

METAPHYSICAL PROOFS  
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD



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being

An Essay Presented for the Degree of Master of Arts

by D. B. Rogers.

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## INTRODUCTION

The existence and nature of God have been the subject-matter for the thought of men in most ages. For the demonstration and the explanation of these, Theological and Philosophical writers have put forward many and varying arguments, but with a large proportion of these writings the present paper will not be concerned. It will confine its treatment to the three great proofs around which the Theistic and the Anti-theistic discussion of the past has largely centred. And in the consideration of these, the purpose will be, not so much either to give an historical account of their developement, for that will be pursued only to the criticism of Kant, or to examine them with a view to working out a new proof -- a restatement or a combination of these positions --, as to examine how far these "proofs" are in reality proofs of what they purport to demonstrate. This will necessitate that the brief historical statement be followed by a more brief examination of the nature both of the God, and of the existence of the God, whose existence these proofs have attempted to establish, and also of the nature of Proof. The result of this examination will justify some criticisms and discussion of the "Proofs" outlined, while the whole will conclude with a summary statement of the results accomplished by these attempts and an indication of their real import.

## HISTORICAL

## The Metaphysical

proofs of the existence of God, as classified by Immanuel Kant, are not easily distinguished from one another even in the writings of that thinker's immediate predecessors, much less in the earlier development of Theistic thought. They are late stages in an evolution of thought which began when Philosophy was but emerging from Mythology. The religious conceptions of the pre-philosophic writers were indeed vaguely expressed. Even in the literature of the race from which the philosophic thought of the modern Western world has come, the first attempt was by no means an early one. In the works of Aristophanes and Hesiod we find a naturalistic and pantheistic cosmogony: in the poems of Homer we reach an anthropomorphic interpretation which makes Jupiter the ὑπάτος μύστης to whom all the forces of nature are subject. This is not very far removed from Theism. Both these explanations of the universe were opposed by Xenophanes, who first overtly insisted on the unity of God. He obtained his Monotheistic belief from reflection which led him to be the champion against Polytheism and the Anthropomorphism of the current religious beliefs. *εἰς θεὸς ἐν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι ἀγίςτος, οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοῖος οὔτε νόμα ὅλος ὄρα, ὅσλος δὲ κούε ὅσλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει ἀλλ' ἀπαντὰ πόνοιο νοοῦ πᾶντα κρεδαίνει.* Though Xenophanes is thought by Aristotle to have given an a priori proof of the unity of God, he cannot be thought of as having attempted in any way a demonstration of his existence or being. Nor can this be said of Anaxagoras, who by positing νοῦς as the first principle and unifying ground of the universe transformed the Pantheism of Xenophanes into Theism and laid the foundation of the monotheistic conception of that universe. That remained for one of later date. "Socrates made the first application of the Theistic principle in the sphere of the adaptation of means to end in the organic world." He is considered the originator of the proof from final causes. And this attempt to prove the existence of God was no doubt suggested by the teaching of the Sophists, especially of Pythagoras. The latter has left a fragment in which he writes, *περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἶδέναι, οὐθ' ὥς εἰσὶν, οὐθ' ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν. πολλὰ γάρ τ' ἐκ κορυφῆς εἰδέναι, ἢ τὲ ἀδελότης καὶ βραχύς ὢν ἐβίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.* In this he is thought by Professor Gomperz not to assail or call in question the Theological belief, "but the scientific or reasonable knowledge of the existence of the 'Gods'. To correct this

1 Baldwin Dictionary Vol 1 p,

2 sc, Janet and Seailles, Hist of the Problems of Phil. Vol. 2, p. 25

3 Diog. L. 9: 51



tendency, which was developed and accentuated in the later Sophists, and to vindicate the popular belief, may have been the object of the attempt of Socrates to prove the existence of God. Here then is to be found for the first time, in occidental Philosophy at least, the attempt if so it may be called, to demonstrate the being or existence of God. And from this point onwards in the present sketch the three proofs as distinguished by Kant, will, as far as possible, be treated separately for the sake of economy of discussion. The Teleological, being, as mentioned above, first in historical order, will be first outlined; then the Cosmological; and lastly the Ontological.

### TELEOLOGICAL

The philosophical standpoint of Socrates was that in his age when argumentative power was so coveted, it was possible to contradict the results obtained by the Sophists and in the place of empirical egoistical subjectivity to put universal rational thought, thus <sup>by</sup> the very method adopted by the Sophists restoring the results formerly reached in unreasoned belief, but denied and destroyed by the Sophists. This applies of course to his remarks on God. He conceived of the universe as the product of a beneficent will, and thought of nature in a teleological manner. There was a power which was disposing all things for the best. Plato gave the conceptions of Socrates a more scientific form. He universalized his principle and thought of it in an ontological sense, identifying it with the idea of the Good, thus maintaining transcendental design and purpose. This is called by Baldwin the "Onto-teleological method of conceiving God in relation to the world". In the Laws Plato writes: "If my friend we say that the whole path and movement of the heavens, and all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement, and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path". And again "he (the king) contrived so to place each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of the Good and the defeat of the Evil in the Whole". And this design enters into the smallest detail. "Let us not then deem ... that God, the wisest of beings, who is able to take care and is willing, is like a lazy Good-for-nothing, or a coward who turns his back on labour and gives no thought to the smaller and easier matters but to the great only". Also in the Philebus he writes, "there is in the universe a cause of no mean power which orders and arranges years and months and may be justly called Wisdom and Mind", and referring to

1 Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, p. 449

2 sc. Schwegler; Hist of Phil. p. 47

3 Baldwin Dict of Phil. and Psych. Theism

4 Plato Laws, 1090A, 904, 902.

5 Philebus sec. 30 p. 177

Anaxagoras, goes on to say that the argument here reaches the same  
 1 conclusion as "those who say of old time that mind rules the universe".  
 "Plato's whole world view was", Dr. Stirling claims, "that of a single  
 teleological system with God alone as its heart, with the will of God  
 2 alone as its Creator and Soul".

This order and arrangement in the universe is also recognised  
 by Aristotle. All the matter is governed or regulated by an Idea. This  
 is in line with his doctrine of four causes and of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*.

Εἰπεὶ δ' αὖ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι  
 καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγκη τὸ διὰ τὴν αἰτιολογίαν φυσικῶς τὴν  
 ἑλὲν, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, τὸ οὐ ἐνέκα. "Φυσις δὲ ἢ  
 3 τὸ πρῶτον ὅλη, καὶ ... τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ  
 τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως". Referring to natural processes he says...  
 4 ἐστὶν ἄρα τὸ ἐνέκα τοῦ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινόμενος καὶ  
 οὐσιν. "Moreover", he says "in what things there is an end, for that

end is realized, as well what preceeds as what follows, as is the action  
 so is the nature, and as is the nature so is the action, in each case if  
 nothing obstruct: and as the action is for the sake of the end so also  
 5 for the same sake is the nature". The God who is immanent in nature is  
 causing it to develop by a uniform series of causes. The *δύναμις*  
 tending to become *ἐνέργεια*: all the imperfections of nature are striving  
 towards perfection: God is always working for an end. "Ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ἡ  
 6 φύσις οὐδὲν μάλιν ποιοῦσιν". Ἡ φύσις δὲ ποιεῖ τῶν  
 7 εὐδεχόμενον τὸ βελτίστον. Yet there is a transition here from  
 Plato's view; there is *ὁ Θεός* and *ἡ φύσις*, i.e., a dualism in the universe.

In opposition to this dualism of the Aristotelian system  
 the Stoic Physics aims at Monism. It is realistic and materialistic yet  
 every thing in the world was the work of reason. Their system developed  
 the theory of Heroditus by conceiving of *ἀπνεύμα* which was a material  
 substance of fiery air or fiery breath pervading and animating the  
 universe, and this *πνεῦμα* or soul of the universe called "Rational or  
 Artistic Fire (*πῦρ νοερόν, πῦρ τεχνικόν* ...) all-penetrating Air  
 Spirit, Reason, Nature, Providence, Destiny, Law, Necessity, The Ruling  
 8 Principle (*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*).... and the Generating Reason *Λόγος σπερματικός*,  
 governs all things for the best ends and makes each part of the whole  
 serve for the good of the whole, for all the adaptation of the world

1 Laws 10, 904

2 Stirling: Phil. and Religion, p, 113

3 Aristotle :Physics, (Z11:1037 ;A16. Bekker text.

4A .ibid Meta.:D,4,1015; A7, p,87      ibid

5 .ibid Physics ,quoted in Stirling p,131.

6 .ibid De Gen. et Corr. 33



can only have come from a thinking mind and proves therefore the existence of Deity. Cleanthes in his hymn to Zeus writes: "Ζεῦ, φύσεως

ἀρχηγέ, νομου κεινὸν πάντα κυβερνῶν

οὐδὲ τί γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονίῳ δίκῃ δαίμον

καὶ κοσμεῖς τὰ ἀέθρα  
Ὡς γάρ εἰς, ἐν ἅπαντα συνήρως ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν

- 1 "Ὡς δ' ἔνα γίγνεται πάντων λόγον αἰ εἰ ἐόντα", showing that he conceived of the world as ordered by a powerful Zeus and as harmonious. "Zeno enim", writes Cicero, "ita concludit quod ratione utitur melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius est
- 2 Ratione igitur mundus utitur." Diogenes says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus and Posidonius agree that the world is "ῥῶν καὶ λογικόν καὶ εὐφύλον
- 3 καὶ νοερόν". The strongest proof given by Cleanthes, according to Cicero, is that from the distinctness, variety and beauty of the arrangement of the sun, moon and stars and all the ordered movements of the heavens.
- 4 "Quarum rerum aspectus satis indicat non esse ea fortuita." "As we enter a house or school or court", writes Cicero, "and observe the exact order and discipline and method of it, we cannot suppose that it is so regulated without a cause, but must conclude that there is someone who commands and to whom obedience is paid: it is impossible for us to avoid thinking that the wonderful motions, revolutions and order of these great bodies, no part of which is impaired by the infinite succession of ages, must be governed by some superior Intelligent
- 5 Being." The Stoics dwelt also on the adaptation of the parts of the plants and animals, on instinct, reproduction, nourishment, and preservation of the young, etc., in fact on all the more apparent features insisted on by the modern Evolutionists, and on these as manifesting the presence of Universal Reason. Thus God is the Reason of the world and the unalterable law that is in the world is produced by him who contains in himself the germs of everything.

This method of conceiving of the universe to which so large a place was given by the Stoics was entirely contradicted by the system of the Epicureans. They found in the atomic theory of Democritus which they slightly modified, a view of the cosmos which offered a completely mechanical explanation and rendered the argument from Teleology superfluous. Atoms and the void with the infinitesimal deviations of the original atoms account well enough for the beauty and all the adaptation apparent in the universe. Epicurus and his school had as their aim "to put forward such a view of nature as would

7 Aristotle: De Cael. A, 37.

8 Mayor, L. B. Ancient Philosophers, p. 154

1 Prof. Ueberweg: Hist. of Phil., V, 1, p. 196.

2 Natura Deorum, III, 9, 22.

3 Zeller; Stoicism Epicureanism and Scepticism, p. 139, note.

4 De Natura Deorum, II, 5

5 Ibid trans. in Janet and Ceailles V2, p. 410.

do away with the necessity of supernatural intervention, without at the same time pretending to offer a sufficient solution of the problems raised by science." "It must not be supposed", says Epicurus, that the motions of the stars, their rising and their setting, their eclipses and the like are effected and regulated, or that they have once for all been regulated by a Being possessing at the same time blessedness and immortality; for labour and care and favour are not compatible with happiness and self-sufficiency." The Sceptics also opposed the view of the Stoics and openly contradicted it. The ingenuity of Carneades soon exposed the weak points of their theory. He asked for the marks of design in the universe in which there was so much injurious and detrimental to man. He scorns the idea of design. In answer to Chrysippus' assertion that the final cause of a pig is to be killed, Carneades argues: "a pig therefore by being killed must attain the object for which it was destined; it is always beneficial for a thing to attain its object—therefore it is beneficial for a pig to be killed and eaten." But even admitting the presence of design, he, as a fair representative of his school argues: Why is it inconceivable that nature should have formed the world as beautiful and good as possible, according to natural laws without the intervention of God?

The Neo-Platonism of the Alexandrian School, on the other hand, in a degree restored the view of the presence of design in the universe. This system included God as the absolute unit of whom or which the world was one of a series of effluences or radiations, each of which possessed less perfection than the one which preceded it. The thought of the vastness, the magnificence and everlasting harmonious motion of the world naturally leads to the thought of its archetype and the recognition of Intelligence as their originator and preserver.

It was not however until the middle ages that this proof is again definitely put forward. Under the influence of Plato and Aristotle the Scholastics of this period restate the argument with perhaps greater acumen than before. "Now who can doubt" writes Anselm, that, that through which things are good is the Supreme Good? It is, therefore, necessary that there exists a Being supremely great and supremely good, that is to say, the sum of all existing things, *maximum et optimum, id est summum omnium quae sunt*. "Albert Magnus also claims," all creatures cry out to us that there is a God, for the beauties of the world bear witness to a supreme beauty, its sweets to a sweetness, what is highest to something higher than all, what is pure to purity itself". Thomas Aquinas also maintains, "that some things which have no power of knowing, such as natural bodies, work for ends, as is manifest from their constantly, or at least frequently, working in the same way for the attainment of that which is best, which shows that

1 Zeller: Stoicism Epicureanism and Scepticism p, 410

2 Diogenes L. X 76 : Uberweg; Hist of Phil. p, 207

3 Plut's Porphyry De Asst. 888, 20.

4 Zeller: Stoic. Epic. and Scept. p, 513, note



that they arrive at their end not from chance but from intention. Now such things as have no power of knowing do not tend towards an end unless they are directed by some being which has knowledge and intelligence as an arrow is directed by an archer. There is therefore some intelligent being by which all things of nature are directed towards ends"; and again, "Everything which aims at an end in a fixed way, either prescribes to itself that end or finds that end prescribed to it by something else; otherwise it would not aim at this end rather than that... Since therefore things do not prescribe to themselves an end, the end must be set before them by another who is the founder of nature. But this(...) is he who gives being to all things and is of Himself necessary Being whom we call God"

From the Scholastics of the middle Ages, this argument was taken over in its entirety by the early modern Orthodox Theists who had to defend it against rationalistic and Deistic tendencies. Descartes who used the other two scholastic arguments as the touch-stone for his proofs was unable to make any use of it because he required to prove God's existence in order to prove the existence of the world and all material things. Spinoza, though he does not employ the proof, does recognise the presence of design in the universe. Leibnitz deduced it from the preestablished harmony of the attributes of God's extension and thought. This physio-teleological argument of Leibnitz was that the harmony of all the monads could only depend on a common cause, i.e., the order of the universe is due to a wise and skillful creator and director. Locke remarks only that "the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them cannot miss the discovery of a Deity... a superior, wise, powerful and invisible being." In Hume's Dialogues the main theme is the criticism of this proof, the other two being only incidental. His position seems to be "that the cause or the causes of order in the universe probably have some remote analogy to human intelligence", but that this simple though "ambiguous" and "undefined proposition" is not sufficient for logical certainty. This he shows in the argument of Philo; that the origin of the whole can hardly be concluded from the operation of one part of nature on the other, much less from the little agitation of the brain we call thought; that the animi mundi argument is as valid as that from design; and that even by extending and universalizing the

5 Schwegler; Hist of Phil, p, 142

6 Anselm Monolog C.1

7 Albert Magnus; Compendia Theologia Veritati Cl.

1 Quoted in Caldecott and Mackintosh's Selections from Theism p. 27 from Summa Theol. Pt. 1 Quaest. 2, An Deus Sit? A3.

2 Summa Contra Gentiles 2.44.

3 Spinoza Ethica, Prop 29.

4 Essay on Human Understanding Bk. 1, C4, Sec 9, 10

5 Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 2; 396.

terms so that the argument implies a divine mind whose ideas correspond to the visible universe, the difficulty is not overcome for the ideal system is as inexplicable as the universe whose counterpart it is. Philo lays stress on the weakness of the analogical inference from works of art and points out that the argument from design cannot warrant the inference of a perfect or an infinite or even a single Deity and that the apparent marks of design in the animals' structure are only results from the conditions of their actual existence so that the ultimate conclusion of Hume is that "the more clearly we scrutinise this imposing argument, the less we can trust it. It proves too much or too little. It leads us into downright anthropomorphism, or it leaves us with nothing but a vague doctrine. We admit that the reasoning is compatible with the orthodox theory, we cannot hold that it proves it." So far as this argument goes the only safe way and position is the entire suspension of judgment. yet in spite of the criticism against it, the view held by the personage of Dialogues who appears on close examination to express more clearly than any other the author's views, was strongly teleological and monistic. "The order and arrangement of nature", says Cleanthes, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ-- all these bespeak in the clearest language an intelligent cause or author. The Heavens and the Earth join in the same testimony: the whole chorus of nature raises one hymn of praise to its Creator." Moreover while there is uncertainty in the Dialogues regarding the author's views, there is none when he writes thus:--"were men led into the apprehension of invisible intelligent power by the contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who bestowed existence on this vast machine and adjusted all its parts according to one regular plan or connected system... All things in the universe are evidently of a piece, everything is adjusted to everything. One design prevails through the whole, and this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one Author." Bacon claimed that he "had rather believe all the fables in the "Legend" and the Talmud, and the Alcoran than that this universal frame is without mind". Reid has said of the Teleological argument that it "has this peculiar advantage, that it gathers strength as human knowledge advances and is more convincing at present than it was some centuries ago". Sir Isaac Newton concludes his Principia with the general observation that "the whole diversity of natural things can have arisen from nothing but the idea and will of one

1 Leslie Stephen--English Thought in the 18th.Cent,V.2,p,327

3 Natural Hist, of Rel. Sec.1,2.sc Stirling Phil.and Rel.157

4

5 Ward--Naturalism and Agnosticism V.1,p,3 quoted from Prin. I

necessarily existing being who is always and everywhere, God Supreme, Infinite, Omnipotent, Omniscient and Absolutely Perfect", and writes also at the end of his Optics, that the various portions of the world, organic and inorganic, "can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill of a powerful and everliving being who, being in all places, is more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless uniform sensorium and there to form and reform the facts of the universe than we are by our will to move the parts of our own bodies." Samuel Clarke writes, "The other argument to which the greatest part of the proof for the being of God may be reduced, is the order and the beauty of the world: that exquisite harmony of nature, by which the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made... Whose power was it.. that formed these vast and numberless orbs of Heaven and disposed them in such regular and uniform motions?... that framed with exquisite workmanship the eye for seeing..endued the soul of man with understanding judgment and will?" These are not to be ascribed to secondary and natural causes for they are either the inanimate motions of senseless matter, or the voluntary motions of dependent creatures, and what are these but, one of them, the direct operation, and the other, only the free permission of Him who ruleth over all". "To evade this argument there is no possible way but to affirm that all things were produced by chance; or that they are all eternal necessarily of themselves." Chance is a mere word: "it is nothing and can do nothing. On the other hand.. if they will affirm that all things are eternal; yet the argument holds as strong as before that things which cannot for any time exist without a cause, can much less exist without a cause through all time, unless they affirm that all things exist by an internal absolute Necessity of their own nature, which that they do not is evident from hence; that there exists in the world an infinite diversity of things whereas Necessity is uniform and without variation". Berkeley, who causes one of his personages to say, "I am not to be persuaded by the...absurdity of an infinite progression of causes", puts the argument on the basis of the recognition of the existence of a thinking man by means of his manifest parts and actions, And against the opponent who claims that he really knows a rational man not because he sees him but because he is found to be able to speak to him, he urges, that the same is true of God "who speaks to men by the intervention of and the use of arbitrary, outward sensible signs which have no similitude with the things signified", but are so compounded and so disposed as to suggest and exhibit an endless variety of objects". "This

1 Ward- Naturalism and Agnosticism V.1p.44.  
2 Samuel Clarke-Works V.1,p.5 (Knaxton)  
3 Ibid. ....p.6  
4 Berkeley Alciphron 2.  
5 Ibid. .... 7,12.

(optic) language hath a necessary connection with knowledge, wisdom and Goodness. It is equivalent to a constant creation, betokening an immediate act of power and providence". "This instantaneous production and reproduction of so many signs combined, dissolved, transposed, diversified and adapted to such an endless variety of purposes, ever shifting with the occasion and suited to them, being utterly inexplicable and unaccountable by the laws of motion, by chance, by fate, or the like blind principles, doth set forth and testify the immediate operation of a Spirit or a thinking being.. which directs, and rules and governs the world." Many however of the early modern Philosophers neglect this argument, some, eg., Malebranche, perhaps because it was unnecessary for their system. others, eg., Hobbes, no doubt because they were unable to recognise genuine marks of design in the universe. It remained the work of Kant to bring it again into prominence, not however by developing it but by criticising its validity. Here it is perhaps most accurately stated. "The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order, variety, beauty and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue our observations into the infinity of space in the one direction, or into the illimitable divisions of it on the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations- even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach- we find language in the presence of wonders so inconceivable has lost its force and number its power to reckon, nay even thought fails to conceive adequately and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without the power of expression.. all the more eloquent that it is dumb." "The chief momenta in the physico-teleological argument", which is "the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity" are as follows:- "1 We observe in the world.. manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose, executed with great wisdom and existing in a whole of content indescribably various and of an extent without limits. 2 This arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world--it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not of itself, whatever means were employed harmoniously tend towards certain purposes were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a rational and disposing principle in accordance with certain fundamental ideas. 3 There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or several), which is not merely a blind all-powerful nature producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the world. 4 The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the

1 Berkeley- Alciphron 14.

2 Critique of Pure Reason: Transcendental Dialectic 3k.2 C.4  
Sec.3,4,5.



reciprocal relations existing between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic edifice —an inference which all our observation favours and all principles of analogy support." Previous to this Kant writes "Although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and utility of the procedure but have rather to commend and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to demonstrative certainty, and to a reception on its own merits, apart from favour and support from other arguments." He holds that it does not prove the existence of an All-sufficient Being and for this reason :- "Since the evidence of design in the world implies only the contingency of the form of the world and not of the matter, the proof can at the most demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of the Creator of the world to whom all things are subject. Thus this argument is utterly insufficient for the task before us—the demonstration of an All-sufficient being." Then further it only gives a cause that is proportionate to the number and value of the indications of design in the universe and accordingly leads us to infer a cause most wise but not an absolutely wise cause, since the "attainment of the absolute totality is completely impossible in the path of empiricism". In another place he adds another consideration. Admitting that the idea of design is essential to our comprehension of the world, it may be not objective or "constitutive" but only subjective and regulative of our perceptions. It may be only a working hypothesis useful for the time. So this argument, according to Kant, is useful as a supplement to the Cosmological or the Ontological or both or some other proof capable of demonstrating the existence of God. When God's existence is assured this argument is useful in leading to the thought that he is intelligent. The "Physico-Theological" failing in its undertaking recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument; and as this is merely the Ontological in disguise, it executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it, at first, professed to have no connection with this faculty and to base its entire procedure on experience alone."

