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The Sun Also Rises and the Production of Meaning

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Abstract

A survey of the criticism on Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises reveals a broad diversity of methods and approaches. Yet, beneath the apparent diversity there exist certain fundamental and longstanding (although rarely articulated) assumptions; assumptions which, unbeknownst to the critics themselves, compelled them to employ similar rules to build their concepts and their theories. The researches that have been carried out in recent decades in linguistics and related areas now permit us to challenge these assumptions, thereby establishing the possibility of a new beginning for criticism. The final chapter of the thesis introduces three such "new beginnings" as they have been set forth by the French critics Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, examines the implications their strategies have for the ways in which we can read and understand Hemingway's book, and indicates some of the problems raised by their methods.

Précis

Une étude sur la critique de The Sun Also Rises par Hemingway révéle une grande diversité de methodes et d'approches. Cependant, sous cette apparente diversité il existe depuis longtemps des présuppositions fondamentales (quoique rarement articulées). Inconnu par les critiques eux mêmes, ces présuppositions les obligeaient à employer des règles semblables pour construire des concepts de bases et leurs thèories. Les recherches qui ont été faites dans la linguistiques et les domaines apparentés, ces dernières décennies, nous permettent de mettre en question ces présuppositions et, alors, d'établir la possibilité d'un nouveau depart de critique litéraire. Le chapitre final de cette thèse introduit trois "nouveaux departs" proposer par les critiques Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida et Michel Foucault, examine les implications que portent leurs stratégies dans la façon dont nous lisons et comprenons ce livre d'Hemingway, et indique quelques problèmes soulevé par leurs methodes.

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I

Historical Survey

When Charles Scribner's Sons issued Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises in New York in the fall of 1926 the book did not, in the words of Malcolm Cowley, "rock the country,"[1] but the overall critical verdict was favourable. An immediate cause of its success was the fact that many characters in the text were based upon identifiable members of the Paris café crowd.[2] Yet, although the initial succès de scandale of the novel, combined with Hemingway's growing reputation as a daring sportsman and connoisseur of bullfighting, assisted in the promotion of the book, its positive reception was due largely to the novelty of Hemingway's style. One enthusiastic reviewer for the Atlantic Monthly said of Hemingway that he writes "as if he never read anybody's writing, as if he had fashioned the art of writing himself."[3]

The attempt to define Hemingway's style became a major preoccupation with the early critics. The emphasis was heavily on Hemingway the realist whose "lean, hard athletic prose"[4] and "ability to seize upon precise details"[5] enabled him to render the world around him with an "objective clarity" unique in his field. Few critics failed to comment on the dialogue, "some of the finest yet written in this country,"[6] which was lavishly praised for its fidelity to the colloquial speech of the day. Burton Rascoe of the New York Sun wrote that Hemingway's dialogue was "so natural that it hardly seems as if it is written at all --one hears it."[7] Comparisons were made between Hemingway and a wide variety of other writers ranging from Maupassant to Joyce, and the names Sherwood Anderson, Gertrude Stein, and F. Scott Fitzgerald were frequently

evoked in the attempt to identify influences.

Although the critics were more or less unanimous in praising Hemingway's style, they were somewhat divided over the issue of his subject matter and character portrayal. Some reviewers felt that he was able, with his "lively dialogue" and "organic action," to give a compelling picture of character.[8] Others, however, worried that the characters "did not come to life," that their talk was "trivial" and they showed no signs of development.[9] The reviewer for Dial spoke for many when he wrote "if to report correctly and endlessly the vapid talk and indolent thinking of Montparnasse café idlers is to write a novel, Mr. Hemingway has written a novel. His characters are as shallow as the saucers in which they stack their daily emotions . . ."[10]

Many critics deplored the waste of such an "immense skill" on "so gestury" a theme.[11] They felt that the book said "nothing of importance about human life" and that it lacked "artistic significance."[12] Cleveland B. Chase, in an article for Saturday Review of Literature, said of Hemingway that "the things he writes about . . . seem scarcely worthy of the care, of the artistic integrity which he devotes to them."[13] Yet, not everyone felt that The Sun Also Rises was "a supreme triumph of style over matter"[14] or that the interests of "burly young Author Hemingway" had "grown soggy."[15] The reviewer for the Boston Evening Transcript, for one, suggested the book be called a "social document,"[16] and Henry S. Gorman, writing for The New York World, described it as "the tale of a great spiritual debacle."[17]

With the publication of Men Without Women in 1927, the critics turned their attention to Hemingway's short story technique, and it was only with the appearance of A Farewell to Arms in 1929, when the critics set about comparing the relative merits of the two novels, that The Sun Also Rises

once again emerged as a popular subject in critical discussion. The new book, it was felt, shed a great deal of light on the attitude behind Hemingway's style. Of particular importance in this regard was the passage in which the protagonist, Frederick Henry, ruminates on the evils of overblown rhetoric: "I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain. . . . There were many words that you could not bear to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. . . . Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates."[18] Taking their cue from this passage, a number of critics began building their readings of Hemingway's work around his apparent distrust of language and fear of abstraction. J. Kashkeen, for instance, said in 1933 that Hemingway had "no faith in the power of the word," that he conveyed meaning, not by the word alone, "but by an opposition of words." Kashkeen believed that the reason for the favourable reception of such books as The Sun Also Rises was that the American public, its eyes now open to the deceit of the Wilsonian era, was "starving for simple truth," the same "simple truth" that Hemingway himself was seeking.[19]

It was also in 1933 that Granville Hicks published his historic essay on Hemingway. Looking back over the first two novels and the short stories, Hicks saw emerging "a sort of composite character, the Hemingway hero," whose story was, in its broad outlines, that of Hemingway himself. Alongside this "autobiographical hero" Hicks saw another hero, "the hero that Hemingway is not but thinks he would like to be," the "code hero."[20] This distinction between the autobiographical hero and the code hero was widely accepted by the critics and was, as we shall see, to remain the basis

of all discussion of the hero in Hemingway's writing for many years to come.

The publication of Death in the Afternoon in 1932 provoked a great journalistic build-up of Hemingway's public personality. The name Hemingway became synonymous with heavy drinking, fighting, and various other demonstrations of physical strength and courage. Many critics began to feel that Hemingway was being carried away by his own personal legend. They also criticized him for what they felt was an unreasonable preoccupation with death and physical courage. Kashkeen thought that "the obsession with death was taking hold of him"[21] and Max Eastman accused him of being "enraptured with courageous killing" and "so romantic about bullfights" as to be quite blind to what they actually are: "A bullfight . . . is men tormenting and killing a bull; it is a bull being tormented and killed. . . . To drag in notions of honor and glory here, and take them seriously, is ungrown-up enough and rather sophomoric. But to pump words over it like tragedy and dramatic is mere nonsense and self-deception crying to heaven."[22] Hemingway also came under attack once more for his narrow range of character. Most notable in this regard was Wyndham Lewis' "Dumb Ox" essay published in 1934 in which he wrote, "The sort of First-person-singular that Hemingway invariably invokes is a dull-witted, bovine, monosyllabic simpleton. . . . It is the incarnation of the Stein-stutter."[23] It would thus seem, judging from the number and general tone of these critical assaults, that Kashkeen's suggestion put forth in 1933 that perhaps Hemingway's was not a mere "art of the surface," that beneath the apparent simplicity lay "a desperate complication,"[24] was certainly the minority report at the time.

The appearance of Winner Take Nothing in 1933 and The Green Hills of Africa in 1935 did little to boost Hemingway's sagging reputation. The

short stories were judged inferior to the stories of the twenties.[25] Many critics felt that they showed up his limitations, that he was beginning to repeat himself. The Green Hills of Africa was regarded as an unsuccessful experiment, the outcome of Hemingway's preoccupation with building his own public personality. Both Lionel Trilling and Edmund Wilson agreed that something "frightful" seemed to happen to Hemingway as soon as he began to write in the first person; that he was likely to lose all capacity for self-criticism and to become "fatuous or maudlin."[26] Hemingway also came under repeated attack from the Leftist critics who ruled his "individualism" and "separate-peacism" irresponsible and charged him with a failure to deal with the larger social issues.[27]

Neither To Have and Have Not published in 1937, nor The Fifth Column which was published along with the First Forty-Nine Stories in 1939, did much to improve Hemingway's standing with the critics. Wilson felt that in the new novel "craftsmanship and style, taste and sense," had all "gone by the boards." He began to fear, after reading the play, that Hemingway would "never sober up," although the short stories, with their "dependable moral backbone," proved his apprehensions unfounded.[28] Trilling noted what he felt was an increasing encroachment of Hemingway the "man" upon Hemingway the "artist," arguing that the critics of the Left, having "forced him out of his idiom of the artist and into the idiom of the man which he speaks with difficulty and without truth,"[29] were largely to blame for the change.

The comparative failure of the 1937-38 books was, however, more than compensated for by the tremendous critical reception of For Whom the Bell Tolls published in the fall of 1940. Wilson entitled his review of the novel "The Return of Ernest Hemingway" and John Chamberlain said in New York Herald Tribune Books that the latest publication redeemed a decade of futility.[30]

Many critics felt that For Whom the Bell Tolls was confirmation of the distinct break they had discerned between the earlier publications and the later ones, and the main critical preoccupation of the forties became the comparison between the early and later works.[31] Critics such as Edgar Johnson and Maxwell Geismar, who were primarily concerned with theme, saw in Hemingway's later works "a major re-orientation of his values" and a growth in terms of his rejection of his previous philosophies of "atomic individualism and irresponsibility."[32] On the other hand, those such as Edmund Wilson, Alfred Kazin and W. M. Frohock, who were more concerned with technique, saw in Hemingway's new copiousness a serious decline from his earlier "precise and clean style."[33] In either case, however, they would probably have agreed with Robert Penn Warren who said in 1949 that Hemingway was a "peculiarly personal writer" whose work, "to an uncommon degree, forms a continuous whole," one part explaining and interpreting another. Thus, "the best way to understand one of his books" was "to compare it with both earlier and later pieces."[34]

This penchant for comparison, combined with the feeling on the part of many critics that Hemingway's art was on the decline, sparked a renewed interest in the early writing. It was discovered that many statements that were made in the later works could be applied with profit to the earlier pieces. Certain passages from Death in the Afternoon[35] were particularly helpful in this regard:

> I was trying to write then and I found the greatest difficulty, aside from knowing truly what you felt, rather than what you were supposed to feel, and had been taught to feel, was to put down what really happened in action; what the actual things were which produced the emotion that you experienced. . . . the real thing, the sequence of motion and fact which made the emotion and which would be as valid in a year or in ten years or, with luck and if you stated it purely enough, always, was beyond me and I was working very hard to try to get it. . . . I was trying to learn to write commencing with the

> simplest things, and one of the simplest things of all and the most fundamental is violent death. (p. 2)
> . . . . . .
> Prose is architecture, not interior decoration, and the Baroque is over. . . . If a writer of prose knows enough about what he is writing about he may omit things that he knows and the reader, if the writer is writing truly enough, will have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the writer had stated them. The dignity of the movement of an ice-berg is due to only one-eighth of it being above water. (pp. 191-92)

Thus, Frohock, writing in 1947, was able to say that "for Hemingway the great necessity was to be accurate in the statement of emotion." If the emotional pattern of The Sun Also Rises, which Frohock felt was "being obscured with time," was "misunderstood" by the reader, the whole point of the book would be "lost."[36] Trilling, in answer to charges of anti-intellectualism in Hemingway, turned to the same passage in Death in the Afternoon when he said, "it is not so much reason as rationalization that he resists; 'mind' appears simply as the complex of false feelings. And against 'mind' in this sense he sets up what he believes to be the primal emotions, among others pain and death, met not with mind but with techniques and courage. . . . it never really is mind that is in question but rather a dull overlay of mechanical negative proper feeling, or a falseness of feeling which people believe to be reasonableness and reasonable virtue."[37] Ray B. West Jr., too, alluded to the passage in Death in the Afternoon when he said in 1945 that "Brett Ashley in The Sun Also Rises decides to give up a love affair because it makes her feel good 'deciding not to be a bitch.' The test of morals is the unadulterated sensibility--the sensibility not misled by the empty forms of patriotism, religion and love . . ."[38] Leo Gurko probably derived his thesis that death as a form of art had been Hemingway's "abiding theme"[39] from the 1932 book, and Maxwell Geismar was perhaps responding to the prose-as-architecture theory when he argued in 1942 that the pattern

of The Sun Also Rises was too carefully constructed to be realistic: "almost every line in the novel contributes its exact weight, the most careless gesture or phrase of Hemingway's characters seeming to provide the one stroke in the pattern hitherto missing. . . . as we know reality is neither quite so accurate nor artistic. There is, indeed, only one thing the matter with The Sun Also Rises. It is not like life."[40]

The iceberg theory, too, was quickly incorporated into the critical vocabulary. Johnson warned in 1940 that Hemingway's writing seemed simple because it was stripped and transparent, but that it was actually "packed with cumulative suggestion revealing depth within depth that may be overlooked on first reading."[41] Another critic, writing in 1942, said that although magic was "an embarrassing admission for the literary analyst to propound," he could only describe Hemingway as possessing "a sort of magic touch . . . an inherited depth and reaching awareness."[42]

Malcolm Cowley, in his Introduction to The Viking Portable Hemingway published in 1944, was the first to suggest what this "depth" might be. According to Cowley, his critical predecessors who had placed Hemingway in the naturalist tradition had been misled by Hemingway's insistence on "presenting things truly." Cowley suggested that Hemingway's true kinship was "with a wholly different group of novelists, let us say with Poe and Hawthorne and Melville: the haunted and nocturnal writers, the men who dealt in images that were symbols of an inner world." He pointed out that Hemingway in The Sun Also Rises was dealing in different terms with the same legend that had informed The Waste Land, but that what T. S. Eliot had discovered through scholarship, Hemingway had discovered for himself "by a sort of instinct for legendary situations." It was precisely this "instinct for legends, for sacraments, for rituals, for symbols appealing to buried hopes

and fear," Baker believed, that explained the power of Hemingway's work.[43]

Despite the failure of Across the River and into the Trees in 1950, the critics, spurred on largely by the success of Cowley's new approach, continued to devote a great deal of attention to Hemingway's books. The first collection to deal exclusively with Hemingway's writing appeared in 1950 when John K. M. McCaffery gathered together a number of the more notable critical essays from previous years and published them under the title Ernest Hemingway: The Man and His Work. McCaffery felt that in the case of Hemingway the personality of the man had been an obtrusive factor in his career. It was Hemingway's "individuality" and "originality," "the personality of his perceptions" that gave his art its quality. If there was one common denominator in the essays comprising his collection it was, said McCaffery, "the striking fact that, with only a few exceptions, the personality of the subject has made a profound impact on the critic and has, in almost every case, affected the tone of the criticism."[44]

The following year brought with it the first stylistic study of Hemingway in the New Critical tradition. Harry Levin, in an article entitled "Observations on the Style of Ernest Hemingway," took up a position directly opposite that of McCaffery and the critics represented in his book. Levin thought it unfortunate that "the distinction premised by Mr. McCaffery's subtitle between 'the man' and 'his work'" had not been upheld, and that the Hemingway critics seemed generally more interested in recapitulating the phases of the author's career than in undertaking a serious study of his craftsmanship. Yet, he too was forced to admit that it was impossible to speak for long of Hemingway's style without soon speaking of the man. Hemingway's style was, said Levin, "his way of life, his Lebensstil." Levin believed, as had Kashkeen and Trilling, that Hemingway's technique was largely a reaction to

the sloganmongers of the First World War who had debased the language. Hemingway's style was an attempt "to restore some decent degree of correspondence between words and things." Thus, although his diction may have been "thin" and his syntax "weak," he was nevertheless able, by putting his emphasis on nouns, which among parts of speech "come closest to things," and then stringing these nouns along by means of conjunctions, to approximate "the actual flow of experience." Through Hemingway, wrote Levin, "a few more aspects of life have been captured for literature."[45]

It was in the fifties that the first full-length studies of Hemingway's work made their appearance.[46] Philip Young's psychological study published in 1952 owed a debt to both Hicks and Cowley. Young upheld the distinction between the "autobiographical hero" and the "code hero" set forth by Hicks and argued, with Cowley, that the Hemingway hero was not the simple primitive that others had often assumed him to be. The primitivism was, in fact, a complicated psychological shield against an inner terror the hero could not bear to face. Consequently, the real battleground in Hemingway's stories was one of the mind.[47] The most significant feature of the Hemingway hero was, Young felt, the fact that he was wounded. Borrowing from Sigmund Freud and Otto Fenichel, Young hypothesized that it was the hero's "traumatic neurosis" that accounted for his "compulsive repetition" of the experience of the wound. The "code hero" offered a solution to the hero's problems by displaying a certain mastery over his emotions. The relationship between the "Hemingway hero" and the "code hero" was thus, according to Young, an educational one, and the "Hemingway hero's" development a gradual acquiring of the "code." Jake Barnes (a "Hemingway hero") was, Young believed, a grown Nick Adams, still projecting the "qualities of the man who created him," and the wound "still the crucial fact about him."[48]

Frederick J. Hoffman, whose book on the literature of the postwar decade appeared in 1955, agreed with Young that the "symbolic injury" was crucial to Hemingway's work, as it was to much of the writing of the time. The important thing about the wound, Hoffman felt, was the fact that it was "unreasonable," the result of "impersonal misfortune impersonally caused." The Sun Also Rises was one in a series of efforts by Hemingway to review the "unreasonable wound" and its consequences, "to find a balance between the inner terror caused by it and the outward need to survive." Since, according to Hoffman, Hemingway could not call upon religion to provide the balance, "he had to discover it in a context both secular and traditional." This he did, in the bullfight. Here, said Hoffman, in a purely artificial and adventitious ordering of human emotion and act, Hemingway found "the perfect palliative to the bewilderment and terror felt by the victims of the 'unreasonable wound.'" Here there was nothing unreasonable--no surprises and no tragedies that could not be explained as the result of fear, ignorance, or mere gracelessness.[49]

Carlos Baker's full length study, Hemingway: The Writer as Artist (Princeton: Princeton University Press), which appeared the same year as Young's book, dealt with what Baker called a "substructure of symbolic meanings" which he felt had gone "unrecorded and for the most part unobserved." Baker thought that Hemingway's Catholicism was an important factor in his writing; that, in fact, his entire work unfolded in the opposition between paganism and Christianity. Thus, although, like Young, Baker subscribed to the notion of a recurrent and autobiographical hero, he did not see the hero's development in terms of acquiring a "code," but rather, in terms of a gradual conversion to complete Catholicism.[50] Baker believed that Hemingway had written The Sun Also Rises partly as an "act of personal

exorcism" and that he had intended his novel to be construed not as "a textbook of lost generationism," but as he, himself, had said in a letter to Max Perkins, "a damn tragedy with the earth abiding forever as the hero" (a point which Baker felt the "reading public in general did not appear to understand"). Baker believed that the text unfolded around two sets of opposition: vanity and sanity, paganism and orthodoxy, the health and humour of Burguete and the sick neuroses of the Montparnassian "ne'er-do-wells," and so forth. He found a "sabidurian symbolism" at work in the fiesta which developed, he said, as "a dialectical struggle between paganism and Christian orthodoxy." His main focus of attention was, however, what he called the "moral norm" of the book which he defined as "the healthy and almost boyish innocence of spirit" carried by Jake, Bill and Pedro Romero. It was precisely this "sturdy moral backbone," Baker believed, that accounted for the "continuing power of the novel."[51]

The only other full-length study of Hemingway to appear during the fifties was Charles Fenton's The Apprenticeship of Ernest Hemingway: The Young Years (New York: Farrow, Straus and Young, 1954), a painstaking study of Hemingway's early years as an aspiring young writer, beginning with his childhood in Oak Park, and ending with his last days in Toronto.

The suspicion that in order to do full justice to Hemingway's work it must be read on the "symbolic" as well as the "story" level was confirmed, many critics felt, with the publication of The Old Man and the Sea in 1952. Joseph Waldmeir said that of all Hemingway's work The Old Man and the Sea demanded most to be read on both levels, but that it was sufficiently similar in its details and methods of presentation to the balance of his work "as to suggest strongly the possibility of a similar

reading and perhaps a similar interpretation."[52] Baker, who quickly became one of the leading advocates of a symbolic reading of Hemingway's work, said in a 1953 article for Saturday Review that it was the "symbolic landscape which in company with the diction, the recorded fact, and the deeply implied emotion, sustains and strengthens The Sun Also Rises from underneath, like the foundation of a public monument."[53] The notion of giving a symbolic reading to the text was further consolidated by the appearance in 1958 of Mark Spilka's well-received essay entitled "The Death of Love in The Sun Also Rises." Spilka felt that the novel was "an extensive parable," the protagonists of which were "deliberately shaped as allegorical figures," with Jake and Brett as the two lovers desexed by the war, Cohn as the false knight who challenges their despair, and Romero as the personification of the good life which will survive their failure.[54]

However, this trend toward the classification of Hemingway as a symbolist did not go long unchallenged. In an essay which introduced what was to become the conventional battle plan for future critics, E. M. Halliday argued that although Hemingway used certain techniques of symbolism, he did so in a very limited and controlled way. The failure to recognize this had led, said Halliday, to "distortions of his meaning and misappreciations of his narrative art." Thus, although Halliday may have agreed with those who saw Jake's war wound as "a kind of metaphor for the whole atmosphere of sterility and frustration which is the ambience of The Sun Also Rises," he felt that much of the recent criticism of Hemingway had gone "far beyond such palpable observations as these." Baker, who Halliday felt had been carried away by his own thesis, was particularly guilty in this regard. "To see symbolism as the master device of the earlier works and short stories tends," wrote Halliday, "to obscure another

and more characteristic type of ambiguity . . . I mean Hemingway's irony." It was Halliday's contention that Hemingway had sought, from the very beginning, to render the "ambiguity of life itself . . . the ironic gap between expectation and fulfillment, pretense and fact, intention and action, the message sent and the message received, the way things are thought or ought to be and the way things are." Thus, although Hemingway may have employed techniques of symbolism, irony served him particularly well.[55]

While Halliday and Baker were debating the issue of the proper classification for Hemingway, others were doggedly insisting that he was simply not worthy of that kind of concern. D. S. Savage and Sean O'Faolain, both writing in the fifties, supported Wyndham Lewis' "dumb ox" evaluation. Harry Levin criticized Hemingway for his narrowness of range, saying that the world that remained most alive to him was "that stretch between puberty and maturity" before "the introduction to sex," after which came "the boasting along with such surviving ideals as Hemingway subsumes in the word cojones."[56] Leslie Fielder accused Hemingway of being "much addicted to describing the sex act . . . the symbolic center of his work."[57] Even Hemingway's technique, which in earlier years had almost always elicited a favourable response, came under attack. Leon Edel said of the famous Hemingway style that it was not really a style at all, but "a series of charming tricks" that created "the artful illusion of a Style."[58]

These protestations grew louder as other critics such as John Killinger began discussing the "very serious ontological questions" which they felt lay just beneath the surface of Hemingway's work. Killinger believed that although Hemingway was not properly speaking an existentialist (neither Hemingway nor the existentialists has ever formally recognized a kinship to one another), he was a product of his age, and his age was that of the great

existentialist thinkers. He felt that death and violence (another form of death in which the victim survives) were important to Hemingway for the same reason they were important to the existentialists. It was only in the face of death, when all the superfluities of culture, race, tradition and religion, along with the trivia of everyday existence disappear, that the real "ex-sisting" man could emerge. Unless the tension between life and death was maintained constantly, the individual risked losing his identity or retreating into the "inauthentic." Killinger believed that because the truly great torero faces death frequently, he became a symbol for Hemingway of one who really knows life. Jake Barnes may not, perhaps, have been able to achieve the same degree of existential awareness as a torero, but he nevertheless experienced a moment of truth when he was "dealt futility in the groin," and was able, as a result, to lead a simple, unentangled, and hence "authentic" life.[59]

Undaunted by the reactions to this approach of some critics such as Philip Toynbee, who deplored the inflation of Hemingway's "stance" into a philosophy, and Dwight Macdonald, who felt that Hemingway had at most initiated a "romantic attitude" and was no more of a philosopher than Byron (in fact, considerably less of one), others, including Nathan Scott and Fraser Sutherland, continued to speak of the "metaphysical situation" in Hemingway's works.[60] Michael Friedberg may have offered a compromise solution of sorts when he suggested in 1973 that Hemingway's contribution to the new metaphysical vision of the postwar period had been a "metaphysics of style."[61]

With Hemingway's suicide in 1961 and the subsequent publication of A Moveable Feast in 1964, Islands in the Stream in 1970, and various collections of previously unprinted stories, many critics began turning their attention to the issue of the wisdom of posthumous publication.[62] The

general consensus seems to have been that although the posthumous publications had little effect on Hemingway's reputation, they did enhance the appreciation of his fiction. They also, according to Young, provided the critics with some sorely needed "new material" and a "larger territory to operate in."[63] This "territory" was also enlarged by the appearance in the two decades following Hemingway's death of dozens of biographical works written by family, friends, and various hunting and fishing companions.

