

The Politics of Dissonance:
A Criticism of Theodor Adorno's Theory of Music

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This thesis is a criticism of Theodor Adorno's theory of music and society. In order to understand Adorno's approach, the political and ideological aspects of cultural phenomena must be appreciated. This in turn requires a re-evaluation of the traditional conceptualization of the 'political', and its implications. For Adorno, music does not simply exist in a removed aesthetic realm, but is immediately involved in the ideological and psychological make-up of the autonomous, mature individual, whom he considers to be the basis of true democracy. The individual is threatened in our era by the emergence of fascist and consumer industry societies, whose socioeconomic, cultural, political and ideological systems deprive the individual of autonomous thought and action, either through overt brutality or manipulation. Authentic music, akin to philosophy, issues one of the last protests against the individual's absorption by these totalitarian administrations.

Although cultural politics need not signify a retreat from political commitment per se, Adorno's theory substitutes the musical revolution for the social one, and in the process becomes socially conservative. The possibility of social change is precluded both by a theory of dynamic music that is ultimately dependent on society's immobility, and by Adorno's pessimistic belief that given the social totality, no collective social agent of change can exist.

La dissertation qui suit est une critique de la théorie de Théodor Adorno sur la musique et la société. Pour comprendre la démarche d'Adorno, il faut, en premier lieu, aborder les aspects politiques et idéologiques des phénomènes culturels. Ceci requiert une réévaluation des concepts traditionnels du "politique" et de tout cela implique. Pour Adorno, la musique n'existe pas dans un domaine esthétique distancé; plutôt, elle fait partie intégrante de la nature idéologique et psychologique de l'individu autonome qui, pour Adorno, forme la base d'une vraie démocratie. De nos jours, l'émergence de sociétés fascistes et de consommation industrielle menacent l'individu, qui se voit déprivé d'action et de pensée autonomes, d'une façon ouvertement brutale ou manipulative, par les systèmes socioéconomique, culturel, et idéologique de ces sociétés. La musique authentique, proche de la philosophie, fait preuve d'une des dernières protestations contre l'assimilation de l'individu par ces administrations totalitaires.

Quoique la politique culturelle signifie pas un départ de l'engagement politique comme tel, la théorie d'Adorno met la révolution musicale à la place de la sociale, et qui par la suite, devient socialement conservatrice. La possibilité d'un changement social se trouve exclut par une théorie de musique dynamique basée fondamentalement sur l'immobilité de la société, et par la conviction pessimiste d'Adorno qui voit que, tenant compte de la totalité sociale, aucun agent de changement social collectif ne peut exister.

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Introduction

The Cultural as Political

When any thesis or essay begins by justifying not only its approach but its actual topic, something is being implied about the nature of the discipline. The topic of this thesis is cultural politics, or, rather, the politics of culture. More specifically, it will examine Theodor Adorno's sociological and ideological critique of music, the extent to which his theory accounts for the ideological basis of some of its crucial concepts, and the degree to which it can explain and deal with modern musical and cultural developments. The choice of cultural politics, and of the aesthetics and ideology of music in particular, as the subject of a political science thesis will be briefly explained in this forward.

The decision to concentrate on music is informed by both a practical and a theoretical reason. Music, more than literature, art, theatre, dance or any other cultural product and process appears to be a significant form of communication, expression and cultural identification in modern Western society. Whereas access to literature, art and dance is restricted by, at the most mundane level, finances, and must be sought by the audience, our society seems to be constantly inundated with sound. Ever-present, music and muzak is played in private homes over the radio, in concert halls, bars, in stores, shopping malls, elevators and metro stations. Popular musicians influence styles, and social and political concerns far beyond the bounds of the purely musical. Even within the 'musical realm', insofar as it can be separated from 'society', the challenge to aesthetic principles is also social and political.

The theoretical reason is that a political-social analysis of music may prove to be far more complicated than a reading of literature or even art. Disregarding for the moment that music (without lyrics) is not immediately representational, it, like any other performance art is

difficult to place. One of the greatest difficulties in such a reading is how to define the boundaries of the 'text'. Does music exist only at the moment of its playing? Does it exist as score? Is the analysis different when the same piece of music is played in a different venue for different people, by different musicians? It seems that the theoretical challenge that this type of inquiry provides may help to reveal some of the problems inherent in any type of structural cultural analysis.

What remains to be answered are the questions, 'why cultural politics, and how is culture political?', and related to these, 'how is this topic part of political science?' In reference to the last question in particular, I would suggest that there seems to be a resistance to multidisciplinary studies as the once sacrosanct borders of disciplines are transgressed, and the rules and authority of each questioned. While the politics of interdisciplinary studies could itself be the topic for another dissertation, what I propose to do in the balance of this forward is address these questions, hoping to show how a multidisciplinary, or political-culture approach, more than a traditional political science one, may be better able to offer some insight into how people live through, experience and express, struggle against or submit to their domination.

Although the main intent of this thesis is not to provide some metacritique of 'political science' itself, its fundamental assumption-namely that the cultural is political, is I suppose, an inherent criticism of the mainstream concept of the 'political'. It seems logical that any 'new' way of understanding social constructs (and theoretical deconstruction) would begin with a commentary on the social role of the discipline itself and how it relates to the central problem in order to justify the changes that it proposes. A major critique of the mainstream

conceptualization of the 'political' is that it is not responsive enough to, and therefore has difficulty understanding its subject. A brief comparison of the more traditional meaning of the 'political' with that proposed by many 'marginalized' groups will, I hope, demonstrate why the broader, more inclusive meaning offers a deeper understanding of some modern political-social phenomena.

The traditional definition of political is, 'of or relating to government, a government or conduct of governmental affairs', while political science is therefore construed to be a social science concerned chiefly with the description and analysis of political and especially governmental institutions and processes...'. Political scientists are primarily concerned with that aspect of the public sphere which is deemed to be central to the exercise of 'legitimate' power and authority. The distinction between the 'political' and other areas can only be successfully defended if it is accepted that the government and its processes are either the fundamental source or the primary brokers and implementing force of power and/or authority and societal control. For the majority of political analysts, the most significant conflicts are those that occur and are resolved within the carefully drawn limits of the political arena. Although some political theorists recognize that the origin of many problems may be economic', cultural' or 'social', they nonetheless subscribe to the theory that the solutions are to be found at the level of the political, ie., within the governmental processes. A notable exception is to be found in the interdisciplinary approach of political economy.

Of fundamental concern is not the variation between these theories, but rather the fact that they all have in common a particular way of segmenting life, and that this segmentation is itself dependent upon a highly questionable assumption:

that there exists at the cultural or communication/symbolic level, a basic consensus of meaning and value that is derived from a shared experience, which allows us to build the institutions through which specific problems can be resolved. Taking this argument to the extreme then, before one can talk of democratic institutions or processes, one must first assume the existence of a democratic or pluralist culture. It is precisely because it is non-problematic (or its problems can be transported by way of interest groups or classes to the 'political' realm) that culture is granted a secondary status, and yet its very existence (although silent) is crucial to our concepts of 'democracy', 'political' and in fact, 'political science'. A 'democratic culture' ie., one which assumes if not consensus, then some sort of pluralism amongst a 'recognizable people' that gives a group or individual the right to govern, and that legitimatise the ruling institutions, is a necessary precondition of a democratic polity and government. Our political language is imbued with terms that not only are carried over from the 'cultural', but which still carry those connotations and expectations of the cultural. 'Popular' government cannot be separated from the notion of the 'popular' itself; who are the people, how is popular defined according to wider social and cultural expectations, what does it mean to say that something is 'of the people' or 'for the people'? The same terminology that gives legitimacy to so many political institutions and theories has meaning which far exceeds those same institutions, which then merely partake of a general meaning or ideology of which 'popular' is the central signifier.

By re-examining these hidden assumptions about the 'popular', or 'culture', about the free or democratic creation of meaning, we not only put political democracy into question, but more importantly the division between the political and cultural and the public and private, the political 'scientist'

and the subject-object of inquiry. Once cultural democracy is challenged, so too is its autonomy from the political realm. This is the type of process in which many new social collectivities are engaged. By questioning the validity of the common assumptions about democracy, culture and politics, and by asserting their right to redraw the boundaries, new social groups are involved in re-defining the 'political'. The struggle to mean, to experience, to constitute a social identity other than that imposed by the dominant group, is a contestation of power. It can therefore be seen as 'political'.

The fatally wrong approach...is from the assumption of separate orders, as when we... assume that political institutions and conventions are of a different and separate order from artistic institutions and conventions. Politics and art, together with science, religion, family life and the other categories we speak of as absolutes, belong in a whole world of active and interacting relationships...

By asking who the 'people' are who can partake of the 'political' we are not merely asking about exclusion from the political arena, but whether or not the very conceptualization of the 'people' serves to reinforce the exclusion of women, racial and other minorities, by denying difference (of experience, of meaning, of value). Academic terminology, far from being value-free, plays an important role in the exclusion or recognition of certain groups. What must be questioned then, is not only what is political?' but in what terms is the political rendered and whose terms are these?'

It is acknowledged that the exclusion of particular groups from the governing process does not mean that they are inherently a- or-unpolitical; but too often the erroneous conclusion is that the solution lies in their politicization' and inclusion into an already-defined 'political' realm. Rather than investigating how this could be accomplished, it might be more important to determine how and why the

'political' is constituted as such, and how its very limits are those which reflect the values and experiences of a few particular groups, thereby negating the experiences of others. It is no longer the fact of their exclusion that so many 'marginalized' groups oppose, but that the political and economic institutions proffered by both the left and the right still embody the values of white males. They further argue that when political studies acknowledge power to be specific to certain realms-*ie.*, economics and politics, or determine that these are the most important arenas of struggle, -the belief that the division between areas is naturally constituted is reinforced. Culture becomes the handmaid to politics and economics. But it is precisely in the area of culture that the politics of marginalized groups become evident.

Traditional definitions of politics and the 'political' then are increasingly rejected by members of new social movements and new collectivities.² If the claims made by feminists, blacks, and some subcultures are to be understood, the objective stance of the 'scientist', who heretofore determined the focus and definitions of study, must be rejected. If the objective is to reach an informed understanding of the subjects, then the theories and methodology must be adapted to take account of their demands. The validity of the study should not be based on its scientific process or methodology, something which is inherent to it, but must rather be related to the experience and reality of the subject; how well does the study express the self-acknowledged identity of the subject?

If we are to avoid a theoreticist or scientistic fallacy that defines 'truth' as the possession only of the system of science, we will have to insist on learning not only about but also from movements.³

The traditional notion of the 'political' has been wrenched out of its exclusive circle by feminists, blacks and gays, so that it now has a far broader application and implication than before. Showing that societal control and authority extends far beyond the public into the private realm in the form of gender domination, and beyond the political-economic into the cultural and social realms, some feminist scholars contend that the private and public are extensions of each other. Women's experience of male domination in the private realm for instance, is the experience of social domination which is legitimized by and sanctified in social codes that do not really respect the boundary between the private and public, although those boundaries are defined by the social code. Domination involves power, whatever the source or kind, and however and wherever it is expressed.

Politics, in any and every sense, is about power, and it is as much about the power that men, wittingly or unwittingly exercise over women as it is about the power that presidents and prime ministers wield over nations."

Since the traditional concept of the 'political' provides tacit support for the distinctions between public and private, the political and the cultural, it reinforces the fallacy that they are 'natural', or at least justifiable. The danger of this objectification fallacy becomes apparent when the demands, or even the existence of new social movements cannot be adequately explained or even answered because there is a refusal to see them as 'political'. An unwavering adherence to the traditional definitions of the 'political', has forced political science to focus on the arena and the actors, instead of on the nature of the relationship as that which is political. In so doing, it confirms the dominant group's ideology by centering attention on their activities, meanings, and values, to the exclusion of the rest.

This does in fact have an affect on the social

organization. The impact of political investigations is not restricted to the realm of a distanced academia, but has implications for the subject of inquiry; social scientists are not objective observers, but enter into the world of their subject. Any inquiry not only gives legitimacy to the subjects, but more importantly gives them a voice-one which they cannot have if the dominant image of the 'people' is accepted. It is often in the fight against their non-existence in the academic institutions that oppressed groups begin to assert their own social identity.

Like any politically disenfranchised group, Black women could not exist consciously until we began to name ourselves. The growth of Black women's studies is an essential aspect of that process of naming....The politics of Black women's studies are totally connected to the politics of Black women's lives.⁵

By accepting the dominant group's appraisal of who acts (ie has power/ authority) and who is acted upon, two important factors are missed: the first is that the process whereby social rules that divide the active and passive are established is usually ignored, and the dominant perspective of history therefore unquestioningly reproduced; and the second is that the oppressed do act, but not with authority and often in subversive ways. Marginalized groups may have power if not authority:

power is the ability to act effectively on persons or things, to take or secure favourable decisions which are not of right allocated to the individuals or their roles'; authority is the right to make a particular decision and to command obedience'.⁶

This distinction between power and authority makes it easier to understand how a dominated group can, in some circumstances, successfully manipulate and at times subvert the rules, actions and meanings of the dominant group.

This distinction is important, for the potential 'subversive' or 'resisting' activities which marginal groups consider to be political are rarely carried out in the realm of politics and economics, which are most obviously controlled by the dominant forces. Rather, it is in the politics of culture that many groups first realize a shared identity, as they work towards the reconstitution of their own history and image, challenging the image, the past, and the experience imposed on them by the dominant ideology.

It is within this context that the politics of culture should be understood, for it entails both the manipulative, authoritative power of the dominant 'culture industry' as well as the potential for revolutionary moments carried out by the groups that the industry attempts to subsume. It is a struggle of power (and a powerful struggle) over the right to create, to define, to mean. It is the fight for identity, for existence-the right to see and constitute, and to give meaning to the world and oneself, to experience. This is the cultural as political.

Great Expectations or the Wasteland:

Theodor Adorno's Cultural Politics

The historical context of fascism and the growth of American consumer society, led Theodor Adorno, along with other members of the Frankfurt School, to question the validity of some of the Marxist assumptions and ideas. The failure of the working class to fulfill its historical role of revolutionary agent seemed not only to signal a defeat for traditional Marxist theory, but also belied the Hegelian belief in history as 'progress' or betterment. The psyche, shattered by the experience of both the First World War and fascism was no longer able to conceive of history as a single, uninterrupted movement towards utopia.

A generation that had gone to school
on a horse-drawn streetcar now stood

under the open sky in a countryside in which nothing remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body.⁷

Concentration camps made a mockery of all affirmative philosophies, and the very notions of 'value' and 'truth'.

Adorno's writings should be understood within the context of this 'meaningless' world, in which fascism and consumer society, both total and totalizing forms of administration, not only attack traditional bourgeois economic and political values, but strike at what Adorno sees as the heart of a truly democratic and emancipated society, the modern individual. Fascism, and the 'culture industry', a term coined by Adorno and Horkheimer, are the direct results of the dialectic of Enlightenment, in which man's attempt to order society and nature results in the imposition of an alien order over man. The return to the autonomous bourgeois individual as the historic subject is a result of both the failure of the working class, and Adorno's suspicion of any other collective identity, and the significant influence of Freudian psychoanalysis on many members of the Frankfurt School.

Coupled with the political failure, and the seeming impossibility of another historical revolutionary subject arising, Freudian theories of psychoanalysis served to re-centre the attention on the individual, and more importantly, on the importance of the individual psyche in explaining political and social phenomena. The incorporation of Freudian ideas demanded a careful review of the assumptions made about the base-superstructure relations in orthodox marxism, and the granting of greater autonomy to social and cultural institutions.

Adorno's critique of culture is therefore another way of interpreting the social, political, economic and ideological bases of modern society, while it is also a way

of seeking refuge from political and social activity and theorizing. For Adorno, the term 'culture' refers specifically to those cultural products, be it popular, or serious art music, or literature for example, rather than to the entire set of living patterns, experiences, habits entailed by the anthropological definition. Adorno rejected the latter meaning because it assumed a false unity between the mental and material spheres of life, where there is in fact a historically real antagonism that should not be spuriously unified by theory.⁸ Adorno's approach to cultural studies therefore reflects one of his major concerns; things should not be equalized, or falsely reconciled in an effort to eradicate difference.

Cultural products not only reflect, but influence the individual psyche and therefore social development or regression. Culture represents that which is most harmful for the individual, the pressure to conform to social dictates, and that which is most enlightening, the last point of resistance against social conformity. In the dichotomy between the culture industry products, which are shamelessly advertised as commodity, and truly autonomous music, which still speaks to and of the alienation of the autonomous individual, Adorno finds some explanation for society's betrayal of true enlightenment and its embracing of totalitarian and barbaric social systems.

Thus Adorno's theory of music and history stands in the middle of some conflicting trends, attempting at one and the same time to recognize the 'valueless' nature of the twentieth century, and its loss of all centering concepts such as 'truth' and 'authenticity', while preserving these ideas in a new, but 'negative' as opposed to 'affirmative' formulation. The individual is reconstituted as the historic subject, the authenticity of individual music asserted, the 'truth' of dynamic music and history proclaimed, while the

didactic narrative and teleological concepts of history, the notion of a historical 'totality' and the concept of progress is criticized. Although convincingly represented as a precursor to deconstruction theory, the deconstructionist tendencies come into conflict with the attempt to re-assert some sort of authority and authenticity in the world. Similarly, the critique Adorno delivers of instrumental rationality is made less convincing due to his own adherence to the primary assumption of rationalism, and his hyper-functionalist theory of music. Although he peers over the edge into a world where there are no grounding concepts or values, he ultimately backs away from the danger, in quest for a new truth and authenticity. It is this quest that eventually freezes what should be a dynamic social theory, leaving it unable to conceive of or explain the possibility of social change.

The whole and the parts are alike;
there is no antithesis and no
connection. Their prearranged
harmony is a mockery...
In Germany the graveyard stillness
of the dictatorship already hung
over the gayest films of the
democratic era.

Theodor Adorno and
Max Horkheimer

Chapter One

Considering Enlightenment and Culture

Historical Context: Fascism and the Culture Industry

Theodor Adorno's works on culture and the 'culture industry' should be understood as a response to the rise of fascism-or the fascist 'era', and the horror of Auschwitz. The barbarity of the Nazi regime and the corresponding alienation, and reification of people in American consumer society, are the culmination of an historical unfolding of the dialectic of Enlightenment.⁹ It is only this which can explain the failure of the working class to fulfill its revolutionary role. For Adorno, this signified not only betrayal of Marxism, but of all the principles of the real enlightenment that were represented by the ideal socialist society.

While not identical, fascism and the monopoly capitalism of the States must be understood within the context of a 'single social order'.¹⁰ Although fascism's existence is dependent on the same principles as monopoly capitalism, it is not the "culmination" of "modern society".¹¹ The evolution from the free or competitive market to one where the state assumes the responsibility for planning, regulating and establishing goals of the economy, is, at the same time, a movement towards greater administrative control over society. It is therefore the administrative principle of rationalization that underlies both the culture industry and the fascist society.¹²

Able to rationalize or disguise the inherent social antagonisms, the administered society has the capacity to resist the internal contradictions that would have led, according to Marxism, to the break-down of liberal capitalism and the creation of a socialist society.¹³ Administration's goal is to 'heal' the social antinomies at a surface level,

depriving history and society of the dynamic dialectical conflict necessary for historical development. As the greatest source of challenge to the principle of administration and equivalence in both fascist and culture industry societies, the autonomous bourgeois individual is eliminated. Although Adorno's comparison of Western consumer society to fascist regimes is somewhat softened in his later works, the economic, social and cultural systems of consumer societies and fascist regimes share this essential antagonism toward the individual.

Even the aesthetic activities of political opposites are one in their enthusiastic obedience to the rhythm of the iron system....Under monopoly all mass culture is identical, and the lines of its artificial framework begin to show through. The people at the top are no longer so interested in concealing monopoly: as its violence becomes more open, so its power grows.¹⁴

Differences between fascist and culture industry societies are significant in that they determine to what extent an immanent social and ideological critique is even possible. Unlike the consumer society which must disguise its brutality by maintaining a verbal commitment to the principles of enlightenment, fascism reveals and revels in the brute nature of its totalitarianism, extolling violent equivalence and "regressive equality," as the new ideology.¹⁵ As part of the school of critical theory, Adorno's immanent critique works by juxtaposing society's, or the cultural object's stated ideology to the historic reality, making the critique dependent on the contradiction between the ideological and the real.¹⁶ Fascism, like the culture industry eliminates the possibility of an immanent critique by dissolving the space between reality and ideology. Its ideology is based on, and is a direct reflection of fascist society; fascist reality is the realization of the ideology's promise. The culture industry cannot however, reveal the true

extent of its totalitarian nature, and is therefore unable to eradicate all works that preserve the promise of enlightenment (negatively).

The development of both fascism and monopoly capitalism can be traced back to the dialectic of Enlightenment, in which man's struggle to emancipate himself from the domination of nature and myth led to his own objectification and domination by an alien and total administration.¹⁷ Rationalist duality of subject and object was the means by which the subject could control the object. But as technology progressed, man's control over the object (nature) was eroded by his own objectification and subordination to the industrial, technological, scientific and philosophical systems that were to have liberated him.

It is in the dialectic of enlightenment, (to be discussed in greater detail below) and the subsequent development of political, social and economic systems based on instrumental rationality, that Adorno discovers the reasons for the rise of fascism and consumer society, and the historical failure of the working class. Adorno's aesthetic critique is also shaped by this combination of historical and social problematics, and his conviction that their source lies in the rejection of true enlightenment. At the heart of both the projects of enlightenment and Adorno's own cultural and music critiques is the autonomous individual, whose crisis of alienation in fascist and consumer societies is one of Adorno's primary concerns.

Individual, Psychoanalysis and Ideology

Adorno's rejection of the working class as the subject-object of history, in contrast to Lukács, for example, is both a reaction to historical events and to more philosophical concerns. First, the failure of the proletariat and Adorno's suspicion of any collective identity following the rise of

fascism meant that the only possible historic subject be non-collective. Secondly, the refusal to name any group as the historic subject-object was a protective measure against the possibility that his theory could be used to justify the actions of any administrative, pseudo-collective body, be it the state or a political party.

Solidarity was once intended to make the talk of brotherhood real, by lifting it out of generality, where it was an ideology, and reserving it for the particular, the Party, as the sole representative in an antagonistic world of generality....[but] solidarity has turned into confidence that the Party has a thousand eyes....any...security gained...is paid for by permanent fear...¹⁸

Thus Adorno's reaction against the supremacy of the administrative system (the general') over the particular, signifies a theoretical shift away from Marxist tenets that has political ramifications. According to David Held, one of the major flaws of Adorno's theory is his refusal to, "identify the subject of revolutionary activity with a class"; ie the identification of the revolutionary subject.¹⁹ More thoroughly discussed in the third chapter, it is sufficient to suggest at this point that if the status of the individual as historic/music subject poses significant difficulties for a 'revolutionary' sociopolitical/cultural theory and practice, there are equally significant problems with the Marxist historic subject. Marxist class analysis, even with its acknowledgement of feminist claims, still reproduces a male-centric and centered image of society.

Adorno's rejection of an historic collective agent is of great importance to his interpretation of music. His move away from a purely class-based analysis decreases the possibility that his critique of music/culture will shift between a complex interpretation and a vulgar class-based reductionism that may be considered characteristic of Lukács, for instance. An additional, and not so beneficial result is the dismissal

of all modern popular music as inauthentic, because no authentic 'popular' or 'people' exist. In this instance the 'general' category of the 'popular' takes precedence over the individual works of music.

In "On the Social Situation of Music," Adorno declares that the association of class consciousness with the definition and production of music obscures its historical truth. Analyzing music as though it were an unmediated reflection of a particular class consciousness is tantamount to suggesting that music is no more free of the class-dominated and reified illusions about reality than the entrapped masses.²⁰ Class consciousness, a result of class domination, is accused of extending the 'wounds of mutilation' caused by class domination, by its interference with the production of music. The mere fact that a work was produced by a member of a certain class is no guarantee of its authenticity or critical social reflection, nor of its 'bourgeois', anti-revolutionary appeal.

It is, according to Adorno, great bourgeois music that speaks to and of the alienated individual, which is authentic and truly revolutionary. It is the culture industry or pseudo-collective music that alienates and reifies, impeding,

the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves. These, however, would be the precondition for a democratic society which needs adults who have come of age in order to sustain itself and develop.²¹

The intention of both the social and aesthetic analyses, which cannot be conducted without a critique of ideology, is to reveal the social and psychological state of the autonomous individual in administered societies. The aim is a 'development of a non-authoritarian and non-bureaucratic politics' in which the individual is the beneficiary of the social system rather than its subject.²² The other influence on Adorno's theory that confirms his re-

establishment of the autonomous individual is that of Freudian psychoanalysis. Complementing certain aspects of Marxism, such as 'false consciousness', Freudianism provided a method for interpreting the effects of cultural forms on the individual psyche, and could also be applied on a larger scale in order to explain mass social and political movements. Thus the breakdown in the bourgeois family, associated with the crippling of the ego, could in turn be related to the willingness to follow an authoritarian, fascist personality.²³ Psychoanalysis thus responds to the dilemma of Marxists by indicating how social and cultural factors could inhibit the expected development of a working class consciousness and action.

Influenced by historic events, his own concern for the individual, and by Freudianism, Adorno's conception of the base-superstructure relationship was closer to that of Walter Benjamin than traditional economic marxism. Benjamin maintained that the superstructure was more than the immediate reflection of economic relations; they are the expression of the specific material conditions, and reflect unintentionally (ie., without the subject's intention) an objective historical truth.²⁴ The superstructure is responsible for the realization of individual identity and the formation of certain personality types that are characteristic of a given period.²⁵

The psyche is directly involved in the development and manifestation of ideology, which is, "anchored in the character structure of the individual."²⁶ In this interpretation ideology cannot be simplistically equated with falsehood, for it is both true and false; its promise of utopia is historically possible, and is therefore true, but its suggestion that the promise has been realized is false. The ideological claim of cultural objects is a necessary lie that gestures to the truth of future possibilities. An immanent critique, the "more essentially dialectical" one, takes seriously the principle that it is not

ideology itself which is untrue but rather its pretension to correspond to reality. Immanent criticism of intellectual and artistic phenomena seeks to grasp, through the analysis of their form and meaning, the contradiction between their objective idea and that pretension.²⁷

The submission of the individual to fascism and the culture industry cannot therefore be blamed on 'ideology' per se, but on the lag between the technological and the individual psychological developments, which give the superstructure the ability to resist change.²⁸ It is therefore the superstructure, and particularly culture, which holds the answer to the failure of the revolution, and the apparent inability of man to appropriate and control, rather than be controlled by, the technological developments.

The cultural and ideological critique must therefore include psychoanalysis in order to explain, "the reach of culture into the depth of human feelings," and the psychological reactions of, "guilt, aggressions, and needs for self-punishment."²⁹ As we shall see in the second chapter, psychoanalytic terms and theories play an integral role in Adorno's music analysis and his search for authenticity in the individual and music.³⁰ Music is more than a reflection of society, it acts on it through the individual psyche.

Myth and Enlightenment

In order to understand Adorno's conceptualization of culture and the culture industry, a brief discussion about the 'promise' of Enlightenment and its subsequent reversion to myth, is necessary. One of the recurring themes found in both the philosophical/historical and music writings is that of time and space and their relationship to history, myth and enlightenment. Since music is viewed as a microcosm of history, the development of musical time is a comment about true history (dynamic) and mythic, non-history (stasis) and the possibility of human progress.

Enlightenment's program, according to the Dialectic of Enlightenment was, "the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy."³¹ As a didactic narrative, myth explained the natural world in human terms through the creation of deities that represented and explained natural events. Rather than freeing man from the domination of nature though, the deification of natural phenomena merely strengthened its power over man. As feared objects and phenomena became sacred, the mythic circle which is both 'prison' and 'protector' was reinforced.³² Obscuring rather than illuminating the object, myths prevent man from knowing his world and thereby losing his fear of it.

Driven by the desire to obliterate any phenomena or object that exists 'outside' his world, man creates explanations for everything 'new', but does so in the terms that have been defined by the pre-established system of knowledge. That which is new becomes more of the old as the system, incapable of addressing what is inherently different in the new object, imposes the same form of explanation and knowledge that it does on all other things. It is the system of knowing, be it myth or rational science, rather than the object, that is seen as the inherent possessor of meaning or truth. Myth thus deprives man of the experience of the new. The present and the future, the possibility of the new, become the re-experiencing of the past.

