Buber's View of Authenticity in His Educational Thought

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ABSTRACT

<u>Thesis Title</u>: Buber's View of Authenticity in His Educational Thought <u>Department</u>: Religion and Philosophy in Education Degree: Masters of Arts

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This thesis will look at the notion of authenticity according to Mordekhai Martin Buber (1878-1965) and its significance in the personal and educational contexts. The focus will be on the relationships between an individual and himself, as well as with others and God. An important emphasis will be on the teacher-student relationship. These relationships will be considered in the light of Buber's I-Thou and I-It modes of relating.

This thesis will analyze, illustrate, and synthesize Buber's reflections on authenticity in order to clarify and illuminate his educational perspective and the import of that perspective.

RESUME

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<u>Titre de la Thèse</u>: L'Authenticité dans la pensée éducative de Buber <u>Département</u>: Religion et Philosophie dans l'Education

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Il sera question dans cette thèse, de la notion d'authenticité selon Mordekhai Martin Buber (1878-1965) et de l'importance de cette notion dans les contextes personnels et éducatifs. Seront soulignés, les rapports entre l'individu et son moi, entre l'individu et l'autre, et entre l'individu et Dieu. Une emphase toute particulière sera mise sur les rapports entre le maître et l'élève. Tous ces rapports seront considéres à la lumière des notions du "Je-Tu" et du "Je-cela" telles qu'énoncées par Buber.

Au moyen d'analyses, d'illustrations et de synthèses, nous tenterons de clarifier et d'illuminer la perspective éducative comprise dans la pensée de Buber concernant l'authenticité et de souligner l'importance de cette perspective. ŠŽ.

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Chapter I. Introduction

Martin Buber is primarily concerned with individuals and their relationships. In order to grasp his analysis of human relationships and why it is imperative for individuals to be authentic, it is necessary to understand his view of God and man. His message is powerful and compelling because he has crystallized in simple terms the experience of relatedness. The distinction made between authentic and inauthentic relationships helps to clarify conceptually experiences which are difficult to articulate and define. To bring experiences to a conceptual level aids in delineating otherwise ineffable experiences and provides a framework for discussing such matters. However, there is always the possibility of misunderstanding—the possibility of Buber's meaning being turned into slogans, catch phases, and jargon. Buber was aware of this, so he wrote emphatically:

> The man who leaves the primary word [I-Thou] unspoken is to be pitied; but the man who addresses instead these ideas with an abstraction or a password, as it were their name, is contemptible.¹

An example of this type of misuse is mentioned by Lowell Streiker. Streiker refers to a "hippie" coffee house in the Haight-Ashbury district of San Francisco that was named 'I and Thou.' Buber's

¹ Martin Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 2nd ed., p. 14. [<u>I and Thou</u>, (<u>Ich und</u> <u>Du</u>) first published in German in 1923, has been translated into many languages: English (1937 Smith), French, Spanish, Hebrew, Dutch, Swedish, Japanese, Danish, Norweigian, Czech, and Italian [Rivka Horowitz, <u>Buber's Way to I and Thou</u> (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1978), p. 17]. For a detailed explanation of the translation of 'Ich-Du' to 'I and Thou' and 'I and You,' see Appendix A.]

profound and significant work had been objectified and reduced to a trendy slogan in order to gain commercial profit.¹

Philosopher Nicolai Berdyaev expresses a similar point concerning abstraction:

At the base of philosophical knowledge lies concrete experience; it cannot be determined by an abstract series of conceptions, by discursive thought which is only an instrument.²

Buber's view of man is based on his personal experience with others and his religious outlook. His belief in the fundamental dignity and worth of the individual is directly related to his understanding of God. For Buber, authentic relationships being paramount, this cannot help but influence his view of the educative process and the nature of the teacher-student encounter.

Buber's educational approach does not focus on methodological techniques in teaching. Rather, it underlines the essential message of human interdependency. In studying such an approach to education, one cannot compartmentalize, divorce, or fragment the educational view from the religious view, "for all life is seen as a continuum and there is a relatedness that cannot be ignored. The message of Buber appears to be obvious and simple but it is profoundly moving and especially relevant

1 Lowell D. Streiker, <u>The Promise of Buber</u> (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1969), p. 11.

² Nicolai Berdyaev, <u>Slavery and Freedom</u> (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 9. "As a philosopher of the personal, Buber stands in close and deep kinship with Berdyaev, the best known representative of the Russian religious renascence." [Paul E. Pfuetze, <u>Self-Society Existence: Human Nature and Dialogue in the Thought of</u> <u>George Herbert Mead and Martin Buber</u> (New York: Harper and Row Torch Books, 1954), p. 215.]

today in light of increasing depersonalization, alienation, materialism, and the technocracy with which the latter half of the twentieth century has been so exponentially and commercially bombarded.¹

If one listens closely to what Buber is expressing, one realizes that he speaks of transcendency, not as something only to be obtained in the hereafter nor something that is so wildly inaccessible that only a few chosen mystics can perceive it. What he talks about is available and accessible in the here and now. There is a deep intuition of the inherent sanctity of our human existence and experience. Ultimately, Buber sees that our task as individuals in this world—each of us an unique, unrepeatable Thou—is to discover and affirm the Thou in others as only we can and thereby to also become clearer in perceiving the eternal Thou.

There are two qualifying points that need to be made here. The first one is that no matter how clear and lucid any analysis or description of what Buber says may be, it remains only that—a description. The I-Thou can only be truly understood if it is experienced. The phenomenon of the I-Thou is particularly clear when one has experience of it in one's own life. Paul Pfeutze surmises that to others it may not be truly understood:

¹ See Eric and Mary Josephson (eds), <u>Man Alone: Alienation in</u> <u>Modern Society</u> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962); Geoffrey Clive. "The Inauthentic Self," <u>Journal of Existential Psychiatry</u>, Vol. 5, No. 5-8, 1964-1965, pp. 51-66; Raiph A. Luce, Jr. "Existential Symptom and The Cultural Conflict," <u>Journal of Existential Psychiatry</u>, Vol. 2, No. 5-9, 1961-1962, pp. 49-70 and Clark E. Moustakas, <u>Loneliness</u> (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1961).

. . . the I-Thou relation will be comprehensible only to those who have experienced it or have been close to it. Others may find the concept interesting but they will not be able to apply the insights to themselves.¹

Haim Gordon echoes Pfeutze's view by pointing out that

underlying Buber's approach is the belief that conveying the significance of the I-Thou relationship means grounding it in human experience. In occurrences that come our way in daily life. Only then will the reader be able to interpret the I-Thou in terms relating to his own existence; only then will he be able to relate to the novel terrain which Buber explored . . . relating fully to <u>I and Thou</u> means viewing its tenets through the prism of our deepest personal experience.²

I believe that most of us, in fact, have the experiential basis' to understand Buber, even if we have not articulated our experiences in quite the same way that Buber has. The importance of Buber's work, at least in part, lies in helping us to articulate and thus to comprehend more fully what in fact we experience.

The second point is that Buber does not set out to convert, persuade, or cajole anyone into seeing things his way. The things that he talks about come out of his own experience and intuition. Ronald Gregor Smith writes: ". . . . Buber was never isolated from the world, and his ideas were not excogitated in academic seclusion."³ He does not make a categorical claim that excludes all those who do not agree.

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¹ Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 146.

² Haim Gordon "A Method of Clarifying Buber's I-Thou Relationship," <u>Journal of Jewish Studies</u>, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1976, p. 75.

³ Ronald Gregor Smith, <u>Martin Buber</u> (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1967), p. 2.

He believes in the I-Thou relationship because he has experienced and has come to realize that within the innate respect for the essential value of man—as exhibited in the I-Thou relationship—is the primary base for man's existence and true fulfillment. It is both his¹ salvation and his route to seeing God—the eternal Thou.

This study will attempt to analyze, clarify, and illuminate Buber's concept of authenticity. It will not try to "verify" its universal value because it would be inappropriate to do so. As will be made evident in this study, to undertake such a "verification" would betray a fundamental misunderstanding of Buber's work. I would say that if there were a compelling quality, it would be in the very existential nature of the I-Thou that provides a way of understanding people and their relationships, and a way of understanding education and the religious underpinnings on which Buber's attitudes and view of man are founded. Whether one chooses to see and interpret the essential relatedness of man, his fellowman, his world, and his God is, of course, another matter. Martin Buber writes in the closing lines of his Afterward to I and Thou dated October 1952:

> The existence of mutuality between God and man cannot be proved any more than the existence of God. Anyone who dares nevertheless to speak of it bears witness and invokes the witness of those whom he addresses--present or future witness.²

¹ The masculine pronoun serves only as a generic term.

² Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970) p. 182.

One could also appropriately refer to Meister Eckhart's words: "der warheit bekennet, der weize daz ich war spriche." ("He who knows the Truth, knows that I am speaking the Truth.")¹ Buber sees the ultimate function of engaging in an I-Thou mode of being as engendering us to see the Thou in all persons, in the life of other creatures, and in nature—thereby also beholding the eternal Thou.

The aim of this study is to show that Buber's educational approach is inextricably bound up with his notion of what it means to be an authentic individual and with the religious import upon which that notion is founded.

In Chapter II, I shall first examine authenticity in the personal context. This will be considered in the light of i) the individual, ii) the individual and others, iii) the individual and God. Chapter III will deal with authenticity in the educational context with particular reference to the teacher-student relationship. I will present a brief comparison of Buber with other educational thinkers, and will offer a conclusion in Chapter IV. Appendix A is on the question of translating <u>Ich und Du</u> to <u>I and Thou</u>, Appendix B has two examples of Buber's poetic writing which serve to illustrate the sagacious and poetic qualities of his language.





¹ Raymond B. Blakney (trans.) <u>Meister Eckhart</u>. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1941), p. ix.

Chapter II. The Personal Context

i) Introduction

Martin Buber's concept of authenticity is set against a philosophical backdrop. That philosophical backdrop must first be described in order to fully grasp and appreciate Buber's view of authenticity.

The existence of man is a wonder and a mystery. It is even more remarkable that man is able to be aware of his existence. Man is a self-conscious being. He is aware of the fact of his existence. However, the difference between a bare fact and the interpretation of the fact must always be borne in mind. That man exists is a phenomenon in nature. It is an ontological reality. The interpretation of man's existence, namely, "What is man?" and "What is the meaning of man?" has been one of the major areas of concern that philosophers and laypersons alike have attempted to address.

Man necessarily is his own interpreter. Perforce, philosophical anthropology is by definition a subjective and hermeneutical venture.¹ It is remarkable that man can create and give meaning to his life. This is true both personally and culturally. Universal questions dealing with meaning plague children to sages: "Who am I? How ought I

¹ "Buber points out that any answer to the question, 'What is man?', cannot be of a general philosophical nature, for any answer must include man in his wholeness--that is to say, not merely man's psychological, theological, metaphysical, or scientific sides but all of these aspects. In particular, for any answer to contain the wholeness demanded by Buber means that it must also include the subjectivity of the person giving the answer." [William H. Klink, "Environmental Concerns and the Need for a New Image of Man," Zygon, Vol. 9, December 1974, p. 301.]

to deal with life's problems? What must I become? What is the purpose of life?"¹

Plato tells us that:

Man is declared to be that creature who is constantly in search of himself, a creature who at every moment of his existence must examine and scrutinize the conditions of his existence. He is a being in search of meaning.²

Axiological evaluation follows fast on the heels of the interpretation one chooses. For instance, if one views man in a Marxist context, then man is to be seen in terms of economic value and class power and domination. The choice one makes in interpreting one's own existence will define the way one evaluates oneself and others. Thus it is crucial, at the onset, to examine the premises and assumptions by which we live and act. To understand Buber's concept of authenticity, one must first turn to his concept of man.

Buber's philosophical anthropology is two-fold. Firstly, Buber defines man as a dialogical being. For Buber, true human existence occurs when man genuinely encounters nature, animals, other men and God. This encounter-what Buber terms as saying "Thou"-is a direct communion between man and his world. For Buber, authentic

¹ Bruno Bettleheim, <u>The Uses of Enchantment</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), p. 47.

² Plato quoted in Martin Buber, <u>A Believing Humanism</u>, trans. Maurice S. Friedman. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 16. existence originates in the I-Thou. His ontology pivots on his conception of man as a dialogical being.¹

The second part of Buber's philosophical anthropology addresses the axiological dimension of man's existence: "What value is there to man's existence? Why does man exist? To place it in more personal terms: Why do I exist? What is the best way for me to live? How can I live it? What is the best that I am capable of? How can I give meaning to my life?" Buber answers the question of value and meaning by not only defining man as dialogical, but also by entreating us to seek the I-Thou relationship in our lives. He does not offer the I-Thou as a theoretical abstraction, but as an existential verity by which we can live as authentic individuals.

The power of Buber's philosophical contribution comes from the SIMPle but profound means of denoting what otherwise would be a vague, undistinguished, unarticulated human experience. Buber is not imposing an artificial conceptualization on man's experience when he speaks of I-Thou and I-It relationships. Rather, experience is made clear when he distinguishes between I-Thou and I-It. At one and the same time, he brings to light that there are diametrically opposed modes of relating to the world (I-Thou and I-It) and also he provides us with a suitable conceptual framework that is based upon concrete experience whereby we may discuss experential differences, subtleties, and nuances. One certainly may have experienced both types of relationships but not be fully cognizant of their existence. The

¹ Sydney and Beatrice Rome, eds., <u>Philosophical Interrogations</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), p. 22.

sagacity of Buber's thought rests on his discernment of the underlying patterns of human communication and non-communication, relatedness and non-relatedness, authenticity and non-authenticity. Clarity, heightened awareness, and more immediate recognition of I-Thou and I-It relationships in one's life ensues from the very naming and defining of I-Thou and I-It. Even if an individual has never experienced I-Thou, he would then by exclusion, have had experienced I-It. To be aware of the possibility of an alternate way of relating would be instructive and helpful in itself. Buber's thought may serve to inform and release heretofore unconscious experience and bring them to the fore of one's consciousness. The increase of interpersonal awareness could only ameliorate and enrich the developing authenticity of the individual.

ii) The individual

Martin Buber, a philosopher of this century, addresses one of the poignant questions of modern times: how to live an authentic life Buber's premise is that each of us has a unique as an individual. opportunity and responsibility to become who we are. He speaks passionately and poetically of the joy of living, the affirmation of the individual, the importance of interpersonal relationships, and the manifestation of God in our everyday human activities and interactions. He speaks of the liberation of the human spirit and he is well aware of the impediments bearing down upon many individuals, whether they be due to societal, political, religious, educational, economic, attitudinal, or psychological pressures and restrictions. Buber speaks with intensity and urgency because he realizes that, in the words of Antoine de Saint Exupéry, "we all yearn to escape from prison."² In order to heal his fragmented and, what psychologist Rollo May calls his "schizoid"³ condition, modern man must first be aware that his existence does not have to reside on a superficial plane and that by genuine relationships with others his life can be infused with value

² Antoine de Saint Exupéry, <u>Wind, Sand and Stars</u>, trans. Lewis Galantière (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967), p. 233.

³ Rollo May, <u>Love and Will</u> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969), p. 16.

¹ Note such lyrical lines as these: "but, what is greater for us than all enigmatic webs at the margins of being is the central actuality of an everyday hour on earth, with a streak of sunshine on a maple twig and the intimation of the eternal You" (Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann. op. cit., p. 182). In fact, Buber's <u>I and Thou</u> has been called "a philosophical-religious" poem (Paul E. Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 3). See also Louis Z. Hammer, "Lyric Poetry as Religious Language," <u>Monist</u>, Vol. 47, Spring 1963, pp. 401-416.

and meaning. It must be stressed that an integrated and authentic life cannot be achieved through intellectual recognition or cerebral understanding solely; the authentic life must be lived. Buber warns us

> that meaning is open and accessible in the actual lived concrete does not mean it is to be won and possessed through any type of analytical or synthetic investigation or through any type of reflection upon the lived concrete. Meaning is to be experienced in living action and suffering itself, in the unreduced immediacy of the moment.¹

Buber goes on to explain that he who makes the experiencing of experience a goal will miss finding meaning because he would, in effect, be one step removed from experience. Thus, the spontaneity of the mystery would be destroyed. Meaning is found when one is open, direct, and genuinely responsive. Only then will the meaning one finds be corroborated by one's own experience and life.

