ISLAMIC MILITANTS IN SĀDĀT'S EGYPT, 1970-1981

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A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

Author:	Melanie Freeman
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Department:	Institute of Islamic Studies
Degree sought:	Master of Arts

This thesis argues that a strong correlation exists between Islamic militancy and socio-economic and political conditions. Under 'normal' everyday conditions, passive elements of the Islamic community, the *mutadayyīn*, dominate, but in times of crisis or challenge, it is the militants, the *islāmiyyīn*, who react against the state, its institutions and its employees. The Egypt of Anwar al-Sādāt (1970-1981) will be used in order to test this hypothesis. The everyday conditions in which the people live, work and survive will first be examined in order to establish the constant, the invariable. These conditions include the sectarian strife between Muslims and Copts, especially in Upper Egypt; overpopulation; the lack of housing; the failure of education; the debt burden; the cost of war with Israel, and the 'brain-drain' from Egypt to the oil-rich countries. These aspects encouraged an increase in religiosity, both Muslim and Coptic, as people turned to religion for potential solutions to these insurmountable problems. Egypt however was also faced with three periods of crisis during Sādāt's presidency, namely the October War (1973), the 'open-door' economic policy of *infitāḥ* (April 1974+)/the Bread Riots (January 1977), and the peace process with Israel (November 1977+). Shortly after each period, the militants reacted against the state: in April 1974, Shabāb Muḥammad attempted a coup d'état; in July 1977, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah kidnapped and assassinated Shaikh Muḥammad al-Dhahabī, former Minister of Religious Endowments *(waqf, awqāf);* and on 6 October 1981, al-Gihād assassinated President Anwar al-Sādāt while he was reviewing the troops. These reactions of the islāmiyyīn were triggered by the three periods of crisis.

SOMMAIRE

Auteur: Melanie Freeman

Titre: Les intégristes islamiques dans l'Egypte de Sādāt (1970-1981)

Département: Institut d'études islamiques

Diplôme: Maîtrise es Arts

L'hypothèse de ce mémoire porte sur l'existence d'une forte corrélation entre l'intégrisme islamique et les conditions socio-économiques et politiques. Dans les circonstances de la vie quotidienne, ce sont les fondamentalistes passifs, les *mutadayyīn*, qui dominent la scène politique. Cependant dans les périodes de crises ou de défi, ce sont les intégristes, les *islāmiyyīn*, qui réagissent contre l'Etat, ses institutions et ses salariés. Cette hypothèse sera vérifiée en Egypte durant le mandat d'Anwar al-Sādāt (1970-1981). Les conditions de vie quotidiennes constituent le cadre de ce travail. Celles-ci incluent le problème du clivage confessionnel entre Musulmans et Coptes, surtout en Haute Egypte, de la surpopulation, du manque de logement, de l'échec de l'éducation, de la dette nationale, du coût des guerres contre Israël et finalement du transfert des cerveaux et des ouvriers qualifiés en direction des pays producteurs de pétrole. Tous ces aspects ont renforcé le sentiment religieux des Musulmans et des Coptes. La population s'est tournée vers la religion pour trouver des remèdes à leurs problèmes. De plus, l'Egypte a vécue plusieurs périodes de crises sous la présidence de Sādāt: la Guerre d'octobre (1973), la politique économique de l'*infitāḥ* (avril 1974+), la révolte du pain (janvier 1977) et enfin le processus de paix avec Israël (novembre1977+). Après chacune de ces périodes, les intégristes ont réagi contre l'Etat. En avril 1974, un coup d'Etat fomenté par Shabāb Muḥammad éclate; en juillet 1977, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah a kidnappé et assassiné le Shaikh Muḥammad al-Dhahabī, ancien ministre des biens de main-morte *(waqf, awqāf)*. Enfin, en octobre 1981, al-Gihād a assassiné le président Anwar al-Sādāt alors qu'il était en train de passer en revue ses troupes. L'argument de ce mémoire est que ces trois périodes de

crises ont créé une situation intolérable qui a provoquée les réactions militantes et violentes des intégristes contre l'Etat de Sādāt.

TRANSLITERATION

The following system of transliteration was used with a few small changes:

Consonants

ء = ' (except when initial)

ب = b	ط = ṭ
ت = t	ظ = ẓ
ث = th	ع = c
ج = j	غ = gh
ح = ḥ	ف = f
خ = kh	ق = q
د = d	ك = k
ذ = dh	ل = l
ر = r	م = m
ز = z	ن = n
س = s	ه = h
ش = sh	و = w
ص = ṣ	ي = y
ض = ḍ	

short vowels: ـَ = a ـُ = u ـِ = i

long vowels: ا = ā وُ = ū يِ = ī

note:

1. a long vowel in the initial position in a capitalized word was ommitted, as in Ayah.
2. the "jīm" (ج) is rendered as "gīm" following the Egyptian pronouciation, as in Gamāl.
3. the diphthong (ـَيْ) is rendered as "ai" instead of "ay", as in shaikh.
4. the "yā" with tashdīd (يّ) has been rendered as "iyyah" as opposed to "īyah", as in islāmiyyah.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the significant contribution of many people to whom I would now like to offer my heartfelt thanks.

My thesis adviser Dr. Charles Adams of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University guided me during the writing of my thesis. Through his comments, queries and insights, I obtained a much better understanding of *islāmiyyah*. My own thoughts also became more focused.

The library staff of the Islamic Institute facilitated my work significantly with its help. Special thanks must go to one of my closest friends, Steve Millier, who gave above and beyond the call of duty throughout the duration of my Masters program. It was Steve who also took on the burden of reading the final version of this thesis.

Shams Nanji, Karmen Talbot, and Mark Segall were godsends with their patience, understanding and knowledge of computers; my relationship with my MAC was made less painful and strenuous as a result of their help. They stood by me in my darkest hours of need, most especially when my hard disk became schizophrenic and suicidal. In addition, the use of Jean Siag's printer made my life much easier.

The encouragement and support of Sophie Erraïs, Floyd MacKay, Dr. A. Uner Turgay, Steve, Marshall, Karmen, and my best friend, Rosanne Athaide, as well as that of the members of the "Melanie Fan Club", especially Ihāb Ḥāshim and Chande, fueled my desire to complete this endeavour. Their friendship burned brightly, particularly in times of difficulty, and they made everything and anything seem possible.

My mother and my sisters, Karen, Selina and Lisa, deserve my undying gratitude for standing by me throughout the duration of my Masters program. They offered unstinting support and encouragement and were there through thick and thin.

This thesis is dedicated

to my mother, Marilla Freeman,

who gave me the confidence to achieve my best,

who taught me to reach for the stars,

who has been my inspiration.

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It is unwise to complain that an escapist religion rigidifies the status pattern, if the only other adjustments available to individuals are utter demoralization and mental illness. But it is equally unwise to say that religion helps a group to bear the enormous burdens of low status, if that very religion obscures real possibilities of other kinds of action that might reduce those burdens. It is unwise to regret that an aggressive sect converts mundane issues into religious questions, incapable of rational examination, if society furnishes few secular means for the resolution of those issues. A severe religion may be the only way to save the selves of those who have escaped serfdom, have had their hopes mightily raised, only to run into insuperable barriers. Yet it is unwise to applaud an aggressive sect that polarizes a society and converts the pursuit of its goals into a sacred battle -- when it has quite effective secular means and many potential allies to help in their attainment.

Günter Lewy, Religion and Revolution (NY: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.544 quoted from Y. Milton Yinger, The Scientific Study of Religion (NY, 1970), pp.344-345.

INTRODUCTION

I believe there to be a strong correlation between social conditions and religious militancy. Under normal (i.e.'everyday') conditions, the passive vein of fundamentalism dominates, but in particular periods of turmoil or success, it is the active, militant elements who explode upon the scene, making their voices heard through a variety of means.[1] In order to test this hypothesis I will look at Muslim Egypt during the presidency of Anwar al-Sādāt (1970-1981) during which time Egypt faced three periods of great turmoil, namely the October War (1973), the "open-door" economic policy better known as *infitāḥ* (April 1974+)/the Bread Riots (January 1977), and finally, the peace process with Israel (November 1977+). Each of these crises was followed by militant (re)actions against the state: Shabāb Muḥammad reacted in April 1974, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah in July 1977 and al-Gihād in October 1981. I believe that these militant groups reacted violently as a result of these three periods of turmoil, and not simply for the sake of violence.

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[1]Periods of turmoil are often followed by an increase of religiosity as was seen, for example, after the defeat of 1967 by Israel. This reaction was based on the Egyptian interpretation of the defeat as a sign that God had abandoned them due to their neglect of Islam. An increase in their religiosity would therefore bring about a change in fortune for the better. In a similar vein, periods of success, such as the Arab oil-embargo of 1973, are interpreted as a sign of God's approval of the Believers, as a confirmation of the validity and superiority of Islam. R. Hrair Dekmejian is the author best known for the "crisis theory" which can be found in his Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), Part 1. Dekmejian (p.9) believes in a causal pattern whereby "manifestations of religious resurgence correspond to periods of intense spiritual, social and political crisis." This theory considers the conditions of society at large in order to explain the behaviour and beliefs of people driven to fundamentalism. Unfortunately however, this view does imply an inherent contradiction between Islam and modernity, and sees Islam as an essentially defensive reaction to negative stimuli. John O. Voll prefers to use the term 'challenge' instead of the 'crisis' of Dekmejian. 'Challenge' is a much more positive term, also implying that Islam can function in the modern era, that it is not therefore a last resort against the onslaught of modernity. Voll claims that "the common threat that seems to run through the history of Muslim revivalism is not decline or failure, it is dramatic change (for either good or ill)." (John O. Voll, "Revivalism and Social Transformation in Islamic History" in Muslim World, vol.76, #3-4 (July/Oct '86), p.172). The contemporary Muslim scholar Khurshid Ahmad states that the current Islamic resurgence needs to be understood "in the context of the positive aspirations of the Islamic ummah to regain the position it lost because of the Western domination. . . [It is] a positive and creative response to the challenge of modernity." (Khurshid Ahmad, "The Nature of Islamic Resurgence" in John L. Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.220).

I will refer to the militant members of Shabāb Muḥammad, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah and al-Gihād as *islāmiyyīn* (islamists, sing.*islāmī*) since this is a term the militants use when referring to themselves.[2] Their ideology will be referred to as *islāmiyyah*. The choice of the name 'islāmiyyīn' by members of the militant groups themselves is a conscious effort to distinguish themselves from the *muslimīn* (the Arabic plural for 'Muslim' which means literally, those who submit to Islam). Although both islāmiyyīn and muslimīn believe in Islam, this is where the likeness ends for the former. The islāmiyyīn believe that whereas the muslimīn are those who are content to live in a modern state and "are 'mere' Muslims who have only the formal qualities of Muslim identity",[3] they, the islāmiyyīn, seek to recreate the conditions of the original ummah of Muḥammad and commit themselves to the full application of the Sharīᶜah, using violence if necessary to accomplish their goals. The islāmiyyīn distinguish among three distinct groups of

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[2]R. Hrair Dekmejian and his colleagues carried out an extensive study of ninety-one Islamic groups and societies in the Arab world. Original Arabic texts and pamphlets circulated by members of Islamic groups -- many of which are underground -- were examined in order to determine what terminology they use vis-à-vis themselves and other similar groups. He discovered that proponents and sympathizers often use the terms *baᶜth islāmī* (Islamic renaissance), *ṣaḥwat al-islāmiyyah* (Islamic awakening), *iḥyā' al-dīn* (religious revival), and *uṣūliyyat al-islāmiyyah* (Islamic fundamentalism) when referring to this Islamic phenomenon. According to proponents of Islamic fundamentalism, they refer to themselves on the whole as *islāmiyyīn* (islamists) or as *aṣliyyīn* (the original or authentic ones). These Arabic terms surely indicate clearly just how the members of these militant groups see and identify themselves in comparison with the rest of society. These terms are also used by the islāmiyyīn in unmistakable contrast to mutaᶜaṣṣib (zealot, fanatic) or mutaṭarrif (radical) which is used by non-islāmiyyīn to describe those inclined to use violence.

Of the ninety-one groups analyzed and presented in Islam in Revolution, nineteen are moderate in their militancy, one is moderate/high, sixty-one are high and three are high/moderate. This classification leads to two possible conclusions: (1) Dekmejian considered only militant groups for his study, since only five of ninety-one are low in militancy while two are moderate/low. The rest are all high in militancy; or (2) Dekmejian does not consider the mutadayyīn (the pious, the devout, i.e. the passive 'fundamentalists') to be islāmiyyīn. The next obvious step would be to ask whether Dekmejian's decision to analyze only militant groups is based merely on personal choice, or whether it is a reflection of the belief of the islāmiyyīn themselves, that only the activist, the militant, can be counted among their number. In the Arabic, there is no special name, no designated term to distinguish a passive islāmī from an ordinary Muslim. This fact gives rise to the conclusion that the term 'islāmī' is restricted to the militant. And the militant is he who espouses violence in order to attain his goals.

[3]Bruce B. Lawrence, "Muslim Fundamentalist Movements: Reflections towards a New Approach" in Barbara Freyer Stowasser (ed.), The Islamic Impulse (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p.19.

individuals within society: the islāmiyyīn who espouse violence, if necessary, in their search to recreate the pure Islamic society; the *mutadayyin* (the pious, devout) who seek to islamize society, but through non-violent or passive means; and the muslimīn comprising the rest of (Muslim) society.[4] This is an interesting insight into how the islāmiyyīn refer to the rest of the Muslim community who do not share their commitment, or rather their zeal in pursuing their commitment.

Although the *daᶜwah* or call differs from militant group to militant group, the common factors are:

1. Islam is a continuation of the previously-revealed Messages but is the last revelation of the Truth and is a complete and total way of life, embodying politics and religion, state and society. It is applicable to all times and places.
2. The perfect blueprint for the society is found in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, therefore the Sharīᶜah must be implemented to bring about an Islamic state which is one of God's imperatives.
3. If the ruler strays from the 'straight path', he must be warned, guided and eventually removed if persisting in his deviation. In the same vein, those Muslim governments which do not implement the Sharīᶜah are illegitimate and should be overthrown, becoming the object of jihād.
4. The good Muslim should go beyond the Five Pillars and should commit himself to a life of action in bringing about the creation of the ideal (Islamic) society -- "by virtue of this, a violent challenge to the status quo becomes a built in component of militant Islamic fundamentalism through the use of jihād."[5]
5. The establishment ᶜulamā' are to be shunned for their tendency to side with the government, and for preaching that jihād is the striving for self-improvement. State-supported mosques are also to be avoided.
6. Non-Muslims are no longer to be considered *ahl al-kitāb* (People of the Book) but kāfirūn (unbelievers) and are therefore to be made the object of jihād.
7. Westernization and modernization are responsible for all the problems of Muslim societies and are the reasons why society is returning to a state of *jāhiliyyah* (ignorance). Returning to the straight path of Islam will correct all problems.

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[4]For some of the islāmiyyīn, redemption exists only within the group. Since non-members are considered *kāfirūn* (unbelievers), the excommunication, defection or desertion of a member relegates him to the status of apostate, and thus the sentence of death hangs over his head. For these islāmiyyīn therefore, society is divided into only islāmiyyīn and kāfirūn.

[5]Dekmejian, p.45. Jihād is the Sixth Pillar of Islam for the islāmiyyīn.

8. The colonial powers have joined with the Zionists in waging a battle against the Muslim world.[6]

All too often, Muslim and Islamic groups throughout the Muslim world[7] tend to be lumped together and explained away with total disregard for the local and therefore unique conditions and aspirations of each individual movement. This flaw is a consequence of the 'myth of the monolith' which "tends to downgrade and underplay (if not totally deny) the divergence in the social, economic and political contexts among the various regions and countries which constitute the world of Islam."[8] This assumption that Islamic resurgence is a monolith eliminates the need to seek out and establish the differences among the many resurgent groups, such as ideology, strategy, degree of activism, social base, impact on

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[6]John L. Esposito, Islam: the Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.170-171; John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984), pp.202-203. The ideologues of militant movements find guidance and justification for their plan of action in the past. When formulating their thought, they are greatly influenced by a number of Muslim thinkers, in particular Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (164-241 AH/788-855 AD) and Ibn Taymiyyah (661-728 AH/1263-1328 AD). These two have inspired many militants, including the Egyptians Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966), Shukrī Muṣṭafā (d.1977) and Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Salām Farag (d.1981) whom we will meet in chapter one. For more information on Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah, please see I. Goldzieher, "Ahmad" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.I, A-D (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913), pp.188-190, and H. Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, vol.5, H-Iram (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), pp.951-955.

The militants rely heavily on particular Qur'ānic verses (5: 44-48) to justify their actions. Please see appendix I for the full citation.

[7]The Muslim world refers to all parts of the world where Muslims are a majority (forty-three countries) or a substantial minority (twenty countries), regardless of the degree of their attachment to Islam. It would be incorrect and imprecise to use 'Arab world' interchangeably with the 'Muslim world' as the majority of the world's Muslims are not Arabs, nor are they Middle Easterners. Please see John L. Esposito, "Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics" in John L. Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.3; Voll, "Revivalism", pp.168-180. It would be just as incorrect to use 'Muslim' and 'Islamic' interchangeably with regard either to countries or governments. There is an important difference to be made between a Muslim country and an Islamic one: in the former, Islam, or rather the Sharīᶜah has a role, in varying degrees, in the government. In some countries, the implementation of Islamic law is only an empty gesture, while in others, Islam is a source of legislation. In contrast, in an Islamic country such as Iran, Libya, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Islam has been made paramount in the legislation. Sharīᶜah laws and regulations are therefore enforced as much as possible. We shall carry this distinction to the level of organizations as well, so that we shall refer to groups of Muslims as 'Muslim' groups while those groups of Muslims striving to implement an Islamic government will be referred to as 'Islamic' groups.

[8]"The myth of the monolith" came from Mohammed Ayoob, "Introduction: the Myth of the Monolith" in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p.1.

society, and political alliances and actions. In addition variances are to be found within each country's historical, psychological, social, political, and economic experience which directly or indirectly affect each group, its ideology and its strategy. To ignore such aspects when studying a Muslim or an Islamic group is to negate the value of such a study while simultaneously drawing imprecise and limited conclusions. In order to reach a better and more precise understanding of Islamic resurgence, it is important therefore to study each Islamic group within its local environment and as a unique experience.[9]

Before beginning the study of the three Egyptian militant groups which reacted against the Sādāt government, it would be beneficial to take a brief look at Islamic resurgence in general in order to better appreciate the need to study each Muslim and Islamic group individually. Since the 1970s, governments in various Muslim countries have begun enforcing Islamic laws and regulations in accordance with the Sharīᶜah (the revealed or canonical law of Islam). Most noticeable have been the carrying out of Sharīᶜah punishments (i.e. the amputation of the hand for stealing, stoning for adultery, death for apostasy), as well as the introduction of Islamic taxes and the establishment of Islamic banks and insurance companies. The increasing presence of Islamic dress[10] (*ḥijāb* -- the head covering; or *al-zayy al-sharᶜī* -- the face and hands are alone uncovered) has also been noted. Islam has also become more politically active, whether at the hands of various states or numerous opposition groups: the Pakistani civil war which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh (1971); the success of the Arab oil embargo (1973); the Arab 'victory' over the Israeli forces (The October War, 1973); General Zia al-Ḥaq's Islamic coup d'état in Pakistan (1977); Iran's Islamic Revolution (1978-1979); the occupation of the Great

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[9]Dekmejian, chapter 4; Ali E. Hilal Dessouki, "The Islamic Resurgence: Sources, Dynamics, and Implications" in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (ed.), Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (NY: Praeger Publ, 1982), p.5.

[10]For an interesting article on the reasons why women in Egypt wear the Islamic dress, please see Fadwa el Guindi, "Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic: Egypt's Contemporary Islamic Movement" in Social Problems, vol.28, #4 (April '81), pp.465-485; John Alden Williams, "Veiling in Egypt as a Political and Social Phenomenon" in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1980), pp.71-85.

Mosque in Mecca (1979); the Iran/Iraq War (1980-1988); Afghani resistance to the USSR invasion (1980); the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sādāt (1981); terrorist attacks against French, American and Israeli personnel and targets in Lebanon (1983-1985); the kidnapping of Western nationals in Lebanon by pro-Iran groups, the increasing visibility of the mutadayyīn in Tunisia (1982, 1987, 1990) and Algeria (1988, 1992); Ayatullāh Khumaynī's condemnation of the Muslim writer Salman Rushdie as an apostate and the ensuing death sentence (1989); the Gulf War (1991); and finally, the near-victory of Algeria's mutadayyīn in the elections (1992). These are just some of the many examples which can be cited to show how different is the Islamic resurgence throughout the Muslim world. Islamic resurgence is expressed differently in each country -- and often from region to region within the same country as well. The historical, cultural, social, economic, and political environment, among other aspects, in which each resurgent group is established will be reflected in some way in the group. In other words, each group reflects its own particular environment in some form or another. Furthermore, a distinction must also be made between the passive (mutadayyī or daᶜwah) groups and the militant ones. Each case is unique and should be studied as such.

Daᶜwah Societies

A brief look at the pacifist organizations so prevalent and prolific within Egypt is in order here. Within twentieth century Egypt alone for example, are to be found about one hundred and thirty-five passive groups which believe that society can be reformed gradually through educating the individual and through moral and social reform.[11] This

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[11]Dessouki, "The Islamic Resurgence", p.10. See a list in Zakariyyah S. Bayūmī, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn wa'l-Jamāᶜāt al-Islāmiyyah fī'l-Hayāt al-Siyāsiyat al-Misriyyah (The Muslim Brothers and Islamic Associations in the Egyptian Political Life) (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1979), p.67. According to Eric Davis, there are "over one hundred Islamic fraternal and charitable organizations officially registered in Egypt." Eric Davis, "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt" in Said Amir Arjomand

objective is achieved through the work of the da^{c}wah movements which are socio-religious in nature. In the past, 'da^{c}wah' referred to groups which propagated the faith among non-Muslims; today such organizations also direct their energy towards Muslims, calling them back to Islam, encouraging them to appropriate more fully their Islamic identity. In addition to the propagation of the faith, the da^{c}wah organizations provide many services for the community, including education (day-care centers, schools, youth camps), social services (health clinics, hospitals, legal aid), religious broadcasting, and economic services (Islamic banks, insurance companies, investment houses).[12]

Consider the ideology of these pacifist organizations. While there are differences in interpretation, there does exist a core ideology common to all groups:

1. Islam is a total way of life, applicable to every age and every situation. It is integral to law, politics and society.
2. The decline of Muslim societies is due to the wholesale adoption of the Western secular ideologies and values. In order to regain the 'straight path' *(al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm)*, there must be a return to Islam, to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah which provide the perfect blue-print for society. The Sharī^{c}ah must be reinstated fully to ensure this return.
3. Returning society to the 'straight path' requires the work of organizations and individuals who are willing to call other Muslims to come closer to Islam, to renew their faith, and to struggle against injustice and corruption.
4. Although the westernization of society is rejected, modernization is not. Science and technology are acceptable if they bow down to Islam in order to protect against the westernization and secularization of society.[13]

These then are the main points in the ideology of the mutadayyīn and the da^{c}wah organizations. Although these movements are passive in nature and are concerned with the betterment of the individual and of society at large, they can "as history has shown . . . move easily from the social to the political, from lobbyists for social and moral reform to

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(ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany: State University of NY Press, 1984), p.145. For a chart of islamist societies in Egypt, please see Appendix III.

[12]Esposito, Straight, p.200. For more information on Islamic banks, companies and services, please see Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), chapter 8.

[13]Esposito, Straight, pp.169-170.

militant political activists and revolutionaries, when circumstances warrant."[14] This aspect also emphasizes the need to understand which factors or conditions can turn mutadayyīn into islāmiyyīn.

The mutadayyīn and the islāmiyyīn

The Egyptian Islamic movement can be subdivided into two groups, the passive and the militant, or the mutadayyīn and the islāmiyyīn. R. Hrair Dekmejian offers a good guide of some behavioural characteristics which can be used to identify the two, beginning with the mutadayyīn:

1. attending the mosque regularly, five times daily for prayer;
2. observing the Five Pillars of Islam strictly: the profession of faith *(shahādah)*, the fast *(sawm)*, the prayers *(ṣalāh)*, the pilgrimage to Mecca *(ḥajj)* and alms *(zakāt)*;
3. striving for an exemplary life with a significant degree of adherence to Qur'ānic prohibitions;
4. regular religious meditation and Qur'ānic reading;
5. participating in group activities organized by religious societies dependent and independent of the mosque;
6. growing a full beard (sometimes a thin moustache as well as a sign of piety and devotion);
7. wearing distinctive clothing.

These above-mentioned signs are not particularly obvious to the naked eye and unless one is specifically looking for them, they are very often missed or overlooked. But it must be emphasized that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to distinguish the islāmī from the mutadayyī except, as Dekmejian indicates, when the following characteristics are displayed:

1. the behavioural patterns of the mutadayyīn (numbers 1-7 above) are followed but more rigorously and more diligently;
2. the tendency to live together in a particular area, and in certain instances to live in self-imposed isolation from the Muslim population and sometimes even from the mutadayyīn as well;
3. the attendance of a specific mosque which panders to their particular mission, call or da^{c}wah (ideology);

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[14] Esposito, Straight, p.200.

4. the intermittent participation in so-called acts of 'purifying' violence directed against places of illicit pleasure, night clubs, movies houses, etc.[15]

The islāmiyyīn made their presence known in the Middle East most noticeably around the end of the 1970s. They have infected their societies with violent actions at various times and have placed them in periodic states of turmoil. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the islāmiyyīn remain the fringe element within Egyptian society, and although they may elicit much sympathy from the masses, they do not draw active support.

CRADLE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Egypt is aptly named the "cradle" of Islamic fundamentalism[16] of the twentieth century. Her history of fundamentalism has been long and fruitful, beginning in Ismāᶜīliyyah in 1928 with the founding of the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (The Muslim Brothers) by Ḥasan al-Bannā'. Within twenty years, the Ikhwān had established branches not only throughout Egypt, but also across the Muslim world, especially in Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan, Syria and North Africa. The more militant thought of Ikhwānī ideologue Sayyid Quṭb,who reinterpreted and radicalized its ideology in the 1950s and 1960s, was produced during his prison years during the Nāṣir era. His thought was consummated in his famous work Maᶜālim fī'l-Ṭarīq (Milestones) which was written whilst he was in prison. Although the importance of the Ikhwān and Sayyid Quṭb can be neither denied nor minimized, I will

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[15]Dekmejian, pp.54-56. Chapter 4 offers a very insightful description and analysis of, to use his terms, passive and active fundamentalism.

[16]This title is taken directly from Dekmejian's own title for his chapter on Egypt (p.79).

focus on three Egyptian splinter groups which broke away from the Ikhwān in the late 1960s in order to forge their own paths in the search to find and implement the True Islam. Shabāb Muḥammad, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah, and al-Gihād each reacted against the state during the Sādāt years, 1970-1981. Only one was successful. On 6 October 1981, al-Gihād assassinated President Anwar al-Sādāt while he was reviewing the troops on the eighth anniversary of the crossing of the Suez Canal during the October War.

In the Introduction, terminology has been examined before providing descriptions of the mutadayyīn and the islāmiyyīn, their doctrines and the differentiation between the two. Chapter one will deal with islāmiyyah (Islamic militancy) in the context of Egypt. In this chapter, I will look first at the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and the thought of Sayyid Quṭb in order to provide the 'past' of Shabāb Muḥammad, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah, and al-Gihād. The three groups will then be examined along with the characteristics and make-up of their members and leaders, including such things as personality types, education, home-town bases, social background, and strategy etc. Similarities and differences between the groups will then be indicated in order to see if there are any general trends to be found. Chapter two will examine the domestic conditions of Egypt during the Sādāt years including among other things, religious, educational, socio-economic, and political factors, which could be instrumental in turning people towards islāmiyyah. This chapter will introduce the first part of the hypothesis, namely the 'normal', everyday conditions of Egypt. The second half of the hypothesis, or the periods of turmoil, will be examined in chapter three. Each period of crisis will be immediately followed by a description of the individual militant (re)actions of Shabāb Muḥammad, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah and al-Gihād. Although external influences are important, they have little relevance to the hypothesis since I hope to establish a correlation between domestic conditions and political activity. Only those external influences which either generated domestic difficulties or are necessary to set the stage for the hypothesis will be discussed.

CHAPTER 1

ISLĀMIYYAH IN THE CONTEXT OF EGYPT

In order to understand and better appreciate the 'present' of the three Egyptian groups which we will be studying, namely Shabāb Muḥammad, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah and al-Gihād, we will take a brief look at their 'past', at the history of the Egyptian Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (the Muslim Brotherhood). We will then examine the thought of its ideologist Sayyid Quṭb, for the three groups rely heavily on him. The remainder of the chapter will be spent looking at the three groups themselves.

Jamāᶜāt al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn

The Jamāᶜāt al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (The Society of the Muslim Brothers, also known as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Muslim Brethren)[1] was founded in 1928 by Ḥasan al-Bannā' in Ismāᶜīliyyah, Egypt. Bannā' grew up in the "shadows of British colonialism";[2] the Ikhwān had its origins in an Egypt where the troops stationed on her soil were a bitter and constant reminder of the British imperialistic legacy. The foreign presence in Egypt in particular and the sorry state of the Arabs in general was seen to be the result of the destruction of the caliphate in 1924 by Kamāl Atatürk (of Turkey) and the

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[1]For more information on the Ikhwān, please see Ishak Musa Husaini, The Moslem Brethren: the Greatest of the Modern Islamic Movements (Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1956); Ibrahim Ibrahim, "Islamic Revival in Egypt and Greater Syria" in Cyriac Pullapilly (ed.) Islam in the Contemporary World (Indiana: Cross Roads Books, 1980), pp.158-169; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat' in Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.4, #1 (Spring '82), pp.75-93; Richard P.Mitchell, "Society of the Muslim Brothers", vol.I, II. A Ph.D. Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Princeton University in 1959; Gabriel Warburg, "The Challenge of Populist Islam in Egypt and the Sudan in the 1970s" in George S. Wise and Charles Issawi (ed.) Middle East Perspectives: the Next Twenty years (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press Inc., 1981), pp.105-128.

[2]John L. Esposito, Islam the straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.155.

Muslim straying from the path of Islam. The Ikhwān therefore called for a return to the True Islam, to the Qur'ān and Sunnah as the primary sources [3]

Even though Ḥasan al-Bannā' and his followers saw themselves as the successors of the revivalist movement of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ᶜAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā, they were more interested in implementing the revival than in engaging in intellectual deliberations.[4] Bannā' clearly defined the role of the Ikhwān, saying:

> My Brothers: you are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qur'an; you are a new light which shines to destroy the darkness of materialism through knowing God; and you are the strong voice which rises to recall the message of the Prophet. . . If you are accused of being revolutionaries, say "We are voices for right and for peace in which we dearly believe. If you rise against us or stand in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your injustice.[5]

This action-oriented directive clearly differentiates the Ikhwān from its revivalist ancestors. The former viewed Afghānī as the "caller" or the "announcer" *(mu'adhdhin, sarkhah)* and Riḍā as the "archivist" or "historian" *(sajal, mu'arrikh).*[6] Bannā' however was respected as the "builder *(bānī)* of a renaissance, leader of a generation and founder of a nation."[7]

The Ikhwān's ideology can be summarized as: based on the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, Islam is a total way of life, applicable to all times and places. Throughout its life-time, the Ikhwān fought for the full implementation of the Sharīᶜah in Egypt. The conviction of the fundamental belief system of Islam -- there is no separation of religion from politics -- made it imperative for the Ikhwān to become involved in the political situation of Egypt. In the first decade, its political input was limited to peaceful pressure, through the writing of

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[3]They did not call for a return to the seventh century, but to the purity of that era which thereby entailed disregarding all Islamic thought since then.

