the "divinely-installed leader of the people". "...The war, a severe test for our Soviet state, terminated in a great and illustrious victory. The victory over the mighty foe was attained through brilliant political and military leadership, with J.V. Stalin at the helm..."¹

The Soviet government has thus utilized an additional fountain of mass enthusiasm for its own purposes. This, of course, did not stop or diminish anti-religious propaganda,² but it was recognized that:

"Not a few of our people still believe in God, and are captives of religious superstition and prejudices. Even among the youth there are many religious survivals. There are instances of young men and women going to church and performing religious rites."³

This inspired the Soviet government to use the Church as an implement of its policies. The struggle with the Germans, and

1. Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, Oct., 1948. 1:13-3
2. Answer to a young Communist whose fiancée wants a Church wedding: "Such an act, if you perform it, directly violates the Young Communist League statutes. It contradicts communist ethics and is incompatible with the title of Young Communist. It would be an unprincipled act..."
Komsomolskaya pravda, March 21, 1950. 2:12-41
- "A Soviet teacher is obliged not only to be an unbeliever himself, but also to be an active propagandist of Godlessness among others, - to be the bearer of ideas of militant proletarian atheism..."
Uchitelskaya gazeta, Nov. 26, 1949.
3. Nauka i zhizn, No. 11, 1949, p. 25.

the conflict with the West, necessitated the solidification of popular support behind the government. The Orthodox Church, a purely Russian institution, would thus serve to strengthen further the obedience and loyalty of the masses to the State, and would stimulate popular enthusiasm for state policies. Reliance on this historically Russian institution, together with the violent denunciation of the Vatican,¹ was a further trend towards traditionally Russian policies, and was accompanied by an attack on the non-Orthodox religions, particularly the Ukrainian Uniate Church² which was forcibly subordinated to the Orthodox Church.

The Orthodox Church, with its traditions of subordination to the State, lavishes praise on the Soviet state and denounces its foreign opponents:

"After 25 years of the separation of the Church from the State in Russia our eyes are turned with sincere gratitude to our Government which has so wisely and so to the benefit of the Church solved the problem of the relationship of the Church and the State." - 3

"The Wall Street billionaires, who dream of a dollar-dominated world, the colonizers who make gold and diamonds from human blood, military spies and provocateurs - these are primarily responsible before humanity, history and culture for the propaganda and preparation for a new war."

"The Church regards with the greatest respect and the warmest appreciation the Soviet government." -4

It serves to strengthen Soviet power abroad by asserting

1. The Pope is described as an instrument of American imperialism, etc. Uchitelskaya gazeta, Nov. 26, 1949.
2. The Moslems, who number about 30 million (USSR Information Bulletin, Aug. 14, 1946), are severely limited in their religious activities.
3. USSR Information Bulletin, Oct. 9, 1946, p. 5, quoting Nikolai, Metropolitan of Kiev.
4. Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, Oct., 1948.

its supremacy over the Orthodox Churches in Hungary, Poland and Finland. In Rumania, as in the Ukraine, the Uniate Church has been subordinated to the Orthodox Church. Appeals have been made by the Russian episcopate to the Orthodox Churches throughout the world to rally round the Soviet Union in the struggle for "peace". The Committee of Intellectuals in Support of Peace was warmly supported by the Orthodox Church, which at the same time called upon its Russian faithful to "the defense of the Motherland" which is "the bulwark of your prosperity, your development and your provision in old age."¹ The recent appeal against American atomic developments was likewise intensively supported by the Russian Orthodox Church.

Soviet nationalism, like all nationalisms, must depend for support on the traditional forces in the community. In times of crisis, especially, such support becomes imperative. The Orthodox Church has always been a willing tool of Russian policies, and its historical role has been to cement the power of the state and to support the Pan-Slavic imperialism of the Tsarist Empire.²

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1. Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, February, 1949. 1:31-12
 2. An interesting demonstration of Church support, or rather, of the use of the Church to support Soviet expansion was provided by the Armenian Apostolic Church which in 1945, at its general congress, demanded that the Soviet government finds "the way to redress the injustice" which the Armenians were alleged to have incurred due to the incorporation of certain Armenian territories into Turkey after the 1st World War. Almost simultaneously, the Soviet government was making territorial demands on Turkey....
"My Three Years in Moscow, Walter Bedell Smith, op. cit.

Its influence was particularly marked in the Balkans, and the traditional friendship of the Bulgarians and the Serbs for the Russians finds its basis on religious grounds. It is thus not surprising that the Soviet government should make use of this institution. The Church can serve through its appeals to patriotism and love for the Motherland and can combat depolarizing indigenous nationalisms which are dangerous to the unity of the Soviet Union. Hence the Church is used to break down the resistance of the Ukrainians and the Western Blyelo-Russians, and by depriving these peoples of their own religious distinctiveness it can hasten the process of denationalizing the lesser peoples of the USSR. The choice of the Russian Orthodox Church also indicates the weight which the Russian community carries in the formulation of Soviet policies. The greater emphasis on Soviet nationalism has been accompanied and is supported by the resurgence of Russian nationalism, and chauvinistic assertions of Soviet superiority find additional support in the Orthodox Church's prayers for a "Third Rome" in Moscow.

CHAPTER XI

RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

The dynamic force of Soviet Nationalism is supplied by a purely Russian nationalism, based on the Russian past, on Russian culture, on the Russian language and on Russian national consciousness. The traditional Russian policies, both internal and external, are the motivating forces of Soviet policies, and the traditional Russian attitude toward the West is fully mirrored by the Soviet attitude.¹ The Russian community in the USSR is the dominating community, both culturally and politically. It supplies the largest sphere of the leadership elite, its traditions are imposing their patterns on the entire population, and Russian history has become the national history of the USSR.