What I find stirring about Buber's message is that he beckons us to a very human journey-one that, as will be shown later--he believes leads-us to glimpses of God in our own experiences. And thus Buber challenges us:

> You shall not withhold yourself. You, imprisoned in the shells in which society, state, church, school, economy, public opinion, and your own pride has stuck you, indirect one among indirect ones, break through your shells, become direct; man, have contact with man!²

¹ Martin Buber, <u>Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation between</u> <u>Religion and Philosophy</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957). "Religion and Philosophy," trans. by Maurice S. Friedman, p. 35.

² Martin Buber, <u>Pointing the Way</u>, ed. and trans. Maurice S. Friedman (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1957), p. 109.

The individual must learn to be aware of himself. Enriched by his self-knowledge, he can go forth and participate in authentic relationships with others. However, the way to self-knowledge is difficult and complex.

Buber is concerned with man and the concrete situation in which he finds himself—both as <u>this</u> particular individual and as part of humanity. In order to appreciate fully the individual's personal context with all his attendant concerns, one ought first to consider the historical and anthropological context in which the individual / finds himself situated. J. Bronowski, in his enlightening book, <u>The</u> <u>Ascent of Man</u>, points out that:

> Man ascends by discovering the fullness of his own gifts (his own talents or faculties) and what he creates on the way are monuments to the stages in his understanding of nature and of self¹... he has what no other animal possesses, a jig-saw of faculties which alone, over three thousand million years of life, make him creative. Every animal leaves traces of what it was; man alone leaves traces of what he created.²

Bronowski underscores an autonomous feature of man-his ability to make choices. Choice plays an important part in creativity³-whether that creativity is employed in an artistic endeavour or whether in deciding what sort of person one wants to be in the world. The

¹ J. Bronowski. <u>The Ascent of Man</u> (London: MacDonald and Co., 1984), p. 16.

² Ibid., p. 27.

³ See Antonia Wenkart, "Creativity in the Light of Existentialism," <u>Journal of Existential Psychiatry</u>, Vol. 1, 1960-1961, No. 1-4, pp. 367-378. ability to make choices resides in the self-reflective capacity of man. Man is able to be aware and to be aware of his awareness and to be aware of <u>that</u> awareness! Thus, man is able to understand himself and others and to express these understandings in forms that will last beyond his own individual death. Not all creative endeavours are tangible. A primary example of creative legacy is that of a civilization. Antoine de Saint Exupéry tells us that

> a civilization is a heritage of beliefs, customs, and a knowledge slowly accumulated in the course of centuries, elements difficult at times to justify by logic, but justifying themselves as paths when they lead somewhere, since they open up for man his inner distance.¹

In the same way a civilization reveals the inner workings of a people, so does a person's total being reflect his internal sensibility and self-awareness. This opening of the inner distance is expressed by Buber as the unfolding of the uniqueness each man possesses. Each individual is a once-in-eternity being, irreplaceable and infinitely precious.

> It is because things happen but once that the individual partakes in eternity. For the individual with his inextinguishable uniqueness is engraved in the heart of the all and lies forever in the lap of the timeless as he who has been created thus and not otherwise.

¹ Antoiné de Saint Exupéry, <u>Flight to Arras</u>, trans. Lewis Galantière (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1942) p. 64.

Uniqueness is thus the essential good of a man that is given to him to unfold.¹

There is also a spiritual dimension to the value of the individual. Referring to the Hasidic² tradition, Buber explains that the uniqueness and irreplaceability of each human soul is a basic tenet. In God's creation, an infinity of individuals, each with idiosyncratic qualities and capacities, exist. God values and loves each individual especially for his uniqueness.³

The difficulties in realizing one's human uniqueness and in maintaining an integrated personality is well understood by Buber. He exhibits a very compassionate understanding of the struggle of the soul and would well agree with Berdyaev who notes: "The struggle to achieve personality and its consolidation are a painful process. . . The self realization of personality presupposes resistance. . . . "⁴ In view of this, Buber offers a note of encouragement and hope that seems particularly poignant in the light of our increasing fragmented modernday existence. We are not helpless:

² Hasidism is discussed further on pp. 53-56 of this thesis.

³ Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 250.

⁴ Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 27.

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¹ Martin Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, trans. Maurice Friedman (New York: Horizon Press, 1958), p. 111. [Pfuetze notes that "This word [Hasidism] is variously spelled: hasidism, Chasidism, Chassidism. It has seemed to me that the use of "Ch" and the double 's' best preserves the Hebrew pronunciation. The term is derived from the name of the 'Chassidism' who were opponents of the Hellenizers in pre-Maccabean Falestine, and were the precursors of the Pharisees, from whose ranks, some scholars maintain, Jesus himself arose" (Paul E. Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 20).]

The man with the divided, complicated, contradictory soul is not helpless; the core of his soul, the divine force in its depths, is capable of acting upon it, changing it, binding the conflicting forces together, amalgamating the divergent elements---is capable of unifying it.¹

Thus, becoming oneself is a personal, creative process. Berdyaev echoes Buber as he also considers the unfolding of one's true self a divine vocation that we are all called to:

> Personality is bound up with the consciousness of vocation. Every man ought to be conscious of that vocation, which is independent of the extent of his gifts. It is a vocation in an individually unrepeatable form to give an answer to the call of God and to put one's gifts to creative use. Personality which is conscious of itself listens to the inward voice and obeys that only.²

Buber does not talk of stages of growth as Piaget and Kohlberg do. Nevertheless, he speaks of a sense of increasing personal integration.³ In this regard, Buber would tend to agree with Joanna Field⁴, a psychologist, who states that growth in understanding the meaning of an experience follows "an ascending spiral rather than a

¹ Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 149.

² Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 48.

³ For a brief comparison of Piaget, Kohlberg and Buber, see T.L. Brink and Connie Janakes, "Buber's Interpersonal Theory as a Hermeneutic," <u>Journal of Religion and Health</u>, October 1979, pp. 295-296. For further discussion on Kohlberg, see pp. 80-82 of this thesis.

⁴ For further discussion on Field's findings, see pp. 21-27 of this thesis.

straight line."1 That is, it requires going over the same ground again and again, with intervals of perhaps years in between, and each time at a higher and more profound level.

Buber also offers hope by way of foretelling the ensperiapediac, synergetic, cumulative, and asymptotic progress the soul will experience:

> One thing must of course not be lost sight of: unification of the soul is never final. Just as a soul most unitary from birth is sometimes beset by inner difficulties, thus even a soul most powerfully struggling for unity can never completely achieve it. But any work that I do with a united soul reacts upon my soul, acts in the direction of new and greater unification, leads me, though by all sorts of detours, to a steadier unity than was the preceding one. Thus, man ultimately reaches a point where he can rely upon his soul, because its unity is now so great that it overcomes contradiction with effortless ease. Vigilance, of course, is necessary even then, but it is a relaxed vigilance.²

Buber may be said to be an immensely realistic man, for his concerns are with the concrete situation of the individual at every turn. For Buber, there is no discrepancy between the concrete and the transcendent. His spiritual vision of man and God is ultimately tied up with the realistic opportunity and responsibility that every person faces. Buber writes in <u>Zwiesprache (Dialogue)</u> that he has no authority to demand the life of the dialogue. He simply records the fact that one <u>is able</u> to live the life of the dialogue. The dialogical life is

¹ Joanna Field, [Marion Blackett Milner], <u>A Life of One's Own</u>, (Los Angeles: J.P. Tarcher, 1981), p. 55.

² Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op.cit., p. 150.

not predicated on intellectual prowess. It is a basic human venture accessible to everyone if they are open and responsive: "There are no gifted and ungifted here, only those who give themselves and those who withhold themselves."

Buber emphasizes that openness to dialogue is what demarcates those who are living authentic lives from those who are living inauthentic lives. It is not a question of intelligence, social position, or talent. It is a question of becoming truly human.

Buber would agree that the individual must be viewed holistically²: the spiritual, physical, intellectual, emotional, social, and sexual aspects of the person must all be taken into consideration. In order to be authentic, one must be aware of all the aspects of one's life and how they affect one's ability to become fully Self-awareness is the first step to self-understanding. human. In relating to others, the self is better understood and confirmed. Man needs to be confirmed and man has the ability to confirm others. The basis of the dialogical life is the wish of every man to be confirmed by his fellowman. He needs to be confirmed as what he is and also as what he can become. Confirmation is an integral part of the authentic life.³ Buber notes that:

¹ Buber quoted in Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 226.

² Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 178.

³ Martin Buber, <u>To Hallow This Life</u>, ed. Jacob Trapp (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958), p. 24.

Man needs confirmation to deliver him from the anxiety of abandonment, which is a foretaste of death.¹

People fear not only physical death but the kind of death which lies in not being acknowledged at all—the kind of death which lies in being forgotten, neglected, and ignored. We all need reassurance of our worth and our dignity.

Beyond the confirmation that others can provide, there is a special role that teachers or those in educationally-related professions (doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, psychotherapists, psychoanalysts, counsellors, professors. theologians, clergy, philosophers, writers and poets, to name but a few) can play. The authentic and professional educator can act in the capacity of an astute diagnostician, heuristic guide, and fellow explorer. To be able to detect and discern in which area a person may need help presupposes a competent understanding of the various elements that go in making up an individual. Oftentimes, an individual may not be able to articulate his needs or indeed be fully aware of them. An individual may just need to learn some tools that will enable him to discover things for himself. Perhaps an individual may just need someone to recognize and understand his struggles and searchings. Educators and those in the helping professions are in a particularly good position to aid in experiencing the authentic life. These professionals usually have a great deal of experience in dealing with people and their problems. By

¹ Gert Hellerich, "An Investigation into the Educational Implications of Jean Paul Sartre's Existential Notion of 'Being-With' and the Reaction of Martin Buber" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1967), p. 140.

seeking their help, one most likely could accelerate and intensify the self-discovery process. Although the bulk of the work must still be done by the individual, the assistance of the teacher would be of great benefit.

Buber believes that in the daily, communal interaction of man and man, God is revealed. Thus, the spiritual life resides in our earthly existence. The divine meets the human in our everyday life.

To illustrate this, I will touch on some specific items that an individual might consider when reflecting on his life. There are both pragmatic aspects and attitudinal characteristics. Under the pragmatic category, one could place family relationships, schooling, religious involvement, life history of the individual, vocational work, creative work, recreation, material possessions, health, finances, sexuality, emotions, social interactions, nutrition, quality and quantity of sleep, housing, intellectual, technological, and aesthetic contact as some topics to consider.

When considering the inner life, there are some attitudinal characteristics which also must be carefully considered. These include ability to discern, focus on and clarify the problem at hand, to exercise caution, to be as truthful and honest as possible with oneself, to be patient, to love, to understand why one feels negative, to find avenues of understanding tailored to one's own temperament and inclinations, to find help from reading and discussions with others, to gain illumination from the arts: film, theatre, music, ballet, opera, poetry, sculpture, painting, and other artistic expressions, and to

articulate and to share new understandings.¹ The above examples are illustrations of possible ordinary, everyday activities and attitudes through which the spiritual element in man can exhibit itself.

Despite multifarious aspects, both pragmatic and attitudinal, the questions of personal identity will never be fully and completely answered; ultimately, we are enigmatic even unto ourselves. Therefore, the process of becoming oneself is never-ending and never uninteresting. Psychologist Joanna Field's writing about her personal experience puts it aptly:

> So I began to have an idea of my life, not as the slow shaping of achievement to fit my preconceived purposes, but as the gradual discovery and growth of a purpose which I did not know. I wrote: 'It will mean walking in the fog for a bit, but it's the only way which is not a presumption, forcing the self into a theory.'²

In order to illustrate the complex dimensions of the inner life and the ability for a person to aid in his own vigilant discernment of his soul, one could consider and reflect upon the personal experience of Joanna Field (the pseudonym of Marion Milner) accounted in <u>A Life of One's Own</u>. In 1926, 'when Field was 26 years old, she became aware that she was not living a truly authentic existence. Field herself reminds us that she had a first-class honors

¹ Similar pragmatic and attitudinal aspects are noted in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs. [See N.L. Gage and David C. Berliner, <u>Educational Psychology</u>, (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1979), p. 378.] For a brief comparison of Maslow and Buber, see Brink and Janakes, op. cit., pp. 294-295, 297. For further discussion on Maslow see pp. 85-87 of this thesis.

² Field, op. cit, p. 89.

degree in Psychology and was a practising psychologist at the same time of her writing. Yet, she had much to learn about herself and others.¹

Field helps illumine Buber because she provides herself as a concrete example of an individual struggling to achieve authenticity. As she finds her own intensely personal way to becoming fully human, she also underscores Buber's notion that as individuals, we each have different avenues to becoming who we truly <u>are</u>. I will employ the example of Joanna Field following an idiographic², non-nomothetic approach that reflects Buber's outlook.

Field's book chronicles and explains her psychological selfexploration which ultimately resulted in her realization that she was personally responsible for her own life and fulfillment. Her book charts her inner journey and progress. In trying to determine what kinds of experiences made her happy, she finds out en route various and hitherto unknown features of her psychological life that only become clear through observation, reflection and integration. It becomes evident that although her discoveries are person-specific--namely, Field's own inner idiosyncrasies-her findings could be related to the experience of others. For example, Field tells us that she discovered the well-known, but important fact that there is a world of difference between knowing something intellectually and knowing it as a "lived" experience.³

¹ Ibid., jacket.

² For further discussion of the idiographic approach, see Abraham Maslow, <u>The Psychology of Science</u> (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), pp. 8-11 and also pp. 85-87 of this thesis.

³ Field, op. cit., p. 12.

There are some "broad strokes" one can paint in depicting the inner life. I have already touched on these when I referred to the pragmatic and attitudinal aspects of self-awareness. However, the inner labyrinth of the self requires a great deal closer and more intricate analysis and comprehension than the basic considerations of life. Joanna Field aptly illustrates this in her chronicle of selfdiscovery.

For instance, Field deals with the different layers of oneself. She recalls wondering why her fears, which were quite oppressive, appeared disproportionately large for the kind of situations which seemed to trigger these fears. Also, there seemed to be a big discrepancy between the two versions of the causes of these fears. The apparent causes of these fears were petty social difficulties. However, upon clearer emotional scrutiny, immediate preoccupation with childhood affairs and echoes of emotional urgency surfaced.¹

There is indeed an undercurrent of emotional life that is not easily discernible in our everyday interactions. This undercurrent has been the subject of much writing. The "stream-of-consciousness" writers such as James Joyce and Virginia Woolf have strikingly portrayed the juxtaposition of our external circumstances and our internal layers of consciousness.

¹ Ibid., p. 62.

Freud¹ makes an analogy with the engrammatic mental life by referring to the present mental landscape as a modern city and the many past mental landscapes as the unexcavated ruins of past cities on the same site. Freud notes "that the observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance or his position in order to call up the one view or the other"², for with imagination one could perceive either the present structures or any of the past structures.

Another mental feature Field speaks of is projection. Projection is a psychological phenomenon defined as the "unconscious transfer of one's own impressions or feelings to external objects or persons."³ Field notes that sometimes her hatred of some part of herself which she would not accept became a hatred of someone else. She would say all manner of negative things about that person, but anyone with insight could tell her that she was really talking about herself.⁴

Buber also shows insight into projection. He explains how someone else can powerfully remind us of unresolved conflicts in ourselves. Once the realization of projection occurs, the person can deal more authentically with himself and with others in a new, relaxed light. It is important to try to resolve one's inner conflicts.⁵ This

¹ For a brief comparison of Freud and Buber, see Brink and Janakes, op. cit., pp. 290-291.