Throughout this period the problem of satisfactorily relating Hemingway "the man" to his work was central. John A. Jones's earnest pronouncement in 1959 that it was not likely that "serious critics" would ever again confuse Hemingway's works with his popular personality or public legend[64] turned out to be premature, indeed. The majority of the critics of the sixties believed the man and his work to be inseparable. Robert P. Weeks thus gave voice to the prevailing attitude when he remarked in 1962 that "Hemingway and what he has written exist in a synergetic relationship, re-enforcing and fulfilling each other."[65]

The many full-length thematic studies that appeared during the years 1961 to 1969 were primarily concerned with the study of the Hemingway hero and his relationship to the author. The first of these was a 1961 book by Stewart Sanderson in which he combined the theories of Young and Baker, expressing his support for the concept of a recurrent autobiographical hero and his relationship with a "code" hero, as well as for the notion of a gradual conversion of both Hemingway and his hero to Roman Catholicism.[66]

The next full-length study to appear was Earl Rovit's Ernest Hemingway (1963). Rovit introduced the book by remarking that although he had originally intended "to dispose of Hemingway the man in the opening chapter and to survey his work chronologically in the succeeding chapters," he discovered

soon after having "disposed of Hemingway in Chapter I," that "he wouldn't stay out of the succeeding chapters." Furthermore, he found it unfeasible to treat Hemingway's work chronologically because the whole body of his writing "proved to be of such a single piece that individual fictions written twenty years apart demanded to be treated together." Rovit felt that the relationship between the autiobiographical hero and the code hero was basically educational and chose to substitute the terms "tyro" and "tutor." According to his hypothesis, the "tyro" ("a very near projection of Hemingway himself") learns to cope with nada from the "tutor" whose "deliberate self-containment" provides a model for behaviour. The Sun Also Rises was, he felt, best described as an "epistemological romance" in which Jake (the "tyro") struggles to regain a positive stance toward life with the help of Count Mippipopolous and Pedro Romero (the "tutors"), and Cohn (the "anti-tutor").[67]

In his full-length psycho-archetypal study entitled Hemingway on Love (1965), Robert W. Lewis argued that Hemingway wrote his fiction out of a need for psychic relief. Lewis traced the progression of the Hemingway hero through five stages of love, beginning with the selfish love of Nick Adams and Jake Barnes (a love dominated by "libido") and ending with the love of humanity characteristic of their counterparts in later works (a love dominated by "agape").[68]

Sheridan Baker (Ernest Hemingway: An Introduction and Interpretation, 1967) felt that the two heroes in Hemingway were independent characters appearing at two different periods: the earlier hero passive and beaten, the later one unbeaten and undefeated. In his chapter on The Sun Also Rises Baker emphasized the similarity of Jake's situation to that of a steer and noted that "Hemingway's crowd" was not only a generation lost,

but that it had lost its powers of generation in turn. He concluded, as had Spilka and Baker, that the book was, "in its very demolition of the romantic dream," a "species of 'chivalric romance.'"[69]

Richard Hovey's Hemingway: The Inward Terrain, published in 1968, was intended, he said, to serve as a corrective to much of what had been written about Hemingway in the past. Hovey felt that a great deal of the earlier commentary had been based, often unwittingly, on the Hemingway myth (the publicized image) rather than the human being. The time had come, he felt, to "break the spell of the legend" and to seek instead to discover the real "inner drama" of Hemingway's life as the only way "to see into and make sense of the world of his fiction." Hovey followed Freud in his reading of the texts, and the hero who, according to Young, had been "wounded" by the war, became, instead, "scarred" by "Oedipal conflict." The Sun Also Rises represented the first step in the development of a conception of romantic love that would, Hovey believed, dominate the rest of Hemingway's work.[70]

Another, slightly different, Freudian reading was proposed the following year by Jackson J. Benson. While subscribing to Sheridan Baker's hypothesis of an early passive, and later active and undefeated hero, Benson read the works in terms of parental polarities which he felt functioned as opposing forces in Hemingway's psyche.[71]

The only full-length stylistic study of the decade, Richard K. Peterson's Hemingway: Direct and Oblique (1969), was also centrally concerned with the relationship of the author to his work. Peterson introduced his book by saying that while he recognized the danger of taking what we know of a person and reading it back into his style, "thus 'discovering' in the style what we already know," he nevertheless agreed with Robert Penn Warren in his conviction that style always reflects the sensibility of the

author more than that of his characters. Hemingway, said Peterson, shared with many of his contemporaries the feeling that words distort reality, that they falsify and cheapen. Peterson felt that it was this fundamental distrust of words that accounted for much of Hemingway's technique and that it was a distrust based largely on a "fear of pretentiousness" and "sentimentality," or "of sounding high-flown and literary." He argued that Hemingway's method of understatement and indirection was primarily a means of avoidance, and wondered how much of Hemingway's so-called "objectivity" was more closely "akin to stylized small talk about safe or unimportant topics." He also questioned the so-called "economy" of Hemingway's writing, asking how far it was actually more economical to give an indirect "objective" description to suggest emotions and ideas than it was to describe these things directly. He pointed out, as had Joseph Warren Beach before him, that the simplest word is often the most common or undiscriminating word, and that, contrary to public opinion, Hemingway had taken great pains to avoid the mot juste. He called attention to the general, unspecific nature of many of Hemingway's descriptions and argued that Hemingway had maintained his reputation for accuracy and concreteness only through his massing of incidental detail, his lists, and catalogues. Peterson did not consider The Sun Also Rises one of Hemingway's better novels and preferred the more expansive prose of such works as A Farewell to Arms. He felt that in 1969 the twentieth century had "not yet recovered from its over-reaction against the excess emotionalism of much of the art of the last century," and maintained that the high critical opinion of The Sun Also Rises that prevailed at the time could be accounted for only by the popular view that the restrained and indirect method was somehow innately superior or more truthful.[72]

Delbert Wylder, also writing in 1969, was perhaps the first critic to make a serious effort to separate the "Hemingway personality, as evidenced in his life and non-fictional statements," from his works. Wylder, whose focus was once again the Hemingway hero, disapproved of the tendency which had persisted, as he pointed out, despite Hemingway's own "often vehement objections," to link Hemingway with his protagonists. He also disagreed with the notion of a recurrent hero in a succession of novels. Wylder thought that each book should be regarded as "a separate entity with its own distinctive artistic unity and its own distinctive protagonist." As his chapter headings indicate (e.g., "The Guilt-Ridden Anti-Hero," "The Self-Destructive Anti-Hero," "The Mythic Hero in the Contemporary World," "The Hero as Saint and Sinner"), Wylder divided all of Hemingway's protagonists into two principal types: most of the early heroes such as Jake Barnes, Frederick Henry, and Harry Morgan fell into the category "anti-hero," while the later heroes such as Robert Jordan and Santiago were designated "real heroes." The Sun Also Rises was, Wylder believed, a satire on the vanity of human wishes, in which Jake ("the wounded anti-hero") learns how to resign himself to his condition and to preserve himself against the forces of "the temptress Brett Ashley."[73]

The publication of Wylder's book signalled a new phase in Hemingway criticism. The psychobiographical approach which had so dominated the critical evaluations of the sixties was dismissed by many critics of the seventies who sought, instead, to eliminate the category "Hemingway the man" from all discussions of his work. Yet, the critics were far from unanimous in their support of this new trend and there remained an appreciable number who felt that certain aspects of Hemingway's life and personality which had a direct bearing on his work had yet to be given sufficient

consideration. It was argued, for instance, that Hemingway's own statements concerning changes in his religious convictions had never been taken into account. Contrary to Baker's thesis of the Hemingway hero's gradual conversion to Catholicism, Hemingway had actually turned away from the Church.[74] This changing attitude was best reflected in Hemingway's writing in the shift from a thematic use of Catholicism in his early novels such as The Sun Also Rises (in which each major character was believed to represent a different religious perspective) to the technical use of certain aspects of Catholic ritual and tradition in his later works, as he began to employ Catholic allusion, pun, and allegory as part of his artistic method.[75] Roman Catholicism, the critics pointed out, is the "code" religion par excellence.

The influence of the visual arts on Hemingway's writing was another area in which some critics felt that the research had been deficient. Although Wilson, Levin, and Carlos Baker, among others, had made cursory comments on the subject, it remained for Emily Stipes Watts (Ernest Hemingway and the Arts, 1971) to carry out a full-scale investigation into the ways in which "the poetry and prose of Hemingway might have been enriched and deepened by the paintings and sculpture and architecture which he saw being created around him, which he owned, and which he had viewed in museums." Watts used passages from The Sun Also Rises to illustrate how Hemingway had borrowed from Cezanne in his use of colour, his interest in the volume and solidity of objects, his trick of using a series of planes for depth and structural development, and even in his conception of the land as the single "element of eternity in the midst of man's relativity and transitoriness."[76]

The debate that had sprung up in the forties and fifties over the

issue of the correct classification for Hemingway ("symbolist" or "realist") had not yet ended; nor was Watts's suggestion that by means of techniques borrowed from Cezanne Hemingway was able to express his "double vision," combining both realistic and symbolic modes, to be the final word on the subject. Some writers were still convinced, based on what Hemingway had said in Death in the Afternoon, that his primary concern was to communicate emotion. The primal "test" for his work was therefore not "what it was meaning or saying," but what kind of "emotional satisfaction, or pleasure" it offered. None of the stock terms, whether "realism" or "symbolism," was thus fully adequate to describe it.[77]

Fraser Sutherland, whose study of Hemingway and Callaghan appeared shortly after the publication of Watts's book, supported the theory that Hemingway's primary aim was to convey emotion, but he felt, too, that Cezanne had been an important influence on his writing. Hemingway, he believed, had learned from Cezanne how to make all of the details in each of his stories coalesce into a single and unmistakable image which then became the "emotional key" to the work. Sutherland thus gave the name "emotional imagism" to Hemingway's technique.[78] The thesis that Hemingway had employed imagist techniques was later reaffirmed by Richard Hasbany who argued with reference to In Our Time that the essentially imagist quality of the book was apparent in Hemingway's use of a "juxtaposition of images" to "escape from logical exposition" and thereby force the reader to respond in "non-intellectual and non-categorical ways."[79]

In a recent book entitled Hemingway: Expressionist Artist Raymond S. Nelson, as his title suggests, proposed yet another term with which to describe Hemingway and his work. Nelson said that he had discovered upon a close reading of Hemingway's texts that, contrary to popular belief,

Hemingway was not at all concerned with "the science of representation." He was, in fact, completely involved with his subject matter and put more emphasis on the expression of feeling than on the objective descriptions characteristic of realistic art. Hemingway's literary style was thus, in both its method and message, significantly like that of the expressionist painters. Nor did Nelson feel that this kinship should come as much of a surprise. Everything about Hemingway--the violent, restless, chaotic age into which he was born, his unhappy childhood, his need to write truly about human experience in defiance of his heritage, his rejection of the accepted modes and techniques of earlier writers, his preoccupation with alienation, suffering, and pain, his contempt for a corrupt civilization--had led him, in a most natural and inevitable way, to adopt an expressionist approach to his art. Hemingway, wrote Nelson, was simply trying to do "in words what his friends were doing in paint."[80]

Other critics of the seventies found the psycho-archetypal approach instrumental as a means of access to Hemingway's work. Richard O'Brien, in a book entitled The Thematic Interrelation of the Concepts of Time and Thought in the Works of Ernest Hemingway (1971), attempted to show that there was in Hemingway's writing "a consistent and systematic relationship between the negation of the concept of ordinary time and the avoidance of cognition and a concomitant affirmation of a world of momentary experience and emotion." O'Brien shared Cowley's opinion that Hemingway's cast of mind was "pre-Christian and prelogical." Hemingway was, like primitive man, "obsessed with the horrors of existence" and employed similar methods of adaptation, most notably ritual. All of Hemingway's "code" characters were thus, according to O'Brien, distinguished by their "sacramental" outlook. The torero, for example, was able by means of his partic-

ipation in the bullfight (a "regenerative ritual") to abolish historical time and live only for the moment. Hemingway's "sloppy" characters, on the other hand, were all "notoriously burdened by the passage of unredeemed, unregenerative, profane time." The Sun Also Rises was, O'Brien believed, the story of "Jake's instinctual struggle to negate the seemingly meaningless flux of temporal or 'profane' existence--to stop thinking on the cognitive level" and to find, instead, "a modus vivendi in which the flux of the phenomenal world no longer has the power to enthrall."[81]

In a paper delivered at a 1973 conference on Hemingway, John Griffith argued against O'Brien's thesis, claiming that Hemingway used ritual not as a means of escape from the temporal world, but as a means to stave off or overcome the fear of annihilation.[82] Richard Lehan, however, speaking at the same conference, supported the notion that Hemingway harboured a "desire to escape from history," adding that this desire was based on the assumption that "modern man is lost because he has lost contact with first things." Lehan was convinced that the entire Hemingway canon unfolded around the need for the "elemental experience," the need "to function at the level of the primitive;" and although Hemingway's position was, he felt, ultimately untenable, Lehan did think that Hemingway had succeeded in showing us "how far we have moved beyond and perhaps betrayed our primitive beginnings."[83]

Various researches into Hemingway's religious convictions, artistic influences and primitive impulses notwithstanding, the shift in critical practice away from those approaches requiring biographical support was widespread and provided a point of departure for the bulk of the criticism of the seventies. This shift was reflected, in the first instance, in the conspicuous decline of interest in the Hemingway hero. Philip Young's 1972 book in which he collected the Nick Adams stories, arranged

them in chronological order of Nick's development, and added eight previously unpublished stories or sketches, was a great critical success.[84] However, the decade produced only one full-length study of the Hemingway hero and, even here, the shift in focus was clearly evident.

Bhim S. Dahiya (The Hero in Hemingway: A Study in Development, 1978) felt that the stock approach to the Hemingway hero had "so confused the fictional character with the writer himself that his work seems in danger of losing its artistic integrity." He disapproved of the application to Hemingway's writing of extra-literary terminologies drawn from Freudianism, Catholicism, and existentialism, and argued, furthermore, that these approaches still laboured under the "misconception" of the "code hero" and "autobiographical hero" made current in the thirties. Dahiya applauded Wylder's efforts to deal with Hemingway's works on their own terms, but thought it rather naive of him to believe that any approach seeking a larger unity in the works of a writer must necessarily undermine the artistic integrity of the individual work. Dahiya believed, on the contrary, that "the works of every great writer inevitably tend to acquire a larger unity," each work representing a different phase in the author's "growing vision of life." He felt that this development of vision was best reflected, in Hemingway's case, in the growth of his central character, the "essential Hemingway hero," whose history could be traced from Nick Adams to Thomas Hudson. The "essential Hemingway hero" did not, according to Dahiya, need to look to any "code" or "tutor" figure to learn about life. The so-called "code heroes," he argued, were always minor characters who served only to project by contrast the more complex personality of the "essential Hemingway hero." In The Sun Also Rises, Jake ("the essential Hemingway hero") stands between the two extremes of Romero and Cohn who

represent two contrasting "levels of consciousness": one primitive, pastoral, steeped in ritual and tradition, and placidly unaware of the threat of nada; the other "post-Darwinian," post-war, and acutely aware of the transitory nature of life; the first possessing strength without awareness and the second awareness without strength. Dahiya believed that by refusing to accept either of these alternatives, by rejecting both Romero's "irrational faith" and Cohn's "unsocial individualism," Jake, who struggles throughout the novel to come to grips with the impermanence of his existence, is able to reaffirm a positive attitude toward life.[85]

When William White wrote in 1969 that The Sun Also Rises was the first, best, and most representative of its author's novels, that it "set forth in full length the Hemingway hero, the Hemingway code, the Hemingway style, and the Hemingway theme,"[86] the critics had already begun, not only (as we have seen) to lose interest in the Hemingway hero, but to turn away from all such "conventional foci" in favour of "more original" perspectives.

One such critic was Robert Lewis who cautioned in 1973 that "continuity and design can obliterate meaning," and that perhaps enough had been said about Hemingway's heroes, his love and death themes, and his style. Lewis recommended that we consider Hemingway as a fiction writer and start again "with something simple." "Fiction," he said, "is prose narrative with characters, plot, and setting, and the setting of fiction is made up of time and place." Hemingway, he believed, had "an almost obsessive concern with the theme of mutability" and "a great awareness of place." He pointed out that the traumatic or dispiriting experiences for Hemingway's heroes tended to occur in man-made environments and that the therapeutic or enspiriting experiences tended to be set where the marks of humanity

were minimal. According to Lewis, at the beginning of The Sun Also Rises Jake Barnes is "out of joint with his time and place." He is thereafter "alternately cleansed and sullied as he moves about in varied terrains with his various friends." The novel thus traces Jake's progress as he "defines himself and seeks to orient himself, finding himself ultimately as a man in a landscape."[87]

Robin H. Farquhar thought it only natural that the critics in the past had been primarily concerned with the hero, style, theme and tone since these were among the "most essential elements" of any novel and since their "discriminatory power" was "particularly strong" in relation to Hemingway's work. He found it "somewhat curious," however, that a fifth basic prose characteristic, "structural pattern," had been "largely ignored" by the critics. Farquhar began his research by turning to Death in the Afternoon: "In investigating issues related to the literary craftsmanship of Hemingway, one typically turns first to Death in the Afternoon for clues." Finding the passage in which Hemingway expounds the tragic structure of the bull-fight,[88] Farquhar decided to find out whether Hemingway had sought, consciously or unconsciously, to imbue his "prose 'dramas'" with the same tragic structure. Thus, having accepted the "five-part inverted 'V' which represents the movement from an introduction 'up' through rising action to the climax, and thence 'down' through falling action to a catastrophe, or denouement" as his schematic model of tragedy, Farquhar proceeded to test its applicability to Hemingway's novels. In his treatment of The Sun Also Rises he located the climax (the top of the inverted "V") at the point at which Jake introduces Romero ("the medium through which Jake can find meaning") to his antithesis, Brett Ashley ("the epitome of aimless decadence"). All of the preceding action, Farquhar believed, prepared the

way for this event, which signalled "the resolution of the major conflict in the novel," and thus set the stage for the subsequent denouement.[89]

Gerry Brenner's ambition to steer clear of the more traditional modes of inquiry, with special reference to the psychobiographical and New Critical approaches, led him, a few years later, to advance what he called a "generic approach." Brenner expanded upon Farquhar's theory of tragic structure for Hemingway's work and suggested that Hemingway might actually have imitated a number of traditional literary modes or works. Thus, while To Have and Have Not conformed to a model of classical tragedy, For Whom the Bell Tolls followed the pattern of the epic, Across the River and into the Trees closely resembled Dante's Divine Comedy, and so forth.[90] In a later article Brenner was to describe The Sun Also Rises as a "roman a thèse" in which Jake learns that in order to know "how to live in it," he must "yoke" together "the ethical principles of hedonism and traditionalism." "Hemingway's refusal to insist upon this thesis," wrote Brenner, "accounts for its subtlety."[91]

Daniel J. Schneider had an entirely different perception of structure in Hemingway. He believed that, far from imitating traditional models or works, Hemingway had actually employed "a simple qualitative shift or oscillation between despair and happiness" as a way of structuring the action of his novels. This scheme functioned in The Sun Also Rises in terms of the shifts from Paris, to Burguete, to San Sebastian.[92]

Chaman Nahal (The Narrative Pattern in Ernest Hemingway's Fiction, 1971) argued, on the other hand, that any critic who attempted to discern the structure of a Hemingway novel from the "action" taking place therein was making the mistake of taking the oft-repeated statement "to put down what really happened in action" literally. He believed that just as most of

Hemingway's heroes were "anti-heroes," so too, his action was "anti-action." Hemingway's originality thus stemmed, Nahal felt, from the fact that he was the first novelist to use inactivity (physical or mental) as part of the structure of a novel.[93]

Quite a number of critics felt that the most important structural feature of The Sun Also Rises was its circularity, but there was some disagreement as to the significance of this form. Whereas earlier critics such as Halliday and Spilka had tended to view the pattern as being indicative of a certain "despair" and "world weariness," the trend now was to see it in a more positive light. One critic who supported the new interpretation was Robert W. Cochran who argued that Brett's "moral success" and Jake's "comprehensive wordly wisdom" were clear evidence of a "moral retrenchment" and a reaffirmation of life's meaning. If any readers of The Sun Also Rises had become "misdirected," they had certainly not, Cochran asserted, been "misled by Hemingway."[94]

When Philip Young voiced the complaint in 1973 that "the more that's written on a man and the more important he is deemed to be, the narrower or more trivial are the areas considered worthy of investigation,"[95] he was probably referring to the growing tendency among Hemingway critics to focus their attention on what many regarded as the "minor details" of his work. Ronald Lajoie and Sally Lentz, for instance, writing in 1975, devoted an entire article to the significance of Jake's reading of A. E. W. Mason's "A Crystal Trench."[96] Donald Daiber, writing the same year, set about exploring the implications of the allusion in Chapter xv of the novel to Robert Browning's "The Pied Piper of Hamelin."[97] Robert E. Jungman carried out a study of Hemingway's use of the name "Gran Via" at

the end of the book.[98] Scott Donaldson (By Force Of Will: The Life and Art of Ernest Hemingway, 1977) built an entire reading of the text around the uses of money in the story,[99] and Sister Mary Grant, writing the same year, centred her interpretation on the dancing motif.[100]

Another development that took place in the seventies was a sudden upsurge of interest in Hemingway's language from both linguistic and thematic standpoints. Numerous studies of Hemingway's "craft" had appeared throughout the fifties and sixties. Most of these were further elaborations of the basic insights into Hemingway's art made years earlier by such critics as Kashkeen and Levin. Typically they concentrated on Hemingway's sentence structure, his diction, and his stylistic devices.[101] Richard Bridgeman's chapter on Hemingway in his book entitled The Colloquial Style in America (1966) may, however, have provided a turning point of sorts. For, not only did Bridgemen examine Hemingway's place in the American colloquial tradition, he also investigated Hemingway's ties to the literary theorists of the time, primarily Gertrude Stein and Ezra Pound. If, wrote Bridgeman, Hemingway desired "both the word clearly placed and the object directly evoked," Stein and Pound, as two practicing literary theorists, offered ways of achieving both ends. From Stein he learned "everything about the abstract relationship between words," about fragmentation of syntax and repetition, and about how to make "patterns of words cohere independently of rational meaning." From Pound he learned about particularity, how to eliminate abstractions and to depend instead upon concrete objects, and how to discard all but the most essential qualification. It was precisely these lessons, Bridgeman felt, that provided the key to the durability of Hemingway's style.[102]

