THE LANGUAGE OF ISLAMISM:
PAKISTAN'S MEDIA RESPONSE TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

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The language of Islamism

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Dedicated to

Mum, Dad and Tahzeem

You are my wings, my eyes, my heart....

Abstract

The role of Islam in the public life of Pakistan has been a complex and changing one. Since the country's inception in 1947, Islamism has been the primary language of its public discourse in political, cultural, economic and social matters. Nevertheless, there has been little consensus with respect to a clear definition of this concept. Islamism has provided a fairly flexible and yet powerful mechanism – or language – through which different political actors have attempted to dominate public discourse in the country.

In recent Muslim history, the Iranian Revoluton of 1978/79 has been a watershed event which has had – and continues to have – a significant impact on Muslim societies. Indeed, the Revolution is often perceived as the single most important example in contemporary times of the manner in which Islamism has been utilized as a revolutionary tool. The success of the Revolution in utilizing ideological Islam has had important implications for Pakistan, given the latter's reliance upon Islamism in its public life. This thesis examines editorial response in the Pakistani press to the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79 and analyzes the factors which influenced this reaction.

Pakistan's response to the Iranian Revolution provides a glimpse into the nature of a country coming to terms with itself and its own interpretation of its dominant socio-political ideology. The Revoluton highlighted already-existing tensions within the Pakistani national psyche: questions were raised with regard to the ideological direction of the country, its pragmatic concerns for security as well as the role of Islam in the formation of a public identity. The Iranian Revolution, by presenting differing perspectives on some of these issues – though all were framed within the context of the language of Islamism – served to deepen the collective Pakistani soul-searching. The nature of Pakistani response was essentially one of an intricate balancing act amongst competing loyalties, perspectives and imperatives. This response highlighted Pakistan's somewhat tense relationship with itself and its reliance upon Islam as a dominant socio-political ideology.

Résumé

Le rôle de l'Islam dans la vie publique du Pakistan a été complexe et variable. Depuis la naissance du pays en 1947, l'Islamisme a été le langage premier de son discours publique en tout ce qui concerne la vie politique, culturelle, économique et sociale. Malgré cela, il y a eu très peu de consensus quant à une définition claire de ce concept. L'Islamisme a fourni un mécanisme – ou un langage – assez flexible mais aussi très puissant avec lequel les différents acteurs politiques ont tenté de dominer le discours publique du pays.

Dans l'histoire musulmane contemporaine, la Révolution Iranienne de 1978/79 a été un grand tournant qui a eu – et qui continue d'avoir – un impact de grande portée dans les sociétés musulmanes. En effet, la Révolution Iranienne est souvent perçue comme l'exemple le plus important des temps modernes de la façon qu'on a utilisé l'Islamisme en tant qu'outil révolutionnaire. Le succès de la Révolution à utiliser l'Islam idéalogique a eu des implications importantes pour le Pakistan étant donné sa dépendance de l'Islamisme dans sa vie publique. Cette thèse examine la réaction des rédacteurs de la presse pakistanaise à la Révolution Iranienne de 1978/79 et elle analyse les facteurs qui ont influencé cette réaction.

La réaction pakistanaise à la Révolution Iranienne donne un bref aperçu de la nature d'un pays faisant face à soi et à sa propre interprétation de son idéologie socio-politique dominante. La Révolution a souligné les tensions déjà existantes dans le psyché national pakistanais: on s'est posé des questions à propos de la direction idéalogique du pays, de ses soucis pragmatiques pour la sécurité et aussi du rôle de l'Islam dans la formation d'une identité publique. La Révolution Iranienne, en présentant des perspectives différantes à propos de quelques unes de ces questions – bien que toutes étaient conçues à même le contexte du langage de l'Islamisme – a servi à approfondir l'introspection collective pakistanaise. La nature de la réaction pakistanaise jonglait essentiellement avec des loyautés, des perspectives et des impératifs rivalisants. Cette réaction a souligné la

relation quelque peu tendue que le Pakistan avait avec soi-même et avec sa dépendance de l'Islam comme étant son idéalogie socio-politique dominante.

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The long journey towards preparing a thesis is rarely travelled entirely alone. While much of the actual research and writing may be completed in physical solitude, there are many people who inspire, motivate, challenge and otherwise nourish the writer. In the flurry that often accompanies the various stages of thesis development, one sometimes neglects to acknowledge adequately the contributions of others. Mere words on paper, however eloquent, are unable to convey the richness and depth of my gratitude. While acknowledging the poverty of my words, I attempt today to pay tribute to these many people who have contributed to, and thus influenced and shaped, my work and life – those countless people who have crossed the path of my life and have affected me.

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> *...It is when you give of yourselves that you truly give....And there are those who give and know not pain in giving, nor do they seek joy, nor give with mindfulness of virtue. They give as in yonder valley the myrtle breathes its fragrance into space. Through the hands of such as these God speaks and from behind their eyes, He smiles upon the earth....*[1]

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1 Kahlil Gibran, The Prophet, New York: Alfred A.Knopf, Inc., 1981, pages 20-21.

Transliteration

The system of transliteration utilized in this thesis follows that used at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. For the sake of uniformity, the vowels of Arabic and Persian words are transliterated as they are written, rather than as they are pronounced. Proper names and common nouns appear in their transliterated form; however, the former have not been italicized. Because of their frequent use in English, words such as Shah, Islam, Iran, and Pakistan have not been transliterated, but appear as they commonly occur. The names of authors, for the purposes of clarity and consistency, have been retained as they appear on the title pages of their works.

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Introduction

Of faith and politics:
Introducing the national discourse in Pakistan

> *From Pakistan's beginnings, its rulers have used Islam....They...invoked Islamic ideology to legitimize their authority, to sanctify their policy goals, and to control their opponents....When a regime equates itself with both the state and religion and then presents a particular version of religion as official dogma, any deviation from the official interpretation inevitably becomes both a religious heresy and treason against the state....The use of Islam has thus made the regime's religious interests indistinguishable from purely political interests and need for legitimacy.*[1]
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> *Both an an indicator of forces already at work in the world scene and as a possible model and stimulus for other such experiments, the Iranian Revolution has created great excitement among those who are basically sympathetic with its objectives and a corresponding fear and unease in the hearts of others who share a different vision of the world, including both Muslims and non-Muslims.*[2]

Pakistan's relationship with the role of Islam in the country's public life has had an intriguing and complex history. Since the country's creation in 1947 as a homeland for Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, its political, cultural, economic and social life has been inextricably linked to Islam. Over the years, there has been much discussion and debate on the political direction of the Pakistani state. Some have urged a secular path to western-style democracy; others have been in favour of the formation of an Islamic state; yet others have instituted military dictatorship to instigate change in Pakistani political, social and economic life. Despite the differences of opinion on the exact nature of the political apparatus desired, Pakistani politicians have had one striking similarity: they have all, at one time or another, been compelled to utilize Islam and and its potent role in the sociopolitical realm – termed ideological Islam or Islamism in this thesis – in order to garner public support. Every political leader, whether a secular democrat or a military

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1 Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Pakistan,' The politics of Islamic revivalism, Shireen T. Hunter (ed), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, pages 231-232.

2 Charles J. Adams, 'Islam and politics in the Indian subcontinent,' unpublished paper, page 1.

dictator, and indeed, every participant in the ideological debate, has relied upon the symbols of Islam to attain, or retain, public office and to influence the national discourse.

Like Pakistan, Iran has also had a long and colourful association with Islam and its role in the public domain. In recent Muslim history, the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79 has been a watershed event, reverberations of which are still being felt both within the Muslim world as well as on the international scene generally. In fact, the Iranian movement has been perceived by scholars as the example *par excellence* of the so-called contemporary 'Islamic revival', known variously as 'Islamic resurgence' or 'Islamic fundamentalism.' The success of the Iranian movement has appeared to galvanize those who supported it and frighten those who did not. Indeed, it is clear that "...because of the suddenness and dramatic character of the changes it has wrought, the Iranian Revolution has dominated contemporary thinking about the political relevance of the Islamic faith and teaching."[3] It would be natural to expect that the Revolution and its success in utilizing ideological Islam would have had implications for a country such as Pakistan, in which Islam has played a prominent role in public life. This thesis examines Pakistani media response to the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79, and analyzes the factors which have influenced this reaction. In so doing, the thesis investigates the manner in which the Revolution and its implications influenced Pakistan's national discourse with respect to its definition, interpretation and application of the role of Islam in public life.

In spite of Pakistan's heavy reliance upon Islamism in its public life, there has been, over the years, little consensus with respect to a clear definition of this notion. In some senses, Islam has provided a fairly flexible and yet powerful mechanism – or language – through which ideological groups and perspectives have engaged in, and attempted to dominate, the public dialogue in the country. The ideological debate in Pakistan has generally been fast and furious; opinions regarding the appropriate role of Islam in public affairs have

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3 Charles J. Adams, 'Islam and politics in the Indian subcontinent,' page 1.

straddled the vast ideological spectrum of Islamic thought, from traditionalist and renewalist views to modernist, even secularist perspectives. It is significant to note at this point that such perspectives are not exclusive to contemporary Pakistan; indeed, differences in opinion regarding interpretation of faith and its sociopolitical role have abounded throughout the breadth of the Muslim world and in different periods of time. In order to obtain a clearer understanding of the issues influencing the Pakistani national debate, it is important to investigate the significant ideological perspectives, opinions and actors within the ideological spectrum. It is to a discussion of these that we now turn.

Despite the differences among the ideological perspectives, there do exist certain commonalities shared by all. First, each approach attempts an interpretation of, and claims allegiance to, the "...true meaning of Islam."[4] In essence, each group perceives its own interpretation to be the correct one which attributes to Islam its appropriate role in public affairs. Second, all groups tend to derive authority and legitimacy for their opinions by recourse to the traditional, authoritative sources of Islam – in other words, the Qur'ān and Sunnah. And finally, the 'classical Islamic state' governed by the Prophet Muḥammad and the *Ḳhulafā' al-Rāshidūn* (the rightly guided *Ḳhalīfahs*) is perceived, by many groups, to be the ideal state; hence it is this state which "...is the stated reference, in most cases of an Islamic state."[5]

Such similar characteristics notwithstanding, however, the ideological positions of the various perspectives within the spectrum differ widely. While all groups claim to utilize the authoritative sources, each position tends to interpret these in a fundamentally different manner. As Ahmed states:

> Since the Quran is not a treatise on politics, but a Book which touches a vast array of subjects, and the Sunnah is derived from various collections which abound in diverse and even contradictory statements and accounts,

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4 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The concept of an Islamic state: an analysis of the ideological controversy in Pakistan, London: Frances Pinter, 1987, page 173.

> the way the authoritative sources are employed depends largely on the overall convictions of the interpreter.[6]

There appears to be fundamental agreement amongst academics with respect to the classification of the major ideological positions within the spectrum, though some writers attempt a more detailed classification than others. Thus, while Hamza Alavi identifies eight ideological-political positions amongst Indian Muslims before independence and Ishtiaq Ahmed identifies nine distinct positions, these groupings fall easily within the parameters of the four major groupings delineated by most academics. Both Leonard Binder in his seminal work, Religion and Politics in Pakistan and Mir Zohair Husain, identify the four positions or categories, though each utilizes somewhat different nomenclature. These positions are: (1) traditionalist, referred to as 'conservative' by John Voll; (2) renewalist, referred to as 'fundamentalist' by Binder, Alavi and Husain; (3) modernist; and (4) pragmatist, referred to as 'secularist' by Binder and Alavi. It is important to note at this stage that these categories constitute approaches and/or interpretations rather than rigid and inflexible groupings; the ideological perspectives may be viewed as a continuum within the parameters of these broad categories, rather than as fixed, rigid positions of thought and action.

The Muslim traditionalists are generally the graduates of formal theological training; hence, the majority of *'ulamā'* tend to fall within this category. This position upholds the historical development and corpus of Islamic thought and law. In this respect, traditionalists "...tend to conserve and preserve not only Islamic beliefs, customs and traditions practised in the classical period of Islam, but in the Islamic period thereafter as well."[7] Generally speaking, adherents to this position believe that God has declared –

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5 Ahmed, The concept of an Islamic state, page 173.

6 Ahmed, The concept of an Islamic state, page 173.

7 Mir Zohair Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism: a case study of Pakistan under Z.A. Bhutto (1972-1977), Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1985, page 188.

through His Revelations and Messengers – His will on all matters; human discretion in the contemporary period is not only undesirable, but unnecessary. Hence traditionalists reject *ijtihād* (the human endeavor to interpret God's message) and uphold the doctrine of *taqlīd* (legal conformity). In particular, traditionalists tend to stress the validity of the Shari'ah in its entirety; through such an emphasis they uphold, and stress conformity with, the entire corpus of Islamic law. They "...reject out of hand any idea of reform of the historically-evolved system of Islam law."[8] Indeed, according to Binder, the traditionalists believe that: "...to alter the decision that has been accepted for ages would be to deny the eternal immutability of God's law and to admit that earlier jurists erred would be to destroy the idea of the continuity of the divine guidance of the Muslim community...."[9]

Traditionalists, in common with renewalists and even some modernists, are concerned about the increasing secularization of Muslim society. This process is viewed by traditionalists as "...being tantamount to the elimination of the Divine *Shari'ah* and will eventually erode the very foundations of the Muslim community."[10] The concern with the increasing secularization of Muslim society, while shared by renewalists, manifests itself in the traditionalist approach, as almost a complete turning away from contemporary issues. The belief that God has "...expressed His will on all matters of individual and collective life..."[11] implies that the traditionalist viewpoint leaves little, if any, scope for human endeavour to accommodate contemporary circumstances. Hence the traditionalist viewpoint, in its rejection of *ijtihād*, does not take into account, in any real sense, the exigencies of modern times. It is this inability to acknowledge change that most distinguishes the traditionalist approach from the others. Indeed, it is this point in

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8 Ahmed, The concept of an Islamic state, page 92.

9 Leonard Binder, Religion and politics in Pakistan, pages 26, 20, 24, 42-43. Quoted in Husain, page 196.

10 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 202.

11 Ahmed, The concept of an Islamic state, page 91.

particular, which is often criticized by the other ideological groups as being the cause for the general stagnation of the Muslim world.

The renewalists, in common with the traditionalists, "...also believe in literally interpreting and rigorously adhering to the fundamentals of their original faith embodied in the Qur'ān and Sunnah."[12] In contrast with that of the traditionalists, however, the manner in which the renewalists seek to do this is markedly different. The renewalist approach views the state governed by the Prophet Muḥammad and the *Ḳhulafā' al-Rāshidūn* as the ideal, and hence, prototypical, state; it is this state which renewalists wish to emulate and recreate in contemporary circumstances. Therefore, this approach is an ahistorical approach – one which attempts to discard the historical development of Islamic law and thought as formulated by generations of *'ulamā'*. Ishtiaq Ahmed, in describing the views of Abul Alā' Maudūdī, one of Pakistan's foremost renewalists, states:

> The whole approach of Maududi is to discover the fundamental Islamic message from the Quran, Sunna and other authoritative sources, and to sift it from the weight of centuries of 'accretions' that burden the Muslim heritage. In other words, 'Muslim Islam' - that distorted version of Islam resulting from human error - is to be discarded. This way he dissociates his Islamic state from most of Muslim political history after the end of the Medinese era. The Islamic state which results from such an approach is an ideal state, above the verdict of history, and therefore divorced from the errors of Muslims.[13]

It is because of the ahistorical desire to emulate and recreate the ideal Islamic state as it existed in the early history of Islam that the renewalist approach is often considered radical. Adding to this radical image is the renewalist advocacy of the application of *ijtihād* in the interpretation of Islamic principles, though generally limiting the right of *ijtihād* to "...those knowledgeable and competent about Islamic law and theology."[14] Renewalists have also tended to be relatively active in lobbying on behalf of their

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12 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 153.

13 Ahmed, The concept of an Islamic state, page 111.

14 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 180.

viewpoints, and this activism further enhances the perception of this group as a radical element within Muslim society.

The modernist approach, sometimes referred to as the 'adaptationist', 'syncretic' or even 'revisionist' approach, does not emphasize a literalist interpretation of Islam; instead this approach views Islam as constituting a framework of broad and general principles. In this context, one document articulated the modernist position as:

> ...first, to define Islam by bringing out the fundamentals in a rational and liberal manner and to emphasize, among others, the basic ideas of Islamic brotherhood, tolerance and social justice and second, to interpret the teachings of Islam in such a way as to bring out its dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world.[15]

In this sense, most modernists "...believe that they are making a sincere and dedicated effort to reconcile the differences between traditional religious doctrine and secular scientific rationalism; between unquestioning faith and reasoned logic; between the continuity of Islamic tradition and the unpredictability of change."[16] Hence, the modernist approach generally attempts to incorporate and adapt western institutions, ideas and ideologies within the broad framework of Islamic thought. Modernist leaders, generally western educated, have thus experimented with the idea of representative political institutions – likened to *Shūra* – as well as with some mode of socialist and/or capitalist economies.

In the effort to interpret Islam within a broad framework, the modernist perspective advocates application of the doctrine of *ijtihād*. Indeed, proponents of this view "...often argue that the main reason for the decline of Muslims is the inhibition of independent, creative and critical thought, as well as the lack of vigorous discussion and debate about

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15 Quoted in Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, pages 206-207.

16 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 207.

Islamic laws and issues that resulted form the closure of the gates of ijtihād earlier."[17] In seeking legitimation for its positions, the modernist approach attempts to limit the definition of 'traditional sources of Islamic thought.' In essence, this perspective narrows the base of 'authority' to the Qur'ān and Sunnah and by so doing, hopes to gain greater freedom in interpreting Islamic law. This approach stresses that "...it is necessary...to begin thinking afresh on the basis of a study of the original message in the Qur'an and Sunnah."[18] In essence, the modernist perspective, urges a creative and dynamic approach in the interpretation and application of the principles of Islam:

> The central ideological concern of the progressive Islamic movement is to redefine Islam in the light of modern knowledge and scientific advancement - the level of contemporary consciousness – a task that requires the contemporary Muslim intellectual to 'rethink the whole system of Islam without breaking away from the past.'[from Muhammad Iqbal, Reconstruction, page 97]. The mainstay of the progressive Islamic movement, therefore lies in its approach to the Quran which is dynamic and creative as opposed to the static and literalist approach of the traditional 'ulamā'. It is in this sense that the progressive Islamic movement stands for the 'rethinking and the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam'[19]

In contrast to the modernist approach, which seeks to accommodate modern and western ideas within the framework of Islamic thought, the pragmatist approach advocates a complete separation between secular and sacred matters. Indeed, pragmatists generally argue with various degrees of intensity that "...religious belief and political matters are two separate and distinct domains, and Islam has left the secular area to the discretion of Muslims"[20] In this respect, the pragmatist approach differs drastically from each of the other three approaches.

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17 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, pages 207-208.

18 Muhammad Asad, The principles of state and government in Islam, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, page 14. Quoted in Ishtiaq Ahmed, page 122.

19 Suroosh Irfani, 'The progressive Islamic movement,' Islam, politics and the state: the Pakistan experience, Mohammad Asghar Khan (ed), London: Zed Books Ltd, 1985, page 34.

20 Ahmed, The concept of an Islamic state, page 163.

Muslim pragmatists are generally heavily influenced by their secular western education, and "...often know more about western intellectual thought than about Islamic intellectual thought."[21] In this respect, not only do they desire a separation of the secular and sacred realms of life, they also "...view the classical and medieval Islamic doctrines and practices as anachronistic, reactionary, and impractical in the modern age."[22] Hence, most Muslim pragmatists embrace the adoption of modern western ideas and concepts. While modernists attempt to reconcile these concepts within an Islamic framework, pragmatists would generally wish to adopt the western concepts with little or no reference to an Islamic framework. Hence, this approach tends to "...emulate western capitalist and socialist ideologies to modernize their societies on the basis of secular capitalism or socialism or some combination of these systems."[23]

Interestingly, it was the pragmatist – and in some cases, the modernist – approach that wielded considerable influence in many Muslim societies in the immediate post-colonial period. While pragmatists themselves constituted a small numerical minority in most Muslim societies, including Pakistan, they have generally held leadership positions and have been among the wealthier segments of society; in effect, they were often the leaders of the nationalist movements that succeeded in lobbying for independence, and thus were in an ideal position to take over the reins of leadership in the newly independent countries. Indeed, in the context of Pakistan, some academics have claimed that the majority of the leaders of the Pakistan movement, including Jinnāh himself, were advocates of the pragmatic approach. Such scholars argue, therefore, that advocates of the pragmatist approach were in the upper echelons of Pakistan's civil service, bureaucracy, armed forces, mass media, educational institutions and business community - in essence, pragmatists constituted the ruling élite of Pakistan after partition.

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21 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 226.

22 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 226.

23 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 227.

Despite their secularist tendencies, pragmatists have often utilized the symbolism of Islam to mobilize the support of the Muslim population. It is through the use of such rhetoric that pragmatists have been able to "...gain or enhance their legitimacy; integrate and unite their fragmented Muslim societies; and inspire, mobilize and galvanize the Muslim masses."[24] Pragmatists themselves are, however, usually non-practicing Muslims; indeed, Husain refers to them as "...'nominal Muslims' with a veneer of a liberal and eclectic version of Islam."[25] Pragmatists, though born Muslim, often do not observe the rituals and the literal interpretations of the faith. Along with their relatively westernized ideas, "...their liberal and lax approach to Islam is not appreciated at all by devout Muslims, who consider them 'wayward souls' at best and 'unbelievers' at worst."[26] The use of the symbolism of Islam by Muslim pragmatists, therefore, is all the more interesting, given their interpretation of the role of Islam – or lack thereof – in public life as well as their adoption of western ideas. This use is, nonetheless, a symbol of the potential power and authority inherent in Islamism as an ideological tool to rally support and legitimacy.

The ideological debate amongst the various perspectives described above has been an ongoing feature of Pakistan's national life since its creation. Any government or leader hoping to attain – or retain – political authority and legitimacy in the country has usually been compelled to attempt a balance of the demands of the prominent ideological perspectives in Pakistan; such a balance was vital if the ruling élite was to be successful in maintaining authority and legitimate acceptance within the country. Over the years, Pakistan's official institutions, governmental élites and leaders had developed what can very loosely be labelled an 'official view or perspective' with respect to the public role of Islam. Such an official view generally had, as its primary goals, the legitimation of ruling institutions and the prevailing government of the day, as well as the enhancement of

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24 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 225.

25 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 225.

26 Husain, The politics of Islamic revivalism, page 228.

cohesion and integration amongst Pakistanis; in essence, the 'official perspective' with regard to the role of faith in public life became linked closely to the political interests of the ruling élite. Hence, any perspective which differed from this view would have the potential to create discomfort amongst the ruling élite in Pakistan, especially if such a perspective became popular and/or powerful.

The Iranian Revolution of 1978/79, both a popular and a powerful movement, certainly represented a differing perspective from the official Pakistani approach with respect to the role of faith in public life. It is important to recognize that the Iranian Revolution was motivated by a wide variety of factors, only one of which was the religious impulse; faith provided one key element in the mobilization and cohesion of opposition forces within Iran. The success of the Iranian movement in utilizing Islam as a mechanism for sociopolitical agitation and for overthrowing the established ruling élite in Iran thus had the potential to cause difficulties in the Pakistani context, especially in light of domestic political unrest in the country during the late 1970s. Moreover, the *Shī'āh* basis of the Iranian Revolution was a significant factor in the differing perspectives between the two countries. Notwithstanding these differences in perspective, however, the symbolism utilized by both countries was based on Islam and its role in the sociopolitical realm. Furthermore, national identity and 'Islamic identity' were closely linked in both Iran and Pakistan. This similarity in language and basis for legitimacy – though certainly interpreted differently – placed Pakistan in an intriguing position with respect to the Iranian Revolution and compelled it to respond to the latter in a cautionary and sometimes ambiguous manner. To complicate matters even further, Pakistan's foreign policy objectives – based essentially on the quest for security and respect – provided yet another set of considerations compelling a cautious Pakistani response towards the Iranian Revolution. It is interesting, in this respect, to analyze the factors which were perceived

by Pakistan's leaders, to necessitate the country's rather ambivalent and cautious response to postrevolutionary Iran.

This thesis evaluates Pakistani editorial commentary regarding the initial phases of the Iranian Revolution in two English-language newspapers, namely Dawn and Pakistan Times. Both newspapers were generally government controlled and/or censored during the period studied and thus may be seen as being semi-official representations of the opinions of the ruling élite during the period studied. The decision to limit analysis to editorial commentary is based on various factors. First, the editorials of a newspaper usually provide a clear view of its dominant opinions and interpretations of any particular news event. Second, the editorial position of a newspaper will influence to a great degree the selection and interpretation of all else that is published with respect to any particular event. And third, analysis of editorial commentary provides a manageable and meaningful manner in which to evaluate Pakistani official and semi-official media response to the Iranian Revolution. Every editorial published between 1978 and 1980 in the two newspapers has been included in this analysis.

Before proceeding to an evaluation of Pakistani editorial commentary with respect to the Iranian Revolution, the thesis provides the contextual background to facilitate a clear understanding of this response. To this end, Chapter one surveys the role of Islamism in Pakistani public life between 1947 and 1980, in an effort to highlight some of the significant issues influencing the country's search for a legitimate dominant ideology. Chapter two investigates the underlying issues of Pakistan's foreign policy between 1947 and 1980 in order to demonstrate the manner in which the search for security and respect in the international domain has been an influential factor in Pakistan. Chapter three studies Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world and highlights its efforts to utilize Islam and its symbolism to achieve a measure of legitimacy and respect within the community of Muslim states. This chapter also provides a survey of Pakistan's relations

with Iran prior to the revolution in order to provide a backdrop for later relations. Chapters one, two and three thus provide the background against which editorial commentary on the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79 is examined in Chapter four. By placing the editorial commentary within the context of Pakistan's pragmatic and ideological circumstances, both domestic and international, the thesis seeks to illuminate some of the factors which influenced Pakistan's national discourse with respect to the Iranian Revolution.

Chapter One

The search for a dominant ideology: *Islamism in Pakistan*

> *...the wish to see the Kingdom of God established in a Muslim territory...was the moving idea behind the demand for Pakistan, the corner-stone of the movement, the ideology of the people, and the raison d'etre of the new nation-state....*[1]
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> *The Pakistan movement was a movement of Muslims, rather than of 'Islam'; a movement in which diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions, representing different social strata and interests, were allied in pursuit of quite material objectives...their objective was the creation of a Muslim state as a nation-state; they did not seek an 'Islamic state' as a theocratic conception.*[2]

Such divergent opinions represent the ideological debate in Pakistan that has raged since the partition of British India in 1947. Some state categorically that Islam was the raison d'être for the formation of the state, and hence, that the state should aim to become a 'true' Islamic state; others reject this theocratic vision in favour of a more reformist and modernist view of Pakistan's destiny. Despite these differences, however, it is clear that Islam has been a recurrent theme in the political life of Pakistan since its creation. Indeed, it has been at the centre of the primary ideological debate on the national scene; this debate has, in turn, fascinated and galvanized the Pakistani population, as well as the intellectual and political leaders of the country. While various shades of opinion do exist – including those of the traditionalists and secularists – the debate within the political arena has generally been dominated by the renewalists and the modernists; the renewalists have wished to move Pakistan closer to a theocratic vision of an Islamic state through the application of Islamic laws, while the modernists have generally hoped to integrate reformist and modernist concepts into the Pakistani political arena. It is the purpose of

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1 Waheed-uz-Zaman, editor's note, 'The quest for identity' (Proceedings of the First Congress on the history and culture of Pakistan held at the University of Islamabad, April 1973) Quoted in 'The political dynamics of Islamic resurgence in Pakistan,' by William Richter, Asian Survey, volume XIX, number. 6, June 1979, page 550

2 Hamza Alavi, 'Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology,' State and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds), London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988, pages 67-68.

this chapter to investigate the nature of this ideological debate and to analyze the role of Islamism in the national political life of Pakistan between 1947 and 1980.

Muslim Nationalism in British India, as it had been espoused by earlier leaders such as Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, the Agha Khān, and others, was aimed at protecting the political and social rights of Muslims against the Hindu majority. By 1909, Muslim leaders were successful in lobbying for separate representation for Muslims in most provinces. With the failure of the *Khilāfat* movement (1919-1924), Muslim antagonisms against Hindus intensified, and the nationalist movement acquired an increased communalistic undertone. In this context, "Muslim communalism contributed towards articulating a common Islamic identity among the Muslims in response to the external threat – Hinduism."[3] After 1936, communalism became the rationale for the Muslim League's Pakistan movement and provided fuel for the movement. It was at this time, in particular after its 1937 electoral defeat, that the League, under the leadership of Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnāh, began to broaden its support base. The Indian National Congress, which had been successful in the elections, reneged on an earlier promise to the League to grant it some ministries in order to safeguard the Muslim minority status. In so doing, the Congress angered both the League itself, as well as Muslims in general; after this, the League gained greater popularity and it was able to appeal directly to the Muslim sense of religiousness to attract support for its objectives. Jinnāh notably, but also other leaders, drew heavily on Islamic values and utilized "...Islamic symbols and slogans to forge a mass movement whose goal was a separate nation – a Muslim homeland wherein Muslims might be free to pursue their way of life...."[4]

The League's appeal to Islamic values and symbols was a politically powerful instrument; it made the movement simultaneously attractive both to the Muslim masses and to rural

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3 Diamond Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismāʿīlī community in Pakistan, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Montreal: The Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1987, page 47.

4 John Esposito, 'Pakistan: the quest for Islamic identity', Islam and Development, Syracuse, New York:

and provincial leaders whose support was required if the League was to be successful. Nonetheless, despite this use of Islamic symbolism, the leadership of the movement continued to be dominated by upper middle class professionals and landowners, the majority of whom were western-educated. Theirs was essentially a secular objective – the achievement of a separate homeland for Muslims wherein their economic and political rights would be protected – rather than a theocratic one calling for the formation of an Islamic State. In this vein, Rattansi writes that "The objectives and the intentions of the Muslim League did not envisage an Islamic State in the normative religious sense nor did its manifestos and other statements attempt to spell out in detail the nature of an Islamic Society based on the *Sharī'ah*." [5] In fact, the leaders of the movement had, at best, an ambiguous vision of the specifics of the proposed state, and even of their own role within it. The foremost objective was to win independence in a form that would provide for Muslim interests; the specifics of the shape and form of the political framework were not formulated in any great detail.

