CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY: ANALYSIS OF CIVILIAN LEADERS

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Abstract

This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role played by civilian leaders in the consolidation of democracy examining changes in levels of military influence over politics. This study departs from typical military-centric civil-military relations literature by employing a civilian-centric analysis. In particular, it shows how the former's focus on changing levels of internal threat cannot account for variations in the levels of civilian control over the military. The study instead adopts a framework that focuses on the incentive structure of civilian leaders as determined by competitive elections; the political capacity of leaders as reflected in their parliamentary majority, political experience and the effectiveness of their economic policies; and institutional rules, such as the system of government and organization of the parties. The thesis argues that, depending on their incentive structure and political capacity, the civilian leaders will either challenge a politically powerful military or ally with that military by adopting its preference structures. The relevance of this model for understanding civil-military relations in the aftermath of a transition to democracy is explored in the Turkish case by examining the shift from low to high levels of military influence between late 1980s and mid-1990s. The thesis identifies this shift by looking at the incentive structure and the political capacity of two civilian leaders: Prime Minister/President Turgut Özal and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller.

Résumé

Dans cette thèse, nous cherchons à mieux comprendre le rôle joué par certains dirigeants civils dans la consolidation d'une démocratie en examinant les changements d'influence de l'armée sur leurs politiques. Pour ce faire, on effectue une analyse civils-centrée. Ceci nous distingue notamment des ouvrages usuels utilisant une approche plutôt basée sur des analyses militaires-centrée ou militaires-civils. En particulier, notre analyse nous permet d'affirmer qu'il n'existe pas de lien direct entre le contrôle des dirigeants civils sur l'armée et de la menace interne que peut parfois poser cette dernière. Notre étude se concentre plus spécifiquement sur les incitatifs déterminés par les dirigeants civils lors de la tenue d'élection serrée; la capacité des dirigeants politiques selon leur majorité parlementaire, l'expérience politique et le succès de leur politique économique; ainsi que les règles institutionnelles telles que le fonctionnement du gouvernement et l'organisation des partis. Notre travail tend à démontrer que dépendamment des structures incitatives présentes et leur capacité politique, les dirigeants civils vont ou bien défier un pouvoir militaire politique puissant ou bien s'allier aux militaires en adoptant une structure qui leur convient. La pertinence de ce modèle dans la compréhension des relations civils-militaires durant la période de transition vers une démocratie est explorée dans le cas de la Turquie où l'on peut examiner divers degrés d'influence de l'armée sur la période allant de la fin des années 80 jusqu'au milieu des années 90. Plus particulièrement, on étudie les mesures incitatives et la capacité politique de deux dirigeants politiques turques: le Premier Ministre/Président Turgut Özal et le Premier Ministre Tansu Çiller.

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Abbreviations

ANAP: *Anavatan Partisi*---Motherland Party

AP: *Adalet Parisi*---Justice Party

CHP: *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*---Republican People's Party

DP: *Demokrat Parti*---Democratic Party

DEP: *Demokrasi Partisi*---Democracy Party

DSP: *Demokratik Sol Parti*---Democratic Left Party

DYP: *Dogru Yol Partisi*---True Path Party

EU: European Union

HEP: *Halkin Emek Partisi*---People's Labor Party

HP: *Halkçi Parti*---Populist Party

MDP: *Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi*---Nationalist Democracy Party

MGK: *Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*---National Security Council

MHP: *Miliyetçi Hareket Partisi*---Nationalist Action Party

MÍT: *Milli Ístihbarat Teskilati*--National Intelligence Agency

MSP: *Milli Selamet Partisi*---National Salvation Party

PKK: *Partiya Karkaran Kürdistan*-Kurdish Workers Party

SHP: *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçi Parti*---Social Democratic Populist Party

INTRODUCTION

Do civilian leaders matter in the traditional civil-military relations literature? Since the early 1940s, much has been written on civil-military relations, specifically analyzing the dynamics underlying military interventions and exploring the mechanisms employed to achieve civilian control. These studies, however, have so far paid insufficient attention on the roles played by the civilian leaders. In general, major works on civil-military relations may be said to be "military centric," concentrating as they have on analyses of the history, institutions, structures, interests, strategies and prerogatives of the armed forces while downplaying the civilian side of the relationship.[1] Civilian actors have consistently been portrayed as the ones exacerbating the economic and political problems rather than contributing to their resolution. Moreover, civilian failures have usually been held up as the main factor contributing military interventions. Overall, this has been an approach that smacks of blaming the victims.

Transitions from military to civilian rule during the 1970s and 1980s highlighted the centrality of civilian actors in the political system through the resurgence of strong civilian leaders who were able to confront military prerogatives. Yet despite these transitions to democracy whereby civilian leaders and civilian institutions began to retake the political front stage, the majority of the civil-military literature continued to concentrate on military c entric analyses.[2] However, more recent works in 1990s have

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[1] Some of these works include: Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (New York: The Free Press, The MacMillan Company, 1960); Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) For a discussion of the political role of the armed forces in Latin American literature, see John Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964) and Edwin Lieuwen, *Armies and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).

begun to take a much closer look at the civilian side of the equation concentrating on civilian leaders and civilian institutions.[3]

In their examination of the civil-military relations in Turkey, Turkish studies following the military-centric trend of the general civil-military literature have been preoccupied with military centric analyses. Turkish civil-military literature has concentrated on the historical legacy of the military, its structure, organization, and prerogatives in an attempt to analyze the dominant role of the military in politics. Moreover, since the early 1980s, Turkish scholars have attributed the greater role for the military in Turkish politics to the rise of internal threats, particularly the rise of Kurdish nationalism between the late 1980s and mid 1990s. Even as civil-military relations literature elsewhere has focused attention on civilians and civilian institutions, Turkish studies continue to neglect the role played by political leaders in shaping Turkish civil-military relations.

This thesis represents an attempt to search for the reasons why the Turkish military's influence over politics diminished between the late 1980s and early 1990s and started increasing in early 1990s on, will focus on the role played by the civilian leaders in Turkish civil-military relations. This analysis will examine the civilian leaders' incentive structures, political capacities and the institutional context in which they

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[2] This can be seen particularly in Latin American civil-military literature. Some of these studies include George Philip, T*he Military in South American Politics,* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Robert Wesson, ed., *The Latin American Military Institution* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986); Augusto Varas ed., *Democracy Under Siege; New Military Power in Latin America* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); Frederick M. Nunn, *The Time of Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992)

[3] See David Pion-Berlin, *Through the Corridors of Power, Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, Politicians Against Soldiers,* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

operated in an attempt to bring a civilian-centric perspective to the literature on Turkish civil-military relations.

Civil-Military Relations and the Role of the Civilian Leaders: The Turkish Case

Turkish civil-military relations is a significant case in the general civil-military literature since the Turkish people while experiencing two direct and two indirect military interventions in its eight decades of republican history and yet accepted the armed forces as the most trusted institution in the country. The Turkish military, as assistant to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the founding of the Republic of Turkey and implementing his reforms to modernize and westernize the country, has always occupied a special place in Turkish politics and has assigned itself the sacred duty of safe-guarding Kemalist principles.[4] Accordingly, Turkish military has not refrained from intervening into politics whenever any kind of threat to Kemalist ideology has been perceived. The Turkish military's definition of security has extended beyond public order and included threats to the country's Kemalist legacy, which comprised a strict commitment to secularism, territorial integrity and cultural homogeneity.

With four different military interventions, the Turkish civil-military relations has followed different patterns. In the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention, while ensuring continued control over its reserved domains and tutelary powers,[5] the Turkish

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[4] Kemalist principles are the principles laid down by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. They will be explained in detail in Chapter 2.

[5] See Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 105-112 for a detailed discussion of tutelary powers and reserved domains. Tutelary powers include military-dominated formal institutions such as the National Security Council or

military turned power over to civilians. In the post-intervention period, despite the military's keeping a strong hold over institutional and informal prerogatives, in a surprisingly short time, the civilian government began to establish a primary role for itself in policymaking. The democratically elected politicians successfully challenged the military on a broad range of issues. Civilian influence reached its peak between 1987 and 1993, through a gradually narrowing of the military's sphere of political influence. Aside from a short period during the transition to a multi-party system in 1950s in Turkey, civilian influence has never so dramatically increased over the military. However, starting in 1993, the military began exercising direct control over civilian authorities by playing an active role in the formulation of security policies. This stark contrast in the civil-military relations pattern which manifested itself during a relatively short time between late 1980s and mid 1990s, makes this an interesting period for analysis of Turkish civil-military relations.

The increase in civilian influence manifested itself in two areas: the expansion of civil rights concerning the Kurdish population and the formulation of political strategies in the struggle with the Kurdish separatists, and the civilian intervention in the promotion processes of the military.[6] The rise of civilian influence in policy-making regarding the Kurdish question is a very significant issue. Since the rise of Kurdish nationalism has

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ambiguous constitutional references to the role of the Armed Forces as 'guarantors' of the constitution and the laws such as Article 35 of the Military Internal Service Code. The reserved domains which imply a high degree of military autonomy in certain policy areas include the 1982 Constitution's exemption of the Armed Forces from oversight of State Supervisory Council.

[6] During this period, under the initiation of Turgut Özal first as the prime minister (1987-1989) and later as the president (1989-1993), Kurdish language was legalized, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders were welcomed to the capital and the borders were opened for hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish immigrants running away from Saddam's soldiers. Furthermore, attempts were made to allow for education and broadcasting in Kurdish. In 1987 under Prime Minister Özal's initiation, his government interfered into the succession of the chief of the general staff bypassing the military's candidate and appointing his own nominee.

been perceived as a threat to territorial integrity of the country, it has, for years been considered as a subject solely under military control. Similarly, the promotion process in the military had been considered beyond civilian interference, so intervention in this process also demonstrates a significant increase in civilian control over politics. However, starting in the early 1990s, civilian influence over these issue areas decreased dramatically.[7]

A shift from higher to lower civilian influence over the military took place during the period between late-1980s and mid-1990s. Most analysts, in an attempt to explain the increase in the military's influence in politics starting in the early 1990s, have focused solely on the changing severity of the main internal threat during the period, the rise of Kurdish nationalism.[8] According to the proponents of this argument, the increase in the military's role in politics in the early 1990s was simply a result of an increase in the severity of Kurdish terrorist activities.[9] Despite the considerable explanatory power of the internal threat analysis, this approach cannot sufficiently explain the rising influence

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[7] The True Path Party-Social Democratic Populist Party government particularly under the premiership of Tansu Çiller's had left the armed forces as the only power for devising and implementing policies to deal with the Kurdish issue. Her government closed down the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*-DEP) and arrested its deputies. Moreover, the military influenced the government's decision in the extension of the term of the Chief of the General Staff in 1993 and the head of the air force and navy in 1994.

[8] See Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,*120-1; Ümit Cizre, *Politics and Military into the 21st Century*, EUI Working Papers RSC No. 2000/24 (European University Institute), 8 and 4; Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics,* The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 337 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 39; Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience," *Armed Forces & Society,* v. 26, n. 4 (Summer 2000). Although these scholars attempted to analyze the Kurdish issue and Islamic issue together as a part and parcel 'internal threat argument,' these two issues showed significance in different periods. While the rise of political Islam was seen as a serious threat to Turkish politics as a serious threat in late 1990s, that time period falls outside the scope of this dissertation. During the period between late 1980s and mid 1990s, the main preoccupation by all concerned actors was in fact the Kurdish issue. For this reason, this dissertation will only look at the Kurdish issue.

[9] See footnote 10.

of the military in early 1990s, because Kurdish nationalism was increasingly prevalent during the late 1980s and earlier. The PKK launched its first armed campaign in 1984, killing more than a dozen people. From 1984 on, the army involved in a conflict with Kurdish separatists, and PKK attacks in the southeastern part of Turkey continued throughout 1980s and 1990s.[10] In particular, 1991 and 1992 were years of fierce fighting between PKK guerillas and the military.[11] However, between 1987 and 1993, during the first period under examination here, although the PKK attacks were intense, there was no appreciablely greater military influence over politics. Only by 1993, while the fight against Kurdish nationalists continued at the same level of severity as before, did the armed forces gain the authority to act as the sole institutions designing and implementing policies concerning the Kurdish issue.[12]

In other words, while the level of internal threat remained the same, relative power in civil-military relations varied. This dissertation will argue that this change in power distribution was due to changes on the civilian side of the equation. More specifically, it will be shown that the only variable that changed from one period to the other was the strength of civilian political actors. While civilian influence over the

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[10] Starting from 1984 on, the army was already involved in a fight with Kurdish separatists. While in late 1985 and 1986 the PKK continued its "hit and run" type attacks to military headquarters, in 1987 it started attacking civilian targets in various towns of Southeast Turkey which claimed the lives of hundreds children and women. In 1988 and 1989 PKK activities continued full steam throughout Turkey including unguarded villages and educational institutions despite serious blows they received from Turkish armed forces. Ismet G. Imset, *The PKK, A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992),* (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, 1992), 40-49, 74-84, 243-307.

[11] See Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler,* (Istanbul: Dogan Kitapcilik, 2003), 161-68.

[12] During the second period under examination (1993-1995), when PKK's leader Öcalan did not receive any response to the unilateral cease-fire he declared in March 1993, PKK started attacking Turkish diplomats and businesses in Europe and tourism centers of Turkey targeting and kidnapping foreign tourists. Throughout the summer of 1993, they attacked the villages and towns of southeastern Turkey resulting in the exodus of thousands of civilian to central, southern and western parts of Turkey. In 1994 PKK started to

military was high under the premiership and presidency of Turgut Özal of Motherland Party, (*Anavatan Partisi*-ANAP) between 1987 and 1993, as soon as Prime Minister Tansu Çiller came to power as the leader of the True Path Party (*Dogru Yol Partisi*-DYP) in 1993, civilian influence over the military began to decrease dramatically. To understand why, this study will investigate the shift that took place by focusing on the civilian leaders' incentive structures, political capacity and the institutional context in which they operated.

By examining the sharp contrast between two short periods in Turkish civil-military relations and by analyzing the role of civilian leaders, this research applies a new trend in the general literature to Turkish civil-military relations. The position taken here is that political leadership is important and that the incentives, actions, decisions and capabilities of civilian leaders matter a great deal in the civil-military relations and formation of civilian influence over the military.

Methodology

The thesis deals with the role played by the civilian leaders in the Turkish civil-military relations in the context of policy formulation concerning the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the promotion process in the military. The research shows the significance of the role played by civilian leaders in the configuration of civil-military relations in Turkey through an analysis of three main sources of data (secondary sources, primary sources and in depth interviews) for both periods: concerning the formulation of

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bomb train stations in Istanbul, in an attempt to show that their struggle is not limited to the southeastern part of Turkey. These attacks continued throughout 1995 and 1996.

policies dealing with the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the promotion course in the military. This data reveals how incentive structures, the political capacity of the civilian leadership and the institutional context in which they operate determine their ability to challenge or ally with the military.

The civilian leaders under investigation are Turgut Özal, the leader of ANAP, who served as the prime minister and the president between late 1980s and early 1990s and Tansu Çiller, the leader of DYP, who served as the prime minister from the early to mid 1990s. The first part of the field research for the study involved archival research of secondary sources. This included official and unofficial statements, news accounts, on-the-record interviews in the Turkish and foreign press, and analyses by journalists and scholars.

Secondly, primary sources included the minutes of sessions of parliament, particularly for the periods when the issue areas under study were discussed. Thirdly, and most important, semi-structured and unstructured in-depth interviews with select members from ANAP and DYP were conducted in order to support, and fill in the gaps of the information gathered from the secondary sources. Interviewees were selected from among those deputies who have played important roles in the parties, supporting or opposing policies their political leaders were formulating while dealing with the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the military promotion process. Most of these deputies were senior members of their parties, close to the party leadership, and participant in the policy formation phases of their parties. In addition, official and unofficial advisors of the political leaders and retired generals were interviewed. Interviews were structured to obtain information on policies designed to deal with the Kurdish issue and military

promotion, the approaches of these parties toward the issues, the role of leadership and attitudes towards military influence over the system.

Interviews were conducted with a total of fourteen party figures from ANAP and DYP, with special advisers to the political leaders, four scholars, two journalists and two generals during two different field trips to Turkey (mainly in the cities of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir) between September 2002 and May 2003. Most interviews were taped with the permission of the interviewees. When the interviewees did not wish the interview to be taped, notes were taken. All the taped interviews were transcribed. All subjects were informed of the purpose of the interviews and their consent was obtained for their identification. While some were identified by name, others were identified in general terms by position or roles inside their respective parties for the purpose of confidentiality.

Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 1 lays out the theoretical framework for the empirical discussions that will follow. It discusses the general civil-military relations literature criticizing its military-centric thrust, which underplays the civilian side of the relationship. It then analyzes the significance of the civilian side of the civil-military relations and examines more recent civilian-centric literature. It continues with a discussion of Turkish civil-military relations literature and its military-centric approach which is manifested in the analysis of the internal threat argument during the period under examination. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the framework for analysis of the role of the civilian leaders by adopting Wendy Hunter's theoretical model developed for understanding

civilian-military relations in Brazil.

Chapter 2 aims to provide an historical background to the role of the military in Turkish politics, including the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980. Kemalist fundamentals of the political regime will be emphasized to explain the common arguments that are used in the explanations of the increase in military influence over civilian leadership. The historical background also includes mechanisms such as the National Security Council and the Ministry of Defense through which the Turkish military has exerted its power in politics and the military's high level of public legitimacy.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 constitute the central part of the dissertation and are based on empirical data on the role of civilian leaders in the issue areas under examination. The emphasis falls on how civilian leaders dealt with the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the promotion process in the military. Chapter 3 looks at the period of Turgut Özal's premiership during 1987 and 1991, and at his presidency from 1991 to 1993. The chapter analyzes Özal's, and his party ANAP's attitude towards rise of Kurdish nationalism with an emphasis on efforts to legalize the Kurdish language and other liberal policies he followed concerning this issue. In addition, Özal's intervention in the promotion of the Chief of the General Staff is explored. Chapter 4 examines the period of Tansu Çiller's premiership between 1993 and 1995. The emphasis is again on the policies she followed concerning the Kurdish issue and her extension of the tenure of the military commanders. The different ways leaders dealt with the issues under examination are understood through an analysis of the incentive structure and political capacity of those leaders and the institutional contexts in which they functioned.

Finally, the conclusion summarizes the analysis of the civil-military relations in Turkey in 1980s and 1990s. It highlights how the incentive structure, political capacity of different leaders and the institutional context in which they operate permit them to deal with the military's influence in politics in different ways. In this way, the conclusion attempts to demonstrate the significance of the role played by the civilian leaders in determining civil-military relations. It also explores those aspects of the findings that can be generalized to the other democratizing contexts and suggests further paths of inquiry for understanding the problematic role of civilian leaders in the evolution of civil-military relations and democratization.

CHAPTER 1

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE CIVILIAN LEADERS

Introduction: Civil-Military Relations from the Perspective of Civilian Leaders

The most important component of civil-military relations in a democratic system is the subordination of military forces to civilian political authority. Control of the military by civilian officials elected by the people must be achieved in order to consolidate the democratization process in any country. Although the military must have the coercive power necessary to protect its country from external threats, this power must not used against the people that created the country in the first place. The literature on civil-military relations generally examines the interference of the military in the civilian sphere. This literature largely concentrates on the military side of the relationship and pays insufficient attention on the role of civilian leaders. As a partial correction, this study examines civil-military relations in Turkey—particularly the shift from higher levels to lower levels of civilian influence over Turkish politics during the period between the late 1980s and mid-1990s—and focuses exclusively on the civilian side of the relationship. The thesis identifies the roles played by the civilian leaders and considers their incentive structure, political capacity and the institutional context in which they operate to be important determinants of civil-military relations.

The first section of the chapter analyzes the civil-military relations literature and locates the gap in the literature that generally concentrates on the "military-centric" approaches and does not pay much attention to the civilian side of the equation. It then

examines a recent trend in the civil-military literature that takes a much closer look at the civilian side of the equation.

The second section of the chapter offers a theoretical framework for understanding the ability of Turkish civilian leaders to exercise influence over the military between the late 1980s and mid 1990s by adopting the framework Wendy Hunter designed to explain the confrontation between military and civilian leaders in the aftermath of Brazil's transition to democracy in 1985. It identifies and discusses two inter-related theoretical approaches, rational choice and institutionalism, to explain the incentive structure, political capacity of the civilian leaders and the institutional context in which they operate.

I. Civil-Military Relations

1. Issues and Actors

A country may be labeled "democratic" as soon as it emerges from authoritarian rule. However, it will continue to lack specific characteristics associated with the consolidation of democracy for some time. Democratic consolidation, while entailing the institutionalization of a new set of political rules, also involves the 'extrication' of the old system and the elimination of 'authoritarian enclaves' inherited from the authoritarian regime.[1] Among the indicators of democratic consolidation, civil-military relations

[1] See Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 67-79; See Manuel. A. Garreton, "Human Rights in Processes of Democratization," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 26, No. 1 (1994), 222. Garreton identifies four of these enclaves. The first is related to the question of the resolution of the human rights. The second is concerned with institutions and prerogatives inherited from the authoritarian regime that constrain the democratic representation. The third one mentions the actors and groups in the

occupy a significant place.[2] According to the 'civil-military relations' criterion, "democracy cannot be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and solidly committed to the democratic constitutional order."[3] Consequently, in a democratic system, the appropriate power balance between military and civilians can only be established by the subordination of military to civilian authority.[4]

There are two sides involved in this relationship. One is the military, which holds the monopoly over the apparatus of coercive state power and includes a variety of organizations and services assigned to national defense: the army, navy and air force. The other is the civilian government, which in a democratic system includes certain elements of the state apparatus including the legislative, executive and judiciary.[5] The most significant dynamic in civil-military relations is the balance of power between the civilian government and the military. While the military must possess a coercive power to protect the country and must be strong enough to prevail in war (or at least deter war), at the same time, it must not use this power to impose its will on the community from which it emerges. In a democracy, when people choose political agents to act on their behalf, they do not intend to give up their political privileges to the military. Thus, how a society

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military whose commitment to democracy is ambiguous and the fourth one refers to the presence of anti-democratic values and mentalities in society.

[2] See Larry Diamond, "Introduction: In search of Consolidation," In *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* eds., Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xxi-xxxvi. According to Diamond, the other indicators are: political institutions, civil society, socio-economic development, and international factors.

[3] Ibid., xxviii.

[4] However, all of the civilian authorities are not always democratically elected. In this study, the analysis of civil-military relations is done in a democratic system.

controls the armed forces and guarantees their loyalty to the civilian government is one of the fundamental questions of democratic governance.[6]

Most civil-military literature focuses on the control or direction of the military by civilian authorities. Felipe Agüero defines civilian supremacy as "the ability of a civilian, democratically elected government to conduct general policy without interference from the military, to define the goals and general organization of the national defense, to formulate and conduct defense policy, and to monitor the implementation of military policy."[7] However, there are different degrees of civilian supremacy.

The nature and extent of civilian supremacy reflect shifts between the strength of civilian political institutions on one side, and the political strength of the military institutions on the other. In the better cases it is characterized as 'civilian control'; in others it can only be defined as 'civilian influence.' Claude Welch defines civilian control as "one of setting limits within which the members of the armed forces, and the military as an institution accept the government's definition of appropriate areas of responsibility."[8] In cases of 'civilian influence,' while civilian leaders and institutions may restrict the military's role in some areas, they cannot interfere in other areas wherein military keeps its institutional and/or informal prerogatives. This thesis makes a case

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[5] Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 22.

[6] For detailed discussion of this issue see Peter D. Feaver, "Civil Military Relations," *Annual Reviews Political Science*, No. 2 (1999), 211-13 and Richard H. Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military," *Journal of Democracy*, v. 8, n.4 (October 1994),140-2.

[7] Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy*, 19.

[8] Claude E. Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality," in *Civilian Control of the Military, Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*, eds., Claude E. Welch, (Albany: State University Press, 1976), 2. Samuel Huntington's models of civilian control will be explained in the next section.

study of Turkey, examining the increase in 'civilian influence' over military during the 1980s and 1990s.

The traditional concern of civil-military relations theory is the direct seizure of political power by the military. Consequently, the civil-military relations literature generally studies military interference into civilian affairs and tries to find answers to the causes of military interventions by concentrating on the military side of the relationship. Thus, the majority of the civil-military relations literature has a "military centric" thrust that downplays the role civilian actors play in shaping civil-military relations. Such theorists focus on the institutions, structure, strength, organization and the corporate interests of the military. The next section of this study will examine military centric analyses of civil-military relations of 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.

2. "Military Centric" Analyses in Civil-Military Relations Literature during 1950s, 1960s and 1970s

Throughout 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the majority of the civil-military literature concentrated on military as an institution as the center of analysis in an attempt to analyze the factors causing military interventions and find ways to achieve civilian control. During this period, when quite a number of regimes were authoritarian, the scholars did not pay much attention to the civilian side of the civil-military relations. The civilian side of civil-military relations only mattered when the scholars wished to show the weaknesses or failures of civilian leadership and institutions; scholars looking at the collapse of democratic regimes and the rise of authoritarianism mainly focused on the highly structured organization of the military, the sophistication of its training, the

professionalization of the military officers, and its corporate interests as factors causing military's interference into politics.

Samuel Huntington, in his landmark study *The Soldier and the State,* suggests two principal types of civilian control designed to minimize the power of the military vis-à-vis the civilian groups; subjective control and objective control. In his notion of "subjective control," civilian control is achieved by maximizing the power of civilian groups in relation to the military. As Huntington explains, since the civilian groups are large in number, varied in character and have conflicting interests, coordination issues make it impossible to maximize their power with respect to military. As a result, attempts to maximize civilian power always lead to the maximizing of the power of some particular civilian group or groups. Consequently, "the general concept of civilian control is identified with the specific interests of one or more civilian groups."[9] Therefore, what makes this kind of civilian control subjective is its domination by particular civilian groups. In its various historical manifestations, subjective control has been identified with the maximization of the power of particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional norms by making civilian control an instrumental value of a particular civilian group.[10]

Huntington criticizes "subjective civilian control" by stating that this kind of control is advanced by one civilian group as a means to enhance its power at the expense

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[9] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* Third Edition (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964), 80.

[10] Civilian control by governmental institutions was achieved in the17th century in America (also in England) when the Congress and the President engaged in a comparable struggle to control the armed forces. Civilian control by social class was realized when the European aristocracy and bourgeoisie struggled for control of the military forces in the 18th and 19th centuries. In civilian control by constitutional form, civilian control is identified with democratic government and military control with absolute or totalitarian government. Ibid., 81-2.

of other civilian groups. This politicizes the military and tends to have distorting effect on the political system insofar as it accrues power to groups closely linked to the armed forces to the detriment of those not so associated. In democracies, civilian control of armed forces results from an 'objective' approach according to Huntington. This is characterized by a clear separation of responsibilities between civil and military sectors. This division of labor ensures the non-interference of politicians in purely military matters, and that the military will stay out of politics.

Huntington prefers the second type of civilian control, because, in Huntington's words, objective civilian control reflects the "distribution of political power between civilian and military groups that is most conducive to professional attitudes and behavior in the officer corps."[11] Objective control maximizes the professionalism of the military by confining it to a purely "military" function and defining its realm of autonomy within a purely and carefully defined military sphere. Consequently, a highly professional officer corps develops the ability to subordinate itself to the decisions and orientation of a legitimate civilian state authority. For that reason, this type of control aims at making the military "politically sterile and neutral." At the same time, objective civilian control recognizes the autonomous military profession as a tool of the state. This separation of political and military duties, according to Huntington, makes the armed forces less prone to political interference and allows the highly professional officer corps to carry out the wishes of any civilian group that secures the legitimate authority of the state.[12]

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[11] Ibid., 83.

[12] Ibid., 84.

A number of scholars, challenging Huntington's 'objective control' approach, argue that armies that become more professional have not always been cooperative and that some, in fact, have been more prone to challenge civilian rule. Among these, in a Cold War classic civil-military study, *The Professional Soldier*, the founder of American military sociology, Morris Janowitz, observes that changes in technology, society and missions inevitably lead to a greater political role for the professional soldier, in contrast to Huntington's analysis. Janowitz thus proposes that the best guarantee of keeping the military out of politics is to sustain division in the military through inter-service rivalry and the intra-military competition for resources and influence.[13]

Along the same lines, Bengt Abrahamsson argues that the professionalization of the military breeds corporate interests, necessarily entangling the armed forces in political concerns. Eventually, the collision of such interests with those of civilians causes political conflicts.[14] Similarly, Alfred Stepan, in another military-centric study of the authoritarian period in Brazil (1964-85) argues that the professionalization of internal security and national development increased the involvement of the military in politics—a conclusion reached after analyzing the expansion of military's role in all phases of Brazilian and Peruvian society as a result of the professionalization of their military officers.[15]

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[13] See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (Glencoe Ill.: The Free Press, 1960)

[14] See Bengst Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), 37. Similarly, Samuel Finer points out that highly professional officer corps, such as those of Germany and Japan had frequently intervened in politics. See Samuel E. Finer, *The Man On Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics*, Revised edition (Pregrine Books, 1976) 21-2.

[15] See Alfred Stepan, eds., *Authoritarian Brazil, Origins, Policies and Future* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), ix. In an attempt to explain the major political and economic characteristics of the development that had emerged in Brazil since 1964, Stepan analyzed the authoritarian regime in

As a result of these critiques, Huntington later qualified his position by differentiating between cases where external threats prevail and cases where threats to the state emerge internally. While the professional training of the military to confront external threats may keep the military out of politics, military education with regards to internal security is such that guerilla unrest or other civilian insurrections may actually draw the military into politics. He argues that in domestic wars the political and military roles of the principal actors are merged on both sides, and that political and military means become indistinguishable.[16]

Consequently, neither subjective control nor objective control is necessarily sufficient to keep the military out of politics. Subjective control, as a result of the alliance of the military with a particular civilian group, gives power to one civilian group at the expense of others and therefore encourages the establishment of authoritarian governments. In 'subjective civilian control' mechanism, as the military may decide with which civilian group to ally, Huntington looks more at the military side of the relation, thus can not offer insights into how civilians might create better mechanisms of control. On the other hand, Huntington's 'objective civilian control,' the professionalization of the military only concentrates on the military side of the relation by looking solely at the military behavior and is empirically wrong since professionalization does not restrain military from interfering in politics.

Brazil first by examining the professionalization of the military officers, second by exploring the relationship between repressive authoritarian rule and high economic growth rate and third by studying the future of the authoritarian regime.

[16] Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," In *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, ed. Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Free Press, 1962), 21-22. Huntington argues that in a coup d'état generals play political roles and governmental leaders, if they are able, exercise military command. He also states that in domestic war, the targets of both contestants are political institutions, social groups, and the general population.

Other military-centric studies explore the corporate interests and the organization of the military. The studies that concentrate on the corporate interests of the military examine the military's determination to manage its internal affairs, including having autonomy in the organization of its budget. They specifically examine the situation wherein military interests diverge or collide with civilian interests.[17] Other scholars emphasize the organizational format of the military, focusing on its size, financial resources, centralized command, discipline, hierarchy, and formalized internal communication as significant reasons behind military's high potential for political involvement.[18]

Among these scholars, some also consider the civilian side of the relation. However, they concentrate only on the shortcomings of the civilian leaders and institutions. A number of scholars, including Finer, Janowitz and Nordlinger, analyze the weaknesses of political leaders and of state institutions.[19] As for factors leading to

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[17] See Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power,* 37; Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977); Amos Perlmutter, *Military and Politics in modern Times, On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977)

[18] Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Development of New Nations,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 31-74. Janowitz argues that the high potential for political involvement by the military has lied in its control over instruments of violence, which created its physical power, its ethics of public service and national identification, and the experience of its officers in managerial tasks combined with their heroic posture. Likewise, Samuel Finer highlights the superiority of the military in organization among the three advantages the military possesses vis-à-vis the civilian organizations. The other two are highly emotionalized symbolic status and a monopoly of arms. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 5; Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule, Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations*, (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1974); Stepan in his examination of the interaction between the Brazilian military and political system from 1945 to 1968, focuses on the institutional analysis of the size, financial resources, organizational strength, and social background of the Brazilian military. See Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971)

[19] Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 75-6; Janowitz, *The Military in the Development of New Nations,* 83-100. Nordlinger also points out that the performance failure on the part of the government, such as the inability to preserve public order, strengthened the officers' resolve to act upon their interventionist motives. See Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics,* 64.

military interventions, Janowitz highlights the importance of civilian incompetence while Finer analyzes different levels of the political culture of the society.[20] Along the same lines, Huntington argues that weak state institutions are less effective tools of civilian control vis-à-vis military ambitions.[21] Claude Welch, differing from the scholars mentioned above, focuses on the skill, patience and leadership of the politicians as a means of achieving and maintaining civilian control in developing countries.[22]

However, this minor degree of attention paid to the vulnerabilities of civilian leaders during the period between 1950s and 1970s does not challenge the dominance of military-centric analyses. During these decades, when the majority of the countries were ruled by authoritarian governments and particularly by military regimes, it probably made sense to concentrate on the military side of the relationship since military was the center of the political scene. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, an era of democratic transitions, it is not sufficient to concentrate solely on the military side of the relation in the analyses of civil-military relations.[23]

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[20] Ibid., Finer identifies "levels" of political culture as the key variable in a nation's civil-military dynamic. He argues that civilian control of the military is strongest in those societies with well-developed political culture. In contrast, countries with 'low political culture', where society's respect for the governmental and legal institutions of the state are lower, are also more vulnerable to a coup.

[21] See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 194-196. Huntington contrasts "civic societies,"-- those with a high level of institutionalization and a low level of participation-- with "praetorian societies," which have a low level of institutionalization but a high level of political participation. In the former, stable civil-military relations are part of a larger, more orderly political system, while in the latter bribing by the wealthy, student riots, demonstration of the mobs and the military coups are quite common.

[22] Claude Welch, "Two Strategies of Civilian Control: Some Concluding Observations." In *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*, ed., Claude E. Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 313-6.

[23] See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). Huntington analyzes the third wave of democratization that started with Portugal's return to democracy in 1974 and continued with Spain, Greece, a number of Latin American countries and with Eastern European countries as a result of the collapse of communism.

3. Continuation of the 'Military Centric' Analyses in Civil-Military Relations Literature during 1980's and 1990's

The military-centric bias of the civil-military literature can be forgiven for the scholars working during the period between 1950s and 1970s, when quite a number of regimes were under authoritarian rule. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, during the decades of democratic rebirth all over the world,[24] the civil-military literature generally and Latin American civil-military literature in particular, continued to concentrate on military-centric explanations when analyzing the power and prerogatives of the armed forces.

For example, Robert Wesson in mid 1980s analyzed the structure of military 'institutions' and concentrated on military organization and training.[25] Along the same lines, George Philip argues that in South American countries the professionalization requirement lead the military to act in accordance with their corporate interests. He points out that most South American armed forces have become powerful institutions with interests and loyalties of their own and thus these forces have reasons to maintain a system that have works to their own advantage even when they are not directly in power.[26]

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[24] During this period, the following countries accomplished their transition to democracy. Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey in South and Southeast Europe; Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala in Latin America; India, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan (partially), and Pakistan in Asia; Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in Eastern Europe.

[25] Robert Wesson, ed., *The Latin American Military Institution,* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986)

[26] George Philip, *The Military in South American Politics,* (London: Croom Helm, 1985) Similarly, Frederick Nunn studies Latin American military professionalism in world perspective where he compares and contrasts officer corps thought and self-perception See Frederick M. Nunn, *The Time of the Generals,*

Another group of scholars concentrates on the prerogatives of the military. Augusto Varas analyzes the political influence retained by the armed forces in the aftermath of transitions to democracy. Varas' edited volume examines the increasing autonomy of military establishments vis-à-vis states and societies in Latin America, and deals with the conflict between military power and democracy in ten Latin American countries.[27] Stepan examines the role of the military in transitions to democracy, introducing the dimensions of military contestation and military prerogatives for assessing progress in the achievement of civilian control.[28] Michael Desch looks at the level of internal and external threats to measure the strength of civilian control of the armed forces and analyzes how the rise of internal threats such as rise of urban guerilla movements, armed left-wing groups and extreme rightist groups caused military interventions in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.[29]

Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992)

[27] Varas' edited volume examine the increasing autonomy of the military establishments vis-à-vis states and societies in Latin America, dealing with the conflict between military power and democracy in ten Latin American countries. He argues that the interventions have showed the military's ability to sustain increasing political autonomy without sacrificing rapid mobilization or professional standards. He also claims that the continuation of military's interference into politics would lead to new state forms, different from Western democratic ones. Augusto Varas, ed., *Democracy Under Siege: New Military Power in Latin America* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989)

[28] Among the military prerogatives, Stepan analyzes the constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in political system, military's relationship to the chief executive, coordination of defense sector, active-duty military participation in the cabinet, role of legislature, role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees, and intelligence, role in police, military promotions, state enterprises and in legal system. Among military contestations, he studies how the new regime handles the legacy of human rights violations committed by the previous authoritarian regime, military's reaction toward the democratic government's initiatives vis-à-vis the organizational mission, structure and the control of the military, cuts or increases in the military budget. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 68-100.