This same reasoning is largely followed by Fichte in his "On The Belief in a Divine Government of the World." And generally since Kant, the Teleological argument has, except in a few isolated cases, been considered, as he insisted it should, as an aid to the demonstration of the nature of God as intelligent or personal. The Teleological argument is now no longer made to carry a burden greater than it can bear, as in the days when, as a single argument, it was, according to Kant's representations expected to yield a direct and entire demonstration of God... Now.. the Teleological argument but infers

2 infers that the necessary being of the Cosmological proof is possessed  
 of large intelligence—so large indeed that in the a priori Ontological  
 proof it seems to be infinite". In this attempted demonstration of the  
 intelligence of the universe a great influence has been exerted by the  
 doctrine of Evolution. The theories of Evolution are variant. Lamarck's  
 theory rests, as he himself says, "on the two essential and regulative  
 bases of observed facts and true zoological principles—namely, first  
 on the power of life, the results of which are the increased complexity  
 of organism, and consequently the progress mentioned; secondly, on the  
 modifying cause, the products of which are interruptions, various and  
 irregular deviations in the power of life. It follows from these two  
 essential bases—first, that there exists a real progression in the  
 composition of the organism of animals, which the modifying cause has  
 not been able to prevent; then that there is no sustained and regular  
 progression in the distribution of the races of animals, because the  
 modifying cause has almost everywhere varied what nature would have  
 1 formed regularly, if that modifying cause had not acted". The doctrine  
 of Darwin was that of natural selection according to which the animal  
 kingdom is the result of the operations of a few agencies acting on  
 one or more living primitive forms and producing from them the numerous  
 species as well as the varieties of the species. This theory though  
 capable of being employed either for or against Theistic demonstration  
 was used definitely for neither by Darwin himself. When this writer  
 touches on the relation of the Evolutionist Hypothesis and Teleology,  
 his attitude is, as he himself states it, "I am led to face a great  
 difficulty, in alluding to which I am aware that I am travelling beyond  
 3 my proper province". But when he does thus overstep the boundaries of  
 science he says negatively, "I have hitherto spoken as if the variat-  
 ions.. so common and multiform with organic beings under domestication  
 and, in a lesser degree, with those in nature.. had been due to chance.  
 This of course is a wholly incorrect expression: but it serves to  
 4 acknowledge our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation."  
 But on the other hand he says positively, "An omniscient Creator must  
 have foreseen every consequence which results from the laws imposed by  
 him: but can it be reasonably maintained that the Creator intention-  
 ally ordered ...that certain fragments of rock assume certain shapes, so  
 that the builder might erect his edifice?" He holds that the variat-  
 ions are not along lines beneficial for man, but plan and foresight  
 are everywhere present. In this form no less than in its broadest form  
 ..in which the network of genetic causation is stretched over all  
 forms, whether living or lifeless, as far back as nebulous vapour..it  
 gives and pretends to give no explanation, either of the origin of the  
 as a whole, or of the order and adaptation that characterise it". Evolut-  
 ion as a physical science, or rather as a scientific hypothesis has to  
 do only with the how and not the why of phenomena. So that Evolution as

1 Lamarck: Hist. des Animaux sans vertebres, tl. quoted in Janet:

2 Lindsay: Recent Advances, p. 176.

Final Causes I, 235

3 Darwin Animals and plants under domestication, 2, 431

evolution does not oppose the Physico-teleological argument. Professor Huxley held that they are compatible: "The Teleological and the Mechanical views of nature are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he affirm primordial nebular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are consequences, the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial nebular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe." It was Herbert Spencer who gave the doctrine of evolution a general form in which it embraced the phenomena and the genesis of the whole universe. With Spencer Evolutionism emerges from "Transformism" and becomes a philosophic and metaphysical doctrine. This greatly influences the task in hand and an outline of the doctrine must be made here as succinctly as possible. His view on Biology is very similar to the preceding doctrines. For the "power of life" and the "modifying cause" of Lamarck and the "natural selection" and "struggle for life" of Darwin, Spencer substituted co-ordination of actions and correspondence with the medium. This does not oppose teleology but Finality is altogether foreign to his doctrine. He states all the facts very justly but he finds in them only "the development of mechanical forces, the corollaries of that fundamental law, the conservation of force." "This ascription of organic evolution to some aptitude naturally possessed by the organism, or miraculously imposed on them," he writes, "is unphilosophical. .. In brief, this assumption of a persistent formative power, inherent in organisms, and making them unfold into higher forms, is an assumption no more tenable than the assumption of special creations, of which indeed, it is but a modification, differing only by the fusion of separate unknown processes into a continuous unknown process." He defines genetic evolution as "an integration of matter and the dissipation of motion during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." Nature tends to proceed from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the indefinite to the definite. "The progress from the simple to the complex across a series of successive series of differentiations, is shown in the first changes of the universe to which reasoning leads us and in all the first changes that can be inductively proved. .. From the most remote

4 Origin Of Species: p,137

5 G. Fisher: Grounds of Theistic Belief. p,53.

1 Critiques p,307.

2 Janet: Final Causes p,267.

3 Biology: Pt. 3,68.

past to the novelties of yesterday, the essential feature is the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous." This transformation is effected according to the laws of the "instability of the homogeneous" and of the "multiplication of effects". While the evolution from the indefinite to the definite, i.e. of the harmonious heterogeneity of nature is by the law of "segregation", which is that "if any aggregate composed of dissimilar units is subjected to the action of a force exerted indifferently on all these units, they separate from each other and from smaller aggregates, each composed of units similar for each aggregate and dissimilar from those of the others." Thus the unstable homogeneity is transformed through the influences of external and internal causes, to a definite heterogeneity which tends to become more and more coherent. In all this there is no admission of an intellectual element, external or internal, rational or instinctive. For Prof. Huxley much the same view was satisfactory. In 1897 he wrote "That there is no evidence of the existence of such a being as the God of the Theologians is true enough", yet he would hold that, "Atheism on purely philosophical grounds is untenable." But his system implied nothing more and his theism never really advanced beyond the recognition of the "passionless impersonality of the unknown and the unknowable which science shows everywhere underlying the thin veil of phenomena."

Doctrines and scientific theories such as these, independent in themselves of the physico-theological argument, are capable of, and have been differently applied by Theistic and Anti-theistic writers, of the successive writers only a few may here be noticed.

Hermann Lotze maintains in the first place, "that the mechanical processes themselves cannot be understood except by the help of ideas respecting the real internal nature of the elements concerned." This internal nature is life and all parts of matter have feeling. "In this internal activity Lotze finds a teleological element, namely, a striving towards self preservation and development. This idea he seeks to blend with that of mechanical relations among the elements so as to make the whole upward processes of the physical the product of the purposeful impulses." "In addition to this he looks at the world process as the gradual unfolding of a great spiritual creative principle which he sometimes figuratively describes as the world soul, more commonly as the infinite substance. This assumption, he says, is necessitated by the very process of cosmic evolution, the absolute beginning and end

1 First Principles : Pt.2, C14.

2 Ibid .. C 21.

3 Life :2; 162

4 Life :1;239 (Ency. Brit. Vol 29, p,372

5 Ency. Brit. Vol.8, p,768.



of which we are wholly unable to conjecture... there must be always a certain order to be accounted for, and science is wholly inadequate to effect this explanation. This conducts to a teleological view of the world processes as directed by mind directed towards some end which we cannot distinctly recognise." However, of the teleological proof, he says that "in order to be convincing it would have strictly to fulfill several requirements, with regard to which... we have seen, that it can satisfy them only with various degrees of probability. It would first have to show that there is in the world a purposive connection which cannot result from an undesigned co-operation of forces, but must have been designed by some intelligence. But..., though it may be in a high degree improbable, it yet remains possible, that a course of nature destitute of design may of itself have taken all the steps, which in order to realize a purpose, must have been taken under the guidance of design: and therefore this first requirement cannot be fulfilled. And we do not succeed better in fulfilling the second requirement -- in showing that purposiveness pervades the whole world harmoniously and without exception so that not merely do intelligent actions occur in it but the whole is embraced in the unity of one supreme design." Empirical knowledge of the purpose in the world, taken alone... would... produce the polytheistic intuition of a plurality of divine beings.

A somewhat different view of this is put forward by another writer of ability -- Paul Janet. Concluding his chapter on Evolution, he writes: "Transformism, then, under whatever form it is presented, shakes none of the reasons... in favour of finality: for on the one hand it is not irreconcilable with it, and on the other, it is inexplicable without it." He accepts the results of Darwin and Lamarck in the developed form of Spencer as favouring and establishing definitely finality in nature. But this is only the minor premise of the syllogism which from its major premise, "That all adaptation of means to an end supposes an intelligence", establishes the conclusion that the existence of ends in nature is equivalent to the existence of a supreme cause, external to nature and pursuing these ends consciously and with reflection." Then in a series of chapters, following an able criticism of Kant's treatment of the Physico-theological Proof, Janet shows that "finality not being a subjective view of our mind, but a real law of nature, demands a real cause: that the finality of nature, being as Kant has said, an internal finality and in that sense immanent" and "that this relative immanence of natural finality does not imply an absolute immanence, and on the contrary, can only be comprehended by its relation to a trans-

1 Ency. Brit. Vol. 8 p, 770.

2 Lotze Microcosmos Vol. 2 p, 667 ( T. & T. Clarke)

3 Janet : Final Causes p, 282.

1 transcendent terminus," and that " the doctrine of *V60S* or of intent-  
 1 tional finality, has for us no other meaning than this, that intellig-  
 ence is the highest and most approximate cause we can conceive of a  
 world of order." "All other causes, chance, laws of nature, blind force  
 1 instinct, as the symbolic representations, are beneath the truth."

This same view had largely been accepted previously by  
 Prof. Flint and others. This last mentioned Theist finds in Physics,  
 in Astronomy, in the mathematical relations of the universe, in Chemist-  
 ry, in Geology, Palaeontology, and in all the sciences, physical and  
 moral, the presence of "order and adaptation, proportion and co-ordination".  
 If we deny that there is such order.. we pronounce science to be from  
 2 beginning to end a delusion and a lie" What was later called the minor  
 premise, with the substitution of "order" for "finality", was thus  
 readily accepted by Prof. Flint as the indisputable result of Science.  
 The Theistic question is, whether this "order, the proof of which is the  
 grand achievement of science, universally implies mind," that is, whether  
 the order in the universe is the result of design. The writer accepts  
 the results of the Scientific Hypothesis of Evolution. "Instead of  
 2 excluding" the theories of evolution," must imply a belief in an all-  
 originating, all-foreseeing, all-foreordaining, all-regulative intellig-  
 ence." He welcomes the criticism of the statement of the proof in the  
 "faulty form—Design implies a Designer: the universe abounds in design;  
 therefore, the universe so far as it abounds in design implies a  
 2 Designer—", yet he holds that the argument is valid: "If we deny that  
 such order implies the agency of a supreme intelligence, we contradict  
 no express declaration of any of the sciences; we may accept all they  
 have to tell us about order, and they can tell us about nothing else, but  
 .. it is far more reasonable, far less absurd, to deny that there is  
 order in the universe, than to admit it and to deny that its ultimate  
 2 cause is an Intelligence."

These three last outlined views were largely formulated  
 under the influence of the Evolution theory and of Hegelianism, for  
 Hegel had said of Teleology, "By Aim or End we must not at once, nor must  
 we ever, merely think of the form which it has in Consciousness as a  
 category found in our picture thinking. By means of the notion of inner  
 Design Kant has resuscitated the idea in general and the idea of life  
 particularly. Aristotle's definition of life virtually implies inner  
 design and is thus far in advance of the notion of design in modern  
 3 Teleology, which had in view finite and outward design only."

1 Janet: Final Causes, p.345. & p. 385

2 Flint : Theism, p.152,153, & p. 53.

3 The Logic of Hegel: p.298 (Wallace Trans)

## COSMOLOGICAL

- The Cosmological
- demonstration like the Physico-theological was begun by Socrates and Plato. In the *Phaedo* Socrates exclaims, "I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition", in which is implied a distinction between the first cause and the secondary causes, as Plato
- 1 definitely states in the *Timeas*, "the second and co-operative causes are thought by most men to be not the second but the prime causes of all things.. but they are not so for they are not capable of reason and intelligence." Thus Mind or God is the first cause. Also he is a first Mover. There is a motion able to move other things but not itself that is one kind: and there is an other kind which can move itself as well as other things... "I must say that the motion which is able
  - 2 to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others." That First Mover is Wisdom or Mind. While these are largely teleological considerations he also argues that since my body has a soul and the body comes from the material or the body of the universe so my soul must come from the soul of the universe. "Socrates --May our body be said to have soul?... Socrates--And whence comes that soul.. unless the body of the universe which contains elements similar and fairer
  - 3 far than it, had also a soul? Protagoras-- ..that is the only source" This God of Plato if it is to be identified with the "Good", is of such power and beauty that it is..the source of being and of truth for
  - 4 everything that is an object of science." "The Good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge in all beings known, but of their being and essence."
  - 4

- The idea of God as the First Cause of motion is developed by Aristotle into his theory of a Divine Mover. He not only taught the eternity of the world and the eternity of the motion but seeks the
- 5 cause of the eternity of motion in "*τὸ πρῶτον κίνησιν ἀκίνητον*."
  - 6 This eternal principle of motion is God-- a conclusion which he gets from his doctrine of *ἐνεργεια* and *δύναμις* and actuality and potentiality. The actual is earlier than the potential both in notion and in time, and motion being a causal series is, therefore only possible if a principle of motion pre-exists. Thus all becoming postulates an eternal unbecoming being, who is, though unmoved himself, the principle of move-

1 *Timeas*: Sec. 46.

2 *Laws* :X, p. 404, 5.

3 *Philebus*: Sec. 30.

4 *Republic*: VI, 506, 509.

5 *Arist. Physics*: 8.6; 258.

6 *Sc. Baldwin Dictionary*: Motion.

ment; "ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῦν κίνησιν αἰεὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ διαλείπειν, δύναμιν εἶναι τι ὃ πρῶτον κινεῖ, ἢτε εἴ ἢτε πλείω, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον". "ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινῶμενον καὶ κενῶν καὶ μέδον, ταινον ἔστι τι οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, αἶδον, καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐσία, also, "ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τι κινῶν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὃν, ἐνέργειαν ὃν τοῦτο ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἄλλους ἔχειν οὐδὲν ὡς. φεραὶ γὰρ ἡ πρῶτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλω' αὐτὴν δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ"

By this is meant that the materia prima of the universe with all its harmony and order is due to the pure Actuality, the absolute Perfection, to God. This God who is the prime Mover "ἐστὶν ἡ κοίτης νοήσεως νόησις" "He is not only the Actuality that brings into existence the Potentiality, but is an immanent cosmic principle, the Thought that animates and inspires and at the same time comprehends the entire universe. This is called, by Janet and Seailles, "the first complete and scientific proof of the existence of God".

Similar to the Cosmological proof of Aristotle is that of the Stoics. Both are concerned with the origin of ordered diversity in the universe. As in reviewing the Teleological argument of the latter, it has been noted that the order of the universe was attributed to God's direction so here in the Cosmological it ought to be noticed that the Teleological was but a phase or development of the Cosmological. The harmony of the present world is but a development of the order latent in that world in its earlier stages or earliest stage, which world in that earliest stage contained within itself its own cause, i.e., God. "Since the world contains parts endowed with self-consciousness, the world as a whole, which must be more perfect than any of its parts cannot be unconscious; the consciousness which belongs to the universe is Deity". When the ideal and the material are compared it becomes clear that there is no difference between God and original matter. "Both are one and the same being which when conceived of as universal subject matter, is known as inert matter, and when conceived of as acting force is called the soul of the world..God." Thus God is everything and the cause of everything material in the world: He is producing all things

1 Physics: VIII; 6, 258b.

2 Metaphysics XI; 7: 4, 7, Text of Bekker, p., 230, 230.

3 Janet and Seailles, Hist. of Problems of Phil. Vol. 2, p. 263

4 Ueberweg: Hist, of Phil. p, 194.

5 Zeller :Stoicism Epicureanism & Scepticism p. 148.



according to his own reason. Thus the harmonious universe which has developed according to unalterable law from an original harmonious state must have had an original cause itself eternal and must also have had a prime Mover, which cause of the original harmony, arising through ordered motion, was God. He is an organising fire which "proceeds methodically to production" and the manifestation of itself:" *πῶς*  
 1 *Τελικὸν ὁδῶ βαδίζον εἰς γενεάν*" The original matter without this inherent power, would be entirely passive and without definite attributes so that the inherent active power is the real cause to which everything owes its existence and to which everything must be referred. "Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quaerimus causam. Haec simplex esse debet, nam et materia simplex est. Quaerimus quae sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est Deus. Ita enim, quaecumque retulistis non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quae faciet," writes  
 2 Seneca. Again, the world contains conscious beings and what is in the effect must be in the cause. The world cannot produce beings possessed of consciousness and endowed with a soul and reason unless it were itself endowed with a soul and reason and were conscious. Cicero writes, that Zeno affirms, "nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur caret sensu  
 3 mundus." "If the Plane tree could produce harmonious lutes, surely you infer that music was embalmed in the plane tree. Why, then, should we not believe that the world is a living and wise being since it produces  
 4 living and wise beings out of itself." Also there are effects in the world greater than a man can accomplish, so a power exists greater than human power." is (Chrysippus) igitur; si aliquid est, inquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine. Homo autem, haec, quae in mundo sunt, efficere non potest. Qui poterit igitur, is praestat  
 5 homini. Homini autem praestare quis possit, nisi deus. Est igitur Deus." There must be a Highest being whose intellect, wisdom and power are unsurpassable.

All these Cosmological Proofs, as well as the Telological, of the Stoics are denied validity by the Epicureans. The latter claimed to account for all the phenomena of the universe and of life in a purely mechanical way. The cause of the material world need not be sought, for the atoms and the void are eternal. Everything is composed of material atoms, so that the soul and conscious life need no special explanation. In all their professed explanations of natural science, if there was not as is claimed by Zeller and others, extreme indifference, there was at least a failure to penetrate the inmost problems arising in any attempted explanation of the universe. The attitude of the Sceptics on the other hand was not one of indifference but of direct opposition. The

1 Diog. L. VII, 156. (Janet and Seailles, II, p. 265.)

2 Zeller: Stoicism Epicureanism and Scepticism; p. 137, note.

3 Cicero: De Natura Deorum; II, 8, 22, Sc. also II, 31, 79; c. 18

4 ibid... .. II, 8 (Janet and Seailles; p. 266.)

5 ibid... .. III, 10, 25 (Zeller, p. 139)

world need not be explained as the result of a first cause but may have been formed from purely natural causes: its first cause was itself. against Zeno's argument, that consciousness in man can be produced only by a conscious cause, the Academician argues, "why must there be a soul in nature to produce a soul" Then again opposing Chrysippus, they claim that, even as was evident there are effects in the world beyond the power of man's production this does not necessarily involve a supreme rational man-like being but only a power greater than man which might be nature herself.

From this time of opposition to the Middle Ages, these Cosmological arguments are not emphatically asserted or accurately stated. The chief thought of the time was the development of precise and definite views of the nature and characteristics of God. Yet the Alexandrian school ascribed the development of the universe to the Divine essence and nature of things, while Christian theology, which to a large degree separated God from the world in the doctrine of the creation ex nihilo, involved the proof from a first cause. Basing their doctrine on Hebrew Scriptures and especially on, "In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth", the Christians were led to such expressions as that of the Apocalypse, "By thy Will they were and were created", and that of Augustine, "God made all things by His Word", or again in "The Confessions", "How didst Thou make heaven and earth?" "Thou didst speak and they were made and in Thy Word Thou madest these things". Thus the explanation of the physical universe necessitated the existence of an Eternal Infinite and Perfect God.

It was not until the Middle Ages that this proof comes forward again. By the Scholastics it was put forward in nearly every possible phase. There must be a First Cause, for an infinite chain of causes is impossible. "Given a thing which is caused, it must have been caused either by nothing, or by itself, or by some other thing.... But an infinite regression is impossible, therefore there must be a first necessary cause, which having no antecedent, can at no time be posterior to itself." Again, "there is no infinite progression in preserving causes, for if it is possible to conceive producing causes as not being actually infinite, one cannot conceive preserving causes without actual infinitude." Regarding this First Cause, Hugh of St. Victor writes, "what is mutable cannot have existed always, for what could not

1 Sc. Cicero: De Nat. Deorum III, 8, 21; X, 26; XI, 27.

2 Civitate Dei: IX, 20

3 Confessions ) XI 5.

4 Duns Scotus: Sentetia I, Dist. 2q2.

5 ibid

Dist. 2, q. 2. (Janet & Seailles p. 279.)

1 remain fixed as long as it was present, shows that the moment before it  
 2 was, it was not. It is thus that nature proclaims her Maker." Thomas  
 3 Aquinas also definitely states this argument; "In things of sense we  
 4 find an order of efficient causes; but it is not found, nor is it poss-  
 5 ible that anything is the cause of itself, for this would mean that it  
 is prior to itself, which is impossible. Finally it is not possible in  
 efficient causes to go back to infinity, for in all series of efficie  
 ent causes, first comes the cause of the intermediate and the inter-  
 mediate is the cause of the last... If then the cause is removed so is  
 the effect. Therefore, if there have not been a first among the effic-  
 ient causes neither will there be a last nor an intermediate. But if  
 we proceed with efficient causes in infinity, there will be no first  
 efficient cause and so no last effect, nor any intermediate efficient  
 cause: which is plainly false. We must therefore, posit some efficient  
 first cause and all men call this God." The same argument regarding  
 necessity and possibility gives the similar conclusion: "We must there-  
 fore, posit something which has its necessity, not from some other  
 quarter, but per se; and which is itself a cause of necessity to other  
 things. And this all men call God." The argument from the existence of  
 effects which man through imperfection cannot produce and from man's  
 consciousness of himself and his own imperfection also appear in their  
 writings especially those of Gerson. Nor is the argument from motion  
 ignored, in fact, Thomas Aquinas in defending the creatio ex nihilo  
 repeats the demonstration of Aristotle almost word for word: "It is  
 certain and agrees with what our senses inform us, that in this world  
 some things are in motion. But anything which is moved, is moved by  
 some other thing; for nothing is moved except in so far as the former  
 is in actuality, for to move is nothing else than to draw anything from  
 potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be brought from potentiality  
 into actuality except by means of something which is already in actua-  
 lity... We cannot here proceed to infinity for in that way there would  
 be no first source of movement:... We must then arrive at some first  
 source of motion which is moved by nothing else, and such a source all  
 men understand to be God."

The Modern Philosophers also use the argument. In His new  
 method Descartes begins with the one certainty, that of his own exist-  
 ence, and from it endeavours to prove the existence of God. In this  
 attempt he assumes without question the Scholastic view of Causation.

1 De Sacramen.: Pars. III, 1 C. 9

2 Summa Theol. Pt. I, Q11, An Deus sit? Art. 3 (J & S)

3 ibid....

4 Sc. Works: 1728, I p. 104.

5 Summa Theol. Pt. I, Q2 An Deus Sit? Art. 2.

(Caldecott & Mackintosh, p. 23-4.

6 Meditation III p. 49.

osh)  
p26..(Caldecott & Mackintosh)

1 His Cosmological Proof depends on this assumption and on his Psycholog  
 1 ical theory of ideas. Ideas are innate, adventitious and factitious. Of  
 these the adventitious alone cannot be explained by the nature of the  
 ego and even of the adventitious all may be explained by the self but  
 the idea of God. "There remains, therefore the idea of God, in which  
 I must consider whether there is anything that cannot be supposed to  
 originate with myself. By the name God I mean a substance infinite, all-  
 knowing, all-powerful, (eternal, immutable) independent, and by which I  
 myself and all other things that exist, if any such there be, were  
 created. But these properties are so great and excellent, that the more  
 attentively I consider them the less I feel persuaded that the idea I  
 have of them owes its origin to myself alone. And thus it is absolute-  
 ly necessary to conclude from all I have before said, that God Exists:  
 for though the idea of substance be in my mind owing to this that I am  
 myself a substance, I should not, however, have the idea of an infinite  
 substance, seeing I am a Finite being, unless it were given me by some  
 2 substance in reality infinite." This idea of God possesses more object-  
 ive reality than any other and so God possess more formal or essential  
 reality. This proof is defended by Descartes against three other explan  
 ations, Negation, Multiplication and Infinite Addition (a) He maintains  
 that the idea of the infinite is a true idea, since "there is more real-  
 2 ity in the infinite substance than in the finite" and that he possesses  
 "the perception of the infinite, ie. the perception of God, before that  
 3 of (himself)", else how could he doubt. (b) Then also this idea of an  
 infinite perfect being could not be derived from the simultaneous co-  
 operation of many causes for idea of the unity of these perfections  
 could not be the result of many causes. (c) Then once more, perhaps all  
 these perfections exist potentially in myself and I may in time possess  
 all the perfections of God in a developed form. Descartes answers to  
 this that it is a mark of imperfection that my knowledge increases  
 while God is infinitely perfect and the "objective being of an idea  
 3 cannot be produced by a being that is merely potentially existent." His  
 other argument which also assumes causality is an answer to the quest-  
 ion, "Whether I who possess this idea of God, could exist supposing there  
 3 was no God?". "I cannot depend on myself else I would have arisen out of  
 nothing and created myself perfect. Nor again have I any knowledge of  
 my own power to conserve myself. But if not dependent on myself, perhaps  
 on my parents. Yet they cannot conserve me. Perhaps then I depend on  
 other things less perfect than God. This is impossible for they in turn  
 must depend on something which "possess in itself the idea and all the  
 3 perfections I attribute to Deity." This infinite regress extends to the

1 Meditation II, 46.

2 ..... III p. 54.

3 ..... p. 60, 56-7, 57, 59



cause which is self-existent. This is God, who alone as a preserving cause explains my actual existence.

- Against the fundamental position of Descartes, Gassendi brings an objection which affects his acceptance of causation: "qua arte,qua methodo,dicernere? Liceat,ita nos habere clarum distinctaque intelligentiam, ut ea vera sit, nec fieri possit ut fallamur." Hobbes had also pointed out that we might claim to have no such an idea of a perfect being. But Geulinx again takes it up and, similarly, beginning with doubt, derives a similar idea of God. He doubts concerning everything and finds, that since we make mistakes, it is impossible for us to be certain that there is not some higher power or faculty judged by which the reason is full of errors. Yet there must be something true for dogmatic scepticism is self-contradictory. The Sovereign truth he finds in God who is the mind of the universe, for "mentes creati non mentes sunt, sed aliquid mentis." "Multae sunt in me quae a me non dependent, cogitationes", because "impossibile est, ut is faciat qui nescit quomodo fiat", hence they depend on something outside of me. They are derived from God who "cogitationes illas in me suscitavit interventu corporis cujusdam."

From the view of Geulinx that "qui operator cognoscit modum quomodo fiat" there is an easy transition to Malebranche's view that no finite being can be an absolute cause, which view, since neither the soul, which according to Malebranche is limited, can be the cause of ideas nor can objects for they are material and the soul is immaterial gives as a result that God is the only cause. This is a further development of the occasionalism of Descartes and Geulinx. Thus we see all things in God, the infinitely perfect being: the idea of the infinite and of God is one and the same thing. God is "the universal being, the being of beings, the sole intelligent being, the sole cause."

