ABUL AʿLĀ MAWDŪDĪ'S AND MOHAMMAD NATSIR'S VIEWS ON STATEHOOD: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Ilzamudin Ma'mur

A Thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University
Montreal

May 1995

Canada

ABSTRACT

Author   : Ilzamudin Ma'mur

Title   : Abul A'lā Mawdūdī's and Mohammad Natsir's Views on

                 Statehood: A Comparative Study

Department   : Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

Degree   : Master of Arts

This thesis constitutes a comparative study on the political thought, more specifically the idea of statehood, of two contemporary scholars of Islam from Pakistan and Indonesia. The two scholars under discussion are Abul A'lā Mawdūdī and Mohammad Natsir who propose fundamentalist and modernist approaches respectively. In spite of their differences, they hold a similar viewpoint on the inseparability of politics and religion. In other words, they reject that religious and state matters are sharply separated. They believe that the state is an important means to guarantee that Islamic law is operative in society. Both Mawdūdī and Natsir share views on divine sovereignty, the form of state, the *sharī'a* as the source of state law, the principle of *shūrā*, and the title of the head of state. However, they disagree on the form of state, nationalism, the political party system, and the definition of citizenship.

This study concludes by showing that though they differ on many details of an Islamic state, in general principles they share more similarities than differences. In their differences, Mawdūdī's views can be described as idealistic, rigid, and uncompromising, whereas Natsir's views are more realistic, flexible, and compromising. However, neither of them present comprehensive or detailed concepts of an Islamic state, which are fully applicable to their respective countries or to other parts of the Muslim world.

RESUME

Auteur   : Ilzamudin Ma'mur

Titre   : Les opinions d'Abul A⁣ᶜlā Mawdūdī et Mohammad Natsir concernant
                  l'étatisme: Une analyse comparative.

Departement : Institut des Etudes Islamiques, Université Mc Gill

Diplome   : Maîtrise ès Arts

Ce mémoire propose une étude comparative de la pensée politique, en particulier la notion de'étatisme telle que perçue par deux intellectuels musulmans contemporains de'origine pakistanaise et indonésienne. Ces penseurs dont il est ici fait mention sont Abul A⁣ᶜlā Mawdūdī et Mohammad Natsir qui respectivement proposent des approches intégriste et moderniste. En dépit de leur différence d'opinions, ces auteurs partagent le même point de vue concernant l'union de la politique et de la religion. En d'autres termes, ils rejetten l'idée que les questions religieuses et étatiques soient distinctes. Ils considérent que l'état est un outil important garantissant que la loi islamique est opérationelle au sein d'une société musulmane. Mawdūdī et Natsir partagent les mêmes opinions concernant la souveraineté divine, le nom de l'état, la *sharīᶜa* en tant que source de la loi du pays, le principe de la *shūrā* ainsi que le titre du chef d'état. Cependant, ils ne s'entendent pas à propos de la forme que doit adopter l'état, le nationalisme, le système des partis politiques ainsi que la définition de la citoyenneté.

Cette recherche se termine en démontrant que malgré que ces deux auteurs divergent d'opinions sur de nombreux détails reliés à un état islamique, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'en général, ces auteurs partagent beaucoup plus de similarités que de différences. Dans leurs divergences, les opinions de Mawdūdī pourraient être qualifiées de'idéalistes, rigides et intransigentes alors que les idées de Natsir sont beaucoup plus réalistes, flexibles et tolérantes. Toutefois, aucun d'entre eux présente des concepts globaux et détaillés de l'état islamiques et qui sont applicables en totalité dans leurs pays respectifs ou ailleurs dans le monde musulman.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

me in editing the text of this thesis; and to Dr. ʿAbdul Ḥakīm Safīr for rendering the abstract of this thesis to French. Finally, I am indebted to Drs. Suhenda Watkin for assisting me in finding some thesis materials available in Indonesia, and to both Drs. Faisal Ismail, M.A. and Drs. Ahmad Jainuri, M.A. for sharing their ideas, help, and suggestions.

I.M.

Montreal, McGill University

May 15, 1995

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND SPELLING

Throughout this study I endeavor to employ Arabic transliteration prepared by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, for names, titles, and terms in Arabic, otherwise mentioned. So far as the Indonesian language is concerned, for the sake of consistency and ease of pronunciation by those who unfamiliar with Indonesian names and terms, I have tried whenever possible to avoid using pre-1972 spelling of Indonesia words. This means that words which used to use the diphthong oe, are now spelt with simple u, i.e., Soekarno becomes Sukarno Similarly dj is simplified to j, i.e., Djakarta becomes Jakarta; while j becomes y, i.e., Jajasan becomes Yayasan. However, in cases where a person's or organization name employs the old spelling, the modern system is employed throughout the study with several exception.

Arabic	English	Indonesian
ء	'	'
ب	b	b
ت	t	t
ث	th	ts
ج	j	j
ح	ḥ	h
خ	kh	kh
د	d	d
ذ	dh	dz
ر	r	r
ز	z	z
س	s	s
ش	sh	sy

ص	ṣ	sh
ض	ḍ	dl
ط	ṭ	th
ظ	ẓ	dh
ع	'	'
غ	gh	gh
ف	f	f
ق	q	q
ك	k	k
ل	l	ḷ
م	m	m
ن	n	n
ه	h	h
و	w	w
ي	y	y
ة	a/at	h

To indicate long vowels of (او ، اي ، آ) these are typed by using the Bars above characters : ā, ī and ū.

INTRODUCTION

The first half of the twentieth century but especially the years following the end of the Second World War, saw the independence of a large number of Muslim countries, including Indonesia[1] and Pakistan.[2] The politicians, intellectuals, and the religious elite of these newly established countries were now faced with the challenges of state-building, of pursuing the aspirations of the people, and of securing their material and spiritual welfare. Some of the politicians and intellectuals tended to imitate or just to follow the policies of their previous colonial rulers, while some others endeavored to make Islam the basis of the policies of the new state.

Mawdūdī in Pakistan and Natsir in Indonesia are the most prominent members of the second category, which offered Islam as the foundation of their respective new states. Their political ideas, and more specifically their ideas relating to Islam and statehood, are the main concern of this study. The main sources concerning Mawdūdī used in this study are limited to primary and secondary works available in English. Whereas in examining Natsir's ideas, both primary and secondary sources written in Bahasa Indonesia and English are used.

There is no dearth of scholarly works (in the form of books, dissertations and articles) on the lives and thought of Mawdūdī and Natsir and on the political

---

[1]After being a Dutch and Japanese colony for almost 350 years, Indonesia, especially its main Island, Java, finally proclaimed its independence on 17th of August, 1945 with Ir. Sukarno and Drs. Moch. Hatta as the first president and vice president, respectively. The newly born country was named the Republic of Indonesia and declared Pancasila as its state philosophy.

[2]Pakistan achieved its independence on August 14, 1947 with Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the first governor-general. The country was named the Republic of Pakistan, but in 1956 it was declared to be the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The regions comprising Pakistan were under British colonial rule for almost two centuries.

parties which they joined and headed. Among the long list of writings on Mawdūdī, some relevant to our topic were written by Ahmad,[3] Ahmad and Ansari,[4] Nasr,[5] Bahadur,[6] McDonough,[7] Haq,[8] and Hashimi.[9] On Mohammad Natsir and the political party he joined, most of the writings are in Bahasa Indonesia and only some in English. To cite a few : *Mohammad Natsir: Kenang-kenangan dan Perjuangan,*[10] *Mohammad Natsir: Pesan dan Kesan,*[11]*Revelation and Revolution: Natsir and the Panca Sila,*[12]*Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia,*[13] and the most recent study is *Modenisme dan Fundamentalisme Dalam Politik Islam: Satu Kajian Perbadingan Kes Parti Masjumi di Indonesia dan Jamāʿat-i Islāmī di*

---

[3]Sayed Riyaz Ahmad, *Mawdūdī and Islamic State* (Lahore: People Publishing, 1976).

[4]Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, ed. *Islamic Perspective: Studies in Honour of Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1986).

[5]Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

[6]Kalim Bahadur, *The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī : Political Thought and Political Action* (New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977).

[7]Sheila McDonough, *Muslim Ethics and Modernity: A Comparative Study of the Ethical Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khān and Mawlana Mawdūdī* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984).

[8]Farhat Haq, "Islamic Reformism and the State: The Case of the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1988).

[9]Abdul Hafeez Hashimi,"Mawdūdī's Political Thought from 1932-1947 and Its Critics," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1981)

[10]Yusuf Abdullah Puar, ed. *Mohammad Natsir: Kenang-kenangan dan Perjuangan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1973).

[11]Lukam Fathullah Rais, et al., eds. *Mohammad Natsir: Pesan dan Kesan* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1989).

[12]Peter Burns, *Revelation and Revolution: Natsir and the Panca Sila* (Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981). It should be noted here that in the sake of consistency and common formal usage, the word "Panca Sila" or "Pantja Sila" will be referred in this study by **Pancasila.**

[13]Deliar Noer, "Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1960).

Pakistan (1940-1960).[14] However, no attempt has been made so far to compare the works of the two, and specifically their ideas concerning the concept of an Islamic state.

This is the first comparative study of Mawdūdī and Natsir's political thought and it highlights similarities and differences between them. Since both scholars were relatively contemporary and operated in somewhat similar socio-political conditions in their respective colonized and post-colonial countries, this study explores how each of them responded to prevailing political challenges and how each endeavored to solve problems faced by Muslims and non-Muslims in their countries.

Our focus is on the ideas of Mawdūdī and Natsir with reference to their concept of statehood, and their elaboration of the Islamic basis of the state. The participation of Mawdūdī in the process of constitution making in Pakistan and Natsir's involvement in the Indonesian Constituent Assembly debates on the formulation of the basis of the state will be specifically taken into account. We have then compared and contrasted the two in order to assess the impact of their ideas and activities on their respective societies.

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter covers the background and biographies of both Mawdūdī and Natsir with special emphasis on their intellectual development, by reviewing their important works. The second chapter comprises a discussion of their respective socio-political thought against the backdrop of social and political developments in their respective countries. This includes their involvement in their respective independence movements, their concept of state, their participation in the constitution making of their countries, their activities in the post-independence era, and their roles in the political organizations to

---

[14]Yusril Ihza, *Modenisme dan Fundamentalisme Dalam Politik Islam: Satu Kajian Perbadingan Kes Parti Masjumi di Indonesia dan Jamā'at-i Islāmī di Pakistan (1940-1960)* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1993).

which they belonged. Finally, an analytical evaluation and comparison of both Mawdūdī's and Natsir's ideas on an ideal state is undertaken in the third part.

This study is significant because Mawdūdī and Natsir were both very prominent figures whose influence and popularity were, to some extent, not limited to their countries, but also because their thought is still very relevant to present-day Pakistan and Indonesia. The main contribution of this thesis, however, lies in its being a comparative study of the political issues confronting two Muslim societies -Pakistan and Indonesia- seen through the eyes of Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī and Mohammad Natsir. Since this is a preliminary study, hopefully this will eventually motivate researchers to study and elaborate further on other aspects of both scholars' works and thought.

CHAPTER ONE

BIOGRAPHICAL AND INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Mawlānā Mawdūdī : His Life and Works

1. Mawdūdī's Life

When tracing the Indo-Islamic history of the Sub-continent, one will undoubtedly find that there have been many great Muslim scholars such as Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877-1938), Khalīfa ʿAbdul Ḥakīm, Muḥammad Asad, and Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, [1] to mention only a view, who have been concerned with the political discourse of Islam; Mawdūdī is one of the most prominent among them. His political ideas and expositions, especially concerning the statehood in Islam, are the most recent and complete.[2] Predicting the place of Mawdūdī in the history of the Islamic movement in Pakistan, Charles J. Adams says that : "Whenever the time comes for the religious history of Islam in the twentieth century to be written, Mawdūdī's name will unquestionably have a prominent and an honored place in its pages."[3]

Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī was born on September 25, 1903, in Aurangabad, a well-known town in the former princely state of Hyderabad, Deccan, presently Andhara Pradesh, India.[4] He was the third of three brothers. His family is said to have had a long association with Sufism and they trace their family tree to a renowned leader of the Chishtī Sufi order, Khwāja Quṭb al-Dīn Mawdūdī, from whom the Mawdūdī family name was probably derived.

---

[1]See Muḥammad Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought* (Lahore: The Institue of Islamic Culture, 1986); M. Aziz Ahmad, *Iqbal and the Recent Exposition of Islamic Political Thought* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1950, 3rd ed., 1977); Parveen Ferouz Hassan, *The Political Philosophy of Iqbal* (Lahore: Publisher United, 1970; Khalifa ʿAbdul Ḥakīm, *Islamic Ideology* (Lahore: The Institute of Islamic Culture, 1951, 3rd. ed., 1965); and Muḥammad Asad, *The Principles of State and Government in Islam* (Gibraltar: Dār al-Andalūs, 1961, 3rd. ed., 1980).

[2]Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Thought* (Austin : University of Texas Press, 1982), p.102; Munawir Sjadzali , *Islam and Governmental System* (Jakarta: INIS, 1991), p.113; and Ishtiaq Aḥmed, *The Concept of Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversies in Pakistan* (London: Frances Printer, 1987), p.7.

[3]Charles J. Adams, "Mawdūdī and the Islamic State," in John L. Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1983), p.99.

[4]Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Anṣari, eds. *Mawdūdī : An Introduction to His Life and Thought* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), p.6.

Moreover, the name of Abul A'lā Mawdūdī itself was once used by one of his great ancestors, Abul A'lā Mawdūdī (d.1529) who had arrived in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent from Chisht, near Herat, Afghanistan, in the fifteenth century.[5] His father, Sayyid Aḥmad Ḥasan Mawdūdī (1855-1920), was a lawyer who abandoned his profession when he realized that many aspects of his job were contradictory to Islamic principles as he believed them.[6] Thereafter, Ḥasan devoted himself to a life of piety and took to the Sufi path.

Mawdūdī received a traditional education at home, which also included the study of several languages such as Urdu, Persian, and Arabic as well as the Islamic sciences such as *ḥadīth, fiqh,* and the Qur'ān. In spite of the fact that Mawdūdī's father was a contemporary of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān[7] (1817-1898) and had pursued his studies at the Muhammadan Anglo - Oriental College (M. A. O. College) in Aligarh and later at the law school in Allahabad, Mawdūdī was deprived of even such basic modern subjects like English, mathematics, and biology.[8] This was due to the fact that Ḥasan wanted his son to become a *maulvī* or theologian. Therefore, Mawdūdī was prevented from being influenced by Western culture and *weltanschauung.* About his father's involvement in shaping his early intellectual development, Mawdūdī wrote:

---

[5]Aḥmad and Anṣari, *Mawdūdī: An Introduction,* p.6; Masudul Hasan, *Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī and His Thought* , Vol. I (Lahore : Islamic Publications, 1984), p.3, and Syed Asad Gilani, *Mawdūdī: Thought and Movement* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), p.22.

[6]Sayed Riaz Ahmad, *Maulana Mawdūdī and the Islamic State* (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1976), p.21.

[7]Aḥmad Khān, educational reformer and religious thinker, was well-known as the first advocate of the Islamic modernism in the Subcontinent, after Shāh Walī Allāh (1703-1762). He believed that Islam should be reinterpreted in line with modern times. Moreover, he was convinced that the best of Western civilization could and should be assimilated by Muslims, because Islam, if properly understood was not opposed to Western civilization. To impart his ideas, he established the first modern Islamic educational institution in India, called the Anglo Muhammedan-Oriental College at Aligarh, in 1875; later developed into a University. For a comprehensive and substantial discussion on Aḥmad Khān and his thought, see Alṭāf Ḥusain Ḥālī, *Hayāt-i Jāvid: A Biographical Account of Sir Sayyid.* Translated by K.H. Qadiri and David J. Matthews (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat, 1979); J. M. S. Baljon, *The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949); Bashir Aḥmad Dar, *Religious Thought of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957, reprint 1961); and Hafeez Malik, *Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

[8]Cf. Charles J. Adams , " Mawdūdī and the Islamic State," p.100.

My father wanted to make me a Maulvi. My education was accordingly directed in that direction. I was introduced to Urdu, Persian, Arabic, Fiqh, and Ḥadīth. I was not allowed access to English or to other disciplines of knowledge. My father was particular about the right training. He took pains to see that I cultivated the right habits and that there was nothing improper in my conduct. With this end in view he did not admit me to any school for years, but made private arrangements for my education at home.[9]

Later on, when his father thought that Mawdūdī had received the necessary grounding for his future higher education, he was enrolled at the *Madrasa Fawqānīya* at Aurangabad. This *madrasa* attempted to combine modern Western educational system with traditional Islamic education system. Mawdūdī matriculated in Islamic studies. In this school he was accepted at the eighth level of *Rushdia* class, which was equal to the high school level. It was in this high school that Mawdūdī became acquainted with several modern sciences such as mathematics, chemistry, physics, and history.[10] During his *madrasa* years, Mawdūdī became acquainted with the writings of Alṭāf Ḥusain Ḥālī (d.1914)[11] and Abul Kalām Azād (d.1958).[12]These two great Indian intellectuals influenced the young Mawdūdī, especially in his early years.[13] Mawdūdī continued his studies at Dār al-ʿUlūm, a well-known institute of higher Islamic education at Hyderabad, when his family moved to that city. Upon his father's death, Mawdūdī withdrew from the Dār al-ʿUlum. Mawdūdī, however, continued acquiring knowledge outside formal institutions. By this time, Mawdūdī had begun to learn English. In

---

[9]See Ḥasan, *Mawdūdī* , Vol. I, p.13.

[10]*Ibid.,* p.15.

[11]He was Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's coleague and was deeply concerned about the welfare of the Muslims. His fomous *Musaddas* deals with the past glory of Islam. It is said that the book had performed impact on the awakening of the mind of Muslim India. See Muḥammad Ṣiddiq, *A History of Urdu Literature* (London: Oxford University Press, 1984).

[12]Abul Kalām Azād was a great Muslim scholar and politician of India who first published a journal called *Al-Hilāl* in 1912. This journal became an important vehicle to express his ideas, and those of Muslims of India, on Islamic and other socio-political issues. See V. N. Datta, *Mawlana Azad* (New Delhi: Vanguard Books, 1990), and Ian Henderson Douglas, *Abul Kalām Azād: An Intellectual and Religious Biography* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[13]Ḥasan, *Mawdūdī,* Vol. I, p.17.

Mawdūdī's own words, : "I persevered in my efforts, and in due course, I became sufficiently proficient in the English language so as to study books in English on history, philosophy, politics, economics, religion, and sociology, and understand them."[14] Equipped with the four languages and filled with enthusiasm in his search for *ʿilm*, it is not surprising to find in an autobiographical note that Mawdūdī mastered the essential content of such sciences as sociology, psychology, politics, philosophy, *tafsir*, *ḥadīth*, and *fiqh* in a relatively short time.[15] In short, Mawdūdī's intellectual growth was largely the result of his own efforts and the intellectual stimulation he had received from his father and teachers.[16]

2. Mawdūdī as a Journalist

After his father's death, Mawdūdī decided, in his own words, "to make a living by the pen". Initially he worked with his brother, Sayyid Abul Khair Mawdūdī, who was the editor of a newspaper called *Medina* at Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh. Soon after, in 1920, when Mawdūdī was only seventeen years old, he was appointed editor of the *Tāj*, which was being published in Jabalpure, Madhya Pradesh. By the end of the year, however, Mawdūdī was offered the editorship of the newspaper the *Muslim* (1921-1923), and later of the *al-Jamʿiyat* (1925-1928), both of which were organs of the Jamʿiyat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Hind.[17] It was under Mawdūdī's editorship that these newspapers became the leading newspapers of Muslim India at the time.

In 1928, Mawdūdī resigned from the editorship of the *al-Jamʿiyat* and decided to go to his birthplace, Hyderabad, to do research, study, and further deepen his self-education in

---

[14]*Ibid.*, p.24.

[15]Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdūdi,' in Donald Eugene Smith, ed. *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p.372. Also see Hasan, *Mawdūdī*, Vol. I, p.25.

[16]Among Mawdūdī's teachers were Mawlana Abdus-Salām Niazi, an eminent Arabic scholar, Mawlana Ashfāqur Rahman, an expert in *ḥadīth*, and Mawlana Shariʾullah, an expert in *tafsir* and *fiqh*. Cf. Hasan, *Mawdūdī*, Vol.I, p.26.

[17]The Jamʿiyat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Hind was founded in 1919 with the purpose, among other things, of defending the principles of the *shariʿa*, protecting the holy places of the Hijaz, and helping win the freedom of Muslim peoples from colonial rule. Cf. Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, reprint 1993), p.739.

Islamic teachings. By 1927, Mawdūdī had already published his first book in Urdu entitled *al-Jihād fī al-Islām*. This treatise on the Islamic law of war and peace had been serialized earlier in the *al-Jamʿīyat*. This book not only won him acclaim from his contemporaries in India, like Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877-1938) and Mawlānā Muḥammad ʿAlī Jawhar (1873-1931), but also from Ḥasan al-Banna (1906-1949) of Egypt, the founder of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn.[18] Not long after this, he published another book entitled *Risālāt-i Dīniyāt*, which later on was translated into English and Arabic respectively under the title of *Towards Understanding of Islam* and *al-Risāla al-Dīniyya*. These two books inevitably showed Mawdūdī to be one of the prominent theologians in the Sub-continent, and his books accordingly became prescribed textbooks in various Islamic schools.

After a break of almost five years from journalism, Mawdūdī returned to take up the editorship of the monthly *Tarjumān al-Qurʾān* in 1933. Since then "this organ has been the main vehicle through which Mawdūdī has been guiding and inspiring the Musalmans of the Sub-continent in every phase of their national existence,"[19] wrote one of the students of Mawdūdī, Miṣbaḥul Islām Fārūqī, in 1968. Before partition the journal was published regularly in Pathankot, and thereafter in Lahore.[20] The subjects discussed in the journal have been described by Khurshid Ahmad:

> Initially he concentrated on an exposition of the ideas, values and basic principles of Islam. He paid special attention to the questions arising out of the conflict between the Islamic and the contemporary Western world views. He also attempted to discuss

---

[18]The Ikhwān al-Muslimīn was founded by al-Banna in 1926. This organizational Islamic movement is more or less similar to that of Jamāʿat-i Islāmī which was founded by Mawdūdī in 1941. For al-Banna's ideas and his movement, see Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1963, 2nd ed., 1993); Maḥmūd ʿAbs al-Ḥamīd , *Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Daʿwah, 1978); Isḥaq M. al-Husaini, *The Muslim Brethren* (Beirut: Khayyat's College Book Co., 1956); and Barry M. Rubin, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1990).

[19]Mishbaḥul Islām Fārūqī, *Introducing Mawdūdī* (Karachi : Students Publication Bureau, 1968), pp.20-21.

[20]Presently the journal is edited by Naim Siddiqi, a member of the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī and a prominent scholar of Islamic theology as well as of contemporary western thought. He is the author of some 24 books on various subjects. Since 1947, the journal has been published at 5-A Zaindar Park, Ichra, Lahore. Syed Hussain Farooqi, son of Mawlana Mawdūdī, is its printer and publisher. See Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Mawdūdī on Education* , translated and edited by S.M. Rauf (Karachi: Islamic Research Academy, 1988), p.23.

some of the major problems of the modern age and sought to present Islamic solutions to those problems. ...His writings disclosed erudition and scholarship, a deep perception of the significance of the teachings of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and a critical awareness of the mainstream of Western thought and history.[21]

However, in the mid-thirties, Mawdūdī wrote on the political, cultural and the religious issues confronting Muslim India. Later on, after partition, he wrote more on Islamic law and politics. Among the scholars and intellectuals who influenced Mawdūdī's political thought were Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), Shah Walī Allāh Dihlavī, Muhammad Iqbāl , and Hasan al-Banna.[22]

Mawdūdī had been involved in politics since he was in his twenties when the Khilāfat and Non-cooperation movements were at their peak and had attracted the support of much of younger generation of India. However, after the abolition of the Ottoman khilāfat in 1924, Mawdūdī withdrew from active participation in the movement.

In March 1938, in response to an invitation from Iqbāl (whom he had met a year earlier) to build an Islamic training center called *Dār al-Salām* Academy, Mawdūdī moved from Hyderabad to Punjab. He settled in Gurdaspur on an endowment of eighty acres. This land had been provided by Chaudhri Niaz Ali and contained a mosque and several buildings for the academy. The objective behind the establishment of such a center was "to collect sensible young representatives of both the old and the new systems of education and train them for providing a new moral and intellectual leadership which should combine the best of both systems."[23] Mawdūdī could not stay long at the Dār al-Islām where the Academy was established, not only because Iqbāl died within a year, but also he had a different political

---

[21]Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, "Mawlānā Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī : An Introduction to His Vision of Islam and Islamic Revival," in the volume that they co-edited, *Islamic Perspective : Studies in Honor of Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī* (London : The Islamic Foundation, 1986), p.362. Also see Ahmad and Ansari, *Mawlānā Mawdūdī : An Introduction to His Life and Thought,* p.8.

[22]Riaz Ahmad, *Mawdūdī and the Islamic State,* p.158, and Asaf Hussain, *Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran* (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd.,1983), p.48.

[23]Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, "Twenty-Nine Years of the Jamā'at-i-Islami," *Criterion* (Karachi), vol.5, no.6, p. 33 as cited in Kalim Bahadur, *The Jamā'at-i-Islami of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977), p.12.

orientation from that of Niaz Ali, who was an ardent supporter of the League. Mawdūdī left the academy in December 1938, but four years later he came back to the *Dār al-Salām* following the establishment of the Jamāʿa-i Islāmī and made it its headquarters. Since Mawdūdī still wanted to be involved in education, he joined the Islamia College in Lahore as professor and dean of the Faculty of Theology. After one year at the college, however, he felt his freedom restricted. He, therefore, resigned and returned to Pathankot to continue writing for *Tarjumān al-Qurʾān*.

Through his journal, he continued to address the Muslims of India. He imparted not only Islamic teachings but also his own brand of Islamic political philosophy. In line with this, and to make his efforts more organized, on August 26, 1941, Mawdūdī held a meeting with approximately seventy people,[24] to propose the establishment of an organization which was named the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī; Mawdūdī was elected its first *amir* and retained this post until 1972.

After the partition of India, Mawdūdī migrated to the newly created state of Pakistan and moved the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī's headquarters to Lahore. Not all the members, however, followed Mawdūdī's move. Consequently, the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī was divided into two organizations, one in Pakistan and the other in India. Organizationally, they were separate and independent, but they had a common ideology.

Mawdūdī remained involved in the Jamāʿat, even after his resignation from the post of *amir*. He was the group's most influential thinker, ideologue and spokesman of the Jamāʿat until he his death on September 22, 1979, in Buffalo, New York.

3. Mawdūdī's Works

Mawdūdī was a prolific writer for almost sixty years of public life. His biographers claimed that he wrote no less than one hundred and twenty books and pamphlets, and made over a thousand speeches and press statements of which at least seven hundred have been

---

[24]Bahadur, *The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan*, p.13.

preserved.[25] Among these works, *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān*,[26] which took thirty years for its completion (February 1942-June 1972), is considered to be his *magnum opus*. Mawdūdī's main objective in writing this *tafsir* was not only to help the common educated people understand the *Qur'ān*, but also to explain its real meaning and intention so that the people might reach its true spirit.[27]

We have divided Mawdūdī's works according to their topics, and presented them chronologically to highlight the evolution in his thought.

3.a. Before Partition (1927-1947)

Mawdūdī's works of this period cover a wide range of issues and can be classified under, at least, six general themes; religious doctrines, education and ethics, history, socio-economic issues, women issues, and politics.

1. Religious Doctrines

Jihād fī al-Islām [28] (Jihād in Islam), 1927, was his first book which dealt with the concept of jihad in Islam. He refuted the Western notion that Islam had been spread by force

---

[25] For a comprehensive and complete list of treatises by and on Mawdūdī, see Qazi Zulqadr Ṣiddiqi, et al., "A Bibliography of Writings by and about Mawlānā Sayyid Abu A'lā Mawdūdī," in Aḥmad and Anṣari, *Islamic Perspectives*, pp. 1-14. and also Gilani, *Mawdūdī*, pp. 386-390.

[26] The original Urdu version of this *tafsir*, which includes Arabic text, meaning and exegesis, comprises six large volumes. It is translated into English by Chaudhury Muḥammad Akbar (Vols. I-VII) and 'Abdul 'Azīz Kamāl (Vols. VIII-XVI) under the title *The Meaning of Qur'ān* in sixteen volumes. All of them were published by Islamic Publications Ltd., Lahore. Its first volume appeared in 1967 and the last volume in 1988. Recently several volumes of the *tafsir* have also been translated by Muḥammad Zafar Iṣhaq Anṣari and published by The Islamic Foundation, London. As far as the discussion on Mawdūdī's *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* is concerned, Adams' article is very useful. See Charles J. Adams, "Abul A'lā Mawdūdī's *Tafhīm al Qur'ān*," in Andrew Rippin, ed. *Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur'ān* (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1988), pp. 307-323; and Freeland Abbott, "Mawlana Mawdūdī and Qur'ānic Interpretation," in the *Muslim World*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1 (1958), pp.6-19.

[27] Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, *The Meaning of the Qur'ān*, Vol. I (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967, 7th ed., 1984), p.7, and Mawdūdī, *The Meaning of the Qur'ān*, Vol. XVI (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1988, 2nd ed., 1989), p.395.

[28] Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, *Jihād fī al-Islām* (Lahore: n.p., 2n ed., 1946). Since the complete English edition of this book is not available yet, this review is based on its partial translation and summary, found in Ḥasan, *Mawdūdī*, Vol.I, p.51-54; Gilani, *Mawdūdī*, 373-374; and Aziz Ahmad and G.E. Von Grunebaum, eds. *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan 1857-1968* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970), pp.156-166.

and the sword. He argued that Islam did not recognize the principle of 'compulsion in religion.' Although Islam prescribed of jihad, its main purpose was, according to him, striving against evil and injustice. Thus, as Hasan puts it, jihad was not an aggressive war undertaken for the purpose of aggrandizement, it was a measure undertaken in the cause of truth and justice to punish wrong doers. This work also demonstrated his conviction that justice, morality, and civilization could only be achieved through a government. In 1939, Mawdūdī also published a booklet entitled *Jihad in Islam*.[29] Here, he went further and said that the objective of the Islamic jihad or struggle was to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish instead an Islamic system of state rule. It referred to the revolutionary struggles and utmost exertion which Muslims had undertaken in the past.

Risālāt-i Dīniyāt,[30] which Mawdūdī wrote in 1932, dealt with the basic Islamic principles, such as the meaning of Islam, the articles of faith, and the principle of *sharīʿa*. In this book, according to Watt, Mawdūdī started emphasizing the finality, superiority and self-sufficiency of Islam. To Mawdūdī, all problems faced by Muslims had a solution in Islam rather than in the West. *Khuṭubāt* (*Fundamentals of Islam*[31]), a collection of Friday sermons delivered at Dār al-Islām, Pathankot, was published in 1939. It had a clear, simple and lucid style, mainly addressed to common people. The *Khuṭubāt* was divided into seven chapters dealing with the basic principles of Islamic teachings. These Islamic teachings, which had been already discussed in the *Risālāt-i Dīniyāt*, were elaborated in great detail to show the completeness of Islam. About the book, Murad remarks, that "To express my own indebtedness to this book, I can do no better than confess that I have now been reading it for nearly four decades and every time I have found it as fresh as and inspiring as ever. Even

---

[29]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Jihad in Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976, 5th ed., 1991). This booklet is based on Mawdūdī's speech in Urdu delivered on Iqbāl Day, April 13, 1939, at the Town Hall, Lahore.

[30]Literally means a book of theology but its English edition appears under the title *Towards Understanding Islam*. (Lahore: Islamic Teaching Center, 1960, 8th ed., 1988).

[31]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Fundamentals of Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1975, 8th ed., 1988). This book was later on retranlsated by Khurram Murad under titled *Let Us Be Muslim*. (London: Islamic Foundation, 1982, 3rd ed., 1992).

today, I find myself speaking and writing, without the least embarrassment, words and ideas from the *Khuṭubāt*, as if they were my own."[32]

Huqūq al-Zawjain [33] (1936), dealt with the marriage laws in Islam. He observed that Anglo-Muhammadan Law,[34] applied under the British, was not according to the spirit of the *sharīʿa*. In line with this, he set forth a full sketch of Islamic marital law, covering its objective in Islam, and the responsibilities of the husband and the wife, with the hope that the Muslims of India will not deviate from the *sharīʿa*.

After discussing the existence of the Divine Being, the Unity of God, the cause of man's distress in *Salāmatī kā Rāsta* (*The Road to Peace and Salvation* [35]), 1940, Mawdūdī came to the conclusion that the only way that we could become good, peaceful, and law-abiding individuals was by believing in God and submitting to His sovereignty. In his words, "Then alone we have peace in this world and salvation in the hereafter."[36]

Qurʾān kī Chār Bunyādī Iṣṭilaḥāt (*Four Basic Qurʾānic Terms* [37]) was written in 1941. Here Mawdūdī explained the true and real meaning of the four Qurʾānic terms of *illah*, *rabb*, *dīn*, and *ʿibāda*, whose meaning, according to Mawdūdī, was not properly understood by the Muslims of his period. Jameelah is of the opinion that this book bears a strong affinity

---

[32]Khuram Murad's Introduction to Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslim*, p.13.

[33]Literally means the rights of the spouses, but its English edition is entitled *The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Islam* Cf. Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Islam*. Translated by Fazl Ahmed (Safat, Kuwait: Islamic Book Publishers, 1983). A summary of this book is found in Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, "Islamic and Western Laws of Divorce: A Comparative Historical Perspective," in *Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly*. Vol. I, (1981), pp.17-23.

[34]Anglo-Muhammadan Law constituted the symbiosis of Islamic law and of English legal thought in British India, see Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (London: Clarendon Press, 1964, 3rd ed., 1984), pp.94-97; and Rubya Mehdi, *The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994), pp.4-9.

[35]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Road to Peace and Salvation* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966, 3rd ed., 1973).

[36]*Ibid.*, p.35.

[37]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Four Basic Qurʾānic Terms*. Translated by Abu Asad (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1980).

to *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* by Shaikh Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703-1787) in its strong condemnation of reverence for saints and their tombs, as tantamount to *shirk* and idolatry.[38]

To remind the Muslims of India of their main tasks, in 1941, Mawdūdī wrote *Shahādat -i Ḥaqq (Evidence of Truth).*[39] Since Muslims were considered as the successors of the Prophet, according to Mawdūdī, their duty was to show the truth of Islam wholeheartedly, either by applying its teachings or by calling people to carry out the true teachings of Islam.

Islām awr Jāhilīyat (Islam and Ignorance[40]) (1941), focused on the ignorance of man in coping with the problems of life they faced. There were, according to Mawdūdī, three kind of solutions to these problems, first, on the basis of sensorial behavior; second, on the basis of observation, and third, on the basis of Islam. To Mawdūdī, only one of them was correct in the eyes of God, and that was the Islamic solution. Again, in this booklet Mawdūdī asserted that the problems of human life could be solved only by the solution offered by the Prophet, and not by any other ideological system.

In his last work concerning religious doctrine, entitled *Dīn-i Ḥaqq (The Religion of Truth)*[41] 1943, Mawdūdī discussed, among other things, the definition of *al-Islām* and *al-Dīn.*. He believed that *al-Dīn* and *al-Islām* denoted the same thing and that it was Islam and only Islam that constituted the true way of life.

---

[38]Maryam Jameelah, "An Appraisal of Some Aspects of Mawlānā Sayyid Aʿlā Mawdūdī's Life and Thought," in *Islamic Quarterly.* Vol.XXXI, No.2 (1987), p.119.

[39]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Evidence of Truth* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967, 4th ed., 1990). In 1986, Khurram Murrad translated this booklet under title *Witnesses Unto Mankind: The Purpose and the Duty of the Muslim Ummah* (London: Islamic Publication, 1986). In addition, this booklet also appears in Bahasa Indonesia entitled *Tugas dan Tanggungjawab Umat Islam di Hadapan Umat Dunia.* Translated by Ilzamudin Ma'mur (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1989, 2nd ed., 1991).

[40]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Islam and Ignorance* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976, 3rd ed., 1982).

[41]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Religion of Truth.* Translated by Miṣbahul Faruqi (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967, 7th ed., 1989). This booklet had been translated earlier by Syed Zainul Abidin under title *The True Conduct of Life.* (Delhi: Markazi Maktabā-i Jamāʿat-i Islāmī-i Hind, 1962).

Mawdūdī sincerely believed that the Muslims of India were living in ignorance and jāhilīyya.[42] Therefore, through the religious doctrines that he outlined in his writings, Mawdūdī called the Muslims towards true and pure Islam. If they returned to a pious life, Mawdūdī believed, the roots of evil and ignorance could be removed.

2. Education and Ethics

On education,[43] Mawdūdī wrote at least three articles: "The Main Drawbacks of Our Education System," 1936; "Proposal for Educational System," 1941, and "A New Education Policy and Its Program for Muslims,"(1942). In these articles,[44] Mawdūdī discussed the importance of Islamic educational institutions. According to him, it was the responsibility of Islamic educational institutions to shape and nurture the younger generation in order to make them useful members of society. He believed that the main reason behind the establishment of the Muslim educational institutions, be it Aligarh Muslim University, Dār al-ʿUlūm, Deoband School, Nadwat al-ʿUlmāʾ or Jamia-i-Millia Islamia, was to provide the opportunity for Muslims to benefit from modern learning without loosing their Islamic identity. Though insisting on the incompatibility of western and Islamic education and culture, Mawdūdī suggested that the foremost task of policy makers of Muslim educational institutions should be to review the western humanities and sciences and to bring them into line with the teachings of Islam.

---

[42]The *jāhilīyya* is a conceptual framework used by Mawdūdī, and later on shared by Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966) of Egypt, not to indicate only the historical epoch before the prophet Muḥammad's time, but as indication of condemnation for those whose life styles do not conform to the true teachings of Qurʾān and the *sunna.* Quṭb did not make Mawdūdī's distinction between pure *jāhilīyya* and partial and mixed *jāhilīyas.* Pure *jāhilīyya,* to Mawdūdī, is one that rejects God completely; mixed *jāhilīyyas* associates religion with infidelity. For Quṭb, the whole world lives one *jāhilīyya.* Cf. Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Quṭb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), p.20 also Ahmad S. Mousalli, "The Views of Islamic Fundamentalism on Epistemology and Political Philosophy, " in *Islamic Quarterly.* Vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (1993), pp.178-181.