[29] Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) 8-21 and 97-113. Desch argues that if a state faces high external and low internal threats, it should have the most stable civil-military relations. In contrast if a state faces low external and high internal threats, it should experience the weakest civilian control of the

The literature on bureaucratic authoritarianism developed by Guillermo O'Donnell focuses more on the civilian side when trying to explain civil-military relations. However, since the bureaucratic authoritarianism model includes a high-level-technocrat-military and civilian influence within and outside the state, working in close association with foreign capital, this model does not apply the argument of this study, which aims for a democratic civilian side in the civil-military relations.[30]

Consequently, even during the period of transitions to democracy in 1980s and 1990s, the majority of the civil-military literature still concentrated on the military side of the relationship without paying much attention to the civilian side. However, during the transition and consolidation stages of democracy, civilian leadership and civilian institutions are significant components of the political scene. Civilian leaders have the capability to advance the consolidation of the democracy in their countries by establishing an appropriate balance between civilian and military interests. To understand this, the literature on civil-military relations must take into consideration both the military and the civilian side of the relationship while analyzing the recent wave of democratic transitions and the aftermath thereof. For the time being, neglect of civilian leadership and institutions leaves these studies incomplete.

A number of recent studies have begun to acknowledge the importance of civilian leaders. For example, David Pion-Berlin in his study of civil-military relations in Argentina in the post-transition period (1984-1994) focuses not on military, but democratic institutions. In order to explain why some of the military policies, crafted by

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military. He argues that civilian control of the armed forces in a high internal and external threat environment or low internal and external threat environment gets complicated.

both political leaders and the military, failed, while other policies succeeded, Pion-Berlin focuses on "the organizational features of government."[31] In this way, Pion-Berlin shows for Argentine how it is impossible to explain—why the Argentine military's budget decreased, why there was failure in reforming the nation's defense law or why some of the human rights violators were not punished—by only looking at the military side of the relation. He demonstrates the need to look at the civilian institutions such as the Ministry of Economics and the independent judiciary in order to analyze these events. By eschewing conventional approaches that view the military as a domineering power, Pion-Berlin shows that the government can either enable or constrain the military's authority.

Felipe Agüero, in his analysis of factors affecting Spain's transition from authoritarianism to democracy between 1975 and 1978, similarly looks at the role of both soldiers and civilians, emphasizing, the role of civilian leaders and institutions. He shows the irrationality of attempting to analyze Spain's transition to democracy without considering the civilian side of the civil-military relations and explores the nature of the elite (civilian versus military) in control of the transition and the internal unity of the key civilian political groups. He also looks at civilian coalescence on fundamental issues as a factor that can limit the range of resistance strategies available to the military. In sum, he

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[30] See David Collier, "Overview of Bureaucratic Authoritarian model," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, David Collier ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 23-24.

[31] See David Pion-Berlin, *Through the Corridors of Power, Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). The civilian government was able to budget fewer funds for the military since a few key civilian decision-makers within the economics ministry had the authority to decide about the budget independent from armed forces and defense ministry. In the case of reforming the nation's defense law, the defense ministry was not able to fulfill its mandate and turned the task over the army, navy, and air force themselves. In the absence of any clear directives and coordination from above, each service chose to do very little or nothing at all, leaving unfulfilled the goal of defense reform. In the realm of human rights violations, at the beginning, the independent judiciary made significant headway by bringing to justice military leaders of Proceso charged with human rights transgessions. However, later when the court decided to pursue officers at lower ranks, it caused a military uprising that made a reconsideration of policy imperative.

argues that a positive definition of civilian control focusing on the prerogatives of civilians is needed. [32]

Finally, Wendy Hunter shows the implausibility of analyzing the confrontation between the military and Brazilian civilian leaders without looking at the civilian side of the relation in her analysis of the aftermath of the democratic transition in Brazil in 1985. Hunter demonstrates how civilians were able to oppose the military on issues such as federal budget allocations, condition of labor rights in the constitution, and military's interest in developing and occupying the Amazon region, by looking at the incentive structure of civilian leaders, their political capacity and the institutional context in which they operate.[33]

In sum, the civil-military studies which try to analyze the period after democratic transition by only taking the military side of the relation are incomplete. Looking solely at the organization of the military, internal or external threats it is facing, and prerogatives it preserves in the aftermath of the transition are not enough for a thorough analysis of civil-military relations in a given case.

II. Civil-Military Relations Literature in Turkey

Following the general trend, Turkish civil-military relations literature has been exclusively preoccupied with military-centric analysis of civil-military relations. The

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[32] Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995)

[33] Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, Politicians Against Soldiers,* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 2, 6-8. I will discuss the usefulness of Hunter's approach in greater detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.

civilian side of the relation has remained largely unexplored. The historical legacy of the military combined with its modernization efforts, sophisticated training, professionalization and high level of organization have been the central subjects of the literature. In particular, the literature has emphasized the emergence of internal threats as motivations for the military intervention. Even in the aftermath of the latest transition to democracy from military rule in the early 1980s, scholars have continued to concentrate on military-centric analysis, focusing particularly on the institutional prerogatives which allow the military to exert its power while under civilian authority and the alleged growth in internal threats.

The historical legacy of the Turkish military has been recognized as an important factor in the military's dominance in politics. Such military-centric works examine the key role played by the armed forces in the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. In addition to the military's modernizing efforts, this literature also examines military's role as guardian of Kemalist reforms and principles aimed at westernizing and modernizing the country.[34] Others focus on the recruitment patterns and the training of its officers in order to demonstrate the effective organization of the Turkish military.[35] Yet another body of military-centric Turkish civil-military literature

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[34] See George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," *The Middle East Journal,* (Winter and Spring 1965) 54-66 and 169-176; William Hale "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey," in Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper State *Democracy and the Military*, (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988); William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1994); Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics and Democracy in Turkey," *Comparative Politics* 16 (October 1983), 17-33; S erdar S en, *S ilahli Kuvvetler ve M odernizm,* (Istanbul: M elisa M atbaacilik, 1 996), 9 7-123 f or t he military's efforts on modernization.

[35] See Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*; Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces,* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1991) Birand in his detailed research on the anatomy of the Turkish armed forces examines the training of the officers from the day they enter a cademy. James Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 25 (July 1989), 392-400

concentrates on direct and indirect military interventions, exploring the relative weaknesses of the civilian leaders to explain how the military saved the nation from the chaos it was dragged into by the poor performance of the civilian leaders.[36]

This literature is full of important works that attempt to explain the role of the military in Turkish politics, in which the military has traditionally been dominant through direct and indirect interventions. However, in focusing on the military as the main actor in the relationship, this literature has paid little attention to the role of civilians. Whether seen as a force of modernization, guardian of Kemalist principles, savior of the country in times of chaos, or the challenger of internal threats, the military has almost always occupied center stage in the field of Turkish civil-military studies. By contrast, democratic policy-makers and institutions have usually been relegated to offstage. When considered in the literature, such policy-makers have been too often considered as bit players clearly outperformed by the military protagonists.

This bias was forgivable during the early decades of the republic when a military dominated single party ruled the country for 27 years, and during 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the military thrice intervened in politics, either directly or indirectly.

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and James Brown, "The Military and Politics in Turkey," *Armed Forces and Society,* v. 113, no. 2 (Winter 1987), 235-253 James Brown's articles explain the recruitment patterns of the Turkish military. Hikmet Özdemir, *Rejim ve Asker*, (Istanbul: Afa Yayinlari, 1989) Hikmet Özdemir studies the organization of the military and the mechanisms through which the military exerts its power.

[36] For the 27 May 1960 military intervention see Ümit Özdag, *Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset Iliskileri, 27 Mayis Ihtilali,* (Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplari, 1997) and Osman Dogru, *27 Mayis Rejimi: Bir Darbenin Hukuki Anatomisi* (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1998). For the 12 March 1971 Coup by memorandum see Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çapli, *12 Mart, Ihtilalin Pencesinde Demokrasi,* (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1994) For the 12 September 1980 military intervention Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Demokrasi Dur: 12 Eylül 1980,* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1986); Mehmet Ali Birand, *The General's Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980,* (London, Washington: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987); Hasan Cemal, *Tank Sesiyle Uyanmak,: 12 Eylül Günlügü,* 9th edition (Istanbul: Dogan Kitapcilik, 2000) For the 28 February 1997 indirect military intervention see Emre Kongar, *28 Subat ve Demokrasi* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000); Hulki Cevizoglu, *28 Subat, Bir Hükümet Nasil Devrildi* (Istanbul: Beyaz Yayinlari, 1998)

However, in the aftermath of 1980 military intervention, starting in 1983 and through the early 1990s, when the transition from military to civilian rule began to show significant effects, it is not sufficient to look exclusively at the military side of the relationship. Nonetheless, the literature on Turkish civil-military remained fixated on the power and prerogatives of the armed forces, and the military's perception of internal threats.[37]

The main concentration of the 1990s Turkish civil-military relations literature has been on the 'internal threat argument,' which seemed to be consistent of rise of Kurdish nationalism as a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. In an attempt to explain the early 1990s, reversal of the previous increase in civilian influence in politics, the majority of the scholars primarily focused on this. For example, Gareth Jenkins argues that the return of the armed forces to a more active political role in early 1990s was a direct response to what it saw as the resurgence of the threat of Kurdish nationalism.[38] Similarly, Ümit Cizre, while agreeing that the military seemed to withdraw from political arena in 1980s, emphasizes that the growing influence of Kurdish nationalism legitimized an expanded political role for the Turkish Armed Forces beginning in the mid-1990s.[39] Along the same lines, another prominent scholar of Turkish politics, Ergun Özbudun, states that the military still saw itself performing a guardianship role against threats to its deeply felt values, such as the indivisibility of the state threatened by the rise of Kurdish

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[37] See Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*; Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*; Ümit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics*, 29, 2 (January 1997). Cizre in this article examines the National Security Council, the Presidency, military budgets, arms production, procurement, military modernization, internal security, intelligence gathering and senior promotions as the prerogatives of the military in the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention.

[38] Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 39.

[39] Cizre, *Politics and Military into the 21st Century*, 8 and 4.

nationalism. He concludes that as long as the threats to fundamental values cherished by the military existed, the military would continue to intervene.[40]

Scholars focusing on the rise of Kurdish nationalism overlook the fact that this internal threat exhibited similar patterns during late 1980s and early 1990s. The PKK attacks were prevalent during the late 1980s and earlier, the period during which the civilian influence over politics and the military was higher. These attacks continued during the early to mid 1990s, during which the civilian influence in politics decreased immensely leaving its place to the military. Accordingly, these works cannot explain the rise of military's influence in politics in 1990s.

Moreover, these scholars do not pay much attention to the policies followed by the civilian leaders in order to deal with the rise of Kurdish nationalism. Turkish scholars have long treated civilian leaders as too weak to be of any real consequence. They have not given much consideration to their influence over the military, particularly in the aftermath of transitions to democracy. However, Turkish civilian leaders are important, permanent fixtures of the Turkish political landscape. Moreover, they played a very important role in increasing civilian influence over politics in the aftermath of 1980 coup. Whether the military likes it or not, it must contend with the democratically elected civilian leaders that are not of their own choosing nor easily circumvented.[41]

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[40] Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, 120-1. All of these scholars, Jenkins, Cizre and Özbudun actually, by taking a longer period of time into consideration from late 1980s until late 1990s, alongside the rise of Kurdish nationalism also mention the rise of Islamic fundamentalism which was considered as a threat (by the military) to the secular character of the republic.

[41] Recently, there is some interest in the role of the civilian leaders. For a recent work on the effect of Turkish civilian leaders in the democratization process in the country see Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari eds. *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002)

In contrast, this study, constitutes a departure from the military-centric Turkish literature, by focusing on civilian leaders contributing to the more general trend in the civil-military literature outside of Turkey. In other words, it brings the civilian leaders back into how we understand civil-military relations. It takes the position that political leadership is important and that the incentives, actions, decisions and capabilities of civilian leaders matter a great deal in defining civil-military relations, particularly of the level of civilian influence over the military.

III. Framework of Analysis

This section offers a theoretical framework for understanding the ability of civilian leaders to exercise influence over the Turkish military between the late 1980s and mid 1990s by adopting—with certain modifications—the framework Wendy Hunter designed to explain the confrontation between military and civilian leaders in the aftermath of Brazil's transition to democracy in 1985.[42] Hunter argues that "electoral competition creates incentives for politicians to reduce the interference of a politically powerful and active military, and that the popular support certified by electoral victory enhances their capacity to do so."[43] She further argues that sufficient level of political capacity, alongside competitive elections, gives means to the civilian leaders to challenge

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[42] In this study Hunter tries to find an answer to the question how the elected politicians were able to contest the military in the aftermath of the transition to civilian rule in Brazil in 1985 despite the negotiated nature of the transition and the institutional privileges the armed forces retained in the transition. Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil,* 2.

[43] Ibid., 8 and 12.

the policies of the military and analyzes the institutional context as a conditioning factor shaping the actions of politicians.

This study effectively adapts Hunter's model by examining two periods (whereas Hunter examines one period only) that vary in degree of civilian influence over the military, which was significant in the first but lower in the second, and attempting to explain the increase in the civilian influence. It demonstrates how one civilian leader was able to challenge the politically powerful military, while another was forced to ally with the military as both attempted to follow their preferences.

1. Incentive Structure of the Leaders and the Rational Choices they make

Hunter's argument rests on the strategic calculations of self-interested politicians for whom electoral advancement is an overriding goal, and assumes that politicians will support specific policies in order to win votes. Hunter argues that competitive elections provide two kinds of incentives, particular and programmatic in electoral politics. Particularistic incentives involve the distribution of public resources to gain and keep constituencies, while programmatic incentives concern the endorsement of specific public policies (e.g. health, education, welfare and economic reform) that are more broadly popular with the electorate. Hunter examines how these incentives shaped the actions of the politicians toward the military in three issue areas in Brazil: Federal budget allocations, the strengthening of labor rights in the constitution and the military's interest in developing and occupying the Amazon region.[44]

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[44] First is on civil-military disputes over federal budget allocations. In this context, electoral competition has reinforced particularistic incentives associated with political clientelism. Consequently, the politicians

In Turkey, too, civilian leaders support particular policies in order to guarantee their political survival. While the particularistic incentives in Hunter's study of Brazil involved the distribution of economic resources in the federal budget to constituencies at the expense of the military, in this study particular incentives involve the intervention of civilians into the area of national security.[45] This study will show how in Turkey competitive elections create incentives and, when accompanied by an appropriate level of political capacity,—i.e., majority in parliament, strong political experience and successful performance in economics—the ability for civilian leaders to assert influence over the military in the critical issue areas of Kurdish nationalism and military promotions.

By adopting Hunter's premise that "politicians are first and foremost interested in their own political survival"[46] this study concentrates on the strategic calculations of civilian leaders. Inspired by the literature on rational choice, the argument focuses on actors and their intentions, explaining political action with reference to rational interest calculation. A rational choice framework argues that if economics can explain how agents behave in market situations, then it may also be able to clarify human behavior in other areas. This argument is based on the premise that actors choose the most effective

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distributed economic assets to their constituencies from the shares of federal budget at the expense of the military's budget with the purpose of guaranteeing their reelection. Second, politicians by strengthening labor rights in the constitution of 1988 as a programmatic incentive despite military's opposition gained electoral popularity. Third, politicians with the capabilities conferred by the electoral competition on them were able to oppose the military's strong interest in developing and occupying the Amazon region.

[45] In Turkey, Turkish military does not own state enterprises (with the exception of OYAK holding--Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund) and military officers do not hold any posts in large state enterprises. Therefore, there is no direct competition between civilians and the military over state resources. Moreover, for geopolitical reasons as the strategic location of Turkey forms a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, the members of the parliaments in general, regardless of their ideological stance accept military's proposal for budget without debate. Therefore, the civilians do not support the idea of any decrease in military's budget.

means of pursuing their goals.[47] The individual is conceptualized as a 'goal-directed actor' pursuing the best available means to some given end. Rational choice models explain political outcomes as a result of the 'optimal choices' of actors in specific situations acting on the basis on self interest. For these purposes, 'rationality' is defined as optimal correspondence between ends and means.[48] Rational choice theory considers the incentives apparent after working through cost-benefit calculations as the driving force behind political action.[49] In this study, civilian leaders—in order to remain in power—carefully calculate the cost of their actions and the benefits they expect to follow as a result of these actions.

Anthony Downs sees political parties as vote maximizers in a one-dimensional competitive space.[50] Similarly, leaders of these parties, once elected, act according to the wishes of their voters in order to be re-elected in the future. As Barbara Geddes argues, "people will choose the means they expect to be most likely to result in the ends they desire."[51] Simply stated, a rational choice perspective assumes that individuals, including politicians, are rational and that given a set of goals and a set of alternative strategies from which to choose, will choose alternatives that maximize their chances of achieving

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[46] Hunter rests her argument of 'electoral competition creating incentives for politicians to reduce the interference of a strong military' on the premise that 'the politicians are first and foremost interested in their own political survival.' Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil*, 8.

[47] George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 6.

[48] Tsebelis, *Nested Games,* 46

[49] See M. Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965)

[50] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, (New York: Harper, 1957)

[51] Barbara Geddes, "Uses and Limitations of Rational Choice in the Study of Politics in Developing Countries" Paper presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, Washington D.C. (September 1993), 3.

their goals.[52] In this study, when the civilian leaders have the choice of following certain policies that are likely, to help guarantee their political survival and reelection, they will try to pursue them —even if these policies run contrary to the preferences of the military. In other words, political leaders will confront the military when the military's ends conflict with the opportunity to gain widespread electoral support. Conversely, under other circumstances, such as when civilian leaders are not able to assert their opinions over military objections due to their weak political capacity, allying with the military may appear as better, more rational means of ensuring their political survival. In either case, the immediate aim of politicians is to retain power. In this study, one political leader is seen to respond to an internal threat by pursuing policies that conflicted with military ends while another adapts to the military preferences; this study will elucidate why their rational calculations took them in different directions.

2. Institutional Context and Institutionalism as a Theoretical Approach

Hunter argues that while politicians are challenging the military, they " are first and foremost interested in their own survival, and that the broad institutional context in which they operate structures their behavior."[53] Following this argument, she examines how institutional rules are conditioning factors that shape the behavior of the civilian leaders. In particular, she focuses on system of government (presidentialism versus parliamentarism), rules governing elections, the party system and internal party procedures. She then argues that in such a context, politicians' strategies for pursuing

[52] Ibid.

[53] Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence,* 8.

reelection will shape their conduct toward military.[54] This study also argues that the institutional context in which the politicians operate structures their behavior, focusing on the implications of Turkey's 'parliamentary system' and 'its highly centralized political parties.'

An institutionalist approach examines how institutions influence the behavior of the individuals through shaping their goals and the strategies by which these are pursued.[55] Nonetheless, rational choice and institutionalism need not necessarily complement each other. From a rational choice perspective, institutions result from the strategic interaction among individuals maximizing their self-interest; from an institutionalist perspective institutions set parameters for individual actors and their interest calculations, but are always open to further modification.[56] The main argument of the study, based on a rational choice perspective, addresses the incentive structure and strategic calculations of the civilian leaders in their attempts to guarantee their political survival. However, institutionalism is employed as a conditioning factor, in which the institutional rules shape politicians' strategies in pursuit of reelection.

What qualifies as an institution is usually a controversial issue as institutions range from specific characteristics of government institutions to more overarching structures of the state. Peter Hall defines institutions as "the formal rules, compliance

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[54] Ibid., 16-7.

[55] Steinmo and Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 6-7.

[56] For the details of rational choice institutionalism, which is sometimes used for describing the application of rational choice principles to explain how institutions develop and affect political and economic outcomes see Douglas C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kenneth A. Shepsle "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal Of Theoretical Politics," 1.2 (1989),131-147; Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, *The Limits of Rationality,* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990).

procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of polity and economy."[57] Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen argue that institutions are found throughout the entire range of state and societal institutions shaping how political actors define their interests and their relations with other groups. Also included in this perspective are such features of the institutional context as the structure of party systems, rules governing electoral competition, relations among the various branches of government, and the structure and organization of economic actors such as trade unions.[58]

While an older body of work on institutionalism focused on detailed configurative studies of different administrative, legal, and political structures which did not render itself open to comparative analysis, neo-institutionalism concentrates on intermediate institutions as it seeks to explain systematic differences across countries, including corporatist arrangements, policy networks linking economic groups to state bureaucracy and party structures.[59] It also analyzes the impact of state structures (state institutions), including constitutional frameworks (presidential vs parliamentary) and other formal rules on political outcomes.[60] Moreover, neo-institutionalists emphasize the relational

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[57] Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 19.

[58] Steinmo and Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 2.

[59] Ibid., 6-7.

[60] Hall, *Governing the Economy,* 19. Also see Peter Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and Three Institutionalism," *Political Studies*, v. 44, n. 5, (December 1996), 936-957; James G. March and J. P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *The American Political Science Review,* v. 78 (1984), 738-749.

character of institutions in analyzing how particular institutional arrangements shape political interactions among different actors in given polity.[61]

In this study the most significant institutional factor affecting the means by which leaders pursue their policies in an attempt to guarantee reelection is the system of governance. The greatest theoretical difference between Hunter's study on Brazil and this study of Turkey is that while former is a presidential system, the latter is a parliamentary one. In a parliamentary system, the civilian leadership must convince members of the parliament to support its policies, which is significantly easier if these leaders' party (or parties) hold the majority in parliament. As a consequence of parliamentary dynamics, the initial electoral support that brings a leadership team to power is not, in itself, sufficient to ensure that it will be able to pursue its policies. The leadership must also have a strong political capacity—which will be examined in depth in the next section—to form a consensus in their party and the parliament.

Another institutional factor influencing the way that Turkish civilian leaders institute their policies is the centralized organization of political parties which provides the leader of a party with near absolute control, thus creating highly personalized leader-oriented politics. Such a system permits party leaders to hold a great deal of personal power if they are experienced politicians. The combination of leader-oriented party

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[61] Steinmo and Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 6-7. Out of new institutionalism, three different analytical approaches appeared over the last two decades: Historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. All of these approaches seek to illustrate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes, however, they do this in different ways. While historical institutionalists see the institutional organization of the polity or political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behavior and generating distinctive outcomes, rational choice institutionalists argue that institutions are created by rational actors in pursuit of their interests. On the other hand, sociological institutionalists argue that many of institutional forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific practices akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations as a result of the kind of process associated with the transmission of cultural practices. See Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and Three Institutionalism."

system with a leader's strong experience can enable that leader to control the party completely. If the leader is not experienced, even such a centralized political party system will not necessarily permit him/her to command the party members.

3. Political Capacity of a Civilian Leader

In Hunter's case study of Brazil, 'political capacity' is introduced as an intervening variable. To understand political capacity, she examines the popular support or political mandate won through an electoral victory as an intervening variable that enhances the capacity of the political leaders to reduce the interference of a powerful military. She argues that the greater the popular backing a government enjoys, the less likely the military will be able to counteract civilian attempts to diminish its political role.[62] However, in the case of Turkey, a simple parliamentary majority, does not, by itself, have an explanatory power unless the leader of the party is experienced enough to consolidate the unity in the party.

Turkey has a parliamentary system of government and under such a system, because the fate of the government depends on party unity in the parliament, party discipline and cohesion are important determinants of political capacity. In this context, political experience is a critically important aspect of leadership. In a highly centralized party system, such as that in Turkey, in which party leaders can exercise absolute control

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[62] Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence*, 12. Hunter explains how Brazilian President Collor was able to challenge the armed forces in the initial stages of his government as a result of capturing 53 percent of the vote in 1989. Hunter also mentions that Collor's predecessor President Sarney, (1985-1990) did not have the necessary authority to stand against military due to his weak parliamentary mandate which was a result of the non-electoral route by which he came to power. Along the same line, Hunter explains how President Franco, who replaced Collor in 1992 without an electoral mandate of his own showed great timidity to increase civilian dominance.

over party organizations, experienced leaders are able to use their political skills to hold their parties together and influence the membership to arrive at a consensus on various issues. The coalescence of civilian support on the fundamentals of certain strategic issues can limit the military's ability to influence government policy.[63] On the other hand, political polarization, perhaps as a result of inexperienced leadership, can provide the military with the motive or opportunity to interfere in politics. With regard to the creation of confidence in the leadership and the maintenance of discipline, the performance of political leaders in the economic field is also significant in determining leader's political capacity. In any country, a primary concern of the majority of the population will be improving their financial well-being. Consequently, performing well in economics is likely to bring popular support and strengthen the position of a civilian leader and party.

For these reasons, this study goes beyond Hunter's electoral victory/ popular support as the sole criteria for measuring the political capacity. In the Turkish case, the experience of civilian leaders depends on their ability to forge a consensus within the parliament and their performance on economic issues. Political leaders who prove to have a high level of political capacity will see this reflected in their ability to pursue their own policies without interference from outside forces, particularly the military. Conversely, leaders without significant political capacity will find their options constrained and their prerogatives challenged by a strong military.

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[63] See Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy*, 31 for the significance of unity for civilian forces.

Conclusion

Civilian-military relations is a broad process involving a civilian and a military side to the relation and the impact of both sides on their relations. So far, the civil-military literature has not paid sufficient attention to the impact of civilian initiatives on the relationship, particularly when it comes to the role played by civilian leaders in democratic regimes. In general, the role of civilian leaders has been taken up in these studies only to show their weaknesses and failures in order to rationalize military's intervention into politics. This study seeks to correct this by contributing a civilian-centric analysis to the scholarship by exploring the role of civilian leaders through an examination of how competitive elections create incentives for leaders to contest a military that is prone to political interference and endowed with extensive institutional prerogatives. The study also analyzes the strength of the political support and the political capacity of the leaders to succeed in such endeavors, which is reflected in their political experience and performance in their economic policy. The institutional context is also taken into consideration as a contributing set of factors which conditions politicians' strategies for pursuing reelection, which in turn shapes their influence over the military.

It is only through a closer look at the role played by civilian leaders in their relations with the military that one can better understand how civilian leaders may have a greater scope for action than is suggested by the military-centric literature. Contrary to the prevailing view that internal threats caused shifts in the role of the military in Turkish politics between late 1980s and mid 1990s, this study suggests that it was actually the civilian leadership that determined the role the military played in politics. In order to analyze how civilian leaders determined the degree of military influence over politics in

1980s and 1990s, it is necessary to understand the traditional role of the military in Turkish politics. The next chapter will analyze the historical background of the Turkish military's role in the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF MILITARY IN TURKISH POLITICS

Introduction

The Turkish military has always played an important role in Turkish political life. Throughout Turkish history, —during the tribal life in Central Asia between sixth and eighth centuries, the imperial life of Ottoman Empire extending into three continents (Asia, Europe and Africa), between thirteenth and twentieth centuries and the period of current modern Turkish Republic—the military has always maintained its dominance in politics as well as the social life. It assisted Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in establishing the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and supported his reforms aimed at westernizing and modernizing the country. Consequently, the military, which appointed itself the guardian of Atatürk's reforms and principles, has not hesitated to intervene in politics whenever it perceived threats to these reforms and principles.[1]

This chapter provides an overview of the role of the military in Turkish politics by briefly analyzing the historical background of the military's political prominence during the Ottoman Empire and by examining the parameters of Kemalist state traditions during the Republican period. Moreover, while exploring the factors behind the three military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980, this chapter will also examine privileges the military engaged in the aftermath of each military intervention. These increasing political

[1] Atatürk's reforms and the principles will be explained in the next section.

privileges of the military will be studied as mechanisms through which the military has been exerting its power in politics. The chapter will also analyze the public legitimacy of the military. Finally, the chapter will explore political developments in the aftermath of the 1980 coup by briefly explaining the increase of civilian control over politics during Premiership and Presidency of Turgut Özal.

I. The Role of Military in Politics during Ottoman Empire Period:

The Turks first appeared in history as an army rather than a nation during sixth and eighth centuries in Central Asia. They were warrior nomads who conquered and then resumed their nomadic life style. In the eleventh century the Turks moved in various waves from Central Asia and conquered most of Anatolia, establishing the Ottoman Empire in 1299, which eventually became one of the greatest in the world. The Ottoman Empire was created by the military through conquest and initially, administered along military lines.[2] The frontiers of the empire was "determined by what its armies could control."[3] As historian Albert Lybyer has stated, the Ottoman empire was "an army before it was anything else" and the government kept itself in power, defending and enlarging the empire, by organizing itself as an army.[4] As a result of its military victories, the Ottoman Empire reached its peak during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

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[2] See Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics,* The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 337 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),10.

[3] Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 2-3.

[4] Albert Howe Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Age of Suleiman the Magnificient,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), 90.

during which time it extended from the Caspian Sea in the east, to the Austrian border in the west and from southern Russia in the north to northern Africa in the south.

Ottoman society was divided into two major classes. There was a sharp social and cultural cleavage between the Ottoman elite of the imperial center and the Anatolian peasantry on the periphery. Alongside members of the civil bureaucracy and religious officials, members of the army were also part of the imperial center. Subject people, comprised of all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government, formed the periphery.[5] Throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, the military nature of the state and concentration of political power in the hands of the sultan, military and bureaucrats hindered the formation of representative institutions, in contrast with the feudal traditions of western Europe.[6] The military, called the Janissary corps,[7] occupied an important position in the imperial political structures.[8] In the Ottoman Empire all the land belonged to the Sultan, thus prohibiting the accumulation of the *capital.* Therefore, neither an aristocratic nor a bourgeois class was permitted to develop. Instead, all state functions were carried out by the army. The army fought for

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[5] Nilüfer Narli, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *Turkish Studies,* Vol. , No. 1 (Spring 2000), 107-8. For center-periphery conflict see Serif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Conflict: A Key to Turkish Politics," *Deadalus,* Vol. 102 (1973), 169-90.

[6] Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," in *Politics in Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences with Democracy* eds., Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 220-223.

[7] Janissary Corps were formed based on the institution of the devsirme (conversion) which involved the drafting of young boys from the subject Christian population, their conversion to Islam, and rigorous training to serve the empire either as officers in the palace or soldiers in the military.

[8] Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey," *Comparative Politics,* 14 (October 1983), 18-19.

the empire, collected taxes, administered the provinces, supervised agricultural production, and looked after state enterprises.[9]

Modernization of the Ottoman Empire from the seventeenth century onward was interwoven with the activities of the Ottoman military. Once the Ottoman military began to lose wars on different fronts in the eighteenth century, it started looking for ways to adapt the technology and organization of a superior European power.[10] In 1792, Sultan Selim III established a modern army called the *Nizam-i Cedit* (new order), whose officers were trained by European instructors. Ottoman military schools were eventually transformed into leading Western-style educational institutions for the new Ottoman elite. The Ottoman military officers who were sent to Europe for training returned with ideas to westernize the state in ways that went beyond the military to include issues such as education and administration.[11] Alongside western military technology, the Ottomans imported European legal codes, written constitutions, and secular ministries while establishing embassies in Europe, new schools of medicine, westernized institutions of higher education, secular schools, railroads, telegraph and postal service, and a daily

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[9] Bener Karakartal, "Turkey: The Army as Guardian of the Political Order," in *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, eds., Christopher Clapham and George Philip, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 47; Ali Kazancigil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism," in *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun, (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981), 41-3. Since the system involved the domination of the political structures over the market, an economic elite did not emerge in the Ottoman Empire until the eighteenth century; before that the Ottoman state machinery controlled productive processes through the *timar* system. Under the *timar* system, the state gave a share of agricultural taxes to a designated region--usually consisting of several villages--in return for military service as a cavalryman and assistance in the provincial administration. By the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire started to be incorporated into the capitalist world economy thanks to the dissolution of the *timar* system and its replacement by *iltizam* (tax-farming), and extension of commercial farming (*çiftlik*), which provided local notables with substantial economic and social power.

[10] Dankward Rustow, "Turkish Democracy in Historical and Comparative Perspective," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds., Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 3 and see Pinar Tank, "Turkey as a Special Case for the EU. Will the Generals retreat from Politics?" *Security Dialogue,* Vol. 32(2), (2001), 219.

press. Moreover, the non-Muslim population started receiving equal rights with the Muslim population.[12] All of these westernization projects were spearheaded by a new generation of elites trained, for the most part, in military academies.

In 1908, a little over one hundred years after military westernization began, a group of Ottoman officers captured power (in what is called the "Young Turk Revolution" in the West) and pressured the Sultan to introduce constitutional rule. A decade later, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)[13] and other generals transformed the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation state. In all, for two hundred years, the military has acted as Turkey's principal modernizer.[14] Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), then an Ottoman general, initiated the War of Independence and expelled allied forces from Turkish lands and, in 1923, established the Republic of Turkey. Consequently, the Ottoman tradition of maintaining close military-state ties continued during the Republican era, giving the military a dominant role in politics.

II. The Role of Military in Politics during the Republican Period

Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk pursued a series of social reforms to modernize and westernize the country. He banned the sultanate, established a republican system and founded the Republican

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[11] Ibid., 3-4.

[12] Ibid., 4.

[13] Mustafa Kemal received his last name Atatürk (which means father of Turks) after the Republic of Turkey was founded.

People's Party. (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP) This was a period of radical, secularizing reforms that included banning of the caliphate, religious orders and Qur'anic schools; the adoption of the Swiss civil code to replace the *sharia* (Islamic law); the replacement of the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet; acceptance of various Western codes in the fields of penal, commercial, and procedural law; restriction on the wearing of religious garb; shifting of the weekly day of rest from the Islamic Friday to the Western Sunday, and the extension of modern civil rights to women. In all of this, the military was the major actor assisting Atatürk in the implementation of his radical reforms.

In addition to these reforms, Mustafa Kemal laid down principles which, in 1937, were incorporated into Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution when they were formally recognized as official state ideology, as well as that of the regime's party, the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi.* These principles include statism, nationalism, republicanism, secularism, reformism and populism. While some of these principles, such as secularism and nationalism have since been challenged, republicanism, reformism, and populism—except for during some uprisings in the early years of the republic—have not been threatened. Statism, however, gradually lost its significance.

Statism *(étatisme)*, which refers to all forms of state intervention in society, but primarily indicates the state's leading, and indeed directive, role in the development of the economy has been placed first, by mixed economy (mixture of state and market economy) and then, by liberal market economy. Reformism *(revolutionism)* refers to the orderly execution of radical changes and methodical replacement of traditional

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[14] Dankward Rustow, "The Military: Turkey," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* eds., R. E. Ward and D. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 352.

institutions.[15] In the early years of the republic, most of these changes took through Atatürk's reforms. Besides the reforms concerning secularism, these reforms did not face a serious challenge.[16] Republicanism first legitimates the abolition of the Sultanate and, secondly, indicates that the ends to which the regime was supposedly heading were democratic. Republicanism, as the fundamental principle of the new Turkish state, introduces a modern concept of national sovereignty.[17] Besides a couple of uprisings in the early years of the republic, the principle of republicanism was not challenged either. Populism contains both the democratic principle of popular sovereignty (governance of the 'people with the people for the people') and a concern for the welfare of the people.[18] Populism did not face any threat either.[19]

Secularism refers to the differentiation of state and religion, following the state's initiative, and is primarily concerned with the separation of church (in this context, mosque) and state. The principle of secularism in the Turkish context is more extensive than in its Western counterpart. In addition to freeing the legislative, executive and judiciary powers from religious influence, secularism undermines many national traditions that shape social, individual or family matters according to the dictates of religion. Atatürk wanted to wipe away those religious traditions standing in the way of

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[15] See Paul Brooker, *Twentieth Century Dictatorships, The Ideological One-Party States* (New York: New York University Press, 1995) 244-46.

[16] See Enver Ziya Karal, "The Principles of Kemalism," in *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun, (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981), 23. Karal explains Atatürk's argument that life was based on the requirements of the world and therefore, these reforms would change according to those requirements, thus the reformism principle of Kemalism was not frozen.

[17] Brooker, *Twentieth Century Dictatorships,* 244-46 and Karal, "The Principles of Kemalism," 16.

[18] Ibid., 244-46.

[19] See Karal, "The Principles of Kemalism, 19-20.

social liberties.[20] Secularism has, so far, been the most controversial Kemalist principle and has faced many challenges due to the difficulties of separating religion from social life in a predominantly Muslim society.

The principle of nationalism insists on the creation and strengthening of a Turkish nation-state, based upon an ideal of Turkish linguistic and cultural solidarity that does not acknowledge religious or racial differences. All citizens are included into the Turkish nation, irrespective of their historical origins or language spoken. The main idea behind this concept of nation was the attempt to create, in the aftermath of collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a nationally and culturally homogenous, unified state on the territory of the Turkish Republic with the help of a new integrating ideology of Turkish nationalism.[21] As a result of this Kemalist definition of the Turkish nation and resulting principle of equality, any expression of Kurdish identity was effectively banned, meaning that the Kurds could only enjoy equality as members of the Turkish nation. However, the Kurds were denied equality of opportunity in terms of fostering and developing their identity, culture and language. These policies of assimilation and homogeneity followed by Turkish governments have eventually led to the violent Kurdish resistance movements. [22] Another component of the Kemalist concept of nationalism, alongside national unity, is the territorial integrity of the country. The constitutional principle of

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[20] Ibid., 22-23.

[21] Andrew Mango, "Kemalism in a New Century," in *Turkish Transformation, New Century-New Challenges*, ed., Brian Breely, (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 2002), 25 and 29.

[22] Gülistan Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey since the 1980s," in *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, eds., Robert Olson (Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 10 and Gülistan Gürbey, "Peaceful Settlement Through Autonomy," in *The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey*, eds., Ferhad Ibrahim and Gülistan Gürbey (New York: St. Martin Press, 2000), 62.

territorial integrity, as stated in Article 3 of 1982 Constitution, references the "indivisible unity of a state's people and its territory," and plays a significant role in issues regarding minorities. According to this article, the granting of cultural autonomy or right to self-administration may be restricted to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country.[23]

As founders of the country and supporters of Kemalist reforms and ideology, the Turkish military assigned itself the task of protecting these reforms and principles from any kind of challenge. Since the majority of the reforms and the principles have been accepted by the population, or, like statism, have lost their significance, they have not created any particularly difficult predicaments for the military. However, some reforms and principles have remained under challenge. Among these are the secularity principle, which is challenged by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and nationalism, which is challenged by the rise of Kurdish nationalism. Once such threats emerge the military has proven willing to intervene, as its so-called "soft coup" of 1997, when it banned the pro-Islamist party from politics and similarly during its intervention into the civilian politics to conduct its fight against the Kurdish Workers Party, the PKK, in the 1990s.