It was perhaps this type of analysis, as it underscored the care applied

by Hemingway to the composition of his prose, that first brought his work to the attention of the linguists. At any rate, many of them began turning to his work for material for comparative and transformational analyses. The upshot of this trend was a series of highly technical and meticulous studies, typical of which was Waldemar Gutwinski's chapter on Hemingway and Henry James in his book entitled Cohesion in Literary Texts: A Study of Some Grammatical and Lexical Features of English Discourse (1976). Having discovered that the "cohesive relations" that are formed on the "morphologic" (grammatic) stratum of a text are a manifestation of the text's "discourse structure," and that an understanding of the former would thus aid in the reconstruction of the latter, Gutwinski set out, using "the tools of linguistic description," to compare the cohesiveness in Hemingway (on both the grammatical and lexical levels) to that of James. Gutwinski was led by his comparison to conclude that whereas lexical cohesion (e.g., the repetition of the same item, the use of identical or parallel constructions) was an important characteristic of Hemingway's prose, grammatical cohesion (e.g., the use of pronouns and prepositions) was more likely to provide the basis for cohesiveness in James. The semantic interpretation of James's texts was, as a result, far more complex than that of Hemingway's.[103]

One of the first critics to discuss Hemingway's language in terms of its thematic significance, as opposed to its stylistic or linguistic attributes, was Floyd C. Watkins (The Flesh and the Word, 1971). Watkins began his book by expressing his support for the popular notion that the "unprecedented distrust" of words that had been experienced by many of the writers (including Hemingway) of the early part of the twentieth century was largely "a reaction to an age of verbomania and logorrhea" which had

"cheapened" and "deadened" the language. These authors not only believed that language was insufficient to describe the "data" of experience, they also, wrote Watkins, felt that words could actually "destroy meanings for a person of sensibility." There was, however, in the decades following the war, a gradual shift away from the objective and impersonal style characteristic of verbal skepticism toward what Watkins called an "abstract, moralistic, didactic discursiveness." "The general movement from objectiveness to abstraction, from flesh to word is apparent," wrote Watkins, "in almost every major writer of the twentieth century." Hemingway's change of style came, he believed, with Death in the Afternoon. The Sun Also Rises, in contrast, clearly belonged to the earlier tradition, a fact which Watkins felt must have important implications for the novel as a whole (see his chapter on the book entitled "The Sun Also Rises and the Failure of Language"), particularly if, as he believed, the principal theme of the novel was "the search for meaning." The characters, Watkins maintained, are unable to articulate their ideas and feelings. They can use language neither as a vehicle of expression nor as a measure of release. Deprived of the means to convey the meanings they intend, they can neither arrive at any principles nor define any values. They must endure their suffering in silence, or, if they must speak, do so with "dissimulation," "stoic restraint," "understatement" and "irony." Thus "Style and language themselves become part of the novel. That is, the author's and the character's very language become part of the meaning." Watkins concludes that "Given the theme of search and despair, the unique style is an almost perfect vehicle to express the futility of those who have discovered the failure of meaning and language."[104]

Ihab Hassan, writing the same year as Watkins, also found important

implications in Hemingway's language practice. Hassan felt that although Hemingway seemed "conventional," the appearance was deceptive, and that he actually belonged among those men of letters ranging from Sade, through Kafka and Genet, to Beckett who "gave themselves to silence." Hemingway's "life, style, morality and vision" had all, Hassan believed, been shaped by his early "encounter with the void." This encounter had led him, in an attempt to expose "the great emptiness" which he had discovered "behind the meticulous shape of things," to write "close to the margins of silence." Hemingway's writing "creates itself," Hassan said, "in self-opposition;" the style "emerges from silence and tends toward it again." Hassan therefore designated Hemingway's style an "anti-style" and his literature an "anti-literature." It was not, however, as such, purely negative for there are, according to Hassan, "two accents of silence (a) the negative echo of language, autodestructive, demonic, nihilist; (b) its positive stillness, self-transcendent, sacramental, plenary." Beneath "the finicky language" of The Sun Also Rises ("our paradigm of radical loss"), we get "a stillness" and "a vision of archetypal unity" in which Hemingway "betrays a sacramental attitude." In the confrontation with death, life can acquire meaning; the universe becomes "not Naught but One." This, according to Hassan, is the crucial insight of the text, and the lesson learned by all of Hemingway's "redeemed characters."[105]

Romeo Giger (The Creative Void, 1977) also spoke of Hemingway's language in terms of transcendence, but transcendence of a different kind. Giger felt that Hemingway's "resolute conviction that language alone was inadequate--yes, even fallible--as a means of uncovering and communicating the basic and unimpaired totality of the felt experience" forced him, in his "striving to give true expression to the hidden essence of things,"

to "transcend the limits of language." It was this necessity, Giger believed, that had given rise to Hemingway's iceberg theory. Hemingway, he said, having realized that "internalization" and "individuation" is the basic pattern of all experience, "wanted more than just to communicate his view of life; his primary aim was to arouse the reader's own personal emotions," to make him discover the meaning in and of himself. Hemingway also realized, however, that if he wanted communication to take place at all, he would have to "appeal to forces stronger than those in conscious individuality" and to rely instead on "a common ground of experience for all human beings." (Giger here evoked C. G. Jung's notion of a collective unconscious.) He therefore developed a technique wherein he called upon a "common code" made up of desire, dreams, fears, and so forth to guide and control the reader in a subtle way and thus get his message across, while, at the same time, leaving the reader with as much scope as possible to respond in a personal way and to relive the experience in his own imagination. It was this technique, Giger believed, that accounted for the "essential incompleteness" of Hemingway's work. Hemingway would state no more than was absolutely necessary to the understanding of his story, for, the more he said, the more he would limit the possible range of response. This technique also accounted for the growing number of meanings that the critics had been able to "extract from" and "project into" Hemingway's texts. Each reader, wrote Giger, "discovers only part of what the author meant to say." ". . . the true dimensions of the underwater part of the iceberg are practically limitless; in fact, there is no good reason why," he concluded, "if given enough time, they may not extend almost infinitely."[106]

Robert O. Stephens, writing in 1972, was perhaps the first critic to suggest that the "pervasive awareness" of language in Hemingway's works

was an outgrowth of his appreciation, not of its "inadequacy" or "fallibility," but of its power. Stephens centred his analysis on For Whom the Bell Tolls, employing the theories of Cassirer and Whorf to delineate the distinction between the use of language in Madrid and its use in the guerilla camp. He demonstrated how, in the political world of Madrid, language is divorced from reality and functions primarily as a means of ideology--as an instrument not of communication, but manipulation and deceit. In the "pre-discursive" world of the guerilla camp, on the other hand, language is both "mythical" and "magical." Words are not treated as symbols, but as realities, and function in such a way as both to make and control experience. The discrepancy between Stephens' perception of Hemingway's use of language and that of his critical predecessors is clearly illustrated in the following passage: ". . . Robert Jordan demonstrates an awareness of the power of language which pervades not only the Spanish Civil War but Hemingway's work in its entirety, from the earliest stories to the last memoirs, in the fictional worlds of his characters and in the semi-legendary world of his own self-creation. For Hemingway and his characters must be seen as they are concerned, even obsessed with language magic--with the tendency to presume necessary connections between words and things or actions and to assume control over events and feelings by the power of words . . . the tendency is central to the way in which Hemingway's world can be comprehended."[107]

Michael Friedberg, speaking at a conference in 1973, reaffirmed Stephen's opinion that Hemingway's treatment of language grew out of an awareness of its positive aspects rather than its negative capabilities, but he also shared Hassan's conviction that language in Hemingway functions primarily as a means of transcendence. According to Friedberg (in an argument some-

what reminiscent of that put forward by O'Brien in 1971), man must, if he wishes to attain "a state of grace," seek to overcome his enslavement to "horological time" and the "objective-material world." This he can accomplish through language, which permits him to order his existence and thus "wrest control of his life from the twin spectres of chaos and death" which are the source of his enslavement. Friedberg believed that, at its best, the new "heroic" language coined by Hemingway could capture "a state of grace" thereby allowing man to catch a glimpse of the "infinite goodness of God."[108]

Finally, Carole Moses advanced the thesis in 1978 that "Hemingway's preoccupation with language" stemmed from his recognition not of its inadequacy, or even its transcendental qualities, but of "the destructive forces inherent" in it. Moses turned to For Whom the Bell Tolls in order to explore "the general skepticism about language" conveyed by the novel as a whole. Moses felt that while it may have been due in part to the inefficacy of language as a means of expression or description, this skepticism was primarily an outgrowth of the "potentially dangerous nature" of language, its ability to "create barriers between men," to deceive and to corrupt. She concluded that Hemingway's view of language was somewhat similar to that of T. S. Eliot in "Burnt Norton":

> Words strain,
> Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
> Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
> Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
> Will not stay still.

However, to this view of language Hemingway had also added "the existence of impenetrable national barriers, which isolate people still further, and man's fallen nature, which perverts the function of language as a means of communication."[109]

II

Assumptions

There exists today an enormous body of critical work on The Sun Also Rises of which the introductory historical survey is by no means an exhaustive description. The survey does, however, serve to indicate the major trends that have taken place in the field of Hemingway criticism in general, as well as the range of approaches that have been employed with respect to The Sun Also Rises in particular. Indeed, the most striking feature of this history is precisely the enormous diversity of critical strategies that can be located within it. Yet, if this same history is examined with a view, not to surveying the range of critical differences, but to identifying the principles or conditions upon which they are based, it is soon discovered that beneath the apparent diversity there exist certain fundamental (although rarely articulated) and relatively unchanging assumptions; assumptions about the nature of literature (its relationship both to the world and to its author) and assumptions about the relationship of the critic to literature that often, unbeknownst to the critics themselves, compelled them to employ similar rules to define the object of their study, to form their concepts, and to build their theories.[1] In fact, once the existence of these assumptions has been apprehended, it becomes apparent that most of the differences in attitude and approach that have been found to exist among past Hemingway critics are superficial. In this context, the modifications that have occurred in the field of critical endeavour are changes in surface and not in depth.

The early reviewers of The Sun Also Rises were, it is clear, still

very much under the influence of the realist tradition of the nineteenth century. Literature was, they believed, primarily a mimetic art. They assumed that the relationship between the literary text and the "real" world, the universe conceived to stand outside the text and to which the text referred, was basically unproblematic. Although surface variations in style and technique could either enhance or detract from its essential reference to a stable world, language, for them, was a more or less faithful and masterable instrument of representation. The analysis of a literary text was thus, at the same time and without the need for further inquiry, the decipherment of what it was saying or representing--its content.[2] The critic's task was primarily one of evaluation. He was concerned (a) with assessing the accuracy or fidelity of the account, the efficacy of the author's style and technique, as well as the degree of objectivity or subjectivity he brought to his work, and, since the truth of the work was defined on the basis of that which it represented, (b) with determining whether or not it represented something of value, with measuring the significance of that segment of the world the author had chosen to depict. It is within the context of these underlying concerns that we must understand the high praise accorded Hemingway's style and narrative technique by the early reviewers, as well as their misgivings regarding his choice of subject matter.

Although the shift away from the realist approach, initiated in the forties, was fairly widespread, the realist position was never seriously challenged or disproved. The most trenchant objections came from such critics as Peterson and, more recently, Nelson who argued that, far from being objective and accurate in his descriptions, Hemingway was often

highly subjective and inaccurate. Most critics, however, like the symbolists who broke with the realist tradition, simply felt that the realist approach, although valid within limits, was insufficient to deal with the complexity of Hemingway's work. To treat his writing as a mere "art of the surface" was to do it a grave injustice. It is precisely this lack of any serious challenge to their approach that accounts for the fact that the realist critics remained an appreciable factor in Hemingway criticism (most of Hemingway's detractors throughout the years were realists who criticized him for his narrowness of range), as well as for the fact that Hemingway critics not of the realist school continued, and have continued to this day, to feel obligated to defend him against them.

The movement away from the realist approach was therefore accomplished not by destroying any realist assumptions about the representative function of literary language, but by reinforcing and expanding upon a second set of assumptions that had been in operation alongside the first right from the start and that concerned the relationship not between the text and the world, but between the text and its author.

The realist critics may have felt that a literary text had primarily to do with the world, but they also believed that it issued from a cogito. It was the author, in his individuality and genius, who lent a book its originality. It was he who was responsible for all those things that set his book apart from any other book. Originality was such an important criterion in the realist conception of art that it was bound to spark a great deal of interest in the life and personality of the writer responsible. The Sun Also Rises, however, triggered an interest in its author that went far beyond the customary bounds. This was due in part

to the flamboyant nature of Hemingway's personality which attracted the attention of journalists and critics alike, but it also had to do with the fact that he had written The Sun Also Rises from personal experience. Hemingway made no attempt to conceal the "true" identities of his principal characters, among them Jake Barnes the first person narrator who was, as the early critics were quick to point out, (Jake's impotence aside) transparently autobiographical. In the case of The Sun Also Rises, the personal stamp of the author showed itself not only in the choice of subject matter and the manner of its presentation, but throughout the very body of the work, in its content--for Hemingway was the content, or so the early critics believed.

What had begun as a belief in the creative authority of the author as the source of the text's originality grew quickly into the abiding conviction that Hemingway was consubstantial with his work. Most of the early reviewers, in fact, made no attempt to separate the man from his work. They used the names Jake and Hemingway interchangeably. This practice resulted in some confusion as it enabled the critics to praise the "detachment" of the narrative and lack of "authorial intrusion" on the one hand, while reading it as the story of Hemingway's own personal experiences on the other. Later, this same practice was to lead such critics as Trilling and Wilson to disapprove of Hemingway's impulse toward autobiography and first person narrative while, simultaneously, referring the meaning of all of his works, first person or otherwise, directly back to him as founding subject. Yet no one objected to this double critical standard and the practice on the whole was widely copied.

As long as each book was believed to be intimately bound to its author, it was also, of necessity, intimately bound to every other book the author

had written. This is what led to the treatment of the books as a series of reciprocally related units and what encouraged the critics to turn their attention away from the individual texts in favour of the search for recurrent themes and "the motives and methods that underlie all of his work."[3] A popular offshoot of this practice was for the critics who discerned an underlying motive, method, or recurrent theme, to convert it into a formula (e.g., the Hemingway "code") which could then be brought to bear in a circular fashion on the books from which it had been derived.

The second approach favoured by the early critics, that of making statements from one text the basis for the reading of another, was also a product of the belief that Hemingway was coextensive with his work. As long as it was necessary to refer a book back to its author, the book's meaning was found to change in accordance with whatever knowledge of him was available at the time. In other words, since the individual text had no true beginning nor end except in Hemingway himself, anything he might say or do (whether in his own life or in one of his books) could affect what was thought about that text. This meant that each time a new Hemingway novel or short story appeared the critics were compelled to reexamine his previous work in the light of the new information.

Statements having to do with literature or writing were, as we have seen, more influential than others. They were implicitly believed (Hemingway, it was assumed, knew better than anyone else what he was attempting to achieve) and lent themselves to reapplication to other books. In fact, it was precisely by taking such a statement (the iceberg theory put forth by Hemingway in Death in the Afternoon) and re-

interpreting his other books accordingly, that the shift away from the realist treatment of his texts toward a symbolist approach came about.

The first intimation that Hemingway's writing was not a mere "art of the surface" came in 1933, right on the heels of the publication of Death in the Afternoon, although it was not until the mid-forties, when there was considerable effort to defend Hemingway against attacks on his simplemindedness, and the realist possibilities were being quickly exhausted, that the notion really gained any currency. It was not Hemingway, the symbolists argued, who was simpleminded, but the realist critics themselves. Hemingway's writing should not be taken at face value. The printed words were merely the tip of the iceberg; the real meaning lay submerged in the seven-eighths of the iceberg not given to sight. It was no longer sufficient simply to evaluate what Hemingway had said about the world, the task now was to seek to discover what Hemingway had wanted to say--his intended meaning. Suddenly Hemingway was no longer consubstantial with his work, he was beneath it and anterior to it. The emphasis shifted from literature as a means of representation to literature as a means of expression.

This search for the author's implicit intentions, or hidden meanings, had the effect of throwing the field of Hemingway criticism wide open. The critics found that they were able to attach a broad assortment of meanings to Hemingway's texts, provided that they did so in the name of the author and provided that they could support their readings with evidence from his life and work. It was at this time that disputes began to spring up as to what was "actually in" Hemingway's books, each critic offering a corrective to some other critic's "misunderstanding" of Hemingway's "true" intent and purpose. Thus, while Cowley may have felt that the realists had been mis-

taken in their treatment of Hemingway's work, Griffith, in turn, advanced a corrective to Cowley's view; and although Halliday may have felt it necessary to correct Baker's interpretation, Peterson found it equally important to offer a corrective to Halliday's position, and so forth.

It was perhaps this attempt to recover authorial meaning by working back from the words on the page to the thoughts that were in the author's mind at the time of writing that made possible the psychobiographical approach introduced by Young. Now Hemingway's books signified above and beyond not only the author's explicit intentions, but his implicit intentions as well. The object for the critic was no longer to discover Hemingway's intended meanings, but his unconscious meanings. One result of this new orientation was a marked increase of interest in the "Hemingway hero," for the hero, as a "projection" of Hemingway himself, was also, the critics believed, the embodiment of all of his anxieties, obsessions, compulsions, and so on.

So prevalent was the psychobiographical approach in the late fifties, throughout the sixties, and into the seventies, that even those critics who did not employ the method directly were nevertheless strongly influenced by it. Thus we find that it was no longer necessary that Hemingway himself be consciously aware of the significance of his stories, although all meanings still emanated from him, and it was still imperative that a critic support his interpretation of a text with evidence from the author's personal experience and background. This is what made it possible for a critic such as John Killinger to justify an existentialist reading of Hemingway's work, even though Hemingway himself may not have consciously intended it that way, on the grounds that Hemingway was a product of his age, and his age was that of the great existentialist thinkers.

It was this dependence upon biographical information and the demand it created for personal data on Hemingway that provided a ready market for any and all material that the publishers were able to procure, whether in the form of memoirs, personal reminiscences, biographical notes, or photographs. The concomitant demand for manuscript material was based, in a like manner, on the belief that it served to shed light on Hemingway's creative processes and thereby assisted in the search for his original intentions. Even the posthumous publications themselves were more highly prized for the insight they afforded into the workings of the author's mind than they were for their artistic or literary merit.

The first sustained effort to separate Hemingway "the man" from his work came, as we have noted, with the publication of Wylder's Hemingway's Heroes in 1969. "Sustained" is the key word here, for numerous critics before Wylder, especially McCaffery and Rovit, had recognized the virtues of such a demarcation and had adhered to it in principle, but had always failed in the matter of its practical application. However, a closer look at Wylder's study reveals that, despite his tenacity, he met with only slightly greater success than had his predecessors. For, although he did manage to uphold the distinction between Hemingway and his heroes, thereby succeeding in freeing himself from an explicitly biographical approach, Hemingway "the man" nevertheless remained an abiding and pervasive presence in his criticism. Having begun, for instance, by appealing to Hemingway's "own often vehement objections" to linking him with his protagonists, Wylder once again committed himself to the view that saw the author's own word as supreme. His chapter headings, too, indicate an inability to escape traditional frames of reference,[4] as well as a failure to resist the

custom of referring the individual texts to a larger unity.

Yet, Wylder's attempt to study Hemingway's work without any aid from his biography was, notwithstanding its shortcomings, perhaps the most nearly successful of any such endeavour, including those of his critical successors. Bhim S. Dahiya, for example, having made up his mind to regard each book as "a different phase in the author's growing vision of life," once more yielded to a biographical reading, and Romeo Giger, for whom "the limitations and dangers of a purely biographical approach" were "notorious," nevertheless based his entire reading of Hemingway's work on what he believed to be the "resolute convictions" and profound "aims" of the author.[5]

The extent of this biographical bias and its influence on the critics of the seventies (despite their "own often vehement objections") is clearly revealed in the popular and repeated use of such phrases as "Hemingway sought," "Hemingway wanted," "Hemingway characteristically employed," "his obsessive concern," "his private goal," and so forth. While the critics <u>did</u> make a conscious effort to avoid those approaches requiring biographical support, and <u>did</u> manage to free themselves to some extent of the methods of psychoanalysis and to bring some new and interesting perspectives to bear on the texts, they were still "totally dominated by the sovereignty of the author."[6]

Why was it so difficult for them to adhere to a principle of separation? Why were they unable to abandon their old habits of thought and carry through in the attempt to treat the individual text as something distinct from its author? The problem was that they were trying to change their approach without changing the assumptions upon which it was founded. In other words, although they may have questioned the perspective that saw all of Hemingway's various protagonists as projections of his self, al-

though they may have doubted the efficacy of "a kind of geological descent" from level to lower level of the author's identity when "no one point" could be said "confidently to _be_ irreducible, beginning identity,"[7] and although they may have recognized the need to respect the autonomy and distinctive artistic unity of the individual text, never did they carry their questioning to the level of their own _implicit_ beliefs about the nature of the relationship between the text and the author. As long as they assumed that language in literature was primarily a vehicle of expression, as long as they conceived of the literary text as a translation into words of meanings already present, consciously or unconsciously, in the mind of the author, the author's privileged position, his role as the central and univocal resource of meaning was guaranteed.

But what if it _were_ possible to challenge these assumptions? What would happen to criticism if the belief in the expressive function of literary language were to be called into question? What if writing were something _other_ than the issue of a sovereign writer? What would happen, furthermore, if the representative function of language, its ability to reflect reality were questioned, if the ties that bind the literary text to the real world were no longer taken for granted, or dismissed as being either natural or inevitable? What, in short, would become of criticism if _all_ the assumptions which have for so long governed its operation suddenly lost their virtual self-evidence, if it became possible to _rethink_ the nature of the relationship between the text and the author, to _reconsider_ the relations between literature and the real world? The researches that have been carried out in recent decades in linguistics and related areas have made it possible to do just that, as I intend to demonstrate.

What modern linguistics reveals, first of all, is that the relationship between the literary text and the real world is perhaps not as simple or unproblematic as the early Hemingway critics may have supposed; that in their attempt to define the literary text on the basis of the world to which it refers, they may actually have reversed what most modern linguists would today regard as the correct order of understanding.