[43]Mawdūdī's writings on education produced before and after partition were collected, translated, and edited by Sayyid Muḥammad ʿAbdur Rauf under title, *Mawdūdī on Education* (Karachi: Islamic Research Academy, 1988). Henceforth, as far as Mawdūdī's ideas on education are concerned, they are taken from this book by this writer.

[44]For these three articles respectively and consecutively, see *Ibid.,* pp.13-24; 55-72; and 24-46.

On the subject of ethics, Mawdūdī wrote two booklets. The first book, entitled *Ethical View Point of Islam* [45] (1944), dealt with the principles of morality in Islam. Having explored various approaches to morality prevailing in modern time, such as those of polytheism, asceticism, and atheism, Mawdūdī found Islam as the only correct basis for morality. This is because its values are and have only one source, Almighty God. The second book was called *Tehrīk Islāmī kī Akhlāqī Bunyādain* (*The Moral Foundations of Islamic Movement*)[46] (1945). Again, in this book, Mawdūdī emphasized the importance of having sound morality for Muslims whose ultimate aim was to bring about a 'revolution.' He believed that to reform the world, Muslims should eliminate discord, chaos, and a Muslim should not confine his activities to preaching piety and the worship of God. His prayers should accompany action. In doing so, this kind of leader should possess good morality and incorporate in his personality four qualities: faith, Islam, piety and excellence.

3. History

On history, Mawdūdī wrote a treatise entitled *Tajdīd-o Iḥyā-i Dīn*, which was translated into English as *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, [47] in 1940. In this treatise, after discussing several ideologies, Mawdūdī dealt with the nature and the process of Islamic renewal or (*tajdīd*). He also discussed several noteworthy reformers (*mujaddids*) of different times, such as ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d.996), founders of the four Sunnī schools of law, i.e. Abū Ḥanīia (d.767), Malik Ibn Anas (d.795), Muḥammad al-Shīfiʿī (d.820), and Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d.855), Imām Ghazālī (d.1111), Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328), Aḥmad Sirhindi (d.1624), and more specifically Shāh Walī Allāh. Mawdūdī also discussed at length aspects of rejuvenating Muslims society, but at the same time warned against the

---

[45]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Ethical View Point in Islam.* Translated by Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966, 6th ed., 1988).

[46]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Moral Foundation of Islamic Movement* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976, 4th ed., 1990). This book also appears under the title, *The Islamic Movement: Dynamics of Values, Power and Change.* Translated by Khurram Murad (London: Islamic Foundation, 1984, 2nd ed., 1991).

[47]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam.* Translated by al-Ashʿari (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1963, 6th ed., 1986).

hazards of this struggle. The most vital point in Mawdūdī's philosophy of history, according to Jameelah, was that he viewed this world as a perpetual battlefield upon which the angelic forces of Islam and the satanic evils of the *jāhilīya* or pagan ignorance struggled for supremacy.[48]

4. Socio-economics

Another issue that attracted the attention of Mawdūdī was economics. On this subject he wrote *Insān kā Ma'āshī Mas'ala awr us kā Islāmī Hall* (*The Economic Problem of Man and Its Islamic Solution* [49]), in 1941. Mawdūdī observed that one of the major problems of Indian Muslims, besides problems of religion, education, and morality, was the economic problem. The real issue was then "how to arrange economic distribution so as to keep all men supplied of the necessities of existence and to see that every individual in society is provided with opportunities adequate to the development of his personality and the attainment of the highest possible perfection according to his capacity and aptitude."[50] To Mawdūdī, the solution of the problem could not be found in communism, fascism, or National-Socialism, but in Islam. This was because, he argued, Islam forbade the accumulation of wealth, gambling, and the spending of money on useless thing such as music, dance, and the decoration of house with the statue and pictures. On the contrary, Islam urged its followers to lead a simple life and pay *zakāt*

5. Women

Many modern Muslim scholars[51] in recent times have asserted that no aspect of Islam is more misunderstood than the status of women in Islam. Through their writings, they try to

---

[48]Jameelah, "An Appraisal," p.122.

[49]Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, *The Economic Problem of Man and Its Islamic Solution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1947, 8th ed., 1978).

[50]Mawdūdī, *The Economic Problem*, p.8.

[51]Recently many books are written both by women and men scholars on he status of women in Islam, see Fatima Mernissi, *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987); Louis Lamyā' al-Farūqi, *Women, Muslim Society and Islam* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1991); Said Abdullah Seif-al-Hatimi, *Woman in Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1979, 3rd ed., 1990); Hasan Turabi, *Women in Islam and Muslim Society* (London: Milestones Publishers, 1990);

clarify the real position of woman in Islam. Apart from slight differences on the role of women outside the home, they agree that in Islam women have a honored position. Mawdūdī also discussed the status of women in Islam in great detail in his book entitled *Purdah* (*Purdah and the Status of Woman in Islam* [52]) (1939). Mawdūdī dealt with the status of woman in various civilizations and ages. He also discussed at length the social system of Islam , women and *purdah*. He was of the view that man and woman were equal, spiritually and intellectually, but not physically. As far as spiritual and intellectual equality was concerned, women had the right to be educated and trained along with men. "The Nations which have denied their womenfolk this kind of equality, " Mawdūdī asserted, "which kept them ignorant and illiterate, and which deprived them of social rights, have ultimately themselves been doomed."[53] However, he felt that a woman should not take part in the same field of activities as a man. Earning a living for the family was the responsibility of her husband, while her duty was to keep and run the house with his earnings. Thus, "her sphere of activity is the home."[54]

6. Politics

Mawdūdī wrote nine monographs which were, directly or indirectly, related to Islamic political issues.*The Sick Nations of the Modern Age* [55](1935), discussed the spread of the ideology of materialism and its impact on the Muslim world. Therein, he called Indian Muslims, who were contaminated with this ideology, to "revert to the principle source of Islamic teaching and the mainspring of Islamic civilization."[56] In *Islām kā Naẓarīya-i Siyāsī*

---

and Aisha Lemu, "Women in Islam," in *The Challenge of Islam*, edited by Altaf Gauhar (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1978), pp.248-267.

[52]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Purdah and the Status of Woman in Islam*. Translated by al-Ashʿari (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1972, 12th ed., 1992).

[53]*Ibid.*, p.113.

[54]*Ibid.*, p.152.

[55]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Sick Nations of the Modern Age* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966, 6th ed., 1979).

[56]*Ibid.*, p.15.

(*Political Theory of Islam* [57]) (1939), Mawdūdī discussed the basic principle of politics in Islam and the nature and the characteristics of an Islamic state. He argued that Islam was not a jumble of unrelated ideas and incoherent modes of conduct. It was, indeed, a well-ordered system.

In another monograph entitled *Nationalism and India* [58] (1939), Mawdūdī traced the idea of nationalism in the modern world and its influence upon both Muslims and Hindus of India. He condemned nationalism because instead of uniting the whole world, it eliminated the spirit of humanity and divided it into nation-states. This book was written when the idea of nationalism influenced deeply both Muslims and Hindus of the Subcontinent and finally brought them into two separate nation-states instead of one united India.

Related to the issue of nationalism and other political situation of the time, between 1938 and 1940, Mawdūdī wrote *Musalmān awr Mawjūda Siyāsī Kashmakash* (Muslim and the Current Political Struggle) in three volumes.[59] In the first two volumes, Mawdūdī criticized primarily the so-called territorial nationalism and the Indian National Congress. He warned Muslims that if they accepted this type of nationalism by joining the party, they would be annihilated and absorbed into the Hindu majority. Similarly, in the third volume, he also criticized Muslim nationalism and the Muslim League in favor of a new, purely Islamic party, which Mawdūdī founded later, the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī.[60] Mawdūdī predicted that the Muslim League would not be able to create an ideal Islamic state.

---

[57]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Political Theory of Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960, 7th ed., 1985).

[58]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Nationalism and India* (Pathankot: Maktāba-i Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, 2nd. ed., 1947).

[59]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Musalmān awr Mawjūda Siyāsī Kashmakash* 3 Vols. (Lahore: n.p., 1938-1940).

[60]Cf. Freeland Abbott, " The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan," in *Middle East Journal* VolII, No.1 (Winter, 1957), p.40; Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), p.276; and for further discussion of these books, see Abdul Hafeez Hashemi, "Mawdūdī's Political Thought from 1933-1947 and Its Critics," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1981).

To Mawdūdī an ideal Islamic state could be realized only through revolution as explicated in *the Process of Islamic Revolution* [61] (1940). Here, Mawdūdī analyzed revolution and the evolution of the state system, the ideological state, the Divine caliphate, the method of revolution, and the techniques of Islamic movement. The most important thing to note here is that, according to Mawdūdī, the distinguishing factor of the Islamic state was its complete freedom from all traces of nationalism. He was also of the conviction that the Islamic state could not be created if the ideological, moral, and cultural conditions prevailing in the society were not brought up to the fold of Islamic teachings, through a social revolution.

Another short book entitled *Nations Rise and Fall -Why ?* [62] (1947), focused on the qualities of the leaders of nations and the factors that contributed to the destruction and the rise of nations in the modern time. His last work on politics *Our Message* [63] (1947), discussed the stand of Islam towards nationalism, secularism, and democracy. Mawdūdī criticized these ideologies and condemned them for their being the main roots of the world's calamities.

3.b. After Partition (1947-1979)

After migrating to Pakistan, Mawdūdī wrote on Islamic law, politics, and other issues confronting the newly born state. His writings in this period can be classified under four general headings: Islamic law, education, the Qadiani problem, and political issues.

1. Islamic law

Islamic Law and Its Introduction in Pakistan [64] (1948), discussed several aspects of the shariʿa, for the guidance of the people of Pakistan. He suggested that several books on

---

[61] Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Process of Islamic Revolution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1947, 9th ed., 1988).

[62] Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Nations Rise and Fall -Why?* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976, 3rd ed., 1983).

[63] Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Our Message* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1979).

[64] Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Its Introduction in Pakistan* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955, 4th ed., 1983).

legal injunction of the Qur²ān, *fiqh*, *ḥadīth* and other important Islamic issues should be translated into the national language, Urdu, so that the people could have direct access to these books. He also suggested that in order to make the enforcement of the Islamic laws possible in the country, an academy of law should be established to codify law, reform legal education, and reform the judicial system. Mawdūdī's article on law entitled "The Role of *Ijtihād* and the Scope of Legislation in Islam"[65] (1960), detailed the meaning and procedure of *ijtihād*, the qualification of a *mujtahid* and the scope of legislation. Mawdūdī opined that the objective of *ijtihād* was to enable the legal system of Islam to keep abreast with the times, and only the qualified individuals should undertake *ijtihād*.

Islamic Law and Constitution [66] (1960), discussed aspects of Islamic law and political and constitutional thought in Islam. Since this book includes Mawdūdī's writings on Islamic law and politics before and after partition, it constitutes the most complete book on the subject. Mawdūdī wrote that "it will prove of immense help to all those persons who want to study the nature of the Islamic State, its theory, form and underlying principles, and who wish to understand how Islamic Law can be implemented in a modern state."[67]

2. Politics

Political writings produced by Mawdūdī in the post-partition era include several books and monographs. *Islām kā Niẓām-i Ḥayāt* (*The Islamic Way of Life* [68]) (1948), dealt with the most essential aspects of Islam such as the political system, the Islamic social order, and the social justice. According to Mawdūdī, the very basis of the Political system in Islam was *tawḥīd*, *risālat*, and *khilāfat*.

---

[65]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, "The role of *Ijtihād* and the Scope of Legislation in Islam," in *Islamic Thought Quarterly Journal*. Vol. VII, No.1 (1960), pp.10-18.

[66]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955, 10th. ed., 1990).

[67]*Ibid.*, p.v.

[68]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Islamic Way of Life*. Translated by Khurshid Ahmad and Khurram Murad (London: Islamic Foundation, 1986, 3rd ed., 1992).

In *Rights of Non-Muslim in the Islamic State* [69] (1948), Mawdūdī discussed the categories of citizens in an Islamic state and their rights and obligation to the state. Another monograph, *Unity of the Muslim World* [70] (1967), stressed that Islam, like Marxism, could be a factor in uniting the entire Muslim world, which has been dominated by ideologies of a secular and a nationalistic nature. Here, Mawdūdī proposed several ways to achieve this unity such as through economic, industrial, and political cooperation.

Recently, the issue of human right has appeared in newspapers journals and books. In some of those publication, the concept of human rights in Islam has been criticized. Mawdūdī also wrote a brief monograph, *Human Rights in Islam*,[71] in 1975. He reasserted the meaning and the nature of human rights in Islam. He discussed basic human rights, the rights of the citizen in an Islamic state, and the rights of enemies in a war in this work.

Another important political treatise, *al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk* [72] (Caliphate and Monarchy Systems) (1967), focused on the history of the *khilāfat* system and the monarchy in early Islamic period. He believed that after the replacement of *khilāfat* system with the monarchy, undoubtedly, people were deprived of their rights. They were often suppressed and exploited. The Muslim rulers throughout the twelve centuries of Islamic history were usurpers, and their rule was illegitimate and un-Islamic.[73] One of Mawdūdī's students, Fārūqī, commented on this book that it "is the most scholarly work that has cleared many a cobweb, problems and issues of our history."[74]

---

[69]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Rights of Non-Muslims in Islamic State* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1961, 7th ed., 1982).

[70]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Unity of the Muslim World* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967, 5th ed., 1982).

[71]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Human Rights in Islam* (Islamic Foundation, 1976, 4th ed., 1990).

[72]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk* (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1398/1978) and its Indonesian edition, *Khalifah dan Kerajaan.* Translated by Muḥmmad Al-Baqir (Bandung: Mizan, 1984, 3rd ed., 1990).

[73]Jameelah, "An Appraisal...", p.123.

[74]Faruqi, *Introducing Mawdūdī*, p.9.

Islam Today [75] (1968), is another work on the issue covering the history of Muslims from the Prophet's time to present. Mawdūdī held the view that Islam was not confined by the limits of time and place. It has always been a practical religion and will remain practical for all times to come. Moreover, he believed that Muslims could achieve political supremacy in the modern world, if they truly practiced Islamic teachings. He hoped, therefore, that Pakistan will be the first of the modern nations to adopt Islam in its totality, and to set up a model Islamic society that should serve as an example and a beacon for the rest of mankind.

His last work on politics was the *System of Government under the Holy Prophet* [76] (1978). Here again, Mawdūdī reiterated that the basic principle of the governmental system of the Prophet was that ultimate sovereignty belonged to Allah. He added that the function of that kind of government was the dissemination of Islamic teachings to its people.

3. Qadiani Movement

In the late forties and early fifties a religious group called the Aḥmadiyas[77] aroused considerable hostility and opposition among Muslims of Pakistan. The opposition for this religious movement was so severe that the Muslims of Pakistan demanded that the government should declare the followers of this movement as non-Muslims. Mawdūdī favored this opposition and wrote a book called *the Qadiani Problem* [78] in 1953. In this book, he put forward the arguments and reasons for excluding the Qadianis from the Islamic fold

---

[75]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Islam Today* (Karachi: Chiragh-e-Rah Publications, 1968). This short book is based on Mawdūdī's speech delivered at a Conference of the students of Pakistan held under the auspices of the Islāmī Jamʿiyat-i Ṭulaba of Pakistan in early 1960's.

[76]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *System of . Government under the Holy Prophet* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1978).

[77]Aḥmadīyah is "an Islamic sect" derived from the leadership and teachings of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad (1835-1908) of the village of ʿQādian. The most distinctive character of this sect is the belief that Ghulām Aḥmad is believed to be a prophet, the Mahdi, and the promised Messiah. A very brief history of this sect, see Stanley E. Brush, "Aḥmadīyah," in Mircea Eliade, ed. *Encyclopedia of Religion* Vol.I (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp.153-155. See also Yohannan Friedmann, *Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Aḥmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

[78]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Qadiani Problem* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1979, 2nd ed., 1980).

and declaring them a non-Muslim community. As a result, riots broke out in different parts of Pakistan between Muslims and the Qadianis, and Mawdūdī was imprisoned and sentenced to death. The death sentence, however, was finally canceled because of the liberal and rational approach of Pakistan's high-level judiciary.

Again, in 1962 Mawdūdī, wrote another book, *Finality of Prophethood* [79] in order to refute Ghulam Ahmad Qadian's claim to prophethood. To support his stand on the finality of the prophet, Mawdūdī quoted the views and arguments of some twenty-one Muslim scholars, from Imām Abū Hanīfa (d.767) to ʿAllama Alūsī (d.1854). Mawdūdī also wrote *the Message of the Prophet's Seerat,* [80] in 1975, in which he emphasized that the message of the last prophet was to call Muslims to believe in the oneness of God, and abide by His laws.

4. Education

There are three articles that Mawdūdī wrote on the subject of Islamic education. The first article, "Islamic Education and its Implementation in Pakistan," [81] written in 1952, outlined the history of the educational system in Pakistan, both traditional and modern. He wished to implement a new system of education aimed at producing men who were inspired by the spirit of Islam. He hoped that the new system would produce individuals who could efficiently run the administrative machinery of Muslim social life along Islamic lines.

In the second article, "A Scheme for an Islamic University," [82](60), Mawdūdī observed that Muslim countries, from Indonesia to Morocco, had two systems of education in force; secular and religious. The first system produced people to run the bureaucratic

---

[79] Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Finality of Prophethood* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1975, 4th ed., 1981).

[80] Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Message of the Prophet's Seerat* (USA: The Message Publications, 1993).

[81] Mawdūdī, *Mawdūdī on Education,* pp.91-114. This article, or more appropriate a proposal, was presented to Rabiṭa al-ʿĀlam Islāmī to be forwarded to the Government of Saudi Arabia in connection with founding of Madina University. This was written in the early of sixties as Mawdūdī mentioned in his letter to Maryam Jameelah in 1961. Cf. Maryam Jameelah, *Correspondence Between Maulana Mawdūdī and Maryam Jameelah,* 4th ed. (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan & Sons, 1986).

[82] Mawdūdī, *Mawdūdī on Education,* pp.115-124.

machinery of the government, whereas the latter only produced persons who served as the custodian of religious affairs. Muslims will have to reform their university system in order to participate in decision making process of their countries. In this proposed system of education, the students at undergraduate levels should not only be taught basic Islamic teachings but also modern western sciences and thought. At the graduate and postgraduate levels, the students should be allowed to pursue Islamic sciences and heritage such as the Qur'ān, hadīth, philosophy, and history. The university should also be rich in library recourses.

His last article on the subject, "Islamic Education System,"[83] was sent to the National Education Commission set up by President Muhammad Ayub Khān in early sixties. In this article, Mawdūdī expressed his opinion on the government's plan to introduce the Latin script and make English the language of instruction. Instead of Latin, he suggest the government adopt Arabic for Bengali script, as it was used in Urdu. Although Mawdūdī did not deny the significant of English, especially for students in the professional schools such as medicine and engineering, he did not favor the adoption of English as the medium of instruction in the entire educational system in Pakistan. As far as the education of women was concerned, Mawdūdī asserted that:

> The women's educational program from primary to specialized education should be designed on the same line as for men. However, the primary responsibility of a woman is to look after her home and family, as well as to rear worthy children. The educational program for women should therefore, equip them to discharge these responsibilitiesefficiently."[84]

Having briefly discussed most of the writings of Mawdūdī, it is clear that he touched upon almost all aspects of life, from theoretical to practical. In line with this view, Rais, a leading Indonesian Muslim intellectual, commented that among the great Muslim thinkers of the subcontinent, from Shāh Walī Allāh to Rahman, Mawdūdī was the only scholar who strove to present Islam as a comprehensive system for human life.[85] A similar tone was also

---

[83]*Ibid.,*   pp.125-129.

[84]*Ibid.,*   p.126.

[85]M. Amin Rais, "Kata Pengantar" in Mawdūdī, *Khilafah dan Kerajaan,* p.6.

voiced by Smith that Mawdūdī was the most systematic Islamic thinker from the subcontinent.[86]

However, as far as the development of Mawdūdī's socio-political thought was concerned, Mawdūdī's ideas in the pre-partition period, in the words of Ahmad, "were mainly normative and directed towards the re-establishment of the undefinable lost glory of Islam."[87] Believing Islam to be a self-sufficient and all-embracing religion, he rejected any ideology coming from the West such as nationalism, secularism, capitalism, or communism. Regarding nationalism, for instance, he condemned it strongly as an antithesis to Islam. Initially, his criticism was directed only towards Muslim and Hindu supporters of composite nationalism; later on he also criticized the supporters of Muslim nationalism. Instead of supporting the Pakistan movement, therefore, he proposed an Islamic movement to achieve an ideal Islamic state, which would include not only the area presently called 'Pakistan' but all of India, if not the whole world. Mawdūdī had already expressed his views on an Islamic state in his *al-Jihād fī al-Islām*, written in 1927. It seems that all his writings of this period were primarily undertaken for the advancement of this ideal.

When Pakistan became a reality, Mawdūdī 's ideas changed from idealistic to pragmatic and realistic ones. To quote Ahmad again, "...after the creation of Pakistan, we see in him the emergence of the pragmatist, a practical thinker employed deeply in the day to day politics of his country."[88] He realized, then, that Islamic law still could be applied in Pakistan. In order to achieve that goal, besides suggesting that the government provide Pakistanis with sufficient books on Islamic law, he proposed the establishment of an academy of Islamic law, where experts on Islamic law could be trained and a codification of law could take place.

Of course, though he no longer questioned about territorial nationalism, he did not totally give up his ideal of an Islamic state, as reflected in his four demands forwarded to the

---

[86]Wilfred Cantwell Smith. *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957). p.234.

[87]Ahmad. *Mawdūdī and the Islamic State*, p.158.

[88]*Ibid.*

constituent assembly of Pakistan. In addition, in line with his principle that an Islamic state was an ideological state, Qadianis, whom he considered non-Muslims, should be clearly identified as such in the constitution. Henceforth, there was no fundamental change in Mawdūdī's idea of statehood after partition.

Mawdūdī's influence spread beyond the subcontinent. Most of Mawdūdī's works have been translated into languages such as English, Turkish, Hindi, German, Persian, French, Swahili, Tamil, Bengali, and Bahasa Indonesia. Most of his books have been printed in several editions. Esposito has therefore rightly pointed out that Mawdūdī is indeed the trailblazer or architect of contemporary Islamic revivalism, a man whose ideas and methods have been studied and emulated from the Sudan to Indonesia.[89]

---

[89]John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat : Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.120.

B. Mohammad Natsir : His Life and Works

1. His Life and Career

In the twentieth century, Indonesia witnessed a number of Muslim scholars, such as Haji Agus Salim, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Roem, Mohammad Natsir, and Ahmad Zainal Abidin, just to name a view, who established their names in the pages of Indonesian history. Among these scholars, however, Mohammad Natsir gained special prominence. He was born into a devout Muslim family of Alahan Panjang, Solok, West Sumatra, on 17 July, 1908, five years after the birth of his Pakistani contemporary Mawdūdī. His father, Idris Sutan Saripado, a pious man, worked as a clerk in a government office. Natsir, who was later on awarded the title *Datuk Sinaro Panjang*,[90] was educated simultaneously at a secular school administered by the colonial government (the elementary school, Hollands Inlandche School or Sekolah Rendah) in the morning and a religious school (*madrasa diniyya*) in the afternoon. For junior high school (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs or Sekolah Menengah Tingkat Pertama), he went to Padang, the capital city of West Sumatra province.

Having completed his primary school and junior high school education in 1923 and 1927 respectively, he went to Bandung, West Java, to pursue further education. In this "Paris" of Java, he joined the senior high school (Algemene Middelbare School or Sekolah Menengah Tingkat Atas). This school, according to Natsir, was the only AMS in Indonesia that had a Western classics division, and was therefore, especially attractive to him.[91] Both his senior and high school education was supported by a government merit scholarship. In 1930, because of his excellent academic record, Natsir was awarded a scholarship to enter either the Faculty of Law (Recht Hogeschool) in Batavia (presently Jakarta) or the Faculty of Economy

---

[90]Since Natsir was considered a great hero and leader of his tribe in particular and Indonesian people in general, he was granted the title of *Datuk Sinaro Panjang* (it has no meaning but a symbol of honour) by the heads of the tribe of Minang, to which Natsir belonged, at Minangkabau, West Sumatra.

[91]George McT. Kahin, "In Memoriam : Mohammad Natsir (1907-1993)," in *Indonesia*. No. 56 (October 1993). p.159.

in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.[92] He also had the option of working for the Dutch government as a civil servant for a good salary.[93] Disregarding all these options, he decided to involve himself in the struggle for Indonesian independence. He was very much aware of the political, economic, social, and religious problems confronting Muslims in Indonesia at that time, and he was convinced that the immediate vehicle through which he could help his people was education. To equip himself for carrying out his ideals and commitment, therefore, from 1931 to 1932, he took a diploma in teacher's training at the Dutch-Native Teachers Training College (Hoolands-Inlansche Kweek School or Lager Onderwijs), which was his last formal education. In addition, Natsir taught himself not only foreign languages, but also religious subjects such as *fiqh, tafsir,* and *kalam,* and secular sciences such as education, history, philosophy, and politics. As far as the foreign languages were concerned, Natsir could speak several languages besides Bahasa Indonesia. According to George Kahin, a friend of Natsir, he became fluent in English as well as Dutch, developed a good command of French and German, and soon mastered Arabic.[94] In addition, he also understood Esperanto.

During his study in Bandung for more than six years, Natsir's interest in Islam grew deeper. He undertook a serious study of Islam under Ahmad Hassan (1887-1958), a leading modernist scholar who headed an Islamic religio-education based organization entitled Persatuan Islam (Islamic Unity).[95] At Hassan's residence, Natsir and other young Persis

---

[92]Ajip Rosidi's Introduction to M.Natsir. *Kebudayaan Islam Dalam Perspektif Sejarah* (Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka, 1988), p.xviii.

[93]Being a *Meester en Recht* was a dream for most of Indonesian young people and their parents, because with this title one could get a high position in the government with a very good salary. Even graduates of AMS were given a reasonable salary by the government.

[94]Kahin, "In Memoriam." pp. 159-160.

[95]The *Persatuan Islam* was founded in 1923 in Bandung. West Java, by H. Zamzam, who spent over three years at Mecca to study Islam at *Dār al-ʿUlū.* He was then supported by several Muslims, who had the same interest and objectives as he did. Later on Ahmad Hassan joined the organization and became one of the most prominent chairpersons. For a comprehensive discussion of the Persatuan Islam, known with PERSIS, see Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970); and Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1980, 3rd ed., 1985), pp.95-104. As for discussion on Ahmad Hassan, see Endang Saifuddin Anshari and Syafiq A. Mughni, *A. Hasan Wajah dan Wijhah Seorang Mujtahid* (Bandung: Al-

members, who had studied at Dutch schools, met frequently to discuss various problems of the times, be they religious, political, educational, or the struggle for independence. Aḥmad Hassan undoubtedly had a deep influence on Natsir. To quote Natsir :

> He was a friendly ʿalim ,who could draw attention and attract the youth around him. ...We felt very fortunate to have received education and guidance from him, which was impossible for us to forget and ignore. We, youths, around him, were always observed carefully and disciplined strictly, and each of us was given certain responsibility. If we proposed a problem on religion, he did not give the answer directly, instead we were asked to find out the answer in the available books. In fact, most of the books were written in Arabic and English.[96]

Indeed, Natsir had already studied Islamic sciences and Arabic language when he was still in West Sumatra. Engku Mudo Amin and Hadji Abdullah Aḥmad, who were known as supporters of Islamic reform, were among his teachers. Noer, a Muslim political scientist, noted that, "Natsir had thus been acquainted with the reformist teachings since his childhood."[97]

When he was still a high school student, Natsir, for the first time, wrote two long articles published in the newspaper of Algemeen Indische Dagblad in September 1929 respectively entitled the Qurʾān en Evangelie (A Comparation Between the Qurʾān and the Teachings of Jesus) and Muḥammad als Profeet (Muḥammad as the Prophet). Later on, these articles were published by A. Hassan as a short book bearing the same title.[98] At this

---

Muslimun, 1985); and Agusni Yahya, "The Impact of Colonial Experience on the Religious and Social Thought of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Ahmad Hassan: A Comparison." (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill Univesity, Montreal, 1994).

[96]Mohammad Natsir, "Membina Kader Bertanggung Jawab," in Tamar Djaja, ed., Riwayat Hidup A. Hasan (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1980), p.56.

[97]Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.89.

[98]These articles were written in response to the speech of Cristoffel, a Catholic priest. Natsir and all his classmates were invited to attend Christofell's lectures. There were two lectures delivered in the meeting. The topic of the first lecture was Qurʾān en Evangelie (A Comparation between the Qurʾān and the teachings of Jesus) and the second one was Muḥammad als Profeet (Muḥammad as Prophet). The lecture, according to Natsir, was very interesting and polite throughout except in the end when Christoffel said that the true prophet was not Muhammad but Jesus. Listening to this, Natsir's religious sensibilities were hurt. Since the lecture was in a Church, he could not comment there. The next day, the lecture was published in the newspaper of Algemeen Indisch Dagblad. Natsir launched a counterattack and wrote a long article in the same newspaper to explain the truth. See Ajip Rosjidi, M. Natsir : Sebuah Biografi (Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka, 1990), pp.43-47, and Yusuf Abdullah Puar, ed., Mohammad Natsir 70 Tahun, p. 17.

time Natsir was a chairman of the Muslim Youth Association (*Jong Islamieten Bond*)[99] of Bandung (1928-1932).

It was during his chairmanship of the organization that he came to know many prominent Muslim scholars and politicians from whom he learned much about Islam and politics. Among these great personalities were Haji Agus Salim and Syaikh Aḥmad Surkati.[100] Meanwhile, among the non-Indonesian Islamic thinkers who influenced him the most were Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905) and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935).[101]

Feeling that not enough had been done for Islamic propagation, Natsir and his friends like Fakhruddin al-Khahir, Bachtiar Effendi, and M. Sabirin set up an Indonesian Islamic journal entitled *Pembela Islam* (Defender of Islam), the first edition of which appeared in October 1929;[102] its last edition was published in 1935. Though Natsir himself was not named in the *Komite Pembela Islam*, a committee which officially ran the journal, he used the journal[103] as an organ through which he could disseminate Islamic teachings and counter

---

[99]This organization was founded by Agus Salim, Syamsurizal, and Kasman Singodimedjo in January 1925 following the 7th Congress of the Jong Java, which was held in Yogyakarta from December 20 to 25, 1924. The purpose behind the foundation of this new organization was to unite Indonesian youth by offering Islam as the unifying factor and avoid the disintegration of Indonesia as some local ethnic oriented youth organizationa had appeared in other regions such as Jong Sumatra in 1917, and Jong Ambon in 1918. See Djauharuddin A.R., et al., *Peranan Umat Islam dalam Pembentukan dan Pembangunan Negara Berdasarkan Pancasila dan UUD'45* (Bandung: Angkasa, 1985), pp.17-18. M. Djoened Pusponegoro and N. Notosusanto, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia.* Vol. V. (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 4th ed., 1990). In addition, to Inamullah Khan, Jong Islamieten Bond was the only association of the youth of Islam which took an active part in creating an Islamic and national consciousness and awakening amongst the Muslim youth of Indonesia. See Innamullāh Khān, "Dr. Mohammad Natsir," in Puar, ed.*Mohammad Natsir 70 Tahun: Kenang-kenangan Kehidupan dan Perjuangan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978), p.345. A brief history of this organization, see H. Kafrawi Ridwan et al, eds. "Jong Islamieten Bond" in *Ensiklopedi Islam.* Vol. I. (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 1993).

[100]Puar, ed. *Mohammad Natsir* , p. 18.

[101]George McT. Kahin's interview with M. Natsir in Jakarta on January 30, 1971; and idem , "In Memoriam," p.160.

[102]The last edition of this journal, no. 71, was published in May 1935. Two years later Al-Lisan appeared as the continuation of the Pembela Islam, but finally the journal, which was moved from Bandung to Bangil, was also closed with no 67 as its last edition.

[103]The mandate of the journal was clearly stated in its first issue: "Our purpose is to defend Islam in patient and polite ways, but whenever it is necessary, we will use all means to convey the truth (haqq) based on the Qurʾān and ḥadith.. Our brothers who are Muslims are

certain groups who misrepresented and undermined Islam because of hatred and other reasons such as ignorance of Islam. Later on, Natsir was asked to write in other journals published in different areas of Indonesia such as *Pandji Islam* (The Banner of Islam), *Pedoman Masyarakat* (The Guidance of People) and *Al-Manār* (The Torch). These journals also became vehicles for him to express his ideas, on Islamic teachings and political matters which were the major issues at the time of the independence movement. Henceforth, it is not surprising when Steenbrink notes that Natsir, from the thirties onwards, proved himself to be a sharp and critical observer of colonial policy towards Islam as reflected in a numbers of articles in, among other journals, the periodical *Pembela*.[104]

Furthermore, in addition to journalism, Natsir was also involved further in Islamic education. In 1930, he established an Islamic educational institution named Pendidikan Islam, for the purpose of imparting Islamic education, but it only flourished until 1942. This institution taught all levels of education: kindergarten, elementary school, junior high school, and teacher training school. The establishment of these schools was originally in response to the demand from various quarters, including those who took private lessons with Natsir in English and other subjects. These demands increased with the establishment of a number of private schools in Bandung where no religious courses were offered. However, with the Japanese invasion to Indonesia in 1942, Natsir's schools and others of similar orientation were shut by the government for they were considered and categorized, by the Japanese, as 'wild schools.'

---

expected to remind us if we deviate from the teachings of Qur'ān and *sunna*. Similarly, we will do the same thing if our brothers are not in line with the real Islamic teaching. As for those who are not Muslims, we will be happy to have a dialogue wisely, at the same time we will answer all questions related to Islam. However against the enemies of Islam, namely, those who will not only destroy Islam, but also those who curse and humiliate the religion of our Prophet Muḥammad, p.b.u.h., we will take gentlemanly action in its widest sense. As long as the soul remains in the body, we will not stop working to fight against and destroy them all. It should be born in mind that the most dangerous enemies are those who call themselves Muslims but in fact are not real Muslims. Cited by Ajip Rosidi, *M. Natsir : Sebuah Biografi*, p.71.

[104]Karel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam*. Translated by Jan Steenbrink and Henry Yansen (Amsterdam: Radopi B.V., 1993), p.119.

As far as Natsir's interest in the political issue is concerned, in the 1930's and 1940's, Natsir had been involved in polemics with Sukarno, the future president of Indonesia, concerning nationalism, the relationship between religion and state, and modernism in Islamic.[105] Before facing Natsir, Sukarno had been involved in a debate with Haji Agus Salim over similar issues, nationalism and patriotism.[106] Thus, Natsir continued these previous debates with Sukarno. Natsir's arguments, however, were stronger and henceforth, clarified the position of both parties. In the words of Natsir's student, Ajip Rosjidi, the polemics could be considered a classic feature of the Indonesian political discourse. This was because, he added, the polemics had highlighted the dividing line between the 'Muslim nationalist group' and 'secular nationalist group'.

Although Natsir had written much about politics, he did not join any political party until the early forties when he became the member of the PII[107] and MIAI.[108] Later on he was appointed as one of the Masyumi's chair persons when the party was established on 7 November, 1945, three months after the proclamation of Indonesian independence. Since then he was involved in the world of practical politics and became a leading politician and statesman of his time. According to Natsir, his involvement with politics was inspired by religion. In his justification, he quoted a verse from the Qur'ān surah *al-Dhāriyāt* : 56, "to be a servant of Allah in its full meaning, to achieve the success in the world and happiness in the

[105]Sukarno's writings about these polemics can be read in Sukarno's *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi I* (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1965) and *Under the Banner of Revolution I* (Jakarta: Committee of Publication, 1966). Natsir's writings on these issues can be found in Natsir's *Capita Selecta* 3rd ed. (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973), pp431-495; and Natsir's *Persatuan Agama dengan Negara*, 2nd ed. (Padang: Yayasan Pendidikan Islam, 1968). For discussion on the ideas of these two figures, see Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim*, pp. 252-266.

[106]For details of these polemics, see *Seratus Tahun Haji Agus Salim* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), pp.346-358 and Sukarno, *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, pp.109-114.

[107]Partai Islam Indonesia, acronimed as PII, was founded by Dr. Sukiman and Wiwoho in 1940. When the PII branch of Bandung was founded, Natsir was appointed its first head.

[108]Before the Japanese occupation in Indonesia, 1942-1945, there was MIAI (Majlis al-Islāmī al-ʿAla al-Indūnisī), a federation of Islamic organizations which was founded in Surabaya in September 21, 1937 by Kyai Haji Mas Mansur (1876-1946). In the organization Natsir was one of its leaders. See Puar, *Mohammad Natsir*, pp.70-71; and Ridwan, et al, eds. *Ensiklopedi Islam*, Vol.3, pp.118-120.

next world."[109] This ideal was reflected in the objective of the party he joined, "to see the Islamic teaching and law applied in the life of individual, society, and the state of the Republic of Indonesia, to achieve God's pleasure"[110] Thus, his deep involvement in politics was prompted by his concern for the *umma*. His serious nature, his tireless efforts and the support he received from the *umma* led him to occupy such important posts such as the member of working committee of KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or the Central Indonesian National Committee) (1945-1946), Minister of Information (1946-1949), the chairman of the *Masyumi* Party (1949-1958), Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia (1950-1951), and the chairman of the Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia (1967-1993).

Natsir's life was wholeheartedly dedicated to his people, his state, and his religion. He kept his principles firmly and acted consistently with what he said. Indeed his concern was not limited to national affairs but extended to international affairs, especially to those of the Muslim world. This can be seen from his involvement in many international organizations in which he stayed in touch with International Muslims until his death. For example, he was a member of Majlis Ta'sīsī Rabiṭah ʿĀlam Islāmī, Mecca (1969-1993), of Majlis Aʿlā al-ʿĀlamī lil Masjid, Mecca (1976-1993), of the Founding Committee of the Oxford Islamic Studies Center, England (1987), of the Founding Council of the International Islamic Charitable Organization, Kuwait (1986), of the Curator Council of the International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan (1987), and he was the Vice President of the World Muslim Congress, Karachi (1967-1993). Moreover, in the recognition of his authority and expertise in Islamic thought, he was awarded the title of Doctor Honoris Causa, first by the University Kebangsaan and later on by the Science University of Penang, Malaysia, in 1991.[111] In

---

[109]Mohammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta I* (Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, 11954), p.436.

