LOSING A REVOLUTION: THE PKI VERSUS THE ARMY IN INDONESIA, 1949-1965

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ABSTRACT

The study applies a "political conflict" approach to the subject. Between 1949 and 1965, Indonesia faced a developing revolutionary situation. The Communists attempted to make the transition from this situation to a revolutionary outcome by accumulating resources within the context of three successive social contracts. Although, they were initially unopposed in their acquisition of a governmental apparatus, adherents, territory, and sovereignty, the Army increasingly attempted to block their growth. However, as the Army was initially unsuccessful, the communist party remained the world's largest nonruling communist party at the time. In 1965, under the protection of the President, the Communists attempted to complete their revolution through acquiring weapons. This attempt flagged an "accelerator" -- a decisive event that would make possible the transition to a revolutionary outcome. Despite their seeming strength, the Communists were extremely dependent upon the political power of the President. Therefore, the Army staged a "decelarator" against the Communists by striking first at the President. Thereafter, the defenceless Communist state-within-a-state was destroyed and the revolution was defeated.

RESUME

L'étude adopte la perspective du "conflit politique" pour aborder le sujet. Entre 1949 et 1965, l'Indonésie faisant face à un début de révolution. Dans le contexte de trois contrats sociaux successifs et par l'accumulation de resources, les communistes ont essayé de transformer cette situation en résultat de révolution. Au début, il n'y avait pas aucune opposition à leur acquisition d'une structure gouvernementale, d'adhérents, du territoire, et de la souveraineté, mais éventuellement, l'armée a tenté de plus en plus d'arrêter leur développement. Cependant, comme l'armée n'y réussissait pas au début, le parti communiste demenera le parti communiste non-dirigeant le plus grand du monde d'alors. En 1965, sous la protection du Président, les communistes ont tenté d'achever leur révolution en accumulent des armes. C'est cela qui signala l'élément "accélérateur" — un événement définitif qui rend possible la transition au résultat de la révolution. Malgré le pouvoir qu'on leur supposait, les communistes devaient compter beaucoup sur le pouvoir du Président. Donc, l'armée a monté un "décélérateur" contre les communistes en portant d'abord un coup au Président. Dès lors, sans protection, l'état-dans-l'état communiste fut démoli et la révolution fut déjouée.

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TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMPAI: American Motion Picture Association of Indonesia

Berdikari: Berdiri diatas Kaki Sendiri; Stand on One's Own Feet

BKS: Badan Kerja Sama; Cooperation Body

BKSBUMIL: Badan Kerja Sama Buruh Militer; Labour-Military Cooperation Body

BKS-Pemuda-Militer: Badan Kerja Sama Pemuda Militer; Youth-Military Cooperation Body

BKSTAMIL: Badan Kerja Sama Tani Militer; Peasant-Military Cooperation Body

BKSWAMIL: Badan Kerja Sama Wanita Militer; Women-Military Cooperation Body

BPI: Badan Pusat Intelijens; Central Intelligence Body

BPPK: Badan Pembina Potensi Karya; Bodies for the Fostering of Functional Potentials

BPS: Badan Pendukung/Penyebar Sukarnoisme; Body for the Support/Spreading of Sukarnoism

BTI: Barisan Tani Indonesia; Indonesian Peasant Front

CGMI: Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia; Indonesian University Students Movements

Depernas: Dewan Perancang Nasional; National Planning Board

DPA: Dewan Pertimbangan Agung; Supreme Advisory Council

DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat; People's Representative Body

DPR-GR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong; Mutual Assistance People's Representative Body

Dwikora: Dwi-Komando; Dual Command

FN: Front Nasional; National Front

FNPIB: Front Nasional Pembebasaan Irian Barat; National Front for the Liberation of West Irian

Gerwani: Gerakan Wanita Indonesia; Indonesian Women's Association

Gestapu: Gerakan September Tigapuluh; September 30 Movement

Golkar: Golongan Karya; Vocational Group

HANSIP: Pertahanan Sipil; Civil Defence Organization

HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam; Islamic University Students Association

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IPKI: Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia; League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence

IPPI: Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia; League of Indonesian High School Youth

Kabir: Kapitalis-birokrat; Capitalist-bureaucrat

KBKI: Kesatuan Buruh Kerakyataan Indonesia; United Popular Labourers of Indonesia

KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat; Central Indonesian National Committee

KOGA: Komando Siaga; Alert Command

KOLAGA: Komando Mandala Siaga; Area Alert Command

KORAMIL: Komando Rayon Milter; Military Rayon Command

Lekra: Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat; League of People's Culture

LVRI: Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia; Veteran's Legion of the Republic of Indonesia

Manipol: Manifesto Politik; Political Manifesto

Masjumi: Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia; Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims

MILTAG: Military Training Advisory Group

MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; People's Deliberative Assembly

MPRS: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara; Provisional People's Deliberative Assembly

Nasakom: Nasionalisme-Agama-Komunisme; Nationalism-Religion-Communism

Nasakomil: Nasionalisme-Agama-Komunisme-Militer; Nationalism-Religion-Communism-Military

NEFOS: Newly Emerging Forces

NU: Nadhatul Ulama; Ulama Association

OLDEFOS: Old Established Forces

ORPI: Organisasi Persatuan Perkerja Indonesia; United Organization of Indonesian Workers

Ormas: Organisasi Massa; Mass Organizations

PANGAB: Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata; Commander of the Armed Forces

Partindo: Partai Indonesia; Indonesia Party

Pepelrada: Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah; Regional Dwikora Executive Authorities

Permesta: Piagam Perjuangan Permesta; Charter of Common Struggle

PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia; Communist Party of Indonesia

PKPI: Persatuan Karyawan Pengarang Indonesia; Union of Indonesian Writer Karyawan

PNI: Partai Nasional Indonesia; Nationalist Party of Indonesia

PNI-Staatspartij: Partai Nasional Indonesia-Staatspartij; Indonesian Nationalist Party-State Party

Polkar: Politik-Karya; Vocation-Politics

PRRI: Pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Indonesia; Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia

PSI: Partai Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian Socialist Party

PSII: Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia; Islamic Association Party

PTK: Persatuan Tenaga Karyawan; Union of Karyawan Forces

PWI: Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia; Indonesian Journalists Association

RTC: Round Table Conference

Sarbupri: Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia; Union of Plantation Workers of the Republic of Indonesia

SESKOAD: Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat; Army Staff and Command School

SESKOAL: Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Laut; Navy Staff and Command School

SESKOAU: Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Udara; Air Force Staff and Command School

SOB: Regeling op den Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg; State of War and Siege

SOBSI: Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia; All Indonesian Central Labour Organization

SOKSI: Serikat Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia; Union of Indonesian Socialist Karyawan Organizations

SUAD: Staf Umum Angkatan Darat; Section of the Army General Staff

TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia; Nationalist Army of Indonesia

USDEK: Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 - Sosialisme Indonesia - Demokrasi Terpimpin - Ekonomi Terpimpin - Kepribadian Indonesia; 1945 Constitution - Indonesian Socialism - Guided Democracy - Guided Economy - Indonesian Identity

USIS: United States Information Service

UUPA: Undang-undang Pokok Agraria; Basic Agrarian Law

UUPBH: Undang-undang Perjandjian Bagi Hasil; Sharecropping Law

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CHAPTER I

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FAILED INDONESIAN REVOLUTION

The Research Problem

The purpose of this study is to examine the factors that led to the collapse of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965. Towards that end, it considers the period from 1949 to 1965, focusing on the development of a revolutionary situation in Indonesia, especially after 1957. While demonstrating the existence of this revolutionary situation, this study also investigates why a revolutionary outcome did not result from the polarized relationship that existed between the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and the Army (TNI) in 1965. More specifically, this study attempts to examine and explain why the PKI -- the actor with the revolutionary intentions in this situation and the world's largest nonruling communist party at the time -- failed to secure its goals and was destroyed by the Army.

For its theoretical framework, this study adopts the "political conflict" model of revolution, drawn from the works of Tilly and Aya.[1] Within this context, revolutionary situations, and ultimately outcomes, result from a quest for power resources among actors in a polity characterized by weakened or "unstuck" state power. The quest must be

coupled with an "accelerator" favourable to the revolutionary contender.[2]

To presage what follows later, it is necessary to indicate why this case study of Indonesia is approached from the perspective of revolution. In terms of a widespread change in political rulers, structures, values, and roles, a national revolution had occurred in Indonesia between 1945 and 1949. The period under study falls after the latter date. This does not, however, diminish the relevance of the perspective of revolution. Although the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 to the new Republic put an end to the most obvious signs of revolution (great, rapid, and violent change), Indonesian society continued, according to Anderson, to "penetrate" the state.[3] Subsequently, Indonesia faced a developing revolutionary situation: a highly politicized and active citizenry engaged in an increasingly intensive fashion in the politics of the state. Until 1957 this heightened political activity manifested itself through political parties, which numbered at least seventy. Thus, the rise of the PKI during this period can be understood as a revolutionary phenomenon. When Indonesia officially "returned to the rails" of its revolution in 1959, there was "an accelerando of mass politics penetrating ever more widely down and across Indonesian society."[4] This situation was one of great instability, normally a prerequisite of a revolutionary outcome, and lasted until 1965, when one of the two main contenders, the PKI, was pulverized.

