Ibn Khaldūn and the Orientalist

Historiography of the Maghrib

by

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Abstract

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From the 1840's on, Western (primarily French) historians structured their histories of the pre-colonial Maghrib around the narrative content and theoretical structures of Ibn Khaldūn's Kitāb al-ʿIbar. Following the manifest content of this text, Orientalists presented a history of the Maghrib which confirmed the image of oriental otherness attached to Islamic civilization since the Middle Ages. Specifically, the history of the Maghrib was defined according to the combined effects of native lassitude and the periodic risings of a destructive nomadic element. The result was to provide the French colonial presence in North Africa with ideological justification: only through the efforts of the mission civilisatrice could the Maghrib be ushered into the modern world.

Résumé

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Depuis 1840, les historiens Européens (surtout Français)
ont organisé l'histoire du Maghreb pré-coloniale en fonction
du récit et des structures théoriques que Ibn Khaldūn nous a
léguées dans Kitāb al-ʿIbar. Fidèles au contenu du livre les
orientalistes nous présentent une histoire du Maghreb qui
confirme l'image d'une specificité orientale, image qui fut
attribuée à la civilisation Islamique à daté du Moyen-Age.
Spécifiquement parlant, l'histoire du Maghreb fut définie par
les conséquences de la lassitude et par les révoltes
periodiques des Maghrébins. Le résultat permit aux
colonialistes Français en Afrique du Nord d'adopter une
idéologie justificative: seule leur "mission civilisatrice"
pouvait libérer le Maghreb de son sous-développement et
l'amener au monde moderne.

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Preface

The system of transliteration used throughout this thesis is that of the Institute of Islamic Studies. The subscript diacritic is indicated by ̣. The names of Arab authors writing in French have been left as they appear in their French language works.

I would like to thank the Institute of Islamic Studies for the funds it has provided me over the past two years, without which the completion of this degree would have been impossible. I would also like to thank my thesis adviser, Professor Issa J. Boullata, for his corrections and patience in seeing this thesis through. Special thanks to Soraya El-Mouldi for the extended use of her typewriter.

Chapter I

Introduction: Ibn Khaldūn,
His Life and His <u>Kitāb al-ʿIbar</u>

I

The current generation of historians has been, for quite some time now, involved in a self-conscious and often soul-searching reappraisal of the historical discipline. With much effort and creativity, new methodologies and approaches have been systematically developed in order to come to a much more objective understanding of the historical process. Scholars have long realized the problems encountered in trying to achieve "real" historical objectivity; indeed, the notion itself has often been regarded as a chimera. Continental thinkers in particular - from Valéry and Heidegger, to Sartre, Lévi-Strauss, and Michel Foucault - have gone so far as to doubt even the value of historical consciousness, and have tried to demonstrate the fictive quality of all historical reconstruction as stemming from man's innate impulse to "clothe the chaos of the phenomenal world in stable images."[1] Generally, these writers maintain that historical "facts" have no ontological validity as such, but, rather, are constituted by the historian himself through a process of abstraction. Furthermore, the arbitrary selection and ordering of these facts within the structure of a narrative sequence necessarily results in a history written in the interests of some specific (manifest or latent) aim or purpose.

In the face of these criticisms, it comes as little surprise that one of the major stimuli provoking the need for a "new history" has been the realization that the "historical consciousness on which Western man has prided himself since the beginning of the nineteenth century may be little more than a theoretical basis for the ideological position from which Western civilization views its relationship not only to cultures and civilizations preceding it. but also to those contemporary with it in time and contiguous with it in space."[2] In particular, there has been a massive realization, partly provoked by the mid-century movements of national liberation, that Western scholarship has been inextricably entwined with the colonial experience of the European nations in Africa and Asia. The mechanics of this operation have been neatly compacted in the maxim "scholarship follows the flag." Throughout the late eighteenth, the nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, scholars followed the military in penetrating the "dark regions" of the earth, with the conscious or unconscious assumption that within the matrix of their own culture was to be found "the unique or at least the most adequate embodiment of the transcendent ideals of liberty and truth."[3] Generally, entire regions were isolated as phenomena and subjected to theories and intellectual concepts that were rooted in European ethno-centrism and cultural bias. The indigenous inhabitants had little opportunity to speak for themselves. In this way the colonial superstructure and its "civilizing mission" were justified and intellectually

maintained.

A good example of this procedure can be found in the French historiography of the Maghrib. From the 1840's on, French historians presented a history of the Maghrib that "constituted one of the main ideological props of the North African empire."[4] It was based upon the assumption that civilization and progress in the Maghrib had early on been arrested by the combined effects of native lassitude and the periodic risings of a destructive nomadic element. Only the order and stability of the French colonial administration, it was felt, could alleviate this pattern of stagnation and decline and usher the Maghrib into the modern world. Yet this scenario of an inherently inferior and unstable Maghrib was not an absolute invention of French historiography. Rather, its basic concepts were taken from the monumental socio-historical work of the fourteenth-century Maghribi scholar Ibn Khaldūn. The French, in other words, considered themselves fortunate in having one of Islam's greatest scholars provide them both with facts and a ready-made historical framework upon which they could build and at the same time validate their colonial presence. The result has been that for over a century Western (primarily French) histories of the Maghrib have been written on the basis of a paraphrase of Ibn Khaldūn.

What these historians have failed to realize, however, is that their reading of Ibn Khaldūn has been premised upon a specific intellectual method and mode of representation which

has worked to mask and legitimize their own often nefarious infrascientific aims and purposes. We refer, of course, to the Western tradition of Orientalism, a concept which has in recent years engendered a great deal of discussion but hardly any firm consensus of opinion. Yet is is not so much the purpose of this thesis to explicate the conceptual topos of Orientalism as it is to examine how Orientalism has functioned as the prime component in the dialectical interchange between Europe, Ibn Khaldūn, and the Islamic Maghrib. It is hoped that the dynamics of this process will become clear as the thesis progresses.

Chapter II will examine how Orientalism emerged in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a broadly based heuristic device used to explicate the main and enduring features of Islamic civilization, a concept which for Europeans had been imbued with an aura of otherness since the Middle Ages. An attempt will be made to show how the epistemological bases of Orientalism have served to support Western hegemony over Muslim lands through the normalization of its principle theses and conceptual paradigms. Chapter III will provide a specific example of this procedure through an examination of how the Orientalist exposition of Ibn Khaldūn's historical thought played into the hands of French colonial ideology, and will further attempt to demonstrate how these judgements came to be regarded as established truths. By way of conclusion, a brief note will be made of some of the more recent attempts to move beyond the strictures of the

Orientalist discourse and view Ibn Khaldūn from new perspectives.

II

It will be useful at this point to briefly sketch some of the main features of Ibn Khaldūn's life and work, if only to place them in a meaningful temporal and spatial context. In regard to Ibn Khaldūn's life we are fortunate in having several very good manuscripts of Ibn Khaldūn's autobiography, the Ta'rīf. Although it tells us very little about the inner man - the contours of his personality, his hopes, beliefs - it nevertheless serves as an excellent guide to his scholarly career and public life.[5]

Ibn Khaldūn belonged to an old Ḥaḍramī family which had migrated to Seville during the Arab conquest of al-Andalus. The Christian Reconquista of the thirteenth century, however, forced the family to move, first to Ceuta and then to Tunis. It was in this latter city that Ibn Khaldūn was born on 1 Ramaḍān 732/27 May 1332. His early years in Tunis coincided with the Marīnid ruler Abū al-Ḥasan's bid for Maghribi hegemony. When Abū al-Ḥasan occupied Tunis in 1347, he brought with him a large number of theological and literary scholars, with the result that Ibn Khaldūn was provided with a stimulating environment in which to intellectually mature, a fact he emphasizes in the Ta'rīf. This environment, however,

was soon eradicated by the ravages of the Black Death and the political disorders which ended the Marīnid rule in Ifrīqiya.

In order to escape this turmoil, Ibn Khaldūn made his way Westwards to the Marīnid power base of Fez, where he offered his secretarial services to Abū al-Ḥasan's successor, Abū ʿInān. But after only three years residency, he was accused of conspiring to aid the exiled Ḥafsịd amīr of Bijāya, Abū ʿAbd Allāh, regain his throne, and as a consequence was imprisoned for two years (1357-8). This episode marked the beginning of a long series of political intrigues which were to dominate the balance of Ibn Khaldūn's career and which were to stamp him with a reputation of mistrust wherever he went.

Released from prison, he travelled to Granada, where the Naṣrid amīr entrusted him with a delicate diplomatic mission to Pedro the Cruel (1364). But once again personal resentment and political entanglement forced Ibn Khaldūn to move on. At Bijāya he was received by Abū ʿAbd Allāh, who repaid Ibn Khaldūn for his previous help by granting him the office of ḥājib. But when Abū ʿAbd Allāh was killed by rebels, Ibn Khaldūn found himself without a benefactor. For the next nine years he wandered around the central and western Maghrib, arranging tribal alliances and levies on behalf of the Marīnids. In the course of one expedition he briefly retired to a ṣūfī shrine. Tired of political double dealing and personal strife, he shortly afterwards made a firm decision to restrict himself to intellectual pursuits. To this end he severed himself from royal connections and took refuge with

the Awlād ʿArif, and for the next four years secluded himself
in Qalʿat Ibn Salāma (1375-9). It was there that Ibn Khaldūn
worked out the theoretical bases of the Muqaddima. But as his
work progressed, he realized he needed more documentation, and
with the permission of Abū al-ʿAbbās, architect of the Ḥafṣid
restoration, returned to Tunis where he completed a first
redaction of a universal history entitled Kitāb al-ʿIbar wa
dīwān al-mubtada' wa al-khabar fī ayyām al-ʿArab wa al-ʿAjam
wa al-Barbar wa man ʿāṣarahum min dhawī al-sulṭān al-akbar, or
the "Book of Exemplaries and the Record of Narratives and its
Principles concerning Arabs, and Persians, and Berbers, and
those Nations of Great Might Contemporary with them". It was
to this work that the Muqaddima was attached as a
prolegomenon. The formation of a cabal, however, convinced
Ibn Khaldūn to leave the Maghrib forever, and in 1382 he
embarked for Cairo on the pretext of making the pilgrimage to
Mecca.

Ibn Khaldūn's time spent in the service of the Mamlūks is
perhaps the most interesting part of his career. Befriended
by the sulṭān Abū Saʿīd Barqūq, he enjoyed the prestige of
numerous positions and postings, including chief Mālikī Qāḍī,
a teaching post at the Azhar, and authority over the
Baibarsiyya, Ṣarghatmish, and Ẓāhiriyya madāris. Yet, once
again, Ibn Khaldūn managed to make enemies, with the result
that for a time he was dismissed from his post of Qāḍī. But
his greatest troubles arose when he signed a fatwā directed
against his benefactor Barqūq in the course of a palace coup,

with the result that when Barqūq was restored to power (1390), Ibn Khaldūn was dismissed from the rest of his official positions for a period of ten years. This period of inactivity was relieved in 1400, when Ibn Khaldūn was obliged to accompany the new sul**ṭān** Faraj on an expedition to relieve Damascus, which was being threatened by Tīmūrlang.[7] However, without warning Faraj fled Damascus with his army back to Cairo, where he suspected treason, leaving Ibn Khaldūn behind. The fame of Ibn Khaldūn had evidently reached the Mongol leader, and a meeting between the two was arranged. Tīmūrlang wanted a good, reliable intelligence report about the Maghrib, with detailed information on its people and geography to be used for a projected invasion. Ibn Khaldūn had not the slightest compunction in providing this, and had Tīmūrlang's secretary translate the report into Mongolian. In the meantime, Damascus was sacked. Ibn Khaldūn, however, was able to make his way back to Cairo where he continued to be active as a judge and scholar, adding the finishing touches to **Kitāb al-ʿIbar** and the **Taʿrīf**. He died suddenly on 15 Ramaḍān 808/17 March 1406.

Ibn Khaldūn's life has been variously judged. Many have regarded him as an opportunist, a backbiter, a sycophant, whose unpleasant disposition prevented him from ever attracting any seriously committed disciples or students. Others, conversly, have seen him as a selfless man for all seasons, whose ultimate quest was geared towards the fashioning of a Philosopher King capable of resurrecting the

political élan of an Islamic world too long dominated by its tribes.[8] This kind of speculative appraisal concerning the personal characteristics and motivations of a medieval man must, however, remain dubious so long as we have no concrete data revealing the dense specificity of Ibn Khaldūn's own mind.

We do, however, possess the concrete data of Ibn Khaldūn's own intellectual output, data which can be measured and compared against a sizable body of information detailing fourteenth century North African intellectual life generally. But the advantage of locating Ibn Khaldūn's thought within the context of Muslim tradition lies not so much in the facility it lends to philosophical source criticism (of which more below); rather, the main advantage lies in the fact that it enhances the ability of the scholar to understand Ibn Khaldūn's work more fully through an investigation of intellectual circumstances which may well point to "meanings only half-represented by the words."[9] The thought behind this kind of operation might at first appear commonsensical, even obvious. But when dealing with Ibn Khaldūn it takes on a whole new significance. For, ever since the "discovery" of Ibn Khaldūn by Orientalists in the nineteenth century, his work has been systematically detemporalized. Specifically, many of his ideas were thought to have prefigured much of the emerging edifice of nineteenth century social science, with the result that the Muqaddima came to be regarded as a timeless masterpiece, and its author,

Ibn Khaldūn, considered a "modern", an individual out of time
and place, who managed to transcend the narrow horizons of his
own intellectual tradition through the efforts of his own
genius.[10]

Fortunately, these kinds of judgement have been
paralleled by a diverse, yet systematic body of scholarship
which seeks above all to place Ibn Khaldūn's thought in its
rightful historical and intellectual context. Here the works
of Sir Hamilton Gibb, Muhsin Mahdi, and Aziz Al-Azmeh stand
out in particular.[11] Each, however, views Ibn Khaldūn's
relation to Arab-Islamic culture differently. For Gibb, the
axioms or principles on which Ibn Khaldūn constructed
'Ilm al-'umrān "are those of practically all the earlier sunni
jurists and social philosophers."[12] In this sense he places
Ibn Khaldūn firmly on the side of belief over and against
reason. Thus Ibn Khaldūn's pronouncement on the necessity for
social aggregation is traceable to a statement of similar
effect made by Ibn Taymiyya.[13] Similarly, his doctrine of
causality and natural law has more in common with the
theological concept of sunnat Allah than it does with the
Aristotelian notion of causal sequence. Given the centrality
of revealed religion for Ibn Khaldūn, it followed that the
central pivot around which his study revolved was the
Caliphate, "the only perfect state, being based on the true
practice of the Sharī'a ...."[14] But "since mankind will not
follow the Sharī'a, it is condemned to an empty and unending
cycle of rise and fall, conditioned by the 'natural' and

inevitable consequences of the predominance of its animal instincts."[15] In the end, Gibb sees Ibn Khaldūn as a fourteenth century al-Māwardī, attempting the reconciliation of the ideal demands of the Sharī'a with the facts of history.

For Dr. Mahdi, on the other hand, Ibn Khaldūn is above all a faylasūf at odds with the positivistic sciences of religion, a last representative of the Andalusian school seeking to "apply the immutable standards which transcend history"[16] to the circumstances of societal existence in an effort to establish the madīna fāḍila. His use of the empirical method in studying the origins, growth, and decay of societies marks him, not as a precursor of modern social science, but as a medieval social scientist.

But for Al-Azmeh, the absolutist distinction between Philosophy and the Law premised by Gibb and Mahdi is false as regards Ibn Khaldūn's thought. Rather, his thinking should be defined in terms of a broadly based Ash'arite nominalism comprising different elements in an intellectual spectrum common to all scholars of the time, including deductive logic and the Aristotelian notion of nature taking shape in individual bodies. While acknowledging the tremendous worth of Drs. Gibb and Mahdi's seminal studies, we will proceed to briefly examine some of the main features of Ibn Khaldūn's work as it has been explicated by Dr. Al-Azmeh, who represents the most recent attempt at Khaldunic revision.[17] It is hoped that the ensuing framework will be useful as a gauge with which to judge some of the Orientalist attempts to appropriate

Ibn Khaldūn as a historical source to be discussed in Chapter III.

According to Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn, like other historians of the medieval age, was primarily a dynastic thinker. His narrative subject is the tale of the innumerable dynasties (duwal) which have seized, held, and relinquished power and hegemony over time.[18] In the tradition of Tabarī and other early Arabic historians, he does not make reference about personal motives without the benefit of direct evidence. But unlike these early historians, he refuses to relate information (khabar) on the sole basis of tradition. To guard against the entrance of unfounded hearsay into the body of historical narrative, he developed a set of uṣūl al-tārīkh to compare with uṣūl al-fiqh,[19] the purpose of which was to vouch for the authenticity of statements through recourse to analogy (qiyās), establishing a correspondence between historical statements and the principles by which they are governed. The explication of these principles forms the content of the Muqaddima.