- These proofs of Descartes are again dealt with by Spinoza. From the definition of God as the Absolute given in the Ethics I;6, he goes on to argue from the potentiality of existence as power, thus:—"If finite things are the only ones, they are more powerful than the infinite. This is absurd. Therefore, either nothing exists or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists. We do exist, therefore, infinite being exists." He also argues that God must exist unless a cause for his non-existence can be given and such a cause, must be either external or drawn from himself. But a substance of another nature can have nothing in common with God and hence not a cause. It cannot be from God's own nature for that would be a contradiction. Hence there is no cause

1 Descartes :Objectiones 4,4

2 Pars III,2; II,5.

3 Ethica I, Prop. 6fff.

of His non-existence. Therefore he exists. Or again he writes, as quoted by Dr. Stirling, "God is the first cause of things; for all finite things, as all that we see and know, are contingent, and have in themselves nothing that makes their existence necessary:... We must, therefore, look for the cause of the existence of this world, which is a collection of things merely contingent, only in such substance as has the cause of its existence in its own self, and is therefore eternal and necessary."

With Leibnitz these considerations come to <sup>be</sup> of a more purely cosmological nature. He derives his proof from a principle peculiar to himself, the principle of sufficient reason. "The sufficient or final reason must be outside the sequence or series of particular contingent things, however infinite this series may be. Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance... and this substance we call God." This writer also derives another argument, which however some confuse with the Ontological, from the fact there are eternal truths which can depend only on the eternal mind of God.

In the thought and writing of the English Philosophers contemporary with these, the Cosmological proof as a proof does not receive a great deal of attention, but the principle on which it is based is fully treated. Of the proof itself, Locke remarks, "we have the knowledge of our own existence, by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration"; and proceeds to give the demonstration as follows: "It is beyond question that man has clear ideas of his own being, and knows certainly that he exists and that he is something." "In the next place man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles".... "If therefore, we know that there is some real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something: since what was not from eternity, had a beginning; and what had a beginning, must be produced by something else." This eternal being must be the source of all power, and of the conception and knowledge in man and so must be all powerful, intelligent and knowing: which eternal all-powerful, supremely intelligent and knowing being is God.

Dr Samuel Clarke's view was somewhat similar. He writes, "Tis evident both we ourselves, and all other beings we know in the world, are weak and dependent creatures... and therefore we entirely owe our being to some superior and more powerful cause; which superior cause must itself be a first cause, which is the notion of God... If it be said that we received our being by a continued natural succession. ... yet still the argument holds no less strong concerning the first of the

1 Stirling :Philosophy and Religion, p.125.

2 Leibnitz: Monadologyn Sec. 37.8.

3 Locke: Essay; 3k.IV, 9Sec.3.: Sec.2a. b, Sec.3

of the whole race, that he could not but be made by a Superior Intelligent Cause. If an Atheist.. shall contend that there may have been without any beginning at all, an eternal succession of men, yet still it may be no less evident, that such a perpetual succession could not have been without an eternal superior cause; because in the nature of things themselves there is manifestly no necessity that any such succession of transient beings, either temporary or dependent should have existed at all."

Bishop Berkeley in his Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous has Philonous to "immediately and necessarily conclude the being of God because all sensible things must be perceived by him." He also assumes for discussion that "God is the supreme and universal cause of all things." And in the "Alciphron", the same is assumed by making Lysicles point out for the benefit of Euphranor that the question is "not whether there was a principle (which point was assumed by all Philosophers, as well before as since Anaxagoras), but whether this Principle was a ~~void~~, a thinking intelligent being?... and whether there must not be true real and proper knowledge in the First Cause?" to which Crito answers that the same argument that proves a first cause proves an intelligent cause.

Hume's criticism of this is found in his "Dialogues concerning Natural Religion", where Demea puts forward the proof and attacks the possibility of an infinite succession of causes and effects without any ultimate cause, by showing that the whole eternal chain requires a cause or reason, so that the "question is still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity and not any other succession or no succession at all." The answer to this, is that we must have recourse to a Necessarily-existent Being who carries the Reason of his existence in himself and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction." In answer to this in turn, Cleanthes, the mouthpiece of Hume, after showing the non-conclusiveness of the proof of Clarke that the material world is not the necessarily existent being, claims that it is absurd to inquire for "a general cause or first author" in the "eternal succession of objects", since each part is caused by that which preceeds it and causes that which succeeds it", and that the cause of the whole is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts. Philo also suggests the alternative

1 Clarke :Works Vol 1, p.5 Ser.1.( Knappton Edt.)

2 Berkeley: Dialogues, Dialogue II, p.65, 69.

3       ibid..... p.163.

4 Hume : Dialogues. IX, p.431 432., See also "Human Understanding"

explanation to avoid Demea's conclusion: " May it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible, they could ever admit of any other disposition?". Hume's view of Causation had led him to see that the conception of causality could not be applied to the totality of being. It could produce only an infinite series for when the cause of the whole had been ascertained we would have to seek a cause of the cause. "The application of the principle is in its very nature incapable of ever leading to an ultimate conclusion." It gives only an infinite progression, not unlike Locke's illustration of his Indian Philosopher and his elephant and turtle.

"The Cosmological Proof", writes Kant, termed by Leibnitz, the Argumentum a contingentia mundi" involves "the connection between absolute necessity and the highest Reality" and " concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality": from an absolutely necessary existence it infers a being supremely real (ens realissimum), a perfect being. "It is framed in the following manner:- If something exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I at least exist, consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The minor contains an experience, the major reasons from a general experience to the existence of a necessary being". "The proof proceeds thus:- a necessary being can be determined only in one way that is, it can be determined by only one of all possible opposed predicates; consequently, it must be completely determined in and by its conception. But there is only a single conception of a thing possible which completely determines the thing a priori: that is, the conception of the ens realissimum. It follows that the conception of the ens realissimum is the only conception by and in which we can cogitate a necessary being. Consequently a Supreme Being necessarily exists." Thus this proof secretly assumes that only a being supremely real or perfect can correspond to the concept of a necessary being and necessary existence and is contained in it. This is but the Ontological argument in a different dress. But, apart from this, "the following fallacies are discoverable in this mode of proof: 1. The transcendental principle, everything that is contingent must have a cause — a principle without significance except in the sensuous world. For the purely intellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce any synthetic proposition, like that of causality, which is itself without significance and distinguishing characteristics except in the phenomenal world. But in the present case it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its own sphere. 2. From the impossibility of an infinite ascending series of

1 Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

2 Leslie Stephen: Eng. Thought in the Eighteenth Cent. p. 226

3 Kant Critique of Pure Reason, p. 338 note, p. 339

causes in the world of sense a first cause is inferred;- a conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not justify even in the sphere of experience, and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3. Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with regard to the conception of this series. It removes all conditions (without which, however, no conception of Necessity can take place); and, as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conception, it accepts this as a completion of the conception it wishes to form of the series. 4. The logical possibility of a conception of the totality of reality (the criterion of this possibility being the absence of contradiction) is confounded with transcendental, which requires a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis -- a principle which again refers us to the world of experience."

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Lotze also employs a negative criticism of this proof, and after summarily stating that it "concludes from the contingent and conditioned character of everything in the world to the existence of a Necessary and Unconditioned Being" and "that nothing but an absolutely perfect being can be thus unconditioned", he insists that it is only by taking the meaning of "contingent" as connoting "that which does indeed exist, but does not have any significance, for the sake of which it need exist" and of "necessary" as connoting "something not that must be, but that has such unconditional value that it seems in virtue of this value to deserve also unconditional existence", that the supreme principle of the universe can be termed necessary, while on the other hand, by employing "contingent in its accurate sense as that" which in the realization of some intention occurs as an unintended and accessory result" and applying it to the course of nature there is nothing found "which is necessary and of which non-existence is impossible, except the conditioned, which as consequent is determined by some antecedent, as an effect by some cause, and as a means by its end, so that" the notion of a being isolated and conditioned by nothing and yet possessed of necessary existence, is wholly impossible." He adds also that "perfection" has lost its speculative significance as conformity to a standard and that the imperfect, i.e., that in which there is the absence of some conceivable beauty or excellence, may be neither dependent nor conditioned. "Unconditioned existence is not the exclusive privilege of that which is most excellent." The result is that the "Cosmological proof can only conclude from the conditionality and conditioned necessity of all individual real things in the universe, to an Ultimate Real

1 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 341..2.

2 Lotze : Microcosmos Vol. II, p. 664 666.

which, without being conditioned by anything else, simply is and simply is what it is, and finally may be regarded as the sufficient reason through which all individual reality is and is what it is... It cannot of itself attain to the religious conception of a God, but only to the metaphysical conception of an unconditioned."



## ONTOLOGICAL

### The Ontological

argument, though perhaps not so old historically as the preceding, has had a more checkered career: the tests to which its validity have been many. Of it, it may be said when speaking in a general way, that it has followed two lines of development, one psychological or epistemological and one logical, which two meet in the treatment of it by Descartes, before and since whose time each had its defenders. In the present paper the latter will be first treated.

The Ontological argument in its strictly a priori logical form was first stated by Anselm. He starts with the definition of God as a "being than which nothing greater can be conceived". Then observing that "it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding and another thing to understand that the object exists", he proceeds to show that the fool who says that there is no God, at least admits that God as he has defined him exists in the understanding. Then, if we have the idea of the perfect being, "assuredly that than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exist in the understanding alone, then it can be conceived to exist in reality which is greater. Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality." "So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord, my God that Thou can'st not be conceived not to exist and rightly."

Now this argument has met with much opposition as early even as the lifetime of its first exponent. The monk Gaunilon, in his "Liber pro Insipientia" first criticised the Anselmian statement of it. He begins by questioning whether we have within us the idea of God, in other words whether God exists in the mind, which was the major premise and according to Anselm the common assent of the fool and the philosopher. Then he asks whether because we have the idea of God, it is permissible to infer from this that God exists objectively and in reality. These two objections cover the whole argument. Either according to Gaunilon, God exists in the mind after the manner of other things, which may be true or false or doubtful, or He exists in the mind in such a way that it is impossible

to conceive Him without at the same time conceiving Him as existing. If the former, nothing can be inferred; if the latter, what had to be proved has been assumed in the principle. By his ingenious comparison of the concept of the most beautiful island and the concept of God, he endeavours to show that the conclusion of the argument is unsound. To this Anselm answers only in part. He admits that we have not complete knowledge of God. Yet every imperfect thing implies something more perfect. He also complains that Gaunilon altered his argument when he accuses him of a *petitio principia* which is in Gaunilon's argument and not in his own.

This was, on the other hand, defended by Bonaventura and by Henry of Ghent, but was opposed by the majority of the Scholastics chief of whom was Thomas Aquinas, who says, "granted that a person understands this word 'God' to signify something so great that it is impossible to conceive any thing greater, it does not follow that by this he understands that what this word signifies exists in reality, for as yet it only exists in the apprehension of his understanding." Duns Scotus also pronounces against it and Gerson writes, "Nescio quis insipientior sit, an is qui putant hoc sequi 'Deum, si est in intellectu esse et in re' an insapiens qui dixit in corde suo 'non est Deus'."

At the hands of Modern philosophers this argument has met with similar treatment. Against the statement of it by Descartes similar objections were urged by Hobbes and Gassendi. Descartes claimed that he knew himself to be imperfect and that this was impossible unless he had an idea of something perfect. He has an idea of this perfect Being through which alone he can be conscious that he is imperfect and that he doubts. The essence of this Perfect Being includes his existence. "It is no less impossible to conceive a God who is a being supremely perfect to whom existence is wanting or who is deprived of a certain perfection, than to conceive of a mountain without a valley." And though this latter may be only a concept the same does not apply to God, "because I cannot conceive God unless as existence and it follows that existence is inseparable from him and that he therefore exists really." First of all Hobbes objects that we may have no idea of God. He says, "he (ie. Descartes) ought to have explained the idea of God better and should have thence deduced not only his existence but the creation of the world," which would invalidate all demonstration for him who would maintain that he had no such idea. But more pointed is the objection of Gassendi that existence is not a property of the thing and therefore not a perfection. "Quamobrem, ut enumerando perfectiones trianguli non recenset existentiam, neque proinde concludis existere triangulam, ita enumerando perfect

1 Aquinas: Summa Contra Gentiles I, 11.

2 Duns Scotus: Opera, IV, Quaest. Supra Metaphy. I, 9; 12.

3 Descartes: Meditation V, p. 78, 79.

1 perfectiones Dei non debuisti in illis ponere existentiam ut conclud-  
 2 eres Deum existere nisi principium petere vellis." This Descartes  
 simply avoids: "Hic non video cuius generis rerum vellis esse exist-  
 entiam."

Spinoza again takes up this argument though in a slightly different manner. In his *Ethica*, Liber I, Def. 6, he defines God as the Absolute Being, in other words, "God is substance constituted by an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence." Then he proceeds to demonstrate the existence of God is necessary since it is contained in the definition of God, for there cannot be two substances each of which consists in a series of modes of one and the same type. This he defends in Liber I, Prop. 11. by three considerations, one only of which is of importance here. "God's non-existence cannot be conceived and consequently his essence includes existence." Then again Potentiality to nonexistence is negation of power, and contra-wise potentiality to existence is power. Therefore in proportion as reality increases in the nature of things, so also will it increase its strength for existence. God has for himself as absolutely infinite, the absolutely infinite power of existence, hence he exists. His essence excludes all imperfections and involves absolute perfection.

Leibnitz also, though he does not use it much, attempts to develop the Ontological Argument of Descartes and Spinoza by remedying what he thought to be a defect. He like Hobbes thought that someone might object, on logical grounds however, rather than on Psychological, that he had not this idea and that Descartes ought to have demonstrated the possibility of it. "I grant that the demonstration is imperfect because it assumes that the perfect Being is possible in Himself. If anyone could prove this we would have a truly mathematical proof of the existence of God." He himself gives a proof of this. As nothing can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits, no negation and consequently no contradiction, this alone is sufficient to make known the existence of God a Priori." He elaborates on this in "That the Most Perfect Being Exists", where he takes a perfection to mean, "omnem qualitatem simplicem quae positive est et absoluta seu quae quidquid exprimit, sine ullis limitibus exprimit.", and endeavours to show that all perfections are compatible with one another or can exist in the same subject. This he does by showing that "A and B (two simple qualities) are incompatible" cannot be proven, i.e. it cannot be proved that it is necessary that they cannot co-exist. Their incom-

1 Descartes: *Objectiones* IV, 4. / Cousin II, 291.

2 *ibid.*... V' 2

3 Leibnitz: *New Essays*, Bk. IV, C. 10.

4 ..... *Monadology* Sec. 45.

5 ..... By Gerhard VII, 261.2.

incompatability cannot be proved without resolving them, otherwise their nature would not enter into the reasoning. But both <sup>are</sup> irresolvable, "nor can their incompatibility be known per se. Hence A and B are not incompatible and such a subject is possible". Then having demonstrated the possibility of God, Leibnitz uses the ontological proof of his predecessors to demonstrate that God is actual.

On the principles of Hume's Philosophy this proof has no validity. It is briefly touched on in his Dialogues on Natural Religion, where Cleanthes, evidently voicing the author's criticism, answers Philo, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose being implies a contradiction... Consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive and am willing to rest the whole controversy on it." This is Hume's criticism of the Cartesian Proof. Reid peculiarly admits the validity of this in regard to all truths concerning existence excepting "only the existence and attributes of the Supreme Being which is the only necessary truth we know regarding existence."

The criticism of Kant is summed up by him in his Transcendental Dialectic, where three objections are made. first of all--if I suppress the Predicate in an analytic Proposition and retain the Subject or vice versa there would be a contradiction. But if I suppress both there is no longer any contradiction. So that in the definition of God, if I suppress the attribute existence there is no contradiction for I at the same time suppress the subject, that is to say, if I conceive of God, I must conceive of him as existent, but why assume the conception of Him. Then again, existence is not a real attribute, i.e., it is not something added to the concept of the thing but merely the position of the thing. Otherwise there would be one more attribute in the being that exists than in the being that is thought, which is impossible for then thought would be inaccurate. A hundred real coins have no more real content than a hundred in the mind. Then, lastly, he argues that "God exists" is either an analytic or a synthetic proposition. If analytic, the attribute adds nothing to the Subject: and accordingly the existence of the thing adds nothing to the thought of the thing. Therefore, the thing is already assumed as existing and real, and we have only a tautology; so that the argument is useless. "If on B

1 B Russell: Philosophy of Leibnitz; p.174

2 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; p.432

3 Reid :Works p.431.

4 Kant: Critique Of Pure Reason; p.333.

the other hand, it is Synthetic, how can it be maintained that the attribute cannot be suppressed since this is only true of Analytic Propositions." To put it shortly, Kant held that there are synthetic Propositions and that of these the chief are the existential. For that reason, from the logical definition of God, as the most perfect being the existence of God could not be derived.

When the other line of development of this argument is examined it is found to be an argument of somewhat different kind, which though in a sense ontological cannot, at least in the form in which it is stated by some, be called strictly a priori.

This argument, as it was first stated by Plato, seems at first sight to be a posteriori rather than a priori. He calls the universal element in all things, that which is fixed and permanent in them, their *ἰδέα*. These ideal types depend on a higher idea. Truth is an inter-related progressive system leading to the supreme *ἰδέα* God. "All intelligent Beings derive their being and essence from the Good *τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ποσὶν*" All ideas have their substance in the Good. The higher idea comprehends within itself the several lower ones. The highest idea, the idea of the GOOD is God, and contains and gives essence existence and truth to all other ideas. And as Mr. Stirling has put it, "what the ideas logically are, things ontologically are, but the logical element alone is true; while the ontological element, as representative, is but temporary show only. The true ontological element, the *ἀντικείμενον* is the Good. To the Good, not only is the knowledge due, but it is the Good also that gives them being." This view that God, as it were, is the fountain head and source, or better still the "ground", of the system of ideas and truth etc., is further developed by Aristotle, who says, "He is thought. Therefore in thinking Himself He thinks thought, and this is in fact his definition. He is Thought of Thought, *ἐστὶν ἐν νόοις νοητικὸς νοητικὸς*" And man thinks over again God's thoughts.

This has been repeated in whole or in part by many since. Augustine took it up and to a large extent relied upon it. Gerson in implies it when he exclaims, "O my Soul, I cannot know thee without knowing thy being and thine essence; and I cannot know what is imperfect & thou art without knowing what is Perfect: I can therefore know nothing-without knowing God, at least as it were in His shadow." Ralph Ludworth used it and its results in connection with his immutable

1 Janet & Seailles: Hist. of the Problems of Phil. Vol III

p 303.

2 Plato: Republic, 509b.

3 Stirling: Phil. & Religion p. 147

4 Aristotle: Metaphysics XII, 19.

5 Gerson: Opera; 1728 I p 104.

Truths". Descartes appropriated it from Augustine and combined it with the logical argument to form his proof "a contingentia mentis". Malebranche in his search for the cause of our ideas, finds that the mind cannot cause them since "qui operatur cognoscit modum, quomodo fiat fiat.", nor can material objects, so that all things must be seen in God the infinite Perfect Being. The idea of God and of the infinite are one and the same thing.

Now this is quite different from the view criticised by Kant. He was concerned with only the Anselmian and Leibnitzian statement. And while it may be legitimate to say of Kant, that he "missed seeing that being was given, not predicated in the affirmation of this argument" and to criticise him for failing or omitting to notice that this was implied in some of the previous treatments of the problem, yet, it is equally legitimate to claim that it was not stated with enough clearness to be apprehended and in others, it was used to prove too much. The result is that it is possible to say that "all-availing as Kant's reasoning was against the Anselmian and Leibnitzian modes of presentation, it is futile if we take the a priori aspect of the argument, not to demonstrate existence a priori, but merely to connect the idea of Deity— as we conceive of Him in His perfection— with the necessary being, which the Cosmological Argument gives "

Towards the accomplishment of this much has been done by Hegel and his school. "What men call Proofs of God's existence" he writes "are seen to be ways of describing and analyzing the inward movement of the mind." Defending the Ontological Argument, which "alone" he says "is the true one", he writes, "nothing can be more obvious than that anything we think only or fancy is not on that account actual, and everybody is aware that a conception and even a Notion is no match for being. Still it may not be unfairly termed a barbarism in language when the name of Notion is given to things like a hundred sovereigns.. Above all, it is well to remember when we speak of God we have an object of another kind than any hundred sovereigns, and unlike any particular notion, conceit, or whatever else it may be styled. The very nature of everything finite is expressed by saying that its being in time and space is discrepant from its notion. God, on the contrary, ought to be what can be "thought as existing". His Notion involves Being. It is this unity of Notion and Being that constitutes the notion of God. In God who is infinite and Absolute there is no contradiction or opposition between

1 Geulinx Pars III

II

2 Malebranche. *Entre Sur Metaphysic.*

3 *Se Bibliotheca Sacra*: January 1909. Kant's Philosophy.

4 Lindsay: *Recent Advances in Theistic Thought*, p. 219

5 Hegel's *Logic*: Wallace Trans. p. 87. 87.

6 Hegel : *Phil. of Religion*, Vol. II p. 547.



thought and existence, for it is transcended by unity.

Supporters of this view are not wanting: they are Rothe,<sup>1</sup> Dorner, Ulrichi, Ludhart, Lotze, Pflöiderer, Greene, Cousin, and others too numerous to mention. A brief note of the statement of it by given by some of these may give a clearer conception of the view. Dorner maintains that the supreme being can be only as absolute or unconditional, as self-existent or objectively existent. Further," to think an absolute is to him a matter of necessity and the absolute so thought by us must be so thought of, if thought at all, as existent or possessed of being. The very possibility of thought is conditioned by the Absolute with Dorner." "It would be intolerable" writes Lotze," to believe of our ideal, that it is an idea produced by the action of thought, but having no existence no power, and no validity in the world of reality." We are directly aware of and directly feel the impossibility of the non-existence of the Most Perfect. Cousin has written," all knowledge of truth is knowledge of God and the direct perception of truth implies an indirect and obscure perception of God.. knowledge is by nature divine."

But this must suffice for Historical sketch. Enough material is outlined in this summary statement to give subject-matter for the present paper; other views will be incorporated in so far only as space will admit and they tend to aid in the subsequent treatment or criticism. Any discussion, however, of these proofs should be preceded by an investigation, however summary it may be, of the nature of God and his relation to the world, the nature of existence, and the nature of proof.

1 Hegel: Logic (Wallace) p.91.2.

2 Lindsay: Recent Advances, p. 229.

3 Lotze: Microcosmos II, 670. (T&T Clarke)

4 Cousin :Priniciples Fragments p.291.

## GOD AND HIS RELATION TO THE UNIVERSE

Now in these proofs of God's existence it is not always evident from the proofs, isolated from their context, what is the nature of God the demonstration of whose existence is sought, nor the relation of this God to the universe. Is God the equivalent of the universe: is He the antithesis of the universe? Does God mean only the ultimately inexplicable natural order; or does He mean an ever-active moral reason and purpose at the root of an always divinely sustained physical order? Can He be considered as transcendent and not immanent or as immanent and not transcendent or must He be thought of as both transcendent and immanent. If the immanent agency of God in the world be assumed which of the alternatives is to be chosen" Pantheism, which frankly identifies God with the world, or a Theistic conception in which a synthesis is aimed at between the notions of an immanent world principle and a being that in its essential nature transcends the world of manifestation."

