

Citizenship and Human Rights in the Postwar British Novel:

Bowen, Macaulay, Spark

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Abstract

Since the mid-twentieth century, human rights have replaced civilization and class as the principal frameworks for international debates about the rights of individuals and groups. This thesis attends to postwar literary treatments of the clashes between human rights and the civil rights endowed through national affiliation in Elizabeth Bowen's *The Heat of the Day* (1948), Rose Macaulay's *The World My Wilderness* (1950), and Muriel Spark's *Robinson* (1958). As a legal discourse, human rights are aspirational, rather than fully actualized. In this regard, they have affinities with the ability of the novel to identify potential yet desirable systems of political organization. This thesis considers literature and human rights to be informing discourses, and teases out the contact zones between the British novel and the evolving language of international human rights in the postwar period. Chapter I argues that, for Bowen, rather than furthering the status of women, the People's War made individuation impossible; individuals became swallowed up by the state's portrayal of citizenship as participation in the national war effort, not as a status conferring rights. In turn, Chapter II contends that in her postwar reimagining of the *Bildungsroman*, Macaulay presents a novel of arrested development in which the nation-state is unable to fulfill its historical rights-bestowing role for displaced Europeans. Drawing on archival material from the University of Tulsa, Chapter III asserts that for Spark human rights offer means of investigating the nature and the scope of a person's entitlements not as nationals but as individuals defined by biological humanity instead of affiliation with a nation-state. This thesis suggests that postwar British novelists draw on human rights declarations and conventions to imagine alternative relationships between individuals and the nation-state following the grisly rights violations of the Second World War.

Resumé

Depuis le milieu du XX^e siècle, les droits de l'homme ont évincé la civilisation et la classe sociale comme cadres principaux des débats internationaux sur les droits des individus et des groupes. Cette mémoire examine les traitements littéraires des affrontements entre les droits de l'homme et les droits civils, qui sont doués par affiliation nationale, dans trois romans d'après-guerre : *The Heat of the Day* d'Elizabeth Bowen (1948), *The World My Wilderness* de Rose Macaulay (1950) et *Robinson* de Muriel Spark (1958). Comme discours juridique, les droits de l'homme expriment des aspirations et ne sont pas pleinement actualisés. À cet égard, ils partagent des affinités avec la capacité du roman à déterminer des systèmes d'organisation politique qui restent potentiels, mais toujours désirables. Cette mémoire considère la littérature et les droits de l'homme comme des discours informant et tente de déterminer les zones de contact entre le roman britannique et le langage, toujours en évolution, des droits de l'homme à l'échelle internationale dans la période de l'après-guerre. Le premier chapitre fait valoir qu'au lieu de faire avancer le sort des femmes, la théorie de la guerre populaire, comme envisagé par Bowen, rend impossible l'individuation : les individus sont engloutis par un portrait, créé par l'État, qui assimile la citoyenneté à la participation au niveau national dans l'effort de guerre et qui la néglige en sa qualité de statut qui confère des droits. Par la suite, le deuxième chapitre prétend que Rose Macauley, dans sa réinterprétation d'après-guerre du *Bildungsroman*, présente une histoire de développement freiné dans laquelle l'État-nation est incapable de remplir son rôle historique et, ainsi, de conférer, aux Européens déplacés, leurs droits. En s'appuyant sur des recherches de documents d'archives entreprises au University of Tulsa, le troisième chapitre affirme que, pour Spark, les droits de l'homme permettent d'examiner la nature et la portée des

droits d'une personne non pas en tant que citoyenne, mais en tant qu'individu défini par l'humanité biologique plutôt que par son affiliation avec l'État-nation. Cette mémoire suggère que les écrivains britanniques d'après-guerre puisent dans les déclarations et les conventions des droits de l'homme afin d'imaginer des rapports alternatifs entre les individus et l'État-nation après les violations atroces survenues durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

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Citizenship and Human Rights in the Postwar British Novel

Since the close of the Second World War, human rights have replaced civilization and class as the principal frameworks for international debates about the rights of individuals and groups. Enshrined in international legislation, human rights inform the novels of Elizabeth Bowen, Rose Macaulay, and Muriel Spark. In the 1940s and 1950s, these novelists applied the emerging language of human rights to novels that wrestle with how such rights stand in tension with national citizenship. My thesis contends that the unprecedented human rights violations of the Second World War—dispossession, statelessness, genocide, crimes against humanity—figure in Bowen's *The Heat of the Day* (1948), Macaulay's *The World My Wilderness* (1950), and Spark's *Robinson* (1958) through a series of meditations on the gap between the growth of worldwide rights rulings and the fact that the nation-state confers rights based on citizenship. Postwar British novelists draw on human rights declarations and conventions to imagine alternative relationships between individuals and the nation-state following the grisly rights violations of the Second World War.

Drawing on recent literary scholarship such as Joseph Slaughter's *Humans Rights, Inc.* (2007) and Lyndsey Stonebridge's *The Judicial Imagination* (2011), as well as on contemporary discussions of human rights such as Samuel Moyn's *The Last Utopia* (2010) and the *Critical Inquiry* issue devoted to "Around 1948" (2014), my thesis considers postwar literary treatments of the clashes between human rights and the civil rights endowed through national affiliation. Giorgio Agamben suggests that such clashes expose "the originary fiction" of national citizenship (21), in light of what Hannah Arendt saw as the historical "identification of the rights of man with the rights of peoples in the European nation-state system" (*Origins* 291). Although

postwar legislators proclaimed the universality of human rights, in reality the nation-state defined the rights with which it endows citizens. This thesis also contributes to the growing body of scholarly writing chronicling the influence of rights discourse upon literary texts, including Slaughter's documentation of the links between the European *Bildungsroman* and universal human rights, Lynn Hunt's view that discussions of rights proliferated during the Enlightenment together with the rise of the epistolary novel, and Moyn's contention that "on the brink of their ascendancy, human rights would have to win or lose on the terrain of the imagination, first and foremost" (*Utopia* vi). In particular, I explore how the burgeoning rights talk of the midcentury—the period during which "[h]uman rights entered the world scene," as Costas Douzinas puts it (115)—inflects the postwar British novel.

This thesis proposes the term, "literary jurisprudence," to refer to the engagement that novelists have with the incipient language of postwar human rights. "Literary jurisprudence" calls attention to the fact that novelists writing in the postwar perform the same linguistic processes of imaginative subject formation as human rights legislation. These two modes of writing, the novelistic and the jurisprudential, are at their core literary in nature, since both put forth possible worlds: fictional worlds, in the case of the novel form, and worlds bound not by global respect to the sovereignty of individual nation-states but to the ambitious principles entrenched in international legislation, in the case of human rights declarations and conventions. As a legal discourse, human rights are aspirational, not fully actualized. In this regard, they have affinities with the ability of the novel to identify potential yet desirable systems of political organization. As Slaughter has shown, the theoretical concerns of the novel and human rights overlap in literary forms such as the *Bildungsroman*, which, in its concern with fostering citizenship by incorporating the protagonist into the political life of the nation, takes part in the

same practices of subject formation as international human rights. Ernst Bloch observes that human rights capture the “forward-pressing, not-yet-determined nature of a human being” (xviii), but much the same can be said of literature invested in human rights. This thesis, then, considers literature and human rights to be informing discourses; it teases out the contact zones between the British novel and the evolving language of international human rights during the mid-twentieth century.

The immediate postwar years witnessed a flurry of judicial activity which gave rise to international human rights legislation: the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948; the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1951; and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1953, to name a few. Despite legislation calling for internationally recognized standards with which to frame future human rights, violations of basic rights continued through the century. As Slaughter points out, “the discursive victory of human rights means that ours is at once the Age of Human Rights and the Age of Human Rights Abuse” (2). The gulf between the exemplary freedoms and rights conferred upon global citizens through the UDHR and the grim realities of the twentieth century emerges as the very origin of Bowen’s, Macaulay’s, and Spark’s novelistic handlings of rights talk. All three of these novelists stand at the forefront of “a generations of writers who . . . forge new literary idioms of judgment in their postwar encounters with the law,” as Stonebridge phrases it (8). These writers thus ask questions that constitute the core of the different chapters of my thesis. What does it mean to live in conditions in which the fundamental human rights to which individuals are entitled are denied through the licit and the illicit workings of the nation-state? How can the postwar British novel represent the plights of those whose rights have been

either abrogated or violated? How do the rise of far-right authoritarian regimes such as the Third Reich, on the one hand, and the passing of emergency legislation which suspends civil liberties during wartime, on the other, reconceive the historical rights-bestowing role of the nation-state?

Chapter I attends to Bowen's critical portrait of British wartime citizenship in *The Heat of the Day* as inflected by propaganda surrounding the myth of the People's War. At a minimum, citizenship implies mutual rights and obligations: rights-bearing citizens owe allegiance to the sovereign, as determined in its legislation and its articulations of the law. In turn, the sovereign state, a legal and juridical entity consisting of a centralized government that presides over a specific territory and enjoys exclusive control of the means of violence in its domain (Benjamin 239), protects its citizens through governmental apparatuses that regulate political and civil life. Yet the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, transformed Britain from a constitutional monarchy with a working parliamentary system into a potential totalitarian state (Ho 1). Through this bill, Britain suspended property rights and enabled the nation-state to seize and detain citizens who violated the constraints of the bill, among other measures. The document inaugurated what Gill Plain describes as an "ironically authoritarian democracy" before the founding of the welfare state (6). Under this ordinance, British citizens were relegated to a muddled legal-juridical category in which they maintained their status as citizens without possessing the rights concomitant with their citizenship. For all the rights-denying impulses of such crisis legislation, however, propaganda disseminated in the United Kingdom sought to highlight the unifying effects of the People's War. Especially prominent, Stephen Spender points out, was the insistence that the war contributed to "the breaking down of class barriers" (7). But the myth also holds that the People's War toppled socio-economic and gendered systems of inequality, with the result that propaganda efforts on the home front popularized the belief that

the end of the war marked the onset of a new era of commonly enjoyed civil rights.

In fact, as Bowen argues throughout *The Heat of the Day*, the People's War ushered in no such institutional or political improvements for women's human rights in Britain. For Bowen, during the war the category of the People supplanted the category of the citizen as the principal means of self-identification left available to individuals. This legislative sea change was the outcome of emergency rulings and crisis legislation, both of which suspended civil liberties in Britain. And yet the much-circulated narrative of communal feeling and communal action, according to which British citizens dispensed with individual rights and became a nation of good-natured workers bent on doing their part for the United Kingdom, does not measure up to Bowen's novelistic critique. Far from furthering the status of women, Bowen insists, the People's War made individuation impossible; individuals became swallowed up by the state's portrayal of citizenship as participation in the national war effort, not as a status conferring rights. Chants of "We can take it!" or "London can take it!" acted as a poor substitute for civil liberties on the part of the individual rights-bearing citizen. How citizens conceive of their duties and obligations towards the state when their fundamental rights have been suspended constitutes the crux of Bowen's novel. As Agamben puts it in "Beyond Human Rights," "In the system of the nation-state, so-called sacred and inalienable human rights are revealed to be without any protection precisely when it is no longer possible to conceive of them as rights of the citizens of a state" (19-20). *The Heat of the Day* fleshes out the implications of legislation that, rather than bolstering an existing body of laws, transforms British citizens into rightless citizens. The novel reflects upon the status of women in the war years to push beyond the nation-state as the dispenser of rights and therefore to advocate for the human rights of every individual.

While Chapter I of my thesis addresses the wartime suspension of citizenship rights and,

by extension, its effects on human rights, Chapter II deals with the return of a rights-bestowing government. Set in 1946, Macaulay's *The World My Wilderness* frames Barbary's return to England from postwar France in terms of a reintroduction into law and civilization out of barbarism and savagery. Throughout her novel Macaulay makes it clear that civilization and barbarism are not poles apart, but mutually defining categories. Civilization, for Macaulay, emerges out of savagery, and the reverse also is true in that the rise of human rights occurred alongside the rise of political means for suppressing human rights in the nation-state. Because of her belief in the barbaric origins of British civilization, and because of her sense that integration into the postwar nation-state is necessary neither from a narrative point of view nor vis-à-vis rights-bearing, Macaulay turns the traditional focus on development and education in the *Bildungsroman* on its head. Very few scholarly resources exist that discuss *The World My Wilderness* in any capacity. Ian Whittington stands alone in talking about the relationship Macaulay's novel has to the *Bildungsroman* in the context of human rights and citizenship, rather than focusing upon either the religious content or the ruined London landscape in the text, as critics Leo Mellor and Ben Highmore do.

In her postwar reimagining of this novelistic subclass, Macaulay presents a novel of arrested development in which the nation-state is unable to fulfill its historical rights-bestowing role for displaced Europeans. Barbary, in this account, is a disruptive political and civil force both because she exposes the limits of the sovereign nation-state as the dispenser of rights to nationals, and because she advocates for an international approach to these entitlements based on human rights. *The World My Wilderness* reconceives citizenship through an international lens. *The World My Wilderness* contends that following the wholesale rights abuses of the Second World War nation has been coupled from state. Macaulay's novel is not a dirge commemorating

the end of empire or the traditional emphasis on non-interference through Westphalian sovereignty, but a text that turns its attention to human rights as the new crucible of subject formation in the postwar.

Building on the idea of rightless citizens in Chapter I and the rethinking of citizenship through human rights in Chapter II, Chapter III treats Spark's portrayal of human rights without the intervention and patronage of a nation-state. *Robinson*, one of Spark's least studied novels, depicts the efforts of a group of survivors of a plane crash to found a political system that will advocate for human rights in lieu of citizens' rights. No form of political organization presides over life on the island, and no body of positive law safeguards individual liberties. Robinson exercises his rule over the island by delegating duties to the survivors, but at first he refuses to endow his new visitors with rights of their own. "I am not obliged to make arrangements for anyone," he says (22). Yet as his control over the survivors loosens, Robinson worries that they will found a community based not on law or citizenship but on shared human rights. Though duty appears as the juridical lingua franca of the text, the characters' talk of duty meshes with extra-legal responsibilities—and their fundamental, not civil, rights. As Hunt indicates, human rights "only become meaningful when they gain political content" (21); unless these rights grant a citizen suffrage and freedom of expression, among other emancipatory entitlements, they are not human rights as such. Given the close-knit connection between human rights and political agency, Spark teases out in *Robinson* the postwar struggle to establish human rights that are not aligned with the priorities and prejudices of a nation-state.

By drawing on archival material from the Special Collections and University Archives at the University of Tulsa, Chapter III shows that Spark sought to stress these questions of human rights and citizenship by focusing on the problem of sovereignty. For Spark, human rights offer

means of investigating the nature and the scope of a person's entitlements not as nationals—that is, citizens incorporated into a given nation—but as individuals defined by biological humanity instead of affiliation with a nation-state. Far from the watchful eyes of the international community, the island on which the novel takes place affords Spark the opportunity to imagine alternate relations between individuals and the nation-state. Not only because of its looking back to Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), but also because of its investment in the rights discourse advanced in the Enlightenment, *Robinson* captures both the radical emphasis on biological humanity put forward in midcentury human rights legislation and the historical origins of this discourse in eighteenth-century American and French rights declarations. The novel looks to the emergent language of international human rights to campaign on behalf of individuals regardless of citizenship status or nationality.