The prime object of Ibn Khaldūn's study, and the source from which these principles originate is ʿumrān, organized habitation or human civilization. Only when these principles are applied to ʿumrān's subject, daula, is the true nature of dynasticism laid bare. The principles are based upon three concepts welded together throughout the text of the Muqaddima in three juxtaposed layers, very common to Ibn Khaldūn's conceptual universe: logic, nature, and time.[20]

In terms of the first conceptual plane, daula is explicated in terms of a logical sequence, characterized by a movement from badāwa, which is daula organized according to natural livelihood (ma'āsh ṭabī'ī), and ḥaḍāra, defined as the telos of daula, and which in turn is characterized by urban life and other complex forms of social and technological organization. As a movement from simple necessity to superfluous complexity the transition fulfills the demonstrative requirements of Ibn Khaldūn's study. To reiterate: The concept which ties the simple and complex forms of daula together is 'umrān. 'Umrān, then, comprises both badāwa and ḥaḍāra, the thematic intermediary of which is daula.

The second conceptual plane is based upon the premise that each entity has a specific nature in it characterized by an active disposition which allows it to pass successively through stages of development, conclusion, and atrophy. Knowledge of a nature's teleology is deduced through knowledge of its causes, an idea which informed, for example, Avicennan medico-physical discourse and neo-Platonic, alchemical science.[21] The aim of the deduction is to establish an outline of the laws which govern any given entity. As a natural organism subject to the law of cause and effect, daula proceeds in a circular movement from birth and growth, to decline, which repeats itself within four generations.

The third plane consists of the chronology of the organized daula. The fundamental feature of daula is the

enduring nature of its morphology: <u>daula</u> remains constant; what fluctuates are the individual dynasties and rulerships of which it is comprised. The fluctuation is specified by the "chronological transference of power" along genealogical lines - so much so, indeed, that once another line has taken over the fortunes of the state, this same state is decreed to have been preserved when many of the conditions that brought it about have radically changed, not least geographically."[22] As examples Al-Azmeh points to the Fāṭimids, whose <u>daula</u> remained intact even after its move from Mahdiyya to Cairo, and the two stages of Almohadism (the Mu'minids and Ḥafṣids).[23] In other words, the historical process is not a natural change from one state to another, but is rather a change in the <u>status quo</u>, with the result that only <u>daula</u> can be described as an historically significant unit.

For Al-Azmeh, <u>ʿaṣabiyya</u>, far from being an abstract "social bond" with a specific internal composition capable of explaining events, is, rather, simply a register of dynastic power. In the <u>Muqaddima</u>, the human composition of what is denoted by <u>ʿaṣabiyya</u> varies from one group to another: it has nothing to do with kinship <u>per se</u> since "the solidarity of the group is itself a function of the coherence of this group, and such coherence cannot be maintained without the presence of a dominant element with a mandate to coerce."[24] The notion of <u>ʿaṣabiyya</u>, in other words, is solely tautological: it refers simply to the solidarity which a ruling group needs to rule, and which is provided by the sovereign.

Finally, it is on the third conceptual level of chronological sequence that the Muqaddima and the narrative portions of Kitāb al-ʿIbar intersect: "The other two planes do not possess any properties which can be shared with historiography."[25] The only difference between the treatment given to concepts such as ʿaṣabiyya, mulk, etc. in the two works relates to their mode of presentation. Whereas in the Muqaddima they are grouped under specific headings, in the Universal History they are dispersed according to the temporal flow of the narrative.

Al-Azmeh's final judgement on Kitāb al-ʿIbar is severe. ʿIlm al-ʿumrān failed to be prescriptive of history because "the marriage of logic and nature and their joint association with historical and political topics ... could only have produced a freak."[26] Such a hybrid was incapable of reproducing itself in the Aristotelian fashion to form a theoretical model. Ibn Khaldūn created a science limited to the descriptive generalization of the things which comprise ʿumrān; it did not have "the potency of conception to produce a paradigmatic omnipotence which could make it claim the topics discussed as its own and exclusively its own within an integral, autonomous, and well-defined conceptual articulation."[27]

This, in very brief and compacted form, is the substance of Dr. Al-Azmeh's study. Although it can in no way be regarded as the final word on Ibn Khaldūn, and in no way invalidates many of the past judgements made on him, as a work

which "claims membership of an emergent class of writings which seek to reconstitute all aspects of the Arab-Islamic past in a manner unfettered by the dead weight of received orientalist (or fundamentalist) scholarship,"[28] it represents a step forward in our understanding. Yet it is to Orientalism and, subsequently, to the Orientalist vision of Ibn Khaldūn that we must now turn.

Notes to Chapter I

1. Hayden White, Topics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 6.

2. Idem, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 2.

3. Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 27.

4. Edmund Burke III, "Towards a History of the Maghrib," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. II (October, 1975), p. 309.

5. For a description of these manuscripts see W.J. Fischel's Ibn Khaldun and Tamerlane, Their Historic Meeting in Damascus, 1401, A.D. (803 A.H.): A Study Based on Arabic Manuscripts of Ibn Khaldun's 'Autobiography', with a Translation into English and a Commentary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), pp. 1-19. The Taʿrīf was earlier translated by de Slane, "Autobiographie d'Ibn Khaldoun," Journal Asiatique, 4 ser; iii (1844), 5-60, 187-210, 291-308, 325-353. See also Fischel's "Ibn Khaldūn's 'Autobiography' in the Light of External Sources," Studi Orientalistici in onore di G. ᶜLevi Della Vida (Rome, 1956), I:287-308.

6. Ibn Khaldūn's activities in Egypt have been made the object of a special study: W.J. Fischel, Ibn Khaldūn in Egypt: His Public Functions and His Historical Research (1382-1406): A Study in Islamic Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

7. Idem, Ibn Khaldūn and Tamerlane.

8. For a negative judgement, see N. Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun: Historian, Sociologist, and Philosopher (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 42-43; for a positive view, Fuad Baali and Ali Wardi, Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Thought-Styles: A Social Perspective (Boston: G.K. Hall and Co., 1981), pp. 5, 116-7.

9. Michael Brett, "Ibn Khaldūn: Comments on the Maghreb Review, IV, 1 (January-February, 1979)," The Maghreb Review, VII, 5-6 (1982), p. 125.

10. The mechanics of the "Ibn Khaldun phenomenon" have been extensively documented by Aziz al-Azmeh in Ibn Khaldūn in

Modern Scholarship: A Study in Orientialism (London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1981).

11. Sir H.A.R. Gibb, "The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldūn's Political Theory," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vii (1933-5), pp. 23-31; Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldūn's Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); see also idem "Ibn Khaldūn," in M. Sharif (ed.) History of Islamic Philosophy, vol. II (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1966), pp. 888-904, 961-984; Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship, pp. 5-39, and idem, Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1982).

12. Gibb, "The Islamic Background," p. 25.

13. Ibid., p. 26.

14. Ibid., p. 30.

15. Ibid., p. 31.

16. Mahdi, Ibn Khaldūn, p. 295.

17. Al-Azmeh, Essay in Reinterpretation; idem, "The Muqaddima and Kitāb al-ʿIbar: Perspectives from a Common Formula," The Maghreb Review, IV, 1 (January and February, 1979), pp. 17-20.

18. Idem, Essays in Reinterpretation, pp. 11-ff.

19. Ibid., p. 32.

20. Idem, Study in Orientalism, pp. 13-24; idem, Essay in Reinterpretation, pp. 49-144, et passim.

21. Ibid., p. 52.

22. Idem, "Perspectives," p. 18.

23. Idem, Essay in Reinterpretation, pp. 24-ff.

24. Ibid., p. 32.

25. Idem, "Perspectives," p. 20.

26. Idem, Essay in Reinterpretation, p. 161.

27. Ibid., p. 161.

28. Ibid., p. x.

Chapter II

Mimesis and Discourse:
Orientalism as a Régime of Truth

I

Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization[1] opens with a description of the confinement and exclusion of lepers in a vast network of leprosaria (leper houses) scattered at the outskirts of the cities throughout the European Middle Ages. The marginal position of the leprosaria - at the edge of the city but not beyond - served to remind Christians through the physical stigmata borne by the lepers of God's power to punish. Collectively, the leprosaria served as a platform onto which the inhabitants of the city could project their fears and anxieties.

By the end of the Middle Ages, leprosy had disappeared from Europe. The leprosaria stood empty "soliciting with strange incantations a new incarnation of disease, another grimace of terror, renewed rites of purification and exclusion."[2] Eventually, the void was filled through the appropriation of a new scapegoat: the insane. Insanity and "foolishness", once honored as models of the simplicity to which all Christians should aspire, were now contrasted to the rationality of "ordinary" men, with the result that the insane came to be confined to the vacant leprosaria (now called "hospitals") with other expendable elements of society, such as vagabonds and criminals. It was Enlightenment society's way of dealing with the casualties of its current system of·

praxis. Foucault goes on to describe how in the nineteenth century the insane were eventualy differentiated from the poor and the criminal. But it was a move that had more to do with basic transformations in society than with liberal reform. For while the poor were liberated from the places of confinement in response to the need for an expanded industrial proletariat, and criminals singled out for special treatment through their blanket identification with an emerging revolutionary element, the insane were rediposed as medical subjects in order to affirm bourgeois society's existentially contrived norms and values. In effect, the clinical treatment of the insane became a new form of exclusion and confinment.

Foucault's analysis of the treatment of insanity reveals much about the conceptualization and intellectual treatment of Islam and Muslim civilization by Europeans since the Middle Ages. The reason is that the Orient, like insanity, has represented for Europe an enduring image of the Other, a notion covering a set of culturally self-validating devices which have also included in their time the ideas of heresy, wildness, and religio-ethnic demonization.[3] The function of these terms has not only been to designate a specific condition or state of being; they have also served to "confirm the value of their dialectical antitheses,"[4] the West, sanity, orthodoxy, civilization, and righteous humanity respectively. They have functioned, in other words, for the purpose of indentity and self-definition, providing life with meaning and operational perimeters through the denial of any kind of

phenomena radically different from the established norm, except as an antitype. The necessary result of this kind of bifurcation is to divide the world into the bipolar categories of "us" and "them", a mental operation that is very easily translated into a concrete spatial distinction between "a familiar space which is 'ours' an an unfamiliar space beyond which is 'theirs'."[5]

Foucault believes, that the systems of practice used to domesticate problematical fields of experience for the purposes of self-identification issue forth from what he has termed a _discours_. In practical terms a discourse functions to place an individual entity into a typology, attach to it a specific identity, and impose upon it a law of truth through the creation of a unitary body of theory which is expressed in social, political, and pedagogical forms. In this sense a discourse is a function power; it creates stable images and units of specificity which can be used to serve and support the ideological and political fixtures of the dominant social classes and institutions of a given society. A discourse serves, in other words, to confine a threatening aspect of existence, such as insanity or the Muslim Orient, within the perimeters of a controlling image. Ultimately, its purpose is subjugation.[6]

Foucault also makes the point that the mode in which a discourse is expressed changes over time according to current forms of social praxis. Thus, as we have seen, in the Middle Ages insanity was regarded and controlled in terms of

religious supernaturalism, while during the Enlightenment and in the nineteenth century it was managed according to specific politico-economic concerns, and its treatment dominated by a legitimizing scientificity. Likewise, the discourses established in Europe to define and manage the idea of the Islamic Orient underwent transformations which paralleled the changing epistemological bases and "common sense" arrangements of European intellectual expression: hence the very different nature of the respective discursive frameworks which dominated the thinking of, say, Peter the Venerable and E.-F. Gautier in their dealings with Muslim civilization. Yet, despite their stylistic differences, they remain linked to a common ground, in that they quite clearly represent the reactions of a Medieval man and a nineteenth century imperialist respectively to a common ground of psychic anxiety.

European anxiety about the Muslim Orient sprang initially from two major concerns. First, the Muslim East presented Europe with a potent military challenge, initially under the Arabs and Berbers, later under the Ottoman Turks; and second, the Islamic religion itself, similar to Christianity but at the same time very different, presented pre-modern Europe with a severe problematic: how to deal with a "heresy" that was securely based "on an external society well beyond the possibility of effective destruction by force."[7] Thus, unlike the remote civilizations of the Indian subcontinent or of China, which were not substantially revealed to Europe until the eighteenth century, Muslim civilization demanded a very

specific kind of European response and reaction from an early date: namely, the gradual construction of a controlling image geared towards the conceptual confinement of Oriental otherness.

The first appearances of the Muslim East as a military threat seem to have largely overshadowed any concern as to what Islam was _per se_, so much so that R.W. Southern has chosen in this regard to label the period spanning the eighth to eleventh centuries the "Age of Ignorance."[8] The Latin chronicles of the time are full of the havoc wrought by Muslim war-parties, especially in Provence and southern Italy. Indeed, in the chronicles the noun _saraceni_ is invariably followed by verbs such as _depopulaverunt_ and _devastaverunt_. The few attempts made to explicate the overall significance of Islam were necessarily limited to the methods of Biblical exegesis and typology practiced in the Iberian, Carolingian, and Ottonian monastic schools. The Cordoban martyr Paul Alvarus (d. 859), for instance, regarded Islam as a sign of the Last Days foretold in the Book of Daniel.[9]

A more precise image of Islam arose towards the end of the eleventh century. By that time the Slavs, Scandinavians, and Magyars had been converted to Christianity and Latin Europe as a whole engaged in the process of developing an ideological unity and self-confidence which found concrete expression in ventures such as the Iberian _Reconquista_ and the armed pilgrimages to the holy places in Palestine. To a large extent this new sense of identity and purpose was fashioned by

the growing institutional authority of the Roman Church which sought, according to Professor Southern, to forge a society of disciplined and organized clergy directing the thoughts and activities of an obedient and receptive laity.[10] One necessary result was an unflinching intolerance directed towards individuals or groups who refused to conform to the Church's discipline: hence the violent polemics and attacks directed against Jews, heretics, and rival Churches. Islam, too, became feared as an ideological rival, and was roundly "convicted of error, to distinguish it from the total truth of Europe."[11]

In order to underline this difference, it was necessary that Islam be imbued with an identity of otherness, that "different" be turned into "wrong". To this end the Church developed a detailed and crushing polemic, the essentials of which had already been established by eighth century Christians such as John of Damascus and Theodore Abū-Qurrah in order to allay the threat of assimilation into the majority Muslim group.[12] The main points of the polemic stated that Islam was inordinately sensual (Muslims were not confined to monogamy); that it was based on violence (Islam justified religious war); and fraud (because these fabrications must have been deliberately concocted).[13] Lay opinion was reflected in the chansons de geste, where an even cruder image of Islam was presented, as for instance when "Mahomet" is placed in a holy trinity with Tevergant and Apollo in the Chanson de Roland.[14]

However the revival of dialectic and the concomitant rise of scholasticism in the twelfth century necessitated that the otherness of Islam be rationally substantiated and subjected to a more sophisticated and systematic treatment. This was first undertaken by a team of Cluniac monks working under the direction of their Abbot, Peter the Venerable (d. 1156).[15] It was Peter's intention to approach the Muslims not "as our people often do, by arms, but by words; not by force, but by reason; not in hatred, but in love."[16] It was to be, in other words, a study of scientific compassion, with the ultimate aim of proving Islam to be self-refuting. But such a project required that Islam be exposed, laid bare for scrutiny, and to this end Peter commissioned one of his team, the Englishman Robert Ketton, to translate the Qur'ān into Latin. Other translations and commentaries followed, including a Summa Totius Haeresis Saracencorum by Peter himself.

But the project begun at Cluny was not followed up. Roger Bacon (d. 1292) and Raymond Lull (d. 1315) each talked of replacing the Crusading impetus with missionary work based upon a disciplined study of the Islamic languages, but in the end their plans came to nothing. There are two probable reasons for this: first, the realization of a vast, pagan Mongol world beyond Islam captured some of the attention and concern previously devoted to the Muslim world. Second, the ideological unity of Europe began to splinter with the consolidation of religious dissent and the rise of the Reformation churches, resulting in a further shift of

attention, but this time towards military and ideological struggles internal to Europe.[17]

Throughout the later Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, then, it seemed enough that Muslim civilization be presented in terms of the twelfth century polemic. No further elaboration was required: Islam had been safely placed within the bounds of a self-authenticating framework situated beyond the spiritual and geographical frontiers of Christendom. In many ways the polemic functioned as a form of theatre, where its players (the Muslims) were imbued with a specificity which reflected Latin Europe's corporate will to manage and contain Oriental otherness. Thus Dante, in his schematic protrayal of man and the cosmos, relegates "Mahomet" and Ali to the dark recesses of the ninth ditch of Hell with other sowers of heresy and schism (Canto XXVIII). Similarly, three and a half centuries later, Barthélemy d'Herbelot (d. 1695) took advantage of the progress made in the study of Oriental languages by scholars such as Guillaume Postel (d. 1581) and Thomas Erpenius (d. 1624) to textually represent the Muslim Orient to European readership in the encyclopaedic Bibliothèque orientale, where Muḥammad, for example, is safely categorized as "le fameux imposteur ... Auteur et Foundateur d'une hérésie, qui a pris le nom de religion, que nous appellons Mohametane."[18] The work of the Medieval period, in other words, was to polemically define an essential Islamic Orient that was in the totality of its civilization the very antithesis of Europe.