It appears clear, then, that the ideals espoused by the leaders of the movement were secularist ones, based more on the material and economic needs of the Muslim community than on religious ideals aimed at forming a theocratic Islamic state. It is in this context that Hamza Alavi writes of the 'salariat', which was comprised of "...those who had received an education that would equip them for employment in the expanding colonial state apparatus as scribes and functionaries – the men of the pen."[6] Alavi argues that it was the interests of the Muslim salariats from the different regions of the country which were the dominant force behind the Pakistan movement. The economic and professional interests of the Muslim salariat propelled the movement for a separate country for Muslims in which these economic and professional interests would be

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Syracuse University Press, 1980, page 141.

5 Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismā'īlī community in Pakistan, page 2.

6 Alavi, 'Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology,' State and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, page

protected. "Most of the Salariat, in fact, implicitly or explicitly, espoused...a secular conception of being part of a Muslim nation....The fact of the matter is that the Muslim League, soon after its initiation by Muslim notables, was taken over by the Muslim Salariat...."[7] Seen in this context, the Pakistan movement can be considered a secularist movement which utilized the religious symbols and values of Islam both to attract and retain popular support as well as to unite the diverse factions of the movement under a common and virtually unbeatable banner. Indeed, Hamza Alavi writes that "...Islam was not at the centre of Muslim nationalism in India, but was brought into the political debate after the nation was created."[8]

The creation of the new state of Pakistan on August 14, 1947 did not resolve the ideological dilemmas faced by the leadership of the new country. Jinnāh, a secular leader, felt that "...economic development and economic power [were] the most important of all the 'departments of life'...."[9] He had consistently opposed the formation of a theocratic state in Pakistan and had, in fact, spoken eloquently of a secular state:

> You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state....We are starting with this fundamental principle, that we are all citizens of one state....I think we should keep that in front of us as our idea and you will find that in the course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense, as citizens of the state....[10]

Jinnāh and the leaders of Pakistan aimed at the establishment of a democratic system of government for Pakistan which was a system based essentially on the legacies of the

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7 Alavi, 'Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology,' State and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, pages 97-98.

8 Hamza Alavii, 'Ethnicity, Muslim society and the Pakistan ideology,' Islamic reassertion in Pakistan, Anita Weiss (ed), Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986, page 8.

9 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: the nature and direction of change, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980, page 25.

10 Jinnah's inaugural address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, August 11, 1947. Quoted in Alavi, 'Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology,' State and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, page 104.

British Raj in India. Nonetheless, Pakistan had been born through the combined efforts of various factions with differing interests; each faction may have had differing interpretations regarding Pakistan's political future. The ideological differences did nothing to lessen – and, in fact, possibly exacerbated – other factors which hindered Pakistani national integration. Such factors included: language diversity (five major linguistic families with thirty-two distinct spoken dialects); strong regional sentiments; and distance (the two major provinces of the country were separated by over 1000 miles of Indian territory.)[11] After partition, in the absence of a strong national identity, regional and ethnic tensions began to appear. The absence of strong integrating and unifying elements fostered a situation which was conducive to an appeal to Islamic values and symbols to forge unity among rival groups. Indeed Jinnāh himself, when faced with the problem of regional conflicts, was said to have pleaded that "...these regional groups should think of themselves as Muslims and Pakistanis first, rather than as Bengalis, or Punjabis, or Pakhtuns...."[12] Despite this appeal to the common bond among all Pakistanis, it remains clear that Jinnāh and the leadership of Pakistan were committed to the ideals of a democratic, secular Pakistan while still retaining use of the guiding principles of Islam to enhance integration within the country. This essentially modernist vision did not include the application of the *Sharī'ah* (Islamic law) in Pakistan, though it attempted to address the issue of the role of Islam in the development of a coherent Pakistani national identity. The modernist perspective on this issue was in marked contrast to the renewalist view – and the race for ideological supremacy was on in post-independence Pakistan.

The growing tension between the views of the renewalists and the modernists is evident in the Objectives Resolution, which was proposed in March 1949 by Prime Minister Liaquat 'Alī Khān. It declared that:

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11 Esposito, 'Pakistan: quest for Islamic identity,' Islām and development, page 141.

12 Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: the nature and direction of change, page 27.

> Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone; but He had delegated this authority to the state of Pakistan and that this was to be exercised through its people 'within the limits prescribed by Him.' [and that] (a) 'the state shall exercise its power and authority through the chosen representatives of the people' and that (b) 'the principles of democracy;, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed' and (c) 'the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah'....[13]

Through its use of Islamic symbols, the Objectives Resolution "...created the impression that Pakistan would move in the direction of an orthodox Islamic state...."[14] Despite its tone, however, the resolution spoke forcefully of a democratic and secular political climate; the document, while utilizing the language and rhetoric of Islamism, was, in reality, a strong testament to a modernist vision of Pakistan. Essentially, the Objectives Resolution attempted to forge an uneasy truce amongst the various ideological groups in the Pakistani political arena; it "...reflected the attempts of the modernist administrators of Pakistan to deal with Islam in an ambiguous way and to avoid offending the *'ulamā'* while at the same time carrying on their activities."[15] Through its rather ambiguous wording, the Objectives Resolution provided Pakistan's leaders with an effective mechanism for meeting the demands, at least in theory, of some of the more vocal ideological groups (primarily the renewalist factions) while remaining true to its own objectives and hence sustaining its grasp of legitimate authority.

Constitutional developments in Pakistan have reflected the continuing tensions between renewalists and modernists within the Pakistani political arena. The Constitutions of 1956 and 1962, which will be discussed shortly, were both examples of attempts by the modernist elements of the government to cater to, and thus hopefully silence, the more traditionalist and renewalist elements in Pakistan. The long debate over the 1956 Constitution "...provided an arena for a protracted battle between conservative religious

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13 Khalid Bin Sayeed, 'Islam and national integration in Pakistan,' South Asian politics and religion, Donald Eugene Smith (ed), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, page 401.

14 Sayeed, 'Islam and national integration in Pakistan,' South Asian politics and religion, page 402.

leaders and modernist factions – the former more inclined to a revival of a past ideal, the latter to modernization and reform through the adoption of Western-based models of development."[16] The aforementioned Objectives Resolution became the preamble for the Constitution and other Islamic provisions were incorporated in a piecemeal fashion into the document, though it did not present a coherent vision of the application of a clear Islamic ideology. The major Islamic provisions of the 1956 Constitution included (a) a change in nomenclature formally declaring that Pakistan would be called the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; (b) a requirement that the Head of State be a Muslim; (c) the Repugnancy Clause, by which no law contrary to the Qur'ān and Sunnah could be enacted in Pakistan; and (d) the establishment of an Islamic Research Centre which was to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society based on Islamic principles. Despite the inclusion of such clauses designed to provide an Islamic basis for the document, the Constitution represented a victory for modernist – and perhaps even for moderate secularist – forces in Pakistan. It incorporated many aspects of a modern parliamentary democracy, including popular sovereignty, a political party system, and the equality of all citizens while nonetheless including various Islamic provisions that appeared to respond to the expectations of religious and renewalist leaders. The Constitution was, for modernists, "...a document whose few Islamic provisions caused a minimum of inconvenience."[17] It was, in essence, a compromise document which did not address the compelling issues of the Muslim or Islamic nature of the state. According to Dr. Fazlur Rahman, "the Constitution of 1956 clearly reflected Pakistan's ideological difficulties for it lacked any systematic statement and implementation of a clear Islamic rationale."[18]

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15 Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismā'īlī community in Pakistan, page 53.

16 John L. Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds), Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986, page 336.

17 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 336.

18 Fazlur Rahman, 'Islam and the constitutional problems of Pakistan,' Studia Islamica, volume 33, number 4,

The tenure of Field Marshall Ayūb Khān (1958-1969) provides another significant example of "...the failure to achieve a national consensus on the meaning, character, and implementation of Pakistan's Islamic ideology."[19] The coup d'êtat engineered by Ayūb resulted in a military government which was committed to a strong centralized national government and swift socio-economic growth. Ayūb Khān espoused an essentially modernist and reformist view of Islam; while the emphasis of his régime was undoubtedly on economic development, his program of modernization also attempted to implement a reformist and modernist perspective with respect to the role of Islam in public affairs. Thus, he emphasized the need to "...liberate the spirit of religion from the cobwebs of superstition and stagnation which surround it and move forward under the forces of modern science and technology."[20] He argued that any "...government, constitution or democracy would be Islamic if it worked in an Islamic spirit, for that spirit was essentially progressive."[21] Ayūb's modernist position was clearly reflected in various measures, including the Constitution of 1962, the establishment of the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology and the Islamic Research Institute as well as in the reforms enacted through the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961. Each of these reforms, the majority of which were vehemently opposed by traditional religious and renewalist leaders, will be discussed in turn.

The 1962 Constitution initially omitted some of the Islamic provisions of the 1956 Constitution, in great measure because of "...the generals' disgust at what President Iskander Mirza termed as the prostitution of Islam for political ends."[22] For example, the

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December 1970, pages 275-287.

19 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion, and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 336.

20 Ayūb Khan, quoted in John L. Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 336.

21 Saleem M.M. Qureshi, 'Religion and party politics in Pakistan,' Pakistan since 1958, Seminar held at the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University, 1964, page 50.

22 Richard S. Wheeler, The politics of Pakistan: a constitutional quest, London: Cornell University Press, 1970,

document omitted 'Islamic' from the official name of the republic and it excluded also the divine sovereignty phrase, which limited the powers of the state 'within the limits prescribed by God.' Under strong public pressure, however, these provisions were reinstated by the First Amendment Bill of 1963.

The principal innovations embodied in the 1962 Constitution called for the establishment of an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology and an Islamic Research Institute; the former was mandated to deal with legislation, while the latter was concerned with research, particularly with reference to Islam in the context of the modern world. The functions of the Advisory Council were "...to make recommendations to the government regarding provisions that might better enable Muslims to lead their lives in conformity with the tenets of Islam; and to advise the government as to whether proposed legislation was repugnant to Islam."[23] The function of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, which had previously been established by the 1956 Constitution and was merely redefined in the 1962 Constitution, was to "...define Islamic fundamentals in a rational and liberal manner so as to bring out their dynamic character in the context of the modern world."[24] Although the influence of both bodies was limited in view of their status as strictly advisory bodies, it is clear that both institutions were designed to facilitate a reformist and modernist vision of the role of Islam in the public life of Pakistan.

The issue of family law became another significant area of conflict between the Ayūb government and the traditionalist and renewalist perspectives. The Commission on Marriage and Family Laws, appointed in 1955, had been formed to make recommendations on the issue. The Commission was largely dominated by lay modernists

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page 106.

23 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 337.

24 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 337.

(three men and three women, which, in itself, was cause for opposition) with only one representative of the *'ulamā'*. The majority report of the Commission, issued in 1956,

> ...did not simply restrict its recommendations to regulations obtained by *taqlid* (the following or imitation of tradition) or selection from medieval *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), but rather asserted its right to depart from tradition and exercise *ijtihad* (individual reasoning or interpretation) in drafting reforms in Muslim family laws (marriage, divorce, and inheritance.)[25]

Such views were strongly criticized by renewalist leaders and the religious establishment, who felt that their traditional position as the interpreters of religion was being usurped. In his minority report, the representative of the religious establishment on the Commission vigorously attacked the lay members of the Commission and questioned their competence to interpret Islamic law. He further accused them of

> ...distorting the religion of God and the worst type of heresy....[Their recommendations] reflect subservience to the West of some of the members and their displeasure with Islam [constituting] an odious attempt to distort the Holy Quran and the Sunnah with a view to giving them a western slant and bias.[26]

The heated discussion between those in favour of the Ordinance and those opposed lasted five long years; finally, a weakened version was passed by the legislature, notwithstanding the vehement objections of the religious establishment.

Each of the aforementioned reforms of the Ayūb government – and the modernist perspective underlying such measures – encountered much opposition from traditionalist and renewalist leaders; such opposition was based both on pragmatic and philosophical grounds. On a practical level, the modernist view threatened a decrease in authority for traditional religious leaders and authority figures. "Since Ayub viewed the 'ulamā' as chiefly responsible for the retrograde state of Islam and as generally ill-prepared to meet the demands of modernity, he tended to limit their powers and participation in

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25 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 338.

26 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran

government."[27] The battle in the political arena merely reflected the nature of the still-continuing ideological and pragmatic battle between a régime committed to its modernist interpretation of the role of Islam in public life and a religious élite with a more conservative world view which was being threatened by its perceived displacement of its own authority. On philosophical grounds, both traditionalists and renewalists had cause for concern because of the emphasis within the modernist perspective on the 'spirit of Islam' rather than on the specifics of past legislation of traditional Muslim jurisprudence which was, in essence, one of the dominant issues of the ideological debate. The ideological conflict was obviously not limited to practical political matters such as the modernist reforms initiated by Ayūb's government, but such measures were good indicators of the extent of the chasm between the modernists, on the one hand, and the traditionalists and renewalists, on the other. This chasm had existed since at least the earliest days of Pakistan's existence and had resulted in various compromise measures which both limited the effectiveness of the appeal instituted by modernists and hindered the process of the definition of a national identity and dominant ideology. Indeed, Esposito, in a summary of the first two decades of Pakistan's existence, comments:

> First, while there was general agreement regarding the need for a Muslim homeland, what that meant was far from clear. Second, profound differences in education, outlook and approach between modernists and traditionalists presented formidable obstacles – as witnessed in the drafting of the 1956 Constitution and the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961. Third, as a consequence of unresolved differences, ad hoc, piecemeal approaches were taken to reach an acceptable compromise. No systematic attempt to define Pakistan's ideology and then to consistently apply it had been made.[28]

The decisive victory of Zulfiqār ʿAlī Bhutto in the 1970 national elections was the beginning of a new phase in Pakistani politics, although few observers at the time

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and Pakistan, page 338.

27 Esposito, 'Pakistan: quest for Islamic identity,' Islam and development, page 147.

28 Esposito, 'Pakistan: quest for Islamic identity,' Islam and development, page 148.

anticipated the scale of the transformation that was to occur. Indeed, according to Esposito, "...few expected that this secularist, representing the socialist platform of his Pakistan People's Party (PPP), would be the Initiator of Islamization in Pakistan."[29] Past experience had shown that while Islamic sentiment, although vaguely defined, was an important sensibility to be observed, "...successive governments had not considered it to be a major factor in Pakistan's political development. Primacy was given to political and social modernization and Islamic reform was surely tangential to this process...."[30] There was little to suggest that the election of Bhutto would change this course of Pakistan's political development. Nonetheless, events in Pakistan during the 1970s prompted Bhutto to increase his references to Islam and then eventually to advocate a greater emphasis on Islamism in Pakistan.

The major political factors responsible for the greater appeal to Islam during the 1970s fall into four broad categories: first, the national identity crisis which followed the Pakistani civil war and subsequent loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); second, general Pakistani discontent and disillusionment with the exported ideologies with which Pakistan had experimented; third, the emergence of the greater international role of the Arab oil powers, and Bhutto's attempts to align Pakistan with the Arab world; and, fourth, domestic politics, and in particular, the March 1977 elections.

Pakistan's civil war had devastating effects on the country; after the loss of East Pakistan, the entire country underwent a wrenching process of searching for the roots of Pakistani national identity. In response to this collective soul-searching, two responses appeared, each with its own interpretation of the loss of one-half of the country. The first response emphasized the geographical identity of the 'new' Pakistan. "Gone was the need to straddle, schizophrenically, both sides of the sub-continent, represented in part by the

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29 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, pages 338-339.

30 Esposito, 'Pakistan: quest for Islamic identity,' Islam and development, pages 148-149.

long-standing question of parity between the two wings of the country."[31] The second, and more powerful, response was a "...renewed and reinforced emphasis upon the Islamic roots of Pakistan."[32] In response to a crisis which threatened the very existence of the country, people turned to the one ingredient which was common to all without reference to ethnic, political or social cleavages: the unifying bond of Islam. In an effort to respond to this renewed call for a greater emphasis on Islamism in public life, Bhutto attempted "...to establish a sense of national unity behind a populist, socialist program which promised to redress the acute socioeconomic disparities in Pakistan."[33]

The identity crisis prompted by the civil war and loss of Bangladesh also fueled general discontent with the foreign ideologies with which Pakistan had experimented. While initially a relatively small factor in the demand for greater emphasis on the role of Islam, this feeling gradually grew to a crescendo in the latter part of the 1970s, as Bhutto's socialist promises failed to bear fruit for the great majority of the Pakistani population. As the people became more frustrated in their attempts to acquire the basics of life – *roṭī, kapaṛa aur makān* (food, clothing and shelter) – they became increasingly aware that both capitalism under Ayūb and, subsequently, socialism under Bhutto had disappointed them. With this disenchantment came the desire to turn to an ideology which was not foreign, and which was perceived as providing the answers to Pakistan's economic, social and political dilemmas. In this context, Richter has written that "Both the loss of Bangladesh and disillusionment with Pakistani capitalism and socialism [have] led to a renewed search for fundamental values and institutions that might both coincide with these values and solve the very real material problems facing the country."[34]

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31 William Richter, 'The political dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan,' Asian Survey, volume XIX, number 6, June 1979, page 549.

32 Richter, 'The political dynamics of Islamic resurgence in Pakistan,' Asian Survey, volume XIX, number 6, June 1979, page 550.

33 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 339.

34 Richter, 'The politics dynamics of Islamic resurgence in Pakistan,' Asian Survey, volume XIX, number 6,

The early 1970s were marked by the growing prominence of the Arab oil powers of the Middle East – a phenomenon often referred to as the 'Islamic Revival.' This development had significant implications for Pakistan's move towards a greater emphasis on the role of Islam in its public life. In the post-Bangladesh period, Bhutto sought to align Pakistan even more closely with the Arab oil-producing countries, and thus, emphasized their common Islamic identity and bond. Indeed, during this period, the results of Pakistan's efforts to ingratiate itself with other Muslim states have been clearly documented: Pakistan's hosting of the Islamic Summit Conference in 1974; its agreement to Egyptian mediation with Bangladesh, with whom it restored diplomatic relations 'in the name of Islam'; and its official efforts to encourage the study of Arabic, are but three examples of Bhutto's attempt to emphasize the Islamic nature of Pakistan, and hence to move closer towards the Muslim states of the Middle East.

As the 1970s drew to a close, it became evident that the prevailing mood in Pakistan was calling for a greater emphasis on the role of Islam in its public life and state apparatus. The country's major opposition groups, and in particular the Jamā'at-i Islamī, a renewalist movement guided by the thought of Mawlana Abū-l A'lā Mawdūdī, continued to criticize the policies of the government as being 'un-Islamic.' In the face of such opposition, Bhutto introduced a number of measures which were designed to respond to the call for greater emphasis on faith in Pakistani public life. "In reacting to this internal political pressure from religious critics, Bhutto increasingly responded to them on their own ground – through appeals to Islam to legitimate his programs and policies."[35] In the Constitution of 1973, for example, Bhutto's government approved various Islamic measures, including compulsory Qur'ānic instruction for all Muslims and a clause stipulating that all existing laws be brought into conformity with the tenets of Islam.

June 1979, page 557.

35 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, pages 339-340.

Despite Bhutto's appeals to Islam, however, opposition to his government and policies continued to grow; leaders of the religious establishment, renewalist factions, as well as others unhappy with the effects of the government's social and economic policies joined a loose coalition of opposition to the régime. In the prevailing political climate, both the government and its critics couched their policies and criticisms in Islamic terms. Once again, "...religion...became a focal point as both sides espoused and committed themselves to a more Islamic system of government (*Niẓām-i Islāmī.*)"[36]

The March 1977 elections in Pakistan proved to be a significant symbol of the transformation that was to occur in Pakistani politics; it was during this time that "...appeals to Islam reached their zenith."[37] Opposition forces gathered under an umbrella group, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), that drew its leadership and direction from the three major religious parties in Pakistan, namely the Jamā'at-i-Islamī, the Jam'īyat-i-'Ulamā'-i-Pakistan, and the Jam'īyat-i-'Ulamā'-i-Islām. The PNA's support base was composed primarily of

> ...urban intellectuals who had supported Bhutto's early socialist platform and were now alienated by his purge of the more leftist elements in his cabinet in 1974; and *bazaaris* (small traditional businessmen, merchants and artisans) and members of the 'new' middle class professionals (teachers, doctors, clerical workers, university students and other professionals) for whom Bhutto's political and economic reforms resulted in an increased sense of powerlessness and alienation.[38]

The middle class base of the PNA was greatly reinforced by the leadership of the religious parties, for whom the traditional base of support had always been the urban middle class. Ideologically, the PNA was guided primarily by the writings and thought of Mawlana Abū-l A'lā Mawdūdī, who offered an alternative vision with respect to the role of Islam in Pakistani society. Mawdūdī's views differed considerably from the modernist

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36 Esposito, 'Pakistan: quest for Islamic identity,' Islam and development, page 151.

37 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 340.

38 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 341.

interpretation which had generally held sway in Pakistan.[39] Mawdūdī's views were greatly influential in Pakistan, for "...not only was Mawdūdī the most widely read religious writer among the educated classes in Pakistan, but, through the translation and distribution of his works, his interpretation of Islam has become an integral part of the rhetoric and ideological statements of Islamic revivalism throughout the Muslim world."[40]

As the campaign for the elections progressed, Bhutto, too, increased his appeals to Islam, in an effort to counter his Islamic opposition. The PPP campaign slogan of 'Islamic Socialism', which had been a prominent symbol of the 1970 elections, gradually receded into the background and the cry of *'Musawat-i-Muḥammad'* (Muḥammad's egalitarianism) became more pronounced. In addition, the new PPP election manifesto included a promise to encourage and implement greater Islamization of society including a commitment to base community life more fully upon the Qur'ān.

In the confused political climate immediately preceding and following the March 1977 elections, in which the PPP were victorious, Islam continued to be utilized as "...the principal political weapon wielded by both sides."[41] Amidst charges of massive election irregularities, the PNA began a campaign of political agitation; in response, Bhutto attempted to impose various 'Islamic measures', which were viewed by the opposition as mere political and stop-gap measures. In this climate, the religious forces played an increasingly important role in the opposition movement. "Demonstrations often originated at the mosque following the Friday congregational prayer and political exhortations from religious leaders. Slogans of 'Islam in danger' and 'Niẓām-i-Islām' summarized the battle

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39 For a detailed and thorough investigation and analysis of Mawdūdī's thought, see Charles Adams, 'The ideology of Mawlana Mawdūdī.,' South Asian politics and religion, Donald Eugene Smith (ed), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966.

40 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, pages 341-342.

41 Esposito, 'Islam: quest for Islamic identity,' Islam and Development, page 151.

cry and slogan of the PNA opposition parties."[42] As the agitation continued, the government was forced to impose curfews and martial law in an attempt to restore peace, but with little success. The political situation was precarious when, on July 5, 1977, a military coup d'êtat brought General Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq to power in Pakistan; the new leader declared his commitment "...to transform the country's socio-economic and political structure in accordance with the principles of Islam"[43] and to implement the Nizām-i-Islam (the system of Islam). The course of political developments in Pakistan during the 1970s had brought a significant turning point: "Islam and Pakistan's Islamic identity had reemerged as the dominant theme in Pakistani politics in a manner and to a degree that had not been seen since its establishment."[44]

The accession to power of Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq and the policies of his government, especially with respect to Islamism, were important symbols of the transformation in Pakistan's public life. Domestic public opinion in Pakistan – at least that which was vocal and active – appeared to suggest that Islamism had become the prominent language of national discourse by the late 1970s. Certainly, a brief glance at the political development of the country testifies to the significance of Islam in its public life. What is also clear, however, is that the general trend during the first thirty years of Pakistan's existence was a movement towards a generally modernist interpretation of the role of Islam in public life. In this sense, the role of Islam was generally limited to piecemeal enactments of 'Islamic' measures and to appeals to the symbolism of Islam for political purposes within the framework of the modernist perspective. The rise of Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq, with promises to institute *Niẓām-i-Mustafa*, created expectations amongst some ideological groups that the role of Islam in public life would be interpreted from a different perspective than the

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42 Esposito, 'Islam: quest for Islamic identity,' Islam and Development, pages 151-152.

43 General Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq. Quoted in Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politic in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 343.

44 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 343.

modernist one. The new government had come to power in great measure due to the activist support of the traditionalist and renewalist groups and hence, could not easily dispense with such expectations. Likewise, many Pakistanis, whatever their ideological leanings, were unhappy with Bhutto and his policies, at least in part because they were perceived to be, at best, insensitive to the religious sensibilities of many within the country. Under such conditions, Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq had little choice but to cater to some of these expectations. In some senses, he was compelled to discover a more comprehensive role for Islam within Pakistan's public life if his régime was to sustain its legitimacy for any length of time.

The early objectives of the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq régime appeared to be defined relatively narrowly. While declaring his commitment to the implementation of 'Islamic measures', the new leader also asserted that his sole aim was "...to organize free and fair elections which would be held in October of this year [1977]....During the next three months, my total attention will be concentrated on the holding of elections."[45] In this respect, the structural features of the new government were notably restrained and unrevolutionary in the early days: for example, while national and provincial assemblies were dismissed, the President of the country was retained and no immediate changes were made to the structure of Pakistan's political framework. Further, the 1973 Constitution was retained by the new government, though certain provisions were held in abeyance. In order to prepare for the forthcoming elections, the government appointed a Chief Election Commissioner, four other members of the Elections Commission, and a committee to work out details for the elections. Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq also entered into discussions with both the PNA and the PPP, after releasing key leaders of all parties arrested earlier, to obtain their agreement for guidelines for the elections. In effect, there appears to be ample evidence that the new government's mandate was interpreted, at this early stage, as being

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45 Dawn. July 6, 1977.

fairly narrow and immediate: the holding of national elections.

As the election campaign began, however, the issue of 'accountability' became a key word by which the PNA and others demanded the prosecution of Bhutto on murder charges before the election. Until at least the end of September 1977, Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq continued to declare his intention of holding elections in October and to maintain neutrality toward all political parties, including the PPP. By late September, however, the government's resolve to hold the elections appeared to change dramatically; on October 1, Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq announced the decision to postpone elections indefinitely. Once this decision was made and announced, the government was in the rather uncomfortable position of having to justify its continued hold on political power, especially in light of its earlier promises to do otherwise. The issue of accountability provided one justification for the indefinite postponement of elections and for the military's continued dominance on the political scene. The issue of greater emphasis on Islamism in Pakistan's public life provided another – and more sustainable – justification for the continuation of military rule. Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq, facing the expectations of the renewalist and traditionalist forces in the country, began the process of instituting *Niẓām-i-Muṣṭafa* within Pakistan.

Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's first noticeable and practical step towards greater Islamization in Pakistan began in 1978 with his reorganization of the Council of Islamic Ideology. The Council had initially been created in the Constitution of 1962, and provision for its appointment had been made in both the 1962 and 1973 Constitutions. The function of the Council of Islamic Ideology was to bring all existing laws into conformity with the injunctions of Islam. Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq gave the Council more prominence than had earlier régimes and increased its membership to a maximum of twenty. He also broadened the scope of the Council's mandate "...so that it might serve as the president's chief advisory council, recommending the best means for introducing a more Islamic system of government."[46]

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46 Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, volume LXXII, number 3-4, July-October 1982, page 202.

Despite the prominence given to the Council of Islamic Ideology, it remained merely an advisory body, and its recommendations were not binding on the government. In February 1979, on the occasion of *'Id-i-Milād-i-Nabī*, however, Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq formalized his régime's commitment to *Niẓām-i-Islam* by promulgating the Ordinance entitled 'Introduction to Islamic Laws'; the document contained the framework for a number of reforms in worship, law, economics and education. "Since that time Islamization has continued to be a prominent part of Pakistan's politics and life. Islamic measures and proposals affecting politics, law, economics, education and culture have been introduced."[47] It is to a survey of some of these reforms that we now turn.

Legal measures taken by the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq régime focused, in great measure, on two essential areas: first, the implementation of the *Sharī'ah* which tends to be the primary goal of most, if not all, Islamic resurgence and renewalist movements and second, the restructuring of the legal and court system in Pakistan. Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's promulgation of 'An Introduction to Islamic Laws' in February 1979 resulted in the enforcement of the Islamic Penal Code based on the *ḥudūd* punishments set in the Qur'ān for offences of drinking, theft, adultery *(zinā')* and false accusation (*qaḍhaf*). The amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code constituted, according to Rattansi, "...the most controversial legal reform in Pakistan."[48] Under the provisions of the revised code, theft or adultery – the punishments for which attracted the most attention and controversy – could have been punishable by severing a limb of a thief or by stoning to death a person found guilty of adultery. Many Pakistanis, including those with modernist leanings, were alarmed at the changes in the penal code which appeared to "...reduce what is, according to them the dynamic and flexible spirt of Islam to a mere hard and fast code of conduct."[49] In any case, the *ḥadd* punishments were not, according to Rattansi, "...carried out widely except

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47 John Esposito ,'Religion and politics in Pakistan', The Muslim World, page 202.

48 Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismaī'lī community in Pakistan, page 126.

49 Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, page 183.

in cases of drinking in which those found guilty [were]...flogged."[50]

Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's efforts to restructure the court system began in 1978 with his introduction of Sharī'ah benches (or courts); the purpose of these courts was to determine whether or not existing laws were in conformity with the dictates of Islam as enunciated in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. In 1980, the Sharī'at benches were reorganized under the Federal Sharī'at Court which consisted of a panel of eight individuals, of whom three were *'ulamā'* and did not need to be qualified as judges or lawyers. In an apparent effort to give the Federal Sharī'at Court more power, Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq amended certain portions of the Constitution in 1980. These amendments decreed that the Court of Sessions would try all cases punishable under the Ḥadd Ordinance of 1979 and that all appeals from such courts would be taken to the Federal Sharī'at Court. Changes such as these in the legal framework of Pakistan paved the way for later measures, including most notably the Ninth Amendment and the Sharī'at Bill, both promulgated in 1986. The impact of these measures represented significant legal and constitutional reform in the country. The Ninth Amendment provided constitutional support to empower the President and the Federal Sharī'at Court to be the supreme law-making authorities in the country; the Sharī'at Bill gave the courts and parliament additional power to enforce *Sharī'ah* in the country. The early legal measures of the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq government, then, represented the first steps towards greater reform of the legal framework, structures and policies of Pakistan.

Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's attempts to enhance Islamism in Pakistan were also directed towards the realms of education and culture. Rattansi writes that "The primary aim of education according to Zia is to cultivate the dual sense of Islamic as well as Pakistani identity...."[51] In this sense, the goal of 'Islamic education' was to promote integration and to discourage regionalism; the focus was on the socio-political role of Islam, rather than the personal obligations and duties of individual Muslims. In this context, the government of Ẓiyā' al-

50 Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismaī'lī community in Pakistan, page 127.

Ḥaqq announced its proposed reforms in education as a part of a Five Year Development Plan in 1978.

Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's initial measures in the areas of education and culture included the replacement of English with Urdu as the medium of instruction; compulsory teaching of religious education – *Islamiyyat* – at all levels of education; the incorporation of the traditional education system, including *madrassahs*, into the recognized educational system in the country; an increased emphasis on Arabic in education; the requirement of national attire during working hours; the renaming of cities, streets and public facilities; and the propagation of Islamic teachings through television and radio broadcasts. The creation of the Sharī'ah Faculty as a wing of the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad marked an important step in the process to formalize the government's commitment to reform of all levels of the educational system in the country. The wing later became the central faculty of the Islamic University, established in 1980; the University, combining the Sharī'ah Faculty, the Islamic Research Institute and a number of other new institutes, was a significant symbol and landmark in the process leading to greater Islamization of education in Pakistan. The purpose of the University was to integrate the country's parallel systems of secular and religious learning "...so as to provide an Islamic vision for those engaged in education and to enable them to reconstruct human thought in all its forms on the foundations of Islam."[52] The ideals articulated in the Islamic University Ordinance represent an echo of the essential aims of Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's policies regarding educational and cultural reform; such reforms attempted to "...resolve Pakistan's decades long identity problems as well as overcome factionalism and regionalism by establishing a national identity and ideology firmly based on the twin pillars of Islam and Pakistan."[53]

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51 Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismaī'lī community in Pakistan, page 135.

52 Islamic University Ordinance, 1980, page 5. Quoted in Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, page 215.

53 Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, page 214.

The realm of economics provided perhaps the greatest challenge for the process of Islamization in Pakistan; changes in this sector usually involve a massive restructuring and reorientation in terms of economic and financial infrastructures and frameworks, not to mention the retraining of personnel and efforts to instigate attitudinal changes amongst the general population. Nonetheless, economic measures affecting issues of private property, taxation and interest constituted an important part of Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's program of Islamization. The government responded to the first of these issues – that of private property – by reaffirming "...the right to private property as the Islamic norm."[54] However, the courts also attempted to legitimate the idea of land reform by resort to the "...Islamic teaching that all land belongs to God and that the right of private property is limited by the demands of social justice."[55]

Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's economic measures included also an attempt to deal with the issue of interest (*ribā*) in the country. According to Rattansi, the promotion of an interest-free economy represented a "...popular and central notion that characterizes the kind of Islamic economic system conceived by Zia and his supporters...."[56] The interest-free economy was initiated in 1979-80 with the introduction of a reformed banking system; under the new system, banks were permitted to accept deposits on a profit-loss sharing basis, rather than on an interest-basis. Further, the Council of Islamic Ideology established a Panel of Experts in Economics and Banking to make recommendations with respect to the Islamization of Pakistan's economy. The Panel produced a report in June 1980 which advocated a gradual approach to this issue and recommended the adoption of a three-phased implementation plan to be put into place over a three year period. The final stage of the implementation plan was to result in the "...elimination of interest from all

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54 Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, page 210.

55 Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismaʿīlī community in Pakistan, page 142.

56 Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismaʿīlī community in Pakistan, page 142.

domestic financial transactions."[57] The report provided the framework and schedule for measures designed to move Pakistan towards an interest-free economy; various reforms were carried out in the 1980s which attempted to comply with the spirit of the report, if not the exact timetable. Despite this, however, claims have persisted that Pakistan's economy remained much the same as it was previous to the adoption of such reforms. Indeed, Rattansi claims that "Given Pakistan's capitalist economy, which is interlinked with the international economic system, the claims for an interest-free economy is another attempt to placate the Islamic opposition.[58]

The promulgation of the Zakāt and 'Ushr Ordinance in 1980 heralded the government's intention to create a mechanism for the collection and distribution of tithe funds within the country. As organized in Pakistan, the system integrated "...elements of Islam's traditional religious welfare institution with those of a modern public welfare system."[59] In essence, the mechanism involved the deduction of *zakāt* directly at the source from financial institutions and then the distribution of such funds through a "...multi-tiered elected administrative (organization) system extending from central commissions (federal and provincial) to councils at the district, sub-district, and rural levels...."[60] The implementation of *zakāt* created a number of problems and raised various issues. First, the initial deduction of *zakāt* was administered without warning and hence, "...exacerbated a climate of apprehension and distrust that already existed."[61] As a religious obligation, some Pakistanis believed that *zakāt* was a private matter to be given voluntarily to the leaders and institutions of the particular sect to which they belonged. Hence, the deduction of *zakāt* directly from bank accounts encountered opposition from many

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57 Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, page 212.

58 Rattansi, Islamization and the Khojah Ismaī'lī community in Pakistan, page 142.

59 Grace Clark, 'Pakistan's zakat and 'ushr as a welfare system,' Islamic reassertion in Pakistan: the application of modern laws in a modern state, Anita M Weiss (ed), Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986, page 79.

60 Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, page 210.

61 Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, pages, 210-211.

Pakistani Muslims; in some respects, the automatic deduction of *zakāt* was perceived to be a governmental tax which some people "...for religious reasons, did not feel that the government was entitled to collect."[62]

The second difficulty encountered in the implementation of the *zakāt* measures concerned the Shi'ah community who "...objected vociferously to the zakāt order since, according to their law (Jafari fiqh) zakāt is not compulsory on capital or trading money."[63] Moreover, according to Jafari fiqh, *zakāt* is payable to the Shī'ī Imams and not to the Pakistani government which tended to have a Sunnī interpretation of the faith. In response to the dissatisfaction expressed by the Shī'ah community, the Zakāt Ordinance was amended to permit any Muslim to be exempt from *zakāt* by filing a sworn declaration confirming that his "...faith and fiqh do not oblige him to pay the whole or any part of Zakāt...in the manner laid down in this Ordinance."[64] Perhaps more important, Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq amended Article 227 of the Constitution; the modified version stated, in part, that: "In the application of the clause of personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression Qur'ān and Sunnah shall mean the Qur'ān and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect."[65] The amendment of article 227 has had, according to Lucy Carroll, far-reaching implications as it "...narrow[ed] and restrict[ed] the options available to those charged with the responsibility of Islamising and codifying the civil law (including family law) applicable to Muslims."[66]

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62 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 'Islamization and taxation in Pakistan,' Islamic reassertion in Pakistan: the application of Islamic laws in a modern state, Anita M Weiss (ed), Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986, page 61.

63 Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, page 211.

64 Ordinance 52 of 1980 (October 29, 1980). Quoted in Lucy Carroll, 'Nizam-i-Islam: processes and conflicts in Pakistan's programme of Islamisation, with special reference to the position of women,' The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, volume XX, number 1, March 1982, page 70.

65 Presidential Order 14 of 1980 (September 18, 1980) Quoted in Lucy Carroll, 'Nizam-i-Islam: processes and conflicts in Pakistan's programme of Islamisation, with special reference to the position of women,' The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, volume XX, number 1, March 1982, page 70.

66 Lucy Carroll, 'Nizam-i-Islam: processes and conflicts in Pakistan's programme of Islamisation, with special reference to the position of women,' The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, volume XX, number, March 1982, page 70.

The reactions articulated with respect to the zakāt measures reflected, in some senses, the general and continuing dilemma of Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's Islamization policies. Mayer articulates the problem clearly:

> Negative reactions to the measure...exposed the fallacious nature of one of the most fundamental assumptions underlying Islamization programs: that there exists a single, Islamic ideology that enjoys the allegiance of all Muslims. In fact, there are few issues on which there is a consensus as to what Islamic law actually requires, so that government programs officially adopting one particular interpretation of 'Islamization' tend to provoke dissent and division.[67]

Once committed to policies designed to enhance the role of Islam in public life, the government became embroiled in a controversy as to how this was to be defined; in essence, the question became one of defining which interpretation of Islam was to be embedded within the government's policies. In this sense, Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's program of Islamization encountered many difficulties in implementation; the process, according to Esposito, "...progressively led to frustration and disillusionment."[68] The aspirations and hopes of both religious and secularist factions – spanning all the ideological perspectives – within Pakistan remained unmet by the Islamization programs and policies implemented by the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq government. In this context, it becomes clear that the use of Islamism by Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq during at least the early years of his régime did not succeed in resolving the issues which had long divided Pakistanis. While the leaders of the country, including Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq, had resorted to Islam in an effort to foster unity and integration, it is this very notion which has created yet greater tension and dissent. Indeed, one writer asserts that:

> It therefore seems ironic that a movement, which is considered by its protagonists and supporters as the only basis for a united, cohesive and just society, should in fact create social schisms which the society may not be

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67 Mayer, 'Islamization and taxation in Pakistan,' Islamic reassertion in Pakistan: the application of Islamic laws in a modern state, page 61.

68 Esposito, 'Religion and politics in Pakistan,' The Muslim World, page 218.

> able to manage successfully, and which may ultimately lead to further disintegration of Pakistan [sic] society.[69]

Even a cursory glance at the political development of Pakistan provides ample evidence of the use of Islamism as the primary language of discourse within public life; there can be little doubt that, in its search for a dominant ideology, the country and its leaders have relied heavily on the public symbols and common bonds provided by Islam. The reliance upon Islamism as the primary language of discourse and as the dominant ideology of the country can be viewed from a variety of perspectives; it is to a brief examination of some of these perspectives to which we now turn.

According to one perspective on the issue, the lack of a strong Pakistani identity – and the absence of the conditions necessary for its development – was one of the factors which prompted the utilization of Islamism in a attempt to develop a commitment to the state of Pakistan. The ethnic, social and linguistic cleavages in Pakistan have been, and continue to be, deep and influential; in such circumstances, Islamism provided a convenient mechanism by which to unite the population under a banner that was both popular and meaningful. For many Pakistanis, no matter what their views with respect to the role of religion in public affairs, Islam has continued to be a pervasive and significant influence in their private lives. In this context, the use of Islamism was perhaps perceived as being the most effective means by which to assist in the development of a strong Pakistani identity, national consciousness, and dominant ideology that are vital to the survival of any state.

An alternate perspective on the use of Islamism as the dominant ideology of Pakistan views religion as a powerfully potent instrument of social and political control, due both to its pervasiveness in the lives of the general Pakistani populace as well as its

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69 Riaz Hasssan, 'Islamization: An analysis of religious, political and social change in Pakistan,' Middle Eastern Studies, 21 (1985), page 280.

emotionally powerful rhetoric and symbolism. Hamza Alavi, in his argument that the Pakistan movement was dominated by a coalition of the Muslim salariats of different regions, believes that Islamism was useful in Pakistan as a tool to maintain the dominance of the Punjabi salariat over those of the other ethnic groups. He notes that

> ...after Pakistan was created, the slogan of Islam was adopted by the dominant component of the Salariat in Pakistan, the Punjabis and, for a time, the Urdu-speaking Muhājirs, who feared the challenge of regional ethnic movements. It was invoked at first only nominally. In so far as it was included in the vocabulary of political debates in Pakistan during the first thirty years, only a few symbolic concessions were made to men of religion to make the argument look convincing. It was no more than a political argument that was used by the dominant Punjabis against the assertion of the new regional and linguistic ethnic identities of Bengalis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluch.[70]

In this context, Alavi views the utilization of Islamism as merely a social and political mechanism designed to sustain the economic and political dominance of one particular ethnic group; this perspective views Islamism as a slogan which masked its real use as a sociological tool.

Yet a third perspective on the issue views the use of Islamism in Pakistan as a political mechanism for the legitimation of various régimes, concepts, ideals, and even specific policies. In this context, Aziz Ahmad has noted that

> Islam was being used for political purposes by all the political parties in Pakistan....All political parties play at least lip service to Islam. There is not a single party which dares call itself secular; though the programs of most parties are by far and large secular, and secularism in Pakistan is labeled Islamic.[71]

Thus, in this view, Islamism is seen to be utilized by cynical politicians in an attempt to win popularity for their policies and régimes, thereby maintaining their hold on power in the Pakistani political arena.

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70 Alavi, 'Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology,' State and religion in the Middle East and Pakistan, page 68.

71 Aziz Ahmad, 'Introduction,' Contributions to Asian Studies, volume 2 (1971), page 4. Quoted in Rattansi. Islamization and the Khojah Ismā'īlī community in Pakistan, page 65.

In the final analysis, it remains clear that the debate within Pakistan with regard to the appropriate role of Islam in public life is a continuing one. The discussion is rooted in the divergent perspectives of individuals and groups vis à vis the creation of Pakistan; in short, Pakistan, as envisioned before 1947, represented different ideals and dreams to different people:

> To the landlords, it meant continued leadership; to the doctrinal-minded Muslims, a unique opportunity to create an Islamic state in the light of their ideas; to the Muslim intelligentsia and the poorer classes, a state where social and economic justice would prevail and their dignity established, according to Iqbalite teachings; to the peasants, freedom from the yoke of the Hindu money-lender; to the regional leaders, greater autonomy than was expected in a united India dominated by the Congress; to the Muslim bourgeoisie, the necessary environment where they would develop their potential, which seemed choked in a united India...[72]

Pakistan's difficulties in coming to terms with its own 'Pakistani' identity and the nature of its state obviously have much to do with these differing expectations. It is these widely divergent expectations which have continued to plague Pakistan in its attempts, however superficial, to resolve its ideological dilemmas. Throughout its existence, Pakistan has struggled to come to terms with its identity and Islamic character – essentially, with the notion of a dominant ideology to guide the country. It has, however, "...remained suspended between the ambiguity of her founder's call for a Muslim homeland and the varying expectations of the majority of the religious establishment and populace for an Islamic state."[73]

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72 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The concept of an Islamic state: an analysis of the ideological controversy in Pakistan, London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987, pages 80-81.

73 Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan,' The state, religion, and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, page 335.

Chapter Two

The Search for Security:
Pakistan's foreign policy

> *Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fairplay in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.* [1]
>
> *Every country has a ruling passion in her foreign policy. When one calls it a passion, one is not suggesting that this is something entirely emotional or irrational. It may be based on genuine fears and hatreds which have accumulated over the years and which may be intertwined with material and religious considerations. Pakistan is no exception to this. Indeed very few countries were born in an atmosphere so charged with intense ill will and mutual hatred as Pakistan was in 1947....* [2]

The foreign policy of Pakistan, like the foreign policies of many other states, has struggled with the tendencies of idealism and pragmatism so evident in the juxtaposition of the above two quotations. On the one hand, the founder of the state, Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnāh, called for 'goodwill towards all nations' and spoke of Pakistan's 'utmost contribution to peace and prosperity.' On the other hand, the actual foreign relations of the state have been dogged by conflicts, hostilities and a determined search for security and national integrity. The tension between these two trends – idealism and pragmatism – has thus been a prominent feature of the international policies of Pakistan. While this tension is not, in itself, a unique phenomenon in the study of international relations, it is especially significant in the case of Pakistan because its foreign policy has involved an intricate balancing process among various trends and interests. This process has, more often than not, necessitated that Pakistan follow a very pragmatic course with regard to

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1 Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnāh, February, 1948, quoted in Readings in Pakistan's foreign policy, volume 1. Hameed A.K. Rai (ed), Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1981, page i.

2 Khalid Bin Sayeed, 'Pakistan's foreign policy: an analysis of Pakistani fears and interest,' Readings in Pakistan's foreign policy, volume 1, Hameed A.K. Rai (ed), Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1981, page 49.

her international relations. It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate the nature of Pakistan's foreign policy since 1947 in an effort to determine its guiding principles and to provide a framework for the later analysis of its relations with Iran.

Pakistan's foreign policy since 1947 has been dominated by one major concern – the need to safeguard its national integrity. The roots of this overwhelming emphasis on national security lie in the difficulties encountered during the struggle for partition and in the immediate post-partition period. Hindu-Muslim differences during the struggle for independence had escalated to phenomenal proportions, and both communities had become intensely suspicious of the motives and goals of the other; such suspicions were difficult to eradicate after the partition of the subcontinent. Pakistanis were suspicious that India had not reconciled itself to the reality of partition and that Indians were "...convinced that Pakistan, like the prodigal son, would return to the fold of Mother India."[3] Furthermore, border conflicts between the two states heightened these suspicions; relations between the two countries have never been relaxed and have, on occasion, erupted into open hostilities. Pakistan, the smaller and weaker of the two states, has always been less well-equipped militarily, economically and politically; as a result, Pakistan's foreign policy has been dominated by an overwhelming concern about the security threat posed by its larger subcontinental neighbour. Indeed, in the words of one writer on the subject, "the single premise that has underlain Pakistan's foreign policy derives from India's centrality in nearly every calculation of Pakistan's foreign policy matters."[4] It is vital, therefore, for any discussion of Pakistani foreign policy to investigate the nature of the relations between the two states and to analyze the roots of such relations. In this regard, it is necessary also to investigate the major objectives of

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3 Shahid Javid Burki, Pakistan: A nation in the making, London: Westview Press, 1986, page 180.

4 W. Howard Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view., Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins, (eds), Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977, page 303.

Pakistan's foreign policy in the early period of its existence.

The immediate post-partition atmosphere was a crucial factor in determining the focus of the foreign policy of Pakistan. In 1947, the new state was not a well-known entity in the international arena; India, on the other hand, began its independent life with a recognizable identity. Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and other major international actors had some knowledge of the leaders, movements, and goals of the Indian independence movement, and hence, "...in mid-August 1947...India had arrived on the international stage with a name that was well known."[5] Pakistan, on the other hand, faced a struggle for recognition; it is symptomatic of Pakistan's difficulties, for example, that it had to apply for membership to the United Nations, while India was accepted upon independence without having to undergo the application process.[6] This lack of international recognition, coupled with other international disputes, was among the primary issues with respect to Pakistan's early foreign policy. As Burki states categorically, international recognition was "...the first task in foreign affairs for Jinnah and his associates during the first year of Pakistan's independence."[7]

The second major objective of Pakistan's foreign policy in the early years of independence was the urgent desire to secure its physical boundaries. In this regard, two unresolved problems remained for Pakistan: the first was the problem of Kashmir; the second was the difficulties encountered due to undefined frontiers with Afghanistan. Both disputes, legacies of British indecision and vacillation, remained unresolved and were a constant source of irritation for Pakistan's international relations in this formative period.

The conflict over Kashmir was, and perhaps continues to be, the greatest single obstacle in the relations between India and Pakistan. The origins of the conflict lay in the

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5 Shahid Javid Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, page 181.

6 Sisir Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, Donald Eugene Smith (ed), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, page 433.

uncertainty as to the manner in which partition was to affect the princely states of the Indian subcontinent. Leaders of the Pakistan movement argued that the principle used to partition British India – that Muslim majority areas be incorporated into the new state of Pakistan – should also be applied in the case of the princely states. In this matter, "...the British, arguing that they did not have constitutional authority,...demurred and left the question of accession to the princes."[8] This inaction led to difficulties in the princely states, and in particular, in the two largest states of British India: Hyderabad in the south, a Hindu majority area ruled by a Muslim family and Kashmir in the north, a Muslim majority area ruled by a Hindu maharaja. According to Burki, "once the British had left, it became clear that the Nizams of Hyderabad and the maharaja of Kashmir were not particularly anxious to see their states absorbed into the new countries; both flirted with the idea of independence."[9] Already suspicious of the other's intentions, India and Pakistan resorted to the use of force to solve the disputes. The problem of Hyderabad was settled by India's use of its well-equipped military forces; the ruling Nizam was deposed; and the state was eventually merged with other districts to form the new Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. Those Hyderabadis who opposed the state's integration into India were permitted to migrate to Pakistan. The migration of population from Hyderabad, as well as between the two countries in general, fueled hostilities, and, in one of the great tragedies of the twentieth century, resulted in massacres of large numbers of the populations of both the Hindu and Muslim communities of the subcontinent.

The issue of Kashmir, however, was not solved in the same manner as the problem in Hyderabad, and thus, it continued to be a source of dispute and, on at least two occasions, was the cause of open hostilities between the two countries. While the clashes between

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7 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, page 181.

8 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, page 182.

9 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, page 182.

the two countries in 1947-48 "...never developed into full-scale war,...it evoked all the old arguments at a time when each side felt that it had already made sufficient concessions to the other."[10] The specific details of the 1947-48 Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan are complex and involve both internal and external political factors; suffice it is to say that the maharaja's decision to permit Kashmir's accession to India was not acceptable to Pakistan, who claimed that the views of the Muslim majority in Kashmir were being ignored. India, on the other hand, argued that "...since the paramountcy exercised by Britain over the Indian Princes lapsed when the British withdrew from India, the Indian Princes had a sovereign right to accede to whichever Dominion they desired."[11] On January 1, 1948, India complained to the Security Council of the United Nations that "Pakistan was involved in the invasion of the state of Jammu and Kashmir launched by Pathan tribesmen in October 1947."[12] The United Nations was utilized as a forum for both India and Pakistan to air their grievances and concerns about the situation; the dialogue did not, however, provide an effective solution to the still-continuing problem, which has, in recent years, once again achieved prominence in relations between the two countries. This prolongation of the Kashmir dispute has coloured the relations between India and Pakistan; indeed, as mentioned earlier, it is possible to view almost the whole of Pakistani foreign policy since 1947 as a reaction to the potential threat posed by India.

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan were also hindered by the existence of border conflicts. This, too, was a problem which had been inherited by Pakistan upon partition and which had its roots in the manner in which Britain had extended its control over the northwestern region of the subcontinent. According to Burki:

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10 David Taylor, 'The changing patterns of Indo-Pakistan relations,' Pakistan in the 80s: ideology, regionalism, economy, foreign policy, Wolfgang Peter Zingel and Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallemant. (eds), Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985, page 554.

11 Khalid Bin Sayeed, The political system of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967, page 264.

12 Sayeed, The political system of Pakistan, pages 263-264.

> As the British had extended their control over India and reached the Pathan areas in the northwest, their first impulse was to stop at the 'scientific frontiers' following the line that ran between the cities of Kabul and Kandahar. Such a frontier would have brought the entire Pathan population under British sovereignty, but the Pathans were less inclined to favour such a final solution to British expansionism. What followed were the so-called Afghan wars, which convinced the British that what was possible and practical was considerably less than what was scientific and desirable.[13]

The Anglo-Afghan Agreement of 1893, seen as the solution to this difficulty, defined the boundaries through the implementation of the Durand line. The line ran a hundred miles south of the 'scientific frontier' of the Kabul-Kandahar line and effectively divided the Afghan population and placed them under two political entities, one of which was marginally integrated into British India. After the British withdrawal from India, the government of Afghanistan refused to accept the Durand line as being a legitimate frontier for Afghanistan and demanded the creation of new borders that "...would pay greater heed to the matter of ethnic purity within country boundaries."[14] In effect, this proposed frontier would have incorporated into the state of Afghanistan the majority of the Pathān population. Alternatively, the Afghan government also hinted that it would accept the creation of Pakhtūnistān, an autonomous province or independent country which would unite the Pathān population. Thus, according to the government of Afghanistan, Pakistan in 1947 was "...not considered a complete state with defined and acceptable frontiers."[15] In this context and against this background, it is notable that Afghanistan was the only country to vote against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations. Obviously, arguments such as these as presented by the Afghan government were not acceptable to Pakistan; hence, as with the Kashmir issue, Pakistan felt that its physical boundaries were being challenged and threatened.

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13 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, page 185.

14 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, pages 185-186.

15 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, page 186.

In light of the prevailing circumstances in the immediate post-partition period, then, it is obvious that Pakistan was preoccupied essentially with the task of forming a viable and distinct state with generally recognized and legitimate boundaries. The foreign policy issues of the day focused upon the national integrity and security of the new state, and Pakistani leaders were faced with an array of other internal difficulties that had international implications. For example, the issue of refugees from India has been described by Leonard Binder as:

> an international issue of great complexity, involving immigration and citizenship laws, the transfer of lands, the disposition of evacuee property, the unification of families, the payment of compensation, the maintenance of law and order, and the provision of rehabilitation facilities on a huge scale.[16]

The objectives of the early years after Pakistan's independence, then, were clear: first, recognition as a nation-state; and second, preservation of its national integrity and security, including the resolution of border disputes with its two neighbours, India and Afghanistan. In this light, Pakistan in the early years felt relatively isolated, and was eager to win friends in the international arena:

> Jinnah and his colleagues looked around, but did not find many friends that they could readily embrace. In the eyes of the world, not yet used to the emergence of new countries with unfamiliar names, Pakistan was clearly on probation. It had to pass the test of nationhood before it could be treated with any degree of seriousness.[17]

It was in this atmosphere and with these objectives that Pakistan began its independent existence in the international field. Its foreign policy was overwhelmingly dominated by the objectives related to its national security and the need to win support for its various international positions, in particular vis-à-vis its neighbour, India:

> However unjustified Indian leaders may have thought it, Pakistan's overriding concern vis-à-vis India was fear, fear of India's sheer size, the

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16 Leonard Binder, Religion and politics in Pakistan, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961, page 116.

> size of its army (never less than two times larger than Pakistan's) and fear of the effects of the hard fact that a large, contiguous India with internal lines of communication separated Pakistan's comparatively small two parts by over a thousand miles.[18]

Indeed, the various phases of Pakistan's foreign policy since 1947 can, in great measure, be understood in light of its need to preserve its national integrity against threats, perceived or actual, posed by India. It is to these various phases of Pakistani foreign policy that we now turn.

The early foreign policy of Pakistan, which lasted from partition in 1947 to approximately 1951, generally focused on attempts to win support for its international positions through idealistic non-alignment and resort to various international bodies. This trend is clearly demonstrated by Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnah's idealistic statement regarding Pakistan's 'goodwill towards all nations' and 'utmost commitment to peace and prosperity.' While the idealism evident in this speech may be viewed as mere rhetoric, it is also plausible that Pakistani leaders, confident of the moral righteousness of their positions – especially with regard to the Kashmir dispute – fully expected that international support could be won by appealing directly to the international community; the assumption was that the international community would naturally choose what Pakistan perceived to be the principled course – and hence ignore other, perhaps more pragmatic and compelling considerations. In this regard, Pakistan made various attempts to win support from the United Nations, as well as from the Commonwealth of Nations. Appeals made to the United Nations, while certainly providing a forum to air grievances, were not successful, primarily because of the inability of the international organization to enforce its resolutions. The United Nations could pass resolutions and attempt to mediate in the dispute between India and Pakistan, but it could do precious else to bring the issue to a positive solution agreeable to both parties. In this regard, "...the collective security system

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17 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, pages 180-181.

provided in the U.N. Charter [was] ineffective in the face of the ever-growing conflict in international affairs. Peaceful settlement of disputes between nations was becoming increasingly difficult."[19] In a similar fashion, Pakistan hoped that the Commonwealth nations, and in particular the United Kingdom, would exert pressure on India with regard to disputes with Pakistan. However, Pakistan's efforts to win support from these countries were thwarted:

> Support from the Commonwealth relationship, particularly Pakistan's expected backing from Great Britain, did not materialize as Karachi had hoped, since Great Britain was determined to maintain relationships with India as with Pakistan, and undue partisanship on behalf on one side in the subcontinent would mean hostility from the other.[20]

In addition to Pakistani attempts to enlist the support of the United Nations and the Commonwealth nations, there were parallel efforts to appeal to the Muslim nations in the name of Islamic solidarity:

> There was a large measure of confidence in Pakistan, immediately after partition, that the Muslim countries of the world would draw closer and, indeed, might move toward a pan-Islamic grouping of nations. Muslim unity, according to this view, was the natural corollary of a renewed sense of Islamic identity; the creation of Pakistan was itself a symbol of this postwar phenomenon.[21]

Despite this confidence in the certainty of Muslim solidarity, Pakistan did not receive significant support from the Muslim world. According to Burki, "...in 1947, Islamic resurgence was still three decades into the future"[22] and each Muslim state was preoccupied with its own issues. Most of the countries of the Islamic Middle East were emphasizing "...secular, not religious, values, and few found Pakistan's effort to establish

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18 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 303.

19 G.W. Choudhury, 'The basis of Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan's external relations, G.W. Choudhury and Parvez Hasan (eds), Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1958, page 10.

20 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 307.

21 Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, page 435.

22 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, page 180.

an Islamic state relevant to their problems."[23] The specific reactions of the Muslim states to Pakistan's overtures will be discussed at a later stage; at present, suffice it is to state that these overtures were not received enthusiastically by the great majority of the Muslim world.

Hence, Pakistan in this period between 1947 and 1951 made various attempts 'to win friends and influence people' in the international arena. During this time, Pakistan attempted to refrain from aligning itself with either of the two major power blocs that had developed after World War Two. Indeed, Prime Minister Liaquat ʿAlī Khān, when he visited the United States in 1950, clearly stated that Pakistan was "...neither tied to the apron-strings of the Anglo-American bloc nor was a camp-follower of the Communist bloc."[24] Despite this strong stand, it is clear that Pakistan's orientation was still closer to that of the West; after all, Pakistan, having been a part of British India, could not have remained uninfluenced by the reality of the western presence. Furthermore, the great majority of the Pakistani leadership was comprised of western-educated secularists who shared the West's distaste for communism. The Communist creed, with its condemnation of the role of religion, would have been entirely unacceptable to traditionalist and renewalist factions in Pakistan, not to mention to the great majority of the general populace, whose religious sensibilities would have been severely offended by acceptance of such a belief. Hence, Pakistani leaders, during this early phase, continued to be more oriented towards the western bloc and, in a quest for security, attempted to win support for its positions from the international community through appeals to the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and to the Muslim world. Unfortunately for Pakistan, it did not receive support sufficient to meet its security and foreign policy objectives.

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23 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 307.

24 Liaqat ʿAlī Khan, quoted in Norman D. Palmer, 'The long search for foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins, (eds), Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977, page 420.

