

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORIES OF EDWARD HALLETT CARR

by

Benjamin P. Geist

Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts in the Department
of Economics and Political Science

McGill University

April, 1957

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction: A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF CARR'S WRITINGS	1
NOTE ON THE METHOD	6
Chapter I: THE ERA AND DECLINE OF LIBERAL SOCIETY	7
From Feudalism to Capitalism	7
The Breakdown of Individualism	9
The Economic Whip	14
The Decline of Liberal Democracy	17
Chapter II: THEORY AND ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . . .	24
Introduction	24
Utopianism and Realism	26
a. Utopianism	26
b. The Harmony of Interests	29
c. Realism	32
The Role of Power in International Relations	36
a. Power politics	36
b. Military power	39
c. Economic power	41
d. Power over the minds of men	45
Morality in International Relations	50
Law in International Relations	55
The Role of Nationalism in International Relations . .	59
Conclusion	68

	Page
Chapter III: THE FUTURE SOCIETY	79
Planning	81
Incentives	85
The "New Faith"	89
Democracy or Totalitarianism	92
The Synthesis	95
The Future International Order	97
Power in the Future International Order	102
CONCLUSION	107
A NOTE ON CARR'S APPRAISAL OF MARX AND MARXISM	111
A NOTE ON CARR'S VIEWS ON THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, AND SOVIET SOCIETY	122
The Genesis of Soviet Russia	122
Soviet Society	123
BIBLIOGRAPHY	127

Introduction

A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF CARR'S WRITINGS

The influence of Edward Hallett Carr on contemporary political thought, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, is great enough to warrant a critical appraisal of his writings. Since Carr is not the ivory-tower social philosopher, but very often descends into the arenas of journalism and radio, reaching a very wide audience, his views contribute to some extent to the moulding of British public opinion. During several debates in the British House of Commons his views were adduced as authoritative in support of post-war planning.¹ Very often, his opinions created wide controversies; his books are almost invariably major events in the scholarly and literary world. Some of his writings have become standard text books in numerous universities throughout the world and have coloured the outlook of many students of international affairs. He is one of the rare scholars who also had an active share in the formulation of his country's foreign policy. He served in the British Foreign Office from 1916 to 1936, rising to the position of First Secretary. For a short period (1939), he was the director of the Ministry of Information of Britain; during the fateful years before and during the second world war, he was an editorial writer for the London "Times".

His analysis of Soviet Russian affairs, especially his lectures on the "Soviet Impact on the Western World", in 1947, followed by the first four volumes of his "History of Soviet Russia"

¹ London "Times", 1943, September 22nd, 7e, and December 9th, 8d.

which promises to be a monumental contribution to scholarship, greatly influenced important segments of British public opinion in their attitude towards Soviet Russia.

An important reason for the influence and attraction of his writings is the singular lucidity of his style which, in keeping with British literary tradition, is devoid of jargon and pseudo-profundity — although the topics of some of his books lend themselves to abstruse treatment and, indeed, have been treated so by others, especially by Continental writers.

His scholarship is thorough and impeccable, and even his most hostile critics invariably pay tribute to his erudition.² The range of his interests is enormous; yet his meticulous concern for detail is astonishing.³ This concern for the minute does not, however,

² Bertram D. Wolfe, one of his harshest critics, in his most vehement attack on Carr, has to admit that Carr "...has waded through an incredible amount of documentary materials in fugitive books and pamphlets scattered all over the world. They show an unerring sense for the key sentence of the decrees, speeches, pamphlets, and pronouncements". Bertram D. Wolfe: "Professor Carr's Wave of the Future", Commentary, March, 1955, p. 290.

³ Two samples may be quoted here, the first a footnote from the fourth volume of the History of Soviet Russia, p. 156. "The story in R. Fischer, 'Stalin and German Communism', p. 264 that on the day after the headline quoted above appeared in the 'Rote Fahne', Radek 'fired the two men responsible for it' (one of them being Ruth Fischer's brother) and changed it to 'Against Cuno on the Spree, on the Ruhr against Poincare' is inaccurate in every particular that can be checked. The original headline was not 'rhymed', and is incorrectly quoted; it was not 'changed' for the simple reason that the Rote Fahne never repeated its headlines and this one did not reappear in any form."

In reviewing the new Soviet diplomatic dictionary, Carr states: "Very few minor inaccuracies have been noted. Krasin was not at Brest-Litovsk; Maltzan's first name was Ago not Adolf, and the withdrawal of Chinese recognition of the former Czarist legation in Peking and the sending of Chang Sho-Lin to Moscow occurred in September, not in April, 1920." Soviet Studies, Volume 3, 1951-52,

obscure the central theme of his thoughts. The details are intricately woven together to form a vast panorama, holding the reader's constant attention. Both the forest and the tress are clearly visible.

Carr has often been called the historian of revolutions. It is significant, that the first books to come from his pen were biographies of revolutionaries, of Marx, Bakunin, Herzen, and sketches of Russian revolutionaries of the nineteenth century. He is at once fascinated and concerned about the social revolutions that are the dominant feature of the history of the last one hundred and fifty years. But no sooner had he begun to study the careers and ideas of the great revolutionaries of our age, his attention was diverted to the growing crisis of the international order. Hitherto, he had been but a detached student of the past; but sitting at the nerve centre of British diplomacy, he became acutely aware of the magnitude of the impending storm. He now detached himself from the past, withdrew from active work in the Foreign Office, and set out to diagnose the ills of the international comity. In his study of Marx, he already foreshadowed the sources of the present crises in processes reaching back into the nineteenth century. But he thought that the more urgent task was to analyze the immediate causes of the collapse of the hopes of a whole generation. The product of these endeavours was "The Twenty

³ (cont'd) p. 318.

Professor Marcuse writes: "to this reviewer, Carr's work is a rare example of great contemporary historiography; it combines mastery of the factual material with that knowledge and understanding of theory which enables him to see the cause of the Bolshevik revolution in the context of the political and economic transformation of the contemporary civilization." H. Marcuse: "Recent Literature on Marxism", World Politics, July, 1954, p. 521.

Years' Crisis", which for the first time expounded, in cogent and lucid terms, the motive forces of the contemporary turmoil, whose nature and origins had been befogged by the trend of utopian and wishful thinking. The symptoms had been known and felt by everyone, but not the causes. It was Carr who shed light on some of the underlying sources; and the book was received with the acclamation following a great discovery.⁴ In the middle of the War, he sat down to supplement his earlier analysis by an exploration of the broader causes of the turbulence of our times. He began to be concerned with the shape of the society that was likely to emerge from the holocaust of the War. It is safe to say that this is one of the most elaborate and comprehensive expositions of his social philosophy; it also ranks as one of the outstanding treatises attempting to diagnose the strains and stresses of contemporary civilization!⁵

So far, Carr had not dealt extensively with the revolutionary implications of Soviet society. Soon after the War, in a series of lectures, later published under the title "The Soviet Impact on the Western World", he attempted to trace the influence of the experiences of Soviet society on Western civilization. He viewed Soviet Russia as a storehouse of new concepts on which the West could draw in the present period of transition. Indeed, he conceived Soviet society as

⁴ See book reviews by A.W. Griswold, American Historical Review, Vol. 46, p. 374, Jan. 1941; L.P. Maddox, American Political Science Review, Vol. 34, p. 587, June, 1940; R. Coventry, New Statesman and Nation, Vol. 18, p. 761, November 25, 1939.

⁵ E.H. Carr: Conditions of Peace, London, (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.), 1942; and, after the war, The New Society, London, (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.), 1951.

a pioneer of social techniques in the fields of economics and politics.⁶ Not that he held up Soviet society as a model to be uncritically imitated by the West. He was repelled by many features of it; although the studied effort at scholarly detachment prevented him from emphasizing this, and he therefore incurred the charge of callousness and even philo-Sovietism.⁷

Having drawn in broad outlines the contours of the social transformation which the world is undergoing, Carr now returned to the sphere of pure scholarship, to narrate and analyze the most significant revolution of our times, the Bolshevik revolution, and to follow its course over the decades of its aftermath. While writing these lines, Carr's magnum opus was still in progress, and the fifth volume is eagerly awaited. Whatever one's attitude is to this work, almost everyone agrees with Isaac Deutscher's appraisal:

"Every future historian of Russia will have to turn to Mr. Carr as to his first great light, as the French historian still turns to the work of Thiers, with which Mr. Carr's history has quite a few features in common. This comparison gives perhaps a measure of Mr. Carr's achievement."⁸

⁶ "Sane judgement has always recognized that there was something in the Russian revolution to be learned as well as much to repel. But the proportion in which the two reactions should be blended has always been controversial." New Society, p. 88.

⁷ See review of A.J.P. Taylor, quoted on p. 74.

⁸ Isaac Deutscher; "Mr. E.H. Carr as Historian of Soviet Russia", Soviet Studies, 1953-54, Volume 4, p. 349.

NOTE ON THE METHOD

Carr is concerned mainly with the revolutionary transformation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and his ideas fall into a well-defined pattern. Thus, we have divided his work into three periods: past, present, and future which are treated in Chapters I, II, and III respectively. This entailed a certain amount of repetition and overlapping, unavoidable in the presentation of his wide range of ideas, and eclectic approach.

Certain doctrines, especially the doctrine of the harmony of interests, have been treated from several angles, and his ideas about nationalism are presented as a coherent whole. In the description and analysis of his theory of international relations, the main body of this thesis, we have followed closely his own presentation in "The Twenty Years' Crisis", which could hardly be bettered.

As far as quotations are concerned, we have tried to use his better known works: thus, if there was a choice between "The Twenty Years' Crisis" and the "Conditions of Peace", for example, we have used the former source. In general, whenever Carr's specific arguments were used, we have indicated this in the text or referred to the source; otherwise we have presented what we considered to be the essential aspect of Carr's analysis.

Chapter I

THE ERA AND DECLINE OF LIBERAL SOCIETY

From Feudalism to Capitalism

Carr's account of the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism is almost indistinguishable from that of Marx. He opens the chapter in The New Society, where he deals with this phenomenon, with the following observation, which reads like an excerpt from a Marxist tract:

"Experience shows that the structure of society at any given time and place, as well as the prevailing theories and beliefs about it, are largely governed by the way in which the material needs of the society are met."¹

Later on² we shall see that the above quotation though stated in a sweeping form, by no means represents Carr's philosophy of history, and Carr's leaning towards historical materialism is considerably qualified. But in this particular case, his adherence to historical materialism knows no reservations.

His treatment of the Feudal age is hurried. Within the small, self-sufficient unit of economic production there was scarcely room for an elaborate division of labour; it did not extend substantially beyond the boundaries of the village. Technological development and the rise of urban centres disrupted the economic fabric of Feudal society, and brought about large-scale economic units. These economic changes brought in their wake equally profound social and political transformations. The feudal social order of hierarchic relationships,

¹ The New Society, p. 19.

² See pp. 111-112.

bound by ties of duty and fidelity, was rapidly replaced by a new conception of the relationship between the individual and society. The free, unfettered individual, pursuing his own interest — which was largely conceived as the acquisition of wealth without regard to the interest of others — replaced the tradition and locally-bound member of the closed society, and became the prototype of the age.

In political terms, the nation-state became the typical political unit. The loyalty of the individual was transferred from the feudal lord and from the universal church to the empire or state. The changes in the moral outlook were no less significant than those in the economic, political, and social spheres. The interdependence of rights and duties of feudal society gave way to naked individualism, and market relationships came to characterize all human relations.

"The dictates of economic morality were henceforth summed up in obedience to the laws of the market; the individual pursuing his own economic interest was assumed to be promoting that of the whole society."³

In the conception of the new age — an age in which the prevalent mood was that of optimism⁴ — the utmost well-being of society was not the active concern of society, but would be the automatic product of the pursuit of individual interests. Thus, the state became the impartial arbiter, the policeman, the institution holding the ring, in short, in the famous phrase of Lassalle, the "night-watchman state". Its functions were to be purely negative and limited, and any of its

³ The New Society, p. 20.

⁴ Carr, the optimist, believes that future historians will rank the Victorian age, with all its limitations, "as one of the great ages of history". Ibid., p. 116.

activities that went beyond the absolute minimum of preserving law and order and protecting private property was regarded as evil, an encroachment upon individual freedom.

The Breakdown of Individualism

As long as men were content to accept the underlying social and moral rationale that all men had equal opportunity, that the reward for industry was wealth, that poverty was the penalty for sin and sloth, the social order was not challenged. But this state of affairs, did not last for very long. It began to be undermined by the middle of the nineteenth century, and the picture of a free society with equal opportunity for all was progressively dissipated. It was dissipated not so much by the advance of socialistic ideas, rather by the rise of powerful conglomerations of interest groups who tried to eradicate competition as an evil not to be tolerated:

"Individuals engaged in the economic process obstinately refused to remain individuals. Instead of competing against one another on equal terms for the good of all, they began to combine with one another in groups for their own exclusive profit."⁵

Carr analyzes the revision of classical economic concepts in terms of three fundamental issues: Individualism and Collectivism, Wealth and Welfare, and Production and Consumption.⁶

The industrial revolution destroyed the belief in a mobile

⁵ Ibid., p. 24.

⁶ Conditions of Peace, p. 68.

society. With the specialization of machinery and production that required large amounts of capital as well as a large labour force of specialized skills which could not be transferred from one sphere of economic activity to another, the trend towards greater concentration of economic power into fewer and fewer hands became inescapable. The argument of the laissez-faire economists that it was the consumer who ultimately determined prices through the natural process of supply and demand, rested in the first place on the assumption of mobile capital and labour markets. But capital, and later labour, would not stay fluid and mobile. The quick, easy adjustment demanded by a system regulated by the consumer's wants could not be effected any more.

The transition from the small workshop to the huge factory, begun as a necessity, became one of choice. Certain types of industry necessitated an enormous investment of capital that had to be protected against the fluctuations of the free market; and the specialization of machinery as well as labour added the final touch to its rigidity.

With the advance of the industrial revolution, it became increasingly difficult to compete with mechanized concerns. It was the small business unit that sought the protection of the state, for the vast new concerns were squeezing them out of existence. The passivity of the state could not be maintained anyway, once it was confronted with the growing friction between two vast power groups: organized capital, then organized labour. It had to intervene first on the side of capital then on the side of labour, to protect them against each other. In this struggle of the mastodons, the consumer's interests

were completely neglected.

"Nowhere has state intervention been more widely solicited than by the small consumer seeking protection against the allegedly inflated prices and profits of the large producer."⁷

The acceptance of the profit motive as the natural regulator of the economy was the second pillar of the laissez-faire.

"The price mechanism expressed the preferences of the consumer; profitability determined the preferences of the producer; and the interplay of these factors, both precisely measurable in terms of money, assured the automatic working of the economic system in a manner calculated to produce the maximum of measurable wealth."⁸

The necessity for a new criterion, different from that of "maximum profit", soon became evident. Prodded on the one hand by the social conscience of the ruling class, on the other, by an increasing fear of revolution, the state began to "interfere" with the workings of a free, unfettered economy.

"The criterion of 'welfare' came almost imperceptibly to be distinguished from, and to take precedence over, the criterion of 'wealth'. "⁹

It was no longer a question of whether the state should regulate, but when and how. With the progressive control of the profit motive, the validity of the price and profit mechanism as a scientific yardstick of the economy had to be abandoned as well, and economics became a qualitative science.

While the producer groups tended to concentrate into a few, powerful units, the consumer still remained the same isolated

⁷ The New Society, p. 27.

⁸ Conditions of Peace, p. 72.

⁹ Ibid., p. 73.

individual of the classical theory. Thus, the balance between the individual producer and individual consumer was completely destroyed. In the struggle between capitalist and labour the interests of the consumer were completely ignored. Indeed, in times of crisis, the two warring parties tended to present a common front to the consumer whose voice, being unorganized, carried little weight in the political arena. With the increasing monopolization of the forces of production, the doctrine of the classical economists that the choice of the consumer would determine the type of goods produced, came to be true the other way around. Price fixing and salesmanship combined to produce a situation where a few powerful firms — aided by the unions — could determine the type and price of goods the consumer got. As early as half a century ago Professor Tawney noted that people "talk as though man existed for industry instead of industry existing for man".¹⁰

Nor did the doctrine of the harmony of interests survive the nineteenth century. Carr recognizes the full impact of the French revolution, that its demand was for the first time in human history "freedom in general, freedom as a matter of principle, freedom for all".¹¹ But once the bourgeoisie achieved its liberation from the feudal order, it became aware of the full consequences of "freedom in general" and consolidated its power at the expense of the fourth estate. Conflict in society was denied, and the pursuit of selfish interests by all was supposed to result in harmonious relations within

¹⁰ R.H. Tawney: The Acquisitive Society, p. 49; quoted in Conditions of Peace, p. 88.

¹¹ The New Society, p. 107.

the country and without. However, the economic doctrine of the harmony of interests deteriorated into the class struggle, while its political corollary, the harmonious coexistence of the nation states haunted the corridors of Versailles in the guise of Wilsonianism, long after the demise of the former.

That laissez-faire survived as long as it did, Carr attributes — further following the Marxist analysis — to the incredible expansion and colonization of the nineteenth century. While demand was continually rising, and while some share of the increased wealth was passed along to the working class, a sense of confidence was created in the desirability of the existing system. The tacit assumption was a world of infinitely expanding markets.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the social and economic structures of the European nations bore only a faint resemblance to the ideals of the theorists of the laissez-faire school. In Germany, Britain, and to a lesser extent in France, the scope of state activities had grown to proportions that would have shocked the classical economists. Only in the United States was the state still of the night-watchman variety, although concentration of economic power was proceeding rapidly. Carr attributes this to the subservience of the machinery of the state to the interests of "big business".

As so often happens in history, ideas lagged behind social and economic changes. Although social and economic reality had undergone a drastic transformation, the ideologues of laissez-faire were still advocating free enterprise and free trade with undiminished vigour, while the suffering it caused was explained with the theory

of Social Darwinism. It was sincerely held that the principles of laissez-faire were still essentially intact; and that the restrictions which they had suffered — the extent of which were never fully appreciated — were regrettable and, it was hoped, transient palliatives, to weather a crisis.

The first World War witnessed in western democracies the extension of state activities into almost every sphere of life. The need arose to gear the whole life of the nation, and especially its economy, to the war effort. Never before had economic planning been practiced on such a scale. The economic engine was no longer driven by the decisions of the private producers in pursuit of profit, but by a national planning agency, with a view to the establishment of a system of priorities and allocation of scarce resources in an equitable manner. It was in Germany that perhaps the most rational system of planning yet known was evolved by Walther Rathenau, the head of a great industrial empire. Without this organization German resistance could not have lasted as long as it did.¹²

The Economic Whip

All societies must devise ways and means to induce their

¹²It is significant, that Lenin held up the German war economy as a model to the first planners of the Soviet economy. "...the most concrete example of state capitalism ... is Germany. Here we have the last word in modern large-scale capitalist technique and planned organisation, subordinated to junker-bourgeois imperialism." (underlined words in italics). "Cross out the words in italics, and, in place of the militarist, junker-bourgeois imperialist state put a state, but of a different social type, of a different class-content — a Soviet, that is, a proletarian state, and you will have the sum-total of the conditions necessary for socialism." V.I. Lenin: "Left-Wing Childishness and Petty-bourgeois Mentality", Selected Works, vol. 7, p. 364-65.

members to perform the work necessary for their existence. Under Feudalism the obligation to work was part of the network of obligations forming the basis of society. With the dissolution of the feudal order, contractual relations superceded the earlier ones. The individual could no longer be legally compelled to work; in theory, every man was free to find his own livelihood. In fact however, states Carr, new and more indirect but no less effective forms of compulsion replaced earlier ones.¹³ Poverty was now accepted as part of the natural order. The relief of the poor was regarded as an encouragement to idleness, and a harmful tampering with the sacrosanct laws governing the economy. The spirit of the age, in this regard, was succinctly expressed in Mandeville's phrase that "to make society happy it is necessary that great numbers should be wretched, as well as poor".¹⁴

By 1834, the transformation of incentives was complete. "The poor laws of 1834 abolished all grants, in aid of wages."¹⁵ Labour was now a commodity subject to the same laws as all other inanimate commodities, whose price was alleged to be determined by the laws of supply and demand. Enclosure of the common lands and other measures

¹³ A striking illustration of the precariousness of this freedom was the emancipation of the American Negroes. After the Civil War thousands of former slaves roamed aimlessly across the South in search of some form of livelihood. Very few of them could find any means of existence, and faced with starvation, they returned to the plantations and miserable hovel existence of pre-emancipation days, working for such low wages as to make their former existence seem desirable and secure in retrospect. See J.W. Cash: The Mind of the South, Harvest Books.

¹⁴ Mandeville: Fable of the Bees, quoted in The New Society, p. 42.

¹⁵ The New Society, p. 43.

drove masses of villagers to the industrial centres, where they saturated the labour market and were compelled to work for a pittance, living in utter poverty and misery.

Carr reveals no moral indignation in describing the misery and suffering attending this process. His treatment is that of the detached scholar, cool and unemotional. This is one of the most characteristic features of Carr's work, a feature conspicuous even in his treatment of contemporary social upheavals. This distinguishes him from the Marxists, particularly Marx. Some of the most striking and powerful passages in "Das Kapital" are the passages describing the misery of British working conditions in terms of blazing indignation. Ironically enough, Carr is perhaps more consistently Marxian, than Marx himself. Like Marx, Carr recognizes that the process of pauperization of large masses was the inevitable price to be paid for industrialization; but he adds that there is little point in moral recrimination of men, who were pursuing — albeit unconsciously — this goal of which we all approve, and the fruits of which we all enjoy today.

"Those who created this system were 'not' cruel or unenlightened men. They accepted the postulate that Britain must be industrialized; and I am not clear by what standard they should be condemned for accepting it. If, however, Britain was to be industrialized, it was necessary to recruit workers and compel them to work when and where they were needed — just as, if you accept the postulate that it is necessary to defend your country in war, you must recruit soldiers and compel them to fight when and where they are needed. The nineteenth century industrialists hit on an efficient method of making the workers work. It was not, judged by more recent standards, a humane method. But it is difficult to see by what more humane method the end could have been achieved.... Let us at any

rate give the devil his due."¹⁶

Marx, while fully admitting the inevitability of the travails of the industrial revolution, for the sake of social progress,¹⁷ condemned violently those who were mainly responsible for its achievements.

The "hunger incentive" continued to operate until the end of the nineteenth century. Apart from humanitarian impulses, noted earlier, the rise of trade unions made significant inroads upon this form of compulsion. The worker no longer stood alone in the face of his employer, but, like the employer himself, tended to combine into groups, in order to enhance his bargaining power. The inroads of trade-unionism, though important, did not however drive out the fear of hunger. The workers, organized in trade-unions, could now afford to go on strikes, and elicit from their employers a larger measure of security, as well as a bigger share of the profits. But the economic whip still loomed in the background as the ultimate threat.

The Decline of Liberal Democracy

Two kindred, but different notions are inherent in the word "democracy". On the one hand, it means a set of rights "passively" enjoyed by the community regardless of the form of government through which these rights are dispensed. Thus, at least theoretically,

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁷ "History is the most terrible of all Goddesses, leading her triumphal chariot over mountains of corpses, not only in war, but also in 'peaceful' economic development." K. Marx: Ausgewählte Briefe, p.404, quoted in E. Goldhagen: Karl Marx's View on Nations and Nationalism, typewritten copy of address delivered at Seminar of the Russian Research Centre, Harvard University, 1956.

freedom of opinion and association, and the rule of law are not incompatible with authoritarianism. On the other hand, and this is the accepted notion in the western world to-day, democracy is largely conceived as a form of governmental machinery, in which the citizenry actively participates. It is erroneous to think that these two notions are inextricably intertwined; that the active exercise of democracy will automatically lead to the realization of the passive rights. This is a fallacy underlying many a well-meaning scheme to institute democracy in underdeveloped countries. It is true that historically the passive enjoyment of rights was rarely achieved without active participation of the citizens; it would seem that autocracy — by its very nature — cannot insure the lasting enjoyment of passive rights. It is also true historically that the simultaneous enjoyment of active and passive rights was only possible, if confined to a fraction of the community. Just like the Athenian policy, where the overwhelming majority of inhabitants was beyond the pale of civic rights and duties, so in the early phases of liberal democracy participation in the affairs of government was restricted to the holders of property.

"To have a 'stake in the country' in the famous Victorian phrase meant to own property."¹⁸

Democracy, as it came to be known in western Europe, rested, according to Carr, on three main propositions:

"...First, that the individual conscience is the ultimate source of decisions about what is right and wrong; second, that there exists between different individuals a fundamental harmony of interests strong enough to enable them to live peacefully together in society; third, that where action has to be taken in the name of society, rational

¹⁸ E.H. Carr: "Soviet Society: Is There A Bourgeoisie?" Nation, vol.181, pp. 277-80, Oct. 1, 1955, p. 277.

discussion between individuals is the best method of reaching a decision on that action. Modern democracy, in virtue of its origins, is individualist, optimistic, and rational."¹⁹

The first articulate challenge to this conception was Rousseau's notion of the general will. To Rousseau, sovereignty was to reside in the whole community, not merely in a fraction thereof. The Jacobins may be regarded as the first practitioners of Rousseau's doctrine of the general will, and this doctrine was used by them as a justification of the Terror. This new conception of democracy could not but clash with the older ideas of natural rights, on which the previous form of oligarchic democracy rested, and which seemed increasingly incompatible with the newly-proclaimed popular sovereignty.