A literary text is, from a linguistic standpoint, first and foremost a work of language. It cannot, therefore, be properly understood without a thorough knowledge of the basic properties and modes of operation peculiar to words. Language, according to Ferdinand de Saussure's seminal definition, is made up of a system of differential elements which he calls "signs." The fundamental discovery of structural linguistics is that the linguistic sign results from the union of a "signifier" and a "signified" in a relationship that is, by nature, wholly arbitrary.[8] It is arbitrary, in the first instance, because no necessary connection holds between the signifier and the signified, sound and concept; not that the connection is simply whimsical (we cannot use any word to mean any thing), but the link between the two is purely contractual in principle. Nor does all of the arbitrariness of the sign reside, as is commonly held, within only one of its terms--the signifier. Language thus conceived would be a nomenclature, a series of names arbitrarily selected and attached to a preexistent set of objects which it would then serve to represent. There <u>is</u> no previously determined or independently existing set of objects or order to which language simply refers; rather, language, itself, is responsible for establishing that order: "I am in my room, I <u>see</u> my room; but . . . what am I to <u>say</u> about what I see? A bed? A color? Already I wildly disrupt that continuity which is before my eyes."[9] The order estab-

lished by a linguistic sequence is, moreover, (this is the second way in which signs are arbitrary) always artificial in relation to the simultaneity that it describes. Just as there is no natural, inevitable, or necessary way of dividing up or delimiting the sound spectrum, so too there is no natural, inevitable, or necessary way of dividing up or delimiting the conceptual field. Both signifier and signified are arbitrary divisions of a continuum. What renders foreign languages opaque to one another and so difficult to translate is not so much the differences between words, but the incompatibility of their sequences, the fact that they operate within different conceptual articulations or distinctions. If there were a fixed and universal set of signifieds to which various languages simply assigned words or sounds of their own choosing, translation from one language to another would be greatly simplified.[10]

Once the purely arbitrary nature of signs is recognized, the meanings of words can no longer be understood to reside in their connection to things, but must be sought instead in the underlying system of conventions which is alone responsible for their significance. That is to say, in the absence of a causal link between signifier and signified which would furnish each sign with an intrinsic meaning and allow it to be treated individually, the sign must now be understood to take its value, function, and meaning from the linguistic system to which it belongs.[11] In this sense, signs are always form rather than content, defined negatively on the basis of their relations with other terms in the system, rather than positively on the basis of their own substance. A word achieves meaning through comparison with other words. What is red? Red is what is not blue, green, yellow, orange, etc. "The difference between words gives meaning: the crucial guarantee of meaning in any language is that the differences between words must be

orderly and consistent; in other words, differences must always be systematic."[12] It is because language is systematic and conventional (a collective contract) that it is, at the same time, wholly arbitrary and still a medium of communication.

Language as it is conceived in modern linguistics is quite clearly not at all what it was for the early Hemingway critics, a passive mirror image of reality, a "value-neutral system of representation."[13] Rather, it is a human construct, a practice that man imposes on the world, the meaning of which lies, not elsewhere, but within the system itself. The realist critics were able to dispose of language (i.e., to assign it a purely representative function) only by endowing it with a degree of transparency that it could never achieve from a linguistic standpoint.[14] They were unable to see what language <u>does</u>. They did not recognize that language, and particularly the language of literature, has an <u>institutional</u> relationship to reality, not a natural one.[15] Nor did they see that "the order of words" is separate from and discontinuous with "the order of things" and reconstitutes it only across that difference, and, this being the case, that it is the order of words, not of things, that holds the key to the understanding of the literary text.

If modern linguistic theory permits us to challenge the assumption that the primary function of literature is to represent the world, it also mitigates the belief that literature is principally a phenomenon of expression, a translation into words of meanings already present in the author's mind. For, once it has been understood that language does not simply copy or reproduce reality, but actually operates in such a way as to organize it and render it intelligible, it must also be understood that, far from being a mere functional addition to thought,[16] language establishes

the structure of our primary classifications of reality,[17] the very forms in which we do our thinking. We cannot, therefore, from the start, conceive of the individual, as the critics in the past conceived of the writer, as carrying out his thought in a silent space anterior to words. Language cannot be separated from thought nor thought from language, for it is through language and within it that thought is able to think.[18]

Language, moreover, is never original. Far from being the free invention of the individual who speaks or writes more or less as he pleases, language is, by virtue of its conventional nature, a collective contract (a transpersonal phenomenon) and it is <u>always</u> given in advance. The "individual by himself cannot either create it or modify it."[19] He can, of course, produce new combinations of signs, but his utterances will be understood only inasmuch as they are already virtually contained within the system.[20] The individual thus "comes into a world full of language . . . there is no reality not already classified by men: to be born is nothing but to find the code ready-made and to be obliged to accomodate oneself to it."[21] The structure of the individual's primary classifications of reality, the forms in which he will do his thinking, are functions of a system that preexists him, a legacy inherited from a previous and different history,[22] for which he is not responsible, but which he must nevertheless "accept in its entirety if he wishes to communicate."[23] Furthermore, the laws governing language, the rules and constraints to which the individual submits himself in his assimilation of the system, operate at a level that escapes his conscious grasp.[24] In relation to the language that he speaks the position occupied by the individual is thus one of total subordination. "Expressing their thoughts in words of which they are not the masters . . . men believe that their

speech is their servant and do not realize that they are submitting themselves to its demands."[25]

Linguistics thus places "drastic limitations upon the idea of man as the author of his work."[26] The thinking subject is henceforth deprived of his role as the source of meaning; he is no longer necessarily the most important condition of his work.[27] He writes it, certainly, but he can do so only because he is "already inserted" in a system. Literature, from this perspective, can no longer be conceived as the "majestically unfolding manifestation" of individual genius.[28] "The writer does not 'wrest' speech from silence, as we are told in pious literary hagiographies, but inversely, and how much more arduously, more cruelly and less gloriously, detaches a secondary language from the slime of primary languages afforded him by the world, history, his existence, in short by an intelligibility which pre-exists him,"[29] the rules and principles of which he is largely unaware.

Whether literature is regarded primarily as a representation of the world (positivism) or primarily as the expression of a subjectivity (logocentrism) it will, in either case, always be treated not as something that exists in its own right, but as "the result or trace of something else."[30] The critic governed by either one of these assumptions will always look upon a literary text as a manifestation in words of some anterior design or totality of meaning and, consequently, will be led to seek its meaning not within it, but beneath it, in its origin (the world or the author) which is also for him its true signified.[31] He will always, in other words, assume that beneath the text he is reading and in the silence preceding it "there runs the sovereignty of an original Text,"[32] and that this "original" text is the true object of his analysis.

The difference between the positivist critic and the logocentric critic is that for the former the text can always only signify one thing--the real. His task, therefore, is not to seek to "uncover" meanings, but, as we have seen, to evaluate them, to determine, for instance, the worthiness of the theme, or the virtue of its moral code. For the latter critic, on the other hand, the "original" of the text, its pure signified, is no longer a determined element. There is never any doubt that such an original exists, but it is now veiled and obscure, buried deep within the consciousness of the author. The "original" text no longer merely provides a foundation for the commentary, it now offers itself as the goal of commentary.[33] Criticism becomes a mode of decipherment, an attempt using whatever tools are available to reconstitute the "true" text. Once this has been accomplished, once the "original" has been found, the task of interpretation, it must be assumed, is complete.

It is not without reason that this terminal stage of interpretation must remain conjectural. We have already noted the extent to which the critics in the past battled over what they believed to be the "correct" reading of Hemingway's work. At no point in the history of criticism on The Sun Also Rises do we find a truly definitive reading of the text, one that satisfies all readers and all critics, and that puts an end, once and for all, to the question "What does the text mean?" For some Hemingway critics this endless proliferation of critical writing is simply the inevitable outgrowth of what Young has described as "the Publish/Perish thing;"[34] for others, it is only proof that The Sun Also Rises is founded on "a special basis of ambiguity,"[35] and that any interpretation of the text refers to a rather unreliable nar-

rator. But, if the goal of interpretation has never been reached, if the critics of The Sun Also Rises have been unable to settle upon a definitive reading of the text, it may be that there is another, more elemental, explanation for the failure.

We have already noted the extent to which the shift away from the realist perspective liberated the critic. As ultimate source and final reference, the author, it is true, still acted as a limit beyond which the critic could not go if he wished his interpretation to constitute a "valid" reading of the text, but the author as limit could, nevertheless, be made to fulfill a virtually limitless number of functions: wounded hero, existentialist philosopher, expressionist, impressionist, and so forth. In fact, if we go back and examine Hemingway's "intentions" as they have appeared in various critical discussions over the course of the years, we discover that they vary in accordance with current intellectual trends. The author, in other words, far from being a given is always constituted after the fact, by particular operations carried out by the critic himself.[36]

It would thus appear that if interpretation has been unable to accomplish itself, it is simply that what lies beneath a text, the source of the interpretation is, in the end, nothing but the interpreter himself.[37] In other words, the critic's reading of a text depends largely on what he brings to bear on the text, his point of view, which is, in turn, conditioned by his place in history. (A realist reading, too, is the product of a certain historical stance and therefore must be regarded merely as one interpretation among others.) As long as intellectual trends continue to change, as long as a critic can approach a literary work with a new or different set of expectations, the process of inter-

pretation will, we must assume, never end, and the notion of a fixed and eternal meaning found in the "original" text is illusory.

We can, perhaps, at this juncture, begin to distinguish a third set of assumptions which have served to govern critical practice in the past; assumptions that concern the relations neither between the text and the world, nor between the text and its author, but between the text and the critic. The critic in the past never devoted a great deal of attention to his own activity; this was perhaps a by-product of an interpretative strategy which always gave priority to origins rather than destinations.[38] The critic always assumed an unproblematic view of the relationship between himself and the "object" of his study. He routinely cast himself in the secondary role of an "attendant upon 'creative' literature."[39] The critic was simply the "faithful commentator" whose task it was to tell "more <u>about</u> the work." He always, in fact, took great pains to remove himself from his work, to project an "objective" attitude (already this contradiction in terms is symptomatic of the problems involved) by erasing all of those elements which might reveal his grounding in a particular time and place or betray his preferences in controversy.[40]

If, however, this characterization of the critic as a mere "attendant upon 'creative' literature" were accurate, if he did not actively participate in the production of meaning, but simply recounted meanings that were already present in the text, wouldn't his commentary be reduced to a mere recitation? Isn't telling more <u>about</u> the text immediately saying something <u>other than</u> the text? Isn't this precisely the paradox of interpretation; that it "gives the opportunity to say something other than the text itself, but on the condition that it is the text itself which is uttered and, in some ways, finalised"?[41] And what about the critic's so-

called "objectivity"? Isn't he always profoundly committed to his own time? Can he hope to construct his criticism other than on the basis of the language afforded him by the age in which he lives? Haven't we just seen that it is precisely by virtue of changes in intellectual trends and the extent to which the critic himself is influenced by these changes that criticism is able to sustain and renew itself? Doesn't the critic, therefore, by suppressing all of those elements in his work which might serve as reminders of his historical and subjective existence (they are the same thing)[42] remove, in effect, the very support and foundation of his work?

How, moreover, could the critic in the past reconcile a resolute belief in his own neutrality and detachment from his work with an equally resolute belief that the meaning of any work of literature had, necessarily, to be referred back to its author as original source and final reference, an author who was, furthermore, always believed to be deeply influenced by the age in which he lived? "By what miracle would the profound communication which most critics postulate between the work and the author cease in relation to their enterprise and their epoch? Are there laws of creation valid for the writer but not for the critic?"[43] Can the critic, by casting himself in a subordinate role, claim immunity from the pressures and constraints that confront the writer? In what way is the critic's language any different from the writer's language? How can the critic suppose that his word is the last word, that his is a language no longer in need of interpretation?

The failure of past critics to address themselves to these questions should not, however, be regarded simply as a matter of incompetence or indifference. The problem was that their very definition of criticism precluded the possibility of asking them. For, just as language disap-

pears in its role as representation, so too does criticism disappear in its role as "faithful commentary." It is only when criticism begins to be perceived as something that exists in its own right, when it is no longer simply defined on the basis of the object which it describes, that the necessity of asking these questions arises.

The discussion has been limited thus far to those critics whose concerns were primarily thematic. It could therefore be argued that if they looked elsewhere than in the text for its meaning, if they seemed always to wish to jump over the text toward what it signified, if they failed to treat the issue of language, it was simply that these things were not their concern; they were, rather, the concern of the stylisticians. Yet, as the complement of the study of theme, the study of style arises from a similar ground of possibility, depends on parallel assumptions, and faces analogous problems.

To begin with, stylistics, like thematics, is based on the assumption that language is a set of devices, a more or less masterable instrument for communicating a preexistent content. This is why, in most discussions of Hemingway's style, we are presented with the image of a craftsman who, having served his apprenticeship as a newspaper reporter, has learned to wield his words, the "tools" of his trade, with a greater or lesser (depending on the individual critic's point of view) degree of skill and economy. Moreover, since style is generally considered to be "the mark of the man," stylistics, no less than thematics, is largely dependent upon the notion of the author as its ultimate source and final reference. This explains why most studies of Hemingway's style, with the exception of those carried out under the auspices of the New Criticism, prove, in the final analysis, to be no

more than further investigations into the author's personality.

The stylisticians did deal to some extent with the issue of language, but, as the study of the particular mode of expression characteristic of an individual author or school, stylistics, by definition, is not at all concerned with the fundamental categories of language (its deep structure), for these, as we have seen, are neither determined by the individual nor subject to modification by him. In fact, since the stylisticians were interested in language only to the extent to which the individual could vary it to suit his own purposes, they were, of necessity, constrained in their dealings to the secondary forms and figures of language--its surface. When they spoke of Hemingway's "distrust of words," an observation which constituted the point of departure for most discussions of his style, they did not, therefore, intend it in the profound sense of an "order of words" fundamentally different from and discontinuous with an "order of things," but in the sense of a personal reaction on the part of the author to the false rhetoric of his age. Words could be made to lie, but they could also tell the truth. How else could the critics account for the fact that this difficulty with words had no effect insofar as their own practice was concerned, unless they assumed, once again, that there were "laws of creation valid for the writer but not for the critic;" that their language was somehow different from the writer's and thus exempt from its problems.

The New Critics, although careful to avoid the "biographical fallacy" and concentrate instead on the self-identity and concrete particularity of the individual text, nevertheless shared with critics from other schools similar assumptions about the relationship between the text and

the critic. Their decision to treat the text as a completed and independently existing object demonstrates a commitment to a critical strategy that once again fails to take into account the knowledge of the reader, his expectations as an individual with a particular past and a grounding in a specific time and place, and his contribution to the creative process.

The critics of the seventies, likewise, still assumed an unproblematic view of the relationship between text and critic, despite their eschewal of the more traditional frames of reference, their concentration on those aspects of the text not fully dependent upon the notion of an individual creator, and their growing awareness that there is more to language than the study of style can comprehend. Continuing to regard themselves merely as "faithful commentators," they were unable to see the necessity of expanding their questioning of the nature of language and its implications for the meaning of a particular text to their own work and their own writing, to see how it might affect both their approach to and treatment of literature in general.

If, however, owing to the radical exploration of language that has been carried out in recent decades, it is no longer possible for us to accept without question the assumptions which have for so long governed critical practice; if we find ourselves unable to support the view that sees the author as the primary object of textual analysis, or the critic as a mere "attendant upon 'creative' literature;" if, in short, we cannot maintain criticism in the forms in which it has been given in the past, this does not necessarily mark the end of literary criticism. On the contrary, it establishes the possibility of a new beginning for criticism, the potential to transform it on the basis of the knowledge that is now available and recast it into forms more compatible with our present situation.[44]

In the following chapter I would like to introduce three such forms as they have been set forth by the prominent French critics ("critic" is used here in the widest sense of the word) Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault. We will see how they have been able, through their redefinitions (or, as Derrida would prefer, "dedefinitions") to revolutionize critical practice. We will investigate the implications that each of their strategies, in turn, has for the ways in which we can read and understand literature in general and The Sun Also Rises in particular. Equally important, however, we will also, by conscientiously questioning the fundamental principles upon which each of these practices is based, and by extending this questioning to the very limit of our present understanding, be able to explore the process of change itself. This process is central, not only to my thesis, but also to our perception of The Sun Also Rises, a novel which is, as I intend to demonstrate, very much concerned with the notion of the dissolution of the old order, and the various possibilities opened by such an event.

III

New Possibilities (and Impossibilities)

The purpose of this final chapter is to show what happens when we approach The Sun Also Rises on the basis of a self-conscious understanding of our critical assumptions. As an axis for three successive readings of the novel, I have chosen to deal with the approaches of Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, because their works result from the constant reassessment of their position and because they represent, as well, a particular continuity of intention. In their distinctive fashion, each is preoccupied with the operations of culture and with a wide range of issues that can potentially enliven our appreciation of Hemingway's novel. By questioning their own assumptions as critics, by being aware of their own role as conditioned by their historical situation, Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault make possible a series of critical reorientations through which it is possible to rethink, as we said above (p. 46), the relationship that holds between text and author and between literature and the real world. This achievement, in itself, warrants our attention, but it is especially pertinent when brought to bear on a novel such as The Sun Also Rises that embodies the same critique of the assumptions of its time.

The writings of Roland Barthes form the central platform of the "methodological movement" that has come to be known as French structuralism, a movement that can be defined in its simplest terms as "a method for the study of cultural artifacts which originates in the methods of contemporary linguistics."[1] Structure, as Barthes conceives

it, is not at all what it was for such critics as Farquhar, Schneider, and Brenner: a mere "heuristic instrument, a method of reading, a characteristic particularly revelatory of content."[2] Nor does structural analysis, although it originates in the methods of contemporary linguistics, bear much of a resemblance to the type of linguistic description found in comparative and transformational analyses.

Founded upon the Saussurian discovery of the purely conventional nature of all sign systems, structuralism takes as its object "the strictly human process by which men give meaning to things."[3] Structural man, says Barthes in "The Structuralist Activity" (his manifesto for structuralism), "listens for the natural in culture, and constantly perceives in it not so much stable, finite, 'true' meanings as the shudder of an enormous machine which is humanity tirelessly undertaking to create meanings without which it would no longer be human."[4] The problem, for Barthes, is that there is a widespread tendency to ignore the workings of the "enormous machine" and to see, instead, the cultural and hence artificial meanings which it produces as being spontaneous, natural and inevitable. This prediliction for confusing nature and culture is due in part, as Saussure explains, to the fact that language, although arbitrary (a collective contract), is always a legacy and consequently "is, as it were, naturalized;"[5] but it is also, as Barthes tells us, a peculiarly bourgeois phenomenon. Both bourgeois society and the mass culture issuing from it "demand signs which do not look like signs."[6] They constantly seek to mask their constructed meanings under the appearance of a given meaning, to transform the historical products of their own system into "essential types."

Barthes calls any such semiological system that has the pretension

of transforming itself into a factual system "myth."[7] Myth is "depoliticized" speech (with an active value given to the prefix "de-").[8] The function of myth, writes Barthes, is to purify things: "it makes them innocent, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact."[9] By transforming history into nature, myth thereby "abolishes the complexity of human acts . . . it organizes a world without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident."[10]

The task of the writer, according to Barthes, is to resist myth as much as possible, "to recognize signs for what they are: that is to say, not to mistake them for natural phenomena and to proclaim them rather than conceal them."[11] The problem with the writers in the past is that they yielded all too readily to the myths of their society. They presented their readers with a predigested version of the world, with events that were filtered through a preconceived network of cultural, moral, and intellectual references.[12] Barthes advises that the individual who wishes to write today must fight against these "ancestral and all-powerful signs." He must endeavour to disturb the language we speak, denounce the grammatical habits of our thought, and dissipate the myths that animate our words.[13] He must labour not only to dissect or decompose, but to "disarticulate," to "undo nomination." "We often hear it said that it is the task of art to express the inexpressible; it is the contrary which must be said (with no intention of paradox): the whole task of art is to unexpress the expressible . . ."[14] The first condition of literature is thus, according to Barthes, "to produce an indirect language: to name things in detail in order not to name their ultimate meaning;"[15] to name their "ultimate meaning" would be to submit once again to myth. And,

"the best way for language to be indirect is to refer as constantly as possible to objects and not to their concepts,"[16] to fragment names (e.g., Marxism, Brechtism, capitalism, etc.) into practices ("words which are not Names").[17]

It is for this reason that Robbe-Grillet is, from a structuralist point of view, a truly exemplary writer. His work, says Barthes, "is in a sense cathartic: he purges things of the undue meaning men ceaselessly deposit upon them."[18] The visual rigour and precision which characterizes Robbe-Grillet's writing has a purely negative motive. It is an attempt "to release things from human signification, to correct them of metaphor and anthropomorphism," to institute "precisely the human nothing of the object."[19] If qualification in his work is always spatial or situational and in no case analogical, it serves, likewise, to attack the "adjectival film" which things accumulate over the years (the adjective, Barthes tells us, always serves the purpose of ideology more than it does that of description), and thereby to induce in the reader "the euphoria of a reconstituted unity."[20] Robbe-Grillet's visual analysis is, says Barthes, "an anti-coagulent operation."[21] His aim, ultimately, is to succeed in designating the "unalienable meaning" of things,[22] "the notorious Dasein (being there) of the object."[23] He wishes "to return consciousness to an apprehension of the world as it might have been before human consciousness appeared in it, a world of things which is neither orderly nor disorderly but which simply is what it appears to be."[24]

And if, as Barthes points out, Robbe-Grillet makes a theoretical error in supposing that there is, indeed, a Dasein of things antecedent and exterior to language,[25] this in no way diminishes his writing. For the

function of literature, as the structuralists understand it, is not to "execute" but to "formulate,"[26] to produce a writing that at one and the same time designates and keeps silent, that is "emphatically signifying, but never fully signified."[27] And this, Robbe-Grillet, with his "matte descriptions of objects," his "anecdotes narrated on the surface,"[28] his empty forms, accomplishes with a perfection of sorts. His writing no longer belongs to a representative order but to a productive one. It "irresistably invites a content."[29] It demands "a practical collaboration" by the reader.[30] The meaning of a literary work cannot, says Barthes, "be created by the work alone; the author never produces anything but presumptions of meaning, forms, and it is the world which fills them."[31] In other words, there is in literature no final signified behind the various signifying elements which constitute a text. Barthes, here, proposes a decisive shift in the orientation of criticism. For him, a text's meaning does not lie "in this or that interpretation but in the diagrammatic totality of its readings, in their plural system."[32]

The new task of the critic faced by the literary text is no longer to seek to decipher it, to attempt to reduce a work to a unilateral signification, but, on the contrary, "to appreciate what plural constitutes it."[33] The structuralist views the text not in terms of mimesis, but of semiosis. That is to say, it is before all else a system of signs. Its meaning cannot therefore be sought either in its connection to the real world or in any intrinsic message or content, but only within its system. The meanings, writes Barthes, that we find in a text are established not by "us" or by others, "but by their systematic mark." The only proof of a reading is "the quality and endurance of its

systematics . . . its functioning."[34] Consequently, the critic's task is to reconstruct the system in which the work functions.[35] The text becomes a kind of music, "the structure of which is more important than any propositional content that might be extracted by logical analysis."[36] On this basis, Barthes can say that in literature "technique is the very being of all creation," that it is "the way that makes the work."[37]

When dealing with systems, the only relevant relations are those that obtain within it, so that the critic inspired by Barthes must attempt to describe the text entirely from within, without recourse to extra-textual support, thereby avoiding the risks of subjectivity and objectivity, both of which are in any case, Barthes tells us, imaginary.[38] Neither history nor biography should concern the critic. At whatever the level of reading, the author must be assumed to be absent; not only because his function is dissolved and taken up by the system that operates through him, but also, as Barthes explains, as a prerequisite to the proper appreciation of the text. "Once the author is removed, the claim to decipher the text becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. . . . In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be <u>disentangled</u>, nothing deciphered; the structure can be followed, 'run' (like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is nothing beneath: the space of the writing is to be ranged over, not pierced . . ."[39] To divest a work of its author is thus simultaneously to liberate it and to "demystify" it--to dispossess it of its "false interiority," its "secret" content. Where critics in the past conceived of a text as a "ready-made veil" that concealed meaning, the structuralist now emphasizes that the text

is nothing other than the veil itself, its surface.[40]

Whether for the artist or the critic (both, Barthes points out, are writers), the structuralist task is to describe "the order of thought, not its substance,"[41] to establish the conditions of content, not the content itself, to discover how something works and how it hangs together. Barthes's objective is succinctly stated in "The Structuralist Activity": "the artist, the analyst recreates the course taken by meaning, he need not designate it . . . like the ancient soothsayer, he speaks the locus of meaning but does not name it."[42]

The whole of Barthes's itinerary as a critic can thus be summed up in a single injunction: question your assumptions; and this demand that begins by questioning the very language we use leads to an inversion of the way we understand literature.