[4]John O. Voll, Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p.175.

[5]Mitchell, p.54 from Bayn al-Ams wa'l-Yaum, p.28-31.

[6]"Afghāni sees the problems and warns; ᶜAbduh teaches and thinks; and Riḍā writes and records." Mitchell, p.516.

[7]Mitchell, p.516 from al-Daᶜwah 4 (20 Feb '51), p.15.

letters and newspaper articles, on rulers (within and without Egypt), and other governmental personnel to heed the call of Islam. As time passed, the Ikhwān became more and more involved in the political scene inside and outside Egypt.[8]

The Ikhwān was not an inward-oriented movement which confined itself to the religious awakening of its members; it was very involved with the society at large. In the first decade the Ikhwān's activities concentrated on the consciousness-raising and moral-teaching of society. Its main role was to educate the masses to the truth; "'when the people have been Islamized, a truly Muslim nation will naturally evolve."[9] Muslim disunity,[10] moral corruption and social welfare were some of its big concerns. Newspaper articles were written explaining how Islam could solve Egypt's problems. The Ikhwān also built and operated mosques, schools (attended by students in the day, their parents at night), hospitals, and medical dispensaries. It even ran its own companies in its fight against unemployment.[11]

Bannā' described his movement as ". . . a Salafite movement; an orthodox way, a Sufi reality, a political body, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society an economic

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[8]Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s" in Third World Quarterly, vol.10, #2 (April '88), pp.635; Mitchell, p.30.

[9]Mitchell, p.497, see foreward in al-Sayyid abū al-Hussayni al-Nadawi's al-Islām wa'l-Hukm (Cairo, 1373), p.3.

[10]A major concern of the Ikhwān was the issue of Muslim disunity which completely undermines and contradicts the fundamental obligation of every Muslim to live in loving brotherhood with his fellow Muslim. Disunity is deadly to the Muslim ummah. It is for this reason that the Ikhwān belonged to neither school nor sect. As Bannā' explained: "Let us cooperate in those things on which we can agree and be lenient in those matters in which we cannot agree" (Mitchell, pp.358-359; Hussaini, p.86). This aspect was a great attraction for potential members, but more importantly, it emphasized the possibility, the reality, of a universal ummah. Such an outlook also enabled the Ikhwān to cooperate with various other organizations, political parties and eventually with the government in the fight for nationalism, independence, Muslim self-determination, international Muslim/Arab unity. (Husssaini, pp.41-42)

[11]The Ikhwān had a number of companies which they ran themselves: Company for Islamic Transactions (1938); Brothers' Publishing Company; Brothers' Journalistic Company (1945); Arabic Advertising Company (1947) -- which proved to be the largest and most successful venture; Company of the Muslim Brothers for Spinning and Weaving; Company for Commercial and Engineering Works (Alexandria); Company for Commercial Agencies (Suez); Commercial Company (1952). (Mitchell, pp.46-48; Hussaini, p.56).

company and a social idea".[12] This totality of the Ikhwān was based on the totality and the comprehensiveness of Islam which is "doctrine, worship, homeland, nationality, religion, spirituality, the Koran and the sword." Islam was not just worship but an integral part of everyday and everything as was embodied in the Ikhwān's rallying call of "God is our goal. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur'an is our Constitution. Struggle is our way. Death in the service of God is the loftiest of our wishes. God is great, God is great."[13] This call also expresses a clear indication that the Ikhwān would resort to active (i.e. militant) struggle if necessary, to see the Sharīᶜah implemented. According to Richard P. Mitchell, there was a wide belief inside and outside the Ikhwān that the violent overthrow of the political order was in fact the intention of the society.[14]

The Ikhwān expanded rapidly: in 1929 there were four branches; in 1931 -- ten; 1932 -- fifteen; 1938 -- three hundred; 1940 -- five hundred, and by 1949 -- two thousand. In terms of membership numbers, this meant in the peak period of 1946-1948, some 300,000 to 600,000 members plus 500,000 sympathizers.[15] The Ikhwān al-Muslimīn is the only grass-roots movement of twentieth century Egypt which virtually represented every group in Egyptian society, particularly the working class. Attracting the urban labourer and the rural farmer counted a great deal towards its success as a popular movement.[16]

In the 1930s the Ikhwān became involved with the cause of Palestine, claiming that Palestine was the heart of the Arab world. This concern for its brethren helped in the spread of the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Sudan, and North Africa. Even before the Palestine War of 1948 began, the Ikhwān sent guerilla troops to help its

[12]Hussaini, p.15 from min Khutab Hasan al-Bannā', Ist series (Damascus, 1938), p.24; Mitchell, p.32 from al-Mu'tamar al-Khāmis, pp.14-16.

[13]Mitchell, p.309. Thus the emblem of the Ikhwān became a Qur'ān between two swords.

[14]Mitchell, p.503.

[15]Mitchell, p.524 See Hasan al-Banna''s Mudhakkarāt al-Daᶜwah wa'l-Daᶜiyyah (15 April '52), p.5

[16]Mitchell, p.29.

Palestinian brothers in their fight against the Jews. Its contingents -- later fighting under the aegis of the Arab League -- fought valiantly and have always been remembered for this heroic role.

From 1939 onwards, the Ikhwān became more and more political, clashing often with the Egyptian government. It championed independence for Egypt, unity of the Nile Valley and eventually a government with a caliph *(khalīfah)* at its head. It also fought to bring about reforms in accordance with the Sharīᶜah. The Ikhwān believed that true renewal cannot be based on blind imitation of the past *(taqlīd)* but rather must be open to fresh interpretation in order to meet the ever-changing needs of the ummah.[17] In this sense, the Ikhwān can thus be seen to be quite 'modern' in outlook, for it is quite obvious that it does not want to return to the seventh century as it has often been accused of desiring. For the Ikhwān, Islam remains pertinent to every age and to every people. It is neither dead nor stagnant, nor is it relegated to the past, as many Muslims were beginning to feel.

From its genesis, the Ikhwān was a direct challenge to al-Azhar (the 'pillar' of Islam in the Muslim world) and its ᶜulamā'. The Ikhwān leveled two accusations at the Azharite religious scholars: (1) they had failed in their assigned role as "spokesman for a living and dynamic Islam"; (2) they were not "forceful enough in the resistance to the intrusion by foreign ideas and values" on Islam. The Ikhwān strongly believed that the Azharī ᶜulamā' had let Egypt plunge into "religious, cultural, political, economical, social, legal and moral decadence and impotence." Al-Azhar had neglected to keep Islam up-to-date with the times and needs of "living Muslims." The ᶜulamā' were therefore to blame for the deterioration of society and instead of trying to rectify the situation, were now linked to the ruling elite and vested interests.[18] They were no longer the voice of opposition they had once been against

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[17]Esposito, Straight, p.55.
[18]Mitchell, pp.352-353.

state corruption and repression. The Ikhwān therefore sought to replace the Azharīs as a voice for the downtrodden.

Late 1942, early 1943 saw the creation of the "secret apparatus" of the Ikhwān which was controlled directly by Bannā'. Its members received special military training beyond that of the other members. The military character of the movement was found in the concept of jihād which was defined as *qitāl* (killing). Jihād was therefore interpreted as an active struggle, (not as the struggle to better ones' self, as the ᶜulamā' tended to understand it), leading if necessary to martyrdom and death.[19] During its lifetime, the secret apparatus initiated campaigns of violence and terror against its opponents on university campuses, as well as against government institutions officials and politicians. Actions were accelerated during and after the Palestine War of 1948.[20] From 1945-1952, more and more of the violence perpetuated by the Ikhwān revolved around the theme of action -- "murder and terrorism" against the English and their tools."[21] But the violence within Egypt during the 1940s was not solely at the hands of the Ikhwān. There were other groups, notably nationalistic in nature, which were also responsible for some of the violence; the difference lay in the Ikhwān's Islamic dimension.

On 28 December 1948 the secret apparatus carried out its most notorious act during its reign of terror: the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrāshī. King Fārūq declared the Ikhwān illegal. An immediate crackdown and severe repression was carried out. On 12 February 1949 General Guide Ḥasan al-Bannā' was assassinated, presumably by the secret police in retaliation for the Nuqrashī murder. According to Richard P. Mitchell, "Banna's death was a tragedy of incalculable proportions to the membership.

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[19]Mitchell, pp.341-342.

[20]It was said by some that the Ikhwān was "an Islamic army for the protection of the Message." Mitchell, p.512, from Aḥmad Anas al-Ḥajjajī, Qā'id al-Da'wah: Ḥayat Rajul wa-Ta'rikh Madrasah (Cairo, 1946), pp.103-104.

[21]Mitchell, p.509, from Anwar al-Sadat, Safahat Maihūlan (Cairo, 1945), pp.142-144.

Nothing that befell the Brothers as individuals and groups at the hands of the authority had a more debilitating effect on the movement than the loss of its leader."[22] Supreme Guide Ḥasan Ḥudaibī (1951-1973) had the difficult task of following Bannā"s charismatic image. He failed. Under him the organization experienced a drop in membership, and there was a general sense of it being a "movement in stagnation", that the Ikhwān had become "a movement of words not actions".[23] The secret apparatus was responsible for the negative and violent image applied to the Ikhwān, but under Ḥudaibī, it was no longer active.

The Nāṣir-led Free Officers' revolution of 1952 ushered in a new mood. The Ikhwān was convinced this was its chance to have the Sharīᶜah instituted. The Free Officers thought otherwise; relations between the two remained shaky and uneasy. In 1954, Gamāl ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir became President of Egypt. His charisma, his aggressive pan-Arabism, social reforms, and mass mobilization filled the ideological vacuum. Arab nationalism replaced Islamic fundamentalism as the solution for Egypt's problems.[24] Nāṣir and the Free officers preempted the Ikhwān in the field of religion,[25] and the latter could do nothing but remain in the background. Both the Ikhwān and the Free Officers drew from the same constituency (the lower-middle class), but in the 1950s and '60s, the Free Officers took most of the supporters away from the Ikhwān.[26] The strained relationship between the two came to an abrupt and ill-fated end with the attempted assassination of Nāṣir in 1954. A member of the Ikhwān was found guilty, and Nāṣir used this opportunity for a massive crackdown and severe repression against the organization. Thousands were

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[22]Mitchell, p.483.

[23]Mitchell, p.79.

[24]Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (NY: St. Martin' Press, 1990), p.13

[25]During his reign, Nāṣir increased the number of mosques greatly; a number of religious broadcasting stations were set up; the Islamic Conferences and Islamic Research Council were founded; a law to develop al-Azhar was issued; religion became an obligatory subject to pass the school examinations. (Rubin, pp.13-14). The Ikhwān could not compete with Nāṣir in the field of religion, nor could it be seen to oppose him: after all, they were both fighting to Islamize the society at large.

[26]Ibrahim, "Alternative", p.76.

arrested and its headquarters were sacked. Initiated by the government through an intense smear-campaign, there was also a general rampage against Ikhwān property by the general public . Six Ikhwānīs were hanged for their role in the assassination attempt. Ikhwān ideologist Sayyid Quṭb was among those arrested and in July 1955 was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. During his years of confinement, Quṭb wrote extensively, with his most well-known works of that period being a thirty volume commentary on the Qur'ān, fī Ẓilāl al-Qur'ān (In the Shadow of the Qur'ān), and Maᶜālim fī'l-Ṭarīq (Milestones). In 1964 upon the request of Iraq's president ᶜAbd al-Salām ᶜArif, Quṭb was released, only to be rearrested a year later on charge of conspiring to overthrow the government. Nāṣir claimed to have uncovered the plot, charging that Quṭb's last book, Maᶜālim, instigated the people to revolt. Twenty-seven thousand people were arrested, and hundreds were sentenced by a special court. The three top leaders, including Quṭb, were executed on 29 August 1966.

With the 1967 Arab defeat in the war against Israel, Nāṣir began to lose support and popularity which the Ikhwān began to win back. With the natural death of Gamāl ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir on 28 September 1970, Anwar al-Sādāt took over the presidency. Sādāt had had good prerevolutionary ties to the Ikhwān, but he had also been one of the three-member tribunal which had smashed the organization in 1954. Sādāt knew that in order to win the necessary support to counter the Nāṣirists and the Leftists, he would have to accommodate the Ikhwān which was the most powerful group on the scene at that time. In keeping with this policy, Sādāt released, in the early 1970s, those Ikhwānīs incarcerated under Nāṣir. He also greatly encouraged all Islamic movements, especially those operating on university campuses.

By the time the Ikhwān was allowed to resume its activities in 1975, Supreme Guide ᶜUmar al-Tilmisānī (1973-1986) had decided that the Ikhwān would forsake violence and would carry out its mission to Islamize society peacefully. Many of the

youngermembers[27] refused to accept this change in orientation. They declared that the Ikhwān had 'sold its soul to the Devil' through its accommodation with the state But the strategic goal of the Ikhwān in the 1970s and 1980s was to rebuild its structure and to re-establish its influence. It rewrote its history, going so far as to even deny its role in the 1954 assassination attempt on Nāṣir's life. Tilmisānī and other leaders defined the 'new' role of the Ikhwān as a "watchman" or "guardian", ensuring that the government did not stray from Islam and its laws. The Ikhwān therefore established itself as a pressure group. It has kept to this new philosophy, for the government has not yet held the Ikhwān responsible for any act of terrorism or violence since 1981.[28]

The Ikhwān however remained relatively loyal to Sādāt until his visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 and his subsequent peace talks with Israel. This opposition to the rapprochement with Israel was based on Islamic solidarity and empathy for its Muslim Palestinian brothers suffering under the repressive government in Israel. Hatred and distrust of the Jews and the Zionists also played a significant part in this stand, for the Ikhwān's role in the 1948 Palestine War against Israel should not be forgotten. The Ikhwān felt that Sādāt had stabbed it in the back. It therefore began a venomous attack on Sādāt and his policies which ultimately encouraged the militant groups to react against him. On 6 October 1981, President Anwar al-Sādāt was assassinated by a member of the radical militant group al-Gihād.

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[27]These younger members split off from the now-moderate Ikhwān, forming new and more radical groups. With regard to these groups, the Ikhwān contend that they would disappear if the Sharī'ah were to be adopted as the basis of Egypt's laws. The Ikhwān sees the extremists as young and hotheaded people who fail to understand that Islam does not flourish under compulsion. (Rubin, pp.35-37 from "Muslim Brotherhood jihad confrontation in Asyut" in Akhir Sā'ah (6 April '88), p.21). Ibrahim points out a very interesting observation, and that is tha most of the Ikhwān's top leaders are the residue of the pioneer generation which worked with Hasan al-Bannā' and are therefore in their sixties. It seems that the Ikhwān is a movement of thousands of youngsters in their twenties led and inspired by figures forty years their senior. (Ibrahim, "Alternative", p.91).

[28]Rubin, p.31 from Umar abd al-Sami, "'I want a party, the Brotherhood did not leave the Wafd and did not join the Liberal Party" in al-Musawwar (2 May '86), pp.16-19.

Sayyid Quṭb

Having taken a brief historical look at the Ikhwān, we shall now take a look at its ideologue Sayyid Quṭb[29] in order to understand the impact his thought had on Egypt's radical splinter groups.

Sayyid Quṭb was a poet, educator, journalist and literary critic before becoming "a leading intellectual of the contemporary Islamic movement in Egypt and the Arab world."[30] From 1948-1950 he was sent to the USA on behalf of the Ministry of Education for which he worked. His dislike for the USA in particular, the West in general, developed during this period. The American joy he witnessed at the 1949 assassination of Ḥasan al-Bannā', combined with the dislike of Arabs he was exposed to, repelled Quṭb tremendously. America's "crass consumerism and moral degeneracy" also played a significant role.[31] In 1949 his Social Justice in Islam was published. This work contained the seeds of his controversial thought of the 1960s. Upon his return to Egypt, Quṭb struck an independent path in his work, calling people to Islam, urging them to agitate against prevailing conditions in Egypt. He was gradually drawn into the orbit of the Ikhwān when he began contributing regularly to its publications. In 1951 Quṭb joined the Ikhwān at the age of forty-five and in the following year, was elected to its leadership and named head of the

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[29]For more information on Sayyid Quṭb, please see: Shaukat Ali, "Sayyid Qutb: a Revolutionary Ideologue of Islamic Resurgence" in Contemporary Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd, 1986), pp.353-408; Yvonne Haddad, "Traditional Response" in Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), pp.89-99; Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: the View of Sayyid Qutb" in Middle East Journal, vol.37, #1 (Winter '83),pp.14-29; Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival in John L. Esposito (ed.) Voices of Resurgent Islam (NY: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp.67-98; Sayyid Quṭb, Social Justice in Islam, trans. John B. Hardie (NY: Octagon Books, 1970); Adnan Ayyub Musallam, "The Formative Stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual Career and his Emergence as an Islamic Da'iyah." PhD dissertation at the University of Michigan, 1983; Sayyid Quṭb, Milestones, revised edition (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Unity Publishing Co., 1982).

[30]Adnan, p.1.

[31]Bassam Tibi, "Islam and Arab Nationalism" in Barbara Freyer Stowasser (ed.) The Islamic Impulse (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p.68.

Department for the Propagation of Islam.[32] Just prior to and shortly after the 1952 revolution, Quṭb had close ties to Nāṣir's government, but he left his advisory post once he realized that the Sharīᶜah would not be implemented as had been hoped would occur following the Free Officer Revolution. In July 1954, General Guide Ḥudaibī (1951-1973) appointed him editor-in-chief of the Ikhwān publication al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn. In October of that same year, Quṭb was arrested in the massive crackdown on the Ikhwān after the assassination attempt on Nāṣir's life. He was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment during which he wrote fī Ẓilāl al-Qur'ān and Maᶜālim, the latter which had considerable repercussions in Egypt for years to come. In 1965 Quṭb was rearrested for conspiring to overthrow the regime and on 29 August 1966 was hanged. His killing did not diminish the influence of his thought in any way, as Nāṣir could only have hoped; instead it created another martyr for the Islamic cause.

While incarcerated from 1954 to 1964, Quṭb had much time to reflect on the state of both Egypt and the Muslim world at large.[33] His reflections took ultimate form in Maᶜālim which he wrote as a manifesto.[34] Since it is this work which has had such a phenomenal impact on the Egyptian scene, we shall focus our attention on it. Quṭb will often speak for himself so that the full effect of his words will be given.

Sayyid Quṭb recognized that as long as Muslims had remained true to Islam, they had controlled their destiny and had been strong and victorious. But once they strayed from the path of Islam, they had become weak and were plagued with hardship. History

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[32]As Head of the Department for Propagation of Islam, Sayyid Quṭb was in charge of the Ikhwān's daᶜwah ('call') and was responsible as well for lectures; journalism and the publication of Islamic literature; the spiritual, mental and physical well-being and direction of each member; and providing the *duᶜāt* (missionaries) for speeches. (Adnan, p.260).

[33]One can see many similarities between the thought of Sayyid Quṭb and that of the Pakistani Abū al-Aᶜlā al-Mawdūdī upon whom he depended quite heavily, by his own admission.

[34]"It is necessary that this vanguard know the landmarks and the milestones of the road . . . I have written "Milestones" for this vanguard, which I consider to be a waiting reality to be materialized." (Quṭb, Milestones, p.12).

demonstrated this only too well, and thus it was time to take a lesson from the past in order to correct the present and save the future. The ummah of Muḥammad and the Rāshidūn Caliphs was the most perfect in Islamic history and was therefore to be emulated in every way; the intensity of its Islamic spirit has yet to be paralleled in history. Although the world of Islam has experienced "an ebb and flow of Islamic spirit"[35] since Muᶜāwiyyah and the ᶜUmayyads, its ultimate defeat occurred only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries at the hands of the European powers when they "conquered the world and when the dark shadow of colonialization spread over the whole Islamic world, East and West alike."[36] Not only was Islam subjugated externally by the colonial powers, but worse yet, it was suppressed internally, as the Muslim world experimented with many imported movements (nationalism, secularism and socialism etc.) which were completely alien to Islam. None of these foreign ideologies proved entirely satisfactory or capable of solving all the current needs or problems of the Muslim world. But with their brief implementation, new and complex dilemmas were often created, throwing the Muslim world into confusion and cultural discord. Why the turn to the foreign and the alien instead of finding solutions in Islam? Was this a sign of the times, that Islam was no longer pertinent in the present age? Was the Revelation 'outdated' and 'old-fashioned'? For Quṭb, this abandonment of Islam was completely unacceptable and incomprehensible: since most people in the Muslim world are Muslim, Islam is a logical means of expression. Islam contains everything needed for a movement (especially with regard to foundations, framework, cohesion, inherent faith, organization, social infrastructure etc.); there is nothing new to be learned or

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[35]Adnan, p.186.

[36]Quṭb, Social Justice in Islam, p.235. The colonial powers helped themselves to the Muslim world: France took most of North Africa, giving parts of Morocco to Spain; Britain occupied and controlled Egypt from the 1880s to the 1950s; Italy defeated Libya (1911-1931) and occupied her till 1942. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in WWI, most of the Arab East was broken up into French and British mandates. Although most Muslim countries gained independence after WWII, they are still politically, economically, and to a certain extent, culturally dependent on the West. (Henry Munsen Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p.118).

implemented. The mosque is not only a place of worship but can also be a forum of ferment, a meeting place, an arena of discussion, a center to disseminate the daᶜwah. Islam also has a distinctive vocabulary, language, symbols and history which simultaneously unite Muslims and separate them from all other political parties. Islam can also be translated into an emotional rallying call for action. In addition to all of this, Islam is flexible enough to remain pertinent to the conditions of a changing world.[37] Quṭb saw all that Islam and its heritage has to offer its believers and could not understand why Muslims rejected Islam so often in favour of the "alien principles, ideas, customs taken from across the deserts and beyond the seas."[38] Egypt was an obvious example. Home to al-Azhar ("pillar of Islam"), here the Sharīᶜah was nevertheless partially discarded in favour of man-made law. Men were subjected to the sovereignty of Nāṣir who was also worshipped. Freedoms were suppressed, and Ikhwānīs were oppressed for living their lives in accordance with the Qur'ān. The Revelation had been abandoned. It was then that Quṭb made his radical condemnation of Egypt in particular, and the Muslim world in general:

> If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in jahiliyyah[39] . . . [which] is not a period in time. It is a condition that is repeated everytime society veers from the Islamic way, whether in the past, the present or the future. . . We are surrounded by jahiliyyah today, which is the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws -- is jahiliyyah even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of jahiliyyah. . . <u>All existing so-called 'Muslim' societies are also jahili</u> . . . because their way of life is not based on submission to God alone. Although they believe in the Unity of God, still they have relegated the legislative attribute of God to others and submit to this authority and from

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[37]The Sharīᶜah (Divine law) with the Qur'ān as its fundamental source, is absolute, complete and changeless. The Sharīᶜah determines the periphery within which Islam operates. It keeps the ummah on the Straight Path and at the same time, ensures a link between the future and the past. *Fiqh* (the science of jurisprudence), on the other hand, is open to change because it "deals with local applications in a changing world." (Haddad, "Traditional Response", p.95).

[38]Quṭb, <u>Social Justice</u>, p.1.

> this authority they derive their systems, their traditions and customs, their laws, their values and standards, and almost every practice of life.[40]

This declaration of Quṭb's, that every society was jāhil, even the Muslim societies, was a radical denunciation of the Muslim world as a whole. The enemy was no longer restricted to "out there" but had been identified "within." The ignorance of Allāh ('jāhiliyyah') was no longer limited to the era before the Revelation but could occur again, despite the Revelation. This was almost inconceivable. Muslims had no excuse for persisting in their straying from the path of Islam since they had the Qur'ān for guidance. Their crime was thus far worse than that of the pre-Islamic Arabs who had had no guidance at all.

Given this abominable state of affairs, Quṭb concluded that the only solution was to take faith and example from the first ummah, to recreate the conditions of early Islam. Muḥammad and his Companions had restricted themselves to the pure source of the Qur'ān to the exclusion of all else -- and so the present Muslim community must likewise return to the purity of the Qur'ān in its drive to reconstruct the early ummah. It was here that Quṭb disagreed with the traditionalists who alleged that the ummah of pristine Islam was a "once-and-for-all, never-to-be-repeated" period of human history. Quṭb believed the significance of this period lay in its ideal nature which is within man's reach again: "Truly this period is not the product of an unrepeated miracle; it was the product of the human effort exerted by early Muslims. It is attainable again when a similar effort is put forth."[41]

Quṭb was unrelenting in his conviction that the Muslim world was in dire need of a vanguard, a small group of committed Muslims which would dedicate itself to the recreation of a pure Muslim ummah based on prophetic precedence. This nucleus would not focus its efforts on teaching society about Islam, but would gradually

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[39]"This jahiliyyah is based on the rebellion against God's sovereignty on earth. It transfers to men one of the greatest attributes of God namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others." (Quṭb, Milestones, p.11).

[40]Quṭb, Milestones, pp.10, 20, 82-83 (my emphasis).

[41]Haddad,"Traditional Response", p.192 from Sayyid Quṭb, Hādha al-Dīn, (Cairo, n.d.), p.38.

> transplant the belief into a living reality. . . [while freeing itself from] the clutches of jahili society, jahili concepts, jahili traditions and jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of jahili society. . . Our aim is first to change ourselves so that we may later change the society. . . [for] the Islamic society is not just an entity of the past, to be studied in history, but it is a demand of the present and a hope of the future.[42]

This vanguard would have to isolate itself from the rest of the jāhilī society in order to avoid contamination. But once it is

> an Islamic community. . . which is a concrete example of the Divinely-ordained system of life, it has a God-given right to step forward and take control of the political authority so that it may establish the Divine system of earth . . .[43]

For Quṭb it was thus truly evident that once the pure Islamic vanguard was created,that it would have to take control in order to re-establish the Islamic way of life. He was not advocating reform but rather revolution, for society had become too corrupt to be saved in its present form. And jihād would be the means to spread Islam to Muslims and the rest of humanity, for the jihād of Islam "is to secure complete freedom for every man throughout the world by releasing him from servitude to other human beings so that he may serve his God."[44] While

> there is no compulsion in religion, [when] . . . obstacles and practical difficulties are put in its way, it has no recourse but to remove them by force so that when it is addressed to peoples' hearts and minds, they are free to accept or reject it with an open mind.[45]

Quṭb was therefore advocating militant action in order to institute Islam in the world again, remaining faithful to the prophetic example of Muḥammad fighting the infidels in the path of Islam.

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[42]Quṭb, Milestones, pp.38, 20-21, 103.
[43]Quṭb, Milestones, p.76 (my emphasis).
[44]Quṭb, Milestones, p.70.
[45]Quṭb, Milestones, p.63 (my emphasis).

It was this denunciation of Egypt as a jāhilī society along with his radical solutions for reconstructing a true and pure Muslim ummah that cost Sayyid Quṭb his life.

But if we recall the Ikhwān, its beginnings, its concern with society's well-being and religiousness, we can almost see Quṭb's 'vanguard of committed Muslims' who fought to bring about the ideal ummah. The Ikhwān was, in fact, a ('pure') society within a (jāhilī Egyptian) society. Education and peaceful means were first used to propagate its da^{c}wah, soon to be supplemented, or replaced, by violence. The Ikhwān even used 'jihād' through the secret apparatus in order to make its radical statements. Did Quṭb base his concept of the vanguard on the Ikhwān before it was brutally crushed in 1954 and 1965? Did he advocate separation and isolation from the jāhilī society before taking over the reins of political power due to the repression suffered by the Ikhwān? Quṭb's militancy appeared after years of suppression and imprisonment suffered by members of the Ikhwān.[46] Rather than adopting Quṭb's ideology, General Guide Tilmisānī and other Ikhwān leaders decided (after Quṭb's execution) that the Ikhwān would go the pacifist way. The organization had suffered terribly since 1954; it could not afford to once again draw Nāṣir's wrath down upon itself. It remained for others outside the Ikhwān to realize Quṭb's dreams.

Shabāb Muḥammad and al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah

As with most case-studies on activist groups, it was difficult finding information on the three groups, namely Shabāb Muḥammad (Muḥammad's Youth), al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah (the group which "charges society with unbelief, *takfīr*, and advocates withdrawal from it,

[46]Al-Gihād was summarily influenced by the cruel treatment suffered in Cairo's prisons. For a brief exposé on how the extremist takfīr theory was formulated, please see Johannes J. G. Jansen, "The Early Islamic Movement of the Kharidjites and Modern Moslem Extremism: Similarities and Differences" in Orient, vol.27, #1(March '86), pp.129-130.

hijrah")[47] and al-Gihād (striving in the way of Allāh),[48] for there is a problem at the research level if only because these groups are underground. Knowledge about them is derived therefore almost exclusively from media coverage of the arrests and trials of their members (which is, not surprisingly, very negative due to government control of the media). In the Egyptian context, we are lucky since Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (and some colleagues) did an in-depth study, from September 1977 to February 1979, of thirty-four arrested members of Takfīr and Shabāb.[49] His work has become the basis for numerous articles by other scholars dealing with this militant yet vibrant type of human behaviour. Unfortunately I too must rely quite heavily on Ibrahim's study, supplementing it with the work of other scholars who have also used his research. The weakness should be quite obvious in that we are basing our research on limited field-work which could, realistically-speaking, prove defective in the future. If more independent studies were possible and available, one would have some means of making more specific and complete hypotheses and conclusions with regard to the many different aspects of islāmiyyah and the islāmiyyīn. One would also be able to verify the analysis against the research of others. However until a means of obtaining this material becomes more accessible and available, one is forced to rely on that which already exists . . .

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[47]This translation of the name "al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah", though cumbersome is the most precise I have yet seen. See Jansen, "Early Islamic Movement", pp.127-128. It has also been translated as "Repentance and Holy Flight" which is quite nonsensical and misleading.

[48]"Al-Gihad" is often translated into "Holy War" but this term is also highly misleading and reflects one point of view of jihād -- the extremist view -- only. We will remain with the base definition of jihād as "striving (in the path of Allāh)." For an interpretation of jihād in Egypt, please see Richard C. Martin, "Striving in the Path of Allah: a Fundamentalist Interpretation of Jihad in Egypt" in Conflict Quarterly, vol.7, #2 (Spring '79), pp.5-19.

[49]Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.12, #4 (Dec '80), pp.423-453.

The militant movement Shabāb Muḥammad[50] is also known as the Islamic Liberation Organization *(Munaẓẓamat al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī)*, but was dubbed the Technical Military Academy Group by the press after its ill-fated attack on Cairo's Technical Military Academy on 18 April 1974 which was to culminate in the assassination of President Anwar al-Sādāt. The justification offered in Shabāb's defense of its actions was a saying of the Prophet which is as follows: "Any of you who sees a repugnance *(munkar)* ought to remove it with his hands; if unable, then by his tongue; and if unable, then by his heart."[51] Its call for action that year was "*ghadbah lillāh*" ("outrage for God"). The punishment for Shabāb's attack on the state was the execution of its two top leaders and the loss of the group's legal status.

Formed by Dr. Ṣāliḥ Siriyyah in Cairo and Alexandria in the early 1970s, the movement was based on friendship and religious ties. It attracted mainly young (the median age was twenty-two), university students/recent graduates of a lower or of a lower-middle class background. Most resided in Cairo, Alexandria or the Delta. Women, however, were not recruited. After recruitment members continued to lead normal lives so as not to attract attention. Siriyyah himself was a Palestinian-born Iraqi and, before coming to Cairo in 1971, was a former member of the Islamic Liberation Party in Jordan. He held a Doctorate in Science Education and was a charismatic, courageous, and pious man in his mid-thirties.

