THE TRIESTE CRISIS, 1953.

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Abstract

This study applies the ICB model of state behavior in international crisis to one actor, Italy, in the 1953 Trieste crisis. At the historical level it reconstructs in detail, through recently declassified American and Italian documents, the flow of events from mid-1951 until October 5, 1954 when the signing of the so-called Memorandum of Understanding of solved the Trieste question. At the theoretical level, it seeks to determine the impact of crisis-induced stress on the coping processes and choice patterns of Italian decision-makers. The findings confirm the major hypothesis (advanced by Holsti and George) about the stress-performance nexus, namely that "moderate" levels of stress improve decision-making performance while "high" stress might impair it. A modification of the definition of foreign policy crisis adopted by the ICB model is also suggested.

Résumé

Cette étude applique un modèle d'analyse des Etats en situation de crise internationale à l'Italie pendant la crise de Trieste, en 1953. Au plan historique, elle examine les événements depuis 1951 jusq'au "Memorandum of Understanding" du 5 octobre 1954, qui regla la question, à la lumière de documents américains et italiens rendus publics récemment. Au plan théorique, elle analyse les conséquences du stress découlant de la crise sur les processus décisionnels et les charactéristiques des décisions. Les résultats confirment l'hypothèse, avancée par Holsti et George, qu'un niveau modéré de stress contribue à une amélioration du processus décisionnel, alors qu'un niveau élevé conduit à sa détérioration. L'étude prone aussi une modification de la définition de crise du modèle ICB.

Miser Catulle, desinas ineptire
et quod vides perisse, perditum ducas.
(Catullus)

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INTRODUCTION

This study is an analysis of the behavior of Italian decision-makers in the foreign policy crisis over Trieste between August 1953 and January 1954. Its objective is threefold: to contribute to an understanding of state behavior in crisis, to further the study of Italian foreign policy, in general, and of Italian-American relations, in particular and to throw some new light on the history of the 1953 Trieste crisis. Although analytically distinct, these three aims are integrated in practice Thus, this is an attempt to combine historical research with political science theory building. [1]

The idea for this research originated in a paper written for a course on international crises The decision to pursue it further here was the result of two considerations my own intellectual interests and the opportunity to contribute to a larger research effort My research interests have concentrated in the area of post-World War II European comparative and international politics, in general, and around the issue of Italian-American relations, in particular Scholarly research on postwar Italian-American relations has only recently entered an exciting phase as diplomatic records have begun to be declassified So far it has, however, concentrated on American policies toward Italy. No systematic or theoretical attention has been devoted to the other half of this relationship, namely, Italian perceptions of, and actions toward, the United States [2]

A study of the 1953 Trieste crisis seemed a particularly appropriate way to begin to investigate this relatively forgotten half

of the relationship more in depth for at least two reasons. First, as one of the two occupying powers in Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), the Americans played a major role in the crisis. The Italians, in fact, singled them out as their major interlocutors in the effort to regain Trieste and the surrounding areas lost in the wake of World War II. Second, as Glenn Snyder has argued, a crisis is international relations condensed and magnified

> A crisis tends to highlight or force to the surface a wide range of factors and processes which are central to international politics in general. . . in a crisis they tend to leap out at the observer, to be combined and related in a revealing way, and to be sharply focused on a single well-defined issue [3]

This suggests that the dynamics of Italian-American relations could perhaps be captured effectively yet parsimoniously by looking at Italian behavior during the few months of the crisis.

A doctoral dissertation that examines a crisis should also represent at least a small contribution to crisis research. The proposition that several coordinated and cumulative studies are necessary (although perhaps not sufficient) milestones on "the long road to theory," is repeated ad nauseam in academic circles [4] Yet social science research, far from being a cooperative enterprise, still more closely resembles the landscape of a frontier town where lonely and rival prospectors work separately, jealously and suspiciously, each on his/her own claim. This situation, moreover, is largely self-reproducing because students are "socialized" in this atmosphere and are not encouraged to pursue team efforts. A single case study can best contribute to the development of theory if it is of the disciplined-configurative type and part of a structured focused project. that is, if it uses available general hypotheses to explain its outcome and is part of a series of studies employing the same interpretative model and asking the same general questions. [5]

The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project is a major enterprise of this kind in crisis research. [6] It has developed an interpretative model which is being applied to a large number of case studies. Each investigator draws upon the results of his/her case to

assess, elaborate or reformulate existing hypotheses about state behavior in crisis--thereby making a systematic contribution to the development of theory. The choice of the ICB model as the conceptual lens through which to examine the Trieste crisis makes it possible to tie this study to a larger ongoing research project, thereby making its contribution to theory development--at least potentially--more significant. Its choice also facilitates the attainment of the other main objective of the study. Since the ICB model focuses on decision-makers' activities, Italy's relationship with the United States can be explored without having to bring in an additional and completely different perspective. It will suffice to enlarge slightly the one used to investigate the crisis.

The question sometimes arises as to whether a disciplined-configurative case study is a somewhat mechanical enterprise and therefore particularly unsuitable to a doctoral dissertation, in which the student has an obligation to demonstrate his/her ability to make an original contribution to the development of science. The application of an existing interpretative model, however, does not prevent investigators from asking questions beyond those in the standard set provided by the model. They certainly are not restrained from throwing light on those idiosyncratic features of their case studies that are of interest in and of themselves if not useful for theory development. The choice of a model, in other words, does not necessarily imply its uncritical acceptance and slavish application. In the course of analysis the explanatory power of the model is assessed, its weaknesses (and strengths) are evidenced and changes are suggested. The model can be recommended, reformulated or discarded. Models conceivably can be, and occasionally have been, applied solely to make apparent their shortcomings and/or the built-in assumptions deriving from the particular brand of philosophy of the social sciences on which they are based. In short, the choice of an existing model, as opposed to the development of a new one, does not necessarily put a limit on creativity or imagination

Besides contributing to the ICB effort in crisis research and exploring Italian-American relations from the Italian side, this study throws some new light on a third area, the history of the 1953 Trieste crisis itself. Until now, the 1953 crisis has received relatively scant attention as merely one episode within the larger context of the territorial conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia which lasted from 1943 to 1954. This is true of the books by Janko Jeri (the first historical account of the diplomatic struggle for Trieste), [7] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (a historical account and theoretical analysis of the conflict), [8] Bogdan Novak (a socio-economic and political history of the Trieste question with a strong focus on local events), [9] Roberto Rabel (a study of Trieste as a bone of contention in the Cold War) [10] and Giampaolo Valdevit (an analysis of Allied wartime policy toward, and postwar administration of, Trieste within the context of the changing international environment). [11] Moreover, Jeri and Novak relied exclusively on secondary sources Duroselle conducted interviews with many people involved in the conflict and had access to some French, Yugoslav and Italian documents. Rabel used American archival documents but only for the period up to 1952, while Valdevit utilized almost exclusively British documents. The work of Diego De Castro deserves special mention. Although he too has treated the crisis as just another occurrence in the conflict, the sheer size of his work makes it the most complete historical account to date. He relied on his own recollections and documents gathered while serving as the Italian Political Advisor to the Allied Military Government (AMG) of the FTT from 1952 to 1954, as well as on those he was able to obtain through a special Minister's permit from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He does not, however, use any Allied documents. [12] In addition, other diplomats have touched upon the crisis in their memoirs [13]

This study is the first to concentrate on the crisis itself and to use American primary sources, mainly the diplomatic correspondence between the State Department and its foreign service posts in Rome, Belgrade, London, Paris and Trieste [14] It also uses Italian archival

documents reported in De Castro's book as well as the yet unpublished journal of, and an interview with, Paolo Emilio Taviani, who was minister of defense during the crisis and is today the only surviving member of the Italian decision-making unit. This is therefore the first investigation based on combined sources. It provides a new look not only at the crisis events but also at some of the most significant episodes of the whole conflict.

According to the ICB definition, which will be given below, the Italian foreign policy crisis over Trieste started on the evening of August 28, 1953 and lasted until January 11, 1954. [15] One of the specificities of this crisis is that it occurred at the end of a protracted conflict of which it represents the most intense phase. [16] At the same time, the abatement of the crisis laid the groundwork for the resolution of the conflict, itself. This tight interconnection provides, I think, a unique opportunity to enlarge the scope of the ICB model--whose central objective is that of identifying the specificities, if any, of crisis decision-making--by making it possible to compare crisis decision-making with noncrisis decision-making on the same issue. I have thus devoted the same attention to the two conflict periods immediately preceding and following the crisis (September 1, 1951 to August 28, 1953 and January 11 to October 5, 1954) as I have to the crisis itself. This seemed particularly advisable, as a number of primary sources were available for the first time on both of these periods, thus allowing new light to be shed on them.

The organization of this study follows closely that of other vertical studies of the ICB project. Chapter One will review the literature on crisis and situate the ICB model within it. I will then set the stage for a close examination of the crisis. Chapter Two will retrace the genesis and main developments of the Trieste question up to mid-1951; that is, the end of what Duroselle and De Castro have called the static phase of the conflict. Chapter Three will look at the Italian decision flow during what these authors have defined as the dynamic phase of the conflict, which represents a prelude to the actual

crisis. Chapters Four through Six will focus on the Italian decision flow during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods, respectively. Chapter Seven will deal with the London Conference; that is, the epilogue to the crisis as well as the resolution of the conflict. At the beginning of each of these five chapters Italian decision-makers will be identified and their psychological environment during the events covered in the chapter explored. The main specificity of Italian behavior in the Trieste crisis was that almost all Italian activity was directed toward the Allies: France, Britain and particularly the United States. (It should be pointed out here that throughout this study the words "Allies" and "Allied" always refer to these three countries and not to the entire coalition fighting the Axis powers in World War II). This was due to the fact that the Allies were in control of the most important part of the territory under dispute as well as to the choice of Italian decision-makers not to deal directly with their Yugoslav counterparts but to have the Allies do so on their behalf. As a consequence, much attention is devoted to Allied activity. Thus, besides unraveling the flow of events, these five chapters also provide a close look at the dynamics of inter-Allied relations in the early 1950s. Chapter Eight will report the findings on crisis and coping, which will be presented largely as answers to the research questions posed by the ICB model. This chapter will also assess hypotheses derived from other cases in the ICB Project and the literature on crisis. It will be followed by some concluding remarks.

All localities in the territories concerned have at least a dual name: Italian and Slovenian or Croatian. In my text, I have used the Italian name if the city is today part of Italy and the Slovenian or Croatian one if the city is now part of Yugoslavia. The first time the name of the city or place is mentioned, I have also indicated the corresponding name in the other language.

Notes to Introduction

1. The use of historical data for political science theory building is nothing new, of course. As recently noted by Ole R. Holsti, however, true 'joint ventures,' as it were, between diplomatic historians and political scientists who specialize in international relations (or even a combination of the two disciplines by the same scholar) are, very rare. Holsti encourages interdisciplinary cooperation because a great deal about the validity of political science models could thus be learned ("Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 13, 1, Winter 1989, pp. 15-43 and "The Political Psychology of International Politics: More than a Luxury," Political Psychology 10, 3, 1989, pp. 495-500). The same call has been made by historian John Lewis Gaddis: "What we need is a data base that would be equally relevant to the respective concerns of historians, political scientists and policy-makers, from which hypotheses could be constructed and tested, and on the basis of which we could begin a sustained dialogue among all three groups". "This data base," Gaddis has noted, "already exists ... it is called ... 'the archives'" ("Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," International Security 12, 1, Summer 1987, pp. 3-21 at p. 15).

2. Besides their greater relative importance (American policies have been usually regarded as the most important variable in postwar Italian political and economic reconstruction) this imbalance is also explained by the fact that American documents have been more readily available than Italian ones. Until recently the main source for a study of Italian perceptions of, and actions toward the United Stated were the memoirs of former Italian ambassadors in Washington--most notably, Alberto Tarchiani (Dieci anni fra Roma e Washington, Verona: Mondadori, 1955) and Egidio Ortona (Anni d'America: la ricostruzione 1944-1951, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984, and Anni d'America: la diplomazia 1953-1961, Bologna· Il Mulino, 1986) This situation is slowly starting to change as Italian authorities are becoming increasingly more willing to grant access to public records to scholars interested in the immediate postwar period. Although Italy does not yet have a Freedom of Information Act, the attitude of authorities has come a long way from the one betrayed by Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti in 1912 when, refusing to release some documents on the Risorgimento, he remarked that "it was not right to have beautiful legends discredited by historical criticism" (quoted in Richard Bosworth, Italy and the Approach of the First World War, London. MacMillan, 1983, p 29). Some scholars have already used American documents in conjunction with those they have been able to obtain from the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to shed some

light on Italian-American relations in this period, usually with reference to some limited and well defined issues All of them, however, have adopted a traditional historical approach No attempt has been made, in other words, to develop an interpretative model and formulate hypotheses which could be tested in other case studies For these examples as well as the larger body of literature on American policies toward Italy see the section on "American-Italian relations" in the bibliography at the end of this study.

3. Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining" in Charles F. Hermann, ed , International Crisis Insights from Behavioral Research, New York. Free Press, 1972, p 217.

4. See, for instance, Fred W Neal and Bruce D. Hamlett, "The Never-Never Land of International Relations" (International Studies Quarterly 13, 3, Sept 1969, pp. 281-305) and Stanley Hoffman, "International Relations: The long road to theory" (World Politics 11, 3, April 1959, pp 346-377).

5. Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The method of structured-focused comparison" in Paul G Lauren, ed , Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, New York. Free Press, 1979, pp 43-58

6. See J. L. Richardson, "New Insights on International Crises" (Review of International Studies, 14, 4, Oct. 1988, pp 309-316).

7. Janko Jeri, Tržaško Vprašanje po Drugi Svetovni Vojni Tri faze diplomatskega boja, Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Založba, 1961 The crisis period is dealt with on pp 262-281. This volume has an English summary of the Slovenian text

8. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Le Conflit de Trieste, 1943-1954, Brussels: Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1966. For the crisis period see pp 379-406 See also, by the same author, "Le Règlement du Conflit de Trieste" in Revue Française de Science Politique 19,6 (Dec 1969), pp 1222-1231.

9. Bogdan C. Novak, Trieste 1941-1954: The Ethnic, Political and Ideological Struggle, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970 For the 1953 crisis see pp. 418-450.

10. Roberto G. Rabel, Between East and West: Trieste, the United States and the Cold War, 1943-1954, Durham. Duke Univ Press, 1988. (subsequent quotations from Rabel refer to his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Duke University, 1984) Rabel's perspective necessarily leads him to concentrate on the 1945-48 period. Some passing remarks concerning the crisis period are at pp. 295-305.

11. Giampaolo Valdevit, La Questione di Trieste 1941-1954 Politica internazionale e contesto locale, Milan. Franco Angeli, 1986 The 1953 crisis is briefly covered at pp 258-270

12. Diego De Castro, La Questione di Trieste l'azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954, 2 vols , Trieste Edizioni Lint, 1981. This work is usually referred to as the "Trieste Bible," not only because of the thoroughness of De Castro's treatment of the subject matter and the incredible wealth of detail he amassed, but also because of an almost religious love he has professed for his native land Notwithstanding his partisan bias on the subject and his intimate connection with the events, De Castro's work, which he modestly calls "a personal narrative," is an admirable scholarly enterprise It must be pointed out,

however, that his exclusive reliance on Italian documents necessarily leads his work to be skewed toward the Italian point of view (a fact he himself acknowledges at p 292 of the first volume) and therefore to recount certain events and accept some arguments rather uncritically Originally conceived as a mere follow-up to his Il Problema di Trieste. Genesi e sviluppi della questione giuliana in relazione agli avvenimenti internazionali 1943-1952 (Bologna. Cappelli, 1953), he ended up rewriting it. The crisis period is dealt with in vol. 2, pp. 527-796

13. Most important among these is the one written by Alberto Tarchiani (op cit.), at the time Italian ambassador to Washington. Although half of the book is devoted to the Trieste question, only a few pages (283-297) deal with the crisis period Egidio Ortona, then a junior officer in charge of economic affairs at the Italian embassy in Washington, recounted a few episodes from those hectic days in the second volume of his memoirs (op. cit , pp. 46-51). Alvise Savorgnan di Brazzá, a resistance leader and NATO employee during the crisis, made some passing references to the event as seen from his observation post (La Veritá su Trieste: una cronistoria, una denuncia, una proposta, Trieste· Edizioni Lint, 1980, pp 145-150). Finally, Giulio C. Re, spokesman for Prime Minister Pella, devoted a few pages of his chronicle of the Pella government to Trieste (Fine di una politica. momenti drammatici della democrazia italiana, Bologna· Capelli, 1971, pp 186-240).

14. These documents were, for the most part, declassified between 1984 and 1986 The most important among them are scheduled for publication in vol VIII of Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1952-1954 series. I spent the month of October 1986 and a week in November 1987 doing research at the National Archives in Washington D C and the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, MD. I would like to thank Mr. John Butler of the Records Center for his kind guidance and assistance.

15. These dates vary according to the definition of crisis one chooses to adopt. Russel J. Leng and J. David Singer, for instance ("Militarized Interstate Crises: the BCOW typology and its application", International Studies Quarterly 32, 2, June 1988, pp 155-173), base their definition of "militarized interstate crisis" on variations in the observed dispute behavior of the participants rather than their perceptions. Thus, for them, the Trieste crisis lasted from July 16, 1953 to October 5, 1954.

16. May 1-9, 1945 was another intense phase in the Trieste conflict. It was indeed another foreign policy crisis. The main protagonists at the time, however, were the United States and Great Britain on one side and Yugoslavia on the other. Italy, although clearly interested in the outcome, could not play a major role at the time because the country was under Allied military rule and had no autonomy. Although starting at the end of World War I and ending only in October 1954, the Italian-Yugoslav conflict was not a "protracted conflict" of the type theorized by Edward E Azar. By the same token, the Trieste crisis lacks almost all the attributes which have been identified as characteristic of crises in protracted conflicts On the concept of "protracted conflict" see Edward E. Azar, Paul Jureidini and Ronald McLaurin, "Protracted Social Conflict Theory and Practice in the Middle East" (Journal of Palestine Studies 8, 1, 1978, pp. 41-60), Edward E Azar and Nadia Farah, "The Structure of Inequalities and Protracted Social Conflict A Theoretical Framework" (International Interactions 7, 4, 1981, pp 317-335) and Edward E Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions" (ibid 12, 1, 1985, pp 59-70). On crises in protracted conflicts see Michael Brecher, "International Crises and Protracted Conflicts" (ibid 11, 3-4, 1984, pp. 237-297) and

Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Crisis, Conflict and Instability (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989, chs. 9-11).

1. CRISIS RESEARCH AND THE ICB MODEL

Crisis Research: A Review and an Assessment

Despite the amount and variety of literature that crisis research has produced, particularly in the last two decades, a theory of international crisis has yet to be developed. [1] This, however, is not at all surprising. A general theory that would account for the events leading to, the behavioral patterns during and the consequences of an international crisis is admittedly not easy to develop, if possible at all. The difficulty of the task is compounded by the fact that a number of different approaches, each adopting a different conceptual framework, compete in the field--making cumulation of knowledge difficult and progress very slow. [2]

This situation is well evidenced by the existing disagreement among scholars about the concept of international crisis itself. There are those who define an international crisis in terms of the interaction process between two or more states. Others define it in terms of the decision-making process within a state. Leaving aside the unavoidable differences in definitional details, the former substantially agree on viewing an international crisis as a systemic phenomenon involving an objective departure from the normal interaction patterns between two or more states. The latter, conversely, are essentially united in regarding a crisis as a situation which creates a perceived threat to

basic values of the decision-makers of a state to which a responsive decision is considered necessary. [3] Briefly, an antinomy exists between what have, respectively, been described as the macro, systemic or inter-unit and the micro, situational or intra-unit approaches. An early example of the first type of definition was formulated by Charles McClelland:

> A crisis is a "change of state" in the flow of international political actions ... an identifiable departure from a pre-existing and temporary status quo in the stream of events of international relations

An instance of the second type is offered by Charles Hermann

> A crisis is a situation that 1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, 2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and 3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence. [4]

These definitional differences are only reflections of the underlying differences in interest that scholars have when approaching the study of international crises. Thus, while the major--albeit not exclusive--concern of those who adopt the first approach is crisis anticipation, the central interest of those who subscribe to the second lies in the process by which decisions are made under crisis conditions. The two approaches, although complementary rather than competitive, are not, after all, equally suitable for the same research tasks, each lends itself to explore certain types of questions better than others.

A brief look at the literature concerned with crisis anticipation reveals, for instance, that scholars adopting a system-level approach have made some progress. Starting from McClelland's proposition that international crises are marked by an "unusual volume and intensity of events," they have developed increasingly sophisticated although not always reliable crisis forecasting techniques based, for the most part, on event interaction analysis. [5] Those subscribing to the unit-level approach, on the contrary, can hardly boast any success at all. With the exception of a few efforts by Hermann and Raphael, [6] rather than attempting to develop a model of crisis prediction they have concentrated on exploring individual cognitive limitations and organizational-bureaucratic constraints as reasons for failures in

crisis anticipation. [7]

The crisis behavior literature is dominated, as one would expect, by scholars adopting the unit-level approach. Their major concern, which is based on the assumption that the decision-making process varies according to the "occasion for decision" [8] or "situation," [9] is to explore the ways decisions are taken during a crisis. A related, although all too often unspecified, assumption is that crisis decision-making differs from noncrisis decision-making in being defective or, in any case, less analytical. Establishing the shortcomings of crisis decision-making therefore would provide valuable policy suggestions for the management of crises and, supposedly, help prevent violence and war.

Although crisis behavior is an area of research which has received considerable attention, knowledge about crisis decision-making is still the subject of controversy. This, however, is not surprising given that most of the literature on crisis behavior consists of single case studies approached from very different perspectives. After the attempts by Glenn Paige to apply the comprehensive but cumbersome decision-making framework developed by Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, [10] research on crisis behavior has become increasingly fragmented--most scholars analyzing or assessing the relative importance of different inputs and/or focusing on different aspects of the decision process.

Thus, Glenn Snyder considered the impact of system structure on the decision process, [11] while Andrew Semmel and Dean Minix, building on the work of Irving Janis, tried to assess the influence of small-group setting on crisis decision-making, with particular reference to risk-taking [12] Richard Betts examined another element of crisis decision-making, the role of military advice and influence on the use of force His analysis was limited, moreover, to American Cold War crises. [13] Others focused on the impact of "personality traits" on the decision-making process [14] Considerable attention has been devoted to the role of perceptions Alexander George, Steven Hoagland and Stephen Walker examined the nexus between decision-makers' "operational codes"

and their crisis behavior, [15] while Lawrence Falkowski looked at the connection between the "memory profiles" of American Presidents and Secretaries of State and their abilities to adopt flexible courses of action when faced with crisis situations [16] The scholars contributing to the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration utilized a mediated stimulus-response model in which perceptions were the key variable in explaining the behavior of states in the crisis leading to World War I [17] In these studies, the effects of stress (defined by Ole Holsti as "the result of a situation that threatens important goals and values") upon decision-making was often examined with particular regard to definition of the situation, perception of hostility, time pressure, communication and information processing and the identification of alternative courses of action [18] Some of the hypotheses developed in the Stanford Studies were occasionally tested by other scholars There was, however, only a rare attempt to replicate the same effort with respect to other crises [19]

Scholars who have looked at the process of crisis decision-making as a whole (as opposed to focusing on only one or some aspects of it) have seen it through the different conceptual lenses provided by the analytic, cybernetic, bureaucratic and cognitive models [20] The analytic (or rational, as it is sometimes called) model posits that decision-makers, after correctly interpreting all available information, are able to identify all possible alternative courses of action and choose that behavior which has the greatest expected utility They calculate this by multiplying the subjective value of each possible outcome of an action by the perceived probability that it will occur Finally, they are also expected to revise their estimates each time during the process that new information becomes available This is the model implicitly used by all traditional historians--as well as by bargaining and deterrence/compellence scholars In a recent horizontal study of one hundred thirty-five crises occurring between 1836 and 1973, Walter Petersen has concluded that his "findings provide strong support for the argument that decisions during crisis are based on expected

utility calculations." [21] The same conclusion has been reached by Zeev Maoz, in a study of the decision to raid Entebbe. [22] They do not claim, however, that decision-makers explicitly make all the calculations posited by the model. Nor could they, since records have yet to be found that reveal this to be the case. Rather, both Petersen and Maoz argue that decision-makers intuitively, and in a qualitative fashion, approximate the kind of decision process required by the analytic model. It remains to be seen how much Petersen's conclusions have been influenced by his operationalization of the model, and those of Maoz by the discriminating questionnaire used in his interviews with the principal decision-makers and the conversion of verbal estimates and value or preference judgments into numerical values. After all, analytic decision processes do not seem to prevail even in the case of highly technical decisions with which they have until now usually been associated. [23]

According to the cybernetic or organizational model, choice is the result of standard operating procedures which decision-makers perform in sequence while monitoring a few feedback variables. It need not be conceptualized in advance but, rather, is arrived at and is satisficing rather than optimizing. [24] This model is used primarily to explain routine, non-emergency political decisions. Since an international crisis is, for the most part, regarded as an extraordinary situation during which usual decision-making patterns are disrupted, one would be tempted to conclude that crisis decision-making does not easily fit this model Yet, Graham Allison has shown that it could be used to explain American and Soviet behavior in the Cuban missile crisis, while Leo Hazlewood, John Hayes and James Brownell, Jr., in a study of the U.S. Department of Defense behavior since 1945, have pointed out that during crises such behavior tends to follow a pre-programmed route. [25]

The bureaucratic model looks at choice as the result of bargaining among players, both individuals and agencies positioned hierarchically in the executive branch Bargaining, moreover, is further affected by the existing standard organizational processes. [26] Again, one would

expect such a model to play little or no role in crisis decision-making, yet Allison has successfully employed it to analyze behavior in the Cuban crisis. [27]

Finally, the cognitive model maintains that the perceptual grids of individual decision makers play a critical role in the shaping of decisions. Borrowing heavily from the fields of cognitive and social psychology, the model suggests that the process of decision-making, far from being analytic, is punctuated by psychological biases Thus the search for alternatives is not exhaustive but limited to options which are consistent with the belief systems of the decision-makers Information processing is faulty: supporting evidence is overestimated while the discrepant is either ignored or discredited. Options are evaluated on a single, most important value dimension Choice, therefore, maximizes this single value [28] Cognitive limitations, moreover, are supposed to become even more severe in decision-making under crisis conditions because of psychological stress. [29] Different studies of crisis decision-making have indeed found reduced complexity in information processing, particularly the tendency to integrate new information into preexisting belief structures, inadequate search for alternative courses of action, faulty evaluation of consequences, lack of value integration and, in short, the whole array of biases and shortcomings that cognitive scholars expected to find. [30]

After showing that the three models (the cognitive one being omitted) could all be applied, Allison pointed out in the conclusion of his study that "none of the three analyses simply described events In attempting to explain what happened, each distinguished certain features as the relevant determinants " He also warned, as some philosophers of the social sciences have repeatedly done, that

> these conceptual models are much more than simple angles of vision or approaches Each conceptual framework consists of a cluster of assumptions and categories that influence what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer [31]

What Allison seemed to be suggesting was not that these models should be discarded because they were simply ideology in disguise or useless as

analytic tools but, rather, that they were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Decision-making is, after all, a complicated process. The fact that each of the models captures some aspects of it seems to indicate that analytic logic, standard operating procedures, bureaucratic forces and individual cognitive limitations all play a role. [32]

It was probably as a result of these considerations that Janice Stein and Raymond Tanter chose to break down the decision process into five phases (diagnosis, search, estimation and revision, evaluation and choice), developing what they called "multiple paths to choice" depending on which of the three models prevailed in each phase (the bureaucratic one being omitted). This revised, or integrated, model of decision-making was then used to explore Israel's security choices in 1967. [33] Although interesting, their effort has remained isolated and (to my knowledge, at least) has not been applied to any other case.

Finally, a number of book-length studies should be mentioned. Although obviously building on and linked to the literature in the field, they are not part of any coordinated research effort and could perhaps best be described (in no derogatory way, however) as lonely fishing expeditions. In 1967, Oran Young explored the role of intermediaries, and of the United Nations in particular, in international crises. Although he clearly subscribed to a system-level definition of crisis, his sphere of inquiry spilled over into a field usually reserved for the unit-level scholars. Thus, in exploring the bargaining process between crisis actors a year later he revised his definition to include unit-level elements. This confusion at the definitional level was but a reflection of the infancy of crisis research in that period. Young himself conceived of his works primarily as contributions to the fields of conflict and strategic studies, respectively. Both works, moreover, were primarily efforts in abstract conceptualization and generalization rather than empirical studies. Historical examples were certainly used, but more as illustrations than as evidence [34]

In the 1970s different authors utilized a combination of system and unit level approaches to address a number of questions about different crises or groups of crises. Thus, Tanter looked at the Berlin crisis in an attempt to assess the relative potency of what he defined as event/interactions (actually a mediated stimulus-response model) and organizational processes (decision-making) in explaining the level and intensity of East-West conflict. [35] Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing looked at bargaining, decision-making and system structure in sixteen international crises from 1898 to 1973. Some of their hypotheses on bargaining were later tested by Russell J. Leng. [36] Alexander George and Richard Smoke focused on American deterrence in eleven crises between 1948 and 1962 [37] None of these works was conceived exclusively or even primarily as a contribution to crisis research Tanter's was primarily a study of East-West conflict. Snyder and Diesing wrote that their aim was to contribute to "systems, bargaining and decision-making theories using crises as an empirical source for the testing, revision, augmentation and synthesis" of hypotheses Hence crisis was more a means than an end of their analysis. George and Smoke intended to contribute to deterrence theory (until then largely normative-prescriptive) by making it historical-explanatory; that is, by paying systematic attention to historical cases of deterrence. [38]

Others adopted the unit level approach. Thomas Halper, for instance, looked at American decision-makers' perceptions in six postwar crises in order to determine their definitions of crisis, their relation to public opinion, and the factors most likely to distort their perception. [39] Richard Lebow, although primarily interested in exploring the relationship between crisis and the underlying pattern of conflict, focused his attention on the process of crisis decision-making. He examined twenty-six crises in which at least one of the protagonists was a great power. [40] John Oneal did the same with respect to the Iranian crisis of 1946, the Greek Civil War and the Berlin Blockade in order to determine the impact of crisis on the structure, process and content of American foreign policy-making [41]

Still others limited themselves to the development of initial conceptual frameworks or a critical summarization of the literature. [42]

The result of this eclectic and unsystematic approach to crisis research has been the proliferation of a number of different, and often competing, hypotheses which, for the most part, have not met any further test--thus making advancement toward even a limited theory of international crisis difficult, if not impossible. [43] On the question of the impact of stress on the quality of decision-making, for instance, disagreement still exists about the specific effects of stress on the various stages of the decision process. Thus, while some analysts have found evidence that stress reduces the search for information and policy options, others have suggested that search under crisis conditions tends to be more thorough and extensive. [44] Some studies have pointed out that the level of stress is inversely related to the number of alternative policy options considered, while others have reached the opposite conclusion. The same is true for what concerns the relationship between stress and the ability of decision-makers to identify and evaluate consequences and choose between different policy options. [45]

Given this state of affairs it is not surprising that the policy suggestions crisis scholars have offered have been both various and at variance. [46] This is somewhat troubling--at least for those who think that the role of science should be also that of providing instrumental guidance to policy--as quality of the decision-making process seems related to crisis outcome. A vigilant approach to problem solving, in other words, would appear to result in decisions that better attain policy makers' goals. [47] Disagreement, moreover, is not limited to the supposed effect of stress on the different phases of the decision process. On occasion, the fundamental question of whether stress has an impact at all (i.e , whether decision-making in a crisis situation differs from decision-making in a noncrisis situation) has been raised. Recently, for instance, Ariel Levi and Philip Tetlock have stated that their findings with regard to the 1941 Japanese decision for war "cast

doubt on the generality of the disruptive stress hypothesis for explaining how crises affect the quality of decision making." [48] There is no reason, however, to expect--as Levi and Tetlock seem to imply--that stress should "disrupt" decision-making processes in each and every case and in the same manner. The relationship between stress and the quality of decision-making could, for instance, be curvilinear rather than linear. A low or moderate level of stress, in other words, could improve decisional performance while higher levels could adversely effect it. Even the staunchest advocates of a method for the social sciences modelled after that of the natural ones do recognize, after all, that in the social sciences the task is not to uncover (nonexistent) laws but to establish some reliable tendency or probability propositions. This obviously requires extensive testing of the same propositions across multiple cases--a task for which the method of "structured focused comparison" seems eminently suited [49]

It is with the aim of fulfilling this need for a more systematic crisis research strategy, thereby contributing some guidance to crisis management, that the ICB Project was conceived. Its final objective is the creation of a theory of state behavior in international crisis--what could properly be defined as a "theory of the middle-range" situated between "abstract empiricism" and "grand theory." [50] To this end, after the compilation of a long list of international crises (the ICB data bank currently contains data on all international crises between 1918 and 1988), the ICB Project has engaged in both "horizontal" and "vertical" research. The former has required the collection of comparable data on all crises and crisis actors during the aforementioned period, while the latter has called for the application of the ICB model to a sample of both. The first goals have been the discovery of crisis patterns and the generation of new hypotheses about state behavior in crisis. [51] The data collected in the "horizontal" segment of the project are then used to test hypotheses advanced in the "vertical" segment as well as to generate new ones. These are then also assessed in new in-depth case studies. The ICB Project therefore uses a

two-pronged research (and reporting) strategy. Its two parts are, however, synchronized and thus represent the first concrete attempt to integrate the unit and system level approaches to crisis research. Until now, efforts to bridge the two approaches had focused on the definition of crisis. Thus James McCormick had simply added the systemic and unit level definitions, while Patricia Close had suggested that a crisis be defined as a state of uncertainty-induced stress. Since the concepts of stress and uncertainty are used at both levels of analysis, she argued that crises could then be investigated operationally through the research procedures of either approach. [52] In the ICB Project, instead, unit and system level crises, while defined separately, are linked as parallel phenomena. In accordance with Phil Williams' suggestion that, to avoid confusion, a system level crisis be called an "international crisis" while a unit level one be referred to as a "foreign policy crisis," the ICB Project has framed the following definitions:

> An international crisis is a situational change characterized by two necessary and sufficient conditions: 1) distortion in the type and an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more adversaries with an accompanying high probability of military hostilities, or, during a war, an adverse change in the military balance; and 2) a challenge to the existing structure of an international system--global, dominant or subsystem--posed by the higher-than-normal conflictual interactions.
>
> A foreign policy crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in a state's external or internal environment. All three are perceptions held by the highest level decision makers of the actor concerned: a threat to basic values, along with the awareness of finite time for response to the external value threat, and a high probability of involvement in military hostilities

An international crisis is thus defined on the basis of objective, behavioral data about conflictual interaction among states within an international system. A foreign policy crisis is subjective in focus. It is derived from the perceptions of threat, finite time and probability of involvement in military hostilities of the decision makers of the state in question. The two phenomena are, however, linked because an international crisis which erupts with a disturbance in the international system creates a foreign policy crisis for one or more

individual states. [53]

It is perhaps worthwhile to dwell briefly on the epistemological significance of this dual methodology. Traditionally, case studies, which alone cannot establish propositions about uniformities in behavior, have nevertheless been regarded as useful in the scientific enterprise because they can stimulate the production of hypotheses about possible regularities. They also provide a richer context in which to test and reject propositions derived from correlational analyses, even those strongly supported by high correlations. [54] Confidence in hypotheses repeatedly supported by case studies is increased because these deal, as Edwin Bock has pointed out, "with action, dynamic consequences and relationships, not with statistical analysis." [55] A case study, in other words, can recreate with some accuracy the complex world in which events occurred. The intentions, interpretations and perspectives of the decision-makers, and not simply their sterilized, dichotomized and coded actions, become an integral part of the analysis Although Bock has alluded to the complementarity of these two methodologies, he has not explored the epistemological implications of his intuition.

Recent research in the philosophy of the social sciences points increasingly to the conclusion that a critical, postpositivistic social science must be based on an alternative methodology that not only incorporates but transcends empirical data by interpreting their meaning in the specific context of action. The notion of "explanation," in other words, is increasingly coming to be regarded as presupposing that of "understanding," which consequently is regaining legitimacy as a necessary component of scientific enterprise As Anthony Giddens has concisely put it: "Qualitative and quantitative methods should be seen as complementary rather than antagonistic aspects of social research." From an operational point of view this means that social scientists must combine the method of hermeneutical understanding with that of nomological explanation. [56]

The two-pronged research strategy adopted by the ICB Project would

seem to represent a concrete step in this direction. In its horizontal segment, the ICB Project maps out correlations between various crisis, state and societal variables with the addition of control for system-level, power, cultural, historical and geographical variables. In its vertical segment, it engages in what could be regarded as hermeneutical understanding by the reconstruction of the decision-makers' perceptual horizons and the crisis action processes. Both segments interact with one another to qualify and refine their respective findings. [57] This study of the behavior of Italian decision-makers in the Trieste crisis can thus be seen as a contribution to the "vertical" segment of the ICB Project. [58]

The ICB Model

Each vertical in-depth case study in the ICB Project, including this one, is guided by the micro-level definition of crisis (foreign policy crisis) quoted above. This definition--it should be pointed out--builds upon and further refines previously established and largely accepted micro-level definitions of crisis, most notably the one originally advanced by Robinson and subsequently developed by Hermann. Modifications have been made as a result of findings which pointed out deficiencies in the previous definitions, primarily the absence of "surprise" as a general attribute of crisis. [59]

The ICB model developed from a conceptual framework for research on foreign policy behavior devised in the 1960s and subsequently applied to explain the external behavior of Israel between 1948 and 1970, as well as some decisions in Indian foreign policy. Such a framework, which is both systemic and dynamic, can briefly be summarized as

follows: events, acts or changes in the internal and external (operational) environment of a state become inputs into its foreign policy system via a communication network. These events, acts or changes constitute stimuli for the decision-makers, who filter them through their psychological predispositions (attitudinal prism) The resulting images constitute inputs for the policy process which result in the implementation of decisions. These are, in turn, fed back into the system as a series of new events. [60]

It is within this general framework for foreign policy analysis that a model of state behavior in international crisis has been constructed. The independent variable is perception of crisis, that is, following the ICB definition, the decision-makers' images of threat, time pressure, and high probability of involvement in military hostilities. The intervening variable is coping the way decision-makers behave during the crisis. The dependent variable is choice, or, in other words, decision. The model (fig. 1) postulates a time sequence and causal links among its variables. An environmental change at t1 triggers an increase in the perception of threat, time pressure and probability of involvement in military hostilities on the part of decision-makers at t2. They respond by adopting certain coping strategies (t3) which lead to decisions (t4). Both perception of threat and time pressure have been identified as sources of psychological stress which is, in turn, supposed to affect rational behavior adversely. [61] The model is thus concerned with the impact of stress on coping and pattern of choice (i.e., with the behavior of one crisis actor rather than the interaction process or the "conflict spiral" among all crisis actors--as in the systemic and most of the Stanford studies, respectively). Since the levels of stress are assumed to vary during a crisis (i.e., to be low in the initial phase because perception of threat is usually the only condition of crisis present at that time, then to rise with the appearance of time pressure and the probability of involvement in military hostilities and, finally, to decline with the fading away of one or more of the three perceptual crisis conditions),

the model presented in fig. 1 is really a three-period model, as depicted in fig. 2. On the basis of findings from the psychological literature, the ICB model deduces the presence and variation in the level of stress from the presence and variation in the level of perception of threat, time pressure and probability of involvement in military hostilities. [62]

The central questions addressed by both the ICB model and this study are the following: 1) What is the impact of changing stress, derived from changes in perception of threat, time pressure and the probability of involvement in military hostilities on the processes and mechanisms through which decision-makers cope with crisis? More precisely, this study will focus on: information (the perceived need and consequent quest for information, the size and receptivity of the information processing group), consultation (type and size of consultative units, frequency and intensity of the consultative process), decisional fora (size and structure of decisional fora and authority patterns within decisional units) and alternatives (perceived range of available options, search for and evaluation of alternatives). 2) What is the impact of stress, as mediated by coping mechanisms, on the cognitive performance of decision-makers? 3) Finally, does stress, as mediated by coping mechanisms and cognitive performance, have any effect on the nature of choice, that is decisions? Obviously, the number of questions addressed and the depth of their answers will depend on the availability of data.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. The literature on crisis research is so vast that guides almost are needed for the student approaching it for the first time. For reviews of this literature see: C. Candela, Decision-Making During Crisis: A Literature Review (Baltimore: Bendix Corp , Applied Science and Technology Division, 1974); Gerald W Hopple and Paul J. Rossa, International Crisis Analysis: A Review and Assessment (McClean, Va.: International Public Policy Research Corp , 1980, a slightly modified version of this review has appeared as "International Crisis Analysis. Recent developments and future directions" in P. Terrence Hopmann, Dina A Zinnes and J David Singer, eds., Cumulation in International Relations Research, Denver: Monograph Series in World Affairs, 1981, pp. 65-87), Richard W. Parker, "An Examination of Basic and Applied International Crisis Research" (International Studies Quarterly 21, 1, March 1977, pp. 225-246), Raymond Tanter, "Crisis Management: A critical review of academic literature" (Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1, 1, Fall 1975, pp 71-101) and "International Crisis Behavior: An appraisal of the literature" (in ibid 3, 2-3, Winter-Spring 1978, pp. 340-374), Ole R. Holsti, "Theories of Crisis Decision Making" in Paul G Lauren, ed., op. cit., pp. 99-136 and Michael Haas, "Research on International Crisis: Obsolescence of an approach?" (International Interactions 13, 1, 1986, pp 23-58). For an in-depth review of the use of the term "crisis" in contexts other than international politics see James O'Connor, The Meaning of Crisis: A Theoretical Introduction (London: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

2. An "approach" can be defined as "a predisposition to adopt a particular conceptual framework and to explore certain types of hypotheses toward the generation of a theory " "Conceptual framework," in turn, refers to "a schema of explicitly defined and differentiated concepts necessary to the study of a particular subject." For an admirable and succinct exposition of these and other related concepts which are all too often confused see. James Q. Bill and Robert L Hardgrave, jr., Comparative Politics The Quest for Theory (Columbus, Ohio. Charles E Merrill, 1973, pp 21-40).

3. An even bigger problem especially, although not exclusively, facing scholars utilizing this second approach is that decision-makers, particularly those belonging to non-Western cultures, may well subscribe to a concept of crisis totally different from the one imposed, as it were, on them by research scholars. For some evidence and suggested remedies see David B Bobrow, Steve Chan and John A. Kringen, "Understanding How Others Treat Crises: A multimethod approach" (International Studies

Quarterly 21, 1, March 1977, pp. 199-223) and Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions The Chinese Case. (New York: Free Press, 1979); Steve Chan, "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a perspective of conflict management" (World Politics 30, 3, 1978, pp. 391-410), Robert B Mahoney, jr. and Richard P. Clayberg, "Images and Threats. Soviet perceptions of international crises, 1946-1975" (in Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, jr., eds., Threats, Weapons and Foreign Policy, Beverly Hills· Sage, 1980, pp 55-81), Howard H. Lentner, "The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the United States Department of State" (in Charles F. Hermann, ed., op cit , pp 112-135), Pat J. Creary, "Contending Images of International Crisis" (International Interactions 10, 3-4, 1984, pp. 401-409) and Fritz Gaenslen, "Culture and Decision-Making in China, Japan, Russia and the United States" (World Politics 34, 1, Oct. 1986, pp. 78-103). See also Bruce J Allyn, James G Blight and David A Welch, "Essence of Revision. Moscow, Havana and the Cuban Missile Crisis" (International Security 14, 3, Winter 1989-90), pp. 136 172), which offers interesting insights on the perceptions of the other side.

4 Charles A McClelland, "Access to Berlin: The quantity and variety of events 1948-1963" in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics. Insights and Evidence, New York: Free Press, 1968, pp. 159-186 at p. 160, Charles F. Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable" in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory, New York· Free Press, 1969, pp. 409-421 at p. 414 and Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, p. 29.

5. Charles A. McClelland, "The Acute International Crisis" in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961, pp. 182-204. For what could be defined as the first generation of event interaction analysis see the studies by McClelland: "Action Structures and Communication in Two International Crises: Quemoy and Berlin" (in Background 7, 1964, pp. 201-215, reprinted in James N. Rosenau, ed., op. cit., pp. 473-482); "The Beginning, Duration and Abatement of International Crises: Comparison in two conflict arenas" (in C.F. Hermann, ed., op. cit., New York: Free Press, 1972, pp. 83-105) and "The Anticipation of International Crises" (in International Studies Quarterly 21, 1, March 1977, pp. 15-38). See also Edward E. Azar, "Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez 1956" (The Journal of Conflict Resolution 16, 2, June 1972, pp. 183-201); Robert Burrowes and Douglas Muzzio, "The Road to the Six Day War: Aspects of an enumerative history of four Arab states and Israel, 1965-67" (in ibid, pp. 211-226); and Edward E. Azar and Joseph D. Ben-Dak, eds , Theory and Practice of Events Research: Studies in Inter-Nation Actions and Interactions (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1975). For the second generation of event interaction analysis see Stephen J. Andriole and Robert A. Young, "Toward the Development of an Integrated Crisis Warning System" (International Studies Quarterly 21, 1, March 1977, pp. 107-150); Edward E. Azar, "A System for Forecasting Strategic Crises: Findings and speculations about conflict in the Middle East" (International Interactions 3, 3, 1977, pp. 193-222); George Duncan and Brian L Job, "Crisis Forecasting Using the Markov Renewal Model" (in ibid. 4, 3, 1978, pp 225-246); Michael R. Leavitt, "Markov Processes in International Crises· An analytical addendum to an event-based simulation of the Taiwan Straits crises" (in J. A. Laponce and Paul Smoker, eds., Experimentation and Simulation in Political Science, Toronto Univ. of Toronto Press, 1972, pp 280-290); Richard S. Beal, Systems Analysis of International Crises (Washington Univ Press of America, 1979); Paul J Rossa, Gerald

W. Hopple and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Crisis Analysis: Indicators and models" (International Interactions 7, 2, 1980, pp 123-163) For an assessment of the application of event data see Stephen J Andriole and Gerald W Hopple, "The Rise and Fall of Event Data From basic research to applied use in the U S Department of Defense" (ibid 10, 3-4, 1984, pp 293-309) Finally, the following studies are instances of the use of other, and usually less successful, techniques Steve Chan and Davis B Bobrow, "Horse Races, Security Markets and Foreign Relations Some implications and evidence for crisis prediction" (The Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, 2, June 1981, pp 187-236), Wayne R Martin, "The Measurement of International Military Commitments for Crisis Early Warning" (International Studies Quarterly 21, 1, March 1977, pp 151-178)

6. Charles F. Hermann, "Indicators of International Political Crises Some initial steps toward prediction" in Edward E Azar and Joseph D. Ben-Dak, eds., op cit., pp 233-243, Charles F Hermann and Robert E. Mason, "Identifying Behavioral Attributes of Events that Trigger International Crises" in Ole R Holsti, Randolph M Siverson and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the International System, Boulder, Colo. Westview Press, 1980, pp 189-210; Theodore D. Raphael, "Integrative Complexity Theory and Forecasting International Crises Berlin 1946 1962," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, 3 (Sept 1982), pp 425-450

7. See, for instance, T. G Belden, "Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations" (International Studies Quarterly 21, 1, March 1977, pp. 181-198), James Cable, "The identification of crisis" (International Relations 8, 2, Nov 1984, pp 117-136), Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates The case of the Cuban missiles" (World Politics 16, 3, April 1964, pp 455-467) and Osvaldo Croci, "The American Friend Canadian decision-making during the 1971 International Monetary Crisis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N S , 1981) The bulk of the literature on anticipation failures is, however, primarily concerned with surprise attacks Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why intelligence failures are inevitable," World Politics 31, 1 (Oct. 1978), pp 61-89 and "Surprise Despite Warning: Why sudden attacks succeed," Political Science Quarterly 95, 4 (Winter 1980-81), pp 551 572, Abraham Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies Toward Japan, 1940-1941: A case study in misperception," International Studies Quarterly 19, 2 (June 1975), pp. 228-248; "Hindsight and Foresight. A conceptual framework for the analysis of surprise attacks," World Politics 28, 3 (April 1976), pp 381-395, G Mathew Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro, "Explanation of the Unexpected: The Syrian intervention in Jordan in 1970" in R Axelrod, ed , Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, Princeton, N.J · Princeton Univ Press, 1976, pp. 113-141, Steve Chan, "The Intelligence of Stupidity Understanding failures in strategic warning," American Political Science Review 73, 1 (March 1979), pp 171-180, Michael I Handel, "The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise," International Studies Quarterly 21, 3 (Sept 1977), pp 461 502, Yaacov Vertzberger, "Bureaucratic-Organizational Politics and Information Processing in a Developing State," ibid 28, 1 (March 1984), pp. 69-95; Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The case of the Yom Kippur War," World Politics 28, 3 (April 1976), pp 348-380, Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa, Cambridge, Ma M I T. Press, 1973, and Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision, Stanford, Ca Stanford Univ Press, 1962 Finally, for an attempt to combine systemic and unit level approaches to predict crises and crisis behaviour see James M McCormick "Evaluating Models of Crisis Behaviour Some evidence

from the Middle-East" (International Studies Quarterly 19, 1, March 1975, pp 17-45)

8. James A Robinson and Richard C Snyder, "Decision-Making in International Politics" in Herbert C Kelman, ed , International Behavior A Social-Psychological Analysis, New York Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp 435-463

9 Charles F Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable" in J N Rosenau, ed , op cit , pp. 409-421

10 For the framework see Richard S. Snyder, M. W Bruck and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics" (in R S Snyder, H W Bruck, B Sapin, eds , Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics, New York. Free Press, 1962) For its application, see Glenn D Paige, The Korean Decision. June 24-30, 1950 (New York. Free Press, 1968) and "Comparative Case Analysis of Crisis Decisions. Korea and Cuba" (in C. F Hermann, ed., op. cit , pp 41-55)

11 Glenn H Snyder, "Conflict and Crises in the International System" in James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd, eds., World Politics. An Introduction, New York: Free Press, 1976, pp. 682-720

12. Irving L Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1972, Philip Tetlock, "Identifying Victims of Groupthink from Public Statements of Decision Makers," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, 8 (Aug. 1979), pp. 1314-1324; Andrew K. Semmel and Dean Minix, "Group Dynamics and Risk-Taking: An experimental examination," Experimental Study of Politics 6, 3 (March 1978), pp 1-33; "Small Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy Decision-Making An experimental approach" in Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed , Psychological Models in International Politics, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 251-287. See also Andrew K. Semmel, "Small Group Dynamics in Foreign Policy Making" (in G. Hopple, ed., Biopolitics, Political Psychology and International Politics, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, pp. 94-113). Semmel and Minix pointed out that Janis did not address the question of whether decisions taken by small groups differed inherently from those of other decision units and, if so, how and why. Their finding was that group setting was indeed a relevant factor. Lowi and Hermann had also posited that decision-making processes in small group settings would exhibit peculiar characteristics They did not, however, specify them. See Theodore Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World· National politics and foreign policy" (in James N. Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press, 1967, pp. 295-331) and Charles F. Hermann, "What Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: Individual, group, bureaucracy?" (in Richard C. Merritt, ed., Foreign Policy Analysis, Lexington, MA. Lexington Books, 1975, pp. 119-123). See also Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, "The Effects of Group Size on Collective Decision-Making" (in R.G. Niemi, H.F. Weisberg, eds., Probability Models of Collective Decision-Making, Columbus, Ohio· Charles E. Merrill Co., 1972, pp. 125-148) and Margaret G Hermann, Charles F Hermann and Joe Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior" (in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W Kegley and James Rosenau, eds , New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Boston. Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 309-336)

13 Richard K Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, Cambridge, MA Harvard Univ Press, 1977. See also Alexander L George, "Crisis management· the interaction of political and

military considerations" (Survival 26, 5, Sept -Oct. 1984, pp 223-234).

14. See Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," International Studies Quarterly 24, 1 (March 1980), pp. 7-46 and the case studies reported in International Political Science Review (10, 1, Jan. 1989)

15. Alexander L George, "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior The 'operational code' belief system"; Steven W Hoagland and Stephen G Walker, "Operational Codes and Crisis Outcomes" (in L Falkowski, ed , op cit , pp 95-123 and 125-167, respectively)

16. Lawrence S Falkowski, Presidents, Secretaries of State, and Crises in U.S. Foreign Relations. A Model and Predictive Analysis, Boulder, Co · Westview Press, 1978 See also Michael A Genovese, "Presidents and crisis: developing a crisis management system in the executive branch" (International Journal on World Peace 4, 2, April-June 1987, pp 81-101) and "Presidential leadership and crisis management" (Presidential Studies Quarterly 16, 2, Spring 1986, pp. 300-309).

17. The findings of the Stanford effort were reported in Ole R Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal McGill-Queen's Univ Press, 1972) and Eugenia V Nomikos and Robert C. North, International Crisis: The Outbreak of World War I (Montreal McGill-Queens Univ. Press, 1976) See also Ole R Holsti, Richard A. Brody and Robert C. North, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical materials from the 1962 Cuban crisis" (Journal of Peace Research 1, 3-4, 1964, pp 170-203, reprinted in J. N. Rosenau, ed., op cit , pp 679-696), Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North and Richard A Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 crisis" (in J. David Singer, ed , op. cit , pp. 123-158). For the complete bibliography and an evaluation of the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration see Francis W Hoole and Dina A. Zinnes, eds., Quantitative International Politics: An appraisal (New York: Praeger, 1976, chapters 17-21 and pp. 514-519). The Stanford Group also paid attention to those systemic factors (demographic, economic, military and political) which they thought could capture the long term dynamics leading to crises among nations. See Nazli Choucri and Robert North, "Dynamics of International Conflict· Some policy implications of population, resources and technology," World Politics 24 (supplement, 1972), pp. 80-122 and Nations in Conflict National Growth and International Violence, San Francisco. W H Freeman, 1975.

18. See, for instance, Ole R. Holsti, "The 1914 Case," American Political Science Review 59, 2 (1965), pp. 365-378 and "Individual Differences in 'Definition of the Situation'" The Journal of Conflict Resolution 14, 3 (Sept. 1970), pp. 303-310, Dina A Zinnes, "A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-Makers in Simulate and Historical Data," World Politics 18, 3 (April 1966), pp. 474-502 and "The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Prewar Crisis, 1914" in J D Singer, ed., op cit , pp 85-119

19. See, for instance, Gordon Hilton "The 1914 Studies A re-assessment of the evidence and some further thoughts," Peace Research Society International Papers 13 (The Copenhagen Conference), 1969, pp 117-141 "A Closed and Opened Model Analysis of Expressions of Hostility in Crisis," Journal of Peace Research 8, 3-4, 1971, pp 249-262 David M Lampton, "The U S Image of Peking in Three International Crises," Western Political Quarterly 26 (March 1973), pp 28-50, David C Schwartz,

"Decision-making in Historical and Simulated Crises" in C.F. Hermann, ed., op cit., pp. 167-184. Randolph M. Siverson, "International Conflict and Perceptions of Injury: The case of the Suez crisis," International Studies Quarterly 14, 2 (June 1970), pp. 157-165; "Role and Perception in International Crisis: The cases of Israeli and Egyptian decision-makers in national capitals and the United Nations," International Organization 27 (Summer 1973), pp. 329-395. The only attempt to replicate the 1914 effort with respect to another crisis was made by O.R. Holsti. See his "Time, Alternatives and Communications· The 1914 and Cuban missile crises," in C.F. Hermann, ed., op. cit., pp. 58-80 and Crisis, Escalation, War, cit., pp. 169-197.

20. For brief reviews of these models see: James A. Robinson, "Crisis Decision-Making, an Inventory and Appraisal of Concepts, Theories, Hypothesis and Techniques of Analysis" in J.A. Robinson, ed., Political Science Annual. An International Review 1, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970, pp. 111-148; Charles F. Hermann and Linda P. Brady, "Alternative Models of International Crisis Behavior" in C. F. Hermann, ed , op. cit., pp. 281-303; Ole R. Holsti, loc. cit. in Paul G. Lauren, ed., op. cit., pp. 99-136; Janice G. Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967, Columbus, Ohio· Ohio State Univ. Press, 1980, pp. 21-62.

21. Walter John Petersen, International Conflict Resolution: An Expected Utility Approach to the Analysis of Decisions During Crisis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1983). The definition of analytic is to be preferred to that of rational because the latter is usually used to characterize decision-makers' appropriate choice of means in relation to their subjectively chosen ends. The model instead looks at the whole process of selection of means. One could therefore conceivably have a "rational choice" arrived at by a nonanalytic process. The two terms should not therefore be used interchangeably as is currently done.

22. Zeev Maoz, "The Decision to Raid Entebbe: Decision analysis applied to crisis behavior," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, 4 (Dec. 1981), pp. 677-707. For two early and traditional applications of the analytic model see Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An analysis of Soviet calculations and behavior," World Politics 16, 3 (April 1964), pp. 363-389 and Leon V. Sigal, "The 'Rational Policy' Model and the Formosa Straits Crises," International Studies Quarterly 14, 2 (June 1970), pp. 121-156.

23. See, for instance, R. W. Rycroft and J. S. Szyliowicz, "The Technological Dimensions of Decision-Making and the Case of the Aswan High Dam," World Politics 33, 1 (Oct. 1980), pp. 36-61. They have reported examples of satisficing, muddling through, and bounded rationality behavior for each of the major participants.

24. Although brief summaries can be found in almost every study of decision-making, the most comprehensive treatment of this model remains John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974. See also Robin F. Marra, "A Cybernetic Model of the U.S Defense Expenditure Policymaking Process," International Studies Quarterly 29, 2 (June 1985), pp. 121-136

25 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, chapters 3-4; Leo Hazlewood, John J. Hayes and James R. Brownell, jr., "Planning for Problems in Crisis Management· An analysis of post-1945 behavior in the U S Department of Defense," International Studies

Quarterly 21, 1 (March 1977), pp. 75-106. See also Jack S Levy, "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War," ibid. 30, 2 (June 1986), pp. 193-222.

26. In the crisis decision-making literature this model is usually either confused with or simply subsumed under the cybernetic, organizational one, which it undoubtedly resembles in many respects. Yet it is, and therefore should be kept, analytically, distinct from it. For a description see Graham T Allison and Morton M. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics, A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World Politics 24 (supplement, 1972), pp 40-79; Morton M. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974 For an application to a noncrisis decision see Norton H Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and domestic politics in the Johnson administration," World Politics 25, 1 (Oct. 1972), pp. 62-95. For a critique see Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important ? (or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy 7 (1972), pp. 159-179; Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A critique," Policy Sciences 4, 4 (1973), pp 467-490; Dan Caldwell, "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy Making," American Behavioral Scientist 21, 1 (1972), pp. 87-110

27. This argument is explicitly made by Jerel A Rosati in "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework. Bureaucratic politics in perspective," World Politics 33, 2 (Jan. 1981), pp. 234-252, G. T. Allison, op cit., chapters 5-6.

28. The list of works on cognitive decision-making could be several pages long. A few of these are· Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, Judgement Under Uncertainty· Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982; Joseph H. De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, Columbus, Ohio· Charles E. Merrill, 1968; Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively" in R. Axelrod. ed., op. cit., pp. 18-54, Michael J Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham, "Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly 17, 2 (June 1973), pp. 147-176; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976. For a review of different works, see. Janice G. Stein, "Freud and Descartes: The paradoxes of psychological logic," International Journal 32, 3 (Summer 1977), pp 429-451; Donald R. Kinder and Janet A. Weiss, "In Lieu of Rationality. Psychological perspectives on foreign policy decision-making," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 22, 4 (Dec. 1978), pp. 707-736 For a critique see: Yaacov Vertzberger, "Misperception in International Politics: A typological framework for analysis" (International Interactions 9, 3, 1982, pp. 207-234) and Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Misperceiving the Role of Perception A critique" (Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 2, 2, 1976-77, pp 74, 93). Ben-Zvi does not attack or dismiss the cognitive approach that he himself has adopted in a number of studies. He cautions, however, against single-factor explanations (i e , the tendency to view everything and always as a result of cognitive limitations). Otherwise, he concludes somewhat sarcastically, "a research category that set for itself the goal of exposing the recurrent tendency of policy-makers to cling to preconceived notions in defiance of contradictory evidence" runs the risk of "itself rigidly adher[ing] to its own preconceived theories "

29. See, among others, Richard S Lazarus, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process, New York: McGraw Hill, 1966, Alexander L George, "Adaptation to stress in political decision making The individual, small group, and organizational contexts" in George V Coelho, David A. Hamburg and John E Adams, eds , Coping and Adaptation, New York· Basic Books, 1974, pp 176-245, Ole R

Holsti and Alexander L. George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy Makers" in C. P. Cotter, ed., Political Science Annual 6, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975, pp. 255-319; Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis, Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979; Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment, New York: Free Press, 1977; Thomas C. Wiegele, "Decision-Making in an International Crisis: Some Biological Factors," International Studies Quarterly 17, 3 (Sept. 1973), pp. 295-335 and "Models of Stress and Disturbances in Elite Political Behaviors: Psychological variables and political decision-making" in Robert S. Robins, ed., Psychopathology and Political Leadership, New Orleans: Tulane Univ., 1977, pp. 79-111 and Margaret G. Hermann, "Indicators of Stress in Policymakers During Foreign Policy Crises," Political Psychology 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 27-46;

30. For some examples, see James A. Robinson, Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann, "Search Under Crisis in Political Gaming and Simulation" in Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, eds., Theory and Research on the Causes of War, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969, pp. 80-94; Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock, "Integrative Complexity of Communications in International Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 21, 1 (March 1977), pp. 169-184; Jack J Snyder, "Rationality at the Brink: The role of cognitive process in failures of deterrence," World Politics 30, 3 (April 1978), pp. 345-365; Avi Shlaim and Raymond Tanter, "Decision Process, Choice and Consequences: Israel's deep penetration bombing in Egypt, 1970," ibid. 30, 4 (July 1978), pp. 483 516; G. Mathew Bonham, Michael J. Shapiro and Thomas L. Trumble, "The October War: Changes in cognitive orientation toward the Middle East conflict," International Studies Quarterly 23, 1 (March 1979), pp. 3-44; Stephen G. Walker et al., "Evidence of learning and risk orientation during international crises: The Munich and Polish cases," British Journal of Political Science 14, 1 (Jan. 1984), pp. 33-51; Yaacov Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decision-Makers as Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied history and its shortcomings," International Studies Quarterly 30, 2 (June 1986), pp. 223-247 and Michael D. Wallace and Peter Suedfeld, "Leadership performance in international crisis: the longevity-complexity link," ibid. 32, 4 (Dec. 1988), pp. 439-451.

31. Graham T. Allison, op. cit., p. 245.

32. As Allison put it, "these three paradigms neglect or underplay a number of further aspects of governmental behavior. Additional paradigms focusing, for example, on individual cognitive processes, or the psychology of central players, or the role of external groups, must be considered" (ibid., p. 277).

33. Janice G. Stein and Raymond Tanter, op. cit. Herman H. Weil was perhaps the first to point out explicitly that alternative models of decision-making were not necessarily competing or mutually exclusive. See his "Can Bureaucracies be Rational Actors?: Foreign policy decision-making in North Vietnam" (International Studies Quarterly 19, 4, Dec. 1975, pp. 432-468). See also Wilfrid L. Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U S.-European Relations Patterns of policy-making" (World Politics 28, 1 (Oct. 1975), pp 1-43)

34. Oran R Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton. Princeton Univ Press, 1967 and The Politics of Force Bargaining During International Crises, Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 1968 Young's definition in 1967 was. "An international crisis is a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises the impact of destabilizing forces in the general

international system or any of its subsystems substantially above normal (i.e., average) levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system" (p. 10). By 1968 he had modified it: "A crisis in international politics is a process of interactions occurring at higher levels of perceived intensity that the ordinary flow of events and characterized by a sharp break from the ordinary flow of politics, shortness of duration, a rise in the perceived prospects that violence will break out, and significant implications for the stability of some system or subsystem (or pattern of relationships) in international politics." It is clear from the introduction of the term "perceived" that in the space of time between the first and second book, Young had read Hermann (who is quoted in a footnote on page 16).

35. Raymond Tanter, Modelling and Managing International Conflicts: The Berlin Crises, Sage Library of Social Research, vol 6, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974.

36. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making and System Structure in International Crises Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977 Russell J. Leng and Hugh G. Wheeler, "Influence Strategies, Success and War," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, 4 (Dec. 1979), pp 655-684; Russell J Leng and Stephen G. Walker, "Comparing Two Studies of Crisis Bargaining: Confrontation, Coercion and Reciprocity" in ibid. 26, 4 (Dec. 1982), pp. 571-591; Russell J. Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises" in ibid. 27, 3 (Sept. 1983), pp. 379-419 and "Crisis Learning Games," American Political Science Review 82, 1 (March 1988), pp 179-194

37. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New York Columbia Univ Press, 1974.

38. Neither Tanter nor George and Smoke had a definition of crisis. Snyder and Diesing defined it as "a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war" (p. 6).

39. Thomas Halper, Foreign Policy Crises: Appearance and Reality in Decision-Making, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E Merritt, 1971

40. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ Press, 1981 Lebow defines crisis as a situation in which the policy-makers of a given country "perceive (1) that the action or threatened action of another international actor seriously impairs concrete national interests, the country's bargaining reputation, or their own ability to remain in power, (2) that any actions on their part designed to counter this threat (capitulation aside) will raise a significant prospect of war and (3) that they are acting under time constraints." See also his "Is crisis management always possible?" in Political Science Quarterly 102, 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 181-192

41. John R. Oneal, Foreign Policy Making in Times of Crisis, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1982

42. Worth mentioning among these are Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (London Oxford Univ Press, 1971) and "Decision-Makers and Crises" (International Journal 39, 2, Spring 1984, pp 324-336) and Phil Williams, Crisis Management. Background and Development (London Martin Robertson, 1976) See also the thirteen highly heterogeneous papers

collected in Daniel Frei, ed., Managing International Crises (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982).

43. For a repertoire of these hypotheses see C. F. Hermann, ed., op. cit., Howard B. Shapiro and Marcia A. Gilbert, Crisis Management: Psychological and Sociological Factors in Decision Making, McLean, Va.: Human Science Research, 1975 and Pat J. McGowan, Howard B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973.

44. Compare, for instance, C. F Hermann, "Threat, Time and Surprise: A Simulation of International Crisis" (in C. F Hermann, ed., op. cit., pp. 187-211 at p. 207), O. Holsti, op. cit. (pp. 14-17 and 119-142) and I. Janis and L. Mann, op. cit. (p. 78) with James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1958, p. 116), Louis C. Gawthrop, Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch: An Analysis of Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 85, 87, 94 and 125) and Harold L. Wilenski, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1967, p. 78). To explain these discrepancies, the hypothesis could be advanced that March and Simon, Gawthrop and Wilenski regard stress as having, potentially at least, beneficial effects on decision-making because, as organizational theorists, they are primarily concerned with showing the negative effects of bureaucratic, formalized procedures. Hence, insofar as stress may free decision-makers from routine constraints, it is likely to improve the quality of decision-making.

45. Compare, for instance, James A. Robinson, "Crisis: An appraisal of concept and theories" in C. F. Hermann, ed., op. cit., pp. 20-35 at p. 23; Glenn Paige, loc. cit. in ibid., p. 52 and Thomas W. Milburn, "The Management of Crisis" in ibid., pp. 259-277 at p. 273 with C. F. Hermann, op. cit., p. 168; C. F. Hermann, loc. cit. in C. F. Hermann, ed., op. cit., p. 298 and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977, p. 178. For more examples of these discrepancies and references to the relative literature see J. Stein and R. Tanter, op. cit., pp. 57-62.

46. This situation has been denounced in rather scathing terms by Adam M. Garfinkle ("Crisis Decision-Making: The banality of theory," Orbis 30, 1, Spring 1986, pp. 12-41). "The crisis theoretical literature in international relations and political science is invalidated and probably invalidatable in any remotely scientific sense, drawn selectively from research fields that are themselves internally divided and narrowly based to boot. It is simply not prudent to rely heavily on such a theoretical corpus to prevent nuclear crisis and nuclear war." Garfinkle, however, does not offer any clue as to what route he thinks should be followed to gain a better understanding of crises or to obtain reliable policy suggestions.

47. See Gregory M. Hereck, Irving L. Janis and Paul Huth, "Decision Making during International Crises: Is quality of process related to outcome?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, 2 (June 1987), pp 203-226 See also the reassessment by David A. Welch, "Crisis Decision Making Reconsidered," ibid. 33, 3 (Sept 1989), pp. 430-445 and the reply by Hereck, Janis and Huth, "Quality of U.S. Decision Making During the Cuban Missile Crisis· Major errors in Welch's reassessment" ibid., pp. 446-459.

48 Ariel Levi and Philip E. Tetlock, "A Cognitive Analysis of Japan's 1941 Decision for War," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, 2 (June 1980), pp. 195-240 Some of these problems undoubtedly

arise because of an insufficiently precise use of concepts and the lack of a standardized terminology. Different authors use the same terms to identify different phenomena Thus (apparent) disagreement at times arises even with respect to the same case study. See Giovanni Sartori "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review 64 (Dec 1970), pp. 1033-1053. On the basis of his study of the 1914 crisis, Holsti (op cit , p. 203) wrote that "crisis-induced stress often affects behavior in ways that are inconsistent with calculated policy making " Zinnes, Zinnes and McClure concluded on the basis of their findings from the same case that "decision makers do not perceive or behave differently in a crisis In a crisis as in a noncrisis, they react in proportion to incoming stimuli" (Dina A. Zinnes, Joseph L. Zinnes and Robert D McClure, "Hostility in Diplomatic Communication A study of the 1914 crisis" in C. F. Hermann, ed., op cit., pp 139-162) The key to the (apparent) disagreement here lies in the words "behavior" and "behave." Holsti uses the term "behavior" to encompass a whole range of decision-makers' "activities." Zinnes et al use it to refer to "expressions of hostility." Although behavior can be assumed to derive from perception, it certainly encompasses more activities than the expression of hostility alone Hence Zinnes and her associates might have established that, in a crisis, perception of threat is accurate and that the subsequent expression of hostility is proportional to perception of threat but not that behavior is the same in crisis and in noncrisis situations.

49. This point has been made very clearly by Gilbert and Lauren in a review of the literature on crisis management "The first step toward curing the ills of present theory surely lies in a proper diagnosis. This requires identifying the symptoms and subjecting the theory to more rigorous testing against reality in order that the theory in turn might become more sophisticated, differentiated, and capable of addressing the practical needs of policy makers" (Arthur N. Gilbert and Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Management: An assessment and critique," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, 4, Dec. 1980, pp. 641-664 at p. 660)

50. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957.

51. Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al , Crises in the Twentieth Century, 2 vols.: (Handbook of International Crises; Handbook of Foreign Policy Crises), Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Crises in World Politics," World Politics 34, 3 (1982), pp 380-417, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, "Superpower Crisis Management Behavior" in C. W. Kegley, jr. and Pat McGowan, eds , Foreign Policy: USA/USSR (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982, pp 185-212) and "International Crises, 1945-1975 The U N Dimension," International Studies Quarterly 28, 1 (March 1984), pp 45-67, Patrick James and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Structural Factors and International Crisis Behavior" in Conflict Management and Peace Science 7, 2 (1984), pp 33-53 Michael Brecher and Patrick James, "International Crises in the Middle East 1929-1979 Immediate severity and long-term importance," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 9, 2 (1987), pp 1-42 and "Patterns of Crisis Management" in The Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, 3, (Sept. 1988), pp. 426-456 and Patrick James, Michael Brecher and Tod Hoffman, "International Crises in Africa, 1929-1979 immediate severity and long term importance," International Interactions 14, 1 (1988), pp 51-84. These data have also been used to shed additional light on unresolved debates in international relations e g. the one about the relative stability of different types of international systems. See for instance Patrick James and Michael

Brecher, "Stability, and Polarity: New Paths for Inquiry," Journal of Peace Research 25, 1 (March 1988), pp. 31-42 and Patrick James, "Structure et conflit en politique internationale: une analyse séquentielle des crises internationales de 1929 à 1979 " Études Internationales 20, 4 (Dec. 1989), pp 791-815.

52. James McCormick, "International Crisis: A note on definition," Western Political Quarterly 31, 3 (Sept. 1978), pp. 352-358. He defines an international crisis as: "a situation between two or more nations characterized by perceptual conditions of high threat, surprise and short-decision time, and by behavioral conditions of marked change in their interaction patterns." Patricia M Close, "The Principle of Uncertainty as an Integrative Concept in International Crisis Research," International Interactions 5, 4 (1979), pp. 331-350.

53. Phil Williams, op. cit., p. 21. For the first attempt to integrate unit and system level approaches see Michael Brecher and Hemda Ben Yehuda, "System and Crisis in International Politics," Review of International Studies 11, 1 (Jan 1985), pp. 17-36 and Michael Brecher, "Système et crise en politique internationale," Etudes Internationales 15, 4 (Dec. 1984), pp. 755-788. See also Michael Brecher and Patrick James, Crisis and Change in World Politics, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1986.

54. See, for instance, Bruce M. Russett, "International Behavior Research. Case studies and cumulation" in Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel, eds., Approaches to the Study of Political Science, Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1970, pp. 425-443; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in Fred I. Greenstein, Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry, vol. 7, Reading Mass.: Addison, Wesley, 1975, pp. 79-137 and Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," loc. cit.

55. Edwin A. Bock, "Improving the Usefulness of the Case Study" in Donald M. Freeman, ed., Foundation of Political Science: Research, Methods and Scope, New York: Free Press, 1977, pp. 674-697 at p. 683.

56. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984, p. 334). The concepts of "explanation" and "understanding" have been central to one of the major controversies in the philosophy of the social sciences. In its most extreme formulation the main terms of this controversy can be summarized briefly as follows. On the one side, there are those who advocate the methodological unity of the natural and social sciences They claim that the advancement of the social sciences depends on acceptance of the methods and standards of the natural sciences The task of the social scientist is to construct causal explanations of human behavior based on general laws (or, better, "lawlike generalizations") that can be verified through empirical observation On the other side, there are those who argue for a methodological dualism. They claim that social reality is not an objective world but a symbolically structured domain which involves an interpretive dimension. Social sciences therefore, far from borrowing their method from the natural sciences, should instead model themselves after the humanities. The task of the social scientist is not to discover natural laws of human behavior, explaining in order to predict, but to make human actions intelligible, interpreting in order to understand. Although some scholars had occasionally suggested that these two approaches need not be mutally exclusive (see, for instance, Leon J. Goldstein, "The Phenomenological and Naturalistic Approaches to the Social" in Maurice Natanson, ed , Philosophy of the Social Sciences A Reader, New York. Random House, 1963, pp. 286-301;

Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1976, Frank Fischer, "Science and Critique in Political Discourse: Elements of a Postpositivistic Methodology," New Political Science 9-10, Summer/Fall 1982, pp 9-32 and Richard Rorty, "Method, Social Science and Social Hope," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11, 4, Dec. 1981, pp. 569-588), it has only been lately that serious attempts have been made to ground their complementarity epistemologically David Braybrooke ("Three Sorts of Social Science or Just One? One science in three personae" paper presented at the June 1983 meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association) has argued that the key ideas of interpretive and explanatory social sciences, that is, "rules" and "regularities" presuppose each other. Karl Otto Apel (Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1984) building on the insight that the concept of causal necessity is rooted in the idea of action, has concluded that understanding action forms the presupposition of causal explanation. The need for blending different approaches as a condition for the progress of science is increasingly gaining support also among practitioners in the field. See Bruno Bueno De Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," International Studies Quarterly 29, 2 (June 1985), pp 121-136 and Joseph Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," ibid. 33, 3 (Sept 1989), pp. 235-254. Perhaps nowhere in the social sciences has this tension between "explanation" and "understanding" been more evident than in studies using the decision-making approach. Scholars using this approach have, in fact, appeared to subscribe entirely to the neo-positivist view of the social sciences. They have regarded human behavior as susceptible to the same type of scientific explanation as natural events. Yet they have somewhat qualified this choice by directing their attention toward non-self-subsisting facts, such the decision-makers' own perceptions and the rules and conventions under which they act These scholars seem, in other words, to have opted for "explanation" as the appropriate scientific method for their research while, at the same time, retaining "understanding." They have generally ignored the philosophical ambiguities present in their approach, as well as the occasional criticisms levied at them. I have examined this epistemological tension in the decision-making approach in a separate and yet unpublished paper, "Explanation, Understanding and Decision-Making" (1986).

57. This "hermeneutical approach" in the ICB vertical segment is implicit in the sense that it has not been openly acknowledged or discussed in the studies published thus far It should also be pointed out that it represents a methodological orientation more than a philosophical concern. In this respect it has more to do with the "hermeneutical theory" of Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Betti, with whom it shares a striving toward the attainment of "relatively objective" knowledge than with the "hermeneutic philosophy" of Gadamer or the "critical hermeneutics" of Apel and Habermas. For a lucid analysis of these different strands, see Joseph Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980)

58. Six book-length studies and a series of shorter articles have thus far appeared. The books are: Michael Brecher (with Benjamin Geist), Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, Berkeley Univ. of California Press, 1980, Adeed I. Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, London McMillan, 1981; Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade 1948-49 A Study in Crisis Decision-Making, Berkeley Univ of California Press, 1983, Alan

Dowty, Middle East Crisis: U.S. Decision-Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984; Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984 and Geoffrey Jukes, Hitler's Stalingrad Decisions, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985. The articles have been collected in a special issue of the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations (3, 2-3, 1978), later reissued as Michael Brecher, ed , Studies in Crisis Behavior (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979). See also Douglas G. Anglin, "Zambian Crisis Behavior. Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence," International Studies Quarterly 24, 4 (Dec. 1980), pp. 581-616. For a slightly different approach see Karen Rasler, "A Comparative Analysis of Monadic and Dyadic Perspectives on the 1976 Lebanese Crisis," ibid., 28, 4 (Dec. 1984), pp. 427-446.

59. For Robinson's early conceptualization of crisis see James A. Robinson's The Concept of Crisis in Decision-Making (Studies in Social and Economic Sciences series, no. 11, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 1962). See also his "Crisis: An appraisal of concepts and theories," loc. cit., in C. F. Hermann, ed., op. cit. For Robinson, a crisis was a situation which could be characterized according to (1) the origin of the event, external or internal, (2) time available for response--short, intermediate or long--and (3) relative importance to participants of the values at stake, low or high. Hermann's definition was quoted above. For his modifications, see C. F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit the Viability of Organizations" (Administrative Science Quarterly 8, 1963, pp. 61-82), as well as his "International Crisis as a Situational Variable" (loc. cit.). Hermann replaced "origin of the event" with "surprise," "limited" time for response to "short" or "restricted" and changed "threat to values" to "threat to high priority goals." Besides the elimination of "surprise" as a general component of crisis (something Hermann himself came to recognize--see, for instance, his "Threat, Time and Surprise" loc. cit. in C. F. Hermann, ed., op. cit., where he states that surprise is not a crucial component), the ICB definition has changed "short" time to "finite" because some findings have revealed that "it is not the perceived brevity of time that influences decision-making behavior, but rather the awareness of the finiteness of time for choice" (see Brecher, op. cit., 1980, p. 4). "High priority goals" have been changed and generalized to "core values." Finally, the "perception of high probability of war" has been added. This was advocated also by other scholars, most notably Snyder and Diesing (see note 36 above). This effort toward increased concept refinement and cumulation of knowledge, besides its systematic and comparative thrust, is another indication that the ICB Project represents the most "mature" development to date in the field of crisis research (James N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis" in J. C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis, New York: Free Press, 1967, pp. 189-211).

60. Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg and Janice G. Stein, "A Framework for Research in Foreign Policy Behavior," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 13 (March 1969), pp. 75-101; Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Processes, New Haven. Yale Univ. Press, 1972. Also, see Michael Brecher, "Images, Process and Feedback in Foreign Policy: Israel's decisions on German reparations" (American Political Science Review 67, 1973, pp. 73-102), "Israel and The Rogers' Peace Initiatives: Decision and consequences" (Orbis 18, Summer 1974, pp. 402-426), Israel, the Korean War and China (Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1974), "Inputs and Decisions for War and Peace: The Israel experience" (International Studies Quarterly 18, 2, June 1974, pp. 131-177), Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale Univ Press,

1974), "India's Decision to Remain in the Commonwealth" (Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 13, March-July 1974, pp 62-90, 228-230), "India's Decision on the Voice of America: A study in irresolution" (Asian Survey 14, July 1974, pp. 637-650). For the ICB model see Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior: A preliminary report" (International Studies Quarterly 21, 1, March 1977, pp. 39-74) and "State Behavior in International Crisis: A model" (The Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, 3, Sept. 1979, pp. 446-480)

61. The ICB model adopts the definition of psychological stress advanced by Janis and Mann (op. cit., p. 50). According to it "psychological stress" refers to "unpleasant emotional states evoked by threatening environmental events or stimuli." On the relationship between psychological stress and decision-making see note 29 above.

62. Thomas C. Wiegele has developed more objective and sophisticated, albeit not necessarily more reliable, stress measurement techniques. They cannot, however, always be used because tapes of the decision-makers' voices at the time of the crisis are not always available. See T. C. Wiegele, "The Psychophysiology of Elite Stress in Five International Crises: A preliminary test of a voice measurement technique," International Studies Quarterly 22, 4 (Dec. 1978), pp. 467-511 and "Signal Leakage and the Remote Psychological Assessment of Foreign Policy Elites" in L. S. Falkowski, ed., op. cit., pp. 71-93.

2. THE TRIESTE CONFLICT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A crisis does not happen suddenly. It is the outcome of a series of events and interactions which may extend quite far back in time. The 1953 Trieste crisis is no exception. It represents the last act in a territorial conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia which started at the beginning of this century. This chapter reviews the main episodes in the history of this conflict, up to the beginning of its most intense phase in mid-1951. Particular attention is devoted to the critical and, in many ways, decisive events surrounding the May 1945 crisis as well as to the 1948 "tripartite declaration." Both episodes, in fact, set the stage or defined the parameters, as it were, of the 1953 events. They also had an important and lasting bearing on the perceptions of the actors involved and, consequently, on their behavior in the 1953 crisis.

Trieste in World War I

The city of Trieste stands as the symbol of the Italian-Yugoslav border dispute which culminated in the crisis of 1953 and the settlement of 1954. The origin of the dispute dates from the end of World War I, when both Italy and the then recently-constituted Kingdom of the Serbs,

Croats and Slovenes sought to gain the ethnically-mixed territories around Trieste from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Because of their geo-political and commercial importance, these territories, usually referred to in English as the "Julian region," [1] had been contested by rival powers throughout history.

The rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century introduced a new element into this struggle. Following the birth of a national state in 1861, the perceived task of Italian nationalists became the completion of unification. After the incorporation of Venice in 1866 and Rome in 1870, attention turned to those areas still under Austrian control, the acquisition of which would have enabled Italy to reach what were then called its "natural" borders. These terre irredente [2] (unredeemed lands), as they were referred to in the rhetoric of the time, were the Trentino (or South Tyrol to the Austrians) and the Julian region. In the rallying cries of the day they were briefly identified with the names of their most important cities: Trento and Trieste. Neither the debates in Italian intellectual circles nor the activities of the various irredentist organizations in these areas, however, produced anything of consequence. Notwithstanding the tensions that this situation occasionally generated, the Italian government was, in fact, unwilling to sacrifice its policy of alliance with Austria on the altar of irredentism. [3]

Thus, when the First World War broke out the irredentist question was still an open one. The problem seemed all the more pressing in the Julian region since by then Slavic nationalism, although late in awakening, had given rise to its own organizations. These were as assertive as the Italian ones in laying claims to the whole region. [4] Although tied to Austria by the Triple Alliance of 1882, Italian policy-makers were able to seize upon a procedural provision of the treaty and declare themselves freed from any obligation. [5] Neutrality, however, was but a means to an end. As Prime Minister Antonio Salandra put it:

> Austria's behavior [its failure to consult with Italy before declaring war] . . . put us in a clear and solid juridical

> position from which it would have been unpardonable for any Italian government not to profit. We were free from obligations, we had well-founded claims to press; we could freely choose our course. [6]

The military stalemate reached after the battle of the Marne (August 1914) increased Italy's bargaining power. Italian decision-makers had to determine whether their objectives could best be attained by assuring continued neutrality to the Central Powers or by promising intervention to the Entente countries. Secret negotiations were conducted with the Central Powers but it soon became clear that, since Italy's requests concerned Austrian territories, they were more likely to be met by the Entente. Although prepared to concede the Trentino region, Austria was unwilling to part with Trieste and would not, moreover, agree to any transfer of territory before the end of the war. The estimate that the Entente ultimately would be victorious also was taken into consideration As Salandra would later recall:

> Trieste was the focus of, and its name encapsulated, the question of our military and commercial hegemony in the Adriatic, a question which was, and is, vital for us and which only a victorious war could have resolved in our favour because it was highly improbable that Austria would abandon Trieste unless it suffered a complete defeat. [7]

On March 4, 1915, the Italians turned to the Entente. As agreed in the Secret Pact of London signed on April 26, Britain, France and Russia promised to give Italy the Trentino, the Julian region and Dalmatia as territorial compensation for its participation in the war (see fig. 3). The city of Rijeka (Fiume) was not among Italy's requests since it was thought that this city would replace Trieste as the port of the Habsburg Empire, whose continued existence was presumed at the time. On May 23, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. [8]

The war was disastrous for Italy. It killed over six hundred thousand people, maimed over a million, disrupted the economy and increased political dissension and social unrest. In 1919, the year of the Fascist movement's birth, a Russian type of revolution seemed imminent to many [9] Italian politicians thus felt even more compelled not only to insist on the total fulfilment of the promises made in London but also to demand the city of Rijeka.

Some obstacles, however, had emerged meanwhile. In July 1917 an agreement had been reached at Corfù between the Serbian government-in-exile and the Yugoslav Committee (a group of politicians and nationalist intellectuals from the South Slavic lands under Habsburg rule), thus laying the groundwork for the birth of the new state of Yugoslavia. [10] The United States, rather than Italy, had proved to be the decisive factor in the outcome of the war and was likely to play a dominant role at the peace conference. President Woodrow Wilson's enunciation of a "new diplomacy," in which the principle of self-determination figured prominently, had sounded to Italian ears as "a usurer's mortgage on the peace conditions." [11] Finally, the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire meant the disappearance of that great and dangerous power on whose existence the Italian request for an eastern strategic frontier rested. Italian insistence on the acquisition of territories which, from an ethnic point of view, were largely (and, in some cases, exclusively) Slavic, could not therefore assume anything but an imperialistic overtone. [12]

The Italian diplomatic position was thus not very strong when the peace conference opened in Versailles in January 1919. Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando betrayed his apprehensions at its very outset In his intervention at a meeting of the Council of Ten on January 21, he used the specter of a Bolshevik insurrection to assure a favorable hearing for Italian territorial claims and requests for economic aid As reported in the minutes of the meeting, "he declared that Italy was subject to the Bolsheviki [sic] disease ... [but] he did not believe that Bolshevism could become supreme in Italy unless it found special conditions there These conditions might be brought about by a depression of the morale of the people through one of two causes, either the disappointment following a failure to attain national aims or an economic crisis." [13]

The diplomatic position of the Yugoslavs was, however, worse than that of Italy. The territories they claimed had been occupied by the Italian army. The representatives of the Slovenes and the Croats, the

two nations most directly interested in the disputed territories, were not recognized as such, but were part of the Serbian delegation. The Italians insisted, in fact, that only the Serbians had contributed to the war effort, the Slovenes and the Croats having fought for Austria. The Yugoslavs relied on Wilson (the "hopeless utopian," as the Italian ambassador to Washington described him), who was not bound by the London Pact, to champion their interests against Italian claims The American President's "lofty principles" (as defined by the same ambassador) had to be reconciled with the necessity of pursuing such equally, if not more, important political interests as gaining support for, and adherence to, the League of Nations and promoting domestic order and stability in its member countries. Thus having compromised with early concessions to Great Britain and France, as well as to Italy, on the question of the Brenner frontier (with its 150,000 German-speaking inhabitants assigned to Italy by the London Pact), Wilson found it difficult to have his point of view prevail on the Adriatic question. [14]

The so-called "Wilson line," which assigned half of Istria to Italy (see fig. 3), was rejected by Prime Minister Orlando, who continued to stress the link between territorial demands and domestic political stability. He abandoned the peace conference in protest and resigned in June 1919, his government beset by severe economic problems and social unrest. Negotiations continued under new Prime Minister Francesco Nitti, but fared no better. On September 12, a motley crew of Fascist activists, former servicemen and romantic adventurers led by the bard Gabriele D'Annunzio, took matters into their own hands and seized Rijeka. The expedition effectively foreshadowed the imminent collapse of the Liberal regime, as the Nitti government conveniently chose not to challenge the occupation. [15]

In October, with D'Annunzio still in control of the city, Nitti suggested to the Americans that he was ready to compromise Rijeka could become a free city provided that Italy received all the other territories He explained to Secretary of State Robert Lansing that he

was a prisoner of public opinion and warned that Italy would suffer "the gravest of crises" if the plan was not accepted. The British suggested that the plan be accepted, but Wilson would not modify his position--even threatening "unsympathetic measures" of an economic nature. American officials in Paris, however, persuaded the President that "any such pressure ... would be extremely harmful to the whole political situation and might entirely prejudice all present [American] policies with regard to Italy." [16]

The Adriatic question continued to go unresolved until February 1920, when Wilson agreed to accept the outcome of direct Italian-Yugoslav negotiations. The Yugoslavs would have preferred to avoid negotiating directly with the more powerful Italians but realized that, unless an agreement was forthcoming, they would soon be deprived of American support. A progressive disenchantment in the United States with Wilson's foreign policies was, in fact, already evident. It led Congress to reject the League of Nations and helped the Republicans to win the 1920 election. Thus, on November 12, 1920, direct negotiations--which had made hardly any progress in six months--produced the treaty of Rapallo, which gave Italy the Julian region but made Rijeka a free city (fig. 4). Later the Italians would point to Yugoslav free acceptance of these borders, while the Yugoslavs would refer to it as a diktat. The Italians had ended up renouncing the Dalmatian strip promised in the London Pact because Count Carlo Sforza, foreign minister in the new Giolitti government, favored the more farsighted policy of establishing amity with the new neighboring state in order to broaden Italy's foreign policy horizons. The strip, moreover, made no sense at all as a strategic frontier and, in the opinion of the military, would have to be evacuated at the first sign of war. [17] On January 1, 1921, D'Annunzio was finally ousted from Rijeka by the Italian army and a free city established. It had a short and tumultuous life. In January 1924 it was seized again by a group of Fascists and then annexed to Italy with the treaty of Rome on January 27, 1924. [18]

Following the establishment of an Italian protectorate over

Albania in 1927, the Yugoslavs--fearing Italian appetite in the Balkans--concluded an alliance with France. From then on, Italian-Yugoslav relations deteriorated steadily as the Fascist regime also became known for its support of Croatian separatists. The policies of denationalization and persecution of the Slavic population in the newly acquired territories, the annexation of part of Slovenia, including the city of Ljubljana (Treaty of Berlin of July 7, 1941), the establishment of a puppet Croat kingdom under an Italian prince who immediately proceeded to cede most of Dalmatia to Italy and the occupation of Montenegro, which was subsequently proclaimed "independent" (July 12, 1941), could only reinforce Yugoslav determination to reverse the injustice they perceived as having been done to them at the end of World War I. [19]

The Secret Agreements of 1941

The first occasion to start working toward such a revision arose in early 1941. Aware of the fact that the British were eager to have the Yugoslavs and the Turks join Greece in the war against Italy and resist a German advance in the Balkans which was considered imminent, the Yugoslav Ambassador Milan Gavrilović suggested to his British colleague in Moscow Stafford Cripps, that "it might help the Yugoslav government to strengthen their own position, and through them that of their neighbors against the Germans" if the British were to support Yugoslav claims in the Julian region. At first, both the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet were reluctant to engage in a promise which had the appearance of a Pact of London in reverse The Allied policy on territorial questions, which officially would be laid down in the

Atlantic Charter later that year, was not to make any commitments with regard to postwar frontiers. Territorial questions were to arrive unprejudiced at the peace table. [20]

This attitude, however, changed following the February 24, 1941 British decision to send troops to Greece Now both the Foreign Office and the Cabinet agreed that "it would be worthwhile to disregard this rule [of not discussing territorial changes during the war] on this occasion if by doing so [they] could induce Yugoslavia to intervene forcibly on behalf of Greece." Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who was to have discussions with the Yugoslav government, was thus instructed that if "necessary and useful" he could mention that "His Majesty's Government [was] studying with sympathy the case for revision of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier which they [were] disposed to think could be established and advocated by them at the Peace Conference." The terms of what could be considered, at most, an assurance of favorable consideration of claims were deliberately vague, as the Cabinet did not intend to commit itself to a precise frontier. Yet rumors of "secret agreements" on the Julian region spread rapidly following a remark by General Dušan Simović, head of the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in London, that after the war his country would regain all "national" territories including Trieste. [21]

Count Sforza, the Italian negotiator of the 1920 Rapallo treaty then in exile in the United States, immediately contacted Lord Halifax, British ambassador in Washington, and Eden, asking for clarification He also expressed his preoccupations to the American Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles. Not satisfied with Lord Halifax's reply that Prime Minister Simović "had expressed his own views for which His Majesty's Government obviously accepted no responsibility," Sforza brought the whole question directly to the attention of President Roosevelt who, in turn, immediately contacted Winston Churchill He inquired about what he diplomatically called "the stupid story that you promised Trieste to Yugoslavia" and then, after recalling the problems of 1919 asked the British Prime Minister whether he would consider releasing a public

statement to the effect "that no postwar peace commitments as to territories, populations or economics [had] been given." Such a statement was never released because, as British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan later explained to Sumner Welles, no such commitments had been made. All the Yugoslavs had been told was "that at the conclusion of the war the subject of jurisdiction over Istria was a matter which might well come up for reconsideration" and this, Cadogan concluded, clearly did not constitute "a firm commitment." [22]

Whatever the case, at the peace conference the new Yugoslav leaders would not need to remind the British of the vaguely worded promise to the old Royal Government, the subject of jurisdiction over Istria having already largely been solved on the battlefield. It is also unlikely that the British would have reacted positively in any case. Their attitude had changed drastically: what could be given to a monarchic government would not be given to a communist one. The episode nevertheless was significant for two reasons. First, it foreshadowed even greater differences of opinion between the United States and Great Britain on military and political questions, especially concerning southeastern Europe. Second, it reinforced in the minds of Italian political leaders an image of a Great Britain that, like the "perfidious Albion" promoted by the rhetoric of Fascism, would continue to oppose Italian interests anywhere, particularly in the Mediterranean.

The Crisis of May 1945

What follows is a historical account of the first international crisis over Trieste. Since this study focuses on Italian crisis

decision-making and Italy was not a crisis actor in 1945, the ICB model is not applied. The fact that only the United States, Great Britain and Yugoslavia were crisis actors does not mean, however, that Italian decision-makers did not perceive a foreign policy crisis or play any role at all in it. They did not play a direct role because the country was under Allied military occupation, hence they had little or no autonomy. Shortly after the Allies landed in Sicily in July 1943, the Fascist government was overthrown by an internal coup On September 8 the new military government of Marshal Pietro Badoglio signed the terms of surrender. As a result of Italy's collapse, southern Italy passed under the rule of the AMG, while the rest of the country, including the Julian region, came under the effective control of German forces Under these conditions, the only way Italian decision-makers could react to the perceived threat of a Yugoslav occupation of the Julian region was to pressure the Allies to act on their behalf. [23]

Italian decision-makers were, indeed, the first to experience a rise in threat perception. The situation in the Julian region became a matter of concern for the Italian government as early as the summer of 1944. The problem was not so much the presence of Nazi forces there as the fact that they might soon be driven out by Yugoslav partisans which would, in all likelihood, mean the loss of that region for Italy. Consequently, Italian decision-makers started to bring pressure to bear on the Allies to convince them of the necessity of occupying the entire region before the forces of Marshal Tito did so In two letters to Ellery W. Stone (Deputy Chief of the Allied Control Commission of the AMG), one written by Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Giovanni Visconti Venosta on August 15 and the other by Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi on September 14, it was pointed out that the Allies were bound to do so by the terms of the armstice and the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The authors also maintained that, given the intensity with which the Julian problem was felt in Italy, Allied occupation was necessary to avoid the dangerous resurgence of nationalist feelings and acts of violence which were likely to ensue if Tito's partisans reached

the region first. They made it clear that Italy expected to retain its 1939 borders at the peace conference. "The Italian Royal Government," it was stated, "considers the Julian region to be an integral part of its national territory which cannot therefore be altered without its direct participation and its freely expressed assent." The Allies were reminded of the Italian contribution to the cause of the Entente in World War I, of its six hundred thousand dead and one million wounded and of the Rapallo Italian-Yugoslav border agreement which had been freely arrived at. Finally, it was pointed out that Italy was currently in a position of military inferiority and had to rely on the Allies to defend her cause; the latter should, however, fully understand the importance of doing so given the strategic significance of Italy's position in the Mediterranean and in Europe. [24]

These arguments did bear fruit in Washington. American policy toward the Julian region slowly began, in fact, to be justified in predominantly political terms, directly related to domestic political stability in Italy. Thus officials at the State Department argued, in a memorandum prepared on September 16 and later approved by President Roosevelt, that "AMG be extended to all Italian metropolitan territory within its 1939 frontiers" because "any other course such as letting the Tito forces occupy the Istrian peninsula ... would cause deep resentment on the part of the Italian people and result in the loss of considerable prestige by the Allies in Italy." [25]

The possibility of an Allied landing in the Julian region was discussed both before and after the invasion of Normandy and was strongly advocated by Churchill. Although he buttressed his position exclusively with military arguments, political motivations also must have been in his mind since, by this time, he was already alarmed by the Red Army's advance into Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Roosevelt, however, feared that any "Balkan entanglement" could be misinterpreted by American public opinion as an abandonment of the policy which regarded a speedy military victory against the Nazi enemy as the first priority. To American ears, moreover, British arguments to increase the

importance of the Mediterranean theater of operations, although couched in strategic terms, sounded like a thinly disguised effort to help preserve traditional British political interests in the region Instead of the landing in Istria, the Americans pressed for a supporting operation in southern France (Operation Anvil). Their position eventually prevailed [26]

Allied planning for the north of Italy meanwhile began, as it was believed that that area might be reached sooner than it actually was (For Operation Anvil, in fact, some divisions were transferred from Italy and the march of Allied troops toward the north of Italy was stopped throughout the winter of 1944-45 by German resistance along the so-called "Gothic line"). On July 28, 1944, Allied Control Commission (ACC) Deputy Chief Stone asked Allied Forces Headquarters for guidance "on what provinces should be included within ACC/AMG administration on the boundaries of Italy." He was particularly concerned about the Julian region and pointed out that "unless some clear ruling [was] given on the policy to be pursued, unfortunate incidents and complications between the Allied authorities and the Yugoslav forces [were] likely to occur." The State Department, to which the request had been passed, answered Stone and reassured the Italians that "AMG should be extended to all metropolitan Italian territory, as it [was] liberated, within the 1939 frontiers" and that "no military forces other than the Anglo-American forces operating through AMG, should be permitted to administer Italian metropolitan territory" since "any other procedure would prejudice [the] final disposition of territories and settlement of frontiers." [27]

A slight difference existed in the position of the Allies on the question of the establishment of AMG in the Julian region Whereas the Americans failed to (or chose not to) consider the possibility of Yugoslav opposition to this policy, the British were aware of the fact that its implementation implied Yugoslav acquiescence. [28] Thus, in meetings held with Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean in Bolsena on August 10 and with Churchill in Naples

on August 12 and 13, 1944, Tito was informed of the Allied intention of establishing AMG throughout the Julian region. While stating that this was in accordance with the Allied policy of opposing wartime territorial changes, they stressed that AMG in the Julian region was required primarily "to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of the Allied troops of occupation in Central Europe." While not questioning Allied military requirements, Tito "said he could not accept Italian civil administration, and pointed out that his National Liberation Movement already controlled many of [those] areas, and should at least be associated in their administration." [29]

The Allied communication convinced Yugoslav decision-makers that the best way to insure their claim to the region was to occupy it militarily. As Vladimir Velebit (then chief of the Yugoslav military mission in London) would later recall:

> We thought ... that whoever is in the possession of a certain territory has a ninety-nine percent chance of keeping it. ... For this reason we made our preparations to concentrate our troops for the final quick advance against the Germans in a north-western direction, in order to be in Austria and Trieste before the British and American troops. [30]

By November 1944 it became clear from reports sent by Allied field officers operating with Tito's partisans that the Yugoslavs intended to seize the Julian region themselves. These reports greatly alarmed the Foreign Office. The British, in fact, wished to avoid in Yugoslavia a repetition of their experience in Greece, where their troops had been turned against forces of the Left. Churchill, moreover, had by now realized that the Soviets would play a significant role in shaping southeastern Europe. This led him to conclude that to secure British interests in the area he could not rely on military strategy alone. He consequently adopted a Realpolitik approach which called for excluding the Soviets where possible but accomodating them where necessary, even if this inevitably implied a painful reassessment of British objectives. In line with this philosophy, embodied in the so-called "Moscow percentages agreement" of October 1944, the Foreign Office now reached the conclusion that the existing Allied policy toward the Julian region should be revised and a local compromise reached with Tito concerning a

provisional line of demarcation. Such a proposal, which was presented but not discussed at the Yalta Conference, fulfilled Allied military requirements by leaving Trieste and the lines of communication with Austria under AMG control, but conceded the rest of the region to Yugoslav military administration on the basis of ethnic considerations. The British hoped that this compromise would enable them to retain some influence in Yugoslavia (Stalin and Churchill had agreed to a 50-50 split there). The negative impact this compromise would have in Italy was of little concern to them since Italy had been clearly assigned to their sphere of influence and, perceiving her as a potential rival in the Mediterranean, they were not reluctant to treat her as a vanquished nation. [31]

The military also supported the idea of a line of demarcation. While intending to secure his military objectives in the Julian region, Alexander wished nevertheless to avoid the risk of an inter-allied armed clash. In February 1945, prior to a meeting with Tito in Belgrade during which he was to discuss the coordination of possible joint military operations in northeastern Italy, Alexander suggested to American Political Adviser Alexander Kirk that an agreement be reached with Tito on "purely military grounds." Kirk, however, categorically reaffirmed existing American policy. [32] Thus, in his meeting with Tito on February 21, Alexander merely reiterated that, since Allied forces needed the port of Trieste and the lines of communication with Austria, it would be necessary to establish AMG throughout the region. As at the Naples meeting six months earlier, Tito did not question the right of the Allies to bring that part of the Julian region they needed for operational purposes under AMG control, provided they recognized the organs of civil administration that his partisans were establishing as they advanced in Istria. He did ask, however, "why it was necessary to impose military government in the whole of Istria as control of the entire area was not essential for military communication." The minutes of the meeting also reveal that Tito "further implied that he wished eventually, when U S and British forces had departed to take over all

northeastern Italy east of the Isonzo." [33] Alexander, realizing that Tito's partisans were likely to reach Trieste before his own armies did, now advised the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) of the need to compromise. This time he suggested that the Yugoslavs be invited to participate in the AMG of the Julian region. The Americans, however, continued to be adamantly opposed to any change in their policy. Their position was that Tito had been told what they intended to do in the area and expected him to cooperate. No contingency plan was developed to implement their policy in the event of Tito's refusal. [34]

Italian Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi and Foreign Minister Alcide De Gasperi, for their part, were keeping the pressure on, repeatedly asking for reassurances as to the continued standing of Allied policy. They emphasized, moreover, the fact that they were constantly reassuring Italian public opinion in this sense and that, consequently, failure to occupy and establish AMG in the Julian region would spell doom for both their political future and Allied popularity in Italy. [35]

In early March, Churchill's own assessment of the situation changed dramatically. He lost all hope of retaining any influence upon Tito and the future of Yugoslavia. Consequently, his views on the Julian question changed accordingly. As he put it to Eden on March 11:

> My feeling is that henceforth our inclination should be to back Italy against Tito. Tito can be left to himself in his mountains to stew in Balkan juice which is bitter.

Following the April 11 Soviet-Yugoslav treaty, Churchill's "feeling" became a deep conviction. He concluded that "nothing [would] wrest Yugoslavia from the Russian grip" and that, consequently, "the harmony of Britain, United States and Italian interests about the Adriatic should henceforth be [British] main themes." Churchill's conversion to the Italian cause in the Julian region was also determined by the desire to acquire, as he put it, "an influence over Italian internal politics as against Communists and wild men." Tito's claims to Istria and Trieste offered, he thought, an excellent opportunity to split the Italian Communists He had "lost [his] relish for Yugoslavia" but hoped the Allies "[could] still save Italy from the Bolshevik pestilence."

Eden and the Foreign Office, however, continued to subscribe to the view of the military that a realistic compromise with Tito was necessary if only because his partisans were likely to occupy the area first. [36]

Thus, while the Yugoslav forces started their advance toward Trieste (March 20), Allied policy toward the disputed territory was still very general and, worse, lacked unity. A more specific plan was approved by he Anglo-American Combined Civil Affairs Committee on April 12, the day of President Roosevelt's death. AMG was still to be established throughout the Julian region but was now to work "through local authorities ... of whatever nationality." Soviet concurrence was to be sought, if necessary, to convince the Yugoslavs to withdraw their military forces from the area This was obviously a hurried and ill-developed compromise plan that attempted to reconcile all existing points of view on the question. This is evidenced by the fact that the U.K. and U.S. governments were said to be still "considering [the] best method of seeking Soviet cooperation and subsequent Yugoslav agreement." [37]

By the end of April it became clear to everyone that the Yugoslavs would soon be in firm military control of the whole region After breaking German defenses, in fact, they were heading toward Trieste--which seemed clearly to take precedence over Ljubljana These developments triggered a rise in threat perception on the part of the Allies, marking the onset of the pre-crisis period Their objective of establishing AMG in the Julian region was most likely going to be openly challenged by Tito once his troops occupied the area The Allies, in this case, would be confronted with the unhappy choices of either revising their official policy or confronting the Yugoslavs

The various Allied decision-makers reacted differently to the new situation Alexander now had an objective reason to buttress what had been his preferred option all along He concluded that, under these circumstances, the Allied objective was no longer realistic and argued for military realities to prevail over political considerations He did not want to risk "drifting," as he put it, "into a state of war with

Tito." On April 26, therefore, he informed the CCS that unless he received different instructions it was his intention, contrary to the Allied official plan, to establish AMG only in "those parts of Venezia Giulia which [were] of importance to [his] military operations." Kirk immediately manifested to the State Department his concerns about what he defined as the "not too sanguine" attitude of the military--which was, in his opinion, all too easily resigning to the Yugoslav "fait accompli." Churchill contacted Truman on the 27th, arguing that it was also "vital to get Trieste" in order to keep political developments in Italy under control. He thought that "there [was] not a minute to waste." The Allies ought to get there "before Tito's guerrillas [were] in occupation" because, he pointed out, "possession is nine points of the law." Once in control of the city, one could also "talk about the rest of the province." [38]

American decision-makers in Washington, for their part, saw no urgency in the situation and decided to await developments in the field before taking action of any sort. Indeed, contrary to Alexander, Kirk and Churchill, they did not seem to perceive a sharp rise in threat until April 30 Thus, on the 28th, with the approval of Truman and the State Department, the CCS turned down Alexander's suggestion and instructed him to "proceed according to plan and establish AMG throughout the region." He was also to inform Tito of his intentions and explain to him that if any Yugoslav forces remained in the area they must of necessity come under his command. In case Yugoslav forces failed to cooperate Alexander, was instructed to consult with the CCS before taking further action [39]

The War Department, however, shared Alexander's apprehensions about the plan. Thus, on April 30, Secretary of War Henry Stimson tried to force a clarification with the State Department. He told Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew that his staff felt they were "taking chances in following Alexander in what he [was] to do and [were] inclined to stay off completely " He had convinced them that, for the time being, they should follow the State Department policy on this

matter. However, "since ... the United States [had] little or no military interest in the [Julian region] once the Germans [had been] eliminated therefrom," the establishment of AMG in the area became a political matter. Stimson pointed out that "the problem of just how much force [should] be used against the Yugoslavs and against the Russians, if they cooperate[d] with the Yugoslavs, [might] quickly become pressing"; hence, he requested that "the State Department furnish clear-cut guidance at once."