[110]Pimpinan Masyumi Bagian Keuangan, *Pedoman Perjuangan Masjumi* (Jakarta: PP. Masjumi, 1955), p.6, Article 3.

[111]However, later on, this doctorate award was withdrawn. According to M. Syafii Maarif, this cancellation was merely on a political reason between two countries, Indonesia and Malaysia. This is, perhaps, because of Natsir's involvement in PRRI rebellion (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia / Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) in Padang, West Sumatra against then Sukarno's 'guided democracy' regime. For general discussion on PRRI and other rebellions broke out at the time, see James Mossman, *Rebels in*

addition, he was awarded *Jāizatul Malik Faisal al-ʿĀlamiya* by King Faisal in 1980, which was also given to his Pakistani and Indian contemporaries Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī and Sayyid Alī Nadvī. For the recognition of his support for the struggle for independence of North African people, in 1957 he was granted Grand Gordon of *Nikhān Istihār* by Lamine Bey, the first president of Tunisia.

In view of the fact that he was a statesman, an ʿālim, a dāʿi, a teacher and also held positions in international Muslim organizations, Peter Burns rightly remarks that, "Natsir is not a one dimensional man."[112] Anshari elaborates this brief statement in his tribute that Mohammad Natsir was a man of *Dhu wujūh*, endowed with many faces in good sense. He was a teacher of the nation, a guide of the *ummat* and a *mujāhid* of *daʾwa*. He was a cultural thinker; he was an ʿālim of many attributes; he was a politician of the first line; he was a foremost statesman; and last but not least, he was a respected prominent international figure.[113] Seeing him from a political angle, Lawrence considers Mohammad Natsir as "the most prominent politician favoring Islamic reform."[114]

2. Natsir's Works

Natsir was a great scholar who always worked for the betterment of the Indonesian people's spiritual and material life. He did so not merely through his inspiring speeches and practical acts, but also through his writings. Like Mawdūdī, who was actively involved in expressing his Islamic ideas in his early twenties, Natsir also started writing on Islam and

---

Paradise: *Indonesia's Civil War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1961), William Stevenson, *Birds' Nest in Their Beards* (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1963), and Barbara S. Harvey, *Permesta: Half a Rebellion* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1977).

[112]Peter Burns, *Revelation and Revolution: Natsir and the Panca Sila* (Townsville: Committee of South-East asin Studies, James Cook University of North Queensland, Australia, 1981), p.3; and in a similarly tone Haryono also states that, "Mohammad Natsir is a multi-dimentional figure, who possess prime quality." Anwar Haryono, "Seorang Pejuang Telah Berpulang," in *Media Dakwah*, (March 1993), p.127.

[113]Endang Saifuddin Anshari, "Pengantar" in Mohammad Natsir's *Kebudayaan Islam*, p.vii.

[114]Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (San Francisco, Harper& Row, 1989), p.206.

politics in Bahasa Indonesia and Dutch when he was still a high school student. It was only in his later life that he begun to write in English. Although he had various jobs and responsibilities, he continued to write until he breathed his last in Jakarta on February 6, 1993.[115] In the post independence era, especially after the New Order[116] took over the government of Indonesia, Natsir's writings could be found mainly in two journals published from the Headquarters of DDII in Jakarta, *Media Dakwah* (Propagation Media) and *Suara Masjid* (Mosque Voice). He left behind no less than forty-five books/monographs and hundred of articles, speeches, statements dealing with various dimensions of Islam.[117] This legacy undeniably constitutes the priceless inheritance that Natsir left for his people. Ajip Rosjidi, a professor at the Foreign Language University, Osaka, Japan, has rightly commented that "Natsir's writings are not only important in terms of documentation or historical records, but they also give guidance to the steps that will be taken by the later generations."[118] Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (1908-1981), a great Muslim scholar and Natsir's contemporary, holds the same point of view, that Natsir's works are very important and useful for young Indonesians and especially for the new generation of Muslim youth.[119]

Like Mawdūdī, Mohammad Natsir's writings touched various aspects of Islam and problems faced by Muslims in general and the Indonesian Muslims in particular. An attempt will be made to briefly discuss his works in the following pages. His works, too, are classified thematically and in chronological order.

---

[115]For further information on the comments, reports, and articles written on the event of Natsir's death, see Lukman Hakiem, ed. *Pemimpin Pulang* (Jakarta: Yayasan Piranti Ilmu, 1993).

[116]The New Order (Orde Baru) is a system of government under Suharto, present Indonesian president, who replaced the Old-Order (Orde Lama) of his predecessor, late president Sukarno, in the mid 1960's.

[117]See Yusuf A. Puar, ed. , *Mohammad Natsir 70 Tahun*, pp.406-409.

[118]Ajip Rosidi's Introduction to M. Natsir, *Perspektif Kebudayaan Islam*, p.xxx.

[119]Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, "Kata Sambutan" in M. Natsir, *Capita Selecta* I, p. 10.

2.a. Before Independence (1927-1945)

During this period, Natsir's writings could be classified under four general themes: Islamic doctrine, Islamic culture, politics, and woman's issue.

1. Basic Islamic Doctrine

On this subject, Natsir wrote four monographs. *Komt Tot Het Gebed* [120] (1931) was primarily a practical guide for performing prayers. Here, he explained the principles of Islam as well as the articles of faith. Having read the book, in a letter to A. Hassan, Sukarno said that, "please convey my praise to Mr. Natsir's writings in Dutch. His introduction of *Komt Tot Het Gebed* is very interesting."[121] In the second monograph, *Het Vasten* [122] (1932), Natsir described the meaning and objective of fasting in Islam and in *Het Islamitische Ideal* [123] (1934), he emphasized that Islam was an ideal religion for human kind. In the last writing on the subject, *Gouden Regels uit Den Qur'ān* [124] (1932), he provided selected verses from the Qur'ān followed by their meanings in the Dutch language. These monographs, according to Natsir, were initially prepared for fellow Muslim youth who studied at the government schools and considered the Dutch language more prestigious intellectually and academically than Bahasa Indonesia. Thus, these writings were directed primarily at Dutch-educated youths.[125] In Natsir's own words "to serve our brothers who, because of special education they received, felt strange even toward their own language. The author wants to reach them and explains to them what the basis, ideas and principles of Islam are."[126]

---

[120]Later on this book was translated into Bahasa Indonesia by D.P. Sati Alimin and H. Sidi Gazalba under the title of *Marilah Salat* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1956).

[121]Cited in Rosidi, *M. Natsir*, p.254.

[122]Mohammad Natsir, *Het Vasten* (Bandung: Persatuan Islam, 1932).

[123]Mohammad Natsir, *Het Islamitische Ideal* (Bandung: Persatuan Islam, 1934).

[124]Rosidi, "Pendahuluan", p.xiv.

[125]M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Perceptions of Culture in the Islamic Movement: An Indonesian Perspective," in *Sojourn, Social Issues in Southeast Asia*. Vol. 7, No.2 (August, 1992), p.250.

[126]Natsir, *Marilah Salat*, p.5.

2. Islamic Culture

Another issue which attracted Natsir's interest was Islamic culture, on which he wrote three books. *Cultuur Islam* [127] (Islamic Culture) (1936), dealt with the cultural and scientific achievements of the Muslim scholars of the classical and medieval period of Islamic history. Natsir, while quoting H.A.R. Gibb, reminded Indonesian people that, "Islam is indeed much more than a system of theology; it is a complete civilization." Natsir's fascination with the early history of Islam as a glorious chapter in Muslim history, earned him the title of a romanticist.[128] This book was written when most of Indonesian people considered Islam as no more than a ritual of worship. According to Rahardjo, Natsir's work on the legacy of classical Islamic culture was a new theme for his time. He was the only thinker and *dā'i* of the time who dealt with this legacy.[129]

Another work he wrote on the subject is *Islam dan Akal Merdeka* [130] (Islam and Free Thinking) (1941). This short book focused on the Qur'ānic teachings which encourage free thinking. Natsir criticized Sukarno's interpretation that free thinking should have no limitations. Islam indeed emphasizes the use of rational faculty, but it should be used proportionally and in accordance with the Islamic teachings. He showed how dangerous free thinking could be.

Another book that can be included in this theme is *Capita Selecta* I. According to its editor, Sati Alimin, Natsir wrote no less than ninety articles published in several different

---

[127]Mohammad Natsir, *Cultuur Islam* (Bandung: Pendidikan Islam, 1936). Later on this book and Natisr's other writings on the cultural sissue were incorporated into a book under title *Kebudayaan Islam Dalam Perspektif Sejarah*, Edited by Endang Saefudin Ansari (Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka, 1988).

[128]See, for instance, M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Kenangan Reflektif atas Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)," in *Ulumul Qur'ān*, Vol.IV, No.1 (1993), p.21. In addition, several Modernits from the Subcontinent such as Ahmad Khān, Amir 'Ali, Iqbāl, and even Mawdūdī are noted for having a romantic view of Islamic history by Western critics.

[129]Rahardjo, "Kenangan Reflektif," p.21.

[130]After being serialized in Panji Islam in 1940's, for the first time this was published in the book form by Bagian Penyiaran Persatuan Islam, Tasikmalaya in 1947 and later on by Sinar Hudaya, Jakarta in 1972. Its 3rd edition was published by Media Dakwah, Jakarta, in 1988.

journals of Islam. However, only fifty two out the ninety articles were later included in the book.[131] This book, which is considered the most important book produced in this period, consists of five parts; culture and philosophy, education, religion, government system, and miscellaneous issues. In the first part, Natsir discussed not only the factors that support Islamic culture but also the Islamic contribution to the world civilization. Whereas, on philosophy, he discussed the ideas of several prominent Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Miskawaih (941-1030), Ibn Sinā (980-1037), Abu Naṣr al-Fārābī (d.950), and al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) and compare their ideas to those of western philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer (1841-1902), Sigmund Freud (1856-1940), G. Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), and David Hume (1711-1776). In the second part, he addressed several important aspects of education such as the foundations of education, the condition of Islamic educational institutions, and Islamic higher education. In the third part, he explained the essence of Islam, the message of the Prophet Muḥammad and the role of ʿulamāʾ in the society. In the fourth part, Natsir touched upon several political issues which were raised under the Dutch government. His main objective was to ask for justice and fair treatment, and later the freedom of Indonesia. Quoting Lionel Curtis, Natsir asserted that, freedom was a human and not a western ideal. The whole earth was a temple of freedom. Its spirit moved wherever men were learning to do justice to each other. Finally, in the last part of this work, Natsir covered political conditions in other countries such as the Philippines and Palestine.

2. Politics.

Natsir's writings on politics are quite a few in numbers. *Persatuan Agama dan Negara*,[132](Unity of Religion and State) (1940), contained several arguments to refute

---

[131]Mohammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta* I. Edited by D.P. Sati Alimin (Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1954).

[132]Mohammad Natsir, *Persatuan Agama Dengan Negara* (Padang: Yayasan Pendidikan Islam, 1968). Its second edition was published in the same year.

Sukarno's ideas on the separation of religion and state. He believed that state affairs were an integral part of Islam. State power was necessary to enact and control the application of Islamic teachings. In *Islam Sebagai Ideologi* [133] (Islam as an Ideology), Natsir emphasized that the development of state and society as well as freedom of expression, were the means to create an atmosphere where Islam could grow firmly. He reasoned that if many recent Muslim political leaders and Muslim intellectuals in and outside of Indonesia were involved in discussing the concept of an Islamic state, it was due to the fact that the spirit of the Muslims had been suppressed by the colonialists for a long time. At the time that Natsir wrote this book, Indonesia was approaching towards its independence.

3. Women

Natsir's *De Islamitische Vrouw en her Recht* [134](The Position of Woman in Islam) (1934), and his article entitled "Disekitar Krisis Perkawinan"[135] (Around the Crisis in Marriage) (1934), touched upon the issue of women. In these writings, Natsir explained that Islam considered women equal to men. Women had a high place in Islam. Even in the field of education, Islam superseded Europe, where women were only allowed to enter universities in the nineteenth century. Natsir, however, disagreed with the feminist movement of the West, whose influence, to some extent, reached Indonesia. He reminded Indonesian women that although they were free to participate in almost all aspects of life such as education, politics, and economics, the most important task of a woman was to be a good wife and mother.

---

[133]Mohammad Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Ideologi* (Jakarta: Pustaka Aida, n.d.). In term of content, this booklet is much similar to his *Persatuan Agama dan Negara.*

[134]Mohammad Natsir, *De Islamitische Vrouw en her Recht* (Bandung: Persatuan Islam, 1934).

[135]Mohammad Natsir, "Disekitar Krisis Perkawinan," in *Pedoman Masyarakat,* February, 1938, included in Natsir. *Capita Selecta* I, pp.50-60.

2.b. After Independence

In the early years of the independence of Indonesia, Natsir did not write much because of his involvement in political and administrative activities. He became a member of KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat - the Central Indonesia national Committee), which was established on 29 August, 1945 and subsequently he served as minister of information, and prime minister. However, his writings, speeches, and statements from 1950 to 1955 were collected by D. P. Sati Alimin and published under the title *Capita Selecta* II. The first part covers his speeches when he was a member of parliament and prime minister of the Republic of Indonesia. In this section, his famous speech, known as "Mosi-Integral Natsir" (Natsir's Integrated Motion), which would lead to a united and integrated Indonesia, is inserted. The second part includes Natsir's speeches on Iqbāl day, Ali Jinnah's birthday, and other speeches delivered on different occasions. The third part discusses internal political problems such as how to settle the issue of West Irian with the Dutch, the *Darul Islam* rebellion, and problems with labor organization. The fourth part contains Natsir's statements and interviews given to various newspapers and journals. The last part concentrates on Natsir's religio-psychological reflections on various matters, published in Natsir's weekly journal *al-Hikmah*. Apart from this second most important book, his writings can be broadly divided into two major themes: politics and *daᶜwa*. [136]

1. Politics

On political issues, he wrote three books. The firs *Revolusi Indonesia* [137] (Indonesian Revolution) (1955), showed the Indonesian Muslims' struggle in driving out the colonialists from Indonesia. He was convinced that victory was possible because of the revolutionary nature of Islam and its emphasis on rebellion against the exploitation of man by man, in

---

[136]It should be noted here that though most of Natsir's important writings will be reviewed in the following pages, there are, indeed, several works of post-independence period which are neither tracable nor accessible to the writer of this study. Among those works are: Mohammad Natsir and Nasrun A.S., *Hidup Bahagia* (Bandung: Van Hoev, 1954); M. Natsir, *Tinjauan Hidup* (Jakarta: Wijaya, 1957); *Kegelisahan Ruhani Barat* (Surabaya: DDII Perwakilan Jatim, 1969); *Masalah Palestina* (Jakarta: Hudaya, 191971); and *Kumpulan Khutbah* (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1975).

[137]Mohammad Natsir, *Revolusi Indonesia* (Bandung: Jihad, 1955).

whatever disguise it appeared, be it capitalism, imperialism or colonialism. This book was written within ten years of Indonesia's independence.

The second work *What and How Can the Muslims Contribute to the Attainment of a Stable World Peace* [138] (1953), was written to dispel western misconceptions towards Islam, especially in regards to the concepts of theocracy, the Islamic state and government. In this work, he not only described the prevailing condition of the Muslim *umma*, but he reasserted that Islam taught its adherents to love peace rather than war. He asked Muslims to show to the world the true teachings of the Qur'ān. While aggression was not permitted at all in Islam, war was allowed as long as it was fought to suppress injustice, oppression, and exploitation. In the third work, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Islam as the foundation of state) (1957), Natsir proposed Islam as the foundation of state. This was prepared to be discussed and defended in the constituent assembly meeting to lay foundations of the Republic of Indonesia.

2. Islamic Da'wa

If the number of writings could be used as a gauge, *da'wa* and Christian-Muslim relations were important topics for Natsir. He wrote six books on these subjects. In *Fiqhud Da'wah* (Methodology of Preaching) (1967), the author spelled out some basic principles of *da'wa* and discussed the method and strategy to propagate Islam among the Muslims of Indonesia. The next work, *Mempersatukan Ummat* [139](Uniting Muslims) (1968), focused on the methods by which Indonesian Muslims, who come from various groups and organizations, could be united. Since he saw Muslims, not as a single body, but divided into separate parts, Natsir felt an urgent need to deal with this issue in this book. In *Gubahlah Dunia dengan Amalmu, Sinari Zaman dengan Imanmu* (Change the World with Your Good Deeds, Light the Time with Your Belief) (1970), Natsir discussed the influence of western

---

[138]Mohammad Natsir, *What and How Can the Muslims Contribute to the Attainment of a Stable World Peace* [Indonesian-English edition] (Jakarta: U.B. Ideal, 1953). This booklet, which is based on a speech delivered at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on the 9th April 1952, was latter published by Cornell University under the title *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1954)

[139]Mohammad Natsir, *Mempersatukan Ummat* (Bandung: Bulan Sabit, 2nd ed., 1968).

materialistic philosophy on Indonesian Muslims. To avoid its further impact, Natsir invited them to return to Islamic teachings. In his fourth book, *The World of Islam Festival Dalam Perspective Sejarah* [140] (The World of Islam Festival in the Historical Perspective) (1976), he recorded his impression and reflections of the world of Islam festival held in London. Having asserted that "al-Islāmu maḥjūbun bi al-Muslimīn" (Islam undergoes backwardness because of its own adherents), Natsir traced the root of this backwardness and concluded that Islam, indeed, contained sources of spiritual and rational energy. If these sources were used properly by Muslim *umma*, they would enjoy the same glory that Muslims experienced in the past.

Natsir's discussion on *daʿwa* also included the relationship between Islam and Christianity in Indonesia. Since Indonesia recognized five religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, he wanted the followers of those religions to respect one another. This idea is reflected in *Mencari Modus Vivendi antar Ummat Beragama di Indonesia* [141] (Searching for a Modus Vivendi Among the Religious Followers in Indonesia), which was written in 1980. The last book in which Natsir emphasized the importance of religious tolerance, especially between Muslims and Christians, was *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia* [142] (Islam and Christianity in Indonesia). This book encompassed Natsir's writings on the subject from 1930's to late 1960's. Here, he discussed the problems between the two religions since pre-independence days. He suggested to Christian missionaries, that instead of trying to convert Muslims, they should concentrate on trying to convert other Indonesian people who were still without a religion. Besides respecting each other, Muslim and Christian leaders were urged to guide their own respective people.

After this overview of Natsir's writings, we agree with Dahm, an American expert on Indonesia, that "Natsir's writings show him to be a man of wide reading, well-informed even

---

[140]Mohammad Natsir, *The World of Islam Festival Dalam Perspektif Sejarah* (Jakarta: Media Da'wah, 3rd ed., 1985).

[141]Mohammad Natsir, *Mencari Modus Vivendi Antar Umat Beragama di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Media Da'wah,1980, 2nd ed., 1983).

[142]Mohammad Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Media Da'wah, 1969, 4th ed. 1988).

outside the Islamic sphere. His breadth of culture suggests comparison with Sjahrir and Hatta, ...; but unlike them, he was concerned for the renewal of Muslim life in a changing world."[143]

His pre-independence writings show that Natsir was more concerned with education and cultural affairs than with politics. This was due to the fact that , in his opinion, ninety percent of the Indonesians were still illiterate. The situation was aggravated by the fact that they were also 'illiterate' in Islam and politics. Influenced by Muḥammad ʿAbduh, whose Islamic reformation was more focused on education, Natsir believed that education could change the condition of society, and, therefore, he made this field his priority. However, in the socio-political sphere, two political issues apparently aroused Natsir's interest; first, nationalism, where he would prefer Muslim nationalism rather than religiously-neutral nationalism; secondly, the relationship between religion and statehood, in response to the secularization that took place in Turkey. Since he believed that Islam was not only a religion in a limited sense, but a complete way of life, he asserted that religion and state could not be separated.

In the post independence era, Natsir, unlike Mawdūdī, was involved in practical politics. Consequently, he could not write much, especially in the first decade of independence. However, his writings of the following decades show the following: first, though he wished Islam to be the basis of the Republic of Indonesia, he accepted Pancasila as the philosophical foundation of the political reality of Indonesia; second, daʿwa to be promulgated effectively and efficiently at all levels of the society throughout the country to Islamize the Indonesian Muslims; third, for the preservation of the quality as well as the quantity of the Indonesian Muslims, the process of conversion to Christianity should be controlled.[144]

---

[143]Bernhard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* (London: Preager Publishers, 1971), pp.151-152.

[144]Concerning this, Woodward states that, "In his later years Natsir became increasingly anti-Christian, blaming Indonesia's Christian community for the establishment of Indonesia as a secular rather than an Islamic state." Mark R. Woodward, "Natsir, Mohammad (1908-1993," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. Edited by John L. Esposito. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.239.

Besides the writings discussed above, there are many articles published in several journals in Indonesia to which we did not have access. It should also be noted here that although some of Natsir's works have been translated into English and Arabic, most of his writings remain in their original language, Bahasa Indonesia. This is the main factor contributing to limiting Natsir's writings to the Muslim Malay-speaking countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. In this aspect, he differed from Mawdūdī whose works are known in almost the entire Muslim world.

Nevertheles, Natsir was still recognized in the Muslim world in general. Haryono, present chairman of DDII, states that , "Mr. Mohammad Natsir is a multi-dimensional figure endowed with a prime quality. He is a politician, but at the same time he is a moralist, *mu²min*, *mukhliṣ, mujāhid,* and educator."[145] A similar belief is also expressed by Metareum, present chairman of United Development Party. In his words, Mohammad Natsir "has proven a real proof concerning what a Muslim should do. He is a Muslim nationalist. The Muslim who has a nation and a state. He is a Muslim who has devoted his entire life to the cause of people, state, and human beings."[146] From among the international figures, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia stated that, "Mohammad Natsir is not only a leader of the Indonesian Muslims but of the whole Muslim world."[147]

We conclude this section with the statement of Kahin, the founder and present director of the Southeast Asian studies, Cornell University:

> Last of the giants among Indonesian's nationalist and revolutionary political leaders, he [Natsir] undoubtedly had more influence on the course of Islamic thought and politics in postwar Indonesia than any of his contemporaries. By nature extraordinarily modest and unpretentious, he had a well deserved reputation for personal integrity and political probity.[148]

---

[145]Anwar Haryono, "Sang Pejuang Telah Berpulang," in Hakiem, ed., *Pemipmin Pulang,* pp.126-127.

[146]H. Ismail Hasan Metarium, "Pejuang Yang Ikhlash," in Hakiem, ed., *Pemimpin Pulang,* p.165.

[147]Cited in Abu Ghazali, "Pemimpin Umat Islam Sedunia," in Hakiem, ed., *Pemimpin Pulang,* p.111.

[148]Kahin, "In Memoriam," p.159.

CHAPTER TWO

ABUL A'LĀ MAWDŪDĪ'S AND MOHAMMAD NATSIR'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

The concept of state in the Islamic political thought has received a great deal of attention from the Muslim scholars and non-Muslim scholars alike, not only in modern times but also in the medieval times.[1] The state that they discuss, especially among Muslim thinkers, is none other than an ideal Islamic state. The idea of an Islamic state, indeed, has existed as early as Islam itself.[2] In other words, it has come into being from the seventh century, since the lifetime of Muḥammad. However, as far as the term Islamic State or *Dawla al-Islāmiyya* itself is concerned, it is a relatively new phenomenon in Islamic political vocabulary. Not a single work of the classical and medieval periods of Islam clearly mentions the term Islamic state. Even the Qur'ān itself is silent about the term. Although the word *dawla* does appear once in the Qur'ān, it does not bear any connotation of a state in the modern sense.[3] It is mentioned only in relation to the distribution of *fay'* as it reads as follows: "What Allah has bestowed on His Messenger (and taken away) from the people of the township belong to Allah, to His Messenger and to the kindred and the orphans, the needy and the wayfarer; in order that it may not take a circuit (*lā yakūna dūlah*) between the

---

[1]For a comprehensive exposition on politics in Islam of pre-modern time, see W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968, 4th ed., 1987); Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought of Medieval Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); and A.K.S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). As for an extensive discussion on modern Islamic political thought see John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984, 3rd ed., 199); Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern Nation State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); Muhammad Asad, *The Principles of State and Government in Islam* (Gibraltar: Dār al-Andalūs, 1961, 2nd.,1980); and Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 2nd ed., 1988).

[2]Mehran Tamadonfar, *The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership : Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Pragmatism* (Boulder, San Francisco : Westview Press, 1989), p.38.

[3]In the modern political science, the state refers to an abstract juridical personality comprising the totality of element such as a people living within a definite territory, a legally constituted government, and a supreme power within the society, and independent from foreign control. Cf. Manzooruddin Aḥmad, *Islamic Political System in the Modern Age: Theory and Practice* (Karachi: Saad Publications, 1983), p.31.

wealthy and among you..."[4] So far the term of *dawla Islāmiyya* appears for the first time in Rashīd Riḍā's book entitled *al-Khilāfa* , which was published in 1922,[5] only two years before the Ottoman caliphate (the last caliphate) was abolished. Apart from the etymological debates, this study will proceed to discuss the idea of the Islamic statehood as proposed by Mawdūdī and Natsir. The discussion in the following pages will be related to the political background of their respective countries in their times - thus, placing their ideas in their own historical context of Pakistan and Indonesia.

A. Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī's Ideas on Statehood

1. Before Partition

1.a. The Pakistan Movement and Mawdūdī

Among the founders of the idea of Pakistan, the historians rank Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817-1898) in the first place.[6] There are at least two reasons for placing Aḥmad Khān in such a high position :

> First, he undoubtedly did encourage the Muslims to be more aware of heritage, culture and interests which set them apart from the Hindus. Secondly, by promoting Western education he helped to create the class of Westernized Muslim intellectuals of whom Jinnah was the supreme example, the class which led the struggle for Pakistan and which has provided it with most of its leaders and virtually all its administrators since the state's establishment.[7]

---

[4]Qur'ān 59: 7.

[5]See Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Al-Khilāfah* (Egypt: 1922), pp.17-18, as cited in A. Syafii Maarif, "Politik Dalam Perspektif Islam," in *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an*, Vol.IV, No.2, (1993), p.3.

[6]Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, for instance, is of the view that, "The conception of Pakistan (i.e. a separate home land for Muslims) has been traced back by historians to Muhammad bin Qasim, the first Muslim conqueror of Sind, early in the eighth century, to Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (d.1625), to Shāh Walī Allāh (d.1762) and later to Jamāl al-Din Afghani (d.1897) and Sir Syed Ahmad Khān (d.1898)." See his article "The Lahore Resolution 1940," in Mahmud Husain, et al, eds. *A History of the Freedom Movement,* Vol.IV. (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970), pp.73-74. An important work on the subject is K. K. Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan,* Vol. III. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987).

[7]Edward Mortimer, *Faith and Power : The Politics of Islam* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1982), p.192.

However, it took a long time to unite Muslims and have them realize that they had a distinct heritage, culture, and interests, qualities which differentiated them from their Hindu 'brothers'. The differences were not only cultural but religious.

It was eight years after Aḥmad Khān's death that the first Muslim political party in British India was established on October 1, 1906. The party, named the All-India Muslim League and later known as the Muslim League, accommodated some of his ideas. The party was founded to secure British recognition of the principle of adequate and separate representation for Muslims. With the establishment of this party, then, India had two major political parties; the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, which was established earlier in 1885. These parties were seen as the vehicles to carry out the respective political demands and aspiration of Muslims and Hindus.

Though prior to the First World War both these parties kept themselves aloof from each other, after the First World War, however, they appeared to be working together in the sense that they had similar goal, to liberate India from the grip of the British colonialism and to establish a free united India. Some leading Muslim leaders such as Jinnah and Iqbāl were among the supporters of the idea, at least in the beginning.[8]

Moreover, when Khilāfat Movement, whose purpose was to support Ottoman Caliphate, started in 1919 and began to fight against the British, the Congress, which at the same time launched non-cooperation movement, expanded its scope and supported the Khilāfat movement. Mawdūdī who was then among the supporters and workers of the Khilāfat movement, described the situation that :

> The passion to be liberated from the yoke of the British rule bursts into a flame.
> Both Hindus and the Muslims of India came to be united. The Muslims were
> primarily interested in promoting the purposes of the Khilāfat movement, while the

---

[8]Jinnah and Iqbāl, for instance, had been initially an Indian nationalist. He began his political career as a member of the All-India National Congress and later joined the Muslim League in 1913. Though until 1930 he remained active in the Indian nationalist movement, from 1932 onwards he left the Congress Party and later on in 1940, he even proposed two nation theory. See Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, p.9. In addition, Jinnah had not given up completely his effort of 'communal harmony' until 1936. See Farhat Haq, "Islamic Reformism and the State: The case of the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1988), p.88.

Hindus were moved by considerations of Swaraj. Both Hindus and the Muslims acknowledge Mahatma Gandhi as their leader. He led a mass non-cooperation movement.[9]

It was during this period that both Muslims and Hindus lived in a honeymoon of unity. For some time they fraternized and it appeared as if all differences among them had disappeared. However, following the abolition of Caliphate in Ottoman Turkey in 1924, the Khilāfat movement also came to an end and consequently the two communities fell apart again and never could be reconciled.

Despite such conflict, many Muslim leaders, including Jinnah, were still active in the efforts of uniting both Muslims and Hindus and supporting composite-nationalism. However, the bitter defeat in the election of 1937[10] made Jinnah and other leaders of the Muslim League realize that it was impossible to unite both the communities. Even Congress did not want to share any ministry posts with Muslims unless they ceased to be the members of the League. Accordingly, Jinnah changed his stance and promoted the two-nation theory. On March 23, 1940, his Muslim League passed a Lahore Resolution demanding the partition of India and the establishment of an independent Muslim state in the subcontinent. This movement came to be known as the Pakistan[11] movement.

---

[9]Masudul Hasan, *Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī and His Thought*, Vol.1. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), p.30.

[10]Farhat Haq, "Islamic Reformism...", p.88.

[11]Explaining the composition of the world of Pakistan, Rahmat Ali writes that, "Pakistan is both a Persian and Urdu word. It is composed of letters take from the names of all our homelands India and Asia. That is Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kachch and Kathiawar), Turkharistan, Afghanistan and Baluchistan. It means the lands of Paks - the spiritually pure and clean." Chaudhry Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan the Fatherland of Pak Nation* (London: The Pak National Liberation Movement, 1947), p.225. Cited in Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan in the Formative Phase, 1857-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968, 4th ed., 1992), p.105.

So far as Mawdūdī's position towards the Pakistan movement, is concerned, many writers like Alavi,[12] Cohen,[13] Esposito,[14] Lawrence,[15] Watt,[16] and Aziz,[17] to mention only a few, are of the opinion that Mawdūdī did not support the movement advocated by Jinnah and his party.[18] This conclusion was, among other things, perhaps derived from Mawdūdī's statement when he said that:

> As a Muslim, I am not interested in the proposition that where the Muslims are in a majority they should be given the right to form their own government. For me the most important question is whether in your 'Pakistan' the structure of government will be based on the concept of the sovereignty of God or on that of sovereignty of the people, as understood by the protagonists of Western democracy. In the former case, it will surely be "Pakistan", but in the latter case it will be just as ungodly as that part of the country... In the sight of God Muslim nationalism is just as cursed as Indian nationalism.[19]

In spite of his opposition, however, Mawdūdī recognized the partition of India. It was in April 1947, anticipating that partition was inevitable, that Mawdūdī instructed his group to split the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī into two wings: one wing would operate in India and the

---

[12]Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology," in Anita M. Weiss, ed. *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p.35. and Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, eds. *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982, 2nd ed., 1988), p.93.

[13]Stephen P. Cohen, "State Building in Pakistan," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds. *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986, 2nd ed., 1988), p.301.

[14]Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, p.93; and also idem *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.157.

[15]Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper and Collins Publishers, 1989), p.207.

[16]W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1988, 2nd ed., 1989), p.55.

[17]K. K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), p.141.

[18]In the official history of the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, according to Farhat Haq, it is denied that Mawdūdī opposed the Pakistani movement. In fact the Jamāʿat is trying to include Mawdūdī's name in the history books as one of the founders of Pakistan. See Farhat Haq, "Islamic Reformism", p.93, note 53.

[19]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Musalmān aur Mawjūda Siyasī Kashmakash* (Muslim and the Present Political Struggle) Vol. III. (Pathankot: Tarjuman al-Qurʾān, n.d.,), pp.12-15. As cited in Hussain Syed, *Pakistan*, p.35; and in Aziz, *Party Politics*, p.141.

other in Pakistan, each working within the political framework and under the peculiar circumstances presented by a democratic state with a Muslim minority and one with a Muslim majority.[20] Later on Mawdūdī was found among the former. It is also interesting to note here that even earlier than this, in the context of giving a solution to the problems then facing the Muslims of India, Mawdūdī proposed three alternatives.[21] Among them, the last one was closest to that proposed by the Muslim League, stating the need for a separate state for Muslims. The only ground for differences lay in the fact that Mawdūdī's state was a federation which was still linked to India whereas Jinnah's state was free and independent of India. However, Mawdūdī's theory was not widely known. Hussain Syed argues that, "It is likely that Mawdūdī's plans for the establishment of autonomous Muslims state had not even reached most Muslims."[22] Meanwhile, Jinnah's plan was welcomed by most Muslims who had known the Muslim League for a long time.

Mawdūdī declined to join the League, although he was approached twice.[23] His refusal to involve himself in the Pakistan movement was seemingly justified on several grounds; first, on theological grounds, Mawdūdī had little faith in Jinnah's commitment to an Islamic state. He feared that Pakistan would become *na-Pakistan* (abode of impure ones) in the hands of Muslims of doubtful faith.[24] Second, as Rosenthal puts it, ideologically, Mawdūdī maintained that the Muslims are not a nation in the Western sense, but a group with an ideology very much like the socialist or communist parties and that they should struggle for the propagation and adoption of an Islamic ideological concept in the whole of

---

[20]Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California, 1961), p.95.

[21]See Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1962), pp.191-192; and Anwar Hussain Syed, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics and Solidarity* (New York: Preager Publishers, 1982), pp.29-32.

[22]Anwar Syed, *Pakistan*, p.29.

[23]Binder, *Religion and Politics*, pp.94-95; and K. K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1956* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), p.141.

[24]Rafiq Zakaria, *The Struggle Within Islam: The Conflict Between Religion and Politics* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), p.9.

India.[25] Alavi holds a similar point of view when he says that, "Mawdūdī's opposition to the Pakistan movement was on the ground that the true vocation of an Islamic militant was a proselytizing one, that Islam was a universal religion that knew of no national boundaries."[26]

In the eyes of the Jamāᶜat historians, both Mawdūdī and Jinnah traveled in the same direction but in different vehicles.[27] In a meeting with a Jamāᶜat official at the instance of Mawdūdī, Jinnah was reported to have said that the only difference between the League and the Jamāᶜat was that the League thought that an independent state for the Muslims was of more immediate importance than the purification of their lives and characters and that without such a state the higher aims of the Jamāᶜat would remain impossible.[28]

From the afore-mentioned reasons it is quite clear that Mawdūdī's desire to see an ideal Islamic state, which does not recognize any particular territory, led him to oppose any idea of nationalism, either Muslim (promoted by the League) or composite nationalism (canvassed by the Congress). Thus, essentially he did not reject the idea of a separate state for Muslims. In order to get a clearer picture of Mawdūdī's political discourses, now we move to examine his concept of an Islamic state.

1.b. Mawdūdī's Ideas on Statehood

Fully convinced that Islam was not a jumble of unrelated ideas and incoherent modes of conduct but a well-ordered system, a constituent whole, resting on a definite set of clear-cut postulates,[29] Mawdūdī tried to explain his concept of an Islamic state at various places in

---

[25]E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Isla.. in the Modern Nation State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p.184.

[26]Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam," p.93.

[27]An interesting discussion on Mawdūdī's and Jinnah's differences in apprehending Islamic political discourses, see Farhat Haq, "Islamic Revivalism...", pp.56-99.

[28]Cf. Sarwat Saulat, *Mawlānā Mawdūdī* (Lahore: International Islamic Publishers, 1979), pp.17-18., as cited in H. Mintjes, "Mawlānā Mawdūdī's Last Years and the Resurgence of Fundamentalist Islam," in *Al-Mushir: Theological Journal of the Christian Study Centre.* Vol. XXII, No.2 (Summer, 1980), pp.67-68.

[29]Sayyid Abul Aᶜlā Mawdūdī, *Political Theory of Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960, 7th ed., 1985), p.3.

his works. This is due to the fact that, as Craig Baxter rightly put it and as Mawdūdī strongly believed it, "Islam does not accept the separation of church and state...Islam is a complete code of life - religious, political, and moral."[30] Accordingly, during the period he sketched the Islamic state to include its characteristics, form, purpose, and even the way as to how to achieve such an ideal goal. Mawdūdī was of the view that the state, according to Islam, was no more than a combination of men working together as servants of God to carry out His Will and Purposes.[31] This kind of state had several features and characteristics: first, the Islamic state was completely free from any trace of nationalism and its influences.[32] It was Islam that were to be a single factor to build any state, and not races, languages, blood, or geographical boundaries. To him, nationalism was diametrically opposed to the Islamic teachings. Nationalism divided man from man on the basis of exaggerated nationality whereas Islam regarded man as man which in turn avoids any subjugation by man over man or nation over nation.[33] Islam urged universal brotherhood whereas nationalism sanctified and glorified its own nationality. Because of this notion, he considered nationalism as a religion which stood as a rival and adversary against the sharīʿa of God.[34] It seems that Mawdūdī's rejection of nationalism coincided with the idea of Pan-Islamism kindled by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d.1897). However, if Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh (Egyptian modernist, d.1905), or even Muḥammad Iqbāl criticized nationalism, they did so because they

---

[30]Craig Baxter, et al., *Government and Politics in South Asia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p.165. Rosenthal holds a similar opinion when he says that, "There was, at least in the classical theory, never a dichotomy between religion and politics in Islam not until something over 80 years of political struggle for freedom and emancipation finally resulted in Turkish lay republic of Kemal Ataturk, producing a new attitude to Islam. See Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, " Religion and Politics in Islam," in *Islam in the Modern Age*," Vol. I, No. 1 (May 1970), p.51.