The industrial revolution produced new forces which hastened and intensified the decline of individualism. Just as the huge enterprise came to take the place of the small entrepreneur, so the new trade-unions in which the individual worker found himself absorbed, superseded the atomized grey mass of labourers. Parallel to these developments,

"...with the mammoth trust and the mammoth trade union came the mammoth organ of opinion, the mammoth political party, and, floating above them all, the mammoth state, narrowing still further the field of responsibility and action left to the individual and setting the stage for the new mass society."²⁰

The individual was now constrained within the framework of vast organizations against whom he alone was powerless. The tyranny of the organized majority became an object of concern to political thinkers. The earliest and greatest thinkers seized with this problem

¹⁹ The New Society, p. 62.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 64.

were Alexis de Tocqueville and J.S. Mill, who saw clearly the danger to individual freedom inherent in the new trends towards collectivism.

The intrusion of the masses into the political processes also spelled the doom of the political doctrine of the harmony of interests. This doctrine was also a corollary of the narrowly-based democracy of the early nineteenth century. The small number of entrepreneurs, operating in a wide and unexplored market, rarely clashed with each other. Their interest did seem harmonious. Each one had ample scope for his enterprise, without trespassing into the domain of his competitor. The ever-growing prosperity, which marked the era of liberal democracy, with only minor interruptions, served to confirm the doctrine that the egoistic pursuit of one's interests promotes the public welfare. The problem of distribution had not yet become a burning question, production was the paramount aim.

When, the large business concerns, who discovered the vast potentialities of political power, manipulate to their own advantage at the expense of other interests, set out systematically to capture the political machinery; this was opposed by the articulation of the hitherto politically-mute masses, progressively enfranchised, who discovered the same vast potentialities of political power (occasionally at their own expense), and rallied around their leaders and organizations; and these two trends issued into sharp group conflicts. The veil of harmony was removed, and society revealed itself as a conglomeration of power groups pitted against each other in a fierce struggle over shares in the social wealth. During this process, says Carr, the institutions of liberal democracy, though continuing in form, were

gradually sapped of their substance. The issue of individual rights became irrelevant; and the most important issues of national life were determined not so much at the ballot box, but by the contest of power between interest groups. Were it not for the intervention of the state seeking to mitigate this struggle, society would, perhaps, have been rent asunder. The intervention of the state, remedying some of the most glaring excesses of the conflicts, had the effect of creating what might be called an artificial social harmony.

Carr disagrees with Marx on the intensity of the struggle. If the struggle had been as fierce and violent as Marx predicted it to be, it would, indeed, have assumed catastrophic proportions. Carr believes that there was a very strong sense of community of interests transcending the struggle, thereby tempering it by adherence to the rules of the game. This is what Marx so grossly underestimated, and here Carr proves again to be a more consistent Marxian, than Marx himself. It would have been strange indeed, if the ruling class could not have imbued the uneducated masses of their times with some sort of cohesive principle. This was not the individual of the theorists of the liberal society, arriving at decisions on the basis of rational reflection, and then expressing them through his vote, but the cog enmeshed in the grinding wheels of the giants of society. He found himself impotent within the framework of the group of which he was a member. His actions were circumscribed, and his mind was manipulated by the "mammoth organ of opinion".

A concomitant factor, causing the decline of liberal rights, was the growth of bureaucracy. The complexity of governmental machinery

required a vast army of hierarchically-organized officials. Officialdom, although technically still responsible to parliament, through its vast and expert knowledge made itself superior to the legislator, sometimes even acting in that capacity.

Carr, apparently subscribing to a paraphrase of the Marxian dictum that the recognition of necessity is a cardinal condition of freedom,²¹ does not lament this phenomena.

"To deplore or denounce it is futile; for the new economic functions of the twentieth-century state cannot be abandoned, and cannot be performed without a vast and complicated administrative machine."²²

Throughout his writings, Carr pours withering scorn on those, who, instead of recognizing the inevitable, waste time in nostalgically admiring the past, and do not come to grips with reality, however uncongenial it may be. He thinks that it is the supreme task of our age to face courageously the dangerous trends of our times, and, instead of throwing up one's hands in despair, to master them, and try to bend them so as to reconcile them to the cherished ideals of the past. Unlike the prophets of doom, of whom he considers Toynbee a qualified representative²³ ("Spengler-cum-splash")²⁴ he thinks that this is by no means a forlorn task, although he does not underestimate the immense difficulties with which it is fraught. Cautious optimism

²¹ "Freedom is the recognition of necessity. Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood". F. Engels: Anti-Duehring, quoted in M. Oakeshott: The Social And Political Thought of Contemporary Europe, p. 103, Cambridge University Press, 1950.

²² Conditions of Peace, p. 27.

²³ The New Society, p. 7.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

is one of the conspicuous features of Carr's social philosophy.

Chapter II

THEORY AND ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Introduction

Of all the social sciences, the study of international relations is the least developed. It lags far behind other social studies, although the events on the international scene affect the lives of every human being. It has not yet been subjected to a thorough, detached investigation, as other disciplines of human affairs have. One of the reasons is undoubtedly the difficulties generally encountered by students of the social sciences. The absence of adequate tools for analysis, the fact that many of the data essential to the forming of intelligent judgment are not available, the failure to evolve consistent methods and procedures on which all investigators could agree, the inescapable "ideological" tinge in all investigations of human affairs, all these have hitherto proven formidable obstacles to the development of a science of international relations.¹

The quest for the solution of a pressing problem lies behind most investigations into nature and society. These initial steps of the enquiry are therefore heavily-coloured by the purpose that inspired them. Short-cut solutions are sought, and instead of a systematic examination of the relevant factors, hasty and ill-conceived conceptions of reality — largely born of wishful thinking — mark the initial phases of a new science. Alchemy is the classic illustration of the fanciful beginnings that attend the genesis of a new science. The

¹ For a summary of the opposite of this view, affirming the "scientific" view of the study of politics see A. Welch: The Possibility of a Science of Politics, Doctoral Thesis, Columbia University, 1951.

growing demand for gold spurred on the alchemists into fantastic lines of investigation. They sought to transform base metals, whose properties they did not bother to examine, into gold, by methods bordering on magic.

Similar circumstances marked the beginnings of the study of human affairs. The first generalizations about man the social animal and society were inspired either by certain interests or desires as to what shape social life should take. Thus the social views of Plato and Aristotle were conditioned by the vicissitudes of the city-state. Discontented with the recurring crises of their times, they endeavoured to offer a solution in the form of a scheme of reconstruction of society along an ideal pattern, constructed by them.

In modern times, the first buddings of the study of international affairs were also influenced by the wishes of a war-weary Europe emerging from the first "total" war. The idealistic schemes evolved by men of good will — ranging from bridge experts to Oxford dons — and labouring under the awful necessity of creating a better world, bore a strong resemblance to the alchemists of earlier times. They too sought to effect a radical change of the relations between states by means of such proposals as the abolition of sovereignty, the obliteration of national boundaries, the outlawing of war, large-scale or total disarmament, and many others which testified to the prolific imagination of their authors. Like the alchemists and the utopian socialists, they never undertook to analyze systematically whether the prevailing political and economic conditions made possible the realization of their plans. Their writings abound in sweeping

assumptions about reality, assumptions which in retrospect strike us as ludicrous; but to their contemporaries they were the hopeful messages of a better world that would redeem mankind from the scourge of war.

While the volume of utopian writings between the two world wars was considerable and impressive, the voices of realism were few and commanded little attention. A generation, in whose minds the memories of the ravages of the first World War were still fresh, was much more susceptible to the dazzling blandishments of utopia than to the stern analysis of realism with its uncongenial results.²

It was against this vogue of utopianism that Carr wrote "The Twenty Years' Crisis". It is significant that in attacking utopianism, Carr draws heavily on thinkers of the past — on Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Spinoza, but on only a few of his contemporaries.

Utopianism and Realism

a. Utopianism

Utopianism and realism have been two concurrent strands in human thought. Indeed, utopianism is — as Carr says — a natural

² I believe that in the current vogue of debunking the League of Nations it is sometimes forgotten that the League largely reflected the realities of public opinion. In the decade after the first World War, there was a passionate desire pervading Europe and America to stay out of any war at all costs. Against this mighty stream any politician would have been foolhardy to fight; few people would rather be "right than be president". Witness the peace-ballot of 1935 in Britain. See Leonard Woolf: "Utopia and Reality", Political Quarterly, vol. 11, 1940, pp. 167-182.

category of human thought.³ The principle source of utopianism in modern times was the rationalism which has been prominent in human thought since the eighteenth century. The rationalists tended to attribute the ills of society to the stupidity or fallacious thinking of men. If the principles of pure reason were applied to society, and its laws discovered, a social order could be erected that would be free of all the ills besetting humanity. It was the task of the human mind to evolve through a process of reasoning the alleged natural laws that govern society. The underlying assumption was that human conflict is the product of misunderstanding, and that given a rational social order, conflict would be altogether avoided or readily resolved. Reason was to be the safe guide to the millenium, and the dissemination of knowledge would ensure that everybody would reason rightly and act accordingly.

"The optimism of the nineteenth century was based on the triple conviction that the pursuit of the good was a matter of right reasoning, that the spread of knowledge would soon make it possible for everyone to reason rightly on this important subject, and that anyone who reasoned rightly would necessarily act rightly."⁴

During the nineteenth century, and the first three decades of the twentieth, this was the assumption underlying the thought of almost all writers dealing with the relations between states. Beginning with Abbé St. Pierre, who thought that his scheme for a league of nations was so foolproof that it could not but be accepted by the ruling powers; to Rousseau and Kant who saw in republicanism a restraint on

³ E.H. Carr: The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939; an Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd and revised edition, London, (Macmillan & Company), 1951, p. 92.

⁴ Ibid., p. 24-25.

war, to Sir Norman Angell's "Great Illusion" according to which war was merely "a failure of understanding"⁵, the utopian chorus was almost unchallenged.

The course of nineteenth century history seemed to lend support to excessive optimism. Although it was marred by intermittent wars, they did not assume proportions that could cloud the sanguine beliefs of contemporary thinkers. The sharp increase in international trade, that has now become vital for the growing output of the industrialized countries, was thought to create favourable conditions for peace. It was almost axiomatic that commerce makes for peace.

This was a delusion born of the peculiar nature of the international economy of the time. As long as the dominant position of the British economy in the world was not seriously challenged, it carried considerable conviction. But with the rise of industrial powers, especially with the rise of Germany, which began to intrude in the markets over which the British had had a well-nigh complete control, the assumptions on which these ideas rested were destroyed, and the world entered into an era of increasing international friction culminating in the first World War.

On a purely abstract level, there may well be a common good for the entire world. But this could only be attained at the expense of the wealthier countries, a sacrifice which they were not prepared to make or even to contemplate. In pursuing their own economic interests, the smaller powers could not but come into conflict with the Great

⁵ Quoted in The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 25.

Powers. The reconciliation of the divergent interests was impossible save by means of coercion.

b. The Harmony of Interests

Although the hollowness of the doctrine of the harmony of interests had long been evident in the economic sphere, (see Chapter I), it was still fervently propounded by utopian writers in the field of international relations. They firmly believed that the common good of the world could be achieved without impairing the interests of any state.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain was the leading industrial power. Germany had not yet attained unity; and French industrial development was proceeding in a desultory fashion. The new markets that were being opened in Asia, Africa, and the Americas became almost the exclusive domain of the British economy. Unchallenged by any serious competitors, and supported by the most powerful navy in the world, British commerce — supported and regulated by the financial centre in London — came to dominate the peaceful world market. The absence of any major conflict in commercial relations between states made the transfer of the doctrine of the harmony of interests, which had been propounded for some time by economists in the domestic realm, plausible. It was assumed that the laws governing the harmonious relationships between individuals could be applied to personified interstate relationships. The pursuit of a state's individual interests was not considered detrimental to the other members of the world community. On the contrary, the joint pursuit of

the separate interests of the states would produce "the greatest good of the greatest number" of states.

Ruling classes have always tended to identify the status quo and their dominant position in it with civilization itself, and proclaimed that theirs was the best of all possible worlds, that the only alternative to it was chaos. When the British manufacturers and traders proclaimed vociferously that the only sure highway to progress was a free international economy; that any nation that put obstacles in the way of free trade was acting stupidly against its own interests (just as they proclaimed that there was no conflict between the various classes composing the community, and if there was a conflict, it was unnatural and the work of wicked or muddleheaded agitators), they were elevating their own ideology to the rank of universal truth. But

"...this alleged international harmony of interests seemed a mockery to those under-privileged nations whose inferior status and insignificant stake in international trade were consecrated by it... When competition of all against all replaced the domination of the world market by a single Power, conceptions of international economic morality necessarily became chaotic."⁶

One should have thought that the doctrine of the harmony of interests would not survive the bitter experience of the first World War. Yet, no sooner had the sound of battle died down, than the peacemakers resuscitated it from its deathbed. This time it appeared in garbs of post-victorian idealism, which was now undergoing its metamorphosis on the fertile grounds of the United States. Having been remote from the storm centre of power politics, and cherishing its idealistic political heritage and the successful experiment in

⁶ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 82.

federalism, it was much more susceptible to utopianism than the war-weary and suspicious nations of Europe. While the harmony of interests within the nation had already been seriously corroded on the European continent by the inroads of state intervention, in the United States it was still enjoying the status of a dominant creed.

In Europe, the last vestiges of the creed appeared in a negative guise, what one might call the "harmony of survival". The peacemakers assumed that the terrible lessons of the war had driven home the "recognition" to all potential belligerents that war does not pay, and they believed that this would act as a powerful deterrent. Carr points out that this belief, though comforting to the victors, could not be readily accepted by the vanquished. The festering wounds of suffering and humiliation could not be soothed with intellectual arguments; moreover some nationalities, such as the Poles and the Czechs for example, who were positive beneficiaries of the War could not be persuaded of its wastefulness; while to the vanquished, such as the Germans and Hungarians, with large segments of their territory and population truncated, this seemed only a further instance of the hypocrisy of the victors.⁷

"A peculiar combination of platitude and falseness thus became endemic in the pronouncements of statesmen about international affairs... The fact of divergent interests was disguised and falsified by the platitude of a general desire to avoid conflict."⁸

The desire for peace is one which — one could safely say — is shared

⁷ Between the two world wars every Hungarian child was taught in school the revisionist war-cry: "Can this remain so? No, No, Never!" This referred to the 1919 peace treaty and the name of Trianon became symbolic of national disgrace, to be avenged at the first opportunity.

⁸ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 53.

by everyone;⁹ and, bearing the imprint of the Great Powers, this doctrine became so ingrained and widespread, that few dared to challenge it. However, the conception of the nature of peace is a matter of national interest. To some it means the preservation of the status quo; to others it means a non-violent change of the status quo.

We thus see the writers and statesmen of the inter-war period casting a veil of high-sounding platitudes over the multitude of conflicting interests marking the international scene. It may safely be said that it was the shunning of reality in an ostrich-like manner that transformed the continuous but latent crisis into a violent one. The Manchurian crisis gave a foretaste of the shape of things to come. But, their illusions destroyed, the utopian writers, instead of reexamining their assumptions, attributed the collapse of their imaginary world to the stupidity and wickedness of men, especially of their leaders.

"Why are unnumbered millions of mankind still overworked and underfed? And why are the peoples of the world ranged in opposing camps competing between themselves for wealth and power, as though the supply of each were limited, so that one side must inevitably go short? The answer is simple.... The cause of the trouble is in men's minds."¹⁰

c. Realism

The consistent realist confines himself to an analysis of

⁹ "Absolutely everyone is in favour of peace — including Kitchener, Joffre, Hindenburg, and Nicholas the Bloody; for everyone of them wishes to end the war." Lenin, 1915; quoted in E.H. Carr: "Honour Among Nations, A Critique of International Cant" (p.496), Fortnightly, vol.151, pp. 489-500, May 1939.

¹⁰ A. Zimmer: "The Prospects of Civilization", p. 18-19, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 1, Oxford, 1939.

the world as it is, and resists the temptations to venture into the realm of what ought to be. He conceives of history as a continuous chain of cause and events which human will can do little to alter. While the earlier realists, especially those of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, imagined the historic process as evolving towards a predestined end, its modern exponents adopt a much more flexible position. In fact, a passage from Carr's writings can serve to elucidate this position:

"...for me, history is a procession of events about which almost the only thing that can be said with certainty is that it moves constantly on and never returns to the same place."¹¹

Determinism and realism, in Carr's view, are inextricably intertwined.

Perhaps one of the most challenging doctrines of realism was the proposition that ethics and thought are the functions of interest and/or practice. Marx gave the first articulate expression to this view. To him ideas were reflections of the existential position of their bearers; and since the existential position is essentially the position the individual occupies in the process of production, he thought ideas to be expressive of economic interests.¹² Carr agrees with Marx, but he emphasizes that to postulate the material conditioning of thought is not to imply that its author is consciously lying. In most cases, it is the product of "false consciousness".¹³ This distinguishes

¹¹ The New Society, p. 5.

¹² K. Marx: Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy".

¹³ The problem of "false consciousness" is discussed in K. Mannheim: Ideology and Utopia, pp. 70-74, and 94-98, Harvest Books ed. Carr's ideas are based on this analysis. The term itself is of Marxist origin.

ideology from the conscious propagandistic lies used as weapons by the contemporary totalitarian regimes.

"The conditioning of thought is necessarily a subconscious process."¹⁴

Thought is also designed to produce a pragmatic effect useful to its author. History abounds with instances of ideas used as weapons for the fulfilment of certain purposes. The Pax Romana and Pax Britannica were typical examples of the ideology that harmony among nations could only persist if ensured by the dominance of one power. Imperialistic powers developed ideologies justifying their expansionist designs: embarking on territorial aggrandizement, they equated their own interests with the universal good. The "White man's burden", "manifest destiny", "the messianic mission of Russia", "the civilizing mission of France" — all fall into this category.

As has already been pointed out, Carr does not deny the possibility of formulating a common good that would embrace all humanity.¹⁵ He attacks utopianism not because it indulges in abstract principles, but because these principles are not detached and disinterested: they are veiled expressions of the national interests of their exponents.

"The utopian, faced by the collapse of standards whose interested character he has failed to penetrate, takes refuge in condemnation of a reality which refuses to conform to these standards."¹⁶

So far, Carr's ideas do not strike us as particularly novel.

¹⁴ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 71.

¹⁵ Supra, p. 28.

¹⁶ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 88.

The conflicting trends of thought of utopianism and realism have been perennial. But as soon as he leaves the task of the demolition of utopianism wrongly conceived, he reveals, if not startling originality, at least a freshness in his approach to international affairs that cannot but challenge and stimulate the student of politics.

Consistent realism is sterile, and perhaps even impossible. It is difficult to conceive of a man whose thought should not be coloured by some conception of a finite goal. Contemplation of reality alone, without applying to it external standards of judgment, condemns us to a passive acceptance of the march of cause and effect, an attitude which few are capable of maintaining. It is difficult for any realistic writer not to succumb to the temptation to go beyond the mere process which he purports to analyse. Thus Machiavelli, commonly regarded as the father of modern realism, concludes "The Prince" on an eloquent note of exhortation to unify Italy, although it is difficult to see how it follows logically from its earlier premises.¹⁷

A nihilistic attitude towards society is inherent in consistent realism. If the historic process is believed to be fully predetermined and no moral judgment may be passed on it, life loses all purpose and all human action devoid of any meaning. Such a state of mind is incompatible with the very nature of human existence. Man cannot escape utopia. As a reasoning and active creature he is bound to strive towards goals which he sets to himself. The pure realist in thought and in deed is an unhistorical abstraction, therefore

¹⁷ Some modern writers, particularly H. Lasswell and his disciples, try to maintain a position of pure realism. H. Lasswell; The Analysis of Political Behaviour, London, (Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1951.

"...any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality. Where utopianism has become a hollow and intolerable sham, which serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged, the realist performs an indispensable service in unmasking it. But pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible. Having demolished the current utopia with the weapons of realism, we still need to build a new utopia of our own, which will one day fall to the same weapons. The human will will continue to seek an escape from the logical consequences of realism in the vision of international order which, as soon as it crystallizes itself into concrete political form, becomes tainted with self-interest and hypocrisy, and must once more be attacked with the instruments of realism."¹⁸

Carr, in his biography of Karl Marx, seems to reject the dialectic.¹⁹ In his later writings, as the above passage indicates, he accepted this mode of thought without however, postulating the realization of a finite goal. While Marx saw the realization of the "absolute spirit" in a classless society, Carr, whose utopian goals are judged by the measure of attainability, believes that we should strive for a real freedom for all through the "creation of abundance";²⁰ but he is not sure whether we shall ever reach this stage, nor does he believe that this will be the final form of society.²¹

The Role of Power in International Relations

a. Power politics

Political philosophers may be divided into two categories:

¹⁸ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 93.

¹⁹ Karl Marx: A Biography, pp. 72-73.

²⁰ The New Society, p. 111.

²¹ See also note on Marxism, pp. 111-121.

some tend to overemphasize man's sociability, his innate moral sense, which, if given free rein, would produce a harmonious society. These thinkers view power as an absolute evil. Others take a much grimmer view of homo sapiens. Man is corrupted beyond redemption. The beast in him predominates and overshadows whatever moral sense he may possess. These thinkers — particularly numerous in nineteenth and twentieth century Germany — glorify power as indispensable to the maintenance of civilization. Once the restraining element of power is removed, mankind would be plunged into chaos and anarchy. Power is the source of all morality.

True to his general eclectic propensity, Carr strikes a balance between these two divergent views. This eclecticism permeates his entire analysis of the political sphere. As we have seen, Carr devotes very little attention to pure philosophy in his writings.²² However, in exploring some of the root questions of politics, he cannot but turn to the ultimate question preoccupying all students of philosophy — the question of the nature of man. His observations in this respect are commonplace, and he draws on the resources of neither of the disciplines dedicated to this question. In fact, his conception of man is akin to the Christian conception. Man is compounded of elements of good and evil. Like the Christians, he emphasizes that all political institutions must be based on this dual nature of man.

"Man in society reacts to his fellow men in two opposite ways. Sometimes he displays egoism, or the will to assert himself at the expense of others. At other times he displays sociability, or the desire to cooperate with others, to enter into reciprocal relations of good will

²² In a review article on Gorky, Carr quotes the following lines from him: "The study of philosophy, Brother, is as interesting as eating sunflower seeds and pretty well as useful." Carr adds approvingly: "It is an opinion of which no man need be ashamed." E.H. Carr: "Maxim Gorky", Spectator, vol. 156, p. 1178, June 26, 1936.

and friendship with them, and even to subordinate himself to them. In every society, these two qualities can be seen at work."²³

According to Carr, the assumption that power can be eliminated completely from the political process is the cardinal sin of utopianism.

"'Government by consent' is a contradiction in terms; for the purpose of government is to compel people to do what they would not do of their own volition. In short, government is a process by which some people exercise compulsion on others."²⁴

He traces the minimization of the role of power to conditions in the nineteenth century when, what Russell calls "naked power"²⁵ receded and gave way to a much subtler form of compulsion. Hitherto the paramount role of power was fully recognized. From Plato, to Thucydides, to Machiavelli and Hobbes due weight was given to the power factor in human relations. But the overpowering might of Britain in the nineteenth century created the illusion that the existing relations between states were not based on power at all. British predominance was beyond challenge and was therefore taken for granted; and British rule was exercised not through the crude application of force; but, as Carr states, was held in the background to be used in the last resort. The sequel of the first World War, when the victorious powers had an almost unchallenged sway in Europe also gave the appearance that the post-Versailles world did not rest on power alone, but on international public morality. Hence the misleading description of the early thirties

²³ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 95. In this respect, Carr is much influenced by the views of R. Niehbur. See R. Niehbur: Moral Man and Immoral Society, New York, (Scribner's Sons), 1934.

²⁴ E.H. Carr: The Soviet Impact on the Western World, London, (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.), 1947, p. 10-11.

²⁵ B. Russell: Power: A New Social Analysis, New York, (W.W. Norton), 1938.

as the period of return to power politics. It was not that power had returned to play a more important role in the interstate relations, rather that new sources of power arose that came to challenge the status quo. In Carr's conception, a powerless order is a contradiction in terms. It may be compared to a fluid without a container. Consequently, as we shall see later²⁶ he regards the concentration of power on a world-wide scale as the condition for international government.

"Any real international government is impossible so long as power, which is an essential condition of government, is organised nationally."²⁷

In his analysis of power Carr follows fairly closely that of Bertrand Russell's "Power". He divides power into three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion.

b. Military power

War is an ever-present potentiality in international relations: hence the tremendous importance of military power. A nation's prestige stands in direct proportion to the estimation of its military might by others. Much of the attitude towards Soviet Russia in the late thirties was coloured by the underestimation of its military strength. Foreign policy must take into consideration strategic factors, but no foreign policy can be effective unless backed up by real or imaginary military power;²⁸ and the diplomat who pursues his country's interests without

²⁶ Infra, p. 102.

²⁷ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 108.

²⁸ Stalin's famous rhetorical question "Oh the Pope! How many divisions does he have?" aptly summarizes the main considerations in foreign policy.

giving due attention to the relevant geopolitical and military factors is unlikely to be successful.

Carr aptly points out that at times military power, although originally conceived as an instrument of policy, becomes an end in itself. However, in the course of his argument he makes such sweeping statements as

"Few of the important wars of the last hundred years seem to have been waged for the deliberate and conscious purpose of increasing either trade or territory. The most serious wars are fought in order to make one's own country militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another country from becoming militarily stronger, so that there is much justification for the epigram that 'the principal cause of war is war itself'."²⁹

The motive powers behind aggression are not as clearly discernible as Carr would have us believe, and different interpretations may be given to explain the origins of the wars.