This question was addressed later the same day at a White House meeting between President Truman, Acting Secretary of State Grew, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy Admiral William Leahy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State William Phillips and Director of the Office of European Affairs Freeman Matthews. Grew told Truman that Yugoslav partisans already appeared to have occupied Trieste (both Radio Belgrade and Radio London having announced one day prematurely, shortly after noon on the 30th, that Yugoslav forces had entered Trieste) and that the Allies "might therefore be faced with the question of whether to use American troops to compel Tito's forces to withdraw." Rallying around the sentiments of the military, Grew said that the State Department "felt it would be most unwise" to do so. The President promptly concurred. He then sent an answer to Churchill, who meanwhile had restated the need for speedy action, even suggesting that Alexander should "try to take possession of Trieste from the sea," reassuring him that Alexander had "all the guidance he need[ed]." He informed Churchill about the CCS' instructions to Alexander of April 28, emphasizing the passage which urged him to consult with the CCS before taking further action should the Yugoslavs fail to cooperate. This was important, Truman pointed out, because he wished to avoid having "American forces used to fight Yugoslav forces or for political purposes in the Balkans." [40]

Alexander's orders on April 30 to General Mark Clark of the 15th Army Group, a detachment of which was marching on Trieste, were limited to the fulfillment of purely military objectives. Clark was to secure

"Trieste and L. of C. [lines of communication] through Italy leading to it ... L. of C. from Trieste to Austria via Gorizia-Tarvisio, .. Pola, anchorages between Trieste and Pola, and L. of C between those ports." Alexander must have felt the situation was fraught with danger. In instructing Clark to "continue operations against the enemy until [he had] completely cleared Venezia Giulia," he recommended, in fact, that "in linking up with regular Yugoslavs, maximum care to ... avoid armed clashes" should be exercised. As instructed, however, he did inform Tito of his intentions to establish AMG throughout the Julian region. Tito replied that the situation had now changed: Yugoslav troops had already liberated the area and were about to make the final attack on Trieste. He further specified that their operational zone went west of Trieste as far as the Isonzo river and that it was on this line that he expected his troops to link up with the Allied ones. The Allies obviously could use the ports of Trieste and Pula (Pola) and the lines of communication to Austria but he made it clear that he expected that Yugoslav "military and civil authorities [would] naturally continue to function." [41]

In Trieste, meanwhile, Italian partisans rose against the Germans on April 30. Yugoslav troops entered the city on May 1. One German garrison, however, resisted until the following day and surrendered to the Second New Zealand Division of the British Eighth Army which reached Trieste on May 2. After linking up with Tito's partisans at Monfalcone (Tržič) on May 1, Allied forces had gone on to Trieste despite Yugoslav warnings not to do so. The Yugoslavs had won "the race for Trieste" and clearly did not intend to let Alexander take over. [42]

Tito's negative reply to Alexander's request, which reached London on May 1 and Washington on May 2, triggered a crisis for Great Britain and the United States. As Matthews put it to Grew when telling him the news: "We will soon be facing the issue we feared." Now it was certain that the original plan could not be carried out without confronting the Yugoslavs The probability of involvement in military hostilities was indeed perceived as being very high, even in the absence of a clear

challenge to Tito. As Secretary of War Stimson put it, "the danger of a clash between [Allied] forces and those of Marshal Tito was very real." Although Alexander had "instructions to avoid hostilities, fighting only in defense," Stimson was of the opinion that "when men of different races were wandering around with different ideas and one of the races was Yugoslav, then the situation was explosive." Abandoning the plan bore other dangers. These, for the moment, were perceived exclusively as "serious outbursts" in Italy, where American troops might have to be called upon to keep order, and on the part of the "large and influential Italian-American population." In informing Truman of the recent developments on May 4, Grew briefed him extensively on the background of the dispute, but made no recommendations. Although the situation now seemed to call for some new initiatives if the official plan was to be implemented, none was considered. American policy supposedly remained the same. [43]

Meanwhile, events were developing rapidly in Trieste. The fact that Allied troops had entered Trieste against Yugoslav wishes had triggered a crisis for Yugoslavia (where the onset of pre-crisis and crisis periods coincided). On May 3, Tito sent a message to Alexander protesting that his forces had "entered Trieste, Gorizia and Monfalcone, the cities which [had] been liberated by the Yugoslav army." At the same time General Jakšić, Chief of Staff of the Fourth Yugoslav Army, sent a message to General Bernard Freyberg, the commander of the New Zealand division, requesting in rather categorical terms that "Allied troops immediately ... withdraw to [the] west bank [of the] river Isonzo and that Allied military authorities not mix in Yugoslav internal affairs." If the request was not immediately complied with, Jakšić warned that the Yugoslavs would not be responsible for anything that might happen. Alexander had already sent a message to Tito informing him that he was "setting up the necessary organization in Trieste, and elsewhere in the Communications Zone" and expressing the hope that "no inconvenience from the joint presence of [their] troops in the same area [would] arise." Confronted with Yugoslav resistance to even his limited

military objectives, Alexander sent a strongly-worded answer to Tito on the 4th, in which he expressed his "astonishment at [Tito's] apparent failure to honor the agreement [they had] made in Belgrade" and suggested that their chiefs of staff meet as soon as possible "to bring [that] conflict of views to a conclusion satisfactory to [them] both" and announced that he had "ordered [his] troops to maintain their present positions in the Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia areas." Tito answered on May 5

> I am keeping my word given in Belgrade, namely that you may use the ports of Trieste and Pula as well as the line of communications leading towards Austria for supplying your troops My troops have been ordered to hold the whole of the occupied territory and not to impede in any way your troops on their way toward Austria along the L of C. foreseen by the agreement. The port of Trieste is also at your disposal. [44]

Alexander now wrote the CCS that he was "quite certain" he could not establish AMG "without the use of force." Tito's "adherents" were "in complete control of civil administration." To disarm them would have been impossible "unless carried out by strong military force which would [have been] tantamount to setting off gunpowder." In view of Tito's reply, Alexander called a meeting to discuss the next step. Kirk and Harold MacMillan, Acting Chief of the ACC/AMG for Italy, were part of it. Alexander suggested that he send his Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Morgan to Belgrade to negotiate a "purely military agreement" that would "in no way affect long-term policy regarding [those] territories " Alexander's suggestion was merely a resurrection of his idea of a demarcation line that he had thought should be discussed with Tito at their February meeting. He required the port of Trieste and the road and rail communications from Trieste via Gorizia to Villach. The territory west of this line would come under AMG administration, although he pledged to make "full use ... of any Jugoslav civil administration already set up and working satisfactorily." Yugoslav regular forces, however, should gradually be withdrawn and partisans disarmed and disbanded [45]

The demarcation line Alexander had wanted to propose in February apparently included territory within a fifteen mile radius of Trieste.

The one he was now advancing undoubtedly was affected by the military situation that had come to prevail meanwhile. The port of Pula, for instance, and the anchorages between Trieste and that port were no longer mentioned Kirk strongly argued against Alexander's suggestion. He deemed it particularly dangerous because it would inevitably "be construed as committing [the Allies] in one way or another with regard to policy toward the fate of that area." He also insisted that any deviation from the official plan "should first be approved by the CCS and by the two governments in Washington and London " MacMillan, for his part, pointed out to him that the official plan had, for all practical purposes, become "out of date" the moment President Truman had "made it clear that he wishe[d] to avoid the carrying out of any action which might possibly lead to fighting between Yugoslav and American troops " 46

On May 7, the CCS agreed to Alexander's proposal on condition that he "make it abundantly clear that this agreement [was] purely military and ensure that Tito understood that it [did] not affect the ultimate disposal of any prewar Italian territory which [would] be a matter to be decided at the peace settlement." This, however, could be little more than the expression of a well-meaning intention, a face-saving clause inserted to allow the State Department to maintain that it still adhered to the spirit, if not the letter, of its original policy On May 2, Kirk had, in fact, requested that the Italian government "be placed in a position to reassure the country that whatever de facto developments [might] occur on a purely military level such events should not be regarded as indicating a policy prejudicial to an eventual just settlement of territorial arrangements affecting Italy " 47

Morgan met with Tito on May 8. The Marshal refused Alexander's proposal As Alexander reported to the CCS, Tito maintained that the matter had for him a "predominantly political significance " Since "his troops had liberated [a] territory which [was] Slovenian he considered that they had a right to occupy it as an allied army on account of their services and sacrifices in the allied cause." Alexander could use the

port of Trieste and the lines of communication he needed, but the Yugoslavs would not relinquish the administration of the area. However, as a compromise solution, Tito suggested the establishment of a joint commission to coordinate and control all matters of military interest in the area. Alexander's attempt to resolve the issue at the military level had failed He told Tito that "since [his] counter-proposals raise[d] a political issue, [he] now [had to] refer the whole question to the British and American governments." He would continue to use the port and maintain his forces in the area meanwhile and trusted that Tito "would take steps to insure that no regrettable incidents [would] occur." [48]

The matter was now squarely back in the hands of the politicians and diplomats Their starting point, however, could be nothing other than what the soldiers were leaving them with. And in the Julian region the military situation was such that even the implementation of Alexander's limited objective, not to mention the official plan, required an open confrontation with a former ally. To be sure, some officials (such as Kirk, for instance) had been advocating a strong-arm policy all along. Being continuously reminded by De Gasperi, especially after May 1, that the Italian government expected the "firmness which the situation demanded" from the Allies in the Julian region, on May 4, for instance, he had reported that "the current developments affecting Trieste and Venezia Giulia .. not only seriously endanger[ed] any possibility of equilibrium in Italy at the moment of liberation of the north but [were] bound to reflect to the grave detriment of Allied authority." Under these circumstances, he concluded that "a departure from a strong stand while the Allies [had] the military power on the spot [would] only operate against the establishment of future stability in Europe."

Because Kirk's reports had emphasized the risks that a Yugoslav occupation of Trieste allegedly posed to domestic political stability in Italy, his pleas to stick to the plan of establishing AMG throughout the Julian region sounded too much like part of a policy of rebuilding Italy

which the military did not regard with a very sympathetic eye It thus could be dismissed by Secretary of War Stimson as "another case of these younger men, the subordinates in the State Department, asking dangerous things." Kirk, however, struck a more sensitive chord in a despatch sent on May 8. By likening Tito's arguments for his occupation of Trieste to those advanced by the "Japs" before Manchuria, by Mussolini prior to his invasion of Abyssinia and by Hitler before the entire series of Nazi attacks, he suggested that Yugoslav action in Trieste represented the first act of postwar aggression. The issue at stake was therefore larger than merely the territory concerned

> I do not see how we as a nation can meet our responsibilities before the world unless we challenge in no uncertain terms Tito's championship of illegal methods and convince him that the course which he is initiating will entail consequences of far reaching significance. [49]

Notwithstanding the dissenting opinion of the military, [50] Kirk's arguments played an important role in Washington. While the CCS, prevailing for the last time, gave their approval to Alexander's request for a limited military agreement with Tito, the State Department, taking Kirk's argument even further, was hard at work to make its case that, "although the stability of Italy and the future orientation of that country with respect to Russia might well be at stake," the Trieste issue was

> not a question of taking steps in a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia, or of becoming involved in internal Balkan politics ... [but] essentially one of deciding whether we are going to permit the Soviet Government . to operate through its satellite Yugoslavia in the Mediterranean theater, to set up whatever states and boundaries look best for the future power of the U.S.S.R.

The problem of Trieste was now seen through an analytical framework and posed in a language clearly prototypical of the Cold War Securing complete Anglo-American control of Trieste, in other words, was important not only to strengthen the democratic political forces in Italy, as Kirk had repeated ad nauseam, but also and primarily to impede Soviet expansion into a strategic area which fell within the Western sphere of influence. [51]

On May 10, Grew submitted a memorandum to Truman It reported the

State Department's views as they had coalesced in recent days and introduced what could be seen as the first formulation of the domino and containment theories. The Trieste question had become the most important item on the agenda, as it symbolized a larger problem in East-West relations. "Yugoslav (Russian) occupation of Trieste," Grew argued, "would have most far reaching consequences beyond the immediate territory involved." Tito had "an identical claim ready for South Austria (a large portion of Carinthia and Styria) and [might] have similar designs on parts of Hungary and Greece, if his methods in the Julian region succeed[ed]." The presentation closed on a dramatic note:

> At a time when we have at last achieved military victory in Europe and have a force of millions of men in arms on that continent, we must decide if we will acquiesce in unilateral action by force as a method of drawing the future boundaries of Western Europe. .. Tito's acquiescence to even an unsatisfactory minimum [his refusal to accept Alexander's demarcation line] now seems questionable. In these circumstances we may be faced with the necessity of withdrawing completely from this area, with all of its consequences, or of implementing our present policy by threat of force to secure complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pula, the keys to the region "

In short, Grew implied, Trieste was another Munich in the making. The United States had to stand firm. At a meeting that same morning with Grew, Phillips and Assistant Secretary of State Julius C. Holmes, the President decided that there was no alternative but to "throw them out." 52

The fact that the politicians and diplomats had regained the upper hand in policy-making did not mean, however, that the military had lost all influence Thus, throwing the Yugoslavs out of Trieste did not necessarily imply continued and complete adherence to the original plan. The following day (May 11), at a meeting between the President, Grew, Phillips, Lehay and Army Chief of Staff General George C Marshall, it was decided that the Allies would not seek the complete evacuation of the region by Yugoslav forces but the more limited objective that "Alexander obtain complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pola, the line of communication through Gorizia and Monfalcone, and an area sufficiently to the east of this line to permit proper administrative control "

This line was selected as a compromise with the military Although Truman later told Churchill that he believed "this [was] the minimum [they] should insist upon," he also added that he considered it "adequate." The use of this adjective would appear to make sense only in reference to the fulfillment of a military objective. The area requested certainly would not have been "adequate" had the objective been continued adherence to the original plan. Moreover, the line more or less corresponded to the one Alexander had intended to suggest to Tito the previous February. The military had manifested a clear unwillingness to use force against an ally for the fulfillment of a political objective but was less reluctant to do so for the attainment of what was regarded as a necessary military requirement [53] The official policy based on the abstract principles of the Atlantic Charter was thus quietly put aside and a new, more pragmatic, one adopted [54]

During the meeting it was also decided, upon Marshall's suggestion, that "before Alexander was given any definite instructions with regard to action" an attempt should be made through the American and British representatives in Belgrade to convince the Yugoslav government by diplomatic means. Truman then informed Churchill of the decisions and urged him to "be prepared to consider any necessary steps to effect Tito's withdrawal." The message could not have fallen on more eager ears: "I need not say," Churchill recalled in his memoir, "how relieved I was to receive this invaluable support from my new companion." He immediately started to select the divisions to be put at Alexander's disposal in the event of hostilities. Truman calmed him down. Before deciding what divisions to authorize for use, he thought they should wait for Tito's answer to their joint request. Force, moreover, should be used only in self-defense "Unless Tito's forces should attack," he told Churchill, "it is impossible for me to involve this country in another war." They also informed Stalin of recent developments and the step they were about to take in Belgrade [55]

The British and American ambassadors in Belgrade met with Tito on the evening of the 15th. Tito's only reaction was to complain that

"Yugoslavia was evidently [considered] a third class ally which did not enjoy the same rights as other classes of allies." A written answer was given on the 18th. In it the Yugoslav government reiterated that "the Allied Forces [could] use the port of Trieste and the communication running from Trieste via Gorizia to Tarvisio" but refused to withdraw its forces from the area, pointing out that "as a belligerent [it had] all the rights to hold [it] till the final decision at the peace conference [was] taken." [56]

Churchill esteemed that "immediate action" was now necessary lest the Allies appear "to have been bluffing" and thus, in fact, be "bluffed out." To him, military action taken by Alexander to convince the Yugoslavs "to quit Trieste and Pola and return to the lines marked out" should not be regarded as "a war with the Yugoslavs" but rather "as in the nature of frontier incidents." Churchill's bold suggestion was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that "it was generally agreed" by all Allied diplomats that "Tito was not very sure of himself and it was not believed that Stalin would give him unlimited support." Truman proposed a more cautious course. They should urge Tito to reconsider his decision, while Alexander would be instructed immediately "to reinforce his troops in the disputed area so that [the Allied] preponderance of force in those areas and the firmness of [their] intentions [would] be clearly apparent to the Yugoslavs." He also sent another message to Stalin urging him to use his "influence" to convince Tito to accept the provisional settlement suggested by the Allies. [57]

The show of force, however, turned out to be unnecessary. On May 21, Ambassador Patterson cabled Washington that at 11:00 a.m. the Yugoslav Foreign Office had transmitted him a written note which stated that "the Yugoslav government agree[d] to the establishment of AMG, under the authority of SACMED [Supreme Allied Command-Mediterranean], in the Slovene Littoral area on the basis of the demarcation line proposed by Field Marshal Alexander." From then on this line would be known as the "Morgan line." [58] Yugoslav acceptance of Allied requests marked the end of the crisis period and the beginning of the post-crisis period for

all crisis actors.

The reason for prompt Yugoslav acquiescence seems to be that Tito lacked Soviet support and therefore did not think it advisable to risk an armed confrontation with the Allies. In answering the Anglo-American communications, in fact, Stalin paid lip-service to the Yugoslav position but agreed in principle to a demarcation line mutually agreed upon by Alexander and Tito. Moreover, he made it clear that he did not wish to be drawn into the dispute, closing his message by simply expressing the hope that the "misunderstanding [would] be eliminated and the whole matter favorably settled" soon. [59]

The Yugoslavs regarded the Allied request to evacuate Trieste as an "ultimatum" and deeply resented the absence of Soviet support Their decision of May 21, 1945 can indeed be regarded as a very important milestone on the road that would lead first to the 1948 split with the Soviet Union and later to the formulation of the nonalignment policy As Tito put it in a mass rally in Ljubljana on May 27.

> We demand that everyone shall be master in his own house, we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest

The Soviets later explained their lack of action by saying that the only way Yugoslavia could have gained Trieste was to have taken it by force, thereby starting a war with the Anglo-Americans. "The Yugoslav comrades could not fail to realize," they pointed out, "that after such a hard war the U.S.S.R could not enter another " [60]

While accepting Alexander's demarcation line, Tito had asked that Yugoslav representatives be included in the AMG, that units of his army remain in Trieste, although under Allied command, and that the AMG act through the civil authorities already established in the area He had also requested that negotiations on these points start immediately Following the Yugoslav backdown, Churchill was of the opinion that, the situation having now changed in favor of the Allies, "stricter terms" than those proposed by Alexander should be demanded In any case, he saw "no reason to help Marshal Tito to find a face saving escape " Consequently, he suggested that no further discussions with the

Yugoslavs take place and that the immediate acceptance of the terms contained in the joint representation of May 15 be demanded. [61]

Having obtained a political victory by securing Yugoslav agreement in principle, however, the State Department had already decided to leave the details of a settlement to the Supreme Allied Command. On May 22 and 23, Alexander, who had meanwhile reinforced his troops, occupied the area he claimed without waiting for an agreement. The Yugoslavs protested such "unilateral action," given the fact that they had already manifested their intention to come to a mutual understanding. Alexander could not agree to the participation of Yugoslav officers in AMG, although he had no objection to a small mission being attached as observers Although he was prepared to have AMG work through Yugoslav civil authorities "wherever they were functioning satisfactorily," he made it clear that he wanted AMG to have the right to use whatever civil authorities considered best in any particular place and to change administrative personnel whenever it liked. A draft agreement (later known as the "Belgrade agreement") was submitted to the Yugoslav government on June 2. It was fully accepted and signed on June 9, 1945. [62] The crisis was now over. On June 10, Yugoslav troops started to withdraw beyond the Morgan line into what subsequently would be referred to as Zone B of the Julian region. Two days later, the Allies proceeded to set up AMG in their own zone.

Throughout this period the Italians could do little but try to influence developments by pressuring the Allies, and the Americans in particular, to stick to their promise of establishing AMG throughout the Julian region. This was done, at a high level, through repeated personal interventions with Allied military and diplomatic officials by Prime Minister Bonomi and Foreign Minister De Gasperi. Their arguments, which had originally relied almost exclusively on the negative repercussions that yielding to the Yugoslav coup de main would have in Italy, came progressively to be based (as was reflected also in Kirk's messages to the State Department) on more universal reasons. Thus, on June 6, for instance, De Gasperi told Kirk that rumors about

Allied-Yugoslav negotiations concerning a demarcation line caused "grave anxiety and worry." Such a division, he protested, would betray the promise that all of the Julian region would be entrusted to Anglo-American administration. Even worse, by rewarding Yugoslav aggression, it would compromise the "fundamental principle" that violence had no place in the new rules of international conduct. Yet, because he assumed that the demarcation line would be the "Wilson line" (by this time a quasi-consensus had been reached within the Cabinet that Italy would accept this line as her new eastern border), he only requested that the Allies insist on a mixed administration in the zone to the east of that line. When he realized that the Morgan line did not correspond to the Wilson line but cut further into "the Italian body already so wounded," he tried to convince the Allies to claim the towns between the two lines. (Art. 3 of the Belgrade agreement did, in fact, leave to Alexander's discretion the matter of which areas on the West coast of Istria between Trieste and Pula should come under AMG control.) [63]

Alexander, however, had no intention of claiming additional areas in western Istria which he did not need for military operations. In fact, originally, he did not even "wish or consider it desirable to take over Pula or the lines of communication from Trieste to Pula", only pressures from the State Department and Churchill had convinced him to include Pula in the Belgrade agreement. On June 20, Morgan met with Tito's chief of staff, General Arso Jovanović, in Duino (Devin), near Trieste, to conclude a supplementary accord arranging the detailed implementation of the Belgrade agreement. The accord established rules for human and economic movement between the two zones but left the demarcation line untouched. [64]

The Julian question had now been shelved, to be taken up again at the peace conference. Italian decision-makers, however, felt they had to continue to press "with all means and in all ways" because, as De Gasperi put it in a telegram to the embassies in Washington and London on June 23,

> There are serious reasons to be worried that the present line of demarcation may represent an experiment for a definitive solution. We should, therefore, avoid having the problem crystallize in the terms in which it has been posed until today and the impression forming there that the current solution might, after all, be considered by us to be equitable and acceptable. [65]

Trieste at the Paris Peace Conference

After June 1945 the politics of the Cold War provided the framework in which the future of Trieste was debated and decided by the major powers. The city became but a pawn on the chessboard that would eventually include the whole world. As John C. Campbell would later recall, by the time it reached the Council of Foreign Ministers (at its London meeting in September 1945):

> The Trieste thing was important because it had become, in world opinion, a test place for East-West relations, a U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the issues. Ethnic composition of the precise boundaries were not so important as one side or the other being able to claim some kind of victory. [66]

The problem proved to be even more intractable because the area in question fell precisely on the boundary line between the two emerging blocs. Indeed the ethnic, economic and historic arguments submitted by Italy and Yugoslavia were hardly of any consequence. [67] On September 19, American Secretary of State James Byrnes suggested that a four-power commission of experts be appointed to study the problem and recommend a border based primarily on ethnic criteria while also taking economic factors into consideration [68]

The commission visited the Julian region in the spring of 1946. Not surprisingly, each of the four experts recommended a different boundary line So two claims, four proposals and a temporary military demarcation line were now on the table Moving from east to west, one

first encountered the Italian claim (which basically coincided with the so-called Wilson line of 1919), then the American, British, French and Soviet proposals and, finally, the Yugoslav claim which ran very close to the Soviet proposal North of Trieste, all three Allied proposals ran west of the Morgan line but crossed it just east of the city to assign Italy either some or all of the western coast of the Istrian peninsula (in the French and English cases, respectively) or (in the American case) part of the eastern one, as well (see fig 5). [69]

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any direct interest in the issue per se; yet both felt obliged to stand behind the claims of Italy and Yugoslavia, respectively, because of their mirror-image perceptions of broader Cold War exigencies As American Ambassador in Moscow Walter Bedell Smith put it to Italian Ambassador Pietro Quaroni. "We care little about the Trieste question, in itself If we defend the Italian point of view, this is only because of its repercussions on the domestic political situation." Thus, while American relations with Yugoslavia had steadily deteriorated with the burgeoning conviction that the country had become but a Soviet satellite, the feeling had grown that "if Italy were to be preserved as a 'bastion of democracy' in the Mediterranean," as Ellery Stone, now ACC Chief Commissioner put it, "it was necessary for the United States and British Governments to ensure that a harsh peace be not applied " He thought that "the ground in Italy [was] fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an anarchical [sic] movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence." The only hope of stopping "communistic [sic] growth" was "to assist Italy economically and to lift her morale by admitting her to a position of respectability in the family of nations." In this context he specifically suggested that "she should be treated as a junior partner in the Mediterranean, a role to which," he maintained, "all Italians--with the exception of those under the domination of Moscow--sincerely aspire[d] " [70]

Italian decision-makers did not miss any opportunity to emphasize these concerns. The only way they could try to influence the

deliberations of the Council of Foreign Ministers was, in fact, by bringing pressures on the Americans who seemed to be the only ones ready to extend a helping hand. [71] Since Italy's problems were regarded as "a completely secondary, and almost incidental, aspect of an infinitely greater political game," as Alberico Casardi, one of the Italian delegates to the Council of Foreign Ministers, put it in one of his reports from the London session, Italian decision-makers made as close and as explicit a linkage as possible between Italian problems (the Julian question, colonies and reparations) and those facing the U.S., if not western civilization as a whole. They tried to present Italy as the place where the East-West game was currently being played and would perhaps be decided De Gasperi constantly reminded those who tried to minimize the Trieste problem of Danzig and Pearl Harbor. He and Italian Ambassador in Washington Alberto Tarchiani incessantly repeated that any territorial amputation in the Julian region would not only represent an international victory for the Soviets but would also "provoke a domestic political and psychological crisis with catastrophic consequences" for the future of the "democratic" forces in Italy. Warnings were intermingled with occasional positive reinforcement. Thus, in June 1946 Tarchiani told Byrnes that the "promising results" in the elections for the Constituent Assembly were in no small degree due to "the active friendship of the United States and, above all, the firm stand taken in favor of the retention by Italy of the Italian city of Trieste." He then added that Italy "now look[ed] confidently to the United States of America .. for a sound and lasting solution of her problems" at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. [72]

The Italians took Talleyrand as their model because, as Quaroni later wrote, "when the winner is a coalition, the hope of the vanquished is always that of succeeding in inserting himself in the disagreements among the members of the coalition " Thus De Gasperi did not disdain to send occasional hints to the Allies that he might have to review, although unwillingly, his staunch pro-Western policy, if it did not prove to have the expected rate of return on investment In July 1946,

for instance, he argued with David McKendree Key, American charge in Rome, that "unjust peace terms" would provoke an "important rightward swing toward extreme nationalism." At the same time he warned that future public opinion could be responsive to the Communist contention that "closer and more friendly relations with [the] U S S R would have aided [a] favorable solution of many of the treaty problems and that disappointment in that respect could be laid to Italy's past policy of close collaboration with [the] Western powers." American diplomatic officials stationed in Italy would invariably concur fully in these assessments. On this occasion, for instance, Key reported that "failure to recognize [the] legitimate Italian ethnic and economic interests in the Julian region . [would] create [a] national atmosphere so unhealthy that [the] possibilities of [the] young republic developing in [a] normal and democratic manner [would] indeed be slight." [73]

The deadlock in the Council of Foreign Ministers was finally broken by a proposal advanced at its Paris meeting by French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault that a temporary international regime under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) be set up for the contended city. The suggestion was at first received very cautiously by the three other members of the Council The Anglo-Americans, however, eventually took to it because, it would appear, they feared a Yugoslav coup de main if the question was not resolved soon In the atmosphere of those days, when the specter of a Soviet invasion haunted Western Europe, the possibility of this starting with a Yugoslav attack on Trieste was indeed taken very seriously The Soviets, for their part, without consulting with the Yugoslavs, traded their acceptance of the Bidault proposal against Anglo-American agreement to their request for reparations from Italy Support for the claims of the "junior partners" necessarily had to give precedence to the interests of the "senior contenders." As a result of what could be called "high level bargaining" in the new logic of the old War, a solution had thus been found and was easily agreed upon: all the territory east of the French line would be assigned to Yugoslavia; west of the same line the

territory to the north of Monfalcone would go to Italy and that to the south would constitute an international territory known as the Free Territory of Trieste (see fig 6). [74]

Both Italy and Yugoslavia opposed this proposal De Gasperi sent the Council of Ministers a message in which he pointed an accusing finger at Byrnes, reminding him of all the "categorical and binding" assurances about Trieste given so often by so many high level American politicians and diplomats, and warned him that "[his] foreign policy [was] being attacked, and not only by the extremes, because it [had] not taken into adequate consideration the Soviet factor " At the same time, he told Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that "he should convince himself that Italy [did] not intend to be a pawn in any anti-Soviet bloc and to draw from this the logical conclusions." [75]

The Italians also tried to have the FTT solution reversed or amended at the Paris Peace Conference They brought forth the usual arguments about domestic political repercussions, adding this time that no Italian government could ever sign a peace treaty that would not give Trieste to Italy They tried to have the FTT extended to include Pula and to have its formation postponed for a year, but in vain. Notwithstanding the protest of De Gasperi, who had warned against "repeating the mistake of Versailles," on October 10, 1946 a plenary session of the peace conference approved the FTT proposal as recommended by the Council of Foreign Ministers [76]

The Council had not been able, however, to agree on the terms of a statute for the FTT and had appointed a special four-member commission to work out a report The commission came back with four different draft proposals The Anglo-Americans had prepared their draft proposal with an eye on the historic lesson of Danzig They advocated a governor "having almost dictatorial powers," while the Soviets "sought to place control in a popularly elected legislature." As Byrnes later recalled: "We were determined to protect the area from infiltration and similar tactics that would pave the way for a coup aimed at delivering Trieste to Yugoslavia, as Danzig had been delivered to Germany." In the

end, a compromise plan suggested by the French was adopted The FTT was to be governed by an assembly, a council of government and an independent governor chosen by the UN Security Council The post of governor was the crucial one With minor amendments made at the final meeting of the Council of Ministers in New York, it was this version of the statute of the FTT which was formally incorporated into the peace treaty with Italy signed in Paris on February 10, 1947 [17]

On paper, the compromise solution of the FTT seemed sound and wise· it recognized that no precise ethnic line could be drawn in the region; it met the economic needs of the port; and, finally, it removed the major bone of contention--the city of Trieste--from both directly interested countries, entrusting final responsibility for its administration to the Security Council of the UN The whole compromise, however, rested on the assumption that the same countries would find it easier to agree in the Security Council than they had in the Council of Ministers. In reality, as the Cold War entered a harsher phase, compromises (not to mention agreements) would become difficult to work out. The FTT had emerged stillborn. [18]

It was not long, in fact, before it was realized that a governor could never be nominated, since the Soviet Union systematically vetoed any candidate proposed by the Western countries and vice versa Because the governor, according to the Statute, was the only official with power to call elections and thus create the other two bodies, the FTT machinery could never be set in motion. The Allies decided therefore to rely on article 1 of the Provisional Statute of the FTT which provided that, "pending assumption of office by the Governor, the FTT [would] continue to be administered by the Allied military commands within their respective zones." It was also established that ten thousand American and British troops led by General Terence S Airey would remain to remind the Yugoslavs and the Soviets of the Allied commitment to the integrity of the area. Thus, when the peace treaty with Italy came into force on September 15, AMG came to an end in the Julian region and the new Italian-Yugoslav frontier north of Monfalcone came into existence

AMG continued instead to operate in that part of Zone A of the Julian region assigned to the FTT, which from now on would be known as Zone A of the FTT Zone B of the FTT remained under Yugoslav military government (see fig 6). [79]

The arrival of Armageddon already seemed imminent on the morning of September 15 The Yugoslavs had chosen to interpret Article 1 of the Provisional Statute as meaning that, until the appointment of a governor, the FTT should be administered by a joint Anglo-American and Yugoslav military government Thus, at 8 p.m. a Yugoslav officer delivered a note to General Airey stating that, "as agreed by British and American governments," Yugoslav troops would enter Trieste at midnight and establish themselves therein To Airey "these events clearly represent[ed] a carefully planned coup " The Anglo-Americans warned that if Yugoslav troops attempted to enter Trieste they would respond with force On the 16th, the Yugoslav government instructed local military commanders not to enter the city The danger, however, was still perceived to remain, albeit under a different form As Robert P. Joyce, the American political advisor to the AMG, reported to the State Department on September 20, he anticipated "a carefully planned and executed war of nerves against AMG" on the part of the Yugoslavs. [80]

The FTT had by now come to be viewed by the Allies in purely Cold War terms An American presence in Trieste, a military outpost on the border of the Soviet "empire," played a role of deterrence that went far beyond the tiny borders of Zone A The British Labor government, however, did not share this point of view totally. On October 31, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, in line with the policy of general disengagement from traditional British areas of influence, suggested to the State Department "a partition of the Territory by which the Italians would regain sovereignty over what [was] now the Anglo-American zone," thereby relieving the British and American governments of their commitments. American diplomats in the field reacted strongly against such a proposal. Cavendish Cannon, American

ambassador in Belgrade, wrote that the FTT

> has been and remains a proving ground for both American and Soviet intentions Our withdrawal under whatever guise would not mean [the] loss only of Trieste but would be [an] encouragement [of] incalculable proportions to [the] Soviet purpose in [the] world's troubled regions

From Rome, Ambassador James Dunn put forth the usual argument that any immediate Anglo-American initiative in proposing partition 'would be extremely harmful to [American] prestige in Italy ' The State Department therefore replied to Bevin's proposal by agreeing that "the eventual restoration of Trieste to Italy may be the best solution" but added that it should not be attempted "at the present time " [81]

Thus, while both the U S and the U K would continue publicly to make an effort to reach agreement with the U S S R on the selection of an acceptable governor for the FTT, in reality they came to regard the status quo as the best solution while waiting for further developments in the Cold War [82]

The Tripartite Declaration

The communist coup in Czechoslovakia and events in Berlin in the first months of 1948 heightened East-West confrontation and cast an ominous shadow on the Italian elections, which were to be held in April. The Americans were concerned that an electoral victory of the Popular Democratic Front (an electoral alliance of the Communist and Socialist parties) would thrust that strategically important country into the Soviet orbit, a danger that Italian government officials and diplomats continuously overplayed While in late 1947 they had been agitating the specter of an imminent communist coup, in early 1948 they started to argue that the Allies could not simply "watch the Italian election from

the window, almost as if its results were not as important for them, their security and world peace as they were for Italy." As Foreign Minister Sforza put it in a letter of instruction to the Italian ambassadors in London, Paris and Washington, the Allies had to realize that the Italian elections would decide "the fate of Western Europe" and, therefore that this was "no longer a time to wait and see . . as in 1914 and 1938 but to act, and to act in every field, not again to repeat the fatal mistake of too little and too late not to have vain illusions because [they were] all in the same boat." [83]

These appeals had always found a receptive terrain in the State Department, where the Office for European Affairs was well-known for its militant anti-communism Whereas in late 1946 all that was requested "to prevent Italy going Communist" was a long term policy consisting of "a kind word, a loaf of bread, a public tribute to Italian civilization, then another kind word, and so on, with an occasional plug from the sponsors advertising the virtues of democracy American style," now something much more dramatic and capable of working in the very short term was deemed necessary The Italian elections had, in fact, become for American leaders "an apocalyptic test of strength between communism and democracy" which led them to organize an unprecedented effort to influence their outcome. One of the many forms of intervention concerned Trieste It, like most of the others, was solicited by the Italians themselves [84]

On March 1, Ambassador Dunn cabled the State Department from Rome that Italian Foreign Minister Sforza had suggested the previous day that, "purely from the tactical point of view in relation to the electoral campaign," the U S. and Great Britain should recommend publicly the return to Italy of that part of the FTT under their administration. [85] Several weeks earlier the Soviet Union, in a move most likely designed to help the electoral fortunes of the Communists, had released a note in which it had declared itself to be in favor of the return of the pre-Fascist colonies to Italy under the formula of the fiduciary administration. Sforza had immediately requested the Allies

for an equivalent declaration but had met British opposition Now he was asking for a similar statement about Trieste since he maintained that the Russians intended to release one a few days before the elections for maximum electoral effect and, he argued, the Allies should beat them to it The idea of requesting a statement advocating the return of Trieste had apparently come to Italian ambassador in Paris Quaroni when, acting on Sforza's instructions, he had met with Bidault to solicit "Allied action" in the forthcoming elections Quaroni communicated with Sforza, who, in turn, passed the request on to the British and American ambassadors [86]

In the next few days, frantic diplomatic activity took place among the Allies Bidault felt that a statement about the colonies was more important than one on Trieste but met with American and, especially, British resistance For his part, Dunn supported both, feeling that any statement that would serve the interests of Italian democracy also served those of the U S An agreement was finally reached on a tripartite declaration on Trieste The French argued, however, that it should provide for the return of the entire FTT to Italy A declaration concerning only Trieste or Zone A would be of little or no electoral help and, even more important, might not be rejected by the Soviets The Anglo-Americans decided that the choice should be made by the Italians. Thus, on March 15 Dunn asked De Gasperi to assess which proposal would have the greatest electoral impact The Prime Minister "immediately expressed preference for [a] declaration returning [the] whole Free Territory to Italy " He could not fail to see that such a declaration, besides its electoral function, would provide ammunition for Italy's continuing struggle for Trieste [87]

Bidault wished to announce the tripartite declaration himself in a speech he was to give in Turin on March 20 at the signing of the Franco-Italian customs union agreement, since he wanted to make up, as it were, for having suggested the FTT compromise at the Paris Peace Conference Sforza, who apparently had learned of this from Bidault himself, told Dunn on March 18 that since he felt that a declaration "by

the United States and Great Britain would be of greater importance than that of France," he hoped that an announcement by the two governments would be made "no later than simultaneously with any announcement by Bidault." Dunn backed Sforza's request to the hilt [88]

And so it was. On March 20, the tripartite declaration was released to the press. It stated that because a governor for the FTT could not be agreed upon and because of indications that Zone B was slowly being incorporated into Yugoslavia, thereby violating "the desire expressed by the powers to give an independent and democratic status to the territory ... the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France [had] proposed to the Governments of the Soviet Union and Italy that those Governments join in agreement on an additional protocol to the treaty of peace with Italy which would place the Free Territory of Trieste once more under Italian sovereignty." Notes to this effect were sent to the governments of Italy and the Soviet Union, but not to that of Yugoslavia. [89]

The Yugoslav reaction was firm but calm. On March 22, Foreign Minister Stanoje Simić handed Ambassador Cannon a note of protest which basically dismissed the tripartite declaration as a cheap propagandistic electoral ploy not contributing to a solution of the FTT problem but likely to poison future relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. "Simić's only oral observation," Cannon reported, "was to [the] effect that [the] procedure chosen was needlessly offensive to Yugoslavia." A proposal for a revision of the peace treaty with Italy should indeed have been communicated to the other treaty signatories, as well--especially to Yugoslavia, which as administrator of Zone B had a primary and direct concern in the question. The Italians, for their part, obviously accepted the proposal immediately. The Soviet Union ignored it. [90]

By the end of March, Soviet silence started to worry Dunn, who, in a telegram to the State Department on March 30, nervously pointed out that:

> [the] public here may quickly forget that [the] implementation of our proposal depends on [a] reply from [the] USSR. Since

> [the] restitution [of] Trieste [is] already [a] foregone conclusion in [the] popular mind failure to implement [it] may well boomerang against [the] Three Powers unless our position of hopefully waiting for [the] reluctant USSR is constantly kept before [the] Italian public

He hoped that the Department would "find some formula for keeping [the] Trieste issue alive" until the elections, suggesting that either "Department official answer frequent press questions on whether [a] Soviet reply [had been] received" or that frequent reminders be addressed "to [the] USSR Government with appropriate publicity." After overcoming British reluctance, the State Department sent a second note on April 9 urging "an early expression of the views of the Soviet Government." A reply finally came on April 13. It was brief and a little sarcastic. It rejected the tripartite proposal on procedural grounds without any comment on its substance. The peace treaty with Italy had been signed and ratified by twenty-one states, hence its revision "by means of correspondence or the organization of private conferences [was] considered unacceptable as violating the elementary principles of democracy." The U.S. expressed regret, but the issue was not pressed further.[91]

Although designed to help the electoral fortunes of the Christian Democrats,[92] the tripartite declaration inevitably publicly committed the Allies to supporting the return of the FTT to Italy. Once it had been issued, in fact, the Italians ceased to regard it "purely from the tactical point of view in relation to the electoral campaign" (as Sforza had put it to Dunn) and chose to look at it as a promissory note in its own right. Gastone Guidotti, at the time Italian diplomatic representative in Trieste, hailed it as "the most brilliant Italian diplomatic success of [the] postwar period." He deemed, in fact, that "the Americans [would] never be able to take back [that] solemn declaration" and that, consequently, it would "always represent the most solid diplomatic guarantee that--someday, somehow--at least Trieste and western Istria [would] be given back to Italy."[93]

There were no excessive illusions, however, as to its immediate, practical significance. As early as March 21, the Office of the

Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry prepared an analysis of the proposal which clearly identified its juridical weaknesses and grasped its practical limits. at best, the proposal could only be implemented with respect to Zone A of the FTT and even in this case there was no indication, let alone guarantee, as to when and how this would or could be done Italian decision-makers, however, did not wish to ask that the proposal be implemented only in Zone A lest a distinction between Zone A and Zone B of the FTT take root and indirectly help the Yugoslavs consolidate their hold on Zone B. Thus, a month after the tripartite declaration and in spite of it, Foreign Minister Sforza concluded that the Trieste question did not appear, for the time being, to offer the possibility of "definitive and acceptable solutions" and that consequently the continuation of the status quo was still the least of all possible evils Italian diplomats should, however, as Sforza put it in a letter of instruction·

> take advantage of every favourable occasion so that the Trieste question is not forgotten in the international fora and by international public opinion and so that each time the occasion arises the principle that the entire FTT must be returned to Italian sovereignty be reaffirmed in authoritative fora even if such reaffirmations are destined, for the time being, to have only a symbolic value [94]

And, indeed, since the proposal could not be forced upon the Soviets and Yugoslavia, the tripartite declaration had no practical follow up. It simply went to enrich the arsenal of arguments the Italians would use to put pressure on the Allies.

The Yugoslav-Soviet Break

Three months after the tripartite declaration, a major new development put the Trieste question into a new and different context

for the United States On June 28, 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform This rift in what had until then appeared to be a communist monolith opened all kinds of potential developments in the Cold War As some officials of the American embassy in Belgrade put it, "no event could be more momentous for the attainment of our foreign policy objectives than the permanent alienation from Moscow of this key regime." The United States' first reaction was, however, extremely cautious. Anticommunism was a deeply-ingrained ideology--a way of life, one might say--in the U S., therefore there was a certain reluctance among top officials in the American administration to assist Communism in one country while opposing it in the rest of the world Former Army Chief of Staff and future President Eisenhower, for instance, was still suggesting as late as 1949 that the whole Soviet-Yugoslav dispute might be just "an extremely subtle trick " More pragmatic and experienced members of the administration who fully appreciated the significance of the rift were nevertheless afraid that overeagerness on the part of the U.S. to come to Tito's assistance might weaken his internal position There were indeed doubts as to Tito's ability to withstand Soviet economic and psychological pressures as it was [95]

With respect to the Trieste question, AMG officials immediately warned their superiors in Washington against "any change in Anglo-American policy for reasons of expediency and in view of the Belgrade-Moscow conflict." Any change, they warned, "would be bound to have [an] unfortunate effect [in Italy]." The State Department and the Foreign Office replied to this and similar cables, as well as to the innumerable solicitations of the Italian government, by maintaining that their Trieste policy was still based on the tripartite proposal and that no change was being contemplated. These reiterations of commitment were, however, purely formal The State Department and the Foreign Office had already agreed that, in light of the new developments, it was wiser for the time being not to take any further action on the statement of March 20, especially since "divergence of aims regarding Trieste" might have been one of the causes of the breach between Soviet and

Yugoslav communists. [96]

The Yugoslav situation had now become the critical factor capable of determining major changes in Allied policy toward Trieste. In Trieste, even if the Italians thought they had detected major changes in Allied policy after Tito's break with the Cominform, the local AMG government continued to maintain a tacitly pro-Italian position on the assumption that Zone A, at least, would eventually revert to Italy This pro-Italian stance is well evidenced by the local administrative elections of 1949, during which AMG officials did everything they could to favor the pro-Italy parties. [97]

In Washington, however, the U.S government decided to take a more active role in assisting Yugoslavia--whose uncertain future was regarded with hope and apprehension, especially in military circles. To keep that country's thirty-odd divisions from the Soviet side already would have represented a major accomplishment for Western security. In 1949, different economic aid programs to Yugoslavia were put into place, with no major political strings attached, lest this give ammunition to a pro-Soviet opposition within the country American policy on the Trieste question--as opposed to local AMG policy on Zone A--started to adjust to this new situation. While still publicly supporting the tripartite proposal, on June 29 the State Department affirmed, for instance, that it considered "Yugo[slav] agreement on [a] formula which w[ou]ld save face for Tito and have his support [as an] indispensable element [for] any solution. There c[ou]ld therefore, for example, be no consideration [of a] return even [of the] U.S.-U.K. zone to Italy without [Yugoslav] agreement, even if [the] Sov[iet]s should agree." [98] And it was precisely the fear that the Soviets might decide to adhere to the tripartite proposal as a means of undermining Tito and embarassing the U.S. that convinced the Americans to revise their policy on Trieste in a more official manner. Had the Soviets given their assent, in fact, Tito certainly would have refused to withdraw from Zone B, leaving the Americans in the embarassing situation of having to choose between abandoning their policies of support and their defense plans for

Southern Europe or reneging on their 1948 declaration. As economic assistance to Yugoslavia was stepped up, the American official objective with respect to Trieste became that of reaching "a lasting political settlement for the area ... by mutual agreement among the parties directly concerned." [99]

At the same time, Yugoslavia signalled that a realistic solution could be represented by some form of partition For this to happen, however, the Italians would have to be convinced that the tripartite declaration could not be the starting point of such a negotiation Thus, in November 1949, Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Aleš Bebler urged the State Department to approach the Italian government and convince it to accept a compromise solution by making it clear that the tripartite declaration was out of the question. He also indicated, although "with a certain amount of circumlocution," the lines along which an agreement could be reached. By stating that "Yugoslavia would have to gain sovereignty over the areas inhabited by Yugoslav peoples," while at the same time acknowledging that "the city of Trieste [was] Italian, and that the coastal settlements also [were] in large part inhabited by Italians," he clearly seemed to hint that Yugoslavia was ready to consider giving up a small part of Zone B. [100]

The British also were eager to press for a settlement along the same lines. In early 1950 the Foreign Office sent a memorandum to the State Department to this effect but while American Chargé in Yugoslavia Reams urged that Italy be approached, Ambassador Dunn strongly argued, for the usual reasons, against pressing Italy to negotiate The State Department thus concluded that "it would be unwise for any outside party to inject itself into this situation at this time beyond taking any appropriate opportunity to remind both parties of the advantages of a settlement ... and the necessity for both sides to make substantial concessions." [101]

Notwithstanding the gentle prodding of the Allies and the signals coming from Belgrade, Italian decision-makers refused, at least until mid-1951, not only to enter into direct negotiations with Yugoslavia but

also to consider any other suggestion that could have opened the way for a solution if it implied the need to present domestic public opinion with the idea that some kind of compromise would be necessary. [102] They preferred to remain anchored to the empty, but politically valuable, promise of the tripartite declaration and concentrated on trying to convince the Americans to use economic aid as leverage "to wrangle Zone B from the Yugoslavs." The Allies were to be "nailed," as De Gasperi put it in a letter to Sforza on May 27, 1950, "to their moral engagement" and not be allowed to give the tripartite declaration a posthumous interpretation in the sense that they "would simply have adhered to a compromise solution to be agreed upon with the Slavs." [103]

By mid-1951, however, this position had become untenable. The Americans were now inclined to start extending military assistance to Tito, their ultimate objective being that of integrating Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey into the Western defence system. This, they thought, could be accomplished through the formation of a regional pact (the Balkan pact) that would include these three countries and Italy. It was obvious that in order to achieve cooperation in the military field the Yugoslavs and the Italians first had to put an end to their diatribes and then establish a minimum level of confidence. This, obviously, required the solution of the FTT problem. What had until then been regarded as an issue in the Cold War had now become, at least as seen from Washington, but a local irritant which needed to be eliminated quickly, both to preempt Soviet attempts to take advantage of the situation and to make progress on much more serious matters. [104] As a consequence, the State Department now abandoned its erstwhile reluctance and started urging the Italians toward direct negotiations. [105]

The British, for their part, began to manifest a decisive unwillingness to give automatic reconfirmations of the tripartite declaration. On March 13 and 14, for instance, there took place in London a meeting between De Gasperi and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee. When the time came for De Gasperi to request the usual reconfirmation of the tripartite declaration in the joint communiqué

released to the press at the end of the two-day meeting, Attlee observed that any reference to the declaration seemed to him superfluous and outmoded and that any illusions to the contrary should be dissipated. De Gasperi, as reported by eyewitnesses, became irate and, in an extremely tense atmosphere, said that if the British Prime Minister desired the immediate fall of the Italian government the best way to effect it was to omit reference to the tripartite declaration and that, if that were the case, he would not sign the communiqué. A compromise was finally reached whereby the British "confirm[ed] the tripartite declaration on Trieste in the belief that a solution would be reached through direct negotiation [and] the Italians declar[ed] their desire to reach a friendly agreement with the Yugoslav government." [106]

The first "official conversations" between the two countries took place in Rome in late July 1951. They were "official" inasmuch as they were conducted with the explicit authorization of the two governments and "conversations," as opposed to "negotiations," because they were held without much preparation and no expectations, as demonstrated also by the choice of representatives: former Ambassador Marco Ristić for Yugoslavia and Ambassador to the Vatican Antonio Meli Lupi Di Soragna for Italy. The Italians said they were prepared to accept a division of the FTT along a so-called "continuous ethnic line." First vaguely suggested by Sforza in a speech in Milan a year earlier, this line meant that almost all of the FTT, with the exception of three townships in Zone B and three in Zone A, was to be returned to Italy (see fig. 7). The Yugoslavs suggested a partition along the zonal boundary with minor rectification for Italy in Zone B and for Yugoslavia in Zone A, or with administrative autonomy to be granted to the Italian townships in Zone B and the Yugoslav ones in Zone A. The two diplomats agreed that their positions were too distant, so the discussions ended. [107]

Although entered into simply to show the Allies that direct negotiations were not likely to lead anywhere, these conversations are significant because they mark the turning point between what have been referred to as the static and the dynamic phases of the Trieste

conflict. From then on, Italian decision-makers would no longer simply wait for the Allies to deliver Trieste to them but would embark on a more active course. The major target of their actions, however, would remain the Allies.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. For details concerning the toponymy of the region, which varies according to the nationalistic viewpoint to which one chooses to subscribe, see Novak, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

2. Dennison I. Rusinow has defined irredentism as "the eldest child of Risorgimento nationalism and half-brother of Italian imperialism" (Italy's Austrian Heritage, 1919-1946, Oxford· Oxford Univ. Press, 1969, p. 15).

3. On this period see William C. Askew, "The Austro-Italian Antagonism, 1896-1914" in Lillian Parker Wallace and William C. Askew, eds., Power, Public Opinion and Diplomacy, Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1959 and Richard J. B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World War, London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979.

4. The most comprehensive treatment of the rise of national consciousness in the different Yugoslav lands is Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984); more general ones are Dimitrije Djordjevic, "The Idea of Yugoslav Unity in the Nineteenth Century" (in Dimitrije Djordjevic, ed., The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914-1918, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980, pp. 1-17) and François Fejtö, "Yugoslavism and the birth of Yugoslavia" (in European Journal of International Affairs 1, 2, Autumn 1988).

5. Art. V of the Triple Alliance read: "Si la paix de l'une des hautes parties contractantes venait à être menacée dans les circonstances prévues par les articles précédents, les hautes parties contractantes se concerteront en temps utile sur les mesures militaires à prendre en vue d'une coopération éventuelle." Austria failed to consult Italy before presenting its ultimatum to Serbia. The text of the Alliance can be found in Albert Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1920-1921, vol. I., p. 248).

6. Antonio Salandra, La neutralitá Italiana 1914· Ricordi e pensieri, Milan: Mondadori, 1928, p. 86 The "well-founded claims" mentioned by Salandra were the annexation of the unredeemed territories and the achievement of a position of supremacy in the Mediterranean.

7. ibid., p. 460.

8. On the London Pact and the negotiations leading to it see William W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War, London: Allen and Unwin, 1957, Mario Toscano, Il Patto di

Londra. storia diplomatica dell'intervento Italiano 1914 1915, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1934; Christopher Howard, "The Treaty of London, 1915," History 25 (March 1941), pp 347-355, Michael Boro Petrovich, "The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary Question, 1914-1915" in Alexander Dallin et al , ed , Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 1914-1917, New York King's Crown Press, 1963, pp 162-193; William A. Renzi, "Italy's Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War A reexamination," The American Historical Review 73, 5 (June 1968), pp 1414-1432. For the original Italian documents see I documenti diplomatici Italiani, series 4, vol 12, Rome· Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1964 Italy's talks with Austria served also to forestall a possible preemptive Austrian attack and to increase her bargaining power with the Entente Thus they have been described primarily, but not exclusively, by British historians as an exercise in "double blackmail " For the "predatory aim" of obtaining Austrian lands, it has often been written, Italy chose the "devious path" of "sacred egoism" and entered the conflict by the back door (quoted in Renzi, loc cit , p. 1415). Italian diplomats, however, were no more guilty of "deliberate duplicity" nor more deceitful than their counterparts One of the reasons which led Italian decision-makers to choose intervention on the side of the Entente was, for instance, the pressure brought by the Entente diplomats and their hinting that Italy could not hope for anything unless she joined in the war If one believed in the victory of the Entente, neutrality was not an option because, as Foreign Minister Marquis Antonino Di San Giuliano put it just before his death. "We would reap all the hatred of the Central Powers who will attribute their defeat to our defection, and all the ingratitude of the other side which will not care to remember benefits gained because of our neutrality" (quoted in Olindo Malagodi, Conversazioni della guerra, Milan: Mondadori, 1960, 2 vols., I, p. 23) A "devious path" was certainly followed on the domestic front But here again it was not unique to Italy. Prime Minister Salandra and Foreign Minister Baron Sidney Sonnino (who had replaced Di San Giuliano) proceeded to negotiate the Pact of London and decided for war without the knowledge of the Cabinet and the General Staff, not to mention Parliament. Indeed, the Pact of London purposely was not called a "treaty" so that it would not have to be ratified by Parliament. Then interventionist demonstrations were organized in major cities with the help of a vociferous and very active minority. This impressed and intimidated many members of Parliament, which approved intervention by a vote of 407 to 73 on May 20. (For a brief account of the turbulent domestic scene immediately prior to Italy's entry into the war, see Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 1870-1925, London Methuen, 1967, pp. 436-450.) Much has also been made of a speech that Salandra made to members of the diplomatic corps on October 18, 1914, upon the death of Di San Giuliano In summing up the work of the deceased, he asserted that "the guiding principles of our international policy will be tomorrow what they were yesterday ... we need a spirit free from any preconceived idea, from any prejudice, from any sentiment save that of exclusive and unlimited devotion to our country, of sacro egoismo for Italy" (Salandra, op. cit., pp 377-378) This concept has since become almost synonymous with Italian foreign policy. Yet it could certainly apply to the foreign policy of any country Having been made the object of harsh criticism, particularly by Wilsonian liberals during and after World War I, Salandra himself tried to put this concept into perspective and compared his speech to one given by President Woodrow Wilson on August 10, 1914 in which he had urged American citizens to unite in "an exclusive American spirit" and, above all, to "serve the interests of their country" (ibid , p 383)

9. For a brief account of the immediate postwar period see Seton-Watson, op cit , pp 510-527.

10. See Alex N. Dragnich, "The Serbian Government, the Army and the Unification of Yugoslavs" and Gale Stokes, "The Role of the Yugoslav Committee in the Formation of Yugoslavia" in Dimitrije Djordjevic, ed., op cit , pp 37-50 and 51-71, respectively, and Dragovan Šepić, Italija, Saveznici i Jugoslavensko Pitanje, 1914-1918, Zagreb Školska Knjiga, 1970.

11 The expression was used by Italian Ambassador in Washington Vincenzo Macchi di Cellere in a communication to Rome on April 19, 1917 and is reported in Justus [Dolores Macchi Di Cellere], V. Macchi di Cellere all'ambasciata di Washington Memorie e Testimonianze, Florence Bemborad, 1920, p. 59.

12. This also is recognized by De Castro (op. cit. I, p. 86), who otherwise goes to great lengths to uphold Italian ethnic, historical, cultural and demographic claims to these lands.

13. FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference, vol. 3, Washington, D.C.· United States Government Printing Office, 1942, p. 666. This was later to become the favourite argument of Italian politicians and diplomats when pleading their case about Trieste with the Allies.

14 Foreign Minister Sonnino attempted to turn Wilson's early concessions to Italy's advantage, arguing that "having lost his virtue by his concessions to Great Britain and France at an early stage of the conference, [Wilson] was belatedly attempting to reestablish his virginity at Italy's expense." The argument was effective with some members of the American delegation who feared that an uncompromising line toward Italy might alienate that country from the Western world and wreck the League of Nations from the start. See Paul Birdsall, Versailles, Twenty Years After, New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941, p. 272, René Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1938 and Ivo Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiermaking, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1963 On Wilson's compromises see Stuling J. Kerneck, "Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination along Italy's Frontier: A study of the manipulation of principles in the pursuit of political interests," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 126, 4 (1982), pp 243-300 and Dragan R. Živojinović, America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia (1917-1919), Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1972. On Wilson's concern with the perceived rise of socialism in Italy see: Louis John Nigro, "Wilsonian Propaganda and Italian Politics During the First World War, 1917-1919: Data and Hypotheses" in Humbert S Nelli, ed., The United States and Italy: The First Two Hundred Years, Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference of the American-Italian Historical Association, 1977, pp. 63-80.

15. See Paolo Alatri, Nitti, D'Annunzio e la questione adriatica, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1959.

16. All quotations in Rabel, op cit., p. 91.

17. The Yugoslavs argued that the treaty of Rapallo was a diktat because the British put pressure on them by threatening that unless a direct agreement was reached the London Pact would be applied integrally. Sforza, for his part, had proceeded to intimidate the head of the Yugoslav delegation, Ante Trumbić, by declaring at the outset of the negotiations that, should these break down, the Italians would "settle the problem by unilateral action" (see V Sedmak and J. Mejak, Trieste, the Problem which Agitates the World, Belgrade Edition Jugoslavija, 1953, pp.

15-16). Carlo Sforza's own analysis of the Rapallo treaty is in Pensiero e azione di una politica estera Discorsi e Scritti, Bari: Laterza, 1924, esp pp 81-86 The opinion of the military about the Dalmatian strip, as expressed to Storza by General Armando Diaz is reported in M K Smogorzewski, "Peace on the Adriatic" (The Fortnightly 182, 1055, Nov 1954, pp 300 308 at p 303)

18. Rusinow, op cit , pp 119-165.

19. The policies of denationalization and persecution already had started during the Liberal regime See Antonio Mosconi, I primi anni di governo italiano nella Venezia-Giulia, Bologna Cappelli, 1924 (which, although largely a tribute to Italian rule, reveals between the lines the problems encountered by the population as a result of Italian annexation) and Claudio Silvestri, Dalla Redenzione al Fascismo Trieste 1918-1922, Udine Del Bianco, 1966. On Italian-Yugoslav relations during Fascism and the Fascist policies in the occupied territories see Rusinow, op cit., pp. 84-118 and 185-210; De Castro, op cit I, pp 99 131 and Elio Apih, Italia: fascismo e antifascismo nella Venezia-Giulia (1918-1943), Bari Laterza, 1966 On Italian support of Croation separatists see James J Sadkovich, "Opportunismo esitante la decisione italiana di appoggiare il separatismo croato 1927-1929" in Storia Contemporanea 16, 3 (June 1985), pp. 401-426 and Antonio Tasso, Italia e Croatia 1918 1940, Macerata. Tip S. Giuseppe, 1967

20. Quoted in Rabel, op cit., p. 104 Arnold Toynbee of Balliol College, Oxford, was nevertheless asked to study "what sort of a case the Yugoslavs could produce in support of frontier recommendations " The report concluded that Yugoslav claims could certainly be upheld on ethnic grounds for most of Istria and the islands of Dalmatia, but not for the cities of Trieste, Gorizia, Rijeka or Zadar (Zara). On this episode, see also Raoul Pupo, "Gli accordi segreti anglo-jugoslavi (1941)," Qualestoria 7 (March 1979), pp. 18-20, Giampaolo Valdevit, "Un documento del Foreign Office sul Confine Orientale" in ibid 7 (July 1979), pp 11 23, Dragovan Šepić, "Velika Britanija i pitanje revizije Jugoslavensko-talijanske granice, 1941," Časopis za Suvremenu Povijest 7, 1 (1975), pp 121-140, Mark C Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940-43, Boulder, Colo East European Monographs, 1980, pp 29-33 and 46-47 and Alfredo Breccia, Jugoslavia 1939-1941: Diplomazia della neutralitá, Milan Giuffré, 1978, pp. 433-434 On Anglo-American wartime planning for the Julian region see Valdevit, op cit , pp. 20-39

21. Quoted in Rabel, op cit , p 105 See also Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London H. M. Stationery Off., 1970, vol I, p 532) and Breccia (op cit., pp. 474-475), who reveals that the British Secret Service, itself, was responsible for spreading the news of "secret agreements" in Yugoslavia

22. Livio Zeno, "La questione di Trieste e l'azione di Carlo Sforza," L'Osservatore Politico Letterario 24, 4 (April 1978), pp 15 30, Department of State (henceforth Dept) to Winant (Ambassador in the U.K), July 14, 1941 in FRUS 1941, I, p 342 and memorandum of conversation (henceforth MC) Welles, Cadogan, Aug 9, 1941 in ibid., pp. 351-352.

23. For local events in the Julian region between September 1943 and May 1945, see De Castro, op cit , I, pp 172 204, Rusinow, op cit., pp 266-365, Mario Pacor, Confine Orientale Questione nazionale e resistenza nel Friuli Venezia Giulia, Milan Feltrinelli, 1964; G Fogar, Sotto l'occupazione nazista delle

province orientali, Udine: Del Bianco, 1968 and Teodoro Sala, "Aspetti della lotta politica nella Venezia Giulia, 1944-45," Movimento di Liberazione in Italia 64, 3, 1961, pp 33-49.

24. See Raoul Pupo, La Rifondazione della politica estera italiana: La questione giuliana (1944-46) Linee interpretative (Udine Del Bianco, 1979), pp 42-69 and De Castro, op. cit., I, pp. 313-314. Pupo points out that, by using the same language and making references to the Liberal, pre-Fascist tradition, the Italians betrayed the same vague ambition in the Balkans De Castro maintains that, in reality, Italian decision-makers knew that the 1939 borders could not be retained Their real objective was to have the old Wilson line become the new border with Yugoslavia They were divided, however, on the question of whether to request the 1939 border in order to have a negotiating margin or to opt immediately for the Wilson line to prove to the Allies a sense of responsibility and seriousness

25. Grew (Acting Secretary of State) to Hopkins (Special Assistant to President Roosevelt), Sept. 16, 1944, printed in Harry L. Coles and Albert K Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, United States Army in WW II, Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Special Studies, 1964, pp 590-591.

26. See FRUS The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 480-481, 493 and 504-505 and Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol VII. Road to Victory, 1941-1945, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986, pp. 779-780, 814-822, 930 and 948. As Truman would later put it in his memoirs: "Churchill was always anxious to save British control of the eastern Mediterranean in order to maintain Great Britain's influence in Greece, Egypt and the Middle East" (Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1: Years of Decisions, New York: Doubleday 1955, p. 245).

27. Stone to G5 AFHG, July 28, 1944, in Coles and Weinberg, op. cit., pp. 590, Stettinius (Secretary of State) to Kirk (American Political Advisor to AMG in Italy), Aug. 9, 1944, quoted in Rabel, op. cit., p. 122. For an exhaustive list of Allied promises and reassurances about Allied occupation of the Julian region see De Castro, op. cit , I, pp. 303-323. No assurances, however, were ever given with respect to the settlement of territorial questions at the peace conference.

28. For an elaboration of this and related points see G. Valdevit, "Gli Alleati e la Venezia Giulia, 1941-1945," Italia Contemporanea 33, 142 (Jan.-March 1981), pp. 55-88 and op. cit., pp. 39-89. See also Anton Giulio M De Robertis, Le Grandi Potenze e il Confine Giuliano 1941-1947, Bari: Laterza, 1983; Hugh De Santis, "In Search of Yugoslavia. Anglo-American Policy and Policy-Making, 1943-45," Journal of Contemporary History 16, 3 (July 1981), pp. 541-563 and Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South East Europe in the Second World War, New York: Harper and Row, 1976.

29. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6: Triumph and Tragedy, Boston. Houghton Mifflin, 1953, pp 90-91.

30. In John Campbell, ed., Successful Negotiations. Trieste 1954, Princeton Princeton Univ. Press, 1976, p. 84

31. FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Meeting of the Foreign Ministers), pp 888-889, Rabel, op. cit., pp. 126-133

32. Minutes of SAC's Political Conference, Feb. 20, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op. cit , pp 592-593; Kirk to Dept , Feb. 20, 1945, FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1103-1106

33. Minutes of SAC's Political Conference, March 2, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op cit , p 593 The Isonzo river represented a line that Slavic nationalists before World War I had claimed as the western frontier of the future Yugoslav national state

34. Alexander to CCS, March 2, 1945, FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1108 1110, Kirk to Dept., March 2, 1945 and Grew to Kirk, March 23, 1945, ibid., pp 1111-1114 and 1117, respectively

35. De Castro, op cit , I, pp 316-321

36. Churchill to Eden, March 11 and 18, 1945, quoted in Rabel, op cit., p. 139 and in Martin Gilbert, op cit , pp 1303 1304

37 Dept. to Kirk, April 12, 1945, FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1120 1121 Three other plans were also considered All of them, to different degrees, took into consideration Yugoslav opposition to the existing official policy. (1) establishment of an Anglo American military government which would administer the region as a unit separate from the remainder of Italy, (2) Yugoslav participation in the AMG and (3) division of the Julian region into two zones, with AMG in the West and the Yugoslavs in the East (see Dept to Kirk, April 10, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1119 1120)

38. Alexander to CCS, April 26, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op cit , p. 594, Kirk to Dept , April 26, 1945, FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1123-1125, Churchill to Truman, April 27, 1945, ibid , p 1125

39. Directive (FAN 536) CCS to AFHQ, April 28, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op. cit , pp 594-95

40. MC Matthews, April 30, 1945, FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1127-1130, MC Grew, Stimson, April 30, 1945, ibid , pp 1129-1130 Churchill's telegram of April 30 is quoted in Dept to Kirk, May 1, 1945, ibid., pp. 1130-1132. See also Truman, op cit , p 244 The telegram to Churchill of April 30 is in Joseph C Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, London Hammond, Hammond and Co , 1953, vol 2, pp 1475-1478

41. Alexander to Clark, April 30, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op cit., p. 595. See also Field Marshal Alexander Earl of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs 1940-1945, John North, ed , London Cassell, 1962, pp. 151-152. Tito's message to Alexander is reported in Alexander to CCS, May 2, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op cit., p 595.

42. On the military aspects of the "race" see Geoffrey Cox, The Race for Trieste, London. William Kimber, 1977, Savorgnan di Brazzá, op. cit., pp. 53-68; Boško Silyegović, "The Liberation of Trieste," Review of International Affairs 4, 14-15 (Aug 1, 1953), pp. 25-28, Dušan Švara, "Borba 9. korpusa za oslobodenje Trsta i Slovenskog primorja," Vojnoistorijski Glasnik 18, 3 (1967), pp 93-116, Uroš Kostić, "Odlučujući značaj Titovih naredenja za uspeh Tržćanske operacje," ibid 28, 2-3 (1977), pp 235-243 and "La Liberation de l'Istrie, de Trieste et du Littoral Slovene 1945," Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire 51 (1981), pp 138-172 and "Les opérations de la 4ème armée dans le secteur du littoral," ibid 64 (1986), pp. 146-203

43. Matthews to Grew, May 8, 1945, FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1132 1133, MC Grew, May 3, 1945, and Grew to Truman, May 4, 1945, ibid , pp 1133-1135 and 1136-1138, respectively

44. General Jakšić's message is reported in Rabel, op cit , p 157, messages between Alexander and Tito are quoted in Alexander to CCS, May 4, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op cit , pp 596 597

Tito's answer of May 5 is reported in Alexander to CCS, May 5, 1945, in Cole and Weinberg, op. cit., pp. 597-598. See also Kirk to Dept , May 4, 1945, FRUS 1945, IV, pp. 1138-1139 and Cox, op. cit., pp 200-207 Despite Alexander's use of the word, it is questionable whether there had been an agreement at the Belgrade meeting Certainly there was no written agreement on a demarcation line and Alexander's and Tito's own understandings of what they had agreed upon varied slightly, as Tito's answer also shows Later, the Americans would convey the idea that an agreement on a demarcation line had indeed taken place between Tito and Alexander at Bolsena and been reconfirmed in Belgrade. C Grove Haines, for instance ("Trieste. A Storm Center for Europe," Foreign Policy Reports 22, 2, April 1, 1946, pp 14-23 at p 18), quoted an unidentified official Army release stating that this agreed-upon line "should run roughly due north of Fiume, with Marshal Tito's forces controlling the port of Fiume and the territory to the East of the line and Marshal Alexander's troops controlling Venezia Giulia." See also John C. Campbell, "The European Territorial Settlement," Foreign Affairs 26, 1 (Oct. 1947), pp. 196-218 at pp 201-202 and Documenti di Vita Italiana (Nov. 1953), p 1835. In reality, as De Castro (op. cit., I, p. 198) also has recognized, Tito never agreed to any demarcation line.

45. Alexander to CCS, May 5, 1945 in Cole and Weinberg, op. cit., pp. 597-598

46 Kirk to Dept., May 5, 1945, FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1142-1144.

47. CCS to Alexander, May 7, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op. cit., p. 598; Grew to Patterson (American Ambassador to Yugoslavia), May 7, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp. 1144-1145; Kirk to Dept , May 2, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op. cit , p. 596.

48. Alexander to CCS, May 10, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op. cit., p. 598; Patterson to Dept., May 9, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, p. 1150; Kirk to Dept., May 9, 1945, in ibid., p. 1149.

49. Kirk to Dept., May 4 and 8, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp. 1136 and 1148; Stimson Diary, May 7, 1945, quoted in Rabel, op cit., p. 164.

50. Kirk made this same argument on May 10 at a political conference of the Supreme Allied Command-Mediterranean at Caserta, but encountered resistance among the military. General McNarney, for instance, argued that public opinion in the U.S. would not support hostilities against the Yugoslavs because this "would mean siding with the Italians, our enemies, in regard to territory they seized after the last war, against the Yugoslavs who were our allies." Marshal Tito's request "to occupy a certain amount of enemy territory which his forces had won," was therefore no different, in his mind, from the French desire "to participate in the occupation of Austria and Germany" (Minutes of SACMED's Political Conference, May 10, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op. cit., pp. 598-599)

51 Rabel has argued that the struggle over Trieste in May 1945 can indeed be regarded as the first episode in the Cold War (see his "Prologue to Containment. The Truman Administration's response to the Trieste Crisis of May 1945," Diplomatic History 10, 2, Spring 1986, pp 141-160) For the point of view of a participant-observer in the local scene, see Alfred Connor Bowman, Zones of Strain A memoir of the early Cold War (Stanford, Cal.. Hoover Inst Press, 1982) The quotation is from a memorandum written by Cavendish Cannon, an official of the State Department's Southern European Division and future ambassador to Belgrade,

quoted in Rabel, loc cit , p 151

52 Grew to Truman, May 10, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1151-53, MC Grew, May 10, 1945, in ibid , pp 1154-55; Grew, op cit., pp 1478-1479, Truman, op cit , pp 246-250 This reversal of opinion on Trieste, only ten days after he had affirmed that he did not 'intend to have American forces used to fight Yugoslav forces," is a good example of the uncertainty and fluidity that some historians have identified as characteristic of American foreign policy in the first few months of Truman's presidency, which is generally attributed to the president's reliance on his advisors See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941 1947, New York Columbia Univ Press, 1972, pp 198-206 As Grew reported, the President himself "realized that this was a reversal of his former position but that developments were such that it left no alternative "

53. After a couple of weeks of forced cohabitation in Trieste, the attitude of the soldiers in the field also had changed dramatically On May 1, Alexander had written Churchill that if the CCS insisted that he occupy all of the region he would certainly be committed to a fight with the Yugoslav Army and had warned him "to consider the feelings of [Allied] troop He had pointed out that "they h[ad] a profound admiration for Tito's Partisan Army" and recommended caution before asking them "to turn away from the common enemy to fight an ally " Two weeks later he wrote to the CCS that 'Yugoslav behavior both in Austria and Venezia Giulia [was] making a very unfavorable impression' and clearly seemed willing to use force because he pointed out that his troops "[were] obliged to look on without power to intervene whilst actions which offend[ed] their traditional sense of justice [were] committed" and that "by taking no action they [felt they were] condoning such behavior" (Alexander to Churchill, May 1, 1945, quoted in Churchill, op cit , p 553, Alexander to CCS, May 17, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op cit , p 600, Truman, op cit., p. 249) During the Tito-Alexander negotiations, Trieste remained under Yugoslav administration This period (May 2 June 12, later referred to by the Italians as "the forty days") was characterized by summary (and often arbitrary) deportations and executions of a large number of real and supposed Fascist sympathizers To be sure, similar events occurred in other northern Italian cities during the period of confusion that followed the fall of the Social Republic of Salò The notion of "popular justice" was often invoked by former partisans to conduct summary vendettas against local fascist officials or sympathizers In the Julian region, these episodes assumed an even worse light because Fascist policies toward the Slavs had been more severe and because the ethnic struggle was superimposed on the class and ideological ones. Absentee landlords living in the coastal cities had traditionally been Italian, while the peasantry was Slav Now "Slav" came to be conflated with "Communist' and "Italian" with "Fascist " On this period see Duroselle, op cit , pp 166 173, Novak, op cit , pp 161-201, Cox, op cit , pp 206 257, Ennio Maserati, L'Occupazione Jugoslava di Trieste, maggio giugno 1945, Udine· Del Bianco, 1963 and De Castro, op cit , I, pp 210 230 and 286

54. The following day, Grew released a press statement which reaffirmed the American government's intention to establish AMG throughout the Julian region because "no territorial problem [should] be solved by proclamations issued in the wake of an army on the march" (see "Concerning Equitable Solution of Territorial Questions," May 12, 1945, Department of State Bulletin 12, 307, May 13, 1945, p 902) The statement could have been intended only for public consumption In fact, if armies on the march had not yet solved territorial problems, they certainly had filled a

security claim on the territories under dispute The Allies, moreover, had reconciled themselves to it

55. MC Grew, May 11, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, p 1155; Grew to Kirk, ibid , pp 1156-57, Churchill, op cit , pp. 554-555; Truman, op. cit , pp 247-248 Truman's message repeated almost verbatim the arguments advanced by Kirk and Cannon and presented in Grew's memorandum Churchill to Truman, May 12, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1157 8, Truman to Churchill, May 14, 1945 (10 13 a m), in ibid , p 1160, see also Grew, op cit , pp 1479-1480 and 1482-1483 Text of Churchill's note to Stalin in Grew to Secretary of State at San Francisco, May 14, 1945, in ibid., pp. 1158-60 Stalin was kept informed of developments until the end of the crisis (see two other telegrams by Truman in ibid., pp. 1178 and 1184)

56. Patterson to Dept , May 15 and 19, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp. 1163-4 and 1165-7, respectively. Text of the note used to approach Tito in Grew to Patterson, May 14, 1945 (11 00 a.m.), in ibid , pp 1161-2

57 Churchill, op cit , p 558, Churchill to Truman, May 19, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1167-8 On the estimate of Soviet support for Yugoslavia see Patterson to Dept , May 9, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, p 1150 and Grew, op cit , pp. 1480-1 Truman to Churchill, May 2 , 1945 (4 11 p m), in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1169-1170; Truman's message to Stalin in Grew to Kirk, May 20, 1945 (4·00 p m), in ibid , pp 1168-9, see also CCS to AFHQ, May 21, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op cit , p. 600 and Truman, op. cit., p 249

58 Patterson to Dept , May 21, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1170-1.

59. Stalin's message to the Allies in Leahy to Dept., May 23, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1172-3. See also his message of June 8 in ibid , pp 1181-2.

60. Both quotations in The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948, pp. 35-36. Tito was even more explicit on his resentment of the lack of Soviet support in a speech given after the break with the Soviet Union: "I can say today . that while we were fighting within ourselves over the terrible decision whether or not to evacuate Trieste, we did not receive any moral support, no sign of it, on the part of the Soviet Union Night after night, I sat by the telephone waiting for at least a word, a counsel. But we heard nothing, because their interest was not directly touched" (Tito, Govori i Članci, vol. 7, Zagreb. Naprijed, 1959, p. 36) One should point out here that the attitude of the Soviet Union indicated that Tito's claims to Trieste had nothing to do with Soviet expansionism (the main reason why Churchill and the State Department decided to challenge it) but was, rather, the result of a nationalist feeling On the Yugoslav perception of having received an "ultimatum" by the "Big Powers" see Bojan Cvietić, "The Trieste Crises in 1945 and 1953," Review of International Affairs 4, 23 (Dec 1, 1953) as well as a comment by Velebit in Campbell, ed., op. cit , p 87

61 British "Aide Memoire," May 23, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp. 1174-5

62 Grew to Kirk, May 21, 1945, in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1171-2. Yugoslav note of protest in Patterson to Dept , May 25, 1945, in ibid , p 1175. Kirk to Dept., May 23, 1945, and Grew to Patterson, May 26, 1945, in ibid , pp 1173-74 and 1176-7, respectively Text of the "Belgrade Agreement" in Manlio Udina, Scritti sulla questione di Trieste sorta in seguita al secondo conflitto mondiale ed i principali atti internazionali ed interni

ad essa relativi, Milan: Giuffrè, 1969, pp. 347-348.

63. For a detailed account of Italian initiatives in this period see De Castro, op. cit., I, pp 316-323 and 329-350. See also Tarchiani's messages to Grew and Phillips in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1162-3, 1164-5 and 1180-1 De Gasperi's messages to Kirk in ibid , pp. 1179-80 and 1184-85

64. Alexander to CCS, May 23, 1945, in Coles and Weinberg, op cit , pp. 600-601 For details of pressures on Alexander see Rabel, loc. cit , pp. 156-7 The "Belgrade Agreement" (or, better, the American decision of May 11 on which the agreement was based raises some interesting questions from a decision-making analysis point of view The agreement could be seen as the result of a compromise between two contradictory objectives pursued by American foreign policy makers to set up AMG in all of the Julian region and to avoid a military confrontation with an ally The State Department, it would appear, had to compromise its original objective, given the reluctance of the War Department and British decision-makers (with the exception of Churchill) to challenge Tito and settle for a more limited one which satisfied military purposes. However, one could point out that, once the war was over, Trieste and the lines of communication to Austria in that area were not really essential to Allied military requirements. Given his reluctance to challenge Tito, Alexander easily could have used Venice and the lines of communication to the west of Trieste to resupply his troops in Austria Hence military requirements merely served as a convenient excuse for what were primarily political motives to nip communist expansion in the bud and prop up the morale of the Italians This is well evidenced by the fact that Alexander also was energetically invited to request Pula, which he did not need or desire for military reasons If this was indeed the case, then why was the long standing objective of establishing AMG in all of the Julian region quietly abandoned in favor of a much more limited one precisely at the time when (1) new political motives would have suggested its maintenance even more strongly, (2) the State Department had regained the major role in the formulation of American foreign policy and (3) the risk of an armed conflict with Yugoslavia had come also to be accepted by the military as necessary to show resolve and firmness in the face of Soviet-backed communist expansion? Rabel (loc cit., p. 159) explains the "Belgrade agreements" using a method which is traditional of historians: assuming the rationality of decision-makers and deriving the reasons (in-order-to motives) for their decision logically from the decision itself Thus Rabel argues that once a compromise had already been made with Alexander's limited demands "by not deviating from those terms thereafter, the United States, with one stroke, could appear to stand firm on principle for the benefit of public opinion, especially in Italy, offer Tito a reasonable compromise in lieu of the original AMG policy, step into line with British policy and fulfill Alexander's military requirements, and offer terms which it was capable of obtaining by military force if necessary since Anglo-American troops already were present in the areas in question." The "Belgrade agreements" could be seen, however, as a typical case of a decision which, being the result of bargaining among different decision-makers (individuals and groups) holding different priorities and objectives, attempts to reconcile them all but looses in the process all rational character as the most appropriate means of achieving any of them Thus, in this particular case, the decision made risked an armed clash in order to achieve a limited military objective pursued for political reasons, while the original and larger political objective was being abandoned precisely to avoid an armed clash

65. De Castro, op. cit., I, p. 347.

66. John C. Campbell (Advisor to Secretary of State Byrnes) is quoted in Rabel, op. cit., p. 212. Trieste also was mentioned symbolically by Churchill in his now famous speech of March 6, 1946 at Fulton, Missouri: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent" (quoted in Martin Gilbert, op. cit., vol. VIII: Never Despair, 1945-1965, London: Heinemann, 1988, p. 200). See also G. Valdevit, "Politici e militari alleati di fronte alla questione della Venezia-Giulia (giugno 1945-luglio 1946)," Qualestoria 3 (Oct. 1981), pp. 83-119.

67. For the statements made by the representatives of the two countries see FRUS 1945, II, pp. 229-232, 258-261 (Yugoslavia) and 232-236 (Italy). All of the documents in which the Italian government set forth its official point of view were collected in a small volume entitled Trieste: The Italian Viewpoint, published in Rome in 1946. The most relevant Yugoslav documents can be found in a pamphlet entitled Trieste published by the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Washington, D.C., in 1946. See also Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's Claim to Trieste, published by the United Committee of South-Slavic Americans, New York, 1946. The Yugoslav point of view was also supported very energetically by British historian A. J. P. Taylor in a pamphlet entitled Trieste, published originally in London under the imprint of the Yugoslav Information Office in the summer of 1945 and reprinted in New York in September 1945 by the United Committee of South-Slavic Americans. The Yugoslavs argued, in brief, that the territory in question, taken in its entirety, was predominantly Slovenian in character in the north and Croatian in the south. While recognizing Trieste's predominantly Italian character, it was emphasized that the city depended on its hinterland. This was more than simply an economic argument insofar as the Yugoslavs maintained that most of the Italian towns along the Istrian coast grew out of commercial settlements or military outposts. This explained the presence of Italians, whom they regarded as foreign dominators. These towns, however, were but linguistic islands formed on Slovenian and Croat soil. For the Italians, however, the countryside rightly belonged to the municipalities upon which it depended administratively, hence the Italian character of the city took precedence over the Slovenian one of the countryside when looking at the territory from a global point of view. It must also be pointed out that Trieste long had been the biggest Slovenian city, the urban center where the largest number of Slovenes lived. In 1910, there were 50,000 Slovenes living in Trieste. Cleveland, Ohio had 20,000, whereas Ljubljana had only 14,000--the rest of its inhabitants being mostly Austrian (I am indebted for this information to Prof. Matjaž Klemenčič of the University of Maribor). The Italians were less linear in their claims. After going on at great length to characterize the border agreed upon at Rapallo as "essentially a compromise between two divergent claims ... signed by two democratic governments," they declared themselves willing "to search for and accept a new solution" which they then proceeded to identify as the Wilson line and back up with ethnic and economic arguments. De Castro (op. cit., I, pp. 236 and 358-363) argues that the Italians chose the Wilson line to ingratiate themselves with the Americans. It was thought, in other words, that the U.S. would back the Italian request because of the moderation thus shown (see also footnote 26 above) and because the line had been suggested by the Americans themselves at the end of World War I.

68. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York: Harper and Bros., 1947, p 97. See also "Record of the Twelfth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, Sept. 19,

1945" in FRUS 1945, II, pp. 254-258 at p. 254.

69. The four recommendations and a map are in "Summary Minutes, Commission on Italo-Yugoslav Boundary, Council of Foreign Ministers, 73rd meeting, Paris: April 28, 1946" in FRUS 1946, II, pp. 148-152. See also Byrnes, op cit., p. 127. For an evaluation of these lines from an Italian point of view, see Carlo Schiffrer, "Italy's Eastern Border: From the Treaty of Rapallo to the 'Morgan line'," Trieste Venezia Giulia Political Review 1, 2 (July-Aug. 1954), pp. 3-6

70. Smith's remark to Quaroni is reported in De Castro, op. cit., I, p. 445; Stone to Truman, April 18, 1946, FRUS 1946, II, pp. 72-79 See also his memorandum, "Future Policy Toward Italy," June 23, 1945, FRUS, The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, I, pp. 688-694.

71. This was well represented symbolically by a frequently-recounted episode at the Paris Peace Conference: when De Gasperi entered the room to deliver his speech, the only delegate who stood to greet and shake hands with him was Byrnes See Mario N. Ferrara, La Politica Estera dell'Italia Libera (1945-1971) (Milan: Pan Editrice, 1972), p. 25.

72. Adstans [Paolo Canali], De Gasperi nella politica estera italiana 1944-1953, Milan: Mondadori, 1953, p. 205; Casardi and Tarchiani are quoted in De Castro, op. cit., I, pp. 392 and 394, Tarchiani to Byrnes, June 5, 1946, in FRUS 1946, V, p. 889.

73. Pietro Quaroni, Il Mondo di un Ambasciatore, Milan: Ferro, 1965, pp. 165 and 171; Key to Dept., July 2, 1946, in FRUS 1946, II, pp. 728-29.

74. Bidault's proposal is in FRUS 1946, II, p 689. The solution suggested by Bidault had been advanced also by some scholars working as advisors to the Allied governments (see Valdevit, op. cit., pp. 142-149). On the fears of the American delegates about a Yugoslav coup in Trieste, see Patricia Dawson Ward, The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945-1946 (Kent, Ohio: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 104-105. Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 132-134. Kardelj would later point out (op. cit., 1953, pp. 30-31): "The Soviet Union endeavored to use this problem as a bargaining point in the mutual transactions between the Great Powers, thus inflicting serious blows to our interests in a most difficult moment."

75. De Gasperi's messages to Byrnes and Molotov are quoted in De Castro, op. cit., I, p. 466 These "overtures" toward the Soviet Union were first made in earnest, at least until the signing of the peace treaty, but later became but another way of putting pressure on the Allies. These, for their part, saw in them but another instance of an old Italian foreign policy vice. duplicity. On Italian-Soviet relations see Giorgio Petracchi, "Le relazioni tra l'Unione Sovietica e il Regno del Sud. una riconsiderazione della politica sovietica in Italia (1943-1944)," Storia Contemporanea 15, 6 (Dec 1984), pp. 1171-1204, Salvatore Sechi, "Tra neutralismo ed equidistanza: la politica estera italiana verso l'URSS 1944-48," ibid. 18, 4 (Aug. 1987), pp 665-712 and Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, La Politica Estera Italiana e l'Unione Sovietica, 1944-1948, Rome: Euroma, 1985

76. On Italy's actions at the Paris Peace Conference see De Castro, op. cit., I, pp. 244-248 and 466-507 and Documenti di Vita Italiana (Nov. 1953), pp. 1837-1846. Italy also tried to mobilize international public opinion through action on those countries that were thought to be sympathetic to the Italian cause Italy

was not taking part officially in the peace conference. Italian proposals and amendments were put on the agenda only if sponsored by one of the official delegations. The Italians could address the delegates but not take part in debates. At such times, Brazil played the role of spokesperson for Italy.

77. Byrnes, op cit., pp. 147-48. In Danzig, the High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations had been powerless to protect the integrity of that city after a well organized Nazi minority had captured control of the local legislature. The reports of the Special Commission on the Statute of the FTT are in FRUS 1946, IV, pp. 592-653. For the texts of the peace treaty with Italy and the FTT statute, see Udina, op. cit., pp. 353-384. For a thorough study of the statute see Jacques Leprette, Le Statut International de Trieste, Paris: A. Pedone, 1949.

78. One month after the signing of the peace treaty (March 12, 1947), Truman requested military and economic aid from Congress for Greece and Turkey and announced the so-called "Truman doctrine" which called for American commitment to assist "free peoples" and to oppose "totalitarian regimes." On June 6, Secretary of State George Marshall announced a larger and more general recovery program later known as the Marshall Plan, directed at reconstructing, stabilizing and protecting Western Europe from the threat of Communism. In July 1947, George Kennan's famous "X" article in Foreign Affairs ("The Sources of Soviet Conduct") publicized the doctrine of containment. In the other camp, the Cominform was established in September, the same month as the "Molotov Plan," forerunner of the Comecon.

79. The Allies did not mind the situation too much, as they had come to the conclusion that, for strategic reasons, maintaining their troops in Trieste was preferable to setting up the FTT. See, for instance, Memorandum by Samuel Reber, Political Adviser, United States Delegation, in FRUS 1946, IV, pp. 840-844 and Report on Trieste of the House Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 11, 1948. On American perceptions of their legal status in Zone A, see "A Legal Concept of the Status of the Administration of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste," prepared by John W. Chapman, Director of Legal Affairs, AMGB-U.S. Zone of FTT, Nov. 29, 1948, in Record Group 84, Records of the U.S. Political Adviser to the Commander British-U.S. Zone, Free Territory of Trieste (henceforth USPolAd), Box 17, File 322. (All documents hereafter identified with reference to "box" and "file" are deposited in the Federal Records Center in Suitland, Maryland). On the structure of AMG, see Allison Alan Conrad, Allied Military Government of Venezia-Giulia and Trieste: Its History and Organization, unpublished M.A. dissertation, Univ. of Maryland, 1956.

80. Airey to CCS, Sept. 16, 1947, in FRUS 1946, IV, pp. 98-99. Joyce's telegram is reported in Rabel, op. cit., p. 242. In this telegram, for the first time, Joyce also complained about the problems created by what he termed the "foolish" and "irresponsible" activities of pro-Italian elements in Trieste, whose behavior justified Yugoslav and Communist demands for involvement in local government. These complaints were to grow stronger as time went by. See also Robert P. Joyce, "Brinkmanship in the Free Territory of Trieste," Foreign Policy Journal 49, 3 (1972), pp. 18 and 28

81. Bevin to Inverchapel (British Ambassador in the United States), Oct. 31, 1947, in FRUS 1947, IV, pp 118-120. See also the report by British Political Adviser to AMG William Sullivan, circulated by Joyce (ibid., pp. 121-123) which maintained that the FTT was

"unworkable" and likely to lead to some "grave international crises." Sullivan also suggested that "perhaps there [was] no alternative to the eventual absorption of Trieste by Yugoslavia" and that the Allies were "merely fighting a rearguard action to delay this inevitable consummation." Cannon to Dept., Nov. 8, 1947, and Dunn to Dept., Nov. 17, 1947 in ibid , pp 123-125 The State Department's answer is in a memorandum from Dowling (Director, Office of European Affairs) to Marshall, Nov 14, 1947, 860S.00/10-3147 (this is the standard identification of the Department of State documents in Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, Washington D.C , the first digit refers to the subject matter, the second and third to the country, the following two digits to categories within the subject matter and the numbers after the slash to the date of the document).

82. For a detailed account of these "efforts," see De Castro, op. cit., I, pp. 645-720.

83. See "Position of the U.S. with Respect to Italy" (NSC 1/2 in FRUS 1948, III, pp. 765-769) and "Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means" (NSC 1/3 in ibid , pp. 775-779), which authorized covert funding to the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. References to the funding are, however, deleted in the document as published in FRUS The National Security Council argued (NSC 1/2) that, since it dominated oil supply lines to the Near East and flanked the Balkans, Italy's position in the Mediterranean was essential to U.S. security. Hence it recommended that "the U.S should make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power in such a manner as might be found most effective to assist in preventing Italy from falling under the domination of the U.S.S.R. ... [and keep it] ... as an independent, democratic state, friendly to the U.S., and capable of effective participation in the resistance to communist expansion." There is no comprehensive study of postwar American foreign policy in the Mediterranean. The standard book on the subject is still William Reitzel, The Mediterranean: Its Role in American Foreign Policy, New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1948. On Italian arguments in late 1947 that a Communist coup was imminent, see MC Lovett (Acting Secretary of State), Tarchiani, Sept. 16, 1947, in FRUS 1947, III, pp. 969-970. Sforza's letter of instruction quoted in De Castro, op. cit., I, pp. 723-724.

84. On the anti-communism of the Office of European Affairs, see Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service, New York: Norton, 1978. The recipe for the long-term anti-communist policy to be followed in Italy is taken from a Nov. 21, 1946 memorandum by Walter Dowling (then Italian desk officer) to Freeman Matthews (Director of European Affairs), quoted in John L. Harper, America and the Reconstruction of Italy 1945-48, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986, p. 109 The quotation is from the article by James E Miller, "Taking the Gloves Off: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," Diplomatic History 7, 1 (Winter 1983), p. 36. See also William Stuart Caldwell, The Organization and Operations of American Information and Propaganda Activities in Early Postwar Italy, unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Univ. of Minnesota, 1960; Ernest E. Rossi, The United States and the 1948 Italian Elections, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ of Pittsburgh, 1964 and M J. and Elizabeth W. Marvick, "U S. Propaganda Efforts and the 1948 Italian Elections" in William E Dougherty and Morris Janowitz, eds., A Psychological Warfare Casebook, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958, pp. 320-326 On British and French activities and attitudes see Antonio Varsori, "La Gran Bretagna e le elezioni

politiche italiane del 18 Aprile 1948," in Storia Contemporanea 13 (Feb. 1982), pp 5-70 and Fabrice Bouthillon, "Les élections italiennes de 1948: un regard français, une politique occidentale" Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique 99, 3-4 (1985), pp. 257-301. The frenzy that took American officials is also well betrayed in some documents. See, for instance: Marshall to Rome Embassy, telegram no. (henceforth omitted) 818 (March 26, 1948), Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Rome Embassy and Consulates (henceforth FSP-Rome), 1948, Box 29 (Confidential Files), File 800, which contains the guidelines for American propaganda in Italy; Dunn to Dept., June 16, 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp. 879-882, which lists American initiatives taken during the elections; Kennan (Director of the Policy Planning Staff) to Dept., March 15, 1948, ibid., pp. 848-849, which contemplates a military invasion in case of Communist victory; an unsigned and undated memorandum in FSP-Rome, 1948, Box 29 (Confidential Files), File 800, which starts with the sentence "The Italian internal issue is easily the most pressing problem in world politics today" and goes on to make a case for the necessity of dissolving the Communist party; and a letter from Robert Joyce (U.S. Political Adviser in Trieste) to Bernard Gufler of the Policy Planning Staff, April 6, 1948, in Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Trieste-Italy 1948-54 (henceforth FSP-Trieste), Box 6, File 19, which states that "the Communists should not be permitted to take over in Italy no matter what the outcome of the elections is." After denouncing Communist propaganda, Joyce goes on to say that "if the Communists win an excellent case could be made that the elections do not reflect the will of the Italian people." Joyce, however, seemed confident of the outcome. He reported that "the Italian Government [was] apparently getting around to the decision that 'the Communists [would] not be permitted to win.'" "It should not be forgotten," he pointed out, "that the present government still controls the electoral machinery and makes the announcement of the electoral results." Although nobody has ever seriously questioned the validity of the 1948 elections and it is doubtful that they were indeed rigged, it is significant that the option was considered.

85. See Dunn to Dept. 883 (March 1, 1948), USPolAd, Box 17, File 322. It must be pointed out here that Sforza, in his memoirs (Cinque Anni a Palazzo Chigi: La politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951, Rome: Atlante, 1952, pp. 321-322, 375 and 400), vehemently denied that he had solicited the declaration for electoral purposes. His "supreme objective," he affirmed, "was that of dismantling and destroying all that was unjust and cruel in the peace treaty." De Castro has partially concurred with him (op. cit., I, pp. 722-723). See also Documenti di Vita Italiana (Nov. 1953), p. 1850. Dunn's telegram 883 (not printed in FRUS), however, establishes beyond any doubt that Sforza's request was, at least officially, made exclusively for electoral purposes. The close of Dunn's telegram clearly states: "The Minister said he did not want to be considered as making this proposal at this time principally for the purpose of obtaining the return of Trieste to Italy but rather more in line of a tactical maneuver to help the anti-communist elements in the present electoral campaign." It is obvious, however, that Sforza was also aware of, and motivated by, the fact that the statement could later be used by Italian decision-makers in their effort to regain the FTT. He obviously could not present this to Dunn as his primary, or even secondary, motivation.

86. This seems to have been established clearly by De Castro (op. cit., I, p 725), who has been able to consult two letters from Quaroni to Sforza dated February 24 and 27. Sforza's meeting with Dunn took place on February 28. Tarchiani is therefore misleading

in his memoir, which confusedly conveys the impression that the idea of the declaration originated in Washington (op cit , pp 143-145). For the request for a statement about the colonies, see MC Armour (Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs), Feb. 18, 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp 830-832 See also Gianluigi Rossi, "Trieste e colonie alla vigilia delle elezioni italiane del 18 aprile 1948," Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali 46, 2, 1979, pp. 205-231. Quaroni, on Sforza's instructions, besides pressing the American ambassador in Paris for a statement on Trieste, suggested, as reported by Ambassador Jefferson Caffery himself, that "in view of the approaching elections it would also be helpful if [the Americans] would announce that aid to Italy would be terminated if the Communists were included in the Government after the elections" (Caffery to Dept 1277, March 11, 1948, USPolAd, Box 17, File 322) To my knowledge, at least, although suspected, it had not yet been proven that this American statement in the 1948 elections also had been solicited by the Italians themselves.

87. Caffery to Dept. 1148 and 1167 (March 3 and 4, 1948), FSP-Rome, 1948, Box 226, File 800; Dunn to Dept. 943 (March 4, 1948), USPolAd, Box 17, File 322. Serious reservations about a statement on Trieste were expressed by the American military advisor in the Rome embassy. see R.G S. to Jones (Chief of the Joint U S Military Advisory Group), March 2, 1948, FSP-Rome, Box 29 Confidential Files, File 800, see also Caffery to Dept 1327 and 1334 (March 13, 1948) and Dunn to Dept 1154 (March 16, 1948), all in USPolAd, Box 17, File 322). Duroselle, (op cit , p 271) reports that De Gasperi, in choosing a declaration about the whole FTT, commented· "When you're offered the moon why settle for a quarter of it?"

88. Dunn to Dept. 1205 and 1221 (March 18 and 19, 1948), both in USPolAd, Box 17, File 322 (1205 also printed in FRUS 1948, III, pp. 515-516).

89. Text of the press release in Department of State Bulletin 18 (March 28, 1948), p. 425. See also Relazioni Internazionali 12, 13-14 (April 3, 1948), pp. 283-285, which also reports the Italian and Yugoslav notes as well as the comments of various Italian, Yugoslav and Allied politicians. Text of the note to the Soviet Union in FRUS 1948, III, pp. 517-518 and the one to Italy in Department of State Bulletin 18 (April 4, 1948), p. 453.

90. Cannon to Dept. 332 and 336 (March 22 and 23, 1948), USPolAd, Box 17, File 322; text of the note in Cannon to Dept. 333 (filed as 332) (March 22, 1948), FSP-Rome, Box 226, File 800. See also the Borba editorial of March 22, 1948 in Cannon to Dept. 334 (March 22, 1948), USPolAd, Box 17, File 322.

91. Dunn to Dept. 1400 (March 30, 1948), USPolAd, Box 17, File 322. Text of the second note in Department of State Bulletin 18 (April 18, 1948). It was presented to the press as proof that the first note had not been intended as a mere electoral move but as a serious step. Text of the Soviet reply and subsequent American rejoinder in Department of State Bulletin 18 (April 25, 1948), p. 549.

92. It is interesting to point out that everybody felt that the tripartite proposal had greatly contributed to the victory of the Christian Democrats, although it is hard to see how the effectiveness of the proposal could be measured independently of other initiatives Indeed effectiveness was not measured at all, each commentator concluding that since the elections were won, the measures taken must have been effective. See, for instance, Eden's comments in his memoirs (Full Circle, London Cassels,

1960, p. 178).

93. Quoted in De Castro, op. cit., I, p. 737.

94. The Foreign Ministry analysis is partially reported in De Castro, op. cit., I, pp. 734-735. Sforza's letter is quoted in ibid., p. 746. As Geoffrey Harrison, the British Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would later recall, the Italians "just could not be shaken free of the tripartite proposal of 1948" (quoted in Campbell, ed., op. cit., p. 61).

95. Quotations in Lorraine M. Lees, "The American Decision to Assist Tito 1948-49," Diplomatic History 2 (Autumn 1978), pp. 407-422, and Henry W. Brands, jr., "Redefining the Cold War: American Policy toward Yugoslavia 1948-60," ibid. 11, 1 (Winter 1983), pp. 41-53. See also Robert M. Blum, "Surprised by Tito: The Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure," ibid. 12, 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 39-57, Beatrice Heuser, Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case 1948-53, London: Routledge, 1988 and "The Attitude of this Government toward Events in Yugoslavia," drafted by Kennan (NSC 18) and partly quoted in Rabel, op. cit., p. 268. For the opinion of a contemporary observer, see Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform, Russian Research Center Studies, no. 5, Cambridge. Harvard Univ. Press, 1952.

96. The quotations are reported in Rabel, op. cit., pp. 268-270.

97. AMG administrative policies which had been, at first, rather impartial started to take on a somewhat more pro-Italian hue and a distinctive anti-communist thrust in mid-1947, thereby paralleling general American policy in Europe. It was then that local AMG officials, feeling that Zone B had "gone with the wind," started to perceive their role as being primarily that of preventing communist infiltration. On the evolution of AMG administrative policies see Rabel, op. cit., pp. 192-209 and 232-246 and Valdevit, op. cit., pp. 113-118, 122-142, 150-187, 209-219 and 237-250. See also "Transmitting Chronology of Important Events in Trieste since the Allied Occupation in 1945," 750G.22/9-850, which pays almost exclusive attention to the activities of the Communists in the FTT. On Italian hypersensitivity about Allied policy in Zone A see De Castro, op. cit., I, pp. 750-751 and Joyce to Dept., May 5, 1948, in FRUS 1948, III, pp. 560-561. On the elections, see two memoranda by Joseph N. Greene, jr., both dated Nov. 8, 1948 (FSP-Rome, Box 32, Confidential Files, File 800), in which Greene (Second Secretary, American Embassy in Rome), after a visit to Trieste, remarks that the outlook for the pro-Italian parties in that city is not good and concludes that "careful work" must be done to strengthen them so that they can conduct an effective election campaign. He also lists some of the ways in which this should be done. He remarks: "It is most important that in Trieste a sizeable pro-Italian vote be given, especially in view of Allied policy since March 20, 1948. General Airey tells me that he feels that the showing must be at least 80 percent Italian in Trieste commune, and that anything as low as say 60 percent, would complicate his task as well as Allied policy." See also Baldwin (United States Political Adviser in Trieste) to Dept., March 22, 1949 and Parsons (Chief of Planning and Advisory Staff, AMG) to Gaither (Director General of Civil Affairs, AMG), March 11, 1949, in FRUS 1949, IV, pp. 500-502 and 502-503, respectively. These documents reveal how, in the face of the adamant Italian refusal to issue documents in the "hated Slovene language" and "in order to avoid a rift which would inevitably do great harm to Italian prospects in the elections," General Airey decided not to press on with the AMG proposal that electoral documents issued by the municipal governments also be in Slovene. See also Raoul Pupo, "Le elezioni amministrative del 1949 a

Trieste. Contesto internazionale e articolazione del 'Fronte Italiano'," Quaderni del Centro Studi Economici e Politici Ezio Vanoni (Trieste), 14, 1980, and C. Columni, L. Ferrari, G Nassisi and G. Trani, "Roma e Trieste di fronte alle elezioni amministrative del 1949," Qualestoria 3, 1978, pp 18-24

98. Dept. to Embassy in the U.K., June 29, 1949, in FRUS 1949, IV, pp. 509-511.

99. These preoccupations were first expressed by American Charge in Yugoslavia Reams in a telegram to the Department on June 21, 1949 (in FRUS 1949, IV, pp. 508-509) and backed up by American Charge in Moscow Kohler (see his telegram of June 24 in ibid., V, pp. 904-905). The quotation is from "Policy Statement Trieste" (611.50G/11-1450). See also the comments of the Chargé in Moscow Barbour, in his telegram 345 (611-50G/1-451). Although officially set forth in 1950, this position had materialized at least a year earlier. See, for instance, MC Greene (now an official at the Division of Southwest European Affairs), Boyd (British Embassy) 860S.00/10-1949, where Greene mentions that, according to the State Department, "the best hope for progress is in Italy and Yugoslavia working out an agreement themselves."

100. MC Perkins (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs), Nov 25, 1949, in FRUS 1949, IV, pp. 522-524.

101. British Embassy to Dept., Jan 18, 1950, FRUS 1950, III, pp 1302-1304; Reams to Dept., Jan 24, 1950, and Dunn to Dept , Jan 26, 1950, ibid., pp. 1305-1307 and 1307-1310, respectively, The Secretary of State to Franks (British Ambassador), March 17, 1950, ibid., pp 1311-1314. See also Dept. to British Embassy, Aug 8, 1950, in ibid., pp. 1329-1334. The reluctance of the State Department to press Italy into direct negotiations derived also from the fact that, as long as Yugoslavia remained in limbo, the Americans were quite happy to keep their troops in Trieste. On the debate about the strategic significance of U.S military presence in Trieste, see, for instance, Unger (American Political Adviser to the AMG in Trieste) to Dept , Jan. 3, 1951, FRUS 1951, IV, pp. 206-208 and the correspondence mentioned therein

102. They refused, for instance, to take into consideration the so-called "Baudier plan." Taking as its point of departure the fact that the peace treaty did not specify the areas of the FTT which should be under Allied or Yugoslav administration, the plan (named after its author, French Political Observer in Trieste Jean Baudier) suggested that a reshuffling of these areas be undertaken under the terms of which Anglo-American administration would be extended to all the prevailing Italian coastal towns of Zone B while the Yugoslavs would assume control of the Slavic townships in Zone A. Although not solving the problem in a definitive manner, the plan's implementation would probably have helped to relieve most of the tensions in the area and between the two countries, facilitated cooperation and possibly provided the basis for a future, final solution. It might not have been accepted by the Yugoslavs, but what is of significance here is that the plan was never taken into any official consideration by the Italian government nor, consequently, by the United States When first suggested by Baudier himself in October 1949, the Foreign Ministry reacted by requesting the French embassy "to invite Mr Baudier not to overstep his function of simple observer" (see De Castro, op cit., I, p. 799, footnote 21) The plan was then resurrected twice by New York Times correspondent Camille M Cianfarra, on March 2 and August 20, 1951. A memorandum of the Foreign Ministry this time dismissed it as having "the same difficulties and risks, both domestic and international, as would be encountered in the search for a definitive solution " Public opinion, it was feared,

would feel that a new compromise, onerous for Italy, had been reached through the acquiescence of the government. Moreover, the provisional acceptance of an ethnic line would be tantamount to the abandonment of the tripartite declaration. No consideration was given to the fact that the plan was supported by Istrian leaders in Trieste, including De Castro, who had personally suggested it to Cianfarra (see De Castro, op. cit., I, pp. 858-861).

103. Both quotations in De Castro, op. cit , I, pp. 797 and 814.

104. On American defense plans for Southeastern Europe see Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Eisenhower's Right Flank," Foreign Affairs 29, 4 (July 1951), pp. 651-663. On Italian-Yugoslav verbal flares see FRUS 1950, III, pp 1317-1319. On Soviet attempts to take advantage of the unresolved FTT question see a note of April 20, 1950 accusing the Allies of violating the peace treaty (in Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953, p. 515). The American answer is in Department of State Bulletin, 20 (May 1, 1950), p. 701. See also Dept. to Embassy in the U.K., June 1 and 6, 1950, in FRUS 1950, III, pp. 1319-1322 and 1324-1325 and Department of State Bulletin 20 (June 26, 1950), p. 1054. The Soviet Union also tried to link the FTT question to the peace treaty with Austria. See U.S. Delegation for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers to Dept., May 22, 1950 and July 10, 1950, in FRUS 1950, IV, pp 460-462 and 464-465, and Dept. to the U.S. Delegation for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers, in ibid., pp. 462-464.

105. As usual, Ambassador Dunn was opposed to pressuring Italy to negotiate: "It is our considered opinion that [the Italian] government in the face of the present national and international crisis would not now be willing to accept [the] political liability involved in [an] agreement [with Yugoslavia]. The government and Sforza, in particular, have taken a beating over [the] failure to regain [the] colonies. It would not seem advisable for them to risk at [the] present time another failure, particularly one which can apparently be postponed. Neither do I consider that it could be in our interest to urge the government to risk a crisis on these grounds at this time" (Dunn to Dept., Jan. 3, 1951, FRUS 1951, IV, pp. 208-211).

106. On this episode see Gastone Guidotti, "Una storia difficile," Trieste: Rivista trimestrale di politica e cultura 20, 101 (May 1976) and Livio Zeno, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza, Florence: Le Monnier, 1975, pp. 315-316. Quotation from the press release in De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 19-21.

107. The two countries had tried repeatedly to establish a dialogue on the Trieste problem before and during the Paris Peace Conference. The most famous of these attempts was a meeting in early November 1946 between Tito and Secretary General of the PCI (and at the time also Minister of Justice), Palmiro Togliatti. Informal conversations occasionally also took place at different levels after regular diplomatic relations between the two countries were reestablished in March 1947. But these were merely "acts of good will," as De Castro has defined them, on the parts of individual diplomats or politicians of both countries. Most important among these unofficial discussions were those which took place in London in late 1950 and early 1951 between the Yugoslav and Italian Ambassadors there at the time, Jože Brilej and Duke Tommaso Gallarati Scotti For a detailed analysis of all Italian-Yugoslav meetings and discussions from the end of the war to 1951 see De Castro, op cit , II, pp 39-105 The Ristić-Di Soragna conversations are reported by Sforza, op cit., 1952, pp. 417-439.

For an English translation prepared by the American embassy in Rome on May 7, 1953, see "Italo-Yugoslav Talks on Trieste in July of 1951" in FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350 Di Soragna had been Secretary General of the Italian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In this position he had contacts with Yugoslav delegates in the fall of 1946 and was very familiar with the Trieste dossier. Sforza's speech in Milan on April 8, 1950 is in Relazioni Internazionali 14, 15, April 15, 1950.

3. PRELUDE TO CRISIS: September 1, 1951 to August 28, 1953

The ICB model of crisis behavior, as noted in Chapter 1, is really a three-period model comprised of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. The pre-crisis period can be distinguished from the preceding noncrisis situation by an increase in perceived threat on the part of the decision-makers of the state in question The presence of all three components of crisis (threat to basic values, time pressure and probability of involvement in military hostilities) characterizes the crisis period. Finally, the decline in intensity of these three perceptual components signals the beginning of the post-crisis period. This, in turn, can be said to end when the intensity of all relevant perceptions has returned to the original noncrisis levels.

In the Trieste case, a "threat to basic values" can be said to have existed for Italian decision-makers since the summer of 1944 when, as noted above, they first became aware that the Julian region might be liberated by Yugoslav partisans and be lost for Italy. After the signing of the peace treaty, the reacquisition of as much of the FTT as possible (and of Trieste, in particular) became a "high priority goal" for Italian decision-makers The same territory, however, remained under constant threat of the Yugoslav rival claim. "Perception of threat," although fluctuating with changing events, did not increase noticeably until August 28, 1953 (the beginning of the pre-crisis period) and then again on October 10 of the same year (the beginning of the crisis period) The perceived component "probability of involvement in military hostilities" likewise did not appear until August 29, 1953

(the reasons for this "early" appearance, relative to the crisis dynamics posited by the ICB model, will be explored later) In line with the model, it came to play an even more significant role on October 10. The third component, "time pressure," however, started to manifest itself as early as mid-1951.

This change in the perception of time should not be taken as signalling the beginning of a crisis period. First of all, it did not affect all high-policy decision-makers but was limited to a few diplomats in the field. Second, there was no parallel increase in threat perception at this juncture. Time started to be perceived as salient, but not in the sense that Italian decision-makers became aware of the finiteness of time for selecting a decisive response to a specific threatening event. More simply, some diplomats started to feel that the waiting game they had played until then was becoming inadequate in light of the evolving international situation and, as a consequence, started to advocate a more dynamic policy

Thus, the period from September 1, 1951 to August 28, 1953, although not part of the crisis, can be distinguished from the preceding period by this new awareness of the salience of time and by an increase in activity on the part of Italian decision-makers Both Duroselle and De Castro, for instance, have defined it as the "dynamic phase" of the Trieste conflict to distinguish it from the previous more "static" one Here it is referred to as "prelude to crisis" and examined with as much attention as is devoted to the subsequent crisis periods To identify the specificities of crisis decision-making, in fact, one needs to compare and contrast such a process with that occurring in a noncrisis situation. In this chapter and the following four, the identification of decisions and decision-makers, as well as an exploration of their domestic and psychological environment, will precede the reconstruction of the decision-flow.