In the early years of the republic, Atatürk wanted to separate the military from the ordinary conduct of political affairs. Although he resigned from military to become the first president of the country,[24] it was his status as a nationalist military hero that gave him the authority to pursue his reforms. He insisted that all the officers who wished to pursue politics resign from the military. However, through retired or resigned[25] officers,

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Atatürk served as the first president of Republic of Turkey from October 1923 until he died in November 1938.

[25] These were the officers who quit their positions in the military in order to enter politics.

the military officers until the 1940s accounted for about a twenty percent of all deputies in the National Assembly and more than a quarter of cabinet ministers. Atatürk's former military colleagues were also solidly established in the top positions of the executive of the ruling CHP, and throughout 1920s and 1930s Atatürk employed former military officers in important administrative posts.[26] For example, İsmet İnönü, who served as prime minister for the majority of the time between 1923 and 1938, was one of the leading military commanders of the nationalist struggle. For these reasons, it can be said that the country was ruled by "former soldiers in civilian clothes."[27]

The CHP, which ruled the country as a single party for 27 years was able to maintain its power and implement its reforms with the support of the military.[28] Although the party never approached a totalitarian party model, the regime's authoritarian tendencies intensified with the failure of its two attempts to create a multi-party system.[29] After the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi*), founded in 1924, became a rallying point for opponents to Atatürk's reform program including monarchists, separatists and Islamic conservatives, it was dissolved in the backlash against the Kurdish rebellion of Sheyh Sait in 1925.[30] Similarly, the establishment of the

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[26] Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elites* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), 181 and 283. According to Frey although the Republican People's Party regime was civilian, persons conditioned by military experience and trusted by military personnel were at the mainspring of power.

[27] Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance,* 10.

[28] Ergun Özbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics* (Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1966), 8.

[29] Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," 227.

[30] Dankward Rustow, "The Political Parties in Turkey: An Overview," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* eds., Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (New York: St. Martin Press, 1991), 460. During Sheyk Said Revolt most of southeastern and eastern Turkey was occupied in an attempt to establish an independent Kurdistan. The revolt was suppressed by the Turkish military.

Free Party (*Serbest Firka*) in 1930, with Atatürk's encouragement, as a second attempt to create a multi-party system did not work out after members of the fundamentalist and conservative opposition joined the party. The suppression of these opposition parties, with the help of the military, marked the end of the first semi-pluralistic phase of the Kemalist regime. Atatürk tried to open up the political system through supporting the formation of opposition parties. However, both of these attempts failed when the opposition parties challenged his principles. When monarchists threatened the regime's republicanism principle, and Islamic conservatives and Kurdish separatists challenged secularism and nationalism principles respectively, Atatürk proved unwilling to tolerate any kind of opposition to the core principles and reforms of the republic. Atatürk wished to see his reforms successfully implemented while maintaining law and order. Consequently, in the early years of Republic of Turkey, the military demonstrated its support for Atatürk's principles by indirectly intervening into politics and maintaining the establishment of the republic.

1. Transition to Multi-Party Period

In the aftermath of World War II, thanks to the Soviet Union's expansionist policies, Turkey was forced to ally with Western nations and to open up its political system. In 1946, after 27 years of single party rule, Turkey held its first competitive election. Although the incumbent CHP won the 1946 elections, the 1950 elections brought victory for the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes whose cadre was composed of a breakaway faction of Atatürk's CHP.

The old center-periphery cleavage of the Ottoman Empire continued during the early Republican era.[31] While the CHP represented the center (the military, civilian bureaucrats and some large landowners), the DP represented the periphery (urban poor, commercial middle classes, religious conservatives and the rural population).[32] Early during the Republican period, the military, civilian bureaucracy and the large landowners continued to hold political power. However, due to rising standards of living and the beginnings of industrialization, commercialization of the economy and the expansion of education, a new middle class began to emerge during the Democratic Party period, and these newly developing groups who were previously excluded became engaged in politics.[33]

The emergence of commercial entrepreneurs and businessmen eventually decreased the power and significance of the twin pillars of Kemalist regime, the military and the civilian bureaucracy.[34] These two groups experienced both a loss of social status and political influence under the regime of the Democrats as a result of significant rise in the inflation. This rise rooted from DP's economic policies of rapid import-substitution based industrialization and modernization of agriculture, which was pursued through external borrowing. As a result of these inflationary policies, the civil and military bureaucrats suffered material losses as their salaries failed to keep up with rapidly rising

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[31] Narli, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," 108.

[32] Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," 230.

[33] James Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case," *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 25 (July 1989), 388; Henri J. Barkey, "The Struggles of a 'Strong' State," *Journal of International Affairs*, v. 54, n. 1 (Fall 2000), 95.

[34] Tachau and Heper, "The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey," 20.

costs.[35] Moreover, Prime Minister Menderes interfered in appointments and promotions in the military throughout his term in office, thus alienating the officer corps by basing promotions on personal loyalty to his party.[36]

Alongside their deteriorating political influence and decreasing salaries, the armed forces were not also happy with the Democratic Party policies that permitted wider grounds for religious practice and education in an attempt to appeal to the religious sentiments of the peasantry. The Democrats lifted the ban on the recital of the *ezan* (the call to prayer) in Arabic, permitted the broadcasting of readings from Koran over the state radio, broadened the scope of religious education, built new mosques, increased the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and tolerated the revival of religious orders and fundamentalist religious movements.[37]

Democratic Party's failure in its economic policies led to the decline of its popular support. The party responded to this situation by resorting to increasingly authoritarian measures against the opposition. The Democratic Party government became more politically repressive and restricted the activities of the Republicans by passing a series of laws that severely limited the rights of the opposition. DP leaders who were originally CHP members had inherited authoritarian attitudes and norms common to a single party system and believed that a popular mandate gave the government the right to use political

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[35] Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," 230; Tachau and Heper, "The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey," 21.

[36] James Brown, "The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey: The Kemalist Tradition," in *The Decline of Military Regimes, The Civilian Influence,* ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos, (Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1988), 134; Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case," 388.

[37] See Ali Yasar Saribay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey,* eds., Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 540.

power without restriction.[38] To gain political advantage, opposition parties were not provided equal air time with the governing party on the state radio, press laws were tightened and many journalists were jailed. A parliamentary investigation committee (formed of DP deputies granted judicial powers) was established to investigate the "subversive activities of the Republicans and the press.[39] These authoritarian measures, coupled with an economic crisis, led to rising popular resentment. Increasing public unrest, student demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara, clashes between the students and the police and, finally, the Democratic Party government's attempt to use military power to repress the opposition and protests, resulted in a coup.[40]

In 1960, the military's main motivation for ousting the Menderes government from power was resistance to the authoritarian policies followed by the DP. However, the DP government's anti-secular policies, attempts to influence appointments in the military and the decline of the social status of the military as a result of the inflationary policies also contributed to the armed forces' decision to undertake the 1960 coup.[41] The 1960 military intervention and the execution of three leaders of the DP, including Prime Minister Menderes, kept the civilian leaders after Menderes from challenging either the

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[38] Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," 232; Ilkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects" in O'Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 173-174. Menderes government was able to apply such authoritarian measures toward opposition with the help of the Constitution. The 1924 Constitution which did not have a system of effective checks and balances to check the power of elected majorities enabled Democratic Party to enjoy an unlimited majority rule.

[39] Saribay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960," 538-539.

[40] Brown, "The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey: The Kemalist Tradition," 134; Roderic H. Davison, *Turkey,* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 151-53; Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," 231-232.

[41] Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance,* 26; For a discussion of this subject see Ümit. Cizre, "Egemen Ideoloji ve Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri, Kavramsal ve Iliskisel Bir Analiz," in *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti, Türkiye'de Ordu,*" eds., Ahmet Insel and Ali Bayramoglu, (Istanbul: Birikim Yayinlari, 2004), 146-7.

military or principles of Atatürk, at least until the period of Prime Minister Turgut Özal who both interfered in the process of military promotion and challenged the "nationalism" principle of Atatürk by attempting to grant cultural rights to the Kurds.

2. The 1960 Military Intervention

In the aftermath of the 27 May 1960 coup, the Democratic Party was banned and three of its leaders were executed. Civilian rule resumed within a year in the form of a coalition between the newly formed Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-AP), a successor of Democratic Party under Süleyman Demirel's leadership, and the Republican People's Party (CHP).[42] A new constitution was established in 1961.

The military's influence was strongly felt during the 1961 constitution-making. While it expanded civil liberties and granted extensive social rights to citizens, it limited the power of elected organs by creating an effective system of checks and balances.[43] The 1961 Constitution first, established the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*-MGK) which provided a legal forum for the military to communicate their views to the civilian politician. Under Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution, National Security Council was composed of the Prime Minister, ministers to be determined by law, the Chief of the General Staff, and representatives of the armed forces, (i.e, army, navy, and

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[42] For a detailed analysis of Justice Party's relations with the military, see Ümit Cizre-Sakallioglu, *AP-Ordu Iliskileri, Bir Ikilemin Anatomisi.* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1993)

[43] These checks included the introduction of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws; strengthening of Council of State, which functions as the highest the administrative court, with review powers over all executive agencies; full independence for the judiciary; creation of a second chamber of Legislative Assembly; improved job security for civil servants, especially judges; and granting substantial administrative autonomy to certain public agencies, such as the universities and the Radio and Television Corporation. See Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," 233.

the air forces), chaired by the President of the Republic. The council was authorized to submit its views to the Council of Ministers to assist them in decision making and to coordinate on issues of national security.[44] Although the council had an advisory, rather than a decision-making role, and the number of civilian members was greater than the number of military members,[45] merely forming such a council gave the military continuous access to, and influence over governmental decisions.[46]

Second, this new constitution made the Chief of the General Staff directly responsible to the Prime Minister. The position of the Turkish Chief of the General Staff went through three stages: while subject to the Prime Minister under 1924 Constitution, in 1949, it was placed under the control of the Minister of National Defense, and with the 1961 Constitution returned to being the responsibility of the Prime Minister.[47] As a result of this change in protocol, the Chief of the General Staff came to rank ahead of the Minister of National Defense and second only to the Prime Minister, a situation that necessarily increases the military's involvement in politics.[48]

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[44] See Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 107-8.

[45] As opposed to the chief of the general staff and three force representatives, prime minister and a number of ministers formed the civilian members of the council. While some of the ministers were specified, others were left to prime minister's discretion. The prime minister could invite ministers whose positions were relevant to the situation on the agenda of the meeting.

[46] Serap Yazici, *Türkiye'de Askeri Mudaheleler ve Anayasal Etkileri,* (Ankara: Yetkin Basim Yayim ve Dagitim, 1997), 84-85.

[47] Ibid., 159.

[48] According to two separate laws (passed in 1970) which specified the duties of the Minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff, the latter received an autonomy in determining defense policy, military budget, future weapon system, production and procurement of arms, intelligence gathering, internal security and all promotions. Rather than the Minister of National Defense, the incumbent Chief of the General Staff selects his own successor, and suggests the candidate to the Prime Minister and the President. Ministry of National Defense does not have authority over the Turkish General Staff. Its responsibilities are only confined to conscription and arrangement of office for the army, rather than determining the defense policy. Moreover, the ministry is staffed primarily by serving officers. While the

Third, in 1965, the National Intelligence Agency (*Milli İstihbarat Teskilati*-MIT), which is subject to prime ministerial control, gave priority to the military to share its information although the military had its own intelligence operation units. The Agency is usually headed by a retired or serving officer or general. So far besides a brief period during Özal's premiership, elected officials and the Grand National Assembly have not established effective control over the policies and operations of the Agency.[49]

Finally, the leader of the 1960 military intervention, General Cemal Gürsel was elected fourth president of the Republic, and the subsequent three presidents of the republic were also retired military officers (General Cevdet Sunay, Admiral Fahri Korutürk, General Kenan Evren, the leader of 1980 coup), establishing a tradition of presidents arising out of a military background.[50] This tradition ended with the election of politicians Turgut Özal, in 1989, and Süleyman Demirel, in 1993, as the eighth and ninth presidents respectively, and judge Ahmet Necdet Sezer, in 2000, as the tenth president.

Following a period of unstable coalition governments in the aftermath of 1961 election, the newly formed Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-AP), a successor to Democratic Party gained a majority of the votes in both the 1965 and 1969 elections. However, toward the end of the 1960s, the Turkish political system began to experience new

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ministry undersecretary is traditionally a serving three-star general, various departments are headed by serving one and two star generals. See Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military,* 294 and Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*,44.

[49] Cizre-Sakallioglu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics*, (January 1997), 161.

[50] The first two presidents of the republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü were originally military-men who played important roles in the War of Independence (1919-1922) The third president Celal Bayar, who was the first civilian president was held responsible from the public unrest by the 1960 coup and imprisoned.

problems. Extreme right and left-wing groups appeared on the political scene, as a result of the more liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution. Relations between the military and the government became tense in the late 1960s thanks to increased student demonstrations, labor union strikes, and political discontent caused by the deepening political cleavages. Extreme ideological and political polarization led to large-scale domestic turmoil, which caused the military to intervene in March 1971 through a memorandum.

3. The 1971 Military Intervention by Memorandum

In March 1971, the AP government, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, was held by the military to be responsible for driving the country into anarchy, provoking violence and social and economic unrest. Demirel government was forced to resign after the generals delivered an ultimatum to the president. The 1971 coup did not go as far as to dissolve the parliament and assume power directly. Instead, the military encouraged the formation of an "above-party" or technocratic government and a non-partisan cabinet to impose martial law, suppress newspapers, outlaw strikes, arrest hundreds of extremists from both the left and the right and dissolve the leftist Turkish Workers Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) and the pro-Islamist National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*). During the following two years, Turkey was administered by governments dominated by technocrats under the watchful eye of the military.

The 1971 and 1973 constitutional amendments increased the military's autonomy within the state apparatus by strengthening its already legitimized position in the

executive.[51] The status of the National Security Council was revised through an amendment of Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution. While the 1961 Constitution stated that the armed forces' representatives would join the National Security Council, the 1971 version replaced "representatives" with "commanders," meaning that the five commanders of the army automatically became members of the National Security Council, thus strengthening the status of the military on the council. The National Security Council's powers were further strengthened by substituting the expression *recommends* for *submits* and dropping the words to "assist": "The National Security Council *recommends* the required basic views to the Council of Ministers concerning national security and ensuring coordination."[52] Consequently, the National Security Council was given greater authority to become involved in politics.

In October 1973, Turkey returned to elected civilian rule, ending thirty months of indirect rule by the armed forces. In the 1973 elections, none of the six parties won a majority. Bülent Ecevit, who replaced İsmet İnönü as leader of the Republican Peoples Party, put forth an unlikely coalition with the pro-Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-MSP). D uring the late 1970s, Turkey was ruled by a series of short-lived, unstable and internally divided coalition governments that included ultra-nationalist and Islamist parties. Turkish politics during this period was characterized by

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[51] See Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, 57 and 111. These amendments first increased the institutional autonomy of the military by excluding it from review by civilian administrative courts and the Court of the Account. The military could pass a law to adjust the powers of the minister of defense. Another amendment created the Supreme Military Administrative Court which was responsible from judicial review of administrative acts and actions involving military personnel. Consequently, this amendment e xempted t he military f rom r eview b y t he c ivilian a dministrative c ourt. S ee B en L ombardi, "Turkey-Return of the Generals," *Political Science Quarterly,* v.112, n. 2 (1997), 205-6. The reversal of articles 141,142, and 163 allowed the state courts to arrest and detain any suspect leftist or right-wing Islamist regardless of the presence or absence of a crime.

[52] Law No. 1488, which passed on 20 September 1971 also see Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 108.

fragmentation and polarization, and by a lack of decisive action on the part of the government. Polarization did not only dominate the political parties, but also the organized labor, the teaching profession, the civil bureaucracy and even the police. As a result, political violence increased, in the form of clashes between ultra-nationalist militants and radical-leftists, urban guerilla terrorism, sectarian antagonism, and union strikes, in addition strife arising from a deteriorating economy. Domestic inflation was in excess of 80 percent and unemployment was running around 15 percent. The 1970s also witnessed a reawakening of Kurdish nationalism in the form of a leftist movement and the re-emergence of political Islam. The military had continued warning the civilian governments to take measures to control domestic violence.[53] However, growing political violence and terrorism between 1975 and 1980 left more than 5000 people dead and three times as many wounded. Such political chaos eventually led to the 1980 military intervention.[54]

As a consequence of political instability during the years between the 1960s and 1980s, and as a result of the increased powers the armed forces gained in the 1961 Constitution and the 1971-1973 amendments, military control over politics dramatically increased.

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[53] On many occasions military leaders issued outright threats of intervention. For example in January 1975, Chief of the General Staff Semih Sancar warned that "the Army will not stay away from the nation's problems." *Hürriyet,* (Istanbul daily) 1 July 1975. The National Security Council also reported warned the politicians both privately and publicly, at least six times during the first eight months of 1980. See *Milliyet,* (Istanbul daily) 3 January 1980.

[54] Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," 235-6; Tachau and Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey," 24-25.

4. The 1980 Military Intervention:

By the time the military intervened on September 12, 1980, with growing economic problems, rising inflation, unemployment, and balance of payment deficits, together with increasing public disorder and political violence between various political, ethnic and religious groups, the Turkish state was on the verge of falling apart.[55] Military intervention in politics and the termination of political violence was greeted with relief by most of the public.[56] Following the military intervention, the leader of the coup, General Kenan Evren, promised to return to civilian rule within a reasonable time.

Following the 1980 military intervention, the military assumed full executive and legislative powers. For 38 months, the armed forces ruled the country and attempted to restructure the political system by making changes in three significant areas: first, the military reorganized the legal structure of the government; second, it took precautions to ensure that the new legal framework would not be filled with old political actors; third, it put itself in a position to observe and influence the performance of the new governments.[57] As a central aspect of the reorganization of the legal structure, the military administration prepared the conservative 1982 Constitution to replace the liberal 1961 Constitution. In an attempt to prevent a return to the chaos of the previous decade,

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[55] Brown, "The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey," 137.

[56] The leader of the coup General Kenan Evren stated, the purpose of the coup as follows: To maintain national unity; to restore the security of life and property by preventing anarchy and terrorism; To insure the primacy of state's authority and to protect it; To secure social peace and insure national understanding and solidarity; To render operational the secular republic system based on social justice, individual rights and freedoms and human rights; Finally, after concluding the legal arrangements, to reinstate the civilian administration within a reasonable time. Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anilari*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1990)

[57] John H. McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic," *The Middle East Journal*, v.39, n.1 (Winter 1985), 70.

a total of 669 new laws were enacted during this period. The public approved the constitution by a referendum. By voting in favor of the referendum, the electorate also enabled General Evren to assume the presidency of the Republic.[58]

The 1982 Constitution put strict limits on individual rights and attempted to create a two-party political system. It sought to strengthen the office of the president from its former ceremonial role to one of importance and power. It replaced the unicameral legislature with a bicameral one in order to eliminate an arena of political contestation. All of the political parties of pre-1980 period were outlawed.[59] In an attempt to bring new political actors to the stage, provisional Article Four of the new constitution banned virtually all officials who had belonged to any political parties prior to the September 1980 coup from being active in politics for a period of ten years. This constitutional prohibition also disallowed all former deputies from being involved in creating and leading new parties. Moreover, politics was restricted to political parties by restraining members of the bureaucracy, associations (including unions and government employees), military, police, judges, and faculty members at universities from having any ties to any political parties. Unions were banned from political activities and the right to strike was curtailed. In addition, the press was controlled by legislation. For any activities that were seen as putting national security in danger, the press was assigned heavy fines, subject to closures and imprisonment. The rationale for these restrictions was to force these

[58] Although General Evren could easily won a separate vote to assume the presidency with the support he was receiving from people, the National Security Council chose to have a unified vote on both questions.

[59] Originally, the military had no intention of closing the major political parties at the time of the intervention. It intended to prosecute the members of the parliament who were suspected of illegal activities. However, when the politicians insistently tried to influence events behind the scenes, the military leaders decided to close all the political parties. See Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anilari*, vol.1 (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1990), 525-526.

associations to concentrate on their core functions rather than becoming involved in political agitation as they did in the pre-1980 period.[60]

Another set of rules regarding the new political order dealt with the laws governing the establishment of the political parties. A ten percent threshold of national votes was put in place for entrance into the National Assembly so as to avoid the experiences of the previous decade when parliament became stalemated due to the lack of a clear majority. Additionally, in order to encourage better discipline within Assembly groups, a member of the Assembly who resigned from his party was prohibited from running in the next election on the ticket of any party in existence at the time of his resignation.[61]

President Evren and others on National Security Council ensured themselves a position from which they could watch over the political process. Provisional Article 1 of the 1982 Constitution made acceptance of the charter contingent upon electing General Evren as President of the Republic for a seven year term. Consequently, General Evren's presidency guaranteed the military a presence at the highest level of decision-making. A Presidential Council composed of the five generals of the junta was formed to examine the performance of the legislature in passing laws and of the bureaucracy in implementing those laws.

The 1982 Constitution, which was designed to protect the country from extensive violence and political polarization, aimed at increasing the military's autonomy in politics. The constitution was planned to maintain the military as the ultimate guardian

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[60] See McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic," 71-72; Brown, "The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey," 139; Also see Henri J. Barkey, "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 16 No.2 (Winter 1990) 179.

and arbiter of the political system through a strengthened presidency and National Security Council. According to Law 1402, the Law on the State of Siege, it was not possible to make any judicial appeals before administrative or civil law courts against decisions of martial law commanders. According to the same law, martial law courts were allowed to try crimes that were committed outside of regions under martial law.[62]

During this period, direct military influence on the executive branch further increased through the National Security Council. In the 1982 Constitution, the number and weight of generals participating in the Council increased at the expense of civilian members. Under Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, under the leadership of the President of the Republic, the National Security Council was composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the commanders of the army, navy, air force and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie. When the sixth general acting as the council's general secretary was added, the Council was composed of six high-ranking military officers and five civilians, thus ensuring that military members outnumbered the civilian ones.[63]

The powers of the Council were further strengthened according to the following passage:

> The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to formulation, establishment, and the implementation of the national security

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[61] McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic," 72

[62] Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, 112.

> policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decision of the National Security Council concerning the measures it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of the society.[64]

This ambiguous definition of national security was further expanded by the Law on the National Security Council. Article 2 of Law 2945 defines national security as "the protection of the constitutional order of the state, its national existence, and its integrity; of all of its interests in the international field, including political, social, cultural and economic interests; and of interests derived from international treaties against all external and internal threats."[65] As a result, the military's broad definition of national security ensured that almost any policy area, from education and the environment to defense and foreign policy, might assume a security dimension.

According to the National Security Law 2945, the Council is responsible for collecting information and preparing briefing papers for the National Security Council

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Translated by Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 108 from Bülent Tanör, *İki Anayasa, 1961-1982,* (Istanbul: Beta Yayinlari, 1986), 54-55, 121-125. However, in July and August 2004, as part of the seventh reform package (the reforms Turkish government passed in order to start membership talks with the European Union) in an attempt to reduce the role of the military in Turkish life, the parliament passed a series of measures that will limit the executive powers and areas of responsibility of the National Security Council. These reforms turned the Council from an executive panel dominated by the military into an advisory body to the Ministry of National Defense and the Prime Minister's Office. The Council has been enlarged to give civilian ministers a majority. The Law on the National Security Council has also been amended to prevent abuse of the Council's advisory role, decrease the frequency of the Council's meetings, and deprive the Turkish General Staff of its authority to convene them. The Prime Minister is now authorized to appointthe National Security Council secretary-general, who sets the agenda and the tone of the Council's work. See David L. Philips, "Turkey's Dreams of Accession," *Foreign Affairs,* (September, October 2004).

meetings. The National Security General Secretary, who is always a serving full general or admiral, employs approximately 350 permanent staff who mostly composed of serving or retired military personnel as well as some bureaucrats and academicians.[66] After the staff collects information, Office of the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence Office draw up the National Security Policy Document. This document describes the main threats to national security and sets guidelines for security policies. However, in reality the Office of the General Staff determines the content of the policy document and the document is only presented to the National Security Council for approval, not to the parliament. Once it is approved in the Council, it is then presented to the Council of Ministers for their signatures and published in the Official Gazette.[67] While the National Security Council's decisions remained advisory in nature, the government is required to give priority to the body's recommendations. In practice, however, when the Council expresses an opinion, civilian governments rarely try to implement a policy that would contract it.

The 1982 Constitution, moreover, established State Security Courts to try crimes against "the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, the free democratic order, or against the republic, and offenses directly involving the internal and external security of the state."[68] Military authorities appointed both civilian and military

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[65] Law 2945 dated 9 November 1983 as cited in Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 108.

[66] Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 51.

[67] Ibid., 47.

[68] Article 143, Turkish Constitution.

judges to work in these courts.[69] Consequently, by establishing these courts, 1982 Constitution gave the right to the military to get involved into the trial of civilians.[70]

In sum, beginning with the 1961 Constitution, continuing with the 1971-1973 amendments, and finally with the new articles brought into effect by the 1982 Constitution, control of the military over Turkish politics dramatically increased. Most importantly, with the 1961 Constitution a National Security Council was established as a platform where the military could voice its opinion on matters of it deemed to be national security issues. With the 1973 amendments, the principal duty of the National Security Council was extended to making recommendations to the government, and, finally, under the 1982 Constitution its position was enhanced by requiring the Council of Ministers to give priority consideration to the recommendations of the National Security Council. Moreover, as Cizre states, the Chief of the General, who is answerable to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister of Defense, "obtained autonomy in determining defense policy, the military budget, future weapon systems, production and procurements of arms, intelligence gathering, internal security and all promotions."[71] As a result of these developments, thanks to the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, the dominant role of the Turkish military in politics has continued growing through these institutional mechanisms. However, alongside these institutional mechanisms, Turkish military also exercises its influence in politics through informal mechanisms, namely the broad popular support it receives from Turkish society.

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[69] Article 136 cited in Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 111-112.

[70] In May 2004, as part of the reforms Turkish government was passing, in an attempt to start membership talks with the European Union, Turkish government abolished the state security courts, following the abrogation of Article 143 of the constitution.

[71] Cizre-Sakallioglu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," 157-159.

5. Public Legitimacy of the Turkish Military

The influence and power of Turkish military in politics cannot only be weighed through laws and institutions. This influence and power goes beyond the institutions into the martial culture of the people.[72] Turkish military receives a tremendous amount of popular support and is viewed as the institution best representing the highest virtues of the nation. Through the conservative-nationalistic education system and media, the majority of the population is encouraged to approve the military's policies. In history classes, teachers emphasize military victories and present the military as the symbol of the Turkish nation's unity and the guarantor of its future. In addition, compulsory male military service which is accepted as a sacred duty enhances the bond between the military and the public. The identification of the nation with the military is augmented through the celebration of national holidays, during which schoolchildren march to the accompaniment of national songs and neo-militaristic displays in the sports stadiums.[73]

Consequently, the view that the Turkish military's recognition of itself as the guardian of the nation and of Kemalist doctrine is not entirely self-serving; it does have a popular mandate. Most Turks expect the military not only to protect them against foreign threats, but also to intervene to check excesses of the civilian leaders, as the armed forces

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[72] Ümit Cizre, "Türkiye'de Silahli Kuvvetler'in etkisi ve gücü yalnizca yasalarla, kurumlarla ve kurullarla ölçülemeyecek büyüklüktedir." In *Kisladan Anayasaya Ordu, Siyasi Kültürde TSK'nin Yeri,* eds. Hidir Göktas and Metin Gülbay. (Istanbul: Siyahbeyaz Metis Güncel Yayinlari, 2004), 185.

[73] Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 6-14; Ümit Cizre, "Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone," *European Journal of Political Research,* 43 (2004), 113-114. Also see Ayse Gül Altinay, "Egitimin Militarizasyonu: Zorunlu Milli Güvenlik Dersleri," in *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti, Türkiye'de Ordu,* eds., Ahmet Insel and Ali Bayramoglu

did in the 1960 coup, or to save the country from the anarchy caused by civilian leaders who failed to manage the country's key problems effectively, as was done in the 1980 coup. Turkish people also expect the military to protect them against the internal threats, i.e. rise of Kurdish nationalism or rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Accordingly, when the rise of Islamic fundamentalism increased in 1997, the armed forces indirectly intervened in politics by banning the pro-Islamist party in power. The public's perception of the security role of the military therefore extends into the political arena.[74] However, while the public supports military interventions to save the country from chaos, their support does not extend to outright military rule; the people prefer a return to civilian politics once public order is restored.[75]

The political role of the military is further reinforced by public perceptions of the security environment, wherein external and internal threats are often inflated and distorted by conspiracy theories. Turks are always under the assumption that their neighboring countries and even their NATO allies are secretly planning to weaken and divide their country. The scholars and the media constantly discuss the fictitious plans on return to Sevres Treaty.[76] The strategic location of the country, neighboring countries

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(Istanbul: Birikim Yayincilik, 2004), 179-198 for details of compulsory National Security (*Milli Güvenlik*) courses taught by military commanders in high schools.

[74] Ibid., and Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 18.

[75] Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 6, 18-19. The two occasions when the military has taken over the government of the country are remembered as being oppressive and restrictive, even though the coups that preceded them undoubtedly restored public order.

[76] Sevres Treaty, which was signed in 1920 by the Ottoman Sultan in the aftermath of Ottoman Empire's defeat, in the First World War, divided the former empire along ethnic lines. This treaty was not followed when the Turks started their Liberation War and got their independence.

such as Iran, Iraq and Syria further enhances this fear.[77] Consequently, in issues such as military's budget, there has always been a strong popular support for increases in the military budget. Accordingly, a conflict between the military and the politicians over the military budget, regardless of the politicians' ideological stance, has been virtually absent. Parliament usually approves the defense budget proposed by the military without debate and by acclamation. In other words, Turkish military retains its monopoly over decisions concerning the defense budget and procurement policies.[78]

In sum, alongside the powerful institutional prerogatives Turkish military maintains, the strong public legitimacy it enjoys enhances its capacity to interfere in politics and over the civilians.

6. The Return to Civilian Rule:

As the threat to terrorism receded and the economy improved, by early 1983, the military signaled its intention to establish a representative system and opened up the political arena. In spring 1983, a number of new parties emerged, although the military's intention was to establish a system, which consisted of two parties, one slightly situated to the right of the center and the other to the left of the center.[79] The right of the center party, Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi*-MDP) was established

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[77] While Iran kept imposing an Islamic regime to Turkey, Syria used to train Kurdish rebels in terrorists camps in its soils. Turkey and Iraq have been in an uneasy relationship since the Gulf War of 1991. Finally, Turkey has long-lasting disputes over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus with Greece. Before the collapse of Soviet Union, communism was Turkey's biggest nightmare.

[78] See Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 54, No. 1(Fall 2000), 215; Cizre-Sakallioglu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics*, 160; Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*,44.

by retired general Turgut Sunalp. The left of the center party, Populist Party (*Halkci Parti*-HP) was led by Necdet Calp, an undersecretary in the Prime Minister's office who had previously served the CHP. The other candidates were vetoed by the National Security Council. Although the military managed to exclude all the newcomers, they were unable to block Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*-ANAP). Özal who served as the minister of state for economic planning during the military administration, directed many negotiations that enabled Turkey to borrow money from international institutions.[80] Özal as the only member left from the overthrown government did not receive the same "veto" treatment of the military the other politicians got. Eventually, only three political parties were allowed to compete in the election, while two other potentially popular parties were excluded.[81]

Özal's ANAP included a heterogeneous group of members from widely different backgrounds representing the nationalist right, religious right and liberal right. The party was held together by Özal's political skills. Despite military's hesitation, Özal's party won the 1983 general election, receiving 45 percent of the vote and 212 seats in the 400 member Assembly, thus gaining the majority of the seats in the parliament.[82] Military

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[79] See Ahmet Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime," In *State Democracy and the Military*, eds., Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 23.

[80] Özal managed to actualize a significant devaluation, decrease in public expenditures, and liberalization of foreign trade and of the banking system. By following these policies he was able to increase exports and straighten the balance of payments crisis. Barkey, "Why Military Regimes Fail," 178.

[81] Ibid and Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime," 23; See McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic," 75; The leader of newly founded Social Democratic Party, Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü, the second president of Turkey and long time Republican Peoples Party's leader was vetoed. Another victim was Great Turkey Party (Büyük Türkiye Partisi) , which was aiming for Süleyman Demirel's constituency.

[82] McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic," 78. On the eve of the elections when former coup leader, then president Evren felt that their transition plan could be destroyed, went on

supported MDP came in third, which was an embarrassing outcome for the Armed Forces.[83] Nevertheless, MDP collapsed in a short time and HP was later absorbed by Erdal İnönü's Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Part*-SHP) As a result, 1983 elections seemed to be a setback for the military. As Ahmet Evin states after planning the transition to democracy very carefully and banning the former political parties and politicians, the military was stuck with an undesirable party forming a majority government.[84]

In the early years of the ANAP government, Prime Minister Özal's ability to maintain a division of labor with the military lessened the danger of confrontation. While President Evren took responsibility for all matters relating to internal and external security, all matters regarding the economy were under the purview of Prime Minister Özal.[85] However, gradually Özal came to act independently of President Evren, distancing himself and his party from the military leadership. Özal's main aim was improve the economy and turn Turkey into a powerful trading and industrial state and make it a member of the European Economic Community. He reoriented the economy towards international markets, applied market principles internally and the reduced the role of the state sector thus bringing healthy rate of economic growth to Turkey. [86]

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national television and radio to attack Özal's party without mentioning the name. For details of the 1983 election see Barkey, "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition," 181-2.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime," 25-26; William Hale, *Turkish Politics and Military*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), 277.

[85] See Metin Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982-1989," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* 3 (1990), 308-313.

[86] See Hale, *Turkish Politics and Military*, 280 and Brown, "The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey," 141-142. The growth rate of GNP was running at an average of 6.6 per cent per year between 1984 and 1987. However, during his second term of office, Özal's economic policies also experienced greater

A complete transition to democracy required the removal of non-elected authorities from the political arena. Despite the 1983 elections, the military did not extensively transfer its power to the civilian regime. The armed forces still maintained significant influence in politics through their dominant representation in the National Security Council. Particularly on issues regarding state security, decisions of the council were compulsory prescriptions rather than mere suggestions. As already stated, the leader of the 1980 military intervention, former chief of the general staff and current president Evren kept a close eye on the workings of the government through the presidency, with its expanded powers under the 1982 Constitution. Although martial law was being lifted province by province, the armed forces still exercised their judicial powers through military courts. People indicted under martial law were prosecuted in military courts. [87]

7. The Erosion of Military's Influence in Politics:

The strong demand for constitutional amendments forced the military and the president to assume a conciliatory tone leading to the lifting of the ban on former politicians. In a 1987 referendum, banned politicians from the pre-1980 period were allowed back into politics and assumed the leadership of the political parties they had directed behind the scenes. Consequently, while Süleyman Demirel, leader of former Justice Party became the head of True Path Party (*Dogru Yol Partisi*-DYP),[88] Bülent

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problems. Özal government faced greater challenge in bringing down inflation and unemployment rates, and halting the decline in real income. By increasing the public expenditure before the 1987 general elections, Özal government gave a further boost to inflation, which rose to 74 percent in 1988, continuing at 63 per cent during 1989.

[87] Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime," 26.

Ecevit, leader of former Republican Peoples Party took over Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*-DSP).[89] In addition, Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti*-SHP) joined politics under the leadership of Erdal İnönü.[90] In 1987 general elections, although ANAP's share of the poll dropped to 36 percent from 45 percent, the party still managed to come to power with a majority in the parliament due to the changes Özal government made on the election system.

Over time, Özal government began to ignore many of the regulations enacted during the military regime and in some cases introduced new legislation to replace the severe measures of the military era. Collective bargaining and strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, the right to form associations and to make collective petitions, which were all made illegal by the military administration in 1980 were legalized. Most of the labor unions were allowed to operate. Restrictions on forming new political parties were lifted. The death sentences passed by the military courts ceased to be implemented since the required approval was not given by the parliament anymore. Deputies were allowed to change their political parties.[91] Moreover, the Presidential Council, which was composed of the five generals who led the 1980 military intervention and enjoyed the power to veto the laws passed by the parliament was terminated in November 1989, according to the timetable laid down in the constitution. Moreover, in October 1989,

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[88] In fact, True Path Party was the successor of Justice Party that was banned by the 1980 military intervention, which was the successor of Democratic Party that was banned by the 1960 military intervention.

[89] Ecevit's Democratic Left Party and İnönü's Social Democrat Populist Party were the successors of Atatürk's Republican People's Party (CHP).

[90] While this party was called Social Democracy Party when it was first established. Its name was changed to Social Democrat Populist Party when it merged with the Populist Party.

[91] Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime," 35.

when President Kenan Evren's term expired, Prime Minister Turgut Özal was elected as the new president by the parliament.[92]

During this period, significant challenges to military came from Prime Minister Özal and his government. These challenges included: Prime Minister Özal's interference into the succession of the chief of the general staff in 1987, his legalization of the use of Kurdish language, his engineering of the diplomatic negotiations with the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq and his initiation of the humanitarian assistance program called "Operation Provide Comfort in 1991 and his attempts to grant cultural rights to the Kurds of Turkey and establish peace through negotiations with the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (*Partiya Karkaran Kurdistan*- PKK) in 1993. These issues will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter.