Myth and enlightenment are born out of the same initial drive for knowledge that stems from man's first experience of being separate from the world. In the beginning, before the word became a signifier, when myths were brought into being, there was an identity between the word and the object. "The gasp of surprise which accompanies the experience of the unusual becomes its name."³³ There was an assumed unity between the natural elements and the deities, and the, "mythic destiny, fatum, was one with the spoken word."³⁴ Words were

power over fact. Enlightenment's birth and conversely, the rigidification of myth's domination are to be found in the breaking of this unity. Myth's internal contradictions inevitably led to Enlightenment, that then became myth. A response to man's increasing effort to know and control his environment, the separation of man from nature and the evolution of myth also entrapped him in a world of symbolic repetition.

Like magical rites, myths signify self-repetitive nature, which is the core of the symbolic: a state of being or process that is presented as eternal because it incessantly becomes actual once more by being realized in symbolic form.³⁵

Distinguishing between the animate and the inanimate, the object and the word, man takes the first step towards enlightenment's separation of subject and object.³⁶ Yet at the same time the move towards representation and signification allows myth to assume the 'eternal' nature of symbolic reality.

The kidnapping of Persephone, for example, once synonymous with the changing of the seasons, was believed to be repeated every year, but as it assumes the nature of the symbolic, the kidnapping is turned into a unique event relegated to the past. It is signified by and repeated through its ritual enactment, taking on the character of inevitability.³⁷ Everything 'new' is predetermined by that which occurred in the past; the changing of seasons no longer requires the actual kidnapping, for the seasons signify the kidnapping that was, and they are eternally committed to the same process and meaning.

...each of the mythic figures is programmed always to do the same thing. Each is a figure of repetition; and would come to an end should the repetition fail to occur.³⁸

Signification brings equivalence, for objects can be substituted, 'mean' the same as the original object. In the ritual of sacrifice, the lamb replaces the daughter or first-born, and becomes their equivalent. Symbolic exchange destroys the specificity of the object as its 'meaning' becomes more important than the object. Equivalence is completed under the scientific system since it destroys the sacredness that magic had conferred on some objects, protecting their inherent value.

Enlightenment's project then, was the salvation of man from the mythic world that had itself conceived of enlightenment. Both the power of myth and the hope of the enlightenment lay in the same process, the disintegration of the initial unities. Myth's strength came from the separation of the 'thing' and the 'meaning', and the hope of Enlightenment lay in the separation of object and subject.

As words are uttered by the magician in an attempt to alter destiny, man becomes conscious of his own intent and will. Whereas myth was predicated of the necessary connection between the word and its one meaning, man's discovery of multiple meanings opens up the circle of myth. The rigidity of meaning and process demanded by myth is shattered by the distance between the word and the possible meanings; man recognizes his ability to steer between the object and sign.³⁹

While the magician's power, similar to that of art, stemmed from his mimesis of that over which he sought control, Enlightenment's knowledge demanded man's alienation from the same.⁴⁰ Distance between subject and object would prevent the anthropomorphization of nature that Enlightenment assumed to be the basis of myth, (ie., the imposition of man's fears on the external world, and would reveal objects' inherent meanings. Unlike the 'knowledge' of myth which consisted of man's learning how to adapt to nature's and myth's demands, the knowledge offered by Enlightenment was that of power over

nature. "The human mind, which overcomes superstition, is to hold sway over a disenchanted nature. Knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles..."⁴¹ The price of this power is man's increasing alienation from nature, which he 'knows' only to the extent that he can manipulate it to his own ends.⁴² Having expulsed the spirit of the gods from nature, claiming them as man's fiction, Enlightenment takes the first step towards its own betrayal, and proceeds to divest the object of any inherent meaning. Rationalism grants to man the full authority to impose meaning on the now meaningless object. Science is the renunciation of the object's inherent meaning and the rejection of any claim to "substance and quality, activity and suffering, being and existence," all of which are denounced as metaphysical.⁴³

As with mythology, the world becomes one of equivalence, where the meaningless objects can be substituted, categorized, and classified as 'specimen'-now the universal, and only possible identity. What is inherently different is forced to be the same due to the role that all must play as abstracted material in the scientific system (or consumer/commodity in the market place). According to the Enlightenment, "that which does not reduce to numbers...becomes illusion....the destruction of gods and qualities alike is insisted on."⁴⁴

Not even the knowledge offered by psychoanalysis is spare this dialectical turn. Where it was once a source of self-knowledge and help, under the "scrutiny" of psychology the self has "been rendered...non-existent."⁴⁵ The intrusion of psychology (in combination with culture industry films and 'soap operas') into the 'deepest recesses' of the human mind is no longer intended to explore the antagonisms between the self and society and the various psychological drives, but serves the conformist rationality of society.⁴⁶ Cutting the individual off from any possibility of self-experience, psychoanalysis categorizes and generalizes individual ills as

an 'inferiority complex', 'mother fixation', and then blames the illness on the individual rather than society.⁴⁷

Man's alienation from external nature is translated into his repression of and increasing alienation from his own nature. But as soon as man forgets that, "he himself is nature," he loses sight of all his real goals, such as "social progress" and the development of his, "material and spiritual powers and even consciousness itself."⁴⁸ Man is objectified along with nature as he assumes the reified state of automated worker-object in the assembly-line, where the end goal is production for the sake of profit. According to Jay, Adorno's definition of reification differs from Lukács' in that Adorno is referring not to the objectification of the subject, ie. the, "reduction of a fluid process into a dead thing," but rather to the forced similarity of dissimilar things which destroys individuality.⁴⁹ But it can also be suggested that Adorno's use of the term often incorporates the Lukacsian meaning.

The total obliteration of war by information
...the mish-mash of enlightened manipulation
of public opinion...all this is another expression
for the withering of experience, the vacuum
between men and their fate, in which their
real fate lies. It is as if the reified,
hardened, plaster-cast of events takes the
place of events themselves.⁵⁰

If in myth man injected the animate into the inanimate, then under rationalism the reverse has occurred-the rendering inanimate that which is animate.⁵¹ As man becomes the servant to his own system, rationality usurps the authoritarian position of myth.

The individual's inherent meaning and value are nullified by a rationality that reduces every object and man to equivalent commodities in an endless system of exchange. The whole notion of an 'end' that gives meaning to the means is destroyed as the 'ends' become nothing more than new means'.

Once part of the end', the individual is nothing more than one of the means in the present economic and social system. Following his instinct of self-preservation, man sacrifices his unique attributes in order to survive in a conformist society. The irony is that his 'self-preservation' is the destruction of the 'self', all that is particular and gives meaning to him.⁵² Driven by the same terror that underlay myth-making, man's scientific process of knowledge echoes myth, reducing everything to the one factor that describes its own inception-in this case, man.⁵³ All that refuses to be classified or rendered into measurable terms is shunned as myth.

Bereft of any meaning, object and subject have become purely functional, signalling the death of experience.

'Experience' in this sense should be understood as operating on both the level of 'knowledge' and of sense/ sensual contact with the world. Functionalism deprives the individual of sensuality by eradicating the potential for pleasure.⁵⁴ The subject is convinced that objects exist only for the sake of their immediate use, not for the purposeless purpose of contact with the object itself. As man's sensual experiencing of the world is curtailed, so too is his ability to know it, and to communicate the knowledge with others.

The movements machines demand of their users already have the violent,... unrelenting jerkiness of Fascist maltreatment. Not least to blame for the withering of experience is the fact that things under the law of pure functionality, assume a form that limits contact with them to mere operation, and tolerates no surplus either in freedom of conduct or autonomy of things, which would survive as the core of experience, because it is not consumed by the moment of action.⁵⁵

Enlightenment and myth are mirror images; they reflect each other's essential aspect, the complete dominion of fate, but achieve the same end by reversing the position of who

dominates, the subject or object.

The dissolution of the dialectical relationship between subject and object points to the liquidation of temporality itself. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment and all of Adorno's musical critiques, the concept of 'time versus space' or of 'dynamic' as opposed to 'static' time is crucial, not only because time and progression are integral features of traditional musical analysis, but because music's time is so intertwined with the concept of historic progression. Music's internal progression does more than 'reflect' a dynamic historical totality, it is able to confront (or, as a culture industry product, support) the current 'mythic' history through the development of its inner drive or dynamic. Music, like philosophy, can go against the grain of actual history.

The dynamic, or historic temporality can be defined as the movement of time through space, the unidirectional progression (linear or not) from one point to the next. The impetus for such movement is derived from the tension between dialectical antagonists. An example drawn from music should help to illustrate this idea: music's inherent forward momentum is the result of the tension that arises between 'discordant' tones, which in traditional music led to a resolution or concordance of tones. Another example might be the tension that develops between the overall theme(s) of the music and the individual variations, that then requires some resolution at the end of the piece. Opposition and resolution give the sense of forward movement.

Mythic time is 'static' in that there is no such progress from one point to the next. Movement occurs, but it is circular so that the beginning and end are one; it is the frenetic turning of the whirling dervish who, despite all the activity remains in the same space. Mythic temporality', characterized by repetition or the "ever-same," is a time-

space continuum that prevents dynamic time and movement from breaking the borders of space.

Mythic time and history, (as opposed to dynamic history) characteristic of our actual historical period, opposes the development of the autonomous individual. Man is prevented from moving into a 'future', since time is dissolved into the eternal present of this space. History's apparent movement forward is in fact an illusion, for the evolution of technology (the basis of the current notion of progress) has as a corollary man's regression to, "anthropologically more primitive stages."⁵⁶ The more that man adapts to the technologies of domination, thereby engendering the death of his own imagination, the greater the power of technology to enforce man's submission. Progress is its own 'contrary'.

Mythic time-space, through constant repetition, has collapsed all of actual, lived history into one endless cycle. Boundaries between past, present and future, which arise from and are central to, man's struggle to free himself from the domination of myth, are dissolved when Enlightenment reverts to myth. Enlightenment's dissolution of these parameters jeopardizes the entire notion of a dynamic history; history is both a tale of the past, an understanding of the present, and perhaps most importantly, offers alternatives of the future. If the present is identical to the past-*ie.*, the present is a repetition of the past, then its identity as the 'present' is no longer valid, for it has become the past. The 'future' similarly loses its claim to independence, becoming but a continuation of the present-past. All possibilities, even the concept of 'the possible' are eradicated in an inevitable cycle that destroys the essence of history. Abstracting and abstract, mythic time reduces all to the inevitability of that which has come before.⁵⁷ Mythic time ceases to be time,

when it confronts the content of experience
as something mechanical divided into static,

immutable units...and its...unstructured character becomes something spatial and narrow at the same time.⁵⁸

'Abstract', 'empty' and 'static' time all ultimately refer back to the domination of man by an alien and alienating rationalism, the epitome of which is the experiencing of industrial labour. The 'discontinuous, shock-like moments' of industrial production destroy the temporal continuum, rendering the 'concept of experience' impossible.⁵⁹ The tedious nature of industrial work, far from being a temporal unity or continuum, is merely the repetition of 'static' and unchangeable moments.

The objective existence of this timeless space is echoed in the individual's subjective experience of an internal loneliness or emptiness that they blame on time, simultaneously 'dreading' it, while trying to fill their internal space or void.⁶⁰ Music, the only object left that confirms a true dynamic, and therefore the idea of the unique, the new, the possible, is turned to for solace. The individual, whose sense of time and space is completely altered by myth, seeks in music the replacement of that which should be part of him-his freedom of movement in and through time.⁶¹ Man's internal void is nothing more nor less than the internalization of myth itself, the loss of his own psyche in the abstract vastness of mythic space and history. It is the function of the culture industry to fill this space with meaningless noise in order to draw attention away from it, while authentic serious art exposes the emptiness, reflecting on the individual's loneliness and alienation.⁶²

Culture and the culture industry do more than represent the antagonistic forces of enlightenment versus myth (Enlightenment), or dynamic versus static time; they are these forces in microcosm, and therefore play more than a symbolic role in the course of history and the individual's life. Music's special relationship to temporality defines its

particular role in the struggle between the alienated individual and true history, and the overwhelming totality of the mythic economic, social and ideological systems. It is in the realm of culture that the basis of a real revolution for a democratic society can be strengthened or thoroughly destroyed. A critique of aesthetics is thus inherently a social, political and ideological critique.

Drawing the Boundaries: Culture and the Culture Industry

The term 'culture industry' does not refer to a set of concrete institutions, but was coined in response to the more positive sounding 'mass' or 'popular' culture. These latter terms are employed by proponents of the culture industry who wish to suggest that modern culture is a truly democratic space where individuals make enlightened and critical choices. 'Culture industry' ridicules the notion that capitalist culture is democratic and the ironic claim that the people get what they want'.⁶³ In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, 'culture industry' replaced 'mass culture',

in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its advocates: that it is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of popular art.⁶⁴

Culture industry is the bureaucratic invasion and planning of the cultural realm. It disseminates, as well as manufactures, controls and disciplines the 'needs' and 'desires' which can only be satisfied by the consumption of the culture industry's products.⁶⁵ Finally, it refers to the 'standardization' of culture industry products and the lack of any substantive or structural difference between musical works, and by implication, between those individuals who constitute the public'.⁶⁶ The latter have become the 'average' and stereotyped consumers, members of the market-research-defined audience whose only distinctions are those

artificially fabricated by the culture industry itself. The series of consumer typologies based on socio-economic background, education and gender, ensure that none may escape the industry's ability to 'provide'. Everyone is expected to react according to his or her predetermined and 'indexed level'.⁶⁷

Although the term 'culture industry' is generally well-understood, the same cannot be said of the Frankfurt School's use of 'culture', a concept which, according to David Held, 'remains underdeveloped'.⁶⁸ Mentioned earlier, Adorno eschewed the anthropological definition which would embody the broad spectrum of morals, values, and institutions in favour of a definition that refers specifically to cultural/artistic products. Discussed at greater length in chapter four, the ambiguity in Adorno's approach to culture stems from his recognition of the other definition, but his refusal to discuss any relationship between the two. Most often the culture and music critique's central concern is the contrast between the products of the culture industry and true artistic culture.

'Culture', as opposed to the 'culture industry', retains its autonomy from the administrative rationale and presents the only critical perspective of modern society. True culture, "always simultaneously raised a protest against the petrified relations under which [people] lived, thereby honouring them."⁶⁹ Once integrated into the 'petrified' relations, art loses its critical capacity, submitting itself and humans to the process of objectification whereby it becomes commodity and its audience consumers.

Authentic art forces a confrontation between man and the reality of his alienation, revealing the culture industry's 'lie of humanity' and democracy. Through its embodiment of the individual's alienation, authentic art shows the culture industry's professed concern for the masses (as opposed to

bourgeois art) to be nothing more than the death of human imagination and spontaneity at the hands of administration and conformity.⁷⁰ Planning is key to the culture industry's escape from rebellion, for the token protest 'message' is allowed provided the industry can absorb it, proving the latter's democratic nature, or, that it be planned by the administration as 'protest'. The end of spontaneity, of the experience of the truly 'new' through the predominance of planning is not only the death of culture, but of history.

Planned production seems to purge the life-process of all that is uncontrollable, unpredictable,...in advance and thus to deprive it of what is genuinely new, without which history is hardly conceivable.⁷¹

Culture's stand against administration and for the immanent value of the individual work is simultaneously a commitment to nature. Culture "must recollectively assimilate," whatever the process of, "control over nature" has left in its trail. "Culture is the perennial claim of the particular over the general, as long as the latter remains unreconciled to the former."⁷² Fundamentally allied with nature, art speaks to the repressed nature in man's psyche as well, reminding him of his natural, instinctive and sensual level. Truly dynamic, authentic music's complete negation of the social totality forces man to confront the mythic stasis of his existence, and his objectification by the socioeconomic and cognitive systems.

In contrast, culture industry products' facile reconciliation of subject and object dissolves the dialectical opposition that creates a dynamic impetus. It falsely confirms that all oppositions have been historically resolved, or, that a synthesis in art is sufficient. The affirmation of great bourgeois art, once revolutionary, has become in modern culture industry society the justification rather than criticism of the status quo.⁷³

It is the change in historical conditions, and

particularly the rise of total administration that renders affirmation conservative and completely false. Affirmative art, as tacit support of the claim that all social contradictions have been solved, creates a 'premature reconciliation of contradictions at the level of popular consciousness'.⁷⁴ Movement towards a real historical and material reconciliation is not even recognized as a necessity.

A false identity between the subject and object within the culture industry work extends to the relationship between the consumer-audience and the works of art. The consumer identifies with culture industry music not because it has uncovered some objective truth of man's condition, but because it faithfully apes those same conditions of alienation and reification that man recognizes and identifies.⁷⁵ (Even the cynical view that all is corrupt and nothing changes is a mere repetition of the fatalism of the mythic world.) Total negation or refusal is the only resistance possible against the totalitarian social totality. By completely rejecting the economic system's demands that it be profitable, and that it adhere to corresponding social and aesthetic values, authentic art negates external interference in the music. It continues to insist on the autonomy that it was granted in the bourgeois world as *L'art pour l'art*', (even if this has been revealed as ideological by the enlightenment). For Adorno, the atonal and serial compositions of Schonberg, Berg and the New Viennese school of music are alone in their autonomy from and negation of rationalist society. The musical structures of the avant garde include, "without concession everything that society prefers to forget."⁷⁶

The opposition of culture to the culture industry is not synonymous with that of 'high' to popular' art, for it is Adorno's contention that the present culture is not popular.

The differences between the culture industry and culture is predicated on their respective relationships to the Enlightenment and administration, and therefore on their social function with regards to the emancipation of the potential autonomous individual. (As will be discussed in the second and third chapters however, this 'non-elitist' view of truly popular music tends to sound rather more aristocratic as the similarity between all culture industry and 'popular' music is examined.) Commodity art lulls man into accepting the inevitability of the given; pleasure is found through conformity. Both the work-place and the cultural or leisure space are of the mythic time-cycle that denies history or true progress. As the technology of domination progresses, man regresses. The loss of history in space, caused by temporality's decline, signals the liquidation of the autonomous individual'.⁷⁷

Music, it was suggested earlier, is particularly suited to carry out the culture industry functions and conversely, is the sole representative of true history and social change, because of its special relationship to the development of the individual senses and its embodiment of temporality.⁷⁸ Thus music's role and the analysis of that role carry more than aesthetic implications. Belonging to the aesthetic and cultural, music is social, ideological and ultimately political; culture industry music perpetuates a social totality that objectifies man and nature through an instrumental rationality, manifested in its economic, social, value and scientific systems. Authentic music, as the embodiment of alienation, offers one of the last hopes for a truly democratic society based on the enlightened individual.

In the following chapter the production and internal structures of music, their relationship to the external social totality and the crisis of the individual, and the struggle between the culture industry music and authentic art

music will be discussed. The third and fourth chapters will consist of a critique of some of the crucial ideas and interpretations. Particular attention will be paid to the question of an historic and musical subject, the notion of a negative totality, the conception of an historical teleology, and especially the interplay between space and time. In the fourth chapter I examine one of Adorno's apparent motivations, the quest for authenticity and the appeal for a true rationality. I would argue that the aesthetic critique and therefore the sociological understanding of music suffers because of Adorno's continued belief in the basis of rationality in spite of his criticism of the rationalism of consumer society. In addition, the quest for authenticity that underlies his critique of music tends to mask rather than reveal the ideological basis of many concepts and ideas, perpetuating a form of social and conceptual domination against which his theory purports to struggle. Finally, the stable centre to which authenticity refers conflicts with another primary consideration, that of the dynamic. Adorno's attempt to locate authenticity in the musical text leads to an undynamic social theory that can neither account for nor promote change.

Reference Notes to Introduction and Chapter One

1. Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (n.p.: Pelican Books, 1961), 55-56.
2. I have taken the liberty of using the term 'social collectivities' that was defined by David Chaney in a series of lectures delivered at McGill University, Dept. of Comparative Literature, in 1987. The term refers to the new type of social groupings-feminists, lesbians, gays, ecological and peace activists-that had not been incorporated into the socio-political and economic systems and theoretical framework. The identification of these new groupings, far from being the result of the social scientist's objective glance, came from the groups themselves. They can be loose or tight coalitions, with members belonging to more than one specific group. The essential factor here is that identification of the group is dependent upon the collectivity's own demand to be recognized as a collectivity that differs from the social or economic groups defined by either the left or right wing.
3. Jean Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," Social Research 52, No. 4 (Winter 1985), 670.
4. Ann Oakley, Subject Women (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), 310.
5. Gloria Hull and Patricia Bell Scott, "The Politics of Black Womens' Studies," introduction to, All the Blacks are Men, All the Women are White, But Some of Us are Brave: Black Women's Studies, Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell Scott and Barbara Smith eds. (New York: The Feminist Press, 1982), xviii.
6. Oakley, 311.
7. Walter Benjamin, "The Storyteller," in Illuminations, edited and with a foreward by Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968; Schocken Paperback, 1969), 84.
8. Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 115.
9. Jay, Adorno, 107. For further discussion of the implications of the messianic nature of Adorno's theories, see also Andrew Buchwalter, "hegel, adorno and the concept of transcendent critique," Philosophy and Social Criticism

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10. David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory; Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 52.
11. Russell Berman, "Adorno, Marxism and Art," Telos, No. 34 (Winter, 1977-78), 158.
12. Held, 53-60.
13. Ibid., 60.
14. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Herder and Herder, 1972; New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1986), 120-21.
15. Ibid., 13.
16. Jay, Adorno, 116. Also see Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) for a complete discussion on the genesis and epistemological foundations of a critical theory.
17. The use of the terms 'man', 'men' and 'his' is entirely intentional. What I hope to show is that Adorno is not referring to men and women when he uses the term 'man', for his theory is of and about men and mankind, not humankind. The exclusion of female experience and values cannot be healed through the addition of a '/her' or '/she', which, in this case, would be a tacit suggestion that women can be 'added on' at the end, as though their inclusion would in no way affect the theory itself. The point of using 'he/she' is to draw attention to the fact that 'he' cannot and does not reflect the universal, gender-free human, but the male of the species. I think that in this situation the use of such a 'term' or corrective would misrepresent both Adorno's theory, and, would divert attention away from its male-centred nature. It seems better to deny women the dubious status of being a late addition by calling attention to their complete absence.
18. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia; Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: NLB, 1974; Verso Editions, 1978), 51.
19. Held, 384.

20. Theodor Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," trans. Wes Blomster, Telos, No. 35 (Spring, 1978), 131.
21. Theodor Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," trans. Anson G. Rabinbach, New German Critique Vol. 2, No. 6 (Fall, 1975), 19.
22. Held, 19.
23. See Horkheimer and Adorno, "Elements of Anti-Semitism; The Limits of Enlightenment," in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 168-208, passim.
24. Susan Buck-Morss, "The Dialectic of T. W. Adorno," Telos, No. 14 (Winter, 1972), 139.
25. Held, 119.
26. Ibid., 117.
27. Theodor Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society," in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge: The MIT press, 1981), 32. Ideology is a necessary part of culture, for while it may be a 'lie', it nevertheless presents the ideal, without which the present would appear as the only possibility, which is itself a lie. It is this lie then, constituted negatively in modern art, that is the only source of redemption in modern society.

To identify culture solely
with lies is more fateful now
than ever, now that the former
is really becoming totally
absorbed by the latter...
If material reality is called
the world of exchange value, and
culture...refuses to accept the
domination of that world, then
it is true that such refusal is
illusory...Since...free...exchange
is itself a lie, to deny it is at
the same time to speak for truth... (Adorno,
"Baby with the bath-water," Minima Moralia, 44).
28. Held, 120.
29. Ibid., 114.
30. Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster (New York: The Continuum Publishing Corporation, 1973), 168.

- 31.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 3.
- 32.Ibid., 16.
- 33.Ibid., 15.
- 34.Ibid., 60.
- 35.Ibid., 17.
- 36.Ibid., 15.
- 37.Ibid., 27.
- 38.Ibid., 58.
- 39.Ibid., 60.
- 40.Ibid., 11.
- 41.Ibid., 4.
- 42.Ibid., 9.
- 43.Ibid., 5.
- 44.Ibid., 7-8.
- 45.Adorno, Minima Moralia, 63.
- 46.Ibid., 64.
- 47.Ibid., 65.
- 48.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 54.
- 49.Jay, Adorno, 68.
- 50.Adorno, Minima Moralia, 55.
- 51.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 28-30.
- 52.Ibid., 54-55.
- 53.Ibid., 7.
- 54.Theodor W. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury Press Inc., 1976), 45.
- 55.Adorno, Minima Moralia, 40.

- 56.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 35.
- 57.Adorno, Minima Moralia, 78.
- 58.Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 47.
- 59.Adorno, Minima Moralia, 54-55.
- 60.Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 47-48.
- 61.Ibid., 48-49.
- 62.See Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 43; and Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 52.
- 63.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 144-45.
- 64.Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," 12.
- 65.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 144.
- 66.Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," 14.
- 67.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 123.
- 68.Held, 81.
- 69.Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," 13.
- 70.Theodor Adorno, "Culture and Administration," trans. Wes Blomster, Telos, No. 37 (Fall, 1978), 99-105.
- 71.Adorno, "Perennial Fashion-Jazz," in Prisms, 125. Even to speak of 'culture' is paradoxically contrary to it. Such a discussion entails the categorization and separation characteristic of administration, which is antagonistic to culture. But the discussion is made necessary by the fact that culture within the context of modern society cannot truly escape compartmentalization, despite culture's attempts to resist. Its objective truth must be weighed against the reality of its dependence on the material conditions. See Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society," in Prisms, 19-34. and Jay, Adorno, pages 112-113.
- 72.Ibid., 97.
- 73.Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1937-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 179.

74. Ibid., 181.
75. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 27-28.
See also, "Perennial Fashion-Jazz," in Prisms, 123-24.
76. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 14.
77. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 187.
78. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 51.

Chapter Two

Composed Rationality

"Music," says Adorno, "is inextricably bound up with...the division of all art into kitsch and the avant-garde...."¹ Music, as kitsch and art, is inextricably bound up with the struggle between the myth of Enlightenment and the autonomous individual. Kitsch is the concrete expression of the culture industry's conformity and uniformity, while art-music is the last expression of social and historical truth.

At the risk of over-simplifying Adorno's highly complex analysis of music, I have, for the purposes of explanation, organized the following discussion around two sets of oppositions or dyads. The first is that of 'good' as opposed to 'bad' music. The 'good' music can be further subdivided into the two categories of '18th century or 'high' bourgeois music' and that of 'avant garde, atonal music'. Adorno's specific understanding of the term 'music' gives rise to the second dyad, in which 'music' -referring only to that which falls into the Western classical tradition, is juxtaposed to 'entertainment', also known as 'vulgar', 'light', 'popular' music. This latter category encompasses everything from tin pan alley songs to operettas, show tunes and jazz.² At the centre of these dyads stands the isolated and alienated individual, whose last point of resistance is that of an oppositional, critical culture. The central opposition-of 'good' as opposed to 'bad' music-is, in the end, the struggle between the autonomous individual and the system which seeks to destroy him.

While the sets of oppositions outlined above help order the discussion of a somewhat confusing topic, Adorno's theories and his language are, in reality, much more complex. These absolute divisions will necessarily become less certain and more complicated as the discussion evolves. In the following chapter then, I will introduce some of

Adorno's key concepts and ideas as well as his interpretations of certain musical works. This chapter is organized along both conceptual and directional lines; each section is based on a specific concept, and in each, the three (or four) types of music-serious good and bad music, as well as popular-will be discussed. In addition, the sections have been arranged so that there would be a downward movement from the external or abstract to the 'centre'-the music itself. Thus the methodology, the most 'removed' from the musical work itself, is the starting point. Discussion then turns to 1)the windowless monad, which establishes the image of music's relationship to society; 2)autonomy of music in relation to the market forces of capitalism; 3)the ideal and real social function of music, its relationship to historical truth and the individual psyche; 4)the dialectical opposition of subject(composer) and object(musical material) in the creation of the musical work; 5)the musical dynamic; 6)the authenticity of music. This last section relates the nature of the internal musical structures to the subject-composer, and then finally back to society at large in search of the authentic musical subject. A crucial idea for Adorno, 'authenticity' is also a reminder of how culture is political, for the 'authentic' is not only an aesthetic criteria, but embodies certain notion of who the 'people' are and how and why they experience and express their world. This section therefore also provides the pivoting point for the thesis, where description gives way to critique.

Most of the primary material in this chapter will be drawn from "On the Social Situation of Music," "Music and Technique," "Music and the New Music, in Memory of Peter Suhrkamp," Philosophy of Modern Music, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, and various essays from Prisms.

What I hope to do in this chapter is bring forward some of the more ambiguous and controversial aspects of Adorno's philosophy of music, since they pose interesting theoretical problems that relate not only to a social understanding of music, but in addition to the perception of history, and the possibilities of social change. In addition, the actual ability to relate and account for the experiential and sensual appreciation of music will be an underlying concern, since the failure to deal with the 'emotional' or lived experience of music signifies a failure to deal with music as a social, living and lived phenomenon.