² Sigmund Freud, <u>Civilization and Its Discontents</u>, trans. Joan Rivière. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1979.) p. 7.

3 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1982.

⁴ Field, op. cit., p. 127.

⁵ Buber, <u>Hasidism and the Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 156.

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Buberian view is echoed very clearly in the reflective personal and professional experience of Joanna Field:

I realized now that as long as you feel insecure you have no real capacity to face other men and women in that skill of communication which more than any other skill requires freedom from tension. By communication I did not of course mean only intellectual conversation but the whole aesthetic of emotional relations. . .¹

Unless one is rather aware of oneself, it is difficult really to understand others and to engage in I-Thou relationships. Lao-Tze, the ancient Chinese philosopher tells us: "I observe myself and so I come to know others."²

Field also speaks of automatic as opposed to agentic living and the role of understanding. When one does not understand and is not aware, many actions are the function of oftentimes irrational habits. However, with understanding, one is able to discover what principles of living truly work and are appropriate for oneself, amidst and despite the clamouring and competing admonishings of an inconstant society.³

Her further discoveries include: different ways of perception, unreasonable or "blind" thinking, "male"/"female" mental dispositions, how to observe her own thoughts, admitting buried thoughts and emotions, recognition of doubts and fears, control over thoughts, receptivity to new thoughts, role of emotion, fatigue, reason,

- ¹ Field, op. cit., p. 192.
- ² Ibid., p. 124.
- ³ Ibid., p. 207.

relaxation and memory, meaning in dreams and how to increase one's awareness.¹

Ultimately, Field becomes "aware of an unconscious wisdom that was wiser than [her]"² and has a feeling of sureness that there was something in [her] that would get on with the job of living without any continual tampering.³ This is very much like Buber's affirmation of the ability of a person to become integrated and aware and Berdyaev's "inner voice."⁴ (The integration process requires some time. It must be noted that Field, a trained psychologist came to these understandings after seven years and much of her understanding was only further clarified after a subsequent eighteen years of living!⁵)

It is also apparent, as I have tried to suggest, citing Joanna Field as an example, that truth has many faces—that is, what is true, experienced, understood and lived, can be expressed in a variety of ways and manifested in a multitude of modes and creations. Field's experience is just one individual person's account and manner of relating to herself, others and to God—her way to becoming fully human. She believes that we all need to find our particular balance. The balance is different for each according to one's idiosyncratic needs, inclinations and circumstances.⁶

- ¹ Ibid., p. 9.
- ² Ibid., p. 9.
- ³ Ibid., p. 185.
- ⁴ Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 48.
- ⁵ Field, op. cit., Prefatory Note.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 16.

Buber stresses:

Certainly in order to be able to go out to the other you must have the starting place, you must have been, you must be, with yourself.¹

I have attempted to illustrate the need to be fully aware of oneself from a Buberian perspective. Also, I have tried to demonstrate the complexity involved in leading an authentic life. There are many emotions, motivations, and attitudes that must be looked at closely before and during the shaping and re-shaping of one's relationships with others. I shall now go on to consider authenticity in light of the individual and his relationships with others.

¹ Martin Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1965), p. 21.

iii) The individual and others

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The Buberian conception of man necessitates others. Man <u>becomes</u> through genuine contact and caring for others. The individual does not become human through complete isolation and solitude. Rather, true interaction with others elicits, impels, and compels the authentic person possible in each individual to come forth.

Central to Buber's thought is the relationship between the individual and others. This is a relationship whose nature has been examined in the thought of many other moral philosophers and religious thinkers. Each one approaches it in his own way and Buber summarized the question of the nature of relationships with the concept of the I-Thou and I-It.¹ How did the I-Thou originate in Buber's thought?

The death of a young man whom Buber had spoken to briefly served as a troubling impetus for Buber to reflect on the nature, significance, and impact of human relationships. Namely, he wanted to know what distinguished authentic from inauthentic relationships-what it meant to be fully present for the person one is faced with at the

It should be noted as well that it is not helpful, and may be even misleading to classify Buber as a member of the existentialist school. "Although in general Buber's thought is akin to the existentialist trend of the twentieth century, his stress upon the social character of the self differentiates him from most thinkers of this school." [See Joseph L. Blau, <u>The Story of Jewish Philosophy</u>, (New York: Ktav Publishing House Inc., 1962), p. 297.]

¹ Buber, <u>Between and Man</u>, op. cit., p. 209. In Buber's article "The History of the Dialogical Principle," he cites others who have contributed to the concept of I and Thou, notably: Frederich Heinrich Jacobi, Ludwig Feuerbach, Søren Kierkegaard, William James, Karl Löwith, Herman Cohen, Franz Rosenweig, Hans Ehrenberg, Eugen Rosentock-Huessey, Ferdinand Ebner, Jacob Böhme, Frederich Gogarten, Karl Heim, Emil Brunner, Gabriel Marcel, Theodor Litt, Eberhard Grisebach, Karl Jaspers, Ludwig Landgrege, and Karl Barth.

immediate moment. Buber's concern with what constitutes an I-Thou relationship did not arise from merely an intellectual curiosity, but rather from a very concrete and shockingly disturbing experience he encountered. Buber relates a profound personal experience which gave him insight into the true nature of dialogue and which, coupled with his Hasidic studies, turned him away from extreme mysticism.

After a morning of "religious enthusiasm," Buber had a visit from an unknown young man.¹ Buber was not truly present for the man. The meeting was cordial, friendly and conversational. Buber was open and attentive—except that he did not discern the unasked questions. Later, Buber learned of this young man's death through his friends. He also learned of the essential content of his questions and that the student had not come to him for a casual chat but for a decision. But Buber had not been fully present for him. Buber realized this and wrote: "What do we expect when we are in despair and yet go to a man? Surely a presence by means of which we are told that nevertheless there is a meaning."²

Maurice Friedman, a Buber scholar, tells us that when Buber "learned that this young man had been killed in the trenches of World War I--not in suicide as some have thought but, as Buber has written me, 'out of despair which did not oppose its own death'--he accepted this as a judgement on a religious life that extracted him from


² Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., p. 13.

¹ The student was Herr Mehé. He met with Buber in July of 1914. He died in battle two months later. See Maurice Friedman, <u>Martin</u> <u>Buber's Life and Work: The Early Years, 1878-1923</u> (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1981), pp. 189-190.

everyday and deprived him of the wholeness of presence with which he might have responded to the claim of the other."1

Prof. Sol Tanenzapf² also speaks on the origin of I-Thou. He says that as a result of Buber's experience with the young student, Buber started to speak of being <u>present</u> for someone else and what that entailed and meant. In a genuine encounter with another person, we can reassure him that there is meaning to life. By being present for him, we express our acceptance of him. This does not pecessarily involve speaking a lot--you can be present for someone without saying anything.³

Thus, Buber began to turn his attention to the question of authenticity in human relationships. Buber distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic relationships by employing word-pairs to describe them. In his book, <u>I and Thou</u>, Buber divides human relationships into two general categories: the <u>I-It</u> and the <u>I-Thou</u>. Diagrammatically, they can be represented thus:



¹ Maurice Friedman, <u>To Deny Our Nothingness: Contemporary Images</u> of Man (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1967), p. 295.

² Prof. Sol Tanenzapf is a Professor of Religious Studies at York University in Toronto, Ontario. He spoke on a radio program: <u>Voices</u> <u>and Visions: A Guided Tour of Revelation</u> as part of the "Ideas" Series on CBC Radio.

³ Heather Martin and Bill Nemtin, <u>Voices and Visions: A Guided</u> <u>Tour of Revelation</u> (Montreal, Quebec: Canadian Broadcasting Company, October 30, 1985 and November 6, 1985: Transcription), p. 19.

a) The I-It Relationship

The I-It relationship is characterized by detachment and distancing on the subject's part, ". . . whether in knowing, feeling, or acting, it is the typical subject-object relationship."¹ The broken circle defining <u>It</u> represents the fact that <u>It</u> does not exist authentically for I^2 . The two circles barely touch at their peripheries. There is ". . . no between in I and It. All this takes place within me; <u>I</u> am judging and <u>I</u> observing."³ Thus, ". . . in the world of <u>It</u>, there is only one centre of consciousness, the one who experiences an object, appropriates the object to his own uses."⁴

The I-It relationship consists of a subject (I) and its relationship to an object (It). The I-It is typical of the people who use and manipulate others as objects. An example would be the politician who sees his constituents solely in terms of votes to be gained or lost. The I-It occurs ". . . when the scientist, the politician, the propagandist, the employer, treats men and women as things, commodities, pawns, objects to be manipulated, pushed around and [treats] persons as abstractions, as perceived part only or in the mass,"⁵

¹ Martin Buber, <u>The Knowledge of Man</u>, trans. ed. by Maurice S. Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 12.

² See diagram I on p. 30 of this thesis.

³ Michael Wyschogrod, "Martin Buber," <u>Encyclopedia of Philosophy</u>, 1973 ed. "Martin Buber," pp. 409-411.

⁴ Blau, op. cit., p. 299.

⁵ Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 144.



There are, of course, variations on the I-It theme. There are the I-I, It-It, We-We, and Us-Them relationships. In his prologue, entitled "I and You" to his translation of "I and Thou"¹, Walter Kaufmann clarifies Buber's description of human relationships and describes the I-I, It-It, We-We, and Us-Them relationships.

The I-I describes people who exist alone. They have no commitment to projects, possessions or other people. They do not genuinely encounter others-they never recognize individuals. Their sole preoccupation is themselves-they do not think of others as subjects <u>or</u> objects. In fact, they do not recognize others at all. Hence, the I-I term is most appropriate: "... the lord of every story will be I."²

The It-It³ describes people who objectify themselves and the work they engage in. An example would be a scholar who was so immersed in his work that he would exclude all else—including himself. He would neglect the spiritual, physical, social and emotional sides of himself in servitude to his intellectual work. His work would become idolized—an academic It and he would find himself also as an It. He would only be significant in terms of his work. There would be no other identity.

- The We-We⁴ is characteristic of those who are so completely immersed in a group that they lose their identity and individuality:

- ¹ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 11.
- ² Ibid., p. 11.
- ³ Ibid., p. 12.
- 4 Ibid., p. 13.

"The contents of this We can vary greatly. But this is an orientation in which I does not exist, and You and It and He and She are only shadows."¹ The We-We mentality can be found in any social or political group that demands exclusive allegiance on the part of its members.

The Us-Them relationship is where the world is divided into two camps—us and them: ". . . the children of light and the children of darkness, the sheep and the goats, the elect and the damned."² Everything is deceptively simple and black-and-white. They are rich or poor, Democratic or Communist, Believer or Atheist, good or bad, "in" or "out." Prescription for action is clear—do not cross the enemy lines--do not go over to "THEM." "THEY" are less than human. Ironically, ". . . those who have managed to cut through the terrible complexities of life and offer such a scheme as this have been hailed as prophets in all ages."³

The Us-Them relationship, like the I-I, I-It, It-It, and We-We, does not take into account or address the "I" of the other. The naming of such relationships serves as an aid in recognizing and re-examining one's relationship with others.

Ibid., p. 13.
 Ibid., p. 14.

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³ Ibid., p. 14.

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b) The I-Thou Relationship

The I-Thou relationship is one in which the other is responded to fully as a subject. This includes the I-Thou relationship with God --the eternal Thou.¹ The I-Thou is a relationship between two subjects where both individuals truly address each other. There is respect and there is affection involved. The relationship is such between them that the term "spiritual" could apply in the sense that the two involved are truly communing. By the very nature of the I-Thou relationship, there is a great deal of intensity involved. The relationship is special and precious.

Buber considers the I-Thou relationship necessary to man for many reasons. Man cannot exist alone; man lives only when in context with others. Buber carefully distinguishes between mere survival and genuine, authentic existence. For Buber, "all real life is meeting,"² that is, the encounter between man and man (and the encounter between man and God <u>through</u> man's relationships with others) defines life in its fullest sense. This living with others is not of the superficial I-It realm, but of the close, warm I-Thou realm. Man is whole only when he is in true communion with others.

Communion involves the ability to focus and concentrate on the other. When two people truly address each other, they need to give complete and utter attention in order to listen, to share, to talk and

¹ Ibid., p. 57.

² Buber quoted in Nash et al., <u>The Educated Man: Studies in the</u> <u>History of Educational Thought</u> (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 366.

to care. It is only in this way that the relationship can be authentic and genuine-the only way it can be an I-Thou relationship.

The matter of genuine response is crucial. The whole being must be involved. There is a risk because such honesty also involves vulnerability. However, in an <u>I-Thou</u> relationship, both partners are mutually entering into the relationship and trust begins to build.

Buber writes on the first page of <u>I and Thou</u> that "the fundamental word I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole of one's being."¹

Buber considers the I-Thou relationship important because he believes that each person is unique-each a particular Thou. Thus, each person should be responded to in the light of his own individuality.

> To be aware of a man, therefore, means in particular to perceive his wholeness as a person determined by the spirit; it means to perceive the dynamic centre (Thou) which stamps his every utterance, action, and attitude with the recognizable sense of uniqueness.²

The reason that the I and Thou circles³ are not superimposed on each other is because the I-Thou relationship is not one of empathic union. That is, the I recognizes the uniqueness of the other person. There is communion, but there is also the recognition that the I is not lost and immersed in the Thou, unlike the We-We relationship where all

³ Refer to diagram I on p. 30 of this thesis.

¹ Buber quoted in Hellerich, op. cit., p. 139.

² Ibid., p. 136.

personal identity is lost. Pfuetze comments that: "I and Thou are the two poles of a relation; love is the reality of the relation between Each retains his identity and autonomy and responsibility."1 them. The I-Thou is based on mutuality. Neither person is dominated or engulfed by the other. Buber warns that if we overlook the real otherness of the other person, we shall not be able to help him. We shall see him a we want to or in terms of ready-made or stereotypical We will not be able to see him as he really is in his categories. concrete uniqueness. But if we see his uniqueness and still accept and confirm him, then we shall have helped him become himself in such a way that would have not been possible without us. Through our genuine acceptance of him and not our image of him, we shall have aided him in becoming authentic.²

This uniqueness makes every I-Thou relationship different because I must always address Thou with freshness of mind and heart and with no preconceived notions or ready-made labels. If one wishes to understand other persons in their uniqueness, then one can readily see that the I-It relationship is a totally inappropriate approach to others. Buber believes that "in each man there is a priceless treasure that is in no other. Therefore, one shall honour each man for the hidden value that only he and none of his comrades has."³ In short, in

- ¹ Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 143.
- ^{- 2} Nash, op. cit., p. 369.
 - ³ Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 115.

the words of Antoine de Saint Exupéry, "each individual is a miracle."¹ Buber entreats us to become who we are since

> every person born into this world represents something new, something that never existed before, something original and unique . . . every single man is a new thing in the world and is called upon to fulfill his particularity in the world.²

There is a difficulty with the I-Thou encounter. It cannot be verified objectively.³ By definition, the I-Thou relationship is subjective and ineffable in nature. Buber writes in <u>I and Thou</u>: "These moments are immortal; none are more evanescent. They leave no content that could be preserved. . . .⁴ This may prove frustrating to some, nometheless, the I-Thou cannot be properly understood until it is experienced. However, I believe that unless one has been unduly unfortunate, that each person must have some small inkling or faint intimation of the I-Thou experience. Buber's epistemological perspective is thus regarded as primarily experentially based.

It is important to note that the I-Thou and I-It are not rigidly established and inflexible. The relationships are fluid and dynamic in nature. They can vary in degree and each relationship is idiosyncratic.