Rights have been historically enmeshed with the nation-state, but the two make uncomfortable bedfellows. The eighteenth-century American and French revolutionary declarations, while they do indeed advocate for the inviolable rights of man, tether human rights to national citizenship. In the Preamble to the 1791 American Bills of Rights, the front matter specifies that these provisions are being adopted with the hope that “extending the ground of public confidence in the Government will best insure the beneficent ends of its institution.” More important, Article 3 of the French *Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789* (DDHC) stipulates that “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.” Particularly in the French document, human rights arise under the umbrella of a sovereign nation guaranteeing its citizens certain protections. Rhetorically, Jean L. Cohen argues, the DDHC justifies itself both by spurning the monarchy and by embracing the principles

of democratic and republican statehood (166). Human rights, in this view, are indissoluble from national citizenship; rather than shielding all people from the arbitrary exercise of state authority, they incorporate individuals into the fabric of the nation-state. For this reason, Moyn says that “The ‘rights of man’ were about a whole people incorporating itself in a state, not a few foreign people criticizing another state for its wrongdoings” (*Utopia* 26). In the modern nation-state, rights consolidated national identity instead of endowing all persons with so-called inalienable rights. The rights of man had a decidedly limited purview because of their entanglement with the identity formation, in which “The idea of a ‘nation’ . . . draws on concepts of consanguinity and folk heritage” (Hart and Hansen 505). During the postwar period, however, rights ceased to be thought of through this lens as an instrument of larger state machinery or as a marker of “consanguinity” (and thus a common citizenship status), and human rights began to be autonomous from the state.

Specifically because of this independence from the nation-state, postwar human rights push for a thorough rethinking of the relationship between individuals and nations. Indeed, in this respect, modern human rights differ from contemporary human rights. Modern human rights, which signify multiply but which often entail a belief in Westphalian sovereignty as expressed by the principle of non-interference in the domestic politics of individual nation-states (Baxi 42), amount to state-sponsored prerogatives that admit the rights-bearer into an exclusionary community of citizens. For Upendra Baxi, the modern discourse of human rights is best considered a “[s]tatist human rights regime”: while the nation-state apportions rights to its citizens, it also makes provisions for the “suspension of human rights in situations of ‘emergency’” (27). In this account the statist human rights regime preserves human rights through national citizenship but also suspends the rights of its nationals through legislation

passed in times of crisis, often as a wartime measure to ensure the continued functioning of the state. The statist human rights regime thus is characterized not by an uncompromising commitment to the rights of nationals, but rather by a wavering between the upholding and the interruption of human rights—a trait that makes up the core of Bowen’s thinking about human rights vis-à-vis the nation-state.

On the other hand, contemporary human rights amount to a cluster of emancipatory claims that liberate human rights from the proprietary hands of the state in order to relocate them in the individual human person. This break from the historical role of the nation-state as the *prima facie* rights-bestowing entity ensures that human rights are independent of the dictates of sovereign power. The contractual logic that binds individual with state, and therefore endows the national with rights, is no longer in effect, according to this way of thinking. Because of the emancipation of human rights from the guardianship of the nation-state, human rights are enshrined in supra-state apparatuses—declarations, conventions, covenants, charters, and the like. Yet as a direct result of their breaking-away from national citizenship, contemporary human rights now occupy a nebulous, quasi-legal sphere: not in the courtroom, but in a jurisprudence that advocates for certain entitlements based on universal humanity. As Domna Stanton notes, contemporary human rights legislation “give[s] individuals agency to disobey the state’s legal but immoral orders” (69). Advocating for a new emphasis on biological humanity rather than on sovereignty, human rights amount to the “legal recognition of individual will” (Douzinas 11), though they also call for the principle of non-interference in the domestic matters of nation-states to take the backseat to the rights of individuals.

All of this is to say that contemporary human rights trace their origins to the postwar period. The “law was at its most audacious and creative in the immediate postwar period” (2),

Stonebridge writes, and, to bolster this claim, she nods to the cluster of international conferences, trials, covenants, and legislation that dealt with human rights after 1945. Marco Duranti, for example, points out that “the most fervent and successful exponents of radical new forms of international human rights law after the war understood their human rights activism as a repudiation of the ‘atomistic’ and ‘statist’ spirit of the 1789 Declaration” (162). Instead of building naturally upon the entitlements enshrined in the 1789 document, the rights asserted in the UDHR take leave of the French covenant by looking beyond the emphasis on national citizenship as the principle through which persons acquire rights and are recognized before the law. Moreover, the exclusionary, citizenship-based politics of modern human rights took their most insidious form in their definition of the human—and with it, what entity is deserving of rights. During the historical emergence of modern human rights in the eighteenth century, women and children, the poor and the mentally unstable, slaves and colonial subjects, aboriginal populations and so-called barbarians were not regarded as rights-bearing individuals. Far from allocating rights based on accidents of birth, contemporary human rights appeal to biological humanity as the guarantor of fundamental entitlements, offering a corrective to the historical influence that race, class, religion, and sex, among other qualities, have had in hindering a person’s juridical recognition as a rights-bearing individual.

By many accounts, “human” expresses a defining and fundamental bifurcation: an entity torn between its status as biological and legal entity, and between being an individual and being a national. In an early text, “On the Jewish Question,” Karl Marx writes that modern human rights “reduc[ed] man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical person” (167; qtd. in Slaughter, “However” 275). Later, Hannah Arendt remarked on the line drawn between humanity and

citizenship in the DDHC and in her reflections on the plight of refugee populations during and after the Second World War. As early as “We Refugees” (1943), Arendt observed that it was delusional to continue to trust in the nation-state to preserve the rights of its citizens. Since humanity *qua* humanity was not a juridical category until the postwar, the sovereign nation doled out civil and political rights for nationals and for nationals alone. For Arendt, what was necessary to ensure that all persons existed as rights-bearing units was a rethinking of rights not in terms of their historical role as perquisites of national citizenship but with respect to the entitlements of “the merely human” (Stonebridge, *Judicial* 110). The midcentury novel as well as midcentury rights discourse, in other words, brought to the fore concerns about the distinction between the rights-bearing human being and the rights-bearing citizen.

As this thesis suggests, citizens formerly deprived of the privileges of their citizenship can regain confidence in the reestablished rule of law through human, rather than civil, rights. The ways in which citizens rethink their relationships with the nation-state when their basic human rights have been reinstated guides my readings of postwar British novels. My thesis explores how the literary jurisprudence of Bowen, Macaulay, and Spark imagines new relationships between individuals and the state, and how the informing discourse of postwar human rights contributes to their novelistic rethinkings of the ties that bind individuals to sovereign power.

Citizenship, Human Rights, and the People in Elizabeth Bowen's *The Heat of the Day*

In *Citizens in War—and After* (1945), Stephen Spender writes that “a striking difference between war and peace is that not only is the individual drawn, in war, with all his passions and deepest feelings into the national struggle, but the State shows a new interest in him or her” (109). For Britons during the Second World War, this “new interest” on the part of the nation-state in the lives of individual citizens took the form of far-reaching and unprecedented legislation that suspended civil liberties in the name of the war effort. With the aim of preserving liberal democratic values in the face of totalitarian tyranny, the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. This bill, rushed speedily through Parliament before the outbreak of war to combat the threat posed by Nazi Germany, granted the nation-state the juridical authority to requisition all forms of private property, to detain individuals whose actions stood in tension with the national interests of the state, and to impose upon all citizens harsh restrictions that affected everything from their food supply to their ability to travel, among other urgent measures. In order to justify an extension of this wartime ordinance, Clement Atlee, appearing before parliament on 22 May 1940, stressed the Nazi Government’s blatant human rights violations and its concomitant disregard for justice and law. “Our ruthless enemy,” he says, “who is restrained by no considerations of international law, of justice or humanity, is throwing everything into the scale to force a decision.” Although the powers requested by Atlee prolonged a juridical order in which British nationals had at least in theory been dispossessed of the rights constituent of their citizenship, he contended that these emergency provisions were indispensable legal instruments for protecting the people of the United Kingdom from the wholesale human rights violations of the Third Reich. During the war,

Britain reconceived citizenship not in terms of rights-bearing but in terms of an interruption of rights-bearing, with the result that the nation-state disseminated propaganda about national affiliation as a willingness to participate in a communal British war effort rather than as a status conferring certain entitlements to individuals.

Against this framework of the state-sanctioned rightlessness of British citizens, Elizabeth Bowen's *The Heat of the Day* (1948) calls into question the universality of human rights and the myth of the People's War in its depictions of the wartime experiences of English men and women in 1942 London. In the publisher's blurb for *The Heat of the Day*, Bowen asserts that "this is a domestic novel" (*Weight* 40), and that while it takes place "in a particular phase of the Second World War," it "is not a war novel" (*Weight* 39). No representations of violence or bloodshed punctuate the novel, which situates itself in a series of interior spaces that capture the war-torn lives of Londoners: rented flats, boarded-up homes, half-empty restaurants, all of which feature either blackout curtains or other markers of how the war has intruded upon private life. Citizenship takes the backseat to communal feeling and action in Bowen's novel. In mid-war London, the category of the People has replaced that of the citizen as the primary means of self-identification left available to individuals: a result of the rights-denying crisis regulations of the war. As H. G. Wells laments in *The Rights of Man* (1940), "Our individual liberties are being threatened by emergency legislation" (24). Throughout *The Heat of the Day*, Bowen's literary jurisprudence opens up possibilities for rehabilitating the juridical validity of individual human rights claims, but it does so by pitting the emerging midcentury human rights discourse against the narrative strategies employed by the warring nation-state of the day, which sought to couch the suspension of civil liberties in a story of good-natured national participation. In her review of Angus Calder's *The People's War* (1969), for example, Bowen argues against the uniform

identity of the British people during the war years: “The war on Britain was undergone by all types. Not only The People were people, so were others” (182). Especially through its depictions of the women of Bowen’s London, *The Heat of the Day* looks to the incipient language of international human rights as a way both of valuing individual rights claims against the narratives of communal identity espoused by the nation-state, as well as of challenging the inclusive and universalizing rhetorics of the People’s War.

In the 1930s and 1940s, many British writers and intellectuals were at odds with visions of communal life put forth in state propaganda. Writing before the outbreak of the war in 1935, but with the dangers of totalitarianism and fascism in mind, E.M. Forster contends, in “The Menace to Freedom,” that man “has persuaded himself that when he sacrifices himself to the state he is accomplishing a deed far more satisfying than anything which can be accomplished alone” (21). For Forster, this narrative of ungrudging self-sacrifice carried out by individuals in defense of the state is nothing short of a delusion—and an insidious one at that, in that it cheapens the value of individual life by placing value on the preservation of the nation-state at the expense of nationals. Put another way, the “People” at the heart of the People’s War exist as such by expunging the individual rights-bearer from their ranks, a reality that Giorgio Agamben considers the true “political meaning of the term *people*” (*MWE* 28; original emphasis). As Forster says in “The Challenge of Our Time,” “I have no mystic faith in the people. I have in the individual” (68). And even Rose Macaulay takes issue with discussions about the People in wartime. In her 1941 essay “Consolations of the War,” she mocks the peculiar fact that whenever “distinguished persons” or political leaders stop by shelters, “it seems to start them [the inhabitants] being a little smug, and shouting ‘We can take it!’—which is an irritating cry, since it is hard to see what else any of us can do but take it, whether above ground or below. Still, if it

cheers them up” (75). At their best, the chants raise the spirits of the displaced Londoners. But for Macaulay, these refrains along the lines of “London can take it”—the subject of the GPO’s 1940 film *London Can Take It!*—are less expressions of communal identity than they are instances of propaganda filtering into everyday life, with the people living in the shelters mistaking popular wartime rhetoric for their own feelings about their status as displaced persons.

Yet this narrative of inclusion, which Macaulay dismisses as a way of pandering to the downtrodden and the displaced, clashes with the fact that historically women have not enjoyed equal involvement in the administration of political and civic life in Britain. The postwar refrain that the Second World War broke down systems of class and privilege addresses socioeconomic injustices without commenting on ones based on gender. For Sonya Rose, “Despite many nationalists’ ideological investment in the idea of popular *unity*, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender *difference*,” in light of the fact that “Women have generally been included within the nation in their status as mothers—as reproducers of the race, rather than as political participants in civil society” (Rose 5-6; original emphasis). By Rose’s account, but also in Bowen’s novel, the wartime lives of women frustrate the usual narratives of wartime inclusivity. ““You’ve bludgeoned me with your perpetual ‘we’—your ‘we’ is my ‘they,’” Stella informs Harrison, thereby resisting incorporation into the People early in the novel and, by extension, attempting to reassert the legitimacy of individual rights claims (*HD* 40).

In *The Heat of the Day*, Louie Louis acts as Bowen’s ironic case study on the story of the unified cast of the People’s War. A voracious reader of newspapers, Louie is the ideal target of British propaganda efforts on the home front: unthinking, unreflective, and impulsive, she accepts what she reads about the progress of the war and the national characters of both Britain

and Germany. She takes nothing with a grain of salt and, unaware of the interplay between information and disinformation in the papers, she “bask[s] in [their] warmth and inclusion [and] every morning and evening she was praised” (*HD* 152). Her reading is affective, not judicious. Having ascribed to the model of communal national citizenship put forth in the newspapers, Louie lacks any stable vision of herself as a rights-bearing individual. Charmed by their indiscriminate “inclusion,” she appears less mercurial or protean than she does feckless in her enthusiastic cataloguing of the positions that she occupies on any given day:

Was she not a worker, a soldier’s lonely wife, a war orphan, a pedestrian, a Londoner, a home and animal-lover, a thinking democrat, a movie-goer, a woman of Britain, a letter-writer, a fuel-saver, and a housewife? She was only not a mother, a knitter, a gardener, a foot-sufferer, or a sweetheart—at least not rightly. Louie now felt bad only about any part of herself which in any way did not fit into the papers’ picture; she could not have survived their disapproval. (*HD* 152)

Worker, wife, woman, Londoner, democrat—all these nouns express competing social roles, yet one thing they do not do is capture Louie’s juridical entitlements not as a right-minded communal citizen but as a rights-bearing individual. “[F]lattered into ready-made identities spewed out by the daily press” (Ellmann 162), Louie is the mouthpiece of the nation-state’s propaganda machine, although she also highlights how the statist rights regime¹ has failed to articulate a coherent set of women’s human rights or how such rights claims would fit into the narrative of national self-sacrifice. As Janice Ho observes about Bowen’s novel, “the citizen has completely erased the individual” (24). More importantly, though, in this case the citizen as receiver of propaganda has replaced the human woman, or at least has conflated wartime

¹ According to Upendra Baxi, the statist regime describes a nation-state that “provide[s] for suspension of human rights in situations of ‘emergency’ (howsoever nuanced)” (27).

femininity with a willingness to engage in gainful labour and to curtail movement. Louie works in the factories. Stella, for her part, takes comfort in the fact that “Laudably little travel was on her conscience” (*HD* 104). A citizen only—and not a thoughtful one at that—Louie thinks in clichés: “War now made us one big family” (*HD* 152). Given that for Bowen “Novelistic character, beyond the necessity of responding to the exigencies of plot, has national qualities” (Hepburn, “Character” 1055), Louie’s credulity dramatizes the stupefying influence of wartime propaganda upon impressionable nationals who are willing to swallow hook, line, and sinker prevailing images of the nation-state. For these insatiable newspaper-readers, feeling shapes the narrative of the war. Louie’s nationalistic fervour, however well intentioned, points to what Bowen described in a 1955 interview with Walter Allen for the BBC General Overseas Service as a rift between the rights of women and of men: “in spite of all the immense changes in the last fifty years,” she says, “women, I think, tend to lead rather circumscribed lives” (*Weight* 59, 528). In *The Heat of the Day* Louie feels most herself when she embraces the fellow feeling that springs from the communal rhetoric of the People’s War. Regardless of celebratory accounts of how the Second World War leveled social, economic, and gendered inequalities, for Bowen this vision of the People’s War is unsuccessful in its portrayals of the lives of women in wartime. More than that, it obscures how postwar human rights legislation did not neatly translate into rights claims on the part of women.