The lack of support received by Pakistan from the international community was instrumental in determining the focus of the subsequent phase of Pakistan's foreign policy. It was during this phase, which lasted from the early 1950s to approximately the mid-1960s, that there was a growing awareness on the part of Pakistan's leaders that it would be necessary to discover more effective means to safeguard the country's international concerns. In this context, Pakistan began to look beyond the methods of idealistic neutrality and thus to search for a more pragmatic approach to offset the insecurities inherent in Pakistan's circumstances:

> Given then, a substantial amount of fear, a goodly dose of ambition to 'redress the injustice in Kashmir,' and a failure of efforts to provide either security or satisfaction through the international community, broadly conceived, through Islamic solidarity, or through the Commonwealth link, Pakistan not surprisingly sought an alliance with an outside Major Power.[25]

As a result of this need for security, as well as of the need to advance the cause of economic development, Pakistani leaders began to entertain the idea of alignment with an external power. The renewed concentration of Indian troops on Pakistan's borders in July 1951 made the matter more urgent; military leaders, in particular, became nervous at the prospect of hostilities with India especially in view of Pakistan's inferior military capability:

> Military leaders in Pakistan must have felt that West Pakistan, besides being a strategic area with India as its next-door neighbour and big powers like the U.S.S.R and China quite close to it, did not have much depth in terms of area for its forces to fall back in and fight if overpowered and thrown back initially by a lightning offensive of the enemy. The only way to deter such an attack was for Pakistan to obtain armaments and air power by aligning itself with a power like the United States. In addition, West Pakistan had to defend physically separate East Pakistan, which had hardly any troops of its own.[26]

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25 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 308.

26 Sayeed, The political system of Pakistan, page 268.

The United States had emerged as the strongest non-communist power after World War Two and, in particular after the advent of Communist China in 1949, took greater interest in South Asia, which it perceived to be an area of possible Communist expansion. In light of the cold relations between the communist and non-communist powers in the post-war period, "...the containment of communism became the goal of American policy....The centerpiece of this strategy was the creation of a system of multilateral and bilateral alliances."[27] Indeed, according to Wriggins:

> ...by the early 1950s the United States was actively pursuing in Asia a policy, begun in Europe and in Greece and Turkey, of developing alliances and supporting aid relationships....It seemed ready to commit large economic resources to assist its friends in Asia. Above all, it appeared ready to provide up-to-date military equipment and training.[28]

This system of alliances in Southeast Asia naturally included Pakistan, which was, coincidentally, also searching for external support – military, economic and political – during this time.

The main framework for the alliance system in Southeast Asia was a "...network of multilateral treaties...in each of which the *casus belli* was specifically defined as Communist aggression"[29] The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, a bilateral arrangement between Pakistan and the United States, was signed in May 1954; the agreement was the basis of the 'special relationship' between the two countries. In addition, Pakistan also joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was established in 1954 and included, in addition to Pakistan and the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, France, Thailand and the Philippines. A third alliance, though not directly involving the United States, was the Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), established in November 1955; it tied together Britain,

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27 Louis D. Hayes, Politics in Pakistan, London: Westview Press, 1984, pages 151-152.

28 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 309.

29 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 310.

Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan (and later Iran) in mutual defensive arrangements. "Together with NATO, CENTO and SEATO threw a chain of defense around the periphery of Communist Europe and Asia; Turkey with membership in NATO and CENTO and Pakistan with membership in CENTO and SEATO formed the two critical links in this chain."[30] For Pakistan, however, the main concern was not Communist expansion, but its overwhelming need to balance the power of its large subcontinental neighbour, India, and thus its need to improve its defensive capacity. This divergence of priorities between the United States and Pakistan was to have dire consequences in later years for the alliance between the two countries.

The alliance with the United States provided much material assistance to Pakistan; it brought "...a sharp increase in military equipment and in economic resources devoted to bolstering local military expenditures of the Smaller Ally."[31] Military assistance given to Pakistan by the United States between 1954 and 1965 amounted to approximately $1.2 to $1.5 billion; total economic assistance, however, has been estimated to be as high as $3 billion.[32] There is no doubt, then, that Pakistan received much material support from the United States during these years of the alliance relationship. Furthermore, it was able to reinforce its defensive capability vis-à-vis India; though not adequate to match India's capability, military assistance received by Pakistan assisted in diminishing "...its sense of anxiety about the ability of its larger neighbour to overrun it."[33]

Despite these significant material advantages, there were also considerable disadvantages faced by Pakistan as a result of the alliance with the United States. The Mutual Defense Agreement had a negative impact on relations between India and Pakistan; as a

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30 Burki., Pakistan: a nation in the making, page 187.

31 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 312.

32 Sayeed, The political system of Pakistan, page 270.

33 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 313.

unexpected by-product, India, too, began to increase its defense budget in an effort to counterbalance the effects of the American-Pakistani alliance. Furthermore, countries of the Arab world did not respond positively to Pakistan's alliance with the United States; as a result, few of these countries were willing to support Pakistan on other major issues, including, most notably, the issue of Kashmir. In the final analysis, the alliance arrangements, while certainly providing the country with considerable material support, came to be viewed by Pakistani leaders as less than satisfactory. Pakistan saw diplomatic and political support for its international objectives and positions as being vital to the alliance arrangement; the United States, however, had a different international agenda.

The divergence in the international priorities of Pakistan and the United States, to which reference has already been made, was instrumental in shifting Pakistan's foreign policy away from the pro-western alliance system. The reasons for this shift away from alliances and towards a diversification of Pakistan's external relations had numerous causes. First, military assistance to Pakistan, while considerable in the early years of the alliance relationship, did not maintain the same pace in later years. Second, "...the Small Ally found that its Major Power Ally did not wholeheartedly support its case against India on the disputed territory, but sought to maintain working diplomatic and economic relations with both countries."[34] Third, India was a vital factor in the Asian balance and was important to the United States in its bid to thwart Soviet expansion. Thus, American aid to India, while on a per-capita basis never more than one-half of that given to Pakistan, was considerable; indeed, in real terms, India often received considerably more than its much smaller and less populous neighbour.[35] Obviously, Pakistan was never fully comfortable with the idea of American collaboration with India; its idea of a special relationship focused on support of its own international positions, especially with respect to India. These differing expectations of the alliance arrangement were tested in 1962, when India

34 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 314.

and China were involved in a military conflict. The United States, sensing an opportunity to seize the advantage with regard to perceived Chinese expansion, came to India's assistance. Pakistan, in light of its alliance arrangements, was disappointed in its expectation of American neutrality in the matter; American aid to its most feared enemy came as a rude awakening:

> ...The Major Power's military aid to the Small Ally's major opponent came as a shock. It underlined the hard fact that the so-called special relationship had not been nearly as special as had been touted. This proved particularly vivid when the Major Power was not prepared to make its limited military assistance to India contingent on a settlement of the disputed territory in a way favourable to its Smaller Ally, as the latter insisted.[36]

Disappointment with the United States led Pakistan to begin the process of a gradual reevaluation of the direction and success of its past foreign policy; through this reevaluation, between the years of 1962 and 1970, Pakistan began to move into yet another period of her foreign policy – that of attempts to diversify its external relations. In particular, relations with the other major powers in the area, the U.S.S.R. and China, were expanded. Indeed, Wriggins makes the point that "...as early as 1959 Pakistan had begun to broaden its relationships with its Asian neighbours to the north in search for additional ways of dealing with its Indian problem."[37] After the mid-1960s, these alternatives were more vigorously pursued; while still attempting to maintain the semblance of an alliance relationship with the United States, Pakistan also began to court China and the Soviet Union. It was hoped that China, already an enemy of Pakistan's principal opponent, would be effective in distracting India from ambitions towards Pakistan and that friendly relations with the Soviet Union might "...induce Russia to be less wholehearted in its

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35 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, pages 314-315.

36 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 316.

37 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 317.

support of India's case at the United Nations."[38] Obviously, the United States did not support such policies with wholehearted enthusiasm; after all, the Soviet Union and China were considered to be the principal opponents of the United States. Nonetheless, Pakistan continued to develop these relationships with its Asian neighbours and, thus, a more complex foreign policy evolved during this period:

> President Ayub called it a 'triangular tightrope.' It sought to retain whatever advantages the alliance with its Major Power Ally might still provide, while simultaneously reaching specific agreements with one of the Ally's major Asian opponents. The trick was to find issues of such manifestly reasonable substance that its Ally's objections could not be too sharp. Yet the issues had to be of sufficient import to dramatize to Pakistan's subcontinental opponent – India – its new flexibility and its potential for bringing new sources of pressure to bear.[39]

During the period between 1962 and 1965, Pakistanis were forced to begin the gradual process of the reorientation of their foreign policies. Relations with India continued be a source of irritation for Pakistani politicians; diplomatically, militarily and politically, India was still the stronger country, and Pakistani fears that Kashmir would become fully integrated into the Indian constitutional system were renewed. In this regard, Pakistani leaders began to believe that "...a policy of doing nothing would mean that the disputed territory of Kashmir would be irrevocably surrendered to India. Such an approach was not only seen as dishonourable desertion of Muslim brethren left under Hindu rule, but would be politically risky at home..."[40] India continued to move closer to the political integration of Kashmir into its constitutional system in 1964 and the early months of 1965, and in the eyes of its leadership, Pakistan's suspicions of India appeared to be justified. In the ensuing months, escalation of tensions continued, and in August 1965, a large number of infiltrators moved into the Indian-held portions of Kashmir. It appears that the purpose of the infiltrators was to "...provoke a popular uprising or to give heart to those Kashmiris

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38 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 317.

39 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, pages 317-318.

40 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 324.

who wanted to oppose the valley's integration into India."[41] In a series of moves and counter-moves, the Indian and Pakistani armies retaliated against each other; eventually India crossed the international frontier between the two countries. At the end of the seventeen day war, during which the United States adopted a policy of strict neutrality and suspended aid to both countries, each side claimed military victory, since each had gained some territory. However, the overall assessment was that "...Pakistan army was effectively brought to a halt, while the Indians had many uncommitted troops and much more material...[and that] the adventure was a disaster for Pakistan and its régime."[42]

The 1965 war irrevocably and bluntly affected Pakistan's relationship with its major ally, the United States. While Pakistani mistrust of the American connection had been developing gradually since the Sino-Indian border conflicts of 1962, the circumstances of the war revealed the intense emotions of the Pakistani sense of betrayal. During the immediate post-1965 years, relations with the United States worsened, and earlier Pakistani attempts to improve its relations with the U.S.S.R. and China were intensified; the earlier move towards the 'triangular tightrope' of bilateralism was consolidated. Along with a policy of 'trilateral bilateralism,' which focused upon better bilateral relations between Pakistan and each of the three global powers, Pakistani foreign policy also made concerted efforts to move closer to the non-aligned movement. Zulfiqār ʿAlī Bhutto, later to become prime minister of the country, was a strong proponent of these policies:

> Caught in the nutcracker of the global conflict, the underdeveloped nations might in despair conclude that they can only marginally influence the *status quo*, that in reality they have no independent choice but to trim their policies to the requirements of one Global Power or another. This is an unnecessarily pessimistic view, a negation of the struggle of the man, expressed through the nation-state, to be free. The force of freedom must triumph because it is stronger than any other force for which man will lay down his life. It is still possible for the smaller nations, with adroit

41 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, pages 326-327.

42 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, pages 327-328.

> handling of their affairs, to maintain their independence and retain flexibility of action in their relationship with Global Powers.[43]

The events during 1970 and 1971 played a vital role in the subsequent phase of Pakistan's foreign policy; the country, devastated by civil war and the loss of its eastern wing, entered a new phase of reevaluation and reorientation of its international relations. India, sensing an opportunity to seize the advantage over Pakistan, was instrumental in the training and equipping of forces in East Pakistan. At the end of the war it was clear that Pakistan was the loser; its former eastern wing became the newly independent country of Bangladesh, and India in 1971 was even more powerful by virtue of the changed circumstances. According to Khurshid Hyder:

> The year 1971 may be said to form a watershed in the brief and chequered history of Pakistan – marking the end of an era and the beginning of a new phase. The succession of events that year...resulting in the break-up of Pakistan had a far-reaching impact on the regional power balance, on which Pakistan's security had been delicately and dexterously poised for nearly twenty-five years. These developments also affected the geo-strategic orientation of Pakistan and were the decisive factors in shaping and moulding its foreign policy in the early seventies.[44]

The 'new' Pakistan had lost over half its population to Bangladesh, one-third of its army had been taken prisoner, and its largest subcontinental neighbour, and arch-enemy, was very influential in its former eastern province. The change in the geographic position of the country was crucial in affecting its foreign relations perspective; after 1971, "Pakistan had ceased to be a part of South East Asia and its foreign policy had inexorably acquired a westward orientation."[45] The orientation of the new foreign policy was strongly focused on Southwest Asia, and in particular, the Muslim states of the Middle East. A collective national identity crisis experienced by the population also assisted in this process of forging closer ties with the Muslim world; Pakistanis, disappointed by the effectiveness of

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43 Zulfikār 'Alī Bhutto, The Myth of independence, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, page 13.

44 Khurshid Hyder, 'Pakistan's foreign policy in the early seventies,' Pakistan in a changing world, Masuma Hasan (ed), Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978, age 97.

45 Hyder, 'Pakistan's foreign policy in the early seventies,' Pakistan in a changing world,page 98.

the foreign ideologies of capitalism and communism, turned towards the common unifying bond of Islam. The specific details of Pakistan's relations with the countries of the Muslim World will be discussed in the next chapter; however, it is important to note at this stage that these relations were given a high priority.

While seeking to renew ties with the Muslim world and to expand ties with the Soviet bloc, Pakistan also sought to decrease its reliance on the West. The recognition of Bangladesh by Great Britain was viewed as an action which "...put the seal of approval on an act of blatant aggression"[46] and, as a result, Pakistan withdrew from the Commonwealth of Nations. Moreover, Pakistan also served formal notice of its intention to withdraw from SEATO, which was considered to be no longer relevant to the needs of the country. Nonetheless, Pakistan continued to search for the means to acquire military and economic resources as well as political support from external sources; the need to balance India's power and superiority was even more urgent after 1971:

> Since taking over his shattered country, much that Prime Minister Bhutto has done can be seen as concerned with this persisting foreign policy problem. His early fast-paced travels to the Middle East, to Peking, to Moscow, and Washington can be understood as continuing episodes in the search for economic and military support from abroad.[47]

Pakistan's foreign policy entered yet another phase in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Once again, the United States became "...alarmed about the danger of a Soviet presence in the area....Thus, Washington [sought] to prevent any further Soviet move.[48] The containment of communism became the stated goal of the United Stated and Pakistan reemerged as a crucial link in American foreign policy. Relations between the United States and Pakistan had not been particularly warm in the

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46 The Pakistan Times, January 31, 1972, quoted in Louis D. Hayes, Politics in Pakistan, London: Westview Press, 1984, page 157.

47 Wriggins, 'The balancing process in Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, page 333.

48 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, 'Proxies and allies: the case of Iran and Pakistan,' Orbis, volume 24, number 2 (Summer 1980), page 345.

years immediately preceding the invasion; indeed, in March 1979, Pakistan, along with Iran, formally ended its membership in CENTO, its last formal alliance with the United States, thereby paving the path for a full commitment to the Nonaligned Movement. In the period immediately following the Soviet invasion, both Pakistan and the United States were forced to reexamine their respective foreign policies.

During the early months of 1980, the political arena in Pakistan was overwhelmingly dominated by the issue of Afghanistan:

> The Soviet intervention in the closing days of 1979 not only increased the numbers of refugees crossing the border to find safety in camps in Pakistan, but it also brought world attention to Pakistan as the major front-line state facing the Soviets in Central Asia, and potentially the next victim of Soviet expansion.[49]

The crisis in Afghanistan "...profoundly and directly threatened Pakistan's security."[50] For a country whose primary foreign policy objective had always been the preservation of its national integrity and security, the Soviet invasion represented a major dilemma. Pakistan-Afghan relations had not been friendly since the former's independence in 1947; indeed, on occasion, relations had deteriorated to the point when border closures were seen as the only option. However, there had been a rapprochement between the two countries between 1976-78, and they had begun working towards a resolution of the Pakhtūnistān issue, which had been the cause of the hostile relations. The April 1978 Marxist coup in Afghanistan, and the subsequent occupation of the country by Soviet forces, reversed this move towards the normalization of Pakistan-Afghan relations and represented a serious threat to Pakistan's security and national integrity. Pakistan's military strength had been sufficient to counter an Afghan military threat; however, "...a Soviet-backed and protected Afghanistan introduced many disturbing elements into

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49 W. Eric Gustafson and William L. Richter, 'Pakistan in 1980: weathering the storm,' Asian Survey, volume XXI, number 2. (February 1981, page 162.

50 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'The Afghanistan crisis and Pakistan's security dilemma,' Asian Survey, volume XXIII, number 3 (March 1983) page 227.

Pakistan's security environment."[51] Most notably, the invasion had provoked fears among Pakistanis that the Soviets would likely move beyond Afghan borders and thus, Pakistan would be the next target of Soviet expansion. Secondly, because of the movement of large numbers of Afghan refugees into Pakistan, there was a concern that the country would "...be drawn into the Afghanistan cauldron, willingly or unwillingly."[52] The third major security concern for Pakistan posed by the Afghan crisis focused on its potential to exacerbate internal difficulties, with particular reference to dissident activities in the provinces of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP). Obviously, then, the crisis in Afghanistan in the late months of 1979 caused much consternation within the Pakistani leadership; once more, the foreign policy of the country was forced to undergo a rigorous process of reorientation.

The foreign policy of the United States was also forced to undergo a similar process of reorientation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The American response to the Afghanistan crisis was dramatic; it was quickly declared the "...biggest crisis since World War II,"[53] and various retaliatory measures, such as an embargo on shipments of grain and technology to the Soviet Union and the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, were implemented. Furthermore, the United States began to renew its allies in Asia in an attempt to limit further Soviet expansion. Pakistan, formerly a strong American ally, was viewed as one of the most serious contenders for a renewal of ties:

> It has an established military, though in need of an extensive weapons-improvement program, and it has become a frontline state should the Soviets choose to move further or use the right of 'hot pursuit' in attacking Afghan insurgents. Moreover, Pakistan, unlike India, already shares the U.S. view of a Soviet threat.[54]

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51 Cheema, 'The Afghanistan crisis and Pakistan's security dilemma,' Asian Survey, page 238.

52 Cheema, 'The Afghanistan crisis and Pakistan's security dilemma,' Asian Survey, page 238.

53 Gustafson and. Richter, 'Pakistan in 1980: weathering the storm,' Asian Survey, page 163.

54 Tahir-Kheli, 'Proxies and allies: the case of Iran and Pakistan,' Orbis, page 347.

In an effort to renew the friendly relations with Pakistan, then, the United States immediately and publicly offered Pakistan ...a $400 million aid package, half of which would be military support to bolster Pakistan's woeful defenses...."[55] The response from Islamabad was equally swift; President Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq "...rejected the aid as 'peanuts' – too small to be effective but large enough to provoke the Soviets."[56] Eventually, the two countries reached an agreement in 1981, which consisted of a five-year program with three separate components.[57] The first of these was a $1.625 billion five-year economic assistance program, which included, among other things, low interest loans for various developmental programs. The second component of the American aid package was the sale of military weapons at commercial terms and in hard currency. The third, and most controversial, component consisted of the delivery of forty F-16A aircraft and their spare parts; this particular aircraft had the advantage of a superior range and ground attack capability. While there was much controversy with regard to this component of the aid package, the American administration of President Ronald Reagan argued that "...the aircraft had become the symbol of a new U.S.-Pakistani strategic relationship and was politically necessary for the entire program."[58] Through this agreement, then, the United States and Pakistan renewed their once-friendly relations; for each country, it provided a means through which to improve its international position.

The issue of Afghanistan had, in essence, brought Pakistani foreign policy full circle; the search for security had necessitated various changes in its policies over the years. Beginning with an attempt to win support through nonalignment, Pakistan sought, maintained, and then was disillusioned by a direct alliance with a western power. By

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55 Gustafson and Richter, 'Pakistan in 1980: weathering the storm,' Asian Survey, page 163.

56 Gustafson and Richter, 'Pakistan in 1980: weathering the Storm.' Asian Survey, page 163.

57 For more details on the American aid program, please refer to Stephen Philip Cohen and Marvin G. Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981: staying on,' Asian Survey, volume XXII, number 2 (February 1982), pages 136-146.

58 Cohen and Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981: staying on,' Asian Survey, page 144.

diversifying its foreign relations, it was hoped that Pakistan's dependence on western powers could be reduced. After Afghanistan, Pakistani leaders turned once again to the United States for assistance to combat perceived threats to the country's national security and integrity. Despite the apparent vacillation in Pakistan's foreign policy, there has always been one common theme which binds these diverse policies together: Pakistan's urgent need to safeguard its own national integrity and thus to find a secure place for itself within the international environment. This one theme has been perhaps the single most important guiding principle of Pakistan's foreign policy since 1947; its early insecurities with regard to the Indian threat have never quite been fully resolved, and this, in itself, has been a crucial factor in Pakistan's need for security. Keith Callard has written that "...in the last resort, foreign policy must be a policy of survival."[59] The veracity of that statement for Pakistani foreign policy since 1947 cannot be doubted.

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59 Keith Callard, Pakistan's foreign policy, 2nd Edition, New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959, page 1.

Chapter Three

The Islamic Connection:
Pakistan's relations with the Muslim World

> *Pakistan has consistently championed the causes of and striven to build up close ties between the Muslim countries, most of which are situated in the Middle East. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan always repeatedly emphasized the 'natural and religious links, the common culture and identity of economic outlook' between Pakistan and other Muslim countries...*[1]
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> *The time has come for Pakistan's intelligentsia to realize that Pakistan is not adding to its prestige in the international field by running after certain other countries which are economically and otherwise in a far less stable position than Pakistan itself and which can really be of little help to us. If we concentrate on building up our resources and our strength...the day will come when many will be candidates for our friendship without our chasing them. Let us not forget that we in Pakistan constitute a Muslim world in ourselves. We say to our nation: give up sloganism and be realists.*[2]

Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world have had an interesting and varied history; as evidenced by the two quotations above, Pakistan's policies have, over the years, vacillated between a strong pan-Islamic ideal and a more secular path. Despite a certain pragmatism during some phases of its foreign policy, a desire to enhance Islamic solidarity remained an important feature of its foreign relations agenda, perhaps in part because it was considered a necessary factor in the forging of a legitimate identity both domestically and internationally. This chapter investigates the nature of Pakistan's foreign relations with the Muslim world between 1947 and 1977. In this context, it also studies the nature of international relations between Pakistan and Iran during the same period in an effort to provide a framework for the analysis of official media reaction to the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79.

The birth of Pakistan in 1947 was heralded within the new country as a victory for

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1 G.W. Choudhury, 'The basis of Pakistan's foreign policy,' Pakistan's external relations, G.W. Choudhury and Parvez Hasan (eds), Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1958. page 18.

2 Dawn, May 4, 1952. As quoted by Sisir Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, Donald Eugene Smith (ed), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, page 439.

Muslims worldwide. In the early years of its existence, therefore, Pakistani leaders were naturally drawn towards the countries of the Muslim Middle East and North Africa in an effort to encourage Muslim solidarity. Furthermore, the new state was faced with a host of international difficulties and disputes; the resolution of these disputes was one of the primary goals of Pakistani foreign policy during its first uncertain years in the international field. Pakistan's early foreign policy was guided by an urgent desire to win international support for its positions through an appeal to various groups. The Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa constituted one of these groups to which Pakistan appealed for support.

Initial efforts towards the ideal of Muslim unity were begun in earnest after the 1949 statements of Prime Minister Liaquat ʿAlī Khān stressing the 'Islamic ideals' underlying Pakistan. Returning from a visit to London, he stopped in various Muslim cities, includingCairo, Baghdad and Tehran and said "In the laboratory of Pakistan, we are experimenting with the principles and ideals of Islam and hope to put before the world a progressive code of life."[3] Contacts between Pakistani leaders and leaders of other Muslim countries were made and maintained, and various official visits exchanged between these leaders. However, a Pakistani attempt to organize an official Islamic conference at the governmental level met with little enthusiasm from the leaders of most Muslim countries. Pakistan continued to make official overtures to other Muslim states throughout the early period of its existence; indeed, until at least 1953, Pakistani leaders continued to emphasize that there were no obstacles to completely positive relations with all Muslim countries, with the notable exception of Afghanistan. By the early 1950s, however, there emerged a growing awareness within Pakistan that other Muslim states were either unwilling or unable to respond positively to its gestures of Muslim

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3 Prime Minister Liaquat ʿAlī Khān. As quoted by Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, page 435.

cooperation and solidarity.

While official governmental efforts to encourage integration between Muslim states were less than fully successful, Pakistan was the site of various Islamic conferences held under non-official auspices. The International Islamic Economic Conference took place in Karachi in November 1949; the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in his opening address, stated that "Pakistan has one and only one ambition – to serve Islam and humanity....We all belong to the great brotherhood of Islam. Islam alone can solve some of the problems facing the world today."[4] At the same conference, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Ghulām Muḥammad, once again appealed for unity and cooperation between Muslim countries, and provided an interesting argument for Muslim solidarity:

> We are now under pressure from two different ideologies, both striving to gain our allegiance. We are told that there are only two ideologies, you must accept one and repudiate the other....We cannot put faith in the western democratic system nor can we subscribe to communism. Islam is the golden mean between these two extremes.[5]

In addition, the second Motamar Conference held in Karachi in February 1951 also appealed for Muslim unity and cooperation. The conference included participants from countries with Muslim populations, including the People's Republic of China; notably excluded were the Soviet Union and India. Presiding over the conference was the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who added his voice to the call for Muslim solidarity and "...asked for the creation of a Muslim bloc, cooperating in matters of culture, economics, politics, and defense."[6]

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4 Prime Minister Liaquat 'Alī Khān. As quoted by Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, page 436.

5 Foreign Minister Ghulam Muḥammad. As quoted by Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, page 437.

6 As quoted by Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, page 437.

Despite such attempts to nourish the development of Muslim unity, the environment in the late 1940s and early 1950s was not encouraging for the cause of pan-Islamism. Official Pakistani attempts to encourage Muslim unity had been unsuccessful in the late 1940s; after the early 1950s, even non-official conferences such as the ones mentioned above became less frequent and evoked less enthusiasm. While on a theoretical level, Pakistan expected that the Muslim world would support its international positions, especially with regard to Kashmir, in reality, this support was not forthcoming. In general, Muslims in the Indian subcontinent were more aware of issues and developments in the Middle East than were the Arabs about developments in other parts of the Muslim world. Hence, support for the issues relevant to Pakistan was not forthcoming amongst the Arab countries of the Middle East who were generally more concerned with their own domestic difficulties and did not, for one reason or another, enthusiastically support Pakistan's international positions.

In the first place, most national movements in the Muslim world were, at this time, moving towards a secularization of the political arena. This period saw the rapid rise to power of leaders such as Jamāl ʿAbd-al-Nāṣir in Egypt; such leaders did not generally encourage an overwhelming role for religion in the political field and tended to be secularists who were opposed by the orthodox religious elements within their respective countries. Under such conditions, sentiments in the majority of the Muslim Middle East tended to oppose the Pakistani concept of religious nationalism:

> ...the political upsurge elsewhere was based largely on territorial and racial nationalism, anti-Western, anti-white. Religion played a part in this, but it was a lesser part than colour, language and a political theory of violent opposition to 'colonialism' and 'exploitation.' For many Muslims elsewhere it has been more important to align Asians and Africans against the colonial powers than to defend Muslim causes against non-Muslims. The [Indian National] Congress argument that specifically Muslim demands hampered national independence found wide acceptance in other

Asian and Middle Eastern countries.[7]

In the second place, there appeared to be a "...striking similarity between the outlook of most Muslim states and India...."[8] In this regard, India's leading role in the Nonaligned Movement was vital because the ideal of international neutrality was attractive to nationalist movements attempting to 'throw off the yoke of colonialism.'

Yet another factor preventing greater Muslim support for Pakistan focused on the international disputes between the two subcontinental neighbours, India and Pakistan. Most Muslim states appeared initially hesitant to choose between the two countries, but "...if a choice had to be made, India, as more powerful, more stable and more influential, was likely to have the advantage."[9] In an attempt to further its own advantage, India encouraged closer political and cultural ties with these Muslim countries. Indeed, Keith Callard has written that these countries "...valued Indian support in international circles and it was clear that they had no intention of participating in a quarrel that did not involve their own immediate interests."[10]

By the early 1950s, it had become increasingly and painfully clear to the Pakistani leadership that international conditions, especially with regard to the Muslim world, were considerably different from those they had initially envisioned. Pakistan had searched for friends in the immediate post-partition period to alleviate its sense of insecurity in the international arena; the Muslim world, according to Pakistan, was a natural direction in which to turn in the search for allies. Since such expectations had been frustrated in the early years of Pakistan's independence, and Pakistan was in urgent need of external assistance, its leaders began to search for another means of external support. By 1953, the

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7 Keith Callard, Pakistan: a political study, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957, page 314.

8 Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, page 446.

9 Callard, Pakistan: a political study, page 314.

10 Keith Callard, Pakistan's foreign policy, 2nd edition, New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959, page 28.

search had yielded some results: Pakistan entered into a formal alliance with the United States.

The formal alliance relationship between Pakistan and the United States had a negative impact on the already deteriorating relations between Pakistan and the Muslim world. The Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), in particular, was perceived as contributing to a division of the Arab world, and Pakistan's involvement in the pact "...provoked intense Arab indignation in large parts of the Middle East."[11] The pact was condemned by India, who reacted specifically to American aid to its major opponent, as well as by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The alliance relationship, and specifically the Baghdad Pact, were perceived in many parts of the Muslim world as a direct contradiction of the views espoused earlier by Pakistani leaders, who had stressed that Islam represented the 'golden mean' between the two dominant ideologies of the day, namely capitalism and communism.

While Pakistani leaders justified their decision to join a western sponsored alliance by claiming that the Baghdad Pact was in fact created to help unite and strengthen the Muslim world, they also began a gradual process of public disavowal of the ideals and practicality of pan-Islamism. In 1956, the foreign minister of Pakistan made a clear statement against an enthusiastic embrace of the ideals of pan-Islamism by stating that "Pakistanis should first guard the interests of their own Muslims and then of other Muslims of the world [and that] Pak-Islamism and not pan-Islamism should now be the new slogan."[12] In addition, the Prime Minister of the country, when asked why Pakistan did not join a Muslim bloc rather than ally itself with a western power, replied that "...zero plus zero is after all equal to zero....The fact is that the Muslim countries today are

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11 Khalid Bin Sayeed, The political system of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967, page 284.

12 As quoted by Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, page 442.

so divided among themselves that it is difficult for them to sit together."[13] Nonetheless, despite such very public disavowals of the ideals of pan-Islamism, likely uttered in justification of the alliance relationship with the United States, the urge for Muslim unity has remained a characteristic of Pakistan's foreign policy; such a desire was perhaps symbolic of the country's need to establish a legitimate identity for itself on the international scene.