It is significant of Carr's conception that "government by consent is a contradiction in terms".³⁰ He realizes that matters of foreign policy require such specialized and highly confidential knowledge that very often policies which might lead the country into war would have to be pursued without consulting the legislator.³¹ Here again one must take exception to Carr's generalization. He tends to place too much emphasis on the role of the expert.³² In a sense, the role of the

²⁹The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 111. The quotation is from R.G.Hawtrey: Economic Aspects of Sovereignty, p. 105.

³⁰Supra, p. 38.

³¹The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 110.

³²I. Deutscher, perhaps the most brilliant of Carr's critics, and certainly his admirer, remarks: "Mr. Carr may be described as an intellectual expatriate from the diplomacy of the 'twenties. The peculiar limitations of the diplomatic mind can sometimes be sensed between the lines of his History." I Deutscher, art. cit., p. 342.

legislator is to weigh narrow expertise in broader political terms. While it may be necessary, especially under conditions of modern warfare, to act either without consulting or even informing the legislator, to suggest this as a general proposition nullifies the representative voice of the nation in the most important questions affecting its existence.³³

It is the overriding concern with military power that lends the international scene something of the appearance of Hobbes' state of nature. There is a certain inertia in the exercise of military power. Once employed, it tends to go far beyond the original aims of those who wield it. As long as military power exists, the constant competition to achieve supremacy over others will remain a permanent feature of the international scene.³⁴

c. Economic power

Economic power has a dual aspect. On the one hand, it is an essential condition of the capacity to wage war, on the other it can

³³ Hobbes, Locke, and in modern times Walter Lippman share Carr's views in this respect. For the latter, see W. Lippmann: The Public Philosophy, Chapter 5, Toronto, (Little, Brown and Co.), 1955.

³⁴ It must be emphasized that Carr's analysis has been rendered somewhat obsolescent by the development of atomic power. Two aspects seem to call for a thorough revision of some long-standing conceptions of international relations. First, the so-called "atomic saturation point", which makes an increase of atomic armament beyond a certain point superfluous, second, the possibility — thus far not yet realized — of equalizing the power of all states. If all powers, large or small, develop atomic energy, this would have a yet unforeseeable effect on the relations among nations. The development of guided missiles has made the wildest dreams of science fiction authors come true. Untold destruction could be inflicted upon any enemy country, by means of mechanical devices, without sending a single soldier into enemy territory.

be used as a "peaceful" instrument to impose the will of one nation upon the other. The dollar diplomacy of the United States and the recent attempt to influence the behaviour of Nasser by the threat to dump cotton neatly illustrate the latter.

In contrast to mercantilism, which assigned to the state the task of increasing the wealth of the nation, thus requiring extensive interference in the operation of the economic order, laissez-faire sought to separate the economic from the political sphere. This doctrine suffered the fate of the entire structure of laissez-faire. Technological developments and the rise of total warfare made economics of paramount importance in the waging of war, and it became an index of the power of a nation.³⁵ Steel, oil, and coal are items that figure quite prominently in strategic calculations and power considerations. All political analysis undertaken without regard to its economic framework is bound to be artificial.

"Power is indivisible; and the military and economic weapons are merely different instruments of power."³⁶

The increasing importance and reliance on certain and adequate supplies has given rise to a trend towards autarky, which, in view of the division of labour of the world economy, and the scattering of resources throughout the world, becomes extremely difficult to realize for all except the greatest Powers. Hence the dilemma of modern politics:

³⁵ To what extent the recognition of the importance of economics in international relations has penetrated the analysis in this field can be seen in most recent books on diplomatic history. As an example, A.J.P. Taylor, in a recent book of the genre, devotes his entire introductory chapter to economic analysis, complete with statistical charts. A.J.P. Taylor: The Struggle for the Mastery in Europe, Oxford, (Clarendon Press), 1954.

³⁶ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 119.

"Autarky is ... an instrument of political power and ... a form of preparedness for war",³⁷ while its attainment is extremely difficult.³⁸

It has been repeatedly argued by utopians that it is irrational for any government to endeavour to establish autarky, because a rational division of labour between nations would produce the highest economic good; therefore the clamour for autarky is but another reflection of human stupidity and selfishness that characterizes the relations between nations in general.³⁹ Carr agrees with many of the moral judgments of the utopians; thus he would not dissociate himself from their view that by absolute standards of reason the search for autarky is irrational. But while the utopians think that the injection of doses of reason would provide a remedy to the situation, Carr thinks that one has to attack the highly complex roots of this irrationalism and work slowly from there. Human selfishness may be deplorable, nevertheless it is an inescapable political fact; at best we can hope to restrain it. Carr the realist, instead of lamenting what he regards as an irreversible trend, suggests that we recognize autarky as a function of the struggle for power.

"Autarky, like other elements of power, is expensive. It may cost a country as much to make itself self-supporting in some important commodity as to build a battleship. The expenditure may turn out to be wasteful, and the acquisition not worth the cost. But to deny that autarky is an element of power, and as such desirable, is to obscure the issue."⁴⁰

³⁷ Ibid., p. 121.

³⁸ The astounding development of the synthetic industries has its origins in the search for autarky. Without "ersatz" Germany could not have waged war.

³⁹ "Autarky can be defined as an exploitation of the apparatus of a parochial state for the purpose of promoting the economic interests of the population of that state, at the expense of the rest of mankind." A. Toynbee: A Study of History, Volume 4, London, (Oxford University Press), 1948, p. 175.

⁴⁰ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 124.

Once the issue of power is settled, the economic wastefulness associated with autarky will be resolved.

Economic power, being exercised indirectly and rarely accompanied by violence and bloodshed, is undoubtedly a much more humane form of power than the application or threat of military power. An important consequence of the humaneness of economic policy is the fact that it breeds in the policy-maker a certain aversion and hesitancy to use violence, and a preference for peaceful methods of penetration. The classic example of economic power effectively exercised is Britain, thus investing her with the mantle of humaneness as well as of perfidy. By virtue of its economic preponderance, Britain could impose its will on many countries throughout the nineteenth century, while rarely resorting to violent means. A cautious criticism may be voiced here. Perhaps the wilful suppression of all Carr's personal feelings was not completely successful; and it is Carr the Englishman who speaks here, and not Carr the scientist so thoroughly grounded in historical materialism. For the "bellicosity" of Germany and the "humaneness" of England may be explained by the different means at their disposal, and the objective circumstances in which they pursued their respective national ends. Marx would have said that

"It is not the consciousness of human beings that determines their existence, but, conversely, it is their social existence that determines their consciousness."⁴¹

⁴¹ K. Marx: Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", quoted in M. Oakeshott: The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe, New York, (Cambridge University Press), 1950, p. 105.

d. Power over the minds of men

It has long been recognized that power over the minds of men is essential to any effective form of government. To Plato, "noble lies" had to be devised, in order to insure the obedience of the subjects. Machiavelli was perhaps the first modern exponent of the power of propaganda as a weapon of rule. But its importance was particularly enhanced by the rise of mass democracy,⁴² and the prophet of mass democracy claimed that all governments must have some claim to legitimacy.⁴³

In totalitarian states the rulers candidly profess their determination to instil in the minds of their subjects those thoughts which they consider correct, and prevent the dissemination of "kikenshiso" or dangerous thoughts.⁴⁴ For that purpose special departments are established, as for example the Agitprop of the Communist Party in Russia, and the Ministry of Propaganda in Nazi Germany.⁴⁵ In democratic

⁴² It was during the Renaissance period that the art of mass persuasion for political ends found its practitioners and theoreticians. Propaganda was generally referred to as arcana dominationis. See Carl Schmitt: Die Diktatur, 2 Aufl., Munchen, (Duncker v. Humboldt), 1928.

⁴³ "Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no rights, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men." J.J. Rousseau: The Social Contract, On Slavery, Great Books of the Western World, Series No.38, p. 389.

⁴⁴ K.L. Wirth: Introduction to K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p.xiv, K. Mannheim, op. cit.

⁴⁵ The slogan of Soviet propaganda is that "writers are the engineers of human souls". The arguments about the role of the writers in Soviet society erupted quite violently after the death of Stalin, in congresses, literary and theoretical journals, and the official press; and it spread like wildfire to the satellite countries. The "revolt of the intelligentsia" has since been crushed, and the task of the Soviet writer is still to write "socialist truth". Soviet Studies, Vol. III-V, translations (cont'd)

states public opinion is also moulded, but by subtler means. The rational individual arriving independently at a political opinion is a mere abstraction. The mind of the mass man, in democratic society, is exposed to the influence of mass media of communications which mould his outlook and attitude. The will of the people is, as Schumpeter said, "a manufactured will".⁴⁶

It is frequently argued that the existence of various, and at times conflicting sources of mass opinion, appealing to the citizen, enables him to compare divergent points of view, and arrive at an intelligent opinion of his own.⁴⁷ Socialist critics point out, however, that in some countries, especially in the United States, sources that advocate an alternative to the existing social system are either suppressed or too weak to reach the public, while the most influential and divergent sources present merely variations on the prevailing social

⁴⁵ (cont'd) from the Soviet press.

The most concise exposition of propaganda used as a tool of power can be found in Doob, L.W.: Propaganda: its Psychology and Technique, New York, (H. Holt & Co.), 1935; and for a practical guide to its uses, see Hitler, A.: Mein Kampf, Stuttgart, (F. Eher Aufag), 1932; Goebbels, J.: My Part in Germany's Fight, London, (Hurst and Blackett), 1940.

⁴⁶ "The will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the political process. The ways in which issues and the popular will on any issue are being manufactured is exactly analogous to the ways of commercial advertising. We find the same attempts to contact the subconscious." Schumpeter, J.A.: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd edition, New York, (Harper & Brothers), 1950, p. 263. Recently, American parties began to use the resources of commercial advertising agencies during the elections campaign, See Hale, W.H.: "The Politicians Try Victory Through Air Power", The Reporter, Sept. 6th, 1956, pp. 16-20; E.H. Carr: "Propaganda and Power", Yale Review, Vol. 42, September, 1952, pp. 1-9.

⁴⁷ Mills, W.: The Power Elite, New York, 1956.

theme;⁴⁸ and it is significant that propaganda and advertising have become so closely associated in modern times.

Propaganda is a time-honoured domestic tool, but its employment as a tool of foreign policy is relatively recent. It can be safely said that its inception dates from the first World War. It has two aims: first, to boost the morale of the army and the civilian population, exposed to great hardships in total war; second, to undermine the morale and thus weaken the will to resist of the enemy. While propaganda has hitherto been used as a conscious instrument of foreign policy in times of crisis only, it became a permanent weapon in the arsenal of statecraft with the rise of the Soviet Union. Convinced that its very survival depended on a proletarian revolution in the West, the Soviet Government embarked on a large-scale propaganda campaign among the German troops on the Russian front, to stir them into revolutionary action. Lenin's dictum was that an idea becomes a material force, once it grips the minds of the masses. It is almost symbolic, that the Russian delegation to the Peace Conference at Brest-Litovsk carried quantities of propaganda literature, to be distributed among the German soldiers.⁴⁹

Carr is eager to refute the notion, particularly widespread

⁴⁸ "Marx grasped the essence of capitalist democracy splendidly, when, in analysing the experience of the Commune, he said that the oppressed were allowed, once every few years, to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class should misrepresent them in parliament!" Lenin, V.I.: State and Revolution, New York, (International Publishers), 1932, p. 73.

⁴⁹ Bennett, J.W.W.: Brest-Litovsk, the Forgotten Peace, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1938.

during the League period of international affairs, that an ideology, unattached to a power basis, can be effective. He advances two reasons why such ideas lack effective force. First, resources are required for the effective propagation of an idea. The second reason is that sooner or later, an idea with a universal appeal will be appropriated by a national power, and thus be harnessed to its interests, its dynamic force. Both in the French revolution and in the Bolshevik revolution universal ideas underwent a drastic transformation, once they became instruments of the raison d'etat of France and Russia respectively.⁵⁰ Therefore any hope that some international idea that does not enjoy the support of one or more Great Powers could exercise a decisive influence on the course of events, is illusory. Such ideas became invariably tainted with selfish interests of national entities.

It would be wrong to assume that the practitioners of mass persuasion could manipulate the human mind at their will. All propaganda must contain a grain of truth, says Carr.⁵¹ This is still

⁵⁰ The example of Zionism, which Carr uses to illustrate his point, not the best one; it is justified only to a limited extent. It is true that when it was launched with full force in the international political arena, at the time of the Versailles Peace Treaty, it did have the backing of Great Britain and the United States. See Speech of Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, House of Commons, July 21, 1937; H.C. Official Report, July 21, 1937, Col. 2249-50. But very soon after the Balfour declaration of 1917, the objectives of Zionism came to clash with those of Great Britain, and gave rise to an ever increasing friction between the mandatory power and the Jewish Community in Palestine. Zionism was left with the backing of the economic power of world Jewry, which lacked a territorial basis.

⁵¹ Konrad Heiden suggests that Hitler's fabulous success as a propagandist was due to the fact that he did not impose his own beliefs on the masses, but, like a human seismograph, always realized the wishes of the masses, and then proceeded to expound them. "It is the art of contradiction which makes him the greatest and most successful propagandist of his time. He does not dominate the minds of millions," (cont'd)

a moot point. It is difficult to determine the limits of the propagandistic lie; and the experience of Nazi Germany and of Soviet Russia suggests that the capacity of human gullibility is almost without limit. The devilish image of the Jew has been so deeply implanted in the German mind, that it persists even after the destruction of the Nazi regime.⁵² Students of totalitarianism have suggested that technological education, with its emphasis on relations between cause and effect, and the general rationalist spirit, militates strongly against the mythology of modern totalitarian propaganda.⁵³

Another source of resistance is the "inherent utopianism of human nature".⁵⁴ Man will not accept indefinitely oppression and ideas that impose upon him a fate which he regards as unacceptable. But it would seem that the effective insulation of the human mind from sources of opinion which the rulers regard as undesirable can make the human mind malleable to a very high degree, perhaps limited only by suffering, which is beyond human endurance; and even the capacity to endure is to

⁵¹ (cont'd) his mind belongs to them. Like a piece of wood floating on the waves, he follows the shifting currents of public opinion. This is his true strength... When a resonance issues from the depth of the substance, the masses have given him the pitch; he knows in what terms he must finally address them."K.Heiden: Der Fuehrer, Boston, (Houghton Mifflin Co.), 1940, p. 140.

⁵² For a different view see B. Russell: "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish", in Unpopular Essays, London, 1950.

⁵³ See F. Neumann: Behemoth, New York, (Oxford University Press), 1940; I. Deutscher: Russia, What Next, New York, (Oxford University Press), 1953; T. Veblen: The Engineers and the Price System, New York, (Viking), 1933.

⁵⁴ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 145.

some extent culturally conditioned.⁵⁵

Morality in International Relations

Carr states, that in the absence of any authority above the state, adherence by it to the moral code of the individual would be an invitation to disaster. Different standards of morality are applied to individuals and to group persons. While sacrifices are expected from the individual, altruistic behaviour is not to be the norm for group persons. This applies to corporate entities within the nation, as well as to the state. Its survival and security is constantly at stake, and it must therefore be guided by the imperatives of expediency, not by the precepts of morality. But, while few expect states to abide by the domestic code of morality, there is a universal feeling — however tenuous — that states are members of a world community, which imposes upon them certain restraints in their behaviour.

The sense of world community can be said to be a product of the modern age. Increased and more frequent intercourse between peoples, made possible by rapid progress in technological developments, and the keen awareness of the economic interdependence of the world, was a principal factor making for more acute sense of world community. The British worker came to realize that his lot depends on events far removed from his home town or even country. The universalistic ideologies

⁵⁵ The readiness of some of the inmates of Stalin's concentration camps to justify their terrible lot as a sacrifice necessary for the attainment of the ideas of Bolshevism is a frightful example of the power of propaganda.

of the last two centuries, promising salvation not only to one nation, but to mankind in general, tended to harness this sense of world community to their own interests. As we have seen, the selfish interests of the nations espousing these ideologies were presented in the cloak of the interest of the world as a whole.

The harmony of interests period — the nineteenth century — was naturally a fertile ground for the flourishing of international morality. Since clashes between nations were sporadic, and did not assume the violent total forms of the twentieth century wars, the moral predicament of the international comity were not as obvious as they became after the turn of the century. But, a hundred years after the French revolution, the nations were locked in mortal battle. Man was perplexed by the strange and, indeed, horrifying contradiction between "moral man and immoral society". The clamour for greater equality, justice, and welfare at home, was accompanied by jingoistic war-cries abroad.

Failing to understand the causes for this distress, writers and statesmen, in a very facile way, were quick to attribute it to the wickedness of their enemies or the wickedness of human beings. It has yet to be proven, says Carr, that mankind has undergone moral deterioration; and in the absence of positive evidence in support of this thesis, the causes for the wholesale flaunting of international morality are to be sought elsewhere.⁵⁶ It is not increased human wickedness, but the economic and social changes which prompt man to act

⁵⁶ The New Society, Chapter 1.

the way he did. The demise of British predominance, the rise of a multiplicity of new states, each striving to assert itself, the clamour for a more equitable distribution of the world's resources, all combined to transform the "peaceful" scene of the nineteenth century into the turbulence of the two great wars. Only the comforting shadow of the atom bomb had at long last brought some respite from the danger of recurring global war. In his constant search to perfect the implements of warfare, man has stumbled upon the ultimate weapon which makes war suicidal.

Extreme realism categorically denies the existence of any moral rules binding states in their relations with one another. This view has found many exponents, of which the most accomplished was Hegel. To Hegel the state was a self-sufficient moral entity not subject to any law external to itself. Carr takes issue with this view. At no time was international morality totally denied. Even the fascist powers, whose formal ideologies gloried in war, paid lip-service in their propaganda to international morality.⁵⁷ Even they had to recognize the pervasiveness and persistence of universal moral norms.

While it is possible to spell out in detail the moral code governing human relations within the nation, it would be very difficult to ascertain the precise contents of international morality. Since there is no legislature, or other authoritative source, on whom one

⁵⁷ "It would be a gigantic event for all mankind if both nations, once and for all, should banish force from their mutual relations. The German nation is willing! For no one could demand that, to achieve a correction, dubious in value as well as in scope, of the present frontiers, a million human lives should be sacrificed." Hitler, addressing his words to France on the current question of the Saar and Alsace-Lorraine, 1934, quoted in K. Heiden: op. cit., p. 688.

could draw, the moral norms of the international comity are extremely nebulous; although the fact that they are frequently invoked points to their existence. The violation of a rule does not deny its existence. Carr believes that there is a set of moral precepts — however ill-defined and vague — which sovereign units are supposed to observe. Thus, he thinks that there is a cardinal obligation on the state "not to inflict unnecessary death or suffering on other human beings, i.e. death or suffering not necessary for the attainment of some higher purpose which is held, rightly or wrongly, to justify a derogation from the general obligation".⁵⁸

It was a fundamental error of utopianism to believe that the morality governing the relations within the state could be transposed to the international plane, without also transposing its power-relations. The physical isolation of the states, the vast differences in standards of living, culture, education, and the absence of a central authority invest the behaviour of the states with a degree of egotism, which would be intolerable in the relations among individuals within the states.

If the world is to emancipate itself from this perennial Hobbesian state, and some form of accommodation is to supersede perpetual warfare, a world community based on a new morality, compounded

⁵⁸ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 154. Professor Morgenthau rightly takes exception to this view. As he points out: "On the contrary, the fact of the matter is that nations recognize a moral obligation to refrain from the infliction of death and suffering under certain conditions despite the possibility of justifying such conduct in the light of a higher purpose, such as the national interest." H. Morgenthau: Politics Among Nations, 2nd edition, New York, (Alfred Knopf), 1955, pp. 213-14. To say, as Carr does, that "suffering not necessary for... some higher purpose" is to say that senseless death or suffering is senseless. It has no particular moral connotation, rather it is a question of expediency.

of self-interest and generosity, must become the goal.

"The essential nature of the crisis through which we are living, is neither military, nor political, nor economic, but moral. A new faith in a new moral purpose is required to reanimate our political and economic system."⁵⁹

A condition of membership in such a community is the subordination of the interests of the member unit to that of the whole. Indeed, this is fundamental to human society. Just as the maintenance of peace and cohesion of the national community requires that all submit to the rules indispensable for its attainment, so — with Carr — a world community can only be realized if all its individual members submit to the rational general will, which is the sine qua non of its existence. In both instances power is the pillar of the general will.

The submission to a rational general will must be tempered by the exercise of rational magnanimity. If peace is to reign in the world, the interest of some states, and, as Carr emphatically points out, of the greater states as well as of the smaller ones will have to be sacrificed to that of the community at large.

"Those who profit most by that order can in the long run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least; and the responsibility for seeing that these changes take place as far as possible in an orderly way rests as much on the defenders as on the challengers."⁶⁰

This suggestion, even on a less than global scale, seems to be a valid and constructive one. The readiness to make economic sacrifices in order to alleviate the dire poverty of the underdeveloped nations has indeed come to be an important aspect of the foreign policy of the

⁵⁹ Conditions of Peace, p. 110.

⁶⁰ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 169.

"have" powers and, as Carr anticipated, this aid was rendered from self-interest; although the donors try to persuade themselves and the world that it was an act of sheer altruism.⁶¹

Law In International Relations

In keeping with his tendency towards eclecticism, Carr's views on the nature of law occupy a halfway position between the naturalists and the positivists. He rejects the claim of the naturalists that there is an immutable law transcending time and place; but he also questions the positivist tenet that law, properly so called, is nothing but the will of the political authority.

Pure positivism cannot adequately explain why some laws are voluntarily observed, even without threat of punishment, while the naturalist is begging the question by denouncing all law that does not conform to his own private view of morality, as invalid. Carr inclines towards the modern school of "natural law", especially to the doctrine of Stammler which regards natural law not as a fixed standard, but as a historical variable.⁶² It is a natural law with a variable content. Underlying each society, with a minimum degree of cohesion, are certain values which have become "internationalized" and which are reflected in the legal system. This is best shown in the English term reasonable, often used by common law courts, rendering judgment on cases to which no specific positive law applies. There can therefore be little doubt

⁶¹ The concern for the economic welfare of the underdeveloped countries is likely to remain a permanent feature of international relations. Barbara Ward calls this a "permanent blood-transfusion". B. Ward: The West at Bay, New York, (Norton), 1948.

⁶² R. Stammler: The Theory of Justice, New York, 1925.

of the ethical foundation of most legal systems, including, as we shall presently see, international law.

Ubi societas, ibi ius succinctly expresses the undisputable postulate that law is an essential ingredient of each social system. Law provides that element of certainty in human relations without which any stable interaction between individuals cannot exist. The individual must know the consequences of his behaviour — whether it will meet with approval or punishment — if some regularity in his relations with his fellow-men is to prevail. Similarly, a pacific and stable international comity is inconceivable without a set of laws governing the relations between states. This condition has never obtained in history, and it is the first and foremost task of any endeavour to attain peace and stability in the world to evolve an effective political substructure making international law operative.

Hitherto, the bulk of international law had been a function of politics. It had been invoked by the stronger to justify his interest and policies. Or, as with natural law in the domestic scene, it had been invoked by the weaker powers to challenge the status quo. Strictly speaking, the problem of international law is not a legal problem, but above all a political one. Even municipal law is, in the last analysis, a reflection of the prevailing power-relations in society.

"Every system of law presupposes an initial political decision, whether explicit or implied, whether achieved by voting or by bargaining or by force, as to the authority entitled to make and unmake law. Behind all law there is this necessary political background. The ultimate authority of law derives from politics."⁶³

⁶³ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 180.

But while in the municipal scene there exists machinery whereby the law can be changed to conform with changed social relations, in the international scene no such machinery has been established.

To be observed the law must reflect the prevailing power relations among states. But this is not enough. It must be tempered by moral magnanimity on the part of the stronger. Carr is fascinated by the analogy of relations between states and labour-management relationships.⁶⁴ Just as in labour-management disputes the concessions made by management are motivated by a mixture of self-interest and generosity, and the desire to avoid unprofitable violence, so in the last analysis, the modifying influence of morality in the international sphere is not morality practiced for its own sake, but is born of the recognition that it is a necessary price for stability and the insurance of gains attained.

The ill repute in which international law has fallen between the two world wars was largely due to the conviction by the dissatisfied powers that it was a weapon of the victor to enforce their will upon them. It reflected the political preponderance of the entente powers. Since it was acutely felt that the Versailles treaty was unjust, the legal basis underlying the power relationship could not command the lasting respect of all parties concerned.

Carr has little faith in arbitration or adjudication as a successful means for the resolution of international conflict. He admits that within certain areas of relatively unimportant disputes

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 212-13.

adjudication and arbitration can serve as a media through which an accommodation of conflicting interests is attained. But in matters regarded as vital by the parties concerned, it is illusory to expect that they will submit to the decisions of a court or any impartial body. The municipal court treats the disputants as equals, and thus disregards their specific interests. Within the nation politics are monopolized by the state, and the decision of the court can be enforced. Disputes between states are power conflicts, which, in the absence of a world legislature, do not come within the realm of law and equity. Because of this, bargaining is the only realistic method of settling inter-state disputes. Underlying bargaining is a constant awareness of the relative power of those engaged in it, and its results will reflect the relative strength of the bargainers. Under present circumstances, according to Carr, this is the only "peaceful" way of resolving conflict between states.