Meeting in the Middle:

The Transcendent and Immanent Critiques

According to Martin Jay, Adorno espouses a combination of a Kantian-inspired immanent critique with a transcendent one in which the interpreter is able to transcend the current social totality, providing a critical, distanced perspective.³ In order to understand why and how Adorno justifies the use of two apparently mutually exclusive approaches, and how he attempts to reconcile them, it might be useful to return for a moment to the 'dyads' described in the introduction.

The approach to 'popular' music (or more accurately, culture industry popular music) is determined by the fact that it is essentially entertainment, which happens to take the form of music. The intent of the immanent aesthetic interpretation is not only to provide an understanding of the music, but through this, to reveal the historical truth which remains hidden in the musical structures. Musically unsophisticated and containing no such enigma, popular music does not require a musical analysis. As a product whose purpose is the satisfaction of immediate needs, this culture industry product is more profitably explored as entertainment.⁴ When it is stated then, that, "the distinction between New Music and music per se has become the distinction

between good and bad music," the 'music per se' does not include contemporary music.⁵ In the terms of an aesthetic analysis, popular entertainment ceases to be 'music'.

Accordingly, there is a difference between the approaches to the serious and popular music, with the immanent critique of art-music paying careful attention to the internal musical structures and dynamic, while the transcendent critique focuses primarily on the social-psychological affect of entertainment. Culture industry popular music, despite the fact that it is not really 'popular' in that it is neither made by nor for the people, is deserving of attention precisely because of its 'popularity' -its psychological and social affects on the vast majority of musically uneducated and non-critical people.⁶ The difference between popular music of the pre-culture industry era and culture industry popular is that the former fulfilled a valid social role. The disappearance of true popular music makes the transcendent critique even more relevant and necessary.

The absolute distinction between serious and popular music requires some modification because all affirmative culture industry music, light and serious, despite the differences in musical sophistication and the presence or lack of an ideological statement, supports the status quo by either completely denying the individual's alienation, or by erroneously offering music as the panacea for a societal illness. Although the psychological results may be similar, the complexity and ideological statement of serious music necessitates a different method of analysis.

An immanent critique assumes that the formal structure of the music, its immanent development and qualities, are the source of its 'truth'. Entering into the music, the critic should apprehend and "develop the logic of the work itself," bringing to their logical conclusion the inconsistencies and antagonisms that characterize the relationship between subject

and object, individual and general.⁷

All serious works of music are ideological insofar as they purport to represent the reality of current conditions. The harmony and organic unity of a sonata falsely suggests that the reconciliations of subject-object and general-particular have already been historically achieved.⁸ Exploring the gap between the ideological statements of the music and social reality, this form of criticism, unlike that which would reduce all art to falsehood, preserves the utopian aspiration of music while simultaneously revealing its lie.⁹

An important aspect of the immanent critique is its granting of primary status to the individual work over the organizing, general concepts. Where a conceptual or transcendent analysis uses the concrete musical piece to substantiate the validity of the analytic method and its predetermined categories, the immanent critique seeks to develop the truth of the individual musical work. Denying the objective stance of positivist enquiry, the "objective consciousness" is "submerged" into the object and develops its hidden truth. The object becomes its own criticism.¹⁰

In contrast, the transcendent or 'conceptual' critique has the premise that the truth of the historical totality-alienation, domination by rationality-as-myth, cannot be found in society or its cultural products. Rather, the truth of history as it actually exists and as the truth of the possible, or what Buchwalter calls the "standards of rationality" are to be found only above society.

Where totality is characterized by its "absolute negativity", criticism becomes utopian in the literal sense; a positive vision of life is sustainable only as that which is absolutely alien (*ganzanderes*) to the entire historical order.¹¹

Here it might be useful to recall that one of the ideas introduced in Chapter One was that critical theory, and hence the immanent critique, works within the space between what

art-music promises and social reality. It is this difference between the two that proves that utopia has yet to be attained. Since culture industry products are perfect replicas of what in fact is, ideology, as the vision of the possible, is destroyed, making an ideological critique impossible. "There are no more ideologies in the authentic sense of false consciousness, only advertisements for the world through its duplication..."¹² If the social critique is to continue, it becomes imperative to assert that there are ideals, principles or standards of rationality which exist above the social totality. It is from this privileged height that the enlightened critic, who has somehow escaped the confines of the social totality can continue to expose society's failures, as well as hint¹³ at the possibilities of the future.¹⁴

It was mentioned above that although these two approaches appear to be mutually exclusive, with each intended for a different cultural product, (ie., immanent critique for serious music, transcendent critique for popular entertainment) Adorno believes that they should be reconciled. The immanent critique eventually confronts history when the musical totality, once evaluated in detail according to the inherent laws of musical development, is related to social configurations and the historical totality. Without the meeting between immanent critique and the, "consciousness transcending the immanence of culture, immanent critique itself would be inconceivable..." All forms of criticism require the presence of, "someone who is not entirely engulfed," by the culture.¹⁵ Ultimately, the musical structures are to be, "understood as social mediations,"¹⁶ although it can be suggested that the necessary mediating stages between the musical structures, society and the individual are not always apparent.¹⁷

Ideally the transcendent and the immanent critiques would be used conjointly, but with the advent of the culture industry the latter has assumed the greatest importance for the analysis of serious music, while the transcendent critique alone is applicable to popular music. There are two closely related reasons why Adorno privileges the immanent critique for serious art music.¹⁸ In the last chapter it was suggested that all objects and subjects are forcibly equalized by an economic ethos and market that deprived them of their inherent value. In response to this, the task of the social critic is to re-assert the value of the object in the face of an overwhelming breadth (and superficiality) of the general concept. Thus interpretation should begin with and within the individual object rather than a set of pre-existing concepts.¹⁹

The second reason is really an extension of the first. An analysis which is based on a set of pre-established concepts tends to ignore or dismiss those musical works that are most likely to be 'good'. Because these works are so rare and are misunderstood by society, they fail to fit into a coherent 'whole'. Throwing, "an all-too rapid glance at the total picture," the conceptual analysis tends to become, "entangled with the totality, or the mainstream... condemn[ing] everything which does not fit into the over-all picture."²⁰ Yet it is in these deviant works that the 'whole picture', the historical and social truth, is best represented.²¹ A purely transcendent critique then, would both misinterpret the music and perpetuate the fallacy of the Enlightenment's 'egalitarianism'.

The transcendent critique is reserved for the analysis of culture industry popular music, which unlike art music is not a complete and mediated totality, but a more direct, and simplistic expression of social formations.²² While culture industry pop reflects the dominant ideology, its ideology is not a visionary reflection of the better society and a greater

historical truth, but is nothing more than a mirror of what is. Immanent critique, relying on the presence of a philosophical idealism that reflects, "the fetishization of culture," is incapable of responding to a society where, "the definition of consciousness has become a means of dispensing with all consciousness which does not conform to existence."²³ By adopting consumerism as the ideology, culture industry products,

need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just business is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce.²⁴

Conversely, part of consumer industry's justification for pop, (aside from the cynical proclamation that it is just business'), that it is harmless fun, makes an intellectual critique seem 'inappropriate' and harmful.²⁵ As one aspect of his analysis then, Adorno evaluates the way in which the natural, 'orgiastic' sensual fun of truly popular music has given way to the administered, simulated 'fun' of the culture industry. The orgiastic moment of pure sensuality in authentic popular music evolves into a never-fulfilled promise in culture industry music, where the satisfaction of desires is ultimately denied.²⁶ An intellectual analysis, done in the service of sensuality and experience, undermines the culture industry's disguise of 'fun'.

Anyone who interprets popular music in accordance with its own laws or standards (ie., an immanent critique) has erroneously assumed that popular music's production is as autonomous as that of serious music. A truly critical analysis would have to emanate from a point outside of popular music and the social totality where the psychosocial affects and relations are more clearly perceived.²⁷

Although the psychosocial critique takes precedence over all others in popular music analysis, it remains an integral element in the interpretation of serious art music as well.

The musical works of Schonberg, Berg, Stravinsky, and Wagner are all related conceptually to the regression or development of the mature ego, neuroses, narcissism, schizophrenia and ego-weakness.²⁸ At the intersection of all musics is the individual, and the dividing line between the 'good' and the 'bad' (although not necessarily so clearly demarcated) is drawn according to the role that the music plays in the psychological and social development of the individual.

It is where the immanent and transcendent critiques meet that difficulties develop. Vacillation between the approaches produces a 'fragmented' system of explanation that is, "stretched between thought and experience, between concepts and formal analysis."²⁹ In addition, I would argue that Adorno's insistence on the 'objective historical truth' further undermines his attempt to reconcile these two approaches, since each seems to assume a different kind of cognition, and a different 'truth'.

A second problem associated with the transcendent critique involves the privileged position of the critic. According to Jay,

Adorno...never rigorously justified his [and other critics'] privileged status beyond talking of a 'stroke of undeserved luck' that has kept some individuals not quite adjusted to the prevailing norms.'³⁰

Another question comes to mind when considering the critic and the transcendent critique. If the critic can transcend social norms and thus apprehend a transcendent truth or principle, then why is this truth not true for serious art music as well? Why the need for an immanent critique? While it can perhaps be suggested that avant garde music shares with the critic a privileged position, since it demonstrates the same critical stance towards the social totality, and is therefore the equal possessor of the 'truth', it too is eventually subjected to a transcendent critique. Buchwalter's

explanation of this vacillation between transcendent and immanent critique is convincing. He suggests that Adorno neither gives up transcendence for the serious music analysis, nor really commits himself to the immanent critique. Rather, Adorno, "espouses a transcendent concept of critique despite his use of the tools of immanence."³¹ Adorno uses immanence as a way of escaping the traps of affirmation-and of achieving the transcendent critique in spite of its conceptual and 'general' tendencies. Working through the immediate reality of the musical work, the critic is able to turn the music into its own criticism, and in so doing is released from having to name the transcendent vision itself.³²

Buchwalter's understanding of Adorno's 'immediate reality' also challenges the idea that all music is ultimately regarded as "social mediations." He maintains that Adorno's 'immediate reality' does not refer to the, "reality of existing conditions," but to the, "reality of 'unregimented experience'."³³ Thus the conceptual dominates the concrete experience.

To conclude this brief section on methodology, it is clear that the attempt to reconcile the immanent and transcendent critiques while maintaining a belief in a knowable truth is fraught with difficulties. I would suggest that the ambiguities and tension that result from this effort are bound to be reflected not only in the actual musical interpretation, but in the implications that the philosophy of music makes about history, culture and ideology. It will become apparent that the discussion of popular music suffers from an exclusively transcendent critique that prohibits any detailed examination of the music itself.

The Windowless Monad

Adorno's depiction of music as a 'windowless monad' is an appropriate pivoting point upon which the discussion of

methodology can turn to that of the musical interpretation. It creates a clear image of music's relation to society, its social function, and also introduces Adorno's most important musical concepts.

The relation of works of art to society is comparable to Leibniz's monad. Windowless—that is to say, without being conscious of society, and in any event without being constantly and necessarily accompanied by this consciousness—the works of art, and notably of music which is far removed from concepts, represent society. Music, one might think, does this the more deeply the less it blinks in the direction of society.³⁴

I will begin with Ferenc Feher's interpretation of the 'windowless monad' since he relates the autonomy of music - its windowless character, to its order formation—the dynamic totality. He makes a distinction between music as an, "entity existing for itself," and music as an, "organized entirety of tones," where the 'organized' indicates the role of the external subject.³⁵ The music, as 'an entity for itself', points to the objectively existing musical material whose main purpose is to express its own inherent musical dynamic, irrespective of the external world. Music though, is an organized totality, and, "every kind of order...every kind of totality," is externally imposed through the intercession of the subject-composer who must, for the sake of human perception, organize the music into a sensually experienceable form.³⁶ Music is therefore both an autonomous windowless monad whose immediate purpose is its self-development, as well as being an embodiment of the social totality. Through the intercession of the subjective will (ie. the composer), music internalizes and reproduces the social totality, ultimately causing it to point to the world beyond. Music best represents and explains the world beyond when it fully develops its internal structures, (remaining autonomous, windowless), for it is through these structures that the truth

of the historical totality finds its voice.

Music is both of nature and is historically constituted; where the material is 'objectively existing', and is therefore of nature, the form or style and the tonal idiom are historically determined. It is the extent to which the music internalizes the social antinomies that determines whether the music is 'good' or 'bad'. Good music is produced through the dialectical opposition of material and style (or object and subject) which results in the formation of a dynamic totality. It is only by resisting the attempts of the economic market to control its formation that music can ensure its authentic presentation of historical truth. Autonomy from the culture industry and the rationalizing profit motive is an essential facet of real music.

On Autonomy

Affirmative music of the high bourgeois era was granted a greater degree of freedom from the forces of the market economy than is contemporary art music. While composers such as J.S. Bach and Beethoven were indebted to Church and court, or private patron respectively, the extent to which these outside factors influenced the actual composition of the music was minimal. In fact, the reliance on a private patron acted as a buffer against the potential pressures exerted by the economy and the process of rationalization.³⁷ In addition, music's seeming irrationality and its strong alliance with nature also preserved its 'sacred' independence from an increasingly rationalized society.³⁸ The irony of society's over-zealous rationalization is that its inability to completely destroy man's irrationality has necessitated the creation of areas in which irrationality can still be expressed.³⁹ Music and other art forms have become these administered 'areas' in which the 'heartwarming aspects' of irrational moments are still provided.⁴⁰

Music can only be considered as 'irrational' from the perspective of a society whose own rationality has become mythical or irrational, serving the needs of the system rather than man. In this context, music's apparent irrationality becomes rational; confronting the utilitarian principle of the market economy and philosophy, music reminds man that his own 'nature' should not be repressed. It is in the 'function of functionlessness' of autonomous music that, "truth and ideology entwine"; where the non-utilitarian sensuality of music gestures back beyond society to the repressed nature.⁴¹ The, "useless occupies the place of that which can no longer be distorted by profit."⁴²

Albeit ideological as 'l'art pour l'art', the 'freedom' from the market economy protected the autonomy of bourgeois music and guaranteed its critical social perspective. With the development of monopoly capitalism this special, if somewhat feudal relationship of patron and composer, was replaced by the more 'rational' market process of production under which music's functionlessness became its immediate function. The function or utilitarian principle conquers functionlessness by asserting that the primary function of music is to be found precisely in its functionlessness, thereby degrading and rendering irrelevant the whole concept of functionlessness. Packaged, sold and bartered like any other commodity, the non-utilitarian truth of music is sacrificed in the name of entertainment.⁴³

The work of art, by completely assimilating itself to need, deceitfully deprives men of precisely that liberation from the principle of utility which it should inaugurate.⁴⁴

The essential difference between bourgeois autonomous and culture industry non-autonomous music is that the actual composition of the latter is immediately directed by external economic forces.⁴⁵ Market rationale not only controls distribution but implicitly dictates the entire structure of

-- the culture industry musical work, thereby guaranteeing its profit potential. The most blatant example of this musical co-optation is the publication of books that guide song-writers in the composition of 'hit songs' (which by definition are neither too challenging nor serious).⁴⁶ While it was also ultimately a commodity, bourgeois music was created by composers who, "lived in permanent conflict with their administrations,"⁴⁷ that is, the church and/or court. Culture industry pop is nothing more than an exaltation of and advertisement for its commodity nature.⁴⁸

Popular music's value is no longer determined by its inherent value as entertainment, but by its externally determined exchange value. As popular' comes to signify a quantitative as opposed to qualitative measure, the needs of man and music are sacrificed to the dictates of social fads. This absorption of music by capitalist rationalization signals the complete alienation (betrayal) from man.⁴⁹

Although affirmative, it cannot be legitimately argued that consumer music is the heir of the great bourgeois tradition of affirmation; bourgeois music's power and greatness is not a function of an imposed style and forced organic unity, but is founded on its expression of the individual's suffering in the, "antinomies of its own formal language."⁵⁰ Elevating the style of affirmation over the substance, consumer music obscures what had been a fundamental truth of the great bourgeois compositions, that is, its autonomy and structural inclusion of social antagonisms.

Modern music must therefore respond to the pressure of the economic forces by portraying its own alienation and asserting its autonomy in whatever tonal idiom the historical period demands. Current conditions no longer permit the affirmative gesture, for, "any presentment of hope is absorbed by the culture industry as justification for the status quo."⁵¹

Only avant garde music is the proper heir to the bourgeois

tradition, since it alone demands autonomy. However removed from society, atonal music cannot rightfully be criticised for 'retreating' from its social responsibility, for only by digging "into its own being," can art bear, "witness to the negative absolute of this world-the world of Auschwitz."⁵²

Social Function

Music's social function, its formal representation of the truth of the historical totality, remains constant in spite of the change from tonality to atonality. The 'change' in 'social function' which Adorno mentions in "Music and the New Music," refers not to the underlying function of the representation of the social totality, but rather to the nature of its presentation. Atonal music, while no longer concerned with being "lovely" nevertheless "preserves an image of humanity," through its continuing portrayal of dehumanization.⁵³

In both the works of Beethoven and Schonberg, the social antagonisms of subject and object, of general and particular are represented in the innermost musical structures. In the greatest works of Beethoven, for example, the organic unity of the style (tonality) is juxtaposed to the inherent antagonisms of the musical structures. Social antinomies are revealed rather than disguised, "behind the smoothness of sensual movement."⁵⁴ Tonality's ideological representation of reconciliation was a necessary counterpoint to the structural antagonisms in which the truth of the social totality was embodied. For Schonberg and the avant garde the internalization of social antinomies can no longer be softened by affirmative idealism, since the promises of true enlightenment cannot be realized, given the current social totality.⁵⁵ Avant garde's harsh truth must be expressed in the foreboding tone of dissonance where the failure to resolve signifies the irreconcilable tension between the general and

particular, object and subject. Avant garde ceases to ideological; "it tends toward the direction of knowledge."⁵⁶

Music performs a social function which closely parallels that of critical theory. Comparable to Adorno's own philosophy, avant garde music (and the affirmative music that preceded it) evokes and expresses the concrete experience of individual suffering.⁵⁷ In its autonomy from the market and the affirmative communication system, atonal music, despite (or because) of its social isolation, finds itself paradoxically closer to man, giving, "concrete expression to the [music's] potential [suffering] subject."⁵⁸ As a sensual form in a world that denies sensuality, the mere existence of real music promises, if only negatively, the possibility of resisting society's totalitarianism and denial of experience.

This emphasis on sensuality (in what might otherwise appear to be a rather sterile theory) is inherently connected to Adorno's concern with the relationship between the development of the individual psyche and the rise of fascism and culture industry societies. Without entering into an in-depth discussion of Adorno's psychoanalytic theories, their obvious importance in his interpretation of music and culture should be noted. Music's social function cannot be understood in simply abstract terms, for music has a direct bearing on- and even incorporates aspects of mental illnesses.

Both man's unconscious and nature' are repressed by culture industry and fascist societies. The relationship between music and the character structure of individuals should be understood within the context of psychological and social repression. The psychological structures of music influence the development of the democratic or authoritarian personality. If "conventionalism, submissiveness to authority, destructiveness and cynicism [are] symptomatic of an anti-democratic character structure," then it is precisely conventionalism and submissiveness in music that further

repress and eventually destroy the individual.⁵⁹ In a social totality that denies experience, the sensuality of music is both a representation of repressed nature and the unconscious, as well as a way perhaps, of awakening the natural (instinctual, libidinal) in man. Yet I don't think that Adorno's concern for the survival of the 'natural' should be seen as a call for the uninhibited expression of the libidinal energies (truly irrational and anarchic), but for their rational and rationalized expression.

One of the major problems with Adorno's psychoanalytic analysis is that it rests on a fundamentally male view of sexuality. He assumes that the 'autonomous male individual' is the, "only locus of possible opposition to the status quo."⁶⁰ The resultant socially conservative view of society and culture is echoed in his approach to music, with its heavy emphasis on production, progress, (and impotence) in the musical structures, and the psychological illnesses that this impotence (lack of male energy) generates.⁶¹ If avant garde music, reaching deep into the repressed subconscious, comes from the, "reality of a psychic drive...towards undisguised and uninhibited expression of the psyche and of the unconscious per se," it does so only in relation to the male psyche.⁶² Like psychoanalysis, the social task of avant garde is to aid in the re-constitution of the (male) ego.⁶³

Stravinsky and other neo-classical composers who attempted to restore communicability to music through tonality, failed to understand that the only solution to the crisis of alienation and reification is social, and cannot be achieved in music itself. They therefore attempt the impossible: the re-creation of an organic unity between subject and object through the imposition of traditional styles onto the musical material, even though the latter has gone beyond the point where harmony is acceptable.⁶⁴

Neo-classical music finds itself becoming an apologist for rationalism. Trying to establish some point of communication between music and the people in a context where communication demands the renunciation of historical truth (that of the complete alienation and isolation of the individual), neo-classical music must depend on the appearance (style) of authenticity in the form of a tired and historically incorrect tonality. Its autonomy dissolved through the external imposition of socially acceptable folk themes, neo-classical music can no longer fulfill its social function.⁶⁵

The attempt to eradicate alienation through music destroys the music, since the structural dynamic is secondary to the creation of a socially acceptable and profitable style, and it is destined to leave the social condition of alienation unaltered.⁶⁶ Even when neo-classical music does approach its desired goal of authenticity, it ultimately confirms that the current psychological and ideological state of the individual and society is immutable. The aim of such music is neither to comment on the truth or falsehood of this state of being, nor to express, even negatively as does the avant garde, the possibility of change.⁶⁷

Psychologically, Stravinsky's regression to primitive styles of music can be related to infantilism through the unrealizable desire to establish a pre-ego collective identity. Where avant garde recognizes that any future collectivity, if at all possible, must first require the maturation of the ego, Stravinsky bypasses the individual to regress to a state of pre-ego individuation where the collectivity is defined by its psychological immaturity. But even this return to the pre-ego stage is made impossible by an irreversible history.⁶⁸ The music which intends to carry out this project, "imprints upon itself an attitude similar to that of the mentally ill," and becomes, "an aping of

obsession, and even more so, of schizophrenia."⁶⁹ Its message to the individual is to submit to his own alienation (mental illness) with a sigh of relief, erroneously seeking in music the restoration of the pre-individual collective.

Neo-classical's final message of submission complements that of culture industry pop, where sado-masochistic and narcissistic tendencies are the norm. Where neo-classical at least acknowledges the ego's weakened state (in order to rejoice in it), culture industry pop denies the existence of the ego from the outset. It is in the analysis of popular music that the transcendent psychosocial critique assumes priority. According to Adorno the psychological impact of pop can best be understood if the music's pretension to any degree of individuality is dispensed with at the very beginning. In the discussion of pop, genres', as opposed to individual works take precedence.⁷⁰

Since pop music has never had the same ideal social function as art music, the only logical comparison to be made is between authentic and culture industry pop. One of pop music's roles has been that of corrective to and inspiration for autonomous bourgeois music. It demonstrated that bourgeois music's autonomy was won at the exclusion (however necessary) of the proletariat, while it simultaneously provided serious composers with new melodies and themes.⁷¹ Representing the unmediated force of nature against an increasingly rationalized society and music, popular music retained the "orgiastic intoxication" that rationalized music increasingly rejected.⁷² Despite its incorporation of nature, its lack of rational organization and critical reflection condemns pop to a secondary role with regards to the autonomous individual-as the handmaid to real music. It is more closely associated with the rebellion of the unindividuated masses against their cooptation by the rationalized system of production. Thus it is also the expression of rebelliousness, ribald celebration

designed to unmask the "feudal hierarchies" of the 17th and 18th centuries.⁷³ Finally, as a necessary diversion from the monotonous routine and daily oppression of the production line, popular music (leisure time) helped workers to psychologically recuperate and prepare themselves for the next day's work.⁷⁴ This diversion, far from being supportive of the status quo, offered a new experience that re-established a belief in the possibility of the individual, and in historical change.

Popular music's decay is a result of the incorporation of both high and low art under the general system of the culture industry. By insisting that popular music adopt a more serious demeanour, the element of absurdity that had constituted a great part of its resistance to rationalization was destroyed.⁷⁵ Popular music has been perverted by the growth of the planned culture, which, in predetermining these moments of 'spontaneity' or 'rebelliousness' during an administered 'leisure time', destroys their very nature. Healthy diversion has become 'distraction'; it,

[prevents] people from reflecting on
themselves and their world, ...and
[persuades] them at the same time that
since this world provides such an abundance
of enjoyable things it must be in good shape.⁷⁶

The characteristic mental non-attention required by everyday life and work is reproduced by popular music, reinforcing the individual's exhaustion and boredom.⁷⁷

Culture industry popular music stimulates (and simulates) the false but comforting collective identity which, in evoking a sense of immediacy, soothes and masks men's suffering. In it the promise of a future utopia is replaced by the music, which is presented (in the present) as the fulfillment of the future.⁷⁸ With the vision of the future indistinguishable from the reality of the present, the mythic circle is completed.

Listeners of popular music suffer from narcissism and ego-weakness, for while the individual submits to the musical primordial collectivity, he is also given the false sense that he may be an important or primary character.⁷⁹ Since self-denial is easier than resistance, the emotionally debilitated individual finds it a relief to allow the music to direct and channel his emotions. For the most self-alienated, music substitutes as "ersatz" emotions in place of real feelings.⁸⁰

Jazz is frequently a target of Adorno's critique, perhaps because it is often perceived to be truly 'popular' and sexually rebellious. Criticizing it for its pure commodity and conformist nature,⁸¹ Adorno's analysis of the sexually emancipatory promise of jazz echoes his interpretation of culture industry's 'fun', where the denial of fun, after it has been promised, leads to the painful 'laughter of conciliation'. According to Jay, Adorno believed that jazz' promise of liberation was combined, "with its aesthetic denial."⁸² The rebellion of jazz was,

accompanied by the tendency to blind
obedience, much like the sado-masochistic
type...who chafes against the father-figure
while secretly admiring him, who seeks to
emulate him and in turn derives enjoyment
from the subordination he overtly detests.⁸³

(It could be argued that Adorno's focus on a White and male perception of sexuality does far more to deny the sexual energy of Black women (and Black men), which may be feared by White male society, than jazz ever could.)

Ideology has been replaced in popular music by, "instructions for behaviour."⁸⁴ Unconscious reflexes are the response to the signals and cues that are created by music's system of special effects. While the weakened individual may occasionally exhibit psychotic reactions to the stimuli, the self-destructive drive instigated by the music usually leads to self-destructive tendencies. Even when the condition of alienation becomes evident, the fatalistic or cynical shrug

of the shoulders merely confirms the individual's powerlessness in the face of the unalterable social totality.

Music's social function is determined by its autonomy and negation of the economic system and dominant ideology. Representation of the individual's alienation is only possible when music resists incorporation into the culture industry, choosing to maintain the integrity of its internal structures over creating the illusion of communication and identity. Formal integrity preserves the musical dynamic, the instance of historical truth. Autonomy from the external pressures to conform is dependent on the subject-composer, who can either resist the demands made upon him by society, or eventually submit to the stylistic dictates of the culture industry. While the dominance of style may at first appear to represent the strength of the subjective will over the object, it really signals the defeat of both subject and object by a market system which respects the integrity of neither. The dialectical opposition of style and material, or subject and object is the foundation of music's (and therefore history's) dynamic.

Subject-Object: Style, Technique and Material

The ideal dialectical relationship of subject to the objective musical material was most closely approximated in the works of Beethoven, whose classical compositions mark the pinnacle of musical and historical progress.⁸⁵ In contrast, the culture industry's emphasis on the subject's manipulation and control of the musical material leads to a dissolution of the dialectical tension that gives meaning to both subject and object. Authentic music must restore the object to its place in the musical production in order to re-create the dialectical tension, crucial to the dynamic of music and progressive history.

The subject-composer's influence is manifested in what is termed the 'style', or way in which the musical material is organized. A genuine style that represents most immediately the wishes and desires of society is the "utopian promise" in the work of art.⁸⁶ Style is what gives sensual and experienceable form to the objectively existing material, but it is neither totalizing nor flawless, rather it reveals its ideological premise by exposing the spaces between it and the material. Style is not merely the imposition of external taste, but is part of the composer's attempt to offer a concrete response to the immanent logic of the object.⁸⁷

The culture industry ignores the fundamental dialectical relationship between style (subjective will) and the objective material, by-passing this crucial confrontation by imposing what it considers to be easily digested forms. Its products are all style, and their glossy surfaces create the illusion of a unified, organic music. But because style is freed from having to oppose the, "specific demands of the subject matter," which is in fact the source of style's own meaning, the reason for its existence is destroyed.⁸⁸

Technique determines the way in which style and subject matter are worked into an organized, rational totality. 'Technique' refers to the, "totality of all musical means: the organization of the substance itself and its transformation into a physical phenomenon." The subjective factor of the composer's talent and ability to which this term generally refers is supplemented by an objective one; the "impetus of ability, success and function which are the purpose and goal of the organization."⁸⁹ What I believe this means is that the impetus of the organization is objectively existing-it is apart from the subject's endeavour. This force has an aspect of 'being-in-itself'.⁹⁰ While 'technique' is not reducible to the subject's expertise, it ultimately depends on it, and while it is not to be equated with content, it is

integral to it. Although a somewhat confusing term, since it includes subjective expertise, refers to methods of organization, and this 'objective impulse' of the organization, technique, along with style, is central to Adorno's theory and his conceptualization of the composer's role.