Prime Minister/President Özal's policies challenging the military, particularly in the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention become even more significant when it is taken into consideration that the role of the military in politics reached to unprecedented levels in the 1982 Constitution. This subject even becomes more interesting when the increase in civilian influence in politics gets reversed in the aftermath of the Özal era. This dissertation will explore how Özal managed to increase the civilian influence in politics by challenging the military in certain areas.

Conclusion

From the time of their nomadic lifestyle in Central Asia to the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and through the current Republic of Turkey, the military has played a

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[92] See Hale, *Turkish Politics and Military*, 290.

significant role at every stage of the evolution of Turkish society. It saved the country from the occupation of the Allied forces in the aftermath of the First World War and it was an important player in establishing the Republic under the protective reforms and principles of Atatürk. The Turkish military was again the savior of the nation when the country suffered under the authoritarian policies of a political party during the 1950s and the political violence caused by the extremist groups in the 1970s.

The Turkish military sought to establish a form of democracy that would function under the guidance of Atatürk's reforms and principles. Any violation of these constitute grounds for the military to intervene in politics. Therefore, ironically, the Turkish military from time to time, to firmly establish democracy in the country, intervened into the political activities of democratically elected governments. It was able to do this through a mixture of institutional and informal mechanisms. The leading role of the National Security Council and Chief of the General Staff in politics helped military to maintain its power. Moreover, through the immense support it received from the population, the military could easily justify its interference in politics in the public's eyes. Nevertheless, during a brief period in the aftermath of 1980 military intervention, between 1987 and 1993, civilian control over politics gradually increased. This was mainly the result of the policies followed by Prime Minister/President Turgut Özal. However, this increase in civilian control in politics did not last long, and once Tansu Çiller began to serve as Prime Minister, the military's control over politics began to increase again until it reached a very high level. Consequently, the role of civilian leadership needs to be understood in the analyses of changing levels of civilian control in

politics. The next chapter will examine the period under Prime Minister/President Özal and his policies that challenged the preferences of the military.

CHAPTER 3

THE PERIOD OF PRIME MINISTER/PRESIDENT TURGUT ÖZAL AND HIS CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE MILITARY (1987-1993)

Introduction

The effect of Turgut Özal, first as Prime Minister and then as President, on the rise of civilian influence in Turkish politics between 1987 and 1993 is a significant issue that has not received much scholarly examination. The increase in civilian influence during Özal's period manifested itself in two issue areas: the rise of Kurdish nationalism, and the process of promotion within the military. In July 1987, Prime Minister Özal interfered in the succession of the Chief of the General Staff by bypassing the military's candidate and appointing his own nominee. In 1991, now in the office of the president, Özal legalized the use of the Kurdish language and attempted to grant cultural rights, for example in broadcasting and education, to the Kurds of Turkey. He began diplomatic negotiations with the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq and played a central role in introducing the idea of a humanitarian assistance program called "Operation Provide Comfort." This program aimed to establish a safe haven in northern Iraq under the protection of international forces for hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fleeing Saddam Hussein's soldiers. In 1993, Özal also attempted to establish peace through negotiations with the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (*Partiya Karkaran Kurdistan*-PKK). Consequently, Özal was seen to be interfering in the national security realm,

which had always fallen within the military's domain, and following policies that contradicted traditional military doctrine.

This chapter after giving a brief background of the Kurdish problem, first presents a detailed analysis of Turgut Özal's liberal policies toward the Kurdish population, his interference in the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff and how these policies contradicted established military policies. Second, in order to analyze the motivation behind Özal's actions, the chapter provides an in depth investigation of Özal's intentions and an explanation of his political acts with reference to rational interest calculations, particularly the strategic calculations made by Özal to ensure his political survival. This chapter examines Özal's political capacity through an analysis of his parliamentary majority, political experience, and his political performance by concentrating on his economic policies. Finally, the institutional context, particularly Turkey's parliamentary system of government and the highly leader-oriented political party system, as conditioning factors shaping the behavior of Özal will also be taken into consideration.

I. KURDISH QUESTION

Starting in late 1970s, and continuing throughout the 1980s and 1990s, one of the main factors controlling Turkish political life was the resurgence of Kurdish nationalism. Since the early years of the republic, the rise of Kurdish nationalism was perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of the country and so, traditionally, fell within the military's sphere of concern. The National Security Council enabled the military to make decisions concerning the Kurdish issue. According to 1982 Constitution, the Council of Ministers should give priority consideration to National Security Council decisions

regarding the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and the indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society.[1] When the military-dominated National Security Council expresses its opinions, civilian governments rarely attempt to implement contrary policies. Consequently, the military may be assured that its decisions on matters of internal security will form the basis of actions, thanks to the National Security Council's influence over the Council of Ministers.[2] However, starting with Özal's presidency, civilian incentives started to play a significant role in discussions of the Kurdish problem, encroaching on one of the military's prerogatives. In a way, by interfering in this realm, and attempting to resolve the issue politically, Özal managed to question the military. However, before analyzing the policies followed by Özal policies, it is essential to examine the historical background of the problem.

Background of the Kurdish Question:

The rise of Kurdish nationalism can be traced back to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War. During the Ottoman period, when the nationalities were defined in terms of religious affiliation, rather than ethnicity, Kurds were considered part of the Muslim "nation." As members of the majority, they had the same rights as Turks, Arabs, and the other Muslims. Sevres Treaty (1920) signed

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[1] Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 108. Article 2 of the Law on the National Security Council (Law 2945) defines national security as the protection of the constitutional order of the state, its national existence, and its integrity; of all interests in the international field, including political, social, cultural, and economic interests; and of interests derived from international treaties against all external and internal threats.

[2] For details on National Security Council, see the section on 1980 Military Intervention in Chapter 2.

by the Ottoman Sultan in the aftermath of Ottoman Empire's defeat, in the First World War, divided the former empire along ethnic lines and gave Kurds the right to establish a homeland and self-rule. The Lausanne Treaty (1924), signed in the aftermath of the Turkish victory in the War of Independence, however, excluded Kurds from the definition of a minority group and did not confer any special status on them.[3] The leaders of the new Republic of Turkey considered nationalism and nation-building as the most important factor of cohesion. Consequently, they perceived Kurdish nationalism as a threat to the integrity of the modern nation-state under construction. Under the 1924 constitution, only Turks could be considered "citizens." For Kurds to qualify as "Turks," they would have to deny their own ethnic identity, but once the new Turkish identity was accepted, they could enjoy full rights of citizenship.[4] Kemalist nationalism required that Kurds give up not only the political aspects, but also all of the cultural and linguistic links to their Kurdish identity. However, while these assimilationist policies worked with those Kurds who, for economic reasons, moved west and mixed with Turkish groups, they were unsuccessful with Kurdish groups living in remote, southeastern parts of the country. Moreover, these policies provoked a backlash and set in motion a process of constructing a new sense of Kurdish identity.[5]

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[3] Lausanne Treaty legitimized the territorial integrity and unitary nature of the newly declared republic. While considering Greeks, Armenians and Jews as minorities, it did not make any reference to other non-Turkish minorities. See Dogu Ergil, The Kurdish Question in Turkey, *Journal of Democracy,* v.11, n.3, (July 2000), 124-5.

[4] Henri J, Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.1997), 10-12. In fact, many assimilated Kurds were able to reach to important positions in Turkish society, from president to prime minister to generals in the military.

[5] Ibid., 13

The increasing efforts for the consolidation of Kemalist Turkish nationalism led to numerous Kurdish insurrections in the early years of the republic; between 1925 and 1940, there were over twenty Kurdish uprisings in the southeastern part of Turkey, all of which were suppressed by the military.[6] Some of these uprisings resulted in the displacement of Kurdish groups from southeastern Turkey and their resettlement in the western provinces. These rebellions led the Turkish elite to consider the Kurds a primary challenge to the territorial integrity of the young Republic of Turkey.[7]

In the aftermath of the transition to the multi-party period in 1946, the Democratic Party brought a period of relative freedom of expression and allowed the Kurds to articulate their grievances. They also recruited prominent Kurdish families to run on their party lists.[8] Although the Democrats, in their election campaign, promised to ease some of the cultural restrictions in the east, once they came to power they refrained from doing so. They were afraid of being accused for engaging in separatist activities by granting cultural rights to Kurds. The 1960 military intervention that ended the Democratic Party era followed hard-line policies toward the Kurdish question. For instance, the military initiated a campaign to rename the Kurdish villages.[9]

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[6] Ibid., Sheyk Said Revolt in 1924, which had both religious and nationalist character was the biggest among all. Sheyk Said occupied most of southeastern and eastern Turkey. It was suppressed by the Turkish military.

[7] Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," *International Affairs*, v.69. n.4 (1993), 660.

[8] Barkey, "The Struggles of a 'Strong' State," 94-95.

[9] Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question,* 14. 1960 military intervention arrested approximately 484 Kurds and exiled 55 *aghas* (Kurdish tribal leaders) to western cities. Before the military intervention, 49 Kurdish intellectuals were tried for creating rebellion.

The liberal atmosphere of the post-1961 constitution encouraged left-wing mobilization, which appealed to Kurdish intellectuals in their struggle for equality and economic development for their region. For example, Kurdish groups were able to organize under the Turkish Workers Party (*Türkiye Íşçi Partisi*), which openly argued that there was an ethnic problem in Turkey. These movements, however, were repressed by the military interventions of 1971 and 1980, resulting in younger, inexperienced, bitter, rural cadres, who opted for armed struggle, replacing the more intellectual, urban and educated older generation.[10]

After the 1980 coup, the repressive policies of the military government—targeting Kurdish nationalism along with the extreme leftist and rightist movements—provided conditions for the radicalization of the Kurdish nationalists.[11] These radical nationalists joined together under the banner of the Kurdish Workers Party (*Partiya Karkaran Kurdistan-* PKK), established, in 1978, by Abdullah Öcalan. Although originally established as a Marxist-Leninist party, the PKK was later converted into a nationalist party that supported an armed struggle.

Gülistan Gürbey argues that the first change in Turkish policy toward Kurds (which basically consisted of suppression and assimilation) occurred during the era of Prime Minister/President Turgut Özal (1983-1993). This was an era of as stated by Gürbey "structural change with economic and political modernization and a gradual forcing out of the traditionally dominant and established elite from the bureaucracy and

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[10] Ergil, The Kurdish Question in Turkey, 126-7 and Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 15.

[11] During this period in the aftermath of 1980 military intervention quite a number of Kurdish nationalists as well as leftists sought political asylum in Western European countries. See Robins, "The Overlord State," 662-3.

military in favor of functional elite, predominantly from business circles."[12] It was only at a later phase (during his second term as prime minister starting in 1987 and during his presidency starting in 1989) during the era of Özal that the Kurdish policy began to change. Despite severe criticism by state elites, the military and the government bureaucracy, Özal attempted to liberalize policies dealing with the Kurds. Özal, moreover, pursued political solutions such as lifting the ban on Kurdish and holding negotiations with Iraqi Kurdish leaders and providing a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq with the help of international forces —to the problem rather than following a purely a militaristic approach.

II. PRIME MINISTER/ PRESIDENT ÖZAL'S KURDISH POLICIES

This section will first analyze Prime Minister/President Özal's Kurdish policies during the period when his own party ANAP was in power and then will examine the Kurdish policies he followed during the SHP-DYP coalition government. It will also examine how Özal managed to introduce certain Kurdish policies by investigating his rational choices, political capacity and the institutional rules that shape his behavior.

1. Prime Minister/President Özal's Kurdish Policies during ANAP Governments

In the aftermath of 1980 military intervention, the military was determined to restrain the rise of Kurdish nationalism along with other extremist movements such as communism, fascism, and Islamic fundamentalism that gained strength since 1970s. In

[12] Gülistan Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey since the 1980s" in *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East* ed., Robert Olson

order to accomplish this task, the military first increased its operations in the southeast, but these operations enjoyed only limited success in the long run. Second, the military started to take measures to abolish displays of Kurdish identity. In 1983, the military government introduced Law 2932, which declared Turkish as the native language of its citizens and banned the use of any other native languages. In reality, the aim of the law was to outlaw the Kurdish language.[13]

In actuality, the Turkish state has consistently pursued military means to resolve the Kurdish problem, with the exception of the latter years of Turgut Özal's era, during which alternative political strategies were considered. During his first term as prime minister, between 1983 and 1987, a period of transition from the military to civilian rule that followed the 1980 military intervention, Özal did not want to stir up a controversy over novel approaches to maintaining the state's unity. Consequently, during his first term as the prime minister, besides offering some assistance to address the economic infrastructure such as building roads and bringing electrification and irrigation to the southeastern part of Turkey, Özal, for the most part followed the military's policies for resolving the separatist threat and responding to the PKK's violence.[14]

Among these, the most significant was the introduction of the "village guard" system in April 1985. The Özal government created a system of civilian militias called "village guards" (*köy koruculari*), with members mostly drawn from the Kurdish

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(Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 13-14.

[13] See Barkey and Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question," 64; Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," 662.

[14] Interview with Associate Professor Ömer Faruk Gençkaya (Bilkent University, Ankara, 5 November, 2002) Özal also identified the PKK activities as "small scale terror problem."

population, to help combat the PKK.[15] Moreover, in 1987, the Özal government established an emergency rule system in the southeastern part of Turkey[16] by replacing the eight-and-a-half year-old martial law regime with a 'Regional State of Emergency Governorate.' The new administrative system aimed to coordinate the activities of provincial authorities in the struggle against the separatist terror under a civilian regional governor (appointed by the Minister of Interior who was accountable to the Prime Minister Özal) who was given extraordinary powers.[17] In May 1990, by decree, President Özal turned the 'civilian super governor' into a 'super commander' by giving the regional governor the authority to reassign and deport from the area, at will, not only government personnel, but also military personnel, judges, and prosecutors.[18] Özal's intention in handing over authority to a civilian official was to bring the struggle with the PKK under civilian control. However, this new system increased the punitive effect of measures that could be applied to the region and restricted the flow of information out of the region by imposing increased restrictions on the media.[19]

During his second term as the prime minister starting in 1987, once Özal consolidated his power in his party and in politics (particularly as a result of his vast

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[15] For details see İmset, *The PKK,* 105-117 and Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question,* 147-8. By the end of 1990s, the number of village guards reached approximately sixty thousand. However, responding to this new system, PKK began using violence as an instrument of terror against the members of the civilian militia and their families. Consequently, while helping the armed forces and gendarme in their fight against PKK, the village guard system initiated a period of greater violence.

[16] Southeastern part of Turkey included ten provinces: Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Sirnak, Siirt, and Tunceli.

[17] See Decree 413 in the Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete) No. 19517, 14 July 1987 and see Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," 664.

[18] *Hürriyet,* (Istanbul Daily) 11 May 1990.

[19] In August 1990, the emergency decree was further intensified by the so-called Cencorship and Banishment Decree, which granted further authority to the special governor of the Kurdish provinces.

experience in politics and the success of his economic policies as will be explained in the section on political capacity), he first started to dominate civilian politics and push back the influence of the military. He openly recognized the problem and set the stage for a political solution to the Kurdish issue. He offered ideas that involved the economic development of the Kurdish areas, reform on the local administrations in order to politically integrate the PKK and liberalization in the field of culture. Furthermore, once he became the president in 1989, he openly recognized the 'Kurdish identity' and courageously suggested alternative ways of dealing with the Kurdish question.[20] Özal transformed the presidency into an activist office, particularly on the Kurdish issue as well as the operation of foreign and economic policies.[21]

Moreover, Özal was able to point out the distinction between the terrorist attacks of PKK and the Kurdish question as a whole. In order to deal with the terrorist attacks of PKK, alongside his political initiatives, during his presidency, he also supported the government's intensive security operations, which included the evacuation of a number of villages, establishment of special teams in the military to fight with Kurdish separatists and small scale cross-border operations in order to fight PKK forces hiding in Iraqi territory. However, he knew that following solely military solutions would not be sufficient to resolve the Kurdish problem and resorted to political solutions. These

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[20] Gülistan Gürbey, "Peaceful Settlement through Autonomy?" in *The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey, Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy*, eds., Ferhad Ibrahim and Gülistan Gürbey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 65-66 and also see See Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 135-6 for Özal's ideas on challenging the taboos. For the details of this period also see Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 53-55.

[21] Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question,* 135.

political resolutions and how Özal managed to pursue them will be analyzed in depth in the next section.

2. Rational Choices, Political Capacity and Institutional Context:

Adopting some parts of Wendy Hunter's framework for looking at Brazil,[22] this study argues that in studying the civilian side of the civil-military relations there is a surprising amount of room for a civilian intervention when appropriate electoral incentives exist and civilian leaders have the capacity to act on them. Hunter, in her study on Brazil, argues that competitive elections create incentives for politicians to reduce the interference of a strong military and that electoral victory strengthens their capacity to do so. She also argues that the broad institutional context in which the civilian leaders operate structures their behavior. My study examines the incentive structure for the civilian leaders in the context of making rational choices and strategic calculations to ensure their political survival. This study analyzes electoral victory, as reflected in receiving a parliamentary majority and other factors that strengthen the political capacity of leaders, including political experience and political performance (particularly in economics). It also looks at the parliamentary system and leader-oriented political party system as conditioning institutional factors. The theoretical framework of this work maintains that politicians are first and foremost interested in their own survival and that their political capacity enhances their ability to act according to their interests.

[22] See Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, Politicians Against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Caroline Press, 1997)

A. Rational Choices and Particularistic Incentives

Hunter argues that electoral competition creates incentives (particularistic and programmatic) for politicians to reduce the level of interference by a politically powerful and active military. Hunter's particularistic incentives involve the distribution of public resources to gain and keep constituencies at the expense of the military.[23] In the Turkish context, Prime Minister/President Özal, followed particular policies, specifically concerning the Kurdish issue, to survive and thrive in politics, and did so by pursuing policies that contradicted those supported by the military.

Consequently, by adopting Hunter's framework, the theoretical framework of this study comes to focus on actors and their intentions and to explain political action with reference to rational interest calculation. It concentrates on the strategic calculations of politicians, who want to guarantee their political survival. Therefore, it is important to understand why Özal challenged the military's Kurdish policies by risking his relations with the armed forces.

Once Özal figured out that it was not possible to resolve the Kurdish issue solely through militaristic means, he aimed at bringing a political resolution to the Kurdish problem, which would provide a popularity boost in international circles that might help to guarantee his own long-term political survival. He knew that following purely militaristic policies (such as establishing the village guard system, evacuating villages, training special military teams, and executing minor cross-border operations), would bring bloodshed and chaos that would not help with his political career. That is why Özal

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[23] As particularistic incentives in the Brazilian context, Hunter examines how electoral competition created incentives for politicians to distribute economic assets to their constituencies from the federal budget with

legalized Kurdish, and, in order to assume the role of 'guardian of Kurds' in the region, invited Kurdish leaders from northern Iraq to Ankara, accommodated hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees in the Turkish territories and initiated the idea of Operation Provide Comfort. Moreover, he attempted to grant cultural rights to the Kurds of Turkey and establish peace through negotiations.

By attempting to resolve the issue politically, Özal aimed, first, to improve Turkey's performance on the question of minority rights and have an upper hand in the relations with the Kurds of northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and, second, to strengthen the economy of the country. By attempting to grant cultural rights to Kurds and particularly, by lifting the ban on Kurdish, Özal hoped to win respect and support in the West and European Community (later known as the European Union), to which the country sought eventual membership.[24] He aimed to improve Turkey's performance on the question of minority rights to comply with one of the conditions for membership set forth by the European Council.[25] The European Community had already rejected Turkey's application for full membership in 1989. The language problem had been an international problem confronting Turkish diplomacy in almost every forum, meeting and debate both in Europe and the United States, and Turkey encountered many

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the purpose of maintaining their personal support network and guaranteeing their election. See Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil,* 94-99.

[24] Özal's purpose for entering the European Community was to make Turkey a part of a politically and economically strong Community where it could benefit from this partnership. During this period, while Turkey's export expansion to the Middle East was stagnant due to the drop in oil prices in 1985, the United States was not willing to improve its trade with Turkey. Consequently, Turkey needed to look for more stable and sustainable markets in the West, particularly, in the European Community. Ihsan D. Dagi, "Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-87," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, (January 2001), 26-7.

[25] See Ömer Laciner, "Gecis Surecinde Özal ve ANAP," *Birikim*, n. 24, (April 1991), 6-7; Kahramankaptan, "Himaye-i Kürt Meselesi," 16-7; Sagirsoy and Ersanel, "10 Milyon Kürt Yarattik," 20-29. The European Parliament very often criticized the Turkish government for its treatment of the Kurds of

difficulties and complaints as the only UN member that forbade millions of its citizens to use their mother tongue. Özal was aware of the fact that Turkey's inflexible approach towards the Kurdish problem was creating obstacles to Turkey's eventual membership in the European Community.[26]

By lifting the ban on the use of Kurdish Özal also aimed to secure the confidence of the Kurdish population in Turkey. He aimed to strengthen Turkey's unity and improve its image in the eyes of the Western states who constantly criticized Turkey's human rights records.[27] He tried to demonstrate both to the Kurds of Turkey and Kurds of Iraq that the Turkish state was not hostile to Kurds, but just to the violence committed by the PKK.[28] Moreover, by suggesting alternative ways of dealing with Kurdish question, Özal wanted to widen the parameters of debate in Turkish democracy. By legalizing Kurdish and attempting to bring education and broadcasting in Kurdish, he sought to break specific political taboos in Turkey and encouraged people to more freely debate the issues.[29] Indeed, he managed to gain the trust of some Kurdish groups. In the beginning, the Kurdish political circles were skeptical about the lifting of the ban on Kurdish, but

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Turkey. See Dagi, "Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics," 21-22.

[26] See Berdal Aral, "Dispending with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade, 1983-1993," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, (January 2001), 83. My Interview with Assistant Professor Berdal Aral at Fatih University (Istanbul, 2 December 2002) In fact, the EC Commission's report of December 1989 which considered the viability of Turkish application for full membership noted that 'within Turkey ... minority rights still fell short of EC norms despite improvements.' [Commission's Opinions on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community,' Brussels, 20 December 1989, SEC(89) 2290 final/2 ,note28]

[27] Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-1995," *Middle Eastern Studies,* v. 32, n. 4, (October 1996), 347.

[28] Interview with Özal's special adviser Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002)

[29] Feride Acar, "Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation," in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey* eds., Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 177-178.

eventually they admitted that by removing the ban on the Kurdish language, the national existence of the Kurds would be officially acknowledged for the first time.[30]

During the Gulf War of 1991, in an attempt to strengthen the position of Turkey relative to its NATO allies in the Middle East, President Özal adopted the anti-Iraq position of the United States.[31] In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Özal operated under the assumption that the Saddam regime would collapse and the Iraqi Kurds would attempt to build a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which was not an outcome favored by the Turkish government.[32] However, at the same time, the government knew that it was unable to prevent the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region. Consequently, in order to gain the upper hand in the process, Özal attempted to establish Turkey as a friendly "big brother" to the Kurds in the region by economically helping the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq; this was done under the assumption that such a gesture would be well received among Kurds of Turkey.[33]

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[30] See the views of attorney Zeki Okcuoglu and the head of Diyarbakir branch of Human Rights Association who both defended people charged with speaking Kurdish or related offenses for years. Sagirsoy and Ersanel, "10 Milyon Kürt Yarattik," *Nokta,* 23-4.

[31] Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf War was essentially determined by President Özal until the rejection of the opposition in the parliament to send Turkish troops to the Gulf. Eventually serious clashes between the president and the generals became evident when Chief of the General Staff Necip Torumtay resigned from his post in December 1990. The Torumtay affair was a good example of military's acceptance of the civilian supremacy. See Hale, *Turkish Politics and Military*, 292.

[32] Since the 1960s, the Kurdish nationalist movements have been vibrant in Iraq as a result of the Iraqi government's authoritarian policies, political and cultural repression, ethnic cleansing and regional destruction. Consequently, the Kurds of Iraq rebelled against the Iraqi government to gain their independence whenever the opportunity presented itself, for instance during the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-1988 and the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Since the Kurds of Iraq were kinsmen of the Kurds of Turkey, the Turkish government has always been sensitive about the independent movements of the Iraqi Kurds, fearing that Turkish Kurds would be influenced from their uprisings. See Carole A. O'Leary, "The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects," *MERIA Journal*, v. 6. N.4 (December 2002).

[33] Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 53. Sefik Kahramankaptan, "Himaye-i Kürt Meselesi," *Tempo*, (Istanbul weekly) Year: 4, No: 5, 27 January - 2 February 1991, 16-7 and Ilter Sagirsoy and Nedret Ersanel, "10 Milyon Kürt Yarattik," *Nokta* (Istanbul weekly) 10 February 1991, 20-29.

Accordingly, by meeting with the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq and accommodating hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees in Turkey, and by initiating the idea of Operation Provide Comfort, Özal followed his 'guardianship' plan. By engineering the meeting of Iraqi Kurdish leaders with Turkish officials, Özal was able to receive first hand information about the developments in northern Iraq and the activities of PKK in northern Iraq and thereby weaken the PKK strategically.[34] An unfriendly, autonomous Iraqi Kurdish state could have helped the PKK, or even made territorial claims on Turkey's Kurdish region. Conversely, a friendly, autonomous Iraqi Kurdish state might persuade PKK to stop fighting against Turkey.[35] By accommodating hundreds of thousands of the Kurdish refugees in 1988, Özal demonstrated to the Kurds of Turkey the goodwill of the Turkish government towards Kurds and gained the appreciation of

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[34] Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 347; See Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 53; Interview with Özal's special adviser Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002) and Interview with the State Minister of the period Mehmet Kececiler, (Ankara, 2 September 2002) The minister claimed that the support for PKK among the Kurds of Turkey decreased tremendously after the Turkish government's humanitarian aid to the Kurds of Iraq. He explained that Özal considered the Kurds of Iraq as the relatives of Kurds of Turkey, therefore, the humanitarian aid that was made to the Iraqi Kurds softened the relations between the Turks and Kurds in Turkey. Furthermore, as a result of these moves, President Özal not only gained the confidence of Turkish and Iraqi Kurds, but also the Kurds who lived in Europe. In an interview held by journalist Rafet Balli with representatives of various Kurdish organizations in Europe, the answers of the representatives to Balli's question: "How do you view Özal?" were quite positive. Hatice Yasar, representative of Flag of Liberation (*Ala Rizgarî*) group considered Özal as a politician who had the best concept of national and regional reality and was closest to society's expectations regarding Kurds and others. Serhad Dicle of *Peshen* organization accepted Özal as the more realistic politician compared to all of the other present Turkish leaders. He found Özal pragmatic and courageous due his attempts to break taboos. Along the same line, the leaders of Kurdish parties in Iraq expressed positive views too. While the leader of Kurdish Democratic Party Barzani expressed that he found Özal more progressive than any other leader in Turkey, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Talabani said that he admired Özal's decision of recognizing the 12 million Kurds of Turkey. See Rafet Balli "Kürtler Özal'i Nasil Görüyor (du)?" *Nokta,* (Istanbul, weekly) 18 August 1991, 17.

[35] Interview with Özal's special adviser Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002) and also see Michael Gunther, "Kurdish Infighting: The PKK-KDP Conflict" in *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s*, ed. Robert Olson, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 52; Sami Kohen, "Sürpriz Kararlar," *Milliyet*, 14 March 1991, 11. Eventually the Turkish military which was against these meetings made use of Iraqi Kurdish parties by receiving help from them during their operations against PKK.

Iraqi Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani.[36] Moreover, by initiating the idea of Operation Provide Comfort, among the international forces, he maintained a significant position in the decision-making process regarding the situation of Iraqi Kurds. He was also able to make the Western policy heavily dependent on Turkish cooperation, as a result of the use the Turkish base, Incirlik for a non-NATO operation.[37]

Furthermore, by resolving the Kurdish issue politically, Özal aimed to strengthen the economy of the country by reducing expenditures related to the $10 billion per year cost of a military confrontation with the PKK.[38] By ending the fighting with PKK, funds that were allocated for the struggle in the southeast could be transferred to the development of the Turkish economy, thereby leading to greater economic growth, not only in the Kurdish regions, but in the whole country. The inflation rate would also be more easily controlled and some breathing room would be gained for those operating under ever tightening budgets.[39] Consequently, Özal had good reasons to believe that these policies would increase his popularity internationally and domestically, and would contribute to his reelection.[40]

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[36] *Milliyet,* 3-4 September 1988.

[37] See William Hale , *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000,* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 223.

[38] Minister of Foreign Affairs' Internet Site: www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ac/acf/acf1/Studies4.htm

[39] Interview with Prof. Metin Heper (Bilkent University, Ankara, 21 April 2003)

[40] Although Özal as the president would not be elected again since presidents only come to power once, he was planning to start a new political party and get into politics once his presidential term was over. Özal was also working on a 'second transformation program' that his new political party was going to adapt in, where he would promote democratization to solve the Kurdish question. Interview with Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002); Yavuz Gökmen who was close to Özal wrote about this transformation program. See Yavuz Gökmen, *Sarisin Güzel Kadin,* (Istanbul: Dogan Kitapcilik, 1999), 71. This program also included full, privatization, shrinking the size of the government and presidential system for Turkey.

While Özal made rational political decisions for his own political survival and reelection concerns, his political capacity helped him to actually implement them. He was able to follow the Kurdish policies that contradicted those of the military as a result of his strong political capacity, which was mainly reflected in his parliamentary majority, political experience and political performance particularly in economics.

B. Political Capacity and Institutional Context

a. Parliamentary Majority

Turkey is a parliamentary system. In such a system, the civilian leaders in an attempt to pursue their own policies are supposed to convince first their own party group and then the rest of the members of the parliament of the necessity of their policies. If the party in power has a parliamentary majority then it may be easier for civilian leaders to convince the members of the parliament for the necessity of their policies once they persuade the members of their own party.

In Özal's case, competitive elections brought him and his party, the ANAP, into power in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. ANAP came to power with 45 and 36 percent of the votes in 1983[41] and 1987[42] elections, respectively. Such electoral achievements gave Özal's party a parliamentary majority, which consequently, gave Özal, as Prime Minister and even as President, space to maneuver that enabled him to design his own policies concerning the Kurdish issue. Constitutionally, as president, Özal's policy-making powers were limited, as once he was elected president by the parliament, he had

[41] In 1983, 211 representatives in a parliament of 400 members were from ANAP.

to resign from his party ANAP and assume a status of being a figure 'above the parties.' However, Özal enjoyed advantages from having his former party, the ANAP, in the position of holding a large majority in the parliament. Moreover, by engineering behind the scenes the election of a low-key prime minister, Yildirim Akbulut, Özal was able to retain a significant influence over his party, the cabinet and, eventually, the majority of the seats in the parliament.

However, the parliamentary majority the civilian leaders have is not sufficient if these leaders cannot persuade the members of their own party to support the policies they are pursuing. In this context, in addition to the ANAP's parliamentary majority, Özal's political experience and successful performance *vis a vis* the economy also allowed him to pursue his own Kurdish policies.

b. Political Experience

Although Turkey is a parliamentary system, where people are supposed to elect political parties for their programs rather than the leaders, it is a characteristic of Turkish politics that personalities attract the voters more than the party programs.[43] In election campaigns, the trustworthiness and other personal qualities of party leaders are much more important than the parties' positions on issues.[44] The leaders outlast the parties. Frequently in Turkey, while the names of the parties change after each military intervention, the political leaders remain the same.

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[42] In 1987, 292 representatives in a parliament of 400 members were from ANAP.

[43] Erik Cornell, *Turkey in the 21st Century, Opportunities, Challenges, Threats* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), 57.

[44] Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 86.

In Turkey the organization of the party system is part of the institutional context that gives absolute control over the party to its leader and maintains strong clientelistic features that shape the behavior of politicians. According to the Political Parties Law, the parties are supposed to follow the party constitution for candidate nomination. In reality, all parties tend to nominate candidates through their central executive committees, which are in general strongly controlled by party leaders. Party leaders control the nomination of candidates in elections, serve as the principal gatekeepers in the distribution of political patronage, and enjoy extensive formal authority. For example, they can abolish local party units that oppose the central executive leadership and expel dissident party members from the organization. Therefore, party leaders hold a great deal of personal power at the expense of organizational autonomy.[45]

All of these tendencies are particularly strong if party leaders are experienced in politics. Özal's experience in politics, first, as a bureaucrat and later as a politician, had a significant impact on his political capacity. Özal served as a technocrat in Turkish political life, working in various government organizations since 1960s. He first worked for the Agency for the Study of Electrical Energy (*Elektrik İdaresi Etüd İsleri*-EİEİ) in technical and managerial positions for ten years. Then, he worked as the undersecretary of the State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teskilati*-DPT) for five years. In the 1970s, Özal worked for the World Bank in Washington D.C. for two years. During this period, Özal corresponded with the prime minister of the period, Süleyman Demirel, and sent him regular reports analyzing the problems of the Turkish economy. Upon his return to Turkey, he worked in the private sector, again in managerial positions. During this

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[45] Sabri Sayari, "Introduction," in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, 3.

period Özal established close relations with conservative religious politicians, particularly with the Nakshibendi religious group (*tarikat*). Özal's last bureaucratic position, before the 1980 coup, was that of undersecretary for Prime Minister Demirel and acting head of the DPT.[46] Demonstrably, Özal had significant experience working in both the private sector and in the highest echelons of the Turkish civilian bureaucracy.

During the military rule between 1980 and 1983, Özal worked as the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs. Although the generals were uncomfortable with Özal because of his close connections with religious groups, they were still willing to work with him because his experience was vital for dealing with international financial institutions and foreign countries.[47] He stayed in this position for two years and began to implement structural changes necessary for economic liberalization.

After the transition from military regime to democracy in 1983, Özal founded the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*-ANAP). The party drew its membership and policies from three main strands of the right and center-right in Turkish politics: liberal conservatives, Islamists and ultra-nationalists. This party was "held together by strength of Özal's own personality and his political skill"[48] to such a degree that the ANAP was labeled the 'brainchild of Özal.'[49] The other founders of the party were relative unknowns in Turkish politics and, as his advisor Cengiz Candar states, Özal actually turned many of

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[46] Acar, "Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation," 164-166.

[47] Ibid., 168. As Acar states the generals depended on Özal for the negotiations to postpone Turkey's debt payments and secure new loans. Accomplishment of these issues was critical for the stability and security of the new regime.

[48] Hale, *Turkish Politics and Military*, 276-7.

[49] Kalaycioglu, "The Motherland Party," 45.

these unknown figures into well-known politicians.[50] Özal was supported by a small cadre of younger professionals with whom he had been working for a long time. Most of these people had associations with Özal dating back to his days at the State Planning Organization.[51] When they became members of ANAP, their respect for Özal continued to grow, and even when they became deputies in the parliament, ministers in the cabinet, or high-level bureaucrats, they felt that their main responsibility and loyalty was to their personal mentor, Özal.[52] Özal, as the founding leader of the party, symbolized the political party during his leadership and continued to cast a shadow over the party during his presidency.[53]

Consequently, the combination of Özal's political experience and his strong leadership in a leader oriented party system empowered him to persuade his party members to accept the policies he wanted to follow.

c. Political Performance in Economy

Özal's political experience led him to advance economic liberalization reforms, for which he received most of the credit in his early years as Prime Minister. He promoted his own "Özalist" vision of a dynamic, open, consumer-oriented Turkey. Turkey has been successful in moving from a statist, centrally guided import-substituting

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[50] Interview with Özal's special adviser Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002)

[51] Acar, "Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation," 170. People like Mehmet Kececiler, Ekrem Pakdemirli, Hasan Celal Güzel, Yildirim Aktürk, as well as his youngest brother, Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, and his cousin Hüsnü Dogan, were among Özal's protégés at the State Planning Organization.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Kalaycioglu, "The Motherland Party," 46.

development model to an export-oriented market economy in less than 15 years. Under Özal's encouragement, the Turkish economy experienced a remarkable expansion. Between 1983 and 1991, Turkey's annual growth rate averaged six to eight percent. Per capita gross national product doubled from $1,300 to $2,600, at the same time as purchasing parity doubled. Exports that totaled $2.9 billion in 1980 reached $13.6 billion in 1991, while imports rose from $7.9 to $21 billion. During this period, Özal's governments began extensive infrastructure works to build highways and bring electricity to the remote corners of the country.[54] As Ersin Kalaycioglu notes, Özal's "credentials as an economic wizard were soundly established" during this period.[55]

As a result of the opening of Turkish economy, less developed regions of the country such as central Anatolia started enjoying greater prosperity, creating a new Anatolian bourgeoisie. This new more conservative and religious pious class coupled with displaced Kurds from the Southeast and Alevis from their secluded villages started to mix up with the traditional middle classes.[56] These new middle classes by time started forming the backbone of Özal's loyal electorate.

Although Özal's economic policies eventually caused a sharp rise in inflation, Özal was still given credit for developing the economy. As Simon V. Mayall states, "Özal's extraordinary success [in economics] had slowly enabled him to challenge the

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[54] See Simon V. Mayall, *Turkey: Thwarted Ambition*, (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1997) (McNair Paper 56), 72 and Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," *Foreign Affairs*, (November 1993)

[55] Ersin Kalaycioglu, "The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party," *Turkish Studies*, v. 3, n. 1 (Spring 2002), 41.