For Socrates God was the beneficent will who produced the universe and continued to guide it, while Plato conceived of the God or the idea of the Good as the source from which all "intelligible beings derive their being and their essence", as the "universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of Light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immanent source of reason and truth in the intellectual." Thus this God of Plato is not merely an abstract system of ideas, not the "supreme term of Dialectic and of Love.", not a mere abstraction or logical entity without consciousness, but an existent intellectual Being. "And, O Heavens", writes Plato in the Sophist "can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind and exists in awful unmeaningness, an everlasting fixture." But with Plato there was God AND Nature: God was an Architect or Demiurge who brought into order out of pre-existing material, the present universe and ruled it according to reason in its detail. This is also true of the system of Aristotle, who recognised a dualism of *Θεός* and *ἡ φύσις*. God is Pure Actuality, the Absolute Perfection the ruling principle of the whole of nature, through *ἐκείνου* causing it to develop and actualize in an orderly and harmonious manner. But further, "Deity is an Animal that is everlasting and most excellent in

1 Baldwin Dictionary: 1.690, Prof. Ormond of Princeton.

2 Republic 509b.; 517a.VII.

3 Janet and Seailles II, 1.254.

4 Sophist 249, e.

nature; so that with the deity life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal: for this is the very essence of God." He has intelligence and  
 1 *ἔστιν ἡ νοῦσις νοῦσως νοήσις* "

On the other hand, the Stoic doctrine was, to use the terminology of Janet and Seailles, a 'Cosmotheism' a doctrine which deifies the world. This is Monistic rather than Dualistic: God is identified  
 2 with nature. "Quid aliud est natura quam Deus?" Vis Deum naturam vocare?  
 3 Non pecabis! Tanquam natura sit Deus mundo permixtus." God is Himself,  
*τὸ πρῶτον κινῆτον*": He is *πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων διεκλυθός*,  
 4 also, *"πορ τεχνικὸν ὁδῶ βαδίζον εἰς γενεαί"* "

These three views are combined in the theory of the Neo-Platonic or Alexandrian school of thought, which accepted a three fold God, the One, the Intelligence, and the Soul, three hypostases, corresponding respectively to the God of Plato, the God of Aristotle and the God of the Stoics. This Trinity suggests the Trinity of Christian Theology. But there is a fundamental difference in the conception of God. The Christian doctrine separated God entirely from the world in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and conceived of Him as transcending nature yet by His will and Freedom giving the world existence and developing it by His direct supervision. *"οὐ ἔκτισας τὰ πάντα, καὶ διὰ τὸ θέλημα σου ἦσαν καὶ ἐκτίσθησαν"*, writes the author of the  
 5 Apocalypse and St Augustine, quoting from "Genesis", "God saw that it was good", adds "God made all things by His Word, and He made them because they were good," and again "Thou didst speak and they were made  
 6 and in thy Word Thou madest these things." But God is more than the  
 6 Creator of the universe. The Christian Theism, was, as Dr. Sanday has well maintained, a timely correction of the tendencies within contemporary Judaism. Arising out of Judaism, it opposed the rigid abstract idea of Oneness of the Jew by insisting through its doctrine of the Trinity that God is "Not a mere Monad, self-centred, self-absorbed, without scope for the exercise of the highest affection within itself as to admit of a perfect interchange and reciprocity of those affections within itself, but a Monad so distributed within itself, as it were, as to admit of a perfect interchange and reciprocity of those affections  
 7 which can exist only as between persons": it harked back from the

1 Metaphysics: XII,7, XII,9

2 Seneca, De Benefic. IV. Quaest. Natura II, 45.

3 Lactant, Div. Instit. VII, 3 (Janet & Seailles p. 264)

4 Dog. L. VII, 156.

5 Revelation IV, 11.

6 Civ. Dei IX, 20 : Confessions XI, 5

7 Hastings Bible Dictionary: Vol. II, p. 206 (GOD)

1 " straining after a conception of the supreme God or supreme Being  
 as transcending the conditions of finite existence", to a more prim-  
 itive anthropomorphism of a God in direct relation to the universe of  
 persons and things. The Christian view affirmed the existence of a  
 Personal, Ethical, Self-revealing, living and infinite God, also the  
 creation of the world by Him, His transcendence over it and His holy  
 2 and wise government of it for moral ends.

This view was held in its essentials by a certain sec-  
 tion of the Scholastics some of whom even did not accept the proofs  
 as conclusive. They based their Theodicy on the doctrines of Aristotle  
 and St. Augustine. Thomas Aquinas the best representative and the high-  
 3 est authority, held that God in Himself was Pure Actuality, the Absol-  
 ute Perfection; not the form of the body nor the soul of the world, but  
 3 the efficient cause of all creatures and was self-subsistent. God is  
 according to him, distinct from his creatures, but God and the created  
 3 thing taken together do not form a tertium quid greater than God Him-  
 3 self for God is Infinite. Aquinas replied to Aristotle's arguments for  
 the eternity of matter and thought that Aristotle did not seriously  
 hold this thesis. But he held that the doctrine that the world had a  
 beginning cannot be proved by reason but can only be established by  
 3 faith. God possesses Intelligence and Will by which he created the  
 world and by which he has conceived of the universal order, produces  
 3 that order and rules all things: He is the efficient exemplary and  
 final cause of all things. He is also a Person. Opposing this view  
 which may be called the orthodox Christian doctrine of God, was a  
 species of Pantheism or Cosmotheism developed from Neo-Platonism. In  
 the works of Scotus Erigena, the Alexandrian influence is most  
 evident. He divides being into 1 creans non creata; 2 creata et creans  
 3 creata et non creans, and 4 non creans non creata. Of these God is  
 4 the first and the world is the third. God is the substance, the true  
 and only essence of all finite things: creation is a procession from  
 God. He and His creatures are one: "Deus est omne vere est". Our life  
 and all nature are a manifestation of the hidden God. So that the God  
 of Aristotle is also *Our* God and is eternal, else before God created He  
 was not. Either creation is eternal or God is not eternal. This is  
 also the theory of Master Eckhart of the fourteenth century, as well  
 as of Amalric of Bena and David of Dinant. "Omnia sunt Deus et Deus  
 est omnia: creator et creatura, idem Deus: omnia unum esse Deum." *No 6's*

1 Hastings Dict. II, p. 206.

2 Sc. Orr: Christian View of God and the World, p. 37-96.

3 Summa Teol.: I, Ia, q4: q3, a8: II, Ia, q103, a3: q7, a1:

I, Ia, q29a42-45a6 concl.: I, Ia, q20a1 .....

4 De Divisione Natura

and materia prima, according to David of Dinant, are identical else there would be a higher concept in which they are united and this concept would be precisely the identity of God with the materia prima.

Descartes, in his definition of God given above, indicates that he was discussing the idea of a God of the same nature as that of the Scholastics of the Traditional Christian type. God is the cause of everything and himself the uncaused or self-existent. This *causa sui* is not to be taken in a negative sense but in a positive, for in God the formal cause or essence is analogous to the efficient cause: His essence is the cause of His existence. God is also the Author of all truth: since willingness to deceive would be an imperfection. Error is due neither to the power of willing nor to the power of understanding, because each in itself is perfect in its kind, but rather to lack of restraint of will. God cannot deceive if these "faculties" are rightly used. Then again God is not only the source of all certainty and truth including the "eternal truths" and the cause of Himself but He is also the preserver or the conservator of this system of eternal truths, spiritual beings and matter. It is not easy, however, to understand clearly and distinctly the relation, according to Descartes, between the world and God. The relation of Thought and Body in his "Passion de Lame" is dualistic and interactionary, and this is evidently intended throughout his works. God was *Deus ex machina*. Yet in some passages, eg. "For by nature considered in general I now understand nothing more than God Himself, or the order and disposition established by God in created things and by nature in particular I understand the assemblage of all God has given me.", while God appears as the law of the construction of the universe as distinguished from the universe itself, there is a hint of the change from "Deus et natura" to "Deus sive Natura".

For Geulinx God is the eternal mind of the universe through whose action or co-operation the human mind derives its ideas of objects external to itself; God is also for him as for Descartes the creator of both the matter and of the minds manifest in the universe. While, according to Malebranche, God is the infinitely perfect being: the idea of the infinite and of God are one and the same thing. He is the "universal Being, the Being of Beings", the Sole intelligent Being, the Sole Cause. This Spinoza develops yet further. He defines God as "Substance constituted by an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence." In this theory the dualism of Descartes is resolved into a monism. God is the Absolute Being, an Infinite Substance possessing an infinite number of infinite attributes. Of these

1 Albert Magnus :Summa Theol.I 4 20

2 Spinoza: Ethica;I,Def.6.

infinite attributes we know only two, extension and thought : all else with which we are acquainted are modes of extension and thought. God, according to Spinoza, is also the cause of evrything: He is the free cause and only free cause, though not as excluding necessity but compulsion; an immanent and not transcendent cause.

With this and especially the latter Leibnitz does not entirely agree. For him God is an all-wise, all-skillful, architect who has instituted a harmony between all the monads of the universe. He evidently is not thought of as the creator ex nihilo of the universe, i.e. the sum total of the monads, but as the law of the structure of the whole. "God is the first reason or cause of things", absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom and in goodness. God is Personal. God is also a Person according to Locke's conception of Him. He is a "superior, wise, powerful invisible being", an "Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent Cogitative Spirit": the God of the Christian belief championed by Berkeley against the Deists. According to these Deists, God is Deus ex machina and exercises only a general providence of the universe; while Berkeley maintained that God was transcendent as well as intimately connected with the universe, exercising a direct control and care of nature and man. Similar was the nature of the God the evidence for whose existence Hume so carefully criticised, for the argument of his Dialogues purports to be regarding the nature of God, whether the ordinary anthropomorphic appellations are expressive of real attributes of the perfect Being or merely man's attempted characterizations of the incomprehensible and unknown. Not of other nature is the God, which is the Summum Bonum, the Divine Personality, whom Kant in his Critique of Pure Judgment sets forth as the being who satisfies the demands of Practical Reason, and whose existence, in his Critique of Pure Reason he endeavours to show cannot be demonstrated by speculative reason or proof. "This moral theology" he writes, "has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a sole Perfect and Rational First Cause, whereof Speculative theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds, far less any convincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental nor in natural theology however far reason may lead us in these, any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only Being, which stands at the head of all natural causes and on which these are entirely dependent. On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe, and further from this point of view consider what is nec-

1 Theodicy: Sec. 7,

2 Locke : essay Bk. I, 4, pp. ; IV, 10, 13.

3 Hume : Dialogues; p. 390.



necessary to give this law adequate efficiency and, for us, obligatory form, we must come to the conclusion that there is one only supreme will which comprehends all these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we find complete unity of ends? This will must be omnipotent that all nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it: omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and thus moral worth : omnipresent, that it may be at hand to supply every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise: eternal, that this harmony of liberty and nature may never fail!"

In the system of Fichte as expressed in his "On The Belief in the Divine Government of the World", this moral being of Kant is not required as the cause of the moral order and law for the active and living moral order, which is absolutely first is itself God. But later he held that the moral order was absorbed in the Divine Being who is the one and the Absolute. "We in our unalterable nature are but knowledge, Representation and Conception." God is everything and the world is not at all. We and everything are manifestations of God.

Schelling's Theology is like Fichte's, an Idealistic Pantheism". While Hegel conceives of the God not only as the Universal Being in Itself, Substance, but Absolute Spirit. For him all reality is ideal. The idea is the first reason of all things, which in externalizing itself forms nature and in returning into itself becomes Spirit, so that Spirit is the consciousness of an idea, the Idea aware of and knowing itself. God is absolute TRUTH: He is Absolute Spirit. He is the all-knowing Idea Pure and Absolute, Self-consciousness.

Lotze thought of God as an inward Spiritual principle or a creative world soul, and labours to show that the proofs cannot demonstrate the God of the Christian or satisfy the religious conception of a God. Schopenhauer, with his "Will", and Hartmann, with his "unconscious" also maintained the immanence of a god, though unconscious, was yet objectifying himself in Nature. The Evolutionists when they discuss Theism, recognise the "God of the Theologians" and distinguish Him from the Unknown and the Unknowable. "The power of which the universe is the manifestation is impenetrable." Similarly Hamilton, developing the doctrine of Kant, held that a "God understood would be no God at all". But this "something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality" was not the Unknowable of the Evolutionist but a God far trans.

1 Dialectic of Pure Reason: p. 493

2 Doctrine of Religion Lecture V.

3 Janet & Seailles II, p. 334.

ending human comprehension. Mansel also maintained that god's attributes differed not only in degree but also in kind from those of man. To which Mill answered that a God not in some way understood would be no God for there was no knowledge there could be no belief. True says Comte we do not know therefore there is no God other than the totality of humanity which is the supreme being.

But there is no need for further historical outline. We might continue like Simonides in asking for one day more in which to find a suitable definition of God, and then two days more and then continually extending the time at no time find ourselves competent for the task. The difficulty of clearly saying what is meant by the term God has become indeed formidable with the altered Philosophical standpoint of modern times, but the Theists now claim that by Theism "no definition of the Divine is either attempted or required." "Mr. Bradley's discussion", writes Mr. Seth, "seems to me to prove that the attempt, metaphysically, scientifically, or literally, to determine the Absolute as such, is necessarily barren. When the definition is not a mere tautology it is a complex of negatives, and if not technically untrue, it has in its suggestions the effects of an untruth." The Christian conception has after all altered but little, and though at one time transcendence and at another immanence may have been considered, the one at the expense of the other, to be the essential characteristic, until at present there is an attempt to combine and reconcile the two—for some modern Theists or Theomonists, at least maintain that "to-days acquaintance with the extent and methods of nature, compels the choice between divine vacuity and divine immanence", so that "Theomonism stands for the valid unification of the immanent and the transcendent in the Divine Personality which is revealed in nature as we know it and therefore throughout the universe beyond our knowledge"; and God, whose emanation, the universe, is distinct from, related to and dependent upon its source, is at the same time the distinct source of nature's grandest unified totality and the ever present secret spring of its minutest workings": while others equally anxious to guard against Pantheism hold that the "Absolute Synthesis is God; and there can be no other God": He is "The All and the All is a one of Being"; which is, on the finite subjective side, Experience, the given of which contains being Unconditioned and Immanent in the Conditioned, i.e. the Notion and on the objective side, the Great Totality, the Unconditioned being conditioning itself in the modality of Time

1 Ballard : The True God p.6.

2 Seth : Theism , p.59 (Re Appearance and Reality)

3 Ballard : ibid p.86, 156 , 157.

4 Laurie : Synthetica; Vol.II, p.69.

and Space in the form of the Dialectic, ie. Actuality: He must be "Feeling and Love as well as Being One and Eternal, Reason-universal and the Sum of Ideals." and further many, of divergent views, eg. Liddon, Martineau, John Caird, Illingworth and Prof. Gwatkin, are equally anxious to substantiate the conception of Hilbert who prayed,

"Intra cuncta, nec inclusus;

Extra cuncta, nec exclusus." ——— it is practically a God

of this nature which the proofs have at all times been employed to demonstrate. It is this that the critics have had in mind when treating the proofs and when conclusions have been obtained they have been that all the claims for the proofs by the Theists cannot be fully substantiated, so that the supplanting God, when a God was demanded or proposed by the argument, was generally "the God of the Theologians" shorn of His Personal or of some other distinctive attributes. Deism has become entirely "out of date". The mechanical theory of the universe has given way to the organic conception in modern thought and that has brought along with it a view of God's relation to the universe in a general way analogous to the relation of the soul and the body. This is not unlike the view of the Stoics and in more recent times that of Lotze and is but a filling of the content of Hegel's Absolute and also is the view of G. T. Fechner, Prof. James Royce and Prof. A. B. Bruce, the two former of whom believe ultimately in one All-inclusive mind, a World-soul which has no other content than us with all other creatures like and unlike us. But there is not general agreement as to the manner or extent of the transcendence and of the immanence. One who writes, "There is no point of space no atom of matter, but God is there: no point of spirit and no atom of soul, but God is there, And yet finite matter and finite spirit do not exhaust God.. God is infinite and transcends matter and spirit, and is different in kind from the finite universe", also confesses, "as the Absolute Cause, God must contain in Himself potentially, the ground of Consciousness, of Personality —yes of unconsciousness and impersonality. But to apply these terms to him seems a vain attempt to fathom the abyss of the Godhead and report the soundings"

Accordingly the problem before us is whether the proofs are conclusive as to a God of the nature which in each case they have claimed to be demanded, whether by the nature of thought and of things they conclusively demonstrate the existence of a God and the nature of the God which can be concluded from them. Whether these arguments will enable us to so reason that "seen at its highest,... and with fuller insight, this world may turn out to be but appearance and God the ultimate reality disclosing Himself in that very appearance". But before proceeding some attempt must be made to review and examine in outline some theories of the nature of existence and of the existence of God.

1 Laurie: Synthetica; Vol 2, 61 & 144.

2 See also Illingworth: Divine Immanence

R Church Quarterly Oct. 1908, Art. 5.

3 Theodore Parker: Quoted in A. B. Bruce: Apologetic, p. 136

## EXISTENCE

When the solution of the problem of existence, and especially of absolute existence is attempted difficulties arise in every direction. Here the question is concerning the existence of Deity or Absolute existence and there has been a confusion of existence, in intellectu, in posse, in esse and in re. When Philosophers or Theologians argue for the "existence" of God or attempt to demonstrate the proposition, "God is", what kind of existence is thought of? Is existence equivalent to Being in all its variant shades of meaning? Can existence like being be affirmed of anything not only "actualities" or "realities" but propositions, whether true or false, or of the terms which may be used in any proposition? This is the existence claimed by Anselm for the idea of God as the starting point for the demonstration of the existence of God. God existed in intellectu, but the proof was to show that God existed also in esse and in re. Does existence when attributed to God, then, mean in contradistinction to existence in idea, existence in time and space, or again is it to be taken as a simple undefinable term indicating unity and determinateness and givenness in the existent? Or may another step be taken and it be held with Prof. Bain, that "existence is but a name for an unreal notion" because it has no negative, and this be applied to the existence of Deity. To Hegel the simplest term of thought is being. We cannot think less about anything than when we merely say that it is. Being—the abstract "is"—is nothing definite and nothing at least is. Being and not-being are thus identical. A view not contradictory to this was obtained by Hume in his discussion "Of The Idea of Existence; and of External existence", where he writes, "The idea of existence, then is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on anything simply and to reflect on it as existent are nothing different from one another. That idea, when conjoined with the idea of an object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being, and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form." But of the proposition under discussion here i.e. "God is", or "There is a God", as a proposition, it is quite evident that it implies for most minds at least, what may be termed "real objective existence". It is, according to Venn, "merely a logical abbreviation for "God is existent, i.e., we are here making a distinct predication about Deity

1 Hume: Treatise on Human Nature, Vol II, p. 370 (Green & Grose)

2 Deductive Logic, p. 59.

that he is not merely a conceivable object of thought but one which exists outside of our imagination and can have his existence verified in some way. In other words, though merely logical existence cannot be intelligibly predicated in as much as it is presupposed necessarily by the terms, yet the special kind of existence which we call objective or experiential can be so predicated. It is not implied by the use of the term.. it is a perfectly fit subject of logical predication. To say "God is existent", if existence here mean nothing more than logical conceivability or predicability, would be a mere pleonasm; but to make the same assertion in the narrower sense of existence, is to utter a perfectly consistent proposition." Hume had written: "When we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being as he is represented to us; nor is the existence which we attribute to him, conceived by a particular idea, which we join to the idea of his other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them.. The conception of the existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it." Is Mr. Mill not justified, then, in including it among the universal predicates? Prof. Bain not only denies this, as Mr. Hume might, but also claims that all such propositions, not excepting that of the existence of Deity, are but abbreviations or elliptical expressions of co-existence or succession. He would resolve the problem of the existence of God into "a question as to the first cause of the universe and as to the continued exertion of that Cause in providential superintendence." Against Mill's reply, "I grant that the decision of questions of existence usually if not always depends on a previous question of either causation or co-existence. But existence is nevertheless a different thing from causation or co-existence and can be predicated apart from them. The meaning of the abstract name of existence, and the connotation of the concrete name being, consist, like the meaning of all other names, in sensations or states of consciousness: their peculiarity is that to exist, is to excite or be capable of exciting any sensations or states of consciousness: no matter what but it is indispensable that there be some".... Being.. is the name for Something taken in the most comprehensive sense of the word.", Bain contends, "that for the meaning of existence we need always to refer to some of the other attributes of the things; that as an independent attribute, it is devoid of all real standing." It implies always a "definite set of conditions of time, place and circumstance." This is exemplified by the topic here in hand. Mr. Bain endeavours to show that the proofs of God's existence are proofs of

1 Empirical Logic 232, 3.

2 Treatise : p. 394, 5. p. 371.

3 Deductive Logic, P. 107

4 Logic; Vol. I, p. 113 (Quoted Bain: Dissertation IV a, §

or inquiries into the manner of the commencement of the universe and of its maintainance and control. This is true of Thomas Brown's and of Dugald Stewart's as well as of Descartes' treatment of the proofs of existence. By it, it appears to be meant, that the proofs for God's existence are statements of the results of an examination into the physical universe given objectively in experience with a view to the discovery of a certain or any attribute of that universe which will correspond to a quality or "mark" contained in the concept God. But is this certain? Is not the existence of God according to the proofs something more than this? Does not the argument from design or order in the universe attempt to go beyond the presence of that design to its origin, does not the Causation argument purport to go beyond it all to an existent First Cause uncaused and distinct from yet related to the universe? In regard to any object which may be said to exist, its existence does not depend on its attributes but is the prius of its attributes. Surely Mr. Mill is ~~as~~ more accurate when he says that "existence is nevertheless a different thing from causation or co-existence" and that "to exist is to excite or be capable of exciting any sensations or states of consciousness." Kant thus viewed existence for in distinguishing the concept of an object and the conception of it as existing he argues that in the case of an object of sense it is impossible to confuse the conception of the thing with its existence, "for the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience." This applies also to the concept of God, in fact, "whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object." "Find any piece of existence" writes another, "take anything anyone could call a fact or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience.. When the experiment is made strictly, I can conceive of nothing than the experienced." "For me experience is the same as reality", writes Mr Bradley, so when the same writer discusses the Ontological Proof the same writer urges its inability to prove not a perfection but a perfection which may "exist" out of my thought! His view like Mill's opposes Bain's statement: he claims that the "attributes" or "content" or "what" points to something beyond and cannot exist by itself." While the subject is never a mere "that", a mere existent, for in fact existent and content are inseparable, yet the "what" is not the "that", and to prove the existence it is not sufficient to demonstrate only the content. His Definition is—"By existence, taken strictly, I mean a temporal series of events or facts and this series is not throughout directly experienced. It is an ideal construction from the basis of what is presented. But though partly ideal, such a series is not wholly so. For it leaves its content in the form of



particulars and the immediate conjunction of being and quality is not thoroughly broken up. Thisness, or the irrelevant content is retained, in short, except so far as it is required to form a series of events. And though the events of the whole series are not perceived they must be taken as what is in its character perceptible." This appears to be a more satisfactory statement than any of the aforementioned. The problem here is an ultimate one which this paper cannot pretend to solve. "Existence" is a simple and indefinable term, yet it should be carefully distinguished from "Being". Or in other words, the different kinds of existence ought to be carefully distinguished, i.e. the existence understood when we speak of an object, eg. this table at which I am sitting, or the man whom I see in front of me and whom I believe to be more than merely what I see and that which is implied when we think of a perfect circle. There are two definitely distinct universes of conversation here. Both of these have, at one time or another, been included in the definition of God and the treatments of the proofs of His existence. As a witness of the one may be noted Vacherot's attempt to give an Ontological turn to Psychology, which has resulted as M. Caro so clearly indicates in His "L'Idee de Dieu", in giving a "shadowy Deity — a God who is a figment of the imagination." His Deity was a merely ideal one, a purely abstract and subjective conception. the mere product of human reason, a pure result of our own intellectual operations. As exemplifying the other there is the Cosmotheism of Realism where there is only one proof of God, but "tout est cette preuve." Accordingly both have to be necessarily taken into account in any remarks about the existence of God if that existence is to be Supreme, Absolute, Perfect and Infinite. God, if He be God, has both Being and Existence. The writer who claimed that potentiality to existence was greater than potentiality to non-existence and he who writes that "not to appear at all in the series of time, not to exhibit ones nature in the field of existence, is to be false and unreal". would surely be justified in applying this to God and claiming with M. Caro that the God who does not exist is no God at all. On the other hand, as Mr. Bradley contends it would not be accurate to limit the nature of God to that field. If the present conception of the relation of God to the world as approximating analogously in some general way the relation of man's mind and body be maintained, the nature of the problem of God's existence does not alter appreciably. The nature of God set forth in the different treatments of the proofs, each of which may be considered as an extreme or

1 Kant : Critique of Pure Reason C.336

2 Bradley : Appearance & Reality, p.145, 1163, See also p.400.

3 ibid..... p.317

4 Lindsay v Recent Advances in.....p.233

5 Bradley: Appearance & Reality; p.400.

partial statement ought to be such as to satisfy the demands for both an ideal, or perhaps better a transcendent existence and a temporal existence in space and time. It is for the establishment of this that the Ontological Argument has been striving. Whether, on the one hand, from the Ontological Proof we can conclude the one kind of existence or being and by the Cosmological or Teleological, the other kind of existence; or on the other hand, by any combination of these or indeed by any proof whatever, we can demonstrate the existence of a being of this nature, i.e., an ideal which is being expressed, or a Spirit which is manifesting itself in time and space will be the problem of the following chapters.