[31]Sayyid Abu Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Process of Islamic Revolution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1947, 8th ed., 1988), p.13.

[32]Mawdūdī, *The Process*, p.8.

[33]Cf. Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Nationalism and India* (Pathankot: Maktaba Jamāʿt-i Islāmī, 1947), pp.10-13.

[34]*Ibid.*, p.41.

believed that it would prevent the unity of Muslim peoples in their struggle for independence, Mawdūdī, conversely, hardly supported the national liberation movement at all.

Second, the basic conception underlying outwards manifestation of the Islamic state was the idea of Divine sovereignty.[35] In other words, there was no person, class or group, nor even the entire population of the state as a whole who could lay claim to sovereignty as was the case in Western and European countries.[36] In line with this, the Islamic state repudiated all traces of secular Western democracy.[37] In addition, since in the Islamic state it was God who was the real law-giver and the authority of absolute legislation was vested in Him, the Islamic state would in all respects, be founded upon the law laid down by God through His Prophet.[38]

The third characteristic of the Islamic state was that it was universal and all-embracing.[39] This means that its activities were not restricted to certain areas but covered all human activities, all aspects of life, individual and collective, social and economic, religious and political. He said that this kind of state, to certain extent, was similar to that of Fascist and Communist states. Finally, an Islamic state was an ideological state.[40] According to David Kettler, ideology is a pattern of symbolically-charged beliefs and expressions that present, interpret and evaluate the world in a way designed to shape, mobilize, direct, organize, and justify certain modes or courses of action and to anathematize others.[41] In line with this, the Islamic state, which was established in accordance with the Islamic principles embodied in

---

[35]Mawdūdī, *The Process*, p.13.

[36]Mawdūdī, *Political Theory*, p.19.

[37]*Ibid.*, p.21.

[38] *Ibid*, p.20.

[39]*Ibid.*, p.30; and Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution* Translated and edited by Khurshīd Aḥmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955, 10th ed., 1990), P.146.

[40]Mawdūdī, *Political Theory*, p.31; and Mawdūdī, *Islamic and Constitution*, p.146.

[41]See David Kettler, "Ideology," in David Miller, et al., eds. *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 3rd ed., 1989), pp.235-238.

the Qur'ān and the *sunna*, should be run by the people who did not only fully comprehend and believe in Islam but also devoted all their attention and efforts to observe the ideology and enforce the Islamic order. Consequently people who were not committed to the ideology were not allowed to join important government ranks. Unlike a Communist state, according to him, the Islamic state did not eliminate minorities, called *dhimmīs*, but protected them and permitted them to live according to their belief.

The Islamic state bearing these characteristics was, therefore, aptly named the Kingdom of God. However, since in Islam there was no tradition of clergy's control of the government, it would not be appropriate to call it a theocracy in a Western sense. Because contrary to a Western theocracy, the Islamic state was run by the entire community of Muslims based on the legislation laid down by God through His Prophet. Thus, Mawdūdī preferred calling it theo-democracy or a divine democratic state.[42]

The head of the theo-democratic state, which might bear any title, such as *amīr* or *khalīfa*, would be elected based on the criterion of his piety. It should be born in mind that he, like ordinary people, would not be above criticism. The people were entitled to disobey and depose him if they found him not following the teachings of Islam. However, Mawdūdī did not clearly explain as to how the people would elect and depose the head of state whenever necessary.

Having discussed the characteristics and the nature of the Islamic state, we come to throw light on the functions of an Islamic state. After citing the verses of the Qur'ān 57:25, 22:41, and 2:110,[43] Mawdūdī asserted that there were at least three main objectives of the Islamic state that could be inferred from them. First, the Islamic state would assure social

---

[42]Mawdūdī, *Political Theory*, p.22.

[43]The translations of these verses are consecutively as follows: "We verily sent Our Messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the Scripture and the Balance, that mankind may observe right measure; and We revealed iron, wherein is mighty power and (may) uses for mankind" ; "(Muslims are) those who, if We give them power in the land, establish the system of Salat (worship) and Zakat (poor dues) and enjoin virtue and forbid evil and inequity" ; and "You are the best community sent forth unto mankind; ye enjoin the Right conduct and forbid evil and inequity." See Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p.145.

justice for the people; Second, besides preventing people from exploiting each other, the Islamic state would safeguard their liberty and protect its subject from foreign invasion. Third, the Islamic state should eradicate all forms of evil and encourage all types of virtue and excellence.[44]

Mawdūdī realized that his concept of Islamic state could not be realized through mere writings and preaching; action and hard woɪk, the efforts that he called a revolution, were necessary. The revolution which would bear responsibility to entirely change the society as was done in the early years of Islam, during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the four rightly-guided Caliphs, al-khulāfāʾ al-Rāshidūn. It would be misleading to draw parallels between his kind of revolution in similar way as it were the revolutions in Russia and France. Instead of involving and generating radical mass movements, he believed that the social order flowed from top to button, not vice versa. From this principle he argued that before changing the society of the Muslims of India, therefore, one had to change the theoretical thinking of the leaders of the concerned society.[45] On several occasions Mawdūdī even told his cadres that the minority status of Muslims in the subcontinent should not deter them from their goal of a complete Islamic revolution in all India.

In this frame work, just a few months after the Muslim League passed its Lahore Resolution in 1940, Mawdūdī established the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī (see: section 2.c.) Through this organization, which constituted a continuation of his effort initiated at the Dār al-Islām, Pathankot, in the late thirties, he started "to produce a cadre of sincere and disciplined

---

[44]See Mawdūdī, *Political Theory*, pp.29-30; Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, pp.145-146; Charles J. Adams, "Mawdūdī and the Islamic State," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. Edited by John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.119. Later on Mawdūdī summarized his objective of an Islamic state when he pointed out that, "The aim is to encourage the qualities of purity, beauty, goodness, virtue, success, and prosperity which God wants to flourish in the life of His people and to suppress all kinds of exploitation and injustice." Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *The Islamic Way of Life* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), p.32.

[45]Cf. Dilip Hiro, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (London: Paladin Graftoon Books, 1988), p.247.; and Dilip Hiro, *Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism* (New York: Routledge, 1989), p.247.

Muslims capable of bringing about the victory of Islam in India."[46] Mawdūdī once said that the Islamic state could not spring into being all of a sudden like a miracle. He reasoned further that to create an Islamic state there should be a movement having for its basis a view of life, an ideal existence, a standard of morality, a character and spirit which was in line with the fundamentals of Islam.[47] However, the political situation in the subcontinent changed dramatically and the Muslim League and its Pakistan movement now was supported by most of the Muslims of India until it opened the gate of freedom for them in 1947. Thus, Mawdūdī was not able to launch his gradual revolution programs; he surrendered to the reality of partition and he had no choice but to choose Pakistan instead of India.

2. After Partition

In this period we will focus on Mawdūdī's political theories and activities under following topics; his concept of the Islamic state; his participation in the constitution making of Pakistan, and finally, his life-long involvement in the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan.

2.a. Elaboration of the idea of an Islamic State

Despite his controversial stand during the Pakistan movement, two months after the partition, Mawdūdī concomitantly decided to migrate to Pakistan. He saw this newly born 'miracle' country providing a new hope where he could realize his ideals, not only to establish an Islamic order but an Islamic state. The difference between the Islamic order and the Islamic state is, as Jansen puts it, that in the former politics are derived from the spirit of Islam, while in the latter politics and religion are parts of the single totality of Islam. Consequently, the Islamic state is more strictly and more truly Islamic.[48] By making an Islamic state into reality, Mawdūdī believed that a complete Islamic order could also be achieved. Meanwhile, describing the existence of Pakistan, Smith remarks that, "In the case

---

[46]Hiro, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, p.247.

[47]Mawdūdī, *The Process*, p.17.

[48]Godfrey H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (London: Pan Books, 1979, 2nd ed., 1980), pp.172-173.

of Pakistan, ...the whole raison d'être of the state is Islam : it is Islam alone which brought it into being, and Islam alone which holds it together."[49] In a similar vein, Enayat is of the view that it came into being as the realization of the demands of the Muslims in the subcontinent.[50] Thus, Pakistan is the only state in modern time whose existence is based merely on a religious reason, and not on other factors such as nationality or language. From this point of view, therefore, it is understandable if Mawdūdī and most of the ʿulamāʾ in Pakistan started demanding "the promised land" to be the real Pakistan in a sense that it would be ruled along the lines of the Islamic state. However, Mawdūdī did not express his views until 1948, when the situation was permissible for him to do so, as we will see later.

As far as his idea of the Islamic state is concerned, as already alluded to in the previous section, it was further developed and elaborated here and there in his writings. In such books as *Islamic Law and Constitution* and *al-Khilāfa wa al-Mulk*, he put his ideas on an ideal Islamic state more completely. Although he emphasized that the Qurʾān did not merely prescribe the principles of morality and ethics, but it also gave a guidance in the political, social and economic fields,[51] he acknowledged that neither the Qurʾān nor the *sunna* gave concrete descriptions of an Islamic state and its form. In other words, in this respect, he did not disagree with Qamaruddin Khan that the Qurʾān was not a treatise on political science.[52] Henceforth, what he had done was an *ijtihād* to formulate the ideal Islamic state in modern time based on four sources; the Qurʾān, the *sunna*, the conventions of *al-Khulafā al-Rāshidūn*, and the rulings of great jurists.

During the pre-partition period, as we have already seen, Mawdūdī's political *ijtihād* had touched upon the characteristics, form, citizenship, and functions of an Islamic state;

---

[49]Wilfred Cantwell Smith. *Pakistan as an Islamic State* (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf. 1951). p.29.

[50]Enayat. *Modern Islamic Political Thought.* p.100.

[51]Mawdūdī. *Islamic Law and Constitution,* p.164.

[52]Qamaruddin Khān. *Political Concept in the Qurʾān* (Karachi: Institute of Islamic Studies. 1973). p.3.

during the post-partition period, he not only elaborated on these points, but he also developed other aspects of an Islamic state. They include the basic principles of an Islamic constitution, the concept of *khilāfa*, qualifications of the state's authority, systems of election, and the functions of the three state organs called *trias politica*.

(i) **Constitution:** According to Mawdūdī, six basic principles of an Islamic constitution could be derived from the Qur'ānic verse 4:59:[53] (a) an individual should first obey God and His apostle, (b) obedience to an Islamic government comes after the obedience to God and His apostle, (c) an Islamic government should consist of Muslim believers only, (d) people have the right to question the government's policies and depose its officers, (e) final authority to determine, judge, and settle any conflict and disputes resting with God and His apostle, and (f) an independent body, free from people's and government's interference, should be set up to give a just and fair judgment in accordance with the law of God and His apostle.[54]

Henceforth, the detailed contents of an Islamic constitution could be primarily based on the law of God and His apostle, i.e. the *sharīʿa*. This was because Mawdūdī believed that, "The *Shari'a* is a complete scheme of life and all-embracing social order where nothing is superfluous, and nothing is lacking." He added that the *sharīʿa* "is an organic whole."[55] In other words, this principle was in line with his concept of divine sovereignty, which was also shared by Khalīfa ʿAbdul Ḥakīm and Muḥammad Asad.

A cursory look at all of Mawdūdī's works shows us that the concept of sovereignty and *sharīʿa* are emphasized again and again in different styles. Thus, *tawḥīd* symbolized in the first of the two *shahāda* is central to his religious and political thought. In the words of Adams, "Mawdūdī conceived God principally as will or demand or imperative, and his view

---

[53]"O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His apostle, if ye do believe in God and the Last Day." Ali, *The Glorious Qur'an*, p.198.

[54]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Khilafah dan Kerajaan*. Tr. by Muhammad al-Baqir (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1984, 3rd ed., 1990), pp.72-73.

[55]Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*. p.52.

of Islam is, in consequence, a very moral one."[56] God's will, which was embodied in the *sharīʿa*, should be observed and recognized as the basic constitution of the Islamic state. No law produced by the state should contradict the *sharīʿa*.

(ii) **Khilāfat** : Since God created mankind as His vicegerent,[57] the political organization of the Islamic state was called *Khilāfat*. Although it was God who was sovereign, He delegated sovereignty to His vicegerent, humankind. However, it should be born in mind that God entrusted this vicegerency not to any one person but to all people who believed in and acknowledged His *sharīʿa*.[58] In practical politics this system might be termed as the limited sovereignty of the people as opposed to the Western concept of the sovereignty of the people. This was due to the fact that the people of the Islamic state had neither the right nor the authority to construct their own constitution, but had to strictly adhere to the Divine Law.

However, it is interesting to note that while most Muslim scholars believed that the term of *khalīfa*[59] in the Qurʾān (2:30) referred to all of mankind, and not to a particular nation or tribe, Mawdūdī understood it to mean Muslims only. Supporting Mawdūdī's interpretation, Kurdi held the view that it were only Muslims who deserved full citizenship in an Islamic state, whereas non-Muslims could be recognized only as permanent residents.[60]

(iii) **Qualifications of State Authority** : Mawdūdī was convinced that an Islamic state was not an end in itself but a means to attain a higher objective, as Asad put it, to

---

[56]Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi," in Donald E. Smith, ed. *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p.382.

[57]Qurʾān 2: 30. According to Mawdūdī, vicegerency or *khilāfa* means one who enjoys certain rights and powers, not in his own right but as representative and viceroy of his Lord. His authority is not inherent; it is a delegated one. He is not free to do whatever he likes, but has to act according to the directives of Principal. See Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 173.

[58]Mawdūdī, *Khilafah dan Kerajaan*, p.67.

[59]An interesting discussion on the interpretations of *khalīfa* given by Muslim scholars from al-Ṭabarī (d. 923), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) to Quṭb (d. 1966), see Jaafar Sheikh Idris "Is Man the Vicegerent of God?," in *Journal of Islamic Studies*, No.1 (1990), pp.99-110.

[60]Abdulrahman Abdulkadir Kurdi, *The Islamic State: A Study Based on the Islamic Holy Constitution* (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1984), p.60.

develop a community of people who worked for the creation and maintenance of social conditions conducive to enabling the greatest possible number of human beings to live, morally as well as physically, in accordance with the natural Law of God, Islam.[61] Henceforth, the authorities of the state such as the head of an Islamic state and all its functionaries should not only possess a deep understanding of Islamic teachings and practice them wholeheartedly, they also should possess certain qualifications.

Mawdūdī described the basic requirements for both the head of an Islamic state and the members of consultative assembly, which he called respectively amir, imām or khalīfa and majlis-i shūrā. To hold any of these positions one should be : Muslim, male, sane, an adult, and a citizen of an Islamic state.[62] Since these five conditions could be easily met, the people should also consider other qualities of the candidates such as their trustworthiness, intelligence, and skill in statecraft. As for the amīr, he should be the most learned, the most wise and the most pious citizen and he should have the greatest authority.[63] However, he did not approve of an individual's self-nomination for an office.

Based on the above requirements, however, not only non-Muslims, but Muslim women were also excluded from the position of head of state and from membership in the constituent assembly and from other important governmental posts. In Mawdūdī's political framework, it seemed that Muslim women were considered politically unequal to men, if not second class citizens. Regarding this issue, Ahmad remarked that, "In an Islamic State, woman will have a specialized task to perform, and therefore, her political and social position would be different from that of man." [64]

---

[61]Asad, *The Principles*, p.30.

[62]Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, pp.243-244; Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, *The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitution*. Ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Karachi: Jamā'at-i Islāmī Publications, n.d.), pp.44-45.

[63]Sayed Riaz Ahmad, *Maulana Maududi and the Islamic State*. (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1976), p.163.

[64]*Ibid.*, p.154.

(iv) **System of Election:** Ideally, according to Mawdūdī, the head of an Islamic state should be elected by *ahl al-ḥal wa al-ʿaqd* (people who loose and bind, elite electors). Without giving the exact method of election, however, Mawdūdī went on to assert that, "We may make fresh rules and regulations to suit our present needs for election of the head of state..." and "...we can adopt all such possible and permissible methods whereby we might be able to find out truly as to which persons enjoy the confidence of the masses in greatest measure."[65] According to him, one of the permissible methods was a election system that fulfilled three required criteria; first, the election depends entirely on the will of people; second, no clan or class should have a monopoly on offices; and third, the election should take place with the free will of the Muslim masses and without any coercion or force.[66]

However, while Mawdūdī discussed the election system and the requirements of the head of an Islamic state as well as the members of the constituent assembly, he did not clearly discuss for how long these offices should be held. He went on to describe the other important aspects of an Islamic state such as the concept of power distribution within an Islamic state, i.e., *trias politica.*

(v) **Trias Politica** : It is interesting to note that in spite of his vehement condemnation of the West for being irreligious, Mawdūdī, adopted the term "trias politica" originating from the West. He went on to explain that the governmental function of legislative, executive, and judiciary should work separately under the supervision of the head of an Islamic state. Henceforth, the three state institutions worked differently from the original concept of trias politica.[67] The legislative branch or *ahl al-ḥal wa al-ʿaqd* or *majlis-i shūrā* had several important functions,[68] the most important of which was to give advice to

[65]Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution,* pp.227 and 240.

[66]*Ibid.,* pp.234-235.

[67]Yusril Ihza, "Modenisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Suatu Kajian Perbadingan Kes Parti Masyumi di Indonesia dan Jamāʿat-i Islāmī di Pakistan 1940-1960" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1993), p.336.

[68]For the other functions, see Mawdūdī, *The Nature,* pp.21-22; and Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution,* pp.221-222.

the head of state on law, economics, and other state policies. Before deciding any policy, the head of the state had to consult the *majlis*. However, while claiming to follow the conventions of the Caliphs and opinions of the early jurists of Islam, he asserted that the head of state is "under no obligation to sanction, follow or adopt their unanimous or even majority verdict or opinion. In other words, he can always exercise his 'Veto'."[69]

Furthermore, the *umarā*³ or the executive branch assisted the head of state in running governmental affairs, it also functioned to enforce the rules and regulations formulated by the legislative branch. Meanwhile, the judiciary branch or *qaḍa* functioned to make sure that the justice was preserved.

The following section will examine how far the Mawdūdian concept of Islamic state was reflected in the constitution of Pakistan.

2.b. Mawdūdī and the Constitution Making of Pakistan

In the first couple of months after partition, Mawdūdī and his people from the Jamā'at-i Islāmī of Pakistan were busy organizing relief work for the *muhajirīn*, who had decided to choose Pakistan as their new home land. Though Mawdūdī was undoubtedly sincere in extending help to the refugees, at the same time presumably he endeavored to alter his negative attitude towards the idea of Pakistan during the Pakistan movement.

Establishment of Pakistan, of course, did not mean that the Muslims' struggle in the way of God came to an end. It was only a beginning in the achievement of a higher ideal which included political stability of the country, the welfare of its people, and justice and peace among its citizens. To realize these objectives, therefore, the government needed a constituent assembly whose task was to formulate and construct a constitution for Pakistan. The constitution was very important because, as Scruton points out, it constituted the fundamental political principles of a state. It would determine such matters as the composition, powers, and procedures of the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, the

---

[69]Mawdūdī, *The Nature*, p.29.; and Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, pp.228-229.

appointment of state officers, and the structure and offices which authorize, express and mediate the exercise of power.[70] In resonance with this, fortunately, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan had already come into being on August 10, 1947 to shoulder such a crucial job.

Neither Mawdūdī nor his group from the Jamāᶜat were a member of the Constituent Assembly. The assembly was dominated by the Muslim League, a political party in power whose members were mostly Western educated intellectuals and modernists. According to Fārūqī, instead of an Islamic state, the League leadership wished to lead Pakistan towards establishing a secular democratic national state. They believed that this trend would lead directly to a type of state like the Turkey of Kemal Ataturk.[71] To prevent this trend, Mawdūdī and the ᶜulamāᵓ tried to influence the assembly from the outside by mass mobilization of the people. Together, they continuously put a political pressure on the assembly so that it would consider their demand of making Pakistan into an Islamic state. It was just six months after the establishment of the Constituent Assembly that Mawdūdī broke his silence by delivering a speech on Islamic law at the Law College of Lahore. Since his speech was apparently welcomed by the students of the college, he delivered another speech on a similar issue. In the second speech, Mawdūdī elucidated the four most important points that he demanded should be explicitly declared in the constitution of an Islamic state. These points are as follows:

> i) That the sovereignty in Pakistan belongs to God Almighty alone and that the government of Pakistan shall administer the country as His agent;
> ii) That the basic law of the land is the Islamic Sharīᶜa which has come to us through our Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him);
> iii) That all those existing laws which may be in conflict with the Sharīᶜa shall in due course be repealed or brought into conformity with basic law and no law which may be in any way repugnant to the Sharīᶜa shall be enacted in the future;

---

[70]Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1983), p.92.

[71]Misbahul Islām Fārūqī, *Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī Pakistan: Literature, Leadership, Organization, Ideal, Achievements , Programs* (Lahore: Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī Pakistan, 1957), p.89.

iv) That the State, in exercising its powers, shall not be competent to transgress the limits laid down by Islam.[72]

Later on, all of these points were presented in the form of a resolution. After it was passed by the Jamāᶜat membership, it was sent not only to the President of the Constituent Assembly but also to the Governor General, and the Prime Minister of Pakistan.[73] Along with these demands, Mawdūdī also criticized government policies and its administrative organization for its failure to put a stop, or at least to reduce, the practice of corruption and bribery in the department of the government. For Mawdūdī, his activities were intended to put corrective pressure on the government, while to the Government they were interpreted as the cause of disruption.[74] Henceforth, this activity, coupled with other activities such as the 'fatwās', forbidding Muslims to take an oath of unconditional loyalty to the government; the statement saying that the secret war between Pakistan and India in Kashmir was an improper jihad; and the pre-partition stand of the Jamāᶜat against recruitment in the army,[75] increased the suspicion and wrath of the government towards Mawdūdī and led the government to arrest Mawdūdī, Miāṅ Ṭufayl and other leaders of the Jamāᶜat and imprison them for two years.

Mawdūdī did not fail to observe that the support from the ᶜulamā᷾ was essential to his four demands, which would lead to the creation of an Islamic state. Thus, he approached Mawlānā Shabīr ᶜUsmani, who was close to the government and was himself the head of the

---

[72]Sayyid Abul Aᶜlā Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and its Introduction in Pakistan* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955, 4th ed., 1983), pp.51-52; and Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p.101.

[73]The four points were preceded by two paragraphs stating that: "Whereas the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Pakistan firmly believes in the principles of Islam; and whereas the entire struggle and all the sacrifices in the freedom movement for Pakistan were for the sole purpose of establishing these very Islamic principles in all fields of our life: Therefore now, after the establishment of Pakistan, we the Muslims of Pakistan demand that the Constituent Assembly should unequivocally declare : ... ". See Khurshid Ahmad's "Introduction" in Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, pp.26-27.

[74]Kalim Bahadur, *The Jamāᶜat-i Islami of Pakistan : Political Thought and Political Action* (New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977), p.59.

[75]Cf. Charles J. Adams, "Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī," in Mircea Eliade, et al., eds. *Encyclopedia of Religion.* Vol.7. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1987), p.15

Jamāʿat al-ʿUlamāʾ-i Islāmī. In addition, Mawdūdī also visited many places of Pakistan to explain to the people about his four demands to the Constituent Assembly. However, due to, among other things, the demands from the people which increased almost incredibly that instead of India Act 35, Pakistan should be immediately framing a constitution in line with the principles and ideals of Islam, on March 19, 1949, the Constituent Assembly passed a resolution on the Aims and Objectives of the Constitution, which was more popular as the Objective Resolution. This was, obviously, not a constitution but general principles and foundation upon which a future solid constitution could be based. As Callard points out that it is a document "to provide a declaration of national objectives, but certain aspects of the form of the future state are outlined in its provisions."[76]

Having read the Resolution[77] and found that it substantially incorporated his demands, Mawdūdī seemed to be happy. Majlis-i shūrā of the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī even held a meeting in which an agreement was reached to the effect that the members of the Jamāʿat were now permitted to cooperate with the government and were then allowed to participate in any election run by the government so as to transform Pakistan society to an Islamic society through constitutional means.[78] This is because, according to them, Pakistan had become 'an Islamic state' at least in its basic nature. In fact, the Resolution opens with "In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful" and is followed by "Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone..." and " Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qurʾān and the *sunna.*"

---

[76]Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), p.90.

[77]For a full text of the resolution, see *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates,* Vol.V., No.5 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1949), pp.100-101.

[78]Cf. *Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, Maqṣad, Ṭahrīkh Aur Lāʾih ʿAmal* [Jamaʿāt-i Islami, Its Objective, History, and Course of Action] (Lahore: Publicity Department of the Jamaʿāt, n.d.,), p.144., cited in Haq, *Islamic Reformism,* pp.208-209.

Since the inception of Pakistan, the idea of an Islamic state had become a topic of discussion and debate among the intellectuals, politician and the ʿulamāʾ of the country. However, it meant different things to modernists and to conservative ʿulamāʾ - two general broad grouping of Pakistani Muslims who participated inside or outside the constituent assembly.[79] While the modernists considered it a state which was based on the general principles of Islamic justice, equality and freedom, and the sovereignty of the people, the ʿulamāʾ believed it as a state that was to be based on the sharīʿa and it was God who was the sovereign over the state, modeled on the government of the Prophet and the four rightly-guided Caliphs of Islam. Thus, the ʿulamāʾ group, to which Mawdūdī was a part, were of the opinion that the clauses of 'sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty' and 'Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qurʾān and the sunna ' mentioned in the Resolution, signify that the state would be run in accord with the sharīʿa. However, when the Basic Principle's Committee of the Constituent Assembly reported its first draft of the constitution, the people, especially the ʿulamāʾ, felt disappointed because the draft did not mention, among other things, the sharīʿa as the basis of state law. As a response, some thirty-one both the Sunni and the Shiʿite ʿulamāʾ of Pakistan who came from various school of thoughts held a four-days conference in Karachi on January, 1951, wherein they formulated the principles of an Islamic state expressed in twenty-two articles.[80] Since Mawdūdī was the most suited to formulate the principles, he dominated discussion in the conference and, therefore, the formulation was much colored by his thought.

---

[79]For this broad grouping, see Freeland Abbott, "Pakistan and the Secular State," in *South Asian Politics and Religion.* Edited by Donald Eugene Smith (Princeton: Princetor University Press, 1966), pp.352-370; Fazlur Rahman, "The Ideological Experience of Pakistan," in *Islam and the Modern Age,* Vol.II, No.4 (1971), pp.1-20; and Grover Verinder, "Enigma of an Islamic State: The Case of Pakistan," in *The Indian Political Science Review.* Vol.XVII, No.I (1984), pp.107-116.

[80]For content of these articles, see *Fundamental Principles of an Islamic State : Formulated at a Gathering of ʿUlamāʾ of Various Muslim Schools of Thought* (Karachi: Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, n.d.), pp. 8-16; and Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution,* pp.31-336.

Eighteen months after forwarding the *ulamā* 's suggestions of an Islamic state, Mawdūdī was no longer patient to wait the result of Constituent Assembly work. Consequently, in May 1952, he again proposed a nine-point demand[81] emphasizing that the *sharīʿa* be taken as the law of Pakistan. Following his concept of an Islamic state which divided its citizenship based on Muslim and non-Muslim, his last demand centered around the Aḥmadīs, especially the Qadianis, whom he wanted to be declared a non-Muslim minority in the Constitution. Mawdūdī even felt it necessary to write a book on the issue and he named it *The Qadiani Problem* , which has been reviewed in the previous chapter. Not long after this, a riot broke out in Punjab, in connection with the demand for the resignation of Chawdhri Zafrullah Khan, an Aḥmadi, from the post of foreign minister. Though Mawdūdī was not the sole cause of the riot, Mawdūdī was arrested and sentenced to death. The Jamāʿat believed that the main reason behind this arrest was not Mawdūdī's anti-Qadiani stand, but his insistence on an Islamic state. However, due to the mass protest both from in and outside of Pakistan, the punishment was canceled and instead he was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, which was later on reduced to a two year sentence.

In the mean time, a new Constituent Assembly, trying to accommodate both modernist and traditionalist demands, kept working to finalize the constitution of Pakistan. After nine years of effort the Assembly was, however, finally successful in framing a constitution which was implemented on March 23, 1956 proclaiming Pakistan an Islamic Republic. Prior to its enactment, Mawdūdī offered some comments on the Constitution Bill saying that, among other things, the constitution should mention the abolishment of interest (*ribā*), and the restriction of the President and Governor's power.[82] It was believed that the most important amendments were accepted by the Assembly. Thus, the minimum requirement of an Islamic constitution were met.[83] The 1956 constitution, which was lengthy

---

[81]See Ghulam Muḥammad's "Foreword" in *Fundamental Principles*, pp.3-5.

[82]For more explanation about this comment, see Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Comments and Amendments on Constitutional Bill* (Lahore: Jamāʿat-Islāmī Pakistan, 1956).

and quite detailed, contained two hundred and thirty four articles, divided into thirteen parts and six schedules.

After the passing of the Objective Resolution which was followed by the enactment of the Constitution of 1956, which clearly stated God's sovereignty, Pakistan, according to Mawdūdī, could be said to be more or less an Islamic state. The Jamāʿat credited Mawdūdī with this success. As far as the idea of the sovereignty of God is concerned, Haq remarks that it is the original contribution of Mawdūdī which he had developed long before the independence of Pakistan. However, to give full credit to Mawdūdī alone is quite misleading. In fact, many leading ʿulamāʾ of Pakistan and Muslim intellectuals, like Khalīfa ʿAbdul Ḥakīm and Muḥammad Asad shared the same opinion.

Though Mawdūdī knew that not all of his demands such as the four and nine points, the ʿulamāʾ's offer of twenty-two points, and his comments on the constitution bill had been incorporated into the final 1956-Constitution, Mawdūdī along with the traditionalist group was satisfied with it. He had at the least succeeded in preventing the state from becoming a secular democratic state. A similar feeling was presumably shared in a different way by the modernist group. Although they felt unhappy for not being able to design the state along secular lines, they were satisfied with the inclusion of a clause stating that'.., and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan..'. They believed that the state would be run on the principles of democracy rather than theocracy. Thus, the constitution reflected compromise between the two groups, as was also found in the subsequent constitutions. Though this first constitution was finally abrogated two years later by Ayub Khan, the Objective Resolution with a few changes was kept as the preamble of the later constitutions of 1962, and 1973.

So far, apart from the ambiguity and compromise in the nature of the three constitutions of Pakistan,[84] it seems that most of Mawdūdī's early demands to Islamize

[83]Freeland Abbott, "The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan," in *The Middle East Journal*. Vol.11, No.1 (Winter, 1957), p.47.

[84]See, Rubya Mehdi, *The Islamization*, pp.71-102., G.W. Choudhury, *Constitution Development in Pakistan* (London: Longman Group, 1959, 2nd ed., 1969).

Pakistan were eventually and substantially incorporated into the three constitutions, especially the last one.

Having focused on Mawdūdī's idea of an Islamic state and his participation in the drafting of Pakistan constitution, now it is worth discussing his religio-political organization, the Jamā'at-i Islāmī , "one of the most significant developments in the contemporary Islam and one of the most significant forces in the contemporary Pakistan."[85]

2.c. Mawdūdī and The Jamā'at-i Islāmī

Since its inception in the early 1940s,[86] Mawdūdī had played a major role in the history of the Jamā'at-i Islāmī. He was almost identical with the Jamā'at until his last years. In fact, he was not only its founder and first *amīr* until 1972, but also its main thinker, theoretician and ideologue, who provided its members abundant literature on Islam which resulted from his prolific pen. In the beginning, the Jamā'at confined its energies to social and educational work by establishing small libraries, traveling dispensaries, educational institutions, and publishing magazines and books for the religious training of the people. However, soon it grew into a political party -the most organized, consistent, and articulate party in the midst of the Islamic parties of Pakistan.[87]

In terms of its development, the Jamā'at can be divided in several stages : the first was between 1933-1937 when Mawdūdī was preoccupied with research, writing, and

---

[85]Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1957, 2nd ed., 1977), p.233, note 26.

[86]There are two opinions on the establishment of the Jamā'at-i Islāmī in 1941. Some consider it a reaction to the Lahore Resolution passed by the Muslim League. See, for instance, Charles J. Adams , "Ideology of Mawdūdī, p.394., and Anita M. Weiss, "The Historical Debate on Islam on the State in South Asia." in *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan.* Edited by Anita M. Weiss (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p.7. On the other hand, according to Bahadur, there is no contemporary evidence that the founding of Jamā'at had any connection with the Lahore Resolution. Kalim Bahadur, *The Jamā'at-i Islāmī,* p.199.

[87]Baxter, et al., *Government and Politics,* p.191., K. K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), p.139., Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1990), p.114., and Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamā't-i Islāmī and the Tablighi Jamā't of South Asia." in *Fundementalism Observed.* Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1991, 2nd ed., 1994), p. 464.

contemplation of the problems facing the Muslim community of the subcontinent. The second phase was between 1937-1941, during which composite nationalism and Hindu domination first became a threat. The next phase was between 1941-1947. During these years, his concentration and energy were focused and devoted to organizational consolidation and character building within the Jamā'at. Finally, from 1947 onwards, there was a political struggle within the constitutional limits,[88] influencing the government of Pakistan on the Islamic lines.

The objectives of the Jamā'at, according to Mawdūdī, were four-folds: a) purification, and the reorientation of thought; b) search for, training of, and organization of righteous persons; c) social reforms; and d) the reform of the system of government and politics.[89] All of these four could be achieved by establishing the rule of Islamic Law (*iqāmat-i dīn.*). As true faith (*dīn*), as Nasr put it, had no meaning without politics, and politics no luster if divorced from faith; Mawdūdī saw the connection between the two not as a hindrance but as ingenious idea, an intellectual breakthrough for using Islamic ideas to reshape the socio-political order.[90] An Islamic order, Mawdūdī believed, could be realized only by capturing the authority and power of state, which was in itself Islamic.

From the above point of view, it is not surprising if the cardinal demand of the Jamā'at was none other than the creation of an Islamic state. All its efforts and activities were almost exclusively directed towards this ideal. Since the idea of an Islamic state was so central to the Jamā'at, the organizational structure of the Jamā'at was even modeled after the structure of an Islamic state. To put it more simply, it is a miniature of the Mawdūdian Islamic state. For instance, both the *amīr* s of Mawdūdian Islamic state and his Jamā'at-i Islāmī were directly elected through ballot; both of them had authority to interpret *sharī'a*

---

[88]Haq, "The Islamic Reformism," p.267.,

[89]Masudul Hasan, *Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī and His Thought.* Vol. II (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1986), p.9., and Haq, "Islamic Reformism," p.267.

[90]Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The Jamā'at-i Islāmī of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.15.

rules; both *amīr*s had to work in consultation with their respective *majlis-i shūrā* ; and the members of the *majlis-i shūrā* of an Islamic state and the Jamāʿat had the same right of free expression in their respective meetings and again both *amīr*s headed the *majlis*.

The *amīr* of the Jamāʿat , who is elected for a five-year term, in achieving the objectives of the party is assisted by *majlis-i shūrā* , *majlis-i ʿāmila* (executive council), and *qayyim* (secretary general). This structure is for the Jamāʿat at central, the districts and the circles levels. Before East Pakistan became the sovereign state of Bangladesh in 1971, the Jamāʿat had seventeen main circles, thirteen in West Pakistan and four in East Pakistan. In the central headquarters, the Jamāʿat has several departments which are in charge of organization, finance, publications, worker training, labor welfare, social service, public schools, adult education, Arabic translation, English translation, Bengali translation, the theological institute, and an information bureau. In addition to this, the Jamāʿat has eight advisory committees whose main task is to provide expert opinion on various problems such as economics, politics, national and international affairs, agrarian and labor problems.[91] To support, Mawdūdī's Islamic ideology, several new organization were also established. The most notable of these were the Islāmī Jamiʿat-i Ṭulabaʾ, Islāmī Jamiʿat-i Ṭalabat, Jamiʿat-i Ṭulaba-i ʿArabiyya; Muslim Lawyer Association, Pasban (protector) Organization, Peasants' Board, Merchant's Organization, and Pakistan Teachers Organization.[92]

Unlike any other political party, the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī has never endeavored to grow into a mass organization. Instead, it set a very high standard for its adherents to qualify as members. This, in turn, has so reduced the interactions between the Jamāʿat and the society in which it operates that the party has developed an elitist and patronizing outlook which one erstwhile Jamāʿat votary calls ʿaṣabiyya.[93] Consequently, the Jamāʿat has only a small membership and has developed very slowly; in the second half of 1947 it started with 385

---

[91]For a short but detailed explanation of the organizational structure. See Misbahul Islam Faruqi. *Jamāʿat-i Islāmī*, p.74.

[92]Nasr. *The Vanguard*, p.62.

[93]*Ibid.*. p.199.

members, and ten years later it had 1271 full-members. Moreover, the latest record of its membership shows no more than 7, 861 full-members; 34, 156 workers (karkun); and 357, 229 registered supporter (muttafiq) and 150, 000 to 200, 000 non-registered supporters.[94] Sayeed argues that it is likely that the Jamā'at' s membership would have multiplied rapidly had the doors of membership been left wide open. But Mawdūdī's aim was to train leaders and workers and not to increase mere membership.[95] As one of Mawdūdī's students, Fārūqī, observes that the Jamā'at's emphasis is on quality and not quantity.[96] Being a political party, however, the Jamā'at needs many more supporters than those it already had, as one of its leaders, Khurram Jah Murad, said that, "revolution has no meaning without popular support".[97] To quote Nasr again:

> Organizational reform and membership criteria continue to preoccupy the Jamā'at's leadership, reflecting its continuing struggle with tensions born of applying its ideological perspective to the pursuit of its political goals. The outcome of this process and the ultimate shape which the Jamā'at greater political activism is likely to take have in good part, however, been controlled and conditioned by the party's interactions with other political actors and various Pakistani regimes.[98]

Since the passing of the Resolution of Pakistan in 1949, the Jamā'at has been always participating in elections held by the government in spite of the failure of these elections to meet the Jamā'at's expectations. For example, in the Punjab election (1951) it fielded juts a few candidates, in the Karachi Corporation election (1958) the Jamā'at captured about a dozen seats, and in general election of 1970, it captured four seats out of 148 of its candidates. In the 1964 presidential elections along with the Combined Opposition Party, the Jamā'at supported the candidacy of Fāṭima Jinnah against Ayub Khan. This action was

---

[94]Ibid., pp.96-97; Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia.", p.491, and Mumtaz Ahmad, "The Politics of War: Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan," in James Piscatori, ed. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p.157.