It is difficult to see any novelty in this particular suggestion. Bargaining has been a time-honoured device in diplomacy; at best, Carr's emphasis on bargaining amounts to a scholarly advice to the weaker to recognize and submit to the power of the stronger. But it is questionable whether this advice is a serious contribution to a solution of the international crisis with which Carr is preoccupied in his "The Twenty Years' Crisis". It is hard to see how this will ever bring about lasting peace. The considerations suggested by Carr have long been recognized by the contestants on the world scene, and yet have not served to prevent violent conflict. After having amply demonstrated the irrational roots of man's thoughts, he suddenly postulates absolute rationality, because such behaviour as he envisages requires a high

degree of rationality, full knowledge of all the relevant facts, and the elimination of all the emotional factors. If there was an impartial global agency that could constantly ascertain the changing power relations between states and then present its findings in the form of a balance sheet to the parties concerned, such a scheme would perhaps not be unfeasible. But, as any competent military expert would testify, the military potential of a nation is not susceptible to accurate measurement. (See the current divergent estimates of the relative military power of Egypt and Israel.)

The Role of Nationalism in International Relations

The origins of nationalism are treated by Carr in empirical terms, but with the period of the rise of mass democracy he returns to the school of historical materialism. While Marx thought that the nation-state was a product of capitalism,⁶⁵ Carr traces its origins to the identification of the nation with its ruler, and considers the mercantilist state already a variant of the nation-state. He also distinguishes between what he calls the "political" and the "economic" period of nationalism.

"Democratic nationalism... had proved manageable and compatible with some kind of international order precisely because its aspirations were predominantly political and could be satisfied within the framework of the nineteenth century laissez-faire or "night-watchman" state. ...social nationalism (or national socialism) ... of the third period, by shifting the ground from political to economic aspirations, brought about the abdication of the laissez-faire state in favour of the "social service" state.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ E. Goldhagen: op. cit., p. 2.

⁶⁶ E.H. Carr: Nationalism and After, London, (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.), 1945, p. 21.

The origins of the integrated or "economic" period of nationalism Carr traces to the early nineteenth century and Rousseau.

"The founder of modern nationalism as it began to take shape in the nineteenth century was Rousseau, who, rejecting the embodiment of the nation in the personal sovereign or the ruling class, boldly identified 'nation' and 'people'." ⁶⁷

Hitherto only the upper classes were the full beneficiaries of the nation. Indeed, there was a tendency to identify the third estate with the nation as a whole. ⁶⁸ Marx's famous outcry that the worker has no fatherland was intended to state the fact that the worker had no share in the fatherland. ⁶⁹ But by the end of the nineteenth century the wide chasm hitherto separating the classes became increasingly narrowed, and, as the first World War revealed, national sentiments proved stronger than class-consciousness. "The nation" in the words of Carr "became socialized". ⁷⁰

This socialization of the nation had a profound effect on the nature of international relations. The decision-makers were now subjected to manifold pressures and the satisfaction of the demands of the various elements of society became the overriding concern of all governments. A multiplicity of divergent interests arose within

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 7. By the time Marx wrote this seems to have been accepted as a commonplace. Marx "used the terms 'nation' and 'society' interchangeably". E. Goldhagen, op. cit., p. 4.

⁶⁸ "Property, sometimes described as a state in the country, was a condition of political rights and — it might be said without much exaggeration — of full membership of the nation: the worker had, in this sense, no fatherland." Nationalism and After, p. 10.

⁶⁹ K. Marx: The Communist Manifesto, quoted in Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 98.

⁷⁰ Nationalism and After, p. 19.

the nation, interests that were only shelved in times of acute crisis which required a concentrated effort on the part of the whole nation, and induced the various parties to rally behind the national government.⁷¹

The emancipation of the masses from poverty and degradation, which according to socialist thinkers should have brought in its wake a more peaceful world, had the effect of sharpening international conflict, and even contributed to the totality of war. More firmly welded together, the nation became more assertive on the international scene. The demands of the rising masses drove the governments to concern themselves in their foreign policies with an ever wider range of problems. Foreign policy had now to be conducted with a view to full employment, to tariffs, to the requisite standards of living: economics figured more prominently than ever before in policy decisions. Since this process occurred almost simultaneously in all European countries, it invested their foreign policy with a high degree of parochialism, very often assuming the form of jingoism, and thus could not but exacerbate their mutual relations.

Carr states that it was the first World War and its aftermath that marked the crest of the nationalist wave in Europe.⁷² Propaganda, as we noted, became an important tool to mobilize the nation for the war effort. Nationalist passions were inflamed, and the enemy came to be regarded as less than human. The Germans were Huns, the Russians

⁷¹ It was the tragedy of France in 1940 that even in the face of mortal danger from Germany, it could not overcome the deep divisions within herself. D.W. Brogan: France Under the Republic, 1870-1939, (Harper & Brothers), New York, 1940; A. Werth: The Twilight of France, 1939-40, New York, (Harper & Brothers), 1942; A. Werth: France and Munich before the Surrender, New York, (Harper & Brothers), 1939.

⁷² Nationalism and After, p. 26.

were Asiatic barbarians. The final, crowning "atrocities" of this intense national passion was the endeavour to purge the body of the nation of alien minorities.

"Today annexations of territory are regarded as more, not less, respectable if they are accompanied by wholesale deportation of the existing population — not perhaps the most callous act recorded in history, but surely the most explicit exaltation of the nation over the individual as an end in itself, the mass sacrifice of human beings to the idol of nationalism."⁷³

This process was usually accompanied by large-scale suffering and loss of life.

After 1919, the demands for higher wages, for protection of home industries, for restrictive immigration laws, all imposed a rigid nationalistic framework within which the foreign policy of governments had to be implemented. It became increasingly difficult for states to undertake commitments, or to make concessions. Foreign policy was conducted with a constant glance over the shoulder towards the domestic scene.⁷⁴ The diplomat was very often driven towards a course of action contrary to his better judgment. One result of this was that at the open diplomatic conferences exposed to the watchful public eye successful negotiations, by definition requiring concessions, became very difficult and gave rise to the increasing tendency towards deadlock.

Another factor intensifying international strife was the

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 33-34.

⁷⁴ The paralyzing effect of an election year on the conduct of American foreign policy has become a common source of lament. In France, it has become customary to defer political "showdowns" in parliament, if there is a high-level international meeting in the offing, so as not to decrease the bargaining position of France, as well as for the sake of prestige.

emergence of a multiplicity of nation-states, particularly in the aftermath of the first World War. The doctrine of self-determination, hitherto confined to western Europe, now began to penetrate the imagination of the rest of Europe, as well as of Asia and Africa, which now adopted the sentiments and the ideas of their European masters.⁷⁵ This trend, says Carr, ran counter to broader economic and technological developments. The imperatives of technology and economy demanded greater territorial units and greater concentration of power sources, while the ideologies and the sentiments current at the time had a fragmenting effect. The most disastrous consequence of this fragmentation was sharpened economic competition; the eagerness of backward nations to catch up with the more advanced industrial powers. The division of labour between nations was undermined. The smaller entities refused to be mere markets or sources of raw materials, and strove to establish their own industries, protected by tariff walls. The international economic cooperation that marked the world while Britain was supreme gave way to this multitude of national entities pitted against each other in constant competition, culminating in a disastrous war.

The existence of the League of Nations only obscured all these trends. Bound by common interests, the victorious powers gave the impression of relative harmony, while the prostrate vanquished lacked the power to assert their national aspirations, and resigned themselves, for the time being, to the status quo. Carr admits that

⁷⁵ "Imitation is the last and sincerest form of tribute paid by the colonial East to the industrial West." The New Society, p. 94.

the history of the League testifies to the widely held view that it was little more than an instrument of the victorious powers to maintain the status quo.⁷⁶ But this is not to say that — in its formal structure — the League was doomed to failure from the beginning. The Covenant contained elements of realism, which, if judiciously applied, could have provided that machinery for peaceful change, which Carr regards as essential for lasting peace.⁷⁷ Unfortunately these elements were overshadowed by the extensive reliance on international public opinion.

Carr believes that the nationalist wave finally spent its strength during and in the aftermath of the second World War, and that there is increasing evidence that concepts of nationality and even sovereignty are undergoing a profound change.

"It is the failure of the nation-state to assure military security or economic well-being which has in part inspired the widespread questioning of the moral credentials of nationalism."⁷⁸

The increasing interdependence of smaller and greater powers, the technological changes in the military field which have made territorial boundaries somewhat obsolete, and the rise of universal ideologies point towards greater conglomerations of political power than the nation-state. Carr believes that the future world order will be determined more along economic than political lines.

"One prediction may be made with some confidence. The

⁷⁶ E.H. Carr: "The Future of the League, Idealism or Reality", Fortnightly, vol. 146, pp. 385-397, October, 1936.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Nationalism and After, p. 38.

concept of sovereignty is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at present."⁷⁹

and

"In Europe some of the small units of the past may continue for a few generations longer to eke out a precariously independent existence; others may retain the shadow of independence when the reality has disappeared. But their military and economic insecurity has been demonstrated beyond recall."⁸⁰

Perhaps the very nature of Carr's cool, detached analysis has led him to an underestimation of the vigour of the forces of nationalism, especially in Asia and Africa. Carr sees that economic and political considerations have made it difficult for a nation to conduct an independent foreign policy. This trend is actually a return to the more "realistic" politics of the nineteenth century when five or six Great Powers settled all international conflicts among themselves; with the difference that the nominal influence of smaller powers will be more pronounced.⁸¹ Up to this point no one would wish to quarrel with Carr's analysis.

But Carr further concludes that, as a consequence, the smaller territorial nation-states will disappear, and within the greater units group relationships will replace international relations. In the meanwhile the demand for self-determination will be lessened, the clamour for a higher standard of living will overshadow all particularistic national movements.

⁷⁹ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 230.

⁸⁰ Nationalism and After, p. 37.

⁸¹ "In Professor Toynbee's brilliant epigram: 'No annihilation without representation.'" The New Society, p. 98.

"In Asia the demand for self-determination may still be heard though perhaps more faintly and less confidently than of late." Small states "can survive only as an anomaly and an anachronism in a world which has moved on to the other forms of organization."⁸²

This seems to me a grave underestimation of the psychological factors involved, an application of the purely materialist concept of history within very narrow limits.⁸³

The whole second cycle of the crisis of self-determination has a particularly anti-western character. It is not so much a revolution against starvation and subsistence conditions of living, but a revolution against western domination, against western ways of life, even against western culture. Self-determination and national aggrandizement are the political slogans which will move the sluggish masses of Asia and Africa. Certainly, the demand for a better way of life, sometimes simply for enough to eat, is an inextricable part of these demands. All Asian and African leaders have realized that the high road to plenty is industrialization, the adoption of western technology. As Carr says,

⁸² Nationalism and After, pp. 36-37.

⁸³ "Marx's hostility toward the movement of self-determination derived from economic considerations, which are never absent from his mind. Only large territorial units with vast natural and human resources are capable of sustaining progressing economies. Capitalism could flourish and bear its rich fruits within the fertile environment of relatively big coherent geographic units, and the full advantages of a planned economy of a socialist order could only be reaped if its territorial base was sufficiently integrated and rich to enable the planner, unhindered by political boundaries, to combine and process vast and varied resources." E. Goldhagen, op. cit., p. 16. The identical words could have been written about Carr, only substituting "reasoned disapproval" for "hostility" in the first line. It is worth noting that Marx more than a hundred years ago said that "nationality is already dead" in the proletariat. K. Marx: Briefwechsel, vol. 1, p. 150; quoted in E. Goldhagen, ibid., p. 28.

"In the contemporary East, Gandhi's spinning wheel is an obsolete cult. Industry is the symbol of progress."⁸⁴

But the political character of the revolution is irrational, and nowhere has this been better demonstrated than in the Arab world. Arab nationalism is religious and ethno-centred in a much greater degree than European nationalism ever was.⁸⁵

The demand for self-determination, contrary to Carr's expectations, is becoming more and more strident in those parts of the world, where it has not yet been achieved, while the movement towards integration of smaller and economically weak powers into larger units is still a utopian goal, lying in the distant future. Even in the field of international trade closer integration is, and will be for some time to come, a very slow process. As the prolonged and fruitless negotiations around the GATT amply show. In those countries where self-determination has been achieved recently, the social

⁸⁴ The New Society, p. 94. Marxists used the term "spinning wheel" as a symbol of obsolescence. See F. Engels: Anti-Duehring, passage in Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 130.

"We did not adopt Gandhiji's views wholly either in regard to non-violence or in regard to economics..."(p.186)"...We talk of freedom, but today political freedom does not take us far unless there is economic freedom. Indeed there is no such thing as freedom for a man who is starving or for a country which is poor. The poor whether they are nations or individuals have little place in this world. Therefore we have to produce in order to have sufficient wealth, distributed by proper economic planning so that it may go to the millions, more especially to the common man." (p.160) J. Nehru: Independence and After, New York, (The John Day Co.), 1950. Mr. Nehru is the ideal type of leader to whom Carr addresses his "call for leadership". (Conditions of Peace, p. 275).

⁸⁵ See G. Antonius: The Arab Awakening, London, (Hamish Hamilton), 1938. The message of the book is the struggle for freedom from western domination, and it has become the bible of Arab nationalists; its hero is, among others, the late King Ibn Saud.

structure of colonial days has to a large extent been retained, and nationalism fulfills again, as it did in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the task of reconciling the divergent interests of all classes in society.

Conclusion

Today, when one analyzes Carr's work, in the light of ex post facto knowledge, it is unavoidable that certain shortcomings should be apparent. Carr himself said that "for me history is a procession of events about which almost the only thing that can be said with certainty is that it moves constantly on and never returns to the same place".⁸⁶ But there is a certain pattern about these shortcomings that go beyond the inevitable faults of contemporary analysis, a blind spot in his otherwise brilliant work. This is a proper appreciation of intense irrationalism that the mass age has produced.

To Carr "the one absolute in history is change".⁸⁷ This change is to be comprehended by the cool exercise of reason, the mastery of the past and the living present, with the help of the massive type of scholarship that is the hallmark of his work. No judgments are passed, no praises bestowed, virtue extolled or vice denounced.

Objectivity, and the consciousness and limitation of bias is what true scholarship strives for, and is so rarely achieved. Carr's "History of the Soviet Union" is such a monumental work precisely

⁸⁶ The New Society, p. 5.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 119.

because of its monumental objectivity in a field noted for its biased literature. But it leads to a certain lack of appreciation of the living forces motivating society.⁸⁸

This failure is apparent already in Carr's earlier writings. To quote only one example, two distinguished reviewers wrote about his biography of Michael Bakunin in the following similar terms, this being the only significant criticism of the book. Mr. Edmund Wilson wrote:

"Mr. Carr tells us everything about his subject, except what it is all about."⁸⁹

Mr. A.L. Rowse wrote:

"If one may venture a word of criticism of so excellent a book, it sometimes leaves the reader in the dark as to what Bakunin was actually doing."⁹⁰

After reading the book, one finds it difficult to couple Bakunin with the anarchist movement that still dominated the left-wing of the Spanish Republicans during the Civil War, until exterminated by the Communists. Mr. A.J.P. Taylor, criticizing the Fourth Volume of the "History of the Soviet Union", states:

"Earlier volumes often gave the impression that what took place in Russia between 1917 and 1923 was an academic discussion of political theory. The reader had constantly to be reminding himself that a great empire was disintegrating,

⁸⁸ "Mr. Carr misses the revolution's climate, its emotional atmosphere, its mass enthusiasms, its moral tensions, the high flight of its hopes, and the deep depressions of its disillusionments all of which are derived from the ardent belief of both the revolutionaries and the people in the reality of that appeal." I. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 345.

⁸⁹ E. Wilson: "Cold Water on Bakunin", in The Shores of Light, New York, 1952, pp. 716-21.

⁹⁰ A.L. Rowse: The End of an Epoch; Reflections on Contemporary History, pp. 261-63, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1947.

millions of men were dying, society was being reshaped."⁹¹

Underlying Carr's analysis is an assumption of the nature of man with which his whole theoretical structure stands or falls. His criterion of utopianism is attainability: whether or not, given the nature of man, political objectives can be realized. "Politics is the art of the possible."⁹² If man is indeed the Hobbesian creature Carr implies then all hope for world government, or a radical transformation of the status quo into a society in which the element of power is removed, is utopian. Some critics, especially L. Woolf, call into question this cardinal assumption of Carr's.⁹³ But it must be stated emphatically that the burden of proof lies with his critics, not with Carr who could adduce the long historical record in his favour. The writer is inclined to think that in this respect Carr's thesis is plausible. Nor does the advent of the atomic age with its revolutionary impact on international relations vitiate Carr's argument. The prospect of eternal peace, made more real by the new technology, and the changes in the frame of mind brought about by it, point out that man is only amenable to reason and to more pacific ways when faced with so formidable a weapon as the nuclear one, which holds the

⁹¹ A.J.P. Taylor: "Review of 'History of the Soviet Union', Vol. 4", New Statesman and Nation, Vol. 48, p. 396, Oct. 2, 1954.

⁹² The New Society, p. 111.

⁹³ "Professor Carr maintains that ... conflicting interests and power are 'real', harmony of interests is 'unreal' or non-existent and political instruments of cooperation in common international interests are therefore also 'unreal'. The idea that there is some 'reality' in a conflicting interest which does not exist in a common interest is an illusion... A study of the history of human society and of international politics ... teaches this lesson: that generally and in the long run (*italics*) common interests are more real than conflicting interests politically." L. Woolf: "Utopia and Reality", Political Quarterly, vol. 11, 1940, pp. 167-182.

potentiality of global death. Political accommodation between major states is not only desirable, it is the only alternative to mutual annihilation. Perhaps never in history has Hobbes' doctrine, the fear of violent death as the most powerful incentive to sociability and peaceful life, been so glaringly demonstrated as in the twentieth century world.

Carr denied that a sense of world community and fear of war are strong enough to override man's time-honoured tendency to conflict. He did not, however, exclude the possibility of its ultimate realization if the ground has been adequately prepared. He certainly had no hope that naked power could be eliminated overnight from the relations among states, or that human psychology, conditioned by millennia of perpetual conflict, could undergo a rapid transformation, as Woolf seems to think is possible. His strictures on utopianism are therefore quite justified, although they are admittedly somewhat irrelevant to the atomic age. Had there been no atomic weapons, it is difficult to see what could have brought about any radical change in human psychology that would have made the utopians realists.

But on closer examination, even Carr's remedy, conceived as a mixture of realism and utopianism, seems to be more utopian than realistic. In essence, Carr suggests that while the power conflict continues it should be tempered by magnanimity born of morality and pacific abdication to superior power, rather than abdicate after a war whose outcome cannot but be defeat for the weak. The outstanding feature of the new international dispensation advocated by Carr is the high degree of rationality and calculation moving the powers concerned.

It is strange to see Carr, who elsewhere spares no effort to expose ruthlessly how fallacious the belief in the rationality of man is, suddenly embracing that very same argument which he treated so scathingly before. He tends to project the very measured conduct of British foreign policy (and perhaps somewhat his own disposition) to all other states. Britain has been in the fortunate position not to have been befallen by major social catastrophies, letting loose passionate mass movements, as the other European countries have been, in whose foreign policy they found reflection. The deficiencies of his all too mechanical approach are revealed here. All states are treated uniformly, regardless of their social structure. Apparently all states pursue power politics in the same spirit, whether they be run by Hitler, Stalin or Winston Churchill.

It may well be a good general rule to make slight concessions to weaker states. But to practice this principle is a different matter. Concessions very often merely whet the appetite for further demands. In making concessions to what is regarded a legitimate demand, one should carefully weigh the intentions of the claimant, whether he will rest content with what he had been granted or only use it as a stepping stone for further aggrandizement. Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler, which Carr strongly defended, is a classic instance of miscalculated concessions. Carr betrayed a singular lack of insight into the nature of Nazism, of the expansionism inherent in it. He probably thought that Hitler would limit himself to a restoration of Germany within the boundaries of the Reich. In fact, he expected Hitler to behave with the restraint befitting a British diplomatist.

This is all the more strange, in view of Hitler's territorial ambitions, so crudely professed in "Mein Kampf", which Carr so often quotes in his writings. He probably thought that Hitler, once in power would not allow himself to be guided by his earlier literary flourishes, and would not launch a war against the rest of the world, in which his victory was seriously in doubt. This is a glaring demonstration how irrational a decision-maker can be, and how ill-considered Carr's prescriptions are when he ignores the powers of irrationality.⁹⁴

If any of Carr's books have a hero, it is perhaps Lenin. Even here, it is not Lenin the visionary, Lenin the revolutionary, Lenin the dedicated leader of an oppressed people that Carr admires, but Lenin the statesman, Lenin the politician, Lenin the shrewd diplomat, Lenin the successful ruler of a Great Power. One can say that there is a kind of satisfaction in the way he points out that the new ways of government and of the conduct of foreign policy, instituted during the first flush of the revolution, all broke down and had to be substituted by the older, tried methods. His admiration for Lenin is all the greater for recognizing this necessity.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Indeed the German generals, immune to Hitler's heavenly vision were skeptical about Hitler's war, even at the height of his victories. Bismarck would probably have behaved according to Carr's anticipation. See W. Churchill: The Gathering Storm, Boston, 1948; J.W.W. Bennett: The Nemesis of Power, The German Army in Politics, 1918-45, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1954; W. Goerlitz: Der Zweite Welt-Krieg, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1951-52; F. von Schlabrendorff: Offiziere Gegen Hitler, Zurich, 1946.

⁹⁵ "Lenin, for all his fame as a revolutionary leader, was a creator rather than a destroyer. Only when the new regime had taken over did Lenin rise to his full stature as administrator, organiser, and supreme political tactician." (pp. 134-135) "Lenin was also a builder, or re-builder, of his country's international status and authority." (p. 135) "...Lenin, with his sense of realism, was the first to

To sum up then, his dispassionate approach led Carr into his defence of the foreign policy of Chamberlain, rather a serious underestimation of the irrational in Hitler's foreign policy; into almost total disregard of the purge and the institutionalization of the terror in Russia; and into minimizing the vast forces of nationalism and the violence of the demand for self-determination in Asia and Africa. A.L. Rowse saw these as "extraordinary gaps both in the development of his theory, and in his perception in the realm of practical politics". He adds: "What his theoretical system needs is the application at every stage of the concept of general interest, whether within a group, the nation state, or the international community as a criterion by which to test the activity of subordinated groups."⁹⁶ A.J.P. Taylor's criticism is much sharper: "To write about evil with detachment is to be on the side of evil. Hence, Mr. Carr, with his cool reason, arrived before the war at conclusions favourable to Hitler; and now arrives at conclusions favourable to Stalin."⁹⁷ Carr would probably answer that this is just the type of involvement he was trying to avoid. Nevertheless, to what extent even Carr himself became aware of this serious weakness is shown by his two analyses of the Munich crisis, one contemporary with it, the other fifteen years

⁹⁵ (cont'd) perceive that a Soviet republic, living even for a limited period in a world of states, would be compelled in many respects to behave like any other state." (p.145) "...If the rest of the world was organized on a system of states, it was not open to any single region to contract out of the system by an act of will." (p. 146) E.H. Carr: Studies in Revolution, London, (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.), 1950.

⁹⁶ A.L. Rowse: op. cit., p. 293.

⁹⁷ A.J.P. Taylor: "Review of E.H. Carr's 'Studies in Revolution'", Manchester Guardian, June 13th, 1950, p. 4.

later; although it is mainly a change of facts, not a change of heart.⁹⁸

No similar reassessment has undergone the role of Stalin, and of the terror in Soviet society. About Stalin, we have three articles from Mr. Carr's pen, one written in 1938, one in 1946, one in 1953.⁹⁹ In the early one -- limited in scope -- there is no mention of the purges taking place at the time, mainly an appraisal of Stalin as "the perfect managing director", "the whole-hearted planner".¹⁰⁰ In the two latter ones these and similar terms of approval recur, and Carr is mainly concerned to prove that Stalin, or someone like Stalin had to be the successor of Lenin, someone who "tamed the revolution",¹⁰¹ "who chained and disciplined the revolution and consolidated its

⁹⁸ E.H. Carr: Britain; a Study in Foreign Policy, London, (Longmans, Green & Co.), 1939; also the passages omitted from the second edition of the Twenty Years' Crisis, on the one hand (specifically compare pages 281, 293, 295, 305, and the whole end of the chapter on "Peaceful Change" in the first edition with pages 221, 229, 230, 238 respectively in the second edition); and the article "From Munich to Moscow" on the other. E.H. Carr: "From Munich to Moscow", Part I, Soviet Studies, vol. I, pp. 3-17; part II, Soviet Studies, vol. I, pp. 93-105, 1949-50. "What I have done", says Carr in an explanatory preface to the Twenty Years' Crisis, second edition, "is to remove two or three passages relating to current controversies which have been eclipsed or put in a different perspective by the lapse of time." Twenty Years' Crisis, p. vii. While in the earlier analysis the Chamberlain policy of appeasement as realistic and the right one under the circumstances, in the latter he states that the attack on Poland was made possible by the continued reluctance of the Conservative government to make common cause with a communist government against Hitler, thus confirming Stalin's worst suspicions of Russia being the next intended victim of Hitler, with the tacit consent of the western powers.

⁹⁹ E.H. Carr: "J.V. Stalin", Spectator, vol. 161, p. 433-34, Sept. 16, 1938; Studies in Revolution, pp. 200-227; E.H. Carr: "Stalin", Soviet Studies, vol. 5, pp. 1-7, 1953-54.

¹⁰⁰ E.H. Carr: "J.V. Stalin", op. cit., p. 433.