The violent rejection of "cosmopolitanism",² of Western influence, the intense assertion of the superiority of all that is Soviet, of all that is Russian, and at the same time, the ever-present desire to "reach and surpass America", to catch up with the West, is nothing more than the same complex from which Dostoevsky, and many of the Pan-Slavists, suffered. Dostoevsky's "samobytnost" - the uniqueness of Russia, his hate for the West, his mysticism and dogmatism, his belief in an eventual war with the West, his support of

1. See remarks of the Soviet representatives when negotiating the Nazi-Soviet friendship Pact on the past Russo-German collaboration, etc.
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, US Department of State, p.32
2. See Chapter VI - Soviet "Patriotism".

Russian expansion, and his idealization of the Russian "mission"¹ - all this is repeated in the vituperative attacks on Westernism, on "cosmopolitanism", all this is repeated in the Soviet assertions of their own superiority, of their own excellence, of their own uniqueness. "Russian communism is a distortion of the Russian messianic idea; it proclaims light from the East which is destined to enlighten the bourgeois darkness of the West. Its falsehood lies in its spiritual foundations which result in the process of dehumanization, in the denial of the worth of the individual man, in the narrowing of human thought, a thing which already existed in Russian nihilism."²

The change in the attitude of the White Russian emigres towards Stalin from violent hate to grumbling admissions that, at least, Stalin is "keeping Russia united" is more than interesting - it is highly illustrative of the change of emphasis in Soviet policies. The original denial of national oppression, the rejection of national domination, the rays of hope for national equality within the USSR have now disappeared. The democratic principles proclaimed during the Revolution have given way to the totalitarian reality of the present USSR. The terroristic violence of the Soviet regime had gradually limited the basis of its support, and made necessary certain compromises

1. See Kucharzewski, The Origins of Modern Russia, pp. 109-118, 269-272, New York, 1948.
2. Berdyaev, The Russian Idea, London, 1947, p. 250.

with the strongest national group - the Russian - in order to maintain centralized state authority. The development of nationalistic, decentralizing tendencies in areas like the Ukraine and Georgia meant that the Russians remained the fundamental centralizing factor in the USSR, and reliance on them for support was a necessity.¹ The resistance of indigenous nationalisms was crushed by violence, and the footprints on the paths leading to Siberia were the only evidence that millions of Ukrainians, Balts or Georgians left behind them to recall their national devotion. It is noteworthy that mass deportations were never employed against the Russian population, and that very frequently Russians were settled in areas from which the local population, had been ejected and deported.² It is likewise noteworthy that mass deportations were applied specifically

1. The role of the Russian people is thus officially described: "At all stages of our people's struggle for socialism, the Russian people have held an unchanging position in command of the situation, as the leading force. The Russian people was in the vanguard of the great fraternity of nations in the Great October socialist revolution, in the subsequent civil war, in the period of the Stalin 5 Year Plans, and in the Great Patriotic War. And the Russian people continues to fulfill its great mission now, in the post-war period..."
Voprosy filosofii, no. 2, 1948. 1:1
2. Prisoners of Soviet labour camps testify that Russian prisoners were frequently better treated than prisoners of other nationalities. Sprawiedliwosc Sowiecka, (Soviet Justice), op. cit.

against those populations which have the most developed national consciousness (the Balts, the Ukrainians, the Poles in the annexed territories, etc).

A natural consequence of this was the fact that in the late war, it was the Russian population that waged the most vigorous campaign against the invaders,¹ and attempts by Lt. Gen. Andrei A. Vlasov and Maj. Gen. W.F.Malyshin and their "Russian Committee of Liberation" to organize a "Russian Army of Liberation" were not notably successful while the recruiting of Cossacks, Ukrainians, Tartars, etc. for the anti-Soviet German units encountered no serious difficulties, especially in the initial stage.² It was this determined resistance of the Russian people that moved Stalin to make during the Victory Celebration his famous toast to the Russian nation, immortalized in Butorin's painting "J.V. Stalin Pronounces a Toast in Honour of the Russian people". The use of the word "Russia", at one time studiously avoided, has now become not only commonplace but almost synonymous with "Soviet"; the Russian army, the Russian inventors, the Russian love for peace, the Russian traditions - all are frequently mentioned. Russia has again become a holy word, identified with the Motherland and patriotism.

1. The Russian population contributed a much higher number of "heroes of the Soviet Union" in respect to its population than any other national group during the late war. A partial statement is to be found in Bolshevik, no. 24, 1944.
2. See also p. 24, footnote 1.

"Unbreakable Union of freeborn Republics
Great Russia has welded forever to stand...

...Sing to our Motherland, glory undying,

...Our country we'll lead to eternal renown."

- from the new Soviet anthem.