Theories of Revolution

This study is based on the premise that political theories of revolution, as opposed to other conceptions of the phenomenon, are better suited to the explanation of the kind of political situation that developed in Indonesia from 1949 to 1965. This study, therefore, first

argues the general and theoretical merits of the political model by demonstrating the inadequacies of the alternative conceptions. Then, it demonstrates the merits of a political framework, and the better and more insightful explanation it may yield, through a discussion of the status of earlier and existing scholarship on Indonesia.

Recent approaches to revolutions typically follow the disciplinary divisions in the social sciences. Despite their differing emphases, however, all approaches -- sociological, socio-psychological, and political -- claim to be concerned with the same social phenomenon of revolution. Ironically, no common and concise definition of revolution unites the diversity of approaches.[5] Answering the question "Why do revolutions occur?" seems to be the only concern binding these theorists. Beyond this, they strike out in different directions, guided mainly by the intellectual tools, constructs, and assumptions of their respective disciplines.

Whether of the "functionalist" (Johnson) or "class conflict" (Moore and Skocpol) subapproaches, sociological theories of revolution focus first on the dynamics of social interaction. Stability or instability in society is analyzed and explained (according to Taylor) by concentrating on notions of social systems, social institutions, and social stratification. For adherents of the "functionalist" subapproach, certain social functions have to be fulfilled in defence of the status quo. In instances of system failure, mass mobilization can lead to revolution, overthrow of the system, and fulfillment of the requisite functions by a reconstituted order. One major criticism of this subapproach, however, relates to its high level of abstraction: Johnson failed to operationalize his own arguments.

The alternative "class conflict" subapproach proceeds from the assumption that possession of power resources in society is contested among individuals and groups. Here, authors undertake an "analysis of the relations between groups competing for resources in the context of how these influence the ability of dominant groups to contain conflict."[6] Moore and Skocpol, in performing such an analysis, commit the same methodological error: their case studies are only instances of revolutionary outcomes, examples of revolution validated by an ex post facto technique. If theorists of this genre failed to explain revolution, one reason for this was their "neglect of causes of revolution which lay beyond the ambit of sociological theorizing, causes which some analysts of revolution would suggest included the psychological dimensions of revolutionary behavior."[7] In short, sociological theories of revolution suffer from reductionism.

From the socio-psychological perspective, theorists emphasize how individuals (normatively) perceive the polity and conditions prevailing within it, rather than an "objective" analysis of the same. These theorists

> seek the causes of individual discontent and, by simple extension, the aggravations of "society" as a whole.... Collective action becomes collective behavior, the abnormal, antisocial activity of disaffected persons driven to violence by pent-up frustrations with the status quo.... A whole society erupts in revolution....[8]

Therefore, "in order to produce adequate explanations of revolutions, it was necessary to specify the perceptions of individuals, how these changed over time, and the mechanisms by which such changes were eventually manifested in revolutionary behaviour."[9] These models share three major weaknesses, delineated by Taylor. First, the relationship among individual perceptions, psychological processes, and aggregate

political violence is not substantiated by direct evidence. From this follows a second weakness: these theorists, like their sociological counterparts, emphasize only the factors with which they are most familiar. Lastly, in approaching revolution by embedding it in the general notion of political violence, the concept of revolution as a discrete phenomenon is rendered meaningless.[10] Revolutions are more than political violence. Hence, these theories illuminate only one component of the phenomenon.

Political theorists approach revolution through either the "political functionalist" or "political conflict" subapproaches. Huntington is representative of the former, asserting that revolution ought to be examined by reference to "the degree to which political institutions could sustain consensus by meeting new functional requirements generated by economic or social modernization."[11] Through this approach, Huntington identifies revolution by outcome.[12] His definition "marks off an extremely narrow range of outcomes — so narrow, in fact, that depending on how we interpret 'rapid' and 'fundamental,' it is doubtful whether a real revolution ever happened."[13] Further, his functionalist approach seems less relevant to contemporary revolutions than older ones, a weakness perhaps redressed by Tilly's alternative subapproach.

The thrust of the "political conflict" model, as in Tilly's approach, is to view the polity or state as "an arena within which groups competed for power, and through this wealth and status, and where the outcome of such competition was determined primarily by the balance of resources available to contending groups."[14] The emergence of multiple sovereignty, by which is meant the struggle between contenders for state

power — that is, a revolutionary situation — relates mainly to "the inability of the government and polity members to incorporate new strata into the polity and provide adequate compensation for loser groups."[15] Thus, three proximate causes flag the onset of a revolutionary situation: the appearance of contenders (new or loser groups within the polity); "the development of commitment to the claims of these contenders by a significant section of the subject population" (these are called "normative resources," which, when coupled with tools of coercion, constitute an actor's "capabilities"); and government's loss of coercive power.

Unfortunately, Tilly confuses

> the causes of revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes with these events themselves.... [In actuality] the causes of a revolutionary situation were whatever variables explained why contenders had appeared, why substantial sectors of the population had transferred their allegiances to such contenders and why the government was deprived of coercive control.[16]

Further, he rejects socio-psychological and institutional variables on the (weak) basis of his hypothesized relationships between the above longer-term cause and the proximate causes of revolution. In general, Tilly "failed to validate the political conflict approach employed...by providing adequate alternative explanations to those stemming from socio-psychological or functionalist perspectives."[17] To overcome these weaknesses, yet preserve the thrust and insights Tilly underscores, one can turn to Aya's brief study.

Sensitivity to the distinction between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome, which have different determinants, is crucial for both Aya and Tilly. One should be aware, according to these writers, that revolution is a complex phenomenon, the nature of which must be disaggregated. Thus, a revolution is only "some minimum combination of

(a) revolutionary situation and (b) revolutionary outcome."[18] Other theorists have erroneously collapsed the two stages into one, seemingly unaware that a revolutionary situation may never result in a revolutionary outcome.

Working from the Bolshevik notion of "dual power," a revolution is, for Aya, really the result of a "trial by battle" that involves

> the seizure (or attempted seizure) of a governmental apparatus (i.e., the concentrated material means of coercion, taxation, and public administration in society) by one contender (or coalition of contenders) from another. The revolutionary situation itself is one of "multiple sovereignty,"...in which public authority is divided between two or more power centers, each attempting to rule people and territory previously subject to a single regime.... multiple sovereignty begins when state power comes unstuck; it ends when — by the victory of one, the defeat of another, or a settlement between warring contenders — one sovereign polity exerts a monopoly of violence, taxation, and justice.[19]

This definition is shared by Aya and Tilly, yet the former overcomes the latter's near exclusive emphasis on political variables by placing participants in this "trial" within a certain functional and institutional context. This innovation is summarized by Aya as follows: "To explain why people do what they do, you make a simple model of their choice situation, including their intentions, capabilities, and opportunities to act."[20] Thus, the institutional or structural variables emphasized by Skocpol play a decisive role,[21] and one should consider revolution by first focussing upon these larger and system-determining variables:

> Changes in the social structure and composition of a human setting, obviously enough, alter the identity of contending parties as well as their organizational bases of collective action — hence, too, their bargaining power vis-à-vis other groups....
>
> This...points up the organizational link between grievances and the capability to act on them. Individuals are not magically mobilized for action, no matter how aggrieved, hostile, or angry they feel. Their anger must first be set to collective ends by

> the coordinating, directing offices of organization, formal or informal.... in any event,...there must be some kind of organization on hand to orchestrate discontent and convert it into collective action.
>
> Now the question becomes, how do structural changes of society — by reshaping organizational means for acting on common claims and grievances — affect the tactical power of aggrieved groups? The issue, then, is not only how structural changes alter the identity, aims, and options of contending forces, but how they modify their respective bases of solidarity and collective effort; how, in a word, they redistribute social power chances.[22]

To effectively trace "social power chances," an analyst must perform an additional task. There must be

> a careful trace of the various pathways to multiple sovereignty — in particular, the intricate rivalries, maneuvers, and realignments of governing groups whose failed consensus [may have] opened the door the revolutionaries ran through....[23]