Decisions, Decision-Makers and Domestic Environment

There were eight decisions during this period: [1]

Decision 1 - September 1, 1951	De Gasperi agrees to direct "talks" with the Yugoslavs.
Decision 2 - March 5, 1952	De Gasperi submits a plebiscite proposal as a convenient way to put an end to the "talks" with the Yugoslavs.
Decision 3 - March 25, 1952	De Gasperi requests the American and British governments to hold a conference to examine the situation in Zone A
Decision 4 - October 1, 1952	De Gasperi requests the Americans to obtain for Italy "an acceptable compromise in Zone B."
Decision 5 - December 10, 1952	De Gasperi rejects Acheson's plan for a division of the FTT.
Decision 6 - March 6, 1953	De Gasperi rejects Dulles' first plan for a division of the FTT.
Decision 7 - March 17, 1953	De Gasperi rejects Dulles' second plan.
Decision 8 - June 17, 1953	De Gasperi decides to seek from the Allies the "provisional" transfer of Zone A to Italy.

All decisions during this period were taken by Prime/Foreign Minister Alcide De Gasperi. The government, the seventh he had presided over since December 1945, had come to power on July 26, 1951. It was a coalition clearly dominated by the Christian Democrats, who held all the portfolios except for Foreign Trade (which had gone to the Republican Ugo La Malfa) Former Foreign Minister Sforza (another Republican) was Cabinet member without portfolio He, however, was already severely ill

and would die on September 4, 1952. The Liberals and Social Democrats provided Parliamentary support but had no representatives in the Cabinet. A key role, both in this period and during the crisis, was instead played by some members of the diplomatic corps

The most influential of these were Count Vittorio Zoppi, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Duke Giulio Del Balzo di Presenzano, Director General of Political Affairs, and the Ambassadors to Great Britain and the United States, Manlio Brosio and Alberto Tarchiani, respectively. Zoppi and Del Balzo, in particular, played a key role not only because they took part in crucial deliberations but also because they requested, received and processed information, laid out the alternatives from which options were selected and basically managed the "public" side of the crisis by drafting key speeches for De Gasperi and giving direction to the pro-government press. Given the central role played by the foreign policy bureaucracy, it is worthwhile to take a brief look at some of its main characteristics.

The basic structures of the Italian state and the bureaucracy, in particular, were almost exactly the same in the early 1950s as those of Fascist Italy. Postwar political reconstruction was, according to the late and well-respected Italian political scientist Paolo Farneti,

> a process of democratization in the sense that power was extended to elected organs and thus it was an operation of elective democratization ... but it was not a democratization in the sense of the removal or containment of certain power structures which, as in the case of the bureaucracy, had played important roles in support of the previous regime [2]

The same had been pointed out even more forcefully in 1951 by Giuseppe Dossetti, then vice-secretary of the Christian Democratic party, just prior to his decision to abandon politics for the priesthood In a communication to the third National Congress of the Association of Italian Catholic Jurists, he said:

> It is interesting to observe from a sociological point of view ... as, almost everywhere and more or less completely, there is the substantive reemergence of all the old forces, of all the political figures of the prewar period to the point that one can affirm that the political praxis today is still that of 1940. [3]

The bureaucracy that is of interest here is obviously that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although after the fall of Fascism a debate developed in Italy on how to restructure the Ministry and the diplomatic service in order to eliminate "totalitarian administrative regulations, or at least those contrary to the spirit of the newly constituted Italian Republic," no initiative was taken until 1962. [4] As Norman Kogan pointed out in what more than twenty-five years later is still the only analysis of the Italian foreign policy bureaucracy, the diplomatic corps managed to go through the advent of Fascism and its defeat while "maintaining its basic social and political characteristics." [5] That is, it remained by and large an aristocratic body of men recruited from rich and, more often than not, titled families with a conservative outlook and nationalistic ambitions. In the late 1920s a few Fascist party hacks did enter the diplomatic service, but the career people were able to relegate them to subordinate positions. The conflict between the two groups, in any case, was over promotion and style rather than goals.

Although after the fall of Fascism it became customary to blame all failed policies on Mussolini, the historic record has shown that career diplomats retained control of foreign policy, by and large, at least until 1936. Their influence declined only after Count Galeazzo Ciano was appointed Foreign Minister and proceeded to set up a kind of parallel diplomatic service made up of young and trusted friends. What distinguished the professional diplomats was their continued adherence to a traditional sober style in the conduct of foreign affairs and a more realistic, less triumphant assessment of Italy's effective strength and capacity to maneuver on the international scene. Their reluctance to adopt the tono fascista (fascist tone), a mixture of daring, arrogance and enthusiasm, and their preference for cautious proceedings over decisive action made them appear to be betraying the heroic spirit of the regime. To be sure, the tono fascista advocated by Ciano did not represent per se a new course of action, although it certainly did have an impact on foreign policy making. The goals of Italian foreign policy

under Fascism did not vary or deviate substantially from those of the previous regime: the pursuit of grandeur and prestige, the search for supremacy in the Mediterranean and the continuance of imperialistic adventures. The means also remained the same, namely the exploitation of rivalries among the major powers. [6] Almost all diplomats, moreover, found the established order acceptable, only a handful of them--one of whom was Carlo Sforza--having resigned in protest over the Duce's policies. Almost all of them, however, deserted him in September 1943, not because of ideological preferences but out of expediency: the imperative of coming out on the winning side. As Kogan again pointed out, the criticism made by those diplomats who sided with the Royal Government of their few colleagues who remained with the Fascist Social Republic was "for their stupidity in misjudging who would win the war." [7]

In 1944, as diplomatic relations with the allied countries resumed, the Royal Government, then including members from all anti-Fascist parties comprising the Committee of National Liberation, appointed a few political figures as chiefs of missions to these countries. [8] Later, however, they were slowly recalled and replaced by career people. By 1953 only Tarchiani was left in service. Although a few attempts were made to retire some prewar career diplomats, they ceased with the end of the governments of "national unity" in May 1947. Moreover, most of the "retired" ones were later reinstated. Duke Del Balzo di Presenzano, for instance, was interned by Allied authorities in September 1943 but was released and returned to his post the following February. The first postwar examination for admission into the diplomatic corps (the previous one having taken place in 1940) was not held until 1948. The vast majority of the top career diplomats in the 1950s had thus entered service before 1940, as can be seen in the following table.

Table 1

Year of entry into the Foreign Service of Top Career Officers

(serving as of 1957)

Rank	Before 1940	After 1948
Ambassador	11	1
Minister, First class	29	2
Minister, Second class	65	2
Counselor of Embassy	63	--
Counselor of Legation	126	5
First Secretary	11	15

This does not mean that the majority of Italian diplomats serving in the early 1950s had Fascist sympathies. They were not "apolitical," however, as Kogan has maintained. Given their social and educational background (they all came from the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie, almost all held a law degree and more than half boasted titles of nobility), their political sympathies went primarily to the Liberal, Monarchic and Christian Democratic parties. [9] This common background also suggests the existence of a certain uniformity of values, beliefs and perceptual predispositions which, as has often been pointed out, represents the kind of decisional environment most likely to give rise to cognitive biases. [10] These values, beliefs and perceptual predispositions, moreover, were of a kind that made it most unlikely for them to identify with, and therefore trust, their revolutionary Yugoslav counterparts.

Psychological Environment

The need to examine the psychological environment of decision-makers stems from the fact that people act on the basis of their own subjective perceptions of reality. Making a decision means choosing one course of action from a range of perceived alternatives. While the operational environment, both international and domestic, delimits the setting within which decision-makers must act, the psychological environment defines the field of choice and the ordering of alternatives in it from which they will select their preferred option. For analytic purposes, the psychological environment can be seen as comprising two inextricably linked elements: an attitudinal prism and specific images. The attitudinal prism is shaped by a mixture of social, cultural, group and individual factors and can be defined as the lens through which decision-makers perceive the operational environment. [11] The content of these perceptions can instead be defined as images. The prism is thus relatively stable through time, whereas images are more contextual and time-specific.

A dynamic relationship can be said to exist between psychological and operational environments insofar as the former generally orients decision-makers towards the latter and predisposes them to act in a particular way, while changes in the operational environment resulting from the actions of the decision-makers will, in turn, affect the psychological one. It must be pointed out, moreover, that this relationship tends to be self-reinforcing rather than self-correcting. If we assume, for instance, that, at a given time, Italian decision-makers have negative images of Yugoslav ones and vice versa, then, according to this model, each set of decision-makers will tend to make decisions whose impact on the operational environment will most likely result in changes that will lead them to form even more negative images of the adversary, and so on in a self-reinforcing spiral. This spiral, however, can be reversed when some major change occurs at the level of the prism (for instance, a change of part or all of the decision-making group as a result of a change in the governmental party or the arrival of an influential new decision-maker with strong,

idiosyncratic personal characteristics) or when some event in the operational environment, brought about by a third actor, changes at the same time the images and the prism of both sets of decision-makers.

The analysis of the psychological environment of Italian decision-makers will deal both with the attitudinal prism--that is, with their background beliefs and assumptions about their operational environment--and with specific images. To speak of the attitudinal prism of Italian decision-makers as if it was exactly the same for each and every one of them, may at first seem somewhat simplistic. Yet, as should already be clear, the key Italian decision-makers during the Trieste crisis were sufficiently homogeneous in terms of their ideological orientation, values and experiences to justify talking about a collective prism. Differences, to be sure, existed, but they related more to the strength of the lenses than the type.

A few words of caution are in order here. The analysis of the psychological environment is based on the perceptions and images expressed by Italian decision-makers in three different types of circumstance: (a) secret deliberations of the decision-making or consultative units revealed by Italian Foreign Ministry documents and quoted in De Castro's work, (b) confidential meetings with American diplomatic officials reported by the latter in their correspondence with Washington and (c) public speeches, statements, press conferences, interviews and memoirs. Not all sets of documents provide the same type of information. Perceptions and images expressed in the first category are more reliable than those articulated in the second or third, where advocative (or, if one prefers, manipulative) intents also come into play.

It was noted in the preceding chapter, for instance, that in conversations with American diplomats by the end of 1945 Italian decision-makers started to articulate the perception that yielding to the Yugoslav coup de main in Trieste would have dramatic repercussions not only in Italy but also in the international system because it would encourage aggression elsewhere. This might mean that Italian

decision-makers had by then developed the "Munich syndrome." It might also mean, however, that they had realized that perception of threat couched in such terms was more likely to elicit the desired response from the Americans. By the same token, when analyzing perceptions and images in public speeches or interviews one must take into account the fact that they were articulated also, if not primarily, with an eye to the audience. References to the Trieste question by Prime/Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella in his speeches to Parliament during the 1953 crisis, for instance, were largely influenced by his need to retain the support of right-wing allies for his government. Thus they reveal more about Pella's perception of the dynamics of coalition governments than about the Trieste question. Granted, discrepancies usually have more to do with the intensity of perceptions and the vividness of images than their substance. Yet these differences can be significant. To overlook them would be tantamount to ignoring the manipulative component vis-à-vis the Americans and/or public opinion. An example using perception of Communist threat will illustrate this point

In September 1947, following a series of mass demonstrations against the government's economic policies, Prime Minister De Gasperi instructed Ambassador Tarchiani to inform the State Department that such events "were of course part of the overall strategy of the Italian Communist party to force [his] government out of office." Since this could not be done by parliamentary vote, he thought the party "might .. attempt to set up a Communist government in northern Italy which would undoubtedly receive recognition and assistance from Tito." To him, this was obvious evidence that the Soviets, now that Greece and Turkey were "under direct U.S. protection," were turning their attention to Italy. To put De Gasperi's perceptions into the proper perspective, however, one must point out that the Italian government was at the time soliciting emergency economic aid also in view of the upcoming elections. De Gasperi knew that the Communist threat was a powerful argument with the Americans and that their degree and speed of responsiveness would be directly proportional to the intensity with

which such a threat was perceived. He therefore backed up his request for economic aid with a series of appeals for military assistance which pointed to the existence of a desperate situation. Between September and December he first asked that American troops be kept in Italy or somewhere in the Mediterranean from where they could easily be dispatched to Italy if need be, then suggested that the American government issue a public statement reminding the Italians "of the proper right and duty [of the U.S.] to intervene whenever ... the democratic anti-totalitarian form of government of the country might be threatened" and finally requested arms and equipment to enable Italian military forces "to meet the possibility of an organized Communist attempt to take over the government by force." [12]

On December 15, upon pressure from the State Department, Congress approved 211 million dollars of emergency "interim aid " A whole series of official and covert operations were also initiated to help the electoral campaign of the Christian Democrats. The request for arms and equipment, however, because of the logistics involved, took a little longer to satisfy. The shipment was ready only in early March. By then, however, with the elections a month away, De Gasperi felt that the arrival of arms would be a political liability and told Dunn that he preferred not to take shipment. This threw American Secretary of State George Marshall literally into a rage. He could not understand why, if the shipping of arms had been deemed of vital importance until only a few weeks earlier, the Prime Minister had now changed his mind. Since he considered it "surely unwise to assume the Communists would meekly accept electoral defeat without resort to direct action," he concluded that De Gasperi had either taken an "attitude of defeatism" or, worse, "had been lulled into feelings of false security." De Gasperi's perception of the Communist threat, however, had not changed. It simply had never been as strong as the Americans had been led to believe. As Tarchiani reveals in his memoir, "De Gasperi would occasionally recur to the Communist bugaboo to move the Americans." The request for arms had been made, not because De Gasperi believed that a revolution was

imminent but as part of a package of initiatives meant to sensitize the Americans to the necessity of providing emergency economic aid and support in the electoral campaign. Since these objectives had meanwhile been achieved, the shipment of arms had become but a financial and political liability which he obviously preferred to avoid [13]

This would seem to suggest that images cannot always be taken at face value. They must be examined within the larger context in which they are expressed, with particular attention paid to the specific objectives decision-makers are pursuing at the time. The expression of certain images, in fact, may well be a particular tactic employed in the pursuit of these objectives. Images, in this case, can hardly be treated as independent variables. Variations in their intensity or type, rather than representing changes in the psychological environment, would then be related to the different fora in which they are expressed.

Attitudinal Prism

Two components of the prism are of particular relevance when examining the Trieste question. The first, which could be defined as the "domestic magnifier," relates to the tendency of Italian decision-makers to regard foreign policy choices as geared to, and shaped by, domestic political considerations. This should not be confused with the constraints that domestic politics inevitably impose upon foreign policy, nor with the so-called "linkages" between domestic and foreign affairs, which are features found in any polity. The "domestic magnifier" points to a rather extreme situation where the main functions of foreign policy are domestic or, to put it less paradoxically, where foreign policy issues are essentially symbolic and always approached with the aim of consolidating the hegemony of the dominant political forces. De Gasperi and Sforza, the chief architects

of Italian foreign policy in the immediate postwar years, did not decide to adhere to the Western defense system, for instance, because they thought that a Soviet military attack to the West was imminent or even likely. In case of conflict, they actually would have preferred not to belong to a military alliance because "[Italy] would thus have," as Sforza saw it, "the possibility, at least theoretical and however scant, to remain neutral." [14] Rather than by considerations of external military security, their decision to seek admission to NATO, amidst serious reservations from groups on all sides of the political spectrum, was prompted by the perception that "membership [was] necessary," in the words of De Gasperi, "to make the efforts of the internal revolutionaries vain." This meant, in clearer terms, to relegate the Communists to a permanent marginal position within the domestic political system and thus insure the ruling coalition against any radical shift in power. [15]

In the Trieste case, the "domestic magnifier" meant that Italian decision-makers, especially the politicians, regarded the question of the FTT in terms of its impact on domestic politics and the electoral fortunes of the center parties, in particular. Its reacquisition, preferably through the intervention of the Allies, was seen as necessary to provide additional legitimization to the controversial foreign policy choices De Gasperi and Sforza had made by showing that they were now paying off. Options were evaluated in the same manner. Thus, until June 1953, for instance, De Gasperi refused to take into consideration the so-called "provisional solution" (an option favored by his diplomatic advisers since August 1951 calling for the Allies to turn Zone A over to Italian administration) because he thought that it could be interpreted as a relinquishment of Italian claims to Zone B and hurt the center parties electorally. Such an option, as he put it in March 1953, was "no longer useful for electoral purposes" because "public opinion already suspect[ed] that under a provisional solution [was hidden], in reality, a definitive one." Therefore, he considered its acceptance on the eve of the elections tantamount to "political

suicide." [16]

The second element of the prism was the "leverage syndrome." This describes the propensity of Italian decision-makers to regard membership in international organizations as a means for Italy to regain her "proper place" in the international community, extract some concessions from her partners and be backed by them in disputes with nonmembers. Ambassador Quaroni, for instance, advised Sforza to seek admission to the Western European Union (WEU) because he thought it would be "the fastest and most effective way for Italy to regain parity in the international community." He suggested, moreover, not to rush to seek membership but "wait calmly until others come looking for us" because "if we press for admission the others will put conditions whereas if we have patience, we ourselves will be in a position to put certain conditions to our entrance." Sforza saw entrance into NATO as assuring the end of "any political and moral difference" between Italy and the other Western nations. Tarchiani argued that "adhesion to the pact would enable Italy to reach the first and fundamental objective of her postwar foreign policy: to become an equal and dignified partner in the Western [international] political system." At the time of the negotiations for both the WEU and NATO De Gasperi hinted that his government would find it easier to join a military pact if membership brought with it revision of the peace treaty--particularly those clauses concerning the colonies and Trieste--which kept Italy in a position of inferiority relative to the other members. In February 1949 he thus commented on Italy's adhesion to the Council of Europe:

> Finally ... we emerge from the peculiar situation in which we have been since the war and like others, reenter the European family of nations in which ... we will be able to say a word on those postwar questions which have not yet been solved.

Trieste obviously figured most prominently among these unsolved questions. As to the perception that membership entitled the country to unrestricted support in disputes with nonmembers, Ambassador Brosio expressed it thus, years later.

> We were NATO allies; we were committed . We believed that being a government of sincere opponents of the Fascist regime and seriously convinced of the necessity of remaining loyal

> allies of the former enemies of our country we were entitled to preferential consideration over Yugoslavia, which had at that time (and still has) a communist regime--one which was then much more ruthless than it became later. We felt that we deserved the support of the U.S. and the U.K. because of a community of ideology, of systems, and of the alliance. [17]

This view, it should be pointed out, was presented to the public as fact. To uphold their foreign policy choices, Italian decision-makers incessantly repeated that "by entering into the Atlantic Pact [they] had reinforced the ties of solidarity and cooperation with the Western democratic nations, thus further committing them to help [Italy] with the FTT." They felt, therefore, that failure on the part of the Allies to act decisively in Italy's favor betrayed the expectations of Italian public opinion and risked turning it against the West.

The two components of the prism thus converged to form a single strong conviction: Italy was not simply entitled to the support of the Allies; it was of paramount importance for them to give it. De Gasperi expressed this very well when, commenting on the prospects of the European Defense Community (EDC) during an official visit to Washington in September 1951, he repeated to the State Department, the President and Congress ("wherever he found an audience," as Acheson would later recall) that "without a satisfactory settlement of the Trieste question no democratic government in Italy could get parliamentary support for a joint defense effort." If the Italians should think that "their allies could not save Trieste for Italy, the result would be a dangerous trend toward neutralism" and "his coalition would lose votes to the left and right."

The "leverage syndrome" did not fade away once Italy, with a firm footing in the Western camp, had regained her "proper place" in the world. Italian decision-makers now felt that new battles were necessary to defend and maintain the reacquired prestige. As Ortona writes in the preface to his second volume of memoirs, in the early 1950s, precisely because a "situation of normalization" could be said to have started, Italian "diplomatic initiatives had to become even more intense both to keep Italy in a position of prominence where [her] interests were at

stake and to avoid relegation to a secondary role in the community of nations." [18]

Images

The two major components of the prism can be regarded as the outer parameters of Italian action in the 1953 Trieste crisis. The "leverage syndrome" points to pressures on the Allies as the most probable means for Italian decision-makers to seek a solution. The "domestic magnifier," on the other hand, suggests that variations in the intensity and scope of these pressures are likely to be related to changes in the domestic political scene. Decision-makers' images of the setting, on the other hand, afford a closer peek at the mental landscape behind specific actions. Some images (for instance, those relative to Trieste) remained basically the same throughout the crisis. Others, instead, varied with changing events. They are presented here as they emerged at the end of the war and developed until the end of the "prelude to crisis" period. Subsequent changes will be discussed at the beginning of each of the following four chapters. Because of the existence of a basically common prism, Italian decision-makers also shared substantially the same images. Differences, whenever relevant, will be pointed out.

a) Trieste

As Tarchiani recalled in his memoir, Trieste was "the dominant territorial problem for Italian diplomacy" in the postwar period. This had little, if anything, to do with the city's economic importance as a major port. For Italian decision-makers Trieste represented a

sentimental as well as historical symbol. [19] The annexation of Trieste after the end of World War I had, in fact, concluded the movement for Italian national unity. The claims on Trento and Trieste, and their surrounding areas, had represented since 1870 the Leitmotif of the Italian irredentist movement and the main formal justification for Italy's entrance into World War I. "Trieste is for Italians," as De Gasperi put it in an interview with United Press in 1946, "more than a city and a harbor: it is a national feeling." Consequently, its destiny was his "supreme preoccupation" and until his retirement in August 1953 it remained, as he again put it, "the polar star of [his] democratic policy." Sforza would refer to it as "city sacred to our hearts." Tarchiani wrote in his memoir that a favorable solution to the Trieste problem was considered to be "imposed on the national conscience by the absolute necessity of achieving a minimal and honorable, if imperfect, national unity as well as a sacred duty towards the six hundred thousand dead and the tragic holocaust of human sorrow which Italy had already paid between 1915 and 1918 towards this end." Paolo Emilio Taviani, who would occupy the post of Minister of Defense during the 1953 crisis, remarked in his private journal that the Allies would never fully grasp what Trieste represented for Italy unless "they realize[d], once and for all, that over half a million Italian families had sacrificed a son to Trento and Trieste." Briefly, regaining Trieste was for Italian political leaders a sort of "religious imperative." [20] It must also be pointed out that "Trieste" was a convenient catch phrase that, in reality, meant the Julian region--with its 1939 borders until May 1945, up to the Wilson line until the peace treaty, up to the so-called French line until about mid-1951 and with as much of Zone B as possible thereafter. Had Italian claims indeed been confined exclusively to the city of Trieste, the problem would have been solved much earlier.

Italian decision-makers also felt that responsibility for the war, which had caused the loss of that region, belonged only to the Fascist government (if not to Mussolini personally) rather than to the Italian people, who had mended their ways by overthrowing the regime and helping

the Allies in their fight against Nazi Germany. Therefore, they concluded that as the new representatives of the people they could claim the country's prewar borders as a matter of right. De Gasperi, for instance, said in April 1945 that, although one could not "rule out the possibility of some rectification," he did not expect "important territorial changes." The provisions of the peace treaty came, therefore, as a great disappointment. As Sforza put it in a note of protest sent on February 10, 1947 to all the signing governments

> The expiation of the people of Italy has been so hard up to the signing of this treaty that we feel we have the right .. to expect a radical revision in the future of such points as are bound to paralyze or to poison the life of a country in which 45 million human beings are crowded into a territory that cannot feed them. [21]

The recovery of the FTT, however, was neither a question of Lebensraum nor a symptom of what a British historian has called "Italy's imperial hangover." It also was not merely a matter of sheer sentimentality. It had a larger and more important symbolic significance: it was perceived as necessary to cancel the most visible sign of a punitive, and therefore unjust, peace treaty which had dealt with Italy as a defeated country and failed to recognize its sacrifices and merits as a co-belligerent. It would represent an official recognition of Italy's newly reacquired prestige and status in the community of nations, a redress of the peace treaty's wrongs and an acknowledgment of her rights. Italian decision-makers pursued this objective with dogged determination. As Tarchiani put it, "[Italian] rights in Trieste had to triumph independently of the circumstances which had caused the loss of that territory and population and of the objective conditions which had prevented regaining them." [22]

This perception of a "right" created an insurmountable obstacle to compromise and therefore to the possibility of reaching agreement through direct negotiations. In both the Ristić-Di Soragna conversations and in the subsequent Guidotti-Bebler talks, the Yugoslavs worked under what could be defined as the Realpolitik assumption: they controlled Zone B while the Italians were, for all practical purposes, in control of Zone A through the Allies. Any solution, they felt, would

have to take this reality into account. Hence, all their proposals were based, in one way or another, on the idea that concessions by the two countries in their respective zones would have to be more or less equal in importance. The Italians, instead, worked under what could be called the transcendental assumption: Italy had a right to territories even beyond the boundaries of the FTT. Hence a solution, to be acceptable, had at least to "redeem" those parts of Zone B that were predominantly Italian. The peace treaty already obliged Italy to leave Italian-populated cities to Yugoslavia. The "continuous ethnic line" was thought to be an acceptable compromise, as it made further territorial concessions to Yugoslavia in areas inhabited predominantly by Slovenes. To the Yugoslavs, however, these were not concessions at all, since these areas were already under Yugoslav control. Given these unstated philosophical differences in their working assumptions, it is not surprising that direct negotiations would only lead to reciprocal accusations of intransigence.

b) Yugoslavia

Given the long-standing rivalry in the Julian region, Italian decision-makers were already predisposed to have a negative image of Yugoslavia. This predisposition was further reinforced, first by the ideological differences created by the coming to power of Tito's Communist partisans and later by the Cold War. Because of geographical proximity, direct rivalry and the legacy of the events of May 1945 in Trieste, Yugoslavia was perceived as posing an even greater threat than the Soviet Union. Perceptions did not improve following the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. It simply added the Communists to the list of his detractors. As American Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce would note in August 1953, Tito became "the most consistently hated man in Italy--hated by all classes and sections, from the Fascist right straight through the Christian Democratic center to the Communist left."

Indeed, instead of the split leading to a reevaluation of perceptions, it was the existing image that affected the appraisal of events. For a long time after 1948, in fact, the prevailing perception among Italian decision-makers was that Tito's break with the Soviet Union was, if not a plain scam, a simple accident de parcours and therefore merely temporary. Yugoslavia was a "Slavic country and a dictatorship." This was enough to conclude that "psychologically it could never become part of Europe." To hope that it would evolve in a democratic, or even social-democratic, direction was mere "wishful thinking." Tito remained an "untrustworthy Slav," an atheist, a dictator, a "Communist Mossadegh" and "to try to hide him in sheep's clothing was a dangerous self-deception." Therefore, they doubted the wisdom of the American policy of supporting Tito in the hope of enlisting him to the cause of the West. Taviani, who was at this time Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, believed, for instance, as he told an American diplomat in August 1951, that although for the time being "Tito had no choice but to stick with the West ... as the country was Slav and Marxist, sooner or later its affinity with the East would reassert itself." De Gasperi, for his part, thought, as he revealed to Ambassador Luce in May 1953, that "the logic of the situation" (that is, the fact that Tito continued to subscribe to the ideology of Communism) would "ultimately force him" to rejoin the Cominform.

Although the definitiveness of these judgments was due to a desire to dampen what was perceived as excessive American enthusiasm for Yugoslavia, the basic doubts were real. At a time when Communism was regarded as a monolithic whole, how could Tito be expected "to march with the anti-communist West against communist Russia in the name of Communism"? And even if one assumed that his intentions were sincere, Italian decision-makers judged the Yugoslav army to be "worth, in terms of modern warfare, little more than the Ethiopian army of 1935." They considered Tito's potential contribution to Western defense to be of little or no significance and could not understand what De Gasperi called "the Pentagon's fascination with Yugoslav divisions." The

Americans, as they saw it, should concentrate on Italy because she was "a central and fundamental element of the Western coalition, not only from the military point of view but also and primarily at the political, economic and cultural levels; Yugoslavia, on the other hand, [was] a force of contrast and disgregation at the political level and a marginal element, at best, from the military point of view." More importantly, "even if Yugoslavia fell, but Italy did not, Europe would be safe militarily." [23]

One of the consequence of this utterly negative image Italian decision-makers had of Tito and Yugoslavia was distrust--which, in turn, was one of the reasons for their refusal to negotiate a solution directly. In the fall and winter of 1950, for instance, following repeated informal discussions with his Yugoslav colleague Jože Brilej, Italian Ambassador in London Tommaso Gallarati Scotti became convinced that the Yugoslavs were ready to negotiate a solution in the form of a partition of the FTT along a "reasonable ethnic line." He therefore tried to convince his superiors in Rome to initiate direct negotiations by granting official status to his discussions. Zoppi, Sforza and De Gasperi, however, interpreted Brilej's overtures as but a devious Yugoslav attempt to lead them indirectly to renounce the tripartite declaration and thus turned down the ambassador's request. Negotiations with a communist dictator, Italian decision-makers felt, could only be successful if conducted from a position of strength. It followed that the U.S. could extract from Tito a solution more favorable than Italy could ever expect to obtain by herself because, as Zoppi put it, "only Washington [had] the means of persuasion" that is, was in the unique position of being able to force Tito to make concessions on Trieste as a condition for granting him aid. [24]

Given their instrumental view of the Atlantic Alliance (a result of the "leverage syndrome" analyzed above), Italian decision-makers did not attach as much strategic importance as the Americans did to a Western opening to Yugoslavia. De Gasperi, in particular, regarded it primarily as a threat to Italy's interest in Trieste and to the

political future of his and the other pro-Atlantic parties at home. Whereas the Americans looked at the Trieste question as an irritant between two countries which shared a common interest in defense and therefore should make an effort to compromise, the Italians looked at it exclusively as a territorial dispute having potentially explosive repercussions on domestic politics, and hence as a zero sum game. If Yugoslavia became a member of the Western club, the solution would have to come out of direct negotiations and could only be a compromise. Italian decision-makers feared, as expressed in a memorandum of the Foreign Ministry of July 21, 1949, that in this case they "would not succeed in obtaining Zone B, or part of it, and could even be obliged to discuss questions concerning Zone A." The inclusion of Yugoslavia, therefore, while possibly increasing the welfare of the club as a whole, would represent a net loss for Italy. Italian decision-makers measured the benefits of belonging to the club in terms of the advantages individual members could derive from it. The club, as they saw it, was supposed to protect and advance the welfare of its members and be of assistance in their disputes with nonmembers. If a nonmember locked in a dispute with a member was seeking help from the club, what would be more natural than asking for something in return? If the nonmember was seeking membership, then why not charge an admission fee? Tito, they thought, should very simply be told that if he wanted aid he would have to show "a sincere willingness to cooperate with the Western world and Italy in particular." This obviously meant yielding to Italian requests on the FTT. As long as Tito failed to provide this "decisive proof," it was also legitimate to doubt his solidarity with the Western democracies and, therefore, there was no reason to treat him as an ally. [25]

c) The Allies

On the subject of Trieste, Italian decision-makers felt towards the Allies as a creditor towards a delinquent debtor: the city was not

to be regained through diplomatic travail but had to be "handed back," as it were, by the Allies themselves. Indeed it is not an exaggeration to affirm that Italian decision-makers felt that the Allies, and the British in particular, were to be blamed for the loss of the Julian region. Yugoslav "armed conquest" or "coup de main," as Sforza and De Gasperi, respectively, called it, had come about "due to the carelessness of the Western Allied military command," its "unpardonable mistakes and suspicious blindness." Quaroni lamented that at the time of the Tito-Alexander negotiations in May 1945, "with a bit more firmness, the Anglo-Americans could have been able to obtain a more favorable line of demarcation." Tarchiani cast the British in the role of the villain. He felt that the region had been lost because of "elements who had the double interest of favoring Jugoslavia and creating a situation of deep and lasting hostility between Belgrade and Rome." [26] Indeed, for a long time after the war it was felt that there existed in London "a very strong dose of hostility towards [Italy], particularly in the Foreign Office." The British, the argument went, sought to regain prestige in the Balkans and supremacy in the Mediterranean. Hence they intended to keep Italy weak or, as one diplomat put it, "to cut our claws once and for all, to make us renounce any pretense of being a great power and to teach us some manners." [27] In June 1953 De Gasperi blamed the poor electoral showing of the center parties on Churchill's call for a second Locarno--which, he claimed, had played into the hands of the Communists by giving credence to the Soviet idea of "peaceful coexistence." He referred to Churchill as a "mid-Victorian British imperialist" who desired "to reduce Europe once again to a collection of small, ineffectual, mutually suspicious nations in order that Great Britain might embark once again on historic British divide-and-rule politics and play the role of mighty mediator between the rest of the world and Soviet Russia." [28]

The Americans, on the contrary, were thought to be much more sympathetic to the Italian cause. The positive image the United States had always enjoyed in Italy had grown to mythic proportions, especially

at the popular level, during the Liberation. According to opinion polls, for instance, in October 1946 an overwhelming 76% of Italians, regardless of their political affiliation, thought that, of the "Big Powers," the U.S. was the best-disposed toward Italy (with 9% indicating the Soviet Union, 5% the U K., 2% France and 8% giving no answer) Asked to rank their feelings toward the British, the Germans, the French and the Americans, 56% of Italians ranked the Americans first, while 47% ranked the English last. [29] Among politicians and diplomats it was common, as Quaroni has revealed, to divide "nations and people between those who love[d] Italy and those who [did] not." The Americans had always been perceived among the first group. This positive predisposition toward the United States, moreover, had been reinforced by the reports of Italian Ambassador to Washington, Alberto Tarchiani According to most observers, the ambassador was "fascinated by the country in which he represented his own" and had the tendency to "attribute to the Americans small merits which were nonexistent or, at least, exaggerated." His reports from Washington were consequently "all very optimistic" about American full acceptance of every Italian request for the Julian region. [30]

Following the Belgrade agreement, and even more after the London meeting of the Council of Ministers, the impression became widespread among Italian decision-makers that the American attitude, although benevolent towards them, was not pugnacious enough towards the others. In a letter to the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry dated December 1, 1945, Quaroni made the following rather grim assessment of American action:

> As far as our eastern borders are concerned, and not only in this matter, we would do well to give a very, very relative value to American support ... notwithstanding the promises which are made and assurances which are given to us when we talk to them face to face, their support isn't worth a plugged nickel [un fico secco] when faced with Russian opposition Away from the conference . they are lions at the conference table the end result of the negotiations is that they give up everything .. even on those issues where they have considerable interests at stake, imagine what will happen on an issue to which they attach no importance and which tends, more and more, to become one of those which have to be solved in any way possible

This perception of "American timidity" was part of a larger image of the U.S. as an all-powerful but rather naive giant which had to be guided by more expert and sophisticated, although weaker, friends. This image (which, incidentally, was widely shared in European diplomatic circles) remained unchanged through the years. As Tarchiani would often put it in his reports, "American semi-paralysis could only reinforce Belgrade's sabotaging passivity." In his mind, "the occasional steps taken by the Allies, whether secretly or openly, were not heavy and loud enough to produce results." Therefore, Italian decision-makers concluded that some energetic prodding was needed if American promises of support were to materialize. Hence, their policy toward the U.S. was characterized by the tactic of building overdrawn scenarios whereby an unfavorable solution to the Trieste problem would threaten the survival of democracy in Italy and, in turn, spell doom for the entire Western world. In June 1953, De Gasperi was still warning the Americans: "Italy may yet be lost on the Trieste question." [31]

The conversion of the Allies to the idea that the best solution would consist of direct Italian-Yugoslav agreement and their consequent urging, which in August 1951 turned into overt pressures, for direct negotiations caused concern and resentment. Italian decision-makers did not feel they could "take upon [themselves] the initiative of direct negotiations which implie[d] a priori too large a renunciation," nor, they thought, should the Allies do so because, if Italy were forced to back down before a communist dictatorship, "the terrible disease would become an epidemic." Pressure, they felt, should be exercised on the Yugoslavs rather than on them, their allies. [32] That the British would be willing to sacrifice Italian interests did not come as a surprise, as they had always been regarded as pro-Yugoslav. The change in the American attitude, on the other hand, profoundly irked Italian decision-makers They followed with great apprehension the evolution of the American "policy of courtship" vis-à-vis Tito, relentlessly pointing out that failure to make aid conditional upon his recognition of Italian rights to the FTT would "stiffen" his attitude and make a settlement

more difficult to achieve. They resented the American decision to grant military aid to Yugoslavia (for which an agreement was concluded on November 14, 1951) and reacted with "disappointment and bitterness" to the Allied communication of October 25, 1952 that a military mission, headed by General Handy, would be sent to Belgrade to examine the possible coordination of Yugoslav defense plans with those of NATO. They did not oppose the formation of the Balkan Pact of Friendship and Cooperation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey (February 1953) but made it clear that "military cooperation with Yugoslavia on the part of any Italian government [was] out of the question as long as a reasonable solution to the Trieste question [had] not been reached." [33]

d) Time

During the Paris Peace Conference, the prevailing Italian perception of time was that Italy's state of weakness was temporary and that her bargaining power on the international scene would improve. Hence Italian decision-makers tried to have any decision on the proposed FTT postponed for at least a year. As Ambassador Quaroni put it at the time, the imperative for Italy was to "give up as little as possible until things change[d] in [her] favor so that [she might] outlive [her] current state of weakness with the fewest losses and amputations." Giuseppe Saragat, then ambassador to France, argued: "We must postpone the Trieste question. The longer we postpone it the more we stand to gain." [34] This perception survived both the Soviet-Yugoslav split and the realization that the Americans did not intend to tie economic aid for Yugoslavia to a solution of the FTT problem. It started to be reexamined only around mid-1951 when it became clear that the Americans not only were bent on providing Tito with military assistance but were considering the possibility of integrating Yugoslavia into the Western defense system.

In July 1951, Ambassadors Tommaso Gallarati Scotti in London and

Pietro Quaroni in Paris and Gastone Guidotti, Italian Political Observer at the UN, started to argue insistently in their reports to Zoppi that a refusal to enter into direct negotiations and the desire to remain anchored to the tripartite declaration for reasons of domestic politics would, in the long run, work against Italy. Their analyses are worth quoting at length, as they reveal very clearly the change in time perceptions. On July 6, Gallarati Scotti wrote:

> What I feel, I must say, is that time works against us and that any postponement of a courageous decision on our part for reasons of domestic politics will not only harm its substance but will also cause domestic political repercussions of an even greater magnitude. Let us not forget that, if today the question is simply that of leaving to the Yugoslavs that part of Zone B on which many Italians still count on the basis of the tripartite declaration (without realizing how radically the international situation has changed since then), tomorrow what could be at stake is the very reunification of Trieste with Italy.

In another report dated August 16, after affirming that the tripartite declaration was "juridically inoperative" and that its "moral value diminishe[d] with the passing of the years and the evolution of circumstances," he exhorted De Gasperi to fall back "on a less intransigent position" and start direct negotiations with Yugoslavia immediately because, he pointed out, "circumstances are such that if the initiative is not Italian, neither, unfortunately, will be the solution." Quaroni was of the opinion that it was illusory for Italy to continue to look to the U.S. for a solution to the problem. Yugoslavia and Germany could offer more divisions than Italy and France, which was the only thing that was of interest to the Americans. As for the tripartite declaration, he wrote:

> [It] represented an enormous victory for us. We had lost the city of Trieste and we could reannex it when we wanted to, sacrificing Zone B in whole or in part. This was its real significance, this and nothing more. Deluding ourselves ... that it is something more, we risk endangering the only real and substantial gain of our policy. Today we are still in time to do it. I don't know if this will be the case tomorrow.

Guidotti made the following assessment of the situation:

> In the current phase of the cold war it is inevitable that the U.S. be tempted to give increasing importance to, and therefore to woo and curry favor with, Yugoslavia. On this point . . we must have no illusions ... Time doesn't work for us in Trieste, it works against us. Under these conditions, the game of requesting a confirmation of the tripartite

> declaration every three or four months becomes, with time, more and more futile and the formulation of the confirmation, if I'm not mistaken, becomes even more sterile. I am well aware of all the unpleasant difficulties of a negotiated solution to the Trieste problem; I only want to say that those of tomorrow will be even worse.[35]

The reports of these diplomats triggered a critical, albeit cautious, reappraisal of the existing policy at the Foreign Ministry On August 14, 1951, in fact, Zoppi presented De Gasperi with a memorandum in which he summed up what he perceived to be the three possible courses of action open to Italy. First, with the help of the Allies, they could look for a definitive solution with the Yugoslavs which would give Italy full sovereignty over Zone A and "as much of Zone B as [they] could tear away from Tito, knowing full well that it would not be as much as [was] included in the 'continuous ethnic line' " As a second alternative, they could look for a "provisional solution" which, while "not endanger[ing]--at least juridically--the question of Zone B," would allow Italy to take control of Zone A and "thus put a stop to the progressive deterioration of [Italian] interests there." Such a solution, he suggested, should consist of "giving Italy the same title to administer Zone A as the Anglo-Americans and the Yugoslavs [had] with regard to Zone B." Although not clearly indicated in the memorandum, this was the alternative Zoppi favored. He had realized that, while reluctant to exert any pressure on Tito to obtain an acceptable compromise in Zone B, the Allies would not hesitate, if need be, "to force our hand on an agreement with Yugoslavia." The "provisional solution" was thus necessary not only to put Italy on a level of parity with Yugoslavia in case the definitive one indeed had to be sought through direct negotiations, but also to deprive the Allies of an instrument of pressure. The third alternative was to leave things as they were, "while waiting for some new event which, by radically changing the Yugoslav situation, [would] open up new possibilities " Zoppi advised De Gasperi against this option by pointing out that this "new event" (the return of Yugoslavia, or part of it, to the Soviet camp) "might never take place " When and if it did, it would allow a reopening of the whole question, even if one of the two other

alternatives had been adopted in the meanwhile. [36]

De Gasperi, however, was not of the same opinion. Direct negotiations, he thought, would not yield acceptable results as long as the Allies continued to curry favor with Tito. As for the "provisional solution," he feared, as already mentioned above, negative domestic repercussions. Besides, he was confident that as the process of European integration continued Italy's position on the international scene would be strengthened and her ability to obtain a better solution on Trieste enhanced. Hence, he did not understand the "siege syndrome"--as he called it--developed by his diplomatic advisors and saw no reason to take any action other than continuing to press the Allies to extract from Tito a division of the FTT along the "continuous ethnic line." He remained of this persuasion until the elections of June 1953 when the poor performance of the center parties convinced him that inaction was just as electorally damaging. He then decided that the time had come to seek the "provisional solution." [37] Two weeks after receiving Zoppi's memorandum, however, De Gasperi agreed to direct negotiations with the Yugoslavs. This decision, the first in the "prelude to crisis" period, was not due to the Prime Minister's belated alignment with the opinions of his diplomatic advisers; it was instead the result of Allied pressures.

Decision Flow

The Guidotti-Bebler talks

In the summer of 1951 the Italian government was seeking a

revision of some of the provisions in the peace treaty, most notably the military ones, so that it could proceed with its rearmament program De Gasperi, moreover, had requested that the AMG postpone the elections for the renewal of local councils in Zone A. He was, in fact, very apprehensive about the growth of independentist feelings in the zone and felt that the pro-Italian parties needed some time to mount an effective campaign. [38] Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs had approached the American embassy in Belgrade, suggesting that they were willing to start negotiating with Italy to reach agreement on territorial and reparation issues after which they, conscious of Western defense exigencies, would have no objection to the revision of the military provisions of the peace treaty with Italy. [39] The British, realizing that the Yugoslav initiative provided them with an opportunity "to induce [the Italians] on a road on which [they] were reluctant to proceed," told Ambassador Gallarati Scotti that they intended to link the resolution of the Trieste problem to the revision of the peace treaty [40] Acheson went even further. He informed De Gasperi that he would agree to a postponement of the elections in Trieste "on [the] clear understanding [that the] Italian government would utilize [this] opportunity to make [a] serious effort to reach agreement with the Yugoslav government on [the] settlement [of the] FTT problem." In this case, Acheson pointed out, it would be easier for AMG to justify the postponement by arguing that it had been decided "to facilitate [the] effort [to] reach [a] mutually satisfactory agreement on Trieste in connection [with the] larger problem [of the] revision [of the] Italian Peace Treaty." [41] On August 28, moreover, Yugoslav Ambassador Vladimir Popović told Acheson that his government was prepared to cede to Italy the town of Koper in Zone B and the rights of rail and road access to it. Acheson must have thought that, although far from the "continuous ethnic line" envisaged by the Italians, this was a small step in that direction and constituted a reasonable point of departure for direct negotiations Thus, on the same day, the State Department and the Foreign Office jointly communicated to De Gasperi that the elections in Trieste would be

postponed by two months if he gave a "firm assurance" that he intended to start direct negotiations with Yugoslavia as soon as possible. [42] On September 1, after consulting with Zoppi, De Gasperi countered by instructing the Italian embassy in Washington to let the Americans know that he was "ready to talk" to the Yugoslavs if the elections were put off until the following spring (decision 1). [43]

Notwithstanding the protests and resentment for these pressures, [44] direct negotiations started during the sixth regular session of the UN. They were conducted by Aleš Bebler, at the time Yugoslav permanent representative at the UN, and Gastone Guidotti, the Italian observer. There were seven meetings between November 21, 1951 and March 11, 1952. Both the substance and the form of the Italian position in these negotiations was determined by De Gasperi himself, with Zoppi's assistance. Guidotti was totally bound by these instructions. De Gasperi maintained that the Italians should again propose, as they had in the Di Soragna-Ristić talks, that the FTT be divided along the so-called "continuous ethnic line." Bebler countered that there was no such thing; east of Monfalcone there was only Slavic land with scattered Italian islands like Trieste and some coastal towns in Zone B. He envisaged three possible solutions. The first of these was a partition with Italy giving Yugoslavia a corridor to the sea at Zaule (Zavlje) in the bay of Muggia (Milye) in which to build a new port for Slovenia (the Slovenian coast, in fact, ends just south of Piran at the mouth of the river Dragonja while the rest of the Istrian coast belongs to Croatia) and receiving, in return, part of the coast in Zone B up to and including the town of Koper (see fig. 9). The second possibility was a joint Italian-Yugoslav administration of the FTT, which he defined as a "condominium," and the third was a partition along the zonal boundaries with minority guarantees and a free port in Trieste. [45]

These talks cannot exactly be regarded as <u>bona fide</u> negotiations. De Gasperi himself, for one, significantly insisted that they be called "exploratory talks." He was convinced that any chance of the Yugoslavs seriously wanting a solution had been nullified by the American decision

to sign a bilateral agreement for the granting of military aid one week before the talks started. Since he did not believe that an acceptable solution could be reached, he did not intend to retreat from the "continuous ethnic line," which he regarded as his conciliatory understanding of the tripartite declaration. Any concession, he thought, would be tantamount to a renunciation of the tripartite declaration. It would then remain on the record and become the starting point for the next round of negotiations. The talks were quickly transformed into yet another diatribe about the ethnic composition of the FTT and, inevitably, became the forum for an international propaganda battle, as well. In the end, De Gasperi felt that Italy stood to lose. In fact, the Italians risked being perceived as responsible for the failure of the negotiations because of their unwillingness to compromise and refusal of all three alternative solutions submitted by the Yugoslavs. To get out of this predicament, he instructed Guidotti on March 5, 1952 to advance the proposal for a plebiscite (decision 2). The tactical character of this proposal is demonstrated by the fact that De Gasperi suggested that the plebiscite be held throughout the FTT (rather than in each zone or township separately) and that the question should only allow a choice between Italy and Yugoslavia. This was to assure victory for Italy. Every effort, morever, was made to present the plebiscite as the democratic, popular confirmation of the tripartite declaration. This was certain to irritate the Yugoslavs and assure their refusal. The Yugoslavs, however, were careful not to reject the idea outright. On March 28 they answered that the plebiscite could not be held immediately because of the discriminatory ethnic policies conducted by the Italian government in the FTT since 1918. They suggested that it take place after a period of at least fifteen years. In the interim, the FTT could be administered jointly. De Gasperi never answered the Yugoslav counterproposal, since he could not accept it but did not wish to refuse it and go on record as the one that had put an end to the negotiations. The propaganda battle thus ended in a stalemate International

attention, however, had meanwhile shifted to events in Trieste. [46]

The London conference

On March 20, 1952, fourth anniversary of the tripartite declaration, riots broke out in Trieste during a rally apparently organized by Mayor Gianni Bartoli and the then recently established Comitato per la Difesa dell'Italianitá di Trieste e dell'Istria (Committee for the Defense of the Italian Character of Trieste and Istria). They continued for several days. There were no deaths, but about one hundred civilians and fifty policemen were wounded. The Trieste City Council demanded the dismissal of many AMG functionaries and refused to cooperate further with it. [47]

The responsibility of the Italian government in these events is still, and will probably always remain, a matter of dispute. What is certain is that Italian decision-makers were prompt in trying to capitalize on the resulting situation. They used the disorders, in fact, as a pretext to try to wrest from the Allies some degree of control over AMG policies and thus "put a stop," as Zoppi had expressed it in his August memorandum, "to the progressive deterioration of [Italian] interests" in the zone. [48] Italian apprehension about what was perceived as an insufficiently pro-Italian stance on the part of the AMG in Zone A had increased with the arrival of Major-General Sir John Winterton, who on March 19, 1951 had replaced General Airey. Since, over the years, the latter had built a reputation of being staunchly pro-Italian, his replacement was interpreted in Italy as symbolic of a change in Allied policy. Some notes of protest followed. Relations became increasingly strained as the Italians also blamed the AMG for the growth of independentist feelings in the zone. [49]

On March 25, while demonstrations of support took place in all

major cities in Italy, De Gasperi, after consulting with Zoppi, decided to request the British and American governments to hold a conference "to examine jointly measures designed to foster a closer collaboration in Trieste among the three governments and with the local authorities there, in the spirit of the tripartite declaration and of the friendly relations uniting them in the Atlantic alliance" (decision 3) The Allies complied with the request immediately The Yugoslav government protested strongly, especially because it was not officially informed but learned about the conference from the press. It also stressed that it would accept no decision affecting its position and interests in the FTT that was made without its participation. The Allies tried to reassure it by arguing that the objective of the conference was simply to associate the Italians with the administration of Zone A, not to make a final disposition of it. They assumed that, since the Yugoslavs had already unofficially accepted that under the terms of a final solution Zone A could go to Italy, they would not be interested in matters concerning its administration. For the Yugoslavs, however, this was a matter of principle. They might have been willing to accept Zone A reverting to Italy but felt that they at least had the right to be part of the group making that decision. [50]

The Italian objective for the London conference, as decided by De Gasperi and approved by the Council of Ministers on March 31, 1952, was to take full administrative control of the zone. Final authority, however, would continue to be formally vested in the Allied Zone Commander. This, De Gasperi thought, would enable him to present the outcome of the London conference at home as a first step toward the implementation of the tripartite declaration without incurring the risks of the "provisional solution". Although negotiations were conducted by a team of seven diplomats and political officials headed by Ambassador Brosio, De Gasperi followed the conference very closely He repeatedly intervened, sending the Anglo-Americans "serious warnings" that unless they adopted a "friendly attitude" and accepted Italian requests he would be forced to either "withdraw from the talks or accept a solution

which would not satisfy [Italian] public opinion and thus provoke in Italy a serious backlash against the government and the Allies which would be used by the right and, above all, the left-wing parties for their propaganda against Atlantic solidarity." [51]

Although willing to accomodate some Italian requests, the Allies were not ready to go so far as to empty the AMG of all powers. The negotiations lasted over a month (from April 3 to May 9). In the end it was agreed that the number of positions held by Italians in the AMG would be increased from five to twenty-one (out of a total of thirty-two). [52] Although not completely satisfied with this outcome, De Gasperi did not hesitate to present it publicly--much to the irritation of the Yugoslavs and embarassament of the Allies--as "a primary application of the tripartite declaration." [53]

The Allies tried to reassure the Yugoslavs by arguing that the London agreement did not support the territorial claims of Italy, as demonstrated by the continued presence of the U.S. and the U.K. in the zone, but simply "recognised administrative realities which had developed in the course of five years of occupation under the Treaty." The Yugoslavs, however, were not convinced. On May 13 they issued an official note of protest against what they called a "unilateral and illegal violation of the international status of Zone A and a serious blow to the rights and interests of Yugoslavia." On May 15, they took some measures of their own in Zone B, further integrating it into Yugoslavia. [54]

Eden's proposal and Acheson's plan

Although the Americans and the British continued to try throughout the summer of 1952 to have the two countries resume negotiations, [55] the conviction slowly grew in both Washington and London that a solution was

not likely to emerge out of direct negotiations unless the two governments took a more active role in them. A slight difference of opinion also developed between the American and British governments on what a viable solution to the problem might be. The British were especially anxious to get rid of it Besides the implications for Western defense, they considered that, as Eden put it, "the cost and trouble of maintaining the Allied occupation of Zone A could not be endured indefinitely, while we received little for our pains but abuse from both sides." After a meeting with Tito in September 1952 he became firmly convinced that the only solution lay in partition along the zonal boundary and could not emerge out of direct negotiations because, for internal political reasons, "neither side could take the political risk of accepting a proposal from the other." Hence, he concluded that the only way out would be to impose partition on the two contenders [56]

Eden communicated his idea to both the State Department and De Gasperi. Although they too had considered this possibility, the Americans were reluctant to press such a settlement on De Gasperi, given their anxiety about the Italian elections scheduled for June 1953. [57] They also thought that bringing Italian troops face to face with Yugoslav ones, without a formal agreement, might be very dangerous. They preferred to search for a definitive solution which, by solving the problem once and for all, would enable them to proceed with the main business at hand: defense planning for southeastern Europe. Such a solution, they thought, could be a division along an ethnic line acceptable to both parties. [58]

The Italians were divided. Diplomats like Brosio, Del Balzo and, to a less extent, Zoppi leaned toward Eden's proposal, as long as partition was "provisional": that is, it left Italian claims to Zone B unprejudiced. Others, such as Tarchiani and De Castro (Italian Political Adviser to the AMG, a post created by the London agreement), intended to explore the possibility of reaching an acceptable compromise in Zone B De Gasperi, for his part, thought that Eden's proposal was politically unacceptable, especially since there was no assurance that

Tito would not react by annexing Zone B. He decided therefore that the safest course of action was to rely on the Americans to obtain a definitive solution along the lines of an ethnic division of the entire FTT (decision 4) On October 1, 1952, he instructed Tarchiani "to exert on the American government the strongest pressure to induce it to act on Belgrade with sufficient energy and obtain for [Italy] (and in the general interest) an acceptable compromise in Zone B even if this meant offering towns in Zone A inhabited by Slavs which had a sentimental value for Belgrade but little importance for [Italy]." Two days later, to add some pressure to his request, De Gasperi instructed the three Italian ambassadors in Paris, London and Washington to tell the Allies that he intended to recur to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) about Yugoslav violations of the peace treaty in Zone B. He also mentioned the possibility of bringing the matter to the UN (under art. 35 of the Statute) or before the Four Ambassadors (under art. 87 of the peace treaty). [59]

The Americans did not look favorably upon the idea of recurring to the ICJ because the Allies "would be directly involved in issues in which their legal position would be extremely weak." They feared that the court could easily rule, much to their embarrassment, that both the tripartite declaration and the recent London agreement "in some respect contravened treaty obligations." [60] The other two alternatives involved bringing the Soviet Union back into the picture and also were risky for the Allies and even more so for Italy. As Tarchiani, Brosio and Quaroni (who all disapproved of the idea) immediately warned Rome, the Soviet Union might choose to ask for the application of the peace treaty and the formation of the FTT. Things now being different than they were in 1947, the Allies might easily decide to agree to it. Zoppi told them on October 14 that "the action was demonstrative" and, with the exception of recourse to the ICJ, De Gasperi did not intend to proceed on such a thorny road. [61] Thus reassured, Tarchiani got to work on the Americans. On October 16, he communicated to State Department officials De Gasperi's intention to recur to all available legal means to defend

Italian interests in the FTT. He also brought up the issue of the upcoming elections, arguing that a solution to the Trieste problem had to be found before the following spring because the pro-Western, democratic forces could come out victorious only if they could prove that their choice of a foreign policy aligned with that of the Western nations was a fruitful one. He was reassured that the State Department would study a solution along the continuous ethnic line, since the Americans "[felt] themselves invested with responsibility, intend[ed] to cooperate decisively ... [and] ... deem[ed] it essential to give the Italian government, as an electoral weapon, an honorable conclusion to the Trieste question." [62]

On December 8, the Americans submitted a proposal for a definitive solution whereby Italy would receive the Koper township in Zone B in exchange for a small concession to Yugoslavia in Zone A (the so-called Acheson plan; see fig. 8). If this was acceptable to Italy they would then endeavor to have it accepted by Yugoslavia The Americans had consulted with the British, who had given their "benevolent neutrality" but preferred not to be associated with this initiative, apparently because Eden was convinced that the only solution lay in imposing partition and considered the American attempt futile. [63] De Gasperi examined the proposal and rejected it immediately, without hesitation and almost with indignation (decision 5). As Zoppi explained to American Ambassador Bunker in giving him an official reply on December 10, the proposal could hardly be considered a division along the "continuous ethnic line" and would inevitably harm De Gasperi in the forthcoming elections. It was therefore politically unacceptable [64]

At a NATO Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris a week later, De Gasperi met with both Acheson and Eden He continued his pressure tactics, forcefully pointing out that an honorable solution was necessary for the continuance of his pro-Atlantic foreign policy and the ratification of the EDC treaty. He also hinted that he could study the possibility of offering Slovenia an outlet to the sea, as requested by Bebler in his talks with Guidotti, if this would help the Allies

convince the Yugoslavs to accept a solution along the "continuous ethnic line." Acheson appeared very skeptical. A few days earlier he had already clearly said to Tarchiani that "the U.S. [could not] do what [the Italians] imagine[d]" with regard to pressuring Belgrade and that he would leave the responsibility for a "possibly less favorable" solution to his successor. [65]

Italian decision-makers were now back to face the same dilemma: whether to start pressing for the "provisional solution" or to wait for a new American proposal that Tarchiani maintained was in the making and more favorable than the one offered by Acheson. [66] The terms of the debate had not changed either. The "provisional solution" could be presented to the electorate as a partial implementation of the tripartite declaration. By this time practically all diplomats, except Tarchiani, were in favor of this course of action. De Gasperi, however, was reluctant to embrace it lest Tito counter by annexing Zone B and the impression be given that this had happened with his prior knowledge and acquiescence. The Allies, moreover, would offer no assurance with respect to the future of Zone B. [67] The diplomats tried to convince him by arguing that the time had come for Italy to take a more "active" role vis-à-vis the Allies. Their objective was the normalization of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. De Gasperi, they thought, should simply indicate that the "provisional solution" was the only formula capable of achieving this objective at that time. Rather than requesting prior assurances that Tito would not annex Zone B, he should simply make it clear that he could not accept it. It would then be up to the Allies to prevent such an occurrence if they wished to see good relations established between the two countries. [68] As for waiting for a new American proposal, the option favored by Tarchiani, De Gasperi felt that unless it indeed represented a division of Zone B along the "continuous ethnic line," he would have to reject it again--in which case the whole exercise would be counterproductive to his electoral campaign. Everything considered, the continuation of the status quo seemed to De Gasperi to be the least of all evils, at least until after

the elections. [69]

Dulles' plans

The Foreign Office and the State Department, meanwhile, continued their debate on whose proposal was more likely to succeed and be more helpful to the center parties in the coming elections. The Americans still believed that the dangers inherent in the "provisional solution" were greater than the marginal advantages possibly to be gained on election day and were very skeptical about its benefit to Italo-Yugoslav cooperation. They preferred, therefore, to work out a new proposal that would better accommodate Italian requests while still retaining a chance of being accepted by Tito. On February 21, Ambassador Bunker presented a new proposal to De Gasperi (Dulles' first plan): in addition to Koper township, Italy would receive a coastal strip in Zone B up to Piran in exchange for a small portion of the interior of Zone A and access to the sea at Sv. Katarina (see fig. 9). Again, if accepted by Italy, the Americans would then try to sell it to Yugoslavia. [70]

During the next two weeks, the proposal was carefully examined by officials at the Foreign Ministry and then by De Gasperi himself This time De Castro also was invited to take part in the deliberations The idea of ceding to Yugoslavia a sovereign access to the sea had seemed like a good idea less than three months earlier Now it was looked upon with perplexity, especially by De Castro. Instead of sovereign access to the sea at Sv. Katarina, where the Yugoslavs could build a port rivaling that of Trieste (a possibility dreaded by the city's pro-Italian political leaders), he suggested offering Yugoslavia a 99-year lease on a portion of Trieste harbor and a railway linking it to Slovenia. The idea was retained by Zoppi and accepted by De Gasperi In a meeting with Ambassador Bunker on March 6, De Gasperi refused

Dulles' plan (decision 6). In advancing the counterproposal suggested by De Castro, he also thought it opportune to try to improve the offer of territory in Zone B to be transferred to Italy. He said that while he appreciated the extension from Koper to Piran, he still thought the proposal insufficient to help him in the upcoming elections. To be politically acceptable, the new border should run south of Piran in order "to come as near to the ethnic line as possible." [71]

On March 13, Tarchiani communicated that Dulles accepted the idea of the 99-year lease but could not modify his proposal with respect to the part of Zone B to be assigned to Italy (Dulles' second plan). He did not think the Yugoslavs could be convinced to accept a plan that gave Italy anything beyond Piran. Moreover, Tarchiani reported, he was very careful "to exclude any absolute promise about the outcome of the initiative." The ambassador, however, had great confidence in the ability of the Americans to convince the Yugoslavs to accept the plan and recommended that De Gasperi accept it. He argued that it was better than the British alternative since it was clear that de facto partition was understood by the Foreign Office not as "provisional" but as definitive, even if not sanctioned by an international agreement. Brosio, for his part, continued to support the British proposal. He argued that if the Americans did not obtain at least tacit approval from Tito their proposal could turn into a trap. Were Tito to refuse it after Italian acceptance, the new position would be interpreted as a retreat and would then constitute a point of departure, rather than arrival, in future negotiations. [72]

Given the difference of opinion between the two ambassadors, De Gasperi decided to call a meeting to "hear their arguments." The meeting took place in three sessions on March 16 and 17. Also present, besides De Gasperi, Brosio and Tarchiani, were Zoppi, Quaroni, Paolo Emilio Taviani and Francesco Dominedó (the two Under-Secretaries for Foreign Affairs), Duke Giulio Del Balzo di Presenzano (Director General for Political Affairs) and Minister Alberico Casardi (Director of the Office of the Secretary General) The diplomats outlined their position

in a memorandum presented to De Gasperi before the meeting. They all rejected the continuation of the status quo as a viable alternative because, as had been repeatedly affirmed in the past, time was no longer on Italy's side. They recommended that Dulles' second plan be accepted contingent upon Yugoslav agreement If Tito turned the proposal down, Italian claims to Zone B would continue to be valid. All the diplomats, with the exception of Tarchiani, seriously doubted Yugoslav adhesion. Zone B had been lost, they thought, when Allied troops withdrew from Pula. At most, the Yugoslavs would agree to exchange Koper with the Slovenian townships in Zone A, which would leave an even thinner coastal strip between Monfalcone and Trieste They suggested, therefore, that "it would be best to engage the Allies immediately to hand Zone A over to [Italy] in case Tito would not accept the definitive solution proposed by the Americans, with the non-recognition of any unilateral act of annexation by one side or the other." De Gasperi, as usual, was primarily concerned with the domestic consequences of the courses of action under scrutiny. For him the decision not to abandon Zone B was more valuable, for electoral purposes, than the announcement of the restitution of Zone A. Short of continuing the status quo, therefore, he thought that the thing to do was "to improve upon the American proposal". He believed that Italy could exercise quite a bit of pressure on the Americans in this direction, especially on the eve of the elections. "One needs to assert with the Americans," De Gasperi said, "the concept that our cooperation with the Yugoslavs is a function of how much we can obtain within the [continuous] ethnic line " If the Americans wanted the Balkan pact, "they necessarily [had to] square their accounts with [Italy]." If the continuation of the status quo was painful for Italy, he concluded, it could also represent "a grave problem for other countries as well." He thought that, to be politically acceptable, Dulles' second plan should be modified so that it could be presented to public opinion as "assuring the return to the motherland of the majority of the Italians living in Zone B " Hence he decided to insist that the coastal strip to be returned to Italy be

extended further south of Piran, possibly to Umag. If Dulles also agreed to this second modification he would then recommend the plan to the Council of Ministers because only in this case "would it be possible to move Italian public opinion and bring it to consider with equanimity the prospect of an agreement with Yugoslavia" (decision 7). [73]

Italian efforts to convince the Americans to accept the territorial modification met with little success until De Gasperi personally pleaded the case with Dulles at a NATO Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris on April 23-25. [74] The precise form taken by the American demarche in Belgrade on May 7 is not known. It appears, however, that American Chargé Woodruff Wallner was not able to talk directly to Tito as the latter "judged [it] best in [the] first instance" that the plan be submitted to Foreign Minister Popović. The reply came on May 13. The Yugoslavs turned the plan down with the explanation that other "proposals for which an answer [was] being expected from Italy [had] been formulated directly in Rome." They were also displeased and irritated by the demarche inasmuch as it came in the wake of a speech given by De Gasperi in Milan on April 26, in which he had made an appeal to the Soviet Union to adhere to the 1948 tripartite declaration. They denounced both the speech and the demarche as evidence that the Italians continued to "expect [a] solution to come from [the] Great Powers ... by means of pressure on Yugoslavia." In a speech made at Slavonski Brod on May 17, Tito affirmed that he was no longer willing to discuss the future of Zone B. He mitigated this remark, however, by pointing out that his preferred solution remained the "condominium" and that if the Italians continued to insist on the ethnic principle they should receive the cities of Trieste, Koper, Piran and Izola but not the territory connecting them to one another. [75]

On the evening of May 7, the Director General for Political Affairs of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Fejć, had taken advantage of a dinner hosted by the British ambassador to approach Italian Minister in Belgrade Vanni d'Archirafi and tell him that "it [was] not by these means that the question of Trieste [would] be solved." He pointed

out that a solution had to be found "directly between Italy and Yugoslavia" and said that the Yugoslavs regretted that such a "desire [had] never been expressed on the Italian part." There was nothing new in this message except the informality of the occasion on which it was given. The Yugoslavs had been repeating it ad nauseam in every conceivable forum.[76] De Gasperi, however, used Fejé's remark to convince the Americans to make another attempt. On May 16, he contacted the American embassy in Rome, now led by Clare Boothe Luce, and requested that the State Department make one last effort to let the Yugoslavs know that "if, for political reasons, Tito desired that the agreement result from direct negotiations, the Italian government would agree to them--on condition, however, that the fundamental terms of the agreement be established and accepted by both parties beforehand through the good offices of the United States" because "he would not and 'dared not' enter into direct negotiations with Tito unless there was prior agreement on the basic solution." As to what this solution should be, he reiterated that "neither he nor whoever in the future might be his successor could politically survive any compromise" that would not give Italy "at least one half of Zone B." To complement this point, he told Luce that he "fear[ed] that, if he los[t] control of the situation or at a time when he no longer guide[d] Italian policies, hotheads in Italy [would] solve the problem by their own means, even at the expense of war." He insisted that the new approach be made immediately, as the elections approached. Luce took this opportunity to bring up the question of military facilities, for which negotiations were not progressing at the desired speed. She stressed American desire that an agreement be signed immediately after the election, both in the interests of Western defense and as evidence of Italian-American cooperation. "At the end of this conversation," Luce reported, "De Gasperi rose and smilingly said 'I could sign anything very easily . . . in Trieste'." Tarchiani used the same arguments with President Eisenhower, Under-Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith and high officials at the State Department.[77]

Although reluctantly, the Americans eventually decided to make a new approach. On the 20th, Wallner informed Yugoslav Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Aleš Bebler that the Italians were ready to accept the May 7 proposal and enter into direct negotiations on the basis thereof The Yugoslavs again turned the request down, arguing, this time, that it would be "preferable" to conduct any "serious negotiations" after the elections. [78]

De Gasperi approves the "provisional solution"

Following this second Yugoslav refusal, the Italians turned their attention to apparent openings for direct negotiations on the part of alleged Yugoslav emissaries in Rome. Although these had started about a month earlier, the Foreign Ministry had at first ignored them because Zoppi feared, as he wrote Tarchiani, that if the Yugoslavs happened to have gained knowledge of the American government's intentions to convince them to accept the Dulles plan they were probably only a ploy to neutralize the American demarche "with a view towards being in a position to tell Washington that direct dealings--even if only informal--[were] already underway with the Italian government." [79] Contrary to prevailing opinion, [80] soundings in Rome in May 1953 did not originate with the Yugoslav government and were not aimed at making the American demarche flounder, although the Yugoslav government certainly took advantage of their existence for this purpose. They were initiated instead by some financiers whose aim was to reap some brokerage fees from the settling of accounts still open between Italy and Yugoslavia. [81] These third party initiatives eventually led to talks between Zoppi and Vladimir Sajčić, the commercial counselor of the Yugoslav legation in Rome They confirmed that the Yugoslavs were still disposed to make some concessions in Zone B, although not enough to satisfy the Italians,

in exchange for access to the sea somewhere close to Trieste, which the Italians were not willing to concede. The talks thus broke down almost immediately, leaving a bitter aftermath because of misunderstandings for which the intermediaries were largely responsible [82]

A few days before the elections Tarchiani tried to obtain from Dulles a declaration on Trieste designed to help the center parties in the elections. Besides being an attempt to emulate Sforza's coup of 1948, this was also a way of testing how far the Americans were still willing to go to back Italian claims. The text, prepared by Tarchiani, was supposed to be released as a press communiqué after a meeting with Dulles. After extolling Italy's successes in the economic field and her valuable contribution to Western defense, the statement affirmed with regard to Trieste that "the American government perfectly understood the necessity that the Italian aspirations be satisfied through an equitable agreement." In 1948, at the height of the Cold War, American decision-makers had left nothing untried to influence the elections. What seemed at stake then was the question of whether or not Italy was to remain in the Western orbit. In the relatively more relaxed international atmosphere of 1953, American decision-makers were much more cautious. Reasonable confidence after all seemed to exist at the State Department that, although perhaps with a slender margin, the centrist coalition would come out victorious. Dulles thus flatly refused Tarchiani's suggestion and reminded him that what the Americans hoped for with regard to Trieste was "an honorable solution which would reflect the legitimate aspirations of all concerned." [83]

On June 10, three days after the elections, Zoppi submitted a new memorandum to De Gasperi. In it he argued that the the only option left now was the "provisional solution." The control of Zone A would put Italy on a level of parity with Yugoslavia. From this stronger position, they could then look more confidently at the prospect of direct negotiations for a final solution. By this time, De Gasperi's attention was drawn to more pressing issues such as the formation of a new government and a power struggle among rival factions within his own

party. On June 17, he decided to accept the recommendation of his diplomatic advisors: the objective would now be to obtain the transfer of Zone A from the Allies (decision 8). This would be his last decision on Trieste. [84]

For domestic political reasons, De Gasperi did not wish to remain on record as having requested the transfer but preferred to have the Allies officially offer it, with assurances that they would not recognize an eventual annexation of Zone B by Yugoslavia. [85] The British had favored such a course of action since the previous September. The Americans, on the other hand, were still reluctant to embrace it. Hence, all efforts had to concentrate on convincing them. The help of French Foreign Minister George Bidault, who was considered "a sincere friend of Italy," was also enlisted. [86] Zoppi and Del Balzo went to work on American embassy officials in Rome. They argued that the Allies should implement the "provisional solution" since all other efforts to bring about a mediated solution had failed. They also suggested that the Allies explain that "in the spirit of the March 20 declaration [they were] turn[ing] over to Italy the only thing they possess[ed], Zone A" and clearly state "for the benefit of Italian public opinion" that Italian claims to Zone B remained totally unprejudiced. This, Zoppi concluded, was necessary to help De Gasperi in his effort to form a new government. In Washington, Tarchiani pressed the issue in meetings with Byington and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Livingston Merchant. They pointed out that such an option had been considered but rejected as likely to increase, rather than decrease, friction between Italy and Yugoslavia. Tarchiani rejoined that whereas the Yugoslav reaction could not be foreseen, friction would surely develop between Italy and the Allies if the "provisional solution" was not implemented. [87]

At the same time, Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington Vladimir Popović was telling the same officials that the question should be discussed and settled in purely bilateral negotiations and that developments like the "Wallner approach" in Belgrade actually detracted

from the possibility of a settlement. Given the difficulty of reaching an equitable division which would take into account both economic and ethnic factors, the Yugoslavs' preferred solution was that of a "condominium," basically understood as the continuation of the FTT as an autonomous region under the alternate governorship of a Yugoslav and an Italian. Popović pointed out that his government was ready to start negotiations with the Italians at any time and suggested that, to improve the atmosphere, minor matters arising from the peace treaty and trade issues which were likely to be settled without too much difficulty should be discussed first. He also proposed that a joint Yugoslav-Italian commission of technical experts be set up to study the question and advise the two governments This, the ambassador thought, would help depoliticize the question somewhat and form the basis for a solution which would assure full protection of the interests of both ethnic groups. In conclusion, Popović said, the Yugoslav government only refused a solution based on the tripartite declaration and did not favor a division along the zonal boundary, as this would involve acceptance of a purely artificial border in disregard of ethnic interests. [88]

The Americans were now convinced that "the course most desirable [was] to urge both Italy and Yugoslavia [to] endeavor [to] arrive at [an] agreement by direct bilateral negotiations." [89] The nationalist rhetoric which accompanied De Gasperi's attempt to form a new government and the political uncertainty which followed his failure to win a vote of confidence from Parliament cooled the eagerness of the Yugoslavs. As Tito put it in an interview to Associated Press on August 10, he thought that the atmosphere was no longer propitious for negotiation and that "the problem should be put aside for a while." [90] On August 24 a new government, headed by Christian Democrat Giuseppe Pella, assumed power in Italy. Two days later, having been briefed by Zoppi on the Trieste situation, the new Prime Minister gave his approval to the decision De Gasperi had made on June 17: the immediate objective for Italy remained the "provisional" reacquisition of Zone A [91]

Findings

The ICB model of crisis behavior posits a relationship between stress and the ways in which decision-makers cope with crisis. Four coping mechanisms are selected for close scrutiny: information processing, pattern of consultation, structure of decisional fora and consideration of alternatives. The main working hypothesis is that in a crisis decision-makers adopt coping mechanisms which are different from those prevailing in a noncrisis. Since coping mechanisms are the assembly line, as it were, of decisions, the hypothesis also states that decisions in crisis should be different from those made under noncrisis conditions. The expectation, moreover, is that crisis decisions are less rational than noncrisis ones. The period under consideration here was not part of a crisis. It must, however, be examined so that it can serve as a benchmark for the analysis of crisis periods. The coping mechanisms adopted by Italian decision-makers during this period can, in fact, be viewed as their normal pattern of behavior; that is, as the standard operating procedures of the Italian foreign policy system, at least in this particular historical juncture. For the main hypothesis to be supported, differences must be found between behavior in crisis and that in a noncrisis. Variations between different crisis periods (and, therefore, stress levels) would provide an even stronger degree of support.

Information

Although there was no particular need felt for information during this period, the flow was larger than in the 1948-51 period, for

instance, because the Trieste issue had meanwhile acquired a higher priority on the agenda of Italian decision-makers. Search for information was conducted through ordinary, diplomatic channels; that is, through the embassies in Washington, London and Paris, the legation in Belgrade and the office of the Italian Political Adviser to the AMG in Trieste. Prime/Foreign Minister De Gasperi also communicated directly, at times, with his Allied colleagues These direct probes, however, should not be considered special channels as they always took place within the context of regularly scheduled visits or meetings of the NATO Council of Foreign Ministers. The search seems to have been rather thorough in Washington, modest in London and marginal in Paris, Belgrade and Trieste. On the one hand, this undoubtedly points to the fact that the United States was considered the most important external actor. On the other, it betrays what many observers have repeatedly identified as one of the major shortcomings of Italian diplomacy the lack of adequate means and resources to fulfill its informational role properly. Quaroni, for instance, lamented during a conference on Italian foreign policy in 1966 that, while ambassador in Moscow, he had only one employee to analyze the Soviet press. The American ambassador had more than a hundred. In London, the staff of the French embassy was six times that of the Italian one and the American one more than one hundred times larger. [92]

As customary, information was channeled through the Office of the Secretary General. It was Zoppi, therefore, who decided who to bring in on any given issue. Besides Casardi, who as Director of the Office was Zoppi's closest collaborator, only Del Balzo was regularly called in to be part of this information processing group Almost all incoming messages, however, were transmitted to Tarchiani, Brosio and Quaroni. Vanni D'Archirafi and De Castro were also kept abreast of developments, but to a lesser extent. This clearly reveals that the Trieste question was paramount for Italian decision-makers even before the crisis As a rule, in fact, the Ministry does not even send its foreign posts a daily telegram summarizing the latest governmental initiatives let alone relay

information coming from other posts. [93]

The central role played by the Secretary General, Zoppi, and, in a more limited way, Director General for Political Affairs, Del Balzo with respect both to information processing and the selection of alternatives, is typical of the way the Italian foreign policy system works The Secretary General, in particular, can be said to shape and embody the position of the Foreign Ministry. He is the repository, as it were, of bureaucratic power His role, however, can also assume political overtones. Officially designed as "the coadjutant of the Foreign Minister," he is charged with "the coordination of the conduct of foreign policy between the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister," is required "to complement their political approach with technical expertise" and is supposed "to assure continuity from one administration to the next." He also has ample liberty to decide which questions and initiatives are to be submitted to the Minister and which fall instead within the competence of the Ministry. It seems clear that under these guidelines, an ambitious and entrepreneurial Secretary General, especially in the presence of a weak, trustful or very busy Foreign Minister, can leave his personal political mark on the country's foreign policy. [94] Indeed, if the role of Zoppi (and Del Balzo), although central, always remained clearly subordinate during the tenure of De Gasperi, it became much more prominent, as will be shown below, with the advent of Pella.

The interpretation of information was colored by certain prejudices. Thus, the conviction that the best, if not the only, solution would be one imposed on the Yugoslavs by the Allies was never called into question. All incoming information was interpreted so as to fit this belief. Yugoslav attempts to steer events toward direct negotiations were consistently regarded as a ploy and, consequently, dismissed or thwarted without any serious further probe The Americans' failure to convince Tito to give up part of Zone B was attributed to their reluctance to apply sufficient pressure Alternative opinions, such as that of Ambassador Gallarati Scotti or that of Minister Enrico

Martino, in Belgrade, that the Yugoslavs would never yield to external pressures and that their desire to solve the question bilaterally was sincere were either ignored, dismissed or discredited. [95]

Faulty information processing, at this juncture, cannot be attributed to crisis-induced stress, as the crisis was yet to come It was rather the result of a more fundamental and less treatable problem having to do with personality traits and role occupancy At the same 1966 conference where he lamented the scarcity of means for the collection of information, Quaroni also remarked that his experience in a forty year foreign service career had been that even when the information sent to Rome was timely, relevant and accurate, the tendency of political decision-makers (and, in the Trieste case, also that of the top officials at the Foreign Ministry) was to "take it into account only in a very relative manner, preferring instead to rely on their intuition, that is their desires, hopes and illusions " [96]

Consultation

In the tradition of all Italian foreign policy, the Trieste question remained firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister and the diplomatic elite. The process of consultation throughout this period did not extend beyond this sphere and was rather informal. It usually took place in two stages. Zoppi would first sound out the opinions of Tarchiani, Brosio, Quaroni and Del Balzo and then report to De Gasperi. De Castro's inclusion in this consultative circle before the making of decision 6 should not be interpreted as an enlargement of the circle to include special interest groups such as, in this case, the pro-Italian leaders in Trieste. Although he might indeed have shared and voiced their opinion, at least on this occasion, De Castro was consulted primarily because, as a native of Istria, he had expertise on the issue

being discussed (the question of what kind of access to the sea to offer Yugoslavia). His contribution, moreover, was regarded exclusively as technical and advisory because he only took part in the early stage of deliberations. [97] The Cabinet (not to mention Parliament, special interest groups and the public at large) not only did not play any consultative role but was kept in the dark about the options under considerations when not actually misled--as, for instance, in the case of De Gasperi's presentation of the London Agreement as a "primary application of the tripartite declaration."

As differences of opinion among members of the diplomatic elite grew stronger the process of consultation became more structured and direct. This resulted in the assembling of an ad hoc consultative group which met formally on two consecutive occasions before decision 7. Besides the ambassadors at odds (Brosio and Tarchiani), this group also included Quaroni, the key officers of the Ministry (Zoppi, Del Balzo and Casardi) and the two Under-Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, Taviani and Dominedò. These were most likely included by De Gasperi so that his political perspective would have some backing when confronted with the "technical" one of the diplomats who had managed to make their different opinions coalesce into a common position before the meeting. In Italy an under-secretary (a position corresponding to that of deputy minister) is, in fact, a member of the government and not of the bureaucracy, hence De Gasperi could be confident of their support. Indeed, both under-secretaries aligned themselves with his position, although Taviani did so less enthusiastically than Dominedò. There was no formal process of consultation before the making of decision 8, as it simply involved De Gasperi's acceptance of the alternative his advisors had favored all along.

Decisional fora

From an institutional point of view, in Italy the Cabinet is collegially responsible for the "determination" of foreign policy while the Foreign Minister is in charge of its "direction." In reality, however, the Cabinet's role in foreign policy is limited--as is Parliament's--to the simple approval of programmatic declarations and to ex-post facto control. It does not make decisions. This would indeed be difficult as there does not exist an institutional organization (such as the Cabinet Office in the British system, for instance) which circulates the documentation necessary to discuss, let alone make decisions on, foreign policy issues. It is not uncommon for Cabinet members to walk into a Cabinet meeting without knowing the agenda in detail. They are kept informed only through the press and the reports of the Foreign Minister. The key role both in the "determination" and "direction" of foreign policy is played by the Prime Minister The Foreign Minister, in fact, is under obligation to consult and clear with him every strategic and tactical decision he intends to make For the consultation to be meaningful and not to affect adversely the timely conduct of policy, the Prime Minister must keep himself constantly well-informed on the state of international affairs This he does with the help of a career diplomat assigned to his office and referred to as his "diplomatic advisor." Having "direct" access to incoming and outgoing diplomatic information also serves the purpose of exercising a permanent control on the conduct of the Foreign Minister. And, indeed, the position of "diplomatic advisor to the Prime Minister" was created by De Gasperi in mid-1946, soon after the Foreign Ministry portfolio had been assumed by Socialist leader Pietro Nenni. [98]

Given this operative framework, the fact that he occupied both the position of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and, last but not least, his centralizing and authoritative governing style (Taviani relates in his private journal that "at Palazzo Chigi [the headquarters of the Foreign Ministry at the time] De Gasperi was referred to as the emperor"), it is not surprising that all decisions during this period were taken by De Gasperi alone. [99] Decision 7 could appear to have been

made in a large decisional forum: the Foreign Minister with his key advisors. The latter, however, performed an exclusively consultative function. There was no vote at the end of the meeting. The option chosen by De Gasperi (to improve the American proposal) did not meet with the approval of any of the advisors except Dominedò. Brosio and Quaroni argued for the "provisional solution." Tarchiani, while favoring the choice of relying on the American initiative, opposed the idea of requesting further territorial concessions, arguing that the Americans considered Piran to be the limit they could convince Tito to accept. Zoppi, Del Balzo and Casardi, the three diplomats based in Rome and therefore working more closely with De Gasperi on a daily basis, shared the position of Brosio and Quaroni. Once De Gasperi had made his choice, however, knowing that he was not likely to budge, they tactically rallied around him. Taviani also supported him, but seemingly more out of a sense of duty than one of conviction. The Cabinet as a whole played no decisional function. Its role was limited to approving decisions already made by De Gasperi and further restricted to those which were to become public knowledge (e.g. decisions 1, 2 and 3, but not 4 through 8).

Alternatives

The search for alternatives was rather extensive, especially with respect to decisions 4 through 7 since decisions 1, 2 and 3 were almost programmed responses to quasi-routine occurrences. Alternatives were selected and evaluated in nonquantitative cost-benefit terms by the information processing/consultative group, ranked and then submitted to De Gasperi. The key alternatives considered in each case were, in decreasing order of desirability: (1) to do nothing, (2) to rely on the Americans to provide a definitive solution giving Italy as much of Zone

B as possible or (3) to convince the Americans to turn Zone A over to Italian administration and then look for a definitive solution. Valuation of consequences was deficient insofar as it paid little or no attention to likely Yugoslav reactions, especially with respect to alternative 3. De Gasperi's fear that the Yugoslavs might react by annexing Zone B was, for him, sufficient reason to reject such an alternative out of hand. His overall evaluation of alternatives was shaped by his antipathy for decisive action, predilection for procrastination and, above all, by domestic political concerns. His choice (alternative 2 and efforts to improve on it), therefore, aimed exclusively at maximizing this single value dimension. He was reluctant to agree to a definitive partition along the zonal boundary not because he considered such a division unfair or inadequate per se but because of the negative impact he perceived such a solution to have on public opinion, in general, and the elections, in particular. In a conversation with Dulles in Rome on January 31, 1953, in fact, he did recognize and accept that the "provisional solution" would "in all probability become the definitive [one]" but insisted that he needed to claim for public consumption that "it did not forestall the possibility of [further] adjustments." During the meeting which preceded decision 7 he reprimanded his diplomatic advisors for continuing to favor the "provisional solution" in the absence of any guarantee that it could indeed be sold to the public as such. He said that their analysis was clearly that of "observers far from Italy" and reminded them that, as Italian representatives, they "should always take account of the internal situation of the country."[100]

No search for alternatives preceded decision 8. After the first alternative had been eliminated and the second had not yielded the desired results, there seemed to be nothing else to do but to turn to alternative 3. This De Gasperi did almost automatically, without any further evaluation or hesitation. By this time, in fact, his domestic political concerns had waned considerably: the elections were out of the way and he was on his way out of power.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Foreign policy decisions can be divided into three categories: strategic, tactical and implementing. Strategic decisions are irrevocable policy choices having a high significance for the foreign policy system as a whole· that is, profoundly and lastingly affecting a large number of its environmental components Tactical decisions are of lesser significance and always precede or follow strategic decisions to which they are indissolubly linked. Finally, implementing decisions pertain to the flow of day-to-day foreign policy acts selected to execute strategic and tactical decisions (Brecher, op. cit., 1974, pp. 2-3). Only strategic and tactical decisions are analyzed here.

2 Paolo Farneti, ed., Il sistema politico Italiano, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1973, p. 31.

3. Quoted in Aniello Coppola, Moro, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1975, p. 38 (footnote 5). See also an interview in Panorama, April 13, 1972 and Claudio Pavone, "La continuitá dello stato, istituzioni e uomini" in Italia 1945-1948: Le origini della Repubblica, Torino: Giappichelli, 1974, pp. 137-290.

4. In 1962, a commission was set up to study the problem. Its report appeared two years later. When a reorganization was finally approved and implemented in 1967 it was not only very limited but also exclusively concerned with the functional set-up of the Ministry. See Enrico Serra, "Italy: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs" in Zara Steiner, ed., The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, London: Times Books, 1982, pp. 297-323.

5. Norman Kogan, The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, 1963, p. 107. For some comments on the Italian diplomatic corps before World War I, see Richard J.B. Bosworth, op cit (1979), pp. 95-126.

6 On Italian diplomacy and diplomatic service during Fascism see H. Stuart Hughes, "The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism, 1922-1932" and Felix Gilbert, "Ciano and his Ambassadors" in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds , The Diplomats: 1919-1939, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1953, pp. 210-233 and 512-536.

7. Kogan, op. cit , p 108.

8. This was due to the perceived necessity of sending proven anti-Fascists as representatives to these countries to symbolize the break with the old regime. Thus Nicolò Carandini was sent to London, Giuseppe Saragat to Paris, Alberto Tarchiani to Washington, Eugenio Reale to Warsaw and Sergio Fenoaltea to China.

For the reaction that these appointments generated among career diplomats, see the comments of Mario Luciolli (who from 1948 to 1955 served as counselor in the Italian embassy in Washington) in his Palazzo Chigi Anni Roventi. Ricordi di vita diplomatica italiana dal 1933 al 1948 (Milan Rusconi, 1976, pp 201-210) Luciolli's memoir provides a good example of the haughty and basically undemocratic outlook of the Italian diplomatic elite in those years

9. Kogan op. cit , p. 35, Luigi Graziano, La Politica Estera Italiana nel Dopoguerra, Padua. Marsilio, 1968, pp 33-41 and Fabrizio De Benedetti, "Il Ministero degli Affari Esteri" in Massimo Bonanni, ed., La Politica Estera della Repubblica Italiana, Milan Edizioni di Comunità, 1967, 3 vols., pp 821-853, esp pp 830-835 Table adapted from Kogan, op. cit., p 110.

10. See, for instance, Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review 66, 3 (Sept 1972), pp. 751-795.

11. Brecher, for instance, has defined it as comprising "a) societal factors, such as ideology and tradition, which derive from the cumulative historical legacy; and b) personality factors- the idiosyncratic qualities of decision-makers--that is, those aspects of elite attitudes which are not generated by their role occupancy" (op.cit., 1972, p. 11).

12. Ambassador Dunn backed all Italian requests "The [Communist] attempt at general revolt," he reported to the State Department in early December, "will probably occur anytime between now and March." He then added, in complete earnest, that it was "military opinion" that the Communist uprising would not take place "prior to the end of December in order that the workers [might] collect their thirteenth month pay (i e. their Christmas bonus)" (Dunn to Dept., Dec 7, 1947 in FRUS, 1948, III, pp 738-739) De Gasperi's requests are reported in: Acting Secretary of State to Secretary of the Army, Nov. 28, 1947, Dunn to Dept., Dec 5, 1947 and Satterwaite (Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs) to Reber (Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs), Dec. 5, 1947; see also Reber to Acting Secretary of State, Nov. 28, 1947 (in ibid., pp. 729, 736-737, 734-735 and 727-729, respectively).

13. It was only after much haggling that De Gasperi agreed to take the shipment provided it arrived after the elections The documentation on this episode, typical of the dynamics of Italian-American relations in the immediate post-war period is in FRUS 1947, III, pp. 969-970 and 1948, III, pp 757, 769-770, 773-774 and 784-788. Tarchiani's remarks in op cit , p 138. This tactic of exaggerating the Communist threat had a tendency to backfire After 1948, for instance, some influential journalists and members of Congress concluded, on occasion, that Italy was irremediably taken in the Communist grip and argued that all aid should be terminated as it was useless to try to prop up a country about to be lost for the West Italian politicians, diplomats and journalists had then to engage in verbal somersaults to convince their "naive" American colleagues that although the Communists were strong in Italy they did not have "any mysterious or mighty power" and "were not in a position to paralyze the state apparatus " Despite the fact that "the Allies were not doing everything they could to help defeat Communism" the reference in this case being to Trieste--"the sagacity of the statesmen and the common sense of the people had already insured the victory of democracy and freedom in Italy" (see, for instance, "Lo stato italiano e il comunismo" in Esteri 2, 7, April 15, 1951 and American Consulate General-Milan to Dept , D 211, 765 00/1 454)

State Department officials, for their part, argued that an effective weapon against Communism would be the implementation of a policy of social and economic reforms This impalatable suggestion was usually dismissed by pointing out that not much could be expected of reforms because "many of Italy's problems were three thousand years old" (see, for instance, MC Secretary of State Acheson, Tarchiani, May 6, 1948 in FRUS 1948, III, pp. 793-796 and Dunn to Dept , July 26, 1951 in ibid 1951, IV, pp. 633-636)

14. Sforza's remark is in a telegram of Aug. 31, 1948 to the main Italian embassies partly quoted in Brunello Vigezzi, "De Gasperi, Sforza, la diplomazia italiana e la percezione della politica di potenza dal trattato di pace al patto atlantico (1947-1950)," Storia Contemporanea 16, 4 (Aug. 1985), p. 682 See also Zoppi to Quaroni, Oct 14, 1948, in Vigezzi, "De Gasperi, Sforza, la diplomazia italiana fra patto di Bruxelles e patto atlantico (1948-49)," ibid. 18, 1 (Feb. 1987), p. 26. Sari Gilbert (From Armistice to Alliance: Goals and Methods in Italian Foreign Policy, 1943 to 1949, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., 1969, p. 361) reports an interview with Quaroni in which he reveals that De Gasperi had told him that as long as he had believed a new war was imminent he had thought that membership in a military alliance was useless and perilous. Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henry Spaak convinced him, however, during a visit he made to Brussels in November 1948, that a conflict was not imminent. De Gasperi concluded that, in this case, participation in the alliance was desirable.

15. De Gasperi in his speech during the final debate in the Senate on March 27, 1949 (Atti Parlamentari, Senato della Repubblica, 1st. Legislature, vol. 1948-49, pp. 6534-6544). See also Tarchiani (op. cit , p. 149). On American motivations see Emory T. Smith, "The Fear of Subversion: The United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty," Diplomatic History 7, 2 (Spring 1983). pp. 139-155. That the Communist threat was not perceived by Italian decision-makers as the likelihood of an armed insurrection, as De Gasperi's words might lead one to believe at first, but in terms of increasing electoral and therefore political strength, is clearly revealed by a letter of Quaroni to Sforza dated Nov. 3, 1948 and quoted in Vigezzi (loc. cit., 1987, p. 28). Commenting on the need to overcome the neutralist position of many political groups, including the Left of the DC, the ambassador pointed out that keeping Italy out of "an area which the Americans intend[ed] to guarantee and defend" would produce a "moral confusion" in the electorate. Most Italians would be led to conclude that the country "had been abandoned to the gentle care of the Russians." The consequences, he thought, would be disastrous: "We know, and it would be useless to deny it, that unfortunately too many people in Italy base their political convictions on assurances for the future; it is not difficult to guess how these people would vote in such a situation." For an analysis of how foreign policy issues in Italy are viewed as essentially symbolic, see Primo Vannicelli, Italy, Nato and the European Community: The Interplay of Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, no. 31, 1974

16 Quoted in De Castro, op cit., II, pp. 429-431 and 434.

17. Quaroni's letter to Sforza of Jan. 22, 1948 is quoted in Vigezzi, loc cit , 1985, p 673. Sforza, op cit. (1952), pp. 189 and 234 Tarchiani's report of Jan 15, 1949 is quoted in Alfonso Sterpellone, "Vent'anni di Politica Estera" in M Bonanni, ed., op cit , p 243 De Gasperi is quoted in Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, La nostra patria Europa: il pensiero europeistico di

Alcide De Gasperi, Milan Mondadori, 1969, p. 17. See also Mario Toscano, "Appunti sui negoziati per la partecipazione dell'Italia al Patto Atlantico" in his Pagine di Storia Diplomatica Contemporanea, Milan: Giuffré, 1963, II, pp 445-519 and FRUS 1948, III, pp. 260-262, 267 and 809-811 Brosio is quoted in Campbell, ed , op. cit , p 119.

18. Sforza, op. cit. (1952), p. 361 See also a letter from Sforza to the Italian ambassadors in the Allied capitals dated July 12, 1949, quoted in De Castro, op cit , I, p 794 De Gasperi quoted in Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation My Years in the State Department, New York: Norton, 1962, p. 572 The minutes of the meeting are in FRUS, 1951, IV, pp 675-680 and 699-705 Ortona, op. cit., p. 5. These remarks should not be taken to mean that the "leverage syndrome" was the exclusive or even the main motivation behind Italian foreign policy choices It is beyond doubt, however, that Italian decision-makers repeatedly succumbed to the temptation to demand concessions as a price for joining Western organizations from the WEU to the EDC. Even a very sympathetic scholar of De Gasperi's foreign policy such as Pietro Pastorelli has admitted that "one of the shadows of De Gasperi's European policy was his belief, always present from 1948 to 1952 even if with different accentuations, that the integration process could provide the occasion to force the solution of some problems of direct interest to Italy such as the colonies and Trieste" (La Politica Estera Italiana del Dopoguerra, Bologna Il Mulino, 1987, pp. 206-207; this is not a comprehensive treatise of Italian postwar foreign policy, as the title suggests, but a collection of partially overlapping essays previously published in various journals and conference proceedings). This Italian tactic greatly annoyed the Allies. Acheson, for instance, reacted to De Gasperi's establishment of a linkage between the ratification of the EDC and the solution of the Trieste problem by noting in his memoir: "It did not take long for me to learn that the Italians believed firmly in the remission of sins. They saw their desertion of Il Duce and of his and their Nazi ally as absolving them from all consequences of losing the war, as indeed putting them at the head of the queue asking favors. In their eyes, however, favors had been transmuted into simple justice, which if denied, might undermine Italy's firm identification of her interests with those of the NATO allies" (op. cit., pp 571-572).

19. Tarchiani, op. cit., p. 317; Corrin Strong (American Ambassador to Oslo) to Dept. D-264, 750G.00/10-1353 reports the comment of his Italian colleague, Duke De Vera D'Aragona D'Alvito, that the "strong emotional feeling" of Italian decision-makers about Trieste had nothing to do with the city's economic importance as an Adriatic port, as "nearly all Italian shipping was through ports on the Tyrrhenian coast."

20. De Gasperi quoted in De Castro, op cit., I, p 450 and in Giulio Andreotti, De Gasperi e il suo tempo, Milan Mondadori, 1956, pp 251 and 364; Sforza, op. cit. (1952), p 399; Tarchiani, op cit., pp. 309 and 317 (footnote 1), Paolo Emilio Taviani, Unpublished Journal (hereafter UJ), entry of Nov 7, 1953 Taviani's private journal which covers the period Aug 15, 1953, Nov. 4, 1954 is to be published only post mortem. I wish to express my gratitude to him for having kindly allowed me to read and quote from it

21. De Gasperi speaking at a meeting of the Italian Council of Ministers on April 17, 1945, quoted in Pupo, op cit , pp 96-97, Sforza's note is reported in Documenti di Vita Italiana (Jan - Feb 1953), p. 991.

22. Christopher Seton-Watson, "Italy's Imperial Hangover," Journal of Contemporary History 15, 1 (Jan 1980), pp. 169-179; Tarchiani, op cit., p 309. The same also was true, although to a lesser extent, with respect to the colonies. Following the Mogadishu affair (when British occupying forces shot into the crowd during a nationalist demonstration, killing 42 Italians), Ambassador Gallarati Scotti remarked in London that "seen from here, with respect to the Mogadishu affair, our propaganda appears to be completely misguided insofar as it aims to arouse public opinion without taking reality into account. .. It rests on the assumption that we have not lost the war--that we have not renounced our rights to the African colonies" (quoted in Vigezzi, loc. cit , 1985, p 668; underlined in the original). See also the November 1953 issue of Documenti di Vita Italiana (a publication of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and therefore a mouthpiece for the Italian government), which is entirely dedicated to Trieste. The dossier significantly starts at Roman times, stops at the treaty of Rapallo (Nov. 12, 1920), skips the Fascist period entirely and resumes with the events of April 1945

23. Luce's comment is in Luce to Dept. 357 (Aug. 7, 1953), FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp. 1624-1630 at p 1628. For an example of the virulence of the Communist attacks on the "renegade" Tito see, P. Robotti and M Germanetto, Trent'anni di Lotte dei Comunisti Italiani 1921-1951, Rome: Edizioni di Comunitá, 1952. Taviani's perception is reported in USPolAd to Zone Commander, Aug 28, 1951, in FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19; De Gasperi is quoted in Luce to Dept. 4821, 750G.00/5-2053 and D-994 (Nov. 3, 1953), FSP-Rome, 1953-55, Box 1, File 350. For a series of comments on Yugoslavia and her foreign policy see: "La dichiarazione del Marzo 1948" (Esteri 1, 8, April 30, 1950), "Washington e i rapporti Italo-Jugoslavi" (ibid 1, 9, May 5, 1950), "Politica e strategia nel Mediterraneo" (ibid 2, 4, Feb. 28, 1951), "Il sistema Italo-Greco-Turco e l'incognita Jugoslava" (ibid. 3, 5, March 15, 1952), "Il Comunismo Jugoslavo a Congresso" (ibid 3, 19, Oct. 15, 1952), "Il Congresso di Zagabria" (ibid. 3, 21, Nov. 15, 1952), "L'Italia e gli Alleati" (ibid. 4, 14, July 31, 1953), "La politica estera Jugoslava" (ibid., 4, 17, Sept. 15, 1953). See also Alfonso Sterpellone, "La politica internazionale della Jugoslavia all'indomani del distacco dal Cominform," La Comunitá Internazionale 10, 4 (Oct. 1955), pp. 646-663 and MC Byington (Director of the Office of Western European Affairs), July 30, 1952, in FRUS 1952-54, II, pp. 1587-1591, which reports Tarchiani's fears about Yugoslav expansionism in the Balkans, especially with respect to Albania. De Gasperi's remark about the Pentagon is in MC De Gasperi, Luce 8853, 765.00/6-2253. As is always the case with depictions of enemy (see Sam Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988), images of the Yugoslavs often had racist overtones, especially those propagated by Triestine politicians and opinion-makers The Mayor of Trieste Gianni Bartoli, for instance, occasionally publicly referred to them as "rapacious wolves " See Higgs (American Political Adviser to AMG) to Dept 209, 750G 00/9-453. The writer Federico Pagnacco was expressing more than his personal opinion when he described them as barbaric Asian hordes, dominated by "unrestrainable primitive instincts" who were "bivouacking within the natural borders of Italy" (Il dramma di Trieste nell'urto fra Italia e Slavia, Trieste Monciatti, 1957, p 96)

24 See De Castro, op cit., I, pp 617 (footnote 58), 883-884, II, pp. 82 84, and a memorandum of the Foreign Ministry dated March 25, 1950 (in ibid , p. 807) which refers to Yugoslav overtures for direct negotiations as having only the propaganda objective of "accusing Italy of intransigence and thereby justifying additional

faits accomplis in Zone B " The Italians had no doubt that Tito would yield to Allied pressures because they saw him as a "primitive realist." See MC Tarchiani, Matthews (Deputy Under-Secretary), W E. Knight (Italian desk officer), 750G.00/11-1252 An article in Relazioni Internazionali (17, 39, Sept. 26, 1953, p. 904) put it even more brutally "The history of dictators who excite the nationalism of the crowds to keep themselves in power and then sell the country's military bases and, at times, the country itself for a few tons of wheat is as old as the world "

25. The Foreign Ministry memorandum of July 21, 1949 is quoted in De Castro, op. cit., I, pp 796-797 See also Sforza's letter of July 12, 1949 (mentioned in footnote 18 above), a memorandum from Zoppi to Sforza and De Gasperi, dated Aug. 29, 1949 and quoted in ibid., p. 617 (footnote 58); MC Luciolli, Del Balzo, Byington, 765.00/9-3052; "L'Italia e la difesa del mondo occidentale" (Esteri 3, 17, Sept. 15, 1952), "L'Italia e il riarmo jugoslavo" (ibid. 3, 23, Dec. 15, 1952) and "Trieste, paravento della politica Jugoslava" (ibid 5, 1, Jan 15, 1954) The only dissenting voice among Italian decision-makers was that of Ambassador Quaroni. He first analyzed the Yugoslav-Soviet rift and its implications for East-West relations, Italy and Trieste in a letter to Sforza, in early July 1948 (partly quoted in De Castro, op cit., I, pp. 783-4) He thought that Tito's break with Moscow was as momentous as that of Luther with Rome and that the Western world had much interest in strengthening the Marshal's ability to resist the pressures Moscow would surely apply on him Yugoslavia would eventually but inevitably have to turn to the West for help; herein lay an opportunity for Italy In line with the image of "broker," which Italian diplomats have always seen the country and themselves as eminently suited for (especially in the Mediterranean), Quaroni thought that Italy should mediate the process of rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the West As he put it: "The bridge between Tito and the Western world could and should be us." This strategy, Quaroni believed, would eventually also pay off on the question of Trieste For the time being, however, he thought it advisable to avoid any action aimed at obtaining the restitution of the FTT because this would weaken the national prestige of Tito precisely when he was breaking up with the Soviet Union for a question of national dignity Once Yugoslavia had become more intimately linked with the West, a solution could be sought through direct negotiations. Although it "would have to be of necessity, a compromise," Quaroni thought that by charging her brokerage fees at this time, Italy could assure that it was an acceptable one As one can see, Quaroni subordinated, even if temporarily, the Trieste question to the larger issue of Western security and Tito s role in it Because of their viscerally negative image of Tito and instrumental view of the Alliance, the priorities of De Gasperi, Sforza, Zoppi and Del Balzo were instead reversed. For them the Trieste dispute had to be solved before Tito received aid from the U S , even better, it should be made a condition for it

26. Sforza, op. cit (1952), p 325, De Gasperi in a communication to Kirk in FRUS 1945, IV, p 1180, "Washington e i rapporti Italo-Jugoslavi" (Esteri 1, 9, May, 5, 1950), Quaroni is quoted in De Castro, op cit , I, p. 399, Tarchiani, op cit , p 56, MC Tarchiani, Phillips, June 9, 1945 in FRUS 1945, IV, pp 1183 4 Tarchiani's remark would seem to be evidence of the existence of a "centrality bias" (i e , a tendency to exaggerate the degree to which Italy played a role, or was a major preoccupation, in the policies of the Allies, see Jervis, op cit , p. 343)

27 The comments about British hostility were made by Minister Alberico Casardi in a report from the London section of the

Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945 quoted in De Castro, op cit , I, p. 392; see also Guglielmo Negri, "Stati Uniti e Gran Bretagna. la politica italiana" in Italia e Stati Uniti durante l'amministrazione Truman, Milan Franco Angeli, 1976, pp 31-43.

28. MC De Gasperi, Luce 8853, 765 00/6-2253, Luce to Dept. 5227 (June 22, 1953) in RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Belgrade Legation and Embassy (hereafter FSP-Belgrade), Box 6, File April-Dec. 1953 In a speech in the House of Commons on May 11, 1953, Churchill commented on the change of attitude in Moscow since the death of Stalin. "It would be, I think, a mistake, to assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia unless or until everything is settled. .. I do not believe that the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe is insoluble . I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the mind of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind. . . I believe that a conference on the highest level should take place between the leading powers without a long delay" (Hansard, Parlamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 515, pp. 883-898). The Locarno treaty of 1925 was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France, England should stand with the French and if France attacked Germany, England should stand with the Germans.

29. Opinion polls are in Pierpaolo Luzzatto Fegiz, Il volto sconosciuto dell'Italia. dieci anni di sondaggi Doxa (Milan: Giuffré, 1956, pp. 668-709). Jane F. Bisel's Advertising and the "American Myth" in Italy: 1946-1955 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Graduate Program in Communication, McGill Univ., 1985) examines the image of the U.S. in Italian popular culture. See also Umberto Eco, Gian Paolo Ceserani and Beniamino Placido, La riscoperta dell'America (Bari: Laterza, 1984), Pietro Cavallo, "America sognata, America desiderata: mito e immagini USA in Italia dallo sbarco alla fine della guerra (1943-1945)" (Storia Contemporanea 16, 4, Aug. 1985, pp. 751-785) and Dominique Fernandez, Il mito dell'America negli intellettuali italiani dal 1930 al 1950 (Caltanissetta: Sciascia, 1969). For a masterly, albeit more general reconstruction of the popular mood of those years see Ennio Di Nolfo, La Paure e Speranze degli Italiani, 1943-1953, Milan· Mondadori, 1986.

30. Quaroni, op. cit., p. 12. For the comment on Tarchiani see De Castro, op. cit., I, p. 339 Pupo (op. cit., pp. 125-126) writes that Tarchiani was imbued with a kind of adoration for the U.S. The judgment of leftist politicians and intellectuals is even more severe. Palmiro Togliatti, for instance, described him as "a mediocre provincial journalist ... incapable of understanding the policies of a world power vis-à-vis other world powers ... hence incapable of distinguishing a position of this world power from a sentence said to him by somebody wishing to get rid of him" (in "La politica del calcio nel sedere," L'Unitá, Nov. 10, 1946) See also the opinion of Sechi (loc. cit , p 673).

31 Quaroni's report is quoted in De Castro, op. cit., I, p. 399. Tarchiani is quoted in Sterpellone, loc cit , 1967, p. 290; MC De Gasperi, Luce 8853, 765.00/6-2253

32. Storza, op cit (1952), pp 325 and 392-393

33. For Italian reactions to the American decision to grant military aid to Yugoslavia see Zoppi's memorandum to Sforza and De Gasperi dated Aug. 24, 1949 (partly quoted in De Castro, op cit., I, p. 617, footnote 58) and MC Tarchiani, Matthews, Greene,

750G.00/11-1551 De Gasperi told British Ambassador in Rome Sir Victor Mallet that he was "astonished' at the decision to send General Handy to Belgrade, which he regarded "as not very friendly." Defense Minister Randolfo Pacciardi said in an interview with the Daily Telegraph "We Italians feel about this much as you British would feel if we were to start defense talks with Dr. Mossadegh" (De Castro, op cit., II, pp 326-331, Daily Telegraph, Dec 6, 1952) The Balkan Pact of Friendship and Cooperation was not a military pact, it only provided for tripartite consultation in the event of a security threat to one of the members, yet it did associate Yugoslavia with two NATO members. Greece and Turkey, in fact, had been admitted into NATO in February 1952 ("The Balkan Pact and Trieste" in Peter Calvocoressi, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1953, Oxford Oxford Univ. Press, 1956, pp 122-135)

34. Quoted in De Castro, op. cit., I, pp 508 and 488, respectively

35. Gallarati Scotti's report 3727 (July 6, 1951) is in De Castro, op cit., I, pp. 869-870. His report of Aug. 16 is quoted in ibid, II, pp. 91-92. See also Tommaso Gallarati Scotti, "Diario Inedito" (Nuova Antologia 2129, Jan -March 1979, p 254) and Alfredo Canavero, "Tommaso Gallarati Scotti and his Role in Italian Foreign Policy after World War II" (Journal of Italian History 2, 1, Spring 1979, pp. 32-51) Quaroni's report 506 (July 27, 1951) and Guidotti's report 1467 (July 24, 1951) are in De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 89-90.

36. Zoppi's memorandum of Aug. 14, 1951 is reported in ibid, I, pp. 870-871. See also his letter to Gallarati Scotti (Aug 13, 1951) in ibid., II, pp. 90-91.