On this basis we can turn to The Sun Also Rises,[43] where we find not only that Jake Barnes has a great deal in common with the structuralists, but that the text as a whole serves as an excellent illustration of Barthes's principles in operation. Throughout The Sun Also Rises, we are frequently reminded of Jake's difficulty with words, of the incapacity of language to serve the purpose of representation, and of the risks involved in verbalization. There is a great deal of talk in the book, yet rarely is anything actually articulated. Conversation is stripped and bare, providing the merest outline of a possible meaning. This abbreviation of form is manifested visually in a dialogue which is lengthened and extended vertically and which usually functions in such a way that meaning is produced, not by the word alone, but by an interplay of words, as the utterances of one speaker deflect off of those of another, as if

to underscore the fact that words do not have any intrinsic meaning but are granted fleeting intelligibility in the system that relates them. In this economy of speech names would be a mere obstruction; to assign a speaker would be to interrupt the flow, to create a buffer that would check the interplay of words and undermine the workings of the system:

> "Don't be an ass."
> "Can't do it."
> "Right. Send him a tender message?"
> "Anything. Absolutely."
> "Good night, darling."
> "Don't be sentimental."
> "You make me ill."
> . . .
> "You don't have to go."
> "Yes." (p. 34)

This type of oblique talk is, as Jake points out, particularly characteristic of the British upper classes whose spoken language must, he says, "have fewer words than the Eskimo" (p. 149). The British rely on a system of differentiation based not on a multiplicity of words but on a multiplicity of intonation. This technique of using "one phrase to mean everything" (p. 149) is carried to an extreme by Brett Ashley whose talk is often reduced to the ". . . . . ." (p. 64) of the drummer's chant. Talking, she suggests on more than one occasion, is "all bilge," and she is frequently found begging for silence, particularly when she is alone with Jake. When she <u>does</u> speak, her talk is the prototype of the "unfulfilled system of signification":[44]

> "I should like to hear you really talk, my dear. When you talk to me you never finish your sentences at all."
> "Leav'em for you to finish. Let anyone finish them as they like."
> "It is a very interesting system," the count reached down and gave the bottles a twirl. "Still I would like to hear you talk sometime." (pp. 58-59)

In the event that Brett <u>does</u> wish to make a point, to communicate some-

thing unequivocally, she does not rely on words alone, but always reinforces the verbal signification with an accompanying physical gesture:

> "Love you? I simply turn all to jelly when you touch me." (p. 26)
> We kissed goodnight and Brett shivered. (p. 34)
> "I hate him too," she shivered. (p. 182)
> "How can I stop it? I can't stop things. Feel that?"
> Her hand was trembling.
> "I'm like that all through." (p. 183)

This trick of using a physical sign or gesture to convey a message is not, however, peculiar to Brett. Throughout the text it is the nod, the glance, the physical touching that is the hallmark of the truly genuine feeling or understanding. "Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent." Most of the characters in the novel would seem to take Wittgenstein's injunction seriously.[45] It is considered bad form to attempt to articulate certain things, a sign that the speaker is not wholly sincere, that he is trying to simulate a feeling that he doesn't really have. Bullfighters without <u>aficion</u>, for instance, write the most flattering inscriptions on their photographs. (It says a great deal for Montoya's character that one day he decides that he simply doesn't want these photographs with their false sentiments around any longer, and drops the whole lot into a waste-basket [p. 132]). It is as if there are certain things that cannot withstand verbal translation, that cannot undergo the process without being in some way corrupted or falsified. To speak something is to rob it of its specificity, to make it the property of others, to threaten its individuality under the weight of an accepted ready-made formula. Thus, when Brett begins to tell Jake about her experience with Romero, he stops her. "You'll lose it if you talk about it." "I'll just talk around it," she responds (p. 245).

Just as important as knowing when to keep silent is knowing how to say something when you say it. Harvey Stone can say some singularly insulting things to Cohn without it bothering Jake in the least. Jake can, in fact, go on to tell Cohn that he is fond of Harvey and that Cohn shouldn't "get sore at him" (p. 44). But when Frances attempts to do the same thing, Jake is sickened and disgusted: "I don't know how people could say such terrible things to Cohn" (p. 49). Later in the story, when it is Mike's turn to badger Cohn, the problem, once again, does not lie with what he is trying to say, since everybody shares his attitude, but with the fact, as Brett points out, that he "put it so badly" (p. 160).

Jake likes the way the English speak and in turn cultivates his own form of indirection. He is distinguished in conversation by his heavy use of irony, a verbal strategy which emphasizes the discrepancy between language and experience, and which permits him to express things at a distance, thereby dissociating himself from the words he speaks. His narrative technique is one of expressive suggestion, reproducing on a larger scale Brett's system of unfinished sentences. He will give the reader no more than is absolutely essential to the comprehension of any given scene or event, presenting the reader with all those elements that bear a significant function, but withholding the signification itself. This type of oblique construction can be found, for instance, in his description of Georgette: "She grinned and I saw why she made a point of not laughing. With her mouth closed she was a rather pretty girl" (p. 15); or again, in his description of Brett: "He was standing talking to Brett, who was sitting on a high stool, her legs crossed. She had no stockings on" (p. 78). It also, however, functions in a wider sense in terms of

the narrative as a whole--for which no rationale is given, no conclusions are reached, and no meaning is fulfilled, thus making it, at every level, precisely what Barthes would call a "suspended" meaning.

Many of the significant structures that can be located within the text are recurrent, i.e., repeated under various guises over the course of the book. The basic anatomy of Jake's encounter on the Boulevard des Capuccines is an example: "I passed the man with the jumping frogs and the man with the boxer-toys. I stepped aside to avoid walking into the threads with which the girl assistant manipulated the boxers" (p. 35). This structure, having already been presented in Jake's account of Cohn (the boxer) being "taken in hand" by Frances (a "very forceful" lady) (p. 5), is repeated in the scene in the café in which Frances baits Cohn while Jake sits by (pp. 48-51), and also reappears in the many scenes in which Brett is found manipulating her various male admirers. The essential constitution of the scene in which the bulls are unloaded and the steers attempt to quiet them (pp. 138-40) is another example of a repeated structure, duplicated many times in the text as Jake and his friends take turns diverting each other from one course of action or another in their efforts to keep things on a even keel.

The arbitrary nature of language, and indeed all human systems of signification or understanding, is underscored in a number of ways throughout the text. We see it, for instance, in Georgette's reaction to the window full of clocks (supposed to "show the hour all over America" [p. 15]) in the New York Herald bureau--certainly a palpable display of man's efforts to impose a human reality on the world, and a spectacle which she finds rather ludicrous. However, it is through the character of Bill Gorton that the essentially arbitrary nature of sign systems is given its

most pointed expression. Bill takes great pleasure in ridiculing all the easy formulas with which men think they can master the world and experience. His reinterpretation of American Civil War history along sexually deviant lines ("Abraham Lincoln was a faggot. He was in love with General Grant. So was Jefferson Davis. Lincoln just freed the slaves on a bet" [p. 116]), and his facile reversal of the chicken and egg theory ("Gentlemen . . . I reverse the order. For Bryan's sake. As a tribute to the Great Commoner. First the chicken; then the egg" [p. 121]) make a mockery of man's efforts to impose some kind of order and logic on history, and call attention to the piteously tenuous nature of man's explanations. His early morning "Irony and Pity" banter (pp. 113-14), likewise, can be viewed as a commentary on all the pigeon-hole thinkers and their cursory precepts for art and literature. Bill shares with Jake a perennial distrust of the myth-makers, the disseminators of common opinion and cliché. Thus Mencken and those whose tastes he dictates ("So many young men get their likes and dislikes from Mencken" [p. 42]), as well as the American and English tourists, with their prepackaged tastes and interests, are the butt of numerous jibes. Bill's "pie-eyed" prattle on the subject of stuffed animals (pp. 72-74) serves, in a like manner, to underscore the discontinuity between nature and culture, for it implies that language can admit things only as things of language, that stuffed animals ("Going to give all my friends stuffed animals. I'm a nature-writer" [p. 74]) are, in effect, the only animals the nature writer has to offer.

We are given further evidence of the distortion that words operate on things in the story of Belmonte, the torero whom myth has transformed into a "stuffed" (so to speak) bullfighter: "When he retired the legend

grew up about how his bullfighting had been, and when he came out of retirement the public were disappointed because no real man could work as close to the bulls as Belmonte was supposed to have done, not, of course, even Belmonte" (p. 214). The same is true of Madam Lecomte's restaurant, which, having been put on the American Women's Club list as "a quaint restaurant on the Paris quais as yet untouched by Americans" (p. 76), now has a waiting list of forty-five minutes and serves apple pie for dessert.

The sheer arbitrariness of language, the fact that different languages differentiate differently, is illustrated in the discussion involving Jake, Romero, and the bullfighting critic on the translation of various bullfighting terms into different languages: "He was anxious to know the English for Corrida de toros, the exact translation. Bull-fight he was suspicious of. I explained that bull-fight in Spanish was the lidia of a toro. The Spanish word corrida means in English the running of the bulls--the French translation is Course de tauraux. The critic put that in. There is no Spanish word for bull-fight" (p. 173).

In direct contrast to Bill and Jake, with all their keen sensitivity to and sophisticated understanding of sign systems, there stands, of course, Robert Cohn. Cohn's most distinguishing personal trait is his consummate inability to recognize signs for what they are. Unable to distinguish between reality and the words with which man is constantly dressing it up, he spends most of his time furiously seeking a reality to correspond to his vocabulary and, failing that, can only try ineffectually "to punch the face of an indifferent world"[46] (much the same way that the spectators at the bullfight, expecting a legend and getting only a man, are reduced to shouting down insults at Belmonte's "utterly

contemptuous and indifferent face" [p. 214]).

It is this incapacity to differentiate between the cultural and the natural that causes Cohn to behave so badly, not simply because he insists on idealizing Brett into his "lady love," but also because he fails to recognize the signs that those around him are constantly directing at him. The first evidence of this difficulty with words is given in the opening scene. Jake has discovered that the best way to get rid of friends who drop by while he is trying to work is to invite them for a drink, after which "all you had to say was: 'Well, I've got to get back and get off some cables,' and it was done" (p. 11). (It is interesting to note, here, his observation that in the newspaper business it is "an important part of the ethics that you should never seem to be working" [p. 11], i.e., news must not look like something you make, but something you find.) But, Jake's scheme simply doesn't work with Cohn:

> "Well," I said, "I've got to go up-stairs and get off some cables."
> "Do you really have to go?"
> "Yes, I've got to get these cables off."
> "Do you mind if I come up and sit around the office?" (p. 12)

The same pattern is repeated time and time again as the various characters try, each in his own oblique (or not so oblique) way, to make Cohn "go away," only to find that he has been completely oblivious to their efforts.

Cohn is a prime example of "man mired in his systems of signification."[47] He looks at everything through a thick fog of culturally determined values, and, moreover, is helpless to recognize his own predicament. Thus, a cathedral that is "nice and dim" from Jake's point of view is, for Cohn, "a very good example of something or other"--Jake forgets what (p. 90).

Cohn's conviction that Anatole France isn't any good is not, Frances points out, based on his own experience of the literature (he doesn't read French very well) but on the fact that some of his French friends have told him so. His passion for South America comes from W. H. Hudson's The Purple Land, and his incapacity to enjoy Paris, according to Jake, "probably came out of a book too" (p. 12). (An analogy to Cohn's situation is provided by the ethnological experiment described by Barthes in "Literal Literature": "the film Underwater Hunt is shown to black students in the Congo and Belgian students; the former offer a purely descriptive summary of what they have seen, precise, concrete, without affabulation; the latter, on the contrary, betray a great visual indigence, they have difficulty recalling details, they make up a story, seek certain literary effects, try to produce affective states.")[48]

Jake, in contrast to Cohn (and the Belgian students), makes every effort to thwart any sort of "spontaneous birth of drama"; for him (as for the Congolese) the precision of the spectacle "absorbs all its potential interiority."[49] His appreciation of Paris is resolutely "de-mythified," an attempt to experience his surroundings directly, without falling back on any previously established knowledge. When he walks through the city it is "with no other horizon but the spectacle before him, no other power than that of his own eyes."[50] Paris is, for him, above all, a physical place filled with streets, parks, trees, restaurants, bars, and so forth, each designated by its proper name and that name alone. Like Robbe-Grillet, descriptive embellishment in Jake's narrative is always held to a minimum. Qualification is spatial and situational, rarely analogical. His descriptions rely heavily on colour, usually primary, as a means of differentiation. He eschews the more subtle connectors such as "if,"

"unless," "although," "whereas,"--anything that might imply causes, sophisticated concepts, or intellectualizations--in preference for the more noncommittal "and." When he describes a place or view the only power binding the various elements together, the only link between them, is his own eye as it traverses the scene: "Then we crossed a wide plain, and there was a big river off on the right shining in the sun from between the trees, and away off you could see the plateau of Pamplona rising out of the plain, and the walls of the city, and the great cathedral, and the broken skyline of the other churches. In back of the plateau were the mountains, and every way you looked there were other mountains, and ahead the road stretched out white across the plain going toward Pamplona" (pp. 93-94). Jake is able to resist myth by remaining rooted in the concrete and the elemental, the here and now. His is not the language of W. H. Hudson, with its rhetorical flourishes and decorative finery; rather it is that of Turgenev, of the sportsman, a language which is, from beginning to end, <u>functionally absorbed</u>.

The similarity between Jake's point of view and that of the structuralists is perhaps given its most concrete expression in Jake's statement, "I did not care what it was all about. All I wanted to know was how to live in it. Maybe if you found out how to live in it you learned from that what it was all about" (p. 148). For the moment he, like Barthes, is content with "collecting and unravelling systems,"[51] with finding out how things work, not what they might ultimately mean. Thus we find that he is always intensely interested in how to do a thing. He knows how to write for good bullfight tickets, he reserves the best rooms in the best hotels at the best price, he knows what restaurants to eat in (or whom to ask when he is in an unfamiliar city), where to shop, and how to get his

money's worth. He has a sense of professionalism about his work and feels that it is important to learn one's trade.

This same sort of methodical care is also extended to his personal relationships. He is always highly concerned with how to behave "correctly," and shows a certain disdain for those, such as Cohn, who have not learned how to comport themselves in public. Jake knows, for example, that he will lose the fifty-franc note which he leaves with the patronne of the dancing-club as payment for the poule, but he also knows that he has done the "right" thing.

What matters to Jake is the detail of the gesture, not the final outcome of the event, just as in the bullfight the real pleasure for the spectator lies in consciously witnessing how it all happens (the skill of the individual performance), not in the final result (the disembowelment of the horse or the death of the bull).[52] In fact, a great deal can be gleaned about the personalities of the various characters simply by observing how they watch the bullfight. Brett, for instance, is absolutely rivetted, and is described at one point as being totally "absorbed in the professional details" (p. 211):

> "Look how he knows how to use his horns," I said. "He's got a left and a right just like a boxer."
> "Not really?"
> "You watch."
> "It goes too fast."
> "Wait. There'll be another in a minute.
> They had backed up another cage into the entrance. . . . a second bull came out into the corral.
> He charged straight for the steers . . . the two steers turned sideways to take the shock, and the bull drove into one of the steers.
> "Don't look," I said to Brett. She was watching, fascinated.
> "Fine," I said. "If it doesn't buck you."
> "I saw it," she said. "I saw him shift from his left to his right horn." (pp. 139-40)

Cohn, on the other hand, finds it rather rough going:

> "It's all right," Bill said, "so long as you weren't bored."
> "He didn't look bored," Mike said. "I thought he was going to be sick."
> "I never felt that bad. It was just for a minute."
> "I thought he was going to be sick. You weren't bored, were you, Robert?"
> "Let up on that, Mike. I said I was sorry I said it."
> "He was, you know. He was positively green." (p. 166)

It is, in fact, characteristic of Cohn, in contrast to Jake and the others, always to put greater emphasis on the ends than the means. We see this in his work (e.g., buying his position as editor of the review), in his personal relationships (e.g., disposing of Frances with a 200 pound cheque and a one-way ticket to England), but most of all we see it in his boxing, a sport which he has learned, not because he takes any delight in the activity itself, but in order "to counteract the feeling of inferiority and shyness he had felt on being treated as a Jew at Princeton" (p. 3).

If bullfighting holds out a special appeal for Jake it is perhaps because, unlike most other practices, it makes no attempt to conceal the fact of its fabrication. On the contrary, it proclaims it, advertises it in the ritual and ceremony which is so vital to it. Bullfighting constitutes what Barthes would call "an accepted myth," the "conspicuous arbitrariness" of which amounts to "perfection of a kind."[53] And if Jake regards Romero as a truly exemplary bullfighter, it is perhaps because he, in a like manner, makes no attempt to disguise what he does, to render it more profound or inaccessible than it really is: "Romero went on. It was like a course in bull-fighting. All the passes linked up, all completed, all slow, templed and smooth. There were no tricks and no mystifications.

. . . The crowd did not want it ever to be finished" (pp. 219-20).

Jake's attraction to those systems that openly display their codes is seen, too, in his interest in Roman Catholicism, as well as in his preference for life in France over life in Spain. Roman Catholicism (certainly a manifestly codified form of worship) is characterized by Jake as a perfectly "grand" religion, and even though he doesn't necessarily "feel religious" (p. 97), he is nevertheless "technically" a Catholic and finds a certain satisfaction in his conscientious observance of the ritual. In a similar way, he finds France an easier, more comfortable country to live in than Spain because the French system is clearly defined in accordance with unabashedly materialistic principles and thus operates in a reassuringly predictable fashion: "Everything is on such a clear financial basis in France. It is the simplest country to live in. No one makes things complicated by becoming your friend for any obscure reason. If you want people to like you you only have to spend a little money. . . . Life is so simple in France. I felt I was a fool to be going back into Spain. In Spain you could not tell about anything" (p. 233). Yet, if Jake <u>does</u> go back to Spain, returning year after year to the fiesta of San Fermin, it is perhaps for the same reason that Barthes seeks out those systems that attempt to conceal the fact of their fabrication--in order to shatter the myth, to reveal it as construct, to render explicit the rules that hold it together and guide its functioning, and, above all, in order to master it.

The structuralist approach presents a decisively plausible reading of <u>The Sun Also Rises</u>. It isolates systematic relations that suggest new possibilities for reading the novel. Yet, its usefulness for literary

analysis and its eschewal of the assumptions underlying traditional criticism notwithstanding, structuralism is not without certain assumptions or impensés of its own, as some of the more recent investigations into the movement have demonstrated. It is not that structuralism was ever "concerned to last."[54] On the contrary, it knew itself as a historical phenomenon, subject to change and ready to be abandoned when the problems it encountered grew too great. In "Literature and Signification," Barthes says that a critical language must "saturate the entire object of which it speaks." Where resistances are too powerful "they reveal a new problem" and thus oblige the analyst to change his strategy.[55]

That structuralism is, indeed, unable to "saturate the entire object of which it speaks" becomes initially apparent at the moment it is pushed beyond the mere presentation of solitary and discontinuous structures to the definition of the relationship between them; that is to say, at the moment the passage from one structure to another becomes an issue.[56] As long as each structure is conceived as a "monolithic unity" closed in upon itself, the structuralist can account for change, similarity, opposition--any connection between systems--only by enlarging the field of discontinuities by adding a new one. In this "infinite continuum" of distinct unities, all things and all events (including all texts), studied in their individuality, are equally valuable and equally good, and differ from all others only in that they might not have existed.[57]

Chance is another category that is expelled from the structuralist view of things, as are accident, passion, chaos, in short anything that cannot be assimilated "to the lovely numinous order of structure."[58] Having substituted the organization of thought for its substance,

the regularity of a system for direct meaning, order, as Edward Said explains, becomes a limit beyond which it is impossible for the structuralist to go.[59] To allow chance into the system, to "be willing to admit that (a) there are no rules for some situations . . . (b) there is no limit to the number of rules," would be tantamount to suicide for the structuralist for it would ultimately lead to the necessity of believing in (a) an infinite set of elements or (b) "a finally useless catalogue of infinite rules."[60]

Jacques Derrida, one of the first and foremost critics of structuralism, argues that another of its major drawbacks is its total disregard for the notion of force. "Form," he says, "fascinates when one no longer has the power to understand force from within itself. That is, to create."[61] A structural analysis is possible, he claims, "only after a certain defeat of force and within the movement of a diminished ardor . . . impotence separates, disengages and emancipates."[62] This is why structuralism is always a posteriori, "a reflection of the accomplished, the constituted, the constructed."[63] Derrida compares structuralism to the panoragram through which, "Thanks to a more or less openly acknowledged schematization and spatialization, one can glance over a field divested of its forces more freely or diagrammatically."[64] The forces of which the field is divested are, moreover, precisely the content, "the living energy of meaning," which the structuralist must neutralize in order to make "the relief and design of the structures" appear more clearly.[65] ("Somewhat like the architecture of an uninhabited or deserted city, reduced to its skeleton by some catastrophe of nature or art.")[66]

Everything, says Derrida, takes place within structuralism as if it "came to life with the aim of final peace."[67] Not only those things

that cannot be contained within an order, but those things, as well, that defy a geometrical-mechanical framework, that do not comply with the demand for the "flat and horizontal"--force, but also quality, depth, and duration--lie outside the structuralist's domain and, consequently, can only be reduced by him to "the appearance of the inessential."[68]

This necessity of spreading everything out into the simultaneity of a form gives rise to further complications, for, according to Derrida, in his demand for presence and synchronization, the structuralist is likely to overlook one of the most important features of the text--its internal historicity--its operation. That is to say, while keeping to the "legitimate task" of protecting the work from the historical constraints inherent in biographism or psychologism, the structuralist risks losing any attentiveness to another form of history, more difficult to conceive: "This history of the work is not only its past, the eve or sleep in which it precedes itself in an author's intentions, but it is also the impossibility of its ever being present, of its being summarized by some absolute simultaneity or instantaneous. This is why . . . there is no space of the work, if by space we mean presence and synopsis. . . . It seems, for the moment, that if 'literary history' (even when its techniques are renewed by 'Marxism,' 'Freudianism,' etc.) is only a restraint on the internal criticism of the work, then the structuralist moment of that criticism has the counterpart role of being the restraint on the internal geneticism . . ."[69]

Yet another problem with structuralism is that although it claims to reject the notion of a fixed or conclusive meaning for the text, it nevertheless always treats it as a completed object, a formal structure which can be filled in various ways. Furthermore, this rejection of a

full and determinate meaning, which is so vital to structuralist descriptions, can only be an a posteriori operation, despite structuralist claims to the contrary. How can the analyst perceive an organized totality or recognize a configuration without some reference to its meaning, "or without presuming to know its end, at least?"[70] Form, Derrida reminds us, can emerge only as a product of a reading.[71] "When one speaks of the structure of a literary work, one does so from a certain vantage point: one starts with notions of the meaning or effects of a poem and tries to identify the structure responsible for those effects. Possible configurations or patterns which make no contribution are rejected as irrelevant . . ."[72] Thus, while the structuralist claims that he escapes ideology by carrying out his activity at a prior level, ideology, far from being excluded from his analysis, constitutes its initial step.

Derrida calls this "an irreducible area of irreflection and spontaneity"[73] in structuralism. It is the point at which "the structurality of structure" must "begin to be thought,"[74] and it reveals in Barthes's enterprise an internal contradiction of such consequence that, together with the pressure exerted on it from the outside by all those things that it necessarily excludes from itself, ultimately causes it to bring about its own dissolution. For, what Derrida has discovered is that a structure cannot account for itself from within itself; it can offer no rationale for its presence. In order for a structure (an organized play of elements) to come into being, there must first be something, some fixed and stable locus or point of reference, upon which that structure can be founded, something to orient, balance, and regulate it, to govern its operation, determine which combinations of elements are to be permitted and which excluded, and so forth. A structure, in

other words, is always entirely dependent on something outside itself, what Derrida calls a "centre" (which can be thought of variously as origin, end, object, dominant significatum, etc.), whose function is to ground it, govern it, and guarantee its coherence.