In keeping with the demands of Russian national feeling, Soviet education stresses the "universal character" of Russian literary geniuses¹ and their patriotic devotion; mathematics and the natural sciences remind the pupil of the achievements of Lomonosov, Mandeleev, and Michurin who "derived the creative strength for their scientific and inventive activity from their unbounded love for their country and of the nation"²; while history develops in the pupils a love for the great Russian heroes as, for instance, Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible.³ The studying of the Russian language is facilitated by the fact that "the great Russian language which, thanks to the October Revolution, was given a new socialist orientation in its development, has become the source of enrichment and growth for the national tongues" and hence "it is studied with love by all the peoples of the great Soviet Union"⁴. The inhabitants

1. Pushkin is described as "A Great Friend of Polish literature", "The Inspirer of Bulgarian Literature", "Great Teacher of Hungarian writers", etc.
2. Vechernaya Moskva, Nov. 28, 1944.
3. The filming of a motion picture on Ivan was halted as it portrayed him in an unfavourable light.
4. Voprosy filosofii, Jan. 21, 1950. 2:7-4

of the Soviet Union are acquainted with "the decisive superiority of Russian over other European languages in the wealth and variety of the word-building potential."¹ Furthermore, "no one can call himself a scholar in the full and genuine meaning of the word if he does not know Russian, if he does not read the works of Russian thought in the original."²

The Soviet citizen is impressed by the magnitude of the Russian contribution to science; in addition to those mentioned before,³ the Russians, it seems, were the first to use ball bearings,⁴ to develop book-printing,⁴ to fly airplanes,⁵ to build the radio,⁶ the diesel engine, the electric powered ship, and many more. The recent Soviet claim to Antarctica finds support in the assertion that Russian sailors were the first to sail there. In brief, Russian nationalism thus serves to give the Soviet citizen a feeling of pride in the creative genius of his people.

The former rejection of Russian history has now been replaced by an idealization of Russian past.⁷ Soviet

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1. Kultura i zhizn 1:26-23
 2. Literaturnaya gazeta, Jan. 1, 1949, "Great language of our Epoch" 2:2-22
 3. See Chapter IX.
 4. Ibid, April 1, 1950. 2:19-27
 5. Pravda, Feb. 20, p. 1, 1949. 1:7-55
 6. "Russia's priority in this new branch of science and technics has always aroused the anger and envy of reactionaries and businessmen of the capitalist world."
Izvestia & Pravda, May 5, 1949. 1:9
 7. "The services rendered by Moscow consist not only in that in the course of the history of our Motherland it liberated her three times from foreign oppression... The service rendered by Moscow consists primarily in that it became the foundation for uniting disunited Russia in a single state, with a single government and a single leadership" - Stalin on the 800th Anniversary of Moscow. USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. VII, no. 15.

Historians are requested to reject the "notorious Normanist theory"¹ and to recreate the glorious Russian past. The native creativeness of the Russian people must be emphasized, and the minimal degree of Western influence on historic Russia must be demonstrated. In this connection, a Soviet historian is taken to task for admitting the possibility that Peter the Great encouraged the cultural influence of Western Europe on Russia. He is accused of forgetting the "world significance of Russian culture."² The proper attitude to Peter is to be found in a new ballet, dedicated to him, which contains the following lines: "now city of Peter, stand thou fast, foursquare like Russia, vaunt thy splendour."³ Russian history serves further to motivate Soviet expansion, and the Red Fleet organ recently spoke of Russia's 1,300 year old drive to the Dardanelles.⁴ The new emphasis on Russian values is best demonstrated by the following order of the day, issued by Stalin, during the war:

"These people, deprived of conscience and honour, people with the morals of beasts, have the audacity to call for the annihilation of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plakhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Puskin and Tolstoy, Glinka and Tschaikowsky, Gorky and Chekhov, Sechenov and Pavlov, Repin and Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov!" - 5

The Soviet state, with a pedantry typical of a nouveau-riche, is now proclaiming the vast superiority of its culture, basing itself entirely on the Russian contribution to it.

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1. Voprosy istorii, no. 2, 1949 (Normanist theory - a historical interpretation, tracing the origins of Russian statehood to early Viking settlements on the Ruthenian riverways) 1:26
 2. Voprosy ekonomiki, no. 8, 1949 1:11-13
 3. Sovetskaya muzyka, Sept. 1949. 2:4-7
 4. Krasney Flot, Apr. 17, 1950.
 5. Stalin, Nov. 6, 1941, Speeches

The Russian people are said in the course of their history to have¹ created the richest culture, and all other countries of the world have drawn upon it and continue to draw upon it to this day." Russian culture is said to be typified by its "exceptional ideological honesty, nobility of character and sincere devotion to the people."² Its drama, "the peak of world drama", is far superior to the "superficial" French drama, or the British, or the Scandinavian.³ A great cult for Pushkin is consciously developed, and "Stalin has called his name one of the dearest and greatest of this country."⁴ His recent anniversary was officially celebrated not only in the USSR but also in all the "People's Democracies."

Emphasis on the immeasurable significance of Russian culture is accompanied by two additional nationalistic tendencies. One is the previously mentioned onslaught on foreign influence: "the tendency to understate the value of Russian culture is very closely connected with groveling before Western bourgeois culture."⁵ This "national nihilism" is being energetically attacked and those guilty of subscribing to it have been eliminated. The other tendency is, while not to directly disparage other Soviet national cultures, to place

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1. Voprosy filosofii, no. 2, 1948. 1:1
 2. Soviet Culture, Moscow, p. 9.
 3. Pravda, Feb. 28, 1949, op. cit. 1:8-63
 4. Izvestia, May 13, 1949. 1:20-63
 5. Voprosy filosofii, no. 2, 1948. 1:1

the Russian culture on a superior plane in relation to other cultures, in a position of teacher and inspirer. The Kazakh, Ukrainian, or Byelo-Russian cultures are said to have developed because of "the tremendous cultural assistance of the great Russian people."¹ The influence of Russian culture is said to have been felt beyond Russia's frontiers, as for instance, in China² and to have inspired other peoples to a greater cultural development. In brief, "it is necessary to bear firmly in mind the indisputable proposition that Russian culture has always played a tremendous role, and now plays a leading role, in the development of world culture."³