37. De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 430 and 432. The disagreement between De Gasperi and the diplomats was such that it even led to personal polemics with Gallarati Scotti, who had been the most forceful in the expression of his opinions. De Gasperi judged Gallarati Scotti's evaluation of the situation to be "inexact and exaggerated" and to give the impression that he considered the Slavs good-natured and the Italians intransigent (ibid, II, p 81). He also accused him of underestimating the importance of Italian public opinion. "Our position as democrats caught in the crossfire," he wrote, "is already bad enough without having to add the lack of understanding and impatience of friends" (Canavero, loc. cit., p. 50). Gallarati Scotti resigned in protest and, in his last report, indicted De Gasperi's foreign policy as a whole. "One has to know not only what one wants but also what is reasonable and possible to obtain. We have to leave behind the vagueness, worries, rhetorical sentimentalism and resentment for a past which is never going to return, so as to be able to develop a sound foreign policy aiming at concrete solutions" (quoted in ibid., p. 51) See also Gallarati Scotti's letter to De Gasperi of Aug. 31, 1951 printed in Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, ed, De Gasperi Scrive: Corrispondenza con capi di stato, cardinali, uomini politici, giornalisti e diplomatici, Brescia Morcelliana, 1974, vol 2, pp 178-180

38. According to AMG order 33 of Feb 21, 1949, the city councils elected in 1949 had to be renewed in the summer of 1951 Both Gallarati Scotti and Quaroni had mentioned in their reports to Zoppi the advance of independentist feelings in Trieste as yet another reason for immediate action Gallarati Scotti had written: 'If, as I am convinced, and as the news coming from our mission in Trieste seem to confirm, the situation in Zone A is such that the coming elections will be less favorable for us than the previous ones (I fear much less favorable, in fact), it is obvious that this will play to our disadvantage when the final

solution is considered." Therefore, Quaroni had added, "in the hope of saving Capodistria, we risk losing Trieste" because "the popular will, when convenient, is superior to any other diplomatic promise" (De Castro, op. cit., I, p. 870)

39 FRUS 1951, IV, p 230, footnotes 2 and 4

40 De Castro, op cit., II, p. 90. See also "Il trattato di pace con l'Italia come si é giunti alla revisione dell'ingiusto trattato," Documenti di Vita Italiana, March 1952, pp 273-280.

41 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy, Aug 1 and 4, 1951, in FRUS 1951, IV, pp. 228-229 and 230-231. As usual, the American embassy in Italy disagreed because "[the] proposed action [was] tantamount," as Chargé Llewellyn Thompson (later the American negotiator in the London talks which resolved the conflict) put it, "to pressure on [the] Italian government and if negotiations [were] to have any prospect of success [he] believe[d] pressure should be brought on [the] Yugoslav government" (Thompson to Dept., Aug 6, 1951 in ibid., pp. 231-232) On American policy see, more in general, Emory T. Smith, "From Disarmament to Rearmament: The United States and the Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947," Diplomatic History 13, 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 359-382.

42. MC Secretary of State, Aug. 28, 1951 in FRUS 1951, IV, pp. 240-242; Acheson, op cit, p. 572. Acheson also made it clear that "the declaration of March 20 had been overtaken by events and ... could not possibly be the basis of a settlement because of the intensity of Yugoslav opposition to it and the immense harm that would be done to all Western interests, especially Italian ones, should Tito be driven to make his peace with Stalin."

43. De Gasperi's answer is in De Castro, op. cit., I, p. 876 and II, p. 31. Given Acheson's refusal to adopt the new Italian electoral law in Zone A, De Gasperi thought he should at least try to have the elections in the zone coincide, for symbolic reasons, with those in Italy. They were held on May 25, 1952. For an analysis of the elections and of local politics in general, see: Press Relations Office, AMG, BUSZ, FTT, Political Parties: British/United States Zone Free Territory of Trieste, July 20, 1954.

44. Italian decision-makers complained that Italy was ready to resolve the Trieste question, "but not with pressure like this, which," as one diplomat put it, "threatens to make us tackle the problem with our backs to the wall and to have us try to solve it under the worst possible conditions." Zoppi lamented that the Allied maneuver was meant to "make us pay the scot for the right to a revision that we feel we have already acquired after years of loyal cooperation with the West" (De Castro, op. cit. II, pp. 90-91 and 102-103, footnote 72).

45. The Guidotti-Bebler talks are discussed in De Castro, op. ci , II, pp. 107-131. The Yugoslav proposal for a "condominium" deserves some attention since it seems a precursor of the more contemporary idea of "région transfrontalière" advanced by some European federalists (see, for instance, Guy Michaud, "L'avenir de la région franco-italienne des Alpes méridionales," L'Europe en Formation, 168, March 1974) The Yugoslavs expounded on their proposal in various articles in Review of International Affairs ("Yugoslavia is Ready to Talk," June 16, 1953; Milan Bartoš, "How to Solve the Trieste Question" and Aleš Bebler, "The Forgotten Elements in the Trieste Problem," both Aug 1, 1953; Janez Klemenc, "Internationalization and Triestine Economy," Sept. 16, 1953 and Milan Bartoš, "What Should be the Status of Trieste,"

Nov. 16, 1953). The stated objective behind the Yugoslav proposal was "the reinstatement of Trieste in its traditional role of Central European port," the preservation of the economic unity of the region and the defense of the "interests of its inhabitants and of their progress." The project envisaged a joint administration by Italy and Yugoslavia (sometimes the inclusion of Austria was also suggested), based on a system of "broad autonomy and self-government by the local population" (at times, referred to as "home-rule") The advocates of the project thought that the joint administration of this area would also "facilitate the general development of cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia, as their own interests would compel them to adopt such a course" De Gasperi, however, thought that such an arrangement far from favouring an amicable solution, would lead to the exacerbation of internal tensions between the two ethnic groups and consequently make the struggle between the two neighboring countries more acute and permanent" (Documenti di Vita Italiana, Nov. 1953, p. 1853; see also "Gli ultimi sviluppi del problema Triestino," Relazioni Internazionali, 17, 28, July 11, 1953, p 660). The Allies did not seem to understand the concept of "autonomy" very well and never paid much attention to it (see, for instance, Eden, op. cit , p. 201 and MC V. Popović, Bruner (First Secretary, Yugoslav embassy), Merchant (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs), Recknagel (Office of Eastern European Affairs), June 24, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Trieste

46. De Castro, op cit II, pp. 126-127 and 152 153 The idea of a plebiscite was not new. It had been proposed repeatedly and in different forms by Byrnes and then Molotov in May 1946, by the Italians in September and again in November of the same year to both the Council of Ministers and the Yugoslavs directly It had always been seen, however, in an instrumental fashion that is, as a weapon in the propaganda battle rather than an effective means to resolve the question (see ibid , pp. 133-162)

47. Novak, op. cit., p. 386; De Castro, op cit , II, pp 181-182

48. De Castro (op. cit., II, p. 167) affirms that the Italian government limited itself to approving the rally and that the riots resulted from the actions of local extremists The Yugoslav and the Allied press accused the Italian government of having organized the riots on purpose (New York Times, March 25, 1952) In "Negotiating Paper for London Talks on Zone A Administration of the FTT" (April 2, 1952, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Manuscript and Letters, henceforth ML), the Americans affirmed that 'there [was] evidence of Italian official responsibility for what happened in Trieste" and reserved the right to use it, if necessary, to get the Italians to assume a reasonable attitude at the conference According to American Political Advisor Higgs, the local Christian Democratic party was controlled by "extremist leaders", like Major Bartoli. He suspected that they were "reporting to and receiving instructions from less mature and less politically responsible leaders of the Demo-Christian party in Rome, such as Andreotti," and had suggested only a few weeks before the riots that "it might be in the interest of the U.S. to make an effort to convince the Italian government that the policy and tactics being pursued by the Bartoli elements in Trieste [were] working against the long term interest not only of the Demo-Christian party but of the Italian government itself" (Higgs to Dept D-294, "Maladministration in Trieste's General Hospital and Other Local Bodies and the Problem this Poses for AMG," 750G 0221/2 2952, see also D-139, 750G 00/12-152). For the Italian official version of events see Documenti di Vita Italiana, Nov. 1953, pp 1856 and Esteri 3,6 (March 31, 1952), pp 1-2 What particularly irritated the Allies was that De Gasperi publicly censured the behavior of the police and thus, indirectly, that of the AMG Minister of

Defense Pacciardi went even further He sent a public congratulatory telegram to the Comitato in which he referred to General Winterton as a foreign oppressor (Relazioni Internazionali 16, 13, March 29, 1952, pp. 333 and 335 and Novak, op. cit., p. 387).

49 Unger to Dept D-122, "Italian Version of Trieste History 1945-'53," 750G.00/11-1853. The most contentious issues between the AMG and the Italian government are reviewed in Downs (Acting U S Political Advisor) to Dept. 162, "De Gasperi's Dissatisfaction with the Administration of AMG Trieste," 750G 0221/10-1851 They were: authority of Italian Court of Cassation in Zone A, validity of any Italian court action in Zone A, assignment and transfer of state employees, flying of flags in vessels registered in Trieste and over Trieste's public buildings and use of the inscription "BUSZ-FTT " Relations between the Italian government and AMG were at times so tense that American Political Advisor Leonard Unger wrote in March 1951: "This whole unpleasant situation makes one wonder whether we should go on fighting the Italian encroachments or whether it might not be easier to relax and let them take over the zone de facto pending such time as they can take it over de jure in implementation of the tripartite proposal. Certainly a terrific number of cables and despatches could be eliminated and our relations with the Italian Government would be free of the thorny question" (Unger to Horsey, First Secretary of U S. Embassy, March 28, 1951 in FRUS 1951, IV, 1, pp 222-224). Winterton was accused of betrayal and of being pro-Yugoslav because upon assuming the post he immediately invited the Yugoslav commander of Zone B, Colonel Stamatović to visit him and ten days later returned the visit (G.E.R. Geyde, "Trieste, Insoluble Problem," Contemporary Review 181, 1038, June 1952, pp. 325-330).

50. De Castro, op cit., II, p. 183. It is curious to notice that, with the exception of the reference to the tripartite declaration, the Allied official announcement of the conference used the same words as were used by the Italians to request it (see ibid., p. 185; in English see Novak, op. cit., p. 388). For the Yugoslav reaction see "No Dictation on Trieste," The Yugoslav Review 1, 4 (April 1952), pp. 4-5 and 15 and De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 186-188.

51. MC Tarchiani, Perkins (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs), Byington, 750G.00/4-2352; De Gasperi's warnings to the Allies are in a letter from Tarchiani to Acheson (750G.022/4-2052).

52. For the American position at the Conference see "Negotiation Paper for London Talks on Zone A Administration of the FTT," April 2, 1952, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. For the final agreement, see Udina, op. cit., pp. 380-387. For an organizational chart of the government in Zone A after the London agreement, see Trieste to Dept. D-198, 750G.00/2-453.

53. See his May 3 letter to Brosio, in which he made a last attempt to bring pressure on the Allies, and his press conference of May 9 in Rome (both quoted in De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 211-215) See also "Le trattative di Londra per Trieste" (Documenti di Vita Italiana Aug. 1952, pp. 517-522 and Esteri 3, 9, May 15, 1952, pp. 16-19)

54. For Allied reassurances see "Memorandum for Ambassador's Background Information Prior to his Meeting with Tito," May 15, 1952, in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. The Italians forcefully denounced the measures taken by the Yugoslavs in Zone B on May 15 as a further blatant violation of the peace treaty. The Allied legal opinion, however, was that "it would be difficult to

establish that they constitute[d] a violation of treaty obligations" (see the memorandum, "Administrative Changes in Zone B of FTT," 750G.22/6-1052)

55. These efforts and Yugoslav and Italian reactions are discussed in De Castro, op cit , II, pp. 267-300 The documents relative to the best known of these attempts, the so-called Brioni step," are in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML

56. Eden, op. cit , pp. 179 and 182 See also John Young, 'Talking to Tito. The Eden Visit to Yugoslavia, September 1952, Review of International Studies 12, 1 (Jan 1986), pp 31 42

57. In a paper prepared on Aug 25, 1952, "Consequences of Defeat of Democratic Forces in Forthcoming Italian National Elections," the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee had recommended that "it is vital that the U.S. take no action during this year which might in any way weaken the moderate parties and the government in next year's elections" (in FSP-Rome, Box 179, File 350)

58. The Americans already had started to think in this direction in March, before the London conference See MC Allen (Ambassador to Yugoslavia), Barbour (Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs), Marcy (Office of Eastern European Affairs), Byington, W.E. Knight, March 6, 1952 and "Memorandum of Discussion of the Trieste Problem in the Secretary's Office," March 31, 1952 See also two memoranda entitled "Negotiating Paper Trieste' dated May 20 and June 18 which were used in discussions with Eden (all in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML)

59. Eden's letter to De Gasperi of Oct 8, 1952 and De Gasperi's answer to him and Brosio are quoted in De Castro, op cit , II, pp. 305-306 and 314-317 For the different positions of Italian diplomats see ibid., pp. 293, 314 and 343 Tarchiani, op cit , p. 216.

60. Baker (Office of UN Political and Security Affairs) to W E Knight, 750G.00/11-752.

61. Quoted in De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 311-313 On Oct 30, an official note was indeed sent to Belgrade with a request that the controversy about the violations in Zone B be submitted to the ICJ. The Yugoslavs refused by pointing out that violations had also occurred in Zone A and reminded the Italians that the only solution lay in a common search for an agreement The Italian note to Belgrade is attached to Rome to Dept D 903, 750G.00/10-3152. See also Esteri 3, 21 (Nov 15, 1952), pp 24-26, and Documenti di Vita Italiana, Nov 1953, pp 1858 1861 The Yugoslav note of Nov 4 is attached to Belgrade to Dept D-351, 750G.00/11-752.

62. Tarchiani memorandum 12560, 750G 00/10-1652, Tarchiani, op. cit , pp. 217-218.

63. See Acheson to Rome 2392, 750G.00/12-652; Gifford to Dept 3174, 750G.00/12-852; Allen to Dept 814, 750G 00/12-852

64. De Castro, op cit., II, pp 348-352 Tarchiani, who had strongly advocated confidence in the Americans, felt almost personally betrayed and, in a letter to De Gasperi, described the American proposal as "absurd, offensive .. an empty trial ballon which the Americans were sure would lead nowhere but would allow the Democratic administration to die, as far as Trieste was concerned, without glory but peacefully " Tarchiani, op cit , p 224 See also Acheson to Rome 2472, 750G 00/12-1152

65. De Gasperi's understanding of the line was less inclusive this time. He suggested that a division along a "continuous ethnic line" meant that Italy should receive at least that part of Zone B up to the river Dragonja. The outlet offered to Slovenia, however, could not be in Zaule, which was too close to Trieste, but would be at Sv. Katarina (Santa Caterina) in the bay of Koper (see fig. 9) De Gasperi suggested that it could be linked to Slovenian territory by a tunnel passing under what was to become Italian territory. See De Castro, op cit. II, pp. 354-357, Tarchiani, op cit., p 224, see also MC Sensi (First Secretary, Italian embassy), Byington 750G 00/1-1953.

66 In a conversation with Matthews and Byington on Jan. 28, 1953 Tarchiani had, in fact, resubmitted the proposal De Gasperi had made to Acheson in Paris After pointing out that "De Gasperi needed to show some spectacular accomplishment to hold the center elements together" in the coming elections, he suggested that "Italy could be given the cities of Capodistria, Isola and Pirano in return for a corridor for Yugoslavia at Santa Caterina" (MC Tarchiani, Matthews, Byington, 750G.00/1-2853).

67. See De Gasperi's conversation with Eden in Paris on Dec. 18, 1952 and a letter to Zoppi dated Feb. 13, 1953 in De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 356-357 and 389-390. For Allied reluctance to offer any assurance with respect to the future of Zone B see Bunker to Dept. 3257 (misprint for 3275), Jan. 23, 1953, FSP-Belgrade (Top Secret General Records 1945-53), Box 5, File Jan.-March 1953 and Dulles to Rome 3026, 750G.00/1-2353 (which should have been 1-2653). See also Dept to London 5081 and 5082 (Jan. 30, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File Jan 30-April 29, 1953 and Bunker to Dept. 3572 (Feb. 13, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File Jan. 30-April 29, 1953.

68. See, for instance, Casardi's memorandum dated February 10, 1953 in De Castro, op cit , II, p. 387.

69 Ambassador Bunker and some senior State Department officials recognized this and almost seemed to suggest such an option. Their opinions, as reported by Tarchiani, are quoted in De Castro, op. cit., II, p. 376.

70. Dulles to Rome 3353, 750G.00/2-1653; Bunker to Dept. 3699, 750G.00/2-2253.

71. Bunker to Dept. 3886 (March 6, 1953) in FSP-Trieste Box 2, File Jan. 30-April 29, 1953.

72. Tarchiani and Brosio's reports are quoted in De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 399-400 Dulles also must have felt confident of the outcome of the initiative because on March 12 he wrote to Eden, suggesting that in his upcoming discussions with Tito during the Marshal's visit to London from March 16 to 21 he "keep [the Trieste] question open in [the] hope [that] Tito [would] not be led to believe [that] either of [the two Allied] governments [were] committed to [an] arbitrary solution along [the] precise present zone line " The problem of Trieste was not discussed at length during Tito's visit, however. According to a memorandum given by Eden to the American embassy, the possibility of a "provisional" solution was explored but the Yugoslavs clearly stated that only a permanent solution would be satisfactory because, as Foreign Minister Popović ironically put it: "The Italians have elections every three years and under any temporary arrangement would ask for more each time " At a press conference held symbolically on March 20, 1953, Popović also declared that during the talks "it [had] been confirmed once more that the solution to the Trieste question [could] be reached only through direct discussions between the two governments concerned." See

Dulles to London 6062, 750G.00/3-1253 and 6120, 750G.00/3-1353, Aldrich (American Ambassador to the U K) to Dept 5214 and 5261 (March 21, 1953), both in FSP-Belgrade, Box 5, Top Secret General Records 1945-53, File Jan.-March 1953

73. The memorandum is reported in both De Castro, op cit , II, pp 403-407 and Tarchiani, op cit , pp. 240-242 An exerpt from the minutes of the meeting is reproduced in De Castro, op cit II, pp. 428-441 and Tarchiani, op. cit , pp 239-266 On the belief that Zone B had been lost with Pula see Taviani, DI, entries of Sept. 2 and 14, 1953. The belief that the electoral eve was a very favorable moment to bring pressure on the Americans was also shared by Prof Mario Toscano, then head of research at the Foreign Ministry. In a memorandum submitted to De Gasperi at about this time, he argued that "the 1953 elections could reproduce a situation similar to that of 1948 with the Allied governments making their best efforts to help democratic parties in Italy" (see Toscano's own reminiscences in Re, op cit , p 181 and Ortona, op. cit., p 31) For the text of the answer to be given to the U S. see De Castro, op cit , II, pp 411-412

74. Given Tarchiani's objections to his chosen course of action, De Gasperi decided to send De Castro to plead the Italian case in Washington. To avoid press speculation, the State Department preferred to send the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Homer M. Byington Jr , to Rome (he was, incidentally, the true author of the Dulles plan) De Castro met with him on April 10 and 11 (De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 443-447) Tarchiani also did his duty but was so convinced that the Americans could not do better that he continued to urge that Dulles' second plan be accepted as it stood (ibid , p 449 and MC Tarchiani, Sensi, Byington, 750G.00/3-2753) Not much is known about the conversation between De Gasperi and Dulles, as the American documents relative to the Paris meeting are still classified The Americans decided, it would appear, that they would submit the plan as a proposal rather than with the formula ne varietur as originally intended. The difference, however, was merely academic because it is not clear how they could have "imposed," as opposed to "proposed," anything concerning Zone B in Belgrade.

75. Wallner's telegram 1531, which reports on the demarche, is still classified. Something, however, is learned from references made in other telegrams, such as Luce to Dept. 4724, 750G 00/5-1153, Smith (Under-Secretary of State) to Belgrade 1375 (May 12, 1953), Smith to Rome 4419 (May 14, 1953), Wallner to Dept 1562 (May 14, 1953) and Luce to Dept 4762 (May 15, 1953) (all in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Trieste) The Americans apparently promised substantial economic aid. They also must have mentioned the necessity of finding a solution to help De Gasperi in the coming elections because Tito opened a speech on May 17 with a somewhat sarcastic remark· "In Italy we now have elections again I say 'we' because they also include us whenever there is an election in Italy. We are [the] chief outside partner who should pay for the victory . . of De Gasperi " Yugoslav press reactions to De Gasperi's speech are reported in Wallner to Dept 1534 (May 7, 1953) in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Trieste and Wallner to Dept 1512 (n d., but probably April 28 or 29) in FSP Trieste, Box 2, File Jan. 30-April 29, 1953 Tito's speech of May 17, is reported and commented on in Wallner to Dept 1574 and 1576, 750G.00/5-1853

76. Fejć's conversation with Vanni D'Archirafi is reported in De Castro, op. cit , II, p 451 For some examples of Yugoslav signals see the following articles in Review of International Affairs: "What is Obstructing Good Relations Between Yugoslavia and Italy," 2, 10 (May 9, 1951), p 12, "No Solution of the

Trieste Problem Without Yugoslavia," 3, 8 (April 9, 1952), pp 7-8, "Italian Action of Straining Relations with Yugoslavia," 3, 11 (June 1, 1952) p. 4, "Latest Edition of Rome's 'Sacro Egoismo'," 3, 15 (Aug. 1, 1952), p 1 and "Blackmail," 4, 2 (Jan. 16, 1953), p. 14. The main message was that Yugoslavia would "never agree to have the Trieste question settled without her participation" and that Italy would do better to "pay more heed to geography" and look for an "Adriatic" solution rather than insisting on an "Atlantic" one because "pressure on Yugoslavia [would] elicit only one reply unwavering resistance."

77. The English translation of the memorandum in which De Gasperi requested a new American approach to Belgrade is attached to MC Sensi, Byington, 750G.00/5-1853 The conversation between De Gasperi and Luce is reported in a memorandum for the Acting Secretary, "Discussion Between Ambassador Luce Prime Minister De Gasperi and Secretary General Zoppi on Trieste," 750G.00/5-2053 and Luce to Dept. 4821, 750G.00/5-2053. On the question of military facilities (which the Americans needed to discharge their responsibilities for the logistical support of NATO's U.S. forces) and the impression that the Italians were stalling negotiations purposely to put pressure on the Americans, see Durbrow (Counselor, American embassy in Rome) to Dept. D-1826 (March 6, 1953), FSP-Rome, Box 3, File Classified, 320-1. For Tarchiani's conversation with Eisenhower see MC Chief of Protocol (Simmons), May 5, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, VI, pp 1605-1606; Tarchiani's letter to Smith, 750G.00/5-1853; MC Tarchiani, Merchant, Byington, 750G.00/5-1953

78. Wallner to Dept 1593, 750G.00/5-2053. This is the telegram in which Wallner reported on his meeting with Bebler. The one in which he reported the Yugoslav answer in detail is still classified.

79. A translation of Zoppi's message to Tarchiani was given by the Italian embassy to the State Department as per Zoppi's instructions on May 4 and is attached to a memorandum from Bonbright (Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) to the Secretary dated the same day but filed as 750G.00/5-253.

80. Tarchiani, op. cit., pp. 276-280; Duroselle, op. cit., p. 373; Novak, op. cit., p. 417.

81. De Castro, op. cit II, p. 462. De Castro does not reveal the names of these "private" negotiators. An American document identifies them as Mr. Ruo and Mr. Attas (see MC Sensi, Byington, 750G.00/5-2656). In another (Wallner to Dept. 1593, 750G.00/5-2053), Restagno (Senator of the Christian Democratic party) is also said to be involved.

82. After the breakdown, the Yugoslavs told the Allied representatives in Belgrade that the Italians had made proposals for a solution which they later had withdrawn. The Italians claimed the opposite (see the memorandum of the Italian embassy in Washington "Some Facts Concerning the Recent Attempts to Solve the Problem of Trieste through Bilateral Conversations," June 19, 1953 and MC Tarchiani, Merchant, Byington, June 19, 1953; both in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Trieste). In fact, as De Castro has revealed, both were wrong (and right, in a sense) insofar as up to the beginning of the Zoppi-Sajčić talks the position of each country had been illustrated to the other by the intermediaries. These had thought that the best way to convince the two parties to start negotiations "was to make Italy think that it was an official Yugoslav initiative, seeking to gild it with non-existent concessions while making Yugoslavia think that it was an Italian initiative showing a flexibility which was greater than it ever

had been in the past" (De Castro, op. cit , II, p 463).

83. The documentation about this episode is attached to a memo from Merchant to W. E. Knight (750G 00/6-453) See also Ortona, op cit., p. 33 Because of its limited scope, American involvement in the 1953 elections has hardly been devoted any attention so far. An in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this study, but a few observations are in order Some members of the American Catholic clergy, some Italian-American leaders and some Italian politicians were of the opinion that a replay of 1948 was needed and took such initiatives as planning another letter campaign, manufacturing propaganda seals to be placed on the letters and soliciting and raising funds (see, for instance, Ernest E Rossi "Italian Americans and U S Relations with Italy in the Cold War in Humbert S Nelli, ed , op cit , pp 108-129 at p 122 123, the memorandum, "Seals--not live!--for Italy," 765 00/1 1953, MC Lucioli, Byington, "Mr. Edward Corsi's Activities Regarding the Italian Elections," 765.00/4-2253 and MC Di Bella (Christian Democratic candidate), Brennen (Office of Western European Affairs), Byington, 765.00/5-1953) The State Department, however, took great care in distancing itself from these initiatives, which it deemed counterproductive Indeed, an attempt by Ambassador Luce, in a speech to the Milan Chamber of Commerce on May 28, to hint that the continuation of American economic assistance could be made dependent on the outcome of the election backfired when the noncentrist press jumped on the opportunity to accuse the Americans of gross interference (Luce's remarks in Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower A Divided Legacy, New York Doubleday, 1981, p 193, see also Luce to Jackson, Special Assistant to the President, June 18, 1953 in FRUS 1952-1954, VI, p. 1613). Some actions were taken with an eye on the elections,but their timing was seen as more essential than their substance. Thus efforts were made to assure the placement of offshore procurement contracts in Italy just before the elections (Bunker to Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, Nov 12, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp 1595-1597, Harriman to Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dec 1, 1952, in ibid., pp 1597-1598 and Dec. 23, 1952, pp. 1600-1601, Secretary of State to Embassy in Italy, Jan. 24, 1953, in ibid., pp 1602-1603), and to press for more liberalized migration policies within the OEEC (Department's telegram 3381, 765.00/8-3052)

84. Re, op. cit., p. 184; De Castro, op. cit., II, pp 484-485, Tarchiani was the only one among the diplomats still opposed to the "provisional solution." In a report dated June 6, he wrote: "The idea of having the Allies hand over Zone A to us and then, conveniently and from a position of strength, negotiate for Zone B is unrealistic I don't see any possibility other than progressive action on the Americans. to solicit and prod them continuosuly so that they, with increasingly more convincing means, push Tito to give up . even in a direct negotiation with us, if that is what he wishes" (in ibid , p 508) In line with this view, he started to argue with State Department officials--much to their skepticism--that the disappointing performance of the center parties in the elections was due to "reasons of foreign policy" and, more precisely, to the "lack of a sense of justice toward Italy in the Trieste affair on the part of the Allies" (see, for instance his letter to Matthews no 8869, 750G.00/6-1653)

85. De Castro, op cit., II, p 507

86. Quaroni, op. cit., p. 262. The French had played no significant role in the Trieste question after the tripartite declaration The return of Bidault to the Quai d'Orsay in December 1952 marked, as pointed out by Duroselle (op cit , p 488), a renewed interest

with a distinct pro-Italian hue This, however, did not gain Bidault a special place in the heart of all Italian politicians because after his fall from grace in 1958 he was refused asylum in Italy He wrote in his memoir. "Even though [Prime Minister] Fanfani got me chased out of Italy when I fled to his country, I never felt sorry for playing a major role in the return of Trieste" (Georges Bidault, D'une Résistance á l'Autre, Paris: Presses du Siécle, 1965, quotation from the English translation Resistance, London Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, p. 158 On French-Italian relations see, more in general, Pierre Guilleu, "I rapporti franco-italiani dall'armistizio alla firma del patto atlantico" in L'Italia dalla Liberazione alla Repubblica, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1977, pp 145-180

87. Durbrow to Dept D-2836, 750G 00/6-2453 and 2877, 750G 00/6-2953; Holmes (Minister, American embassy in London) to Dept 6834 (June 26, 1953) and MC Tarchiani, Merchant, Byington, June 19, 1953, both in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Trieste, De Castro, op cit , II, pp. 509-510

88. MC V Popović, Bruner, Merchant, Recknagel, 750G 00/7-853 and June 24, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Trieste. Around the middle of June the Yugoslav Minister in Rome, Pavle Gregorić, did indeed suggest the establishment of a technical committee of experts to the Italian Foreign Ministry but received no answer (De Castro, op cit , II, p 519). Having finally convinced De Gasperi to press for the "provisional solution," the Foreign Ministry did not seem willing to reevaluate such a course of action in light of new developments

89. Dulles to Belgrade 1567 (June 27, 1953), FSP-Belgrade, Top Secret General Records 1945-53, Box 6, File April-Dec. 1953. See also Byington to Wainhouse (Director, Office of UN Political and Security Affairs), 750G.00/7-253, where Byington replies negatively to a proposal of the U.S. delegation to the UN that a conciliator selected from the UN conciliation panel be enlisted to solve the dispute.

90. MC V. Popović, Bruner, Barbour, Colbert (Office of Eastern European Affairs), Marcy, 750G.00/7-2453. Tito's interview with A.P. is in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 35 (Aug. 29, 1953), pp. 827-828.

91. De Castro, op cit., II, p. 522.

92. Pietro Quaroni, "Chi é che fa la politica estera in Italia" in Bonanni, ed., op cit., pp. 801-820 at p. 809.

93. De Benedetti, loc cit , p. 835.

94. De Benedetti, loc. cit., pp. 823 and 827-828 and Guglielmo Negri, "La direzione e il controllo democratico della politica estera" in Bonanni, op. cit , pp. 721-800 at pp. 745-746.

95. For the opinions of Gallarati Scotti and Martino see De Castro, op. cit., II, pp. 82-83, 324-5, 337, 341, 343 and 353.

96. Quaroni, loc. cit , p. 810

97. As he has recalled, in fact, he had many meetings at the Foreign Ministry during this period but none with De Gasperi personally (De Castro, op cit , II, p 397)

98 G Negri, loc cit , pp 775-782, De Benedetti, loc cit., p. 825 and Kogan, op cit , p. 67. It is very hard, if not impossible, to establish what really happens at Cabinet meetings, as Italy is

perhaps the only Western country where no minutes of Cabinet meetings are taken (see Gianfranco Bianchi, L'Italia dei Ministeri: lo sfascio guidato, Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1981, pp 27-28).

99. Taviani, UJ, entry of Aug. 29, 1953.

100. Dunn to Dept., Feb. 1, 1953 in FRUS 1952-54, V, pp. 1551-1553, De Castro, op. cit., II, p. 434. On De Gasperi's personality traits see Leo Wollemberg, Stelle, Strisce e Tricolore. Trent'anni di vicende politiche tra Roma e Washington, Milan Mondadori, 1983, p. 11 and Duroselle, op. cit , pp. 545-553.

4. THE PRE-CRISIS PERIOD: August 28 to October 10, 1953

Decisions, Decision-Makers and Domestic Environment

There were four decisions during this period.

Decision 9 - August 29, 1953	An ad hoc group decides to move troops toward the Yugoslav frontier.
Decision 10 - September 8, 1953	The same group decides to maintain the military measures adopted on August 29.
Decision 11 - September 11, 1953	Pella, upon the suggestion of Zoppi and Del Balzo, decides to make a formal proposal for a plebiscite
Decision 12 - October 9, 1953	The Council of Ministers decides to accept the Allied plan of transferring Zone A to Italian administration.

The two key decisions of this period (decisions 9 and 10) were made by an ad hoc group including Prime/Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella, Minister of Defense Paolo Emilio Taviani, Chief of Staff Efisio Marras and the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Count Vittorio Zoppi

Decision 11 was formally made by Pella but formulated by Zoppi and Del Balzo. Decision 12--which was, for all practical purposes, merely an ex post facto ratification of the initiatives the Foreign Ministry had taken with respect to Trieste until then--was made by the Council of Ministers. The new government had assumed office on August 24, 1953.

Because of their significant impact on the Trieste question some attention must be devoted here to the events leading to the fall of De Gasperi and the coming to power of Pella. Although Italian diplomats blamed the fall of De Gasperi on Allied mishandling of the Trieste question, it really was the result of increasing discord between the members of the centrist coalition, which had dominated government politics since May 1947, and infighting within his own party. The most divisive issue, moreover, was not Trieste but the question of which model of economic development to adopt. The Liberals and the most conservative Christian Democrats (a group referred to as vespisti because of their habit of holding meetings at the Vespa Club) favored the restoration of a pre-Keynesian form of capitalism. They had strong personal ties to traditional agrarian and industrial interests and were virulently opposed to any idea of social and economic reform. Although a minority, until at least 1949 they wielded a strong influence within both the party and the coalition. Favoring a policy of gradual reform were the Social Democrats and some Christian Democrats. The most active and well-organized of these were the so-called dossettiani, named after their leader, Giuseppe Dossetti. Most of them were young catholics who had entered politics during the Resistance. Their reformist élan was part of a vision of politics modelled after the social doctrine of the Church. In between stood the Republicans and the core group of the Christian Democrats, the so-called popolari. Led by De Gasperi, these were the old guard, having for the most part entered politics before the advent of Fascism, when the party was known as Partito Popolare. Although originally committed to a policy of moderate reformism, they soon realized that their remaining in power (De Gasperi occupied the position of Prime Minister uninterruptedly from December 1945 to August

1953) depended on their ability to mediate between the demands of the reformists and the resistance of the conservatives. This meant that when reforms were finally implemented their impact was considerably diminished by the compromise of which they were the result Thus, as the 1951 and 1952 city and provincial council elections clearly indicated, they contributed to swelling the ranks of both oppositions rather than strengthening support for the parties of the centrist coalition. [1]

As the parliamentary elections of 1953 approached and prospects for the Christian Democrats did not look any brighter, De Gasperi thought he could find an immediate and easy remedy in a new electoral law which was hurriedly pushed through Parliament amidst furious protest and much filibustering, from the opposition parties. Labelled by the Communists as the legge truffa (swindle law), the name with which it was to pass into history, the law aimed to create a large and stable centrist majority. It corrected, in fact, the proportional electoral system by assigning 65 percent of the seats to that party, or coalition of parties, which obtained 50 percent of the votes plus one The electoral results were a bitter disappointment for the centrist coalition, which polled only 49.8 percent of the votes. Not only was the premium not assigned but the actual reconstitution of a centrist majority became more difficult. The Christian Democrats, although still the party of relative majority, had shrunk perceptibly; so too had their smaller centrist allies. On the left, the Communists and Socialists--who unlike 1948, had gone before the electorate on separate tickets--had increased their share of the vote by over 4 percent and had gained an extra 35 seats. On the right, the Monarchists and neo-Fascists had more than trebled their votes. The strength of the major parties in the Chamber of Deputies, as compared to 1948, was now the following: [2]

Table 2

	1948		1953	
	% votes	no. seats	% votes	no. seats
Christian Democrats	48.5	305	40.1	263
Social Democrats	7.1	33	4.5	19
Liberals	3.8	19	3.0	13
Republicans	2.5	9	1.6	5
Communists	31.0	183	22.7	143
Socialists			12.7	75
Monarchists	2.8	14	6.9	40
Neo-Fascists	2.0	6	5.8	29

The fissures within the Christian Democratic party had by now become open warfare among rival factions. The leadership of the popolari was openly challenged by a group of "young Turks" united in early 1952 and known as Iniziativa Democratica. They had little use for the liberal economic tradition which the party claimed as part of its heritage. Combining some elements of Keynesianism with the social concerns inherited from the dossettiani, they envisaged the development of what would later become the welfare state--Italian style. Their immediate objective, however, was simply to change the image of the party from that of a collection of notables representing conservative interests to that of the driving force of progres., modernization and social concerns. [3] These changes, it was thought, would not only put an end to the party's electoral hemorrhage but even enable it to conquer votes on the left. This was deemed possible because of the "attraction" that an expanding economy also would have on the ideological terrain. [4] Since a new governmental formula was difficult to find in the wake of the election results, the members of Iniziativa Democratica took a rather pragmatic position within the party on the subject of alliances. Their avowed preference was to continue with centrist coalitions. They were not reluctant, however, to form a temporary alliance with the Right and were also prepared, if absolutely necessary, to "open"--in the political jargon of the day--to the Socialists. Soon after the

elections, in fact, aware of the difficulties that the Christian Democrats would face in its attempt to form a new governing coalition, Socialist leader Pietro Nenni--supported in this initiative by the Social Democrats who aspired to be the mediators of the operation- had hinted to De Gasperi that his party would consider participating in, or supporting, a government that would undertake substantial domestic economic reforms and reorient foreign policy in a less pro-Atlantic direction. The National Council of the Christian Democratic party, still controlled by the popolari, refused Nenni's advances because it was not prepared to make the policy changes he requested. Also taken into consideration were the sternly negative attitude of the Vatican and the adverse effect it was thought that such an opening would have on American policies toward Italy. [5]

De Gasperi's attempt to form a new government proved, as expected, to be difficult: an opening to the Socialists had been excluded, the Social Democrats were opposed to a continuation of centrist coalitions, on the right, the neo-Fascists were openly opposed to the ratification of the EDC treaty while the Monarchists gave some vague assurances of support on the condition that the new government give priority to the problem of Trieste. After an attempt to convince the Social Democrats to remain in a centrist coalition De Gasperi formed a monocolore (a government composed only of Christian Democrats) but failed to obtain a vote of confidence from Parliament (July 28, 1953). [6] After De Gasperi had refused a new mandate from President Luigi Einaudi, the choice turned to another Christian Democratic leader, Attilio Piccioni Although more successful than De Gasperi in his preliminary exploratory contacts, Piccioni stumbled when the time came to choose the new ministers. The Social Democrats, in fact, refused to give their support unless the names of some old guard Christian Democrats were dropped from the list [7] When it appeared that the only solution to the impasse was to dissolve Parliament and call for new elections, Einaudi, in a surprise move, gave the mandate to Giuseppe Pella Such a designation caused an uproar in the directorate of the Christian Democratic party

Pella, in fact, had not been included in the party's list of papabili (acceptable candidates) submitted to Einaudi Elected to the Costituent Assembly in 1946, Pella had occupied key ministerial posts since May 1947 (Finance, Treasury and the Budget) and had made a name for himself, especially in conservative circles, for his tight monetary policies and dogged determination to balance the budget Yet, he had remained an isolated and relatively marginal figure within the party. He did not lead, or even belong to, a faction and was regarded more as a "technician" than a politician Thus, only the intervention of De Gasperi prevented Pella's designation being disavowed by the leaders of his own party It seems that De Gasperi thought that the Pella government would afford him the time to recompose the centrist coalition and call for new elections once this task had been accomplished. [8]

Einaudi's choice of Pella, however, had not been whimsical or simply the result of a personal predilection deriving from their common faith in the classic, liberal economic credo. Pella had been designated by the Monarchists; Einaudi therefore thought that he would be able, with their support, to obtain a vote of confidence. His government, moreover, was to be presented to Parliament as provisional, a governo di amministrazione (administrative government) whose main task would be to have the various ministerial budgets approved by the end of October. [9] Pella decided to keep the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and the Budget for himself. All the ministers, with the exception of two "technicians" without parliamentary mandate, were Christian Democrats. [10] Yet, all that the new Premier received from his party colleagues was a dry communication that the parliamentary group "would not deny its support to a government which would deal with the most urgent problems of the day ... and ensure the prompt approval of the budgets." [11]

Pella presented his government to Parliament on August 19. In the Chamber of Deputies the vote of confidence was 315 to 215 with 44 abstentions--a majority that even De Gasperi had never had. In the Senate the vote was 140 to 86 with 10 abstentions. The new government obtained the support of the Liberals, Republicans and Monarchists and

the abstention of the neo-Fascists and Social Democrats.

Psychological Environment

There were no major changes in the attitudinal prism of Italian decision-makers during this period The "domestic magnifier" gained somewhat in relevance with the arrival of Pella His government, in fact, rested on the support of the Monarchists and the benevolent abstention of the neo-Fascists These two parties had consistently censured De Gasperi's Atlantic foreign policy for not guarding national interests properly, especially with respect to the colonies and Trieste During the electoral campaign, moreover, they had pledged themselves "to create a climate of irredentism to recover Trieste, Istria and the other Adriatic lands unjustly taken from [Italy]." Pella, therefore, felt that his future as Prime Minister depended, in no small measure, on his ability to please the nationalistic ambitions of these two allies and potential opponents. This is well evidenced by his policy speech to Parliament on August 19:

> Our foreign policy remains oriented toward security and peace ... Security demands faithfulness toward our alliances and loyal execution of the engagements derived from them Peace can be achieved by supporting all serious initiatives aimed at solving open problems through international agreements. Italy will continue on this road . but to this firm resolve there corresponds as firm a determination to defend national interests These, in fact, stemming from elementary and self-evident principles of justice, as well as solemnly expressed international recognition [an obvious reference to the tripartite declaration], not only do not contradict the objectives of the policy of Allied solidarity but form an essential and indivisible part of it [12]

The conviction also existed that the "provisional" reacquisition of Zone A, and of Trieste in particular, was all that was needed to please public opinion, keep the opposition under control and give

Pella's government a new lease on life. Taviani, for instance, often remarked that "very few men in the streets kn[ew] anything about the location of such towns as Capodistria, Pirano or Umago." Italian Chargé in Washington Mario Luciolli told some State Department officials who wondered how a supposedly transitional government could tackle the Trieste question that "the Pella government might turn out to be much more long-lived if the 'provisional' solution [was] implemented." In a speech to the National Council of his party, a few days before the Allies announced their decision to return Zone A to Italy, Pella did indeed hint that he wished to have his mandate transformed from provisional to unlimited [13]

Although more willing than De Gasperi to rock the boat of the Atlantic Alliance because of greater domestic political necessity, Pella also suffered from the "leverage syndrome" and was not prepared for an outright confrontation As he told those who urged him to threaten to abandon NATO in order to force the Allies to adopt a more favorable attitude, membership in the Western Alliance might not have brought with it the automatic reacquisition of the FTT but had nevertheless advanced the Italian case on many other fronts. He was ready to defend "the cause of the country with sacred ardor." This, however, should not be confused with "outdated forms of nationalism or, even worse, extremism which would prove dangerous and counterproductive " Conversely, in commenting the Allied decision to return the administration of Zone A to Italy he told the Chamber of Deputies on October 9 that the Allied offer was "another substantial step forward" in the action undertaken by all Italian governments from 1947 onwards and "constitute[d] proof of the effectiveness of a policy which ha[d] looked for the presuppositions for a solution of all major Italian problems, and that of the eastern frontier in particular, in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance " [14]

Images also remained basically the same. Their intensity, however, increased remarkably. This was especially the case for those expressed in conversations with Allied officials (and American ones, in particular), most likely because of the stronger pressure now exercised

on them Trieste, for instance, had always been an important problem in the minds of Italian decision-makers Now, however, it was said to have acquired "an absolute priority over all other foreign policy matters', its solution "constitute[d] a critical test of [Italian Allied] friendship." Pella thought of it as a new Danzig when he affirmed in one of his speeches that "grave would be the responsibility of the Allies ... if Trieste should go down in history like another city whose disputed history threw humanity into ruins, tears and blood " [15]

The image of the Allies as naive and irresolute was reinforced by the feelings of dejection Italian decision-makers seem to have developed following the American decision, announced in July 1953, to hold talks on joint military planning with Yugoslavia in Washington and the immediately subsequent collapse of De Gasperi's centrist coalition American "infatuation" with Yugoslavia, coupled with what was regarded as insensitivity to the Italian plight, now made the climate of frustration among Italian decision-makers so acute that a confrontational attitude started to emerge Tarchiani had a very stormy conversation with Byington Zoppi vigorously complained to Ambassador Luce that these talks--and, even worse, the fact that they were to be held in Washington--would make De Gasperi's already difficult task of forming a new government impossible De Gasperi, for his part, inserted a bitter warning in his programmatic speech to Parliament on July 21

> Let it be clear to our allies that certain miscalculations could have repercussions on the very solidity of the alliance and lead to crises that only would be resolved to the exclusive advantage of those who have an interest in undermining the structure of Western solidarity .. it seems to us that they have not understood the decisive significance of the FTT question. [16]

After the advent of Pella the view became that, unless the Allies changed their tune, "Pella too would go as De Gasperi had gone, broken by his own loyalty to the West which had betrayed him." The Allies also continued to be reminded, with increasing intensity, that "Italy had received nothing in return for the solidarity she had shown the West" and, more to the point, that "their so-called impartiality' in the Trieste question created "profound pain and disappointment," as

"impartiality shown towards a communist dictatorship and a democratic, full-participating member of NATO [could] only be interpreted . as partiality for Tito and support for Yugoslavia " Hence, if they did not wish to see "the solidity of the Atlantic system crack open from the inside," they had better reward "Italy's good schoolboy policy" with "proof of solidarity " What better proof than enabling her to fulfill her "historical claims underwritten by the [tripartite] declaration?" Tito, after all, would have already acceded to such a settlement had he "ever felt that Trieste constituted a stumbling block in the development of his relations with the West " [17]

The progressive inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Western defense club, in conjunction with De Gasperi's political demise and the advent of a weak, "provisional" government, looked to Italian decision-makers like a sign that Italy's international position was deteriorating. As a consequence, they perceived Tito's self-assurance to have increased and, because of their existing image of the Yugoslavs as cunning and untrustworthy, they expected him to make some daring and devious attempt to exploit Italy's weakness to his advantage in Trieste. [18]

Most Italian decision-makers had shared the perception that time was not on Italy's side since mid-1951. Now they started to feel that it was running out, for both Trieste and Pella's government. To convince the Allies (and the Americans in particular) to hand them over Zone A, two alternatives seemed available: to dissipate what Luciolli called their "attitude of reverential fear towards Yugoslavia" or to show them, as Zoppi put it, that they worried too much about Yugoslav reactions if the "provisional solution" were to be implemented and too little about those in Italy, if it were not [19] Besides providing Pella's government with a new lease of life and improving Italy's bargaining power with Yugoslavia ("equalization" of their position in Zone A to that enjoyed by the Yugoslavs in Zone B was regarded by Italian decision-makers as a precondition to direct negotiations), the reacquisition of Zone A was deemed necessary for yet another, even more important but unavowable, reason to deprive the Allies of a potential

instrument of political pressure As long as Zone A remained under their control, in fact, the danger existed that they would use their position to press Italy to agree to a less satisfactory settlement or to make concessions in other fields The Allies were certainly not above using such means (as they had demonstrated during the negotiations for the revision of the peace treaty) and the increasing attention they were paying to Yugoslavia was not a good omen The perceived imperative for Italian decision-makers was, therefore, to obtain the maximum possible under the circumstances, at the earliest As Taviani used to repeat, with the tripartite declaration the Allies had issued two cheques Their assets, however, covered only one of them The Italians, therefore, had better cash it before liens were attached by other creditors. [20]

Decision Flow

Italian troops are moved to the border

On the evening of Friday, August 28, 1953, a wire from the Milan bureau of the United Press (UP) arrived at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was purported to be the translation of a statement released earlier the same day by the Yugoslav press agency Yugopress The first sentence read: "It was stated today that Yugoslavia has lost patience with Italy on the Trieste question and is considering changing its moderate and tolerant attitude, perhaps by annexing Zone B in reply to Italy's cold annexation of Zone A " Carlo Perrone Capano, head of the press services at the Ministry, ran to the office of Secretary

General Zoppi, who immediately alerted the Prime Minister Pella, who was supposed to leave for a brief vacation near Rome, immediately cancelled his plans He then called a meeting for the following morning with Zoppi, Defense Minister Paolo Emilio Taviani and Chief of Staff Efisio Marras and decided also to confer with the Allied diplomatic representatives in Rome A telegram requesting further information from the Allies as to Yugoslav intentions was also sent to the Italian embassies in Washington, London and Paris A statement was then released to the press It revealed that "no news ha[d] yet arrived .. to confirm the Yugopress report" and warned that if the Yugoslav government did indeed proceed with the annexation of Zone B Italian reaction "would without doubt be that which the conscience of [the] people require[d] " [21]

The meeting between Pella, Zoppi, Taviani and Marras on the morning of August 29 lasted from 10 30 to 11·30 a m ; Pella and Taviani had met alone between 10·00 and 10.30 Following a phone consultation with President of the Republic Luigi Einaudi, former Prime Minister De Gasperi and Ambassador Tarchiani, who were all on vacation in nearby villages in the Alps, the group decided to suspend all military leaves and move some troops toward the Yugoslav frontier (decision 9). [22] Pella and Zoppi received British Ambassador Victor Mallet at 11:30, French Chargé Pierre Sebilleau at 12:00 and American Chargé Eldridge Durbrow at 12 30. Both American Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce and French Ambassador Jacques Fouques Duparc were out of town. According to the report Durbrow cabled to Washington immediately after the meeting, Pella started by apologizing for having to bring to the attention of the U.S. government "in the most serious way a matter which was based only on an unconfirmed press report " He could not ignore it, however, since "the press in Yugoslavia [was] state-controlled and press stories [were] not released without some prior official approval " Then, "speaking very carefully," as Durbrow noted, he requested that the Allies intervene in Belgrade and obtain from that government a clear and explicit denial of any intention to annex Zone B If annexation were to take place, Italy

would be obliged to move troops to occupy Zone A "within 24 hours." Should Allied troops in the zone offer resistance, Italy "would not of course try to use force to complete occupation." He hinted, however, that in such case Italy's continuing participation in NATO would be threatened. If, on the other hand, the United States could help Italy reach a satisfactory solution, all other pending international questions (such as the ratification of the EDC treaty and the concession of military facilities) "would be comparatively easy to resolve." In his conversation with Mallet, Pella also recommended that General Winterton be instructed to intensify surveillance on the border between Zone B and Zone A and between the latter and Yugoslavia. There was no mention of the troop movements he had just ordered [23]

That same afternoon Luciolli reported, after a meeting with Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Livingston T. Merchant, that, from all indications the Americans had, the Yugoslav government was interested in a joint Italian-Yugoslav administration of the FTT. There was no evidence to suggest that it was considering annexing Zone B. The Yugoslav embassy in that city, moreover, had already issued a statement defining the rumors circulating in Rome as "entirely untrue" (the next morning the official press agency Tanjug would go even further, calling them a "planned provocation"). Following Merchant's meeting with Luciolli, the State Department requested its embassy in Belgrade to seek clarification from the Yugoslav Foreign Office and, in concert with the British and the French, to suggest that a "public disavowal" be issued "in order to reassure [the] Italians and prevent the incident from being further blown up out of all proportion." [24] Further reassurances were received the next day from Durbrow, who called on Pella and Zoppi to recommend that the Italian government "take no action or public position" pending the results of the inquiry in Belgrade. Pella was pleased to learn of the Allied demarche in Belgrade and agreed that prudence was necessary, but warned that any public statement suggesting that the Allies were counselling him to moderation would only make his position more difficult. Again, he made no mention of the military

measures adopted the previous morning. [25]

Allied intelligence in the FTT had meanwhile detected a concentration of troops around Monfalcone. General Winterton worried that this might be a prelude to local disorders purposely instigated by pro-Italian leaders to offer a pretext for Italian troops to enter the zone. The British, therefore, suggested to the Americans that a formal demarche also be made in Rome to request the immediate cessation of troop movements. The proposal met with the opposition of the French and the reluctance of the Americans. After much bargaining, concerning also the wording and tone to be used, a compromise was finally reached and instructions sent to the Allied diplomats in the two capitals. In Belgrade, they were to seek clarification of the Yugopress story and request an explicit declaration that the Yugoslav government was not contemplating the annexation of Zone B. In Rome, they were to request that troop movements, if indeed under way as reported, be stopped immediately. [26]

The two demarches were made in the afternoon of August 31. In Belgrade, British Ambassador Ivo Mallet first, and French Ambassador Philippe Baudet and American Chargé Woodruff Wallner soon afterwards, met with Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Aleš Bebler who explained that the Yugopress release neither mentioned nor pertained to Zone B. It referred to the Yugoslav government's intention to protest at the progressive "italianization" of Zone A and insist on better treatment for its Slovenian population. The ambiguity of the statement, however, should have called for no more than a routine inquiry from Italy as to its correct interpretation. Instead, Bebler charged, Pella had seized it "as a favorable occasion to curry public favour by dramatic moves." He then pointed out that Yugopress itself was about to release a clarification of its previous statement and gave assurances that his government, which was accustomed to sabre-rattling at its eastern frontiers, would not adopt "adventurous and unilateral" measures but simply send Rome a note of protest. [27]

In Rome, Durbrow saw Pella and Zoppi. After asking for

confirmation that some troops had indeed been moved toward the border, he went on to voice "Allied surprise" at some of the statements Pella had made during their meeting of August 29, particularly the intention to occupy Zone A and the suggestion that Italy's continued adherence to NATO might be called into question. Pella minimized the scope of troop movements which he said had now ceased and made it clear that he had never considered entering Zone A forcibly. He also emphasized that his government was committed to NATO and the idea of a European community and would continue to support both. Developments in the Trieste question, however, could unfortunately influence the degree of such support. He then went on to express what he called his "personal ideas" on Trieste. Pella said he hoped that something along the lines of the so-called "provisional solution" could be worked out in the not-too-distant future. He argued that obtaining administrative control of Zone A--which, he said, implied the withdrawal of Allied troops and their replacement with Italian ones--would put Italy on an equal footing with Yugoslavia and therefore make it easier for her to negotiate a more satisfactory final solution later on. A statement released to the press by the Prime Minister's office after the meeting revealed that the government felt "reassured" by the action undertaken by the Allies. Pella himself, according to the description given by journalists, appeared "calm" and definitely gave the impression of being in control of the situation. That afternoon, he left for a brief vacation in the mountain resort of Terminillo, near Rome. [28]

As anticipated by Bebler, on September 1 the Yugoslav government sent the Italian one an official note of protest. In typical diplomatic lingo, the note pointed out that the "undertaking of armed demonstrations represent[ed] a gross violation of the rules of conduct among states maintaining regular diplomatic relations." It stressed that "such methods [were] completely ineffective towards Yugoslavia and [could] only make a solution more difficult to achieve" and invited the Italian government to refrain from using them. The Italians replied the same day that the measures taken were of "a precautionary, protective

nature" and that, in any case, the Italian government had "the full and indisputable right to take on its territory any measure it judge[d] necessary in given circumstances." [29]

The somewhat pungent tone of the Italian reply must have vexed the Yugoslavs. The following day Bebler called the three Allied representatives to his office and informed them that his government considered itself provoked by the military measures Italy had taken, for which it had given no motive. He asked that the Allies use "their good offices" with the Italians to convince them to cancel these measures. Otherwise, regardless of the fact that they were not serious, Yugoslavia would be forced to take corresponding action. Following an exchange of opinions, the three concluded that the Yugoslavs were not bluffing and recommended that their respective governments "bend every effort" to convince the Italian government to revoke the measures. This suggestion met the resolute opposition of Ambassador Luce. She had just been told by Pella that his government could not even contemplate a revocation of its "very minor" troop dispositions at least until after a speech Tito was scheduled to make on September 6 to a rally of former partisans at Okroglica, near the FTT border. The Prime Minister had also told her that although he did not intend to make any concessions to the ultranationalistic clamors of the Right, he still had to reckon with the fact that his government depended on its support. Hence, she thought that such an intervention on the part of the Allies would harm Pella and "only strengthen extremist elements." [30] The fact that, contrary to Allied recommendations, Yugopress had meanwhile made Bebler's request public convinced the State Department that it was preferable to endeavor, instead, to discourage the Yugoslavs from implementing their threat: "We believe it essential," the official explanation went, "to avoid any indication [that] we are complying with the Yugoslav request and thus siding with Yugoslavia." There is no evidence to suggest that the reverse concern existed in the mind of Allied officials. [31]

After hammering out a concerted procedure, the Allied representatives in Belgrade called on Foreign Minister Koča Popović and

explained that, Bebler's request having been made public, any Allied demarche in Rome would now be useless given "the special psychology of the Italian government and people." In any case, "the military spectacle, hastily, but not uncharacteristically, staged by the Italians" (as the French ambassador put it) was not so serious, as Bebler himself had recognized, and certainly did not justify any countermeasures, especially since these undoubtedly would increase tension. Betraying a certain resentment for Allied failure to intervene with the Italians, Popović replied that to restore calm the Allies should have addressed themselves "to the place where the trouble started," as the influence of the Allies in Rome, he added, could certainly be no less than in Belgrade. He then concluded that he would faithfully report to his government the views the diplomats had expressed but that they had failed to convince him that Yugoslavia should not take countermeasures. [32]

Bebler's request to the Allies for an intervention in Rome had been followed by a second note of protest. This time the Yugoslav government had warned the Italians that if "the abnormal situation at the frontier" continued, it would "be forced to take corresponding measures on its territory." The Italians reiterated the "precautionary and protective nature" of their measures and pointed out that the Yugoslav government would bear "full and exclusive responsibility" for its own actions. This frantic exchange of notes came to an end on September 5, when the Yugoslav government replied that it considered the Italian answer unsatisfactory and maintained the position taken in its previous note. At the same time the Allies were told, in a memorandum submitted the same day, that the Yugoslav government agreed to postpone military countermeasures to give the Italians time to revoke theirs. The Allies were expected to help persuade them and, even more important, give their assurance that they would oppose any attempt on the part of Italy to affect by force the territorial integrity of the FTT [33]

The request for the "provisional solution"

In Rome, meanwhile, Zoppi had sent instructions to the embassies in the three Allied capitals to "take up and pursue" the course of action initiated by Pella in his conversation with Durbrow. Pella himself continued the presentation of his "personal ideas" in a meeting with Luce on the 3rd. This time he was less specific than he had been with Durbrow, saying that he expected the Trieste question to be solved at least in the spirit of the tripartite declaration. An acceptable solution, he suggested, could be "one based on a plebiscite." Pella also continued to imply that once a satisfactory settlement had been reached all outstanding foreign policy issues--such as EDC, facilities agreements and other NATO commitments--could be easily solved. Otherwise, the U.S. would continue to experience "the daily fatigue and frustration" of dealing with problems of mutual interest. [34]

Even clearer signals were sent that night at an official dinner occasioned by the visit to Rome of General Alfred Gruenther, SHAPE Commander. Taviani, in particular, spoke at length about Trieste, hinting repeatedly at the "provisional solution" as the only possible way to reach a settlement. So did Marras and other military officers. This prompted Luce to ask Pella whether the fact that he had not mentioned this option in their morning meeting meant that it was not acceptable to him. Pella answered that he did not exclude it. Later, he let her know through his private secretary, Scola Camerini, that he did not wish to make a formal request for the "provisional" and preferred that the Americans "infer" it. As De Gasperi before him, Pella did not wish to remain on record as having made the request for the "provisional" himself because, given the virulent opposition of the Right to the relinquishment of Italian "sacred rights" to the entire territory, he felt his government had to be in a position to argue, plausibly, that it had not sold Zone B "in cold blood." This same reasoning led both him (during another meeting with Luce two days later)

and Taviani (in his conversation with Gruenther) to affirm that, ironically, from an Italian point of view, it would have been better if Yugoslavia had actually annexed Zone B. In this case, in fact, "it would have been only proper and just" for the Allies to withdraw and hand Zone A back to Italy. Coming under the form of an Italian reaction to a Yugoslav move, the occupation of Zone A could have been presented as a victory and would have satisfied everybody [35]

This tactic of trying to bring the Americans to implement the "provisional solution" through a combination of suasion and pressure was emboldened by an untimely remark from Secretary of State Dulles on September 3 and by Tito's speech at Okroglica on the 6th. While in Rome Pella was telling Luce that he expected a solution in the spirit of the tripartite declaration, at a press conference in Washington Dulles was asked whether the U.S. had an official policy position on Trieste that was more recent than that of the 1948 tripartite declaration. Dulles answered:

> I would say the U.S. since that time has been exploring other alternatives. In other words, we do not necessarily regard that like the laws of the Medes and the Persians which stand forever. So far we have not come up with any official alternative proposal.

The reaction of Italian decision-makers was one of grievous exasperation. In Rome, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ludovico Benvenuti immediately requested a meeting with Luce. As she later reported to Washington, "for 20 impassioned minutes he debated on the disastrous effect of the statement." Backing his arguments with press headlines unanimously calling for the Italian government not to put up with the Allied policy of neglecting existing commitments, and proclaiming expediency as the only guiding principle, he sketched a scenario of what would follow if the statement went unclarified. Tito would soon announce that he was following a realistic lead of the U.S. in making new claim on Trieste, tension would mount and anti-Allied sentiment would solidify. This would lead to the fall of Pella's government, the rapid strengthening of extremist political forces and the consequent abandonment of a pro-NATO foreign policy. If the Allies

wished to help Pella's government in its effort to have the country retain a solid pro-Western posture, Benvenuti concluded, their continued adherence to the "spirit of the tripartite declaration," in the form of either a plebiscite or the "provisional solution," had to be reconfirmed immediately. In Washington, Luciolli conveyed the same views to Dulles personally and was authorized to state after the meeting that he had been assured that American policy with regard to Trieste "remain[ed] unchanged." After another attempt to obtain a clarifying statement directly from the State Department, the Italian government issued a press release in which Dulles' statement was interpreted as meaning that American policy was still "in search of a practical application of the tripartite." [36]

In his speech at Okroglica on September 6, Tito repeated that Yugoslavia had no intention of annexing Zone B. He also cleared the slate of all previous Yugoslav proposals and suggested that the only solution now lay in the internationalization of the city of Trieste and the annexation of the rest of the FTT to Yugoslavia. He did, however, also reiterate the Yugoslav desire to settle the question bilaterally at the negotiating table. Concerning the Allied request not to take countermeasures he was even more accomodating than the memorandum submitted the previous day had been, clearly suggesting that he would not take them unless there were more serious provocations than had occurred to date. The Italian government's public reaction to Tito's speech was that the "megalomaniac dictator" had finally revealed his "real designs" and that "this ought to open the eyes of those who [had] deluded themselves into thinking that there was on the part of Yugoslavia a gleam of reasonableness and some intention to resolve the problem through direct or indirect negotiations with Italy." The speech, the official press release concluded, undoubtedly "furnish[ed] the Italian and the Allied governments new fundamental elements for a wide reexamination of the situation." Privately, however, Pella sent word to Luce (again through Scola Camerini) that according to the Italian government "the excessive claims in Tito's speech were largely

for domestic consumption and that there were indications that Tito was ready for a de facto solution, that time was ripe, and that an occasion for a solution would not come again in so favorable a form." Scola Camerini assured her that the implementation of the "provisional solution" (or the "establishment of Yugoslavian-Italian equality," as he called it) would satisfy Italian public opinion, open the way to direct negotiations for a final settlement, consolidate and strengthen Pella's government and permit him to pursue strong pro-Western policies in Parliament. He also pointed out that Italy could live with an Allied refusal to provide any further commitment to support claims beyond Zone A as long as partition was not publicly presented as final--because this would "take the public cream off Italy's slice of the pie." Finally he hinted that, if the Allies could give assurances that such a solution was definitely in the making, troops could be withdrawn. [37]

The role of Ambassador Luce

All these efforts were not in vain. Ambassador Luce not only perfectly registered all Italian concerns and suggestions but, more importantly, made them her own. In reporting them to Washington, in fact, she added a tone of dramatic urgency which, coupled with her willingness to use extraordinary channels (and, at times, even unorthodox means) to promote her points of view, led the State Department to act both very quickly and in the manner she wished on the Trieste dossier. Given her pivotal role in shaping the Allied decision to return Zone A to Italy, it is worthwhile to dwell briefly on her perceptions and actions.

After enjoying some success as a playwright, she married press magnate Henry Luce, was elected to Congress and finally was appointed Ambassador to Italy by Eisenhower as a reward for her support of his

campaign. [38] Italian political and diplomatic circles had at first reacted rather coolly, fearing that the appointment of a woman to the Rome embassy indicated Italy's diminished importance in the eyes of the Republican administration. Tarchiani's first reaction, for instance, was that her appointment represented "a revolution in the customs of Roman diplomatic circles and Italy as a whole." This attitude was short-lived. Tarchiani himself was the first to reassure De Gasperi and the Foreign Ministry by pointing out that the close relationship she enjoyed with Eisenhower and the considerable power of the press empire controlled by her husband could be harnessed to Italy's cause. "If this is the case," De Gasperi is reported to have replied, "she is more than welcome." And indeed, it did not take long for Italian decision-makers to realize that with Luce's arrival the American embassy in Rome had become, in the words of De Castro, "more pro-Italian than the Italians themselves." The tendency of diplomats to become partial, in the long run, toward the countries to which they are assigned is a well-known phenomenon. In the case of Luce, identification with the Italian point of view on the question of Trieste was so swift and complete and her efforts to promote it in Washington so fervid that Pella used to refer to her as "our friendly mediator." This behavior was not the result of Luce's special sympathies for Italy or the Italians. According to C. L. Sulzberger, who met her on different occasions during her stay in Rome, she was actually rather contemptuous toward the Italians whom she considered "corrupt cowards ... unable to govern themselves by democratic means and whose temperament she regarded as "histrionic." Her efforts to make Italy the cornerstone of American security, were rather due to her anticommunist crusading spirit and, as Sulzberger maintains, to her desire "to make a big name for herself as an activist in her first diplomatic job." [39]

Italian decision-makers privately regarded Luce's ideological fervor as somewhat excessive and naive (Taviani, for one, felt she was "apodictic in her judgments" equating, for instance, "socialism and marxism with nazism") but found it very convenient for policy purposes,

at least as far as Trieste was concerned. Indeed, they had hoped for some time that the more pronounced ideological character of the new Republican administration would insure that "military [i.e pragmatic] considerations would not continue to prevail as in the past" on the question of Trieste. Now, Luce's admonitions to the State Department that "the contradiction between America's ideological war against Communism and Totalitarianism and its support of renegade Communist dictator Tito" was morally indefensible, perfectly came to complement their own that such a support would ultimately work to the detriment of American interests because it eroded the political power of the pro-Western parties in Italy [40]

The results of the June elections confirmed Luce's worst nightmare. The dreaded prospect of seeing Italy turn to the Left only a short while after her arrival in Rome seemed dangerously close. Her fears were reinforced by the self-serving analyses of the situation eagerly provided by conservative politicians and socialites, the only ones she received and frequented, whose judgment she trusted and whose assertions she always seemed to take at face value In May 1953, for instance, in the wake of De Gasperi's suggestion that Yugoslavia would sooner or later rejoin the Cominform, she launched a major debate within the State Department on the question of relations with Tito in light of his rapprochement with Moscow. Soon after the elections, following another conversation with De Gasperi during which he had repeated several times that Italy could easily be lost on the question of Trieste, she immediately sent the State Department (and Eisenhower personally) a seventeen page memorandum in which she argued that, unless the Trieste dispute was solved in Italy's favor, all American "investments in Italy might prove to have been in vain," as the "great lesson" of the elections was that Italy was "slowly but steadily moving toward the Kremlin." [41]

Luce's warnings did not go unheeded in Washington. In the summer of 1953, to reverse the declining electoral trend of the center parties, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched what William Colby, then

head of its political operations in Italy, would later define in his memoir as "the largest political action program undertaken until then or, indeed, since " While the CIA, adopting a strategic approach, was busy distributing "several millions of dollars" up and down the peninsula in its effort to build "democratic organizations on a long-term basis . . to prevent Italy from being taken over by the Communists in the next--1958--elections," Luce fretted about the morrow [42] For her, the danger was imminent: the fall of De Gasperi (and later of Pella) would open the way to Nenni's Socialists, lead to Italy's withdrawal from NATO, allow a Communist takeover and spell disaster for the whole Western world. Hence she saw the problem in a more tactical vein. Short-term remedies had to complement long-term therapies, otherwise they would prove useless and the patient would die and generate a plague into the bargain. In this context, a favorable solution of the Trieste problem came to be regarded by her, especially after the fall of the center coalition, as a kind of panacea. Initially she limited herself to reporting her views to the State Department. At the beginning of September, however, she became totally convinced--thanks also, if not primarily, to the relentless efforts of Italian decision-makers to this end--that Trieste was the only key to the survival of Pella's government and that a solution could not be deferred any longer. Consequently, she passed to the adoption of more forceful means of making her views heard--and, even more importantly, acted upon--in Washington.

Following Dulles' remarks in his press conference on the 3rd and Benvenuti's remonstrations, she lost patience with the State Department's inactivity and apparent lack of sensitivity for the Italian problem which, as ambassador to Italy, she also regarded as her own. She left the meeting telling Benvenuti that "there was not a minute to lose" and cabled the State Department that "failure to clarify the Secretary's statement immediately and to seek a rapid solution of the question .. [would] endanger not only the future of a moderate, pro-American government in Italy, but might crack wide open [the] NATO

system in Europe." That same evening, she called Dulles and vented her worries and frustations even more strongly than she had in her telegram. She was so insistent that the next day Dulles felt the need to send her the following reassuring message:

> I was glad to talk with you on the phone and I have since discussed our conversation with the President on the phone. Please feel free always to send frankly your views. You can be sure we here do not minimize the importance and danger of the situation.[43]

This was not enough for Luce. She also wrote to C.D. Jackson (a former vice-president in her husband's Time-Life organization who, perhaps somewhat ironically, had become Eisenhower's special assistant for psychological warfare), explaining in some detail why if the outcome of the Trieste dispute were adverse for Italy it would also be a moral, diplomatic, strategic and political blow for the United States. For the President, she enclosed a short summary in verse of her assessment of the situation:

> For the want of Trieste, an Issue was lost
> For the want of an Issue, the Election was lost
> For the want of an Election, De Gasperi was lost.
> For the want of De Gasperi, his NATO policies were lost
> For the want of his NATO policies, Italy was lost.
> For the want of Italy, Europe was lost
> For the want of Europe, America .?

Luce had written this soon after the elections but believed that her evaluation was even more valid now, as the fall of the Pella government would set in motion the same disastrous concatenation of consequences. Luce's resourcefulness did not stop here. After going over Dulles' head to the President, she decided to go even further, appealing almost directly to the American people. There is hardly any doubt, in fact, that she was behind the stern article published in her husband's Time magazine a week later. After lashing out at Dulles for the content and timing of his comments on Trieste, the article concluded, with typical Lucean apocalyptic gloom, that "unless the Western powers replace[d] their lassitude and ineptitude about Trieste with some diplomacy, they st[oo]d in great danger of losing Italy as a firm friend and cold war ally."[44]

Next, Luce took it upon herself to shield Pella from what she

regarded as imprudent attempts to have him revoke his military measures. Because of Winterton's increasing concerns about Italian troop dispositions on the border with Zone A and the possibility of disorders in Trieste, the State Department instructed Luce on September 5 to ask Pella to use his influence to restore calm (as the Allies certainly "could not give in to any attempt .. to impose a change in the status of Zone A by force or agitation") and request him to withdraw at least some of the troops She answered that such a request "would undoubtedly be considered highly offensive," given Pella's assurances that he had no intention of attempting a forceful entry of Zone A. It would also alienate the Right, cause the fall of Pella and endanger Italy's permanence in NATO She invited her colleagues to weigh carefully this scenario against the danger of possible Yugoslav countermeasures and Winterton's concerns and, ultimately, flatly informed them that she would not make the demarche requested. [45]

Last but not least, Luce issued a call for positive action. In two telegrams written immediately after the meetings with Pella on the 5th and Scola Camerini on the 6th, she invited the State Department to consider the possibility of guiding developments concerning Trieste in such a manner "that the Italian government could accept a Zone A-Zone B split without imposing upon [the Allies] the necessity of publicly supporting further Italian claims." She was aware that this required that Tito annex Zone B at the same time and "realize[d] the tripartite complexities involved in arriving at, and coordinating such outcome," nevertheless, she urged that the "fullest consideration" be given to such an idea because "the immediate decision on [the] part [of the Allies] to turn over Zone A to the Italians if Tito annexe[d] Zone B, would constitute all [the] satisfaction that Italian public opinion would demand to continue to support the government." [46]

Luce's efforts paid off almost immediately. On September 8, she received a telegram from the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Homer T. Byington, who informed her that her ideas were "receiving the Department's urgent consideration." Luce's suggestions

were, in fact, discussed in a meeting between Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary for UN Affairs Robert Murphy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Livingston T. Merchant and his deputy, James C. H Bonbright. Byington also suggested that she inform Pella that the Department was "urgently studying the Trieste question" and recommend that he refrain in his public speeches from "advocating any new step which might well upset the boat and render future moves on [the] part [of the Allies] impossible." [47]

The proposal for a plebiscite

On September 8 Pella, Taviani, Marras and Zoppi met to discuss the question of troop dispositions. They decided to maintain the measures adopted on August 29 (decision 10). Through Scola Camerini, the decision was immediately communicated to Luce. On the 9th, Pella met separately with each of the three Allied ambassadors He said that troops would be withdrawn gradually, when it would no longer appear that he was doing so because of Tito's requests or Allied pressures. He hoped that the small number involved would dissipate any concern that Italy harbored aggressive intentions and convince the Allies not to insist on embarassing requests for the issuance of public clarifications or their withdrawal. Luce revealed to him that a plan to solve the question was currently being studied in Washington Pella said he hoped he would not be requested to negotiate directly with Tito, as all previous attempts to do so had failed. Yugoslav claims, moreover, were now too excessive and before he could consider entering into negotiations Italy had first to be put on an equal footing with Yugoslavia. He also requested that action be taken quickly, or else his government would face intense political difficulties in Parliament Zoppi, whom Luce met soon afterwards, continued to hammer on the same

points, stating that "if the U.S. thoroughly understood the volatile character of Italians, they would then understand both the danger and the opportunity of the present situation." With Trieste out of the way, Pella "would lead the Italians forward, toward European integration and support of all other Western objectives." If the Trieste problem went unsolved, "someone else" could plunge the country into an anti-Allied policy which could negatively affect the entire Western system. That same evening, at a private dinner, Pella gave another hint about the type of plan he liked to see submitted. Asked by Arnaldo Cortesi, the New York Times' Rome correspondent, if he thought that Italian public opinion would accept partition as a final solution, Pella answered:

> I am well aware that any proposal such as this would run into serious opposition in some quarters ... I think, however, that it is an idea that deserves to be proposed to the Italian people, particularly if it were accompanied by a specific warning to both ... occupying powers that the territory in question is not ceded to them, but only entrusted to their administration pending its final disposition.

The reason for the increasing frequency and transparency of these signals was that Italian decision-makers underestimated American ability to interpret their wishes correctly and willingness to act accordingly. After the meeting with Luce, in fact, Pella and Zoppi wrote to Luciolli that they feared that the plan Luce had mentioned as being currently under study at the State Department might take attention away from the "provisional solution" at which they were "decidedly aiming" or, even worse, embarrass Italy. Luciolli immediately went to see Byington and told him that Tito's speech had strengthened the Italian government's belief that only the "provisional solution" was now possible. The following day (September 10), Byington informed Luce that a plan "to accomplish for Italy the 'equality' which Pella desir[ed] so strongly" was ready and waiting for governmental approval. [48]

In Belgrade, meanwhile, the three Allied ambassadors were giving Bebler a reply to the Yugoslav memorandum of September 5. They told him that the Allies appreciated the Yugoslav decision not to take countermeasures and hoped that such a constructive attitude would be maintained, especially since they had "no reason to believe" that the

Italians intended to use their troops to "attempt to change the present status of the FTT by force" and "good reason to hope" that they would "in the near future" restore the military situation on the frontier to normal. [49] As already mentioned, the Allies had not really made a formal demarche in Rome for the recall of troops First Luce had refused to act upon such instructions; then, following Pella's assurances of a gradual withdrawal, the State Department had concluded that an official request was no longer necessary [50] After the meeting with Bebler, however, the British insisted that some moderating influence also should be exercised on the Italians. The Americans went along on condition that, "to spare Italian susceptibilities," the demarche would not be made to Pella directly, or even in Rome, but be confined to the Italian embassies in London and Washington Moreover, because of its language (itself the subject of controversy and bargaining), the message conveyed could hardly be considered an earnest attempt to persuade Pella to revoke his military measures [51] Thus, while the Allied ambassadors in Belgrade were reassuring Bebler that Pella was about to restore the military situation to normal, Tanjug was reporting from Rome that "the Italian government ha[d] decided to keep its troops on the Yugoslav frontier until ... the Trieste problem [was] justly solved." Even worse, while Wallner and Mallet were telling Bebler that the Italians did not intend to take over Zone A by force, their governments were busy planning a way to hand it over to them. News of such a plan, moreover, was already reported in the press: in two reports by New York correspondent Ugo Stille, in fact, Corriere della Sera had revealed on September 9 and 10 that "a unilateral de facto solution between the Western Allies and Italy with regard to Zone A [was] gaining ground," suggesting that there were contrasting views within the State Department and identifying Luce as one of its most eager supporters. [52]

On September 12, Casardi and Del Balzo informed an official at the American embassy in Rome that Pella would propose a plebiscite in a speech at Campidoglio (Rome's city hall) the following day Upon urging

from the State Department, Luce attempted to convince them to dissuade Pella from making any formal proposal. They replied that it was too late to withdraw the text of the speech from the press and that, in any case, they expected Tito to reject it "within twenty-four hours." [53] Although the occasion for the speech was a ceremony held to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the defense of Rome by Italian partisans against German troops, Pella spoke mostly about Trieste. After reaffirming Italian rights, in a highly rhetorical style typical of the political discourse of the times, he suggested the plebiscite as a solution to the problem and called for an immediate five-power conference between the Allies, Italy and Yugoslavia to organize it. The same day, such a proposal was formally submitted to the Yugoslav and Allied governments (decision 11). [54]

Pella's proposal was but a resurrection of the one De Gasperi had advanced and Tito rejected in March 1952. It actually added some new controversial conditions, such as one that the plebiscite was to take place "without the presence of troops of the two interested parties." Since Italy had no troops in the FTT, this could only mean that Yugoslavia should withdraw hers from Zone B, making a new rejection by that country even more likely. The proposal was indeed merely a tactical move to cover and back up simultaneously the diplomatic action under way for the implementation of the "provisional solution." "We did not believe the proposal of the plebiscite would go through," Tarchiani would later reveal in his memoir, "but we hoped through a forceful action on our part to reach a solution; that is, that we could at least obtain the administration of Zone A." Indeed, on the evening of the 12th Zoppi instructed the Italian embassies in the Allied capitals to intensify their action for the reacquisition of Zone A as soon as Tito turned the proposal down, as expected. Unbeknownst to the Italians, however, that very morning the plan Luce had set in motion at the State Department had received "the endorsement of the U.S. government at [its] highest levels " All that remained to do now was to obtain British concurrence. [55]

The Anglo-American plan

Before examining Italian diplomatic activity following the proposal for the plebiscite, some attention must be devoted to the making of the Anglo-American plan which culminated in the October 8 announcement that Zone A would be returned to Italian administration While Luce considered the latest developments in the Trieste conundrum to be an opportunity for the Allies to orchestrate a solution based on partition, American Chargé in Belgrade Woodruff Wallner thought such an idea "impractical" under the circumstances and specifically warned against the temptation of simply turning Zone A over to Italy Such a decision, he argued, would worsen Yugoslav-Italian relations and could also be "highly dangerous." This, as shown in Chapter Three also had been the view of the State Department ever since Eden had first advanced the idea of imposing partition a year earlier; hence, Acheson's and then Dulles' efforts to mediate a solution. Once these efforts had failed, official thinking in Washington had become that the best course of action was to convince the two countries to sit at the negotiating table. Between September 8 (when Byington cabled Luce that her ideas were receiving "urgent consideration") and 11 (when the first draft of the plan was completed) the State Department made a dramatic U-turn. Suddenly, imposing partition became the option capable of "reliev[ing the Allies] of their ... embarassing responsibilities and commitments" and "pav[ing] the way ... for collaboration" between Italy and Yugoslavia. Luce might not have been able to change the personal opinions of all officials but, thanks to her determination, public visibility and political influence, she certainly succeeded in changing State Department policy. Those officials who had worked on the Trieste dossier for years were skeptical, if not openly dissentient, but once she was able to convert Dulles to her point of view, they too had to rally. [56]

The plan exuded Luce's influence even in its wording, the opening

statement being an almost verbatim transcription of her telegrams. It openly admitted that the "Department's thinking [had been] conditioned" by the "recent, and increasingly concrete, Italian suggestions" for the implementation of the "provisional." The change in policy was then justified with the same argument Italian decision-makers had used with Luce to solicit it. First, Tito's Okroglica speech was interpreted as being "designed to push [the Allies] toward offering him the Zone A–Zone B solution which he always wanted in the past." Second, military cooperation with the West was said to have become "the single most important factor in Yugoslav foreign policy" and, as a consequence, was thought to give the Allies "great bargaining power with Tito." [57] Finally, it was concluded that, provided the "modalities" of implementation met Tito's "peculiar political requirements," the plan "avoid[ed] the risks envisaged by Wallner." In reality, these risks had, all of a sudden, merely been wished away with a mixture of oversights, doubtful interpretations and unspecified caveats.

The schedule of events which the State Department believed "desirable and possible to put in motion" was the following:

a) The Allies would make a public announcement that all other efforts having failed, they had decided, "with a view to equalizing the situation" between the two countries, to turn the administration of Zone A over to Italy. The transfer of authority to the Italians was supposed to take place "simultaneously with the announcement."

b) As a result of the announcement, Tito was expected to annex Zone B. Beforehand, the Allies were to approach Tito to seek guarantees that he would do no more (e.g., attempt to occupy Zone A) and Pella to ensure that he would not oppose their acquiescence to Tito's annexation of Zone B.

c) Italy could then annex Zone A. Both countries were to give assurances that they would respect minorities and civil rights in their respective zones.

d) The Allies would then issue a public statement to recognize the de

facto situation thus created.

e) Some time later, the situation could become de jure.

The viability of the plan hinged around point b. While recognizing that Tito might not necessarily react to the Allied approach by stating that he would annex Zone B but might "reserve his position or indicate that he [would] take military action," the authors of the plan chose not to deal with these possibilities. Instead, making an optimistic assessment of their ability to deal with possible complications (a typical occurrence after decisions for action) they simply concluded that any such hurdle might be easily overcome by pointing out to Tito "the seriousness with which the [Allied] governments [would] view [his] reaction," if it was not the desired one. If anything, they worried that the plan might fail if Pella decided to oppose strongly Allied acquiescence to Yugoslav annexation of Zone B. On the evening of September 11, the text of the plan was given to the British embassy in Washington and transmitted to the American embassies in London, Rome and Belgrade for comment. The French, it had been decided, would be left out of the process of consultation.[58]

Luce was the first to react. Her only concern was that the British, even if their concurrence could be secured, might be inclined to defer action for some time. Instead of being "concerned" they were almost "irritated" by Pella's appeals for help and "saw no need for urgency." They obviously did not realize, she lamented, the gravity of the situation: a debate on foreign policy was to take place shortly after the reopening of Parliament on September 22 and unless the plan could be implemented by that date Pella's government would be in great danger. She suggested that a five-power conference be called immediately after the public announcement to discuss and solve the last outstanding issues. Such an idea, she thought, "might appeal to the British, particularly if London [was] chosen as a site" and thus help convince them to proceed with the plan without delay. While "broadly in accord" with the plan, the British Foreign Office did not, indeed, think it advisable to "strike while the iron [was] hot" and suggested that

implementation be postponed for some time in order to allow passions to die down. The Americans thought that British reluctance was due to Acting Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury's desire to wait for the return of Eden, who was on sick leave, before deciding. Eden, however, was not due back until the end of September and the State Department doubted "if Pella [would] wait that long without bringing [the] matter to a head and perhaps confronting [the Allies] publicly with [a] request for handing over Zone A," thus further complicating the situation. With pressure from Washington, the British eventually agreed to proceed. No action, however, was to be taken until Tito had formally rejected Pella's proposal for a plebiscite. [59]

The reactions of the Allied diplomats in Belgrade were more negative. Neither Mallet nor Wallner believed that Tito would react to the Allied decision by annexing Zone B. They considered the State Department estimate of Allied capacity to influence Tito excessively optimistic since the Marshal was not likely to bend under pressure. In their opinion, the only way the Yugoslavs might be persuaded to acquiesce was to make it absolutely clear from the start that the envisaged solution was final. They also recommended that any reference to "equalization" as a reason for the Allied decision be struck from both the text of the approach to Tito and the public announcement. [60] Luce was vigilant and always prompt in rebutting those suggestions she perceived as threatening to Pella. Thus, not only did she firmly oppose the idea that the solution be publicly declared as definitive but she also insisted that it should not be privately presented as such, lest the Yugoslav publicly state so and create problems for Pella. She was furious when Winterton requested that the entry of Italian troops into Zone A be delayed until the withdrawal of Allied ones. Luce, in fact, regarded the plan almost exclusively in terms of its impact on domestic Italian politics: "I consider that one of our primary objectives in advancing the Trieste solution," she had written on the 16th, "should be to prevent the Pella government's fall." She had even exhorted the State Department to work out the details of the manner in which Italian

troops would enter Zone A so as to "produce the maximum favourable impact on the Italian people." She accused the British of using "stalling tactics" and since she deemed time to be of the essence, she recommended that Pella be informed immediately of the details of the plan so that "he might trim his political and parliamentary sails accordingly." [61]

In Washington Luce's point of view almost always prevailed Thus, although a compromise, the agreement finally hammered out satisfied her concerns more than allayed Wallner's fears. [62] Indeed, it would seem that the State Department also ended up regarding the plan as if it were intended exclusively to help Pella remain in power As Acting Secretary Smith put it at one point, most of the suggestions coming from Belgrade could not be accepted because they "would render the plan unworkable in Italy." He did not seem to realize that the reverse might also be true. Thus, if "in deference to the recommendation of the embassies in Belgrade" the State Department agreed to omit any reference to "equalization" in its approach to Tito, it refused categorically to state publicly that the solution was considered final because, as Dulles himself explained, such a statement would make the U.S. "run the very serious risk of losing Italy." It also put pressure on the British for an early closure, so that the plan might "serve its purpose of achieving the Trieste solution in time to prevent the fall of the center government in Italy." On the subject of the entry of Italian troops, the State Department had to defer to the military, which stood by its recommendation that it be postponed until after completion of Allied military evacuation.

On September 30, the British Foreign Office sent the Director of its Western and Southern departments, N.J.A. Cheetham, to Washington to work out the final details. The British insisted that, unless Allied private assurances to Tito concerning the final character of the solution were strengthened, the chances of obtaining Tito's acquiescence were too slim to justify the risk of proceeding with the plan. The Americans, on the contrary, were enveloped in a comfortable feeling of

self-confidence. They believed that "both sides [could] be guided into annexation" and that even if this would prove impossible the plan would still be a step forward As Smith again put it: "If we end up with Italy and Yugoslavia in occupation of Zone A and B respectively, on a temporary basis, we will be better off than at present." From the American point of view, in other words, the worst alternative was to remain in the current impasse. This, in fact, might oblige the U.S. "to choose definitively between permanently alienating from Western defense either Yugoslavia or Italy." [63] Thus, it was only in order to hasten the implementation of the plan that the State Department agreed to some changes in the wording of the approach to Tito. [64] The possibility that Tito might not accept the Allied decision meekly and that, consequently, one might have to either confront him to effect the transfer or abandon the idea--in other words, the possibility that the plan might worsen rather than improve the situation--continued to be ignored.

This faulty appraisal of consequences and the consequent lack of contingency planning are all the more surprising given the fact that the Allies were certainly solicited to think in this direction. Durbrow, for instance, was clearly thinking of the need for contingency planning when he remarked in a telegram on September 18 that once the decision to return Zone A to Italy had been announced, the Allied governments had to "go through with it regardless of Tito's rejections" (probably a misprint for 'reactions'). Even more to the point was a question raised by Higgs on the same day:

> For planning purposes we desire [to] know what reply to make should [the] commander [of the] Yugo[slav] troops claim [the] right under [the] peace treaty to bring his troops into Zone A to assist U.K. and U.S. troops to maintain [the] integrity [of the] zone or to do it alone if we should say we do not oppose [the] entry [of] Italian troops, basing his claim on [the] point [that] he is as much responsible under [the peace] treaty for [the] integrity [of] Zone A as of Zone B.

The answer was that should such a situation arise, "Winterton should take [the] line [that] any such proposal would have to be submitted [to the] U S -U.K governments through direct diplomatic channels." This was perhaps a satisfactory answer to Higgs' inquiry but did not

certainly represent an adequate way of dealing with the question he had raised. Wallner had gone even further, calling into question the very idea that a solution could emerge from imposing partition In February, for instance, following a speech by Koča Popović in which the Yugoslav Foreign Minister had referred to partition as a solution acceptable to Yugoslavia "provided it was not imposed from abroad but formed part of [a] mutually agreed Italo-Yugoslav settlement," he had pointed out that such a qualification undoubtedly aimed at "heading off what [Popović] guessed (or knew) to be Eden's proposal." The report ended with a terse analysis:

> The Yugoslavs cannot or will not accept concessions on [a] national problem like Trieste imposed from abroad at a time when they are drawing closer to [the] West. This would be contrary [to the] ultranationalistic tendencies [of] this young nation as a whole and within [the] regime [it] would be resented by doctrinaire commies as paying too great [a] national price to enter [the] bourgeois club Consequently, they require that the Yugo[slav]-Ital[ian] settlement appear as [a] freely negotiated understanding between two sovereign nations with concessions being freely consented [to] in [the] interests [of] collective security against [the] Soviet threat and not imposed on them by [the] West

On September 14 Wallner had reiterated this point backing it up this time with some passages from a speech Tito had made in Split two days earlier. The Marshal had first said that Yugoslavia did not demand support but only impartiality from the Allies Consequently, he hoped that "they [would] not again make some unilateral conclusion and agreements without [her] knowledge and against [her] will " He had then delivered a clear warning concerning Zone A· "I must declare that Yugoslavia will consider Italy's entry into Zone A as an act of aggression against which Yugoslavia will be compelled to take steps." Such a statement represented, Wallner wrote, a public commitment to oppose forcibly the Italian occupation of Zone A even if it was the result of an Allied decision Hence, Wallner concluded, Tito was not likely to accept the Allied plan because to acquiesce would mean to lose face, internally and internationally [65]

As press rumors about the Allied plan increased, the Yugoslavs also started to send clear signals of disapproval On September 17, a long editorial in Borba, significantly titled "Message to the Western

Powers," indicated that the solution rumored to be in the making at the State Department was yet another example of the anti-Yugoslav and pro-Italian policy the Allies had conducted with respect to Trieste ever since the war and that, as such, it would be "unacceptable." On September 21, Bebler presented the three Allied representatives in Belgrade a note of protest containing "recriminations" similar to those expressed in the Borba editorial although conveyed in a more detailed manner and in stronger language. On September 26, in an interview to the French weekly L'Express, Vice-President Edvard Kardely said that he feared that the Allies would yield to Italian pressures for the transfer of Zone A. He added that the Yugoslav government would never recognize such a unilateral decision and "adopt all necessary measures to prevent such a situation from occurring." On October 4, in a speech at Kočevje, he warned that no solution could be reached behind the back of the Yugoslavs because nobody had "the means to force Yugoslavia to accept a diktat." The same concept was reiterated in another Borba editorial on the very eve of the Allied declaration. [66]

Besides issuing warnings against another unilateral Allied decision, the Yugoslavs also provided suggestions for alternative courses of action. Thus they indicated that Yugoslavia would agree to attend a conference on condition, however, that other countries with political or economic interests in the FTT also be invited (Austria, Greece and Turkey were mentioned) and that its agenda not be narrowly defined and predetermined (i.e., restricted to the organization of the rules of the plebiscite, as suggested by the Italians) but be left open to any proposal advanced by the participants. Although on September 28 they formally rejected Pella's proposal for a a plebiscite, they made an effort to transform such a refusal into the beginning of an honest and constructive dialogue. In his speech at Kočevje, Kardelj explained, for instance, that the plebiscite created more problems than it solved. If it were to take place on the whole FTT, as the Italians had suggested, then Trieste would decide for everybody--since the city had almost 300,000 inhabitants while the rest of the territory had fewer than

90,000. If it was held in each different township, the result would be a variegated picture which would make it impossible to draw a frontier line. If the choice also included internationalization, such an option would most likely come out victorious This and the economic needs of the FTT were, according to Kardelj, the reasons why his government preferred to find an agreement with the Italians directly He recognized that the latest events had created a situation in which direct negotiations were more difficult than ever before "Yet," he concluded, "it is not too late." [67]

Even if clearly registered, all these signals did not lead the Anglo-Americans to reevaluate their plan. Once committed to it they hardly paid any attention to anything except working out their differences. [68] Even worse, at the very end, a change was agreed upon which ran precisely counter to Wallner's warnings and Yugoslav signals. On October 5, in fact, the British requested that the plan be implemented without prior consultation with Tito or Pella The preliminary approach to the two leaders, in other words, would no longer aim at obtaining their guarantee or assurances of compliance but would simply inform them of the decision. Eden's return to the helm of the Foreign Office after a period of convalescence and his deep-seated, albeit mistaken conviction, matured during his September 1952 trip to Yugoslavia, that partition had to be imposed, were the reason for this last minute request. The change effectively eliminated from the plan the only aspect that arguably could have distinguished it from a diktat. [69]

Eden's request nevertheless received Dulles' "wholehearted concurrence." Psychologically, in fact, it relieved him of the need to worry about what to do if Tito reacted negatively to the preliminary approach. Until then this troubling eventuality had been assuaged by the reassuring conviction that Tito could be made to fall into line Now, it was completely exorcised by changing the stated aim of the approach: Tito would not be asked, he would simply be told. As the State Department significantly explained in its instructions to Wallner,

the alteration was meant "to eliminate the possibility of being put in a position where the plan [could] be thwarted by either Yugoslavia or Italy." The decision had "stem[med] from the conclusion that a decisive action [was] important", therefore, "once embarked upon, the plan [had] to be carried through." [70] The problem, however, remained. The fact that the Allies would not solicit a reaction from Tito obviously did not mean that he would not have one. Indeed, it increased the chances that it would be both negative and virulent.

Italian pressures

From September 13 until October 8 all Italian diplomatic activity concentrated first on pressuring the Allies to implement the "provisional solution" and then, once it became apparent that this plan was indeed under study in Washington, on ensuring that all its details conformed to Pella's political needs. The Americans, and Luce in particular, were the main target. Italian decision-makers, in fact, continued to doubt that the State Department had converted fully to the merits of the "provisional." Luce, on the other hand, was considered, in the words of Benvenuti, "to be won over to [the Italian cause] completely" and, even more important, to be willing "to do everything possible to defend it in Washington." Pressure on the British and the French was not as intense or assiduous. The former were, in fact, known to support the "provisional; as for the latter, the Italians soon realized that this time they had been left out of the inner sanctum. Neither, moreover, was likely to respond too kindly to pressures--their attitude being, in the words of Quaroni, increasingly one of "annoyed understanding." [71]

Soon after Pella announced the proposal for a plebiscite and a five-power conference to organize it, Italian decision-makers started to

doubt the outcome of this tactical maneuver. As Zoppi put it in a September 16 telegram to the embassies in London, Paris and Washington: "We must be careful that taking as a pretext our proposal ... one does not try, while forgetting the plebiscite, to maintain the idea of the conference and lay out for us some trap from which it would be difficult for us to disentangle." The Allies, therefore, were to be clearly told that the Italian government would not agree to a conference convened "to discuss solutions other than that of a plebiscite." [72] Although the true Italian objective was to reenter into possession of Zone A, a favorable Allied answer to the plebiscite proposal was considered necessary to help Pella face the parliamentary review of foreign policy which was to precede the vote on the Foreign Ministry budget scheduled for October 5. Zoppi therefore instructed the diplomatic representatives in the Allied capitals to exert pressure in this sense also. Luciolli was requested to try to mobilize American public opinion, as well. [73] The Allies, however, had already decided that the best course of action on Pella's proposal was to ignore it As Lord Salisbury briskly told Brosio, who had gone to solicit a positive answer, the Allies were studying a different course of action and expected the Italians not to insist on requests "which one could not convince Tito to accept and only put [their] governments in conditions of extreme difficulty." [74]

The painting of the usual apocalyptic scenarios as well as a careful mixture of promises and threats continued to characterize Italian pressures on the Americans. In two meetings with Byington on the 17th and Smith on the 22nd, Tarchiani argued that Italy was at a crucial turning point. If the Allies could not adhere to the plebiscite proposal they had better come up with some other plan or all hopes for the survival of a center government would have to be abandoned The fall of Pella would, in fact, lead to a government including Socialist Party Leader Nenni, who "would have [Communist Party Secretary] Togliatti under his desk"--thus spelling "the end of all the pro-Western policies which had been carried out under De Gasperi." If instead the

Trieste issue could be resolved, Tarchiani said--attributing to that city almost thaumaturgic powers--it would be possible to hold new elections in which the center forces would fare better. A stronger center in a new Parliament could, in turn, "pave the way for a much needed reform of the proportional system of voting thus assuring a stable government for the future." [75] On the 23rd, Pella told Luce that he wanted to take action on all matters relating to European political and military integration but feared "the stumbling block of Trieste." The previous day, in a speech given at Villa Aldobrandini in Rome at the opening of a conference of the deputy foreign ministers of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), he had emphasized the "sincerely European spirit" of Italian foreign policy--warning, however, that such a spirit could remain dormant unless the Trieste problem was solved soon. "I hope," he said to the delegates, "that the work you are about to undertake ... finds the road completely free of problems which, because of their delicate nature, could delay the speedy realization of the goal to which we all aspire." On October 1, in an interview with Relman Morin of the Associated Press, he changed the expression of this linkage from negative to positive and affirmed that "the ratification of the EDC treaty [would] be greatly facilitated by a previous solution of the Trieste problem." [76] American embassy officials who worried about reduced Italian defense expenditures and the yet unsolved question of the concession of military facilities were reassured that such problems could be easily solved as soon as Zone A was returned to Italy. Meanwhile, however, discussions were bogged down in details and a rumor was spread that the Italian ambassador to Moscow had been instructed to seek public Soviet adherence to the tripartite declaration in return for which Italy would refuse to ratify the EDC treaty and take a passive attitude toward her NATO commitments. [77]

As the parliamentary debate on foreign policy approached, Italian officials started to manifest some impatience with what looked to them like Allied temporization. While blaming the British for the delay in implementing the plan, which Luce had maintained to be "on the verge of"

unveiling on September 12, they started to request from the Americans some precise indication of "what was boiling in the pot." Pella's position, they argued, was becoming more difficult by the day. He needed at least to be made privy to the details of the plan if he was to rebutt accusations of "helplessness ... in [the] face of Allied lethargy, disinterest, disunity or preference for Tito" and chart a safe course for his government in the forthcoming parliamentary debate. [78] Another motive for this request was that Italian decision-makers still did not trust the plan to involve the pure and simple "provisional" transfer of Zone A to Italy. Since details of the plan, notwithstanding Luce's intercession with the State Department, were not forthcoming, they immediately changed their tactic and started to indicate to the Americans the main features they wished the plan to have or not to have. On September 23 Luciolli reminded Byington that if the plan aimed to return only Zone A to Italy it had to be presented publicly as "provisional," even if the Italian government realized that "such a solution would almost certainly last until the next war." In another meeting on October 2 he added that the "Italian government would deeply resent any requirement [to] ... give guarantees regarding minorities in Zone A." At the same time Luce was asked to reveal the precise content of the plan to Pella at least twenty-four hours before Tito because unlike a dictatorial regime, in a democracy time was needed to sell the plan to the different party leaders and organize a favorable public reaction. [79] Finally, on October 5, upon instructions from Pella, Tarchiani gave the State Department a detailed outline which he said was meant "to facilitate the study of an initiative which could eliminate the present state of tension, consolidate the support given by Italian public opinion to the new government and restore the confidence of the Italian people in the solidarity of the democratic nations." The outline specified that:

a) the transfer of the administration of Zone A besides being "provisional," was not to be accompanied by conditions or limitations which could weaken Italian bargaining position in the

event of future direct negotiations;

b) the Allies should publicly state that they would not recognize the unilateral annexation of Zone B by Yugoslavia;

c) any statement apt to lead to an interpretation of the transfer as a repudiation of the tripartite declaration was to be avoided.

If the plan met all these "legitimate expectations" the Italian government would accept it and pledge to work toward a speedy normalization of its relations with Yugoslavia. The same points were reiterated by Pella personally to Luce in a meeting on the morning of October 7. [80]

These actions at the diplomatic level were complemented by pressures exercised through the press. At the beginning of October Italian newspapers started to reveal details of the Allied plan. This was, as also recognized by Luce, the result of a campaign orchestrated by the Foreign Ministry both to prepare Italian public opinion for the forthcoming announcement and pressure the Allies to include in the plan those features which Italian decision-makers considered indispensable. The alleged details of the plan printed in the press strongly resembled, in fact, the outline submitted by Tarchiani to the State Department--thus suggesting a purposeful leak. It was as if Italian decision-makers were trying to take by themselves, publicly and in advance, what they feared the Allies might not be ready to concede. [81]

On October 5, meanwhile, the Chamber of Deputies had concluded its review of foreign policy. Contrary to the predictions of Italian officials, Pella had not encountered major difficulties and the Foreign Ministry budget had been approved with a comfortable majority. [82]

The October 8 declaration

The plan agreed upon by the Anglo-Americans provided for the British and American diplomatic representatives in Rome and Belgrade to meet with the two premiers at the same time on the morning of October 8.[83] They would first read them the text of the public declaration, which was to be released to the press later the same day, then follow up with a set of separate secret instructions. In compliance with Italian requests, however, Durbrow gave Casardi a preview of the public declaration and the secret annex the evening before.[84] Luce and Victor Mallet met with Pella, Zoppi and Casardi at 9:15 on the morning of October 8. Mallet first read the text of the public declaration. After briefly recalling the history of the FTT problem and Allied efforts to promote a settlement between the two contending countries, the declaration pointed out that the British and American governments were "no longer prepared to maintain responsibility for the administration of Zone A" and had "therefore decided to terminate AMG, to withdraw their troops, and having in mind the predominantly Italian character of Zone A, to relinquish [its] administration ... to the Italian government." It then expressed the hope that such a solution would "provide the basis for friendly and fruitful cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia" and concluded that the decision would be carried out "at the earliest practicable date." The secret instructions contained an invitation to the Italian government "to give public assurances regarding minorities and civil rights in Zone A" and made it clear that although "in taking such a step both governments [were] aware that it constitute[d] a de facto settlement ... it [was] their intention that this de facto settlement [would] actually become final." Hence, "should either ... government later wish to initiate bilateral negotiations with a view to the modification of boundaries the U.S. and U.K governents would not intervene on behalf of either party."[85]

Pella stressed the importance of the Allies not giving publicly the impression that they regarded the plan as final He said he would present it to Parliament as a step toward the implementation of the tripartite declaration which would remain 'the constant point of

reference for the Italian government." These remarks prompted Mallet to re-read twice the passage in the secret instructions which revealed that, for the Allies at least, the solution was final. Luce hurried to point out that the Italian government was not requested, however, "to adhere formally to this interpretation." She further specified that the turning over of Zone A to Italy was the "final action" undertaken by the Allied governments with regard to Trieste, but not necessarily the "final solution" to that problem. Pella reiterated that as Prime Minister it was impossible for him to regard the solution as final. He would consult with his cabinet regarding the acceptability of the plan and give an answer soon afterwards. The discussion was held in what Luce defined as "a calm, friendly but not a jubilant atmosphere." Her impression was that Pella would be able to accept the plan provided that the British would "not continue to overemphasize either privately or publicly the final nature of the solution." The main danger for her remained the possibility that Tito would immediately annex Zone B and claim to be acting upon the suggestion of the Allies. [86]

At the same time in Belgrade Wallner and Ivo Mallet were meeting with Tito and Bebler. Tito listened calmly to the presentation and then said he would give an answer the following day after he had consulted his government. He anticipated, however, that the solution the two diplomats had unveiled would not lead to the desired ends. Since it encouraged Italian ambitions for more Yugoslav territory it could not possibly be accepted by the Yugoslav people. The two diplomats hurried to stress that the solution should be considered permanent and that the Allies had no intention of supporting further Italian territorial claims. Tito rejoined that while he accepted Allied intentions he doubted their ability to carry them through. He suggested that the two governments might care to delay releasing their public communiqué until he had given the Yugoslav government's official answer. The Allies, however, released the text of the public declaration as scheduled, at 4:00 p.m. that afternoon. [87]

Although yet without an official answer, later that same day the

American embassy in Belgrade was able to surmise that things were not proceeding according to plan. Yugoslav radio broadcasts that afternoon included a summary of a press conference in which Bebler had reported Tito's comments to the two ambassadors and Kardelj had added that the Yugoslav government could "not at all agree with such a unilateral act" and would "undertake all measures at its disposal within the framework of the UN to protect the interests of the Yugoslav people in Zone A." A protest note to the U.S. and the U.K. was announced for delivery the following day. Demonstrations, moreover, took place before the American and British embassies and the Italian legation. Stones were thrown and windows broken. [88] State Department officials, however, continued to believe that Tito might annex Zone B and to worry, like Luce, about Pella's future. They instructed Wallner to react to any statement Tito might make regarding annexation by signalling "acquiescence by silence" so as "to avoid Tito being in a position to make a statement that he annexe[d] with U.S.-U.K. consent." [89]

In Rome, meanwhile, Pella appeared to have some reservations about the Allied plan. He feared that, if not well-managed publicly, its acceptance could cause his downfall. Zoppi and other Foreign Ministry officials reassured him. Upon instruction from Paris, Fouques Duparc also urged him to accept the plan. He said it was an important step forward for Italy and counselled Pella to use caution in his public declarations, avoiding in particular any reference to the tripartite declaration. [90] After two meetings on the evening of October 8 and the morning of October 9 the Italian Council of Ministers unanimously decided to accept the Allied plan (decision 12). Luciolli was instructed to reiterate to the State Department that the overriding consideration for the Italian government was that the U.S. make, for the time being, no public statement indicating that the hand-over of Zone A represented a final solution or that the tripartite declaration had been repudiated. The Italian government had to be given time "to sell this arrangement to the Italian people on a provisional basis." Pella, for his part, contrary to the recommendations of Mallet and Fouques Duparc,

both in the press communiqué released after the Cabinet meeting and in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies, emphasized that "the Allied decision far from being in contradiction with the tripartite declaration [was] rather inspired by, and linked to it." The Allies had simply handed over that part of the FTT of which they could effectively dispose and "accepting the administration of Zone A [did] not imply on the part of Italy any abandonment of her claims relative to Zone B." [91] All of these affirmations were played up by the press, thus indirectly lending support to the image of a revanchist Italy propagated by the Yugoslavs. If pro-government Il Messaggero, in fact, after pointing out that "the Atlantic alliance [was beginning] to bear fruit," limited itself to writing that with Italy in Trieste, "the brothers in Zone B [could] rekindle their hopes" because "Italy [would] never waver from her firm request for a plebiscite in both zones," righ-wing Il Secolo carried the more ominous headline: "Italy in Trieste with eyes on Istria." [92]

Pella, Zoppi and Casardi gave Mallet and Luce an official oral answer on the evening of October 10 during a meeting characterized, according to Luce, by an "atmosphere of great cordiality." Pella was very pleased because he had full parliamentary support behind him. Mallet referred to the tension and the disorders in Yugoslavia resulting from the announcement of the decision and renewed his invitation to Pella to exercise restraint in his official pronouncements. Pella said he was conscious of the need to avoid giving the impression that "Italy was gloating" but added that while his government was "realistic about the problem" it nevertheless "constantly required public support." The most important thing for him was to move on with the business of the transfer of the administration. He handed the two diplomats what Luce defined as "an unofficial piece of paper." It requested that "the withdrawal of the [Anglo-American] troops and the transfer of the administrative powers take place in the shortest possible time." Because of the news coming from Yugoslavia, Pella obviously feared that unless the transfer was carried out immediately it might run the risk of becoming another empty promise, as the tripartite declaration had before

it. The Council of Ministers had already entrusted Minister without portfolio Scoca with the task of studying and preparing the provisions necessary to take over the civil administration of Zone A. Now, Pella suggested the establishment in Rome of a "mixed commission" to work out the details of the transfer. The meeting closed with one last appeal from Pella to the British and American governments to influence the press in their respective countries "to refrain from any statements, stories or speculations which might disturb the present excellent state of Italian public opinion." Mallet and Luce replied, as if giving him a lecture on democratic theory, that "there was nothing the two governments could officially do about the press which was free in both countries." [93]

Crisis Components

The ICB model defines an "international crisis" as a situational change in the relations between two or more states. Such a change, characterized by an increase in the intensity of conflictual interactions, is set in motion by an event (or set of events) in the external (or internal) environment: the trigger. It is responsible for the first of the three perceptual changes among a state's decision-makers, namely the increase in their perception of threat to basic values, which marks the beginning of the pre-crisis period of a "foreign policy crisis." The latter then enters its central phase with the appearance of the other two perceptual variables: the probability of involvement in military hostilities and a finite time for decisional response. These perceptual changes lead to stress--which, in turn, is supposed to affect the state's coping mechanisms

The trigger for the onset of the pre-crisis period for Italy in the 1953 Trieste case was, following the ICB typology, a "directed external hostile act" of the "verbal" type. More specifically, it was the receipt by the Foreign Ministry of the UP wire speculating on Yugoslavia's intention to annex Zone B. It should be pointed out, however, that the Yugopress release, while perceived as "directed" and "hostile" by Italian decision-makers, was not intended to be so by the Yugoslav ones. The Italians simply assumed that, since the press in Yugoslavia was state-controlled, the Yugopress release must obviously be a carefully calculated move on the part of the Yugoslav government. In reality, Yugoslav decision-makers played no direct role in this critical event. First of all, Yugopress was not state-owned or controlled, as Tanjug was, but was a cooperative organized by the Yugoslav Journalists' Association Its prime function, moreover, was, in the words of a Western analyst, "to balance Tanjug's strictly official reporting." [94] Second, the Yugopress story had undergone two translations which, unbeknownst to the Italians, had slightly but dramatically modified its content. Originally, it was but a brief commentary on the official Yugoslav reaction to the speech Pella had given to Parliament on August 19. The text, in the English translation distributed to foreign correspondents in Belgrade late in the afternoon of August 28, ran as follows:

> According to Yugopress information the last speech of the new Italian Premier, Mr. Pella, was accepted in Belgrade political circles as a proof that the appeasing and lenient attitude of Yugoslavia in regard to the non-constructive attitude of Rome, cannot lead to a settlement of the Trieste problem. The Trieste problem, stress the above mentioned circles, is a result of expansionist tendencies of Italy and of yielding to those tendencies by the big powers which have shown themselves ready to sacrifice the vital interests of Yugoslavia in this problem. This new proof of an unchanged, negative attitude of Italy towards the settlement of the Trieste problem, expressed in the speech of the Italian Premier, utterly convinced many personalities in Belgrade that a serious reconsideration of the Yugoslav attitude towards the Trieste problem was necessary. It is generally believed that this reconsideration will give the results which are imposed by the circumstances created in the Trieste problem, as well as by those created by the procedure of a cold annexation of Trieste by Italy.

