

The Turkish Transformation and Celal Bayar

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is a study of one of the most important national statesmen, politicians, and economists in the history of Turkish republic: Celal Bayar. It will analyze his impact on the Turkish revolution and the evolution of the nation's politics. Celal Bayar, Turkey's third president did not fit the mold of his country's top politicians of the day. He was essentially different from all the other key players of his generation in terms of his background, education, experience, career path, and even length of life. Those who have written about him have for the most part been either uncritical admirers or bitter enemies. Though he held, in turn, the positions of Minister of the Economy, Prime Minister and President (he was the first civilian to hold this part) during one of the most critical periods in Turkish political history. Thus, he was overshadowed by his predecessors Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. Yet his very uniqueness makes him an apt subject for study.

Celal Bayar deserves our attention because he undertook crucial responsibilities and duties in the social and economic transformation of Turkey. In an era of strong state policies that made up for the weakness of the social classes, Bayar was the founder of the nation's mixed economy. During the Turkish revolution and the subsequent formation of a united Turkish society, he devoted himself to the development of the national economy. Throughout his political career he exercised a decisive influence over the evolution of the country's politics, economy, society, and foreign relations. Despite his importance, there is a general dearth of academic studies in English about him—a situation that this study seeks to correct.

RÉSUMÉ

Auteur : Başak Özoral
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Cette thèse étudie l'un des plus importants hommes d'état, politiciens et économistes de l'histoire de la République turque : Celal Bayar. Elle examine son impact sur la révolution turque et sur l'évolution politique de son pays. Bayar, le troisième président, ne conformait pas au modèle des politiciens saillants de son jour. Il se différait essentiellement des autres joueurs clefs de sa génération pour ce qui est de sa formation, son éducation, sa carrière et même la durée de sa vie. Ceux qui ont écrit sur lui ont été, pour la plupart, ou des admirateurs peu exigeants ou des ennemis implacables. Or, même s'il a détenu les postes de ministre de l'économie, premier ministre et président (le premier civil à tenir cette place), pendant l'un des périodes les plus critiques de l'histoire de la Turquie, il a été éclipsé par ses prédécesseurs Mustafa Kemal Atatürk et İsmet İnönü. Ainsi, son caractère unique le rend très convenable comme sujet d'étude.

Celal Bayar mérite notre attention parce qu'il a pris en main des responsabilités et des devoirs critiques à la transformation sociale et économique de la Turquie. Dans une période de politiques d'état qui rachetaient la faiblesse des différents secteurs, Bayar est devenu le fondateur de l'économie mixte de la nation. Pendant la révolution et la formation d'une société turque unie, il s'est dévoué au développement de l'économie nationale. Pendant toute sa carrière politique il a exercé une influence décisive sur l'évolution de la politique, l'économie, la société et les relations étrangères du pays. Mais malgré son importance, il y a une pénurie relative de documentation sur lui – une pénurie que vise à combler le présent travail.

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I dedicate this work to my father Muammer Ekti who encouraged me to be a lifelong student. I thank my mother and sister and my mother-and father- in- law who gave much of their love and energy to care for my newborn baby throughout my thesis research.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CUP	the Committee of Union and Progress
DP	Democrat Party
GNA	Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NUC	National Unity Committee
RPP	Republican People's Party
TL	Turkish Lira

NOTES ON TRANSCRIPTION

In the following pages, the official modern Turkish orthography has been used when transcribing Turkish names and words in the Latin script. The following notes on pronunciation, based mainly on G. L. Lewis, *Teach Yourself Turkish*, 3rd ed. (1959), are given as an aid to readers unacquainted with the language:

c- j as in jam

ç- ch as in church

ğ- soft g lengthens the preceding vowel

ı- something like u in radium

ö- French eu as in deux or seul

ş- sh as in shut

ü- French u as in lumière

THE TURKISH TRANSFORMATION

AND CELAL BAYAR

INTRODUCTION

After the occupation of İzmir, military and civilian patriots worked to set up national resistance forces to oppose the Greek advance in the Aydın region. The efforts and loyalty of Celal Bey, who went to this region from İzmir, having changed his name and disguised himself, were truly remarkable in this endeavour.

**Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
October 1927¹**

Scholars of Turkish political history, when studying the formative period of the Turkish Republic, will notice the names of two individuals who competed in their devotion to the republic and in loyalty to Atatürk: One of these great statesmen was İsmet İnönü,² the other, Celal Bayar.³

The success of the Turkish revolution in fact gave rise to the notion that these and other principal figures on the Turkish side acted in total harmony and solidarity. Traditional Turkish historians and the version of history taught in state schools have sought to perpetuate this idea.⁴ This thesis, however, seeks to explore the dynamics between the leaders of the revolution and the consequences thereof, which were to affect the life of the

¹ Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, vol. 2, 1920-1927 (Ankara: TTK Yayınları 1989), p. 607. Translation is mine.

² Turkish statesman and soldier, President of Turkey (1884-1973)

³ Turhan Dilligil, "Tarihi Buluşma," in *100 Yaşında Celal Bayar'a Armağan* (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1982), p. 61.

⁴ Ceyhan Atuf Kansu, *Atatürk ve Kurtuluş Savaşı* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1997); Şerafettin Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2004); Patrick Kinross, *Atatürk: the Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990); Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (London: John Murray, 1999).

republic established as a result of this revolution. My investigation of these dynamics will be carried out by focusing on the life of Celal Bayar, one of the foremost leaders of the revolution. A supporter from the start, Bayar was key player in the establishment of the Republic and eventually became its president, only to be removed in a coup and later marginalized politically.

The reason why I have chosen to study Bayar's life between 1918 and 1960 is because biographical research in the political history of the Turkish republic is very well developed. Social scientists usually preferred research a specific time period or a specific institution. As a result the biographical tradition in Turkey has been confined to autobiographical works by retired politicians and civil servants. These studies are personal and are neither very scientific nor academic.

Bayar's life makes an especially interesting topic for academic research on account of the sheer diversity of his activities in support of the Republican cause. He was initially inspired by the Young Turk revolution, and then trained as an economist and banker. During the War of Independence, he played a crucial role not only as a strategist and commander but also as an astute observer of Turkish society, a trait that enabled him to mobilize the population by appealing to their religious sentiments. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic he was instrumental in almost single-handedly establishing the economic system of the new republic. He was a minister of the economy, founder of the republic's first national bank, architect of Turkish 'statism,' and initiator of true

multiparty democracy in Turkey. He was also the first civilian prime minister and the third president of the Republic. In addition he lived to be over a hundred years old, thus enjoying one of the longest political careers in Turkish history.

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the role that Celal Bayar played as a political leader in the evolution of Turkish politics. Emphasis will be given to his impact on the achievements and shortcomings of Turkey's experience with democratic politics during the twentieth century. The portrait of him presented here offers a unique perspective into the world of Turkish politics and the country's quest to consolidate its democratic regime.

The aim of this research, however, is not only to relate Bayar's life story, but also to provide an understanding of the important role of this life story in the context of the Turkish revolution. An examination of Celal Bayar's career presents, moreover, an opportunity for an objective evaluation of early Turkish republican history as well as of the dynamics of religious and social change in modern Turkey.

So far, no major work has been undertaken in English about Celal Bayar and his influence on Turkish political life. This thesis, a study of Celal Bayar, his works, and his impact on the Turkish revolution and Turkish democracy, aims at filling this gap. It also represents the most recent, and perhaps the first critical, evaluation of Bayar.

There have been many books and a few masters' theses written in Turkish about Celal Bayar by journalists, political scientists, and historians.⁵ Yet although it is easy to access these resources, there is some concern about their quality. This is for two reasons: First, most of the studies were written from the political perspective of the Democrat Party or of the opposition. Therefore, they were far from objective. Second, they generally involve political advocacy and fail to employ a satisfactory proper methodology.

For this reason the present study will rely mainly on primary sources, such as Özel Şahingiray's collection of Bayar's speeches entitled *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev, Demeç ve Konuşmaları* [Celal Bayar's Speech's, Declarations, and Discussions]⁶ and Bayar's own eight-volume memoirs *Ben de Yazdım* [I Also Wrote]⁷. I will also draw upon Cemal Kutay's *Celal Bayar*,⁸ a highly informative book, which specifically deals with his early life. These three works provide substantive insight into the events during Bayar's involvement in all phases of political and social changes in Turkey, and depict some of the intimate aspects of Bayar's life.

Structurally, this study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter examines the early life of Celal Bayar; his educational background and the factors that influenced Bayar in his activities during the Turkish war of independence. The second chapter deals with

⁵ *Türk Devriminde Celal Bayar* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2000) was written by Erkan Şenşekerci as a Ph.D. thesis, while *Celal Bayar, Başbakanlık Dönemi* (1937-1939) (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1996) was written by Nurşen Mazıcı as a M.A. thesis. Turkish historian Cemal Kutay furthermore wrote *Celal Bayar* in 4 volumes (İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1939-1940), while *Galip Hoca Celal Bayar* (Ankara: Saypa Yayınları, 1996) was written by Burhanettin Bilmez as a M.A. thesis.

⁶ Özel Şahingiray, *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev, Demeç ve Konuşmaları* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999).

⁷ Celal Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, 8 vols. (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965-1972).

⁸ Cemal Kutay, *Celal Bayar*, 4 vols. (İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1939-1940).

Bayar's ideas and ideology and his impact on the creation of a new secular republic and a new economic structure. The third chapter concentrates on Bayar's views and activities in the establishment of a multiparty system, besides offering a detailed discussion of the growth of democracy in Turkey and the 1960 'revolution'.

CHAPTER ONE

The Historical Background

“Turkey out of the war!” was the shout of London newsboys on 31 October, 1918.⁹ After eight years of uninterrupted struggle, the resistance of Turkey had finally been broken; thus it seemed that the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ was about to expire after a prolonged illness.¹⁰

Although Turkish public opinion was generally against joining World War I, the Ottoman Empire found itself at war with the Allies (the French, British, Italians, and Greeks) as a result of a secret treaty signed on 2 August 1914 with the Imperial Germany. The treaty was signed by a small group of senior army leaders who had come under German military influence.¹¹ Enver Pasha, the minister of War, bore particular responsibility for the nation’s entry into World War I.

Although at first the Germans and Austrians considered Turkey more of a liability, than considering the resources devoted to its defence a waste, the Germans soon realized that a Turkish army commanded by German officers was an effective fighting machine and a

⁹ Sir Telford Waugh, *Turkey Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1930), p.170.

¹⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 234.

¹¹ The signatories on the Ottoman side included Enver Pasha the Minister of War, the Grand Vizier Sait Halim Pasha, Talat Pasha, the Minister of the Interior and Halil Bey, chairman of the Chamber of Deputies. Sait Halim Pasha reiterated that the nature of the German- Ottoman military agreement of 2 August 1914 was not offensive but defensive. See, Geoffrey L. Lewis, *Turkey* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 48-49; Ahmet Şeyhun, *Sait Halim Pasha* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2003), p. 119.

very valuable resource in its struggle against Russia.¹² This belief was borne out by Turkish victories over the British forces at Kut al-Ammara in Iraq in 1916 and over the allied expeditionary forces (Anzacs) in Gallipoli.

During the war the principal Western allies the France and Britain, conspired in a series of secret agreements¹³ to carve up the Ottoman Empire and distribute the pieces among themselves, with only a small piece of land in Central Anatolia left over for the Turks. İstanbul was promised to Russia, Turkey's historic enemy. The Allied intention was thus not only to divide up the Ottoman Empire (that is, the non-Turkish parts), but also to take possession of large sections of the very heartland of Turkey -- Anatolia-- where the majority of the population was Turkish.

Ottoman armies fought on many fronts simultaneously: in the Caucasus, in Iraq, Palestine, the Dardanelles, Galicia, and Macedonia. The Empire lost territories in the Levant and Eastern Anatolia while repelling allied offensives in Gallipoli and in Iraq. It was in part this over-extension of its forces that led to the nation's defeat, confirmed by the Mudros Armistice signed on 30 October 1918.¹⁴ One of the first consequences was the arrival of an allied fleet of sixty ships in the port of İstanbul on 13 November. The following day allied troops began to occupy İstanbul; many buildings were

¹² Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (İstanbul: Remzi Yayınevi, 1987), p. 269.

¹³ The Constantinople Agreement (1915) between Britain, France and Russia promised Constantinople to Russia. By the secret Pact of London (1915), arranged between Italy, France and Russia Italy was to receive certain territories in Asia Minor, including a share in the southern Anatolia region of Adana. The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) between Britain and France related mainly to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and provided for the establishment of the independent Arab states under the control of Britain and France. The St. Jean de Marianne Agreement (1917) was signed between Britain, France and Italy. See T.L. Jarman, *Turkey* (Bristol: Arrowsmith, 1935), p. 62; Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey* (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1965), p.53.

¹⁴ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 234; Ahmet Şeyhun, *Sait Halim*, p. 109.

commandeered for their use. French troops from Syria moved into the Galicia and Adana regions. British forces landed at the Dardanelles, Samsun, Antep, and other strategic points. Italian forces landed at Antalya, while the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were handed over to mandatory powers. Armenia was declared an independent state, and a commission in Constantinople was set up to prepare a plan for the establishment of an autonomous region for the Kurds. Although the word 'occupation' was not used, it was obvious that the allies had designs on a large part of Anatolia itself.¹⁵ The Mudros Armistice in fact spelled the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire: all sovereign rights were ended, the army was dismissed, the fleet demobilized, and all resources and agencies of communication were handed over to the enemy powers. It was a black day in Turkish history and was in store.

At the end of World War I, the new Sultan Mehmet Vahideddin, known as Mehmet VI, sought to take refuge in Britain, believing that unrest against the allied occupation was detrimental to both the interests of the Empire and his own personal future.¹⁶ The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)¹⁷ had collapsed because it was blamed for both the war and the shameful defeat, while its leaders had fled abroad. Some of the new parties and associations were looking for peaceful solutions, but the Sultan was among

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 235. Russian claims to Turkish territory had been renounced by the Bolsheviks in 1917. See G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 52.

¹⁶ Fahri Belen, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1983), p. 49.

¹⁷ The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (*İttihat ve Terakki*) was a secret revolutionary organization of students and graduates of the modern schools of higher education in the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning it was established to fight with the oppressive regime of Abdulhamid II (1908) so that the CUP became the first political party which supported modernity, the parliamentary regime, the constitutional reform and the constitution. The first and the most important of these schools were the schools of Medicine (founded in 1827), War (1834), and Administration (1859). "Union" signified the union of the different ethnic and religious groups that inhabited the Empire, while "progress" was the aim of the CUP. When the power of Abdulhamid II was very weak, the CUP suddenly spread throughout the country and became only the most important power, effectively ruling the Empire. See, *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971) vol. 20, pp.197-199.

the new leaders in the capital for whom political discussion centered on the form that Turkish helplessness was to take, and on the comparative merits of an American or a British mandate. The Turkish people, demoralized and discouraged, seemed prepared to say yes to almost any conditions that the victors chose to impose on them.¹⁸ Mustafa Kemal described the position at the end of the war thus:

Sultan Vahidettin, the degenerate occupant of the throne and the Caliphate, was seeking for some despicable way to save his person and his throne, the only objects of his anxiety. The Cabinet, of which Damat Ferit Pasha was the head, was weak and lacked dignity and courage. It was subservient to the will of the Sultan alone and agreed to every proposal that could protect its members and their sovereign.¹⁹

Britain, France, and Italy were the main occupying powers but they had been weakened by the war. Greece wanted to realize its historical ambitions²⁰ of expansion into Anatolia while the great powers still had designs on other parts of Anatolia. During the summer and fall of 1919, with authorization from the Supreme Allied War Council, the Greeks occupied Adrianople (Edirne), Bursa, and Smyrna (İzmir), where a landing was effected under cover of an Allied flotilla that included American warships. No Turkish opposition was offered, and the Greeks had soon moved as far as Uşak, 175 kilometers inland from İzmir. Finally, on 15 May 1919, Greek military forces occupied İzmir.²¹ The reasons for the Greek occupation of İzmir were not clear. However, The Italians were pushing for the realization of their aims as spelled out in the Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, and the

¹⁸ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 236.

¹⁹ Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, *A Speech* (Germany: Leipzig, 1929), p. 9.

²⁰ This was the 'Great Idea' - the restoration of the departed glories of the Greek Christian Empire of Constantinople, see Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 237.

²¹ Tülay Duran, "Milli Mücadele Batı Cephesinde Kuvay-i Milliye'nin Kuruluşu ve Celal Bayar" (Atatürk'e Verilen Rapor), In *Yüz Yaşında Celal Bayar'a Armağan* (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1982), p. 287.

Allies feared that they might not wait for a peace treaty but would seize İzmir out of hand as they had seized Fiume and Dalmatia. At the same time the Greek premier, Venizelos, used his influence over the British Prime Minister Lloyd George to such an extent that the Allied Powers agreed to the sending of Greek troops to İzmir.²² The Allies insisted that this occupation was necessary to stop disorder and to secure the safety of Greek and the other minorities, while citing the terms of the Mudros Armistice in this regard.

Most of the Turkish cities were thus under enemy control, while the Turkish nation itself stood on the brink of disaster. But, as had happened before in their history, at the hour of real disaster, Turks responded spontaneously to the first stirrings of nationalist spirit, and decided to stand together. Patriotic groups sprang up in every part of Turkey. The threat of final obliteration had forced the Turks to awaken from dull indifference and rouse themselves to action.²³

Turkish guerrillas took up the struggle and a bloody resistance soon developed; indeed, the idea of resistance became stronger after the occupation of İzmir. Turkish resistance fighters in the İzmir area joined together under the name of *Kuvay-i Milliye* (National Forces).²⁴ On 28 May 1919, the first military engagement occurred at Ödemiş in Anatolia, while guerrilla clashes flared up along the line of the Greeks' furthest advance. The Turks

²² Thomas. L. Jarman, *Turkey* (Bristol: Arrowsmith, 1935), p. 63.

²³ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey* p. 53.

²⁴ Ibid.

were ready to put up a fight against the attackers,²⁵ despite the fact that the position of the Sultan and his government was the nationalist ideology itself was responsible for the misfortunes that had befallen the Empire.²⁶

Hence, although the Turkish War of Independence was fought mainly against the invading Greeks, it had elements of a civil war as well, since the movement for liberation also opposed those Turks who still supported the Ottoman sultan and his government in occupied İstanbul. The Turkish national mythology soon focused on a single hero, Mustafa Kemal, and the masses rallied around him. He was to be known later, after his many successes, as Atatürk, the Father of the Turks. He was not, however, alone in defending the country: there were many other figures who were instrumental in winning the Turkish War of Independence and who played a significant role in founding a new republic with him. One of them was Celal Bayar.

According to the Turkish author, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir,²⁷ Atatürk was the first, and İnönü the second most important man in the history of the Turkish revolution, while there is an on-going debate about the third most influential. No one has as yet suggested Celal Bayar for this honour, and even Celal Bayar did not see himself as the third man of this troika of power. Thus the title is still unattributed. Yet it is obvious that, after the Turkish War of Independence, the national economy owed its re-establishment to the leadership

²⁵ Ibid., p. 237.

²⁶ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 240.