"As the peoples of our country emulate the Russian people in the struggle for communism, the peoples of the world study from them and from all Soviet people how to triumph over foreign and domestic enemies, fight for socialism and build communism." - 4

Russian cultural primacy has been accompanied by a more physical and concrete expression of the dominant role that the Russian community plays in Soviet life. The Russian nation is spreading rapidly eastwards, and supplies the pioneers in the development of new industrial centres in the formerly barren Asiatic wastes. The Russians supply the factory

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1. Pravda, Jan. 13, 1949. 1:3-70
 2. Kultura i zhizn, Feb. 11, 1949. 1:8-13
 3. Voprosy filosofii, no. 2, 1948. 1:1
 4. Bolshevik, March 15, 1949. 1:19-30

managers, the engineers, the directors; even a superficial examination of Soviet press, of the letters to Stalin, of criticisms, reports, articles and stories, of new socialist competitions, be they from Yerevan or Petrozavodsk or Chelyabinsk, reveals the great frequency of Russian names in managerial and executive positions. This is even true of such non-Russian industrial centres as the Donbas or Baku.

This expansion of Russian population, and the assertion of Russian cultural supremacy finds additional proof in statistics of the Soviet publishing output. The stress on the Russian language (even though local dialects are supposedly encouraged), the imposition of the Russian alphabet on the other national languages, and the tendency to make Russian, which is already the official language, the tongue of the cultured, of the ruling class, hastens the process of submerging local national languages in favour of the Russian tongue. As language is an important contributing factor to the development of nationalism, the

1. e.g., the following: "By a decree of the Kazakh Party Central Committee the number of hours in the curriculum of Kazakh schools devoted to studying Russian has been increased and the total number of lessons in all the grades increased to 1,790. Attention has been devoted to supplying Kazakh schools with books in Russian for reading outside class....
It is necessary to do everything possible in order to satisfy as fully as possible the ardent desire of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union to know the language of the great Russian people in addition to their own national language."
Izvestia, June 10, 1950. 2:24-15

following figures should be of interest:- (it should be noted that the Russians constitute about 55% of the total population), The USSR Constitution was published in about 40,000,000 copies in the Russian language and only in about 13,000,000 copies in all the other non-Russian languages;¹

Lenin's works and pamphlets:

155,200,000 in Russian, 28,500,000 in others;²

Stalin's works and pamphlets:

425,000,000 in Russian, 90,000,000 in others;³

The entire Marxist-Leninist classics:

617,000,000 in Russian, 122,000,000 in others;⁴

Stalin's "History of the Communist Party":

35,875,000 in Russian, 3,000,000 in Ukrainian;⁵

(note the population ratios).

It is also noteworthy that the number of Russian newspapers exceeds those published in other languages by a ratio of about 3:1, while their circulation exceeds by about 5:1.

In Latvia, for instance, which is certainly nationally conscious, of the two youth newspapers, one is published in

Russian.⁵ Russian literature, likewise, is published in the largest numbers (it must be recognized, however, that its contribution was likewise greater), as demonstrated by

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1. Pravda & Izvestia, Dec. 2, 1949. 1:49-33
 2. Pravda & Izvestia, April 23, 1950. 2:17-17
 3. Novy mir, no. 1, 1949. 1:11-37
 4. Pravda, Dec. 11, 1949. 1:51-43
 5. Ibid, Feb. 28, 1950. 2:10-36

the current programme of the State Literature Publishing House which will put out 24,595,000 of Soviet Russian literature, and only 1,265, 000 copies of works from other Soviet nations.¹

The previously quoted figures on Marxist propaganda are, however, the most illuminating. It is the profound conviction of the communist leaders that the people must be literate in order to properly be indoctrinated. Consequently Marxist propaganda is printed in a form most accessible to the masses, and the prevalence of the Russian language would indicate the surprising extent of Russification on the literary field,² quite to the contrary of official Soviet claims.

"The feeling of friendship and love for the Russian people has grown and strengthened immeasurably among the Stalinist family of peoples, under the aegis of the Soviet regime. That is why the Soviet nations respond with such hatred and scorn to the attempts of bourgeois-nationalist diehards to sow even a grain of distrust of the Russian people in the hearts of other Soviet nations." - 3

Distrust of Russian motives, and criticisms of Russian influence, are viewed as direct demonstrations of "bourgeois-

1. Literaturnaya gazeta, Aug. 31, 1949. 1:36-61
2. e.g., of 52 plays submitted in the Uzbek Republic play contest, 26 were in Uzbek and 23 in the Russian language. Nov. 23, 1949. Pravda. 1:48-64
17th Congress of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party stressed as the primary educational aim the study of Russian. Pravda, Jan. 27, 1947. 1:4-37
In the Stalin University of Tbilisi, Georgia, instruction given in both Russian and Georgian. USSR Information Bulletin, June, 1950, p. 328.
3. Pravda, March 1, 1950.