However, in the case of language (the structure of structures), no such origin, end, object, or "transcendental signified" is available;[75] "nothing can be ontologically independent of language since we can only locate things in and through linguistic terms."[76] Language never ceases to speak from within itself,[77] and any reference to what precedes it or what is outside of it is, hence, an unknown.[78] If we attempt to recapture the origin, to rediscover that primary, that absolutely initial word, upon which language is founded and made possible, what we find is not the "stumbling sound," the primeval utterance, but only "the previously unfolded possibility of language."[79] The origin is "a silent zero-point locked within itself."[80] It is "hopelessly alien" from the stream of words.[81] Language thus "rests upon an objective foundation which it is not possible to bring to light,"[82] and any belief in language as structure can therefore only be a matter of faith. This fact, alone, strikes at the very heart of the structuralist argument, based, as it is, on the belief that all meaning is constructed, not given to mankind.

What Derrida therefore "undertakes to fix before our mind's eye is the paradox of a structural knowledge which takes order as the unified play of elements (pure signifiers) that do not have a center, or Origin, or dominant significatum."[83] We can easily see how this paradox is manifested in Barthes's work. Although he may posit the discontinuity between words and things, and support the notion of a wholly self-contained, self-

referential language, Barthes is still led, through the example of Robbe-Grillet and his attempt to construct a perfectly transparent and value-neutral language, to seek some kind of fundamental ground, some source and guarantor, to which he can attach his otherwise freefloating set of signifiers. As his adherence to a doctrine of signs based upon a distinction between signifier and signified implies, he is still principally an empiricist, attempting to base his language on things.[84]

It is this demand for a centre, which Derrida calls "presence," that makes structuralism "a tributary of the most purely traditional stream of Western philosophy."[85] Structuralism, Derrida argues, is only a variant of "theology aesthetics." It represents the "rabbinical" interpretation of interpretation, whose goal is final truth, as opposed to the "poetical" interpretation of interpretation, which is the one to which he, himself, subscribes:[86]

> Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play whose other side would be the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of the center. And it plays without security. . . .
>
> There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of onto-theology--in other words, throughout his entire history--has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play.[87]

For Derrida the absence of the origin is purely a liberation. Having been delivered "from their 'supposed' origin in things,"[88] released from any responsibility to a fixed and stable signified, words are free to take on any meaning. The natural support of words is now nothing but other words.[89] Everything becomes discourse, described as "a system where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences."[90]

With the removal of the origin, moreover, all the great inaugural fictions of mankind--not only purpose, unity, and the illusion of progress,[91] but also reason, order, and logic--suddenly evaporate. There is no longer any "right" way to read, nothing to which results ought to correspond, only open, endless interpretation. Derrida thus stresses the active, productive nature of language, the dearth of meaning and the occlusion of truth.[92] A text, for him, is no longer what he calls <u>la trace</u>, the mark of an anterior presence, origin, or master; it is, rather, an "unorganizable energy," a system of forces--of interdependent, differential impulses--whose power does not lie in its polysemousness, but in the possibility of its infinite generality and multiplicity.[93]

The break with those forms of thought (Western thought in general) founded upon the notion of an origin is not, however, as easy as we might suppose. The problem, Derrida tells us, is that although the origin is forever cut off from words, it is, nevertheless, assumed by them. Our language irreducibly belongs to a metaphysics of presence. We have no language, no syntax and no lexicon, which is foreign to it.[94] We cannot utter "a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest."[95] Michel Foucault describes our

predicament well when he writes: "God is perhaps not so much a region beyond knowledge as something prior to the sentences we speak; and if Western man is inseparable from him, it is not because of some invincible propensity to go beyond the frontiers of experience, but because his language ceaselessly foments him in the shadow of its laws: 'I fear indeed that we shall never rid ourselves of God, since we still believe in grammar.'"[96]

The break with the "structure of belonging" therefore requires a strategy; Derrida calls it "deconstruction." Since the language of presence is the only language we have, emancipation from it must be sought from within, by using the means at hand (i.e., the strengths of the field) to turn its own strategems against itself. This is accomplished, as we have seen in Derrida's "deconstruction" of structuralism, by following the "totalizing logic" of a system to its final consequences in order to reveal that point, that excess which cannot be construed within the rules of the system, but which necessarily determines the valorization of that system.[97] Derrida thus works in the spirit of a kind of negative theology.[98] By deconstructing all the institutions that serve to uphold the tyranny of presence, he hopes, ultimately, to succeed in a complete overturning of Western culture.

However, his goal is not to construct simple opposition, to challenge structuralism, for instance, simply by opposing "duration to space, quality to quantity, force to form, the depth of meaning or value to the surface figures."[99] This, he says, would be to submit once again to the system of metaphysical oppositions, the circle without a centre. Nor does he attempt to replace the old ideas with new ones, to provide an alternative apparatus to the one he has destroyed.[100] To imagine another system is,

as Foucault points out, to extend our participation in the present system.[101]

In fact, Derrida tries not to make any positive claims at all. He seeks to possess nothing, to affirm nothing but freeplay itself. Deconstruction is always carried out at the outer limit of a system, at that point which simultaneously closes it off and invites its transgression, and it is precisely this point that is Derrida's true object and end. He says that he wants to remain poised at the edge, at that place where there is "no longer any method or any meditation;"[102] to stand in the open without the armour of a system in order to be able to experience the marvellous "illumination of multiplicity itself."[103] "I am trying," he writes, "precisely to put myself at a point so that I do not know any longer where I am going."[104]

Moving beyond the impensē of structuralism, through Derrida, leads to another reorientation in our reading of The Sun Also Rises. The most dramatic consequence is that we immediately find ourselves out of sympathy with Jake and his crowd. Jake, we find, is so closely aligned with the structuralists that he faces many of the same problems that Derrida has analyzed. To begin with, he has great difficulty dealing with the relationships between systems.

When we first meet Jake in Paris, his life seems well-ordered and comfortable. He puts in a certain number of hours each day at the office, he spends his evenings at the popular bars and cafēs or at the fights, he plays tennis regularly, goes to the races, and has, for several years, vacationed in Spain. Just as Cohn has his "tennis" friend and his "literary" friend, so too Jake, whose list of acquain-

tances is perhaps longer and more diversified, has his journalist friends, his café friends, his bullfighting friends, and so forth. It is only when Jake's various spheres of activity begin to conflict with one another, however, that we realize how fragile the equilibrium which he has managed to achieve really is, and how ill-equipped he is to deal with situations that fall outside any particular sphere or that require mediation between them. Thus, his troubles seem to begin when Cohn, his tennis friend, discovers that Jake is "really just about the best friend" (p. 39) he has, and in the process of "hanging about," comes to meet Jake's café friends, among them "Lady Brett Ashley." Things are further complicated when his café friends, Brett and Mike, ask him if they can accompany him on his trip to Spain; a petition to which Jake, despite any reservations he might have, and despite the fact that he has already (probably out of sympathy) agreed to let Cohn come along, can only agree.

By the time the day of departure arrives, all of Jake's carefully laid plans have been thrown into confusion. In fact, as it turns out, the only truly satisfying part of the trip is that which, as chance would have it, goes as planned, i.e., the fishing in Burguete. When all the members of his party finally convene in Pamplona the atmosphere is strained and volatile. Caught in the middle of the Cohn, Brett, Mike triangle, each of whom expects his full support and sympathy, and caught as well between the austere world of the aficionados and the inebriate world of his expatriate companions, Jake's grip on the situation begins to weaken. This conflict of interests and commitments comes to a head when Brett implores him, on behalf of her own self-respect, to "see her through" with her decision to take Romero as her lover. Torn between his love for and loyalty to Brett, and his dedication to Montoya and his fellow

aficionados, and lacking the means to carry out a compromise, Jake is forced to choose between them. His subsequent decision brings about one of his worst moments:

> I stood up. Romero rose too.
> "Sit down," I said. "I must go and find our friends and bring them here."
> He looked at me. It was a final look to ask if it were understood. It was understood alright.
> "Sit down," Brett said to him. "You must teach me Spanish."
> He sat down and looked at her across the table. I went out. The hard-eyed people at the bull-fighter table watched me go. It was not pleasant. (p. 187)

Yet, this difficulty in dealing with the relationships between disparate systems, however devastating its results, is not the only problem faced by Jake. The shortcomings of his structuralist principles are felt by him in other ways as well. There is, for example, the matter of his impotence, the very thing which from a Derridean standpoint makes his structuralism possible ("impotence separates, disengages and emancipates"), but which cannot be accounted for within a structuralist framework. What order can comprehend a freak wound on "a joke front like the Italian" (p. 31)? What system can account for bad luck? Jake tells us that he has already considered his wound "from most of its various angles" (p. 27) and, although he claims that he is "pretty well through with the subject" (p. 27), it continues to haunt him.

Still, he might have been able to "play it along" (p. 31), had he not chanced to run into Brett when he was shipped to England. Although Jake's wound has deprived him of the ability to express his passion, it has in no way diminished his capacity to feel these emotions. Passion, precisely the thing excluded from his system, poses the greatest threat, for, not only does passion, like chance, defy inclusion into any order, it also

has the power to undermine existing orders. It is perhaps for this reason that Lady Ashley is such a disruptive force in the novel.

From the moment Brett makes her appearance, we know that there is something extraordinary about her. For, even here, with "her hair brushed back like a boy's" (p. 22), her "man's felt hat" (p. 28) in hand, and accompanied by an entourage of male homosexuals, she neatly manages to invert the accepted order. In fact, wherever she goes, structures seem to fall around her; men are led to violate their most firmly established principles and to renounce their most cherished institutions. Everybody "behaves badly": Jake betrays Montoya, Mike takes refuge in drink, and, as for Cohn, Jake sums it up with his observation that "When he fell in love with Brett his tennis game went all to pieces" (p. 45). Only Bill, the count, and (perhaps) Romero manage to survive their encounter with Brett unscathed: Bill, because Brett is not particularly attracted to him, although she likes him well enough; Romero, because of his determination to assimilate Brett to his system rather than vice versa, and because Brett releases him before too much damage has been done; and the count, because he simply refuses to indulge in the sort of passion to which the others have succumbed. Love, he says, has a place in his values, but he will not allow it to overwhelm them. The count's appreciation of Brett is thus somewhat akin to his appreciation of a fine wine:

> "I say that is wine," Brett held up her glass. "We ought to toast something. 'Here's to royalty.'"
> "This wine is too good for toast-drinking, my dear. You don't want to mix emotions up with a wine like that. You lose the taste." (p. 59)

Yet, despite her subversive capabilities, Brett is not the sole source of dislocation at work in the novel. In fact, of the many relationships that are shown breaking down in the text, the one that, perhaps, most

clearly illustrates the structuralist predicament, the breakdown of language which Jake experiences at night, has very little to do with her. Like the early Barthes, Jake is principally an empiricist attempting to found his language on things. The visual faculty is thus very important to him as it reinforces his identification of words and things and guarantees the coherence of his language. At night, however, when he turns off the light, the system of correspondences by which words and things are linked begins to disintegrate. Words wander off and begin to proliferate on their own. Jake is unable to maintain control over his thoughts. His speech becomes rambling and incoherent. His sentences grow longer and he begins to think in abstractions. His verbal behaviour is so transformed, in fact, as to become almost stream-of-consciousness:

> I lay awake thinking and my mind started jumping around. Then I couldn't keep away from it, and I started to think about Brett and all the rest of it went away. I was thinking about Brett and my mind stopped jumping around and started to go in sort of smooth waves. Then all of a sudden I started to cry. Then after a while it was better and I lay in bed and listened to the heavy trams go by and way down the street, and then I went to sleep. (p. 31)

> I wished Mike would not behave so terribly to Cohn, though. Mike was a bad drunk. Brett was a good drunk. Bill was a good drunk. Cohn was never drunk. Mike was unpleasant after he passed a certain point. I liked to see him hurt Cohn. I wished he would not do it, though, because afterward it made me disgusted at myself. That was morality; things that made you disgusted afterward. No, that must be immorality. That was a large statement. What a lot of bilge I could think up at night. What rot, I could hear Brett say it. What rot. (pp. 148-49)

An analogy to Jake's nighttime experience with language is provided by the peasants' experience with money at the fiesta. When the peasants first arrive in Pamplona they cannot "start in paying café prices."

Their money still has "a definite value in hours worked and bushels of grain sold" (p. 152). Like words, however, money is a representation and not a commodity like other things, and it is liable to lose its value as soon as it is no longer immediately tied to what it signifies. Thus we find that, late in the fiesta, it no longer matters to the peasants what they pay, nor where they buy.

Jake's reaction to the absence of a centre, or reliable support for words, and the "pandemic circulation" of signs to which it gives rise, is certainly a far cry from the kind of joyous Nietzschean affirmation proposed by Derrida. Quite the contrary, he dreads the darkness and the thoughts that attend his periods of insomnia. He has discovered that one way of holding down the play of signification is to sleep with the light on: "There is no reason why because it is dark you should look at things differently from when it is light. The hell there isn't. I figured that all out once, and for six months I never slept with the electric light off. That was another bright idea" (p. 148). He sees religious faith as a viable alternative to the experience of absence ("I only wished I felt religious") and regrets that he is "such a rotten Catholic," but realizes that there is nothing he can do about it, "at least for a while, and maybe never" (p. 97).

Thus Jake is pre-eminently aware of the absence at the centre, but lacks the faith to compensate for the loss of a sustaining order; equally, he is unable to embrace the freeplay that is the "other" of order. He occupies, in short, a position that cannot be construed within either a Derridean or a structuralist framework. Structures, for him, do not exist as ends in themselves, nor do they possess any transcendental value. He readily admits that a system that may have appeared legitimate

five years ago can grow "silly" with time (p. 148). But structures are, notwithstanding their limitations, absolutely indispensable to him; not as a "negative, nostalgic, guilty" search, but as a practicality. They enable him to channel his discursiveness, they furnish him with a purpose, and allow him to intend and execute things. Whether it is something as elemental as having to go to work each day, or whether it is an annual trip to Spain, structure, as an organizing principle, is precisely what makes it possible for Jake to live in the world.

The same holds true for most of the other characters in the book. Like Jake, Count Mippipopolous, Brett, and Mike have all "been around a very great deal" (p. 59). That is to say, they have all, at one time or another, through various wounds of their own (whether physical, mental, or financial), been exposed to the absence at the centre. It is this shared exposure to loss that forms the basis for the camaraderie which exists among them, and it is probably an important criterion for becoming part of the "privileged" group Brett refers to when she says of the count that he is "one of us" (p. 32). Yet, not one of these individuals could be properly described as revelling in the liberation which their experience has brought to them. On the contrary, they have all, like Jake, sought to establish certain limits for their behaviour, certain secular substitutes for that which is forever lost to them. Their task, moreover, is further complicated by the fact that, unlike Jake, they are not faced with the immediate constraints of having to make a living. The liberation that the Spanish peasants experience only toward the end of the fiesta, when they have begun to forget how hard they have worked for their money, is, for the expatriates, a perennial condition.

From this point of view, Mike's bankruptcy would seem to be a godsend,

and may even have been subconsciously intended on his part as a kind of self-imposed system of restraint. His behaviour is now held in check by his "keeper" (i.e., his mother) from whom he must solicit his funds, and is further constrained by the fact that there are certain places he cannot go and certain people he must attempt to avoid. The count achieves order and stability in quite a different way. His strategy is to make his money work for him, to turn his epicureanism into a full-time occupation. Even Brett, who seems so liberated, doing what she wants when she wants, in defiance of all convention, has devised certain constraints for her behaviour, certain limits beyond which she hesitates to venture. Thus, she will not, she tells Jake, "be one of those bitches that ruins children" (p. 243). In fact, "deciding not to be a bitch" is, she says, "sort of what we have instead of God" (p. 245).

As the Princeton polo shirts he still prefers to wear suggest, Cohn, in contrast to the others, has not "been around a great deal." His wounds are both superficial and self-inflicted.[105] He represents what Derrida calls the "unhappy consciousness" characteristic of a theological state of mind. His is precisely the "rabbinical interpretation of interpretation," one which longs for an original truth and a transcendental value. His vision is rigid and he demands that his experiences be measured in terms of absolutes.[106] "I felt terribly. I've been through such hell, Jake. Now everything's gone. Everything" (p. 194). Unlike the others, who have learned better than to take <u>anything</u> for granted, Cohn <u>assumes</u> that his life will follow the normal course--that he will live, grow old, and die. Thus he worries that he has already lived "nearly half the time" that he has to live, and that "in about thirty-five years more" he'll be dead (p. 11). That he belongs to a realm where continuity is still assumed

to exist is further underscored by the fact that he is the only person in the book whom Jake addresses by his last name. Jake even plays with some of the others characters' names, introducing Georgette Hobin as Georgette Leblanc, for instance, or Bill Gorton as Bill Grundy, thereby calling attention to the purely functional, or arbitrary nature of the name. His use of the patronymic in the case of Cohn, however, serves to emphasize Cohn's dissociation from the others--the fact that for him there <u>is</u> an order, a truth, and a filiation.

If Cohn corresponds to Derrida's definition of the "rabbi," it is tempting to put Bill in the place of the "poet." We have already noted the extent to which he delights in rhetorical play. His joy at the "autonomous proliferation or words"[107] is so infectious, in fact, that he even manages to get Jake "going" on at least one occasion:

> "You're an expatriate. You've lost touch with the soil. Fake European standards have ruined you. You drink yourself to death. You become obsessed by sex. You spend all your time talking not working. You are an expatriate, see? You hang around cafés."
> "It sounds like a swell life," I said. "When do I work?"
> "You don't work. One group claims women support you. Another group claims you're impotent."
> "No," I said. "I just had an accident."
> "Never mention that," Bill said. "That's the sort of thing that can't be spoken of. That's what you ought to work up into a mystery. Like Henry's bicycle."
> He had been going splendidly, but he stopped. I was afraid he thought he had hurt me with that crack about being impotent. I wanted to start him again.
> "It wasn't a bicycle," I said. "he was riding horseback."
> "I heard it was a tricycle." (p. 115)

Bill is forever the iconoclast. His "utilize" speech, like his other rhetorical outburts, triumphs through sheer destructive energy and rejoices in meaninglessness:[108]

> "Utilize a little, brother," he handed me the

> bottle. "Let us not doubt, brother. Let us not pry into the holy mysteries of the hencoop with simean fingers. Let us accept on faith and simply say--What shall we say, brother?" He pointed the drumstick at me and went on. "Let me tell you. We will say, and I for one am proud to say--and I want you to say with me, on your knees, brother. Let no man be ashamed to kneel here in the great out-of-doors. Remember the woods were God's first temples. Let us kneel and say: 'Don't eat that, Lady--that's Mencken.'" (p. 122)

Yet, although Bill may at times experience a sort of Nietzschean affirmation, although he may even have glimpsed what Derrida calls the "opening into totality,"[109] by no means does he remain poised at the edge indefinitely. In fact, he is rooted firmly in tradition. Like the count, he has come "to know the values" (p. 60), and will not compromise on them. He is angered at the injustice of the Vienna prize fight, and does everything in his power to assist the misused fighter. Likewise, although he may not <u>like</u> Cohn, he is deeply disturbed by Mike's verbal abuse of him. "I don't like Cohn, God knows, and I think it was a silly trick for him to go down to San Sebastian, but nobody has any business to talk like Mike" (p. 145). The same holds true for Mike when he is forced to suffer the vilification of his creditors. "Nobody ought to have a right to say things about Mike. . . . They oughtn't to have any right. I wish to hell they didn't have any right" (p. 204). Of course, they <u>do</u> have a right, as Bill is to learn, first-hand, a little later:

> "It's yours, Mike," Bill said. "Old Mike, the gambler."
> "I'm so sorry," Mike said. "I can't get it."
> "What's the matter?"
> "I've no money," Mike said. "I'm stony. I've just twenty francs. Here, take twenty francs."
> Bill's face sort of changed. (p. 229)

For Bill, "freeplay" may be a wonderful thing, but not when it is

at the expense of fair play.

Derrida's "deconstruction" of structuralism and his investigation of the consequences of the absence of a centre offer a significant insight into the actions and motivations of Jake and his friends, but their behaviour, clearly, does not conform entirely to Derrida's "philosophy." Derrida would, of course, argue that the reason why no one in The Sun Also Rises is able wholly to endorse freeplay is that they are unable to free themselves of a logocentric bias which teaches them still to pronounce "the absence of a centre, when it is play that should be affirmed."[110] But the question nevertheless arises whether the Derridean response to absence is, indeed, legitimate. Is it possible to remain poised indefinitely between an old and new sense? Or will not this median, undecidable position gradually begin to corral more and more meaning for itself?[111] Can we, in fact, hope to deny one system without already declaring allegiance to another? Can change occur without a recovery of stability on the other side?[112] Derrida will not say that he has fallen into a systematic method, yet, can he not help but speak from a certain position?[113] In the end, does not deconstruction amount to little more than another way of constructing?[114] Won't the centre, even if "emptied" by a radical deconstruction, always fill itself in?[115]

And, even if it were possible to remain suspended indefinitely in the midst of multiplicity, what could we make of this new found freedom? How could we operate in a field of dispersion? Where would we stand in the face of infinite generality, deprived of all boundaries and paths, with no principles of relevance or standards of significance? Do we not court danger in wanting to be freed from all categories and all systems? Do we

not, in abandoning their organizing principle, "risk being surrounded not by a marvellous multiplicity of differences, but by equivalences, ambiguities, the 'it all comes down to the same thing,' a levelling uniformity . . . a black stupidity"?[116]

We find a most memorable demonstration of freeplay and the dangers it entails (including loss of value and meaning) in the running of the bulls described by Jake in Chapter xvii. The encierro, in contrast to the bullfight, with its complex procedural order and elaborate construction, is sheer pandemonium--a free-for-all in which the bulls are sent thundering through the streets behind a running mob, while the police fight desperately to rescue those who fall to the ground, or, in the general frenzy, leap out and attempt to do capework with the bulls. The efforts of the police are not entirely successful, however, and one of the would-be bullfighters, a young farmer by the name of Vicente Girones, is caught by the horn of a bull and dealt a fatal wound through the back. This is certainly a literal account of the dangers of standing "in the open without the armour of a system," and an event upon which Jake does not comment. We hear only the waiter at the café: "Badly cogido . . . All for sport. All for pleasure. . . . Badly cogido through the back . . . A big horn wound. All for fun. Just for fun. . . . All for fun. Fun, you understand. . . . Right through the back. A cornada through the back. For fun--you understand. . . . You hear? Muerto. Dead. He's dead. With a horn through him. All for morning fun. Es muy flamenco" (pp. 197-98). Later, when Jake tells Bill of the death, Bill's response is nonchalant; not at all what we expect from a man who cannot even bear to hear someone he doesn't like spoken of badly:

> "Was anybody killed in the ring?"
> "I don't think so. Just badly hurt."

"A man was killed outside in the runway."
"Was there?" said Bill. (p. 204)

The fact is, however, that there can be no meaning for such a death. In the absence of a system, no significance, no meaning or value can be attached to it. It is an empty event, or, more precisely, a non-event, for it is only by virtue of its susceptibility to inclusion within a system that something can be raised to the level of an event (a basic flaw in Derridean thought).