²⁷ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir is a famous Turkish historian who has written biographies of important figures in Turkish history like Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, and Adnan Menderes. His best known books are: *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Atatürk* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1983); *İkinci Adam* (İnönü's biography), 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1980), and *Menderes'in Dramı* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1976).

of Bayar. It is impossible to become an independent country without economic freedom, and Bayar assured this. For this reason alone he ranks with Atatürk and İnönü.

Origins and Political Career of Bayar

Celal Bayar was born in Umurbey, a local village about thirty kilometers northeast of Bursa, on 15 May 1883. His father, A. Fehmi Efendi, who had emigrated to the area from Plevne in the Balkans, was educated as a *müftü*²⁸ and served as the principal of Umurbey Middle School (*rüşdiye*). Bayar received his early education at the hands of his father, but he was deeply influenced by his maternal uncle, Mustafa Şevket, who had taken part in Ali Suavi's attempt to take over the CUP in May of 1878.²⁹ This revolutionary uncle gave his collection of books and magazines to Bayar, and they influenced him deeply.³⁰ This Şevket also bred in the young Bayar nationalist ideas and a permanent antipathy towards Sultan Abdülhamit II.³¹ Next to his family life, Umurbey provided the most influential environment for Bayar, who had an opportunity there to learn the rural traditions of Turkish Islam, and gained an intimate knowledge of village people and the land. Thus he did not learn these traditions from academic texts but rather from his actual surroundings. He was also led to question the relative positions of Greeks and Turks in society, especially in terms of economic prosperity. There was a remarkable contrast and difference in lifestyle between Muslim Turkish families, who lived in poor neighbourhoods, and Greek families, who dwelled in large and expensive houses. These

²⁸ The rank of *Müftü* designates a scholar with deep religious knowledge; therefore, he is head the forefront of other imams.

²⁹ Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 45.

³⁰ Mehmet Kemal, *Celal Bayar Efsanesi ve Raftaki Demokrasi* (İstanbul: ABeCe Yayınları, 1980), p. 9.

³¹ George Harris, "Celal Bayar: Conspiratorial Democrat," in *Political Leaders*, p. 45.

were important realities in the eyes of a politician eager to serve his country.³² The Turkish writer Şevket Süreyya Aydemir writes: “Bayar played a political game from a very early age and remained in politics all his life; that is why it is not wrong to say that he was a professional politician.”³³

At the Umurbey Middle School Bayar had many influential teachers, one of whom was named “Galip Hoca,” and he never forgot this name. Many years later, when he started to organize the *Kuvay-i Milliye*, he used this name as a pseudonym.³⁴ It is a good example of his loyalty. Also during this period he took extracurricular French lessons, while at the same time learning Arabic and Pharsian from his father. Unfortunately for Bayar, however, his two older brothers had died of tuberculosis, and so because he was the only child in his family, his father did not want to send Bayar on for higher education. Thus this formal education came to an end after completing middle school, although his efforts to learn on his own continued until the end of his life.³⁵ Later, Bayar passed the exam to join the Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankası*) and moved to Bursa to start working in this institution. At the same time he took classes at the College Française de L’Assomption to improve his proficiency in French.³⁶

This intellectual expansion obviously shaped his early career choices. Banking was a profession of completely Western motivation, at the time dominated by foreign institutions. After working for the Agricultural Bank, he moved to the Deutsche Orient

³² Burhanettin Bilmez, *Galip Hoca Celal Bayar* (Ankara: Saypa Yay. 1996), p. 36.

³³ Aydemir, *Menderes’in Dramı*, p. 175.

³⁴ Bilmez, *Galip Hoca*, p. 31.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³⁶ İsmet Bozdağ, *Celal Bayar* (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1986), p.326.

Bank, where, by 1907, he had become the Bursa branch manager. This further extended his horizons.³⁷ Bayar had an opportunity to read a number of magazines and books that came from Europe to the Bank, and so he started to understand the freedom movements in Europe and Macedonia, becoming particularly interested in the history of the French revolution.³⁸

During this period, his social circle in Bursa was becoming ever larger: in the process he made many friends, some of whom were members of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, CUP). In 1903, Bayar married Reşide, daughter of İnegöllü Rafet Bey, whose family was long established in Bursa.³⁹ In 1907, he joined a secret CUP Bursa branch by the name of “KÜME.”⁴⁰ When he joined the CUP, it is claimed that he told Reşide that they would have to divorce because of his revolutionary commitment, but she refused to consider this option and continued to support Bayar’s political activities until her death in December 1962.⁴¹ Bayar rose rapidly in the CUP, and became head of its organization in the Bursa region.

While serving in Bursa as the party’s *Katib-i Mesul*,⁴² two important events happened.

The first of these, in 1909, was the ‘31st March Incident,’⁴³ on which occasion Bayar

³⁷ Harris, “Celal Bayar” p. 46.

³⁸ Utkan Kocatürk, “Celal Bayar’la Bir Konuşma,” *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. 2, no: 5 (March 1986), p.325.

³⁹ Harris, “Celal Bayar” p. 46.

⁴⁰ Erkan Şenşekerci, *Türk Devriminde Celal Bayar* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2000), p. 29.

⁴¹ Harris, “Celal Bayar” p. 46.

⁴² In the CUP organization, the *Katib-i Mesul* had the last word on the most important decisions. The post was usually given to the oldest, best known, most experience person in the CUP. Celal Bayar thus became a *Katib-i Mesul* in İzmir, the second biggest city after İstanbul, when he was only thirty the youngest ever. See Cemal Kutay, *Üç Devirden Hakikatler* (İstanbul: Alioğlu Yayınevi, 1982), p. 12.

⁴³ Although the 31st March Incident has been seen as an Islamic reaction, it was really a military reaction opposed to *İttihat ve Terakki*. It was a different reaction from others, because although the military was not

created and armed a willing militia in Bursa to stop the coup attempt in İstanbul. He led this militia battalion from the front wearing a headband proclaiming “freedom or death.” They did not reach İstanbul, but were assigned to patrol and control the Mudanya coast. The second event was the outbreak in 1912 of the Balkan War. The loss of territory and the shame brought about by defeat incensed Bayar so much that he left Bursa in secret to go fight against the Bulgarian Army, without even informing his family or his employer.⁴⁴ These two incidents amply demonstrate his enthusiasm for and his commitment to the cause of a modern and strong Turkey. In 1913, Talat Pasha sent him to İzmir to serve as secretary in charge of the İzmir branch of the CUP when he was only 30 years old, and so at this point Bayar left his banking position and devoted all his attention to party work.⁴⁵

At the end of the Balkan war, the CUP lost its political power with the sultan and opposing parties deriding it as the cause of all the disasters that had befallen the country. As a result almost all CUP leaders left the country except for Bayar, who continued his job in İzmir.⁴⁶ There were two important items on Bayar’s agenda during his İzmir years. The first was limiting the influence in Western Anatolia of the Greek population and the second the promotion of Turkish economic activities in the Aegean. The percentage of the Greek population in Western Anatolia was very high and he felt that it could obstruct the

opposed to Sultan Abdulhamid II, the Sultan had to leave his power at the end of the Incident. The anti-Unionist forces attacked the İstanbul garrison. Islam was used for political ends again. The insurrection was led by very minor religious functionaries, known as *softas*, who had infiltrated the ranks of the garrison. They demanded the Sharia, which they claimed the constitution had replaced. To protect the safety in the country, a force known as the ‘Hareket Ordusu’ was sent to İstanbul and the 31st March Incident was stopped. Sina Akşin, “*İttihat ve Terakki* (İstanbul: Remzi, 1987); Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), p.36.

⁴⁴ Ziya Şakir, *Celal Bayar Hayatı ve Eserleri* (İstanbul: Akgün Matbaası, 1952), p.81.

⁴⁵ Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım: Milli Mücadeleye Giriş*, vol.5 p. 1579.

⁴⁶ Süleyman Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği* (Ankara: Serajans Yayınları, 1997), p. 101.

defence of the Dardanelles in the World War I.⁴⁷ The Ministry of War (*Harbiye Nezareti*) met secretly to resolve this issue. One of the decisions was that those Greeks who lived in İzmir and other parts of Western Anatolia were to be sent to the Aegean islands, and the execution of these orders was entrusted to Celal Bayar.⁴⁸ He applied considerable pressure on the Greeks, forcing about 130.000 of them to move to the Aegean islands from Western Anatolia in a very short time, and without any great turmoil.⁴⁹ In this way he was also able to reduce the economic predominance of the Greek community.

During this exercise, Bayar was greatly distressed by his realization of the economic and technical backwardness of the Turks. One of the first things that he noticed was that all railroad personnel were foreigners. He also appreciated the fact that railways were of critical military and strategic importance. His concern was further raised when he discovered that a problem involving the supply of wagons could be traced to a black market in which some brokers had suddenly become very rich.⁵⁰ He felt that the training and establishment of a new staff were necessary to stop this. He started by opening a railroad school to train Turkish youths in this field. Despite initially negative reaction, primarily from the government and Greeks, he ran this school very successfully. He said to the reactionaries:

⁴⁷ There were 450 000 Greeks living at the time on the West coast; 200 000 of them dueled in small towns along the coast, while 250 000 were living in 16 different cities. Faruk Şen, *Egenin iki Yakasından Ekonomi* (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları, 1987), p.2.

⁴⁸ Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, pp. 34-35.

⁴⁹ Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, vol. 5. p.1580; Kutay, *Üç Devirden Hakikatler*, pp. 52-53. Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, pp. 34-35. Although Bayar was successfully performed his task, after the Mudros Agreement, the Greeks who had left for the Aegean Islands returned to Turkey again. See Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, vol 5, p. 1580.

⁵⁰ Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, vol 5. p. 1558.

People want to see their government close to them at the head of beneficial enterprises and institutions. It should make us proud. If a war starts soon, will the Greek staff transport the Turkish soldiers or their necessities safely? Even if we do not care about this kind of probability, learning the railroad business is our own children's right in our land.⁵¹

Bayar engaged in many other nationalist activities as well. He and his close friend Dr. Nazım were the founders of the “Halka Doğru Cemiyeti” (Towards the People Society) whose aim was to raise the status of the middle class. Bayar also wrote a fortnightly column on economic issues under an assumed name: Turgut Alp. He also founded an agricultural cooperative and another co-op for fish producers in Balçova, as well as trying to establish several Turkish import-export companies and a national banking system, the latter in an attempt to solve the problem of obtaining capital.⁵² During all these activities he represented the CUP and never hesitated to apply the party program. After the fall of the CUP, he continued his activities by opposing the foreign occupation in the İzmir region, but government pressure on him increased and his name was placed on the wanted list: he even spent his last weeks in İzmir under police custody. On his release in 1919 Bayar decided to go to the Aegean region and organize the local village guerrillas in order to create a defensive border in Western Anatolia.⁵³ He could not stay in İzmir any more and so, with the help of his officer friends, he went to Tire-Ödemiş to join the National Independence Movement as one of its most important early members.

⁵¹ Yesilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, pp. 31-32.

⁵² Between 1915-1918, Bayar founded a number of national companies, among them; Aydın Kooperatif İncir Mahsulleri A. S, Şark İplik ve Mensucat Sinaat Osmanlı A.S. İzmir İhracat ve İthalat Türk A.S. , and Türkiye Palamutçuları A.S. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: Anadolu Yayınları 1983), vol. 6, p. 4284.

⁵³ Sakir. *Celal Bayar*, p. 55.; Bayar , *Ben de Yazdım* , vol. 5, p, 1648.

The Years of Kuvay-i Milliye and Bayar's New Title: Galip Hoca⁵⁴

In May 1919, after the Greeks landed in İzmir, a critical stage began in Bayar's revolutionary life, which would see him organize resistance activities in the Aegean under the disguise of a religious teacher, known as Galip Hoca.⁵⁵ 'Becoming' Galib Hoca marked a very interesting period in his life and it was the only example in the Independence War of a senior commander operating under disguise. Because of the religious education that he had received from his father, he had sufficient knowledge of Islam to become a preacher, or *hoca*.⁵⁶ Also at this time both the Greeks and government forces were relentlessly pursuing him, which gave him every reason to change his name and appearance.⁵⁷ He had originally changed his costume to that of an *efe* (village hero), but neither his speech nor his appearance lent credence to that disguise. He thought that, as a religious *hoca*, he would be able to move about more easily be organized the Akhisar front and worked with irregular militias who were themselves known as *efe* (village heroes). The support of these latter was to be essential to the success of the independence struggle.

On arriving in the Ödemiş –Tire region, Bayar explained to everybody he met that "this is our land, our nation and if it is necessary we have to protect our land with arms."

According to Bayar, military resistance was the only viable way to resist occupation, and

⁵⁴ Hoca: hodja (a devout Muslim man who is respected for his knowledge of Islam and who may perform a specific duty within an Islamic community).

⁵⁵ Harris, "Celal Bayar," in *Political Leaders*, p. 46.

⁵⁶ Şenşekerci, *Türk Devriminde*, p. 60.

⁵⁷ Necmettin Önder, "Bayar Yüz Yaşında," in *100 Yaşında Celal Bayar'a Armağan*, (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1982), p. 153.

he persuaded Gökçen Efe to join the armed fight with his eighty men.⁵⁸ His fame spread throughout the region and his recruits increased in number. Despite the fact that suspicions about his title and identity had increased, he moved to Germencik, which was occupied by Greeks. He called on Emin Bey who was the town leader and learned from him that the “People of Germencik were ready for the National Struggle.”⁵⁹ Bayar also devised a rudimentary news distribution system by means of which important information and messages could be posted on mosque doors.⁶⁰ In addition, Bayar and Emin Bey founded a small armed group consisting of 30 members.⁶¹ However, the secret identity of Galip Hoca was beginning to unravel. Less free now to move about, he became adviser to Demirci Mehmet Efe, who had many of his men at the Köşk front. There was a strong rivalry between Demirci Efe and Yörük Ali Efe, as *efe* were usually not able to endure each other’s power. However, they both respected and believed in Galip Hoca which allowed Bayar to smooth out disagreements between them.⁶² After this Bayar left the Aydın region and went to Akhisar, towards which the enemy was advancing. He was appointed the commander of the Akhisar Front after a short time⁶³ interestingly; Bayar did not follow the CUP’s policies during these activities on the Western front but rather the ideals of the national cause. Although he was an important figure in the CUP, he

⁵⁸ Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, p. 1768.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 1861. “Galip Hoca” was moving from one town to another in the Aegean region. First he went to Tire and Sivrihisar, and thereafter moved Köşk town. Germencik was one of the towns near Aydın. After he organized a small force in Germencik, he drove the Greeks out of the Aydın region with this troop. It was the first military movement in this region. After that Galip hoca went to the Akhisar Front Bayar had used every means of organizing the national resistance necessary for the national war in the Aegean region. The title of hoca gave him freedom. He could use mosques, and religious speeches to incite the people to national war. At the same time he cooperated with the national forces and their commanders. Ali Efe, Gökçen Efe, and Demirci Mehmet Efe were living in the Aegean Mountains with their men. Galip Hoca persuade these rebellious *efes* to fight together to rescue their land. Tülay Duran, “Milli Mücadelede Batı Cephesinde Kuvay-i Milliye’nin Kuruluşu ve Celal Bayar,” in *100 Yaşında*, pp. 241-245.

⁶⁰ Ziya Şakir, *Celal Bayar Hayatı*, p.81.

⁶¹ Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, p.1918.

⁶² Harris, “Celal Bayar” in *Political Leaders*, p. 46.

⁶³ Sakir, *Celal Bayar*, p.92.-93

believed that the national struggle did not depend on partisanship but rather on national consensus.

By July 1920, important military successes had been achieved, and the Greek advance stopped for the time being: this bought a little time for military reorganization in Anatolia.⁶⁴ Bayar had by this time already been returned as deputy for Saruhan (Manisa) in the 25 December 1919 elections to the Ottoman Parliament, where he served from 12 January to 16 March 1920.⁶⁵

Although Bayar had risked his life while fighting on the Akhisar front, those in power did not like what he had done. Minister of International Relations (*Dahiliye Nazırı*) Ali Kemal Bey described Bayar as a “bandit” in his newspaper *Payam-e Sabah*, declaring: “It is only in our poor country that a person who has worked as *Katib-i Mesul* for the CUP and determined the future of Greeks, who lived there, arms and encourages the people to fight.”⁶⁶ However, when the Turkish War of Independence ended in victory, Bayar’s mission was not commented on by anyone else.

Bayar in the Ottoman Parliament:

On 13 March 1920, Bayar delivered a very effective speech exhorting the Turks to armed struggle to save their country. He warned the İstanbul government and the foreign powers in the name of the Turkish people not to continue the occupation, and explained what

⁶⁴ Şenşekerci, *Türk Devriminde*, p. 64.

⁶⁵ Harris, “Celal Bayar” in *Political Leaders*, p. 46.

⁶⁶ Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, p. 51.

kinds of atrocities had happened since the occupation of Izmir. He said “The government does not understand people or care about their pain. While we are giving speeches here, the Turkish people are disappearing. If things continue like this, it will be understood that you are nothing.”⁶⁷ This speech had a very strong effect on the Ottoman Assembly and, three days after this speech, the British Army closed the Parliament. Moreover, because Bayar was a member of both the CUP and the *Kuvay-i Milliye*, the allied forces distrusted him and exiled him to Malta. Later, however, he escaped to Ankara with the help of some friends who were members of the CUP. In April 1920, while passing through Bursa on the way to Ankara, the Şeyhul-İslam Durrizade Abdullah Efendi issued a *fetva* (religious edict) declaring that the killing of rebels, on the orders of the Caliph, was a religious duty. With this *fetva*, Mustafa Kemal and other nationalist leaders, as well as members of the *Kuvay-i Milliye*, were effectively sentenced to death. The sultan and his government were prepared to use every means to pacify the growing resistance in Anatolia.⁶⁸ According to Celal Bayar, the biggest problem in the first days of the National Struggle was, in fact, this *fetva* which affected religious people very negatively. Bayar persuaded Muderris Kırşehirli Mustafa Efendi to issue an opposing *fetva* which declared “because İstanbul is under foreign occupation, it can not act according to its own free will, so this *fetva* of İstanbul is invalid. In addition, it is impossible to declare as rebels people who want to rescue their fatherland from the enemy, since the aim of this movement is to liberate their Sultan and Caliph from captivity.”⁶⁹ The effect of this new *fetva* was noticed immediately

⁶⁷ Şakir, *Celal Bayar*, p.102.

⁶⁸ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 246; Muhterem Uz, “Mahmut Celal Bey’i Nerede ve Nasıl Tanıdım”, in *100 Yaşında*, p. 204.

⁶⁹ Kutay, *Üç Devirden Hakikatler*, p. 82; Bilmez, *Galip Hoca*, p. 159.

and the number of recruits to the *Kuvay-i Milliye* increased remarkably. The rebel movement became stronger with every passing day.⁷⁰

Government in Ankara: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey

After the occupation of İstanbul, Bayar went to Ankara to take his seat in the National Assembly. This is where he first met Atatürk, for it was in Ankara that the nationalist movement had set up its wartime headquarters.⁷¹ Bayar's close relationship with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk would continue until the end of the Atatürk's life.⁷² At this meeting, the effect of Atatürk on Celal Bayar was quite positive. Bayar says: "He had an attractive persona, and he was a perfect example of trust and control of soul."⁷³ Bayar served as delegate for Manisa in the first Ankara Grand National Assembly, and very quickly showed himself to be one of the hardest working deputies.⁷⁴ On 27 February 1921, Celal Bayar was chosen by the first G.N.A. as Minister of the Economy because of his background in economic affairs.⁷⁵ His first achievement as a minister was a proposal to the Assembly to establish an Independence Tribunal (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*) with Tevfik Rüştü and Refik Şevket.⁷⁶ This proposal was accepted on 11 September 1921.⁷⁷

⁷⁰ Bilmez, *Galip Hoca*, p. 159.