At times, the I-Thou may change into an I-It. In fact, there are many who would even turn the I-Thou experience itself into an I-It

- ¹ Antoine de Saint Exupéry, Flight to Arras. op. cit., p. 194.
- ² Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 140.
- ³ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 82.
- ⁴ Ibid., p. 82.

by objectification---mistaking the naming of an experience for the experience itself. (Some scholars have this proclivity). Charles --Axelrod explains that due to the nature of dialogue, Buber's thought tends to evade any objective formulation. Dialogue lives only during the dialogical event and only between its participants. While we may find meaning from a particular dialogical event and preserve it as objective speech, we will <u>not</u> have preserved the dialogue itself. Dialogue is a living, dynamic phenomenon intrinsically subjective in nature. Ut is ineffable and cannot be reduced to objective speech or writing. Buber realized this and did not claim to present his work as the authoritative explanation of dialogue. As Buber often stated his work can only <u>point</u>¹ to a uniquely human dimension of speech which cannot be reduced to abstractions.²

An I-It may become an I-Thou. Such is the nature of mutable human relations. It is important to realize that the I-It relation is not inherently evil.³ The I-It is necessary for ordered civilization, the acquisition of objective knowledge, and for achievement of

³ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 95.

¹ Buber quoted in Donald L. Berry. <u>Mutuality: The Vision of</u> <u>Martin Buber</u> (Albany, New York: The University of New York Press, 1985), p. 89.

² Charles David Axelrod, <u>Studies in Intellectual Breakthrough:</u> <u>Freud, Simmel, Buber</u> (Amherst: University of Massachüsetts Press, 1979), p. 66. For a more detailed and fuller explanation, see Axelrod's chapter on Buber (Chapter 4, pp. 51-64). For further discussion on the ineffable quality of the I-Thou, see Leon J. Goldstein "The Problem of, the Given in Buber's Conception of the Interpersonal" in A.A. Chiel (ed.). <u>Perspectives on Jews and Judaism</u> (New York: The Rabbinical Assembly, 1978), p. 141.

technical advances and scientific accomplishment.¹ The I-It is not necessarily a permanent mode of relationship. Rather, the I-It can be a potential opportunity for an I-Thou relationship. For instance, even though I may have a functional I-It relationship with a shopkeeper, that shopkeeper could potentially become a good friend of mine. The very existence of multi-functional I-It relationships in our society means that there are many potential I-Thou relationships. Also, I-It relationships underscore the essential interdependency and interrelatedness of us all. Pfuetze tells us that "the life of the dialogue is not just limited to man's traffic with another, it is a <u>relation</u> of man to another man that is only represented in their dealings with one another."²

One could initially have an attitude towards a flower, a poem, a painting, a sculpture, or a melody that is similar to an I-It approach. However, if I change my attitude or approach and allow for example, the music to speak to me, if I engage fully in the work, the world of I-Thou may be revealed.³ Thus, the I-Thou is not only experienced with other men for "Form's silent asking, man's loving

¹ Steven Katz, ed. <u>Jewish Philosophers</u> (New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1975), p. 193. See also Nash, op. cit., p. 363.

² Pfeutze, op. cit., p. 167.

³ For more on the world of the artist, aesthetic ontology, and aesthetic epistemology, see Werner Manheim. <u>Martin Buber</u> (New York: Twyane Publishers, 1974), pp. 33-36.

speech, the mute proclamation, are all gateways into the presence of the Word."1 The I-Thou leads us to God.

The I-Thou in other than interhuman relationships has been the subject of much discussion.² As emphasized previously, in the I-Thou each partner retains his full independence and identity, yet shares a reciprocal relatedness with the other. At first glance, an I-Thou with natural elements, biological or zoological entities would appear dubious since these beings and things cannot become partners in a fully reciprocal dialogical encounter in the same way as human beings can. However, although we can not have a fully mutual I-Thou relationship, we can have an I-Thou attitude of gelatedness.

Buber explains that there are gradations of mutuality [<u>Gegenseitigkeit</u>] possible.³ The elements (earth/rocks, air, fire/sun, and water) are "sub-threshold"; botanical elements are "pre-threshold"; and zoological entries are at the "threshold" of mutuality.⁴ Donald

² For example, see references in Berry, op. cit., pp. 26-38.

³ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op cit., pp. 57-59, 172-173 and Berry, op. cit., p. x.

⁴ Berry, op. cit., pp. 5, 25, 99-101: [Adapted] To be more specific, Buber mentions examples of zoological entities, at the threshold of mutuality as the beaver, bird, butterfly, cat, cricket, dog, horse, lion cub, monkey, ox, ram, swallow, and tuna. Botanical entities, at the pre-threshold of mutuality are flowers, fruit, a grain of seed, grass, madrepores, mushrooms, a thistle, a linden/lime tree, an oak tree, an olive tree, a planted tree, a stone pine tree, and wine. The elements, at the sub-threshold of mutuality are the air/breeze, air/wind, mica, a heap of stones, a clump of earth, a sandy plain, desert, sea, lake, tide, waves, and the sun.

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¹ Buber, <u>I</u> and Thou, trans. Smith, p. 102. [See also Buber, <u>I</u> and Thou, trans. Smith, op. cit., p. 6., Berry, op. cit., pp. 1, 26, and Grete Schaeder. <u>The Hebrew Humanism of Martin Buber</u>. trans. Noah J. Jacobs (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1973), pp. 151-152.]

Berry interprets Buber's use of the concept "threshold" as metaphorical.

The concern is not simple proximity in spatial terms to the realm of our life with one another and all of its dialogic possibilities -- that would be "threshold" in a more literal usage. Buber means by "threshold," rather, the positive significance or value of such nearness to the mutuality or reciprocity that is possible when both partners of the relation are human beings.¹

According to Berry, these gradations or degrees are more easily understood if taken metaphorically. Berry's interpretation stresses "an approach which understands '<u>degrees</u> of mutuality' less quantitatively and more centrally as '<u>modes</u> (or kinds) of mutuality'."² There ought to be more focus on the nature of the I-Thou attitude 'itself.³

It must be stressed however, that despite analysis and clarification the I-Thou can pever be fully defined and explained "since the mystery of the other and of finding ourselves standing in relation to the other is never reducible."⁴ What can be seen clearly, though, is the effect that entering an I-Thou has on other relationships. Berry claims that it is because we experience the I-Thou with humans that we learn to develop a sense of relatedness to nature.⁵ In the same vein, John Tallmadge, an environmental writer,

- ¹ Ibid., p. 5.
- ² Ibid., p. 35
- ³ Ibid., p. 35.
- ⁴ Ibid., p. 36.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 37.

claims that by having an I-Thou attitude towards nature, we enrich and enhance our relationships with our fellowmen.¹

An I-It attitude involving an instrumental and objectifying approach toward nature presupposes that animals, plants and natural resources exist solely as means to human purposes and needs. Having an I-Thou attitude involving a relating and reciprocal approach toward the natural world² helps us to realize our urgent responsibility and stewardship in caring for the earth and the creatures that dwell therein, not selfishly for our own sakes but for the continued survival of all.³

There are various directions where the I-Thou process would take one. The most important feature to note is that I-Thou does not refer to I or to Thou alone but to the I-Thou; that is, to the relation <u>between</u> I and Thou. As Alan Watts explains:

> I being I goes with you being you. [Thus, as Buber put it] 'If I am I because you are you, and if you are you because I am I,

³ Berry, op. cit., pp. 4, 37-38.

¹ John Tallmadge. "Saying You to the Land," <u>Environmental Ethics</u> 3, Winter 1981, pp. 351-363 and Berry, op cit., p. 36.

^{. &}lt;sup>2</sup> William Klink makes an interesting point on our new ability to have an I-Thou relationship with the environment as a whole: "Man not only has the possibility of having an I-Thou relationship with elements of the environment but, because of modern technology, is able to extend the I-Thou relationship to the whole of the environment." (See Klink, op. cit., p. 307.) Klink's observation also brings us to an interesting area that is beyond the scope of this thesis but could be a fruitful and illuminating area for further investigation and discussion; namely, the relationship between man and technology and products of technology such as machines and particularly computers. The advent of rudimentary artificial intelligence vis-a-vis computers provide a whole new area of stimulating discussion that requires careful extrapolation and application of Buber's thought. (See Buber, Between Man and Man, op. cit., p. 37.)

then I am not I, and you are not you.' Instead, we are both something in common between what Martin Buber has called I-and-Thou and I-and-It-the magnet which lies between the poles, between I myself and everything sensed as other.¹

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This relation is the primary phenomenon. Out of this experience arise many new understandings. At least three elements can be culled forth from the I-Thou process. Firstly, one's relationship with oneself is clarified. It may sound odd to consider one's relationship with oneself, as many people just react to life without real reflection and introspection vis-a-vis their particular psycho-historical profile. By engaging in honest relationships with others, one's understanding of the self is deepened.

Secondly, one's comprehension of others is broadened. The recognition of relatedness and the perception of the quality of that relatedness is heightened. The need for connection to the world is a very basic human characteristic. We are defined by our relationships, nay, we <u>are not</u>, save for our relationships. Who am I? My selfidentity is necessarily defined by my relationships to others. My relationships help define who I am. I am one's daughter or son, or sister or brother, or mother or father, or friend, or lover. If I am not in relation to others, then I am not fully alive. Rollo May suggests that

> . . . wish, will, and decisions occur within a nexus of relationships upon which the individual depends not only for fulfillment but for his very existence.

¹ Alan Watts, <u>The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are</u> (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 108.

This sounds like an ethical statement and is. For ethics have their psychological base in the capacities of the human being to transcend the concrete situation of the immediate self-oriented desire and to live in the dimensions of the past and future, and in terms of the welfare of persons and groups upon which his fulfillment ultimately depends.¹

For Antoine de Saint Exupéry, "man is a knot, a web into which relationships are tied. Only those relationships matter."² And the same notion is expressed in the oft-quoted line of John Donne—"no man is an island."³

Buber's I-Thou presupposes a theory of man—a view of man which values and esteems the other as Thou. This view of the value of man comes from a religious outlook or a religious interpretation of the phenomenon of our human existence. Therefore, thirdly, through the I-Thou, one's relationship with God is illuminated.

Only man appears to have a self-reflective capacity. In psychological terms, man has a self-observing ego. Man is aware of his existence in the world. Man can view himself as distinct from his physical, social and technological environment. Thus, only man is able to enter into relation with his world. Therefore, what results from

¹ May, op. cit., p. 266.

² Saint Exupéry, <u>Flight to Arras</u>, op. cit., p. 107.

³ John Donne, <u>Meditation XVII</u>. [John Donne. <u>Selected Prose</u>, ed. Helen Gardner and Timothy Healy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 100-101.] relational interaction is <u>uniquely</u> human and authentic.¹ Grete Schaeder writes:

> The infant's striving for relation, which appears like a primordial recollection of the prenatal union with his mother, like a 'wordless prefiguration of the Thousaying,' was one of the basic elements of Buber's dialogue principle: here . . he found a concrete example of the <u>a priori</u> of relation, 'the inborn Thou.' The development of the child's soul is above all bound up with this instinct for unification.²

Genuine encounter constitutes authenticity for Buber.

Coming full circle, man is reunited with the world of which he has always been part, whether he has been cognizant of this relationship or not. This process is particularly striking in the light of personal and cultural psychological development. Prior to birth, the child is at one with the world, literally connected to his mother and thus his environment. At birth, he is abruptly thrown into the world which appears alien and terrifying to him. After the process of physical and psychological maturity, the healthy adult emerges as a person who is not lost, alone and helpless in the world. Maurice S. Friedman notes:

Without the I-Thou relation, the biological human individual would not become a person, a self, an I at all. He begins with the I-Thou in his relation to his mother and family.³

¹ Buber, <u>A Believing Humanism</u>, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

² Schaeder, op. cit., p. 194. See also Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 76-79 and Manheim, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

³ Nash, op. cit., p. 363.

Man becomes competent in terms of self-parenting and is able to maintain a sense of security by weaving a matrix of deepening interpersonal relationships which allow for self-acceptance, and expression of warmth and love. He has turned full circle and is again at unity with his world.

The starkest counter-motif of this process is expressed at a macro-level in the form of our twentieth-century Western civilization. The contemporary Occidental view of man is diametrically opposed to the traditional Oriental conception of man. Western man sees himself as one who needs to dominate and subjugate his environment. (He treats his environment with an I-It attitude). Eastern man, on the other hand, sees himself as one who needs to be in harmony with his environment. Grete Schaeder writes:

> The Oriental experiences the world as something that happens to him, something that takes hold of him; unending relation runs through him like a stream. But deep within him is a quiet passive core which feels itself to be at one with the hidden sense of the world, and this sense of unification leads him to recognize his essential task: to make manifest the truth of the world.¹

There is an I-Thou relatedness with the world. James Moran explains why the Oriental man was a better example of true humanity for Buber. Whilst trying to discover new orientations for the life of the spirit, Buber found in the Oriental religious traditions a perspective on human living which provided a corrective to the dominant values and attitudes of modern western society. The Oriental emphasis on humility,

1 Schaeder, op. cit. p. 98.

acceptance of reality as the condition of genuine relation, the joy of simple everyday relations with nature and man's fellow man, and on the need for each man to find a way in life, seemed more sensible and more human than the frenzied pursuit of success, personal dominance, and rechnical mastery so pervasive in western society.¹

What is particularly disturbing about the advent of technocracy is that it has served to alienate us even further from our world—to a point where we have become alienated from ourselves and where our relationship to <u>ourselves</u> is that of the I-It realm. Buber's I-Thou serves as a refreshing corrective to a menacing psychological schism that threatens to fragment in neurotic, psychotic, and violent ways our very existence as a civilization. This is evidenced by intense and frequent bursts of public and private violence and the deep despair and <u>angst</u> felt by many trapped in a society that is highly affluent and materialistic, but quite devoid of meaning, particularly personal meaning.

Buber sees the uniquely human ability to engage in dialogue as the primary task of mankind. For in the I-Thou relationship, Buber discerns man's way to self-fulfillment and authenticity. One of the pressing concerns that individuals have today is the search for personal fulfillment. Affurements and illusions are ubiquitous. Power is eagerly sought after in many forms. Societal status, political, ecclesiastical, intellectual, monetary, sexual, and other types of

1 James A. Moran, "Martin Buber and Taoism," <u>Judaism</u>, Vol. 21, Winter 1972, pp. 98-99. For further discussion on Oriental and Occidental man, see Haim Gordon, "An Approach to Martin Buber's Educational Writings," <u>Journal of Jewish Studies</u>, Vol. 29 (Spring 1978), pp. 87-89.

"points" have to be scored and won. Ultimately, these forms of power do not provide lasting fulfillment. And to those who ever seek but never taste of such "victories"—they are destined to always feel that they have somehow lost out on the good things in life. Buber tells us that man only truly <u>becomes</u> in the context of I-Thou relationships. Fulfillment is to be found in the I-Thou between man and man.

Buber's underlying premise is that all life is held to be inherently sacred. For if existence is meaningless and without value, what would be the point of establishing ties? Through the life between man and man, there is a mutual confirmation of personal dignity, worth and value.

Man is a meaning-making creature. As such, he has a deepseated need to make sense of his environment, his inner landscape, and his relationships. Perhaps, this is a function of both biological and psychological evolution and development.¹ To establish, nurture, and maintain meaningful, and trusting relationships is the basis for making integrated sense of all of one's life, including the spiritual dimension. Thus, the concept of authenticity is tied with oneself, others, and at the same time with God.²

Haim Gordon relates an experience which concretely illustrates the nature of the I-Thou. He tells us that sometimes when we least expect it, a fellow human confronts us as a Thou. He gives the example

² Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 155. Pfuetze describes the I-Thou as being triadic in nature and points out that the relationships with oneself and with others are also part of one's relationship with God.