[95]Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Jamā'at-i Islāmī Movement in Pakistan," in Pacific Affairs Vol.1, No.30 (1958), p.64.

[96]Fārūqī, Jamā'at-i Islāmī, p.76.

[97]Cited in Nasr, The Vanguard, p.99.

[98]Ibid., p.100.

considered in opposition not only to the established opinion of the ʿulamāʾ of Pakistan, that a woman should not to be permitted to be a head of state, but also to Mawdūdī's own previous opinion.[99]

Having experienced hostility and suspicion from Pakistani regimes from Liaquat Ali Khan to Zulfiqar Bhutto, and even its banning under Ayub Khan's regime due to its political pressure and criticism of the regime, the Jamāʿat at last gained a close relationship with the government of Zia-ul Haq, especially during his early years of rule. As Nasr aptly points out that after thirty years of political activity in Pakistan and for the first time in its history, the Jamāʿat became part of the ruling political establishment. It was to operate in a hospitable political environment, enjoying a certain amount of government patronage like that of "a mother-daughter relationship." For example, Jamāʿat members were entrusted several ministerial posts such as minister of production and industry; minister of petroleum, minerals, and power; minister of information and broadcasting; and minister of planning.[100]

Though at the time of Zia's take over, Mawdūdī did not have any official post in the Jamāʿat, his influence became still more pervasive in Zia's cabinet. When Zia declared the launch of his program to Islamize Pakistan, Mawdūdī supported it with great enthusiasm. Taking a cue from Mawdūdī, the Jamāʿat under the leadership of Miān Ṭufayl wholeheartedly assisted Zia-ul-Haq in preparing a comprehensive Islamization program. Like Mawdūdī, Zia believed that Pakistan was an ideological state.[101] He, therefore, worked

---

[99]In justifying this stand, Mawdūdī said, "If we were not to array behind the candidature of Miss Fatima Jinnah this would imply that we supported Ayub. We had to choose between two evils - the candidature of a women or the candidature of a tyrant..." "Islam," he added, "permitted exceptions in exceptional circumstances." Hasan, *Mawdūdī*, Vol.II. p.179. It seems that Mawdūdī's legimitation was based on the Islamic legal maxims that if a Muslim was faced with two evils he is allowed to choose one of them which has less risk or harm. Present writer's interview with Malik Mujahid, president of ICNA and former president of Jamāʿat-i Ṭulaba, on September 20, 1994, in Scarborough, Toronto.

[100]Comprehensive discussion on the Jamāʿat's relationship with Zia regime, see Sayyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, 1977-88," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Vol.25, No.2 (May, 1993), pp.261-283.

[101]To quote Zia-ul Haq, "Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out Judaism from Israel and it will collapse like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse." Cited in Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive?* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p.133.

toward establishing *shari'a* in the country by, among other things, the promulgation of *hudūd* punishment.[102] In a radio talk of March and April 1978, just a year before his death, Mawdūdī had hailed this effort as the first step in bringing Islam to Pakistan's judicial and political system.[103]

However, they differed in their perception of how Islamic values were to be implemented. In the words of the Jamā'at : "we were interested in *sirāt al-nabī* [the Path of the Prophet], while Zia was content with *milād al-nabī* [popular celebration of the birth day of the Prophet, which is essentially a facet of the Sunni folk religion of Pakistan]," as a result, the Jamā'at became distant from the regime. This stand was further taken by Mawdūdī's successors; Miāń Ṭufayl Muḥammad (1972-1987) and Qāzī Ḥussain Aḥmad (1987-).

---

[102]See Charles H. Kennedy, "Islamization of Pakistan: Implementation of the Ḥudūd Ordinances," in *Asian Survey*. Vol.XXVII, No.3 (March, 1988), pp.307-316.

[103]Nasr, "Islamic Opposition," p.193.

B. Mohammad Natsir's Idea on Statehood

1. Before Independence

For this period our attention will be focused on Natsir's support and participation in the movement for independence; the conflict between so called secular or religiously-neutral nationalists and Muslim nationalists on nationalism and on the future basis of the state of Indonesia; and his ideas on the separation between religion and state.

1. a. Natsir and the Indonesian Struggle for Independence

Like Mawdūdī, Natsir considered Islam was all and everything. To emphasize this, he quoted a prophetic ḥadīth, al-Islām ya'lū wa lā yu'lā 'alayhi, which means that Islam is high, and there is nothing above it.[104] This belief was further affirmed by the Qur'ānic verse stating that, "I have only created jinns and men, that they may worship Me" (al-dhāriyāt 51: 56). Henceforth, the raison d'être of man's existence in this world is none other than to worship Almighty God. It has been argued that worshipping God, however, is not limited merely to the activities such as daily prayers, fasting, alms giving, ḥajj, etc., as believed by most of Indonesian Muslims, but it includes much more than this. Every good deed which is performed for the sake of God can be considered as worship or 'ibāda. It is only by fulfilling this duty that a believer will lead a correct life, in the eyes of God, in this world and in the next world. Thus, he becomes a true worshiper of God. The true worshiper, according to Natsir, is the one who always strives to eliminate all forms of tyrannical actions he encounters.

Islam was, therefore, Natsir opined, not merely concerned with the relationship between man and God, but also between man and man and even between man and his environment.[105] To borrow Hamilton A.R. Gibb's statement, Natsir asserted that, "Islam is indeed much more than a system of theology, it is a complete civilization."[106] This means

---

[104]Mohammad Natsir, "Oleh-oleh Dari Algiers," in Panji Islam, (July 1939) which is included in M. Natsir, Capita Selecta I (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1955, 3rd ed., 1973), p.193.

[105]Mohammad Natsir, Capita Selecta Vol.II (Jakarta: Pustaka Pendis, 1957), p.59.

that Islam covers not only theological or religious matters but also mundane affairs such as economics, culture, education, and politics. Elsewhere in his books, Natsir said that Islam was not merely an ideology, but it was also a way of life that should be realized in the real world, by applying the Islamic law or *sharīᶜa* in a Muslim's daily individual or collective life.[107] In order to apply the *sharīᶜa* fully, Muslims should possess the freedom to practice the *sharīᶜa* without feeling frightened and threatened. Freedom also signifies the freedom from exploitation of man by man. In line with this Natsir stated further that basically Islamic teaching is a revolution in the sense that it destroys and fights against all kind of exploitation.[108] Consequently, the Dutch colonialists, who came to Indonesia at the beginning of the seventeenth century and since then had exploited the country and its people, had to be driven out from the surface of the 'water and soil' of Indonesia. He believed that if Indonesian Muslims wanted to establish Islam firmly, they should also restore society, establish a state, and achieve freedom at the same time. He added further that: "Nationalism is not the only motivation for us to struggle for independence, but as adult Muslims, it is obligatory to carry it out."[109] Such a firm Islamic concept and belief eventually led Natsir to dedicate all his time and energies to fight against all types of exploitation encountered by his country and society.

If the Pakistan movement was backed only by Muslims of the Subcontinent, the Indonesian struggle for independence involved Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Protestants, and Catholics. Among them, however, Muslims who constituted 90 percent of the total population, were the most determined supporters. They were very, if not the most, enthusiastic fighters because, as Natsir indicated earlier, they considered the freedom

---

[106]Mohammad Natsir, "Islam dan Kebudayaan," in *Pedoman Masyarakat* (June, 1936); and Natsir, *Capita Selecta* Vol.I, p.15; and M. Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Ideologi* (Jakarta: Pustaka Aida, 1954), p.7.

[107]See Mohammad Natsir, "Agama dan Negara," in M. Isa Anshary, *Falsafah Pejuangan Islam* (Medan: Saiful, 1951), p.261.

[108]Natsir, *Capita Selecta* II., p.125.

[109]Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Ideologi* , p.7.

movement as *jihād fī sabīl Allāh*, a fight for the sake of Allāh against Dutch the exploiters, who were *kāfir* as well as being exploiters. The struggle to gain independence from foreign exploiters was considered a jihad. Thus, in spite of their tribal and language differences, they were united and moved by the spirit of Islam, the faith of their heart. It was not an exaggeration when Kahin remarked that, "The Muhammedan religion was not just a common bond; it was, indeed, a sort of in-group symbol as against an alien intruder and oppressor of a different religion."[110] Moreover, Islam was more than a symbol of unity, it was actually a source of inspiration for several wars against the Dutch rule, though their struggles were regional in nature, such as those of Padri (1821-1827), Diponegoro (1825-1930), Bone (1835), and Aceh (1871-1908), to mention only the most important ones which occurred during the nineteenth century.

In the following century, a similar trend was clearly reflected in the history of independence movement when national awareness awoke among the Indonesian people in most part of the country, then named the Netherlands Indies.[111] In the words of Nasution, "Islam was a force that promoted the rise and growth of Indonesian nationalism."[112] Although Budi Utomo [Noble Endeavor], which was founded in 1908, is now considered as the first national- awareness organization and the date is annually celebrated as the Indonesian national-awakening day, the first Indonesian political party, according to Natsir and other Muslim writers, was Sarekat Islam, which was formed in 1912 under the leadership of Haji

---

[110]George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 7th ed., 1966), p. 38.

[111]Several words had been employed to denote Indonesia such as Insulinde, Nusantara, Indies, Netherlands India, Netherlands Indies, Further India, East India or Malay Archipelago. "Indonesia" was used for the first time by J.R. Logan, a British anthropologist, in 1850, and later it was popularized by Adolf Bastian, a German anthropologist, through his book entitled *Indonesia* published in 1884. Some Indonesian students in the Netherlands used the term Indonesia as early as 1917, and also the Indonesian Youth Pledge of 1928 formally adopted the name of Indonesia to designate the future nation, its citizen and language. This pledge is then affirmed and preserved in the Constitution of Indonesia. See: Robert Cribb, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia* (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1992), p.199.

[112]Harun Nasution, "The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for Its Creation and the Theory of the Masjumi," (Unpublished MA Thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1965), p.180.

Umar Said Cokroaminoto.[113] Budi Utomo was more cultural and local in orientation than political, while Sarekat Islam, which stemmed from Sarekat Dagang Islam, founded in 1905, was a political movement with national orientation. Unlike Budi Utomo whose membership was limited to Javanese and Maduranese, Sarekat Islam was open to Indonesian Muslims, therefore it immediately gained a large membership spread from Aceh in the west to Maluku in the east.[114] As in many other parts of the Afro-Asian world, however, the nationalist movement in Indonesia comprised both Islamic and secular forces.[115]

At this time, while Natsir was the head of the Bandung branch Islamic Party of Indonesia (Partai Islam Indonesia), he still continued his educational efforts for Muslims through his educational institutions in Bandung. His involvement in politics at this time was more as a political commentator than as a political actor. Moreover, though he was active in the Muslim Unity (Persatuan Islam / PERSIS), he maintained his involvement in educational activities even when the Japanese came and drove out the Dutch from Indonesia in March 1942. While it was true that as soon as the Japanese secured their position in Indonesia they,

---

[113]See Mohammad Natsir, *Revolusi Indonesia* (Bandung: Pustaka Jihad, 1955), p.6; Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Politik di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 1988); Nasution, "The Islamic State" ; A. Timur Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam: Its contribution to Indonesian Nationalism," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1959); and Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1971), pp.90-91

[114]In line with this, Budi Utomo could be said to be a proto-political organization bearing the aspiration of secular or religiously-neutral nationalists. Following the footstep of Budi Utomo, whose ardent supporters were secular nationalists, several political organizations were later on set up: Indische Partij [Party of Hindia] (1913), Partai Nasional Indonesia [National Party of Indonesia] (1927), Partindo [Indonesian Party] (1931), Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia [National Education of Indonesia] (1933), Perindra (Party of the Greater Indonesia] (1935), and Gerindo [Indonesian Movement] (1937). Meanwhile, Islamic forces represented by the Sarekat Islam, which changed its name in 1923 to Partai Serikat Islam Hindia Timur [Islamic Association Party of East Indies] and in 1929 to Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia [Islamic Association Party of Indonesia], was followed by the establishment of the political parties such as Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia [Indonesian Muslim Association] in 1932 and Partai Islam Indonesia [Islamic Party of Indonesia] in 1938. In addition to Islamic political parties, Muhammadiyah (1912), Persatuan Islam (1923), and Nahdlatul Ulama (1926) appeared as socio-religious organization forces whose orientation and objectives were directed to daʿwa, education, and social welfare. The first two organizations have been recognized as modernist organizations while the last one is seen as a traditionalist or orthodox organization.

[115]G.W. Choudhury, *Islam and the Contemporary World* (Illinois: Library of Islam, 1991), p.140.

banned all radical political parties. Not realizing their fascist nature, the Indonesians regarded the Japanese not as invaders but more as liberators.[116] Natsir, like Sukarno, was not an exception in sharing this feeling and he, therefore, did not reject the Japanese's offer to head the Bandung Educational Bureau from 1942-1945. However, it was later in the Japanese occupation that Natsir got involved in Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia as one of its leaders. This organization, founded by the Japanese, was not a political but a socio-religious organization.[117] Though Natsir was an ardent supporter of the struggle movement, he did not emerge as a well-known politician and advocate of democracy until 1948.

Both Muslim nationalists and secular or religiously-neutral nationalists were undeniably determined to free Indonesia from any kind of imperialist bondage whether Dutch or Japanese. In 1927, they were united under P.P.P.K.I. (Council of Indonesian Nationalist Organization), and under Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Federation of the Indonesian Political Movements) in 1939. In doing so, it was inevitable that by their political activities underwent strict control and even threat of a ban by the foreign rulers. As Nardholt remarked, the nationalists' political ambition were restricted and not allowed to manifest themselves openly.[118] Therefore, what often appeared on the surface were open debates on various issues, and not direct threat to the Dutch position. Although most of the secular nationalists

---

[116]In Nasution's words, "Many Indonesian leaders and the majority of Indonesian people did not consider the Japanese invaders as enemies. This Indonesian attitude toward the Japanese can be understood if we take into account the strong repression by the Netherlands Indies government of the Indonesian striving for their political liberty during 1930's." Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), p.6. The Dutch suppression and arrogance of not wanting to speak with Indonesian nationalists about the future free Indonesia was reflected in the words of B. C. de Jonge, then the Governor-general of 1931-1936: "My predecessor made too many promises, I always preface my remarks to the nationalist with one sentence: 'We Dutch have been here for 300 years; we shall remain here for another 300 years. After that we can talk." Cited in *Ibid.*

[117]In this respect, Lapidus states that,"In November 1943 the Japanese founded Masyumi to unify and coordinate the whole Muslim movement. Under the aegis of Masjumi the Japanese created a religious bureaucracy staffed by Muslims to connect the central administration with the villages.' Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 3rd ed., 1991), p.768.

[118]N.G. Schulte Nardholt, *State-Citizen Relations in Suharto's Indonesia* (Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1987), p.18.

were Muslims, they preferred secular rather than religious approaches as taken by their Muslim nationalist counterparts. The secularists considered Islam as a private religion while the Muslim nationalists believed it as an ideology.[119] Consequently, these different approaches influenced the national movement for Indonesian independence and continued to do so after independence, as we will see later. The differences were best exemplified by the debates on nationalism, secular nationalism versus Islamic nationalism, and by the debates on the philosophical base of the future free Indonesia, Pancasila versus Islam. The former occurred in the twenties and thirties, whereas the latter happened just couple of months before Indonesia declared its independence.

1.b. Secular Nationalism versus Islamic Nationalism

As far as the debates on the issue of nationalism are concerned,[120] Sukarno (1901-1970) (the first president of the Republic of Indonesia, 1945-1966) can be taken as representative of secular nationalism, whereas Haji Agus Salim, A. Hassan, and Mohammad Natsir can be taken as representative of Islamic nationalism. In 1928, to rekindle a nationalist spirit in the hearts of PNI cadres in particular and the Indonesian people in general, Sukarno rhetorically voiced that:

> "Your mother Indonesia looks extremely beautiful. Her sky and earth are beautiful, her mountains and jungles are beautiful, her sea and rivers are beautiful, her rice fields and agricultural fields are beautiful,....Her weather is better, healthier, and cooler for you. Your mother Indonesia is extremely kind. Her water you drink, her rice you eat....Therefore, it is not an exaggerated obligation for you to serve, to enslave

---

[119]It should be noted here that within the fold of Muslims themselves, following Cliford Geertz's theory, they consisted of Santri or devout Muslims and Abangan or less devout, syncretic, and even nominal Muslims; Indonesian Muslims were more dominated by the latter group rather than the former. For this typological discussion, see Clifford Geertz, *The Religion cf Java* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960); and Zaini Mochtarom, *Santri dan Abangan di Jawa* (Jakarta: INIS, 1988).

[120]The issue of nationalism and patriotism was then warmly debated in Indonesia. An anonymous Muslim felt it necessary to write a latter to Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935) in 1933, asking his opinion about these issues. Among other things, Riḍā answered that "Islam's view of this is that Muslims are obliged to defend the non-Muslims who enter under their rule and to treat them as an equal according to the just rules of the Sharīʿa," which may imply that all Indonesian people should defend their country from any foreign colonialism. See Rashīd Riḍā , "Patriotism, Nationalism, and Group Spirit in Islam," in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp.57-59.

yourself to your mother Indonesia, to become her son who sincerely gives his loyalty to her."[121]

Since Sukarno's sense of nationalism and patriotism, as reflected in this speech and in other writings, was seemingly motivated more by material aspects than religious ones, it failed to please Haji Agus Salim who chose to disagree with him. According to Salim, whether one's mother was beautiful or not one should love her. He believed that the reason behind one's love for mother Indonesia should be Allāh. Whatever one contributed to one's nation was *lillāhi ta'ālā,* for the sake of Almighty Allāh alone. He was worried that if this principle was neglected, exploitation and destruction over other nations in the name of 'nation' would inevitably occur as was proven by the history of Austria, Italy, France, and Prussia. Henceforth, Salim reminded Indonesian Muslims to love their mother land, Indonesia, based on the higher ideals of justice, obedience, virtues, and moral excellence whose limitations and measurements had been determined by Almighty God.[122]

A stronger rejection of nationalism was put forward by A. Hassan in his *Islam dan Kebangsaan,* which was serialized in Pembela Islam in the early thirties. He condemned secular nationalism because, as Lapidus put it, "it represented a deification of the nation."[123] He was of the view, based on *ahādīth* narrated by Abū Dawūd (d.888) and Muslim (d.875), that to set up a nationalism-based organization and to assist a nationalism-based party was forbidden in Islam. This was because nationalism was the same as *'aṣabiyya,* zealous tribal partisanship like that practiced by the Arabs before the coming of Islam. Thus, he believed, it was useless to struggle and die for the sake of nation because "his death would be the death in *jāhiliyya*".[124] However, he asserted that to love one's motherland and join any political

---

[121]Cited in Haji Agus Salim, "Cinta Bangsa dan Tanah Air," in *Seratus Tahun Haji Agus Salim* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), p.346. Both Sukarno's and Salim's polemics on the issue were included in this book. see *Ibid.,* pp.346-358.

[122]Salim. "Cinta Bangsa," p.348.

[123]Lapidus, *A History of Islamic.* p.763.

[124]See A Hassan. *Islam dan Kebangsaan* (Bangil: Lajnah Penerbit Pesantren Persis, 1984). pp.20-26.

organization, preferably an Islamic party, was permissible in Islam as long as the intention behind one's action was to carry out the law of God.

Differing from these scholars who rejected nationalism based on their definition of nationalism and on conclusions derived from various *ḥadīth* and Qurʾānic verses, Natsir, who employed the pseudonym of Is, analyzed it from the perspective of the historical development of Indonesian nationalism prevailing at his time. In "Kebangsaan Muslimin"[125] [Muslim Nationalism], he said that long before the existence of proto-nationalism-based organizations, like Budi Utomo, Jong Java, Jong Sumatra, and Jong Ambon, movements such as Muhammadiyyah and Sarekat Islam, which based their activities merely on the religion of Allah and whose membership was found throughout Indonesia, had already adopted an Indonesian nationalist connection (the tie which Renan called *le desir de vivre ensemble*).[126] Henceforth, Natsir did not object to identifying these Islamic movements, whose struggle to liberate Indonesia was based on Islam, as movements inspired by Muslim nationalism [Kebangsaan Muslimin]. Referring to Indonesian Muslims, he asserted that "...their wealth and lives were ready to be used [to liberate Indonesia] in line with their nationalism as the tie of unity and as the basis to seek real independence."[127] However, he rejected a call for unity among Indonesian people based solely on secular nationalism. In other words, like Agus Salim and Hassan, he could not accept fanatic Indonesian nationalism. In 1939, again under another pseudonym of A. Muchlis, though he noted that

---

[125]Is [Mohammad Natsir], "Kebangsaan Muslimin," in *Pembela Islam* Nos. 41-45 (January-March, 1932), and also "Indonesisch Nationalisme," in *Pembela Islam* No.36 (October 1931).

[126]*Pembela Islam*, No. 36 (October 1931), pp.14-17 as cited in Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.260. H.A.M.K. Amrullah, "Bukti Yang Tepat," in *Pembela Islam*, 46 (April 1932), p.2. For the English edition of Renan's speech on nationalism, whose original speech [in French] was repeatedly refered to by Natsir and other Indonesian nationalists, see Earnest Renan, "What is a Nation?," in Alfred Zimmern, ed. *Modern Political Doctrines* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp.186-205; and Mark O. Dickson, et al., eds. *Introductory Readings in Government and Politics* (Toronto: Methuen, 2nd ed., 1987), pp.38-49.

[127]*Pembela Islam*, No 45 (March 1932).

there was nothing wrong in using nationalism as a means of concentrating and strengthening

power, Natsir warned his Indonesian fellows that:

> Islam does not tolerate [nationalism] founded on fanaticism...which breaks up the
> bond of brotherhood of all Muslims of various nationalities;[it also disapproved of]
> the pride of a nation if this constitutes the criterion for deciding what is right and
> wrong; if what is right is considered wrong in order to diminish the glorification of
> the nation; if the wrong is considered right even if this is in the interest of and for the
> success of one' own nation. If all that comes from one's own group is defended and
> protected, although it is wrong: [Islam does not agree with the slogan] 'My country
> right or wrong.[128]

In spite of Natsir's emphasis on Muslim nationalism and pan-Islamism, of course,

Natsir did not mean to disrupt the relationship between Muslims and the secular nationalist

group, or the non-Muslims. Indeed, in Noer's point of view, Natsir only called on the

Muslims to be aware of their Islamic ideals and to be firm in the maintenance of their

ideology.[129] Finally, to sum up the similarities and differences between the two forces,

Muslim nationalism and religiously neutral or secular nationalism, during these years, in

Salim's words, they had:

> The same direction: "Loving nation and home land' (nationalism and
> patriotism). The same objective: "The glory of the nation and the independence of
> home land". The same place to move: "In the battlefield of colonized political struggle
> between the present ruler and the people who demanded their 'right of natuurlijk
> recht,' i.e., the right of the undivided power to rule their own nation and country, for
> those who acknowledged the nation and homeland and did not depend upon any
> foreign nationality from outside this home land." But [they] differed in principles and
> intentions. Our principle was religion, namely Islam. Our intention was Lillahi
> Ta'ala.[130]

Since the second example of the two forces, their debates on Islam versus Pancasila occurred

several months before the Indonesian independence, we will discuss it later after examining

Natsir's idea on the unity of religion and politics.

---

[128]A. Muchlis (M. Natsir), "Cinta Agama dan Tanah Air, Bersimpang Dua Dan
Berpahit-pahit," in *Panji Islam* No. 4 (23 January 1939) cited in Noer, *The Modernist*, p.276.

[129]Noer, *The Modernist* , p.277.

[130]Salim, "Cinta Bangsa...", p.356.

1.c. Natsir on the Unity of Religion and Politics

Natsir touched upon the issue of statehood in his debates with Sukarno in the twenties and thirties. Natsir's ideas on statehood during the pre-independence period were mainly reflected in two booklets and a long essay (*Islam Sebagai Ideology ; Persatuan Agama Dengan Negara : M. Natsir Versus Sukarno ;* and "Agama dan Negara").[131] These writings were very similar in content. Among the first Indonesian Muslims who welcomed Kamal's secularization of Turkey was Sukarno. Natsir's writings were initially and primarily a response to his articles on Turkey and Islam serialized in Panji Islam written between 1927-1930, especially his article entitled "Mengapa Turki Memisahkan Agama dari Negara?" (Why Has Turkey Separated Religion from the State?).[132] In this article, giving the reason for the separation between religion and politics in Turkey, Sukarno pointed out that "Islam has been separated from the politics in order that Islam may become free, and that the state too may become free. In order that Islam could develop by itself. In order that Islam may prosper and that the state too may be prosper."[133]

Though Sukarno stated that he was merely providing data for consideration, Natsir was of the opinion that it was indeed a reflection of Sukarno's real opinion or at least he supported what Kamal had done. By exhibiting such support, Sukarno seemed to reject the role of religion in state affairs.[134] Natsir disagreed with Sukarno that religion should be separated from politics. This was because Natsir, like Mawdūdī, believed that Islam was an ideology. He believed that the future modern state of Indonesia could be built without necessarily 'putting Islam aside'. Though Islamic ideology needed pages to explain itself in

---

[131]Mohammad Natsir,*Islam Sebagai Ideologi* (Jakarta: Pustaka Aida, 1954); Mohammad Natsir, *Persatuan Agama Dengan Negara: M. Natsir Versus Sukarno* (Padang: Yayasan Pendidikan Islam. 1968); and Mohammad Natsir, "Agama dan Negara" in M. Isa Anshary, *Falsafah Perjuangan Islam* (Medan: Saiful, 1951), pp.261-285.

[132]Sukarno, "Mengapa Sebab Turki Memisahkan Agama dari Negara?," in *Panji Islam,* 1940, which was later on included in Sukarno, *Under the Banner of Revolution* Vol.I (Jakarta: Publication Committee, 1966), pp.387-427.

[133]Sukarno, *Under the Banner,* p.389.

[134]Ajip Rosidi, *M. Natsir Sebuah Biografi* (Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka, 1990), p.258.

detail, it could be summed up, according to Natsir, in the verse, earlier cited, that reads "I have only created *jinns* and men, that they have to serve Me" (51:56).[135] Natsir inferred from this verse that a Muslim was living in this world with a goal to become an *ʿabid* or servant or worshiper of Allāh in its fullest and widest meaning; with the purpose to attain a supremacy in this world and a victory in the next world.[136]

To achieve these ideals, God had given a complete guide whose broad lines were provided in the Qurʾān and the *sunna* of the Prophet Muḥammad. This guide covered not only religious but state affairs as well. However, like other laws and regulations, Natsir argued, both the Qurʾān and the *sunna* could do nothing by themselves; their laws and rules could not be enforced unless the state, which had power, did so. To put it simply, Natsir conveyed that a " State, for us, was not an objective, but a means. The state affairs were essentially and basically integral part or *'intergreerende deel'* of Islam."[137] However, by stating this, Natsir did not mean that, as Watt put it, "...one cannot be a Muslim except in an Islamic state."[138] By asserting the unity of state and religion, he meant that the state would guarantee the realization of the latter ideals, "complete enforcement of God's laws, which were related either to individual or collective lives, and which either concerned mundane affairs or hereafter."[139] Natsir believed that there was no Muslim state in which religion and state were really separated; if there was, it actually meant that the state did not want to apply some parts of Islamic law related to statehood and *muʿāmala* (mundane affairs).[140]

When Sukarno, quoting Abdul Raziq indirectly, stated that the Prophet did not establish a state but spread a religion, Natsir acknowledged that with or without Islam, a state

---

135The Qurʾān 51: 50. Cf. Ali. *The Holy Qur'am.* p.1429.

136Natsir. *Persatuan Agama.* p.7.

137*Ibid.,* p.15.

138W. Montgomery Watt. *Islamic Fundamentalism.* p.93.

139Natsir. *Persatuan Agama.* p.15.

140*Ibid.,* p.76.

could be established and therefore the Prophet did not directly ask Muslims to establish a state. However, since many kinds of states had existed in different times, utilizing different systems, and holding different objectives, the Prophet provided Muslims several guidelines to regulate their state.

Natsir agreed that the Qur'ān did not give any detailed regulations on modern state affairs. He said that in the Qur'ān, of course, one would not find a guidance for the drafting of a state budget, the arrangement of a quota system, the regulation of foreign exchange, or traffic regulations, because, according to him, these things were subject to change, according to the demands of time, place and circumstance. The Qur'ān stipulated only general and eternal principles,[141] Natsir commented without elaborating further.

In a state based on Islam, according to Natsir, the head of the state could bear whatever title he considered appropriate, be it president, caliph, *imām*, or *amīr al-mu'minīn*. The title was not a *conditio sine quanon*. (primary requirement), Natsir asserted. The most important thing to be kept in mind was that "the head of state should be given an authority as *ūlil amir* (leader) for Muslims and he should be able to act and ensure that Islamic rules were run as they should within the structure of the state, theoretically and practically."[142]

The criterion for electing the head of state was not only based on his intellectual capacity, but also his religion [Islam], his character and behavior, his ethics and his ability to hold the authority which was entrusted to him. As for running the state, according to Natsir, the head of state should consult those people who had the ability to deal with concerned issues. However, Natsir asserted that for all the laws which were clearly stated in the Qur'ān and the *sunna*, the head of state did not need consultation but only needed to enact them.

Meanwhile, the consultation or *shūrā* could be arranged either in accordance with the practices of the first caliph Abū Bakr (632-634) or as a modern parliamentary system. Regulations which were clearly defined in the Qur'ān and the *sunna* could be formulated

---

[141]*Ibid.*, pp.21-22.

[142]*Ibid.*, p.17.

according to the needs of time and place, or they could be taken from other countries. He remarked that Muslims had the right to borrow system and rules from other countries, such as Japan, Russia, Finland, and British, as long as they did not contradict Islamic teachings, because, Natsir reasoned, achievements of any civilization were not merely the monopoly of the concerned nation or state.[143]

Considering that Islam emphasized consultation, did it mean that Islam was democratic in nature? Natsir's answer was that Islam was neither one hundred percent democratic, nor one hundred percent autocratic or dictatorial. Islam, he emphasized, was Islam.[144] This meant, according to him, that Islam was a synthesis of the two opposites - democracy and dictatorship. The synthesis gave enough room for the evolution of whatever needed evolving and for radicalizing for whatever needed to be radical. What Natsir meant, perhaps, was that Islam would allow to develop certain state regulations on which the Qur'ān and the *sunna* were still silent.

The different outlook between Sukarno and Natsir could be best summarized in their own words.[145] While Sukarno, quoting Zia Gokalp, was of the view that, "We come from the East, we walk towards the West," Natsir declared that "Whether in the West or in the East, we walk towards God's pleasure." This statement implied that Natsir did not mean that whatever came from the West was totally bad and whatever came from the East was good. Thus, progress should not be an imitation of the West in every respect. In this regard, Natsir pointed out that "The West is God's property, as is the case with the East. Both have sound characteristics, but both also have certain defects and certain shortcomings which should be removed. Neither the West nor the East constitutes the standard for us."[146] To Natsir, the standard to determine good or bad, right or wrong was the God's law.

---

[143]*Ibid.,* p.25.

[144]Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Ideologi,* p.24.

[145]See, Sukarno, *Under the Banner,* p.387; and Natsir, *Persatuan,* p.18.

[146]*Panji Islam* No.28 (15 Jyly 1940) cited in Noer, *The Modernist,* p.289.

1.d. Islam versus Pancasila

Furthermore, the second example of the conflict between the two forces was clearly seen when their respective representatives in Badan Panitia Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia [the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence], a body set up by the Japanese on March 1, 1945, were planning to prepare a constitution for the future free Indonesia.[147] Headed by Rajiman Wedyodiningrat, the Committee had 62 members, both secular and Islamic nationalists. It seemed that the members of the Investigating Committee, especially those who represented the Islamic community, were appointed from among the senior leaders like Haji Agus Salim, Abdulkahar Muzakir, Abdul Wachid Hasyim. Mohammad Natsir, who belonged to the group of young leaders was, therefore, not included.

There were two preliminary meetings held by the Committee between May 28 to June 1, 1945. It was quite clear in the meetings that Islamic nationalists wanted Islam to be the state philosophy of Indonesia, whereas secular nationalists insisted on a secular state. To overcome the conflict between the two opposing groups, or to make a compromise between the two demands, Sukarno delivered his well-known speech on June 1, 1945, in which he propounded Pancasila as a *weltenshaaung* or basis of the future Indonesian state. The Pancasila (Five Principles) included nationalism, internationalism or humanitarianism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God. However, since Muslim nationalists still did not feel satisfied enough because they felt that their interests were not represented yet fully in the Pancasila, a sub-commission of nine members representing both parties was formed. It was headed by Sukarno. On June 22, the commission was finally successful in passing a draft preamble of the future constitution known as the Jakarta Charter. In the charter, the Pancasila was again mentioned but was slightly modified: Belief in God with the obligation for

---

[147]For a comprehensive discussion of the Investigation Committee debates related to the basis and the form of the future government of Indonesia, see Saifuddin Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman's Agreement Between the Islamic and Secular Nationalist in Modern Indonesia," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1976).

adherents of Islam to carry out the *sharīʿa* ; just and civilized humanitarianism; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by wisdom in consultation and representation; and social justice for the whole Indonesian people.[148] Between July 10 and 17, 1945, two other preliminary meetings, headed by Supomo, a leading secular nationalist, were held to draft a constitution in which a basic agreement was achieved taking into account the Islamic claims. These were achieved as an compromise agreement between the two groups.

However, when the draft was later accepted by PPKI[149] on August 18, 1945, as the first constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the formerly accepted Islamic wording disappeared or was altered.[150] Considering that the newly born Republic needed unity and stable governance, or as Wachid Hasyim stated that "what we need most of all at this time is the indissoluble unity of the nation,"[151] further compromise finally had to be accepted.[152] In addition, Sukarno promised that as soon as the whole country was under control, a general

---

[148]H. Muhammad Yamin, *Naskah Perssiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, Vol.I. (Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1959), pp.153-154.

[149]It should be recalled that the Muslim representatives in both BPUPKI and PPKI were far outnumbered by the secular nationalists. In BPUPKI, only 16 out of 60 members were Muslim representatives, while in the PPKI only 3 out of 20 (later on 27) members were Muslim representatives.

[150]There were four important changes in the preamble and in the body of the 1945 constitution. 1) The word "Mukaddimah" was replaced by "Pembukaan". 2) In the preamble, the caluse "based on the Ke-Tuhanan, with the obligation to carry out the *sharīʿa* Islam for its adherents," was changed to "Ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Belief in God who is Absolutely One). 3) In article 6, "The President of the Republic of Indonesia should be a native-born Indonesian, and an adherent of Islam," the words "and an adherent of Islam" was deleted. And 4) In line with the second change listed, article 29, paragraph 1 should read: "The state based on Ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa," instead of "based on Ke-Tuhanan, with the obligation to carry out the *shrīʿa* Islam for its adherents." See, Saifuddin Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945," p.140., and Anthony H. Johns, "Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism," in John L. Esposito, ed. *Islam in South Asia: Religion, Politics & Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.211.

[151]Quoted in Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958), p.189; and J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (New York: Preager Publishers, 1972), p.297.

[152]Though, in general, Indonesian Muslim leaders accepted the compromise, however, Kartosuwiryo felt dissatisfied and he later on launched a radical movement called Darul Islam, based in the mountains of West Java. On August 7, 1949, he declared West Java as an Islamic State of Indonesia with himself as its Imam. However, the government of the Republic finally crushed the rebels. For further information on the Darul Islam, see W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesia in Transisition* (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1964); and C. van Diejk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinos Nijhoff, 1981).

election would be held and, in turn, a constituent assembly would be set up to formulate a more complete and perfect constitution.[153]

2. After Independence

For this period we will concentrate on several topics: Natsir's involvement in the government; his ideas on the Pancasila; his participation in the constituent assembly debates on the basis of state; and finally the Masyumi and Natsir role in it.

2.a. Natsir in the Early Years of Independence

Two days after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed by the United States of America, on August 17, 1945, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesia an independent country. On the following day, the 1945 Constitution, which was drafted earlier by the BPUPKI, was enacted as the 'temporary' constitution in which the Pancasila was adopted as the state philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia.[154]

Natsir immediately joined the government as one of the members of the Working Committee of the Central National Indonesian Committee, which served as an advisory committee and was later vested with full legislative power. On January 3, 1946, however, he was appointed Minister of Information in the first Syahrir Cabinet and continued in this position until June 27, 1947. He was reappointed in this position in the Hatta Cabinet (January 29, 1948 - August 4, 1949).

Natsir's political career reached its peak when he was designated to be the first Prime Minister of the unitary state (negara kesatuan) of the Republic of Indonesia. Though he represented the Masyumi, which was the largest political party at that time, he did not appoint only people from his own party to various posts. Out of eighteen members of his cabinet,

---

[153]Yamin, *Naskah*, Vol. I, p.410.

[154]It should be noted that though Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, the struggle to make that independence a reality actually took five more years which are called the years of physical revolution. With Australian and British help, the Dutch attempted to regain control of the Indies [Indonesia]; only in August 1950 [this should be December 1949], under Indonesian military and United Nations political pressures, were the Dutch finally obliged to recognize an independent republic. Lapidus, *A History*, p.768.

only four including himself, were from the Masyumi. He perhaps intended to form his cabinet with the support of as many parties as possible in order to give it national color and to get support from parliament.[155] Like previous cabinets, Natsir's cabinet lasted for only a short period. However, Herbert Feith, a leading scholar on Indonesian politics, remarked that, "In the very short time it had been in the office, the Natsir cabinet pursued its policy goals intently and with some success." He added, "It moved the country several steps along the road to civil security, administrative routinization, increased production, and planned economic growth."[156]

These points are touched upon to show that while Natsir was an Islamic nationalist, who idealized Islam as the basis of the state, as he had expressed in the pre-independence time,[157] he did not hesitate to join the democratic form of government based on Pancasila. It showed his flexibility in the sense that he was ready to accept whatever decision had been reached by the people of Indonesia as long as it was constitutional. He emphasized the unity of nation more than the *umma*, the Muslims. In the words of Adnan Buyung Nasution, a leading expert on law and well-known advocate in Indonesia, "Natsir is a genuine democrat."[158] Throughout his political career, from 1945 to 1958, Natsir, as the statesman, remained a democrat who worked for the nation and state.