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[50]For information on Shabāb Muḥammad, please see Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s" in Third World Quarterly, vol.10, #2 (April '88), pp.632-657; Ibrahim, "Anatomy", pp.423-453; Dekmejian, pp.93-96; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Islamic Militancy as a Social Movement: the Case of Two Groups in Egypt" in Ali E. Dessouki (ed.), Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, chapter 6; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants" in MERIP REPORTS, #103, vol.12, #2 (Feb '82), pp.5-14.

[51]Ibrahim, "Anatomy", P 43. The full ḥadīth is as follows: On the authority of Abū Sayyid al-Khudrī who heard it from the Prophet: "Whosoever sees an evil (munkar) let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart and that is the weakest of faith (ḥadīth #35)." As related by Muslim. (Taken from An-Nawawī's Forty Hadith, trans. Ezzeddin Ibrahim and Denys Johnson-Davis (Damascus: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 1976), p.110).

Shabāb Muḥammad was a democratic movement, led by a twelve-member executive council. Decisions were weighed and taken formally. The leadership believed in meticulous planning for the coup d'état, and had even managed to secure a detailed study of the presidential and other élite behaviour, and of daily routine etc. Members had penetrated the army and the police, and all had strenuous and thorough training in weaponry. General rehearsals of most of the plan were even carried out.

Shabāb Muḥammad was heavily influenced by the writings of Ḥasan al-Bannā', Sayyid Quṭb (both of Egypt), Abū al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī (of Pakistan), and ʿAlī Sharīʿatī (of Iran). The group's ideology is very similar to that of the second group, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah, and for that reason only the differences will be mentioned here; the similarities will be discussed later. According to Shabāb, the political system alone obstructed the spread of the Islamic form of society. Not all people were *jāhil* (ignorant) -- submissive to man as opposed to Allāh -- for society was seen as the victim of unscrupulous leaders at the top of the political system. The lack of Sharīʿah in society was the cause of all of Egypt's domestic problems and her weakness in the face of her external enemies. All of this could be brought to an end through the restructuring of society on the basis of Sharīʿah. Members wanted therefore to seize power in a coup d'état, instituting Islam from the top down. This identification of the problem of society conforms with the very choice of action and the manner of implementation chosen in order to bring about its goals: jihād against an apostate. Common also to both Islamic groups is their conviction that Islam is the only way for a virtuous life. But Shabāb deviated from Takfīr with its uncompromising dismissal of all other religions as *kufr* (godless). As a result of this rigid stance, one finds Shabāb far more intolerant of the Jews and Christians than most other movements in general.

The second group, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah,[52] was forced into early confrontation with the state due to the treatment of its jailed-members by the state. In protest, Takfīr kidnapped Muḥammad al-Dhahabī on 3 July 1977. Al-Dhababī was a religious scholar and former Minister of *Awqāf* (religious endowments) who had not only written negatively against the group in the newspaper but had also spoken out vigorously on T.V..[53] Three days later, after the government refused its demands, he was killed. Members claim they had been forced to do so by the lack of government compliance. In retaliation, the group's top five leaders were executed and mass arrests were carried out. The group was believed to have crumbled at the loss of its founder; however, many of its members defected to other Islamic militant groups or left the movement for good. A few members maintained the group in the 1980s, outside Egypt, under the guidance of Muḥammad Amīn ᶜAbd al-Fattāḥ. The membership stands at about one hundred and fifty within Egypt, slightly more without. It is said that the group now aligns its policy with that of Shabāb Muḥammad.

Takfīr was started in the early 1970s by Shukrī Muṣṭafā who first operated in his home-town of Asyut before heading later to Cairo. The group was influenced by the *Khawārij* (Kharijites), Ibn Taymiyyah, Ḥasan al-Bannā', Sayyid Quṭb and Abū al-Aᶜlā al-

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[52]For information on al-Takfīr, please see Israel Altman, "Islamic Movements in Egypt" in Jerusalem Quarterly, #10 (Winter '79), pp.87-105; Patrick Bannerman, Islam in Perspective: a Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law (London: Routledge, 1988), chapters 8 and 9; Ibrahim, "Islamic Militancy" in Dessouki (chapter 6); Ibrahim, "Anatomy", pp.423-453; Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants", pp.5-14; Dekmejian, pp.93-97; Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: al-Saqi Books, 1985), chapter 3.

[53]There exists a discrepancy concerning Shaikh Muḥammad al-Dhahabī. Some say he was the former Minister of Awqāf while others say he was Minister of Awqāf at the time of his kidnapping and eventual assassination. According to Jansen, al-Dhahabī held the post of Cabinet Minister for Awqāf and hence was "one of the most important functionaries responsible for the religious policies of the Sadat regime. An attack on Sheikh Al-Dhahabi had, at that point in time, to be regarded as an attack on the government's policies on religion in general and on the government's policy on Islam in particular." (Jansen, "Early Islamic Movement", p.128).

Al-Dhahabī's religious attack on the islāmiyyīn was entitled al-Ittijāhāt al-Muḥarrifah fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Karīm: Dawāfiᶜuha wa Dafᶜuha (1976) (Deviant Tendencies in Interpreting the Holy Qur'ān: their Motives and their Repudiation).

Mawdūdī among others. No difference was made between the political system and the society as a whole; both were believed to be manifestations of the other: a corrupt society breeds a corrupt political system and vice versa. Egypt was therefore beyond salvation. Muṣṭafā interpreted Quṭb's words in Maʿālim to mean a necessary and actual physical separation from the rest of society until his group (the "vanguard") was strong enough numerically to return and change society from the bottom up. Muṣṭafā consequently withdrew with his followers into the Egyptian desert in 1973 following the example of the Prophet's *hijrah* ('migration') in 622 AD from Mecca to Medina.[54] By the time the officials noticed Takfīr a short time later, its members had followed their leader into self-imposed seclusion within Cairo itself. Living in a designated area, contact of any sort with the outside (especially with the state) was forbidden as contamination would ensue. As a result, the lives of the members revolved around the group which ministered to their every need. Members resigned from their jobs, left their families and cut all links with the outside world. Trade became the only acceptable and permitted occupation for members. Errant members suffered physical punishment and/or excommunication. Since non-members were not considered Muslims and were labelled *kāfirūn* (non-believers), excommunication relegated the unfortunate one to the status of apostate and the sentence of death hung over his head. Redemption existed only within the group. Once Muṣṭafā's model, nucleus community was numerically and spiritually strong enough, it would be able to reform society from bottom up. Takfīr had therefore a long-term strategy, one which entailed patience.

Shukrī Muṣṭafā was a leader who elicited fear from his followers, an autocratic *amīr* (leader) who was regarded as the *"mahdī* [messianic figure] sent to save the world from

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[54]At some point in time, Muṣṭafā, with his followers, had also planned to perform hijrah to North Yemen where they were to remain until the group was adequately prepared to carry out its mission successfully.

God's enemies . . ."[55] He was obeyed by all members by virtue of an oath of obedience *(bayaᶜ)*. His followers were recruited from Upper Egypt through kinship and religious ties. Women also joined but were on the whole wives and relatives of members. At the height of its popularity Takfīr boasted two or three thousand members and active sympathizers throughout Egypt; had contacts -- mainly migrant workers -- in Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Saudia, Syria, Yemen and probably Western Europe as well; had financial assets of £E50,000 and ran several small businesses (according to government estimates).

The group rejected *qiyās* (analogical deduction), *ijmāᶜ* (consensus) and *ijtihād* (independent judgement), for it considered everything after the Qur'ān and the Sunnah excluded from the domain of legitimate knowledge. It viewed the ᶜulamā' harshly (even more so than did Shabāb Muḥammad) for their support of an unIslamic government and for those *fatāwā* (pl. of fatwā, religious rulings) which were deliberately and obviously contrary to the teachings of Islam.[56] All respect for these religious scholars had been lost.

The differences between the groups have just been discussed. We will now take a look at the similarities to see if any pattern emerges:

1. With regards to the leaders, we find that both were in their mid-thirties when they began their movement. Both were former members of the Ikhwān and had been jailed under Nāṣir. Siriyyah (Shabāb) had a Doctorate in Science Education while Muṣṭafā had a Bachelor of Science in Agricultural Science -- they were therefore highly intelligent and motivated men. Both were charismatic, devout and well-versed in doctrine. Siriyyah ran his movement democratically however, in contrast to Muṣṭafā who was autocratic.
2. Members were university students/recent graduates and were therefore high-achievers. They came from a rural/small town background, from the lower-middle to middle classes, but were recent arrivals to big cities. The median age of Shabāb was twenty-two while that of Takfīr was twenty-four. Siriyyah was fourteen years older than most of his followers while Muṣṭafā was sixteen. (This age difference between leaders and members demonstrates the traditional respect of the Middle East for one's elders. The age of the members indicates

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[55]Israel Altman, "Islamic Movements in Egypt" in Jerusalem Quarterly, #10 (Winter '79), p.102.

[56]Examples of these unIslamic fatāwā included: beer is not really alcohol; banking interest does not count as usury.

these groups belong to the youth revolt). Total commitment and an iron-clad discipline was demanded from the members who were conditioned to become *shuhadā'* (martyrs).

3. Both leaders considered their groups an extension of the original Ikhwān although they had difficulties relating to the moderate (pacifist) Ikhwān of the 1960s and 1970s which, they believed, had 'sold its soul to the Devil.'
4. Both groups advocated an absolute and fundamental transformation of society and of the individual, using violence to bring it about, if necessary. Takfīr had a long-term plan of action (from the bottom up) while Shabāb wanted an immediate result (from top to bottom) through a coup d'état.
5. The Egyptian political system was inept and corrupt, and moral decay was the result of its total oblivion to the Sharīᶜah. This lack of Sharīᶜah was the reason for all the problems which Egypt faced. Everything would be solved if it were to be implemented in everyday social life.
6. The ᶜulamā of al-Azhar had abdicated their responsibility and had ceased to be qualified to lead the ummah. More damnable still, they stood in the way of recreating a true Islamic society through their blatant fawning upon, loyalty and submissiveness to the rulers. The religious scholars are condemned as propagandists who reinforce an immoral socio-political order, thereby corrupting Islam in the process.
7. Any foreign influence was termed 'imperialism' and was deemed antagonistic to Islam. Her enemies are: (1) Israel/ Zionism at all times; (2) the USSR during the 1960s and early 1970s; and (3) the USA in the 1970s. This identification provided the political justification for the operations of both groups, because Sādāt had moved too close to two of Islam's arch enemies through his wooing of the USA and his rapprochement/peace process with Israel.
8. Both groups had a foremost social obligation to the poor and to social justice according to the principle "justice is the foundation of rule" *("al-aᶜdl asād al-ḥukm")*.
9. A woman's first place is at home, her first obligation to her husband and to the socialization of good Muslim children. The family is the basic unit of Muslim society and is therefore vital for its well-being. *Al-fitnah* (imperative of modesty), *al-ghiwayyah* (protection of women from temptation) and the separation of the sexes in public places is to be insisted upon. The application of *ḥudūd* (legal punishment) with regard to sexual offenses is necessary and sufficient to ensure those ends.[57]
10. Both groups lost their founders and top leaders after their confrontation with the state. A great number of their members were also jailed but these did not regret their actions and would do it again. Both groups are still active though underground.

The membership make-up of both groups shows that university students/graduates who were recent arrivals to urban areas were most attracted to these militant groups. Did these groups attract these particular members because of the emotional support system they could

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[57]Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants", p.8.

offer as a replacement for the one the members had left behind in their hometown? Or was it their ideology that proved so attractive?

Al-Gihād

The last group to be discussed is al-Gihād[58] about which not much is known. People became aware of it only through its violent acts against Coptic places of worship in Upper Egypt sometime between 1978-1980. Al-Gihād was also very active in the violent student demonstrations in Asyut in 1980 and played a significant role in the sectarian conflicts with the Copts, first in Upper Egypt and then throughout the entire country. It was this group of the three groups discussed which was responsible for the most 'successful' act of all against the state: the assassination of President Anwar al-Sādāt on 6 October 1981 while he was reviewing the troops in Cairo. Two days later, fifty members attacked the security forces in Asyut. Mass arrests were carried out. State reaction was quick and predictable: a massive and extensive crackdown on all opposition groups, religious or not. The assassination made the news everywhere and was one of the factors which generated an increase in interest in fundamentalism. Since the assassination, most of the information about this group has been based upon the manuscript al-Farīḍah al-Ghā'ibah (The Neglected Duty) written by Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Salām Farag.

Farag was the ideologue of al-Gihād and according to Hamied Ansari, also the chief 'architect'.[59] There is little information known about him; he was a university graduate with a degree in Electrical Engineering who had joined the administrative staff of Cairo University. He came from a lower-middle class background. His father was an employee

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[58]For more information on al-Gihād, please see Dekmejian, pp.97-101; Kepel pp.191-222; Hamied N. Ansari, "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.16, #1 (March '84), pp.123-144; Helena Cobban, "The Angry Children of Islam" in The Middle East, #87 (Jan '82), pp.17-19; Assem Abdul Mohsen, "Defiant from the Docks", The Middle East, #87, (Jan '82), p.19; Johannes J. G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: the Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (NY: Macmillan Publ. Inc, 1986).

[59]Ansari, "The Islamic Militants", p.135.

of the Ministry of Health. Farag himself had been a distinguished Ikhwānī and had been arrested several times, although he soon became disenchanted with the moderate "watchdog" Ikhwān, taking consequently a militant stance. Blatantly contemptuous of the ᶜulamā', he was also very critical of the Ikhwān for ignoring the necessity/obligation of jihād, and for maintaining that a coup d'état was premature, the masses unprepared.

Although little was known of the group before Sādāt's assassination, we find that it was superior to the other groups in organizational structure. Its leadership was collective as opposed to resting on a charismatic individual. This organization allowed for much flexibility, not only in the decision-making process, but in every operation executed. The collective nature of the upper echelons also assured the group of longevity: al-Gihād could survive even if its leaders were executed or imprisoned, for it did not depend upon the charisma and magnetism of its founder/ideologue to keep it together. The group had two organizations which oversaw its operations: the leadership apparatus (including a ten-member *shūrā*, consultative assembly) which was in control of the overall planning, administration and policy-making; and the supervisory apparatus which was in charge of the activities of three groups which did the following:

1. conducted propaganda, recruitment, research and enforcement of religious laws.
2. provided operational support in technology engineering, arms procurement, intelligence and other specialization tasks.
3. acted as the combat organ charged with training in martial arts, marksmanship, medical support, and weaponry. It also sent emissaries to garner support and financial aid from members residing abroad, and it supervised al-Gihād's domestic communications network.[60]

The success of these subgroups is evident when one learns about the following: the theft of gold in Upper Egypt from jewelry shops owned by Copts in order to sell it and use the money to help finance activities; the attack on police stations in order to secure firearms; the

[60]Taken directly from Dekmejian, p.97. For the general structure of al-Gihād, please see appendix II.

cultivation of support among military officers to exploit not only their expertise in the use of firearms but also their ease in obtaining weapons and ammunition; the infiltration of the military's security forces and other governmental institutions. It is mainly this last point which so frightened and threatened the state, for at least four of Sādāt's assassins were military officers.[61] The state had no idea of the extent to which its institutions had been penetrated; the threat of further ferment would continue to exist as long as positions within state institutions would be held by individuals loyal or sympathetic to a militant group. (But how to determine which positions were filled by fifth columnists? This in itself is an indication of success, for al-Gihād could call upon these members at any time to initiate another coup d'état). Consequently the state purged the upper echelons of the military in the hopes of eliminating any lingering threat after the assassination. After all, it had been this infiltration which had made the entire operation so much easier, substantially increasing the chances of success: Sādāt reviewing the troops at the time of the attack, surrounded by military troops. Nonetheless, the assassins had been able to approach undercover by virtue of their uniforms and their positions in the officer corps. The successful assassination is an indication of their foresight and intricate planning.

Members were drawn quite extensively from the university-based jamāᶜāt (organizations), and the Ikhwān. The majority of members resided in Upper Egypt (65%) and Greater Cairo (26%), with the organizational strength centering in Upper Egypt's Asyut. Members were young (76% aged twenty-one to thirty) and from a lower-middle class background. Students made up the largest percentage (44%), followed by workers (14.5%), professionals (12.5%) and the unemployed (10.5%). The membership make-up is fairly similar to that of Shabāb Muḥammad and al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah. Members were

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[61]The members credited with the assassination and thus charged were: First Lieutenant Khālid Aḥmad Shawkī al-Islāmbūlī (an artillery officer who admitted to firing the fatal shot); Sergeant Ḥussayn ᶜAbbās; ᶜAṭā' Tayyal (an engineer and reserve officer) and ᶜAbd al-Ḥamīd Abd al-Salām (an army officer turned bookshop owner). (See Mohsen, "Defiant in the Dock", p.19).

divided into semi-autonomous, self-contained cells which provided more flexibility and which simultaneously guaranteed a greater chance of success for their operations: if one cell was discovered, the entire operation was not lost as another was able to take over its duties/ operations. One can see a strong resemblance with wartime guerilla units.

Al-Gihād had three main reasons for its assassination of Anwar al-Sādāt. First, it felt that Egypt's laws were inconsistent and incompatible with the laws of Islam. It had been within Sādāt's capabilities and duty to make them conform with the Qur'ān and the Sharī'ah, but he had done nothing of the sort. Second of all, Sādāt's rapprochement and peace with Israel, an arch enemy of Islam, was impossible to allow and was in total opposition to Islam. The last reason, namely the arrest, persecution and humiliation of Muslim fundamentalists in Sādāt's massive crack-down of 3 September 1981, seems to have been the 'final straw' so to speak, for less than a month later Sādāt was dead.

The ideology of al-Gihād was not much different from that of the other two groups discussed. It too wished to establish an Islamic state and society based on the adoption of and adherence to the Sharī'ah as the basis of political and social life. It did not intend to educate society, for it was not the individual who was at fault, but rather the state. Since Egypt's Muslim leader Anwar al-Sādāt had failed to meet the obligations of Islam, he had become an infidel (kāfir) and his legitimacy had been undermined.[62] He was therefore condemned to destruction. Al-Gihād aimed at seizing state power in order to achieve its goal, counting on an immediate take-over of power as "we proceed from top to bottom as we believe that a good ruler can create everything in society."[63] There was no need for mass support since it planned only to replace the ruler -- once that was accomplished,

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[62]A ruler holds authority by virtue of the choice of the people, and the legitimacy of his rule lasts as long as he adheres to the laws of the Sharī'ah. Obedience to his rule ceases immediately as soon as he deviates from the path of Islam.

[63]Tarek Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Government and Politics in Islam (London: Frances Pinter Publ., 1985), p.121 as quoted from Karem Zuhdi.

everything would be done in accordance with the Qur'ān and Sharīᶜah; justice would be restored.

But what did al-Gihād's manuscript al-Farīdahal-Ghā'ibah reveal? What is stated unquestionably is the need, the obligation, the necessity of jihād to bring about an Islamic society living under the laws of Allāh. It is the responsibility of the individual to wage jihād in order to see it realized, for the State of Egypt is governed by laws of unbelief and therefore can in no way be considered Islamic. Her people are Muslims, however, and are not to share in the punishment of the ruler who, although he claims to be Muslim, cannot be, since he does not govern with Allāh's laws. He is an apostate and rightfully deserves the punishment decreed appropriate and just for apostates. Death. Farag claims that:

> The Rulers of this age are in apostasy from Islam. They were raised at the tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism [Christianity], or Communism, or Zionism. They carry nothing from Islam but their names, even though they pray and fast and claim to be Muslim.[64]

According to al-Gihād it is therefore wrong to collaborate with the state in any way, even with the intention of eventually establishing an Islamic system (as the Ikhwān attempted), for the state of kufr (unbelief) would then contaminate them in the process.[65] Not surprisingly, the manuscript's greatest emphasis is on the duty of jihād of which the only form is militant. Jihād by means of the heart, the tongue and the pen are unacceptable and are doomed to failure. Islam had been victorious in the past because of its offensive, militant nature and it will succeed only as such. That militancy is Islam's inherent character of which one is to be proud. In fact, according to al-Gihād, it is the neglect of jihād which is a cause of the state of affairs in which Egypt finds herself. Jihād is to be offensive and

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[64]Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p.169.

[65]Here we see similarities with al-Takfīr since Muṣṭafā forbade his followers to have anything to do with state institutions. In fact he forced those who held governmental jobs to quit. However there is a conflict inherent in this position as al-Gihād's fifth columnists within the military work(ed) for the state, albeit under pretense. Without them, the assassination of Sādāt would have been far more difficult to accomplish. Does the state of kufr consequently contaminate them?

continuous in order to bring about the establishment of an Islamic State. Once the creation of an Islamic State has come about, the external enemies of Islam can be fought, for "to fight an enemy who is near is more important than to fight an enemy who is far."[66] Farag thereby implies that in order to be Muslim, one has to be in a continuous state of jihād.

Al-Gihād has many similarities with Shabāb Muḥammad and al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah, especially with regard to the desire for the implementation of the Qur'ān and the Sharīʿah, the membership make-up (urban, university students/recent graduates: Shabāb and al-Takfīr -- 85%, while half of the Gihād members brought to trial -- half of 326 --had a university education), the corruption of the political system and the apostate nature of the leader. Differences are also to be found, the most noticeable one being the incredible emphasis on jihād from which there is to be no escape. There is no concept of mahdiism or withdrawal (unlike Takfīr) nor is there an acceptance of a slow, gradual change of society from a state of jāhiliyyah into a state of Islam through education (unlike Shabāb). The goal is the same for all three groups, though the manner and approach vary. And it is interesting to note that all three groups exploded upon the scene in times of crisis as will be seen in chapter three.

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[66]Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p.192.

CHAPTER 2

SETTING THE STAGE

Let us refresh our memory concerning the hypothesis from the introduction before we begin looking at the situation of Egypt. The hypothesis states that in 'normal' conditions, passive elements of the Islamic community dominate, but that in times of turmoil and conflict, it is the militants who will react violently against the state. It becomes clear that the stage has to be set, the background has to be given. Accordingly, in section I, we will look briefly at the last few years of the Nāṣir regime in order better to appreciate what kind of Egypt Anwar al-Sādāt inherited in 1970. We will examine some of Gamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir's socialist policies as well as his Islamic policy which included harnessing the religious establishment. His deteriorating relationship with the Ikhwān will be dealt with only in passing as it was covered in some detail in the previous chapter. We will conclude this section with the mention of some of Nāṣir's more important external affairs, ending with the defeat of 1967. This glimpse will put the Sādāt's years better into perspective, as many of Sādāt's decisions were influenced by the policies of his predecessor.

In section II, we will look take a look at Egypt's religious situation. An obvious increase in the visibility of Islam (as well as of Coptic Christianity) has been recorded in Egypt, particularly since the defeat against Israel in 1967. Nevertheless, this increase has first to be qualified before any conclusions can be drawn. Is this rise in 'religiosity' confined to the masses only, or do other classes exhibit it as well? Is Islam a 'coat' to be put on whenever the storm of reality becomes too harsh to bear without protection, to be put away when the weather improves? Or is Islam a genuine expression of the people, in good and in bad times? This distinction is extremely difficult to make on the part of the outsider who is far removed from the conditions of everyday life which shape the responses of the

people. Nonetheless, it is important to attempt to differentiate Islam as belief from Islam as a means of social expression (especially of protest). Although Islam plays a central role in the lives of its adherents, it would be misleading to assume that everything Muslims do and think occurs because of Islam. They too are human and share the same basic needs and desires as every human being. One has therefore to be careful not to assign too much value to Islam's input or presence, without the understanding that Muslims may be (re)acting as human beings and not as Muslims.[1] One however cannot go to the other extreme and completely ignore the presence of Islam either. Somehow a happy medium has to be found, or at least acknowledged. Again, this distinction is present only for the outsider or the observer; it would not occur to a Muslim to distinguish those actions dictated by his Muslimness from those dictated by his humanness. Consequently we will explore the presence of Islam in Egypt through the Islamic garments of the government, the presence of the university-based *jamāʿāt al-islāmiyyah* (Islamic Organizations) and the resulting sectarian strife, ending with the religiosity of the masses.

Following this section, we will describe the 'normal' conditions of Sādāt's Egypt. We will look at the various predicaments facing Egypt such as overpopulation, the lack of housing, the failure of education, under/unemployment, labour migration from Egypt to the oil-rich countries, and debt management. The burdens of a third world country will thus be acknowledged, for these have a substantial impact on the masses, often dictating actions. Although these millstones are not much different from those of any other developing third world country, Egypt was set apart by the role she played as the geopolitical center of the Arab world situated at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and Europe. (It was not always a leadership role assigned her by the other Arab countries; often she helped herself to it). Nevertheless, in this period of study, Egypt's history of living in the limelight does help explain much of the extravagance of the actions of her leaders, both Gamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir

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[1]Nazih N. M. Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam: the Case of Egypt" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.12, #4 (Dec '80), p.484.

and Anwar al-Sādāt. Egypt and her ruler(s) performed on center stage and had an image to maintain.[2] Some played the role better than others. Nāṣir knew and judged his audience with far better accuracy than did his successor who soon lost complete touch with his people. It was to prove a fatal mistake.

Thus will conclude chapter two which will cover the 'normal' conditions of Sādāt's reign from 1970-1981. Chapter three will provide the second half of the hypothesis, that of the periods of turmoil which generated a militant reaction against the state.

I. THE NĀṢIR YEARS

In 1952 King Fārūq was overthrown by the Free Officers.[3] Gamāl ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir had envisioned the Free Officers initiating change by ridding Egypt of the monarchy and the British; the politicians were then expected to take over and rule. The military would have a supporting role only. The possibility of military rule had not been anticipated, but once this new state of affairs was accepted, Nāṣir and the Free Officers did their best in Egypt's interests. In other words, these were not men trained to run a country; they were military men who found themselves in a position they had not chosen and were in fact ill-equipped to fulfill. Nevertheless, they fulfilled their roles to the best of their abilities,

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[2]"For two generations, the country lived in the spotlight of spectacular, riveting events that made it possible to overlook the rot in the shadows. . . Egyptians became accustomed to a theatrical environment and theatrical leaders." (Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt after Nasser: Sadat, Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity (NY: Paragon House, 1989), p.4). For Sādāt as superstar, please see also Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (London: André Deutsch Ltd, 1983), especially Part I, "The Making of a Super Star"; David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1981), especially pp.354-357; Doreen Kays, Frogs and Scorpions: Egypt, Sadat and the Media (London: Frederick Muller Ltd, 1984). Kays (p.250) captures the essence of Anwar al-Sādāt: "Therein lies the tragedy of Anwar Sadat: a "hero" who got carried away with his own image of greatness; a megalomaniac with whom Egypt could no longer cope; an omniscient being who became a stranger in his own land; a personality cult who won the West and lost Egypt; a hero-villain."

[3]The Egyptian monarchy was only abolished in 1953 however.

reacting to the obvious ills of society as they came into contact with them. They had no plan of action, nor any real ideology, though their immediate concerns were outlined in six proposals later to become the platform of the Liberation Rally in 1953: (1) the elimination of imperialism; (2) the destruction of feudalism; (3) the eradication of monopolies and the "control of capitalistic influence over the system of government"; (4) the creation of a strong military; (5) the creation of a just society; and (6) the "establishment of a sound democratic society."[4]

Although Nāṣir courted the Ikhwān until the Free Officers consolidated their power, he felt threatened by the Ikhwān who challenged his authority and his socialist ideology. The Ikhwān was too popular for Nāṣir who also considered the organization a disruptive force within Egypt. Their shaky relationship fell apart with an assassin's bullets. The 1954 attempt on Nāṣir's life by an Ikhwānī marked the beginning of a harsh repression and crackdown on the Ikhwān. Thousands were arrested, the Ikhwān headquarters were sacked, and a general rampage against the Ikhwān by the public was initiated through the government's smear.

In 1956, Gamāl ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir nationalized the Suez Canal, and his victory over the combined British, French and Israeli forces in the 1957 Suez War made him a hero for Egyptians and Arabs alike. Nāṣir's hold over his people was secured through his emotional appeal and charisma, but his control was solidified through his many socialist policies. After 1956, the Nāṣir government began to nationalize with zeal. Most of the major industries, banks, insurance companies, utilities and foreign trade found their way into the public sector. Both Western companies and large native businesses were taken over by the government as well. Agriculture, wholesale, retail and service trades remained in private

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[4]Günter Lewy, Religion and Revolution (NY: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.443 quoted from Fayez Sayegh, "The Theoretical Structure of Nasser's Arab Socialism" in St. Anthony's Papers, #17, Middle Eastern Affairs, #4 (London, 1965), p.13. See also John Waterbury, "Egypt, Islam and Social Change" in Philip H. Stoddard et al. (ed.), Change in the Muslim World (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981), p 52.

hands however. July 1961 marked the beginning of the "socialist transformation" which solidified Nāṣir's socialist policies.[5] Heavy industrialization was initiated. Land holdings were drastically cut by the Land Reform Act in September 1952 which limited holdings to a maximum of 200 feddans (1 feddan = 1.058 acres); in July 1961 it was lowered to 100 feddans per individual or to a maximum of 300 feddans per family, and was again further reduced in 1969 to 50 feddans per person or to a maximum of 100 feddans per family. This act effectively destroyed the landowning class. Land distribution to farmers and agricultural cooperatives began. At one time, the property of some 850 people was confiscated due to economic problems while taxes were increased for those in high income brackets.[6] The bourgeoisie and upper classes suffered through these socialist policies and were completely alienated. Comprising a substantial percentage of these classes, thousands of Copts left Egypt in the mid-1960s. Much of Egypt's educated elite and professional classes -- especially physicians, surgeons, scientists and engineers -- were thus impoverished.[7] This mass emigration by Egypt's Copts was not only prompted by Nāṣir's socialist economic policies, but also by the realization that their future prospects were limited in a country which did not have a secular pluralist political system.

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[5]According to some however, Egypt's socialist transformation was superficial only: Egypt "remained a capitalist society run by the state and hence controlled by the state machinery. . .The nature of the institutional transformation that took place during the years from 1957 to 1970 [involved] a change of ownership of the means of production on a massive scale . . . [but] there was no corresponding change of control to match it. Control merely shifted from capitalists to techno-military elements with no effective supervision by the public." (Gouda Abdel-Khalek, "The Open Door Economic Policy in Egypt: its Contribution to Investment and its Equity Implications" in Malcolm H. Kerr and El Sayed Yassin (ed.), Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p.262). The new direction of the early 1960s cemented the financial, trade and military ties between Egypt and the USSR which caused problems in Arab and Western circles due to Nāṣir's obvious flaunting of communism.

[6]Yvonne Haddad, "The Arab-Israeli Wars, Nasserism, and the Affirmation of Islamic Identity" in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1980), pp.114-115; Waterbury, p.54; Lewy, pp.449-450.

[7]By the 1980s, it was estimated that 90,000 Copts lived in North America, and another 20,000 in Australia and smaller communities in West Europe. (Anthony McDermott, Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: a Flawed Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1988), p.186; P. J. Vatikiotis, "Religion and State" in G. Warburg and U. M. Kupferschmidt (ed.), Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in Egypt and Sudan (NY: Praeger, 1983), p.65).

In the sphere of Islam, Nāṣir made many drastic changes too. He harnessed Establishment Islam -- represented by Cairo's al-Azhar -- and made it his mouthpiece, thereby ensuring its support for his policies while simultaneously eliminating its potential for criticism.[8] Changes came rapidly and drastically: 1952 saw the abolition of the family *awqāf* (religious endowments) and its inclusion into the Ministry of Awqāf; 1956 witnessed the abolition of the Sharīᶜah courts and their incorporation into a secular system; Islamic laws were slowly replaced by Western codes; in 1957 the *waqf khayrī* (public endowment) was nationalized; Qur'ānic schools *(kuttāb)* were placed under the control of the Ministry of Education; 1961 saw the restructuring of al-Azhar itself, making it a state-controlled university.[9] All of these statutes greatly restricted the freedom that al-Azhar had

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[8]Establishment Islam represents the institutionalized Islam which became codified over time, influenced by jurists and theologians. It is also this Islam which is used as a tool of legitimization by the ruling Muslim classes and can therefore be considered a means of oppression.