¹⁰¹ Studies in Revolution.

achievements".¹⁰² True "the impression remains that Lenin's dryness concealed a certain degree of humanity"¹⁰³ while "Stalin was a cunning, vindictive, and ruthless antagonist; and the indignities and brutalities, which he heaped on his fallen adversaries while they had many precedents in the Russian tradition, were shocking to the western minds".¹⁰⁴ Yet "such difference of doctrine and emphasis as may be detected between Lenin and Stalin can however, be plausibly attributed not so much to personal divergencies of outlook or temperament, as to differences in the historical situation which confronted them".¹⁰⁵ Stalin may have been one of the most ruthless tyrants the world has ever known, and this the historian will duly note. "The criticism which will have to be taken into account in the ultimate assessment of Stalin's record relate not so much to the end which he pursued and achieved as to the means by which he pursued and achieved them."¹⁰⁶ This however was inevitable, and since his policy was crowned with such an enormous success, the proper task of the historian is to evaluate the whole period in terms of its achievement. Carr sums up his views in a passage remarkable not less for its penetrating insight, than for its glaring omissions:

"Stalin's role in history will, however in the last resort not be determined by his personal qualities and prejudices and still less by those aspects of his career, which were for obvious and more or less accidental reasons, most

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 205.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 209.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 206.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 209.

conspicuously in view at the moment of his death. If we compare the Russia of 25 years ago with the Russia of today, the outstanding and almost breathtaking contrast is the rise of Russia to become one of the two great world powers; and this in turn is due to the astonishingly rapid expansion and modernization of the Russian economy. This achievement cannot be dissociated from the name of Stalin. If, therefore, Stalin appears today as a curious and baffling amalgam of a latter-day Peter the Great, forcing industrialization on a recalcitrant peasant Russia, and of a high priest of an orthodox Marxism calling down anathema on the West, it is perhaps in the role of Peter that history will best remember him. Paradoxically, posterity may yet learn to speak of Stalin as the great westernizer."¹⁰⁷

As we have pointed out elsewhere, Carr's analysis of contemporary politics is hardly distinguishable from that of a Marxist. Using the dialectic, he determines the significance of the historical data, and fixes our attention on them, while disregarding that which seems to him immaterial.

"The facts help to mould the mind of the historian. But the mind of the historian also, and just as essentially helps to mould the facts."¹⁰⁸

The other great influence on his work is that of Karl Mannheim, to whom he acknowledges his indebtedness.¹⁰⁹ Similarly to Mannheim, his conception of objectivity as that of the conscious bias; thus his

¹⁰⁷ E.H. Carr: "Stalin", op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁰⁸ The New Society, p. 10.

¹⁰⁹ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. ix; "The function of the historian is not to reshape or reform the past, but to accept it and to analyse what he finds significant in it, to isolate and illuminate the fundamental changes at work in the society in which we live and the perhaps age-old processes which lie behind them." The New Society, p. 17.

"Compelled by the dialectical processes of thought, it is necessary to concentrate our attention with greater intensity upon the task of determining which of all the ideas current are really valid in a given situation." K. Mannheim, op. cit., p. 94.

"It was Professor Karl Mannheim, more than any other thinker who established the 'realist-utopian' antithesis in British political thinking; but it was Professor E.H. Carr who popularized and elaborated

factual analysis is tinged with his own view-point and the degree of his own interest in the matter. One of his critics was prompted to remark about the first volume of the "History of the Soviet Union" that "his conviction of the legitimacy of revolutionary power has produced a book on the Bolshevik revolution which is in the last resort an act of faith rather than of analysis."¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, broadly speaking, one can say that Carr, in his analysis of international politics errs more on the side of objectivity than on the side of bias. There is very little consciousness in his writings of the shifting values and goals of everyday life, of the shape that ideas take in their present form, no matter what their origin. This difficulty of the evaluative process is shared, according to Mannheim, by Marxist thinkers who, like Carr, do not deny the sphere of irrationality, but try to assess it with the tools of rationality and fit it into their theory with new methods of rationalization.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ (cont'd) it for English consumption, and who incorporated Mannheim's ideas into British thought." Contemporary Political Science; A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching, UNESCO, 1950, p. 588.

¹¹⁰ Times Literary Supplement, February 16, 1951, p. 102.

¹¹¹ K. Mannheim, op. cit., The Political and Social Determinants of Knowledge, pp. 117-147.

Chapter III

THE FUTURE SOCIETY

Within the changing pattern of human and social relations, it is always difficult to ascertain in what directions contemporary trends of development lead us. Even if one has correctly analyzed the present pattern of society, and the underlying political and economic factors, the path may turn in two or more directions, with equal certainty or uncertainty in all of them. The possibility of cataclysmic change can rarely be taken into account, for in the process of a revolution not only other things, but our basic assumptions cease to be equal. Contemporary political thought, whenever seized with the future of humanity, carefully diagnoses the present trends of society and tries to induce others to think "clearly" about the future, either in the manner of analysis or in the tones of conviction.¹

Carr's approach is a compound of both these elements, analysis and conviction. Its tool is painstaking scholarship, its tone optimism. It is also a "call for leadership" in the coming world order,

¹ A good example of the former are the writings of J. Schumpeter, of the latter Harold J. Laski. The distinction is more that of a distinction of approach than content. Thus the burden of Schumpeter's analysis is the "inevitability" — though not in the Marxist sense — of the gradual disappearance of a mature capitalist society, and the rise of some form of socialist world order. But the approach and purpose of his writings is not to predict, but to present a clear picture of economic and political changes. This he states clearly and repeatedly. "We walk into our future as we walked into the war, blindfolded. Now this is precisely where I wanted to serve the reader. I did want to make him think. And in order to do so it was essential not to divert his attention by discussions about what from any given standpoint" should be done about it "which would have monopolized his interest. Analysis has a distinct task and to this task I wished to keep though I was fully aware of the fact that this resolve would cost me a great deal of the response a few pages of practical conclusions would have invoked." S. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. xi.

dedicated to the men who shape policy. Carr recognizes the danger of projecting present trends into the future, yet courageously goes ahead, and draws up a blueprint of "what ought to be". That this outline is a socialist one is not a profound or daring innovation, we are socialists now. That it is utopian, "utopian in the right sense"² Carr is the first one to admit.³ What gives special impact to his ideas is his clear-sighted lucidity of style and thought, and the synthesis of the elements of power and morality that he achieves.

"We are living today in a period of revolution which has now been in progress for nearly two centuries — what Marx would, I suppose, have called the permanent revolution."⁴ The end of this revolution is not in sight yet: since its main driving force is the economic quest for plenty, the goal is the Marxist one "to each according to his needs", but while Marx believed that the classless society will inevitably achieve this, Carr is not at all sure whether present society will ever attain it.

Carr's favourite metaphor is that of society described as a boat in midstream. This boat has been cast adrift by the violence of the latest revolutionary storms — the Bolshevik revolution and the two World Wars — and has to be navigated to the other side, to an unknown shore. It is no use trying to return to the old shore, for

² "We can describe as utopian in the right sense 'something that performs' the proper function of a utopia in proclaiming an ideal to be aimed at though not wholly attainable." The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 222.

³ Ibid., p. 239.

⁴ The New Society, p. 86.

the old world is dead. Whether the boat will reach the unknown shore ahead, or drift into the gulf of disaster, depends on whether there are enough people at the helm "who can resolutely turn their back on the old world and face the new one with understanding, courage, and imagination".⁵ The old shore is the world of liberal democracy, national self-determination and laissez-faire economics.

Thus, when Carr describes the future society, he is navigating in unknown waters, and his views are speculative. It would be rash to say, that Carr has abandoned the hard road of realism, and fallen into the trap of utopianism, for which he accused so many of his contemporaries. His views are no more than a warning on one side, and a "call for leadership" on the other, and this, in his view, is the right role any utopia should fulfil: to postulate an ideal that one strives for, and is theoretically attainable. When one considers his views on the basis of his own premises, they do not contradict each other, or constitute a sharp break, rather complete the process. Having demolished the utopian beliefs of the past with the weapons of reality, he now proceeds to describe a new utopia, which, even if it is ever attained, will surely be demolished by future realists.

Planning

The twin pillars of Carr's new society are planning and a sense of participation. Planning of the national economy had been introduced already during the first World War, and made the permanent basis of every national economy after the crisis of the 1930's. In

⁵ Conditions of Peace, p. 275.

its initial phase, the direction of the national economy was a product more of a national emergency, than of any desire for social reform.

In all its phases, planning has a two-fold purpose:

"It stands for national efficiency in the sense of more efficient production and it stands for social justice in the sense of more equitable distribution."⁶

No one can ignore the national aspect of planning, for after the moral principle of equality of income had been satisfied, it is still necessary to regulate the productive capacity of the nation in the most efficient way in order to keep or increase the national product.

Yet in any future society the social ends of planning are to be the determinant factors, says Carr, and efficiency only a secondary consideration. Planning for what should be the first question we ask ourselves, how to plan only a function of it. For Carr, the answer to the first question is a most emphatic "planning for socialism."

"We have reached a point in history where the process of transition from the nineteenth century laissez-faire capitalist order offers us no alternative, short of annihilation in war, to a social and economic order which we can call the 'welfare state', the 'social service state', or simply 'socialism'."⁷

As long as planning was considered a necessary evil, to be abandoned once the crisis is over, there was no automatic connection between planning and socialism. The regulatory intervention of the state as a mediator between the powerful economic interest-groups was an inevitable development of the capitalist order; the marshalling of the nation's resources, the decision to apportion the amount of

⁶ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 27.

⁷ The New Society, p. 38.

producer and consumer goods to be produced, the treatment of the nation as one economic unit, were the outcome of war and other emergencies; while socialism had other origins. But with the introduction of planning on a permanent peacetime basis, this connection became inevitable.

"Once the historical evolution of the capitalist system has made a controlled and planned economy necessary, and once the temporary expedient of planning for war has become obsolete, to plan for socialism is the only available alternative."⁸

For purposes of practical consideration Carr assumes the unit of planning to be the "nation", at least until the higher goal envisaged by Carr, a world of group relations, is achieved. Within the nation, planning for socialism means planning equality of opportunity and the final goal of freedom from want for all. In Carr's future society, freedom from want is the only absolute, the final goal towards which we not only should but must strive. Questions of ideology, of national security, of freedom of speech and of person are unimportant as compared to it. He rejects the theory of crisis, the stabilizer of the capitalist economy, as "intolerable". Whatever the merits or demerits of the economic theories of capitalism and socialism are, the principle that divides them is, in his view, that capitalism plans for inequality, while socialism plans for equality.

"In theory, if it had been possible everywhere in the 1920's and 1930's to apply the principle of non-intervention by the state, and if capitalists themselves could have been prevented from combining to protect themselves against the free working of the capitalist system, the economic balance in the long run would have readjusted itself. But this was the 'long run' in which, as somebody once said, we shall all be dead. Such

⁸ Ibid., p. 38.

readjustment would have called for an entirely new pattern of world economy, a shifting of centres of production from continent to continent, an intensification of existing inequalities between man and man and between nation and nation, and the unemployment transplantation or final extinction of vast populations. This fantastic nightmare is a sufficient answer to the plea that there was nothing wrong with the capitalist system, but only with the measures taken by governments — or by capitalists themselves — to interfere with its free operation."⁹

His definition of socialism is "to combine planning with a maintenance of the old principles of democracy as well as with far-reaching social policies of 'fair shares for all'".¹⁰

He also rejects unemployment as that "touch" of insecurity that will provide the worker with incentive. If unemployment prevails, it will be the sign of faulty planning, and the first task any future society will be faced with is the task of not only eradicating unemployment, but even the fear of it. Unemployment was the final crisis that destroyed the last vestiges of laissez-faire; the fear of unemployment is still responsible for the inherently anti-social attitude of part of the working class in western countries; while "full employment is the master key to social justice in the modern industrial state, the dynamic force which alone can cure the major social evils of our time."¹¹ Carr fully realizes the dangers of a full-employment economy, but his conclusions are characteristically optimistic. While capitalist economists argue that full-employment conditions will undermine the initiative and independence of the workers, that human nature being what it is, the strongest incentive

⁹ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁰ Ibid.,

¹¹ Nationalism and After, p. 68.

is still the economic whip, Carr argues that on the contrary, the workers will be too independent, that without a sense of social obligation they may press for constantly higher wages which the economy will be unable to afford; therefore what is needed is, as we shall see, self-discipline.¹²

The exaggerated importance that Carr places on the problem of solving the recurrent unemployment crisis can be better understood in the British context. The disastrous result of the misery of the pre-War laissez-faire economy culminating in the general strike of 1926 is, even today, a hatred and distrust in the British working class of all measures short of full employment, measures that come under the heading of the "dole". While in other democratic countries a certain minimal percentage of unemployment has come to be regarded, even by highly organized trade-unions, as "normal", in Britain the almost instinctive reaction of the working class would lead to the fall of a government that would try to introduce such a measure even as a temporary expedient; and no one appreciates this better than the Conservative Party now in power.¹³

Incentives

The dangers of the grey uniformity of the mass age were recognized more than a hundred years ago by De Tocqueville. Recently the problem of saving some vestige of individuality from the horrors

¹²The New Society, pp. 48-49.

¹³See the "Industrial Charter of The Conservative Party", 1947.

of "bigger and better" uniformity of the mass age has occupied the thought of some of the outstanding thinkers of the century. But while most thinkers accept, either with despair or with equanimity, the passing of individualist democracy, and the coming of the mass age, or are content to point nostalgically to the past,¹⁴ Carr accepts the present mass age, but points to a future that will incorporate some of the most cherished values of democracy.

"The trend towards mass civilization seems irresistible and irreversible; the alternatives are to accept it, or to let contemporary civilization perish altogether."¹⁵

and

"...it has still to be proved that individual enterprise and individual distinction are necessarily crushed out of existence by the far-reaching organisation, the external standardization and, perhaps, external drabness which go with mass civilization."¹⁶

¹⁴ See Ortega Y Gasset: The Revolt of the Masses, Mentor edition.
T.S. Eliot: Selected Prose, Penguin books, No. 873. T.S. Eliot's solution eloquently and brilliantly presented, seems to me just another brand of escapism. "...we might get a 'totalitarian democracy', different but having much in common with other pagan societies, because we shall have changed step by step in order to keep pace with them: a state of affairs in which we shall have regimentation and conformity, without respect for the needs of the individual soul; the puritanism of a hygienic morality in the interest of efficiency; uniformity of opinion through propaganda, and art only encouraged when it flatters the official doctrines of the time. To those, who can imagine, and are therefore repelled by such a prospect, one can assert that the only possibility of control and balance is a religious control and balance; that the only hopeful course for a society which would thrive and continue its creative activity in the arts of civilization, is to become a Christian. That prospect involves, at least, discipline, inconvenience, and discomfort; but here as hereafter the alternative to hell is purgatory." T.S. Eliot, op. cit., p. 210.

¹⁵ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 103.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 104-105.

Thus the second pillar of his future society is the sense of participation of each individual, the need for every member of society to feel that his contribution to the common good is necessary and useful. This can be instilled through emphasis on the duties and obligations of citizens, concomitant with their rights. He rightly points out that all political movements in democratic countries have been mainly concerned with the rights of citizens, not with their duties, and this will have to be remedied in the new society. Thus the right to work should also mean the duty to work. On the reverse, while society has a right to demand from each individual his fullest cooperation in the creation of abundance, it ought to have the obligation to provide useful and soul-satisfying work for every one of its members. The state, instead of being satisfied with its regulatory function, should boldly carry these ideals into practice, thus creating the conditions for a new type of democracy.

The problem then to Carr is how to create a sense of obligation among the workers, even to the extent of self-sacrifice, and at the same time give them a sense of participation. This problem in his view could be solved by increasing the share of the worker in the product of his labour; by improved working conditions and consultation between labour and management; by the realization of the concept of "industrial democracy", e.g. nationalization; and "to fit specific individuals in the right proportion to specific jobs, and to get the jobs efficiently done".¹⁷

The first three incentives are only short-run solutions.

¹⁷ The New Society, p. 56.

As long as the economic pie was constantly growing, the interest of the workers in an ever-increasing slice of the pie was natural and necessary. But we have reached a point, states Carr, where there is very little increase in the real national product, where wages are approaching the limit of their share. Recent rises in the real wage level of western democracies have only been achieved at the expense of the consumer, through the combined power of the two giant interest groups of society, labour and management.¹⁸ Thus the first type of incentive becomes meaningless. Carr believes that the task of trade-unionism in the future should be to increase the real national product through greater efficiency, improved working methods, to provide moral leadership, and organize all efforts for the improvement of the nation's economy; not to bargain for wages. This is similar to the Leninist-Stalinist conception of trade-unionism, the ideal of the system that has been in practice in the Soviet Union since the late twenties.¹⁹

The second and third groups of incentives are also important only in the short-run. The nationalization of industry is important in making industrial democracy more real to the masses.

"...nationalization of the major part of industry would be a necessary condition of the transition from purely economic incentives to incentives which include a sense of social obligation on the part of the worker."²⁰

But it is the fourth motive, the most positive of them all, the adjustment of every individual to the right type of work, the creation

¹⁸ Conditions of Peace, p. 82-83.

¹⁹ See I. Deutscher: Soviet Trade Unions: Their Place in Soviet Labour Policy, Royal Institute of International Affairs, New York, 1950.

²⁰ The New Society, p. 55.

of a sense of social obligation and a pride of achievement in the whole hierarchy of labour, that should be the pillar of the new society. The only negative incentive that Carr envisages in the future society is the right of society to compel its members to work. Adjustment to new techniques of production are difficult under the most ideal conditions, and regimentation of labour may thus become necessary during periods of readjustment; such measures to be used only when all other methods of persuasion fail. Carr is very hesitant about advocating such measures, he approaches it somewhat in the manner of a father trained in all the modern methods of child psychology and education faced with the possibility of having to spank his child. This trepidation is due more to the possible effect the advocacy of such measures may have on his audience than to any real fear that any such measure may deteriorate into the daily arbiter of society.²¹

The "New Faith"

Carr summarizes his optimistic belief in the rationality of man in what one might call his "Charter for the New World". That the ideas in it are clearly speculative, Carr is quite ready to admit; but they are underlined by the somber imperative of finding a common purpose or perish. Indeed, one must say that the juxtaposition of such drastic alternatives as socialism or barbarism, the acceptance of the mass age and the "new faith" or perdition makes his protestations of scientific innocence somewhat hollow. Thus the new faith, although supported by Carr's careful and powerful analysis, is also clearly

²¹ Ibid., p. 59.

intended to carry a message. His basic appeal is to reason, but reason augmented by faith in the future of mankind.

This "new faith" should be positive; it should strive for the achievement of good rather than the suppression or avoidance of evil. It should break away from the paralyzing influence of the contemporary big organizations, whether they be industry, party or labour, and strive to appeal to "the common man", the "little man" enmeshed in the wheels of mammoth organizations. Its first task should be the solution of great economic inequalities, for without this there can be no progress in other matters. But these inequalities should not be solved by the downgrading of the upper level, rather by raising the standard of the masses; although some downgrading will be inevitable. Unemployment should not be solved through ways of prevention, but of creation; thus needs vast enough should be created to have enough work for everyone. As we have seen, it should stress our obligations more than our rights. Even rights of property and the unfettered right of free speech must be curbed if democracy is to be saved. More emphasis should be placed on the international community, the exclusive authority of national units should be less emphasized, and the right of self-determination should be practiced with the best interest of individuals per se, and not group persons in mind. Finally, the "new faith" should achieve a synthesis between liberty and authority, especially in the social and economic sphere.²²

These are noble suggestions. There would be little point in

²² Conditions of Peace, pp. 117-125.

assessing their value individually or collectively, in the present world, for they are, as Carr says, essentially a matter of faith.

"There is all the difference in the world between an examination of the conditions which a new faith and a new moral purpose must fulfil and an assurance that this faith and this purpose will come to birth. They cannot be generated by an intellectual process, which can do no more than demonstrate the need for them if civilisation is to be saved."²³

It may be germane at this point to consider some specific analogies between the writings of Carr and H.J. Laski. No greater contrast can be imagined than the personalities and approach of the two: Laski, the convinced although erratic Marxist, rushing into pronouncements and predictions that have little connection with reality; and Carr, cool, detached, careful, never raising his voice to the shrill cry of conviction. Laski, in the unhappy position of a revolutionary, cast into the position of theoretician of a party committed to evolution and "safety first", contradicts himself again and again; while Carr is almost wholly consistent. Nevertheless it is important to point out the very significant field of agreement between them, for Carr has also greatly influenced British and European socialist thought, especially the younger generation.²⁴ The defence of socialist democracy through "mobilisation for democracy" implying a limitation on cherished freedoms, the basically humanistic, anti-liberal approach is common to Carr and to Laski. In line with this, both reject the neutralist view of the position of the intellectual, although Carr would hardly go as far as Laski and advocate "socialist

²³ Ibid., p. 124.

²⁴ See f.e. Twentieth Century Socialism, by Socialist Union, Penguin Special, No. 165.

consciousness" in every novel or poem; he has too much respect for style.²⁵ Finally, both place enormous emphasis on the importance of the new faith (Laski calls it the "positive new faith"), a secular faith almost religiously held that is patterned very much on the ideals of Soviet society, without its cruder practices.²⁶

Democracy or Totalitarianism

This is the scheme of Carr's "New Society", the planned future should be all-powerful, restricted only by morality, and the periodic process of counting heads. It should treat the economy of the nation as a whole, fix the amount of the nation's wealth that produces consumer goods and producer goods respectively. It should have a complete monopoly on imports and exports, and should have complete control over its foreign policy, whether in its economic, political, or military phase. Since the moulding of public opinion is everywhere today already a directed, conscious process, and the foundation of the order is to create a new faith and a sense of obligation, it should also have control over freedom of speech, and limit it, insofar as they endanger the foundations of the social order. In this as in other matters, since the management of society in the mass age has become a much too complex matter to be left in the hands of the well-intentioned layman, the knowledge of the expert

²⁵ See H.J. Laski: Faith, Reason, and Civilization, London, (V. Gollancz), 1944, p. 133; The New Society, p. 16-17.

²⁶ See H.A. Deane: The Political Ideals of H.J. Laski, New York, (Columbia University Press), 1955.

should be the guiding hand. It should also instill in every citizen a sense of self-discipline, even to the extent of self-sacrifice, and have the power of compulsion in the background as the final arbiter.

This outline raises the disturbing spectre of a totalitarian society. To use one of Carr's phrases "a lot of nonsense" has been written about his "impatience with democracy",²⁷ his leanings or sympathy with the totalitarian form of government of Soviet Russia.²⁸ That Carr has no sympathy with totalitarian governments has been shown in the preceding analysis. The methods he would use are inherently democratic methods, the methods of persuasion rather than coercion. Neither does he profess to possess a "special access to truth" or insist upon the inevitability of the conclusions he came to, although this is sometimes obscured by the juxtaposition of dire extremes. He accepts the trend towards mass society, but he also sees the positive factors involved. It is a continuation, as he sees it, of the revolution that began with the French Revolution, whose ultimate aim is the freedom of the masses through abundance. He also believes that the world is moving towards a totalitarian age, from which it can only be saved through a conscious act of will, a new faith, a new morality. To do this, the democratic forces have to mobilize: "democracy must have faith in itself." By this he means that democracy is something worth fighting for; that in the process we shall have to control, channel, and influence the forces of mass society in such a manner, as to retain some democratic, pre mass-age values. It also means that individual

²⁷ Times Literary Supplement, February 16, 1951, p. 102.

²⁸ B.D. Wolfe: op. cit.

freedom will have to be limited.

This is the most controversial part of his theories, for to many people governmental control means serfdom, while to Carr it is the precondition of democracy. As a democrat, he has ideal standards, and believes in an ideal type of democracy. It means equality of opportunity, equality between man and man, and the rule of law. It does not mean unconditional freedom of speech, nor necessarily ballot democracy. It means a controlled economy, and rational decision-making. This has to be reconciled with the fact that the technological revolution has brought about the necessity of including the masses in the governmental process, and the possibility to do so; in contrast with the previous form of democracies, where the ideal was only approximated when it was limited to a small portion of the population. Carr believes that the only agency powerful enough to do this, and at the same time alleviate the plight of the masses in the present is the strong, remedial state.²⁹

The above definition, in his view, fits all shades of democracy, including the Soviet or "totalitarian democracy".³⁰ To any other thinker, except to Laski, the phrase "totalitarian democracy" would be a contradiction in terms. But within these terms, the question of means becomes all-important, yet it is never clearly defined. As we pointed out, his justification of certain aspects of Stalinism stem from the astounding underestimation of the role of terror

²⁹ The New Society.

³⁰ J.L. Talmon: The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, London, (Secker & Warburg), 1952.

in Stalinist Russia. He argues that every great revolutionary movement has two aspects: the destructive and the creative.

"Bolshevism, like Christianity or like any other doctrine which has made a powerful impact on the world, has two aspects: the destructive or revolutionary, and the constructive or positive. Broadly speaking the tendency in any great movement is for the revolutionary aspect to predominate in the earlier stages, the positive aspect in the latter."³¹

He justifies the use of "revolutionary terror" in the early phase of the Bolshevik revolution, by the imperative of creating order out of chaos.³² With Stalin, the age of the "great managing director" was ushered in, and the implication is that terror has been relegated to the background as ultima ratio; although for his final verdict we shall have to await future volumes of the "History of the Soviet Union".

The Synthesis

Individualist democracy, has become a luxury that even the most stable of western democracies cannot afford any more. The absolute right of toleration, retained for a while if only to counter-balance its opposite extreme³³ has been abandoned by all countries for greater or lesser degrees of coercion. Just as the strong remedial state has replaced the harmony of interests, so mass democracy has replaced individual democracy.³⁴

³¹ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, pp. 87-88.

³² E.H. Carr: History of the Soviet Union, Vol. I, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1950, pp. 152-55.

³³ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 17.

³⁴ The New Society, p. 67.