⁷¹ Uz, "Mahmut Celal Bey'i Nerede ve Nasıl Tanıdım," in *100 Yüz Yaşında*, p. 204.

⁷² Harris, "Celal Bayar" in *Political Leaders*, p. 46.

⁷³ Kutay, *Üç Devirden Hakikatler*, p. 86.

⁷⁴ Bozdağ, *Celal Bayar*, p. 79.

⁷⁵ Harris, "Celal Bayar" in *Political Leaders*, p. 46.

⁷⁶ Altuğ Kurtul, *Celal Bayar Anlatıyor: Kritik Olayların Perde Arkası* (İstanbul: Tercüman Dizi Yazı, 1986)

⁷⁷ The establishment of the discipline forces and stopped of rebels in Anatolia was not easy. At the first times, Ethem, the Circassian was used for stop to rebels, but the success of an independence war depends on establishment a disciplinary forces. The problem of army escapers had prevented that. For this reason the law of "*Hiyaneti Vatanıye*" was accepted and Revolution Courts had established for these trails. After that their responsibilities were become larger. It contained betrayal of country, espionage, impropriety. See Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1839-1950* (Ankara, İmge Yayınları, 1995), pp. 193-95.

Leftist ideas first began to emerge in the Independence War after the establishment of the G.N.A.⁷⁸ During this time the first leftist society approved by Atatürk was the “Green Army.”⁷⁹ The aims of this society were clear: it would provide psychological support for the soldiers at the front to oppose the religious propaganda coming from İstanbul, and it would help mobilize soldiers who came from Russia.⁸⁰ However the “Green Army” turned out to be little more than a secret Turkish Communist Party and it was eventually declared an illegal organization by the G.N.A government.⁸¹

The list of the founders of this secret society consisted of fourteen names. Although thirteen of these are known,⁸² doubts remain regarding the identity of the last founder. According to leftist writers Aydemir and Mete Tuncay the fourteenth person was Bayar,⁸³ but there is no strong proof offered in justification of this claim. Bayar himself said: “although I visited the society very often because I was a close friend of Hakkı Behiç, who was the head of the society, I never joined them. Anyway, it lost its importance because Atatürk told them to stop and they stopped.”⁸⁴ However, despite Bayar’s declarations, the Green Army was not disbanded by Atatürk: its end came only with the arrival of Ethem the Circassian in the fall of 1920.⁸⁵ To prevent the spread of this society’s influence, however, Atatürk did approve a

⁷⁸ Mete Tuncay, *Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar (1908-1925)*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1967, p.77.

⁷⁹ Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, vol.2, pp. 627-629.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Aclan Sayılğan, *Solun 94 Yılı (1871-1965)* (Ankara: 1967), p.127.

⁸² Bursa deputy Sheyh Servet and Muhittin Baha, Minister of Health Dr. Adnan Adıvar, Minister of Finance Hakkı Behiç, Eskişehir deputy Eyüp Sabri, Hüseyin Sami, and İbrahim Süreyya, Muğla deputy Yunus Nadi, Saruhan Deputy Cırgıssızian Reşit, Dersim deputy Mustafa, deputy of İzmir Sırrı and Hamdi Namık, and deputy of Tokat Nazım. See, Fethi Tevetoglu, *Türkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler* (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1967), p.146; Fethi Tevetoglu, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar* (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1998), p. 220.

⁸³ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, 3 vols, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1980.vol.2, p. 344.

⁸⁴ Kocatürk, “Celal Bayar’la, p. 341

⁸⁵ Tunçay, *Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar (1908-1925)*, pp. 80-81.

new party--a legal Turkey Communist Party-- which survived only for three months.⁸⁶

Bayar shared Atatürk's ideas about the organization of the Green Army and Turkish Communist Party and said: "Atatürk wanted me to follow the Green Army's movement, but he did not say 'go and do it.' He preferred that I do so myself. Although I accepted his ideas on this point, I did not do it. The reason I did not take the responsibility to follow their movement was: I was the Economy Minister; I wanted to give all my attention to this job..."⁸⁷

Atatürk considered Bayar a good "revolutionary" and an excellent "organizer"⁸⁸ during the Independence War, and yet it was not clear whether Bayar was a member of the Communist Party or not. In any event Bayar had won the trust of Atatürk and kept it even after the dissolution of the party

Ethem, the Circassian

Because of the destructive Greek attack in June 1920, the strategy of the national movement had to be changed and rearranged, and the G.N.A. took some very serious decisions in this regard. The guerrilla war, which until then had been conducted by the *Kuvay-i Milliye*, was to be halted and a regular army created in its place. However, new, disciplined forces were not easy to set up because this would affect the distribution of the

⁸⁶ Tevetoğlu, *Türkiye'de Sosyalist*, p. 313.

⁸⁷ Mehmet Saray, *Atatürk'ün Sovyet Politikası* (İstanbul: Acar Yayınları, 1987), p. 58. The daughter of Bayar, Nilüfer Gürsoy rejects the suggestion that Bayar was a member of the Communist Party.

⁸⁸ Bayar wrote his memories and he mentioned that after the occupation of İstanbul he gave a speech in the Assembly and while Atatürk was listening he said "Pay attention to this man, he is a nice man but a revolutionary", and "...This man is a good organizer, he can be a good head" See, Celal Bayar *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar* (İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955), p. 82.

authority of the military forces. The strongest reaction came from the Western front where the most powerful guerrilla leaders had gotten used to their privileges. Ethem, the Circassian, the most important guerrilla leader, refused the offer to join the discipline of the regular army under the command of Albay İsmet (İnönü) and Albay Refet (Bele). Ethem looked down at the Government of the G.N.A. He did not like the commanders in charge of the Western Front and he declared he would not obey them.⁸⁹ Although Ethem's forces fought against the enemy (which prevented his dismissal by the national movement), he later focused more on augmenting his personal wealth and power.⁹⁰

In December 1920, Mustafa Kemal sent a committee led by Celal Bayar to Kütahya to solve this problem in a peaceful way.⁹¹ At this time Ethem, was gathering together his forces in Kütahya to attack the national forces. Mustafa Kemal had learned this from Ankara and he asked Bayar for details but Bayar's answer was different: "relax; there is no disagreement between us and Ethem, the Circassian."⁹² Why Bayar wrote this answer is still unclear, but obviously Bayar felt about Ethem differently from Mustafa Kemal. When Bayar was a member of *Kuvay-i Milliye*, he had fought in the front lines alongside Ethem. For these reasons, Bayar always respected Ethem and had sympathy for him.⁹³

Ultimately, however, the negotiations were unsuccessful and war broke out between the National Forces and Ethem and his brothers. As a result all Ethem's forces were dispersed, and he and three of his brothers joined the Greeks with a small band of

⁸⁹ Şenşekerci, *Türk Devriminde*, p. 92.

⁹⁰ Rahmi Apak, *Garp Cephesi Nasıl Kuruldu* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990), p. 105.

⁹¹ Yunus Nadi, *Çerkes Ethem Kuvvetlerinin İhaneti* (İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955), p. 74.

⁹² Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 161.

⁹³ Şenşekerci, *Türk Devriminde*, p. 94-95.

followers.⁹⁴ Ironically, had Ethem accepted a role within the National Forces, he probably would have emerged as one of the most important leaders of the nationalist movement.

The Treaty of Lausanne

In July 1921, Greeks attacked along the entire front, and on 13 July they entered the city of Afyonkarahisar. The same day, the battle of Kütahya-Eskisehir-Altıntaş started on a very wide front as well. The Turkish Commander of the Western Front ordered a retreat, and Turks lost the city of Kütahya on July 17 and Eskişehir on July 19. The next obstacle faced by the Greeks was the crossing of the Sakarya River.⁹⁵ However their advance was finally checked in 1921, when İsmet Pasha managed to halt the Greek advance at İnönü, a little west of Eskişehir. But a new Greek offensive in July caused Kemal himself to order a strategic retreat, bartering space for time, until the Greeks were on the Sakarya River, only some fifty miles from Ankara. Mustafa Kemal became the Commander in-Chief of the army and president of the National Assembly.⁹⁶ He had by this time assigned Bayar to the *Tekalif-i Milliye Komisyonu* (National Tax Committee) with a staff of seven senior officers. The Turkish army confiscated forty percent of all available material and human resources of the general population in order to oppose the advancing Greek Army.⁹⁷

While Atatürk was stabilizing the military situation, he asked Bayar: “Celal Bey, you must know: Can each family give a pair of underwear and a pair of wool socks to

⁹⁴ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 161

⁹⁵ Kutay, *Üç Devirden Hakikatler*, p. 88.

⁹⁶ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 71., Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 39; Roderic H. Davison, *Turkey*, pp. 124-127.

⁹⁷ Kutay, *Üç Devirden*, p. 92.

provision the troops?"⁹⁸ Mustafa Kemal personally promised the Turkish people that he would pay back every cent of all of the materials after the victory and one of the signatures on this governmental decree was Bayar's.

Bayar's other duty was to represent the government in the military negotiations to buy arms secretly from the French and Italians. He was in Germany buying arms at the beginning of the Great Offensive. After three weeks of fighting in the Sakarya region in the summer of 1921, Kemal drove the Greeks back. The G.N.A. was overjoyed, and in gratitude gave Mustafa Kemal, on behalf of the Turkish people, the title of Gazi (warrior Hero). On August 1922, the final stage of the war began when the Greeks broke and fled towards the coast, their commanding general having been captured. On 9 September, the Turkish nationalists reoccupied İzmir, thus completing the reconquest of Anatolia.⁹⁹ On 11 October 1922, a peace agreement between Turkey and Greece was signed in Mudanya, and so the treaty of Sèvres now stood revoked. In November 1922 a new treaty was signed, in Lausanne, and the Ankara government alone represented Turkey there.¹⁰⁰ İsmet Pasha was the head of the Turkish delegation and Bayar joined these meetings as an economic consultant from November 1922 to January 1923. His refusal to pay off the Ottoman loans in gold averted what could have been a serious economic problem for the new government.¹⁰¹ Bayar and İnönü, however, had disagreed over the Aegean Islands, with Bayar insisting that these islands situated off of Turkish coast should be under Turkish control while İnönü said in meetings that he did not want any land except those

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 95.

⁹⁹ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 71., Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 39; Davison, *Turkey*, pp. 124-127.

¹⁰⁰ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 71.

¹⁰¹ Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, p. 65.

within the national borders of Turkey. Bayar told Mustafa Kemal that he did not want to join the second round of the Lausanne meeting. Mustafa Kemal granted Bayar's request, and allowed him to stay behind in Ankara.¹⁰²

As a result of the treaty of Lausanne, the national borders of Turkey were established as per the demands of the G.N.A. One other problem was solved at Lausanne: the Greek and Turkish populations of Turkey and Greece were to be exchanged, except for the Greeks of İstanbul and the Turks of Western Thrace.¹⁰³ The G.N.A. could not do this job itself because the populations on both sides were huge and there could be a number of serious problems and unpleasant results about the population exchange. In March 1924, Mustafa Kemal put Celal Bayar in charge of the Exchange of Populations, Construction, and Resettlement until 7 July 1924, in recognition of his experience in dealing with the Greeks during CUP times. Bayar not only organized the exchange of population but he tried to solve the resettlement and employment problems of immigrants. There were 400.000 Turkish who were waiting to migrate to the motherland.¹⁰⁴ Bayar established a commission to research which climates and regions were suitable for immigrants and how they would be transferred to Turkey. During Bayar's term 60.000 people transferred each month, settling in Izmit, Samsun, Adana and Tekirdağ. For the first two months the Turkish government gave them economic support. Bayar eventually resettled more than

¹⁰² Kutay, *Üç Devirden*, pp. 160-162.

¹⁰³ Davison, *Turkey*, p. 126; G. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 75. "An exchange obligation between Orthodox Greek Turkish citizens who settled in the Turkish lands and Muslim Greek citizens who settled in the Greek lands will start 1 May 1923 (Number 1). However this exchange would not cover the Greeks who live in İstanbul and Muslims who live in Western Thrace (Number 2)," Ismail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Anlaşmaları*, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları 1990), p.177.

¹⁰⁴ Faruk Şen, *Ege'nin İki Yakasından Ekonomi* (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları 1987), p. 3.

250.000 displaced Turks in Anatolia.¹⁰⁵ The results of this exchange were significant; the Greeks who migrated to Greece were professionals and their arrival affected the Greek economy very positively. Turkish immigrants on the other hand were usually farmers and they were used to rebuild Turkish villages that had been destroyed in wartime. When Greek immigrants left the Aegean region an economic crisis began, so the creation of a national economy became an urgent obligation.¹⁰⁶ In the July 1923 national elections, Bayar ran for a seat from İzmir on the ticket of the recently organized People's Party and he was elected to the parliament. During this term he served as chairman of the G.N.A.'s Economics Committee. He was noticed for his speeches that were opposed to monarchy and the Caliphate. The conditions of the G.N.A. were not suitable for such speeches in these years, and a lot of people objected to Bayar and his ideas. However, Atatürk shared Bayar's opinions and supported him suppressing the reactions with his authority. During this term Bayar's aim was the development of the economic power and the military potential of Turkey. When he organized the Economy Ministry, he was working on some new projects for increasing the productivity of land and managing the mines. He visited the mine pits and saw the conditions faced by the miners, which prompted him to design new laws about mines and to propose them to the G.N.A.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, pp. 65-66.

¹⁰⁶ Şen, *Ege'nin İki Yakasından Ekonomi*, p. 3.

¹⁰⁷ Bozdağ, "Celal Bayar'ın Hayat Hikayesi," in *100 Yaşında Celal Bayar'a Armağan*, p. 336.

CHAPTER 2

The Turkish Republic and the rise of Celal Bayar;

Establishment of the İş Bank (Business Bank)

After the military struggle had been won, the new government was faced with the need for urgent economic development, but lacked the finances and access to loans necessary for generating capital.¹⁰⁸ Before founding a national economic system, therefore, it was essential to prepare a national loan system, in which the most important step was the founding of a national banking sector. The biggest obstacle to this, however, was the perception that Turks lacked business prowess and skills.¹⁰⁹ In the Ottoman Empire, Turks had traditionally avoided careers in business, preferring to become soldiers, farmers, or government employees.¹¹⁰

After the establishment of the Republic, the first big bank founded through private loans was the İş-Bank (Business Bank). Bayar offered to set up a national bank to promote commerce and industry in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal supported this idea and appointed Bayar as the general manager for the management and organization of the İş- Bank, prompting Bayar to quit his ministry job and become the head of the İş Bank in 1924. On Atatürk's orders, he proceeded to establish the bank with funds from Atatürk and

¹⁰⁸ *The Economist*, 13 March 1926,

¹⁰⁹ Kutay, *Celal Bayar*, vol. 1 p.

¹¹⁰ Bayar knew this would have to change if Turkey was over to become a financially viable nation. Burhan Ulutan, "Celal Bayar'ın Ekonomik Politika ve Uygulamaları," in *100 Yaşında*, pp. 285-287.

Muammer Bey, Atatürk's father in law.¹¹¹ Muammer Bey was looking for business opportunities, so Bayar persuaded him to help establish this new private bank. Atatürk gave to İş Bank all his savings, 250 thousand Turkish Liras and Muammer Bey provided the rest of the starting capital of İş Bank: 1 million Turkish Liras. As soon as the idea of establishing a national bank was floated, strong opposition emerged to the idea and malicious gossip began started to circulate, with the result that nobody bought shares in the bank. Consequently shares were sold to deputies, officers, and official employers at a low price. Attacks on the bank were very strong and emanated chiefly from foreign bankers and merchants in İstanbul. The former Ottoman Finance minister Cavit Bey even said of the establishment of İş Bank: "I love Celal, he is an old member of CUP. I really want his success, but it looks impossible."¹¹² At the beginning, the situation of the İş Bank did indeed seem hopeless, but Bayar was sure of its eventual success. He said that: "I am one of the people who created a respected revolution with an empty treasury... When I was walking in the İzmir's mountains to safety of the country with rawhide sandals for my shoes, I never thought about becoming a minister or a president. My aim is the economic development of this country and the trust which I saw is enough for the success of the Bank."¹¹³

The İş Bank, with its founding capital of one million Turkish Liras, began operation with only four employees working in a small building. In a few years its capital had increased to 5 million Liras and it had become a strong supporter of the industrial development of

¹¹¹ Harris, "Celal Bayar" in *Political Leaders*, p. 48.

¹¹² Ulutan, "Celal Bayar'ın Ekonomik Politika ve Uygulamaları," in *100 Yaşında*, pp. 285-287.

¹¹³ Ibid.

Turkey.¹¹⁴ Bayar chose all the personnel of İş Bank from among Turkish youth: he did not want any help from his foreign friends, because his aim was the establishment of truly national bank. This was Bayar's life dream and as a result of his decision he achieved great success with the project. Further banks were also established after this initial success. The Sanayi ve Maadin Bank (Industrial and Mineral Bank), which later changed its name to Sümer Bank, for industrial establishments, the Eti Bank for mining and power developments, and the Halk Bank (People) were established with the support of İş Bank. In addition, Bayar took the first steps to set up the Turkish insurance sector and trained an entire generation of workers at the İş Bank.¹¹⁵

Although the İş Bank was phenomenally successful, Bayar came under politically motivated criticism by a faction led by İsmet İnönü, who alleged that as all the executive committee of İş bank consisted solely of members of the Assembly, they had used their positions for personal benefit. Bayar replied "Buying shares of İş -Bank is a disadvantage for buyers, because they pay a thousand lira for only one share, in order to help the bank."¹¹⁶ The other criticism focused on the credits which were being given to the new enterprises. İsmet İnönü was especially disturbed that some people used the İş bank for their personal benefit. Bayar's explanations were not enough to stop these allegations and two opposing groups that set the tone for future debate emerged: the İş Bank group, called by its detractors "affairists" (self seeking) and partisans of the state controlled group, led

¹¹⁴ İsmet Bozdağ, "Celal Bayar'ın Hayat Hikayesi," in *100 Yaşında*, p. 338.

¹¹⁵ Ulvi Yenal, "İş Bankasından İzlenimler," in *100 Yaşında*, pp. 218-219.

¹¹⁶ Mustafa Aysan, *Celal Bayar ile Sohbet: Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi* (Manisa: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997), p. 8.

by İsmet İnönü.¹¹⁷ However, the reality was obvious; İş Bank was a great example of successful national bank and credit to its first manager.