Since its foundation as a school of religious learning, al-Azhar has raised a voice of opposition against state corruption and repression. Its ᶜulamā' were not only the spokesmen for the masses but also for the rulers and had therefore the role of intermediaries. As a result of this role, it was their function to give counsel and guidance and to influence rulers through their *fatāwā* (pl. of *fatwā*, or formal legal opinion) as opposed to taking action. (Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, "Religion or Opposition?: Urban Protest Movements in Egypt" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.16, #4 (Nov '84), p.542). This dual role gave the ᶜulamā' much power and prestige. Financially independent from the state, al-Azhar had total control over what it taught, and it did not refrain from criticizing as it saw fit. Understandably, this made it a powerful force to be reckoned with. Over time and history however, the character of al-Azhar changed as it became involved with the ideological and political strifes of the ruler who often had to call on the Azhari ᶜulamā' to give fatāwā justifying and legitimizing policies implemented or actions carried out. As all these things happened, al-Azhar became coloured by various political leanings. More significantly, its ᶜulamā' became more obviously quietist, preaching inactivity and pacifism even in the face of undeniable oppression. They became famous for constantly stressing "better that thousands should suffer than that a people should become a disintegrated mass, helpless like dust in the wind." (Fouad Ajami, "In the Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt" in James P. Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.19 citing a passage from Joseph Conrad, Under Western Eyes (London: Penguin, 1979), p.36). But in the twentieth century, particularly under Gamāl ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir, al-Azhar underwent the most significant changes in its entire history through governmental laws which radically altered its structure and foundation. (For a very cynical view of al-Azhar and its ᶜulamā', see Ajami, pp.14-19. He says, "As always, the opinions of the ᶜulamā' of al-Azhar are the opinions of Islam itself. Islam is what they will it and pronounce it to be.").

[9]Haddad, "The Arab-Israeli War", p.115; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s" in Third World Quarterly, vol.10, #3 (April '88), pp.635-638; Gabriel Warburg, "Islam and Politics in Egypt: 1952-1980" in Middle Eastern Studies,

enjoyed and effectively strangled any voice it once had. The ᶜulamā' saw their effective power eroding with time, to the point where they were completely dependent upon the good will of the state, for they were reduced to the status of state employees. Adding insult to injury, Nāṣir even had the Friday *khutbah* (sermon) censored, thereby eliminating one of the few vehicles of criticism and opposition left the common man. Al-Azhar is now considered by the people -- especially the islāmiyyīn -- a puppet of the state. Through the expert exploitation and reading of the Azharī ᶜulamā', Islam became Nāṣir's tool to justify his social, economic and political polices, his attempts at birth control, war with Israel, his foreign dealings. Sādāt maintained this complete control over the religious establishment whose ᶜulamā' continued to support and legitimize the government's policies. The people could no longer see an answer for their problems nor find support for their cause with the Azharī ᶜulamā', and thus they were forced to turn to other expressions of Islam in order to vocalize their demands.

By the late 1950s, early 1960s there were problems abounding in Egypt. The Socialist policies were neither effective nor successful, and the economy was in trouble. Egypt had a balance of payments crisis in 1962 and then again in 1965. Sequestration had benefited a percentage of the middle class, although the *fellāḥīn* (peasants) gained little. Over 7,000 people were affected by expropriation laws and were deprived of their political rights. Harnessing al-Azhar and its ᶜulamā' through a series of statutes ensured religious obedience and support which were used to quiet the masses as well as to sanction policies. In 1961 Nāṣir nationalized the press and the news media thereby effectively controlling the knowledge and limiting the worldview of his people. The media were put to 'good' use, as in the case of the vigorous press campaign initiated against "reactionary, feudalist, and

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vol.18, #2 (April '82), pp.135-139; Ayman al-Yassini, "Islamic Revival and National Development in the Arab World" in Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol.21, #1-2 (1986), p.111.

capitalist elements" within Egyptian society.[10] Nāṣir was relying more and more on the organs of the state to keep control of the people along with the suppression of liberties. His authoritarian, heavy-handed rule became more and more evident as he sought to control every matter of state. As Anthony Nutting described it:

> Suspicion was Nasser's besetting sin and principal weakness. For, as Zacharia Mohieddin never tired of telling him, not only did his distrust of his colleagues cause disharmony . . . it also made him interfere continually in their work and so added still further to the already huge burdens which he had to bear. Moreover, the more he involved himself in the details of administration, the less time he had to argue or discuss the broad lines of policy. . . Worse still, he pried into the private lives of his Ministers, whose telephones were tapped and any recordings suggesting misconduct on their part kept in his personal files.[11]

Egypt was slowly becoming a police state as Nāṣir effectively silenced all his critics and opponents. In the 1960s, there were an estimated 20,000 political prisoners. Phones were tapped, mail was opened, and those with international contacts were followed. Egyptians looked over their shoulders, constantly suspicious of everyone, for "to live in Cairo in the mid-1960s was to be aware of a pervasive security system which made individual citizens unable to trust their neighbours and colleagues."[12]

In 1964 Nāṣir initiated a massive crack-down on the Ikhwān after he discovered a plot to overthrow the government. Twenty-seven thousand people were arrested, hundreds sentenced. In August 1966 Ikhwānī ideologue Sayyid Quṭb was hanged. This move eliminated the threat the Ikhwān posed Nāṣir, for the organization never recovered from the blows he dealt them during his reign.

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[10]Lewy, p.450 from Charles Issawi, Egypt in Revolution: an Economic Analysis (London, 1963), pp.61-62 and Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism 1952-1965 (London, 1966), pp.130-131; Haddad, "The Arab-Israeli Wars", p.115.

[11]McDermott, p.27 from Anthony Nutting, Nasser (London: Constable, 1972), p.304.

[12]McDermott, pp.25-26.

In the external sphere, Nāṣir became increasingly involved in the affairs of the Arab world as a whole as time passed. This involvement was to be to the detriment of Egypt. Energy and resources which could have and should have been spent on Egypt were spent in the pursuit of pan-Arabism. The house should have been put in order before the neighbourhood was cleaned, so to speak. But even in the Arab sphere success evaded him. The union of Syria and Egypt was only three years old when Syria withdrew in 1961. It was a heavy blow to his pride as well as to the romantic notion of pan-Arabism. The following year Egypt became heavily involved in the Yemen War (1962-1967). Within three months of the decision, Nāṣir committed 50,000 men to the battle zone based on recommendations by Anwar al-Sādāt who was in charge of the Yemeni policy. At one point , 70,000 of Egypt's finest were fighting. The deployment of these forces to the Yemeni front was to have monumental and detrimental consequences in the (June) 1967 War against Israel in which Egypt was decisively defeated in six days, losing in the process almost her entire air force.[13]

The defeat imposed heavy material losses for Egypt including $1-$1.5 billion in lost or wrecked military equipment and supplies; the demolition of two Suez refineries; the blocking of the Suez Canal till 1975 (at an annual loss in revenues of about $1 million); and the loss of the Sinai oilfields to Israel. The loss of Sinai was a terrible psychological blow for the Egyptian people. Moreover, several thousand Egyptians fled the Canal zone for safer cities -- notably Cairo -- thus aggravating the burden of the urban centers. During the War of Attrition (1969-1970) which followed, the Canal towns were under much attack by the Israeli forces; even Cairo was not immune. The tourist industry suffered terribly as a consequence.[14] But the cost of the war did not end here. Psychologically the humiliation of the defeat dealt a detrimental blow to the Arabs in general, the Egyptians in particular. The War of Attrition was able only to begin the slow process of healing, thereby proving

[13]Hirst/Beeson, pp.351-352; McDermott, pp.26-30, 41.
[14]Paraphrased from McDermott, pp.127-128.

that the Egyptians were not as helpless and as cowardly as they had been judged to be by their actions in 1967. In the aftermath of the Six Day War the Egyptians came to the realization that they had paid a heavy price for Arab solidarity. They had proven their loyalty far beyond all other Arab states, had in fact fought four wars (five including the War of Attrition) since 1948 in the name of Arab solidarity, but enough was enough. It was high time to start putting Egyptian needs on par with, if not ahead of, Arab needs.[15] The defeat generated a heavy sense of despair, depression and anguish and brought about much soul-searching. Egyptians went through an identity crisis trying to find an answer for their disastrous and humiliating performance. Shortly after the defeat, visions of the Virgin Mary appeared for several months in a Coptic church in the Cairo suburb of Zaytūn. Hundreds and thousands of people, both Muslims and Copts, went to see. The visions were soon interpreted as an indication that the war had been lost through a lack of religiosity, but that an increase in religiosity would prevent a similar event from occuring. The expected rise in religiosity was soon to be noted.

The defeat against Israel ended Gamāl ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir's hegemony. Nevertheless, the people refused to accept his resignation and begged him to stay on as president. By the time of the defeat, Nāṣir had recognized that Arab socialism and Nāṣirism had not been as successful as he had hoped. And so he turned to Islam to replace the source of his legitimacy once provided by the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the following arms deals with the Soviets. Religious symbolism laced his speeches, religious festivals were celebrated openly, and Islamic institutions began participating in religious events again. Nāṣir also released about a thousand of the imprisoned Ikhwānīs -- half its number behind bars. Furthermore, he cultivated and encouraged an interest in Islam, especially among the youth.[16] His radical and socialist policies were toned down, and he attempted timid

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[15]Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984, 2nd edition (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p.99.

[16]Israel Altman, "Islamic Movements in Egypt" in Jerusalem Quarterly, #10 (Winter '79), p.88; Raphael Israeli, "Islam in Egypt under Nasir and Sadat: Some Comparative

economic liberation. In addition, Nāṣir initiated a policy of producing and importing more consumer goods in order to win back the support of the middle and upper classes which he had alienated through his socialist economic policies.[17] Most noteworthy on the international level, Nāṣir received the text of the peace plan as outlined by US Secretary of State William Rogers on 20 June 1970. While in Moscow for medical treatment very shortly before his death, he decided to accept the Rogers Plan, even though he did not have high hopes in its success. This plan entailed peace with Israel and in effect anticipated Sādāt's November 1977 trip to Jerusalem along with his pro-West policy.[18]

Although Nāṣir lived another three years after the defeat, he was a broken man. Death, when it finally came for him on 28 September 1970, claimed only his body. His spirit had died on 5 June 1967 with the outbreak of war.[19]

II. THE RELIGIOUS CLIMATE

The Sādāt Government

Following a leader such as Nāṣir, and lacking his obvious charisma and personality, President Anwar al-Sādāt retained a tenuous hold on his country. After all, Nāṣir had accepted Sādāt's resignation as vice-president two months before his death, but had not had

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Notes" in Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (ed.), Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp.69-70.

[17]Rudolph Peters, "The Political Relevance of the Doctrine of Jihad in Sadat's Egypt" in Edward Ingram (ed.), National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedouri (NY: Frank Cass, 1986), p.254; Waterbury, p.54.

[18]Hirst/Beeson, p.101; McDermott, p.38; Peters, p.254.

[19]"The events of 5 June dealt him [Nāṣir] a fatal blow. They finished him off. Those who know Nasser realized that he did not die on September 28, 1970, but on 5 June 1967, exactly one hour after the war broke out. That was how he looked at the time, and for a long time afterwards -- a living corpse. The pallor of death was evident on his face and hands, although he still moved and walked, listened and talked." (Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity: an Autobiography (NY: Harper & Row Publ., 1977), p.180).

a chance to replace him.[20] No one expected him to last even six months in power; he was to be temporary president until someone more suitable was found. Sādāt however, decided otherwise and quickly eliminated his rivals in every sphere. By May 1971 his position was much more secure.

In order to secure his position, Sādāt used Islam as a legitimating tool, continuing the tradition begun by Nāṣir three years previously. However Sādāt accelerated the process and began courting the religious establishment and the Muslim organizations in earnest, especially the Ikhwān. Islam became a familiar prop during his reign; Islamic symbolism and 'colouring' became much more visible in Egyptian life. Sādāt himself became known as *al-ra'īs al-mu'min* or "the Believer President" and took to beginning public speeches and addresses with "in the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful" and ending them with verses from the Qur'ān. Hassan Hanafi, Islamic activist and Egyptian professor at Cairo University, noted that

> President Sadat has been given the title, the "believing President." He is always called by his first name, "Muhammad." He is shown in the mass media in his white *Jallabiya*, going to the mosque or coming out of it, with a rosary in one hand and Moses's stick in the other, with a prayer mark on his forehead, etc. . . He murmurs in prayer, closes his eyes and shows signs of fear, humility, and devotion. He begins his speeches with "in the name of God," and ends them with Qur'anic verses signifying modesty and asking for forgiveness. . . At the last ten days of Ramadan he retires at the feet of the Mount of Sinai where he will build a compendium of houses of worship, a temple, a church, and a mosque as a sign of love and brotherhood.[21]

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[20]Hirst/Beeson, pp.100-106. Nāṣir gave Sādāt the vice-presidency on 19 December 1969, a post which had remained empty since early 1968. Sādāt however made two major mistakes which eventually cost him this position. While Nāṣir was in Moscow receiving medical treatment and advice concerning the Rogers Plan, Sādāt called a meeting of the ASU Higher Executive Committee and recommended that the Plan be dismissed. His other mistake concerned the 'villa-scandal' in which he had set his eyes on a particular villa and thus served the owner with a requisition order after the owner refused to sell. Nāṣir sent Sādāt on 'extended leave' and 'accepted his resignation.' Nāṣir however did not have him replaced.

[21]Hassan Hanafi, "The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt" in Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.4, #1 (Spring '82), p.63.

Sādāt made heavy use of religious symbolism and was not against making comparisons between the conditions faced by the Prophet Muḥammad and those he himself confronted. The 1973 war against Israel was a typical example. It was launched in the month of Ramaḍān, and the crossing of the Suez Canal was given the code name of Badr, thereby not only recalling Muḥammad's historical victory in 623 AD against overwhelming odds, but also giving the battle religious overtones. The battle cry was "*Allāhu akbar*" ('God is greater') as opposed to "Land, Sea, Sky" of the June 1967 War. It was later reported that the Egyptian soldiers had seen white heavenly bodies as they made the crossing. Sādāt encouraged such things for they added to his religious legitimacy. Sādāt basically gave the people what they thought they wanted: religious trappings.

Not only did Sādāt and his government appear more 'religious' than the 'atheist' Nāṣir and his regime, but Islam was allowed free-rein after its suppression during the previous years. *Ṣūfī* (mystic) orders were permitted to flourish and to function freely and publicly. The remaining imprisoned Ikhwānis were also released[22] and the organization was permitted to operate openly once more, although its prison years under Nāṣir had made the Ikhwān very cautious and suspicious. By the mid-1970s the Ikhwān was permitted to begin publishing its two official papers, al-Daʿwah and al-I'tiṣām. Furthermore, Ikhwān members were allowed to participate in Egyptian political life and sit in Parliament. They were even actively involved in discussions preceding the proclamation of the 1971 Constitution.[23] The Ikhwān was however denied political party status. In order to combat the influence of the Leftists and Nāṣirists moreover, Sādāt greatly encouraged the presence and proliferation of the Islamic groups and associations, especially on the university

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[22]The last imprisoned Ikhwānis were released only on 22 March 1975 however. (Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: al-Saqi Books, 1985), p.105).

[23]Adrienne L. Edgar, "The Islamic Opposition in Egypt and Syria: a Comparative Study" in Journal of Arab Affairs, vol.6, #1 (Spring '87), pp.82-108.

campuses. As his predecessor had done, Sādāt also used al-Azhar and its ᶜulamā' to give religious sanction to his economic and socio-political policies.

On the politico-legal front, President Sādāt made important concessions to the religious lobby. The following are just a few of the changes made: (1) the Sharīᶜah was made a source of legislation in the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, and in 1979, by virtue of a plebiscite, the Sharīᶜah became the source of legislation. If actually implemented, this change would revert every non-Muslim to the status of *dhimmī* (a free non-Muslim subject living in a Muslim country), making him in effect a second-class citizen.[24] But it is still questionable even today, over ten years after this constitutional change, whether the Sharīᶜah will ever be actively enforced in its entirety. This demand is of course standard for the islāmiyyīn who persistently pressure the state to uphold and fulfill this change of law. To no avail. Given the reaction of the state since the 1979 plebiscite, one is almost inclined to believe that changing the emphasis of the Sharīᶜah within the legislation was an empty concession, a gesture and nothing more, to still the voices of the Islamic groups. In fact, Hassan Hanafi seems to agree, as he concludes quite sarcastically, "Religion is always included in any draft article in the Egyptian constitution . . . the article is pure form without content. Once the article is stipulated, passions calm as if the Islamic State had already been built . . . ";[25] (2) in 1975 a ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court decreed that the Sharīᶜah was to be the criterion for determining the constitutionality of all existing and new

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[24]The status of dhimmi was extended only to *ahl al-kitāb* ('People of the Book', i.e. Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians). Traditionally, in exchange for their loyalty to the state and the payment of the *jizyah* (poll tax), dhimmis were guaranteed life, property and exercise of faith, and were also protected from attack. Dhimmis were however forbidden to fight in the Muslim army and to carry arms. The above stipulations were among the most important, but all of these were enforced in varying degrees from state to state. Obviously in modern times, the status of dhimmi is less agreeable due to the inroads made in individual rights and the equality of men. Minorities who have enjoyed relative equality, freedom and protection in modern Muslim states fear that this drive to implement the Sharīᶜah will revert them to the status of second class citizens under traditional Islamic Law. (See John L. Esposito, Islam the Straight Path (NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.192-193; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na-m, "Religious Freedom in Egypt: under the Shadow of the Islamic Dhimma System" in The Copts, vol.14, #1 (Jan '87), pp.2-6).

[25]Hanafi, p.64.

laws;[26] (3) in 1976, a bill was passed making it a crime for Muslims to drink alcohol in public. In connection with this legislation, alcohol could be sold only in designated tourist places; (4) in 1977 a law was introduced into Parliament which would have made apostasy from Islam punishable by death. There was an immediate outburst and protest by the Christian community: many Copts become quasi-Muslims after their marriages to Muslims, with the understanding that they would revert to Christianity after the death of or divorce from their spouses. Such a statute, if it passed, would condemn each of these Copts to death for apostasizing from Islam. Coptic Patriarch Pope Shanūdah led his followers in a fast before this law was dropped.[27] These are just a few of the changes made in the political arena which could have considerable influence on the community at large if they remain more than superficial.

All of the signs discussed above can be misleading if they are interpreted to mean that Egypt has become more 'religious'. It is far better to interpret them to mean that Egypt's religious identity has become more 'visible'. It must not be forgotten that under Nāṣir, Islam was played down and was not quite so obvious or visible until after the defeat against Israel. Under Sādāt however, the people's religiosity was allowed free rein, which means nothing except that it became more visible. This visibility is often mistaken for an increase in religiosity. A clear example of such a misunderstanding can be found at the time of prayer when one sees hundreds of Egyptians praying on the streets surrounding the local mosque. The automatic and obvious interpretation of this sight is that there is an increase in Islamic religiosity. It is however also possible that these devout people pray outside because of an insufficient number of mosques, not because of religious fervour. A similar example concerns the very obvious proliferation of mosques. During the Sādāt years, the number of *ahlī* (private) mosques doubled from roughly 20,000 in 1970 to over 40,000 in

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[26]Rivka Yadlin, "Militant Islam in Egypt: Some Sociocultural Aspects" in G. Warburg and U. M. Kupferschmidt (ed.), Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in Egypt and Sudan (NY: Praeger, 1983), p.175 from al-Ahrām, 4 April '75; 23 May '80.

[27]Waterbury, p.57.

1981 so that out of the 46, 000 mosques in Egypt, only 6, (00) were controlled by the Ministry of Awqāf. Is this remarkable increase a sign of an increase in religiosity, or did Sādāt's offer of a tax exemption for a mosque on one's property greatly encourage the establishment of small 'mosques' in basements, on staircases etc.?[28] And do Egyptian women wear al-zayy al-sharʿī (Islamic dress) as an expression of religious beliefs, as a social statement, or because it cuts across class barriers and makes women uniform, fashion-wise, and because it is subsidized by various Islamic groups?[29] One should not automatically assume that such visual signs indicate a marked increase in religious belief. Perhaps practicality has a role. Just as important, Hassan Hanafi reminds us that "since none of these religious phenomena affect the social system of the country, they are therefore allowed to multiply ad infinitum. They are used as an opiate on the people."[30]

Keeping Hanafi's words in mind, it becomes more obvious that all of these social phenomena appear to be nothing but an attempt to manipulate the emotional appeal of Islam. The masses were therefore led to believe that Sādāt's government was obviously Islamic or was at least in the process of bringing Islamization about. (This assertion in no way questions the religiosity of Sādāt himself). Nothing of substance was changed at all. As

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[28]In 1962 there were roughly 3,000 government mosques and approximately 14,(00) ahli mosques. By 1981, the government mosques had only doubled while those privately owned had trebled. (See Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), pp.198-99 from ʿAdil Hammudah, Al-Hijrah ila al-'Unf. . . (Emigration to Violence: Religious Extremism from the June (1967) Defeat to the October (1981) Assassination) (Cairo: Sina, 1987), p.214 and Rōz al-Yōsuf, 1 March '82). Haddad says that of the 40,000 mosques in Egypt in 1984, only 3,000 were directly administered by the Ministry of Awqāf. (Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Islamic "Awakening" in Egypt" in Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.9, #3 (Summer '87), p.250; McDermott, p.51).

[29]Lippman, p.145; Fadwa el-Guindi, "Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic: Egypt's Contemporary Islamic Movement" in Social Problems, vol.28, #4 (April '81), pp.465-485; John Alden Williams, "Veiling in Egypt as a Political and Social Phenomenon" in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1980), pp.71-85.

[30]Hanafi, p.66. Hanafi claims that Egyptians were not taken in by Sādāt's act of piety, that he had no one convinced of his religious sincerity. Nevertheless, Egyptians must have believed Sādāt's piety in the early years, if only because they needed and wanted to believe in it. Hanafi's article gives an insightful though highly sarcastic look at the use of Islam by the government.

will become more clear with the development of this chapter, Islam was also purposely used by the state as a distraction from all the pressing problems facing the Egyptian people.

The Jamāᶜāt and Sectarian Conflict

In the early 1970s, Sādāt greatly encouraged all Islamic movements, especially those operating on university campuses. These jamāᶜāt al-islāmiyyah (Islamic Organizations)[31] were used as a means of countering the Leftist and Nāṣirist influence there. With regards to membership makeup, one finds that the majority had a fairly

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[31]For more information on the jamāᶜāt, please see Israel Altman, "Islamic Movements in Egypt"' in Jerusalem Quarterly, #10 (Winter '79), pp.87-105; Hamied Ansari, "'Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and the Political Expediency of Religion" in Middle East Journal, vol.38, #3 (Summer '84), pp.397-418; Nazih N. M. Ayubi, "The Politics of Militant Islamic Movements in the Middle East" in Journal of International Affairs, vol.36, #2 (Fall/Winter '82/'83), pp.271-283; Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: al-Saqi Books, 1985), chapter 5; Rudolph Peters, "The Political Relevance of the Doctrine of Jihad in Sadat's Egypt" in Edward Ingram (ed.), National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie (NJ: Frank Cass, 1986), pp.252-271; Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990), chapter 5 ("The Radical Jam'iyat"). All of the articles discussing the jamāᶜāt refer to the militant ones which go about the campuses and the towns enforcing their beliefs and their interpretation of proper Islamic behaviour on others. However the Peters' article is the first I have come across which offers a positive look at the university jamāᶜāt. According to Peters, these pacifist university organizations are the rule, the militant ones the exception. A significant portion of the pacifist jamāᶜāt's popularity is based on their Islamic answers for the various social problems facing university students. Examples of these solutions include: providing segregated buses for the women -- on the condition that they wear al-zayy al-sharᶜī -- so that they can avoid the overcrowded public buses and the accompanying groping hands; providing students with books and al-zayy al-sharᶜī at discount prices; organizing study and prayer groups; organizing (cheaper) group trips for ḥajj and ᶜ*umrah* (lesser piligrimage), etc. These groups found solutions and provided valuable services which the government should have done, but could not. These jamāᶜāt are pacifist and try to establish an Islamic society through preaching (without violence or force). They advocate and fight for separation of the sexes, the banning of music/films/singing, and the enforcement of Islamic norms. (Peters, p.255). The jamāᶜāt gained in popularity very quickly, as much for the services they provided as for the fact that with the elimination of Nāṣirist/Leftist groups on campus, students had a choice between the government-supported Miṣr group or the jamāᶜāt. The Muslim groups had landslide victories in the student unions from 1975-1979. This fact (combined with Sādāt's rather belated realization that these unions had minds of their own and refused to be controlled by him) resulted in their dissolution by presidential decree in the summer 1979. Peters feels that this dissolution resulted in the radicalization of views of some of the members who later became involved in the confessional conflicts in Cairo and Upper Egypt from 1979 to 1981. (Peters, pp.256-57; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary FIndings" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.12, #4 (Dec '80), p.425). For the sake of this paper, we shall deal only with the militant jamāᶜāt.

common ancestry rooted in the Ikhwān either as former members or sympathizers, or through the same background.[32] But the jamāᶜāt do not seem very sophisticated when compared with Shabāb Muḥammad, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah or al-Gihād, for they appear to lack organization at the very least. They are quite simplistic in nature, and do not follow an ideology other than that of implementing the teachings of the Qur'ān. In the process jamāᶜāt students often give the impression that this movement is nothing more than a violent means of releasing frustration for the islāmiyyīn (especially in Upper Egypt).

The Islamic jamāᶜāt were most active in Upper Egypt where one third of Egypt's people live. The potential for violent actions is higher here than anywhere else in the country due to its high Christian concentration (which therefore 'necessitates' more of an effort -- jihād? -- to bring about the Islamization of that region). Copts comprise 10% of the national population; in Minya and Asyut however, they make up between 20-25%, though some scholars maintain that the percentage is still higher.[33] And the jamāᶜāt have placed themselves in frequent and deliberate confrontations with the Coptic Egyptians. These confrontations have had either a social character or a decisively destructive element to them. Some of the more obvious examples of the social type illustrate the success as well as the power and strength of the jamāᶜāt: (1) it is now possible to buy beer and wine in only two or three expensive hotels in Minya, Asyut and Suez; (2) cabarets and discotheques have been closed down; (3) male and female students sit apart in Asyut University (the only Egyptian university where this practice takes place); and (4) a host of ethical norms have been violently enforced on students. But this is not the only form these jamāᶜāt provocations can assume. More serious (and unfortunately, more common at various

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[32]Ansari, p.406.

[33]There is great variance among authors with regards to the percentage of Copts in Asyut and Minya: Ansari (p.406) says Minya has a Coptic population of 18.6%, Asyut 20%; In "The Power of the Zealots" in The Middle East, #160, (Feb '88), p.15, Jasper Mortimer claims that in both cities Copts make up at least 30%; whereas the percentage goes as high as 30-40% as stated in "Recent Atrocities against the Christians in Egypt by Muslim Fundamentalists" in The Copts Newsletter, 20 March '87.

times) is the destructive type. Although there were serious sectarian clashes in 1972-1973 which centered around attacks on Coptic churches, it was throughout 1977-1980 in particular that Minya and Asyut were ticking bombs. The sectarian confrontations were many and violent. Even Cairo was not immune. During the 1977 Bread Riots night-clubs and casinos were targeted while those during the 1979 anti-settlement demonstrations included attacks not only on Coptic students, but also secular professors, and government officials. In March 1979, a Coptic church of great historical value was mysteriously burned down in Cairo, and a near-riot was started by Muslim activists in Asyut in that same month. In 1980, after several bombing attacks on Coptic properties in Upper Egypt and Cairo, Pope Shanūdah cancelled all Easter celebrations. (At the time of the Easter attacks, Sādāt was in the US, and Copts there staged a demonstration in protest of the treatment of Egyptian Copts. Sādāt was greatly embarassed for he had wanted to project an image of a united harmonious country. He blamed Pope Shanūdah for his embarassment, the demonstration and the public outcry). The strength of these jamā^{c}āt has polarized both Muslim and Coptic communities. Rather than finding a means to unite these two societies, they have been kept divided. Aggravating this situation is the unfortunate but significant discovery that the jamā^{c}āt provide recruits for the other militant groups (such as Shabāb Muḥammad, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah and al-Gihād) and can almost be considered the training ground of future militants. It is not illogical to speculate whether this intolerance for the Copts is also transferred to their new groups.

In the universities, Coptic students founded their own fraternities on campus to counter those of the Muslims. Interestingly enough, it should be noted that militancy was not limited to the Muslims alone. There was a similar rise in religious militancy on the part of the Coptic minority as well, although most scholars agree that it arose as an effect of and in protest against the rise in militancy of the Muslims, especially on the part of the

university jamāᶜāt.[34] Even though they outnumber jamāᶜāt students by more than double, the Coptic students are still intimidated. Conscious of their minority position in Egypt, the Copts fear a victory over the militants (now possible under Mubārak) could generate a substantial counter-reaction from the Muslim majority which would prove a no-win situation. This fear in itself was a very effective restraint on the ability of the Coptic community to defend itself. Even the state police force seemed unwilling to get involved in these intercommunal strifes. Sādāt did not do anything substantial to bring this explosive situation to a permanent end, for the sectarian conflict kept the attention of the population diverted from the hopelessness of its own situation.

Egypt has never suffered intercommunal warfare throughout her history. It is only in the very recent past that this harmony has been violently disrupted. Emmanuel Sivan demonstrates convincingly how "Islamic revival enhances confessional cleavages" as can be seen in the following country examples: Egypt (anti-Copt propaganda and riots); Iran (anti-Bahai); Iraq (Khumaynist Shīᶜī v.s. Sunnī elite); Lebanon (Shīᶜī v.s. Druze v.s. Maronite); Sudan (Muslim-North v.s. Christian-South); and Syria (anti-ᶜAlawī ruling minority).[35] In comparison with the other country-cases mentioned, Egypt's Muslim and Coptic communities have had a remarkably harmonious relationship until recently; even so, her confessional conflicts were on a much less violent scale and degree. Her Coptic population is linguistically and ethnically indistinguishable from the Muslim Sunnī majority. And although the Copts are among the most educated and best paid, they have proven their loyalty, their patriotism and their military support throughout the years. They are therefore as Egyptian as the Muslims themselves (if not more so, as they consider

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[34]"Extreme piety among militant Islamic fraternities has given rise to uncompromising attitudes which have been matched by Coptic students militancy." (Ansari, p.397).

[35]Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p.177; Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam", pp.481-499.

themselves to be the true descendents of the Pharaohs).[36] Although the harmony of both communities has been emphasized and encouraged in Egypt in the past, the expected discord did exist, but it was not unmanageable. Muslims and Copts remained more or less united behind common national goals. But under Sādāt these goals were no longer enough. The sectarian conflicts were all too real and could no longer be ignored. The state would not publicly admit to these conflicts however[37] and one would find these disturbances brushed over, perhaps in an attempt to maintain the image of harmony between both religious communities in the face of the rest of the world. Until these aggressive and provocative confrontations between the two are brought to an end, Egypt will not enjoy real peace and harmony again. As Hanafi explains:

> In all its history, Egypt never knew religious wars. Egypt was able to unify all religions into one popular religion, that of Egypt. . . Only when the state is weak, when a national cause to which every citizen is loyal is absent, when religious formalism serves as a cover-up for social and political crisis, only then sectarianism appears. The ruling elite uses it to strengthen its hold on the people by introducing new repressive measures under the pretext of protecting national unity. Islamic zeal causes Christian fervor and the political consciousness of both communities is falsified.[38]

This sectarian strife threatened a stability and harmony that has existed for a long time. This tension and turning of brother against brother was a consequence of the many problems facing Egypt; the frustration needed an outlet. And the state turned one

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[36]Lippman, p.237.