II

This image of Islam as outsider was to undergo a dramatic transformation in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was then that a number of new representational and intellectual styles emerged which were instrumental in restructuring the Medieval image of Islam according to the strictures demanded by a new configuration of formalized consciousness, namely, secularism. Edward Said has described the transformation as "a reconstituted religious impulse, a naturalized supernaturalism."[19]

Two elements appeared which were of particular importance: a new romantic sensibility, and the emergence of a new scientific episteme dominated by the twin concerns of positivism and reductionism. Taken by themselves these elements were simply new ways of perceiving and ordering the phenomena of the world; but taken together with Islam they were responsible for the creation of a much more formalized and organized portrayal of the Orient, a new discourse that by the end of the eighteenth century came generally to be known as Orientalism. The term was used broadly: it was used to denote both the artist and writer who took the Orient as a subject, and the more disciplined, scientific, and ultimately institutional study of the Orient's languages, peoples, and cultures. Always there existed a good deal of traffic between these two manifestations of Orientalism; each supported and helped define the rarefied image of Islam developed by the

other. And, despite the efforts made at this time to uncover traces of the Hindu, Zoroastrian, and Buddhist worlds, Orientalists, like their medieval counterparts, were still primarily (though not wholly) concerned with the Muslim Orient, if only for reasons of geographical proximity. But, whereas in the Middle Ages Islam was dominated by a discourse concerned mostly with military and ideological security, the new discourse represented a will much more offensively minded; for the stylistically Romantic and scientifically disciplined presentation of the Muslim Orient coincided with the first moves of the European nations towards imperial domain. We will examine the dialectical exchange between Orientalism and imperialism below; but first the two major components of Orientalism will be considered individually.

European Romanticism (and before it "pre-Romanticism") represented a distinct sytle of artistic and intellectual expression which was inextricably linked to the revolutionary upheavals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In basic terms it was a multi-faceted protest against the binding forms of political absolutism, social hierarchy, and religious dogmatism, and in this sense represented an urge for free untrammelled self-expression. One way of loosening the "fixities" and "definities" of societal existence was to sympathetically identify with other people, places, and times, and ultimately, with the world in general - in the words of Novalis, "to render the strange familiar."[20] This process of identification was facilitated by the idea, developed by

Herder, Hegel, and others, that each culture was a unique compound of race, geography, and history - a coherent whole with its own individual personality. One major consequence of this theory was the division of the world into cultural and racial types, an _idée_ _force_ that was to feed the emerging nationalisms of Europe. Now that the Ottoman threat to Europe had subsided, the polemical guard inherited from the Middle Ages could be let down and the otherness of the Muslim Orient appropriated as a fixed field in which the Romantic sensibility could achieve its desired self-transformation. Thus Herder himself sought to locate and penetrate the essential _Lebensgrund_, or creative genius of the East, and in this task greatly influenced Goethe, who analyzed and commented upon Islamic poetry in his _West-Östlicher_ _Divan_ (1819), which opened with a call to a "'Hegira' towards the East where the poet will recover his youth in the spring of _Khidr_ ..."[21]

The desire for cultural _dérangement_, however, inevitably led to an apotheosis of the weird, the mysterious, and the most _outré_ that has continued to be an important current of thought and feeling until the present day. Writers such as Sir Walter Scott and Gustave Flaubert, and painters such as Delacroix and Gérôme each in their own way helped nourish a growing image of a mysterious and unchanging Muslim Orient through the creation of images of Oriental splendor, cruelty, and sensuality. For many, the desire for sympathetic identification with oriental otherness gave way to a more

self-centered need to enter directly into and act upon the phenomena represented by these images, often with the aim of achieving some sort of personal psycho-sexual transformation. Flaubert's description of his encounter with the Egyptian courtesan Kuchuck Hanem,[22] no less than André Gide's account of his dionysian revels at the Algerian oasis of Biskra,[23] indicate well the Romantic will to discover in the otherness of the Muslim Orient some kind of personal fulfillment.

Scholarly, scientific Orientalism, on the other hand, was rooted in the intellectual preoccupations of the Enlightenment, and at the heart of the Enlightenment lay a concern for rationality and its necessary correlate, scientific objectivity. Together, these concerns spawned a new form of positivistic analysis concerned with measurement, serial arrangement, and classification, the ultimate aim of which was to abstract from the individual members of the classes some general nature which they all shared. Initially, the method was limited to the domestication of the phenomena of the natural world: here the names of Linneus, Buffon, and Curvier stand out in particular; but the success of the physical sciences suggested that the same method also be applied to human phenomena. The result was the birth of the human sciences.[24]

Language was one of the first human phenomena to be subjected to the rigorous strictures of this kind of scientism. The resultant science of philology replaced the theory of the divine origin of the sacred languages with a new

rational concern as to what language might be in its genealogical essence.[25] Here important ground work was laid by Fredrich Schlegel's essay _Über die Sprach und Weisheit der Indier_ (1808), Franz Bopp's work on the conjugation system of Sanskrit (1816), and Jacob Grimm's _Deutsche Grammatik_ (1818). Essential to the new science was the designatory character of language: just as the order of nature could be fully explicated through its classification into a universal language of signs, so too could the meaning of a text be laid bare through the identification of the words contained with their referents. Words, once safely stored and inventoried within the confines of a lexicon, and understood in relation to the surrounding grammar, were assumed by the philological method to have a direct correlate in reality.[26]

The great pioneer in the exposition of Arabic language and literature was the French scholar Silvestre de Sacy (d. 1838).[27] De Sacy can be said to have single-handedly inaugurated scientific Orientalism. Students flocked to him from across Europe to receive training in his methods; and once returned to their home universities (which, incidentally, were then in the midst of a revolutionary process of secularization)[28] they consolidated the new tradition, providing it with a degree of prestige and influence which has only recently begun to diminish.[29]

Like his philological colleagues, de Sacy believed that texts possessed a semiotic power to denote reality, that they served as "windows" on reality. Nothing, therefore, was put

forward in the way of ideas and hypotheses which was not first clearly exemplified in the texts; theory and supposition were rejected as lying beyond the province of reason.[30] The implication inherent in this idea was that a culture or civilization could be accurately reconstituted and objectively defined according to whatever textual evidence had been appropriated for the purpose, an idea which was to be more clearly developed in the European historiography of Ranke and his followers according to the precepts of his well known dictum wie es eigentlich gewesen.

The genre of textual presentation used by de Sacy, and others after him, to facilitate this procedure was the compilation or chrestomathy. Edward Said has aptly described de Sacy's Chrestomathie arabe (1806 and 1827) as a sort of "Benthamite Panopticon" in that it served, much as did d'Herbelot's Bibliothèque, as a single vantage point of surveillance, observation, and knowledge, which pedagogically spread before a growing network of Orientalists and their students a collection of Arabic texts and fragments which were taken to be an accurate representation of Arabo-Islamic civilization as a whole.[31] It was in this form of essentialist presentation that de Sacy revealed for the first time a wide variety of Arabic authors to Europe.

Yet, this kind of scholarly purism was far less objective than its practitioners supposed. As we have briefly noted in Chapter I, since Valéry and Heidegger scholars have generally been aware that the hermeneutic study of a text always starts

from a certain preunderstanding, that the very notion of objectivity may be a chimera. It is in this same regard that Maxime Rodinson has pointed out that the supposed objectivity of the philological method necessarily led its exponents "to the unconscious acceptance of the opinions that were common in its own environment", which resulted in "an uncritical promulgation of implicit ideologies underwritten by the prestige of impressive scholarship."[32] In this sense the textual editions compiled by de Sacy and his successors, far from being objectively representative of Muslim civilization, are as much works of censorship as they are of exposition. For the texts chosen for scrutiny were invariably those which were consonant with the dominant preconceptions and intellectual allegiances of contemporary scholarship. The Orientalist was guided by an often unconscious élan to seek out characteristics that somehow typified for him what Islam "was". In this way, what was revealed became significant and essential to the understanding of Muslim civilization; what was neglected became unessential and unrepresentative. Moreover, what was revealed was often subjected to very precise forms of conceptual valorization.

Thus, the Orientalist's major concern was the selection and study of texts which were thought to portray Muslim civilization's essential nature, or pure form. It was this basic concern for generic origins which led Julius Wellhausen, for instance, to turn from Hebrew to Arabic studies: he wished to get to the heart of the culture of ancient Israel through an

investigation of that of the ancient Arabs and early Islam, in which he believed the original form (urgestalt) of Semitic civilization was best preserved: "When I went over from the Old Testament to the Arabs," he wrote, "I intended to learn about the wild stock upon which the shoot of Yahwe's Tora was grafted by the priests and prophets. For I do not doubt that the best way to get an idea of the original equipment with which the Hebrews entered history is to compare it with Arab antiquity."[33]

For most Orientalists, however, the essence or "matrix" of Muslim civilization was to be found in its "classical age", which was usually thought to have flourished in the period spanning the 'Abbāsid Revolution and the consolidation of the Saljūq amirates.[34] It was then that the characteristic cultural direction of Muslim civilization was felt to be best articulated in certain representative forms of high culture, for instance in the fiqh and kalām of certain "orthodox" 'ulamā', in the decrees of the ruling bureaucracy, and in the thoughts and deeds of "great men". In keeping with the philological method, the explicit content of these texts was held to be normative, and to correspond to actuality. There was little understanding that a huge gulf might exist between the stated prescription or theory and the actual practice. Thus, for example, a concept taken from a text of legal theory might be used to fashion a sweeping generalization concerning the history of the Caliphate; or, likewise, a philological reading of a dynastic historian such as Ṭabarī or Ibn al-Athīr

might be used to render a description of politics as a web of internecine struggle, or of history as the simple oscillation of despotic dynasties.[35] Scientific Orientalism became, in effect, an anthropology of what Rodinson has termed the homo Islamicus, a creature embedded in a field of uncompromising specificity.[36]

However, to be fair, it must be stated that part of this emphasis upon representative textuality sprang from the tendency of the Islamic high culture itself to stratify Islamic practices into higher and lower ones in accordance with its own idealized image of Islam. In favourable circumstances it would even attempt the elimination of the lower practices.

Given this abiding image of an essential Islam, one of Orientalism's chief concerns has been to reduce all textual and societal particulars to the Orientalist topos.[37] Often the Orientalist will go to great length to make the particulars fit the mold and relate microcosm to macrocosm. A good example of this procedure is found in the Orientalist concept of social structure. Orientalists were early on struck by the great diversity of Muslim society. In academic works as well as in the enormous bulk of travel literature which followed in the wake of nineteenth century imperial expansion, the Muslim Orient was described as a patchwork of autonomous and mutually isolated vertical units, composed of tribes, clans, guilds, communities, races, and so forth.

Thus we find Gibb and Bowen's long-standing analysis of Egyptian and Syrian society, for example, basically concerned with a description of the potentially disruptive assembly of disparate elements - races, religious and social groupings - which made up the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century.[39] Many other potent examples of this same mosaic model of dichotomous and mutually exclusive groupings could be given, for instance, Xavier Planhol's study of the particularistic nature of Islamic city quarters.[40] We will see in Chapter III that this basic concept of inherent division was further explicated by the sociologists and ethnographers who began to apply their methods (primarily Durkheimian) to the study of Muslim cultures from the late nineteenth century onwards. Attention will also be paid to the colonial uses of such a schema. But the point to be made here is the way in which scientific Orientalism solved this "problem" of fissiparous social life through the claim that Islam played an integrative, unitive role through mechanisms such as the ʿulamāʾ, the Sharīʿa, and the Ṣūfī Ṭuruq. Again Gibb and Bowen provide the example in their claim that collectively, the religious institutions served "to knit the separate small groups together by supplying a common ideal and a common organization [emphasis is the present writer's] superimposed upon group loyalties and if need be overriding them in a wider common loyalty."[41] The thrust, in other words, is upon an essentialist vision of Islam as a normative set of values and institutions capable of levelling and ultimately defining

Muslim civilization.

There is no doubt Islam did play some sort of integrative role: for instance, Ira Lapidus, in his seminal study on Mamlūk cities, has shown how the ʿulamāʾ helped allay civic dissolution in Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo.[42] But, in broad terms, such an approach completely ignores the insight recently provided by scholars such as Clifford Geertz and Dale Eickelman that Islam must be defined according to its local contexts; that each context must be understood in terms of its own unique conceptual structure and system of symbols; and that an individual instance may contain an entire repertoire of possible societal relationships determined by the contingencies of the ecological setting, not by an ahistorical Islamic essence.[43]

Several factors lay behind this emphasis upon an essentialist Islam. Each stemmed from the "macroscopic configurations of formalized consciousness" which directed Western intellectual enquiry throughout the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment epochs.[44] We have already mentioned, in relation to philology, the influence of scientific reductionism, which was characterized by a search for the generic origins of things, and which became a central part of orthodox science with Darwin. Another factor was the influence of the Greek and Latin educational curriculum handed down from the Renaissance in which only the writings of certain specified authors were studied: a course of studies might include, say, Aeschylus or Cicero, never the works of

later "decadent" writers such as Libanius or Ausonius. It was natural for scholars trained in this way to make similar assumptions when confronted with textual material from the Muslim lands.[45]

But perhaps the most far-reaching and significant influence was the view of culture put forward by German Idealist philosophy. As we have seen with revolutionary Romanticism, the Idealists conceived of civilization as a field in which all particulars possessed a common unity since each was an expression of one fundamental "force". What is more, each "force" represented a necessary stage in the teleological unfolding of history towards some final end state. History, therefore, came to be inextricably tied to the idea of process and development. According to Albert Hourani, the general concept "could be developed in many different ways, with differing emphases."[46] Thus, the "idea" which carried Islamic civilization was variously defined: for Alfred von Kremer and Alois Sprenger, it was understood in terms of the Hegelian notion of the Zeitgeist;[47] for Ernest Renan it was defined according to the spirit of the Semitic race;[48] while for Caetani it was conceived as the result of "the Oriental religious mentality."[49] What each of these various conceptualizations had in common was the notion that Islam represented one particular phase, or stage, in the history of human development.

An important, if not obvious, implication lay behind this kind of historicism. Since at least the eighteenth century,

North-Western Europe had been moving in an increasingly industrial, technological, and rationalized direction. Indeed, as Marshall Hodgson has noted, the dramatic changes which accompanied the "Great Western Transmutation" may have influenced the very idea of historical progress and maturation itself.[50] Whatever the case, it was inevitable that Europeans compare and contrast their own steady, primarily material progress with the "backwardness" and "stagnation" they encountered in the contemporary Muslim lands.[51] In keeping with the intellectual predispositions outlined above, scholars assumed the difference between the two civilizations must be the result of some inherent flaw or defect in the very essence of Islam.[52] Given the framework within which the Orientalist was working (i.e., an ever widening development gap between East and West) it was only natural that the flaw be defined in terms of what Islamic civilization lacked in relation to Europe. The assembled textuality of the Orient indicated that what Islam lacked was the general facility of reason which Europeans had inherited from the ancient Hellenes and which made them free and self-defining subjects. Their understanding of their own essence was drawn from a postulated interior proclivity towards reason, and no longer from a supposed cosmic order in which they were set. Conversely, Islam had since its inception been locked within the confines of divine Law. In fact Renan, himself a convert from religion to <u>la science critique</u> (by which he meant philology), believed Islam to be the very antithesis of science.[53] It followed from

this kind of judgement that if Greek science had ever appeared within the orbit of Islam, it had remained largely undigested, its practitioners (the _faylasūfs_) being none other than intellectual renegades working beyond the limits of what was permitted.[54] Furthermore, the absence of 'rationality and science prevented Muslim civilization from entering the future.[55] And since its most brilliant era occurred in its past ages, the consequence was that Islam was embarking on a slow teleology of decline. Scholars noted with interest the contemporary survivals of the classical period, and romantic artists relished the images inherent in the idea of decline. In fact, it was in this atmosphere of decline that romantic and scientific Orientalism most readily intersected. According to Hayden White, nineteenth century historians, despite the critical vigor of Ranke and Niebuhr, continued for the most part to see their work as a combination of romantic art and positivistic science: it was believed that an individual creative effort was needed to resurrect the past.[56] This was the approach taken, for example, by Jacob Burckhardt in his impressionistic renderings of the Italian Renaissance. In Islamic studies today, Jacques Berque is perhaps the best exponent of this approach.[57]

These are some of the broad contours of the Orientalist discourse. Its major result has been to "represent a world related to the West by absolute difference ...".[58] In this sense Muslim civilization provided Europe with a sort of mirror image, or negative copy, of itself; despotism instead

of democracy, casuistic legal investigation instead of free
rational inquiry, social segmentation instead of social
integration, decline instead of progress. The point is that
in the later stages of the eighteenth and in the course of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Muslim Oriental came
to be regarded as an example of arrested humanity, as a
segment of the human race that had failed to raise itself from
the dead weight of holy Law and its own moribund traditions.
In this way the identity of otherness with which Islamic
civilization had been stamped in the Middle Ages was
reconfirmed and substantiated. Islam, as an entity of dense
specificity, became a covering term used to describe all
manner of diverse phenomena, an operation which has enabled
many of the scholars and newsmen of today, for example, to
speak of an "Islamic Revolution," rather than a revolution
with Islam as one of several major components.