The image envisioned by idealist aesthetics of the composer as a free creator, once not entirely inappropriate, has been thoroughly discredited by the culture industry's total control over the composer. The freedom of the few avant garde composers must therefore be expressed negatively as disobedience to society, but not as freedom to create, for the social disobedience only leads to obedience to the demands of the music.

[The composer's] efforts find fulfillment in the execution of that which his music objectively demands of him. But such obedience demands of the composer all possible disobedience, independence, and spontaneity.⁹¹

Such disobedience that depends on the ingenuity and strength of the composer, frees him to follow the rules established by the music, an increasingly strict task-master. The composer becomes less of a 'creator' than a problem-solver. Every musical measure becomes a challenge of technique, with the composer required to reply with the correct response.⁹² In one sense a technocrat's dream, radical music's testimony to man's suffering requires that the music no longer be 'decorative', or even 'lovely', it can no longer provide the context for imagination and play; it is true.⁹³

In contrast to the traditional tonal system where keys and intervals are predetermined, Schonberg's atonal-later twelve-tone system permits the composer to create a series or row of twelve tones whose intervals are arbitrarily selected. Any tone can be the 'tonic', and all twelve tones must be used before the tonic can be heard again.⁹⁴ In contrast to tonal

technique, the atonal or twelve-tone technique tends to produce dissonant, and what some people feel are jarring sounds, disrupting common musical expectations. (While Adorno's admiration of Schonberg decreases as a result of the new domination of the material through the twelve-tone technique, it is still seen as the culmination of the Western musical tradition.)⁹⁵

Breaking through the strictures of tonality liberated the composer and the material from the weight of historical convention, and undermined tonality's claim to be 'natural', as opposed to historically constituted, music. Freed from social convention, the composer was in a position where the development of compositional technique, and mastery over the musical material, became possible. Yet even the twelve tone system arouses the temptation to use technique to obfuscate or destroy the potential of the musical material, a temptation to be constantly resisted by the composer.⁹⁶

The apparently arbitrary nature of the twelve-tone technique is not an indication of the imposition of the subject's will, but is the expression of the musical material's own desires, its internalization and extension of society's total and totalizing rational organization. Atonality, divesting itself of any "animal warmth," signalled the, "maximum of rational organization of the sounds."⁹⁷ The avant garde musician is severely restrained by his compositional technique which prohibits any flight of the imagination. The "terrible discipline" of the twelve-tone technique is nevertheless an "instant of freedom," for it preserves, more than any other musical form, technique itself, and therefore musical experience in the face of a barbarity that destroys true technical standards.⁹⁸

On the first level then, atonal music is, "produced through bypassing the subject"; neither a reflection nor product of a subjective "state of feeling," the avant garde's

expression of the objective, reified condition of man finds its source in the immanent musical material.⁹⁹ In this context the composer has ceased to create, becoming more of a catalyst whose expertise is in interpreting and expressing the intentions of the musical material. However, the 'bypassing' of the subject is accomplished only with the permission of the subject-composer. The composer must therefore have both the technique(subjective) to answer the material's puzzle, and the insight which commands him to follow the music rather than society's direction. Thus Adorno's favourite composers are members of the 'lucky few' individuals who escaped the social totality.

In complete contrast to Schonberg's works, those of Stravinsky and other neo-classical composers are defined by the supremacy of style and taste over the musical intent. Making alienation a direct, immediate concern of the music's style rather than its structures, Stravinsky tried to respond directly to the external demands for a reconciliation of social antinomies.¹⁰⁰ In Stravinsky's music, style becomes a superficial wrapping that advertises itself as the cure to alienation.

Like the avant garde, Stravinsky's music is strictly controlled, and has a rigid process or selection. Twelve-tone technique's intent however, if not always successful, was the exclusion of old, cliched elements of composition and the elaboration of a completely new set of rules emanating from the music itself, whereas Stravinsky's deliberately seeks to restore some sense of familiarity and recognition. The exclusion practiced by Stravinsky, his resort to tribal rhythms and dance music is the composer's, not the music's response to alienation and the liquidation of the individual.¹⁰¹

If atonality's initial denial of freedom to the composer and apparently, to the musical material, eventually leads to

a deeper freedom for both, Stravinsky's apparent liberation of composer and music masks the annihilation of both. Because popular opinion associates the 'primal' or folk rhythms with nature, it is assumed that Stravinsky's music is also closer to nature, less governed by intent, and therefore liberated from rationalist social constraints.¹⁰² This perspective is reinforced by atonal's seemingly overly-intellectual, rational sound. Yet the absence of intent is the absence of music's intent, not that of the composer's. Stravinsky's harmony, unhindered by the necessity of guided chordal progression, gives

an objective picture of sovereignty, freedom from the force of nature, and a mastery which although fully developed, is without intention.¹⁰³

Absence of the musical material's intention destroys the compositional intent. Technique serves the composer's impulse as opposed to that of the musical totality's, undermining the very purpose of technique. Stravinsky's "clever mastery" and musical skill are harnessed to his taste, leading to the, "progressive deterioration of compositional procedures, to the ruin of technique."¹⁰⁴ Although the subject may dominate through the imposition of style, the subject's true purpose is denied if it is prevented from confronting the drive of the objective material. Aleatory music merely confirms the domination of the immature subject over the object, and hence the meaninglessness and impotence of the subject. An illustration of this is drawn from "Petrouchka," which shows the music's unsympathetic attitude towards the individual. Even when the text calls forth the suffering of the clown, the music, indifferent to the individual's alienation, identifies not with the individual, but with those who would destroy him.¹⁰⁵

The neutralization of the objective musical material leads inevitably back to the liquidation of the subject, who

finds no point of resistance in Stravinsky's music, but is instead persuaded to seek comfort in the conformity of self-annihilation.¹⁰⁶ The relationship between subject and object, devoid of any dialectical tension, produces a static, unprogressive time which portrays the present as eternal and immutable. The collective that demands the self-abrogation of the subject celebrates the individual's mental illness and powerlessness.

While serious music allows the style to confront the musical substance so that in the final musical work the two become indistinguishable, the culture industry's popular music is nothing but style.¹⁰⁷ Its insistence on the structural similarity of musical forms for the purposes of reproduction and distribution, in accordance with pre-established stylistic conventions assure the listener that nothing really 'new' or 'threatening' will be produced.¹⁰⁸ Constant repetition convinces the listener that he identifies with the music and can consider himself part of a musical collective, whereas in fact what he is experiencing is a manipulated familiarity. Music becomes predictable, and the subject rejoices in his ability to foresee the end.¹⁰⁹ Even the differences between genres-*i.e.*, country and western, jazz, rock- are superficial, created by the industry in an attempt to disguise the essential sameness of the music.

While the 'new' may not be totally excluded, it must be adjusted to the predominant style so that the style need not significantly change. Although admirers of Coltrane, Coleman and Monk might disagree, Adorno believes that jazz's pretension to atonal dissonance for instance, is not a radical stylistic or substantial departure from the norm, for the dissonance is decorative, a superficial addition to the already existing form.¹¹⁰

The culture industry composer uses technique to master the material, giving style credence from an external source,

since it lacks an internal validity. For the culture industry, 'technique' has come to signify expertise in achieving superficial, manipulative special effects'.¹¹¹ The apparent differences in popular music are really the attempts of the culture industry to prevent the listener from being bored with obvious repetition. While structures retain their essential form, minor and superficial changes create the illusion of individuality. Standardization is accompanied by pseudo-individuation, where stylistic and technical changes produce the false sense of substantial change. Standardized and pseudo-individuated, popular music has become self-reproducing and -referring, and self-mimetic.¹¹² Where authentic music reflects the entire social totality, creating a critical image that society would prefer not to see,¹¹³ pop's unquestioning representation of society is the reflection of a mirror rather than of a critical subject.¹¹⁴ Satisfied with market popularity, pop music's mimetic function is reduced to the constant reflection of previous hits'.

This predominance of style eventually destroys style by removing it from that which gives it meaning-musical substance. Having no contact with the material of music, style is condemned to be an observer rather than an active participant in the musical process, thereby becoming redundant. Where serious music "catches fire" on the form and "melts it down" in order to reform it anew, popular music freezes style, and hardens it into an immobile form.¹¹⁵

While even in Stravinsky's music the composer maintained a certain degree of autonomy, the culture industry's control of the popular composer is almost complete. Imposition of style is not the expression of the composer's will, but that of the culture industry which, playing upon the composer's own desires/fears, uses him as an instrument through which it dominates the object. Even according to the apologists of the culture industry, the difference between serious music and pop

is that pop music, and hence its composers, "must stick to an unmercifully rigid pattern while the composer of serious songs is permitted free, autonomous creation."¹¹⁶

Although the discipline of rigid patterns may sound like an echo of Schonberg's demand for strict adherence to the twelve-tone system, the discipline of the latter is intended for the realization, not the suppression or obliteration of the musical totality. The example of the jazz musician who remains incapable of escaping the structural limits that have been established by social dictates is indicative of the 'discipline' of popular music. Acting as an involuntary agent by 'syncopating' a musical work that should be played 'straight on the beat', the musician demonstrates his obedience to the culture industry, not to the music.¹¹⁷

At this point I would like to raise what seems to me to be a rather important question. If the social function of popular music has always been different from that of art music, then are the dialectical relationships of subject and object, style and material really valid concepts for the analysis of pop? The difficulty arises when one tries to determine how art music and good popular music differ, particularly when each seems to require the same type of dialectical tension between the various poles. What, aside from musical complexity could prove to be the essential structural, or compositional difference between popular and art music?

I think that this ambiguity might be more fully appreciated if we return to Feher's article, in which a simple 'order formation' of music was differentiated from 'rationally organized totality'. According to Feher, the totality, more than being an, "absolute interconnection of objects," is an order, "consciously realized as being-for-us."¹¹⁸ It could perhaps be postulated that this distinction also applies to light and serious music, where light music, although a musical

order, is not consciously produced as a 'being-for-us'. The reason this problem becomes so important is that the concept of the dynamic is related to the whole notion of the musical totality. Although Adorno criticizes modern pop for its static and undynamic nature, he never informs the reader how or why any popular music, (a form which is neither required to be an ordered totality nor whose function is related to the revelation of historical truth), could and should produce the same internal dynamic as art music. In other words, popular music is at one and the same time dismissed because its function is, in grandiose historical terms, not as crucial as that of art music, and yet implicitly told to produce the same subject-object relationships (ie., dialectical interaction of style and substance) and the same progressive dynamic as art music. Thus the relationship of popular music to this most fundamental of terms remains somewhat ambiguous.

Musical Dynamic

Vital to the whole experience of music, the musical dynamic or progression is what sustains the musical totality as a totality.

Musical subjects can find fulfillment and be organized into a communal order only in a progressive time...time-progress is nothing but the dynamics of this self-organization and formation into order.¹¹⁹

Produced by the tension of the subject-object dialectic, the dynamic or historic progressive time is as central to musical development and self-fulfillment as it is to historical progress itself. Musical dynamic not only signifies but is an expression of the historical dynamic that counters the static eternity' of myth. Myth, and enlightenment as myth signals the death of knowledge and experience through its refusal to accept the new'. Dynamic time, by its mere presence, begins to confront the all-inclusive nature of

rationalism, pointing beyond the present to the possibility of the unexperienced. Dynamic time is therefore a promise of experience itself.

In bourgeois affirmative music, the progressive impulse found expression in the harmonious tonal system that promised the eventual reconciliation of subject and object, and of the re-creation of the communal or collective subject. The music that epitomized this progressive vision was chamber music, which more than any other form, "concerned itself with uniting music and audience, no matter in how limited a social realm."¹²⁰ Despite, or perhaps because of its humanist ideological aspect, affirmative music in the early bourgeois era was a revolutionary appeal for the triumph of freedom and reason.¹²¹

The sonata, as the epitome of western bourgeois music, was deemed to be an organic entity; its reconciliation of thematic variations with the central themes showed respect for both the individual variation and the meaning of the whole work, as established by the themes. The dialectic of individual and general results in a musical composition where the harmonious conclusion is based on a meeting (if not identity) of the antagonists, not one's absorption or loss into the other.¹²²

Adorno's assessment of the sonata or chamber music is rather ironic, considering that it only pronounces these humanitarian aspirations at the greatest possible distance from the majority of the people. 'Chamber music', as the term implies, is music which was composed for performance in the chamber rooms of private houses.¹²³ It epitomizes the bourgeois commitment to individual freedom' and to private property, and it might be suggested, the private accumulation and appropriation of art and culture.

In the greatest compositions, the dynamic power attained to what Beethoven called the 'glorious moment', a sense of

permanence and abundance which existed beyond temporality itself. Music's dynamic brought the listener-for a moment-into a free space-extended time. As Jay remarks, this is not to be confused with the repetitive, space-time continuum of the culture industry where all time is liquidated; when great music suspends "normal time," it replaces that time with, "a type of coherent development which was a foretaste of the temporal order of the 'other society'."¹²⁴ The sublime moment in music offers a brief experience of the idyllic 'other'.

Music's gift of the sublime moment and affirmation of the new is a testament of its enmity to fate.¹²⁵ Its power, and its empowerment of the subject comes from its sensual experience of the new. A powerful musical work is constantly changing; the theme, apparently secure, is in fact altered by each variation, which in turn changes in response to the theme. It is a never-ending dialogue, with each individual part introducing some new idea or emotion that causes the whole to respond anew. It is this, "self-creating totality," which, "guarantees the normal role of time,"-of being in the present, remembering the past, and looking toward the future.¹²⁶

Attempting to restore music's social legitimacy, Stravinsky labours under the mistaken assumption that the style alone, not the historically determined dynamic interaction of style and substance, is the source of music's authenticity. In Beethoven's music, the authentic unity came from his profound respect for the individual elements, which he then allowed to develop according to their own musical dynamic, to form the 'natural' or 'organic' musical work. Although contradiction is essential to the tension and resolution that make up a musical progression, Stravinsky does not, "tolerate any contradiction." The "strict self-development of essence," is renounced, "in favour of the strict contour of phenomena."¹²⁷

Modern affirmative music has become myth, convincing its listeners that the music is utopia (present and future).¹²⁸ Even though Stravinsky differs from his less astute followers insofar as he recognizes alienation, and gives it an occasional cameo appearance in his music, he too produces a static, non-dynamic music. His 'serial manipulation' destroys any progression or drive towards the new, collapsing time into space. Temporality, disposable, possessable, is captured.¹²⁹

The subject's dread of his inner void or emptiness was once assuaged by the positive assurance of music that the flow of time could still carry with it the brilliance of a unique experience.¹³⁰ In the context of the culture industry's affirmative ideology however, this promise, becoming purely ideological (ie., without its redeeming truth), destroys music's inner dynamic; it is frozen and reified. In a desperate attempt to re-capture time, the new affirmative music turns to the power of rhythm to defeat culture industry's space. Yet the prominence of rhythmic structures in Stravinsky's works has not freed time, but has reified it even more. By separating rhythm from the other musical elements so that 'timing' or temporality is restricted to defining its own role in the composition, rhythm and time are weakened even further.¹³¹

Most guilty of this attack on time is consumer pop, which does not even bother to relate rhythm to a sophisticated melodic or harmonic structure. Rather than penetrating through time, pop music in particular clings to the 'beat' like a parasite, essentially killing time. Culture industry pop is incapable of internalizing rhythm or time by re-creating its own sense of temporality through the elaboration of harmonic and melodic themes. Instead, it establishes a set rhythm that neither comes from nor relates to the rest of the music, but rather, acts as a carrier for the whole musical entity.¹³² If musical time was once a promise of freedom from

the monotony of everyday life, then pop has reversed this function; it has become the echo of monotonous production, and is itself part of the mechanism of social control.

An exception is often made by music and social critics for jazz, and even Adorno very occasionally, and grudgingly, acknowledges its not-quite-redeeming qualities. Where most popular music has thoroughly forsaken all technique, concentration, and any degree of sophistication in rhythmic structures, jazz has-within popular music-upheld these traditions. This is not to be understood as support for jazz's claim to spontaneity and improvisation however. The technique that it has preserved is put in the service of 'irrational totalitarian control.' Severely restricted by metric and harmonic boundaries, the technique consists of imposing, "certain well-defined tricks, formulas and clichés," rather than in creating true improvisations.¹³³ While commercial jazz' may certainly be limited, this category apparently includes everything from swing, to bebop, and cool, and most probably free jazz.¹³⁴ Adorno's failure to take into account the great distance between bebop and show tunes, for example, is indicative of a tendency to over-generalize and seriously misrepresent some forms of popular music.

The submission of jazz to the culture industry and fascism becomes most apparent in its close relationship and obeisance to the style of the military march. Both jazz and the military music drum or beat in' the forced identification of pseudo-individuals with a false collectivity. The spontaneous improvisation that seems to free the music from the tonal structure is really a clichéd copy of, "waltzes, character pieces and reveries," that merely insert chromaticisms into the unchanged diatonic harmonic

structure.¹³⁵ Cool jazz and perhaps free jazz experimentation with non-diatonic, dynamic forms were and are bound to be further absorbed by the dominant system.¹³⁶ Rebelliousness, characteristic of older forms of popular music is found neither in 'pop' nor in jazz.

This overly simple dismissal of jazz and its real popular basis amongst Black Americans is justified by Adorno on the highly questionable grounds that jazz is not truly a Black music, but the creation of the dominant culture industry. "It is difficult to isolate the authentic Negro elements in jazz," and those that are found, as suggested previously, are more sado-masochistic than healthy and rebellious.¹³⁷ (While it is impossible to do so here, Adorno's perception of the Blacks' 'compliance' could perhaps benefit from some comparison with his understanding of the holocaust, and how he distinguishes between helpless submission and willing compliance. Moreover, how an inherently violent and aggressive act-slavery-can be so easily translated into sexual terms -and then just as easily dismissed-deserves closer examination. The presentation of any form of aggression as inherently sexual-whether it be that of White vs. Black or man vs. woman, disguises the fact that it is essentially violence-and has been cast into sexual terms by the transgressor as a way of implying the passive acceptance-and self-degradation of the victim.)¹³⁸

Although pop music's rhythm, by an, "ersatz physical motion," may momentarily remind the subject that he has a bodily existence and is not merely a machine, pop music is essentially a part of the rationalized world that produces it.

...in the mechanical rigor of their repetition,

the functions copied by the rhythm are themselves identical with those of the production processes which robbed the individual of his original bodily functions.¹³⁹

Where music was once the surrogate of the individual's own time (or space-as-time), assuring him of the possibility of true dynamic temporality, and therefore of the sublime moment that exists beyond time, consumer music fills the individual's space with empty, meaningless chatter. Music confirms the sense of loss, but provides noise as a placebo so that the individual is left with neither time nor the silent space to reflect on the meaning of his emptiness.¹⁴⁰ It is only avant garde music that retains this truly dynamic quality. In it the paradoxical relationship between music and time is maintained. Repetition points to the theme's identical nature, but it is non-identical in that the variations from the theme have altered the theme in its relationship to the whole musical work. If music were to surrender itself to time by dissolving its constant theme, the whole meaning of music as an object in and for itself and the notion of dynamic would be destroyed.¹⁴¹

Atonality has become, in both senses of the word, music's "fate". History has left modern music with no alternative but that of atonality, but this fateful development that has given music its freedom from the past has also entrapped it in a heartless, subjectless circle. The premise of the twelve-tone system is that the composer can dictate both the tonic (although this is now a misnomer) and the intervals of any series, composing his own boundaries and musical functions. In the process of composing though, the subject finds himself subjected to the rational system of composition, so that he is eventually excluded from the music. Although a dynamic, rational totality, music has become restrained and cold.¹⁴² It faces a serious dilemma; how to be the total rational organization that is demanded by the musical material without

dispossessing itself of the musical subject, and consequently isolating itself from the rest of society. That which brings it closer to man-its own alienation-also leads it away again as the music must insist on its isolation from society.

Authenticity

The search for authenticity is at the heart of Stravinsky's objectivism and Schonberg's atonality. Although the term 'authenticity' is never directly defined I would suggest that it is a crucial concept for Adorno. In the simplest of definitions, it can be stated that authentic music is that which embodies the historical truth. It can further be suggested that historical truth is the reality of the individual who is not only alienated from society, but from the 'natural' in himself. The 'authentic' therefore refers to the expression of the real individual-the real self' as opposed to, and in opposition to a society which commands him to be 'other' than what he is, or should be.¹⁴³ Authentic music involves the true representation of the individual's situation-but more than that, music is authentically individual, for it cannot embody and reflect this individuality if it is not similarly in opposition to society. Authentic music is necessarily original, and its nature, its beingness, means that it could not have been other than what it is.¹⁴⁴

At this point the individual author must be introduced, for the source of originality (which is part of, but not identical to authenticity) is the originator, the individual subject-composer, who leaves his mark (his responses) within the musical work. Thus in the Philosophy of Modern Music the whole discussion of authenticity is centred on the composers, Schonberg and Stravinsky.

Stravinsky's attempt to attain authenticity is foiled by the predominance in his music of the image of the authentic,

which proves to be an illusion. Mistaking the style or form as the source of authenticity, Stravinsky tried to translate the bourgeois authenticity into modern music by preserving the bourgeois musical idioms. The style ceases to be original and therefore authentic, because it is imposed on rather than developed through the artistic production. The expressed intention to develop truth in the work inevitably destroys the music, and hence its truth and authenticity. The illusion of authenticity was once necessary since society needed to be convinced of art's power, but the 'will to style' and concern with appearing to be authentic turns music into myth.¹⁴⁵ In some ways, authenticity must be approached like Medusa; it cannot fall into the direct line of vision, (or speech) without destroying that which seeks or speaks it.

Where Stravinsky allows the image of authenticity to command his music, Schonberg, "sacrifices the illusion of authenticity," as being incompatible with the current state of the individual and society. Schonberg recognizes that once music produces the image of authenticity it is absorbed by the myth of Enlightenment: anything which "advertises" its authenticity as something already attained becomes part of the "everyday jargon," supporting Enlightenment's false claim that true enlightenment has also been realized.¹⁴⁶ "The absolute renunciation of the gesture of authenticity becomes the only indication of the authenticity of the structure."¹⁴⁷

The authenticity of a musical work is intimately connected to the music's social function and then, in microcosm, to the internal function of all the elements that make up the dynamic musical totality. Thus the withering of tonality and its loss of authenticity can be heard in some of the most cliched forms of resolution employed in the 'salon' music of the late 1800s. According to Adorno, the diminished seventh chord and, "certain chromatic modulatory tones," in this musical form no longer fulfill their function.¹⁴⁸ The

diminished seventh's resolution to either the fifth or tonic sounds tired, lacking in its initial impetus to resolve. As the function of chords within the musical work begins to fade, so too does the music's function in relation to society. The failure of one component cannot be regarded as an isolated incident, to be 'cured' with the insertion of another resolving chord, without affecting the total musical organization.¹⁴⁹ Nor can such a failure be attributed to the music itself, but rather, to this music's inability to represent significant historical changes.

However confusing it may first sound, the twelve-tone system should in no way be considered anarchical. Schonberg replaced,

within all his works-...any private fortuitousness which might have been viewed quite correctly as a type of anarchic musical production with an objective principle of order...[which is] extracted from the material itself.¹⁵⁰

More rational and organized than consonance, twelve-tone's polyphonic principle allows the individual voices of each chord their full and differentiated expression, no longer disguising their differences through an imposed unity.¹⁵¹ It thus rejects anarchy, (which I understand here to mean the loss of order in time-ie., of past, present, future) the "most terrifying of all" possibilities.¹⁵² It therefore challenges the neo-classical school which, in its search for authenticity in the past and the imposition of the past on the present, verges on the anarchical. True, dynamic temporality is the signpost of authenticity and of the historic, musical subject.

Reprieve-the Authentic Subject

The question still remains, for whom is atonal music intended if the majority of the people are incapable of

understanding it, and the music itself seems intent on its own isolation? If the musical totality is defined as a 'being-for-us',¹⁵³ we are even at this point left without any idea of who constitutes the 'us'. It is most clear that the proletariat cannot be the musical subject, and that music, in Adorno's terms refers to bourgeois music.

The proletariat was never permitted to constitute itself as a music subject; such a creative function was made impossible both in terms of its position within the system -where it was nothing more than an object of domination-and through the repressive factors which formed its own nature.¹⁵⁴

Given that education is the foundation of musical appreciation, the possibility of becoming a true bourgeois individual subject is further reduced.¹⁵⁵ How the musical totality will ever serve society becomes problematic when society is excluded from the music.

The answer to this dilemma can be found in the somewhat Lukacsian figure of the vanguard-critic, whose musical and philosophical expertise allow him to translate music's language and its historical truth into something apprehendable by the non-musical masses. The musical-philosophical expert becomes the sole source of music's validity and its meaning.¹⁵⁶ Adorno's typology of musical listeners, with the expert or critic at the top, and the rest divided according to the extent and type of their regressive, fetishistic listening is not merely description; it is justification for the superiority of the musical elite.¹⁵⁷

The elitism, however, according to Feher, is not intended to brutalize the listener, but bear witness to his unconscious suffering.¹⁵⁸ The attempt of the culture industry to undermine the role of the critic with its pronouncement that all opinions-and taste-are equally valid, is in fact an act of condescension to the listeners. The assertion that 'the people get what they want' is a truth that hides a falsehood; it is

true in that the culture industry caters to very real needs, but false because even the desires have been manipulated and perverted by the industry so that only consumerism will momentarily fulfill them.¹⁵⁹ The critic's apparent retreat to "arrogant esoterica" is similar to the autonomy of music, for it is only by upholding certain standards and levels of comprehension that the critic can serve society.¹⁶⁰

If art music's authenticity, ultimately dependent on the authoritative figure of the composer subject, is determined on the first level by its internal structures, pop music's authenticity rests entirely on an external source of validation, namely, the people'. Unlike serious music, where there are complicated mediations between the authenticity of the musical structures and the authentic individual, popular music's authenticity is immediately reducible to the authenticity of its creators. Ironically, the authenticity of art music during the high bourgeois period required the exclusion of the masses (the better to represent their true needs), while during the culture industry era the elimination of the collective people' reinforces serious music's claim to be the sole source of authenticity.

While avant garde protects serious music from being completely absorbed by the culture industry, popular music has no such recourse. Collapsing the popular music with the serious music, the culture industry has created one vast area it calls culture' that it has then proceeded to administer.¹⁶¹ Even if the culture industry succeeds in producing popular music that is identical to that produced by the people and is accepted by them, it cannot be considered authentic; the culture industry has not only destroyed the culture of the people' through administration, it has decimated the very basis of popular music's authenticity, - 'the people'.

The 'anti-experience' of Auschwitz convinced Adorno that the 'collective' and all that a notion of community entails,

is an impossibility. Truth and authenticity come only from the few remaining individuals and their music who resist all of society's demands to conform to the economic, social and ideological systems. Complete negation extends to authenticity; any indication of concern for restoring authenticity is an affirmation of its possibility, which inevitably destroys it. Removed from society and social concerns, Adorno's authentic music, and his theory, turns away from any commitment. If Schonberg described himself as, "a conservative who was forced to become revolutionary,"¹⁶² Adorno could be described as a pessimistic revolutionary who sought comfort in conservatism.

I have organized this chapter along conceptual and directional lines for two reasons: the first is to provide an explanation that was as simple as possible, given the fact that none of these concepts can really be explained without making some reference to all the others. The second reason is that I think that it provides a good basis for the critique in Chapters Three and Four. The ideas that emerge from the discussion of music-the importance of autonomy, the dialectical relationship of subject and object, the function of music as historical revelation, the centrality of 'dynamic' time as opposed to mythic cycles, coupled with the conclusion that atonal music is the only possible modern music, can be seen as extensions of some of the most important ideas introduced in the first chapter. In both we find the idea of an autonomous culture struggling against the almost total (and inevitable) control of the culture industry, the importance of pure negation in the face of the affirmation of the culture industry, the role of the autonomous individual as the only (and disappearing) historical/musical subject, and the opposition of myth/history (dynamic time). In the following chapters I

will outline and proceed to address what I feel to be some important questions that arise from this exegesis.