[37]Ayubi suggests the anti-Copt stance is a means of attacking the state indirectly. If the state defends the Copts, the islāmiyyīn can accuse it of favouring the minorities over the believers; if however the state leaves the Copts defenceless, it will appear weak and inefficient under the attack of the islāmiyyīn. Other scholars suggest that the Copts are attacked because it is felt that they are favoured by Sādāt over the Muslims, while yet others suggest they are used as a handy scapegoat for islāmī economic and socio-political frustrations. (Ayubi, Political Islam, p.217; Kepel, p.240). Sādāt did make a conscious effort to nominate a significant number of Copts to his government. He also made it a policy to have both Muslim and Coptic dignitaries with him for state functions. But the question to be raised is whether Sādāt made these overtures in order to secure Coptic support for his regime and to keep the Coptic community 'happy', or whether they were done with the genuine desire to include Copts in the affairs of state. (Please see Ansari, pp.397-418; Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: the Politics of Islam (London: Faber & Faber 1982), pp.15-17).

[38]Hanafi, p.67.

community on the other in an attempt to control the tension and keep it aimed at others. It was an act of state self-preservation at the cost of fratricide.

The Masses

On the part of the masses themselves,[39] it is interesting to note that Egypt has witnessed an increase in religious observance and use of Islamic slogans among all sectors and ages. It is no longer merely the old and the sick who find strength and comfort in Islam, for it has become the hope and revitalizing force of the youth. As more than 50% of Egypt's population is under fifteen years of age (1987),[40] the consequences of this shift could be quite phenomenal, especially when overall conditions worsen. Furthermore, a clear proliferation of Islamic movements has been observed since the death of Nāṣir and the subsequent encouragement given them by his successor, although these groups continue to remain mainly clandestine due to government restrictions. The presence of these groups also demonstrates the attractiveness of Islam. Or perhaps it indicates the belief of these members that their problems can be solved through Islam (that is to say, through 'their' Islam as opposed to State/Establishment Islam or the Islam of the rest of the Egyptians), which is in itself a clear indication of their lack of faith in the state's ability to alleviate their situation. Whether their turn to Islam comes as a first or last resort remains to be seen, but its implications should be very obvious.

But it is no longer just the Islamic groups calling for a greater Islamic awareness or consciousness. An Islamic outrage has surfaced within society at large against an obvious lack of 'Islamic behaviour'. This sense of anger is directed towards such things as belly-

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[39]For the increase in religiosity on the part of the masses, please see Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), p.72; Patrick Bannerman, Islam in Perspective: a Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law (London: Routledge, 1988), pp.161-163; Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Islamic "Awakening" in Egypt" in Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.9, #3 (Summer '87), pp.234-259; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, "Religion or Opposition?: Urban Protest Movements in Egypt" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.16, #4 (Nov '84), pp.541-552.

[40]Haddad, "Awakening", p.238. Lippman (p.142) defers, saying it is 40% of the population which is under fifteen years of age.

dancing which is considered provocative, improper, and loose; 'pornographic' films; the consuming of alcohol which is forbidden by the Qur'ān; night-clubs and casinos, especially on Cairo's Pyramids Road (mainly catering to foreigners and rich Gulf Arabs); singers who worship the beauty of a man or woman, nationalism or a variety of other themes in their songs, thereby arousing feelings and thoughts which distract the mind and soul from Allāh. Increasing this outrage is the fact that such music programs are more popular on T.V. than the religious ones which offer Qur'ānic recitation. This is a genuine concern and fear that Muslims are straying from the 'straight path', that they are forgetting the teachings of the Prophet Muḥammad and are instead being influenced by more worldly pleasures. One of the biggest fears concerns the so-called 'loose sexual behaviour/morals' of the youth itself, which is further aggravated and 'encouraged' (in a highly negative sense) through the very overcrowdedness of Egypt itself. This overcrowdedness is expressed in the sardine-can effect evident in Cairo buses, in the constant brushing of man against woman on crowded streets and in over-flowing university classrooms, and in the drastic lack of housing which forces people to live in even-closer-than-acceptable quarters. All of these situations induce temptation away from the path of Islam into immorality and sin, where Islam plays no role. The above examples show an intensifying awareness and an increasing attempt to incorporate the teachings, mores and beliefs of Islam into every sphere of daily life.[41]

A growing percentage of the population at large is unhappy with the lack of 'true' Islam in society and as this percentage increases in size and strength, this outrage will manifest itself more and more blatantly. Its influence will be curtailed however as long as it lacks political and economic power. Since the 1970s, discontented groups of islāmiyyīn are

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[41]Haddad, "Awakening", pp.234-259; Kepel, chapter 5; Peters, pp.254-255; Sivan, Radical Islam, chapter 1; Emmanuel Sivan, "How Fares Islam" in Jerusalem Quarterly, #13 (Fall '79), pp.34-46; Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, "Egypt" in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp.23-38. Sivan ("How fares Islam", p.35) points out that sociological surveys have discovered that love songs make up 37.8% of Egyptian broadcasting time compared to 9% for religious programs.

constantly appearing, then disappearing, as they are unearthed by the government, are oppressed then go underground to escape further repression, only to reappear in some other form. It is these groups which initiate change, most often through violent and militant operations. Sādāt discovered this truth the hard way.

III. EGYPT'S 'NORMAL' CONDITIONS

Let us examine some of the more crucial everyday problems facing Egypt during the Sādāt years.[42] This investigation will give a general idea as to what the Egyptian had to cope with on a daily basis. The people generally remained passive under these so-called 'normal' situations, for this state of survival was their constant situation, as horrific as it may appear to the outsider. It must be emphasized and duly underlined however, that this situation described as 'normal' during Sādāt's reign did not spring from an Eden under Nāṣir. By no means. These issues all existed during Nāṣir's eighteen year government as well, albeit on a much lower scale. Nāṣir's socialist polices dealt with many of these crises through stringent controls, and much was done by way of alleviating the condition of the people. Unfortunately these problems were not eradicated but merely temporarily and partially resolved or put on hold. When Nāṣir's regime fell apart so to speak after the 1967 defeat, these problems resurfaced. The people were tired and fed up and wanted change. Immediately. After Nāṣir's death, Sādāt provided that change. At first it came at a slow pace, for Sādāt was unwilling to jeopardize his precarious hold on the country, but as time

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[42]For social problems please see Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam, chapters 2 and 7; Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984, 2nd edition (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), chapters 8 and 9; Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt after Nasser: Sadat, Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity (NY: Paragon House, 1989); Anthony McDermott, Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: a Flawed Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1988), chapter 9; John Waterbury, "Egypt: Islam and Social Change" in Philip H. Stoddard et al. (ed.), Change and the Muslim World (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp.49-58.

progressed and he became more confident, there were drastic changes which completely unsettled the nation in the long run and allowed those very same problems to become uncontrollable. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that Sādāt's options in dealing with these problems were influenced (even limited) by those of his predecessor, so he was not completely free to do as he pleased. Despite these restrictions Sādāt's grandiose gestures only exacerbated the situation. Granted, the overpopulation, lack of jobs, housing shortage etc. all existed in Nāṣir's time as well; Sādāt however only aggravated these situations, for his policies did not solve anything. It is perhaps harsh and unfair to say that Sādāt's reorientation only made matters worse, but it did. Not only did it reverse the socialist trend Nāṣir had been implementing, but it simultaneously negated those very same policies. In addition to this factor, infitāḥ made money more visible, lending to the façade of increased wealth. Money was more readily available, true, but only to a chosen few. The lives of the everyday Egyptian changed not for the better but for the worse, as we shall see.

Overpopulation

Thomas W. Lippman describes Egypt best and most precisely, presenting not only her assets but her weaknesses too, which have combined to leave Egypt sitting on a roundabout, going quickly nowhere in particular:

> Egypt has assets and strengths that are the envy of other developing countries. The Egyptians are a proud, homogeneous people, politically and culturally sophisticated, deeply conscious of a continued existence as a nation that dates to earliest history. They had factories and railroads and universities when other communities of Africa and Arabia were tribal backwaters. Their land, while largely barren, is not without resources.
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> But the country's liabilities have overwhelmed its assets. Housing conditions are appalling, illiteracy is still widespread, disease is endemic. Mismanaged factories equipped with obsolete machinery produce inferior goods. Organizations are cumbersome, work habits are slovenly, and the state is committed to welfare and subsidy systems that exceed its resources.

> Every gain is outstripped by the unchecked growth of the population. Egypt has to keep running faster and faster just to stay in the same place.[43]

Of all the problems facing Egypt, the one requiring immediate action is that of over-population. Egypt's population has increased drastically since the beginning of this century: in 1907 the population was 11.1 million, rising to 20 million by 1952. In 1976 the number had jumped to 36.6 million and was 38 million a year later. In 1986 there was over 50 million Egyptians, and it has been estimated that by the end of this century there will be about 70 million people inhabiting a land forever shrinking in size as the desert continues to increase annually. According to John Waterbury,[44] the population stood at 11.1 million in 1907 and jumped to 36.6 million in 1976, but in that same period, the land per capita dropped from 0.5 acre to 0.15 acre. A catastrophic situation and one which does not seem to be preventable in the near future; nevertheless, it has a rolling stone effect on many related facets of the Egyptian game of survival. Although the population crisis has been acknowledged as a prime cause of a great many of Egypt's problems, it has not yet been challenged head on. Instead it has been approached rather hesitantly by Egypt's successive ruling men. Attempts have been made to implement birth control methods, but the success rate has been limited due to a number of factors, including religious opposition, cultural and historical opposition, and the unfailingly consistent break-down of a bloated incompetent bureaucratic system. Birth control clinics established under Nāṣir in the 1960s for example, were targeted by the islāmiyyīn under Sādāt for being anti-Islam. Every gain made by Egypt's successive governments has been overshadowed or negated by the phenomena of an ever-expanding population, one which increases steadily by one million every ten months.[45] There is no end in sight to stem this human tide headed for a life-time of

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[43]Lippman, p.5 (my emphasis).

[44]Waterbury, p.50.

[45]Haddad, "Awakening", p.247. There must be an error on Lippman's part for he claims (p.157): "Even as the 1978 plan proclaiming the invasion of the desert was being published, the population was increasing by one million people per month." (my emphasis), which appears rather exaggerated. Burrell/Kelidar raise a very interesting political aspect to this crisis which has so far been ignored. Could Egypt afford politically

poverty. Egypt's meagre resources cannot provide adequately even for the population of yesterday, let alone for the horrific number of new lives joining her ranks each year. With the realization that only 4% of Egypt's surface area is habitable and cultivatable -- a mere 15,000 square miles -- the problem becomes more obvious. The rest of Egypt's 370,000 square miles is desert. The Nile is the source of life for Egypt. On either side of its banks are strips of fertile cultivatable land which, combined with the fertile Delta to the north, are the extent of Egypt's agricultural base. In 1974, G. A. Amin calculated that in some of the most concentrated areas of Cairo, such as Bulaq and Bāb al-Sharᶜiyyah, the density of the population may be as high as 900,000 per square mile.[46]. In 1977, the population stood at over 38 million with a density of some 2,500 people per square mile. It can only be far higher today. Cairo itself, built to sustain a population of two million, was bursting at its seams with over ten million in 1980 with an additional one million refugees who had fled the Canal zone (1967-1974), and there is no end in sight. On top of this incredible number, an additional two thousand peasants came daily to Cairo in 1976 alone, having left the villages of Upper Egypt for a 'better' life.[47] "In 1907, Cairo accounted for sixteen percent of the urban population; in 1985 it had jumped to fifty-one", for "with a metropolitan area

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to attempt to limit her population while in a constant state of war with Israel, while her enemy was doing everything in her power to increase her own population artificially through immigration? (R. M. Burrell and Abbas R. Kelidar, Egypt: The Dilemmas of a Nation -- 1970-1977, The Washington Papers, vol.5, #48 (London: Sage Publications, 1977), p.48). This consideration no longer had to be taken into account once Sādāt began the long process of rapprochement with his long-time enemy, and became in fact, insignificant. Nevertheless, the multitude of problems now facing Egyptians would be a heavy price to pay indeed if this political consideration explains the delay in confronting the crisis of overpopulation.

[46]Burrell/Kelidar, p.4 from G. A. Amin, Modernization of Poverty (Leiden: Brill, 1974), p.104.

[47]Lippman, p.175 as told to him by the then-governor of Cairo Amīn ᶜAbd al Hāfiẓ; Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam", p.495. See also Bannerman, p.169 from Albert Hourani, "Conclusion" in James P. Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.227; Haddad, "Awakening", pp.142-143. Many authors talk of the 'ruralization' of the urban centers in conjunction with this incredible influx of peasants from the rural areas. These newcomers retain many of their traditions, customs, values and behaviour. It is therefore debatable as to whether these migrants become urbanized or whether it would be more precise in fact to describe the process as a ruralization of the cities, at least in the poorer quarters where the migrants head.

of about 14.5 million, Cairo is home to more than a quarter of all Egyptians. It is the largest Arab city and the largest city in Africa. It is not only the seat of government, but also the country's industrial, artistic, intellectual and economic center and thus is a powerful magnet drawing ever more people from the countryside." The dilapidated Cairo infrastructure is incapable of handling daily demands far exceeding its means. Chaos reigns supreme. It was this factor which kept Cairo from replacing Beirut as the 'capital', the 'center' of the Middle East once the Lebanese civil war began.[48]

Overpopulation translates itself into a multitude of other serious crises, all of which exacerbate the already difficult life of the masses: a lack of housing; unemployment/quasi-employment; an inadequate education facilities; a drop in agricultural produce as land is lost to industrialization and there occurs a corresponding increase in imports as a substitution; an increasing reliance on foreign aid, whether Arab or Western, etc. The only conclusion to be drawn is that Egypt will drown in an ever-rising sea of poverty, or that she will just barely keep her head afloat, buoyed by the generous aid of her international friends (which obviously comes with its price tags attached).

Housing

Housing is another major concern in the cities, of which Cairo suffers the most. According to Thomas W. Lippman, "in the 1970s, private industry and government together were developing about 30,000 dwelling units a year in all of Egypt, against an estimated need for 62,000 a year in Cairo alone." This figure does not take into account those buildings so decrepit that they are unsafe for habitation, which far too frequently eventually topple with unavoidable fatalities.[49] Housing has been constructed, especially

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[48]Although this falls outside the scope of our time-frame, in 1987, the World Bank reported that "the population densities in rural areas exceeded those of Bangladesh; residential densities in Cairo exceeded those of Manhattan and Bangkok. (McDermott, pp.131-132; Lippman, p.166). See also Lippman, chapter 7, for Cairo's lost opportunity to replace Beirut as business center of the Middle East.

[49]Lippman, pp.145, 151, 173-176. "Estimates by various officials and committees put the number of buildings in Cairo that are unsound and should be condemned at any-

under infitāḥ, but private developers preferred to leave new buildings empty due to their unaffordable costs rather than to rent them at affordable 'Egyptian' prices and have them subject to rent control and occupancy rights. Journalist Muṣṭafā Amīn expressed his shock at the expense of a five room flat asking £E26,000, with £E5,000 paid in advance and an additional £E3,5000 to be paid in installments every six months -- hardly within the reach of the average Egyptian, let alone a "30-year old engineer with a monthly salary of about 60 pounds."[50] Many Egyptians delay marriage due to their inability to afford housing; even those who are married have troubles, as indicated in an early 1970s government report which estimated that over 100,000 married couples lived apart from their spouses as they were unable to find accommodation. Married couples are often forced to move in with their parents or luckier siblings in order to have accommodation.[51] Those who can afford housing have most often worked in the oil-rich countries for a number of years and have saved enough to afford the luxury.

But even if accommodations are found, conditions are found wanting and are not always adequate as Lippman demonstrates in his dreadful picture of living conditions in the cities and villages: "In the largest cities, workers and their families often live 8 or 10 to a room in unheated tenements with communal plumbing -- or none. . . In the villages, two or three generations may live together in a one-room mud brick hut, along with their goats and chickens."[52] But at least these people have a home of sorts: approximately two million people live in Cairo's City of the Dead, a six mile long string of cemeteries on the eastern edge of the city. The government has realized that these people will not move (or

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where from 30,000 to half a million. . .[with an estimated] annual national loss of housing to structural failure at 12,000 units." See also McDermott, chapter 9.

[50]Lippman, p.150; Heikal, p.88.

[51]Sādāt himself lived in such a situation. His father's house had four rooms in which lived Sādāt, his three siblings, his mother and his grandmother; his father's second (barren) wife; his father and his favourite wife and their nine children. A grand total of five adults and thirteen children. And when Sādāt, a brother, and a half-sister married, they brought their spouses home with them until they found their own residence. (Heikal, pp.9-11).

[52]Lippman, p.143.

disappear), and so some facilities have been installed; nonetheless, these squatters share their homes with the dead of years gone by. Although Egyptians are said never to be alone or lonely, the housing conditions as outlined above must inevitably lead to social and psychological problems of various kinds.

Education

The rapid growth in population has made itself obvious in the field of education which determines the future of each Egyptian. It is education which will eventually provide each student with a career and a job as promised by Nāṣir in 1962 in a law which guaranteed all graduates a position. Despite Nāṣir's promise, problems abound at every level of the education system, not least of all in relation to its unnecessary and superfluous expansion with which the economy was unable to keep pace. The never-ending migration of people from the villages to the urban centers has forced the establishment of a rotary system whereby classes are offered in three shifts. Even so, this solution merely ensures more students are taught; it does not guarantee quality. The phenomenal population growth merely exacerbates an already difficult situtation: the number of university students alone rose from some 100,000 in 1962-1963 to about 400,000 in 1976. There has been no corresponding increase in staff members in order to accommodate the new numbers. According to one study, the ratio of faculty to students in 1976 was 1 to 666. In addition, there are poor teaching facilities and inadequate room in the lecture halls to accommodate all the students. Nor is it always possible to hear the lecturer should the microphone malfunction, and equipment is more often than not outdated. Not only has the quality and level of education itself deteriorated, but consequently so has the quality of the students. As with all other state employees, teachers are underpaid and so they supplement their income by offering private lessons -- often the only way a student can pass due to poor facilities. On the other side of the coin, many teachers seek jobs in other countries due to their impossible working conditions within Egypt: Nazih Ayubi claims that in 1975-1976

alone, over 20,000 school teachers were on secondment in Arab countries, for teachers are in high demand in the Arab world.[53] Students quickly realize their poor job prospects in Egypt and are all too soon disheartened. They are therefore all the more ready to join anti-governmental demonstrations or rallies to show their dissatisfaction. Or they are swayed to join the jamāᶜāt which provide solutions for some of their more basic needs, such as finding housing, organizing study groups, selling photocopied texts at cheaper prices, providing al-zayy al-sharᶜī at discount prices etc. (Due to the suppression by Sādāt of the Nāṣirist and Leftist groups on university campuses, students could vote only for the Islamic groups or the government-sponsored Miṣr group). Upon graduation, it is not unusual for a graduate to have to wait up to five years before he is found a job as guaranteed by Nāṣir in 1962. Even then he is more likely to find himself an employee of the state in the civil service which does not provide a salary adequate to survive. He is then ultimately forced to moonlight in order to survive. Or else he finds a way to migrate to the oil-rich states or to other lands where job prospects are far greater. Fouad Ajami mentions an informal university survey in which 85% of those surveyed said they would like to emigrate upon graduation.[54] Although this trend set in after the defeat of 1967, it became a mass exodus

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[53]Nazih Ayubi, "The Egyptian "Brain Drain": a Multidimensional Problem" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.15, #4 (Nov '83), p.439 citing statistics from the Ministry of Information (Egypt), The Yearbook 1977 (Cairo, c.1978), p.168. Ayubi adds a high incentive for teachers to go abroad and work: "During the period of four to five years that the seconded Egyptian school teacher normally spends in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, he will receive an amount of money that far exceeds all his prospective earnings in Egypt during the whole of his working life." (Ayubi, "Brain Drain", p.439 taken from Suzanne A. Messiha, The Export of Egyptian School Teachers. The Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol.3, monograph 4 (Cairo: AUC, April '80), pp.61-63).

[54]Fouad Ajami, "Retreat from Economic Nationalism: The Political Economy of Sadat's Egypt" in Journal of Arab Affairs, vol.1, #1 (Spring '81), pp.27-52; Burrell/Kelidar, p.50; Kepel, p.135-146; Lippman, pp.152; McDermott, pp.206-208; Gabriel Warburg, "The Challenge of Populist Islam in Egypt and the Sudan in the 1970s" in George S. Wise and Charles Issawi (ed.), Middle East Perspectives: the Next Twenty years (NJ: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1981), p.111; Waterbury, p.50. The university survey was cited in Adel Husayn, "Petrodollars as an Obstacle to Unity and Complementarity" in al-Mustaqbal al-ᶜArabī, #5 (1979), p.28.

after 1973. Not only does emigration provide Egypt with a solution for the discontented elements of society, but it more importantly deprives Egypt of her educated elite.

Although education has been greatly expanded since the days of Nāṣir and more Egyptians have had the chance to go to school, numbers can be deceiving. Many children receive only a few years of schooling and are then withdrawn by their parents in order to find a job and help support the family.[55] Of those who receive basic education it is disconcerting to realize that with time many revert to basic illiteracy and thus have a much more difficult time finding work. According to Thomas Lippman and John Waterbury, the illiteracy rate of the total Egyptian population over the age of ten had dropped from 70.5% in 1960 to 56% in 1976, representing 42% of all males, and 71% of all women. While these percentages indicate an impressive drop in illiteracy, due to the rapid rate of population growth, the actual number of illiterates had in fact increased and was standing at a staggering fifteen million in 1976. (The number of illiterates in 1976 was therefore substantially greater than the entire population of Egypt in 1907 which stood at 11.1 million).[56] This factor is a prime obstacle in Egypt's drive to move from an agricultural base to an industrial nation.

Underemployment/Unemployment

> The definitional difficulties [of unemployment] may be comprehended more easily when it is realized that there are probably over a million household servants in Egypt; 150,000 public sector 'messengers' and coffee carriers, not to mention a vast array of car washers, doormen, street vendors, and other such walks of life that lightly mask a situation of basic unemployment.[57]

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[55]Cairo in fact is known as "a city of working children." It is not odd to see boys as young as ten years old, collecting garbage, selling goods in shops or at stands, shining shoes and doing a whole assortment of other jobs. (Lippman, p.163).

[56]Lippman, p.152; Waterbury, p.50.

[57]McDermott, p.137 from John Waterbury, Financial Times, 1 Aug '72, no pg.

In 1962, Nāṣir passed a law guaranteeing all graduates a job. Although unrealistic to fulfill now -- there is a total of 100,000 university and technical institute graduates combined annually -- the government is caught in this promise and somehow manages to find work for those graduates who are willing to wait the five or ten years it often takes. Those students who don't depend on the government to find them a job most often head to the oil-rich states in search of work. Job prospects are better there, along with pay and living conditions. The government is now the employer of last resort, employing in fact perhaps one quarter of the work force of 13 million.[58] The civil service suffocates in its redundancy -- roughly 30% is completely unnecessary. It is incapable of fulfilling its prime function of serving the public, for it is bloated and overgrown to a point of unacceptable proportions. Tens of thousands of civil servants are unnecessary and redundant, existing for no reason but Nāṣir's genuine attempt to provide jobs for all graduates. Efficiency is impossible; bedlam, pushing and shoving, connections and *baqshīsh* ('tip') are the only constants worth knowing. But there is not enough work to do, and too many people to do what little there is. Nothing gets done, or takes forever to be done (thereby justifying all the nonsensical jobs the majority of civil servants have). It is often joked that civil servants do only about half an hour of 'real' work per day; the rest of the day passes slowly while drinking *ahwah wala shay* (coffee or tea), reading the paper, playing cards etc. In 1985 a Middle East Journal study (vol 39, #3, Summer '85) discovered that 89% of those civil servants interviewed were forced by their unbelievably low salaries to hold a second job ('moon-lighting') in order to make ends meet. This situation is no different from that under Sādāt. Although moonlighting is completely illegal, it is inevitable in order to survive.

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[58]Lippman, p.87. Waterbury (p.51) claims the number is far higher: in 1976, the civil service stood at approximately two million with another one million employed in public enterprises. Combined with teachers and those in the armed forces and the police force, roughly 50% of the active work force was in public employ, with the other half in agriculture. In 1970 approximately 60% of all 'living' university graduates were working in the public sector.

Often three to five hours per day are spent on this second job. These people often moonlight as taxi-drivers or plumbers etc.,

> jobs they perform so inadequately that they might as well be filled by illiterates, the competent plumbers having long since emigrated to the Arabian Peninsula where their spanners are worth their weight in gold. An illiterate peasant woman who arrives in the city and manages to land a job as a foreigner's maid will be paid more or less double the salary of a university assistant lecturer.[59]

One can only imagine how the unemployed manage to make ends meet. It is not a pleasant thought at all.

Debts

Upon his death, Nāṣir left Sādāt debts amounting to approximately $2,563 million. Of this, $380 million was owed Russia including payment for the construction of the Aswan Dam and other industrial projects (excluding military supplies); $205 million was due the USA and was principally connected to wheat shipments between 1957-1965; $122 million was owed Italy; $105 million to West Germany; $150 million to Kuwait; debts to Japanese and East European companies/private banks brought Egypt's non-military debts up to a grand total of $1300 million. On top of all that, Egypt had a military debt of $2,200 million to the USSR of which $500 million was repaid. It was decided by both parties to let the remainder slide. Therefore, when Sādāt became effective as well as nominal President of Egypt (after the 'corrective revolution' of 1971), her debts stood at about $2,563 million. But by the time Mubārak took over the presidency eleven years later, Egypt's total indebtedness had soared to roughly $26,000 million, some ten times larger than Sādāt's original debt. Ḥusnī Mubārak's situation was vastly different from that left Sādāt by Nāṣir in 1970: there was a civil debt of $119,500 million and a military debt of $5,700 million -- for a grand total of $26,000 million -- with an additional $1,000 million

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[59]Kepel, p.85. See also Kepel, pp.32, 50, 135; Lippman, chapter 3; McDermott, pp.122-123; Waterbury, p.55.

owed the IMF. Mubārak stated that it was costing $2000 million annually just to service the debt, an amount equal to the annual revenue generated by the Suez Canal and the Sinai oilfields together.[60] This phenomenal debt can be explained to some extent by the grandiose gestures to which Sādāt was prone. Money was spent carelessly and with little if any thought. Much was used for his own personal use. Infitāḥ (the "open door" economic policy) did not help the situation either, and corruption escalated as a result. Egypt's overall situation could have improved, despite the drastic jump in debts owed, had money been wisely spent. Alas, Egyptians paid the price of having an extravagant president.[61]

Egypt under Sādāt was running the risk of recreating the same situation in which the Khedive Ismāʿīl found himself at the end of the 1870s. Ismāʿīl too had accumulated such a high debt that it had necessitated the creation of the Commission of Public Debt with the dual controllers (Sir Rivers Wilson of Britain and the Marquis de Blignières of France) overseeing the financing of the debt. This in effect meant foreign intervention in Egyptian internal as well as foreign affairs and ultimately led the way to Egypt's occupation by Britain. Sādāt's extravagant spending could easily have led to a similar state of affairs which would have proven dangerous to Egypt's independence.[62]

The Military Cost of the Constant State of War

The 'victory' of 1973 legitimized Sādāt's regime and simultaneously gave the Egyptians back their pride which had been lost in the defeat of 1967. But 'victory' also carried a big financial burden which was slowly crippling Egypt through the ever-increasing military budget. Sādāt simply could not afford to remain in a constant state of war with Israel. The Egyptian economy was at risk. In a report made by the Budget

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[60]Taken directly from Heikal, pp.77-78, 82. McDermott however claims that according to the IMF, Egypt's debt in 1981 was $21.18 billion with a service debt ratio of about 25%.

[61]Please see Hirst/Beeson, pp.211-215, 219-221; Heikal, pp.76-77, 171-182 for examples of Sādāt's extravagence.

[62]Heikal, part 2 (chapter 3); Hirst/Beeson, pp.337, 352-353; McDermott, pp.80, 144.

Committee to the People's Assembly on 12 December 1974, it was pointed out that although the four wars with Israel (five including the War of Attrition) had cost Egypt approximately $40 billion in direct expenditure, she had received only some $3.2 billion in financial aid from the Arab States for that same period.[63] Egypt had to foot this astronomical bill for the wars herself, even though she had been ostensibly fighting on behalf of the other Arab States as well. The Arab States should therefore have contributed far more financially towards Egypt's war efforts. It was established by The International Institute for Strategic Studies, for example, that Egypt had spent some $6 billion on defence in 1975-1976 alone. This figure is tantamount to over 40% of government expenditure and equal to the spending of over $160 per person.[64] Obviously such high military costs meant less money for civil projects and thus all of Egypt was made to suffer. It was therefore time for Egypt to begin thinking of herself first, putting her needs above those of pan-Arabism. Egypt could no longer remain in a constant state of warfare with Israel. It cost far more than the meagre resources Egypt could generate. Peace with Israel was a must. Egypt had no choice financially.

In addition to the financial burdens of the cost of war, the armed forces should not be forgotten, upon whom rests the internal and external security of a nation. In Egypt, military service is compulsory. Not only does it provide military training for hundreds of thousands of men, but it also "absorbs the energies of men who would otherwise be unemployed." There is a problem with the pay though, which has been exacerbated

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[63]Burrell/Kelidar, p.49. Hudson points out that aid to Egypt (and Syria) from Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia after the defeat of 1967 played a significant part in keeping the economies afloat, and in "preventing their complete capitulation and economic relapse." Libya financed Egypt annually to a tune of $150 million, while Saudia Arabia gave between $100 and $150 million for 1973 alone, excluding financial contribution during the 1973 October War. (Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p.136 from Jim Hoagland, The Washington Post, 2 Sept '73).

[64]Burrell/Kelidar, pp.48-49 from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1975-76 (London: International Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1975), p.76.

through infitāḥ: a major might earn as much as a secretary in the private sector, whereas his brother might earn four times as much there. This pay discrepancy can only increase the dissatisfaction in the forces which eventually will spell trouble for the government. It is only a matter of time. Egypt's armed forces are large -- over 472,000 in 1987 and over 300,000 reservists --.and have to be kept 'happy', for the army is indeed a people's army, and as such, it is a true representative of the masses. "It reflects closely the strengths and weaknesses of Egyptian society." To compound this problem, a high percentage of the military conscripts come from Upper Egypt which is also fertile ground for religious fervour. These factors have to be considered, for an unhappy army is an unhappy people militarily trained and armed with deadly weapons: the four charged with the assassination of Sādāt were military men, and in February 1986 there was a revolt of army conscripts.[65] One has to assume that the majority of islāmiyyīn have had some military training of sorts through the compulsory military service. Weapons can be procurred illegally. The threat such men present to the government therefore increases tenfold.