At midcentury, human rights were “nascent rather than fully developed as a legal discourse,” and, because of their status not as a normative instrument of the law but as jurisprudence, they “offered no protections” for those persons whose rights had been abrogated (Hepburn, “Righting Queer Rights” 83). As aspirational jurisprudence, human rights advocate for the universal rights-bearing individual, an entity whose rights are guaranteed by biological

humanity alone. Human rights jurisprudence acquires this universality based on the abstraction of human rights themselves. But in practice, “This abstraction, which renders them of general application, also means that this application turns very significantly upon their interpretation. Their interpretation, in turn, is ultimately a matter for the judiciary” (McColgan 2). The very mechanism designed to ensure their comprehensive applicability—the abstract universality of human rights—also functions as a rights-denying instrument. Though conceived to apply to all of biological humanity, human rights nonetheless can be interpreted through exclusionary lenses, and even instruments such as the UDHR, which seeks to safeguard human rights, can replicate the systems of gender-based inequality that it aims to eradicate.

Worrying about the seemingly cursory way in which the UDHR often frames women’s human rights, Laurie Wiseberg and Harry Scoble write that “the literature on international human rights tends to treat the problem of women’s rights in a rather peripheral manner” (127). For one thing, sweeping clauses gloss over crucial particularities: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (Article 2). Of course, this non-discrimination clause makes an attempt to include all of biological humanity in its purview, but in its universalizing impulses, it does not dwell at all on how discrimination based on gender differs from that based on race or religion—to give only one example. Indeed the Article reads as though all forms of systemic prejudice are structurally analogous, with the result that the very clause designed to protect the human rights of the disenfranchised and excluded not only fails to do so in light of the absence of enforcement mechanisms, but also collapses distinctions among these disenfranchised and excluded groups. While intending to enshrine the human rights of women and other groups, Article 2 instead

suggests that these marginalized figures are alike in their exclusion from the masculinist-universalist discourse of human rights, however inclusive the drafters intended this discourse to be.

As well, the emancipatory promise of the UDHR vis-à-vis women's human rights is undercut throughout the document in places such as Article 16, which provides protections relating to marriage and the family. In fact, the term "women" only crops up twice in the UDHR: once in the mention of "the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women" in the Preamble, then again in Article 16. Article 25, moreover, designates motherhood and childhood as distinct statuses, without identifying the forms of "special care and assistance" to which either mothers or children are entitled. The point here is not just that the language of the UDHR only fleetingly refers to the human rights of women, but also that when it does so, it tends to reify women into identities such as wife and mother. By broaching the topic of women's human rights solely in the contexts of marriage and motherhood, the UDHR envisions women less as rights-bearing individuals than as a jurisprudential category defined by certain biological functions (mother) or marital standing (wife). This emphasis on the juridical and marital identities of women at the expense of their rights-endowing humanity relegates them to the status of "objects of traditional customs" (Reanda 30), which makes unachievable the acquisition of full women's human rights and which delimits full participation in political life. On a local level, the specification that certain articles in the UDHR apply to both men and women is of course necessary if the project of universalizing human rights is to have any jurisprudential meaning. On the other hand, since the term "women" is used sparingly in the declaration, it invites speculations on why the term does not appear in articles that enshrine, say, a universal right to education (26) or to the prosperity made available in democratic societies

(29). The risk, in this account, is that universal human rights fail to be universal at the same time that they are applicable to women. As feminist and gender scholars have shown since the 1970s, rights never go without saying.

For Bowen, the problem facing women vis-à-vis their human rights claims is that in wartime their entitlements are contingent upon labour. As Allan Hepburn points out in *People, Places, Things* (2008), “Civic obligation determines her political outlook” (12). Participation in British political life takes place on the terms set by the nation-state, and in this case these terms involve the forfeiture of both civil liberties and the entitlements that historically accompany citizenship. In “Frankly Speaking,” a 1959 radio interview, Bowen echoes this sentiment: “Just as in an air raid, if you were a warden, which I was, you stump up and down the streets making a clatter with the boots you are wearing, knowing you can’t prevent a bomb falling, but thinking, ‘At any rate I’m taking part in this, I may be doing some good’” (334). For Maud Ellmann, the cast of *The Heat of the Day* also “revel[s] in the fellow-feeling of a city under siege” in a way that echoes Bowen’s interview (10). By this logic, Londoners make the best of the crisis restrictions that regulate their lives, and carry on with their wartime routines as best they can. Yet what undercuts the spirit of solidarity contained in Bowen’s account of wartime London in the interview as well as in her fiction is the ever-present threat of death during an air raid. For all that, *The Heat of the Day* depicts characters whose civil rights have been stripped in the name of the war effort, and who, careering about a city rocked by bomb blasts, do their part knowing that they may not make it through the night, despite the fact that the narrative of the People’s War is one of participation and self-sacrifice: a time during which individual interests defer to national ones. If, however, through Louie Bowen critiques the model of communal citizenship popularized in wartime and after, then through Stella she envisions a true-to-life account of

female wartime experience which calls to mind the burgeoning discourse of human rights at midcentury.

Unlike Louie, who relies on newspapers to apprise her of the fact that “Britain had something up her sleeve” as well as that the country “could always, in default of anything else, face facts” (*HD* 151), facing facts is precisely what Stella does throughout *The Heat of the Day*. Where Louie takes stock of happenings that “made the war seem human” (*HD* 152), Stella intuits that the category of the human is expressly what has been lost in this conflict. Indeed she does not indulge in the nationalistic fervour that sways Louie, and she thinks of the war in terms of individual feeling, not in terms of the flag-waving demanded in the papers. First and foremost, Stella acknowledges how total war has turned domestic life upside down. For one thing she lives in a series of flats that are not her own. Other people’s furniture fills the rooms that she rents: “Here in Weymouth Street she had the irritation of being surrounded by somebody else’s irreproachable taste: the flat, redecorated in the last year of peace, still marked the point at which fashion in the matter had stood still—to those who were not to know this room was not her own it expressed her unexceptionably but wrongly” (*HD* 24). The domestic spaces in which she finds herself put up do not reflect the outbreak of total war. From Stella’s point of view, however, this failure to observe the current state of war does not do justice to her sensibilities as a woman attuned to the juridical, political, and civilian exigencies of wartime. The war also inflects everyday speech: “In this flat, rooms had no names; there being only two, whichever you were not in was ‘the other room’” (*HD* 51). And when Harrison, surveying the room in which she lives, speaks highly of its furnishings, she says, “‘It’s not mine,’ she flickered. ‘Nothing in this flat is’” (*HD* 27). While Maud Ellmann asks in response to this passage “Who is Stella without her furniture? Does her identity belong to her belongings?” (146), the more important queries

with respect to this aspect of Bowen's novel concern whether Stella's identity inheres in her status as a rights-bearer who no longer enjoys the right of possession—to name but one instance of a right that has been repealed through emergency legislation—and whether the rescinding of rights that had been guaranteed through national affiliation has altered her character in any noticeable way.

The Heat of the Day suggests that Stella's identity, like that of the countless other dispossessed and rightless Londoners, does inhere, at least in part, in her belongings. Since she finds herself doubly dispossessed—not only of her property but also of the right to possession itself—she can no longer rely on her status as a rights-bearer to distinguish herself from the other people who surround her. The war, with its taking-away of entitlements formerly enjoyed by nationals, renders impossible differentiation based on rights. Under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, property no longer signifies a claim to ownership; it points to a common lack. If the war effaced the systems of class and privilege in the UK, then it also replaced these systems with the myth of the people: indistinguishable, self-effacing, fervently participatory. A result of the machinery of wartime propaganda, the totalizing category of the People supplants the individualizing category of the citizen. But in Bowen's London, the People are unified by rightlessness, not by commonly held entitlements. And this lack of rights enables the fiction of the People to carry so much weight and to draw attention away from the state of exception that has turned citizens into rightless citizens, despite this evident contradiction in terms.

Thoughtful and self-aware, Stella intuits the ways that living through the Second World War muddles up the possibility of human individuation. Thinking about her time in London since the Fall of France, she judges that “She had had the sensation of being on furlough from

her own life” (*HD* 94).² Of course, the mention of furlough calls to mind how the war shapes speech patterns and introduces into daily life idioms that nod to the global conflict. But it also contributes to Bowen’s impression that people tended to resemble one another, which she makes clear both in her fiction and in her non-fiction ruminations on the Second World War. In this instance Stella conveys her innermost thoughts in a language that is better representative of Roderick’s being in the armed services than of her being employed by the Ministry of Information, and, glancing about the city around her, she then relates how Londoners “began, even, all to look a little alike” (*HD* 94). This emphasis on the widespread similarity among citizens in wartime also crops up in Bowen’s 1945 preface to the American edition of *The Demon Lover and Other Stories*, in which she writes that

In war, this feeling of slight differentiation was suspended: I felt one with, and just like, everyone else. Sometimes I hardly knew where I stopped and somebody else began. The violent power destruction of solid things, the explosion of the illusion that prestige, power and permanence attach to bulk and weight, left all of us, equally, heady and disembodied. Walls went down; and we felt, if not knew, each other. We all lived in a state of lucid abnormality. (95)

Bowen’s stress on the feeling of wartime Britain echoes that of Stella in *The Heat of the Day*, such as when Stella says to Harrison, “These days, *you* always talk about feeling (*HD* 221; original emphasis). That Bowen draws attention to “the explosion of the illusion [of] prestige” echoes Spender’s view that “the breaking down of class barriers” (7) is the most significant

² So keenly does she discern this contrast between wartime living and pre-war living that she muses that “the ban, the check, the caution as to all spending and most of all the expenditure of feeling restricted them. Wariness had driven away poetry: from hesitating to feel came the moment when you no longer could. Was this war’s doing? By every day, every night, existence was being further drained” (*HD* 55).

renovation of British culture to emerge from the wartime experience. The myth of “the bomb story,” Spender claims, is that of “people forg[etting] themselves and acting disinterestedly” (15). Nevertheless, if in Spender’s account of the conflict people gave up individual entitlements and, in the name of the war effort, became an unselfish if rightless collective, then in Bowen’s account this ethos of self-sacrifice was less willed than foisted upon the citizenry: “War at present worked as a thinning of the membrane between the this and the that, it was a becoming apparent” (*HD* 195).

Yet for Stella in *The Heat of the Day*, this blurring of the boundaries or thinning of the membranes between self and other is a cause for alarm, not an indication of the truth behind the communal impulses of the People’s War. If anything unites the people of London at this time in the middle of the war it is the threat of German aggression or the memory of consecutive nights of air raids during the Blitz. Trekking back from Soho to her flat, Stella “began to feel it was not the country but occupied Europe that was occupying London—suspicious listening, surreptitious movement, and leaden hearts” (*HD* 126). This is decidedly not an image of the sort of spirited citizenship put forth in propaganda efforts such as *London Can Take It!* (1940). Instead, rightless British citizens slink about town after nightfall with “leaden hearts” and a keen awareness of their surroundings which has its origins in fear and frayed nerves. Moreover, as Stella continues towards her flat, “She had so dissolved herself . . . into the thousands of beings of oppressed people” (*HD* 127). While Louie embraces the state-sponsored narrative of inclusion, Stella understands that the defining communal experience of 1942 is one of collective oppression. As a result of the blue-penciling of rights-bearing individualism through emergency legislation, she notes “the indifference of the embattled city to private lives” (*HD* 99); in this context “private life” encapsulates not just the lack of domestic environments and personal property that Britons

can call home, but also how the dispossession of civil liberties does away with the category of the individual itself. And she even worries that “Tonight, the safety-curtain between the here and the there had lifted; the breath of danger and sorrow traveled over freely from shore to shore” (*HD* 126). For Stella, the safety guaranteed by Britain’s status as an “enislanded”—a word Bowen coins in her 1949 essay “English and American Writing” to capture a sense of isolation and removal from the world (*Weight* 30)—nation-state preserving the rights of its citizenry has proven to be illusory, and she in turn refuses to place trust in the prevailing us-versus-them discourse of the day.

Through Stella’s conversations with Harrison, Bowen homes in on how the binary logic of communal citizenship contained in wartime propaganda, for all its proclamations about the unified home front, draws on existing pre-war conditions and prejudices. Early in the novel Harrison comments, “‘Yes, it’s funny about the war—the way everybody’s on one side or the other’” (*HD* 31). His point is not that total war allows for neat divisions to be drawn between conflicting systems of value, but rather that it brings to the fore convictions that remain muted in peacetime. For Harrison war is less an eruption of a hitherto-unexpressed possibility of violence than a natural extension of the very political and juridical outlooks that lie dormant before open conflict has been declared. As he phrases it, “‘War, if you come to think of it, hasn’t started anything that wasn’t there already—what it does is, put the other lot of us in the right’” (*HD* 33). Later, Robert says as much in an argument with Stella: “‘This war’s just so much bloody quibbling about some thing that’s predecided itself’” (*HD* 282). In part, as Megan Faragher notes, these accounts resonate with the fact that during the Second World War propaganda “simplified and condensed the complicated nature of political allegiance into a hyperbolized vision of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (52). But the real danger underlying Harrison’s worldview, as Stella

sees it, is that a given nation-state may render licit an unconscionable political-juridical rule in which extraordinary measures are to be both understood as a given and assented to “with no more questions than at a government order” (*HD* 32). The risk, to Stella, is that when the conflict comes to an end the nation-state will become an apparatus whose political and juridical policies accord with those of the Harrisons of the world, the people who abrogate the rights of others and who often speak in maxims that do not leave room for deliberation on juridical matters: ““You talk as if there were rules,”” he says (*HD* 27).

In Bowen’s literary jurisprudence, Stella resists being encoded in the narrative of the People’s War both in her opposition to Harrison’s unflinchingly statist view of the necessity of civil rights violations and in her speculations upon the humanity that underlies the newly rightless British citizen. Having bumped into Louie at a restaurant while dining with Harrison, Stella reminds the factory worker of the category of the human and raises a defense of its continued importance. Reciting platitudes that she has read in the papers, Louie rather matter-of-factly informs Stella, ““we women are all in the same boat”” (*HD* 237). Bowen makes it clear that the women are far from being in the same boat.³ In contrast to Stella, Louie comes across as young, impressionable, and naïve. While Louie hopes to draw attention to their shared womanhood as a way of beginning a friendship, Stella conceives of women’s human rights as a sort of proof against the narrow universalizing rhetoric that circulates on the home front. Womanhood does not bring women together; for Stella, it points to their marginalization. Human rights jurisprudence opens up possibilities for talking about rights claims, in spite of the fact that emergency legislation has put an end to civil liberties. As Stella points out, ““we’re all three

³ This cliché appears elsewhere in *The Heat of the Day* as well. When in chapter Roderick first visits his mother, he says, while facing her, that ““This is like being opposite one another in a boat on a river”” (*HD* 53). For her part, Stella does not repeat the stock wartime phrase, and asks him: ““*Have* we ever been in a boat on a river—have we?”” (*HD* 53; italics in the original).

human. At any time it may be your hour or mine—you or I may be learning some terrible human lesson which is to undo everything we had thought we had. It's that, not death, that we ought to live prepared for" (HD 240). Unlike Louie, who thinks in terms of social roles and civic responsibilities, Stella gives prominence to their status as biological human beings and therefore as rights-bearing individuals. Even though this conversation takes place in a semi-dark restaurant after London has been shaken by aerial bombardment, Stella lingers over questions surrounding their possible violent deaths or the quashing of their systems of belief not in terms of warring nation-states but vis-à-vis their humanity. The tragedy of the Second World War, she argues, affects Britons both at home and overseas, but the fact that the nation-state is embroiled in a global conflict should not elide the individual human toll of the war. As she takes stock of the customers at the restaurant, Stella notes that "Not a person did not betray, by one or another glaring peculiarity, the fact of being human: her intimidating sensation of being crowded must have been due to this, for there were not so very many people here" (HD 225). Human rights have urgency because, as Lyndsey Stonebridge observes, "There is nothing stable about the 'human' to whom rights are supposed to attach themselves" ("Writing and Rights" 3). In other words, Stella's efforts to abstain from the model of cooperative citizenship advanced in British propaganda also faces challenges relating to the instability of the term human itself. Muriel Spark plays with this legal lacuna in her literary jurisprudence in *Robinson*, but Bowen homes in on how the slippage in the use of the term human constitutes the defining feature of the wartime category of the rightless citizen.