"Mass democracy is a difficult and hitherto largely uncharted territory; and we should be nearer the mark, and should have a far more convincing slogan, if we spoke of the need, not to defend democracy, but to create it."³⁵

The socialist form of mass democracy is the only alternative for Carr, as we have seen. The "absolute" of this society is freedom through abundance. The direction in which we should advance, in which the first steps have already been taken, is the synthesis between the eastern and western view of mass democracy.

"...the prospect is probably not an out-and-out victory either for the western or for the Soviet ideology, but rather an attempt to find a compromise, a half-way house, a synthesis between conflicting ways of life... No human institution or order ever stands still. The fate of the western world will turn on its ability to meet the Soviet challenge by a successful search for new forms of social and economic action in which what is valid in individualist and democratic tradition can be applied to the problems of mass civilization."³⁶

and

"...the western world will have to develop a stronger sense of the duty of the individual to society, and the Soviet Union a stronger sense of the obligations of society to the individual."³⁷

Whether this synthesis will be achieved it is difficult to perceive. There is no doubt that East and West have reacted on each other, since the Bolshevik revolution, and that these changes are mirrored in the framework of their societies. Professor Marcuse has suggested recently that the doctrine of "socialism in one country" in the Soviet Union has collapsed because the solution of internal

³⁵ Ibid., p. 76.

³⁶ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 116.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 103-104.

contradictions ultimately depends upon the solution of external contradictions.³⁸ The raising of the standard of living thus becomes a vital necessity for the Soviets, even if it retards the overall development of the country's economy. At the same time, the West has become conscious of the necessity, if it is to survive, of trying to eliminate glaring inequalities not only within the national boundaries, but across the borders as well. It has come to accept the idea of the "permanent blood transfusion" from the "have" to the "have not" countries, with ever greater emphasis laid on the technological and purely economic phases of it. The middle way of India, on the other hand, is perhaps the first practical approach towards a synthesis.

The Future International Order

Carr has travelled a long way from his earlier position when he still believed in the possibility of a genuine community of nations,³⁹ although even then he pointed out that the inequality among nations, would make it no more than an organization for the defence of the status quo. He assumes that we have reached the final stage of nationalism, the stage of the socialized nation, where the contradiction of freedom without but economic slavery within has been solved; when it is finally realized that the term "national freedom" is meaningless, for the nation cannot have freedom, only its individual

³⁸ H. Marcuse: "Remarks About the Relation between Ideology and Utopia in Soviet Marxism", January, 1954, lecture delivered at Harvard University, mimeographed text.

³⁹ E.H. Carr: Future of the League, op. cit.; The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 166; Nationalism and After, p. 42f.

members.⁴⁰ But the forces that combined within the nation to curb the disastrous economic individualism are still at work, and are straining at the national boundaries. In a world, where every national society is planned and organized, peace and security can still not be achieved, and the mutually-competing planned units, reinforced by the power of cohesion, can become a source of continual danger to world peace. The only way to channel these forces — bearing in mind that the well-being of the individual and not of the nation is the final goal — is to break the fetters of national boundaries and plan for larger units. "Internationalism, like nationalism, must become social."⁴¹ Even more clearly than in his description of the internal changes in society, Carr hammers away at the idea that the social well-being of every human being will be more important than the forms and mechanics of the future international order.

"Any project which demands unity on 'democratic' or on 'communist' lines ... is doomed to failure."⁴²

"Any international order which seeks to conjure the spectre of war and win the allegiance of mankind will have in future to set before it some higher ideal than orderly stagnation. Its primary function will have to be not to maintain the international status quo or to defend the right of nations, but to seek by active policies to improve the conditions of life of ordinary men and women in all countries."⁴³

The unit of these plans is "the common man": not China or Albania, but individual Chinese and Albanians.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 42-43; The New Society, pp. 108-111.

⁴¹ Nationalism and After, p. 63.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 61.

On the other hand, there is little hope yet for "one world", for an organization, whether political or economic, that will embrace all the lesser units. The sense of unity is still lacking.⁴⁴ It is very problematical whether a universal form of government, ruled from one centre will ever be achieved, or indeed is desirable. The very complexity of life in the twentieth century is a strong divisive force that would be hard to overcome. Furthermore, there will always exist local, regional, and national loyalties that will have to be taken into consideration, and given their due importance in the universal framework just as they are within the national framework; the alternative would create "intolerable and unmitigated totalitarianism".⁴⁵ The ideal may be retained as a "valuable symbol", just as a world organization may become a "necessary convenience".⁴⁶ But as a practical possibility, intermediate units of organization are our best hope for the future.

The scope and nature of these intermediary organizations is to be determined by the purpose they will serve, in other words they should be "functional". Carr points out that the most positive results were achieved by the functional organizations of the League of Nations; we can say today that this is just as true of the United Nations. Yet, since all world organizations based on sovereign national units are at best a "necessary convenience", doomed in their primary purpose because of the great inequality of its members, any intermediary organization will have to be based upon the common purpose of individuals,

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 44.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 49.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

cutting across national boundaries.

"...functional internationalism is based on the conception of international order as association not between nations as such but between people and groups of different nations, and realized through an indefinite number of organizations cutting across national divisions, and exercising authority for specific and limited purposes over individuals and functional groups..."⁴⁷

The nature of these functional units would in the first instance be economic. In the field of transportation, a high degree of cooperation has already been achieved before and during the Second World War. But the problem that faces us in the new society is of a much larger order. It is the relative equalization of the standard of living among the different national units; "for no real sense of community between countries is compatible with the maintenance of conspicuous and permanent discrepancies in the standard of living."⁴⁸

Thus, in the form of overlapping, interlocking, local, regional, national, and international units, the form always to be determined by pragmatic considerations, and the modicum of common purpose, an organization should be built up that would finally control, in an increasingly wider scope, the modes of production and consumption, inter-unit trade, finance, and communications. The goal is some form of centralized economic authority, functional in the sense that it should be a coordinating agency at the tip of the pyramid, of the different technical units, its authority extending — with the tacit or explicit consent of the sovereign units — across the national and group boundaries.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 50-51.

⁴⁸ Conditions of Peace, p. 256.

Such a development would necessarily have to be a slow, educative process. People all over the world should be "induced to determine themselves into different units for different purposes".⁴⁹ Carr believes that the principle of national self-determination has become obsolete "so long as it is interpreted in a way which nullifies security and limits economic well-being and economic opportunity".⁵⁰ But within the international framework, it can again become a creative force through the fostering and strengthening of local and regional loyalties, and the spirit of national cohesion that is yet our best guarantee against sheer totalitarianism.

"Just as democracy flourishes most where national cohesion is most assured, and liberty where authority is most deeply rooted, so self-determination can be most real when the international order is most firmly established."⁵¹

Carr's touching faith in the power of education to make people realize their better interests is not really justified by human nature, as he himself defines human nature, nor is it clear what he means by it. As we shall see, he is fully aware that power is necessary to realize these "newly felt needs"⁵² but here, as throughout all his writings he does not tackle the problem of where education stops and the application of power begins. People have to be "educated", they have to be "induced", new organizations have to be "created", the consciousness of participation has to be "instilled".⁵³ Nowhere does

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 274.

⁵⁰ Nationalism and After, p. 59.

⁵¹ Conditions of Peace, p. 274.

⁵² Ibid., p. 273.

⁵³ Phrases taken from passages already quoted.

Carr tackle what form this education should take and what its sanction should be. The question is shrouded in generalities, sometimes, as we can see, in ambiguous generalities. Human beings are not better and not worse than they were two hundred or two thousand years ago, and there is little reason to suppose that people will begin to act more reasonably (and Carr suggests that they will) in the shadow of catastrophe. It would be unreasonable to expect a treatise on the new form of education that is necessary (and it seems certain that the present supervised and controlled form of education will not achieve what Carr proposes);⁵⁴ nevertheless the total omission of a consideration of this problem reveals a certain divergence between theory and practice that is more than utopian in the right sense.

Power in the Future International Order

The utopian outline of the future society that Carr has drawn up can only be achieved if the question of power can be solved. The condition of the "Carrist" future society is the concentration of power into few centres.⁵⁵ The execution of the "general will" must be reinforced by the power of the magistrate, the authority of the people's will be the power of the truncheon.

"No durable peace can be made unless those who have the power have also the will in the last resort, after having tried all methods of persuasion, to take and enforce with vigour and impartiality the decisions which they think right."⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 103.

⁵⁵ The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 106-107.

⁵⁶ Conditions of Peace, p. 275.

Militarily, as well as economically, the nation has become an obsolescent unit. Today there is no nation in the world that could dominate all the lesser units. The technological revolution in warfare has made "natural" or other frontiers meaningless. The neutrality sought by smaller nations proved unattainable, while their contribution to a war effort in a collective security system based on national armed forces proved of little significance. Already during the Second World War the western alliance pooled its military potential under the direction of a Supreme Allied Headquarters; and since the end of the war this has come to be the basis of the military organizations on all sides.

"The prospect ahead is a compromise — which, like other compromises, may in the event make either the best or the worst of both worlds — between the past confusion of a vast number of nations, great and small, jostling one another on a footing of formal independence and equality, and the well-knit world authority which may or may not be attainable in the future."⁵⁷

This compromise is the emergence of multi-national power conglomerations with pooled security systems and geared as one unit to a potential war effort. These units exercise power as the Great Powers exercised it in the past, thus the competing and conflicting interests of nationalism are replaced by the conflicts of multi-nationalism, and group-imperialism. Carr believes that, unhindered, the result of this development would be a war even more terrible than the two World Wars of the twentieth century. International security could only be achieved by the creation of a standing international force, powerful enough to prevent further conflict.

⁵⁷ Nationalism and After, p. 52.

Carr suggested in 1945 that the most convenient way to create such a force would be through a world security organization, where the regulation of the relationship between great and small nations could be appropriately solved.⁵⁸ The executive arm of this organization would be "an international general staff, or series of international general staffs, for different regions, operating under the general direction of a world security organization with national or joint forces in occupation of strategic bases at key points".⁵⁹ This force would have to be able to move across national frontiers without hindrance. The only solution that would solve the dilemma of sovereignty posed by such an organization would be "a solution which seeks to divorce international security and the power to maintain it from frontiers and the national sovereignty which they represent".⁶⁰ Once international security would be guaranteed by the world security organization, national self-determination could fully assert itself, whether within its old boundaries or new ones, for it would not be fettered any more by strategic considerations.

It should be emphasized that this represented Carr's views in 1945. At the time many people believed in the feasibility of such a plan. This project had been tried, insofar as it was included in the Charter of the United Nations (Chapter VII), with little success. Although Carr is, on the whole, one of the most consistent thinkers we know, and the writer felt at liberty to quote from his writings

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 54.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 59-60.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 58.

without paying much attention to the year in which he wrote them, the writer does not believe that Carr would subscribe to this view today; although there is no evidence to prove it, since he has not written on the subject since 1945.

"It goes without saying that such an organisation could function only if the three Great Powers were in agreement to give it their approval and support."⁶¹

Whatever the merits of Carr's suggestions, the sine qua non failed to materialize and his dire predictions about "nationalism writ large" have become true. There is little doubt that — but for the hydrogen bomb — the third World War would be upon us now or in the near future. There is little reason to congratulate ourselves for the present state of affairs, though the writer believes that global war has become an impossibility. The atomic stalemate has reinforced the totalitarian tendencies of mass society, and Carr's clear warnings that we are heading for a totalitarian age whose forces we can only hope to channellize through a new faith, are more timely than ever. The hopeful element in the situation is that the Bomb may have achieved that international order without which the social revolution could not be carried through. There is growing realization in all strata of society of the utter futility of an atomic war, and this climate of opinion in itself may become a powerful factor in the struggle for the minds of men. National interest dictates that each nation should weaken or destroy its enemies. Once this becomes an impossibility the only rational alternative is that the two sides compromise. This

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 60.

conclusion has been reached by now by Churchill, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Nehru, Eisenhower, and General MacArthur; even though the actual compromise still seems to be very far off. In consequence of this realization, the battle between East and West has shifted to the vast masses living in the colonies, or former colonies of the Great Powers, and is being fought in terms of loans, grants, machinery, technical experts. There is little doubt that the vast sums spent yearly will increase until the economies of the underdeveloped countries will be stronger, and the minimum necessities for survival will have been guaranteed to all the people.

Carr stated in 1950 that the difference between the European and the American outlook was that the Europeans "are not concerned, like many Americans, with the question how a third world war is to be won, but only with the question how it is to be avoided".⁶² It can safely be said that we have passed that stage, and are all concerned in equal measure.

⁶² The New Society, p. 98.

CONCLUSION

Carr combines in his thought the high regard for power characteristic of German thought of the nineteenth century, with the vision of social justice of Marx, and the skeptical empiricism of his native land. With Marx, he also shared the belief that through power a solution to problems can be found. Unlike the Germans, or many Englishmen, whose thought was bound by the borders of their country, Carr is not an insular thinker. He is too much aware of the conditioning of thought to fall victim to an Anglo-centric view of the world. Indeed, he even envisaged the possibility that the centre of civilization will shift from western Europe and Britain elsewhere, possibly to Asia.¹

His thoroughness is Teutonic, but his reasoning is British. He shuns dogma, and his writings therefore have the refreshing quality of common sense intelligible to all. The reader of his writings has the satisfying experience of having been conducted through the troubled era of our times by an enlightened, keen, reasonably impartial mind, that does not shun the conclusions to which his own thought drives him, however unpopular or uncongenial they may be.

One cannot say that Carr's thought is particularly original; most of the elements of his thought can be traced to some other source, such as Marx, Mannheim, Niebuhr, and others. But it is the singular lucidity with which the various trends are knitted together into a coherent system and are expounded, that lends to it its particular appeal and influence.

¹ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 109.

The price for his lucidity and objectivity is the occasional lack of profundity in his ideas. This expresses itself in the sometimes noticeable gap between his scholarship and the generalizations about contemporary social reality that he paints with bold strokes on the canvas of history.

Carr is not a liberal, but a humanist. He is the most eminent historian of the contemporary revolution, but he misses the climate of the revolution, the extremes of human suffering and joy, the dedicated fervour of its leaders.

"Sometimes Mr. Carr's characters seem to move through an airless space and an emotional vacuum as if they were nothing but disembodied political conceptions and formulas."²

He is unconcerned with the suffering of the individual per se, his eyes are fixed on the goal of social justice for all, and for this he is willing to "mobilize" all the forces of democracy, with all the anti-liberal implications of this mobilization fully understood.

"The price of liberty is the restriction of liberty. The price of some liberty for all is the restriction of the greater liberty of some."³

Carr's sympathies lie with the Marxist philosophy, and in the final analysis he returns to it, by equating freedom with abundance.

"Freedom can only come in full with full abundance. The economic condition of freedom is the creation of abundance through the right allocation of our human and material resources to the requirements of production ... the political condition of freedom —

² I. Deutscher: Mr. Carr as Historian of the Soviet Union, op. cit., p. 345.

³ The New Society, p. 109.

and economic and political conditions are not really separable — is the realization by the new mass democracy of the principle of government of all, and by all, and for all."⁴

He recognizes that we live in a mass age, just as Marx had foreseen its coming but he also realizes the shortcomings of the mass society, which Marx did not. He is appalled by the implications of a society manipulated by its elite, whether it be a circulating or a permanent one, but he never really tackled the problem of bureaucracy or authoritarianism.⁵

His alternatives for the future are socialism or the destruction of all vestiges of democracy. He lives in an age, and in a country, where the socialist form has already been tried, and he tries to come to grips with it more explicitly. Poverty is not inevitable, he argues. Neither is unemployment. At the same time, full employment and the welfare state also mean social obligations, the main one being duty to work. Undoubtedly British society is closer to his ideal order than anything else he has examined. His psychological and philosophical assumptions are the ordinary assumptions of a good Englishman: common sense, and the belief in the rationality of man. He does not find it necessary to delve too deeply into the nature of man; the criteria that he uses are largely mechanistic, although he appreciates the negative forces of human nature and provides for the threat of force in the background.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Carr's work is, that he

⁴ Ibid., p. 111.

⁵ Ibid., p. 78; Ibid., p. 69.

opened the eyes of a whole generation of intellectuals to the pitfalls of utopianism. With arms borrowed from Mannheim and Marx, he directly attacked the foundations of individual democracy with such force and clarity that most of his contemporaries were forced to take stock of their ideological assumptions, and adapt them to the changed needs of mass society. Only the verdict of history can pass final judgment on the value of his work. The writer believes that as a historian of the Bolshevik revolution Carr has a permanent niche in the scholarly world. As a social thinker and critic, he has added little to the ideas of those who inspired him, but used them brilliantly and effectively to demolish the ossified remains of theories that could hardly be applied to the mass society.

A NOTE ON CARR'S APPRAISAL OF MARX AND MARXISM

Rarely has a writer admired a thinker so much, and yet held in so low an esteem some of the fundamental postulates of his thought. Carr rejects many of the cardinal elements in Marxism, especially those on which the Marxist claim to scientific validity rests, such as the labour theory of value.¹ In spite of this negative verdict, Carr's work bears pronounced traces of Marx's influence. His acceptance of the irrevocable doom of the capitalist system, and the need for a radical reconstruction of the fabric of society along socialist lines, coupled with the acute sense that we are living in a period of revolutionary transition, is inspired by Marx's teachings.

No other aspect of Marxist theory finds such strong approval by Carr as historical materialism. We already quoted his succinctly but categorically stated views on this matter. It is indeed the mode of production that determined to a considerable extent the course of modern history. This is evident throughout all his writings, although in his professed views on the subject Carr is inconsistent. While in the biography of Marx he says:

"...it is not possible to pretend that during the past hundred years the relations of production have determined the course of history."²

in the "New Society" he reveals himself as a faithful adherent to historical materialism.³ It would be rash to conclude that Carr

¹ He refers to the labour theory of value as an "act of faith", to Marxist economics generally as "tissue of economic fallacy", "economic curiosity"; E.H. Carr: Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism, London, (J.M. Dent & Sons), 1938, pp. 264, 279, 269 respectively.

² Ibid., p. 78.

³ The New Society, p. 19, quoted supra, p. 7.

changed his views from the time he had written the biography of Marx (1933) to the year he wrote the "New Society" (1951), yet the contradiction is undeniably there; and it is evident from his writings that he leans heavily towards historical materialism. This is particularly true of his evaluation of the Bolshevik revolution. It is more likely that the passage from the Marx biography, written in connection with a discussion of Marx's underestimation of nationalism, was hasty and not born of careful reflection. One must also bear in mind, that the concept of the modes of production or the relations of production is not a well-defined one, and it is not clear what Carr meant by it.

Although a biographer, he, with the Marxists, attaches little importance to the role of the individual in history. Marx in his estimation was certainly a great man, but it is clear from Carr's writings, that he did not play a decisive role as a personality in history. Lenin was a master-builder, a great revolutionary, a profound thinker, but there is nothing to suggest that the course of Soviet Russian history would have been different had he not lived.⁴ In his review of Isaac Deutscher's book "Russia After Stalin" he accused a Marxist writer of attaching too much importance to the role of Stalin in the development of Bolshevik Russia.⁵ His determinism is very much akin to that of Marx. Individuals do play a role in history, but within very narrow limits. They operate within an objective environment which leaves but few alternatives for human action. Carr

⁴ Studies in Revolution, Lenin: The Master Builder, pp. 134-151.

⁵ Review of I. Deutscher: Russia After Stalin, "The Dialectics of Stalinism", Times Literary Supplement, June 10, 1949, pp. 373-375.

criticizes Marx for his ambiguity in dealing with the vexing question of free will and determinism, but he does not seem to be altogether immune from this ambiguity himself. At times some of his statements seem to negate all determinism.⁶ But in looking into the future, Carr sees very few alternatives open to mankind, and although he refuses to prognosticate with certainty, he cautions mankind that the present trend can be modified only in two radical directions:

"The trend towards mass civilization seems irresistible and irreversible; the alternatives are to accept it or to let contemporary civilization perish altogether."⁷

Of the numerous references by Carr to the question of free will and determinism the following is perhaps the one which, in the writer's opinion, guides his historical analysis:

"The human being is indissolubly bound, in both his actions and his judgements, by a chain of causation reaching far back into the past; yet he has a qualified power to break the chain at a given point — the present — and so alter the future. In common-sense language, he can decide and judge for himself, but only up to a certain point; for the past limits and determines his decision and his judgement in innumerable ways."⁸

The doctrine of the class-struggle in modern times, according to which the proletariat will play a decisive role in it, is an element of historical materialism, for which Carr pays the highest tribute to Marx.

"Marx was the prophet of the newly-created, inarticulate, manyheaded proletariat, which, emerging from the throes of the industrial revolution, dominates the present age.

⁶ The New Society, p. 5, quoted supra, p. 33.

⁷ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 103.

⁸ The New Society, p. 14.

Marx perceived that this emergence heralded the end of the three-hundred year period of history, to which he gave the convenient, though not entirely appropriate label of 'bourgeois civilization'."9

However, his image of the proletariat differs markedly from that of Marx. To Marx the proletariat was destined to reject unconditionally the existing order, radically break with it, and erect on its ruins the new society. The class struggle was to rage continuously until the inevitable consummation of the revolution. Carr, speaking from ex post facto knowledge, envisages the new society, at least in western Europe, emerging not through bloody struggles, but through slower and more peaceful transition, even to the point of collaboration between the hostile classes.

To orthodox Marxists, the capitalist world, in spite of its prolonged stability, is still ridden by severe contradictions which will ultimately bring about its downfall. The reconciliation of the overwhelming majority of the working class to the existing order in most western European countries, India, etc., is explained by the resilience of the capitalistic economies, which is however, a resilience of an artificial nature. The alleged economic laws in "Das Kapital" driving the capitalistic system to its certain perdition are still operating, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Carr dismisses Marxian economics as fallacious and irrelevant.¹⁰ However, he too sees no prospect for the continued existence of the capitalistic

⁹ Karl Marx: A Biography, p. 301.

¹⁰ See Karl Marx: A Biography, Chapter XV.

system, but for different reasons. Unlike Marx, who thought that a planned capitalism is a contradiction in terms, Carr argues that private ownership of the means of production and planning are not necessarily incompatible. The ideals of equality, however, have become so deeply engrained in the people of the mass-society, that planning which does not abolish inequality would not be countenanced by them.

"Once you can no longer explain inequalities either as the salutary result of a natural economic process or as incidentals in an economic organisation primarily designed to prepare for war, it must become a main purpose of economic policy to eliminate them. This is the political connexion between planning and socialism."¹¹

The chain of Carr's reasoning differs from that of Marx, but in looking into the future, both see the inexorable advent of socialism.¹²

On closer examination, Carr's avowed rejection of Marxism is belied by his own analysis. Whenever he turns to the discussion of the contemporary crisis, his analysis is scarcely distinguishable from that of a Marxist. His affinity with Marxism is particularly pronounced when he discusses the ideals that are to inspire our mass society, and the goals towards which it should strive. Ultimate freedom, in Carr's conception, is identical with Marx's vision of the freedom of the society to come. It is the creation of an abundance of goods that would liberate men from "alienating labour", and thus enable him to devote himself to the full development of his potentialities.¹³

¹¹ The New Society, p. 38.

¹² See preface to Karl Marx: A Biography.

¹³ The New Society, p. 111.

In establishing a kinship between Carr's thought and that of Marx, one must note a striking difference between them. Carr is no crusader, and is not inspired by the passionate hatred of the powers that be, that animated Marx's works. He does not write to rouse masses, fulminating against wickedness; he is rather the cool scholar, who examines the society, diagnoses its ills, and then advises a not entirely cooperative patient to mend his ways.

After such sharp criticism of Marx, it is strange that Carr still considers him a prophet. He calls him a prophet largely for his brilliant, intuitive insight into society.¹⁴ Intuition and moral passion, these are the twin pillars of Marx's greatness, in Carr's view. But born in an age believing in the power of science, Marx endeavoured to cloak these twin sources in the fashionable mantle of science. For the "scientist" Carr reserves condescending irony, for the cold, arrogant personality he has little love, but for the intuitive prophet his admiration knows no bounds.

"Marx was not, in the strict sense of the word, a great philosopher. He was not in any sense of the word at all, a great economist. He was not a statesman or an orator or a leader of men. He was not inspired by any deep love for humanity; and he was not, in his dealings with most of his fellow-men, a particularly estimable or lovable character. But he imposed himself on his contemporaries, and he has imposed himself on history, with all the sheer force of a unique and dominant idea."¹⁵

"Das Kapital" is above all a moral treatise, Carr continues, and its impact on the world was largely due to its moral message. Its essence is the proposition that the workers are exploited, that they do not

¹⁴ Karl Marx: A Biography, p. 277.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 300.

get a rightful share of the nation's wealth; but this simple message with which Carr associates himself, is enveloped in a formidable "scientific" apparatus, which is comprehended but by very few of those people who profess to be guided by its teachings. Indeed the book is frequently called the bible of the proletariat and revered as such by large sections of the proletariat; but unlike the Bible, its contents are known to very few. "The average workingman did not read 'Das Kapital' and, if he had read, could not have understood the complicated argument which proved the justice of his case."¹⁶

In his biography of Marx, Carr treats with unconcealed amusement Marx's vision of the future.

"The proletarian lamb will not be asked to lie down with the bourgeois lion — for there will be no more lions. But the lambs, whose community of interest will survive the extermination of the lions, will lie down side by side for ever in perfect and uneventful harmony."¹⁷

Carr believes that had Marx carried his thought to its logical conclusion, he would have had a much less sanguine view of the future. But his mind was so preoccupied with the utopian schemes inherited from the nineteenth century utopian thinkers, that his stern realism abandoned him when he looked into the future, and his vision was therefore conventional and childish.¹⁸ In Carr's "New Society", however, he does accept the Marxist conception of the future society as the ultimate goal towards which the present society should work, and does not altogether exclude the possibility of its realization; but before

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 82-83.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 301.

mankind can come close to it, it must submit itself to the rigorous discipline of the fully planned society. Unlike Marx, (but like latter-day Marxists),¹⁹ who anticipated that the society of the future will be the immediate sequel to the destruction of capitalism, Carr foresees a long period of arduous regimentation and toil.