Aya neatly summarizes this modified "political conflict" approach in three analytical components. These components must be examined in their entirety:

> (1)...the prevailing terms of social contract — to which various sets of people are party and which, once violated, make for grievances;
> (2) note, too, with regard to capabilities and opportunities, the tactical power resources available to aggrieved groups — their economic basis, community organization, political connections with outside allies, and (most important) fissures in the power structure that may open from above.
> The combined result is (3) a focus on the social distribution of power chances, on tactical coalitions between various contenders, and on the occurrence of top-level power struggles [among members of the state] that, without warning, may open the political arena to popular intervention.[24]

Therefore, in instances of a revolutionary situation where no revolutionary outcome ensued, much attention must be focussed upon the "capabilities" of the actor endowed with revolutionary intentions and why these "capabilities" failed to result in the neutralization or destruction of the "coercive control" of the existing government. It is important to know under what conditions a revolutionary power contender

with a favourable social contract, diversified and large tactical power resources, and even coercive capabilities, fails to make the desired "breakthrough," and is crushed. Seemingly, those factors emphasized by both Tilly and Aya in their explanations of revolutionary outcomes — mainly those resources consisting of commitments of members of the polity and coercive resources — were meaningless, at least, in the case of the PKI.

In this example what really needs to be explained is that which Johnson calls the "accelerator." This notion, although originally ensconced in the theoretical milieu of structural-functionalism, may be extracted from the same and used to explain the critical moments when an advanced revolutionary situation can lead either to a revolutionary outcome (in which case the accumulated capabilities count for success), or be crushed by nonrevolutionary contenders. Johnson states that the sufficient cause of a revolution, in the context of an existing revolutionary situation

> is some ingredient, usually contributed by fortune, which deprives the elite [or government] of its chief weapon for enforcing social behavior..., or which leads a group of revolutionaries to <u>believe</u> that they have the means to deprive the elite of its weapons of coercion.... such final...causes of revolution are referred to as "accelerators."[25]

In short, accelerators are events which "suddenly make apparent the already real though latent situation," effectively captured by the concept of a revolutionary situation.[26]

The concept of the accelerator has only been applied in the literature as an explanatory factor of revolutionary outcomes. Johnson has asserted, "The event that triggers revolution in a society that is disequilibrated and that has a discredited base of authority is called an 'accelerator'."[27] Accelerators, as <u>decisive events</u>, are framed in the

literature such that revolutionary outcomes are the only consequences when such events occur. This, however, does injustice to the real possibilities faced by contenders -- revolutionary or nonrevolutionary -- in a revolutionary situation. The concept does not seem to have been fully theoretically articulated. Accelerators can be events that paralyze a government's coercive capability, thus leading to revolutionary outcomes. Accelerators favouring a revolutionary actor can lead to a revolutionary outcome only if that actor also possesses those other capabilities (normative resources) discussed earlier. However, such capabilities are also subject to liquidation. For that reason, decisive events favourable to a nonrevolutionary contender that neutralize a revolutionary contender's capabilities, and thus thwart a revolutionary outcome, can be called "decelerators." From the perspective of a "trial by battle," the nonrevolutionary contender has the easier task and is not obliged, as is the revolutionary contender interested in success, to build up capabilities, although that option is open. Hence, this study proposes to adopt the notion of the "decisive event" (within Aya's three component scheme) and its double-edged nature: it can topple both revolutionary and nonrevolutionary contenders in a developing or fully developed revolutionary situation.

To see how the works of Aya and Tilly complement one another, it is necessary to complete Aya's larger framework by superimposing on it Tilly's notion of time perspectives and including within that the genuine proximate causes of a revolutionary situation. The "careful trace" proposed by Aya also determines the criteria for the onset of a revolutionary situation. Here a certain time dimension must be added. Tilly states that there exist three time perspectives that may be adopted

with regard to either a revolutionary situation leading to a revolutionary outcome, or a revolutionary situation that fails to complete the "breakthrough." In the long-run, "the reorganization of production" -- and how this "creates the chief historical actors, the major constellations of interests, the basic threats to these interests, and the principal conditions for the transfers of power" -- becomes the centre of the analysis.[28] The historical time frame of the present study, however, precludes this longer-term time perspective; the medium- and short-run perspectives, however, are quite appropriate vantage points from which to approach the Indonesian case.

It is the medium-run perspective that best encapsulates the criteria of a revolutionary situation, for it is herein that the analyst focusses upon the presence of mobilized contenders. In short, here one attempts to overcome Taylor's criticism of Tilly and explain "why contenders had appeared, [and] why substantial sectors of the population had transferred their allegiances to such contenders."[29] These are, of course, the first and second genuine proximate causes of a revolutionary situation. Hence, examining the Indonesian case from this time perspective will constitute the bulk of the study.

With regard to the first proximate cause -- the appearance of a contender and that its claims amounted to an alternative to those in power -- this study seems to be somewhat weakened by the exclusion of the longer-term time perspective wherein the origin of the chief historical actors is explained. To be sure, this study will not be taking the existence of the PKI as a contender for granted. Indeed, while the study excludes the questionable assertion that a reorganization of production explains the rise of the PKI (as Tilly would presumably argue), it must

explain the appearance of the PKI and its development into a contender. This is because in 1948 the PKI was almost destroyed as a viable political entity in an abortive uprising in Java. By 1949 the PKI was still indistinguishable from a myriad of political organizations in terms of its accomplishments, claims, membership, or any of the other appurtenances of a nascent contender. Thus, the study will, in essence, be concerned with explaining, in the medium-run perspective that has been adopted, what is meant to be explained in the long-run perspective.

Illuminating the second facet of the contender, that it advanced alternative claims, is to be accomplished by a brief analysis of the PKI's ideology. The evaluation of aspects of the party's ideology covers the entire historical period under consideration. Even to the end, it will be argued, the PKI sustained fundamentally alternative claims to power and legitimacy in the Indonesian Republic.

It is true that almost every government has faced at least one rival to its claims of power and legitimacy. However, this study will examine the Communist Party of Indonesia on the basis of a demanding standard: the contender can be measured by some "gauge of seriousness."[30] The means by which one can distinguish between a marginal challenger and a fledgling or full-fledged contender is by measuring not only its claims, but also whether "some significant part of the subject population honors the claim."[31] This is the second proximate cause of a revolutionary situation.

In this vein, Tilly affirms that

> the revolutionary moment arrives when previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves confronted with strictly incompatible demands from the government and form an alternative body claiming control over the government, or claiming to <u>be</u> the government...and these previously acquiescent people obey the alternative body. They pay taxes, provide men to

> its armies, feed its functionaries, honor its symbols, give time to its service, or yield other resources despite the prohibitions of a still-existing government they formerly obeyed. Multiple sovereignty has begun.[32]

This definition is, however, rather rigid in that the rival demands being made are "strictly incompatible." Furthermore, this definition is only suitable to situations of open civil war when "armies" are in existence. Tilly's definition seems to fit only one type of revolutionary situation, that which Huntington has called the "Eastern" model of revolution. Examples of this type of revolution are characterized by mobilized armies and, frequently, "strictly incompatible" demands being made on the mass of people.[33] The Indonesian case does not fit this definition of the "beginning" of a revolutionary situation. Moreover, it can be argued that by this definition no revolutionary situation is a peaceful situation. However, if one were to modify certain features of this definition, and ground it in the essentially turbulent but nonviolent domestic political circumstances of the Indonesian example, a case could still be made for a developing revolutionary situation.

A modified definition encompasses the existence of conflicting demands between the contender and the government, if this rivalry is carried out effectively and in a competitive fashion. The supporters of the former "lean to one side" in the context of domestic politics and will act despite the prohibitions of the existing government. In place of Tilly's zero-sum transfer of resources from the government to the contender, the modified version of a revolutionary situation envisages citizens surrendering resources to both actors but increasingly more to the contender as the revolutionary situation develops. The particular resources in this case are taxes, in the form of party dues, donations, and so forth; members of the party and its front organizations and

auxiliaries; the honouring of its symbols as in party congresses, anniversaries, special events, and so forth; giving time to its service; and votes during elections. The last resource becomes the single most crucial element in determining the difference between a mere claimant and a full contender. In the absence of elections, the number of members in the organization and its auxiliaries, in relation to the size of the adult population, becomes a reasonable substitute.