Throughout *The Heat of the Day*, Stella often acts as the sole agent capable of discriminating between individual biological humanity and communal citizenship, regardless of whether she is sizing up a member of the armed services or a civilian. When Roderick visits her

flat, for example, “He searched in Stella for some identity left by him in her keeping. It was a search undertaken principally for her sake: only she made him conscious of loss or change” (*HD* 48). He looks to his mother for confirmation about whether he has or has not changed since the outbreak of the war and the advent of the emergency legislation. From Stella’s point of view, Roderick’s concerns are far from trivial. In fact, he expresses her deepest fears for her son: “She dreaded dissolution inside his life, dissolution never to be repaired” (*HD* 49). Dissolution involves the blotting-out of Roderick’s very humanity in the name of the war effort, but Stella clarifies that this does not imply that he will be killed in the process. Rather, the dissolution that she dreads is a result of following the logic of the emergency provisions and wartime propaganda to their ineluctable ends. In light of this, Stella’s interactions with Harrison often bring to the fore her worries vis-à-vis her son.

Harrison, who has no fixed address and who globe-trots because of his work as a counterspy, irritates Stella to no end specifically because both his citizenship and his unswerving allegiance to the country have rendered him inhuman. As the narrator puts it, “His concentration on her was made more oppressive by his failure to have or let her give him any possible place in the human scene. By the rules of fiction, with which life to be credible must comply, he was as a character ‘impossible’—each time they met, for instance, he showed no shred or trace of having been continuous since they last met” (*HD* 140). Devoted to intelligence gathering, he is to Stella bereft of the usual traits she expects to see in people. In short, he embodies not the rights-bearing individual but the statist right regime, which aligns him with the communal war effort and which adds further distance between himself and individuals such as Robert who do not adhere to the normative demands of wartime citizenship.

Acting against Britain’s interests, Robert advocates for a vision of wartime citizenship

that is poles apart from that of the participatory narrative of the People's War. For Robert, "Treachery, disloyalty and trespass are the themes of the wartime social contract" (Stonebridge, *Judicial* 124), not voluntary involvement in civic affairs or the good-humoured overlooking of the suspension of civil liberties. Though both Stella and Robert resist the communal, self-effacing model of citizenship of the war, Stella aspires to replace this model with one that attends to individual rights claims as well as individual feeling, while Robert instead thinks of the validation of the individual in terms of a reactionary fascist politics that places itself in opposition to the nation-state. Talking to Robert in her blacked-out apartment Stella inquires:

Raising herself in order to be more clearly heard, she said: "Only, why are you against this country?"

"Country?"

"This, where we are."

"I don't see what you mean—what *do* you mean? Country?—there are no more countries left; nothing but names. What country have you and I outside this room? Exhausted shadows, dragging themselves out again to fight—and how long are they going to drag the fight out? We have come out at the far side of that." (*HD* 267; original emphasis)

Robert rails against the call for the scrapping of personal interests for the sake of protecting the nation-state, but he does so in a way that is eerily similar to the individuation processes that Stella hopes to promote throughout the novel. In a sense, he serves as a botched case study of her own liberal democratic principles. Flying in the face of the nation-state that abrogated civil liberties, Robert champions the validity of the human individual. In the course of doing so, he winds up selling national secrets and embracing fascist ideologies. He embodies "the discrete

individual who has separated himself from others through his or her exceptionalism”; in light of his fascist sympathies, however, he also “represents the now threatening prospect of the differentiated individual” (Faragher 58). Robert thus occupies what Agamben would call a zone of indistinguishability between left-leaning liberal politics and right-wing authoritarianism; in his ambition to promote the merits of individualism and to make a stand against nation-states that are playing truant vis-à-vis their human rights obligations he ends up furthering the interests of a totalitarian regime. In Bowen’s view, the universalizing rhetoric of the People’s War necessitates clinging to convenient yet spurious lines drawn between us and them, ally and enemy, patriot and traitor. Neil Corcoran, writing about *The Heat of the Day*, calls the novel “a story about entangled loyalties and treacheries” (168). In Bowen’s novel, these entanglements are not simply the result of an interlacing of impulses towards loyalty and treachery, but also—and more importantly—a commentary on the often Janus-faced nature of the motives that inform characters’ actions.

In “Conversation on Traitors,” broadcast on BBC radio on 21 August 1952, Bowen gives voice to what she sees as a form of “perverted patriotism” as a leading motivation for a certain kind of turncoat (320). Likening this person’s reasoning to that of a twisted expression of love or national belonging, she proposes that “Just as people can do drastic things to each other—hurt each other because they believe it will attain some good for the person hurt”—so too can fifth columnists betray their country in the hopes of securing a better future for that nation (320). In this, Bowen not only complicates but also points to the arbitrariness of national affiliation as a category that determines the human rights of individuals, both in wartime and in peacetime. If, she asks in her broadcast as well as in *The Heat of the Day*, the motives that can lead a national to campaign on behalf of their country are the very same as those which can incite that national

to conspire against the political interests of their nation-state, then what is to be said of the relationship between a citizen and their sovereign vis-à-vis the bestowing of rights? What's more, how is it that that entity composed of separate executive, judicial, and parliamentary branches which is responsible for designating the rights-conferring status of citizenship is also the entity that in times of emergency strips away the rights of individuals? Since the problem is not one of unadorned motive but of the appraisal of that motive, and since the nation-state adjudicates this matter, Bowen reasons, the administration of rights should not fall under the purview of an entity whose interests may at times clash with those of the individual rights-bearer. In the same broadcast, she asks the other invited speakers, Nigel Balchin, Alan Moorehead, and Noel Annan, whether the demands of citizenship were matters of degree or of kind: "Do you think that the scale of the betrayal—the size of the issues at stake, such as atomic secrets—determines the scale, the size, the magnitude or the ability of the traitor?" (Bowen, "Conversation" 306).⁴ For Bowen, the same logic informs the actions of the defector who trades in nuclear secrets as the defector who passes on what he or she may consider to be relatively harmless bits of information. Her literary jurisprudence focuses on how the "perverted patriot"

⁴ The broadcast shares some of the prominent political concerns of Bowen's *The Heat of the Day*, not least in the attention that the novel pays to questions of loyalty and treachery as well as of citizenship and rights-bearing. Both "Conversation on Traitors" and *The Heat of the Day* attend to the crucial role that private conversations play in the larger theatre of war. As Roderick informs his mother, "'conversations are the leading thing in this war . . . Everything you and I have to do is the result of something that's been said. How far do you think we'd get without conversations?'" (*HD* 63). That even the most apparently innocuous of conversations shape the course of the Second World War—careless talk costs lives, after all—highlights the way in which the conflict has made it increasingly difficult to disentangle the individual from the communal. For Stella, this expresses the erasure or, at the very least, the incorporation of the individual into international conflicts: so much so that, when Stella is talking to Robert at a restaurant, the narrator notes, "No, there is no such thing as being alone together" (*HD* 195). The spectre of history makes itself known in Bowen's novel: "Their time sat in the third place at their table. They were the creatures of history, whose coming together was of a nature possible in no other day—the day was inherent in the nature" (*HD* 194-195).

operates outside the rule of law and against the national interests of a given state, but at the same time pursues ends that are at least nominally in line with those of the sovereign they have renounced.

As well as echoing Robert's messy relationship with the British nation-state, this conception of the Janus-faced nature not only of national affiliation but also of democracy itself acts as one of Bowen's subtler critiques of the People's War. In "Britain in Autumn," a draft of her essay "London, 1940," Bowen writes that "We have almost stopped talking about Democracy because, for the first time, *we are* a democracy" (54; original emphasis). Yet this impression of democracy as having come to a head during the Blitz of course stands in opposition to the passing of emergency legislation that was decidedly less democratic than it was totalitarian. Gill Plain even calls the war years the era of an "ironically authoritarian democracy" that preceded the founding of the welfare state (6). Elsewhere in her writings Bowen undercuts the supposedly super-democratic nature of the Second World War when, following an air raid, she asserts that "It is a fine morning and we are still alive" (*PPT* 218). Whereas in Hobbes's thought the state of nature is "life always exposed to a threat that now rests exclusively in the hands of the sovereign" (Agamben, *MWE* 5), in Bowen's London not only has the sovereign lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in its territory but through emergency legislation it has also abolished the separation of the judicial, executive, and parliamentary branches of the state. Moreover, in her preface to *The Demon Lover*, Bowen also remarks that "self-expression in small ways stopped—the small ways had been so very small that we had not realized how much they amounted to. Planning fun, going places, choosing and buying things, dressing yourself up, and so on. All that stopped. You used to know what you were like from the things you liked, and chose" (97). Even Bowen's syntax captures the sense of loss that dominates this memory of the

lean war years; the comma between “liked” and “and chose” adds a pause that expresses how the simple pleasures derived from being able to make a decision are no longer within reach. In any case, her meditations on the Second World War point to the two-sided nature of wartime democracy: democratic in name but authoritarian in practice. For Robert, that liberal democratic principles are indistinguishable from totalitarian oppression gives grounds for rethinking political allegiance altogether, with the result that he champions a law not rooted in the nation-state but instead springing from individual human action. Individual will, he thinks, exceeds the law.

When Stella confronts Robert about his secret-selling, he announces the extent of his contempt for the communal myth of the People’s War. As the narrator puts it, “The war-warmed impulse of people to be *a* people had been derisory; he had hated the bloodstream of the crowds, the curious animal psychic oneness, the human lava-flow. Even the leaded enthusiasm, so deeply shared, had provoked him” (*HD* 275; original emphasis). “[L]eaded enthusiasm” calls to mind Bowen’s earlier description of Londoners trudging through the city at night with “leaden hearts,” which suggests that Robert serves as a distortion both of the myth of national unity (in that he shares the same leaden sentiments as the staunch nationalists who remained in the capital) and of Stella’s belief in individuation based on local human rights claims. In an effort to confront the ongoing incorporation of people into People, Robert elects to search for law within himself, but what he finds is a perversion of two conflicting belief systems. Attempting to explain himself, he says to Stella: ““We’ve seen law in each other”” (*HD* 271). In a sense, his line of thinking is in keeping with the call for the reform of superficially liberal democratic principles in an often-quoted passage from “The New Europe,” which was published in the *Times* on 1 July 1940:

If we speak of democracy, we do not mean a democracy which maintains the right to vote but forgets the right to work and the right to live. If we speak of freedom, we do

not mean a rugged individualism which excludes social organization and economic planning. If we speak of equality, we do not mean a political equality nullified by social and economic privilege The European house cannot be put in order unless we put our own house in order first. The new order cannot be based on the preservation of privilege, whether the privilege be that of country, or of an individual. (5)

Statist and conservative in its political outlook, this article locates the changes it calls for in a renovation of policies surrounding political life in Britain at this early stage in the war. What Robert asks of Stella is nothing less than a realignment of their juridical relationships, not just towards other people but also towards the state (Rose 16). Although he hopes to appeal to their shared conviction of the worth and dignity of the individual even or especially in times of emergency, their conversation lays bare the political distance that now separates their outlooks. While Stella might be sympathetic to his view that he has ““a right to my own side”” (*HD* 272), the two lovers disagree about crucial issues: though she calls Nazi Germany ““specious, unthinkable, grotesque”” (*HD* 274), Robert not only accepts this characterization of the Third Reich but also says that ““they have started something. You may not like it, but it’s the beginning of a day. A day on our scale”” (*HD* 274). For him, the opportunity for individual differentiation made possible through the Axis Powers justifies his double-dealing, in that it enables him to move beyond the communal-participatory model of national affiliation demanded of British citizens. Throughout *The Heat of the Day*, then, Bowen sets Stella and Robert in opposition to each other in order to demonstrate how individual rights claims, however well-intentioned, can be perverted in the same way that the narrative of the People’s War perverts the ostensibly inclusive political and juridical category of the citizen.

In *Citizens in War—and After* Spender asserts that in the mind of the British war “is simply an ultimate way of asserting the reality of their own existence” (38). Robert garbles this ideal of the differentiated individual throughout *The Heat of the Day*, but in her literary jurisprudence Bowen insists that this is a personal failing, not a condemnation of rights-bearing individualism. Rather, Stella’s approach to rights, an approach that both attends to and also identifies the juridical category of the human rights-bearer, offers a corrective to Robert’s fascistic convictions. After Robert’s death, Stella “seemed to be someone for the first time finding herself alone among humanity” (*HD* 293). She later reassures her son, when he asks her, “do you really think that I am a person?” (*HD* 300), that he is not merely or not exclusively a citizen but a rights-bearing individual. Far from dismissing rights-based individualism, *The Heat of the Day* instead pays special attention to those perversions, both political and juridical, which blur the lines between the rights-bearer and the rightless citizen, the People and the excluded other, the patriot and the traitor, and the democratic and the authoritarian systems of governance on which the novel turns.

Citizens and Savages: Human Rights in Rose Macaulay's *The World My Wilderness*

By drawing on the discourses of barbarism and civility that circulated during the war years, Rose Macaulay nods to the emerging language of postwar human rights declarations and conventions in *The World My Wilderness* (1950). The UDHR takes to task the “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind” (“Preamble”) since the outbreak of global war in 1939. In general, human rights legislation aims to curb the proliferation of rights violations and other barbarous acts in the future. Macaulay views citizenship and savagery as mutually defining categories, not as the result of a narrative of progress in which lawless barbarians assimilate into the political life of the nation-state. In this respect, *The World My Wilderness* is a *Bildungsroman*, but a messy one. A story of arrested development, the novel calls attention to Barbary’s bullheaded refusal to adjust to the juridical demands of British civilian life in 1946. Though immature and unsympathetic, Barbary acts as an example *par excellence* of how narratives of personal development are at odds with narratives of nation-building in the postwar. The novel suggests that human rights, rather than citizenship, promote respect for individuals. After the prolonged crisis of the war years, the nation-state has to imagine new political relationships with individual rights-bearers based on human, not civil, rights.

In “Consolations of the War,” published in *The Listener* on 16 January 1941, Macaulay worried that the British campaign against Nazi Germany threatened to topple liberal democratic principles on the home front:

It is, of course, an extremely horrid business; a grotesquely barbarous, uncivilized, inhumane and crazy way of life to have been forced on us by a set of gangsters who are making us use their own weapons and practice their own horrid incivilities—as if

we were jungle savages like themselves instead of twentieth-century men and women who had hoped war to be for ever outlawed. (75)

Macaulay condemns the injustices carried out against Allied nation-states and civilian populations both in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. At the same time, this description calls to mind the character of Barbary in *The World My Wilderness*. Both Macaulay's brief essay for *The Listener* and her postwar novel employ a common vocabulary. The essay rails against right-wing authoritarianism, while the novel finds fault with an infantile teenager who clings to a way of life that led to the deaths of thousands of nationals suspected of collaboration following the Liberation of France. Though the "Consolations of the War" essay makes use of terms such as citizens and savages to denounce a loathed enemy, *The World My Wilderness* turns this focus on Nazi savagery on its head by paying attention to the sympathetic motives of an unsympathetic and uncivilized character such as Barbary: the liberation of an occupied nation from the hands of its brutish conquerors.

In *The World My Wilderness* Macaulay calls attention to the proliferation of barbarism resulting from military alliances during the Second World War, but she does so in order to shed light on the national and political allegiances that inspire rights-bearing individuals to violate the rights of others. In postwar Europe, nation-states were coming to grips with the grisly human rights violations at the same time as they were founding intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and drafting ambitious international legislation. Macaulay's literary jurisprudence hinges on the co-presence of postwar human rights discourse and the exclusionary politics of the statist rights regime in the British cultural imagination. What concerns her, in *The World My Wilderness*, is not Barbary's savagery being imported into postwar Britain, but the way that the discourse of savagery comes into contact with—and then shapes—the discourses of civilization

and rights.