[56] Barkey, "The Struggles of a 'Strong' State," 99.

military's primacy in the state, allowing him to increase the areas of competence of the civil government."[57]

The next section will analyze Özal's Kurdish policies by concentrating on his political capacity. It will examine how Özal's political capacity enabled him to the legalize the Kurdish language, organize the invitation of Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq to Ankara, accommodate hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees in Turkish territories and initiate the idea of Operation Provide Comfort which all contradicted the military's Kurdish policies.

C. Analysis of Political Capacity Through Different Issue Areas

a. Lifting of the Ban on Kurdish

The military government, aiming to outlaw the Kurdish language, introduced Law 2932 in 1983. This law declared Turkish as the native language of its citizens and banned the use of any other native languages. President Özal, in an attempt to gain the upper hand in relations with the Iraqi Kurds, gain the support of Turkish Kurds and improve Turkey's performance on minority issues in order to enter the European Community, recognized the need for reforms lifting the ban on Kurdish.

During the meeting of the National Security Council on 25 January 1991, Özal stressed that after the Gulf War, Turkey should be prepared for new developments in the region including the necessity of reform on Kurdish issue. In a speech at the War Academy in February 1991, Özal pointed out that it was necessary to be realistic

[57] Mayall, *Turkey: Thwarted Ambition*, 70.

regarding ethnic differences and explained that even in the first session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1920, Kurdish had been spoken and Kurdish national deputies had been present.[58]

President Özal lobbied very intensely for lifting the ban on Kurdish.[59] He convened the ANAP parliamentary deputies and then the Council of Ministers in order to explain his reasons for lifting the ban on Kurdish as some ANAP deputies were against the legalization of Kurdish. For instance, the ANAP's chairman of the Constitutional Committee declared that Turkey was not yet ready to revoke this law and the chairman of Justice Committee expressed his 'deep' concerns about the bill. He was afraid that accepting the Kurdish language would mean recognizing the Kurds as a nation, which would bring the freedom of education and broadcasting in Kurdish before eventually leading to an independent Kurdish state.[60]

At this point, Özal's political capacity played a significant role. Özal, as the founder of the party and the person who brought many of these deputies into their positions by using his negotiation skills, convinced the hardliners in his own party to vote in favor of the lifting of the ban on Kurdish.[61] He explained to the concerned deputies that legalizing Kurdish would not have an effect on breaking down the unity of the nation. Moreover, he pointed out that even the leader of PKK, Öcalan, published his

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[58] İlter Sagirsoy, " Özal'a ragmen 'Hayir' " *Nokta*, (Istanbul, weekly) 24 February 1991, 29.According to Sagirsoy this was probably the first time a president made a speech in this context in a War Academy.

[59] Interview with Hüsnü Dogan (Ankara, 6 September 2002). Özal's fervent efforts to lift the ban on Kurdish were also explained by another State Minister of the period, Günes Taner (Istanbul, 2 May 2003)

[60] Sagirsoy and Ersanel "10 Milyon Kurt Yarttik," 20-29; See *Cumhuriyet*, (Istanbul Daily) 19 March 1991.

[61] Ibid. Interviews with Hüsnü Dogan and Günes Taner.

booklets in Turkish because Kurdish was not that widespread anyway. He even suggested that a Kurdish institute could be established in Turkey as had been done in France. Özal stated that these bans in fact were provoking the Kurdish reactions. He pointed out that such restrictions on mother tongues did not exist even in the most repressive regimes, such as Russia and Albania, where people spoke Turkish freely.[62] Occasionally, Özal mentioned that for democracy to be consolidated in Turkey, certain freedoms had to be firmly established. Özal referred to multi-national states, particularly the United States, to make the point that the unity of language was not in any way related to the unity of a state.[63]

During discussions on lifting of the ban on the use of Kurdish in the parliament, the press started to circulate stories concerning the reservations of the military on this issue.[64] Like some members of the parliament, Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres and other senior generals expressed their worries about subsequent demands, such as education and broadcasting rights in Kurdish, which would come from the Kurdish population following passage of the bill on the free use of Kurdish. They argued this could harm Turkish national integrity and eventually lead to an independent Kurdish state.[65] The former president and leader of the 1980 military intervention, Kenan Evren, accused Özal of playing a dangerous game, stating that such movements begin with asking for social rights and end with independence.[66]

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[62] *Cumhuriyet,* 5 February 1991.

[63] See *Hürriyet,* (Istanbul Daily) 2 February 1991.

[64] *Cumhuriyet*, 24 March 1991.

[65] Nilüfer Yalcin, "Askeri Yetkililer Kaygili *Milliyet*, 28 March 1991.

As a result of the reactions Özal received from the military, in order to ease the tension between the military and the government, he met with military officers and explained to them that the Kurdish language would not pose a danger to Turkish national unity and Turkey had to make such reforms to keep up with the contemporary world. He also told the generals that the Kurds of Turkey did not have any intention to establish an independent state and, as a result, that Turkey's national integration was not threatened.[67]

Finally, a cabinet meeting under Özal's chairmanship, and clearly at his instigation, decided to abolish the law 'restricting use of languages other than Turkish' in April 1991.[68] Upon President Özal's suggestion and under his direction, the government commenced pursuing its proposal for constitutional changes to complement the liberalization in the criminal law. Eventually, after stormy debates inside and outside of the parliament and an all-night meeting, amendments to the Turkish Criminal Law were passed on April 6, 1991. The parliamentary majority that Özal's former party, the ANAP, held in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (292 representatives out of 400 members in the parliament) enabled Özal to persuade the parliament to vote in favor of the amendments of Turkish criminal law. Although as president, he was not supposed to influence the parliament, as the founder and former leader of the governing ANAP, Özal had already been involved in every stage of the amendments and had spoken with ANAP deputies about voting in favor of the amendments, which included the lifting of the ban on Kurdish.

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[66] *Milliyet,* 20 March 1991; *The Times*, 21 March 1991; Hugh Pope, "Turkey's Kurds Scent Freedom," *The Independent* (London) 26 March 1991. Evren also accused the European countries for attempting to revive the Sevres Treaty of 1920 which intended to establish an independent Kurdistan.

[67] Tayfun Talipoglu, "Cumhurbaskani Özal'dan Komutanlara Güvence: Kürtler Devlet Kuramaz," *Milliyet,* 26 March 1991, 16.

As a result of amendments to Turkish Criminal Law, Articles 140, 141, 142, and 163, regulations that had seriously curtailed the freedom of thought and association of supporters of leftist, religious and other kinds of anti-state ideologies, were abolished. Accordingly, thousands of political prisoners were released.[69] Most importantly, the reform package allowed the use of the Kurdish in private by removing all references to Turkish as the mother tongue.[70]

As Gürbey states, the legalization of the Kurdish language through the repeal of the law prohibiting other languages in April 1991 was the most far reaching gesture towards the Kurds living in Turkey.[71] President Özal used his power as the former prime minister and the founder of the governing party ANAP and his negotiation skills to influence ANAP deputies, the military, and even deputies from the opposition parties to legalize the Kurdish language in order to engage Kurds democratically in their own country.

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[68] Robins, "The Overlord State," 665.

[69] *Milliyet*, 2 April 1991. While the penal code articles restricting freedom of conscience and freedom of association were abolished, 'Anti Terror Legislation,' was passed. This new legislation widened the definition of terrorism and introduced guarantees for protecting the integrity of the state and the regime against 'anti-system' threats by increasing penalties for 'crimes against the state.'

[70] For the Anti-Terror see Law No: 3713 in the *Official Gazette* (Resmi Gazete) No. 20843, 12 April 1991. However, holding public meetings and rallies in languages other than Turkish was not permitted. Under Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, propaganda (written or oral propaganda as well as meetings and demonstrations) against the indivisible unity of the state's people and its territory is subject to penalty. The anti-terror law, while relaxing the criminal code and moving closer to the European human rights standards, at the same time, it tried to secure the claim to power of a centralist state and its ideology. Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement," 11.

[71] Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 14.

b. Official Recognition of the Iraqi Kurdish Leaders

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, in an attempt to gain insight into the position of parties affected by the Gulf War, particularly the independent movements of the Kurds of northern Iraq, President Özal broke with the long-standing Turkish government policy of not dealing with any Kurdish group and invited the Kurdish leaders of Iraq to Ankara.[72] Under Özal's initiative, secret meetings were held between Turkish officials and the Kurdish leaders of Iraq in March 1991. Özal first sent his special adviser, Cengiz Çandar, to Iraq to talk to Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq to explain to them that the Turkish government could help them assume a place on the international stage by establishing communication links between the Iraqi Kurds and European countries.[73] Eventually, both Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and Mohsin Dizai, a representative of Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), met with two officials from Foreign Ministry. Neither the Cabinet nor the National Security Council had any knowledge about this meeting.[74]

During this meeting, Turkish officials explained to Kurdish leaders that Turkey wanted the territorial integrity of Iraq to be respected and was not going to accept the emergence of an independent Kurdistan state in northern Iraq.[75] However, they also made it clear that the Turkish government would not object to an autonomous Kurdish

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[72] Ibid., and see Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq,"347; *Middle East International*, no: 396, 22 March 1991.

[73] Interview with Özal's special adviser Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002)

[74] See Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalcin, *The Özal, Bir Davanin Öyküsü*, (Istanbul: Dogan Kitapcilik A.S., 2001), 463; Yalcin Dogan, "Kürt Özerkligine Özal'dan Destek," *Milliyet*, 13 March 1991, 17. In their first visit to Turkey in March, Iraqi Kurdish leaders met with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a second visit in June 1991, this time Jalal Talabani met with President Özal.

region[76] in a confederation headed by a democratic Iraqi government. In a subsequent meeting between President Özal and Talabani in May 1991, President Özal demanded that the Iraqi Kurds stop supporting the PKK.[77] In exchange, the Turkish government agreed to send food and medicine to Iraq through international relief agencies.[78]

The meeting with Kurdish leaders from Iraq by officials in Ankara was met with criticism from opposition leaders and the military. The leaders of main opposition parties, Süleyman Demirel and Erdal İnönü, stated that the meeting with representatives of opposition groups in Iraq was an intervention in the domestic affairs of a neighboring country and contradicted the principles of interstate relations.[79] Moreover, the military was not happy with the new Kurdish policy being pursued by President Özal, which contravened their policy against meeting with any Kurdish groups. The military believed that any autonomous arrangement or federal structure for Iraqi Kurds could have a demonstration effect on PKK, who would continue its bloody insurrection to achieve such a goal within Turkey,[80] and former President and Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren stated that the autonomy given to Iraqi Kurds could endanger the territorial

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[75] President Özal also told American President Bush during their meeting at Camp David that Turkey could not accept an independent Kurdistan in Iraq. "Kürt Devleti Kurdurtmayiz," *Tercüman*, (Istanbul Daily) 24 March 1991, 8.

[76] Although the autonomy of Kurds living in Northern Iraq was accepted on paper by Saddam's government in 1970, in reality, it was never practiced.

[77] Nur Batur and Nilüfer Yalçin, "Kürt Federasyonuna Isik," *Milliyet*, 13 Mart 1991, 17; Birand and Yalcin, *The Özal*, 465; Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement," 14.

[78] *Milliyet*, 12 March 1991; *Milliyet*, 13 March 1991.

[79] *Milliyet*, 13 March 1991; *Cumhuriyet*, 13 and 14 March 1991.

[80] *Günaydin*, (Istanbul Daily) 14 March 1991.

integrity of Turkey.[81] Chief of the General Staff, Dogan Güres expressed his annoyance by asking whether the government have also met them if the representatives of ASALA had come?[82]

As a result of these criticisms, President Özal again met with military officials. He explained to the commanders that because the entire world was listening and talking to the Iraqi Kurdish leaders Talabani and Barzani, the Turkish government could not be expected to stay out of these developments. The government had to follow what was going on in the region firsthand rather than relying on other countries. Özal stated that Turkey was in favor of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and that the only way Turkey could help the Kurds in Northern Iraq was by sending them food and medicine, but not weapons. [83]

Despite the criticism of the opposition and the military, President Özal managed to engineer more talks with the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq after their initial meeting. This was again a result of President Özal's strong political capacity, which allowed him to influence the officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to accept such a secret meeting. Özal managed to make foreign policy single-handedly by communicating with higher level bureaucrats personally, bypassing the cabinet ministers.[84]

Turkish foreign policy is traditionally shaped by the Foreign Ministry, the Prime Minister and the military. Of these three, the military is the dominant player and

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[81] Fikret Bila, "Türkiye Parçalanir," *Milliyet*, 20 March 1991.

[82] Erdal Çetin, "Güres: Görüsümüzü Söyledik," *Milliyet*, 19 March 1991, 15. ASALA is an Armenian terrorist organization which is responsible from the assassination of a number of Turkish diplomats and bombing of Turkish embassies in Europe and North America.

[83] Tayfun Talipoglu, "Cumhurbaskani Özal'dan Komutanlara Güvence: Kürtler Devlet Kuramaz," *Milliyet*, 26 March 1991, 16.

institutionally exercises its power through the National Security Council. However, this classic 'tripod model of Turkish foreign policy' was modified in the late 1980s, with the presidency emerging as a fourth major pole in decision-making. As Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari state, "The possibilities for the president to play an activist role in foreign policy-making became clear particularly during the presidency of Turgut Özal[...]."[85] As president, Özal did not hesitate to assert leadership in foreign policy and was able to engineer strategic meetings that normally would have been dictated by the military-dominated National Security Council.

In this context, the parliamentary majority of ANAP was not directly relevant to Özal's organization of the meeting between the Iraqi Kurdish leaders and the officials of Turkish Foreign Ministry, since the meeting was held without informing the cabinet or the parliament. However, there was an indirect effect of ANAP's majority in the parliament. All the ministers in the cabinet, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were from ANAP, so Özal could exert his influence to engineer the meeting through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Interestingly enough, in August 1991, when the military officials figured out that cooperation with the leaders of Iraqi Kurdish groups could help them immensely in their fight with PKK, they did not refrain from meeting Barzani or Talabani to exchange information about PKK bases in northern Iraq.[86] Similarly, in the fall of 1992, the

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[84] Acar, "Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation," 174.

[85] Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, "Introduction," in *Turkey's New World, Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, eds., Makovsky and Sayari (Washington DC.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 4-5. The authors also include the ninth president Süleyman Demirel to this category for the policies he followed in Central Asia. However, Demirel took a more traditional approach and did nor contradict the policies followed by the military.

[86] Aziz Utkan, "Kürt Liderlerle Askeri Toplanti," *Hürriyet*, 12 August 1991, 17.

Commander in Chief of the gendarmerie forces met twice both Barzani and Talabani in the southeastern part of Turkey to discuss border and regional security, and the cooperation of the Turkish government, PUK and KDP to jointly control the area.[87] By October 1992, Turkish forces were receiving help from the Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq in operations against PKK. In December 1992, Iraqi Kurdish leaders reached an agreement on border security with the Turks.[88]

After President Özal managed to influence particular state organizations and agencies to accept important changes in Kurdish policy, the Turkish government agreed to allow permanent representatives of Iraqi Kurdish groups to reside in Ankara without official or diplomatic status.[89] Similarly, the leaders of the opposition parties who earlier criticized Özal for coordinating meetings with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Demirel and Ínönü, also held meetings with Talabani and Barzani after coming to power in November 1991.[90]

c. Kurdish Refugees from northern Iraq and Operation Provide Comfort

In 1988, in the aftermath of Iran-Iraq War, 50,000 to 70,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees fled from Halabja, Iraq to Turkey to escape Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's massacre in revenge for their attempt to found an independent Kurdistan in Iraq during the war. Several thousand civilians were killed by Saddam government's use of toxic

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[87] *Hürriyet*, 20 November 1992.

[88] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 309.

[89] *Turkish Daily News,* (Ankara Daily in English) 17 September 1991.

[90] *Anatolia Agency*, (News Agency) 20 February 1992 ; *Anatolia Agency*, 8 June 1992.

gases.[91] Under Prime Minister Özal's initiative, and despite the military's objections, the Iraqi Kurds were provided with temporary settlement facilities and medical care by the Turkish government. This act brought the Turkish government close to the Kurds for the first time.[92]

The military was worried about the PKK's ability to infiltrate into Turkey by mixing in with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish refugees.[93] Özal convinced the military members of the National Security Council that, for humanitarian purposes, Turkey had to open its borders to Kurdish refugees.[94] Both Barzani and Talabani thanked the Özal government for opening its borders and sheltering their people.[95] For the first time, Turkish government and Iraqi Kurds were involved in a friendly relation. While the majority of the refugees returned to Iraq, 30,000 of them stayed in Turkey for a couple of more years.

A similar scenario was repeated in March 1991, when hundreds of thousands of Kurds started fleeing to the Turkish borders to escape Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's revenge in the aftermath of their ill-fated rebellion during the Gulf War. In ten days, the number of Iraqi Kurds crossing into Turkey reached half a million, putting the Turkish government in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the Turkish government could

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[91] Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement," 21-22.

[92] See Zeynep Sarlak, "Atatürkçülük'ten Milli Güvenlik Rejimine: 1990'lar Türkiye'sine Bir Bakis," in *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti Türkiye'de Ordu*, eds., Ahmet Insel and Ali Bayramoglu (Istanbul: Birikim Yayinlari, 2004), 289; Interview with the State Minister of the period Mehmet Kececiler, (Ankara, 2 September 2002) and see *Günaydin* (Istanbul daily) 4 September 1988. During this period, Özal in several occasions stated that the Turkish government could not turn a blind eye to the massacre of tens of thousands of people including children.

[93] Interview with Özal's special adviser Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002).

[94] *Milliyet,* 1 September 1988.

hardly deny assistance to desperate refugees. On the other hand, the government was reluctant to allow the refugees to settle in Turkish territory as it had done in 1988, since this would force Turkish authorities to take care of a very large number of refugees for an indefinite period.[96] Nevertheless, Turkish government provided medical aid, foodstuffs, blankets, and temporary shelters to the refugees who managed to get into the Turkish territories.

In April 1991, President Özal played a central role in introducing the idea of 'safe haven.' He believed that the best way to help the refugees was to bring them down to the plains on the Iraqi side of the border. When the National Security Council could not meet as a result of a religious holiday, on May 1, 1991, President Özal invited some important members of the council to the resort town of Kemer where he was spending his holiday and convinced them of the necessity of a safe haven for the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq. His suggestion of having the UN take control of this territory was adopted by the British and US governments.[97] On 5 April 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688, a resolution under which an international force, initially numbering around 20,000 troops from 11 countries (including Turkey), established a safe haven in northern Iraq. As a member of UN and the initiator of the notion of a safe heaven, Turkey also accepted the resolution.[98]

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[95] *Milliyet,* 3-4 September 1988.

[96] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 222. The accommodation of 50.000 to 70.000 Kurdish refugees in Turkish territories in 1988 brought a big burden to Turkish economy. Moreover, European countries which refused to accommodate the refugees in their countries found Turkish government's help insufficient. Interview with Mehmet Kececiler, (Ankara, 2 September 2002)

[97] *Milliyet*, 19 April 1991.

[98] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 199 and 222.

All the refugees had returned to Iraq by the end of May 1991, as part of an operation called 'Operation Provide Comfort' (OPC).[99] Saddam's forces were kept out of the safe haven by a special detachment of US, British and French aircraft based at Incirlik in southern Turkey, which enforced a no-fly zone in Iraq north of the 36th parallel.[100] By proposing the safe haven in northern Iraq, Özal reached both of his aims: protecting the Kurds of northern Iraq and making Western policy heavily dependent on Turkish cooperation, a goal which was achieved because permission to use the Incirlik base for a non-NATO operation had to be renewed by the Turkish Parliament at six months intervals.[101]

Özal's decision to organize a meeting between Iraqi Kurdish leaders and Turkish officials and initiating the establishment of OPC marked an important turning point in Turkish foreign policy, as the state moved from a non-interventionist passive policy to an active foreign policy that involved Turkish engagement with the Iraqi Kurds, which had been avoided previously. Both of these moves demonstrate President Özal's influence in designing foreign policy, leaving the military and the foreign ministry on the margins.[102]

Although Özal was able to convince the members of the National Security Council to support the establishment of the safe haven for the Iraqi Kurds, the military generally was reluctant to accept the creation of such a safe haven. They perceived it as

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[99] Ibid. Also see Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey and the Kurdish Safe Haven in Northern Iraq," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, (1996), 21-23.

[100] See Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-1995," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32 (1996), 345-346. *Milliyet,* 13 April 1991.

[101] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 223.

[102] Ibid. 223-4.

the creation of an autonomous identity for the Kurds of Iraq.[103] However, after the UN resolution and its acceptance in the Turkish parliament, where Özal's former party ANAP held the majority, the military had no choice but to accept it. Ultimately, Turkish military chiefs started to favor the continuation of the safe haven due to their close relations with their US counterparts.[104]

Accordingly, Turkey continued to play its new role as protector of the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds, with the double economic blockade imposed by both the United Nations and Saddam Hussein, were entirely dependent on Turkey. The Harbur border crossing point with Turkey was their only legal point for commerce and custom revenues. Eventually, when the Iraqi Kurds started receiving humanitarian help from European countries, Turkey provided the only avenue for the delivery of aid. The Kurds of northern Iraq also found themselves in need of the assistance of Turkish businessmen to reconstruct their communities in Northern Iraq.

3. President Özal's Kurdish Policies During the DYP-SHP Coalition Government:

When President Turgut Özal's former party, the ANAP, now under the new leadership of Mesut Yilmaz, lost the elections in October 1991, the two main opposition parties formed a coalition government, with the center-right True Path Party (*Dogru Yol Partisi* --DYP) led by Süleyman Demirel as the senior partner and center-left Social

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[103] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy,* 199 and 223. Actually the fears of the Turkish military was proven right. Western policy effectively left a power vacuum in north-eastern Iraq, which strengthened rather than weakened PKK. Also see Henri J. Barkey, "Under the Gun," Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdish Question," in *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s,* 72 for military's and the foreign ministry's views on OPC.

[104] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy,* 225-6.

Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti*--SHP) led by Erdal İnönü as the junior partner. Once this new coalition came to power, President Özal lost his influence over the cabinet and the parliament. As president, he had the right to veto bills, but he was not able to pass any bill he wanted as had been the case when the ANAP held the majority of the seats in the parliament. This meant that the president was not easily able to pursue his Kurdish policies during this period.

The new coalition government promised to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. Moreover, the center-left Social Democrats (SHP) formed an electoral pact with the pro-Kurdish People's Labor Party (*Halkin Emek Partisi*--HEP). HEP was founded in 1990 as an explicitly Kurdish party. The party formed an electoral pact with SHP to reach the 10 percent national threshold[105] and as a result, 22 HEP representatives were elected to parliament on the SHP ticket in the 1991 elections. Although deputies of Kurdish origin from various parties had sat in the parliament in the past, for the first time these deputies managed to come to power as representatives of a Kurdish party.

On one of their first trips as members of the coalition government, Prime Minister Demirel and Deputy Prime Minister İnönü visited the Southeastern part of Turkey and declared that they would recognize the "Kurdish reality."[106] Prime Minister Demirel, who had never accepted the existence of a Kurdish problem, for the first time recognized the "Kurdish reality." However, his recognition of Kurdish reality did not last long. After this speech, he was warned by military officers on the scene that such speeches weakened

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[105] This was a particular threshold established by the military administration of 1980-1983 to avoid the formation of coalition governments

[106] See the visit of Prime Minister Demirel and Vice-Prime Minister İnönü to the southeast region of Turkey, *Hürriyet*, 9 December 1991.

the morale of the soldiers fighting in the region.[107] Demirel, who had already lost his premiership twice due to two military interventions, was determined not to provoke the army into removing him for a third time Consequently, he returned to his "rejection of the existence of a Kurdish problem" policy, reducing the issue to a "terror problem" and emphasizing a militaristic approach to resolving the issue.

Moreover, the hard-liners in both coalition parties were of the opinion that cultural rights would inevitably lead to demands for political rights, ultimately leading to federation, statehood and eventually to a union with adjacent Kurdish lands. Therefore, the coalition government turned to hard-line policies and expressed its determination to persist in the struggle against terrorism. [108]

The Kurdish deputies who joined the parliament through SHP criticized this policy shift, stating that the Kurdish issue could not be reduced to a "terrorism problem" and insisting that a political solution was needed. The HEP provided a list of demands to the leader of SHP, İnönü, in which the Kurdish deputies demanded the granting of cultural rights in education and broadcasting in Kurdish and a halt to the state of emergency and military measures in the southeastern part of Turkey.[109] However, with the banning of the HEP by the Constitutional Court in 1992, they were unable to realize their aims. The HEP was shutdown and charged with collaborating with the PKK.

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[107] Interview with the Special Adviser of Prime Minister Çiller, Yalim Eralp (Istanbul, 30 April 2003) Also see Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler*, (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2003), 54.

[108] See Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," 666-7; Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey since 1980s," 15. The coalition government refused to recognize the Kurds as a minority, referring to to the fact that all Turkish citizens had equal rights and responsibilities under law. They mentioned that only the groups that are referred to as minorities by the Lausanne Treaty were recognized as such.

[109] Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement," 26.

Members of the HEP formed the Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*-DEP) and some of the Kurdish deputies remained in the parliament, this time as a part of the alliance between SHP and DEP.[110]

During the period of the DYP-SHP coalition government, President Özal came up with various ideas to resolve the Kurdish issue peacefully. He suggested the introduction of the Kurdish language into the educational system and TV and radio broadcasts. Moreover, he even indicated that everything, including a federation and amnesty for PKK militants, should be discussed freely. In the very first National Security meeting of the DYP-SHP coalition government, President Özal told council members that it was time to look for novel solutions to the Kurdish problem.[111] He was convinced that the Kurdish problem could not be solved solely through military means and that making a political resolution to the Kurdish issue the prioritization was necessary.[112] Consequently, he encouraged discussion on new reforms by introducing new proposals.[113]

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[110] Eventually DEP was banned from politics and some of its deputies were imprisoned on charges of sedition during Prime Minister Çiller's period. See Chapter 4 and the section on "Imprisonment of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party deputies.

[111] Interview with the Interior Minister of DYP-SHP coalition, İsmet Sezgin, (Ankara, 16 April 2003)

[112] See Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey since 1980s," 14; *Cumhuriyet*, 14 October 1991.

[113] I was told by a number of prominent politicians, columnists and scholars that Özal was very sincere in his suggestions to grant cultural rights in order to resolve the Kurdish problem politically. Metin Heper, a prominent scholar of Turkish politics, Yalim Eralp, former diplomat and special adviser to Prime Minister Çiller and Celal Baslangic, a reporter who specialized on Kurdish issue and wrote for Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet* during that period all told me that Özal was really trying hard to solve the problem with methods other than military. (Interviews with these people were held in Ankara, 21 April 2003, Istanbul 30 April 2003 and Istanbul, 1 May 2003 respectively)

A. Discussion of "General Amnesty" and the Feasibility of a Federation

President Özal sincerely believed that problems could only be solved through dialogue and, therefore, offered to discuss everything with the PKK. It was the first time that a Turkish leader offered to open discussions with this organization. He argued that it was necessary to discuss everything frankly in a country where freedom of expression was respected, and stated that freedom of belief and discussion were essential for democracy.[114] In an interview, he stated that the main reason for young men to join the PKK was not to earn money, but to support their ideology. So, by debating the problem freely, it would be possible to weaken the support given to that ideology.[115]

Özal stated that everything, including a federation, should be discussed in order to explain to the Kurdish separatists the irrationality of a federation. He opposed to federalism for geographic and demographic reasons. He explained that the majority of the Kurdish population had been integrated in Western Turkey and it would not be possible to divide Turkey into Turkish and Kurdish sectors. He also stated that Southeastern part of Turkey which is heavily populated by Kurds needed continuous economic support which would not take place in case of federalism. Moreover, he argued that federalism

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[114] Gülistan Gürbey, "Özal Dönemi Dis Politikasi," in *Devlet ve Siyaset Adami Turgut Özal*, eds., Ihsan Sezal (Istanbul: 20 Mayis Egitim, Kültür ve Sosyal Dayanisma Vakfi , 1996), 74-85.

[115] Derya Sazak, "Özal'in Endisesi: PKK Kök Saliyor," *Cumhuriyet,* 2 September 1992, 9.

would make Kurds second-class citizens.[116] Özal even said that he was ready to declare a general amnesty if the PKK quit its armed struggle.[117]

Although Özal's proposals for talking about federation and amnesty had generated a negative reaction from the coalition government and military circles and were, in fact, blocked by the government, Özal had managed to encourage people to freely debate alternative ways of dealing with the Kurdish question. In this sense, as Acar states, "Özal was actually instrumental in widening the parameters of debate in Turkish democracy."[118]

B. Broadcasting and Education in Kurdish

President Özal openly recognized the Kurdish problem and the need for cultural concessions, which he believed were inevitable in any case.[119] According to Özal, the time had come to move away from prohibitive approaches and to act in keeping with global democratization and liberalization tendencies.[120] He did not believe that recognizing cultural rights would lead to secession.[121] As a result, in April 1992,

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[116] Gürbey, "Peaceful Settlement through Autonomy," 66; Interview with Özal's special adviser Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002); See Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, "Turgut Özal'in Güneydogu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakisi," in *Kim Bu? Özal, Siyaset, Iktisat, Zihniyet,* eds., Ihsan Sezal and Ihsan Dagi (Istanbul: Boyut Yayincilik, 2001), 126; Ertugrul Özkök, "Özal: Kürtce Egitim Serbest Olmali," (February 1992) *Hürriyet*, 1, 21.

[117] "Özal'dan PKK'ya Af Önerisi," *Milliyet,* 1 February 1992, 11.

[118] Acar, "Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation," 177.

[119] Özal was right. Turkey reached that point in July 2002. The Turkish parliament agreed to allow broadcasts in Kurdish as a part of a package prepared to enter EU. However, it took them another two years to implement the reforms. The first news broadcasting in Kurdish (Kirmanji and Zazaca) took place in June 2004.

[120] İskender Songur, "İlerleme Özgürlükle Olur," *Milliyet*, 28 April 1992, 7; *Sabah*, 28 April 1992, 20.

President Özal proposed including the Kurdish language in the educational system and broadcasting in Kurdish on the state-run GAP[122] television network.

President Özal's proposal brewed into a major controversy with Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, the military and some political operators, including the members of the extreme right Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP).[123] Prime Minister Demirel stated that broadcasting in Kurdish would violate Turkey's constitution and the republican values of Atatürk, who as the founder of the Republic of Turkey wanted a single, unified, secular and westernized country. Demirel also categorically rejected the idea of education in other languages. He was afraid that taking any conciliatory measures on the Kurdish issue would be interpreted as making concessions to the PKK, which would create the impression that the PKK held the upper-hand in the fight.[124] The military also objected to the President's proposal. A written statement from the office of the Chief of the General Staff stated that the 1982 Constitution specified a broadcast strategy that was compatible with the "fundamental aspects of the republic."[125]

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[121] Gürbey, "Peace Through Autonomy," 67.

[122] GAP stands for Southeast Anatolia Project, (*Güney Dogu Anadolu Projesi*) which is huge dam project that consist of 20 plus small dams on the ancient river Euphrates (Firat in Turkish). GAP TV broadcasts in predominantly southeastern Anatolia which is highly populated by Kurds.

[123] The leader of Nationalist Labor Party, Alparslan Türkes emphasized that the language of the Turkish nation living in the Turkish republic is Turkish. Therefore, Turkish Radio and Television broadcasts, national education activities, and everything else in Turkey must be conducted in the Turkish language. He stated that introducing languages and dialects based on local and ethnic origins in place of Turkish would be equal to undermining the Turkish national culture. See Fikret Bila, "Kürtce TV Catlagi," *Milliyet*, 23 April 1992, 1, 7.

[124] My Interview with Süleyman Demirel, (Ankara, 18 April 2003).

[125] Xu Wenqun, "Controversy Arises over Proposal on Kurdish broadcasts," *Xinhua News Agency*, 25 April 1992. (Lexis Nexis) Although the statement underlined that it was meant to disclose the views of the Turkish military regarding a draft law reforming television broadcasts, it coincided with discussions over President Özal's proposal. The only support to Özal's broadcasting in Kurdish came from SHP, the junior partner of the coalition. The party general secretary announced the support of his party for broadcasting in Kurdish on TV, emphasizing that people should be free to speak their own languages and maintain their

In response, President Özal argued that implementing cultural autonomy would not lead to secession, and that Kurdish broadcasts on GAP television, including music and news, would prove that those citizens were not simply a minority, but were, on the contrary, an integral part of the mosaic of the society.[126] He claimed that such an approach would provide clear confirmation that the Turkish government cared about those citizens and considered them a part of their nation. He also declared that such a move would give the Turkish government a chance to bring an end to the exploitation of the subject by foreigners as it worked to gain membership in the European Community.[127]

Although President Özal was not able to persuade the government to pass a law on broadcasting and education in Kurdish, he was able to break another taboo by bringing the discussion to the forefront of the country's agenda, and, as Acar states, "Özal played a critical role in starting a deepening of democracy."[128]

C. Peace through Negotiations and Unilateral Cease-Fire

President Özal believed that peace could be achieved only through negotiations with the PKK and that a cease-fire was essential for the introduction of specific steps in the peace process. He was not happy with the purely militaristic approach to the Kurdish

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own cultures. SHP in general believed that broadcasting in Kurdish would help to solve the existing problems rather than creating problems. See *Hürriyet*, 21 April 1992.

[126] *Milliyet*, 22 April 1992.

[127] İskender Songur, "İlerleme Özgürlükle Olur," *Milliyet*, 28 April 1992, 7; *Sabah*, 28 April 1992, 20. Özal also mentioned that removing article 163 and 141-142 did not bring Islamic fundamentalism and communism to the country respectively.

[128] Acar, "Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation," 178.

problem advocated by the new Chief of the General Staff, Dogan Güres, who refused to make a distinction between the innocent Kurdish population and the PKK.[129]

In March 1993, encouraged by indirect contacts with President Özal through the Iraqi Kurdish leader Talabani, the PKK's leader, Öcalan, sent a letter[130] to Turkish government through Talabani, then announced a unilateral cease-fire on March 17, 1993.[131] In a press conference that took place in Lebanon's eastern al-Biqa' Valley, Öcalan explained that the cease-fire would take effect on March 20, the day before the Kurdish New Year and last until April 15, 1993. Öcalan stated that they wanted to renounce violence and open the way to a new era of peace between the Kurdish and Turkish people. He explained that if the Turkish government accepted the national

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[129] Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Yasasaydi*, (Ankara: Verso Yayinlari, 1994), 107.

[130] Text of the letter Talabani brought was as follows:
I. I have met Workers Party of Kurdistan leader Abdullah Öcalan. We discussed all the problems in detail. We also considered the present situation. I reiterated my well-known proposals. They were the ones I brought to your (referring to President Özal) attention in the past and then conveyed to Öcalan. But Öcalan rejected them and lost a very rare opportunity. Nevertheless, we conveyed to each other our complaints.
II. Considering Newruz as an opportunity, Öcalan has been convinced that he should clearly disclose the following to confirm that he agrees that:
1. All forms of terrorism should be condemned and a statement should be made that terrorist activities have been abandoned.
2. Instead of clashes and acts of violence, political solutions should be preferred between the Kurds and the Turks to solve the problems.
3. The military operations and acts of violence should be halted and a fraternal dialogue should be held between the two sides.
4. No demand should be made for talks with the PKK, and talks should be held instead between the Turkish government and the Kurdish deputies in the National Assembly.
5. Turkey's unity should be maintained and the historic brotherhood between the Kurds and Turks strengthened.
6. Separatist and subversive activities and slogans should be renounced and democracy, human rights and cultural and administrative rights within the concept of Turkish identity accepted.
7. Legal and democratic activities and party work should be initiated within the framework of democracy.
III. I believe that a suitable opportunity exists to abandon the acts of violence, terrorist activities, and disputes between the fraternal sides. In view of this, I encouraged Öcalan to demonstrate good will. I asked him to hold a news conference to inform the world of his intentions. He promised that he would adopt a positive approach and act accordingly. İsmet G. İmset, "Talabani'nin İlettigi Mektubun Tam Metni," *Hürriyet*, 14 March 1993, 24.

[131] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 200.

existence of the Kurds and gave them democratic rights, then the cease-fire could be extended.[132]

The government's response to Öcalan's letter and call for cease-fire was negative. Prime Minister Demirel stated that negotiations between the Turkish government and terrorists were impossible. Interior Minister İsmet Sezgin stated that the Turkish state would not act on the basis of statements made by criminals and that the PKK should lay down their arms unconditionally.[133]

Those within Turkish military circles did not attach much importance to the letter, nor the declaration of the unilateral cease-fire, and adopted a cautious and skeptical approach towards the possibility of the peace called for by Öcalan. The military officials believed that Öcalan had lost a significant part of his fighting forces due to Turkish cross-border operations of October and November 1992, and that was why he was looking for a peaceful solution.[134] They interpreted this cease-fire call as the PKK's attempt to gain time to reorganize for an ongoing armed struggle.[135] However, during the period between Öcalan's declaration of the cease-fire on March 17 and April 16, 1993, although the Turkish military did not completely halt its operations, it significantly decreased its number of attacks by refraining from launching its spring offensive.[136]

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[132] "PKK Leader Öcalan's 17 March News Conference, Paris *AFP* in English, 17 March 1993. Also see Ayse Önal, "Baris Sinavi," *Nokta,* (Istanbul, weekly) 21-27 March 1993, 10-26; *Cumhuriyet,* 18 March 1993; Cengiz Çandar, "PKK Silahlarini Birakmaya Hazirlaniyor," *Sabah,* 13 March 1993, 17.

[133] Interview with the Interior Minister of the period, Ismet Sezgin (Ankara, 16 April 2003)

[134] *Hürriyet,* 14 March 1993.