III

It now remains for us to examine in more detail the uses
and exact purposes of the Orientalist discourse. To say that
it was (and is) inextricably connected with Western hegemony
over the Muslim world is probably not to say anything very
profound. But at the same time, to simply state that
Orientalism has been a tool of Western imperialism is to make
a naïve, even crass judgement about an extremely complex

historical relationship. It forces one to deal, for example, with all of those scholars who have categorically denied any complicity with imperialist ventures in the Muslim Orient; those who, with Francesco Gabrieli, have argued that their studies have been guided by "a disinterested and impassioned search for the truth"; or those who, like Louis Massignon, remained throughout their lives tireless critics of colonialism and of cultural chauvinism generally.[60] It also forces one to deal with those Muslim scholars who have themselves appropriated the tools and conceptual paradigms of Orientalism for the purpose of substantiating the integrity and value of their own tradition. Ṭāhā Ḥusain's study of Ibn Khaldūn, presented to the Sorbonne in 1917 as a Doctoral dissertation, is an example of this kind of oriental Orientalism.[61] Instead, we must realize that the effects of power which have issued forth from the Orientalist discourse have done so subtly, and in ways unknown even to the practitioners. For Orientalism's strength largely derives from the fact that it is not seen as power, but as science, or even (as in the case of Romanticism), as personal liberation.[62]

For Abdallah Laroui, the hidden nature of Orientalism's power is largely a result of the ingrained practice of scholars to continually invoke one another's authority, resulting in a "conspiracy" which "puts the most adventurous hypotheses into circulation and ultimately imposes them as established truths."[63] Consequently, Orientalists have rarely been able to critically examine the assumptions upon which

their work has been predicated. The mechanics behind this practice have been articulated by Thomas Kuhn in his work on the structure of scientific revolutions.[64] According to Kuhn, a science becomes normalized when scholars in a certain area of study (for example, physics) agree that a particular work identifies and solves the problems in a given field of investigation. Kuhn calls this kind of consensus a "paradigm," and cites Newton's Principa as a prime example. Once the paradigm has been set, every effort is made to incorporate disparate facts and anomalies into the established theoretical structure. The ideal is to create a paradigm that is both self-contained and ontologically valid. Kuhn's main point, however, is that the very prestige of a paradigm may conceal the fact that it is premised upon non-rational procedures.

The "non-rational" procedures which have served to govern Orientalism according to principles which go beyond those of "pure science" have issued forth from its involvement in processes of control. Its main concern has been the explication and domestication of a particular human phenomenon through the categorization, classification, and sub-jectification of an entire field of human experience. It has functioned, in other words, as the whole nexus of objects, criteria, practices, and institutions to which Foucault has given the name "Power/Knowledge régime."[65] It has already been explained that for Foucault power is a primary function of any discursive régime. When we apply Foucault's method to Orientalism we see that the mechanisms used to dominate its

subject matter have included: the valorization of some statement forms over others, the institutional licensing of certain individuals who are henceforth entitled to judge and make pronouncements about their object of inquiry, and the ultimate targeting of the objects of inquiry for the application of policy.

But Foucault is not claiming that these instances of power have been the result of any kind of institutionally based plot or subterfuge. What he is claiming is that certain techniques, or "micropractices," arise in local piecemeal fashion (for instance, the sudden appearance of philology in the eighteenth century), which are taken up and perfected by individuals (like Bopp) far removed from the centres of power. Only when these techniques have been integrated into the emerging constellation of state institutions are they put to definite political use.[66] To a large extent, this integration results from industrial civilization's proclivity to reorganize society in the name of efficiency and higher production. According to Professor Charles Taylor, this "utilitarian conception" has become "entrenched in our practices," and represents a mode of thought in which societal and inter-societal relations are assessed "by their efficiency in the production of benefits which are ultimately consumed by individuals."[67] A good example of this procedure is found in the reorganization of education to meet state needs in eighteenth century Prussia. Certain developments and techniques which had their origins in the Reformation period,

such as the increased use and prestige of the vernaculars, the educational reforms of thinkers like Comenius, and the emphasis upon regimentation and discipline first found in institutions such as the army, were appropriated by the Prussian state for the establishment of schools concerned with the mass education and normalization of a loyal citizenry. The emphasis placed upon the training of a specialized labour force, and the institutionalization of scientific innovation was directly relevant to the concerns of a highly centralized, utilitarian state.[68]

For our purposes the finest example of this kind of appropriation of knowledge and method is Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and the scientific mission which followed, especially as the motivating force behind the entire project was imperialism, perhaps the most consequential effect of the utilitarian state. The massive, twenty-three volume Description de l'Égypte (1809-1828) which resulted is testimony to the way in which an imperialist power could appropriate Orientalist methodology in order to lay bare a country's secrets for its own purposes through the tabulation of its population and geography.[69] Similarly, it was in this atmosphere of growing Western hegemony, coupled with the increasing centralization of French institutions following the Revolution, that the Paris School of Oriental Languages was founded (1795). Under the direction of de Sacy, it was primarily involved in the training of dragomans and the translation of government documents. Indeed, as Said points

out, when "the French occupied Algiers in 1830, it was Sacy who translated the proclamation to the Algerians."[70] Further examples of this connection between the institutionalization of Orientalism and imperialism can be given: for instance, the creation of the Royal Society of Bengal (1784), presided over by William Jones and coinciding with British infiltration into the sub-continent; or the founding of Oriental studies in 1804 at Kharkov and Kazan in anticipation of the great Russian advance into Central Asia.[71]

The appropriation of Orientalist "technology" by the state has been a hallmark of the discipline ever since. Noam Chomsky has shown how in recent years the "Pentagon system" in the United States has directed area studies personnel to investigate the history and cultures of developing areas with the aim of "more easily controlling them."[72]

Romantic Orientalism has also been involved in the processes of control, but unlike academic Orientalism it has not been institutionalized. Instead, its influence has been much more subtly diffused, issuing forth from novels and other forms of artistic expression. Its power has functioned in the way it has made the otherness of the Muslim Orient appear infinitely seductive, as for example in the fictional works of Pierre Loti, a young officer in the French navy, whose accounts of desire and temptation in Oriental lands served as elaborate metaphors for conquest.[73] T.E. Lawrence describes this same kind of subjugation in its active mood in his <u>Seven Pillars of Wisdom</u>, in which he explains how a listless,

barbaric, yet enticing Arabia was ushered into the world of modern nation-states through the pull it exerted upon a single individual.[74] And Frantz Fanon describes in a similar vein the colonial relationship between the colon and the Algerian woman: "Unveiling her is revealing her beauty; it is baring her secret, breaking her resistance, making her available for adventure .... There is in it the will to bring this woman within his reach, to make her a possible object of possession."[75]

At first sight, this general concern with the intrinsic links between knowledge and power might be taken as being a variant of the sociological concerns of the Frankfurt School, which condemns "all dominant and socially ratified forms of knowledge as masks and instruments of oppression."[76] The difference, however, lies in the fact that the power inherent within the very structure of Orientalism is on-going - in Foucault's terminology, "capillary." Once taken up by the state, it once more descends to those mechanisms and individual carriers from whence it originated, effecting "an orthopaedic training of the body and soul of an individual"[77] which ultimately determines both actions and attitudes. The result is a consensus backed by institutional prestige and authority. Quoting Renan on his own situation, Said comments that although the word "moi" seems lonely, "it is in fact supported by all sorts of institutions." Everything about Renan, according to Said, "exudes the authority of massive centralized institutions like schools, disciplines, missions,

teams of cooperating but hierarchically arranged scientific workers."[7] The "power/knowledge régime," in other words, is self-generating: its effects as regards Orientalism are continually circulating throughout the social body of the West. Scholars can in all sincerity claim political neutrality, but the very tradition in which they are set serves at the same time to support and justify Western hegemony over Muslim lands.

Notes to Chapter II

1. Michel Foucault, _Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason_, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. For interesting studies on the formation and social uses of these contrastive _topoi_ see: for heresy, Robert Lerner, _The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Middle Ages_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); for wildness, Edward Dudley and M.E. Novak (eds.), _The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought From the Renaissance to Romanticism_ (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972); on the demonization of Jews in the Middle Ages, Norman Cohn, _The Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages_ (London: Secker and Warburg, 1957), pp. 76-80.

4. Hayden White, _Tropics of Discourse_, p. 151. An interesting variation of this idea is found in the contemporary usage of the terms "terror" and "terrorism", which have become tools of the powerful to describe those who oppose the established order.

5. Edward Said, _Orientalism_ (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 54. This is also the theme of John B. Friedman's _The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), where he cites such varied sources as _Mandeville's Travels_ and Wahb Ibn Munabbih's _Kitāb al-Tījān_ to explain how every culture has filled its peripheral lands and seas with the grosteque. Mircea Eliade's _Images and Symbols_ (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, Inc., 1952), relays a similar idea: "In archaic and traditional societies, the surrounding world is conceived as a microcosm. At the limits of this closed world begins the domain of the unknown, of the formless ... the ... region of the demons, the ghosts, and of foreigners ....", p. 37.

6. Foucault's concept of discourse can be found in his _Power/Knowledge_, trans. Colin Gordon _et al._, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 92-108.

7. Norman Daniel, _The Cultural Barrier: Problems in the Exchange of Ideas_ (Edinburgh: Univesity Press, 1975), p. 152.

8. R.W. Southern, _Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 1.

9. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

10. R.W. Southern, Church and Society in the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 13.

11. Norman Daniel, Islam, Europe, and Empire (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966), p. 7.

12. Idem, Islam and the West: The Making of an Image (Edinburgh: University Press, 1960), pp. 2-6; and Idem, Empire, pp. 3-4.

13. Idem, Islam and the West, chaps. 2-4.

14. Idem, "The Impact of Islam on the Laity in Europe from Charlemagne to Charles the Bold," Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge, ed. A.T. Welch and P. Cachia (Edinburgh: University Press, 1979), pp. 105-125.

15. The best study on the Cluniac project is M.T. d'Alverny, "Deux traductions latines du Coran au Moyen Age," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyan Age XVI (1948), pp. 69-131. See also J. Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

16. Quoted in Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable, p. 161.

17. Southern, Western Views, p. 67-ff.

18. Barthélemy d'Herbelot, Bibliothèque orientale, ou Dictionnaire universel contenant tout ce qui fait connaître les peuples de l'Orient, vol. 4, nouvelle édition (Paris: Moutard, 1781-83), p.

19. Said, Orientalism, p. 120.

20. J.L. Talmon, Romanticism and Revolt (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967), p. 148.

21. Quoted in Maxime Rodinson, "The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam," The Legacy of Islam, ed. J. Schacht and C.E. Bosworth (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 44. See also K.J. Fink, "Goethe's West-Östlicher Divan: Orientalism Restructured," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3 (August, 1982), pp. 315-328.

22. Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour, trans. and ed. F. Steegmuller (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 200. See also Said's comments, Orientalism, pp. 186-188.

23. André Gide, Si le grain ne meurt (Paris: Gallimard, 1928). See also Ernest Gellner's appraisal in "The Unknown Apollo of Biskra," Muslim Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 149-173.

24. For an account of the "genealogy" of the scientific episteme see M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaelogy of the Human Sciences, translator not indicated (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), esp. pp. 250-300.

25. Ibid., p. 289.

26. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship, pp. 44-49. See also the comments of Foucault, Order of Things, p. 290.

27. On de Sacy see Said, Orientalism, pp. 123-130; and ·Henri Dehérain, Silvestre de Sacy: Ses contemporains et ses disciples (Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1938).

28. The 18th and 19th centuries saw a reorganization of education - what the Germans call a Kulturkampf, the struggle to free education from the Church. In part, it involved the gearing of education to meet the increasing bureaucratic and scientific needs of the state.

29. Dehérain, de Sacy, pp. 1-113.

30. Rodinson, "Western Image," p. 45.

31. Silvestre de Sacy, Chrestomathie arabe, ou Extraits de divers écrivains arabes, tant en prose qu'en vers, avec une traduction français et des notes, èa l'usage des élèves de l'Ecole royale et spéciale des langues orientales vivantes (reprint ed., Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1973). On "panoptic vision" see Foucault Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon was premised on architectural and organizational innovations which made possible an intelligible overview of the prison population for purposes of control; Said, Orientalism, p. 127.

32. Rodinson, "Western Image," p. 45. This is also the basic theme of Jacques Waardenburg's L'Islam dans le Miroir de l'Occident: Comment quelques orientalistes occidentaux se sont penchés sur l'Islam et sont formés une image de cette religion (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1963), where he examines how the work of I. Goldziher, S. Hurgronje, C. Becker, D.B. Macdonald, and L. Massignon was stamped by their culturally-bound scholarly precommitments.

33. Josef van Ess, "From Wellhausen to Becker: The Emergence of Kulturgeschichte in Islamic Studies," Islamic Studies: A Tradition and its problems, ed. M.H. Kerr (Malibu, Calif.: Undena Publications, 1980), pp. 27-51.

34. See, for example, the comments of Abdallah Laroui concerning the essentialist views of Gustave von Grunebaum in "The Arabs and Cultural Anthropology," The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual, trans. Diarmid Cammel (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1976), pp. 54-59.

35. See the comments of Said, Orientalism, pp. 302-3, where he criticizes the Cambridge History of Islam, ed. P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, B. Lewis, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), for presenting the history of the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid Caliphates as "an unrelieved chronology of battles, reigns, and deaths, rises, and heydays, comings and passings, written for the most part in a ghastly monotone."

36. Rodinson, "Western Image," p. 47; also the comments of A. Abdel-Malek, "Orientallism in Crisis," Diogenes, 44 (Winter, 1963), pp. 107-8, on the homo arabicus, homo sinicus, etc.; and Said, passim.

37. Aziz Al-Azmeh, "The Articulation of Orientalism," Arab Studies Quarterly, 4 (1981), p. 294; also his comments in Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship, pp. 201-209, where he criticizes the reductionism of Reinhard Dozy and W.J. Fischel.

38. Bryan S. Turner, Marx and the End of Orientalism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p. 39.

39. H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East, vol. 1, part II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957). " ... Society was composed of a vast number of small social groups, almost self-governing ..." p. 77.

40. Xavier Planhol, The World of Islam, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1959), pp. 10-13.

41. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, p. 77.

42. Ira M. Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 107-115.

43. For Geertz, see The Religion of Java (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); Islam Observed: Religious Developments in Morocco and Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). For Eickelman, see The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1981); Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Centre (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976).

44. Hayden White, Tropics, p. 238.

45. Anouar Abdel-Malek, "Orientalism," p. 109.

46. Albert Hourani, "Islam and the Philosophers of History," Middle Eastern Studies, 3 (April, 1967), p. 246.

47. Rudi Paret, The Study of Arabic at German Universities: German Orientalists Since Theodor Nöldeke (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1968), p. 11; and Rodinson, "Western Image," p. 54.

48. On Renan see Said, Orientalism, pp. 130-148; Hourani, "Philosophers of History," p. 250-1.

49. Hourani, ibid, pp. 248-9.

50. M.G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 3:176-9.

51. Ibid., p. 178.

52. Turner, Marx, p. 7.

53. E. Said, "Islam, the Philological Vocation, and French Culture: Renan and Massignon," Islamic Studies: A Tradition and its Problems, ed. M. Kerr (Malibu: Calif., Undena Publications, 1980), p. 65.

54. For example, Professor Muhsin Mahdi writes that there is "an essential distinction, if not incompatibility, con-tradiction, and conflict between philosophy and the Law," Ibn Khaldūn's Philosophy of History, p. 89, forcing Ibn Khaldūn (a faylasūf), to disguise his intentions through the adoption of a crytographic code employed throughout the text of the Muqaddima, thereby allowing it to circulate freely in society. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation, p. 73, criticizes this absolutist distinction between philosophy and the Law, explaining that they "are different spheres within which Islam dwells"; that the culture of elites who practiced science was in part an expression of, and therefore congruent with, popularly held beliefs. Any such distinction of ideal type serves only as a heuristic device. For this same view in regard to Medieval European thought, see Carolly Erikson, The Medieval Vision: Essays in History and Perception (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 10.

55. Turner, Marx, p. 5, explains how early Marxist thought, through the influence of Hegelian historicism, adopted this point of view: "The revolt of Abd el Kader against French forces was dismissed by Engels as the 'hopeless' struggle of 'the barbarian state of society', while the French conquest was welcomed as 'an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization."

56. White, Tropics, p. 43.

57. For example, see his Le Maghreb entre deux guerres (Paris: Le Seuil, 1962).

58. Al-Azmeh, "Orientalism', p. 389. This conceptualization of Orientalism as the inversion of Western categories has also been articulated by Laroui, <u>Crisis</u>, pp. 52-62; and Said, <u>Orientialism</u>, p. 141.

59. It might be asked at this point if there has been a corresponding tradition of "Occidentalism" among Muslims; Bernard Lewis, in his <u>The Muslim Discovery of Europe</u> (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982), has examined this question and has decided that there has not. Muslims have been less interested in Europe than vice versa. Among his reasons for thinking so: Muslims dominated the exchanges between Europe and the Muslim world until the 17th century and therefore for practical purposes needed to know less about Europe than Europeans did about Islam; the Renaissance and Enlightenment, which imbued Europeans with a curiosity about the world, were only comprehensible within a European context.

60. F. Gabrieli, "Apology for Orientalism," <u>Diogenes</u>, 50 (1965), p. 131; J. Waardenburg, "Massignon: Notes for Further Research," <u>Muslim World</u> LVI, 3 (1966), p. 169; also D.P. Little, "Three Arab Critiques of Orientalism," <u>Muslim World</u> LXIX, 69 (1979), pp. 122-131.