For Macaulay, a spurious distinction between the barbarism that takes place on foreign soil and the barbarism that takes place at home elides the juridical contexts that enable such behaviour to occur in the first place. Macaulay stresses that the barbarism that takes root on the home front is just as pernicious as its counterpart on foreign soil. More specifically, *The World My Wilderness* asks whether citizens can also be collaborators, and how occupation affects the entitlements of the individual rights-bearer. The choice of allegiances—to national identity or to sovereign authority—is of supreme political importance and legal significance. Although these rival systems of political loyalty certainly inform Barbary's worldview, Macaulay attends to the contact zones in which opposing belief systems converge upon one another. Maurice, for example, refuses to face the fact that even the most civilized of motives can result in affiliations with totalitarian regimes. Through Maurice, Macaulay shows that injustices occur regardless of a citizen's having being aligned with either the Allies or the Axis.

Throughout *The World My Wilderness*, Macaulay offers teasingly few snippets of information about the extent of Maurice's collaboration with the Nazis. Early in the novel the narrator notes that he had "collaborated mildly but prosperously from 1940 to 1945" (7), and that "having collaborated, however mildly, the Michels had lived quite well, and had been able to ameliorate also the lives of many of their neighbours, including some of the local maquis, a thankless tribe" (7-8). Though his traffic with the Occupying forces is said to have benefitted the wider community in Provence, the maquis execute him. Explaining Maurice's rationale for doing business with the Germans, the narrator remarks, "Maurice had made money out of the Nazis, and had accommodated himself with ease to Vichy, saying that, since France had come to terms with Germany, it was not for French citizens to wage a private war of their own" (23). By this

logic, resisting Occupation would be the equivalent of disavowing the allegiances that nationals have to their nation-state.

Collaboration was a marker of good citizenship for Maurice; doing business with his conquerors was beside the point. As Macaulay makes clear, his decision to have dealings with the Nazis was far from unconsidered. A serious concern for civility, as well as respect for sovereign power, informed his judgment: “They had won; France had lost; it was the fortune of the war; what would you have? One must behave like a civilized being, even to victorious invaders, not lurk round them like savages in a jungle, plotting and executing futile vengeance” (23). Maurice regards the business of ferreting out and subsequently putting to death Resistance fighters as barbaric; at the same time, he behaves as though profiting from his business with the Nazis is a token of his own *savoir-vivre*. In this regard, the novel frets about citizenship when the nation-state no longer fulfills its historical rights-bestowing role and when totalitarian regimes demand the very same duties of individuals as liberal democratic countries.

Mistrustful of contemporary British culture, Barbary thinks that her values are the anti-authoritarian ones of the *maquis* even while she lives with her British family in London. As Macaulay wrote to Hamilton on 1 April 1952, “*The Wilderness* was a meditation on Ruin, physical and material, with a lost waif for its central character” (*Letters to a Friend* 300).). As a waif—a homeless individual—Barbary represents displaced people in postwar Europe. For this reason, Barbary shares affinities with Macaulay, who, after her home was destroyed in an air raid on 10 May 1941, wrote that she felt “bombed and burned out of existence, and nothing saved. I am bookless, homeless, sans everything but my eyes to weep with” (qtd. in Pong 100). Barbary sees in the devastation of postwar Europe the sundering of nation from state. Manifestations of this rootlessness emerge in the forms of refugeeism, statelessness, and displaced persons. But in

Barbary's case this experience of the cleaving of nation, as manifested in Matthew Hart's vision of the "consanguinity" (505) of national identity and sovereign authority, from the political organization of the state is a direct result of living in Vichy France and under Occupation. Barbary is out of place and out of step with the political and cultural orthodoxies with which Sir Gulliver enjoins her to comply. Recognizing these defining elements of her waifish character opens up *The World My Wilderness* to interpretations that depart from the usual focus on the landscape of the novel, as discussed by Leo Mellor, Beryl Pong, and others.

In fact, Macaulay focuses on landscape in order to think about sovereignty through an historical lens, not simply a British one. She traces different forms of allegiance and citizenship as far back as the Roman Empire, while castigating the brutishness that underlies centuries of political rule in Europe:

The peace that shrouded land and sea was a mask, lying thinly over terror, over hate, over cruel deeds done. Barbarism prowled and padded, lurking in the hot sunshine, in the warm scents of the maquis, in the deep shadows of the forest. Visigoths, Franks, Catalans, Spanish, French, Germans, Anglo-American armies, savageries without number, the Gestapo torturing captured French patriots, rounding up fleeing Jews, the Resistance murdering, derauling trains full of people, lurking in the shadows to kill, collaborators betraying Jews and escaped prisoners, working together with the victors, being in their turn killed and mauled, hunted down by mobs hot with rage; everywhere cruelty, everywhere vengeance, everywhere the barbarian on the march.

(109-110)

In this bloody account of European political history, the only constant is the increasingly heinous nature of the atrocities unleashed upon citizens, from Rome's clashes with Germanic tribes to the

Third Reich's extermination camps and grimly efficient methods for bureaucratizing statelessness and rightlessness. Macaulay does not elegize Empire and Westphalian sovereignty so much as she paints an unflattering portrait of a European history of civil and human rights abuses.

For Macaulay, civilization does not emerge out of barbarism; instead, civilization progresses in tandem with savagery. The more civilized Europe becomes, the more barbaric becomes its means of doing violence to citizens. As the narrator predicts, "Savagery waited so close on the margins of life; one day it would engulf all" (112). In *The World My Wilderness* Macaulay situates Barbary within this common history of civilization and barbarism. "History is not on the side of the young," Pong writes, "and it nearly swallows Barbary whole" (107). People are so uncomfortable with Barbary because she lays bare the fiction of historical development, which holds that political organization came to a head with the emergence of the modern nation-state, but which in reality conceals the rise of human rights abuses that coincided with the rise of international human rights declarations.

Shrugging off a model of citizenship premised upon citizens being under allegiance to a sovereign, Barbary proposes a new relationship between individuals and nation-states that has its origins in the principles enshrined in human rights jurisprudence. "Nations contain and naturalize the problem of uneven development by appeal to a common culture, language, and destiny," Jed Esty argues in *Unseasonable Youth*, but he also contends that "such claims cannot really be sustained by the inorganic entities of the modern state, the baggy empire, or the acultural world system" (26). *The World My Wilderness* puts forth a similar critique of the inability of the nation-state to serve as a crucible that makes possible the free development of the human personality and, at the same time, that insists on the obedience of its citizens. In this, Macaulay

engages critically with the tradition of the *Bildungsroman*, but she does so in political and historical ways rather than in purely literary ways. For Pong, “*The World My Wilderness* purports, in part, to be a *Bildungsroman*, a text about attempts to educate and ‘civilize’ youth astray in their trajectories towards adulthood” (107). The novel is skeptical about how a narrative of personal growth or political cohesion could ever hope to ring true after the war.

Macaulay’s engagement with the *Bildungsroman* in *The World My Wilderness* begins with the fact that the novel of education takes citizenship as a given. Citizenship is a category of group membership that confers rights. In theory the citizen and the state find themselves in a relationship of mutual obligation, with either party having duties towards the other. As Joseph Slaughter points out, however, human rights have historically been understood as “the rights of incorporated citizens” (89), which suggests that “both human rights and the *Bildungsroman* equivocate as a matter of form” (88). From a juridical point of view, that equivocation lies in the fact that the *Bildungsroman* takes citizenship for granted insofar as the protagonist will be integrated into the nation-state at the conclusion of the novel. Human rights jurisprudence enjoys no such certainty, and, as in Bowen’s *The Heat of the Day*, this legal discourse calls into question the self-evidence of the category of the citizen as the vehicle through which individuals acquire rights. Similarly, because citizenship is at issue in *The World My Wilderness*, integration into political life is far from assured. The case of Maurice makes clear that belief in civilization or in the nation-state as the guarantor of civil liberties and human rights is not an overt good. Macaulay plays with the *Bildungsroman* at a time of crisis of faith in the European nation-state; she tackles jurisprudential topics that are decidedly of the postwar moment. Sovereignty is not above reproach, Macaulay argues, and while lawless states such as Nazi Germany enjoyed territorial sovereignty in the same manner as responsible states, they lacked a concomitant

respect for human rights. Since the difficulties that *The World My Wilderness* presents are juridical and political in nature, Macaulay's novel toys with the *Bildungsroman* in order to question the relationship between individuals and the state vis-à-vis postwar human rights discourse.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes the traditional literary engagement with subject formation in the *Bildungsroman* a matter of international human rights law, rather than a matter of the domestic politics of individual nation-states. Article 29.1-2 expresses, in a clear and concise form, the relationship between citizen and nation-state which so preoccupies the *Bildungsroman*:

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

Article 29.1 captures the paradox of the differentiated, individual subject of human rights. Individuals exist as such within a community of fellow rights-bearers, yet they are both psychologically and judicially distinct from the other members of their community. Wendy Brown proposes that “attention to paradox help[s] formulate a political struggle for rights in which they are conceived neither as instruments nor as ends, but as articulating through their instantiation what equality and freedom might consist in that exceeds them” (241). Much like fiction, human rights imagine possible worlds. They aspire to realize, on the international stage,

the principles enshrined in declarations and conventions. Moreover, the rights-bearing individual envisaged in documents such as the UDHR does not exist in a vacuum: it is predicated upon the mutual recognition of—and by—two human beings, or an individual and the state, that the person with whom they have come into some sort of a relation is the subject of rights. A bizarre category of entitlements, human rights are subject to legislation that places constraints upon individual liberties in order to safeguard the rights of others and to ensure what Article 29.2 describes as “the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”

The World My Wilderness confronts the discourse of international human rights by asking what, exactly, constitutes a just postwar order, and which principles of good citizenship can incorporate individual citizens into a Europe that is still reeling from six years of global conflict. For one thing, the teenagers in the novel—Barbary and Raoul; the English deserters, Horace and Jock; the shoplifter, Mavis—reject Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: the freedom of worship and the freedom of speech, and the freedom from fear and the freedom from want. As Whittington has shown, by dwelling on Roosevelt’s rights paradigm, Macaulay taps into ongoing discussions about how to frame the language of international human rights in the 1940s and 1950s. Ratified seven years after Roosevelt’s speech, the UDHR relies on the Four Freedoms in order to push for a new postwar rights agenda: “the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people” (“Preamble”). The Preamble notes that a desire for a world that resembles the one put forth in the Four Freedoms speech “has been proclaimed,” but it does not feign that such rights and freedoms are being respected around the world. This formulation also expresses the antagonism between the declared human rights aspirations of the UDHR and

the brute fact that international bodies such as the UN lack both the resources and the political clout necessary to enforce the principles of the declaration on the international stage. At the same time, this section of the Preamble in the UDHR bears resemblances to the ability of the novel form to imagine alternative worlds with different modes of political organization.

For Macaulay, the theoretical investments of both human rights law and literature converge through the question of mobility. Citing an undated article entitled “The Fifth Freedom: Getting About” written by Macaulay and housed in Trinity College, Cambridge, Whittington has demonstrated that during the war “Macaulay was thinking about the emergent discourse of human rights and its connection to the national-state, and . . . she saw liberty of movement within and across national frontiers as a key determinant of free citizenship” (15). The dates of composition for this piece are unknown, Whittington notes, but he conjectures that it was written during the war. Nevertheless, Macaulay’s essay anticipates the content and the key terms of Article 13.1 of the UDHR, which holds that “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.” Article 13.2 continues in the same bent and avails of this language of mobility: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” Her investment in the freedom of mobility, entrenched in human rights law in 1948 with the drafting of the UDHR, crops up in *The World My Wilderness* as Barbary travels between Britain and France as well as from the Scottish Highlands to London. Her mobility jumbles her legal understanding of the concept of citizenship, so much so that the British teenager aligns herself with the French nation and its Resistance fighters even though she is a subject of the common law for the bulk of the novel. Over the course of the Second World War, Macaulay therefore advocated for further entitlements than those contained in Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech before this legal discourse rose to prominence in the immediate postwar

years. She continued to reflect on the scope of individual human rights in the 1950s, especially vis-à-vis women's human rights. In *The Towers of Trebizond* (1958), a novel that centres on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, Aunt Dot seeks to convert Turkish, Israeli, and Palestinian citizens to the Anglican Church as a means of promoting the human rights of women. Unapologetically mobile, Aunt Dot slips under the Iron Curtain in order to roam about the USSR.

For all of Macaulay's investment in the rights talk of the 1940s, the maquis consider Roosevelt's Four Freedoms and, by extension, those imported into the Preamble of the UDHR to be at odds with the lived experience of postwar Britain. Especially suspect to these waifs is the freedom from fear, which they dismiss as sheer high-minded theory, not a human entitlement that anyone, least of all individuals out of step with the nation-state, could ever presume to enjoy:

“Freedom from fear of the policeman knocking at the door, I've heard it say it means,” Jock dubiously said. “And we ought to have it, it's our right. But we have no such thing at all. What call have policemen to be knocking on our doors at all hours, putting fear into us? I've heard it say it should only be the postman and the milkman that knocks, and so it should. Wasn't it Churchill said that, or one o' them big-shots? Then why don't they stop 'em from knocking, that's what I'm asking?” (61)

Jock conflates all authority with authoritarianism, the usual way in which the younger generation of the novel regards sovereign authority. As Randall Stevenson has shown, this refusal to recognize the reinstatement of the law is in keeping with how many “postwar British writers found a whiff of remembered fascism tainting not only authority, but also authorship . . . committed . . . to decisive imposition of pattern and order on the world” (103). The Provence maquis, as Barbary and Raoul think of themselves while they consort with the London branch of their movement, have an unwavering “police-phobia,” an aversion to law enforcement that the

narrator describes as “that natural and laudable distaste of the properly constituted human mind” (52). Likewise, for the cast of the so-called London maquis, authority demands reciprocal obligations as a necessary precondition for the bestowing of rights, which, in their minds, makes impossible differentiation based upon individual human rights. Far from safeguarding “the inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” (UHDR, “Preamble”), the state, in the eyes of these maquis, encroaches upon the freedoms of citizens.

Unable to fulfill its rights-bestowing function in *The World My Wilderness*, the state overlooks the right to “security of person” enshrined in Article 3 of the UDHR. Authority is synonymous with abuses of authority for the waifs, and when state or police authorities invoke the law they consider it to be a rights-denying force. This understanding of the law as an instrument that suspends rights is a hangover from Vichy France, in the cases of Barbary and Raoul, and of the constraints set in place by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, in the cases of the other members of the London maquis. Because of these prejudices, Barbary and her delinquent colleagues take issue with the fact that “human rights should be protected by the rule of law,” as the UDHR urges (“Preamble”). Instead, they believe that rights have their origins in the individual, not in the state. Bringing human rights into law, they think, muddles up the human origins of these entitlements. And even if they were to put faith in an overarching structure beyond the individual person they would do so in the familial and fraternal bonds of nation rather than in the institutional obligations of a particular political organization.

Given that her coming-of-age characters spurn any sort of affiliation with the British state, Macaulay highlights how the *Bildungsroman* is unsuited to portrayals of political incorporation in the postwar world. Her focus on adolescents playing truant vis-à-vis their social

and civil duties does not result in their ultimate reintroduction into political life at the conclusion of the novel. As Esty observes, “The trope of adolescence, once conceived of as entertaining the telos of maturity (and, by allegorical extension, the telos of modernization), comes to refer both to that developmental process *and* to its multiple sites of failure or incompleteness” (36; original emphasis). For Macaulay, that telos of incorporation does not pass muster when applied to displaced people in the postwar. If *The World My Wilderness* is to be considered along novelistic-generic lines, then it would best fit not with the European *Bildungsroman* but with what Esty terms the “metabildungsroman,” which he characterizes as “mixing antidevelopmental and developmental narrative units” (37). Concentrating on static, immobile characters allows Macaulay to look to the ties, both social and political, that bind the individual rights-bearer to the larger political community around her or him, and to probe why these connections fail in their inclusive ambitions at this particular historical moment. With her emphasis on arrested development in *The World My Wilderness*, Macaulay investigates the relationship between the novelistic character and the aspiring citizen whose actions place her or him within a narrative of incorporation into the political fabric of the nation, but who, in the postwar, is incapable of the personal growth necessary for integration in the nation-state.