Bayar, the Minister of Economy

The Great Depression and its impact on the Turkish economy

Despite the success of İş Bank, the development of the national economy was not satisfactory between 1923 and 1933, a period that is viewed as the first stage in the development of the Turkish economy. Although until 1929, contemporary Turkish economists determined the era to be “liberal,” manifesting a strong recovery under conditions of an open economy, in reality this era was one of restoration and rehabilitation. Industrialization and the creation of a Turkish bourgeoisie were considered at that time the key objectives of national economic development.

The economy developed at a very slow pace, in keeping with the slow emergence of the new nation state. However economic politics were also the cause of the situation, in addition to some internal and external reasons that were beyond out of the control of the Republic. Some of them were listed as follows:

- 1- Financial resources were very limited and per-capita income was very low, resulting in a lack of new investment in the economy. There was a general dearth of private capital in an economy devastated by a decade of war and access to foreign capital was very limited or nonexistent due to uncertainty about the nature

¹¹⁷ İsmail Cem, *Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları 1995), pp. 289-294.

of the Turkish revolution among foreign bankers spooked by the Russian experience.

- 2- There were significant debts carried over from the Ottoman period.
- 3- The “population exchange” resulted in the exodus of many skilled artisans and merchants to Greece.
- 4- The level of technical education in the economy was very low.

Despite all these disadvantages, the first ten years of the Turkish Republic constituted a crucial period, in which national economic policies gradually took shape.¹¹⁸ The new government was trying to create a national economy within the new borders of the Republic.

One external factor was the fact that the development of the Western economies slowed down in 1926 and actually started receding in 1929. This marked the beginning of the economic crisis known as the Great Depression, and it affected all capitalist countries with devastating repercussions for the world economy.

The progress of industry in particular was insufficient and since the Turkish national economy was dependant on only agriculture production, it was defenceless against economic crises in the rest of the world.¹¹⁹ The prices of the leading crops, wheat and other cereals, declined by more than 60 percent from 1928-29 to 1932-33 and remained at

¹¹⁸ Reşit Aktan, *Türkiye İktisadı*, vol. I., (Ankara 1973), pp. 47-49; M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk Devrinde İktisadi Yapılaşma* (Ankara: Kültür ve Truzim Bakanlığı Yay.), p. 102.

¹¹⁹ Erdoğan Alkın, “1923-1929 Döneminde Türk Ekonomisinin Yapısı, (İstanbul: İ.Ü. Yayınları., 1981), pp. 1-6.

those levels until the end of the decade. The severity of the agricultural and commercial crises convinced the government to undertake an important shift in economic policy and move toward protectionism and greater control over foreign trade and foreign exchange. Exports failed to act as a source of recovery and growth for the national economy during the 1930s.¹²⁰

Because of unfavourable world market conditions, the government announced in 1932 the beginning of a new economic program to be labelled “statism.” The economic atmosphere of the 1930s played a direct role in the determination of a process that carried Bayar back to the Economics Ministry. Once there, he looked for a solution in the experience of the USSR. Instead of following the capitalist countries, which were deeply affected by the great depression, the USSR had saved herself from that fate by a planned economic system.¹²¹ The effects of the world economic crisis of 1929-1930 had been very significant¹²² and the “Great Depression” had discredited political and economic liberalism in Turkey. The only solution was to increase the role of government in economics.¹²³ Economic planning, programming, and tax policies now formed the basis of the state’s intervention.¹²⁴ The purpose of statism originally was to develop the national economy by weaning it off of its dependence on foreign capital and by supplementing and encouraging locally owned private industries through state action. In general, state intervention entailed:

¹²⁰ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 16-17.

¹²¹ M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk Devrinde İktisadi Yapılaşma ve Celal Bayar (1920-1938)* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları 1987), p. 104.

¹²² Burhan Ulutan, “Celal Bayar’ın Ekonomik politikası ve Uygulamaları, in *100 Yaşında Celal*, p. 289.

¹²³ Beşir Hamitoğulları, *Cağdaş İktisadi Sistemler* (Ankara: A.U. SBF Yayınları, 1975), p. 209.

¹²⁴ Aktan, *Türkiye İktisadi*, vol.1, pp. 47-49; Tural, *Atatürk Devrinde İktisadi*, pp. 104-105.

- 1- Founding of government intuitions for producing goods and services,
- 2- Direct administrative control by the government,
- 3- Increasing control over and retraction of foreign capital,
- 4- Setting up a quota system for external trade,¹²⁵

Quotas and tariffs were the most effective instruments in this process. A strong restrictive foreign exchange regime and a growing reliance on bilateral trading arrangements also served to limit import volumes. After 1929, better conditions were created for emerging domestic manufacturers because of the severe import restrictions and an import substitution regime.¹²⁶

In short, the state, in accordance with its overall tendency, acquired greater responsibilities in the general control over the economy.¹²⁷ Statism essentially entailed the increase of state-sector activities and control over other parts of the urban economy as well.

This centralized economic policy paralleled a strengthening of one party rule. In 1931, state intervention was broadened and integrated into the Republican Party's Program.¹²⁸ Although state intervention in Turkey was only realized after 1932, the theoretical basis of this approach had taken shape in 1931. State intervention was officially deemed a third

¹²⁵ Frederick I., Nixon, "State Intrevention, Economic Planning The Experience of the Less Developed Countries", *ODTU Gelişme Dergisi*, Özel No, 1981, p. 55.

¹²⁶ Owner and Pamuk, *History of the Middle East*, pp. 125-130

¹²⁷ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 69.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.68

and permanent way as opposed to the economic theories of liberalism and Marxism.¹²⁹ There was an exchange of polemics between İnönü's group, and the İş (Business) Bank group, headed by Çelal Bayar. The former advocated a "third way," while the latter believed in economic liberalism and only accepted state intervention as a necessary but a temporary application essential to support private enterprise.¹³⁰ Until 1930, the group headed by İsmet İnönü held political control and it deemed economic activities to be of secondary importance.¹³¹ After 1930, economic considerations gained in significance within the government and Celal Bayar's prestige increased correspondingly: Atatürk made him the Minister of the Economy on September 9, 1932.¹³² Indeed, Atatürk told the author Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu during the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Republic in 1933 that Bayar was "Turkey's greatest economist."¹³³ İnönü had authorized the broad demand for state ownership expounded by the Kadro¹³⁴ group, which argued that the state should build up and directly use capital. However, Atatürk evidently saw the quasi-public, mixed economy approach of the İş Bank as more likely to be successful.

Between 1932 and 1939, Bayar left his mark on the Turkish economy. The first five-year industrial plan, which was adopted in 1934, consisted of details of investment projects.

¹²⁹ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi Yayınları, 1986), p.180-181

¹³⁰ Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 81.

¹³¹ Webster, Donald E. "State control of Social Change in Republican Turkey," *American Sociological Review*, 4 (1939), pp.247-256; Karpas, *Turkey Politics*, p. 69.

¹³² Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)* (Ankara:Yurt Yayınları 1986), p. 24.

¹³³ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politika'da 45 yıl* (Ankara:Bilgi Yayınları 1968), p.132.

¹³⁴ The Kadro met with the approval of those in official circles who hoped to see it develop a socio-political philosophy for the regime's new economic policy. Kadro's philosophy in fact was a superficial combination of Marxism, nationalism and corporatism. The Turkish revolution, in the view of Kadro ideologists, was a struggle against capitalism and imperialism. They believed, consequently, that the state should be able to avoid class struggle and accumulate capital. Their idea was "a new type of economic state, which would lead the advanced social classes of the society, and direct, establish, and operate in well-planned way all the economic activities." Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert* (İstanbul: 1933), pp. 13-15; Karpas, *Turkey Politics*, p. 70.

Soviet advisers were assisted in this plan, which made Turkey the second country to adopt economic planning after Soviet Russia. For this reason, relying on Russian experience was considered quite normal.¹³⁵ The aim of the five year plan was the concurrent development in a number of key sectors, such as textiles and paper, glass, and ceramics, and an enhancement of basic industrial potential in materials such as iron, steel, cement, utilities, and chemicals.¹³⁶ Bayar took on full responsibility for economic planning: all plans and decrees were issued under his signature.¹³⁷ In this way, and under Bayar's guidance, Turkey became the first country to apply systematically the model of a mixed economy.¹³⁸ Statism was born out of the very specific economic, historical, and political circumstances of Turkey.¹³⁹ Although the private investor was protected and a national bourgeoisie created in this era, the state was still in control of the economy.¹⁴⁰ Bayar was nevertheless in a difficult situation in İnönü's cabinet, since the economic ideas of the latter were different from those of Bayar. İnönü had proposed a rigid statism in the Republican Party program. Bayar struggled to apply this plan and added elements of his new mixed economy program, insisting that statism was supposed to encourage private enterprise.¹⁴¹ In his view the plan would have to provide stimulus to private initiative and capital, and, perhaps to his surprise, the Republican Party program accepted private enterprise as a basic element in the economy.

¹³⁵ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik* (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982), p.111.

¹³⁶ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 281; A. Kazancigil, E. Özbudun "Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism" in *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-1985* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınları 1990), edited by Korkut Boratav, p.p. 324-35; Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisat Tarihi, 1923-50* (Ankara, Yurt Yayınları, 1986), pp.197-285.

¹³⁷ A. Kazancigil, E. Özbudun "Kemalist Economic Policies," in *Türkiye İktisat*, p.109.

¹³⁸ Bozdağ, "Celal Bayar'ın Hayat Hikayesi", *100 Yaşında*, p. 343.

¹³⁹ Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 85.

¹⁴⁰ Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiyede Tek Parti Yönetimi (1930-1945)* (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1983), p. 126.

¹⁴¹ Bozdağ, "Celal Bayar'ın Hayat Hikayesi", p. 340.

Statism in Turkey was not a clear theory, and its definition and meaning differed from one minister to another.¹⁴² The position of the individual in the theory of statism likewise to have been appears unclear; in theory, private capital and enterprise were accepted, but in practice the state's economic activities sought to restrict and even eliminate those enterprises.¹⁴³ Atatürk himself declared (through Celal Bayar) in 1935 at İzmir that the meaning of statism was to:

Uphold the principle of private enterprise but to take into state hands the fatherland's economy, keeping in mind all the needs and the unaccomplished tasks of a great nation and a vast country.¹⁴⁴

It is difficult to claim that the private sector was damaged by the growth of the state sector, although state control over key enterprises did increase. State enterprise actually helped the development of private enterprises indirectly in the process of industrialization. For example, the Economy Ministry decided to abolish the Commission of Establishing Exports on 18 September 1932. In this way exports were removed from the orbit of statism. As a result of this decision the government control over exports came to end, giving encouragement to the private sector.¹⁴⁵ Despite this, there was a clear domination on the part of the state sector in the urban economy both as an investor and as a producer during the 1930s.

¹⁴² Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 87.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Kutay, *Uç Devirden*, p. 141; Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, pp. 75-76.

¹⁴⁵ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye'de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu*, (Ankara: 1982) p. 334.

The achievements of this plan can be summed up as follows: The plan was first applied in May 1934 and ended in 1937.¹⁴⁶ In an effort to speed up the process of industrialization, many new institutions were founded, like Etibank (Mineral Bank), Maden Tetkik Arama Enstitüsü (Mineral Exploration Institution), and Elektrik İşleri Etüd İdaresi (Agency for the Study of Electrical Projects).¹⁴⁷ During Bayar's tenure as minister of the economy, 24 foreign companies were nationalized, with the greater part of these nationalizations in the sectors of railways, ports, and municipal services.¹⁴⁸ However, even in the midst of the nationalization drive, Bayar stressed that he was not opposed to foreign capital, and as if in confirmation of this, 32 new foreign institutions began operating in Turkey between 1934 and 1938.¹⁴⁹ The National Income Index was 100 in 1933; it increases to 115.65 in 1935-36 during the years of Bayar's tenure as economic minister and prime minister. In 1935-1936, furthermore, the Turkish economy grew at a rate of 9%, with industrial growth averaging 10.2%.¹⁵⁰ During Bayar's term there were no export restrictions: a balance and order had been arrived at in foreign trade with the new agreements.¹⁵¹ An infrastructure for an advanced economy was prepared while economic development and the creation of entrepreneurial classes in the society and civil society --all necessary for a classic parliamentary democracy proceeded apace.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁶ Kutay, *Celal Bayar*, vol 1, p. 31-33 , and vol 2, pp. 495-496; Şakir, *Celal Bayar*, pp.129-134.

¹⁴⁷ Erdoğan Alkın, "Dış Ticaret" in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983-1985), vol. 2, p 450; Kutay , *Celal Bayar* , p.32-33.

¹⁴⁸ Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisat Tarihi* (Ankara:Yurt Yayınları, 1982), pp. 184-85.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 178.

¹⁵⁰ Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm (1860-1990)* (Ankara: Okan Mat. 1982), pp. 216-18.

¹⁵¹ Bayar went to Greece in May 1933, France in August 1933, and Germany in September 1933, and he signed all trade agreements himself. See Kutay, *Celal Bayar* vol. 1.p. 32-33; Şakir, *Celal Bayar* pp.130-131.

¹⁵² Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları 1990), p. 230.

However, strong criticism of statism came from two social groups. The first consisted of farmers and low income families. They claimed that their standard of living had declined because statism had put an end to some industries.¹⁵³ The second group was composed of investors, for w statism was a check on their economic ambitions.

Despite these criticisms, the economy seemed to be developing comparatively successfully under Bayar. Thus, Atatürk and İnönü came to a parting of the ways in the fall of 1937, Atatürk chose his minister of the economy to be the new prime minister.¹⁵⁴ Bayar was later to found the Democratic Party that ruled between 1950 and 1960 only to be toppled by a military coup in 1960.

The reason why Atatürk made Bayar prime minister remains unclear. The most likely reason was that Atatürk agreed more with Bayar than with İnönü on economic issues. İnönü and his circle had moreover accused İş Bank group of giving unfair credit and of other irregularities, leading to disagreements throughout that term. The other difference in their economic ideas was over the subject of foreign advisers. Bayar wanted to use the experience and advice of foreign economic experts and so when preparing the five year plans he had consulted American and Russian economists. According to a newspaper report from November 1932, however, all branches of the economics ministry were dependant on foreign advisers while all ministry reports were prepared by them. İnönü reacted to this report in a speech to the G.N.A. November 1932:

¹⁵³ Fethi Çelikbas, "Devlet ve Hussusi Tesebbüs İktisadı" *Türk Ekonomisi*, February 1949, pp. 27-29.

¹⁵⁴ Harris, *Political Leaders*, p. 48.

We must consider the financial and economic problems of this country like all other problems and we can't let a foreigner consider them for us...So that we can say we Turks know best the problems of Turkey and their reasons...¹⁵⁵

Another disagreement over economic policy was regarding statism, as we saw earlier.

The effort to create “national enterprises” bore results between 1923 and 1931, and a new class more accustomed to working with the international economic system was born.

Sociologist Emre Kongar separates the class development into two different parts:

“outstanding statist” and “traditionalist liberal.” These two classes were able to coexist under the leadership of Atatürk, but religious groups within the traditionalist liberals were completely repressed. In the meantime, as a result of the relationship between bureaucratic politics and the middle class, a capital class was created, and differences began to appear between “outstanding statist” and “traditionalist liberal” even in the Atatürk period. Once the capitalist class was formed, the “outstanding statist” were frozen out and Bayar became prime minister instead of İnönü.¹⁵⁶

In addition to their clashes over economic matters, there were some disagreements between Atatürk and İnönü over international politics. Two issues in particular were the cause of division: the problem of Hatay and the Nyon Meeting. The first issue involved the special status granted to İskenderun city, which was under the control of Syria by virtue of the Ankara treaty between Turkey and France on 20 October 1921. Although France had given freedom to Syria by its September 1936 treaty, there was no decision

¹⁵⁵ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Uygulamaya Geçerken*, p. 172.

¹⁵⁶ Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Evrim Matbaası, 1985), pp. 449-450.

about İskenderun: France had left to Syria all its authority over this city. The Turkish government did not accept this situation and demanded control over İskenderun.¹⁵⁷

Atatürk asserted that the real owners of İskenderun were Turks, in one of his speeches to the G.N.A.¹⁵⁸ Atatürk believed that the Turkish government could take Hatay by moving quickly and using political pressure, but İsmet Pasha wanted to solve this problem step by step through international institutions.¹⁵⁹ The other issue was the Nyon Meeting, which in 1932 led to an agreement to stop piracy in the Mediterranean Sea, signed by all Mediterranean and Black Sea countries except Italy, Germany, Spain and Albania. İnönü showed timidity over the agreement, fearing war with the Italians and favouring marine patrols by each country in its own territorial waters. Although İnönü hesitated to sign this agreement, Atatürk intervened in this decision, bypassing İnönü and dealing directly with Tevfik Rüştü who was the Turkish representative at the meeting.¹⁶⁰ In acting thus Atatürk had intervened in government politics and İnönü critiqued his interference in a democratic regime, which led to a disagreement between the two.¹⁶¹ İnönü later recalled that, in 1936-37, "Both Atatürk and I were tired and nervous. I think because of the sickness, Atatürk was losing his temper easily."¹⁶² The tension between them came to a head one evening at Chankaya, over a small problem of a beer factory. İnönü lost his temper and shouted "How much longer is this country going to be governed from a drunkard's table?" Atatürk coldly replied, "You seem to forget that it was a drunkard who appointed you to your post," and the conversation jolted awkwardly on to less explosive topics. The

¹⁵⁷ İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi 1983), p. 533.

¹⁵⁸ *TBMM Zabut Ceridesi*, Term, 5, vol.8, November 1, 1936.

¹⁵⁹ Bozdağ, *Celal Bayar*, p. 48.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.49

¹⁶¹ Kutay, *Üç Devirden*, p. 141; Yesilyurt, *Bayar*, pp. 75-76; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, vol. I. p. 498-503.

Bozdağ, pp. 48-49; Mükerrerem Sarol, "Bayar Çizgisi, in "100 Yaşında Celal Bayara Armağan, pp. 167-173.

¹⁶² İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 2 vols. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), p. 289.

moment had come for Atatürk to change his prime minister;¹⁶³ this was the backdrop against which Bayar came to receive his appointment.

Thus of Atatürk was not motivated by personal vendetta when he by passed İnönü, but rather by a desire to see the economy grow under new policies and without interference. The Atatürk –İnönü relationship had began in the Independence War and continued in the republican period. İnönü had been his prime minister for more than thirteen years. It is quite normal that disagreements of this kind should emerge in a long- term relationship. Atatürk was a far-sighted man, and this time he thought Bayar was the best person to lead the economic development of Turkey. As Atatürk once said: “freedom without economic independence is impossible.”¹⁶⁴

Prime Minister Bayar

İnönü has written that he took the decision to leave the Prime Ministry on September 18 1937, and he adds that he thought Bayar was the best choice to replace him.¹⁶⁵ Bayar’s cabinet immediately published its political agenda, of which 48 pages were devoted to the problems of economic development in a program that was approved by Atatürk. The content of the program was very rich, although foreign policy did not receive much space. The most important economic issue addressed in the document was that of agriculture and the conditions faced by landless farmers. It was interesting that, although a very detailed programme was laid out, there wasn’t any mention of employee –employer relations, the

¹⁶³ Lord Kinross, *Atatürk* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965), pp. 552-553.

¹⁶⁴ Kutay, *Üç Devirden*, p. 109.