While Pakistan's relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East had generally been hindered by the alliance relationship with the United States, it was able, however, to maintain more positive ties with the Muslim countries of Turkey and Iran. Sayeed has written that the common bond amongst the three countries had always been strong:

> Persian has exercised probably a greater influence over West Pakistan's languages than Arabic. The Mughal emperors who ruled India during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were of Turkish origin. In addition to these cultural ties, the three countries have also been able to cooperate with each other because the ruling élites of each have on the whole been conservative and moderate.[14]

Both Iran and Turkey were, like Pakistan, members of the CENTO pact; through the provisions of this arrangement, the three countries were able to encourage greater cooperation. Within CENTO itself, for example, there were initial steps taken towards an improvement in the roads and railways among the three countries. In addition, the leaders of the three countries established the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) organization in July 1964, in an effort to foster even greater cooperation outside the framework of CENTO. The goal of the RCD was to foster greater unity among the three countries in terms of economics and trade ventures, improvement in communications, technical assistance and other joint ventures.[15] Such attempts at closer collaboration

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13 Prime Minister's Statement on Foreign Policy, December 9, 1956. As quoted by Gupta, 'Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy,' South Asian politics and religion, page 443.

14 Sayeed, The political system of Pakistan, page 285.

15 For more information on the details of the RCD agreement, see Sayeed, The political system of Pakistan, pages 285-286.

among the three countries were instrumental in maintaining good relations among Pakistan and Iran and Turkey, despite Pakistan's noticeably cooler relations with other Muslim countries.

The alliance relationship between Pakistan and the United States began to lose its charm in the 1960s. During this period, Pakistan, disappointed that its major ally did not provide it with enough political support in the international arena, began to diversify its foreign policy. Deliberate action was taken by Pakistani leaders to expand relations with other countries, and in particular, with Pakistan's Asian neighbours. This move towards a diversification of Pakistan's foreign policy occurred at a time when both Pakistan and the countries of the Muslim world were undergoing a fundamental shift in attitudes and policies. For Pakistan, the late 1960s was a time of great uncertainty; the United States had proved to be an unreliable ally, and, once again, Pakistani fears of international isolation had been heightened. The Muslim world, in turn, was approaching an era of the renewed emphasis on Islam in public affairs; indeed, by the early 1970s Islamic resurgence had become an international phenomenon.

The year 1971 marked a watershed for relations between Pakistan and the Muslim world. Pakistan had fought a devastating civil war, resulting in the loss of her eastern province; this geographic shift had considerable impact on the foreign policy of the 'new' and considerably smaller Pakistan. Indeed, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqār ʿAlī Bhutto clearly stated that:

> The severance of our eastern wing by force has significantly altered out geographic focus. This will naturally affect our geo-political perspective. The geographical distance between us and the nations of South-East Asia has grown...At the moment, as we stand, it is within the ambit of South and Western Asia. It is here that our primary concern must henceforth lie[16]

In addition to these factors, the country experienced an acute crisis of identity during the

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16 Zulfikār ʿAlī Bhutto, Speeches and Statements. As quoted in Shahid Javid Burki, Pakistan: a nation in the making, London: Westview Press, 1986, page 192.

period following the 1971 war; in the wake of the secession of Bangladesh, there was, within Pakistan, a renewed desire to focus on Islam to forge a sense of national unity. After 1971, then, Pakistan's foreign policy experienced a considerable shift in priorities; the country's ties with the Muslim countries of the Middle East became, once again, a primary issue of the Pakistani international agenda. A cursory glance at the activities of Prime Minister Bhutto in his early days of power provides a revealing picture of the importance placed on a renewal of positive links with Muslim countries; his first international visits consisted of journeys to Afghanistan, the Middle East and North Africa. Indeed, it appears clear that the Bhutto government "...gave top priority to chalking out new horizons of cooperation with the Muslim countries of the region."[17]

The Islamic Summit Conference, convened by the Bhutto government, gave Pakistan an opportunity to consolidate its ties with the Muslim world. The summit, held in Lahore on February 22-24, 1974, had the participation of thirty-eight Muslim states, twenty-five of which were represented by their heads of state or government. In this context, "the Summit...served as a magnificent advertisement of the revived, vibrant and confident Pakistan – a Pakistan which had triumphantly emerged out of the chaos and confusion of 1971 and re-introduced itself as an important diplomatic force both in South Asia and in the community of Muslim states."[18] The Summit also attempted to give practical shape to the ideals of Muslim unity and cooperation, while at the same time subscribing to the national independence of each respective Muslim state. The Lahore Declaration, approved by delegates at the conclusion of the conference, announced that:

> the Kings, Heads of State and Government and the Representatives of the Islamic countries and Organizations [affirmed] their determination to preserve and promote solidarity among Muslim countries, to respect each other's independence and territorial integrity, to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs, to resolve their differences through peaceful

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17 Khurshid Hyder, 'Pakistan's foreign policy in the early seventies,' Pakistan in a changing world, Masuma Hasan (ed). Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978, page 98.

18 Hyder, 'Pakistan's foreign policy in the early seventies,' Pakistan in a changing world, page 99.

> means in a fraternal spirit and, whenever possible, to utilize the mediatory influence or good offices of a fraternal Muslim State or States for such resolution.[19]

Pakistan's renewal of the importance placed on the 'Islamic connection' in its foreign policy coincided with a time of tremendous political transformation in the Muslim world. The new circumstances in the Middle East – most notably, the escalation of national incomes as a result of increases in the price of oil and the disillusionment with foreign ideologies – led to a renewed orientation towards Islam and its role in public life. The leaders of Muslim countries, faced with political, economic and social difficulties, turned increasingly to Islam for solutions. In this respect, Prime Minister Bhutto was able to utilize the language of Islamism to forge alliances with other Muslim countries. While such reliance upon the language of Islamism may well have been symbolic, it provided perhaps a legitimate mechanism through which to justify a renewed emphasis on the ties between Pakistan and other Muslim states, some of which had historically been important to Pakistan. In particular, Pakistani-Iranian relations represented the continuation of a historical tradition; the two countries had shared healthy and positive relations since Pakistan's independence in 1947. It is to an analysis of these relations between 1947 and 1977 that we now turn.

Pakistani-Iranian relations since 1947 have been a constant and positive feature of Pakistan's international relations. These relations have been based on a "...deep perception of the common interests of the two countries and a clear vision of the complementarity of their objectives [and upon the existence of] historic and cultural considerations."[20] The relationship between the two countries can be divided into two time periods: first, from 1947 to 1971, and second, from 1971 to 1977.

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19 Norman Palmer, 'Pakistan: the long search for foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins (eds), Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977, pages 427-428.

20 Hyder, 'Pakistan's foreign policy in the early seventies,' Pakistan in a changing world, page 100.

During the first period of Pakistani-Iranian relations, Iran was the weaker power, despite Pakistan's relative instability in the international arena and Iran's vital assistance and support to Pakistan. Both countries were faced with the possibility of external threats; Pakistan feared Indian aggression, and "...Iran was recovering psychologically from the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan in the immediate post-World War II period."[21] In light of these perceived threats from the external environment, both Pakistan and Iran required foreign assistance, and both became tied into an alliance relationship with the United States. In addition to a mutual need for security, and membership in the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), the absence of serious disputes between Iran and Pakistan was instrumental in the development and growth of friendly relations between the two countries. Furthermore, both Iran and Pakistan had poor relations with their respective neighbouring countries; a sense of growing isolation provided yet another reason for the countries to seek friendship with each other.

The friendly relations between Iran and Pakistan were institutionalized in a number of agreements and cooperative measures. It was in this context that the two countries signed the Iran-Pakistan Friendship Treaty in February 1950. This treaty extended most-favoured nation treatment in trade and allowed for greater cooperation between the two countries within the framework of the United Nations. In addition to the Iran-Pakistan Friendship Treaty, a cultural agreement to extend the cultural and linguistic ties between the countries was signed in March 1956. The Border Demarcation Agreement of 1956 prevented the possibility of border disputes between the countries. Support for each other's international positions was also a vital component of the friendship agreements; Pakistan supported Iran's nationalization of the British oil companies in March 1951, and Iran supported both Pakistan's entry into the United Nations and her claims regarding Kashmir.

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21 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, 'Iran and Pakistan: cooperation in an area of conflict,' Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No 5 (May 1977), page 474.

During the early years of independence, Pakistan's foreign relations were dominated by the issue of Kashmir; this issue was the "...yardstick used by Pakistanis to measure the friendship of other nations."[22] On this issue, Iran did not disappoint Pakistan; despite Iranian desires to nourish healthy relations with India, Pakistani claims to Kashmir were always supported by Iran. Iranian support for the 1956 United Nations resolution calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir did not go unnoticed, nor did her considerable support – both material and psychological – during the 1965 war with India. For Pakistan, disappointed that many countries in the international arena did not support its claims publicly, Iran's support was significant and at least symbolically important..

Iranian-Pakistani cooperation was also institutionalized in the RCD scheme, which has already been mentioned; the purpose of the agreement, signed among Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in July 1964, was to provide for greater cooperation in the economic, technological and cultural fields. While the RCD scheme "...succeeded in fostering feelings of comraderie [sic] between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, and in easing travel restrictions and improving communications, ...its achievements have been modest when compared to its aspirations."[23]

Throughout this period of Iranian-Pakistani relations between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan remained the stronger and more dominant of the two countries, in great measure due to its growing industrial base and stronger military establishment. The nature of the relationship underwent a significant change in the 1970s, during which time increasing Iranian strength coincided with Pakistan's period of decline. Indeed, Tahir-Kheli addresses this point when she writes that:

> The withdrawal of Great Britain from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the Shah's desire to replace the British as the guarantor of the status quo, and the rising importance of oil as a crucial factor in international relations enhanced the importance of Iran, just as Pakistan, truncated and

22 Tahir-Kheli, 'Iran and Pakistan: cooperation in an area of conflict,' Asian Survey, page 475.

considerably weakened by the 1971 war with India, began a period of soul-searching and reconstruction.[24]

Post-1971 relations between Iran and Pakistan were composed of three separate, but interrelated, components: first, Iran's political commitment to Pakistan's national integrity and security; second, Iran's military assistance; and, third, Iran's economic aid to Pakistan. Each of these will be examined in turn.

Pakistan's desire to balance the power of India has already been seen to be a fundamental element in its foreign policy; this foreign policy need became even more important for a smaller, weaker and less confident Pakistan after the 1971 war. In an effort to meet this policy objective, Pakistani leaders attempted to cultivate, on a regular basis, the support and the commitment of the international community; a lack of military equality with India made external commitments to Pakistan's security a vital issue. In this regard, Pakistan was constantly assured by Iran that it considered the existence of Pakistan to be an important issue. Such commitments to Pakistan's national integrity were not merely Iranian attempts to soothe Pakistan; clearly, domestic instability or external threats to Pakistan would have been contrary to Iranian interests. Pakistan provided a good buffer zone between the two major regional powers, India and Iran. Furthermore, a "...weaker Pakistan, a junior partner with an obvious dependence on Iran, could be a useful link in improving Iranian links with Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Emirates."[25]

The second aspect of the Iranian-Pakistani relationship during the 1970s was the military component. Iran's military capability, far exceeding that of India, was acutely recognized by Pakistani leaders. This military superiority, coupled with Iran's political commitment to Pakistan's national integrity, was a fundamental factor in helping to alleviate the

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23 Tahir-Kheli, 'Iran and Pakistan: cooperation in an area of conflict,' Asian Survey, page 476.

24 Tahir-Kheli, 'Iran and Pakistan: cooperation in an area of conflict,' Asian Survey, page 477.

25 Tahir-Kheli, 'Iran and Pakistan: cooperation in an area of conflict,' Asian Survey, page 479.

latter's growing insecurity with regard to perceived Indian threats.

The third component of the relations between Iran and Pakistan focused on the economic aspects of the relationship. Iranian aid to Pakistan between 1974 and 1977 exceeded $800 million in credits and cash. Indeed, one writer comments that:

> ...after the oil price increase of 1973, the oil-rich states began to underwrite the cost of economic programmes in Pakistan as they augmented the more traditional sources of assistance. While, in general, the aid was erratic and personal in nature, certain countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE [the United Arab Emirates] and Iran did give project assistance, enter into joint ventures...and make substantial personal donations to offset dwindling foreign exchange reserves and, occasionally, to help defray oil price increases.[26]

In addition, countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula became markets for Pakistani workers; indeed, in the mid to late seventies, "...around 1.2 million Pakistanis in the Gulf and Middle East returned more than $2 billion in annual remittances to Pakistan."[27]

Pakistan's trade with Iran has, despite the large amounts of Iranian aid, "...always been only a fraction of the Indo-Iranian trade. Even in 1959, the volume of Iran's trade with India was five times that between Iran and Pakistan."[28] Indo-Iranian relations in the years 1971 to 1976 became considerably more friendly; Pakistan caught, literally and figuratively, 'in the middle', was requested to assist the growth of trade relations between the two countries by allowing Indo-Iranian trade to utilize Pakistan as a transportation throughway. The Shah's advocacy of an Asian Common Market also posed a dilemma for Pakistan. It had, over the years, supported the concept of regional cooperation in institutionalized forms such as the RCD scheme; however, such arrangements had looked westward towards the Muslim states, with which Pakistan shared a common religious and cultural history, thus making economic and political cooperation more practical and

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26 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, 'In search of an identity: Islam and Pakistan's foreign policy,' Islam in foreign policy, Adeed Dawisha (ed), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, page 74.

27 Tahir-Kheli, 'In search of an identity: Islam and Pakistan's foreign policy,' Islam in foreign policy, page 74.

28 Tahir-Kheli, 'In search of an identity: Islam and Pakistan's foreign policy,' Islam in foreign policy, page 480.

feasible. The difficulty posed by the Shah's proposal of a common market was that it called for economic and political collaboration among states with different orientations, and, in the case of India, with a state hostile to Pakistan. Obviously, then, the growth of Indo-Iranian relations, both economic and political, made Pakistan uneasy; nonetheless, Iran was an important ally which had publicly and politically committed itself to Pakistani security. In this commitment, lay the seeds of Pakistani dependence on Iran between 1971 and 1977.

In the ultimate analysis, the roots of Pakistan's positive relations with Iran lay not only in a shared history, culture and religion, but also in a shared orientation in the global arena. Both countries, feeling threatened and isolated in the international environment, initially looked towards the United States to provide support and assistance. In later years, as Iran grew stronger, it was able to provide to Pakistan a measure of security in that it was committed to Pakistani independence and was able to supply Pakistan with economic and military assistance. The fall of Bhutto in 1977 and the Shah in 1978-79 represented a watershed in the history of the relations between Iran and Pakistan; relations between the two countries altered in the years after the late 1970s. The nature of each country's experience with Islamism may well have provided each country with a different outlook in respect to the other. It is to Pakistan's response to Iran's Islamic Revolution to which we now turn.

Chapter Four

Between a rock and a hard place:
Pakistani media response to the Iranian Revolution

His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryamehr, with his vast knowledge of problems facing the country and with his great experience, has guided the nation....[1]

...Iran is a great country with a glorious past and a vital role for the future. To Pakistan, it has been the closest of brotherly nations and in view of his relations, this country can have nothing but fond feelings for the Shahanshah as it can have nothing but profoundest good wishes for the Iranian people....[2]

The Shahanshah has acted wisely. His departure has come not a moment too soon....[3]

Being their next door neighbours, the people of Pakistan rejoice with the Iranians in the success of their long and heroic struggle to rid themselves of tyranny and rediscover their Islamic identity....The shining example they have set giving the blood of their sons and daughters...will always remain a source of unfailing inspiration....[4]

...the New Iran is Islamic Iran. The era of blind imitation of the West belongs to the past. The new Iranian generation is to be raised not on Western ideas of politics, economy and permissiveness, but on Islamic values which have roots among the people and which have sustained and nourished the Iranian people through some of the darkest periods of their history....[5]

With the psyche of the revolution outliving the revolution itself, it has not been possible to channel the energy of revolutionary forces into the positive task of economic and political reconstruction and social renovation. The purges and summary trials which still continue unabated detract from the more fundamental task of restoring law and order and rehabilitating the economy....It is much to be hoped that the Iranian leadership will address itself to these basic tasks without further loss of time....[6]

Pakistani media response to the Iranian revolution of 1978/79 was, as can be evidenced by the quotations above, a diverse and evolving response. An investigation of editorials in the

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1 Pakistan Times, editorial, January 27, 1977.

2 Pakistan Times, editorial, December 15, 1978.

3 Pakistan Times, editorial, January 18, 1979.

4 Dawn, editorial, February 13, 1979.

5 Dawn, editorial, February 6, 1980.

6 Dawn, editorial, November 11, 1980.

Pakistani press reveals not only the diversity of opinions expressed, but also some of the difficulties encountered in formulating a coherent and meaningful response. As can be seen from a cursory glance at the quotations above, editorials in the Pakistani media have expressed views ranging from glowing tributes for the Shah, to a disavowal of his methods, and from strong ideological support for the new revolutionary régime to a firm plea for the normalization of the socio-economic and political climate of post-revolutionary Iran. This diversity of opinions reflects the Pakistani dilemma of attempting to fashion a coherent response from 'between a rock and a hard place'; on the one hand, there was a sense of ideological affinity with the ideals of the revolution, and on the other, pragmatic domestic and international considerations could not be entirely discounted. Thus, both the nature of Pakistan's ideological debate and its pragmatic concerns influenced and shaped the nature of its media response to events in Iran. It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate the nature of the Pakistani editorial response to the early phases of the Iranian revolution, between late 1978 and the end of 1980.

An analysis of the opinions of Pakistani media towards the Iranian Revolution must necessarily begin with a brief investigation of pre-revolutionary media coverage. In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that Iranian-Pakistani relations had been warm since the latter's inception in 1947; as already articulated in chapter three, Pakistan had relied on Iranian support for its various international positions. However, the economic, diplomatic and political ties already forged in the early years of Pakistan's existence, became appreciably stronger after the early 1970s, when Iran, newly wealthy with 'petrodollars', was able to provide considerable economic and potential military assistance to Pakistan. Hence, it is not surprising to find that Pakistani media coverage vis à vis the Shah and his policies was particularly supportive. It is perhaps useful at this point to survey briefly the coverage accorded to Iran on the pages of the Pakistani press during 1977 and the early months of 1978. These weeks and months were turbulent times for domestic Pakistani

politics, as has already been indicated in chapter one. Further, these were the weeks and months before street demonstrations in Iran became serious enough to warrant press coverage in the Pakistani media.

Iranian-Pakistani relations, particularly after 1971, were characterized, in great measure, by two fundamental elements: first, the economic and trade ties between Iran and Pakistan, and second, Iran's political commitment to Pakistan's national integrity and security. While it is obviously difficult to categorize Pakistani media coverage into exact classifications, it is possible nonetheless to identify manifestations of Pakistan's opinions along these two broad categories. Indeed, Pakistani media coverage in this period appeared to encompass both these elements, along with two other related, but distinct, features, namely that of strong support for the Iranian monarch and his role in Iran's development, as well as an emphasis on the nature of the 'special relationship' between Iran and Pakistan. Each of these will be examined in turn.

Economic and trade ties between Iran and Pakistan received much emphasis on the pages of the Pakistani press during 1977 and the early months of 1978. In particular, editorials and articles focussed on the already existing ties between the two countries and on the possibilities of the expansion of economic collaboration. For example, upon the signing of an economic agreement to expand trade between the two countries, one editorial commented:

> The signing of a protocol by Iran and Pakistan...is in consonance with the special relationship that exists between the two countries....As the Iranian Minister of Economic Affairs said on the occasion, the protocol was another important step forward towards the expansion of trade and increased collaboration in various projects of public utility....[7]

Despite the growing collaboration, there were issues of concern which Pakistan did not hesitate to voice. One notable issue was the Iranian proposal to develop land routes through

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7 Dawn, editorial, May 20, 1977.

Pakistan in an effort to boost Indo-Iranian trade as well as economic cooperation in the region. Notably, one editorial commented unequivocally that:

> The opening and development of Pakistan's land routes for expansion of trade with neighbouring India and Iran and of Indo-Iranian transit trade has caused a great deal of concern in this country. From a political point of view, this alarm is quite understandable with reference to the various issues between India and Pakistan that remain unresolved....[8]

Given Pakistan's almost overwhelming preoccupation with India in the post-partition period, it is hardly surprising that concern over this issue was expressed. Nonetheless, despite the concern over this issue, Pakistani press coverage regarding Iranian-Pakistani economic ties was generally favourable and supportive. Indeed, the expansion of economic collaboration between the two countries was seen to be "...in the interest not only of the two countries, but of the region as a whole...."[9]

The second element of the Iranian-Pakistani relationship, that of the former's political commitment to the national integrity and security of the latter, was also manifested on the pages of Pakistan's media. In this respect, editorials regarding the historical relationship between the two countries focussed upon Iran's enduring ally relationship with Pakistan. One editorial, for example, explicitly stated that:

> ...Iran has stood by Pakistan, through thick and thin: friendship has stood the test of time. The understanding and sympathy that Pakistan found in Teheran for its case remained unmatched...the kind of support that has consistently been given by Iran could not but evoke feelings of deep gratitude....[10]

Editorial comments such as this clearly reflected Pakistani appreciation for the comfort of secure allies such as Iran. In the atmosphere of highly charged acrimony that accompanied Pakistan's birth and the climate of insecurity that pervaded the post-partition period, there is no doubt that Iran's support was both much needed and appreciated by Pakistan.

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8 Dawn, editorial, February 23, 1978.

9 Pakistan Times, editorial, May 20, 1977.

10 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 5, 1978.

Pakistan's gratitude for Iran's friendship and support – both economic and political – was also expressed in the media as warm and overwhelming support for Iran's head of state – the Shah. This element of Pakistan's media coverage during 1977 and the early months of 1978 was clearly manifested time and again in editorial comments of the day; it is these comments which echoed perhaps most vividly the tone of Iranian-Pakistani relations during this period. In this respect, editorial commentaries spoke highly of the Shah's "...vast knowledge of problems facing the country and...his great experience...."[11] In fact, great emphasis was often placed upon the Shah's role in leading Iran towards development and progress. One editorial, commenting on the Shah's White Revolution, stated:

> All his life at the service of the people, the Shahanshah had the dream and vision of the future for leading his people and his country along the path of progress and prosperity...with the full support of the Iranian people, the Shahanshah succeeded in destroying the vestiges of colonialism and foreign interference....The Iranian Revolution under His Imperial Majesty's dynamic, objective and forward looking leadership is not a static revolution. It goes on...taking the people of Iran to the ultimate goal of the 'Great Civilisation' reaching a self-sustained and self-propelled economy, ensuring to the nation happiness and prosperity for all time to come....[12]

Pakistani media portrayal of the Iranian monarch as the all-important symbol of, and focus for, socio-economic and political progress in Iran reached its zenith in October 1978. On the National Day of Iran (October 26), articles stressed the Shah's role in the future development of his country, even as street demonstrations and uprisings were already threatening the viability of the monarchy itself. One article contained the following statement, which speaks volumes both of Pakistan's loyalty to the Shah as well as its failure, like that of most countries, to recognize the serious nature of the protest movement against him:

> The monarchy has always been the most important political institution in this society. Through centuries of trial and error, the monarchy has evolved as the symbol of Iran's historical continuity; today it is the most important

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11 Pakistan Times, editorial, January 27, 1977.

12 Pakistan Times, editorial, January 27, 1977.

> mechanism ensuring continuity amid the social and political changes yet to come....[13]

Finally, Pakistani media in 1977 and early 1978 spoke often and emphatically about the 'special relationship' between Iran and Pakistan. Notably, much attention was paid to the historic linguistic and cultural ties between the two countries:

> Pakistan and Iran are linked with each other in myriad ways and have been so from time immemorial. The ties of language scarcely need emphasis....The cultural face of what used to be Muslim India was given the name Indo-Persian and what came from Iran covered a wide range of fields from ideas to dress and architecture....[14]

It is interesting to note that the absence, in media reports, of an emphasis on the common religious heritage shared by Iran and Pakistan. In fact, religious bonds took a decidedly secondary role to the "...enduring foundations of high principles, shared culture and a common heritage."[15] In part, this absence was related to the different histories of religious development in the two countries during the 19th and 20th centuries. For example, the growth in the significance of the Iranian *'ulamā'* had no parallel in the Pakistani context. Nonetheless, given that both Iran and Pakistan were on the threshold of new phases in their political development – phases in which Islam was to acquire an increasing public visibility and symbolism – it is interesting indeed to notice this absence of emphasis on religion in 1977 and early 1978.

Hence, Pakistani media coverage vis à vis Iran was characterized by an emphasis on the economic ties and the special historical bonds between the two countries; Pakistani warmth and appreciation for Iran's political and diplomatic support; as well as overwhelming support for the Iranian monarch and his policies. It is against this background that Pakistani media reaction to the Iranian Revolution can best be investigated and analyzed. It is to this task that we now turn.

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13 Dawn, supplement, 'The National Day of Iran,' October 26, 1978.

14 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 5, 1978.

15 Dawn, editorial, March 21, 1977.

An analysis of Pakistan's media reaction to the Iranian Revolution reveals at least four distinct phases; the dates for these phases should be viewed as approximate, as the response should be viewed as a a gradually evolving one. These phases are first, the period of the early disturbances from August to November 1978; second, the phase of escalating tension which eventually overthrew the Shah from November 1978 to February 1979; third, the phase of the establishment of the Islamic Republic from approximately February 1979 to November 1979; and fourth, the period of the power struggle between the hardliners and moderates within the Iranian leadership, and the establishment of a clergy-dominated government, between November 1979 and December 1980. The editorials that appeared in the Pakistani media during each of these phases had various distinguishing features; in effect, each phase had a differing 'flavour' or emphasis. An investigation of these various 'flavours' and emphases provides a fascinating glimpse into the nature of the evolving Pakistani response to events in Iran.

Press reports of the early disturbances on the Iranian political scene began as early as May 1978; such reports were, however, scanty and dismissed all-too readily. There did not appear to be a concerted effort to investigate further and to analyze the early disturbances during this time, even though a cursory glance at the chronology of the revolution shows clearly that serious political unrest in Iran had begun, by conservative estimates, by early 1978.[16] Evidence for dismissal of the serious nature of the riots can be found in the fact that Pakistan Times did not make an editorial commentary on the Iranian disturbances until December 15, 1978 – by which time the riots had clearly become a national uprising, if not an actual revolution. Dawn, on the other hand, did publish editorials in August 1978 which addressed the issue of the Iranian riots. However, even these editorials were relatively mild ones which attributed the unrest to the "...social changes which have come in the wake of

16 Nicholas M. Nikazmerad, 'A chronological survey of the Iranian Revolution,' Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, numbers. 1-4, 1980.

the rapid economic expansion in Iran since 1973...."[17] While editorials did not explicitly state strong support of the Iranian monarch, one did express a concern that "...the implications of political instability...in Iran for the security of Pakistan can hardly be over-emphasized...."[18] Clearly, the euphemism 'political stability', if broadly conceived, represented the idea of the maintenance of the status quo; in this case, it appears that Pakistan was expressing, albeit in a subtle manner, its hope that anti-government agitation would somehow cease and that the normal state of affairs would prevail in Iran. In fact, one editorial in Dawn ended with an explicit warning and plea to the anti-government forces:

> It is for the forces in opposition to recognize that their failure to settle their differences with the government through a compromise would only destabilise the country further and this can have serous implications for the security and stability of not only Iran but the region as a whole.[19]

During the second phase of the revolution – that of escalating tension in Iran – the sporadic riots and demonstrations grew steadily into what was clearly a spontaneous national uprising. Pakistani media reports and editorials during this period showed a growing concern, on the one hand, and an uneasy ambivalence, on the other. Clearly, the Pakistanis were worried about the developments in Iran, but growing expressions of a guarded neutrality in the editorials of the day bear witness to the confusion felt in official and semi-official circles. After expressing staunch loyalty to the person of the Shah and the institution of the Iranian monarchy, there was a growing apprehension lest the monarchy fall – a scenario which, by the end of 1978, was becoming increasingly possible. In this regard, editorials during this time were marked by a growing awareness of the strength of anti-government sentiment in Iran, on the one hand, and a desire to encourage a compromise solution which would rescue the monarch, on the other. One editorial, for example, acknowledged that "...there can be no doubt about the sentiments of the people

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17 Dawn, editorial, August 17, 1978.

18 Dawn, editorial, August 17, 1978.

19 Dawn, editorial, August 29, 1978.

and the extent of their involvement."[20] However, the same editorial also stated clearly that:

> The main question remaining would be the future of the monarchy: should Iran become a constitutional monarchy or a full fledged republic?*...[This question] should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people. The slogan of emotion-charged rallies are not necessarily a conclusive expression of these wishes....[21]

The growing ambivalence and neutrality can be attributed, in great measure, to Pakistan's gradually crystallizing awareness by November-December 1978 that the Shah's role in the future political life of Iran was to be, at best, a limited one. One editorial was explicit in stating that "...the crisis in Iran has reached such a pitch that many outside observers are confidently predicting a change of government in Teheran in which the Shahanshah might not have a role to play...."[22] Hence, there appeared to be, on Pakistan's part, an effort – albeit a belated one – to present a relatively neutral front; if indeed the Shah did fall, as was appearing likely by the end of 1978, Pakistan would need to distance itself from his policies in order to establish a working relationship with the new government. It is not overly surprising, therefore, that Pakistani editorials stressed that Iranian political difficulties should be "...judged in Iran's own context."[23]

As the Iranian Revolution progressed in the closing days of 1978 and the opening days and weeks of 1979, it is possible to discern in Pakistan's media subtle hints of the beginnings of a 'courtship relationship' with Iranian opposition forces. Already, there was a growing distance from the Shah and his policies; in the early weeks of 1979, Pakistani editorials began also to realign themselves with the apparently new political configuration in Iran. Hence, editorials began to make comments such as: "To what extent the new Government

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20 Pakistan Times, editorial, December 15, 1978,

* While Iran had officially been a constitutional monarch since 1906, the Shah had, by and large, ignored the Constitution. In this sense, the real question for consideration was probably the issue of whether or not the monarchy would be abolished altogether from the Iranian Constitution.