---

[155]See Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional* (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1987), p.27.

[156]Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, 3rd. ed., 1968), p.176.

[157]Woodward points out that, "Like most educated Indonesians of generation, Natsir was a fervent nationalist; he was also a Muslim idealist." Mark R. Woodward, "Mohammad Natsir," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Muslim World.* Edited by John L. Esposito. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.239.

[158]Adnan Buyung Nasution, "Natsir Tidak Sektarian," in *Suara Masjid,* No.221 (February, 1993), p.10. A similar tone is also stated by Burns that,"He has emerged as a moderate nationalist. Some of his stronger natiolaist statements, as for instance the decalaration of the unity of Indonesia from Sabang to Merauke,..." Peter Burns, *Revelation and Revolution: Natsir and the Panca Sila.* (Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981), p.59.

2.b. Pancasila

While it is necessary to discuss the implementation of the concept of Pancasila, we will limit this discussion to Natsir's comments on the Pancasila. In 1952, in front of an audience of the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs, Karachi, Natsir asserted that Pakistan was decidedly an Islamic country on account of its Muslim population and its choice of Islam as the state religion. Similarly, Indonesia was an Islamic country because, though not mentioned in the constitution, Islam was embraced by the majority of Indonesian population. Denying that Indonesia excluded religion from statehood, Natsir pointed out that "In fact it has put the monotheistic belief in the one and only God, as the head of Pancasila." He said further, "The Five Principles are adopted as the spiritual, moral, and ethical foundation of the state and the nation."[159] Indeed, the first principle of the Pancasila reflects the spirit of *tawḥīd*, which is in the words of al-Fārūqī, "the essence and core of Islam."[160] It is derived from the thought of Muslim leaders, as Sukarno did not include this principle in his previous formulations, not until 1945.

So far Pancasila was democratically accepted by the Indonesian people. Natsir, however, realized, as was later stated by Suharto, the present president of Indonesia, that the "Pancasila is an open ideology."[161] The problem was then how to fulfill the ideology. Natsir was of the view that it should be fulfilled by Islamic values. In 1954, Natsir stated that Pancasila, as a formulation, did not contradict the Qurʾān, but it would if it was implemented with elements which contradicted the Qurʾān. Henceforth, he believed that Pancasila would flourish only on the soil and climate of Islam.[162] Moreover, he was of the view that Pancasila

---

[159]Mohammad Natsir, *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs* (Ithaca: South Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1954), p.1.

[160]Ismāʿil Rājī al-Fārūqī, *Tawḥīd: Its Implication for Thought and Life* (Pensylvania: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982), p.18; and Natsir held similar view that, "Islam in essence is *Tawḥīd* ." Mohammad Natsir, "Iqbal on the Separation of Religion and State," in *The Islamic Review* Vol.XLI, No.7 (July 1953), p.7.

[161]Cited in Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam dan Kekuasaan di Indonesia," in *Panji Masyarakat* No.783 (February 1994), p.10.

[162]Natsir, *Capita Selecta* II, pp.144-150.

would be meaningless if it was only a lip service without really applying its principles in the daily life, individual and collective, and on the social and political affairs.

2.c. Natsir and the Constituent Assembly Debates on the Basis of State

While it is true that the nation-wide elections were announced as early as October 1945 and were planned to be carried out in January 1946, but on account of the turbulent circumstances of the revolution, the government was repeatedly not able to hold general elections until the last months of 1955. The general elections for the House of Representatives took place on September 1955, and for the Constituent Assembly on December, 15, 1955. Following this first national general elections, in which some 34 parties participated, the Constituent Assembly was set up. The main and most urgent task of the Assembly, consisting of 544 members, Natsir being one of them, was to formulate a definitive constitution for the Republic of Indonesia, and this was done between November 10, 1956 and June 2, 1959.

The members of the Constituent Assembly were generally divided into three blocs; first, those who advocated Pancasila as the state philosophy; second, those who wanted Islam as the basis of the state; and third, those who proposed a socialist-economy as the basis of the state. Among the three, however, the first two dominated the debates in the Assembly. Thus, they, Islamic and secular nationalists, met for the second time to discuss the 'old' issue: Islam versus Pancasila. For the purpose of this study, however, we will focus only on the second block and more specifically on Natsir's ideas of Islam as the basis of state.[163]

The State: Mohammad Natsir's idea of an Islamic state was presented to the Constituent Assembly on November 12, 1957.[164] Before presenting his ideas, he described the characteristics or elements which were found in a state.[165]

---

[163]For comprehensive discussions on the entire debates see, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Chicago University, Illinois, 1983); and Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government.*

The state, Natsir explained, was an institution that had special rights, tasks, and objectives. In this respect, he was not different from the other political thinkers. The requirements of the modern state were territory, people, government, sovereignty, and a constitution or other unwritten sources of law and authority.[166] Explaining each of these categories further, Natsir said that the first requirement included the entire society and all institutions in it; and the second bound or unified the institutions under stipulations of laws. The third requirement functioned to coordinate and regulate all segments of society; and the forth forced the people to obey the established rules and laws. The last requirement was aimed at fulfilling and guiding the people's needs as a whole.[167] From these requirements, it is clearly seen that the state and its laws could hardly be separated one from another.

The inseparability between the state and its law was also shared by Barker when he remarked that the state was a legal association, a juridically organized nation, or a nation organized for action under legal rules. It existed for law: it existed in and through law. By law, Barker meant not only a sum of legal rules, but also an operative system of effective rules which were actually valid and regularly enforced. Barker emphasized further that the essence of the state was a living body of effective rules; and in that sense the state was law.[168]

Secularism and State: However, unlike Barker, what Natsir meant by law here was not man-made law but the Law of God, namely sharī‘a, which was derived from the Qur'ān and the sunna. Thus, the state he wanted was the one based on the sharī‘a. The aims

---

[164]Besides its inclusion in *Tentang Dasar Negara di Konstituante* Vol. I, (Bandung: Konstituante, 1959), this speech was published separately under the title of *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Bandung: Pimpinan Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1957); and it was later on translated into Arabic by Geys A. Tamimi entitled *Ikhtarū Ihdassabīlayn: al-Din aw al-Lādiniyya* (Jiddah: Saudi Publishing and Distribution House, 1970).

[165]Natsir. *Islam Sebagai Dasar*. p.6.

[166]Ahmad Syafii Maarif. *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1987). p.127.

[167]Natsir. *Islam Sebagai Dasar* . p.7.

[168]Ernest Barker. *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). p.89.

of the *sharī'a* itself were, according to Natsir, not only to serve as a guide to an individual to attain the highest possible development of spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical faculties, but also to maintain and harmonize the relationship between God and man and between man and man.[169] Based on this point of view, therefore, Natsir agreed with Ibn Khaldūn that the state to the society was like form [*'ard*] to matter [*jawhar*], where one could not be separated from the other.[170] Since the philosophy of the state should be deeply rooted in the society, and since the majority of Indonesians were Muslims, Natsir, therefore, argued that the state should be based on Islam. In other words, he proposed the Republic of Indonesia should be a democratic state based on Islam.

Observing the history of the modern nation-states in the world, Natsir concluded that there were basically only two options before us: secularism [*lā dīniyya*] or religion [*dīnī*].[171] Secularism, according to him was a way of life whose belief, aims, and attitudes, were limited to mundane affairs. For a secularist, though he might believe in God, he did not feel the need to relate his daily individual or collective activities to God. The secularist, Natsir explained further, did not recognize the existence of God's revelation as one of the sources of belief and knowledge. The secularist believed that belief and moral norms were merely created by the society.[172] Secularism, to put it simply, "stands in contrast to the sacred, marking an approach to life divorced from the influence of religion, and thus determined by temporal or worldly concerns."[173] Henceforth, if it was taken as the basis of state, there would be, as Asad observed, "no stable norm by which to judge between good and evil, and between right and wrong. The only possible criterion is the nation's interest."[174]

---

[169]Natsir, "Iqbal," p.7.

[170]Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar,* p.7.

[171]*Tentang Dasar Negara,* Vol., p.116; and Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar,* p.12.

[172]Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar,* p.12.

[173]W. L. Reese, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought* (New Jersey: Humanitary Press, 1980), p.519.

[174]Asad, *The Principle,* p.5.

Religion and State: Unlike secularism, Natsir asserted, "Religion provides a basis which is free from relativism. ...Religion gives a permanent basis and stability."[175] For Natsir, the best religion was, of course, Islam. This was due to the fact that the teachings of Islam provided perfect and complete qualities and requirements for the life of a state and society, in which pluralism and tolerance among various groups of the people were fully protected and guaranteed.[176] This meant that it was inconceivable for a minority to fear that when Islam was accepted as the basis of state, they would be denied some of their social and political rights, as they would be in the Mawdūdī's concept of an Islamic state.

Who would be sovereign in the state which was based on Islam? Agreeing with Mawdūdī in this respect, Natsir was of the view that sovereignty was vested in God. He was the absolute source of law and the values of life. Natsir believed that if the state philosophy was not based on the sovereignty of God, the formulations of the parliament would merely be 'dry grains of sand which are meaningless'.[177]

By emphasizing the position of Islam as the philosophy of the state, however, Natsir did not mean to make the state theocratic with a direct rule of religious elites on behalf of God. In Islam, he reminded, priesthood was not recognized. Therefore, he added that the state which was based on Islam was not theocratic. It was an Islamic democratic state which might be termed Theistic Democracy.[178] Probably, what Natsir meant by theistic democracy here is that all rules and regulations stipulated by the government should be in accordance with the spirit of *sharīʿa* and their application should be based on a democratic system.

Convinced of the ability of Islam to manage the various problems of a modern state, Natsir argued that the reason why Islam [the Qurʾān] did not provide detailed guidance in every single aspect of human life, especially those relating to mundane affairs, was because

---

[175]Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar*, p.22.

[176]*Ibid.*, pp.11-12.

[177]*Ibid.*, p.39.

[178]*Ibid.*, p.30.

they were subject to change according to time and place. Islam , he emphasized, actually provided only the essential and fundamental tenets which were in accordance with the very nature or *fiṭra* of man; these tenets were eternal and immutable and were applicable to all places and time, in the past and in the present.[179] In addition, there was general principle in Islam usually called *al-barāʿat al-aṣliyya*, stating that in matters of *ʿibāda*, everything was prohibited except which was permitted; and in matters of *muʿāmala*, everything was permissible except which was prohibited. Based on these solid basic teachings and at the same time on the flexible principles of Islam, Muslims must use their rational faculty in *ijtihād* in all fields of life in accordance with the demands of time and place, especially in the field of *muʿāmala*, including the running of state affairs.

Another point which is very important in Natsir's thought concerning statehood is his ideas on *shūrā*. Basing himself on the Qurʾānic verse, " ..and consult with them upon the conduct of affairs,"[180] Natsir suggested that an Islamic government should be based on the principles of *shūrā*, because Islam had affirmed that 'the value of consultation in governing life, either the life of society or the life of the state, should be preserved, supported, and encouraged. In line with this argument, it was necessary for the ruler of an Islamic state to gain the recognition and support of the people he ruled. He must be involved in consultation on all matters concerning the life and interests of the people.'[181] However, Natsir explained, this did not mean that in an Islamic government all of its affairs were fully dependent on the decisions of the consultative assembly. Every thing that was clearly stated in the Qurʾān and the *sunna* did not need to wait for the decision of the parliament. What needed to be discussed was, according to Natsir, only the ways of carrying out the law. Summarizing Natsir's ideas on statehood, Maarif reaffirms that in dealing with and managing socio-

---

[179]*Ibid.*, p.29.

[180]Qurʾān 3: 159. What is meant by "affairs" here is mundane affairs such as politics, economics, and social matters. See: Muhammad M. Pickthall. *The Glorious Qurʾān: Text and Expalanatory Translation.* (New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qurʾān, Inc., 1992), p.67; and *Al-Qurʾān dan Terjemahanya.* (Jakarta: Departemen Agama R.I., 1987), p.103

[181]Natsir. *Islam Sebagai Dasar*, p.31.

political affairs, unquestionably, the principle of *shūrā* ought to play an important role. The development and adaptation of the mechanism of the *shūrā*, however, depends on the *ijtihād* of the Muslim *umma*, because Islam did not lay down rigid rules in this respect. [182]

Natsir was of the opinion that, in a state which is based on the principles of democracy and *shūrā* as described above, maintaining and preserving the multi-political parties was unquestionably important. He insisted that as long as there was freedom to establish political parties there would be democracy. However, if the parties were buried, then democracy too, would follow them into the grave. What would be left in the graveyard then would only be a dictatorship. He, therefore, emphasized that only in a state with democracy could the atmosphere of Islam prosper.

Discussing Natsir's debates in the assembly would be incomplete without briefly touching upon his opinion on two other proposed bases of the state: Pancasila and socio-economics. Since both of these bases were man-made theories, they were partial and secular in nature. To Natsir, Pancasila was 'pure formulation' in the sense that its contents would depend upon the people who interpreted it. The Pancasila would be meaningful if it contained certain ideology. While he agreed that no one could deny the good ideas in the Pancasila, the explanations given by its supporters were not clear in terms of its true content, its proper sequence, its sources, and its nucleus, as well as the inter-dependence of its components. "Since the basis of our state needs to be clear and distinct and not to confuse the nation," therefore Natsir reasoned, "it is difficult for our group to accept something which is vague."[183]

Finally, as to the Pancasila and socio-economic blocs respectively, Natsir appealed that "Your intended principles exist in Islam, not as a sterile pure concepts but as a living value which has real and distinct substances. By accepting Islam as the philosophy of state,

---

[182]Maarif. *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan*. p.130.

[183]*Tentang Dasar Negara*, Vol. I, p.28.

the defender of the Pancasila will lose nothing. ...And in a similar manner the supporters of the social-economy could find in Islam the progressive concept of social economy."[184]

However, after almost thirty months' hard work, though the representatives in the assembly finished ninety percent of their job, they could not agree on the basis of the state, and therefore, no compromise was achieved. "It was impossible, " Ward said, "for either Islamic organizations or secular one to obtain the two-third majority that was necessary for their respective proposals."[185] Consequently, a deadlock was inevitable. The government then interfered in the assembly proceedings, and without providing an additional chance for the assembly to finish their job, on July 5, 1959, Sukarno issued a presidential decree to return to the 1945 Constitution. Now, having discussed Natsir's idea on Islamic statehood which ended in a deadlock, we turn to his involvement in the Masyumi party.

2.d. Masyumi and Natsir's Role

Responding to the government's announcement of October 3, 1945, which encouraged Indonesian people to form a political party, a committee headed by Mohammad Natsir held a national Muslim congress [Mu'tamar Islam Indonesia] in Yogyakarta on November 7-8, 1945. In this congress, which was attended by Indonesian Muslims leaders representing almost all socio-religious organizations and pre-independence Islamic political parties, an agreement was concluded to establish one Islamic political party to carry out their political struggle and aspirations. The party was then named Masyumi and Natsir was appointed as one of its central board members. Thus, this party, though bearing the same name as that of Masyumi founded by the Japanese in 1943, was new and not the continuation of the pre-independence Masyumi as wrongly assumed by some writers such as Dahm and Kees.[186]

---

[184]Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar*, p.28.

[185]K. E. Ward, *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1970), p.7. For further information on the deadlock in the assembly, see H. Muhammad Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, Vol.III. (Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1960), p.618.

The party had two main objectives; first, to maintain the sovereignty of the state of the Republic of Indonesia, and second, to carry out Islamic ideals in the state affairs.[187] These objectives, especially the first one, were very important at the time because, though Indonesia had proclaimed its independence in 1945, the Dutch did not want to recognize this independence. They finally recognized Indonesia's independence on December 27, 1949. These years were generally called the years of physical revolution during which the Indonesian people were involved in preserving their country from the Dutch soldiers who attacked them with the help of Australian and British forces.

Later on in the fifties, when the country achieved relative stability, the party objectives were modified, "to make the teachings of Islam and *shariᶜa* operative in the lives of individual, society, and state, for God's pleasure." This objective was formulated in order to achieve *baldatun ṭayyibatun wa rabbun ghafūr* - a territory fair and happy, and a Lord Oft-Forgiving - as mentioned in the Qurʾān[188] and as often quoted by leaders of Masyumi.

The leadership of the party was entrusted to a central board consisting of one chairman, three vice-chairmen, and several other functionaries. This board was assisted by Majlis Syuro, consisting of a chairman, three vice-chairmen and several *ᶜulamāʾ*, whose function was to give advice and *fatwā* s to the central board when they were needed. Following the government geographical administrative structure, the party was divided into branches in districts, sub-branches in sub-district , and branches of sub-branches in villages.[189] For carrying out the party's programs, Masyumi also felt it necessary to

---

[186]See Bernhard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* (London: Preager Publishers, 1971), p.151; and B. Kees, "Observation on the Political Situation in Indonesia," in B.H.M. Vlekke, ed. *Indonesia in 1956: Political and Economical Aspect* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1957), p.25.

[187]*Masjoemi: Partai Politik Oemat Islam* (Yogyakarta: Pengurus Besar Partai Masjoemi, nd.), p.10; and Yusril Ihza, "Modenisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Satu Kajian Perbandingan Kes Parti Masyumi di Indonesia dan Jama'at-i Islami di Pakistan (1940-1960)," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University Sains Malaysia, 1993), p.90; and Noer, "Masjumi," p.66.

[188]Qurʾān 34: 15. Translation taken from Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Glorious Qurʾān: Translation and Comments.* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), p.1138.

[189]Noer, "Masjumi," pp.44-45.

establish several   support or sub-organizations such as Indonesian Muslim Youth Association, Indonesian Muslim Farmers Association, Indonesian Muslim Traders Association.[190]

Unlike the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan, the Masyumi soon grew into one of the two biggest parties (the other one was the PNI) and rooted itself deeply in the Muslim society of different parts of Indonesia. Moreover, it remained as the largest party and surpassed other parties in number until the early fifties, when NU withdrew its Masyumi membership to become a separate political party.[191] The Masyumi had two kinds of membership: first, ordinary members who were Indonesian Muslim citizens; secondly, extraordinary members consisting of Muslim organizations. The members had voting rights whereas the organizations only had the right to give advice and suggestions to the party. Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Perikatan Umat Islam, Persatuan Islam Indonesia, Persatuan Islam, Al-Irsyad, al-Jam'iyatul Washliyyah, and Al-Ittihadiyah held the second kind of Masyumi membership and among them, the first two were the main members of the party.

Based on the congress decision of 1949, Mohammad Natsir was elected as the chairman of the party. He was reelected as chairman in four subsequent congresses held in 1951, 1952, 1954, and 1956. Thus, he was the only leader among the Masyumi intellectuals who was entrusted the top party leadership for five terms. In the words of Ihza, "In his hands, Masyumi was biggest political party in Indonesia or can even be regarded as the biggest Muslim party in a Muslim country." He added," During this era, Masyumi was only comparable to the Pakistan Muslim League under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan."[192] Undeniably, this fact showed the *umma*' s acknowledgment of Natsir's capacity as a leader. While it was true that in the party there were at least two groups

---

[190]*Ibid.,*   p.49.

[191]Cf. Deliar Noer, "Contemporary Political Dimensions of Islam," in M. B. Hooker, ed. *Islam in South-East Asia.* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), p.185.

[192]Yusril Ihza, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: the Biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993) " in *Studia Islamika,* Vol.2, No.1 (1995), p.124.

of leadership, ʿulamāʾ and intellectuals or traditionalists and modernists, Natsir could bridge the gap between these groups. He was able to do it because, besides having obtained Western education in pre-independence days, Natsir had also been thoroughly trained in religious matters. His training, his personality as well as his piety created confidence among both groups; the traditionalists and the modernists.

These qualities coupled with his political experience led Natsir, then a parliamentary member representing Masyumi, to propose the so called 'integral motion' in which Natsir demanded that the present federal states of Indonesia were to be integrated as a unitary state.[193] The parliament members unanimously accepted it and Indonesia became the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. Natsir's step was then considered a strategic choice, which was achieved constitutionally, democratically, and in a respectable manner.

The Masyumi relationship with the government was, therefore, cordial, especially during the first decade after the independence. Besides Natsir, some other Masyumi representatives such as Dr. Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo and Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap had served as prime ministers. The following members were cabinet ministers: Dr. Abu Hanifah, Mr. Mohamad Roem, K.H. Wachid Hasyim, Mr. Achmad Subarjo, Mr. Yusuf Wibisono, Dr. Samsuddin, Mr. Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Sarjan, K.H. Fakih Usman, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Abdul Hakim, Prof. Mr. Mulyanto, Suchyar Tejakusuma, and Ir. Pangeran Noor.

However, when the era of the constitutional democracy faded away with the emergence of Sukarno's guided democracy, Masyumi distanced itself from the government and became an opposition party. Masyumi leadership did not compromise with Sukarno, who later had autocratic tendencies.[194] According to Natsir, Sukarno with his 'conception of

---

[193]For the text of this integrated motion, see Mohammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta* II, pp.3-7.

[194]In the words of Bracher, "Sukarno's concept, formulated towards the end of fifties largely for the legitimation of his own permanent presidency, was strongly reminiscent of the classic theory of authoritarianism with a national-revolutionary touch: rejection of the multi-party state, government by a liberation elite, consultative function of a parliament representing different social and economic groups, decision making by discussion and (guided) consensus instead of multi-party government and major vote." Karl Dietrich Bracher,

president', contrary to the constitution, would change the structure of the state totally. He intended to include PKI [Communist Party of Indonesia] in the cabinet, on which Hatta disagreed.[195] Comparing Sukarno's and Ayub Khan's governments of their respective periods, Mawdūdī said in 1970 that "Ayub during his regime did what Sukarno had done in Indonesia. All religious elements," he added, "were crushed and the administration went into the hands of the lefties."[196]

The increasing communist influence upon the government, among other factors, led Masyumi leaders such as Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Burhanuddin Harahap, and Mohammad Natsir to join PRRI [Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia], a counter government proclaimed on February 1958 in Padang. After the central government put an end to the PRRI rebellion in 1961, Natsir along with other Masyumi leaders were put into jail without trial while their political party, Masyumi, was banned forever.[197]

Natsir was released in 1965, after the Old Order government was transferred to the New Order under President Suharto. However, since Natsir was never allowed to practically participate in the Indonesian world politics, he chose *da'wa* as his means to keep struggling for the betterment of Indonesian Muslims religiously and politically and for that purpose he established Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia in Jakarta in 1967. The DDII constitutes one of the biggest *da'wa* organizations in Indonesia, which is now, among others, working in cooperation with the International Institute of Islamic Thought in Virginia, U.S.A.

The Age of Ideologies: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century. Translated by Ewald Osers (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1984), p.263.

[195]*Tempo,* February, 1993, p.85.

[196]Quoted in Bruce Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1989), p.208.

[197]It is believed that Partai Muslimin Indonesia, founded on 20 February 1968, is a legal successor to Masyumi, however, the military government excludes former Masyumi members from leadership position. For further information, see Ward, *The Foundation.* See also John Obert Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982, 2nd ed., 1994), pp.256-257.

CHAPTER THREE

ABUL A'LĀ MAWDŪDĪ'S AND MOHAMMAD NATSIR'S CONCEPT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE : SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

So far we have discussed not only both Mawdūdī's and Natsir's biographical and intellectual sketches, but also observed their ideas on statehood and their involvement in practical politics in their respective countries. Though Mawdūdī and Natsir are respectively described by some writers as fundamentalist and modernist, as far as their ideas of statehood are concerned, they share many views, especially those related to the idea of statehood. In this chapter, however, we will focus on these similarities and differences, especially the most apparent ones, and on the reasons behind their views. In addition, since the root of their political thought was seemingly deeply planted in their belief in the unity between religion and state, a brief discussion on this aspect is also in order.

A. Fundamentalism vs. Modernism

Since both Mawdūdī and Natsir are described as coming from fundamentalist and modernist groups, we will briefly touch on the terms of fundamentalist and modernist as schools of political thought or ideology in Islam. Mousalli remarks that both fundamentalists and modernists "aim to motivate the Muslims to work towards progress and development. Both see Islam as necessary for the reformulation of history and reformation of civilization. Islam should provide the metaphysical foundations as well as the motivating force for regeneration."[1]

In spite of having a similar basis and objectives, the worldviews of the fundamentalists and modernists are quite different. Their differences are reflected in their ways of interpreting Islamic doctrines. In other words, they employ different approaches in

---

[1]Ahmad S. Mousalli, "Two Trends in Modern Islamic Political Thought: Modernism and Fundamentalism," in *Hamdard Islamicus*. Vol.XVI, No.2 (Summer 1993), p.73.

understanding the position of *ijtihād*, the early precedence of Islam, *ijmāᶜ* (consensus),

heterogeneity in society, and the position of wisdom as a way to adopt the a. hievements of

other Muslim and non-Muslim societies. While modernists seemingly employ methods of

takhayyur (process of selection) and *talfīq* (piecing together), reflecting elasticity and

flexibility, fundamentalists tend to see and understand this doctrine rigidly and literally.

Consequently, while fundamentalists consider the Qurʾān and the *sunna* to have already

covered all aspects of human life, leaving little room for *ijtihād*, [2] modernists regard the

Qurʾān and the *sunna* as having only provided general principles, and therefore, the door

of *ijtihād* still remains open. While fundamentalists limit *ijtihād* to the *mujtahid* with high

qualifications, modernists consider that *ijtihād* can be done by a Muslim intellectual who

has competency in dealing with the problems of the society, be they social, religion,

economic, and political. While fundamentalists see the early precedences of Islam, even its

details, and the *ijmāᶜ* of Companions of the Prophet as binding, modernists consider them

as being open to interpretation. If the social, economic, and political factors behind the

recognition of the *ijmāᶜ* are now changed, so the *ijmāᶜ* could be changed in accordance

with the most recent social, economic, and political conditions. In addition, while

fundamentalists tend to regard society as monolithic and divide the society into two groups,

devout Muslims and non-Muslims, modernists realize that society could not be monolithic,

but instead should be considered heterogeneous. In a heterogeneous atmosphere,

modernists believe that Muslims should play their role as *ummatan wasaṭan* (moderate

community), who not only could act as mediator but at the same time could appreciate the

---

[2]While Iqbāl was of the view that the Qurʾān provided for what was eternal but that the principle of movement in the structure of Islam was provided by *ijtihād*, Mawdūdī's conservatism and fundamentalism tended to take the spirit of mobility out of Islam. While he was liberal in the sense that he did not accept to any one of the four Sunnī's schools of law to be wholly applicable in our circumstances and allowed Muslims to work out a system of law most applicable to their own situations when he came to reinterpretation, or what we might call legislation in our own context, his conservatism allowed us very little freedom of action in detail. Sayed Riaz Ahmad, *Maulana Maududi and The Islamic State* (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1976), pp.159-160.

wisdom coming from even non-Muslim societies of either the East or the West.[3] These trends, to some extent, can be traced respectively in the political thought of both Mawdūdī and Natsir.

B. The Relationship Between Religion and State

The history of the modern Muslim political system was marked, during the early part of the twentieth century, by the abolition of the last Ottoman Caliphate, which was considered by most Sunnis to be a symbol of Muslims' unity. The caliphate was replaced by civilian rule and a secular state, the Turkish Republic. The current debate on the relationship between Islam and the state can be considered to have begun with this event and the events leading up to it. Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) could be said to have been the most prominent Muslim politician and military leader behind the final abolition of the caliphate. Under his direction, "Turkey chose a totally secular path, separating Islam from the state and thus restricting religion to private life."[4]

---

[3]For a more detailed discussion on the theoretical grouping of fundamentalism and modernism seen from the political point of view, see Yusril Ihza, "Modenisme dan Fundamentalisme Dalam Politik Islam: Satu Perbandingan Kes Parti Masyumi di Indonesia dan Jamā'at-i Islāmī di Pakistan," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1993), pp.31-32; and Mousalli, "Two Trends in Modern Islamic Political Thought.", pp.51-78. "The concern of religious modernists is to purify the religious heritage, to interpret some of its aspects and to fuse it with modern elements, in order to reinstitute the dignity of that heritage and establish its worth against foreign encroachment. ... Thus, the goal of Islamic modernism is to make Islam relevant and responsive in the context of modern society." Ali E. Hilal Desouki, "Islamic Modernism," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Religion*. Vol.VII. Edited by Mircea Eliade, et al., eds. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), p.14. In other words, "Islamic modernists advocate flexible, continuous reinterpretation of Islam so that Muslims may develop institutions of education, law and politics suitable to modern conditions." David Commins, "Modernism," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Muslim World*, Vol.III. Edited by John L. Esposito. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.118. Meanwhile, "those commonly referred to as 'fundamentalists' adopt an identifiable approach to those common obligations, an approach marked by an exclusivist and literalist interpretation of the fundamentals of Islam and by a rigorist pursuit of sociomoral reconstruction." John O. Voll, "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan, " in *Fundamentalism Observed*. Vol.I. Edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, 2nd ed., 1994), p.347.

[4]John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984, 3rd ed., 991), p. 96.

This and other events in Turkey, along with reactions coming from the rest of the Muslim world, either directly or indirectly influenced both Mawdūdī's and Natsir's early political thought. This influence was clearly reflected in their writings, as noted earlier. Instead of supporting Kemal's secularization, they considered him misleading and even a heretic. They strongly rejected Kemal's idea that religion should be separated from the state. The supporters of Kemal's ideas were called by Mawdūdī and Natsir Kemalists and Kemalisten, respectively.[5] This rejection is understandable if we carefully look at both Mawdūdī's and Natsir's understanding of Islam. Daniel's words aptly describe their belief that, "Islam is not a religion in the common, distorted meaning of the word, confining itself to the private life of man." Indeed, he emphasizes further that, "It is a complete way of life, catering for all the fields of human existence. Islam provides guidance for all walks of life - individual and social, material and moral, economic and political, legal and cultural, national and international."[6] Thus, to both Mawdūdī and Natsir, Islam did not recognize the separation of religion from mundane affairs. This belief was not only held by their predecessors, such as al-Ghazālī (d.1111) Shāh Walī Allāh (d.1762), and other earlier Muslim scholars and jurists, but was also shared by their contemporaries both from the Subcontinent and from Indonesia such as Muḥammad Iqbāl and Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1911-1983).

B.1. Rashīd Riḍā : A Source of Inspiration

Looking at their insistence on the inseparability of religion and state, it appears that both Mawdūdī and Natsir were influenced by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā's political thought.

---

[5]Though Mawdūdī personally did not use the term of Kemalists, but it seems that he agreed to the term when his people from the Jamāʿat such as Misbahul Islam Fārūqī and Masʿūd ʿĀlam Nadwī used the term. In addition, Mawdūdī's association with the Khilafat movement had made him particularly suspicious of Mustafa Kemal, and he came to view Kemalism as a symbol of godless secularism posing danger to Muslim societies. See, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.226, note.16.

[6]M.N. Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1962), cited in G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1979), p.17.

Similarly, Hasan al-Banna', their contemporary from Egypt, was also influenced by Riḍā; especially Riḍā's thought after the First World War, when his Islamic modernism gave away to an increasing conservatism. At this time, Riḍā was not only critical of the West, but he also emphasized the comprehensiveness and self-sufficiency of normative Islam. He stressed further that the fundamental sources of Islam provided a complete code of life. Thus, he concluded, Muslim reformers should not search for answers for their problems from the West, but should single-mindedly return to the Qur'ān, the *sunna*, and the consensus of the Prophet's Companions.[7] Regarding this, Paul Salem remarked that Mawdūdī articulated a conclusion that Rashīd Riḍā had been stumbling towards for some time, namely, that a compromise between modernity and Islam was not possible but that a complete triumph of Islam was a necessary perquisite for the revival and progress of the Muslim community.[8] Following Riḍā's footsteps, Mawdūdī went further as he not only asserted that Islam was all-embracing and self-sufficient, but he even rejected and condemned the West as irreligious, or as Watt put it, as entirely atheistic and materialistic.[9] The notion of self-sufficiency was apparent not only in religious matters but was also extended to the political sphere, as is shown in his concept of an Islamic state. For Mawdūdī, Naṣr concluded, "Politics was declared to be an integral part and inseparable component of the Islamic faith, and the 'Islamic state' which Muslim political action sought to erect viewed the panacea to all problem facing Muslims."[10] However, while it was true that Natsir was influenced by Riḍā's political thought, Natsir, unlike Mawdūdī, did not go as far as to reject the West totally. Not because Natsir himself was a product of the Western educational system, but because he considered that wisdom could be found either in the

---

[7] Cf. Esposito. *Islam and Politics*, p.65.

[8] Paul Salem. *Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p.126.

[9] W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1988, 2nd ed., 1989), p.55.

[10] Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, p.7.

East or in the West, both of which belonged to Almighty God. Therefore, Natsir would advise Indonesian Muslims to adopt whatever achievements in statecraft were achieved by those two worlds, as long as it did not contradict the spirit of Islam. He asserted that wisdom and civilization were not a monopoly of the concerned inventors. This view is in line with that of generally held by the modernists.

B. 2. Differences

In spite of their belief in the inseparability of religion and politics, Mawdūdī and Natsir differed in understanding how religion and state should actually be united. For Mawdūdī the state could only be called Islamic as long as its constitution clearly stated that it was an Islamic state or mentioned the sharīʿa as its source of law. Mawdūdī's stance was apparent during the early years of Pakistan, when he suggested that the Jamāʿat membership not join the government, at least, not until after the passing of the Objective Resolution of 1949, as Pakistan, which was still governed according to the India Act of 1935, was then, in Mawdūdī's opinion, not Islamic state. In 1956, when the constitution was enacted, Mawdūdī seemed content with it because the constitution clearly stated Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic, in spite of it not mentioning the sharīʿa as the source of its law. Henceforth, it seems that Mawdūdī put more emphasis on the formal aspect of Islam rather than its spirit; he emphasized more on the theoretical rather than practical aspects. This stance was, according to Ihza, generally held by other fundamentalists.[11]

On quite a different level, Natsir considered the relationship between religion and state in Indonesian context as a mutual symbiosis in the sense as what had been stated by ʿAlī Ibn Abī Ṭālib (the fourth rightly-guided caliph of Islam period of Caliphate) that: "State and religion need each other. Religion as the basis, while state as its guardian. If there is no basis, the state will collapse, similarly if there is no guardian, religion would be useless."[12] Thus, soon after Indonesia was proclaimed independent and Pancasila was

---

[11]Yusril Ihza, "Maududi dan Jama'at Islami: Tujuan dan Pembentukan Partai Fundamentalis," in Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an. Vol.IV, No.3 (1993), p.52.

taken as its basis, Natsir joined the government[13] as he believed that Pancasila could reflect the spirit of Islam and, in its framework, the shari‛a could be applied at both society and state levels. In addition, although Natsir preferred Islam as the basis of the state, he accepted Pancasila instead. This is because the people's representatives through democratically means agreed upon Pancasila as the basis of the state. Natsir believed that democracy, in which social control, social support, and social participation were included, should be upheld and respected. An interesting question may be raised: if Natsir really accepted Pancasila why did he seemingly reject it in the constituent assembly debates in 1957 ? Noer has given some plausible reasons: First, the constituent assembly was a forum for an open and free discussion, as well as for comparing opinions. Like the other constituent members, he freely expressed his ideas on the basis of state. Second, Natsir and his friends from other Islamic organizations wanted to carry out the responsibility of the amana (trusteeship) of Muslim voters and to present their aspirations to the constituent assembly. Third, like the other constituent members, Natsir and his friends wished to introduce the novelty of their respective beliefs.[14] This means that Natsir used the constituent forum to further an understanding of what he was struggling towards .

Natsir's democratic stance, coupled with a non-compromising attitude towards communism, were clearly demonstrated when Sukarno introduced guided democracy and centralized power in his own hands, and then introduced his concept called NASAKOM (a mixture of nationalism, religion, and Marxism). Natsir felt that Sukarno tended to ignore the constitution and were to close to the leftist wings backed by the PKI [Indonesian Communist Party], who later brutally launched the aborted coup d'état of September, 30,

---

[12]M. Isa Anshary, *Falsafah Perjuangan Islam* (Medan: Saiful, 1951), p.197.

[13]For an interesting discussion on the justification of the present government of Indonesia being in line with the principle of an Islamic state is that shari‛a gives the soul to Indonesian constitutions, see Sjechul Hadi Permono, *Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Sebagai Pengelola Zakat* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1993), pp.145-150.

[14]Cf. Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila, dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1983, 2nd ed., 1984), p.111; and Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional* (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1987), p.266.

1965. This bitter event is known as *Gestapu*.[15] To make Sukarno realize his 'wrong' policy, which dissatisfied the people of the outer islands, Natsir joined the PRRI in Sumatra in 1958. About his involvement in the PRRI, Kahin remarked : "It has seemed to me that one of Natsir's major contributions to his country came in the course of the PRRI rebellion." He reasoned further that, "It is to a large extent because of Mohammad Natsir that PRRI's struggle was waged within the context of Indonesian unity."[16] In fact, Natsir succeeded in blocking those who favored Sumatra's secession from Indonesia and becoming a separate state.[17]

In light of the above-mentioned facts, Mawdūdī's and Natsir's differences were due to different socio-political conditions of both states and ideologies. Mawdūdī considered Islam to be the main factor in the establishment of Pakistan and, therefore, Pakistan should be built as an Islamic state. Meanwhile, Natsir considered the concept of an Islamic state in Indonesia merely an ideal - something yet to be achieved and still very far removed from the reality of the present.[18] Though Muslims comprised ninety percent of the total population, they still considered Islam to be a private religion with no relationship to state affairs. Natsir supported this belief by pointing out that in spite of this majority, Islamic parties only got 45 percent of the vote in the first general election in Indonesia of 1955.[19]

---

[15]Gestapu stands for Gerakan September tiga puluh (September 30th movement). For a discussion on PKI's history and aborted coup d'état, see Arnold C. Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969).