¹⁶⁵ İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 2 vols. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları 1987), p. 289.

press or academic matters. Bayar frequently used concepts like “Kemalism,” “national merchant”, “and “national culture”. The economic priorities, which formed more than half of the plan, were listed as:

- 1- Suitable trade policies with external and internal benefit
- 2- Planned industrialization
- 3- A strong mining policy
- 4- A new marine policy
- 5- New finance and tariff policies.¹⁶⁶

Atatürk liked this program and said: “I am the President of Turkey and the Turkish nation will follow the program of Celal Bayar, Prime Minister, and his colleagues, and we want to see real results from it.”¹⁶⁷

On 26 October 1937 the new cabinet was formed,¹⁶⁸ with all members of the old cabinet retained except the health minister;¹⁶⁹ thus, in spite of the new program, İnönü’s cabinet continued in this new government. The hopes that had been pinned on Bayar and his cabinet, however, would not be realized during the first thirteen months. The problem of

¹⁶⁶ Nurşen Mazıcı, *Celal Bayar, Başbakanlık Dönemi(1937-1939)* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1996), pp.44-45

¹⁶⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, İlk Kanun 1937, no: 48, p.63.

¹⁶⁸ Bayar’s cabinet consisted of the following members: Minister of Low: Şükrü Saracoğlu (İzmir), the Minister of Army: Kazım Özalp (Balıkesir), the Minister if International Relationship :Tevfik Rüşdü Aras (İzmir), the Minister of Internal Works: Sükrü Kaya (Muğla), the Minister of Finance: Fuat Ağralı (Elazığ) , theMinister of Education: Saffet Arıkan (Erzincan) ,the Minister of Development :Ali Cetinkaya (Afyon Karahisar), the Minister of Economics and Agriculture: Şakir Kesebir (Tekirdağ), the Minister of Health and Social Help: Hulusi Alataş (Aydın), the Minister of Tariff and Monopoly: Ali Rana Tarhan (İstanbul) .See, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term.5, vol, 20, November 11 1937.

¹⁶⁹ The Minister of Health Refik Saydam refused a position in the new cabinet and Atatürk surprised and determined that behavior as “lack of understanding.” Instead of Refik Saydam deputy of Aydın Hulusi Alatas was appointed to the Minister of Health. See, Soyak, Ali Rıza. *Atatürk’ten Hatıralar*, 2 vols, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Bankası Yayınları 1973), p.712.

Hatay preoccupied the Turkish political agenda at this time. In addition, the threat of a new war and its attendant problems in external relations, combined with Atatürk's growing illness in February 1938, meant that Bayar's economic programme was relegated to secondary importance. During this period, Bayar too had become interested in the Hatay problem, with which Atatürk was obsessed, and went on visits to foreign countries to set up stronger relations with them.¹⁷⁰ In addition, he followed Atatürk's sickness very closely, and had to balance the political situation which had become very problematic, especially with the Military school and Fleet trials and the Dersim Events, which had become serious troubles for the new government.¹⁷¹ Starting in the summer of 1938, Atatürk's sickness had become very acute, and began to occupy the center point of all activities in Turkish political life. In the beginning Atatürk had refused all medical examinations and the foreign doctors that Bayar offered, but when his sickness increased Atatürk told Bayar "My child, do whatever you can do, I am sick," and Bayar sent for a French liver expert. The doctor forbade all alcohol and advised complete rest. Atatürk accepted the first advice but with his active character would not accept the second and his health continued to worsen.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ During this term some trade agreements were signed with Japan, Romania, Switzerland, Lithuania, and Russia, some financial agreements signed with Germany and England, and some friendship agreements with Afghanistan, Greece, France and Bulgaria. Mazıcı, *Başbakanlık Dönemi*, p. 93-101.

¹⁷¹ In 1935, a big rebellion began in the Dersim region which is known as Tunceli Today. Some Kurdish tribes were very dominant in this region and they blocked the authority of the central government. The government appointed a military governor to break the sovereignty of the tribes in 1935 and was given the power send people or families from Dersim to other lands. The rebellion began with this appointment decision and spread in March-April 1937, but the government crushed the rebellion. İnönü declared 250 people had been killed and 1000 people surrendered. After the military action the trails began and seven people, one of whom was Seyyid Rıza, the head of the rebellion, were executed. The Dersim rebellion was halted completely in September 1938. See www.isik.ch

In the Military School and Navy trials in 1938, claims were made that there was a communist movement ready to revolt in the army, so at the end of the trials a number of intellectuals were sentenced. Mazıcı, *Başbakanlık Dönemi*, p. 52-63.

¹⁷² Kutay, *Üç Devirden*, pp. 153-156; Bayar, *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar*, p.88-90.

Bayar saw Atatürk regularly during this period, traveling almost every day between Ankara and İstanbul to follow his sickness. Thus, it so happened that he met with Atatürk to discuss the second three year development plan in Dolmabahçe Palace on 5 October 1938. This was the Bayar's last visit, for on this day Atatürk slipped into a coma. Atatürk's last sentence, which Bayar heard, was like a farewell; "Goodbye Bayar... greetings... and love to all friends. God help you..."¹⁷³ When Atatürk died on 18 November 1938, a very important period in Turkish politics came to an end.

¹⁷³ Kutay, *Üç Devirden*, p.158.

CHAPTER 3

THE EXPERIMENT OF DEMOCRACY

The Multi-Party Conundrum (1945-1960) and Bayar

Although the idea of and the desire for democracy were not new to Turkey, the journey to democratization was a long and difficult one. Perhaps the most significant event in the democratic development of the new republic occurred in May 1950 when the first fair multiparty election was held, which resulted in a surprise great victory for the opposition. Although the Democratic Party (DP) won 65 seats in the first election in 1946, the result of the 1950 election was surprising; after 27 years of almost unremitting rule by the Republican People's Party (RPP) (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP), a government of that party presided over a free and peaceful election that resulted in its own defeat. This significant event bore proof of the constructive work of the Kemalist regime, and the political maturation of the Turkish people under its protection. The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the contributions of Celal Bayar to the transformation to a multiparty regime in the context of the establishment of democracy in Turkey.

The Atatürk Reform Program

After his military victory, Atatürk brought in many fundamental reforms designed to sweep away old institutions and to recreate Turkey as a modern, western, secular

democratic state.¹⁷⁴ The ideological bases of the reform program were six basic tenets, which, when they appeared for the first time in 1931, became known as the Six Arrows of Kemalism- republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, statism, and revolution. Nationalism was intended to focus attention on the Turkish nation within its newly defined frontiers.¹⁷⁵ Secularism, however, was one of the most significant aspects of the Atatürk revolution. Atatürk interpreted it as the elimination of religious influence from public life and in some cases sought to extend this to discouraging private religious observances as well. After Atatürk's death, the role of religion in Turkish state life would become one of the most important public issues.¹⁷⁶

The RPP was created by Atatürk to put into effect and maintain these reforms. The party became the image of the revolution between 1923 and 1946. The two periods when opposition parties came to power nevertheless sowed the seeds of the issues that were to separate the nation more and more after 1946.¹⁷⁷ In 1924 a group of Atatürk's closest collaborators during the War of Independence, who maintained more conservative views on the subject of social reform, resigned and formed the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*).¹⁷⁸ But Atatürk saw it as an obstacle to rapid reforms and as anti-Republican group and banned it after a few months. Until 1930 the RPP was

¹⁷⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 235-88.

¹⁷⁵ In addition it became the take-off point for a large scale program of revival, reinterpretation and some rewriting of the history of the Turkish people from the time of their origin to the modern period. The reformist reinterpretation of history sought among other things to link up the Hittite and Sumerian peoples with the Turks. Still another program sparked by nationalism was the language reform, which sought to substitute "pure Turkish" words for the large number of Persian and Arabic terms that had infiltrated Ottoman Turkish through the centuries.

¹⁷⁶ *World Politics*, vol. 11, no. 4 (July 1959), pp. 513-552.

¹⁷⁷ Walter Weiker, *the Turkish Revolution 1960-1961* (Washington: The Brooking Institution, 1963), p. 4.

¹⁷⁸ On the Progressive Republican Party, see Tarık Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler* (İstanbul: Hurriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1952), pp. 606-22.

working under the assumption that reform had been absorbed by the Turkish nation. In that year, however, the establishment of the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*) -- created by Atatürk's closest friend -- marked an important event in Turkish political life; however, the Free Party lasted only three months before it dissolved itself after having become the rallying ground for dissidents of all complexions. In that short time however, the party managed to focus criticism on the RPP's policies, particularly the extensive role of the state in the economy, and demanded far more political and individual freedoms.¹⁷⁹

The establishment of the Free Party was important in that it revealed the shortcomings of Atatürk's reform policies in the 1930s. It showed that the efforts of the previous period in preparing Turkey for a multiparty system had been deficient.¹⁸⁰

The Struggle for the Establishment of a Multiparty System

One of the leading biographers of Mustafa Kemal, Lord Kinross, states that Atatürk had himself wanted İsmet İnönü to succeed him as president of the Republic. He does not however, provide any proof for this claim.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, in anticipation of Atatürk's death İnönü himself, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, the Chief of Staff, and Celal Bayar, who had replaced İnönü as Prime Minister in September 1937, did agree to a soft transition

¹⁷⁹ Weiker, *the Turkish Revolution*, p. 5.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁸¹ Lord Kinross, *Atatürk : A Biography of Mustafa Kemal Father of Modern Turkey* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965), p.566.

and the continuation of previous policies under İnönü as the new president.¹⁸² The day after Atatürk's death, İsmet İnönü was unanimously voted by The Grand National Assembly as the second president. At the Extraordinary Congress of the RPP, held on 26 December 1938, the party regulations were amended so that İnönü could be elected as the party's permanent chairman, while Atatürk was declared "founder and eternal head of the Republican Party." At the same congress, İnönü adopted the title "national leader" (*milli şef*).¹⁸³ After this the monolithic form taken by the party was best expressed by the famous slogan "one party, one nation, one leader."¹⁸⁴ This was the first time "*şef*" had seen the light of day in Turkish political life. Atatürk used only one title, "*gazi*" (war veteran). As the writer Nadir Nadi determined, "Only one person had used the title of "leader" in Turkish political life and he was İsmet İnönü."

The writers of the Kadro group explained this system thus: one person (*şef*) has the most influence, and his influence different from that of anyone in the political system. He represents the common volition of the nation, shows the right way, thinks the best, and does not make any mistakes. However, "*şef*" was a continuation of some concepts like "*sultan*" or "*hakan*," and had a harder profile. The concept of "chief office" and one party rule were compared very often with the application of one party and one leader systems in Italy or Russia.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 288.

¹⁸³ Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Yenişehir Matbaası, 1965), p. 139.

¹⁸⁴ Celal Bayar, *Baş Vekilim Menderes* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967), pp. 118-19

¹⁸⁵ Osman Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1998), p. 30.

İsmet İnönü is known as the second most important figure in modern Turkish history, and was widely regarded as Kemal Atatürk's right-hand man, the volatility of their relationship notwithstanding.¹⁸⁶ He was born in İzmir on 24 September 1884. His father was a judge; his mother came from a Turkish family that had long been settled in Bulgaria. His education was almost exclusively military. Upon his graduation from the Staff College in 1906, he was posted to the Second Army in Adrianople, and he became an important figure in the local branch of the Committee for Union and Progress.¹⁸⁷

During the First World War he was Mustafa Kemal's chief of staff, and in this period the foundations of their long friendship were laid. He worked at the Ministry of War until the Allies occupied the capital, at which point he went to Ankara where, because of his success during the War of Independence the Grand National Assembly made him chief of staff of the Nationalist forces.

He was often criticized by his opponents for his rigid vision, being referred to as "good staff officer, and nothing more." İnönü won at Lausanne against the great European masters of diplomacy and it was a unique victory for a staff officer. The slogan 'Sèvres, death; Lausanne, life,' is still remembered in Turkey.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Morris Singer, *the Economic Advance of Turkey; 1938-1960* (Ankara, Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1977), p. 3.

¹⁸⁷ The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (İttihat ve Terakki) was the revolutionary organization of the students and graduates of the modern schools of higher education in the Ottoman Empire. The first and the most important of these schools were the School of Medicine (founded in 1827), the War College (1834), and the School of Administration (1859) "Union" signified the union of the different ethnic and religious groups that inhabited the Empire, while "progress" was the aim of the CUP". See Sina Akşin. *İttihat ve Terakki*, pp.12-23.

¹⁸⁸ Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 112-13.

After Atatürk's death, İnönü appointed Bayar as prime minister to set up the cabinet but in reality, this was given to Bayar only for a transitional period. Because of inevitable economic policy disagreements, Bayar soon submitted his resignation. İnönü accepted it and named Refik Saydam as prime minister on 25 January 1939. Though deprived of executive authority, Bayar retained his seat in parliament, but during this term he did not attend party meetings and preferred to remain aloof. Between 1939 and 1945, Bayar began to take stands of his own in opposition to the government.¹⁸⁹ As a result, his disagreements with İnönü became a significant factor in the establishment of a multiparty regime. Bayar and his supporters were the biggest rival of the RPP in the multiparty period.

The Multiparty Period

By the end of World War II, Turkey was ready for change-- politically, socially and economically. President İnönü, to his eternal credit, placed the nation's welfare before personal ambition and permitted a slow liberalization of political institutions, thus giving freedom to pressures that had built up over a quarter of a century of one-party rule. An opposition began to form as a fragment group from within the RPP. There had been opposition movements before, but always short-lived and never on such solid ground organizationally.¹⁹⁰ In the spring of 1945, a systematic and organized opposition was

¹⁸⁹ Harris, "Celal Bayar," in *Political Leaders*, pp.48-49.

¹⁹⁰ Richard Robinson, *the First Turkish Republic* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 125-126.

created by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü and Refik Koraltan who were at the time all members of the RPP.¹⁹¹

During the 1939-1945 period, the conditions that had produced the opposition prepared the political groundwork for democracy, classical parliamentary, and a multiparty system. The causes of the dissolution of one-party rule may be summed up as follows:

- 1- Lack of party unity
- 2- Wartime economic policies and the general dissatisfaction they created in society
- 3- External factors determined by World War II.

The state philosophy was the ideology of the republic. The government played a very dominant role in the social and the economic spheres. As a result, during the rule of İnönü's RPP, its rigid, conservative economic policy left all groups in Turkey dissatisfied. A desire for social justice was awakened in the three main social classes of Turkey: peasants, industrial workers, and the middle class.¹⁹² Although rural development was given priority in Turkish politics during the 1930-1945 period, this was only made possible by the development of internal markets, especially rural markets. Harsh taxes were levied on agricultural products, and in reality the peasants were in no position to meet such demands.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ *TBMM Zabut Ceridesi*, Term 4, vol.10, 14.

¹⁹² Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, p.98.

¹⁹³ *The Toprak Mahsulleri Vergisi* (Tax on Soil Products) yielded TL. 229 million in 1944-1947, this was comparatively higher than the share actually due the peasants. Faik Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası* (İstanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınları 1951), p. 36.

The industrial working class was the most recent social group in the new republic.

Turkish workers were generally considered politically “leftist” by the government. Class activities, such as strikes, were severely punished and labour’s problems were ignored. Labourers were considered only as production and there were no government welfare programs put in place for their benefit until 1945.¹⁹⁴

Although there was no capitalist bourgeoisie class dominating the country’s economy, there was an upper class consisting of landowners, businessmen, industrialist, and the intelligentsia. Two elements of the middle class, both of which were equally politically conservative, i.e., the industrialists and businessmen, criticized the struggle to westernize the economy arguing that this never seemed to improve conditions. Moreover, whereas the rural upper middle class in Turkey favoured greater religious freedom, the upper middle class favoured secularism.

Two important laws seriously affected these two groups in Turkey: the *Varlık Vergisi* (Tax on Capital) submitted on 11 November 1942 and the *Toprak Kanunu* (Land Reform Law) on June 1945.¹⁹⁵ During the war, the government had increased taxes and levied new ones, including the much hated capital levy or *Varlık Vergisi*. Its announced purpose was the taxation of the capital gains that traders--mainly businessmen and especially non-Muslims and producers of goods--had realized from wartime inflation. Definitely the memories of the harsh implementation of the *Varlık Vergisi* helped affect the outcome

¹⁹⁴ A ministry of Labour was established and their welfare needs were handled in a more basic fashion (Law 4763, June 22, 1945); see also Karpas, *Turkey’s Politics*, p. 109-111.

¹⁹⁵ Karpas, *Turkey’s Politics*, p. 113-114.

of the post-War elections.¹⁹⁶ The Land Reform Law was a social reform aimed at providing farmers with sufficient land for their needs and the tools necessary for agriculture; it was aimed especially at converting landless peasants into farmers if they so wished.¹⁹⁷

Economically, İnönü was determined from the outset to continue the programs of statism and centralization. Turkey did not join the Second World War, but the Turkish economy was affected very negatively by the war during the entire period. Because of the taxation in kind and forced deliveries at below-market prices, producers at all levels tried to cope with their problems through dishonest practices and evasions. Shortages in the large urban areas became direr, and the government was forced to rearrange its policies, especially the price mechanism.¹⁹⁸ The shortages created by the decline in imports also placed enormous strains on the industrial sector. For a short time, the RPP delayed this development strategy and tried to fight with inflation and by countering businesses that had grown rich during the war, but in the end it could not create an efficient economic policy. As a result, a business class emerged that had no links to the RPP, constituting a strong opposition with broad popular appeal.¹⁹⁹

Large segments of the urban and rural populations began to oppose the single-party regime because of the combination of declining production and a sharply lower standard of living. The opposition's support base included most of Turkey's conservative peasants,

¹⁹⁶ Singer, *Economic Advance*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁹⁷ *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi* Session 7, Vol.17, pp. 97-102.

¹⁹⁸ Owen and Pamuk, *A History of the Middle East*, 25-26

¹⁹⁹ Şenşekerçi, *Türk Devriminde*, p. 170.

much of the business community, and a significant number of intellectuals who were eager to make Turkey democratic, based on a multiparty system. Most of its early leaders had received valuable training and experience in the RPP. Bayar, Menderes, Köprülü and Koraltan were all deputies and RPP members before they rose up on against their party in 1946.²⁰⁰ Bayar and his three colleagues presented a petition to the RPP discussion group calling for a greater parliamentary role, more political rights for citizens, and a comprehensive reform of party activity. This request was rejected but Bayar believed strongly in the proposed changes. He also wanted to have the press law amended to allow greater criticism of the government, but the government blocked this. When Adnan Menderes published an article which criticized a speech of İnönü, there was a harsh reaction from the RPP. The republicans could not endure the fact that, although Menderes was a deputy of the RPP, he criticized the prime minister. Some powerful deputies insisted on expelling Menderes and his three friends from the party. Finally, on 25 September 1945 the RPP decided to expel Köprülü and Menderes.²⁰¹ The important point was that with this decision, the RPP once again demonstrated its intolerance for intra-party criticism and its general rigidity.

Bayar resigned from parliament on 26 September 1945²⁰² and left the Republican People's Party. The Democratic Party (DP) was founded on 7 January 1946 by these four dissenters. Bayar became the chairman of the party, his personal integrity, and fame

²⁰⁰ Weiker, *the Turkish Revolution*, p. 7.

²⁰¹ Bayar, *Baş Vekilim Menderes*, p. 36.