21 Pakistan Times, editorial, December 15, 1978.

22 Dawn, editorial, November 17, 1978.

23 Pakistan Times, editorial, December 15, 1978.

can cope with the tasks before it will ultimately depend on the rapport, if any, it can establish with the religious leaders, especially Ayatollah Khomeini...."[24] By this time, of course, it was obvious to all concerned that the days of the Shah as the absolute Iranian monarch were numbered; there was little doubt by this time that he would have to relinquish his power. But it was equally clear that religious leaders had played a vital role in the uprising. While the role of the religious establishment had not yet been consolidated, there was recognition, nonetheless, in the Pakistani press, as elsewhere, that such leadership had been instrumental in the revolutionary process and would thus have to be 'courted.' This courtship would have to be conducted not only by foreign countries, but also by political forces within Iran's political arena, including the new government of Shahpour Bakhtiār. One editorial categorically stated that "...the new Government will continue to lack credibility until it finds acceptance from Ayatollah Khomeini."[25]

The departure of the Shah was generally viewed as a positive measure by the Pakistani media. Reports portrayed this event as a "...watershed in Iranian politics"[26]and, while severely criticizing the shah, expressed hope that the crisis would be resolved:

> The departure of the Shah, who had come to symbolize autocracy and tyranny at its worst for a number of people and had become the focus of opposition, has not defused the crisis altogether, but has certainly paved the way for opposition leaders to take positive measures towards a political solution.[27]

It is significant to note that the Pakistani media did not seem to envision the formation of an Iranian government dominated by the religious establishment. In part, this emphasis can be attributed to the long-standing unease of many modernists and secularists within Pakistan – many of whom remained in leadership positions – with involvement of the

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24 Dawn, editorial, January 5, 1979.

25 Dawn, editorial, January 15, 1979.

26 Pakistan Times, editorial, January 19, 1979.

27 Dawn, editorial, January 15, 1979.

'ulamā' in public life. The growing political influence of the religious class in Iran could very possibly have sparked the fear that the Pakistani *'ulamā'* would be encouraged by the Iranian scenario to demand greater influence. In this respect, editorial comments tended to downplay the possibility that the Iranian *'ulamā'* would play a significant and meaningful role in postrevolutionary Iran. Rather, it appears that the religious leaders were seen to be the 'guardians' of the revolution who would oversee the establishment of a more or less liberal democratic state run according to popular wishes. Editorials during this period were not always supportive of the Bakhtiār government, which was felt to be unrepresentative. Support was, however, given to Āyatullāh Khumaynī, because of the overwhelming popular support expressed towards him – although, again, his role seemed to be limited at this time to that a guardian through the period of transition in post-revolutionary Iran. It was envisioned, it seems, by the Pakistani press, that Khumaynī would guide Iran out of revolutionary chaos, and would encourage a transition to popular and representative democracy. One editorial commented:

> The greatest responsibility lies with the Shahpour Government which has not acted with the kind of discretion the situation demands. Ayatollah Khomeini represents the popular will which is clearly against the continuation of the old order. Anyone or anything associated with that order can have no place in today's revolutionary situation....Being an appointee of the Shah, Mr. Shahpour could not hope to be acceptable other than in his limited role of helping a transition....His attitude in the last week has not been very helpful....Things are, however, not past redemption and a patch-up can be effected if he adopts a conciliatory approach. After all, the Ayatollah wants no more than to hold elections in which people of various persuasions will be free to take part. Any other course is fraught with unforeseen dangers....[28]

Indeed, this emphasis on the establishment of democracy was echoed in another editorial published upon the return to Iran of Āyatullāh Khumaynī. Responding to Bakhtiār's fear that the political and constitutional transitions would be disorderly unless legal elections were held, the editorial stated:

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28 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 7, 1979.

> His fears seem hardly justified in view of the plan Ayatollah Khomeini has clearly spelled out envisaging a political process in which the people will have the fullest opportunity to express their will freely on the issues at stake....Khomeini is adhering to the accepted norms of democracy and is not demanding that the massive public demonstrations held in his support be accepted as the final expression of the popular will.[29]

The fall of the Bakhtiār government, which can be seen to mark the beginning of the third phase, was generally hailed in the Pakistani media as a triumph of the people; it was viewed as a new opportunity to begin the final phase of the revolution – the phase of reconciliation and reconstruction. Bakhtiār was denigrated as an obstacle to the inevitable triumph of revolutionary progress in Iran:

> ...with the disappearance of Shahpour from the gory scene, in the midst of which he was standing like a colossus of clay averting the inevitable, Iran must speedily return to stability and peace – and to the Islamic order for which it had been waging one of the most determined fights in history.[30]

Yet another editorial proclaimed:

> the rear-guard action which Mr. Shahpour Bakhtiar valiantly but foolishly mounted on behalf of a politically isolated and patently doomed monarchy has collapsed....The will of a brave people has prevailed over the power of money and the power of guns. The Iranian Revolution has emerged victorious. The Islamic Republic of Iran is born.[31]

Mention of the 'Islamic' nature of the Revolution and the 'Islamic order' were significant as this appeared to suggest that Pakistan viewed such an order to be a significant goal of the Iranian Revolution, along with democracy and representative government. It is doubtful, however, if Pakistan envisioned the type of order which was to emerge in Iran. It is much more likely that what was envisioned was the emergence of a fairly moderate political leadership and order which would utilize Islamism as a means of legitimation. In short, it is more than likely that Pakistani leaders envisioned – or at least hoped for – the

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29 Pakistan Times, editorial, January 26, 1979.

30 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 13, 1979.

31 Dawn, editorial, February 13, 1979.

emergence of a new order in Iran which was not unlike the order in Pakistan.

Media coverage during this time was marked also by expressions of hope that Iran would quickly normalize its political climate; in effect, this called for a quick resolution of revolutionary passion:

> The first task of Mehdi Bazargan's provisional Government is to send people back to their homes, to restore order in the streets and bazaars and to reactivate offices, factories and oilfields. The fury is still apparently not spent. The former oppressors and opposers face the prospect of having to account for their past. It would be best for the new Government if the process is not allowed to degenerate into a vindictive witchhunt and if it is got over as quickly and painlessly as possible. The country has seen enough violence, suffering and bloodshed. It is time for a new beginning; for reconciliation and reconstruction.[32]

By February-March of 1979, Iranian acceptance of the concept of an Islamic Republic appeared to have been a foregone conclusion, although formal ratification occurred somewhat later. Pakistani media coverage during this time was characterized, initially, by very strong ideological support for this concept, along with support for, and identification with, the Islamic goals of the new republic. One editorial, in discussing Iranian-Pakistani relations, stated that such relations would be strengthened because the ties of renewed commitment to Islam would:

> ...add a totally new dimension to Pak-Iran relations. The ties between them so far have had only a temporal basis....But added to this now is a new commitment by the two brotherly countries to the revival of the great values and ideals of Islam that brought a revolutionary message of hope, equality and justice to mankind and gave a radical new direction to history....[33]

It is significant to note the increasing use of the language of Islamism in the press during this period. Whereas previous editorials had commented on the historical, linguistic, cultural and economic ties between Iran and Pakistan, they now spoke of the 'rediscovery of Islamic identity.' Utilization of the language of Islamism and Islamic symbolism was, in

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32 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 13, 1979.

33 Pakistan Times, editorial, Mar ch 13, 1979.

fact, to increase, as the revolution progressed.

While the Pakistani press was expressing ideological support for the ideals of the Islamic revolution, it was also, however, clearly encouraging the democratic and liberal elements in the revolutionary process. Ideological support for Iran, while strong, represented only one element of Pakistani support during this early phase of the revolution in Iran. In essence, the Pakistani press appeared to be stating that the adoption of democratic and moderate political mechanisms and approaches were not contradictory to a reliance upon Islamism – if such reliance could be controlled by the political leadership of the country. In other words, Islamism could be utilized if – and only if – it was implemented carefully and without forsaking the more moderate views which called for a return to democratic principles. Clear manifestations of an encouragement of the moderate, pragmatic and democratic trends on the Iranian political scene were often expressed in the editorials of the day. One such editorial, referring to the issues confronting the Bazargan government, stated that:

> The new Government has applied itself to dealing with the problems of law and order, the restoration of the administrative machinery, the rehabilitation of the economy and, above all, the reorganization of the armed forces....Mr. Bazargan's team is eminently qualified to grapple with these fundamental tasks....[They] have brought to their task the advantages of modern education and political experience, as well as the spiritual and moral values of Islam. They have displayed a pragmatism which will stand them in good stead....[34]

The encouragement to adopt a pragmatic and moderate course for Iran was to remain a fundamental element of Pakistani media coverage of events in Iran. Even when ideological support for Iran's revolution was at its peak, there was still a strong Pakistani plea for moderation – sometimes euphemistically referred to as 'normalization of affairs' – in Iranian political, economic and social affairs. Indeed, the message was quite clear in one editorial published on March 18, 1979 – relatively early during the phase of the

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34 Dawn, editorial, March 2, 1979.

establishment of the Islamic Republic. The commentary stated:

> It seems clear that in the present critical phase, Iran's national interest will be best secured by adopting a flexible approach which can elicit the commitment of the 'ulama, the lay intelligentsia, the workers, the bureaucracy, and reorganized army....[35]

Hence, it is obvious that there was a clearly discernible pattern during this time; pragmatism and moderation were encouraged in press reports and editorials, even though support was expressed for a reliance upon Islamism within Iran's political arena. One article published in March 1979, in support of a moderate, liberal democratic government and a balanced approach stated:

> One may assume safely that this Islamic Republic – after the referendum and elections to the Constituent Assembly – will be run by Mujtahids as well as pious secular leaders, Doctors of Islamic divinity as well as modern technocrats. Parliament will pass laws in the light of Islamic tenets and apply these to modern conditions and contemporary needs.[36]

The Pakistani plea for an orderly moderate and pragmatic transition to a 'normal' socio-economic and political climate in Iran was perhaps best succinctly expressed in the words of the following editorial:

> Iran's paramount need is to complete speedily the transition from the revolutionary set-up of today to an ordered society governed normally by the people's chosen representatives in accordance with the broad principles of the Islamic Revolution.[37]

Another fundamental and recurring theme in media coverage during this phase was the Pakistani plea for an end to the revolutionary passion and fervour that characterized Iran in the immediate post-revolutionary period. While some editorials justified the intensity of Iranian anger against collaborators – either actual or perceived – of the Shah's régime, the same editorials commented, time and again, on the need to "...control the revolutionary

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35 Dawn, editorial, March 18, 1979.

36 Dawn, editorial, March 13, 1979.

37 Dawn, editorial, August 3, 1979.

fervour that swept the shah from the throne."[38] Indeed, another editorial was even more unequivocal in its comments:

> If this policy of revolutionary vengeance continues unchecked for long, it will keep the country in the grip of violence and counter-violence. Thus, the historical axiom of a revolution devouring its own children could come true in Iran....[39]

In this regard, there was much concern expressed in the Pakistani press about the various summary trials, purges and executions of former officials under the Shah's régime. It was this aspect of Iran's post-revolutionary environment that perhaps caused the greatest discomfort amongst Pakistani officials.

Pakistan's growing concern over the nature and intensity of Iranian revolutionary passion and fervour was also coupled with its concern about the lack of governmental authority exercised by official institutions in Iran. This concern was manifested in various editorials lamenting the "...duality of control"[40] between the Bazargan government and the Revolutionary Council. Generally, the Pakistani media were supportive of the Bazargan government, in keeping with their encouragement of the development of a moderate, pragmatic, liberal-democratic republican postrevolutionary Iran. Support for the Bazargan government was, however, still cautious; Pakistan could not afford to offend the members of the religious establishment who dominated the Revolutionary Council and who had clearly played an instrumental role in the revolution. Despite this caution, however, support for the Bazargan government was seen to be in accordance with Pakistan's policy of encouraging stability and the normalization of political and economic life in Iran:

> If Mr. Bazargan is really in the process of acquiring a measure of effective power to run the country, this should prove to be a significant development

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38 Dawn, editorial, April 15, 1979.

39 Dawn, editorial, May 8, 1979.

40 Dawn, editorial, April 20, 1979.

> for Iran. Lacking in political and economic direction, the country now needs a stable administration to guide it back to normality....[41]

The period between approximately February and December, 1979, was also characterized in the Pakistani media by an awareness and acknowledgement of the reality of power struggles amongst various groups in the Iranian revolutionary coalition. For example, one editorial, commenting on the apparent struggle and disagreement between Āyatullāh Khumaynī and Āyatullāh Taleghānī, stated that the episode had encouraged "...new efforts to resolve the differences afflicting the top leadership of the revolution."[42] A later editorial stated even more explicitly that "...the struggle between the moderates and the extremists which has now surfaced was quite inevitable given the differing and, at times, conflicting, orientations of those who joined hands to oust the monarchy."[43] In this regard, it is significant to note that an article published in Dawn on October 3, 1979 was mildly critical of the course of the Iranian revolution. Written not by a correspondent of the newspaper itself, but by a former Iranian ambassador to Britain (presumably pro-Shah), the article's significance lay in the very fact of its publication. That an article critical, however mildly, of the revolution could be published in martial-law Pakistan is an indication of the growing Pakistani concern over the course of events in Iran.

Despite the caution, Pakistani editorials also wrote with optimism of possible conciliation and unity amongst the various political groups on the Iranian political scene. In this regard, the editorials discouraged a "...hardline and inflexible approach"[44] and instead strongly recommended that Iran discover appropriate means by which to "...provide new bases for fostering unity."[45] In this respect, the Pakistani media strongly encouraged, yet once more, that: "...the universally recognized norms of democracy should not be sacrificed for the

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41 Dawn, editorial, July 25, 1979.

42 Dawn, editorial, April 20, 1979.

43 Dawn, editorial, May 8, 1979.

44 Dawn, editorial, May 31, 1979.

45 Dawn, editorial, July 25, 1979.

sake of expediency...."[46]

Hence, Pakistani media response to events in Iran during this period between February and December 1979 was characterized by a number of trends. First, there was an increasing emphasis, though not yet at its peak, on the use of the language of Islamism and symbolism to represent Pakistan's ideological support of the ideas of the Iranian Revolution. Second, there was strong Pakistani encouragement and support of the development of a moderate, pragmatic and liberal-democratic institutions and policies in Iran. Third, Pakistan expressed a desire and a plea to end the revolutionary turmoil in Iran and thus to return to a 'normal' socio-economic and political climate. Fourth, concern was expressed about the lack of authority exercised by the official government of Iran. And fifth, there was an acknowledgement of the divergence of power and authority groups in Iran and the consequent power struggles amongst them.

The take-over of the United States embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and the subsequent hostage crisis marked the beginning of the fourth phase of Pakistani media reaction to the Iranian Revolution. During this phase, editorials expressed, on the one hand, even stronger ideological support for the ideals of the Revolution, and paradoxically, on the other hand, a growing discomfort with, and hence neutrality and ambiguity regarding, the relatively militant methods adopted by the hardliners in Iran. A close examination of Pakistani editorials during this period reveals that, as the initial crisis developed into the lengthy ordeal that it was to become, these paradoxical expressions became even more pronounced. Pakistan's pragmatic and ideological considerations continued to place it, strategically speaking, in an increasingly delicate position; manifestations of this could clearly be evidenced in the growing ambiguity – sometimes in an almost contradictory stance – of Pakistani editorials.

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46 Dawn, editorial, June 25, 1979.

The initial reaction by Pakistani media to the embassy take-over appeared to be mildly disapproving of the Iranian position, even though justifications for the action were offered. For example, one editorial, published on November 8, 1979, days after the takeover, stated:

> Given the excesses committed by the former monarch and the support he received from Washington, it is understandable that the Iranians should feel strongly perturbed....However, the method adopted by the Iranian students to press their demand is, to put it mildly, not very convincing and could set a dangerous precedent....The continuation of this takeover for four days and above all, its condonation as a 'revolutionary act' by the authorities in Iran simply amounts to giving sanction to acts of violence.[47]

Other editorials also stressed that the Iranian action had been motivated by anger and resentment at the excesses of the Shah's régime, but that such "...drastic"[48] actions would not necessarily safeguard the gains of the revolution. Indeed, one editorial stated categorically that "...at a time when the Iranian Government's major concern is to bring domestic stability in the country and carry the revolution to a fruitful conclusion, Teheran might find it in its own interest not to create new difficulties for itself."[49]

Coverage in Pakistan's press regarding the hostage crisis was, then, fairly moderate; while there was general – and often rhetorical – justification of the underlying reasons for the Iranian action, it was clear that the actual act of hostage taking was not viewed favourably. The pragmatic realities of international politics were taken into account and, ideological support aside, Pakistan's editorials sent a clear signal to Iranian radicals:

> The young Iranian revolutionaries may be accused of impetuosity but they are certainly not naive enough to think that the shah can be turned over to them...In essence, it is the irreversibility of the change in Iran they want to emphasize...[They] have been more than able to make their point, and the seizure of the U.S. embassy has been duly taken note of by the world as the kind of symbolic action they intended it to be. Things had better stop at that....[50]

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47 Dawn, editorial, November 8, 1979.

48 Pakistan Times, editorial, November 19, 1979.

49 Dawn, editorial, November 8, 1979.

50 Pakistan Times, editorial, November 19, 1979.

In this regard, it is perhaps noteworthy to mention the editorial published in Pakistan Times on November 23, 1979, which concerned the attacks perpetuated on the "...Haram Sharif by a band of demented religious fanatics."[51] It was obvious – and expected – that the editorial would condemn strongly the attack itself. However, what was most significant about the editorial was its condemnation of the acts of arson and violence at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. The words of the editorial were quite clear and sent a strong message to radicals both in Pakistan and abroad, perhaps notably in Iran:

> It is not difficult to understand peoples' emotional outburst, but doing violence to properties belonging to foreign countries is certainly not the right way to give vent to our feelings on this issue. This is not only against the norms of international behaviour but, as the President said, it is also not approved of by Islam. Foreign embassies here are our honoured guests, and we will only be acting to [sic] the finest tradition of our faith by taking all possible care to ensure their safety....[52]

Thus, it is quite obvious that Pakistan's initial reaction to the hostage crisis was not supportive of the Iranian action. Underlying this response was, perhaps, the consistent theme of moderation; while justification for the Iranian action could be found, such acts of militancy were, nonetheless, unpalatable to the Pakistanis. This expressed desire for moderation and restraint was not, however, limited to Iranian actions; American actions during this time also underwent scrutiny and often met with Pakistani disapproval. Editorials condemned the actions of the United States government and, in particular, the U.S. embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil, the freezing of Iranian assets and the renewed military exercises and threats to utilize force to resolve the crisis. Such actions were strongly criticized as "...extreme measures not warranted by the...situation."[53] The American government was accused of "...creating a war psychosis"[54] and of taking action

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51 Pakistan Times, editorial, November 23, 1979.

52 Pakistan Times, editorial, November 23, 1979.

53 Dawn, editorial, November 20, 1979.

54 Dawn, editorial, November 20, 1979.

that spoke of "Great Power arrogance."[55] Therefore, it was obvious that Pakistan was attempting to encourage moderation and restraint on the part of all concerned; both the American 'overreaction' and Iranian militancy were condemned: "Although the students' actions in violating the diplomatic immunity of a foreign mission is not be be condoned, America's reaction to this episode can by no means be described as mature and responsible."[56]

It is at this stage that a change – subtle and qualitative – can be discerned in the nature and tone of Pakistani editorials vis à vis the Iranian revolution. Although Pakistani editorials henceforth certainly did not condone the Iranian action of hostage taking, there seemed to be greater animosity expressed towards the American position. After this time – fairly early in the hostage crisis – there appeared to be a greater degree of hostility, albeit muted and subtle towards the Americans. Early manifestations of this increased animosity were expressed in one editorial, which roundly criticized the apparently conflicting foreign policies of the United States. While names were not mentioned, it appears quite obvious that this particular editorial was referring, on the one hand, to American disapproval of Pakistan's nuclear program, and, on the other, to its professed willingness and threat to utilize force against Iran:

> It passes comprehension that super powers who on the one hand consider themselves so crucially and exclusively responsible for world peace that they try to make it a moral obligation on the part of smaller countries to hold aloof from acquiring nuclear capability should on the other hand, prove so touchy and belligerent as to threaten invasion for no other reason than saving face.[57]

The growing animosity towards the United States was due, in great measure, to the Pakistani need to balance its foreign policy orientations. Pakistan had been disappointed on

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55 Dawn, editorial,November 20, 1979.

56 Dawn, editorial, November 20, 1979.

57 Pakistan Times, editorial, November 26, 1979.

various occasions by what it perceived to be American 'unreliability' as an ally; hence, the need to elicit support from other actors on the international scene necessitated a 'balancing act' with regard to its foreign policies. Obviously, other factors, such as Pakistan's irritation with U.S. disapproval of its nuclear program, the increasing reliance of the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq régime on its Islamization program, as well as other domestic and international factors also played vital roles in this process. What is clear, however, is that Pakistan's media reaction to the Iranian crisis from this point onwards appeared to be very much a balancing act of sorts; the response was influenced and shaped by a host of factors – both domestic and international – that necessitated a neutral, moderate and cautious approach. Hence, Pakistan's foreign policy in this period – whether referring to Iran, Afghanistan, the United States, or any other major issue or actor on the international scene – was fundamentally affected by this balancing act. Whether condemning American overreaction to the Iranian hostage-taking or the abortive rescue mission, or welcoming the election of Iranian President Banī-Ṣadr, or even attempting a peaceful resolution of the Iran-Iraq war, the Pakistani response can be interpreted in light of the Pakistani desire to steer a neutral and hence safe, course through the maze that characterized international relations during this period.

In the desire to balance its foreign policy orientations, it is thus clear that Pakistani reaction in its media during this period moved towards a much stronger denunciation of American policies regarding Iran. U.S. support for the Shah was severely criticized as this editorial shows:

> The American Government not only sustained the monarch politically and militarily but was utterly insensitive to his repressive policies and flagrant violations of human rights in the country, for reasons of America's own nominal interests....It is rather disappointing that the human rights situation in Iran under the monarchy has been by-passed altogether.[58]

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58 Dawn, editorial, December 6, 1979.

Pakistan's condemnation of U.S.policy regarding Iran was not merely limited to the past; also criticized was American handling of the hostage crisis:

> The reverberations of President Carter's public threat to use military force in order to have the hostages released are now being widely felt and the display of American naval strength in the Indian Ocean just off the Iranian coast has only deepened the crisis.[59]

American hardline policies were denigrated as being for the benefit of "...domestic consumption"[60] and as being designed to aid the political campaigns of American presidential candidates. Statements such as this make abundantly clear the Pakistani distaste for, and disapproval of, hardline U.S. policies which it viewed as a threat to the security of the region.

Another interesting feature of Pakistani media response to Iranian issues during this period was greater and stronger identification with the Islamic basis of the revolution. Such an identification often took the form of an increasing use of the language of Islamism both to justify and legitimize specific policies of the Iranian government as well as to lend general support to the ideals of Muslim brotherhood, solidarity and commitment. One editorial, in attempting to justify the goals and methods of the Iranian revolution stated:

> Pakistan is doubly in unison with Iran. Not only does it whole-heartedly respond to the surge of Islamic revolution which has overtaken the country, it feels that Iran has reason to fear an attempt at restoring the shah who served Western strategic and material interests even as he tyrannised over the people...No doubt there was something unorthodox about the style Teheran adopted to make itself felt. But there is something to be said about it. Firstly, revolutions do not follow orthodox rules. Secondly, the Iranian methods have not failed to achieve their purpose. The United States has been compelled to reckon with the power of both the Islamic Revolution and Imam Khomeini. And what is more, the rest of the world has taken due notice of Teheran's point of view.[61]

Editorials in the Pakistani press had expressed support for the 'Islamic' basis of the Iranian

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59 Dawn, editorial, December 6, 1979.

60 Dawn, editorial, December 28, 1979.

61 Pakistan Times, editorial, December 8, 1979.

Revolution in previous months; however, such support had generally been more cautious and subdued. During this period, caution was not as evident and subdued expressions of support often gave way to ringing declarations of solidarity:

> The triumph of Islam in Iran has been an endorsement of Pakistan's own ideological basis and an inspiration to it in its current efforts to adopt the Islamic way of life. Pakistan has watched with deep appreciation the way the Iranian people have managed the post-revolutionary situation and also their brave struggle in the face of continuous attempts by hostile forces to destablise their revolution.[62]

Hence, it is obvious that the language of Islamism became a very fundamental and common ingredient in the Pakistan press coverage during this time. Articles and editorials boldly stated that "...politically Islam has emerged as a force to be reckoned with...."[63] Articles expressed very strong support for the ideals of the Iranian revolution:

> Iran's has been a unique revolution. It has no parallel, no precedent, in contemporary history...it has been totally home-grown...it has nothing to do with any imported alien ideology and draws its inspiration from the peoples' basic genius – the faith they profess....Iran projects a new, dynamic image of Islam, one of a forward-looking, all-conquering force which, in fact, it was in its early period....[64]

In fact, support for the revolution appeared to be so strong that some articles even justified the excesses and revolutionary chaos of the new Iranian régime:

> What is in Western eyes chaos and instability is no more than exuberance born of a feeling of total freedom after a long night of unbridled repression. No revolution is without its attendant tremors and troubles. And Iran's has been what can be called a total revolution. The feeling of deliverance is therefore all that more potent.[65]

Strong support for the Iranian revolution could also be discerned in the manner in which Āyatullāh Khumaynī was portrayed; glowing reports of his role in the revolution were published in the Pakistani press during this time. One article, in particular, provided a

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62 Pakistan Times, editorial, December 30, 1979.

63 Dawn, editorial, January 1, 1980.

64 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 23, 1980.

65 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 24, 1980.

fascinating glimpse into one writer's view of Khumaynī:

> ...His is a remarkable personality. There is a decidedly hypnotic quality about it...his features were firm and his eyes darted steely determination. It was impossible for one not to be moved by his magnetic presence. The great architect of the Islamic Revolution appeared greater in flesh and blood.[66]

An increased emphasis on Islamism was evident in editorials in the Pakistan press after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Appeals were made often to the "...fraternity of Islam to take a stand independent of the East and the West.[67] Pakistani concerns that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was only a prelude to an eventual move against Pakistan itself clearly intensified its concerns; in essence, Pakistan was apprehensive of the potential Soviet threat both to its own security and to regional stability. In this regard, overtures were made by Pakistani leaders – though this was done relatively subtly – to the United States to provide much needed political, economic and military support to counter the Soviets. At the same time, however, Pakistan also utilized its credentials as a non-aligned Muslim state to unite with other countries – either non-aligned, Muslim, or both – in opposing the Soviet move into Afghanistan. The need to unite with other Muslim countries, in particular, resulted in a greater emphasis on the language of Islamism being utilized in the Pakistani media. Further, in utilizing the language of Islamism, editorials in the Pakistani press also appeared to be justifying Muslim opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 'in the name of Muslim brotherhood.'

Pakistani editorials regarding the election of Abū-l-Ḥasan Banī-Ṣadr as President of Iran at the end of January 1980 appear to confirm that Pakistan's response to Iran was beginning to undergo, in this fourth phase, a reevaluation. In great measure necessitated by the demands of the intricate act of balancing foreign policy orientations, there appeared to be a renewed emphasis in editorials on the need for moderation and pragmatism – in effect, a

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66 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 21, 1980.

67 Pakistan Times, editorial, January 30, 1980.

more or less neutral stand. Banī-Ṣadr himself was hailed as an "...economist President"[68] who represented the "...opposite pole of the 'reactionary Islamic monopolists.'"[69] His election was viewed as a "...vote reaffirming the country's ideological direction in the post-revolution era and for moderation and realism."[70] Notably, the same editorial ended with the following statement, which was a testament to Pakistan's desire to see moderation prevail in Iran, but without forsaking ideological commitment to, and support of, the ideals of the revolution:

> His unequivocal declaration that 'Iran does not want to live under American domination' and his disapproval of the extremism displayed by a section of students indicate that a balanced approach is to be expected. We wish the President-elect all success in the mission that lies before him.[71]

The election of Banī-Ṣadr was seen in Pakistani media as being a vital step in the establishment of a constitutional and democratic system in Iran; editorials celebrated the "...auspicious start to [the] second post-revolutionary phase – the phase of stabilisation and construction.[72] It was these trends – stabilization, reconstruction and pragmatism – that Pakistan hoped to encourage in post-revolutionary Iran. The election of Banī-Ṣadr, a moderate, was viewed as a positive step in this direction. One editorial stated explicitly:

> The economist President can now go to work and use the nationalist emotion for reconstruction. Economic consolidation is the best response that Iran can make to the winds of destructive change blowing in our part of the world.[73]

Pakistani editorials also lauded Banī-Ṣadr for his attempts – eventually unsuccessful – to wield real and legitimate authority in Iranian politics. He was congratulated on his attempts to "...address the drift which has come to mark the Iranian political scene of late...[and to]

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68 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 15, 1980.

69 Pakistan Times, editorial, March 28, 1980.

70 Dawn, editorial, January 30, 1980.

71 Dawn, editorial, January 30, 1980.

72 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 12, 1980.

73 Pakistan Times, editorial, February 15, 1980.

unify the authority of various institutions."[74] Approval was also expressed of Banī-Ṣadr's efforts to resolve the U.S. hostage crisis:

> Without adopting a position of direct confrontation with militant students, he has let it be known that he intends to be in control....Within the framework of a policy of independence he has sought to defuse the American hostage crisis.[75]

With respect to the continuing U.S. hostage crisis, Pakistani editorials, while supportive of Banī-Ṣadr's moderation, encouraged restraint also on the part of the American administration. By early April, Pakistani editorials showed signs of hope for a peaceful resolution of the dispute; they spoke candidly of a "...shift away from the course of confrontation."[76] It was only a policy of restraint, argued the editorials, which would allow for a satisfactory and peaceful resolution of the crisis:

> Washington can contribute to the process by playing its hand discreetly and cautiously at this stage...This will go a long way towards strengthening the hands of those in Iran who want to put an early end to the hostage crisis.[77]

Because of the hopeful signs of a peaceful resolution of the crisis, it was a deep disappointment for Pakistan when the U.S. severed all diplomatic and trade relations with Iran in mid-April 1980. Editorials lamented the American moves as "...hasty...precipitate and unjustified..."[78] and decried the use of measures such as these, especially as there had been "...some positive movement on the hostage issue from the Iranian side."[79] There was a great deal of concern that the United States was "...strengthening the hands of the extremists and undermining the position of the moderates."[80] Pakistani editorials deplored the American threat to utilize force against Iran and expressed the fervent hope that

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74 Dawn, editorial, February 15, 1980.