This difference between Carr and Marx can however be exaggerated. Marx, too, envisaged a transitional stage to precede mature communism; latter-day Marxists commonly call the two periods "socialism" and "communism" respectively. The socialist period was to be marked by inequalities of income and generally was to fall short of the ultimate ideal. However, since Marx did not spell out in any detail his vision of the future, but confined himself to vague but glowing generalizations, the inevitable impression remains that once capitalism is abolished, something approaching bliss will follow automatically.²⁰

Carr's admiration for Marx as a "prophet" does not extend to his personality. There is only one personal trait in Marx's character for which Carr has high praise, and that was his capacity to pursue a fixed goal relentlessly. This trait, quite common in revolutionaries and fanatics, Carr never fails to point out, whenever he encounters it in the heroes of his writings.²¹ However, the

¹⁹ V. Lenin: State and Revolution, op. cit.

²⁰ See E. Goldhagen: The Withering Away of the State, McGill University, 1954.

²¹ "...that masterful concentration on a single end which was the hallmark of Lenin." History of the Soviet Union, Vol. I, p. 22.

excellence of Marx's consistency was not equalled by the rest of his character. The man who wanted humanity to adopt the principle of universal love, showed a singular lack of this admirable sentiment in his relations with his fellow men. His egotism, his arrogance, his imperiousness, his conviction that he is destined to greatness, and that he and he alone is capable of guiding the proletariat in its historic mission bred in Marx a spirit of intolerance and inconsideration towards his fellow men, including his devoted friend Engels whom he did not hesitate to exploit to his own advantage. Carr makes no attempt to suppress these unattractive aspects of Marx's personality, and gives free vent to his distaste.

Carr's writings contain no extensive excursion into the realm of philosophy. It is therefore difficult to fathom the philosophical foundations, on which his thought rests. His leanings towards historical materialism would suggest an affinity with dialectical materialism, substantiated by some passages from his writings.²² As a social philosopher, he need not have preoccupied himself with questions of pure philosophy; and it would be unfair to reproach him for not having done so. Only in the biography of Marx does he venture a few cursory criticisms of the philosophical basis of Marxism, without revealing much of his own.

In Hegel's system, the dialectic is a procession of thought through which the Absolute Spirit realizes itself. The clash between the positive and the negative, giving birth to a new synthesis, is the basic phase of this process. Carr criticizes Marx for transposing

²² See quotation on p. 36.

the dialectical process which in Hegel was a mere category of thought, into the material world.

"He did not attempt to defend the legitimacy of transposing the dialectical process from the plane of idealism to that of materialism; he simply assumed it."

Carr adds

"The soundness of the philosophical base of Marxism does not affect its value as an empirical analysis of certain phases of human history and politics. But Marx claimed for it the validity of a universal truth; and this claim must stand or fall with the tenability of his initial philosophical assumptions."²³

Unlike most other biographers of Marx — Marxists and non-Marxists alike — Carr emphasizes the element of hatred which permeates Marxist philosophy. There is abundant and violent hatred towards the capitalists, but little love for the proletariat. This emphasis on hatred he traces back to the Romantics.

Carr sees another source of embarrassment in the implication of determinism in Marxism. "Is Marxism a theory of knowledge or a theory of action?"²⁴ If the former be true, then anyone who has grasped and accepts Marxism may call himself a Marxist. In the latter case all those who are actively engaged in working towards the social revolution, whether or not they understand the Marxian doctrine, may be considered Marxists. The Marxist solution to this problem offered in the form of a catchword, "the unity of thought and action", is strongly suspected by Carr to be meaningless. "If it means anything, it means that you cannot be sure of your theory, until you have tested

²³ Karl Marx: A Biography, p. 74.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

it in practice."²⁵ The implication of this formulation is far-reaching. It implies that theory has to undergo modifications in the light of the lessons of practice. Indeed this threatens to undermine the validity of Marxism itself, and the whole doctrine tends "to degenerate into a species of opportunism whose philosophical basis can be nothing but pragmatism".²⁶ Carr implies, although he does not say so explicitly, that this is precisely the fate that has befallen Marxism in Soviet Russia. Bolshevism, in pursuit of the ultimate Marxian goal, has cast theory overboard when it clashed with the exigencies of revolutionary practice. The Stalinists have become unwitting adherents of pragmatism.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 80.

²⁶ Ibid.

A NOTE ON CARR'S VIEWS ON THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION,
AND SOVIET SOCIETY

The Genesis of Soviet Russia

Carr's interpretation of the Bolshevik Revolution is substantially Marxist. The transition from feudalism to socialism began with the French Revolution and has been going on ever since, and the Bolshevik Revolution is a "tributary" of the main stream.

He follows closely Trotsky's theory of the "telescoped" or "permanent" revolution, although in pragmatic terms. Trotsky believed that the Bolshevik Revolution would be the starting signal for revolutions in all capitalist countries, thus it would not have been isolated in the struggle for socialism. The only possible way to save the Revolution from final disaster in a liberal bourgeois society that would not have been much different from the Tzarist regime, was for the communists to take over the leadership of the Revolution, and combine its bourgeois phase with the socialist one. This theory was accepted by Lenin in a startling reversal of his former advocacy of bourgeois revolution in Russia, when he was faced, on his arrival in Russia, with the realities of the revolution.¹ Carr believes that the extension of the revolution was the only way to save it under the circumstances. Not that Russia is fated to breed authoritarianism, because of the national character of its people.² But social conditions ruled out the development of a bourgeois-capitalist society along the

¹ See History of the Soviet Union, Chapter I, part 4.

² Although at other times Carr shows a tendency all too readily to attribute distinctive characteristics to ethnic groups. See E.H.Carr: Dostoevsky, London, (Allen & Unwin), 1931, p. 190, 296.

lines of a constitutional democracy, and some form of authoritarian government was the only viable form of government in the Russia plunged into chaos by the first World War, the disintegration of the army and all authority, and the fratricidal struggle that marked the first phase of the Russian Revolution.

Had the first World War not occurred, the Tzarist regime would have continued to lead its moribund existence for decades.³ In the conditions of 1917, the road travelled by Lenin was the only road Russia could enter, because the alternative to it was perpetual chaos and unrest. This is the interpretation he puts on the events leading up to the October revolution, in the first four chapters of "The History of the Soviet Union", and the conclusion that it leads to.

"It may well have been true that, as the rapid disintegration of the February revolution seemed to show, that bourgeois democracy and bourgeois capitalism on the western model, which was what the Mensheviks wanted and expected, could not be rooted in Russian soil, so that Lenin's policy was the only conceivable one in the empirical terms of current Russian politics. To reject it as premature was to repeat, as Lenin once said 'the argument of the serf-owners about the unpreparedness of the peasants for freedom.'⁴

Soviet Society

Soviet society is a "new form of civilization",⁵ not a futile

³ See review by Carr of R.H. Haimson: The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism, in Times Literary Supplement, June 1st, 1956, pp. 321-322.

⁴ History of the Soviet Union, p. 100.

⁵ E.H. Carr: "Soviet Society: Is There a Bourgeoisie?", op. cit., p. 280.

tyranny. It has replaced the values of individualist, liberal democracy with the cult of the common man. While the most important principle of the French Revolution is, for the liberals, liberty, for the Soviet society the creation of real equality is vital, through the fraternity of all members of society united in a common purpose.⁶ Thus the political institutions of Soviet society are the expression of its social and economic content.

"In the western conception of democracy institutions are all important, and the antithesis of democracy is dictatorship; in the Soviet conception class content is the first consideration, and the antithesis of democracy is aristocracy or plutocracy, the predominance of the select class."⁷

The hallmark of the new civilization is the class-less society, even though it may not yet have been achieved, and the assertion of the universality of the creed between man and man. The rise of the "new bourgeoisie" in Soviet society does not vitiate, in his opinion, the realization of the class-less society. The "new bourgeoisie" is an elite in constant flux, that rises from the masses in an expanding society, and it is an expression of the social mobility of Soviet society.⁸

The pattern of Soviet society is not an aberration from contemporary civilization, nor is it something utterly alien to the

⁶ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 100.

⁷ The Soviet Impact on the Western World, p. 12.

⁸ See controversy between Carr in "Soviet Society: Is There a Bourgeoisie?", op. cit.; and H. Seton Watson; "The Ruling Class in Russia", The Listener, June 2, 1955, pp. 959-960, 974; also letter to the editor (by H. Seton Watson), The Listener, August 11, 1955, pp. 222-223.

West. It is well within the main stream of development of western society.

"We are steering our course on a stream of events whose headwaters can be traced in the broad historical region of the French, the American and the Industrial revolutions. The Russian revolution is a tributary which, joining the main river at a comparatively recent stage, has swollen it and made it more turbulent, but has probably not much deflected its course."⁹

It is also a variant of the planned society towards which all humanity is travelling. Since it is the first completely planned society, it has pioneered in many of the techniques of planning, and can therefore serve as a storehouse of experience from which the West can draw. It has already influenced the process of planning all over the world to a greater degree than most people realize, although what is precisely the impact of Soviet influence and what is due to other causes producing similar effects is difficult to determine.

It is quite clear that Carr does not mean to set the Soviet Union before our eyes as the perfect example of the planned society. His ideal of the planned society is tinged with individualist values, and there is clearly much that is repugnant to him in the Soviet pattern.¹⁰ What he sees in Soviet Russia is a grossly distorted image of his ideal society.

As we have pointed out, the weakness of this view is the underestimation of the role of terror in Soviet society. The influence of the Terror in the shaping of Soviet society is so great that it

⁹ The New Society, p. 86.

¹⁰ See quotation on p. 5, footnote 6.

would be a fatal weakness of any theory to ignore it, or relegate it to the minor instances of historical trivia.¹¹ But it must be stressed that Carr has not yet treated systematically Soviet society as it took shape after the second Stalinist revolution.

This may also clear up the inconsistencies in his treatment of the Soviet society as a branch on the democratic tree. Occasionally he tries to lump together Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia as totalitarian systems,¹² at other times he places Soviet society within the democratic species of nations. The trouble is that Carr is never very clear about the criterion or criteria of "democracy". The ideal standards of democracy are the equality of men, socially as well as economically, and the rule of law and reason. If certain phases of Stalinism are justified — as they are in his admittedly cursory treatment of Stalin — "Soviet democracy" does not qualify at all, for the basis of Stalinism is the negation of the rule of law.

¹¹ B. Moore: Terror and Progress in the Soviet Union, Cambridge, Mass.,

¹² See E.H. Carr: "Europe and the Spanish War", Fortnightly, Vol. 147, pp. 25-34, January, 1937; E.H. Carr: "Hitler's Gospel and Stalin's", Spectator, Vol. 161, p. 433, September 16, 1938.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE WRITINGS OF EDWARD HALLETT CARR

1. Books and pamphlets

Dostoevsky: A New Biography, 2nd Impression,
London, (George Allen & Unwin Ltd.), 1949,
first published in 1931.

A comprehensive treatment of Dostoevsky's life, with thorough analysis of his major works. Also description of Russian literary circles from 1830 to 1870, and the intellectual movements that influenced Russian literature of the period, particularly the German Romantics. Includes valuable material on the Slavophil movement.

"Dostoevsky was not insincere, but muddle-headed ... His interest lay in moral, and not at all in social or political issues. ... He reduces the issue to the question of religion; he believes that the intelligentsia, by abandoning its religion for democracy and utilitarianism and economic materialism had consummated its own divorce from the people. The remedy is for the intelligentsia to return by one and the same process, to religion and to the people..." pp.268-69.

The Romantic Exiles; a Nineteenth Century Portrait Gallery,
Penguin Books, No. 707, May 1949, first published in 1933.

The first of his series of biographies on nineteenth century revolutionaries, mainly a biography of A. Herzen, includes portraits on Bakunin, Herwegh, Nechaev, Prince Dolgorukov. The background is the intellectual, non-revolutionary opposition to Tzarist autocracy, and its eclipse; also the origins of the revolutionary, anarchist opposition.

"Herzen belonged to the Russian generation of the 'forties. ...Romanticism was his religion, liberalism his political faith, and constitutional democracy his ideal for Russia. The generation of the 'sixties had grown up in a Russia which Herzen never knew... These young men were materialists by religion, and revolutionaries by precept and by practice. Their opinions were clear-cut and decisive. For Russia, the first step towards reform was to bring down with a crash the whole existing system; the second step it was premature to discuss." p. 299.

Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism,

London, (J.M. Dent & Sons), 1938, first published in 1934.

A non-Marxist biography of Karl Marx, bringing out with full force the anti-social personality of the "intuitive prophet" of socialism and communism. Thorough discussion of Marxist theory, rejecting most of its basic economic premises as "mumbo-jumbo", but appreciating the moral force of his work.

See quotation on p. 1.

Michael Bakunin,

London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1937.

The definitive biography of the father of anarchism, describing in detail, and with a touch of sympathy, the Bohemian character of Bakunin, as well as the birth of the anarchist movement. A lot of the material in the book not new, chapter 19, parts of chapter 20, chapter 21, and parts of chapter 22 identical with passages in "The Romantic Exiles", chapter 25 partly identical with passages in "Karl Marx".

"Bakunin and Marx both influenced by Hegel. Both conceived revolution as the product of an Hegelian antithesis between positive and negative, between conservative and progressive, and that, through the destruction of the former through the latter, the synthesis of a new order would come into being... But Bakunin remained an idealist, an extreme individualist, an advocate of absolute freedom; ... while Marx became a materialist, to whom freedom meant freedom of the classes, not of the members of this class among each other... Bakunin believed in spontaneous peasant jacquerie, Marx in the organised rising of the industrial proletariat. Both believed in a violent revolution..." p. 434-435 (sequence changed).

International Relations Between the Two World Wars (1919-1939),

London, (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.), 1952, first published under the title "International Relations Since the Peace Treaties", 1937.

A thorough, concise guide to the turbulent interwar period, written in a singularly lucid style. Divided into the periods of "The Alliances", "The League of Nations", and "The End of the Treaties", 1920-24, 1924-30, 1930-39, respectively. Contains already his realist approach to international relations.

Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War, with a preface by the Right Honourable Viscount Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, (Longmans, Green & Co.), 1939.

Companion volume to the above book, dealing with British Foreign Policy in the same period. The peculiar distinction of this book is the defence of the policy of appeasement, then practiced by the British government in its dealings with Hitler. Carr has since retreated from that position.

The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939; An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd and revised edition, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1951, first published in 1939.

This is Carr's great contribution to the theory of international relations, dedicated to "the makers of the coming peace". Using Karl Mannheim's categories of the analysis of human thought, utopianism and realism, he propounded the futility of utopian ideals divorced from the realities of the contemporary political scene, and showed that power is the decisive factor on the international scene, but power tempered by morality. The first edition contained passages justifying the appeasement policy mentioned in "Britain", these have disappeared in the second and revised edition.

Propaganda in International Politics,
Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 16, Oxford, 1939.

A pamphlet on propaganda based on chapter 8 of "The Twenty Years' Crisis".

Conditions of Peace,
London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1942.

Carr's thesis is that the roots of the contemporary crisis stretch back into the nineteenth century, and here he comes to grip with it. The framework he uses is similar to that in "The Twenty Years' Crisis", thus he deals with the political, economic and moral crisis. Part of the book is devoted to the study of the role of Britain in contemporary Europe, and the world, another deals with the immediate and long-range problems that were to face the world after the second world war. The book is also a call for "new faith", a "new morality" in society, and in international politics.

"The old world is dead. The future lies with those who can resolutely turn their back on it and face the new world with understanding, courage and imagination. This book is a call for such leadership." p. 275.

The Future of Nations: Independence or Interdependence,
London, (K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.), 1941.

A pamphlet based on the (then) forthcoming "Conditions of Peace", chapter 10.

Nationalism And After,
London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1945.

The book deals with the background of nationalism, and with its "climax" in our time. Carr states that the nation-state is an obsolete unit, and discusses the shape the future international order will take. He subscribes to the gradualist, "functional" theory of international organization, and believes that the common purpose needed for a world community is not yet present. The study is divided into two parts, dealing with the origins and "climax" of nationalism, and "the prospects of internationalism", respectively.

"Many old traditions will have to be discarded, and new ones created, before Europe and the world can recover their balance in the aftermath of the age of nationalism." p. 74.

The Soviet Impact on the Western World,
London, (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.), 1947.

Deals with the challenge of fully planned, communist society to western society. He believes that the Bolshevik revolution is a tributary of the social upheavals in the West that started with the French revolution, and not something outside it. His conclusion is that there may be a synthesis between the concepts and ideas of western and Soviet democracy.

"The contemporary crisis of western civilization is in, perhaps its profoundest aspect, the crisis of the individual. The age of individualism now drawing to a close stands in history as an oasis between two totalitarianisms — the totalitarianism of the medieval church and empire and the new totalitarianism of the modern world." p. 112.

Moral Foundations for World Order,
Foundations for world order, 20th Anniversary Lecture Series, No. 5,
Denver, (University of Denver Press), Social Science Foundation, 1948.

Studies In Revolution,

London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1950.

A series of studies on nineteenth and twentieth century revolutionaries, ending with two articles on Stalin; also includes some old material from "Dostoevsky", "The Romantic Exiles", and "Karl Marx". He gives full credit to the utopian socialists, for the recognition of the importance of planning, and the duty of the individual to submit to society. Most of the articles appeared in the London Times Literary Supplement as review articles from 1946 to 1949.

The New Society,

London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1951.

Describes and analyzes the whole sweep of the social revolution, from the French Revolution to the present. The thesis of the book is that we are living in the age of mass society, that we have to accept this, and try to save some of the cherished values of the past through channelling and influencing the forces of mass society, and not pit ourselves against it. The only way to achieve this is through a planned society, and a socialist form of government; the alternative is the destruction of contemporary civilization, and a totalitarian world. The book also contains his personal beliefs, and his own view of history, as well as a short discussion of other contemporary views of history, such as that of Professors A. Toynbee, and H. Butterfield.

"To reconcile democracy with planning for socialism is a difficult task. It may have been undertaken too late. But it is the only course which may yet, if war can be avoided, enable democracy to survive." p. 39.

German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939, The

Alert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1951, delivered at the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Baltimore, (The Johns Hopkins Press), 1951.

Deals with another aspect of the history of the interwar period, the relations between Soviet Russia and the German Reich. It is based partly on the yet unpublished Trotsky and Seeckt archives, and perhaps the definitive answer to many controversial issues, such as the extent of collaboration between the German industrialists and the Wehrmacht, and the Soviet government. Carr believes that the Rapallo treaty was a masterstroke of Soviet and German diplomacy, the beginning of their return to the ranks of Great Powers. It also argues that German foreign policy is most successful, when it coincides with the interests of Russia, and risks disaster when it ignores this.

"So long as that situation" (The German-Soviet pact) "was maintained, German fortunes prospered. But less than two years later Hitler was tempted and fell, repeating the

blunder of William II and courting war against the country on whose cooperation or friendly neutrality German military success had always depended. The question-mark which confronts the world little more than ten years after the close of this story is whether German leaders, once more in possession of the means to conduct a German foreign policy, would be content for a third time to reject the policy of Bismarck and the advice of the most successful of their monarchs to "cultivate the friendship of these barbarians." p. 137.

A History of Soviet Russia,

Volume I, II, III : The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923.

Volume IV : The Interregnum, 1923-1924.

London, (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.), 1950, 1952, 1953, 1954.

These are the first four volumes of a monumental projected ten-volume series on the history of Soviet Russia. Judging from the volumes that have already appeared, there seems to be little doubt that it will rank as the authoritative history of Soviet Russia, and can be compared to the works of Thiers on France, and Gibbon on Rome. The first volume deals with the background of the revolution, the revolution and the structure of Soviet society as it emerged from the revolution; the second deals with the economic order of the period; the third with Soviet foreign policy during the same period; and the fourth with the intermediary period between the death of Lenin, and the beginnings of the struggle for power.

Edited by E.H. Carr:

Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, (Oxford University Press), 1939.

2. Articles

"City of Kiev is to Have a New Railway Station",
New Statesman, vol. 33, p. 180, May 18, 1929.

Satirical article on Russian society built around the theme in the title.

"Turgenev and Dostoevsky",
Slavonic Review, vol. 8, pp. 156-163, June 1929.

The up and down relationship between the two writers, material included in the Dostoevsky biography.

"Chekhov: 25 Years After",
Spectator, vol. 143, pp. 72-73, July 20, 1929.

An article assessing the position of Chekhov in Russian literature, written on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of his death.

"Dostoevsky and a Russia Minx",
Fortnightly, No. 132, pp. 525-533, Oct. 1929.

Another incident — a love affair — from Dostoevsky's life, material included in Dostoevsky biography.

"Fantastic Teuton",
Spectator, vol. 143, pp. 710-11, Nov. 16, 1929.

An assessment of the romantic literature of the nineteenth century, and some contemporary German literary works. The fantastic teuton mentioned is Hoffmann.

"Two Russians",
Fortnightly, vol. 132, pp. 823-26, Dec. 1929.

The relationship between Tolstoy and Turgenev, based on their correspondence.

"Age of Unreason",
Spectator, vol. 144, p. 698, April 26, 1930.

Still speaking in the literary vein, he is concerned with the passing of individualism and rationalism in contemporary literary trends.

"The new scheme of things allows no place for individual greatness. We have banished the great man from history as we have banished the character from modern fiction." p. 698.

"Was Dostoevsky an Epileptic?",
Slavonic Review, vol. 9, pp. 424-431, Dec. 1930.

Yet another aspect of Dostoevsky's life, material included in Dostoevsky biography.

"League of Peace and Freedom: An Episode in the Quest for Collective Security",
International Affairs, vol. 14, pp. 837-844, Nov. 1935.

Description of one of the movements created by Bakunin's fertile imagination, material included in the Bakunin biography.

"Maxim Gorky",
Spectator, vol. 156, p. 1178, June 26, 1936.

An eulogy of Gorky on the occasion of his death; his relationship with Stalin briefly described.

"Future of the League: Idealism or Reality",
Fortnightly, vol. 146, pp. 385-397, Oct. 1936.

A realistic assessment of the role of the League, a sharp attack on the meaningless debate around the Abyssinian crisis. He believes that there are three views on the League, the idealist, the French, and as it will appear to the future historian. Strongly advocates the use of article 19 to effect a peaceful change of the status quo.

"I have always felt that if we wish to imagine a world order based on pure idealism, we should seek on those lines (world government) rather than on those of a League of sovereign states." p. 389.

"New Currents on the Danube",
Christian Science Monitor Magazine, pp. 1-2, Oct. 7, 1936.

"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace",
International Affairs, vol. 15, pp. 846-862, Nov. 1936.

Inaugural lecture delivered by Carr, on being appointed to fill the Wilson Chair of International Politics, Oct. 14, 1936. A review of contemporary pacifist, isolationist, and collectivist trends, also contains some of his views on the approach to the study of international relations.

"I regard international politics not as a pure, but as an applied science. The student of international politics is, in my view, not concerned to elaborate a pure theory of war and peace which would be valid in some hypothetical international community. His task is the more arduous one of applying his thought to international relationships as they in fact exist. Let him alter those relationships if he can. But do not let him merely imagine them other than they are in order to make them fit his theory." p. 853.

"British Lion and the Duce",
Atlantic, vol. 158, pp. 607-613, Nov. 1936.

An article assessing the Duce's imperialistic designs, and the possible clash of interest between Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa.

"The Englishman has for more than half a century regarded the Italian with a kindly, tolerant liking, mixed with just a spice of contempt. The Duce has gone a long way to kill the liking, without, fundamentally, having much diminished his contempt." p. 608.

"Security and the Small Powers",
Christian Science Monitor Magazine, pp. 1-2, Dec. 2, 1936.

"Europe and the Spanish War",
Fortnightly, vol. 147, pp. 25-34, Jan. 1937.

The article deals with the war only incidentally, it is more a discussion of contemporary ideological trends. He believes that the alliance between the Fascist powers will "continue to be a substantial dream or nightmare" (p. 33), if Britain is able to stay neutral. The ideological conflict he dismisses airily, and reduces it to a question of power.

"There is, in short, plenty of sound and fury, but for less substance, in this fashionable conflict of ideologies; and the fundamental division is not between Fascism and the "left" but between those who are in the main satisfied with the present distribution of the world's goods as between states, and those, who for various reasons, are not." p. 32.

"Bakunin's Escape from Siberia",
Slavonic Review, vol. 15, pp. 377-388, Jan. 1937.

Another incident from Bakunin's life, material included in the Bakunin biography.

"Britain Quarantines Spain",
Christian Science Monitor Magazine, p. 3, Oct. 27, 1937.

"Twilight of the Comintern",
Fortnightly, vol. 149, pp. 137-147, Feb. 1938.

A description of the Comintern's history, its role in European politics, and its relationship with Soviet leadership. Believes that the Comintern declined in importance, because it became an anti-revolutionary force, a branch of the Soviet Foreign Office.

"Today, Comintern is neither communist nor international: it is merely the ghost of world-revolution flitting uneasily in the twilight round the tomb of Lenin in the Red Square." p. 147.

"Hitler's Gospel and Stalin's",
Spectator, vol. 161, p. 433, Sept. 16, 1938.