Helen Fisher, the UP correspondent, had noticed the story earlier in the Yugopress Serbian daily news file. She attempted to obtain a clarification on the nature of the "serious reconsiderations of the Yugoslav attitude" from Bebler but was told that he had left to join Tito in Brioni. Subsequent attempts to contact some other high officials at the Foreign Ministry were of no avail. Because, in the past, Yugopress had always refused to elaborate on stories concerning government policies, she decided against requesting a clarification directly from the agency and went on to interpret the story herself Thus, she wrote that "Yugoslavia [had] lost patience with Italy on the Trieste question and [was] considering changing her moderate and tolerant attitude [her own translation from Serbian of what the agency later rendered in English as "appeasing and lenient"], perhaps by annexing Zone B in reply to Italy's cold annexation of Zone A " She then quoted the text of the Yugopress story, reviewed previous Yugoslav claims and offers on Trieste and concluded that, although Yugoslav officials were not available for comment, Bebler's sudden departure for Brioni could be taken as confirmation that Yugoslavia's policy toward Trieste was being discussed with Tito. The story was then telephoned to the UP bureau in Frankfurt and from there relayed to the UP bureau in Milan for translation and distribution to the Italian press. Apparently, the translator did not recognize that the "perhaps" in the lead sentence was Fisher's own speculation and regarded the sentence, in its entirety, as part of the Yugopress release. [95]

Ignoring that the possible annexation of Zone B was a speculation added by the UP correspondent and not part of the original Yugopress release, the UP story did indeed trigger an increase in threat perception on the part of Italian decision-makers, although its level does not appear to have been very high. As Tarchiani would later recall in his memoir: "We immediately realized that the Yugoslav threat--coming out of the blue sky, without our slightest provocation--was extremely grave, but we sincerely hoped that it was not after all a very serious thing, as had often been the case in similar

circumstances in the past." Although the ICB model does not posit an increase in time pressure until the onset of the crisis period, it would appear that Italian decision-makers perceived time constraints already in this phase. Taviani's journal entries for the first two weeks in September contain, in fact, many remarks to the effect that time was running out and that, unless Italy regained control of Zone A soon, Trieste also would be lost forever. [96] The reasons why these data do not fit easily into the ICB model as it now stands will be explored in the concluding chapter.

Findings

The coping mechanisms adopted by Italian decision-makers during the pre-crisis period will now be explored. Differences from the previous (prelude to crisis) period will be identified and explained.

Information

Apart from a reexamination of old intelligence estimates of Yugoslav intentions, the UP wire did not lead to any of the activities which could be regarded as logical manifestations of an increase in the felt need for information (i.e., the opening of new channels and a deeper probe of existing ones). The search for new information continued to be conducted through ordinary diplomatic channels and limited to Allied sources. Italian decision-makers did not request

additional information concerning Yugoslav intentions, in general (and the Yugopress story in particular), from the Italian legation in Belgrade. Nor was any attempt made to obtain an explanation from the Yugoslav legation in Rome.

Also during the rest of the pre-crisis period, the search for information continued to be conducted through ordinary diplomatic channels. In order of importance, Washington, London and Paris were the capitals in which it was concentrated. Searching in Belgrade and Trieste became even more marginal than it had been until then The objective pursued by Italian decision-makers during this period (reacquisition of Zone A) required them, in fact, to focus their attention on the Allies. Pella communicated directly (or through his personal secretary) with the Allied diplomatic representatives in Rome more often than De Gasperi had ever done--at least with respect to the Trieste question. This, however, does not indicate an attempt on the part of the Prime/Foreign Minister to establish direct or alternative channels of information. The purpose of these meetings was not to collect additional information but to take action based on information already collected and processed at the Foreign Ministry

The Office of the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry continued to function as the main information processing center The same types of prejudices prevailing during the prelude to crisis period (distrust of Yugoslavia and the belief that the key to the best solution was in the hands of the Allies) continued to mar, on occasion, the interpretation of information. Thus, while at the Defense Ministry the UP wire was not deemed worthy of the Minister's immediate attention, at the Foreign Ministry it produced immediate apprehension At the Defense Ministry, in fact, Trieste was not an issue and Yugoslavia was perceived, militarily at least, as well on her way to becoming a full-fledged ally. Moreover, an invitation to attend her forthcoming maneuvers had just been received and accepted At the Foreign Ministry, instead, Trieste was the dominant problem and there was a deep-seated distrust of Yugoslavia. [97] Luciolli reported to Rome after his August

29 meeting with Merchant that the U.S. had been impressed by Pella's reactions and had finally realized the mistake of their attitude toward Yugoslavia. As he put it: "For the first time the seriousness of the consequences of American weakness toward Yugoslavia is precisely gauged here in Washington by the type of measures which the Italian government would adopt in the deprecable case of additional arbitrary acts on the part of Yugoslavia." This is undoubtedly what decision-makers in Rome wanted to hear, but does not seem to be an accurate interpretation of the conversation which took place. The minutes of the meeting, in fact, do not contain any comment by Merchant which could be, even remotely, construed to this effect. [98] Reports which cast doubt on the wisdom of the chosen course of action and indicated the need for a revision of strategy received little or no attention. Thus, Vanni D'Archirafi's warnings that the Italians "would not be able to have the Allies simply hand them over Zone A because the Yugoslavs were against dealings of Great Powers behind her back" and that the "provisional solution" was achievable but "had, of necessity, to be the result of a direct agreement with Yugoslavia" were ignored, as those of Enrico Martino before him had been. Also unheeded were the two telegrams sent on October 2 and 3 in which Vanni D'Archirafi reported that, if the Allies were to turn Zone A over to Italy, all of his Western colleagues in Belgrade expected a "violent" reaction from Yugoslavia, possibly "the massing of troops at the Italian frontier." [99]

With respect to the narrower objective Italian decision-makers had set for themselves (i.e. to convince the Allies to hand over Zone A), the search for information was thorough and its interpretation almost completely free of biases. Although deprived of their best source of information on Allied thinking and activity, since the French had been left out of the Allied planning process this time, Italian decision-makers were nevertheless able to obtain sufficient information and to interpret it accurately. By the end of September, in fact, they had a rather precise picture of the Allied plan, which was supposed to be top secret One may conclude, therefore, that inside the limits of

the decision-makers' own personal and political prejudices and within the boundaries set by the objective they were pursuing at the time, the advent of the pre-crisis period (and the consequent moderate increase in stress) did not impair, in any drastic or fundamental way, the receptivity of the information processing group.

Consultation

A brief consultation with President Einaudi preceded decision 9. Although new, the inclusion of the President in the consultative circle must not be regarded as extraordinary. The government is, in fact, under obligation to keep the President of the Republic "continually and constantly" informed on affairs of state--and foreign affairs, in particular. The President has a high-ranking career diplomat attached to his office as diplomatic counselor, receives a copy of all incoming and outgoing diplomatic reports and has "power of consultative intervention." Since decision 9 was perceived as very important and involved the movement of troops (the President is also Chief of the Armed Forces), consultation with Einaudi should be regarded as normal. Pella also had a one hour meeting with Einaudi on October 2. The meeting was reported by Corriere della Sera to be related to a "proposal for the resolution of the Trieste problem which the U.S. was to advance shortly." Most likely Pella gave Einaudi a summary of the most recent developments and consulted with him on the features of the plan he was about to request Tarchiani to give to the State Department Consultation with De Gasperi and Tarchiani before decision 9 must have been accidental, since they just happened to be visiting Einaudi when the phone call from Rome arrived. [100] According to Mario Toscano, then head of research services at the Foreign Ministry, no action with respect to Trieste was taken during the tenure of the Pella government

without De Gasperi's "knowledge" and "direct or indirect approval." [101] This claim is probably exaggerated, however, as indicated by a letter De Gasperi wrote to Pella around the middle of September revealing that the former Prime Minister had serious reservations about the course of action undertaken by his successor. De Gasperi was certainly contacted before the formal acceptance of the October 8 decision (De Castro reports overhearing someone at the Ministry saying that "the old man agreed"), but this was more a notification that the objective he himself had approved on June 17 had been reached than a consultation. [102]

The consultative role played by the ambassadors in the Allied capitals which had been significant in the past declined markedly. They were never recalled to Rome for the purpose of consultation, for instance, and their opinions, although at times offered (especially by Quaroni), were rarely, if ever, solicited. The pro-Italian leaders in Trieste continued to be not only excluded from the consultation process, but also misled (together with Parliament and the public at large) about the real state of affairs. They were actually regarded as an annoying pressure group asking for the impossible or the dangerous whose activities needed constant surveillance and had to be, if anything, kept in check. Italian decision-makers were, in fact, interested in Zone B only instrumentally: the October 8 decision had to be presented as "provisional" because the maintenance of a claim, however fictitious, to Zone B was perceived as indispensable for the survival of the government. Instead, the pro-Italian leaders in Trieste (especially those of Istrian origins) did not intend to abandon Zone B to Yugoslavia. For them, even a solution based on the peace treaty (i.e., some form of internationalization of the whole FTT) was preferable to partition. Upon learning that the Italian government had decided to pursue the "provisional," the pro-Italian parties in Trieste and the Committee for the National Liberation of Istria submitted to Pella, through De Castro, a memorandum which contained a proposal for a plebiscite Although, in his speech on the 13th, Pella maintained that the idea of a plebiscite had come "from the pressing appeal of the

inhabitants of the two zones," the Italian proposal had matured quite independently. The proposal formulated by the Triestine leaders took into consideration some of the objections Tito had raised a year earlier (which, as De Castro also recognizes, "were not unfounded") and thus would have made it more difficult for him to reject it again It suggested, for instance, that a plebiscite be held in each township and only persons born in the FTT before 1918 and their descendants be given the right to vote. The Italian proposal, instead, had, if anything, moved in the opposite direction. De Castro, moreover, reveals that he only forwarded the memorandum to Rome on the 11th. The idea of a plebiscite, however, must have been already under discussion at the Foreign Ministry, since Casardi apparently remitted to Zoppi that same day a report on the previous proposals for a plebiscite. Such a report must obviously have been requested by Zoppi some time earlier. Notwithstanding Pella's affirmations then, the Italian proposal for a plebiscite was not advanced as a result of consultations with, or even pressures from, the pro-Italian leaders in Trieste. It would seem instead that the idea came from Luciolli. In a report which reached the Ministry on the 10th, he argued that the Italian diplomatic offensive was yielding good results, as both Tito and the Allies had undoubtedly realized that the Italians this time meant business. To convince the latter to hand over Zone A, however, he thought that a tactical proposal, such as a plebiscite, was needed which, once refused by Tito, would push the Allies to implement the "provisional." During the debate in the Chamber of Deputies before the vote on the Foreign Ministry budget, Pella said that he was ready to accept a plebiscite restricting the vote to persons born in the FTT before 1918 This, however, did not indicate a belated acceptance of the opinion of the pro-Italian leaders in Trieste nor a yielding to their pressures. Pella simply felt the need to present another tactical proposal which could "tide him over" domestically until the Allies unveiled their plan [103]

On September 18 Pella sent the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, Giuseppe Bartole, a native of

Istria, to Trieste for the purpose of winning over the pro-Italian parties to the idea of partition as the only solution ultimately possible. Bartole's mission, however, only succeeded in throwing pro-Italian leaders into a state of turmoil. Their opposition to partition was so strong that some of them even threatened to organize a popular resistance to the entry of Italian troops into the Zone. A delegation was sent to Rome to confer with Pella on October 1. The Prime Minister confessed that a proposal for giving the administration of Zone A to Italy was indeed under study in the Allied capitals but gave his assurances that his own decision would be made only after consultation with local leaders. Mayor Bartoli and the secretary of the local Christian Democratic party, Redento Romano, were indeed called to Palazzo Chigi (as was De Castro) the day before the Allied declaration was made public. The aim of the meeting, however, was not to consult but to sell them the Allied plan in advance in order to avoid negative reactions in Trieste, which would have been very embarassing for the government. Italian decision-makers knew, in fact, that even the pro-Italian population in Trieste was seriously concerned about the economic future of the city once it was returned to Italy. Romano and Bartoli, both skilled politicians, resigned to the inevitable and did their utmost to rally the Triestines around the government choice. Not so the Istrian leaders, who urged Pella to reject the Allied plan and take the plebiscite proposal to the UN. In protest, De Castro handed his resignation directly to Pella on the evening of the 9th. Other Istrian leaders eventually convinced him to stay on. [104]

In conclusion, there were very few consultative group meetings during this period. They were, moreover, informal (Zoppi, for instance, often consulted by telephone with Taviani) and composed almost exclusively of the same people who made the decisions. This seems to be due to the fact that, having decided the question of which objective to pursue at the end of the prelude to crisis period, all activity was now concentrated on the attainment of the objective itself. Almost all of it, moreover, consisted of exercising pressure on the Allies. There

were, in other words, many implementing decisions, a few tactical ones (9, 10 and 11) and no strategic ones (decision 12 was strategic but not new; it merely confirmed the choice made with decision 8). Under these conditions there was less scope or reason for consultation

Decisional Fora

Two noticeable changes took place during the pre-crisis period, as compared to the prelude to crisis, in the type of decisional fora and the authority pattern within them. The first, and more important, concerned the diminution in the role played by the Prime/Foreign Minister. The second was the establishment of an ad hoc group which was responsible for decisions 9 and 10. Both changes, however, seem to be due exclusively to differences in personality and leadership style between De Gasperi and Pella. Pella, unlike De Gasperi, had no experience in foreign affairs, nor did he have a taste for them He had therefore to rely on the advice of the top officials at the Foreign Ministry more than his predecessor had. This, moreover, perfectly accorded with one of his personality traits. As Re has pointed out, Pella was full of consideration for the bureaucracy. To him, "a state functionary, whether an ambassador or a director general, deserved unconditional respect and had to be listened to as if he were always right." Necessity and predisposition thus combined to bring to the fore the roles of Zoppi and Del Balzo. [105]

Apparently the idea of military measures understood primarily as a mechanism to involve the Allies more directly and to sensitize them to the necessity of implementing the "provisional" was suggested by Del Balzo on the evening of the 28th and immediately embraced by Zoppi. Although Pella must have expressed some reservations about the repercussions of such a gesture on Tito (and, even more, the Allies),

for all practical purposes the decision could be said to have been made at this point The phone call to (Minister of Defense) Taviani and the inclusion of the Chief of Staff in the ad hoc group which officially made the decision points, in fact, to the existence of a parti pris. Marras, in particular, could have been called exclusively to help with the technical aspects of a decision which it was already known that the group would make. Indeed, no other alternative was discussed at the meeting. Zoppi opened with his suggestion, which Taviani supported fully (the two had worked together for over two years during Taviani's tenure as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and, as he himself mentions in his journal, had always been of one mind on what to do about Trieste). The rest of the time was spent dispelling Pella's lingering hesitancy (he had already gotten over most of his reservations during the brief meeting with Taviani) and, above all, overcoming Marras' surprisingly open reluctance. Pella was easily convinced by the argument that the measures would show the resolve of his government to both Tito and the Allies. He could not fail to realize, moreover, that a more assertive attitude vis-à-vis the Allies would please the right-wing parties upon whose support his government rested and, therefore, reinforce his position. Marras, for his part, resigned himself to giving the orders only when he was made to realize that he could easily be replaced. [106] The ad hoc group, from this perspective, could be considered almost a ratifying and implementing forum rather than a decisional one. As for authority patterns within it, Del Balzo conceived the option, Zoppi promoted it and Taviani's intervention was decisive in giving it political legitimacy and cutting short Marras' technical difficulties. Pella's role was limited almost to that of a concerned spectator. The same pattern characterized the making of decision 10, except that this time Pella's hesitancy and Marras' reluctance had diminished.

Although formally announced by Pella on September 13, the decision to propose a plebiscite was actually made on the 11th by Zoppi and Del Balzo, who were also responsible for writing Pella's speech. Pella

personally did not favor the idea lest the German speaking population of Alto Adige, or Austria on its behalf, might also request one Again, however, he bowed to the opinion of those he considered diplomatic professionals. [107] The role of the Cabinet continued to be limited to endorsing, periodically, decisions already made and implemented Thus, on September 17, it approved unanimously all actions on Trieste taken by the Prime Minister since the end of August It was formally responsible for making decision 12, as this was a choice which had to be made public. In reality, however, it was but a ratification of a decision already made by a reluctant Pella upon the strong advice of the top Foreign Ministry officials. Indeed, it is doubtful whether all Cabinet members were fully aware of the secret annex and its implications for the future of Zone B. It should be noted that Pella's apprehension about the impact of the plan's acceptance on his political future was such that at the end of the Cabinet meeting of October 8 he requested, contrary to custom, that minutes be drawn up and signed by all present. He felt reassured only on the morning of October 9, just before the second Cabinet meeting, when the directorate of his party gave the go-ahead by approving the Allied plan and congratulating him and his government for the success achieved. [108] To conclude, the beginning of the crisis marked the Prime/Foreign Minister's increased reliance on the advice of his closest collaborators, particularly the top Foreign Ministry officials. This, however, seems to be due to Pella's personality traits rather than the crisis situation.

Alternatives

Faced with American reluctance to implement the "provisional," Italian decision-makers seem to have perceived only two alternative courses of action. As concisely put by Tarchiani in his July 19 report

(partially quoted above), they were: "either to resign ... to the status quo while waiting for more or less distant or even remote or chimeric, events which [might] play in [Italy's] favor" or to recur to a "well-constructed and well-executed plan" capable of accelerating the speed of events. The first alternative, however, was mentioned only for rhetorical purposes. It is obvious that Italian decision-makers did not think they could wait any longer and perceived the seizure of a propitious occasion to obtain the implementation of the "provisional" as their only real choice. [109]

There was no search for alternatives to decision 9. Once the option was put forth, all attention focused on it. It was carefully evaluated and deemed to be worth the risks it involved. A careful evaluation of consequences also preceded decision 10. The choice was between revoking or maintaining the military measures of August 29 in the face of Allied timid and confidential requests for troop withdrawal or, at least, a public clarification as to their limited amplitude. A revocation of the measures (and/or the issuance of a clarification) had potentially adverse consequences, whereas their maintenance avoided such consequences without incurring further risks. As Del Balzo, Scola Camerini and Pella himself clearly (almost to the point of impudence) told Allied officials, Italy had never officially admitted to having taken any military measure. Hence, a public clarification was out of the question because it would be tantamount to an admission and thus constitute an important propaganda victory for Yugoslavia. A revocation, on the other hand, would engender violent attacks on the government by political extremists and cause its downfall. By diffusing tension, moreover, it risked taking Allied attention away from Trieste and thus causing the action under way for the reacquisition of Zone A to lose its momentum Since Tito had decided not to take any countermeasure, the rational choice was to keep the pressure on and leave troops where they were until the objective for which they had been moved in the first place had been achieved. Hence, Scola Camerini's communication to Luce, soon after Tito's speech at Okroglica, that Pella

would start to withdraw troops as soon as the Allies could assure him that a solution for Trieste was definitely in the making [110] It should be noted that Italian decision-makers also turned the tables by calculatedly informing the Allies in advance of their desire not to be asked officially for troop withdrawal. After that, in fact, an outright refusal of such an eventual request would be more of an embarassment to the Allies (for having made it) than to them (for refusing to comply with it). As an alternative to the tactical proposal of the plebiscite (decision 11) Zoppi considered, upon Luciolli's suggestion, the idea of resurrecting the "continuous ethnic line." The consideration that the plebiscite had a larger popular appeal and the fact that Tito could be counted on to reject it, thus minimizing the risk feared by Pella that Italy would have to face a similar request from the German speaking population of Alto Adige, led him to prefer it to the "continuous ethnic line." [111]

Decision 12 required no search for alternatives being a dichotomous choice between acceptance or refusal of the Allied plan Acceptance was a foregone conclusion, as the plan almost completely met all Italian requirements. Evaluation of consequences, in this case, had taken place when the objective of the reacquisition of Zone A had been selected the previous June. De Castro maintains that Italian decision-makers' only mistake was precisely their failure to evaluate correctly the political and psychological impact the Allied decision of handing over Zone A to Italy would have on the Yugoslavs. [112] Indeed, no revision of the evaluation of consequences was ever made, notwithstanding the reports of Vanni D'Archirafi mentioned above. Italian decision-makers focused primarily on domestic consequences and continued to believe, on the basis of Eden's assurances, that Tito's reaction would be limited to a strong protest. This, however, can hardly be regarded as a flaw in what was a very rational and, by and large, also analytic decision-making process. First of all, Vanni D'Archirafi's report put more emphasis on the difficulties Italian decision-makers were likely to encounter in convincing the Allies to

hand over Zone A than on certain Yugoslav opposition to it. He seemed to imply, therefore, that the Allies would not comply with the Italian request and not that the Yugoslavs would be able to halt the implementation of the decision. Read this way, the report seems less relevant and Zoppi more justified in paying little attention to it. The fact that the Allies might not comply with the Italian request, in fact, was per se certainly no reason not to try. Second, Vanni D'Archirafi's warnings about possible Yugoslav military reactions were not based on hard evidence; hence, they were really alternative estimates, rather than new information Seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that Eden's assurances, which were (or, at least, claimed to be) based on Tito's words, should have been given more weight than the estimates of Western diplomats in Belgrade. Besides, the question of whether Tito would limit himself to a diplomatic protest or resort to military measures could be considered, from an Italian point of view, if not irrelevant then certainly secondary. The decision to turn Zone A over to Italy was going to be made by the Allies; hence, Yugoslav reactions, whatever they might be, would be primarily directed at them. Even in case of a military reaction (a rather unlikely probability given that Tito appeared to depend in no small degree upon Western aid), Italy could take refuge behind the Allies. Her position would, in any case, be reinforced because her cause would now also become the Allied cause. As Yugoslav Vice-President Kardelj would later lament, "the October 8 decision converted a dispute localized in Yugoslav-Italian relations into one between Yugoslavia and the Western powers." Italian decision-makers thus thought that the business of estimating Yugoslav reactions could be left to the Allies and concentrated their own efforts on making sure that they would not be too easily deterred by Yugoslav signals. Following Tito's speech in Split on September 13, in which he warned that Yugoslavia would "consider Italy's entry into Zone A as an act of aggression against which Yugoslavia [would] be compelled to take steps," Zoppi immediately warned the ambassadors in the Allied capitals that Tito's speech was obviously "an effort to intimidate the Allies and

keep them from re-establishing parity" and exhorted them to make sure that the Allied "complex of inferiority toward Tito would not go so far as to let themselves be scared off." Luciolli explicitly exhorted State Department officials not to sound out the Yugoslavs before announcing the plan since this "would give [them] a chance to reject [it]." [113]

It may reasonably be concluded that the onset of stress did not adversely affect Italian decision-makers' ability to search for alternatives and evaluate their consequences. A partial exception is, however, represented by decision 9 (once the option of moving troops was advanced, the search stopped and discussion concentrated on the evaluation of consequences). Indeed, it would seem that such an ability was the same as in the prelude to crisis period: bounded by personal and political prejudices but not by situational variables. The same, however, cannot be said of the Allies, not so much because they failed to predict Yugoslav military reaction and plan for it as because they failed to realize that Yugoslavia would not accept a unilateral decision. Not only did they fail to pay proper attention to the information and signals coming from Belgrade and the alternative estimates of intentions of Wallner and other Western diplomats, but they also failed to remember Yugoslav reactions to the 1948 tripartite declaration and 1952 London conference. This casts doubt on the often cited hypothesis that decision-makers are all too eager to recur to the lessons of the past. It would seem instead that this recourse to the past is selective. Appeals to it, in other words, are more likely to be made when they back up courses of action toward which decision-makers lean than when they call them into question.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. Giuseppe Mammarella (L'Italia dopo il Fascismo 1943-68, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1970) provides a good historical introduction to postwar Italian politics. The agrarian reform (which, ironically, would also play an important role in the fall of Pella's government in December 1953) provides a good example of a reform that backfired electorally. After a long gestation it was finally approved in 1950. Because of its limited character the expectations of many landless peasants and farm laborers went unfulfilled Only about one hundred thousand families were assigned some land out of a total landless rural population of over six million. The Communists, moreover, were successful in presenting it as their own victory: a small concession extracted through a grass-roots struggle from a reluctant government. On the other hand, the reform--however limited--could but meet the strong opposition of the landowners and spread apprehension among the propertied class. Thus the redistribution of land that De Gasperi thought would win over to (Christian) democracy the sector of the agricultural population most exposed to the appeal of extremist parties ended up by achieving the opposite result. As he himself told a visiting delegation of the United States Foreign Relations Committee in July 1951. "Up to the present, so far as votes are concerned, the result has been to arouse the opposition of the landowners but not to acquire the support of those who would benefit from the program" (Dunn to Dept., July 26, 1951, in FRUS 1951, IV, p 634).

2. The coalition was comprised of the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, the Republicans, the Social Democrats, the Sud-Tiroler Volkspartei and the Sardinian Action Party. Ironically, the new electoral law turned out to be--at least according to the political analysts of the time--one of the most important factors in the relative defeat of the center parties (see, for instance, M.K.G , "The Italian General Election and its Consequences," The World Today 9, 8, Aug. 1953, pp. 331-343). The opposition effectively denounced it as a devious attempt to do away with democracy by equating it with the 1923 Acerbo law which had consolidated the Fascist occupation of power. Because of this, the Italian electorate had come to have, and still has, a concept of democracy based on a rigidly proportional electoral system. Table adapted from Mammarella, op cit., p. 416.

3. Iniziativa Democratica would eventually take control of the party and can be regarded as the original icicle out of which developed the so-called "Christian Democratic iceberg" (Giuseppe Tamburrano, L'Iceberg Democristiano, Milan. Sugar Co., 1974) Through the control of the instruments of economic management that this strategy required (state corporations, special purpose funds,

regulatory agencies, etc) the party would come literally to occupy and control the state This would make the Christian Democrats less dependent on the support of the collateral organizations of the patronat and the Church and give the party its own mechanism of self-reproduction and expansion The party would cease to be a mere electoral cartel and become an organization wielding its own economic power. On the genesis and development of Iniziativa Democratica, see Gianni Baget Bozzo, Il partito cristiano al potere La DC di De Gasperi e di Dossetti 1945-1954 (Florence Vallecchi, 1974) and Giovanni Mantovani, Gli eredi di De Gasperi: Iniziativa Democratica e i "giovani" al potere, (Florence Le Monnier, 1976) Although including some of the former dossettiani, Iniziativa Democratica had a more pragmatic bent Dossetti had withdrawn from active politics in 1951 and turned to the priesthood. Unlike him, the new leaders of Iniziativa Democratica were more preoccupied with the occupation of the seats of power than with the establishment of a Christian society. For an analysis of its economic doctrine as well as a colorful account of the chameleonic career of one of its original leaders, see Giorgio Galli, Fanfani (Milan Feltrinelli, 1975).

4. This, one may point out, was one of the central tenets of the social sciences of the day: affluence would undermine the breeding grounds of Communism, neo-capitalism would spell the end of ideologies. See Chaim I. Waxman, ed., The End of Ideology Debate, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968 On the relationship between science and politics, especially in this period, see Job L. Dittberner, The End of Ideology and American Social Thought, Ann Arbor: Michigan Univ Press, 1979 and Greta Jones, Science, Politics and the Cold War, London Routledge, 1988

5. On Iniziativa Democratica's position after the elections see Mantovani, op. cit., p. 111. On the pressures of the Vatican as well as the fear of American reactions, see Luce to Dept. 5151 (June 16, 1953), FSP-Belgrade, Box 181, File 350. The Americans were vehemently opposed to any opening to Nenni's Socialists because, they thought, "it would open the way to infiltration of the government by Communist agents, ... water down measures against the Communists .. increase the long run danger of Italian neutralism and ... result in the establishment of a channel through which all Italian secrets, including those pertaining to NATO and U.S.-Italian bilateral relations, might eventually pass to the USSR" (The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, June 29, 1953, in FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp 1620-1621)

6. As part of his efforts to maintain a centrist coalition, De Gasperi instructed his personal secretary Paolo Canali to approach the American embassy and suggest that some prominent British laborite like Attlee or a similar authoritative American figure press Social Democratic leader Saragat to drop his proposal of an opening to Nenni's Socialists (Luce to Dept 5151, June 16, 1953, FSP-Belgrade, Box 181, File 350). The vote on De Gasperi's government was 282 against vs 263 for. The Communists, Socialists, neo-Fascists and Monarchists voted against while the Liberals, Republicans and Social Democrats abstained

7. It appears that the Allies (and the U.S in particular) manifested apprehension at the prospect of De Gasperi's departure and insisted that he stay on, at least as Foreign Minister, in the Piccioni government (Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, De Gasperi uomo solo, Milan Mondadori, 1965, p. 336). Ironically, the insertion of De Gasperi appears to have doomed Piccioni's chances of forming a new centrist coalition According to Taviani, in fact, the "real reason why Saragat refused to support the Piccioni government was his opposition, presumably at Nenni's insistence, to De Gasperi's holding of the Foreign Ministry portfolio"

(Durbrow to Dept. D-941, 765.00/8-2753).

8 Re, op. cit., pp. 151-153 and 162. For a portrait of Pella see ibid, pp. 38-40. On Pella's economic policies, see Bruno Bottiglieri, "Tra Pella e Vanoni: la politica economica degli ultimi governi De Gasperi", Storia Contemporanea 15, 4 (Aug. 1984), pp. 781-839

9 The expression that would later be adopted and pass into Italian political jargon for this type of government was governo estivo or governo balneare (summer or sea-side government). Aldo Moro, then President of the Parliamentary Group of the Christian Democrats and responsible for inventing some of the most abstract yet creative lexical alchemies to gain a permanent place in the political lingo of the peninsula, later attempted to define provisional or administrative government. In characteristic fashion, he gave only a negative definition: "The Pella government cannot be said to be transitional or provisional in the sense of having a limited term or an administrative government in the sense of having minor dignity or less power or reduced competence" (Corriere della Sera, Sept. 17, 1953). Whatever the meaning, the Pella government would last only as long as his party would let it

10. The composition of the Pella government was the following: Giuseppe Pella (President of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Affairs and the Budget), Amintore Fanfani (Interior), Antonio Azara (Justice), Ezio Vanoni (Finance), Silvio Gava (Treasury), Paolo Emilio Taviani (Defense), Antonio Segni (Education), Umberto Merlini (Public Works), Rocco Salomone (Agriculture and Forestry), Bernardo Mattarella (Transportation), Piero Malvestiti (Industry and Commerce), Leopoldo Rubinacci (Labor and Social Insurance), Fernando Tambroni (Merchant Navy), Pietro Campilli and Salvatore Scoca (ministers without portfolios). The two "technicians," both personal friends of President Einaudi, were Modesto Panetti (Post and Telecommunications) and Costantino Bresciani-Turroni (Foreign Trade). The most important Under-Secretaries were: Giulio Andreotti (Presidency of the Council of Ministers), Giorgio Tupini (Press Services and Information), Francesco Maria Dominedò and Ludovico Benvenuti (Foreign Affairs).

11 Mantovani, op cit., p. 115.

12. The electoral program of the Right is reported in Rome to Dept. D-2338, 765.00/5-553. On the position of the Right vis-à-vis Italian foreign policy and defense policies in particular see Stefano Finotti, "Difesa occidentale e patto atlantico: la scelta internazionale del MSI (1948-52)," Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali 4, 1 (1988), pp. 85-124. Pella's policy speech is in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 35 (Aug 29, 1953), pp. 822-825.

13 Taviani's remark is in MC Gruenther (SHAPE Commander), Durbrow, Taviani, Sept. 4, 1953, attached to Williamson (Counselor, American embassy in Rome) to Dept. D-598, 750G.00/9-753. An opinion poll taken in November 1953 did indeed reveal that when asked to name some cities or villages of Zone B fewer than 30% of Italians could do so, over 50% could give no answer and the rest named either localities in Zone A or formerly Italian localities in Istria (Luzzatto Fegiz, op cit, p. 778) MC Luciolli, R.B. Knight (Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs), W E Knight, 750G 00/8-2453, Corriere della Sera, Sept 30, 1953. Only a few days earlier (Sept 16), the same newspaper had pointed out that "with his initiative [i.e, the military measures of August 29 and the proposal for the plebiscite of September 11] Pella ha[d] assigned to his government a task which [went] beyond those characters of transition or pure administration which it was said

to have at the moment of his formation." Luce, for her part, wrote in one of her reports (Luce to Dept 1027, Sept. 27, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3) that once Zone A had been turned over to Italy, Pella would be in no hurry to press for a final solution and probably would "go on stalling facilities, the EDC, etc." because his government "could make plenty of political hay, perhaps for months, out of [that] achievement."

14. See his speech at the close of the debate which preceded the approval of the Foreign Ministry budget in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 41 (Oct. 10, 1953), pp. 968-971. The speech of Oct. 9 is in ibid. 17, 42 (Oct. 17, 1953), p 995

15. Mentioned by Pella to Luce and reported in Luce to Dept 765, 750G.00/9-453; see also MC Sensi, W E. Knight, 750G.00/9-253 For the image of Danzig, see Pella's speech of Sept 13 reported in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 38 (Sept 19, 1953), pp 890-892

16. The decision to coordinate contingent military planning with Yugoslavia was made by a tripartite military committe at a NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris in April 1953 ("Yugoslavia and Possible Relationships with NATO," April 14, 1953 in FSP Belgrade, Top Secret General Records 1945-54, Box 6, File April-Dec. 1953) Tarchiani's conversation with Byington is reported in Ortona, op. cit., p. 34. Zoppi's remark about the Washington talks and De Gasperi's political demise are reported in Luce to Dept 118 (July 14, 1953), FSP-Belgrade, Top Secret General Records 1945-54, Box 6, File April-Dec 1953 De Gasperi's speech is in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 31 (Aug 1, 1953), p 737

17. See Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ludovico Benvenuti's conversation with Luce reported in Luce to Dept 782, 750G.00/9-453 and De Castro, op. cit., II (all subsequent quotations from De Castro's study are taken from this volume), pp. 542-543; see also Pella's conversation with Luce reported in Luce to Dept. 765, 750G.00/9-453 and 817, 750G.00/9-953, MC Luciolli, Merchant, W. E. Knight, 750G.00/9-153 and Dillon (American Ambassador to Paris) to Dept 899, 750G.00/9-253

18. See, for instance, De Castro, op. cit., pp. 498-502, Taviani, UJ, entries of Sept. 11 and 29 and Oct. 1, 1953 and Pella's speech to Parliament of Oct. 17, 1953 in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 43 (Oct. 24, 1953), pp. 1025 and 1027.

19. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 543, 561 and 567.

20. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 583-584 and 593; Taviani, UJ, entry of Oct. 7, 1953;

21. Re, op. cit., p. 186; De Castro, op cit., pp 527-529. The press release is in Documenti di Vita Italiana, Nov. 1953, p. 1864

22. Savorgnan di Brazzá, op. cit., pp. 145-146; Tarchiani, op. cit., p. 283; Taviani, UJ, entry of Aug. 29, 1953. The troop movements were not very significant. According to the official information the Foreign Ministry later supplied to the American embassy, one cruiser and two destroyers were dispatched to Venice from Taranto. The artillery regiment of the "Mantova" division, normally quartered in dispersed billets in the area around Monfalcone, was concentrated in this city and Gorizia The number of soldiers involved was about four thousand Three air force regiments, making a total of 200 combat-worthy planes in the Po valley, were put on alert status (Luce to Dept 749, 750G.00/9-353, see also 718, 750G 00/8-3153 and 817, 750G 00/9-953) Both naval and air forces involved were assigned to NATO This raised the question of whether a NATO member could freely move its divisions about

without consultation with the Atlantic Command. The Italians argued that there was no need to consult on moves inside the national frontiers (Luce to Dept. 752, 750G.00/9-353).

23. Luce to Dept 699 and 700, 750G.00/8-2953. A press release issued later that evening also failed to mention them. It simply stated that the ad hoc group which had met in the morning had "examined the political and technical aspects of the threatening Yugoslav attitude toward the FTT" (Documenti di Vita Italiana Nov. 1953, p. 1864).

24. De Castro, op. cit., p. 530; MC Luciolli, Merchant, W.E. Knight, 750G.00/8-2953, Tanjug's press release is in Wallner to Dept. 243, 750G.00/8-3053; Dulles to Rome 741, 750G.00/8-3053.

25. Luce to Dept 701, 750G.00/8-3053.

26. Trieste to Dept. 174 (Aug. 30, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File 1; Aldrich to Dept. 872, 750G.00/8-3053. The French opposed the British proposal of a parallel demarche in Rome because the Italians, they argued, would resent a procedure treating them on the same level as the Yugoslavs. The Americans consented to it only after the British agreed that no mention of the request to stop troop movements would be made to the Yugoslavs or the press (Dillon to Dept. 827, 750G.00/8-3053; Dulles to Rome 742, Aug. 30, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File 1).

27. Wallner to Dept. 252, 750G.00/8-3153. The statement released by Yugopress on August 31 was considerably longer than the one issued by Tanjug the previous day. It gave a summary of events since the release of its controversial story of August 28 and charged, as Bebler had done in his conversation with the Allied diplomats, that "in this desire to attribute to Yugoslavia alleged intentions to annex Zone B it is impossible not to see the desire of the Italian government to conceal its own designs with regard to Zone A." Excerpts of this statement are in Wallner to Dept. 253, 750G.00/8-3153.

28. Luce to Dept 718, 750G.00/8-3153; De Castro, op. cit., p. 532; New York Times, Sept. 1, 1953. In his separate meeting with the French chargé, Pella asked Sebilleau what the French position would be on allowing the Italians to take over the responsibility for the administration of Zone A. Such a concession, Pella argued, would be enough to permit him to control Italian public opinion, which was now out of hand. Sebilleau also had the impression that Pella hoped that the French would pursue and support this proposition with the Americans, which they did--although at a rather low level. See MC Gontran de Juniac (Minister, French embassy in Washington), R.B. Knight, 750G.00/9-353. Apparently, there was no mention of the "provisional solution" in the meeting with Mallet. This is not surprising as the British had favored such a solution all along and needed no convincing. Indeed, they encouraged the Italians to press the Americans for its implementation. The same day, for instance, Italian Chargé in London Marquis Livio Theodoli reported that Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Geoffrey Harrison had asked him whether Italy intended to take some new "positive steps" to solve the problem. Harrison had pointed out that Washington was still a little worried by the idea of Italian and Yugoslav troops facing each other along the Zone A/Zone B border but hinted that were the Italian government to ask the American one for the implementation of the "provisional solution" it would not likely receive a negative answer (De Castro, op. cit., p 533) On September 3, Harrison asked Theodoli when the Italians would present a formal request for the transfer of the administration of Zone A. He expressed the opinion that such a

solution was the only possible one and regretted that nine months earlier, when the British government had persuaded Belgrade "to swallow such a pill, willingly or not," the Italians had let the opportunity slip by (ibid., p. 546)

29. For the complete text of the two notes see Relazioni Internazionali 17, 37 (Sept. 12, 1953), p 869 On Sept 2, 3 and 4, and intermittently thereafter, Yugoslavia also protested border violations by Italian troops Allied military intelligence in Trieste confirmed these violations (Higgs to Dept 179, 750G.00/9-153; Luce to Dept. 726, 750G 00/9-153 and 749, 750G.00/9-353), but Italian officials always categorically denied them. Pella, for his part, in a conversation with Luce, denied that Italian troops or airplanes had "purposely" violated the Yugoslav frontier (Luce to Dept 765, 750G.00/9-453) Obviously the key word here was "purposely." Some border violations might have occurred but they were certainly not part of a deliberate, provocative plan. For long stretches of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, in fact, there was no clearly marked boundary. In such places it was easy for patrols to pass into contested areas without even knowing it. See MC Luciolli, Merchant, W E Knight, 750G.00/9-153 and Taviani, UJ, entry of Aug 31, 1953

30. Wallner to Dept. 274 and 277 (Sept 2, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File 1; Luce to Dept. 742 and 748, 750G 00/9-353 and 765, 750G.00/9-453 Pella's reluctance to antagonize the Right was compounded by the fact that only the previous day the Parliamentary group of the MSI had approved an order of the day which expressed to the government "the solidarity of Parliament for the brothers of Trieste and Istria and the full support for any initiative aiming at averting the danger once again facing them and at guaranteeing the sacred rights of Italy" (Corriere della Sera, Sept. 3, 1953).

31. Dulles to London 1167 (Sept. 2, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File 1 and 1190, 750G.00/9-353 The concern of American officials for Italian sensitivity also led them to change the date of return to Trieste of an American battalion that had gone to Germany for training. Such a return, the American Political Adviser in Trieste suggested, should be completed by Sept. 11 instead of 13, as originally scheduled, so that American troops "not be on road in Italy on the 12, anniversary of D'Annunzio's advance into Fiume, or 13, day on which Pella [was] scheduled to make a speech ... in reply to Tito'[s at Okroglica]" (Higgs to Dept 216, 750G.00/9-553). The State Department went even further and recommended that the return be deferred until after Pella's speech "lest any troop movement to Trieste just now be misconstrued as reinforcement" (Dulles to USPolAd Trieste 197, 750G 00/9-553)

32. Wallner to Dept. 297-298, 750G 00/9-453.

33. The text of the first two notes is in Relazioni Internationali 17, 37 (Sept. 12, 1953), pp. 869-870; the third is in Wallner to Dept 306, 750G 00/9-653 The Yugoslav memorandum is reported and commented in Wallner to Dept. 303, 750G 00/9-553 and 305 (Sept 5, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 2.

34. Zoppi's instructions are reported in De Castro, op cit , pp 539-540; Luce to Dept 765, 750G.00/9-453, MC Pella, Luce, Sept 4, 1953 (attached to Luce to Dept D-599, 750G 00/9-753) After this meeting, a frustrated Fulton Freeman, first secretary of the American embassy, thus commented the status of negotiations on military facilities "Pella was apparently so imbued with his own polemics on the Trieste question that he could think of little else and was apparently unmoved even by the potent economic arguments which the Ambassador set forth for the program The

consensus here is that practically nothing can be done during this particular period of semi-crisis over Trieste" (Freeman to Unger, Sept. 4, 1953, FSP-Rome, Box· Classified, File 320 1).

35. MC Gruenther, Durbrow, Taviani, Sept. 4, 1953 (attached to Williamson to Dept. D-598, 750G.00/9-753), Luce to Dept. 765, 777 and 781, 750G 00/9-453 and 789, 750G.00/9-553. See also Taviani, UJ, entries of Sept 3 and 4 and Oct. 7, 1953. The Italians must also have expressed the desire that their views be conveyed directly to the President because Eisenhower later wrote in his memoir that Pella "through General Gruenther, privately sent [him] a request to consider letting Italian troops occupy Zone A" (Dwight D Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, New York Doubleday, 1963, p 413).

36 Dulles' remarks on Trieste are in Dulles to Rome 808, 750G.00/9-453. Luce to Dept. 782, 750G.00/9-453 reports on the meeting with Benvenuti. Italian press reactions to Dulles' statement can be found in Luce to Dept. 769, 750G.00/9-453 and Higgs to Dept. 208, 750G.00/9-453. Luciolli's instruction from Rome and the report on his meeting with Dulles are in De Castro, op. cit , pp. 542-543 For the American perspective see MC Luciolli, Bonbright, R B Knight and Merchant to the Secretary, both 750G.00/9-453. On the Italian effort to obtain a clarifying statement from Dulles himself or the State Department, see Luce to Dept. 785, 750G.00/9-553 The press release is in Documenti di Vita Italiana, Nov 1953, pp 1866-67

37 Tito's speech is partly reported in Wallner to Dept. 307 and 308, 750G.00/9-653 and Relazioni Internazionali 17, 37 (Sept. 12, 1953), pp. 870-873. For the entire text of the Italian official reaction to Tito's speech, see Documenti di Vita Italiana, Nov. 1953, p 1870; Luce to Dept. 796, 750G.00/9-753.

38. Two biographies of Luce have been published to date: Alden Hatch, Ambassador Extraordinary: Clare Boothe Luce, New York: Henry Holt, 1955 and Stephen Shadegg, Clare Boothe Luce: A Biography, New York· Simon and Schuster, 1970. Both, particularly the one by Hatch, are rather celebratory in tone. A scholarly evaluation of Luce's political role and influence is overdue.

39. Ortona, op. cit., p. 16; De Castro, op. cit., p. 468. The fact that the official review Esteri felt the need to issue a formal denial of the rumor that the appointment of Luce was resented ("Clare Boothe Luce," 4, 4, Feb. 28, 1953) would seem to indicate that such a feeling was inde·d strong and widespread. C. L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries 1934-1954, Toronto MacMillan, 1969, pp. 964 and 977 Luce to Dept. 2836 (March 19, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 12. See also Barbara Blair, "Italy--as Mrs. Luce sees it," US News and World Report, Sept 25, 1953

40. Taviani, UJ, entry of Sept. 8, 1953, Luce to Dept. 357 (Aug. 7, 1953), FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp. 1624-1630 On Italian hopes about the Republican administration see "Gli Stati Uniti, l'Europa e l'Italia," Esteri 3, 22 (Nov. 30, 1952) For a lucid analysis of the role of ideology in American foreign policy see, Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U S Foreign Policy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987 Luce's anticommunist crusading was, however, the source of many headaches for Italian decision-makers in other policy areas To combat the electoral advance of the Communist party she urged, in fact, the adoption of drastic legislative measures Italian decision-makers could not convincingly persuade her, after having themselves contributed to whip her into such a frenzy, that the Communist threat was not after all so serious. At the same time they could not adopt the measures suggested,

which they knew to be exaggerated and therefore politically counterproductive Luce reacted to what she regarded as dangerous timidity by suggesting to the State Department that economic aid to Italy, including the placement of orders to Italian industries under the Off-Shore Procurement program, be used to "negotiate" with the Italian government "specific internal anti-Communist policies" (see FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp 1642-1645 and 1646-1647, footnote 3 and Ortona, op cit., pp 57-58, 71 and 73-75) Ortona commented that it was a pity that "Luce's influence with Eisenhower and the State Department could not be utilized to [Italy's] advantage on this issue and, even worse, risked to become counterproductive" (op cit., p 60) Prime Minister Scelba's attempt to steer a middle course gained him the reputation of a repressive hardliner domestically while leaving Luce with the "firm impression that [he] had no real emotions or convictions on the score of Communism and was concerned largely with one thing: being, if possible, in a position to survive, if necessary, in either camp " Scelba's anti-Communist measures are listed in Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy. Politics and Economics 1945-1955, London· Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955, p 113, Luce's impressions are in Luce to Dept , D-1164, "Memorandum of Conversation between the Ambassador and Mario Scelba on Nov 27, 1953," 765 00/11-3053 See also Wollemborg, op cit , pp 20-25

41. Memorandum by Under-Secretary Smith, A-1036 (May 25, 1953), FSP-Belgrade, Top Secret General Records, Box 6, File April-Dec 1953; Luce's letter to Dulles and attachments, 765 00/6-1953 Although circulated within the Department as her "penetrating and brilliant analysis of the Italian elections," the memorandum was nothing more than an elaboration of De Gasperi's arguments (compare with MC De Gasperi, Luce 8853, 765.00/6-2253)

42. William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men My Life in the CIA, New York· Simon and Schuster, 1978, pp. 109, 115, and 123-124. Colby further defines the CIA operation in Italy as a "pilot operation " Several others, he maintains, were modelled after it later: among them the one leading to the 1973 coup in Chile (p. 113).

43. Luce to Dept. 782, 750G.00/9-453 and 785, 750G 00/9-553 and Dulles to Luce, 838, 765.00/9-553.

44. Rabel, op. cit., p. 299. Eisenhower commented in his memoir that "this version by Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce of the old 'For Want of a Nail' may have been a little overdrawn, but it held considerable truth" (op. cit , p 409) Time, Sept 14, 1953, pp 23 and 32.

45. Instructions to Luce are in Dulles to Rome 831, 750G 00/9-453 and 839 (Sept. 5, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 2 Luce's answer is in Luce to Dept. 792, 750G.00/9-653 Winterton was particularly worried about the presence of Italian troops in Ronchi dei Legionari because of the historical and emotional significance of that place (D'Annunzio had departed from there for his raid on Rijeka, the anniversary of which fell on November 12) Winterton's concerns about the possibility of disorders in Trieste had increased following the submission, on September 2, of a memorandum by the Committee for the National Liberation of Istria It warned, among other things, of a possible 'popular reaction in Trieste which the parties would not be able to control through political means" (Higgs to Dept 190, 750G 00/9-453, and 215, 750G.00/9-553, a copy of the memorandum is attached to Higgs to Dept. D-59, 750G 00/9-453) The possibility that Italy might actually be tempted to occupy Zone A worried Allied military personnel because, according to AMG intelligence, 'high Italian

government officials d[id] not take seriously the thought that Italian armed units would meet with military resistance if they attempted to force entry into Zone A." See Higgs to Dept. 228, 750G 00/9-853, see also Scott (Director, Executive Secretariat) to Under-Secretary, "Summary of Defense Telegram JCS 947627," 750G.00/9-853

46. Luce to Dept 790, 750G.00/9-553 and 796, 750G.00/9-753.

47 Dulles to Rome 857, "For Ambassador," 750G.00/9-553. Although filed as if written on the 5th (9-553), this document was clearly written and sent on the 8th, as the date written next to the name of Byington, the author, clearly indicates. The meeting between Dulles, Murphy and Merchant is revealed in a memo from Popper (Office of the UN Political and Security Affairs) to D. Sandifer (Deputy Assistant Secretary for UN Affairs), 750G.00/9-1453 in which Popper requested that his office be kept abreast of Trieste events in general, and the content of the plan discussed at that meeting, in particular. Dulles to Rome, 884, 750G.00/9-1053.

48. Taviani, UJ, entry of Sept. 9, 1953. Luce to Dept. 808, 750G.00/9-853 and 817, 750G.00/9-953. Pella's conversation with Cortesi is reported in Luce to Dept. 825, 750G.00/9-1053, De Castro, op cit , p. 552; MC Luciolli, Byington, W E. Knight, 750G.00/9-953; Dulles to Rome, 884, 750G.00/9-1053.

49. It took five days, many telegrams and much rewording before the Allies could reach agreement on how to answer the Yugoslav memorandum (see, in particular, Dulles to London 1252, 750G.00/9-753, Dillon to Dept. 956, 750G.00/9-853 and Aldrich to Dept. 1013 and 1020 (Sept. 9, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 2. The meeting with Bebler is reported in Wallner to Dept. 324, 750G.00/9-1153.

50. Dulles to London 1317, 750G.00/9-953. All that had been done, apart from a British request for a public clarification of the military measures, which Del Balzo had immediately protested to the American embassy (Luce to Dept. 787, 750G.00/9-553), was to tell the Italians that the zone commander was under instruction to defend the integrity of the zone against attacks from any quarter. This statement, moreover, had not been made to Pella directly but by Harrison to Theodoli in London and by Winterton himself to De Castro in Trieste (De Castro, op. cit., p. 552).

51. It simply welcomed Pella's "assurances that troops and warships [would] be gradually withdrawn to their normal positions" and pointed out that the Allies hoped (an insertion made at the insistence of the British) that this would be done as soon as possible. See MC Salt (First Secretary, British embassy in Washington), Byington, W.E. Knight, Nes (Office of Western European Affairs), 750G.00/9-1153 and Dulles to London 1338 (Sept. 11, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 2.

52. Wallner to Dept 325, 750G.00/9-1153, Corriere della Sera, Sept. 9 and 10, 1953

53. Luce to Dept 854 and Dulles to Rome 906, 750G.00/9-1253, Luce to Dept 855, 750G 00/9-1353

54 The text of Pella's speech is in Documenti di Vita Italiana, Nov. 1953, pp 1871-1880. An English translation can be found in Williamson to Dept D-651, 765.00/9-1553. To back up Italian rights, Pella even resurrected a letter President Abraham Lincoln allegedly had written to Italian physicist and nationalist Macedonio Melloni in 1853 which supposedly had been translated by Giuseppe Mazzini The letter was a forgery, and a very bad one at

that. It was written in 1919, when President Wilson had started to contest the borders agreed upon in the London Pact It was first printed on April 2, 1920 in Il Popolo d'Italia (then published by Benito Mussolini) and kept reappearing in third rate history books afterwards. As recently as the previous year, historians Gaetano Salvemini and Carlo Schiffrer had denounced it as a ridiculous forgery (see two articles entitled "Lincoln, cavallo di ritorno" in Il Ponte 8, 4, April 1952, pp 511-512 and 8, 10, Oct 1952, pp. 1579-1582). It is indeed hard to imagine, even for the most naive reader, that Lincoln would have used the term 'Venezia Giulia" (which, incidentally, was not coined by linguist Graziadio Ascoli until thirty years after the letter was supposed to have been written), called the Adriatic sea a "Venetian lake," referred to the Yugoslavs as "the most barbaric and the most savage nation of the world" and concluded that "in the name of humanity these peoples must be thoroughly polished by a people of a higher civilization." The note with the plebiscite proposal is in Documenti di Vita Italiana, Nov 1953, pp. 1880-1881; the text in English can be found in Williamson to Dept D-669, 750G 00/9-1853.

55. Tarchiani, op. cit., p. 287; Taviani, UJ, entry of Oct. 1, 1953. Zoppi's telegram is reported in De Castro, op cit , p 556. Dulles to Rome 907, 750G 00/9-1253.

56. Wallner to Dept. 258, 750G.00/9-153 and 314, /50G 00/9-953 It should be pointed out that when Wallner made his comments about the dangers of turning Zone A to Italy the plan had not yet been formulated Wallner's warnings were prompted exclusively by his assessment of the Yugoslav mood in conjunction with the signals coming from Italy. Luce's influence in Washington and her key role in turning State Department thinking around was recognized also at the time. See, for instance, Ortona op. cit , pp 53 and 61. Corriere della Sera, paid hommage to her efforts immediately after the Allied announcement: "What has happened has been largely the work of a woman, Mrs Luce .. It is her doing if the American government has changed opinion .if Trieste is about to be reunited with its motherland this is due to her Maybe never in history has such a great people owed so much to such a small, fragile and gentle creature" (Oct 9-10, 1953)

57. Contrary to Italian beliefs, Americans diplomats had indeed been conveying--albeit very cautiously and against the advice of the military--the message to Tito that Western security assistance and cooperation depended in no small degree on a solution of the Trieste problem. In January 1953, for instance, Ambassador Allen told Tito, who had expressed surprise and resentment at what he regarded as an excessively cautious approach to joint strategic planning that "the chief stumbling block" to real progress in the area of collective security was the bad state of Yugoslav-Italian relations. Hence a solution for Trieste should be the principal objective to be pursued before "wider political decisions could be reached." When the talks on coordinated contingent military planning resumed in Washington in August 1953, the Allied representatives were instructed "to seek the appropriate occasion to lead the Yugoslavs to [the] realization" that "none of contingent planning could have reality without ultimate Italian cooperation which, as it was well known, depended on a prior solution of [the] Trieste problem " To allay Italian fears, moreover, "adequate knowledge of Yugoslav military organization, defense plans and dispositions" was to be sought without revealing "information of any kind concerning NATO or Italian defense plans, mobilization plans or military dispositions " On the position of the military, see MC Adm Carney, Unger, July 26, 1952, FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19, on Allen's conversation with Tito see Allen to Dept 935 (Jan 8, 1953), on the August talks see Smith to Paris 574 (Aug 19, 1953) and Smith to London 880 (Aug 20,

1953), all in FSP-Belgrade, Box 5, Top Secret General Records 1945-53, File Jan.-March 1953.

58. The text of the plan is reported in Dulles to London 1337, 750G.00/9-1153. The decision to leave the French out was justified by the fact that they had no responsibility in the AMG and that it was imperative to avoid any possible "leak of details to [the] Italians" (the Santa Margherita agreements of February 1951 between Italy and France provided for the exchange of information between the two countries).

59. Luce to Dept. 893, 750G.00/9-1653; Aldrich to Dept. 1092, 750G.00/9-1453, 1126, 750G.00/9-1653 and 1135, 750G 00/9-1653; MC Salt, Byington, W.E Knight, 750G.00/9-1753 and Smith to London 1388, 750G.00/9-1553.

60. For Ivo Mallet's position see Durbrow to Dept. 968, 750G.00/9-2253; Aldrich to Dept. 1216, 750G.00/9-2153 and 1234, 750G.00/9-2253; MC Salt, Byington, W.E. Knight, Nes, 750G.00/9-2353 and Smith to London 1584, 750G.00/9-2453. The telegrams in which Wallner sent his comments are still classified. His position, however, can be gathered indirectly from the memo W.K. Scott to Acting Secretary, "Summary of Trieste Developments," 750G.00/9-2153.

61. Luce to Dept. 1006 (Sept. 25, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3; Luce to Dept. 893, 750G.00/9-1653, 1056, 750G.00/9-2953 and 1072, 750G.00/9-3053. It should be noted here that Winterton's concerns about even a temporary division of the control of Zone A between Italian and Allied troops were also shared by the American military. Indeed, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had been the first to express "reservations as to the mechanics of the actual transfer of administrative and military control of Zone A to [the] Italians and [the] timing of the withdrawal of U.S./U.K. forces" as envisaged by the plan and had recommended "that the military commander of the U.S./U.K. forces in the FTT be consulted ... prior to approval of the plan" (untitled memo 750G.00/9-1253; see also Merchant to Secretary, "Letter of Oct. 1 from the Secretary of Defense regarding our Trieste Plan," 750G.00/10-253).

62. Some resented career diplomats would later charge that the State Department was "kowtowing to Clare Luce" because of the weapons she held in Time, Life and Fortune. There is hardly any doubt that, given Senator McCarthy's ongoing anti-communist crusading, it required some courage to challenge Luce's views openly (see, for instance, C L. Sulzberger, op. cit., pp. 964, 10[illegible] and 1018 and Hugh De Santis and Waldo Heinrichs, "The Department of State and American Foreign Policy" in Z. Steiner, ed., op. cit., pp. 586-587).

63. Smith to Rome 981 (Sept. 18, 1953) and Smith to London 1510 (Sept. 21, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3; Smith to London 1583, 750G.00/9-2453; W.K. Scott to Secretary, 750G.00/9-2553; MC Cheetham, R.H. Scott (Minister, British embassy in Washington), Salt, Byington, Barbour, Freund (Office of Western European Affairs) W.E. Knight, Nes, Sept. 30, 1953; MC Cheetham, Salt, Byington, Barbour, Freund, W.E. Knight, Nes, Oct 1, 1953; MC Cheetham, Salt, Byington, Barbour, Freund, Oct 2, 1953 (4:00 p.m.) and MC Cheetham, Salt, Byington, Freund, W.E Knight (6.30 p.m), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. American confidence in the plan is also proven by the fact that on September 30 President Eisenhower sent a note to Dulles asking what progress was being made on the plan for Trieste Dulles answered the next day that the Department was "pushing the settlement vigorously" and he was confident that "the matter could be settled within the month" (Eisenhower, op cit , p 413).

64. Luce to Dept 1157 (Oct. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3 and Luce to Dept. 1167, 750G.00/10-753 Although concerning more the tone than the substance of the approach, these changes, which aimed at making it clear for Tito that the Allies considered their decision final, irritated Luce who commented resentfully "At the last moment, the British have demolished our carefully constructed plan." As usual, however, her concern was for the future of Pella, whom she doubted would be able to "dig himself out of the political hole [the] plan [had] now put him in"

65. Durbrow to Dept. 945, Higgs to Dept 272 and Dulles to USPolAd 256, all 750G.00/9-1853, Wallner to Dept 1098 (Feb 3, 1953), Top Secret General Records, 1945-1953, Box 5, File Jan -March 1953, Wallner to Dept 329, 750G 00/9-1353, 333 and 335, 750G 00/9-1453 The text of Tito's speech in Split is also in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 38, (Sept. 19, 1953), pp 892-893

66. Wallner to Dept. 355, 750G 00/9-1753. The Yugoslav note is still classified but its content can be largely reconstructed from fragments of information contained in other documents. See, for instance, Wallner to Dept. D-251, "Yugoslav Aide-Memoire re Trieste of Sept. 21, 1953," 750G.00/9-2953 and MC Ruffin (First Secretary, French embassy in Washington), Marcy, Sept. 29, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. Kardelj's interview with L'Express and part of his speech in Kočevje are in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 40 (Oct. 3, 1953), pp 943-944 and 41 (Oct 10, 1953), pp 972-973. The Borba editorial of Oct 6 is reported in Wallner to Dept. 414 (Oct. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3

67. The text, in French, of the Yugoslav note rejecting the plebiscite is in FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350, Higgs to Dept 288, 750G.00/9-2253; Wallner to Dept 410, 750G.00/10-553

68. Thus, they also ignored the suggestions of the French who seem to have been the only ones to realize that partition, if implemented unilaterally, would make a difficult situation worse. Hence, while unaware of the plan under study at the State Department, they twice suggested to the Anglo-Americans the organization of a five-power conference with an open agenda which, even if would not serve to establish the rules for the holding of a plebiscite, as desired by Pella, could nevertheless be used to reach agreement on partition. Although they too eventually converted to the idea that partition had to be precipitated, as it were, by the Allies themselves, they still thought that, once a plan had been worked out, it should be submitted for evaluation to "the two directly interested parties" (MC Gontran de Juniac, Byington, 750G.00/9-1753, MC Ruffin, Marcy, 750G 00/9-2453 and Sept. 29, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File: ML)

69. It is not clear how Eden reached the conclusion that partition, to be accepted by Tito, had to be imposed In his memoir (op cit., p. 181) he conveys the impression that it was Tito himself who suggested it. This, however, seems highly unlikely In an interview with the Observer on Oct. 18, 1953, Tito wondered, for instance, how Eden could have misinterpreted him "I don't doubt Eden's good faith but I do not understand how my words could have been misinterpreted" The most likely hypothesis is that Eden reached his conclusion independently and did not revise it, despite the signals coming from Belgrade He is also misleading on another point. he suggests that the idea of not consulting with Tito was in the plan originally submitted by the State Department and that upon his return to the Foreign Office on Oct 5, he simply endorsed what Lord Salisbury had done (op cit , p 183) He also selects "lack of finality" in the declaration, instead of failure to consult with Tito, as the "weak point" in the plan (p 184) See also Dulles to Rome 1265 (Oct 12, 1953), FSP Trieste,

Box 2, File 4 which reports Eden's comments to Dulles soon after the Yugoslav reactions to the Allied announcement.

70. MC Cheetham, Salt, Barbour, Byington, Freund, W. E. Knight, Nes, Oct. 6, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Dulles to Belgrade 379 (Oct. 6, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3. Later, however, Dulles would not hesitate to blame Eden for the failure of the decision On December 15, for instance, he told Pella: "Perhaps our intelligence regarding Tito's attitude was somewhat inaccurate We relied considerably on the views of the British who, we felt, had closer relations with Tito than the United States " Achilles (American Chargé in Paris) to Dept. 2319 (Dec. 16, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

71. Quoted in De Castro, op. cit., pp. 543 and 565.

72. De Castro, op. cit., p. 561. Pella personally conveyed the same message to the Allied representatives in Rome (ibid., p. 564). See also MC Luciolli, Byington, 750G.00/9-1853 and Durbrow to Dept. 951, 750G 00/9-1953.

73. During the following weeks the State Department received a few letters from different Italian-American associations requesting that the U S. government agree to a plebiscite They all carried a standard text, most likely supplied by the Italian embassy itself. They were all carefully filed away but obviously had no impact on American policy. Similar letters, after all, had also been sent after 1948 (requesting the implementation of the tripartite declaration) and after De Gasperi's proposal for a plebiscite the previous year Only on one occasion did the State Department have to take some action beyond providing a polite answer. In November 1952, the Grand Council of the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts of the Order of the Sons of Italy approved a resolution on the return of Trieste to Italy and sent it to Senator John F. Kennedy (Kennedy to Acheson, 750G.00/11-2452). In February 1953, Kennedy decided to submit a resolution in the Senate which (1) called for a plebiscite in the FTT under UN supervision (2) requested that, in the interim, Italy be admitted into the administration of Zone A with the U.S. and the U.K. and (3) required the U.S. to re-examine the policy of providing assistance to Yugoslavia if the latter failed to acquiesce to the proposal. He sent a copy of the resolution to the State Department for comment (Kennedy to Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs Morton, 750G.00/2-653). William E. Knight asked Kennedy to submit the resolution without points 2 and 3 ("Thus emasculated," he commented, the resolution "would do little harm") and advised him to avoid a debate on the issue. Kennedy reassured him by saying that he did not anticipate that the Senate would do anything with it and that he just wanted to submit something to show his interest (MC J.F. Kennedy, W.E. Knight, 750G.00/2-653). It should also be pointed out that the Yugoslavs were apparently better organized and more effective than the Italians in promoting their point of view in the Allied countries. They had, for instance an information center in New York and understood the key role of television in winning over the public mind Taviani (UJ, entry of Nov. 22) reports a letter from an Italian official in New York suggesting that Italy follow a similar strategy

74. For the Allied decision to let Pella's proposal go unanswered see MC Salt, Byington, W.E Knight, 750G.00/9-1753. Luce told Pella confidentially, some time later, that the reason was that "it might create undesirable precedents for other powers in other areas" (Luce to Dept. 1270, Oct 15, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4) Brosio's meeting with Lord Salisbury on Sept 18 is reported in De Castro, op cit , pp 564-565.

75. MC Tarchiani, Byington, 750G.00/9-1753, MC Acting Secretary, Byington, Tarchiani, Sept. 22, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. It should be noted here that State Department officials, unlike Luce, did not take all of Tarchiani's evaluation at face value (see, for instance, Bonbright to Acting Secretary, Sept 21, 1953, filed as 750G.00/9-1753).

76. Luce to Dept. 1000, 750G.00/9-2453; Corriere della Sera, Sept. 22 and 23, 1953; "Intervista del Presidente del Consiglio On Giuseppe Pella al Sig Relman Morin della Associated Press," Oct 1, 1953, FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350.

77. Scott to Acting Secretary, "Summary of Trieste Developments," 750G.00/9-2153, Luce to Dept 1108 (Oct 2, 1953), FSP-Rome, Box Classified, File 320 1. The information about the alleged Italian maneuver with the Soviet Union was obtained by AMG intelligence "from a source evaluated C." Most likely it was false and probably "planted" by the Italians themselves as part of their pressure strategy (Higgs to Dept. 281, 750G 00/9-1953)

78. Durbrow to Dept. 959, 750G.00/9-2153, Luce to Dept 1000, 750G.00/9-2453; Luce to Dept. 1044 (Sept 29, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3 and MC Tarchiani, Merchant, Byington, Sept. 30, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. Tarchiani also had various meetings at the Pentagon, since the military was still deemed to be somewhat pro-Tito because of its desire to use Yugoslav troops as the first barrier in the defense of Europe (Duroselle, op cit., p. 387).

79. MC Luciolli, Byington, W E. Knight, Sept 23, 1953 and MC Luciolli, Byington, Oct 2, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML, Luce to Dept 1113 (Oct 2, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3.

80. De Castro, op. cit., p. 575; Tarchiani to Dulles, 750G 00/10-553; Luce to Dept. 1157 (Oct. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3

81. See Il Messaggero, Oct. 4, 1953 and Corriere della Sera, Oct 6, 1953; Luce to Dept. 1148 (Oct. 6, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3.

82. Luce to Dept. 1153 (Oct. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3. For the parliamentary debate see Relazioni Internazionali 17, 41 (Oct. 10, 1953), pp. 952-953 and 963-971.

83. Although they had originally intended to obtain French concurrence on the release of the public declaration, and therefore had to inform them officially of the plan before unveiling it, on the evening of the 7th they had not yet done so Late that evening the news reached the State Department that the French had learned of the plan. American Ambassador in Paris Douglas Dillon was instructed to act immediately. He called the Foreign Ministry at 1:00 a.m., saying that "the U S. and the U K wished to deliver an important message regarding Trieste." He was told to wait until the next morning, as Bidault had asked before retiring to receive that message personally. Next morning Bidault asked the ambassador to inform the State Department and Dulles personally that, while he had no substantive objection to the plan, he was "very upset, hurt and displeased" at the manner in which the decision had been made He would concur to the public declaration because he personally had announced the tripartite one of 1948 and, "clearly, he could not agree publicly to its being changed unilaterally by the U S and the U K." but he would never be able to "understand why such a highly ungracious course of action had been adopted " Aldrich to Dept 1491, 750G 00/10 753, MC Salt, Byington, Freund, W E Knight, Nes, 750G 00/10 753, Dulles to Paris 1299, 750G 00/10-653, 1312 (Oct 7, 1953), FSP Trieste, Box

2, File 3 and 1330, 750G 00/10-853; Dillon to Dept. 1386 (Oct. 8, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3 The Anglo-American reaction was rather pragmatic In view of the "very constructive way" in which the French had handled the matter publicly, it was decided that "the best course was to permit their private pique to run its course while at the same time seizing every opportunity to smooth their ruffled feathers" (MC Salt, Byington, W.E. Knight, Nes, 4.00 p.m., 750G 00/10-853).

84. De Castro, op cit., p 581. It is not clear whether this was done with the approval of the State Department or on Luce's personal initiative The State Department had originally agreed to Luce's recommendation but, because of the change in the nature of the approach (i e., from consultative to informational), it had later told Luce that it believed that "prior communication to Italians on informal basis [was] no longer feasible" (Dulles to Rome 1160, Oct. 3, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3 and 1187, Oct. 15, 1953 but filed as 750G.00/9-2753). There is no document in the files authorizing Luce to reveal the content of the Allied approach to the Italians beforehand. Luce, moreover, does not seem to have reported Durbrow's conversation with Casardi to Washington. The most likely explanation is that, since the Department had merely expressed a "belief" and not issued new instructions, Luce reasoned that she could still go ahead on the basis of the previous concurrence.

85. The entire text of the October 8 declaration can be found in Department of State Bulletin 24, 747 (Oct. 19, 1953), p. 529. The text of the secret instructions for Rome is in Dulles to Rome 1182 (Oct. 6, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3. De Castro reports (op. cit., p. 586, footnote 1) that the Italian Foreign Ministry has always denied the existence of this document. As late as 1974, for instance, the Foreign Minister, answering a question on this subject in the Chamber of Deputies, pointed out that "the fact that a document was quoted in some historical books did not constitute proof of [its] existence." In deference to the attitude chosen by the Italian Foreign Ministry, De Castro does not report the text of the secret annex in his book.

86. Luce to Dept. 1179 and 1180 (Oct. 8, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4.

87. Wallner to Dept. 419 (Oct. 8, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4. Dulles to Belgrade 381, which contains the text of the secret instructions for the approach to Tito, is still classified.

88. Wallner to Dept. 421 (Oct. 8, 1953) and 423 (Oct. 9, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4.

89. Dulles to Belgrade 399 (Oct. 8, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4; MC Salt, Byington, W.E. Knight, Nes (4:00 p.m.), 750G.00/10-853. That the State Department believed the plan to be working is demonstrated even more clearly by a personal message from Dulles to Luce: "Thanks for the skillful way in which you have handled the delicate and important program for Trieste. First reactions indicate that the operation will be successful and we hope that your handling of the matter will enhance our prestige in Italy." Luce replied: "The consequences of your Trieste decision must inevitably create difficulties elsewhere but I believe they will be overcome and compensated for by increasing Italian cooperation with your European policies as the result of a great improvement in Italian-American relations" (Dulles to Luce 1233, 750G 00/10-953 and Luce to Dulles 1206, 750G.00/10-1053).

90. Pella's reservations about the Allied declaration were expressed by Luciolli in a conversation with Byington. He lamented the

deliberate omission of any reference in the public statement to the tripartite declaration (which he called "a distortion of the history of the case"), pointed out that the reference to the "predominantly Italian character of Zone A" was "an implied refusal to recognize the Italian preponderance in the entire FTT" and said that the U.S. and the U.K. should have made it clear that they would not recognize Yugoslav annexation of Zone B were it to take place (MC Luciolli, Byington, Freund, W E Knight, "U S. U.K Actions Regarding Trieste," 750G 00/10-853) Luce to Dept 1181 and 1183 (Oct. 8, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4.

91. Corriere della Sera, Oct. 10, 1953, MC Luciolli, Byington, Oct 8, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. The press communiqué and Pella's speech to the Chamber of Deputies are in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 42 (Oct. 17, 1953), pp. 995-996. The official interpretation of the October 8 decision can be found in an article by Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs F.M. Dominedo, "Sulle dichiarazioni alleate del 20 marzo 1948 e dell'8 Ottobre 1953" in Civiltá Italica 4, 11 (Nov. 1953), pp 661-667 Even the absence of France from this phase of the events was brought to attention to demonstrate the provisional character of the decision. Acting alone the U.S. and the U K had wished to underline, a semi-official article in Relazioni Internazionali claimed, that they were simply calling Italy to replace them in the provisional administration of the zone. Had France been associated in the October 8 announcement, the decision could have been understood as a partial application of the tripartite declaration and, therefore, as definitive. ("La restituzione di Trieste all'Italia," 17, 42, Oct. 17, 1953, p 986).

92. The Left, both in the debate in the Chamber and in the newspapers, also welcomed the Anglo-American decision but regretted that it implied the definitive abandonment of Zone B. It also warned that because the decision had been unilateral it was certain to create on the eastern frontier "a very tense situation full of unknowns and perils." For Italian press reactions to the Allied declaration, see Luce to Dept. 1200 (Oct. 9, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4.

93. On the meeting of Oct. 10 see Luce to Dept 1207 and 1208 (Oct 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4. On the appointment of Scoca, see Luce to Dept. 1222 (Oct. 12, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4.

94. Gertrude J. Robinson, Tito's Maverick Media: the Politics of Mass Communications in Yugoslavia, Urbana· Univ. of Illinois Press, 1977, p. 32.

95. Wallner to Dept. D-239, "Press Role in Development of Present Trieste Crisis" 750G.00/9-2353 The text of the Yugopress statement quoted by Wallner in his despatch and reproduced above is slightly different from the one which appears in Novak (op. cit., p. 420). Wallner's source is Donald C Dunham, (Political Aspects of Press Reporting of Crisis of November 1953, Trieste, FTT, Mimeograph, Trieste, 1954, p. 67) The difference is probably due to the fact that Dunham, the press officer in the office of the American Political Adviser in Trieste retranslated into English the Italian version of the text Dunham's book is a collection of articles mainly about the November 1953 disorders.

96. Tarchiani, op cit., p. 283; Taviani, UJ, entries of Sept 7 and 14, 1953.

97. For a discussion of the relationship between distrust and threat perception and predispositions and interpretation of evidence see Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of

International Action" in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., op. cit., pp. 393-432 esp pp. 396-407. The reaction to the UP wire at the Defense Ministry is reported by Taviani (UJ, entry of Aug. 28, 1953) That the Defense Ministry had originally accepted the Yugoslav invitation, which was then declined following the Aug. 29 decision, is reported in Higgs to Dept. 193 (Sept. 3, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File 1.

98 Luciolli's report, quoted in De Castro (op cit., pp. 530 and 535) should be compared with MC Luciolli, Merchant, W.E. Knight, 750G.00/8-2953.

99. Vanni D'Archirafi's telegrams are paraphrased in De Castro, op. cit., pp 502 and 579.

100. Negri, loc. cit., p 763; Corriere della Sera, Oct. 3, 1953; Tarchiani, op. cit., p. 283.

101. Toscano affirms (Re, op. cit., p. 186) that he also received a phone call from Zoppi on the morning of August 29. This, however, must have happened after decision 9 had been made because Toscano adds that he warned that "the measures taken would be ineffective and probably counterproductive." Toscano cannot therefore be regarded as a member of the consultative group. For his observations on the role of De Gasperi see ibid., p. 184.

102. De Castro, op. cit , p. 593, footnote 15. De Gasperi's letter to Pella, which De Castro maintains was never actually sent (p. 536, footnote 13), is in M. R. Catti De Gasperi, ed., op. cit., I, pp. 240-241. In it, De Gasperi expressed some reservations about the military measures of August 29, which he studiously called "demonstrations," and manifested his concern that Pella's public rhetoric might really push Parliament to subordinate loyalty to the Alliance and European collaboration to the resolution of the Trieste problem.

103. The Trieste memorandum and the circumstances leading to the formulation of the plebiscite proposal are reported in Higgs to Dept. 243, 750G.00/9-1153. Casardi's report and Luciolli's telegram are mentioned in De Castro, op. cit., pp. 553-554. For De Castro's comment on Tito's objections to the plebiscite see ibid., pp. 567, footnote 44. Luce to Dept. 1044 and 1053 (Sept. 29, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3. That Pella's proposals had nothing to do with the sentiments of the local FTT inhabitants did not go unnoticed in Trieste. On the evening of the 13th, for instance, Higgs reported: "People [here] realize the issue is a political one between Italy and Yugoslavia and is not looked upon as a humanitarian problem by either Yugoslavs or Italians and that Pella's suggestion for a plebiscite is almost a cynical appeal to public reaction in the USA" (Higgs to Dept. 252, 750G.00/9-1353).

104. Higgs to Dept. 280, 750G.00/9-1953 and 301, 750G.00/0-2953; Luce to Dept 1008 (Sept. 25, 1953) and 1109 (Oct. 2, 1953) FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3; Il Messaggero, Oct. 2, 1953; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 578, footnote 54 and 593.

105. Re, op. cit., p. 39. De Castro also recognizes the key role played by Zoppi, Del Balzo and Casardi in this period (op. cit., p. 581).

106. Savorgnan di Brazzà, op. cit , p 146; De Castro, op cit., p. 537; Taviani, UJ, entry of Aug. 29, 1953; interview with Taviani, Montreal, Sep 16, 1988. That domestic political considerations were significant in the shaping of decision 9 is recognized by De Castro (op cit , pp. 535-537) and was also mentioned by some Italian officials to Allied colleagues. See Higgs to Dept. 194,

750G.00/9-353 and Freers (First Secretary, American embassy in Rome) to Dept. 607, 765.00/9-953) Domestic reactions were indeeed very favorable. The press, regardless of party affiliation, approved Pella's actions and welcomed what it called a foreign policy which put Italian national interests first (a summary of press reports is in Luce to Dept 719, 750G 00/8-3153). As far as the public at large was concerned, results of an opinion poll taken in November 1953 show that a majority (60%) of those interviewd approved of Pella's actions with respect to Trieste, 29% were indifferent or uninformed and only 10% disapproved The greatest number of these was to be found among supporters of the leftist parties. A relative majority (32%) of this group was nevertheless in favor of Pella's measures (see Luzzatto-Feqiz, op cit., pp. 776-778).

107. Taviani, UJ, entry of Sept. 13, 1953 Pella's fears concerning Alto Adige (reported in Novak, op. cit , p. 426) were not unfounded because, not much later, the Austrian government felt the duty to communicate to the State Department that if the South Tyrolians were to request a plebiscite "Austria would ... be impelled to give its emphatic support to such a demand" (Statement of the Austrian Embassy, 750G.00/10-1653).

108. Corriere della Sera, Sept. 19, 1953; Taviani, UJ, entries of Sept. 17 and Oct. 8, 1953; Re, op. cit., p. 242.

109. Tarchiani, op. cit., p. 282; see also Toscano's recollections in Re, op. cit., p. 185.

110. Luce to Dept. 787, 750G.00/9-553; 796, 750G.00/9-753; 808, 750G.00/9-853 and 817, 750G.00/9-953.

111. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 553-554.

112. ibid., op. cit., pp. 537 and 581.

113. Kardelj's remarks which appeared in Borba, Oct. 25, 1953, were reported in Wallner to Dept. 561 (Oct. 25, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5. For an Italian expression of the same concept see "Trieste e la Conferenza di Londra," Relazioni Internazionali 17, 43 (Oct. 24, 1953), p. 1015. Zoppi's telegram is quoted in De Castro, op. cit., p. 558; MC Luciolli, Byington, W. E. Knight, Sept. 23, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3. File ML.

5. THE CRISIS PERIOD: October 10 to December 5, 1953

Decisions, Decision Makers and Domestic Environment

Eight decisions were made during this period:

Decision 13 - October 17, 1953	Pella decides (a) to turn down the Allies' conference proposal and (b) to submit a counterproposal.
Decision 14 - October 17, 1953	Pella decides to send troop reinforcements to the Yugoslav border.
Decision 15 - October 27, 1953	The Council of Ministers decides to subject exports to Yugoslavia to government license.
Decision 16 - October 31, 1953	Pella decides to send a strong protest to the U.S. and the U.K.
Decision 17 - November 5, 1953	Pella decides to relax further the counterproposal of October 17.
Decision 18 - November 9, 1953	Pella decides to suggest that the conference be preceded by a preparatory meeting of experts.
Decision 19 - November 20, 1953	The Council of Ministers accepts the Allies' revised conference proposal.
Decision 20 - December 5, 1953	Pella decides to withdraw troops and revoke the trade measures adopted on October 27.

All of these decisions were approved by Pella but were formulated primarily by Zoppi and Del Balzo; Taviani also played a key role, especially with respect to decision 14. Decisions 15 and 19 were formally made by the Council of Ministers. There were no changes in the domestic environment.

Psychological Environment

The "domestic magnifier" and the "leverage syndrome" remained the central components of the attitudinal prism. Allied hesitation to transfer the administration of Zone A, in the wake of Yugoslav reactions to the October 8 announcement, generated "a feeling of dismay" (as Zoppi put it in a conversation with Luce on October 18) among Italian decision-makers because failure to regain Trieste after all the recent turmoil was perceived as very likely to deal a mortal blow to Pella's government. Hence Pella's request, first, that a final date for the transfer be fixed before the Senate vote on the Foreign Ministry budget and then, his government having survived that deadline, for the gradual transfer which he thought was the minimum requirement to satisfy public opinion and keep the opposition under control. If the U.S. yielded to the Yugoslav threat ("an act of international criminality," as Tarchiani defined it in a conversation with Dulles on October 14), its image as champion of justice and defender of right would be tarnished, NATO's credibility would be seriously endangered and Italy's continued democratic growth also would be jeopardized. If the U.S. would not confront "a small bandit" who was trying to prevent "the settlement of a

most urgent international problem," its willingness to respond to a Soviet threat to Europe would also be questioned. Taviani, for instance, told Luce that if Trieste was returned a continued pro-Western policy could be taken for granted whereas if Tito's tactics succeeded and the West backed down in the face of his war threats "great sections of the Italian population might regret the passing of Mussolini." The presence of the "leverage syndrome" assured that the perceptions deriving from the "domestic magnifier" would not lead to choices that would antagonize the Allies too strongly. Thus, if on October 17 a somewhat belligerent Pella told Parliament that "Italy in 1953 was no longer the prostrated Italy of 1945" and could therefore look after herself, a month later he cautioned the same audience that it "would be extremely dangerous" if the Italian "passion for Trieste" were allowed to strain relations with the Allies beyond repair because it was only within the framework of a pro-Western foreign policy that a solution for Trieste could be found [1]

There is no doubt that Italian decision-makers sincerely believed that Allied failure to stand up to Tito would provide ammunition to the nationalist Right, give the Left an opportunity to join in the same chorus and, therefore, make it much more difficult (if not outright impossible), for the government to pursue European and Atlantic policies more actively. Taviani, for instance, recorded in his journal on October 23 that "unless the Trieste problem was solved, Italy [could] remain in the Atlantic pact, only <u>juridically</u>, exactly as she had stood in the Triple Alliance." Yet the dramatic tone of these admonitions and the frequency with which they were expressed seem to indicate that they were also used by Italian decision-makers as a pressure tactic. This is particularly evident in the case of the EDC. That the solution of the Trieste question was absolutely necessary for the ratification of the EDC treaty was repeated to the Allies throughout the crisis period. Yet, Taviani's journal entry of October 30 suggests that by this time Italian decision-makers had realized that France would not ratify the treaty and had already concluded that, although the Parliamentary

majority necessary for ratification existed, it was useless for the government to engage in a battle for a cause already lost [2]

Given the lack of major changes in the attitudinal prism, the attendant images also remained basically the same The Yugoslavs, for instance, continued to be perceived as devious communist aggressors This image, moreover, now merged with that of Trieste as Danzig and the Allies as naive and irresolute to produce the contours of "a new Munich." The claim of Yugoslavia that the transfer of the administration of Zone A, "a territory which never belonged to Yugoslavia," would be an act of aggression was "typical," as Zoppi put it in a conversation with the Turkish ambassadors in Rome, "of the way of thinking, speaking and eventually acting of Communists in the Balkans, Korea, and everywhere else." Although Italian decision makers could understand how the danger of a conflict could raise preoccupations (fearing themselves that Yugoslavia was infiltrating agents into Zone A in order to create disorders, if not to launch an insurrection at any moment desired by Tito), they felt that "to yield to dictators and the threats of dictators [did] not mean, as experience had shown, avoiding a crisis, but only deferring it to have to face it under more difficult conditions." Hence, the Allied decision to call a conference before giving Zone A to Italy as requested by the Yugoslavs was regarded as "a new form of appeasement," the "exhumation of the spirit of Munich," which was all the more surprising since the Allies (and the British, in particular) "should [have] know[n]," as Pella put it, "what the results of the last Munich were." [3]

The decision to accept the Allied conference proposal toward the end of the crisis period was not brought about, as one might think at first, by a change in this composite image. Rather it was the result of it. Italian decision-makers were convinced that Tito had no intention of becoming a full member of the Western defense system and that he did not want Italy to join the Balkan pact lest she challenge Yugoslavia's hegemonic role in it Hence, they concluded, Tito had no interest in agreeing to a solution on Trieste Even worse, he had an incentive to

delay a solution Keeping the FTT question unresolved, in fact, allowed him to postpone a clarification on the question of his commitment to the West while, at the same time, permitting him to continue to benefit from American aid This was why he always put forth different proposals and never clarified his true objective. Since the Americans were too naive to realize this ("Tito is a Communist, he negotiates like a Communist," Zoppi told Luce, expressing surprise that the Americans had not yet learned from their dealings with the Soviets in Korea), Italian decision-makers thought that by agreeing to the Allied conference proposal they would put an end to Tito's game and finally make the Americans open their eyes. Likewise, the decision to withdraw troops and revoke the trade measures adopted at the height of the crisis was made not because of a change in the images of Yugoslavia but because of the perceived necessity of competing before international public opinion (and the Allies, in particular). After the Yugoslavs announced publicly their willingness to withdraw their troops if Italy would follow suit, the Italians felt they had no choice but to comply, lest they give the impression of being more rigid than the Yugoslavs. [4]

Decision Flow

Yugoslav reactions

Yugoslav reaction to the announcement that Zone A was to be returned to Italian administration was very different from the one the Allies expected. Demonstrations of protest took place in all major cities. Various Allied and Italian official buildings were vandalized.

Checkpoints along the Zone A/Zone B border were closed. Former partisans rallied in various Istrian centers to cries of "Zivot damo, Trst ne damo" (We give our lives, but not Trieste).[5] The official answer to the Allied communication came in the form of a note of protest handed by Bebler to Wallner and Sir Ivo Mallet on October 9. Its central point was that the Allied decision could not be accepted because it had been made unilaterally and thus violated the principle of the sovereign equality of states. As a Borba editorial published the same day clearly put it. "We cannot allow the big powers to decide on their own the vital questions of an allied country." The unilaterality of the decision was all the more grave since Yugoslavia, as recognized also by the peace treaty with Italy, had a special interest in the FTT. The note requested that the decision "not be carried out" and warned that the Yugoslav government was prepared "to use appropriate means to protect [its] interests."[6]

The Yugoslavs apparently considered two possible reactions: sending troops into Zone A or appealing to the ICJ. The choice was made public by Tito in a speech at Leskovac on October 10 and one at Skopje the following day. In his speech at Okroglica on September 6, he had said that Yugoslavia would not take military measures against Italian provocations. Now, however, the time had come to act. He announced that military units had been sent to reinforce the troops already located in Zone B (Yugoslav forces at the Zone A border were estimated a few days later at about 200,000). The moment an Italian soldier entered Zone A, Tito warned, the Yugoslavs would do the same. As explained in a letter to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, the entry of Italian troops into Zone A could be considered--given Italian traditional expansionist tendencies in the Balkans, the military measures of August 29 and subsequent frontier violations and revanchist statements by various political figures--as the beginning of a policy of open aggression. Yugoslavia would thus be justified, on the basis of art. 51 of the UN Charter, in resorting to force in order to protect her rights and national interests.[7]

There is little doubt that the Yugoslavs were serious about their threat. The American military attaché in Belgrade reported that "if Italian troops enter[ed] Zone A without the protection of U.S.-U.K. troops, Yugoslavia w[ould] probably attempt to seize Zone A." If, on the contrary, protection was accorded, Yugoslavia "would react most violently by other methods short of armed actions." Duroselle independently reached the same conclusion on the basis of interviews with Yugoslav officials. De Castro admits that the Yugoslavs intended to use force but, on the basis of conversations with "Yugoslav friends," concludes that this was not to be understood "in the real sense of a war." This belief would seem to be confirmed by a conversation between Bebler and the Turkish ambassador in Belgrade Informed by Bebler of the Yugoslav decision, the ambassador expressed concern that it might lead to war. Bebler replied that "the Yugoslav government hoped that the only result would be a few skirmishes." All concerned were aware that skirmishes could, however, easily escalate into something more serious.

Although ready, if necessary, to send their troops into Zone A, the Yugoslavs were nevertheless eager to avoid having to take such a dangerous step. Thus, on October 12, they suggested a four-power conference between the U.S., the U.K., Italy and Yugoslavia as a way out of the impasse. The proposal was presented by Bebler to Wallner, Mallet and Vanni D'Archirafi in Belgrade and by Foreign Minister Koča Popović to Dulles in Washington. Although the main point on its agenda would be the removal of "the threat to peace created by the October 8 decision," the conference, it was suggested, could also afford a forum for discussing the bases for a final settlement of the question. [8]

The Allied decision and the Yugoslav reaction had meanwhile created an opportunity for the Soviet Union to denounce the Anglo-American violation of an international agreement and embarass the Yugoslav leadership On the 12th, the British and American embassies in Moscow received a note protesting the October 8 decision as a "gross violation of the provisions of the peace treaty with Italy." On the

13th, another note was presented to the UN Security Council requesting a meeting to discuss the appointment of a governor for the FTT. The Soviets this time suggested the name of Colonel Fluckiger, whose candidacy they had rejected in 1948 [9]

Yugoslav leaders did not welcome this unsolicited Soviet move Insofar as it appeared to support the Yugoslav cause, in fact, it risked reawakening Cominformist sympathies within the country Yugoslav decision-makers had decided not to appeal to the Security Council but to propose a conference and merely notify the UN, precisely in order to keep the Soviet Union out of the dispute As Bebler had explained to Mallet and Wallner, in the Security Council "the Russians' veto could block, or the Russians' maneuvers complicate the step to a solution " As soon as the Yugoslavs learned of the Soviet move, Bebler requested French Ambassador Baudet to endeavor to make the Anglo Americans realize that acceptance of the Yugoslav proposal was now more important than ever. The holding of the conference could, in fact, be used to maneuver the Soviet proposal out of the way in the Security Council This diplomatic demarche was complemented by strong signals sent through the press. On the 14th, for instance, UP reported from Belgrade that it had learned from an "authoritative source" that, although the October 8 decision had dealt a serious blow to the confidence in the West gradually building in Yugoslavia, the Allies could quickly regain it by adhering to the conference proposal. The Yugoslav government, the source affirmed, was not opposed to Zone A being returned to Italy, "provided it [was] done in a facesaving way and with proper guarantees " [10]

The guarantees requested were of two types The first was a demand for an explicit Italian engagement to recognize the rights of the Slovenian minority in Zone A Given Italy's less than perfect record in this field, this demand undoubtedly reflected a sincere concern of the Yugoslav government. The second was a request for assurances that the Allies would stop supporting Italian expansionist ambitions. To be sure, the idea that there was a continuity in Italian

foreign policy running from the Liberal, through the Fascist, down to the Christian Democratic regimes and that the reacquisition of Trieste would be a springboard for further adventures in the Balkans was repeatedly invoked as one reason to reject the October 8 decision.[11] Yet this request, more than deriving from a genuine fear of Italian alleged "imperialistic appetite for Yugoslav territory," was linked to the perceived necessity of disarming actual and potential domestic opposition. As Tito himself eventually explained to the Allied diplomats in Belgrade, he did not require guarantees against further Italian claims or actions In fact, if some form of partition was agreed to, he would not object to the Italian government declaring that it did not renounce its claims to the area adjudicated to Yugoslavia. All that he desired was a public declaration by the Allies that they would not support further Italian claims. This would show Yugoslav public opinion that the Allies would not always side with Italy against Yugoslavia and that, therefore, cooperation with the West would not necessarily compromise national objectives Indeed, the major efforts of Yugoslav decision-makers after October 8 concentrated on containing and repairing the damage caused by the Allied decision to their policy of rapprochement with the West and, consequently, their prestige. Thus, while Tito's speech at Leskovac played on Yugoslav national pride by emphasizing that the country was ready to forego all Western aid if its acceptance implied compromising on questions of vital national interest and pointing out that cooperation could only develop on the basis of equality, Vice-President Moše Pijade sought instead to minimize anti-Western feelings by trying to explain Allied behavior. In an article in Politika on October 15, he wrote that the Allies had decided to return Zone A to Italy not out of disregard or indifference for Yugoslavia but because they were "blackmailed" by the Italians with the threat that they would refuse to cooperate further in all common defense efforts They had acted rashly but in good faith, believing that Yugoslavia "would be able to stand such a hard blow." At the same time, Kardelj informed Eden (and Tito later repeated to the Allied diplomats

in Belgrade) that if the Allies went ahead with their plan and let the Italians into Zone A under the cover of their own troops, Yugoslavia would refrain from using force, but the political consequences would be disastrous. Such a decision, in fact, would be regarded as an instance of unfair pressure against a small country (if not outright imperialism), "cast a dark shadow" on the role of NATO and seriously jeopardize Yugoslav continued cooperation with the West [12]

Italian concerns about Allied firmness

Italian decision-makers could ignore the Yugoslav proposal for a conference since, officially at least, they had never received it. Vanni D'Archirafi, in fact, had refused to accept the document delivered by Bebler because it contained references to Italian frontier violations which he considered offensive. [13] They were very worried, however, that the proposal might convince the Allies to reconsider their decision. Thus, as soon as they learned of it, Zoppi and Pella notified the Allied governments that "any modification of the Anglo-American decision, or even a proposal to that effect" would be tantamount to yielding to Yugoslav threats and have "very grave consequences in Italy." They also expressed the hope that the transfer of the administration of Zone A would start immediately so that it might be completed by November 4. Although reassuring as to the standing of the decision, the State Department would not commit itself to any specific date--pointing out, for good measure, that November 4 was decidedly a "highly unlikely" date for the completion of the transfer. [14]

On the 13th, the pro-government daily Il Messaggero reassured the public that Yugoslav threats and maneuvers aimed at thwarting the Allied transfer of Zone A to Italy could in no way endanger the Italian position because "before taking the October 8 decision, [the Allies]

amply evaluated, beyond its juridical aspects, all possible further developments of the question and particularly those, so easily forecastable, of threats of recourse to force, counterbalanced by general proposals to negotiate." More than an expression of a naive belief in the perfect analytic character of Allied decision-making processes or an attempt to exorcise fears, this was a maneuver on the part of the Foreign Ministry to make it more difficult for the Allies to repudiate their decision, at least publicly. Luce herself, for instance, recognized that the article could hardly be termed "unofficial." Italian decision-makers, moreover, were perfectly aware of the lack of Allied contingency planning, Taichiani having clearly pointed it out in a report on October 8. The article also contained a moral, as it were, for both the Allies and the Yugoslavs. It suggested, in fact, that the Soviet initiative in the Security Council was extremely interesting from a political point of view insofar as it provided a "test of whether Moscow and Belgrade ha[d] really ceased to be in agreement or whether, as the majority of Italian political circles believe[d], the 1948 break was only a comedy." The implication was obvious: unless the Yugoslavs acquiesced in the October 8 decision, they could not be considered bona fide allies of the West. Beyond public rhetoric, however, the Soviet move was perceived as an additional complication also in Rome. Italian decision-makers reacted, in fact, by requesting the Allied governments to try to postpone the meeting of the Security Council. To the Soviet government, instead, they conveyed the message that efforts to hamper the realization of the legitimate Italian rights in Trieste could but create an avoidable deep rancor in the Italian people. [15]

Italian concerns about Allied firmness increased when hints appeared in the Allied press (particularly in the U.K.) that the plan unveiled on October 8 represented a definitive settlement. Zoppi personally requested Luce and Sir Victor Mallet that, to dissipate dangerous doubts and facilitate the task of the Italian government, the Allies publicly state that on October 8 they had "implemented the

tripartite declaration insofar as [they were] able under existing circumstances." The final and definitive realization that the Allies had started to "capitulate" came on October 13 when some British diplomats started to suggest, although unofficially, that Italy should accept the Yugoslav proposal for a conference. Also it was learned that Trieste had been included on the agenda of a meeting of the three Allied Foreign Ministers which was to be held in London a few days later. Tarchiani and Brosio were immediately instructed to exhort the Allied governments not to succumb to the temptation of appeasing Tito. Pella, Zoppi and Casardi did the same with the Allied representatives in Rome. The Italian position, as summarized in a statement that Tarchiani left with the State Department, was that the Italian government was willing to participate in a five-power conference (i.e., one including France) to explore ways of reaching a final agreement as soon as the transfer of the administration of Zone A had been completed. To call a conference before the implementation of the October 8 decision "would constitute a clear reward to Tito's threat of aggression, increase his demands and create a disastrous impression in Italy." The substance of the Italian position was made immediately public through an interview Pella gave to Reuter and the semi-official magazine Esteri on the evening of the 14th. Pella softened it somewhat, as compared with the one contained in the statement to the Allied governments, by stressing Italy's intention to reach a solution peacefully and not insisting on the implementation of the October 8 decision as a precondition for Italy's attendance at the conference. He requested "parity," which he said could also be achieved if Yugoslavia withdrew her troops from Zone B. [16]

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Benvenuti and Director General for Political Affairs Del Balzo had meanwhile been dispatched to Paris. Their mission was to fathom French intentions and to pressure them to counsel "firmness" to their British and American colleagues at the upcoming London meeting. The report Benvenuti sent to Rome at the end of various meetings with top Foreign Ministry officials and one with Bidault himself was not very reassuring. The French could not be

counted upon to counsel firmness to the Anglo-Americans since they themselves took the Yugoslav threat rather seriously. In their opinion, the operation had been mismanaged If the Anglo-Americans really wanted a fait accompli they should have handed Zone A to Italy at the same time as the announcement of the decision. Now it had become more difficult, if not impossible, to do so The French, Benvenuti feared, would probably advance "some formulas of mediation which even if apparently reasonable w[ould] in any case create for [Italy] serious difficulties on the domestic front." The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Alexandre Parodi, had suggested, for instance, that Italy could accept the Yugoslav proposal if the Allies would guarantee the transfer of Zone A in case the conference failed to reach a negotiated solution. The news coming from Washington and London was even worse. Dulles had expressed deep concerns about the seriousness of the Yugoslav reaction. While affirming that the Allies did not intend to be deterred by threats, he had carefully dodged Tarchiani's attempts to obta n unequivocal assurances that the decision was still standing. He had instead insisted on the need for prudence and, above all, restraint in Italian public declarations. Brosio had met separately with both Eden and Harrison. The former had diplomatically refused to take a position before his meeting with Dulles. Harrison, however, had clearly said that it would be difficult to turn down the Yugoslav proposal. Brosio's conclusion was that the British had been scared off and intended to bury the October 8 decision "with international conferences or other convenient initiatives of the same kind." [17]

Confronted with mounting evidence of Allied hesitation, the immediate reaction of Italian decision-makers was to intensify their pressures. On the 15th Pella met with the three Allied ambassadors in Rome After reiterating the Italian position, he requested a date for the transfer of the administration of Zone A and warned that any "declaration, announcement or impression" emanating officially or unofficially from the Allied governments that their decision had been "withdrawn, abandoned in whole or in part, or was in effect plain

partition" would oblige him to resign. On the 16th Luciolli handed Byington a letter drafted by Tarchiani for Acting Secretary Smith. It reviewed the history of American-Yugoslav relations and recounted the many Italian protests that the policy of assistance to Tito would rebound to Italy's harm. It declared that the most recent developments had shown clearly that the Italian government could no longer accept such a policy and concluded that it would be difficult for Italy to remain in the alliance unless the Allies started to pay more attention to her views. Byington advised Luciolli not to leave the letter with him since it set a new and unfortunate tone in Italian-American relations, which would not help Italy's case. Luciolli complained that all past representations couched in more polite language had served no purpose but took the letter back. On October 17, in his speech to the Senate before the vote on the Foreign Ministry budget, Pella made public the threat that his government would resign should the Allies renege on, modify in any way or delay the implementation of their decision Although explained to the American embassy as necessary to silence criticism on both the right and the left and to have the budget approved, the purpose of Pella's "solemn engagement" was also to show the Allies that the cost of not fulfilling their latest promise was going up. Now, it would no longer be a matter of simple prestige. It also would mean the loss of a reliable government with all the political uncertainties regarding Italy's continued Atlantic policy that this would entail. [18]

The first Allied proposal

After October 8 the Allies had slowly come to realize that their plan could not be implemented as intended At the same time, they started to blame the explosive situation created by their decision on

Italian "excessive exhultations" and persisting claims to Zone B. To be sure, Italian public rhetoric had helped the Yugoslavs make a stronger case but, as demonstrated by Tito's remarks above, were not per se the reason for their reaction The Allies, however, found in it a perfect justification for changing their plan without having to admit, at least openly, to any shortcomings or deficiencies in it. On the 12th, the British Foreign Office, preoccupied by Yugoslav reactions and annoyed by what it called "Italian triumphalism," already had sought State Department concurrence for a joint public statement revealing that the tripartite declaration had been superseded and that the two countries considered the present de facto settlement to be final The State Department, however, while agreeing to censure the Italians for their "gyrations and public polemics since the announcement of the decision," doubted that such a statement would help Tito and was certain it would cause grave difficulties for Pella so counselled against it. Although it was decided that, for the time being, no suggestion should be made that the two governments intended to do anything other than pursue the course of action announced on October 8, it was already silently understood that this was no longer feasible [19]

Both the British and the Americans felt that the Yugoslavs were serious about their threat to enter Zone A and that implementation of the decision did indeed risk armed conflict. Dulles, for instance, personally tried to fathom the depth of Yugoslav resolve during a meeting with Koča Popović on the 13th and concluded, as he then told Tarchiani, that he could not simply assume that the Yugoslavs were bluffing since "the restraints from the use of force inherent in a Christian society [were] not present in the Yugoslav regime." To let the Italians into Zone A under the cover of Allied troops defeated the main purpose for which the British, at least, had made the decision in the first place (i.e., to remove their own troops) From the American point of view, it risked nullifying five years of efforts to cultivate relations with Yugoslavia and, as a consequence, wrecking all defense plans for southeastern Europe. The problem, moreover, would not be

confined to Yugoslavia alone, where such a decision, as Wallner warned, would "confirm long-standing suspicions that [the Allies] w[ould] continue to be partisans of Italian expansionist interests," but would also invest Greece and Turkey American Ambassador to Greece Cavendish Cannon, who had previously been stationed in Yugoslavia, reported, in fact, that there was "an underlying and persistent fear throughout southeastern Europe of Italian ambitions of expansion across [the] Adriatic' and that unless "all Italian claims to Istria, Dalmatia, et cetera cease[d] forthwith ... even Greece [would] become uneasy." The Turkish government went even further. Through diplomatic channels it conveyed the opinion that the Allies had put Tito in a difficult position and that, in the present situation, the interests of the Balkans and the Allies themselves would be served best by not insisting on a speedy implementation of the October 8 decision and accepting Tito's proposal for a conference. It seemed, moreover, that the Turks had acted on their own initiative, not by request of the Yugoslavs to lobby on their behalf. The idea of the conference was also personally supported by Cannon, who thought that partition had not been acceptable to Tito because it appeared to be a victory for Italy. At a conference, however, this impression could be corrected with "a few small nibbles in the frontier north of Trieste ... [which] the Italians should be persuaded to accept ... without clamor." Wallner also believed that the next step, whatever it might be, involved "some sacrifices for Pella," but perhaps the time had come "to ask Italy as a NATO partner to help redress the situation." Without specifically recommending the acceptance of the Yugoslav proposal, he nevertheless pointed out that "from the standpoint of local developments ... it would be highly dangerous to reject it out of hand." The Allies' desire to avoid a Security Council discussion of the Trieste question sponsored by the Soviets was as great as, if not greater than, that of Yugoslavia; arguing that a conference to reach a final settlement was in the making was certainly the best way to obtain a postponement. Last but not least, Luce did not oppose the idea On the contrary, she reminded the

Department that she had suggested it herself in her comments on the original draft of the October 8 plan. She made it clear, however, that the conference could not be presented as a substitute for the Allied decision but had to be convened "to approve a final settlement with such minor adjustments as may be necessary on the basis of the Anglo-American communiqué of October 8." Luce envisaged a conference, in other words, called on almost exactly the same terms as those suggested by the Italians. The challenge for the State Department and the Foreign Office, instead, was to come up with a different proposal because neither country would agree to take part in a conference called on the terms of the other. [20]

Thus, the proposal which was eventually submitted to the two parties called for a five-power conference to discuss some practical problems left unsolved by the October 8 decision, such as the use of the port and the status of ethnic minorities. With respect to the central question of the transfer of the administration of Zone A, the text was deliberately ambiguous. The intention of the Allies was to be in a position to tell the Italians that they were not revoking their decision and, at the same time, to be able to claim with the Yugoslavs that while it was still their intention to turn Zone A over to Italy, the transfer would not occur until they had had their say. They thought the vagueness of the proposal would enable each of the two countries to interpret it in the most favorable way and thus allow both of them to accept it. It was, however a difficult sleight-of-hand to perform because, as Luce immediately pointed out, Pella would turn the invitation down if "the transfer of the administration to Italy were not carried out either immediately before or simultaneously with the conference." Wallner, on the other hand, clearly stated that the Yugoslavs could not agree to attend a conference called to implement a decision they had already termed illegal and publicly rejected. At their London meeting (October 16-18) Dulles, Eden and Bidault, having learned the lesson of October 8, decided that the invitation to the conference would not be made public immediately The text would first

be submitted to Tito and Pella for their approval. This would avoid the danger of having the invitation publicly refused by both countries and thus making an already difficult situation worse. If the sounding was negative the proposal could be altered. [21]

Yugoslavia and Italy turn the Allied proposal down

On October 17, Eden communicated the text of the proposal to Brosio and the Yugoslav Ambassador in London, Vladimir Velebit. The Yugoslav answer came the following afternoon. It was given to the three Allied diplomats in Belgrade by Tito himself, undoubtedly to stress the importance attached to the question. The Yugoslavs agreed to a five-power conference but not to the agenda proposed. The latter, they argued, prejudged its outcome by limiting its purpose to examining ways to implement a decision made without them which they had already rejected. It was a question of principle involving a delicate aspect of national independence and prestige. Yugoslav decision-makers had to stand firm, especially because they had been put in a similar position by the Soviet Union in the past (the 1948 Bucharest conference, convened simply to formalize their expulsion from the Cominform) and they had refused to attend Not having yielded to the Soviet Union they could not now bend to the West Tito's tone, as noted by Wallner, although "emphatic" was also "friendly." He took care to specify that all the Yugoslavs, and he himself, valued the relationship built with the West since 1948 and that an effort to find a mutually satisfactory solution would greatly enhance it.