75 Dawn, editorial, February 15, 1980.

76 Pakistan Times, editorial, April 5, 1980.

77 Pakistan Times, editorial, April 5, 1980.

78 Dawn, editorial, April 10, 1980.

79 Pakistan Times, editorial, April 11, 1980.

diplomatic relations would again be utilized to solve the dispute:

> ...Presidential Adviser of Foreign Affairs Agha Shahi's declaration that Pakistan is firmly opposed to the use of force against Iran from any quarter is not only an expression of solidarity with a neighbouring Muslim state, but is also a piece of sane advice to the elements who want to rush headlong into trouble. Force instead of solving any problem can only give rise to new ones and may even spark a wider conflict. The policy makers in Washington will do well to keep this in mind. Diplomacy can yet be given a try.[81]

The disapproval of American actions – both actual and threatened – was coupled in the Pakistani media with expressions of support for Iranian grievances. It is, however, notable that such editorials still maintained a moderate, more or less pragmatic, stance with respect to Iranian militant demands. Despite this stance, the United States was roundly criticized for being generally insensitive to Iranian anger and grievances:

> Although the militant students will ultimately be required to moderate their stand, it is time the United States took a closer look at the grievances of the Iranian students. They are symptomatic of the deep resentment the entire nation feels against three decades of blatant American interference in the affairs of Iran....Iranian sensitivities are all the more understandable given the record of the monarchy in Iran which plundered the country with the overt backing of the United States....[82]

Hence, it is obvious that some editorials in the Pakistani press were attempting, during this period, to encourage a moderate, pragmatic and diplomatic resolution to the hostage crisis. From an analysis of Pakistani editorial positions during this period, it is also clear that Pakistan was engaged in a difficult process of taking a middle and balanced approach in its foreign policy orientations; the process was to become yet more difficult in the months ahead.

Pakistani media reacted with staunch disapproval of the aborted American attempt to rescue the hostages; the Americans were criticized as having caused "...provocation to the

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80 Dawn, editorial, April 10, 1980.

81 Pakistan Times, editorial, April 11, 1980.

82 Dawn, editorial, April 10, 1980.

captors, who are not amenable to the control of their own Government"[83] and of having possibly "...jeopardized the chances of a peaceful resolution of the dispute...."[84] Editorials accused the United States of committing an "...act of war [which] amounts to an act of aggression against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iran before which the seizing of hostages pales into insignificance.[85]

Along with strong and outright condemnation of the American action, Pakistani editorials also expressed support of the relatively 'moderate' Iranian reaction. One editorial stated that "...the Iranian response, given the internal situation was that of moderation and humanitarian concern."[86] In addition, editorials expressed, once again, support of the Iranian concerns regarding relations with the United States. Dawn, for example, stated that "...it is obvious that the hostages issue is only one aspect of the wider question of Iranian-American relations. By focussing narrowly on the hostages question, the U.S. has overlooked the broader compulsions of the situation."[87]

Pakistani editorials also expressed fear that the American action would encourage Iran to adopt a militant stand by "...vindicating the stand of hardliners in Teheran and making it difficult for moderation to prevail."[88] This move towards militancy would, no doubt, have greatly concerned the Pakistanis; moderation had, after all, been a key theme in their response to the Iranian situation. Such militancy would, it was feared, prevent not only a peaceful resolution of the hostage crisis, but would also help to escalate even further the already tense situation in the region. On this issue of concern over the security and peace of the region, Pakistani editorials were quite categorical. Dawn wrote that "...the Pakistan

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83 Dawn, editorial, April 27, 1980.

84 Dawn,editorial, April 27, 1980.

85 Dawn, editorial, April 27, 1980.

86 Pakistan Times, editorial, April 27, 1980.

87 Dawn, editorial, April 27, 1980.

88 Dawn, editorial, April 27, 1980.

Government has deplored the adventure in no uncertain terms goes to underline not only its consternation at an act of violence against a friend of long-standing, but also its concern over the worsening political environment in the area...."[89]

The Pakistani dilemma of balancing its foreign policy became even more obvious and clear in the period following the attempted U.S. rescue mission. On the one hand, Pakistan did not want to be seen as condoning the American action, which would discredit it in the eyes of the non-aligned Third World and in particular, the Muslim countries. On the other hand, however, it could not afford to alienate too strongly the United States and its western allies due to the potential threat from Soviet troops in Afghanistan. To complicate the issue even further, while Pakistan wished to demonstrate its solidarity with the ideals of the Iranian revolution, there also appeared to be some apprehension about the increasing militancy of the methods adopted by the Iranians; revolutionary fervour – with is accompanying violence, intransigence and violation of international diplomatic and political norms – was quickly becoming distasteful to the Pakistanis, who had painstakingly built the edifice of their foreign policy on the need to ingratiate themselves with other actors on the international scene. Too close an identification with the policies and methods of post-revolutionary Iran would isolate Pakistan from other international actors to whom it looked for its political and diplomatic support; an outright condemnation of Iran, however, would earn not only the wrath of Iranian leaders – itself an undesirable end – but would also leave Pakistan open to the accusation that it had failed to uphold Muslim solidarity.

Pakistan's increasing difficulty in maintaining a balanced approach in its reaction to Iran was clearly evident in editorials regarding the seizure of the Iranian embassy in London. Two editorials, one each in Dawn and Pakistan Times respectively, attempted to articulate the Pakistani position regarding the seizure, which was obviously compared to the seizure

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89 Dawn, editorial, April 27, 1980.

of the American embassy in Tehran. Both editorials expressed relief at the quick resolution of the London crisis, and congratulated the British government and security forces for effective handling of the situation. However, the editorial in Pakistan Times specifically dismissed comparisons between the London and Tehran crises:

> ...No such comparison is valid. The Iranians' anger at the shah's prolonged reign of terror and at those who made it possible and who have since provided the shah and his plundered wealth with havens of safety, can hardly said to be exaggerated. Nor could they in their state of ferment expect to be very selective in the way they expressed that anger. They have only wanted a retribution of acknowledged crimes – and wished to make sure that these are never repeated....[90]

The same editorial commented, nonetheless, that "...the Iranian government is clearly not happy itself at the continuation of this crisis."[91] In this manner, the editorial appeared to be supportive of Iranian grievances and yet, at the same time, acknowledged the Iranian government's desire for a quick resolution of the dispute.

Hence, the editorial in Pakistan Times regarding the London embassy seizure attempted to express a relatively neutral stance, even while expressing support for Iranian concerns. Dawn, on the other hand, was more categorical, though the superficial guise of neutrality was nonetheless still maintained. This particular editorial voiced very strong support for the international principles and norms of diplomatic relations; actions which violated the sanctity of diplomatic embassies were not to be condoned:

> What merits serous consideration is the fact that the number of incidents involving diplomatic missions is fast growing. With the sanctity and inviolability of embassies having been recognized and upheld by international law for ages it is regrettable that this principle now stands in danger of being eroded. Acts of terrorism against diplomats have serious implications for the conduct of orderly and peaceful international relations....The need to tackle the problem of violence against diplomats can hardly be overemphasised....If Governments look the other way in cases of violence against diplomats, they will not only be disrupting normal diplomatic relations, but bring into question the very purpose and utility of

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90 Pakistan Times, editorial, May 7, 1980.

91 Pakistan Times, editorial, May 7, 1980.

diplomacy as a peaceful means of resolving problems between nations.[92]

Despite these strong words upholding the tenets of international diplomatic relations, the editorial also attempted to balance its views. The editorial attempted, in essence, to address the issue of the underlying cause of violent incidents concerning foreign embassies, perhaps in an effort to make a case for the justification of 'morally and politically just violence.' Thus, the editorial stated that:

> ...the cause the terrorists espouse is often morally and politically just and enjoys the support of an important section of public opinion as well as that of some foreign governments. This can at times make it difficult for violence to be unequivocally condemned, since the wrong it seeks to rectify might be of an extremely grave nature[93]

However, aside from this expression of support for the ideals and goals of those who commit acts of violence against foreign embassies, Dawn's editorial also contained a thinly veiled plea to the Iranians who held the American hostages:

> ...without detracting from the rightness of the cause a group of militants might be espousing, we consider it necessary to impress upon them the importance of resorting to means which do not endanger innocent lives.[94]

The attempt to formulate and express a neutral, moderate and yet meaningful opinion was quite evident in Dawn's editorial; definite, clear and consistent positions were elusive. The inability to articulate a consistent position is discernible in the following passage:

> ...in the case of the American embassy in Teheran, few, if any, would dispute the justice and rightness of the cause the students stand for....The act of taking hostages is a form of protest against American domination and interference in Iranian affairs which should not be condoned under all circumstances....But at the same time, the sanctity of diplomatic missions and the immunity of envoys need to be upheld clearly and unequivocally by all countries and governments.[95]

The Pakistani desire to forge a balanced response to Iranian affairs was also reflected,

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92 Dawn, editorial, May 7, 1980.

93 Dawn, editorial, May 7, 1980.

94 Dawn, editorial, May 7, 1980.

95 Dawn, editorial, May 7, 1980.

during this period, in a renewed desire to encourage the moderate forces in Iran. Such encouragement could clearly be discerned in editorial pleas for non-interference by foreign powers, especially the United States, in the internal affairs of Iran; such interference, it was feared, would only create a "...climate in which militancy and extremism would flourish and grow."[96] In turn, Iran was exhorted to counter such attempts at destablization, in particular, by attempting "...to promote national unity and to concentrate on the vital tasks of national reconstruction."[97] In this regard, one editorial published upon the death of the Shah stated the hope that:

> The passing away of Reza Shah, by dashing the last hopes of the forces working against the Islamic regime, may lead to a scaling down of the strident militancy in Iran....This can only make for greater stability in Iran which undoubtedly needs a long, undisturbed period of peace to recover from the ravages of the past and work for a new prosperous future....[98]

As in an earlier phase of the Pakistani response to the Iranian revolution, editorials during this period showed an increasing emphasis on the necessity of the normalization of the Iranian socio-economic and political climate. In this context, much concern was expressed about the "...multiplicity of the centres of power"[99] as well as a "...return to orderly government"[100] and the growing factionalism between moderate and radical factions within the Iranian leadership. Also criticized were the purges and summary trials which had by now become almost a routine feature of Iranian political life. The words of one editorial were pointed and clear:

> Now that the revolution has triumphed, the revolutionary leaders bear the responsibility for creating the conditions in which their declared aims can be fulfilled. The task of reshaping the social order, renovating the economy and building up new institutions...cannot be fulfilled until order and discipline are restored and the Government is allowed to assume its responsibilities. The purges and summary trials have already gone too far. Upholding the

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96 Dawn, editorial, May 16, 1980.

97 Dawn, editorial, May 16, 1980.

98 Dawn, editorial, July 29, 1980.

99 Dawn, editorial, July 19, 1980.

100 Dawn, editorial, July 19, 1980.

rule of law is one of the conditions for the return of normality in everyday life.[101]

Clearly by this time, Pakistan was beginning to find the revolutionary turmoil in Iran to be somewhat distasteful and even unacceptable; the purges and summary trials, in particular, seemed to offend the sensibilities of Pakistanis. In light of the apparent Pakistani discomfort with the Iranian revolution during this phase, it is noteworthy to mention one letter to the editor which was published in Dawn on August 29, 1980. Responding to a previous article about the Iranian revolution, the writer of the letter referred to Principle 12 of the Iranian Constitution which stipulated that the "...official religion of Iran would be Islam as practised by the ʿIthnā ʿAṭharī sect."[102] In this respect, the writer stated that "...on the face of it, this gives a second grade status of citizenship to persons subscribing to non-Asna Ashari [sic] beliefs...."[103] The very publication of a letter of this nature was a good indication of Pakistan's growing discomfort with what it perhaps perceived as a 'radically narrow' interpretation of Islamism; in the climate of martial-law Pakistan when censorship and/or at least government approval of published articles, editorials and letters was a reality, such a letter, one imagines, could not have been printed without official authorization.

It was in the climate of growing Pakistani discomfort with the revolutionary fervour on the Iranian political scene that there occurred Iranian media attacks on Pakistan. The attacks, broadcast on Tehran Radio, encouraged the people of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to overthrow their respective governments. The broadcasts caused much concern and consternation in the Pakistani media; surprise, disappointment and even confusion appeared to be the dominant themes of the editorials:

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101 Dawn, editorial, July 19, 1980.

102 Dawn, editorial, August 29, 1980.

103 Dawn, editorial, August 29, 1980.

> Coming from the land of the Islamic Revolution, the attack on Pakistan, another Muslim country working for the same ideals as Iran is most surprising. Pakistan has had the best of relations with Revolutionary Iran and was among the first countries to come out in open support of the Islamic Revolution. The authorities in Teheran are on record as having acknowledged the consistent support given by Pakistan to the Islamic Government in Iran...Against this background Teheran Radio's outburst comes as a severe jolt to us....[104]

Indeed, Dawn, utilizing the all-important language of Islamism was no less forthright:

> The people in this country feel deeply hurt, especially because they have supported the Iranian revolution from its very beginning...The ushering in of Iran's Islamic republican era under the guidance and leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini has been universally greeted with enthusiasm in Pakistan. It has been and is a source of inspiration for all those who seek to strive for the realization of an Islamic social order in Pakistan. In this context, one finds it galling that a section of the Iranian media should have started a campaign of denigration against Pakistan.[105]

Pakistan's editorials regarding the broadcasts tended to view the hostile broadcasts as the work of the "...enemies of Islam"[106] who were attempting to "...create a cleavage between the two brotherly countries.[107] While not fully accepting the Iranian claim that the broadcasts were the responsibility of left-wing factions, one editorial urged the Iranian government to "...crack down on heretical and communist elements who are sworn enemies of Islam....This is indeed something that calls for attention at the level of Imam Khomeini himself."[108] The implications of this particular editorial were significant. In utilizing the word 'heretical', the editorial appeared to imply its support for a religious criterion to govern political accountability. In support of the Pakistan Times editorial cited above, an editorial in Dawn pointedly addressed the possibility that the broadcasts had been motivated and/or authorized by the Iranian government; in effect, the editorial implied that Iranian relations with Pakistan may have soured:

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104 Pakistan Times, editorial, September 5, 1980.

105 Dawn, editorial, September 22, 1980.

106 Pakistan Times, editorial, September 5, 1980.

107 Pakistan Times, editorial, September 5, 1980.

> Intended or not, this [the broadcast] is an attempt to sour the relations between two countries which have been traditional friends. If any differences have arisen between the two countries or if their perceptions of a given issue are divergent, the best course will be to enter into a dialogue to sort out things. Press attacks will only vitiate the atmosphere and dampen the enthusiasm of the people of this country for Iran's revolution. We hope the coming weeks will provide a clear indication of where the Iranian Government stands on the issue...[109]

The disappointment over the issue of the hostile radio broadcasts was also reflected in two letters to the editors published shortly after the publication of the above-mentioned editorials; once again, the very fact of the appearance of such letters in the press gave ample evidence of official disillusionment. One letter expressed misgivings over what the writer perceived as the mild reaction of the Pakistani government to the incident. Further, the writer also showed concern over the widening gulf between the two countries:

> It is fantastic that two brotherly countries wedded to the course of the revival of the pristine glory of Islam are gradually drifting apart. It is obvious that by waging war on every conceivable front and antagonizing its friends one by one, Iran is getting more and more isolated in the international community.[110]

The other letter to the editor also voiced disappointment over the incident of the broadcasts. The writer, enumerating a cursory list of Pakistani support for the Iranian revolution, asked pointedly, "...And what do we get in return?"[111] The letter concluded by articulating – and reaffirming – one of the central messages of the previous editorials:

> Let us, in Pakistan, hope that the authorities in Iran, interested in the renaissance of Islam, see that the elements bent upon creating cleavage between the two friendly countries are eliminated completely...[112]

Hence, it is quite clear that Pakistani disillusionment with, and disappointment in, the

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108 Pakistan Times, editorial, September 5, 1980.

109 Dawn, editorial, September 22, 1980.

110 Pakistan Times, editorial, September 16, 1980.

111 Pakistan Times, Letter to the Editor, September 16, 1980.

112 Pakistan Times, Letter to the Editor, September 16, 1980.

Iranian revolution was, by this time, being expressed in the pages of the Pakistani press. Overall, a discomfort with the revolutionary turmoil, including the summary trials and executions, characteristic of Iranian politics at this stage, a growing concern at Iran's isolation in world affairs, the pragmatic security and international concerns of Pakistan itself, as well an an increasing awareness of the different interpretations of the two countries with respect to Islamism were contributory factors in Pakistani disillusionment. It was in this context that two more events in the closing months of 1980 appeared to reinforce this disappointment. In this respect, the Pakistani response to the Iran-Iraq war and to the final ascendancy of radicals – represented by the arrest of ex-foreign minister Sādiq Quṭbzādeh – reflected both Pakistani disillusionment as well as its need to forge once again a moderate, neutral course in world affairs.

The Iran-Iraq war was obviously not viewed favourably by the Pakistani media; editorials often encouraged both parties to accept a truce as well as third party mediation, including that of Pakistan itself. Appeals were made to the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) to attempt a reconciliation between the two Muslim countries. The implications of the war for regional peace and security were often reiterated, as were the implications for the future of Muslim solidarity. In the final analysis, Pakistani editorials appeared to dismiss the presence of substantial issues of dispute between Iran and Iraq and stated that "...the leaders of Iran and Iraq owe it not only to themselves but to the Muslim world as a whole to make a determined effort to come to a settlement."[113]

Pakistan's response to the second event – the arrest of Quṭbzādeh – also reflected its disenchantment with the course of the Iranian revolution. The event was viewed as the culmination of the power struggle "...between the Islamic fundamentalists and the supporters of Mr. Banī-Ṣadr."[114] Pakistani response to the outcome of the power struggle –

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113 Pakistan Times, editorial, September 16, 1980.

114 Dawn, editorial, November 11, 1980.

the loss of authority by the moderate faction – was represented by its relatively strong reaction to the event:

> The arrest of Mr. Sadeq Qotzbadeh, the former Iranian Foreign Minister, by the Revolutionary Guards in Teheran has come as a surprise to the well-wishers of the Iranian President.[115]

This editorial also expressed deep concern over the state of Iranian affairs; both the tone and the content of the editorial were sharply critical. Highlighted for criticism in particular were the parallel centres of authority which appeared to be "...working at cross purposes"[116]; the government's lack of authority and legitimacy; the power struggles within the Iranian leadership which resulted in "...government functionaries often [taking] the path of confrontation rather than conciliation[117]; and the inability and ineffectiveness of the Iranian government to undertake the vital tasks of reconstruction. The editorial was, in fact, quite categorical and explicit in its condemnation:

> With the psyche of the revolution outliving the revolution itself, it has not been possible to channel the energy of revolutionary forces into the positive task of economic and political reconstruction and social renovation. The purges and summary trials which still continue unabated detract from the more fundamental task of restoring law and order and rehabilitating the economy....Disillusionment is easily possible if the revolutionary order is seen to be failing to deliver the goods. It is a little surprising that instead of recognizing this danger, sections of revolutionaries continue to relish dispensing summary justice to those who basically agree with the principles and ideals of the revolution but differ with the methods adopted by some of those in power.[118]

Hence, it is evident that by the closing months of 1980, Pakistan had become disenchanted with the Iranian revolution. Far from expressing a justification for the excesses of revolutionary fervour – a tactic to which the Pakistani media had resorted in earlier

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115 Dawn, editorial, November 11, 1980.

116 Dawn, editorial, November 11, 1980.

117 Dawn, editorial, November 11, 1980

118 Dawn, editorial, November 11, 1980.

editorials – there was increasingly sharp criticism of its militancy reflected in Pakistani editorial opinion.

As can be evidenced, then, Pakistani media response to Iranian affairs underwent a definite evolution between the 1978 and 1980. There appeared to be, at times, a vacillation between two extremes in an effort to steer a middle course. During some periods, ideological support for the ideals of the revolution was particularly strong; during other periods, however, the militant methods of revolutionary forces in Iran met with Pakistani disapproval and, instead, pragmatic, moderate and democratic trends were encouraged. Significant in this vacillation between the extremes was the increasing reliance upon the language of Islamism and symbolism; as the revolution progressed, there appeared to be a greater emphasis on the 'Islamic ideals' of the two countries. Even during phases when there appeared to be a growing Pakistani concern about the militancy of the revolution, this emphasis on Islamic symbolism continued; indeed, at times, criticism of revolutionary militancy appeared to be 'balanced' by a reinforcement of Pakistan's commitment to the 'Islamic ideals' of the revolution. The ambiguity sometimes encountered in Pakistani editorials was ample evidence of the difficult position in which Pakistan found itself; at times, its ideological and pragmatic considerations demanded responses that were at odds with one another and perhaps even contradictory. It is thus important to analyze some of the ideological and pragmatic factors which influenced Pakistan's media response to the Iranian Revolution. It is to this analysis that we now turn.

Conclusion

The cloak of ambiguity
An analysis of Pakistan's response to Iran

> *...Without the slightest doubt, Pakistan's ideology is Islamic ideology....The definition of the Islamic ideology is quite simple. It means the will of Allah as expressed in the Holy Quran and Sunnah*[1]
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> *...What specific terms or symbols mean is a contingent matter in the sense that it is decided by specific situations and political forces. Ideologies are not infinitely flexible: they do exclude some possibilities. But they are sufficiently ductile to allow very different interpretations and uses. Ideologies claim that they provide a firm unchanging answer to the major issues in question and that others are to be disqualified on the grounds that they are deviants or deformers of ideological essence....*[2]

Pakistan's response to the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79 provides an illuminating glimpse into the nature of a country coming to terms with itself and its unique interpretation of its dominant socio-political ideology. Caught between the twin pillars of its stated ideology and pragmatism, Pakistani reaction relied heavily on ambiguity and ambivalence to guide it through the sometimes perilous challenges presented by the watershed events in Iran. In many senses, the Revolution highlighted already-simmering dilemmas and tensions within the Pakistani national psyche: Pakistan's peoples and political actors raised questions with respect to the ideological direction of the country, the country's very real pragmatic concerns for security, as well as the role of Islam in the formulation of a coherent and sustainable public identity. The Iranian Revolution, by presenting differing perspectives – though couched in similar language – on some of these issues served to deepen the intensity of Pakistani collective soul-searching. The nature of the evolving Pakistani response was essentially one of an intricate balancing act amongst competing loyalties, perspectives and imperatives. This response highlighted Pakistan's somewhat tense relationship with itself, and its use of its dominant socio-political

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1 B.Z. Kaikus, Pakistan Times, editorial, September 18, 1980.

2 Hamza Alavi and Fred Halliday, The State and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, London: MacMillan Education, Ltd., 1988, page 7.

ideology. Earlier chapters have provided the context, both domestic and international, within which Pakistani media response has been surveyed. It is the purpose of this chapter, therefore, to provide a summary of the implications of this study.

Pakistan's reaction to the Iranian Revolution altered significantly, both in content and in tone between 1977 and 1980. At first strongly supportive of the Shah and his policies, editorials in the press moved gradually towards a more ambiguous response. On the one hand, Pakistan expressed support for the ideological goals of the revolutionary movement, but, on the other, showed a growing concern over the directions taken as well as the methods utilized by some post-revolutionary leaders. Given Pakistan's historical reliance upon Islamism in public life, proponents of the Iranian Revolution could have expected to find unambiguously positive and powerful support within Pakistan. Media response did not, however, provide such clear support; as has been demonstrated, the response in the Pakistani press was decidedly ambiguous and ambivalent. It appears clear, then, that Pakistan's leaders and its peoples found themselves in a somewhat precarious position with respect to the Iranian Revolution, and hence attempted to chart a middle course between two dangerous extremes. As Tahir-Kheli explains, "The fall of the shah had important consequences for Pakistan, not only because of the Iranian monarch's role in guaranteeing Pakistan's economic and military security, but also because a militantly Shia régimé in Tehran could create mischief in Pakistan."[3] Notwithstanding this 'potential for mischief', the Iranian Revolution represented also a relatively clear ideological shift: one which, at least superficially, moved Iran closer towards the 'ideology of faith' professed by Pakistan. In this respect, an important question for consideration is to analyze why Pakistan appeared to need its ambivalent and ambiguous response to Iran. The answer appears to lie in the delicate and complex set of circumstances, events and issues, both

3 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, 'Proxies and allies: the case of Iran and Pakistan,' Orbis Volume 24, number 2, Summer 1980, page 76.

pragmatic and ideological, which contributed to the struggle confronted by Pakistan's leaders to sustain legitimacy and respect, both domestically and internationally. It is to a discussion of these factors to which we turn.

There can be absolutely no doubt that Pakistan's response to the Iranian Revolution was shaped, in the first instance, by its own practical considerations, both internal and external; in this respect, the country has not been an exception to the general rule of the international political system. Indeed, perhaps the most significant and pressing issues for the country during its relatively short history, have been its very identity, legitimacy and survival as a nation-state. This quest has constituted the essential intention and aim of most, if not all, Pakistani government policies, statements and actions. Expressions of this intention have differed according to the circumstances, contexts and political actors involved, but the intention has, for the most part, remained constant. Thus, most, if not all, the pragmatic issues and concerns that shaped Pakistani reaction to the Iranian Revolution were motivated by Pakistan's search for survival and for a legitimate identity, both in the domestic and the international arenas. It is important, then to survey, some of these issues and analyze the manner in which they contributed to an ambiguous Pakistani response to the Iranian Revolution.

Pakistan's domestic political atmosphere during the late 1970s and early 1980s was characterized primarily by tension, instability and a polarization of views. In particular, the months leading up to the fall of the Bhutto government and the establishment of the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq régimé were marked by intensely divisive politics. Hence, the primary focus during the early stages of the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq government was obviously the desire for stability and continuity. To this end, the all-important task of the military government was the establishment and consolidation of its continued grip on the political front: the quest for governmental legitimacy was of paramount concern. The search for legitimacy

and continued support expressed itself in a variety of ways and had a definite impact on the manner in which Pakistan responded to events in Iran during this time.

The early goals of the military régimé, as articulated by General Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq, appeared to be relatively narrow and modest: initial claims of 'elections within 90 days' provide ample evidence of these modest objectives. However, these aims did not endure; very quickly, the government began to articulate concern over the issues of 'accountability' and 'Islamization' as the primary foci of its continued hold on power in the country. Islamization, in particular, provided a relatively secure and longer-lasting foundation upon which to build legitimacy for the government. Islamization, writes Richter, was "...sufficiently vague and diffuse to last a long time as a political issue, yet sufficiently rooted in Pakistan's history and culture to compel considerable public support...."[4] The language utilized for political discourse during the 1977 elections had featured Islam as a significant element: both the Bhutto government and its primary opposition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), used the symbolism of Islam to win popular support. Calls for the establishment of '*Nizām-i Mustafa*' had become fairly persistent, and the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq government, either because it was dominated by genuinely pious leaders, and/or for other, more political reasons, found in these calls a viable means for its continued hold on political authority. Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's régimé needed legitimacy and "...to the traditional twin justifications of military rule in Pakistan, 'political instability' and 'threat to the country's survival', General Zia ul-Haq had to add the slogan of 'enforcement of Islamic Sharia law' in a momentous effort to sell extended military rule to an increasingly skeptical public..."[5] The use of Islamic symbolism – the language of Islamism – within revolutionary Iran obviously then resonated with its use in Pakistani political discourse

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4 William Richter, 'The political meaning of Islamization in Pakistan: prognosis, implications and questions,' Islamic reassertion in Pakistan, Anita M. Weiss (ed), Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986, page 132,

5 Mohammed Ayoob, 'Two faces of political Islam: Iran and Pakistan compared,' Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, number 6, June 1979, page 539.

during this time; vocal and positive support for the expressed ideals of the Revolution clearly reflected this resonance.

The governmental search for legitimacy in Pakistan was also reflected in its desire to find a comfortable balance amongst the competing ideological perspectives in the country; these perspectives had traditionally been diverse and, at times, even contradictory. The environment in the late 1970s was characterized by even more intensely competing and divisive perspectives: the country had become almost polarized in its views and loyalties. In particular, the traditional struggle between the renewalists and the modernists, historically a tense debate, had become so intense that the fragile compromises aimed at the integration and unity of the country were under threat of disintegration. Hence, the primary task of the government, if it wished to survive, was to attempt a reconciliation of some of these competing perspectives and loyalties; under such circumstances, this reconciliation would be possible only if the government adopted a moderate, relatively 'middle of the road' approach, thus attempting to balance the more radical and extreme views. The essential crux of the Pakistani ideological debate focussed upon the appropriate role of Islam in public life. The Iranian Revolution, in presenting a particular perspective regarding this issue, provided for Pakistani leaders, an interesting challenge. The task of the Pakistani government was, essentially, to discover a delicate balance between the extremes of, on the one hand, total commitment to the Revolution in its entirety or, on the other hand, a complete rejection of it. Either position was untenable, on pragmatic grounds, for the Pakistani government; each position was relatively radical and would entail the rejection of one or another of the perspectives within the ideological spectrum. Hence, ambiguity with respect to the Iranian Revolution was potentially the safer – and most practical – position for the Pakistani régimé in its quest for legitimacy.

Governmental legitimacy in Pakistan was also inextricably intertwined with the notion of authority; the question of élite dominance over the governmental institutional structure

was an important point for consideration. In the late 1970s, the military establishment had gained a powerful grip on the political and institutional structure within Pakistan. It was obviously in the best interests of the military leadership to consolidate this position; the task, ultimately, was to foster its legitimacy by encouraging other interest groups to participate in the political process while ensuring that real authority continued to be concentrated in the hands of the military establishment. In this respect, again, the Iranian Revolution presented an interesting challenge for the leadership of Pakistan during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Historically, the role of the *'ulamā'* in Pakistan had been, while symbolically significant, effectively marginalized in the political domain. Traditional *'ulamā'*, though continuing to issue *fatāwa* and express their opinions on relevant issues, had generally been, overshadowed by the more potent and powerful voices of both renewalist and modernist forces on the national political scene. Further, for various reasons, including the relative lack of precedent for their involvement in politics, Pakistani *'ulamā'* had usually been coopted by one political leader or another; in essence, the symbolic activities of the *'alīm* had been utilized for more mundane political purposes by various leaders of the country.