Tilly emphasizes that "commitments to some alternative claimant must be activated in the face of prohibitions or contrary directives from the government."[34] In the Indonesian case, two instances of such activation occurred through PKI orders, one in 1957 and the other throughout the period from 1963 to 1965. In 1957 negotiations with the Dutch over the fate of West New Guinea (West Irian) collapsed and prospects for the peaceful transfer of sovereignty to Jakarta dimmed. In an effort to demonstrate Indonesia's national commitment to the attainment of the territory, PKI cadres and members of its labour and trade union fronts illegally seized Dutch commercial enterprises throughout the country. During the period from 1963 to 1965, the PKI again demonstrated its organizational skills and challenge to the established order by directing the seizure of British commercial enterprises, the land holdings of "feudalists" and, later, American commercial enterprises. These occurrences brought multiple sovereignty nearest to the point of the two warring governmentlike or statelike structures, to which Tilly alluded.

This medium-run analysis, therefore, permits us to focus on the increasingly statelike nature of the PKI. Much like the legally empowered Indonesian state, the PKI, and to some degree the Army as well, came to acquire qualities, capabilities, and resources normally

associated with a state. It can be demonstrated that both the PKI and, to a lesser extent, the TNI exhibited statelike properties: government, territory, people, and sovereignty. It can also be argued that the motives behind becoming statelike arise not only from the endogenous interests of the actor, but that the environment within which it operates politically determines to a significant degree the intensity of that process as well as success in its attainment. Here one can measure the true nature of the relationship between the PKI and the TNI. Thus, applying the concept of being statelike is useful in determining the salient features of their interaction.

The final time perspective, the short-run, compels the analyst to scrutinize "tactics and the balance of forces." More specifically, the utilization of this approach brings to the fore "the control or neutralization of the available military force at the center of the short-run conditions for the transfer of power."[35] To cite Taylor again, this approach explains "why the government was [or could have been] deprived of coercive control."[36] This is the third genuine proximate cause of a revolutionary situation and constitutes the sole bridge between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome. Use of the theoretical device of the accelerator (or decelerator) permits the adoption of this time perspective. Finally, when combined, the medium- and short-run time perspectives delimit a useful approach to the Indonesian experience.

Thus the development of the revolutionary situation in Indonesia can be divided into four time blocks: (1) 1949 to 1957; (2) 1957 to 1962; (3) late 1962 to late 1964; and (4) 1965. The first three time blocks fall within the purview of a medium-run time approach, whereas the year 1965

falls within the time frame of a short-run approach. Accordingly, the analysis of developments from 1949 to late 1964 will accent three areas: the appearance of the PKI as a contender; the advancement of alternative claims to power and legitimacy by the PKI; and the increasing commitment to these claims by a significant segment of the population. With respect to the final section of the historical analysis, there will be an examination of the conditions in 1965 that prompted both the PKI and the Army to try to stage a favourable decisive event.

What differentiates each of the first three time blocks are the demonstrably different terms of the social contract that characterized each period. By a social contract is meant the explicit rules (usually laws) that govern who is included or excluded from legal political activities, the general form and content of those activities, and their institutional embodiment. Consequently, actors that are included within the contract can be expected to act in a certain manner that conforms with the agreed norms. Contrariwise, actors that are excluded can be expected to act in a different fashion and attempt either to overthrow the whole contract or to revise it in such a way that they are included. Thus, this study will argue, in accordance with Aya, that the social contract affects an actor's identity, aims, options, bases of solidarity, and collective effort.

With particular regard to the PKI, it can be stated that from 1949 to 1957 the social contract (which was liberal democratic in orientation and featured political parties, from across the political continuum, as the vehicle to power) was characterized by <u>tolerance</u> (on the part of the government) toward mobilization (attaining resources and capabilities) and collective action (various acts such as strikes, demonstrations,

meetings, or even publishing a newspaper). From 1957 to 1962, the social contract (which was authoritarian and featured corporatist tenets and organizations based on function, not class or ideology) was characterized by repression of the PKI's collective action and facilitation of Army mobilization and collective action. From late 1962 to late 1964, the social contract (which was authoritarian and featured national revolutionary struggle of a largely ideological nature) was characterized by facilitation of Communist Party collective action and mobilization, while the Army endured tolerance of its own mobilization and collective action.

The suggestion that the strategy adopted by an actor is largely conditioned by the environment within which it functions can be more clearly demonstrated by reference to the strategies of particular actors. In the first time block, the PKI was mobilizing, or accumulating greater resources or capabilities as well as enhanced potential for collective action. This ability to accumulate (which holds true for any actor) depended, in part, upon the fissures in the power structure, as delineated by Aya. Within this context, the distribution of "political power chances" can be evaluated.

Also in 1957, the dramatic appearance of the Army on the political stage served to intensify the revolutionary situation. In December 1957 a state of near multiple sovereignty briefly came into existence as the PKI tried to recover the political initiative lost due to the TNI's emergency powers. This was an opportunity for the Communists to make political capital — when conscious will and good fortune were combined and something was actually done to try to benefit from this rare nexus— but it became a primary concern for both actors:

> The appearance of [near] multiple sovereignty [put] into question the achieved position of every single contender [and actor], whether a member of the polity or not, and [this tended] to initiate a general round of mutual testing among contenders.[37]

The second time block witnessed reactive action by the PKI (a response to protect its accumulated resources then being claimed by the Army, which was in a de facto duumvirate with President Sukarno) and a mobilizing strategy on the part of the Army. The block's social contract expired toward the end of 1962 as the PKI displaced the Army as the President's favourite partner. This compels an examination of the distribution of the "political power chances" at the end of the contract.

Lastly, from late 1962 to late 1964 the PKI was engaged in a "proactive" or offencive strategy (both designations for plans of action that see a group lay claim "to resources from which it had previously been considered ineligible, and [be] resisted by at least one other group"[38]), while the Army was thrust into a reactive state, in which it attempted to retain control over resources acquired under the previous contract. It is felt that this specific combination of strategies, one deployed by a rising actor and the other by an actor that had recently enjoyed substantial power, especially over its current rival, is particularly volatile. In this situation, it is not difficult to imagine either actor attempting to act decisively against the other. It is this political environment that led inexorably to the events of 1965.

Hypothesis

The present study, which is based on the aforementioned framework, culminates in an examination of the situation in 1965 between the Army and the PKI, when each attempted to stage a favourable decisive event (accelerator or decelerator) and vanquish its rival. The underlying

hypothesis is that a revolutionary outcome was "on the agenda" for Indonesia, owing to the PKI's successful attainment of diverse capabilities in the context of a developing revolutionary situation, but that the nonrevolutionary contender, the Army, neutralized these capabilities by preempting the staging of an effective accelerator. The transition from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome depended upon which contender was able to destroy the capabilities of the other. In other words, only if there had been an effective accelerator could the revolutionary situation in Indonesia have culminated in a revolution in 1965. This hypothesis can be restated in terms of variables:

Dependent variable:	A revolutionary situation failing to result in a revolutionary outcome.
Independent variable:	The absence of an accelerator and the use of a decelerator.

Earlier Scholarship

The importance of the decisive event in the Indonesian case, which has been called the "abortive Communist coup attempt of September 30-October 1" in the literature, has been vastly misunderstood, owing to the lack of a theoretical orientation and undue focus upon the two contenders in isolation from one another. There are, however, several excellent works relating either exclusively to the PKI or to the TNI. The two most outstanding works on the Army -- Crouch (1978) and Sundhaussen (1982)--comprise scholarly efforts to understand an actor that, in relation to the PKI, has been greatly understudied.[39] Crouch, for his part, focusses on the Army's development of political interests and political orientation since the revolution. His study valuably delineates the Army's philosophy of political involvement yet fails to connect this

seemingly autonomous process to the needs of actor survival, especially in the face of the PKI threat that emerged in the mid-1950s. Similarly, Sundhaussen argues that the Army takeover in 1965 relates to the military leaders' attitudes and perceptions, not those of their civilian adversaries. Once again, one witnesses the autonomous process of the Army's politicization that ineluctably results in it wielding supreme power. The major weakness of these, and ancillary, works on the Army stems from the methodological assumption that this actor is best understood in isolation from others in the Indonesian polity.[40] The dynamism that the PKI opposition, at least in part, fostered in military circles has been erroneously attributed to the Army's own abilities and nature.[41]

The same general argument made about studies of the Army may be applied to the larger number of studies conducted on the PKI. In several studies, the PKI, too, has been shorn of the effects of its political environment. From the perspective of domestic politics, the party has been studied with a focus on the implementation of a national front strategy (Hindley, 1964) — which is very useful in detailing how capabilities were secured, at least up until 1963 — but, again, the countervailing force of its contender, the Army, is absent.[42]

Van der Kroef (1965), fortunately, considers the party's theoretical principles and organizational structure within the context of its place in the polity.[43] This approach permits one to gauge, at least partially (up to mid-1964), the effects of the Army, as a contender, upon the PKI. The observer is also able to determine how the party reacted with regard to tactical coalitions, namely with President Sukarno.