Derrida says that he wants to celebrate "open, endless interpretation," but the question now arises whether interpretation is itself possible in the world that he envisions. Equally problematical is his notion of an infinitely free and multiple text. Can we imagine such a text? A text without form or function, a text that says nothing--would this not amount to an invisible text? Doesn't the writer, in the very act of writing, arrest (to some degree) the play of words? Can we, in fact, pronounce a single utterance without already violating the principle of freeplay? Doesn't the individual who truly wants to affirm play, therefore, and by that very fact, condemn himself to silence?

Michel Foucault is a post-structuralist writer whose penetrating, often disturbing exploration of the underpinnings of Western culture has taken him beyond Derrida, and profoundly altered our understanding of Western history and language. Foucault agrees with Derrida that the disappearance of the centre or origin is an event of enormous significance. It frees us from the responsibility of finding eternal hierarchies in everything and allows us, at last, to call into question "pre-existing forms of continuity" and "ready-made syntheses"[117] that have paralyzed our understanding for so long. Consequently, the disappearance of the origin opens

up a whole new space for thought. But Foucault does not, like Derrida, immediately proceed to affirm freeplay. He argues, on the contrary, that Derrida is able to concentrate exclusively on the play of the signifier detached from any fixed and stable signified only because he fails to comprehend the true complexity of language. How is it, for example, in a world without truth or origin, a world in which there is, theoretically, an open set of possibilities for meaning, that one system of signs will emerge and another one will not? Or again, since <u>everything</u> can never be spoken, since in relation to what can be stated in natural language statements are always finite,[118] who or what determines which statements, which combinations of signs, will be permitted and which excluded from our thought and speech? How, moreover, do we account for the historical persistence of certain modes of thought? How, by what force, do they maintain their hold over us? What is it, for instance, that keeps the ideas of Western metaphysics in circulation?[119]

It is precisely this sort of questioning that leads Fouacult to speculate that traditional methods for describing language are simply insufficient to deal with the complexity of verbal events; that "there undoubtedly exist specific discursive properties and relationships that are irreducible to the rules of grammar and logic and the laws that govern objects."[120] If we wish to grasp not what is <u>given</u> in a linguistic formulation, but the fact that it <u>is</u> given,[121] not the moment of its formal structure and laws of construction, but that of its existence and the rules that govern its appearance,[122] it is necessary to bring to light a new level of description. By suspending not only the point of view of the signified (the Derridean perspective), but also that of the signifier,[123] one can consider verbal performances in them-

selves, in their own "empirical modesty," as the locus of particular regularities, relationships, modifications, and so forth.[124] This level of description Foucault designates as the "archeological."

Archeology is defined by Foucault as a method of "description that questions the already-said at the level of its existence."[125] It does not, as such, claim to be a total, exhaustive description of language, nor does it replace linguistic, grammatical, or logical analyses. Rather, it exists in addition to them, as "another way of attacking verbal performances, of dissociating their complexity."[126] It takes as its primary object neither the sign, not the sentence or proposition, but the statement, a linguistic formulation that is defined neither on the basis of its grammatical acceptability or logical correctness, nor on the basis of that to which it refers (the objective world which it designates). Rather, the statement is based on the operational domain from which it emerges and which gives it its own unique existence and its particular enunciative function. The statement, as it is defined by Foucault, is not, in other words, a unit of a linguistic type (superior to the phenomenon of the word, inferior to the text).[127] It is a function that has a bearing on a series of signs, which may be a sentence or a proposition, but which may also be a fragment of a sentence, a set of propositions, a table of signs, or a graph. It is this that allows such a series to be something more than a collection of marks on a page, something more than the objects to which it refers, and something more than the rules of grammar or logic can quite exhaust. It is this that makes it possible to differentiate two verbal performances that are identical from a grammatical or logical point of view.[128] The sentence "dreams fulfill desire," for instance, does not constitute the same statment

or perform the same enunciative function in Plato and in Freud. The meaning of the words may not have changed, but what has changed in the sentence is its schemata of use, its rules of application, the constellation of other statements in which it plays a part.[129] In short, what has changed is the enunciative field from which it emerges and which determines its role and its function as a "statement."

The fact that we can isolate and describe an enunciative field shows, says Foucault, "that the 'given', the datum, of language is not the mere rending of a fundamental silence." Words, sentences, and meanings "do not back directly on to a primeval night of silence . . . the sudden appearance of a sentence, the flash of meaning . . . always emerge in the operational domain of an enunciative function."[130] We learn, in other words, that to speak is something other than to express what one thinks, to translate what one knows, or to play with the structures of language. To add a statement to a preexisting series of statements "involves conditions (and not only a situation, a context, a motive), and rules (not the logical and linguistic rules of construction)."[131] The fact that we can isolate and describe an enunciative field also proves, Foucault tells us, "that it is vain to seek beyond structural, formal, or interpretive analyses of language, a domain that is at last freed from all positivity"[132] (the Derridean objective). Behind the visible façade of the completed system is not "the rich uncertainty of disorder," but, before all, "an immense density of systematicities,"[133] a complex web of rules and relations which define "the conditions according to which the enunciative function operates."[134]

The particular enunciative system (e.g., economics, medicine, grammar)[135] from which the statement emerges and which gives it its unique

and limited existence is called a "discursive formation." "A statement belongs to a discursive formation as a sentence belongs to a text, and a proposition to a deductive whole. But whereas the regularity of a sentence is defined by the laws of grammar, and that of a proposition by the laws of logic, the regularity of statements [since a statement exists only insofar as a series of signs--a sentence or a proposition--figures at a definite point within an enunciative network] is defined by the discursive formation itself. The fact of its belonging to a discursive formation and the laws that govern it are one and the same thing."[136]

These "laws" (called "rules of formation") define the form of positivity of a given discourse.[137] They determine (a) the objects of which it can speak and the conditions of their historical appearance;[138] (b) the modalities that it uses (e.g., qualitative descriptions, biographical accounts, statistical reports, experimental verification, etc.);[139] (c) how concepts will be formed (i.e., the orderings of inferences, successive implications, and demonstrative reasonings, the order of descriptive accounts and the schemata of generalization or progressive specification to which they are subject, and the ways in which groups of statements may be combined or linked together);[140] (d) the various strategies or theoretical choices that it sanctions (i.e., how certain organizations of concepts, types of enunciation, and so forth can form themes and theories, as well as the principle of choice when two alternative possibilities arise);[141] and finally, (e) the relationship of the discourse to other discursive formations, past and present, as well as its relationship to non-discursive practices.[142]

These rules of formation and the positivities they characterize, how-

ever, "must not be taken as blocks of immobility, static forms that are imposed on discourse from the outside, and define once and for all its characteristics and possibilities."[143] They constitute, rather, the set of conditions in accordance with which discourse, as a practice obeying certain rules, is exercised, in accordance with which it forms groups of objects, enunciations, concepts, and theoretical choices, and in accordance with which these things survive, become transformed, appear, and disappear. A system of formation does not "elude historicity;" it does not constitute "above events, and in an unmoving heaven, an atemporal structure;"[144] it is immanent in practice and describes that practice in its specificity.[145]

Positivities do not characterize forms of knowledge, nor do they define the state of knowledge at a given moment,[146] rather, they determine, prior to all effective knowledge, what may be established in the field of knowledge.[147] There is, therefore, "no knowledge without a specific discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms."[148] In this capacity, systems of formation are absolutely inescapable. Every statement, the most extraordinary or the most banal, "belongs to a certain regularity."[149] The individual cannot help but speak from within a particular order. This does not mean, however, that everyone who speaks from within the same system must think the same way, or say the same thing.[150] A positivity is not, Foucault explains, a set of determinations imposed from the outside on the thought of individuals; it does not lay down a law of construction, or forms, which must be applied in the same way by all speaking subjects; rather, it defines a <u>limited space of communication</u>.[151] Within this space people may speak of different objects, make contradictory choices, and hold widely differing opinions. What unites them, however, is the fact that they oppose one another on "the

same field of battle;" they place themselves at "the same level" or at "the same distance" by deploying "the same conceptual field."[152] Positivities, then, "are not so much limitations imposed on the initiative of subjects as the field in which that initiative is articulated."[153]

All discourse (hence all knowledge) is "rarity" which is the affirmation that results from a process of exclusion.[154] The rules that shape a particular discursive practice are not only principles of formation, they are also principles of rejection, exclusion, and separation. They, simultaneously, open up a possible domain of knowledge and fix the limits of that domain, provide access to "reality" and delimit the horizon of what can appear as "real."[155] They should thus be understood as being "productive constraints": at once negative and restrictive in the exclusions that they operate, and positive and multiplicatory in the effective knowledge that they form.[156] The analysis of discourse, writes Foucault, always "brings to light the action of imposed rarity, with a fundamental power of affirmation."[157]

The fact that all discourse is based on an implicit order of exclusion means that where we think we recognize the source of discourse, the principle behind its flourishing and continuity, in those factors that, traditionally, seem to play a positive and productive role, we must recognize, instead, a negative activity, in the cutting-out and rarefaction of discourse.[158] We can no longer, in other words, treat discourses (including texts, which are also discourses) as infinite resources for the creation of new meanings, or as the locus of unlimited hidden significance. We must treat them, instead, as events whose emergence was caused by highly rarefied and differentiated historical processes, processes which have given them a very precise intelligibility and

effectiveness:[159]

> Unlike all those interpretations whose very existence is possible only through the actual rarity of statements, but which nevertheless ignore that rarity and, on the contrary, take as their theme the compact richness of what is said, the analysis of discursive formations turns back towards that rarity itself; it takes that rarity as its explicit object; it tries to determine its unique system . . . To interpret is a way of reacting to enunciative poverty, and to compensate for it by a multiplication of meaning; a way of speaking on the basis of that poverty, and yet despite it. But to analyse a discursive formation is to seek the law of that poverty, it is to weigh it up, and to determine its specific form. In one sense, therefore, it is to weigh the 'value' of statements. A value that is not defined by their truth, that is not gauged by the presence of a secret content; but which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation, not only in the economy of discourse, but, more generally, in the administration of scarce resources. In this sense discourse ceases to be what it is for the exegetic attitude: an inexhaustible treasure from which one can always draw new, and always unpredictable riches . . . it appears as an asset--finite, limited, desirable, useful--that has its own rules of appearance, but also its own conditions of appropriation and operation . . . (The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 120)

Discourse, at once rarity and asset, is tied, from the moment it comes into existence, to the question of power and the will to dominant control. It is, by nature, the object and instrument of a struggle --a political struggle.[160] The modes of discourse that prevail in a given society are always a sign of victory in language. They are the outcome of a desire to master the powers contained within discourse, to control and manipulate the knowledge that it forms.[161] Above all, the goal of these "master" discourses (i.e., those that form the dominant culture) is to maintain themselves, to manufacture continuously the material that sustains them,[162] and to do so by exercising "a sort of

pressure, a power of constraint"[163] upon other forms of discourse which may arise alongside of it. In every society, says Foucault, "the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role it is to avert its powers and dangers."[164]

Some of the procedures for the control of discourse are active on the exterior and take the form of prohibitions (e.g., taboo subjects such as sex and politics) and rejections or divisions (the way in which a culture designates and isolates in a massive, general way the difference that limits it--its opposite, e.g., the division between reason and folly). In addition to these external constraints there are certain internal rules through which discourse exercises its own control. Foucault cites commentary and the author, as conceived in traditional criticism, as two such principles of constraint: commentary because it simultaneously permits the creation of new statements, but limits their proliferation by making them responsible to an original text; and the author because he implants "into the troublesome language of fiction" an obligatory unity and coherence. Disciplines, too, Foucault tells us, constitute a system of control in the production of discourse, making it possible to construct new statements, but only within a strictly limited framework.

Other rules serve to limit discourse by setting up what Foucault calls "a rarefaction among speaking subjects." These rules concern the social appropriation of discourse. They ensure that none may enter into a discourse on a specific subject unless he has satisfied certain conditions. They determine the circumstances under which a discourse may be employed and impose a certain number of rules upon the individuals who

employ it, thus denying access to others. One such restrictive system, Foucault tells us, is ritual, which defines the qualifications required of the speaker, as well as the gestures, behaviour, and circumstances that must accompany his discourse. The social appropriation of discourse also has institutional supports, such as the educational system, which functions as a means of restricting access to the corpus of already-formulated statements, as well as a means of determining who, among speaking subjects, will have the right to invest their speech in decisions, institutions, and practices.

But, of all the systems of constraint that collectively serve to master and control the vast proliferation of discourse, thereby securing the continuing authority of the dominant culture, the greatest, or most effective one, writes Foucault, is that which designates the opposition between true and false discourse; or, rather, the way in which the dominant discourse is able to make itself appear to be speaking for, about, and in truth.[165] This division, which operates in much the same way as Barthes's semiological systems that transform themselves into factual systems, makes the principles of exclusion and choice upon which it is based appear to be spontaneous, natural, and inevitable; and this is in spite of the fact that standards of right and wrong, true and false, exclusion and inclusion, neither preexist discursive formations (each form of discourse has its own canons of truth), nor possess any pre-discursive justification. By wrapping itself systematically in the language of truth, rationality, and utilitarian values,[166] the dominant discourse is able effectively to eliminate any other (any contrary) discourses that may arise (there can always only be one truth). It is also able, by appearing as simple necessity, to carry out its

"productions, discriminations, censorship, interdictions, and invalidations on the intellectual level of base, not of superstructure,"[167] and thereby "to practice a more subtle, more insidious form of control over its material and its subjects."[168]

The very effectiveness of a discourse is thus always tied not only to its rarity, but also to its invisibility. It is for this reason, Foucault tells us, that "Western literature has, for centuries, sought to base itself in nature, in the plausible, upon sincerity and science."[169] And, if, today, it is so difficult for us to free ourselves of this Western bias of mind, it is only that the dominant discourse has succeeded too well in achieving its goal. It is because a discourse will always seek to render itself invisible that Foucault speaks of archeology as a "counter-memory" to discourse; its task (not simply a historical one, but a political one as well)[170] is "to make visible the actuality of discourse," to render once more audible whatever silent voices it may carry with it.[171]

The break with the dominant culture, a change in the order of discourse, comes about, Foucault tells us, not through "a little invention or creativity," or even "a different mentality," or "new ideas," but through a transformation in discursive practice.[172] Such a transformation can come about in two ways: it can originate in the interior of a discourse, when, for instance, a contradiction arises that is so great as to put into question the "acceptability" of the discourse thereby defining the point of its effective impossibility;[173] or it can begin with an erosion from the outside, when, for example, the pressure of the excluded grows so great as to cause the system to collapse; or, as we saw in our analysis of the weaknesses of structuralism, it can happen both ways at once.

It is because of their exteriority to social discourse that Foucault is so interested in those individuals, including madmen, visionaries, and convicts, who have been classified as "deviant" by a particular society. In speaking from their position of exteriority they institute a sort of counter-discourse, thereby creating rents in the fabric of discourse that it is thereafter forced to repair.[174] Foucault, likewise, expresses a special interest in writers and artists, because they, too, have a role to play in stimulating discourse to change. Their task, according to Foucault, is constantly to test the limits of their discourse, to use its rules to expand their reach and thus open up new areas for thought.[175] "Writing," says Foucault, "unfolds like a game that inevitably moves beyond its own rules and finally leaves them behind."[176]

Whether it takes the form of an assault from the outside or a disturbance in the interior, a change in the order of discourse always involves the opening up of a limit (an act of transgression) into that space that has been, for thought, "on the other side." To say that such an event (which Foucault calls a "rupture") has occurred is not "to say that a whole world of absolutely new objects, enunciations, concepts, and theoretical choices emerges fully armed and fully organised."[177] A change in the order of discourse means that statements are governed by new rules, but this does not necessarily mean that all of the elements of the old discourse are suddenly transformed or disappear. Some elements may remain constant through several distinct positivities; they may be made to occupy a new position in a different formation; they may even reappear, be reactivated, after a period of oblivion or invalidation.[178] Since, moreover, a particular discursive formation (owing to the system of its strategic choices) never occupies all the possible

volume opened up to it by its constitutive objects, concepts, and enunciations, an entire discourse, taken up and inserted in a new constellation, may reveal new possibilities. These new possibilities do not arise on the basis of a secret content that has remained implicit, but appear as a result of a modification in the principle of exclusion and the principle of theoretical choices.[179] The ability to last, to be taken up again and reappropriated, to repeat its present and its rules in new ways (as when a later age returns to Marx or Freud) is, in fact, a sign of success for discourse, a measure of its fertility and value.[180]

The analysis of discursive formations (and transformations) thus reveals a new form of history: "not the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in the origin,"[181] nor "the slow progress of consciousness or the steady forging of new tools which will finally reveal our identity,"[182] but a history of discontinuous systematizations that no "quasi-divine archē or telos," no "smug continuity," can reduce in advance. This history does not reveal a progression but numberless transgressions, "not the comparatist fact of identity but the difference of times."[183] "For each appeal to the absolute, profound or transcendental origin," Foucault "would oppose in answer an instance of surface, which is the place at which meaning begins,"[184] and for each chance occurrence, abrupt interruption, or historical accident which had, in the past, to be erased or removed in order to disclose the network of causality running just beneath it, Foucault would discover, instead, an active and significant factor in the production of events.

"If for Derrida the impensē in criticism which he has frequently

attacked signifies a lazy, imprecise understanding of signs, language, and textuality, then for Foucault the impensé is what at a certain time and in a specific way cannot be thought because certain other things have been imposed on thought instead."[185] And if for Derrida the absence of a centre, origin, or transcendental signified releases us to a world where anything is possible, then for Foucault it neither grants us a leap into a limitless world nor restores us "to a limited and positivistic world, but to a world exposed by the experience of its limits"[186]--to a world in which "the interrogation of the limit replaces the search for totality and the act of transgression replaces the movement of contradictions."[187]

One might well wonder: what has all this to do with a seemingly simple book, a book with such minor pretensions as The Sun Also Rises? Barthes and Derrida have been readily incorporated, of late, into an important reorientation of literary criticism. But what of Foucault? How are his arguments and, more importantly, his practice, of significance to the working critic? It should be clear from my preceding remarks that the implications of Foucault's method are far-reaching. But I will restrict myself to the actual reading of The Sun Also Rises that Foucault makes possible. This, in itself, should suggest Foucault's immediate value for criticism; and it may, as well, suggest, more implicitly, a new understanding of the way a text operates as part of a larger discursive formation. Let us return, one last time, to The Sun Also Rises.

Jake and his friends have all (always with the exception of Cohn), as we have seen, been exposed to the absence at the centre. They have,

as a result of this experience, been forced to reevaluate past traditions, to call into question some longstanding and well-established principles and beliefs. Their exteriority to tradition is underscored in a number of ways in the text: it is suggested, for instance, in Jake's impotence, which has forever cut him off from the continuity of generations; it is suggested, too, in Brett's promiscuity, Bill's verbal perversity, the count's unabashed hedonism, and Mike's total disregard for the staples of convention. But Jake and his friends are not, for all that, a "lost generation." Their displacement with respect to the old order may signify their rejection of all the traditional forms, but these rejections are not purely negative; on the contrary, they designate an active will and a fundamental power of affirmation. For, it is precisely on the basis of those things that they must now cast out or exclude from their thought that the expatriates are able to formulate their own position, to regain their own speech. What may have seemed a total collapse of values becomes, instead, a transformation in practice, and the opening up of a new space for thought and action.

Thus we find that the views of the "good" characters, the "in" crowd, are generally defined, not explicitly in terms of any positive content, but implicitly on the basis of that which they exclude or reject. The character of Brett, for instance, is defined largely in contradistinction to Frances Clyne, just as Jake is defined in contrast to the other news correspondents, Romero in contrast to the decadent bullfighters, Bill through the types of behaviour he abhors, Montoya through the photographs he throws away, and so forth. But, by far the most significant object of exclusion in the text, not only with respect to the individual characters,

but also with respect to the group as a whole, is Robert Cohn. Cohn's exclusion, while due in part to the faults of his personality (his immaturity, pomposity, lack of self-control), is based primarily on the fact that he does not live in the same world as the rest of the expatriates; he operates according to a different system and a different set of rules, he speaks a different language:

> "You're awfully funny, Harvey," Cohn said. "Some day somebody will push your face in."
> Harvey Stone laughed. "You think so. They won't, though. Because it wouldn't make a difference to me. I'm not a fighter."
> "It would make a difference to you if anybody did it."
> "No, it wouldn't. That's where you make your big mistake. Because you're not intelligent." (p. 44)

> "Shut up," Cohn said. He stood up. "Shut up, Mike."
> "Oh, don't stand up and act as though you were going to hit me. That won't make any difference to me." (p. 142)

(Later, when Jake does hit Cohn, it is simply that he has come to understand that this is the only response, the only form of action, that will make a "difference" to Cohn--the only language that Cohn can comprehend.)

We may, of course, feel that Jake and his friends are a little unfair in their dealings with Cohn, that although his behaviour is certainly annoying enough, it hardly warrants the type of treatment he receives at their hands, and that he is simply a convenient scapegoat. But if, at times, the expatriates seem over-zealous in their denunciation of Cohn, their vehemence is not entirely without reason; for, not only is Cohn different from them, he embodies all of those things, all the principles and beliefs, that have just ceased to be theirs, that have been nullified by the experience of absence. Cohn is thus, at one and the same time, close to them and distant from them. He resides at the

limit of their thought, in the marginal region that defines its borders. They simultaneously need him, and need to denounce him, for it is through him that they are able to regain their footing and assert their own identity. The exclusion of Cohn thus serves to strengthen the position of the group much the way the exclusion of a wounded steer at the unloading of the bulls serves to consolidate the rest of the herd (p. 140), as the following incident illustrates:

> ". . . Tell me, Robert. . . . Don't you know when you're not wanted? I know when I'm not wanted. Why don't you know when you're not wanted? . . . Why aren't you drunk? Why don't you ever get drunk, Robert? You know you didn't have a good time at San Sebastian because none of our friends would invite you on any of the parties. You can't blame them hardly. Can you? I asked them to. They wouldn't do it. You can't blame them, now. Can you? Now, answer me, Can you blame them?"
>
> "Go to hell, Mike."
>
> . . .
>
> "Come on, Robert," Bill said.
>
> . . .
>
> Bill stood up and took hold of Cohn.
>
> "Don't go," Mike said. "Robert Cohn's going to buy a drink."
>
> Bill went off with Cohn. Cohn's face was sallow . . .
>
> "I say, Michael, you might not be such a bloody ass . . . I'm not saying he's not right, you know." She turned to me.
>
> The emotion left Michael's voice. We were all friends together. (pp. 142-43)

The rejection of Cohn, however, is not the only way that Jake and the others are able to assert themselves and establish their exteriority to tradition and society. Their speech, too, in its obliquity, indirection, and essential incompleteness, functions as a system of rarefaction, as it is entirely dependent upon a shared background of exclusion which defines a limited space of communication effectively barring access to anyone who does not happen to be on the same footing. The same purpose is served by their cultivation of "inside" knowledge (whether

familiarity with bartenders, café owners, musicians, or bullfighters), and even by their choice of bars (note their preference for the Café Select over the Café Rotonde).