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¹ See Cesar R. Castillo, "A Parallel Between Ontological and Neurophysiological Concepts," <u>Journal of Existential Psychiatry</u>, Vol. 1, Nos. 1-4, 1960-1961, pp. 89-111.

of his son's newly acquired friend, seven-year-old Michael. One day, Neve (Gordon's son) and Michael returned from school together before he was about to leave the house. Newe introduced Michael to the house, explained who Gordon was and started to play. Before Gordon left, he walked over to Neve and stooped to give him a good-bye kiss. When he straightened up, Michael was standing there, hands outstretched, smiling gently, waiting to be kissed after Neve. Gordon tells us that he was so surprised by this simple gesture that for a moment time stood still; then a stream of love for this almost unknown child surged up from the roots of his being, and he stooped to kiss Michael too. Still bewildered, Gordon turned to go, conscious that Michael had taught him something about love, for Michael had related directly to him — he had said Thou.¹

Perhaps, the nature of the I-Thou is best captured in a lovely, haunting poem written by Martin Buber entitled "Weißt du est noch...?" ("Do You Still Know It . . . ?") which was inscribed in the copy that Buber gave his wife Paula of the German edition of the <u>Tales of the</u> <u>Hasidim</u>.²

In both Gordon's example of his encounter with Michael and the celebratory poem of Buber's I-Thou relationship with Paula, we find that there is a transcendent quality about the relationships. Buber considers the dialogical process as leading to God. For Buber, human I-Thou relationships point the way to the divine I-Thou. The function

I Gordon, "A Method of Clarifying Buber's I-Thou Relationship," op. cit., pp. 71-83.

² See Appendix B.

of engaging in I-Thou relationships is not just to establish one's identity, nor is it solely to maintain solid and supportive relationships with others. Buber believes the I-Thou ultimately brings us to God.

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iv) The Individual and God

Buber begins with fine individual but certainly does not end there:

One need only ask one question: 'What for? What am I to choose my particular way for? What am I to unify my being for?' The reply is: 'Not for my own sake.'¹

He goes on to tell us:

To begin with oneself, but not to end with oneself; to start from oneself, but not to aim at oneself: to comprehend oneself, but not to be preoccupied with oneself.²

Buber states that "individuation is only the indispensable personal stamp of all realization of human existence. The self as such is not ultimately the essential, but the meaning of human existence given in creation again and again fulfills itself as self."³

Buber's attitudes toward man are based upon his perception and understanding of God. For Buber, God is a Subject to be encountered and addressed. Central is the relationship between God and the individual. The nature of this relationship must be dealt with by each person. Buber rejects any cognitive propositions or metaphysical speculations about God as the first cause or as leading humanity towards some historical destiny or, again, as something that can be

¹ Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 163.

² Ibid., p. 163.

³ Buber quoted in Nash, op. cit., p. 368. For a brief comparison of Jung and Buber, see Brink and Janakes, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

discovered through conscious and deliberate introspection. For Buber, it is simply eternal reality. He writes:

> It is not as if God could be inferred from anything—say, from nature as its cause, or from history as its helmsman, or perhaps from the subject as the self that thinks itself through it. It is not as if something else were 'given' and this were then deduced from it. This is what confronts us immediately and first and always, and legitimately it can only be addressed, not asserted.¹

Buber states emphatically that God is the eternal Thou that cannot become It. The eternal Thou, by His nature, cannot become It because He defies quantification and limitation, not even in non-limiting terms, such as immeasurable or boundless being. He cannot be understood as a sum of qualities, not even as an infinite sum of transcendent qualities; for He cannot be manipulated, reduced to an abstraction, or objectified. We miss the essence of the living God if we believe in Him only as an abstraction or a metaphor. God is the ever-present, eternal Thou.² Thus, instead of trying to locate God through abstract theories, Buber believes God is to be found in our everyday dealings and relationships with ourselves, others, animals, and nature. In short, the epiphany of God-the eternal Thou-is in our I-Thou relationships. The eternal Thou is part and parcel of every finite Thou. The infinite Other is made manifest in our finite I-Thou relationships. The One who is transcendent Being becomes in our world through our response and authenticity in I-Thou relationships. Buber

¹ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 129.

² Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>. trans. Smith, op. cit., p. 112.___

stresses that the human I-Thou and divine I-Thou are inextricably bound up with each other. God is an integral part of man's authentic relationship to man.

For Buber, God is present and must be addressed:

I am there as whoever I am there. That which reveals is that which reveals. That which has being is there, nothing more. The eternal source of strength flows, the eternal touch is waiting, the eternal voice sounds, nothing more. 1

What does this <u>presentness</u> mean? It signifies that God is present in the here and now, in our everyday existence, in our human, concrete experience.

Buber's thinking about God was greatly influenced by his understanding and interpretation² of the Hasidic tradition. Hasidism

¹ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 160.

 2 It should be stressed that Buber's interpretation of Hasidism is not always adopted.

Gershon Scholem, an outstanding authority on Jewish mysticism, has argued that Buber's version of Hasidism is not correct and that in many fundamental respects the teachings of Hasidism are opposed to the world-affirming dialogical 'hallowing of the everyday' which Buber sees as at the centre of Hasidic life and teaching. [See Katz, op. cit., p. 195.]

This article Katz refers to is Gershon Scholem, "Martin Buber's Hasidism: A Critique" in <u>Commentary</u> 32 (October 1961), pp. 305-316 and 33 (February 1962), pp. 162-163.

For further discussion on Buber's interpretation of Hasidism, see Maurice S. Friedman, "Hasidism: The Buber-Scholem Controversy," <u>Midstream</u> Vol. 30, pp. 40-47, February 1984 and Maurice S. Friedman, <u>Martin Buber's Life and Work: The Later Years--1945-1965</u> (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1983), pp. 280-299.

was the popular communal mysticism of eighteenth and nineteenth century Eastern European Jewry. Buber was instrumental in introducing Hasidism to Western culture. He did this by interpreting and re-writing Hasidic tales and sayings of the Rabbi Israel of Ben Eliezer Baal-Shem-Tov (Master of the Good Name, or Besht--1700-1760¹), the founder of Hasidism during the first half of the eighteen century in Poland.²

In his study of Hasidism, Buber claims that there was a universal quality to the Hasidic message as he understood and interpreted it.³ Hasidism itself wishes to work exclusively within the boundaries of Jewish tradition. Yet something within Hasidism transcends its specifically Jewish orientation. This something is a mysticism which is unlike any other-a hallowing of the everyday and sanctifying of the profane which endeavors to heal the breach between religion and our everyday life. Hasidism has a special message for modern man in crisis. 'the simple truth that the wretchedness of our world is grounded in its resistance to the entrance of the holy into Man must reach the divine by starting with human lived life.' experience. To become fully human is what this individual man has been Hasidic life and teaching revolves around this central created for.

¹ Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 121.

² Donald J. Moore, <u>Martin Buber: Prophet of Religious Secularism</u> (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974), p. 24.

³ All references to Buber's relation to Hasidism should be understood as qualified in this manner, in view of Scholem's argument against Buber's interpretation of Hasidism (cited in footnote # 2 on p. 53 of this thesis.)

and eternal truth.¹ Buber writes that man must begin just as a man and ". . . presume to no superhuman holiness in him. Therefore, the Biblical command, 'Holy men shall you be unto me,' has received Hasidic interpretation thus, '<u>humanly</u> holy shall you be unto me.'"²

Buber could not completely embrace the Hasidic way of life because he was not able to accept the authority of the traditional Halakhah (Jewish sacred law) in its entirety as divinely revealed.³ He did, nevertheless, glean much of value from the tradition. Buber considered that the issues of religion that Hasidism deals with are relevant to modern man. It is true that modern Western man has faced a crisis regarding religion. Traditional Judeo-Christian religious institutions and practices seem to many to be highly removed from everyday reality. God seems so inaccessible and the religious life seems unattainable. So, in frustration and cynicism, man turns away from organized religion. Buber points out that Hasidism can end the discrepancy between religion and everyday life. This is done by transforming our earthly existence into a fully lived, human, sanctified life. By doing so, we will find our way to God. What we have to start with is in the here and now, not in the hereafter. Instead of retreating from the world, Buber tells us to enter the

¹ Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., jacket page.

² Ibid., p. 31.

³ Bernard Martin, ed., <u>Great Twentieth Jewish Philosophers</u> (London: The MacMillan Co., 1970), p. 243.

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world, "for man cannot love God in truth without loving the world." He explains that

> the world is an irradiation of God, but as it is endowed with an independence of existence and striving, it is apt, always, and everywhere, to form a crust around itself. Thus, a divine spark is enclosed by an isolating shell. Only man can liberate it and re-join it with the Origin: by holding holy converse with the thing and using it in a holy manner, that is, so that his intention in doing so remains directed towards God's transcendence. Thus, the divine immanence emerges from the exile of the 'shells.'²

It is important to know that Hasidism taught that in everything and everyone there was a 'spark' of the Divine needed to be liberated. Buber interpreted this as meaning that everything in the world is potentially sacred and all that is needed to sanctify things is human energy directed in an I-Thou fashion.³

The first step to finding God is to begin with the human situation. Buber is very specific on this point: he places the responsibility squarely on the <u>individual</u>. Buber is always concerned with the concrete, immediate predicament that the individual must face. Starting with oneself is very difficult. To be an authentic, autonomous, free agent is not an easy task. To think and feel for oneself is not easy. To know and understand oneself is not easy. There are many who simply drift along without really thinking about

¹ Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 10.

² Itid., p. 126.

³ Katz, op. cit., p. 195.

their lives very deeply. Once in a while, vague questions appear at the back of their minds and are momentarily disturbing but are quickly forgotten in the midst of the multitude of everyday activities. One perhaps goes through life wanting more but not knowing quite what and feeling listless and unable to cope.¹

The quintessentially religious questions—"What is it all about? Who is God? Is there a God? Is there life after death? What is the purpose of my life? Is there meaning to life? What is the vocation of man?"—have been with us since the earliest times. Madeleine L'Engle notes:

> This questioning of the meaning of being, and dying, and being, is behind the telling of stories around tribal fires at night; behind the drawing of animals of the walls of caves; the singing of melodies of love in spring, and of the death of green in autumn. It is part of the deepest longing of the human psyche, a recurrent ache in the hearts of all God's creatures.²

Such questions can be faced in three different ways. First, there are those who are not disturbed by these questions at all, or indeed are never fully aware of them; second, those who are disturbed by them but will not pursue them because they do not have the inclination or sufficient interest, and finally those who are disturbed by these questions and continue to search for illumination. Buber is fully aware of the difficulties facing those who continue the search. The first step is for the individual to confront his own need and to

¹ Field, op. cit., p. 19.

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² Madeleine L'Engle, <u>Walking on Water: Reflections on Faith</u> and Art (Illinois: Harold Shaw Publications, 1980), p. 13.

recognize the superficiality of his own condition. He points out that one must first find his way from the casual, accessory, external elements of his existence to his own true self. He must seek not the trivial ego of the egotistic individual, but the deeper self of the person living in relation to the world. This genuine self-awareness is contrary to everything that we are used to.¹ The true self which is more than the roles and functions one plays in everyday life is very easily deflected, avoided, or ignored. E.M. Forster warns us that "the armour of falsehood is subtly wrought out of darkness, and hides a man not only from others, but from his own soul."² Sometimes it takes a personal crisis to shock and jolt one into addressing the questions dealing with one's life and purpose. Buber describes this awareness of the true self as the beginning of the return of man to himself and to God:

> For all his autocratic bearing, he is inextricably entangled in unreality; and he becomes aware of this whenever he recollects his own condition. Therefore, he takes pains to use the best part of his mind to prevent or at least obscure such recollection. But if this recollection of one's falling off, of the deactualized and the actual I, were permitted to reach down to the roots that man calls despair and from self-destruction and rebirth grow, this would be the beginning of the return.³

* 1 Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 159.

² E.M. Forster, <u>A Room with a View</u> (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973), p. 181.

³ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 110.

Buber's view is that God wishes to be sought in man and in man's * experiences:

> God's grace consists in precisely this, that He wants to let Himself be won by man, that He places Himself, so to speak, into -man's hands. God wants to come to His world, but He wants to come to it through man. This is the mystery of our existence, the superhuman chance of mankind.¹

Buber refers to the story of the Rabbi of Kotzok who surprised a number of learned men by asking them where God dwells. They laughed at him: 'What a thing to ask! Is not the whole world full of His glory?' But then the rabbi answered his own question: 'God dwells wherever man lets Him in.²

Buber goes on to say that the great treasure which may be called the fulfillment of existence can only be found in one place—the place on which one stands. For it is here that we should try to make shine the light of the hidden divine light.³ The discovering of the divine and the unfolding of the divine in the present is, of course, not only a Buberian appeal. Jean-Pierre de Caussade, John Beevers, Dag Hammarskjöld, the Rabbi of Berditchev⁴ and Hildevert of Lavarin⁵ have also expressed the same notion, to name but a few. Jean-Pierre de Caussade, an eighteenth-century Jesuit priest, insists on the

- ³ Ibid., p. 175.
- ⁴ See Appendix B.
- ⁵ See L'Engle, op. cit., p. 87.

¹ Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 175.

² Ibid., p. 175.

"sacrament of the present moment."¹ Dag Hammarskjöld, past Secretary-General of the United Nations, writes: "In our age, the road to holiness necessarily passes through the world of action."² John Beevers, the translator of <u>Abandonment to Divine Providence</u>, comments that Caussade combines intense practicality with profound mysticism. Beevers maintains that this is nothing extraordinary as "true mystics are always much more practical than ordinary people. "They seek reality, we, the ephemeral. They want God as He is; we want God as we imagine Him to be."³

Note Caussade's insight:

You seek for God, beloved soul, and he is everywhere, everything speaks of him, everything offers him to you, he walks beside you, he surrounds you and is within you. All you suffer, all you do, all your inclinations are mysteries under which God gives himself to you while you are vainly straining after high-flown fancies. God will never come to dwell with you clothed in these imaginings.⁴

¹ Jean-Pierre de Caussade, <u>Abandonment to Divine Providence</u>, trans. John Beevers (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1966), p. 16.

² Dag Hammarskjöld, <u>Markings</u>, trans. W.H. Auden and Lelf Sjöberg. (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 23. Hammarskjöld first met Buber on May 1, 1958. He was very enthusiastic about Buber's work both in literary and peace activities and nominated Buber for the Nobel Peace Prize in June, 1959. He wanted to translate <u>I and Thou</u> into Swedish. Maurice Friedman tells us that: "When Dag Hammarskjöld's plane crashed in Northern Rhodesia, he had with him the manuscript of a translation that he was making of Martin Buber's classic work, <u>I and Thou</u>." (See Martin Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., p. xiii.) The I-Thou relationship with God is aptly expressed in a poem written by Dag Hammarskjöld on July 19, 1961, shortly before his death in August 1961. (See Dag Hammarskjöld, <u>Markings</u>, op. cit., pp. 176-177, 185.)

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³ Caussade, op. cit., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 96.

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Buber echoes Caussade:

God's speech to men penetrates what happens in the life of each one of us, and all that happens in the world around us, biographical and historical, and makes it for you and me into instruction, message and demand.¹

Transcendence, according to Buber, is to be found in our concrete experience—in the "hallowing of the everyday."² Ultimately, I-Thou relationships are important because they lead us and direct us to the eternal Thou-God. Buber says that, "every particular Thou is a glimpse through the eternal Thou."³ He writes "Love is the mystery of existence and points the way to divinity."⁴ Also, he states that "true love of God begins with the love of man."⁵ In the Scriptures it is summed up thus:

> If a man says, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen? And this commandment have we from him, That he who loveth God love his brother also.⁶

- ¹ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Smith, op. cit., p. 136.
- ² Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., jacket page.
- ³ Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>. trans. Smith, op. cit. p. 75.