The "Open Door" Economic Policy

In April 1974 Sādāt proclaimed the October Paper which inaugurated the economic policy later to be known as the "open door" policy or infitāḥ.[66] This policy referred to the

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[65]McDermott, p.176. The riot of the conscripts in February 1986 which caused havoc for the Mubārak government should not be forgotten. At that time, conscripts supposedly made a mere £E6 per month. Compare this salary to that of a primary school teacher who in mid-1987 made £E54 per month to start; a Cairo street car-parker: £E500 per month (estimated); a museum guard: £E58 per month. The purchasing power of the recruit was therefore severely limited when compared to the price of goods which was also taken from mid-1987: 1kg of mutton cost £E8 while 1kg of camel meat cost £E4; a factory-made cotton dress-shirt: £E18.9; a two room apartment in Tenth of Ramadan City (a desert-city to the northeast of Cairo): £E5,000; a locally assembled small car: £E10,000. (Taken directly from Lippman, pp.86-87).

[66]For more information on infitāḥ, please see Gouda Abdel-Khalek, "Looking Outside, or Turning Northwest? On the Meaning and External Dimension of Egypt's Infitah 1971-1980" in Social Problems, vol.28, #4 (April '81), pp.394-409; Gouda Abdel-Khalek, "The Open Door Economic Policy in Egypt: its Contribution to Investment and its Equity Implication" in Malcolm H. Kerr and El Sayed Yassin (ed.), Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), pp.259-284; Fouad Ajami, "Retreat from Economic Nationalism: The Political Economy of

opening of Egypt to foreign investment without the strict taxation normally applied. Sādāt desperately required international aid and foreign investment on an enormous scale. The only possible avenue to attract it was through infitāḥ. Opening Egypt up to foreign investment however necessitated a complete change of direction economically. Nāṣir's industrialization was replaced by a policy which favoured the import industry at the expense of local industry and by 1974-1976 for example, the paper, textiles, tire and plastic industries were in trouble. By 1975, 102 laws had been enacted for the new economic order. Despite these changes, fundamental problems abounded, for Egypt faced many problems related to a socialist (or more precisely, state capitalist) economy joining a world open market. Through his protectionist policies Nāṣir had eliminated the need for competition, but with infitāḥ, Egyptian manufacturers were forced to compete with cheaper, better quality imports and found they could not survive. Sādāt's removal of their protectionist policies had eliminated any fighting chance they had had to compete. Furthermore, the public sector was in the process of being dismantled and the private sector was expected to take over its duties. Inflation shot up drastically so that by 1979, officials acknowledged that it was roughly 30-35%.[67] Inflation alone was a tremendous burden for the average Egyptian to cope with, especially since Sādāt had convinced his people that prosperity would follow infitāḥ almost instantly. In fact, it took a number of years before any effects were felt, and then it was only a tiny percentage of the population which did

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Sadat's Egypt" in Journal of Arab Affairs, vol.1, #.1, (Spring '81), pp.27-52; Raymond William Baker, "Sadat's Open Door: Opposition from Within" in Social Problems, vol.28, #4 (April '81), pp.378-384; R. M. Burrell and Abbas R. Kelidar, Egypt: the Dilemmas of a Nation -- 1970-1977. The Washington Papers, vol.5, #48 (London: Sage Publ, 1977), chapters 3 and 4; Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Policy Making in Egypt: a Case Study of the Open Door Economic Policy" in Social Problems, vol.28, #4 (April '81), pp.410-416; Osama Hamed, "Egypt's Open Door Economic Policy: an Attempt at Economic Integration in the Middle East" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.13, #1 (Feb '81), pp.1-9; Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: the Assassination of Sadat (London: André Deutsch Ltd, 1983), pp.86-89, part 5 (chapter 2); David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1981), chapter 5; Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt after Nasser: Sadat, Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity (NY: Paragon House, 1989), chapters 3 and 4.

[67]Ajami, "Retreat", pp.27-52 with industry troubles taken from al-Ahrām, 21 Dec '78; Burrell/Kelidar, p.29; Heikal, pp.87-88.

benefit. But Sādāt had raised high hopes in his people, having boasted often of how many investment deals had been approved since the onset of infitāḥ. What he conveniently neglected to mention was just how little capital was actually committed, and how foreign investors were repeatedly deterred from investing or constructing in Cairo due to its dilapitated infrastructure. Far too much desperately-needed capital was lost as a result.[68]

Infitāḥ also had a drastic effect on Egypt's meagre and fast depleting land resources. A heavy price had been paid as a result of urbanization over the years. Between 1963 and 1973 the construction of buildings, roads and military installations consumed roughly 200,000 feddans (1 feddan = 1.058 acres). This is a considerable amount of land for a country which was only just in the process of transforming from an agricultural to an industrial society. But after 1973 Sādāt and infitāḥ accelerated the conversion of agricultural land for urban purposes at a ridiculously careless rate. By the late 1970s, it was determined that all the agricultural gains of the Aswan Dam -- some 900,000 feddans or roughly one eighth of Egypt's entire cultivated surface -- had been erased. A heavy price to pay for urban purposes when one remembers that the Aswan Dam was constructed in order to increase the amount of cultivatable land available to Egypt. Infitāḥ all too soon advertised the profit to be had in the exploitation of the land for construction instead of for agricultural purposes which would ultimately benefit the entire nation. Much valuable land was lost in this manner. As a result, Egypt was soon growing less wheat herself (due to the loss of land and the lower profitability of agriculture) although her need for it was steadily increasing as the population continued to expand. Consequently, Egypt was soon forced to import wheat to a tune of half of her import's bill in order to meet her demand. By 1976, Egypt was importing twice as much wheat as she was producing herself. By 1979 Egypt had to import four million tons of wheat annually in order to meet the demand for

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[68]Please see Ajami, "Retreat"; Burrell/Kelidar, chapters 3 and 4; Heikal, pp.86-89, part 5 (chapter 2); Hirst/ Beeson, chapter 5; Lippman, chapters 3 and 4.

bread. And the situation only continued to get worse. Egypt was therefore placed at the mercy of world market prices which were skyrocketing.[69]

Infitāḥ and the investment it would generate was supposed to serve every class of society, but once it was understood that far more money could be made in private investment, public investment suffered. A considerable proportion of private investment (65%) was directed into construction -- the ever-present housing problem was left in a permanent crisis. Much construction took place, but it was to be found mostly in luxury apartments and hotels etc. designed for the upper crust and foreigners with money in their pockets. The masses were ignored yet again, despite their desperate need for housing units. Those unscrupulous individuals who did construct housing units did so in glaring disregard of the building regulations, often building far higher than was safe, using cheaper materials, skimping wherever possible. It was not uncommon for such buildings to collapse with a corresponding loss of life. Shady deals abounded everywhere by both local and foreign crooks, for many sought to "make a quick buck" at anyone's expense. But nothing was done to put an end to this corruption; it had reached every level of society and government -- even members of Sādāt's own extended family were not immune to charges of corruption. The net result of infitāḥ was the rich, lucky, unscrupulous and crooked growing richer while the poorer grew ever poorer. At least under Nāṣir, the rich were made to pay; even if the poor did not see any of their wealth themselves, they knew that Nāṣir was attempting to iron out the obvious wealth discrepancies.

Infitāḥ created a new class of people soon to be labelled the "fat cats." These people, the *nouveaux riches* (the 'newly rich') gained their wealth through this economic policy and joined the ranks of the 10% who are responsible for 60% of the consumer spending. Society became polarized between the "fat-cats" and their hangers-on -- some

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[69]Burrell/Kelidar, pp.49, 51 from Economist Intelligence Unit, "Egypt" in Annual Supplement 76, p.10; Hirst/Beeson, pp.224-230; Lippman, p.128. Until the 1970s, Egypt was a net exporter of food. This situation changed with the increasing population combined with the loss of arable land to construction.

15,000 people perhaps -- and the rest of society. New to the ways of the rich, the "fat-cats" copied their president and the upper classes and in like manner did not hesitate to flaunt their new-found wealth in the faces of the masses, if only through their imported Mercedes, their lavish social parties and exotic menus, their extravagant weddings. This was a class artificially and illegally created through infitāḥ, soon to be hated by the masses who saw in them the loss of the benefits and the improvements promised them by Sādāt. According to one estimate, there were some 500 millionaires at the beginning of infitāḥ, but by 1981, Parliament was informed that the number had increased to some 17,000. The exact number of millionaires is irrelevant; one should focus instead on the drastic inflation of their numbers. Exaggeration of numbers is bound to exist, should in fact be expected; regardless, the incredible number of the ultra-wealthy is obscene and unforgivable in a country where five million families have to live on the equivalent of less than $30 per month, where another two million live in Cairo's City of the Dead in a world completely unconnected with that of the "nouveaux riches", and this in a country where the per capita income in January 1977 stood at about £E100 per year, with the official minimum wage at £E12 per month.[70]

The "Brain-Drain"

With employment possibilities almost non-existent at home despite Nāṣir's 1962 law guaranteeing jobs to all graduates, many Egyptian graduates have migrated to the oil-rich countries for work. Mohamed Heikal, right hand man to Nāṣir, claims that perhaps only 4% of graduates benefited from infitāḥ, not more. Although this number should be taken with a grain of salt since Heikal opposed infitāḥ and fell from grace under Sādāt, it is nevertheless disturbing to discover the percentage to be so low. It is however striking to notice that it is not just graduates who are being drawn to the oil-rich countries, but

[70]Heikal, p.87; Hirst/Beeson, p.239. Haddad ("Awakening", p.224) claims however that most Egyptians agree that there are 250,000 millionaires.

intellectuals, professionals and skilled workers as well. Even cultivators have left Egypt for better prospects elsewhere; one million *fellāḥīn* (peasants) left for Iraq; 250,000 to Jordan; and 100,000 to other Arab countries. Some returned to Egypt once enough money had been saved, in order to buy some land, a taxi or some other vehicle and to eke out a living, while many others simply stayed in their new country. This migration or emigration is quite unsettling when one realizes that Egyptians are generally very tied to their land; only in the last two decades or so have Egyptians contemplated leaving their homeland in search of a better life.[71]

The oil boom of 1973-1974 had powerful repercussions on Egypt's population, albeit only temporarily. It created a phenomenon of mass migration to the oil-rich countries where jobs were plentiful. Prior to October 1973, Egypt was a leading exporter of workers to the other Arab countries to a grand total of 95,000: 61,000 to Libya (1973); 18,000 to Kuwait (1970); 11,000 to UAE (1968); 5,000 to Lebanon (1970); with no available data for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain or Oman.[72] These statistics jump drastically after 1973-1974, with numbers for 1975 being as follows: 229,000 to Libya; 95,000 to Saudi Arabia; 37,558 to Kuwait; 7,000 to Iraq; 5,300 to Jordan (East Bank); 4,600 to Oman; 2,850 to Qatar; 2,000 to Yemen and 1,237 to Bahrain, with a grand total of 397, 545 workers exported. Egypt provided 30% of all migrant labour.[73] This population export might seem like a partial solution to the chronic problem of unemployment/quasi-employment,

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[71]Heikal, p.88.

[72]Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Oil, Migration and the New Arab Social Order" in Malcolm H. Kerr and El Sayed Yassin (ed.), Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p.24 based on A. Farrag, "Migration between Arab Countries" in Manpower and Employment in Arab Countries (Geneva: ILO, 1976).

[73]Ibrahim, "Oil", p.26 from J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region (Geneva: ILO 1980), p.134-135. ILO (Birks/Sinclair) estimate that Egypt exported 398,000 in 1975, while the IMF quoted 350,000 in 1977. M. A. Fadil suggests 600,000 in 1977 for he claims that the number of migrant workers is far larger than those quoted on official statistics if one is to include illegal migrants as well as those who enter many countries which do not require registration or a visa. (Ibrahim, "Oil", pp 23, 28).

while simultaneously increasing the influx of hard currency into Egypt. Remittances from the migrant workers soon came to constitute a significant percentage of income upon which Egypt came to depend and can ill-afford to lose.[74] Unfortunately, this matter is not as straight-forward as it may appear for, as Saad Eddin Ibrahim has found, the population attracted to these oil-rich countries was not the unemployed or the 'unemployable' of Egypt, nor was it the semi-skilled who had trouble finding jobs in Egypt. The migration has therefore not solved the unemployment problem which has been hovering at around 11% since the late 1960s, for the unemployed have not the means to get to the oil-rich countries, even if they had the desire to do so. Rather the mass exodus consists of the trained and skilled individual among the labour force. Egypt is thus experiencing a "brain-drain", "a draining of her valuable brains and hands." In addition to this temporarty migration of "brains and hands" to the oil-rich countries there is a drastically increasing number of permanent migrants, that is to say, emigrants. According to Nazih Ayubi,

> From 1962 to 1972 some 28,000 individuals left Egypt as declared permanent migrants, a figure that becomes more significant when one looks at its internal details and discovers a dangerous increase in the percentage of graduates in scientific fields who were departing -- from 3.4 percent in 1962 to 51.5 percent in 1968. . . It is believed that from the end of the sixties onwards, the emigration of highly qualifies scientists, teachers, and engineers has been growing in an alarming way, accounting in the seventies -- according to some sources -- for as much as 70 percent of all emigrants.[75]

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[74]By approximately 1979-1980, annual remittances from abroad -- between $2 and $2.5 billion -- came to constitute more than thrice the annual amount of aid received by the Arab states before Camp David, and more than twice the annual amount given by the USA since then. (Nazih Ayubi, "Brain Drain": a Multidimensional Problem" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.15, #4 (Nov '83), p.446).

[75]Ayubi, "Brain Drain", p.431 from Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAMPAS), Tawzīʿ Ijmāli al-Muhājirīn (The Distribution of Emigrants) (Cairo: 1972); Al-Ahrām al-Iqtisādi, 15 June '69; Al-Taliʿah, July 1970, April 1973; Al-Ahrām, 12 Sept '72, 22 Feb '73; Saneya Saleh, The Brain Drain in Egypt, The Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol.2, monograph 5 (Cairo: AUC, May 1979). Please also see Saneya Saleh, "Motives for the Emigration of Egyptian Scientists" in Social Problems, vol.25, #1 (Oct '77), pp.40-51.

Egypt has been experiencing a second labour loss in the last thirty years, for the Coptic emigration of the late 1960s, consisting also of the finest and brightest -- including especially scientists, engineers, physicians and surgeons -- should not be forgotten. What the migration has done is to cause a skilled-labour shortage in Egypt herself, as all her skilled-manpower heads for the better conditions and far better wages to be found outside Egypt. There is almost a cat and dog fight to have the chance to work abroad, and once that opportunity is won, it is a hard fight to maintain that right. Egypt is in the odd position of producing the "brains" and the skilled "hands" but being unable to induce them to stay. She therefore produces them for others. There are obvious repercussions of this trend, not least of all how these labour shortages affect Egyptian society and its people. What is less obvious perhaps, is that many workers accept jobs below their skill as long as the pay is better than anything they would get in Egypt. Consequently, in the long run, there is a loss in skill due to lack of practice. No one wants to stay in Egypt; those who have the means to leave, do so, and those who do not, wish they could and strive to make their dream a reality.[76] This is a very depressing finding and one which does not bode well for Egypt. It is the educated and the skilled who can make a better Egypt, and it is precisely those people who are fleeing Egypt in droves.

These then are some of the major problems which faced Egypt during the presidency of Sādāt. The crisis of overpopulation, the lack of jobs and housing, the poor

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[76]Nazih Ayubi, "Brain Drain", pp.431-450; Ibrahim, "Oil", pp.41, 43. Yvonne Haddad has also remarked that due to the labour migration, educated women from the socially mobile class are often put into the work force in order to fill positions left empty by workers who have left for oil-rich countries. Thus an opportunity to work is given these women which otherwise might not have been possible. But there are obvious repercussions of this trend, not least of all how this will effect the 'traditional' and 'conservative' elements of society, nor what will happen to these women when the men return and want their jobs back, or should they be forced to return should the demand for migrant labourers decrease. The loss of income for these women and their families could also be detrimental for their well-being. (Haddad, "Awakening", pp.249-252).

quality of education, the loss of agriculture and a corresponding increase in imports, the debt management, the "brain drain" and loss of skilled workers form the basis of Egypt's so-called 'normal' everyday conditions. These problems have existed for so long they have become chronic and are now considered constants. They have become, in fact, a part of everyday life and the continuous fight for survival. But the overall situation was sorely aggravated by Sādāt's policies which benefitted the upper crust of society at the expense of the other 98% of the population.

In the following chapter, we will explore the periods of turmoil which generated a reaction by some of the dissatisfied against the Sādāt government.

CHAPTER 3

PERIODS OF CRISIS

The previous chapter presented the first part of our hypothesis, that of the everyday 'normal' conditions of Egypt during the Sādāt years. This chapter will be devoted to the second half of the hypothesis, that of the periods of turmoil which generated a militant reaction against the state. The October War of 1973, infitāḥ/the 1977 Bread Riots, and peace with Israel were all followed shortly afterwards by militant actions against Sādāt's regime by Shabāb Muḥammad, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah and al-Gihād. These groups did not simply materialize upon the Egyptian scene without cause, nor did they attack the state without provocation or justification. Furthermore their timing is relevant. A linkage between the turbulent periods and the violence of the islāmiyyīn must be therefore seriously considered. If a link is to be denied, we would be forced to look for something else which triggered the militant reactions -- unless we assume that these were senseless acts of violence, nothing more. Why did Shabāb Muḥammad attempt to take over Cairo's Technical Military Academy in April 1974 and not, for example, in 1972, in 1975, or sometime since Ḥusnī Mubārak became president? If Shabāb's attempted coup d'état was pure violence, timing is irrelevant; it could have been carried out at any time but just happened to be executed in April 1974. Instead the islāmiyyīn carried out their attack a mere six months after the October War. Their timing is a significant factor. Furthermore, having examined briefly in chapter one the ideology and plans for an Islamic society (albeit very unsophisticated) of Shabāb Muḥammad as well as of al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah and al-Gihād, it can be accepted that theirs were not cases of random violence. Rather they were deliberate attempts to take over the state apparatus in order to "implement a set of policies

intended to create a social order different from the one offered by the incumbents."[1] The islāmiyyīn wanted to establish a truly Islamic society in complete accordance with the Sharīᶜah. Theirs was indeed *jihād fī sabīl illāh* ('fighting in the path of God').[2] The link between event and militant reaction can neither be disregarded, nor can these actions be simply reduced to senseless violence. To do so would erase the islāmī criticism of and opposition to the Sādāt regime which were expressed through their militant actions. It becomes therefore important to view each militant reaction as an undeniable criticism and opposition to the state. This understanding of the reactions will also help explain the counter-reaction of the state. Timing however was forced upon the islāmiyyīn by external factors over which they had no control, as will be seen in the following pages.

We will begin this chapter by briefly examining the October War (1973), infitāḥ (April 1974+)/the Bread Riots (January 1977), and the peace process with Israel (November 1977+) in order to determine whether the turmoil generated could have triggered the islāmiyyīn to act against the state when they did: Shabāb Muḥammad reacted in April 1974, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah in July 1977 and al-Gihād in October 1981.[3] Were these turbulent times completely unconnected to the violence which followed? Were the outbursts of violence delayed reactions to the crises or were the individual crises used as a

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[1]Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Stateness and Ideology in Contemporary Egyptian Politics" in G. Warburg and U. M. Kupferschmidt (ed.), Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in Egypt and Sudan (NY: Praeger, 1983), pp.87.

[2]Jihād is historically, legally and traditionally interpreted as a military struggle involving force and arms. In recent times however, it has been given a pacifist interpretation by modernists and apologetics in order to make it more acceptable and less violent to non-Muslims. The islāmiyyīn on the other hand, clearly understand and promote jihād in its most military form. For more information on the concept of jihād, please see Richard C. Martin, "Striving in the Path of Allah: a Fundamentalist Interpretation of *Jihad* in Egypt" in Conflict Quarterly, vol.7, #2 (Spring '79), pp.5-19; Rudolph Peters, "The Political Relevance of the Doctrine of Jihad in Sadat's Egypt" in Edward Ingram (ed.), National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie, (NJ: Frank Cass, 1986), pp.252-271.

[3]Militancy was not limited to the Muslim population alone. There was a similar rise in religious militancy within the Coptic minority as well, although most scholars agree that it arose an an effect of and in protest against the rise in militancy of the Muslims, especially the university jamāᶜāt. (Hamied Ansari, "Sectarian Conflict and the Political Expediency of Religion" in Middle East Journal, vol.38, #3 (Summer '84), p.397).

convenient excuse or justification for the attacks on the state? Was the violence, the attempted coups, avoidable or preventable by the state? Were these militant actions directed specifically towards Sādāt as individual or towards Sādāt as representative of the state? How much leeway did Sādāt as individual have? In other words, were these periods of turmoil the 'straws which broke the camel's back' so to speak? Did the October War, infitāḥ, the Bread Riots, and the peace process generate a feeling of urgency, of impending doom, which prompted the militants to react violently against the state? Did the violence occur for the sake of violence or because the groups felt action, even if it entailed inevitable violence, was justified given their interpretation of Islam? Why did nothing similar occur during Nāṣir's eighteen year presidency? Did Nāṣir's security apparatus and his tight reign over the country prevent any possible dissension and opposition from occurring? Can authoritarian state control explain why there was no militant attack against the state from June 1967 to September 1970 when Nāṣir was at his weakest -- whereas Sādāt suffered an attempted coup d'état just six months after Egypt's 'quasi' victory over Israel, when he was at his most popular? Can the personality of the ruler have a role in the lack/presence of violence against the state? Can it be said that Gamāl ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir was more representative of his people despite his oppression, than was Anwar al-Sādāt despite his genuine relaxing of the *mukhābarāt* (secret police)?[4] We will venture to answer some of these questions in the course of this chapter.

The October War

The October War had both positive and negative aspects to it. The Egyptian 'victory' over the Israeli forces bestowed legitimacy on Anwar al-Sādāt who became a hero in the eyes of his people. His empty promises of two years past were finally fulfilled. But

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[4]An issue raised by fellow student of the Institute of Islamic Studies, Mr. Abdel-Aziz Ezzel-Arab.

more important the 'victory' restored the shaken confidence of the Egyptian military and people while shattering the image of the undefeatable Israeli army. Euphoria filled the hearts and minds of the common man; soldiers walked tall and proud once more, redeemed from their inglorious humiliation of 1967. For a short while, Egyptians forgot the problems of their daily lives as they revelled in their victory. Furthermore, Israel was forced to realize the real threat which a united Arab force could pose, given the success of the early part of the war. Israel had taken the Arabs too lightly after the 1967 defeat. Arab solidarity had also proved effective in the oil embargo aimed at the Western supporters of Israel. On 17 October the Arab oil-producers had announced a 5% cutback in production to be followed by other monthly cutbacks until the Israelis withdrew from the occupied territories and restored the rights of the Palestinian people. (The so-called 'friendly' Western nations had continued to receive their oil supplies uninterrupted however). King Faiṣal of Saudi Arabia went even further and announced a 10% cutback in Saudi output after learning of US President Nixon's plea to Congress for more aid to Israel. Five days later King Faiṣal halted all shipments to the USA. The effects of the oil-embargo of 1973 were felt far more strongly than the oil-embargo of 1967 -- despite its complete halt in production -- due to the increased reliance of the West on Arab oil since then. The Arabs therefore exploited a powerful weapon against the West. But despite all these positive signs, all was not quite as it seemed. The Egyptians were not as victorious as the news media had at first triumphantly broadcast and as the people had joyously believed. After the UN ceasefire was announced, it became known that the 1973 Victory was in reality only a "quasi" victory. What had happened? The Egyptian forces had crossed the Canal on 6 October 1973 and had taken the Israeli forces completely by surprise. This military manoeuvre was superbly and faultlessly executed. The Syrian and Egyptian forces progressed at first with little resistance from the Israeli forces. By 14 October however, the tide of war had begun to turn as the Egyptians began committing a series of very costly blunders. As Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Anwar al-Sādāt was ultimately

responsible for the decisions taken. He all too often ignored the advice and skill of his military staff, especially that of his Chief-of-Staff General Saʿad Shazlī who was in charge of winning the war. In the very early morning of 16 October, Israeli General Ariel Sharon and a task force of 200 men secretly paddled across the Canal, split up into raiding parties, and attacked missile and artillery positions behind Egyptian lines. On 18 October, US President Nixon asked Congress for $2.2 billion in "emergency funds to finance the massive airlift of arms to Israel that was already underway." By 18 October the Israelis had won the Battle of Deversoir. They began their march on Cairo. On 20 October, Sādāt called on the Russians for a Soviet-sponsored cease-fire, and two days later the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338 which called for a cease-fire by all parties within twelve hours in the positions they occupied at this time. The following day, despite the resolution, the Israeli forces managed to surround and effectively cut off the Egyptian Third Army which consisted of two divisions (45,000 men and 250 tanks). A UN emergency force was immediately sent to the battle-zone to ensure the cease-fire was properly obeyed. By the end of the war, Israel was in possession of more territory than she had been at the beginning. She now had the whole of the Sinai, the Golan Heights, Gaza and the West Bank. Egypt had been winning the war in the first week, true, thereby forcing the Israelis to call on the Americans for military support in order to ensure their survival. Nevertheless, Egypt had begun losing decisively as blunders were committed. Sādāt's immediate acceptance of the UN cease-fire came as a big shock and disappointment to the rest of the Arab World. Some of the Arab States rejected it outright, but President Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad of Syria accepted it two days after Sādāt. Within Egypt, the masses soon turned on Sādāt for his quick acceptance of the humiliating conditions. As the unrest and dissatisfaction continued to grow, Sādāt began to realize the potential danger present. To pacify the masses, he ordered a general mobilization of the youth in order to form militias which were to be sent to join those already in the Canal Zone. Volunteers came from all over the country and were sent to training camps between Cairo and the Canal Zone. These young

men soon returned to the cities completely disillusioned, claiming there had been no training camps. Unable to fight, these young men were left to answer the agonizing questions which inevitabily arose. Within a week of Sādāt's triumph, of his being hailed as "Hero of the Crossing" *("baṭl al-ᶜubūr")* Sādāt was already in danger of losing his newly-won still-shaky legitimacy. Compounding this soul-searching agony was the eternal practical financial burden of war. Military expenditure was breaking Egypt financially; she could ill-afford to remain in a constant state of war with Israel.[5]

On 18 April 1974, six months after the October War, Shabāb Muḥammad[6] led its ill-fated attack on Cairo's Technical Military Academy. Arms, vehicles and other equipment were to be seized before storming the Arab Socialist Union where Egypt's ruling élite was to hear Sādāt speak.[7] The leadership believed in meticulous planning for the coup d'état and had even managed to secure a detailed study of the presidential and other élite behaviour, and of daily routine etc. Members had penetrated the army and the police, and all had had strenuous and thorough training in weaponry. Furthermore, general rehearsals of most of the plan had even been carried out. Shabāb believed that all of Egypt's problems were due to the absence of Sharīᶜah in society. It therefore executed this coup d'état with

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[5]David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1981), pp.17-35, 156-167. The latter pages also give an insightful account, written by General Saᶜad Shazlī, Egyptian Chief-of-Staff, of the Egyptians' blunders; R. M. Burrell and Abbas R. Kelidar, Egypt: The Dilemmas of a Nation -- 1970-1977. The Washington Papers, vol.5, #48 (London: Sage Publications, 1977), pp.49.

[6]For more information on Shabāb Muḥammad, please see the following: R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (NY: Syracuse, University Press, 1985), pp.86-96; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.12, #4 (Dec '80), p.425, also footnote #14 on p.450; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s" in Third World Quarterly, vol.10, #2 (April '88), pp.632-657; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants" in MERIP REPORTS, #103, vol.12, #2 (Feb '82), pp.5-14; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Islamic Militancy as a Social Movement: the Case of Two Groups in Egypt" in Ali E. Dessouki (ed.), Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, chapter 6; Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: al-Saqi Books, 1985), pp.92-94.

[7]Contradicting the details of the coup d'état given above, Kepel (p.94) states that Shabāb planned to storm the Academy and seize control of its armoury before attacking and killing Sādāt in the presidential procession which was to pass near-by.

the belief that a popular uprising would follow in its wake. Following the assassination of the president, society would then be structured on the Sharīᶜah thereby establishing Islam from the top down. It was felt that once a 'true' Muslim ruled and enforced the Sharīᶜah, society would automatically be reformed. However the plot was frustrated before it got that far. The shoot-out between security forces and the islāmiyyīn at the Academy destroyed Shabāb's plans. On 20 April 1974, al-Ahrām stated that 11 were killed, 27 wounded. An immediate and pervasive crack-down by the régime followed which resulted in the arrests of hundreds of islāmiyyīn. State justice was meted out quickly: 60 were released, 29 received prison sentences, and the leader (Ṣāliḥ Siriyyah) and another were executed on 9 November 1976. According to Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the "attempt was spectacular in volume, planning and timing," despite its ultimate failure.[8] What is interesting and significant about Shabāb's attempted coup is its timing. It was executed at a time when President Sādāt was at his most popular due to the 1973 'Victory'. It was also a period of legitimacy for the regime during which Islamic groups were still being encouraged by Sādāt in order to garner more support for the regime.

Infitāḥ, and the Bread Riots of 1977

The October Paper which introduced infitāḥ in April 1974 cannot be included among the reasons explaining Shabāb's attempted coup d'état later that month, for the attack was carried out too soon after the appearance of the economic policy, with not enough of a time lapse to allow any effects of the new economic direction to be felt. Sādāt promised quick prosperity for all through infitāḥ which would attract foreign investment and capital immediately. Admittedly, millions of pounds worth of investment plans were approved by the Investment and Free Zone Authority, but the actual committed capital was far far less.[9]

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[8]Ibrahim, "Anatomy", p.425 and footnote #14 on p.450.

[9]Fouad Ajami, "Retreat from Economic Nationalism: the Political Economy of Sadat's Egypt" in Journal of Arab Affairs, vol.1, #1 (Spring '81), pp.30-31.

This distinction was not public knowledge, and hopes for a better future continued to grow unrealistically. Infitāḥ instead rapidly exacerbated the dismal situation of Egypt through the reorientation from Nāṣir's industrialization policy to Sādāt's policy of importing and foreign investment. Local industries suffered greatly as a consequence. Few benefited, certainly not the average Egyptian who only saw his overall condition worsen. The rich, lucky and unscrupulous got ever richer, and their numbers increased with the creation of the class of "fat cats" or "nouveaux riches." Their disgusting displayal of wealth, along with the rampant import of luxury goods emphasized the opulance of the few and increased the general feeling of disatisfaction among the masses. 'Rich' migrant workers returning from their jobs in the oil-rich countries (generated by the oil-boom of 1973-1974) were laden with luxury goods and weighed down with money. The power and comfort of wealth was yet again highlighted. 'Off-limits' luxury goods of yesterday became 'must-haves' of today, and disappointment, envy, and jealousy became vogue, along with the coveting of the neighbours' possessions. But the average Egyptian could not even hope to own what the richer man flaunted so casually; soon he could no longer afford to live even in his own society. As Hassan Hanafi explains this odd situation, "In a society of consumption, importing consumer goods, a simple Egyptian with limited income cannot live. Egyptians have become foreigners in their own country."[10] Social, psychological and financial problems at the level of the individual were thus artificially created and fed.