²⁰² Ziya Şakir, *Celal Bayar*, pp. 176-77.

lending great credibility to the organization.²⁰³ The government and the Republican People's Party welcomed the establishment of the Democratic Party and uttered the wish that it would soon surface as a party with a program different from that of the Republican People's Party.²⁰⁴ Two principles that determined the party program of the DP were liberalism and democracy. The DP was indeed a party at the centre right. Because it projected an image as the party of free enterprise, it was supported by landlords and merchants who did not like the economic and social policies of the RPP.²⁰⁵ The Democrats were described as "Turkish liberals." and they were particularly accepted in the West. Although the DP received supports from businessmen and merchants, Menderes said that his party was more than the party of these special interests: he claimed that the democrats represented all those who wanted an end to the one-party system.²⁰⁶

During the first few months relations between Democrats and Republicans were very amicable and friendly, but once the DP began to expand its base and activities, this relationship changed. In a short time the DP suddenly began to spread greatly in towns and villages where groups of citizens would get together and form a local branch of the DP. People did not care that the DP did not yet have an official program; simply its status of opposition to the government was the common spirit that motivated them.²⁰⁷ Although the DP refused to be defined as a class party, its leaders could not really explain what the differences were between the DP and other parties. As a result, the RPP claimed that the

²⁰³ Harris, "Celal Bayar," *Political Leaders*, p. 49, Roderic Davison, *Turkey* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 148.

²⁰⁴ *Ulus* (editorial), January 8, 1946; *Akşam* (editorial) January 9, 1946; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*. İstanbul: 1952, pp. 662-673.

²⁰⁵ Feroz Ahmad, *the Turkish Experiment in Democracy; 1950- 1975* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977), p. 16.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁰⁷ See *Tanin* (editorial), July 8, 1947.

opposition raised no issues and criticized the government only for the sake of criticizing. With this souring relationship between the RPP and the DP, democracy made a terrible start.²⁰⁸ Bayar gave an answer to a question regarding the place of the DP in Turkish political life as follows: “The DP is democratic, if you research our programme, you will see our place there.”²⁰⁹ It was considered by outsiders, however, that the DP was especially against the political power of the civil- military bureaucracy left over from the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the DP, both in its establishment and increasing power, demonstrated for all to see that it was a rightist party. As a result of the DP’s slogans calling that called for more freedom, religious issues were also raised. The democrats insinuated that they were more democratic than the RPP, and therefore more open to the expression of religious sentiments. The republicans in turn began accusing the DP of betraying secularism and Kemalism by permitting “reactionaries” to gain the freedom to divert secularism. They argued that political freedom was intended only for those truthfully differing over the ways to preserve the revolution. In response Bayar explained the basic ideas of the DP, as follows:

- 1- The Democrats believe that the principles of Atatürk were strongly accepted by the Turkish nation, and that the revolution’s term ended with the death of Atatürk, and that social growth started. The most important parts of the revolution are the Republic and democracy, and the DP will protect them.
- 2- Since the time of Selim III, all modernist movements in the Turkish nation have been constructed from top down. When the powers that formed the upper-class of the government had felt the necessity of “westernization,” they tried to have the lower

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁰⁹ Tekin Erer, *Türkiye’de Parti Kavgaları* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları 1966), p. 229.

classes accept it. Today, the idea has come from the people to the government. The Turkish nation is a mature nation and is able to manage itself; consequently, the new party should support the structure of the government as coming from below upwards.

- 3- In the general social structure of the Turkish nation, classes are not separated from each other by a certain border. There is no fighting between employee and employer as in the West. The Turkish government does not depend only on one class, and all classes call the government “father” -- the term “government father” does not appear in other languages. In our structure, the base of the government rests on a mass without class. The people should join the power (management) without adversely affecting the quality of the “protector government” and an honest election system is the only solution.
- 4- The people are able to bestow political power by election and governments manage the country according to the political desires that come from the nation. This can be realized only with a “strong government.” However, there is a danger in this idea: governments could use their power to stay in power! This can be guarded against by fairness and justice in elections.
- 5- Because of the terrible experiences that Turkish people went through before, the members of the DP all agree that they have to be very sensitive about “secularism.”
- 6- The RPP is a cadre party. It could be defined as an arm of government that reaches into the people. No other way was possible in the circumstances of a revolution. However, when the term of the revolution ended, and the term of growth from this revolution started, the RPP should have changed to a democratic basis. The leaders of the RPP preferred not to do so; hence our party has to be oppose of this situation. It

means the members of the DP will build on the reflections of the people and not on the ideas of cadres. The power of the people can only be established in this way.²¹⁰

The DP began preparations for the new elections in 1947. It was an exciting period and as far as political activities was concerned, freer than any other period in modern Turkish history. In a short period, the Democratic Party had organized itself to penetrate every corner of the country. However, in accordance with a decision after a meeting of the RPP on 10 May 1946, the government changed the election date to 21 July 1946.²¹¹ The reason for this decision was to keep the RPP in power and at the same time to destroy the enthusiasm of the opposition. Moreover, the government surmised that if the election were won by the DP, whose party program and whose leaders' aims were not clearly known, it could menace the very bases of the regime itself. The DP, aware that it was not quite ready for a national election, reacted strongly to this decision. They accused İnönü of having broken a promise to hold the general election at the scheduled time. Although the DP found the decision of RPP "unjust," they continued to campaign actively through their organization right down to the village level. The opposition accused the RPP of "despotism," which was epitomized in their famous poster- a raised hand with the caption "artık yeter!" (It is enough!). When the Democrats made the decision to join the election, they said: "We want to come to power..." The propaganda of the DP was intensive. The party leaders were very popular and huge crowds, in a show of unrivalled enthusiasm, carried them on their shoulders wherever they campaigned.²¹² The DP complained,

²¹⁰ Bayar, *Baş Vekilim Adnan Menderes*, pp. 42-43.

²¹¹ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 155.

²¹² *Cumhuriyet*, 30 June 1946.

moreover that they were threatened and harassed by military officers.²¹³ Marshal Fevzi Çakmak was taken into the permanent staff of the DP, so that another “national hero” would be found to balance the charisma of İnönü, a veteran of the War of Independence.²¹⁴ The DP was not the only opposition party, but the other smaller political parties played only a minor role in the elections 1946.²¹⁵ The campaign was really between the two major parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, and the latter had no chance of success at this time.²¹⁶

As a result of the election the Republican Party won a comfortable majority, 395 seats out of a 465 seat house. The Democrats won 65 seats, and the rest went to smaller parties. The Democrats would have won more seats if there had been no pressure placed on voters by local government officials and had there been a fair public tally of the ballots.²¹⁷ Although in the cities the Democrats were in the lead, in the villages and towns the rate of votes for the RPP was higher. Despite the generally calm and orderly atmosphere of the election, however, the DP protested it, claiming there were a number of complaints from voters; indeed, there were more votes than there were names on the registers, and some votes were burned.

Despite the victory of the Republicans it was obvious that the party in power had lost considerable prestige. The new government took some serious economic steps, known as

²¹³ İzmir, 8 July 1946.

²¹⁴ Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları 1986), p. 306.

²¹⁵ For complete name and list of the parties, see İlhami Soysal, *Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Yer Almış Başlıca Siyasal Dernekler, Partiler ve Kurucuları*, in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.8, pp. 2015-2016.

²¹⁶ For the small parties established during this period, see Karpas, *Turkey’s Politics*, chapter 15.

²¹⁷ Davison, *Turkey*, p. 148.

the “7 September Decisions,” to increase the power of the RPP. According to these decisions, restrictions on imports were lifted and imports became duty-free, while the Turkish Lira was devalued so that the US dollar was equivalent to 2.80 Turkish Liras. Banks were also given permission to sell gold. “The 7 September decisions,” brought considerable negative movement to the prices on the stock-exchange. However, the market was irresolute, and the opposition party was quiet about these economic decisions.²¹⁸ When Adnan Menderes voiced serious criticism of the budget in the Grand National Assembly, Premier Recep Peker used very sharp terms in his answer, claiming that Menderes had dismissed the decisions as the ‘expression of a psychopathic soul.’ The Democrats protested this speech and they left the Assembly for eight days.²¹⁹ İnönü met with Bayar at Çankaya, the presidential residence, to solve the crisis and the Democrats returned to the Assembly.

Although the RPP government tried to strangle the opposition, President İnönü took a higher position than his party, declaring in the summer of 1947 that a multiparty state demanded that both parties have the same privileges and that they respect each other’s rights when in power.

This is the right path for the development of our political life; and this is the more constructive way for the welfare and the political maturity of the nation. We shall strive with all our strength so that differences of political opinion do not lead to enmity between our compatriots.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Taner Bayazıt, *İzmir Basınında Demokrasi Mücadelesi (1923-1950)*, (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Yayınları 1992), pp.160-61.

²¹⁹ Bayar, *Baş Vekilim*, p. 64; Karpas, *Turkey’s Politics*, pp. 174-75.

²²⁰ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 300.

The establishment of new parties brought a new activism to the country. During the election campaign people had joined in discussions and developed an interest in their own political life. Things were becoming easier for the opposition parties; they only needed to criticize the party in power, and there were many serious problems to criticize. The press and almost all opposition groups were close to the DP. The general public, on the other hand, now found the first opportunity to express its discontent with the party in power.

The strategies of the parties

The most important supporter of the DP was the press, because the press had not forgotten that newspapers had been closed for some petty transgressions under one-party rule. It appeared that almost the entire press encouraged the multiparty system and the leaders of the DP took advantage of this by establishing especially close relations with the press. The RPP, on the other hand, was trying to win over the wealthy classes under Recep Peker's management. However, Peker's attitudes were very authoritative; in fact, he tended to look down on democracy while his contemptuous behaviour became a serious problem for relations between him and the opposition groups. Peker's cabinet wanted to control the criticism of the opposition and sometimes applied antidemocratic laws: it changed the press law, or intimidated the opposition by reminding them of the "independence courts." The DP, however, continued its criticisms and expressed its opinions in the strongest terms.

With relations between the RPP and opposition groups so chaotic, İsmet İnönü talked with leaders on both sides and issued the 12 July Declaration.²²¹ The declaration contained the following these messages:

- The political atmosphere has become poisonous because of the claims of both sides
- The DP is not a revolutionary group but is a legal party
- Legal political parties should have the same opportunities as the party in power
- The duty of the government is to provide peace.

İnönü has stated: "I believed that the government should be equally neutral with respect to political parties and to the basis of political safety."²²²

At that time, long and hard discussions about secularism had been underway within the RPP. The RPP added a new article to its program. "Religion is a matter of conscience and it is secure from all kinds of interference. All citizens are free to perform their legal prayers or ceremonies."²²³ Very early in 1947, the RPP group authorized the government to open some schools for educating religious leaders and allowed religious courses in the elementary school curriculum. As a result, the RPP's policies on this issue became similar to those of the DP, in an attempt to win over voters with this move. The RPP took some decisions to meet the democratic demands claims of the DP, for example, permanent presidential rule was cancelled, scientific and administrative autonomy was guaranteed to the universities, and the press law was changed.²²⁴ On 17 November, at the seventh congress of the party, the RPP seemed to have acquired a new character. The party

²²¹ Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, (Ankara: İmge Yayınları 1993), p. 57.

²²² *Anadolu*, November 18, 1947.

²²³ Taner Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), p.62.

²²⁴ Bayazıt, *İzmir Basınında*, pp. 178-179.

decisions appeared more democratic because the RPP had been forced to adapt and reinterpret the six principles, the 'ideology' of the party. This was a measured step towards democracy in that reforms would no longer be applied forced from the top, and only those reforms welcome to the people would be implemented in future.

The leaders of the DP noticed these remarkable changes in the RPP's policies and they commended them. Adnan Menderes said: "We can talk about two different Republican Parties, the first one until 1945, and the second one established after that. This party consisted of two opposite ideas and philosophies under the same name and it shows us that the RPP is ready to make all kinds of concessions to ideas and philosophies in order to maintain its power. It is not necessary to go far. The party program of the RPP before the establishment of the DP is completely different from the party program of the RPP after the establishment of the DP, and it is enough to see the realities."²²⁵

It was obvious that the mentality of the RPP was changing and that it was trying to renew itself. The RPP had hoped to win the 1950 election because of its new liberal leaps.

However, in reality the DP was moving towards the elections much stronger. The DP had become organized in all corners of the country, and they were having an influence over large groups of people. The authoritarian appearance of the party in power was noted and used successfully by the Democrats. The leaders of the DP travelled throughout the country, and they had listened to people's problems in every village. The DP developed

²²⁵ Taner, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, p. 63.

very strong slogans which influenced the people, such as “Happy is he/she who can say that he/she has a full stomach!”²²⁶

They promised that if the DP were come to power, taxes would decrease, and economic difficulties would end! The cheerful wind that blew over the entire country was bringing hope to the hearts of the people.

The Election of 1950

The elections of 14 May 1950 were free and honest, for the first time in Turkish history. The voters came out in overwhelming numbers, almost 90 per cent of the registered voters, and they voted İnönü’s RPP out of power. The opposition DP swept to power with 408 seats in the 487-seat house.²²⁷ After twenty-seven years of almost unremitting rule by the Republican People’s Party, a government of that party presided over a free and a peaceful election that resulted in its own defeat. It was obvious that the RPP was condemned to losing whatever it did, because it represented the one party rule. Many years later when İsmet İnönü wrote about this defeat to his son Erdal İnönü, he said:

“There were a number of unjust or just reasons, but the primary reason was the desire for

²²⁶ *Yeni Dava*, July 21, 1949. This slogan was transferred from a famous motto “Happy is he/she who calls himself /herself a Turk!” See, Andrew Mango, *Turkey the Challenge of a New Role*, (Washington: Washington Papers and Praeger, 1994), p. 33.

²²⁷ The rate of the participation in the elections was 89.3%

	DP	RPP
Vote	4.241.393	3.176.561
The percentage of the vote	53.3	39.9
Deputy	408	69

Hikmet Bila, *Sosyal Demokrat Sürec içerisinde CHP ve Sonrası* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yay, 1987), p. 187, Sirin Tekeli, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Seçimler,” in *Cumhuriyet Donemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7, p.1803.

change, and it was a natural and innocent desire of the people.”²²⁸ The most remarkable feature about the 1950 election was that the regime in power refused to control the elections to guarantee positive results for it, even though it possessed the power. Also, the army and police were loyal to it.²²⁹ The reactions from outside of Turkey were very positive as well. They praised the democratic capability of a country like Turkey, where illiteracy was still very high. The results were greeted with applause everywhere as a “white revolution.”²³⁰ The democrats had gained a great success in the political arena by taking votes away from the well-entrenched ruling party, a rare achievement in the politics of developing countries. Despite rumours of military intervention, the transfer of power was carried out smoothly. This was the most significant event in the democratic development of Turkey to that point. According to Bernard Lewis, “the election itself was not an isolated phenomenon, but it was the last step towards democracy extending over several years.”²³¹ Turkey had shown political maturity and demonstrated that its democratic evolution had clearly started. When Turkey entered the multiparty system without flinching, a new stage began in Turkish political life.

Bayar was the man of the day: he was generally credited with the success of his party. On 22 May 1950, Celal Bayar was elected as president by the National Assembly. With his enormous popularity, Bayar could have chosen any office he wished in the new government. However, he decided to take the post of president, an office without formal

²²⁸ Cüneyt Arcayürek, “10. Yılın Ardından DP İktidarı, İsmet İnönü’nün Oğlu Erdal İnönü’ye Mektupları,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 20, 1990.

²²⁹ Robinson, *Turkey*, p. 142.

²³⁰ Arcayürek, *Demokrasinin İlk Yılları 1947-51* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1983), p. 189.

²³¹ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 186.

executive power.²³² He appointed Adnan Menderes prime minister, a major show of confidence in this young lawyer, ambitious colleague, and deputy from the Aydın region, a lawyer but who had started out his career in agriculture. Bayar had the endless trust of the city bourgeoisie and Menderes represented the big landowners. Menderes had come to Celal Bayar's attention during the 'Free Party Experiment'. The latter was struck by Menderes's dynamism and his acute awareness of Turkey's problems. Menderes understood the psychology of the people, especially the Turkish peasants. Bayar acknowledges in a memoir of his colleague that he had long ago made the decision that Menderes would be his prime minister should his party ever come to power.²³³

The Decline and Fall of the Democratic Party

It seems clear that, soon after the elections, Bayar was the leading member of the government. It was Bayar who chaired the session of the cabinet to approve a decision to commit Turkish troops to Korea at the end of 1950. After World War I Turkey had enjoyed normal political relations with all countries, but Turkey was not party to any alliance and often felt left out. Turkey could not consider an alliance with Russia given the latter's traditional designs on İstanbul and the Dardanelles. Turkey was thus forced to turn to the West to find new allies. İnönü agreed with Bayar that entering NATO would be beneficial for Turkey.²³⁴ Moreover, it was Bayar who met the American delegation that came to Ankara in 1951 and took the lead in urging it to support Turkey's entry into NATO. His efforts were successful and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Before the 1954

²³² Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı* (İstanbul: Anı Dizi, 1996), p.46.

²³³ Bayar, *Baş Vekilim Menderes*, p. 103; Ahmad, *the Turkish Experiment in Democracy* pp. 35-36.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 128.

election, Bayar achieved another foreign affairs triumph when he made a state visit to America. His month-long visit helped increase his prestige as well as strengthen relations with Turkey's principal friend.²³⁵

The period from May 1950 to 27 May 1960 was characterized primarily by a continually increasing polarization between the DP and the RPP.²³⁶ One of the first acts of the new government was to consult some senior military figures that were close to İnönü and set up a command committee.²³⁷ The DP's liberal democratic promises could not be realized. The Democrats appeared to be more broadminded and favoured a return to some aspects of the old religious way of life. The most influential motive at work was a desire to see Islam restored in the life of Turkey. On 4 June 1950, Menderes spoke as follows: "Atatürk had to fight the spirit of fanaticism to materialize the revolution; the obligation of using the Turkish language for the call to prayer was a necessity of this kind. However,...today, it is no more necessary to take these measures which wound the freedom of conscience. We too, shall fight reaction and fanaticism..."²³⁸ On 17 June 1950, the call to prayer was once again allowed in Arabic instead of Turkish.²³⁹ The number of institutions for training *imams* (leaders of prayers) was expanded by the Democrats and this broadened their appeal. Religious publications began to come back and different sects began cautiously to show their heads. Government loans were used for building new mosques. This quiet struggle for limited resources seems highly symbolic of the greater

²³⁵ *Milliyet*, 14 February 1989.

²³⁶ Weiker, *Turkish Revolution*, p. 8.

²³⁷ Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti (Tarihi ve İdeolojisi)* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1970), p. 67.

²³⁸ *Yeni Sabah*, June 5, 1950.

²³⁹ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 132-13.

struggle between the forces of secularism and Islam in Turkey.²⁴⁰ In 1951 the ‘people’s houses,’ *Halkevleri*, were closed, while in 1954 the village institutes were turned into teachers’ schools.²⁴¹ The educational system would take moral, spiritual, and national factors into account. Religion courses became obligatory in elementary schools. Radical leftists were portrayed as the instruments of destruction rather than as holders of abstract beliefs. Under the guise of freedom of thought, the leftists were accused of planning to eradicate all liberties. These populist moves by the democrats nevertheless led to the disappearance of some important secularist and Kemalist values which had been institutionalized under the one party regime.