⁴ Buber quoted in Audrey Hodes, <u>Martin Buber: An Intimate</u> <u>Portrait</u> (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 223.

- ⁵ Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., p. 224.
- ⁶ I John 4:20, 21.

And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul and with all thy might.¹

. . . thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.²

Buber further elucidates the notion of finding God through loving one's neighbour by writing that the true meaning of loving one's neighbour is not that it is a command from God which we are to fulfill, but that through loving one's neighbour we meet God. It is not just written: 'Love thy neighbour as thyself,' — fullstop, but it adds: 'Love thy neighbour as thyself, I am the Lord.' The grammatical construction of the original text shows quite clearly that the meaning is: You shall deal in a loving way with your 'neighbour', that is, with everyone you meet in life, and you shall deal with him as your equal. "The second part, however, adds: 'I am the Lord' — and here the Hasidic interpretation comes in: 'You think I am far away from you, but in your love for your neighbour you will find Me; not in his love for you but in yours for him.' He who loves brings God and the world together."³

A notable feature of Buber's philosophy is that his Utopian view is not dependent on other-worldliness or on a future time when perfection and bliss would reign supreme. Buber's Utopia is established in the "here and now." The concrete, everyday experiences of ordinary individuals is the basis for his vision of heaven on earth.

- ² Leviticus 19:18C.
- ³ Buber, <u>To Hallow This Life</u>, op. cit., p. 67-68.

¹ Deuteronomy 6:5.

The Kingdom of God is established here on earth through I-Thou authenticity and it is directly accessible to all of us.¹

Although the concept of divine epiphany in our everyday lives is not exclusive to Buber, nonetheless, Buber provides clarification of this concept <u>via</u> the prism of his expressive and sustained exposition of the I-Thou relationship. How he brings his perspective on human relationships to bear upon the educational context will be the subject of the next chapter.

¹ Buber's dialogical path is "grounded on the certainty that the meaning of existence is open and accessible in the actual lived concrete." See Martin Buber, <u>A Believing Humanism</u>, op. cit., p. 22.

Chapter III The Educational Context

i) Introduction

The second chapter of this thesis dealt with Buber's philosophical ideas on the individual, the individual and others, and the individual and God. This chapter will deal with Buber's educational perspective. I will also present a brief comparison of Buber with other educational thinkers.

Buber's educational perspective is informed by his general philosophy and in turn, his educational perspective further illuminates and clarifies his general ideas. The most recognizable link between the two is that the educational relationship is a potential forum for an I-Thou experience. Although subject matter is what ostensibly links student and teacher, upon analysis, the educational relationship transcends mere subject matter. Adir Cohen writes: ". . . education [is] no longer dedicated only to the transmission of information and the development of intellectual faculties but is intent on fostering true dialogue."1 What concerns Buber primarily is the emergence and actualization of man in the I-Thou. He writes: "The attitude of dialogue creates the sphere of authentic existence."² Buber's challenge to be authentic extends to the educational realm. It becomes clear that the essential business at hand is the nurturing of the human It follows then that Buber does not particularly focus on spirit.

1 Adir Cohen, <u>The Educational Philosophy of Martin Buber</u> (London: Associated University Presses, 1983), p. 13.

² Martin Buber, <u>The Way of Response: Martin Buber</u>, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1966), p. 9.

externals, 'how-to's', elaborate theoretical schemes, or specific pedagogical methodology in his educational writings. Cohen writes: "It is a fact that Buber founded" no educational movement, proposed no educational methodology, and expounded no theoretical precepts to which a teacher could resort for guidance in his work."¹ He is eminently concerned, however, with the attitudes, character and being of both the teacher and the student.

The goal of Buberian education is to foster the development, growth and integration of the autonomous and <u>authentic</u> individual that will enable him to engage in I-Thou relationships with others and God. Buber sees the educational relationship as another avenue whereby an individual may be brought into relationship with God as a function of increased awareness of the spiritual dimension in life.

In order to understand the nature of the educational relationship, it is necessary to understand how it is distinguished from other dialogical relationships. Buber notes that there are three main forms of dialogical relationships.²

The first type Buber names as an "abstract but mutual experience "of inclusion."³ An example of this type of relationship is one where the other individual is seen as a spiritual person with a responsible attitude to being and truth, even if the other individual has an

¹ Cohen, op. cit., p. 14. See also Brian V. Hill, <u>Education and</u> <u>the Endangered Individual</u> (New York: Teachers' College Press, 1973), p. 248.

² Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., pp. 98-101.
³ Ibid., p. 98.

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opposing view.¹ Buber names this relationship "abstract" since it is not a fully inclusive relationship—only one element of the other person is apprehended by the other. For instance, two people who do not know each other very well are engaged in a discussion. Even if they totally disagree with each other's point of view, but respect each other's right to a view and realize intellectual integrity, then this would be a mutual (although partial) experience of inclusion. Full inclusion [<u>umfassung</u>] would signify mutual, concrete and holistic comprehension and acceptance.

The second type of dialogical relationship is the educational relationship. It is based on a concrete but one-sided experience of inclusion.² The teacher is able to see both his point of view and also comprehend the student's perspective. However, the student, by definition, can only see his own point of view. Buber points out that however intense the mutuality of giving and talking is between the teacher and student, inclusion cannot be mutual. The teacher experiences the educating of the student, but the student cannot experience the education of the teacher. The teacher can see both sides of the situation, the student only one side. In the moment when the student is able to view and experience both sides, the purely educative relationship is ended or changed into friendship.³

¹ Schaeder, op. cit., p. 196.

² Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., p. 98. See also Berry, op. cit., pp. 39-68. The limitation on full mutuality is also present in other helping relationships. For example, between: physician/patient; psychiatrist, psychologist, psychotherapist, psychoanalyst/analysand/or client; priest/penigent.

³ Ibid., p. 100.

The third type of dialogical relationship is that of friendship. "This is based on concrete and mutual experience of inclusion. It is true inclusion of one another by human souls."¹ Buber writes that the educative relationship by its very nature may never unfold into complete mutuality. Donald Berry suggests that "attitudinal and social problems, and the possible requirement of evaluative judgement might account for the necessary and normative limitation of the mutuality which may exist between teacher and pupil."²

What also should be understood is Buber's conception of the teacher. Some salient characteristics of the Buberian teacher include self-awareness, sense of responsibility, presence, trustworthiness, integrity, courage and commitment.

The teacher must be aware of his vocational situation. He is in a special position whereby he can influence the lives of others in quite a direct manner. One has to be aware of the import and impact of one's professional contribution since teaching holds an enormous responsibility. Buber notes: "What is otherwise found only as grace, inlaid in the folds of life—becomes here a function and a law."³

The educational situation requires true presence on the part of the teacher, who must be attentive to and present for the student in front of him. The teacher's main task is in "being true to the being in which and before whom I am placed."⁴ When Buber speaks of being

- ¹ Ibid., p. 100.
- ² Berry, op. cit., p. 47.
- ³ Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., p. 100.
- ⁴ Buber quoted in Hodes, op. cit., p. 225.

present for the student, he does not only mean being present for a specified amount of dutiful time or being present as giving full attention to the student. What he means is far more pervasive and farreaching. He speaks of presence in terms of trustworthiness. The student ought to feel that the teacher is there for him as a person, even when the teacher is not <u>literally</u> present. The influence of the teacher should be such that the teacher's concern and support are internalized and serve as a guiding force in times of doubt, discouragement and despair. The outcome of the educational relationship should be that the ". . . steady potential presence of the one to the other is established and endures."¹

The integrity of the teacher is crucial because it is this quality that offers hope to the despairing student. We learn by example. To be able to see another human being struggling, dealing with and overcoming concrete issues of self-identity and responsibility is inspiring and serves as much needed encouragement to those who are just starting out on the paths of discovery and illumination. Buber emphasizes that

> trust, trust in the world, because this human being exists—that is the most inward achievement of the relation in the education. Because this human being exists, meaninglessness, however hard pressed you are by it, cannot be the real truth. Because this human being exists, in the darkness the light lies hidden, in fear, salvation, and in the callousness of one's fellow-men the great Love.²

¹ Maurice S. Friedman, <u>The Life of the Dialogue</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 176.

² Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., p. 98.



The Buberian teacher has to ask himself searching questions such as these: "What am I doing here?" "What are the principles upon which I base my pedagogical praxis?" "What sort of intellectual and spiritual awareness and understanding do I hope to convey?" "What are the best ways for me to do this?"

Teachers have a solemn stewardship to carry out for theirs is the responsibility to help lead the students entrusted to their care into knowledge, self-understanding, fulfilling relationships with others, and ultimately into the presence of God. God is revealed in man through the I-Thou relationship. It follows then, the I-Thou relationship between teacher and student is of crucial importance. In order to appreciate Buber's educational philosophy, it must be remembered that the development of the student as a spiritual beingthat is, a person with the ability to relate to the eternal Thou-is of central concern.

Although Buber realizes sadly that "the spirit of man is in a tragic situation today,"¹ he also reminds us that man is made in the image of God and that the educator, like all of us, stands in the <u>imitatio Dei</u>:

Man, the creature who forms and transforms the creation, cannot create. But he, each man, can expose himself and others to the Creative Spirit. And he can call upon the Creator to save and perfect His image.²

² Schaeder, op. cit., p.196.

¹ M. Levin, "The Sage Who Inspired Hammarskjöld," <u>New York Times</u> Magazine, December 3, 1961, p. 63.

11) The teacher-student relationship

The notion of authenticity is evident also in Buber's educational view, for the teacher-student relationship is an excellent forum for genuine exchange between individuals. If one sees Buber's stance, then one can see the traditional ways of viewing education and teacher-student relationships as needing serious revision and approach. For educational questions no longer solely focus on questions of curriculum, job-training, critical skills, and so on, but on the nature of what is being exchanged between one human being and another human being. Buber writes: "For the genuine educator does not merely consider individual functions of his pupil, as one intending to teach him only to know and be capable of certain definite things; but his concern is always the person as a whole, both in the actuality in which he lives before you and now in his possibilities, what he can become."¹

For Buber, education is an extension or another arena in life that the I-Thou attitude can be manifested. This is possible in spite of the limits on mutuality and full inclusion.² The educator ought to demonstrate by his life the quality of I-Thou; he ought to lead the student in such a way that the student will be able to be authentic.

The search for knowledge, meaning, and understanding should not be excluded from the Buberian conception of the teacher-student relationship. A man must be awake and be aware of the man in him that he does not know. For example, in Hermann Hesse's novel, <u>Narziss and</u>

¹ Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., p. 104.

² Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Smith, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

<u>Goldmund</u>, Narziss counsels the yet uncomprehending Goldmund, his favorite pupil:

. . . at times your whole life is a dream, I call that man awake who, with conscious knowledge and understanding, can perceive the deep, unreasoning powersain his soul, his whole innermost strength, desire, and weakness, and knows how to reckon with himself.

Buber believes the purpose of education is to enable the student to live humanly in the world, that is, to help the student to be authentic with himself, others and God and to give him such tools so that he can deal with life responsibly on his own terms and in his own autonomous way and not by simply accepting the standards and values set by others.

> Buber makes it particularly clear that the tasks of the educator is to bring the individual face to face with God though making him responsible for himself rather than dependent for his decisions upon any organic or collective unity.²

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² Maurice S. Friedman, "Martin Buber's Philosophy of Education", Educational Theory. Vol. 6, No. 2, April 1956, p. 101.

¹ Hermann Hesse, <u>Narziss and Goldmund</u>, trans. Geoffrey Dunlop (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1959), p. 45. In an address celebrating Herman Nesse's eightieth birthday, Buber notes that the relationship between Narziss and Goldmund is a 'grandly conceived dialogical relationship. Within both the authenticity of the spirit dwells; both together are spirit' (see Buber, <u>A Believing Humanism</u>, trans. Maurice S. Friedman, op. cit., p. 74). Both Buber and Hesse admired each others' work. Hermann Hesse nominated Buber for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1949 and again in 1959. Hesse declared: 'He [Buber] has enriched world literature with a genuine treasure as has no other living authori-the <u>Tales of the Hasidism</u>.' (See Friedman, <u>Martin</u> Buber's Life and Work: The Later Years, 1945-1965., op. cit., p. 63.)

In my view, this is particularly relevant today in the light of the multicultural <u>milieu</u> with all its attendant value systems that we experience in this "global village."

Buber is always concerned with equipping students with tools to discern the truth. In his view, learning how to discern the truth is an important part of the educative process. The teacher should guide the pupil toward reality and realization. This presupposes that the teacher have a sense of integrity and an unflinching commitment to truth. Only this type of teacher is truly qualified to teach. Buber writes:

> That man alone is qualified to teach, who knows how to distinguish between appearance and reality, between seeming realization and genuine realization, who rejects appearance and chooses and grasps reality.¹

The teacher must treat each child as a Thou. Each child is unique. The teacher accepts the student who is there before him. It is not a matter of personal choice or appeal.² The teacher must accept not only the student in the here and now but also accept him in his potentiality:

The teacher will awaken in the pupil the need to communicate of himself and the capacity thereto and in this way bring him to greater clarity of existence.³

¹ Buber, <u>Pointing the Way</u>, op. cit., p. 105.

² Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>. op. cit., pp. 94-95.

³ Sydney and Beatrice Rome, op. cit., p. 68.

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The teacher should educate, that is, "lead out" the potential ability for understanding that is in the pupil. Buber does not advocate just leaving the pupil to his own creative devices. If there is no human interaction, then the creative process is simply arid and has no meaning. The pupil should not live in a creative vacuum. This paves the way to a greater ioneliness for the pupil. At the same time, Buber does not approve of the other extreme, namely, the old, authoritarian method where pupils were passive recipients of knowledge. Instead, he focusses on the reciprocal communication between pupil and teacher, arguing that "at the opposite pole from compulsion there stands not freedom but communion."²

The teaching experience is dynamic. The teacher educates himself as well and discovers his own limits. The <u>I-Thou</u> relationship does not mean there will always be agreement. Through conflict and disagreement, constructive criticism and guidance, the teacher and student learn from each other. They both learn to think more clearly and more effectively.³

Buber places emphasis on education as dialogue. Thus, it behooves the teacher to ensure an amenable milieu which fosters understanding and appreciation for authentic dialogue. Buber's primary concern is with the nature and quality of relationships between individuals in the personal and educational setting. Buber notes that

² Buber, <u>Between Man and Man</u>, op. cit., p. 91.

³ Ibid., p. 107-108. See also Clark E. Moustakas, "Confrontation and Encounter," <u>Journal of Existential Psychiatry</u>, Vol. 2, No. 5-9, 1961-1962, pp. 263-290.

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¹ Buber, <u>A Believing Humanism</u>, op. cit., p. 98.

the authentic teacher "also learns himself through teaching thus: he learns ever anew to know concretely the becoming of the human creature that takes place in experiences, he learns what no man ever learns completely, the particular, the individual, the unique."¹

If the teacher is not carrying on a true dialogue with the pupil, he is not educating. If the relationship becomes a debating situation, the whole thing is simply an intellectual game and the teacher is confirming his self-esteem at the pupil's expense.

Again, if the teacher is simply giving out information, he is carrying on a technical conversation and not a true dialogue.² Also, if the teacher is not genuinely responding to his pupil, the relationship also becomes an <u>I-It</u> one, and there is present only a monologue on the teacher's part.³

Buber expresses very strong sentiments on propaganda and indoctrination. He feels strongly because those who manipulate with propaganda have no concern for the individual. An indoctrinator does not respect the <u>Thou</u> of the student because he offers the student no freedom of choice to decide on his own. There are two primary ways to influence the minds and lives of others. One is through propaganda. The other is through education.⁴ Buber says that education means teaching people to think for themselves and to be criticallyreflective. Education means teaching people to see the reality around

- 2 Ibid., p. xv.
- ³ Ibid., p. xv.
- 4 Ibid., p. 378.