The following day Dulles tried to impress the idea on Ambassador Popović that Yugoslavia should perhaps privilege questions of security over those of principle If one wanted to erect a barrier to Soviet aggression in southeastern Europe, the "bone of contention" represented

by the Trieste question had to be eliminated so that the countries involved could cooperate in the common defense effort. This was all that the Allies intended to accomplish on October 8. With respect to the conference, Dulles tried another sleight-of-hand, arguing that Yugoslav participation in the conference would not involve acceptance of the October 8 decision any more than American participation would involve its repudiation. The decision merely constituted "the bare bones to which the conference could add flesh," since many matters of concern to the area, such as the problem of minorities and free port facilities, as well as mutually acceptable adjustments of a minor character, remained to be examined and settled. If the conference was held promptly, moreover, it would precede the implementation of the decision, since the mechanics of the transfer of the administration to Italy would certainly require some time to work out. This way, Dulles seemed to imply, both the U.S. and Yugoslavia could save face. Although Popović's rejoinder was limited to an appreciation of the semantic gymnastics used by Dulles in his effort to demonstrate that the Allied proposal tried to take into account Yugoslav concerns, the State Department impression was that "the conversation [had] tended to reveal some degree at least of maneuverability in the attitude of the Yugoslavs." However, this conclusion was too optimistic since, meanwhile, news of the sounding and the terms of the invitation had leaked to the press and, as a consequence, the Yugoslavs had made their refusal public. [22]

Upon receiving news of the Allied proposal for a conference from Brosio on the evening of the 17th, Pella convoked at Palazzo Chigi a meeting of his "closest foreign policy advisors." Most likely these were Zoppi, Del Balzo and Taviani. They decided to turn down the Allied conference proposal (decision 13a) and to reinforce the troops moved to the Yugoslav border on August 29 (decision 14). In the answer transmitted to Brosio, which Pella personally gave to Mallet the next morning, it was pointed out that the text of the proposal seemed to imply either that "the conference would be held prior to the actual

transfer of Zone A" or that the conference would discuss conditions for the transfer, "thus permitting Tito to establish ground rules for the implementation of the Allied decision." Neither interpretation was acceptable When first communicated, the October 8 decision and its implementation were not subordinated to any limitation or condition and it was on these terms that the Italian government had accepted it. On the other hand, in suggesting a five-power conference to discuss a final solution to the FTT question, the government had made it clear that it wished first to be put on an equal footing with the Yugoslavs, which meant either the transfer of Zone A to Italian administration or the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Zone B. These terms could not be modified because they were the basis upon which the Senate had just reconfirmed its confidence. Since the Allies had yet to communicate a date for the transfer and, worse yet, there was no sign in Trieste to suggest that this was imminent, the Italian government could not accept the proposal as formulated At the same time, it could not fail to notice that, notwithstanding its repeated warnings, "the American and British governments [had] modified the decision communicated on October 8 in its premises, substance and scope" and that "no account had been taken of President Pella's communication ... that yielding to the threats of Belgrade ... would cause [his] immediate resignation." [23]

To soften this rather rigid prise de position Italian decision-makers had also worked out a counterproposal (decision 13b) which Zoppi described to Luce that same afternoon and Pella himself presented in detail at a luncheon meeting two days later. This counterproposal rested on the notion of "implementation" as a gradual process, as opposed to a single act The first step would be the setting up of a "mixed commission" to discuss the modalities of the transfer This could start with turning over to Italy those offices which were left under Allied control at the London conference of 1952. Then a contingent of Italian armed forces could be introduced and attached to the Anglo-American ones A gradual transfer was meant to minimize, if not remove, the risk of Yugoslav military intervention. It

was difficult, Italian decision-makers pointed out, to imagine that the Yugoslavs would react to any of these small, incremental steps by occupying Zone A. Next the administration could be transformed from military to civil by substituting an Italian High Commissioner for General Winterton. Italian and Allied troops under the command of a Senior Allied Officer, preferably American, could be assigned to NATO and remain in the territory until such time as they could be totally replaced by Italian ones Once this process was under way, a five-power commission could be appointed to discuss the agenda for a conference which should not contain, however, any point dealing with the procedure for the implementation of the October 8 decision. Then, once the transfer had been completed, the conference could begin The counterproposal also indicated that the Italian government was ready to exchange with the Yugoslav one a mutual commitment, which the Allies could guarantee, that neither country would press its claims to the zone administered by the other except by peaceful means On October 22 Pella also advanced a suggestion for the revocation of the military measures taken by both countries. He instructed Quaroni, Brosio and Tarchiani to inform the Allied governments that if the Yugoslavs withdrew their troops from the border the Italians would do the same and to request that they make the necessary demarche in Belgrade. He also asked the ambassadors, and Tarchiani in particular, to hint that all that was needed to bring Tito back to reason was to deny him further military and economic aid and that, under the circumstances, the Allied policy of assistance to Yugoslavia appeared to be decidedly inconsistent with the behavior one would expect from members of the same military alliance. 24

Brosio later reported that the Foreign Office officials to whom he had submitted the counterproposal had simply "listened attentively." Bidault, instead, had promised support but Quaroni doubted the French had much influence on the Anglo-Americans. Bidault, moreover, seemed to think that the best course of action was to hold secret diplomatic talks with the Yugoslavs to permit them to reconcile themselves with the

October 8 decision The conference could then be called simply to ratify the solution already agreed upon (this, incidentally, was the first formulation of the proposal which would eventually succeed in breaking the impasse); [25] Tarchiani officially submitted the Italian counterproposal to Dulles on October 23 He received only noncommittal answers Dulles told him that asking Yugoslavia to withdraw her troops would mean being confronted by a request not to implement the October 8 decision As for suspending aid, he remarked that Tito was certainly aware of this possibility and argued that uncertainty about the possible imposition of sanctions was probably more effective than their actual imposition Concerning the gradual transfer of the administration, Dulles assured Tarchiani that conversations with the British on the many technical problems involved would begin shortly and Italian suggestions would certainly be taken into account On the central issue of the timing of the conference and the transfer, however, he resorted to the same sleight-of-hand he had used with Ambassador Popović three days earlier: he reassured Tarchiani that he "did not propose to put the October 8 decision on the agenda of the conference" while, at the same time, making it clear that he "did not have in mind that the conference should be held after the transfer of the administration had been fulfilled." [26]

Toward a second Allied proposal

The failure of the first sounding had left the Allies still facing the same problem: how to transfer the administration of Zone A to Italy without risking an armed clash with Yugoslavia Since their "distinct impression" was that the only retreat from the October 8 decision which the Yugoslavs would require at the negotiation table was a minor face-saving adjustment in the zonal frontier, [27] they continued to

regard a five-power conference as "the only available means of avoiding either a direct showdown with Tito or a retreat from [the] October 8 decision with resulting catastrophic effects in Italy, not to mention the damage to the United States' prestige." The first sounding, however, had clearly indicated that the Yugoslavs would attend only if they received assurances that the October 8 decision would not be implemented in advance of or during the conference, whereas the Italians wanted the transfer of the administration to begin prior to the conference. To come out of the impasse, the State Department and the Foreign Office revised the text of the conference proposal in an attempt to make it acceptable to both countries. Although this time the public announcement would contain no explicit reference to the October 8 decision, the basic thrust of the new proposal was precisely "to finesse," as the State Department put it, the meaning of that decision. More precisely, the new proposal rested on the distinction between civil and military administration. The conference would be called to work out a final solution to the FTT problem and the two countries invited to attend prepared only to give assurances regarding minority rights in both zones and, in Italy's case, free port facilities in Trieste. Pella would be informed confidentially that technicalities concerning the turnover of the civil administration to Italy were currently being examined and that the Allies expected to begin talks with the Italians in a "mixed commission" prior to or during the five-power conference. The beginning of the actual turnover would depend upon the completion of these arrangements and therefore a precise date could not yet be announced. At the same time Tito would be informed that while arrangements for the transfer of the civil administration to Italy would continue, ultimate control of the zone would remain in Allied hands until the end of the conference. This idea was submitted to and approved by President Eisenhower in a meeting that took place on October 22. Two decisions were made at this meeting: representatives of the State Department, Defense Department, British Foreign Office and British War Office would meet in London as soon as possible to devise a schedule

for the turnover of the civil administration to Italy. Meanwhile, British and French embassy officials would start working with the State Department in Washington on the text of the new proposal [28]

The London group met on October 27 and 28. It approved a plan which provided for the transfer to Italian administration of most of the offices which the 1952 London agreement had left in Allied hands. Control and direction of some key offices deemed essential for military security (i.e., Police, Port and Post and Telecommunications) would be retained by Allied officers. Italian understudies, however, could be appointed so as to be ready to take over their duties on the date of the Allied withdrawal of troops. The transfer of responsibilities could commence, the working group suggested, as soon as agreement had been reached on the five-power conference [29]

In Washington, meanwhile, the second working group began to draw up the text of the new conference proposal. Although the composition of this group varied slightly from one meeting to another, its core members were Walworth Barbour (Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs), Homer Byington, jr. (Director of the Office of Western European Affairs) and Henri Ruffin and Barbara Salt (First Secretaries of the French and British embassies). At the beginning of November Julius Holmes (American Minister in the London embassy) also joined in. They had to consult with their colleagues in Rome and Belgrade as well as with their superiors in London and Paris. Every detail, moreover, had to be approved personally by Dulles, Eden and Bidault. It was a slow, tiring, confused and suspicious bargaining process. The record shows that at least twenty meetings were held between October 26 and November 11 and that the group went through eight different drafts of the proposal.

The Americans were the main driving force behind it, relentlessly pushing the effort forward and vigorously surmounting obstacles and objections. The British were sceptical, if not outright pessimistic, about the outcome of this new diplomatic endeavor. Eden, for instance, was tempted at one point to give up all efforts to convene a conference

and entrust the whole messy situation to the UN Dulles convinced him that the organization of a conference, however difficult, was the safest course of action available. [30] The French paid particular attention to protecting Italian political interests and sensibilities Wallner recommended that the approach to Tito be "crystal clear" on the crucial point of Allied intentions to go ahead with arrangements for the partial transfer of the civil administration of Zone A He believed, however, that Tito could be convinced to accept the proposal since the Allies would continue to exercise final authority until the end of the conference Even Luce, after an initial irate reaction, gave her approval and assured that she would "strongly urge its acceptance by Pella" To convince Italian public opinion that the gradual implementation of the October 8 decision was indeed under way, she thought it important, however, that technical discussions with the Italians in a "mixed commission" begin immmediately after, if not at the same time as, the public announcement of the conference [31]

The Washington working group reached agreement on the text of the new proposal on November 5. Before a date for the second sounding could be chosen, however, disorders in Trieste and Italian use of them gave rise to new inter-Allied divergences of opinion and the bargaining process had to be resumed. [32]

The Italian "crisis of confidence" in the Allies

While the Allies poured their energy into "finessing" the text of their new conference proposal, Italian decision-makers, who by and large were kept informed by the French about ongoing Allied activities, worried that the Allies might decide to issue a public invitation to a conference before taking concrete steps toward the transfer of the administration. By the end of October the pace of events had slackened

and the Trieste question was no longer on the first pages of newspapers. Italian decision-makers feared that the Allies might therefore conclude that Italy had made a lot of fuss at the end of August but had eventually calmed down in the face of the firm Yugoslav reaction This, they felt, would definitively put the October 8 decision on the same course as the 1948 tripartite declaration To keep the pressure on, the Council of Ministers decided on October 27 to subject all exports to Yugoslavia to government license (decision 15). At the same time, the conviction also grew that it was necessary, as Zoppi put it in a letter to Tarchiani and Brosio on October 27, "to prevent the Allies from continuing to take advantage of our good will by putting forth embarassing proposals destined ultimately to harm our interests." The two ambassadors were therefore instructed to make it clear to the State Department and the Foreign Office that "calm and moderation in Italy derive[d] solely from the nation's awareness of its rights and the trust that it [had] in the Allies' loyalty .. but that failure to hand over Zone A would cause such a backlash of bad feelings as to make EDC ratification impossible and inevitably weaken Italy's Atlantic policy." If calm and serenity were interpreted as weakness and resignation the Italians would conclude that being heard required "the method of public threats " [33]

Pella, who was in Paris attending a meeting of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, sought reassurances from Bidault, who promised him that France would not be associated with a public invitation to a conference unless Italy had assented beforehand Pella subsequently gave an interview to Le Monde in which he stated that Italy had already made a conciliatory move by manifesting her willingness to start working toward the organization of a conference as soon as the October 8 decision had begun to be implemented Now it was up to the Allies to make the next move He concluded that he had "no reason to doubt" their intention to stick by their decision [34]

On October 31, however, Le Monde reported an AP, AFP and Reuter story from Washington that the U.S , the U K. and France were about to

invite Italy and Yugoslavia to a conference on Trieste. The news irritated Bidault and greatly alarmed and irked Pella. The former immediately issued a public statement and sent instructions to Washington and London to the effect that if the U.S. and the U.K. intended to call a conference based on suspending the October 8 decision, he would not associate himself with such an initiative. The latter, after a meeting with Bidault, spoke of a "crisis of confidence" in Italy with respect to Anglo-American intentions. He also sent instructions to Brosio and Tarchiani to lodge a strong protest with the the two Allied governments and invited Zoppi to do the same with Luce (decision 16).[35] To this end, he included a message which gave full vent to his disappointment and resentment. After pointing out that the impression had started to prevail in Italian public opinion that the Anglo-Americans did not intend to stand behind their decision, the message asked rhetorically:

> Can the Italian people continue to have faith in the decisions of the British and American governments? Can the Italian government ask the Italian people to continue to have such a faith? Under these circumstances, the Italian government finds itself in the absolute impossibility even to consider a proposal of a five-power conference, unless concrete and actual measures of implementation of the decision of October 8 shall have previously reestablished the confidence of the Italian people in the determination of the British and American governments

In a subsequent telegram he requested Tarchiani to transmit this passage to the State Department verbatim, while he left Brosio and Zoppi the choice of taking it out or toning it down. Zoppi, a consummate diplomat, deemed Pella's text too harsh and antagonizing and therefore particularly inappropriate to hand to Luce who was, after all, Italy's best ally on the American team. He sent her a letter conveying the same message expressed in a much more moderate tone. He also enclosed Pella's original text but had Casardi, who personally delivered it to the embassy, explain that it "represented an extreme position" dictated by the impression that, "despite all the advice from the embassy for the Italians to keep their shirts on, Tito seemed to gain more by taking his off." After expressing surprise at the news coming from Washington and listing all the various occasions on which Pella had stated that he

could not attend a conference prior to some implementation of the October 8 decision, Zoppi's letter concluded as follows:

> We firmly trust, dear Mrs. Luce, that ... our friend and ally, the United States Government, will not place the Italian Government, which is also bound by an explicit vote of Parliament on this issue, in the delicate and painful but unavoidable necessity of having to decline an invitation made to us . . before the decision of October 8th has been implemented, and before the Italian Government has been given a friendly opportunity of examining and expressing its views on the agenda of the Conference prior to its official communication to Belgrade

Brosio transmitted Pella's message to Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Sir William Strang on November 2. Presumably he left Pella's strongly-worded passage out since, according to his report, the meeting was calm, Strang having limited himself to pointing out that the Allied governments had not yet reached any decision concerning the issuance of a new conference proposal. [36]

Tarchiani wrote in his memoirs that Pella's instructions hit him and his aides "like a bomb." However, since they "could not sit in judgment of a decision taken by [their] chief," they simply "tried, through an artful English translation, to smooth out the form of the message while keeping the substance intact." Dulles, who had learned of the message Tarchiani was about to deliver from Luce, seized the opportunity to take a harsher stand vis-á-vis Italian intransigence. His meeting with the Italian ambassador on November 3 was indeed a stormy one. Dulles immediately requested to see the document that the ambassador had come to deliver. Tarchiani, "with some hesitation," handed it to him. Dulles perused it, read aloud the two key sentences and then, as the memorandum of the conversation reveals, remarked that "this was an unexpected step" and "expressed doubt whether the Italian Government understood the significance of those phrases." Tarchiani replied that the situation in Italy was one of "suspicion, diffidence and despair" and "gave a dissertation" upon the predicament of the government and the domestic political perils which would follow Pella's resignation or fall. Dulles rejoined that it was useless to discuss such matters if the Italian government questioned "the good faith of the U.S government" and had "no confidence" in its word. He handed the

document back to Tarchiani, suggesting that the ambassador might "want to consult further with his Government before leaving a communication of [that] kind." He then repeated that the Allies had no intention of repudiating their decision but were not prepared "to carry it out in such a way as to start another war." Tarchiani tried to interject that steps could be taken without the danger of war but Dulles cut him short by pointing out that "Great Britain, France and the United States, using their combined judgment, were in a better position than Italy to judge this aspect." Moreover, Dulles added, they had already taken some steps such as evacuating dependents of AMG personnel from Trieste and setting up a group in London to study the technicalities of the transfer. The next step would be to continue this planning stage with the Italians in a "mixed commission." The Italian government, however, was not helping the situation with its public statements about its continued claims to Zone B. Then, as he had done with Yugoslav Ambassador Popović on October 20, Dulles invited the Italian government to act with "enlightened self-interest" and consider the issue of Trieste in the broader context of common defense interests. The October 8 decision had not been intended by the Allies as "a judgment of Solomon" but as an effort toward the construction of "a solid and secure arrangement" for the defense of Italy, the other NATO countries and Yugoslavia. Giving the Italians some of their own medicine (the linkage between Trieste and the EDC), Dulles pointed out that if the Italian government expected the United States "to win back Italian confidence by treating the question [of Trieste] just exactly as Italy stipulated," there would have to be "a radical revision" of all American strategic thinking and planning for southeastern Europe.[37]

This position was reiterated unofficially, and therefore even more pungently, by Byington to Luciolli during a dinner at the home of the latter two days later. After pointing out that Dulles was furious about the recent demarche and counselling more moderation for the future, Byington pleaded for the acceptance of a new conference proposal which the working group at the State Department had approved that very

morning:

> You started the crisis for reasons of domestic politics. We went along, aware of your exigencies. We have gone so far as to risk a small war. We propose a conference to take the chestnuts out of the fire, you refuse and even worse, insult us calling into doubt our word. We have engaged ourselves but help us by accepting the conference. We cannot do anything more.

The tone used by Pella to express his frustration had ended up giving the Americans the opportunity to turn the tables and cast themselves in the role of the injured party. Now the logic of the situation was such that the Italians were expected to make a conciliatory move. [38]

And indeed on November 5, upon Zoppi's advice, Pella decided that he would not insist upon a complete transfer of civilian control as a condition for attending the conference. A "substantial implementation" would suffice (decision 17). Casardi and Del Balzo, who notified the American embassy of such a decision, characterized it as "a major concession." They also went to great lengths to explain that Pella's message reflected public opinion and not government views. The message did not question the integrity of the Allies in carrying out their commitments but simply endeavored to alert them that, unless some action was taken soon, Italian public opinion would inevitably conclude that the Allies intended to deal with their October 8 decision as they had with the tripartite declaration: by consigning it to oblivion. A written communication later delivered to the embassy stated that the Italian government was now "confidently" expecting the Allies to proceed to the next step in the transfer: setting up a "mixed commission." As for the proposed conference, the communication pointed out that the Italian position was known and hoped that "the Allied governments would not make the mistake of not taking it into consideration." [39]

The Trieste disorders of November 1953

On November 3, disorders broke out in Trieste during nationalist demonstrations. Clashes between police and demonstrators soon escalated into outright urban guerrilla actions and by September 7 six people had been killed and about one hundred injured. [40] These events led to a further straining of relations between Italy and the Allies. The Italian government claimed in its official report that the disorders resulted from the excesses of the police attempt to suppress a spontaneous assertion of italianità by the Trieste population. The Americans and the British, on the contrary, regarded the disorders as a replica of the events of March 1952; that is, as a deliberate attempt by nationalist groups, backed directly or indirectly by the Italian government, to force them to turn the administration of the zone over to Italy immediately. [41]

As is to be expected in such cases, the truth is probably somewhere in the middle. The Italian government was aware that groups of Italian neo-fascists, in cooperation with local elements, were organizing a nationalist demonstration in Trieste. Starting in mid-October, in fact, various AMG intelligence reports, which were shared with Italian officials, indicated that the neo-Fascist party was "collecting arms and organizing youth in squads" and clearly warned of the possibility of serious trouble around November 3 and 4. [42] Later, moreover, various Italian officials admitted, although privately and unofficially, that Italian security services knew of the neo-Fascist party plans. [43] There is also no doubt that the Italian government welcomed a demonstration of italianità in Trieste on November 3 (the anniversary of the arrival of Italian troops in 1918), especially given the lack of enthusiasm with which the October 8 announcement had been received in the city. Italian officials, in fact, not only did not try to dissuade the Italian organizers of the demonstration but also backed Major Bartoli's decision to stage an "unofficial" celebration on November 3 and even perorated with Luce his request to fly the Italian flag over the municipal building on that day. This initiative did not please General Winterton, given the well-known and long-standing AMG

policy of forbidding the flying of the Italian flag on government buildings and its more recent decision to suspend authorization for the holding of public meetings, marches or demonstrations. [44] Bartoli's decision to go ahead with his plans notwithstanding Winterton's negative answer to his request, the fact that the removal of the flag by the police and a subsequent attempt by the demonstrators to re-hoist it had triggered the first clashes and, finally, the less than responsible behavior of local pro-Italian individuals and organizations (which instead of attempting to calm spirits took initiatives which exacerbated the situation) all inevitably cast the Italian government in the role of supporter, if not hidden instigator, of what appeared to be a carefully planned defiance of AMG authority. [45]

In reality, Foreign Ministry officials called Bartoli on the evening of November 2, asking him to "submit and not provoke" but he did not listen. As De Castro has pointed out, the major, who could count on the support of the city council executive, acted independently of Rome as well as of his own party (the Christian Democrats). [46] The disorders resulted from the activities of right-wing agitators (or, as Unger called them, "gangs of toughs") who whipped the crowd, seemingly composed mostly of idealistic nationalists and young neo-fascists (members of the party's youth and student organizations such as Giovane Italia and Goliardia Nazionale), into action. The overreaction of some policemen who, apparently without orders to do so, shot into the crowd turned the disorders into a real battle. At most, therefore, the Italian government can be accused of recklessness and wishful thinking for believing that a demonstration organized and directed by such elements could remain confined to a peaceful assertion of italianitá and not degenerate into violence. [47]

What most annoyed the Allies, however, was the use the Italian government made of the disorders. No sooner had news of the deaths in Trieste reached Rome than instructions were sent to prefectures all over Italy to fly the flag at half mast. Protest marches were organized in all major cities Minor incidents occurred in front of some British and

American consulates. [48] Brosio and Tarchiani were instructed to lodge a protest with the Foreign Office and the State Department and ask for Winterton's removal. [49] In his public speeches Pella, besides praising Bartoli for having displayed the flag, put all the blame for the disorders on the AMG (and General Winterton, in particular) "At the origin of the events," he affirmed, "is the irresponsibility of those who, holding very delicate positions, have not been able to understand that this transitional phase required very different methods and behavior." [50]

Already on October 30 Italian decision-makers, through De Castro, had offered General Winterton to place 1200 carabinieri (an Italian military corps having police functions) at his disposal to help cope with possible disorders. Winterton had refused, arguing that the entry of Italian forces in Zone A would provoke the Yugoslavs and that, in any case, the AMG police force was sufficient to insure order in case of disturbance. Soon after the disorders, the Italian offer became a request. In two meetings with Luce on November 6 and 7 Pella asked, in fact, that the gradual implementation of the October 8 decision start with transfering the police to Italian control. The "indefensible" conduct of Winterton and the police during the recent events had had a profound impact in Italy and their removal, he argued, was necessary to restore order and assuage public opinion. Under the circumstances, Pella concluded, acceptance of a five-power conference without some visible sign of the implementation of the October 8 decision was virtually impossible. [51]

The second Allied proposal

In Washington, meanwhile, the agreement reached on November 5 on the text of the second conference proposal had been broken by yet

another change of Eden's mind. The note of protest and, above all, the fact that the Italians had singled the British out as the major villain in Trieste events had greatly irritated the British Foreign Secretary. Besides asking the State Department to issue some appropriate statement indicating American solidarity, on November 7 he also proposed that the Allies drop their current plans and release instead a statement indicating that while they had been at the point of issuing an invitation to a conference, the Trieste disorders had necessitated the reestablishment of order and the cooling of passions before the problem could be tackled again. While complying with the request for an expression of solidarity, American officials in the Allied working group at the State Department strongly opposed this proposal. They feared it would signal to the Italians that disturbances were effective and encourage them to increase their pressures for an immediate implementation of the October 8 decision. [52]

This position eventually prevailed also because of the somewhat surprising developments of a personal initiative taken by Dulles. On November 2, while the working group at the State Department still haggled over the text of the conference proposal, Dulles, without informing anybody, had asked Luce and Wallner to fathom Pella's and Tito's likely reactions "were [the Allies] privately to ask each to despatch to Washington or London forthwith a trusted official to participate in [a] secret informal meeting with tripartite representatives." The purpose of such a meeting would be to pave the way for the five-power conference or, if successful, even to replace it. [53] The idea had considerable appeal in both Belgrade and Rome. Yugoslavs decision-makers had repeatedly expressed their worries about the lack of concrete developments since the Allied sounding of October 17 and were anxious that a solution be found soon, through either a conference or other diplomatic means After the Trieste disorders, arguing that the situation in Trieste was becoming increasingly serious, the Yugoslavs tried to jolt the Allies out of their apparent inactivity by espousing Dulles's idea and turning it into a proposal Foreign

Minister Popović presented to Mallet and Wallner on November 6. It called for a meeting of the diplomatic representatives of the countries directly concerned with the Trieste question to be convened as soon as possible in one of the capitals of Western Europe to prepare for a five-power conference. Popović said it was the Yugoslav intention to release such a proposal to the press shortly. [54]

In Rome, Luce presented Dulles's idea to Pella in their meeting on November 6 After consulting with De Gasperi and the leaders of the parties supporting his government, Pella decided on November 9 to submit a memorandum to Luce in which he suggested a preparatory meeting of experts from the five interested countries to exchange initial views and establish an agenda for the subsequent conference (decision 18). Pella made it clear, however, that he still expected the transfer of the administration of Zone A to begin before this meeting was convened and be completed by a fixed date independent of the results of the meeting and the conference. [55]

The fact that both countries had made the same suggestion did not lead the Allies to reevaluate their plans, setting aside their efforts to convene a conference and concentrating instead on the organization of a preparatory meeting. Although prima facie the conditions under which the two countries expected the meeting to be called were the same as those for the conference, a reconciliation of their positions was less difficult to achieve in this case. Neither Tito nor Pella, in fact, had public or parliamentary domestic constraints with respect to a preparatory meeting of experts. Therefore, it should have been possible for the Allies to convince the Yugoslavs to agree to the transfer of some administrative posts to Italy before the beginning of the conference and, at the same time, to persuade the Italians to wait until the preparatory meeting was under way Although neither Popović nor Pella had voluntarily manifested such preparedness, it would appear that both countries would have been favorably disposed to make such a compromise if so requested by the Allies. A few days later, in fact, the Yugoslavs, while turning down the second conference proposal,

invited the Allies to give some thought to their idea of a preparatory meeting. This time they openly revealed their willingness to discuss the introduction of Italian officials into the administration of Zone A before the conference, or even during the preparatory meeting itself, "once the purely symbolic character of such officials ha[d] been demonstrated." The same concept was repeated by Ambassador Popović to Dulles on November 19 and by Kardelj to the new American Ambassador in Belgrade, James W. Riddleberger, on November 20. As for the Italians, Brosio and Casardi told Durbrow that the main purpose of the Italian "proposal" was to enable Pella to live up to the promise made to Parliament that he would not attend a conference unless parity was first attained. Hence it was important that such a meeting not be officially referred to as a "conference" because Pella had to be in a position to state before Parliament that he had not accepted a "high level" conference but had simply consented to an exploratory meeting of a different sort. [56]

The members of the Allied working group in Washington, however, did not recognize this opportunity. The convening of a preparatory meeting, they thought, presented the same difficulties a conference did. To postpone a conference, moreover, would make the Allies "lose the initiative" and, even worse, risked subjecting them to international criticism for their failure to take the measure most likely to calm the situation. Hence, despite the danger of one, if not both, of the two parties refusing to attend, they all remained convinced that "there [was] no alternative" but to continue working on their conference proposal. If the conference was to be postponed or cancelled, they thought, responsibility "should be placed squarely on the Yugoslavs and Italians for failure." Eden's proposal was thus rejected, while both the Yugoslavs and the Italians were requested to keep their proposal secret. Some new divergences of opinion on the text of the conference proposal had meanwhile arisen and a new agreement was finally reached on November 12. [57]

The second Allied sounding took place on November 13. In Rome the

proposal was submitted to Zoppi, Pella having left for an official visit to Turkey. Zoppi regretted that Pella's idea of a preparatory meeting of experts had not been retained and complained that the implementation of the October 8 decision was small. On the whole, however, as Luce reported to Washington, his reaction "was far from unfavorable." He immediately informed Pella in Ankara of the substance of the proposal and started to inquire at the legation in Belgrade about the Yugoslav answer. In Belgrade, it was Foreign Minister Popović who received the three Allied representatives. In view of the seriousness of the matter, he said he did not wish to offer any personal preliminary reactions. He would present the proposal to his government and give an answer as soon as possible. [58]

The Yugoslav answer came on November 15. Notwithstanding the carefully constructed semantic somersaults in the Allied communication, the Yugoslavs maintained that the introduction of Italian officials into Zone A prior to and during the conference would influence, if not predetermine, its course and outcome. Hence, they could not accept the proposal as formulated. In a speech in Belgrade the same day, as if to compensate for the negative answer to the Allied proposal, Tito called for a peaceful resolution of the controversy. He said the Yugoslavs were giving up their claim to Trieste because "there [was] no good will to give it to [them] on any side." He was confident that a provisional division along the zonal border could be agreed upon at the conference and expressed the hope that the Italians would attend without insisting on the transfer of the administration of Zone A beforehand. [59]

Pella accepts the second Allied proposal

Following Tito's conciliatory speech, Italian decision-makers felt that they too should publicly manifest their willingness to work out a

reasonable solution lest international public opinion conclude that Yugoslavia was being less intransigent and more reasonable than Italy. Given Pella's "solemn engagement" with Parliament, however, no alternative seemed available other than insisting on a preparatory meeting of experts Thus while officials at the Foreign Ministry started to work on a detailed plan to be presented to the Allies, Pella introduced the idea to Parliament. In a speech to the Chamber of Deputies on November 18 he affirmed, in fact, that while his conditions for attending the conference remained unchanged, "adequate preparation [was] indispensable before negotiation c[ould] begin " On November 19, however, having learned of the negative Yugoslav answer to the Allied sounding, Italian decision-makers concluded that they could go even further and accept the Allied proposal for a conference. On the next day, the decision was approved by the Council of Ministers (decision 19). [60]

Pella presented a memorandum drawn up by the Foreign Ministry to the three Allied ambassadors at 12:30 on November 21 It stated that the Italian government was "ready to accept participation in a five-power conference such as [had] been proposed to it" on November 13, as long as it was understood that:

1) the conference would seek a definitive solution for the entire FTT which would give Italy no less than was promised on October 8;
2) if the conference failed, the Allies would implement their October 8 decision in full;
3) the announcement of the convening of the "mixed commission" (i.e. the next step in the gradual implementation of the October 8 decision) was made together with or immediately after that of the conference but before that of the preparatory meeting (should the Allies decide to have one) and the replacement of Allied functionaries with Italian ones in the AMG started before the conference;
4) the preparatory meeting, if held, would not question the implementation of the October 8 decision.

The implication was that these conditions had already been agreed to by the Allies in their November 13 sounding and that they were being repeated simply to avoid any possible misunderstanding Pella also suggested that after the announcement of the conference and the convening of the "mixed commission," Rome and Belgrade simultaneously could announce military normalization at their borders Italy would also announce the revocation of the trade measures of October 27 He requested that these proposals remain secret until then [61]

On the morning of November 22, following receipt of the Italian reply, the Allied working group at the State Department met to discuss the next step. Although the second sounding had only reconfirmed the original positions (Yugoslavia expected no transfer to occur before the conference, while Italy viewed the beginning of the transfer as a pre-condition for attendance), the group optimistically concluded that "a considerable measure of agreement" now existed for a conference to be called soon. Since the conditions listed in the Italian reply did not require any open or public acknowledgment, the Allied working group felt that such a difference could be bridged through a further semantic finessing of a new proposal to be resubmitted to the Yugoslavs In substance, they were to be told that the Italians had accepted fully the idea of a conference and requested to reconsider their position The Foreign Office agreed. Instructions were sent the same day to Belgrade [62]

The Italian desire to ingratiate international public opinion dealt a blow to this plan immediately. The Yugoslavs, adhering to the recommendations made with the sounding, had maintained a press silence and were waiting for a formal invitation, which they hoped would take into consideration their position. The Italians, instead, made their reply to the sounding public. Following Pella's meeting with the Allied diplomatic representatives, an official communiqué was released It stated that Italy, continuing in her "positive and constructive attitude," had accepted the five-power conference suggested by the Allies. The Yugoslav reaction was cautious at first A Tanjug pre-

release, published in Borba on November 22, stated that Yugoslav official circles had received such a communiqué "with reserve and without particular optimism" because Italian acceptance was probably dependent on prior implementation of the October 8 decision. It then pointed out that, if this was the case, Yugoslavia could not participate in such a conference and that "only a preparatory meeting without a fixed agenda and conditions . represent[ed] a realistic and feasible solution." Italian decision-makers now felt the need to make explicit what the Yugoslavs had prudently put in hypothetical form. On November 23, pro-government Il Messaggero published what Luce described as "an authoritative although unattributed front page story." It stated that the Italian government, following the Allied sounding of November 13, had requested clarifications in order to evaluate the proposal. Since they had been satisfactory, "in the sense that they met those minimum conditions on which the Italian government's adhesion depended," the proposal had been accepted. [63]

The Italians had now publicly pre-interpreted what the Allies intended to present ambiguously (i.e., the extent, significance and timing of the administrative transfer prior to the conference). By doing so in advance of the public issuance of the conference proposal itself, they were saddling the Yugoslavs with a hard choice: either to accept the conference on Italian conditions, or to refuse to attend and thus be exposed to international public opinion as unduly rigid and unreasonable. To make things even worse, The New York Times had meanwhile published a story stating that after the announcement of the Italian decision to attend the conference "a Yugoslav reply [was] awaited." The long-standing suspicions of the Yugoslavs about Italian-Allied collusion now seemed to be confirmed. On November 24, Foreign Minister Popović regretted that the Allies had not retained the Yugoslav idea of a preparatory meeting, which seemed acceptable also in Rome, and had chosen instead to put pressure on Yugoslavia to agree to the unacceptable condition that the conference be held after the administration of Zone A had been handed over to Italy. Under the

circumstances, Yugoslavia could only hope that the Allies would reconsider [64]

The Allied hope that the Yugoslavs could be convinced to accept the transfer of some symbolic administrative post before the conference had now received a mortal blow. Pressuring the Italians to relax their conditions did not look any more promising. Following the Yugoslav reaction, in fact, Zoppi and Del Balzo concluded that the Anglo-Americans were likely "to capitulate again" before Tito and, consequently, to submit a revised conference proposal that would prove unacceptable to Italy. Wishing to avoid, for reasons of international image, having to turn it down, they suggested to Pella that the Anglo-Americans must be made to realize that Italy could and would not back up any further. Pella agreed with this recommendation and immediately instruct d the ambassadors in the Allied capitals accordingly. Quaroni was also requested to enlist the help of Bidault. [65]

Toward a third Allied proposal

These events started a new debate among the Allies about what to do next. The three Allied diplomatic representatives in Belgrade opposed a new approach to Tito. [66] The Foreign Office suggested that the new invitation to Belgrade should be to a preparatory meeting, rather than a conference, and that technical discussions with the Italians in a "mixed commission" should begin after the preparatory meeting had convened rather than immediately following its announcement [67] No sooner had this suggestion been adopted than Eden came up with a new proposal. Arguing that the current diplomatic attempts to convene a preparatory meeting or a conference had proven fruitless after almost six weeks of effort, he suggested centralizing the endeavors in one

spot, perhaps Paris, by arranging for the four ambassadors there to meet secretely with a French representative. The members of the Allied working group strongly opposed this suggestion because, in their opinion, all possibilities of convening a preparatory meeting had not yet been exhausted. [68] Eden eventually agreed that it was better to go ahead with the new sounding in Belgrade, as one could always revert to the idea of an ambassadorial meeting if the approach proved unproductive. On November 28, after the incorporation of some minor revisions suggested by both the French and the British, the text of the new proposal was finally approved. [69]

On November 29, in a speech at Jajce and an interview with Oslobodjenje, Tito reiterated Yugoslav willingness to attend a preparatory meeting to work out a temporary division of the FTT. In a conversation with Riddleberger on the same day, moreover, Bebler "expressed the hope" that if the transfer of some administrative posts to the Italians before the conference were absolutely necessary and still contemplated they might be restricted to the city of Trieste, the city already having been publicly renounced by Tito. Now it was France's turn to come up with a new proposal. Although they had been impressed by the more flexible position of the Yugoslavs, they believed that there was still a substantial gap between the positions of the two countries toward attending a conference. They suggested that, in order to relax the tension and diminish the gap further, Allied efforts concentrate on trying to bring about a meeting of the Italian and Yugoslav ambassadors in one of the Allied capitals to discuss subsidiary issues, such as the withdrawal of troops and the revocation of the Italian trade measures of October 27. Should the two parties reach agreement on these issues, a more favorable climate would exist in which to reopen negotiations on a conference. The Allied working group opposed such a proposal, maintaining that apparent Yugoslav flexibility was, if anything, a reason to proceed with the demarche in order not to lose momentum toward a conference. [70]

On December 1, Bidault declared himself ready to drop his

suggestion and to agree to action in Belgrade on condition, however, that the the introduction of Italian personnel into the administration of Zone A begin prior to the preparatory meeting. Bidault was acting here on Pella's request that he help make the Anglo-Americans realize that Italy was not prepared to accept any further retrenchement from his understanding of the November 13 proposal. Bidault's condition actually improved Pella's understanding of the November 13 sounding, as the Italians had simply requested the introduction of Italian personnel before the conference and not the preparatory meeting. The Allied working group was puzzled at how Bidault could believe that the Yugoslavs would accept a formula which worsened rather than improved the one used on November 13 and wondered whether he "[had] no exact understanding of the issue or simply wish[ed] to delay the approach." [71] Time, the group also felt, was pressing. The situation in Trieste was still volatile and, at the UN, the debate called by the Soviet Union to elect a governor for the FTT had already been postponed three times on the grounds that efforts to reach a negotiated solution were under way. Under the circumstances, the call for a conference could not be delayed much longer. After repeated efforts to convince Bidault to drop his request, the group decided that Eden and Dulles, who were to meet Bidault at the Bermuda conference (a forerunner of today's so-called "summit meetings"), would personally make a last attempt. If Bidault remained unmoved, the next sounding in Belgrade would be made without the French. [72] Bidault finally agreed to drop his condition after Dulles suggested that "it might be less awkward for the French in light of their special and valuable relationship with [the] Italians if [the] U.K. and [the] U.S. took responsibility for [the] next approach." Dulles also had to agree, as a compromise, that the convening of the "mixed commission" be announced by the AMG rather than the Allied governments and at the same time as the preparatory meeting was announced. The final text of the instructions for the new sounding in Belgrade was sent on December 5. The meeting with Foreign Minister Popović was set for 5:00 p.m. on December 6. [73]

While the Allies were wrangling among themselves about the best way to approach the Yugoslavs, the latter were trying to open a direct dialogue with the Italians. On November 28 a Yugoslav counselor of the legation in Rome remarked to an official of the Italian Foreign Ministry that all Yugoslavia desired was a division of the FTT along the present zonal lines, provided that the Slovenian minority in Zone A was protected and port facilities for Yugoslavia were arranged. Two days later the same point was reiterated by the First Secretary of the Yugoslav legation. Although skeptical about Yugoslav intentions, Zoppi requested that the French chargé ask his government to inquire in Belgrade whether the statements made by the two Yugoslav representatives in Rome had any validity since, if they did, they might open the way for a conference settlement. Still preferring not to have direct dealings with the Yugoslavs when, on December 4, Yugoslav Minister in Rome Gregorić asked for a meeting with the Prime Minister, it was decided that if he raised the same point again Pella would reply that the proposal had some merit but suggest that he mention it to the Allies for their consideration as a possible basis for a conference. [74]

A direct agreement between the Italians and the Yugoslavs, without Allied assistance, however, was reached on a joint withdrawal of troops. Pella had told the three Allied representatives on November 21 that the two countries could work out the withdrawal of their troops immediately after the announcement of the conference. In his speech at Jajce on November 29, Tito had suggested that the Yugoslavs were "prepared to have both armies withdraw so that the matter c[ould] be discussed without armies on the frontier." Italian decision-makers now concluded that the withdrawal could take place even if the conference was not yet in sight. Also on this issue, the first, almost Pavlovian, response was to contact the Allies in the belief that "some form of tripartite assistance in working out the details and getting the final agreement might be helpful." Upon Yugoslav insistence, however, the agreement was reached directly by Pella and Gregorić in a meeting on December 5. The withdrawal would begin immediately and be completed by December 22. As

part of this agreement, the Italians also decided to revoke the trade measures of August 27 (decision 20). [75] Yugoslav perseverance was probably due to the effects of the trade measures and the problems caused by the mobilization. Although Italian officials maintained that only strategic goods (oil and petroleum products, in particular) were affected by the measures, the definition of "strategic" was quite liberal, since only citrus fruits and seed to be used to grow produce and fodder had been exempted. Given also the inevitable bureaucratic delays in granting export licenses, the measures amounted for all practical purposes to a trade embargo which hurt Yugoslavia, given that Italy was, after all, a significant trading partner. Before attempting to have them revoked through a direct agreement, the Yugoslavs had presented three notes of protest and denounced them in the press. Mobilization, on the other hand, was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as winter approached, given the inadequacy of such infrastructures as military barracks and road communications near the Italian border. [76]

The Yugoslav press highlighted the significance of this direct agreement, commenting snidely on "possible" complications if the matter had been handled by Western "mediators" and expressing hope that this was the beginning of "a more realistic and more sensible attitude on the part of Rome." Upon instructions from Belgrade, Gregorić openly suggested to Pella that the remaining issues also be solved through direct negotiations. Although through the press Italian decision-makers seemed to suggest that this might indeed have to be the case unless the Allies came forward with something acceptable soon, they refused to embark on this road immediately and continued to look to Washington for a final solution. [77]

The December 5 agreement marked the first thaw in Yugoslav-Italian relations and broke the perverse spiral (of negative images and conflictual behavior) which had plagued the interaction between the two countries since the end of World War II From then on, Italian images of Yugoslavia would start to improve and, although very slowly at first,

lead to better relations in a self-reinforcing positive spiral until October 1954 when, an agreement on Trieste having been reached, half a century of rivalry and tensions seemed to dissappear in an instant. [78]

Crisis Components

According to the ICB model, a crisis period is characterized by an increase in threat perception" and the appearance of the perceptual components "time pressure" and "probability of involvement in military hostilities." [79] Although in the attempt to convince the Allies to implement their decision Italian decision-makers argued that Tito's threats were just a bluff, there are indications that the prospect of being left alone in Zone A to face Yugoslav forces was not particularly appealing in Rome. When giving the official answer to Luce and Mallet on the evening of October 10, 1953, Pella already had manifested some apprehension, noting that "whatever friendly advice the Allies might wish to give to Belgrade ... would certainly turn out to be quite useful." While not openly or officially asking for Allied military cover, Italian decision-makers nevertheless sent signals in this direction. Thus Zoppi and Magistrati separately inquired of Luce on October 10 and 11 whether the U.S. intended to leave any troops in Trieste or whether they had any plans for establishing a military facility in the area. Luce replied that the plan was to remove all Allied forces Then, while negotiations on military facilities in the rest of the country were still dragging on, the Foreign Ministry let the American embassy know that "in the event the U.S. desire[d] to request the authorization to establish a military facility in the Trieste area, the Italian government [would] grant the request immediately." [80] The

press agency ADE, a mouthpiece of the Ministry of Defense, after pointing out that "one could not exclude whimsical and reckless decisions on the part of Tito," suggested that the NATO Command in Naples convince the American Sixth Fleet to show itself in the Adriatic This would certainly "cool Tito's bellicose folly." It also pointed out reassuringly that General Gruenther had declared in The Hague that a conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia on the question of Trieste "would inevitably have repercussions on NATO" since "peace was indivisible." [81]

The increase in threat perception was only indirectly linked to Tito's announcement that he would send Yugoslav troops into Zone A What worried Italian decision-makers the most, in other words, was not that the Yugoslavs might act on their threat but that the Allies might be deterred and decide not to go ahead with the transfer. The Yugoslav threat was something about which the Allies had to worry. As Marras put it at one point to the American military attaché in Rome, "it [was] up to the [Americans] to control Tito since [they had] given him tanks and guns." Hence, the major Italian effort was to convince them that the Yugoslav threat was not so serious while, at the same time, trying to ensure that their troops would stand by just in case the threat turned out to be serious. Time pressure, which, as mentioned above, was already present in the pre-crisis period, now increased. Once the Allied decision had been announced, failure to reacquire Zone A was worse than it would have been before October 8. As Pella put it, the objective was not to let the October 8 decision become "frozen credit," otherwise, it would have been better that it never be made. [82]

Findings

Information

The beginning of the crisis period marked an increase in the Italians' felt need for information. At first, the information sought related primarily to Allied intentions (this, incidentally, can be taken as yet another sign that Italian decision-makers worried more about the possibility that the Allies might be deterred by the Yugoslav threat of intervention than about the threat itself). Later, as the debate started to revolve around the issue of the conference, information about Yugoslav intentions also started to be perceived as vital.

This increased need for information did not lead to the opening of new channels but only to a deeper probe of existing ones. With the exception of a special trip to Paris by Benvenuti and Del Balzo (prior to the London meeting of Allied foreign ministers in which it appeared the choice between firmness or capitulation before Tito's threat would be made), the Italian embassies in the Allied capitals and the Allied diplomatic representatives in Rome remained the main sources of information The different records consulted show, however, that the number of meetings between Italian and Allied officials increased by 12.5% with respect to the pre-crisis period (90 meetings in 45 days as opposed to 77 in 44 days). This increase is more significant than the number might suggest at first since during this period, unlike the pre-crisis period, Italian officials could count on the French to provide most of the information desired. Bidault, for instance, reported to Quaroni all the behind-the-scenes discussions at the London meeting, while the Quay d'Orsay, through Quaroni and French Ambassador in Rome Fouques du Parc, kept Pella and Zoppi constantly apprised of all British and American actions in Belgrade as well as of their positions and intentions concerning the conference. [83]

The inquiries, particularly those in Washington, besides being more frequent, were also more persistent and direct (or less diplomatic, one might say) In his meeting with Dulles on October 14, for instance,

Tarchiani attempted repeatedly to draw him out on American intentions Since Dulles carefully avoided any straightforward answer, he sent Luciolli to try his luck with Byington. After unsuccessfully trying different tactics, Luciolli abandoned all circumlocutions and asked point-blank whether the U.S. intended to go ahead with the transfer of the administration of Zone A. Byington evaded the question by pointing out that there was nothing he could add to what the Secretary had already said to Tarchiani. On November 19, Luciolli again tried to find out from Byington the precise content of the Yugoslav answer to the second Allied sounding. This time, Byington politely but firmly told him that he was not at liberty to give him the information requested 84

A few meetings also took place between the Italian Minister in Belgrade Vanni d'Archirafi and Bebler in Belgrade and officials of the Yugoslav legation and Pella and Zoppi in Rome. Although this was a novelty compared to the pre-crisis period, when the two legations had served, on the subject of Trieste at least, almost exclusively to transmit reciprocal notes of protest, it cannot be regarded as an Italian attempt to establish a direct channel of information, since the initiative came from the Yugoslavs. It was, rather, part of yet another effort by the Yugoslavs to open the way for direct negotiations De Castro affirms that Italian decision-makers learned of the Yugoslav negative answer to the second Allied sounding "through an indirect, non-Allied source" (i.e., not from the French). Whatever the channel through which the information reached Rome, there is no indication that it was an extraordinary one set up especially during this period. Most likely, the information was obtained through the secret service. Its gathering, moreover, can hardly be considered a coup, since a simple perusal of the Yugoslav press would have indicated the same conclusion, although as an educated guess rather than a certainty. 85

Pella, like De Gasperi during the prelude to crisis period, communicated directly with various Western colleagues. These direct contacts cannot, however, be regarded as new or extraordinary channels

of communication, as they always occurred during regularly scheduled international meetings or visits of state (an OEEC meeting in Paris at the end of October, state visits to Turkey on November 12-14 and the Netherlands on November 24-25 and a conference of the ECSC foreign ministers in The Hague on November 26-28). More than searching for new information, moreover, Pella's main objective during these meetings was to promote the Italian point of view and seek solidarity among Western allies or, to use the expression of an Italian political commentator, "to give the Trieste crisis a more international scope." [86]

Information continued to be channeled through the Office of the Secretary General. The information processing group also remained the same, except for the first couple of weeks in November when Quaroni and Brosio (who had been recalled to Rome for consultation) also joined in. [87]

The interpretation of information continued to be marred by occasional biases and lingering prejudices, but not to a greater degree than in the prelude to crisis and pre-crisis periods. One cannot say, for instance, that Tarchiani gave a very faithful rendition of his conversation with Dulles on October 14. His press release, in which he stated that "absolutely nothing ha[d] been said which could be construed in any way as an indication that the United States plan[ned] to amend or delay the October 8 decision" can be explained by the perceived importance of not letting Italian public opinion know that the Allies were hesitating before Tito's threat. His report to the Foreign Ministry that "following [Italian] insistence, the Americans had finally decided to choose between [Italy] and the Yugoslavs," however, can be attributed only to wishful thinking or his desire to give his superiors the news he thought they wanted to hear. Dulles' remarks, in fact, especially his reluctance to give any assurance that the decision was about to be implemented, clearly betrayed American doubts about the wisdom of challenging the Yugoslavs further by proceeding with the transfer. [88]

Continued distrust of the Yugoslavs, on the other hand, led

Italian decision-makers to interpret their renewed efforts to engage in direct talks at the end of November as nothing more than a tactical maneuver to counter Italian acceptance of the conference proposal. They regarded Yugoslav overtures, in other words, as aimed solely at justifying a refusal of the upcoming Allied sounding with the excuse that direct negotiations with the Italians were taking place Likewise, the fact that the Yugoslav appeal to the UN was contemporaneous with the Soviet initiative in the Security Council was taken to mean that the rapprochement between the two countries, which Italian decision-makers had always maintained to be inevitable, was well under way. This interpretation, however, seems to have been exaggerated on purpose in order to be used as a form of pressure on the Allies. [89]

In conclusion, the advent of the crisis period resulted in a slightly greater felt need for information. It did not lead, however, to the search for or opening of new channels but was satisfied through a deeper probe of existing ones. There were no marked changes either in the size or the receptivity of the information processing group

Consultation

The advent of the crisis period marked the entrance of some new actors into the consultative circle. The meetings with Luce and Bidault, for instance, not only achieved their goal of acquiring information but also served the purpose of obtaining advice. Among Allied officials they were, in fact, those who most sympathized with Pella's plight. The slightly more conciliatory position expressed by Pella in his interviews with Reuter and Esteri on October 14 (Italy would assert her claims to the FTT only by peaceful means, as befitted a member of the Atlantic alliance, and would agree to a conference even prior to the transfer of Zone A provided Yugoslavia withdrew from Zone

B), as compared to the very rigid one contained in the instructions sent to Brosio and Tarchiani on October 13 (anything less than the immediate and complete implementation of the October 8 decision was pure and simple "appeasement"), was adopted, for instance, following a conversation between Luce and Taviani on the morning of the 14th whose content the latter had immediately relayed to the Prime Minister. Luce had suggested that in the delicate situation resulting from the Yugoslav threat Pella could not simply stand still and merely exact the full implementation of the October 8 decision. He had instead to take initiatives to relieve tension and try to link each of them to Italy's duties and responsibilities as a member of the Atlantic alliance. The Italian position was relaxed even further in the counterproposal of October 17, in which the unrealistic condition that Yugoslavia withdraw from Zone B was replaced by a more reasonable request for a gradual transfer of Zone A. [90]

Pella sent a strongly-worded protest to the U.S. and the U.K. after consultation with Bidault in Paris on October 31. The opinion of the French foreign minister, to whom Pella showed the text of his message and, above all, his assurance of support, were of critical importance because Pella decided to go ahead with such a step despite the fact that both Tarchiani and Brosio had reported only a day earlier that the Allies' conference proposal included "a substantial beginning of implementation of the October 8 decision" and would be submitted confidentially to Italy before being made public. Most likely, Pella discounted this information and, on the basis of the ambiguous report published in Le Monde, concluded with Bidault that the Anglo-Americans intended to pressure them into accepting a conference on terms both of them considered unacceptable. [91]

As Pella's domestic political situation started to become more delicate, especially in the wake of the Trieste disorders, he sought not only advice but also encouragement and support from President Einaudi, who was something of a mentor to him. Indeed, it would appear that, taken as he was between the pressure of the right wing parties (which

favored a strong nationalist policy with anti-Western implications) and the mounting criticism of some sectors of his own party, like the popolari, for instance (which regarded a policy of open confrontation with the Allies as a dead end), Pella became progressively "dejected and disheartened" and seriously considered resigning. Einaudi, however, convinced him to stay on.[92]

Before deciding to retreat from his original decision not to enter into any type of negotiation with the Yugoslavs prior to the full transfer of the administration of Zone A, Pella consulted with his own party as well as the leaders of the parties directly or indirectly supporting his government. De Gasperi, for instance, was the one who suggested the clause that, in exchange for Italy's agreement to attend a preparatory meeting of experts soon after the beginning of the transfer, the Allies would set a fixed date for its completion. The pro-government parties formalized their approval through the press, stating that they were not opposed to Pella's new position because, as an official statement of the Christian Democratic party put it, "some concessions had to be made ... if Italy did not want to run the risk of ending up by getting nothing."[93]

The question of how Pella could assume a more flexible posture on the conference without betraying his promise to Parliament was also discussed at Cabinet meetings. On November 11, for instance, Taviani told Luce "in strictest confidence" that one way the Allies could help Pella extricate himself from his commitment to Parliament was to have the conference imposed on him from a higher level--for instance, by President Einaudi acting on a direct request from Eisenhower. He also said that such an idea had emerged during a Cabinet discussion. Given that Pella's survival as Prime Minister was perceived to depend largely on finding a satisfactory solution to this question, it is not surprising that the whole Cabinet became involved in such a quest. It does not seem, however, that such discussions were encouraged by Pella himself.

Chief of Staff Marras played a key role in the formulation of

decision 14 and was consulted before the making of decision 20. Such a consultation, however, was technical and not political. Pella, in other words, sought from him an estimate of how long he would take to complete troop withdrawal, not his opinion about the decision to withdraw. [94]

The consultative role of the pro-Italian political leaders in Trieste remained very limited. Following the Trieste disorders, for instance, they suggested to Pella that he should request the immediate transfer of the police to Italian administration, demand the removal of Winterton and make an appeal to the UN. Pella retained the first suggestion because it agreed with his request for a gradual transfer of administration, perfunctorily acted on the second but strongly opposed the third lest such an appeal help the Soviets in their disruptive effort in the Security Council or give an opportunity for countries with mediatory ambitions to come forward with some "bright ideas." When, upon Mayor Bartoli's instigation, the Trieste city council decided to send its own appeal to the UN, the reaction from Rome was furious. Cabinet Under-Secretary Giulio Andreotti, for instance, implored Bartoli and other pro-Italian leaders to stop "putting oil on fire" and warned them that unless they "abide[d] by the directives coming from Rome" they "could go to the dogs and Rome [would] not concern with them further." Indeed, relations became so strained that it took considerable patience and diplomatic skill on the part of De Castro to restore them to normalcy. [95]

As a whole, however, it was the diplomatic elite that continued to play the main consultative role during the crisis period. Zoppi, Del Balzo and Casardi (in this order), remained Pella's closest advisors. They participated in the discussions preceding all decisions, with the partial exception of decision 16. Both Del Balzo, who had accompanied the Prime Minister to Paris, and Zoppi, who had stayed behind in Rome, were informed by Pella of his intention beforehand, however. The fact that the record does not show any attempt on their part to dissuade him from lodging his strong protest with the U.S. and the U.K. suggests that they did not disapprove of the decision in principle--although Zoppi, at

least, might have preferred a more diplomatic language. The ambassadors in the Allied capitals also played an important role, both through their reports and in person Brosio and Quaroni, in fact, were recalled to Rome for consultation on November 7 and took part in the deliberations leading to decisions 18 and 19. On the political side, Defense Minister Taviani (and, to a lesser extent, Under-Secretary Benvenuti) also continued to play a noticeable role.

In conclusion, the pattern of consultation during the crisis period changed in two respects: the consultative circle extended beyond the diplomatic elite (which continued, however, to remain at its core) to include some new actors (both individuals and groups) and meetings became more formal and much more frequent The record shows, for instance, eight formal meetings between Pella and the core political-diplomatic group, compared to only three in the pre-crisis period. There were also four meetings between Pella and Einaudi and six with different party leaders and parliamentary groups compared to one and two, respectively, during the pre-crisis period Finally, there were six meetings of the Council of Ministers during this period and only two in the pre-crisis period.

The reason for this surge, as it were, in consultative activity was that, once the Allies had made it clear that they would not hand Zone A over to Italy before a conference was held, it became necessary for Pella to find a course of action which would be conciliatory toward the Allies, whose diplomatic weight he still regarded as necessary to reach a favorable solution and, at the same time, palatable to domestic hardliners, whose political support he needed to remain in power The increase in consultation (in terms of both the number of participants and the number of meetings) was, in other words, a reflection of the very active search for an appropriate way to deal with Allied hesitation. Under these circumstances, therefore, there was more scope for consultation than there had been in the pre-crisis period

Decisional Fora

All decisions in this period were ultimately approved by Pella but formulated and discussed, and therefore technically made, in a larger forum composed primarily of his closest diplomatic advisors. Thus, decision 13 was made on the evening of October 17 by Pella, Zoppi, Del Balzo and Taviani (possibly with Casardi and Benvenuti). There was no disagreement on the need to turn down the Allied conference proposal, given Pella's pledge to Parliament only a few hours earlier. The counterproposal formulated at the same meeting indicates, however, that all present were also convinced that no solution could be achieved by entering into an open confrontation with the Allies.

The decision to move additional troops to the Yugoslav border was primarily a technical one. The initiative came from Chief of Staff Marras, who had only reluctantly complied with the order to move troops on August 29. Following the Yugoslav countermeasures of October 10, however, Marras felt that, from a strictly military point of view, it was necessary to send reinforcements or risk being overrun in case of a Yugoslav attack. Between October 13 and 16 he requested the necessary authorization from the Minister of Defense four times. Taviani, however, estimated that a Yugoslav attack was highly unlikely. ("Tito is not the megalomaniac some people make him out to be," he wrote in his journal on October 16, "he is a sensible person"). Therefore, he preferred to postpone such a decision until the end of the London meeting of the Allied Foreign Ministers. If, as he expected, the meeting marked the beginning of a process of backtracking from the October 8 decision, sending reinforcements would put additional pressure on the Allies. Hence, notwithstanding Marras' insistence, Taviani waited until this meeting to submit his request to Pella for approval. 96

Little information is available about the genesis of decision 15. The idea might either have been suggested by Marras as a collateral

measure to his request for reinforcements or have emerged during the discussion at this same meeting. Whatever the case, the measure could, under the circumstances, be justified as a standard operating procedure and was, therefore, a very convenient way for Italy to apply some direct pressure on Yugoslavia. As Luciolli explained to the State Department, since Yugoslavia threatened to wage war, Italy could not be expected to supply fuel for her tanks to cross the border. Although the decision was probably made at this meeting, it had to be formally approved by the Council of Ministers (October 27) and went into effect only on October 29. Its implementation, in fact, was to be carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. [97]

Pella alone was responsible for decision 16. It was an instinctive reaction to the suspicion, shared also by Bidault, that the U.S. and the U.K., despite his efforts to grant their wishes for a conference, intended to force it on him in total disregard of his political difficulties. No matter how strong, however, Pella's protest did not imply a revision of the conclusion, exemplified by decision 13b, that a solution to the current impasse necessarily lay in a compromise This, most likely, was the reason why Zoppi, who continued to play the key role among Pella's advisors, did not question the Prime Minister's initiative but merely tried to soften its impact on the Allies--and Luce, in particular. The diplomats, of whom Zoppi could be said to embody the official, collective position, were indeed the driving force behind each of the successive retreats Pella made from his initial position of no conference without transfer. The initial input for decision 17 came, for instance, from Tarchiani. Following his stormy meeting with Dulles on November 3, he counseled his superiors in Rome "to accept the next conference proposal on the basis of some implementation of the October 8 decision, without insisting on almost complete implementation." "I am aware," he added, "of the responsibility I take in giving such advice and the even greater political responsibility the government would take were it to accept it. I believe, however, that it is still my duty to give it." Zoppi

endorsed Tarchiani's suggestion and persuaded Pella to make it his new position. [98]

The diplomats also played an important role in convincing Pella that a preparatory meeting of experts would enable him to appear both conciliatory toward the Allies and faithful to his promise to Parliament. Pella made decision 18, in fact, after various meetings with Zoppi, Del Balzo, Casardi, Brosio and Quaroni, the last of which lasted all of November 9. Given the political sensitivity of the issue, however, this time Pella also sounded the representatives of the parties upon whose continued support the survival of his government depended. [99] Since it had to be made public, decision 19 was formally made by the Council of Ministers. In reality, it was again Zoppi and Del Balzo, once they learned of the Yugoslav refusal, who persuaded Pella to accept the Allies' revised conference proposal. [100]

Finally, the diplomats were also the main influence behind Pella's decision to withdraw troops and normalize trade relations with Yugoslavia. On this point their advice to Pella was in open contrast with that provided by Taviani. The latter maintained that it was necessary to keep the troops where they were because the danger of a conflict was what spurred the Allies to work toward a solution. Besides, he was convinced that the cost of mobilization and the virtual trade embargo Italy had imposed would sooner or later become unbearable for Tito and he would, out of necessity, prove more reasonable. Thus, while the diplomats concluded that Tito's conciliatory speech of November 15 in Belgrade made it necessary for Pella to come out with a public display of good will, Taviani regarded the speech as a sign that Tito's retreat had begun and was of the opinion that, now more than ever, it was vital for Italy to stand firm. He forcefully and repeatedly conveyed his point of view to the Prime Minister but, in the end, the advice of the diplomats prevailed. Pella's decision to withdraw the troops, however, was not only a result of the "congenital Anglophilism" of the diplomats (to use Taviani's expression) and their consequent desire to satisfy the Allies. With it Pella also sought to

appease the critics within his own party and buy some more time for his government. This attempt, as will be shown below, would prove to be in vain. The criticism of his handling of the Trieste crisis was, in fact, a way for his party to signal that it considered the term of his "provisional" government to be approaching an end and not the reason for its termination. [101]

In conclusion, there were no major changes in the type of decisional fora and the authority patterns within them during this period. Although Pella was formally responsible for all decisions, he continued to rely heavily on the advice of those he considered to be the "professionals" of diplomacy. Zoppi, in particular, played the key role within the decisional fora, which, with the occasional exception of Taviani and Benvenuti, only included other top Foreign Ministry officials. This influence became even more decisive towards the end of the period, when Pella started to realize that whatever the outcome of the crisis its government would not survive.

Alternatives

The major problem Italian decision-makers had to face during this period was Allied reluctance to proceed with the implementation of the October 8 decision. As long as such reluctance, although clearly evident, was not expressly stated, they dealt with it simply by pretending that it did not exist and by minimizing its source (i.e., the likelihood of the Yugoslav threat). Once the Allies came forward with their conference proposal, Italian decision-makers realized that Zone A would not be reacquired without some kind of compromise. Italian Minister in Belgrade Vanni D'Archirafi believed that Italy had nothing to lose in a conference, which would relieve tensions while leaving everything else as it was. Domestic political constraints, however,

prevented the uncompromising acceptance of the Allied proposal. The task of Italian decision-makers was to come up with a course of action which would solve the diplomatic impasse without incurring political costs. [102]

The search for alternatives was incremental. The counterproposal of October 17 (decision 13b) did not compromise on the central point that Italy would attend a conference only after the implementation of the October 8 decision but attempted to spell out the conditions under which the decision could be implemented without risk (the transfer of the administration was to take place over time in incremental steps while, to create a more favorable atmosphere, troops would be withdrawn and mutual guarantees exchanged). [103]

Confronted with Allied resistance, the next alternative (suggested independently but at about the same time by Brosio and Quaroni) was to present the conference to domestic public opinion as a step forward with respect to the October 8 decision. At a conference, they argued, one could try to work out a definitive solution, perhaps along the lines suggested by Dulles earlier that spring. The discussion would thus concern the whole FTT, whereas insisting on the transfer of Zone A would risk focusing only on this part of the FTT and having to make concessions for the privilege of obtaining its administration while, at the same time, foregoing any possibility of reacquiring part of Zone B. The most that could be requested from the Allies was "the precise and irrevocable understanding" that if the conference achieved no results within the space of three or four months "they would implement the October 8 decision coûte que coûte."

Pella left the evaluation of this alternative to Zoppi, inviting him to fathom American willingness to resurrect Dulles' plan by mentioning the idea to Luce. Zoppi decided against it. He assumed, perhaps correctly, that the Yugoslavs would make the same proposals advanced in the Guidotti-Bebler conversations of 1952 and in those he himself had had with Šajčič the previous spring and concluded that "it would serve no useful purpose to go to a conference merely in order to

listen to a renewal of [the same] requests." The reopening of negotiations, moreover, "would stultify the very reason for the decision of October 8;" namely, the creation of that parity which Italy deemed necessary to acquire before starting negotiations for a final solution. With Zone A still in their hands, in fact, the Allies could exercise decisive pressure to arrive at an agreement which might not be completely acceptable to Italy. Zoppi, in other words, still regarded parity as indispensable to protect Italian interests from the Allies more than from the Yugoslavs. Finally, Zoppi maintained that if the government went back to reexamine those proposals domestic critics could easily charge that Pella was trying to pass off as acceptable solutions which De Gasperi had rejected as insufficient, while foreign ones would point to Italian gyrations and unfavorably compare them with the more constant Yugoslav position.

Pella might not have been totally convinced by Zoppi's reasoning because in his conversation with Luce on November 6 he mentioned, although somewhat underhandedly, that if the scope of the conference could be presented as a search for a definitive settlement along the lines of Dulles' plan of the previous spring he might be able to accept it and get public opinion to endorse it. The idea, however, was not pursued any further, because at this meeting Luce introduced the concept of a preparatory meeting and all attention immediately turned to the evaluation of this new alternative. [104]

As revealed by a conversation between Brosio, Casardi and Durbrow on November 10, a preparatory meeting appealed to Italian decision-makers because it allowed Pella to reconcile international needs (to assume a less intransigent posture and appear responsive to Allied solicitations) with domestic constraints (to remain faithful to his "solemn engagement" with Parliament). On November 8, moreover, Casardi had learned from the American embassy that the Allies were about to make a new proposal. Italian decision-makers could not be sure of its acceptability but, at the same time, wanted to avoid finding themselves in the position of having to turn it down again. The formal

submission of a proposal (as opposed to a simple assent to the idea expressed by Luce) allowed them to show the Allies their desire to cooperate and, at the same time, provide them with a positive example of an acceptable compromise. [105]

Italian decision-makers' immediate reaction to the second Allied conference proposal, which did not sufficiently satisfy their request for a "substantial" implementation of the October 8 decision, was to resubmit their proposal for a preparatory meeting. The knowledge that Yugoslavia had rejected the same proposal led, instead, to the development of a new alternative. In a memorandum submitted to Pella on November 20, Zoppi argued that if the Yugoslavs truly aimed at becoming full members of the Western defense system, they would have already made some compromises to resolve the Trieste question. Their refusal of the Allied proposal was yet another indication that they had no intention of working closely with the West. They were trying, however, to keep the situation ambiguous in order to continue to receive American aid. From this, Zoppi concluded that Italy should accept the Allied proposal. A refusal, in fact, would have obliged Italy to continue to insist on a "substantial" implementation of the October 8 decision, knowing perfectly well that the Allies would not have the courage to do it. Hence, it would have played into Tito's hands by allowing him to continue his procrastination tactic. Acceptance, on the other hand, would provide an immediate victory with international public opinion and unmask Tito's game. As stated in the memorandum Pella gave the three Allied ambassadors on November 21, the Italian government accepted the proposal because it trusted that "such a conference [might] provide a way not only to demonstrate to the Allied governments the lack of an effective Yugoslav intention to reach a reasonable solution of the entire problem, but also and above all to clarify the real importance and real significance that the government of Belgrade attribute[d] to its relations with the defensive grouping of Western democratic countries." [106]

It is impossible to establish whether Italian decision-makers made

their acceptance public, together with the implication that the proposal met all Italian conditions, to ensure that the Yugoslavs would not eventually change their answer or to protect Pella from the possible charge that he had yielded to Allied pressures. Whatever the case, they could later denounce Yugoslav protests as "maneuvers to shift the responsibility for their refusal to attend the conference to Italy and the Allies" and the refusal itself as "the latest proof of Yugoslav determination to keep the problem unsolved as a convenient expedient to leave the question of the country's alignment with the West unanswered." At the same time, the Italian attitude toward the idea of a preparatory meeting became "firmly negative," the Yugoslavs having meanwhile advanced it publicly as a counterproposal. "A preparatory meeting," the Italians now maintained, "would mean a considerable step backward and would lend itself to the delaying tactics of Belgrade." [107]

Decision 19 allowed Italy to win a propaganda battle. The victory was, however, rather ephemeral. Acceptance of the Allied proposal had, in fact, been nullified by its attendant preinterpretation. A retreat from those terms was now unthinkable. A preliminary meeting of experts, a viable alternative until then, had now become unacceptable because of its having been publicly espoused by the Yugoslavs. Zoppi examined this new situation in a memorandum dated November 30. His major preoccupation was to avoid the Allies' coming back with a new conference proposal. Italy, in fact, would have to refuse it, thus reversing the positive impression created by her acceptance of the November 13 proposal. He suggested that the Allies be clearly told that if the Yugoslavs would not accept the November 13 proposal then the Allies should "set aside the idea of a conference and they themselves confront Tito, through secret diplomatic channels ... in order to convince him to accept a reasonable solution." For Italy, three solutions were acceptable: 1) a plebiscite in the entire FTT, 2) a division along a continuous ethnic line, and 3) a provisional division along the zonal border as provided by the October 8 decision. This way, Zoppi pointed out, the Allies would finally convince themselves of Tito's

unreasonableness and eventually conclude that there was nothing else to do but to begin the transfer of Zone A to Italy. That Italy would not accept a revised conference proposal was communicated to the Anglo-Americans immediately, through the help also of Bidault. As for the new course of action, Pella approved it in principle but decided to evaluate it further before submitting it to the Allies. [108]

Also with respect to the search for alternatives and evaluation of consequences, one may conclude that the onset of the crisis period did not negatively affect the performance of Italian decision-makers. Both search and evaluation continued to be bounded by the same personal and political prejudices and although choices still aimed primarily at maximizing one single value dimension (the survival of Pella's government), this tendency was less pronounced than had been the case in the prelude to crisis and pre-crisis periods. If anything, the onset of crisis actually enlarged the perceived range of alternatives and led to a relatively more thorough and imaginative search, as well as to a timely reevaluation of choice in light of new information.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. MC Tarchiani, the Secretary, the Under-Secretary, Merchant, Byington 750G.00/10-1453; Luce to Dept. 1257 (Oct. 14, 1953) and 1270 (Oct. 15, 1953) in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4; Luce to London 150 (Oct. 18, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5; Corriere della Sera, Oct. 20, 1953 and Luce to Dept D-1163, "Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador and Vittorio Zoppi on Nov 27, 1953," 750G 00/11-3053. Pella's speeches to Parliament on Oct 17 and Nov. 18 are reported in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 43 (Oct. 24, 1953), pp. 1025-1027 and 48 (Nov 28, 1953), pp. 1146-1148 The perception of the U.S. as a kind of white knight always ready to go to the rescue of the weak and the oppressed all over the world is well expressed in a telegram from Trieste Mayor Gianni Bartoli to President Eisenhower: "Triestines and all Italians feel sure that no hidden or open threat to peace will cause American people receding from restoring right and freedom in every worlds country [sic] intervening with its moral and political power to stop in Italian territory of Zone B mankinds [sic] persecution" (750G.00/10-1353).

2. Taviani, UJ, entries of Oct. 23 and 30, 1953. See also Luce to Dept. 9 (July 1, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 16.

3. Luce to Dept. 1347 (Oct. 22, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5 and 1270 (Oct. 15, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 600, 611 and 741-742; Corriere della Sera, Oct. 17, 1953 and Relazioni Internazionali 17, 46 (Nov. 14, 1953), pp. 1081-1082. Although appeasement was regarded as a typical British disease, the Americans were not spared either. The attacks, however, usually came from the pro-government press rather than Italian decision-makers themselves. Under attack was Dulles' roll back policy. As daily Il Tempo put it "We would never have thought that the policy of 'liberation' announced by the Republican administration in January would be conceived and implemented as Secretary Dulles is doing today" (reported in Luce to Dept. 1320, Oct. 20, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5)

4. Luce to Dept D-1163, "Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador and Vittorio Zoppi on Nov. 27, 1953," 750G 00/11-3053, Corriere della Sera, Oct. 31, 1953

5. New York Times, Oct. 10 and 11, 1953, Higgs to Dept 332, Connelly (American Consulate in Zagreb) to Dept. 19 and Wallner to Dept 429 (all Oct. 9, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4, Duncan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979, p 90

6. Wallner to Dept. 428, 437 (both Oct 9, 1953), 446 (Oct 10, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4, and 438, 750G 00/10 953

See also Lourie (Under-Secretary for Administration) to Belgrade 410 (Oct. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4, which reports the protests expressed by Ambassador V. Popović to Merchant. The resentment at not having been consulted was compounded by the belief that the Italians instead had been heard. See Courtney (First Secretary, American embassy in London) to Dept. D-1381, 750G.00/10-1353 and the comments of Tito in an interview with the Observer on Oct 18, 1953, also printed in Yugoslav Review 2, 8 (Oct. 1953), pp. 5-6. The Yugoslav position following the October 8 decision is best resumed in Edvard Kardelj, Trieste and Yugoslav-Italian Relations, New York: Yugoslav Information Center, Nov 1953.

7. The two alternatives considered by the Yugoslavs are mentioned in Wallner to Dept. 445 (Oct. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4. Tito's speeches are reported in Wallner to Dept. 447 (Oct. 10, 1953), 451, 453 (both Oct. 11, 1953) and 463 (Oct. 12, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4. The estimate of Yugoslav troops is in De Castro, op. cit., p. 505. A copy of the Yugoslav letter to the UN is attached to USUN to Dept. 243, "Text of Cablegram from Yugoslavia to the SYG-UN Concerning Trieste," 750G.00/10-1453. See also "Informing the United Nations," The Yugoslav Review 2, 8 (Oct. 1953), pp. 8-9.

8. See J.C. Kitchen (Acting Director, Executive Secretariat) to Secretary, "Trieste Military Matters," 750G.00/10-2053; Duroselle, op. cit., p. 391; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 598, footnote 19. For the conversation between Bebler and the Turkish ambassador, see Wallner to Dept. 445 (Oct. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4. The Yugoslav conference proposal is reported in Wallner to Dept. 460 and 461 (Oct. 12, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4 and MC K. Popović, V. Popović, Bruner, the Secretary, Merchant, Barbour, 750G.00/10-1253 and 750G.00/10-1353.

9. Bohlen (American Ambassador in Moscow) to Dept. 461 (Oct. 12, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4; Lodge (American Representative to the UN) to Dept. 204, 750G.00/10-1353.

10. Bebler's meeting with Baudet is reported in Wallner to Dept. 479, 750G.00/10-1353 and MC Ruffin, Leverich (Office of Eastern European Affairs), Marcy, "Yugoslav Request for French Good Offices," 750G.00/10-1553. Copy of the UP despatch is in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4. The "authoritative source," as Wallner later found out (Wallner to Dept. 486, 750G.00/10-1453), was a member of the Foreign Ministry press office and there was no doubt that he spoke under high instructions, probably from Bebler himself. The fact that the Yugoslavs chose Helen Fisher of UP, the same journalist who had involuntarily been responsible for triggering the crisis, to relay these signals might have been fortuitous, but was certainly symbolic.

11. See, for instance, the comments of Yugoslav diplomatic representative in Trieste Jože Zemljak to General Winterton reported in Higgs to Dept 373, 750G.00/10-1253. The themes of "continuity" and "expansionism" in Italian foreign policy were indeed so commonly used in Yugoslav political discourse as to have become the subject of many cartoons. Two, in particular, deserve mention The first ("Roman Relay" by D. Savić, Borba, March 31, 1952) shows Mussolini ending his march on Rome and passing the baton, in the shape of a Roman fasces, to De Gasperi departing for Trieste. The second ("A long debit makes for lasting affection" by M Ćirić, Borba, April 6, 1952), shows a very thin De Gasperi who, while being recruited into NATO, hands the Allies a long list of territorial claims--starting with Trieste, followed by former colonies, various Yugoslav, Greek and French cities and ending with "the very, very Italian New York."

12. Pijade's article is reported in Wallner to Dept. 489 (Oct 15, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4. Kardelj's message to Eden is mentioned in MC Salt, Barbour, Freund, W.E. Knight, Nes (Oct. 12, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML Tito's conversation with the Allied diplomats in Belgrade is reported in Wallner to Dept. 512 (Oct. 18, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5

13. Wallner to Dept. 484 (Oct. 14, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4

14. MC Sensi, R.B. Knight, W.E Knight, Oct. 12, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Lodge to Dept. 208, 750G 00/10-1353; De Castro, op. cit., p. 603; Tarchiani, op cit , p 290. The Italians hoped that the transfer could be completed by November 4 because it would have allowed them to stage public celebrations in conjunction with the anniversary of the arrival of Italian troops in Trieste in 1918 (Nov. 3) and Armed Forces Day in Italy (Nov 4).

15. Luce to Dept. 1243 (Oct. 13, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 590, 603, 608 and 634.

16. Luce to Dept. 1257 (Oct. 14, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4, De Castro, op. cit., pp. 604-605, 607 and 608 Pella's telegram of instruction to Tarchiani, the statement he left with Dulles and a copy of Pella's interview with Reuter were filed as 750G.00/10-1453; Luce to Dept. 1270 (Oct. 15, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4.

17. MC Tarchiani, the Secretary, the Under-Secretary, Merchant, Byington 750G.00/10-1453; Benvenuti and Brosio's reports are in De Castro, op. cit., pp. 615-616.

18. Luce to Dept. 1270 (Oct. 15, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4, MC Luciolli, Byington, W.E. Knight, 750G.00/10-1653. Pella's speech is in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 43 (Oct. 24, 1953), pp 1025-1027; Luce to Dept. 1291 and Luce to London 144 (both Oct 17, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5. Luce called Pella's speech "a long hysterical review of the Trieste question " The budget was approved with a comfortable majority, only the Communists and Nenni's Socialists having voted against it.

19. MC Salt, Barbour, Freund, W.E. Knight, Nes, Oct 12, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Dulles to Rome 1265 (Oct. 12, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4. Luce, as one could expect, opposed the British proposal very strongly, arguing that such a statement would "encourage Tito to pursue tactics of war threats to avoid any subsequent solution not meeting with his approval" and "dangerously disillusion Italian public opinion and alienate it from U.S. leadership" (Luce to Dept. 1245, Oct 13, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4). For the Allied demarches to preach moderation and good sense to the Italians see Penfield (American Chargé in London) to Dept. 1598 (Oct. 13, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4; Merchant to Secretary, 750G 00/10-1353 and Smith to Rome 1328, 750G 00/10-1553 That Italian misbehavior was the main reason for the failure of the October 8 plan eventually became the standard Allied explanation Eisenhower, for instance, wrote in his memoirs that "the enthusiastic official and public reaction from the Italian side .. unquestionably made Tito feel that he had to react adversely and much more vehemently than he otherwise would have" (op. cit , p. 415)

20. MC Salt, Byington, Freund, 750G.00/10-1453, Wallner to Dept 468 (Oct. 13, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4, Cannon to Dept 1098, 750G.00/10-1653 For the Turkish initiative see Warren (American Ambassador to Turkey) to Dept. 386 (Oct 14, 1953) and 390 (Oct 15, 1953), Smith to London for Secretary 5 (Oct 15, 1953), all in

FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4, and Lodge to Dept. 213, 750G.00/10-1553; Dulles to USUN 160, 750G.00/10-1353 and 182, 750G.00/10-1953; Luce to Dept. 1245 (Oct. 13, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4.

21. The original text of the Allied proposal is in Washington to London for Secretary 10 (Oct. 16, 1953), which is still classified Comments on the text are in Smith to London to Sec. 14 (Oct. 17, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5. The text of the invitation to Italy can be found in De Castro, op. cit., p. 618; Luce to Dept. 1285 (Oct. 17, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5; Wallner to London 129-130 and 131 (Oct. 17, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5.

22. Wallner to London 134, 136, 138 (Oct. 18, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5 and 137, 750G.00/10-1853. MC V. Popović, Bruner, the Secretary, Merchant, Barbour, 750G.00/10-2053. Concerning the position to be taken publicly, in the meeting between Tito and the Allied diplomats it had been agreed that if the Allies did not mention the sounding the Yugoslavs would not reveal it either. If the sounding was mentioned without the terms of the invitation, the Yugoslavs would say that they had submitted a counterproposal regarding the agenda. If, instead, the terms of the invitation were also made public, the Yugoslavs would be obliged to reveal their position. Thus when Reuter reported, at the end of the London meeting, that the Allies had invited Italy and Yugoslavia to a five-power conference, provided that "the U.S. and U.K. firm intention to deliver Zone A to Italy" was accepted from the beginning, Borba replied that "such an approach would not lead to any solution whatsoever, but on the contrary would cause further deterioration of an already serious situation" (Wallner to Dept. 524, Oct. 20, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5).

23. The Times, Oct. 19, 1953; Corriere della Sera, Oct. 20, 1953. Luce to Dept 1297 and to London 150 (Oct. 18, 1953) and Luce to Dept. 1319 (Oct. 20, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5.

24. Luce to London 150 (Oct. 18, 1953) and Luce to Dept. 1323 (Oct. 20, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 623-624. The proposal for the withdrawal of troops is reported in ibid., p 628, and mentioned in Luce to Dept. 1346 and Aldrich to Dept. 1735 (both Oct. 22, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5. Pella also instructed the ambassadors to leak the proposal about the withdrawal of troops discretely to the press (De Castro, op. cit., p. 628). The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry dismissed it as "obvious hypocrisy," which could only mislead those who were not familiar with the history of military measures at the border since August (Wallner to Dept. 562, Oct. 26, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5).

25. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 624-625 and 629. The French perfunctorily recommended acceptance of the Italian counterproposal to the Anglo-Americans (MC De Juniac, Ruffin, Durbrow, Byington, W.E. Knight, Nes, Oct. 24, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML) At the same time, however, Bidault also pressed his suggestion for secret diplomatic talks with the Yugoslavs in a conversation with the American and British ambassadors in Paris on October 26 (Dillon to Dept 1748, 750G 00/11-453).

26. Tarchiani's meeting with Dulles had been preceded by two meetings between Luciolli and Byington on October 20 and 22 in which the Italian minister had informed the State Department in advance of the points the ambassador would raise (MC Luciolli, Byington, W.E. Knight, 750G 00/10-2053 and Luciolli, Byington, Nes, 750G.00/10-2253). See also the two briefings compiled by Merchant for Dulles: "Visit of Italian Ambassador Alberto Tarchiani,"

750G.00/10-2153 and 750G.00/10-2353 The summary of the Tarchiani-Dulles meeting is in Dulles to Rome 1414 (Oct 23, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5. The memorandum "Suggestions for a Gradual Implementation of the Decision of October 8," which Tarchiani left with Dulles is in FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350 Luce, for her part, had recommended that Pella's counterproposal be accepted lest what the Italians regarded as "new evidence of [the] old Allied habit of appeasement of [a] sword [sic] rattling Communist dictatorship at the expense of [a] friendly democracy" lead not only to the loss of military "facilities, EDC and much NATO cooperation" but also to the demise of Pella himself, which would eventually result in Italy coming up "with a Communist dictator of its own" (Luce to Dept 1326, 750G 00/10-2053) Pella's threats of resignation did not work as well with the British. Brosio pointed out, in fact, in a telegram to Rome on the 22nd that they were useless because everybody in London knew that Pella would succeed himself or be succeeded by somebody like him (De Castro, op. cit , p. 629).

27. See, for instance, MC Ruffin, Marcy, 750G 00/10-2253 Ambassador Popović himself confirmed this impression when he stated unofficially at a private dinner that all his government desired was "to participate in a conference which might modify even slightly the terms of the existing declaration, perhaps giving Yugoslavia Zone B and a small portion of the southern part of Zone A" (Memorandum for the Under-Secretary, "Conversation between the Yugoslav Ambassador, Vice-Admiral Sir William Elliot and Frank Wisner," 750G.00/10-2753)

28. MC Salt, Byington, Freund, Nes, Oct 20, 1953, MC Salt, Byington, Freund, Knight, Nes, Oct 21, 1953 and MC the Secretary, Sir Roger Makins (British Ambassador), Merchant, Byington, Oct 21, 1953, all in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML, MC the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Radford, Mr Cutler (Special Assistant to the President), Merchant, Byington; "Memorandum for the President" (which also contains the first draft of the new proposal) and "Meeting with the President Regarding Trieste," all 750G 00/10-2253

29. Aldrich to Dept. 1808, 750G 00/10-2753, 1832 (Oct 28, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6, and 1841, 750G 00/10-2853. It must be pointed out that there were strong military objections to transferring control of the civil administration of Zone A while keeping Allied troops there, on the grounds that disturbances within the zone or border incidents caused by Italian groups might endanger their safety. The State Department, for instance, acting on Pella's request of October 10, had immediately invited the AMG to set up a "mixed commission" to work out the details of the transfer. General Winterton, however, had pointed out that "he had nothing to discuss with the Italians until he had been able to obtain a clear idea of the date of evacuation" (Higgs to Dept. 362, Oct. 12, 1953, FSP-Trieste. Box 2, File 4, Kitchen to Acting Secretary, 750G.00/10-1553) At the meeting of October 22, Dulles expressed the view that political considerations left few alternatives other than relying on the Italian government's ability to maintain order and asking the military to assume the risk. President Eisenhower questioned not the Italian government's ability but its willingness to maintain order He said he could envision a situation in which the Italians might purposely permit incidents in Zone A in order to push the issue to a crisis and provide an excuse for bringing in Italian troops as well as facing up to the Yugoslavs while Anglo-American troops were still there He believed that General Winterton, besides retaining final authority, should also be able to reclaim at his discretion full control of the administration of the zone

30. Eden's suggestion aimed at "spreading the burden of responsibility" by having the Security Council or the General Assembly set up a commission of neutrals to investigate the situation and recommend a solution. Dulles, briefed by Merchant, argued that UN action was certainly a far less desirable alternative than a conference for all concerned, including Pella and Tito. A UN debate, moreover, by exacerbating the recent conflict of opinions could seriously weaken Yugoslavia's association with the West To be successful, moreover, any UN action needed at least Italian acquiescence. Otherwise the Italians, "with their influence over the Latin Americans, [could] seriously hamper any [Allied] efforts in the UN" (Merchant to Secretary, "Tentative British Proposal for UN Action in Trieste;" MC The Secretary, Sir Roger Makins, Merchant and Sandifer to the Secretary, "Observations Regarding Possible United Nations Action on Trieste," all 750G.00/10-2653).

31. Wallner to Dept. 582 (Oct. 28, 1953) and 588 (Oct. 29, 1953) Luce to Dept. 1433 (Oct. 30, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6. Luce's first reaction was very negative, primarily because she was furious at having learned of the proposal through the British embassy in Rome before being officially informed by the State Department, which she took as a serious personal offense. In a personal letter to Dulles, after voicing her "astonishment and concern" about that "extraordinary procedure" and reserving further comments "until the Department [chose] to grant t'e U.S. Embassy in Rome parity with the British and French Embassies in the discussion," she protested that the proposal was "an ambiguous attempt to by-pass the implementation of the October 8 decision, in order to save Tito's face. I cannot believe," she continued, "that the U.S. seriously intends to back-track, weasel, welch, renege or--since the Department prefers the euphemism--to 'finesse' its decision to proceed with the transfer (however slowly) of Zone A in order to give Italy parity with Yugoslavia as a basis of negotiation. Merely to make the attempt will have a most lamentable effect here, and, I believe, throughout Europe. What price Tito's face if America loses face in the eyes of all Europe? I do not believe the proposed demarche will work here and to proceed with it will do grave damage to Italo-American relations, already suffering strain as a result of the evident stultification of our announced policy in face of Tito's threats. This demarche will in all probability compound the Italian lack of faith in U.S. intentions which dates from our inability to implement the 1948 declaration and which has been growing progressively since that time." Luce was also concerned about her own image in Italy: "I know you realize," she wrote, "that inevitably our Embassy will be held in part responsible--indeed I am already being held responsible--by public opinion for the decisions taken in the Trieste affair, and for their consequences" (Letter of Luce to Dulles, 750G.00/10-2753 and Luce to Dept. 1415, Oct. 28, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6). Luce again felt it necessary to go over Dulles' head, directly to the President. She first pointed out that all that the "Cominform Left" needed to gain power in Italy was to poll another 4 per cent of the vote at the next elections. Then she outlined her antidote: "Our proposal to resolve the Trieste question to Italy's satisfaction [is] ... the most effective delaying and supporting action we could now take to strengthen pro-Western Italian political elements and to forward US foreign policies." Finally, she warned that "delay in implementing the October 8th decision ... now threaten[ed] to destroy" any progress the U S. had made toward checking the growth of Communism In his answer, Eisenhower explained that the U.S. had "no intention of weaseling on [the] October 8 decision," but because of some "unexpected reactions," caution was needed in its execution. Both Luce's letter and Eisenhower's reply have been published, in a slightly expurgated form, in FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp

1631-1637. See also Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 415 The CIA's assessment of the political situation in Italy was more sober. The analysis of the Office of National Estimates, drawn up during these same days, pointed out that "a Trieste settlement favorable to Italy would bolster the present Italian government but would not, in itself, be sufficient to avert the gradual weakening of the democratic center " Such a weakening, however, was not taken to imply an automatic accession of the Communists to power If anything, the report concluded, "any changes in the political complexion of the Italian government over the next two years are more likely to be toward the right than toward the left." See "The Short Term Political Outlook in Italy (through 1955)," 765.00/11-1053.

32. See "Proposed Conference Demarche" and "Draft Instructions for a Preliminary Sounding in Rome and Belgrade," both in FSP-Belgrade, Top Secret General Records, Box 6, File April-Dec. 1953, Smith to Rome 1623 (Nov. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 and the memorandum "Recent Trieste Developments," 750G 00/11-853.

33. Corriere della Sera, Oct. 28, 1953; Relazioni Internazionali 17, 47 (Nov. 21, 1953), p. 1125. Zoppi's telegrams to Tarchiani and Brosio are quoted in De Castro, op cit., pp. 635-636. See also MC Luciolli, Bonbright, Oct. 28, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML.

34. Dillon to Dept. 1677 (Oct. 29, 1953) and 1707 (Oct 30, 1953); both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6, Le Monde, Oct. 30, 1953 The text of this interview also is reported in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 45 (Nov. 7, 1953), pp. 1068-1069.

35. Dillon to Dept. 1715 (Oct. 31, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6. The news agencies had simply freely interpreted a State Department spokesman's remark that it was an "aspiration" of the Department to issue an invitation soon. See Dulles to Belgrade 541 (Nov. 1, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 and MC Vodusek (Yugoslav Chargé in Washington), Merchant, Barbour, 750G.00/11-553).

36. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 639-640 and 643. Letter of Zoppi to Luce 4/670 (Oct. 31, 1953), FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350 The translation of Pella's instructions is the one made by the American embassy in Rome and reported in Luce to Dept 1439 (Oct. 31, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6. Another argument used during these days by the Italians with the American embassy in Rome was that it would not hurt to delay the call for a conference until after the Yugoslav elections while, in the meantime, proceeding with the transfer. Political considerations, in fact, might force Tito to take a more intransigent stand than he would otherwise. Luce endorsed this argument but Wallner shot it down by pointing out that the Italians were simply transposing the Italian situation to Yugoslavia, where "there [was] no opposition as understood in the West" (Luce to Dept 1453, Nov. 2, 1953, and Wallner to Dept. 617, Nov 3, 1953, both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6). The Italian argument about electoral pressures had some merit, however. Tito might not have had other parties to contend with but had to be careful when it came to national interests As a Croatian ruling from Belgrade, he could ill afford to appear insensitive to the interests of Slovenia

37. Tarchiani, op. cit , p 293, Ortona, op cit , pp 48-49 Notwithstanding Tarchiani's affirmation, there does not seem to have been any "artful translation " The only differences between the translations of the American embassy in Rome and the Italian embassy in Washington were the following "Can the Italian people continue to have faith in the decisions of the American and British Governments?" became "The dilemma is whether the Italian

people can continue to have confidence in the word of the American and British Governments." "Shall have previously reestablished the confidence of the Italian people in the determination of the British and American governments" became "have not reestablished in advance the confidence of the Italian people in the word of the British and American Governments." These changes can hardly be called a "smoothing out" (Cf. Luce to Dept. 1439, Oct. 31, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 with MC The Secretary, Tarchiani, Smith, Merchant, Byington, Nov. 3, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML).

38. Byington's remarks to Luciolli are reported in Ortona, op. cit., p 50. Byington's remarks were particularly effective because he had long been associated with the Trieste question and was considered a very good friend of Italy (he was born in Italy of American parents and from 1947 to 1949 had been posted in Rome as counselor of embassy). Dulles had also instructed Luce to repeat the strong reply he had given Tarchiani directly to Pella and, at the same time, "urge [him] in [the] strongest terms that the Italian government avoid adopting [any] adamant position until they ... had an opportunity to consider a proposal for a conference." Luce, however, must have considered the Secretary's reply too strong because she decided instead to have Durbrow communicate it by phone to an official of the Foreign Ministry (Dulles to Rome 1548, Nov. 2, 1953, incorrectly filed as 750G.00/10-3153, De Castro, op. cit., p. 647).

39. Luce to Dept. 1485, 750G.00/11-553; De Castro, op. cit., p. 648.

40. The November disorders have already been described by Novak (op. cit., pp 435-448) and De Castro (op. cit., pp. 651-708). For a press report of the events, see Dunham, op. cit. The American documents do not provide any revelations with respect to their dynamics. A summary of the events, as seen by American Political Advisor Leonard Unger (following the October 8 decision, the State Department had decided to send Unger back to Trieste because of the perceived need to have an experienced senior officer in charge during a period which was anticipated to be delicate and critical), is contained in USPolAd to Dept. D-118, "Chronological Sequence of Events in Trieste Nov. 3 to Nov. 8, 1953," 750G.00/11-1853. Day by day events are described in more detail in telegrams 583 (Nov. 3, 1953) to 667 (Nov. 12, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, Files 6 and 7.

41. The text of the Italian report prepared by Counselor Michele Lanza (Trieste desk officer), who happened to be in Trieste during the disorders, is attached to Williamson to Dept. D-1074, 750G.00/11-1653. It also appeared in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 46 (Nov. 14, 1953), pp. 1097-1099 and Documenti di Vita Italiana, Dec. 1953, pp. 1919-1924. The interpretation of the Yugoslavs and the Trieste independendists went even further than that of the Allies. They regarded the events as an attempted coup d'état organized by the Italian government in close cooperation with local nationalists (see Novak, op. cit., pp. 444-445). The disorders were described in Borba's editorials as "bloody blackmail, organized in Rome" and regarded as Italian pressures on the Allies to implement the October 8 decision. Parallels were drawn to 1948 (leading to the tripartite declaration) and 1952 (leading to the London agreements). See Wallner to Dept. 644 (Nov 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 and 659 (Nov. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7. For more details on the American interpretation see Unger to Dept. 610 (Nov. 6, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 and 651 (Nov 9, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7 and Higgs to Dept. 1695, 750G 00/12-453.

42. See, for instance, Unger to Dept. 486 (Oct. 22, 1953) and Luce to Dept. 1361 (Oct. 23, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5. The cover for the demonstrators' entry into the zone was the use of Trieste as a point of departure for a "tricolor caravan" to nearby Redipuglia, site of a large World War I cemetery where official ceremonies were to be held on November 4 (Armed Forces Day). On the morning of November 3, about 4500 more than the normal number of entrants were registered at the block posts. Several hundred people, moreover, were refused entry either because their documents were not in order or because they were on the list of undesirables. A few of these probably managed to slip over the border irregularly. Between November 2 and 8 a total of 82,873 people entered the Zone from Italy while an additional 3,317 were denied entry (Unger to Dept D-121, "Border Controls During Period of Demonstrations in Trieste," 750G.00/11-1853)

43. Unger to Dept. 603 (Nov. 5, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 and Williamson to Dept. D-1090, "Demonstrations in Trieste, Nov 4-6," 750G.00/11-1853. In September 1954, the AMG established that arms had been brought into the zone upon the initiative of Major Bartoli and "with full knowledge and consent of the Italian government." The State Department, however, preferred to hush the investigation given the fact that by this time the Italian government was about to accept a solution to the problem and that any such publicity "would only help those who oppose[d] a settlement of the Trieste question." See Sims (Office of the American Advisor to the AMG) to Dept 61 (Sept. 3, 1953) and 67 (Sept 8, 1954); Durbrow to Dept 900 (Sept 4, 1954) and Smith to Trieste 114 (Sept. 4, 1954) all in FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 18

44. The lack of enthusiasm in Trieste for the October 8 decision, frequently mentioned in the reports by Higgs and Unger, is confirmed also by De Castro who writes that if there would have been a plebiscite with three choices in October 1953 an independent FTT would have been created (op. cit., p 664) Bartoli's decision to stage an "unofficial" celebration on November 3 is mentioned in Unger to Dept. 556 (Oct. 31, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6. Luce recommended to the State Department that Bartoli's request be approved. The State Department answered that the question was one for the Zone Commander to decide (Luce to Dept. 1452, 750G.00/11-253 and Dulles to USPolAd Trieste 507, 750G.00/11-253; Luce should perhaps have given such an answer herself to avoid giving the impression that AMG policies could be swayed through pressure on sympathetic American officials and diplomats). On AMG policy about the flag see Col. N.R. Voorhis (Director of Legal Affairs) to Director General Civil Affairs, "Flying of Flags," Aug 2, 1951, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 and Higgs to Dept D-134, "Flying of National Flags from Public Buildings in Trieste," 750G.00/12-953. The decision to withhold authorization for demonstrations had been taken by Winterton on October 13 because of the "subdued state of tension" existing in Trieste after the October 8 announcement. (Higgs to Dept. 387, Oct. 13, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4)

45. The list of questionable initiatives of Trieste individuals and organizations could be very long. The pro-Italian Giornale di Trieste, for instance, indulged in what Unger defined as "scurrilous, sensational and maliciously distorted reporting of events" and even published an open call for insurrection. AMG later put its owner on the list of undesirables (Unger to Dept D-126, "Exclusion of Rino Alessi from Zone A-FTT," 750G.00/11-2053). Bartoli, the City Council Executive and the Committee for the Defense of the Italian Character of Trieste and Istria called for a general strike on the evening of November 5. The trade unions endorsed the call and the Trieste employers' association backed it up by declaring a lockout. As a result even

more people were out on the streets on November 6, the day when the harshest clashes and the largest number of casualties were registered (Unger to Dept. 612, Nov. 6, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6).

46. Unger to Dept. 583 (Nov. 3, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6; De Castro, op. cit., p. 662, footnote 14.

47. It should also be pointed out that the AMG was even more deficient than the Italian government in its preventive action. Notwithstanding the intelligence reports on impending local disturbances organized by the neo-Fascist party and the smuggling of arms into the zone, Winterton seemed to be primarily concerned about disorders created by pro-Yugoslav elements in Trieste and infiltration by Titoist agents. On October 31, for instance, he reassured Unger by stating that "the borders with Zone B and Yugoslavia were adequately patrolled" (Unger to Dept. 556, Oct. 31, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6).

48. Luce to Dept. 1492 (Nov. 6, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6; Tenney (American Consulate, Milan) to Dept. D-156, "Demonstrations in Milan over Trieste," 750G.00/11-1053; Nester (American Consulate, Naples) to American Embassy Rome, "Trieste Demonstration in Naples," Torrey (Public Affairs Officer, American Consulate, Palermo) to Keeley (American Consul, Palermo), "Effective Student Demonstrations on USIS Palermo, Saturday, Nov. 7, 1953" and Keeley to C.W. Gray (American Consul, Rome), all Nov. 9, 1953, FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350.

49. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 689-690 and Aldrich to Dept. 1997 (Nov. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6. Tarchiani, still fresh from his stormy meeting with Dulles on the 3rd, delivered a memorandum but took great care not to characterize it as a note of protest (MC Tarchiani, Merchant, Byington, Nov. 7, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File MC).

50. See Williamson to Dept. D-1033, "Mr. Pella's Statements of Nov. 7 Regarding Trieste Incidents" (Nov. 10, 1953), FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350. See also Relazioni Internazionali 17, 46 (Nov. 14, 1953), p. 1099 and Esteri 4, 21 (Nov. 15, 1953). Pella's statements were only relatively more moderate than the communiqué issued by Bartoli and the Committe for the Defense of the Italian Character of Trieste and Istria, which charged AMG with "the premeditated will to create incidents at all costs" and equated the deaths to "the assassinations perpetrated by the Titoists in May 1945" (Unger to Dept. 606, 750G.00/11-653). Member of Parliament Oddo Spadazzi, a Monarchist, went as far as publicly challenging General Winterton to a duel: "Holding you responsible for the doleful events of Piazza Unitá," he wrote in a telegram published by Corriere della Sera (Nov. 12, 1953), "I challenge you to the pistol in the same square where six Italians yearning for justice and liberty fell." Pella's blaming of the AMG and his reluctance to set up an independent committee of inquiry (see, for instance, Williamson to Dept. D-1090, "Demonstrations in Trieste, Nov. 4-6," 750G.00/11-1853) are hardly surprising, given that his government rested on the external support of the party which appeared to have the greatest responsibility for the events. Both Monarchist and neo-Fascist party leaders praised him for being "solicitous about the defense of national interests" and encouraged him to "proceed courageously on the path of (to) a political revisionism understood as a search for a coincidence between national interests and international pacts" (Corriere della Sera, Nov 11, 1953). Afterwards, Pella toned down his anti-Allied rhetoric and shifted the blame for the disorders to more convenient targets like the independentists, the Titoists and the Cominformists. "Whenever street fights of so grave a character

take place it is always possible for provocatory action to be undertaken by persons who have an interest in making matters worse, whether, in the case of Trieste, on behalf of those who oppose our recognized rights, or of those who wish to sow discord among the nations in order to weaken the whole defensive organization of the Western world" (speech to the Chamber of Deputies, Nov. 18, 1953, quoted in De Castro op cit , p 696)

51. Unger to Dept 556 (Oct 31, 1953), Luce to Dept 1497 (Nov 6, 1953) and 1507 (Nov 7, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6

52. Dulles to London 2516 (Nov. 6, 1953),incorrectly filed as 750G.00/11-953, Aldrich to Dept 2000, 750G 00/11-753, Memorandum "Recent Trieste Developments," 750G 00/11-853 Wallner also believed that the Trieste disorders had made it impossible for Tito to consider any transfer of administrative functions to Italy, no matter how insignificant (Wallner to Dept. 643, Nov 7, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6) Concerning Eden's request for an expression of solidarity, the State Department immediately issued a press release stating that, while the U.S government regretted the incidents, it could not accept an interpretation of the events which laid responsibility in any way on the U S and the U.K. (Smith to Rome 1624, Nov. 7, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6). On November 9 Dulles stated at a press conference "The United States government has complete confidence in General Winterton. We believe he has correctly handled the situation and we do not sympathize at all with the suggestion that emanates from certain quarters that he should be replaced" (Dulles to Rome 1643, Nov. 9, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7)

53. Dulles to Rome 1433 and to Belgrade 535 (Nov. 2, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6.

54. See Wallner to Dept. 559 (Oct. 24, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5. In an effort to help Allied efforts to call a conference on terms acceptable to both countries, the Yugoslavs had repeatedly suggested, both officially and unofficially, that they did not request a withdrawal of the October 8 decision but simply wished that attendance would not imply a direct or indirect recognition of that decision. They had also advanced the idea that, since it was imperative that the conference not fail, the Allies might try to work out the bases of an agreement beforehand by having separate conversations in both Rome and Belgrade The conference could then simply be called to put the final seal on the agreement. See Suydam (Chief of the News Division) to Merchant, 750G.00/10-2853; MC V. Popović, Bruner, the Secretary, Bonbright, Barbour, 750G.00/10-2953; Wallner to Dept 570 (Oct 27, 1953) and 581 (Oct. 28, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5, and 603, 750G.00/11-153. This suggestion was very similar to that made by Bidault to Quaroni and the British and American ambassadors in Paris. It might therefore be (the records consulted have failed to clarify this point) that Bidault had made the same suggestion to the Yugoslavs (he had met with Foreign Minister K Popović on October 28) and they simply repeated it to the Anglo-Americans Wallner to Dept. 639 (Nov 6, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 and 646 (Nov 8, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7

55. Luce to Dept. 1533 (Nov. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7 The text of the memorandum Pella handed to Luce on November 10 is in FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350 Italian and Yugoslav willingness to attend a preparatory meeting confirms a series of preliminary conclusions about the phenomenon of prenegotiation recently presented by Janice Stein 1) prenegotiation (or the willingness to engage in it) is triggered by a mutual perception of a hurting stalemate informed by a recent or impending crisis, 2) it signals the parties' readiness to move from a conflicting,

unilateral solution for a mutual problem to a joint search for cooperative, multilateral solutions; 3) it is often perceived by the parties in question as a device which helps manage the risks connected with more formal negotiations (e.g., a conference, in this case) by setting its agenda and specifying the boundaries of discussion ahead of time ("Getting to the Table· The trigger, stages, functions, and consequences of prenegotiation," International Journal 44, 2, Spring 1989, pp. 475-504). See also the special issue of Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13, 1 (March 1991).

56. Wallner to Dept. 683 (Nov. 15, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7; Riddleberger to Dept. 704 (Nov 20, 1953), FSP-Belgrade, Box 6 (Top Secret General Records), File April-Dec. 1953, Dulles to Belgrade 645, 750G 00/11-2053. See also MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Byington, Barbour, Freund, W E Knight, Nov. 22, 1953 (morning), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML and MC Lekic (Yugoslav military attaché), Bruner, Marcy, 750G.00/11-2453 and Luce to Dept. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7.

57. Memorandum "Recent Trieste Developments," 750G.00/11-853; MC Salt Ruffin, Holmes, Barbour, Byington, W.E. Knight, Nes, 750G.00/11-1253; The new divergences of opinion revolved around whether or not the number and importance of administrative posts to be transferred to Italy should be reduced in light of the Trieste disorders, whether or not to give assurances to the Yugoslavs that the transfer would start only when the Allies were satisfied that there was no further danger of disturbances in Trieste and whether the sounding was to be made by the three Allied representatives in the two capitals together or separately.

58. Luce to Dept. 1568 and Wallner to Dept. 674 (both Nov 13, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7.

59. Wallner to Dept. 683 (Nov. 15, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7; De Castro, op cit., pp. 723-724. Telegram 684, in which Wallner reports extensively on the Yugoslav answer, is still classified. Tito's speech is partially reported in Wallner to Dept. 681 (Nov. 15, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7 and Relazioni Internazionali 17, 47 (Nov. 21, 1953), p. 1125.

60. Luce to Dept. 1591 (Nov. 17, 1953) and 1611 (Nov. 18, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 727 and 729-730; Corriere della Sera, Nov. 21, 1953. Pella's speech is reported in Williamson to Dept. D-1120 (Nov. 20, 1953), FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350 and Relazioni Internazionali 17, 48 (Nov. 28, 1953), pp. 1146-1148.

61. Luce to Dept. 1648, 1649, 1650 and 1651 (all Nov. 21, 1953) and 1652 (Nov. 22, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8. The memorandum is in FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350 and is also reported in De Castro, op. cit., pp. 730-732. On Pella's suggestion for the withdrawal of troops see MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Byington, Barbour, Freund, W. Knight, Nov. 22, 1953 (afternoon), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML.

62. MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Byington, Barbour, Nov 22, 1953 (morning) and Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Byington, Barbour, Freund, W. Knight, Nov 22, 1953 (afternoon), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. See also Dulles to Belgrade 648 (Nov. 22, 1953) and Aldrich to Dept 2220 (Nov 23, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8. In requesting the Yugoslavs to reconsider their position, the Allies were to argue that there would be no "transfer of authority," whether civil or military, in the administration of Zone A before the conclusion of the conference Discussions with the Italians in a "mixed commission" regarding the transfer would,

however, begin immediately after the announcement of the conference. Some symbolic changes, such as the introduction of understudies, might have to be effected before the conclusion of the conference but they would in no case involve any transfer of authority. As to the implementation of the October 8 decision following the conference, the Yugoslavs were to be assured that the Italians had been given no formal commitment

63. Both the Italian communiqué and the Yugoslav press release are reported in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 48 (Nov. 28, 1953), p 1149 and in Riddleberger to Dept 708 (Nov 22, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7; Luce to Dept. 1677 (Nov. 24, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8.

64. Riddleberger to Dept. 709 (Nov 23, 1953), 712 (Nov. 24,1953) and 718 (Nov. 25, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8.

65. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 747-748.

66. "The Yugoslavs are in no mood," Riddleberger reported to Washington after consulting with his British and French colleagues, "to have the November 13 demarche transformed, through Italian acceptance, from a sounding to a proposal backed by the full weight of the three great powers." Hence, he concluded, "it would be fruitless and harmful to go back and urge [them] to accept the November 13 proposal unchanged and with no new persuasive arguments" (Riddleberger to Dept. 711, Nov. 23, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8)

67. MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Byington, Barbour, W E Knight, Nes, Nov. 24, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Dulles to Belgrade 654 and 655 (Nov. 24, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8. Luce at first opposed such a suggestion, arguing that "to urge preliminary talks in the above terms on Pella [would] be interpreted by him as a request to capitulate totally to all Tito's demands made immediately after October 8" (Luce to Dept. 1700, 750G 00/11-2553 and 1703, Nov. 25, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8) She eventually gave her assent, however, convinced that the British suggestion would lead nowhere and that the only solution lay in the immediate implementation of the October 8 decision (Luce to Dept. 1706, Nov. 26, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8)

68. The British suggestion was apparently motivated by the fact that the procedure followed until then had been difficult to coordinate, frustrating and responsible for a certain degree of slowness and confusion. The Foreign Office insisted that it regarded the suggested Paris meeting as a continuation of the current efforts "around one table rather than through cabled communication between five cities." American officials in the working group thought, however, that it could also be seen as a surreptitious way to start a preparatory meeting without calling it such. One of the reasons for the refusal was, in fact, th "the Italians would immediately jump to the conclusion that we were endeavoring to mislead them and that in fact we were accepting completely the Yugoslav position and subjecting the implementation of the October 8 decision to five-power discussion" (MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Byington, Nes, Nov 26, 1953 (p m), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML). Luce, instead, supported the idea because she regarded it as a kind of pre-preparatory meeting and, as such, preferable to the first British suggestion (Luce to Dept 1731, Nov. 27, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8)

69. MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Byington, Barbour, W E Knight, Nov 28, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML, Dulles to Belgrade 672 (Nov. 28, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8 See also "Draft Instruction for Tripartite Approach in Belgrade Incorporating

British and French Amendments as Agreed Working Group November 28," 750G.00/11-3053.

70. Tito's speech and interview are partially reported in Riddleberger to Dept. 729 (Nov. 29, 1953) and 730 (Nov. 30, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8 and Relazioni Internazionali 17, 49 (Dec. 5, 1953), p. 1176. MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Barbour, Nes, Dec 1, 1953 (11:00 a.m.), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML and Dulles to Paris 2003 (Dec 1, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8.

71. MC Salt, Holmes, Barbour, Nes, Dec. 1, 1953 (1:00 p.m) and MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Barbour, Nes, Dec. 1, 1953 (6:00 p.m.), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Achilles to Dept. 2128, Dulles to Paris 2004 (both Dec. 1, 1953), Riddleberger to Dept. 740 (Dec. 2, 1953) and Luce to Dept. 1784 (Dec. 3, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8

72. For the three postponements of the debate in the UN Security Council on Oct. 20, Nov. 2 and 23, see United Nations Bulletin 15, 8 (Oct. 15, 1953), pp. 396-398, 10 (Nov. 15, 1953), p. 454 and 12 (Dec. 15, 1953), p. 592. The debate was postponed again, this time indefinitely, on December 14. See ibid. 16, 1 (Jan. 1, 1954), p. 43; Achilles to Dept. 2144, 2145 and 2146, and Dulles to London 2928 (all Dec. 2, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8; MC Salt, Byington, Nes, Dec. 3, 1953 (11:00 p.m.), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML. Already at the time of the first proposal the Anglo-Americans had felt that if the main reason to call a conference was "to give Tito face and to contribute to the restoration of his confidence in the West" it would be preferable to have a four-power conference without the French, which the Yugoslavs might well regard as "loading in Italian favor." Now it was felt that there would actually be some advantage in not having the French, since it would thus appear to Tito that what was being offered was something the French thought was disadvantageous to the Italians. These considerations tell more about British and American attitudes toward the French than they do about Tito or the Yugoslavs, who had repeatedly stated that the inclusion of the French, although not originally suggested by them, represented no obstacle. The central point for them was not the presence or absence of the French but the question of Zone A being disposed of without their concurrence.