Reference Notes to Chapter Two

1. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 10.
2. This second division puts into question the assertion that Adorno, unlike traditional critics such as Matthew Arnold, for example, (in "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time"), appears to avoid the elitist assumption that 'popular' music-or any other popular art, is itself responsible for the denigration of serious art. See Held, 102. The categories of 'bad' (music that is 'for society') and 'good' (music that is 'for music') it is suggested, are not synonymous with those of 'popular' and 'art' music respectively, but there is little doubt that the two are seen as being incomparable in the terms of social and aesthetic function, as well as inherent value. See Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 132.
3. Jay, Adorno, 115-17.
4. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 158.
5. Theodor W. Adorno, "Music and the New Music: In Memory of Peter Suhrkamp," trans. Wes Blomster, Telos No. 43 (Spring, 1980), 138.
6. See Adorno, "Popular Music," chapter two of Introduction to the Sociology of Music, and "Culture Industry Reconsidered."
7. Berman, 164.
8. See discussion in Chapter One, pages 16-17, and Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society," in Prisms, 32-33.
9. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 44.
10. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 27-28
11. Andrew Buchwalter, "hegel, adorno and the concept of transcendent critique," Philosophy and Social Criticism No. 4 (1987), 303.
12. Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society," in Prisms, 34.
13. That the critic can only hint or even imply the utopian potential is one aspect of how Adorno's theory of negativity influences his language. See Terry Eagleton, "Friends of Wittgenstein" in Against the Grain: Essays 1975-1985 (London: Verso, 1986) See also Chapter Three, pages 3-4.

14. Jay, Adorno, 117.
15. Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society," in Prisms, 29.
16. Berman, 164.
17. John Frow, "Mediation and Metaphor; Adorno and the Sociology of Art," Clio Vol. 12, No. 1 (1982), 59-60.
18. Adorno suggests that "only immanent critique can serve as the vehicle of new quality." Theodor Adorno, "Music and Technique," trans. Wes Blomster Telos No. 32 (Summer, 1977), 87.
19. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 24-26.
20. Ibid., 25.
21. Adorno, "Music and Technique," 87.
22. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 159.
23. Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society," in Prisms, 29.
24. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 121.
25. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 158.
26. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 27.
27. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 34.
Adorno suggests that, "psychoanalytic theory alone can provide an adequate explanation of this phenomenon [ie., culture industry products and their affects]." Adorno, "Perennial Fashion-Jazz," 129.
28. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, see especially 153-184, passim.
29. Berman, 164.
30. Jay, Adorno, 117.
31. Buchwalter, 299.
32. Ibid., 305.
33. "Adorno focuses on the reality not of societal immanence but a noumenal order..." Buchwalter, 305.
34. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 211.

35. Ferenc Feher, "Negative Philosophy of Music-Positive Results," trans. Zoltan Feher, New German Critique Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter, 1975), 104.
36. Ibid., 104.
37. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 157.
38. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 41.
39. Ibid., 14.
40. Ibid., 140.
41. Ibid., 41.
42. Adorno, "Culture and Administration," 98.
43. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 41.
44. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 158.
45. The extent to which this is in fact true can be debated, since the churches were not above interfering in the composition of musical works. They also established stylistic rules to which the composers had to conform. One example of religious control over music is the existence of something known as the 'devil's triad', - a set of tones the church decided was impermissible.
46. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 25-27.
47. Adorno, "Culture and Administration," 99.
48. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 157.
49. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 129. A cautionary note must be included here, for the meaning of 'alienation' varies according to the context. When consumer music is depicted as 'alienated' from man, this refers to a fundamental, irreconcilable alienation that stems from consumer music's complete rationalization or co-optation by society, and its denial of nature. When Adorno speaks of the 'alienation' of the avant garde music however, it can be interpreted in two, closely related ways, again depending on the context. The first is that avant garde music is alienated from society and the historical totality in the same way that the individual is alienated. It is conscious of its own inability to reconcile itself with man, and to overcome the internalized social antagonisms that prevent avant garde music from harmoniously resolving. It experiences

the same loneliness that the individual suffers. Secondly, this alienation is manifested socially in its isolation from the majority of musically uneducated people. Avant garde's social isolation is a result of the inability of the people to transcend their own reified condition, their own search for ease and comfort rather than the pain of truth. (See Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 143) When the educated listener hears the alienation in avant garde music, it is the knowledge of his own socially constructed alienation that becomes apparent. Paradoxically, it is this knowledge of alienation that atonal music provides which indicates that it, far more than comforting music, is closer to man.

50. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 130.
51. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 130.
52. Ibid., 135.
53. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 129-30.
54. Ibid., 133. See also Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 157.
55. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 14.
56. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 41.
57. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 130, 137.
58. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 129.
59. Jay, Adorno, 40.
60. Ibid., 93.
61. Discussion of Stravinsky's Sacre is replete with references to the sado-masochistic elements, and the eunuch-like nature of the collective, pre-ego society that this music encourages. See Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 157-60.
62. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 134.
63. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 166-68.
64. Ibid., 136.
65. Ibid., 136-38.

- 66.Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 140.
- 67.Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 136-37.
- 68.Jay, Adorno, 106-07.
- 69.Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 168-69.
- 70.It is interesting to note however, that while the accusation of 'pseudo-individuation' and 'standardization' are reserved for the popular music of the culture industry, nowhere does Adorno discuss that which is unique in any pre-culture industry popular or folk music. It too is largely discussed as a 'whole', or genre, with general statements made about its rebellious character' or amusement value. See especially discussion in "On the Social Situation of Music." If there is little conceivable difference in the approach to popular music of the past and that of the present, ie., the general concept is allowed to subsume the individual works in both cases, then we might be led to assume that the 'pseudo-individuation' and 'standardization' of culture industry pop actually presents no real divergence from popular music of the past. The essential difference between the two would not hinge on these two vital concepts that are structural in nature, but rather, on the actual content or 'message'. See Held, 102.
- 71.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 135.
- 72.Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 21.
- 73.Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 159.
- 74.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 135.
- 75.Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," 12.
- 76.Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 42.
- 77.Held, 102.
- 78.Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 46.
- 79.Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 163.
- 80.Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 27.
- 81.Ibid., 33.
- 82.Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 186.

83. Adorno, "Perennial Fashion-Jazz," 122.
84. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 53.
85. Ferenc Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes (Adorno's philosophy of music)," Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 1982), 47-48.
86. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 130.
87. Ibid., 130-131. Adorno is most intrigued with the *Missa Solemnis*, perhaps Beethoven's most 'misunderstood' and unappreciated work. In it, Beethoven's awareness of individual's suffering and loneliness are given greater expression than in any of his more positive works. Thus the *Missa Solemnis*' failure to achieve the desired unity is interpreted by Adorno as a sign of Beethoven's great insight into the human condition. See Jay, Adorno, 143-145.
88. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 130.
89. Adorno, "Music and Technique," 79.
90. Ibid., 80.
91. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 36-37.
92. Ibid., 36.
93. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 129.
94. For more information on the twelve tone technique and how it differs from tonality, see Joseph Kerman, Musicology (London: Fontana Paperbacks and William Collins, 1985), 92-100.
95. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 51-52.
96. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 68-69.
97. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 51.
98. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 116.
99. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 129.
100. Ibid., 148.
101. Ibid., 149, footnote.
102. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 139, and Philosophy of Modern Music, 141.

103. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 141.
104. Ibid., 154.
105. Ibid., 142-43.
106. Ibid., 156-57.
107. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 131.
108. See Held, 94-95.
109. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 125.
110. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 25.
111. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 128, 136.
112. Adorno, "Perennial Fashion-Jazz," 125-26.
113. Jay, Adorno, 156.
114. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 128.
115. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 24.
116. Ibid., 25.
117. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 128.
118. Feher, "Negative Philosophy of Music-Positive Results," 105.
119. Ibid., 106.
120. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 85. The very term 'chamber music', which denotes works in a sonata style initially intended to be performed in small, often private rooms, indicates how limited this social realm was. Donald Tovey, The Forms of Music (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), 6-8. As such, chamber music could be considered one of the most characteristic forms of bourgeois music; its autonomy and totality depended on private patronage and the exclusion of the vast majority. Adorno has suggested that Beethoven's later affinity for the symphonic style was due partially to his desire to extend the reach and power of his music both to a greater number of people, and deeper into the individual's soul. See Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 94.
121. Ibid., 62.

122. One of the significant features of the sonata's form is the use of chromatic progressions and thematic variations where the second variation may be performed in an entirely different key from the first theme. Thus the themes could be identical, but their differing relationship to the musical whole mean that they were also non-identical. The forward impetus of the music comes from the relationship between the diatonic tones and the tonic, which ultimately lead to resolution.
123. Donald Tovey, The Forms of Music (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), 6.
124. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 192.
125. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 66.
126. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 47.
127. Ibid., 136.
128. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 44.
129. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 131.
130. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 48-49.
131. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 154-57.
132. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 48-49.
133. Adorno, "Perennial Fashion-Jazz," 123-24. See also Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 33.
134. Ibid., 34.
135. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 162.
136. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 187.
137. Adorno, "Perennial Fashion-Jazz," 122. For comment, see Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 186.
138. The question of ethnocentricity and sexism, and Adorno's refusal to consider any non-white and non-male as either a musical or historical subject will be raised in both chapters three and four.
139. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 52.
140. Ibid., 48-49.

141. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 55-56.
142. Ibid., 69.
143. Williams, 103.
144. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 136-38.
145. Ibid., 215-216.
146. Ibid., 212.
147. Ibid., 214.
148. Ibid., 35.
149. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 130.
150. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 135.
151. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 59.
152. Ibid., 7.
153. Feher, "Negative Philosophy of Music, Positive Results,"
104.
154. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 130.
155. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 16.
156. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 61.
157. For description of the listener typologies, see
Introduction to the Sociology of Music, Chapter One.
158. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 60.
159. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 134.
160. Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," 15.
161. Ibid., 12-14.
162. Blomster, "Electronic Music," 74.

"Without exact boundaries we don't know where we are." It is the tone in which one says this-anxious or euphoric-which indicates whether one is a metaphysician or a deconstructionist.

Terry Eagleton, Against the Grain

Here stands the defect of all notions of play, freedom, transparency or disalienation; it is the defect of the revolutionary imagination....the sphere of human play is defined as the fulfillment of human rationality, the dialectical culmination of man's activity of incessant objectification of nature and control of his exchanges with it.

Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production

Chapter Three

Negating Imagination

The critique developed in the following chapters has the dual intention of underlining some of the questionable and ambiguous aspects of Adorno's philosophy of music and history, and of showing how significant themes and concepts related to history, described in the first chapter are echoed in the analysis of music. The belief that atonal music (negation), as the only possible heir of bourgeois music, is a true dynamic totality whose structures embody the historical truth of individual alienation, leads to questions about the path of history and tradition, the meaning and implications of negation and a totality, the nature of the subject, and the significance of temporality with regards to historical truth.

In Chapter Three I have concentrated on the following four issues: 1) the presence or lack of a teleological concept of history and historical determinism; 2) the possible interpretations of negative totality; 3) the nature of the historic/musical subject; 4) the dialectic of Myth and Enlightenment, space and dynamic temporality. I would suggest that some of the debates over the meanings and implications of Adorno's terms might be clarified by comparing the 'pure' philosophical writings to those where the philosophy is applied-the social critique of music. Not only do the statements in the latter sometimes contradict those in the former, but the implications of the musical interpretation also raise serious questions about the apparent philosophical stance.

The arguments of David Held, Martin Jay, Susan Buck-Morss, among others, which are direct commentaries on Adorno, are supplemented by the works of historian E.P. Thompson, theologian/literary critic Rene Girard, and Julia Kristeva, among others, whose works are not direct responses to Adorno. The objective of this exercise is neither to disprove'

Adorno's theory, nor to provide an in-depth evaluation of the other theories, but is intended to throw light on the limitations of Adorno's approach.

Learning the Language

The issue of Adorno's convoluted language, perhaps made more obscure by translation, should first be addressed. Adorno's ideas and terms tend to defy identification and decisive commentary (if such a thing is ever possible). This elusiveness can be seen as his deliberate attempt to escape the traps of language, whose affirmation of communication renders the communication of a negative truth nearly impossible. The discrepancy between what is stated and what is implied may be an indication of Adorno's distrust of a language that appears to be identical to its meaning.

Language becomes a measure of truth only
when we are conscious of the non-identity
of an expression with what we mean.¹

The problem he faces is how to say something meaningful when any statement is subject to the process of reification. The signs themselves are defined by exchange value rather than their social use within the system of signification. One solution lies in the language itself: the more difficult and confusing it becomes, the more the reader must endeavour to work through rather than appropriate its truth. His attempt to escape the communication trap, suggests Terry Eagleton, defines the tortuousness of his writings.² The obfuscation of meaning may be language's salvation, but it has the additional result of removing meaning from those who might listen. Adorno's language shares with atonal music the dilemma of an authenticity that demands isolation. Thus a critique of Adorno and an evaluation of the differing interpretations should recognize the discrepancy between what is stated and what is implied.

Teleology and Determinism

The first debate is over Adorno's acceptance or rejection of a teleological concept of history. Whereas Piccone claims that Adorno loses faith in historical unity and rejects Hegelian teleology to, "fall back on an abstract Kantian moralism," which cannot offer an explanation for its own existence, Berman suggests that the continued adherence to this teleology, which then proceeds to confine the individual within a pre-determined present, renders praxis-as, "rationally chosen activity," impossible.³ Without agreeing with Piccone's conclusion, Buck-Morss concurs that Adorno divests his philosophy of history of any teleology. Adamantly casting aside the Hegelian and Lukacsian notion of a (present) possibility of an historical synthesis between subject and object, Adorno believed that the historical rupture of fascism disproved the identity of history with the unfolding of a greater Truth or Progress.⁴ As the death of experience and communicability, fascism disrupts the historical narrative. Continuity and communication are replaced by incommunicable, isolated moments of shock.

Just as the war lacks continuity, history, an 'epic' element...seems rather to start anew from the beginning in each phase, so it will leave behind no permanent...image in the memory. Life has changed into a timeless succession of shocks, interspaced with empty paralysed intervals.⁵

Only the indeterminacy of history can be ascertained. Neither a first or originating principle nor a pre-determined end can be contemplated.

The renunciation of the identity of History with Progress, and the conception of Truth as that which conflicts rather than converges with history, is not, however, the same as rejecting the notion of a telos. I would argue that rather than positing no end, Adorno posits two ends; the probable one (negative) and the very distant, potential one (true

enlightenment). Neither is necessary. To suggest that Adorno did not conceive of an historical 'ought' would deprive his critique of its essential hope, however remote, that the resurrection of the autonomous individual and an enlightened society are possible. The Dialectic of Enlightenment was written for the, "sake of the Enlightenment and the rationality which it promised."⁶ Indeed, the proposition that,

Adorno had an almost Hegelian faith in the immanent logic of philosophy, in its historical development as the unfolding of truth, even if...he believed that truth critically challenged the course of history rather than merged with it...⁷

implies the telos of history, if only negatively. If philosophy as an unfolding of truth counters history, then history must be philosophy's opposite, the increasing negation of truth.

The negative telos presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which 'individual phenomena' are integrated into a, "unified development, originating in the past, determining the present and lurching, ineluctably toward a future,"⁸ is merely a reversal of the concept of history as progress. In spite of the radical ruptures of modern experience, Adorno's concept of history continues to be governed by determinism and continuity.⁹

This is apparent in Adorno's philosophy of music. The historical pinnacle of great bourgeois music necessarily gives way to the decadence of Stravinsky and neo-classicism. As the only real music, the avant garde is like philosophy itself, working against the grain of actual history whose course of decadence seems nearly impossible to halt. The history of real music becomes a, "progressive line of rationalizing the musical material," from its birth in Bach's dialectics, to its pinnacle in Beethoven, where the, "world-spirit home-bound has reached its final destination," and

thence to its decadent contemporary state.¹⁰ As the, "dregs of musical history," all culture industry music is the inevitable culmination of actual social and historical development.¹¹ Dodecaphony's rationalization of musical material is music's "consummation" in the 'ought' or counter-culture of history.¹²

Striving to maintain the teleological unity of history and theory, the interruptions in musical tradition are subsumed by the greater continuity represented by an unchanging ideal social function. If atonality, historical truth's new form of representation, signals a radical break from the past, it does so in order to preserve the continuity of the historical truth previously embodied in tonality. Both in the terms of the music and in those of the theory which brings all music into two parallel lines of tradition and counter-tradition, there is a pre-determined course.

Lost in the over-arching flow of concepts are the individual details of popular music in particular, lending credence to Berman's complaint that Adorno's arguments are ahistorical precisely because all individual details are somehow fit into the unified tale of history.¹³ Aside from "failing to really distinguish" between jazz, rock, and the 'light' music that "developed out of the European tonal code,"¹⁴ the claims made about authentic popular music are also debatable. As opposed to being diversion from work rhythms and time, sea shanties, field calls and market songs were sung during and accentuated work rhythms.

When the women grind their corn...they sing
an air which perfectly accords with the
rhythm of the tinkling rings and bells.
(...) Paddling songs exactly preserved their
West African pattern of two measures to each
stroke...¹⁵

As a second example, even a cursory examination of the jazz tradition would quickly show that the pentatonic scale, the polyrhythms, the slurs and slides between major and minor

notes are all part of the West African musical tradition, and are indeed Black.¹⁶ Aside from being ethnocentric, Adorno's analysis of jazz suffers from a deterministic and teleological conception of history. The linear ruptures and breaks in the history of Western music are absorbed by its continuity, and the ruptures that occur at the meeting of cultures are ignored.

Piccone's claim that Adorno forsakes a historical telos is not altogether correct; what is at issue is Adorno's rejection of the necessity of the positive telos, and his positing of the probable negative one. While the tone of Minima Moralia conveys the sense of despair and loss of orientation in time and space, it is the desperation of a man who is almost convinced of history's descent into complete barbarity. Perhaps what Adorno fears most is not an 'end' per se, but the end or death of true history.

Negative Totality

If Adorno's conceptualization of telos generates debate, so too does the concept of a negative totality. According to Buck-Morss, Adorno's use of the term totality owed more to the, "Marxian meaning of the total socioeconomic structure of relations," characteristic of the bourgeois world than to the Hegelian concept of a, "closed metaphysical system."¹⁷ Concurring with this assessment, Held states that Adorno's cultural critique involves the understanding of a work's, "social origins, form, content and function-[that is] in terms of the social totality."¹⁸ If by this it is meant that Hegel's concept of totality differs from that of Marx insofar as the former situates thought as independent of material reality whereas the totality' of the latter refers to the nature of class society, then this assertion regarding Adorno's meaning can also be questioned. It is by no means clear that the totality' to which Adorno refers is the socioeconomic one of

Marx, particularly in view of the relative autonomy that is granted to both art and philosophy over history.¹⁹

The critique of music tends to focus on the internal structure and form of music to the exclusion of its concrete social production and reception. In Adorno's theories, music becomes a microcosm of an abstract world of ideas and concepts rather than the reflection of a concrete social (ie., class) totality.²⁰ Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Adorno's analysis seems to be more concerned with the ideas of music as opposed to the sensual experiencing of it. Buchwalter's contention that the core of Adorno's critical theory is 'messianic, not materialistic' is somewhat accurate-although I am not certain that Adorno has a 'core' that cannot be somehow retracted and replaced.²¹ Adorno's ideal negative totality is raised above the historical order, so that the only impetus towards the restoration of a true history must come from outside the social totality.

What Adorno did reject was the Lukacsian version of the harmonious totality which was equated with the ideal proletarian consciousness. The superiority of the proletariat, declared Lukacs, is manifested, "exclusively in its ability to see society from the centre, as a coherent whole," which enables it to act consciously on history.²² Further, the proletariat's historically sanctioned revolutionary role is possible only because the dialectical relationships of the social totality are, "located in the consciousness of the proletariat itself."²³ The ideal proletariat consciousness is nothing more nor less than the social totality.

Rather than dismissing the Lukácsian totality', Adorno reversed or turned it inside out. Adorno's rebuttal to Hegel, the "whole is the false," does not deny the 'whole', but makes it negative.²⁴ There are two possible ways of approaching the enigma of the 'negative whole': the first has relativist tendencies and sees Adorno approaching the verge

of a non-totality, while the second views the negative whole as a negative but unified totality.

(i) According to the first reading, Adorno's rejection of the Lukacsian took him to the brink of relativism where only alienation and fragmentation can be known.²⁵ The truth is that of the suffering individual who speaks only of the totality to the extent that it is discontinuous, or fractured.²⁶ The fragments offer perspectives of the whole, which cannot then be known as a whole.

The problem with this interpretation though, is that it cannot explain how the broken totality can be known as a totality. If fragments can only provide a perspective of the totality, then the concept of a whole or of a (ruptured) totality becomes not a matter of cognition, but one of faith. It must be assumed that all perspectives will somehow reflect this alienation. And yet, this element of faith is clearly belied by the positing of an objective and knowable historical totality.

(ii) In contrast to the first interpretation where primacy is given to the notion of fragmentation, the second reading would place a greater emphasis on the totality. If the image of 'an explosion of given forms'²⁷ is an appropriate metaphor for the first interpretation, then the second could be described by a shattered mirror whose shards are still bound by the knowable boundaries of the frame. The negative totality is still knowable as a totality whose objective historical truth is the alienation and non-identity of the fragments. Thus the significant difference between the Hegelian/Lukacsian and Adorno's formulation of totality is not Adorno's rejection of the whole, but that for the former, the totality was, "the result of the actions of free individuals," whereas for Adorno it has become, "an alien power dominating them."²⁸

I would argue that the second interpretation offers a better understanding of Adorno's concept of totality, particularly with regards to his critique of music. The importance placed on the musical totality is best understood if each musical work is seen as embodying the entire social totality, not merely a perspective of it. If each piece reflected only a partial truth, and the objective historical truth of the social totality could only be known through the combination of perspectives, then the 'totality' would be nothing more than the sum of the parts—a conclusion with which Adorno would strongly disagree. The "unity of an epoch," or the social totality, "asserts itself above and beyond works of art through its presence in these very works...."²⁹ Moreover, this approach would do more violence to the individual work, for its importance would be determined by the extent to which it informed, and could therefore be subsumed by, the whole'.

The result of Adorno's musical analysis is a substitute order, an ordering of negation rather than the complete negation of order. This is the case for instance, in Adorno's demand that modern music adhere to a counter-order by never allowing itself to refer to the harmonious resolutions of tonal music. An explosion of forms would be musically manifested as a haphazard series of resolutions and non-resolutions rather than the orderly disorder of Schonberg's twelve-tone system.³⁰

Finally, Adorno's theory of a knowable, universal language is the translation of the historical totality into musical form. In the case of authentic music, the totality is once again 'friendly'. Based on the questionable premise that music is a universal as opposed to national-local language, the logical extension—that there is one set of rules governing its composition—becomes a justification for the hegemony of the Western classical music form, and the

subsequent rejection of all other 'local' musical languages. The listeners of these dialects are implicitly 'abnormal', since, "every dialectic of musical language can be comprehensible to every normal human being."³¹ European music's totality becomes totalitarian for all other forms.

Aside from the fact that the notion of dialectic may not be understood or shared by all cultures, the very definition of the 'normal' human being as an autonomous and alienated individual excludes those who do not live in a rationalized Western society. Adorno's 'universal language' (Western European) creates hegemony through exclusion of other ideas, and then includes other music (jazz, for instance) into its explanatory framework in such a way that it can be explained and then dismissed.

Eurocentric to the last, Adorno never felt any real sympathy for American, let alone more 'primitive' forms of culture outside of the West.³²

It is ironic that in neglecting the validity of a different tradition Adorno actually obscured some of the important similarities between African-inspired and Western music. Both African and African-American music have developed the same basic principles of counterpoint, theme and variation, and the suite, that are found in Western music, where Europeans have applied these principles to harmony, Africans have applied them to rhythm and timbre.³³ Chastising jazz for its emphasis on rhythm, and thus its dissolution of the dialect of timing and harmony, Adorno neglects his own predisposition towards the domination of harmony. The claim that jazz musicians cannot play in proper time is not applicable given the African tradition, where timing and accentuation are implied rather than stated.³⁴

Unlike the first interpretation, the second one does not put the project of de-mythification into immediate jeopardy by eradicating the foundations of the historical truth-*ie.* the

social -historical totality. The logical extension of the first argument would be that any attempt to define the historical truth would be undertaken in vain since the only truth is that there is no truth. In his most pessimistic moments Adorno does seem to endorse this type of complete relativism, but this tendency is usually tempered by the belief in some objective standards that distinguishes the 'good' from the 'bad' art, the truth from Enlightenment's lie.³⁵

It is Lukacs who offers an explanation for Adorno's reluctance to dismiss the idea of a totality. Without the concrete analysis which relates everything to the social whole, offering true explanation for actual events or phenomena, claims Lukacs, the study of history becomes naive description, 'Without this accurate assessment, history's objective possibilities would remain unfulfilled.'³⁶

The Historic and Musical Subject

Adorno's concept of history requires the knowing subject who can experience the truth of the social-historical totality. Given this necessity, the claim that Adorno has a, "subjectless revolutionary social theory," must be examined.³⁷ As already suggested, Adorno renounced the Marxist subject, the historically constituted working class, which is charged with a specific role by virtue of its social condition.³⁸ It is his rejection of the collective revolutionary subject that provides the basis for both Held's and Piccone's criticisms. Concurring with Piccone, Held maintains that non-identity theory cannot move beyond the point of negation because the utopian potential, the "ought" of history, has not been carefully defined or explored. The refusal to ground it in a revolutionary subject renders the theory impotent and idealistic.³⁹

This criticism leads to two basic questions: (1) how is Adorno's subject constituted and is it revolutionary? (2) is the collective working class subject any more revolutionary?

To answer the second question first, I would argue that while Adorno's theory may become idealistic because he rejects any potential collective historical agent, the re-introduction of the working class is not the best 'cure'. Adorno's denial of the privileged position of the proletariat was both insightful and necessary.⁴⁰

The Marxist critics of Adorno fail to see that the step back into Kantian moralism, or idealism is not the result of the proletariat's absence. Rather, its cause can be found in Adorno's continued acceptance of one of the central ideas of the more orthodox left, namely, the belief that there is no revolutionary collective subject other than the working class. The failure of the one revolutionary subject signals the defeat of any and all revolutions. Adorno's theory becomes trapped in this no-man's (and definitely no-woman's) land not only because of the historical circumstances at the time of his writing, but because his belief in this Marxist presupposition led to complete despair, and thence to political retreat.

In response to the first question I would suggest that Adorno's autonomous individual is neither historically accounted for, or historically accountable, nor revolutionary. Disregarding the individual's apparently premature memorial service in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno resurrects him in the "Culture Industry Reconsidered," where he declares him to be the necessary precondition of a truly democratic society.⁴¹ While the article may be more optimistic than earlier works, the autonomous individual, as the, "subject of cognitive experience,"⁴² has always been the heir apparent of Adorno's theory. Thus even though the social critique's objective is to prove that the current social

totality has destroyed the autonomous individual, there are a 'lucky few' who escape the objective conditions, and constitute his experiencing, knowing subject.

Despite the claim that Adorno's theory is not intended to be limited to the individual,⁴³ the latter is incapable of altering his material environment, and cannot therefore be considered revolutionary. Psychoanalysis and the avant garde, unable to move beyond the bounds of the individual, restricts emancipation to the individual psyche.

A change in philosophical consciousness can only mean, concretely, a change in the consciousness of philosophers. But this is hardly a sufficient condition for compelling real social change.⁴⁴

This subject is a curious one, for he is both historical and trans-historical, and is not quite the, "suffering, empirical subject," that is materially constituted, as Jay would have us believe.⁴⁵ By reading the autonomous bourgeois individual back into history to the time of Odysseus, Adorno not only does not free the present from the past, but 1)denies the reality of the historical circumstances which gave rise to the bourgeois individual, thereby 2)producing an historic subject whose existence cannot be accounted for by history, 3)producing a subject whose suffering seems more conceptual than real, and 4)strips the subject of a potentially revolutionary historical role.

The individual may be materially manifested at different times in history, but is transhistorical (in the Dialectic of Enlightenment) in that he has existed as an invisible ever-present concept since the time of the Odyssey. By presenting Odysseus as the prototype of the bourgeois individual, the subject becomes more of a mythic, heroic figure than a real, suffering one.⁴⁶ More importantly, the collapsing of the past into the present denies the specific material conditions that gave rise to the concept/experience of being an modern

autonomous individual.

While the individual is not visible in every historical period, Adorno's theory of history is a recording of his absence. In recognizing the absence, the theory maintains the individual as a presence in the form of a concept, even though it is often not historically realized. Beckett's "Waiting for Godot," provides an appropriate analogy. Godot does not appear, but his lack of presence on stage becomes an invisible presence due to the expectation of his appearance. Just so, the individual in Adorno's theory has the presence of a missing, yet-to-arrive actor; an absence, which implies its presence.