nationalism". The Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union-Republics frequently go on record as energetically condemning such survivals of the bourgeois era, and suggesting immediate steps to intensify the battle against "nationalist deviation"¹. Simultaneously, the Soviet press is conducting an intensive campaign with the object of impressing the other nations and nationalities of the USSR with the immense role of the Russian nation and with their dependence on it for support. The "Sovetskaya Litva" (Soviet Lithuania) publishes, for example, an article entitled "Russia - Friend and Teacher" ("the hearts of all of us are filled with deepest gratitude to the great Russian people")², while the "Literaturnaya gazeta" emphasizes the "beneficial influence" of Russia on the development of Tadzik culture.³ An Uzbek Epic is attacked for ignoring the Russian influence on Uzbek culture and the Stalin Prize, awarded early in 1950 to G. Guseinov for a work on the "History of Social and Philosophical Thought of Azerbaïdzhân in the 19th Century" is recalled for not portraying the national hero, Shamil, as an Anglo-Turk agent, and thus indicating "a reflection of Bourgeois-nationalist deviation."⁴ Vivid demonstrations of local nationalisms are viewed with disfavour, and writers and artists are called

1. 6th Congress of the C.P. of Lithuania condemns nationalism and calls for its elimination - Izvestia, Feb. 16, 1949, 1:7-41
10th Congress of the C.P. of Uzbekistan notes that "survivals of national narrowness were still visible", Pravda, Mar. 3, 1949 1:9-39
U.P., April 20, 1950, reports widespread purge of Estonian Communists for "bourgeois nationalism", incl. govt. members.
2. as quoted in Pravda, March 18, 1950. 2:12-41
3. Literaturnaya gazeta, Feb. 19, 1949. 1:3-63
4. Izvestia & Pravda, May 14, 1950. 2:17-6

upon to "unmask fully all manifestations of cosmopolitanism¹ and bourgeois nationalism."

The much publicized official Soviet policy of giving the formerly primitive and Russian-suppressed peoples a share in their own government is not even borne out by Soviet statistics. Thus, for instance, in Kazakhstan, which has a population about 57% Kazakh, only the following percentages of Union Republic government posts were held by Kazakhs:

Local industry	- 2%	
Public health	- 2%	
Light Industry	- 4%	
Textiles	- 7.6%	
Commercial Economy	- 7.9%	
Agriculture	- 10%	
Milk and Meat	- 14%	-- 2

In the Kirgiz S.S.R., 66% Kirgiz, according to the Party Secretary, about 55% of the Party workers were non-Kirgiz, while the Kirgiz share in the government amounted to:

17.8%	in Light Industry	
27 %	in Planning, finance, and trade	
28 %	in Agriculture.	--2

In Kazakhstan again, out of 63,400 persons attending factory³ schools in 1945-46 only 14.3% were native Kazakhs.

A more careful examination of the Soviet press reveals, furthermore, the fact that the Russian element dominates the elite corps of the Communist Party not only within the RSFSR but within all the Union Republics. Russian

1. Literaturnaya gazeta, March 16, 1949. 1:13-61
2. Kazakhstanskaya pravda, Aug. 14, 1948
3. Ibid.

sounding names can be found in reports of the Communist Party activity from every Union Republic. The Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics usually include two, and always at least one Russian, most frequently in the position of 2nd Secretary. In Kirghizia, even the 1st Secretary is Russian. The following table, assembled from official Soviet reports and statements, would indicate the presence of the following Russians in the Communist Parties of the Union Republics:

- as of early 1950

Communist Party of:

Russian Secretary on the
Party Central Committee:

Ukraine
Latvia
Lithuania
Karelia
Moldavia
Estonia
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Kirghizia
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Ust Ordynsky Buryat
(national region)

Melnikov
Titov
Trofimov
Kuprianov, Andronov
Kashinkov
Stepanov
Batyrov, Sh.
Kruglov, S.I., Yakovlev, S.Y.
Bogolyubov, N.S., Yakovlev, B.P.
Kulkov, K.G., Shilkin, M.S.
Melnikov, R.E., Lopatov
Boldonov, I.

Russians likewise participate in many of the Union Republic governments (see p.133) and almost always head the MGB and MVD offices.¹ For instance:

- as of early 1950

<u>Union Republic</u>	<u>Department</u>	<u>Headed by</u>
Kazakhstan	planning, Trade and Finance	M. Chernetzov
	MVD	I. Dolgih
	Republic Procurator	Rumiantzev
Uzbekistan	" "	Sadovnikov
	Machine Building	Efimov
	Health	Labrov
Tajikistan	MGB	D. Vishnevsky
	Agitation and Propaganda	Yurin
Estonia	Vice-Premier	Y. Ostrov
Kirghizia	Procurator	Romanov
	Agriculture	A. Vorobiev

On top of all this, Russians frequently represent the Union Republics in the central Government organs, as for instance: Sadikov for Uzbekistan, Dvornikov and Petrov for Tajikistan, Popkov for Kirghizia, Lukyanetz for Kazakhstan in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; Mazaev and Saiko for Tajikistan, Kabanov for Uzbekistan, and Iskakov for Kirghizia: Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet Council of Ministers.

The test case for Russian nationalism is, however, the Ukraine, the most nationally conscious Union Republic in the USSR. It is also in the Ukraine that Russian nationalism

1. e.g. Prisoners held in the Korolenki prison in Kiev testify that not a single NKVD functionary spoke Ukrainian.
"Sprawiedliwosc Sowiecka, p. 144.

manifests itself most openly, and the former policies of Russification seem to come to life again, indicating the full extent of the resurgence of Russian nationalism.

In the first years after the Revolution, the Ukraine was permitted to enjoy almost fully the fruits of national autonomy. Many prominent Ukrainian scholars returned from abroad, and cultural and scientific life flourished. The policy of "Ukrainization" was in full swing. This period, however, came to an abrupt end when it was realized that it actually stimulated Ukrainian national consciousness, and contributed to the stiffening of Ukrainian resistance to political, cultural, and economic centralization.