Instead of penning a narrative of national incorporation, Macaulay writes about the paralyzing effects of postwar guilt, about Barbary’s stubborn refusal to adapt to changing political climates, and about the non-integration of citizens into the nation. As Stonebridge notes, Macaulay “takes ‘war guilt’ as a starting point for forging some kind of relation with recent history” (*Anxiety* 100), but she also points out that in *The World My Wilderness* the “post-war moral wilderness only just stays this side of kitsch. But perhaps in this way it manages to say something more historically pertinent about the writing of guilt. For it seems to me that it is not

some kind of unspeakable anxiety, but an over-naming of guilt that is the issue here” (*Anxiety* 100-101). The crux of Macaulay’s novel lies precisely in her investment in literary kitsch, although it is kitsch of a decidedly postwar variety: the result not of indulging in lengthy descriptions of a ruined London, but of questioning whether it is possible to move forward following the Second World War, and, if possible, how one would go about doing that. In a letter to Father Johnson on 9 January 1951, Macaulay explained that her fixation on guilt at this time was the result of her thinking about responsibility, whether that responsibility takes place in the realm of politics, religion, or otherwise: “I don’t mean, can one be forgiven, but can one be good, honest, unselfish, scrupulous. Or is the whole basis and structure of character sapped by the long years of low life?” (*Letters to a Friend* 51). Though she is writing here about her own failings, she may as well be speaking about Barbary in *The World My Wilderness*. The teenager’s anxiety about coming to grips with personal guilt in the aftermath of the war provides occasions for talking about human rights through the lens of individual accountability.

Surrounded by the debris of bombed churches and buildings, Barbary delivers a sermon of her own on the nature of guilt and responsibility:

“It is a pity, Barbary said, after a moment, “that if we others do wicked things, they stay done. Christians can undo what they’ve done by confession and absolution. Do you remember Henri Leclos at Port Vendres, him who attacked little girls? Then one day he was nearly drowned in a storm and he repented and got absolution and began a new life. So it was all right for him, but it made no difference to the little girls and their parents. If you are a Christian, you just think how you have sinned against God, and God will forgive you if you repent. But we others can’t be forgiven, because we sin only against people, and the people stay hurt or killed, or whatever it is we have

done to them. It would be better to be a Christian and get forgiveness, and only mind about God and hell. Perhaps I shall myself turn devout, in that church.” (45)

Although the oration is largely religious in nature, it lends itself to discussions about the nature of postwar human rights jurisprudence. A similar point can be made of the raving priest’s speech in the bombed-out church in London. The clergyman’s mental instability has its origins in his lived experience of the Blitz; his sermon on hell is partly a painful reminder of air raids during the Second World War. *The Towers of Trebizond* also employs religious terminology in a human rights context, with Aunt Dot and, to a lesser extent, Laurie hoping to better the entitlements of women in the Middle East by converting them to the Anglican Church.

Yet Barbary does not grasp the finer points about human rights, since she was “Deprived of basic rights under Vichy” and therefore “has no corollary sense of her responsibilities to those others with whom she shares the polity” (Whittington 13). Regardless of her limited knowledge about citizenship and human rights, Barbary understands guilt in its most immediate, pressing instantiations. At its core, Barbary thinks, guilt is about individual responsibility, which precludes the intervention of the nation-state. Macaulay mobilizes Barbary’s guilt in the novel to tender the suggestion that human rights jurisprudence offers a theoretical lens through which to advocate on behalf of individuals beyond the terms set by the state. Rather than faith, she wrestles with the weight of her own actions in Vichy France, and in Macaulay’s judgment, responsibility promotes individuation, not group membership, communal identity, or religious persuasion.

Recalling her involvement in the activities of the maquis and her undisclosed roles in plots to do away with collaborators, Barbary translates religious guilt into secular terms which attempt to broach the topic of individual accountability. For example, Barbary says, ““Repenting

and confessing. It only puts *you* in the right, not what you've done to people” (59; original emphasis). For Barbary, what she has done to other people not only appears beyond forgiveness, but also debars her from participating in the cultural and political life in Britain. On the one hand, she worries that her having trapped a German soldier renders it impossible for her to reintegrate into postwar society. Both British law and international law oppose the model of reprisal advanced by the maquis. Looking back to the war years, she calls to mind the fact that “No one had known. They knew that she had been caught by the Germans, beaten a little, released with a warning. They did not know that she had met again in the forest the one who had ordered her to be beaten and released; met him there three times, and the third time it was a trap. They had only known of the trap, and had praised her for her cunning” (58). The maquis executed this unnamed German soldier, with whom Barbary, it is suggested, may have had two sexual encounters after having been raped by this very man; the third encounter results in his death. Macaulay leaves unclear the extent to which Barbary took part in these trysts—namely, the nature of her relationship with the Nazi soldier, and how willing she was while engaging in this dalliance. On the other hand, she also thinks that her having stood by while the maquis drowned Maurice firmly estranges her from civilized life; nevertheless, Macaulay does not indicate one way or another whether Barbary or Raoul would have been able to put a stop to the plan. In ruminations about her wild years among the maquis, Barbary thinks, in a rather defeatist and self-hating tirade, that there was “Nothing to be done about it, in that jungle world in which justice could not be invoked, in which the only safety—and how incomplete—from betrayal was the universal guilt, in which the hated enemy, pacing ominously heavily, on the jungle margins, integrated its denizens into a wary school-tie solidarity, defensive yet precarious” (121). This meditation is less self-involved than it may at first appear. Despite the limits of her adolescent

point of view and her repudiation of all forms of authority, she taps into a larger theoretical concern set out in the novel as a whole: the mutually-defining categories of the savage and the citizen. In Barbary's account, civilization boasts no hard and fast distinction from savagery, but rather follows from the process of savages establishing group membership and, as a result, consolidating communal identity. And since "denizen" refers, historically, to an individual who is allocated certain rights in a country to which he or she has relocated, Barbary's language is in keeping with Macaulay's vision of the girl as being homeless—a waif—in postwar Europe. Barbary's point is not that citizens should abandon their investment in justice in light of the atrocities of the war years, but that postwar justice takes place beyond the borders of nation-states. As in Muriel Spark's *Robinson*, this new arena for justice assumes the form of extra-legal claims and counter-claims, with individual rights-bearers holding nation-states responsible for violating the rights of nationals and also overriding the principle of non-interference in the domestic matters of sovereign nations.

Throughout *The World My Wilderness*, Macaulay exploits the twin discourses of civilization and savagery to show how the rise of the nation-state occurred alongside the rise of human rights violations. In this, she shares concerns with Dorothy Thompson, who argued, as early as 1939, that nationalism was "turning the world into a jungle The jungle is growing up, and the jungle is on fire" (39). By dwelling on the non-integration into political life of a character such as Barbary, Macaulay's novel flirts with the *Bildungsroman*, but it does so to point out how the genre is no longer sustainable in a geopolitical world in which the category of the citizen itself has been thrown into question by human rights, statelessness, and other postwar juridical concerns. The strongest critique of the nation-state as the historical progenitor of rights in *The World My Wilderness*, in the end, comes from Raoul. Initially, Raoul sounds juvenile in

his unflinching, anti-authoritarian stance; he declares that he opposes “the Gestapo, the Fascists, the laws” (60). He later speaks with authority when he says, “I shall collaborate. That is to say, I shall observe the laws” (175). Macaulay’s displaced postwar youths think of the law in relation to the scrapping of civil liberties through either emergency legislation or totalitarian politics. This amalgamation of law with lawlessness and civilization with barbarism frustrates the impulse towards development and inclusion in the *Bildungsroman*. For Macaulay, focusing upon the traditional role that the nation-state has had in dispensing rights to its nationals elides the concomitant human rights violations that have occurred in tandem with political organization and because of it. Her depictions of the London maquis enable her to flesh out alternative means of safeguarding the rights of individuals through postwar human rights jurisprudence.

Human Rights in Muriel Spark's *Robinson*: Contestation and Juridical Personhood

Postwar anxiety about the emancipatory potential of human rights jurisprudence pervades Muriel Spark's *Robinson* (1958). Set in 1954, the novel takes place on an isolated, human-shaped island in the North Atlantic between Portugal and the Azores. Marooned on a swathe of land belonging to Robinson, a group of survivors of a plane crash struggle not for survival but to establish a functional and inclusive political life on territory bereft of a judiciary. The island lacks both a working government and a system of positive law formalized through a legislative body. Robinson reigns over the island by delegating duties to the survivors, although he does so without immediately conferring rights upon them. "I am not obliged to make arrangements for anyone," he says (*R* 22). By insisting that January Marlow, Jimmie Waterford, and Tom Wells not stray too far from the house, he denies the survivors freedom of mobility. Since he urges January to adhere rigidly to the facts of daily life in her journal entries, he limits characters' freedom of expression.¹ And given that he enjoins them to comply with his dicta, not to elect a representative or to negotiate a set of laws, he suppresses their claims to suffrage. He metes out these tyrannies without the legal or political culpability accompanying such abuses of power in the contemporary nation-state: no courts hold him accountable for the mistreatment of the citizenry, and no governmental watchdogs or advocacy groups cry out for reform on behalf of a population whose rights have been either violated or abrogated. Because of the seclusion of the island, Robinson also conducts himself beyond the watchful eyes of the international community.

¹ As well as violating Article 19 of the UDHR, which holds that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression," Robinson's conduct also encroaches upon what Homi Bhabha calls "the right to narrate": "a metaphor for the fundamental human interest in freedom itself, the right to be heard, to be recognized and represented" (20). James Dawes echoes this sentiment when he says that "human rights work is, at its heart, a matter of storytelling" (394).

With his control over the survivors waning, Robinson worries that they will found a community based not on law or citizenship but on shared human rights. For the new arrivals to the island, human rights offer an alternative to the civil entitlements they had been accustomed to being administered through the nation-state. The published version of *Robinson* adopts a language of duties and rights in the first chapter. Yet archival material at the University of Tulsa shows that this discourse appears only in chapter five of the holograph first draft, which suggests that while going about her revisions Spark sought to highlight the importance of questions of sovereignty and human rights in the text. In *Robinson*, human rights serve as a way of adjudicating the nature of a person's entitlements not as citizens but as individuals, advocating for a human rights jurisprudence that not only liberates rights from the proprietary hands of the nation-state, but also functions as a *jurisgenerative* discourse that brings about the new postwar juridical category of the human.

Even though the Atlantic separates the survivors from a working judiciary, discussions about civil and fundamental rights abound. In view of the absence of an official legal system, duty is the juridical lingua franca of the early moments of *Robinson*. "My hours of duty were from eight in the morning until three in the afternoon, when Robinson relieved me," January recalls of her time tending to Tom, who is injured (*R* 14). Miguel, the orphaned son of one of the plantation workers who spend August labouring on the pomegranate orchard on the island, also "had certain duties, like fetching small consignments of firewood into the house and making tea" (*R* 14). But Robinson refuses to make concessions for others or to deviate from the routine that he establishes once the survivors are able to work. Instead of immediately bringing into play the human rights discourse of the midcentury, Spark at first foregrounds how the lack of a system of reciprocal obligations between citizens and their sovereign leads individuals to stake their claims

to fundamental, not civil, rights. Frightened by Wells and reluctant to tend to him, January says to Robinson:

“You must make arrangements about Wells. I won’t nurse him.”

“I am not obliged to make arrangements for anyone,” he said. “Have sense,” he added, mimicking Jimmie who used often to say, “Have sense.”

“I will not be left alone with that man in this house.” (R 22)

During their dispute January charges Robinson, who denies that he has any sort of duty towards his new houseguests, with exercising responsibility over the survivors of the plane crash and with ensuring her basic right to privacy, which is enshrined in Article 12 of the UDHR. Archival material at the University of Tulsa demonstrates that Spark conceived of Robinson with regard to “his tutelary function” in the novel (Tulsa, Spark Collections, 65.4). Yet the same folder contains a note that mentions how Robinson is “absolutely useless” as an authority figure, which speaks to the lackluster sovereign’s hesitance to address rights violations (Tulsa, Spark Collections, 65.4). January directs her appeals to the aspirational goals of international human rights, not to British common law,² and, for this reason, she points to the pivotal role that contestations and counterclaims play in securing the rights of individuals who have been threatened by the everyday operations of sovereign power.

Human rights discourse offers a formidable political countermeasure to the partisan or discriminatory actions of the state. As Jean L. Cohen points out, “International human rights discourses and practices . . . serve to justify grounds for interference by the international community in the internal affairs of states” (182). This point is not as simple as it may appear, in

² Privacy was only incorporated into British law upon the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998, which serves as a fitting example of the *jurisgenerative* potential of human rights discourse.

light of its implications in international human rights jurisprudence. For example, the Preamble to the 1945 UN Charter seeks “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” The Preamble appeals to the pre-judicial legitimacy of values such as universal human rights and the fundamental dignity of all persons as a way of shoring up its own legitimacy. The document also binds signatory parties to the upholding of these values in Article 1.3, and even advises member states to counsel non-members to abide by the same standards in Article 1.6. On the one hand, the Charter expressly stipulates, in Article 2.7, that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.” On the other, Article 43.1 allows for armed intervention if “necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”; this intervention would presumably take the form of UN Member States encroaching upon the sovereignty of non-members through measures that would likely violate the rights of foreign nationals enshrined in 1.3. Whereas Article 2.7 draws attention to the policy of non-interference in the domestic matters of member states, Article 43.1 cites the destabilization of international security—and its attendant human rights violations—as justifiable reasons for infringing on the sovereignty of nation-states. With this in mind, Cohen’s argument identifies the legislative basis for the emancipatory potential of human rights declarations, conventions, and charters. If, at first glance, human rights jurisprudence can appear to be foundationless by virtue of its supranational status or the absence of apparatuses to ensure its enforcement, it nonetheless enables the international community to “set limits to the domestic jurisdiction of states, and to override the non-intervention principle, if and when these rights are violated” (Cohen 183). John Rawls argues the

same point in *The Law of Peoples* when he notes that human rights “specify limits to a regime’s internal authority” (79-80), with the result that national sovereignty and, with it, non-interference take the backseat to the safeguarding of human rights. In *Robinson* violations of basic human rights constitute grounds for countermanding Westphalian sovereignty, and in this Spark’s literary jurisprudence anticipates developments such as the UN’s 2005 recognition of the Responsibility to Protect, which affirms that “Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their people.”

In Spark’s novel, when January enjoins Robinson to safeguard her rights and therefore to acknowledge her juridical personhood, she demonstrates how human rights jurisprudence often takes the form of extra-legal counterclaims. Her assertion of certain basic rights—to privacy, to non-interference, to legal recognition as an entity whose interests must be protected by law—reflects contemporary understandings of human rights campaigns as taking the form of contestations of individuals against states. In this case, January’s demand that Robinson redress rights violations directs his attention toward his duty to protect the human rights of his newly arrived subjects. As well, her actions reflect Michael Gardiner’s contention that “Much of Muriel Spark’s work is preoccupied with individuals’ negotiation, playful or serious, conscious or unconscious, with the structures of nation, state and empire” (27). January’s early appeal to Robinson for the protection of her interests and his subsequent refusal to cooperate with her request thus opens up what becomes an ongoing discussion of human rights on a territory without a legitimate form of governance. By speculating about what human rights would look like in the absence of a functioning nation-state, Spark envisages the capacity of human rights to break away from the originary tie—or, as Samuel Moyn phrases it, “the umbilical connection

between rights and citizenship” (*Last Utopia* 38)—that anchored rights to the operations of sovereign states.