¹ Nash, op. cit., p. 386.

them and to understand it for themselves. Propaganda is diametrically opposed to this. It tells people what and how to think. The message is "Think as we want you to think!" It wants to control people's perception of reality. Propaganda compels one to accept dogmas without question or any doubt at all.¹

Furthermore, the indoctrinator does not see the whole being of the other; he does not view the student as a Thou but as an It. Various individual qualities are important only insofar as they can be exploited for the indoctinator's own purposes. Unlike the indoctrinator, ". . to dictate, dominate or impose is not the task of the true educator."²

Buber stresses clarification of concepts because they will lead to a better discernment of what is true and what is not. He stresses that educators should inculcate their students with a sense of responsibility with regard to concepts and speech.³

Man has the remarkable capacity to teach his fellow man. If the teacher provides a meaningful educational environment and engages in meaningful learning experiences with the student, then not only content and skills are transmitted, but also the sense of sharing an authentic relationship.⁴ What is also fostered is the wish to emulate the pedagogical I-Thou relationship and the desire to establish other

¹ Hodes, op. cit., p. 117.

² Hellerich, op. cit., p. 153.

³ Friedman, "Martin Buber's Philosophy of Education", op. cit., p. 109.

⁴ Hill, op. cit., p. 248.

I-Thou relationships. The student is thus heartened, through the teacher's demonstration, to seek out meaning-making activities and meaningful relationships for himself. It is through others affirming us that we learn to affirm others in return. Indeed, it is by others demonstrating love to us, that we learn how to love. Thus, the significance of the teacher as exemplar cannot be stressed enough. Buber tells us that:

Everything depends on the teacher as a man, as a person. He educates from himself, from his virtues and his faults, through personal examples and according to circumstances and conditions. His task is to realize the truth in his personality and to convey this realization to the pupils.¹

In response to critics who would argue that there are too few first-rate teachers qualified to teach in an <u>I-Thou</u> mode, Buber would reply that authenticity in education is needed then that much more. The first step is to educate the educators. He writes:

. . . education must change; and that means above all: the educator must change. We must begin with the education of the educator. 2

In the 1960s, Erich Fromm³ warned:

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Today the crucial danger in an automatized, gadget-ridden consumer culture is that we are becoming less and less alive, and more

1 Buber quoted in Hodes, op. cit., p. 127.

² Sydney and Beatrice Rome, op. cit., p. 66.

³ For a brief comparison of Fromm and Buber, see Brink and Janakes, op. cit., pp. 292, 297.

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and more alienated from each other and from our very selves.¹

Bruno Bettleheim echoed Fromm's warning:

. . . modern man requires a more highly developed emotional sensitivity so as not to succumb to temptations inherent in a machine age. The more mechanized and fragmented the world around us, the more we must. develop the humanity of human relations. The more we live in a mass society, the better we must know how to have intimate relations.²

How much more immediate and acute is the death of the spirit in our present time?

As the age of technocracy threatens to alienate already solitary modern man even more, and as it threatens to cut him off further from his fellowman, it is my view that the message Buber brings of authenticity and genuine response has never been more timely or 'more apt.

What kind of a person does Buber's teacher have to be? What does he have to do? He does not have to be perfect, or even nearperfect, but he has to be wholeheartedly <u>there</u> for the student. Buber states:

> The good teacher educates by his speech and by his silence, in the hours of teaching, and in the recesses, in casual conversation, through his mere existence, only he must be a really existing man and

¹ H. Hart, ed., <u>Summerhill: For and Against</u> (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1970), p. 263.

² Bruno Bettleheim, <u>The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age</u> (New York: The Hearst Corporation, 1960), p. 102.

he must be really present to his pupils; he educates through contact.¹

For the teacher to be truly <u>present</u> for the student requires courage. Thus Buber challenges:

> . . . Teachers you must dare. Everything in life is based on daring. For a man to father children in these times is daring. For a man to believe in God today—that is daring. All the teacher must do is to point the direction. Then it is up to the pupil himself.²

How many of us have chosen and succeeded in our particular field of endeavour because of some encouraging word from our favorite teacher, or because of a sense that the teacher really believed in <u>us</u>, in our dreams, our hopes, and our aspirations? How many great men and women become great because at one point in their lives they were inspired by the profound example of their teachers?

Buber calls us, as educators and as human beings, to genuine response, genuine commitment and genuine caring in our profession. When he says, "I consider the profession of teaching the most important in human society,"³ I am certain he means 'profession' in both senses of the word. To be an educator is not only a calling but it is also a

¹ Buber, <u>A Believing Humanism</u>, op. cit., p. 102.

² Buber quoted in Hodes, op. cit., p. 124.

³ Ibid., p. 124.

statement of faith. And a statement of faith is really a celebration of the created and the Creator.1

1 Dylan Thomas, "Notes on the Art of Poetry," <u>Twentieth Century</u> <u>Poetry and Poetics</u>, Ed. Gary Geddes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 665.

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iii) A comparison of Buber with other educational thinkers

Whilst it is not within the scope of this thesis to compare Buber with other educational thinkers extensively, there are some interesting similarities and differences that can be noted and could serve for fruitful further discussion and investigation. Educational thinkers that I will touch on briefly in reference to Buber are Lawrence Kohlberg, Paulo Freire, Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow. Each $C_{\rm o}$ of these authors has had a strong influence on educational theorists and has emphasized the importance of interpersonal relationships in teaching and learning. Consideration of their positions, even if only very briefly, can serve as a foil for Buber and provide an opportunity to clarify his work further.

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The developmental approach as presented by Lawrence Kohlberg is antithetical to Buber. Buber's approach does not employ the very structured, sequential, and invariant nomothetic stage theory principles. Buber's approach is idiographic.

The question arises whether in fact Kohlberg's moral Stage 6--postconventional justice reasoning involving commitment to universal¹

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¹ There is a question of whether universality as Kohlberg defines it—a principle that can be applied everywhere—is so general and devoid of holistic and intimate comprehension of the nuances, ambiguities and exigencies of human moral situations as to be of any real value or significance. [See G. Moran. <u>Interplay: A Theory of</u> <u>Religion and Education</u>. (Minnesota: St. Mary's Press, 1981), p. 124.]

ethical principles of conscience or his hypothetical religious Stage 7¹ of selfless love share a certain kinship with the I-Thou experience.

The developmentalists claim that reaching Stage 6 and Stage 7 requires the achievement of the preceding cognitive² and moral stages.

. . . a true I-Thou is not possible where individuals fail to acknowledge such principles [the importance of justice, reciprocity, equality, and basic human dignity]. Therefore, the first five stages are variations of the I-It, and individuals who fail to develop cognitively and advance to Stage 6 do not enter the I-Thou.³

According to my understanding of Buber's work, the I-Thou relationship is not necessarily predicated on acquisition of certain normative or prescriptive developmental cognitive or moral stages. I do not think that Buber would choose to view authenticity in reference to the individual's developmental stage. Stages in the idiosyncratic and ineffable I-Thou experience would be considered anathemathetic. For example, the fact that the I-Thou relationship can exist between a young child and an adult as cited previously in the experience of

¹ Lawrence Kohlberg, <u>The Philosophy of Moral Development</u> (San Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981), pp. 206, 308, 341, 347, 351. See also Kohlberg, Lawrence, Levine, Charles, and Hewer, Alexandra. <u>Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to</u> Critics. (New York: Karger Publishers, 1983), pp. 41-48.

² Kohlberg's theory is based on Piaget's approach to cognitive development. Moral development presupposes cognitive development according to Kohlberg.

³ Brink and Janakes, op. cit., p. 296. It should be noted that Kohlberg reduced the number of stages to five by making Stage 6 an advanced Stage 5 form due to lack of empirical validation. Consequently, the existence of Stage 7 is also in doubt. [See John Martin Rich, and Joseph L. Devitis. <u>Theories of Moral Development</u> (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1985), p. 89.]

Gordon Haim¹ illustrates that full cognitive and moral development are In fact, I believe Buber would argue not imperative prerequisites. that true moral understanding and maturity arises from experiencing and valuing the I-Thou mode of relating and not solely from development of reasoning about hypothetical moral dilemmas, as Kohlberg and other developmentalists claim. The I-Thou may serve as a corrective for the absence of ethical motivation² behind the Kohlbergian moral development The question "Why be moral?" is not addressed by Kohlberg's scheme. As I interpret Buber, he would claim that Kohlberg places too theory. much importance on reasoning 3 to the exclusion of other considerations and does not take into account religious notions such as grace⁴ and mystery⁵ in his moral scheme. There are some situations and events in human life that are not covered by cognitive and moral developmental theories⁶. Kohlberg and Buber hold educational perspectives that differ widely from each other.

¹ See pp. 48-50 of this thesis.

² R.S. Peters. <u>Psychology and Ethical Development</u>. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1974), pp. 314, 327, 330.

³ R. Neibuhr. <u>The Nature and Destiny of Man</u>. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 164.

4 Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, trans. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 58.

⁵ Berry, op. cit., p. 36.

6 Anthony Falikowski, "Kohlberg's Moral Development Program: Its Limitations and Exclusiveness." <u>Alberta Journal of Educational</u> <u>Research</u>, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, (March 1982), pp. 78, 82, 85, 88. Falikowski refers to the intrapersonal, private and psychological aspects of morality. See also Edmund V. Sullivan. <u>Kohlberg's</u> <u>Structuralism: A Critical Appraisal</u> (Toronto, Ontario Institute of Studies in Education, 1977).

Buber is more closely aligned with Paulo Freire who also speaks of dialogue in concrete situations and not in pre-defined abstractions. They agree that dialogue is an expression of love. Freire writes:

> If I do not love the world—if I do not love life—if I do not love men—I cannot enter into dialogue.¹

Freire, like Buber, believes that genuine dialogue can only be carried out by persons who respect and consider each other as Subjects-as Thous. Freire writes in language very similar to Buber:

> How can I dialogue if I regard myself as a case apart from other men-mere 'its'--in whom I cannot recognize other 'I's'? How can I dialogue if I consider myself a member of the in-group of 'pure' men, the owners of truth and knowledge, for whom all non-members are 'those people' or 'the great unwashed'?²

True dialogue requires love, humility, boldness, courage, faith, trust, hope and critical thinking says Freire. He goes on to say "without dialogue there is no communication and without communication there can be no true education."³

Freire and Buber agree on many elements of dialogue although Freire sees dialogue as the tool for <u>social</u> action, transformation, and liberation and emphasizes dialogue amongst groups or communities whereas Buber emphasizes dialogue between persons and regards it as an intrinsically valuable experience with change primarily occurring in

¹ Paulo Freire, <u>Pedagogy of the Oppressed</u>, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum Publishing Co., 1981), p. 78.

² Ibid., p. 78.

³ Ibid., p. 81.

the <u>individuals</u> involved and consequently, society. Nonetheless, Freire and Buber provide much common ground for a radical critique of traditional education as we know it.

Carl Rogers certainly concurs with Buber and Freire on the importance of the educational relationship. He states that "the facilitation of significant learning rests on certain attitudinal qualities which exist in the <u>personal</u> relationship between the facilitator [teacher] and the learner."¹ Rogers names the qualities which facilitate learning as genuineness, acceptance, understanding and co-operation. He agrees with Buber that education is a mutual venture. Rogers like Buber maintains that the teacher is most effective when he is in dialogue with the student—that is,.". . . coming into direct, personal encounter with the learner, meeting him on a person-to-person basis."²

Although Rogers' view of the educational relationship is not unlike Buber's, it somehow lacks the depth and profundity of Buber's viewpoint. Rogers' prescription for good pedagogical praxis appears fairly simple to achieve in contrast to Buber's recognition of the immense struggle required to lead an authentic and thereby truly religious life, tremendous human responsibility, and the significant

² Ibid., p. 106.

¹ Carl Rogers. <u>Freedom to Learn</u>. (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969), p. 106. [For a brief comparison of Buber and Rogers, see Brink and Janakes, op. cit., p. 293. Rogers also shares another common interest with Buber — the area of psychotherapy. See "Dialogue Between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers" in Buber, <u>The Knowledge of Man</u>, op. cit., pp. 166-184 and Carl Rogers, <u>Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice</u>, <u>Implications and Therapy</u> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), pp. 20-55.]

need to foster the student's awareness and relationship to God. In effect, Rogers' view is Buber's view lacking the spiritual and religious dimension. The qualities that Rogers requires of the facilitator are those which he believes create an atmosphere of <u>psychological</u> security, openness and trust. This secularized version of Buber's approach nullifies the basic premise on which the I-Thou experience stands. The goal of Buberian education is that of bringing the student to a closer understanding of himself, others, and ultimately, God. The authentic relationship in education arises from a belief in the sanctity of the human individual and not seen merely as a means to facilitate and expedite learning.

Abraham Maslow also emphasizes along with Buber the value of the individual. He takes into account the uniqueness of the person and maintains with Buber that the idiographic, non-nomothetic approach is the best approach to knowing and understanding others.¹ Maslow also agrees with Buber on the importance of viewing the individual holistically and on the importance of auspicious social, political and economic milieux for the development of the individual.²

Maslow employs Buber's I-Thou and I-It in differentiating between two types of knowledge: "spectator knowledge" or "I-It

¹ Abraham Maslow. <u>The Psychology of Science</u>. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), pp. 8, 11.

² Brink and Janakes, op. cit., p. 297. It is interesting to note that Maslow cites Buber as a case example to illustrate his theory of self-actualization. [See Abraham Maslow. <u>Motivation and Personality</u>. Second Edition. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), p. 152.]

knowledge" and " experential/interpersonal knowledge" or "I-Thou knowledge".¹

In effect what I am implying is that honest knowing of oneself is logically and psychologically prior to knowing the extrapsychic world. Experential knowledge [I-Thou knowledge] is prior to spectator knowledge."²

As with Rogers, Maslow does not include the specifically religious dimension in his approach. However, Maslow does appear to have a spiritual sensibility and appreciation that Rogers does not emphasize, Although Maslow does not speak of a personal God as Buber does, he emphasizes an attitude of reverence and love for human life and nature. He speaks of the "is-ness", essence, and meaning of life.³ He cites the beauty and meaning of a robin, a bluejay⁴, a leaf, a fugue, a sunset, a flower, a person.⁵ He speaks of the value of contemplation, mystery, wonder, and transcendence.⁶ He calls us to experience, enjoy, savour, marvel at, and love life. In this way, Maslow is very close to Buber who entreats us to <u>be</u> in this world.

¹ Maslow, <u>The Psychology of Science</u>, op. cit., pp. 45-64, 102-118.

² Ibid., p. 48. For further discussion on the relationship between the self and knowledge see Michael Polanyi. <u>Personal Knowledge:</u> <u>Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy</u>. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

- ³ Ibid., p. 109.
- 4 Ibid., p. 82.

⁵ Ibid., p. 89. This is similar to Buber's emphasis on I-Thou relatedness with nature, animals, and art.

6 Ibid., p. 100.

Rogers, Maslow and Buber may be seen as representing gradations of complexity. Rogers represents the psychological dimension. Maslow represents the psychological (Rogers) and the spiritual dimensions. Finally, Buber represents the psychological (Rogers), spiritual (Maslow) and specifically religious dimensions since he speaks of a personal Deity.

Chapter IV. Conclusion

As the present study makes evident, the experiential nature of Buber's famous concept of the I-Thou relationship does not lend itself easily to purely intellectual discussion nor can it be replaced by sterile catch-phrases. Words can help us to somewhat pin down the I-Thou, but they certainly cannot be exchanged for the I-Thou experience. Thus, the t-Thou transcends whatever artificial classification one may wish to place upon it. Buber himself avoids producing a system of social relationships or an objectification of such relationships. Rather, as this thesis has shown, he chooses to illustrate the I-Thou experience by his poetic style. Buber has a sentient, poetic vision which assumes a Judeo-Christian ethic.