In 1930 the All-Ukrainian Academy of Science was suppressed and, together with the Shevtchenko Society, purged of nationalist elements. A first mass trial of "nationalists" took place in Kharkov, to be followed by another in 1931 of the "National Centre". In 1933 the Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, Kotsubinsky, the Commissar for Agriculture, Kovnar, and others were shot after a trial for nationalist activities. The old Ukrainian communist activist, Skrypnyk, committed suicide to avoid arrest. Intense persecution followed, especially after the incorporation of former Polish territories into the Soviet Ukraine with a militant nationalistic Ukrainian population. Among others, six Ukrainian Catholic bishops were imprisoned for refusing to submit to the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Communist

1. See Chapter X

Party was purged immediately again after the conclusion of the late war, and at the moment numbers only about 690,000 members - a disproportionately low number when compared to some 230,000 Party members in Kazakhstan, the population of which is about 1/6 of that of the Ukraine. As recently as the spring of 1950, the head of the Lwow Province Communist Party was removed for his inability to deal with "bourgeois nationalism".¹

It is noteworthy that the Ukrainians are not represented on the Politburo, and that in the Ukraine itself out of 29 regional secretaries of the Communist Party 13 are reported to be of Russian nationality.² This has been accompanied by an alarming decrease in the native Ukrainian population, admitted even by Soviet statistics, from 23 million in 1936 to 19.6 million in 1939, while the non-native population increased from 5.8 million in 1926 to 11.4 million in 1939.³ In the major cities, Russian is beginning to displace Ukrainian as the spoken language; and the fact that the non-Ukrainian population is mostly Russian is shown by the increased output of books in Russian in the Ukraine. Thus the collected and individual works of V.I. Lenin were published in the Ukraine in 9,600,000 copies in the Ukrainian and 1,200,000 in Russian,⁴ and Malenkov's speech of Nov. 6, 1949 was issued by the Ukraine Publishing House of Political

1. B.A. Koval, head of the Lwow Pr. C.P.; N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1950.
2. Ukrainian Bulletin, vol. ii, no. 7, p. 2
3. Ukrainian Bulletin, vol. iii, no. 5, p. 2.
4. Izvestia, Jan. 13, 1950. (see also p. 126)

Literature in 100,000 copies in the Ukrainian and in 50,000 copies in the Russian language.¹

Soviet historicism is currently engaged in proving conclusively the fact that the Ukrainian nation as such is but a branch of the great Russian nation; that the Ukrainian language is a mere dialect, and that Ukrainian history is nationalist propaganda. The Ukrainian language itself is being Russified by the introduction of Russian words and syntax, and by the elimination of native idioms and expressions. In the schools, Russian influence is propagated, and the pupils "learn from Ukrainian authors themselves the influence on them of the ideas of the great Russian revolutionary democrats".² During the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, January 1949, nationalist deviationism was attacked, the Institute of the History of the Ukraine was criticized for nationalist leanings, and an intensive struggle against "bourgeois nationalism" was promised.

At the same time, Ukrainian nationalism is being combatted by a policy of violence. Mass deportations of the Ukrainian population have taken place; pitched battles have been fought by the MVD troops with the UPA, the activities of which find expression in official denunciations of it by the Soviet press and which are even witnessed by a brief mention in "Why I escaped" by the former Soviet Air Force Lieutenant, Pirogov, who flew in 1948 to the US zone of Germany,

1. Izvestia & Pravda, Nov. 20, 1949. 1:48-51
2. Uchitelskaya gazeta, April 26, 1950. 2:16-15

and who writes that he and his fellow officers were issued side-arms while in the Ukraine to defend themselves against the UPA "bandits". It is claimed by many Ukrainians that the 1930 famine was specifically stimulated by the Soviet authorities to break down Ukrainian national resistance.

Soviet policies in the Ukraine, as well as in the other sectors of the USSR, thus bear a familiar Russian imprint. Russian nationalism has again reasserted itself and the Russian community again dominates the destiny of that huge state entity. Russian nationalism asserts its own superiority to such an extent that an extremely limited scope of action is left for the local nationalisms. The bombastic emphasis on Russian superiority is equalled only by the denunciations of native nationalisms as "bourgeois deviations" and by the measures taken against them.

Russian nationalism claims for itself cultural primacy and political supremacy. Russian nationalism identifies itself with the entire USSR. Russian nationalism is both intolerant and violent, it is both extremely acute and highly emotional; in brief, it is open to the accusation of being chauvinistic. Russian culture is super-imposed over all local cultures under the guise of providing inspiration; the Russians exercise effective control over the Union Republican governments; the Russians are the most reliable element in the Centralized government structure.

Soviet "patriotism" finds its historical foundation and emotional basis in Russian tradition and character. The Motherland and Russia become the incarnation of the supreme national ideal and the ardent Soviet "patriotism" only becomes meaningful when called Russo-Soviet Nationalism.