61. Ṭāhā Ḥusain, <u>Étude analytique et critique de la philosophie sociale d'Ibn Khaldoun</u> (Paris: A. Pedone, 1917).

62. Foucault, <u>Power/Knowledge</u>, pp. 92-108.

63. Abdallah Laroui, <u>The History of the Maghrib: An Intrepretive Essay</u>, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 3.

64. Thomas Kuhn, <u>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

65. Foucault, <u>Power/Knowledge</u>, pp. 112-113, 131, 133.

66. Ibid., pp. 96-102.

67. Charles Taylor, <u>Hegel</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 540.

68. See the comments of M.J. Fischer on educational modernization in <u>Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 55-59; also John Edward Sadler, <u>J.A. Comenius and the Concept of Universal Education</u> (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 29-30.

69. On the Napoleonic expedition in general see Jean Thiry, <u>Bonaparte en Égypt décembre 1797 - 2 août 1799</u> (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1973); on its Orientalist implications, see Said, <u>Orientalism</u>, pp. 80-88.

70. Said, <u>Orientalism</u>, p. 124.

71. Rodinson, "Western Image," pp. 44, 46. Also, V. Barthold, <u>La Découverte</u> de <u>l'Asie: histoire</u> <u>de l'orientalisme en Europe</u> <u>et en Russie</u>, trans. from the Russian B. Nikitine (Paris: Payot, 1947), p. 264.

72. Noam Chomsky, <u>Problems of Knowledge and Freedom: The Russell Lectures</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 69-70.

73. For example, his novel <u>Aziyadé</u>. See Malise Ruthren, review of <u>Pierre Loti: Portrait of an Escapist</u>, <u>London Review of Books</u>, 14 March 1984, pp. 18-19.

74. T.E. Lawrence, <u>Seven Pillars of Wisdom</u> (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962).

75. Frantz Fanon, <u>A Dying Colonialism</u>, trans. Haakron Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1965), pp. 43-44.

76. Foucault, <u>Power/Knowledge</u>, p. 236.

77. Ibid., p. 254.

78. Said, "The philological vocation", p. 64.

Chapter III

Disciplining the Maghrib:
The Interpretation and Use of Ibn Khaldūn
in the Historiography of the Maghrib

I

The intricate links between Orientalism and imperialism have been nowhere better articulated than in the manifold processes of French domination over the Maghrib. The celebrations of 1930 marking the centenary of the French occupation of Algiers offer a particularly advantageous point from which to examine the Orientalist discourse in full gear. More than merely an anecdotal moment of colonial glory, the centenary served as a sign which pointed to far greater meanings than were readily apprehensible on the surface.

Overtly, the celebrations were designed both to applaud the accomplishments of several generations of enterprising colons, and to reaffirm their links with the metropole. They included a dramatic re-enactment of the historic landing of French marines at Sidi Feruch, the erection of a monument at Bufarik commemorating General Bugeaud, the Comte de Vialar, and General Lamorcière, all heroes of the conquest, and the organization of numerous spectacles and academic congresses, all at a cost of about 100 million francs.[1] Gustave Mercier, director of the proceedings and a noted scholar of the medieval Maghrib, stated that the occasion demonstrated "the profound and indissoluble union of peoples of different origins in love for a Fatherland whose generosity and nobility all now understand."[2] Many native Algerians evidently agreed.

In one celebration a _bashagha_ was inspired to proclaim that if the Muslims had known the French in 1830 as they knew them now, they would have loaded their guns with flowers.[3] A year later, the eminent historian E.-F. Gautier, Professor at the University of Algiers, captured the self-congratulatory mood of the centenary in a summation of the benefits French civilization had brought to Algeria. Among his many boasts was that roads, railways, port facilities, and modern hygiene had been introduced; that the European population had grown to over eight-hundred thousand and the Muslim to over five million; and that the death rate among the _indigènes_ of Bufarik had decreased to 1:41 from a previous ratio of 1:4 per annum.[4] France, as heir to ancient Rome, could be congratulated for introducing its _mission civilisatrice_ to a region that had for centuries stagnated under the atavistic yoke of oriental barbarism.

In fact, it was this discrepancy between East and West which allowed the French to speak of enlightening the "dark places" of the earth. Ultimately, their aim was towards a policy of assimilation - to try and educate the native elites in the French possessions and protectorates of North and West Africa, Syria, Indo-China and Madagascar, to speak and think like Frenchmen. It is revealing that the term the French used for a French-educated native is _évolué_, an individual who has literally evolved from a lower state of existence to a higher one after adopting the French language and French cultural ways. There were few Europeans inclined to disagree with this

kind of imperialist judgement. Even Jean Jaurès, the influential French socialist, accepted the concept of a North African empire provided it included the extension of French culture and French cultural ideals.[5] British observers, themselves fellow travellers in the imperialist venture, also concurred. For example, Anthony Wilkin, in an attempt to explain Algeria to his countrymen in 1900, justified the French imperial project by asking his readers " ... not to forget that it is to the French, and to the French only, that we owe a great work of reformation - the cleansing of one of the filthiest Augean stables in the modern world."[6] Similarly, Sir Arthur Nicholson, British representative in Morocco from 1895 to 1905, gave his implicit sanction to the French effort to transform Morocco into a protectorate (realized in 1912) when he declared that he "had been to most Oriental countries," but had "never seen such darkness as reigns here."[7]

But for many North African nationalists and their anti-colonial sympathizers, such expressions of self-pride and cultural superiority were in actuality powerful exemplars of Western economic and political power which grew out of the historical need and desire for an aggressive capitalist expansion - initially through the domineering mercantilism of the Company of Africa, created by French royal edict in 1741 and working out of Marseilles;[8] and later, after 1830, through direct military intervention and colonization. Collectively, they functioned to mask and legitimize the French presence in

the Maghrib, and contributed to the consolidation of an ideological edifice predicated upon a manichaean split in the French mind between the rational good order of European, and specifically French, civilization, and the "medieval," underdeveloped traditions of the Islamic Maghrib. The Algerian nationalist leader Ferhat Abbas, for example, spoke for many when he stated that the Algerian centenary celebrations had been "organized in the best of racist styles."[9] Indeed, by the time of the centenary, French perceptions of North Africa had been inextribably linked to, and elaborated by, the Orientalist discourse for over a century; and, as part of a régime of truth, they were rarely questioned.

As with Egypt, the Maghrib was first exposed to Orientalist scrutiny in the wake of invasion and military occupation. Each of its three principal regions - the beyliks of Algeria and Tunis, and the Kingdom of Morocco - were, however, subjugated differently, according to both circumstance and strategic need. Thus, whereas the French offensive in Algeria produced a harvest of destruction, famine, and demographic dislocation, the occupation of Morocco and Tunisia left the indigenous social fabric basically intact; for in these latter regions the French chose to govern through native elites and intermediaries rather than instigate, as in Algeria, a policy of massive colonization.[10] Yet, all three regions were subjected more or less equally to a form of colonial control which was insidious in its

subtlety, and which has only recently attracted the attention it merits by semioticians. We refer to the French strategy to order and modify the indigenous culture through the replacement and repression of its ancient system of descriptive symbols and cultural paradigms, what Jacques Berque has called the "whole cycle of politics and piety."[11] Already in 1842 Alexis de Tocqueville described the nature of this kind of domination when he wrote that he was "convaincu qu'à tout prendre à Alger le pouvoir le plus oppressif et le plus malfaisant .... se montre partout et sans cesse, réglant, dirigeant, modifiant, touchant, et rétouchant chaque jour toutes choses."[12] The French understood well that the indigenous spirit of independence and revolt could only be eradicated through the extinction of those societal norms which provided the Maghrib with its prime foci of identity; for ultimately, the French aim was to control the inner esprit of Algerian society as a whole.[13]

One of the most effective ways to implement this kind of domination was through the disciplining of space, the capture and control of les indigènes through the imposition of order and visibility upon the native society. The physical transformation of Muslim cities under European hegemony provides a particularly good example of this process. In cities such as Cairo, Rabat, and Tunis, new spatial and technological forms were introduced, such as grid-pattern street plans, open squares, and street lighting, which facilitated government control by making visible both

individuals and things through the regulation of activities and the establishment of a comprehensive order.[14] Eventually, these innovations would work to effect among the indigenous population the normalization of new patterns of behaviour based upon the European model. What remained of the "old town," like the Casbah of Algiers, would then serve to remind Europeans and the westernized native elite alike of the irrevocable chasm between the two urban worlds: "One was the place of the irrational, secret, superstitious, dark and threatening, diseased, tightly packed native quarter; the other was open, linear, public revealing, centered, rational, and insisting on its hierarchies - the spaces of power and status."[15]

The physical disciplining of indigenous society was supplemented by a form of regulatory domination which operated on a conceptual level. Here the aim was to pin-down and classify the elusive social groupings of the subjugated society according to scientific principles. Once safely stored within the authoritative confines of an ethnography or history, information regarding the indigenous society could be used to facilitate policy decisions or appropriated for purposes of military intelligence. Orientalism, as we have seen, facilitated this kind of process through the reduction of oriental chaos to an intelligible order, the result of which was a normalization of knowledge achieved through the force of mimesis. It is with this background in mind that we must view the thirty-nine volumes of the Exploration

scientifique de l'Algérie (1844-1867),[16] which in conscious imitation of the Description de l'Égypte, sought to flush out the geographical, historical, and sociological realities of the Maghrib for purposes of control. For our purposes, however, it is important to note that the Exploration scientifique instigated a scholarly tradition which regarded Ibn Khaldūn as the primary expositor of Maghribi history.

II

The first mentions of Ibn Khaldūn in Europe are vague and obscure. He appears initially as a practitioner of letter magic, first in the De scriptoribus arabicus of the sixteenth century scholar Leo Africanus,[17] and then in d'Herbelot's Bibliothèque. Whether these references were drawn from a specific chapter in the Muqaddima dealing with letter magic, or were taken from a separate work now lost is unknown. The first reference to Ibn Khaldūn within the orbit of academic Orientalism, however, was made in 1804 by Josef von Hammer-Purgstall, who as a professional dragoman and founder of the first specialist Orientalist review in Europe, the Fundgruben des Orients (1809-1818), included information on Ibn Khaldūn in his Encyclopedische übersicht der Wissenschaften des Orients.[18] This effort was soon followed by that of de Sacy, who from 1810 onwards edited and translated passages from the Muqaddima in the chrestomathic fashion

described above.[19] Several of de Sacy's students, chief among them Coquebert de Montbret, Étienne Quatremère, Schultz and de Slane, continued the project well into the nineteenth century. The Quatremère edition of the Muqaddima (1858) and de Slane's French translation (1863 ff.) were of particular importance in that they allowed readers for the first time to scan the entirety of the text with relative ease. The Universal History aroused less interest, although it did find an early translator in Noel Desvergers, who in 1841 published extracts under the title Histoire de l'Afrique sous la dynastie des Aghlabites et de la Sicile sous la domination musulmane. Another partial translation was published some years later by de Slane. Entitled Histoire des Berbères et des dynasties musulmanes de l'Afrique septentrionale (1852-6), it remained for years the principal source for the history of the Muslim West.[20]

It might also be mentioned here that the increased proclivity towards programmes for revival and reform throughout the Muslim world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries produced a parallel interest in Ibn Khaldūn among Muslims. It was felt that an aetiology of decline formulated by one of Islam's greatest scholars would be useful in explicating some of the features of the current social and political malaise. It seems to have been a concern with problems of decline which spurred the Ottoman historian Na'īma (d. 1716), for instance, to provide a summary of Ibn Khaldūn's political ideas, and to have similarly inspired the Shaykh al-Islām Pīrī-Zāde Meḥmed

(d. 1749) to attempt the first translation of the Muqaddima
into Turkish.[21]. It may also have been reformist concerns
which inspired the Egyptian modernist Rāfi' al-Ṭahṭāwī
(d. 1873) to encourage the Government Press at Būlāq to
publish Naṣr al-Hūrīnī's edition of the entire Kitāb al-'Ibar
in 1857.[22] Yet, despite the close timing, it would appear that
Muslim and European interests in Ibn Khaldūn developed
separately and in isolation. Even the Hūrīnī edition, on
display at the Vienna Book Fair in 1873, seems not to have
influenced contemporary European scholarship in any way.[23]

The "discovery" of Ibn Khaldūn by de Sacy and his
protégés attracted the early attention of scholars attached to
the Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie. The Exploration
originated in the efforts of the bureau arabe, which was
established in 1841 by General Bugeaud to systematically
monitor and administer the Muslim population through a corps
of specially trained officers. Working within the shadow of
the tenacious resistance of the amīr 'Abd al-Qādir, the
officers sought to win the hearts and minds of the native
Algerians through the introduction of public works and the
administration of justice, prefiguring in a strange way the
later efforts of Jacques Soustelle's Sections Administratives
Spécialisées, created in the course of the Algerian Revolution
for the same purpose.[24] But there was an added dimension to
the work of the bureau. In the course of their missions the
officers were also directed to seek the key to the tribes'
operation, "the secrets which would open them to

domination."[25] Considerable effort was therefore expended in explicating the nature of the native society and the topography of the countryside. To this end new methods were pioneered, for instance, the technique of oral investigation based on the questioning of tribal informants, which so greatly facilitated Lt. Col. Eugène Daumas' important study of Saharan geography and society (1845); and E. de Neveu's use of an administrative questionnaire to classify information on the ṣūfī ṭuruq, thought to be centres of resistance.[26]

The scientific work undertaken by the bureau arabe was appropriated to form the textual backbone of the Exploration scientifique by the project's editor, Pelliser de Reynaud. New works, however, were soon added; for example, E. Carette's two volumes on the region of Kabylia and its inhabitants (1848). Carette also wrote the project's first work on history proper, the Recherches sur l'origine et les migrations des principales tribus de l'Afrique septentrionale et particulièrement de l'Algérie, published in 1853.[27] The work is largely based upon Desverger's translation of Ibn Khaldūn. Although other Arabic sources are cited - most notably al-Bakrī and al-Idrīsī - they are used sparingly.[28] It seemed both necessary and sufficient that Ibn Khaldūn, as the only full source on the subject, be followed explicitly and in detail.

The reason, of course, was that Carette's historical vision was dominated by the philological positivism of his age. As we have seen, for the philological historian,

historical writing was the "depiction of past events according to the letter." The event, so to speak, was carried in the source. The only factor that was capable of preventing the events from being carried completely was identified with some "mechanical defect in the compilation of the source, that of inaccuracy and incompleteness:"[29] hence the importance of source criticism in all positivist historiography.[30] Carette, therefore, sought not to offer his own interpretive scheme or pass judgement on the "facts" as they stood within the text of Ibn Khaldūn: he sought only to present them as they were. This was important, for the purpose behind Carette's use of Ibn Khaldūn was entirely practical - to supplement the ethnographical data provided by the officers of the <u>bureau arabe</u> with information which would help the French better understand the society they were in the very process of subjugating. Books VI and VII of <u>Kitāb al-ʿIbar</u> were particularly important in supplying not only the most complete narrative of historical events in the Maghrib, but a comprehensive classification of the Maghrib's principle tribes and racial groups as well.