On a more frightening level, the political independence of Egypt continued to remain potentially at stake. In Egypt, it is the multinationals which monopolize foreign

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[10]Hassan Hanafi, "The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt" in Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.4, #1 (Spring '82), p 73. Galal A. Amin explains Egypt's situation thus: ". . . a typical third world country enjoys a very low degree of freedom in deciding what kinds of foreign goods and foreign investments to import. If it decides to import only what it considers to be necessary goods and investments, it is likely to be deprived of both the necessary and the luxury. On the other hand, if it follows a liberal economic policy whereby little discrimination is made with regard to what to import, it is likely to be showered by goods and investments for which it has very little need." (Galal A. Amin, "Some Economic and Cultural Aspects of Economic Liberalization in Egypt" in Social Problems, vol.28, #4 (April '81), p.436).

investment, and their control over the Egyptian economy would likely spread with their increasingly active role envisioned by infitāḥ. Any development implemented in Egypt would therefore in all likelihood be "dependent development" which could eventually result in economic control. In time Egypt's political independence could be controlled by these multinationals.[11] Observant Egyptians could soon see a striking resemblance between Sādāt's Egypt and the Egypt of Khedive Ismāʿīl. In the late 1870s, Ismāʿīl's finances had been in such dire straits that the Commission of Public Debt had been created in order to oversee the financing of the Egyptian debt through dual controllers which had ultimately led the way to Egypt's occupation by Britain. It had happened in the 1870s and it could so easily have been repeated in the 1970s under Sādāt. This was a frightening but realistic prospect, and one which Sādāt did not consider carefully enough in his haste to embrace the capitalist doctrine.[12]

Despite Sādāt's promises and avid assurances regarding infitāḥ, the economic situation of Egypt continued to worsen as the months progressed. In 1974 alone, there were some 400 minor strikes and work stoppages or interruptions. However these had been small in scale, and public awareness of them had been limited as it had been possible to keep them out of the papers. Eight months after the inauguration of infitāḥ, major demonstrations broke out in central Cairo on New Year's Day 1975. It was impossible to keep these disturbances quiet due to their size, location and timing. These were the first significant demonstrations to erupt since 1967 in which Israel and the return of the Sinai were not issues. These demonstrations were economic in nature, not the first nor the last of their kind since infitāḥ. On 19 March 1975, three months after the New Year's Day

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[11]Gouda Abdel-Khalek, "The Open Door Economic Policy in Egypt: its Contribution to Investment and its Equity Implications" in Malcolm H. Kerr and El Sayed Yassin (ed.), Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p.265.

[12]Please see David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), pp.211-215, 219-221, 353; Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (London: André Deutsch Ltd, 1983), pp.75-77, 171-182. Examples of Sādāt's lavishness are also given.

demonstrations, 33,000 workers went on strike at Maḥallah al-Kubrā, Egypt's largest spinning and weaving mills. The demands were again economic in nature, for the workers called for better wages and improved working and living conditions. Three days later, 4,500 men from the Central Security Forces were sent in to bring the situation under control. Chaos ensued when the population believed the mills had been bombed by military aircraft. Police stations and public buildings were stormed and vandalized. The participation of students, opposition groups and the intelligentsia lent these demonstrations a political colouring, but they were economic at heart. Once again, "communists, Jews, spies and *agents provocateurs*" -- the typical scapegoats -- were blamed. Approximately 2,000 were arrested, only some of whom were charged but not convicted of attempting to overthrow the government. But the economic grievance was acknowledged: after a ten-hour emergency session, the Cabinet announced "drastic measures to meet the people's needs."[13]

By the mid-1970s, the economy was in a disastrous state of affairs as a result of, as Sādāt liked to explain, too much consumption and not enough production. Egypt was in dire need of liquid cash despite the foreign cash which was flowing in at an unparalleled rate. But it was not enough given the way the Egyptian economy was being managed. By the beginning of 1976, Sādāt stated that Egypt "needed an economic transfusion of $4,000 million in Arab aid over the next two years." Yet again Egypt was falling behind in her short term repayments. Consequently Sādāt headed to the Gulf in an attempt to muster up financial support. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait agreed to provide emergency aid, and simultaneously created an Arab fund called Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt (GODE) to support the Egyptian economy. In April of that year, GODE revealed that it would give £E2 billion over the next five years. Sādāt however promptly replied that

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[13]Hirst/Beeson, pp.231-234.

he had need of £E12 billion. Sādāt was having such tremendous difficulty finding adequate money injections abroad that he was forced to find it at home.[14]

Under Sādāt, Egypt had been gradually moving closer to the Western sphere of influence. As a result, she was slowly being pressured directly by the US, indirectly by the IMF and the World Bank, to conform to Western economic know-how and policy, which implied the "subordination of Egypt to the West's economic purposes." At this point in time and in dire need for money, Sādāt could ill-afford to refuse to comply. He needed money so desperately that it had been estimated that Egypt's deficit for the second half of 1976 would be £E1.25 billion. The IMF, the World Bank and the US joined forces to pressure Sādāt to implement "a 'stabilization' plan entailing a cutback in subsidies, the paring of public sector inefficiencies, the setting of a 'realistic' exchange rate to promote exports and attract foreign capital, the control of credit and consumption, and a retrenchment in investment outlays." At this time, one third of the federal budget was allotted for subsidies on basic commodities, including bread, flour, rice, beans, butane gas, gasoline, soap, cigarettes, some textiles and other basic commodities.[15] For millions of Egyptians these subsidies were the subtle difference between "subsistence and something approaching starvation." However the IMF did not endorse this state generosity which admittedly Egypt could ill-afford.[16] In November 1976, ʿAbd al-Munim Qaisūnī was made Deputy

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[14]Hirst/Beeson, p.235 from al-Siyāsah (Kuwait daily), 8 Jan '76; Hirst/Beeson, p.235 from John Waterbury, Egypt, Burdens of the Past, Options for the Future (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), p.308.

[15]See Marvin G. Weinbaum and Rashid Naim, "Domestic and International Politics in Egypt's Economic Policy Reforms" in Journal of Arab Affairs, vol.3, #2 (Fall '84), pp.157-188. The flat round unleaven bread in Egypt is known as *ʿaish* ('life') -- Egypt is the only Arab country to refer to it as such -- and has been kept at the artificial price of 1 piaster since 1961. It is the staple of the masses.

[16]By the end of the 1970s, subsidies were costing the government more than £E1 billion. This amount had jumped by 1986 to £E3.8 billion or roughly 10% of the GDP -- excluding all indirect subsidies such as bus fares, electricity, books, etc. In 1987, President Mubārak stated that the "total cost of state subsidies comes to about 5.502 billion pounds. This includes subsidies for goods, textiles, medicines, dairies, housing, railroads and portable water. . . The annual cost to the government . . . amounts to 583 pounds per family." (Lippman, p.115).

Premier for Financial and Economic Affairs and was given the task of finding a solution to the economic crisis. Egypt was placed in an impossible situation but had no choice or maneuverability if she wanted to continue receiving loans from the IMF. Qaisūnī's answer entailed cutting the subsidies drastically. "What these measures would do, in cold arithmetical terms, was directly or indirectly to raise the cost of living by £E500 million."[17] These cuts were designed primarily to halve the £E553 million which the government would otherwise have spent on subsidizing basic commodities. Accordingly the necessary cuts were made and were announced in the morning of 18 January 1977. Subsidized goods jumped in price between 10% and 35% overnight. There was an immediate and spontaneous uproar from the masses. The people had had enough. They were twice made to pay for infitāḥ: once because of empty promises and unfulfilled hopes and dreams which Sādāt had fed them through his talk of infitāḥ, and a second time because now their very subsistence was to be taken away through the cuts. The fury erupted. The rich had to be made to pay.

> . . . the riots . . . were a popular uprising; a warning from the have-nots to the haves that they wanted more; the message being that if they couldn't have their share, the greedy ten percent should be deprived of theirs. The majority of Egyptians had come to feel like second class citizens in a new consumer society spawned by Sadat's 1974 infitah economic liberalization policy through which the nouveaux riches passed on their way to join the established rich, flaunting their foreign luxury wares as they went . . .[18]

Heavy rioting took place across the country, from Aswan to Alexandria. Night clubs and fancy places were set ablaze on the Pyramids Road in Cairo. The rich were targeted as the population unleashed its frustrations on tangible objects. The violence spread quickly. The reactions expressed in the riots were serious, spontaneous and genuine outbursts of emotion. Shouts of *"yā baṭl il-ᶜubūr, fain il-fuṭūr?"* ("Oh hero of the crossing, where is

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[17]Material in quotation marks within this paragraph are taken from Hirst/Beeson, pp.237-239.

[18]Doreen Kays, Frogs and Scorpions: Egypt, Sadat and the Media (London: Frederick Muller Ltd, 1984), pp.253-254.

our breakfast!") and *"Gihān! Gihān! al-shaᶜab gaᶜān !"* ("Gihān! Gihān! The people are hungry!") were to be heard everywhere intermingled with "Nāṣir! Nāṣir!" and "We would rather be ruled by Nasser from the grave than by Sadat from Aswan."[19] The riots were not only protests against the cuts but outcries at the obvious wealth discrepancies created and widened by infitāḥ. The violence, destruction and looting were also expressions of outrage at the abominable and inhumane conditions in which the people were forced to live, work, and survive. The riots were a combination of frustration, despair, anger, outrage and helplessness. The riot police and the army were sent in to restore order, but clashes between the forces and the enraged mob lasted well into the night. Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and their suburbs were placed under curfew in the evening of 19 January. There is great discrepancy with regard to the number of dead and wounded resulting from these riots. Figures range anywhere from forty-three to eight hundred dead and from one thousand to several thousand wounded.[20] Some 1,250 were imprisoned. At the time of the riots, Sādāt was in Aswan and had not even been aware of the riots there until the mob was quite enraged. He had to disguise himself as a fellāḥ to reach Aswan Airport safely in order to fly back to the capital. Upon his return to Cairo, on the night of 19 January 1977 -- the day after the cuts were announced -- it was proclaimed that the subsidies would be restored immediately. The violence which so stunned Sādāt and his government demonstrated a serious miscalculation on the part of Sādāt (as well as the IMF) in even considering a reduction of subsidies after over two decades of price stability.[21]

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[19]Despite every attempt by Sādāt to deNāṣirize Egypt, he was not as successful as he first thought, as was demonstrated in the riots which proved that "neither Anwar nor Jihan would ever command that spontaneous esteem in which, for all his faults, Nasser had been held, and that, seven years after he had gone, he lived on in the minds of the people, a memory which official neglect could not expunge." (Hirst/Beeson, p.244).

[20]Anthony McDermott (p.54) stated that 43 were killed and over 800 injured in the riots and demonstrations; Raymond William Baker estimated 79 dead and 1,000 wounded in his "Sadat's Open Door: Opposition from Within" in Social Problems, vol.28, #4 (April '81), p.381; while David Hirst and Irene Beeson (p.245) offer a far higher number, claiming that unofficial estimates put the dead at 800 with several thousand wounded.

[21]R. M. Burrell and Abbas R. Kelidar, Egypt: the Dilemmas of a Nation -- 1970-1977. The Washington Papers, vol.5, #48 (London: Sage Publications, 1977), p.71;

The reaction of Sādāt and his government to the riots was only another indication of the gap between ruler and ruled which had been ever increasing as the years passed. By this time, Sādāt had lost complete touch with the masses who felt he was far beyond their reach (in complete contradiction to their relationship with Nāṣir who remained forever 'one of them'). Sādāt allowed the poor to pay the consequences of the lavish spending and corruption of the upper classes (including government officials), and the masses would not easily forget this latest injustice.[22] Did Sādāt and his government (and the IMF) not realize the extent of Egyptian dependency on the subsidies for survival? Could not another solution have been found to solve or alleviate Sādāt's cash problem? Expenditures should have been cut elsewhere in order to ensure the maintenance of the subsidies. Instead the subsidies were sacrificed immediately with inadequate thought given to the consequences that such drastic cuts would have on the average Egyptian who depended on them for his very survival. Sādāt completely misread the situation and his people.

After the riots Sādāt called upon the Ikhwān to support his contention that the communists were to blame. The Ikhwān had not partaken in the violence because of its new image of respectability and pacifism, though it feared Sādāt would not make a distinction between it and the islāmiyyīn should he decide to enforce a crack-down on the opposition after the riots. This fear proved to be justified as was soon discovered. Some jamāᶜāt members used the opportunity provided by the riots to attack night clubs and

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Hirst/Beeson, pp.235-254; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.12, #4 (Dec '80), p.424; Anthony McDermott, Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: a Flawed Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp.53-54. Raymond William Baker (p.381) clearly shows the creativity of the government within its fear of the wrath of the masses: the price of bread was restored to its pre-cut level; the size of the bread however had been shrunk.

[22]The problem of subsidy abuse is well known. It was not uncommon, for example, to find five-star hotels using subsidized flour and bread, among other basic commodities, in food to be sold to foreigners and the well-off -- people who did not depend on the subsidies for survival, who could in fact afford the 'real' price. The subsidy system was implemented in order to help the average Egyptian make ends meet, but exploitation was only to be expected, given the lack of government checks and controls.

casinos to make an Islamic statement. Although there were the inevitable looters who benefited from the chaos which reigned, while others participated for the sake of violence, these were the exceptions.

Sādāt responded to the Bread Riots with a series of sweeping repressive measures against all kinds of political opposition whether left, center or right. He put to a referendum a series of emergency laws which were designed to prevent a similar incident from arising and which would punish any perpetrators. The laws were supported by the people with a enormous and totally predictable 99.46% majority and were put into effect immediately. The following actions all became punishable by life imprisonment with hard labour: "Participation in, or intent to establish, organizations hostile to the social system"; "demonstrating with intent to destroy public property"; "participation in, or incitement or, riotous assembly or public disorder"; "obstruction of, or intent to obstruct, the proper functioning of government bodies, public or private institutions or educational establishments by the threat of force"; "planning or participation in a gathering or sit-in which could endanger public security"; and "deliberately striking . . . for the achievement of a common aim which could be damaging to the national economy." The police began ferreting out the conspirators, managing to track down some of the individuals who had been involved in the actual looting, destruction and rioting. The police, however, also rounded up approximately 3,000 others, including the 'regulars' who seemed to get arrested each time a crisis occurred -- journalists, intellectuals, authors, playwrights, and other critics of the government. It took three years before the 176 individuals accused and tried for "incitement and belonging to secret organizations related to the events of January" by the State Security Court were finally acquitted. Sādāt also moved to silence decisively his internal critics within the Egyptian press, namely the independent writers, those who could and did say "no." Although these writers continued to draw a salary, they were no longer

published. Their voices were effectively strangled, their audience eliminated. But the damage had been done. And Sādāt's legitimacy was marred and questioned.[23]

On 30 January 1977, some two weeks after the riots, Sādāt finally came before the people to talk. In his speech he confidently and consistently blamed the communists for the disturbances, persistently referring to the riots as an "uprising of thieves."[24] Designating the Riots as such demeaned and discredited the anguish and primal feelings of the people while simultaneously providing an excuse to enforce a crack-down upon the opposition. Rather than addressing the serious issues confronting the nation which simmered malevolently beneath the surface until something triggered them to explode, Sādāt chose publicly to close his ears to the anguished cries of his people. He appeared to make no attempt to understand the reasons behind the rioting and looting of the dark days of 18 and 19 January 1977. In the space of a few short years, Sādāt had managed to create a tremendous gap between the people and himself. He was no longer sensitive to the true needs of his people.

Despite the seriousness of the riots, they bought Anwar al-Sādāt much-needed cash and time. Temporarily. The IMF took a more lenient stance toward the avenues open to Egypt to solve the economic crisis. Cutting the subsidies was obviously no longer a viable option. Sādāt was quick to exploit the riots so that all were aware of exactly how fragile his régime would be in the face of a similar situation. The point was taken. The Arabs rallied to his side, as did the West (especially the US) with emergency cash injections. Unfortunately Egypt's ecónomic crisis was not solved. Aid was more short-term in nature, for it was sucked in and swallowed with hardly an effect due to the terrible state of the economy. Only a complete and drastic over-haul could have solved the situation permanently. But Egypt and her people could not survive the radical 'belt-tightening' such a

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[23]Baker, p.382; Hirst/Beeson, pp.249-252.
[24]Hirst/Beeson, p 248, from al-Ahrām, 4 Feb '77.

measure would obviously entail. The riots were also too fresh in everyone's mind even to begin thinking of a permanent solution to the economic crisis. Sādāt all too soon found himself in the same position he had been in prior to the January Bread Riots. Little had changed.

On July 3, 1977 al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah[25] kidnapped Shaikh Muḥammad al-Dhahabī, former Minister of *Awqāf* (religious endowments). Among other things, Takfīr demanded £E200,000 and the release of some of its members imprisoned since November 1976. Three days later, their demands unmet, the hostage was killed.[26] The resulting violent confrontation with the authorities included the group's carrying out of some bombing attacks in Cairo in which a number of security officers were killed. Casualties numbered 6 dead in the ensuing shoot-out, with 57 injured in the shoot-out and explosions. A nationwide crackdown was enforced, resulting in 620 arrests. Of those individuals held, 465 were tried by military courts. Five of the leaders were hanged on 19 March 1978.[27]

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[25]For information on Takfīr, please see: R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse, NY: University Press, 1985), pp.93-97; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.12, #4 (Dec '80), pp.423-453; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants" in MERIP REPORTS, #103, vol.12, #2 (Feb '82), pp.5-14; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Islamic Militancy as a Social Movement: the Case of Two Groups in Egypt" in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (ed.), Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (NY: Praeger Publ., 1982), pp.117-137; Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: al-Saqi Books, 1985), chapter 3. Officials first noticed Takfīr in 1976 when Muṣṭafā led punitive attacks against some of its former members who had defected to another group of islāmiyyīn. Takfīr had not been considered dangerous to the security of the state at this time. At the height of its popularity Takfīr boasted between 3,000 and 5,000 members; had active sympathizers throughout Egypt; had contacts -- mainly migrant workers -- in Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and probably Western Europe as well; had financial assets of £E50,000 and ran several small businesses (according to government estimates).

[26]See Kepel, p.96 for a list of the demands.

[27]Ibrahim, "Anatomy", p.450, footnote #10, from Arab Reports and Records, 1-15 July '77 and al-Ahrām, 21 July '77. There is discrepancy among various authors in the details described above: Kepel, for instance, states that Takfīr demanded the release of 14 of its members arrested in November 1976 for attacks against other islāmiyyīn, whereas McDermott (p.190) claims that Takfīr demanded the release of 60 of its members who had been imprisoned mainly in connection with the Military Academy coup of April 1974. McDermott asserts that security officials had discovered that the 1974 coup had been executed by a 20-member squad of Takfīr (not Shabāb) whereas Ibrahim ("Egypt's Islamic

Takfīr had not planned to confront the state at the time of the kidnapping, but it felt it had been pushed to react due to the arrests of some of its members. At the time of its confrontation with the state, Takfīr was based in a closed, isolated and insulated area in Cairo. Contact with the outside world was forbidden and prevented due to the group's belief that both the political system and society as a whole were corrupt. A corrupt political system breeds a corrupt society and vice versa. Egypt was therefore beyond salvation. The model, nucleus community of Shukrī Muṣṭafā was thus kept away from the contamination of Egyptian society. Once his community was numerically and spiritually strong enough, it would go out to reform society (and later the world) from the bottom up just as Muḥammad's ummah had done fourteen centuries before. This was therefore a long-term strategy and entailed patience.

The move against al-Dhahabī, former minister of Awqāf, was a clear condemnation of the religious character of the state in particular, and the actions of the state in general. Takfīr viewed the ᶜulamā' harshly for their support of an unIslamic government and for those *fatāwā* (pl. of fatwā, formal legal opinion) which were deliberately and obviously contrary to the teachings of Islam. All respect for the ᶜulamā' had been lost. Al-Dhahabī was furthermore one of Egypt's top ᶜulamā', and with his kidnapping and murder, Takfīr demonstrated its total contempt for the religious scholars. But al-Dhahabī had been also consciously chosen as victim, for he had led a forceful and successful propaganda campaign against the group in public and through the media. Muṣṭafā admitted that the group had consequently experienced a decrease in membership as well as a number of defections.[28] Through his propaganda campaign, al-Dhahabī had made himself an obvious and highly-visible target. But in spite of this visibility, his connections with the state should not be ignored or minimalized. Takfīr admitted that it was forced into an early

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Activism", p.650, footnote #30) disagrees, saying that 100 stormed the Academy. Ibrahim found Shabāb and Takfīr to be two completely distinct groups.

[28]Israel Altman, "Islamic Movements in Egypt" in Jerusalem Quarterly, #10 (Winter '79), p.103 from al-Akhbār, 7 July '77.

confrontation but nevertheless, it had hoped that its actions against the state would incite others to turn against the government, especially in the wake of the Bread Riots of seven months earlier. As with Shabāb Muḥammad's attempts three years earlier, this confrontation with the state ended in failure. The expected popular uprising did not materialize in its wake, and Takfīr itself was crushed as a result of its premature challenge.

The Peace Process with Israel

Sādāt realized somewhat belatedly the distressing state of his country. He was forced into awareness of the dangers of an unhappy population, having experienced first-hand the violence of the Bread Riots and the speed with which they had swept the entire country. His shock and surprise at these riots is a telling indication of his separation from the people. Seven months later came the Takfīr assassination of al-Dhahabī and its subsequent attack against the state. Sādāt knew that he had immediately to divert the attentions of his people yet again. The distraction he provided was none other than the peace process with Israel. The stage, however, had been set far earlier, beginning with his unilateral cease-fire on 22 October 1973, Kilometer 101 (27 October 1973), the first Sinai disengagement (17 January 1974), the premature lifting of the oil embargo (18 March 1974), the unscheduled premature opening of the Suez Canal (5 June 1975, despite his insistence not to reopen it until the Israelis had withdrawn from the whole of Sinai -- empty promises), and the second Sinai disengagement (1 September 1975).[29] All of these actions worried the other Arab States which were convinced that Sādāt was going to negotiate for a separate peace with Israel. Sādāt's constant reassurances, reminding them of his pan-Arabism, his stands on the Palestinian issues of homeland and autonomy, did little to allay their fears. What the Arabs chose instead to remember was Sādāt's quick abandonment of the Arab causes if he benefited from doing so. They were more than

[29]Hirst/Beeson, pp.163-194.

convinced that Sādāt was selling them out to the Israelis for the chance to regain Sinai. They were not far wrong. Sādāt needed the political victory which the returning of Sinai would bring. He also desperately needed the economic boost peace would ensure. Egypt could no longer afford to remain at war with Israel. However Sādāt's unexpected and shocking offer to speak to the Israeli Knesset stunned Egyptians and Arabs alike and convinced the Arab States of the validity of their fears. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismāʿīl Faḥmī resigned, followed immediately afterwards by Deputy Foreign Minister Muḥammad Rīāḍ who was promoted to replace him. When Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin realised Sādāt's seriousness, he issued an invitation, and on 20 November 1977 (just four and a half months after the Dhahabī affair), Sādāt arrived in Jerusalem. With this monumental visit, Sādāt managed to do the impossible: his 'go it alone' diplomacy proved to the world the sham of Arab solidarity. David Hirst and Irene Beeson give a good description of the reactions in the Arab World the day Sādāt arrived. It is worth repeating in its entirety:

> Syria went into national mourning. Offices closed. Traffic stopped for five minutes. Muezzins and church bells sounded all day. In Iraq *Id al-Adha* celebrations were cancelled. Libyan envoys in various capitals ceremonially burned the Libyan flag (still the same as Egypt) because it had been flown alongside the Star of David. . . In Damascus, the preacher of the ʿUmayyad mosque condemned Sādāt as "a traitor who had plunged a dagger in the back of the Arab nation" . . . In Beirut, the leading left-wing newspaper *al-Safīr* said that "Sadat has entered history. As of today, his name will be remembered . . . as one of the founders of the State of Israel, the consolidators of its existence, the champions of its imperialist dreams. Sadat has entered history -- but he will enter it again. The decision rests with the Arab people of Egypt, the Egyptian army, or indeed with any Arab. For he is now the enemy of them all, and it is the right of any one to pass judgement and carry it out."[30]

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[30]Hirst, pp.266-267 with a quote from al-Safir, 20 Nov '77. It took just a little under four years for that judgement to be passed and carried out by a group of Egyptian islāmiyyīn on 6 October 1981.

Before the Knesset and throughout his stay in Israel (19-21 November 1977), Sādāt did attempt to bring up the Palestinian cause, but Begin remained as unmoving and steadfast as always. Once again it was Sādāt who modified his demands in accommodation and compliance. The cost was yet again carried by Sādāt and the Egyptians; Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin paid nothing:

> For him [Begin] this visit was a gift from Heaven. It was handed to him free, on a silver platter. It was Sadat who initiated it and paid the full price for it, endangering his life and his regime, and gave Israel an invaluable prize -- full recognition of her existence and her legitimacy. What did Begin pay? Nothing at all, not even a piaster with a hole in it.[31]

Despite all the obvious problems which emerged during the Jerusalem visit, the average Egyptian welcomed the prospect of peace, and once again Sādāt was cheered and hailed as a hero. He had done the impossible. He had gone to Israel to meet the enemy face to face and had made a bid for peace. Too long the Egyptians had lived under the constant fear of war, and they desperately craved the security that peace would provide. And they needed peace in order to allow the economy to recover. Peace, as Sādāt continued to claim, would bring prosperity to the land of Egypt. Sādāt gave his people hope for a better tomorrow.[32]

The invitation to peace had been initiated by Sādāt, but peace still had to be worked out. After months of stalemate, US President Jimmy Carter became involved through the Camp David fiasco in September 1978. These talks finally culminated in the signing of the Camp David Accords in Maryland, USA, on 17 September 1978.[33] Egyptian Foreign Minister Ibrāhīm Kāmil resigned just before the signing. Through the Accords, Israel

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[31]Hirst/Beeson, p.292 from Uri Avneri, Hablem Hazeh, 23 Nov '77.

[32]Kays, p.253.

[33]The Camp David Accords contained two parts, namely the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and the "Framework for the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel." In order for peace in the Middle East to come about, the issue of Palestinian autonomy had to be settled. Accordingly, negotiations were begun on 26 May 1979 with a target date of 26 May 1980 set for their successful completion. The Palestinians made their opinion known regarding its unfeasibility by boycotting the whole process. Sādāt was left representing the Palestinians himself. For more information on the Accords, please see Kays, chapter 7.

agreed to return the Sinai to Egypt and in return got to keep the Golan Heights, Gaza and the West Bank. But more importantly, the Accords split the Arab world and broke its formidable unity in the face of its common enemy, i.e. Israel. Immediately after the signing of the Accords, the arguments between Sādāt and Begin began with little agreement in sight. The concept of actual peace seemed nigh impossible. Nevertheless, both Anwar al-Sādāt and Menachim Begin were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize at the beginning of December 1978.[34] The date for the signing of the peace treaty had been set for 17 December 1978, but that date came and went with little fanfare and no signing in sight. Finally, on Monday, 26 March 1979, after much delay and all too many disputes between the parties, the historic peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed at the White House. But Sādāt capitulated far too early and received nothing in return. As David Hirst and Irene Beeson explain,

> . . . it [peace with Israel] should have come at the end of the peace-making process, not at the beginning. It would thereby have constituted the full recognition of the state of Israel which the Arabs, formally renouncing a territory they deemed their own, could only confer in exchange for the return of the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. It was this that would have marked the consummation of a 'just and lasting' peace in the Middle East.[35]

But Sādāt could not wait; he had to have the attention and the glory of the international limelight immediately. He got peace, but at what cost? Egypt had capitulated on all demands in order to regain the Sinai, and in return, Israel got to keep Gaza, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Jerusalem. Sādāt reneged on all that the Arabs held sacred and also sold out Palestinian hopes for autonomy. His peace with the 'mortal' enemy made a mockery of the Egyptian lives sacrificed in the Palestine War fighting the creation of Israel.

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[34]Once wanted for murder in British-ruled Palestine, Menachim Begin's share of the Nobel Peace award at £40,000 was some £10,000 more than the price the British authorities had put on his head some thirty years ago as the most-wanted terrorist in Palestine. (Hirst/ Beeson, p.315).

[35]Hirst/Beeson, p.280.

Sādāt also (rather unrealistically) expected the other Arab leaders to follow his example and make overtures of peace with Israel. When they did not, he began insulting them publicly in the media, calling them "dwarves", "ignoramuses" with "putrid and corrupt minds." Sādāt was convinced the Arab States needed Egypt more than she needed them, and he did not hesitate to show his contempt. These words and actions bought him many enemies. In return for the Egyptian peace with Israel, the Arabs cut off all contact with Egypt: Egypt was expelled from the League of Arab States, and its headquarters were moved from Cairo to Tunis; financial aid to Egypt was cut off; embassies were closed; the national airlines were withdrawn; joint development ventures of any kind were abandoned.[36] All this was a very high price to pay for peace. Sādāt did not find support on the home front either: politicians and groups alike spoke out against the treaty, either for selling out Egypt's independence to the Americans, for forsaking pan-Arabism, or for making peace with the Devil. The islāmiyyīn called for jihād; peace with Israel went against Islam. So Anwar al-Sādāt stumbled along the rocky road to peace completely alone. He could not back down, for to do so would have negated all he stood for and had struggled for. During a visit to Haifa, in September 1979, Sādāt once again caused a public outcry when he offered to sell Israel two million tons of oil annually to make up for the loss of the Sinai oilfields which Israel had in fact been milking since the Six Day War of 1967. He also agreed to ensure "the rapid development of social and cultural relations" between the two countries, and twinned Haifa with Alexandria, inviting the Israeli inhabitants to come and visit. If this were not enough, Sādāt went on to say that he would divert some of the Nile's waters to Israel.[37] This suggestion was absolutely blasphemous for the Egyptians, not just because the Nile was their source of life, nor because there was barely enough water for themselves and the Sudanese, but because of Sādāt's sudden and complete about-face, treating the enemy of yesterday like the brother of today. It was just too fast.

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[36]Lippman, pp.183-184.
[37]Hirst/Beeson, p.328.

Though Sādāt really admired, respected and liked US President Carter, he did not truly understand the depth of friendship and support the US had for Israel. Sādāt had been drifting ever closer to the American sphere of influence, and he wanted to offer the USA an Arab alternative to Israel in the form of Egypt. He had begun travelling this road from the summer of 1972 when he decisively ended reliance upon and friendship with the USSR which had dated back to the days of the revolution. Although this decision thoroughly pleased the US, it did not prevent her from showing overt support of Israel, even to the point of promising Israel military superiority over all the Arab states combined. By the end of 1979, Sādāt had offered the Americans military facilities on Egyptian soil. In return, Egypt was rewarded with military bonuses: $1.5 billion in military aid (on easy credit terms) for making peace with Israel, as well as, in 1980, an additional $3.5 billion over the next three or four years, to buy the most up-to-date military weapons. As many Egyptians saw it, by 1979, they had exchanged British (military) occupation of the pre-revolution days for American (military) occupation. But more than just friendship and co-operation, Sādāt offered as well complete dedication to and identification with American 'values' as he perceived them.[38] But in actual fact, this was a complete sell-out to Washington with nothing in return for Egypt which she could not have gotten from Moscow.