## PROOF OF EXISTENCE

At the end of the

last paragraph it was seen that it was necessary to examine the nature and power of proof: in other words, that if the proofs of God's existence were to be adequate, they must demonstrate that there is such a class or class concept as God, that that class is not a null class, that it has at least one and in this case perhaps one only member, which member has "objective existence". It is with the former that the Ontological argument is concerned: that argument endeavours to show that the very existence of the class necessitates the existence of its one member and in its later development, especially under Leibnitz, to demonstrate the possibility and the necessity of the class. Kant has maintained that, "if I conceive of God I must conceive of Him as existing but why assume the conception of Him.", i.e. if you grant the existence of the class it follows that the member of the class must exist. To think of God and think of Him as existent are, according to Kant, in no way different. Existence is not a predicate. It may be a logical predicate for a "logical predicate may be what you please", but "Being is evidently not a real predicate, i.e., a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing.", "it is merely the positing of a thing of certain determinateness in itself"—a view also held, as has been seen, by Hume. The result is that the "proof" of existence; the rigid demonstration of the existence of anything is impossible for "all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by perception or inference connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience." On this point, Leibnitz, developing Descartes' view had defended the opposite, which is implied in the attempt to demonstrate the possibility of God's existence and is overtly stated in his "New Essays" "Concerning Human Understanding", where he writes that "when we say that a thing exists or that it has real existence, this existence is itself a predicate." Now the decision as to whether existence be a predicate or not, whether all propositions are analytic or there be some which are synthetic, e.g. existential, is very difficult. Logicians of the first rank have in the main favoured Kant's position. "The inferences of formal logic have nothing whatever to do with real existence: that is, occurrence under the conditions of time and space", writes Jevons. This is also true, according to Mr B. Russell, of Symbolic Logic. He is careful to distinguish between the two kinds of existence: "The meaning of existence which occurs in Philosophy and in daily life", he writes, "is the meaning which can be predicated of an individual, the meaning in which

1 Critique : p, 337. 335.

2 Leibnitz : New Essays; p, 401, (Langley Trans.)

3 Jevons: Studies In Formal Logic: p. 55.

we inquire whether God exists, in which we affirm that Socrates existed and deny that Hamlet existed. The entities dealt with in Mathematics do not exist in this sense: the number 2, or the principle of the syllogism or multiplication, are objects which mathematics considers but which certainly form no part of the world of existent things. This sense lies wholly outside symbolic logic, which does not care a pin whether its entities exist in this sense or not." "The sense in which existence is used is a definable and purely technical sense: namely this, to say that A exists means that A is a class which has at least one member. Thus whatever is not a class (eg. Socrates) does not exist in this sense; and among classes there is just one which does not exist, namely, the class having no members, which is called the null class." Thus, though formal symbolic logic may deal with the existence of God as a class concept, which class will have one member, it according to the above can have nothing to do with existence in the first of these sense: it cannot point to a member of that class as existing in re. This has been accepted by only some logicians. In answer to these remarks of Mr. Russell, printed contemporaneously with them a writer claims and with some justice that "Symbolic Logic has the right to occupy itself with any question whatever on which it can throw any light." Supporting this is the recent attempt on the part of Prof. C. J. Keyser to show the contribution of Mathematics towards the solution of the ultimate problems of Theology and the restoration of that department of thought. While this latter may be of value yet it is evident that strictly formal or symbolic logical demonstration cannot establish conclusively the existence of any object, in fact can throw very little light on the subject of existence. The extent to which this is held, will depend on the attitude taken to the contradictory categorical statements of Kant who supported, and Leibnitz who dissented from, the predicability of existence. In the remarks above regarding the existence of God and the nature of that existence, the view of Kant was assumed, But as that assumption affects the thinkers view of the power of proof to demonstrate existence it requires to be justified in some way. Kant held definitely, as was seen above, that existence was not a predicate, i.e., it is not contained in the concept of anything, we must go beyond the concept if we wish to claim existence for the object. On the other hand, Leibnitz states definitely that existence is a predicate. While Kant would hold that a concept may have meaning without existence, Leibnitz maintained that an accurate

1 Mind : N. S. XII, p. 398. 3 Russell

2 Ibid ..... p. 401 Hugh MacColl

3 Hibbert Journal : Jan. 1909, p. 370.

4 See Kant's Critique, p. 336

analysis of the concept would give existence as one of its predicates. That the former is true appears from the fact that a concept is never a subject but always the meaning of a grammatical predicate. There is a fundamental distinction between a thing and a concept. We cannot say of X that it is Alexander the Great or the number 5 as accurately as we can say that X is green or X is mammal. In the latter case the grammatical predicate is a concept under which the X is subsumed, but in the former eg., "X is the number 5", "is the number 5" is only a part of the predicate the whole predicate being "is identical with the number 5", which is a concept under which X is subsumed, so that "the number 5" never forms the whole of a predicate but only a part. Thus there is a distinction between what can appear only as a "thing" and every other object of thought — a distinction which does not vanish even if we hold that some concepts can also be things. To take an example already

- 1 employed in this in this connection:—"The concept of a horse is an easily formed concept", here the concept forms the subject, but it no longer is a concept but a "thing" subsumed under the concept of the predicate "easily formed concept", it is as much a proper name as "Montreal" is in the proposition "Montreal is a city". Again the predicative value in the concept remains even where a "subject-concept" is employed in such sentences as "All mammals are red-blooded", for this is equivalent to saying, "If a thing is a mammal, it has red blood." Also when a concept falls under a higher concept, ie. a genera which contains subordinate species, are radically different from concepts of the first order under which things fall, eg: "Socrates is a man" is radically different from "A Greek is a man.", the latter is transitive, the former not. This difference is indicated through the use, by some, of "Property" and "Mark" and in the symbolical representation of exact Logic such as that of Peano by  $\varepsilon$  and  $C$ . The view here put forward is also buttressed up by the view of Dr. Hillebrand and others, "that every categorical Proposition implies existence unless it explicitly denies it.", or more strongly, that every particular proposition positively asserts existence, eg. we cannot say "some witches are women" because it equals, "There are (or exist) some witches etc." which is untrue unless we specify that the universe of thought is one of fancy or superstition. So that there is a gulf fixed between the "concept" and the "thing" and the reasoning which holds that the most far-seeing and elaborate examination and analysis of the concept is and must be unable to "claw out" the predicate existence for the simple reason that existence is not a predicate need not be ashamed, but may ask the question and expect a negative reply, "Has proof anything to tell us of existence?" But if on the other hand, some such idea of reality
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1 In a discussion between M. Frege SA. KERRY.

2 Mind :N. S. VOL, VI p.542.

and existence as that given above, modelled on Dr. Bradley's definition — a view which, if it be a common notion, differs from that described by Fichte, according to which Being "is something, which in and through itself neither is nor can be, receives from without a super-added existence— which thus is an existence of nothing" for according to this "Being alone is" and existence is a manifestation of or a form of that Being— may the thinker find himself compelled to make use of logic if he is to establish the existence of the ideal element which is constructed on the basis of experienced fact. It does not seem an altogether accurate method of procedure, if in the consideration of the nature of God ideal attributes or elements be found necessary, but in the attempt to prove his existence, that science, the primary function of which is to treat of existence of that nature be entirely neglected. It was seen above in the survey of the nature of God and of Existence, that the nature of the former is not such that his existence is completely limited to temporal existence in space. It is difficult, therefore to go the entire length with B. Russell when he places God among the objects that have existence in the sense of the former meaning, but denies him a place among those which exist in the sense of the second meaning of that term. It will appear more clearly in the sequel whether logical demonstration is competent to establish definite proof or proofs of God's existence in either of these senses— for the Ontological argument in the hands of some apparently attempts the demonstration of the former—, but in all the discussion it ought to be borne in mind, as in fact it has not by many Theistic writers, that there is a difference between proof and inference; the latter proceeding from premise to conclusion and the former from conclusion to premise. The one is the reverse of the other; while both attempt to establish the same fact, the inference is the process of finding it. In Theistic "Proofs" especially the Cosmological and the Teleological, many inferences have erroneously been given the title proof. Moreover the degrees of cogency in Inductive proof have not always been most evident. Inductive Argument, if Prof. Hyslop may be trusted, is but an argument to show why one supposition or practical conclusion is preferable to another supposition and the conclusion can never reach any higher accuracy than probability. Or as a recent writer has well said that "only an argument starting from necessary premises is formally capable of bringing out a necessary result".

1 Fichte: Works, The Doctrine of Religion, I, p. 392 (Smith)

2 Sc. B. Russell: Philosophy of Leibnitz p. 173.



## EXAMINATION

With these considerations in mind a return may now be made to the subject with which the present paper is more directly concerned. It is found that in tracing the historic development of the "proofs", the Teleological came first, then the Cosmological followed by the Ontological. This order was simply reversed by Kant in his treatment of them, but here the Cosmological, as purporting to begin with objective existence will be first examined, then the Teleological, and finally as the crown of all and to which all according to Kant, revert, the Ontological. As in the historical outline there was a certain overlapping of the ground, so in this examination, entire isolation cannot be expected, but, as far as possible, the arguments will be treated separately, their relation and inter-dependence being reserved for the concluding paragraphs of the paper.

## COSMOLOGICAL

A beginning is made with the Cosmological because it starts from an existence of the kind which the examination of the nature of God and of His existence suggested as being implied in the several historical treatments. The main question, the crux of the discussion is the problem as stated by Kant. The other minor modifications must be first dealt with, in order to clear the way for the main point at issue.

One very trifling element needs only to be mentioned to show its force or lack of force, that is, that there are effects in nature greater than man can produce which must depend on God. This view of Chrysippus, as the Epicureans plainly saw, though pointing to a fact in nature does not allow for the alternative view that nature herself might produce these results. From this it cannot be inferred that a Supreme Intelligent Being is producing these effects, but at the very most only a power superior to man though it may be of a different nature. This, though a phase of the Causation Argument, verges on the border line of the Teleological and though it was again put forward and defended by the Scholastics, and may be valuable as regulative of man's conception of his own powers, it cannot be defended against the criticisms of the Sceptics.

Another development or phase of the Causation Argument which shares somewhat the same features, is that put forward by Plato and

developed by the Stoics and some Moderns, that is, that the conscious and intelligent beings in the universe demand an adequate cause. Plato conceived of the body of the universe as possessed with a soul which was the cause of the human souls & the body of the universe was the cause of the human bodies. Zeno and Cicero claimed that the world must be a living and wise being containing consciousness and reason, else it could not produce "living and wise beings out of itself"; thus reasoning for the divinity of the world. This same reasoning was employed by Descartes, Goulinex, Malebranche, John Locke and others, to establish not so much the divinity of the world as the existence of a God the cause of the conscious and intelligent beings in the world. All this will require more careful investigation when the question of Biological Evolution is discussed. At the present, it may be noted that though the attitude of the Epicureans that all is material so that the conscious and intelligent soul needs no originating cause other than the material universe, cannot be considered fatal to this argument, yet the objection of the Sceptics to Zeno's argument is not without some weight, that is, that it is not strictly logical to argue from the analogy with man, that because man is body and soul and the body is a part of the body of the universe, so there must be a soul of the universe of which man's soul is a part. They saw, evidently, that though "non igitur caret sensu mundus" be true, it is not necessarily the same truth as, "the world is a living and wise being, since it produces living and wise beings out of itself". What is there logically to prevent the possibility that the soul of man may be the result of the isolation or the separation of the body of man from the body of the universe. But when Aristotle and the Stoics conceive of this world soul as not so much "a spiritual fountain-head" from which the individual souls are springing, but as an immanent cosmic principle which at the same time comprehends the sum total of things, they have more ground for defending their view. There is much to commend the view of the universe which makes God immanent in all things and at the same time considers Him as *παντος παντων*. These men in their systems are treating what would be termed by more modern writers the "Absolute", the "Ultimate Reality", the sum total of what has been called "spiritual" and "material" things conceived of as a unity or Fichte's "only life which exists entirely in itself and from itself and by itself". Kant's criticism that the Teleological argument recurs for support to the Cosmological would apply to this form of the argument and must be again considered in the subsequent treatment of the Teleological Proof. Here may it be noticed only that if men thus con-

ceive of God as both active and passive, inert matter and active force when viewed from different standpoints, the problem is not regarding God's existence but His nature. If everything I see before me be God; if God and the original matter be one, where is the need and whence the origin of the proof that He exists! But the problem for these writers, and especially for Aristotle, was to establish the existence of a God whose nature would not only satisfy Cosmotheism but would be such as to transcend the cosmos and to comprehend it in its entirety. This is again connected with and cannot be separated from their doctrine of "First Mover"

This theory of a First Mover, which as has been seen, was employed by Plato, who thought that the action of one physical object on another implied an inherent power which in turn necessitated the existence of an absolute power capable of moving itself and all else, was at the time an offset to the physical explanations of the earlier and contemporary Philosophers. This of course to the Greek mind implied the eternity of matter, and matter too which was in continual motion. The best kind of motion of Plato becomes for Aristotle the eternal cause of eternal motion. He saw that unless motion was either inherent in the original matter or was, as it were, superinduced from without, the universe would have remained in perpetual rest which was the very opposite to what has happened. He apparently favours the former and this "τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον". That he is opposing is the doctrine overtly stated later by the Epicureans, that if there is apparent in the universe a receding series of causal events implying motion, it is absurd to trace this back to obscurity and then say that there must have been a time when it was not, but that the atoms of the material universe, emerged from their perpetual homogeneity or perpetual harmonious motion independent of one another into the present condition of action and reaction by some chance deviation or hitting on one another. The modification of this by such schoolmen as Thomas Aquinas was due to the elements incorporated from Christian Theism, the creation ex nihilo and consequent dualism. The separation of the moving principle from the moved and the conception of inert matter created by an Omnipotent Being necessitated for these latter the introduction of a power capable of originating and conserving motion in the lifeless mass. The objects incapable of inducing motion on one another and the motion which was apparent must be produced by some adequate cause, which is God. This naturally has been defended by many Theistic writers even in spite of Kant's criticism. Kant held that when he ascribed motive force to a body

and thus thought of it under the category of causality he cognised it by that category as an object of sense, but when he thought of "a Supersensible being as the first mover"; and thus by the category of causality: as regards its determination of the world, he could not think of it as existing in space or time or simultaneously with other things, so that he could have no determinations whatever, which could make intelligible the condition of the possibility of motion by means of this Being as its ground". Hence this conclusion, "I do not in the very least cognise it by means of the predicate cause (as first mover), for itself; but I have only the representation of a something containing the ground of the motions in the world." Kant no doubt is right here when he points out that the conception of motion as expressing a relation between the two sensible objects cannot be extended to the supersensible First Mover, but this statement of his conclusion is an advance upon the conception of a first mover even though it gives only "a something containing the ground of the motions in the world." The argument might here make this a point of departure to consider the ultimate nature of motion and its present "ground" of explanation. But Kant apparently thought of the argument as dealing with the nature of a supersensible origin of motion pre-existent to the first motion of the universe, so that this is parallel with or is a phase of the Causation argument proper. This argument from motion does not thus necessarily consider the problem of the eternity of matter. Whether motion be inherent in the original matter or superinduced at some time upon eternal matter by an eternal source of motion is not an integral part of the argument. Granting even the eternity of matter, the motion argument and the treatment of the ultimate origin and nature of energy would be yet entitled to a consideration. But more of this in the treatment of the Teleological Argument. Yet the eternity of matter comes in for special treatment in the purely causation phase of this argument. To the pre-Christian Greeks, it was a subject of no difficulty. The matter of the world for them contained its own cause: God was an immanent cosmic principle; He was a something which was the ground of the existence of the universe. This is definitely true of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. The Epicureans also and the Sceptics though they conceived the world as in no sense in need of a transcendent God, yet they thought of it as containing within itself its own cause. This was to a large extent reversed by the Christians in their doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, in which the immanence of God was sacrificed in the interests of His transcendence. Now the Causation Argument when carefully examined leads to a conclusion from which either of

these two may be inferred. In tracing the history of the universe in a  
 receding order as a series of causal events it is equally possible to  
 conceive of that series as infinitely receding, i.e., as an infinite  
 series, as it is to think of it as ending arbitrarily at any one stage  
 in its recession. Further, if as some have declared, it must be thought  
 of as ending somewhere, cannot it be conceived of as an unit containing  
 within itself its own cause and not necessarily as being such as that a  
 cause must be sought for that initial stage, which cause to be *causa sui*  
 What can prevent a search of a cause for this cause, i.e. why must it be  
*causa sui* any more than any other? This as a logical problem is not con-  
 clusive: it proves nothing at all. It is on this latter that the criticism  
 of Kant is effective, that the principle of causality is "without sig-  
 nificance except in the sensuous world." The theory of causality held by  
 those whom Kant was criticising was that which the Scholastics had hand-  
 ed down from Aristotle: the principle of Efficient Causation assumed by  
 the Scholastics, by Descartes, and by all the Philosophers to the time  
 of Hume. "It is manifest by the natural light that there must at least  
 as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect", writes  
 Descartes. While Locke remarks, "a cause is that which makes any other  
 thing either simple idea, substance, or mode begin to be." Such a defin-  
 ition according to Hume is useless; "Should any one.. pretend to define a  
 cause, by saying it is something productive of another, 'tis evident he  
 would say nothing.", i.e. he would be defining it in and by a synonymous  
 term. The idea of causality when examined must contain the two relations  
 contiguity and succession and also an additional relation of "necessary  
 connection" which latter resolves itself into "constant conjunction." T  
 Thus Causation is only a succession of antecedents and consequents,  
 always con-joined which produces a corresponding antecedent and con-  
 sequent of feeling on feeling, from which our idea of causality is formed  
 Causality does not exist apart from the mind. This also was the theory  
 of J. S. Mill, though he gives it more than a psychic significance.  
 After distinguishing between efficient and physical causes he defines  
 the law of Causality as the "familiar truth that invariability of  
 succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in  
 nature and some other fact which has preceded it, independently of all  
 considerations respecting the ultimate mode of the production of phenom-  
 ena or of every other question regarding the nature of "things in them-  
 selves". It is simply invariable antecedent and invariable consequent.

1 Meditation III, p. 49 (Open Court)

2 Essay Concerning The Human Understanding, Bk.II, C26, p.218

3 Treatise Pt. II, Sec.2, p.379 (Green and Gross)

..... Pt. III Sec. 6.

4 J. S. Mill: System of Logic; Bk.III, C5, Sec.2 p.213.

This limitation of the causality of nature to the phenomena, was also previously the tenet of Kant. It was according to him, "the conjunction of a particular state with another preceeding it in the world of sense the former following the latter by virtue of a law." This never gets beyond phenomena for "the causality of a cause must itself be an effect — must itself have begun to be, and therefore, according to the principle of the understanding itself requires a cause.", so that, practically for Kant the principle of causality is an universal axiom indispensable in all science. It was with such views of causality as these in mind that Hume and Kant criticised the Cosmological Argument, so that to be fair to these writers this must be remembered in any examination of their treatment of the proofs. Hume was certainly accurate, according to his theory of causation, when he insists that the argument can give no ultimate conclusion but that there was an infinite regression or progression of phenomenal events. Kant also is justified in his criticism that "no phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series. Every action in so far as it is productive of an event. is itself an event or occurrence and presupposes another preceeding state, in which its cause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a series, and an absolute beginning is impossible in the sensuous world. The actions of natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects in time. A primal action, an action which forms an absolute beginning is beyond the causal power of phenomena;" and that, the principle of causality—"a principle without significance except in the sensuous world"—is employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere. This has been recognised by at least one Theistic writer, who agrees with Kant in that, "In the endless regress of the usual form of the argument we reach an end of efficient forces in the physical realm and therewith, causation ceases, leaving the attempt—as ought to have been seen—to prove an absolute cause abortive." The same writer echoes what Lotze and others have claimed, that it is to be freely granted "that personal being at the end of the series of things or events is an illegitimate or unwarranted displacement and substitution — that the argument in fact does not suffice to set up the personality of the self-existent First Cause".. "that an Infinite Being, who is or causa sui cannot be reached by the process of merely negating the finite." May not a step further be taken and it be said that the only conclusion which can be obtained, if any can, is that there must be only a physical existence the physical antecedent of the present physical universe. The result is that assuming Hume's and Kant's caus-

1 J. S. Mill: System of Logic; Bk III, SEC. 2, p. 299.

2 Kant: Transcendental Dialectic; Bk. IC. 2 Sec 9, 3. p. 300.

3 ..... p. 305

4 Lindsay: Recent Advances in Theistic Thought, p. 161.: 149.

causality doctrine the legitimacy of their reasonings and their conclusions regarding the first cause must be admitted. So that Prof. Flint is rightly attacking the criticism when he begins to examine the principle of causality. Though this writer gains little by saying of the theories of Hume and J.S. Mill, that they are "utterly inadequate statements and explanations" of the principle of causality and puts nature as an effect whose cause is God, on apparently the same level as any ordinary event, which is the effect of some other like occurrence, yet he insists rightly that it is the theory of Causality employed by Hume and Kant which is to be discussed. However in his own view he practically harks back to the view of Locke. In assuming causality what is assumed, according to Prof. Flint, is "that whatever has begun to be, must have had an antecedent, or ground or cause which accounts for it." This is guarded by the substitution of "what has begun" i.e. an event, for an "effect" and "existence", and by the saving word "ground". But the manner of its employment does not substantiate its finality, i.e., his acute attempt to find by examination an absolute beginning for the universe, "by reasoning back from mere individual effects or objects or even from the supposititious state of the universe that end in pristine mist and ether.", so that the universe may in this sense demand a "ground" or cause which is God, cannot fairly pass current in this highly intellectual and definitely scientific age. While the principle of Causality as a postulate of scientific thought may be stated thus:—"everything which begins to be must have a cause" and while an indefinite regress may be complained of as explaining nothing but implying a perversion of the causal principle as thus understood we do yet appear to be left with a choice between an infinite regress and a first cause which first cause can be obtained only by an arbitrary desertion of the causal principle at the point where it becomes inconvenient to remain faithful to it." The search for a beginning of the causal series is not justified by the results of modern scientific investigation and the desertion of the principle at an arbitrary point is unreasonable. So that with Prof. Strong, who agrees with Prof. Flint that the argument is from begun existence to a sufficient cause of that beginning, it may be reasonably contended against Diman's statement "While the law of causality does not lead logically up to the conclusion of a first cause it compels us to affirm it", "that it is not the law of Causality which compels us to affirm, for this certainly" does not logically lead up to the conclusion". But it has been largely by reverting to the pre-Hymian and Pre-Kantian theories of causality and by developing these that the modern writers have obtained

1 Flint: Theism; p. 96. 97, 98.

2 Lindsay: Recent Advances... p.157.

3 Tennant V: Cambridge Essays; p 81.

4 A. E. Taylor: Metaphysics. Quoted in Camb. Theol. Essays. p.81.

5 Strong Systematic Theology p. 40, 41.



their doctrines. In so doing some, it seems, have unfairly dealt with Kant and his followers forgetting that he does recognise at least the possibility of a causality other than that of the sensuous world, and has only missed the more accurate view on account of his absolute distinction between noumena and phenomena. When a writer remarks that Kant restricted causality to the sensuous phenomena and maintained the impossibility of founding any argument on a principle which with him did not hold "except in relation to the world of sense", for a world that shall lie, as he puts it "beyond the world of sense and time" and adds that, "when Kant restricts the validity of the principle of causality to the sensuous world, he overlooks how synthetic thought is of itself and how unwarranted is his denial of every sort of causality, save that only which finds play within the range of experience.", that writer either fails to give due credit to or interprets with a broad outlook and clear insight, that section in the Dialectic called "Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the totality of the deduction of cosmical events from their causes", where Kant, after distinguishing very carefully causality of nature and causality of freedom, argues, that since phenomena are "nothing more than mere representations, connected with each other in accordance with empirical laws they must have a ground which is not phenomenal" and accordingly, "the causality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or determinable by phenomena; although its effects as phenomena, must be determined by other phenomenal existences", so that "this cause and its causality exist, therefore, out of and apart from the series of phenomena." He does not recognise the way Kant, after stating the fact that "we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes in which, however, absolute totality cannot be found", labours to answer the question, "Whether admitting the existence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of freedom - or whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and incompatible" Though Kant concludes this section with the statement that his intention in it was not to prove "the actual existence of freedom", nor to demonstrate the "possibility of freedom", but merely to show "that nature and freedom are at least not opposed" yet the writers since him have made this the starting point of their reasoning and have sought to rescue causality from the realm of phenomena and to restore it meaning so as to include the notion of creative or formative power. As has been seen above, the view of Kant was that the principle of causality was an axiom whose validity must be maintained because it is one of the

1 Kant Transcendental Dialectic: Bk. II. C.II, Sec XI, 3 p. 299.

logical presuppositions of knowledge and whose being must be due to the mind itself, for the formal elements implied in our knowledge cannot themselves be regarded as material passively supplied to the mind; and that of Hume was, that causality was merely mental and physical sequence. Both these theories are treatments of the problem from a wrong standpoint. Kant has not shown and indeed it would be difficult to show that the causal principle is an indispensable axiom. Any effort to do so must depend on an assumption like that of Hume's that experience is composed of a number of detached events. This does not appear accurate. We do not conceive of two objects, one a cause and another an effect, as two individuals and then search, as Hume does in his Treatise for a link connecting them: we rather isolate one continuum of experience and then within this arbitrarily isolate two elements which were formerly and in reality inseparable, except in conception. Cause and effect are in reality not distinct and separable events but merely earlier and later stages of a continuous process. This is evident from the purpose which the physical sciences set before themselves at the present time—a purpose which is the development of the conception which underlay the answer of Le Place to Napoleon's question regarding the absence of the mention of God in his *Mechanique Celeste* "Sir, I had no need of that hypothesis", and does not contradict the response of Lagrange to the report of the conversation "Nevertheless that is a hypothesis that accounts for many things"—i.e., the establishment of mathematical relations between the events of a continuous course, or in other words, the description of the course of events by the aid of the fewest and the simplest formulae. Fully worked out this view of the nature of the experimental science leads to the so-called "descriptive" ideal of scientific explanation advocated by such eminent thinkers as Kirchhoff, Mach, and Ostwald among physicists, and with various modifications, Avenarius, Munsterberg, Royce and James Ward among recent philosophers." "The efforts of Kirchhoff, of Herz and I may say of Avenarius" writes Dr. Bush "show the effort to eliminate explanation from science as the ultimate goal and to limit its task to description which shall be as simple and as complete as possible." "The newer physical science.. banishes from its terminology all such words as involve metaphysical adjuncts to what is actually presented to us by the world on the surface. It dispenses with "force" save as a purely mathematical relation; it replaces "causes and effects" by equations; it recognises that "matter", with which the scientist deals, is very distinct from the "substance" of the metaphysician.. It admits the short comings of the mechanical theory of the

1 See. Ward: Naturalism and Agnosticism Vol: I, C. I

Hibbert Journal: Jan. 1909, p. 373

2 A. E. Taylor: Elements of Metaphysics: p. 174.

3 Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience, Bush;

Nov. 1908.

universe and asserts that there is no necessity for the choice of this rather than of other methods of systematising our scientific knowledge. It proclaims that its role is not explanation at all, but only description." This role it is now content to play in its treatment of electrons and radio-activity. The principles relating to the conservation and the transformation of energy, conservation of mass and momentum etc., etc., are witnesses of this manner of procedure. In this recognition of the continuousness of the evolutionary or transforming process, there is the tacit assumption that there is no such thing as causality or cause. The principle of Causality is a mere postulate made because of its practical efficacy and justified by experience, yet altogether incapable of logical demonstration. But even in such doctrines as the conservation of energy, a principle, very similar to the causation principle, is contained, which may be called the "Principle of Ground and Consequent": The formulae or the mathematical relations existing between earlier and later events do not represent a cause but express the law of the whole. In fact in all modern experimental science, in all search for a "how" and not a "why" the principle of Causality has really been abandoned for the more accurate conception of events as connected in a series by reason of an underlying ground or principle. As long as a thinker confines his attention to physical and experimental science and seeks to recognise and confirm the mathematical and quantitative relations of "earlier" and "later" stages of a continuous process, he requires to recognise only phenomena. Kirchhoff is right, when in his introduction to his "Vorlesungen über Mathematische Physik" in the course of the precision of mechanics, he writes, "I, therefore, propose, as this task, the description of the movements which occur in nature, a description as complete and simple as possible." So that despite the possible lament for the materialism of the past, it is "more intelligent to recognise science as the effort to describe experience rather than to try to regard it as explaining experience in any ultimate sense." It is this very fact that has brought the principle into disrepute. While it is true that, "the sheer impotence of science to do any thing more for us than take us to the succession of antecedents and consequents cannot be too plainly expressed" and that "the artificiality of our whole phenomenal sequence has been thoroughly laid bare before our evolutionary science with its correlation and convertibility of forces", yet it must be recognised that for the purposes of science, which are practical, not much more can be desired, so that "the aspect of cause when taken simply to signify antecedent, rather than relation of phenomena to that which is real," may not be "absurd

1 Cambridge Theological Essays, 1905, F.R. Tennant, p. 60.

2 Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience: W. T. BUSH, p. 57, 58.