The politics of human rights in *Robinson* capture a moment of historical transition from the statist rights regimes espoused in modernity to a post-Westphalian order in which human rights can restrict the actions of states. After her initial conflict with Robinson, January takes steps to develop an inclusive political life for the jumbled community of temporary and permanent residents which itself consists of continental and non-continental Europeans. On that account, the island serves as a crucible in which varied juridical customs interact: British common law in cases of January and Tom and French civil law in the cases of Robinson (a Spaniard) and Jimmie (a Dutchman). These clashing legal traditions provide an opportunity for human rights jurisprudence to adjudicate on behalf of humanity rather than common or civil law to adjudicate on behalf of nationals, as the case may be. In this, Spark’s novel echoes the stipulation in Article 2 of the UDHR that “no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.” According to the principles of postwar human rights jurisprudence, humanity alone was the only necessary guarantor of legal rights, but this discourse still faces challenges when it encounters the constitutions, charters, or bills of rights of individual nations.

Sensitive to the challenges of civil and political life on the island, January galvanizes this process of legal change in her efforts to check Robinson’s seemingly unjust conduct. More specifically, she ceases to embrace the attitude of unconcern that marked her early dealings on the island. At first, she says, “I knew, with an inhuman indifference, that there had been an accident. I accepted the situation of being simply in a place, that Robinson was in charge, and

that I was to look after Tom Wells at certain fixed times” (R 15). Like Tom and Jimmie, she consents to being governed in exchanged for life-sustaining provisions and shelter, as well as for the promise of some form of social life. That Robinson informs them all that a ship will arrive to bring them back to Europe in the coming months also mitigates the psychological impact of their being stranded. On these grounds, Spark deviates from the logic of Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*; her characters await an assured rescue in the coming three months, while Defoe’s castaway, shipwrecked for close to three decades, hopes for a deliverance that is not guaranteed. At any rate, in *Robinson* the promise of the restoration of rights occurring in the not-too-distant future enables present rights violations to continue, which reflects the rights paradigms of statist rights regimes. Having witnessed Robinson’s flouting of his obligations to the survivors, January recants her “indifference” because she sees a worrying magnification of this very quality in Robinson. “In Robinson I had detected something more than indifference: a kind of armed neutrality,” she reveals (29).

While Robinson is adept at managing civil life on the island during moments of crisis, the same cannot be said of his capacities in the times of so-called calm in which human rights flourish. As January puts it, “I feel that we were all unwelcome on the island. The emergency is over . . . Robinson seems rather irritated by all of us” (R 40).³ Yet in the second notebook containing the holograph draft of *Robinson* at the University of Tulsa, Spark highlights even more forcefully the extent to which Robinson seeks to impose upon the survivors his sovereign will: “It came to me like a minor revelation, what was all the secrecy about? I did not then realize the extent to which we were dominated by Robinson, so that we were, in these first weeks, always conceding unawares to his desire for distance among us” (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 65.6).

³ The fourth holograph notebook draft of *Robinson* pushes this point further: “our unwelcome ungrateful intrusion into his elected solitude” (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 66.2).

For Robinson, the time of crisis determines the time of action; the end of emergency marks the end of his duties towards others. Sovereign action occurs when sovereignty is threatened.

January elaborates this point:

I could see that Robinson was making an effort to form some communal life for the period of our waiting on the island. I could see he conceived this a duty, and found it a nuisance. It had been different in the first few weeks, when we were impaired by the crash. Then Robinson had met the occasion. So, too, had Jimmie, who was now suffering belatedly; he kept insisting he had lost his nerves. (*R* 43-44)

At the beginning, Robinson's responsibilities towards his unexpected guests resembled those of a physician rather than those of a head of state. They were patients, not individuals demanding rights. And he was a caregiver, not a sovereign. Upon the survivors' recovery the system of obligations changed, with Robinson ceasing to be the sole individual charged with certain duties. Instead, the obligations are reciprocal, and the duties are not medical but political and juridical in nature.

Robinson betrays his profound discomfort as sovereign in his efforts to stymie the emerging juridical category of the human. In this respect *Robinson* shares with the postwar desire to introduce the category of the human into law. Legal personality conveys "the quality of being equal before the law" (Slaughter, *HRI* 17); it recognizes the subject as a rights- and duties-bearing entity. Drawing on Foucault and Althusser as well as Rousseau, Slaughter contends that such an entity is "capable of fully exercising the rights enabled by" a "particular sociopolitical formation," an account that "entails, at the same time, a 'free' submission to its norms" (*HRI* 9). For Lyndsey Stonebridge, "Turning this mysteriously freely playing personality into positive law, and making this idea of personhood . . . was the creative work demanded of the drafters of

the UDHR” (122). At the same time, the real challenge facing postwar human rights legislators was the burden of entrenching humanity and human rights in law without relying upon the figuration of personhood. Indeed, the new human rights jurisprudence required a new lexicon, and, as Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman notes, “Only in the second half of the twentieth century did human rights develop into a political and legal vocabulary for confronting abuses of disciplinary state power” (1-2). The problem, then, was devising a nonliteral, non-representative register for incorporating biological humanity into law.

In Spark’s novel, this process of legal incorporation occurs as the survivors begin to form a loose community with Robinson and Miguel. That Spark lists “Communal life on Robinson” under the heading “Motifs” on the page of a notebook titled “Points to be developed” in her archive suggests that she sought to call attention to the development of political life on the island (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 65.4). Musing on the others’ increasingly cooperative spirit, January observes that “these people were becoming part of my world” (*R* 39). This climate of camaraderie gives rise to an informal and quasi-legal community structure, with every character being assigned certain duties and owing allegiances to each other. Tom even calls his being stranded a kind of temporary incarceration, which demonstrates, albeit in a histrionic form, the fact that legal terms began to enter into circulation on the island (*R* 66). In any case, individuals become recognized by others as humans through community-building, a proposition put forth in the UDHR: “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible” (29.1). Yet Robinson takes to this new reality less eagerly than the survivors precisely because, by the brute fact of their having crash-landed on his secluded island, they have encroached upon the solitude he prizes. As January puts it, “It is hard for a recluse, and such an upright one, to feel his seclusion threatened by others’ knowing a little about him” (*R*

73). He cannot cope with uninvited guests traipsing about his house and violating the isolation he worked so hard to establish.⁴ Even the books in his personal library bear witness to a man who desires to be removed entirely from the world; the motto penned on the inside cover of every volume reads, “*Nunquam minus solus quam cum solus*” (R 25, 133), or “Never less alone than when alone.” Jimmie believes that he has “chuck[ed] the world” (R 41). For this reason, Robinson differs from Defoe’s character insofar as Crusoe claims to be “happ[ier] in this Solitary Condition, than [he] should have been in a Liberty of Society” (96). Hoping that the survivors’ “intrusion in his life [is] temporary” (R 46), Robinson distrusts the blossoming of the survivors’ legal subjectivities on the island, and holds on to the fact that a ship may whisk away the survivors in the immediate future—thus preserving his cherished isolation and putting a stop to their community-building.

Throughout *Robinson*, the development of the legal person takes place first and foremost through the power struggles that stem from the forced interaction of individual with individual. This strained—and, in the case of Robinson, uncomfortable—form of sociability results in an immediate breach of privacy and the creation of a platform for sociability insofar as at least two formerly secluded persons are now thrust into contact with one another. Robinson, however, thinks of the right to privacy and the violation of this right vis-à-vis his own aspiration for exhaustive control over civil life: in other words, in relation to his sovereign will. As January recalls, he “showed his anxiety to keep authority on his island, to know what was going on between us, to prevent our quarrelling or behaving other than impersonally, and to prevent our

⁴ In 1936, Robinson deserted the Republicans after six months of fighting in the Spanish Civil War; he then fled to Mexico, where he stayed for the duration of this conflict as well as the entirety of the Second World War. Having heard news of his mother’s death, he returned to Europe in 1946 in order to settle the estate and to receive his inheritance. Robinson has spent eight years in his willed isolation, with only the yearly arrival of the pomegranate men and, later, the orphan Miguel for company.

making friends with Miguel, and, most of all, to detect any possibility of a love affair between Jimmie and me” (R 80). In short, Robinson insists on both complete control over and absolute knowledge of his wards’ private lives. Rather than assuring that “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized” (UDHR 28), he makes an effort to hamper the emergence of the juridical category of the human. Moreover, by having January familiarize herself with the topography of the man-shaped island, which boasts arms and legs as well as a head and a torso (a sketch of the humanoid island precedes the first chapter of the novel, and is also present, in different stages of development, in Spark’s working notes), Spark makes it clear that her protagonist’s wanderings are as much a process of discovering the layout of a new region as they are a process of dramatizing the development of the human as a concern of law. As Gardiner observes of Robinson, “A modern leviathan, he blows up his own body to the size of the known earth—his body *is* the abstraction of the state” (32; original emphasis).

Although Martin Stannard suggests that “Robinson might well be construed as a God-figure, in whose absence chaos reigns” (188), the recluse is better understood as what January describes as a “moral organizer” (R 98): an embodiment of the totalizing impulses of power, captured expressly by probing into citizens’ private lives and frustrating their desires for sociability.⁵ Spark’s irony is palpable. “Moral” has a decidedly immoral inflection, as it does in *The Comforters* (1957) when Mervyn Hogarth calls Georgina a “moral blackmailer” rather than a lawbreaker (144). “Most of all,” the narrator of *The Comforters* announces, “she cherished those offences which were punishable by law, and for this reason she would jealously keep her

⁵ Stannard presumably takes a cue from January’s comment that she “recalled the prevalent feeling of his trying to bring order out of chaos in a schoolmasterly way, never really trusting the evening to go smoothly unless he organized it for us” (R 131), with the phrase “bring[ing] order out of chaos” leading him to see Robinson as a godlike figure.

prey from the attention of the law. Knowledge of a crime was safe with her, it was the criminal himself she was after, his piece of mind if she could get it” (C 145). Both in *The Comforters* and in *Robinson* so-called morality stands in stark contrast with the normative demands of the law, with Hogg’s blackmail and extortion being motivated by her own sense of justice (by using blackmail as a means of taking down a smuggling operation) and Robinson’s persuasions leading him not only to pilfer Tom’s occult belongings and January’s rosary but also to stage his own murder. Morality opposes justice in both of these instances. As Gardiner rightly observes of Robinson, he is “a manager who . . . polices the spiritual lives of his subjects and generally instrumentalizes thinking” (30-31). And while January points out that “he was not . . . exercis[ing] his authority on the island simply from a need of power,” she also sees the way “he was constitutionally afraid of any material manifestation of Grace” (R 98-99). In other words, Robinson dreads outside interference in his island, be it human or, as he fears, divine.

The more time that January, Tom, and Jimmie spend on the island, the more dissatisfied they become with their host, for whom they initially make excuses because of his being the property-owner. Throughout the novel, January and Jimmie tend to defer to Robinson’s authority; they act as apologists for his sometimes erratic behaviour by shrugging their shoulders and repeating that he is legally entitled to the island. For example, when Tom accosts January—he complains about being Robinson’s dependent: ““Robinson saved my life. Does that give him the right to boss me around for three months?””—she answers: ““It’s Robinson’s island”” (R 51). For January and Jimmie, property legitimates his sovereignty on this territory. However, property signifies doubly in *Robinson*: both as a claim or an entitlement to ownership and as a marker of illicit conduct. Property usually changes hands unlawfully. January takes cigarettes from Robinson, who in turn hides her rosary and also liberates Tom’s suitcase of its contents.

Further, the three men sift through the wreckage of the plane in search of salvage; January later joins them in this practice, despite her initial misgivings about wearing the clothes and makeup of the dead passengers. After Robinson disappears and his tenants presume him murdered, Jimmie quaffs the recluse's brandy, and January and Tom compete for possessorship of the key to the gunroom and, by extension, the monopoly on the exclusive use of violence on the island. Having read newspaper accounts of the plane crash, January's family thinks she is dead; they even use the opportunity to make off with whatever they happen to fancy. When both Robinson and January return to the world of the living (the island in his case and England in hers) the first thing that they do is take stock of their missing property and attempt to recover it. Without a legal system to establish a law of inheritance and to protect the right of possession, the exchange of property in *Robinson* is predicated upon the death of the owner, or the threat of death from someone who is capable of snuffing out life.

Refusing to recognize Robinson's claim to sovereignty vis-à-vis property, and mindful of the possibility of violence breaking out on the island, Tom is quite vocal in his protestations about the Spaniard's conduct. Tom does not see a break in continuity between the obligations owed him by the British parliamentary government and those that the new sovereign owes him. In fact, he fails to realize that his citizenship status no longer safeguards his rights. In a conversation with January, which lets slip his lack of insight about the distinction between civil and human rights, he says that

"There's something wrong with that man," said Tom Wells.

"It's Robinson's island," I said.

"I'm a British citizen," said Wells. "He has destroyed my property. Those are the simple facts; I'll take it up with the authorities when we get home." (*R* 61)

Tom's complaint is deceptively straightforward. But it nonetheless brings to the fore concerns about the historical conjunction of national affiliation and rights-bearing and also gestures towards contemporary debates about citizenship and postwar human rights jurisprudence. His being a British citizen is of no consequence to his being stranded on an island that lacks the authority to enforce the common law to which he is appealing. A judiciary has not ratified his right to property. And his assertion that he will bring his grievances to the attention of the British law suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the civil origins of his entitlements: as a British citizen, he has no rights on Robinson's island. The privileges of national citizenship are not entitlements as such in the absence of the nation-state that grants to the individual national affiliation. While Tom later exclaims that Robinson "has no right to take my possessions" (R 96), Robinson is the one whose sovereign will legitimates this conduct. During his airing of grievances he should have drawn on Article 17 of the UDHR, which maintains both that "[e]veryone has a right to own property alone as well as in association with others" (17.1) and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property (17.2). British civil rights are not in question because they are inapposite to his life on the island, though the contents and scope of his human rights are certainly open for debate. For Tom, it is impossible to think as a non-national and to dissociate rights from citizenship. Both of these problems reflect the conceptual and juridical challenges of enshrining international human rights law without falling back upon national sovereignty.

When Robinson, making his unanticipated retreat from public life, stages a bloody mock execution which leads the survivors to conclude that there is a murderer in their ranks, Spark disrupts the historical confidence that the nation-state has enjoyed as the sole dispenser of rights. With the authority of the sovereign seemingly violently overthrown, the survivors regard

biological humanity not only as the origin of their rights but also as the centre of the now-post-Westphalian political life of the island. As Costas Douzinas notes, contemporary human rights discourse “emancipates the human person, turns him from citizen to individual and establishes him at the centre of social and political organization and activity” (20). But in *Robinson*, this new emphasis on the centrality of the juridical category of the human in political-legal life leads to intense suspicion. January remarks: “Jimmie and Tom Wells had all at once become strangers to me, far more than when I first fell in with them, for now their familiar characteristics struck me merely as a number of indications that I knew nothing about them” (*R* 109). Since anyone is capable of committing a crime, January reasons, the very fact that a law has been broken throws into question the characters of the men with whom she is stranded, especially if the perpetrator of the crime has not yet been identified. Now, they appear to January as potential murderers concealing either dark secrets or plots for further violence instead of fellow marooned travelers. She sees them not as rights-bearing entities but as potential embodiments of legal transgression.