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[38]Hirst/Beeson, pp.342, 346-348. Just prior to the Sādāt assassination, Egypt was a beneficiary of all-purpose American economic aid, second only to Israel. Economic aid to Egypt was running at approximately $1,100 billion annually, but nonetheless, this amount was still far less compared to that given to Israel which benefitted greatly, both materially and politically, from its close relationship with the US. Egypt appeared to benefit far less despite a nearly parallel arrangement with the US. Anthony McDermott gives a good example of this disparity between both economic recipients. Although the year in point is taken from the period of Mubārak, the situation was the same under Sādāt. In 1985, Israel had a population of 42 million and an annual per capita income of $5,300 US. She received more than $700 US per capita in grants, for it had been decided in 1983 to give Israel only grants or loans which need not be repaid. Egypt had a population of 50 milion but a per capita of only $700 US per year. She received in US economic aid the equivalent of only about $50 per capita in loans which had to be repaid, in stark contrast to Israel. This obvious economic aid discrepancy can only be interpreted as favouritism towards Israel, and is a clear indication that the US had not changed its policy in the Middle East since the Sādāt years. One can only wonder why Anwar al-Sādāt was so sure that the US would jump at the possiblity of using Egypt as an Arab alternative to Israel. He obviously did not comprehend the close relationship between the US and Israel, nor the strength and

As time progressed, the peace process was replaced in the international headlines by Ayatullāh Khumaynī and the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1978-1979. The hostage-taking of November 1979 ensured keeping Iran in the spotlight for months ahead. Meanwhile within Egypt itself, problems were once again mounting. Sādāt's decision to allow the ex-Shāh of Iran to spend the remainder of his days in Egypt caused an uproar, especially among the islāmiyyīn. Despite this obvious opposition, the Shāh arrived in Cairo from the US on 23 March 1980. Two days later, several hundred islāmiyyīn demonstrated against both the Shāh and Sādāt on the campus of Cairo University. Demonstrations by several thousand students took place on 29 March in Asyut, capital of Upper Egypt, in protest as well. The police had to use tear gas to disperse the crowds. Injuries and deaths were yet again impossible to ascertain due to the usual discrepancy between official and unofficial numbers.[39]

With stalled negotiations on Palestinian autonomy and international mesmerization with Iran, the Islamic Revolution, and the hostage-taking, Sādāt took the opportunity offered to quiet his internal opposition. He began this process with the elimination of the only legal party (the National Progressive Unionists) likely to challenge infitāḥ, then went one step further with the passing of the so-called 'Law of Shame' on 29 April 1980. It was designed to "protect the political, economic, social and moral rights of the people" as well as traditional "values of the Egyptian family." Doreen Kays' words best portray this law and its implications:

> Anyone fostering or advocating a doctrine that went against divine teachings or encouraged youth to stray from established popular, religious, moral or national values; anyone setting a bad example in a public place; anyone broadcasting or publishing false or misleading information or news which could inflame public opinion, generate envy, hatred or threaten national unity and social peace; anyone broadcasting or publishing scurrilous words or pictures which could offend public sensibilities or undermine the dignity of the state; anyone endangering public property, squandering public funds,

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influence of the American Jewish lobby. (Hirst/Beeson, pp.349-350; McDermott, p.89 with my emphasis).

> abusing power, directly or indirectly influencing the prices of basic commodities and accepting bribes -- all would be guilty of shameful crimes and handed over to Sadat's hand-picked Prosecutor-General who was answerable only to the People's Assembly and its Committee of Values. Big Brother had the power to ban the guilty from all public and economic life, or banish them to internal exile, or prohibit them from leaving the country for a period of five to ten years. The only provisions that might have made the law respectable -- those dealing with bribes, the market-place and corruption -- drew the biggest laughs.[40]

The 'Law of Shame' was only a part of the constitutional changes passed that day. The Sharīʿah was made the source of all legislation, a step which seemed to indicate an Islamization of the legal process. This amendment greatly pleased the islāmiyyīn for whom this demand has been standard over the years. Furthermore, a *shūrā* (consultive assembly) with 132 members was established. At the same time, Sādāt also made himself president for life. There was much opposition to the amendments passed that day. Everyone saw through the Law of Shame and knew it to be naught but another means of oppression; the entire Coptic community opposed the Islamization of the legal system which would only be to their detriment; and the intelligentsia, the islāmiyyīn, the opposition, and probably a significant segment of the public opposed the idea of having Sādāt as president for life.[41] Sādāt was slowly strangling any possible means of expressing opposition to the state and to his policies.

A short while later, Sādāt decided to make himself Prime Minister as well in order to be able to "'devote ninety-five per cent' of his time to what he admitted were Egypt's 'appalling problems.'" For the first time in living memory, there had been bread shortages in the first part of 1980. This was a frightening reality in a country in which bread has been kept at the artificial price of one piaster since 1961. The overall inflation rate was officially estimated at 30%. To pacify the masses, Sādāt raised the minimum wage from £E15 to £E20, handed out special bonuses to public-sector workers, gave out 10% pay increases to

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[39]Kays, pp.190-193.
[40]Kays, p.196.
[41]Hirst/Beeson, pp.331-333; Kays, pp.196-197.

public and private sector workers; reduced import duties on certain goods, and also cut the cost of "more than a hundred commodities, few of which the masses were in the habit of consuming at any cost." Martial law which had been in effect since the Six Day War of 1967 was abolished, and Sādāt warned Muslim and Coptic militants to calm down.[42] But all of these compensations did little to ease the burden of the poor. The black market continued to boom, the rich and the foreigners continued to enjoy their life of luxury, while the average Egyptian watched helplessly as the prices of those commodities which really mattered continued to spiral out of control.

The outbreak of the Iran/Iraq war in late September 1980 provided yet another much-needed distraction for Sādāt. Jimmy Carter lost the US elections of 4 November 1980 and was to be replaced by Ronald Reagan on 20 January 1981. Sādāt quickly realized that his best hope for the future lay in becoming a reliable military partner of the USA. In no time at all, American troops were carrying out mock battles on Egyptian soil, US military technology was rushing in, and military and technological know-how were exchanged between the military forces. By the end of 1980, Cairo was "home to the largest US diplomatic mission in the world."[43]

For the first time in years, Egypt could boast the once unthinkable: an authentic balance of payments surplus. Peace had brought Egypt economic well-being to a certain extent. Western aid flowed into the country to a tune of $2 billion annually, and the recovery of the Sinai oilfields increased the oil revenues from $312 million in 1976 to $2.85 billion in 1980. The Suez Canal, (prematurely) reopened on 5 June 1975, had been widened in order to accommodate supertankers, and now generated $700 million. Tourism brought in an additional $700 million as well. Furthermore, despite the enforced isolation and embargo of Egypt by the other Arab States, the import of Egyptian labour was not

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[42]Hirst/Beeson, pp.335-336; Kays, p.197.

[43]Kays, p.215. This enormous American presence in Egypt led to the not unwarranted fear of an Islamic revolution occurring in Egypt as it had done in Iran. Before the Islamic Revolution, the largest US diplomatic mission was to be found in Iran.

stopped, but in fact increased. In 1974 the estimated remittance from these exported labourers was $189 million but by 1979-1980, it had jumped to between $2 and $2.5 billion. This latter figure constitutes more than three times the annual amount of 'aid' received from the Arab states before Camp David, and more than twice the annual amount of 'aid' given by the US since then. The remittances from the Egyptian labourers working abroad outweigh in importance the income generated by the Suez Canal, petroleum sales, cotton export or tourist activities.[44] Within this same period of 1974-1980, Egypt's imports also rose from $1.14 billion to over $8 billion, but nevertheless, she could now boast an authentic balance of payments surplus. Egypt seemed to be doing much better financially, but the internal domestic situation looked considerably different, as we shall soon see.

On 4 June 1981 Anwar al-Sādāt met Menachim Begin at Sharm-al-Shaikh in the Sinai for their eleventh summit. Sādāt made it perfectly clear there that the Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty would survive, that the October War of 1973 would be their last. Sādāt furthermore stated that Egypt would not become militarily involved in any Arab-Israeli conflict. Until the last third of the Sinai still in Israeli hands was once again under Egyptian jurisdiction in April 1982, Sādāt's hands were effectively tied. Begin took advantage of the political and military weakness of his peace partner and bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor in Baghdad three days after the summit meeting. Sādāt was humiliated and ridiculed. What credibility remained to him had been completely wiped out. He was made the laughing stock of the Middle East. As a result of this June summit, his internal opponents once again began agitating: Sādāt had yet again given far more to Israel than he had received. Domestic problems continued to mount, and the voices of the islāmiyyīn became louder and louder, matching Egyptian press opposition and criticism of Israel. Sādāt quickly came to the conclusion that he preferred to deal with angry Egyptians than with nervous Israelis

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[44]Ayubi, "Brain Drain", p.446; Hirst/Beeson, pp.334-335.

who might withhold the last of the Sinai territory in their scepticism of Egypt's true desire for peace. Sādāt decided to handle his domestic critics decisively.

In mid-June 1981 sectarian clashes in three of Cairo's suburbs claimed the lives of between 10 and 20 people and wounded about 50 others. Dozens of homes were destroyed, and three churches were fired. This clash proved to be the most serious confessional disturbance for many years, and its intensity indicated yet again the polarization of Egypt's people. Until now, the majority of sectarian conflicts had been localized more or less in Upper Egypt; now they were having serious repercussions within the capital as well.

On 3 September 1981, in the early hours of the morning, Sādāt initiated a massive crack-down on all of his opponents. He issued a decree listing 1,536 individuals who had "participated or [had] taken advantage of events aiming at undermining the unity of the nation and its security."[45] The majority of those arrested were islāmiyyīn although approximately 150 Coptic bishops, priests and militants were also included. The list did not end there; any opponent or critic of Sādāt and his régime, whether religious or political, was also rounded up. The arrests were not selective either and included not only (Coptic) Pope Shanūdah III, Mohamed Heikal (confidante of Gamāl ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir, author, and editor for 17 years of the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahrām), Fūʾād Sirāg al-Dīn (leader of the Wafd), Ḥilmī Murād (deputy leader of the Socialist Labour Party), Fatḥī Radwān (a minister from the early days of the revolution), Shaikh Kishk (a popular blind preacher), and Shaikhs ᶜId and Mahalawī, but also prominent members of the Lawyers' Syndicate and of the Newspaper Syndicate, students and many others.[46] In addition to the pervasive arrests, Sādāt also closed down seven publications, religious and political; nationalized approximately 40,000 ahlī (private) mosques, replacing some of their preachers with

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[45]Decree #493 of 1981. Nemat Guenena, The 'Jihad': an 'Islamic Alternative' in Egypt, Cairo Papers in Social Sciences, vol.9, monograph 2 (Cairo: AUC, 1986), p.58.

[46]Heikal, pp.231-241 which also includes a description of his own arrest that same day; Kays, pp.229-231; McDermott, pp.59-62; Guenena, p.58.

government moderates; banned all political activities in mosques and churches alike; forbade religion and politics on the university campuses, along with the overt symbols of the islāmiyyīn, namely the veil, the beard and the gallabiyyah; dissolved thirteen religious societies and appropriated their funds; and reappointed 125 university professors, journalists and broadcasters.[47] These arrests angered the masses, as well as domestic and foreign observers who saw a personal vendetta taking place, not just an attack against the islāmiyyīn. Hundreds of islāmiyyīn took to the streets in protest. The riot police and tear gas were used to keep the situation under control. But Sādāt realized his danger too late. The crackdown crippled the inevitable assassination attempt , but it did not prevent its happening.

On 6 October 1981 as Anwar al-Sādāt was reviewing the troops in the eighth celebration of the 1973 victory, the Egyptian President was gunned down by men in military gear. Al-Gihād took credit for the only successful attack against the state. Two days later, 50 members attacked the security forces in Asyut. State reaction was quick and predictable: a massive and extensive crackdown on all opposition groups, religious or not. Ḥusnī Mubārak stepped into the presidency without a ripple stirring.

The assassination made the news everywhere and was one of the factors which generated an increase in interest in so-called Muslim 'fundamentalism'. Since the assassination, most of the information about al-Gihād has been based upon the manuscript al-Farīdah al-Ghā'ibah (The Neglected Duty) written by Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Salām Farag. Al-Gihād cited three reasons for the assassination: Egypt's laws were inconsistent and incompatible with the laws of Islam; Sādāt was thus labelled kāfir ('apostate') for not bringing Egypt's laws into accordance with the Sharīᶜah and hence his punishment was death in accordance with the Qur'ān. Sādāt's rapprochement and eventual peace with Israel -- an arch enemy of Islam -- was also impossible to allow and was in total opposition to

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[47]Kays, p.230.

Islam. The September crack-down was the trigger to the assassination. Al-Gihād's three subgroups (propaganda, intelligence, and armaments) were successful in their individual duties as is evidenced by the following: the theft of gold from jewelry shops owned by Copts in Upper Egypt, in order to sell it and use the money to help finance activities; the attack on police stations in order to secure firearms; the cultivation of support among military officers to exploit their expertise in the use of firearms and their ease in obtaining weapons and ammunition; the infiltration of the military's security forces and other governmental institutions. It was mainly this last point which so frightened and threatened the state, for at least four of the assassins were military officers.[48] The state had no idea of the extent to which its institutions had been penetrated. The threat of further ferment would thus continue to exist as long as positions within state institutions would be held by individuals loyal or sympathetic to a militant group. But how to determine which positions were filled by fifth columnists? This dilemma in itself is an indication of success, for al-Gihād could call upon its people at any time to initiate a future coup d'état. Consequently the state purged the upper echelons of the military in the hopes of eliminating any lingering threat after the assassination. After all, it had been this infiltration which had made the entire operation so much easier, substantially increasing the chances of success.

The ideology of al-Gihād was not very different from that of Shabāb Muḥammad and al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah as discussed in more detail in chapter one. It too wished to establish an Islamic state and society based on the adoption of and adherence to the Sharīᶜah as the basis of political and social life. It did not intend to educate society, for it was not the individual who was at fault, but rather the state. Since Egypt's Muslim leader had failed to meet the obligations of Islam, he had become an infidel (kāfir) and his

[48]The members credited with the assassination and thus charged were: First Lieutenant Khālid Aḥmad Shawkī al-Islāmbūlī (an artillery officer who admitted to firing the fatal shot); Sergeant Ḥussain ᶜAbbās; ᶜAṭā' Tayyil (an engineer and reserve officer) and ᶜAbd al-Ḥamid ᶜAbd al-Salām (an army officer turned bookshop owner). (See Abdul Mohsen, "Defiant in the Dock" in The Middle East, #87 (Jan '82), p.19).

legitimacy had thus been undermined.[49] He was therefore condemned to elimination. According to al-Gihād it was, therefore, wrong to collaborate with the state in any capacity, even with the intention of eventually establishing an Islamic system (as the Ikhwān attempted), for the state of kufr (unbelief) would then contaminate it in the process.[50] Al-Gihād aimed at seizing state power in order to achieve its goal, counting on an immediate take-over of power: "We proceed from top to bottom as we believe that a good ruler can create everything in society."[51] There was no need for mass support since al-Gihād planned only to replace the ruler -- once that was accomplished, everything would be done in accordance with the Qur'ān and Sharīᶜah; justice would be restored.

But what did al-Gihād's manuscript al-Farīdah al-Ghā'ibah reveal? What is stated unquestionably is the need, the obligation, the necessity of jihād (of which the only form is militant) to bring about an Islamic society living under the laws of Allāh. It is the responsibility of the individual to wage jihād in order to see it realized, for the State of Egypt is governed by laws of unbelief and therefore can in no way be considered Islamic. Her people are Muslims, however, and are not to share in the punishment of the ruler who, although he claims to be Muslim, cannot be so, since he does not govern with Allāh's laws. He is an apostate and rightfully deserves the punishment decreed appropriate and just for apostates. Death.

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[49]A ruler holds authority by virtue of the choice of the people, and the legitimacy of his rule lasts as long as he adheres to the laws of the Sharīᶜah. Obedience to his rule ceases immediately as soon as he deviates from the Path.

[50]Here we see similarities with Takfīr since Muṣṭafā forbade his followers to have anything to do with state institutions. In fact he forced those who held governmental jobs to quit. However there is a conflict inherent in this position as al-Gihād's fifth columnists within the military work(ed) for the state, albeit under pretense. Without them, the assassination of Sādāt would have been far more difficult to accomplish. Does the state of kufr consequently contaminate them?

[51]Tarek Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Government and Politics in Islam (London: Frances Pinter Publ., 1985), p.121 as quoted from Karem Zuhdi.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this thesis, I have tried to show that there is a strong correlation between Islamic militancy and the socio-economic and political conditions of Sādāt's Egypt. Chapter two described the many examples of hardships endemic to the daily battle for survival of the Egyptians. These ordeals include the sectarian conflict between the university jamāᶜāt and the Copts, overpopulation, the housing shortage, the failure of the system of education, quasi-employment/unemployment, the debt burden, the cost of war with Israel, the socio-economic and political consequences of infitāḥ, and the 'brain-drain'. But extrinsic to these 'normal' conditions, Egypt under Sādāt was furthermore faced with three periods of turmoil which were identified as the October War (1973), infitāḥ (April 1974+)/the Bread Riots (January 1977), and the peace process with Israel (November 1977+). Shortly after each of these periods, the islāmiyyīn reacted against the Sādāt government: in April 1974, Shabāb Muḥammad attempted to take over the Technical Military Academy of Cairo in order to carry out a coup d'état; in July 1977, al-Takfīr wa'l-Higrah kidnapped and then assassinated Shaikh Muḥammad al-Dhahabī, ex-Minister of Awqāf; and finally, on 6 October 1981, al-Gihād assassinated President Anwar al-Sādāt while he was reviewing the troops. The hypothesis claims that under 'normal' everyday conditions, the mutadayyīn dominate the Egyptian scene, but that in times of turmoil, it is the islāmiyyīn who react militantly against the state, its employees and its institutions. This hypothesis has been shown to be valid in the context of Sādāt's Egypt. The violent reactions against the state by the islāmiyyīn were triggered by the three crisis periods, for the islāmiyyīn did not react militantly in a haphazard manner or with haphazard timing; theirs were reactions to these crisis events as opposed to attacks against the state for the sake of mere violence. Each group attempted a coup d'état against the Sādāt government in order to end the intolerable everyday situation within Egypt, for each was convinced that the implementation of the Sharīᶜah would immediately resolve the situation, creating the

'perfect' problem-free society. Each time however the attempt was foiled, ending in failure. But the threat the islāmiyyīn pose continues to plague the Egyptian government.

Although the islāmiyyīn speak through the symbols of Islam, it seems unlikely that individuals join these groups for purely religious reasons. If this were the case, one would expect to find a significant number of students or graduates from the religious faculties among the membership.[1] This is not so as was shown in chapter one. According to Fadwa el Guindi, the biggest concentration of islāmiyyīn is to be found in three of the five top science faculties, namely medicine, engineering and pharmacy. In other words, these islāmiyyīn are among those who get the highest marks in the national exams, and who will eventually be occupying the most highly cherished and esteemed professions in Egypt. They have the brains, the drive, and the motivation to succeed. It is these science students who have the potential for the best kind of life and job, who have therefore also the highest (realistic) expectations given their capabilities.[2] However after waiting up to five years for

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[1]If individuals join the islāmiyyīn for purely religious or doctrinal reasons, one would expect to find students from the religious faculties to provide the bulk of the membership, for it is they who specialize in theology and doctrine. Interestingly enough there is however, a "noticeable lack of theology students among the militants." According to the fundamentalist scholar ᶜUmar ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān, "most members of al-Takfīr w'al-Hijra do not remember the Qur'an, do not know the rules of grammar, and are often mistaken even in the names of the books on which they base their arguments." (Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), p.80) quoted from al-Musawwar, #3013, 9 July '82. Please see also Nazih Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam: the case of Egypt" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.12, #4 (Dec '80), p.493). Furthermore, transcripts of the trials of Gihād members (presuming of course that these transcripts have not been completely distorted out of all proportion) indicate that members are not always particularly knowledgeable about the intricacies or technicalities of Islam. This deficiency, this lack of knowledge in doctrine, leads one to believe that ideology is not the main reason why members join the islāmiyyīn. (The leaders and upper echelons of the islāmiyyīn are, on the other hand, very knowledgeable in ideology and doctrine. They are the ones who join specifically for religious reasons in order to create, to build, a better Islamic society based on Sharīᶜah).

[2]Fadwa el Guindi, "Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic: Egypt's Contemporary Islamic Movement" in Social Problems, vol.28, #4 (April '81), p.480. In Egypt, the intelligent students go into the sciences where better job prospects are to be found; poor and mediocre students go into the Arts and Humanities. Students who qualify to enroll in the faculties of medicine, engineering (these two rotate in requiring the highest scores), dentistry, pharmacy and veterinary medicine are therefore the top students. Saad Eddin Ibrahim supports this finding, for in his study of 34 arrested Shabāb and Takfīr members, the students/recent graduates who are attracted to the islāmiyyīn are in the sciences. All but five were university graduates or students who were enrolled in university at the time of

the job guaranteed them by the government, more often than not the job is not in their field, or it is one in which they are redundant. And it does not pay a salary adequate to survive. These same science students/graduates are also therefore the most quickly disappointed when they are hit by Egypt's reality. Socially, economically and politically frustrated, these individuals have been deprived their dues on every sphere. Nor could they voice their dissatisfaction with the state or society, for Egypt's political system was closed. Under Sādāt, there was no opportunity for genuine political participation, and young people "found it impossible to be heard unless they oblige the listener by claiming more knowledge of and dedication to, the world of the Almighty."[3] Dissatisfaction with both the state and society was voiced however by the islāmiyyīn in their militant actions as they attempted to bring about a coup d'état in order to implement the Sharīᶜah. Sādāt could not deny them their existence since they, like he, spoke with the language of Islam. To do so would have been anti-Islam and would have raised serious questions regarding his own beliefs. The militant groups managed therefore to discredit Sādāt using his own weapon, that of Islam.

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their arrests. The rest were secondary school educated. Only 16 members (47%) were not students, 12 of whom were professionals employed by the state: five teachers; three engineers; two doctors; and two agronomists. Three were self-employed (a doctor, a pharmicist and an accountant) and the last one worked as a bus conductor. Of the 18 students (53%), six majored in engineering, four in medicine, three in agricultural science, two in pharmacy, two in technical military science and one in literature. (Taken directly from Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy", pp.439-440). Eric Davis raises an interesting point which helps explain why science students are attracted to the islāmiyyīn: ". . . there is no contradiction between the fact that such a large percentage of Islamic militants have been educated in the natural sciences and still subscribe to radical interpretations of Islam. Since the natural sciences stress an absolute approach to knowledge (either something is right or it is wrong), it is erroneous to assume that a 'modern' education will necessarily erode traditional consciousness which likewise emphasizes absolute categories of thought." (Eric Davis, "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt" in Said Amir Arjomand (ed), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany: State University of NY Press, 1984), p.146). For the islāmiyyīn (as for the scientists) there is only black and white, no gray. Thus it was with the islāmiyyīn who gathered their evidence against the state and presented their conclusions. There was no room for gray; Sādāt was an apostate and thus had to be eliminated.

[3]Ayubi, Political Islam, p.218.

Despite their visibility and presence, the islāmiyyīn do not represent the masses but remain only the fringe element of the Islamic resurgence. The majority of adherents belonging to this phenomenon are pacifist or mutadayyīn. Although the majority of Egyptians may empathize and passively support the actions of the islāmiyyīn, they do not actively support them nor do they help them fight their battles against the state,[4] for the masses do not on the whole become mobilized and as such generally remain passive, except in times of crisis or turmoil (such as the Bread Riots of January 1977). On the whole, the masses provide support to the islāmiyyīn as sympathizers, but they can also be readily mobilized for rallies or marches to support an islāmī stand. As a result of this type of collective behaviour, the state can, for the most part, handle the islāmiyyīn since they are only a small percentage of the general populace. The threat to the government is therefore minimal. Nevertheless, the ranks of the islāmiyyīn will grow proportionately as conditions worsen and solutions appear unattainable. But as long as the islāmiyyīn continue to lack influence in political and social institutions, or control over economic resources, their impact and threat to the government will remain limited and controllable. Their threat will lack power so long as they stay internally divided[5] and unable to mobilize the masses.[6] Nevertheless the islāmiyyīn will continue to pose a threat to the stability and legitimacy of

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[4]"For the time being, as Fahmī Huwaidī, religious affairs writer for al-Ahrām (the Egyptian daily), states, "the silent majority is ready to vote for the islamicists, but not to fight their fight." (Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt after Nasser: Sadat, Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity (NY: Paragon House, 1989), p.255).

[5]Since the late 1920s, the Islamic opposition had been embodied by a single organization, the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn; by the 1970s however, the Ikhwān had lost its ideological and organizational cohesiveness and unity. By this time, the religious opposition was no longer a single movement but consisted instead of the revived pacifist faction led by General Guide ᶜUmar Tilmisānī (which soon experienced its own internal divisions), the radical islāmiyyīn who had adopted the philosophy of Sayyid Quṭb and advocated violence against the state, and the militant jamāᶜāt al-islāmiyyah which operated on university campuses.

[6]"Given the presupposition of reading and writing skills which are required for even the most basic religious tracts, illiterate or simi-literate peasants and workers are unable to relate to radical Islamic writings and the study circles in which these writings are discussed." (Eric Davis, "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt" in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany: State University of NY Press, 1984), p.156).

the government, despite their small membership. If, however, the islāmiyyīn are able to enter into a coalition with other rightist groups, they could present a serious challenge to the government, or even seize power.[7]

[7]Davis, pp.150-156.

APPENDIX I

The islāmiyyīn rely heavily on these verses (5: 44-48) as central to their ideology:

Sūrah 5: The Table Spread

Ayah 44:
Lo. We did reveal the Torah, wherein is guidance and a light, by which the prophets who surrendered (unto Allah) judged the Jews, and the rabbis and the priests (judged) by such of Allah's Scripture as they were bidden to observe, and there unto were they witnesses. So fear not mankind, but fear Me. And barter not My revelations for a little gain. Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers.

Ayah 45:
And We proscribed for them therein: The life for the life, and the eye for the eye, and the nose for the nose, and the ear for the ear, and the tooth for the tooth, and for wounds retaliation. But whoso forgoeth it (in the way of charity) it shall be expiation for him. Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are wrong-doers.

Ayah 46:
And We caused Jesus, son of Mary to follow in their footsteps, confirming that which was (revealed) before him in the Torah, and We bestowed on him the Gospel wherein is guidance and a light, confirming that which was (revealed) before it in the Torah -- a guidance and an admonition unto those who ward off (evil).

Ayah 47:
Let the People of the Gospel judge by that which Allah hath revealed therein. Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are evil-livers.

Ayah 48:
And unto thee have We revealed the Scripture with the truth, confirming whatever Scripture was before it, and a watcher over it so judge between them by which Allah hath revealed, and follow not their desires away from the Truth which hath come unto thee. For each We have appointed a divine law and a traced-out way. Had Allah willed He could have made you one community. Be that He may try you by that which He hath given you (He hath made you as you are). So vie one with another in good works. Unto Allah ye will all return, and He will then inform you of that wherein ye differ.

Taken from Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1985), p.117. The verses were taken from Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an (Hyderabad: Governmental Central Press, 1938).

APPENDIX II

GENERAL STRUCTURE OF AL-GIHĀD



Reproduced from *Al-Jihad* (Tehran), December 31, 1982, p. 150

Taken directly from R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p.95.

APPENDIX III

ISLAMIST SOCIETIES IN EGYPT

Name of Organization	Beliefs and Membership	Militancy	Sect	Leadership	Size	Current Status	Outside Ties	Country and Region
1. Faramawiyyah (The Faramawites)	Abstain from medicine and education, only Quran	High/ Medium	Sunni	Charismatic?	Small	(New)	Malaysia	Egypt (Upper)
2. Hizb Allah (Party of God)	—	High	Sunni	Yahya Hashim (District Attorney)	Small	Active, underground (New)	Yemen (N.)	Egypt
3. Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Suppressed under Mubarak (New)	Arab countries	Egypt
4. Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood—M.B.)	Middle, Lower-Middle, and Lower	Medium	Sunni	Hasan al-Banna, Tilmisani	Large	Active, public (Old)	Gulf States Syria Jordan Maghrib Europe S.A.	Egypt
5. Jamaat al-Ahram (Pyramid Society)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Underground (New)	—	Egypt
6. Jamaat al-Fath (Society of Conquest)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Underground, suppressed by Mubarak (New)	—	Egypt
7. Jamaat al-Haq (Society of Truth)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Underground, suppressed by Mubarak (New)	—	Egypt
8. Jamaat al-Harakiyyah (Society of Action)	Opposed to "sinful leaders," not society	High	Sunni	—	Small	Very secretive (New)	Libya	Egypt
9. Jamaat al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Society)	Middle, Lower-Middle	Medium	Sunni	Collective	Large	Active (New)	—	Egypt (Cairo)
10. Jamaat al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Society)	Students	High	Sunni	Collective	Medium	Active, partly suppressed (New)	Saudi (?)	Egypt (Minyah)
11. Jamaat al-Khalifah (Caliph's Group)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Underground (New)	—	Egypt
12. Jamaat al-Munazilah Shuuniyyah (Society of Spiritual Separation)	—	Medium	Sunni	Abd al-Munim al-Sabruti (founder)	Medium	(New)	—	Egypt
13. Jamaat al-Muslimin lil-Takfir (Taha al-Samawi Group) (Society of Muslims for Accusation of Disbelief)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic Small *Amir*, estab., Taha al-Samawi	Small	Active, suppressed; ties to Al-Jihad (New)	—	Egypt (Bani Suaif)
14. Jamaat al-Muslimun (The Muslim Group)	—	High	Sunni	Taha al-Sawi	Small	Unknown (New)	—	Egypt
15. Jamiyyah al-Shariyyah (Society of Islamic Law)	Grassroots (tied to M.B.)	Medium	Sunni	Collective (Journal, *al-Itisam*)	Medium	Semi-public (New)	Gulf States	Egypt
16. Jamaat al-Tabligh (Society of Transmission)	Passive Muslims turned activists (1975)	High/ Medium	Sunni	Charismatic	Medium	Jailed by Sadat (1975) (New)	Gulf States	Egypt

Appendix III (continued)

Name of Organization	Beliefs and Membership	Militancy	Sect	Leadership	Size	Current Status	Outside Ties	Country and Region
17. Jamaat al-Takfir (Society of Denouncement)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Jailed by Sadat (1975) (New)	—	Egypt (Alexandria)
18. Al-Jihad (Holy War)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic, Ali al-Maghrabi (founder)	Small	Related to old Shabab Muhammad (New)	—	Egypt (Alexandria)
19. Junud Allah (Soldiers of God)	Middle, Lower-middle; Attack Churches, police, clubs	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Underground, suppressed in 1977 (New)	—	Egypt (Alexandria)
20. Junud al-Rahman (Soldiers of the Compassionate)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	— (New)	—	Egypt
21. Mukaffaratiyyah (Denouncers of Infidels)	—	High	Sunni	—	Small	Suppressed (New)	—	Egypt
22. Munazzamat al-Jihad (Jihad Organization)	Middle, Lower-Middle Killers of Sadat	High	Sunni	Collective, Sh.Abd al-Rahman, A. Zumur, M. Faraj	Medium	Underground, suppressed in 1977, 1981 (New)	—	Egypt
23. Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Organizational Technical Military Academy Group)	Middle, Kinship, Students	High	Sunni	S.Sinyya, Charismatic, Palestinian, pro-Libya	Medium	Underground (New)	Syria Jordan Sudan W. Bank	Egypt (Cairo, Alexandria, Delta)
24. Qif wa Tabayyin (Halt and Prove)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic, Muhammad Abd al-Salam and Dr. Umar	Small	Suppressed (part of group that killed Sadat) (New)	—	Egypt
25. Qutbiyyin (Followers of Qutb)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Sayyid Qutb's followers (New) suppressed	—	Egypt
26. Samawiyyah (The Heavenly)	—	High	Sunni	Charismatic	Small	Underground (New)	—	Egypt
27. Shabab Muhammad (Youth of Muhammad)	Youth, Students	High	Sunni	Collecuve?	Medium	— (Old)	—	Egypt
28 Takfir wal-Hijrah (Denouncement and Holy Flight or Society of Muslims)	Rural/Small Town, Middle, Lower, Kinship ties	High	Sunni	Shukri Mustafa, Charismatic Muh. Abd al-Fattah, Muassab Abu Zayd, Mahdist	Medium	Suppressed, underground, active (New)	Kuwait Turkey Gulf States Jordan Libya Saudi Arabia Pakistan Syria	Egypt (Minya)
29. Usbah al-Hashmiyya (The Hashemite League)	Lower-middle, Lower Esoteric	Medium	Sunni	Charismatic messianic (Al-Mahdi al-Arabi)	Small	Jailed, freed (1983) (New)	—	Egypt (Upper)

Taken directly from R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (NY: Syracusue University Press, 1985), pp.179-182.

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