[135] Foreign Minister of the period Hikmet Çetin told me that the military did not believe in Öcalan. Interview with Hikmet Çetin (Ankara, 26 April 2003) The military considered the declaration of the unilateral cease-fire as a trick Öcalan was maneuvering to pacify the security forces before the celebration of the Kurdish New Year *Newruz* on 21 March. See *Hürriyet,* 14 March 1993.

President Özal's response to Öcalan's letter and the announcement of the cease-fire was more welcoming. He saw the cease-fire as an opportunity to engage the PKK politically and pave the way for a political solution through specific measures, such as the granting of amnesty.[137] President Özal's initiation of a dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to try to work out some kind of *modus vivendi* was an important step that led to this development.[138]

In April 1993, when meeting Talabani, President Özal stated that he was satisfied with recent peaceful developments in the region and expressed his support for the cease-fire in order to achieve peace, welfare and stability for the people living in the region.[139] Moreover, in order for this cease-fire to continue, President Özal asked the Kurdish deputies in the parliament to influence the PKK to take steps towards ending the strife. Upon Özal's request, some of the Kurdish deputies held talks with the PKK leader, Öcalan.[140] Furthermore, President Özal started to work on a "stage-by-stage amnesty plan" to resolve the Kurdish question. He was planning to take this amnesty proposal to the parliament when he died on April 17, 1993.[141]

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[136] İsmet G. İmset, "PKK Commanders Discuss Cease-Fire Extension," *Turkish Daily News*, 20 April 1993, 1,11 and see Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma," *Survival,* Vol. 35, No. 4, (Winter 1991), 57.

[137] *Cumhuriyet*, 1 April 1993.

[138] Derya Sazak, "Özal, HEP, PKK," *Milliyet,* 14 March 1992, 12; Gökmen, *Özal Yasasaydi*, 109.

[139] *Cumhuriyet*, 1 April 1993.

[140] See Gökmen, *Özal Yasasaydi*, 109; İsmet G. İmset, "Pro-Kurdish HEP joins Peace Process," *Turkish Daily News*, 12 April 1993, 1, 11. These negotiations in particular later played a role in stripping of their parliamentary immunity.

[141] Interview with President Özal's special adviser and journalist Cengiz Çandar. Çandar was the one who conveyed messages between the president and the PKK leader Öcalan unofficially. (Ankara, 5 September 2002) Also see Yurdagül Erkoca, "Özal'in PKK'ya Af Formülü," *Cumhuriyet,* 13 April 1993, 14. According to this amnesty plan, if the PKK militants who have not committed crime were ready to lay their arm down, they could regain their citizenship rights. If the militants who were involved in attacks were ready to lay down their arms, they could as well regain their citizenship rights. However, they would be

On April 16, 1993, the day after the expiration of the first cease-fire, Öcalan announced an indefinite extension of the cease-fire.[142] Prime Minister Demirel reacted abruptly to the extension of the cease-fire and repeated his usual statement that "the state would not engage in a dialogue with armed people who kill people and who disrupt peace."[143] However, the continuation of the cease-fire and the peace and stability it brought to the region led the Demirel-İnönü coalition government to adopt a more moderate approach towards the Kurdish problem. Interior Minister Sezgin also listed some steps the government was planning to take in response to a sincere PKK move to abandon its attacks. Among these were halting the spring operations of the Turkish military; establishing a radio station that would broadcast in Kurdish; allowing Kurdish towns to get their Kurdish names back; lifting the state of emergency in the southeastern part of Turkey; leniency toward PKK members who had not committed crimes and were ready to lay down their arms.[144] Consequently, the coalition government, despite its negative reactions at the beginning, started to adopt a more moderate approach towards Öcalan's declaration of a cease-fire.

In the aftermath of President Özal's death, upon the recommendation of National Security Council, the Council of Ministers drafted a decree involving an amnesty plan similar to the one President Özal was planning to propose before he died.[145] However,

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inspected for five years to insure that they do not get involved into any armed struggle against Turkey any more. At the end of five years, if they were not involved into any armed activity, the charges held for them would be dropped.

[142] "PKK's Öcalan announces Month-Long Cease-Fire Extension," Paris *AFP* in English, 16 April 1993.

[143] Ankara Türkiye Radyolari Network (16 April 1993) in Turkish in *FBIS*-WEU-93-074.

[144] *Hürriyet*, 23 March 1991.

[145] According to their plan, if the members of the PKK who have not committed any crime would surrender, then they would not be prosecuted and regain their full citizenship. *Milliyet*, 25 May 1993.

when the PKK militants attacked a vehicle carrying unarmed, recently discharged Turkish soldiers and killed 33 of them, the government decided to cancel the draft and the war between PKK guerillas and Turkish soldiers began again.[146] Öcalan claimed that his militants realized this attack without informing him. He stated that if he had known about it, he would have prevented it.[147] Yet, he did not stop the breaking of the cease-fire. He explained that he was not satisfied with the amnesty plan, as it was not a political step. He stated that he was expecting political solutions to Kurdish problem such as freedom of broadcasting in Kurdish.[148]

As a result of President Özal initiations, through the Iraqi Kurdish leader Talabani, PKK leader Öcalan declared a unilateral cease-fire. This cease-fire, after receiving some negative reactions from Demirel government, was eventually accepted. In the aftermath of Özal's death, even Demirel government upon the military's suggestion worked on a decree involving an amnesty plan for PKK militants. However, in the political vacuum created after Özal's death, the cease-fire failed and there was little hope of seeing it repaired.

In sum, President Özal by legalizing the Kurdish language, organizing the meeting between Iraqi Kurdish leaders and Turkish officials and initiating the idea of a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds intervened in the military's sphere of influence and increased the civilian influence in politics. Moreover, by raising questions about the unfeasibility of

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[146] Ankara *Türkiye Radyolari Network* (25 May 1993) in Turkish in *FBIS*-WEU-93-100.

[147] London *Kanal-6 Television* (8 June 1993) in Turkish in *FBIS*-WEU-93-110..

[148] Ibid. Moreover, Öcalan stated that the political cadres had no intention of solving the Kurdish problem by political methods. Öcalan said, "We formulated the cease-fire decision relying on Turgut Özal's determination to solve this problem. Now, Turkey has lost this chance and so have we. This is not good.

a federation, amnesty for the members of PKK, education and broadcasting in Kurdish and peace through negotiations, President Özal smashed traditional political taboos and brought alternative solutions to the Kurdish problem into the discussion.

III. INTERFERENCE IN THE MILITARY PROMOTION PROCESS

The role played by civilian governments and leaders in military promotions is one of the most crucial criteria for demonstrating the level of civilian control within a country. In Turkey civilian influence over military promotions has traditionally been low. The military, and particularly the Chief of the General Staff, has generally played a major role in setting the boundaries for promotion patterns, especially for the selection of service commanders. Previous attempts to end the military's monopoly over decisions regarding promotions for the force commanders' positions failed.[149] The most significant and eventful interference by a civilian government into the process of the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff took place during the period of Turgut Özal's premiership in June-July 1987.

1. The Role of Civilian Leaders in Military Promotions in Turkey

In Turkey, the 17-member Supreme Military Council, composed of the Prime Minister, Defense Minister and all 15 four-star generals and admirals, makes decisions on

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Demirel and İnönü are avoiding the solution of this problem and have handed it to the Army. In view of this, we again decided to wage war....."

[149] In 1977, the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel attempted to have his own candidate, General Ali Fethi Esener, become the next Chief of the General Staff. However, then President, Fahri Korutürk (a retired admiral), withheld ratification until Ersener came due for retirement. By effectively blocking Ersener's appointment, President Korutürk opened the way for the appointment of General Evren.

promotions and retirements at its annual August meeting.[150] In theory, although the Prime Minister acts with the Deputy Chief of the General Staff to chair this council, in practice, the military members of the council make decisions on appointments and promotions. The military members review the relevant officer's file and listen to comments from current and former commanding officers on the council and make their decision.[151]

The Supreme Military Council usually selects the commanders of the three services from the four-star full generals and admirals depending on their seniority. Although in theory the Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff submit to the President, a joint list of nominees for service commander positions for approval, in practice, the Chief of the General Staff chooses service commanders according to their seniority. In fact, the Chief of the General Staff informally notifies the prime minister of his choice before the list is prepared for signature. Along the same line, while on paper Council of Ministers chooses the Chief of the General Staff after submitting the name of a candidate to the President for ratification, in practice, traditionally and automatically, the commander of the ground forces takes over the post of Chief of the General Staff.[152] Furthermore, Article 125 of the 1982 Constitution does not allow any judicial appeals on decisions of the Supreme Military Council.

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[150] The Supreme Military Council was restructured after the 1971 military intervention. According to Law 1612, published in the Official Gazette, the council would be composed of the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, force commanders (army, navy, air), army division commanders, military police commander, navy fleet commander, and all-4 star generals in the armed forces, whereas previous councils included only a few select top ranking generals. By including all the high generals into a kind of power-sharing, cohesion of the military in the council increased.

[151] Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 25-6.

[152] Ibid., 26.

2. The Appointment of the Chief of the General Staff in June-July 1987

Prime Minister Turgut Özal, in June 1987, intervened in the succession of the Chief of the General Staff by bypassing the military's candidate for the position and appointing his own candidate. In the summer of 1987, the outgoing Chief of the General Staff, Necdet Ürug, and the commander of ground forces, General Necdet Öztorun (who would normally assume the position of Chief of the General Staff), were going to retire at the same time; a situation that obviously complicated General Öztorun's accession to the position of Chief of the General Staff. In order to open the way for his close friend General Öztorun, the outgoing Chief of the General Staff, General Ürug asked for an early retirement date.[153] General Ürug revealed this plan by telling reporters that he was ready for the retirement, and that according to the promotion principles of the Turkish military, he was expecting General Öztorun to take his post.[154]

Prime Minister Özal, who had long wanted to exercise civilian control over military promotions, was not happy to hear that generals had engineered this promotion; moreover, as will be analyzed in detail in the next section, Özal did not wish to see General Öztorun become the next Chief of the General Staff, due to his inflexible loyalty to Kemalist principles and his disobedience of Özal concerning the fight against Kurdish nationalism. Consequently, in an unprecedented decision, Özal vetoed General Öztorun's appointment as the new Chief of the General Staff. Instead, he named the Deputy Chief

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[153] See Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal'in Anilari*, (Istanbul: Sabah Yayinlari, 1994), 107. See Ertugrul Özkok, "Neden Orgeneral Torumtay?" 30 June 1987, *Hürriyet*, 15. While General Ürug's tenure ended in August 1987, he wanted to leave his post and retire beginning on 1st of July and started his yearly holiday in mid-June for two weeks until the 1st of July.

[154] Orhan Tokatli, "Org. Öztorun Baskanliga Hazir," *Milliyet*, 29 June 1987, 1,14 ; M. Hulki Cevizoglu, "Org. Ürug: Kararliyim," *Hürriyet*, 29 June 1987, 1, 13.

of Staff, General Necip Torumtay, to the post on June 30, 1987. General Torumtay was known as a 'democratically-minded' and disciplined military officer. The cabinet decided that the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Torumtay, would first be appointed to the position of Commander of the Ground Forces and subsequently be installed as the new Chief of the General Staff. Prime Minister Özal and his cabinet completed the procedures for the new appointment in a very short time and General Torumtay then became the new Chief of the General Staff. Özal was also able to convince then President Kenan Evren, to accept the decision of the cabinet. President Evren's acceptance of the appointment of General Torumtay as the new Chief of the General Staff prevented any potential reaction from the military.

By intervening in the military's promotions, Özal tried to prove that civilian authorities need not comply with the schemes of the military and that the civilian government could exercise its authority to choose the Chief of the General Staff whenever necessary. He knew that for the democratic system to function, it was necessary for the political authorities to exercise their power.[155] In doing so, Özal proved that the civilian government could impose the candidate of its own choice to ensure that the Chief of the General Staff would work well with the government.

3. Rational Choices and Political Capacity

A. Rational Choices:

Prime Minister Özal's intervention into the succession of the Chief of the General Staff—clearly a move that intended to demonstrate the civilian influence over the

military—was an important step toward the strengthening the influence of the civilian government over Turkish politics.[156] Besides proving the civilian government's influence over the military, Özal had instrumental reasons for disrupting the military's schemes; reasons related to his own political ambitions, specifically his campaign for the presidential office. Özal did not wish General Öztorun to be elected as the Chief of the General Staff because of Öztorun's strict adherence to Kemalist principles and the investigations he ordered into religious orders (*tarikats*). General Öztorun's succession to the position of Chief of the General Staff would have upset Özal's electoral base, which partially consisted of religious orders.

Secondly, Özal was not happy about the lack of information the military had conveyed him regarding PKK's terrorist activities in the southeastern part of Turkey. As the head of the government, in order to have the upper-hand in decision-making concerning the Kurdish issue, Prime Minister Özal needed to be informed about the Kurdish separatist movement properly. Thirdly, and most importantly, Özal was planning to run for the presidency in 1989 and did not want the military to make plans for the election of an ex-military person to this position, as it had been done since 1950s.

a. The Strict Kemalism of General Öztorun :

As the military considers itself the guardians of Kemalist principles, members of the Turkish military are expected to be strictly loyal to these principles. General Öztorun was rigorously loyal to Kemalist principles to the extent that he even wrote an

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[155] *Milliyet*, 30 June 1987 and 1 July 1987.

instructional book explaining how to follow these principles and the system of Kemalist ideas.[157] In addition, on several occasions General Öztorun stated that it was the foremost duty of the political leaders to accept Kemalist principles as a doctrine.[158] Finally, Öztorun, in cooperation with General Ürug, had started a serious fight against the religious orders (*tarikats*), some of which supported Özal.[159]

Prime Minister Özal, maintaining a large group of Islamists in his party, cabinet and in the parliament, could not afford to have a strict Kemalist Chief of the General Staff getting involved in investigations of the religious orders.[160] Furthermore, Özal, was connected to one of the religious orders himself, and received a number of votes from such orders, so he did not wish to risk ire of his electorate. He decided to appoint General Torumtay to the post of Chief of the General Staff. On the matter of Islamic fundamentalism, General Torumtay's views were not different from General Öztorun's. Still, Torumtay had been known as a more liberal professional regarding these issues.[161]

General Öztorun also did little to endear himself to Özal by criticizing the Prime Minister's policies on many different occasions. For example, General Öztorun did not

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[156] Interview with Özal's special adviser Cengiz Çandar (Ankara, 5 September 2002) and Interview with the State Minister of the period Hasan Celal Güzel (Ankara, 5 September 2002).

[157] *Cumhuriyet,* 1 July 1987. The title of his book is *Atatürkcü Düsünce Sistemi, (The System of Atatürk's Way of Thinking)*

[158] *Milliyet,* 2 July 1987.

[159] Ugur Mumcu, "Sivillesme," *Cumhuriyet,* 1 July 1987, 1,15.

[160] See Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Demokrasi Donemecinde Uc Adam,* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1999), 355-77, for General Oztorun's report on how to follow Kemalist principles.

[161] Mehmet Ali Birand, "Ürug-Öztorun ve Torumtay Ücgeni," *Milliyet,* 3 July 1987, 12. It was a well known fact that that as a junior officer during the 1960 military intervention, Torumtay had been very polite to the arrested politicians. *Milliyet,* 1 July 1987.

favor Özal's suggestion for privatization in the military.[162] In a report he prepared for the commanders in 1987 Öztorun criticized the Özal administration for attempting to run the military as though it were a civilian corporation.[163] He also openly criticized Özal's fiscal policies for failing to follow Kemalist economic principles and argued that total freedom in the markets would destroy the economy.[164]

b. The Pinarcik Incident :

During his second term as Prime Minister in late 1980s, Özal was searching for ways to resolve politically the Kurdish issue. Consequently, in order to ensure that he could control the implementation of policies concerning the Kurdish issue, he insisted on being well informed of the goings on in the southeast. However, in June 1987 the military failed to properly inform Özal of a PKK attack on the southeastern Turkish village of Pinarcik, which resulted in the massacre of 32 people. Özal held the Commander of Ground Forces, General Öztorun, responsible for this communications failure.[165] Özal cancelled the National Security Council Meeting of June 1987[166] and

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[162] Özal suggested the military to give the tailoring of the uniforms to private sector rather than military sewing houses. Cemal, *Story of Özal,* 230.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Ugur Mumcu, "Evren'in Elinden birsey Gelmedi," *Cumhuriyet*, 2 July 1987, 1,13; *Hürriyet,* 4 July, 1987.

[165] General Öztorun often avoided sharing the intelligence concerning the events in the Southeast with Prime Minister Özal. He usually first informed President Evren. Nurcan Akad, "O Gece 9," Türkiye'yi Sarsan Geceler Yazi Dizisi, *Hürriyet*, 14 Temmuz 1994.

[166] Yalcin Dogan, "Gün Gün Operasyon," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1987. It is not that common for a prime minister to cancel a National Security Council meeting in Turkey.

ordered an inquiry into the allegations that the army had failed to come to the aid of the Pinarcik villagers, despite having received information about the attack.[167]

Besides the lack of intelligence sharing, General Öztorun openly ignored the Prime Minister in this matter. According to the sources close to Özal, when the Prime Minister requested information regarding the Pinarcik incident from General Öztorun, the Ground Forces Commander, he was told to get the information from his own sources. Therefore, it is not surprising that Özal did not want Öztorun installed as Chief of the General Staff.

c. The Year 2000 Plan :

The most important reason for Özal's rejection of the appointment of General Öztorun to the post of Chief of the General Staff was General Ürug's 'Year 2000 Plan.' There was speculation that General Ürug's attempt to appoint General Öztorun as the incoming Chief of Staff was part and parcel of a pre-planned schedule of promotions that would bring Ürug's protégés to the position of the Chief of the General Staff for the remainder of the century. As the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff takes place every four years, General Ürug's plan therefore involved the next four scheduled appointments in the years 1987, 1991, 1995 and 1999. Moreover, General Ürug was hoping to be elected president when the term of President Kenan Evren came to an end in 1989. Up to that time in Turkey, where only one out of seven presidents had risen from a

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[167] *Milliyet*, 29 June 1987 also see Sam Cohen, "Turkey's Premire Earns Plaudits for Move seen as Challenging Military," *Christian Science Monitor,* July 8, 1987, 9.

civilian background, the presidency was seen as the ultimate military rank.[168] However, at the time, Prime Minister Özal was also planning to become the next president of Turkey and on various occasions promoted the idea that the next president should be a civilian.[169]

General Ürug did not deny the existence of the Year 2000 Plan, but explained the purpose of the plan differently. He argued that the plan involved research into the qualifications of junior officers in order to properly conduct their promotion process. He maintained that this was merely a study to systemize the promotion of all generals, rather than a decision on who would become Chiefs of General Staff through to the year 2000.[170] By no means would Prime Minister Özal accept this plan, given his determination to assert civilian control over the military, especially in light of his own political aspirations.

The confidence of the military leadership in their ability to ensure the promotion of their candidate was manifest in the distribution of invitations of a ceremony honoring General Öztorun's appointment to the position of Chief of the General Staff before the

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[168] Kutlay Dogan, *Turgut Özal Belgeseli*, (Ankara: Türk Haberler Ajansi Yayinlari, 1994) 138; *Milliyet*, 30 June 1987; Ertugrul Özkök, "Neden Orgeneral Torumtay?" 30 June 1987, *Hürriyet*, 15; Cizre, "Egemen Ideoloji ve Türk Silahli Kuvvetler," 148.

[169] For instance in the meeting of the Council of Ministers in June 1987, Prime Minister Özal told the ministers that the next president should be elected from a civilian. For the details of the meeting see Yalcin Dogan, "Gün Gün Operasyon," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1987.

[170] See Cemal, *Story of Özal*, 233-4.

actual decision was reached.[171] This infuriated Özal as he interpreted it as signal that the military considered their plans a *fait accompli.*[172]

B. Political Capacity

Prime Minister Özal's political capacity helped him to follow his interests that are based on his strategic calculations. He was able to bring a candidate of his choice to the position of Chief of the General Staff by his considerable authority over the government—he was, after all, the Prime Minister of a government that held the majority of the seats in the parliament and all of the ministries in the cabinet—to issue a decree on the subject. As Özal was the founder of his party and highly respected by its members, it was not difficult for him to convince the cabinet to reject the candidate of the military for the position of Chief of the General Staff. There were some objections in the cabinet as some members were afraid that such an act would lead to another military intervention, but Özal personally convinced these members that 'the era of coups' was over. He also convinced the ministers that democracy required a civilian regime in which democratic civilians led the soldiers. Therefore, on Özal's instructions, the Council of Ministers met at midnight and rejected the military's candidate.[173]

More importantly, Özal was able to convince the former coup leader and current president, Kenan Evren, to accept the decision of the cabinet, and all necessary decrees

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[171] Interview with a retired General. (Izmir, 19 July 2002); Also see Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalcin, *The Özal*, (Istanbul: Dogan Kitapcilik, 2001), 308-9.

[172] Yalcin Dogan, "Gün Gün Operasyon," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1987.

[173] Interview with the State Minister of the period, Hasan Celal Güzel, (Ankara, 5 September 2002); Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu*, (Ankara: V Yayinlari, 1992), 133

were signed within twenty-four hours.[174] Although President Evren was against any kind of civilian intervention in military promotions, when Özal indicated that he was ready to resign if his candidate was not appointed as the Chief of the General Staff, the President had no choice but to accept Özal's proposal.[175]

In September 1987, Özal was in a very strong political position. He was at the end of his first term as prime minister and was confident that he would be reelected in the November 1987 general elections. During the period Özal had been in power and under his initiative, the Turkish economy experienced a remarkable expansion. Manufacturing experienced a boom that saw the value of industrial exports quadruple; agricultural production expanded; many villages in remote corners of the country were electrified and an extensive network of roads was built.[176] These economic successes increased Özal's political power and strengthened the position of his party in the eyes of the electorate. As a result of his increasing political power and capacity, Özal was able to take the initiative regarding the promotions in the military.

Özal's move was applauded by several quarters, including the media and some political parties, as a bold step for democracy. The local press described Özal's intervention in the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff as a "coup against the army" and interpreted this move as an unprecedented assertion of Turkish government

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[174] See *Hürriyet*, 30 June 1987.

[175] Interview with the State Minister of the period Hasan Celal Güzel (Ankara, 5 September 2002)

[176] Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," *Foreign Affairs*, (November 1993) and see Kalaycioglu, "The Motherland Party," 46.

authority over the military.[177] The move was described as the "victory of the civilian democracy" or the "smashing of a taboo" as in Turkey civilians did not publicly challenge the military or discuss military institutions or practices.[178] Political scientist Ahmet Evin, for example, argued that the announcement of the decision was clearly intended to demonstrate the power of the government over the military.[179] Chairman of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), Erdal İnönü, said that this move was in line with the concept of civilian rule and hailed it as another major step toward democracy in Turkey.[180]

Prime Minister Özal was able to intervene in the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff while following a rational, strategic plan for advancing his own political ambitions. That he was able do so while exercising his power within constitutional limits has given rise to the conclusion that his moves simultaneously strengthen democratic institutions and governmental authority over the military.

Conclusion

Civilian control over the military considerably increased during Turgut Özal's premiership and presidency. Although Özal served as Prime Minister and President between 1983 and 1993, the rise in civilian influence was most apparent in the years

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[177] See Esen Ünür and M. Hulki Cevizoglu, "Ordu Zirvesinde Operasyon," *Hurriyet*, 30 June 1987, 1; *Milliyet*, 30 June 1987.

[178] *Milliyet*, 30 June 1987; Ugur Mumcu, "Aslanli Kapi," *Cumhuriyet*, 30 June, 1987, 1, 15; Yalcin Dogan, "Sivil Otorite Belirleyici Oldu," *Cumhuriyet*, 30 June 1987, 1, 15. Also see Oktay Eksi, "Yetki Hükümetindir," *Hürriyet*, 30 June 1987, 3.; Mümtaz Soysal, "Sivillesme and Dis Dünya," *Milliyet*, 30 June 1987, 2; Hasan Cemal, "Bir Atama ve Demokrasi," *Cumhuriyet*, 2 July 1987, 1, 12; Cüneyt Arcayürek, "Genelkurmaya Atama!.." *Cumhuriyet*, 30 June 1987, 1,15.

[179] Interview with Prof. Ahmet Evin at Sabanci University (Istanbul, 30 April 2003)

[180] *Hürriyet*, 1 July 1987.

between 1987 and 1991. Özal first came to power in the aftermath of 1980 military intervention. Consequently, it took Özal a while to exert civilian influence in politics during the transition period. By 1987, when his party was elected for the second time, Özal had consolidated power and was ready to pursue policies that would assert civilian control in politics. After he was elected president in 1989, he was able to continue to follow similar policies as a result of the parliamentary majority won by his party, ANAP. However, once ANAP lost power in 1991 and the DYP-SHP coalition replaced it, civilian control over the military began to lessen.

The increase in civilian influence over Turkish politics manifested itself significantly in two issue areas: Kurdish nationalism, and military promotion. Despite the objections of the military and the state elite in both of these areas, Özal, as Prime Minister and, later, President, was able to shape both.

In both cases, behind Özal's motivation to take advantage of certain political openings by challenging the military's policies, was his concern for his political survival and reelection. By trying to reach a political solution to the Kurdish problem, Özal was hoping to lift the financial burden that the struggle with PKK was placing on the Turkish economy. At the same time, he was hoping to improve Turkey's performance on the question of minority rights and thereby improve the chances of Turkey becoming a member of the European Community. By doing so he would increase his popularity both nationally and internationally, which, it was hoped, would ensure his reelection. In the case of 'promotions in the military,' Özal did not want to see the promotion of a die-hard Kemalist general who had started investigations of religious orders, which formed part of his constituency. Moreover, he wanted to stop the military's plan of bringing another

general forward for the position of president in the 1989 election, since he was hoping to save that position for himself.

While Özal's rational choices in pursuit of his political ambitions encouraged him to make these decision, his political capacity enhanced his ability to do so. He was able to implement his more tolerant policies on the Kurdish issue due to the strong support he received from his political party, although he was not the leader of the party at that point. As the founder father of the party, he was highly cherished and respected; moreover, many previously unknown political personalities had achieved prestigious positions thanks to Özal, and these individuals continued to support him. Even after he was elected president, thanks to the leader-oriented Turkish politics, he could still influence the ANAP behind the scenes by engineering the election of a low-profile prime minister. In spite of the constitutional restrictions on his positions as the president, Özal's role as the founder of the ruling party and his experience as prime minister allowed him to control both the cabinet and the party from behind the scenes. However, once ANAP lost the elections in 1991, Özal lost much of his power and influence, despite remaining president. Similarly, on the issue of promotions in the military, Özal, as the Prime Minister in 1987, was able to persuade his own cabinet overnight by pronouncing a decree to reject military's choice of Chief of the General Staff. Moreover, he was able to convince former general, and then president, Evren to accept his decision.

In sum, Özal, as a result of his parliamentary majority was able interfere into a national security area, the rise of Kurdish nationalism, which had traditionally been in military's realm. While he was challenging the Kurdish policies of the military, his tremendous experience in politics and his successful performance in economics enhanced

his capacity to do so. Moreover, the parliamentary system of government and leader-oriented political parties as institutional conditions shaped his behaviors.

CHAPTER 4

THE PERIOD OF PRIME MINISTER TANSU ÇİLLER AND HER ALLIANCE WITH THE MILITARY (1993-1995)

Introduction

Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's impact on the rise of military's influence in politics in Turkey between 1993 and 1995 during her True Path Party's (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP) coalition government with Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçi Parti-SHP) is a crucial topic in Turkish politics. Although the weaknesses of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller as a political leader have been examined by many scholars, her role in decreasing civilian influence over politics has not been subject to much study.

The increasing military influence in politics during the Çiller period displayed itself significantly in two major areas: the fight against Kurdish nationalism and the military promotion process. After Çiller unsuccessfully attempted to bring about a political settlement to the Kurdish issue upon coming to power, in June 1993, she ruled out any solution to the problem other than a military one, surrendering civilian authority over the issue to the military by supporting increased military offensives and cross-border operations. Although Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres, having reached the retirement age of 67, was supposed to leave his post by the end of August 1993, the Çiller government extended his term of office by one year by a special decree to satisfy his demands to retain his position.

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of first, Prime Minister Çiller's failure to find a political solution to the Kurdish question, second, her alliance with the military to resolve the issue through military means, and, finally, her acceptance of the demands of the Chief of the General Staff to extend his term. In order to analyze the motivation behind Çiller's alliance with the armed forces—her surrender of the Kurdish issue to the military and acceptance of military demands in the promotions—this chapter investigates Çiller's intentions in depth and explains her political actions with reference to rational interest calculation. It concentrates on the strategic calculations made by Çiller in order to ensure her political survival. Moreover, it examines the political capacity of Çiller by exploring the strength of her political competitors, her decreasing electoral support, her limited political experience, and her weak political performance through an analysis of her policies concerning economics. Institutional rules such as the parliamentary system of Turkey and the highly leader-oriented political party system will also be taken into consideration as conditioning factors shaping the behavior of Çiller.

I. KURDISH PROBLEM DURING PRIME MINISTER ÇİLLER'S PERIOD

In the aftermath of President Özal's death in April 1993, the government was completely submerged in debates over the presidential succession for several weeks. Consequently, it ceased to address the most crucial problems that country faced, including the unilateral cease-fire declared by the PKK leader, Öcalan. During this chaotic period, starting on April 17, 1993, the day President Özal died, until June 13, 1993, when first the presidency and then the premiership were filled, there was no discussion of how the government should respond to the cease-fire offer. The Prime

Minister of the time, Süleyman Demirel, was elected by parliamentary majority to the post of president.[1] Demirel's ascendance to the presidency left the DYP-SHP coalition government without a prime minister, and the DYP without a chairperson. Subsequently, Tansu Çiller was elected leader of the DYP in the extraordinary convention held in June 1993. As leader of the DYP, Çiller also assumed the position of the prime minister at the head of the coalition government.[2]

Özal's death caused a serious political vacuum in Turkish politics that was particularly evident in efforts to resolve the Kurdish crisis.[3] Özal's policy of "peace through negotiations" soon crumbled, when Öcalan was not satisfied with the policies followed by the newly formed DYP-SHP coalition and his militants attacked a vehicle carrying soldiers killing 33 unarmed, recently discharged soldiers. Consequently, PKK unilaterally ended its cease-fire and by initiating a new series of attacks.[4] Demirel, as the new president, shut the door to a political solution on the Kurdish issue, permitted relations with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to deteriorate and sided with the hardliners, especially those in the armed forces, impeding Prime Minister Çiller's attempts to reach a political solution.[5] As Philip Robins states, the response to Kurdish issue "was reduced

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[1] In Turkey, presidents are elected by the parliament usually among a very small number of candidates (mostly one or two) who are also proposed by the members of the parliament. The presidential candidates do not run a public campaign for their elections.

[2] As discussed in the previous chapter when President Turgut Özal's former party ANAP lost the elections in October 1991, the two main opposition parties formed a coalition government, with the center-right True Path Party (*Dogru Yol Partisi* --DYP) led by Süleyman Demirel as the senior partner and center-left Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti*--SHP) led by Erdal İnönü as the junior partner.

[3] See İsmet G. İmset, "Wiping Out the PKK Again and Again..." *Turkish Probe,* 6 July 1993, 4-7.

[4] Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," 669.

[5] Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 136-7.

almost exclusively to a function of national security."[6] Consequently, Çiller, as a result of severe criticism she received from the military, the President and the hard-liners in her party, failed to find a political solution to the problem.

The following sections will analyze Prime Minister Çiller's unsuccessful attempts to resolve politically the Kurdish issue, and then examine her strategic calculations and meager political capacity that compelled her to accept a military approach to resolving the Kurdish question.

1. Prime Minister Çiller's Failure to bring a Political Solution to the Kurdish Problem

Prime Minister Çiller committed herself both to economic liberalization and an expansion of democratization during her election campaign for the premiership.[7] The new protocol of Çiller's True Path Party-DYP and Social Democratic Populist Party-SHP coalition government stated that the struggle against separatist terror would continue within a framework of respect for human rights. Similar to the previous DYP-SHP government (Demirel's coalition government with İnönü), this protocol also referred to political liberalization and the promotion of ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities. In the protocol it was stated as follows:

> Our government will overcome the legal and other obstacles that hinder the free expression of our people's cultural and ethnic rights. This will be done in compliance with national unity and in accord with the principles of the Paris

[6] Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, 174.

[7] *Milliyet*, 15 June 1993.

> Charter. Various ethnic, cultural and lingual groups will be permitted to develop freely. These rights will be preserved with thoughtful care and developed without fear of retribution. Our government regards these elements as a rich contribution to the society....[8]

Once Çiller became the prime minister, she initially tried to bring a political resolution to the Kurdish issue. As will be analyzed in depth in the next section, in one of her early initiatives Çiller began a "national consensus" tour with opposition party leaders from the parliament, during which she listened to the views of these leaders on the Kurdish issue. Later, she attempted to form a joint inter-party "Parliament Security Commission" to investigate the Kurdish problem. Finally, she attempted to implement the 'Basque Model' as a means to resolve Turkey's ethnic problem.[9] However, when she received all kinds of negative responses from members of her own party, opposition parties, the president and the military, she soon abandoned her plans and resigned herself to seeking a military solution by allying with the military, on their hard-line terms, in order to secure her position as the prime minister.

Eventually, Çiller adopted a one-dimensional policy, assuming that the problem was only one of separatist terrorism and that there was no broader Kurdish dimension.[10] In contrast to her earlier views, she began to claim that granting cultural rights, for example in the areas of education and radio-television rights, to the Kurds would lead to the

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[8] *Coalition Protocol between the True Path Party and Social Democratic Populist Party,* (in English) 24 June 1993, 10.

[9] See *Sabah,* 13 July 1993; *Milliyet,* 13 and 14 July 1993.

[10] Hasan Cemal, "Anlasilan o ki, Güneydogu'da 'aci reçete' uygulamasi sürecek..." *Sabah*, 24 March 1994, 25.

division of the country.[11] She committed herself to a hard-line policy and started equating all things Kurdish with the PKK.[12]

Under Demirel's presidency and Çiller's premiership, the military again gained the upper hand in shaping policy on the Kurdish situation. As commentator İsmet İmset has pointed out, while the late President Özal tried to close the doors on the military where the Kurdish issue was concerned, the President, and former Prime Minister Demirel opened the door to the military out of fear of losing his authority if he tried and failed to limit the authority of commanders. Eventually, the new Prime Minister Çiller had to allow the military to walk through the door opened by Demirel and ceded "full authority" over the Kurdish issue to the armed forces.[13]

The next section will examine the reasons for the reversal of Çiller's Kurdish policies by analyzing the effects of her incentive structure and political capacity on her political decisions and strategic calculations.

2. Rational Choices, Political Capacity and Institutional Context

According to Wendy Hunter's framework for Brazil, there is room for civilian intervention in politics (as opposed to military intervention) when the appropriate electoral incentives exist and civilian leaders have the capacity to act on them.[14] As was

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[11] See *Basbakan Tansu Çiller'in TBMM DYP Grup Konusmalari, 22 Haziran-21 Aralik 1993* (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1994), 40 and İsmet G. İmset, "Southeast Crisis: Turning to Military Politics," *Turkish Probe,* 20 July 1993, 2-5.

[12] Ibid., 138.

[13] İsmet G. İmset, "Military Determined to Crush Rebellion by Force," *Turkish Daily News,* 24 March 1994, 3

[14] See Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil.*

already stated in the previous chapter, Hunter, in her study on Brazil, argues that competitive elections create incentives for politicians to reduce interference from a strong military, and the politicians' political capacity helps them to act on these incentives. Moreover, the institutional context in which the civilian leaders operate shape their actions and decisions. This chapter examines the incentive structure of Prime Minister Çiller in the context of making political decisions and strategic calculations, in order to guarantee her political survival and reelection. It analyzes Prime Minister Çiller's lack of electoral support, which was a major impediment for her ability to exercise influence over the military, alongside other factors that weakened her political capacity, including the existence of strong competitors, insufficient political experience and poor political performance, particularly in economy. It shows how the parliamentary system and leader-oriented political party system did not help Prime Minister Çiller to pursue her own policies since she did not have the necessary political capacity and political experience.

A. Rational Choices and Particularistic Incentives

Like Prime Minister/ President Özal, Prime Minister Çiller also followed particular policies concerning the Kurdish issue to ensure her political survival. However, unlike Özal, the particular incentives followed by Prime Minister Çiller led her to abandon any civilian initiative concerning the Kurdish crisis, leaving the resolution of the problem completely in the hands of the military. Concentrating on the strategic calculations of Prime Minister Çiller, it is important to understand why Çiller adopted the

preferences of the military in her attempts to resolve the Kurdish issue and improve her political position.

In fact, as will be analyzed in depth in the following sections, Çiller initially wished to follow policies similar to those of Özal, however, once she learned that without strong electoral support and political capacity, she would not be able to pursue purely political measures to resolve the Kurdish issue, she resorted to militaristic means. Faced with serious criticism from the military, the President and hard-liners in her own party, she soon understood that pursuing such policies would endanger her position as Prime Minister. Consequently, in order to strengthen her weakened position within the party, receive the support of the military and the President, and win the votes of the hard-liners and Turkish nationalists, she adopted more militaristic policies concerning the Kurdish issue.