Both Mortimer (1974) and Tornquist (1986) concentrate on ideology.

For the former, this was the real expression of the party's strength, especially its "ingenuity and flexibility."[44] Mortimer argues that to survive politically in independent Indonesia, the PKI had to "Indonesianize" its Marxism-Leninism and work within the natural cultural bounds of the polity. The party could afford to ignore its capabilities: there was to the leaders a "seeming irrelevance of the size of [their] following to the problem of gaining power under Indonesian conditions."[45] Thus, the interaction between Sukarno's brand of nationalism — which fell into disrepute after the coup attempt in 1965 — and the PKI's ideology is, according to Mortimer, the major factor to which the party's immolation may be attributed. Tornquist argues at the same abstract level: the PKI is best understood in terms of its ideology, to which it owes it collapse. "Unable to make a correct analysis" is the sole reason given for the PKI's demise.[46] The real factors behind the party's rise and fall -- organization, leadership, the structural environment, and a decelerator -- are never mentioned.

Those studies that attempt to analyze the PKI within the international communist setting are inherently limited in their explanation of the most important forces impinging upon the party: those domestic forces represented by Sukarno and the Army, and the "intricate rivalries, maneuvers, and realignments" in which they all engaged. Simon (1969) considers the PKI only within the larger context of the process of alliance formation between the two radical-nationalist regimes of Indonesia and the People's Republic of China in the mid-1960s.[47] The party's significance as an autonomous actor is completely underestimated in his study, as is the case in Dake (1973).[48] While making a fine study of the party's drive to stage an accelerator, Dake is unconvincing

in his argument that the attempted coup in 1965 was a plot by China -- in concert with its local minion cultivated since 1955 (the PKI) -- and Sukarno to have the party seize power. Again, very little is mentioned in terms of the Army's role in the failed coup.

The last study under consideration in this category is by Corsino (1982).[49] This author contends that the PKI can be beneficially understood as a possible "state-actor," virtually possessing the essential elements of a state: a government, territory, people, and sovereignty. What is of interest here is not the possibility of the PKI engaging in international relations inside or outside the international communist system, but rather that, when considered as a domestic actor, one is presented with a pristine image of multiple sovereignty. Thus, although the Army has been omitted from the Corsino study, it is still possible to draw upon this unique and insightful piece that fully illuminates the breadth and depth of the PKI's capabilities.

It is evident thus far that the existing body of literature suffers from a woeful neglect of study of the dynamic interaction between the PKI and TNI, although studies of each actor separately are plentiful and, on the whole, well executed. There remains one last study, by Reeve (1985), that attempts to put some perspective on the interaction between the two contenders.[50] Reeve's approach is novel: he wishes to explain, among other things, how the traditional Indonesian concept of social organization -- functional representation -- came to be implemented, and why only partially, from 1959 to 1962 in Indonesian political institutions. He provides an indirect window on that most important element in Aya's framework: the prevailing terms of the social contract as expressed institutionally. The rise of functional representation,

which denies the relevance of class, was sponsored by the Army as a tactical means of neutralizing the class-based ideology and party system of political representation espoused by the PKI. This struggle, and the failure of the Army after 1962 to sustain a favourable institutional expression of the social contract, offers a rare opportunity to examine those elements of the "political conflict" approach that are not found elsewhere in the literature.

This literature review may affirm the importance of approaching Indonesian political developments from the perspective of revolution. There are many explanations of the two main actors, yet little enough comprehension of the two acting dynamically and dialectically. There may be a need to redress that understanding. A proper appraisal of what occurred in 1965, and what could have occurred, is of fundamental importance, at the very least, if one is to understand Indonesia after 1965.

Organization of the Study

The delineation of the contents of the remaining chapters follows. In Chapter II appears an analysis of the developing revolutionary situation in Indonesia. The analysis focuses upon the nature and profusion of political parties in Indonesia until 1957. It examines the costs of the failure of parliamentary democracy to the functioning of the Indonesian polity and what effect this had in altering the actors, and their strategies. Additionally, it delineates the success of the PKI as a product of the period of mass party politics, and its changed prospects in the wake of a new social contract.

In Chapter III the focus is on the nature of the new Army-Sukarno social contract and how it affected both the Army and the PKI in their

quest for capabilities and in their political manoeuvring. This chapter concentrates on the institutional expression of the new social contract and accents the continued development of the revolutionary situation. Of particular concern is the increasingly statelike nature of both the PKI and the TNI.

Chapter IV examines the changed situation in 1962-1963, when the social contract was once again redrawn, this time in favour of the PKI. Its effect on the two contenders is evaluated and the salience of international disputes and issues, primarily the "Crush Malaysia" campaign, is analyzed with regard to the quest for capabilities between the actors. The examination of developments takes us to the twilight days of Indonesia in late 1964.

In Chapter V the centre of attention is the drive by each actor for the opportunity to stage a favourable decisive event in the year 1965. An intensive study is made of the capabilities available to, and the social distribution of power chances of, each actor. The intricate manoeuvres and tactical alliances so emphasized in the "political conflict" approach are also analyzed.

In Chapter VI conclusions are drawn on the basis of the Indonesian case. Conclusions are made about the movement from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome, and how the theoretical framework either helps or hinders our understanding of that transformation. Finally, the different requirements facing revolutionary and nonrevolutionary contenders are assessed.

CHAPTER II

A SOCIAL CONTRACT WITHOUT PURPOSE: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA AND THE COMMUNIST PHOENIX

Even as Indonesian revolutionaries succeeded in collectively negotiating the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949, they remained divided. On the important issue of the institutional expression of their newly won freedom, the nationalist movement was badly split.[1] The adoption of the national social contract -- the philosophical undergirding that structured and ordered the legitimate participants, set the tenor, and specified the limits of political interaction -- had cleaved Indonesian nationalists into two distinct groups even from the very outset of their common struggle in 1945. Adherents of a liberal democratic contract challenged the adherents of a corporatist contract. The nature of that division and the manner in which the schism was resolved affected post-independence politics in an important fashion.

The particular set of conditions that led to the predominance of liberal democracy from 1945 to 1949, based on the need to fight the Dutch, ceased to exist after 1949. As well the fissiparous character of the political actors, partially suppressed in conditions of armed revolution, came to the fore after the same year. The direction of change was toward national disintegration, and the political order was

prone to attack and abuse by its adherents, from within, and by its detractors, from without.

From within the contract, disaffected political parties defected from the liberal democratic order in the wake of the 1955 national elections; from without, those political forces that preferred the displaced corporatist norms, and hence were excluded from the outset of the erection of liberal democracy in 1949, agitated during the lifetime of the weak liberal democracy in an effort to overthrow it. The latter forces consisted mainly of President Sukarno and the Army. Increasingly beleaguered by challenges to its legitimacy, the weak liberal democratic order also provided optimal conditions within which the PKI could assert rival claims to power and secure adherents and resources.

With a lack of consensus among Indonesia's top political leaders on important matters of state — the political nature of the state, the economy, and development policies — the task of contenders to assert themselves became easier during liberal democracy. Within this context, it is understandable why there could emerge from both ends of the political spectrum sustained challenges to the liberal democratic framework. From the right, the Army struggled to retain a political existence separate from the liberal democractic politicians, and when dissension arose among the politicians, the Army served to reinforce the cleavages. In destroying liberal democracy, the Army allied itself with the President, who had his own reasons for agreeing to cooperate, which related to his personal loss of power at the hands of the same politicians after 1949. From the left, the PKI had to overcome the ignominy of its attempt in 1948 to seize control of the independence movement just prior to an impending Dutch military attack on the

Republic. In attempting to make itself respectable, the PKI helped to polarize domestic politics by allying itself with the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (Partai Nasional Indonesia -- PNI) in the advancement of Javanese political and economic interests. This strategy served to weaken the fabric of liberal democracy and divided the nation's leadership. More importantly, the failure of others to govern (which the PKI exacerbated but did not create) provided the Communists with an opportunity to demonstrate their leadership qualities. However, despite the good fortune (from the perspective of the PKI) of having an irrevocably divided national leadership, the collapse of liberal democracy was to have damaging consequences for the party after 1957.