CONCLUSION

Our study of Russo-Soviet Nationalism has demonstrated the following points:-

- (a) Marxism rejects nationalism as such, assigning it a bourgeois prefix, and giving it a specifically anti-proletarian role in the life of a community.
- (b) The Revolution in Russia established a state entity based on Marxism; hence nationalism in state policy was officially rejected, and inter-national equality in the USSR was officially declared through a federal arrangement, guaranteeing equal rights to all nations and nationalities of the USSR.
- (c) In fact, however, this federal arrangement has a centralized locus of power, with the dynamics being supplied by the Communist Party, a centralized, disciplined body, not organized on the multi-national pattern in so far as leadership is concerned.
- (d) The centralized, totalitarian state creates an intensified integration of the citizen with the state, denying the citizen's individuality, and associating him entirely with state ends. The impact of the state on the individual monopolizes the citizen completely for service for the state and tends to develop in him an emotional association with the state.
- (e) Stalin as an institution supplies, among other, emotional integration on a totalitarian pattern and serves to cement further the total unity of the individual with the state.
- (f) The submergence of the citizen in the state, and the necessity of capturing for the state, the emotional attachment of the citizen, give rise to an official Soviet "patriotism", very ardent and highly acute, which then develops all the characteristics of nationalism.
- (g) This Soviet nationalism reveals itself most clearly in dealings with smaller communist-controlled states through the exploitation of such relationship in favour of the Soviet Union.

- (h) The development of militarism, based on purely Russian military traditions, and the employment of the Russian Orthodox Church for state policies, indicate the reliance of the state on the strongest national, traditionally centralizing, community in the USSR, and that community's assertion of its primacy.
- (i) Russian nationalism manifests itself openly and is officially encouraged through the press, through the educational process, through the increased usage of the Russian language, and through the dominant role the Russian community plays in the formulation and execution of state policies. Russian nationalism supplies the element of high tension which, together with Soviet "patriotism", develops a highly pitched Russo-Soviet Nationalism.

The USSR thus cannot exempt itself from living in the Era of Nationalism and must allow the tidal wave of Nationalism to sweep through the minds and hearts of its people. Nationalism, in the present crisis, also may tend to provide the required social integration and adjustment for the citizen and inculcate him with an attachment to his state.

Russian nationalism, through official Soviet "patriotism", wishes to superimpose itself upon all nationalisms as an all-embracing national consciousness which could include regional feelings and traditions, but which would still be fundamentally Russian. Americanism could possibly be a useful example - it embraces all national groups by being the essential state emotion, most clearly associated with the state. Americanism, also somewhat like Marxism, advances the proposition of a better to-morrow, based largely on technological progress, as a uniting bond for the highly diverse national elements, living together within a single state entity.

Marxist dogma, is international in the scope of its conception. National movements, as pointed out in Chapter I, can serve only to achieve tactical advantages. They can be encouraged and fostered, but they remain merely a means to an end. Within the proletarian community, once it is established, a new society will develop, influenced by the Marxist environment, and moulded on the socialist pattern. Thus the national features of the community, which give it its distinctive character, will fade, and a universal society will develop. The conviction in a better future, promised by Marx, will supply the uniting bond, which will integrate even formerly antagonistic and hostile communities.

The Soviet state is supposed to be such a Marxist community. Although not embracing the whole world, as seemed to be Marx's aim, it does contain diverse nationalities. In keeping with Marxist teachings, the Soviet state, in its initial stages especially, laid great emphasis on national equality, and national development of the nationally under-¹developed communities. A common emotional attachment to the community would necessarily develop with greater material wealth, with increased individual happiness, and with a growing recognition of the advantages of mutual association. The policy of toleration, or gradual assimilation, would prevent indigenous national feelings from resisting the development of such general affection for the entire Soviet community.

1. See Chapter I.

This, however, met with somewhat unexpected obstacles. The national development of hitherto nationally subconscious communities seemed to stimulate indigenous nationalism,¹ quite incompatible with the theoretical foundations of the Soviet state. Local national awareness gave rise to an appreciation of the values of national traditions and history, of customs and habits. It began to develop an awareness of the distinctive features of the community, and a desire to assert them. The more mature Ukrainian nationalism began to have doubts in the supposed advantages of a common association, especially since a great many were convinced that the 1930 famine was not merely an act of nature.² The frequent attacks on nationalist "deviationism" even in such Republics as Uzbekistan indicates a growing tendency to question the validity of the alleged advantages of an over-all Soviet national allegiance.

Soviet national consciousness, furthermore, unlike Americanism, was not developing in a virgin territory. Traditions have always formed an integral part of the life of the Russian community. The development of a national consciousness in the non-Russian lands served to stimulate within them an awareness of their own past, and as a reaction, led to greater reliance, within the Soviet state, on the Russian elements, as the centralizing force.

The solidification of the Revolution in the USSR and the simultaneous growth of a single state consciousness,

1. See Chapter 11.

2. Ibid

culminating in Russo-Soviet Nationalism, has developed such typically Russian attributes as the attack on "cosmopolitanism", which was accompanied by a thinly camouflaged display of traditionally Russian anti-Semitism. The Jewish communists were the international force in Soviet policies¹ and the emphasis on national feelings led naturally to attacks on those that could not develop them. It is notable that a great proportion of the "cosmopolitans" were of Jewish descent; these denunciations were accompanied by widespread rumours of a Jewish purge in the Army and the MVD,² and by the closing of the Jewish Culture Institute in Kiev.³ It is furthermore alleged by Trotskyite writers that, in the struggle with Trotsky, Radek, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, anti-Semitism contributed to, and was employed to achieve the victory of the Stalin group, which contained no Jewish leaders.

The containment of the Soviet state necessitated a state esprit de corps, supplied most directly by those with a stake in the state. The Soviet managerial class, the engineers, the officers, the bureaucrats, were the counterpart of the Western middle-class, which is traditionally the most nationalistic. This class, even in a proletarian state, needs nationalism and develops nationalistic feelings with utmost facility. They attempt to justify them in terms of a colonial mission or a cultural duty, and thus again indicate their tendency to think in terms of superiority in relation to the other peoples of the USSR.