As Prime Minister Çiller did not come to power as a result of nation-wide popular elections, she lacked obvious electoral support.[15] As already explained, when the leader of DYP, Prime Minister Demirel assumed to presidency upon President Özal's death, Tansu Çiller was elected as the chairperson of the party by delegates at the DYP's extraordinary general convention in June 1993, which automatically led her to premiership. Although she managed to win as a dark-horse candidate over two more experienced candidates in the congress, she lacked a power base within the party. The "electoral victory" variable that enhanced the political capacity of Özal did not exist in Çiller's case. Çiller's DYP was already in power since the 1991 general elections, having

[15] Consequently "electoral victory" variable that enhanced the political capacity of Özal did not play an important role in Çiller's case. Çiller's DYP was already in power since 1991 General Elections with the 27.1 percent of the votes and 173 members in a 450-member parliament. Although DYP-SHP coalition formed a parliamentary mandate (266 members in the parliament altogether) and SHP supported liberal

won 27.1 percent of the votes and 173 seats in a 450-member parliament. The DYP-SHP coalition formed a parliamentary majority (266 members in the parliament altogether) and SHP supported liberal policies for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. However, SHP was a weak party full of strife, having changed its leader three times in a two year period as a result of these conflicts. In addition to the weakness of SHP, Çiller lacked sufficient support from her own party DYP. Consequently, she could not adopt political measures for resolving the Kurdish problem. She lacked the capacity to pursue her own policies and, out of necessity followed the military's preferences.

B. Political Capacity and Institutional Context

In this context, political capacity includes political experience, which is reflected in the scanty political support Çiller received from her own party, political performance, particularly on the economy which is the most significant issue in Turkish domestic politics, and the existence of a strong competitor, President Demirel, for political control. The parliamentary system and leader-oriented political party system also condition Prime Minister Çiller's actions, especially given her lack of power base within her party and inexperience in politics.

a. Political Experience

The overly centralized party system, which is a conditioning institutional factor that normally gives absolute control over the party to its leader, did not help Çiller given

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policies for the resolution of the Kurdish issue, however, as a result of the inadequate support Çiller received from her party, she could not adopt political measures for the solution of the Kurdish problem.

her inexperience in politics. As a result, she did not hold a great deal of personal power in the party.

As both the first female prime minister of Turkey and the first woman to lead a major political party, Tansu Çiller holds a special place in Turkish politics. Although she did not have any prior political experience, she was able to reach the top leadership of the DYP and the prime minister's office in a very short time. Moreover, she was able to impress many people in Turkey and abroad with her modern and western outlook, her fluent English, and her background as an American-trained economics professor. [16]

Çiller returned to Turkey in 1974 after receiving her Ph.D. in economics from the University of Connecticut to begin teaching at Bogaziçi University in Istanbul. By the end of the 1980s, she was well known thanks to the research projects and reports she prepared for influential economic interests, such as the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (*Istanbul Sanayi Odasi*) and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (*Istanbul Ticaret Odasi*). Her close relations with politically influential members of the Turkish business world led her to enter politics after being recruited by the DYP as a "technocrat" in 1990. In the 1991 general elections, she was elected as a deputy from Istanbul and served as the Minister of State responsible for the economy in the DYP-SHP coalition, where she performed very poorly. Nonetheless, she was able to attain the position of Prime Minister in 1993, when her predecessor, Demirel, stepped into presidency after the death of Özal.[17]

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[16] Ümit Cizre, "Tansu Çiller: Lusting for Power and Undermining Democracy," in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari eds., (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 199.

[17] Ibid., 200.

At the DYP's extraordinary general convention, convened in Ankara in June 1993 to choose the party's next leader, the tutelage of Demirel as the founder and the leader of the party for 29 years was so strong in the party that neither of the two male contenders could compete effectively for Demirel's seat. Demirel's unwillingness to approve any potential candidates for the party's leadership worked to Çiller's advantage.[18] Çiller showed up at a time when the DYP needed to replace its rural image with ideas and aspirations drawn from Turkey's sizable modern sectors. Çiller was the appropriate candidate for DYP to gain the confidence of urban sectors of Turkish society.[19] She was also supported by the military as a symbol of modernity, thus reinforcing the Kemalist ideology.[20] Benefiting from the most experienced advisers, strong public relations and political strategists in her election campaign, Çiller was elected to the leadership of the party, which automatically led her to premiership.[21]

Consequently, Çiller was able to reach to the upper-leadership of DYP without rising through the ranks and gaining political experience.[22] Although she was elected by the majority of the delegates in the convention, she did not have a strong support base within the party and among the loyal constituency of DYP. Çiller as an openly urban,

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[18] Demirel's reluctance to endorse any candidates was a result of his concern of creating a strong rival to himself in the party.

[19] For details see Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 199-202.

[20] Interview with the second Interior Minister of Çiller period, Nahit Mentese (Ankara, 27 April 2003)

[21] For details see Faruk Bildirici, *Maskeli Leydi*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayincilik,1998), 226-46 and Üstün Reinart, "Ambition for All Seasons: Tansu Çiller, (http://www.winmagazine.org/issues/isssue18) Her public relations consultants advised her to wear white for look of innocence, to walk fast, for a look of dnamism and to put one of her hands on her waist during speeches as a sign of authority.

[22] Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 199.

professional woman was alien to DYP's conservative and rural constituency.[23] One of the prominent members of her party explained that Çiller was supported by the so-called 'nationalist' delegates and veteran politicians of the party who saw in her prospects for enhancing the profile of the party and the nation. These seasoned politicians were also hoping to wield significant influence over her once she came to power.[24] Eventually, as will be analyzed in the next section, they successfully managed to dictate their conservative policies to Çiller.

b. Political Performance in Economics

Çiller at the beginning of her premiership had a strong commitment to a free market economy that resembled Özal's stance more than Demirel's more statist policies. She made the Özalist market economy a priority through privatization, liberalization and stabilization, and tried to end the DYP's dominant discourse that was somewhere between state-led economy and liberal economy. However, once she learned that following such policies would weaken her fragile popular support, she quickly abandoned her interest in free market economic policies.[25]

During Çiller's period, the country's economic problems and inflation continued to worsen due to trade imbalances and the large current account deficit accumulated by state

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[23] Yesim Arat, "A Woman Prime Minister in Turkey: Did It Matter?" *Women and Politics,* Vol. 19 (4) (1998), 8.

[24] Interview with Coskun Kirca, (Istanbul, 29 April 2003); Also see *Nokta* (Istanbul weekly), 16 June 1993. Moreover, Çiller in order to survive in a male-dominated conservative party, tried to fit in the traditional male coding of leadership, to legitimize her authority. She emulated the body language of men with its gestures and assertiveness. However, prior to 1995 general elections she started show her feminine side to attract the votes of the women. See Arat, ""A Woman Prime Minister in Turkey: Did It Matter?" 11 and 14-17, for details.

owned enterprises. Çiller was committed to curbing inflation, bringing fiscal balance, reducing high interest rates, and achieving market and public sector reforms, yet her government issued 21 billion Turkish liras in 15 days, significantly worsening the situation.[26]

In April 1994, in an attempt to pay the immense public deficit of $7 billion, the Çiller government introduced an economic austerity package that included price and tax increases and the privatization of state assets. However, the Çiller government did not levy any additional taxes on prosperous social groups. Moreover, these measures actually missed their basic goal of controlling the public deficit because the government left the major source of public expenditures, state expenditures on security and defense, intact. These expenditures comprised approximately twenty percent of the budget. In addition, Çiller's support for a militaristic solution to the Kurdish problem escalated the scale of the military's fight with the PKK.[27] This struggle also had a tremendous impact on the economy in indirect ways, by discouraging foreign investment and decimating income from tourism.[28] Consequently, the economic and financial measures adopted by Çiller's austerity package did not succeed.

The failure of the Çiller administration to alleviate economic ills weakened support for the Prime Minister, both with the public and within the party. Consequently, she was forced to find new bases of support to ensure her political survival and in this

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[25] Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 210-212.

[26] Ümit Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party," *Turkish Studies*, v.3, n.1 (Spring 2002), 91.

[27] Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah," 91 and 92; Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 209-210; Ertugrul Kürkçü, "Peace: A Rational End to the Southeast Conflict," *Turkish Daily News,* 21 April 1994, B3.

[28] Sahin Alpay, "Bir Numarali Sorunumuz," *Milliyet*, 8 December 1994, 18.

context it was in her interests to ally with the military.[29] Moreover, in order to compensate for her failure in economics, she used the policy of annihilating the PKK as her flagship achievement.

c. Existence of a Strong Competitor for Political Control

The continued tutelage of a founding leader of the DYP, Süleyman Demirel, played a significant role in Çiller's failure to pursue liberal policies on the Kurdish issue. Demirel's legacy as the leader of DYP for twenty-nine years, and of its predecessor, the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-AP), could still be felt, particularly among veteran conservatives. When elected Prime Minister in 1991, Demirel declared that he now recognized Turkey's Kurdish reality. However, as Barkey states, this action "did not translate into conciliatory policy initiatives."[30] As already explained in the previous chapter, after receiving a warning from Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres that such speeches weakened the morale of the soldiers fighting in the region,[31] Demirel proceeded to reject the existence of a Kurdish problem, reducing the issue to a "terrorist problem."

As a veteran politician, who had already experienced two military interventions in civilian politics during his previous premierships, Demirel was insistent about not giving the military another chance to remove him from power.[32] Therefore, he made a special

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[29] See *Milliyet,* 26 May 1994.

[30] Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma," 56-57.

[31] Interview with the Special Adviser of Prime Minister Çiller, Yalim Eralp (Istanbul, 30 April 2003) Also see Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler*, (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2003), 54.

[32] Süleyman Demirel, even during his premierships in the past did not confront the military. He followed double discourse. While following a conciliatory policy toward the military, at the same time to impress

effort not to challenge the military's approach towards the Kurdish problem. Once Çiller became the Prime Minister during his presidency, Demirel also forced her to accept the military option for the resolution of the Kurdish issue.[33] The next section, alongside other variables, will examine Demirel's reaction and efforts to hinder Çiller's political solutions.

C. Analysis of Çiller's Attempts to Bring Political Solutions to the Kurdish Problem

Upon assuming the premiership, Çiller initially sought peaceful political solutions to the Kurdish question, as opposed to the exclusive employment of militaristic means. At the beginning, she was determined to follow a policy of differentiating the problem of ethnic identity from terrorism. While the security forces would maintain their wide-scale operations against PKK's acts of terrorism, the government would consider the security, economic, social, cultural and psychological aspects of the problem as a whole.[34] Just a month after she came to power, on the eve of her tour to the southeastern part of Turkey, in July 1993, in a televised 'Address to the Nation' she stated that the struggle against terror was the parliament's responsibility. She repeatedly stated that she would find a solution to terror 'under the roof of the Parliament' and would not take the issues to the

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the popular will he made ineffective efforts to convey the military to a politically inferior position in the system. For example, when he became the prime minister in 1965, he gave up all attempts to bring the military under civilian control and opted for virtual autonomy for the armed forces. [See Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst, 1977) 237.]

[33] İlnur Çevik, "The State has to Counter Terrorism," *Turkish Daily News,* 12 July 1993, 3

[34] Aydin Hasan, "Güneydogu'da Çiller Modeli," *Milliyet,* 10 July 1993, 15.

military-dominated National Security Council before they were debated in the parliament.[35]

As one of her first initiations for finding a political solution to the problem, Çiller began her "national consensus" tours with opposition party leaders from the parliament, during which she listened to their views on the Kurdish issue. In order to settle the issue politically, she called for support for broadcasting in Kurdish on state-owned television and education in Kurdish. The leaders of the main opposition parties suggested various solutions to improving economic and social development in the area and expressed their support for the Turkish military's fight against PKK. Aside from the Social Democrats, (SHP), the junior partner of the coalition, however, none of the parties in the parliament supported the granting of cultural rights to the Kurds.[36]

Despite her long-lasting meetings with these leaders, the inexperienced Prime Minister was unable to bring these politicians to support a political resolution to the problem. Çiller had limited knowledge of the Kurdish issue and was facing extremely seasoned veteran politicians, including Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkes, all of whom supported conservative nationalist policies to resolve the Kurdish issue.

As soon as Prime Minister Çiller began her "national consensus" tours with opposition party leaders, President Demirel shut down the idea of a civilian solution to

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[35] *Milliyet*, 21 July 1993.

[36] While the leader of pro-Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*-RP) Necmettin Erbakan proposed solutions such as abolishing Operation Provide Comfort and lifting the embargo in Iraq, leader of center-right Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*-ANAP) Mesut Yilmaz suggested better coordination and communication between the forces fighting against PKK and the leader of center-left Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*-DSP) Bülent Ecevit concentrated on economic development in the region. See *Sabah*, 13 July 1993 and *Milliyet*, 14 July 1993 for details.

the Kurdish problem by harshly reacting to Çiller's reference of the possibility of recognizing the Kurdish language, television broadcasts and Kurdish education, stating that such concessions would endanger the territorial integrity of the country.[37] He also opposed them on the grounds that taking such steps would create the impression of a retreat and encourage the PKK to think that they have won those rights through struggle. He continuously emphasized that Turkey did not have a Kurdish problem, but a terrorism one. He held the opinion that Kurds of Turkey did not want anything in the political sense, and that the only thing the terrorists were after was an independent Kurdish state. He emphasized that Turks and Kurds had been living together for centuries and that Kurds enjoyed full citizenship.[38]

Another rejection of Çiller's attempts to reach a political resolution to the Kurdish issue came from the Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres. He maintained that the place to discuss the issue was in the National Security Council and stated that the Turkish military was not going to accept any plan that involved education and broadcasting in Kurdish.[39] In mid-July, before the first month of Çiller's government was over, military officials gave a long briefing on the Kurdish issue to Prime Minister Çiller and the cabinet. In this briefing, after explaining the situation in the southeast, military officials repeated their claim that there was no Kurdish problem in the country and that the only problem was one of terrorism, which could only be solved with military measures. For

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[37] See *Milliyet*, 14 July 1993; *Hürriyet*, 14 July 1993; *Sabah*, 25 July 1993; Also see Andrew J. Mango, "Testing Time in Turkey," *The Washington Quarterly*, 20:1 (Winter 1997), 14. Demirel said, "As we cannot discuss the territorial integrity of Turkey, we cannot discuss Kurdish TV."

[38] Interview with the Ninth President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel (Ankara, 19 April 2003) and also see İlnur Cevik, Hayri Birler, and Sinan Yilmaz: "Turkey and Terrorism in 1994" *Turkish Daily News*, 18 January 1995, B1.

the military, any move toward meeting demands for Kurdish rights in the region would have helped the outlawed PKK to achieve its goal of dividing the country and establishing an independent Kurdistan in the Middle East.[40]

In a second attempt, Çiller tried to form a joint inter-party "Parliament Security Commission" as a kind of a civilian National Security Council that would consist of representatives of the parties in the parliament and investigate the Kurdish issue. However, her attempt to establish a commission was rejected by prominent members of her own party on the grounds that such a commission would hand over the executive powers of the government to the parliament.[41] In the early months of her leadership, DYP's parliamentary group displayed signs of discontent with Prime Minister Çiller's attempts to assert civilian authority in the search for a solution to the Kurdish question. For example, Çiller was criticized harshly for her suggestion that education and broadcasting in Kurdish be part of a "political solution" to the Kurdish problem. This rebuke came from the hard-liner nationalist block of her own party in a stormy parliamentary group meeting in July 1993, causing Çiller to walk out of the meeting. One of the leading figures of the party's hard-liners, Istanbul Deputy Coskun Kirca told her that education and radio broadcasts in Kurdish would be unconstitutional. Kirca

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[39] *Hürriyet*, 15 July 1993 and *Cumhuriyet* 20 July 1993.

[40] It was not only the Prime Minister and ministers who received a briefing on July 11, 1993, the owners and senior managers of major Turkish newspapers, television stations, and agencies were also given a separate briefing at the chief of the general staff headquarters on the current situation and were politely advised not to promote PKK activities. They were advised on how to write stories, how to "arrange" the wording so it did not serve "PKK propaganda," and which words to choose for the same cause. See *Sabah*, 12 July 1993.

[41] Interviews with Hüsamettin Cindoruk (Istanbul, 28 November 2002 and 1 May 2003) In response to this attempt, a prominent member of her party and the parliament spokesperson Hüsamettin Cindoruk told Çiller that such a body would be against the constitution and the governmental system in Turkey.

stated that a political solution meant Kurdish autonomy and accused Çiller of not understanding that her proposals would lead the country to a division.[42]

Another idea that Prime Minister Çiller proposed in October 1993, after speaking with her Spanish counterpart Felipe Gonzalez in Vienna, during the Council of Europe meeting, was implementing the 'Basque Model' as a potential formula for resolving Turkey's ethnic problem. Gonzales had reportedly explained Spain's threefold campaign on the Basque issue to Çiller. The Spanish campaign included Spain's agreement with neighboring France to prevent use of its territories by Basque separatists, to reach a consensus between all parties in the parliament to take a joint decision against terrorism, and to give more authority to local administrations, which also meant giving rights to Basques, including those over broadcasting and education in their own language.[43] To implant such a plan, Turkey would not only have to secure the full cooperation of its neighbors, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Armenia, but it would also have to take simultaneous steps to restore Kurdish rights and freedom.[44] However, even without the international dimension of the problem, in those aspects over which Turkey had complete control (granting cultural rights and trying to reach a consensus with the other parties in the parliament) Prime Minister Çiller was completely unsuccessful.

Çiller received all kinds of reactions to her "Basque Model" proposal from the military, the President and the hard-liners in her party. President Demirel rejected the

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[42] Interview with Coskun Kirca, (Istanbul, 29 April 2003) In this meeting Kirca also said, ".... Mrs. Çiller is gone if she fails to meet the expectations of the nationalist base of DYP ... If she is hoping to persuade the DYP group into accepting the ideas of Kurdish education and broadcast, she is wrong; this is impossible.... Her ideas will be rejected." See *Hürriyet,* 27 July 1993.

[43] Güneri Civaoglu, "Çiller, Istanbul, Viyana," *Sabah,* 10 October 1993, 31; Kurthan Fisek, "Güneydogu'ya Bask Modeli," *Hürriyet,* 11 October 1993, 19; *Milliyet*, 11 October 1993.

suggestion by pointing out that the Basque model was not adding anything new to the precautionary measures they were already taking. He explained that Turkey was already cooperating with its neighbors, mentioning his recent visit to Iran and Interior Minister Ísmet Sezgin's visit to Syria. He stated that there was a consensus among the parties on the resolution of the Kurdish problem and they voted for the extension of emergency rule in the region. He also mentioned that projects to strengthen the local administrations were underway, thus there was no new solution that the Spanish model could offer to Turkey. He added, however, that giving cultural rights would not solve the problem and would not bring the armed guerrillas down from the mountains, emphasizing that the only way to deal with this problem would be through military means.[45] Moreover, in the aftermath of the Basque model debates, Çiller received two unexpected visits from the Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres. Although the office of the General Staff acknowledged that these visits were related to the crisis in Somalia, Dogan explained to Çiller the military's concerns with the "Basque Model" proposal.[46]

Consequently, as a result of the severe responses Prime Minister Çiller received to her proposals from conservative members of her own party, President Demirel and most importantly the armed forces, she gave up her initial attempt to bring a political resolution to the Kurdish issue. Although her leadership began with a permissive outlook

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[44] Civaoglu, "Çiller, Istanbul, Viyana"

[45] See Fikret Bila, "Demirel: 'Çözümü Ispanya'da Arama'," *Milliyet,* 11 October 1993, 14; Cengiz Çandar, "Ankara'da Bask Krizi," *Sabah,* 13 October 1993, 11. In an interview Demirel replied as follows, "There are armed men in the mountains of Turkey. If we bargain with them, the state will lose its raison d'etre. What other remedy could there be other than taking the arms away from the gunmen? The Turkish republic is defending its borders, territory, and population. It will continue to do so and will emerge victorious from this struggle. See Ruhat Mengi, "Demirel: Terör Artmiyor," *Sabah,* 25 October 1993, 26; Also see Ertugrul Özkök's and Sedat Ergin's interviews with Demirel, *Hürriyet,* 19 and 25 October 1993.

[46] *Hürriyet,* 13 October 1993; See Yavuz Gökmen, "Özal Yasasaydi," *Hürriyet,* 14 October 1993, 28; Interview with Yalim Eralp (Istanbul, 30 April 2003).

toward Kurdish cultural expressions, in a short time she rejected any initiatives along those lines.[47] By November 1993, Çiller was already acting as a fervent supporter of the militaristic solutions to Kurdish problem. During the annual convention of DYP in November 1993, she stated that it was not possible to talk about a civilian solution in a situation where innocent people are being killed and that the only way to cope with the problem was to fight. She also noted that a political differentiation based on ethnic differences would never be allowed.[48]

Çiller needed to consolidate her position in the party, since she was elected as an inexperienced, surprise candidate when neither of the two male contenders could gather the necessary resources, skill and support to compete effectively for Demirel's seat.[49] Once she realized that her attempts to find political means to resolve the Kurdish issue were endangering her political position, she decided to adopt military's preferences in order to secure a broad-based support in her party and gain the confidence of the military.[50] Her inexperience in security and domestic policy matters also discouraged her from challenging the military on the Kurdish issue and led her, as Cizre states 'to abandon any pretense of reasserting civilian supremacy and instead [she] began to lavish praise on the armed forces.'[51]

Moreover, by resorting to a purely militaristic solution and scoring a decisive military victory against the PKK, she hoped to capture the admiration and votes of hard-

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[47] Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 202 and Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah," 92.

[48] See *Sabah*, 21 November 1993.

[49] For details see Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 199-202.

[50] Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 137-8; Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma," 57.

core nationalists who appreciated her firm approach in the fight against the PKK[52] thus, Çiller began using the PKK issue to improve her chances for political survival. What mattered for Çiller was winning at any cost.[53] If that meant relinquishing civilian authority to the military in order to deliver a catastrophic military defeat to PKK, she was ready to do so. Çiller was hoping to achieve a political victory by eradicating the PKK and capturing Abdullah Öcalan, leader of PKK, paving a road to the presidency for herself.[54]

In this way, Çiller committed herself to a more nationalist and hard-line policy. Contrasting her earlier views, she started to treat the issue simply as a "terrorism" problem and made "anti-terrorism" the primary basis of her policy toward the Kurds. Furthermore, she started claiming that the granting of cultural rights would lead to the division of the country. Çiller did not want to arouse the military's antagonism by upsetting the status quo. Therefore, she abandoned other policy instruments to cope with the problem and left the armed forces as the only power for devising and implementing policies to deal with the Kurdish issues.[55] However, by tilting the balance of civil-

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[51] Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 203.

[52] Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah," 92.

[53] Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 206 and 209. For Çiller, all that mattered was to keep her post as the prime minister and to consolidate her power. For the sake of keeping her premiership, Çiller did not have any problem of moving diametrically opposed positions. For example, while she was dedicated to the accession of Turkey to the European Union, she could at the same time defy European norms and standards in the name of protecting nationalistic attitudes and values in order to appeal to the conservative and nationalist population.

[54] My first interview with Hüsamettin Cindoruk, (Istanbul, 28 November 2002); Tansu Çiller, *Türkiyem*, (1995), 2; See Bildirici, *Maskeli Leydi*, 279; Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah," 84 and 89; Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 203 and 206.

[55] Hasan Cemal, "Anlasilan o ki, Güneydogu'da 'aci reçete' uygulamasi sürecek..." *Sabah*, 24 March 1994, 25 ; See *Basbakan Tansu Çiller'in TBMM DYP Grup Konusmalari, 22 Haziran-21 Aralik 1993* (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1994), 40 and İsmet G. İmset, "Southeast Crisis: Turning to Military Politics,"

military relations in favor of the military, Çiller undermined the democratic consolidation process in the country that was still in the recovery stage in the aftermath of 1980 military intervention. Moreover, as will be explained in depth in the next section, the Çiller government received serious criticism from the European Union countries and the United States for the hard-line policies she pursued concerning the Kurdish problem.

3. The Signs of the Increase in Military's Control in Politics through Prime Minister Çiller's Hardline Kurdish Policies

During Prime Minister Çiller's government as described by Eric Rouleau "the generals received a free rein both to diagnose the illness and to prescribe the treatment."[56] Çiller appointed a general as her adviser in order to coordinate the operations of her office with those of the office of the General Staff. She explained that this was necessary due to the continuous assessments she had to make on incoming information and reports related to the Kurdish issue.[57] In addition to the general, Çiller established a military-dominated special Security Council, *Güvenlik Kurulu,* that was in charge of the Kurdish problem and was supposed to meet every ten days. In contrast to the National Security Council, this council had the executive power to make decisions.[58] As Çiller's first

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Turkish Probe, 20 July 1993, 2-5; See Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 138-142 for details of the hard-line policies of Çiller period; Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 203.

[56] Rouleau, "Turkey's Dream of Democracy," 110.

[57] Interview with Yalim Eralp (Istanbul, 30 April 2003)

[58] *Milliyet*, 30 October 1993 and *Hürriyet* 24 October 1993.

Interior Minister, Mehmet Gazioglu, stated during this period, the government felt that the army was the only force able to deal with the Kurdish issue.[59]

While the special Security Council influenced Çiller's policies, the ultimate decisions concerning the fight with PKK were being taken by a couple of high-level officers in the Office of Chief of the General Staff.[60] Occasionally, General Güres made decisions on the Kurdish issue without consulting the government at all.[61] In one interview, Güres explained that compared to other prime ministers he had worked with, he found working with Prime Minister Çiller much easier.[62] What usually happened was that Güres would explain his suggestions to Çiller regarding the Kurdish issue and within a couple of days Çiller would ask Güres to fulfill the tasks as if they were her own suggestions. Moreover, whenever a victory was won in the southeast, Güres would present it as the success of Prime Minister Çiller.[63]

As Barkey and Fuller point out, the Çiller government reduced the Kurdish question from a political policy issue to a military campaign to eliminate the PKK,

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[59] See *Turkish Daily News*, 3 July 1993.

[60] Interview with Yalim Eralp, (Istanbul, 30 April 2003) and Interview with Coskun Kirca (Istanbul, 29 April 2003) also see Gökmen, *Sarisin Güzel Kadin*, 84. In spite of the fact that the Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres dictated to the Prime Minister Çiller the policies that should be followed, he always argued that the last decision belonged to the civilian authority and he would carry out the orders he received from the prime minister.

[61] See Sezai Sengün, "Yetkimi Asiyorum," *Hürriyet*, 9 July 1993, 1, 21. In an interview Chief of the General Staff told the reporter that he often went to the region (southeastern Turkey) to inspect the area and whenever it was necessary he sent troops to various towns without getting in touch with the government. He openly stated that he exceeded his responsibilities. He also explained that at one time, the governor of Maras had asked for war planes and he had sent them without consulting the Minister of Interior.

[62] See Mehmet Ali Kislali, "Interview with Çiller," *Türkiye*, 27 November 1997. In another interview with prominent military and security officers in the southeastern part of Turkey, the officers drawing a line from Özal to Demirel and to Çiller stated that Çiller was the political leader who had been working the most harmoniously with them. See Hasan Cemal, "Diyarbakir'da Devlet Ne Düsünüyor?.." *Sabah,* 23 March 1994, 25.

focusing on body counts, cross-border raids, village evacuations, and imprisonment of pro-Kurdish DEP deputies, leading to a significant increase in human rights violations.[64] In DYP's parliamentary group meetings, Çiller spoke only of the fight against PKK and the number of PKK militants that were killed every week.[65]

The alliance of Çiller with the military in the resolution of the Kurdish issue reflected itself in the hard-line policies followed by her administration. Some of Çiller's hard-line policies, such as the establishment of village guards and special teams to engage the PKK guerrillas, village evacuations and cross-border operations, were continuations of military measures that were started during Özal's period, however, now they were intensified as a result of Çiller's adoption of military's preferences. Other policies, such as the rejection of cease-fire offers by PKK and cooperation with the Kurdish leaders of Iraq, postponement of army discharges, the imprisonment of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party's deputies and the establishment of state-supported crime syndicates to track down PKK sympathizers were all initiated during Çiller's government.

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[63] Interview with Coskun Kirca (Istanbul, 29 April 2003)

[64] Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 138.

[65] See *Basbakan Tansu Çiller'in TBMM DYP Grup Konusmalari*. 22 Haziran-21 Aralik 1993, 52. For example, speaking to the parliamentary group of her True Path Party on September 1, 1993, Çiller stated that the death ratio was one security forces officer killed for every '22 terrorists.' Çiller added that separatists were losing 35 members daily. She noted that a total of 501 operations have been carried out especially in Hakkari and Sirnak. She stated that around 1000 terrorists, who refused to surrender, have been killed during these operations and 443 of them have been captured. In her 5 October 1993 parliamentary group speech, Çiller stated that they had been keeping the same ratio of one security forces officer killed for every '22 terrorists' for the last three months.

A. Village Guards (Köy Koruculari)

The "village guard" system introduced by the Özal government in 1985 continued under the Çiller government, though on an intensified level. Village guards were recruited from Kurdish tribal groups to help in the fight against the PKK by providing security officials with intelligence about the tactics of the PKK and providing security for the selected villages.[66] The armed forces favored this system due to the tremendous help they received from the village guards in their fight against PKK.

However, the village guard system escalated the violence among the Kurds by dividing the Kurdish communities.[67] The PKK started using violence as an instrument of terror against members of the village guards and their families, declaring them to be the most traitorous elements within the Kurdish population.[68] Despite the tremendous amount of violence and bloodshed the village guard system created among the Kurds, Çiller government continued to employ village guards for the sake of wiping the PKK at any cost. Consequently, during Çiller's period the number of village guards reached up to 60,000.[69]

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[66] Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 71-72 and 147. The state salaries were often the village guards' only source of income. As Barkey and Fuller explain, the village guard system is actually a direct outgrowth of the societal structure in the region, where Aghas (big landowners) who were enjoying the patronage of the state saw PKK as a threat to their power. Therefore, these Aghas forced the peasants residing in their villages to join the village guards.

[67] While the state forced the villagers to join the village guards threatening them with the evacuation of their villages if they do not collaborate, the PKK threatened them to kill if they become village guards. See Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 72 and 148.

[68] See for details İmset, *The PKK,* 105-117 and Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 147-8.

[69] During Özal period there were about 30,000 village guards.

B. Military's Special Teams

The special teams, which were trained for counter-terrorist warfare, were first established during Özal's period;[70] however, as part of Çiller's militaristic resolution to the Kurdish problem their number increased tremendously. As the Kurdish rebels were using hit-and-run methods and hiding in the areas where a regular army was not able to confront them, special teams were established to counter the methods of the guerrillas' with similar ones.[71] The Çiller government and the military alliance increased the number of special teams by enlisting former military servicemen, who received commando training in southeastern Anatolia authorized by a decree signed by President Demirel.[72]

The special teams were established to help the military to fight against the PKK. These teams quickly gained a reputation for brutality, killings and violence. While they were very successful combating the terrorists, they were ineffective in dealing with the people, particularly when deployed to counter public riots.[73] Although the special teams became a symbol of oppression to the local people and committed numerous human rights violations, the Çiller government continued to increase their numbers in order to eradicate the PKK.

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[70] See Cemal, *Kürtler*, 115 and İmset, *The PKK*, 214-5.

[71] There were two kinds of special teams: One group was part of the gendarmerie (Special Team), and the other group belonged to the police units (Special Action Teams). See Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 148; *Milliyet,* 14 August 1993; "Prime Minister Çiller's 2 November 1993 Speech," in *The Speeches of Prime Minister Çiller in her Parliamentary Group Meetings 22 June-21 December 1993,* (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1994), 129-130.

[72] *Milliyet, Basbakan Tansu Çiller'in TBMM DYP Grup Konusmalari.* 22 Haziran-21 Aralik 1993, 129-130.

[73] In Tunceli, in 1995 as a result of their provocative acts, the Minister of Interior was forced to withdraw them and apologize for their conduct in terrorizing local citizens. See Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 148-9.

C. Village Evacuations

In the southeastern part of Turkey, in an attempt to defeat the PKK terrorists, the evacuations of villages that began during Özal's period continued and increased during Çiller's period. During this period, Prime Minister Çiller and Chief of the General Staff established a new military strategy called Field Domination Doctrine, which postulated that the Turkish army had to be present everywhere in the field and not leave any areas unpatrolled. Between 1994 and 1996, the security forces and the gendarme evacuated many villages on the grounds that they supported and accommodated the terrorists. They evacuated some villages due to the difficulty of protecting villagers against terrorists and evacuated others when the villagers refused to join the paramilitary village guards. In the aftermath of the evacuations, some of these villages were either bombed or burned to the ground by the military and security forces to prevent them from being used by separatist forces.[74]

Although most of these village evacuations in southeastern Anatolia were justified by the government for security reasons, these operations started to head the list of major human rights complaints about Turkey. More than one million people who had lost their homes, their fields, animals and income sources started living in poverty in the ghettos in

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[74] See Cemal, *The Kurds*, 256; See Yildirim Türker, "Köyün Yolu Çok Uzak," *Radikal* (Istanbul Daily), 13 September 2004; See İlnur Çevik and İsmet G. İmset, "Interview with Demirel," *Turkish Daily News*, 23 December 1993, B1; *Turkish Daily News*, 7 October 1994. *Parliamentary Minutes*, 19th Legislative Year, Session 40, (23. 11. 1994), 429-30; *Parliamentary Minutes*, 19th Legislative Year, Session 21, (19.10.1993), 8-12. In several occasions, it was not clear whether the villages or towns were burned by the security forces or the PKK. For example, in the Lice incident it was claimed by the people and a parliamentary commission that the PKK had carried out a brief attack and security forces later opened fire in Lice and the town was pulled to the ground. However, these claims were rejected both by President Demirel and the Çiller government. In another case where a dozen villages in the Ovacik District of Tunceli Province were claimed to be burned by the soldiers, the secretary-general at the Chief of Staff's office and Interior Minister Nahit Mentese denied the allegations and claimed that the villages were burned by the militants of PKK. However, in the case of burning several villages in the Genç district of Bingöl

and around the big cities of regions such as Diyarbakir, Batman, Sanliurfa, Gaziantep and Mardin, or they immigrated to southern, central and western cities of Mersin, Adana, Ankara, and Istanbul. They became refugees in their own country, increasing the risk of urban violence and the establishment of shanty towns in big cities. Other costs included the growing enmity of citizens toward the state. Moreover, when the government did not compensate them for their losses, some of them ended up in the mountains joining the PKK militants.[75]

D. Cross-Border Operations

Cross-border operations became a means of conducting operations against the PKK camps located in Iraqi and Syrian territory. During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, Turkey signed a security agreement with Iraq that allowed Turkey to conduct operations against the PKK in Iraqi territory. In the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990-1991, in order to halt PKK infiltration into Turkey as part of the mass flight of Iraqi Kurds fleeing the atrocities committed by Saddam's soldiers, these operations continued.[76] As a result of the intelligence Turkish officials received from the Iraqi Kurdish leaders in 1992, the

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Province, by the soldiers, Minister of Interior Mentese accepted the government's fault stating that Turkish military was fighting in very tough circumstances in the southeast.

[75] See Soli Özel, "Of Not Being A Lone Wolf: Geography, Domestic Plays, and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," in *Powder Keg in the Middle East*, eds., Geoffrey Kemp and Janice Gross Stein (Lanham, MD: Rowman, Littlefield, 1995) 183; İlnur Çevik, "Village Evacuations May Backfire One Day," *Turkish Daily News*, 1 October 1994, A3; See *Tercüman*, 3 August 1993 and İsmet G. İmset, "Tension Rises as Turkey Falls into Polarization Trap," *Turkish Daily News*, 23 September 1993, 3. As İmset argues, with each and every village being raided, evacuated and sometimes burned down to prevent them from being used again, with each and every pain inflicted on the local Kurdish people of the Southeast, the PKK got stronger and stronger and gained new recruits.

[76] See Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 51.

Turkish military stepped up their efforts and began conducting air raids on PKK camps in northern Iraq.[77]

These operations, which started during the Özal period, continued and expanded under Çiller's government, attracting strong international reactions. In October and November 1993, as well as January and April 1994, the Turkish military launched ground and air attacks on the PKK camps in northern Iraq.[78] However, the largest cross-border operation took place in March 1995. The operation took place over a 220-kilometer-long (135-mile-long) border zone and involved an advance of 40 kilometers (25 miles) into northern Iraq by 35,000 Turkish troops backed by warplanes, armor and artillery to engage 2400 to 2600 PKK members.[79]

As a result of the March 1995 cross-border operation, the Çiller government was subjected to severe reactions from the European governments. Several European countries, including Britain, France and Germany, called on Turkey to end its incursion into Iraq as quickly as possible. They were worried about a possibility of a long-lasting Turkish occupation of northern Iraq and accused the Çiller government of endangering the civilian population and abandoning its political responsibilities to the military. The Europeans also declared that the situation was taking Turkey in the opposite direction of

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[77] İmset, *The PKK,* 200.

[78] Ibid. Among these operations in October 1993 the Turkish military launched ground and air attacks on the PKK camps in two different areas in northern Iraq. In late November 1993, Turkish security forces launched a cross-border air operation after PKK's raid on Üzümlü military post in Çukurca district of Hakkari Province. In January 1994, Air Force Command warplanes carried out an operation against the Zhalah camp of PKK in northern Iraq. Another cross-border operation took place by the cooperation of Turkish ground and Air Force units and Kurdish peshmergas affiliated with KDP leader Barzani in April 1994.

[79] *Agence France Presse* (Paris) in English, 20 March 1995 in *FBIS*-WEU-95-053 and Kelly Couturier, "Turkey invades North Iraq to battle Kurdish Guerrillas," *Washington Post*, 21 March 1995, A01.