As Buber does not believe in the fragmentation of life, he advocates authenticity in the educational forum. I interpret the Buberian ideal of the authentic teacher as encompassing these roles: astute diagnostician, heuristic guide, and fellow explorer. The I-Thou experience in education is not merely functional (i.e., to facilitate teaching and learning); it is also a mutual search for knowledge and truth and ultimately, the getting of wisdom.

This type of educational relationship provides an experience of the I-Thou mode which exemplifies a certain manner and attitude towards others that bear emulation. The I-Thou relationship is particularly crucial to the Bubèrian sensibility that perceives authentic relationships reflecting <u>agapé</u>, that is, the love of God. As Paul Pfuetze notes:

All genuine I-Thog relations are characterized by love. Not Eros, not subjective feeling. Buber has in mind an ethical principle, even a kind of ontological principle, akin to what the Bible calls <u>agapé¹</u>... Love in the I-Thou is not unlike St. Paul's <u>agapé.</u>²

Buber states that: "Love is an existence which lies in a kingdom larger than the kingdom of individual It is in truth, the Bond of Creation, that is, it is in God."³ Buber sees our participation in authentic relationship as our contribution to the epiphany of God in the here and the now.

There are different ways of interpreting our existence and our experience. I believe that the Buberian sensibility is valid, useful, and enriching both on an educational and a personal level. This sensibility engenders the <u>épanouissement</u>—the development and growth of the human spirit. In the latter quarter of the twentieth century, Western civilization exists in a curious paradox. There has never been such thorough subjugation of man's environment thanks to modern technology. We have never had such quantity of information nor such instantaneous access to that information thanks to state-of-the-art computer and satellite wizardry. Yet, these data and technical acquisitions have not brought us any closer to personal understanding and inner meaning.

¹ Pfuetze, op. cit., p. 155.

² Ibid., p. 219.

³ Martin Buber quoted by Willard Moonan in <u>Martin Buber and his</u> <u>Critics: An Annotated Bibliography of his Writings in English through</u> <u>1978</u> (New York: Garland Publishers, 1981), p. 1.

In a quotation attributed to Paracelsus we are told about true understanding:

He who understands nothing, loves nothing. He who can do nothing, understands nothing. He who understands nothing is worthless. But he who understands also loves, notices, and sees. The more knowledge is inherent in a thing, the greater the love.

I believe it is this knowing which enables us to love even more and more fully. For this search for knowledge and meaning is an act of affirmation in itself; in religious terms, it would be called an act of faith. We confirm each other in the I-Thou. We try to make sense of our environment and existence, of our human condition. The search for self is also a creative act--we seek for order in the chaos, meaning in the mystery, illumination in the darkness. We both discover and create meaning for ourselves. This is the touchstone of our encounter with each Thou and with our God. Meaning is established when we see the relationship <u>between</u> things; what Buber terms '<u>dazwischen</u>' (there-in-between).¹ Saint Exupéry underscores this notion when he writes:

> Man's spirit is not concerned with objects; that is the business of our analytical faculties. Man's spirit is concerned with the significance that relates objects to one another. With their totality, which only the piercing eye of the spirit can perceive.²

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¹ Buber, <u>The Knowledge of Man</u>, op. cit., p. 12.

² Saint Exupéry, <u>Flight to Arras</u>, op. cit., p. 15.

Buber maintains that man has the power to relate--to ascribe significance to his life:

Man's power to relate—that power which alone can enable man to live in the spirit. . . Spirit in its human manifestation is man's response to his Thou. Man speaks in many tongues—tongues of language, of art, of action—but the spirit is one. . . 1

What then, is the significance of Buber's thought to contemporary man? In our complex, pluralistic world, does Buber's thinking apply to the experience of contemporary man? Can there be a universal application of Buber's thought? There is a universal quality to Buber's I-Thou as the search for meaning and value in interpersonal relationships is common to humanity. This is particularly relevant and important in the light of increasing despair over finding any shared values in a world that becomes exponentially complex and fraught with uncertainty as numerous and diverse cultures come into conflict. Buber's I-Thou realization in this age rests on the ability to transcend cultural barriers, to look beyond ethnic differences and thus, to discover the essential mutuality of individuals--the universal, common truths that bind us together as part of the human family. In this era, where effects of technology are ubiquitous, men and women become depersonalized, replaceable, and mechanized in the labour force and in the marketplace, and in a time when dealing with human beings "embraces the technological principle of the

I Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, op. cit., p. 89.

interchangeability of parts and raises it to high art,"¹ Buber's view of man contrasts sharply. He believes that each one of us is unique and that we have a unique contribution to make to the world:

> Each man has an infinite sphere of responsibility, responsibility before the infinite. He moves, he talks, he looks, and each of his movements, each of his words, each of his glances causes waves to surge in the happening of the world: he cannot know how strong and how farreaching. Each man with all his being and doing determines the fate of the world in a measure unknowable to him and all others; for the causality which we can perceive is indeed only a tiny segment of the inconceivable manifold, invisible working of the all upon all.²

When Buber speaks of individual responsibility, he speaks of <u>quantum satis</u>. This means the possible amount of what one can do in a particular hour and in a particular situation.³ That is, if one does not deal with a problem or a person to the utmost of his present ability, he has shirked his responsibility as a human being. He has failed to meet "what the moment demands."⁴ Buber is aware that we do not live in a vacuum. We live in a world with concrete reference points: points of history, culture, traditions, and legitimate societal obligations and expectations. Buber asks us to fulfill our <u>quantum</u>

¹ Van Cleve Morris, <u>Existentialism in Education</u> (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), p. 64.

- ² Buber, <u>Hasidism and Modern Man</u>, op. cit., p. 68.
- ³ Nash, op. cit., p. 365.
- ⁴ See Hodes, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

<u>satis</u>. He emphasizes that true guilt¹ lies in not fully responding to another's needs and concerns when it is within your power to do so. Buber says that real guilt consists of remaining with oneself. If the being now placed before one is not met with the whole of one's life, then one is guilty. When we are guilty, it is not because we have failed to realize our potentialities which we cannot know in the abstract, but because we have failed to bring the available resources we have at the time. We have failed to be truly present.²

What Buber is calling for is a commitment; not a commitment to an externally imposed moral or religious code, but a commitment to life and a commitment to others and one's self. In the final analysis, each individual knows himself best and he is faced with his own perceptions and judgement in every decision he makes and every situation he faces. He knows intimately what the <u>quantum satis</u> is for himself. If he does not live up to his <u>quantum satis</u>, he has failed precisely because it was in his power to do otherwise.

Buber's message of authenticity in the personal and educational realms is not only relevant, but <u>vital</u> in confronting our contemporary existential predicament. One can hope that man will not withhold himself and will meet Buber's challenge to <u>become</u> the authentic person

² Nash, op. cit., p. 374.

¹ See Martin Buber, "Guilt and Guilt Feelings," <u>Psychiatry</u>, Vol. 20, 1957, pp. 114-129. See also Herbert Fingarette, "Real Guilt and Neurotic Guilt," <u>Journal of Existential Psychiatry</u>, Vol. 3, Nos. 9-12, 1962-1963, pp. 143-158.

that he is-in spite of the many hindrances and obstacles he will encounter.¹

The message of Buber may not be well received in our contemporary world. Indeed, it may be violently resisted, denied or ignored. We live in a time when whatever is not empirically verifiable or reducible to scientific terms is often looked upon with suspicion, incomprehensibility, and even contempt. Nonetheless, the dialogical and spiritual path Buber and others attest to is desperately needed in both individual lives and in the lives of communities. Indeed, our spinning, complex, global, living village requires what Robert Frost calls a "stay against confusion"² in order to overcome our violent and masochistic proclivity to self-annihilation and in order to survive as a species. Buber bids us, indeed, charges us to pursue the dialogical gath in order to discover and affirm ourselves, others, and God.

¹ Hermann Hesse fashions the challenge thus:

Each phenomenon on the earth is an allegory, and each allegory is an open gate through which the soul, if it is ready can pass into the interior of the world where you and I and day and night are all one. In the course of his life, every human being comes upon that open gate, here or there along the way; everyone is sometimes assailed by the thought that everything visible is an allegory and that behind the allegory live spirit and eternal life. Few, to be sure, pass through the gate and give up the beautiful illusion for the surmised reality of what lies within.

[Hermann Hesse, <u>Strange News from Another Star</u> (England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972), p. 107.]

² Robert Frost, <u>Selected Prose of Robert Frost</u>. ed. Hyde Cox and Edward Connery Lathem (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1946), p. 18.

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Authenticity in both education and in life will serve us well in terms of finding inspiring, meaningful and ultimately, redemptive answers to the quintessential question asked since the inception of mankind: What does it mean to be truly human?

In 1925, Buber spoke prophetically at the Third International Educational Conference held in Heidelberg, Germany. His message holds truth even more poignantly now in our present, troubled time than it did in 1925:

> Future history is not inscribed already by the pen of a casual law on a scroll which merely awaits unrolling. Its characters are stamped by the unforeseeable decisions of future generations. The part to be played in this by everyone alive today, by every adolescent and child, is immeasurable, and immeasurable is our part if we are educators. The deeds of the generations now approaching can illuminate the grey face of the human world or plunge it in darkness.¹

¹ Buber quoted in: Charlie May Simon, <u>Martin Buber: Wisdom in Our</u> <u>Time</u> (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1969), p. 115.

Appendix A

On the question of translating "Ich und Du" to "I and Thou"

I and Thou was first published in German in 1923. In the original translation of Ich und Du by Ronald Gregor Smith, "Du" was translated as "Thou." The problem lies in the fact that there is not the same kind of distinction in English as there is in German when itcomes to second person pronouns. "Du" is an intimate term used between people who know, esteem, and love each other. It is analogous to "tu" in French. Kaufmann's contention was that the term "Thou" belied "the meaning that Buber intended. [Kaufmann completed a second translation of Ich und Du-Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New As "Thou" has formal York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970.] connotations of a God who is distant and to be fearfully revered, it is not suitable to the immediacy and personal significance of a trusting. close relationship with either a human "You" or the eternal "You." (Also etymologically, it is interesting to note that "Thou" is the proper informal second person pronoun and that "You" is actually the formal second person pronoun. Through misuse, "You" was applied universally, except when "Thou" was used in formal situations, and thus the understanding of the role of these two pronouns was changed.) Nonetheless, I will continue to use the term "I-Thou" as it has already been established and it will be understood as having been qualified.

I concur with Donald Berry's careful assessment of the use of I-Thou. He explains:

> I also use I-Thou (Smith) as the preferred translation for 'Ich-Du' rather than 'I-You' (Kaufmann): . . . Neither term is

without its problematic features as a way of rendering in contemporary English the subtleties of Buber's thought. Kaufmann regards 'thou' as inappropriate because it sounds 'religious' or 'theological' and its use in this context would mislead the reader into supposing that Buber's book is basically a work in religion or theology, conventionally understood. Kaufmann regards 'thou' as both the sign and the road by means of which an alien Protestant piety has been imported into the thoroughly Jewish world of Ich und Du (Walter Kaufmann, "Prologue to Martin Buber's I and Thou," pp. 14-15, 20-21, 38). There is no gainsaying the fact that 'you' is the better term with respect to its ability to suggest ordinariness. That is not unimportant, since Buber is interested in dealing with the ordinary, quotidian world, not the religious or sacred as opposed to the secular or profane. 'Thou' is heard by some as giving the book an overtly religious tone or a mystical dimension. To that extent, 'you' is preferable, and its use could well help to demystify and to detheologize the impression which the use of 'thou' in the book might convey. On the other hand, 'you' is also used in contemporary English in two ways that - complicate and which call into question its appropriateness as a vehicle for Buber's intention.

1) 'You' is both nominative and objective in form. 'Thou' is only used in the nominative ('thee' is the objective form), and hence is a better metaphor for the nonobjectifying attitude of mutuality. 'Thou' also is not infrequently used to express the kind of intimacy Buber seems to have in mind, an intimacy which Kaufmann feels is expressed only in 'you.'

2) In addition, 'you' is both singular and plural in usage. 'Thou ' is inescapably singular, and hence is more suitable for the word of relation which one can only speak to one other. Few commentators on Buber's work, even those who find Kaufmann's translation corrective in several places, invigorating, and fresh, follow him in his substitution of 'you' for 'thou.' Each translation has its

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inadequacies, but 'I-Thou' seems, on balance, to be less misleading.¹

In his discussion of Kaufmann's translation, Maurice Friedman points to an additional consideration that counts against the use of 'You' for 'Du', mamely the "already established usage of 33 years [by 1970; 47 by 1984 (50 years by 1987)] and a whole literature in which 'I-Thou' is employed. (Martin Buber's Life and Work: The Early Years 1878-1923 (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1981), p. 429).²

1. Berry, op cit., pp. xii-xiii.

² Ibid., p. 103.

<u>Appendix B</u>

Two Examples of Buber's Poetic Writing

Buber inscribed this poem in the German copy of the <u>Tales of the</u> <u>Hasidim</u> that he gave his wife, Paula.

I.

WEIST DU ES NOCH . . . ?

Weißt du es noch . . .? Weißt du es noch, wie wir in jungen Jahren Mitsammen sind auf diesem Meer gefahren? Gesichte kamen, groß und wunderlich, Wir schauten miteinander, du und ich. Wie fügte sich im Herzen Bild zu Bildern! Wie stieg ein gegenseitig reges Schildern Draus auf und lebte zwischen dir und mir! Wir waren dor und waren doch ganz hier Und ganz beisammen, streifend und gegründet So ward die Stimme wach, die seither kündet Und alte Herlichkeit bezeugt als neu, Sich selbst und dir und dem Mitsammen treu. Nimm denn auch dieses Zeugnis in die Hände. Es ist ein Ende und hat doch kein Ende, Denn Ewiges hört ihm und hört uns zu, Wie wir aus ihm ertönen, ich und du.1

DO YOU STILL KNOW IT?

Do you still know, how we in our young years Travelled together on this sea? Visions came, great and wonderful, We beheld them together, you and I. How image joined itself with images in our_hearts! How a mutual animated describing Arose out of it and lived between you and me! We were there and were yet wholly here And wholly together, roaming and grounded. Thus, the voice awoke that since then proclaims And witnesses to old majesty as new, True to itself and you and to both together.

1 Wehr, Gerhard. <u>Martin Buber</u> (Hamburg, West Germany: Rowholt Publishing Company, 1968), p. 77. Take then this witness in your hands, It is an end and yet has no end, For something eternal listens to it and listens to us, How we resound out of it, I and Thou.¹

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The wonder of God's immanence in the world and our part in it is expressed in a song by the rabbi of Berdithchev which Buber rendered in his <u>Tales of the Hasidim</u>.

> Wo ich gehe - du! Wo ich stehe - du! Nur du, wieder du, immer du! Du, du, du! Ergeht's mir gut - du! Wenn's weh mir tut - du! Nur du, wieder du, immer du! Du, du, du! Himmel - du, Erde - du, Oben - du, unten - du, Wohin ich mich wende, an jedem Ende Nur du, wieder du, immer du! Du, du, du!²

Where I wander-You! Where I ponder-You! Only You, You again, always You! You! You! You! When I am gladdened-You! When I am saddened-You! Only You, You again, always You! You! You! You! Sky is You! Earth is You! You above! You below! In every trend, in every end, Only You, You again, always You! You! You! You!³

¹ Buber, <u>A Believing Humanism</u>, op. cit., p.)50.

² Wehr, op. cit., p. 76.

³ Martin Buber, <u>Tales of the Hasidim-Early Masters</u> (New York: Schocken Books, 1947), p. 212.

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