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1. N.B. - Trotsky, Radek, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were all of Jewish origin.
 2. Continental News Service, Oct., 1949, op. cit.
 3. Narodnaya Pravda, Paris, Dec., 1949, op. cit.

This mixture, however, of a civilizing role and the simultaneous assertion of Russian primacy has created an unexpected development of national feelings in previously dormant areas. Judging from the Resolutions of the Communist Parties, nationalism is becoming a constantly greater force in even the most hitherto backward Union Republics, and is developing decentralizing tendencies and challenging the Russian supremacy. This constitutes a direct danger to the USSR. It is being combatted through the denial of economic self-sufficiency to the national communities, through Russian political domination, etc, but the power of freedom menaces the unity of the Soviet state, and places the Soviet leadership in a difficult position. To give more scope for local nationalisms would mean to permit them to develop freely decentralizing tendencies; to deny them that scope means national reaction to repression. The Soviet solution is a combination of both; with the latter being the essential one.

Russo-Soviet nationalism has been so far successful in preventing the indigenous nationalisms from asserting their rights. Under present conditions, and with the entire state machinery at its disposal, Russo-Soviet nationalism need not fear excessively the challenge offered it; it can continue inculcating the citizenry with an emotional attachment to the state and it still can provide the essential integrating function. The danger, however, although latent,

may erupt in time of a crisis, when the very life of the USSR will be at stake. The Western world has at its disposal all the means to create a multi-national anti-Soviet version of the Comintern - and its appeal would be exceedingly powerful. Reliance within the USSR on the Russian community indicated the lack of reliance on the non-Russian communities, and the intense assertion of Russo-Soviet-Nationalism could possibly be more than national pride - it could be an indirect indication of internal, but it must be emphasized - latent, dissension.

Russo-Soviet Nationalism and what we believe to be true Freedom will clash some day - and understanding the component elements of Russo-Soviet Nationalism may help a great deal the cause of Freedom.

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Literaturnaya gazeta	Literary Gazette
Kultura i zhizn	Culture and Life
Novy mir	New World
Voprosy istorii	Problems of History
Slavyanye	The Slavs
Trybuna Ludu	People's Tribune (Warsaw)
Voprosy ekonomiki	Problems of Economy
Borba	The Struggle (Belgrade)
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Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii	Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate
Nauka i zhizn	Science and Life
Vechernaya Moskva	Evening Moscow
Sovetskaya muzyka	Soviet music
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Kazakhstanskaya pravda	Kazakhstan Truth
Komsomolskaya pravda	Komsomol Truth

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APPENDIX I.

Population of the USSR

(based on The Peoples of the USSR, C. Lamont, N.Y., 1949)

(estimate as of 1941)

<u>Union Republic</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>% of Russians</u>
R.S.F.S.R.	114,350,000	75%
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	42,250,000	10-30% ¹
Byelo-Russian S.S.R.	10,500,000	16%
Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.	500,000	66%
Estonian S.S.R.	1,100,000	16%
Latvian S.S.R.	2,000,000	15%
Lithuanian S.S.R.	3,150,000	3%
Moldavian S.S.R.	2,300,000	
Georgian S.S.R.	3,700,000	
Armenian S.S.R.	1,350,000	
Azerbaidzhan S.S.R.	3,375,000	16%
Kazakh S.S.R.	6,500,000	20%
Uzbek, S.S.R.	6,600,000	
Turkman S.S.R.	1,300,000	8%
Tadzik S.S.R.	1,550,000	
Kirgiz S.S.R.	1,550,000	10%

1. Ukrainian sources abroad advance the higher percentage due to mass deportations of the Ukrainian population.

APPENDIX II

Article 14 of the Fundamental Law of the USSR

(Official Soviet copy in English, Embassy of the USSR, Washington, 1945)

The jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its highest organs of state authority and organs of government, covers:

- (a) Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states;¹
- (b) Questions of war and peace;
- (c) Admission of new republics into the USSR;
- (d) Control over the observance of the Constitution of the USSR and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the Constitution of the USSR;
- (e) Confirmation of alterations of boundaries between Union Republics;
- (f) Confirmation of the formation of new Territories and Regions and also of new Autonomous Republics within Union Republics;
- (g) Organization of the defense of the USSR and direction of all the armed forces of the USSR; - 1
- (h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly;
- (i) Safeguarding the security of the state;
- (j) Establishment of the national economic plans of the USSR;
- (k) Approval of the single state budget of the USSR, as well as of the taxes and revenues which go to the All-Union, Republican and local budgets;
- (l) Administration of the banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and enterprises and trading enterprises of All-Union importance;
- (m) Administration of transport and communications;

1. Amended in 1944 in favour of the Union-Republics.

- (n) Direction of the monetary and credit system;
- (o) Organization of state insurance;
- (p) Raising and granting of loans;
- (q) Establishment of the basic principles for the use of land as well as for the use of natural deposits, forests and waters;
- (r) Establishment of the basic principles in the spheres of education and public health;
- (s) Organization of a uniform system of national economic statistics;
- (t) Establishment of the principles of labor legislation;
- (u) Legislation on the judicial system and judicial procedure; criminal and civil codes;
- (v) Laws on citizenship of the Union; laws on the rights of foreigners;
- (w) Issuing of All-Union acts of amnesty.

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