73. Dulles from Bermuda to Dept. 1 (Dec. 4, 1953, 10:00 p.m.) and Smith to Belgrade 699 (Dec. 5, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8. These two telegrams provide an instance of the degree of confusion and the many misunderstandings which resulted from the difficulties of coordinating action among various groups of diplomats scattered around the world. This new sounding was supposed to be made only in Belgrade. Yet the telegram from the Bermudas ended with the notation: "the three Ambassadors in Belgrade and Rome should concert for the purpose of approaching Tito and Pella respectively Saturday Dec. 5." Simultaneous demarches in Belgrade and Rome had by now become such standard operating procedures that the error also went unnoticed at the State Department, or officials here did not dare to question what they took as a last minute change by the Foreign Ministers. The telegram sending the final instructions, in fact, opened: "Following is the entire text of the simultaneous oral approach to Tito and Pella on five-power meeting on Trieste as finally amended and agreed upon by U S -U K -French Foreign Ministers at Bermuda." This obviously confused the diplomats in Rome and especially Luce, since the Foreign Office, which had also received instructions containing the same error from Bermuda had nevertheless correctly advised the British embassy in Rome that a demarche there was not intended. See Luce to Dept 1808 and 1811 (Dec. 5), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8. The misunderstanding was finally clarified by

Smith (Smith from Bermuda to Dept. 6, Dec. 5, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8).

74. Luce to Dept. 1750 (Nov. 30, 1953) and 1800 (Dec. 4, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8.

75. De Castro, op. cit., p. 749; MC Sensi, Knight, Nov. 30, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML.

76. MC Luciolli, Holmes, Byington, Nov 6, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Relazioni Internazionali 17, 47 (Nov. 21, 1953), p. 1125 The Yugoslav notes of protes are mentioned in Corriere della Sera, Nov. 4, 9-10 and 15, 1953; see also "Troups [sic] and Arms Are Not Enough," Review of International Affairs 4, 22 (Nov 16, 1953) and Wallner to Dept. 631 (Nov. 5, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6. Italy had also exerted pressures on exporters in Zone A to halt shipments to Yugoslavia (see Unger to Dept 570, Nov 2, 1953 and Wallner to Dept. 620, Nov. 3, 1953, both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6); De Castro, op. cit., p. 634. For some figures on Yugoslav-Italian trade see "Gli scambi commerciali Italo-Jugoslavi," Documenti di Vita Italiana, December 1954, pp 2895-2898

77. The comments by the Yugoslav and the Italian press are reported in Riddleberger to Dept. 759 (Dec. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9 and 762, 750G.00/12-853, as well as Higgs to Dept. 787 (Dec 8, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9. Gregorić's suggestion is reported in De Castro, op. cit., p 752

78. The December 5 agreement marked, in other words, Italian decision makers' abandonment of what Noel Kaplowitz has called "totalist conflict strategies" (generated by highly righteous self-images in conjunction with strongly negative perceptions of the enemy) in favor of "firm-but-cooperative ones" (a result of positive self-images involving, however, concerns with having been too aggressive or uncompromising, in conjunction with perceptions of the enemy which include hostility but also corrigibility). See Noel Kaplowitz, "National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychological Dimensions of International Relations," Political Psychology 11, 1 (March 1990), pp. 39-82

79. Although the ICB project considers only Yugoslavia and Italy to have been crisis actors in 1953, a foreign policy crisis seems to have been perceived also by American and British decision-makers. The Yugoslav reaction represented a threat to the Allies' status since it obliged them to revise their policy objectives (or at least the means chosen to attain them) and to halt the implementation of their decision. The search for an acceptable compromise was conducted under time pressure, given the perception that military hostilities between Italy and Yugoslavia, which also inevitably would have involved Allied troops, could break out at any time, especially by accident On October 16, for instance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arthur Radford, told Secretary of Defense Wilson that, although the Allied plan provided for Anglo-American troops in Trieste to be evacuated by December 1, "in the light of new developments, continuation of the occupation ... would seem a small price to pay to avoid the risk of an international conflagration, the extent of which could not be predicted" (Radford to Wilson 5773, Oct 16, 1953, attached to Wilson to Dulles 750G.00/10-2053). Savorgnan di Brazzà points out that the Anglo-Americans at SHAPE "were seriously worried" (op cit., p 148) Winterton told De Castro that the Allies were convinced that the Yugoslavs would send their own troops into Zone A if Italian troops entered it or even if only its civil administration was transferred (De Castro, op cit., p 616) After Italy sent reinforcements to the border, moreover, Allied

military officials became convinced that "a situation now exist[ed] along the frontier which could be utilized by extremist elements" or "Cominform agents" to start hostilities between Italy and Yugoslavia into which the Allies would inevitably be drawn (Luce to Dept. 1333, Oct. 21, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5; MC Salt, Freund, Oct. 23, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; OARMA to DEPTAR for G-2 2149, and Wallner to Dept. 558, both Oct. 24, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5). The military recommended that both Tito and Pella be requested to withdraw their troops to some distance from the border. The recommendation, however, was never acted upon because Allied decision-makers could not agree on who should make the approach or what form it should take (Dulles to Paris 1564, Oct. 24, 1953 and Dillon to Dept. 1635, Oct. 26, 1953, both FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5). On November 16 Eisenhower sent a personal message to Tito pointing out how deplorable any outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Yugoslavia would be when such encouraging progress had recently been made on defense planning for southeastern Europe (Riddleberger to Dept. 689, Nov. 16, 1953, FSP-Belgrade, Box 6, Top Secret General Records, File April-Dec. 1953.

80. Luce to Dept. 1208 (Oct. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4; Luce to Dept. 1223, 750G.00/10-1253. Luce commented to the State Department that she thought that the establishment of "some military facility requiring the presence in Trieste of certain military forces might well have a salutary effect on the situation both from the political and economic viewpoint and might act as further deterrent to any impetuous Yugoslav action when the administrative control [was] transferred." The State Department replied that "the United States ha[d] no present military facility requirements in Zone A of the FTT" an "prefer[red] that no further discussion on the subject take place" (Smith to Rome 1603, Nov. 5, 1953, incorrectly filed as 750G.00/10-1253).

81. On ADE see Corriere della Sera, Oct. 16, 1953. The report about Gruenther's alleged statement created a lot of polemics. Yugoslavia charged, in fact, that NATO was lending its support to Italy's imperialistic ambitions. In reality it would appear that the Italians had "forced" Gruenther's statement. He, in fact, had simply pointed out that the alliance applied only to "active aggression" against a member state and that the NATO governments would have to decide their position in the event of violence over Trieste (Dillon to Dept. 1826, Nov. 9, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7). On this subject, the French argued that if Italian troops were attacked upon entering Zone A the "NATO treaty could not be applied because Italian troops would be in the zone illegally as the London and Washington governments did not have the legal authority to let them in" (reported by Italian ambassador to NATO Alberto Rossi Longhi and quoted in De Castro, op. cit., p 608). Since the division and one of the brigades sent by Italy as reinforcements to the border on October 18 were assigned to NATO, General Gruenther this time hurried to announce that those troops ceased to be under NATO command (Kitchen to Secretary, "Trieste Military Matters," 750G.00/10-2053). Signs of panic were evident in Trieste, where savings accounts were closed and some families started to leave the city. Pro-Italian leaders asked De Castro to obtain from Winterton a guarantee that an order to fire would be given if the Yugoslavs were to enter Zone A before Italian troops arrived (De Castro, op. cit , p. 616 and Higgs to Dept 386, Oct 13, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4).

82. Kitchen to Secretary, "Trieste Military Matters," 750G.00/10-2053. Luce to Dept 1320 and 1323 (Oct. 20, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5

83. De Castro, op. cit., p. 622; Corriere della Sera, Oct. 20, 1953, Luce to Dept. D-1163, "Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador and Vittorio Zoppi on Nov 27, 1953," 750G.00/11-3053.

84. MC Luciolli, Byington, Oct. 14, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML and 750G.00/11-1953. Dulles to New York 237 (Nov. 19, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7.

85. De Castro, op. cit., p. 726. See, for instance, an article in Politika of Nov. 18, 1953 reported in Riddleberger to Dept 694 (Nov. 18, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7.

86. Relazioni Internazionali 17, 47 (Nov. 24, 1953), p 1117 See also ibid. 17, 49 (Dec. 5, 1953), pp. 1175-1176 and Luce to Dept 1728 (Nov. 28, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7.

87. Luce to Dept. 1553 (Nov 12, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7.

88. Tarchiani's press release is reported in MC Sensi, Knight, 750G.00/10-1553; his report is mentioned in Ortona, op. cit., p. 48.

89. Reported in De Castro, op. cit., p. 744. Luce to Dept. 1243 (Oct. 13, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4.

90. Luce to Dept. 1259 (Oct. 14, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4 and De Castro, op. cit., p. 611.

91. Dillon to Dept. 1715 (Oct. 31, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6 and De Castro, op. cit., pp. 636 and 638. De Castro has hinted that Pella probably "had not read" Tarchiani and Brosio's reports when he decided to send his strongly-worded protest to the Allies, implying that had he done so he would have refrained from sending it (ibid., pp. 637 and 639). This hypothesis, however, does not stand up to a closer scrutiny of events First, even if Pella "had not read" the two reports, he certainly had been informed of their content by Zoppi--as demonstrated by a letter he sent to the Secretary General on the 31st, in which he commented extensively on Brosio's attending recommendation for acceptance of the forthcoming conference proposal. Second, Brosio and Tarchiani did not transmit Pella's message to Strang and Dulles until November 2 and 3, respectively, hence there was ample time to change the instructions, if this had been the course of action desired

92. Luce to Dept. 1507 (Nov. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6; Taviani, UJ, entry of Dec. 1, 1953.

93. Luce to Dept. 1533 (Nov. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7; Corriere della Sera, Nov. 12, 1953 and The New York Times, Nov. 14 and 16, 1953.

94. Luce to Dept. 1536, 750G.00/11-1153; De Castro, op. cit , p 749.

95. De Castro, op cit., pp 688-689; Lodge to Dept, 229 750G.00/10-2753 and Unger to Dept. 681 and 682 (Nov. 14, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7

96. Taviani, UJ, entries of Oct. 13, 16, 18, 19 and 25, 1953; Savorgnan di Brazzá, op. cit., pp 147-148.

97. MC Luciolli, Holmes, Byington, Nov. 6, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Relazioni Internazionali 17, 47 (Nov 21, 1953), p 1125

98. De Castro, op cit , p 647.

99. Luce to Dept. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7.

100. De Castro, op. cit., p. 729.

101. Taviani, UJ, entries of Oct. 24 and 25, Nov. 16, 21 and 30 and Dec. 1, 3 and 6, 1953.

102. Vanni D'Archirafi's opinion is reported in De Castro, op. cit., p. 607.

103. Luce to London 150 (Oct. 18, 1953) and Luce to Dept. 1323 (Oct. 20, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5.

104. De Castro, op. cit., pp 638-643; Luce to Dept. 1497 (Nov. 6, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 6.

105. Luce to Dept. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 7; De Castro, op. cit., p. 713.

106. De Castro, op cit., pp. 729-730. The Italian memorandum of Nov. 21, 1953 is in FSP-Rome, Box 1, File 250-350.

107. See, for instance, Luce to Dept. 1677 (Nov. 24, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8 and the Foreign Ministry's press release of November 26, 1953, reported in De Castro, op. cit., p. 736.

108. Luce to Dept. 1737 (Nov. 29, 1953) and 1750 (Nov. 30, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 8 and De Castro, op. cit., p. 748.

6. THE POST-CRISIS PERIOD: December 5, 1953 to January 6, 1954

Decisions, Decision-Makers and Domestic Environment

Two decisions were made during this period.

Decision 21 - December 24, 1953	Pella (a) declines the Allied exhortation to agree to an unconditional preparatory meeting and (b) suggests instead secret parallel talks.
Decision 22 - January 6, 1954	Pella decides to accept the Anglo-American plan for secret separate talks.

There was one major change in the domestic environment during this period, namely the resignation of Prime Minister Pella on January 5, 1954. Although blamed on the Allies for their mishandling of the Trieste question, the fall of Pella was in reality the result of factional infighting within the Christian Democratic party itself. Once Pella's government had accomplished the task of having the various ministerial budgets approved, its status became the topic of an increasingly open discussion within the party. The members of Iniziativa Democratica regarded it as responsible for giving the party

exactly that type of conservative image they wished to shed. The old guard of the Popolari desired to reconstitute a centrist coalition which coud not possibly be done under Pella's leadership given his close association with the Right The conclusion of the debate, expressed in that Byzantine style which so often characterizes Italian politics, was that Pella's government to continue in power had "to clarify its political qualifications" that is, to receive from Parliament a clearly "political" as opposed to "administrative" mandate.

On December 12, speaking at the opening of a provincial party congress in Novara, Mario Scelba, a prominent Christian Democratic leader, clearly affirmed that the Pella government had outlived its mandate and advocated a return to a centrist coalition. A few days later, De Gasperi, who at the end of September had been reelected Party Secretary, stated that it was the party's "duty to support in principle a friendly [emphasis added] government," which under difficult domestic and international circumstances, was doing its best to defend most important values and interests. De Gasperi's ambiguous statement was blown up by the press (first and foremost by the party daily Il Popolo, whose director was a personal friend of the Minister of Interior and leader of Iniziativa Democratica, Amintore Fanfani), as marking the end of Pella's government. On December 20, after a brief meeting with De Gasperi, Pella decided to proceed to a reshuffling of his government. On January 3, he notified his party of the changes he intended to make. Giving in to the desires of the Monarchists, he substituted the Minister of Agriculture Salomone with Aldisio. Although both were Christian Democrats, the first favored the latifundia reform and was supported by Iniziativa Democratica, the second had close ties with southern landowners and therefore was more acceptable to those, like the Monarchists, who opposed the reform

Aldisio's appointment gave the party the opportunity to precipitate a showdown with Pella. De Gasperi and other prominent party leaders requested Pella to drop Aldisio Pella countered that regardless of the minister in charge, he would guarantee personally the

continuity of the agrarian reform. On January 5 Pella met with the presidents of the two parliamentary groups of the party. They insisted that Aldisio was not acceptable. Shortly afterwards, following a Council of Ministers' meeting which lasted only fifteen minutes, Pella resigned. He could have given in on the question of the candidature of Aldisio, and thus put his opponents within the party into difficulty For Pella, however, this was a question of principle which he did not wish to solve with a tactical move "I have to resign," he told his spokesman Re, after the meeting with the presidents of the party's parliamentary groups, "the party does not support me It has never supported me." [1]

Psychological Environment

There were no major changes in the psychological environment of Italian decision-makers. The "leverage syndrome" and the "domestic magnifier" remained at the core of their attitudinal prism In a speech to the Senate on December 10, for instance, Pella reiterated his view that the Atlantic alliance was not only "an instrument for the defense of the Western world" but also "an organization which should harmonize and promote the points of view and interests of its members " Soon after Pella decided a reshuffle of his government, Luciolli told State Department officials that "an undue postponement of the implementation of the October 8 decision would appear as a subordination, by the West, of the alliance with Italy to cooperation with Tito's communist regime." This, he pointed out, would undermine the basis of the government's foreign policy, destroy Pella's majority and thus play in the hands of the Communists.

At the level of images Italian decision-makers continued to believe that if the Trieste problem had not yet been solved it was only because of the Allies' lack of firmness toward Yugoslavia. They thought that the Allies should proceed with the transfer of the administration of Zone A under the cover of their troops because, although Tito threatened war, he would not wage it. As Zoppi told French Ambassador Fouques Duparc, "if only the Anglo-Americans had shown resolve, he would have resheathed his sabre already the previous October." Any further hesitation, besides having grave consequences in Italy, would also preclude the possibility of a final settlement because Tito would interpret it as a sign of weakness and continue to stall any serious negotiations. The Yugoslavs, Italian decision-makers believed, had no interest in seeking a solution because as long as the Trieste question remained unsolved they could continue to benefit from Western aid without having to engage themselves fully in the Western camp. Trieste, they thought, was but "a screen which allowed Tito to practice a comfortable policy of nonalignement." As Tarchiani put it in one of his reports, following the third Yugoslav refusal to attend a conference on Italian conditions, now that Yugoslavia had "finally and unequivocally revealed herself as an element which the West could not assimilate," perhaps the time had come for the Americans "to confront a problem which for too long they had tried to elude with all kinds of expedients" namely, to choose between Italy and Yugoslavia. [2]

Decision Flow

More Allied efforts to convene a conference

While making overtures toward the Italians, the Yugoslavs, aware that the Allies were still grappling with the task of convening a conference on terms acceptable to both countries, put together a counterproposal, which Foreign Minister Koča Popović presented to Ambassadors Ivo Mallet and Riddleberger on December 6, when the latter went to see him to submit the third Allied proposal for a preparatory meeting The following day the same counterproposal was submitted also in the three Allied capitals. The Yugoslavs rejected the third Allied proposal because it still foresaw the implementation, however partial and symbolic, of the October 8 decision prior to the convening of the preparatory meeting, which they continued to regard as a predetermination of the final solution

Their counterproposal was based on the following considerations Italian demand for "parity" before the conference was groundless because Yugoslavia administered Zone B on the basis of a mandate from the Peace Treaty signatories Italy did not have such a mandate for Zone A Worse still, it had entered it in 1952 under Allied cover but without international legal authority. If the Italians insisted on consolidating their holding on Zone A prior to the conference and the Allies were all too ready to comply, then Yugoslavia had the right to lay down preconditions as well so that "equality of rights" at the conference table be reestablished. The counterproposal thus expressed Yugoslav willingness to attend a conference if her preconditions were also accepted It requested that as a counterpart to the introduction of Italian officials into Zone A, the AMG should, in a public announcement, assure the rights of the Slovene minority and abrogate Italian fascist laws and the sentences of Slovenes by Italian courts under such laws. It also requested that prior to the conference Italy publicly renounce Zone B as Yugoslavia had already done with the city of Trieste and finally asked that, to assure the rights of ethnic minorities, "political autonomy" be granted to the areas to be ceded to Italy and Yugoslavia

The Allied working group at State Department thought that it might

be possible to make a general five-power declaration regarding minority rights prior to the conference but that it was impossible to take any positive action such as the repealing of laws, "which would imply admission by the AMG that minority rights [had] not [until then] been fully protected." With respect to the demand for Italian renunciation of Zone B, the working group considered that the statement contained in the secret annex of October 8, to the effect that the Allies would not support further territorial claims by either party, should suffice. At most the Allies could consider making it public as part of a final settlement. The concept of "autonomy" caused some confusion as American officials thought it would detract from sovereignty and thus derogate from the finality of the solution and give rise to future irredentist claims. [3]

For Luce the counterproposal was evidence that the Yugoslavs would not agree to attend any conference unless the October 8 decision was "stripped of all meaning." Since one could not expect the Italian government to agree to such conditions, she suggested that short of the unlikely possibility of being able to convene a conference without preconditions, all participants being free to maintain their different positions, the thing to do was to proceed immediately with the transfer of Zone A to Italy. Espousing the Italian position on this issue, she argued that this would involve no risk because if the administrative posts were turned over to the Italians one at a time, no one step could be used by the Yugoslavs as justification for hostile action.

For Riddleberger and his English and French colleagues in Belgrade, the Yugoslav rejection of the third Allied proposal confirmed their earlier conviction that "the continued presentation of demonstrably unpalatable proposals to the Yugoslavs, each one weaker than the last, [did] more harm than good." The Yugoslavs would not attend a conference if based on the prior implementation, no matter how limitedly or symbolically, of the October 8 decision. Riddleberger suggested that the options available at this point were a conference or preparatory meeting called without prior conditions or with balanced

preconditions, as proposed by the Yugoslavs, carrying the whole question to the UN or, finally, attempting to negotiate a settlement through diplomatic channels. [4]

Although, formally at least, concurring with Riddleberger's view that it was "undesirable to continue to press unpalatable proposals on the Yugoslavs," the members of the Allied working group decided nevertheless, to make yet another effort in Belgrade, before turning to explore other courses of action. A conversation Ambassador Vladimir Popović had on October 8 with some State Department officials had, in fact, led them to believe that the Yugoslavs might consider favorably the December 6 proposal if amended to the effect that the introduction of Italian understudies would be limited to the city of Trieste and a five-power declaration guaranteeing minority rights would be issued prior to the preparatory meeting. Riddleberger was thus instructed to submit the revised proposal to Tito personally. [5]

Luce insisted that before going back to Tito the Allies begin the transfer of the administration of Zone A to Italy. This, she argued, would serve to "unfreeze the Italian and Yugoslav positions," make it clear to both countries that the Allies "retain[ed] full control of concessions to either party" and enable them "to bring pressure at appropriate time during any negotiation in the future." Riddleberger thought that the amendments were "a change of label and not of content" and consequently, felt "personally most reluctant to make the suggested approach to Tito." The Foreign Office, upon Ambassador Ivo Mallet's recommendation cabled Washington that "without further substantive changes" the submission of the proposal to Tito "would be fruitless . . . and possibly counterproductive in that his negative attitude might be enhanced by [the] repetition [of] previously presented positions." [6]

Thus, after some further attempts to see whether the Yugoslav and Italian positions toward the convening of a preparatory meeting could be reconciled, the working group at the State Department abandoned the idea of a further approach to Tito and turned to explore new options. After much debate, it was decided that first a last attempt should be made to

see whether the Italians would agree to attend a secret unconditional meeting of ambassadors. The approach would be informal and no pressure would be put on them to do so. The Allies would simply point out that, in spite of all their efforts, they had been unable to get the Yugoslavs to agree to their November 13 formula Hence they now liked to ascertain whether the Italians might be willing to attend a preliminary meeting without preconditions. Should the answer be negative the problem would be tackled from a different angle.

The new plan provided for the Anglo-Americans to approach the Yugoslavs and tell them that before withdrawing their troops and turning the administration of Zone A to the Italians, they wished to initiate secret discussions with them, as third occupying power of the FTT, in order to solve, in a manner acceptable also to the Italians, outstanding issues such as border rectifications, minority rights, and a free port in Trieste. The members of the working group hoped this way to reach agreement on a division of the FTT along the lines suggested by Dulles but refused by De Gasperi the previous spring. They were certain that the Italians would now welcome such a solution and were reasonably confident that it would also be acceptable to Tito since it would offer him a way out of the impasse resulting from his opposition to the October 8 decision. Although for the Yugoslavs the final settlement had to represent an improvement over the October 8 decision such an improvement did not have to be necessarily territorial. Wallner's pre-October 8 messages now having sunk in, the working group concluded that Tito could adhere to the Dulles' plan of May 1953 provided that it resulted from a freely negotiated agreement clearly demonstrating Yugoslavia's independence and equality as a country. The Americans also suggested that to put some pressure on Tito he should be told that refusal to go along with such a plan would result in the implementation of the October 8 decision, although accompanied by a public statement that the Allies would not support future territorial claims of either country Eden, however, insisted that such an option be considered only if Tito's answer was negative. The French, it was decided, would be

left out of both the approach and the discussions since the Anglo-Americans were to act in their role of occupying powers As for the Italians, they were to be told that since all efforts to convene a five-power conference or preliminary meeting on a basis acceptable to both countries had proven fruitless, the U.S and U.K , while continuing to stand behind the October 8 decision, intended now to consult secretly and privately with the Yugoslavs in an endeavor to obtain their agreement to a final solution which would be acceptable also to Italy. [7]

The new plan is accepted by both countries

The Yugoslav press presented the Pella-Gregorić December 5 agreement on the withdrawal of troops as evidence that without Allied intervention and pressure a final settlement for Trieste would be easier to find. At the same time, Yugoslav officials continued to send out signals indicating a preference for direct negotiations with the Italians. On December 8 a counselor of the Yugoslav legation in Rome, Zvonko Peresić told Italian counselor Michele Lanza that all that the Yugoslavs desired was a slight modification of the October 8 decision. The solution favored in Belgrade was an exchange of the Italian coastal cities in Zone B against the Slovenian villages of the hinterland of Zone A and access to the sea at Zaule, this being a question of considerable importance for Slovenia Similar hints were also to be found in the Yugoslav press. Italian decision-makers, however, regarded these advances as just another Yugoslav tactic to wreck the October 8 decision and ignored them. As Pella stated in a speech to the Senate on December 10, the October 8 decision was to be considered "final and irrevocable" [8] Pella sought reassurances in this sense from both Dulles and Eden whom he met a few days later at a meeting of the NATO

Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. All he received, however, was a general promise that the Allies would "seek in every possible peaceful way to bring about an equitable solution of the problem." [9]

On December 20, having learned from the French of the Yugoslav counterproposal of December 6 (acceptance to take part in a conference on Italian terms if Yugoslav preconditions were also accepted) but ignoring that the Anglo-Americans had already discarded this option, Pella and Zoppi immediately instructed Brosio, Tarchiani and Quaroni to make it clear to the Allied governments that acceptance of the November 13 sounding was as far as Italy would go. The Yugoslav counterproposal, the ambassadors were to argue, was but an attempt "to forestall or prevent further unwelcomed Allied initiatives" and "to obtain the greatest possible concessions in Zone A from the Allied and Italian Governments without any prejudice to the totalitarian Yugoslav hold on Zone B." The ambassadors were also to point out that "after the decision of October 8 and in the spirit of the same, any change in the legislative and administrative situation in Zone A could only be contemplated following a previous exchange of view with the Italian Government." [10]

On December 23 the State Department sent Luce instructions for the approach to Pella. She cabled Washington that it had already been decided that the approach would be made by British Ambassador Ashley Clarke alone. Having learned that Pella was to leave the capital shortly and expected not to return until after New Year, Clarke, although still without precise instructions from the Foreign Office, informally approached Pella the same day during a reception for the Diplomatic Corps given by President Einaudi. He unofficially told him that the three governments intended to ascertain his preparedness to attend a secret unconditional five-power ambassadorial meeting. Pella's reaction, as Clarke later referred to Luce, was "grey." [11]

The following day Pella explained to Luce personally that he could absolutely not agree to attend a secret unconditional meeting of ambassadors, or whatever one might choose to call a meeting at which all

five countries sat around the same table (decision 21) because it would give the impression that Tito's proposal for a preparatory meeting without conditions had been forced on Italy. This would have devastating repercussions on Parliament and public opinion. He said, however, that he would have no objection to accrediting a duly authorized representative to meet in Paris to discuss the Italian position with the Allies. The Yugoslavs could obviously send a representative of their own to explain, separately, their own position. The Allies could then try to mediate the two and bring them more in line. Pella's proposal was later further clarified by Zoppi and Casardi to both Durbrow and Clarke. Pella expected Bidault to chair the talks. These should deal with the substance, that is the territorial aspects of the Trieste question and not with finding a formula for arranging a conference, which might not, after all, have to take place, if all substantive matters were completely resolved during the talks. The Italians also expected that if the talks failed, the October 8 decision would be implemented. [12]

This suggestion provided the Anglo-Americans with a welcome opportunity. They could now, in fact, present their own plan as if it had been prompted by Pella himself. The working group at the State Department thus decided that it was no longer necessary to put an invitation formally to Pella regarding the unconditional meeting of ambassadors. The Prime Minister would instead be officially approached with the new plan. He would be told that "his suggestion was an excellent idea but that [the Allies] thought there would be advantages in arranging the timing of the resultant talks between the various representatives a bit differently." They would first talk secretly with the Yugoslavs to explore with them as occupying powers a possible settlement and then, when "a realistic basis for a mutually agreeable solution" had been reached, the Italians would be called in to express their opinion and verify whether they provided a basis for more direct negotiations. [13] The Yugoslavs would be told that the Allies had overestimated their willingness to accept de facto partition as embodied

in the October 8 decision. Given their strong opposition to the unilaterality of this decision, they had refrained from carrying it out. For ten weeks they had endeavored to find a basis on which both Italy and Yugoslavia could agree to attend a five power conference at which to seek a definitive, peaceful and equitable solution to the problem. This search having been unsuccessful, they had now decided to invite the Yugoslavs to designate a representative to meet with them, as three occupying powers of the FTT, either in Washington or London, to discuss secretly possible solutions to the entire problem of the FTT. [14]

On January 4 the Anglo-Americans told Bidault of their new plan and of their intention to leave France out of the implementation of at least its initial phase since there would probably be a "far greater chance of obtaining a Yugoslav agreement to a reasonable Trieste settlement if the U.S. and U.K [went] to them secretly as powers sharing responsibilities for the administration and occupation of the FTT." Bidault commented somewhat resentfully that he had been "so many times embarked and then disembarked from [the Trieste] boat that ... [he had] developed a case of seasickness". [15] On the same day in Rome Clarke and Durbrow submitted the plan to Zoppi, Pella being unavailable because of the governmental crisis. Zoppi regretted that the French had not been included. He said that "psychologically London would be less acceptable than Washington" because Italian public opinion "rightly or wrongly [had] the impression that the British [were] more favorably inclined to Tito because of their Balkan policy or other reasons." He also inquired as to what action would the Allies take with respect to the October 8 decision if the talks proved unproductive. Durbrow answered that during the talks "no assuring would be given [to the Yugoslavs] which could prejudge the implementation of such a decision." Zoppi said that his own personal reaction was not unfavorable and expressed the hope that the plan would also meet the approval of the Prime Minister. [16]

Because of the ongoing governmental crisis, Zoppi could meet Pella only on the evening of January 6. The Prime Minister decided to accept

the Anglo-American plan (decision 22) The following evening Zoppi communicated the answer to Clarke and Durbrow. He pointed out that the proposal submitted for consideration was not exactly the same as the one suggested by Pella to Luce. Despite the differences, particularly the absence of the French from the secret talks, and the fact that these would not be conducted in parallel, Pella had accepted it [17]

The Italians having accepted the plan, Riddleberger was instructed to issue the invitation to the Yugoslavs. He met with Foreign Minister Koča Popović and Bebler on the evening of January 8. After the proposal was outlined Popović said the Yugoslav government would study it and give a reply as soon as possible. The Foreign Minister asked a few questions, but as Riddleberger commented they "seemed to be primarily for purposes of elucidation and critical comment was absent". The official Yugoslav answer came on January 11 The Yugoslav government accepted the plan. After all, Popović commented, negotiations between the three governments entrusted with the mandate of temporary administration of the FTT was one of the many proposals advanced by the Yugoslavs themselves in the past. He said that his government thought that London would be more practical as site of the talks and that it had decided to appoint its ambassador there, Vladimir Velebit, as Yugoslav representative. He would be assisted by several experts As it would be necessary to recall Velebit to Belgrade for discussions and instructions, Popović thought the earliest practicable date for convocation of the meeting would be the last week of January. [18]

Crisis Components

According to the ICB model the post-crisis period is characterized

by a marked decline in intensity of one or more of the three perceptual crisis conditions--threat, time pressure and war probability. In the case under consideration it was the agreement on troop withdrawal reached on December 5 between Pella and Gregorić which led to a drastic decline in the perceived probability of involvement in military hostilities, even by accident, and thus marked the onset of the post-crisis period. Perception of threat also declined as it became progressively clear that Italy would sooner or later certainly regain Trieste, which Tito had explicitly renounced in his speech in Belgrade on November 15 and, most likely, also the rest of Zone A since the Allies, although reluctant to give precise assurances about the date of the transfer, wished to avoid the embarrassment of having to renege publicly their decision of October 8.

Time pressure was the last perceived crisis component to decline. It should be remembered that time pressure was not so much linked to the Trieste developments per se as it was, instead, to the domestic situation. It derived, in other words, from the perception that a timely, favorable solution of the Trieste question could be decisive in prolonging the life of the government. At the meeting of the NATO Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris in mid-December Pella asked, for instance, both Dulles and Eden "to do all possible to solve the Trieste problem" by January 15 when Parliament would reconvene. [19] By the end of December, however, Pella had to face the fact that he lacked the support of his own party and that even a last minute solution of the Trieste question would not save his government. Consequently also time pressure declined. By the beginning of January the intensity of all relevant perceptions had returned to noncrisis norms. The post-crisis period (and the entire crisis) was now over.

Findings

Information

During the post-crisis period the information sought by Italian decision-makers continued to be related primarily to Allied intentions. Given the marked decline in intensity in the perceived probability of involvement in military hostilities following the Pella-Gregorić agreement on troop withdrawal and the consequent decrease in the likelihood that the Allies might be tempted to renege the October 8 decision, there was a corresponding diminution in the felt need for information. Search remained confined to diplomatic channels and the frequency of meetings between Italian and Allied officials went down by 47% with respect to the crisis period (about 30 meetings in 32 days as opposed to 90 in 45 days). The French continued to offer reliable, although not always timely, accounts of all Allied behind-the-scenes debates as well as other key pieces of information. Bidault, for instance, gave Quaroni a detailed report on the discussions Dulles, Eden and he had at the Bermudas where the Allied December 6 approach in Belgrade had been finalized. The French chargé in Belgrade promptly informed Vanni D'Archirafi of the failure of this approach, while Prime Minister Robert Schuman illustrated to Quaroni the nature of the Yugoslav counterproposal. [20]

As had been the case during the crisis period, Pella occasionally communicated directly with Allied leaders. During this period he met, as already mentioned, with Dulles and Eden in Paris. His main objective, however, was not to obtain additional information but to sensitize them to the Italian point of view and spur them to action by emphasizing the need for Western solidarity and exerting some pressure. He did not hesitate, in fact, to stress that given "the delicate domestic political balance in Italy," only a successful outcome of the Trieste question would "enable him to continue the execution of a pro-NATO foreign policy" and ratify the EDC treaty in particular. [21]

Information continued to be channeled through the Office of the

Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry and to be processed by the same restricted group of people as in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Distrust of the Yugoslavs continued to affect interpretation of evidence The attempts by the Yugoslav Counselor in Rome Peresić to convince the Italians to accede to direct negotiations, by assuring them that the solution most favorably regarded in Belgrade was an exchange of part of the coastal strip of Zone B with the hinterland of Zone A, failed because Italian decision-makers regarded such assurances as a ruse to lead them to renounce indirectly the October 8 decision and thus discarded them without further probe. Indeed, it would appear that no Yugoslav initiative, short of complete acceptance of Italian terms, could have changed the mind of Italian decision-makers since they regarded the advancement of new, different suggestions not as an indication of flexibility and hence eagerness to reach an agreement but as a sign that the Yugoslavs were bent on muddling the question in order to delay a solution This interpretation was consonant, in fact, with the belief that keeping the Trieste question unsolved allowed the Yugoslavs to benefit from Western aid without having to commit themselves to the West. Following Clarke's informal approach to Pella on December 24, for instance, Casardi told Durbrow that the view of most Foreign Ministry officials was that "it would be to the advantage of Italy to accept [an] informal five-power meeting without any conditions." The Yugoslavs, he argued had no intention of reaching a solution. Since this would become c- it any meetings or conferences, whatever the terms under which they would be convened, by accepting the proposal Italy could finally unmask the Yugoslav game. On January 4 De Balzo told Durbrow that the new plan he had just unveiled would undoubtedly be a step forward because it would enable the Allies to realize at last that the Yugoslavs did not want a realistic solution. Finally, on January 7, Zoppi remarked that the plan indirectly recognized that while Italy's position concerning a final solution was clear, the substance of the Yugoslav one was still a mystery He also recommended to Clarke and Durbrow that during the talks with the

Yugoslavs the Allies do not limit themselves to accept a general formula for a solution but to press for a concrete and detailed one. The Yugoslav tactic, he explained, was to put forward vague proposals and concepts which at first seemed reasonable and promised positive developments but later, once they were examined closely, turned out to be quite different and completely unacceptable.[22] Whatever the merits of this belief, Italian decision-makers's conclusion about Peresic's assurances were certainly hurried and, it would appear, also mistaken. There is some evidence, in fact, that the Yugoslavs were serious about the possibility of exchanging part of the coastal strip of Zone B with the hinterland of Zone A. Yugoslav Ambassador Vladimir Popovic, in fact, told various State Department officials on December 29 that "while Yugoslavia felt that Italy should be prepared to renounce Zone B in return for Yugoslav renunciation of the city of Trieste, that did not mean that when the time [came] to consider the substance of a final solution Yugoslavia [would] not be prepared to see some adjustments in Zone B".[23]

In conclusion, the advent of the post-crisis period resulted in a decrease in Italian decision-makers' felt need for information and, consequently, in a less intensive search. It did not lead, however, to changes either in the size or the receptivity of the information processing group.

Consultation

The inception of the post-crisis period led to a restriction of the consultative circle to the diplomatic elite. Given the increasing difficulties faced by his government because of the ongoing intra-party struggle, Pella had less time to devote to Trieste and was obliged to rely almost exclusively on the advice provided by Zoppi. The latter

took into account the views of the ambassadors in the three Allied capitals and worked in close cooperation with Del Balzo and Casardi Although there were frequent exchanges of views between Zoppi and Pella particularly following Peresić's advances, the Yugoslav counterproposal of December 6 and Clarke's approach of December 23, no formal meetings for consultative purposes took place during this period. By the beginning of January, when the governmental crisis became acute, Zoppi had literally to chase after Pella to keep him au courant of developments. By this time the management of the Trieste question was completely in the hands of the diplomatic elite. Decision 22, for instance, more than being made by Pella after consulting with Zoppi, was made by Zoppi who then gave it formal, institutional legitimization by seeking and obtaining Pella's assent

There is no evidence that Pella consulted during this period with President Einaudi, Christian Democratic or other party leaders or even the Cabinet, as had been the case during the crisis period. Also ignored were the pro-Italian leaders in Trieste and the Italian Political Adviser to the AMG, De Castro. The latter particularly resented not having been even informed of Peresić's overtures at the beginning of December. He recounts that he would have certainly "moved heaven and earth" to pursue these overtures which seemed to indicate the possibility of regaining the Italian coastal cities of Zone B, had he known about them Since they had been kept secret from him, he dismissed the signals in the Yugoslav press as a simple propaganda offensive. Pella and his closest advisors, he would later lament, had their mind set on the achievement of the provisional solution and were bent on avoiding having to deal with any obstacle on this road, including his opinion. He felt already frustrated, as he confided to Higgs, by the fact that the Foreign Ministry had deliberately ignored his office for some time This last episode convinced him that, under the circumstances, the noblest course of action for him was to submit his resignation which he did on December 16. [24]

As had been the case during the crisis period, Italian

decision-makers continued to regard Luce and Bidault not only as reliable sources of information but also as consultants. Pella, for instance, chose to give his negative reply to the Allied sounding of December 23 and, at the same time, advance his counterproposal to Luce rather than to Clarke, even though the approach had been made by the latter alone. He also recommended Paris as site of the talks and Bidault as chairman of the Allied team and was not pleased to see that in the plan submitted by the Allies on January 4, the site had been moved from Paris to Washington or London and the French shorn of any role. As stated in an informal memorandum Zoppi handed to Durbrow, the Italian government accepted the plan but wished to make it clear that once informed of the results of the talks with the Yugoslavs "reserved the right to consult with the French ... before deciding whether to pass to the second phase of the plan." [25]

This extraordinary consultative role in which Italian officials often cast Bidault and Luce appears, however, to have been primarily an attempt to win them over completely to the Italian cause in the hope that they would assume a progressively more forceful stance on the Allied team thereby, hopefully, increasing their influence within it. Whether or not as a result of this attitude of regard, Bidault's and Luce's actions certainly became progressively more sensitive to Italian interests. If until then they had sympathized with the Italian position, by the end of the post-crisis period they had come to identify with it completely. Both, for instance, vigorously discouraged--in Luce's case one could say boycotted--the submission to Pella of a new invitation to an unconditional preliminary meeting which they knew would only embarrass him, advocating in its stead the beginning of the implementation of the October 8 decision. Both also expressed disapproval of the plan for secret separate talks. Bidault did it forcefully with the use of arguments often used by Italian officials themselves. He told the Anglo-Americans that dealing with Tito on the basis of occupying powers was contrary to, and inconsistent with both the 1948 tripartite declaration and the October 8 decision. Treating

him on such a level of equality would only increase his confidence and lead him to greater intransigence vis-á-vis both Italy and the Allies. Luce avoided commenting about the plan itself. On January 4, however, she gave her colleagues at the State Department an assessment of the situation which was a carbon copy of the Italian one Unless a favorable solution was forthcoming one could not expect Italy to ratify the EDC treaty or give a more active contribution to Western defense. If no agreement would result from the secret talks with the Yugoslavs within a reasonable amount of time, the October 8 decision would have to be implemented. [26]

Decisional Fora

Decision 21 was made by Pella after consulting Zoppi. Most of the diplomatic officials, as Casardi revealed to Durbrow, favored the acceptance of an unconditional five-power meeting "from a purely diplomatic and international public opinion point of view." Pella, however, could not accept Clarke's proposal because of the perceived negative repercussions it would create domestically. Acceptance, he felt, would spell doom for whatever residual possibility he had to salvage his government. [27] Zoppi recognized Pella's domestic imperative. On November 30, fearing that the Allies, faute de mieux, might be tempted to come back precisely with an invitation to an unconditional preliminary meeting, he had advised Pella to tell them that if the Yugoslavs would not accept the November 13 sounding they should abandon the idea of a conference or preliminary meeting and try instead to wrest from Tito a reasonable solution themselves, through secret diplomatic channels. Pella had approved the idea in principle but had decided not to submit it to the Allies for the time being preferring to limit himself to letting them know that he could not and

would not agree to take part in a conference on terms other than those communicated on November 13 Zoppi suggested that time had now come to present the Allies with that idea, which Pella did in his meeting with Luce on December 24 To minimize the damage to the image of reasonableness Italy was trying to portray internationally Zoppi also handed Durbrow a memorandum aimed at putting on record the fact that the Italian government had not turned down any Allied proposal concerning the Trieste quesion, having accepted both the October 8 decision and the November 13 sounding The approach to Pella made by British ambassador Clarke on December 23, the memorandum pointed out, was not official, hence Pella could not have rejected a proposal which had not been made 28

Decision 22, although formally approved by Pella was for all practical purposes made by Zoppi. By this time, having already resigned, Pella did not have to worry about the domestic impact of the decision. The choice therefore could be left entirely to the professionals of diplomacy.

In conclusion, there were no major changes in the type of decisional fora and the authority patterns within them during this period. Pella was formally responsible for both decisions but in both cases he relied heavily on the suggestions of his diplomatic advisors The influence of the latter, moreover, became more decisive once domestic political considerations lost most of their relevance with the government's resignation.

Alternatives

Decision 21 was not preceded by any search for alternatives Italian decision-makers had already decided at the end of November that they could not and would not budge from their position of agreeing to a

conference only on the terms suggested in the November 13 sounding The possibility that the Allies might try to change them in case of Yugoslav resistance having been foreseen, the rejection of Clarke's approach and the submission of the counterproposal for secret, parallel talks to Luce were therefore almost the simple implementation of a pre-programmed response

Decision 22 likewise required no real search for alternatives, being a dichotomous choice between acceptance or refusal of the Allied plan. The debate among diplomatic officials centered therefore immediately around the evaluation of consequences. Quaroni pointed out that "the danger exist[ed] that .. having ascertained the Yugoslav position and having clipped somewhat their claims [the Anglo-Americans] would then turn to [the Italians] and say: 'This is the proposal Now you decide take it or leave it' " He nevertheless thought that the plan had to be accepted because its refusal would leave as the only alternative to continue to press for the implementation of the October 8 decision without any real guarantee that the Allies could and would respect their moral engagement fully. Brosio's assessment ran along the same lines. The exclusion of the French was symbolic, he noted, of the break of this initiative with those of March 20, 1948 and October 8, 1953. The Allies were about to engage in an act of mediation which implied the fatal consequences of pressure on Italy to make it accept what would be obtained from the Yugoslavs. Since the only acceptable final solution was that of a division of the entire FTT along an ethnic line, without concessions to Yugoslavia in the port of Trieste or on the littoral of Zone A implying a direct or indirect, total or partial renunciation of sovereignty, Brosio was skeptical about the result of the talks. Italy, he thought, would eventually have to press for the implementation of the October 8 decision. He suggested therefore that it was advisable to be conciliatory in this phase, i.e. accept the plan, and be firm later on. Tarchiani, for his part, was more optimistic He thought that the Yugoslavs, having been invited to negotiate on a level of parity with the Allies, might prove less intransigent and forget the

offense of the October 8 diktat He was also convinced that being in a position to deal with them directly and secretly, the Americans would be able to apply more pressure and finally "bring such an indocile partner to reason."

Zoppi, in recommending acceptance of the plan to Pella, highlighted what he considered its positive aspects the Allies for the first time had consulted Italy before making a demarche in Belgrade, they were concentrating their efforts on the search for a final solution; they had recognized that whereas the Italian position was clear the Yugoslav one was not, London as site of the talks was a good choice "because of the recognized ability as a negotiator of Brosio." In giving his assent Pella made one final, and perhaps, most important consideration: whatever the risks of the plan, and there appeared to be none since assent did not imply any engagement except to evaluate the results, he could not prevent the Anglo-Americans from having private, secret talks with the Yugoslavs if they so wished [29] In conclusion there was only one noticeable, albeit important difference in the evaluation of alternatives in this period, namely the fact that domestic consequences were no longer the paramount discriminant for choice In the case of Decision 22 at least, a course of action was, for the first time, examined and evaluated exclusively in its international dimension This, however, was not related to the advent of the post-crisis period and the consequent decrease in the level of stress, but rather to the fact that, his government having resigned, Pella could now afford to pay less attention to the domestic consequences of his choices on Trieste. Previous behavior suggests, in fact, that although he could not prevent the Allies from talking to the Yugoslavs if they so wished, he would certainly have done everything he could to dissuade them had he perceived such an initiative as damaging him domestically. This time, however, the consequences of the Allied plan were not even evaluated on the domestic value dimension.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. The fall of Pella's government is chronicled in Re, op cit., pp. 247-286. See also Mantovani, op. cit., pp. 118-134 and Baget Bozzo, op. cit , pp 463-469.

2. Pella's speech to the Senate is in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 51 (Dec. 19, 1953), pp. 1223-1224; MC Luciolli, Bonbright (and attachment), 750G 00/12-2253, De Castro, op cit., pp 751 and 754, "Trieste, paravento della politica jugoslava?" Esteri 5, 1 (Jan. 15, 1954), pp. 10-11 See also the remarks made by Brosio to Kirkpatrick on Jan. 4, 1954, reported in De Castro, op. cit., p. 771 as well as those made by Vanni D'Archirafi to Riddleberger, reported in Riddleberger to Dept. 770 (Dec. 9, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9

3. Smith to Bermuda to Sec. 47 (Dec. 7, 1953); Aldrich to Dept. 2489 (Dec. 8, 1953), both FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9; Smith to Belgrade 706, 750G.00/12-853. For the rationale behind the Yugoslav counterproposal, see an article by Bebler in Borba on December 6, reported in Riddleberger to Dept. 758 (Dec 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

4. Luce to Dept. 1823 (Dec. 7, 1953); Riddleberger to Dept. 761 (Dec. 8, 1953), both FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

5. MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Barbour, Byington, W.E. Knight, Dec. 9, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML and Dulles to Belgrade 712, 750G 00/12-853 (drafted on Dec. 9).

6. Luce to Dept. 1850 (Dec 10, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9; MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Byington, Barbour, Dec 10, 1953, Box 3, File ML, Riddleberger to Dept. 775, and Smith to Belgrade 726, both 750G 00/12-1153 (the latter drafted, however, on the 12th). To top it all, the State Department 's repeated efforts at "finessing" the proposal were torn apart by a telegram from Higgs, who assured that there was no AMG position whose duties could be said to be confined to the city of Trieste alone. To limit the appointment of Italian officials to the city of Trieste would require splitting responsibilities so that Allied officials would retain authority over the rest of the zone (Higgs to Dept. 792, Dec. 11, 1953 and 824, Dec 17, 1953, both FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9) In what perhaps amounted to the supreme semantic somersault on the part of the State Department, Higgs was told that what the Department really meant was that "the officials concerned would be resident in the city of Trieste and they would not physically present themselves or operate beyond the city" (Smith to Belgrade 728, Dec. 14, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9)

7. Smith to Belgrade 726, 750G.00/12-1153, Butterworth (American Chargé in London) to Dept 2636, 750G 00/12 1653, 2696, 750G 00/12-1853 and 2713, 750G 00/12-2153, MC Salt, Ruffin, Barbour, Nes, Dec 18, 1953, MC Salt, Ruffin, Byington, Barbour, Nes, Dec 19, 1953; MC Salt, Ruffin, Holmes, Barbour, Nes, Dec 22, 1953 (11 00 A.M); MC Salt, Holmes, Barbour, Nes, Dec 22, 1953 (4 30 P M), MC Salt, Holmes, Nes, Dec 23, 1953 (10 30 A M), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML, Courtney (First Secretary, American embassy) to Dept D-2173, 750G 00/12 1753, Riddleberger to Dept 798 (Dec 18, 1953), Dulles to Rome 2103 (Dec. 19, 1953) and 2138 (Dec 24, 1953) and to Belgrade 754 (Dec 23, 1953), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9, Dulles to Belgrade 755, 750G 00/12-2353, see also the memorandum "Suggested Territorial Adjustment between Zone A and Zone B of the FTT" (prepared by W E Knight on Nov 16, 1953 and attached to a letter from Leverich to Riddleberger dated Jan 14, 1954 in FSP Trieste, Box 6, File 19) and an untitled and undated 47-page memorandum (in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML), which reviews the evolution of the Yugoslav position over the years and assess the type of solutions most likely to be accepted, Eden, op cit , p 185

8. The Yugoslav press was also always prompt in picking up and magnifying any comment by Italian politicians in favor of direct negotiations On January 9, 1954, for instance, Politika gave much space to a letter by former Prime Minister Ferruccio Parri to the weekly Il Mondo in which it was pointed out that a "healthy and solid solution would be one which both sides accepted willingly" and not one which "was presented as a gift by the Western powers " See Riddleberger to Dept 759 (Dec 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9 and 850 (Jan 11, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10 Peresić's approach is reported in De Castro, op cit , pp 756-760 and 764 Pella's speech to the Senate is in Relazioni Internazionali 17, 51 (Dec 19, 1953), pp 1223 1224 On December 12, the Italian Observer at the UN, Guidotti asked Rome for directives in case the Yugoslavs suggested direct negotiations as a way to deal with the Soviet initiative in the Security Council. Pella answered that if approached by the Yugoslavs he should limit himself "to observe that since efforts to convene a five-power conference already accepted by Italy [were] underway, it [was] necessary to avoid anything which could cause confusion or delays A direct exchange of opinions would, after all, take place within the conference itself."

9. Achilles to Dept 2310 and 2319 (both Dec 16, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9 and "Summary Notes on the Conversation in Paris between M Foster Dulles and Signor Pella," FSP-Rome, Box Unclassified, File 350.

10. "Instructions Sent to the Italian Ambassadors in London, Paris and Washington on December 20th," FSP-Rome, Box Unclassified, File 350.

11. Dulles to Rome 2131 (Dec. 23, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9, Luce to Dept. 1971, 750G.00/12-2353 The official reason Luce gave for the decision to have the British ambassador make the approach to Pella was that she expected to have already left for Washington by the time the instructions would reach Rome This, however, must have been an excuse for not taking a step with which she disagreed because she did not leave Rome until three days later.

12. Luce to Dept 1983 (Dec. 24, 1953), Durbrow to Dept 2031 (Dec 30, 1953), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9, MC Salt, Holmes, Jones, Leverich, Nes, Dec. 30, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML

13 MC Beeley (Counselor, British embassy), Holmes, Barbour, Jones (Office of Western European Affairs), Nes, Dec. 28, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML, Dulles to Paris 2314 (Dec. 28, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9 See also Merchant to the Secretary "Recent Trieste Developments," 750G 00/12-3153. De Castro (op cit , p 778) who has not consulted the American documents suggests that the Americans got the idea "for this new type of diplomatic technique" from the Italians. He thus interprets a telegram sent by Tarchiani on February 2, 1954 in which the ambassador revealed that the idea of the secret negotiations did not derive from Pella's suggestion but was "a concept autonomously and independently developed" at the State Department, as an attempt by Tarchiani to attribute that merit to his American friends

14 Dulles to Belgrade 782 (Dec 30, 1953) and 788 (Jan 1, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9. The Americans had first expressed preference for Washington but upon strong British pressure agreed to let the Yugoslavs choose

15. Joyce to Dept 2484 (Jan 4, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9

16. Durbrow to Dept. 2059, 750G.00/1-454. The British were more reluctant to give assurances about the implementation of the October 8 decision They did not feel that they could "assume a precise engagement to withdraw troops and relinquish Zone A regardless of the consequences, were the talks to fail" (De Castro, op cit., pp 769, 771-772 and 774)

17 Durbrow to Dept. 2088 (Jan 7, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

18. Riddleberger to Dept 839 (Jan 8, 1954) and 851 (Jan. 11, 1954) both FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10.

19. Achilles to Dept. 2319 (Dec. 16, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

20. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 750-1, 754-55 and 764.

21. Achilles to Dept. 2319 (Dec. 16, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

22. Luce to Dept 1976, 750G.00/12-2453; Durbrow to Dept. 2059, 750G 00/1-454 and 2088 (Jan. 7, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

23. MC V. Popović, Bruner, Smith, Holmes, Barbour, Dec. 29, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML.

24. De Castro op. cit., 756-760; Higgs to Dept. 826, Dec 17, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

25. Luce to Dept 1983 (Dec. 24, 1953); Durbrow to Dept. 2031 (Dec. 30, 1953) and 2088 (Jan. 7, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9.

26. Suspecting that the Allied plan might be an indication that the Anglo-Americans, if pushed to make a choice between Italy and Yugoslavia, had opted for the latter, Bidault also warned against the temptation of "writing Italy off militarily" arguing that "in his memoirs Napoleon I had praised Italian soldiers who entered Russia with him in 1812 as supporting [the] cold and miseries of [the] Russian campaign as well or better than soldiers of other nationalities composing [la] Grande Armée" (Joyce to Dept. 2484, Jan 4, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9), MC Luce, Holmes, Barbour, Jones, W Knight, 750G 00/1-454

27 Luce to Dept. 1976, 750G 00/12-2453.

28. De Castro, op. cit., p 748, Durbrow to Dept. D-1345, 750G.00/1-554 The Italian record seems to have been adjusted accordingly because De Castro writes (p. 767) that Clarke never submitted a proposal to Pella. This is obviously true only if one adds the qualification "officially."

29. De Castro, op. cit , pp 771-776.

7. POSTLUDE TO CRISIS: January 12, 1954 - October 5, 1954

An analysis of the postlude to crisis period is included, as was the case for the prelude to crisis one, in order to compare and contrast the behavior of Italian decision-makers during these two "normal" periods with that prevailing during the crisis and thus better assess the influence of the situational variable "stress" on the decision-making process.

Decisions, Decisions-Makers and Domestic Environment

There were 2 decisions during this period:

Decision 23 - June 9, 1954	Foreign Minister Piccioni decides to continue negotiations.
Decision 24 - September 22, 1954	Prime Minister Scelba decides to accept one of the two alternatives submitted by the Yugoslavs The FTT problem is resolved.

On the domestic front, all political attention and efforts during January and February 1954 concentrated on the task of putting together a parliamentary majority for a new government Although the Christian Democrats had let Pella go in order to revamp a center coalition, no preliminary agreement on its specific composition or program had been worked out. This task was left to the leader of Iniziativa Democratica Amintore Fanfani, whom the party designated as its candidate for Prime Minister and on whom President Einaudi, with some personal reluctance, conferred the mandate on January 12. After an unsuccessful tour d'horizon, Fanfani decided, with the self-confidence of the exuberant maverick he then was, to face Parliament without a preliminary inter-party agreement. On January 18 he announced the formation of a monocolore (a government formed only by Christian Democrats) Parliament, he pointed out, would have to judge it exclusively on the basis of the merits of its program. Although by promoting this image of himself as a dedicated technocrat above the tactics of corridor bargaining he might have been adding to his political assets for the future, in the politically volatile atmosphere of those days his move was a sure recipe for failure On January 30, the Chamber of Deputies denied him a vote of confidence. President Einaudi then turned to De Gasperi and Attilio Piccioni. Both, however, refused the mandate and suggested, instead, the name of Mario Scelba, who, meanwhile, had managed, through a personal initiative, to reach a programmatic agreement with the center parties On February 8, Einaudi gave him the mandate. Two days later Scelba communicated the composition of his new government which included fourteen Christian Democrats, four Social-Democrats and three Liberals. The Republicans agreed to support the new government but were not represented in it The Foreign Affairs portfolio went to Piccioni while Taviani retained Defense On February 18, Scelba presented his program to Parliament. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies gave him a vote of confidence on February 16 and on March 10, respectively. [1]

Psychological Environment

Given the ongoing Allied-Yugoslav secret talks, neither Fanfani nor Scelba dealt at length with the question of Trieste in their programmatic speeches to Parliament Both simply committed themselves "to continue to defend valiantly [Italian] rights" and obtain "a just solution." The "leverage syndrome" and the "domestic magnifier" remained, however, the two main features of the decision makers' attitudinal prism. No sooner had Scelba been sworn in than he restated the familiar connection between a satisfactory solution of the Trieste problem and the ratification of the EDC treaty. How could the government convince the Italian public, he pointed out in a letter to Dulles on March 27, that the EDC offered "effective defense against all aggression when Yugoslav oral threats succeeded [in] holding up [the] implementation of [the] October 8 [decision], especially when one considered that [the] Yugoslav regime had no free choice between east and west." In a meeting with Dulles in Milan on May 13, both he and Piccioni again made this linkage. An impatient Dulles flatly told them (as he had already done in a response to Scelba's letter on April 10), that they were wrong to believe that holding up the ratification of the EDC treaty would bring about a more favourable solution for Trieste. He then proceeded to lecture them on the need for Western solidarity to prevail over national parochialism. Trieste could not be used as a stumbling block to European unity because, if the latter should not come about to counter the Soviet menace, the Trieste question risked becoming no longer very important. Piccioni replied that special consideration had nevertheless to be given to individual countries for problems affecting their basic values as Trieste was for Italy and the Saar for France. Brosio even suggested, in a report to Rome, that the EDC treaty be introduced to Parliament and ratified with the condition that the President of the Republic would sign it only after the Trieste question

had been solved. Once the EDC was scuttled by the French before the Italian Parliament could vote on it, a just solution to the Trieste problem came to be perceived as necessary "to show some justification [to Italian public opinion] for [the government's] consistent adherence to the Atlantic policy." Only if the Western powers could help Italy attain this "basic national aspiration," could the government plausibly argue that its Atlantic policy had not been a failure and was worth pursuing. [2]

Images also remained the same. Scelba, for instance, in a speech in Palermo on May 24, the anniversary of Italy's entry into World War I, told his audience that the "Italian passion for Trieste" was not based on "abstract rights" but arose from "the blood generously spilled by 600,000 Italians," and that the "natural frontiers of Italy" were well beyond those of the present. He exhorted the Yugoslavs not to forget that Italian blood had contributed also to their cause by "making modern Yugoslavia from little Serbia." He also reminded the Allies that "Italy had already paid a high price for the errors of Fascism," through "the harsh sacrifice imposed by the peace treaty." Italian decision-makers also continued to think that the Yugoslav regime "notwithstanding its fleeting dissension with the Soviet leaders, had not lost in the least its communist character" and, although not a Soviet "satellite," it was nevertheless to be considered as being "basically on the Eastern side." An irate Luciolli, for instance, told Merchant on June 5 that the Trieste problem was not a case of an Italian-Yugoslav quarrel but rather one between the West and the East. The belief also persisted that Yugoslavia was not really interested in a solution and would continue its tactics of wasting time by advancing promising but vague proposals which, on closer scrutiny, would reveal themselves unacceptable. Although Italy had not opposed the formation of the Balkan Pact of Friendship and Cooperation, it had adopted a rather cool attitude arguing that no cooperation with Yugoslavia would be possible until relations between the two countries had been "normalized," i.e. until the Trieste question had been solved. When the time came to transform

the pact into a military alliance the Italians not only continued to refuse to play any part in it but also maintained that Greece and Turkey, as members of NATO, could not enter it without the unanimous consent of all the other member countries. This effectively meant that Italy reserved for itself veto power over the formation of the Balkan Alliance. [3]

Perceptions of the Allies also remained unchanged Thus Italian decision-makers continued to resent the fact that, in their view, the U.S. government "seemed to be treating both Yugoslavia and Italy on equal footing. Since the British repeatedly exhorted them to be more flexible by pointing out that "Trieste was the pearl among the shells" of the FTT and Tito had already renounced it, Italian decision-makers concluded that with respect to the upcoming talks they, although perhaps not determined "to sacrifice [Italian] interests a priori, [were] nevertheless certainly psychologically prepared to meet Yugoslav requests." This, the Italians thought, was due both to a lingering war solidarity and to the fact that, as Brosio later put it, "sometimes you have more interest to soothe an uncertain country than to support a certain one." [4] And indeed when the proposal agreed upon in London was unveiled, I lian decision-makers regarded it as being too favourable to Yugoslavia. At the same time, the Allies' efforts to convince them that it was the maximum they had been able to extract from Yugoslavia were taken as evidence that Italy was being presented with an unacceptable ultimatum. The images of Fiume and Munich were often conjured to warn the Allies of the dire consequences which might follow Taviani, for instance, reminded Eden that the attitude of the Western powers toward the question of Fiume after World War I had significantly contributed to the rise of Fascism in Italy. He also wondered how Eden, who had been critical of Chamberlain's policy toward Germany, could fail to realize that appeasing Tito would not convert him to democracy but simply "bury" Italian democracy. [5]

The Allied-Yugoslav talks

The American objective for the secret talks was, as stated on January 28, 1954 in a letter by Acting Secretary Smith to the London embassy, to seek "a package deal which would put Italo-Yugoslav relations on a permanently sound basis." The Yugoslavs were to be impressed with the idea that the Allies were not thinking in terms of a territorial settlement alone, "but rather of the political, military, and economic health of a key area which w[ould] have great significance for all the free world and for the world-wide effort to throw back Soviet expansion." The best form of pressure against the Soviet system was "the demonstration of unity among countries of the free world" and "except for the relations between France and Germany" there was no part of the free world, the State Department believed, where "that demonstration would have more profound significance in the eyes of the Kremlin than in the area of Yugoslavia and Italy." At the specific level of the territorial settlement, the American objective was to have the Yugoslavs agree to exchange part of the coastal strip of Zone B for the hinterland of Zone A. The crucial issue in this context was the question of a Slovenian outlet to the sea. The Yugoslavs had repeatedly expressed interest in a corridor in the Zaule area where they intended, if need be, to build a new port for Slovenia. The Americans intended instead, as requested by De Gasperi in May 1953, to make a pitch for the 99-year lease of part of the Trieste port. To "sweeten the proposal" they poured over the possibility of "undertak[ing] a substantial development of the leased port area and the railway system leading to it." The British had little hope that the Yugoslavs would be satisfied with the lease and regarded these American endeavors with some

skepticism. [6]

Although the Yugoslavs had already expressed a vague preference for London as site of the talks, the Americans also tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the British to steer the Yugoslavs toward choosing Washington instead. They argued that Ambassador Popović who, were the talks to be held in Washington was likely to be selected as Yugoslav representative, was more flexible than his colleague in London As a Slovene, in fact, Velebit was reported to "hold extreme personal views on Trieste." They also thought that when and if the moment came for "putting a proposed settlement to the Italians, it would go better with them if [the] deal [had been] worked out in Washington than in London". Finally, they maintained that if held in Washington the talks had a better chance of remaining secret Secrecy was considered of paramount importance because it was feared that leaks to the press might lead to "damaging statements by Italian political figures " The press, it should be pointed out, had already picked up on the latest developments and Mayor Bartoli had wasted no time in labelling the proposed talks "a maneuver against Italy and Trieste." [7]

On January 15, Foreign Minister Koča Popović told the Allied diplomatic representatives in Belgrade that his government had decided on London. The choice had been determined by practical reasons of convenience as well as the consideration that Velebit was better prepared than the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington on the subject. Secrecy, he also argued, could be better maintained since the recalling of Ambassador Popović for consultation, a few weeks before his scheduled return to Yugoslavia (he had been elected to the National Assembly), would undoubtedly cause comments in the press On January 21 Velebit returned to Belgrade for consultation. The following day the British informed the Yugoslavs that their representative at the talks would be Assistant Undersecretary Geoffrey W Harrison The Americans selected their ambassador to Vienna, Llewellyn Thompson. The first meeting was held on the afternoon of February 2 [8]

The talks started with Velebit firing off "a baroud d'honneur,"

that is asserting, exclusively for the record, Yugoslav rights to the entire FTT with the exception of the city of Trieste. As soon as the discussion entered a more realistic phase, it became clear that Velebit was reluctant to reveal the Yugoslav position in detail. A difference of opinions developed between the British and the Americans on how to deal with this situation. The British did not perceive any need to extract from the Yugoslavs a detailed plan. According to them, all that was necessary was to obtain from Velebit agreement on a general plan which would leave room for final bargaining between the Yugoslavs and the Italians. They also felt that the Yugoslavs could not be pushed to make their maximum concessions because the Italians had asked and the Allies "had at least tacitly agreed that [they] would not be presented with an agreed U.S.-U.K.-Yugo[slav] plan on a take it or leave it basis." The Italians would certainly come up with a counteroffer and the British felt that they should not get themselves in a position in which they were left with only two alternatives: implementation of the October 8 decision or the agreed upon plan. The Americans maintained, instead, that it was necessary to reach agreement on a very precise plan based on maximum concessions from the Yugoslavs and then submit it forcefully to the Italians. The latter should be brought in to deal only with the Allies, not to negotiate directly with the Yugoslavs. Some aspects of the final solution, such as economic issues, would probably require bilateral discussions, but the two countries could not be expected to negotiate successfully the territorial aspect of the settlement. The Americans, therefore, took every opportunity, when alone with the Yugoslavs, to exercise strong pressure on them. [9]

At first, however, Velebit was unmovable. His objective, before going into the discussion of specific and concrete details, was to obtain preliminary approval of two basic principles: Slovenia's retaining an outlet to the sea and a statute for the protection of the Slovenian minority in Zone A. Feeling at a dead end, Thompson suggested that the State Department ask the Italians whether they would agree, in principle, to grant Slovenia a corridor to the sea. This would not

commit them to any specific solution. It would simply help the Allies evaluate various alternatives. Thompson believed that if such a preliminary agreement was obtained, the Yugoslavs would come forth with a more specific plan and a solution could be reached sooner Harrison suggested, as an alternative, appealing directly to Tito but Thompson thought it better to reserve this move for closing the final gap that he was sure would remain between the Yugoslav and Italian positions Luce opposed Thompson's suggestion. Given the ongoing governmental crisis, the Trieste problem was very much in the background in Italy and she preferred to leave it there until there was some real progress to report. Moreover, she did not believe Scelba would consent to grant a corridor to Slovenia. She pointed out that if De Gasperi had considered such an option it was only because at the time he was "hard pressed in the election campaign" and "was eager to get any solution of Trieste which could possibly assist him in [the] election." Scelba's government which, at the time, was not even sworn in, had no such urgency Even if Scelba agreed, moreover, he would want to know what kind of concessions in Zone B the Yugoslavs were ready to make in return In the end the State Department agreed with Luce. Before asking the Italians about the corridor, the Allies should acquaint themselves fully with other concessions expected of Italy in Zone A and those the Yugoslavs were prepared to make in Zone B. [10]

At the end of February Velebit presented a more concrete proposal. Although not all its details are known (quite a few documents relative to this phase of the talks are still classified), it would appear that in return for part of the hinterland of Zone A, the granting of a statute for the protection of its Slovenian minority and settlement of various outstanding financial questions, the Yugoslavs would give Italy an enclave around Piran to be connected by railway to Trieste As foreshadowed by some comments Bebler had made to Riddleberger at the end of January and by Velebit's insistence on Slovenia's retaining an outlet to the sea, the Yugoslavs were not prepared to exchange the coastal strip of Zone B for the mere lease of part of the Trieste port For

domestic political reasons, namely the need of the federal authorities not to be perceived as treating too cavalierly the interests of one of the republics, it was felt that Slovenia should have a port of its own. For this reason, the Yugoslavs decided to keep Koper and the coastal strip between the latter and Zone A where, if need be, a bigger port could be built [11]

The Allies felt that to be presentable to the Italians the enclave should be extended south, to include Portorož (Portorose) if not Umag, and north to include Izola (Isola d'Istria) and come as close as possible to Koper. They tried to lure the Yugoslavs by promising, besides regular economic aid, additional financial assistance specifically for the development of the port and its attending infrastructure and even going as far as suggesting that part of the enclave be "sold" to Italy. But it was all to no avail, and possibly counterproductive since the Yugoslavs were particularly sensitive on this subject and wished to avoid that Allied aid, although badly needed, be connected in any way with the settlement of the Trieste question. On March 11 Velebit made it known that his government could at most extend the enclave to Izola. This effectively convinced the Allies that the only pursuable solution was a division along the existing zonal boundary. [12]

The rest of March as well as the month of April were spent in putting together all the details of a proposal to be submitted to the Italians. Progress was slow and in mid-April Dulles and Eden felt the need to intervene personally. They informed Yugoslav decision-makers that they were "extremely disturbed" by the slow pace of the talks and pointed out that "the longer the discussions with the Italian Government [were] delayed, the more difficult it [would] be to secure the agreement of Italy on the proposed settlement." [13] On April 27, a proposal was sent to Belgrade for approval by the Yugoslav government. On May 11, in an interview with C. L. Sulzberger, Tito revealed most of its substance and declared himself confident about a solution being forthcoming. Although an official reply had not yet been received, the State

Department now decided that discussions with the Italians could not be delayed any longer Italian officials complained, in fact, that such public comments could only be aimed at "deliberately building up public hopes of [an] early agreement to focus [the] blame for any delay on [them] Thompson was instructed to tell Velebit that he would start initial contacts with the Italians immediately On May 13, the Yugoslav government communicated its approval of the proposal It insisted, however, on changing some procedural points The most important was a request for the Italian parliament to ratify the final agreement prior to its implementation. The aim was to preempt future Italian claims to Zone B as contained, for instance, in the so-called "Cammarata thesis" (which claimed that the FTT not having been set up, Italy retained sovereignty over the whole territory) and also, in a more veiled manner, in a speech on May 2, by Vice-Prime Minister Giuseppe Saragat After further discussions on May 31, the three negotiators reached agreement on the text of the proposal to be submitted to Italy [14]

As far as the territorial question was concerned, it was substantially a division along the zonal border with some modifications in favour of Yugoslavia which was to receive twice as big an area in Zone A as Italy was to obtain in Zone B (see figs 9 and 10) Such an area had, moreover, approximately 4000 residents while the one going to Italy was largely uninhabited. As Velebit would later comment, these "few square miles of territory were of no importance whatever, except to sweeten the deal a little bit in appearance to the Slovenes and to show that the solution was not a hundred percent imposed " The other points were: a statute for the protection of minorities in both zones, the settlement of all outstanding financial problems (arising mostly from the peace treaty), a promise by both countries not to prosecute or discriminate against any resident of the zones coming under their administration for past political activities related to the solution of the FTT problem, an undertaking by the Italian government to maintain a free port in Trieste, grant some measure of autonomy to the area coming under its administration, accord consular status to the Allied and

Yugoslav representatives in Trieste, allow the setting up of a Slovene bank in Trieste and provide three buildings to house Slovene cultural institutions Finally, adhering in part to the Yugoslav request, the Allies engaged themselves, notwithstanding Luce's opposition, to release a statement of nonsupport of further territorial claims by either party 15

The Allied-Italian talks

Italian decision-makers followed the Allied-Yugoslav phase of the talks with impatience and trepidation. Already the choice of Thompson as American negotiator was the source of some anxiety. He had spent some time in the Rome embassy as Minister Counselor and was therefore thought to be familiar with the Italian point of view on Trieste. He was regarded, however, as "not very forceful " What most worried Italian officials was that as former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, he had played a major role in the development of American policy toward Yugoslavia. At first Italian decision-makers limited themselves to asking for reassurance that the Allies would not try to impose on them the agreement they would reach with the Yugoslavs. At the end of March, however, as they began to glimpse the contours of the proposal which was shaping up in London, they began to resort to their usual repertoire of pressures. Prime Minister Scelba, for instance, complained to Dulles in a letter on March 27, that the Allies did not seem to understand the importance of a favourable solution of the Trieste question. The key to the ratification of the EDC treaty as well as the consolidation of democracy in Italy, he argued, lay in the adoption of the solution promised on October 8 He also kept delaying the signing of the agreement on military facilities with the excuse that his government had yet to solve such "juridical" details as whether it

was better to sign an umbrella agreement or a number of specific agreements. [16]

At the beginning of April, remonstrations about Allied behavior started to turn up insistently in the press Also following a rather stormy meeting between Scelba and Luce, during which the Prime Minister "vehemently" stated that "Italy c[ould] not be expected to pay any more reparations, make any more sacrifices, financial or territorial, than were envisaged by [the] October 8 [decision]," the Allies came to fear that the Italian government might be trying another "squeeze play" on them. Consequently Durbrow warned Del Balzo, as one would do with an undisciplined child with whom one is about to lose patience, that "another maneuver similar to Pella's operation [the previous] August would be counterproductive . as it would cause serious irritation among Western powers now facing grave problems elsewhere " [17]

On April 24, Foreign Minister Piccioni took the opportunity offered by a NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris, to reiterate to Dulles the importance of a prompt and favourable solution both for the ratification of the EDC treaty and the future of Italian democracy. He also expressed the hope that the Allies would reach an acceptable solution in their talks with the Yugoslavs so that Italy would not be required to negotiate directly with them Upon Piccioni's request, on his way back from the Geneva conference on Indochina, Dulles stopped in Milan on May 13 to meet with Scelba Notwithstanding the Secretary's attempt to avoid the topic, Scelba dwelt at length upon Trieste Besides restating the usual connection with the EDC, he made it clear that his government was not prepared to accept a solution worse than the one offered on October 8 He then sent instructions to Brosio to inform Harrison and Thompson that "there could be no territorial reduction in Zone A of even a single meter" unless there were adequate compensations in Zone B. He also warned that plans for the construction of a new Yugoslav port at or around Koper would represent an implicit confirmation of the definitive character of the solution Then, in a speech in Palermo on May 24, Scelba publicly engaged himself not to

accept a solution which would give Italy less than what was promised on October 8. [18]

Before presenting to the Italians the proposal worked out with the Yugoslavs, the Allies decided that they would stand as firmly as possible behind it The Italians were to be told that the Yugoslavs had been pushed to make their maximum concessions and nothing more could be expected from them The proposed settlement was, after all, what Italy had been promised As Dulles personally told Tarchiani on June 4, he had always referred to the October 8 decision as "bare bones" and what Thompson had done in London was simply to put some flesh around it. [19]

The proposal was submitted to Brosio on June 1. His first reaction was that it was disadvantageous to Italy territorially and that, in his opinion, it was doubtful whether his government could even enter into negotiations on such a basis Harrison and Thompson strongly recommended that Italian officials be cautious in their public statements and make an effort to present the proposed settlement in a positive light (e g. "Yugoslavia agrees to the October 8 decision with only a small adjustment" as opposed to "the Allies make one-sided concessions in favor of Yugoslavia") Italian decision-makers followed this recommendation and refrained from making negative comments publicly or in the press Privately, however, the reaction of Scelba was very negative In a meeting with Luce on the evening of June 3, the Prime Minister referred to the Allied proposal as "a slash in the face of Italy" (a Sicilian expression meaning an affront). Italy was asked to sacrifice another piece of its national territory which, to add insult to injury, had "no or little significance for Yugoslavia." He complained that such a proposal was proof that "Italy did not receive from the U.S. the support it was entitled to as an ally and that, consequently, his government could not see to a speedy ratification of the EDC treaty nor to the signing of the agreement on military facilities." The proposal, he concluded, was unacceptable. In a meeting with Merchant on June 5, Luciolli complained that contrary to their assurances, the Allies were presenting the Italian government with

a proposal on a take it or leave it basis. Merchant's reaction was firm. He told Luciolli that the Allies had pushed the Yugoslavs to the limit and that the proposal was "fair." He also warned that before rejecting it, Italian decision-makers had better remember that Dulles' threatened "agonizing reappraisal" of American policy toward Europe had been uttered with reference not only to France but also to Italy [20]

The initial tendency in Rome, at least as far as Scelba and Piccioni were concerned, was to reject the Allied proposal outright Their diplomatic advisors, however, took a more moderate stance. At a meeting at the Foreign Ministry on June 9, Zoppi, Del Balzo and Brosio himself, were able to convince Piccioni of the need to continue negotiations (decision 23). Brosio's primary objective during the talks, however, would be the improvement of the territorial settlement. Although the new boundary line requested by the Yugoslavs might have had some military significance (AMG military experts pointed out, for instance, that it was indeed far more advantageous to Yugoslavia than to Italy, "providing ample opportunities for . observation of Trieste from high ground and placing good lateral ro ds on the Muggia peninsula in Yugoslav hands") the main reason for Italian opposition was prestige Scelba, in other words, could not appear to accept an Allied proposal on the exact conditions laid down by Tito, but had to show that he too had "gained something" from his round of talks [21]

On June 12, back in London, Brosio met with Harrison and Thompson As Velebit before him, he began by asserting Italian rights to the entire FTT and lamented that the Allies' conception of what constituted a fair solution to the problem had progressively changed to Italy's detriment ever since the peace treaty. He then stated that the Italian government was "prepared to take the Yugoslav proposals into careful consideration as long as some essential requirements [were] observed." The most important of these was a revision of the territorial settlement. Any adjustment had to be approximately equal. Only in this case, Brosio argued, could the settlement justifiably be presented to Italian public opinion as an implementation of the October 8 decision

On June 15, Thompson and Harrison urged Velebit to reopen the question of the interzonal boundary He was sympathetic and agreed to pass on the request to his government. [22]

While waiting for the Yugoslav answer, both Piccioni and Scelba assumed a cooperative stance. On June 23, in a speech to the Senate, Piccioni started to prepare Italian public opinion for what was to come. He indicated that a solution was being worked out within the framework of improved relations with Yugoslavia and that Italy would receive at least as much as promised on October 8. On the 26th, Scelba promised Luce that as soon as an agreement on Trieste was reached, parliament would vote the EDC treaty and he would sign the agreement on military facilities. [23]

In London meanwhile, Brosio continued to negotiate on the other aspects of the settlement. The Italians were mostly concerned with the reciprocity of concessions. In the statute for the protection of minorities, the Yugoslavs mentioned ethnic groups whereas the Italians insisted on guarantees for single individuals. They were reluctant to grant autonomy to Zone A because they thought that such a status would be meaningless in Zone B, given the nature of the Yugoslav regime. They were prepared to provide three buildings to house Slovenian cultural institutions in Trieste but offered only a fraction of the 500 million liras requested by the Yugoslavs for their equipment. They also requested a similar engagement on the part of the Yugoslavs in Zone B. The same position was taken with respect to the questions of a Yugoslav consular representation and the opening of a Slovenian bank in Trieste. On the questions of reparations, the Yugoslavs requested 40 million dollars while the Italians argued that they owed at most ten (the discrepancy was due to the different evaluation of Italian assets left in Yugoslavia). Finally, the Italians were willing to maintain a free port in Trieste but opposed its being put under the control of an international commission. At the same time they resented the Allies' promise of financial help to build a rival Yugoslav port in Zone B and asked that at least the announcement of its construction be delayed for

some time. [24]

Concerning the strategy to adopt in the negotiations, Italian officials in Rome wished to delay agreement on at least some of these issues to use them as bargaining tools to reach a satisfactory solution on the territorial question. Brosio, instead, thought that it was better to settle all these secondary issues immediately and then ask the Allies to exercise their strongest pressure on the Yugoslavs to convince them to give in on the territorial question. As he put it in a report on August 3: "We will be in a stronger position because of the inexorable logic of any negotiation which prevents one side from demanding for itself one hundred percent of the difference still under discussion." Scelba insisted that if negotiations were to break down on the territorial question he wished to adduce also other reasons, such as the Yugoslav refusal to guarantee fundamental individual rights in Zone B. Such an explanation would be more readily accepted by international public opinion than the territorial one alone. A compromise was eventually reached whereby Brosio was authorized to reach agreement on the various points "but only provisionally ... subject to satisfactory solution of the ... territorial question." [25]

After consulting with his government, Velebit met again with the two Allied negotiators on July 21 and continued discussions until the 29th, when the results were communicated to Brosio. While ready to compromise on some points concerning the subsidiary issues, the Yugoslavs held firm on the territorial question In various conversations with Allied officials, they also hinted, rather clearly, that they had made their maximum concessions and would not welcome requests for new ones. This led some Allied officials (Ambassador Riddleberger in particular) to question the utility of going back to the Yugoslavs. The State Department, however, thought the only way to reach a solution was to keep pressing both countries until their positions were brought together "without undue loss of face on either side." [26] Thus, on July 29, Eden and Dulles, in a meeting with Velebit and Matěs respectively, expressed disappointment at the Yugoslav refusal to make a

minor revision in the territorial settlement and urged them to reconsider. They also hinted that if this last hurdle was overcome, the Allies would be able to extract from Italy a considerably higher reparations payment. This view was reiterated on August 26, when Mateš called on Acting Secretary Smith to request American financial assistance to surmount a temporary difficulty in his country's balance of payments. Smith pointed out that a minor territorial concession on Trieste would increase Italian reparations by about twenty million dollars. Besides being "the most profitable real estate deal [he] had ever heard of," he said jokingly, such a sum would undoubtedly also be of help to Yugoslavia in its present conjuncture. [27]

Italian decision-makers's reaction to Velebit's refusal to budge on the territorial question was very strong. For them the uncompromising attitude of the Yugoslavs could only be explained by the Allies' failure to exercise strong pressures on them. They protested that when they consented to the London talks, they expected that various proposals would be made back and forth by both sides until an agreement was reached, whereas now it appeared that the Yugoslav May 31 proposal was considered unmodifiable. This constituted a "mortifying diktat," as Piccioni put it to Durbrow on August 2, which Italy could not accept. Unless the Allies were able to convince the Yugoslavs to change their mind, Italy would have no choice but to break off negotiations and ask "peremptorily" for the implementation of the October 8 decision. As in the past, pressures were complemented by suasion. The EDC project having just been scuttled by Mendès-France at the Brussels' conference, Scelba assured Luce (in a conversation on August 24) and Dulles (in a letter written on the 26th and delivered by Tarchiani on the 30th) that he would give his "wholehearted support" to any alternative American project for German rearmament. At the same time, however, he needed a prompt agreement on Trieste to help alleviate the negative repercussions of the EDC failure on his government's ability to pursue a strongly pro-Atlantic policy. To this end, he requested another high-level approach with the Yugoslavs to avoid the danger that negotiations "run

aground because of [their] intransigence" just before the first anniversary of the October 8 declaration. Brosio, meanwhile, suggested to Eden, in a meeting on August 26, the terms of a possible territorial compromise, namely, the exchange of that part of Zone B which Italy was to receive according to the May 29 proposal for the coastal part of Zone A between Punta Grossa and Punta Sottile (Fig 10) Brosio had been thinking about such a compromise for some time, but had not put it forth because he regarded it as his last card. He was convinced that the idea would appeal to Tito for reasons of prestige (Yugoslavia would receive a bit of Zone A and, at the same time, keep all of Zone B). Nevertheless, he asked Eden to make "a strong and decisive representation." The idea "was not to be simply suggested to the Yugoslavs; it had to be imposed." On September 1, Eden and Bedell Smith again urged Velebit and Mateš respectively, to make this last concession. Again, they were unsuccessful. In a report to Rome on the same day, Brosio sadly remarked that "the situation c[ould] not be modified through ordinary diplomatic channels. If the Italian government still did not deem it possible to accept the proposal as it stood, the only thing left to do was to attempt an Allied governmental demarche in Belgrade at the highest level." [28]

Following this new Yugoslav refusal, the Allies concluded that the time had now come to shift the pressure decidedly on the Italians. The attempts by the Allied diplomatic representatives in Rome to convince the Italians to accept the proposal as it stood met, however, with staunch resistance. Both Del Balzo and Casardi on September 2 and Piccioni on the 3rd, reiterated that to accept such an ultimatum would spell the fall of Scelba's government and put an end to all policies of Western solidarity They thought that it would be useless, if not dangerous, to submit the proposal to the Cabinet and hoped that the Italian government would not be obliged to reject it formally. They asked that the Allies make instead a last effort, this time by Eisenhower and Churchill directly to Tito, to obtain the desired concession Scelba also wrote a letter to Churchill (which Taviani

delivered personally to Eden on September 9), in which he asked the British premier to intervene and intercede in Belgrade. Brosio, meanwhile, told Harrison and Thompson that he was not prepared to yield on the question of Punta Sottile He realized, however, that short of the success of the request for Allied intervention in Belgrade, Italy had come up against a wall. As he put it in a report to Rome on September 3: "At this point, without hesitation, although with pain and bitterness at Allied indifference and Tito's arrogance, I think I have to take the responsibility to declare that, in my judgment, our fundamental interests oblige us to bend to this imposition and accept the agreement as it is presented to us today." [29]

Once more, it was Luce who came to Italy's rescue. In early July she had gone to Washington to discuss the Italian situation with various government officials. As Taviani noted in his journal on July 9: "Clare Luce ... is working for us." Having returned to Italy to attend De Gasperi's funeral (the former Prime Minister died on August 19), she had a long meeting with Scelba who impressed her with the idea that in the wake of the EDC failure, "an acceptable Trieste settlement" was of paramount importance both to keep the Communists under control and give a new boost to the country's Atlantic policy. Upon her return to Washington Luce argued with insistence at the State Department that there was an "intimate connection" between a satisfactory solution to the Trieste question and "the whole range of Italian foreign policy as it w[ould] emerge in [the] forthcoming crucial [London] conference on [an] alternative to [the] EDC [treaty]." Scelba had given her assurance that his government would "cooperate with [the U.S.] in working out [an] EDC substitute." Since "a minor concession by [the] Yugos[lavs] might make [the] difference between Scelba's defeat or victory," it was imperative for the U.S to "make a very strong appeal to Tito using aid threats if necessary in order to prevent a possibly serious political crisis in Italy." Tito's claim to part of Zone A was, after all, Luce argued, only an "intolerable attempt to humiliate Italy." On September 2, at a private dinner in Washington, Luce met Deputy Undersecretary of

State, Robert Murphy. The question of Trieste having come up in the conversation, Murphy happened to mention his personal wartime acquaintance with Tito. "You are just the man we need to bring Tito around," Luce exclaimed. The next morning she contacted both Eisenhower and Dulles and suggested that Murphy be immediately sent to Belgrade. Being the sort of person who "usually got what she wanted," as Murphy later recalled, the idea was immediately approved. [30]

On September 11, Murphy left Washington for London where he was briefed by Thompson. Then, via Bonn, he proceeded to Belgrade where he arrived on September 14. After talking to various Yugoslav officials, Murphy visited Tito in Brioni on September 16 He brought with him a letter from Eisenhower. In it the President asked Tito to consider the Italian request for the southern tip of Zone A. In exchange, Italy would forego any compensation in Zone B "I want you to understand," Eisenhower's letter pointed cut, "that in urging this further small concession I am not blind to the great contribution you've already made [toward a settlement]." After reading the letter, Tito submitted to Murphy two alternative proposals: the first provided for the interzonal boundary to be moved immediately south of Punta Sottile with Italy retaining the triangle of Zone B in the hinterland. The second alternative would move the border further to the south, but Italy would forego any compensation in Zone B (Fig. 11). [31]

Much has been speculated about what convinced the Yugoslavs to make this last territorial concession. Eden, in his memoirs suggests, rather bluntly, that it was Murphy's promise of a few tons of wheat which made Tito change his mind. He was also echoed by various Italian commentators. There is no doubt that, while in Belgrade, Murphy discussed the question of economic aid with Bebler and Vukmanović-Tempo. Indeed, upon learning of Murphy's trip, Riddleberger had suggested that he come prepared "also to talk about aid and wheat." Murphy, however, did not bring up this subject with Tito. The British had, in fact, recommended that he not mention aid to avoid giving the impression that they were trying to buy him off by economic means. Murphy writes that

he did inform Bebler that the US "would be willing to deliver 400 000 tons of wheat" but adds that "it was incorrect for Sir Anthony Eden to suggest that I went to Belgrade and laid some wheat on line, whereupon the Yugoslavs grasped the pen and signed the Trieste agreement. Tito sensibly wanted to bring the Trieste disturbance to an end but I doubt that he would have surrendered on matters of principle for a shipment of wheat." He suggests that Eisenhower's letter might have been the decisive factor. Velebit also thinks that "economic considerations ... did not play any role." He adduces as proof the fact that such "purists" in Belgrade like Koča Popović and Kardelj resented his initiative of including the settlement of all outstanding financial claims with Italy in the London negotiations since they thought it "a shame to get economic advantages out of a political agreement in which [the Yugoslavs] were giving up Trieste." He too thinks that Eisenhower's letter "was really important" to the point that it "changed the situation at once." Yet, when Murphy met with Tito the two alternative proposals had already been devised by the Yugoslavs. Riddleberger had already reported on September 6, that in a conversation "with three high-level Yugoslav officials" he received a strong impression that a compromise was in the making. Tito himself told Ambassador Mallet on September 11 that if it were only a question of a village, perhaps something might be done. Finally, Velebit asked for a meeting with Thompson and Harrison, to give an official answer in London, the same day Murphy was to meet Tito in Brioni. Thus it would seem that neither economic aid (although this consideration might have been in the background) nor Eisenhower's letter were the decisive factors. Most likely, as suggested by Durbrow after a conversation with some Yugoslav officials in Rome, before giving in the Yugoslavs wanted to be sure that the Allies had really tried hard to convince the Italians to accept their May 31 proposal. The news of Murphy's trip must have convinced them that every attempt had been made. Hence, as Brosio had correctly foreseen, once only one issue remained on the table, they had to make one last concession to close the deal. [32]

From Brioni, Murphy went back to Belgrade and then on to Rome. On the morning of September 20 he met with Zoppi, Del Balzo and Casardi. He outlined the two alternatives and made it clear that all that they could do was to choose one of the two. Although complaining that what was offered was a "choice between two evils," they stated that the Foreign Ministry could agree to either of them. Later the same day Murphy met with Scelba. The Prime Minister offered a reflection on the history of the Trieste question, lamenting that it befell to his country to pay the price for Yugoslavia's entry into the Western camp However, he made it clear that he would accept one of the two alternatives: "We are at the end of the drama," he said. Murphy also met the newly appointed Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino (Piccioni had resigned in connection with the so-called "Montesi case"--a sex-drugs-and-politics scandal in which his son was said to be implicated). He tested the waters to see whether the two alternatives could be improved Murphy dissipated any illusions the Foreign Minister might have had on this subject. "If we have no other choice," Martino then concluded, "we must accept one of these." Brosio was authorized to reach an agreement on all subsidiary issues still pending. Scelba, Martino and the top Foreign Ministry officials decided, on the afternoon of September 22, to accept the second alternative (decision 24). In communicating their choice to Brosio, they also instructed him to see whether the Yugoslavs could be convinced to leave to Italy a small part of the Zone B triangle to help the Italian government sell the agreement to the public. [33]

Negotiations on all subsidiary issues were swiftly wrapped up. On the statute for the protection of minorities the compromise agreed upon guaranteed the rights of the "members of the Yugoslav (sic) ethnic group in the area administered by Italy and the members of the Italian ethnic group in the area administered by Yugoslavia " On the question of reparations, the Italians agreed to pay 30 million dollars on the understanding that more than half of that sum would be provided by the U.S. government. Likewise, they accepted to disburse 500 million liras to equip the three Slovenian cultural houses in Trieste after the

Americans promised to contribute 325 million liras themselves. Both agreements were to be acknowledged by an exchange of letters between the two governments, but the figures were to remain secret. The maintenance of a free port in Trieste would be guaranteed by the Italian government alone without the presence of an international supervisory commission. The question of autonomy for the two zones was dropped upon the insistence of the Allies. They feared that it would create "a situation without sufficient assurance of stability" which would not be "in the interest of either Yugoslavia or Italy." [34]

On the morning of September 28, Harrison and Thompson communicated to Velebit the successful completion of the negotiations including the choice made by the Italian government on the territorial question. Brosio met Velebit that same afternoon. Although he had been strongly discouraged by Harrison, Thompson and Murphy from doing so and he himself believed it to be a useless exercise, he carried out the instructions received from Rome and asked Velebit that Italy be granted at least part of the Zone B triangle. Velebit answered politely that he would transmit the request to his government. Two days later he informed Brosio that his government had unfortunately not thought it possible to accede to the Italian request. [35]

On October 5, the four negotiators initialed the so-called Memorandum of Understanding which resolved the FTT problem. The French were requested only to join in the Allied declaration of nonsupport of further claims. Unlike October 8, 1953, this time there were no complaints. Ever since the departure of Bidault from the Foreign Ministry, the French had, after all, shown little interest in Trieste. The agreement contained in the Memorandum was considered, de jure at least, as provisional. Since it was purported not to represent a modification of the peace treaty with Italy, it was not communicated to all peace treaty signatories but only to the UN Security Council in its capacity as the body responsible for the FTT. There was some concern as to how this notification would be received by the Soviet Union, but on October 13, to the surprise of many, the Soviet government informed the

President of the UN Security Council that in view of the fact that the agreement reached by the two countries would "contribute toward a relaxation of tension" the USSR took cognisance of the Memorandum. [36]

The Italian government approved the Memorandum on October 5 and then transmitted it to President Einaudi for his approval. The agreement was construed as an accordo in forma semplice, that is an executive agreement which did not require parliamentary ratification. It was simply discussed, together with other items on the agenda, during the annual foreign policy review preceding the approval of the Foreign Ministry budget. Although the debate was rather virulent, the government received a comfortable majority in both houses [37] The transfer of powers, which had been carefully planned took place on October 26. The bora (a cold wind which on some winter days literally sweeps Trieste) claimed the day and disrupted all the ceremonies. The military parade was cancelled and General Winterton and the Anglo-American garrison left without the formal farewell of the incoming Italian troops. [38]

The "provisional" situation created by the Memorandum of October 5, 1954 was to last for twenty-one years. On November 10, 1975, the division became permanent also de jure with the Treaty of Osimo The item "appointment of a governor for the FTT," however, was to remain on the agenda of the UN Security Council for two more years. In May 1977, Italy and Yugoslavia finally requested its removal For a stillborn creature, thirty years must be considered a remarkable life span. [39]

Findings

Information

The felt need for information on the part of Italian decision-makers during the first phase of the London talks was at least as intense as during the crisis period. Although they had been asked not to make inquiries concerning the substance of the talks, Brosio asked Thompson to see him only a couple of days after their inception "to get the feel of how things [were] going." Thompson refused because he felt that since the Yugoslavs already regarded the Americans as Italian advocates, a meeting with Brosio could seriously jeopardize the talks. Although never asking for specific details, Brosio, as well as other Italian diplomatic officials, continued to make inquiries in general terms throughout the rest of the talks. Not much information, however, was obtained from the two negotiators or other Allied officials. Brosio could only report generalities from his meetings with Kirkpatrick and Eden while Tarchiani often lamented the vagueness of the answers he would get from the State Department [40]

More detailed information was obtained through the French. Harrison reported that he kept the French counselor in the London embassy, Claude Lebel, regularly informed on the progress of the talks. Moreover, it would appear that the French were also passed information by the Yugoslavs, their intent being that of having it relayed to the Italians to have some indirect feedback on the different options they were considering. De Castro mentions a document prepared by Casardi on February 24 ("Secret London Talks: Yugoslav Attitudes") based on information the French had obtained through Yugoslav officials in London and Washington. [41]

Information was also obtained through the British Minister in Rome, G. G. Hannafords (a secret service official, described by Savorgnan di Brazzà as "Eden's righthand man who does in Rome those things the ambassador cannot do") with whom Taviani kept in frequent touch. He might have been, for instance, what De Castro calls the "indirect diplomatic source" through which Italian decision-makers learned the substance of the discussion between Velebit and the two Allied negotiators between July 21 and 29 before the latter made their

official report to Brosio. [42]

De Castro complained that the Italians were kept in the dark concerning the substance of the Allied talks with the Yugoslavs (he particularly regretted the fact that the Allies never, officially at least, informed the Italian government of the option of exchanging part of the coast of Zone B for a corridor at Zaule) Yet, it seems rather evident that Italian decision-makers were well informed about this Yugoslav proposal De Castro resigned on March 29 (that is, shortly after the Allies decided to abandon this option) because he did not wish to be connected in any way with a solution based on partition. Since De Castro's protest must have been aimed at the Italian government and not at the Allies, this indicates that the government was aware of the option being discussed in London but discouraged the Allies from pursuing it. On March 4, for instance, Trieste desk officer Michele Lanza told an American embassy official that "no Italian government could survive if it granted Yugoslavia a corridor to the sea" Likewise, Italian decision-makers seem also to have been aware of almost all the other details of the talks. In a conversation with Luce on April 5, Scelba mentioned that Italy had paid its reparation bills and hinted that his government would oppose any further payments Scelba's conversation with Dulles in Milan and the instructions he subsequently sent to Brosio show he was well informed about the new boundary proposal, as well as about Allied promises of financial help for the construction of a new port at Koper. [43]

The felt need for information sharply declined during the second phase of the London talks. With the Yugoslav proposal on the table, the major preoccupation for Italian decision-makers became that of convincing the Allies to push the Yugoslavs to make the modifications requested and to prepare public opinion, the Trieste one in particular, for partition.

Consultation

The management of the Trieste issue remained firmly in the hands of the diplomatic elite. Upon receiving the May 31 proposal from Brosio, Zoppi initiated a wide range of consultative and "lobbying" activities. He sent the document to Quaroni, Tarchiani and Vanni D'Archirafi for comment. He also had a meeting with President Einaudi on June 4. Einaudi was of the opinion that "the problem of Trieste ... could only be solved through a compromise." He, moreover, did not perceive the Allies' promise of financial aid to Yugoslavia for the construction of a new port as threatening the viability of the Trieste one. Zoppi thus asked him "to counsel the government" for the continuation of the negotiations. Zoppi feared, in fact, that "the government might choose a road of intransigence" which greatly worried him. On June 14 he even met with Don Luigi Sturzo, founder of the Partito Popolare and mentor of Scelba, and asked him to counsel moderation to the Prime Minister. Finally, he also spoke with, and made the same recommendation to leading members of Parliament. No consultation took place with the local political leaders in Trieste, who were all opposed to partition and, for the most part, in open conflict with their national party leaders. Zoppi actually used the new Italian Political Advisor in Trieste, Marquis Cristoforo Fracassi Ratti Mentone di Torre Rossano to calm them down and try to keep their activities under control The Cabinet was not consulted either. This is demonstrated by the fact that Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino, who as Minister of Education had sat in on all Cabinet meetings, was completely unfamiliar with the details of the problem when meeting with Murphy on September 21 Only some key ministers, such as Taviani who had been involved with the issue from the very beginning, were kept regularly informed of developments [44]

Before choosing one of the two alternatives submitted by Murphy, Zoppi consulted with Brosio, Tarchiani, Quaroni and Fracassi to see

which of the two would be better received in Trieste. Again he also consulted with, and solicited the intervention of Einaudi The President urged both Scelba and Martino to accept the settlement, impressing upon the latter the idea that a solution to the Trieste problem would provide a perfect start to his term as Foreign Minister. According to Re, the influence of Einaudi was even greater Upon Piccioni's resignation Einaudi apparently told Scelba that the new Foreign Ministry portfolio should go to someone ready to sign the Trieste agreement. He suggested Ambassador Brosio and when the latter refused the choice fell upon Martino. Finally, Scelba formally consulted with the leaders of the different factions of his party as well as with Vice-Prime Minister Saragat. It should be pointed out that this special treatment was not due to his position in the Cabinet (the Cabinet was again left out of the consultation process and was presented with the choice only once it had been made) but to the fact that he was the leader of the Social-Democratic party which formed the government coalition with the Christian Democrats. The third member of the coalition, the Liberal party, did not need to be officially heard by the Prime Minister since its leader was Gaetano Martino. As Foreign Minister he had been directly involved in this phase of the decision-making process. [44]

Decisional Fora

Decision 23 was taken by Piccioni and his diplomatic advisors. The group included Zoppi, Brosio, Ambassador to NATO Alberto Rossi Longhi, Del Balzo, Casardi, Minister Massimo Magistrati and Counselors Eugenio Prato and Michele Lanza. The influence of the diplomats was decisive. Piccioni, in fact, was ready to break off negotiations because for him the most important consideration was "not to give the

impression to the Allies that Italy was too pliant." The diplomats instead insisted on the importance of continuing the exercise. According to Brosio, Piccioni "neither accept[ed] nor refuse[d]" their advice; he "silently swallowed it." When informed of the decision, Scelba insisted that Brosio show the Allied negotiators that "under its composed form, the document [he was submitting] contained the resolute [Italian] will not to yield [on the territorial question]." [46]

As far as the decisions on the subsidiary issues were concerned, Brosio regularly consulted with his superiors at the Foreign Ministry but had much leeway and, for the most part, one can say that he made the decisions which were then approved in Rome. This is also indirectly confirmed by Harrison who later affirmed that Brosio, as well as Velebit, kept "going back to their governments saying 'I'm sorry, I can't get this; I have to give this away' and so on." Brosio noted in his diary: "They [his superiors in Rome] first advance some reservations, then give me a free hand saddling me with the responsibility of the choices made." [47]

On the territorial question, the influence of Piccioni was quite significant. Although none of the Italian decision-makers was willing to yield, Piccioni's opposition was the most resolute. According to De Gasperi, in a conversation he had with Luce shortly before his death, Piccioni was obsessed with the idea of "doing better than Pella had done." He, more than Scelba, insisted that the signing of the agreement on military facilities be postponed until the Trieste question had been settled. On more than one occasion he stated categorically that he would not sign any agreement which would not give Italy the territorial rectification requested. Allied officials in Rome thought that since he was seriously considering resignation because of the "Montesi scandal," he was probably using the territorial rectification as an excuse to step down with "flying nationalistic colours." When, on September 2, Piccioni and Scelba met to discuss Brosio's suggestion to sign the agreement as it stood, following the latest unsuccessful attempt by the Allies to convince the Yugoslavs to yield on Punta Sottile, Piccioni

insisted he would not sign even if the Cabinet would decide otherwise. During his trip to London, Taviani told Thompson that Scelba and he personally would have been willing to sign the agreement as it was except for the fact that it was unlikely that the government could survive Piccioni's resignation if motivated by his opposition to the settlement. [48]

Decision 24 was formally made by Scelba in consultation with Martino and the top Foreign Ministry officials. The Cabinet was convened simply to ratify the final Memorandum of Understanding. Although not technically necessary, Scelba also asked President Einaudi to give his "high approval."

Alternatives

Neither decision 23 nor decision 24 required a real search for alternatives, both being essentially dichotomous choices. In both cases the attention of Italian decision-makers concentrated immediately on the evaluation of consequences. The opinions sent by Quaroni and Tarchiani put the accent on the negative consequences that the breaking off of negotiations would have both for the Trieste question and Italian foreign policy in general. Quaroni wrote that the Allied proposal was the same as the October 8 decision and the tripartite declaration: they all meant that Italy could have Trieste back. He thought that Italy could reject it only at the price of remaining "without Trieste, without EDC, without dollars, without anything." The proposal represented "the last chance to reannex Trieste and to miss it . would be criminal." Tarchiani also thought that the May 29 proposal was substantially the same as that of October 8. Its rejection, therefore, would be interpreted in the U.S. as "unreasonable because due to narrow-mindedly nationalistic feelings." It would certainly provoke "a crisis in

Italian-American relations" and leave Italy "in a secondary position, isolated and even ostracized ... in the Atlantic community." In a memorandum dated June 4, the Foreign Ministry took a strong position in favour of continuation of the negotiations on the basis of the May 31 proposal. The reacquisition of Trieste, the memorandum argued, was more important than some minor territorial modifications which one could "bury" by presenting the settlement as an overall "package deal." The time had come, the memorandum concluded, to solve that dispute because it "act[ed] as a grave impediment to the normal and advantageous conduct of Italian foreign policy." Having been able to convince Piccioni and Scelba to continue negotiations, Zoppi immediately sought to see whether flexibility on Trieste could be used to gain Italy some advantages in other fields. In a letter to Tarchiani on June 21, he instructed the ambassador to make it clear to the State Department that "such a sacrifice should be compensated politically and morally by recognizing Italy's position [of regional power] in the Mediterranean and in South-Eastern Europe." Such a position, Zoppi argued, was after all "at least equal, and in the Near-East certainly superior, to that of France." [49]

Concerning the choice between the two boundary proposals, Brosio preferred the second because he thought that "the strip of Zone B without inhabitants [was] not a compensation but a derision." The choice, however, should depend on "which of the two alternatives was better presentable to public opinion both in Italy and in Trieste itself." And indeed Scelba chose the second alternative because it involved giving up a smaller part of Zone A and was therefore considered "politically more acceptable." [50]

In conclusion, the disappearance of stress did not have any noticeable impact on the search for and evaluation of alternatives. No great search was actually necessary since both decisions in this period were essentially dichotomous choices. The evaluation of alternatives, on the other hand, remained as rigorous and thorough as it had been in the preceding phases

Notes to Chapter 7

1. The reasons behind the failure of Fanfani's effort and Scelba's success are minutely examined by Mantovani (op. cit., pp. 134-148) and Baget Bozzo (op. cit., pp. 473-486). See also Giorgio Galli, Fanfani, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1975, pp. 55-57.

2. Fanfani's speech to Parliament is reported in Relazioni Internazionali 18, 5 (Jan. 30, 1954), pp 98-104, Dulles to London 5076 (March 31, 1954); Aldrich to Dept. 4036 (March 19, 1954); Durbrow to Dept 2873, 2877 and 2888 (all March 23, 1954) and 2985 (March 29, 1954) all in FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 13; The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Scelba, April 10, 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, V, pp. 929-930; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 828-830 and 832-833; Luce to Dept. 3514 (May 4, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14 and 739 (Aug. 24, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 17, Durbrow to Dept. 927 (Sept. 7, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 18

3. Luce to Dept. 3834 (May 25, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14, Dulles to Dept. 12 from Paris (April 24, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4 File 13; MC Merchant, Luciolli, Jones, Hooker (Office of Western European Affairs), June 5, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File Untitled Documents (henceforth UD); "I falsi di Belgrado," Esteri 5, 5 (March 15, 1954), pp. 20-21; Luce to Dept. 3514 (May 4, 1954) and 3743 (May 18, 1954) both in FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14. For a detailed analysis of the evolving Italian attitude toward the Balkan pact see De Castro, op. cit., pp. 975-988. The Italian prise de position on the Balkan Alliance had no legal standing because art. 10 of the NATO treaty contemplated unanimity only in case of admission of a new member. The Italians also argued that one of the reservations they had about the Alliance was that "the lack [in Yugoslavia] of a true parliamentary system, always a brake to dangerous adventures, constituted, especially for the old democracies, an element of serious perplexity" (see "L'Alleanza Balcanica," Esteri 5, 8, April 30, 1954 and Cialdea, loc. cit., pp. 544 and 550-1). This perplexity about the nature of the Yugoslav regime would, however, have disappeared as if by magic if Tito yielded on the question of Trieste.

4. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 769-770; Luce to Dept. 3371 (April 25, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 13. Campbell, ed., op. cit., pp. 119-120.

5. MC Merchant, Luciolli, Jones, Hooker, June 5, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD; Durbrow to Dept 427 (Aug. 2, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 17; De Castro, op. cit., p. 991; Taviani, UJ, entry of Sept. 9, 1954.

6. See Letter of Instructions from Acting Secretary of State W. B. Smith to Ambassador Thompson, 750G.00/1-2854, reprinted also in Campbell, ed., op. cit., pp. 170-174; a letter of Holmes to Higgs (Jan. 8, 1954) with enclosed memorandum prepared by Mr. Barnett of the Office of Western European Affairs dated January 8 and titled "Economic Aspects of the Trieste Problem" and one of AMG Comptroller, Colonel J.J. Madigan to Higgs, dated January 30, 1954, which examines the technical feasibility of the project (both are in FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19). Higgs pointed out that the ability of the AMG to promote and improve economic relations with Yugoslavia was severely limited by the behavior of its "Italian functionaries" which "used their positions to carry out the policies of the Italian Governments" (Higgs to Dept. for Holmes 932, Jan 22, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10). An example of this behavior was provided not long thereafter. During the talks the Yugoslavs complained about the alleged refusal by the AMG's Finance Department to approve the application by an association of Slovenian farmers, artisans and small merchants to set up a cooperative financial institute. This, they charged, was yet another example of the discrimination systematically practised against the Slovenes. Since AMG authorities ignored this matter completely, Higgs inquired into it and found out that the application had been turned down by low level Italian functionaries of the Finance Department "without any Allied official having ever been consulted or informed in any way." This, Higgs pointed out was the "typical operating procedure of [the] Italian functionaries [of the] AMG" (Higgs to Dept. 1074, March 19, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 12 and D-222, March 30, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD).

7. Dulles to Belgrade 811 (Jan. 12, 1954), to Paris 2485 (Jan. 13, 1954), and to Belgrade 821 (Jan.14, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10. On press leaks see Joyce to Dept. 2531 (Jan. 7, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9; Dulles to Paris 2442 (Jan. 8, 1954) and Butterworth to Dept. 3011 (Jan. 15, 1954), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10. Bartoli's comment is reported in De Castro, op. cit., p. 777.

8. Riddleberger to Dept. 863 (Jan. 15, 1954), 876 (Jan. 20, 1954), 883 (Jan. 22, 1954) and 909 (Jan. 30, 1954); Dulles to Belgrade 827 (Jan. 16, 1954); Smith to Belgrade 859 (Jan. 28, 1954) and Aldrich to Dept. 3294 (Feb. 2, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10. Velebit, Harrison and Thompson were assisted by several experts. The Yugoslav ones were the military attaché in London, General Bogdan Oreščanin and three officials from the Foreign Ministry: Franc Primozić, Janvid Flere and Vlado Sestan. The Americans sent Major General Clyde D. Eddleman, Philip E. Moseley, who had been the American representative in the 1946 four-power commission charged with the demarcation of the border line, Raymund T. Yingling (Assistant Legal Advisor to the State Department) and Leonard Unger, former Advisor to the AMG in Trieste. Harrison was assisted by the Director of the Western and Southern Department of the Foreign Office N. J. A. Cheetam. Brosio had at his side Minister-Counselor Livio Theodoli and Secretary Fausto Bacchetti. In their interviews with Campbell, however, all the chief negotiators reported that "within a relatively short time [they] just dismissed [their] delegations and carried on [alone]." Campbell, ed., op. cit., pp. 27, 49, 95 and 123-124.