The Iranian Revolution presented for the Pakistanis a widely differing perspective on the role of the *'ulamā'* in political life; after all, the Revolution appeared, accurately or otherwise, to have been led by the religious class in Iran. It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the precedents and factors leading to *'ulamā'* involvement in Iranian political life; suffice it is to say here that the image of the Revolution appeared to present one example of the religious class holding legitimacy and authority in a Muslim nation-state. In view of the military government's desire to concentrate authority in its own hands, the Iranian example of *'ulamā'* leadership was problematic. Should the Pakistani government have supported the Iranian Revolution without qualification, it would have left itself open to criticism from Pakistani *'ulamā'* with respect to their own role in the

country's political arena. In particular, the issue of authority – or lack thereof – of the Pakistani *'ulamā'* could have proved to be a thorny problem for the military leadership. Further, a strongly supportive stance in favour of the Iranian Revolution might also have been interpreted as an affirmation of the *Shī'āh* perspective since many of the arguments in favour of *'ulamā'* participation in the political realm emanated from this tradition. Hence, ambiguity in the Pakistani response to the Iranian Revolution, expressed through support for its ideals, but with an emphasis on moderation and pragmatism, was also shaped by the desire for military élite dominance within Pakistan, and ultimately, for continued governmental legitimacy.

Legitimacy for the Pakis tani régimé provided one set of pragmatic considerations that influenced response to the Iranian Revolution. The issue of identity was another primary force in shaping Pakistani reaction. Since independence, Pakistan, more a federation of diverse ethnic, linguistic, regional and ideological groups than an integrated nation-state, had engaged in a quest for internal integration. The challenge was to forge a common identity for all Pakistanis, regardless of other ethnic, linguistic, regional or ideological loyalties. Time and again, Pakistan and its leaders had turned to Islam as the 'common thread' uniting all Pakistanis in an effort to stem the separatist tendencies amongst ethnic and regional groups within the country. It was argued that the common belief in Islam and its 'ideology' would provide Pakistanis with a viable and strong sense of their 'Islamic identity', and hence, foster unity within the country. Islam had been celebrated, on countless occasions, as the 'raison d'être' of the state, without which Pakistan would not have been created. Loyalty to the state and its ideals, then, was equated, especially by those who had an interest in maintaining authority and power, with loyalty to the faith and to the 'Islamic identity' of Pakistan. In this respect, the aim of the Iranian Revolution to conduct the country's public life on the basis of its Islamic roots and identity could hardly have been fully condemned by Pakistani leaders, even if they had wished to do so. Such

support of the central role of the language of Islamism was fairly evident on the pages of the Pakistani press. Other factors, however, limited this support and compelled Pakistan to respond to the Revolution with caution.

Despite Pakistani support for rather generalized principles of a 'return to an Islamic identity' which appeared to motivate the Iranian revolutionary movement, its support was not unqualified and limitless. Though it may be a truism to state, the Iranian Revolution represented one view – obviously a distinctly Iranian one – of 'Islamic identity' while Pakistan represented another. Such differing perspectives and expressions of the supposedly 'universal' ideal of Islam clearly impacted upon Pakistan's ambiguous response. On the one hand, revolutionary Iran could not be entirely condemned by the Pakistanis (though there is little reason to believe that this was their desire) because, at least symbolically, the Revolution upheld the principles celebrated by Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan could not afford to express unqualified support towards the Revolution because of the possible danger of de-legitimizing its own unique perspective on the notion of 'Islamic identity' – a perspective which had evolved in the country through the course of its own particular history, experiences and circumstances.

The issue of differing perspectives on the notion of 'Islamic identity' cannot be overemphasized. Pakistan had, through the years, painstakingly, struggled to discover a comfortable niche for itself: attempts had been made to accommodate and integrate differing ideological perspectives, in an effort to forge a comfortable vision and identity for all Pakistanis. Political leaders, both before and after independence, had relied upon the common faith of Pakistanis to attempt a viable integration and reconciliation amongst diverse ethnic, linguistic, regional and ideological groupings. In effect, the very identity, legitimacy and survival of Pakistan as a nation-state was reliant, in the absence of other integrating factors, upon the common religious bonds shared by the diverse peoples inhabiting Pakistan. The establishment of an identity based on the bonds of faith was

more difficult during the early years of Pakistan's existence because of the relative heterogeneous demographic makeup of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). After 1971, with the secession of this part of the country, with its relatively larger proportion of non-Muslims, Pakistan's identity became even more closely allied with the notion of Islamism, though defined differently by the various ideological perspectives in the country. The 'ideology of identity' that emerged through this process represented the unique perspective of the country, or at the very least, that of its political élite, with respect to its own sense of identity. To be presented with another, differing and popular, perspective on the issue of 'Islamic identity' created a difficult situation for Pakistani leaders. Unqualified support for this differing perspective might have left Pakistan open to the criticism that its interpretation of 'Islamic identity' had been, for lack of a better word, 'incorrect.' Such a view would most certainly have shattered any sense of the tenuous, but evolving Pakistani identity upon which its claims to legitimacy as a country had been based. Given Pakistan's domestic instability at this time, as well as its historical sense of insecurity on the global front, such potential threats to its identity and legitimacy would obviously not have been welcomed. Hence, Pakistan's ambiguous response to the Iranian Revolution served also to provide it with a mechanism through which it could express generalized support for the principles of the Revolution while yet maintaining its own sense of identity and legitimacy as a viable nation-state.

Analysis of the factors shaping Pakistan's response to the Iranian Revolution has, thus far, concentrated on domestic issues; it is important to consider also external factors and policies which influenced this response. As will be recalled from earlier chapters, Pakistan's primary concern in its relations with the world, has been the issue of external security, in particular with respect to India. In great measure due to its tense relationship with India, and the ever-present threat of war, Pakistani foreign relations have been motivated by this quest for stability and security in the international arena. Events during

the late 1970s and early 1980s did nothing to alleviate this concern with security; if anything, circumstances and events at this time served only to exacerbate and intensify Pakistani insecurity. This quest for international security, like the search for identity and legitimacy on the domestic front, played an important role in shaping Pakistan's reaction to the Iranian Revolution.

Tension with India had prompted Pakistan, since independence, to engage in a search for friends and allies in the international context; the country had sought support – political, economic and military – from a wide variety of sources. Throughout its history, Pakistan had, almost like an 'out of control yo-yo,' experimented with alliance relationships with the USA, the USSR, and China as well as with other states. By the late 1970s, Pakistan had emerged from these experiments with an awareness of the very fragile nature of alliance relationships, in particular with the USA. In fact, it had learned rather harsh lessons about the fickle nature of some of these relationships. International events during the late 1970s served only to intensify Pakistani fears. Renewed tension with India and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provide ample evidence of these uncomfortable circumstances. In particular, the situation in Afghanistan presented for Pakistan a deeply disturbing prospect: the possibility of 'two-front hostilities' became more than a passing thought, if the Soviets, allied with India, moved towards an invasion of Pakistan. Under such circumstances, the Iranian Revolution presented, once again, an interesting and challenging dilemma for Pakistani leaders.

During the early stages of the Iranian Revolution, between November 1978 and mid-1979, Pakistan's reaction to the Revolution appeared to be influenced – in the context of its foreign affairs – by its need to maintain good relations with Iran, a long-standing friend and ally for Pakistan. As will be recalled from earlier discussions, the Shah's régimé had been a staunch supporter of Pakistan's international positions and had, especially after the early 1970s, provided much economic assistance to the country. Pakistan, always in need

of good friends and allies, thus attempted, until the very last minute, to extend support to the Shah: Pakistani media response tended to be supportive of the Shah in the early turbulent days of what initially appeared to be 'random rioting.' Once it became clear, however, that the fall of the Iranian monarch was inevitable, Pakistani response shifted quite dramatically to support for revolutionary forces in an effort to maintain friendly relations with the new leadership in Iran. Despite the need to maintain friendly relations with Iran, Pakistani support for the ideological goals of Iranian revolutionary leaders was qualified, even at this early stage. In part because of Pakistan's discomfort with radical views and methods and in part because of its desire to maintain healthy relations with its other allies, some of whom were not fully supportive of revolutionary events in Iran, Pakistan balanced its support of the Revolution with calls for moderation and pragmatism.

Political events in 1979 provided, in some senses, the impetus towards another, perhaps more subtle, shift in Pakistan's response to revolutionary Iran. The take-over of the United States embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of the same year both served to move Pakistan towards an even more ambiguous response to revolutionary Iran. As it had been torn between diverse loyalties and perspectives on the domestic front, Pakistan quickly became entangled, once again, in an intricate balancing act in the global arena. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan necessitated a reevaluation by Pakistan of its relationship with the United States: American assistance became, once again, a vital ingredient for Pakistani stability. A comment by an earlier Prime Minister of Pakistan, H.S. Suhrawardy, would have been appropriate for the country's foreign policy dilemmas during this time. Said he: "Isolation...cannot be the policy of a country that is liable to be attacked. We have, therefore, to have allies."[6] In light of the invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan also became

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6 H.S. Suhrawardy, Quoted in Norman Palmer, 'Pakistan: the long search for foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins (eds), Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977, pages 420-421.

the linchpin of American foreign policy in the region; having 'lost' Iran as an ally and confronting the reality of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the United States focused primarily on Pakistan as its only significant ally in the area. Pakistan, in light of its basic sense of insecurity in the international arena, attempted to capitalize on this situation in an effort to bolster its own security. Hence, the relationship between Pakistan and the United States became one to which Pakistan paid considerable attention during this period. To complicate matters further, relations between Iran and the United States, already tense in the early post-Shah period, became even more strained after the American Embassy takeover. Both countries had been allied with Pakistan and this created a dilemma for the latter. Despite its need and desire for American assistance and support, Pakistan could not ignore its desire and need for Iran as an ally and friend. Under such circumstances, Pakistan clearly became embroiled in a delicate and very difficult act of balancing the needs of its various ally relationships.

This act of 'international balancing' had obvious implications for Pakistan's response towards the Iranian Revolution. Outright and complete rejection of the revolutionary movement would not have been acceptable because of Pakistan's desire to maintain friendly relations with Iran and because of the need to appear supportive of the quest of other Muslim countries to conduct their socio-political lives within the context of Islamic ideals – a goal to which Pakistan had devoted considerable energy. However, total and unqualified support of the Revolution in all its aspects – had this been desired – would not have been practical for the Pakistanis because of their important relationship with the United States. It is in this context that media response to the Iranian Revolution should be analyzed. It is significant to note, for example, that editorials referring to the hostage crisis were remarkable in their 'balanced positions.' On the one hand, the legitimacy of Iranian grievances was rigorously upheld, but, on the other, the taking of hostages was not condoned. Such 'vehement ambiguity' in the press was symptomatic of the Pakistani

desire to balance competing interests and loyalties in an effort sustain friendly relations with all its allies.

It is clear from the above discussion, then, that specific pragmatic considerations, both domestic and international, played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's response to the Iranian Revolution. Ideological imperatives, to which allusion has already been made, were also important factors for consideration in the shaping of this response. In some sense, the Revolution served as a 'litmus test' of sorts for Pakistan. Ideological issues, which already had a history of tension in the country, became even more pronounced and the debate more intense. It is thus necessary to investigate, in a more coherent fashion, some of these ideological issues and imperatives.

The essential focus of the ideological debate within most Muslim societies has concerned the relationship between Islam and public life: questions abounded as to the role of Islam, if any, in the arena of national socio-economic and political affairs. The Pakistani debate on this issue had been intense and protracted, with no clear resolution; fragile compromises had, of course, been achieved over the years, but were always in danger of disintegration as a result of shifting circumstances and loyalties. As Palmer writes:

> The ideology on which Pakistan is said to have been founded is, of course, Islam, and the country is a leading example of an ideological state in the modern world. Nevertheless, there is no consensus within Pakistan regarding the nature of the 'Islamic state' and there is no agreement regarding the nature of Islamic theology. As an elusive concept, it is subject to interpretations and applications.[7]

The fall of the Bhutto government and the establishment of the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq régimé during the late 1970s with its accompanying environment of political instability and fluidity, presented, in some senses, yet another opportunity for the various ideological

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7 Norman Palmer, 'Pakistan: the long search for foreign policy,' Pakistan: the long view, Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins (eds), Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977, page 418.

positions to lobby for greater authority within the country's political framework. Under such conditions, there is no doubt that the Revolution, by presenting one particular view (or seemingly so) of the essential ideological issues, provided an intriguing challenge for the country; such a challenge obviously impacted upon the Pakistani response to revolutionary Iran. It is important, therefore, to investigate the Pakistani and Iranian experiences with, and perspectives on, the ideological role of Islam in public life.

The debate with respect to ideological issues and the exact nature of the role of faith in public life has raged within Pakistan since at least the early days of independence. Ideological groups within Pakistan have, over the years, waged an intense power struggle for control of the country's political institutions and official policies. An investigation of Pakistan's history of ideological struggles reveals a pattern of concessions made to satisfy the demands of one or another ideological view. "...There is a serious disagreement among various Pakistanis on the nature of an Islamic state. That the nature of this disagreement was revealed during the constituent process and that no single view emerged completely victorious testifies to the political character of this process..."[8] Despite the intensity of the debate, and the fact that no one perspective has been entirely victorious, the modernist view has generally been the most prevalent view within Pakistan, at least at the level of political structures and official governmental policies. As Alavi states concisely, "...Insofar as it was included in the vocabulary of political debate in Pakistan during the first thirty years, only a few symbolic concessions were made to men of religion to make the argument look convincing."[9] Hence, the dominant view with respect to the role of Islam in Pakistan's public life perceived faith as a set of guiding principles and a fundamental system of values for socio-political conduct. Such a view was not necessarily in favour of the application of specific policies, injunctions and laws;

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8 Leonard Binder, Religion and politics in Pakistan, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961, page 6.

rather, faith was to provide the foundation upon which society was to be based, policies to be implemented and actions to be evaluated.

The Iranian experience with the role of Islam in public life can be contrasted quite starkly with the generally modernist view prevailing in Pakistan. The image, whether accurate or otherwise, was that Iranian revolutionary leaders intended to utilize Islam, not only in a symbolic sense to provide a coherent system of values and guiding principles, but also as a very viable and concrete plan for socio-political action. The dominant view within revolutionary Iran, especially after the gradual consolidation of power by Āyatullāh Khumaynī, appeared to emphasize the necessity of relying on the prophetic vision to deal with the significant socio-political issues of the day. In this respect, the Iranian leadership appeared to favour the application of certain specific injunctions, laws, and policies upheld by the prophetic ideal: Islam was to provide not only the guiding principles for society, but also the specific policies necessary for an 'Islamic state.' In this sense, the Iranian perspective on the role of Islam in public life was essentially a renewalist view and differed significantly from the Pakistani perspective calling for a more modernist role for ideological Islam in the socio-political arena.

Pakistani and Iranian experiences with Islamism and its role in public life also differed significantly with respect to the composition of their respective political élites. In Pakistan, the more modernist view of socio-political life was reinforced by the fact that political and/or military leaders retained dominance within the country's political structure. As already mentioned earlier, the *'ulamā'*, though playing symbolically significant roles, remained devoid of real authority within the Pakistani context. Generally speaking, traditional religious leaders had, over the years, been coopted by one or another political leader. Even during the Ẓiyā' al-Ḥaqq's régime, when the rallying cry of

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9 Hamza Alavi, 'Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology,' State and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan. Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds), London: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1988, page 73.

'Islamization' was utilized so frequently, the *'ulamā'* continued to lack dominance within Pakistani political and institutional structures. Indeed, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was abundantly clear that the military establishment was the dominant political élite within the country – a position which it obviously wished to safeguard and consolidate.

In marked contrast to the relatively marginalized role of the *'ulamā'* in Pakistan, the religious class in revolutionary Iran appeared to play a fairly significant role. In part because of historical precedents for their involvement in politics as well as their symbolic role as 'guardians of the revolution,' Iranian *'ulamā'* played a prominent and active role in Iranian political and institutional structures. In fact, it seemed that the religious class had become the most significant political élite – or at least its most important partners – in the new system established after the fall of the Shah. Hence, Pakistani and Iranian experiences differed with respect to the composition of the dominant policymaking groups within the socio-political arena. This is an important point for consideration in any analysis of the ideological and policy perspectives of the two countries.

Yet a third area of divergence between Pakistan and Iran with respect to ideological issues concerned the manner in which ideology was utilized in the two contexts. The Pakistani reliance upon Islam and its role as a socio-political ideology was utilized generally, by governments and the political élite, both to legitimize their own régimés as well as to promote a sense of identity amongst Pakistanis in an effort to enhance national integration and unity. Indeed, these two objectives often became inextricably bound together: enhancing the notion of Pakistan's 'Islamic identity',' and hence its viability as a nation-state, became a fundamental ingredient of governmental claims to legitimacy and authority. In great measure because of their awareness of the powerfully potent role of Islam, Pakistani leaders, in their quest for consolidation of their own authority, frequently relied upon the integrative and unifying role of faith to attain or sustain popular support. It

is in this sense that the Pakistani experience with Islam in the socio-political arena has generally been, in the words of Ali Dessouki, "...Islam from above." or "...an apology for the status quo."[10] In the Pakistani context, then, the ideology of faith has, more often than not, been relied upon by dominant élite groups – whether political, ethnic, linguistic or ideological – as a mechanism to maintain the status quo. As Ayoob writes:

> While in the 1930s and 1940s, political Islam...was the ideology of the official opposition to the Indian national mainstream, as represented by the Indian National Congress, from 1947 onwards, it became the primary instrument used to provide legitimacy, not only to the state of Pakistan, but, even more important, to the regime that came to power....[11]

It is in this respect that the Iranian experience with ideological Islam differed perhaps most significantly from the Pakistani scenario. In sharp contrast to the 'status quo' or 'governmental' role of faith in the latter case, Islam in the Iranian context was utilized as an tool for opposition to a government and, after its fall, for reform of the country's socio-political framework. Faith, in the Iranian context, was utilized both as an integrative and unifying force as well as a rallying cry for an uprising against the Shah's régimé. In this respect, the Iranian experience with Islamism, especially during the days, weeks and months preceding the Revolution itself was, to continue with Dessouki's classification "...Islam from below" or "...regime-challenging ideology."[12] In fact, as one writer states, "..events in Iran leading to the flight of the shah and the overthrew of the established monarchical order have demonstrated, as few other events have done, the revolutionary potential of political (or politicized) Islam."[13] The revolutionary role played by Islamism

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10 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'The Islamic resurgence: sources, dynamics and implications,' Islamic resurgence in the Arab World, Ali. Dessouki (ed), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, page 8.

11 Mohammed Ayoob, 'Two faces of political Islam: Iran and Pakistan compared,' Asian Survey, Volume XIX, number. 6, June 1979, page 531.

12 Ali. E. Hillal Dessouk, 'The Islamic resurgence: sources, dynamics and implications,' Islamic resurgence in the Arab World, Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (ed), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, page 8.

13 Ayoob, 'Two faces of political Islam: Iran and Pakistan compared,' Asian Survey Volume XIX, number 6, June 1979, page 540.

in the Iranian context emerged because of, among other factors, the unique blend of Iranian socio-political circumstances during the late 1970s, the precedents for *'ulamā'* participation in such opposition, as well as the peculiar nature and independence from state control of the Shī'āh, and in particular, the Iranian religious class. While it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze in depth the unique blend of factors which gave rise to the Iranian Revolution, it is important, nonetheless, to recognize that "...the political role of Islam leading to the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, as well as the emergence of the Khomeini phenomenon, has deep roots in the history of Iranian Islam and particularly in the political manifestation of the Shia clergy's opposition to monarchical tyranny."[14]

The independence of the *'ulamā'* had far reaching implications for the Iranian scenario. In contrast with *Sunnī* Islam, in which the authority of the state has been subject to community consensus, whether explicit or implicit, in "...predominantly Shī'ī Iran, there has always been potential opposition from the Shī'a 'ulamā' to the shah."[15] This 'potential opposition' can, then, be translated into active opposition during times of discontent and thus made to provide a powerful foundation for an 'Islamic revolution' against a secular state. It was this 'potential opposition' which was mobilized so very effectively during the final months of the Pahlavi régime. Hence, the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 represented an eminent example of

> the revolutionary strand in Islam which, if properly operationalized in the political sphere, can provide both the legitimacy for relentless opposition to an established but tyrannical order, and the appropriate channel to mobilize the usually 'silent majority' into active participation in a revolutionary process transforming the entire character of such a movement.[16]

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14 Ayoob, 'Two faces of political Islam: Iran and Pakistan compared,' Asian Survey Volume XIX, number 6, June 1979, page 541.

15 Ayoob, 'Two faces of political Islam: Iran and Pakistan compared,' Asian Survey Volume XIX, number 6, June 1979, page 541.

16 Ayoob, 'Two faces of political Islam: Iran and Pakistan compared,' Asian Survey Volume XIX, number 6, June 1979, page 543.

It is clear from the above discussion, then, that Pakistani and Iranian experiences with respect to Islamism have been divergent; the uses of ideological Islam, though similar in language and rhetoric, differed widely in motivation, substance and objectives. In the Pakistani case, a generally modernist ideological perspective prevailed and governments utilized Islam as a tool to maintain and legitimize their own authority. In Iran, however, faith became a powerfully potent mechanism for opposition to the monarchical order and, later, for radical reform and transformation of the prevailing socio-political framework of the country; the 'new' order was based, in essence, upon the generally renewalist views of Āyatullāh Khumaynī. As Ayoob concludes:

> ...In the case of Pakistan, Islam was used...as an instrument to maintain the privileges of the privileged, and to denounce and proscribe any attempts at social and political change by branding it 'un-Islamic'...Khomeini and his colleagues have served a purpose...they have...demonstrated the revolutionary potential of political Islam – a facet of Islam that is often forgotten because of the overwhelming presence in the recent history of Islam of the Zia ul-Haqs...[17]

Ideological divergences between Pakistan and Iran with respect to Islam's role in public life presented unique challenges for the former in its search for a meaningful, and yet safe, response to the Iranian Revolution. On an ideological plane, Pakistani leaders had always shown a commitment – whether symbolic or otherwise – to the public role of Islam in the country's socio-political arena: the propagation of the notion of 'Islamic identity' had become intertwined with attempts to promote governmental legitimacy as well as national integration. In fact, in both Pakistan and Iran, the close connection between national and Islamic identity is clear and this similarity provided a common base for the relationship between the two countries. Hence, at the ideological level, Pakistan was more or less committed to support the general principles articulated by leaders of the Iranian

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17 Ayoob, 'Two faces of political Islam: Iran and Pakistan compared,' Asian Survey Volume XIX, number 6, June 1979, ages, 545-546.

Revolution; to condemn such principles would have called into question Pakistan's own commitment to the underlying ideals of Muslim society. However, unqualified support for all aspects of the Revolution was also problematic as it would have placed Pakistan in the uncomfortable position of upholding an ideological perspective divergent from that generally articulated within its own official ideological arena. Such unqualified support may have called into question the validity of the government's perspective on the country's 'official ideology.'

Clearly, Pakistan's search for a meaningful response to the Iranian Revolution needed to accommodate its ideological and pragmatic imperatives, both of which appeared to be significant elements of its sense of identity and stability as a nation-state. In this context, ambiguity provided the key element in Pakistan's response to the Revolution. Powerful and positive expressions of support for the ideals of the Revolution provided a viable mechanism for meeting Pakistan's ideological commitments, while pleas for moderation and pragmatism allowed it to maintain a certain distance from the specific perspectives, interpretations, and methodologies utilized by revolutionary Iranian leaders. In essence, ambiguity provided the mechanism by which Pakistan could be inclusive, rather than exclusive, in its acceptance of divergent ideological perspectives. It was through the language of ambiguity that Pakistan and its leaders could accept, *defacto*, if not *dejure*, and by implication, if not by words, the notion that 'Islamic ideology' could and did have divergent interpretations. An admission of the divergent ideological perspectives and uses of faith, on the part of Pakistan, however subtle and implicit, has significant implications. It is to a brief discussion of some of these to which we now turn.

Islamism has clearly played a significant role in the public lives of both Pakistan and Iran. In some senses, faith provided an appropriate language and ideology through which to legitimize socio-economic and political conduct. In other words, Islam was utilized not only as a universal faith to which allegiance is paid, but also as an ideological mechanism

claiming to present a world view with answers for the socio-economic and political dilemmas confronting society. Indeed, "The reference to Islam...is the most important striking constant of ideological debates in the Muslim world."[18] Despite this commonality of reference and language, there has not appeared to be, as has been demonstrated in the cases of Pakistan and Iran, a clear definition of 'Islam' that is relevant to every circumstance; expressions of 'Islamic ideology' have appeared to be as diverse as they are powerful in mobilizing or maintaining support. As Hourani points out:

> There is more than one possible view of what Islam really is...and therefore there can be more than one political language of Islam. It can be used both to justify an existing order and to condemn it,...there tends to be a vast difference between the Islam to which rulers and dominant elites appeal and the Islam of the masses, and potentially, of revolution.[19]

Given the divergent ideological perspectives of Pakistan and Iran it appears that the notion of Islamism has not been a stable, concrete phenomenon that has been universally interpreted and applied. Indeed, Islamism has, in the socio-political realm, served many objectives, been utilized by many groups and actors, and been invoked in different times and circumstances. Clearly, the notion of Islamism, then, is one which can and has been moulded to suit the specific needs, contexts and aspirations of different Muslim societies and groups. As Piscatori contends, "...we are all guilty at times of speaking of Islam as if it means the same to everybody....and it is certain that everybody will continue to use 'Islam' as a shorthand expression. The task is to avoid generalization and thus the important thing is always to ask: whose Islam? and when?[20]"

In light of the diversity of interpretations and meanings ascribed to the role of faith in the socio-political context of Muslim societies, as well as the diversity of circumstances

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18 Ali Merad, 'The ideologisation of Islam in the contemporary Muslim world,' Islam and power, Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds), Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981, page 42.

19 Albert Hourani, 'Conclusion,' Islam in the political process, James P. Piscatori (ed), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, page 229.

within which the ideology is utilized, it is clear that there has not been one universally accepted notion of Islamism. As encapsulated in one of the opening quotations, ideologies, and in this case, 'Islamic ideologies,' are flexible: "...they are sufficiently ductile to allow very different interpretations and uses...."[21] Rather, as Imtiaz Ahmad succinctly says:

> ...Each Islamic country or people has used Islam in a wide variety of mutually differing ways and not infrequently in the same country Islam has acted to serve contrary purposes. For example, Islam has served as an anchor to authoritarian rule as well as democratization; it has served as rationalization or justification for reform and change as well as a basis for return to a supposedly pristine version of the faith...In other words, Islam is like a cloak which can be worn to suit all occasions.[22]

The 'cloak of Islam,' therefore, has been – and continues to be – utilized as a mechanism to provide a viable and relevant ideological framework within which diverse Muslim societies and groups operate. It is this 'cloak' which has provided the appearance of a 'universal ideal' of Muslim society while, at the same time, allowing unique expressions of this ideal to emerge in specific contexts. Hence, while the 'ideal' or 'intention' of the notion of Islamism may be universal – though this, too, is highly contentious – its expressions and manifestations are many and diverse; there is simply no one 'Islamic ideology' which can serve as a formula or panacea for the dilemmas confronting every Muslim society, each differing from the other. As Imtiaz Ahmad writes, "...the particular context of the country, its unique historical experience, and the contemporary socio-economic or political circumstances are of singular significance in the discussion of Islam"[23] Any study purporting to investigate 'Islamic ideology' or Islamism and its uses

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20 James Piscatori (ed), Islam in the political process. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, page 8.

21 Hamza Alavi and Fred Halliday (eds.), The state and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan. London: MacMillan Education Ltd, page 7.

22 Imtiaz Ahmad, 'Introduction,' Islam and the state in the world today, Olivier Carré, (ed), New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987, page xxv

23 Imtiaz Ahmad, 'Introduction,' Islam and the state in the world today, Olivier Carré, (ed), New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987, page xxv.

in the public life of Muslim societies must, therefore, study, in the first instance, the specific circumstances and contexts of a particular Muslim society; only through such an analysis, will there emerge an accurate and appropriate picture of the role of faith in the socio-economic and political life of a Muslim country.

On the basis of this conviction, this thesis has studied the Pakistani media response to the Iranian Revolution; through an investigation of the factors shaping this reaction, the study has provided a glimpse into some of the challenges, both ideological and pragmatic, facing a contemporary Muslim society. Confronted, on the one hand, with its stated ideological commitment to the guiding ideals of Islamic society and, on the other, with its own pragmatic needs and aspirations, Pakistan formulated – whether consciously or otherwise – a creative and evolving response to the Iranian Revolution. Using the mechanism of ambiguity, Pakistan endeavored to maintain a viable and workable balance amongst its various, often competing, imperatives, perspectives, and loyalties. While the language of 'common religious bonds' and ideological rhetoric utilized by both countries played important roles in shaping the response, equally as important, if not more so, were the unique perspectives, circumstances, and experiences of each society. Pakistan, in responding to the revolutionary events in Iran, accommodated its ideological and pragmatic considerations, without forsaking either, while, at the same time, being inclusive, rather than exclusive, in its acceptance of divergent interpretations of the notion of 'Islamic ideology.'

Multifarious manifestations of Islamism – the 'cloak of Islam' – and its role in public life have become a compelling reality of the Muslim world today. Acceptance of the diversity of interpretations – a perspective that engenders inclusivity, rather than exclusivity – remains a prerequisite for harmonious coexistence amongst divergent interpretations, groups, and societies. It is clear that the unique experiences of each Muslim society and/or country will have a great impact upon its interpretations and uses of Islam in its own

socio-economic and political domain. Given the powerful role of Islam as a tool for communication, mobilization, integration and legitimacy, political actors within Muslim societies will continue in their attempts to utilize Islamism to provide general overarching principles – a dominant ideology – to legitimize their socio-economic and political conduct. Such principles or ideologies are, however, unlikely to be interpreted or implemented in a universally similar fashion. The 'intention' or 'ideal' of many Muslim societies may continue to focus – at least at a theoretical level – upon a commitment to the general principles of Islam. The expressions, however, of this 'intention' – essentially the manner in which the ideal is interpreted and utilized – will remain diverse and specific to the context within which they are applied. In the final analysis, Dessouki, in his discussion of contemporary Islamic resurgence movements, provides a compelling and illuminating view of the public role of Islam. Says he of the role of ideological Islam in Muslim societies:

> Islam is better understood..as designating an 'ideal type' which should be analyzed in relation to specific social structures. The basic assumption here is that the unity and universality of the ideal type are reflected in a multiplicity of actual historical experiences in specific social contexts....[24]

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24 Dessouki, 'The Islamic resurgence: sources, dynamics and implications,' Islamic resurgence in the Arab world. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (ed), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, page 7

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