3 Lindsay: Recent Advances; p. 144.

1 and meaningless", if in that aspect it be considered as a mere postulate  
 dealing with "antecedant" and "consequent" stages of a continuous  
 process. It is not an axion indispensable in all thinking but a postul-  
 ate "which science invents, tentatively applies to Nature, and finds by  
 2 experience to be generally verified within the actual limits of actual  
 observation."

And before passing on to discuss the "True Principle of Causality" or rather "The Principle of Ground and Consequent" it might be well to examine whether Causality taken in the more accurate sense as dealing with "earlier" and "later" stages of one phenomenal process, is capable of taking us to anything other than a succession of antecedents and consequents. Does this clear up the question of the eternity of matter. At this point the consideration is neither of an event A preceeded by an event B and B by C, nor of A&B intercepted by or transformed through C etc., for now the event is A-B ie., there is no actual sequence of A and B for the stages of the transition are only distinguished by an artificial and arbitrary abstraction. When we isolate, as it were, a bit of experience and distinguish A and B as stages in that experience an infinite number of intermediate stages may be sought, though it might be an unprofitable search. But any attempt to explain the "later" in time by a prior in a continuous process, the conception of an infinite regression must be employed. "The absence of a beginning follows as necessarily from the principle of explaining the latter stages of a continuous process as conditioned by the earlier, as it does  
 3 when the stages are taken to be distinct events." If this be carried further and the totality of the present cosmic system be considered as the posterior stage of a continuous development for which a temporarily  
 4 prior stage is sought the infinite regress is begun which can never lead to any "cause" of the present universe which would be other than a universe of the same nature with itself. The idea of a cause, a first cause, causa sui would be an impossibility. The series would recede ad infinitum unless arbitrarily interrupted and if so interrupted the final stage of the regression would not of necessity be of other nature essentially than the present. But reason finds it impossible to stop anywhere in the infinite regress of finite or phenomenal causes. "The principle of causality utterly fails to get beyond an infinite regress to an absolute beginning. "The proposal to prove by the scientific law of causality, the

1 Lindsay: Recent Advances; p. 144.

2 Camb. Theol. Essays: Physical Science and the Being of God  
 F. R. Tennant; p. 69.

3 A. E. Taylor: Elements of Metaphysics, p. 179.

4 Seth: Theism, p. 4.

1 existence of an uncaused being seems, indeed, little better than a contradiction in terms. Hence, "writes Prof. Seth, "the deistic God (ie. the "Etre supreme or great cause, the first cause) is at last discarded as a hypothesis which is not required." The primordial stage, however, must contain within it the ground of the succeeding stages of the continuous process. This will be more evident in the discussion of Evolution which by its co-relation and convertibility of forces has insisted upon it. Physical science with its causal postulate and descriptive method has neglected the search for a temporal sequence capable of explaining the entire process and demands rather its own immanently prevailing principle

It has been the confusion of these two latter points of view with the gradual shading off of the principle of causality into the more logically real Principle of Ground and Consequent, which has given the causation argument the cogency it has had for many minds and has brought it into touch with the Ontological Argument. That this proof does depend on the admission of the Ontological to produce a proof of God's existence as the most perfect existence is quite evident. But how far on the way is this proof alone capable of leading? Is a thinker justified in admitting that it demonstrates "independent" or "unconditioned" existence? If any existence eg., some physical object or the thinker himself be singled out, that existence must be thought of as part of a larger whole, ie., it is conditioned existence, or at least a related existence. If then the part of a whole exists, or if there be conditioned existence, the whole must exist, there must be unconditioned existence in the sense of a totality of inter-related existence, either finite or infinite. A conception similar to this underlies the dialectic of Hegel's Logic of which a simple example is given at the beginning of his Phaenomenologie. It will surely be granted if the being of the isolated existence be granted. In order, however to make the proof accurate, this existence or being of the so-called finite being would first require demonstration, which only removes the solution one step further and betrays its impossibility; for this is not a matter of proof at all, there is reason to maintain. And when the "cause" of this conditioned existence is sought, it is to be found only in the explanation of its relation to the underlying principle of the continued series of the conditioned existence, ie., the Kantian "intelligible (ie, non-sensuous) existence", which means the explanation of the series. This latter the Teleological Argument attempts, supported, as it is, by the Ontological, which by its connection with these two arguments must strive on the one hand to invalidate the contention of Cleanthes as the

spokesman of Hume's scepticism, that the succession of objects taken in its totality, or the entire series of events might itself be the unconditioned existence for in this case, as in the case of the explanation of the particular causes of the individual particles of matter in a collection of twenty, the cause of the entire collection would be sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts" and on the other hand rescue Theism from a repose in a "dim Spencerian Unknowable", if the existence of a God of the nature above described is to be concluded. Regarding the former, Leibnitz has said that a sufficient reason must be given for the entire contingent series which metaphysically necessary sufficient reason of all contingents must be a necessary existent i.e., a being whose essence involves existence, in which treatment of the Cosmological argument he definitely introduces the Ontological Proof of which more must be said later. This can be attained only by the identification of the "unconditioned" or "independent" or "inter-related whole of existence" with the ens realissimum or Perfect Being. The Cosmological Argument, whether it deal with the "phenomenal" or the "ultimately real", can, however go no farther than to establish the existence of this "necessary" or "unconditioned" existence: it can give us a God who is "the ultimate Reality into which all else can be resolved and which cannot be resolved into anything beyond; that in terms of which all else can be expressed, and which cannot itself be expressed itself in anything outside itself." It truly "cannot of itself attain to the religious conception of a God", but it can and does lead, "to the metaphysical conception", not a proof of an unconditioned—which is merely to say that the principle of Ground and Consequent is a true and valid principle. And as long as the proof is content with this result, it is a perfectly legitimate argument, for it says nothing regarding the question of the one and the many, it does not settle the question of the ultimate nature of the "ground" of the inter-related universe, or of the phenomenal and the real, but simply that there is a "whole", a Totality of existence which is real, which is unconditioned by anything extraneous to itself, which is the Absolute and which has areal Ground. This may be Pan-theism, but it may be more than mere Pantheism. It is the result of the conclusion maintained by many, not that the infinite is obtained by negating the finite but that the finite is known by isolation from or an arbitrary limitation of the infinite which is first known. A species of Onto-epistemological argument has been worked out with the purpose of show-

1 Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 433.

2 Lotze: Microcosmos; Vol. II, p. 666.

3 Haldane : Pathway to Reality, p. 19.

ing that man's means of knowing the universe leads him to know the Absolute in its true character as Rational Spirit. This is touched on under the Epistemological form of the Ontological proof below :it really is a fusion of the Cosmological and the Ontological. The argument here gives "some cause of the universe indefinitely great.. Whether this cause is the cause of being, or merely a cause of change; whether it is a cause apart from the universe, or one with it; whether it is intelligent or unintelligent, infinite or finite, one or many, this argument cannot assure us", writes a Christian Theist. But to speak of a First Cause of the Absolute ,ie., of this Totality of existence, is ,as was seen above, surely an abuse of terms. If the Absolute had a cause then it would not be the Absolute or Totality. This is what Fichte meant when he said "Being alone is--ie., that only which is by and through itself, is.. This Being is simple, homogeneous and immutable; there is in it neither beginning nor ending, no variation or change of form, but it is always and forever the same unalterable and continuing Being." Nor is this opposed to the view of Kant, if his thought of phenomena and of noumena be re-interpreted and it be held, as Hegel in a measure maintained, that the phenomena reveal in some degree the noumena and are not entirely different from "intelligible existence"; for that thinker writes, "All sensuous phenomena may be contingent and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence, and yet there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series, or in other words, a necessary being." and again, "It has been shown.. that the contingency of all the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary though purely intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists between them and consequently, both may be true." He also holds out this hope to him who would oppose the anti-cosmo-theist--"The existence of such an absolutely necessary being may be impossible ; but this can never be demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of sensuous phenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue a series at some member of it or to seek for its cause in some sphere of existence beyond the world of nature."

1 Strong :Systematic Theology; p.41.

3 Sc. Illingworth: Reason and Revelation, C. 2'

2 Fichte: Works on The Doctrine of Religion, Lec.I, p.392 (Smith)

4 Kant: Critique, 315 316.

5 Kant V Critique; Solution of the Cosmological idea of the  
Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existence.



## TELEOLOGICAL

The teleologic-

al argument takes this "unconditioned existence" or this "sum-total of the continuous world process" and endeavours to find in it its own true nature i.e., to discover the character of its underlying principle or ground. The Cosmological Argument leads to a conception of a totality of existence: the Teleological seeks its character. These are closely connected, the latter especially with the principle of efficient causality of the former. Some moderns have rehabilitated the doctrine of cause claiming, as Mr. Lindsay does, that "power, and not mere antecedence, is what the metaphysical idea of cause proclaims, and even from the scientific side recent writers like Le Conte have held to our consciousness of will-power as the source of causality, rather than trace it to the observation of external sequences.", or as A.K. Rogers, who does not agree that the feeling of effort is adequate to meet the requirements of the problem of the origin of the idea, for "Between the sense of effort and the subsequent result there is no connection whatever that is transparent to thought", that the scientific meaning of causality does not exhaust the full content of the conception, but that "the real basis of interpretation" of the causal idea is "the rational and intelligible connection present in a related series of facts or steps united by their association with a common end." This views the underlying principle or ground of the inter-related existence as a purposive series in which the earlier and the later stages are related to one another by their own intrinsic nature, so that the "world is itself in its true nature a conscious experience, in which alone purposes are embodied." This has not always been the manner of the statement of the Physico-theological argument and its logical justification will be examined later. Meanwhile the Humian and the pre-Kantian Proofs must be discussed.

The criticism of this argument by Hume and Kant, is most important and has not been without effect in moulding the modern views. Kant's remarks on two points must be considered final. When he insists that the proof cannot demonstrate the existence of a God of infinite wisdom and goodness, he raises the problem of infinitude and of existence. That it gives only a cause of a nature proportionate to the number and value of the indications of design and accordingly not an absolutely wise, but only a most wise cause, is an accurate contention regarding the absolute wisdom of the cause, for the assertion of the absolute harmoniousness and goodness of or in nature which is needed to substantiate the

1 Lindsay Recent Advances; p.145

2 A. K. Rogers: The Religious Conception of The World; p.p. 144, 147 149.

inference to infinite wisdom and goodness in its author goes beyond the realm of the empirical, but it is a question whether the capability or the work of the proof is to infer a cause at all, or only a method of development. He is also accurate when he remarks that it is insufficient to prove the existence of God as the Creator of the Universe, but why does he admit that it is competent to "demonstrate the existence of an Architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material on which he works? It is no doubt due to the then current manner of viewing teleology as something introduced into matter from a source external to it. The argument properly considered ought not to aim at proving either an Architect or a Creator. The argument, however, which Kant and Hume were attacking did aim at such a conclusion and that largely because of the influence of the Creationist doctrine of Christianity, which allowed of a Deistic interpretation. Aristotle had spoken of *ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις*. The Scholastics of the Middle Ages thought of God as entirely distinct from but exercising an influence on the world, so that bodies thought of as composed of inert and passive matter incapable in themselves of the power of knowing or working for ends are conceived of as so working. Again in the Early Modern Philosophers we are continually hearing of God and Nature. Descartes as was seen, hesitates to maintain only "Deus ex machina" yet, generally speaking Dualism was his theory. In Spinoza's God the same externality of the "spiritual" or "thought" element to the "material" or "extension" is most evident. While in Leibnitz the influence of God which produces the harmony in the several monads is from without; his God is an eternal Architect, who has eternal matter upon which to work. In fact, during the interval extending from the time of the Neo-Platonists to the time of Hume and Kant, the majority of writers who dealt with design and teleology, held, as was seen in the examination of the nature of God, that the action, interference, guidance or control which God was supposed to exercise on the universe was manifestly upon rather than through or in it. The *ἡ φύσις ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ* were considered as too absolutely distinct and separate. This is true to a greater or less degree, of those who even maintained the immanence of God as well as His Transcendence, eg., Aristotle, to some degree the Stoics, Geulincx, Berkeley and others. Thus the teleological argument criticised by Hume and Kant endeavoured to establish the existence of an infinite God and implied the conception of the sum-total of existence as composed of the universe of men and things in which God was working, though not inwardly and immanently but from without, ie. as a factor fundamentally

different from the essential nature of the universe. This is evidenced also by the very possibility, which became an actuality, of the formation of the Deistic doctrine in contradistinction to the Theistic. Now with some such view as this of the universe an attempted teleological proof of the existence of God was worked out. Of this Kant, as quoted above, has accurately outlined the chief momenta. Any criticism of a proof which has these as its essentials cannot go very far beyond that of Kant. He appears to take it for granted that there are "manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose", which some have questioned, and his distinction between the demonstration of the existence of a creator and of an architect is only another way of indicating that this proof is not concerned with the problem of the eternity of matter, or at least of the origin of the matter of the universe i.e., that it was not called upon to prove the non-eternity of matter, but that granting the existence of the matter, it could lead to the conclusion that some very powerful Architect has so arranged the elements of matter. His other remark about proportion would be more to the point had it been applied to the Architect, rather than to "cause", except to a final cause which the proof did not warrant. It would have shown, what he previously had hinted, that the Architect's powers were proportionate to the evidences of arrangement of means to ends. This Kant no doubt saw, but he evidently did not notice the most fundamental misconception contained in the momenta else he would not have talked of a "kind of causality—namely, understanding and will"—which "reside in nature". With those momenta as the only ones his remark elsewhere is more convincing, i.e., that the idea of design may be only subjective and regulative, a working hypothesis, and not objective or "constitutive". Had Kant, however, recognised that merely a "blind all-powerful nature producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity", had not a sublime and wise cause added onto it or infused into it in some manner by means of which it could influence it and direct it, but that the cause was in some sense within the universe, not merely residing in it, but being its essential nature, so that nature was all-powerful, not blind but intelligent or perhaps purposive, his criticism would have taken a different form. But his work had its effect in at least showing the limits of this argument and its dependence on the Cosmological i.e., that only when a first cause or ground of the universe was established or postulated, could this proof proceed to search for marks which evidenced its character as intelligent or purposive. Since Kant, this has been generally acknowledged and it has been relegated to its true function of devel-

oping the Cosmological Proof. But subsequent to him it has been largely modified by the modern scientific theories and especially that of Evolution.

Evolution, as evolution or as a scientific hypothesis, was as noticed in the historical outline above, not employed by its earliest and most accurate exponents as a weapon to defeat Theism. Nor indeed can it so do. It is the pseudo-science, which may be described in the words of a modern writer regarding physical science as "a kind of sandwich of genuine science between two thick layers of metaphysics", which has brought confusion to the entire position instead of the definite aid which the purely scientific theory should render in clearing up the situation. By this is meant, that when evolutionary scientists have transformed themselves into evolutionary philosophers they have not always recognised the rightful position and the true merit of the science. Prof. Huxley himself wrote as follows, "The teleological argument runs thus— an organ or organism(A) is precisely fitted to perform a function or purpose (B); therefore, it was specially constructed to perform that purpose. In Paley's famous illustration, the adaptation of all the parts of the watch to the function or purpose of showing the time, is held to be evidence that the watch was specially contrived to that end, on the ground that the only cause we know of competent to produce such an effect as a watch which shall keep time, is a contriving intelligence, adapting the means directly to that end", and suggests that it is possible to think of a watch gradually evolving from a revolving barrel by means of a "tendency in the structure to vary indefinitely", and by "something in the surrounding world which helped all variations in the direction of an accurate time-keeper and checked all those in other directions", which would destroy the force of Paley's argument: "for it would then be demonstrated that an apparatus thoroughly well adapted to a particular purpose might be the result of a method of trial and error worked out by unintelligent agents, as well as of the direct application of the means appropriate to that end by an intelligent agent." While it must be recognised that the writer was in this passage only stating the issue and a possible line of procedure and not stating that "the teleological argument had.... received its death-blow from Darwin." Yet many have claimed that his possibility is actuality. Darwin himself had written, "The old argument from design in nature.... fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered.. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings.. than in the course which the wind blows.", or again, "I have no intention to

1 Camb. Theol. Essays: F. R. Tennant: Lect. II, 61.

2 Lay Sermons, p.330, 331.

4 Prof. Flint: Theism, p.196.

3 Vol I, C.8, Religion (Letters to Asa grey)

write atheistically. But I own that I cannot see as plainly as others do and as I should wish to do, evidences of design and beneficence on all sides of us. I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance." Now this doctrine in a warped form has strongly opposed Theism. In the hands of Comte, Weissman, Helmholtz, Romanes, Haeckel, the Author of Mr. Balfour's Apologetics, Buchner, and many writers of the Rationalist Press Association, it has dealt heavy blows. These Darwinists have out-darwined Darwin himself and regard Darwinism, not evolution, as fundamentally the interpretation of all phenomena. Buchner has said, "Darwinism is the chief support of materialism and monism". Weismann, writes, "The philosophical significance of natural selection lies in the fact that it shows us how to explain the origin of useful, well-adapted structures purely by mechanical force and without having to fall back on a directive force." "Darwin", writes Haeckel, "gave us the key to the monistic explanation of organism.. Mechanism alone can give us a true explanation of natural phenomena; for it traces them to their real efficient causes, namely, to blind and unconscious agencies." Darwin himself, when concerned with the evolution of living organism based it on two postulates; the original creation of a few or one being; and, the existence of variations, without which, he says, natural selection can do nothing and when discussing man treats primarily of the evolution of his body from the lower animals. But it must be admitted that Darwin himself was not always consistent. "Some have imagined that natural selection induces variability, whereas, it implies only the preservation of such variations as arise and are beneficial to the being under its conditions of life", is his contention at one time, while at another he speaks of natural selection as picking out with unerring skill each improvement and as able to "produce structures". And his professed followers going further, claimed for natural selection "the lofty position of a competent explanatory cosmic principle. It has in fact been spoken of as an "agent" or as "possessing power". But it is nothing of the sort. even were it universally valid: Darwin himself at one time at least claimed it to be but a theory to account for the process of evolution. It is but a "natural law". "Some have objected" writes Darwin, "that as plants have no volition, natural selection is not applicable to them. In the literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a false term; but whoever objected to chemists speaking of the elective affinities of the various elements?... It has been said that

1 Quoted from Religion, Letters to Asa Grey, in Stirling, p. 328

2 Last Words on Materialism, p. 179 Sc. Christian Apologetic, p. 6.

3 The Evolution Theory: p. 55. 56.

Sc. Ward: Naturalism and Agnosticism Vol. I. p. 273

Romaes: Darwin and after Darwin. Vol. II. C. I

4 Haeckel: Riddle of the Universe, p. 264, 265

I speak of natural selection as an active power or Deity; but who objects to an author speaking of "the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of the planets? Everyone knows what is meant and implied by such metaphorical expressions." The meaning of this is unmistakable. The Darwinians, of whom the above are representatives, overlook the implications of the theory, that in the protoplasm or the nucleus there is a power residing which can respond to external influences and by means of which they can construct cells, tissues and organs in response to, and direct adaptationsto, the conditions of life. What is this power? "If", as Prof. G. Henslow has contended with some show of accuracy, "Darwin was right in supposing the Creator to have breathed life into a single form, or to have made a speck of protoplasm with its nucleus, .. then that speck was sufficient to evolve the whole of the vegetable and animal worlds, including man, past present and future. If we reflect on this phenomenon we discover that the protoplasm is endowed with a practically creative omnipotence. To most minds such an astounding fact would be sufficient of itself as an infallible witness to an omniscient power behind nature." But this merely assumes the statement of Darwin and would not necessarily convince the same minds of the actuality of design. This would be as fatal as the natural selection of Darwin, to the conception of the design argument as implying a Deity who proceeds in the same manner as a human artificer, first conceiving an idea, then making a plan and then constructing a mechanism to satisfy the conditions of the plan, conceiving all the adaptations in the plants and animals before their creation; so that Darwin was rigidly true to his own principles when he remarks that he could not see evidences of design and beneficence on every side of him, for nothing he thought was made in anticipation of its use or requirement, but its structure is evolved by the "universal process of self-adaptation to the environmental forces." He could not see evidences sufficient to justify the teleology of Huxley's description which held that "each organism is like a rifle bullet fired straight at a mark" because for him "organism are like grape-shot, of which one hits something and the rest fall wide." But there is no necessity to take teleology in this strict sense of supposing that each organism is "a rifle bullet fired straight at a mark." While Darwin could not see evidences of this he could not, as Iverach points out, "dispense with superintendence, nor with an agency which watches, picks out, accumulates and forms", ie., he could not explain

1 Origin of Species: Darwin; p.63.  
2 Christian Apologetic; May, 1903.p.19.  
3 Huxley; On the Origin of Species; Appendix; Quoted in Iverach, p.104.  
4 Evolution and Christianity, p 103.

evolution as due to "blind and unconscious agencies". Thus natural selection as an ultimate principle of organic evolution leaves many desiderata. Huxley quotes the following from the great Palaeontologist Zittel;—"The naturalist evolution offers the only natural solution of the problem of the development and succession of organic beings...That the principle of natural selection discovered by Darwin leaves many phenomena unexplained is no longer denied by even the warmest followers of Darwin."

1 Passing from Zoology to Biology a similar result is obtained. In considering man something more than "natural selection" or "Survival of the fittest", must be taken into account to explain in any way the idea of progress and the fact of the development from the protozoa up to man. The theories of Spencer and Huxley have nothing in them by which this development of form and structure can be explained much less the fact that there is in the upward development a point reached when a being comes on the stage who can adapt himself to his environment, not only by being modified by the environment, but chiefly the environment in its order itself. And in this higher state there are other elements, such as volitional and rational self-consciousness, of which an account must be given. It is not the business of the present paper to discuss the merits of different psychological stand-points: here it need only be remarked that the onus probandi yet lies with the empiricist to show that either volition or rational self-consciousness can be produced by the action of external stimuli or by environment. Du Bois Reymond in his *Die Sieben Welträthsel* specified some seven limits to the materialists explanation and among them are the origin of life and the origin of consciousness and rational thought. And for some more recent writers the position has altered but little. Prof. Orr in a recent work, writes "In the forefront, in the development of nature, the origin of life stands as a blank wall in the way of any thorough-going theory of naturalistic evolution." "Science has abandoned, with some little indignation, the endeavour to get from matter to mind, to derive the mental from the physical."