9. As Thompson put it in a telegram to Washington on February 10: "Eddleman and I are dining with Velebit tomorrow without [the] British, which will afford [the] first opportunity to ascertain [the] real situation and for us to take [the] gloves off." Campbell, ed., op. cit , pp. 26, 50 and 94; Aldrich to Dept 3257 (Jan. 31, 1954), 3373 (Feb 6, 1954) and 3435 (Feb. 10, 1954);

Smith to London 4080 (Feb. 8, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10 See also Smith to London 4255 (Feb 17, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 11

10. Aldrich to Dept. 3488 (Feb. 13, 1954), 3617 (Feb. 23, 1954), 3637 and 3638 (Feb. 24, 1954) and 3681 (Feb. 26, 1954), Luce to Dept 2460 (Feb. 16, 1954), 2501 (Feb. 22, 1954) and 2541 (Feb 25, 1954), Dulles to London 4326 (Feb 23, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 11. Both Thompson's and Luce's positions reflected their personal beliefs on the question Thompson thought that the Yugoslav request for an outlet was understandable since one could not realistically expect them to give up almost the entire Slovenian coast for a lease of part of the Trieste port Luce instead, believed that even if the Italians would agree to it, the corridor would be "a burr under the saddle' which would plague future relations between the two countries.

11. Smith to London 4737 (Feb. 28, 1954) and Aldrich to Dept 3746 and 3750 (both March 2, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 11. Bebler's comments to Riddleberger are reported in Riddleberger to Dept. 910 (Jan. 30, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10

12. Aldrich to Dept. 3783 (March 3, 1954), 3915 (March 11, 1954) and 4065 (March 22, 1954), Luce to Dept 2647 (March 5, 1954), Smith to London 4586 (March 8, 1954) and Dulles to London 4815 (March 18, 1954) and 4956 (March 25, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 12. De Castro, who has not consulted the American documents, writes that "it is a mystery why the Americans chose the solution of a division along the Morgan line." On the basis of a statement made by Velebit in his interview with Campbell (namely, that Yugoslavia should not renounce its claims to Trieste for ever, op cit., p. 100), he advances the hypothesis that it was the Yugoslav negotiator "to pilot" the Allies toward it. He also hints that the Italian government, had it been informed of the substance of the discussions in this phase of the negotiations, would have favourably considered the option of the enclave (De Castro, op. cit., pp. 806-812). It is doubtful, to say the least, that the diplomatic elite, committed as it was to partition, would have recommended this option to Scelba. If De Castro's assessment is to be believed, however, one can only conclude that in this case the Italians were badly served by De Gasperi's strong opposition to the concession of a corridor in the spring of 1953 and by Luce's concern with the Italian political situation. A division along the Morgan line had been already accepted by the Italians, hence the Allies felt, justifiably, that such a course of action was likely to lead to a speedier conclusion of the whole question, which was what mattered the most to them.

13. See the memorandum "Confidential' Understanding Between United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslav Governments" attached to a letter from Thompson to Hooker, April 16, 1954, as well as the Yugoslav memoranda "The Status of Minorities" and "The Free Port of Trieste" both attached to letters from Unger to Hooker dated April 15 and 21, 1954, all in FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD. For an example of the legal and political intricacy of some of the issues under discussion see Higgs to London 132 (April 23, 1954) and 133 (April 27, 1954), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 13 and a letter from Thompson to Durbrow, May 3, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19. Message from Dulles to Bebler, April 13, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 12; see also Butterworth to Dept 4970 (May 7, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14

14. Riddleberger to Dept. 1207 and Dulles to London 6016 (both May 11, 1954); Aldrich to Dept. 5084 and Rome to Dept 3668 (both May 13, 1954), all FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14, Smith to London 5497 (April 17, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 13 Angelo E

Cammarata, "La sovranità italiana su Trieste," Rassegna Italiana, 315 (Feb. 1951) Cammarata was the rector of the University of Trieste Saragat's speech is reported in De Castro, op. cit., p. 840, footnote 77 Thompson reports that the Yugoslavs also suggested that the Allies "put forward a [territorial] position which was worse for Italy than the one [they] had agreed upon, so that [they] could have a concession to make to the Italians " The Allies, however, "were afraid to do that for fear it would leak" and so they refused (Campbell, ed., op. cit., p. 28).

15. Campbell, ed., op cit., p. 99; Aldrich to Dept. 5095 (May 13, 1954), 5202 (May 19, 1954), 5249 and 5250 (both May 20, 1954), 5288 (May 23, 1954), 5343 (May 25, 1954), 5348 (May 26, 1954), 5392, (May 28, 1954), 5436 (May 31, 1954); Riddleberger to Dept. 1218 (May 14, 1954), 1236 (May 19, 1954); Dulles to London 6098 (May 14, 1954), 6106 (May 15, 1954) and 6251 (May 21, 1954); Luce to Dept. 3782 (May 20, 1954) and "Text of Three-Power Agreed Record," all in FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14.

16. De Castro, op. cit., p. 779; Luce to Dept. 2283 (Jan. 28, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10; Tarchiani, op. cit., pp. 301-302; Dulles to London 5076 (March 31, 1954) and Luce to Dept. 3111 (April 6, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 13; Durbrow to Dept D-1728 (March 5, 1954), "Military Facilities, Status of Forces and of Bilateral Agreements," and Luce to Dept. 4306 (June 26, 1954) both FSP-Rome 1953-55, Box Classified, File 320.1. The agreement was finally signed on October 20, 1954, two weeks after the resolution of the Trieste conflict. It was an "executive agreement" which was kept secret from both the press and Parliament. See Durbrow to Dept. (no number), July 27, 1954; Luce to Dept. 1376 (Oct. 6, 1954) and (no number), Oct. 20, 1954, all in FSP-Rome, Box Classified, File 320.1.

17. Luce to Smith, April 8, 1954 and attached memorandum of conversation with Scelba (with many deletions), FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp. 1671-1675; De Castro, op. cit., p. 831; Luce to Dept. 3162 (April 9, 1954), 3371 (April 25, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 13. Durbrow also urged Italian officials to stop being "so wrapped up in the important but comparatively minor question of Trieste" as not to be able "to see [the] wood for [the] trees." Otherwise the Allies "might get a bit annoyed at the[ir] 'wolf, wolf, wolf' crying."

18. Dulles to Dept. 12 from Paris (April 24, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 13; Luce to Dept. 3514 (May 4, 1954), 3743 (May 18, 1954) and 3834 (May 25, 1954), all FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14; MC Tarchiani, Murphy, W.E. Knight, May 21, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD. Besides insisting on a favourable solution for Trieste, Piccioni and Scelba also emphasized the need for off-shore procurement contracts and economic aid to counter the advance of communism in Italy. See Dulles to Stassen (Director of Foreign Operations Administration), May 14, 1954 and his reply, May 18, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp. 1681-1685.

19. Aldrich to Dept. 5429 (May 30, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14; Luce to Dept. 3907 (June 1, 1954) and Aldrich to Dept. 5453 (June 1, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 15; MC The Secretary, Tarchiani, June 4, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD.

20. Fausto Bacchetti, ed., "La ricongiunzione di Trieste all'Italia. Diario di Manlio Brosio," Nuova Antologia, 2155 (July-Sept. 1985), p. 9; De Castro, op cit , pp. 852-855, 858-860 and 862; MC Merchant, Luciolli, Jones, Hooker, June 5, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD. Luce to Dept. 3952, which reports her stormy meeting with Scelba, is still classified

21. Bacchetti, ed , loc. cit., p. 10; De Castro, op cit , pp 865-869; Durbrow to Dept 4103 (June 14, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 15; Cope to London 142 (May 25, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14. Italian officials occasionally gave rather ludicrous justifications for their refusal to agree to the new boundary line. Thus Casardi argued that the coastal area to be given up was a "watering place" for Trieste. On another occasion he complained that "all Triestines looking out their windows would see Yugoslavia." Brosio, in his interview with Campbell, claimed that "the Yugoslavs would be always looking into the Trieste port." Luce to Dept. 4147 (June 16, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 15; Durbrow to Dept. 56 (July 5, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 16 and Campbell, ed., op cit , p 116

22. Thompson to Dept. 4031 (June 14, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD and Aldrich to Dept. 5738 (June 15, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 15.

23. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 822 and 894; Luce to Dept 4307 (June 26, 1954), FRUS 1952-54, V, pp. 990-992; Dulles to Rome 25 (July 2, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 16

24. The negotiations on this subsidiary issues are minutely examined by De Castro, op. cit., pp. 872-876, 883-893, 895-906, 914-917 and 921-958. See also Bacchetti, ed., loc. cit., pp. 13-16, 19-22, 24-26 and 35. For the Allied point of view see Aldrich to Dept 11 (July 1, 1954), 59 (July 6, 1954), 109 (July 8, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 16 as well as 574 (Aug. 13, 1954) and 720 (Aug. 20, 1954), Penfield to Dept. 858 (Aug. 18, 1954), Durbrow to Dept. 789 (Aug. 26, 1954) and Butterworth to Dept 1002 (Aug. 16, 1954), 1018 (Aug. 27, 1954) and 1047 (Aug. 30, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 17 The texts of documents and their revisions are attached to Unger to Hooker, July 6, 14, 22, 28 and Aug. 3, 9, 17, 1954; Thompson to Hooker, July 9, 1954 and Butterworth to Belgrade, Sept. 3, 1954, all in FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD.

25. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 964-967; Bacchetti, ed , loc cit., pp. 20-21; Campbell, ed., op. cit., p. 115.

26. Bacchetti, ed., loc. cit., p. 19; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 918-920. MC Mateš (Yugoslav Ambassador), Merchant, Thurston (Director Office of Eastern European Affairs), July 2, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD; Riddleberger to Dept. 10 (July 5, 1954), 38 (July 14, 1954) and 57 (July 20, 1954); Dulles to Belgrade 62 (July 15, 1954) and to London 379 (July 19, 1954); Aldrich to Dept. 275 (July 15, 1954) and 314 (July 19, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 16.

27. London to Dept. 485 (July 28, 1954) and Dulles to London (July 29, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 16; Smith to London 1132 (Aug. 26, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 17.

28. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 960-965, 971-975 and 988-989, Tarchiani, op. cit., pp. 306-308 and 310-313; Bacchetti ed , loc. cit., pp. 19 and 27-28; Campbell, ed., op. cit., p. 118, Durbrow to Dept 397 (July 30, 1954) and 427 (Aug. 2, 1954); Penfield to Dept. 861 (Aug. 19, 1954); Dulles to London 686 (Aug 3, 1954), 1211 (Aug. 31, 1954) and Luce to Dept. 739 (Aug. 24, 1954), all FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 17. Butterworth to Dept. 1101 (Sept 1, 1954) and Smith to London 1245 (Sept. 1, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 18

29. Durbrow to Dept. 875 (Sept. 2, 1954), 893 (Sept 3, 1954), 908 (Sept. 6, 1954), 927 (Sept. 7, 1954) and Butterworth to Dept 1240 (Sept. 9, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 18, Campbell,

ed., op. cit., p. 117; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 989-996; Taviani, UJ, entries of Sept. 2, 3, 6 and 9, 1954.

30. FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp. 1686-1687, Taviani, UJ, entry of July 9, 1954; Luce to Dept. 739, (Aug. 24, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 17; Smith to London 1292 (Sept 3, 1954) and Durbrow to Dept. 908 (Sept. 6, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 18; Eisenhower, op. cit , pp 417-419; Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, New York: Doubleday, 1964, p. 422. For a general assessment of the political situation in Italy, see NSC 5411 and NSC 5411/2, March 12 and April 14, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, VI, pp. 1656-1660 and 1677-1681.

31. Eisenhower's letter is reported in Campbell, ed., op. cit., pp. 168-169; Murphy, op. cit., p. 423. Before Murphy's departure, Riddleberger insisted that any proposition submitted to Tito be balanced because the Yugoslavs did not regard the May 31 proposal as a diktat but as an Anglo-American proposal which they accepted only under the greatest of pressure (Riddleberger to Dept. 186, Sept. 5, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 18).

32. Eden, op. cit., p. 187, Re, op. cit., p 192; Murphy, op. cit., p. 424; Campbell, ed., op. cit., pp. 91-92, 101, 103, 133, 136 and 140; Riddleberger to Dept. 186 (Sept. 5, 1954), 187 (Sept. 6, 1954), 197 (Sept. 12, 1954), 202 (Sept. 13, 1954); Butterworth to Dept. 1266 (Sept. 10, 1954), 1353 (Sept. 16, 1954) and 1282 (Sept. 13, 1954), all FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 18; Durbrow to London 44 (Aug. 6, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 17.

33. Luce to Dept. 1107, 1113, 1114 (Sept. 20, 1954), 1133 (Sept. 21, 1954), 1140 (Sept. 22, 1954), 1175 (Sept. 23, 1954) and Aldrich to Dept. 1511, 1512 (Sept. 24, 1954), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 1006-1008.

34. Aldrich to Dept. 1477 (Sept. 23, 1954), 1528 (Sept. 24, 1954), 1579 (Sept. 28, 1954) and 1550 (Sept. 27, 1954), Smith to London 1672 (Sept. 22, 1954), all FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19; Aldrich to Dept. 1682 (Oct. 2, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 1-6 Oct. 1954.

35. Aldrich to Dept. 1579 (Sept. 28, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 1010-1011; Bacchetti, ed., loc. cit., pp. 35-36.

36. Smith to London 1762 (Sept. 27, 1954) and 1813 (Sept. 29, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 909-911; Wallner to Dept 257 (Oct. 1, 1954), FSP-Trieste Box 5, File 1-6 Oct. 1954. For some comments on the international legal aspects of the Memorandum see Manlio Udina, "Juridical aspects of a provisional agreement," Trieste, 1, 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1954), pp. 2-3; Milan Bartoš, "The Trieste Problem from a Legal Point of View," Review of International Affairs, 5, 109 (Oct. 16, 1954), pp. 2-4 and "Some Legal Problems of the FTT Memorandum," in ibid., 5, 111 (Nov. 15, 1954), pp. 3-5.

37. Text of the Memorandum of Understanding in Campbell, ed., op. cit., pp. 159-167 and in Documenti di Vita Italiana, Dec. 1954, pp. 2877-2886. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 1028-1029 and 1034-1035; Luigi Einaudi, Lo Scrittoio del Presidente (1948-1955), Turin: Einaudi, 1956, pp. 96-97. The vote was 122 for and 89 against in the Senate and 295 for 265 against and 7 abstentions in the Chamber of Deputies. In his speech to the Senate, Scelba argued that "the Memorandum did not need to be submitted to formal ratification because it concerned a transfer of administration and not of sovereignty." He also added that "parliamentary ratification would deprive the agreement of its provisional character" (reported in Negri, loc. cit., pp. 793-794, footnote

126). See also Centro di Documentazione della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, L'Italia a Trieste, Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1955.

38. For the planning of the transfer of powers see Smith to Trieste 2817 (Sept. 30, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD, Sims to Dept 102 (Oct. 2, 1954) and 119 (Oct 5, 1954), both in FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File 1-6 Oct. 1954; De Castro, op. cit., pp 1021-1024, 1026-1027 and 1039-1040.

39. Manlio Udina, Gli Accordi di Osimo Lineamenti introduttivi e testi annotati, Trieste. Lint, 1979; De Castro, op cit., I, p 720.

40. Aldrich to Dept. 3370 (Feb 6, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10, Del Balzo later argued with Luce that Brosio did not act on instructions from Rome (Luce to Dept 2426, Feb 12, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10); MC Sensi, W E Knight, Feb 24, 1954 and March 4, 1954 both in FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File UD; Aldrich to Dept. 3784 (March 3, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 11; Campbell, ed., op. cit., p. 38, De Castro, op.cit , pp 821-824, Tarchiani, op. cit , p. 300.

41. Campbell, ed., op. cit., pp. 58 and 98; De Castro, op. cit , 821; Higgs to Dept. 1039 (Feb. 24, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 11. Thompson, in his conversation with Campbell reports (p. 29) that Luce might also have been "slipping something" to the Italians (see also Taviani, UJ, entry of April 8, 1954)

42. Savorgnan di Brazzà, op. cit., p. 140, Taviani, UJ, entries of Jan. 14, Feb. 16, April 9 and 29, June 16, Sept 1 and 17, 1954, De Castro, op. cit., p. 918.

43. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 808 and 871; B.C , "Le dimissioni di De Castro," Relazioni Internazionali, April 10, 1954, pp 366-367; Taviani, UJ, entry of April 1, 1954; Luce to Dept 2629 (March 4, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 12, 3111 (April 6, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 13 and 3743 (May 18, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 14.

44. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 856-857, 869, 870-871 and 876-882; Einaudi, op. cit., pp. 90-96; Bacchetti, ed., op. cit., p 10; Luce to Dept. 4138 (June 15, 1954), 4232 (June 22, 1954), both FSP-Trieste, Box 4, File 15 and 1133 (Sept. 21, 1954), FSP-Trieste Box 6, File 19; Taviani, UJ, entry of July 12, 1954.

45. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 1008-1009, 1011 and 1025-1026; Luce to Dept. 1107, 1113 (both Sept. 20, 1954), and 1149 (Sept. 22, 1954), all FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19; Re, op. cit., p. 288, Negri, loc. cit., p. 768, footnote 76; Bacchetti, ed., op. cit , pp. 31-35; Taviani, UJ, entry of Sept. 25, 1954.

46. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 867-869. Bacchetti, ed., loc. cit., p. 11.

47. De Castro, op. cit., p. 895; Campbell, ed., op. cit., p. 74; Bacchetti, ed , loc. cit., pp. 5 and 21.

48. Durbrow to London 7 (July 2, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19; 844 (Sept. 1, 1954), 899 (Sept 4, 1954) and Butterworth to Dept. 1240 (Sept. 9, 1954), all FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 18 Bacchetti, ed., loc. cit., p. 29.

49. De Castro, op. cit., pp. 857, 861-862, 868 and 876, footnote 30; Bacchetti, ed., loc. cit., pp. 10-11 See also MC Merchant, Luciolli, Jones, Hooker, June 5, 1954, FSP-Trieste, Box 5, File

UD.

50. Bacchetti, ed., loc. cit., pp. 26 and 35; Luce to Dept. 1113 (Sept. 20, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 6, File 19; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 1108-1009.

8. CRISIS AND COPING: OVERALL FINDINGS

This study has analyzed the perceptions and behavior of a single crisis actor, Italy, during the 1953 Trieste crisis. Such an analysis has been guided by the model and related research questions set out in Chapter 1. Findings for each of the five periods examined were reported in the final sections of Chapters 3 through 7. This chapter will report overall findings from this case study and relate them to hypotheses regarding the relationship between stress and the performance of various decision-making tasks as done in other ICB vertical studies. It should be remembered that the main working hypothesis at the base of the ICB model is that under conditions of crisis-induced stress decision-makers are likely to adopt coping mechanisms which are different from those prevailing in noncrisis situations. Since coping mechanisms form the assembly line, as it were, of decisions, it follows that decisions in crisis should be different from those made under noncrisis conditions. The expectation is that they are less rational because crisis-induced stress is supposed to disrupt normal coping mechanisms and, consequently, to affect negatively the general cognitive performance of decision-makers. As Holsti and George have stated in concluding their extensive review of the literature on this subject· "The overwhelming preponderance of historical and experimental evidence indicates that stress impairs cognitive performance." [1]

First, the impact of stress on coping mechanisms will be examined For the main hypothesis to be supported, differences must be found between the behavior of decision-makers in crisis and that in a

noncrisis, that is between the absence and the presence of stress. Variations in behavior between different crisis periods, that is between different stress levels, would provide an even stronger degree of support. Then, the impact of stress on the general cognitive performance of decision-makers will be examined. Finally, the decisions made during the five periods examined above will be dissected, as it were, to establish whether stress, through the mediation of coping mechanisms and general cognitive performance, has any impact on the nature of decisions.

Coping Mechanisms

Information

This section explores the impact of stress on: 1) the perceived need and consequent quest for information and 2) the functioning of the information-processing group. Research in experimental psychology and organizational behavior as well as previous crisis studies have advanced several hypotheses concerning the relationship between stress and information gathering and processing. Those tested in previous ICB vertical studies are: [2]

> 1. The higher the stress, the greater the felt need and consequent quest for information.

Three hypotheses concern the form and effectiveness of this increased quest.

> 2. The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the greater the tendency to rely upon extraordinary and improvised channels of communication [and information]
>
> 3. The higher the stress, the higher the rate of communication

> by a nation's decision-makers to international actors outside their country.
>
> 4. As crisis-induced stress increases, the search for information is likely to become more active, but it may also become more random and less productive

Finally, one hypothesis concerns the functioning of the information-processing group

> 5. The higher the stress, the more information about it tends to be elevated to the top of the organizational [decisional] pyramid. [3]

Evidence from the Trieste crisis provides support for hypothesis 1, which was supported also by evidence from all previous ICB vertical studies. The felt need for information on the part of Italian decision-makers rose moderately at the beginning of the pre-crisis period (soon after the decision to move troops on August 29), increased markedly with the advent of the crisis period (October 10) and then declined in the post-crisis period (the information sought concerned the Yugoslav and, above all, Allied reactions to the Italian decision to move troops in the pre-crisis period, and Allied intentions in the face of the strong Yugoslav reaction to the October 8 decision in the crisis period). Higher stress is also positively correlated with greater quest for information. The number of cables between Rome and the Allied capitals more than doubled after August 29, reached its peak after October 10 and began to decline after December 5 (the same is true for American and British cables). It should be pointed out, however, that the felt need for information increased again, although perhaps not to the same level, during the first phase of the London talks, that is during a noncrisis period. This suggests that the felt need for information is likely to increase any time decision-makers are confronted with uncertainty with respect to a situation involving a threat to national core values. Not all such situations are crises. The presence of time constraints and possibility of involvement in military hostilities, which are necessary for a crisis situation to exist and for stress to increase, is not, therefore, a necessary condition for an increase in the felt need for information to occur The presence of crisis and stress simply compounds any increase due to

uncertainty, which can exist also in a noncrisis situation.

Hypotheses 2 and 3, too, were supported by evidence from all previous ICB vertical studies. Evidence from the Trieste crisis, on the other hand, while not disproving them, calls for a major qualification. Search for information was always conducted through ordinary, diplomatic channels, that is through the embassies in Washington, London and Paris as well as the Allied diplomatic representatives in Rome and, to a lesser extent, the legation in Belgrade and the office of the Italian Political Adviser to the AMG in Trieste. The increased need for information during the crisis period did not lead to any opening of extraordinary or improvised channels but only to a deeper probe of existing ones. As already noted, the number of meetings between Italian and Allied officials increased noticeably in the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis period (90 meetings in 45 days as opposed to 77 in 44 days). It then declined markedly in the post crisis period (30 meetings in 32 days). It should be noted, however, that there was little reason to resort to extraordinary channels since a deeper probe of the regular ones fully satisfied the increased need for information. Prime/Foreign Minister Pella often communicated directly with various Western colleagues. These direct contacts can hardly be regarded, however, as reliance upon extraordinary channels of communication since they always took place during regularly scheduled international meetings or visits of state. More than searching for new information, moreover, Pella's main objective during these meetings was to exercise pressure on the Allies and promote the Italian point of view and seek solidarity among other Western leaders. These contacts are not evidence of an increase in the rate of communication by Italian decision-makers to international actors outside their country (hypothesis 3) either, since they occurred just as frequently under De Gasperi, during the prelude to the crisis period, and continued with Scelba, during the postlude to the crisis period The only examples of "extraordinary " communication with foreign leaders during the crisis period was the trip to Paris by Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Benvenuti and Director-General for

Political Affairs, Del Balzo, in mid-October (soon after Italian decision-makers realized that the Allies did not intend to implement the October 8 decision but would discuss alternative courses of action at an upcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers in London) and the "nonconfidence" message Pella sent to the Allied leaders at the end of October. Such evidence, however, cannot be regarded as supportive of hypotheses 2 or 3, since a similar type of interaction occurred also during the postlude to the crisis period, i.e. the Dulles-Scelba-Piccioni meeting in Milan (May 13, 1954), which was requested by Italian decision-makers, and the letters by Scelba to Dulles (March 27 and August 26, 1954) and to Churchill (September 9, 1954). In conclusion, evidence from the Trieste crisis supports the hypothesis that as crisis-induced stress increases, so does search for information. Greater search, however, does not necessarily take the form of increased reliance upon extraordinary or improvised channels nor of a higher rate of communication by a nation's leaders with foreign ones.

All previous ICB vertical studies provided evidence to support the first part of hypothesis 4. With respect to its second part, however, evidence was mixed. Brecher and Shlaim found no supportive evidence. Dowty, instead, found corroborating evidence in two cases out of three (K. Dawisha did not test this hypothesis). The Trieste crisis provides evidence to support the first but not the second part of this hypothesis. As search for information became more active, it did not become more random nor less productive. As already noted, Italian decision-makers simply increased their probe of existing sources. The additional information thus obtained continued to be as accurate and reliable. There were not, in other words, wasted search efforts, nor did the increased search produce a higher level of "noise."

Hypothesis 5 was confirmed by all previous ICB studies. Evidence from the Trieste crisis provides only a mild degree of support. As customary in the Italian foreign policy system, information was channeled through the Office of the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry and processed by a small group of people (Zoppi, Del Balzo and

Casardi). Almost all incoming messages, moreover, were retransmitted to the three key embassies in the Allied capitals and, less frequently, to the legation in Belgrade and the Office of the Italian Political Adviser to the AMG in Trieste. The top political leaders (De Gasperi, Pella and Scelba) were always supplied with information which had already been interpreted, evaluated and, more often than not, was accompanied by suggestions for action. There were no deviations from this standard pattern of information processing in any of the five periods examined. From this point of view one would have to conclude, therefore, that hypothesis 5 is not supported. It should be noted, however, that during the crisis period the two top political leaders (Pella and Taviani) had frequent meetings with the Allied diplomatic representatives in Rome. Although their purpose was simply to press the Allies to turn Zone A to Italy, they also became involved, as a byproduct of these meetings, in both the gathering and evaluation of raw information.

Consultation

This section explores the impact of stress on 1) the type and size of consultative units, and 2) the frequency of the consultative process. The hypotheses tested in previous ICB studies are the following:

> 6. The higher the stress, the larger the number of persons and groups consulted.
>
> 7. The higher the stress, the greater the frequency with which these persons and groups are consulted.
>
> 8. The higher the stress, the greater the tendency for consultation to be ad hoc rather than institutional.
>
> 9. The higher the stress, the greater the felt need for face-to-face proximity among decision-makers.
>
> 10. The higher the stress, the less the influence of vested interests and other groups outside the bureaucracy [4]

Evidence from the Trieste crisis provides support for both hypotheses 6 and 7, which were also supported in all previous ICB studies. The pattern of consultation which prevailed throughout the five periods examined was the following: the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, Zoppi, would first sound out the opinions of the three ambassadors in the Allied capitals as well as that of Del Balzo and then work them into a technical, diplomatic recommendation for the Prime/Foreign Minister. Further discussions would then take place among the members of the core decisional unit (usually the Prime/Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry top officials) With the advent of the crisis period the consultative circle extended beyond the diplomatic elite (which continued, however, to remain at its core), to include some new actors (both individuals and groups). The first was President Einaudi. He had already been consulted during the pre-crisis period before the making of decision 9 and again on October 2 As the crisis entered its higher stress phase, Pella sought his advice more often both in relation to Trieste and the increasingly more difficult political situation he faced domestically. Chief of Staff Marras, who had also been consulted in relation to the making of decision 9, was approached again before the formulation of decisions 14 and 20 [5] Also consulted were some leaders of the Christian Democratic party as well as the secretaries of the parties on whose support Pella's government rested. Even the Cabinet, whose role was for the most part limited to ratifying the key decisions taken by the Prime/Foreign Minister, played a consultative role, however limited, during the crisis period. The meetings with Luce and Bidault during this phase served also a consultative purpose. Among Allied officials they were the most sympathetic toward the Italian cause, and both Pella and Zoppi were eager to sound their opinion and obtain their advice before making decisions in this phase. Finally, during this period, even some of the suggestions advanced by the pro-Italian political leaders in Trieste were received, albeit perfunctorily, by Pella. On all other occasions, they were excluded from the consultation process and treated, at best,

as an annoying pressure group. In conclusion, it would appear that, as stress increased, a larger number of persons and groups outside the core decisional unit were indeed consulted.

Meetings became much more frequent. The record shows in fact eight meetings between Pella and the core political-diplomatic group of advisors compared to only three in the pre-crisis period. There were also four meetings between Pella and Einaudi and six with different party leaders and parliamentary groups as opposed to one and two, respectively, during the pre-crisis period. Finally, the question of Trieste was discussed in six meetings of the Council of Ministers as compared to only two in the pre-crisis period. Even allowing for the fact that the crisis period was longer than the pre-crisis one (56 days as compared to 43), it would seem that also hypothesis 7 is fully supported. [6]

Hypothesis 8 was also confirmed by all previous ICB studies with the partial exception of the Soviet Union in the Prague Spring case when, as Dawisha pointed out, "there was not a major shift toward ad hoc consultation with the escalation of the crisis." [7] Evidence from the Trieste crisis does not confirm this hypothesis. Consultation before, during and after the crisis was almost always institutional rather than ad hoc, that is the Prime/Foreign Minister relied for advice on individuals belonging to categories (e.g. diplomacy, party leaders, etc.) which he normally consults either because of rules or conventions rather than to special groups made up of individuals selected from different categories and convened for the specific purpose of providing advice on the Trieste question. The only exceptions to this pattern occurred in the prelude to crisis and pre-crisis periods, that is in low stress phases. The first was the group convened by De Gasperi on March 16, 1953 specifically to discuss the second Dulles' plan. The second was the group which met to discuss the military measures of August 29, 1953. The first, moreover, has to be considered ad hoc only because of the presence of the two under-secretaries for Foreign Affairs whom De Gasperi most likely included simply in order not to face alone a group

of diplomats which, he knew, held a position different from his own. The second group was certainly ad hoc but can be considered consultative only in a limited sense since it was convened primarily to discuss the technical implementation of a decision (to move troops) which, for all practical purposes had already been made by Del Balzo and Zoppi the previous evening. In conclusion, as far as Italy's case in the Trieste crisis is concerned, there was no shift toward ad hoc consultation with the increase in stress. Nor did consultation become noticeably more formal. Advice was often given through memoranda or by telephone. Meetings, even at the height of the crisis, were rarely called for the specific purpose of discussing Trieste Finally, the great majority of consultative meetings during the five periods examined, were small (less than 5 participants), very few were medium (between 5 and 10 participants) and none, with the exception of those Cabinet meetings when Trieste was discussed, was large (more than 11 participants).

Hypothesis 9 is not supported by the evidence from the Trieste crisis. Although the frequency of consultation increased during the crisis period, there is no evidence to indicate an increase in the felt need for face-to-face proximity among decision-makers. Except for a slightly higher pace of activity, including an increase in the number of meetings, business continued to be transacted as usual. There were no marathon consultative sessions and phone calls and written memoranda continued to be the standard means of communication among decision-makers.

Hypothesis 10, on the other hand, is supported. The pro-Italian political leaders in Trieste, the only vested interest group in the Trieste case, had little or no influence during the crisis. The degree of support is, however, not very strong because their influence was just as insignificant during the prelude and postlude to the crisis periods. This group was indeed constantly excluded from the consultation process, and often misled about the real state of affairs The interaction between national decision-makers and the local Trieste leaders was characterized by the constant effort of the former to "sell" their

objectives to the latter and control their activities when these were perceived as being counterproductive to the pursuit of those objectives.

Decisional Fora

This section will look at the impact of stress on: 1) the size and structure of decisional fora, and 2) authority patterns within decisional units. The hypotheses advanced and tested in previous ICB studies are the following:

> 11. The higher the stress, the smaller decision groups tend to become.
>
> 12. The higher the stress, the greater will be the tendency for decisions to be reached by ad hoc units.
>
> 13. The higher the stress, the greater the felt need for more effective decision-making authority and leadership within decisional units.
>
> 14. The higher the stress, the greater the conflict within decisional units and the greater the consensus once a decision is reached. [8]

The testing of hypotheses 11 and 12 in previous ICB studies provides an interesting finding. Both hypotheses are supported by the evidence from the crises studied by Dowty and Shlaim and rejected in the case of those examined by Brecher and Dawisha. The interesting aspect is that Dowty and Shlaim examined the behavior of the United States in four different crises between 1948 and 1973, whereas Brecher and Dawisha looked at the behavior of Israel in the 1967 and 1973 crises and of the Soviet Union in the Prague Spring one. This would seem to suggest that, as stress increases, decisions units tend to become smaller and ad hoc only in the case of the United States. An examination of all the crises in the ICB data set from 1929 to 1979 does indeed reveal that "the overwhelming majority of crisis actors used an institutional, not an ad hoc decision-making unit." [9] Evidence from the Trieste crisis does not support hypotheses 11 and 12.

In the Trieste case two phases can be clearly distinguished. During the prelude to crisis (the first of the five periods examined), all the decisions were made by the Prime/Foreign Minister. Although he did consult with his diplomatic advisors (at times also in a very formal way as, for instance, before decision 7), De Gasperi did not hesitate to make choices which went against their unanimous opinion. During the three crisis periods, which coincided very closely with the tenure of Pella as Prime/Foreign Minister, the role played by the latter diminished noticeably. Although all the decisions were still formally made by him, Pella relied, much more than De Gasperi ever had, on the advice of the top diplomatic officials to the point that they could indeed be regarded as the central crisis managers. Pella's involvement was almost limited to the assessment of the impact of their choices on the domestic environment and hence, his political future. Crisis-induced stress, however, does not seem to be the reason for this change. First of all, contrary to what hypothesis 11 predicts, the change was in the direction of an enlargement rather than a restriction of the decision-making group. Second, there were no variations in this new decision-making pattern between the three crisis periods, notwithstanding the variations in the level of stress. Finally, such a pattern continued also during the postlude to crisis. Scelba and Piccioni, much like Pella and unlike De Gasperi, also relied heavily upon the advice of Foreign Ministry officials. Indeed, many decisions during the London negotiations were delegated further down the line to Ambassador Brosio himself. Had crisis-induced stress been the influential variable (even if working in the opposite direction of what predicted by hypothesis 11), one would have expected, in this period, a reappearance of the decision-making pattern prevailing during the prelude to crisis.

Differences in personality and leadership style between De Gasperi and Pella probably account for this change. Pella's lack of experience in foreign affairs, his reserved style and his trust in the expertise of the bureaucracy combined to bring to the fore the role of the Foreign

Ministry top officials. Although Pella had serious reservations about some of the decisions made during the crisis (particularly decisions 9, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19 and 20), in the end he always bowed to the opinion of those he considered the "professionals" of foreign affairs. Indeed the only decision Pella made without the assistance of his diplomatic advisors was decision 16 (to send a strong protest to the U.S. and the U.K.). This exception was due to the fact that he made the decision while in Paris. Even on this occasion, however, Zoppi was able to intervene. He, in fact, softened the tone of Pella's letter of protest to Luce by adding an explanatory note to it. Toward the end of the post-crisis period, having realized that his government would fall, regardless of how the Trieste question was handled, Pella abdicated his leadership role almost completely. He simply approved the courses of action suggested by Zoppi. This pattern continued almost unchanged also under Scelba whose leadership style, at least in foreign affairs, was certainly closer to that of Pella than of De Gasperi. This shift in leadership from the Prime/Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry is, moreover, not uncommon in the Italian foreign policy system. As already mentioned above, the institutional responsibilities of the Secretary-General are quite vast: he is supposed to assist the Foreign Minister, coordinate the conduct of foreign policy between the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, provide "technical expertise" and "assure continuity" from one administration to the next. These guidelines, coupled with the liberty he has to manage the daily business of the Foreign Ministry as he sees fit, can make a Secretary-General, especially in the presence of a weak, trustful or very busy Foreign Minister (Pella was considered a transitory leader, regarded the bureaucracy almost as infallible and had two ministerial responsibilities besides being Premier), the leading force both in the determination and the conduct of Italian foreign policy.

Some of the decisions both before (decisions 1, 2 and 3), during (decisions 12, 15 and 19) and after the peak of the crisis (decision

24), were formally made by the Cabinet. In reality, however, this was merely Cabinet approval of choices already made by the Prime/Foreign Minister and his diplomatic advisors This rubber-stamp authorization was requested and obtained whenever decisions were to become public In other words, post hoc support from the Cabinet was sought primarily to share responsibility for politically delicate decisions. Decision 12 (to accept the "provisional" solution offered by the Allies on October 8) was the most blatant case. At the end of the Cabinet meeting which approved such a decision, Pella requested, contrary to custom, that minutes be drawn up and signed by all present. The formal ratification of decisions by the Cabinet can therefore be seen as corresponding to the enlargement of the consultative circle to include political party secretaries and parliamentary leaders The limited role played by the Cabinet is again typical of the way the Italian foreign policy system works. Being a large body without organizational features (such as the Cabinet Office in the British system, for instance) which can facilitate the circulation of documentation necessary simply to an informed discussion of foreign policy, the Cabinet can hardly be expected to make decisions. Its role in foreign policy--very much like that of Parliament--is thus limited to the simple approval of programmatic declarations and to an ex-post facto periodical endorsement of decisions often already implemented. Hypothesis 11 is thus decidedly rejected. Decision groups did not become smaller with the advent of the crisis. Having basically concided until then with the person of De Gasperi, they actually became more decentralized, with the Foreign Ministry officials coming to play a much more influential role than in the prelude to the crisis period. Furthermore, this change is not to be considered extraordinary since it is typical of how the Italian foreign policy system works under certain conditions even in regular, noncrisis situations.

Although decisions 9 and 10 were formally made by an ad hoc group (composed of Pella, Zoppi, Minister of Defense Taviani and Chief of Staff Marras) in reality, by the time the group met, the decisions (to

move troops and, then, to leave them where they were) had already been made. Hence, the ad hoc group was more an implementing forum than a decisional unit. Marras, after all, was included, especially in the case of decision 9, simply to help with the technical aspects of the decision. When he questioned its political wisdom (albeit by adducing technical, military reasons), he was promptly silenced with the powerful argument that if he would not cooperate he could always be replaced with somebody readier to obey orders. In conclusion, since Italy did not resort to ad hoc decisional units during the crisis, except as an implementing forum, hypothesis 12, too, is decidedly rejected.

Hypothesis 13 was supported by evidence from at least three of the previous ICB studies (Dawisha did not test it). In the Trieste case, the increase in stress did not lead to a display of more effective decision-making authority and leadership within decisional units. During the prelude to the crisis period De Gasperi provided effective leadership by ruling with firm authority the working of the decisional unit. With the advent of the crisis there was instead a fragmentation of authority and the disappearance of effective leadership. Direction within the decisional unit was provided primarily by the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, Zoppi. Decisions were, for the most part, shaped by him and then cleared with and, at times, pushed on the Prime/Foreign Minister. Political legitimacy within the decisional unit was provided in these cases by Defense Minister, Taviani. This change in the dynamics of the decisional unit does not seem to be related to variations in the level of stress but rather, as was the case with its size (hypothesis 11), to differences in personality and leadership style between De Gasperi and Pella. This same dynamics continued, almost unchanged, also during the postlude to the crisis period. It should also be pointed out that this lack of effective decision-making authority and leadership on the part of Pella did not cause any malaise to the other members of the decisional unit. On the contrary, Pella's relative aloofness was almost welcomed by Zoppi and the diplomatic elite in general since it allowed them to manage the

Trieste question in a much more direct and decisive way than they had ever been able to do under De Gasperi. Hypothesis 13 is therefore rejected. Higher stress did not lead to a greater felt need for effective decision-making authority and leadership within decisional units. Authority and leadership actually waned away with the advent of the crisis. This change, moreover, seems to be related to the personality traits of the new Prime/Foreign Minister and not to variations in the level of stress.

Hypothesis 14 was supported by evidence from all previous ICB studies. In the Trieste case instead, the increase in stress did not lead to greater conflict within decisional units nor did it influence the level of post-decisional consensus. Conflict within decisional units was at its highest during the prelude to the crisis period. While all the diplomats argued for the "provisional solution," De Gasperi favoured, and finally imposed for reasons of domestic politics, the choice of requesting additional improvements of the American plan for a definitive partition of the FTT. Once De Gasperi converted to the "provisional solution" (following the June 1953 elections) and Pella embraced it as his official policy, the conflict about objectives became a debate on question of tactics. The diplomats, for instance, strongly favoured the military maneuver of August 29 seeing it as part of a series of initiatives aimed at pressing the Allies to transfer Zone A to Italy. Pella, on the other hand, was more reticent, fearing negative political repercussions. Later the roles were reversed Following the strong Yugoslav reaction to the October 8 decision, the diplomats were more prepared to recognize the difficulty of the Allies' predicament and better disposed to heed their request for some form of compromise. Pella instead favoured, again for reasons of domestic politics, a more intransigent line. Given Pella's proneness to rely on the advice of the "professionals," the options favoured by the diplomats always prevailed in the end. Differences of opinion, moreover, were never expressed with the acrimony of tone which characterized at times the debate about objectives during De Gasperi's tenure (e g his diatribe with Sforza)

Contrary to what is predicted by the first part of hypothesis 14 then, the increase in stress led to lesser rather than greater conflict within decisional units. This change, moreover, seems again to be related more to differences in leadership style between De Gasperi and Pella than to variations in the level of stress. The advent of the crisis did not affect post-decisional consensus either. Regardless of the level of stress and pre-decisional conflict, post-decisional consensus did not vary. It always remained at a level which could be defined as "administratively or bureaucratically normal." There was never any evidence of groupthink. The supporters of the losing alternatives, in other words, retained their views and, whenever the opportunity arose, continued to defend and advance them. Each of them, however, dutifully carried out the tasks necessary to the implementation of the choice which had been made. In conclusion, evidence from the Trieste crisis does not support any of the hypotheses on decisional fora.

Alternatives

This section will examine the impact of stress on: 1) the perceived range of available options, and 2) the search for, and evaluation of alternatives. The major hypothesis advanced and tested in previous ICB studies are the following:

> 15. The higher the stress, the greater the tendency to perceive a narrowing range of options
>
> 16. The higher the stress, the greater the tendency to reduce the search for alternatives.
>
> 17. The higher the stress, the less careful the evaluation of alternatives becomes.[10]

The overwhelming evidence from previous ICB studies seems to indicate that stress has little or no disruptive influence on the search for alternatives and the evaluation of their consequences. Hypothesis 15, on the other hand, was tested only by Brecher who found that both in

1967 and 1973 "escalating stress ... led to a perception of steadily narrowing options." [11] Even in these two cases, however, the Israeli search continued to be rather thorough and alternatives were carefully evaluated. Indeed, it would almost appear, as indicated by Dowty in at least two of the cases he examined (the U.S. in the 1958 and 1973 Middle-East crises) that as stress rises the search for alternatives tends to become more rather than less extensive Likewise, rising stress does not seem to lead to a less thorough evaluation of alternatives, although both Brecher and Dowty suggest that this might happen in "peak stress phases." Evidence from the Trieste case reinforces this general picture of the stress-alternatives linkage

Both the perception of available options and the actual search for alternatives in the prelude to the crisis period were extensive. Alternatives were selected and carefully evaluated in nonquantitative cost-benefit terms by the Foreign Ministry top officials, ranked and then submitted to De Gasperi. They were then evaluated again prior to choice. Although this second evaluation occurred within the decisional unit, it was usually done by the Prime Minister alone. This "executive" evaluation, as it were, was influenced above all by domestic political concerns. De Gasperi's choices, in other words, aimed primarily at maximizing this single value dimension. This, incidentally, supports a hypothesis on the linkage between type of evaluative units and evaluative depth, namely: "The greater the reliance on group problem-solving processes, the greater the consideration of alternatives." [12]

As in the Israeli cases examined by Brecher, also Italian decision-makers seem to have perceived a narrowing range of options concomitantly with the increase in time pressure. By the end of the prelude to the crisis period, all Italian decision-makers, with the exception of De Gasperi, were convinced that unless Trieste was reacquired soon it would be lost forever. When in June 1953 even De Gasperi recognized the necessity of requesting the "provisional solution," they came against American reluctance to proceed with it.

The resulting time pressure led to the perception that only two options were now available: to do nothing and resign to the status quo or to act at the earliest possible time to unblock the situation. Furthermore, within the option "to act," pressure on the Allies seems to have been the only kind of action perceived as viable. This narrowing of perceived options to the category "to act" cannot, however, be considered a full confirmation of hypothesis 15 since such a reduction seems to be implied by the definition of foreign policy crisis itself with its emphasis on finite time for response [hence action] to an external value threat. [13] Furthermore, there were no other variations in the range of perceived options for the rest of the crisis, notwithstanding successive variations in the level of stress. Finally, the range enlarged again with the end of the crisis.

The narrowing of the perceived options to the single category "to act" might have been responsible, however, for the restricted search for alternatives prior to decision 9. The idea of moving troops, the first alternative advanced in the context of considering a response to the Yugopress statement, came to be immediately regarded as having also a persuasive influence on the Americans and hence, as capable of unblocking the situation. Thus, the search for other, more adequate alternatives--at least if judged exclusively as a response to the Yugopress statement--stopped immediately. This was the only instance, throughout the crisis, of nonextensive search for alternatives. Even in this case, however, one cannot speak of premature closure since the evaluation of consequences of the chosen alternative was very thorough.

A second consequence of time pressure, deriving in this case from the perception that the survival of Pella's government depended on its ability to achieve the "provisional solution" promptly, especially after it had set the question in motion again with its military measures of August 29, was that during the crisis preference was shown for alternatives capable of achieving immediate results as opposed to more distant ones. This, however, is not evidence of reduced search because within this narrower range, search for alternatives was extensive. This

heightened concern for immediate results confirms a hypothesis advanced by Holsti to the effect that "as stress increases, decision-makers become more concerned with the immediate than the long-run future." [14] It cannot be taken, however, to imply a diminished capacity for evaluation. Rather, it shows an attentive assignment of subjective values which indicates careful evaluation

The onset of stress, therefore, cannot be said to have adversely affected the ability of Italian decision-makers to search for alternatives and evaluate their consequences. Indeed, an increased reliance on group decision-making during the crisis led, after decision 9, to a greater consideration of alternatives and a better integration of different value dimensions than had been the case during the prelude to the crisis period. At first, choices aimed at convincing the Allies to implement the "provisional solution" which was regarded as necessary both to reacquire Trieste and prop up Pella's government. Once it became clear that the Allies, notwithstanding the October 8 decision, would not transfer the administration of Zone A without some kind of compromise with the Yugoslavs, Italian choices aimed at solving this diplomatic impasse, and thus advance the prospects of Trieste problem, while, at the same time, minimizing the domestic political costs for Pella. The sequence of decisions also shows that domestic political concerns gradually receded on the value scale as time went by, the stalemate continued and Pella's government looked increasingly doomed for reasons independent of the Trieste situation Thus, the request for Zone A to be transferred in incremental steps (decision 13b) was followed by the proposal for a preparatory meeting of experts (decision 18) and finally by the suggestion for secret parallel talks (decision 21). In between these choices, other alternatives were also carefully considered and rejected because they were reputed to score low on either one or the other value dimension. When, at the end of the post-crisis period, given Pella's imminent resignation, domestic political costs ceased to be a major influence on choice, the evaluation of alternatives became easier to perform but was not less thorough Finally, during the

postlude to the crisis period, the dichotomous character of choices led to little search but did not undermine the evaluation process.

As reported by previous ICB studies, therefore, also in the Trieste case increasing stress is not associated with restricted search or less careful examination of alternatives. Contrary to what is predicted by hypotheses 16 and 17, search and, above all, evaluation of alternatives actually improved during the crisis to the point that one can indeed affirm that these two tasks "occupie[d] a substantial part of decision-making time." [15] Increase in stress or, more precisely, time pressure appears, on the other hand, to have led to a narrowing of the range of options. A focus on options calling for action might be, however, a characteristic associated with the phenomena of foreign policy crisis itself.

Performance of Decision-Makers

In their study on the relationship between stress and the performance of foreign policy decision-makers, Holsti and George conclude that the quality of cognitive performance resembles an "inverted-U" curve, that is "low" or "moderate" levels of stress improve performance while "high" or "intense" levels affect it negatively. In particular, they contend that high stress leads to a general decline of the decision-makers' cognitive ability which manifests itself through the appearance of a number of biases such as: a more limited span of attention, lower cue awareness, greater conceptual rigidity or, if one prefers, reduced capacity to cope with complexity and ambiguities, increased propensity to stereotype, greater reliance upon past experience, decreased creativity (e.g. identification of and focus on a very limited number of alternatives), the emergence of groupthink and, finally, a tendency to premature closure with a marked preference for

courses of action capable of yielding results in the immediate as opposed to the more distant future, brief, a tendency to regard the situation in terms of emotional, psychological predispositions and define it in simplistic, zero-sum terms This means that one could construct as many hypotheses concerning the relationship between stress and cognitive performance as there are ways of breaking down the latter. Indeed, in the other ICB vertical studies published thus far, this relationship has been explored in different ways. Brecher tested two hypotheses relating stress to two specific biases, namely closedness to new information and reliance on past experience K Dawisha did the same with respect to four biases which she grouped in three hypotheses The biases she selected to examine were: use of stereotypes, reduced ability to cope with complexity or ambiguities, reliance on past experience and preference for options yielding short-term results. Shlaim tested the relationship between stress and span of attention, cognitive rigidity and time perspective which he regarded as codenames for a series of related biases, namely lower cue awareness and reliance on past experience, reduced creativity and diminished ability to cope with complexity and focus on short-term achievements Dowty made no distinction between coping mechanisms and cognitive performance and tested some hypotheses on the impact of stress on cognitive performance together with those concerning coping mechanisms [16] To avoid confusion it is perhaps better and certainly more parsimonious to summarize Holsti and George's findings into one single hypothesis which can be stated as follows:

> 18. The higher the stress, the more likely cognitive performance is to be characterized by psychological biases

A second hypothesis could also be advanced, namely, the greater the number of biases uncovered, the more likely cognitive performance is to have been disrupted. It seems evident, however, that there is no precise relationship between number of biases and quality of performance and that the evaluation of the impact of biases on performance calls for the careful and informed but ultimately subjective judgment of the analyst All previous ICB studies, for instance, report that at least

some biases were present but they all conclude that there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that rising stress drastically or fundamentally disrupts cognitive performance.

Evidence from the Trieste case leads to the same conclusion. The Italian approach to the Trieste question since the end of World War II was shaped by two deeply held beliefs: 1) Italy had a right to the FTT which transcended the limits imposed by the realities of international politics and, 2) it was the Allies' duty to help recover it because of the commonality of interests deriving from the fact that Italy, unlike Yugoslavia, was a democracy and part of the Western camp. The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav rift and the consequent American overtures towards Tito posed a challenge to De Gasperi's policy of waiting for the Allies to deliver the goods. The public reaction of Italian decision-makers was to minimize the significance of the event. The rift, they argued, was a plain scam or, at best, a temporary disagreement. Yugoslavia would eventually and inevitably rejoin the Cominform. The country remained a Communist dictatorship and, therefore, untrustworthy and undeserving of Western consideration. These statements could be taken as evidence that Italian decision-makers were affected by conceptual rigidity and inability to cope with complexity long before the crisis. More likely, they were due to the necessity to dampen what was perceived as excessive American enthusiasm for a rapprochement with Tito until a more realistic strategy for the recovery of Trieste was devised. Otherwise, as cogently expressed in a memorandum of the Foreign Ministry already in mid-1949, Italy would not only fail to obtain Zone B but "could even be obliged to discuss questions concerning Zone A." The development of the "provisional solution" in mid-1951 is evidence that Italian decision-makers, notwithstanding the rhetoric of their public utterances, were not suffering from conceptual rigidity. On the contrary, they had adapted, even if belatedly and with the partial exception of De Gasperi, to the complexity of the new situation, resigned to international political realities and recognized the limits of the help they could expect from the Allies

The advent of the crisis did not lead to a deterioration of the performance of cognitive and decision-making tasks. Notwithstanding a narrowing of their span of attention to the Trieste situation, Italian decision-makers retained a high awareness of their complex environment. Given that the pace of events quickened considerably they can indeed be said to have performed even better under crisis conditions than they had until then. To be sure some cognitive biases can be found A complex problem such as whether or not to enter into direct negotiations with the Yugoslavs continued to be viewed largely through predispositional lenses and the basic belief that the best solution could come only through the Allies was never called into question Thus, Yugoslav overtures toward direct negotiations were regarded, both before and during the crisis, as attempts to thwart the solutions pursued through the Allies and, consequently, ignored or dismissed without any serious inquiry as to their earnestness. Likewise, information which cast doubt on the viability of the "provisional solution" (e g. articles in the Yugoslav press as well as reports from the legation in Belgrade warning that Yugoslavia would not accept a solution imposed by the West) were disregarded. This, however, can hardly be considered a major flaw since such information about (or, more precisely, estimates of) Yugoslav reactions ran directly counter to Eden's assurances, allegedly based on a personal conversation with Tito, that the Yugoslav reaction to an imposed partition would be limited to a strong protest

As for the propensity to stereotype and rely heavily on historical lessons, Italian decision-makers certainly continued to label Tito an "untrustworthy Communist" and refer to Trieste as "another Danzig." They also regarded American willingness to come to terms with Yugoslav requests after October 8, 1953, not as an effort to avoid a potential armed confrontation but as an exercise in appeasement, (a "new Munich") Since all these parallels were made in public speeches and conversations with Allied officials, they could represent a different effort to exert pressure on the Allies rather than reliance upon lessons of history. In any case these biases were also present before the crisis, their

frequency did not increase with stress and, even more important, they rarely determined the decision-makers' approach. On the contrary, it was precisely during the period of higher stress (October-November 1953), when the challenge they faced became more complex, that Italian decision-makers operated at their best. They recognized the difficult position of the Allies and gradually relaxed their original intransigent stand (no conference without prior transfer of Zone A) to avoid reaching a dead end. At the same time, they were able, through a series of creative proposals, to reconcile the demands of effective crisis management with domestic political concerns. Indeed, as already shown in more detail in the section on alternatives, it was precisely during the crisis and post-crisis periods that Italian decision-makers were able to integrate these two value dimensions effectively. Until then, and especially during the prelude to the crisis period (under De Gasperi), domestic political concerns had consistently prevailed over the need to address the Trieste problem. [17]

Although inducing a slightly higher cohesion within decisional units, rising stress did not lead to groupthink. Likewise, there were no clear instances of premature closure although, as already noted, a preference for alternatives yielding more immediate results can be detected during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. This tendency was not, however, very marked and it cannot be said to have hampered the effective management of the crisis.

On balance, then, the performance of Italian decision-makers during the Trieste crisis shows no evidence to support hypothesis 18. The increase in stress did not result in the appearance of more cognitive biases and cannot be said to have disrupted performance in any significant way. Indeed, during the whole crisis there was only one decision which could appear to be the result of disrupted coping mechanisms and faulty cognitive performance. This was the decision to move troops (decision 9) Seen as a response to the external stimulus provided by a press story, decision 9 decidedly appears to have been an overreaction Even an Italian observer later readily admitted that

Pella's reaction was "disproportionate to the effective level of threat." In more technical terms, the Italian response, which was non-violent military (troop movements), did not match the trigger, which had been nonviolent verbal (the Yugopress story) [18] Since matching behavior is the expected behavior in international interactions, the question arises: why did Italian decision-makers respond with such a stern measure? A first explanation, based on the disruptive stress hypothesis, could be deduced from the ICB model.

The model would suggest that the rise in threat perception, however modest, led to stress which, in turn, negatively affected the quality of the decision-making process. [19] The New York Times intuitively advanced this same hypothesis when it wrote on September 2 that the Italian decision was "puzzling" and, unless the Italians had "inside information on Marshal Tito's plans," could only be the result of "hysteria." [20] Since the ICB model simply deduces the presence and intensity of stress from a correlation with one or more of the three perceptual crisis components, the increase in the level of threat perception caused by the UP story and reported by Tarchiani would automatically confirm the presence of stress. Further, since an analysis of the coping mechanisms yielding decision 9 reveals some faulty aspects (namely, failure to look for additional information and no search for alternatives, hence premature closure), the hypothesis that decision 9 was the result of a stress-impaired decision-making process would be supported. [21]

A closer look at available evidence reveals, however, a slightly different and puzzling picture. The receipt of the UP wire, for instance, while triggering a modest increase in threat perception, did not lead to a marked increase in the level of stress. Taviani's journal entry for Friday August 28 does not report an emergency situation in the Defense Ministry that evening The UP wire was not thought to be of special significance because it was not brought to his attention immediately upon receipt. He learned of it only later when, about to leave town for the weekend, Pella reached him by phone. He also reports

that there was no noticeable anxiety in the Prime Minister's communication and affirms to have been more disappointed by having to cancel the weekend with his family than he was perturbed by the note. De Castro, who was on vacation in Montecatini, called the Foreign Ministry on the morning of the 29th to ask whether he should return to Trieste immediately. He reports that Zoppi told him "very calmly" that he "could take it easy," and categorically concludes that "nobody had lost his head at Palazzo Chigi." [22] That the level of stress was not very significant at this juncture is still consistent with the ICB model. Since this was the very beginning of the crisis only one of the three crisis components (namely a moderately higher threat perception) was present at this time. It does cast doubt, however, on the hypothesis that the decision to move troops to the border was an overreaction to the UP report due to a stress-impaired decision-making process. Also disturbing is the fact that the level of stress appears to have risen soon after decision 9 had been made. It was during his meeting with the Allied diplomats, in fact, that Pella was reported for the first time to be "extremely excited and nervous." One would have expected the level of stress, if anything, to decline at this point because of what the psychological literature calls "post-decisional relief" and the reassurances Pella received from the Allied diplomats of the absence--to their knowledge, at least--of any Yugoslav intention to annex Zone B. [23]

A different hypothesis would seem to fit better with this and other available puzzling evidence: the military measures taken on the morning of August 29 were not the result of a stress-impaired decision-making process but a deliberate move to advance the Trieste agenda. Ever since Italian decision-makers had agreed upon the "provisional solution" as their next objective (June 17), their immediate task had become to convince the Americans to implement it, the British being already favorably disposed toward it. As repeated light nudges produced no results, the idea started to gain ground at the Foreign Ministry that one might have to resort to other, more adequate,

means. In a report dated July 19, for instance, even Tarchiani, who had always professed unswerving confidence in the Americans, suggested recourse to "a well-constructed and well-executed plan which [would] drive the point across to [them] that some grave inconveniences [might] well be encountered if [they] persist[ed] in obstructing Italy in the achievement of her aspirations." [24] This does not mean that decision 9 was part of a grand design. The Yugopress story simply provided Italian decision-makers with a propitious occasion to send a message to the Allies to the effect that their patience and understanding had been stretched to the limit and that they had better implement the "provisional solution" soon.

A clarification on the nature of the perceived threat is in order here. The threat perceived by Italian decision-makers was not the possibility that Tito might annex Zone B, although this was the impression conveyed to the Allies and the public in general (alleged perceived threat). In approving the "provisional solution" they had already accepted such a final outcome, even if they wished, for domestic political reasons, to postpone the announcement of its official and definitive character as long as possible On the basis of the evaluation of Yugoslav intentions provided by SIFAR (the Italian military secret services), they feared that Tito had concluded that the delicate political phase Italy was going through afforded him the possibility to extract a better deal than the one he had showed himself willing to accept in his meeting with Eden (i.e., partition along the zonal boundary). More precisely, Italian decision-makers thought Tito would eventually press for Trieste and its surroundings to be turned into an international neutral area, following the model of Tangiers The (real perceived) threat was thus represented by the perception that unless Trieste was reacquired soon, it would be lost forever Internationalization would lead to the inevitable "pollution" of its Italian character already felt to be in danger under Allied administration "The countryside of Alto Adige has by and large retained its German character," Zoppi pointed out during the discussion

preceding decision 9, "but Bolzano italianized itself in seven years; the Allies must be made to realize that it would not take much to balkanize Trieste." [25] To counter this threat, one had to regain control of Zone A from the Allies as soon as possible. A small concentration of troops in Monfalcone and along the Yugoslav frontier could not deter Tito from annexing Zone B, had this really been his intention, but would be effective in signalling Italian restlessness about the future of Zone A to the Americans and, hopefully, pushing them along a path they had been reluctant to follow until then. As Tarchiani put it in retrospect: "From that unfortunate series of incidents [the Yugopress story and the Italian military measures] the Allies were almost forced to convince themselves that the problem of Trieste could take a tragic turn at any moment; hence, it was both necessary and urgent to solve it." [26]

The fact that, apart from a reexamination of old intelligence estimates of Yugoslav intentions, the UP wire did not lead to any increase in the search for information, is not a sign that stress disrupted coping mechanisms and cognitive performance leading to a restricted search for information and premature closure. The behavior of Italian decision-makers was instead perfectly rational. After an initial sense of bewilderment, Pella, Zoppi and Del Balzo concluded, already on the evening of the 28th, that the Yugopress story was, at worst, a trial balloon which did not imply a very serious or immediate threat of annexation. Moreover, once the idea surfaced that the story offered the opportunity to send the Allies a strong signal that time had come to return Zone A and thus preempt any possible Yugoslav demand for internationalization, the task at hand was no longer to establish the likelihood of the alleged threat but to magnify it. Not surprisingly, for a few days after August 28, the Foreign Ministry was more interested in spreading the information it already had than in seeking new information Contrary to its custom, in fact, it kept nineteen of its embassies informed about developments--undoubtedly, as also recognized by De Castro, with a view to dramatizing the situation. The text of the

telegram sent to the embassies in the Allied capitals reveals that Italian decision-makers were not really seeking a clarification of Yugoslav intentions. Their primary interest was to ensure that the Allies intervene in Belgrade to extract an explicit denial of any intention to annex Zone B Such a denial would, indirectly and in retrospect, back up their reading of the Yugopress story. The Tanjug release of August 30 (calling Italian rumors of a Yugoslav intention to annex Zone B a "planned provocation") was indeed presented by the Italian press as a Yugoslav backdown in the face of Pella's firm reaction. In the same vein, the demarche made by the Allies in Belgrade on August 31 was said to be one of the initiatives taken by Pella's government to thwart Yugoslav designs. New information was actually to be eluded, insofar as it could undermine the plausibility of the course of action under consideration. It was, in other words, a typical case of what cognitive psychology refers to as "defensive avoidance." Decision 9 was, indeed, made before any new information could be received from the embassies in the Allied capitals and before the meeting with Allied diplomats Pella could thus later reasonably argue that the Yugopress story, "while not necessarily meaning that Yugoslavia [was] about to annex the zone, [was] sufficient to justify apprehension and precautionary measures on the part of Italy" and that he had felt compelled to move troops even if there was only a "one percent possibility" that the story was true. [27]

The hypothesis that moving troops to the border was a deliberate attempt "to cut the Trieste knot," to use Taviani's words, also explains why independent evidence of psychological stress can be found only after decision 9 had been taken. Following the receipt of the UP wire, only one of the three independent perceptual variables that the model takes as stress indicators was present: a moderately higher threat (Tito is up to something and he might indeed start soon to press for the internationalization of Trieste). The other two, however, emerged during the decision-making process leading to decision 9, whence the increase in stress. These two components--which the ICB model assumes

to be absent during the pre-crisis period--did not derive directly from the trigger but were internally generated, as it were. Thus, time pressure was linked to goal attainment; that is, to the perception that some action had to be taken soon if the objective was to be reached. Taviani's journal entries for the first two weeks in September contain many remarks to the effect that time was running out and that, unless Italy regained control of Zone A soon, Trieste also would be lost forever. To be sure, this type of time pressure had been felt by Italian decision-makers, as alreday noted at the beginning of Chapter 3, at least since mid-1951. The perception of finite time for action (or better, the feeling that one had to act rapidly) increased, however, following receipt of the UP wire because the Yugopress story was seen as a convenient opportunity which, if immediately seized and well-exploited, could help advance the return of Zone A. As Taviani effectively put it at the meeting: "This could be a good chance to prove to Tito and, above all to the Allies, [emphasis added] that we do not intend, on any account, to give up Trieste." The perception "probability of involvement in military hostilities" was a byproduct of decision 9 itself. Italian decision-makers carefully evaluated the consequences of their action and the series of events they were about to set in motion on Yugoslavia. How would Tito react to Italy's reacquisition of Zone A? Here Taviani could point out reassuringly that Eden had told him that, when asked what he would do if the Allies gave Zone A to Italy, Tito had answered: "I'll protest but I certainly won't go to war over it." How would he respond to the envisaged military measures? Here the answer could only be conjectural. He could ignore them, protest (which is what he did) or respond in kind. In any case, moving troops closer to the border was a risky course of action because it represented an escalation in a conflict which--after May 1945, at least--had remained firmly within verbal, diplomatic confines. It also created the danger that some skirmishes might break out by accident. Chief of Staff Marras deemed that if hostilities were to break out the technical posture of the Italian army would be so weak, especially with

respect to positions on the terrain, that he opposed the decision and even tried to stall its implementation. Only a decisive intervention by Taviani convinced him to proceed. [28] The political and bureaucratic decision-makers, in fact, although aware that their actions might lead to an armed confrontation, were more willing than Marras to trade a certain amount of risk for the expected benefit of reacquiring Zone A. As Taviani put it in his journal on November 4, 1954: "Only this way, by means of, and thanks to that risky move, Trieste could come back to Italy ... That movement of troops, that risk of war was not an error. In any case, si error, felix error." Stress thus resulted from both uncertainty about the outcome of their gamble and their cognizance that the cost of the loss might also include involvement in military hostilities. When, on August 31, it became apparent that their decision had not created complications in the relations with the Allies and was not going to bring about anything more than a strong verbal reaction from Tito, the level of stress decreased. Pella, in fact, now felt he could leave for the brief vacation he had planned to take two days earlier. [29] Italian decision-makers' awareness of the possible implications of their actions for Yugoslavia and the type and amount of risk involved further permits qualifying their decision as "calculated." To conclude, the decision to move troops to the Yugoslav border was not a response to the alleged perceived threat of the Yugopress story but a deliberate and calculated initiative undertaken because of a perceived opportunity to attain a highly valued goal (the reacquisition of Zone A). Even more important, it was not the result of a faulty decision-making process but a highly rational one.

In conclusion, the Trieste case casts doubt, to an even greater extent than previous ICB vertical studies have done, on the universal validity of the hypothesis that stress seriously and adversely affects decision processes and outcomes. On the whole, the behavior of Italian decision-makers in the Trieste crisis was a calculated and rational one. Unquestionably, there were instances of faulty performance (cognitive rigidities, tendency to stereotype) but it is unlikely that they were

the results of crisis-induced stress since similar biases could be found also in their behavior before the crisis. Although measurements in this context should be attempted only cautiously, it does not seem too hazardous to affirm that the behavior of Italian decision-makers actually improved under stress. This finding does not contradict the conclusion offered by Holsti and George, namely that "moderate" levels of stress actually improve performance while "high" levels affect it negatively It might, in fact, very well be that stress in the Trieste crisis never reached more than a moderate level. It is not easy, however, to measure the precise, absolute as opposed to relative, level of stress (low, moderate, intense, high or extreme, as opposed to lower, rising, higher). The problem arises from the fact that the presence as well as changes in the level of stress, are tracked in an indirect way: relying on conclusions offered by the psychological literature, they are inferred from the presence and variation in the level of perceptions of threat, time constraints and probability of involvement in military hostilities. While the historical record certainly provides evidence of such perceptions (and therefore of the presence of stress), such evidence is fragmentary and impressionistic, as it were, rather than systematic and accurate. The data gleaned from the historical record in the case at hand generally support the ICB model assumption that crisis-induced stress rises as one moves from a noncrisis to a pre-crisis and then to a crisis phase, declines during the post-crisis phase and finally returns to "normal" levels as the crisis fades away. They do not permit, however, to identify the precise slope of the stress curve as truly experienced by decision-makers individually or as a group Thus, as already noted by Shlaim in the second of the in-depth, vertical ICB studies published thus far, [30] these findings permit the assessment of hypotheses concerning the impact of rising and declining stress on coping mechanisms but are less reliable when it comes to evaluate theoretical propositions related to specific levels of stress (e.g. moderate, intense, extreme, peak). If one assumes that the variable "average stress level" in a foreign policy crisis corresponds,

even if imperfectly, to the variable "severity" in an international crisis (it is after all plausible to expect that more severe crises should lead decision-makers to experience higher level of stress) one could at least compare crisis stress levels The findings concerning the impact of stress on decision-making (no disruptive and possibly beneficial effects) suggest that the Trieste crisis should rank, in terms of severity, lower or even considerably lower, than those examined in previous ICB studies. All of them, in fact, reported that stress had affected decision-making process, although not in a drastic or fundamental way. In the ICB scale of severity the Trieste crisis is measured at 2.89 (values range from 1 to 10) As expected the crises studied in the previous ICB vertical studies were in comparison much more severe: Israel 1967 (9.72), Israel 1973 (9 18), Prague Spring (6.77), Berlin Blockade (7.71), Lebanon-Iraq crisis (6 91), War of Attrition (5.70). It should also be pointed out that the value of 2.89 might actually be overstated because of how one of the indicators of severity, namely heterogeneity, is measured. Heterogeneity is measured by the number, not the intensity, of attribute differences among adversaries. The attributes are military capabilities, economic development, political regime and culture. In the Trieste case heterogeneity scores a 4 (highest value). This means that, everything else being equal, a crisis between Italy and Bulgaria would have had the same degree of intensity. This, however, does not take into consideration the rather important fact that in 1953 Yugoslavia was no longer in the Soviet block and, for all practical purposes, an ally of the West. This means that the degree of severity of 2 89 (which already makes the Trieste crisis one of the least severe in the ICB set) might be slightly overstated [31]

In conclusion, if severity could be taken to be even an approximate indicator of the absolute level of stress, then the findings from the Trieste crisis can be said to provide a strong degree of support for Holsti and George's "inverted-U curve" hypothesis about the effects of stress on decision-making performance

Crisis literature has usually confined its analysis of the impact of stress on decision-making to an examination of processes--that is, to the coping mechanisms adopted by, and the performance of decision-makers. Brecher, in his study of the 1967 and 1973 Israeli crises has attempted to discern whether changes in the level of crisis-induced stress are associated with distinctive patterns of choice. [32] The same analysis is done here with respect to the Trieste crisis. To this end, each decision made by Italian decision-makers during the five phases examined above will be dissected according to eight different dimensions:

> Core input. the crucial stimulus to each decision as perceived by the decision-makers
>
> Costs: the perceived magnitude of the loss(es) anticipated from the decision which was made--human (casualties), material (equipment, economic), political (alliance support, domestic legitimacy) and intangibles (morale, unity). These are coded as N (none), L (low), M (medium), H (high).
>
> Importance. the perceived importance of the decision at the time it was made. This is measured along a five-point ordinal scale. 5 (decisive), 4 (significant), 3 (important), 2 (consequential), 1 (marginal).
>
> Complexity. the number of issue-areas involved in the choice, namely, M-S (military-security), P-D (political-diplomatic), E-D (economic-developmental) and C-S (cultural-status)
>
> Systemic Domain: the perceived scope of reverberations of the decision, ranging from D (domestic), A (the Allies) B (bilateral), R (regional), S (Superpowers), G (global)--any one or all of which may constitute the domain.
>
> Process the cognitive procedure used to reach the decision. C (routine or cybernetic, that is following established procedures for response to similar challenges), A (cognitive, that is a procedure dominated by cognitive biases), R (rational, that is a procedure based upon a cost-benefit analysis).
>
> Activity· the thrust of the decision. A (to act), D (to delay), N (not to act) as well as the kind of activity, that is P (physical) or V (verbal).
>
> Novelty the presence or absence of innovation, in terms of reliance on precedent or past choices. Y (innovative), N (noninnovative)

Since the coding of these dimensions of choice requires, in most cases, a careful, but ultimately subjective assessment of the decision-makers' own perceptions of the situation, these findings have to be viewed with caution. Some dimensions of choice have not been coded either because information was insufficient for an accurate coding or serious doubts existed as to its interpretation.

In the Israeli cases Brecher reported that crisis-induced stress resulted in changes in the coping mechanisms adopted by Israeli decision-makers and had a slightly impairing influence on their performance. He also found that different stress phases exhibited different choice patterns with distinct content traits. In the Trieste case, very few changes in coping mechanisms occurred between the noncrisis and crisis periods and practically none between the different stress phases. At the same time, stress was not found to have any disruptive effect on the performance of decision-makers The expectation, therefore, is that no significant differences in choice patterns should emerge between different stress phases and few, if any, between the noncrisis and crisis periods. The findings are presented in table 3.

An analysis of this table reveals that, in the Trieste case at least, changes in crisis-induced stress were not, as a whole, associated with distinct patterns of choice Some dimensions of decisions, however, seem to be affected. The variety of core inputs, for instance, increases drastically in the rising stress phases Thus, eight different core inputs characterize decisions 9 through 16. Conversely, variety decreases again as stress begins to decline The same core input (U.S proposal) characterizes five of the six decisions in the declining stress phases (decisions 17 through 22) This same core input, moreover, prevails in the two noncrisis periods [33] These findings are exactly the same as those reported by Brecher in the Israeli cases.

With respect to the dimensions of costs and importance, Brecher found that as crisis-induced stress increased, decision-makers tended to

perceive decisions as more costly and more important. Conversely, as stress declined so did perceptions of costs and importance. The Trieste case, on the other hand, shows hardly any variation. Costs, with the exception of decisions 7 and 9, were on average perceived as low. Importance ranked for the most part at 3 (on a five-point ordinal scale) with a maximum of 4, again in the case of decisions 7 and 9.

With regard to complexity, Brecher found that as crisis-induced stress rises, the complexity of issue-areas involved also steadily rises. The peak is then reached in the declining stress phase. Table 3, on the other hand, shows only a very modest increase in the rising stress phase.

In the Trieste case the only significant change in systemic-domain occurs during the transition from the noncrisis to the pre-crisis period when the perceived scope of reverberations of decisions expands from the "domestic" and the "Allies," which prevail throughout all the phases, to include the "bilateral" (Yugoslavia). In the Israeli cases, instead, systemic-domain narrowed as stress increased to expand again in the declining stress phases.

With respect to process, both in the Israeli and Trieste cases there is an overwhelming reliance on rational decision-making. Only decision 16 (to send a strong protest to the Allies), seems to have been the result of an affective process. This decision was the only one made by Pella without the consultation of his diplomatic advisors.

The Trieste case shows a marked preference for decisions to act. The only exception is represented by De Gasperi's preference to delay decision on the American plans for partition in early 1953 (decision 5, 6 and 7) in the hope of obtaining a better deal Activity remained primarily verbal throughout the crisis. As stress rose, however, activity moved also to physical In the Israeli case, instead, decline in stress was associated with a sharp increase in decisions to delay or not to act.

Finally, in the Trieste case, decisions without a precedent were rare. The only instances occurred in the rising stress phases In the

Israeli cases, on the other hand, they seem to have been more frequent and have peaked in the high and declining stress phases

In conclusion, table 3 does not show that different levels of stress are associated with distinct choice patterns This, however, does not represent a refutation of the principal hypothesis advanced by the ICB model, namely that crisis-induced stress, through the mediation of coping mechanisms and general cognitive performance, has an impact on the nature of choices. On the contrary, noticeable changes in some traits of the decisions (most notably, core inputs, complexity, systemic-domain and, to a less extent, activity) especially between noncrisis and crisis periods, support the hypothesis and demonstrate the validity of the model. This is particularly true as the level of stress in the Trieste crisis does not seem to have reached more than a very moderate level. On the other hand, the effects of stress on the traits of the decisions were, in some cases, different from those reported by Brecher in the case of Israel. These differences, however, are most likely a result of the individual characteristics of the crisis and of the crisis-actor.

Threat, Opportunity and Crisis: an addendum to the ICB model.

The fact that the Italian decision to move troops (the first decision in the Trieste crisis) contrary to what the ICB model would expect, was not a response to the alleged threat of the Yugopress story but a deliberate and calculated initiative undertaken because of a perceived opportunity to attain a highly valued goal, has at least two theoretical implications The first concerns the notion of stress The ICB model links trigger, crisis components and stress in a causal,

sequential manner The Trieste case shows, however, that time pressure and probability of involvement in military hostilities were related to variables other than the trigger: the decision-makers' goal and the action chosen for its attainment This means that stress, besides being trigger-induced (i.e , deriving from an environmental event or stimulus), can also be opportunity-induced (i e., resulting from the perception that a particular situation represents a propitious occasion to take some risky initiative toward the attainment of a high-priority goal). "Risky" refers here to the decision-makers' awareness that their action, if unsuccessful, entails a high probability of involvement in military hostilities. A crisis stress curve can thus move in a less regular and, therefore, predictable manner than the ICB model assumes. The impact of opportunity-induced stress, which--analytically, at least--should be kept distinct from trigger-induced stress, can in fact make the level of stress increase suddenly within each of the three crisis periods and the curve peak within any of them. This has obvious implications for the study of the impact of stress on decision-making as comparison of crisis periods may not necessarily reflect different levels of stress. Hence, also the necessity to compare behavior with noncrisis phases.

The second theoretical implication is the following a disproportion between external stimulus (trigger) and its ostensibly consequent response (decision), in the absence of a significant level of stress or other potentially disruptive influences on the decision-making process, suggests that the stimulus does not represent the core input into the decision. Such an input is to be found instead in the anticipated impact of the decision on the environment. The trigger, as perfectly exemplified in the Trieste case by Taviani's remark quoted above, simply provides a pretext for the decision, its covering facade. In these cases, instead of "response" the decision should really be categorized as "initiative."

As already pointed out by Zeev Maoz, both the systemic and situational approachs to the study of crises characteristically omit the

initiation factor. The major consequence of this omission in the case of the systemic approach is that the distortion in the type and increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions in the international system seem to come out of nowhere They just happen [34] In the case of the situational approach, this omission leads to what could be defined as the defender's bias. The conceptual framework used, in other words, casts each crisis actor in the role of respondent It is as if in a game of tennis the point on the court where one player sends the ball was seen as always determined by the previous stroke of his adversary and not also by the skill and intent of the player himself. To express this in phenomenological terms, decision-makers are regarded as acting primarily upon "because of," as opposed to "in order to," motives. To be sure, in a crisis both actors will, in their public utterances, always cast themselves in the role of defenders and explain their actions as necessary to meet or preempt some perceived threatening move or intention on the part of their adversary. These attempts at shifting the blame for initiating the crisis can, at times, reach preposterous levels--as when, in the Trieste case, Italian Chargé in Washington Luciolli argued with some State Department officials that "it was evident that the Yugoslavs had had something in mind Whether it was annexation or not, one could not be sure, but in any case, as a result of the Italian response, they had not done whatever they had in mind." [35] Crisis researchers, however, should try to assess whether the purported threat perception can be considered accurate (in which case the adversary is the initiator, either out of some unintended, miscalculated action or because of a deliberate initiative) or has instead to be regarded as suspect (in which case the actor under consideration is the initiator, either due to misperception or as a result of a deliberate initiative). They must then try to establish which of these two other alternatives fits available evidence better. The three Allied diplomatic representatives in Rome, for instance, followed this same procedure immediately after their meeting with Pella: they judged the Yugopress statement to be "not as categoric regarding

annexation as Pella and [the] Italian press [had] inferred" and concluded that the Italians might be "trying to build up [a] series [of] press rumours to lay [the] groundwork [for the Allies] accepting and trying [to] put over [the] so-called 'provisional' solution." In the same way, the French Foreign Office concluded that the Italian action was due primarily "to Pella's desire to impress certain views upon the Allies using any plausible excuse." [36]

What may be required to redress the current imbalance is a slight modification of the definition of crisis adopted by the ICB model. A new definition could be the following:

> A foreign policy crisis is a situation with the following necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in a state's external or internal environment. All are perceptions held by the highest level decision-makers of the actor concerned a threat to basic values and/or an opportunity for a risky initiative toward the attainment of a high-priority goal, along with the awareness of finite time for action (whether a response to the external value threat or an initiative toward the attainment of a high-priority goal), and a high probability of involvement in military hostilities. [37]

Contrary to the notion of response to a perceived threat, which carries with it the connotation of necessity, the notion of risky initiative raises the question of what conditions are more likely to push decision-makers to accept a trade-off between the fear of involvement in military hostilities and the benefits of a favorable outcome. The hypotheses could be advanced that the willingness to accept such a trade-off is directly proportional to: (1) the value decision-makers attach to the goal; (2) their level of frustration, where frustration is defined as a discrepancy between their goals and their achievements (which could be measured in terms of the centrality of the value attached to the goal, the length of time during which it has been sought, the amount of resources spent in its pursuit and the limitedness of the results achieved) and (3) the intensity of the perception that (a) the adversary will back down; (b) the initiative is necessary to harness the decisive help of a powerful ally who will ensure a favorable outcome or, at least, avoid total defeat and (c) an armed confrontation, should one erupt, can be easily and swiftly won. It should also be noted that in an "opportunity crisis," time pressure (understood as the

perception that unless some kind of initiative toward the attainment of a high-priority goal is taken soon, the goal will be lost) is present, even if at a moderate level, before the crisis begins. In the Trieste case, Italian decision-makers became aware of the salience of time already in mid-1951 Such an awareness increased with the perception that international political conditions for the reacquisition of Trieste were deteriorating until it led to the risky initiative of August 29, 1953 and the consequent crisis. The threat, on the other hand, is represented by the perception that unless a risky initiative is taken the goal might be lost forever.

The independent variable in the "revised" ICB model would still be perception of crisis. Following the new definition, however, this would now include the decision-makers' images of threat and/or opportunity, along with time pressure and high probability of involvement in military hostilities. The intervening variable would remain coping the mechanisms used by decision-makers to respond to the threat or take advantage of the opportunity The dependent variable would still be choice; that is, decision. Finally, the model would continue to be concerned with the impact of changing stress on coping and choice. The suggested revisions would entail, however, a number of advantages: (1) a better tracking of the stress curve would be permitted; (2) the model could more easily unravel the behavior of actors, such as Italy in the Trieste case, whose alleged perception of threat is more a pretext than a reason for action and (3) the model could also be applied to actors whose actions, although not resulting from the necessity of responding to a perceived threat, precipitate a foreign policy crisis for others and, eventually, also for themselves The most obvious case is that of Germany in a number of European crises between 1936 and 1939. All of these were precipitated by German actions. Because their initial action was not determined by a perception of threat, however, the ICB Project either does not regard Germany as a crisis actor at all (e. g , in the crisis over the re-militarization of Rhineland, the Munich crisis, the Czech annexation crisis, the Memel crisis and the Danzig crisis) or

assumes a foreign policy crisis for Germany to have started only when Hitler's initial challenge was met with resistance (e. g., the Anschluss crisis, where a foreign policy crisis for Germany is said to start on March 9 when Hitler was informed of Austria' plans to hold a plebiscite) The important aspect of this revision would be that those decisions which precipitate (international and foreign policy) crises also would be included in the study of decision-making in crisis. This would seem to be of paramount importance in the pursuit of a general theory of international crisis. [38]

Conclusions

This study has applied a model of state behavior in international crisis to one actor, Italy, in the 1953 Trieste crisis. At the historical level it has reconstructed in detail, through previously unavailable archival documents, the flow of events from mid-1951 until the so-called Memorandum of Understanding of October 5, 1954, which solved the Trieste question. At the theoretical level, it has sought to determine the impact of crisis-induced stress on the coping processes and choice patterns of Italian decision-makers. The comparison of coping processes and choice patterns between noncrisis and crisis periods shows that stress had only a very moderate influence. This influence, moreover, seems to have been a beneficial one, that is it improved, rather than impairing, the performance of decision-makers. The increase in the felt need for information led to a greater search which did not become more random or less productive. Information processing continued to be attentive and did not manifest a larger variety or a higher incidence of cognitive biases. The consultative

circle expanded and meetings became more frequent Consultative activity became more significant (or less perfunctory) than in noncrisis periods. Decision groups did not become smaller and stress did not induce greater group cohesion Differences of opinion continued to be expressed freely and decisional authority did not become more centralized. On the contrary, there was increased reliance on group decision-making. Search for alternatives was extensive and consequences were thoroughly and carefully evaluated In sum, far from being impaired by emotional or psychological predispositions, Italian decision-makers manifested a higher awareness during the crisis They responded more promptly to the changing environment, devised more creative courses of action and, last but not least, integrated different value dimensions more effectively

The little difference found between noncrisis and crisis behavior suggests that the level of crisis-induced stress, which cannot be measured in absolute terms, was moderate. The absence of major variations in coping processes and choice traits between crisis phases further suggests that the level of stress, whatever its absolute value might have been, varied only slightly If these two statements could be confirmed independently of the model, then the findings of this study would provide a strong degree of support for the major hypothesis about the stress-performance nexus advanced thus far, namely that "moderate" levels of stress improve decision-making performance while "high" levels impair it.

It has been suggested that "average stress level" in a foreign policy crisis might correspond to the variable "severity" in an international crisis. If this were true, then the Trieste crisis should rank lower, in terms of severity, than the crises examined in previous ICB vertical studies, since all of these reported slightly higher and mildly impairing effects of stress on performance A comparison of the values of severity of all the crises in the ICB data set does confirm that Trieste ranks considerably lower than these crises It is, in fact, near the very bottom of the whole set. The possibility that a

correspondence might indeed exist between "average stress level" and "severity" deserves further research. The establishment of this linkage between the intra-unit and systemic levels of analysis on more solid theoretical grounds would, in fact, help provide at least an approximate indication of the specific level of stress.

Finally, this study has suggested an addition to the definition of foreign policy crisis adopted by the ICB model. The revised definition states that a foreign policy crisis can also be triggered by the state's decision-makers themselves when they take a risky (that is, heightening the probability of involvement in military hostilities) initiative toward the attainment of a high-priority goal. In this case, the threat to basic values is represented by the perception that unless the risky initiative is taken, there will be little or no time left for the attainment of the goal.

The historical events examined in this study are nearly forty years old. As these line are being written, however, all over Eastern Europe equilibria and frontiers which emerged at the end of World War II are being called into question and, in some cases, crumbling down. Yugoslavia, in particular, is undergoing a bloody process of disintegration. Will this provide a temptation for Italy to revive its claims to Zone B and even beyond? Does the question of Trieste risk to become topical again? The answer appears to be a decisive no. The refugees from Zone B and the areas lost by Italy at the Peace Treaty would be the only ones willing to organize a movement for the support of such a claim. They are, however, scattered around the world. Political parties (with the exception of the increasingly weaker neo-Fascists) would, in any case, be highly unlikely to support any such movement, let alone encourage its formation. At a time when the economic unification of Europe looms ahead, the political one is hotly debated and new, regionally based, political forces, pursuing regional aims, are on the rise, no great political gains can be expected from the revival of nationalist crusades in Italy Thus, the reconstitution of a greater Venezia-Giulia will have to wait until a new Europe of regions sees the

light.

Notes to Chapter 8.

1. Holsti and George, loc. cit., pp. 277-281.

2. The testing of hypotheses in previous ICB studies is a little confusing. Brecher first tested all the hypotheses about stress and cognitive performance and coping mechanisms advanced by Holsti and George. Then, in a subsequent section, he tested other hypotheses about crisis behaviour derived from other crisis as well as experimental psychology and organizational research studies. Some of these, although phrased differently, were similar to those advanced by Holsti and George. Hence, they perhaps did not require a separate testing. Others were not phrased in the language of hypotheses (i.e. did not express a relationship between two variables) but were presented more as findings (e.g. "in crisis decision-making becomes increasingly centralized" as opposed to "the higher the stress, the more centralized decision-making becomes"). Finally, in a third section, Brecher advanced some new hypotheses based on his findings of Israel's behaviour in the 1967 and 1973 crises. Dowty replicated Brecher's format although he merged the three sections into one. Shlaim and Dawisha, on the other hand, focussed only on the main hypotheses advanced by Holsti and George (Brecher's first section). This study takes into consideration most of these hypotheses. It eliminates, however, those which, although phrased differently, were mere replicas of others. It also occasionally modifies the language in which the hypotheses were originally phrased so as to maintain consistency and avoid confusion. The original formulation is reported in note. Finally, rather than testing separate hypotheses about decision-making in the three different crisis periods--as Dowty does--this study tests a single hypothesis across the three periods as well as under noncrisis conditions.

3. Brecher, op. cit., (1980), p. 375. These hypotheses were originally formulated by Paige, op. cit., p. 292; Holsti, loc. cit. and Hermann, loc. cit. (both in Hermann, ed., op. cit., pp. 75 and 202-204) and March and Simon, op. cit., p. 116. Hypotheses 1 and 5 were originally formulated as "The greater the crisis, the greater ". This has been changed to "The higher the stress, the greater " in order to make it clear that one is comparing felt need and consequent quest for information and direction of the information within the organizational pyramid across different crisis periods and not among different crisis cases. Hypothesis 3 was originally formulated as "In crises, the rate of communication by a nation's decision-makers to international actors outside their country will increase." It seems clear that Hermann meant to compare "in crises" with "noncrises" or "stressless situations," hence, the hypothesis can be rephrased, for reasons

of clarity, as it now stands

4. Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8 are reported here as phrased in K. Dawisha, op. cit., p 356 Hypothesis 9 is in Brecher, op cit (1980), p. 375 It was originally advanced by I L Janis, op cit , pp 4-5. Hypothesis 10 is in Dowty, op cit , p 347 He formulated it as "The more intense the crisis, the less the influence " Brecher also tested a hypothesis originally advanced by Paige (loc. cit., p 52), which states that 'The longer the decision time (in a crisis), the greater the consultation with persons outside the core decisional unit " Since Brecher stated that "decision time .. may be equated with our notion of crisis-induced stress" (p 376), this hypothesis is but a different formulation of hypothesis 6 For this reason it has not been included here

5. Such consultation, however, was more technical than political What was sought from him, in other words, were technical estimates necessary to the implementation of certain decisions under consideration and not his opinion about them, which Marras nevertheless also offered

6. It should be noted that the number of persons and groups consulted and the frequency of the consultations correlate also with the type of decisions and their domestic political significance More precisely, the more strategic--as opposed to tactical or implementing--the nature of decisions to be made, and the greater their perceived domestic political significance, the higher the number of persons and groups which are likely to be consulted and the frequency of such consultations The increase in consultative activity appears, in other words, to be the result of a more active search for options and of the effort to master political support for the choice once selected In the Trieste case the number of consultative meetings as well as the number of participants in the consultative units was high also immediately before the making of decisions 6 and 7 Although made during the prelude to the crisis period, both decisions were strategic and were perceived by De Gasperi as having great domestic political significance in view of the forthcoming elections Consultative activity was high also during the postlude to the crisis period. Decision 23 was strategic. Decision 24 (acceptance of one of the two alternative territorial solutions) although not strategic, was to be formally accepted by Cabinet and, indirectly at least, approved by Parliament, hence the need to build political support for it. It should be noted in this context that the passage from the pre-crisis to the crisis and from the crisis to the post-crisis periods are almost always characterized by strategic decisions having considerable political significance for the domestic environment as well.

7 K. Dawisha, op. cit , p 360.

8. Hypotheses 11 is in Brecher (op. cit., 1980, pp 354 and 377). It was originally advanced by Holsti and George (loc cit , pp 286-290) It should be noted that it also subsumes the hypothesis originally advanced by Lentner (loc cit , p 130), which Brecher, however, tests separately (op cit., 1980, p 377), namely, "in crises, decision-making becomes increasingly centralized " Hypothesis 12 is reported here as phrased in K Dawisha (op cit , p. 360). It was originally advanced by Paige (op cit , p 281) Hypothesis 13 combines two separate, but very similar, hypotheses reported by Brecher (op cit , 1980, pp 354, 358 and 376) They were originally advanced by Holsti and George (loc cit , pp 286-290) and, in a slightly different form, by Paige (op cit , p 289 and loc cit , p 52) Hypothesis 14 groups three hypotheses reported separately by Brecher (op cit , p 376) and

originally advanced by Paige, (loc.. cit., p. 52), Lentner (loc. cit., p. 133) and Shapiro and Gilbert (op. cit , pp. 55-56).

9. Brecher, Wilkenfeld et al., op cit., vol. II, p 205

10. Hypothesis 15 is in Brecher (op cit , 1980, p 360). Hypotheses 16 and 17 were originally formulated by Holsti and George (loc. cit , pp 280, 291). In Dowty (op cit., p. 349) the relationship between stress and search is formulated and tested in reverse, namely: 'As crisis-induced stress rises, the search for alternatives tends to increase "

11. Brecher, op. cit., (1980), p 360.

12. ibid , p 377, originally advanced by Shapiro and Gilbert, op. cit , p 83.

13. This emphasis on action under crisis conditions seems also confirmed by a hypothesis reported by Dowty (op. cit., p. 349), namely "The more intense the crisis [or, as stress increases], the more likely that decision-makers will be forced [or will feel forced] to make a clear choice rather than postponing choices or drifting into policy."

14. Reported in Brecher, op. cit., (1980), p. 377.

15. This statement--which can only improperly be called a hypothesis--is made by both Robinson and Simon and is reported in Brecher, (op. cit , 1980, p. 377). Since in the Trieste case stress, although fluctuating according to the ICB model, never seems to have reached what could be considered very intense levels, this finding would seem to confirm at least the first part of a revision of hypotheses 16 and 17 advanced by Shapiro and Gilbert and Holsti and George (reported in Brecher, op. cit., 1980, p. 377), namely: "The relationship between stress and group performance in the consideration of alternatives is curvilinear (an inverted U)--more careful as stress rises to a moderate level, less careful as stress becomes intense."

16. Brecher, op. cit , (1980), p. 343; K Dawisha, op cit., pp. 341-342, Shlaim, op. cit., p. 405. These three authors examine the impact of stress on the performance of decision-makers under the heading "Psychological Environment for Crisis Behavior." Dowty, op. cit., p. 345. It should be noted that these studies (especially the one by Dowty) do not explore in a clear and systematic way the connection between coping mechanisms and the general performance of decision-makers. They treat coping mechanisms exclusively as a dependent variable and not also as an intervening variable which mediates the impact of stress on decision-making. Thus, it is not clear whether the biases which are occasionally found to characterize decision-making in crisis are the result of certain changes in coping mechanisms (e g. greater conceptual rigidity being due to greater amounts of information to be processed, groupthink resulting from face-to-face proximity of decision-makers, etc.), or can occur as a direct result of stress independently of any change in coping mechanisms

17. Theories of analytic decision-making regard behaviour which does not maximize overall utility as faulty Currently, there is an attempt to move away from such a universal model and try to construct "contextual" theories of decision-making, that is theories which give more weight to the specificities of the context in which decisions are made Thus, for a political decision-maker the best possible solution of the problems at hand is not necessarily that which maximizes overall utility but that

which enables him to continue in power. Political decisions, in other words, maximize "acceptability" (see Barbara Farnham, "Political Cognition and Decision-Making," Political Psychology, 11, 1, March 1980, pp. 83-111). From this point of view, De Gasperi's choice not to address the Trieste problem rather than adopting the "provisional solution" which he regarded as "political suicide" was "politically rational." This "political model" would also regard Italian acceptance of the "parallel talks" (which were a backdown for Pella) as having been greatly facilitated, if not made possible, by the fact that his government had already fallen.

18. Sterpellone, loc. cit., p. 303. On the concept of "matching behavior" see Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises, 1929-1985," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35, 1 (March 1991), pp. 143-169.

19. A model, it should be remembered, is a theoretical and simplified representation of the real world. By itself, it is not an explanatory device but simply an isomorphic construction of reality or, better, anticipated reality. Because it posits relationships among variables, however, its application to concrete cases tends to promote certain hypotheses and to make investigators more alert to supporting (as opposed to disconfirming or puzzling) pieces of evidence. Hypotheses might thus hurriedly be corroborated which do not give the best possible account of all the data. This danger is particularly high in so-called "horizontal studies." Data are, in fact, collected without in-depth probing and their meaning in the specific context of action of the cases from which they are extracted may well be different from the one assigned by the investigator. The tension between "horizontal" and "vertical" studies (or quantitative and quantitative research, if one prefers) is not an easy one to solve. The former allows the formulation and testing of more lawlike generalizations. The risk, however, is that these might be based on invalid or approximative data since the amount of time spent on collecting and interpreting the data for one case in a set containing dozens or even hundreds of them cannot usually be the same as that spent on a single, in-depth case study. Recently, for instance, Lebow, Stein and a number of their students attempted to replicate the data collected by Huth and Russett on fifty-four cases of "extended deterrence" through a more in-depth look at each of those cases. The result was that, according to them, only nine cases out of the fifty-four could be regarded as genuine instances of extended deterrence (cf. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics 42, 3, April 1990, pp. 336-339 with Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," ibid. 36, 4, July 1984, pp. 496-526). Under these circumstances, Huth and Russett's hypotheses about what makes deterrence work are open to criticism (see, however, their reply to Lebow and Stein, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," ibid., 42, 4, July 1990, pp. 466-501). Besides its emphasis on cooperative research (hence, a great deal of time spent on the original collection of data) the ICB project has attempted to resolve this tension by testing the validity of, and revising, whenever necessary, the initial data set through vertical, in-depth case studies.

20. New York Times, Sept. 2, 1953. Another hypothesis which could, however, be largely subsumed within the one provided by the ICB model is that Italian decision-makers' perception that Tito's assurance and daring had increased led to excessive vigilance and was responsible for their exaggerated and aggressive response.

21 Given the absence of any hard proof of Yugoslav intentions, perception of threat itself could indeed be seen as having been a "misperception" i e the result of a faulty process of inference, involving the interpretation of weak, ambiguous and circumstantial evidence, in which the negative predisposition of Italian decision-makers vis-à-vis Yugoslavia played a dominant role. In his conversation with the Allied diplomatic representatives on the morning of August 29, Pella, in fact, boosted evidence supporting the threat that Yugoslavia might annex Zone B while discounting or ignoring any indication to the contrary He pointed to some recent harsh articles in the Yugoslav press, for instance, although they did not represent, as Tarchiani also recognized in his memoir, any new departure in Yugoslav behavior. In the past, harsh articles had repeatedly appeared as a reaction to what was perceived in Belgrade as unabashed Italian expansionism and Allied complaisance to it He argued that the story was undoubtedly a trial balloon launched from Belgrade to test his government's resolve, yet, at the same time, recognized that it was only "an unconfirmed press report " He mentioned that military maneuvers were scheduled to take place in the proximity of Zone B but disregarded the fact that Allied and Italian representatives had been invited to attend. If one assumes that the arguments used by Pella truly reflected the process of inference used to establish the existence of a threat, one would have to conclude that cognitive flaws led him to regard Yugoslav annexation of Zone B, a mere possibility, as a serious probability--to the point of saying that he expected Tito to announce it on September 6 in his speech at Okroglica. Luce to Dept. 699, 750G.00/8-2953; Dulles to Rome 741, 750G 00/8-2953.

22. Taviani UJ, entry of Aug. 28, 1953; De Castro, op. cit., pp. 535 and 537

23. Pella's mood during his meeting with the Allied diplomats is reported by the New York Times and Corriere della Sera, Aug. 30, 1953.

24. Tarchiani's report of July 19 is partly quoted in his memoir (op. cit., p. 282) and, more extensively, in De Castro (op. cit , p. 517). It was written immediately after the Americans made public their decision to resume talks on joint military planning with the Yugoslavs in Washington.

25. Taviani, UJ, entry of Aug. 29. 1953. Italian apprehensions about Yugoslav intentions seemed to be confirmed by a new UP story written again by Helen Fisher. On the morning of August 29, while still unaware of the impact of her first story in Italy, she was asked by the UP bureau in London for a follow-up story on the Yugoslav attitude on Trieste. Again she tried to consult with Yugoslav officials and again she was unsuccessful. She then filed a story containing only speculations. She wrote that Tito's "new and sharper stand" on Trieste might be announced at his forthcoming speech at Okroglica; that "it was believed" Tito would warn the Italians that, unless they made some efforts to solve the problem bilaterally, Yugoslavia would "act alone to remove the territory from international wrangling" and that the Yugopress story of the previous day had been released "as an obvious trial ballon to test foreign relations in advance" (Wallner to Dept. D-239, 750G 00/9-2353). This second story did not contribute, however, to the making of decision 9 as, by the time it was released in Italy, the military measures had already been adopted. The story was simply used to back up the arguments about the existence of threatening Yugoslav intentions.

26. Tarchiani, op cit , p 322 Corriere della Sera put it even more clearly following the October 8 declaration, when Pella's decision

appeared to have achieved the purpose for which was intended "[Pella] dared to make the dramatic gesture which served to take the question of Trieste out of the dead end in which it had languished for years and convince the Allies how necessary and urgent it was to find a solution It was a gesture not only dramatic but also full of risks Pella risked besides his political position, Italian dignity and maybe even peace" (Oct 9-10, 1953). For an elaboration of the point that the Italian measures made little military sense if meant to counter a possible Yugoslav annexation of Zone B, see Enrico Mattei, Gli aspetti 'tecnici' del problema triestino," Tempo 15, 37 (Sept 10, 1953), p 7. Taviani himself later honestly admitted, in a conversation with an American diplomatic official in Rome, that Italian troops had been moved to Montalcone to have them ready to occupy Zone A (Williamson to Dept D-598, 750G.00/9-753) If this was the major threat perceived by Italian decision-makers, then Pella's perception of threat, as revealed in his conversation with the Allied diplomats (see footnote 21 above), cannot be regarded as the result of a faulty process of inference caused by the negative predisposition of Italian decision-makers vis-à-vis their Yugoslav counterparts but an exercise in ex post facto rationalization aided, perhaps, by a different type of cognitive bias the tendency to adjust one's beliefs so as to justify conduct already engaged in. He, in other words, more or less consciously favored an interpretation of available information which provided a plausible cover for the course of action he and his advisors had embarked on in the effort to reacquire Zone A

27. Luce to Dept 718, 750G.00/8-3153, De Castro, op cit , p 541 Excerpts of the text of the telegram are in ibid , pp 528 529 Corriere della Sera, Sept. 1-2, 1953 and New York Times, Aug 30, 1953.

28. Taviani, UJ, entries of Aug. 29, Sept 11, and Oct. 12, 14 ,20 and 22, 1953. On time pressure see the entries of Sept 2 and 14, 1953. On Marras' hesitations see also Savorgnan di Brazza, op cit., p. 146 The increase in stress connected with decision 9 can also be explained through what Janis and Mann call "decisional conflict," that is the simultaneous opposing tendency within a decision-maker (or a group of decision-makers) to accept and reject a given course of action. Such a conflict is particularly acute (and the resulting stress severe) when decision-makers are aware of the risks of suffering losses from whatever course of action they select. In the case at hand, not to move troops meant losing an opportunity to make what could be an important step toward the reacquisition of Zone A; to move them meant to incur the risk of becoming involved in military hostilities (Janis and Mann, op. cit , p 46)

29. Taviani, UJ, entry of Nov. 4, 1954. An element of uncertainty concerning the outcome of decisions obviously always exists What is argued here is that this uncertainty, and consequently the stress induced by it, is directly proportional to the perceived risk. Such a subjective evaluation of risk could be measured in terms of the perceived importance, costs and scope of reverberations of the action contemplated In the case at hand, the decision to move troops was perceived as very important both with respect to goal attainment (particularly in light of the perceived finite time for action) and because it represented an escalation Its costs were regarded as high both militarily (danger of war) and politically (disruptions in the relations with the Allies) The scope of the decision's reverberations was also large, ranging from the domestic political scene to relations with Yugoslavia and the Allies, with the danger that some ripples might be felt also in relations between the two Superpowers To manage the risk, Italian decision-makers avoided giving excessive

resonance to their measures, at least as long as there was still uncertainty about Yugoslav reaction (e. g. the press release issued after the meeting referred to them cryptically as "technical aspects") and strict orders were issued to the troops to minimize the danger of fortuitous incidents at the border.

30 Shlaim, op cit , pp. 403-404.

31. Brecher, Wilkenfeld et al., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 119-141.

32. Brecher, op cit (1980), pp. 379-397.

33 This, as well as the omnipresence of the entry "the Allies" in the dimension "systemic domain" indicates, as already shown by the decision-flow, the crucial role played by the U.S. both before, during and after the crisis

34 Zeev Maoz, "Crisis Initiation: a theoretical exploration of a neglected topic in international crisis theory," Review of International Studies 8, 1982, pp. 215-232. See also his Paths to Conflict: Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1982

35. MC Luciolli, Byington, W.E. Knight, 750G.00/9-953. The pro-government press, for its part, argued that the decisive and energetic action of Pella's government had successfully blocked Belgrade's "coup de main" and obliged the Yugoslavs "to eat their words." Luce to Dept 719, 750G.00/8-3153 and Cope (Office of USPolAd) to Dept 173 (Aug. 30, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File 1. See also the articles "Gli avvenimenti in Italia" and "Per una giusta soluzione" in the official publication Esteri (4, 17, Sept. 15, 1953, p 5 and 4, 20, Oct. 31, 1953, pp. 1-2) which make the same argument.

36. Luce to Dept. 700, 750G.00/8-2953; Dillon to Dept. 833, 750G.00/8-3153.

37. Linda P. Brady was the first (to my knowledge at least) to advocate that a crisis be defined as a "threat-opportunity" situation. For her, however, opportunity was not a perceptual variable which could explain decision-makers' activity but an objective trait of the situation. Thus she argued, almost normatively, that in a crisis the best leaders could "focus their attention, talents and energies on a common problem, ... review critically established national goals and policies ...[and] inspire [their] staff to transcend parochial biases in favor of a broader organizational or national perspective" (Threat, Decision Time and Awareness. The Impact of Situational Variables on Foreign Policy Behavior, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Ohio State Univ., 1974). Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan and John A. Kringen, for their part, have pointed out that from the Chinese point of view at least, crise "provide opportunities to advance one's interest as well as stress and dangers" (op. cit., p. 58).

38. See Brecher, Wilkenfeld et al., op. cit., I, pp. 156-157, 163 and 165-170. At the moment such decisions are taken into consideration but only as triggers for the foreign policy crises of the actors. They are not dissected like other foreign policy crisis decisions

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3) The Question of Trieste

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a) National Archives, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

Record Group 84
Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State

Records of the U.S Political Advisor to the Commander of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste,
General Records
Box 17, Fil 322

Trieste-Italy, 1948-54
Box 1 through 6

Rome Embassy and Consulates, 1948:
Box 226, File 800 (Trieste);
Box 29 (Confidential Files), File 800 (Trieste),
Box 32 (Confidential Files), File 800 (Trieste).

Rome-Italy, 1953-55
Box 1, File 250-350 (Trieste),
350 (Trieste unclassified 1953-54);
320-1 (Classified file: military facilities)

Belgrade Legation and Embassy
General Records 1951-53
Box 179, File 350,
Box 181, File 350,
Top Secret General Records, 1945-53:
Box 5, File (January-March 1953),
Box 6, File (April-December 1953).

b) National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, Washington D.C.:

Record Group 59
Records of the Department of State
Central Decimal File

All documents starting with numbers 765 (Italy) and 750G (FTT) from 1948 to 1954.

c) Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.:

Private Papers Collections:
John Foster Dulles

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Livingston T. Merchant
James W. Riddleberger
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d) Interviews and Unpublished Material:

Interview with Paolo E. Taviani, Montreal, Sept. 16, 1988
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Fig. 1



Model of International Crisis Behaviour

Fig. 2



A Three-Period Model of International Crisis Behaviour

Fig. 3



_____ Territory to be assigned to Italy according to the London Pact also claimed by the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

------ Wilson Line

Fig. 4



Territory assigned to Italy at the Treaty of Rapallo (1920)

Fig. 5

0 5 10 15 20 25
miles
AUSTRIA
Villach
Klagenfurt
Tarvisio
KANAL VALLEY
VENETIAN SLOVENIA
Soča
Isonzo
Kobarid
Tolmin
YUGOSLAVIA
ITALY
Udine
Ljubljana
Idrija
Gorizia
Gradisca
Ajdovščina
Vipava
SLOVENIA
Monfalcone
Duino
Postojna
Trieste
St. Peter
Koper
Piran
CROATIA
Buje
ISTRIA
Novigrad
Opatija
Rijeka
Pazin
QUARNERO
ADRIATIC
SEA
Pula
Julian Region
Boundary proposals 1946
Austro-Italian boundary 1866-1918
Italo-Yugoslav border 1924
Austrian border 1920
Morgan line
American proposal
British proposal
French proposal
Russian proposal
Italian offer
Yugoslav claims

Fig. 6


0 5 10 15 20 25
miles
AUSTRIA
Villach
Klagenfurt
Tarvisio
KANAL VALLEY
ITALY
VENETIAN SLOVENIA
YUGOSLAVIA
Udine
SLOVENIA
Gorizia
Gradisca
Monfalcone
Trieste
Koper
Piran
Umag
CROATIA
ISTRIA
Rijeka
ADRIATIC SEA
QUARNERO
Pula
Zone A of Julian Region
Zone B of Julian Region
Zone A of Free Territory of Trieste (FTT)
Zone B of Free Territory of Trieste (FTT)
Julian Region 1945-1947
Austro-Italian boundary 1866-1918
Austrian border 1920
Italo-Yugoslav border 1924
Italo-Yugoslav border 1947
Italo-Yugoslav border since 1954
Boundary of Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) 1947-1954
Morgan line
Slovenian-Croat boundary

Fig. 7



----- The so-called "continuous ethnic line".

Fig. 8


Monfalcone
Duino
Golfo di Panzano
Aurisina
Sgonico
Sesana
Poggioreale
Gropada
TRIESTE
Muggia
Capodistria
Isola d'Istria
Pirano
Punta Salvore
F. Dragogna
Umago
F. Quieto
Cittanova
Part of Zone A to be transferred to Yugoslavia (Acheson Plan)
Part of Zone B to be transferred to Italy (Acheson Plan)
Additional part of Zone B to be transferred to Italy (Dulles' Plan)

Fig. 9



Zonal border area showing:

1) Valle di Zaule, proposed port area (Bebler-Guidotti talks)
2) St. Caterina, alternative location offered by De Gasperi.
3) the lines (as traced on the map now in the American archives) of the May and September 1954 agreements.

Fig. 12

THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE

Area D indicates the part of Zone A to be transferred to Yugoslavia according to the Allied-Yugoslav agreement of May 1954.

Area C indicates the part of Zone B to be transferred to Italy according to the same agreement.

Fig. 11


TRIESTE
Punta Sottile
Muggia
S Dorligo
Lazzaretto
1954 border
Zonal border
FTT-Yugoslav border
First Alternative: area to go to Italy in zone A and B
Second Alternative: area to go to Italy only in zone A