Reiterates the argument on the insubstantiality of the ideological conflict, lumps together the German and Soviet variety of totalitarianism. Rather startlingly argues that while the Soviet society did not succeed yet in creating a classless society, Germany has more success in creating one. Specific parallels between the two societies are the encouragement of sports and cultural activity, the efforts to create a classless society, one-party state, re-writing of history, the adulation of the leader. The "Volk" and the "Proletariat" are two parallel mystical entities.

"In both countries capital and labour meet in the belly of the new Leviathan." p. 433.

"J.V. Stalin",

Spectator, vol. 161, pp. 852-853, Nov. 18, 1938.

A rather sketchy assessment of Stalin's role in Soviet Russia. Emphasizes Stalin's organizational talent, believes that "by a technique all his own — and without anyone understanding what he was doing, or how he did it — he tamed the revolution".

"Stalin is a trivial thinker and a mediocre writer. The dictator of the proletariat is the perfect managing director." p. 852.

"Honour Among Nations; A Critique of International Cant",

Fortnightly, vol. 151, pp. 489-500, May 1939.

A strong criticism of the identification of the national with the universal interest; Carr believes that the transformation of the power conflict into a supposed conflict of good and evil did much to embitter international relations in this period.

"An international morality can come only through the synthesis — or conglomeration, for no synthesis can be complete — of national moralities; and if it be said that the process will be long and difficult, then one must reply that the road towards the formation of a true international community, and the road towards international peace, is also long and difficult." p. 429.

"Two Currents in World Labour",

Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, pp. 72-81, Oct. 1946.

Describes briefly the history of the International Federation of Trade Unions; the occasion is the incorporation of the I.F.T.U. into the new World Federation of Trade Unions. The two currents are the syndicalist, craft movements as f.e. the A.F. of L., and the industrial current, as it exists in the Soviet Union; believes that the craft type union is a thing of the past. W.F.T.U. dominated by Russia, but he believes that workable solution worked out through weighting of votes.

"Rights of Man",

United Nations Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, pp. 520-522, Oct. 21, 1947.

Part of a series on the rights of man, written by the outstanding social scientists and philosophers of the century. Carr was at the time Chairman of the UNESCO Committee on the Philosophical Principles of the Rights of Man, sponsoring the symposium. He expounds same ideas that formed the basis of "The New Society" that every right ought to mean an obligation as well, the obligation of every man to society, and that the freedom of want is the basic condition of all human freedom.

"The Dialectics of Stalinism",
Times Literary Supplement, pp. 373-375, June 10, 1949.

A review of I. Deutscher's "Stalin", in which he criticizes Deutscher for attributing too much importance to the influence of Stalin's personality on Soviet history.

"Meaning of Human Rights",
United Nations World, vol. 3, p. 55, July 1949.

"From Munich to Moscow" (in two parts),
Soviet Studies, vol. I, pp. 3-17, pp. 93-105, 1949-1950.

The article describes and evaluates Soviet foreign policy during the Munich crisis. Carr believes that the most decisive factor was Soviet skepticism of the seriousness of allied intentions, and the reluctance of the western Powers, particularly England, to conclude a military pact with the Soviet Union. It also throws some light on his approach to the study of Soviet Russia.

"Controversy on policies is perhaps not very profitable. The historian of Soviet foreign policy will more prudently confine himself to analyzing the calculations which determined that policy and considering how far these calculations were correct and rational in terms of the problem set." p. 102.

"Propaganda And Power",
Yale Review, vol. 42, pp. 1-9, Sept. 1952.

Gives his latest view on the role of propaganda. He believes that propaganda is reaching a "saturation point". The crisis of propaganda is not a crisis of technique or of breaking down sales resistance, but our inability to invoke a universal principle, our failure to escape from the constraining influence of the national interest.

"Ideas are not stronger than atom bombs. But the world cannot be governed with atom bombs and without ideas." p. 8.

"Background of Revolution",
Current History, vol. 25, pp. 65-69, August 1953.

The article gives a short, incisive resume of the development of Russian society prior to the revolution. Carr argues that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to create a capitalist bourgeois society.

"Trotsky ... clearly realized that the basis for intermediate stage, corresponding to the liberal democracy of the western world, was lacking in Russia." p. 69.

"Die Historischen Grundlagen der Sovietischen Aussenpolitik",
Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte, pp. 239-249,
herausgegeben von Osteuropa Institut an der freien Universität Berlin, Berlin, 1954.

This lecture delivered at the Berlin Free University dealt with the continuity and change of Russian Foreign Policy. Carr believes that there is substantial continuity between Tzarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, that even Great Russian Chauvinism and the "Messianic mission of Russia" have been resuscitated; but the significant new element he sees is the duality of containment of capitalist government, while appealing to their people in the name of world revolution.

"Es soll nachgewiesen werden, dass die auswaertige Politik der Sowietunion im wesentlichen ein neues Gebäude darstellt, wenn auch auf alten Grundlagen und aus altem Material errichtet, die teilweise seine Gestalt bestimmt haben."
p. 239.

"Stalin",
Soviet Studies, vol. 5, pp. 1-7, 1953-1954.

Carr assesses the role of Stalin in similar terms as in the two previous articles, one included in the "Studies in Revolution". He passes history's verdict on Stalin, and this seems to be that it was necessary for Stalin, or someone like Stalin to solidify the gains of the revolution. In this sense, he is Lenin's successor.

"Stalin, through the five year plans and the collectivization of agriculture, carried on the revolution as Lenin had conceived it, though in conditions, and by methods, which Lenin had never envisaged. Secondly, Stalin had inherited Lenin's view of politics as an "art" permitting of fairly wide opportunities of manoeuvre within the scientific framework of Marxist analysis. This view had both voluntarist and empirical implications." p. 3.

"Soviet Society: Is There a Bourgeoisie?",
Nation, vol. 181, pp. 277-280, Oct. 1, 1955, also published in The Listener, pp. 167-168, 184, August 4th, 1955.

Controversy with Professor H. Seton Watson about the "new Soviet bourgeoisie". Carr states that the Soviet system rejects all the characteristic values for which the bourgeoisie has stood, both in theory and practice. The intelligentsia that rules Russia today cannot be called a bourgeoisie.

"If we want to identify the ruling group in Soviet society, we have to look not for a class, but for a party... There is no ruling class in Soviet Russia, there is a ruling group, which finds its institutional embodiment in the party." p. 278.

"Revolutionary Pre-History",
Times Literary Supplement, pp. 321-22, June 1, 1956.

A review of A.H. Haimson's "The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism". Reiterates briefly the argument, that it would have been difficult to create a bourgeois capitalist society, as a transition to Socialism.

Carr has also written a vast number of book reviews that appeared in British journals during the past twenty-five years. Of these the "Journal of International Affairs", the "London Times Literary Supplement", and "Soviet Studies" must be singled out. In 1936-1937 he was the most prolific book reviewer in the first journal, and has contributed book reviews to it ever since. In the "Times Literary Supplement" his reviews began to appear in 1940, when he also became the assistant editor of the "Times", and wrote a number of editorials. Most of the articles included in the "Studies In Revolution" appeared in book review form in this journal; some reviews from the "Times Literary Supplement" I have cited in the thesis. In the "Soviet Studies" (started publishing in 1949) there are two or three book-reviews in almost every volume from his pen.

COMMENTARIES ON E.H. CARR

1. Articles

L. Woolf: "Utopia and Reality", Political Quarterly, pp. 167-182, vol. 11, 1940.

H. Garnett: "Reality and Utopia", Hibbert Journal, vol. 38, pp. 480-488, July 1940.

G.L. Schwartz: "The Economics of Professor Carr", Nineteenth Century, vol. 131, pp. 260-265, June 1942.

The Editor: "Federal Union", Nineteenth Century, vol. 132, pp. 1-14, July 1942.

I Deutscher: "The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923", International Affairs, vol. 27, no.2, April 1951, pp. 204-207.

D.L. Mundy: "E.H. Carr and the Economic Order", Twentieth Century, vol. 153, pp. 106-117, February 1953.

H. Morgenthau: "The Political Science of E.H. Carr", World Politics, vol. I, pp. 127-134, 1949.

I. Deutscher: "Mr. E.H. Carr as Historian of Soviet Russia", Soviet Studies, vol. 6, pp. 337-349, 1954-1955; also published in I. Deutscher: Heretics and Renegades, and Other Essays, London, (Hamish Hamilton), 1955, pp. 91-112.

B.D. Wolfe: "Professor Carr's Wave of the Future", Commentary, vol. 19, pp. 284-90, March 1955.

I. Deutscher: "Protocols of Maxim Litvinov", Reporter, vol. 13, pp. 42-45, Nov. 17, 1955.

2. Book Reviews

on "Dostoevsky":

Richard Church, Spectator, vol. 147, p. 548, Oct. 24, 1931.

Avraham Yarmolinsky, New York Times, p. 4, Nov. 1, 1931.

American Mercury, vol. 25, p. 4, Feb. 1932.

Nation, vol. 133, p. 490, Nov. 4, 1931.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 773, Oct. 8, 1931.

on "The Romantic Exiles":

J. Lover, Saturday Review of Literature,

Nation, vol. 137, p. 164, Aug. 9, 1933.

New Republic, vol. 76, p. 219, Oct. 4, 1933.

New York Times, p. 6, July 30, 1933.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 241, April 6, 1933.

on "Karl Marx":

R.P. Dutt, Labour Monthly, vol. 16, pp. 432-39, July 1934.

E.L. Woodward, International Affairs, vol. 13, p. 72, Sept. 1934.

on "Michael Bakunin":

I. Berlin, Spectator, vol. 159, p. 1186, Dec. 31, 1937.

F. Hoellering, Nation, vol. 146, p. 358, March 26, 1938.

A.M. Karpovich, American Historical Review, vol. 44, p. 380.

Margaret Miller, International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 5, p. 738, Sept. 1938.

A.L. Rowse, Political Quarterly, vol. 9, p. 297, 1938; also published in A.L. Rowse: The End of an Epoch, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1947, pp. 261-63.

W. Sandelius, American Political Science Review, vol. 32, p. 599, June 1938.

M.B. Scheler, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 199, p. 268, Sept. 1938.

A.J.P. Taylor, Manchester Guardian, p. 6, Aug. 10, 1937.

E. Wilson, New Republic, vol. 97, p. 137, Dec. 7, 1938; also published in "The Shores of Light", pp. 716-721, New York, 1952.

L. Woolf, New Statesman and Nation, vol. 14, p. 971, Dec. 4, 1937.

New York Times, p. 5, Feb. 13, 1938.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 813, Nov. 6, 1937.

on "International Relations since the Peace Treaties":

C.D. Burns, Spectator, vol. 159, p. 111, July 16, 1937.

G.M. Gawthorne Hardy, International Affairs, vol. 16, p. 977, Nov. 1937.

F.L. Schuman (on 2nd edition), Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 260, p. 190, Nov. 1948.

R.G. Woolbert, Foreign Affairs, vol. 16, p. 177, Oct. 1937.

New Statesman and Nation, vol. 14, p. 352, Sept. 4, 1938.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 552, July 31, 1937.

on "Britain":

G.L. Kirk, American Political Science Review, vol. 34, p. 1041, Oct. 1940.

F. Kuhn, New York Times, p. 3, July 28, 1940.

T.L. Wallbank, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 212, p. 238, Nov. 1940.

Foreign Affairs, vol. 19, p. 261, Oct. 1940.

on "The Twenty Years' Crisis":

C. Brinton, Saturday Review of Literature, vol. 21, p. 19, Feb. 17, 1940.

R. Coventry, New Statesman and Nation, vol. 18, p. 761, Nov. 25, 1939.

A.W. Griswold, American Historical Review, vol. 46, p. 374, Jan. 1941.

H. Kohn, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 210, p. 152, July 1940.

E. Lengyel, New York Times, p. 3, Feb. 4, 1940.

W.P. Maddox, American Political Science Review, vol. 34, p. 587, June 1940.

L. Rogers, Nation, vol. 150, p. 285, Feb. 24, 1940.

A. Zimmern, Spectator, vol. 163, p. 750, Nov. 24, 1939.

The Economist, vol. 138, p. 61, Jan. 13, 1940.

Foreign Affairs, vol. 18, p. 564, April 1940.

New Republic, vol. 102, p. 222, Feb. 12, 1940.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 650, Nov. 11, 1939.

on "Conditions of Peace":

A. Adey, Current History, vol. 3, p. 67, Sept. 1942.

C. Becker, Yale Review, vol. 32, p. 159, Autumn, 1942.

H. Butler, Spectator, vol. 168, p. 284, March 20, 1942.

W.H. Chamberlin, Atlantic, vol. 170, p. 104, Aug. 1942.

P.E. Corbett, Pacific Affairs, vol. 25, p. 487, Dec. 1942.

M. Cowley, New Republic, vol. 107, p. 353, Sept. 21, 1942.

W.R. Deuel, New York Times, p. 5, Aug. 9, 1942.

H. Kohn, Saturday Review of Literature, vol. 25, p. 9, July 4, 1942.

C.A.W. Manning, International Affairs, vol. 19, p. 443, June 1942.

T.S. Rousek, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 223, p. 226, Sept. 1942.

F. White, New Statesman and Nation, vol. 23, p. 195, Mar. 21, 1942.

L. Woolf, Political Quarterly, vol. 13, p. 328, 1942.

Qu. Wright, Ethics, vol. 53, p. 64, Oct. 1942.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 138, March 21, 1942.

on "Nationalism And After":

T. Balogh, Political Quarterly, vol. 16, p. 272, 1945.

J. Coatman, International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 278, April 1946.

L. Woolf, New Statesman and Nation, vol. 29, p. 243, Apr. 14, 1945.

Current History, vol. 9, p. 550, Dec. 1945.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 109, 1945.

on "The Soviet Impact on the Western World":

S.S. Counts, Saturday Review of Literature, vol. 30, p. 12, Jan. 25, 1947.

E. Crankshaw, Spectator, vol. 177, p. 616, Dec. 6, 1946.

W. Gurian, Commonwealth, vol. 46, p. 289, July 4, 1947.

S.S. Harcave, New York Times, p. 33, Feb. 16, 1947.

H. Janzen, American Political Science Review, vol. 41, p. 361, April 1947.

P.E. Mosely, Yale Review, vol. 36, p. 536, Spring 1947.

K. Scholz, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 252, p. 117, July 1947.

Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, p. 527, April 1947.

Labour Monthly, p. 62, Feb. 1947.

Political Quarterly, vol. 18, p. 188, 1947.

Political Science Quarterly, vol. 62, p. 310, June 1947.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 587, Nov. 30, 1946.

on "Studies in Revolution":

D.W. Brogan, Spectator, vol. 184, p. 58, July 14, 1950.

R.H.S. Crossman, New Statesman and Nation, vol. 40, p. 211, Aug. 19, 1950.

I. Deutscher, Nation, vol. 171, p. 346, Oct. 14, 1950.

M. Eastman, New York Times, p. 12, Aug. 27, 1950.

A.J.P. Taylor, Manchester Guardian, p. 4, June 13, 1950.

Current History, vol. 19, p. 229, Oct. 1950.

Foreign Affairs, vol. 29, p. 147, Oct. 1950.

International Affairs, vol. 27, p. 470, Oct. 1951.

Political Quarterly, vol. 21, p. 431, 1950.

Saturday Review of Literature, vol. 33, p. 36, Aug. 19, 1950.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 477, Aug. 4, 1950.

on "The New Society":

C.H. Driver, Yale Review, vol. 41, p. 631, Summer 1952.

Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 238, May 1952.

Current History, vol. 21, p. 354, Dec. 1951.

Political Quarterly, vol. 23, p. 114, 1952.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 642, 1951.

on "Soviet-German Relations":

P.E. Mosely, New York Times, p. 26, Oct. 7, 1951.

R. Schlesinger, Soviet Studies, vol. 4, p. 291, 1952-53.

Current History, vol. 21, p. 355, Dec. 1951.

on "The History of Soviet Russia":

Volume I:

F.C. Barghoorn, Saturday Review of Literature, vol. 34, p. 21, March 17, 1951.

M. Beloff, Spectator, vol. 184, p. 518, Nov. 17, 1950.

M.T. Florinsky, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 66, p. 286, June 1951.
G.F. Hudson, New York Times, p. 7, Feb. 4, 1951.
B. Moore, American Political Science Review, vol. 45, p. 885, Sept. 1951.
A.J.P. Taylor, New Statesman and Nation, vol. 40, p. 628, Dec. 16, 1950.
L. Woolf, Political Quarterly, vol. 22, p. 209, 1951.
Current History, vol. 20, p. 229, April 1951.
Foreign Affairs, vol. 29, p. 676, July 1951.
Times Literary Supplement, p. 102, Feb. 16, 1951.

Volume II:

F.C. Barghoorn, Saturday Review of Literature, vol. 35, p. 16, July 12, 1952.
M. Beloff, Spectator, vol. 188, p. 404, March 28, 1952.
G.D.H. Cole, Soviet Studies, vol. 4, p. 139, 1952-53.
J. Davis, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 283, p. 225, Sept. 1952.
H. Holborn, Yale Review, vol. 42, p. 142, Autumn 1952.
B. Moore, Nation, vol. 174, p. 383, Apr. 19, 1952.
P.E. Mosely, New York Times, p. 19, Apr. 13, 1952.
A.J.P. Taylor, New Statesman and Nation, vol. 43, p. 350, March 22, 1952.
Current History, vol. 22, p. 377, June 1952.
Foreign Affairs, vol. 30, p. 679, July 1952.
International Affairs, vol. 28, p. 520, Oct. 1952.
Journal of Modern History, p. 318, June 1952.
Times Literary Supplement, p. 165, March 7, 1952.

Volume III:

F.C. Barghoorn, Saturday Review of Literature, vol. 36, p. 20, Oct. 17, 1953.
M. Beloff, Spectator, vol. 190, p. 522, April 24, 1953.

J. Degras, International Affairs, vol. 29, p. 512, Oct. 1953.

P.E. Mosely, New York Times, p. 1, Sept. 27, 1953.

Nation, vol. 177, p. 452, Nov. 28, 1953.

Times Literary Supplement, p. 359, June 5, 1953.

Volume IV:

M. Brecher, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, p. 267, May 1955.

D. Footman, Spectator, vol. 192, p. 502, Oct. 22, 1954.

P.E. Mosely, New York Times, p. 3, Nov. 28, 1954.

A.J.P. Taylor, New Statesman and Nation, vol. 48, p. 396, Oct. 2, 1954.

International Affairs, vol. 31, p. 245, April 1955.

OTHER SOURCES CONSULTED

1. Books

G. Antonius: The Arab Awakening, London, (H. Hamilton), 1938.

J.W.W. Bennett: The Nemesis of Power, The German Army in Politics, 1918-45, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1954.

J.W.W. Bennett: Brest-Litovsk, the Forgotten Peace, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1938.

D.W. Brogan: France Under the Republic, 1870-1939, New York, (Harper & Brothers), 1940.

W. Churchill: The Gathering Storm, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co.), 1948.

Contemporary Political Science, A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching, UNESCO, 1950.

J. Deane: The Political Ideals of H.J. Laski, New York, (Columbia University Press), 1955.

I. Deutscher: Stalin, a Political Biography, London, (Oxford University Press), 1949.

I. Deutscher: Russia: What Next? New York, (Oxford University Press), 1953.

- I. Deutscher: Heretics and Renegades, and Other Essays, London, (Hamish Hamilton), 1955.
- I. Deutscher: Soviet Trade Unions: Their Place in Soviet Labour Policy, New York, (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1950.
- L.W. Doob: Propaganda, its Psychology and Technique, New York, (H. Holt & Co.), 1935.
- L.W. Doob: Public Opinion and Propaganda, New York, 1948.
- T.S. Eliot: Selected Prose, Penguin Books, No. 873.
- Ortega Y. Gasset: The Revolt of the Masses, Mentor Books ed.
- J. Goebbels: My Part in Germany's Fight, London, (Hurst & Blackett), 1940.
- W. Goerlitz: Der Zweite Welt-Krieg, 1939-45, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1951-52.
- E. Goldhagen: The Withering Away of the State, M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1954.
- K. Heiden: Der Fuehrer, Boston, (H. Mifflin Co.), 1944.
- A. Hitler: Mein Kampf, 13. Aufl., F. Eher, 1932.
- J.H. Herz: Political Realism and Political Idealism, Chicago, (University of Chicago Press), 1951.
- H.J. Laski: Faith, Reason, and Civilization, an Essay in Historical Analysis, London, (V. Gollancz), 1944.
- H.D. Lasswell: An Analysis of Political Behaviour, London, (Routledge, Kegan Paul), 1951.
- V.I. Lenin: Selected Works, 10 vols., London, (Lawrence & Wishart), 1938.
- V.I. Lenin: State and Revolution, New York, (International Publishers), 1932.
- W. Lippmann: The Public Philosophy, Boston, (Little, Brown & Co.), 1955.
- M. Litvinov: Notes For a Journal, with an introduction by E.H. Carr, New York, (W. Morrow & Co.), 1955.
- K. Mannheim: Ideology and Utopia, New York, (A Harvest Book).
- K. Marx: Selected Works, London, (Lawrence & Wishart), 1945.
- K. Marx: Capital, a Critique of Political Economy, ed. by F. Engels, Chicago, (C.H. Kerr Co.), 1933.

- K. Marx: A Critique of the Gotha Program, London, (Martin & Lawrence), 1933.
- K. Marx: Capital, The Communist Manifesto, and Other Writings, ed. by M. Eastman, New York, (The Modern Library), 1932.
- K. Marx: Selected Works, ed. and introduced by G. Burns, London, (Victor Gollancz), 1935.
- W. Mills: The Power Elite, New York, 1956.
- B. Moore: Terror and Progress in the USSR; Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship, Cambridge, Mass., 1954.
- H. Morgenthau: Politics Among Nations, Second, revised ed., New York, (A.A. Knopf), 1955.
- J. Nehru: Independence And After, A Collection of Speeches, 1946-49, New York, (The J. Day Co.), 1950.
- F. Neumann: Behemoth, The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-44, New York, (Oxford University Press), 1944.
- R. Niehbur: Moral Man and Immoral Society, a Study in Ethics and Politics, New York, (Charles Scribner's Sons), 1934.
- M. Oakeshott: The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe, New York, (Cambridge University Press), 1950.
- J.J. Rousseau: The Social Contract, On Slavery, Great Books of the Western World, Series No. 38.
- A.L. Rowse: The End of an Epoch, Reflections on Contemporary History, London, (Macmillan & Co.), 1947.
- B. Russell: Power; a New Social Analysis, New York, (W.W. Norton & Co.), 1938.
- B. Russell: Unpopular Essays, London, 1950.
- F. von Schlabrendorff: Offiziere Gegen Hitler, Zurich, 1946.
- C. Schmitt: Die Diktatur, 2. Aufl., Munchen, (Duncker & Humboldt), 1928.
- F.L. Schuman: International Politics, 5th ed., New York, (McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.), 1953.
- J. Schumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd ed., New York, (Harper & Brothers), 1950.
- H. & M. Sprout: (ed.), Foundations of International Power, New York, (O. Van Nostrand Co.), 1945.

- R. Stammler: The Theory of Justice, New York, 1925.
- J.L. Talmon: The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, London, (Secker & Warburg), 1952.
- A.J.P. Taylor: The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford, (Clarendon Press), 1954.
- K.W. Thompson: The Philosophy of International Relations of A.J. Toynbee, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1951 (microfilm).
- A. de Tocqueville: Democracy in America, 2 vols., New York, (Vintage Books), 1954.
- A. Toynbee: A Study of History, vol. 4, London, (Oxford University Press), 1948.
- T. Veblen: The Engineer and the Price System, New York, (Viking Press), 1933.
- B. Ward: The West at Bay, New York, (Norton), 1948.
- W. Welch: The Possibility of a Science of Politics, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1951 (typewritten copy).
- A. Werth: The Twilight of France, 1939-40, New York, (Harper and Brothers), 1942.
- A. Werth: France and Munich Before the Surrender, New York, (Harper & Brothers), 1939.
- E. Wilson: The Shores of Light, New York, (Farrar, Strauss), 1952.
- A. Zimmern: The Prospects of Civilization, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, Oxford, (Clarendon Press), 1939.

2. Articles

- H. Butterfield: "The Scientific Versus the Moralistic Approach in International Affairs", International Affairs, vol. 27, pp. 411-22, Oct. 1951.
- G. Catlin: "Contemporary British Political Thought", American Political Science Review, vol. 46, pp. 641-59, Sept. 1952.
- E. Goldhagen: "Notes on Karl Marx's Views on Nations and Nationalism", Typewritten copy of an address delivered at Seminar of the Russian Research Centre, Harvard University, 1956.

- W.H. Hale: "The Politicians Try Victory Through Air Power", The Reporter, Sept. 6, 1956.
- H. Marcuse: "Recent Literature on Marxism", World Politics, pp. 515-25, July 1954.
- H. Marcuse: "Remarks about the Relations between Ideology and Utopia in Soviet Marxism", 21st Jan. 1954, Lecture delivered at Harvard University, Mimeographed text.
- B. Moore: "Notes Toward a Theory of International Relations", paper presented in a staff seminar, at Harvard University, 1954, mimeographed copy.
- F. Neumann: "Approaches to the Study of Political Power", Political Science Quarterly, 1950.
- F. Neumann: "Oekonomie und Politik im Zwanzigsten Jahrhundert", Zeitschrift fur Politik, Jahrgang 2, March 1955, pp. 1-11.
- H. Seton Watson: "The Ruling Class in Russia", The Listener, pp. 959-60, 974, June 2, 1955.
- Soviet Studies, Vol. I-V, Oxford, (Blackwell), 1949-1955.