2 The topics of evolutionary Zoology and Biology, having been examined and "the power of life" and "modifying cause" of Lamarck, and the "natural selection" and "struggle for existence" of Darwin, having been found incapable of supplying a completely satisfactory explanation of the facts of these sciences, attention must be directed to the problem of cosmic evolution as dealt with by Spencer in order that it may be seen whether it is justified or not in its assumption of an indefinite incoherent homogeneity and in its passage from this to a

1 Nature: Nov. 1, 1894. Quoted in Orr; *God's Image in Man* p. 92 foot-note.

2 Orr: *God's Image in Man*; p. 118.

3 *Camb. Theol. Essays*: F. R. Tennant; *Physical Science and the Being of God* p. 65.



definite coherent heterogeneity by the means of the principle of force and matter without any introduction of an intellectual element, external or internal, rational or instinctive of some nature similar to the Idea of Hegel, the Will of Schöpenhauer, the Absolute of Schelling or the Divine Wisdom of Leibnitz. Spencer systematically excludes the possibility of a plastic principle which might give form to matter, allowed by Lamark and sometimes even by Darwin. Is this justifiable? Is the law of segregation an adequate explanation of the harmoniousness of the heterogeneity? In the organic world it will have to explain an external and an internal harmony ie, the harmony of the component parts of an organism and the harmony of the whole with its environment. A purely mechanical agent is set to solve the problem of correspondence and proportion in a living being. Regarding its internal harmony or "co-ordination" the question may be asked, how and why does "integration" produce such compatibility of the elements within the types themselves. To this Spencer's theory supplies no answer. Nor does it to the same question concerning the correspondence of a being with its medium. There must have existed some definiteness in the similar elements, else why similar before segregation produced the coherent and definite heterogeneity from the homogeneous. Indeed with this "homogeneous" and the entire system there is a serious difficulty, which Janet and others have not failed to point out. The indefinite, incoherent, undifferentiated homogeneity is the result of a logical confusion only. "For how", asks Janet, "can there be in a primitive whole, absolutely homogeneous forces, different in species or even in intensity? How can there be in a whole an external and an internal side?" In a whole absolutely homogeneous there can be no internal and external sides and the "distribution of force must be as homogeneous as the distribution of matter" and there can be no forces different in species and in intensity. The primitive homogeneity once in equilibrium, will remain so indefinitely until an internal force, though such is excluded by the nature of the case, act upon it, or an internal principle of development, not deduced from the laws of matter and force, impell it to diversity. "In other words, if, "the indefinite incoherent homogeneity" in which, according to Mr. Spencer, some rearrangement must result, were a state devoid of all qualitative diversity and predicable of the universe, then, . . . , any rearrangement could result only from external interference, it could not begin from within." So that with Janet,

1 Janet: Final Causes p. 270.

2 Ward: Naturalism and Agnosticism; Vol. I, p. 223.

"we must conclude that this hypothesis of an absolute homogeneity implies contradiction.. that however high we ascend we must still admit the existence of the same and the other, as Plato said( $\tau\acute{o} \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu \times \tau\acute{o} \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu$ ) and that consequently the heterogeneous is quite as much a principle as the homogeneous itself." "The homogeneous that is to develop into the heterogeneous, must be implicitly heterogeneous from the start": "the heterogeneity that appears in the development is nothing essentially new, but always been at least potential." Development or evolution is not the making of something out of nothing, but the unfolding or manifestation of that which in another aspect eternally is. On this point Hegel and Hegelianism have been most insistent.

From this it may be seen how the doctrine of the origin of Motion or the Prime Mover is a link connecting the causation and the Teleological arguments. In discussing the Cosmological argument it was seen that granting the eternity of matter an explanation of the "cause" of motion could yet be demanded, i.e., an explanation of force, or, as Prof. Flint expressed it, an explanation of the origin of energy. Here a return must be made to the dilemma of Aristotle as to whether the motion was an inherent quality of original matter or was superinduced from without. If the latter be accepted, then the whole cannot be homogeneous for the cause would be a diversity external to the whole itself. If the former, which is the more accurate, which Aristotle apparently held and which Kant's view favoured, then within the whole there is already a heterogeneity or distribution of motion proportionate to the distribution of matter. Hence the assumption of a homogeneous mass is on either hypothesis unwarranted, and the conclusion is reached that in some way the "cause" of motion is correlative with and immanently inherent in the matter in some way as its essential nature, though yet distinguishable at least in conception from it.

Now from the above summary and meagre survey of the theory of evolution it may be plainly seen that evolution can be viewed from two different standpoints. As a cosmic formula, it may be a description of the genesis and history of the facts to which it is applied or it may be such a description plus a metaphysical theory of their causes or ultimately real nature. It may be looked upon as expressing the gradation in the stages of a development, by degrees or intervals from what according to our conception may be considered less perfect to more perfect forms. This is the scientific aspect of evolution. In itself it neither opposes nor favours teleology or finality but it furnishes the material for the discussion of the Theistic proof. On the

1 Janet: Final Causes; p. 271.

2 Bowne: Theism; p. 93.

3 Sc. Prof. Seth: Theism p.46.

4 "Our theory of the cosmos" writes Lotze(Microcosmos II,684) "must somehow and some where recognise the actual movement itself as an originally given reality, and can never succeed in extracting it from rest". Sc Seth p.42 Hegelianism "has insisted that development is not an addition of that which was in no sense there before"

other hand this may be viewed metaphysically. Here again two views are possible. This scientific theory may possibly<sup>be</sup> explained as the statement of a development which is the successive groupings attempted by nature until favourable circumstances brought about the exact coincidences which produced the present definite coherent heterogeneous universe. Or otherwise it may be explained as a gradual evolutionary manifestation of an intelligence working systematically in and through the matter of the universe. The problem is whether the facts of the cases favour Theism or Naturalism and Naturalistic Materialism. The decision between the two view points is part of the problem of the teleological proof of the present time.

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That there is order in the universe can scarcely be doubted. Prof. Flint has examined all the sciences fairly accurately and has found in each of them evidences of what we call order. The reign of law is but one way of stating the presence of order. But is Prof. Flint right in claiming that order can only proceed from an intelligence and that the question of the argument under discussion is whether the world exhibits order or not? Kant did not raise the question regarding the presence of order: he simply assumed it, or at least recognised that it was a self-evident truth. What Kant dissented from was teleology and finality in nature, not order and system. Is Janet more accurate when he accepts the testimony of science as unanimously and overwhelmingly in favour of order and system and proceeds to establish the legitimacy of drawing a conclusion from a syllogism of which this fact is the minor premise and the major is that, all "order, or strictly speaking, all adaptation of means to ends supposes an intelligence." His conclusion would be that the order and the adaptation in the universe are signs of intelligence. Janet appears to have emphasised the less important premise of the syllogism. It is not altogether the major premise which needs demonstration nor is it the rationality of drawing the conclusion from the two premises. The question is whether the facts referred to design really justify this reference i.e., whether the order and purpose-like adaptations and combinations found in the universe are referable to only a designing and purposive Mind. There must be an inductive search into nature for activity of ends. Here order and design must be distinguished. The study of the order of production and continuation may be entirely separate from the search for finality. The former is that with which evolution is chiefly concerned. It is that which the minor premise of this argument pretends to establish. But does

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1 Sc. Ward: Naturalism and Agnosticism; Lect VII.

2 Janet : Final Causes.p. 290.

it establish finality when it establishes order and adaptation? Even in human purposive or intentional acts the distinction between order and finality is so marked that in any action they vary almost in the inverse proportion. Most actions which are performed with the greatest degree of exactness and regularity are most devoid of purpose or finality. Then again, how many even of man's intelligent actions are purposive; have a final aspect or relate definitely to the continuous purpose of his life? And in the solution of the problem of cosmic development it would appear that the teleological interpretation, as including an aiming at an end, must be modified and made less prominent, or, it may be, give way to a different interpretation of the order and adaptation of the universe. It seems to be going too far to agree in toto with Janet and his apparent follower Prof. Bowne, in claiming absolute validity for the teleological argument. "There is no need to adduce instances of apparent design..... Besides, all admit that in the organic realm the world ground proceeds 1 as if it had plans and purposes", writes Prof. Bowne. Are all agreed? If it proceeds as if it had plans and purposes and has them, what further need has the argument? Is not this what it seeks to establish? Granting even that it proceeds "as if" it had plans and purposes this is no guarantee that it has them. But are we justified in saying that the world ground proceeds thus? Does a candid examination of the evolutionary development, of which the present order and harmony of the universe are the manifest result, reveal that it is proceeding towards an end or only that it is conscious or intelligent or implies an element other than the physical and mechanical? This latter can be briefly dealt with now while the former which in reality involves an ideal and thus is beyond the realm of the empirical must be discussed later.

The Eutaxiological argument, which ought to be recognised as entirely distinct from the argument "to design", being an argument from the order and harmony of nature, is purely empirical though it has been confused by many writers with the argument for finality. In the empirical treatment of the world process by Darwinism and the evolution of Spencer and Huxley, there were, as was seen above, many facts left unexplained and inexplicable by those theories. This was recognised at the time and has been more forcibly so since. These scientific laws are valid "only for the approximate methods of the practical science and not at all for the rigorously exact universal statements of the philosophers"; "...scientific postulates, however productive of results and however necessary to the existence of science and her work of description, are by no means to be adopted as the expressions of ultimate 2 reality." And the very recognition of the incompetence of evolution has caused, not the abandonment of the theory, but rather its modification, on the part of some, into a system which is a development of the

1 Prof. Bowne: Theism p. 87.

2 Camb. Theol. Essays : Physical Science and the Being of God  
p. 173

views of such men as Mivart, Asa Grey, Murphy, Owen, Carpenter and The Duke of Argyle, contemporaries of the authors of the theories. This view is not in opposition to Darwinism as a scientific hypothesis, but, seeing its inadequacy as a metaphysic they have denied the view of Helmholtz as quoted by Strauss, that " Darwin's theory shows how every adaptaion of structure in organism can originate without admixture of intelligence, through blind operations of a natural law.", and in the place of blind natural selection or natural law have substituted an intelligence. The question for the later day Darwinian is not as to the existence of the laws on which Darwinianism was based but as to their sufficiency of themselves to explain the evolutionary process. "On every side", writes Prof. Orr, "we hear the admission made that while the fact of evolution or the doctrine of descent stands secure, the laws which Darwin invoked to explain it--especially natural selection--are inadequate for that purpose and that the real factors in evolution are yet to seek and must... be sought within the organism." Weismann has said "Even the much easier problem, how and by what forces the evolution of the living world has proceeded from a given beginning is far from being settled :... The how of evolution is still doubtful but not the fact and this is the sure foundation on which we stand to day." The history of this change need not here be traced. The modern view of evolution, though expressed in various manners, seems to have as its chief features the following: 1, the recognition of directive intelligence in the evolutionary process; 2, the denial that the one only mode of progress is by insensible gradations; 3, that nature can be arranged in "ascending series of kingdoms-- the higher in each case involving new factors, and requiring a specific cause to account for it" The defence of the two last if these would take the present examination too far afield from its present purpose. The view of the former and the theory generally here adopted may be best summed up in the words of the two parallel sections of Rudolf Otto's contrast between "Darwin" and "Korschinsky und die Neweren" :--(1) Die Neweren--"All organic being is capable of modification. This capability, a fundamental, inner property of living beings generally, independent of external conditions... is preserved usually in a latent form by inheritance. It breaks out here and there in sudden changes".. Darwin--Advance in nature, the "perfecting" of organisms, is only a more complicated adaptation to external conditions. It is attained in purely mechanical way, through accumulation of marks "at one time useful"--- Die Neweren--"The adaptation wrought by natural selection has nothing to do with perfecting; for the organism which physiologically and morphologically stands higher are not always better adapted to external relations than those which stand

1 Prof. Orr: The Christian View of God and the World. p. 97, 98.

2 The Evolution Theory: I, p. 3.

3 Darwinismus von Heute und Theologie in Theologische Rundschau Jan. 1904, Quoted Orr, p. 295.

Evolution is not explicable mechanically. The origin of higher forms out of the lower is only possible through a tendency to advance which resides in the organism. This tendency is nearly related to, or identical with, the tendency to change. It impels the organism, so far as external conditions permit, towards perfection." This metaphysical view of Evolution does not in any way destroy the value of natural Selection as a descriptive hypothesis. Nor would Natural Selection, were it entirely acceptable, in any way invalidate this philosophical interpretation of the world; for however far mechanical description may be carried within the field of biology "explanation" will not be fully attained.

Thus this evolution explains organic evolution and the same view is extended to explain the cosmic process, and contribute the desiderata of Darwinianism. This at the same time meets and defeats the objection of Hume that "if the material world rests on a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest on some other and so on without end", so that this ideal arrangement of the universe requires a cause, for according to this view the material world has its cause within itself and God is the "cause" of the ideal and the material world process. The Theist of course welcomes such a theory and claims that the something behind and within the great ordered development is a directing intelligence which he calls God. The systematic world process has as its "ground" an intelligence at least capable of directing the evolutionary process to its present point of development. He can claim that nature itself has been unable of itself by purely mechanical means to bring about her own apparent order and that the universe is the effect of mind because it is characterised by proportion and harmony, which is only explicable by the operation of mind. If the Theist cares to so estimate the evidence, what is to prevent him? The gain or loss is all his own. "In such sublime and complicated subjects, everyone should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument." And for his advantage here it may be said according to the criticism of Kant, that an Architect only can be inferred and that one whose power is proportion to his work. The modern Theist may answer that all he desires is an Architect or artificer, who though he must work from within the material and not from without upon it, is possessor of power proportionate to his work for now his work and its evidence and the manifestation of his power is all but infinite. But is this conclusion of the Eutaxiological argument logically justified? To say that because A, B, C, or D have been unable to explain the facts of the case and that the assumption of E will explain them, therefore E is the only explanation is not

1 Hume : Enquiry 147

2 Sc. Stirling: Philosophy and Religion, p. 304.

accurate. It has neglected F, G, ... ad infinitum and also that further examination of A, B, C, and D might reveal qualities proportionate to the task. The conclusion is not justified. While it may be argued that Mr. Lindsay is right when to his query as to Buchner's view regarding "what sort scientific reason may be", he answers "We are wont to regard scientific reason as having respect, &c. before all, to the theory which best fits in with the facts", yet from a logical point of view it must be maintained that the onus probandi lies with the Theist to show that every other hypothesis save the Theistic theory is to be taken as

1 admittedly insufficient." The proof would have to show that the order, may it not be called the dynamic order, i.e., the order in the evolutionary process to the present time and the static order of the movements of the inorganic world, cannot have been the result of anything but an intelligent factor. But it is legitimate to argue that since the human mind sees on every hand and in the course of the development of the universe what appears to it as order and finds on the one hand that the non intelligent causes which have been advanced as explanatory, are incompetent and on the other that it has a conception of order from its own procedure, it is justified in claiming that the world order is due to the direction of intelligence. While this postulate when made, makes possible the explanation or description of the greater part of cosmic phenomena it is yet a postulate and cannot claim to be logical proof. It is obtained not by a method of proof, not even by inference but of analogy. It is however a postulate which anyone is warranted in making for purposes of science and of practical life and is confirmed by the same for practical purposes when made.

When the design argument is taken up and this postulate for the moment neglected, what is found that is logically more certain? The question to be immediately met is whether this is empirical or purely ideal and subjective. This does not affect the postulate or assumption made at the close of the previous paragraph. What was there assumed was a real power behind and within the phenomenal development of the universe, but the question here is that raised by Kant, whether the principle of design or finality is "regulative" or "constitutive". As long as "design" is talked of it must be recognised that an ideal is being dealt with. In this sense "design" or "finality" can be only an hypothesis which the mind makes for its own convenience and this cannot be demonstrable. In any other way than a very loose and metaphorical sense



design has no existence except in the mind. And when design in the universe is thought of in what way can it be conceived except as existing ideally in some mind and as being gradually accomplished in the progressive evolution of the universe? From the process up to the present time it ought to be possible for a thinker to infer that the characteristics of the plan imply an intelligence and to reason from its characteristic nature that the plan will be fulfilled. This is what the argument cannot do. "Science, as a mere exposition of the facts of the universe, can never show us Divine Design for the good reason that there is no such design in these facts."

But the entire meaning of the argument has changed since Kant, so that, though that writer may have been justified in describing it as regulative; it must now in its evolutionary aspect be considered constitutive. It deals with a proposition expressing, or a conception regarded as corresponding with, the true nature of things. It has incorporated the views of Hegelian Idealism that nature is merely the "other" of reason and that in the history of the world process we have the necessary stages in the progress of Absolute Spirit on its way to complete self-realisation, for according to Hegel the universe is rational through and through to the smallest detail; "the real is rational and the rational is real." It is not constitutive in the sense of being a principle inherent in the human mind and applicable in a necessary sense and universal manner but as representing facts and expressing the relation of real to real or relations within the Absolute. "Modern thought has... purged the design argument of its old and external and accidental character and has recognised the immanence of design." The argument does not rest content with the sporadic signs of adaptation but examines the cosmic process as a whole: the evidence of purpose is sought "in the order and the meaning gradually revealing itself in the whole continuous act, not any single fact out of relation to the series of which it is a part." The question which it asks is whether this process has a meaning, whether it manifests growth, development, progress, etc.. It employs the evolution process to show that the order of the universe does not contradict the possibility of the presence of finality. Transforming or re-interpreting Darwinism and the cosmic evolution of the Huxlian type, the modern Theism has not been content, neither, without "seeking some higher principle of development which, carrying with it, it may be, the presupposition of conscious preconceiving intelligence and creative cause, will determine the "direction" and

1 Flint: Theism, p.155.

2 Lindsay: p 189,190.

3 A. K. Rogers: The Religious Conception of The World; p 96

limit the amount of "variability", nor without claiming the existence of "far more than blind mechanical necessitation of the whole, even underlying, end-positing Reason as the root and base of all." The teleological argument is not satisfied that the evidence is exhausted when from the apparent inability of mechanical forces to supply an adequate explanation of the facts of the world process, it infers the existence of a "spiritual" ground behind the phenomenal forces and then claims that this must be mind or something intelligent in order to account for the order of the universe, but by means of this order and harmony of the system it seeks to confirm these conclusions by maintaining that this "spiritual" or ultra-material "ground" is immanently rational, end-forming, purposive and free or as in some cases a "purely Spiritual Personality". It does, there is reason to believe, recognise that we have no right to assume the "ends and purposes which are being subserved by creation.. as lying completely spread out before us in the order of things at present known to us.", but on the other hand, it feels that to emphasize mere brute present fact, what has already been brought to the light of day, summed up and made fully actual, is to miss the whole significance of evolution." It looks at the before and after of the world and claims that a right interpretation of the "before" must reveal "the hidden trend, the suggestion, not fully realised as yet, of what nevertheless in the future will stand revealed as the vital germ of things to come." While in doing this it has rightly, as most writers will admit, kept "men fast to the essence of the argument, which is not one of the infinite attail, but really one of mind--Mind as the inferred result of design.", yet it has gone beyond the bounds of logical demonstration. This can be detected as the view even of those who would most desire to defend the argument and claim that as a proof it is valid. Prof. Bowne, in his preface writes of the proofs in general, that, "the argument then is not demonstrative, and rests finally on the assumed existence of a perfect Being." Of this teleological proof Mr. Lindsay claims, "we must postulate supreme self-conscious Intelligence as immanent." Yet even Hegel, when the "what is" was postulated as Reason, seems, in those passages where he speaks of the "range of the contingent" in nature to surrender that claim to demonstrate the utter rationality of existence. "Whether we .. look at Aristotle or at Hegel", writes Prof. Pringle-Patterson, "it would seem as if it were impossible for the finite mind to carry through in detail the demonstration of the rationality of existence." Janet in the Classic on Final Causes writes of the argument: "No more has it the certainty that experiment and calculat-

1 Lindsay: p.195,c;196; 197;198.

2 Rogers: p.104.

3 Theism p.IV.

4 Baldwin Dictionary, I 502.

ion can give ; it is a hypothesis, a doctrine, an opinion; it is neither a theorem an axiom nor a fact", and speaks of a part of it as "insusceptible of demonstration and verification." Even Prof. Flint confesses that, "to assume design in the universe is to assume what cannot be proved, yea, what the Theist requires to show against the Pantheist cannot be proved." In fact to be logically cogent this argument would have to proceed somewhat thus: Upon examination of the cosmic process to the present time it would arrange a series of symbols of some kind to express the different qualitative stages of what it considers an immanent principle; such a series for the want of better symbols might be expressed by the even integers of which only a limited number are at present recognisable eg., 102, 104, ..... (N plus 1). The argument would then have to show that an accurate examination of this part of the series would reveal its true nature as a whole so that those preceding 102 and those following (N plus 1), especially the latter, could be inferred with accuracy, for neither are as yet definitely known. And then, further, it would be incumbent upon it to demonstrate that the latter, may it not be said the last, members of the series, for it would have to be definite if it were of teleological significance. were the only ones that could and that they must follow by reason of the nature of the few known. Mr. Lindsay agrees with Mr. Morris in thinking that the true path of Theistic progress lies today in trying to discern the nature of the end for which things subsist by deeper study of the nature of the processes that make for the end—make for it, too, in a world that is quite unfinished." This would be difficult if not impossible even granting that the world process could be thus symbolically indicated. But it is impossible accurately to do this, so that the whole task is hopeless. "Qualitative diversity" writes Prof. Ward, "may be replaced by quantitative formulae and the range of mathematical description extended without assignable limit. But such procedure is plainly one of abstraction and —if carried to its uttermost— leaves us.. with absolutely no real content to which our numbers and diagrams correspond and apply." Prof. A. C. Pigou claims in his modern book on "The Problem of Theism", that the convergence of many phenomena to a "result" is no proof that the result is "foreseen" and "designed". Is it not true that the view of Mr. Illingworth when he claims that the confirmation of the presence of intelligence at work in the universe is that man's intelligence calculates certain effects which in time are produced by the working on nature

1 Lindsay: p. 322.

2 Flint Theism, p. 154.

3 Lindsay p. 213.

4 Sc. Divine Immanence and also Reason and Revelation.

is not a confirmation that finality is present in the universe, but rather that man's quantitative denotation is accurate enough to allow him to calculate the procedure of nature's forces because they are occurring regularly more on the analogy of man's well formed habits in the absence of definite design rather than because they are designed by an intelligence analogous to man's? And when the argument is closely scrutinized it is found after all to be an argument from analogy, yet a permissible argument, an analogy permissible for practical purposes of life, since man must begin in all his interpretation of data from the standpoint of man. However, any argument from analogy can only give probability and the present teleological argument is no exception. Thus here again, even at the best and giving the Teleologist the benefit of the possibility, it is possible only to make a postulate or assumption that the world process is proceeding intelligently, and purposively to ends.

Then again when the results of the Eutaxiological and the Teleological arguments are combined there is but little advance. It was found that an assumption of an unknown something manifesting itself in the evolutionary process was justified and then from the order of the universe and of the cosmic principle that this "something" could best be conceived of as a directive intelligence. When this is done there is a strong presumption to think of this as working to ends or an end. The examination of the process leading to the plausibility of the same assumption confirms the position. And another fact which can then be employed is that in man who is a part of the great development, in whom perhaps this intelligence shows itself most plainly there are evidently signs as well as a consciousness of an aiming at ends. If this be certain and the process can be viewed as an entire whole, which of course is not unquestioned by some, then it can be argued that since there is finality in one part there is in the whole. But admitting all this, admitting even that the details which do not appear to manifest design may all be explicable and some day explained on this hypothesis, i.e. that there is evidence of finality throughout the entire system, enough evidence is not yet accumulated to elevate this argument to the position of Proof. There remains the question raised by Hume in his "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State". He puts into the mouth of Epicurus the following words: while we argue from the course of nature, and infer a particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless... It is useless; because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, accord-

ing to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour.", or as previously, "You seem not to remember that all your reasoning on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes; and that every argument, deduced from causes to effect, must necessarily be a gross sophism; since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause but what you have antecedently, not inferred but discovered to the full in the effect."

So that, as concluding the present discussion of the "Teleological Proof", it may be said that much the same criticism of the proof as that of Hume, Kant and Lotze which was relevant in their day applies to the proof in its modern developed form. While one may be "bold enough to claim, on behalf of Theistic thought, that its march has been a magnificent progress in vividness and grasp of the grandeur and of the glory of an illimitable working, ... one, too, the conformity to purpose of whose beauty and sublimity reason has stubbornly refused to regard as explicable otherwise than as the expression—objectively existent, after every allowance for what has been contributed by the mind of the subject—of Designing Intelligence", yet it must be recognised with Lotze, that in order to rank as proof, it would have to satisfy several requirements which it can fulfil only with probability. While it may be agreed that "ends and means are inconceivable and impossible except as ideal or subjective relational systems which the creative understanding absolutely produces and the will reproduces in Nature as real or objective rational systems", on the other hand it must be admitted that the arguments here classed under the teleological proof do not logically demonstrate that the world—"ground" is Intelligence or Mind pursuing an end. At the same time it must be ever remembered that the proof is all the while proceeding on the assumption of a "ground" of "totality" taken over from the Cosmological Argument.

- 1 Hume: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding C. XI.
- 2 Lindsay: Recent Advances; p. 206, 7.
- 3 See Lotze, Microcosmos Vol. I p. 667.
- 4 Lindsay p. 214, Quoting Dr. F. E. Abbott.