The Rise and Consolidation of Liberal Democracy in Indonesia, 1945-1949

Perhaps more than any other factor, it was the concern for appearances that led to the rise of a liberal democratic form of politics in the early days of independent Indonesia.[2] In their common struggle against the Dutch and their allied British forces, the nationalists quickly surmised that their greatest strength was not to be found in the material sphere. The Indonesians could not rely upon any coercive resources because they were largely nonexistent.[3] Thus they had to emphasize the intensity of the convictions of the Indonesian people for independence, and convince sympathetic foreign powers of the sincerity of those convictions. Insofar as it was necessary to convince powerful foreign states of the Indonesian desire for independence, and have them help to prevail over the Dutch on the political and diplomatic fronts at the international level, a social contract that would be acceptable to these same powers was adopted. The corporatist social contract and its

embodiment, the constitution in place since 17 August 1945, were pushed aside by November 1945.[4]

In the process, the "Syahrir group" — the defender of the liberal democratic order — was not detained by excessive theorizing on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the institutions they envisaged creating for Indonesia. The looming battle with the Dutch had ensured the unimportance of such tasks. As Anderson has argued,

> Given Syahrir's long standing commitment to 'democratic' processes, [and] the wish to demonstrate ordered and democratic government to the outside world...it must have seemed to Syahrir and his colleagues that the existence of several parties would be an appropriate response to the particular situation and, in the longer term, a democratic and legitimate expression of the diversity of Indonesia's highly plural society.[5]

In contrast to this positive image were the negative connotations associated with the Sukarno leadership and the attendant corporatist contract, not only in the minds of the Dutch and their Allies, but also, to some degree, in opposition groups at home. That the Indonesian revolution was undemocratic, that its institutions were "fascist"[6] bodies inherited from the Japanese, that its highest leaders were potentially authoritarian or actually unrepentant collaborators,[7] and that the Indonesians could not govern themselves were all perceptions, some of which were based on fact, that had to be dispelled from the minds of those powers that could make up for the material weakness of the new Republic.

Grafting liberal democratic characteristics on to the texture of the Indonesian revolution was a matter of survival. The Indonesians believed that by bringing Syahrir into the political establishment, and by introducing the trappings of a liberal democratic social contract, the Republic would have better chances of success at the negotiating table

with the Dutch. Later, when the Dutch pursued an immensely successful strategy of military occupation, Syahrir's presence and influence in the uppermost echelons of the Republican leadership afforded much diplomatic and behind-the-scenes support for the imperilled Republic.[8] For the remainder of the struggle with the Dutch, liberal democratic norms and political forms -- the political parties -- continued to gain ascendancy over the corporatist vision and its political vehicles, despite constitutional provisions safeguarding the latter.[9]

The reasons for the ultimate Indonesian success against the Dutch, Anderson states, "had little to do with the Republican state":

> The prime factor was a highly localized popular resistance, above all in Java and Sumatra, expressed through a myriad of extrastate politico-military organizations, locally recruited, financed and led.... What linked these myriad resistances together was not the state, but a common vision of a free nation.[10]

The success of the revolution, therefore, involved the "freeing up" of the politics of the new nation from November 1945 onward. Sukarno's proposal, on the day after independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945, to erect a monolithic organization called the PNI-Staatspartij (Partai Nasional Indonesia-Staatspartij -- Indonesian Nationalist Party-State Party), which would have invariably resulted in a one-party state, would have jeopardized or retarded the revolution by stifling the expression of political beliefs.[11] The necessity of winning the revolution compelled the abandonment of a potentially stymieing corporatist social contract.

The problem of revising Indonesia's style of politics was not seriously addressed during the last climactic year of its revolution, save in supplanting the defunct 1945 Constitution with a new document that coincided with existing conditions. Indeed, the 1949 Constitution, promulgated on 27 December 1949, at the time of the transfer of

sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI), was less a positive attempt to create new ideals and institutions than a negative attempt to supplant disliked corporatist forms and organizations. In this sense, the 1949 Constitution could not but feature liberal democratic norms and institutions.

In contrast to the 1945 Constitution, the document drafted in 1949 as the highest law of the Indonesian nation was an endorsement of parliamentary democracy, individual rights, and the party system.[12] "Democracy" was to be attained and safeguarded by making ministers responsible to the (provisional) Parliament (the People's Representative Body, or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat — DPR) that comprised a territorially-based senate and a chamber of representatives. The members of both bodies were to be freely and popularly elected, meaning that party competition would be the primary form of political activity in Indonesia.[13] General elections were to be called within one year of the date when the provisional Constitution became operative, and from this result there would be created a Constituent Assembly (konstituante) that would be charged with drafting a permanent constitution. Although the 1949 Constitution lasted less than a year, a victim of the unitarist movement to undo the Dutch-created federalist structure of RUSI,[14] its replacement, the 1950 provisional Constitution, retained the major elements of the liberal democractic contract for the reconstituted unitary state.

Inherent Weaknesses of the Liberal Democratic Contract

The new constitutional order suffered from several important defects. The new order had created "losers" who had no place in the new contract: these actors could be considered extra-contract challengers.

These were actors at the margins of power who could not transform themselves into the "proper" political vehicle -- a political party-- such as the Army, or whose personal inclinations disfavoured liberal democracy (President Sukarno).[15] These two actors were not disgruntled with the success of liberal democracy so much as they were with their own failure to erect a new political order. Their political fortunes during the course of the armed struggle with the Dutch seemed to herald future political power. During the revolution Sukarno had enjoyed wide powers within the framework of a contract of his own making, and the Army had assumed for itself the position of "savior of the nation." Both actors were relegated to marginal or subservient roles after 1949.

The new Constitution, for example, rudely demoted Sukarno from the position of foremost nationalist leader with wide powers to a mere figurehead.[16] Furthermore, the liberal democratic politicians were unprepared to appreciate the Army's sense of political independence. When the parties and the politicians acted in unison in relation to the two actors, little prevented them from taking their preferred course of action. Neither the Army nor the President possessed sufficient power alone to change liberal democracy. Even though Sukarno noisily attacked liberal democracy during the course of his annual Independence Day speeches, especially after 1952,[17] and the Army demanded a larger political role,[18] liberal democracy was not weakened.

The new order also created "victors." The parties became the self-styled inheritors of the revolution. In this capacity, however, the inner workings of parliamentary democracy, coupled with the temporary nature of the Constitution, created difficulties. The major difficulty related to cabinet formation. The cabinet was to be selected from the

unrepresentative and unelected delegates of the Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat — KNIP[19]), which had served as the temporary parliament during the revolution. The problem was that until preparations for national elections were complete, the cabinet could not dissolve the DPR or change its composition. Thus, from 1949 until 1956, when national election results were first used as the basis of cabinet membership, cabinet formation and political action at the highest levels became a matter of balancing the demands of the original formulators of the liberal democratic contract — the parties based in the old KNIP. After 1949 these parties took control of the nation; they were confident that their demonstrated ability to defeat a former colonial power could be successfully translated into a capacity to govern. Thus began the postindependence experiment in liberal democracy.

The Era of Liberal Democracy and the Rise of Contenders, 1949-1957

The contract formulators, coexisting mainly on the basis of a shared belief in an unqualified freedom, had very little reason to struggle for nationwide goals after 1949. Instead, particularist goals that reflected the specific set of interests on which the party or group was founded came to the fore of its political demands. The Constitution of 1949 provided for political interaction, and allowed for all but a very few political actors.[20] The guidelines of legitimate political participation were assumed, but not clearly defined.

In the theoretical terms used by Aya, the liberal democractic contract defined the actors' identities, aims, options, bases of solidarity, and collective efforts. In its manner of political operation, the liberal democractic Indonesian leadership was almost

united. On the matter of liberal democracy in Indonesia, too, "the political elite was substantially united on fundamentals."[21] This homogeneity of orientation and action prompted Feith to assert that, on the basis of six measures, Indonesia and its leaders upheld a liberal democracy:

> Civilians played a dominant role. Parties were of very great importance. The contenders for power showed respect for "rules of the game" which were closely related to the existing constitution [entailing "options," "bases of solidarity," and "collective efforts"]. Most members of the political elite had some sort of commitment to symbols connected with constitutional democracy [entailing "identities" and "aims"]. Civil liberties were rarely infringed. Finally, governments used coercion sparingly. This represented, at the very least, an attempt to maintain and develop constitutional democracy.[22]

The political parties appeared to be the defenders of liberal democracy, able and willing to employ its machinery in the pursuit of their political interests.