An ever-present threat of violence fills the void left by the absence of law. Bothered by the fact that even the most innocuous of actions can betray the criminality, the criminal intentions, or the human rights violations of either Tom or Jimmie, January wonders, “Is it possible to infer guilt or innocence from such attitudes? If Jimmie does not try to avoid Wells and me as if we were potentially dangerous and murderous, does it follow that he is guilty?” (*R* 122). In this moment of heightened agitation all action points to individual guilt. At stake are the rights of due process ratified in Article 11.1 of the UDHR: “Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.” Yet on Robinson’s island, no charges can be laid against any party; nor can anyone be presumed innocent. And no “spirit of

brotherhood” (UDHR 1) informs the actions of the stranded Europeans, who fret at length about whether solitude or company will best ensure their safety. The community that they had established, which enabled them both to assert and to enjoy their human rights, has splintered. With the sovereign absent, no monopoly on the use of violence prevails; now violence, or even the threat of violence, is certainly not legitimate. At this point in *Robinson*, the discourse of survival has displaced the discourse of human rights. This is Hobbes’ grim vision of the state of nature expressed in *Leviathan*,⁶ yet in light of the postwar context of her writing Spark’s novel homes in on the wholesale disregard for human rights obligations, both among individuals and between individuals and the state.

January takes it upon herself to act where the law is unable to do so, and where the sovereign has chosen not to act. If, as Douzinas contends, “Rights are the legal recognition of individual will,” then January’s comportment as she combs the island for traces of the truant Robinson asserts her juridical humanity (11). By virtue of her being human, she assumes responsibilities that, to date, had formerly been under the purview of sovereign authority. “It was, I thought, always desirable that justice should be done,” she says, “but I had never thought of myself as an avenger, a hunter-down of evil. It was one thing to applaud justice, another to bring it about” (R 125). Moreover, her actions gain added urgency as a result of the changed trajectory that Spark imagined for *Robinson* between her time jotting down notes about the plot and her time writing the first draft. As archival material demonstrates, she initially toyed with the notion of killing off Robinson in the very first chapter:

⁶ In “Beyond Human Rights,” Giorgio Agamben writes that “in the Hobbesian foundation of sovereignty, life in the state of nature is defined only by its being unconditionally exposed to a death threat (the limitless right of everybody over everything) and political life—that is, the life that unfolds under the protection of the Leviathan—is nothing but this very same life always exposed to a threat that now rests exclusively in the hands of the sovereign” (5).

Chapter I The island and how we
came to be there. ~~Death of~~

~~Robinson~~. (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 65.4)

The strikethrough appears in the same blue ballpoint pen as the rest of the text on the notepaper.

Of course, it is possible that Spark never seriously entertained the idea of doing away with Robinson, and that this potential early plot development was simply a passing fancy.

Alternatively, “Death of Robinson” may have been the formulation that Spark used to express his disappearance in the published version of the novel. In this view, the phrase points only to her tinkering with the progression of the plot, with the recluse concealing himself not in chapter one but, as is the case in the published version, at the beginning of chapter eight. Death might as well be surrounded by scare quotes. That yet another chapter breakdown appears in the same folder and still calls for the “Death of Robinson” (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 65.4), however, indicates that this was not just an empty notion. In addition, the first page of the notebook to mention Robinson’s death—identifying it as a death, not a disappearance—also conceptualizes a radically different novel than the published *Robinson*:

VII Tom Wells
~~Jimmie Waterford~~ attacks January. Is
killed in self-defence. She presumes that
it is from revenge of Robinson. & that therefore
~~Tom Wells~~ is the guilty party.
Jimmie Waterford (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 65.4)

The differences between the notes and the published novel are many and striking. Not only do the notes call for the deaths of both Robinson and Tom, but they also suggest that Spark envisaged different relationships between January and Tom and between January and Jimmie. In

the published text Jimmie is January's closest friend and confidant, a welcome respite from Tom's incessant complaining and efforts to fleece the gullible with his occult products. Jimmie also enjoys an intimate knowledge of Robinson's character by virtue of their being related, so that he can explain to January why the hermit behaves so oddly. Above all, no deaths occur. But the bodies pile up in Spark's working notes: Jimmie kills Robinson; January kills Tom; and the resolution between January and Jimmie is left unmentioned. This version of the *Robinson* narrative would have been in line with the view of the 19 October 1958 *New York Times* review of Spark's novel: "Miss Spark's intention seems to be to write (or to satirize) a formal whodunit, along with variations on the desert-island theme suggested by the title" (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 67.3). The result would have been a bloody comic-tragic succession of errors, although it would not contain the same sophisticated examination of Robinson's "tutelary function" as the final version of the novel.

Both by keeping Robinson alive and by keeping him active in the plot for an additional six chapters, the published version of *Robinson* allows for a fuller investigation of the clashes between sovereign power and human rights jurisprudence. What Spark elsewhere calls the "whydunnit" takes precedence over the "whodunit" of the *New York Times* review.⁷ Indeed, the "why" of Robinson's disappearance is never answered in the text. When he returns from his mysterious stint in hiding, Robinson says, "my actions are beyond the obvious range. It surely needs only that you should realize this, not that you should understand my actions" (R 161). Though January presses him to explain himself further, he refuses to elaborate. In the holograph manuscript, however, January briefly matches Robinson's rhetorical register in a way that is absent in the final version of the novel: "'If the end is good and the means are good, then the

⁷ Spark uses this expression in her notes for *The Driver's Seat* (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 16.8), where it appears on a yellow sheet marked "Telephone Message."

action is good,' I said. 'You might wait all your life if you are waiting for pure motives'" (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 66.3). Her phrasing calls to mind the *jurisgenerative* potential of human rights jurisprudence, which, in its ideational impulses, seeks to promote judicial change through the incorporation of biological humanity into the law. Further, in both the draft and final versions, January even accuses him of holding on to the belief that his actions are weighted differently than the actions of the other people on the island: "'I chuckled the antinomian pose when I was twenty. There's no such thing as a private morality'" (R 161). Only in the holograph draft does Robinson respond unambiguously to her jab: "'There is, when you live as I do'" (Tulsa, Spark Collection, 66.3). While the accusation of antinomianism remains in both texts, in the published version Robinson does not confirm that he puts stock in this view. By cutting not only January's harsher response to Robinson's disappearance in the published version but also his retort, Spark augments the ambiguity surrounding his departure. For this reason, the confusion surrounding his unexpected exit—and his bathetic return—highlights the specifically postwar background to the novel, in which human rights jurisprudence continues to place limits upon state sovereignty.

In part, Robinson orchestrates the bloody scene in order to cement his continued rule. Confronted with January's urgent questions, he says, cryptically and obliquely, "'Things mount up inside one, and then one has to perpetuate an outrage'" (R 162). In declining to account for his actions, he preserves an air of mystery regarding both his own person and his island. He only leaves January, as she departs from the island, with a disquieting truism that anticipates the phone calls that pester the elderly Londoners of *Memento Mori* (1959): "'You've got to die some time'" (R 163). For Gardiner, "Universalist assumptions about the individual are therefore contextualized by . . . Robinson . . . as the workings of raw state power" (33). Robinson's actions certainly dramatize "the workings of state power," yet it would be more accurate to say that the

“universalist assumptions about the individual” stem not from his actions but from those of the castaways of the island—and especially from January. He is a sovereign who reneges on his duties, which leads the cast of the novel to appeal to human rights in the absence of civil ones. The gap between Robinson’s and January’s actions reflects how the “emergence of human rights during the midcentury crisis as a normative concept that claimed authority even beyond state boundaries stood (and continues to stand) in tension with the principle of sovereignty” (Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman 14). In *Robinson*, Spark is critical of Westphalian sovereignty, and, through the figure of Robinson, portrays the nation-state as an entity that is incapable of fulfilling its historical rights-bestowing role.

The strongest critique of the failings of the nation-state takes place before the survivors head back home. Dodging January’s queries about his absenteeism, Robinson justifies himself only in saying, “Normally, my life is regulated, it is a system. It was disrupted by your arrival” (*R* 162). Instead of engaging with a community of rights-bearers based on reciprocal obligations, he chooses to withdraw from such obligations. In turn, she insists that “Any system . . . which doesn’t allow for the unexpected and the unwelcome is a rotten one.” (*R* 162). For January, the statist rights regime is less concerned with the rights of its nationals than it is with its own continuance. Nevertheless, locating Spark’s criticism of the statist model and identifying her interest in the emancipatory potential of postwar human rights jurisprudence—as is particularly clear in her revisions to the text, which call attention to the midcentury discourse of rights and duties much sooner than the holograph draft—can only gesture towards a solution to the puzzle of Robinson’s vanishing act.

In *Robinson*, postwar human rights jurisprudence offers a means of curbing the unjust exercise of state power, but one difficulty of its enforcement stems from its supranational status.

In a sense the discourse is as much supra-legal as it is extra-legal. That said, this model of human rights as excess—outstripping the bounds of the law—allows for the intervention of literary texts into matters usually considered to be concerns of a judiciary. As Slaughter observes in *Human Rights, Inc.*, “The virtue that literature is traditionally understood to hold over law is its capacity to represent contradiction and paradox without a professional disciplinary obligation to offer a logical resolution” (43). While courtroom adjudication seeks to set down formal decisions upon contested legal matters, fiction sustains ambiguity in ways that would be inapposite to legal determinations.

Conclusion

British novelists writing in the postwar period draw on midcentury discussions of human rights in order to envision alternate relationships between individual rights-bearers and the nation-state. Postwar human rights legislation proposes new ways of thinking about the historical connection between national affiliation and rights-bearing, but the same is also true of the novel form. Elizabeth Bowen's *The Heat of the Day*, Rose Macaulay's *The World My Wilderness*, and Muriel Spark's *Robinson* all engage imaginatively, whether directly or indirectly, with the human rights jurisprudence of the immediate postwar years. These two modes of writing share theoretical concerns about how individuals possess rights, and whether those rights are acquired through national citizenship or secured through biological humanity alone. For Bowen, Macaulay, and Spark, the nation-state falls flat in its historical rights-bestowing role; the literary jurisprudence of these writers suggests that human rights, not civil rights, will provide the framework for future models of rights-bearing. Throughout their novels, these figures call into question the narrative of coming into rights through citizenship, rather than simply having such rights because of the brute fact of an individual's being human.

In Bowen's novel, the nation-state is unable to move beyond a model of rights acquisition based upon national affiliation. Despite the high-minded rhetoric surrounding the myth of the People's War, as Bowen implies in *The Heat of the Day*, the state is not an inclusive political entity, but an exclusionary one. Citizenship is a muddled category in wartime Britain, and, because of the lack of certainty about whether British citizens possess rights, Bowen finds fault with a system of political organization that can suspend the rights of its nationals. *The Heat of the Day* warns that appealing to communal feeling and communal identity inevitably occludes

the disenfranchised, especially women. Not only do propagandistic depictions of British citizenship circulated during the war years fail to do justice to the experiences of women, but they also make impossible individual rights claims. In *The Heat of the Day*, Louie acts as Bowen's satirical case study of the self-sacrificing, unashamedly nationalistic citizen. At the same time, Louie also exposes the limits of the statist rights regime. While she believes the nation-state dispenses rights to citizens, she fails to recognize how the very entity in which she places her trust is also the one that stripped her of her rights. Antagonistic towards this wartime category of the rightless citizen, Stella advocates individuation based on individual human rights. As a result, *The Heat of the Day* attends to the ways that British propaganda blurs the line between citizen and rightless citizen. Through Stella, the novel advocates for human rights rather than the nation-state as the origins of individual rights.

In *The World My Wilderness*, Macaulay exploits the genre of the *Bildungsroman* by composing a novel in which the protagonist refuses to integrate into the political life of the nation. For Barbary, assimilation into English life is impossible, in light of her complete identification with the ties she developed during her time in the Provencal maquis. Macaulay's heroine, rather than embracing the tenets of British civilization, opts to be a savage. In this way, Macaulay sunders the connection between nation and state. Though Barbary is subject to British law, she spurns the sovereign to whom she owns allegiance; instead, she imports the lawlessness she had grown accustomed to in Provence. With its disorderly engagement with the *Bildungsroman*, *The World My Wilderness* suggests that human rights will constitute grounds for subject formation in the postwar. The novel turns to the emergent midcentury human rights discourse in order both to identify the failure of the nation-state as a rights-bestowing entity and to gesture towards human rights as the origins of an individual's entitlements.

For her part, Spark calls attention to questions of human rights and sovereignty throughout *Robinson*, as archival material at the University of Tulsa attests. Spark's novel homes in on the way that human rights jurisprudence often enables individuals to contest the unjust exercise of state power on the international stage. *Robinson* and human rights jurisprudence, which share theoretical concerns, define rights-bearing individual not by national affiliation but by biological humanity. Spark argues that, in the absence of a form of political organization in which individuals and states share corresponding rights and duties, individuals will declare their entitlement to human rights, not civil ones. Spark thinks of the nation-state vis-à-vis its failure to endow nationals with rights, but she also traces the development of the postwar juridical category of the human without a lawful form of governance. Much like Louie in *The Heat of the Day*, Tom parodies the staunch British nationalist unable to work out the fact that his rights have been abrogated; the legal system that otherwise guarantees rights is no longer in effect. *Robinson* appeals to human rights as a way not only of liberating individual entitlements from the influence of the nation-state, but also of calling into being the rights-bearing individual without recourse to the legal category of the person.

These three novels by Bowen, Macaulay, and Spark show how midcentury human rights discourse occupies a sort of supranational status beyond the borders of the nation-state. In this regard, human rights operate in opposition to politics. As Wendy Brown observes, contemporary human rights jurisprudence “generally presents itself as something of an antipolitics—a pure defense of the innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defense of the individual against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy, and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power against individuals” (453). On the one hand, this conception of human rights as antipolitics emancipates

human rights from the politics of individual nation-states. As is the case in Spark's *Robinson*, an antipolitical view of human rights enables individual actors to put pressure on states and sovereigns in order to hold them accountable to their citizens for their potential rights abuses. Human rights, as a discourse that reins in Westphalian sovereignty and delimits international interference, regulates the territorial sovereignty of individual nation-states.

On the other hand, by holding nation-states in check, human rights can claim an authority on the international scene that far exceeds reductive discussions about empathy and the novel form. In *Inventing Human Rights*, Lynn Hunt proposes that "Novels made the point that all people are fundamentally similar because of their inner feelings" (39). Moreover, she argues, "reading novels created a sense of equality through passionate involvement in the narrative" (39). And even Samuel Moyn, responding to Hunt's argument, says, "early-modern explosion of novels, especially the wildly popular sentimental novels of Samuel Richardson and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, led people beyond aristocratic and religious frameworks to see one another as fellow humans worthy of empathy" (*Human Rights and the Uses of History* 4). Rather than emphasizing how novels and human rights discourse engage in similar processes of imaginative subject formation or call into being potential systems of political organization, Hunt and Moyn state that these modes of writing perform similar functions through empathy. To them, the novel and human rights legislation enjoin individuals to regard others as individuals as well. Because of this newly empathetic stance, they maintain, people will recognize others as rights-bearers. For all that, they do not explain how empathy for characters in a novel translates into empathy beyond the act of reading, or even how this compassion towards others is mobilized.

Human rights jurisprudence and the novel form converge through their respective logics. While writing about Hannah Arendt's view of the Rights of Man and human rights, Jacques

Rancière notes:

She makes them a quandary, which can be put as follows: either the rights of the citizen are the rights of man—but the rights of man are the rights of the unpoliticized person; they are the rights of those who have no rights, which amounts to nothing—or the rights of man are the rights of the citizen, the rights attached to the fact of being a citizen of such or such constitutional state. This means that they are the rights of those who have rights, which amounts to a tautology. (302)

In their aspirational impulses, and as antipolitics, human rights and novels dealing with questions of human rights take that tautology seriously: the human beings who possess rights have rights because of their humanity. The postwar British novel revels in the ambiguity surrounding the rights-bearing subject by teasing out, in imaginative forms, what makes up the individual who possesses human rights without reaching definitive conclusions.

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