# ONTOLOGICAL

The criticism of

the Ontological Proof, as that of the other two must necessarily be Kantro-centric. Yet its weakness is evident even before it falls into the hands of Kant. In what has above been termed the logical view of the argument there is a difficulty patent even in the discussion of it by Leibnitz, which depends on his entire philosophy. He definitely states, as quoted above, the position covertly held by Descartes, that existence is a predicate. In his Primary Truths, he maintains that all proposition are analytic, also in another place in his work he says that

1. "every predicate is truly contained in the nature of the subject" And it is on this that he bases his Ontological Proof. If this be granted, then his proof of the Possibility of Non-contradiction in the concept of God may be accurate. His demonstration depends on his failure to prove that the contradictory of the proposition "A and B are compatible" is necessary. "If it is not necessary that A and B cannot exist in the same subject, they therefore exist in the same subject, and since the reasoning is the same in regard to any other assumed qualities of this kind, therefore, all perfections are compatible. Datur ergo sive intelligi potest subjectum omnium perfectionem sive Ens Perfectissimum. Unde ipsum quoque existere patet cum in numero perfectionem existentia contineatur." This involves the identity of the Law of Identity and the
- 2 Principium Contradictionis. If this be true, if the Principium Contradictionis and the law of identity are identical, then the former is a synthetic proposition and hence there is at least one proposition
- 3 which is not analytic. And so his proof is invalidated since propositions about a simple property A or B may be synthetic. There are also other propositions which are considered synthetic, eg., mathematical and relational. If existential propositions are truly synthetic we have one true proposition about Leibnitz's monad which is not analytic. But on the other hand, if existence be a predicate, then according to Leibnitz, it must be contained in the concept and notion of it and so his monad always existed and God on his view would be superfluous.

It was against this fundamental error in the view of Leibnitz that Kant directed his criticism. Hume before him had seen that the conception of the existence and the non-existence did not involve a contradiction because existence is an empirical fact, a position in space and not an attribute and predicate, so that no existence could be demonstrated a priori. While Hume's view and his remark about there being no Being whose existence implies a contradiction have been large-

1 New Essays- Langley Trans. p.726 Of the Method of Distinguishing the real from imaginary phenomena.

2 ..... p.714,715. Gerhard's Leibnitz Phil. Schrift. VII,262.

largely overlooked in the subsequent treatment of the proof, his criticism and that of Kant have been widely accepted as conclusive. Some have criticised unfairly, partly out of a desire to retain the argument, and partly out of a confusion of the Psychological or Epistemological and the Logical aspects of the problem. It should be remembered that Kant in discussing it, is discussing it as a logical problem. Prof. Flint in opposing Kant's conclusion writes, "mere existence is not a predicate, but specifications or determinations of existence are predicable." This is quite true: the effect of the former on an attempt to prove existence has been seen above, but the latter statement is superfluous to the logical argument. Further he continues, "Now the argument nowhere implies that existence is a predicate: it implies only that reality, necessity and independence of existence are predicates of existence." The latter is quite true of the argument as Prof. Flint would state it, but the former is false for the argument as Kant criticised it. Statements such as these do not invalidate Kant's criticism: it is of permanent value, as directed against an "Intelligible" non-sensuous Deity who stood transcendent and in external relation to the universe. "To conclude that because the notion of the most perfect Being includes reality as one of its perfections, therefore, a most perfect being necessarily exists, is, so obviously to conclude falsely that, after Kant's incisive refutation, any attempt to defend such reasoning would be useless", writes Lotze, who also adds, "We do not from the perfection of that which is perfect immediately deduce its reality as a logical consequence; but without the circumlocution of a deduction we directly feel the impossibility of its non-existence." "It is no doubt perfectly true", writes a modern Theistic Apologist, "that the Ontological or a priori argument has with an ever increasing clearness, been seen to be utterly unable to bridge the abyss between a mere idea and a fact". It is of course unquestionable that "Kant has forever laid this spectre of abstract thought as something that has no relation to the realm of reality." Mr Lewes writes of the Anselmian argument, "It exhibits to us only the spectacle of the grossest self-contradiction, made possible by the attempt to prove precisely subjectively, the most perfect objectivity". Ueberweg's remark that "every inference from definition is only hypothetically true, with the pre-supposition, that is, of the actual existence of the subject", agrees with Kant's position that existence is not a predicate and shows the "absurdity of comparing together two entities, one of which shall not exist but only be thought, while the other shall be both thought and exist, and inferring that this latter, as greatest, must not only exist in thought, but also in reality". Dr. Lindsay admits that the reasoning of Kant was all-availing against the "Anselmian and Leibnitzian modes of

3 Se. Sigwart: Logic Vol. I, (Dendy) p143 Sec. 23.

1 Prof. Flint/ Theism, p. 279 2 ibid.

3 & 4 Lotze: Microcosmos; Vol II p668 & p. 670 Bk. IX. C 4

5 & 6 Lindsay, 216 & 219.

(Hamilton and Jones)



presentation". As Prof. Wallace has said of Anselm and Descartes in this connection—"As Kant is supposed to have forever shown—these decepti-  
 1 deceptores are now universally discredited." Thus it is found that there is little for which to hope from the Ontological a priori argu-  
 2 ment of this nature stripped of all its cosmological and psychological accretions. It is certain that as a formal syllogism it is faulty and inadequate. "The major premise in fact by presupposition contains with in it the whole case".

The import of the other phase of the argument termed above, the Psychological or better the Epistemological, may be easily discovered in the brief historical outline given above. As for Plato there was an inter-related system of ideas, so for the Hegelian there is an Absolute—an apparently complete system of truth, goodness, and beauty. And in knowing any truth the human mind is aware of the absolute. This theory is evidently not intended to be taken, as some have ex-  
 3 pounded it, as meaning that truth is ultimately one and that the eternal truths, not dependent on the human mind's perception, must be perceived by an Eternal and Infinite Mind. This would involve all the difficulties of the Leibnitzian proof from eternal truths, which B. Russell describes as "scandalous" because it confuses God's knowledge with the truth He knows. A more accurate description would be that it identifies the eternal truths or rather the system of truths and also of Beauty and of Goodness etc., with God. As Aristotle taught, "He (God) is Thought", or as Malebranche claims, we see all things in "Intelligible Existence". This appears to be the view point of the Hegelian system as a whole, of which Prof. James Royce writes that in it "the knowing process....in its evolution, and in its entire constitution, not only precisely corresponds to, but is identical with, the essential nature of the world, the object or true being, which is known, so that not only the theory of knowledge cannot be separated from metaphysics, but also the theory of the constitution of the universe is identical with the theory of the  
 4 process by which we come to know the universe". "It has come to be maintained, as we take it," writes Mr. Lindsay, "that this proof, stripped of all that does not belong to its essence, amounts really to an assertion on the part of the human spirit of the actuality of its ideal, which is  
 5 a self that is Perfect and infinite." Is God then merely an ideal or has the argument nothing to do with God? "The deeper meaning of the proof has been seen to be that the self-existence it assumes is existence which

1 Hegel's Logic: Wallace; p.415

2 Stirling: Philosophy and Religion p. 191

3 B. Russell :The Philosophy of Leibnitz.

4 Baldwin Dict. I, p.455b. Hegel's terminology.

5 Lindsay: Recent Advances in Theistic Thought. p., 214

1 which is spiritual". "We maintain", continues this Hegelian, "that the  
 Philosophy of Theism finds in the spirit of man that which so trans-  
 2 cends Nature, as to make it ultimately irrational to rest in barren  
 rationalism or in anything short of conscious communion with that uni-  
 versal presupposition of all our thinking." The Hegelians claim that  
 Kant set out under the misapprehension that Anselm asserted that what  
 exists in intellectu exists also in re, whereas Anselm maintained that  
 existence is of necessity in the conception of God, its tenet is that,"  
 "thought itself seems to demand a unity of things which shall be ulti-  
 mate, and this argument is but an effort to give logical form to our  
 belief in such an ultimate. God is the Ultimate which thought so demands  
 3 —is the ultimate concrete totality."

Now in Hegel and Hegelianism there is something so  
 attractive that the entire system and particularly the Ontological  
 proof has, without dissection, been readily accepted by some Theistic  
 thinkers. This may be due to what some may call its comprehensive nature  
 or others its diffuseness, but more accurately perhaps, to the fundamen-  
 tal truths which a careful study of it reveals as latent in it. At least  
 such remarks as those of Dr. Stirling, who is not openly anti-Hegelian,  
 ought to induce wariness in the acceptance of the treatment of the  
 proof. The latter writes, "Hegel, in fact, will not satisfy many readers  
 in these proofs of his for the existence of God. They seem so diffuse,  
 so vague, so indefinite; even to abound in so many repetitions, in circum-  
 locutions, in strange causes out of place or insusceptible of any mean-  
 ing in their place—in short, so confuse", dry, colourless and uninterest-  
 ing that one wonders that there ever was found a class of young men  
 4 able to listen to them." Now however true this may be, it is also true  
 that dryness and colourlessness are no guarantee of illogicality. Yet  
 Hegel and Hegelianism are not without difficulties. One who confesses  
 himself an out and out Hegelian writes regarding the *Ens Realissimum*, "The  
 judgment then starts with a "this" and the "this" when we follow it out  
 is found to be related to and inseparable from the universe taken as a  
 whole. In the individual I have got a potential and implicit relation-  
 ship to the whole universe, and the judgment starting with this proceeds  
 to unravel the system of reality." "Knowledge is thus a continuous judg-  
 5 ment, proceeding always by a qualification of what is real". T. H. Green  
 6 also claims that it is the "Eternally Complete Consciousness", as far  
 realized in or communicated to us through modifications of the animal  
 organism, that constitutes our knowledge". It is also implied in the  
 7 thought of Bosanquet that each particular judgement is only a fragment of  
 one single assertion, i.e., that the whole body of true propositions can be  
 deduced from the analysis of one true Proposition. But regarding this, the

1&2 Lindsay V p.p. 214ff.

4 Stirling: Phil. and Religion p.188.

3 Bibliotheca Sacra Jan. 1909. p.40.

5 Haldane, Pathway to Reality p.160 Lec. 6.

question must be raised whether one truth can be deduced from another or not and the answer must be that no inference follows from a single premise. This is exemplified in the sciences. Geometry recognises a number of Axioms and in the Logic of Geometry it is necessary to show that each axiom is independent of each other. Again in the Science of Logic there are the two, the "Dictum de omni et nullo" and the Law of Identity, from which a body of truth can be deduced, but one can never be derived from the other. Thus regarding the unity or the Absoluteness of truth there is a difficulty in its explanation: it seems evident that there must be at least two differentiated elements in any such system. And this difficulty must extend to the view of Hegel, since for him God and Truth are synonymous and interchangeable. This disparateness or lack of unity in the Absolute is also apparent in the system of Hegel, where he endeavours to connect Logic with the Philosophy of Nature. Beginning with Nature and Mind as distinct forms of reality and seeking to satisfy the demand for a complete system he was led into some difficulty in establishing a relation between them. His statement of their relation varies according to the stages in the history of his system. Nature comes to be the form to which Mind passes in order to get rid of the limitation implied in self-knowledge; "the externalization of the Notion of Mind in its process towards complete realization". Finally, Logic becomes the supreme science and the Idea "creates nature". The idea is in its totality Being, and as such is Nature, for the totality of what is is simply Nature. This is the result of one form of his Dialectic method in which he endeavours to show that the development of the ideal process and of all the complex inter-relationships, which it involves, is itself a fact, relatively independent through its very universality of the single subjective stages through which it has become explicit, so that, in discovering the inevitable character of a given process of thinking we have discovered the only truth that at this stage there is to know. This truth then becomes "immediate" and its actuality is experienced. That is to say the ideal construction gives us a demand for a certain system of conceptions or relationships, then we are led to ask, if there be not some objective truth corresponding to the ideal demand and finally this ideal demand shows, by its very universality and necessity, that it covers the whole ground which any object could here occupy, "so that the fully grown Begriff is itself the object sought, the curtain is the picture and the thought is the being". The universal laws of ideal processes taken together with the processes which embody these laws, are equivalent to all that is properly to be meant by reality.. Here according to Wallace, Hegel has been lured on

6 T. W. Greene: Prolegomena to Ethics p.82.

7 Sc. Bosanquet Essentials of Logic Lec. IV p 73 ff.

1 Baillie: Hegel's Logic p. 315.

2 Hegel Logic, III, 26.

3 Baldwin Dictionary: Hegel's Terminology Vol.II, p457.

too far by a daring paradox. At this point there is a difficulty similar to the above. In this transition there is a transition to an otherness. Nor can the idea be absolutely complete and self-determinate if this action is to get rid of a limitation. Similarly, Logic, the Science of the Absolute Idea cannot be a closed system and yet require some completion from without. And further, as Mr. Baillie points out, if Logic actually covers as for Hegel it professes to do, the whole of reality, then all the essentially constitutive elements of nature must be contained within the Logic and accordingly, incapable of completing it. Other inconsistencies are not wanting. He avoids the paradox that Fichte at first held but afterwards abandoned (and from which some of his followers do not seem to be entirely free) "that man establishes God's existence by creating Him and makes the ground of His experience the consequence of the Experience itself", and recognised the inadequacy of beginning with anything less than the whole. However, while Hegel may be allowed to be on safe ground when he regards the Absolute in Religion as transcending Religion and when he falls back on Experience for the content of Logic. yet, "when he regards the object dealt with in the two cases as the same, the inconsistency is too perilous to be left un-noticed". Again that the content of the Term God is entirely covered by the content of the term Truth is not evident. Logic does not perfectly reveal the absolute nor is reality in its essence a process of knowledge, for on Hegel's own lines the immediate in experience which is reality is absolutely continuous and indissoluble, otherwise experience would cease. If we could have a single immediacy of Experience in knowledge, knowledge would not be knowledge, but experience. Underlying all this and the estimation of it is the problem of the relation of subject and object. How can that which is "subject" be also "object", if truth be a system, if being be one? The development of Hegelianism of course shows that according to that system there is no difference between subject and object for if the system be true, Being is the ground of subject and object. The view of Hegel was that "far from subject and object seeming identical they appear separated by the whole diameter of being. Still, let the difference be asserted to be as absolute as possible, it is evident, even from the view currently taken concerning their relation, that on the one hand consciousness has in knowledge some truth that is, there is always some identity, some agreement between subject and object; and on the other, there is a closer intimacy, a nearer agreement between consciousness and its object in some spheres of experience than in others, though in none short of absolute truth is the distinction

4 Wallace: The Logic Of Hegel, p.86.

1 Hegel: Logic; III 342.

2 Sc. Baillie: Hegel's Logic; p 316, 17, 18.

3 Sc. Mackintosh: Hegel and Hegelianism p.275 ff. foot note.

4 Baillie: p.335. & 5 ibid p.336

and opposition removed entirely". "Natural Realism" claims that the ultimate reality, Being, is manifesting itself in two modes subject and object, which are finite differences within the Absolute. "Being" writes Dr. Laurie, "never was and never will be but always is undividedly present, everywhere self-identical as the continuum which holds all things together—the one in difference. I differ from you and from a tree or a stone, but we are all alike: we are one with a difference". Subject and Object are one in Being but neither is cancelled. "There is one Being in which and out of which all differences arise, including the supreme opposition of Subject and Object". This is dualism but they are careful to point out, "not a dualism of antagonism and separation of subject and object, but a dualism which takes account of both factors in one whole of system-subject-object". Yet it is difficult to go the entire length of holding that God's method of externalisation, the synthesised opposition of subject and negating object, when explicit, leaves no distinction or difference between subject and object. While the question may be legitimately asked and even with a prejudice in favour of a negative reply "who has the right to say that the phenomenal manifestation of universal mind are essentially different from finite mind?", may not the counter question be asked, "Who has a right to say that an "object" is a phenomenal manifestation of universal mind?" Has this been established or is it only an opinion? Further, as a manifestation of mind, effected by negation, may it, or indeed must it, be capable of knowing? Can an "object" always be a "subject"? If man's body is within the nature system and in continuity with it and his mind within the mind system and in continuity with it, the two can be subsumed in "One Concrete" only by a departure from Hegel's own position—a departure which does not appear to justify itself. This is thought to be reached in a higher experience, in which will and thought and feeling may all be one once more, but which is really a return to the immediacy of a lower experience of feeling. This was the view of Lotze, Schleiermacher, Bradley and others. Prof. Seth has dealt so clearly with the position of the latter that his words are worth quoting. "According to Mr. Bradley, knowledge inasmuch as it is relational throughout is defective as such: it makes distinctions (it distinguishes qualities, for example in a thing) but it never reduces its distinctions to a real unity. The very relation of subject and object must exist in every instance of knowledge and implies a difference not overcome. But in the Absolute all differences must be overcome, perfect unity must be realized; there must be what is called an "all-pervasive transfusion". Now the only hint

1 J. Baillie Hegel's Logic p.180.

2 Laurie: Synthetica; Vol. I, p.59 & 63 & 86

we have of such a state according to Mr. Bradley, is in pure feeling—the diffused sense of being, out of which our conscious life seems continually to emerge. The first dawn of active consciousness introduces the distinctions of knowledge into this characterless unity. Indeed, Mr. Bradley admits that we hardly possess the state of mere feeling, "as more than that which we are in the act of losing". I would go further and say more definitely that it is a stage we never actually realise, though we seem at times to approximate to it; and conceive it as being reached asymptotically in the lowest forms of organic life. Such asymptotic approach consists simply in dropping one by one the distinctions of our conscious existence. Consequently the state is describable only by negatives and its realization would mean a lapse into unconsciousness altogether. "Subject" would become "object" but not "object", "subject". The difference remains, for when they become identical "subject" is not at all. The last state is worse than the first for knowledge would not only not be knowledge, it would not even be experience, but it would be nescience. After all said and done, while Hegel has been of inestimable service in insisting on the rational character of the universe, yet is not the making of Thought the exclusive principle, either to go to an extreme or to use "thought" in a non-natural sense. There is the danger of reverting to an abstract view similar to that of Plato, even less satisfactory than that of Plato, and "reducing the universe to a Phantasm of the intellect— an impersonal system of thought-harmony —or, in Mr Bradley's vivid phrase, "an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories", against which Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" is possibly an over-zealous protest.

This has carried the discussion far adrift from the Hegelian treatment of the Ontological Proof, but it has at least helped to make it evident that on Hegel's own principles the Being, the Absolute Truth which exists by reason of a kind of subjective necessity, of which is presupposed in all logical thinking, cannot be demonstrated to be identical with The Absolute, the absolutely Real, with God. But back of and behind all these difficulties, even if the above examination be fairly accurate, there lies a truth in Hegel, i.e., that there is something that transcends mere Absolute truth, or Absolute Beauty, or Absolute Goodness and comprehends them all in itself. Hegel held, as noted above, that "a Notion is no match for Being", and answered to the critics that "those who like to taunt the philosophic idea with a difference between being and thought, might have admitted that Philosophers were not wholly

1 Prof. Seth: Theism; p. 52.

2 .. . . . p. 46.

3 Hegel: Logic, p. 92

4 ... .. p. 91.

ignorant of the fact." But he maintained that certainly it would be strange if the notion, the very heart of the Mind, the Ego, in a word, the concrete Totality we call God, were not rich enough to embrace so poor a category as being, the very poorest and most abstract of all." In the Anselmian statement the kernel of the truth was contained, for it was said by him, "God is the only Necessary Being. He is the Whole, the Absolute, the only God", and no proof of his existence is possible or necessary. This is what was seen in the criticism of Hegel's Logic, i.e., that it could not exhaust the entire content of the Absolute. Prof. James has recently written that "If thinkers who go from parts towards wholes are ever to be convinced of an Absolute Spirit's existence, it can never be by the style of reasoning of Hegel and his disciples." Hegel's view was a timely offset to the subjectivity of Kant's treatment of the a priori forms of thought, for the knower is in the world which he comes to know and the forms of his thought are themselves a function of the whole. And for Hegel, Nature when viewed in its formal essence is a system of objective thought. The human mind rethinks the thoughts of creative reason. Thought is the common essence of subject and object expressing on the intellectual side the nature. "To know reason, therefore is to know God; the presence of reason within us is the presence of God; the progressive rationalization of the world by science is a continuous extension of knowledge of God—a cumulative theistic proof", writes Prof. Seth, "if it is right to talk of proof in a case where necessary assumption might better express the real state of affairs". So that the chief value of Hegel is that he has shown most plainly that the proof which he called the "only true one", was no proof at all, in fact that there is no proof of the existence of God. He calls the proofs, the "somewhat obsolete metaphysical proofs of God's existence". "He does not for a moment allow that there can be any formal demonstration of the existence of God". And the very reason of this is that in any attempted formal demonstration of this fact the very truth whose proof is sought is already assumed in the terms of the demonstration. This is the same truth which is implied in the remark of Lotze that "without the circumlocution of a deduction we directly feel the impossibility of Its (the Most Perfect Being) existence". A modern writer has said that the Ontologists "have been those who at once saw what lay beyond the Empiricists' view and were aware of the want of cogency in the Rationalists' "proofs" as then presented. They did all they could they affirmed the convictions of their own experience at its highest point and found in them the tranquility of immediate faith". Bosanquet

1 Hegel :Logic; p.91,2.

2 Hibbert Journal, Jan. 1909. 279.

3 Prof. Seth: Theism; p.22.

4 Wallace Hegel's Logic; ,3.

5 Sterrett: Studies in Hegelian phil. of rel. p.282.

6 Lotze: Microcosmos; Bk. IX, C.4, p. 679 (T & T. Clark).



may be interpreted in the same way, when he writes that the idea of God has become, "rather an ideathrough which we know than an object of knowledge. And therefore it is urged that to <sup>A</sup>reason from the idea of God to His reality is merely to recognise the movement by which the unity of things makes itself explicit alike in the experience we call ourselves and in the experience we call the world". The proof has been an effort — from the nature of the case an almost vain effort— to give logical form to our thought of the Absolute.

7 Philosophy and the Being of God: Cambridge Theological Essays  
p. 125.

1 Baldwin Dictionary Vol. II, 457, Dr. Bossnquet.

In concluding this

paper it will be well to bring together the results of the criticism of the individual proofs. The Cosmological has given the fact that there is an unconditioned existence or a whole of inter-related existence, which must have some "ground" that is real. This is a result which is no more value than that which is assumed in the starting-point, i.e., that something exists, except that this is extended to the universe as a whole. This proof has given in fact what the Ontological also, especially in its Epistemological form, purports to demonstrate; showing clearly the accuracy of the remark of Kant about its being the same argument in another form - a remark by far more accurate of the <sup>(relation of the)</sup> Cosmological attempt to deduce the necessity of the "ground" of the universe to the Ontological with its epistemological pretensions, than of their similarity when Kant criticised them. Of the two the Cosmological approaches the nearer to the proof of the existence of the sumtotal with its ground of existence: the Ontological taken alone is merely an assumption - an assumption it may be necessarily made by the necessity of necessary existence, but yet an assumption - that an absolute exists which has the infinite attributes of Goodness, Beauty and Perfection, etc., But neither the Cosmological nor the Ontological is competent in any way to instruct us in regard to this Absolute. This was the purport of the Teleological. Yet the inductive search into the physical universe led only to an inference and not a proof that the "Ground" of the Absolute was intelligent. So that the proofs are no proofs: there can be no proofs of God's existence. "The existence of God cannot be logically demonstrated. There are many proofs, but there is no demonstration and those who ask for and insist on having one, must be plainly told that we have none to give". At this point the subject might be discontinued, but there is more than this negative result from all these attempts on the part of the human mind to rationalize the facts of life and the universe.

The individual proofs of God's existence are no proofs at all. Since the time of Kant and his criticism, it has been plainly seen that separately these are insufficient and the several historic proofs have been gathered together as converging lines of one demonstration. "The argument for the Divine existence is a vast and complex synthetic one - a whole of many parts - and the force is in the whole, not in any of the parts". The various elements have been pieced together to form a

1 Gwatkin: Knowledge of God; p.9.

2 Biblio theca Sacra Jan. 1909, p.39.

species of mosaic. Evidence of a similar nature to that employed in the traditional proofs, but a larger amount, has been brought forward but the method of conceiving and presenting and marshalling it has until at least quite recently, been not without fault. In many cases it has been employed to demonstrate that God is rather than what He is. The proof that God is, there is reason to believe from the above, is impossible and the transfer of the energy directed in the past to the demonstration of His existence, from this problem to the endeavour to explicate His nature and relation to the universe, will be a great gain. This is realized by the best of recent Theistic writers. Prof. G. Fisher claims that the arguments for the existence of God do not originate faith in Him but only elucidate it and define it. "Each of them tends to show, not simply that God is, but what He is. They complete the conception by pointing out the particular predicates brought to light, in the manifestation which God has made of Himself." Prof. Gwatkin maintains, and rightly, that "neither can we logically demonstrate <sup>the existence</sup> of self or of the world-- of subject or object. The world and self and God are alike in being final postulates of thought and, therefore incapable of demonstration; but " the existence of God is not the less certain for being the necessary postulate of every argument instead of the logical conclusion of one argument". "It would seem" writes another Theist, as if the way of wisdom were to abstain from all attempts at proving the Divine existence, and assuming as a datum that God is, to restrict our enquires to what He is". " Our Transcendent Method", writes Dr. Caldecott, "transforms venerable proofs and sets them in fresh strength and beauty as pillars of Theistic faith". Adopting this as the view point the value of the Proofs can be easily estimated: they "constitute an organic whole of argument, each of them establishing its separate element, and thus contributing to the general result-- confirmatory evidence that God is and complementary evidence to what God is".

- 1 G. Fisher: grounds of Christian and Theistic belief p.87.
- 2 Gwatkin: The Knowledge of God; vol. I, p.10.
- 3 A. B. Bruce: Apologetics p.158.
- 4 Cambridge Theological Essays: p.142.
- 5 Prof. Flint: Agnosticism; p. 589.