Religious leaders and traditionalists still retained memories of the RPP’s strict policy of secularism, followed in the face of their strong opposition. People were not surprised to hear the imam of an Ankara mosque, Tevfik Hoca, say in Ankara on 30 June 1950: “We thank God for having freed us from the RPP government.” In 1950, a DP deputy by the name of Memiş Yazıcı spoke as follows in the assembly. “Atatürk was the president of independence, İnönü was the president of totalitarianism, and Bayar is the president of freedom.”²⁴² The religious reaction had become the number one issue for the RPP, much to the embarrassment of the DP leadership. The latter was embarrassed by the accusations

²⁴⁰ David Hotham, “Turks Turn Again to Religion” *The Times* (London), Feb 23, 1960.

²⁴¹ Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti (Tarihi ve İdeolojisi)* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1970), pp. 89-90. Halkevleri (people houses) were opened by a decision of the RPP on 18 May 1931. Their essential aims were to create a common culture and thought linking the intellectuals and rural people, support of the observation of Atatürk’s revolutions, and ending the differences between villagers and people who live in the cities. The first *halkevi* was opened in Ankara in 1932, and 478 *halkevis* were opened between 1931-1952. Their activities covered nine different areas; literature, arts, theater, sports, social help, popular courses, libraries, village knowledge, history and museum. They were closed in 1952 and opened again in 1960. See www.geocities.com/bilimselkemalizm/halkevleri.htm

²⁴² Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdağı, “*Islam and Political Parties in Turkey: 1950- 1975*,” M.A. thesis, (McGill University, 1981), p. 43. For the statements by Tevfik Hoca and Memiş Yazıcı, see, *Ulus*, July 1, 1950 and *Ulus* June 3, 1950.

of anti- Kemalism levelled against the party because many Democrats, especially Bayar, were able to make as good a claim to Kemalism as any Republican. Actually, they claimed that their aim was to make Kemalism a living ideology, as it had been before Atatürk's death. Menderes's attitude to Kemalism was that Atatürk had carried out his programme of reforms in order that Turkey should become westernized within the capitalist system based on free enterprise.²⁴³

There were some important developments that allowed the liberal wing of the DP to remain hopeful over the first four years of its term in power. First of all, the DP had acquired stronger influence over the army and local administrations. Second, the Democrats had overwhelming numbers in the parliament. And third, the positive influences of the Korean War on exports and the economic help furnished by the Marshall Plan helped to improve the economy.²⁴⁴ The capital earned in this way was transformed into agricultural development and the establishment of new highways, so that a larger portion of society had access to benefits, and more goods were now available in the markets. However, perhaps because of its success in economic matters, the DP made no serious progress in the spheres of either liberalism or democracy.

Interestingly, a short time after their victory the DP began to show a marked sensitivity to criticism. According to the party's interpretation of democracy: "Democracy is the regime of numbers." In this regime the wishes of the masses are carried out. We, as the responsible ones in power, are obligated to take into consideration the wishes of the mass

²⁴³ Ahmad, *the Turkish Experiment*, p. 42.

²⁴⁴ Çağlar Keyder, *Geciş Sürecinde Türkiye* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1982), p. 57.

of the people and not the shouts and criticisms of a handful of intellectuals.”²⁴⁵ This view was consistent with the national idea and yet was equally vague. After the DP gained power, it began using the radio to spread their propaganda. The Democrats felt they had the right to monopolize and to use for their own purpose all the institutions of the state. Another issue was its demand that the RPP transfer all its funds to the treasury on 14 December 1953, and more generally that strong-arm tactics be used on the opposition to pacify it.²⁴⁶ Bayar himself disagreed with the transfer of the wealth of the RPP to the treasury in that would poison relations between the DP and the RPP. Bayar tried to stop this law but the DP insisted on applying it. Next a series of laws was passed that placed harsh limitations on the press, the universities, and the opposition parties. It was the interpretation of enforcement of the laws, which was the real stroke.²⁴⁷ The DP was drifting towards totalitarianism. Menderes had decided to put his trust in the voter, and said: ‘If the nation declares that we have made a mistake, we will pay the price like men in the elections in three months’ time.’²⁴⁸

Because of these antidemocratic attitudes and measures the Democrats began to lose the confidence and the support of the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia had supported the DP in opposition precisely because the RPP had become a totalitarian power and had used state institutions to achieve its goals. They had expected that the DP would restore the system and bring back to it the dynamism and freedom it originally had. However, the result was a disappointment: the Democrats had begun to apply the same rigid controls

²⁴⁵ Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in my Time* (Oklahoma, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 238-239.

²⁴⁶ Şenşekerci, *Türk Devriminde*, p. 218.

²⁴⁷ Weiker, *the Turkish Revolution*, p. 10.

²⁴⁸ Ahmad, *the Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p.44.

over state institutions, and tried to stifle all opposition voices. As a result, by mid-1952, the popularity of the RPP and İnönü was increasing.

Relations between the Democrats and the RPP were very bad. The Democrats were very sensitive about their standing with the military, and they suspected that the commanders would not be totally faithful to the government while İnönü was still around. The Democrats felt unconfident so long as İnönü was active in politics. İnönü brought out a sense of weakness in the DP in a way that could not be explained. The reason for this was that, while the Democrats had acquired political power at the polls, they felt uncertain about their hold over the state, the armed forces, the judiciary, and even the universities and the press. According to the Democrats all these institutions, but especially the armed forces, still retained considerable loyalty to İsmet İnönü and the RPP.²⁴⁹

After their success in 3 consecutive elections --1950, 1954 and 1957²⁵⁰-- it became even more difficult for the Democrats to endure and tolerate criticism. Menderes was often more apprehensive about his own supporters. He recalled how in 1937, when Atatürk came to İstanbul, he was surrounded by crowd, and so he told the writer Hamdullah Suphi “this same crowd can be gathered to lynch me; their love or hate is not very reliable...” Atatürk had known the Turkish people. He was the man who commanded people; he did not submit to them. Menderes believed his supporters to be capable of doing everything

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 37.

²⁵⁰ On 17 November 1957 the election results surprised for which won 40.6% of all votes and took 178 seats in the assembly, the RPP won 47.3% of all votes and took 424 seats. It showed there was a strong opposite party when the DP entering its last term. Saim Sezen, *Seçim ve Demokrasi*, Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1994, p. 245.

for him and this proved to be a mistake.²⁵¹ According to the historian and writer Şevket Süreyya Aydemir;

The biggest enemy of democratic experience in the developing countries where parliamentary traditions are not entrenched is pride of the party that holds power which causes it to be arrogant. It comes with if that party thinks its votes are everything and the voice of the streets is the strongest voice. Indeed, this is a political complex of the one party regime.²⁵²

Members of the DP felt so confident that they were heard to say dangerous sentences like: “If you want, you can bring back the Caliphate.” or “If I presented [a block of] a wood as a candidate, it would win.” This, of course, was the result of DP having such a large majority in the parliament.²⁵³ The new parliament was under the control of authoritarian powers, but this time people had brought them into power to oppose the authority of the RPP which had continued for 27 years. As far as the DP was concerned, however, its authority derived from the people.

During the ten years that the Democrats were in power, many people sought to identify the principal philosophical differences between Democrats and Republicans. The Democrats were described as a populist, rural party and the Republicans as elitist, urban and supported by the intelligentsia.²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, p. 263.

²⁵² Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 197), p.163.

²⁵³ C. Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, p. 131.

²⁵⁴ Ahmad, *the Turkish Experiment*, p. 44.

In the election of 1957, the DP won 424 seats and the RPP 178, an increase over the past year.²⁵⁵ Because of the troubled atmosphere, the DP had lost a considerable number of votes in 1957 election. Through 1958 and 1959 the RPP's position it faced considerable further improved.²⁵⁶ This weakening of the DP was obviously serious. In its last term in power, opposition and problems that were usually ignored were now solidly placed on the political agenda by that opposition. There is substantial evidence that Bayar took the initiative to block İnönü's trip to heavily democratic southwest Turkey in April 1959.²⁵⁷ After three days, as İnönü entered İstanbul on his return trip, he was met by large numbers of Democratic partisans and would have been "accidentally killed had it not been for the interference of soldiers after the police had looked the other way."²⁵⁸ Censors were forbidden to publish of this news about the incident, setting a pattern which was to be followed often in 1960. The common idea was that Bayar, saw İnönü as a rival. For example, when İnönü visited Kayseri, he was struck by some partisans of the DP in the outlying village of Yerköy. This event had been planned by Minister Namık Gedik, who was very close to Bayar, he even said the order was given by Bayar. İnönü wrote in his notebook on 5 May 1956: "All bad events affecting the RPP are planned by Bayar, as we have come to know from an official voice"²⁵⁹ this legal voice was Menderes. These examples show that Bayar had lost his objectivity and had decided to support Menderes and his cabinets since the beginning. Celal Bayar, at a meeting, insisted on acceptance of "the decision of the Party's Central Committee as the decision of all the Democrats." This

²⁵⁵ Saim Sezen, *Seçim ve Demokrasi* (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1994), p. 245.

²⁵⁶ Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p. 117.

²⁵⁷ Harris, "Celal Bayar," *Political Leaders*, p. 51.

²⁵⁸ Weiker, *Turkish Revolution*, p. 11.

²⁵⁹ Toker, *Demokrasimizin*, p. 279.

aimed at establishing the party founders' domination.²⁶⁰ In 1957, İnönü opened the session with a scathing speech by denouncing the proposal as dictatorial, unconstitutional, and violation of human rights.²⁶¹ Not even the most partisan presiding officer could deny İnönü the right to refute this, and he made his famous speech that "If you continue on this road, even I will not be able to save you."²⁶²

In addition to political affairs, a great deal of argument centered on the economic policies of the Democrats.²⁶³ Analyzing Menderes's policy in 1951, Bernard Lewis wrote:

Present government policy seems to be, not to abolish statism (*étatisme*) entirely, but to reduce it progressively and limit it eventually to those forms of economic activity which are specially suited to State ownership, or, what is perhaps the same thing, which are unattractive to private capital...

The central question here is- has the planned reconstruction of Turkey under *statism* gone far enough to permit its restriction or abandonment, without danger of a relapse into the old conditions or same form of economic colonialism?... Certainly the attempt, in the middle of the twentieth century, to run back and catch up on the missing chapter of nineteenth-century liberal capitalism in Turkish history is not without its perils.²⁶⁴

This was, indeed, the question that had to be answered before liberal capitalism could be fostered in Turkey. The democrats found that the social class embodying the values of the private entrepreneur was very small and underdeveloped. To the extent that such a class existed, its activities were hampered by current social attitudes and values. In spite of all

²⁶⁰ *Vatan*, March 1, 1948.

²⁶¹ İnönü declared "This pressure management is an illegal coup which is opposed to rights and the law" See, *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları* (1920- 1973), vol 2; edited by Ali Rıza Cihan (Ankara: KSYK. Yayınları 1993), p. 83.

²⁶² The texts of İnönü speeches, and a report of much of the debate of April 18, were printed in *Ulus*, April 19, 1960.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁶⁴ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 328-29.

their good intentions, the Democrats had difficulty in implementing their program. Although the DP stood for easing of government controls and more opportunity for private initiative, they could not find an appropriate formula for limiting the activities of the state sector. The new regime, in fact, continued and increased government expenditure upon economic development --industrial as well as agricultural. Between 1950 and 1960 the private industrial sector in fact grew very slowly.²⁶⁵

	Private Sector		Public Sector	
	1950	1961	1950	1961
Factories (number)	441	1,082	16	21
Workers (numbers)	31,933	73,837	23,426	27,731
Fixed capital (1000TL)	15,160	63,893	19,885	23,392
Production value (1000 TL)	307,244	2,728,923	216,711	798,602

Source: The State Institute of Statistics, *İstatistik Yıllığı*, 1962, p. 276.

In short, the Democratic regime pursued a policy that favoured economic development over price stability-- a choice for which it should not perhaps be faulted-- but it did so in what must be regarded as an exaggerated degree. Monetary and fiscal policies were all formed with the objective of economic growth. In addition, the government pursued its economic development without planning and without much attention to the linkages that already existed within industry. The predictable consequence was a serious inflation that not only threatened the political popularity to which the Democrats attached such high value, but also acted to halt economic growth. The Menderes government did succeed in continuing to obtain substantial foreign aid, which helped support a large portion of the

²⁶⁵ Davison, *Turkey*, p. 152; Ahmad, *the Turkish Experiment*, p. 129.

Turkish budget, especially from the United States.²⁶⁶ In the latter half of the 1950s, however, Menderes could no longer control the economy, though he was sure that the problems were temporary. Despite strong opposition from nationalist and leftist intellectuals, he wanted to rely on the help of foreign allies, especially from the United States and West Germany. Hence the government received more and more American aid (which was thought to be at low cost,) in return for the use of important military bases in Turkey by the U.S. armed forces.²⁶⁷

After the 1960 revolution, it was demonstrated that the fallen regime had left Turkey with enormous internal and external debt. Figures released to the newspapers on 17 June 1960 were as follows:

Estimated Turkish Debts, June 1960
(Thousands of Turkish Lira)

	Internal	Foreign	Total
Regular budget	1,417,781	2,882,767	4,300,548
Annexed budgets and state			
Economic enterprises	2,949,768	1,872,747	4,822,515
Total public debt	4,367,549	4,755,514	9,123,063
Private sector and miscellaneous debts			3,068,379
Grand Total			12,191,442

Source: Printed in *Ulus*, 17 June 1960. Weiker, *the Turkish Revolution*, p. 12.

²⁶⁶ Marshall Aid provided TL 37 million and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) granted a loan of \$9 million. Davison, p. 152; Ahmad, *Turkey Politics* p. 129; Singer, *Economic Advance*, pp. 380-81; Weiker, *the Turkish Revolution*, p. 12-13.

²⁶⁷ Geyikdağı, *Islam and Political Parties in Turkey*, p. 55; Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment*, p. 117

The Democrat's completion of the letter and spirit of the stabilization program was lethargic. In 1960 many of the shortages of consumer goods had become accentuated; even Turkish coffee was hard to be finding. Because of development without planning and inflationist fiscal policies, out-payments were delayed and the government went to devaluation as the last solution in 1958. As a result, the cost of living increased to a level that people could not endure.

The positive activation of economics was transformed to the constructor industry and trade, so rooted and balanced economic development did not be realized. The complaints, which came from ordinary people, had grown louder.²⁶⁸ The Turkish economy was in collapse, and clearly one of the principal tasks of the regime that took over would be to restore it to health.

The DP tried to hide the economic crisis by aggressive politics. Instead of solving problems, the Democrats tried to do away with the opposition that brought them to light. When Menderes became quite unable to endure the sight of any support given to the opposition, the DP made its biggest and last mistake in 1960. In order to silence its critics who were becoming stronger and more effective, the DP began to place rigid pressure on the press. Some newspapers were closed and several journalists prosecuted. On 18 April the Assembly voted to establish a Commission to investigate the opposition which, it was alleged, in cooperation with a section of the press, was trying to set up illegal and secret columns, and armed political gangs composed of ruffians and ex-convicts. The Commission, 'to enable its investigation,' at once banned all political activity and any

²⁶⁸ Ahmet Yücekök, *Türkiye'de Parlemantonun Evrimi* (Ankara: SBF Yay, 1983), pp. 130-131.

published reference to the debates of the Assembly. This shift towards totalitarianism was one of the basic factors that led to the downfall of the DP.

The government continued to be apprehensive about military intervention, The Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatih Rüştü Zorlu said: "The Turkish officer is fully aware that the army should not interfere in politics."²⁶⁹ On the same day, although İnönü denied that any element of his party had connections with the army, he made an interesting speech in which he said: "an oppressive regime can never be sure of the army."²⁷⁰ On 27 April, the dictatorial powers of search, arrest, and imprisonment were voted in by the Commission. After a law professor in İstanbul University told his class that he chose not to give his lecture on constitutional law that day since there was no such thing in Turkey, Turkish students began to hold demonstrations in İstanbul. Fighting between students and the police ended in gunfire by the latter, with police jeeps being driven at the student positions. The students were scattered but repositioned themselves inside the campus. The students began a silent march to the governor's office. Rumours of the toll of killed, injured, and arrested ran completely wild. Similar events occurred at Ankara University the next morning. Students were met this time by soldiers as well as by the police. The students, chanting "freedom, freedom, Menderes resign!" were loudly heard in the streets of Ankara. Such activism had, was until that time, been unknown in Turkey. A group of Democrats called on Bayar and begged him to dissolve the Commission. His reply was,

²⁶⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, May 7, 1960.

²⁷⁰ *The Times*, May 7, 1960.

“If we give them our hand they’ll take our arm; if we give them our arm they’ll take our head.”²⁷¹

During May further demonstrations continued, and on 21 May a spontaneous anti-government demonstration was joined by the cadets at the Ankara Military School. This caused panic within the government as it was the first demonstration by members of the armed forces, and so the military schools (Reserve Officer Schools) were “closed.”²⁷² However, Menderes said that he could never believe that the army would act against him.²⁷³

After this, events moved very fast. Much is still not clear about the origins and motives of the bloodless coup which actually did occur in 1960. In the early hours of the morning of 27 May, the armed forces secured control of İstanbul and Ankara, arresting Bayar, Menderes and other members of the DP in the National Assembly. Bayar was seized in the Presidential Palace in Çankaya and taken immediately to the Military School, where apparently General Cemal Madanoğlu proposed to him that he resign the presidency. Bayar categorically refused, saying, “I came through elections, I will go by elections.”²⁷⁴ The coup was nevertheless perfectly planned and executed.²⁷⁵ The body formed by the military officers to rule the nation became known as the National Unity Committee (*Millî Birlik Komitesi*).

²⁷¹ Weiker, *the Turkish Revolution*, p. 16., G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 146.

²⁷² G. L. Lewis, pp. 144-146.

²⁷³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of the Modern Turkey*, Routledge, (1993), p. 110.

²⁷⁴ Aydemir, *Menderes' in Dramı*, p. 427.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 146; Davison, *Turkey*, pp. 155-56; Aydemir, *Menderes'in*, p. 466.

The radio announcement on 27 May by the officers who had just seized power was remarkable for its stress on the reasons for their actions, which included rescuing “the parties from the irreconcilable situation,” the setting up a supra-party administration, the holding of free elections and the handing over of political power to the civilian government, formed by the party which would win these election. However, it is always easier for a military to take power than to turn it over to a civilian government. In June, General Cemal Gürsel, the head of the National Unity Committee, made his position clear at a gathering of officers at the Ministry of Defence:

The Army today has taken on a number of tasks all over the country. This is a matter of duty. But to continue it would be weakness...We must all be eager and anxious to slip away from this duty as soon as possible and return to our real jobs. Our highest ideal must be to go back to soldiering. Because our present duties involve a little less discipline, are a bit fancier than we're used to, people may be unwilling to leave them. That's human nature. But we are not going to give in to it...The world will see that the moment our task is done we shall return to our own honourable ranks, our own units, our own duties.²⁷⁶

But not all members of the National Unity Committee were of the same mind. General Gürsel wanted to turn the government over to a constitutional civilian regime after a very short time. This was not to be. He became head of the state, chief of government, and chief of the general staff. Power resided with him and 37 other officers.²⁷⁷ They were great believers in abolition. They began with the armed services. Of the 260 serving generals and admirals, 235 were placed on the retirement list on 3 August, while about 5,000 colonels and majors followed them three days later. Then the universities' turn

²⁷⁶ G. L. Lewis, p. 156.