This sort of elaborate system of exclusion and rarefaction is not peculiar to Jake's crowd. We find it everywhere in the novel: news correspondents, boxers, prostitutes, bullfighters, writers, pilgrims, the Catholic Church, different nations--all practice their own specialized modes of exclusion, rejection, discrimination, and differentiation; and all these practices are able to maintain themselves only at that cost. As Jake observes, you do, indeed, "pay something for everything." The challenge for the individual is to buy his way into the right things, and to get his money's worth:

> I thought I had paid for everything. . . . No idea of retribution or punishment. Just exchange of values. You gave up something and got something else. Or you worked for something. You paid some way for anything that was any good. I paid my way into enough things that I liked, so that I had a good time. Either you paid by learning about them, or by experience, or by taking chances, or by money. Enjoying living was learning to get your money's worth. The world was a good place to buy in. (p. 148)

Jake and his friends are different from Cohn (or the Catholic pilgrims, or Biarritz English) because they are not lodged in their discourse in the same way as he is. What has happened in World War I has allowed them to free themselves sufficiently to know that theirs is not the only possible order, nor necessarily the best. They are, therefore, more open and receptive to other forms of thought and other systems. Thus, while the Biarritz English sit in their big, white car looking through their field glasses at the "quaint" little fiesta, or Cohn sleeps peacefully through the opening celebration, Brett, Mike, Bill, and Jake truly par-

ticipate in it all. They sing, dance, drink, eat, and, in Brett's case, even sleep with the Spanish. They are more willing to test the limits of their experience, to try to see things from a new and different perspective. This, perhaps, explains their interest in alcohol, but it also explains the great appeal that the fiesta holds for them. For the fiesta, more than simply a single, prolonged drinking bout, is a sort of invitation to transgression, an arena in which limits can be tested, a place where necessity, responsibility, consequence, all the pressures of daily existence can be momentarily forgotten, thus providing the individual with an opportunity to reestablish the fact that rules and constraints are human products, and that, consequently, no rule is so sacred that it cannot be broken.

The businessmen of the town are perfectly aware of the madness that attends the annual celebration and take pains to prepare themselves for it: "I walked down the hill from the cathedral and up the street to the café on the square. . . . The marble-topped tables and the white wicker chairs were gone. They were replaced by cast-iron tables and severe folding chairs. The café was like a battleship stripped for action. . . . The fiesta was really started. It kept up day and night for seven days. The dancing kept up, the drinking kept up, the noise went on. The things happened that could only have happened during a fiesta. Everything became quite unreal finally and it seemed as though nothing could have any consequences. It seemed out of place to think of consequences during the fiesta. All during the fiesta you had the feeling, even when it was quiet, that you had to shout any remark to make it heard. It was the same feeling about any action. It was a fiesta and it went on for seven days" (pp. 153-55).

But, when the "wonderful nightmare" of the fiesta is over, after Jake has betrayed Montoya, Brett has gone off with her bullfighter, and Bill and Mike have thoroughly "fest-ed" the English, order is restored and there is a return, if not to complacency, at least to a certain comfort and regularity. "In the morning it was all over. The fiesta was finished. I woke about nine o'clock, had a bath, dressed, and went downstairs. . . . The cafés were just opening and the waiters were carrying out the comfortable white wicker chairs and arranging them around the marble-topped tables in the shade of the arcade. They were sweeping the streets and sprinkling them with a hose. I sat in one of the wicker chairs and leaned back comfortably" (p. 227). Jake is, clearly, as he says, "through with fiestas for a while" (p. 232), and looks forward to a quiet week on the beach at San Sebastian.

It is perhaps only now that we can begin to understand why bullfighting is such an exemplary activity, and why "Nobody ever lives their life all the way up except bull-fighters" (p. 10). For, the kind of testing of limits that Jake and his friends experience only at odd intervals and not without a certain amount of prompting (alcoholic or otherwise), the bullfighter, at least the <u>good</u> bullfighter, undergoes regularly and with a steadfast self-possession and cool resolve. In fact, the whole elaborate order of rule and ritual which is the very fabric of the bullfight, and which the bullfighter must follow to the letter if he wishes to fight with integrity, is designed and executed with only one end in sight--the crossing of its own limits and the penetration into the territory of the bull. The moment the bullfighter begins to simulate a danger that he no longer truly faces, the moment he (like the English tourists) begins to play it safe, the moment the bullfight becomes a <u>representation</u> and no

longer a pure act, the whole art is lost. The rules, no longer serving any definite end or purpose become pointless and ridiculous, the performance becomes a matter of style for style's sake--"no more than the vain grace of a ballerina."[188]

Bullfighting, at its best, embodies everything that is positive about discursive practice, and artistic discourse in particular. But, true to its discursive nature, it has changed with time, has undergone a gradual erosion and deterioration, which even the aficionados are powerless to halt. Still, as Jake says, Romero has "the old thing," the old greatness, and it is a greatness that not even the Biarritz English can fail to recognize:

> Romero never made any contortions, always it was straight and pure and natural in line. The others twisted themselves like corkscrews, their elbows raised, and leaned against the flanks of the bull after his horns had passed, to give a faked look of danger. Afterward all that was faked turned bad and gave an unpleasant feeling. Romero's bullfighting gave real emotion, because he kept the absolute purity of line in his movements and always quietly and calmly let the horns pass him close each time. He did not have to emphasize their closeness. Brett saw how something that was beautiful done close to the bull was ridiculous if it were done a little way off. I told her how since the death of Joselito all the bullfighters had been developing a technic that simulated this appearance of danger in order to give a fake emotional feeling, while the bull-fighter was really safe. Romero had the old thing, the holding of the purity of line through the maximum of exposure . . . (pp. 167-68)

Yet, although bullfighting may be an exemplary activity, it is still not the most important system of rarefaction at work in the novel, for there remains one system that has yet to be discussed; one that is, perhaps, less conspicuous than some of the other systems we have located in the text, but that is, nevertheless (or, perhaps, by this very fact),

by far the most significant. It is the fundamental order of exclusion upon which the novel itself is based, and it operates through the narrator, Jake Barnes.

Jake, as we know, participates in a particular discursive regularity which he shares with the other members of his crowd. We have already noted how the rarity of this practice manifests itself in the speech of the expatriates. Since, however, Jake relates the story in the first person, it is no less operative at the level of the narrative itself. This fact becomes apparent the moment we stop to analyse his narrative technique, to study it, not only in terms of style, but also in terms of strategy and effectiveness.

Jake's sentence structure may be elemental, and his diction thin; his vocabulary may consist of relatively few and short words, and he may not indulge in a great deal of descriptive embellishment; but this bareness of style does not necessarily betoken a return to a more primitive speech. On the contrary, many of his pet words, such as "good," "fine," and "nice," which may appear simple because they are common and monosyllabic, are, in fact, conceptions of a highly complicated ethics in which a whole series of processes (exclusion, rarefaction, unification, consolidation) have been semiotically condensed. They do not describe, they evaluate.[189] They do not convey any precise meaning, they designate the position or attitude that has been adopted with respect to the objects of which they speak:

> He was nice to watch on the tennis-court, he had a good body, and he kept it in shape . . . (p. 45)
>
> It was a nice hotel, and the people at the desk were very cheerful, and we each had a good small room. (p. 89)

> It seemed like a nice cathedral, nice and dim, like Spanish churches. (p. 90)

Since, moreover, these qualifications are so common, and so unemphatic in tone, we tend to accept the discriminations that operate through them without offering much resistance. The same is true of Jake's trick of making valuative terms out of such apparently objective things as the "cool," the "clear," the "smooth," the "fresh," and so forth.[190] This device permits him to reinforce his own position (or, more accurately, his own practice), while, at the same time, subtly coercing the reader to adopt a similar point of view:

> It had cleared and there were no clouds in the mountains . . . . . .
> It was cool outside in the early morning and the sun had not yet dried the dew that had come when the wind died down. The stream was clear and shallow . . . (p. 112)

> There was no undergrowth, only the smooth grass, very green and fresh, and the big trees well-spaced as though it were a park. (p. 119)

> They were beautifully colored and firm and hard from the cold water. . . . I took the trout ashore, washed them in the cold, smoothly heavy water above the dam . . . (p. 119)

> It had rained a little in the night and it was fresh and cool on the plateau . . . (p. 151)

> I walked around the harbor under the trees and to the casino, and then up one of the cool streets to the Cafe Marinas. There was an orchestra playing inside the cafe and I sat out on the terrace and enjoyed the fresh coolness in the hot day . . . (p. 235)

The reader's inclination to accept Jake's position is further bolstered by his technique of addressing the reader directly, and in precisely the same way he would any other of his good friends. There is, thus, from the start, the assumption that the narrator and the reader understand and appreciate one another, that they share the same values, and that Jake can,

therefore, rely on the reader's sympathy and good will:

> Robert Cohn was once middleweight boxing champion of Princeton. Do not think that I am very much impressed by that as a boxing title, but it meant a lot to Cohn. (p. 3)
>
> Cohn, I believe, took every word of "The Purple Land" as literally as though it had been an R. G. Dun report. You understand me, he made some reservations, but on the whole the book to him was sound. (p. 9)
>
> I know that they are supposed to be amusing, and that you should be tolerant, but I wanted to swing on one, any one . . . (p. 20)

The primary effect of this assumption is that the reader is effectively incorporated into the "inner circle." He becomes "one of us"--an insider. He, no less than Bill, is capable of granting the understanding nod or the embarrassed glance. Thus, when Jake says in Chapter xv, "I knew <u>our</u> crowd must have all been out at the ring" (p. 160, italics my own) the reader can rest assured that he has been included in the possessive pronoun.

Yet another narrative device used by Jake to draw the reader into his circle, perhaps the most effective of all, is irony. Irony functions in such a way as to reinforce simultaneously the narrator's and the reader's positions: the narrator's because in making the reader reject an apparent meaning in favour of a "true" meaning, he forces him to read something in a certain way (the narrator's way), thereby arresting the play of possible meanings;[191] and the reader's because in order to reject one meaning (the apparent meaning) in favour of another (the "true" meaning), the reader must presuppose that he has discovered the "right" way to read something. Irony thus puts the reader in the position of being "in the know," and with each successive recognition of irony he receives fresh confirmation not only of the "accuracy" or

"authenticity" of his reading, but of his status as an "insider" as well.

Jake's coercive tendencies, his efforts to impose his own order on the reader, are, of course, the expression of his will (the same will that gets the story told), but they also play upon the reader's own will. For, having been put in the position of being "in the know," the reader (critic) is naturally encouraged to speak from his position of authority, to repeat the text from within his own system, to reappropriate it for his own purpose, to fill in the, more or less, generic forms of exclusion which operate throughout the text with his own specific content.

The Sun Also Rises is not a revolutionary text, it does not break with the dominant culture, nor does it bring about any dramatic reversals, or disturb or unsettle the reader by forcing him to think in new ways. Rather, its power lies in its ability to reinforce the reader's present practice, to encourage him to take it up and repeat it in new ways, to turn it to fresh purposes, and, in so doing, keep itself in circulation. The history of The Sun Also Rises is, and will be, in this way, the history of society[192] and the history of the various discursive practices in which that society is invested.

Conclusion

This thesis arose out of a desire to come to terms with a fundamental reorientation of thought, what Michel Foucault calls an "epistemological mutation," which, although not of recent origin (since its beginnings can be traced back to the nineteenth century and the researches of Nietzsche),[1] has nevertheless established itself as a major force only within recent years, and which concerns the rediscovery of language in its specific reality, and the area of inquiry opened up by that event.

My intention was not to discredit the critical work on The Sun Also Rises that has been carried out by previous critics. I did not wish to show how these early, "primitive" readings of the text have been superseded or rendered obsolete by our present, more "sophisticated" understanding. I have attempted, on the contrary, to show that there is no "right" way to read a text, if by this is meant the discovery of its singular and eternal meaning. I wished to show how the analysis of a text is neither a search backward to some original sense, nor a demystification, the unlocking of a secret content, but always the production of a new knowledge;[2] that criticism is the outcome of the meeting, not of "a flexible subject and a completed object,"[3] but of two distinct discourses (the writer's and the critic's), each with its own possibilities and impossibilities.

I hoped to show that a shift in the way in which we read and understand a text is brought about, not through a little added perspicacity, or a more refined sensibility, but through a reforged discursivity[4] and a modification in the assumptions that underlie practice. I endeavoured to

demonstrate how such changes come about, as well as to indicate some of the practical effects they have for the ways in which we can read and understand a particular text.

I also undertook to show how critics like Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault, operating out of a self-conscious awareness of their assumptions, have been able to redefine the very nature of the text and of literature, and establish new relations between the text and its author, and the text and the critic. One of the primary practical effects of this redefinition is that the novel can no longer be viewed as the inspired creation of an eccentric author, but becomes, instead, a distinctive discursive entity that records the historical constraints that made it possible. Another important consequence of our recent reorientation of thought[5] is that the critic is no longer compelled, as he was in the past, to remove himself from his work, to erase those elements that reveal his grounding in a particular time and place.[6] On the contrary, since from the present perspective the critic is <u>always</u> constrained by the intelligibility of his age, and since, furthermore, all knowledge is now understood to be something that is constructed, not something that is given to man, the critic, far from trying to conceal the fabrication of his discourse, or to obscure the productive mechanism, must attempt to render explicit all the necessities that go into the writing of his criticism, to locate the assumptions that inform his practice, and to acknowledge his "system of injustice."[7]

I have therefore sought, by preceding each successive reading of <u>The Sun Also Rises</u> with an account of the basic "philosophical" reflections from which it will spring, to make my own allegiance, the system in accordance with which I was operating, as apparent as possible. Yet, as Foucault points out, however hard we may try to identify the pressure

of the contemporary,[8] and recognize our own discursive complicities, we will never entirely succeed. Like "the overly familiar that constantly eludes one,"[9] the conditions upon which our own speech is founded are largely inaccessible to us:

> . . . it is not possible for us to describe our own archive [the "archive" is defined by Foucault as the first law of what can be said, the space in which various discourses are articulated], since it is from within these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to what we say--and to itself, the object of our discourse--its modes of appearance, its forms of existence and coexistence, its system of accumulation, historicity, and disappearance. The archive cannot be described in its totality; and in its presence it is unavoidable. It emerges in fragments, regions, and levels, more fully, no doubt, and with greater sharpness, the greater the time that separates us from it . . . The analysis of the archive, then, involves a privileged region: at once close to us and different from our present existence, it is the border of time that surrounds our presence, which overhangs it, and which indicates it in its otherness; it is that which, outside ourselves, delimits us. The description of the archive deploys its possibilities (and the mastery of its possibilities) on the basis of the very discourses that have just ceased to be ours; its threshold of existence is established by the discontinuity that separates us from what we can no longer say, and from that which falls outside of our language . . . its locus is the gap between our own discursive practices. (The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 130-31)

Thus we find that if it is now possible for us to locate and discuss the assumptions that lie at the root of traditional criticism, it is sufficient proof that our thought has changed. And if, at times, I have seemed over-zealous in my denunciation of the practice of earlier critics, it is simply that their practice (like Cohn for Jake and his friends) 'resides at the limit of our thought, in the marginal region that defines its borders,' and, without which, our thought would not be what it is today.

What unheard-of meanings will be produced by future discursive formations we cannot even begin to speculate. ". . . one knows insistently that what appears certain to one group of minds is not true for another separated from the first in time and space."[10] There may even come a time when our discursive practice is so changed that The Sun Also Rises is no longer susceptible to inclusion within it.

"One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh, but the earth abideth forever . . ."

--Epigraph to The Sun Also Rises

Footnotes

Chapter I

1. "Commencing with the Simplest Things," Three Novels of Ernest Hemingway (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), rpt. in The Merrill Studies in The Sun Also Rises, ed. William White, Charles E. Merrill Program in American Literature (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishers, 1969), p. 104. Hereafter cited as The Merrill Studies.
2. Carlos Baker, Hemingway: The Writer as Artist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952; 3rd ed., 1963), p. 78.
3. Bruce Barton, rev. of The Sun Also Rises, Atlantic Monthly, 139 (April 1927), rpt. in Ernest Hemingway: The Critical Reception, ed. Robert O. Stephens, The American Critical Tradition (New York: B. Franklin & Co., Inc., 1977), p. 46. Hereafter cited as The Critical Reception.
4. "Marital Tragedy," New York Times Book Review, 31 Oct. 1926, rpt. in The Critical Reception, p. 32.
5. Cleveland B. Chase, "Out of Little, Much," The Saturday Review of Literature, 3 (11 Dec. 1926), rpt. in The Merrill Studies, p. 11.
6. Ibid., p. 9.
7. "Diversity in the Younger Set," rev. of The Sun Also Rises, New York Sun, 6 Nov. 1929, rpt. in The Critical Reception, p.32.
8. See, for instance, "Marital Tragedy," New York Times Book Review, 31 Oct. 1926, rpt. in The Critical Reception, p. 32; or Ernest Boyd, "Readers and Writers," The Independent, 117 (20 Nov. 1926), rpt. in The Merrill Studies, pp. 5-8.
9. See, for instance, Allen Tate, "Hard-Boiled," The Nation, 123 (15 Dec. 1926), rpt. in The Critical Reception, pp. 42-3; or "Fiesta" (rev. of the London edition of The Sun Also Rises, an edition omitting the

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10. Rev. of The Sun Also Rises, Dial, 82 (January 1927), rpt. in The Critical Reception, p. 45.
11. "Hemingway Seems Out of Focus in 'The Sun Also Rises,'" Chicago Daily Tribune, 27 Nov. 1926, rpt. in The Critical Reception, p. 39.
12. Edwin Muir, "Fiction [Fiesta]," Nation and Athenaeum, 41 (2 July 1927), rpt. in The Merrill Studies, p. 5.
13. "Out of Little, Much," Saturday Review of Literature, 3 (11 Dec. 1926), rpt. in The Merrill Studies, p. 41.
14. Ibid., p. 42.
15. "Sad Young Man," Time, 8 (1 Nov. 1926), rpt. in The Critical Reception, p. 34.
16. K. J. W., rev. of The Sun Also Rises, Boston Evening Transcript, 6 Nov. 1926, rpt. in The Critical Reception, p. 37.
17. "Hemingway Keeps His Promise," New York World, 14 Nov. 1926, rpt. in The Critical Reception, p. 38.
18. A Farewell to Arms (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 191.
19. "A Tragedy of Craftsmanship," International Literature, No. 5 (May 1935), rpt. in Ernest Hemingway: The Man and His Work, ed. John K. M. McCaffery (Cleveland, Ohio: The World Publishing Co., 1950), pp. 78-108. Hereafter cited as The Man and His Work.
20. Granville Hicks, The Great Tradition: An Interpretation of American Literature Since the Civil War (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), pp. 273-74.
21. "A Tragedy of Craftsmanship," International Literature, No. 5 (May

1935), rpt. in The Man and His Work, p. 93.

22. Max Eastman, "Bull in the Afternoon," Art and the Life of Action (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1934), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 66-75.

23. "The Dumb Ox: A Study of Ernest Hemingway," Life and Letters, 10 (April 1934), rpt. in Wyndham Lewis, Men Without Art (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1934), p. 29.

24. "A Tragedy of Craftsmanship," International Literature, No. 5 (May 1935), rpt. in The Man and His Work, p. 91.

25. Robert O. Stephens, Introduction to The Critical Reception, p. xviii.

26. Lionel Trilling, "Hemingway and His Critics," Partisan Review, 6 (Winter 1939), rpt. in Hemingway and His Critics: An International Anthology, ed. Carlos Baker (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), pp. 61-70. Hereafter cited as Hemingway and His Critics; Edmund Wilson, "Hemingway: Gauge of Morale," Atlantic, 146, (July 1939), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 242-5.

27. Edmund Wilson, "Hemingway: Gauge of Morale," Atlantic, 146 (July 1939), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 242-8.

28. Ibid., pp. 236-57.

29. "Hemingway and His Critics," Partisan Review, 6 (Winter 1939), rpt. in Hemingway and His Critics, pp. 61-4.

30. Robert O. Stephens, Introduction to The Critical Reception, p. xxiii.

31. See Bhim S. Dahiya's discussion of the Hemingway criticism of the forties in Chapter 1 of The Hero in Hemingway: A Study in Development, Series in English Literature and Language, No. 1 (New Delhi: Bahri Publications, 1978), pp. 2-3.

32. See Edgar Johnson, "Farewell the Separate Peace: The Rejections of Ernest Hemingway," Sewanee Review, 48, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1940), rpt.

in The Man and His Work, pp. 130-42; and Maxwell Geismar, "Ernest Hemingway: You Could Always Come Back," from Maxwell Geismar, Writers in Crisis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 143-89.

33. See Wilson, "Hemingway: The Gauge of Morale," Atlantic, 146 (July 1939), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 236-57; Alfred Kazin, "Hemingway: Synopsis of a Career," revised slightly from Alfred Kazin, On Native Grounds (New York: Doubleday, 1942), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 190-204; W. M. Frohock, "Violence and Discipline," Southwest Review, 32, Nos. 1 & 2 (1947), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 262-91.

34. "Ernest Hemingway 1944-47," A Farewell to Arms, MSA ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), rpt. in Robert Penn Warren, Selected Essays (New York: Random House, 1951), p. 85.

35. Death in the Afternoon (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932).

36. "Violence and Discipline," Southwest Review, 32, Nos. 1 & 2 (1947), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 263, 267-9.

37. "Hemingway and His Critics," Partisan Review, 6 (Winter 1939), rpt. in Hemingway and His Critics, p. 66.

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39. Leo Gurko, "Hemingway in Spain," from Leo Gurko, The Angry Decade (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc., 1947), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 258-61.

40. "Ernest Hemingway: You Could Always Come Back," from Maxwell Geismar,

Writers in Crisis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942), rpt. in The Man and His Work, pp. 157-58.

41. "Farewell the Separate Peace: The Rejections of Ernest Hemingway," Sewanee Review, 48, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1940), rpt. in The Man and His Work, p. 131.

42. Maxwell Geismar, "Ernest Hemingway: You Could Always Come Back," from Maxwell Geismar, Writers in Crisis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942), rpt. in The Man and His Work, p. 146.

43. Introduction to The Viking Portable Hemingway, ed. Malcolm Cowley (New York: Viking Press, 1945), rpt. under the title "Nightmare and Ritual in Hemingway" in Critical Essays, pp. 40, 47-49.

44. John K. M. McCaffery, Introduction to The Man and His Work, pp. 10-13.

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46. Bhim S. Dahiya, The Hero in Hemingway: A Study in Development, Series in English Language and Literature, No. 1 (New Delhi: Bahri Publications, 1978), p. 3.

47. See Dahiya's summary of the book in Chapter 1 of The Hero in Hemingway, p. 3; and Weeks's summary in his Introduction to Critical Essays, p. 5.

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49. The Twenties: American Writing in the Postwar Decade (New York: Viking Press, 1955), pp. 66-76, 80-85.

50. See Dahiya's discussion of the book in Chapter 1 of The Hero in Hemingway, p. 4.

51. Hemingway: The Writer as Artist, pp. 75-93.

52. "Confiteor Hominem: Ernest Hemingway's Religion of Man," PMASAL, 42 (1956), rpt. in Critical Essays, p. 161.

53. "When Warriors Sleep," Saturday Review, 36 (2 July 1953), rpt. in The Critical Reception, pp. 49-50.

54. "The Death of Love in The Sun Also Rises," Twelve Original Essays on Great American Novels, ed. Charles Shapiro (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1958), rpt. in The Merrill Studies, pp. 73-85.

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60. See Philip Toynbee, rev. of Hemingway and His Critics: An International Anthology, ed. Carlos Baker, Encounter, 17 (Oct. 1962), p. 86; Dwight Macdonald, "Ernest Hemingway," Encounter, 18 (Jan. 1962) pp. 116-17; Nathan Scott, Jr., "Ernest Hemingway: A Critical Essay," Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Erdmans, 1966), rpt. in Ernest Hemingway: Five Decades of Criticism, ed. Linda Welshimer-Wagner (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1974), p. 214; and Fraser Sutherland, The Style of Innocence: A Study of Hemingway and

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62. Robert O. Stephens, Introduction to The Critical Reception, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

63. Philip Young, "Posthumous Hemingway, and Nicholas Adams," Hemingway in Our Time, p. 23.

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