Subsequent histories of the Maghrib, written privately and beyond the institutional authority of the <u>bureau arabe</u>, continued the wholesale appropriation of <u>Kitāb al-ʿIbar</u> begun by Carette. Often the result was little more than paraphrase. Ernest Mercier's influential history of the establishment of the Arabs in the Maghrib (1873),[31] for example, is simply a dry re-run of de Slane's <u>Histoire des Berbères</u>, supplemented

here and there by a number of other sources according to the
demands of philological source criticism. For Mercier, Ibn
Khaldūn's value lies in the fact that he is "une véritable
mine de précieux renseignements" resurrected through the
fortuitous introduction of "l'Afrique septentrionale à la
science ...."[32] The historical work of Georges Marçais is
similarly emplotted and structured according to the Khaldūnian
exemplar. In the introduction to his Les arabes en Berbérie
du Xe au XVe siècle, Marçais informs us how dependent all
historians of the Islamic Maghrib must be upon Ibn Khaldūn,
"un des esprits les plus originaux et plus puissant qu'ait vu
naître le monde musulman."[33]

The image of Maghribi history to be drawn from these
three seminal studies is that of a fixed field dominated by
the incessant struggles and state formations of the Maghrib's
various tribes and dynasties. Events up until the
mid-eleventh century are particularly lacking in substance:
Berber tribes rise and fall, but nothing ever really seems to
happen. Carette's history is a plodding chronicle which
details the individual history of each tribal grouping up to
his own time. The histories of Mercier and Marçais display an
equally strong affinity for names and classificatory schemes.
But nowhere do we find any significant attempt to discover the
structures undergirding these events. In particular, no
effort is made to structure the historical narrative around
the conceptual schemes which underpin the Muqaddima. Thus,
when Mercier tells us that the Maghrib was composed of

"cultivateurs sur le littoral et dans les montagnes, ils vivaient attachés au sol et habitaient des cabanes de branchages; pasteurs dans l'intérieur, ils menaient la vie nomade ... leurs conditions normales d'existence étaient la guerre et la pillage ...." ,[34] he goes no further, declining to explain the various modes of Maghribi existence and livelihood in terms of the two genres de vie - ʿumrān badawī and ʿumrān ḥaḍarī - described by Ibn Khaldūn in the Muqaddima. Similarly, although Marçais deems it necessary to explain the social and economic bases of nomadism so as to more fully understand the nomadic constitution of the Berber dynasties, he does so without regarding nomadism as an element in the teleological unfolding of ʿumrān.[35]

There is, however, one event around which all three historians structure their respective histories: the arrival of the Banū Hilāl and the Banū Sulaim into the Maghrib in 1052. On the authority of Ibn Muyassar and Ibn al-Athīr, whose source in turn was the Ifrīqiyan exile Ibn Shaddād, Ibn Khaldūn repeats at the beginning of book VI of Kitāb al-ʿIbar the story of how these nomadic tribes were sent from Egypt by the Fāṭimids to punish their rebellious vassal, the Zīrid sulṭān al-Muʿizz Ibn Bādīs.[36] The result, he tells us, was the introduction of a new racial element which wrought calamity and devastation over an area once renowned for its agricultural and urban prosperity. Orchards were uprooted, fields given over to grazing, and the cities of Qayrawān, Ṭahārt, Qalʿa, and Sijilmāsa reduced to poverty and insignificance. Indeed,

the central image in Ibn Khaldūn is that of a swarm of locusts sweeping away the fruits of settled life in its wake.[37]

For the historians, the events of the Hilālī taghrība spoke for themselves. The invasion of the Arab nomads was the single most consequential event of the Maghribi Middle Ages. The uneasy equilibrium between Berber tribes which had allowed for a relatively stable economic environment was now irrevocably upset by a destructive nomadic element. Henceforth the Bedouin would be everywhere, determining the politics of the Maghrib and instigating a process of Arabization through the wholesale introduction of their language and customs. The havoc and chaos created a political vacuum which resulted in incursions by Norman and Genoese adventurers. The cities, unable to draw upon the resources of the interior, were forced to rely increasingly upon piracy. The invasion, in other words, signalled a turning point in the history of the Maghrib. It ended a period of stagnation and initiated a new period of decline which would eventually culminate in the French occupation of the entire region. Carette saw the Arab onslaught as changing "entièrement la face de l'Afrique ... anéantissant le travail de dix siècles de trois civilisations ...."[38] For Mercier, the invasions were of such consequence that he divided his work into two parts corresponding to events taking place before and after the Arab element was introduced. And for Marçais, "le fleu arabe" instigated effects felt in "tous les domaines, politique, économique, social, intellectuel, et nulle région, nul peuple

de l'Afrique de Nord n'y échappera complètment."[39] To
underline the enormity of the event, Marçais added to the
repertoire of facts already provided by Ibn Khaldūn the
accounts of Arab geographers such as al-Yaʿqūbī (d. 891) and
Ibn Ḥawqal (d. after 977), both of whom detailed the economic
prosperity of Ifrīqiya prior to the bedouin arrival.[40] The
intended effect, however, was not so much to confirm the
outline of events as they occurred in Ibn Khaldūn as it was to
supplement with more data a scenario that had already been
imbued with an unquestioned truth-value.

The ideological implications behind this scenario of
Maghribi stagnation and decline are perhaps obvious. French
Orientalists had tapped a source which allowed them to "read"
the history of the Maghrib as it really was. Two periods were
distinguished. The first was characterized by the
changelessness and lassitude of Berber tribal life, while the
second was marked by nomadic destruction and decline.
Furthermore, the fact that the Banū Hilāl were Arabs played
into the hands of the racialism of late-nineteenth century
social theory put forward by scholars such as Renan, for whom
there was a real semitic "essence". Indeed, all of the
historians thus far examined speak of the Maghrib as having
been "lost" to the Arabs. The net result was to view the
region in terms of primitive and mutually antagonistic social
groupings cut off from the wellsprings and stabilizing
influences of European progress and development. The
underdeveloped conditions of the Maghrib in the historians'

own day worked to confirm this judgement. Consequently, the historical and contemporary otherness of Islamic civilization in the Maghrib was confirmed, and the French _mission civilisatrice_ provided with implicit justification.

III

With Mercier and Marçais these judgements entered the University of Algiers where they were taught and propagated. A body of data and theory which had originally surfaced with a constellation of military personages - teams of cartographers, inspectors, and social workers - had become in a relatively short period of time institutionalized knowledge. The dominating thrust behind this institutionalization was still control, but a form of control which was now more easily masked through the legitimizing agency of academic consensus. Behind the institutionalization was the unflagging will of the Algerian _colons_. Indeed, the _Liste des souscripteurs_ prefacing Mercier's history is a who's who of the _colon_ establishment,[41] and includes Chief Justices, businessmen, and politicians, all of whom had a stake in the maintenance of a strong French presence in Algeria. In fact, repelled by the savagery of the Moqrani rebellion of 1871, and hungry for more land, the _colons_ had for years been pressing the French government for stricter measures against the _indigènes_. One result was the enactment in 1881 of punitive regulations

directed against the Muslims which were collectively known as the <u>Code</u> <u>de</u> <u>l'Indigènat</u>. Another result, on a different plane, was the ready acceptance of the "colonial vulgate" of the historians.

Yet, this colonial vulgate was not systemitized and given its full ideological expression until 1927. It was then that Emile-Félix Gautier published his <u>Les</u> <u>siècles</u> <u>obscurs</u> <u>du</u> <u>Maghreb</u>, later expanded and republished in 1952 as <u>Le</u> <u>passé</u> <u>de</u> <u>l'Afrique</u> <u>du</u> <u>Nord</u>: <u>Les</u> <u>siècles</u> <u>obscurs</u>.[42] As its title suggests, the purpose of the work was to shed light on the darkest and most obscure period of Maghribi history, namely the centuries between the initial Arab conquest and the Hilālī incursions. By concentrating on this period, Gautier sought to explicate some of the enduring features and patterns of Maghribi social organization. In doing so, he hoped to demonstrate the congenital incapacity of the Maghribi peoples for self-determination and statehood.

The timing of Gautier's undertaking is perhaps significant in this regard. His professorship at the University of Algiers coincided with the first stirrings of Algerian nationalism.[43] In 1926 the Algerian émigré Massali al-Hajj organized the nationalist sentiment that had been brewing among Maghribi workers in the Paris area into a Marxist inspired movement called the <u>Étoile</u> <u>Nord</u> <u>Africain</u>, which called for total and uncompromising independence for Algeria. This event coincided with the attempts of a growing body of reformist-minded <u>ʿulamā'</u> to restore the Algerian

personality through a revitalization of its Islamic heritage according to the tenets of the Salafiyya. Under the leadership of Shaikh Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn Bādīs, they published journals (al-Muntaqid; al-Shihāb) in which they called for a return to Islamic learning and the recognition of Arabic over French as Algeria's official language. In 1931 they would finally organize as the Association des Oulémas Musulmans Algériens (Jamʿiyyat al-ʿUlamāʾ).[44] Finally, it was also during this period that the governor of Algeria, Maurice Viollette, attempted against the wishes of the colons to convince the French government to extend full citizenship rights to the évolué population. It was perhaps in reaction to this rising tide of anti-colonial and reformist activity that Gautier was moved to publish Les siècles obscurs when he did. As it stands, the work is an excellent example of how "philological procedures play into the hands of ideological convenience."[45]

Gautier's contribution to the historical vulgate revolved around the idea that the history of the Maghrib could be explained in terms of an eternal and ontologically-rooted antinomy between nomadic and sedentary peoples. He found his initial clue to this hypothesis in the Universal History, where Ibn Khaldūn arranges the historical populations of the Maghrib into three broad groupings: two Berber, the Ṣanhāja and Zanāta, and one Arab, stemming from both the initial Arab conquest and Hilālian invasion. In fact, the Universal History is, for all intents and purposes, a genealogical

history in which the individual tribal lineages of these
groups are chronologically traced down through the centuries.
In adopting this scheme, Ibn Khaldūn was following a common
Islamic view of mankind as descended from the progeny of
Noah's three sons, Shem, Ham, and Jepheth, and "divided,
therefore, into great lineages correspondingly arranged in
order of ability and merit."[46] The concept appeared in many
different kinds of genre: for instance, in the aḥādīth, where
opinions ascribed to the Prophet are used to judge nations
according to their genealogical worth, and in the shuʿūbī
literature, dating from the eighth century on, where writers
argued about the merits or demerits of the Arabs in comparison
with other peoples.[47] There was also the precedent set in the
ninth century by al-Balādhurī, whose Kitāb al-Ansāb was
written around the genealogical histories of individual
personalities, beginning with the Prophet.[48] After the ninth
century this mode of historical presentation ceased to be
popular in the Mashriq, but it thereafter enjoyed a certain
degree of popularity in the Maghrib, where it was used to
demarcate and genealogically establish the growing ethnic
split between Arabs and Berbers.[49] Ibn Khaldūn, however, was
as cognizant as any present-day anthropologist that the
substance behind any genealogical scheme was notoriously
unreliable. He understood well that the concept of common
descent from a single ancestor was a heuristic device used to
amalgamate tribes and individuals of different origins.[50] But
he also realized that as a mode of structuration, it served

well as a forum in which the various ṭabaqāt (chronological "layers" of individual genealogical lineages could be provided with their necessary historical significance. For, as we have seen in Chapter I, Ibn Khaldūn believed that genealogical continuity (albeit false) was the prime criterion for the historical existence of any particular daula.[51]

Gautier's task was to discover the actual bases upon which the lineal schemes put forward in the Universal History were set. As both a human geographer and a product of his age, he believed that there was a historicity proper to nature; that forms of adaptation to the environment were defined for each broad type of living being which would make possible a subsequent definition of its evolutionary outline.[52] He therefore compared the historical situation of the tribal groupings with the physical outlay of the Maghrib, and decided that Ibn Khaldūn was really writing about two distinct ways of life: nomadic pastoralism, and the sedentary existence of agriculture and urban life.[53] He identified nomadism with the Zanāta, and sedentarism with the Maṣmūda and the northern branch of the Ṣanhāja. Furthermore, he believed that the sudden disappearance of the Zanāta nomads from the historical record in the course of the eleventh century could be explained in terms of their assimilation into the ranks of the more aggressive Banū Hilāl, who henceforth replaced the Zanāta as the most important nomadic element in the Maghrib.[54]

Gautier's second clue was culled from the text of the Muqaddima. Like others who had been studying the Muqaddima in

the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Gautier believed that Ibn Khaldūn had developed a theory which was scientifically valid because it was erected upon a law of regularity.[55] On this basis he believed that the <u>Muqaddima</u> could be used to provide a true analysis of the political and economic conditions of the medieval Maghrib. He was thus prompted to structure the components of his nomad/sedentary dichotomy around the two thematic classes of <u>badāwa</u> and <u>ḥaḍāra</u>, for as concepts involved in a continuous dialectical interchange they would do much to explain "the motive forces and explicative patterns" of Maghribi history as set forth in the narrative sections of <u>Kitāb</u> <u>al-ʿIbar</u>. The result, according to Al-Azmeh, "is a paradoxically ahistorical history in which the basic process is that of two juxtaposed primordial substances upon which temporality impinges in the form of discrete events that acquire their rationality with reference, not to these terms, as such, but in their capacity as carriers of atemporal sources of vitality."[56] The dynamic aspect of the model is supplied by the inspirational power of ʿaṣabiyya, which for Gautier is "le privilège exclusif des nomades."[57] Armed with this <u>esprit</u> <u>de</u> <u>clan</u>, the nomads, in Gautier's account, are periodically driven through the transhistorical exigencies of their particular <u>genre</u> <u>de</u> <u>vie</u> to overwhelm the social, economic, and political bases of settled existence. Here Gautier draws heavily upon Ibn Khaldūn's reference to nomads as descructive to agriculture and fixed dwellings.[58] In time, however, the vigour of the nomadic group

itself succumbs to the temptations of settled life, with the result that a society once strong and powerful becomes prey for the next fresh nomadic group possessing ʿaṣabiyya in its uncorrupted form.[59]

Gautier's understanding of the Muqaddima, however, was based upon a complete misreading of its technical vocabulary. The key terms were interpreted according to the strictures of his own intellectual and ideological allegiances. For Ibn Khaldūn, badāwa has nothing to do with nomadism per se; rather, it denotes primitive society, in which man concentrates on satisfying limited and necessary needs according to rudimentary modes of production which may include agriculture, animal breeding, as well as nomadism.[60] ʿUmrān ḥaḍarī is similarly tied to notions of livelihood, but in this case characterized by the complexity and advanced technical skills of the city. It has nothing to do with agriculture.[61] De Slane came closest to the original meaning of ʿumrān ḥaḍarī when he translated it as "la vie de villes."[62] Gautier's understanding of ʿaṣabiyya as a combination of bedouin clannishness and religious enthusiasm is similarly alien to Ibn Khaldūn's original intent. As we have noted, ʿaṣabiyya has no existence apart from the group which characterizes it. For Gautier, it became a purely harmful force which corresponded very closely to the original colon fear of the power of Islam to incite rebellion.[63] It was what made the nomads "la source unique de l'autorité de l'organisation politique et sociale" in the Maghrib.[64]

Nevertheless, it is on the basis of these misreadings that Gautier describes three attempts to construct a lasting polity in the Maghrib, each of which failed on account of a nomadic element. The first attempt comprised the efforts of the Aghlabids in Ifrīqiya and the Idrisīds of Fez, both of whom were pressed hard by the Zanātī under the ideological cover of Khārijism. The second was the attempt of the Kutāma Shīʿīs and their Şanhāja allies in Kabylia, whose political ambition of Maghribi hegemony was again thwarted by the Zanāta and further complicated by the arrival of the Hilālīs. The final attempt was taken by the Maṣmūda Almohads, who might have succeeded if they had not made the fatal mistake of transferring a large number of the Banū Hilāl to the Moroccan plains, where they contributed to the decline of an already over-extended empire. Indeed, for Gautier, as for the other historians we have examined, the presence of the Banū Hilāl in the Maghrib constituted "la plus terrible maladie du Maghreb."[65]

For Gautier, the inability of the nomadic and sedentary populations to cooperate and live according to common goals explained everything that was wrong with the Maghrib. The problem, be believed, had begun with the entrance of the Maghrib into the fold of Islam. Cut off from its Punic and Latin heritage, the Maghrib was absorbed into the alien impress of an Oriental civilization which was noteworthy for the things it lacked in relation to Europe, one of which was the "statist notion of a national life whose fatherland had

its origin in the _polis_."⁶⁶ While the cities of the Islamic Maghrib were centres of religious and commercial life, they lacked certain crucial aspects of urban and social integration which had characterized urban life in the West since Classical antiquity, most notably, civic administration, an autonomous bourgeoisie, and the concept of civic solidarity, "les sentiments, dont la légende de Cincinnatus est le reflet ...."⁶⁷ It was this lack of municipal integration and corporate spirit which condemned city dwellers to the progressive social debilitation described by Ibn Khaldūn,⁶⁸ and which allowed nomads possessed of a strong "clan spirit" to periodically overtake the city and displace the urban elites. In fact, for Gautier, it was the nomad who "distingue essentiellement l'Orient de l'Occident."⁶⁹ This was an important fact to realize, for the prime purpose of Gautier's work was to draw attention to the inherent differences between the social structure and history of European societies and the Islamic world. The nomads could overrun settled life in the Maghrib only because the loyalties of the Maghribi peoples (both nomadic and sedentary) were defined in terms of the genealogies of clan and tribe, not in terms of territory, or civic or national feeling. The Islamic Maghrib, in other words, was characterized by a form of social organization lacking a network of essential social linkages and connections, with the result that history could only be recounted and explained "biologically". In Gautier's own words:

> On voit bien la différence avec notre patriotisme.
> Une patrie est un pays géographique, un territoire
> délimité .... Le clan, au contraire, est un groupe
> humain de générations, considéré independamment de
> son substratum régional, une race, une espèce
> biologique.[70]

In Gautier's view, this inability to unite and form a
viable state was responsible for a cycle of destructive
tribalism which could only be alleviated through the efforts
of the French _mission civilisatrice_. Only through the
introduction of development schemes, western education, and a
thorough colonial administrative framework responsible for
policing the tribal hinterlands could the inhabitants of the
Maghrib step beyond the bounds of Oriental otherness and come
to conceive of "notre notion d'évolution progressive
indéfinie."[71] This is the basic message of _Les siècles
obscurs_. As a work based upon the scientific explication of
the thought of the Islamic Maghrib's most renowned native son,
it served as a powerful response to nationalist aspirations.