When the individual does arrive on the historical stage his appearance can be accounted for by the context, but the individual himself is not constituted by what happens on stage, and thus remains beyond historical accountability. The individual is therefore historical in that his material manifestation can be attributed to the specific historical configurations, but he is also transhistorical, waiting as an already-constituted agent/actor in the wings'. Thus Adorno describes Schonberg as, "a man without origins, fallen from heaven," inside but outside the social order.⁴⁷

The crucial point in history where men became individuals, aware of their internal space and the sense of an essential self becomes lost in the transcendence of Adorno's theory. Could it be that 'modernity' is not directly responsible for the internal void of the individual, but more for the individual himself, and that the notion of the self necessarily implies the idea (and experience) of the private 'space'?⁴⁸ The idea of an 'individual' who did not experience some sense of inner emptiness would be untenable.

The subject as actor is bound to wait for the appropriate context to develop in order to make his appearance (on stage). If he were constituted by the historical events (ie., what

happens on stage), then his appearance could be potentially revolutionary, since the on-stage situation would have to fundamentally alter in order to allow for his existence. But what happens in Adorno's script is that history prepares for the entrance of the individual. Again, by noting his absence, history creates the space that the individual subject should fill. The subject is turned in to a passive observer of history, its recipient, more than an active participant in its formation.

This passivity, coupled with the incapacity of the individual to alter conditions external to himself, leads to a non-revolutionary (potential) subject and a corresponding pessimism. The totality of administration is matched only by the totality of Adorno's own negativity which becomes, like all totalities, idealistic. Adorno's contention that,

The logic of history is as destructive as
the people that it brings to prominence:
wherever its momentum carries it, it
reproduces equivalents of past calamity.
Normality is death.... 49

is, in Buck-Morss' words, the "photographic negative" of idealism.⁵⁰ Even the more optimistic tone of the "Culture Industry Reconsidered," in which real enlightenment is once again conceived as possible, still leaves us asking, 'possible for whom?'

We already know that the working class, through a lack of education, exclusion by the bourgeois class, "repressive factors which formed its own nature," and the self-willed isolation of atonal music, is prevented from being the musical subject.⁵¹ However, there is a fine line between a theory's acknowledgement of society's domination and objectification of one group, and its presentation of this domination as immutable fact, which inadvertently affirms it. In this instance, Adorno's factual statement becomes the ideological justification for his theory's exclusion of the 'people', and

the denial of their creativity and experience.⁵² To either completely ignore or conversely over-emphasize the freedom and creativity of a dominated group is to do disservice to the experiencing subject.

The exclusivity of the musical subject is in fact intimately connected to the whole concept of a negative totality. Music's dilemma is identical to that of language: how to communicate the atomization of individuals and the loss of shared experience without becoming an affirmation of experience? If music is too successful in communicating its message it engenders identification, and thus disproves its own message of non-identity. Success in communication is music's ultimate failure, since negation and autonomy demands social isolation from its potential audience. Condemned to an existence on the periphery of experience, the question of how the gap between music and the people, and between the subjects and non-subjects are to be closed cannot be broached without jeopardizing the principle of negation.

Mythology and Enlightenment

As Adorno's materialism succumbs to the temptations of idealism, so too does his counter-mythology take on the proportions of the mythic. Enlightenment's mythic quality is matched by Adorno's own never-ending litany of civilization's decay and barbarity. History becomes nothing more than a series of catastrophes that portend more of the same.⁵³ The bourgeois individual assumes a mythic identity as the legendary Odysseus, now a proto-capitalist, travels through a foreign and unfriendly space and time.⁵⁴ Disconnected from his environment, himself and his purpose, the individual is the prototypic flaneur. Even the composers are mythical legends and pioneers, "path-finders, trail-blazers, and -above all-tragic figures."⁵⁵

Prior to investigating the implications of Adorno's meaning and application of 'myth', 'dynamic' and 'time-space' or stasis, an idea of how these terms are to be understood is required. Buck-Morss suggests that,

it is accurate to say that Adorno had no concept of history in the sense of an ontological, positive definition of history's philosophical meaning. Instead, both history and nature as dialectical opposites were for Adorno cognitive concepts...⁵⁶

History is "antiontological" insofar as its essence is its "one-time-ness"; its particular nature allows it to escape the "possession" which is the aim of an ontology of history. By keeping the present as his point of reference, Adorno, according to Buck-Morss, hoped to avoid a "metaphysics of history." The "present did not receive its meaning from history; rather, history received its meaning from the present."⁵⁷ What we have to ask then, is whether or not these concepts are in fact exclusively cognitive as opposed to ontological, and whether Adorno does succeed in escaping the metaphysics of history. While escaping ontology might have been the intent, there are three problems or ambiguities that arise from this interpretation.

(i) Nature and history are used to undermine the other so that neither will be granted the primary status in explaining the present.⁵⁸ The present is therefore hypothetically freed from the mythic status of either history or nature. But what is the 'present' if not the result of precisely the dialectical opposition and interaction of nature and history? The 'present' cannot therefore be seen as something external to the concepts which explain it. While the lack of an external point of reference might not prove to be so problematic if the act of interpretation were incorporated into the 'reality' that was being explained-thereby softening the claim to an 'objective' historical truth, Adorno's critique of music does not indicate such a position. Neither

the interpretation of the musical work nor music's interpretation of society are seen as integral to the absolute historical truth that music's formal structures reflect.⁵⁹

(ii) Accordingly, there should be a differentiation between actual history (that which has happened) and the ideal concept of history, which I have called the historical 'ought'. Buck-Morss does suggest that Adorno's 'history' has both a positive and a negative meaning. The difference between them hinges on temporality. The negative concept of history,

was determined by the fact that the actual history of actual human praxis was not historical insofar as it merely statically reproduced the conditions and relations of class rather than establishing a qualitatively new order.⁶⁰

This differentiation between 'negative and positive' closely approximates my own distinction between the 'actual' and the 'ought' of history. That the 'positive', truly dynamic history and the notion of progress and development are inherently related becomes most evident when Adorno's theory of music is considered.⁶¹ This point will be discussed below. The problem with this conception of history is that a messianic intervention, a transcendental rupture in actual history, is required if true history is to be re-introduced into actual history. Actual history is subordinated to the transcendental 'other'.

(iii) The concept of history's (positive) 'anti-ontology'-its 'one-time-ness' requires a further comment. In the first instance, 'anti-ontological' is not identical to non-ontological, because history is still being conceived in the terms of an essence. It could be argued that the quest for authenticity in music immediately points to an essential nature that is not reducible to its dynamic temporality. The search for an absolute nature and truth actually freezes the

'present', and removes from it its transient quality. The musical structure's authenticity gestures beyond the music to the subject, without which neither the 'truth' of music nor that of history would be conceivable. As the, "agent of an unconscious social force of production," the musical subject becomes the unifying, meaning-giving principle in the musical and historical totality.⁶²

All the phenomena of social life converge at any one point in time on the historically specific relation between the categories of subject and object....History is thus marked by a totalizing and immanently developing logic; a central energy which shapes all secular manifestations around itself.⁶³

I consider the question of ontology to be an important one because it is indicative of a tension that arises from Adorno's vacillation between metaphysics and a history without meaning or essence. Although Terry Eagleton sees him as a significant precursor of deconstruction, with its emphasis on fragmentation and non-identity, Jay contends that Adorno would never have accepted the deconstructionist view of society as an, "indeterminate, carnivalesque...play of irreducible differences."⁶⁴ Deconstruction invalidates the rational basis of critical theory itself.⁶⁵ Related to this indecision is the tension produced by a theory which is too abstract and general on the one hand, and too concerned with the 'essence' of the referent on the other.

As already noted, abstraction destroys the concrete detail.⁶⁶ Writing within the framework of rationalism, Adorno's theories ultimately succumb to the problem of conceptual domination for which he criticizes the ideology of rationalism. On the second hand, the commitment to 'authenticity' and the inherent meaning and value of the object ties Adorno's theory to ideas whose social and ideological connotations are conservative, and, as Baudrillard might suggest, unimaginative. This second proposition is of

more concern for the fourth chapter where the term, 'authenticity' will be examined. The following discussion on myth and temporality relate more to the first point regarding the abstract and generalizing quality of Adorno's critique.

Myth is not only the conceptual opposite of (true) enlightenment, it is the social-symbolic entity by and through which people have explained their experiences. One of the main problems with Adorno's myth is that 'real' myths are absorbed by the concept 'myth'. In the next few paragraphs I will briefly consider the differences between René Girard's and Adorno's understanding of the term 'myth'.⁶⁷

Girard contends that too often the explanations for myth and ritual ignore the latter's material and social origins. The question of, "how can a real institution be constructed on a purely illusory basis?" is equally valid for those who view myth as an "untruth" without relating it to the real conditions in which it evolves.⁶⁸ Adorno's analysis of the myth of Persephone, where the text is severed from its context to become the universal example of symbolic ritual and repetition, is dependent on the ahistorical collapsing of real myths with the concept, 'myth'.⁶⁹ The development of specific myths in specific cultures and at certain times, whom they served and to what ends, is never really a concern. Furthermore, the disregard of competing social interpretations, or even competing mythologies is indicative of Adorno's assumption of a unified social totality.

For Girard the role of myth and ritual can only be appreciated if the social and human context that gave rise to the text is considered. He therefore first looks to human interaction rather than to the relationship between humans and nature for an explanation of ritual. This contrasts with Adorno's theory that human fear of nature, and his subordination to it, is the source of myth. Rituals, according to Girard, precede myth, and function to deflect

uncontrolled social violence onto a suitable scapegoat, which then serves to reunite the community.⁷⁰ The rituals determine the myths, which then justify and occasionally explain the act of violence against the sacrificial subject-object. Nature only,

enters the picture later, when the ritualistic mind succeeds in detecting certain similarities between nature's rhythms and the community's alternating pattern of order and disorder. The modus operandi of violence...is then taken as the model for the entire universe.⁷¹

Unlike Adorno's theory of myth which is grounded in the ideology of the enlightenment, it succeeds in breaking through the perceived dichotomy between nature and man, and therefore their apparently inevitable alienation. Social rhythms are not created and enforced by nature, but are parallel to them. The cyclical 'rhythm' of myth or nature is man's reading of nature through his own social organization.

In contrast to Adorno's claim that myth's all-inclusive nature excludes or eradicates even the idea of outsideness, Girard speculates that rituals serve to reinforce it, and in so doing, reinforce the 'inside' or the community. It is only through a recognition of the outside that the community can retain its validity. (It must be remembered that the 'outside' signifies nature for Adorno, while according to Girard it represents a taboo human event or phenomena.)

Girard's belief that the 'external' is necessary for the unity of the 'internal' (community) actually finds an echo in Adorno's insistence on the autonomous musical monad. The internal structures of music can only be authentic if they reject the external social demands. The contradiction with, and therefore the presence of the "external" is an integral part of music's authenticity. The musical monad resembles, in some ways, the community that justifies the exclusion on the basis of myth. The 'myth' of art's autonomy justifies its own internal unity and its ritual exclusion of the majority.⁷²

The myth' of music's autonomy is then rationalized by Adorno. In the context of a hyper-rational society, music's promise of sensuality becomes, like critical theory, part of true enlightenment. By proclaiming that art's irrationality is in the service of true enlightenment, Adorno's own rationalist explanation threatens to undermine the autonomy and irrationality of music. The rational penetration of music is manifested in Adorno's demand that music be composed of a rationalized ordering of tones.⁷³ Such a rational ordering may reflect the musical material's response to an irrational rationalist society, but it also threatens to draw music into the mythic circle of hyper-rationalism (myth) that it reflects.

Finally, Adorno's contextless interpretation of myth fails to account for the progressive potential of the mythologies now being created by new collectivities. Feminists in particular often regard Western history and the various theories' as mythology-tales and stories that communicate a shared experience of and amongst white men. To this extent then, all communities (or cultures) have their mythologies; the current attempt to write and speak a woman's myth comes from their sense that their experience is not addressed in male history. Uncovering roots, deconstructing the present and reconstructing the past in a female shape is an example of cultural resistance using the knowledge' of myth.⁷⁴

The creation of women's mythology is a dynamic re-reading of the past through the present. The 'present' is not presented as inevitable, but as one symbolic and material configuration of the possible. Present and past are used as ways of understanding, not drawing lines of cause and effect through history. For Adorno as well, the reading of the past through the present was intended to liberate the present from the pressure of having to live up to a nostalgically perceived

past. The question is whether or not Adorno's reading succeeds in freeing the present, or reducing it to an inescapable result.⁷⁵ The answer to this question lies in how the myth of Odysseus is read. It can either be understood as a concrete interpretation that traces the roots of modern capitalism back to the social, economic and ideological structures of the ancient world, or, as an allegory of metaphorical parallels between Odysseus and the modern bourgeois individual.

Problems arising from the first interpretation involve the notions of inevitability and historical determinism. If the source of the modern individual's crisis can be found in the first division of man from nature, or the initial attempt by man to control nature in the distant past, then the present predicament appears to be nothing but the culmination of an inevitable sequence of events that escape man's own actions. Reference to a non-legendary active subject is almost completely lacking, creating the impression that history acts on man, not the reverse. Man's choice is, "between [his] subjection to nature or the subjection of nature to the Self," both of which have the same end: the domination by myth.⁷⁶

If however, the myth of Odysseus is metaphorical, then the burden of the past inherent in the first reading, gives way to a new set of difficulties. These problems have, in fact, been outlined by Adorno himself in his criticism of Walter Benjamin's work.⁷⁷ The first is that a metaphorical interpretation sacrifices the most essential aspect of the analysis, that is, the concrete individual. The abstract and abstracting qualities of legend and parable subsume the details of individual suffering, particularly when the metaphor's main figure is a fictional, representative character who already exists as metaphor. Mythical abstraction does not make the legend less distant, but makes the individual seem less concrete, less capable of real

experience and suffering.

The same criticism can be made concerning the metaphorical relationship established between the musical and the material systems of production.⁷⁸ In addition, the direct connections drawn between the musical forms, the twelve-tone system and Stravinsky's primitive rhythms, and psychological states, autonomy and maturity or ego-weakness and schizophrenia for instance, are similarly metaphorical and unmediated. Exactly how certain musical structures and tonal idioms actually affect the individual or even social psyche is assumed rather than explained. Adorno's theory thus moves away from an interpretation of an individual work to a, "clarification of the historical [and musical] dialectic itself."⁷⁹

In either interpretation history seems beyond the grasp and action of the subject. Similar to the attempt to escape the subject by means of the subject, which leads back to the subject, the attempt to escape the mythic by employing its own legends traps Adorno's theories in a mythic, abstract circle.

The absolute division that is established between historical or dynamic, and mythic time-space tends to obscure the possibility of a socially progressive mythic time-as-space. The contradictory experience of time lived by people, and the ways in which mythic time is associated with anti-system social forces, women's collectivities, for instance, that associate themselves with nature', cannot be explained.

Mythic cycles, according to Adorno, dominates both the experience of the rationalized modern production line, and pre-industrialization work-time that had been set by the demands of nature. Aside from the musical moments of dynamic diversion after work, it seems that the work process of 'the people' has never followed the rhythm of a dynamic temporality. Silence about workers' experience of dynamic work

rhythm leads me to conclude that the brief appearance of dynamic history was experienced only by the bourgeois individual. For the rest of the population then, the tyranny of nature (mythic time and repetition) runs into the "whip and cudgel" of slavery and thence into the factory production line without any apparent break.⁸⁰

Since Adorno assumes that both the 'natural' time of work and that of the production line are essentially mythic, there is no effort to determine whether or how the shift to industrial time in fact significantly altered the experiences and lives of the workers. The idea that different experiences of time could intersect, and that in this complex meeting the time of ritual and myth could be experienced as liberating from work is never considered. Again, although the topic is far too complicated to be adequately addressed in this thesis, the relationships between space and time, between the experience of times and the uses of concrete spaces, and the notion of cultural space and leisure time deserve more attention.

E.P. Thompson's article, "Time, Work Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,"⁸¹ seems closer to Adorno's ideal of the detailed, concrete study than do his own historical interpretations. Thompson's article concentrates on how patterns of living, rituals and institutions that gave to the workers their independent culture (accorded great value in "Culture Industry Reconsidered,") is undermined by the enforcement of industrial time. Where Adorno's metaphorical formulations never account for the historical birth of certain modern concepts of temporality, (i.e., dialectics), Thompson's far more concrete approach not only examines the affects of these changes, but the notion of time as well.

The change in popular conceptions of time, from 'task-orientation' or 'natural rhythms' to those of time as currency, as 'free time' and time owed to the factory owner,

are explained in the context of industrialization and development of the economic system.⁸² 'Time' is not kept at a distance from the people, but is understood in the terms of their experiences, in which different senses of time can conflict. Thus the work of the thresher is monotonous, alienating, (similar to factory work), but harvest is the moment, "at which the old collective rhythms break through the new," (my italics) as the ritual functions of the harvest are re-asserted.⁸³ There is a material basis of time and notions of temporality, and the possibility of one experience of temporality breaking through the next.

In Adorno's work, the idea of dialectical time, which is first encountered in the works of Bach and finds its climax in those of Beethoven, is then read back into history (reading the past through the present) so that it is seen as another ever-present and therefore transhistorical possibility.⁸⁴ He ignores the actual socio-economic (industrial) configurations that gave rise to the idea of dialectics.

It is this concept of dialectical time that helps to re-introduce an unacknowledged rationalist productivism to Adorno's theory. Given that Adorno is apparently, "no friend of the productivist bias of orthodox Marxism,"⁸⁵ this criticism may be surprising, but a productivist bias is evident in both his notion of a progressive time, and in his conceptualization of the composer-material relationship. The dialectical interaction of subject and object, of the general and the particular, is intended to produce the new, the next progressive idea, experience or historical stage; this is an essential aspect of time's movement from past through present to future. Time's unceasing production of the new also produces the subject of history-the autonomous individual.

Thus the musical dynamic is similarly productive'; it shares "emphatically in progress-in industrial progress..⁸⁶ Music produces not only the next 'experience', but through

that, the autonomous individual. The 'objective' value of music is dependent on its productive capacity with regards to the individual psyche. If music is a producer, then so too is its composer, who, like the proletariat, is a "productive worker".⁸⁷ The approach itself focuses almost exclusively on the 'production' of the music, ignoring its 'consumption' or reception.⁸⁸ Adorno has moved Marx's productivist ethic from political economy to the realm of the aesthetic. His sphere of play', music, is still defined in terms of the fulfillment of human rationality, and while the object, in the first order, has its value, in the second order this value can only be understood within the context of man's rational and enlightened domination of nature and all that is associated with it, including women and other primitives'.⁸⁹

This connection between dynamic time and rationalism leads to an interesting paradox: on the one hand, Adorno mourns the loss of working class independence and yet on the other, he supports the concept of time which finds its source in the rationalism that undermines workers' independence through its imposition of an industrial, productivist time. His notion of temporality is anathema to the irrational, mythic time-space that gave to the workers free space in which to create. Focusing on the brief moment of 'dynamic' time in music, Adorno's analysis discards the rest of working class experience as uniformly dominated by endless repetition.

Finally, this dynamic, productivist time is formulated according to the experience and value of white males. Neither speaking to, nor about, the subjective experience of any other group, it is completely antagonistic to the space-time that is seen as being closest to the subjective experience of women. Female experience of time, it has been suggested, is characterized by, on the one hand, "cycles, gestation, the eternal recurrence of a biological rhythm which conforms to that of nature," and, on the other, "a monumental temporality

without cleavage or escape, which has so little to do with linear time (which passes) that the very word 'temporality' hardly fits."⁹⁰ Dynamic time's superiority confirms the exclusion of women's and other groups' experiences from history. It is ironic that history', as the dialectic of history and nature denies the equality of nature, 'natural' or mythic time, and women.

Once again, Adorno succumbs to the mythic. In his homogeneous and homogenizing conceptualization of 'society' or the people', the differences between gender, between cultures and between races remains mystified and mythified. What the theory gains in unity and continuity by locating truth and validity in the dominant group's experience of time and space, it loses in its failure to express a varied, disunified and disparate reality. The 'truth' of Adorno's theory becomes an experiential 'untruth' once it leaves the ideological realm of the bourgeois, white male.

Rather than viewing dynamic time and time-as-space as mutually exclusive and absolute categories, we should concentrate on how they interact, for it is at that point where people live their lives. Neither the dynamic time of production nor the mythic time-space of cycle and ritual completely governs people's lives and psyches; they develop according to a wide range of experiences in which ritual and free space, production and leisure time, all have some meaning. But this project would require the de-mythification of both temporality and space, which would bring time down from its abstract height, and space back from its exile to where they belong: at the centre of culture and lived experience.

This series of criticisms has been presented for two main reasons: (1) individually, the criticisms point to inconsistencies between the stated intent and the results, and between the philosophical/historical works and the

critique of music, as well as to ambiguities in terms and concepts; (2) together, they gesture to the two main contradictions in Adorno's interpretation of music and history. The first is that his critique of rationalism and consumer industry society are weakened by his own belief in the rationalist duality of subject and object. The continued, if silent, belief in a historical telos, the desire for a rational, if negative, order to replace the irrationality of the social totality, the positing of the autonomous, knowing, individual subject, and the desire to return to a progressive, if un-named, 'true' and productive dynamic history, are grounded in rationalism itself. The critique of music, ultimately rationalist and functionalist, is done in the name of, and for the individual and the truly rational society.

The second contradiction is that the desire to identify and define some knowable, historical truth, and a knowing subject, coupled with a structural analysis, leads to a quest for authenticity in the musical structure, and a subsequently undynamic concept of society and music. It is this quest for authenticity that lies at the heart of Adorno's interpretation of music and his struggle to re-assert some understandable, controllable order in both music and society, but his pessimistic evaluation of historical potential freezes the authentic within an unmoving text. The 'dynamic' is trapped within the autonomous circle of music, forsaking society. The quest for authenticity is the subject of the following chapter.

Reference Notes to Chapter Three

1. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, (amended translation) (London: 1973), 146 cited in Terry Eagleton, "Wittgenstein's Friends," in Against the Grain, 120.
2. Terry Eagleton, "Friends of Wittgenstein," in Against the Grain: Essays 1975-1985 (London: Verso Press, 1986), 119.
3. Paul Piccone, "From Tragedy to Farce: The Return of Critical Theory," New German Critique Vol. 3, No. 8 (Spring, 1976), 100; and Berman, 160.
4. Susan Buck-Morss, "The Dialectic of T.W. Adorno," Telos No. 14 (Winter, 1972), 137, 139.
5. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 54
6. Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 46-48, 61.
7. Ibid., 66.
8. Berman, 159.
9. Peter Uwe Hohendahl, "Autonomy of Art: Looking Back at Adorno's Asthetische Theorie," in Foundations of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, eds., Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tar (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1984), 222.
10. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 44-48.
11. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 29.
12. Feher, "Negative Philosophy of Music-Positive Results," 108.
13. Berman, 159.
14. Dick Bradley, "Music and Social Science: a Survey," Media, Culture and Society, No.3 (1981), 215.
15. Ernest Borneman, "The Roots of Jazz," in Jazz, eds. Nat Hentoff and Albert J. McCarthy (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1959; Da Capo Press, n.d.), 10-11.
16. Ibid., 5-7.
17. Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 73.

18. Held, 77.

19. Interpretation of a concept like 'totality'-and especially a negative totality-is difficult. 'Totality' can be approached as a 'cognitive' concept-ie. a tool of knowledge which must be employed in order to reveal a specific historical truth. Music for example, should be interpreted according to its "social totality," its "origins, form, content and function", which really entails its social origins, the role of the subject in the composition of the objective musical material, the ideological role it plays with regards to the individual, social change etc., and the actual structure of the music-if the historical truth is to be made apparent. [See Held, 77-78.] However, there is no truth to be discovered except that of the social totality itself. It would appear that the situating of a work within its social totality may lead the critic to understand how the objective material reflects back on, and reveals ever more completely the truth about both itself and the totality. The predicament of this position lies in the very beginning. In order to first situate the music in its social totality one must assume a sufficient understanding of the totality-or even of the concept of the totality and what it encompasses, even though this can only be known through the apprehension of the 'truth' inherent in the individual work.

20. Frow, 58-59.

21. Buchwalter, 303.

22. Georg Lukács, "Class Consciousness," in History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: The Merlin Press Ltd, 1971), 69.

23. Ibid., 71.

24. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 50.

25. For this type of interpretation, see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, chapter 3.

26. See Jay, Adorno, Chapter 3.

27. Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 46.

28. Feher, "Negative Philosophy of Music-Positive Results," 109.

29. Adorno, "Music and Technique," 81. See also Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 130-132; and Hohendahl, "Autonomy of Art: Looking Back at Adorno's Aesthetische

- Theorie," 213-14.
- 30.Feher, "Negative Philosophy of Music-Positive Results," 106-07.
 - 31.Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 56.
 - 32.Jay, Adorno, 120.
 - 33.Borneman, 5.
 - 34.Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 128.
 - 35.Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 6-7.
 - 36.Lukacs, "Class Consciousness," 50-51.
 - 37.Piccone, 98-99.
 - 38.Lukacs, "Class Consciousness," 71. See Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 29-32, for discussion of Adorno's rejection of the proletariat as historic subject.
 - 39.Held, 384.
 - 40.Buck-Morss, "The Dialectic of T.W. Adorno," 143.
 - 41.Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," 19.
 - 42.Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 82.
 - 43.See Jay, Adorno, chapter three, passim.
 - 44.Buck-Morss, "The Dialectic of T. W. Adorno," 143.
 - 45.Jay, Adorno, 83.
 - 46.Martin Donougho, "The Cunning of Odysseus: a theme in hegel, lukács, and adorno," Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1981), 28-29.
 - 47.Adorno, "Arnold Schoenberg 1874-1951," in Prisms, 151.
 - 48.Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 24-25.
 - 49.Adorno, Minima Moralia, 56.
 - 50.Buck-Morss, "The Dialectic of T. W. Adorno," 143.
 - 51.Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 130.

52. See Janice A. Radway, "Identifying cultural seams: Analytical method, and political practice," Communication, Vol. 9 (1986), 94-95, for discussion of experience and validity of analytic method.
53. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 54-56.
54. Donougho, 28-29.
55. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 30.
56. Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 49.
57. Ibid., 57, 50-51.
58. Adorno, 49-50.
59. Frow, 60.
60. Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 54.
61. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 46-49.
62. Berman, 161.
63. Frow, 59.
64. Eagleton, "Wittgenstein's Friends," in Against the Grain, 99-130; and Jay, Adorno, 109.
65. Jurgen Habermas, "The Dialectics of Rationalization, an Interview," Telos, No. 49 (Fall, 1981), 8 cited in Jay, Adorno, 109.
66. Berman, 159
67. Although there may appear to be some startling similarities between Adorno's and Girard's concerns, it is important to keep in mind that similar terminology may not necessarily imply a correspondence of ideas. Such is the case with the concept of difference. Both agree that a cultural (and for Girard, sacrificial) crisis arises from the erosion rather than the creation of difference. It is important to remember that Adorno's 'difference' is that of the individual, whose inherent unique qualities distinguish it from all other objects (and subjects). For Girard however, difference is that of position, or status that ensures the smooth running of the social hierarchy. To illustrate the importance of the adherence to one's proper role or station, he cites one of Shakespeare's famous passages from "Troilus and Cressida" that presents the Romantic concern with the

harmonious society, which is maintained by a strict delineation of social roles. See René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1977), 7. As in the various Henry plays, the difference between the King and the others, between the 'head' and the 'body', is that which constitutes safety and continuity, while either the usurpation of the King's role, or its rejection by the proper King leads to social anarchy. Identity and difference then are socially and culturally imposed, relating more to birthright and potentially occupation, than to inherent qualities or values.

68. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1977), 7.
69. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 27.
70. Girard, 92.
71. Ibid., 96.
72. See Peter Burger, Theory of the Avant-Garde: Theory and History of Literature, with a foreword by Jochen Schulte-Sasse, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis, Minnesota Press, 1984).
73. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 51.
74. See for example, Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978); and for discussion of women's myth-making, Julia Kristeva, "Women's Time," trans. Alice Jardine and Harry Blake in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, eds. Nannerl O. Keohane, Michelle Z. Rosaldo, and Barbara C. Gephart (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 31-54.
75. See W. Jackson Bates, The Burden of the Past and the English Poet (Cambridge: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1970; New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972).
76. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 32.
77. Frow, 57-58.
78. Ibid., 59.
79. O. K. Werckmeister, "Das Kunstwerk als Negation," in Ende der Aesthetik (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1971), 14; cited in Frow, "Adorno and the Sociology of Art," 59.

80. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 21.
81. E.P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present, No. 38 (1967), 56-97.
82. Thompson, 60-62.
83. Ibid., 62.
84. Feher, "Negative Philosophy of Music-Positive Results," 100.
85. Jay, Adorno, 86.
86. Adorno, "Music and Technique," 82.
87. Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 32.
88. Berman, 161-162.
89. Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, translated and with a forward by Mark Poster (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975), 56.
90. Julia Kristeva, "Women's Time," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, eds. Nannerl O. Keohane, Michelle Z. Rosaldo, and Barbara C. Gelphi (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 34.

I

They said, you have a blue guitar
You do not play things as they are

The man replied, 'Things as they are
Are changed upon the blue guitar.'

IV

A tune beyond us as we are,
Yet nothing changed by the blue guitar;

Ourselves in the tune as if in space,
Yet nothing changed, except the place

Of things as they are and only the place
As you play them, on the blue guitar,

Place, so, beyond the compass of change,
Perceived in a final atmosphere;

For a moment final, in the way
The thinking of art seems final when

The thinking of god is smokey dew.
The tune is space. The blue guitar

Becomes the place of things as they are,
A composing of senses of the guitar.

Wallace Stevens, "The Blue Guitar"

Chapter Four

Playing on Authenticity

Although 'authenticity' is a primary concern of Adorno's analysis of music, there is little attempt to account for its historical development or its implications for other aspects of the socio-aesthetic critique, such as the idea of authorship, of the authorial function, authority and creativity. A brief review of the meaning and etymological origins of authenticity might uncover the relationship between authenticity, authorship and even the historical development of the modern individual. Since Adorno locates authenticity in the musical score or text, the limitations of a textual interpretation will also be considered. The search for the authentic and the restrictions imposed by the structural analysis combine to form a static image of society. Grounding itself in the authenticity and truth of the object, Adorno's theory of the musical dynamic becomes an undynamic theory of music and society. The fear of chaos and the overthrow of all rationality contributes to Adorno's desire for a stable, perceivable 'reality'.¹ The power struggle that underlies the definition and interpretation of 'reality' and 'truth', is not as great a concern as the re-affirmation of the existence of authenticity and truth. The sociopolitical connotations of an apparently aesthetic term are made more evident in the discussion of authenticity, since it is a more obvious expression of social concerns and values than is the more removed subject of musical composition itself. The ensuing discussion of authenticity, and the problems of a textual analysis will be primarily based on works by Lionel Trilling, Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, and Edward Said.

Defining the Authentic

While it appears in works such as the Philosophy of Modern Music, the term 'authenticity' is not defined. Authentic music, we are told, has the character of being-so-

and-not-being-able-to-be-otherwise', that can be developed only through the full and autonomous development of the internal musical structures.² By its incorporation of the historical truth of the alienated individual, authentic music embodies real history's dynamic nature. Authenticity is thus related but not reducible to the dynamic, the autonomous individual, and negation.³ For an understanding of its ideological and historical foundations and implications, I have turned to the work of Lionel Trilling.

According to Trilling, 'authenticity' is a 'polemical concept' that challenges society's aesthetic and sociopolitical expectations, and whose development is closely related to that of the autonomous individual.⁴ Authenticity implies an, "exigent conception of the self and of what being true to it consists in...and a less acceptant and genial view of the social circumstances of life."⁵ It has come to signify the 'natural' or 'true' self in opposition to society and the socially defined character.⁶ It can also be inferred from Trilling's description of the term's social and aesthetic significance that authenticity signifies the hegemony of masculine values.

The antagonism between, on the one hand, the non-conformist 'true' self and the less 'genial' perspective of society that this entails, and, on the other, the conformist self and the accepting view of society, is manifested in the aesthetic realm by the conflict between the 'authentic' and the 'beautiful'. 'Beauty' is a socially determined category that reflects the 'taste' and the desires of the dominant groups, and therefore perpetuates their values and mores. It also creates the false impression of a social harmony through the universal acceptance of the dominant group values. Beauty, as art's highest ideal, has been challenged by the belief that art's greatest attribute is its unfailingly true, but often distasteful representation of society. If an

audience resists the authentic work of art, it is because they are unwilling to transgress the socially defined standards.⁷ An authentic work will portray social and individual conflict and its own ideological foundations by ignoring the appeal to 'pleasure' and 'taste'. In all authentic art, "nothing shall pretend to be other than it is."⁸ If art is the authentic portrayal of the social totality, it cannot pretend to be 'lovely' or concerned with humanist ideals. Authenticity's disdain for socially defined beauty has an impact beyond the parameters of the musical score, because it is an implicit condemnation of the sociopolitical basis of 'the beautiful'.

Adorno's criticism of Stravinsky demonstrates the greater value accorded to authenticity over the 'beautiful' (as an expression of social expectations). Whereas the legacy of German music from Beethoven to Schoenberg has been characterized by an 'absence of taste', (i.e. the refusal to acquiesce to external demand, or the presence of authenticity) in Stravinsky the, "primacy of taste collides with the thing."⁹ Stravinsky sacrifices the music's authentic portrayal of alienation in order to guarantee communication with society; the social expectations of beauty are fulfilled while the inhumanity of society is tacitly denied.

Trilling continues his analysis by noting the similarity between authenticity and the sublime moment, both of which share an antipathy to beauty'.¹⁰ It is in the description of this antagonistic relationship that sexual politics most clearly emerge. Where the sublime moment is 'masculine', imbued with 'manly ambition' and a sense of 'terror', inspiring an aggressive desire to 'master' and dominate the offending piece, 'beauty' is feminine, and induces a passive acquiescence and loss of energy and rationality.¹¹ The 'sublime' character of Beethoven's music, which he called the 'glorious moment', is found in the momentary suspension of time-consciousness, during which the listener is offered a,

"foretaste of the temporal order of the 'other' society."¹² This sublimity is directly connected to the energetic, virile and challenging nature of both Beethoven's and Schonerg's work. In contrast, the culture industry product seduces the listener into accepting the status quo.¹³

The helpless passivity of the culture industry listener is a function of the ear itself, suggests Adorno.

The ear is passive...the ear is open and must not so much turn its attention toward stimuli as seek protection from them.¹⁴

The active capacity of the ear corresponds to the development of the ego, and the deterioration of the latter leads to the passivity of the former. Insinuating and seductive, culture industry music eases its way into the open and defenseless ear, blocking its reception of authentic music.¹⁵ The male strength of avant garde music is expressed in its desire to, "blast away everything which closes the ear of human beings."¹⁶

The dominance of culture industry music creates a rather curious and overwhelmingly feminine image, in which the passive organ is infiltrated not by an external aggressor, but by a seductress. The missing' element in this picture is masculine energy. Rejection of the feminine is intertwined with Adorno's criticism of what is perceived to be a female sense of time (cyclical) and woman's correspondence to nature. Male society's domination of the passive' feminine is one facet of the rationalist desire to 'master' nature and the associated mythic cycles. Woman,

became the embodiment of the biological function, the image of nature....Where the mastery of nature is the true goal, biological inferiority remains a glaring stigma, the weakness imprinted by nature as a key stimulus to aggression.¹⁷

Adorno's claim that, "without a single exception feminine natures are conformist," contains an element of truth.¹⁸ While

the male-defined image of the 'feminine' is internalized by women, and as such represents their dominated position, both the desire to discard as valueless all 'feminine' characteristics and the equation of 'feminine' with 'female' are unacceptable. Insisting on a 'masculine' world, Adorno commits the same error as male society in imposing values on the female population without regard for their experience. Masculinity is reinforced as the ideal, thereby rendering null and void all female values.

The failure to appreciate the distinction between the 'female' and the 'feminine' means that the progressive potential of 'feminine' values (such as nurturing, passive resistance, for instance) as they are applied by women critical of male society is invalidated. Reinforcing his condemnation and association of the passive and the feminine is Adorno's negative assessment of homosexuality, in which the essence of the homosexual relationship, closely related to fascist society, is deemed to be the surrender of masculine energy. "Man surrenders to man...as woman did before him. Man turns into woman gazing up at her master."¹⁹ What Adorno considers to be sexual perversity leads to and perpetuates a feminine world-in both fascist and culture industry societies, that he can only conceive as a lack of masculinity'. Emancipation comes from the castration of all that is feminine/female, including that other quality associated with women and the culture industry, emotion. Adorno's analysis of bourgeois music reflects the superiority of masculine values. Characterized by its, "progressive logicity and mastery of [female] nature," what bourgeois music loses from its separation from nature it more than gains in its sophistication and importance.²⁰

Although useful, interpreting Adorno's theory on the basis of an absolute dichotomy of authenticity and beauty tends to obscure one of its dialectical turns in which

sensuality, pleasure, and beauty can be progressive. One of the reasons that Adorno turns to music and art as the last stand against a barbaric culture is that they alone are sensual in a world devoid of sensuality. Music is the final hope for real experience.

In The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse discusses the dialectic of beauty. Traditional Marxist aesthetics, which Adorno has rejected, condemned 'beauty' as an, "irresponsible, snobbish, bourgeois convention," in contrast to authentic art which expressed the consciousness of an ascending class.²¹ According to Marcuse however, the 'beautiful' belongs to the domain of Eros and represents the pleasure principle'. It outlasts the, "changes in the 'judgement of taste'," and can provide the basis for a revolution of sense against the sterility and the puritanical nature of the social system. The pleasure provided by a work of art is an act of rebellion against the dominant social institutions and values.

...historically, the attack on autonomous art is linked with the denunciation of sensuousness in the name of morality and religion.²²

Similarly, Adorno contends that religious and even secular asceticism harbours a, "hostility against happiness."²³ Secular asceticism and denial is perfected in culture industry society, in which fun, as the replacement of pleasure, "postpones satisfaction until the day of the pogrom."²⁴

For Adorno as for Marcuse, society is anti-libidinal and repressive. Music's sensuality and beauty is society's greatest adversary. Beauty, in this context, is not contrary to but in collusion with authenticity. Real sensual pleasure can only be derived from rebellion against the culture industry, making art at once authentic and beautiful. All art strives, "towards an image of beauty free of appearance."²⁵ In other words, the desire to become the absolute representation of beauty is simultaneously its desire to be

absolute truth, to be rather than seem to be the embodiment of beauty. Thus the 'goal' of art is the 'death' of all other works; each work, in seeking to be 'beauty' also desires the destruction of 'art', which is the search for beauty and authenticity. Art's desire to 'self-destruct' is its salvation, its continued attempt to be beauty.

In the culture industry society, the art work's beauty rests in the truth of its individual, particular nature. Only the unfaltering and religious gaze that resists any external abstraction or concern with the universal can recognize the authentic beauty.

The eyes that lose themselves to the
one and only beauty are sabbath eyes.
They save in their object something of
the calm of its day of creation.²⁶

Thus the authenticity of the individual is its beauty, and resistance is both authentic and beautiful, for it speaks of and for the individual. It is only by painting an image of 'dehumanization' that music, "preserve(s) the image of humanity," and its authenticity; it is, "only by no longer being 'lovely' (that music)...offer(s) any presentment of beauty."²⁷

Yet Adorno's commitment to beauty and sensuality is undermined by the disparity between it and the functionalist, purely rational and anti-emotional approach to music. The duality of subject and object has as an additional duality that between mind and emotion. The association of emotion and passivity with the anti-rational leads to the, "submission of the emotional to the rational," and a. "philosophy of music which does not even mention the role of the emotional," in musical reception.²⁸ This is most apparent in Adorno's suggestion that music does not really want to be involved with the senses, but with the world beyond, or pure spirit.²⁹ Adorno's antipathy toward performance is indicative of the way in which the 'sensual experience' is eliminated in his theory

by the authoritative status of the idea of the unheard music. This is apparent even in his perception of the proper compositional method where the 'principle' of a certain technique or the 'idea of a totality' must command the realization of the musical theme rather than allowing the theme to develop into an abstract principle.³⁰

While an anti-emotionalist reaction may be an understandable response to the inauthentic displays of "feeling" that sometimes greet a musical performance, the equation of emotion with emotionalism (which I believe is inherent in Adorno's approach), similar to the reduction of female to feminine, is also an error in logic. Similar to those who would denounce all art as ideology, this indeed is 'throwing the baby out with the bath water'.³¹ The antipathy toward emotions is related both to the fear of the passive 'feminine' character, and the rejection of all displays of 'authentic' feeling as truly inauthentic. The appearance of emotions (ie., a visible reaction) contradicts authentic emotion because they appear. 'Appear' in this case is meant in both senses; they are visible, but since they 'appear' to be authentic, they in fact are not. Any positive display immediately betrays the truth.

Separating music from the audience's emotional response does a disservice to music and makes it impossible to recognize (and explain) those instances where music's emotional appeal, working against the affect intended by the culture industry, leads to 'authentic' passive resistance.³² Having precluded the possibility of an authentic collective agent of social change, Adorno's quest for authenticity in music is dependent upon the authenticity that comes from those in positions of cultural authority, the great bourgeois masters. Authority and authenticity exist in a circular relationship; those in authority have the power to enforce their 'truth' and values, thereby establishing their claim to

authenticity, while those who are deemed 'authentic' assume a position of authority. Adorno's theory permits only the established cultural and political authorities to be 'authentic'.

Authentic and Authoritative

A brief look at the etymological origins of the term 'authenticity' might establish a clearer picture of the necessary connection between authenticity and authority. It will also re-introduce an idea briefly mentioned above, that of death's relation to authentic art. The origins of 'authenticity', according to Trilling, are to be found in the Greek words, 'authenteo', and 'authentēs'. The first means, 'to have full power over,' and 'to commit a murder,' and the second, 'a master and a doer,' as well as a 'murderer' and a 'suicide'.³³ Authenteo and authentēs point to authenticity's own incorporation of death and mastery, reflected in Adorno's narrative theory of history.

In Walter Benjamin's "The Storyteller," death is the definitive source of authority and knowledge. It is in this instance that,

a sequence of images is set in motion
inside a man...-unfolding the views of himself
under which he has encountered himself without
being aware of it-suddenly in his expressions
and looks the unforgettable emerges and imparts
to everything that concerned him authority...³⁴

If it is the quintessential authority, death is also the ultimate instance of authenticity; death cannot seem to be, it can only be. If "only death is an image of undistorted life," then it can also be said that death is the only undistorted image of life'.³⁵ The work of art whose goal it is to be the authentic embodiment of life and beauty, must seek the death of 'art'. The death of all other art is the sign that one work is the authentic, the authority. It is in this destructive impulse that the connection between

authenticity and the ultimate authority of the art work, and death is most evident.³⁶

In addition, the death impulse which authenticity implies is also apparent in the music's self-destructive nature. According to Adorno, music's authenticity can only be achieved through its isolation and alienation from society, the death of music's potential for communication. Schonberg also believed that widespread popularity of his work indicated that it was worthless and lacking of authority.³⁷ Finally, the authority and authenticity of the music is based on the self-effacement (sacrifice) of the composer, whose mastery of the material is subordinated to the demands of the object. It is in the death' of the composer's will that music's authenticity, and the real life-force of the subject, his individuality, is secured.

In "The Storyteller," death's authority is intimately bound to the communication of experience. The authority that death confers also marks the occasion when all of man's knowledge and wisdom', the wealth of his life experiences can be related. Storytelling is destroyed by the loss of continuity and the impossibility of real communication in a world where short-term, surface information has replaced experience.³⁸ The loss of continuity and communication is a manifestation of the collapse of history's narrative; the sharing of experience and the notion of progress were destroyed by the shock of the world wars, and for Adorno, the radical rupture of fascism.

'I have seen the world spirit', not on horseback, but on wings and without a head, and that refutes, at the same stroke, Hegel's philosophy of history.³⁹

Just as death confers authority on man's life, making it communicable, the truth of an epoch can only be apprehended and shared during its death or decay.⁴⁰ The death of the last epoch is, for Adorno, also the death of the possibility of

true history and communication. The historical narrative, the continuity that absorbs death as communicable experience is seemingly replaced by a series of disparate, disjointed 'shocks'.⁴¹ This history is devoid of any authority, order and authenticity. It is at this point that Adorno's quest for authenticity, and an accompanying rational counter-order in critical theory and music, conflicts with the concept of a fragmented history. Adorno's historical 'ought', represented and embodied by an atonal music that carries on the bourgeois tradition for instance, or by critical theory's support of the autonomous individual, suggests the possibility of communication and continuity, the historical narrative.⁴²

The recipient of the historical narrative and the only source of authority and authenticity is the autonomous individual composer, who resists external approval of his work, looking to himself or some transcendent power' as the ultimate judge of its worth.⁴³ The modern concept of authenticity is therefore dependent on the conflict, or distance between the individual and society. It refers us once more to the idea of space and the development of the bourgeois individual. The identity between reality and appearance, characteristic of the authentic musical work and the individual, depends on the initial experiencing of a distance or space between the 'real' and the 'appearance'. Trilling suggests that this sense of space between the 'real' self and the socially determined self only emerged when people became conscious of their social roles'. Rather than seeing themselves as unified and undifferentiated, modern individuals began to experience themselves as having a multiplicity of functions and characters. This signified the awareness of the space between the individual and society, and between the 'real' self and the personae.⁴⁴

The quest for authenticity therefore, is tied to assumptions about reality', the centre and essential nature

of the object and the individual. Yet authenticity only becomes a problem as its passing is noted; its very existence signifies a loss. The correspondence of 'reality' and appearance' can only be thought when the distance between the two is noted. Thus authenticity's purpose in Adorno's aesthetic critique is to notify us of the difference that jeopardises the established notion of 'reality', and at the same time resist its dissolution. Its 'revolutionary' nature is to be found in its desire to conserve. Thus the authentic music is the restoration of authority; Schönberg's music,

combines aesthetic avant-gardism with a conservative mentality. While inflicting the most deadly blows on authority through his work, he seeks to defend the work as though before a hidden authority and ultimately to make it itself the authority.⁴⁵

For the audience, the authenticity of the art work, "instructs us in our own inauthenticity." We hope that through it we can re-acquire our own authenticity. The composer seeks to define himself and his autonomy through the realization of the art work's authenticity.⁴⁶ For the author, the audience, and the critic, the term 'authenticity' is the promise of a centre, a grounding point from which and according to which the world and the individual can be evaluated. To be able to ask, 'Is it authentic?', is to declare a faith in a recognizable, stable point of reference. Like Nietzsche, I would argue, Adorno, "dreaded the weightlessness of all things".⁴⁷ By promising the existence of the external referent, authenticity anchors the signs in a comprehensible system of meaning and value. It is the promise of depth as opposed to a smooth surface of equivalencies, in which everything can be, and is substituted.

While the eternally self-reflexive and self-questioning character of a theoretical approach that denies reality' beyond the signifier may be elitist and unresponsive to people's lives, it raises an extremely important point; if

'authenticity' acts as an anchor, what other unexamined 'weights' accompany it? While the need for the anchor itself, if it is acknowledged as a necessary ideological construct, may be understandable, the other ideas that are uncritically adopted as part of its make-up require careful review. Thus the next few sections will deal with where Adorno locates authenticity, how it is related to the concept of the 'author' or composer, to ideas about creativity, and to the structural reading of music.

The Death of the Author/Composer?

In "Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Benjamin states that authenticity requires the 'presence of the original'. Authenticity, as the, "essence of all that is transmissible," including the work's "testimony to the history which it has experienced," depends on the first, experiencing, worldly text.⁴⁸ Given that music's realization in performance is commonly seen as the moment of authenticity, the concept of an 'original' proves to be somewhat problematic.⁴⁹ Traditional musicology has tended to evaluate authenticity of performance (ie. historically accurate instrumentation, for example) rather than that of the composition.⁵⁰

Agreeing with Benjamin more than traditional musicology, Adorno locates authenticity in the original musical score or autograph. The text or score is the realization of music itself. The problem with much of the 19th and 20th century music is that performance, the communicative aspect of music, "took primacy over that which it actually was intended to serve: over the composition itself."⁵¹ Scores that have become little more than "a guide to performance" introduce external concerns into the autonomous musical monad, risking the integrity of the dialectical relationships of subject-object, individual-society, and the authenticity of the musical structure.⁵² Performance is an after-thought, and has

no bearing on the musical work or its authenticity.

...the autograph itself is the absolute realization of the work and consequently the instance of authenticity....This autograph incarnates the 'pure mind, pure spirit'...⁵³

The difference between Schonberg's works and others is that the twelve-tone system re-established the primacy of the score; through it not only is the interpretive act of the performers limited by the composer's strict control, but the performance or communication is of secondary concern.⁵⁴ Schonberg's autographs were once again "the abode of authenticity."⁵⁵ The autograph is also the instance of the author's authority, for it bears his signature, testimony of the score's originality. As the signature of the self, the autograph points inexorably back to the originator.

In "What is an Author?", Michel Foucault critically examines the ideological foundations and social functions of the author. Although the composer's and authorial function may not be identical, certain aspects of Foucault's critique are relevant. The first issue he raises for instance, the death of the author in modern literature, finds a somewhat similar movement in modern music criticism. Adorno's disregard for the intentions of the composer and an almost exclusive concentration on the objectively existing and meaningful text echoes literary criticism's turn away from the author to a focus on writing.

The elevation of writing, or composition in this case, to a primary status, argues Foucault, re-introduces the author/composer at a transcendent level. The 'empirical' traces may be erased, but all the, "representations that formed a particular image of the author," preserve the author/composer's presence through his absence. Creativity, for example, cannot be understood without the creator. The religious principle of, "unalterable and yet never fulfilled

tradition,"⁵⁶ in which the creation of text is seen as an eternal attempt to reconcile original divisions still implicitly points to the originator of the text, and the perpetuators of the chain of texts. Adorno's perception of music shares, to a degree, this religious view of the text. The works of Bach and the avant garde are conceived as,

exercises to gain power over musical material in such a way that the difference between the material and the musical subject might some day disappear.⁵⁷

Each musical work signifies the attempt to reconcile the original differences, and reveals to the meditative mind the historical truth of separation.⁵⁸ The composer's absence in both the music and Adorno's analysis depends on his initial presence and mastery; absence is a function of his willing sacrifice to the musical material, which can then be analyzed as an authorless text. The composer remains as a necessary creator or initiator of the musical text.

The contradiction between the author's 'death', and his transcendental re-appearance is a function of how the composition is located in its historical tradition.

There seems to be an important dividing line between those who believe that they can still locate today's discontinuities (ruptures) in the historico-transcendental tradition of the nineteenth century, and those who try to free themselves once and for all from that tradition.⁵⁹

Adorno identifies the historical ruptures, recognizing what they signify, but is unwilling to forsake the narrative of historical progress. Breaks in tradition are explained in the terms of the traditional. Although Adorno talks of the, "discontinuity of musical history," he also states that by its break with tradition new music, "enters into union with tradition."⁶⁰ Avant garde's radical opposition to tradition is explained in the terms of tradition's underlying and unifying principles that are deemed to be universal.

The very concept of the 'work', which was intended to draw attention away from the author, demands the presence of the author/composer's name as a unifying principle' and as a constant level of value'.⁶¹ In the Philosophy of Modern Music, the names 'Schonberg' and 'Stravinsky' function not only as the common source of all the various musical works, but as indicators, if not synonyms, for 'good' and 'bad', 'authentic' and 'inauthentic', and 'psychologically mature' or 'regressive and schizophrenic'. Thus Adorno can write that, "in Stravinsky the desire of the adolescent is ever stubbornly at work..." (my italics) or, "...Schonberg's music has hovered in the vicinity of cognition."⁶² 'Schonberg' and 'Stravinsky' have become the symbols for certain value judgements as well as denoting the unity of their works.

The intrusiveness of the economic system in musical composition and the impact of consumer ideology aside, the socioeconomic and ideological foundations and assumptions concerning the modern concept of composer/author tend to be ignored.⁶³ To a great extent the idea of author as the producer and owner of his text depends on a notion of private ownership, and ideas as property.⁶⁴ Supporting these views are a wide-ranging set of laws regulating the production, distribution, exchange of, and remuneration for musical texts. Of growing importance is the judicial system whose role it has become to decide the ownership, and hence the originality and origins of the artistic text.⁶⁵ Where Adorno's analysis falls short then, is in its failure to consider that the avant garde was rebelling not only against external systems, but the very socioeconomic and ideological foundations of the institution of 'art', and all that it entails.⁶⁶

Of great interest is how Adorno and Foucault's initial observations about society can sound similar but lead to opposing conclusions regarding art and the social function of the author. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, it was

suggested that man's first realization that nature was a separate entity, and therefore new and alien, engendered a reaction of fear and terror. His attempt to explain the new through the deification of nature translated the terror into sacredness.

The dualization of nature as appearance and sequence, effort and power, which first makes possible both myth and science, originates in human fear, the expression of which becomes explanation.⁶⁷

The idea of an unknown, and therefore uncontrollable 'outsideness' is the source of fear', and the foundation of myth and Enlightenment. As the first attempt to demythify the outside through systematic knowledge, Enlightenment failed because its concepts, like the ancient deities, have also embodied and reproduced man's fear of the new.⁶⁸

Foucault's contention that our society, "fear[s] the proliferation of meaning,"⁶⁹ although not identical to Adorno's idea that we fear the 'new' or the 'external', shares with it the notion that fear of difference is an important element in society. Where Foucault argues that the world is "thrifty" not only with "resources and riches," but with, "discourses and their significations,"⁷⁰ Adorno might respond by saying that it is in society's over-explanation of things where the true extent of its 'thrift' is revealed. By explaining and giving meaning to every object and phenomena in accordance with (the myth of) enlightenment, society actually limits the creation of new meaning by denying the object's inherent value. Fear of the 'new' for Adorno, is fear of the object's inherent value. For Foucault fear of the 'proliferation' of meaning is the fear of discarding the idea that there is one meaning.

Art's special relationship to the proliferation of meaning and the experience of the new is in part a function of society's designation of its social role. Both the author

and the text are traditionally regarded as the source of experience and meaning. For Adorno, art's 'sacred circle' is the heir of magic, for it continues to introduce society to the terror of the new. Removed from profane society,

...it is in the nature of the work of art
...to be what the new, terrifying occurrence
became in the primitive's magic: the appearance
of the whole in the particular.⁷¹

The authentic work of art is therefore sacred and terrifying. Similarly, Foucault contends that, "fiction threatens our world," with "great peril...great danger."⁷² What fiction proposes is the loss of the absolute centre, the point where the definitive meaning resides. While both Adorno and Foucault see in art a set of possibilities, the implication of these possibilities are opposed. Adorno's music may present the new experience and meaning, but within a framework that protects the authenticity of the text against the unsettling notion of polysemy and the 'plurality' of interpretations.

For Adorno, it is the author, as the originator of the text, who is the means by which the authentic, new experience is introduced. The individual composer stands at the beginning of the work like a pioneer.⁷³ According to Foucault, the authorial presence is an ideological construct of, rather than the creator of the discourse, whose main social function is the limitation, not creation of new possible significations. It is through the author that society,

limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by
which one impedes the free circulation, the
free manipulation, the free composition,
decomposition...⁷⁴

of the text. As the text's centre, or 'weight', the author, either through an empirical or 'transcendent' presence, ensures that only certain interpretations are permissible. Another instrument of repression, the author, theoretically a "source of knowledge," actually acts to restrain it.⁷⁵

Schonberg's presence, for example, as the promise of authenticity not only limits the possible interpretations of text, thereby restricting knowledge, but in addition signifies the limitation of access to it. The very nature of Adorno's concept of authenticity is predicated of the exclusion of the majority. Both Adorno and Schonberg believe that avant garde music's restricted, select audience is a function of its authenticity.

Along with the author, I would argue, the critic, supposedly the disseminator of knowledge, also acts to restrain it. Through his identification of the text's single meaning, the critic takes possession of the truth. He vicariously assumes the position of the author at the centre of the text, and like the author, becomes the means by which society limits meaning. Adorno's 'monolithic view' permits only one correct philosophy of music, offering the truth as opposed to a 'better perspective'.⁷⁶ Thus Schonberg's autograph authenticates both the text and the critic's position.

Adorno's theoretical approach, although it plays with the death of the author/composer depends upon and reproduces its ideological social function. Authorship becomes the stable point of reference within the musical text which Adorno's concept of authenticity requires. The author is both in the text and external to it, for while the author-centre is seen as the originator of the musical text's dynamic, and is therefore represented in it, he is not dynamic, and is therefore apart from the internal dynamic of the text.