European Community standards. The United States, while more understanding at first, was soon forced to join the Western chorus for an immediate pullback.[80]

Moreover, in Geneva, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a statement asking Turkey to restrain its military activities in northern Iraq and expressed deep concern for the safety of 4,500 refugees in the area.[81] On 26 April 1995, the Council of Europe approved a resolution asking its governing committee of ministers to suspend Turkish membership in the organization unless it showed significant progress towards a withdrawal from Iraq prior to a June 26 European Union summit. Turkey's Minister of Defense, Mehmet Gölhan, accused the council of indirectly supporting the PKK. He stated that while the council, on one hand, was acknowledging the terrorist nature of PKK, on the other hand, it was ordering Turkey to withdraw. He then declared that the Turkish armed forces would return home only after they finished their job.[82]

Prime Minister Çiller told European governments that the PKK infiltrated Turkey from northern Iraq, where there was lack of authority, and was engaged in the killing of innocent people. For this reason, Turkey had no choice but to conduct cross-border operations to protect its own citizens. Pointing out that these operations were carried out

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[80] Sueddeutsche Zeitung in German, (Munich Daily) 29 March 1995 in *FBIS*-WEU-95-061; *Agence France Presse*, (Paris) in English, 2 April 1995 in *FBIS*-WEU-95-065; *Turkish Daily News*, 17 April 1995; "Turkish Troops and Tanks penetrate Iraq," *United Press International, BC Cycle*, 20 March 1995. (Lexis-Nexis) Although the US government initially supported the operation at the beginning on the grounds that Turkey's need to deal decisively with the rebel PKK terrorist bases across the Turkish border, once the number of civilian casualties increased, the US government also joined the critics of the European countries.

[81] "Turkish Army crosses into Northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK rebels," *BC Cycle*, 20 March 1995.

[82] *Turkish Daily News*, 29 April 1995.

in accordance with international law, she stated that the Turkish military only attacked the PKK camps and did not accept the accusations that civilians were targeted. [83]

In sum, such an immense cross-border operation, while enhanced the Turkish-Iraqi borders' security for a short period of time, eroded ties with Turkey's Western allies and international organizations and brought greater Western attention to the PKK's diplomatic offensive in a bid to "internationalize" the problem.[84]

E. Rejection of Cease-Fire Proposals:

The PKK leader, Öcalan, offered numerous cease-fire proposals to the Turkish government during Çiller's period. However, the military, believing that these new appeals for peace talks were a sign of weakness, rejected all proposals. Although under Özal the March 1993 cease-fire had been proceeding towards a negotiated amnesty, the military considered it as a mistake that saved the terrorists from a planned offensive. Every time PKK proposed a cease-fire, the President, the Prime Minister, and Chief of the General Staff or the Minister of Interior issued a statement that military operations would be maintained in full and that there was no way that the Turkish government would sit down at a table with a terrorist organization to discuss a cease-fire.

That is what happened in March 1994, when PKK leader Öcalan proposed a cease-fire and declared that the PKK was prepared to accept any formula for a dialogue

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[83] See *Turkish Daily News,* 8 April 1995; "Interview with Tansu Çiller by Kerry Marcus," *London ITV Television Network,* 21 March 1995 in FBIS-WEU-95-056, 23 March 1995. Minister of Foreign Affairs Erdal İnönü visited Bonn, Paris and Washington to explain Ankara's position and motives. Minister of Interior Nahit Mentese defended the operation in northern Iraq as "in accordance with international law recognizing a country's right to defend itself". He stated that Turkey respected the territorial integrity of Iraq and wanted its own territorial integrity to be respected. Interview with the Interior Minister of the period Nahit Mentese (Ankara, 27 April 2003)

with Ankara, so long as it aimed at finding a peaceful political solution to the Kurdish issue, provided a general amnesty to all PKK members, and recognized the Kurdish identity in Turkey. Öcalan even called on international and European organizations, including the European Parliament, the European Union and the United Nations, to mediate and supervise the dialogue leading to a peaceful solution of the Kurdish issue.[85] The response from Ankara was a repetition of positions held for years. Both President Demirel and Prime Minister Çiller declared that the PKK was a criminal organization, that the government would not negotiate with terrorists and expressed confidence that the PKK would be wiped out. [86]

In November 1994, PKK leader Öcalan issued another cease-fire offer in which he stated that he was "prepared to end the fighting if Turkey agrees to comply." He sent a letter to the high-ranking officials in several influential countries, including the US, Germany, France, and Britain, wherein he explained that PKK had abandoned its goal of free and independent Kurdistan. The Turkish government's reply to this proposal was negative and the National Security Council decided to maintain the uninterrupted struggle against the separatist and terrorist activities.[87]

Nonetheless, such cease-fire proposals put Turkey in a difficult position in the eyes of Western countries. European countries pressured Ankara to find a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) issued a report recommending a "bilateral cease-fire" between Turkey and the

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[84] See *Turkish Daily News*, 17 April 1995.

[85] See *Hürriyet*, 14 March 1994.

[86] *Hürriyet*, 14 March 1994.

outlawed PKK. [88] The co-chairman of the CSCE, U.S. Senator De Concini, in his visit to Turkey in October 1994, recommended that "if the PKK were to declare a unilateral cease-fire—as it did in March 1993—the Turkish government should seriously consider suspending its costly military campaign."[89] The CSCE report added that "such a bilateral cease-fire could be a first step toward establishing a climate in which non-military approaches could be discussed and implemented."[90] However, the Turkish government did not take these suggestions into consideration.

F. Deterioration of the Relations with the Iraqi Kurdish Factions:

President Turgut Özal tried to keep up good relations with the leaders of the Iraqi Kurdish factions, the leader of Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP), Masud Barzani, and the leader of (PUK) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Jalal Talabani, in order to have the upper hand in the new Kurdish formations in northern Iraq and to receive intelligence from these groups in Turkey's fight with PKK. Özal allowed Iraqi Kurdish immigrants to cross into the Turkish territories both in 1988, after the Saddam's massacre in Halapja,

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[87] Yavuz Gökmen. "Öcalan'in Ateskes Çagrisi Turkiye'yi Zor Durumda Birakacaktir," *Hürriyet*, 28 November 1994, 30. *Turkish Daily News,* 26 November 1994; *Milliyet,* 1 December 1994.

[88] The CSCE report made the following recommendations to the Turkish government regarding the Kurdish problem: 1. Allow all nonviolent political parties to participate in political life. 2. Abolish restrictions on free expression including those within the Anti-Terrorism law. 3. Repeal the State of Emergency 4. Dismantle the Village Guard System 5. Remove all restrictions on Kurdish linguistic and cultural expression 6. Lift constraints on dissemination of Kurdish language 7. Develop a government sponsored Institute of Kurdish Studies and allow schools to offer instruction in Kurdish. 8. Convene a high-profile conference to examine all aspects of Turkish-Kurdish relations. See *Turkish Daily News*, 30 November 1994.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid.

and in 1991, during the aftermath of the Gulf War. He invited the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to Ankara to receive help in an attempt to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem.

However, both President Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller allowed relations with the Iraqi Kurdish factions to deteriorate. They believed that both Barzani and Talabani were supporting the PKK and were planning to establish an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq.[91] Consequently, the Çiller government completely changed Özal's Iraqi policy by attempting to revitalize the role of Saddam Hussein's government in northern Iraq. Turkish government sources stressed that this was not a policy change, but only a change in approach to show the West that Turkey could not be taken for granted by the United States and the European countries on issues regarding northern Iraq. This decision was taken as a response to the US government's refusal to help Turkey make up for its economic losses as a result of the sanctions against Iraq. [92]

The deterioration of Turkish relations with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders also blocked cooperation between the Turkish government and Talabani and Barzani in trying to address the Kurdish problem. This eventually led Turkey to conduct immense cross-border operations since they were no longer able to receive intelligence from the Iraqi Kurdish leaders.

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[91] Turkish Daily News, 8 March 1995.

[92] İlnur Çevik and Hayri Birler, "Ankara works to restore Bagdad Authority in North," Turkish Daily News, 29 August 1994, 1, 11; İlnur Çevik, "...and Turkey takes vital steps on Iraq," Turkish Daily News, 30 August 1994, A3. Foreign Minister Mümtaz Soysal stated that during Gulf Crisis Turkey had pursued a policy linked to the US but now it was time for Turkey to formulate policies in line with its own interests. He also criticized European countries for interpreting separatist terrorism as a reaction to ethnic discrimination. In fact, Turkey's new Iraqi policy was a reaction to the United States and Europe.

G. Postponement of Army Discharges:

In December 1993, under pressure from the Office of the Chief of the Staff, the Çiller government decided to freeze all army discharges for periods ranging from three to five months. Prime Minister Tansu Çiller even admitted that this development had not been designed by her coalition government, but had been the result of a demand presented to the government by both the National Security Council and the security forces.[93] Following the November 1993 National Security Council meeting, military officers drafted and delivered the decision to each cabinet minister, one by one, to be signed. As the main reason for this decision, the office of the Chief of the General Staff explained that the peacetime staff were unable to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces in the combat zone.[94]

The military did not want to hurt Çiller government's electoral interests, since they were able to work with her government in harmony and to dictate to it decisions concerning the Kurdish issue. The military therefore, kept the extension secret from the moment the measure was drafted in the Chief of Staff's office and relayed to regional and unit commanders and, finally, to soldiers. The military did not even inform the Ministry of Defense or the Parliament's National Defense Commission.[95] A similar postponement of discharges also took place in July 1994 in order to continue operations without interruption using experienced personnel.

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[93] İsmet G. İmset, "..and Turkey is mobilized Against Terrorism," *Turkish Probe*, 13 January 1994, 5-7.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

H. Imprisonment of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party Deputies:

When Çiller began her "national consensus" tours to discuss the Kurdish issue with the opposition party leaders, she also met with the deputies of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) —who were represented in the parliament as a result of their electoral pact with the SHP—in order to learn their views on the issue.[96] She considered them to be legitimate representatives of the Kurds of Turkey.[97] However, once she abandoned the idea of finding political solutions and adopted the military's preferences concerning the Kurdish problem—following the demands of the Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres—Prime Minister Çiller, engineered the imprisonment of DEP deputies.

The military had always believed that the Kurdish deputies collaborated with the PKK, and thus had been uncomfortable with the idea of members of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party serving as deputies in the parliament. Moreover, the statement of Hatip Dicle, the leader of DEP, that "everybody in military uniform was a target during a war" in the aftermath of a PKK's bomb explosion at Istanbul's Tuzla train station, in February 1994, killing five military cadets and injuring thirty people, enraged the generals.[98] In a mini-security summit that met at the initiation of General Güres, with the participation of

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[96] *Turkish Daily News*, 16 July 1993. HEP formed this electoral pact with SHP to reach the 10 % national threshold and get represented in the parliament. 1982 Constitution put a ten percent threshold of national votes in place to avoid the experiences of the previous decade when the parliament became stalemated due to the lack of majority. When HEP was closed by the Constitutional Court, the former HEP deputies in May 1993 established the DEP. The DYP deputies, particularly the dominant nationalist ones were not happy with the inclusion of Kurdish deputies into the parliament through SHP ticket. However, when DYP needed a coalition partner in order to come to power in the aftermath of 1991 elections, SHP was the best option.

[97] Interview with Yalim Eralp (Istanbul, 30 April 2003).

[98] See *Sabah*, 22 February 1994 and *Cumhuriyet*, 21 and 22 February 1994.

Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, the participants decided to lift the immunity for six DEP deputies, including DEP leader Hatip Dicle.[99]

The DEP deputies were arrested before their immunity was lifted and tried by a special State Security Court. According to the indictment, they were accused of carrying out their propaganda activities as the political flank of the separatist terrorist organization in order to establish an independent Kurdish state in the southeastern part of Turkey.[100] Following a five-month trial, eight DEP deputies were sentenced to up to 15 years in jail.[101] The then Constitutional Court decided to shut down Turkey's only Kurdish-based legal party, the DEP, in mid June 1994.[102]

Both the arrests and the verdict provoked an outcry in the West and caused a serious crisis in Turkey's relations with the western countries, damaging Turkey's international image. The European Union asked for the deputies' immediate release. International pressure on Turkey intensified over alleged human rights violations, so that when the Customs Union agreement was signed between Turkey and European Union in

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[99] See Gökmen, *Sarisin Güzel Kadin,* 84-5. Parliament spokesperson and prominent member of the True Path Party Hüsamettin Cindoruk told me that the lifting of the immunity of the DEP deputies was initiated by the Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres. (Interview with Hüsamettin Cindoruk, 1 May 2003) At the summit, General Güres accused the Turkish Grand National Assembly of keeping terrorists (meaning the DEP deputies) in the parliament. He said "why should we look for the terrorists on the mountains while they are in the parliament?"

[100] See the stormy debates in the parliament concerning the lifting of the immunity of the DEP deputies. *Parliamentary Minutes*, 19th Legislative Year, Session 78 and 79, (2-3. 3.1994), pp. 244-410.

[101] These DEP deputies —as part of the seventh package of reforms that passed by the Turkish parliament in July and August 2004, in order for Turkey to start negotiations for its full membership in EU—were released in 2004 when the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government adopted a provisional amnesty for individuals involved in the Kurdish separatist movement.

[102] For details of DEP's views on PKK see Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement," 26-27. The decision was made after the court concluded that two speeches made by the party's former chairman and a circular that was published by the party's Central Executive titled "Declaration by the DEP: Peace Now," were in violation of the Constitution and the Political Parties law.

December 1995, it was done so only by including a stipulation that in the case of a deterioration of human rights, financial aid could be suspended.[103]

In fact, by banning the Pro-Kurdish Democracy Party and prosecuting all Democracy Party deputies, the Çiller government had unwittingly supported the PKK argument that Turkey had closed the doors to any legal resolution of the Kurdish issue. Ironically, the DEP was actually a party that had initiated a peaceful campaign to start future negotiations on the resolutions of the Kurdish conflict.[104] The closure of DEP gave the PKK an opportunity to expand its influence in foreign countries as the only group representing Kurds of Turkey.[105]

By following the demands of Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres, Prime Minister Çiller managed to capture the votes of ultra-nationalists who shared her uncompromising attitude in the fight against the PKK.[106] Çiller took advantage of the anger that increased with each deadly PKK attack, basing her electoral campaign for the March 1994 local elections almost solely on this issue.[107] The imprisonment of the DEP

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[103] See John Murray Brown, "Tansu Çiller And the Question of Turkish Identity," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1994, v. 11, 56; *Turkish Daily News*, 25 October 1996. Hundreds of millions of dollars—targeted to help Turkey implement the Customs Union—were blocked

[104] DEP supported "Campaign for Peace" that essentially voiced the need for the state to recognize the "Kurdish identity," for negotiations with the Turkish government, for granting cultural rights such as publishing, broadcasting and educating in Kurdish, for abolition of the emergency rule in the southeast, for removal of the special teams, and village guards and for the introduction of economic reforms in the region. Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 85.

[105] Cengiz Çandar, "Çiller'e Verilecek Her Oy," *Sabah*, 22 March 1994, 13; See *Hürriyet* 11 July 1994 for a meeting held by the president Demirel with deputy prime minister, foreign minister, and other officials discussing the crisis the imprisonment of the DEP deputies caused in the Western World. Also see Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 85.

[106] Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah," 92

[107] Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, 138; Interview with Yalim Eralp (Istanbul, 30 April 2003) and a second interview with Hüsamettin Cindoruk (Istanbul, 1 May 2003) As Barkey and Fuller explain in her 1994 campaign Çiller often stressed that a vote for her was a vote against the PKK. p. 151, ftn. 7.

deputies and the closing down of the party just before the election worked toward her party's victory in the local elections. On the other hand, by pursuing such a policy, Çiller and her party lost a tremendous amount of credibility in the West.

I. State-supported Crime Syndicates

For Çiller, destroying the PKK, whatever the costs, mattered most. She pegged her political survival on wiping out the PKK and capturing Öcalan, leader of the PKK. In order to accomplish these goals she relinquished virtually all of her power to the military and, moreover, turned a blind eye to the establishment of an Islamic and right-wing radical nationalist group, a Turkish variant of Hizbullah (Party of God), which collaborated with security forces and crime syndicates to track down PKK sympathizers.[108] The ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP), which is reputedly linked with right-wing violence also played an important role in the formation of these groups.[109]

The parliamentary commission that was set up to investigate the extra-judicial killings was unable to publish its report due to the successful efforts of nationalists to block it. Most of the information confirmed by commission members through interviews and other forms of investigation was effectively censured by hard-line-DYP deputies because it contained severe accusations of "uncontrolled groups" operating within the

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[108] Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 202. It has been claimed that Hizbullah had killed around 200 people, mainly in the eastern cities of Diyarbakir, Mardin and Batman. İlnur Çevik, Hayri Birler and Sinan Yilmaz, "Turkey and Terrorism in 1994," *Turkish Daily News,* 19 January 1995, B1.

[109] Gürbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement," 18. A considerable portion of the special teams and security forces were preferentially recruited from the ranks of MHP activists.

security organization.[110] When investigations started on this issue in year 2000, Çiller responded to allegations by stating that everything that had been done at that time to combat terrorism was legal[111] Such assertions are contradicted by Çiller's willingness to take the initiative, without military encouragement, and employ illegal crime syndicates to combat Kurdish militants.

In sum, all of the hard-line policies followed by Prime Minister Çiller demonstrate why—once she learned that she would not be able to bring about a civilian solution to the Kurdish problem without endangering her position as the prime minister—she abandoned all alternative strategies and began following hard-line policies in lock-step with the military. In the process, she surrendered civilian control over the military; as a result, village evacuations increased tremendously, more and more special teams were established to fight with PKK, cross-border operations reached a level that brought a reaction from European countries, army discharges were postponed, cease-fire proposals from the PKK were completely rejected, relations with Iraqi Kurdish factions deteriorated and, most importantly, the only instrument through which the Kurds could be represented legally, the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party, was banned and its deputies were imprisoned. Prime Minister Çiller managed to strengthen her position in her party, among the nationalists and in the eyes of the military, but at the cost of threatening the nature of the

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[110] Yavuz Baydar, "New Public Enemy: The Liberals," *Turkish Daily News*, 24 April 1995, A7.

[111] *Ankara Anatolia* (in English) 11 February 2000; Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 202 and *Milliyet*, 10 February 2000. In February 2000, it was claimed by the Turkish media that between 1994 and 1995 the Çiller government had committed serious irregularities and had been involved in corruption concerning the importation of weapons by the governor of the town of Batman for a "Special Combined Force" established in the Southeast to fight the PKK. The Istanbul daily *Milliyet* reported that the money (around $2.3 million)

democratic regime. The next section will examine how Çiller government accepted the demands of the military for the extension of the term of the Chief of the General Staff for an additional year.

II. EXTENSION OF THE TERM OF CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

The role that civilian leaders play in military promotions is a significant criterion showing the degree of civilian control over the military. In Turkey, this pattern has, so far, favored the role of the military and the Supreme Military Council in promotions. Although on paper the Council of Ministers choose the Chief of the General Staff, in practice the commander of the ground forces traditionally takes over the post of Chief of the General Staff. An important exception to this tradition was practiced during Prime Minister Özal's term of office, when in 1987 he intervened in the succession of the Chief of the General Staff, bypassing the military's candidate and appointing his own nominee.

In her relations with the military, Prime Minister Çiller abandoned any effort to assert civilian supremacy over the military. She was generally reluctant to arouse the enmity of military commanders by upsetting the status quo. Consequently, she accepted the military's monopoly over promotions and when the question of the appointment of the new chief of staff came up in 1993 and 1994, Çiller refrained from undertaking any initiative that would displease the High Command, particularly the Chief of the General Staff, Dogan Güres.[112]

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for the purchase of the arms came from a fund allocated for "the construction of police stations and lodgings" out of the Development and Support Fund during Çiller's premiership

Extension of Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres' Term in August 1993

Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres, having reached the retirement age of 67, was supposed to leave his post by the end of August 1993. However, in response to his demand, General Güres' term in office was extended by a special decree of the Çiller government for an additional year. Prime Minister Çiller justified the extension of General Güres' term on the basis of the need for the general's expertise in the military's new combat strategy against PKK's guerrilla terror in the southeast. She maintained that it was necessary to extend General Güres' term at a time when the military was at a very critical stage in its fight against the PKK. Moreover, projects such as establishment of a military strategy called Field Domination Doctrine,[113] and the organization of special teams to fight PKK guerrillas were coordinated by General Güres, making it necessary to extend his term of office to finalize such projects. Minister of Defense Nevzat Ayaz stated that it would not have been wise to change the Chief of the General Staff in the middle of the struggle with terror.[114]

Despite some dissent, the Çiller government pursued this move through a decree.[115] The head of the Constitutional Court, Yekta Güngör Özden declared that the government was not supposed to pass laws pertaining only to specific persons. Some bureaucrats claimed that it was not possible to extend the Chief of the General Staff's term under existing laws, and cabinet ministers from the junior partner of the coalition,

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[112] Cizre, "Tansu Çiller," 203.

[113] A postulation that requires the Turkish army to present everywhere and not leave any unpatrolled areas for the PKK

[114] See *Sabah,* 23 July 1993; *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* 28 July 1993.

[115] *Sabah*, 23 July 1993; *Sabah*, 26 July 1993.

the SHP, were reluctant to support the extension, arguing that it was against the existing laws. However, Prime Minister Çiller and Defense Minister Nevzat Ayaz managed to convince these ministers to support the extension of the term of office on the grounds that this extension was necessary to achieve victory against PKK.[116] Moreover, President Demirel, who had been supporting a military solution to the Kurdish problem from the beginning, defended the extension of the term of General Güres.

In actuality, the Çiller government, by extending the term of General Güres in this way exploited the much debated authorization bill that "empowered the government to amend some laws regarding civil servants" with decrees. While the law did not include the general staff of the military, Çiller government decided to treat the Chief of the General Staff differently, privileging him by extending his term.[117]

In April-May 1994, a year after the controversial extension of General Gures' term, Prime Minister Çiller considered extending the general's term in office for a second time. However, this time facing President Demirel's opposition, she was not able not manage to pursue her policy.[118] She was only able to engineer the extension for one more year of the tenure of two senior generals, the head of the Air Force, General Halis Burhan, and the head of Navy, Admiral Vural Beyazit, in order to keep up the same command team in her fight against PKK. [119]

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[116] *Milliyet,* 28 July 1993.

[117] Derya Sazak, "Fisunoglu Olayi," *Milliyet*, 28 July 1993.

[118] Prime Minister Çiller attempted to extend the term of the Chief of the General Staff for the second time as a result of General Güres' demand. President Demirel opposed this attempt as a result of his fear that such an extension could lead to considerable frustration at the lower ranks of the Turkish military. Consequently, the reason for both leaders to support or reject the extension was related to the military's demands but at different ranks.

[119] *Milliyet,* 7 May 1994.

Rational Choices

Prime Minister Çiller's initiative to extend the term General Güres for another year came weeks after the announcement of the reaction of the military and President Demirel against Çiller's proposal for an inter-party commission to investigate the Kurdish question in the parliament and Çiller's declared intent to grant cultural rights to Kurds of Turkey. She began her "national consensus" tours with opposition party leaders in the parliament, during which she listened to various views on the Kurdish issue. Then, she proposed the establishment of an inter-party commission called the "Parliament Security Commission" where the Kurdish problem would be investigated. However, the opposition parties did not support her attempts to grant cultural rights to Kurds. She also received negative reactions from her own party for her proposing the formation of an inter-party commission and attempting to resolve the Kurdish issue politically by granting cultural rights. Again, however, she received warnings from Demirel and Güres about their uneasiness concerning her proposed Kurdish policies.

When Prime Minister Çiller found herself in such a delicate situation, she decided to consolidate her position by making a complete u-turn in her policies, and started allying with the military and pursuing military policies over political ones. As the first step of this alliance, and in order to strengthen her relations with the highest ranking officer of the military, she initiated the extension of Güres term for one year upon his request.[120] Such a move brought her a powerful and much needed ally.

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[120] Interview with Yalim Eralp (Istanbul, 30 April 2003) Eralp told me that General Güres wrote him a report of arguments explaining the reasons why his term should be extended. I was also told by Coskun

In spite of the fact that the decision to extend the term of the Chief of the General Staff seemed to demonstrate the power of the civilian authority over the military, in fact the extension was a result of military exercising its power over the civilian government. As the resolution of the Kurdish conflict was surrendered to the military and particularly to General Güres, his request to extend his term for one more year was accepted by Çiller government. [121]

Conclusion

Starting in the early 1990s, and more particularly from 1993 on when the second coalition government between DYP and SHP was formed under Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, a dramatic rise in the military's influence over the civilian administration and in politics more generally started to show itself in Turkey. In contrast with the previous period, when Turgut Özal served as prime minister and president and exercised civilian control over the military, particularly under Çiller the military's influence in politics increased regarding the Kurdish problem and military promotions. Under Prime Minister Çiller, the military was involved directly in politics and exercised control over civilian authorities. Particularly concerning the Kurdish problem, the parliament was relegated to the status of a rubberstamp institution that approved all decisions taken by the military-dominated National Security Council. The military, particularly the Chief of the General Staff, began acting like a coalition partner in government.

Kirca, one of the hard-liners of True Path Party that the extension was done upon General Gures' request. Interview with Coskun Kirca, (Istanbul, 29 April 2003)

[121] Ibid.

When Çiller was faced with all kinds of criticisms for her proposed political solutions to the Kurdish problem from opposition parties, hard-liners in her own party, the president and the military, she found herself backtracking on her liberal policies. As a result of her limited experience in politics, lack of electoral support and strong base of support in her own party, and the failure of her economic policies, she allied with the military in order to resolve the Kurdish issue and commit herself to hard-line policies. By doing so, she planned to increase her appeal among the nationalist electorate and strengthen her position in her party; in other words guarantee her political survival. Along the same line, Çiller abdicated important decisions over military promotions to the military by extending the term of Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres in office by one year through a special decree in response to his demands to keep his position.

The hard-line policies Prime Minister Çiller followed in an attempt to bring a resolution to the Kurdish problem had serious consequences for Turkey. First, these policies created tensions with the European Union and the United States as a result of the increases in human rights violations. The Çiller government received serious reactions for its cross-border operations, forced evacuations of the villages, the brutal treatment of the Kurdish population by the Special Teams, the imprisonment of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party deputies, and the closure of the Democracy Party. The European Union's statements and European Parliament Resolutions made it clear to the Çiller government that they expect a permanent, non-military solution to the Kurdish problem.[122] Second, these hard-line policies threatened the consolidation of democracy in the country. In the aftermath of 1980 military intervention, while the democratic institutions were reinstalled

[122] For details see Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics," *East European Quarterly*, XXXIV, No. 2 (June 2000)

one more time and the civilianization of the regime was taking place gradually, the increase in military's influence in politics deteriorated the democratic consolidation process. Finally, such hard-line policies, while limiting Turkey's influence on the Kurds of Iraq, at the same time alienated the Kurds of Turkey who lost their trust in Turkish authorities.

CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation traces Turkish civil-military relations in the post-1980 coup period, particularly the late 1980s and mid 1990s, during which time military influence over national politics varied considerably. Departing from traditional military-centric Turkish literature on the subject, this dissertation adopts a civilian-centric approach and focuses on the civilian leadership, particularly on how leaders' incentive structures, political capacities, and the institutional context in which they operate shape the policies followed by these leaders either to challenge a politically powerful military or ally with it by adopting the military's preference structures. To understand changes in Turkish civilian-military relations, the dissertation looks at two issue-areas of particular importance to the military: the rise of Kurdish nationalism and civilian intervention in military promotion processes .

Civilian Centric Analysis

Following the military-centric trend in analyzing civil-military relations, the focus of Turkish civil-military literature has so far been on military actors. It has concentrated on the military's role as the guardian of Kemalist principles and reforms, as well as the power prerogatives it gave itself after each military intervention in politics. The Turkish literature has not paid much attention to the civilian side of civil-military relations. Scholars have considered civilian leaders in civil-military relations as weak, corrupt, inefficient actors who play an important role only in leading the country into chaos.

In an attempt to analyze the changing balance of power between the military and civilians during the late 1980s and mid 1990s, most analysts have focused solely on the severity of the main internal threat during the period, the rise of Kurdish nationalism. As the rise of Kurdish nationalism is perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of the country, analysts have argued that the increasing power of the military during in the early 1990s was simply a result of the rise of Kurdish nationalism and terrorist activities. However, such scholars have overlooked the fact that the Kurdish separatist movements exhibited similar patterns throughout the late 1980s and mid 1990s, so this factor cannot by itself explain the shifting levels of military influence.

The Role of Civilian Leaders in Civil-Military Relations

Modifying the framework Wendy Hunter designed for Brazil to better reflect Turkish conditions, this dissertation underscores that in Turkey the influence of civilian leaders over the military in politics can vary depending on the incentive structure of civilian leaders as determined by competitive elections, their political capacity as reflected in their parliamentary majority, their political experience, the effectiveness of their economic policies and the institutional context (the system of government and organization of political parties) in which they operate. In other words, this study argues that when appropriate electoral incentives exist and civilian leaders have sufficient political capacity to act on them, civilian leaders are able to exercise considerable authority over even a recalcitrant military. Conversely, when appropriate electoral incentives do not exist or civilian leaders lack the capacity to act on them, civilian leaders cannot challenge a politically powerful military and will adopt the preferences of the

armed forces in their decision making.

This framework is utilized in order to explain why civilian influence over the military increased during the period Turgut Özal, who first served as Prime Minister and later President, between 1987 and 1993, but then decreased dramatically after Özal's party ANAP lost the 1991 elections and Özal died in 1993, at which time Tansu Çiller came to power at the head of the DYP-SHP coalition. In particular, the case studies show how the differences between the electoral incentives and political capacity of the civilian leaders involved influenced their ability to limit the military's capability to intervene politically.

One of this study's principal conclusions is that rational politicians, following the incentives created by electoral competition, will challenge a politically influential military. Competitive elections held in 1983 and 1987 brought Turgut Özal's ANAP government to power with the 45 percent and 36 percent of the votes respectively, providing the ANAP with a parliamentary majority in both cases.[1] This majority, combined with the leader's considerable political capacity (as demonstrated by his vast experience in politics, having served in the highest echelons of the Turkish civilian bureaucracy and his success in liberalizing the economy) enabled Özal to increase civilian influence over politics, thereby allowing him to impose specific policies concerning the Kurdish issue and the promotion process that have traditionally been in military's domain. As the founding father of the ANAP and the person responsible for assembling a team of new politicians who were previously unknown political figures,

[1] By receiving 45 percent of the votes in 1983 elections, the ANAP was able to occupy 211seats in a 400-member parliament. However, in 1987 elections by receiving the 36 percent of the votes, the party occupied 292 seats in the parliament as a result of the changes made in the election law.

Özal was highly respected by the members of his party and exercised considerable influence over these people. Consequently, the parliamentary majority of the party combined with Özal's strong leadership in a leader oriented party system empowered him to follow policies that the military normally would oppose.

According to the principles of rational choice which underwrite the theoretical framework of this study, in Özal's attempts to challenge the policies of the military, his priority was ensuring his own reelection. In an attempt to guarantee his political survival, Özal pursued political solutions to the Kurdish problem. Once he realized that an attempt to resolve the Kurdish issue solely through militaristic means would bring more bloodshed and human rights violations—degrading Turkey's image in the western world and negatively affecting Turkey's economy due to the budgetary demands of pursuing a military solution—he sought an alternative political resolution of the problem. By lifting the ban on the use of Kurdish and attempting to grant cultural rights to Kurds of Turkey, meeting Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq and accommodating Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Turkish territories, Özal aimed to improve Turkey's performance on the question of minority rights and gain respect and support in the West and European Community to which the country sought eventual membership. Furthermore, he sought to gain the upper hand in the relations with the Kurds of northern Iraq following the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Similarly, in intervening in the promotion process, Özal did not wish to allow the military to dictate who would become Chief of the General Staff, as it had always done, because the person occupying this office could potentially undermine Özal's position. By following these policies, Özal appealed to a liberal constituency that longed for a more open democracy in Turkey.

When she assumed office, Prime Minister Çiller initially wanted to bring about a political resolution to the Kurdish problem by granting cultural rights to the Kurdish population. However, after the strong negative reactions she received from the hard-liners in her own party, the president and the military, she abandoned her plans and resigned herself to seeking a military solution. Her recourse to such a solution was primarily the result of her lack of support and political inexperience. Çiller did not come to power through a popular election, but won her party's nomination in a divided leadership race. Lacking a power of base within her party and supported by veteran politicians who did so only in order take advantage of an inexperienced leader, Çiller soon had hard-line nationalists (including the military) dictating their policies to her. Although Çiller's DYP and her coalition partner SHP maintained the majority of the seats in the parliament, this was not enough for her to implement her initial policy preferences because she did not receive the support of the members of her own party. In addition, Çiller's failed economic policies further weakened the limited support she had enjoyed from the party and the public. Çiller's position was further undermined by President Demirel's opposition to her policies.

Consequently, in order to retain power, Çiller changed her initial policy position and sought the support of the military and the hard-liners in her own party by backing increased military offensives and cross-border operations, village evacuations, the establishment of more Special Teams, the imprisonment of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party deputies, and the closure of the Democracy Party, as well as extending the term of office of Chief of the General Staff, Dogan Güres, by one year at the military's insistence.

In this way, the dissertation clearly shows how the rise in Turkish military's

influence during the early 1990s can not be explained by solely looking at the military side of the equation such as military's focus on changing levels of internal threats. By applying a civilian-centric analysis to the shifting degree of military influence over Turkish politics it demonstrates that incentive structure and political capacity of the civilian leaders determines their attempt to increase or decrease the civilian influence in politics and over the military. This study thus makes a contribution to the Turkish civil-military relations literature by bringing an approach that has not been subject of analysis before.

This is not meant to suggest that the role of the military is insignificant in analysis of civil-military relations. Rather, any attempt to understand the military's subordination to civilian leadership, particularly in the aftermath of a transition to democracy, is insufficient if it looks only at the military side of the relationship,. By concentrating on the civilian side, and bringing in new factors such as the political experience and capacity of the civilian leaders, this study contributes to the broader civil-military literature that has recently started to concentrate on the civilian side of the relation.[2]

Applicability of the Model for Further Study

Since rational choice affirms universal interests, analyses founded on the rational choices and strategic calculations of the political actors should be applicable to a variety of cases dealing with the process of a transition to democracy. In other words, electoral competition should impose similar pressures on civilian politicians to reduce military

[2] See Pion-Berlin, *Through the Corridors of Power, Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina*; Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil,*; Agüero, *Soldier, Civilians and Democracy: Post- Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective.*

influence, and likewise test the political capacity of these leaders that involve different variables, in a variety of national settings.

However, the rational choices made by the civilian leaders may differ from case to case. While in Brazil the particular policies supported by the civilian leaders involved the distribution of economic assets to constituencies from the federal budget at the expense of the military's budget, in Turkey they revolved around the intervention of civilians into the realm of national security, which has traditionally been in military's domain. Accordingly, in another national setting these policies may include other issues that involve conflicting interests between civilian and the military leaders. Similarly, the political capacity variable that enhances the capability of the leaders to challenge the military may vary from case to case. As a factor enhancing political capacity, the popular support created from an electoral victory is a sufficient variable to increase the capacity of a leader in the Brazilian case which is governed by a presidential system. However, in the Turkish context that has a parliamentary system, in addition to their electoral victory, the political experience of the leaders coupled with their performance on economy policies plays an important role in consolidating the unity of their party in the parliament. Therefore, in different contexts the factors enhancing political capacity may involve different variables. Along the same line, the institutional rules that condition the behavior of the civilian leaders in their attempts to challenge the military may change in different settings. In the Turkish context, the system of government and the organization of the parties as institutional conditions helped to shape the behavior of the civilian leaders. In sum, this model must be adapted to different cases.

In the current era, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the US, the rise of global terror is creating a major challenge to the established sociopolitical order—one that may seem to modify the balance between civilian and military leaders in favor of the military commanders. This new global terror threat may create new kinds of tensions between the military and the civilians as reflected in the struggles over 'security versus liberties.' However, according to the model defended in this study, if an electorate shares the same security concerns that the military has, civilian leaders will have electoral incentives to side with the military in order to win the elections. If the electorate does not share the military's security concerns, then the tension between the civilians, who want to win elections, and the military, which sees their national security threatened, is likely to grow. Ultimately, in a democratic system it is the civilian leaders who will make the final decision.

Turkey too is directly facing the same global terrorism threat, as was witnessed in the two bombings that took place in Istanbul in November 2003, killing dozens of people. As the Turkish public has been toughened by decades of experience with terrorism, from the Armenian organization ASALA and extreme rightist and leftist terror of the 1970s and 1980s, and continuing with the PKK and Islamist fundamentalists' (i.e. Hizbollah) terror in the 1980s and 1990s, one might still ask whether the rise of global terror could pose a threat to Turkish civil-military relations by again encouraging a dominant role for the Turkish military in politics. It seems however, that the most important issue for the Turkish public at present is about becoming a full member of the European Union (EU) and thus for the Turkish public, the attraction of attaining membership in the EU overpowers potential security fears and serves to increase the essential role of the

civilians in politics. Under these circumstances, and in line with the model defended here, one can argue that as long as Turkey continues to pursue her accession to the EU, the role of the military in politics will gradually decrease. Nevertheless, this will only be established by the civilian leaders. While the EU is an external factor that shapes the democratic consolidation process in Turkey, at the end it is the civilian leaders who play the decisive role in the acceleration or deceleration of this process. The EU comes into the picture as a factor that enhances the civilian leaders' capacity to increase their power in politics. In Turkey as in any other democratizing country, as long as the civilian leaders have the necessary popular support creating electoral incentives for them to pursue policies that conflict with those of the military, they will be able to establish their supremacy in politics.

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