The broad lines of Gautier's interpretation of Ibn
Khaldūn were taken over by subsequent historians, including
Henri Terrasse, whose _Histoire du Maroc_ (1949) came to be
regarded as the standard work on Moroccan history.[72] Like
Gautier, Terrasse viewed Maghribi society as being essentially
tribalistic: "Les Berbères ont un sens biologique de la
patrie":[73] all efforts towards national unity "ont été
toujours contrariées par une indiscipline native, un
invincible penchant à l'anarchie."[74] Condemned to the
perpetual patterning of tribal cycles, Morocco, like other
regions of the Maghrib, was not able to solve the political

and social problems that the countries of the West had solved
through the process of dynastic, and then national,
consolidation. For Terrasse, Ibn Khaldūn's view is one
"n'aboutissant qu'à un determinisme historique sans issue et
sans espoir. Après avoir analysé avec une rare acuité,
l'histoire passée et présente de son pays ... il ne voit ni ne
cherche des remèdes à ce retour rythmique des mêmes
catastrophes. Ce cycle infernal d'échecs et de misères lui
paraît la loi inéluctable de l'histoire."[75]

But Terrasse also added a new dimension to the historical
vulgate: the metamorphosis of the concepts ʿumrān badāwa and
ʿumrān ḥaḍāra into the bipolar categories of bilād al-sība and
bilād al-makhzan, usually rendered as "the land of dissidence"
and "the land of government" respectively. Compared to
Algeria and Tunisia, French interest in Morocco began
relatively late - in the first decade of this century. The
first French ethnographers to enter the region were
immediately struck by the division of Moroccan society into a
well-defined urban-based sultanate (the makhzan), and a tribal
hinterland (the sība) which was often directly opposed to the
central government's political and economic control.
Subsequent ethnographers noted that this division neatly
corresponded to the "ethnic" split between Arabs and Berbers,
with the Arabs in control of the towns, and the Berbers
limited for the most part to the mountainous regions.[76]
Furthermore, Berber society itself came more and more to be
defined according to the precepts of the "Kabyle myth", which

emerged out of Hanoteau and Letourneaux's study of Kabylian society in Algeria (1873).[77] In this study, Berbers are conceived as Noble Savages living in a basically democratic condition due to their possession of a Jamā'a type of representative government and their own customary law ('urf). Attention was also drawn to the supposed superficiality of thier islamicization, and to the fact that their treatment of women appeared to be very close to the European model. The result was that in substance the bilād al-sība came to be regarded in terms of a composite stereotype which was held to be the very antithesis of the bilād al-makhzan. But what is significant is that this stereotype was transposed to Morocco ·just as the French colonial offensive in that country was getting under way. The purpose of the transposition was to fuel and substantiate a policy of divide and rule: it was felt that by fostering and supporting Berber particularism (the sība), a counterweight to the more centralized, and hence more powerful Arab component (the makhzan) could be developed. Moreover, unlike the Arabs of Morocco, who were conceived to be locked within the rigid edifice of Islam, the Berbers were considered to be potentially assimilatable to French culture.[78] The policy culminated in the promulgation of the two Berber ẓahirs (vernacular, dahir, royal decree) of 1914 and 1930. The first detached Berber customary law from the shar', while the second incorporated it within the French judicial apparatus. There was nothing unique in the mechanics of this operation: Edmond Burke III has shown how the same

policy was subsequently adopted in the Syrian mandate, where the French sought to exploit the differences between the Druze and Alawite minorities.[79] Attention has elsewhere been drawn to the Soviet and British attempts to divide and rule in Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent respectively.[80]

However for our purposes the importance of the Arab/Berber dichotomy lies in its subsequent identification with the perceived content of Ibn Khaldūn's historical theory. By the 1920's many anthropologists were beginning to shake off the ahistorical methodological practices of typological description and classification developed by Emile Durkheim[81] and further articulated by British functionalists such as Sir Arthur Evans-Pritchard, in favour of a new approach which fused both anthropological and historical interests. This was the approach taken, for instance, by Robert Montagne who, like the officers of the bureau arabe, studied the patterns of Moroccan rural behaviour in order to guide the colonial administrators in their efforts to control the countryside.[82] As a colonial advocate, he fully accepted the French policy of divide and rule, and further substantiated the theoretical bases upon which it was predicated by noting that Ibn Khaldūn's theory that "urban civilisation and the creative power of the empire builders represent two rival and antithetical forces which ceaselessly destroy each other in turn," corresponded to the makhzan-sība dichotomy of his own day.[83] He concluded, therefore, that the tribal patterning of early twentieth century Morocco, particularly when it revolved

around <u>sība</u> based rebellion of the kind led by his contemporary, 'Abd al-Karīm, was simply a variation of the cyclical dynasticism described by Ibn Khaldūn in the fourteenth century. History served ethnography in explicating the continuity of Maghribi social structures over time.[84]

Two decades later, Terrasse came to the same conclusion, but this time it was in the context of ethnography serving history:

> Le spectacle de ce qui se passe encore, et la connaissance de ce qui s'est passé dans le demi-siècle qui précéda le Protectorat, nous permet de suppléer à l'indigence des textes, d'acquérir l'intelligence du passé marocain. La sociologie est ainsi devenue au Maroc l'indispensable auxiliaire de l'histoire .... Tout ce qu'Ibn Khaldoun nous dit de la vie politique et sociale dans ses <u>Prolégomènes</u> et son <u>Histoire des Berbères</u> s'accorde avec les observations des modernes sociologues de l'Afrique du Nord.[85]

With Terrasse and the melding of historical and ethnographical interests, then, Ibn Khaldūn was further confirmed as the true and objective source for his time, with the result that the Maghrib continued to be defined according to the determinisms of race and geography. As late as 1969 Roger Le Tourneau, who throughout his life remained a strong proponent of French Algeria, concluded his study of the rise and decline of the Almohad movement by stating that "neither geography nor history favors North African unity. Because of the togography and the climate, that country is divided into a rather large number of small regions, and the inhabitants are led by nature to live in quite different and conflicting ways."[86] We can see, therefore, that by the mid-point of this

century, a sizeable body of scholarship had developed which, disguised as truth, was used to legitimize the French colonial presence in the Maghrib.

IV

Yet it must not be supposed that the ideology behind the colonial vulgate went unchallenged. Already in 1931 Charles-André Julien, Professor of history at the Sorbonne, sought to compensate for the colonialist biases through the publication of his Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord.[87] Written as a response to the centenary celebrations of the previous year, the work was meant to rid Maghribi history of historical and racial stereotypes, and to portray the pre-colonial period in an objective and sympathetic light.[88]

In fact, Julien was throughout his adult life firmly opposed to the prevailing chauvinism of the colon population. As a youth newly arrived in Oran (1906), he was repelled by the overt racial discrimination which marked the everyday existence of the communes de plein exercice, administrative districts where the European population predominated. He began his career as a journalist, attacking the Code de l'Indigènat, and after the victory of Léon Blum's socialistic Popular Front, supported the efforts of Maurice Viollette to extend full citizenship rights to the évolués; for Julien believed above all that with reform and benign, intelligent

handling, the Muslim Algerians could one day be assimilated into France as full citizens. In this sense he stood in diametrical opposition to the inflexible attitude of the colons who felt that any elevation in the legal status of the Muslims would weaken their own superior socio-economic position. Even after 1954, when the Algerian Revolution dashed all hopes for liberal reform of the kind advocated by the assimilationists, Julien up-dated his liberal attitudes and pushed for negotiations with the FLN against the prevailing opinion in Algiers and Paris. With Jean-Paul Sartre and other opponents of French policy in Algeria, he remained an outspoken critic of the French use of torture throughout the struggle.[9]

All of this is to say that Julien very consciously tried to separate himself from the colonial polemic. But the point to be made is that despite this effort, Julien's history of the medieval Maghrib remains tied to many of the basic explicative structures put forward by the colonial vulgate. The paternalistic and condescending attitudes of his predecessors are gone, but the assumptions remain intact. Thus, in Julien's view, the history of North Africa has been determined by the deeply rooted struggle between sedentary and nomad "described" by Ibn Khaldūn.[11] Up until the eleventh century there was a balance between these two eco-logically-bound ways of life. Ibn Ḥawqal describes the Maghrib in the mid-tenth century as still an agricultural country, wooded and prosperous.[12] But the cataclysmic arrival of the

Banū Hilāl "threw everything into a melting pot" and resulted in the victory of the nomad and the decline of agriculture and city life, so that by the "beginning of the nineteenth century the entire Maghrib was living, withdrawn into its shell, in accordance with standards that had held for thousands of years, and without having been able to evolve in the direction of statehood in its modern form."[93] It was therefore inevitable, and perhaps necessary, that the French should extend their domination to the Maghrib's shores.

But Julien's judgements could not have been otherwise: they were determined by his very position within the Orientalist discourse, the central tenets of which had in the course of over a century been imbued with an authoritative truth-value. Indeed, the methods and techniques of the discourse itself determined the course that Julien's history was to take, irrespective of his beliefs; for there was no escaping the epistemological constraints of philology and historicism once they had taken root. The work of more recent historians of the Maghrib has likewise been subjected to the methods and received wisdom of Orientalist interpretations of Ibn Khaldūn. Hady Roger Idris' study of the Zīrīds, for example, faithfully copies Ibn Khaldūn's rendition of the Hilālian invasion.[94] Jamil Abun Nasr, in his A History of the Maghrib,[95] does likewise, and explains in his introduction that the conceptual framework used throughout the book "is inspired by Ibn Khaldūn's ideas on the rise and fall of states and the role of religious doctrines as instruments of

political cohesion." Indeed, the strength of the Khaldūnian model is evident in the way it has been uncritically appropriated by scholars working within the frameworks of other disciplines. It has structured, for instance, the anthropologist Ernest Gellner's "Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam", and Elbaki Hermassi's understanding of the socio-political traditions of the medieval Maghrib.[6] Perhaps the time has come to follow the advice of Abdallah Laroui and place the problems besetting Maghribi history "outside the Khaldunian framework."[7]

Notes to Chapter III

1. Jacques Berque, French North Africa: The Maghrib Between Two World Wars, trans. Jean Stewart (New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 222.

2. Quoted in David Gordon, The Passing of French Algeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 19.

3. Berque, French North Africa, p. 223.

4. Gordon, French Algeria, pp. 19-20.

5. James Cook, "The Maghrib through French Eyes: 1880-1929," Through Foreign Eyes: Western Attitudes Toward North Africa, ed. Alf A. Heggoy (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1982), p. 59.

6. Anthony Wilkin, Among the Berbers of Algeria (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1900), p. 2.

7. Quoted in F.V. Parsons, "Late Nineteenth Century Morocco Through Foreign Eyes," The Maghreb Review, III, 5-6 (January-April, 1978), p. 1.

8. Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa Before the French Conquest, trans. K.J. Perkins (New York and London: Africana Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 65-66.

9. Quoted in Gordon, French Algeria, p. 19.

10. Elbaki Hermassi, Leadership and Development in North Africa: A Comparative Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 56-90.

11. Berque, French North Africa, p. 71.

12. Alexis de Tocqueville, "Ecrits et discours politiques," Oeuvres complètes, vol. III (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), p. 261.

13. Thus the statement of Captain Richard: "It is necessary indeed to regroup these people who are everywhere and nowhere; it is essential to render them vulnerable to our seizure. When we capture them, we shall be able to do many of the things which are impossible today and which will, perhaps, permit us to take possession of their minds once we have secured thier bodies." Capitaine Charles Richard, Étude sur l'insurrection du Dahra (1845-1846), pp. 140-190; as quoted by Hermassi, Leadership, p. 60.

14. It must be emphasized, however, that in the case of Cairo these transformations had already begun under Muḥammad ʿAli and his fourth successor, Ismāʿīl, both of whom adopted Western technology and methods of organization for puposes of obtaining greater control over their own people and greater autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. For a record of urban transformations in Cairo, see Janet A. Abu Lughud, _Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), esp. pp. 98-117; for colonial urbanism in Morocco, Jean Dethier, "Evolution of Concepts of Housing, Urbanism, and Country Planning in a Developing Country: Morocco, 1900-1972," _From Madina to Metropolis_, ed. Leon Carl Brown (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1973), pp. 197-243; for Tunis, Ibid., Leon Carl Brown, "Introduction," pp. 28-29.

15 Michael Gilsenan, _Recognizing Islam: An Anthropologist's Introduction_ (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 200-201; cf. Frantz Fanon, _The Wretched of the Earth_, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963), pp. 38-39; Abu Lughud, _Cairo_, p. 98; and Brown, "Introduction,", pp. 28-29.

16. _Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie pendant les années 1840, 1841, 1842, publié par l'ordre du gouvernement_, 39 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1844-1867).

17. Leo Africanus, _Description de l'Afrique_, trans. E. Epaulard (Paris: Mouton and Co., 1956), vol. I, pp. 34-35, 219.

18. Published at Leipzig, 1804; pp. 278-279.

19. See Chapter I, p. 34.

20. E. Quatremère, _Les Prolégomènes d'Ebn Khaldoun, texte arabe_, 3 vols. (Notices et Extraits, XVI, XVII, XVIII, Paris, 1858); W. de Slane, _Les Prolégomènes d'Ibn Khaldoun_, 3 vols. (Paris: Benjamin Duprat, 1863 ff); Ibn Khaldoun, _Histoire de l'Afrique sous la dynastie des Aghlabites, et de la la Sicile sous la domination musulmane_, trans. and ed. Noël Desvergers (Paris, 1841); Idem, _Histoire des Berbères et des dynasties musulmanes de l'Afrique septentrionale_, trans. de Slane, 2nd ed. Paul Casanova (Paris: Librairie orientaliste, 1925).

21. Under the patronage of the Grand Vizir Amčazade Köprülü Hüseyin Paşa, Naʿīma diagnosed the ills of the Ottoman State by combining Ibn Khaldūn's cyclical theory of history with Katip Çelebi's medical analogy, which compared the various elements of the state to the parts of the body; see Lewis V. Thomas, _A Study of Naima_, ed. Norman Itzkowitz (New York: New York University Press, 1972), esp. pp. 65-124. Ibn Haldun, _Mukaddime_ 2 vols., translated by Pīrīzade Meḥmet Sapr (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1275); see also _Islām Ansiklopedisi_, vol. 5:2 (Istanbul, 1950), pp. 740-1.

22. Albert Hourani, <u>Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939</u> (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 72.

23. Aziz Al-Azmeh, <u>Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship</u>, p. 56.

24. Alistair Horne, <u>A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962</u> (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 108-109.

25. Edmond Burke III, "The Sociology of Islam: The French Tradition," <u>Islamic Studies: A Tradition and its Problems</u>, ed. M.H. Kerr (Malibu, California: Undena Publications, 1980), p. 88.

26. E. Daumas, <u>Sahara algérien</u> (1848), published as Vol. 4 of <u>Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie</u>; E. de Neveu, <u>Khouan, ordres religieux chez les musulmans de l'Algérie</u>, 3ième éd. (Alger: A. Jourdan, 1913); also Burke, "The Sociology of Islam," p. 80.

27. <u>Études sur la Kabilie</u>, vol. 3 and 4; <u>Recherches</u>, vol. 9.

28. Al-Idrīsī (d. 1166) is known for a work of descriptive geography entitled <u>Kitāb Nuzhat al-mushtāq fī'Khtirāq al-āfāq</u>, completed in 1154 for Roger II, the Norman king of Sicily; the geographer al-Bakrī (d. 1094) is known for his <u>Kitāb al-massālik wa al-mamālik</u>.

29. Al-Azmeh, <u>Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship</u>, p. 199.

30. The method of philological source criticism can be traced back through Herder to Vico. It is perhaps best articulated in Niebuhr's treatment of Livy. See R.G. Collingwood, <u>The Idea of History</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 129-130.

31. E. Mercier, <u>Histoire de l'établissement des arabes dans l'Afrique septentionale selon les documents fournis par les auteurs arabes et notamment par l'Histoire des Berbères, d'Ibn Khaldoun</u> (Constantine: Chez L. Marle, 1873).

32. Ibid., pp. i, v.

33. G. Marçais, <u>Les arabes en Berbérie du Xe au XIVe siècle</u> (Constantine: D. Bahram, 1913), p. 4.

34. Mercier, <u>L'établissement des arabes</u>, p. 42.

35. Marçais, <u>Les arabes en Berbérie</u>, pp. 39-44, 689-690.

36. Ibn Khaldūn, <u>Histoire des Berbères</u>, trans. de Slane, vol. I, pp. 28-ff. The historiography of the Hilālī saga has been traced by Michael Brett in "Fitnat al-Qayrawān," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1970. Ibn Muyassar (d. 1278), author of <u>Kitāb Qudāt Miṣr</u>; Ibn Shaddād (d. 1108), author of <u>Kitāb al-Jamʿ wa al-Bayān fī ahkbār al-Maghrib wa al-Qayrawān</u>.

37. Ibn Khaldūn, <u>Histoire des Berbères</u>, vol. I, p. 34: " ... toutes les familles hilaliennes se précipitèrent sur l'Ifrīqia comme une nuée de sauterelles, abimant et détruisant tout ce qui se trouvait sur leur passage."

38. Carette, <u>Recherches</u>, p. 399.

39. Marçais, <u>La Berbérie musulmane et l'orient au moyen âge</u> (Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1946), p. 5.

40. Idem, <u>Les arabes en Berbérie</u>, pp. 62-64, 70-72.

41. Mercier, <u>Histoire du l'établissement des arabes</u>, pp. v-xiii.

42. Emile-Félix Gautier, <u>Les siècles obscurs du Maghreb: l'islamisation de l'Afrique du Nord</u> (Paris: Payot, 1927); Idem, <u>Le passé de l'Afrique du Nord: les siècles obscurs</u> (Paris: Payot:, 1952).