It might be suggested that concern with authenticity reflects the fear generated by the sense of space that separates subject and object, and exists within the individual. The ability to identify the authentic is a claim to know the object's meaning. Knowledge of the object requires control, if not transcendence of the space between subject and

object. It is man's, "separation from a presumed state of nature," that constitutes meaning and language, the articulation of differences.⁷⁷ The trauma of separation, as Adorno, Foucault and Kristeva suggest, is terrifying, and motivates man's desire for explanation and control of the other. Men's response to this traumatic experience of the 'other' and the 'self' suggests Kristeva, is to "magnify both [separation and language] and, terrified, attempt to master them."⁷⁸ Authenticity becomes one of the means by which meaning, and therefore the space, is controlled. Kristeva's argument, although referring to 'abnormal' men, is particularly relevant when Adorno's concept of the universal language of music is considered. The one correct philosophy of music's interpretation of the meaning of the universal language is representative of Adorno's own effort to bridge the irreconcilable gap between the subject and the object, meaning and referent.⁷⁹ Non-identity theory is jeopardized by the fear that inspires the need for authenticity and authority.

Up to this point the discussion of authenticity and authority have focussed almost exclusively on serious art-music, for obvious reasons. Adorno's contention that there is no longer any authentic popular music, combined with the more straightforward way of evaluating the authenticity of popular culture provides less of an opportunity for discussion of 'authenticity'. I have fewer criticisms of 'authenticity' as it relates to popular art, perhaps because Adorno's discussion of popular music does not often entail a detailed examination of it. Some brief criticisms include the fact that the equation 'authentic art equals that which is made by and for the (authentic) people', becomes tautological in that the authenticity of one explains the authenticity of the other. Moreover, while Adorno's approach to serious art appears to escape the reductionist tendency of equating class and

authenticity, the same cannot be said about popular culture. Determining authenticity solely on the basis of class origins reintroduces reductionist tendencies, reducing the individual and individual musical work to a representative of an objectively determined collective. Authenticity is, in this case, not only a value sought after, but a means of domination.

It is with regard to the preceding discussion of the authorial discourse that a more interesting problem emerges. Although for both serious and popular art the source of origin is ultimately an important factor, the differences between the 'authorial function' as it relates to the individual author, and the creative effort of the collective are significant. The whole point of the 'authentic' popular text is that it is 'authorless' insofar as it has either more than one, or an unidentified author, whose identity has no importance for the work. Thus the term 'traditional' or 'folk' occupies the place reserved for the composer's name on a music sheet.

Communication of experience, and the passing on of the cultural text is an integral aspect of its formation, and its authentically 'popular' nature. The popular art of storytelling for instance, depends on the repetition of the stories, and the listener's 'integration' of it, "into his own experience".⁸⁰ Assimilation and communication are part of the fabric of the story and popular music or song. This is in direct contrast to the creativity involved in the act of serious composition, which, like the writing of a novel, depends on the isolation of the "solitary individual."⁸¹ If, as Foucault suggests, creativity is one of the functions society confers upon the author, then we have to ask whether the collective can 'create' in the same way. Given Adorno's assumptions about art, is authentic popular music a creative text at all? Does it involve a difference in degree or form of creativity from that which is associated with serious art?

Adorno's doctrine of art is based on a notion of representation that is more than mere depiction of what appears to be. Art should critically reflect upon the social totality, revealing its repression of nature. His theory of art belongs to a doctrine which, "first defined art as an institution of the hidden reality, thus making it a form of revelation," as well as one which, "saw art as the idealization of nature; that is to say, showing things not as they are but as they ought to be."⁸² The second doctrine (in combination with the first) is more applicable to classical music, whose presentation of utopian visions idealized the present, but whose internal dynamics belied the promise through its critical reflection of the social totality.

Although the modern composer has had to forego the positive idealization of society, he shares with the classical composer the same mimetic function. The question then becomes, if authentic popular music is not reflective in the same way, does it 'reflect', and if so, what and how? Do the acts of creation and reflection require the consciously reflective subject? Is the fact that 'the people' are 'closer' to nature merely transferred unconsciously into their cultural products?⁸³

Adorno's 'creativity' seems to implicitly exclude the activity of the collective. Creativity is reserved for a particular type of restricted and private action, and while communication at one time was a secondary goal of art, it is now anathema to the creative act. Authentic creativity, and creation of the authentic art resists communication between art and lived culture.

According to Raymond Williams, one of the greatest flaws in this type of artistic theory is that it assumes a duality of 'art' and 'reality'. Creativity, he claims, is not peculiar to those designated 'artistic' areas, but is a fundamental activity of daily living. Constantly ordering

and re-ordering our reality, our interpretation is in part, the creation of reality. Art's distinctive value is not its 'creativity', but is highly organized and effective communication of its interpretation and creation of reality.⁸⁴

In spite of its inconsistencies and tendency to ignore social conflict, Williams' emphasis on communication and the relationship between the artistic effort and everyday life underlines one of the problem's in Adorno's theory. It's refusal to consider communication means that it cannot really explain the creativity of the authentic collective and the interplay (not the absorption of popular by serious) of popular and serious art. Creativity becomes the exclusive enterprise of the autonomous individual. As such, it is erected as a further barrier to the proliferation of meanings and knowledge.

Authenticity, and the related concepts of authorship and a restricted creativity, signifies a certain centre of order and authority that can resist the overly rational disorder of society. Authentic art and critical theory, as the inheritors of true history, are the only realms from which a truly rational order can emerge. In the face of the anarchy produced by a social and economic system that deprive all objects and individuals of their inherent value, 'authenticity' becomes a promise of stability, truth and meaning.

The Unmoving Structures: Music and Society

One of the fundamental problems with Adorno's concept of authenticity is its location. Although it requires the external originator, authenticity resides in the musical text alone. A structural reading of music, in combination with the concern for authenticity, limits the dynamic of the text and the subject. Once in existence neither the text nor the subject can alter its/his position. A function of its internal

formation, authenticity cannot be conferred by the listener, nor can the authentic text alter the situation of the (inauthentic) conformist subject.

The only movement permitted to the text is that of decay; while no musical work can gain authenticity through social use, the once authentic text can be degraded through its incorporation into the mass communications structures. The mere "gesture of recognition," that signifies familiarity with the style and play of Bach's music, for instance, is the sign that he has been, "changed into a neutralized cultural monument."⁸⁵ Locking authenticity within the text, Adorno's dynamic music critique becomes an undynamic social theory. Trapping itself within a specific historical period, Adorno's theory is incapable of hearing subversion, the misuse and abuse of culture industry music, or conceiving of a context in which previously inauthentic music comes to represent the expression of an authentic collective.

The musical work neither moves through time from one period to another, nor can it move laterally in time, closer to the listener. The classical music text is trapped in its own epoch, incapable of addressing modern experience and social reality. Its authenticity can only be assessed from the perspective of its historical context. Nor can the subject move closer to the music. The hierarchy of listeners "excludes ex principio," the hope that music can alter the listener's state of consciousness. The hierarchy provides no possibility for advance, and is therefore as "masochistic" as culture industry music.⁸⁶ The retreat to art as the last hope for changing society is made futile by the belief that society cannot be changed. Bereft of all capacity to communicate its truth to the majority, music is trapped in its isolated, windowless circle that preserves its authenticity. Ironically then, the text's socially undynamic nature is necessary for the development of its internal dynamic.

Viewing the text as the embodiment of external social struggles, Adorno's theory neglects the text's 'worldly', concrete and sensual nature, ie. its participation in society. In "The Text, the World, the Critic," Edward Said suggests it is the text's, "worldliness, circumstantiality, the text's status as an event having sensuous particularity," not the fact that a, "situation is hidden within...as a mystery," that limit the possible interpretations of the text.⁸⁷ In arguing for the worldliness of the work, Said establishes the text's inherent capacity to shape meaning, as well as the impact of the external interpretation and context. The meaning' is inherent in neither text nor context, but is developed through their interplay.⁸⁸ While arguing against the indeterminacy of limitless interpretation, Said does not go to the other extreme by granting primacy to the text, proposing instead a course that accounts not only for the limits imposed by each, but the dynamic between them.⁸⁹

Said's approach not only preserves the, "text's decisive claim on actuality," but it also provides for the text's influence on the world.⁹⁰ If the text can only be understood with reference to its circumstances, then its role can only be understood with reference to its affect on the world. Such is the case, according to Said, with Marx's The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," whose own textuality (worldliness) has changed reality by "providing a world historical situation with circumstances otherwise hidden..."⁹¹

Concurring with Foucault, Said sees the text as an expression and fact of "the will to power."⁹² Texts ,

compel attention away from the world
even as their beginning intention as texts,
coupled with the inherent authoritarianism
of the authorial authority ...makes for
sustained power.⁹³

With the death of God as the originary of the first, divine text, the authority (and hence authenticity) of the text

became factors of the text's language. Discerning between languages became the justification for the creation of discourses, (such as the 'Orientalist') that effectively confined and implicitly graded all other cultures in relation to the dominant European one. The "passing of divine authority," permits the rise of, "European ethnocentrism."⁹⁴ Thus the critic's role cannot be understood without appreciating the politics of the discourse and the text, and it is within this context that Adorno's own ethnocentric delineation of what constitutes music must be understood.

To Said's questions and commentaries about the critic's approach to the text and his situation with regards to both text and reader, I would add the question, how is the position of the critic who interprets non-language texts to be understood?' It seems to me that the music or dance critic not only comments on, but necessarily translates the non-language text or phenomenon into language for the purposes of commentary. This is, in fact, part of the problem of any interpretation of music, since it cannot be related by the critic in its own mode of expression. This problem of trying to convey music in words is what Charles Louis Seeger called the 'linguocentric predicament,' or the 'musicological juncture'. Speech is unable to relate anything but scientific fact about music.⁹⁵

If the critical text cannot be analyzed on only one level or as having only one primary function, then so too must the music text be accorded a similarly multi-function, multi-level analysis. Adorno however, refuses to consider that the text can be more than an object that exists for itself (and here we might consider what the music's self' is). By positing an absolute distinction between music's self-fulfilling function and its existence as a form of communication, Adorno's theory tends to smooth over one of music's contradictions; the communicative effort is continued in

spite, or maybe because of alienation, and the communication of alienation (itself a contradiction) can succeed in momentarily reviving a collective identity. If, as Trilling suggests, the concept of authenticity is related to the growing awareness of an internal space, then it could also be suggested that the consciousness of the space, of alienation, has made us aware of 'communication'. Alienation and communication may therefore belong together, but an exploration of their relationship cannot be conducted in accordance with a structural analysis.

Up to this point I have not directly questioned the merits of a structural sociological interpretation of music, although I will argue that there are some problems inherent in such an approach that cannot be resolved within the limits of textual analysis. Assuming for the moment though, that the musical score is the centre of the musical work, or is 'music' itself, I would still maintain that the failure to consider both the performance and audience interpretation is an obstacle to understanding how the music's 'ideology' is experienced and manifested by the people. While I do not want to suggest that Adorno ignored the context, his analysis abstracts and idealizes it, while the musical text, severed from people's experiences, is presented in overly intellectualized and rational terms.

Determining the social effect of music on the basis of the musical structures' 'objective' nature, Adorno's theory grants the text primacy over the context. In contrast, Schonberg states that the musical impression is not produced by the musical work alone, but relies on a combination of, "what the work of art gives to the onlooker," and what the latter is, "capable of giving to the work of art." % The 'impression' suggested by Adorno's theory is more an imprint or stamping of the music on the (mostly) passive mind than the active engagement of music by the listener. Severed from

sensual experience, music starts to resemble an intellectual exercise.

The priority of text is related to both the bourgeois doctrine of autonomy that Adorno has uncritically accepted, and the separation of subject-object and mind-emotion that characterizes rationalism. In the first place, the doctrine of autonomy presumes the superiority of the art work over lived culture, and the absolute separation of one from the other.⁹⁷ This in turn becomes the justification for ignoring the lived experience of music, aside from the 'effects' on the listeners that Adorno has predetermined without the benefit of listening to the listeners. In a related point, the distance between the high and low, and high and lived cultures is reflected in the distance between 'high' and 'low' theory. There is too great a space between sociological studies by Simon Frith,⁹⁸ for example, that study in detail listener response, habits, relation to lifestyle and values, and the 'high' theory that fails to speak to, of and for the listener. While the two may be irreconcilable, the existence and validity of both must be recognized.

Secondly, the assumed inferiority of the lived culture (which is closely associated with the expression of experience/emotions) reinforces Adorno's rationalist antipathy to the experiential. Disregard for experience is in part a function of the tendency to objectify the audience, and ironically, the music itself. The disregard for the experiential is further reflected in the authority that Adorno grants to the 'pure spirit' of text. According such, "great power to mass culture texts...and so little to the individuals who consumed them," Adorno's theory establishes unwarranted equivalencies between all individuals and all groups. Having predetermined the effect of the culture industry music, there was no reason to "ask questions about who used mass culture, how they did so, how those people understood such forms, or

how they evaluated them."⁹⁹ It is not the music, but the theory which evaluates music as a series of coded signals engendering specific responses, that deprives the listener of the right to act and react. Unaffected by the interpretation of the audience, musical "work and effect" in Adorno's theory, "are juxtaposed in an unmediated manner."¹⁰⁰ Like the audience, the music becomes a frozen object of study.

Returning to the original assumption about the musical work then, I'm still not convinced that the score is, or can be equated with what we call 'music'. For reasons already apparent, including the quest for authenticity and all that it entails, combined with a justifiable suspicion of positivist reception studies, Adorno's concentration on the text seems consistent. Yet it conflicts with other aspects of the theory, such as the concern with sensual experience and nature, the concrete, detailed attention to the individual, and the sense of individual alienation. Individual alienation and sensual experience have to struggle through an often overwhelmingly functional and utilitarian reading of music, which, limited by the authority of score, is itself restricted.

Aside from ignoring the experiential aspect of music, the score's centrality determines, to a degree, what is accepted as 'music'. If the score is the 'realization' of the music, then how should spontaneous music be interpreted? There is an increasing interest in forms of music which are composed during performance. In such cases the musician-composer may not even have a pre-determined idea of what the music will be, but creates it in response to other musicians, or visual stimuli. Far from being 'popular' or 'light' music that can be easily dismissed because of its simplistic structures and ideas, spontaneous music created by, Fred Frith for example, needs to be interpreted seriously as music. As with electronic music, but to an even greater extent, the

space between idea, composition, notation and performance is erased, and so too is the music, unless it is recorded. According to a text-centered analysis, this could not be music'.

While the musical score may be more than an intended guide to performance since it is a 'text', and therefore partakes of what Said calls the 'worldliness' of the text, this does not necessarily mean that it alone is 'music'. Where the literary text is the work realized, the score is a set of mathematical notations and ideas that have to be performed for there to be a sensual, experienceable medium called music'. A theory that relies on the analysis of a text that few people see/hear in its 'pure form' cannot give a full account of the relationship between the music and social reactions, or the instances of counter-culture and subversion. While the score may be a part of music, it cannot be seen as its total expression.

If the score is not 'music', then neither are the performance and the audience interpretation of the performance, for neither the audience nor the performer create the initial text. The musical ideas, the instructions for performance pre-exist the event. They are all part of the process of music. The question then becomes, 'where is music and how can it be studied and understood?' While Claude Lévi-Strauss may have accorded primacy to the idea of music rather than the music itself, thereby engaging in a "wrong-headed account of Ravel's Bolero",¹⁰¹ in the introduction to The Raw and the Cooked, his comparison of myth and music is provocative.

Thus the myth and the musical work are like conductors of an orchestra, whose audience becomes the silent performers. If it is then asked where the real centre of the work is to be found, the answer is that this is impossible to determine. Music and mythology bring man face to face with potential objects of which only the shadows are actualised.¹⁰²

The whole function of the centre, says Derrida, is revealed as being "mythological," as an "historical illusion."¹⁰³ The centre, the point of authenticity, the author as authority, acts as an anchor, keeping both the text and the subject frozen in time and space. The social dynamic between texts, between subjects, and particularly between text and subject is ironically erased by the need for the dynamic of the internal musical structures, and the quest for authenticity. Thus music returns, along with the centre, to myth itself.

Reference Notes to Chapter Four

1. Jay, Adorno, 108-9.
2. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 136.
3. See Hohendahl, 211, and Wes Blomster, "Electronic Music," Telos No. 32 (Summer, 1977), 68.
4. Trilling, 94.
5. Ibid., 11.
6. Williams, 103-104.
7. Trilling, 94-99.
8. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 181.
9. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 154.
10. Trilling, 94-95.
11. Ibid., 95.
12. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 154.
13. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 26-29, passim, and "Music and the New Music," 136.
14. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 51.
15. Ibid., 51-52.
16. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 136.
17. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 248.
18. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 96.
19. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 252.
20. See Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 27-28.
21. Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics, trans. Herbert Marcuse and Erica Shrover (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), 62, 2.
22. Ibid., 66.

23. Theodor W. Adorno, Noten Zur Literatur (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1958), pp. 80f cited in Marcuse, 67.
24. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 138.
25. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 75.
26. Ibid., 76.
27. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 129-130.
28. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 58.
29. Blomster, "Electronic Music," 67-68.
30. Adorno, "Music and Technique," 93.
31. See Adorno, "Baby with the bath-water," in Minima Moralia, 43-45.
32. In a related field, the studies done on women and romance novels, for instance, indicate some interesting results. Women readers have interpreted the characterization of the female and male characters in ways which contradicted those of the 'expert' readers, by seeing the female characters as more independent and in control of the situation. Further, the novels were often used as a means of 'escape' from the pressures of both child-rearing and domestic work. The 'resistance' against the culture industry may not be great, but the process of a counter-interpretation, in which the women were not placated but were less satisfied with their lives, is one basis for possible 'rebellion'. See especially Janice Radway, "Identifying Ideological Seams," Communication, Vol. 9 (1986), 93-123, and Radway, Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).
33. Trilling, 131.
34. Walter Benjamin, "The Storyteller," in Illuminations, edited and with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968; Schocken Books, 1969), 94.
35. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 78.
36. See above.
37. Arnold Schonberg, Style and Idea: Selected Writings of Arnold Schonberg, ed. Leonard Stein, trans. Leo Black (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), 51.

38. Benjamin, "The Storyteller," 86-87.
39. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 55.
40. Jochen Schulte-Sasse, "Introduction," to Theory of the Avant-Garde, Theory and History of Literature, Vol. 4, by Peter Burger, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxxvi.
41. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 54.
42. Hohendahl, 222.
43. Trilling, 97.
44. Trilling, 24-25. While Trilling also devotes a chapter to authenticity, the self and psychoanalysis, which is certainly relevant to Adorno's critique of music, the topic is far too complex to be dealt with adequately in this thesis. See Trilling, "The Authentic Unconscious," chapter VI of Sincerity and Authenticity. The problems in trying to define the 'natural' as opposed to the 'socially determined', or, in Adorno's terms, 'conformist personality', are enormous. Gender politics, Adorno's view of the family, and the conservative social implications of his psychoanalytic theories would all have to be addressed.
45. Adorno, "Arnold Schoenberg 1874-1951," in Prisms, 151.
46. Ibid., 100.
47. Ibid., 158.
48. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations, 220-21.
49. Blomster, "Electronic Music," 67.
50. Kerman, 192-94, 208-9.
51. Adorno, "Music and Technique," 81.
52. Ibid., 87.
53. Blomster, "Electronic Music," 68.
54. Adorno, "Music and Technique," 81, 93.
55. Blomster, "Electronic Music," 68.

56. Michel Foucault, "What is An Author?" in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. Josue Harari (Cornell University Press, 1979), 144-45.
57. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 134.
58. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 76-78.
59. Foucault, 145.
60. Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 133-134.
61. Foucault, 151.
62. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 137, 124.
63. The same criticism could be made about this thesis of course, since I have also used Adorno's name as a unifying principle, and assumed that he is a creator of his texts rather than a function of the pre-existing discourse.
64. See Foucault, 148.
65. The recent court cases concerning works by George Harrison, and others are just a few of the growing number of court challenges regarding authorship of texts, and legal ownership of copyrights.
66. For a detailed study of the avant-garde's rebellion against artistic tradition, the socio-economic and ideological systems of society as well as the ideological and concrete foundations of the institution of 'art' (and artistic autonomy), see Peter Bureger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, Theory and History of Literature, Vol. 4, with an introduction by Jochen Schulte-Sasse, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1984).
67. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 15.
68. Ibid., 16.
69. Foucault, 157.
70. Ibid., 158.
71. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 19.
72. Foucault, 158.
73. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 30.

74. Foucault, 159.
75. Josué Harari, "Critical Factions/Critical Fictions," in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. Josue Harari (Cornell University Press, 1979), 42-44.
76. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 61-63.
77. Kristeva, 41.
78. See above.
79. See discussion above on religious reading of the text, and Adorno's perception of music as that which tries, and can momentarily reconcile the antagonistic elements. See Adorno, "Music and the New Music," 133-135.
80. Benjamin, "The Storyteller," 91.
81. Ibid., 87.
82. Williams, 22.
83. The theory of representation itself is highly problematic when music is the artistic product. Discussing the problems of a semiotics of music, Henry Orlov suggests that the "similarity between the music in some illustrative passages of programmatic pieces and the audible phenomena of the world is by no means characteristic of music in general." Orlov, "Toward a Semiotics of Music," in The Sign in Music and Literature, ed. Wendy Steiner (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 132. The notion of 'representation' is highly complicated when no clear equivalence or even symbolic representation can be established. This is an even greater problem when music is asked to represent abstract concepts and social tendencies.
84. Williams, 35-39, 47.
85. Adorno, "Bach Defended Against His Devotees," in Prisms, 135-36.
86. Feher, "rationalized music and its vicissitudes," 62.
87. Edward Said, "The Text, the World, the Critic," in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. Josue Harari (Cornell University Press, 1979), 171.

- 88.Ibid., 170.
- 89.Harari, 45.
- 90.See above.
- 91.Said, 178 and Harari, 46.
- 92.Said, 184.
- 93.Ibid., 179.
- 94.Ibid., 180.
- 95.Kerman, 158.
- 96.Schonberg, 189.
- 97.Burger, Iiii.
- 98.Simon Frith, The Socioloy of Rock (London: Constable and Company Limited, 1978)
- 99.Radway, 94.
- 100.Burger, 11.
- 101.Kerman, 181.
- 102.Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, trans. John Wightman and Doreen Wightman (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 14. [Translation somewhat modified.] cited by Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 287.
- 103.Derrida, 102.

Conclusion

The Master's Voice

Theodor Adorno's ideological, philosophical, sociological, and psychological critique of music cannot be fully appreciated if the strict boundaries that restrict and protect academic disciplines are left erect. Exploring and dismantling the walls between the political and the cultural, the aesthetic and the ideological, was one of the more general concerns of this thesis. Investigating Adorno's theory of music entails the acceptance that in the final analysis, there are no natural borders between areas, only ideological constructs. Culture is more than a reflection of political and ideological concerns, for the debates that occur in culture and about aesthetics, about authenticity, truth, meaning, political commitment and social autonomy, are all manifestations of power struggles in the realm of culture. The terms, 'truth', 'authenticity' and 'meaning', all point unerringly to those who have the power to define social reality' and the limits beyond which nothing can be said. These terms also gesture toward those groups (such as women, gays, non-whites), that are excluded from the process of defining, and who live, silently, on the margins of the socially acceptable. Aesthetic debates can, in some ways, be interpreted as polite politics.

The more immediate objective was to engage in a detailed examination of Adorno's theory of music in order to evaluate its internal consistency, the image it drew of society and the nature of his unspoken utopia, and the extent to which his critique and vision responds to the challenges of those groups presently involved in cultural struggles. There are two reasons why Adorno's works were selected as the topic of study; 1) His sociology of music has had a significant influence on later attempts to analyse music and society. (This is true even when the authors have adopted a very different approach to the topic.) 2) More importantly, his theories are fascinating because they combine a highly

sophisticated analysis of music with an equally complex perspective of the relationship between music, and the social, economic and cognitive systems, and the individual psyche. In addition, the political aspect is not reduced to the 'message' of the music, nor to authorial intent, but is a facet of the internal formal elements of the musical work. The act of composing is itself political; to compose authentic music, for Adorno, is to reject the profit-oriented economic system and its ethos, and the social and ideological systems that demand conformity and obedience from all people, depriving them of their individuality. Composition is the renunciation of the philosophical and material foundations of modern society, i.e., rationalism and hyper-rationalization. Thus the composer's first act, negation of society, is music's first political statement.

The major themes of Adorno's theory of music, such as: negation, autonomy, the individual subject, myth and Enlightenment, the dynamic totality and time-as-space, authenticity, the culture industry, all illustrate how closely related are music, history, and political and social concerns. As an embodiment of the alienated individual and true historical temporality, music stands deep within and yet outside the social totality, as a complement to critical theory and philosophy. Yet even if the (antagonistic) relationship between music and society were not made so apparent in Adorno's theory, the political aspect of a musical or cultural critique would still be undeniable; every theory presupposes some connection between music and society, music and the proper musical subject, authentic and inauthentic music. There are always implicit assumptions about who has the power and the right to define the process according to which cultural value is assigned.

The series of criticisms offered in the third chapter indicate that there are some questions about the consistency

of Adorno's approach to both history and music. The comparison of what was said in the more 'philosophical' sections of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, and what was either stated or implied in the critique of music brought to light certain discrepancies. For instance, in spite of the stated dedication to the concrete individual detail, some unwarranted generalizations detracted from the discussion about popular music, myth, and the experience of time. In addition, the resort to metaphorical and sometimes unmediated connections between, for example, internal musical structures and the psychological reactions of individuals, undermined the claim that the concrete individual was of paramount concern. While music was not a retreat into 'arrogant esoterica', being truly committed to social change, the resurrection of the autonomous individual as the historic subject signified a de facto withdrawal from anything but personal, psychological emancipation. Supposedly fragmented and fractured, history's continuity is salvaged by an underground tradition; denying surface continuity, atonality's rejection of tonality is really a conservation of the bourgeois heritage and music's ideal.

More troublesome than these inconsistencies are a set of ambiguities that seem to stem from conflicts between traditional values and terms, and the recognition that these ideological constructs may no longer be valid. The tension between the tendency towards deconstruction and the unwillingness to forsake the 'authentic' meaning and objective truth; between the criticism of functionalist rationality and the subjugation of both object and subject to the utilitarian system, and the desire for true rationality, also based on the duality of subject and object; between the emphasis on regaining experience and sensuality, and the subordination of the female emotions to the male intellect and energy, all weaken Adorno's own condemnation of rationalized, male-

dominated consumer society. The utopian potential that is drawn out from Adorno's theories resembles precisely that Enlightenment ideal which reflects the values of White, male, bourgeois individuals. Thus his theory of music and society rejects the potentially liberating action of women, Blacks, non-westerners and gays, who are currently engaged in cultural struggles.

The quest for authenticity, belief in rationality, and the inferiority of feminine values, are mutually supportive in ensuring that, within Adorno's theories, new collectivities cannot undermine the authority of traditional values. For example, Adorno's presumption that no 'authentic' collectivity is possible is justification for locating authenticity within the text. The primacy of the text is in turn supported by rationalism, which posits both an objective truth, and as a secondary factor, the superiority of the intellect over the emotions. This latter aspect further legitimizes the refusal to consider the audience's emotional response as a valid source of meaning-giving. Finally, the superiority granted to masculine over feminine traits (also justified by rationalism's equation of the feminine with nature, and desire to master both), is another factor in the ease with which the emotional, sensual element of music is subordinated to the rational, objective text. Authenticity, rationalism and the correlated dominance of male values combine to insulate the privileges of the dominant groups, and divorce the theory from the groups whom it objectifies and dismisses.

Finally, the inability of the theory to respond to the challenges of these groups is a factor of Adorno's essentially pessimistic view of society and the potential for change. Convinced that no basis for political and social action could exist given the social totality, Adorno retreated to the authenticity of the musical text as a substitute for political commitment. Potentially revolutionary, the theory of the

musical dynamic is dependent on music's social alienation, which thereby deprives society of the last experience of true historical temporality, and the possibility of change. The internal musical revolution can only be maintained at the expense of society's petrification. The process by which subversive groups and interpretations develop, are absorbed by the culture industry, and then reappear in some other guise, can not be seen let alone explained from this perspective.

Having discussed the flaws in Adorno's ideas, it must still be said that many of his conclusions may indeed be valid. His criticism of popular music's standardization and conscious adherence to a 'hit' formula, the condescension with which musicians, radio stations and record companies play to the lowest common denominator (pre-established by market research), and even the way in which time is set aside for 'new' (different) music, are all insights that must be considered seriously. All popular media including music are replete with images or sounds of success, of beauty, of femininity and masculinity that encourage unquestioning conformity. Manipulation of desires and expectations, and the power struggle over who defines and designs these desires, disagreement over the values reflected, cannot be understood from a position where domination itself is ignored.

And yet, this cultural struggle can only be appreciated if the corollaries of struggle, chaos and uncertainty, are also accepted. While Adorno recognizes the breakdown of the older order, his proposal of orderly negation in music effectively denies the disorder that accompanies all substantial change, and the constant chaos without which political struggle itself is inconceivable. In the end, music's revolutionary impulse is its desire to conserve the traditional authority and authenticity of the master's voice.

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