²⁷⁷ Tekin Erer, *On Yılım Mücadelesi* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1963), pp.16-17; Ahmad, *the Making of the Modern Turkey*, p. 161; Davison, *Turkey*, p. 156.

came. In October the National Unity Committee decreed the dismissal of 147 university teachers on grounds of incompetence, absenteeism, homosexuality, and having communist sympathies. Meanwhile all political party activities had been curtailed.²⁷⁸ The Democratic Party was dissolved and the Democratic deputies as well as cabinet ministers arrested and put on trial for violations of the constitution of 1924.²⁷⁹

A new constitution to “solve the faults of the old one” was prepared by a committee of lawyers that had been flown in from İstanbul University just a few hours after the revolution. The draft was thoroughly reworked by a constituent assembly that met in Ankara from January to May 1961. The final text was very detailed. It set up a Senate, a new political body in the Turkish political system, and an Assembly whose membership was to be based on proportional representation (formerly there had been only one chamber); it provided a constitutional court to review legislation; it contained a strong section on individual rights; and it confirmed the essential secularizing reforms of the Atatürk period. On 9 July 1961, the constitution was submitted to a national referendum and it was approved by 62 percent of voters. Thus it became the fifth in the series of written constitutions that Turkey had known since 1876.²⁸⁰ The military intervention of 27 May 1960 was in the tradition of the Young Turk revolution of 1908; its aim was to carry out primary structural changes in society.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 148.

²⁷⁹ Davison, *Turkey*, p. 156.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, p.11.

The measures taken by the officers appeased the extremist, dominant group of the armed forces, if only temporarily. But did the 1961 election result signify a sound defeat for the neo-Democrat parties and victory for İnönü's RPP? The results were interpreted, in the country and outside, as a victory for the latter. But the results justified the predictions of those who had warned against the danger of handing power back to civilians without changing the social and political structure. The RPP received only 36.7 per cent of the votes and 173 seats. The two neo Democrat parties -- the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party (NTP-Yeni Türkiye Partisi) received 34.8 and 13.7 per cent of the votes and 158 and 65 seats respectively. The results were interpreted by some as a victory for Menderes and a vote critical of the regime of 27 May. In such a political atmosphere it was improbable that the army would be able to return to the barracks and watch events take their course.²⁸² As a result of increased complaints by the people on the street, the opposition had become more intensive. The 1960 military move that ended the power of the DP was not only committed to protecting freedoms and saving the regime, but it also constituted a reaction to the military-civil bureaucrats who had formed a closed network of citizens economically the opposite of the bourgeoisie. Truly, the 1960 coup established fixed the formula of military + the RPP= power for the Turkish people, and it affected the political power of the RPP very negatively in the future, so that the RPP has never come to power with a majority to this day.²⁸³

Turkey became one of the first so-called "developing" nations to start a program of fast-track political, social, and economic development. It was hoped that its progress would

²⁸² Ahmad, *the Making of Modern Turkey*, p. 172.

²⁸³ H. Ulman, Ahmet. Yücekök, "CHP'nin Vardığı Nokta," *Özgür İnsan*, no: 1 (June, 1972)

make it a mainstay of stability and democracy and a model for other emerging nations. But some important questions about Turkey's future arose with the revolution by the Turkish armed forces on 27 May 1960. For instance: Did the elimination of the Menderes regime by a military junta mean that modernization and multiparty government in Turkey had failed? Actually the efforts of the military regime to return Turkey to the path of Atatürk's Revolution revealed the magnitude and complexity of many of the problems that remained to be solved. The DP had come to power by election and it believed that this gave them a right to act in defiance of any criticism or opposition, even to the point of persecuting the opposition party directly.

The events described above continue to polarize and affect Turkish society to this date. Some still hold the view that the DP regime was becoming increasingly undemocratic and dictatorial and that the armed forces acted justifiably in defending the nation. Some others point to the legacy of military coups and political polarization that resulted from it, and view the execution of democratically elected leaders that followed the coup as a major setback to the process of democratization of the Republic.

Leftist writers insist that general politics and their social consequences did not change with the introduction of the multiparty system, and that the dominant powers in the system became more powerful. Political independence could not be supported by economic independence. As a result, the nationalist-conservative classes abolished the nationalist reforms. This was the meaning of the multiparty regime for the ruling classes. According to Halil Berktaş a modern Turkish scholar, "The multiparty regime was a kind of politics which led to the dictatorship of dominant powers. Although there were many

parties in this regime, all of them depended on the landlords and powerful bourgeoisies.”²⁸⁴ The results of the experiment in the multiparty system between 1950 and 1960 were:

- The return of an authoritarian regime
- Economic and cultural degeneration.

However, right wing writers and members of the DP movement, point out that the DP was a movement that originated came directly from Turkish society. Former DP minister Hayrettin Erkmen has said “the aim of the establishment of the DP was to end the contradictions that had continued for years between the government and people, and to do away with government pressure as a means of becoming closer to the people.”²⁸⁵

It is obvious that interpretations of the multiparty regime were different and contradictory. Only with a balanced view of what was done wrong by both sides, can one achieve a new synthesis about the multiparty experiment in Turkey.

Generally, in developing countries like Turkey, real democracy does not come easily. The DP’s political adventures did not fit any specific development agenda. Political parties turned to demagogy in order to win the votes of people. However, it is obvious that interference by the army in politics in 1960 was an undemocratic action. The DP movement was the first real multiparty experience in Turkish political life and the fact that it would make mistakes was to be expected. Moreover, despite their mistakes, Bayar

²⁸⁴ Halil Berktaş, DP Tarihine Bakışlar, *Tarih ve Toplum*, no: 54 (Haziran 1988), p.12.

²⁸⁵ Fahri Aral, “Hayrettin Erkmen’le DP Üzerine”, *Tarih ve Toplum*, no: 53 (Mayıs, 1988) p.18.

and other Democrats made a significant contribution to establishing a democratic and modern Turkey.

The *Yassı Ada* Trials and Bayar

Bayar was arrested at 5 o'clock in the morning of 27 May at the Çankaya Palace and brought to the Military School. The next day, a number of claims about Bayar and Menderes were voiced on the newspapers and radio channels. According to these claims, 103 million Turkish Liras had been found in Bayar's account, at the time a very substantial sum. Other strange rumours claimed that "people were cut up by meat grinders," during the April- May demonstrations and that "they were buried under the asphalt highways" constructed by the DP government. Obviously, all of these claims were untrue, but all these rumours showed the general situation of a society that had lost confidence in the DP government and was in a depressive mood.

There was discussion regarding who was truly the government leader between 1950 and 1960, and this basically came down to two different claimants: Adnan Menderes or Celal Bayar. Bayar, however, was not a president who pushed his agenda: always stayed within the borders of the constitution. According to a member of the DP government Samet Ağaoğlu, nobody could say that Bayar forced them to do anything, because Bayar never thought of himself as the sole head of the Party or government. If some measures had

been taken as he suggested, everything might have been different.²⁸⁶ The general perception was that Menderes was the active leader of the DP. The writer Aydemir described him as “the wild rider of the white horse.”²⁸⁷

The trial of the DP leaders took place on Yassiada, the barren ‘Flat Island’ in the Sea of Marmara. Bayar and Menderes in particular were sentenced for violating the constitution. There was a definite difference in the images of Bayar and Menderes that emerged from the trials. Menderes seemed exhausted, tired, and weak. Bayar’s stand was essentially “I did it and I’m glad.” Though just prior to the opening of the trials he had attempted suicide (25 September), he maintained his self-respect and proud manner throughout the entire proceedings. At one session in his series of trials, the judge Salim Başol told Bayar that he hadn’t used his power well, otherwise he could have stopped all these events. Bayar asked: “What should I have done to stop the events?” When Başol said: “You could have changed the prime minister, and established a new cabinet; in short, you could have restored confidence to the society.” Bayar said: “Okay...I see, I stand accused of not using powers that the constitution did not let me use! There is nothing to be said about it.” He furthermore said “let the decision be for or against me, it is not an important matter.”²⁸⁸ Even those who were opposed to him agreed that he acted with bravery in the courtroom.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ Toker, *Demokrasimizin*, p. 105,

²⁸⁷ Cihat Baban, “Bayarın Mazhariyeti” in *100 Yaşında*, pp. 24-29; Toker, *Demokrasimizin*, pp.54-55; Aydemir, *İhtilalin*, pp. 206-211. The white horse was the symbol of the DP.

²⁸⁸ Bayar referred himself as a “Komiteci,” which in Turkey meant a member of a secret revolutionary society during the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

²⁸⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, December 26, 1960. Bayar had tried to kill himself in September 25, but this attempt was prevented by officers and he was rescued after medical intervention. Tarık Güryay, *Bir İktidar Yargılanıyor* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları 1971), p.p. 181-183.

Bayar was also accused of having ordered the destruction of the Military School (*Harbiye Okulu*), but the strangest of all charges was what led to the “dog trial.” According to certain claims, Bayar had built a charitable fountain in the village of Ödemiş, and to provide the money for it, he sold a dog to an official employee at the Atatürk Farm. The dog had been given to him as a gift when he had visited Afghanistan.²⁹⁰ This suggested were put in place in order to humiliate the Democrats. There are other reasons this.²⁹¹ First of all, on the opening day of the courts, the files dealing with “violating the constitution” were not ready. Secondly, ordinary criminal trials would lower the accused in the eyes of the people while the more serious charges were being prepared. Thirdly, the Democrats might not have recognized the Court of High Justice²⁹² but if forced to respond to these other charges, they would in effect be recognizing its validity.

The special court, consisting of nine regular judges, handed down its decisions in September 1961: fifteen of the accused were sentenced to death, 31 to life imprisonment, 418 to lesser terms and fines, while 123 were acquitted. The National Unity Committee commuted the death sentences on eleven but confirmed those on Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, the Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Celal Bayar was later reprieved on account of his age, but Zorlu and Polatkan were hanged on 16 September and Menderes a day later. The feeling in the country had been that there would be no executions; there is reason to believe that the judges themselves, when they had passed the sentences lay down by the criminal code for

²⁹⁰ *Hayat Mecmuası*, yıl 5, vol 2, no: 43, 1960, p.12.

²⁹¹ Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı*, p. 379.

²⁹² On 16 June 1960, a new court was established immediately by NUC to sentence those responsible. The members of the this High Justice Court were: Ferruh Adalı, Selman Yörük, Abdullah Üner, Hıfzı Tüz, Cahit Özden, Rıza Tunç, Hasan Gürsel, Nahit Saçlıoğlu, see, Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, p. 324.

the crimes in question, had expected the National Unity Committee to exercise its right of mercy.²⁹³

Throughout the Yassiada trials Bayar was always a real “leader,” and “statesman.” He showed that his honour was more important than his life. After Bayar’s death sentence was commuted to prison term, the commander of Yassiada came to Bayar and put his hand on his shoulder, saying: “Okay, you escaped death now, the next time you should be careful!” Bayar pulled his shoulder away harshly and said: “Mr. Commander, I am not afraid of death!.. But I hate the informality...”²⁹⁴ Those who heard this were shocked. For a time afterwards Bayar was kept in the Kayseri Prison with the other sentenced DP members. He stayed there for three years, but and had a heart attack, and was released.²⁹⁵

İnönü became the Prime Minister on 10 November 1961. However, Bayar and all his Democrat Party colleagues were prohibited from engaging in political activities and only İnönü could help to approve a new law that would restore their political rights. After much hesitation Bayar consented to meet İnönü and he visited İnönü’s house.

Consequently, on 14 May 1969, the political rights of the Democrats were given back.

However Bayar was 86 years old and it was unlikely that he would exercise his political rights actively. Maybe for this reason he refused the title of “natural senator” given to him by the constitution. Bayar said: “I will not occupy a position for which I was not chosen by popular mandate.”²⁹⁶ Until his death on 23 August 1986, he responded to the questions of researchers and journalists with a clear mind. He even founded a museum in Umurbey,

²⁹³ Davison, *Turkey*, p. 157; G.L.Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 152.

²⁹⁴ Bozdağ, “*Celal Bayar*,” in *100 Yaşında*, p. 378,

²⁹⁵ Yeşilyurt, *Bayar Gerçeği*, p. 401; Bozdağ, *Celal Bayar*, pp. 115-116 ; Akşit, *Celal Bayar*, p. 26. His political rights were given to him on 5 November 1969.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

his birth place, and continued to write his memoirs until he died at the age of 103. When he left active politics he promised the following. “There is no reason why I should scream at anybody or make somebody afraid! I will speak of realities and of things that I believe are beneficial to my country until I close my eyes.”²⁹⁷

²⁹⁷ Bozdağ, “Celal Bayar,” in *100 Yaşında*, p. 381.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this research was not to recapitulate the life story of Bayar, but to study his contribution to the Turkish revolution and the nation's subsequent political life. To understand the reasons for his personal decisions, however, it was necessary to look at his childhood and youth before looking at his political career up to 1960.

Although revolutions seem to be sudden actions, their repercussions are often spread over a long period of time during which they transform society. This can be seen in the continuity between Bayar's activities in the Independence War and his personal involvement in the Turkish revolution. It is hoped that in this research this fact in relation to Bayar was made clear.

As a child of an immigrant family forced to leave Plevne as a result of the Ottoman – Russian War, Bayar carried the physical sores of conflict and oppression. His education and the effects of his environment transformed him, during the Constitutional period, into an intellectual obsessed by the notions of “independence” and “freedom.”

Bayar then went on to acquire active experience with the CUP between 1908 and 1918, and he drew on this as well during his activities on the battlefield and as a resistance fighter. He was also affected by the political atmosphere of his times, especially at the end of World War I when a ban was imposed on the CUP by the İstanbul government. CUP members like Bayar were forced into hiding: in Bayar's case, refuge lay in the

Aegean islands. It was from there that Bayar later set up his defence forces, and ultimately joined the Independence War.

From beginning to end Bayar was one of the thousands of individuals who played a role in the Turkish War of Independence. Although his role was not central to the development of the war and did not bring him into a top leadership position; his was nevertheless an extraordinary contribution. His success in revolutionary organization was reason enough for him to be chosen as part of the general staff. This role, together with the experience gained with the CUP, had a considerable influence on him.

Celal Bayar came from a middle class Turkish family of village background, yet despite having only an elementary education he became economy minister and prime minister, which in itself was a victory for Turkish democracy. His propaganda efforts and his organization in the Aegean region were vital to the success of the nationalist movement. He showed considerable ability in resolving the rivalry between Demirci Efe and Yörük Ali Efe and he persuaded Gökçen Efe to join the offensive on behalf of the nationalist forces. Bayar was not just a fighter in the independence War: he was also one the highest-ranking officers on the western Front. In the subsequent contraction of a democratic Turkey, his key contributions were as follows:

1. Bayar's speech in March 1920 to the last Ottoman Parliament exposed the realities about the occupation of Anatolia to those deputies who had followed the events from the capital. The influence of this speech was crucial to continued support for the rebellion.

2. After the occupation of İstanbul, he moved to Bursa, where he had published a *fetva* in support of the nationalist struggle, contradicting an earlier İstanbul *fetva* opposing it. This may be seen as the starting point of the religion-legal battle between İstanbul and Ankara.
3. The proposal of a “law about wartime deserters” (designed to stop the escape of soldiers), drawn up by Bayar along with Tevfik Rüştü and Refik Şevket and accepted on 11 September 1920, gave rise to the establishment of the Independence Courts (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*).
4. Bayar attended the Lausanne Meeting as an economic adviser, where he refused to consider paying Ottoman debts with the country’s gold reserve. This was fortuitous for the future health of the Turkish economy.
5. He was the founder of the İş Bank, the premier example of modern Turkish banking. Not least of its accomplishments was the self-confidence it instilled in the country, which led to the establishment of other national banks.
6. He prepared the first development plan under the guidance of Atatürk, while the industry financial provisions established in this plan provided useful service to the Turkish revolution.

7. After World War II Turkey found itself isolated between the USA and Russia and tried to find a new place in the new word order. According to Bayar, a closer relationship to the USA would be of greater benefit to Turkey: thus Turkey entered NATO on 18 February 1952 through Bayar's efforts. The international relations established by of Turkey were determined between 1950 and 1960 direct by Bayar, and the effects of this continue to be felt to this day.
8. Bayar was one of the most influential politicians in the process of moving the state to a multiparty system, and he played a significant role in the struggle for the establishment of a democratic Turkey.
9. Bayar was unique as a Turkish statesman in that wrote down all his activities from his CUP period to his years as prime minister in Ankara, and left all these documents about his activities and service to future historians.

This eighth point has been investigated in greater depth because Bayar's struggle on behalf of democracy is still a controversial subject. This study claims that Bayar's role in the movement contributed to democratic change, but does not form any conclusions as to the democratic personality of Bayar. Once Turkey transferred to a multiparty system from one-party rule, his impact may be described as follows:

Under the system of one-party rule, Bayar was affected by Atatürk's political ideas. The bases of his political philosophy were nationalism, pragmatism, revolutionism, and a soft middle class ideology. Although his opinions were not to change remarkably in the

multiparty period, his application, and interpretation of them differed in tone. For example, his pragmatism was transformed into liberalism and enthusiasm for democracy, his revolutionary spirit transformed into a respect for law that was limited by the electoral system, and his soft middle class ideology changed into a populist middle class attitude.

Bayar was the founder of Turkish statism and the first to make the economic well-being of the middle class the main aim of a “national economic” programme. He also fought to protect private capital and enterprises under both one-party rule and the multiparty system. Bayar did not join in the discussion over the system; instead, he concentrated on organizing the economy in keeping with the circumstance of the country, which changed fast. Politically, he was strongly opposed to communism. He became more liberal in his economic policies but more conservative in his cultural policies.

Bayar was a bigot when it came to religious questions, but by the mid-1950s, Bayar submitted to the populist stance of the DP on this subject. Bayar was a faithful follower of Atatürk and his ideas, but on religion he was not as rigid as his master. Menderes was the more dominant figure in the DP, and despite the secular personality of Bayar, Kemalism was seen by the Democrats as a flexible ideology to be interpreted in the light of daily circumstance. Men like Bayar were able to make as good a claim to Kemalism as any Republican, but he went along with the transformation that the Democrats required, especially as they saw it as being completely in keeping with the previous aims of Kemalism. When we look at his life, we can see that Bayar was often managed and directed by stronger leaders. It was under such circumstances that he sometimes did not plan or think ahead: Bayar’s acceptance of the religious populism of the DP should be

analyzed from this point of view, as could, perhaps, his acquiescence in other DP policies that led to his and the party's downfall.

None of this however takes away from his real contribution to the emergence of a civil democracy in Turkey during the last century. In his own way he was loyal not only to the revolution that he had waged alongside Atatürk, but to future generations of Turks who will enjoy the fruits of his sacrifices in a turbulent age.

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