Importantly, Feith's definition of liberal democracy excludes the fundamental principle of representation. In accordance with the argument put forward by Goh, if a "complete" definition of democracy includes Feith's six characteristics plus the principle of representation, then liberal democracy existed in Indonesia only from March 1956 to April 1957, "when the only elected cabinet government in the history of Indonesia held office."[23] Unfortunately, Goh does not attempt to explain why it took five years and six cabinets to finally stage a national election. Instead he simplistically asserts that "the idea of democracy came naturally to the Indonesian nationalists."[24]

Prior to national elections, there existed in Indonesia no basis of determining which parties or groups ought to be in the seat of government, the cabinet, save the particular group's or party's ability to manipulate its way into power or opportunistically deprive its rivals

of the same. Generally, in terms of the political "rules," the parties did indeed have common identities (they were political parties), aims (they wanted to be in the cabinet and Parliament), options (they reverted to opportunism, coalition building, and coalition destroying), bases of solidarity (they all claimed to represent a particular group), and collective efforts (they concentrated their efforts on parliamentary struggle). In contrast to this uniformity, liberal democracy in Indonesia had no purpose, no definitive and constructive end towards which it steered the nation. Liberal democracy in Indonesia was merely a structure; it was an arena without political substance or direction. Although this can be said of all liberal democracies, the Indonesian example is extraordinary because its adherents were almost unanimously opposed to elections — the very hallmark of such contracts.

Party Behaviour, 1950-1957

The patterns of politicking that were to last until 1957 were evident when the task of governing Indonesia began in 1949: the imminence of national elections served to foster destructive political patterns. Pauker tells us that "the first years of the young Republic as a recognized sovereign state were marked by a continuation and even accentuation of group conflicts."[25] Trouble began as soon as the composition of the first unitary cabinet, under Natsir, was announced on 6 September 1950. The centre of the coalition was Natsir's Masjumi party (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia — Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims); an alliance with seven other parties cemented Natsir's grip on power. In building a workable coalition, however, the second largest party in the country (after Masjumi), PNI, was conspicuously absent.

The manner in which the PNI was not included in the cabinet, and its

reaction to its predicament, set the style of cabinet formation — and destruction — that was to characterize further endeavours in this area prior to national elections:

> The PNI declined to join the cabinet because it was not offered as many seats as it felt entitled to....
>
> Five members of Parliament — two non-party members acting in behalf of the PNI and three others from smaller parties — presented a motion calling on the President to name three formateurs for a new cabinet, one from the Masjumi, one from the PNI, and one from another group. Natsir and his cabinet refused to accept the self-liquidation implicit in this demand and called for a vote of confidence. The PNI voted with the various Communist groups against the government. In this it was joined by two other groups which had hitherto been counted in the government's coalition...[In addition, one party which had] previously supported the government, abstained from voting.[26]

In this particular vote, the government survived, but liberal democracy itself could not in the long-run weather the strategy employed by the PNI in this confrontation. The strategy was wholly self-serving and, as van der Kroef has remarked, constituted little more than "rank opportunism."[27] By 1954, for example, the PNI had "twice in the past five years...brought down a cabinet, though it had helped to form and occupied seats in that cabinet."[28]

What Kahin has called "irresponsibility in politics" came to dominate Indonesia's experience with parliamentary democracy.[29] There existed, even in 1951, when Kahin was writing, a

> ...tendency toward social irresponsibility among the leaders of some political parties, and their obsession [was] with the struggle for personal power for its own sake.... Irresponsibility and the stress on personal power to a considerable extent result from the fact that the competition for leadership is generally not exacting enough....
>
> There is also an ingrained psychological reason for the dangerous social irresponsibility shown by a number of Indonesian political leaders, and particularly in the behavior of certain political parties in Parliament. This arises in part from their long conditioning to the politics of opposition. They were <u>against</u> colonial rule, <u>against</u> the colonial government's policy in the Volksraad (parliament), <u>against</u> negotiations with the Dutch. During most of their careers they have been an opposition

> without responsibility and with little or no opportunity to participate in the positive development of policy.[30]

Soedjatmoko has asserted that

> instead of developing into organs mediating between the needs, problems and wishes of the electorate, and the purposes, limitations and problems at the level of the national government, the parties became mere instruments in the power play of their leader.[31]

There is no better illustration of this than the PNI: "The opportunistic nature of the Nationalist Party's behavior and program," says van Niel, writing in 1953, "suggests a complete lack of discipline and principle. Many of its members might be as willing to cooperate with the Communists as with the Masjumi. Many others are simply waiting to see which will emerge the stronger in the coming months."[32] Examining the situation at a general level, van Niel sadly concluded that there was a

> ...a lack of a common base of understanding or point of general departure....
>
> Leaders seem to have only the vaguest notion of their social and cultural objectives. One leading Indonesian has aptly said that his country stands between a shattered myth and an unformulated one. Politics has not made way for statecraft. The principles of state that were advanced during the revolution, the Pantjasila, remain vague signposts of direction, but nothing has been done to bring about a solid understanding of the aims and goals to be pursued.[33]

The incomplete Indonesian liberal democratic social contract thus served to foster unfounded hopes of attaining power among a multitude of parties and groups that ostensibly adhered to its rules. When an elections act was finally passed in April 1953,[34] for example, it had the unanticipated effect of causing yet more political divisions. Hatta has succinctly traced out the devastating logic that the act had on the parties:

> The party chiefs draw up the list of candidates for Parliament. Indonesians vote for a party, not for individuals: X votes elect the top leader on the list, 2X votes elect the first two, 3X votes elect the first three and so on. If the twenty at the

> bottom of a party's list of candidates feel they have no chance of election they form a new party and put themselves at the top of its list. In a big constituency of many millions even a [weak] party can manage to elect the top two or three candidates. The one-chamber parliament elected in 1955 subsequently included fifteen parties with five members, or less. This fosters parliamentary irresponsibility.[35]

The elections law was drafted so as to subject the political parties to the principle of representation, and presumably simplify the political landscape by reducing the number of political parties, yet it lacked the criteria for the formation of parties.

Under these conditions, it became almost natural for those political parties lucky enough to be in power in the cabinets preceding the election to convert preelection privilege into postelection power. Anderson has remarked that

> building nationwide parties in a nation of roughly 100 million people was naturally an expensive proposition. The leaders found that a cheap way to develop their organizations was to enroll supporters inside the state apparatus. Thus, the civil bureaucracy swelled.... An economically weak state was in no position to pay this vast body adequately (and so maintain some inner institutional discipline). The inevitable consequences were spreading corruption (some personal, some for party coffers) and declining efficacy. And insofar as all governments of the 1950-1957 period were coalitions of parties, departmental segmentation under patronage politics became even more serious.[36]

The PNI, for example, employed a government scheme designed to foster the development of an indigenous class of import and export traders (the benteng programme) in a self-serving manner. According to Glassburner, "under the minister of economic affairs, Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, the issuing of licenses became primarily a means of financial support for the Nationalist Party."[37] The Department of Information was regarded as a Nationalist stronghold, while the Masjumi and the Ulama Association (Nadhatul Ulama — NU) succeeded in commanding the loyalty of the members of the Department of Religious Affairs.

The conduct of the political parties was an illustration of Indonesian liberal democracy's lack of political civility. The extremely large number of political actors had to grapple, more so than in the 1940s, with each other's demands in the new era of peace and independence when positive political action, policy formulation, and implementation came to be expected of them by the Indonesian citizenry. The promises made in 1949, however, failed to set the nation on an orderly schedule and deleteriously served to set party against party, resulting ultimately in the polarization of society. The main consequences of this were failure of cabinets and the government to take action on important issues, the collapse of successive cabinets on relatively minor matters, and increasingly bitter purges of the decreasingly autonomous organs of the state as parties moved in and out of the cabinet. Failing to fulfill these tasks, the liberal democratic parties drew the extra-contract forces of the Army and President Sukarno into the political arena, while ensuring the PKI's rise to power from within.

Building a State-Within-A-State: The PKI's United National Front

The PKI reacted differently from the other political parties to the conditions of liberal democracy and the challenge of national elections. To the PKI, liberal democracy in Indonesia became the ideal environment within which to pursue its political interests. With the exception of the time period at the beginning of liberal democracy (1949-1950), the Communists respected and upheld liberal democratic norms and institutions. At one level, the PKI's identity, aims, options, bases of solidarity, and collective efforts were set by the liberal democratic contract, as was true of the other political parties. The party

respected the "rules of the game" and upheld the tenets of constitutional democracy, especially from 1951 to 1957; in this regard the PKI was indistinguishable from its political counterparts.[38] By utilizing the existing political structure and, in time, exposing and exacerbating its weaknesses, the PKI strove to develop an alternative ideological claim to power and acquire a governmental structure, territory, and people.