43. The background and components of Algerian nationalism are traced in Charles-André Julien <u>L'Afrique du Nord en marche: nationalismes musulmanes et souveraineté française</u> (Paris: René Julliard, 1952); David and Marina Ottaway, <u>Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist State</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); William Quandt, <u>Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968</u> (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969).

44. Ali Mérad, <u>Le reformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940</u> (Paris: Mouton et Cie., 1967).

45. Al-Azmeh, <u>Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship</u>, p. 218.

46. Michael Brett, "Ibn Khaldūn and the Arabisation of North Africa," <u>The Maghreb Review</u>, IV, 1 (January-Febuary, 1979), p. 4.

47. Ibid., pp. 9-10; for examples of genealogically oriented Hadīth see Muḥammad Ṭalbī, <u>L'Émirate Aghlabide</u> (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1966), pp. 19-20; for Shuʿubī literature Ignaz Goldziher, <u>Muslim Studies</u>, Vol. I, ed. S.M. Stern (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 137-198.

48. C. Becker [F. Rosenthal], "Ibn Balādhurī," <u>Encyclopaedia of Islam</u>, New Edition (1981), Vol. 1, pp. 971-2; also Franz Rosenthal, <u>A History of Muslim Historiography</u>, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), p. 96.

49. Ibid., Rosenthal gives as an example Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Rāzī's work on the genealogies of famous Spaniards: al-Istīʿāb fī ansāb ahl al-Andalus. He further suggests that it was in the Maghrib that historical material was first arranged according to ethnic group.

50. Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddima: An Introduction of History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), Vol. I, pp. 267-8; see also Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation, p. 15.

51. Ibid., p. 19.

52. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 128-9.

53. Gautier, Le passé de l'Afrique du nord, pp. 242-4.

54. Ibid., pp. 82, 425-34; idem, Les siècles obscurs, pp. 401, 410.

55. Idem, Le passé du l'Afrique du nord, pp. 95-102.

56. Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship, p. 211.

57. Gautier, Le passé de l'Afrique du nord, p. 114.

58. Ibid., p. 93; Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, vol. I, pp. 302-5.

59. Gautier, Le passé du l'Afrique du nord, pp. 110-113.

60. Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, vol. I, pp. 249-52.

61. Ibid., vol. II, pp. 309 ff.

62. W.M. de Slane, Les Prolégomènes d'Ibn Khaldūn, vol. I, p. 300, and passim.

63. Peter von Sivers has examined a series of revolts against the French which took place in south-eastern Algeria in the third quarter of the nineteenth century in his article "The Realm of Justice: Apocalytic Revolts in Algeria (1849-1879," Humaniora Islamica, I (1973), pp. 47-60. According to von Sivers, these revolts, unlike the "patriotic revolts" of ʿAbd al-Qādir and al-Moqranī, had their origins in the traditions of apocalyptic Mahdism, and therefore had a religious basis. Gautier's particular usage of the term ʿaṣabiyya may well have provided the colons with a tool with which to intelligibly structure the otherwise vague and incoherent notion of "Islamic Revolt."

64. Gautier, Le passé de l'Afrique du nord, p. 112.

65. Ibid., p. 93.

66. Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship, p. 211.

67. Gautier, Le passé du l'Afrique du nord, p. 119.

68. Ibid., p. 112; Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, vol. II, pp. 279-83.

69. Gautier, Le passé du l'Afrique du nord, p. 113.

70. Ibid., p. 114.

71. Ibid., p. 112.

72. Henri Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc: des origines à l'établissement du protectorat français, 2 vols. (Casablanca: Éditions Atlantique, 1949).

73. Ibid., vol. I, p. 409.

74. Ibid., p. 444.

75. Ibid., p. 423.

76. David M. Hart, "The French Contribution to the Social and Cultural Anthropology of North Africa: A Review and an Evaluation," Leonard Binder (ed.), The Study of the Middle East: Research and Scholarship in the Humanities and Social Sciences (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 220.

77. Adolphe Hanoteau and Ernest Letourneaux, Le Kabylie et les coutumes Kabyles, 2nd ed. (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1893). The origins and components of the "Kabyle myth" have been examined by Edward Burke III, "The Image of the Moroccan State in French Ethnological Literature: A New Look at Lyautey's Berber Policy," Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud (eds.), Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa (London: Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1973), pp. 175-199.

78. Ibid., p. 197.

79. Edmond Burke III, "A Comparative View of French Native Policies in Morocco and Syria," Middle Eastern Studies, 9 (1973), pp. 175-186.

80. For the Soviets see Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1967.), pp. 125-137, who discuss the Soviet effort to demarcate the Uzbeks, Kirgiz, et al. as separate and distinct peoples whose national identity has been suppressed in the past by the Tartar, Iranian, and Islamic tyrannies, and must not now be obscured by pan-Turkish, pan-Iranian, or pan-Islamic propaganda. For British India and the consolidation of Muslim-Hindu communalism, see Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 62, 79 ff.

81. It is interesting to note that Durkheim developed his notion of "social segmentation" and "mechanical solidarity" from Kabyle materials taken from Hanoteau and Letourneaux's Le Kabylie et les coutumes Kabyles; see D. Hart, "The French Contribution," p. 219.

82. Montagne was commissioned by Marshall Lyautey, architect of the Moroccan Protectorate, to travel among the Berbers of the High Atlas in order to gather information about their social and political organization for puposes of military intelligence. The result was his _Les Berbères et le makhzen dans le sud du Maroc, Essai sur la transformation politique des Berbères sédentaires (groupe Chleuh)_ (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1930). A shortened version of this work has been translated by David Seddon: _The Berbers: Their Social Origins and Political Organisation_ (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1973); for a good overview of colonial ethnography in Morocco, see ibid., pp. xiii-xxxix.

83. Ibid., p. 81.

84. Ibid., p. 78.

85. Terrasse, _Histoire du Maroc_, vol. 1, p. 27.

86. Roger Le Tourneau, _The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 111. Le Tourneau's colonial biases are evident in his article "North Africa: Rigorism and Bewilderment," in G. von Grunebaum (ed.), _Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 231-260.

87. Charles-André Julien, _Histoire de l'Afrique du nord: Tunisie, Algérie, Maroc_ (Paris: Payot, 1931); later revised by Roger Le Tourneau, translated by John Petrie, and edited by C.C. Stewart as _History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco_ (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

88. Ibid., p. x.

89. David C. Gordon, _Self-Determination and History in the Third World_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 165-167.

90. Ibid., p. 167, and Horne, _Savage War_, p. 196.

91. Julien, _History of North Africa_, p. 140.

92. Ibid., p. 341.

93. Ibid., p. 343.

94. Hady Roger Idris, _La Berbérie orientale sous les Zirides, Xe-XIIe siècles_ (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962).

95. Jamil M. Abun Nasr, _A History of the Maghrib_, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 12.

96. Ernest Gellner, "A Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam," Sociology of Religion, ed. Roland Robertson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 127-138. Gellner combines David Hume's thesis that there exists an oscillation between polytheistic and monotheistic forms of religion with what he understands to be Ibn Khaldūn's "tribal circulation of elites". The result is a "paradigm of the traditional Muslim state" which sees religious reformism (i.e., the reassertion of monotheism) as responsible for a political crystallization which leads to the replacement of the old dynasty by the new. In time, the "pendulum" once more swings back to its original position, and the process is repeated. Elbaki Hermassi, Leadership and Development, pp. 15-22.

97. Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib, p. 221.

Conclusion

Ibn Khaldūn has been the central axis around which the historiography of the medieval Maghrib has revolved. In many ways it could not have been otherwise: as the only full source available to us for this period ("les siècles obscurs") it has proven necessary that he be dealt with; in other words, that he be subordinated to categories of thought and modes of discourse alien to his own intellectual universe. It has been the purpose of this thesis to show how Ibn Khaldūn has been subordinated to the methods and conceptual paradigms of Orientalist historiography.

The paradigms, as we have seen, had their origins in the Middle Ages, when Islamdom constituted for Europe a severe ideological and military threat. Europe's response was to imbue Islam with an identity of otherness so as to create for itself the self-validating spaces of reason and righteousness. By depicting Islamic civilization as exotic and strange, Latin churchmen were able to create a conceptual distance between object and subject which worked to establish an inequality between the two. Here the basic tool was the polemic. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, this image of Islam as outsider was revalorized according to the techniques and methods of philology and historicism. Together they helped mold the intellectual underpinnings of the new science of Orientalism. The revalorization necessarily involved the "promulgation of implicit ideologies." The result was the

creation of an essentialist image which worked to confirm the civilizational otherness of Islam. To the extent that this image was consonant with the current scientific episteme, its central precepts went unquestioned. The simultaneous emergence of romantic Orientalism supported and further defined the main features of this image.

The birth of Orientalism coincided with Europe's move toward Afro-Asian hegemony; indeed, in so far as Orientalism and imperialism were products of the "Great Western Transmutation" which set Europe in an increasingly industrial, technological, and rationalistic direction, the two can be said to be related. But to simply state that Orientalism was, and still is, a tool of imperialism is to ignore the subtleties of the interchange between the two. Orientalism exposed the social and intellectual categories of Muslim societies as they were represented in the texts of the high culture. Only after the precepts culled from these categories had been imbued with the broad consensus of institutional authority could they be acted upon in the interests of colonial control, or used to create a controlling image for the ideological justification of the imperial venture. The Orientalist exposition of Ibn Khaldūn contributed to the functioning and maintenance of a controlling image which worked to define the essential features of the Islamic Maghrib. Following the manifest content of <u>Kitāb al-ʿIbar</u>, French historians such as Carette, Mercier, and Marçais tended to portray Maghribi society in terms of its presumed fossilization and decadence. With

Gautier and his successors, however, a new structural component was added to this earlier image which sought to explain the absence of effective government in the Maghrib in terms of Ibn Khaldūn's theory of the cyclical rise and fall of tribes. The motor force of the model was supplied by what was perceived to be an inherent incompatibility between nomadic and sedentary ways of life. The widely held notion that Ibn Khaldūn's Muqaddima was a "scientific" work written beyond the perimeters of what was properly "Islamic" worked to further confirm the validity of this structuration. It therefore followed that only under the aegis of the pax gallica could the Maghrib be liberated from this nefarious cycle and set on the way to European-style progress and development. Despite their intentions, liberals such as Julien were unable to escape the strictures of this image simply because the methods and over-all truth-value attached to the pronouncements of the Orientalist tradition would not allow for it. In effect, they were captives of a subtle, yet comprehensive "régime of truth" which circulated freely throughout the institutional matrix of the West.

In the face of this fusion of ideological and intellectual interests, it is not surprising that from the 1950's on there has been a systematic attempt to décoloniser l'histoire. The nationlist ideologues of the post-independent Maghrib have in particular been interested in initiating a "Copernican Revolution,"[1] a complete re-thinking of the colonial vulgate. For the most part their tone has been

apologetic, and the impetus behind their efforts based upon the effectation of what John Wansbrough has termed "the transvaluation of past deficiencies," characterized by attempts to impose positive or constructive interpretations upon events in Maghribi history "hitherto regarded by historians of North Africa either as disastrous or, at best, as unmistakable evidence of social and political decline."[2] In order to carry this transvaluation through, it has been necessary that Ibn Khaldūn be regarded in a new light. Thus we find ʿAlāl al-Fāsī, leader of the Moroccan Istiqlāl party, stating that "national consciousness existed in al-Maghrib before and after the advent of Islam. Evidence of deep-rooted nationalism may be discerned in the books of ʿIbn Jubayr, Ibn Khaldūn, in the poems of Ibn Hānī, and others."[3] Yet, despite al-Fāsī's invocation of Ibn Khaldūn as witness to an early-felt sense of nation, most nationalist ideologues have been afraid either to accept or to reject the received wisdom on Ibn Khaldūn:[4] rejection would imply the deflation of a cultural icon, the Islamic Maghrib's most famous native son; acceptance would be to admit that the French were right. Many, therefore, have chosen to ignore Ibn Khaldūn, and have concentrated instead upon the moments of glory without reference to the major historical reversals.

According to Edmond Burke III, the value of the revisionist apologies lies in their determined effort to break out of the old paradigms and ask new questions.[5] Many of their arguments have been pursued and further developed by

historians drawing upon the methods pioneered in the first decades of this century by the founders of <u>Annales</u>, Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, and Fernand Braudel, and by the Althuserian school of Marxism which seeks to go beyond historicist models like that of the Asiatic Mode of Production used, for example, by Yves Lacoste in his effort to explain the easy colonizability of the Maghrib.[6] At the heart of both schools of thought is a concern with the basic structures of social history, the former with the economic, social, and ecological contexts within which events occur, and the latter with the modes of production which govern the social foundations of any given society. More recently, these efforts to synthesize cultural, economic, and political considerations have been further developed by the anthropologists of the "Moroccan school," best represented by Clifford Geertz, whose method of "Thick Description" seeks to flush out the conceptual structures and systems of symbols which provide social existence with definition and meaning.[7]

Thus, when the national revisionists began to attack the belief that the Maghrib had been devastated by the Hilālī nomads as perpetuating an ideological justification for the continued French presence in the Maghrib,[8] their criticisms were further investigated by <u>Annales</u> inspired historians such as Claude Cahen, Jean Poncet, and Jacques Berque who found that the basic precepts of these criticisms could be substantiated.[9] Their arguments have revolved around three main points. First of all, they believe that the source

materials detailing the Hilālī invasion may not be entirely reliable: Ibn Khaldūn wrote over three hundred years after the event, and based his account upon authors whose anti-nomadic biases may have been at least partly conditioned by their membership in the urban official class. Second, the dichotomy between 'umrān badāwa and 'umrān ḥaḍāra, as it has been abstracted from Ibn Khaldūn, does not own up to the anthropological evidence which suggests that relations between town life and nomadism are governed by the symbiotic relationship "of two but intermittently workable economies attempting, according to season and circumstance, to feed off one another."[10] Furthermore, to see nomadism as an abstract agent of change explains nothing; for nomadism "has both conditions and causes. The former can well be natural ones, but the latter, its veritable motor force, are historical."[11] And third, what scanty economic evidence as we do have for the medieval period, such as the documents of the Fusṭāṭ geniza,[12] indicates that the urban decline of the Maghrib, and of Ifrīqiya in particular, was underway at least a century before the Hilālī incursions, and was possibly tied to larger geo-political factors extending throughout and even beyond the Mediterranean basin.

But our purpose is not to attempt any kind of analysis or detailed appraisal of these methodological and conceptual approaches; such a project would be well beyond the scope of this thesis. It is rather to make the point that each of them represents a self-conscious effort to break free of the

methods and paradigms of Orientalism. Historians of Muslim
societies have come to realize that the historical narrative
and theoretical framework of a medieval man (or any man for
that matter) cannot be regarded at face value as providing for
a window on reality, that the philological reading of a text
results in the creation of stable images which lend themselves
to ready appropriation by multifarious intellectual and
ideological schemes. They have come to realize that they must
extend their critical faculties to an investigation of the
intellectual and social circumstances in which a text is
enmeshed, an operation which necessarily involves the use of
techniques and concepts drawn from other disciplines. This is
the approach taken by Aziz Al-Azmeh, who tells us in the
preface of his reinterpretive study of Ibn Khaldūn that his
methods are largely "anthropological."[13] Historians must learn
to do the same.

But this is not to denigrate the entire worth and
importance of the Orientalist tradition. For despite the
abuses to which Orientalism has been put, we are indebted to
the foundations which it has laid. According to Leonard
Binder, Orientalists "have given us the basic outlines of
Islamic history, religion, and society" and have provided us
"with the basic hermeneutical frame of reference, the
intellectual and historical context which is the sine qua non
of understanding the worldly meaning of anything called
Islamic."[14] But as both a method and a paradigm for organizing
knowledge its usefulness has long been surpassed.

Notes to Conclusion

1. The term is used by Mohamed Chérif Sahli, Décoloniser l'histoire (Paris: Maspero, 1965).

2. John Wansbrough, "The Decolonization of North African History," Journal of African History, XI (1968), p. 644.

3. ʿAlāl al-Fāsī, The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954), p. 7.

4. Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, p. 221.

5. Edmond Burke III, "Towards a History of the Maghrib," p. 310.

6. Yves Lacoste, Ibn Khaldoun; naissance de l'histoire passé du tiers-monde (Paris: Maspero, 1966), chapter 1.

7. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3-30.

8. Sahli, Décoloniser l'histoire, pp. 78-86.

9. Claude Cahen, "Quelques notes sur les hilaliens et le nomadisme," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 11 (1968), pp. 130-133; Jean Poncet, "Le myth de la 'catastrophe' hilalienne," Annales, 22 (1967), pp. 1104-1112; Jacques Berque, "Du nouveau sur les Banī Hilāl?" Studia Islamica, 36 (1972), pp. 99-111.

10. Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed, p. 17; also Cahen, "Quelques notes," pp. 130ff.

11. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship: A Study in Orientalism, p. 214.

12. S.D. Goitein, "Medieval Tunisia: the Hub of the Mediterranean," Studies in Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), pp. 308-28.

13. Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation, p. x.

14. Leonard Binder, "Area Studies: A Critical Reassessment," in Leonard Binder (ed.), The Study of the Middle East: Research and Scholarship in the Humanities and Social Sciences (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp. 9-10.

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