[16]George McTurnan Kahin, "Mohammad Natsir," in Yusuf Abdullah Puar, ed. *Mohammad Natsir 70 Tahun: Kenang-kenangan, Kehidupan, dan Perjuangan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978), p.335.

[17]*Ibid.*

[18]George McTurnan Kahin, "In Memoriam: Mohammad Natsir (1907-1993)," in *Indonesia*. No.56 (October 1993), p.161.

[19]Cf. Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1971), pp.58-59.

Having discussed Mawdūdī's and Natsir's stand on the relationship between religion and state, as well as their attitude towards the political reality in their countries, we will see further similarities and differences in their concept of statehood.

C. Mawdūdī's and Natsir's Concept of Statehood in Islam

Asad sates that the political ordinances of the Qur'ān and the *sunna*, if examined objectively, do not lay any specific form of state. In other words, the *sharīʿa* does not prescribe any definite pattern to which an Islamic state must conform. Following the logical consequence of this argument, Mawdūdī and Natsir had already developed their idea of an ideal [Islamic] state in the thirties and elaborated it in the forties and fifties. Though they built and deduced their theories from the same Islamic sources, they agreed on some points and differed on others as shown below:

C.1. The Similarities

Both Mawdūdī and Natsir considered the following five points to be important elements in an Islamic state: divine sovereignty; the function of state; the *sharīʿa* as the source of law; the principle of *shūrā*; and the head of state.

(i) Sovereignty : Both believed that the sovereignty in an Islamic state should be vested in the hands of God alone. While Mawdūdī had emphasized this idea far before partition, Natsir touched upon it much later, in 1957. Based on the idea of God's sovereignty, instead of theocracy, Mawdūdī and Natsir preferred to call their state systems theo-democracy and theistic-democracy, respectively.

There was little doubt that what they meant by sovereignty was an absolute sovereignty; the sovereignty that could not be denied by any Muslim. However, if this concept was applied in practical politics it was not appropriate, because in modern politics "the concept of sovereignty is entirely human and not divine. It implies the sovereign's

participation in day-to-day governance; he ought to give commands and enact laws."[20] Thus, sovereignty should not be seen as an absolute one, but as human sovereignty, commonly called popular sovereignty. The wrongly applied concept of divine sovereignty in politics can be traced back to a work of Jean Bodin (1530-1596), a French philosopher and political writer, entitled *Six Livres de la Republique*, written in 1576. Because, in the theory of politics, certain terms may change in meaning, depending on the time and place where they were used, this concept was probably only appropriate and, in fact, generally employed, in the medieval era, and not in modern time. With such a concept, according to Adams, "there is a failure to distinguish between the locus of sovereignty at the theoretical level and sovereignty in the more immediate sense of who actually exercises power."[21] He explained the weakness of Mawdūdī's concept, probably it could be applied also to Natsir's, that: "While sovereignty may belong to God, God does not Himself intervene directly in the life of an Islamic state to give orders, decide policies or render decisions; there must be human agency to do those things on His behalf and in His name."[22] Though Mawdūdī reasoned that the Islamic state would be run by all Muslims, as His vicegerents, still it was the ruler who performed these functions. The ruler was open to the possibility of tyranny in the name of God. In other words, both Mawdūdī's and Natsir's concept of divine sovereignty was unacceptable, if not impossible to apply to the modern world, with its challenges the complexities of social life, because neither of them explained clearly how this system would operate in their respective countries. To quote Adams again : "In a situation of controversy such as Mawdūdī faced, the use of such arguments is perhaps

---

[20]Syed Barakat Ahmad, "Mawdudian Concept of Islamic State," in *Islam in the Modern Age*. Vol.XIV, No.4 (November 1983), p.255.

[21]Charles J. Adams, "Mawdūdī and the Islamic State," in John L. Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.118.

[22]*Ibid.*

understandable, but they did not contribute either to clarity of thought about constitutional problem of Pakistan or to strengthening his own case."[23]

(ii) **State** : Regarding the main function of the state itself, both Mawdūdī and Natsir believed that the state was not an end in itself, but was rather no more than a means or an instrument to achieve the ideals of Islam, to guarantee that Islamic law operated in the lives of individuals and society, as well at a state level. In addition, both of them were of the view that political power was important, because it was the state that had the power to enforce the law of God on this point (for more discussion, see C.2.i.).

(iii) **Law** : The next concept which is shared by Mawdūdī and Natsir is that an Islamic state should be based on Islamic law. In other words, the constitutions of an Islamic state should be legislated in line with the principles of the sharī*a. However, while both Mawdūdī and Natsir believed that the sources of the sharī*a were the Qur'ān and the sunna, the sharī*a did not mean exactly the same thing to both of them. The sharī*a was, according to Mawdūdī, a complete scheme of life which included all social structures.[24] This kind of understanding of the sharī*a was considered to be very rigid and old fashioned. This rigidity was also reflected in his conviction that if there was clear naṣṣ in the Qur'ān and the ḥadīth, no one could be permitted to move away from the naṣṣ (text) Neither the people nor the majlis shūrā (parliament) were allowed to change it, not even a single word. On the contrary, even Abū Yusuf, a disciple of Abū Ḥanifa, was of the view that if the naṣṣ was formerly based on custom, the sanction of law in it was abrogated if the custom was no longer relevant. Similarly, as far as mu*āmala was concerned, al-Ṭufi, a Hanbalite jurist, asserted that if there was a conflict between the interests of society on

---

[23]*Ibid.*, p.119.

[24]In Mawdūdī's own words, "the Sharī*a is a complete scheme of life and all-embracing social order where nothing is superfluous, and nothing is lacking." Cited in Peter Bannerman, *Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law* (London: Routledge, 1988), p.123.

one hand, and the *naṣṣ* and *ijmāʾ* on the other hand, the former, i.e. people's interest, should be given priority.[25]

It is not clear from Natsir's writings what he meant by the *sharīʿa*. While he clearly stated the objectives of the *sharīʿa*, as we discussed in the previous chapter, he did not give a definition of the *sharīʿa* as Mawdūdī did. However, since Natsir rarely identified the *sharīʿa* as the Islamic law found in the books of Islamic jurisprudence as generally understood by Indonesian Muslims, it seems he understood it as "simply general moral injunctions of the Qurʾān and the *sunna* regarding the behavior of man as an individual and as a member of society."[26] This conclusion was very similar to the definition of *sharīʿa* given by Rahman. He said that the *sharīʿa* was a group of Divine imperatives to man, imperatives which were frankly admitted to be primarily of a moral character. The *sharīʿa* was thus not an actual code of particular and specific enactment but it was conterminous with the good.[27] Natsir, like other modernists in Indonesia, had never explicitly tried to question the content of the *sharīʿa*, in spite of his strong insistence upon the right and urgency of *ijtihād* in order to meet the contemporary demands of the Muslim people as a whole, perhaps, among other things, because of his flexibility in understanding the *sharīʿa* and other doctrine of Islam. (On *ijtihād*, also see under the *shūrā*). Therefore, Fazlur Rahman regarded Mohammad Natsir as being much more progressive than Mawdūdī and the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan.[28]

---

[25]Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara* (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia Press, 1990), p.177.

[26]Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, Illinois, 1983), pp.199-200.

[27]Cited in Thomas W. Lippman, *Understanding Islam: An Introduction to the Muslim World* (New York: Mentor Book, 1982), p.73.

[28]Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 2nd ed., 1984), p.80.

(iv) **Shūrā** : Another similar concept that Mawdūdī and Natsir agreed upon was that the Islamic state should be based on the principle of *shūrā*. The concept of *shūrā* is mentioned in the Qurʾān. Henceforth, both Mawdūdī and Natsir cited the Qurʾānic verses: "It is by the mercy of Allah that you were lenient with them, for if you had been rough and hard-hearted they would have dispersed from around you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult with them on the matter" (3:159) and "And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish prayer and who conduct their affairs by counsel, and who spend of what We have bestowed upon them"(43:38). Based on these verses, they theorized that the *shūrā* constituted one of the most basic principles of an Islamic state. The head of state, therefore, should always consult the *majlis shūrā* on matters related to public interest.

The *shūrā* might be carried out in a parliament in which all people were represented by their representatives. However, when the discussion on how the *shūrā* should be carried out came up, both scholars had a different stance. While Mawdūdī was of the opinion that the head of state, who either chaired or was one of the members of the *majlis shūrā*, had a right to accept or to veto a decision reached by the members of the *Majlis*, Natsir, like Rahman, was of the view that whatever decision was reached by the members of the parliament, the head of state could not neglect or abrogate it.

Regarding the questions of abolishing gambling, forbidding alcohol consumption and eliminating *khurafat* (superstition) and *shirk* (associating God with others), the government, according to both Natsir and Mawdūdī, did not need the approval of parliament as these things were clearly stated in the *sharīʿa*. Similarly, Muḥammad S. El-Awa pointed out that, " ...*Shūrā* is not applicable to questions on which an injunction exits in the Holy Qurʾān or in the *sunna*, both of which constitute binding legislation; matters falling in this category are necessary out of the scope of the *shūrā*, except when its purpose is only to interpret the injunction or to enforce it."[29] *Ijtihād* was then highly recommended

for matters not explicitly mentioned in the *ḥudūd*. According to Mawdūdī, a person who conducted *ijtihād* had to meet certain qualifications such as faith in the *sharīʿa*, proper knowledge of Arabic, sound knowledge of the Qurʾān and the *sunna*, familiarity with the contributions of the earlier jurists and *mujtahids* of Islam, acquaintance with the problems and conditions of our times, and commendable character and conduct according to the Islamic ethic standard.[30] Since perhaps not all the members of the *majlis shūrā* could meet this standard, and since the head of state should possess these qualifications, it was understandable that he had a veto over the majlis. In other words, *ijtihād* was to be very limited and could only be done by a qualified Muslim scholar.

While Natsir, like other modernists, strongly encouraged *ijtihād*, he did not mention any specific qualifications for a *mujtahid*. Presumably, Natsir shared the belief of his contemporary, Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy (d.1982), an expert of Islamic law in Indonesia and a member of Masyumi, who was of the view that *ijtihād* in the modern time could be done collectively by an institution, which he called, *ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaqd* (people who loose and bind or the elites), consisting of not only experts in Islamic law, but also scholars from various disciplines. Similarly Iqbāl also suggested that *ijtihād*, which he called the principle of movement, could be undertaken collectively in a parliamentary institution. In addition, one of prominent Pakistani modernists considered it "obviously the only place where discussion can take place in connection with the reinterpretation and reorientation of the *sharīʿa* is the Legislature ...The supreme representatives of the people."[31]

(v) The Head of State: While it was true that Mawdūdī would prefer to call the head of an Islamic state an *amīr* or a *khalīfa*, he, however, like Natsir, did not object to

---

[29]Muhammad S. El-Awa, *On the Political System of the Islamic State* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1980), p.90.

[30]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955, 10th ed., 1990), pp.77-78.

[31]I.H. Qureshi cited in Said Amir Arjomand, "Religion and Constitutionalism in Western History and in Modern Iran and Pakistan," in Said Amir Arjomand, ed. *The Political Dimensions of Religion* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), p.87.

whatever title would actually be used by the head of state, be it *amīr*, *amīr al-mu'minīn*, *khalīfa, imām*, or president. In Natsir' words, it was not a *conditio sine quanon*. Their main concern was that the head of state should be able to guarantee that Islamic law could operate in society in order to maintain general welfare and salvation. In Kahin's words, "Given the nature of Islam, Natsir holds that its proper application in politics is to emphasize egalitarianism and social justice."[32]

The head of state should meet certain conditions to be elected. Both agreed that his religion, character, behavior, and ability to run state affairs justly should be among the main considerations. As far as the qualifications of the head of state were concerned, however, Mawdūdī and Natsir were not in agreement with Rashīd Riḍā. Riḍā considered that Qurayshite descent to be one of the requirements of a head of state. Presumably, instead of following the *ḥadīth*, cited by Riḍā, "This matter [the right for the caliphate] is always with the Qurayshite tribe so long as there remain two people,"[33] they cited Qur'ānic verse (49:13) "The most respectable among you in the sight of Allah is he who is the most faithful."[34] This implied that whoever met this qualification, in addition to the above-mentioned conditions, could be elected as head of state.

Neither Mawdūdī nor Natsir clearly explained the method of electing head of state and asserted that it was entrusted to the people to choose the best and most suitable method, which was in line with the spirit of Islam and the principle of justice. It should be noted here that while Mawdūdī strongly rejected the candidate who promoted his own election, Natsir did not explicitly express his views on this matter. Similarly, Natsir did not discuss whether a woman could be elected as the head of state.

---

[32]Kahin, "Mohammad Natsir." p.332.

[33]Cited in Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State," p.69.

[34]Sayyid Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī, *Political Theory of Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960. 7th ed., 1985), p.40.

C.2. The Differences

After observing overlappings in the thought of Mawdūdī and Natsir, we can now allude to the differences found in their concepts of the Islamic state. There are, at least, four areas in which both scholars disagreed: the form of state; nationalism; the political party system; and citizenship in an Islamic state.

(i) **Form of State** : Unlike their contemporaries from Egypt such as Sayyid Quṭb and Ahmad Hudaibi, who considered that the form of Islamic state was not important,[35] Mawdūdī and Natsir believed that the form of an Islamic state was very important. Both of them rejected the monarchical system because it did not reflect the spirit of Islam, and was the antithesis of 'popular sovereignty' and 'popular caliphate'. Mawdūdī and Natsir, however, had different opinions as to what form of state was the most suitable in modern times. Following Mawdūdī's belief that Islamic political theory should be based on the principles of *tawhīd*, *risalāt*, and *khilafāt*, the form of Islamic state should be "a caliphate under the sovereignty of God."[36] This is because, like other fundamentalists, Mawdūdī believed that the form of government of the first four rightly-guided caliphs was the best model that should be followed in almost all their respects. In contrast, although Natsir regarded the government of those caliphs as undoubtedly sound, he did not think that we should imitate every single aspect of it, but rather stay with main principles. Henceforth, he was of the view that Islamic states should take republican form. In an Indonesian context, he said what he wanted was a democratic Republic of Indonesia based on Islam. A similar tone was echoed by Iqbāl, the modernist spiritual founder of Pakistan, who felt that a "Republican form of Government, is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become necessary in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam."[37] In other words, instead of a caliphate system which would include

---

[35]Cf. Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tatanegara*, p.156.

[36]Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, *Human Rights in Islam* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1976, 4th ed., 1990), p.10.

all Muslims, Natsir, realized that, at least at present, the nation-state was a must. In the words of Iqbāl, "[for] the present time every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of Republics."[38]

(ii) **Nationalism** : Since Mawdūdī was of the view that an Islamic state recognized no boundaries, he strongly rejected the idea of nationalism as contradicting the very nature of Islamic teachings, which encouraged universal brotherhood or pan-Islamism rather than territorial-nationalism. This attitude was demonstrated in his sharp criticism of the Indian National Congress and the Jamā'at-i 'ulamā' Hind for their composite-nationalism.[39] The same criticism was also directed later on at the Muslim League who endeavored to create a separate state for Muslims based on Muslims nationalism. Henceforth, he endorsed neither composite-nationalist India nor the Pakistan movement. Natsir, on the other hand, supported the idea of nationalism by using terms such as Muslim nationalism to denote Muslims who struggled for the country independence. He himself was directly or indirectly involved in the struggle for independence by joining the PII. He affirmed that one could become a devout Muslim and at the same time sing the national anthem, Indonesia Tanah Airku [Indonesia is my country]. To Natsir, nationality was a natural reality and national territorial boundaries were an important dimensions of a modern state.[40]

Mawdūdī's feared that nationalism, especially extreme nationalism, would become a new religion which would rival Islam. The kind of nationalism Mawdūdī was afraid of is aptly illustrated by Hayes that for nationalism its God is fatherland; its has its own

[37]Muḥammad Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986), p.125.

[38]*Ibid.*, p.126.

[39]Cf. Aziz Ahmad, "Mawdudi and Orthodox Fundamentalism in Pakistan," in *The Middle East Journal* Vol.21, No.3 (Summer 1967), p.373.

[40]Cf. Mohammad Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Bandung: Pimpinan Fraksi Masjumi, 1957), p.7.

missionaries, and it gets converts, its salvation or the ideal of immortality is the independence of the nation state, its object of worship is the flag, its ceremonies and pilgrimage are processions, parades and honors of the dead, its theology is its constitution, and its commandments are the Declaration of Rights.[41] However, when the nation-state of Pakistan became a reality, Mawdūdī accepted the fact and chose Pakistan as his homeland, instead of India. Since then his condemnation of nationalism has lessened, if not totally disappeared.

Like Mawdūdī, Natsir also realized that the idea of nationalism which was derived from eighteenth and nineteenth century German philosophical thought, not French thought as generally believed,[42] was not free from defect. Therefore, he warned his people that they should feel proud to be Indonesians, but they should not go as far as to be narrow chauvinists, which might lead towards fascism and totalitarianism.[43] Following his respected mentor, Ahmad Hassan, Natsir did not reject nationalism, but he emphasized that Islam should always be the most important factor in being a Muslim.

Though Natsir accepted nationalism early, he did not loose his feeling of being a part of the Muslim *umma*. Thus, he kept alight the spirit of pan-Islamism kindled by Jamāl Afghāni several decades earlier. This fact, according to Inamullah Khān, could be seen in Natsir's activities throughout his life, especially after the fifties. He said that through the Muᶜtamar al-ᶜĀlam al-Islāmī and the Rabiṭa al-ᶜĀlam al-Islāmī, Natsir was doing great and continuous service for world Muslim unity and solidarity.[44] Meanwhile, though

---

[41]Cited in Ilyas Ahmad, *Sovereignty: Islamic and Modern* (Karachi: The Allies Book Corporation, 1965), p.434, and Cf. Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960).

[42]See Louay Safi, "Nationalism and the Multinational State," in *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences.* Vol.9, No.3 (Fall 1992), pp.338-350.

[43]Cited in Lukman Hakim, "Tiga Menguak Kebangsaan," in *Media Dakwah* (July 1994), p.47.

[44]Inamullah Khan, "Dr. Mohammad Natsir." in Puar, ed. *Muhammad Natsir*, pp.344 and 351

Mawdūdī rejected any kind of nationalism and, therefore, his ultimate aim was the establishment of a universal Islamic order and state,[45] he was more preoccupied by the political affairs of his own homeland than those of the Muslim world in general.[46]

(iii) **Political Parties:** Mawdūdī and Natsir disagreed over the idea of the party system in an Islamic state. In line with his monolithic concept of the Muslim community, as well as his understanding of Muslims not as a nation but as a party, Mawdūdī believed that the Islamic state should be a one party system, the party of government. This was because, according to him, "Muslims themselves are a party without economic, political, social or regional differences."[47] If there had to be many political parties, however, the representatives, who were elected as the members of parliament, should cease to represent their respective parties. They should work for the government not on behalf of their parties but on behalf of the head of state. Because of this conception coupled with an insistence on divine sovereignty, therefore, Ahmed concluded that Mawdūdī's Islamic state was a device to give religious cover to what might otherwise appear to be the arbitrary and tyrannical acts of the ruling hierarchy.[48]

On the contrary, Natsir believed that human society was heterogeneous even within Muslim society itself, like in Indonesia. Based on this reality, Natsir had the view that an ideal state should be based on the multiparty system. In line with his insistence on democracy, he said that in order to maintain and preserve the government in the democratic path, political parties were unquestionably needed. He reasoned, as long as there was freedom to establish parties, there would be democracy. Reversely, if there was only

---

[45]Cf. Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), p.276.

[46]Cf. Bannerman, *Islam in Perspective*, p.124.

[47]Zafaryab Ahmed, "Mawdūdī's Islamic State," in Mohammad Asghar Khan, ed. *The Pakistan Experience: State and Religion* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985), p.110.

[48]Ahmed, "Mawdūdī's," pp.110-111.

one government political party, democracy was not guaranteed.[49] However, though he emphasized the multiparty system, he reminded these parties that they should uphold ethics and fairness, and at the same time, wholeheartedly carry out their voters' political aspirations.

(iv) **Citizenship** : Mawdūdī and Natsir disagreed on the classification of citizenship in an Islamic state. Mawdūdī still believed that the citizens of an Islamic state consisted of Muslims and *dhimmīs*. Though both groups were guaranteed the same facilities by the Islamic government, the *dhimmīs* were politically excluded from key governmental posts. In addition, in Mawdūdī's view, following the medieval jurists, they still should pay *jizya*. Regarding this, Ali Engineer emphasizes that:

> It is undoubtedly true that the classical Islam does not give *dhimmīs* (non-Muslim protected communities) the governing rights and while guaranteeing them security of life and property, does not permit them to become an integral part of the ruling class. The Mauwlana wants to uncompromisingly follow this provision for the non-Muslim communities in his modern Islamic state also. Mawlana Mawdūdī...is votary of medieval Islam and hardly approves of any creative interpretation of its provisions in keeping with the modern condition and hence, in this matter too, is not prepared to understand the provision for *dhimmīs* in the light of the then historical situation.[50]

On the contrary, in spite of Natsir's statement that Islam was an ideology, he did not mention explicitly whether it were only Muslims who had the right of full citizenship in an Islamic state. However, from his statements and actions, it could be inferred that Natsir would likely consider all citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims, and men and women, as being socially and politically equal. For instance, when he was a prime minister in the early fifties, Natsir appointed several non-Muslims as ministers in his cabinet such as M. A.Pellaupessy, Dr. Johannes Leimena, F. S. Haryadi, and Mr. Assaat.[51] As for why he

---

[49]Cf. Puar, ed., *Muhammad Natsir*, p.207.

[50]Asghar Ali Engineer, *Theory and Practice of the Islamic State* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985), p.146; and idem, *The Islamic State* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980), p.146.

[51]Cf. Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, 3rd ed., 1968), p.150.

did not include any woman in his cabinet was probably because there were no qualified woman candidates at that time. In the entire history of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, from 1945 to 1959, there were only two women who were appointed to the ministerial post in cabinets, Maria Ulfah S. and Eni Karim. In addition, based on the Masyumi document, Ihza remarked that "following the principles that all citizens have equal position, the constitution draft of Indonesia (Islamic) republic does not touch about *jizya* as it is known in the formulations of classical and medieval *fiqh*." He added, "Regulations concerning *jizya* are considered not suitable anymore for present time."[52]

It should also be noted that while most of Mawdūdī's proposed components of an Islamic state such as the sovereignty of God, Islam as the state religion, that the head of state should be a Muslim, and that Qadianis should be declared as non-Muslims were substantially and gradually incorporated in the constitutions of Pakistan, Natsir's idea that Islam should be taken as the basis of state of the Republic of Indonesia, was not supported by enough voters in the constituent assembly. Moreover, the debate in the assembly was deadlocked and ended with the assembly's dissolution. After that Natsir did not further develop his idea of an Islamic state. Unlike Natsir, after the passing of 1956 constitution, Mawdūdī still continued writing on politics in Islam. In addition, Mawdūdī never occupied any governmental or political post in Pakistan and hence, he could, to certain extent, maintain his rigid principles. Indeed, when Indonesia proclaimed its independence, Natsir did not discuss the concept of an Islamic state until 1957 when he presented his ideas to the constituent assembly. Probably, Natsir saw in Pakistan a hope that it would be the best model of an Islamic state in the modern world. In Burns' words : "For Natsir, Pakistan was to be a test case. The role of the Pakistani people was to show the relevance and sufficiency of the Islamic faith in the twentieth century."[53]

---

[52]Ihza, "Modenisme dan Fundamentalisme," p.391.

[53]Peter Burns, *Revelation and Revolution: Natsir and the Panca Sila* (Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981), p.21.

So far similarities and differences in the views of Mawdūdī and Natsir have been discussed, however, there are several points upon which Natsir kept quiet and did not explicitly express his views as Mawdūdī did. These include the distribution of state power among the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, as well as the function of these branches.

Our discussion above shows that in regards to the general principles of an Islamic state, Mawdūdī and Natsir agreed on more points than they differed. The major difference was that while Natsir considered the doctrine of Islam on statehood to be open to *ijtihād* and, thus, not always binding, Mawdūdī believed that, "only by following literally the precepts of the Qur'ān, as amplified by the Sunna, the practices of the first four caliphs, and guided by the rulings of great jurists, could an Islamic state be build up."[54]

Our study also shows that it was Natsir who was presumably influenced by Mawdūdī. Natsir, for instance, employed several terms which were very close to those used by Mawdūdī. While Mawdūdī had developed terms such as divine sovereignty, theo-democracy, and *lā diniyya* (secularism) in pre-partition India, Natsir did not utilize ideas such as Kedaulatan Tuhan (divine sovereignty), Teistik Demokrasi (theistic-democracy), and Sekulerisme (*lā diniyya*) until 1957, after his meeting with Mawdūdī. Though Mawdūdī never visited Indonesia, he met Natsir for the first time at Islamic Cultural Center, Lahore, in 1952. At that time, Natsir came to Pakistan because he was invited to deliver a speech at the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs, a research institution headed by then foreign minister, Muḥammad Zafrullah Khan. In addition, four years latter, in 1956, both scholars met again in Syria attending the international conference of the Rabiṭa al-ᶜĀlam al-Islāmī, where Natsir acted as the chairman of one of the meetings at the conference and Mawdūdī was the vice-chairman.[55]

---

[54]Cited in Freeland Abbott, *Islam and Pakistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p.182.

[55]See: Puar, ed. *Muhammad Natsir*, pp.133 and 139.

Regarding his own opinion about Mawdūdī, Natsir considered him "a Pakistani scholar who is not so philosophical as Iqbāl and is more operational." He added, "He is not yet influential in Indonesia but is so in the Middle East and to some extent in Turkey."[56]

---

[56]George McTurnan Kahin's Interview with Mohammad Natsir in Jakarta on February 24, 1971.

CONCLUSION

From the statements of not only their respective disciples, admirers, and contemporaries, but also of some leading non-Muslim scholars, Mawdūdī and Natsir could be identified as great scholars of Islam in this century, at least in their respective countries. They earned this recognition not only through his writings but also by their other activities during their life times. The King ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz Award, for example, could be used as a gauge of the international recognition of their contributions to Islam and the Muslim world. Both scholars received the award in 1979 and 1980, respectively. In addition, Natsir received two doctorates of honoris causa from two universities in Malaysia. Both of them were men of principles, who were imprisoned for their beliefs.

Mawdūdī and Natsir had different backgrounds in education, although both of them taught themselves many Islamic sciences and other subjects; Mawdūdī was educated at home and later at a traditional religious school, where he studied such subjects as *fiqh, ḥadīth, tafsīr,* and Persian, whereas Natsir was educated in the Western system of education; he studied Islam intensively under A. Hassan. These educational backgrounds undoubtedly influenced their later worldviews. Whereas Mawdūdī was later known as a fundamentalist, Natsir was closely associated with modernist groups.

Mawdūdī's works on Islam far surpass those of Natsir in both number and the scope of subjects matters covered. Mawdūdī wrote no less than one hundred and twenty monographs, while Natsir wrote no more than half as many. The writings of both scholars touched upon almost all aspects of Islam, although Natsir did not write on *tafsīr* . Their magnum opuses were *Tafhīm al-Qurᵓān* and *Capita Selecta,* respectively. A similar picture is reflected in their works on politics. Except for his *tafsīr,* most of Mawdūdī's writings were directly or indirectly related to and colored by politics, whereas Natsir's writings touched upon politics to a much lesser extent.

Despite these variations, they had similar concerns about their respective societies and about the Muslim world in general. Both believed that the raison d'être for human existence in this world was to worship God. Since they interpreted 'worship' to encompass a whole range of human activities beyond the performance of prayer, fasting, *hajj*, and the payment of *zakāt* ; they were of the view that all these things could be realized through an ideal system of statehood.

Henceforth, they saw the state as no more than an absolute instrument to guarantee that the true way of worshipping God would prevail in the life of society. They wished to see Islamic law operate in the individual as well as in collective life. They were convinced that by doing so, Muslims could achieve glory not only in this world but also salvation in the next world. In the often-quoted verse by Natsir, the state was to achieve *baldatun tayyibatun wa rabbun ghafūr* (a territory fair and happy a Lord Oft-Forgiving) (34:15). Both Mawdūdī and Natsir did not see any possibility of separation between religion and state affairs.

Following this line of argument, they felt that their countries should be freed from all foreign domination. Mawdūdī wanted to liberate his country not only from the British but also from other infidel domination by Islamizing the whole of India through a gradual downward revolution. He refused to join any nationalist movements - Muslim nationalism or composite-nationalism. Thus, Mawdūdī did not join the Pakistan movement. On the contrary, since Natsir was eager to see Indonesia freed from the Dutch, he supported the national movement for independence by joining, among other things, Partai Islam Indonesia. Although he objected to religiously neutral nationalism, Natsir employed terms such as *Kebangsaan Muslim* (Muslim nationalism). When their countries gained independence, Natsir served his government as a member of parliament, a minister, and eventually even as prime minister, whereas Mawdūdī remained on the outside and never occupied any political or government post.

As far as their views on statehood were concerned, Mawdūdī conceived the idea of an Islamic state as early as 1927 when he wrote *al-Jihād fī al-Islām*. This idea was then

developed and elaborated upon quite extensively in his following works, the latest of which, *Human Rights in Islam*, was written in 1975. Natsir expressed his idea of statehood in the late thirties and did not elaborate upon it further until the mid-fifties.

As they had rather different approaches in understanding Islamic doctrines, their concept of an Islamic state could not be identical. Undeniably, they shared many views on general principles but differed over details. While Mawdūdī's concepts and attitudes were likely too ideal, rigid, and non-compromising, Natsir's were more realistic, flexible, and compromising.

As for their similarities, Mawdūdī and Natsir were of the view that God is the source of sovereignty for an Islamic state and, thus, it is God's law that should be the basis of state law. This kind of state, they respectively called theo-democracy and theistic-democracy. A democratic state, they felt, should follow and apply the principle of *shūrā*. The head of state, whether titled *amīr, amīr al-mu'minīn, imām, khalīfa*, or president, should consult with parliament before making decisions related to the general public interest.

Mawdūdī and Natsir differed over the form of an Islamic state. While Mawdūdī was of the conviction that an ideal Islamic state should be a democratic caliphate based on Divine Sovereignty, Natsir, like other modernists such as Afghānī, ʿAbduh, and Iqbāl, believed that an Islamic state should be a republic.

Their forms of governments, therefore, determined who should hold citizenship. For Mawdūdī, the Qur'ānic term of *khalīfa* was to be confined to Muslims only. Thus, since it was an ideological state, citizens of an Islamic state were to be divided into Muslims and non-Muslim (*dhimmī*) categories. On the contrary, Natsir felt that, regardless of their religions, all the citizens of an Islamic state should be considered socially and politically equal. Thus, he did not employ the terms of *dhimmī* or *jizya*. Presumably, he considered Mawdūdī's division to be inappropriate to modern times, especially in the Indonesian context. Seeing society as homogenous rather than heterogeneous, Mawdūdī further believed that a one-party system, the party of government, was the best model to maintain the Islamic state and

preserve the principle of *shūrā*. On the contrary, Natsir was of the view that a one-party system could lead to dictatorship. Therefore, he urged a multiparty system through which the heterogeneous society could forward their interests, be they political, social, or religious.[1]

Mawdūdī and Natsir had played quite different roles in the constitution making of their respective countries. Though Mawdūdī was not a member of the constituent assembly, he put outside pressure on the assembly to reconstruct the Pakistani constitution in line with the Islamic state. And he succeeded, as most of his demands were substantially incorporated in the constitution, especially the 1956 Constitution. Natsir also recognized that Mawdūdī's "major contribution [to his country] was in framing of the first Pakistan constitution, providing for an Islamic state."[2] On the contrary, though Natsir was a member of the constituent assembly, his idea of Islam as the basis of the state did not get the necessary votes. He was ready to compromise with the religiously neutral nationalist but he failed because of the assembly's dissolution. Concerning this fact, Kahin comments that:

> As to Natsir's part in the work of the Constituent assembly, it seems to me that he accomplished more than has generally been acknowledged. In the face of an initially strong suspicion by the non-Muslim parties, Natsir, ...and other progressive Masjumi leaders ultimately went a long way in adapting party's position to the realities of political representation in the Assembly. Towards the end, it looked as if enough common ground was being discovered to provide a fairly good basis for the final compromise that could have produced a constitution suited to Indonesia's social and political circumstances. If Sukarno had not so abruptly ended the Assembly's life, I believe that there was a reasonably good chance of achieving the necessary agreement among two-third of its membership.[3]

Furthermore, throughout the political history of their respective countries, Mawdūdī and Natsir, as well as their political parties, played different roles. As Ahmad remarks, "*unlike the conservative ulama and the modernists, the fundamentalist movements are*

---

[1]Today there are only three recognized political parties in Indonesia Golkar (acronym of Golongan Karya, a government party), PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan - United Development Party), and PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Indonesia Democratic Party).

[2]George McTurnan Kahin's Interview with Mohammad Natsir on February 27, 1971, in Jakarta.

[3]George McTurnan Kahin, "Mohammad Natsir," in Yusuf Abdullah Puar, ed. *Muhammad Natsir 70 Tahun: Kenang-kenangan, Kehidupan dan Perjuangan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978), pp.334-335.

primarily political rather than religio-intellectual movements"[4] (italics in original). In light of this, it is understandable that Mawdūdī was very interested in establishing an Islamic state in the modern world. In other words, politics were central to his thought.[5]

However, while it is true that Mawdūdī and the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī added concerns for Islamic ideals to the Pakistan's political discourse, Mawdūdī in his quest for ideological purity, tended to disregard several major realistic considerations such as nationhood, heterogeneity of the society, economic problems, and popular support. Consequently, as Nasr puts it, "the party's success in the intellectual and ideological domains found no reflection in politics. It has influenced politics but has failed to control them."[6] Moreover, while it is true that the Jamāʿat was for some time involved in a coalition government under Zia-ul Haq, Mawdūdī was never involved in any governmental structure of Pakistan so as to settle real problems faced by the Pakistani government, be they political, economic or religious. This position, therefore, allowed Mawdūdī preserve his rigid principles and uncompromising stance regarding an Islamic state. In other words, as far as the idea of an Islamic state was concerned, it can be said that the political milieu of Pakistan had little impact in shaping Mawdūdī's thought.

Unlike Mawdūdī, Natsir was politically active, especially in the first of three phases of political history of post-independence Indonesia; parliamentary democracy (1949-1957), guided democracy (1957-1966), and the military-dominated New Order (1966-).[7] During

---

[4]Mumtaz Ahmad, "The Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī and the Tablighī Jamāʿat of South Asia," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. *Fundamentalism Observed*, Vol.I. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, 2nd ed., 1994), p.463.

[5]Maryam Jameelah, "An Appraisal of Some Aspects of Mawlana Sayyid Aʿlā Mawdūdī's Life and Thought," in *Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI, No.2. (1987), p.126.

[6]Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1994), p.219. A similar view is held by Farhat Haq that the Jamāʿat "has been successful in capturing ideological hegemony in Pakistan but has failed to seize political power." Farhat Haq, "Islamic Reformism and the State: The Case of the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī of Pakistan." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1988), p.2.

this first phase, Natsir served as a parliamentary member, representing Masyumi, and for some time he also served as the prime minister of the Republic of Indonesia. He was even involved in the government earlier when he was appointed as the minister of information during the revolution years (1945-1949). This position, coupled with his belief that Islam "cannot be discerned *rigidly* and *literally*, but should be comprehended *elastically* and *flexibly* "[8] (words in italics are original), made Natsir a more realistic and pragmatic 'statesman' who, at the same time, upheld ethics highly. In other words, it seems that Natsir's political thought was deeply influenced by day-to-day political problems facing the Indonesian's government and peoples.

However, apart from the different political conditions and positions that influenced them, in conclusion, we can say, in opposition to Enayat and Federspiel,[9] that neither Mawdūdī nor Natsir formulated and proposed a comprehensive state system. In other words, we concur with Maarif that neither in Indonesia and Pakistan nor in any other Muslim country has any scholar of Islam written a universally comprehensive, systematic and applicable work on politics in Islam in modern times.[10]

---

[7]For a general discussion on the phases of Indonesian political history, see Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," in Mohammed Ayoob, ed. *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp.190-207, and R. William Liddle, "Participation and the Political Parties," in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, eds. *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp.171-195.

[8]Yusril Ihza, "Combination of Activism and Intellectualism: the Biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)," in *Studia Islamika.* Vol. 2, No.1. (1995), p.132.

[9]Enayat states that Mawdūdī's "religious and political teachings thus offer the most comprehensive exposition so far of the nature of an Islamic state." Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 2nd ed., 1988), p142, and Federspiel writes that "...of all the leading Persis writers, Natsir was the only one who attempted a full exposition of the concept of an Islamic state." Howard M. Federspiel, *Parsatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p.191.

[10]Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago, Illinois, 1983), pp.194 and 313; and idem, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985, 2nd ed., 1987), pp.125 and 203.

GLOSSARY, ABBREVIATIONS,
AND IMPORTANT ORGANIZATIONS

abangan (Indonesian, from Javanese) = nominal Muslim.

ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaqd (Arabic) = people who loose and bind, electors, or the elite.

AIML = All-India Muslim League, which was later on changed to the Muslim League of Pakistan, was founded in 1906.

al-Irsyad (Indonesian, from Arabic) = guidance; the name of an Islamic reform movement founded by Ahmad Surkati in Jakarta in 1913.

al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala (Arabic) = general ineterest of community.

amana (Indonesian from Arabic) = trusteeship.

amar maʾrūf nahy munkar (Arabic) = enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong or the evil.

AMS = Algemene Middelbar School (General Senior High School).

ʿarḍ (Arabic) = form.

ʿaṣabiyya (Arabic) = kinship and tribal ties.

Ayub Khan = the president of Pakistan (1958-1969).

baldatun ṭayyibatun wa rabbun ghafūr (Arabic, from a Qurʾānic verse) = a territory fair and happy, and a Lord Oft-Forgiving.

Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Indonesian, from Old Javanese) = "Unity in Diversity", Indonesian national motto.

BPUPKI = (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia - Investigatory Body for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence). It was set up by the Japanese in March 1945.

Budi Utomo = (Noble Enedavor), founded on 20 May 1908.

CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency.

dār al-Islām (Arabic) = 'The Household of Submission,' meaning the territories governed by Muslims under the *sharīʿa*; the term opposite is *dār al-Ḥarb*, 'The House of Warfare,' those lands lacking the security and guidance of God's law.

dawla (Arabic) = state or government.

dawla Islāmiyya (Arabic) = an Islamic state

dawla ḥukūmīyya (Arabic) = an Islamic state/government

daʿwa (Arabic) = to call to Islam; religious missionary activities.

Demokrasi Terpimpin = (Guided Democracy), general term for the years 1957-1966, in which Indonesia was dominated politically by Sukarno.

DEPAG RI = Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia (Department of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia).

dhimmī (Arabic) = Non-Muslims whose religion is tolerated by Islam; they are protected under Muslim law and must submit a poll tax to Muslim government.

dīn (Arabic) = Literally, religion; used by Mawdūdī to mean true faith, unwavering adherence to religious law.

fatwā (Arabic) = an opinion on a point of law made by an *ʿālim* or a *muftī* (legal scholar) or a *qāḍī* (judge).

fiṭra (Arabic) = The original framework or nature of humans as created by God, considered good.

fundamentalism = A term originally applied to conservative Protestant Christians, but more recently applied to religiously conservative Muslims who interpret their Scriptures literally and rigidly and who favor a strict adherence to their doctrines and practices.

fiqh (Arabic) = Islamic jurisprudence

GAPI = Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Indonesian Political Federation), founded in May 1937.

Gestapu = Gerakan September tiga puluh (September 30th movement), reffered to a failed coup d'état by PKI in 1965.

GOLKAR = (acronym of Golongan Karya, a government party), founded in 1966.

ḥadd, pl. *ḥudūd* (Arabic) = boundaries, the punishment prescribed by the Qurʾān or *sunna* for crimes.

HIKS = Hollands-Inlandsche Kweek School (Dutch-Native Teacher's Training College).

HIS = Hollands Inlandsche School (General Elementary School)

ḥukūmat-i ilāhiyyat (Urdū) = Divine government.

ibāda (Arabic) = Worship.

ijmāʾ (Arabic) = Consensus.

ijtihād (Arabic) = Intellectual effort of Muslim jurists to reach independent religio-legal decisions, a key feature of modern Islamic reform; one who exercises *ijtihād* is a *mujtahid.*

imām (Arabic, Urdu) = literally, a leader of prayer or a head of state or a founder of the school of law.

INC = India National Congress was founded in 1885.

istidbād (Arabic) = tyrany.

istiḥsān (Arabic) = the prinsciple of desirability.

Jamāʿat-i Islāmī (Urdū) = Muslim Society, founded in 1941 by Mawdūdī.

Jamʿiyat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Islām = The Association of the Islamic Scholars was founded in 1945 by Shabir Ahmad Usmani (1885-1949).

jawhar (Arabic) = matter.

JIB = Jong Islamieten Bond (Islamic youth association).

jihād (Arabic) = exercition in the work of God, including, sometimes, armed force.

jizya (Arabic) = poll tax, see *dhimmī* above.

kāfir (Arabic) = literally 'reject'; used in Muslim theology and law to define the unbeliever.

kalām (Arabic) = theology

khalīfa (Arabic) = literally means the sucessor of Muḥammad, the head of state.

khurafat (Indonesian, from Arabic) = superstition.

KNIP = Komite Nasional Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee).

majlis-i ʿāmila (Urdū) = excutive council.

M. A. O. College = Muhammadan Anglo - Oriental College, founded by Ahmad Khan in 1878.

Masyumi = Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Legislative Council).

maulvī (Urdū, from Arabic) = a learned man, a graduate in theology.

MIAI = Majlis al-Islām Aʿla al-Indūnisī, a federation of Islamic organization in Indonesia which was founded in Surabaya in 1937.

modernism or Islamic modernist = Islamic modernits advocate flexible, continuous reinterpretation of Islam so that Muslim may develop institutions of education, law,

and politics suitable to modern condition. This movement was started in the late nineteenthcentury.

Mohammad Hatta (1902-1980) = the first vice president of Indonesia (1945-1958).

Muhammad Ali Jinnah (d.1948) = the fisrt president of Pakistan (1947-1948).

Muhammad Zia-ul Haq (1914-1988) = the president of Pakistan (1977-1988).

Muhammadiyah = (Followers of Muhammad), Muslim modernist organization founded in 1912 by K.H. Ahmad Dhlan (1868-1933).

MULO = Meer Uitgbreid Lager Onderwijs (Junior High School).

muʿāmala (Arabic) = mundane affairs.

NU = Nahdatul 'Ulama (Revival of Religious Scholars), founded in Surabaya in 1926 by K.H. Hasyim As'ari (1871-1947) to resist the rise of modernism in Indonesia.

nahḍa (Arabic) = renaissance.

naṣṣ (Arabic) = literally a text; an explicit provision of the Qurʾān or the Traditions.

niẓām (Urdū, from Arabic) = system.

Pancasila (Indonesian, from Sanskrit) = Five Principles or Pillars.

PARKINDO = Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party) founded in 1945.

PARMUSI = (Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party) founded on 20 Febryary 1968.

PDI = Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party) founded in 1973 by a government-enforced merger of the PNI, Paratai Katolik, PARKINDO, Murba and IPKI.

PERSIS = Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union), modenist Muslim organization founded in Bandung in 1923.

PERTI = Persatuan Tabiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Education Association), founded in West Sumatra in 1930.

PII = Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party).

PKI = Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).

PNA = Pakistan National Alliance was founded in January 1977 to face the Pakistan People Party, founded in 1966.

PNI = Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian nationalist Party), founded in 1945.

PPKI = Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee of Indonesian Independence).

PPP = Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development United Party), founded on 5 January 1973 as a forced merger of the four Muslim parties, Parmusi, Perti, NU, and PSII.

PRRI = Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), founded in 1958.

PSII = Parti Serikat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Association Party of Indonesia), founded in 1913 by H.U. S. Cokroaminoto and H. Agus salim.

purdah (Urdū) = the term applied to the system of seclusion of Muslim women in India and Pakistan.

qayyim (Urdū, from Arabic) = secretary general.

Quraysh (Arabic) = The leading Meccan tribe to which the Prophet belonged.

qiyās (Arabic) = argument by analogy.

ribā (Arabic) = usury, which baned by Islam.

ṣaliḥ qiyādat (Urdū) = Virtuous leadership; the Jamāʿat's term for the kind of leadership it hopes to bring power.

santri (Indonesian, from Javanese) = devout or pious Muslim.

shahāda (Arabic, Urdū) = Muslim testimony of faith: "There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah."

shirk (Arabic) = lit. 'association', association of something with God. other than God Himself and is considered a fundamental error at the root of all sins or transgression.

shūrā (Arabic, Urdū) = the principle of democratic participation; consultation.

Suharto = the present president of Indonesia. (1966-   )

Sukarno (d.1971) = the first president of Indonesia (1945-1966).

sunna (Arabic) = Tradition; proper practice of Islam, following the example of the Prophet Muḥammad.

Sunnīs (Arabic) = The majority of Muslims, who believe that any good Muslim can be leader; they prefer to reach agreements by means of consensus and do not recognize special sacred wisdom in their leaders like Shīʿites do.

swarāj (Hindi) = Home rule; policy introduced by the Congress party in its struggle for independence.

ṣirāt al-nabī (Arabic, Urdū) = the path of the Prophet.

tafsīr (Arabic) = a commentary on the Qur'ān.

tajdīd (Arabic) = Literally, renewal; refers to Muslim millenarian yearnings.

takhayyur (Arabaic) = The modernist process of selection from variant juristic opinions and interpretations.

talfīq (Arabaic) = literally, piecing together. The process in legal modernism of patching together or combining the views of differnet schools and jurists, or elements thereform, to form a single legal rule.

taqlīd (Arabic) = blind acceptance of tradition or thought.

tawḥīd (Arabic) = the unity of God.

ummat (Indonesian, from Arabic) = Community of Muslims.

ummatan wasaṭan (Arabic) = moderate community.

zakāt (Arabic) = A canonical tax, the payment of which is incumbent on all Muslims.

ẓulūm (Arabic, Urdū) = exploitation or oppression.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS:

Abbott, Freeland. *Islam and Pakistan.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968.

Ahmad, Ilyas. *Sovereignty: Islamic and Modern.* Karachi: The Allies Book Corporation, 1965.

Ahmad, Khurshid, and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, eds. *Islamic Perspective : Studies in Honor of Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī.* London : The Islamic Foundation, 1986.

Ahmad, Khurshid, and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, eds. *Mawdūdī : An Introduction to His Life and Thought.* London: The Islamic Foundation, 1986.

Ahmad, M. Aziz. *Iqbal and the Recent Exposition of Islamic Political Thought.* Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1950, 3rd ed., 1977.

Ahmad, Manzooruddin. *Islamic Political System in the Modern Age: Theory and Practice.* Karachi: Saad Publications, 1983.

Ahmad, Sayed Riaz. *Maulana Mawdūdī and the Islamic State.* Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1976.

Ahmad, Aziz, and G. E. Von Grunebaum, eds. *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan 1857-1968.* Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970.

Ahmed, Akbar S., and Hastings Donnan. *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity.* London: Routldege, 1994.

Ahmed, Ishtiaq. *The Concept of Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversies in Pakistan.* London: Frances Printer, 1987.

al-Fārūqī, Isma'īl Rajī. *Tawḥīd: Its Implication for Thought and Life.* Pensylvania: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982.

al-Fārūqī, Louis Lamyā'. *Women, Muslim Society and Islam.* Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, 1991.

al-Hatimi, Said Abdullah Seif. *Women in Islam.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1979, 3rd ed., 1990.

al-Ḥamīd, Maḥmūd 'Abs. *Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn.* al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Da'wah, 1978.

al-Ḥusaini, Isḥaq M. *The Muslim Brethren.* Beirut: Khayyat's College Book Co., 1956.

Ali, Abdallah Yusuf. *The Glorious Kur'an: Translation and Commentary.* Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.

Ali, Chaudhry Rahmat. *Pakistan the Fatherland of Pak Nation*. London: The Pak National Liberation Movement, 1947.

Ali, Tariq. *Can Pakistan Survive?*. New York: Penguin Books, 1983.

Anshari, Endang Saifuddin, and Syafiq A. Mughni, *A. Hasan Wajah dan Wijhah Seorang Mujtahid*. Bandung: Al-Muslimun, 1985.

Anshari, Saifuddin. *The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman's Agreement Between the Islamic and Secular Nationalist in Modern Indonesia* . Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1979.

Anshary, M. Isa. *Falsafah Perjuangan Islam*. Medan: Saiful, 1951.

Arjomand, Said Amir, ed. *The Political Dimensions of Religion*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.

Asad, Muhammad. *The Principles of State and Government in Islam*. Gibraltar: Dār al-Andalūs, 1961, 3rd. ed., 1980.

Aziz, K. K. *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*. Vol.III. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987.

Aziz, K. K. *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958*. Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976.

Bahadur, Kalim. *The Jamaᶜāt-i Islamī of Pakistan : Political Thought and Political Action*. New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977.

Baljon, J. M. S.*The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949.

Bannerman, Patrick. *Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics, and Law*. London: Routledge, 1988.

Barker, Ernest. *Principles of Social and Political Theory*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Baxter, Craig, et al., *Government and Politics in South Asia*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.

Benda, Harry J. *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958.

Binder, Leonard. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*. Berkeley: University of California, 1961.

Bracher, Karl Dietrich. *The Age of Ideologies: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*. Tr. by Ewald Osers. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984.

Brackman, Arnold C. *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969.

Burns, Peter. *Revelation and Revolution: Natsir and the Panca Sila.*. Townsville: Committee of South-East Asian Studies, James Cook University of North Queensland, Australia, 1981.

Callard, Keitn. *Pakistan: A Political Study*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1957.

Choudhury, G. W. *Constitution Development in Pakistan*. London: Longman Group, 1959, 2nd., 1969.

Choudhury, G. W. *Islam and the Contemporary World*. Illinois: Library of Islam, 1991.

Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates. Vol.V, No.5. Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1949.

Cribb, Robert. *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*. London: The Scarecrow Press, 1992.

Dahm, Bernhard. *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century*. London: Preager Publishers, 1971.

Daniel, M. N. *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*. Ediburgh: University Press, 1962.

Dar, Bashir Ahmad. *Religious Thought of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān*. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957, 2nd ed., 1961.

Datta, V. N. *Mawlana Azad*. New Delhi: Vanguard Books, 1990.

Dicjk, C. Van, *The Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam Movement in Indonesia*. The Hague: Martinos Nijhoff, 1981.

Dickerson, Mark O, et al., eds. *Introductory Readings in Government and Politics*. Toronto: Methuen, 2nd ed., 1987.

Douglas, Ian Henderson. *Abul Kalām Azād: An Intellectual and Religious Biography*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988.

El-Awa, Muḥammad S. *On the Political System of the Islamic State*. Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1980.

Enayat, Hamid. *Modern Islamic Thought*. Austin : University of Texas Press, 1982, 2nd ed., 1988.

Engineer, Asghar Ali. *Theory and Practice of the Islamic State*. Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985.

Esposito, John L. *Islam and Politics*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984, 4th ed., 1991.

Esposito, John L. *Islam: The Straight Path*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Esposito, John L. *The Islamic Threat : Myth or Reality?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Fārūqī, Miṣbaḥul Islām. *Introducing Mawdūdī*. Karachi: Students Publication Bureau, 1968.

Fārūqī, Miṣbaḥul Islām. *Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī Pakistan: Literature, Leadership, Organization, Ideal, Achievements, Programs*. Lahore: Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī Pakistan, 1957.

Federspiel, Howard M. *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1970.

Feith, Herbert. *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, 3rd. ed., 1968.

Feith, Herbert. *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*. Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1971.

Friedmann, Yohanan. *Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Aḥmadī Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background*. Berkeley: University of California, 1989.

Fundamental Principles of an Islamic State : Formulated at a Gathering of ᶜUlamāʾ of Various Muslim School of Thought. Karachi: Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī, n.d.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Religion of Java*. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960.

Gilani, Syed Asad. *Mawdūdī: Thought and Movement*. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984.

Hakiem, Lukman, ed. *Pemimpin Pulang*. Jakarta: Yayasan Piranti Ilmu, 1993.

Hakim, Khalifa Abdul. *Islamic Ideology*. Lahore: The Institute of Islamic Culture, 1951, 3rd. ed., 1965.

Ḥālī, Alṭāf Ḥusain. *Hayāt-i Jāvid: A Biographical Account of Sir Sayyid*. Translated by K. H. Qadiri and David J. Matthews. Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat, 1979.

Haq, Farhat. "Islamic Reformism and the State: The Case of the Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī of Pakistan." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1988).

Harvey, Barbara S. *Permesta: Half a Rebellion*. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1977.

Hasan, Masudul. *Sayyid Abul Aᶜlā Mawdūdī and His Thought*, Vol. I. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984.

Hasan, Masudul. *Sayyid Abul Aᶜlā Mawdūdī and His Thought*, Vol. II. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1986.

Hashemi, Abdul Hafeez. "Mawdūdī's Political Thought from 1933-1947 and Its Critics." (Unpublished MA thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1981).

Hassan, Ahmad. *Islam dan Kebangsaan*. Bangil: Lajnah Penerbit Pesantren Persis, 1984.

Hassan, Parveen Ferouz. *The Political Philosophy of Iqbāl*. Lahore: Publisher United, 1970.

Hayes, Carlton J. H. *Nationalism: A Religion*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960.

Hiro, Dilip. *Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism*. New York: Routledge, 1989.

Hussain, Asaf. *Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran*. London: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1983.

Ihza, Yusril. "Modenisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Suatu Kajian Perbadingan Kes Parti Masyumi di Indonesia dan Jamāʿat-i Islāmī di Pakistan 1940-1960." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1993).

Iqbāl, Muḥammad. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 2nd ed., 1989.

Jameelah, Maryam, ed. *Correspondence Between Maulana Mawdūdī and Maryam Jameelah*. Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan & Sons, 4th ed., 1986.

Jansen, Godfrey H. *Militant Islam*. London: Pan Books, 1979, 2nd ed., 1980.

Jones, Howard Palfrey. *Indonesia: The Possible Dream*. New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1971.

Kahin, George McTurnan. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 7th ed., 1966.

Khān, Qamaruddīn. *Political Concept in the Qurʾān*. Karachi : Institute of Islamic Studies, 1973.

Kurdi, Abdulrahman Abdulkadir. *The Islamic State: A Study Based on the Islamic Holy Constitution*. London: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1984.

Lambton, A. K. S. *State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Lapidus, Ira M. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 4th ed., 1993.

Lawrence, Bruce B. *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age*. San Francisco: Harper and Collins Publishers, 1989.

Legge, J.D. *Sukarno: A Political Biography*. New York: Preager Publishers, 1972.

Lippman, Thomas W. *Understanding Islam: An Introduction to the Muslim World*. New York: Mentor Book, 1982.

Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. "Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia." (Unpublished Ph.D.

dissertation, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago, Illinois, 1983).

Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. *Islam dan Politik di Indonesia.* Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 1988.

Mahmood, Safdar. *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development.* New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1990.

Malik, Hafeez. *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan.* Washington, D.C. : Public Affairs Pers, 1963.

Malik, Hafeez. *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Masjoemi: Partai Politik Oemat Islam. Yogyakarta: Pengurus Besar Partai Masjoemi, n.d.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam.* Translated by al-Ashʿari. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1963, 6th ed., 1986.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk.* Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1978.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Come Let Us Change This World.* Compiled by Kaukab Siddiqi. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1975, 3rd ed., 1988.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Comments and Amendments on Constitutional Bill.* Lahore: Jamāʿat-Islāmī Pakistan, 1956.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Ethical View Point in Islam.* Translated by Khurshid Ahmad. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966, 6th ed., 1988.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Evidence of Truth.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967, 4th ed., 1990.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Finality of Prophethood.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1975, 4th ed., 1981.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Four Basic Qurʾānic Terms.* Translated by Abu Asad Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1980.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Fundamentals of Islam.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1975, 8th ed., 1988.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Human Rights in Islam.* Islamic Foundation, 1976, 4th ed., 1990.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Islam and Ignorance.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976, 3rd ed., 1982.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Islam Today.* Karachi: Chiragh-e-Rah Publications, 1968.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Islamic Law and Constitution.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955, 10th. ed., 1990.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Islamic Law and Its Introduction in Pakistan.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955, 4th ed., 1983.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Jihad in Islam.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976, 5th ed., 1991.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Jihād fī al-Islām.* Lahore: n.p., 2n ed., 1946.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Let Us Be Muslim.* Tranlsated by Khurram Murad. London: Islamic Foundation, 1982, 3rd ed., 1992.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Mawdūdī on Education.* Translated and edited by S.M. Rauf. Karachi: Islamic Research Academy, 1988.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Musalmān awr Mawjūda Siyāsī Kashmakash.* 3 Vols. Lahore: n.p., 1938-1940.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Nationalism and India.* Pathankot: Maktāba-i Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, 2nd. ed., 1947.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Nations Rise and Fall - Why?.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976, 3rd ed., 1983.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Our Message.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1979.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Political Theory of Islam.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960, 7th ed., 1985.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Purdah and the Status of Woman in Islam.* Translated by al-Ashʿari. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1972, 12th ed., 1992.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Rights of Non-Muslims in Islamic State.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1961, 7th ed., 1982.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *System of Government under the Holy Prophet.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1978.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Economic Problem of Man and Its Islamic Solution.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1947, 8th ed., 1978.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Islamic Movement: Dynamics of Values, Power and Change.* Translated by Khurram Murad. London: Islamic Foundation, 1984, 2nd ed., 1991.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Islamic Way of Life.* Translated by Khurshid Aḥmad and Khurram Murad. London: Islamic Foundation, 1986, 3rd ed., 1992.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Islam*. Translated by Fazl Ahmed. Safat, Kuwait: Islamic Book Publishers, 1983.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Meaning of the Qurʾān*. Vol. XVI. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1988, 2nd ed., 1989.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Meaning of the Qurʾān*. Vol. I. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967, 7th ed., 1984.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Message of the Prophet's Seerat*. USA: The Message Publications, 1993.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Moral Foundation of Islamic Movement.*. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976, 4th ed., 1990.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Process of Islamic Revolution*. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1947, 9th ed., 1988.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Qadiani Problem*. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1979, 2nd ed., 1980.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Religion of Truth.*. Translated by Miṣbahul Faruqi Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967, 7th ed., 1989.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Road to Peace and Salvation*. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966, 3rd ed., 1973.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The Sick Nations of the Modern Age*. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966, 6th ed., 1979.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *The True Conduct of Life*. Translated by Syed Zainul Abidin. Delhi: Markazi Maktabā-i Jamāʿat-i Islāmī-i Hind, 1962.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Towards Understanding Islam*. Lahore: Islamic Teaching Center, 1960, 8th ed., 1988.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Unity of the Muslim World*. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967, 5th ed., 1982.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Witnesses Unto Mankind: The Purpose and the Duty of the Muslim Ummah*. Translated by Khurram Murad. London: Islamic Publication, 1986

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿlā. *Tugas dan Tanggungjawab Umat Islam di Hadapan Umat Dunia*. Translated by Ilzamudin Ma'mur. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1989, 2nd ed., 1991.

McDonough, Sheila. *Muslim Ethics and Modernity: A Comparataive Study of the Ethical Thought of Sayyid Aḥmād Khān and Mawlānā Mawdūdī*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984.

Mehdi, Rubya. *The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan*. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994.

Memisi, Fatima. *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society.* Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987.

Mitchell, Richard P. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers.* Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1963, 2nd ed., 1993).

Mochtarom, Zaini. *Santri dan Abangan di Jawa.* Jakarta: INIS, 1988.

Mortimer, Edward. *Faith and Power : The Politics of Islam.* London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1982.

Mossman, James. *Rebels in Paradise: Indonesia's Civil War.* London: Jonathan Cape, 1961.

Moussalli, Ahmad S. *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb.* Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992.

Nardholt, N. G. Schulte. *State-Citizen Relations in Suharto's Indonesia.* Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1987.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. "The Politics of an Islamic Movement: The Jamā'at-i Islāmī of Paksitan," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991).

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The Jamā'at-i Islāmī of Pakistan.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

Nasution, Adnan Buyung. *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959.* Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992.

Nasution, Harun. "The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for Its Creation and the Theory of the Masjumi." (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Motreal, 1965).

Natsir, Mohammad and Nasrun A.S., *Hidup Bahagia.* Bandung: Van Hoev, 1954.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Capita Selecta.* Vol. I. Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, 1954.

Natsir, Mohammad *Capita Selecta.* Vol. II. Jakarta: Pustaka Pendis, 1957.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Cultuur Islam .* Bandung: Pendidikan Islam, 1936.

Natsir, Mohammad. *De Islamitische Vrouw en her Recht.* Bandung: Persatuan Islam, 1934.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Het Islamitische Ideal.* Bandung: Persatuan Islam, 1934.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Het Vasten.* Bandung: Persatuan Islam, 1932.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Ikhtarū Ihdassabīlayn: al-Dīn aw al-Lādīniyya.* Transletd by Geys A. Tamimi. Jeddah: Saudi Publishing and Distribution House, 1970.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Islam dan Akal Merdeka.* Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 3rd ed.,1988.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Media Da'wah, 1969, 4th ed. 1988.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Islam Sebagai Ideologi*. Jakarta: Pustaka Aida, 1954.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Kebudayaan Islam Dalam Perspektif Sejarah*. Ed. Endang Syaifuddin Anshari. Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka, 1988.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Kegelisahan Ruhani Barat*. Surabaya: DDII Perwakilan Jatim, 1969.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Kumpulan Khutbah*. Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1975.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Marilah Shalat.*. Translated by D.P. Sati Alimin and H. Sidi Gazalba. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1956.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Masalah Palestina*. Jakarta: Hudaya, 1971.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Mempersatukan Ummat*. Bandung: Bulan Sabit, 2nd ed., 1968.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Mencari Modus Vivendi Antar Umat Beragama di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Media Da'wah,1980, 2nd ed., 1983.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Persatuan Agama Dengan Negara*. Padang: Jajasan Pendidikan Islam, 2nd ed., 1968.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Revolusi Indonesia*. Bandung: Jihad, 1955.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs*. Ithaca: Southeast Asian Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1954.

Natsir, Mohammad. *What and How Can the Muslims Contribute to the Attainment of a Stable World Peace*. Indonesian-English edition. Jakarta: U. B. Ideal, 1953.

Natsir, Mohammad. *The World of Islam Festival Dalam Perspective Sejarah*. Jakarta: Media Da'wah, 3rd ed., 1985.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Tinjauan Hidup*. Jakarta: Wijaya, 1957.

Noer, Deliar. *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942*. Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1980, 3rd ed., 1985.

Noer, Deliar. *Islam, Pancasila, dan Asas Tunggal*. Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1983, 2nd ed., 1984.

Noer, Deliar. *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*. Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1987.

Noer, Deliar.*The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*. Singapore: Oxford Universoty Press, 1973.

Permono, Sjechul Hadi. *Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Sebagai Pengelola Zakat*. Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1993.

Picthall, Muhammad M. *The Glorious Qur'an: Text and Explanatory Translation*. New YorK Tahrike Tarsile, Inc., 1992.

Pimpinan Masyumi Bagian Keuangan, *Pedoman Perjuangan Masjumi*. Jakarta: PP. Masjumi, 1955.

Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. *Evolution of Pakistan*. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1962.

Rahman, Fazlur. *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 2nd ed., 1984.

Reese, W. L. *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought*. New Jersey: Humanitary Press, 1980.

Riḍā, Muḥammad Rashīd. *Al-Khilāfah aw al-Imāmat al-Uẓmā*. Cairo: n.p. 1922.

Rosenthal, Erwin I. J. *Islam in the Modern Nation State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

Rosethal, Erwin I. J. *Political Thought of Medieval Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

Rosjidi, Ajip. *M. Natsir : Sebuah Biografi*. Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka, 1990.

Rubin, Barry M. *Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1990.

Salem, Paul. *Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995.

Sayeed, Khalid B. *Western Dominance and Political Islam*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.

Sayeed, Khalid B. *Pakistan in the Formative Phase, 1857-1947*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968, 4th ed.,1992.

Schacht, Joseph. *An Introduction to Islamic Law*. London: Clarendon Press, 1964, 2nd ed., 1984.

Scruton, Roger. *A Dictionary of Political Thought*. London: The Macmillan Press, 1983.

Ṣiddīq, Muḥammad. *A History of Urdu Literature*. London: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Sjadzali, Munawir. *Islam and Governmental System*. Jakarta: INIS, 1991.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. *Islam in Modern History*. Princeton: Princeton University press, 1957, 2nd ed., 1977.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. *Pakistan as an Islamic State*. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1951.

Steenbrink, Karel. *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam.* Translated by Jan Steenbrink and Henry Yansen. Amsterdam: Radopi B.V., 1993.

Stevenson, William. *Birds' Nest in Their Beards.* Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1963.

Sukarno. *Under the Banner of Revolution.* Vol. I. Jakarta: Committee of Publication, 1966.

Syed, Anwar Hussain. *Pakistan: Islam, Politics and Solidarity.* New York: Preager Publishers, 1982.

Tamadonfar, Mehran. *The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership : Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Pragmatism* Boulder, San Francisco : Westview Press, 1989.

Tentang Dasar Negara di Konstituante. Vol.I. Bandung: Konstituante, 1959.

Turabi, Hasan. *Women in Islam and Muslim Society.* London: Milestones Publishers, 1990.

Voll, John Obert. *Islam : Continuity and Challenge in the Modem World.* Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1982, 2nd ed., 1994.

Ward, K. E. *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia.* Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1970.

Watt, W. Montgomery. *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity.* London: Routledge, 1988, 2nd., 1989.

Watt, W. Montgomery. *Islamic Political Thought.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968, 4th ed., 1987.

Wertheim, W. F. *Indonesian in Transisition.* The Hague: van Hoeve, 1964.

Yamin, H. Muhammad. *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.* Vol. I. Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1959.

Yahya, Agusni. "The Impact of Colonial Experience on the Religious and Social Thought of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Ahmad Hassan: A Comparison," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1994).

Yamin, H. Muhammad *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.* Vol. III. Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1960.

Zakaria, Rafiq. *The Struggle Within Islam: The Conflict Between Religion and Politics.* New York: Penguin Books, 1988.

B. ARTICLES:

Abbott, Freeland. "Pakistan and the Secular State," in *South Asian Politics and Religion.* Edited by Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966: 352-370.

153

Abbott, Freeland. " The Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī of Pakistan," in *Middle East Journal.* Vol. II, No.1 (Winter, 1957): 37-51.

Abbott, Freeland. "Mawlana Mawdūdī and Qurʾānic Interpretation," in the *Muslim World,* Vol. XLVIII, No. 1 (!958) : 6-19.

Adams, Charles J. "Abul Aᶜlā Mawdūdī's *Tafhīm al Qurʾān,*" in Andrew Rippin, ed. *Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qurʾān* Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1988: 307-323.

Adams, Charles J. "Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī," in Mircea Eliade, et al., eds. *Encyclopedia of Religion* Vol.7. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1987: 15-18.

Adams, Charles J. "Mawdūdī and the Islamic State," in John L. Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam.* Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1983: 99-133.

Adams, Charles J. "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdūdī,' in Donald Eugene Smith, ed. *South Asian Politics and Religion.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966: 371-397.

Ahmad, Aziz. "Mawdudi and Orthodox Fundamentalism in Pakistan," in *The Middle East Journal.* Vol.XXI, No.3 (Summer 1967) : 369-380.

Ahmad, Mumtaz. "Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī and Tabligh-i Jamāᶜat," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. *Fundamentalism Observed.* Vol. I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 2nd ed., 1994: 457-530.

Ahmad, Mumtaz. "The Politics of War: Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan," in James Piscatori, ed. *Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1991: 156-173.

Ahmad, Syed Barakat. "Mawdudian Concept of Islamic State," in *Islam in the Modern Age,* Vol. XIV, No.4 (November 1983): 239-258.

Ahmed, Zafaryab. "Mawdūdī's Islamic state," in Mohammad Asghar Khan, ed. *The Pakistan Experience: State and Religion.* Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985: 95-113.

Alavi, Hamza. "Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology," in Anita M. Weiss, ed. *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986: 21-48.

Alavi, Hamza. "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, eds. *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982, 2nd ed., 1988: 64-111.

Arjomand, Said Amir. "Religion and Constitutionalism in Western History and in Modern Iran and Pakistan," in Said Amir Arjomand, ed. *The Political Dimensions of Religion.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993: 69-100.

Brush, Stanley E. "Ahmadiyah," in Mircea Eliade, ed. *Encyclopedia of Religion.* Vol. I. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987: 153-155.

Cohen, Stephen P. "State Building in Pakistan," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds. *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986, 2nd ed., 1988: 299-332.

Commins, David. "Modernism," in John L. Esposito, ed. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Muslim World.* Vol. III. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995: 118-123.

Crouch, Harold. "Indonesia," in Mohammed Ayoob, ed. *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981: 190-207.

Desouki, Ali. E. Hillal. "Islamic Modernism," in Mircea Eliade, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Religion.* Vol. VII. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1987: 14-17.

Haryono, Anwar. "Seorang Pejuang Telah Berpulang," in Lukman Hakim, ed. *Pemimpin Pulang.* Jakarta: Yayasan Piranti Ilmu, 1993: 122-127.

Idris, Jaafar Sheikh. "Is Man the Vicegerent of God?," in *Journal of Islamic Studies.* 1 (1990) : 99-110.

Ihza, Yusril. "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: The Biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1093)," in *Studia Islamika.* Vol.2, No.1 (1995) : 111-147.

Ihza, Yusril. "Maududi dan Jama'at-i Islami : Pembentukan dan Tujuan Partai Fundamentalis," in *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an.* Vol.VII, No.3 (1993) : 42-52.

Jameelah, Maryam. "An Appraisal of Some Aspects of Mawlānā Sayyid Aʿlā Mawdūdī's Life and Thought," in *Islamic Quarterly.* Vol. XXXI, No.2 (1987): 116-130.

Johns, Anthony H., "Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism," in John L. Esposito, ed. *Islam in South Asia: Religion, Politics & Society.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1987: 202-229.

Kahin, George McT. "In Memoriam : Mohammad Natsir (1907-1993)," in *Indonesia.* No. 56 (October 1993): 159-165.

Kahin, George McTurnan, "Mohammad Natsir," in Yusuf Abdullah Puar, ed. *Mohammad Natsir 70 Tahun: Kenang-Kenangan Kehidupan dan Perjuangan.* Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978): 322-335.

Kees, B. "Observation on the Political Situation in Indonesia," in B.H.M. Vlekke, ed. *Indonesia in 1956: Political and Economical Aspect.* The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1957: 5-52.

Kennedy, Charles H. "Islamization of Pakistan: Implementation of the *Ḥudūd* Ordiances," in *Asian Survey.* Vol. XXVII, No.3 (March, 1988): 307-316.

Kettler, David. "Ideology," in David Miller, et al., eds. *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought.* Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 2nd ed., 1989: 235-238.

Khān, Inamullāh. "Dr. Mohammad Natsir," in Yusuf Abdullah Puar, ed. *Mohammad Natsir 70 Tahun: Kenang-Kenangan Kehidupan dan Perjuangan* Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978): 336-351.

Khān, Inamullāh. "Dr. Mohammad Natsir," in Yusuf Abdullah Puar, ed. *Mohammad Natsir 70 Tahun: Kenang-kenangan, Kehidupan, dan Perjuangan.* Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978: 336-351.

Lemu, Aisha. "Women in Islam," in Altaf Gauhar, ed. *The Challenge of Islam.* London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1978: 248-267.

Liddle, R. William. "Participation and the Political Parties," in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, eds. *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia.* Berkeley : University of California Press, 1978: 171-195.

Maarif, A. Syafii. "Politik Dalam Perspektif Islam," in *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'ān.* Vol. IV, (March 1993): 3.

Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. "Islam dan Kekuasaan di Indonesia," in *Panji Masyarakat.* No.783 (February 1994): 10-11.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul A'lā. "Islamic and Western Laws of Divorce: A Comparative Historical Perspective," in *Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly.* Vol. I, (1981) : 17-23.

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul A'lā. "The Role of *Ijtihād* and the Scope of Legislation in Islam," in *Islamic Thought Quarterly Journal.* Vol. VII, No.1 (1960): 10-18.

Mintjes, H. "Mawlānā Mawdūdī's Last Years and the Resurgence of Fundamentalist Islam," in *Al-Mushir: Theological Journal of the Christian Study Centre.* Vol. XXII, No.2 (Summer, 1980): 46-73.

Mousalli, Ahmad S. "The Views of Islamic Fundamentalism on Epistemology and Political Philosophy, " in *Islamic Quarterly.* Vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (1993): 178-181.

Mousalli, Ahmad S. "Two Tendencies in Modern Islamic Political Thought: Modernism and Fundamentalism," in *Hamdard Islamicus.* Vol.XVI, No.2 (Summer 1993): 51-78.

Nasr, Sayyed Vali Reza. "Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jamā'at-i Islāmī, 1977-88," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* Vol.25, No.2 (May, 1993): 261-283.

Natsir, Mohammad. "Agama dan Negara," in M. Isa Anshary, *Falsafah Pejuangan Islam* (Medan: Saiful, 1951: 261-285.

Natsir, Mohammad. "Iqbal on the Separation of Religion and State," in *The Islamic Review.* Vol. XLI, No.7 (July 1953): 5-8.

Natsir, Mohammad. "Membina Kader Bertanggung Jawab," in Tamar Djaja, ed., *Riwayat Hidup A. Hasan .* Jakarta: Mutiara, 1980: 55-59.

Noer, Deliar. "Conte.nporary Political Dimensions in Islam," in M. B. Hooker, ed. *Islam in South-East Asia.* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988: 183-215.

Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. "The Lahore Resolution 1940," in Mahmud Husain, et al, eds. *A History of the Freedom Movement.* Vol. IV. Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970.

Rahardjc, M. Dawam. "Kenangan Reflektif atas Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)," in *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'ān.* Vol.IV, No.1 (1993): 20-24.

Rahardjo, M. Dawam. "Perceptions of Culture in the Islamic Movement: An Indonesian Perspective," in *Sojourn, Social Issues in Southeast Asia.* Vol. 7, No.2 (August, 1992): 248-273.

Rahman, Fazlur. "The Ideological Experience of Pakistan," in *Islam and the Modern Age.* Vol. II, No.4 (1971): 1-20.

Rahman, Fazlur. "The Principle of *Shūrā* and the Role of *Umma* in Islam," in Mumtaz Ahmad, ed. *State, Politics, and Islam.* Indianapolis: American Trust publications, 1986: 87-96.

Renan, Ernest. "What is Nation?," in Alfred Zommern, ed. *Modern Political Doctrines.* London: Oxford University Press, 1939.

Riḍā, Muḥammad Rashīd. "Patriotism, Nationalism, and Group Spirit in Islam," in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds. *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1982: 57-59.

Rosenthal, Erwin I.J. " Religion and Politics in Islam," in *Islam in the Modern Age.* Vol. I, No. I, (May 1970): 50-64.

Safi, Louay. "Nationalism and the Mutinational State," in *The American Journal of Islamic Social sciences.* Vol.9, No.3 (Fall 1992): 338-350.

Sayeed, Khalid B. "The Jamāᶜat-i Islāmī Movement in Pakistan," in *Pacific Affairs.* Vol.I, No.30 (1958): 59-68.

Siddiqi, Qazi Zulqadr., et al., "A Bibliography of Writings by and about Mawlānā Sayyid Abu Aᶜlā Mawdūdī," in Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Anṣari, eds. *Islamic Perspective : Studies in Honor of Sayyid Abul Aᶜlā Mawdūdī.* London : The Islamic Foundation, 1986: 3-16.

Verinder, Grover. "Enigma of an Islamic State: The Case of Pakistan," in *The Indian Political Science Review.* Vol. XVII, No.I (1984): 107-116.

Voll, John O. "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and Sudan," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. *Fundamentalism Observed.* Vol. I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 2nd ed., 1994: 345-402.

Weiss, Anita M. "The Historical Debate on Islam on the State in South Asia," in Anita M. Weiss, ed. *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986: 1-20.

Woodward, Mark W. "Natsir, Mohammad (1908-1993)," in John L. Esposito, ed. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Muslim World.* Vol.III. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995: 239-240.