Even from the outset of liberal democracy in 1949, the PKI benefited from the new contract more so than other parties. In 1948, when the PKI's attempt to seize control of the independence movement at Madiun failed, it was discredited.[39] Not only had the PKI struck when the Republic was imperilled by an impending Dutch military attack, but its actions seemed to be part of a wider Moscow-inspired plot to communize Southeast Asia. In 1948 there had been Communist uprisings in Burma, the Philippines, and Malaya. However, regardless of these events, and the perceptions of many Indonesians about the PKI's external ties, the "Madiun Affair" became less important in the face of the renewed Dutch military threat and, later, in the conditions of hope and goodwill that surrounded the transfer of sovereignty. While the PKI was destroyed as an organization — its top leadership was decimated, its cadres scared away, and its front organizations nearly gutted — it retained strong representation in the DPR. In the conditions of liberal democracy, therefore, the PKI appeared to be "forgiven" and was largely left alone to contend for power.

Nevertheless, from 1949 to 1951 the PKI remained a marginal political sect, a lowly status guaranteed by its treachery in 1948. The damage that the Republican forces had inflicted upon the party, however, had caused it to lose many of its top leaders and "most first and many

second echelon leaders."[40] Hindley adds that

> the imprisoned numbered approximately 30,000 Communists and other leftists. In the following months [after September 1948] what Communist or Communist-sympathizing officers there had been in the army were carefully weeded out. The Communist-led trade union federation, S.O.B.S.I., lost its president, while its membership fell from about 1 1/2 million at the time of the rebellion to 220,000 a year later.[41]

In fact, party membership was about 4,000 in 1948,[42] and, according to Hindley, "must have been below 5,000" in 1951.[43] The nadir of the party's existence seemed to come in 1956 when its efforts to merge with two other Marxist parties, the Labour Party (Partai Buruh) and the Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis), failed.

The PKI ensured its lack of political success throughout this period by standing "in outright opposition to the Hatta [December 1949-September 1950], Natsir [September 1950 - March 1951] and Sukiman [April 1951 - February 1952] cabinets," which it "had strongly and consistently attacked...as reactionary governments and instruments of imperialism, and sometimes as fascist."[44]. Feith adds that the party "made little attempt to associate itself with the symbols of the nationalist revolution."[45] Indeed, the PKI during this period of "oppositionism" "scorned the symbols of Indonesian nationalism, arguing that the United States, not the Netherlands, was Indonesia's chief enemy, and even [issued] a rejection, quickly retracted, of Indonesia's claim for the entry of West Irian into her own territory."[46]

The PKI had itself to blame for its abysmal performance until early 1951. The extant political order presented the party with wide opportunities for both mobilization and collective action. Furthermore, many of its cadres and sympathizers who had been incarcerated after Madiun were soon set free and participated in the closing stages of the

revolution. Thus, despite much latent support — a consequence of Indonesian liberal democracy itself — the PKI remained indistinguishable from the multitude of other political parties.

The year 1951 marked a decisive break for the PKI: a new, vibrant, and creative leadership embarked upon the road to the construction of a statelike organization and the creation of a revolutionary situation. Tired of the PKI's seemingly self-imposed political obscurity, a group of young revolutionaries — the Sajap Leninis, or Leninist Wing — took over the party leadership in January 1951. Under the guidance of Dipa Nusantara Aidit, the party effected a preliminary and promising reintegration into the mainstream of Indonesian politics by engaging in parliamentary activities. The Communists' renewed interest in party politics marked the beginning of a profound reassessment of their role in Indonesia and in the prospects of building socialism.

At the most fundamental level, the ideology that the Aidit leadership created for the party, right up to 1965, was a rival claim to power and legitimacy designed to serve a revolutionary contender. At the most basic level, the organization and the ideology meant to serve it, "represented a challenge, albeit for many years an [indirect], circuitous one, to the ruling government":

> To PKI leaders they were the sole inheritors of the correct technique for nationbuilding, that of Indonesian socialism based on the truths of Marxism-Leninism. As communists, the PKI leaders viewed themselves as the vanguard of the working class that was predestined by the objective force of history to effect the revolutionary transformation of Indonesian society. The clear implication was that the PKI leaders regarded themselves as, inexorably, the future governmental rulers of a socialist Indonesian state. The Indonesian nationalist revolution (against the Dutch) was deemed but the first part of the envisioned total overhaul of the socio-economic and political order. PKI Chairman Dipa N. Aidit, in fact, viewed the PKI as the "heir" to the Indonesian revolution.[47]

While the party respected the "rules of the game" and the symbols of the liberal democratic contract, from 1951 to 1957, this conformity must not be confused with the party's distinctiveness and ulterior revolutionary goals. As Corsino has asserted

> Aidit desired an active PKI overtly defined by its communist identity. While moored to the style of the peaceful parliamentary road, the PKI would stress not its uniformity with, but distinctiveness from, other parties as well as its separate base of legitimacy vis-à-vis the government as a whole. Unlike Tan [Tan Ling Djie, the party's major leader from late 1948 to early 1951], Aidit would more consciously address the question of gaining power in Indonesia by stressing the PKI's rightful claim to leadership over the entire Indonesian nationalist movement.... Under Aidit, the PKI was to remain a communist revolutionary movement. And as such, it inexorably plotted a road toward gaining power, actively envisioning itself as a future state-ruler, through faith in Marxist-Leninist dialectics, long before the goal, for practical purposes, was attainable.[48]

The united national front strategy was based on the realization by the PKI leadership that the other political parties had no intention of sharing power with it or permitting it to control their members, and also that its past political behaviour concentrating on parliamentary work was an incomplete mechanism to achieve power.[49] Thus, the united national front strategy was to coordinate the PKI's parliamentary activities and dealings with other political parties (called the "united front from above"). It was also to build an organizational foundation for the party among the groups and classes as yet unpoliticized and unrecruited by the other political parties found within Indonesian society (called the "united front from below").

The most important assumption of the national united front strategy — that Indonesia was a semicolonial, semifeudal country[50] — guided all major PKI activities throughout the period covered by this study. Indonesia had internal and external enemies, feudalism and imperialism respectively. Party analyses proclaimed the importance of destroying

imperialism first, for it was the sponsor of feudal Indonesian elements. Aidit argued,

> If viewed from the tactical angle of the particular conditions of the present moment, the head of the revolutionary spear should in the first place be pointed at the foreign enemy (imperialism) and those feudalists and bourgeois who have become the agents of this foreign enemy.... we must concentrate all our efforts for a blow against imperialism in order thus to be able to settle the first contradiction, the contradiction between the Indonesian nation and imperialism.[51]

From this analysis it neatly followed as to which classes in society constituted the motive forces of the revolution, and which were their enemies.[52] Aidit and other party theoreticians recognized the proletariat as "the basic force pushing the revolution forward."[53] However, as was clearly demonstrated by the disastrous events of the period from 1948 to 1950, the proletariat had to have allies in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism. Therefore, because of its victimization by these two enemies, the peasantry "can be, for the working class, not only the most numerous ally but also the most loyal and most trusted ally."[54] Also listed among the driving forces of the revolution was the petty bourgeoisie -- the urban poor, the intellectuals, the small traders, the handicraft workers, the fishermen, and the independent workers.[55]

The bourgeoisie was seen as split between compradors and nationalists. The compradors could become allies of the revolution because they were subject to several imperialist masters; the PKI counted the pro-American Masjumi and the pro-British Socialist Party of Indonesia (Partai Sosialis Indonesia -- PSI), which was led by Syahrir, as compradors. In the struggle against imperialism, these parties constituted targets. The nationalist bourgeoisie was more naturally inclined to struggle against imperialism and feudalism but lacked the

courage to do so, according to the PKI.

Lastly, the landlord class was perceived to be "a target of the revolution,"[56] but only in the longer-term struggle against feudalism itself. On the basis of these classifications the PKI leadership predicted that for the revolution to succeed, "the working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie must unite in one national front."[57] Building such a front was undertaken at two levels: among the political parties and other extant political forces, and among the "masses."

The "United Front from Above"

Ostensibly, the purpose of the PKI's "united front from above" was to forge an alliance between the "progressive" groups (the urban proletariat and peasantry) and the "middle" groups (the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie) in the political arena to defeat the reactionary "pig-heads" ("the feudal and comprador class working hand in hand with foreign imperialism").[58] On the basis of this simple characterization of the extant political forces, and despite the seeming ideological vehemence of its terminology, the party proceeded after November 1951 to effect several important policy changes. These greatly moderated, while masking, the PKI's revolutionary intentions.

There were three primary policy shifts. First, the PKI agreed to support the Wilopo Cabinet (April 1952 to June 1953) despite the refusal of its Masjumi members to permit the entry of Communists or Communist-supported persons. Second, the party's categorization of political forces necessitated an alliance with the "middle" group, which had as its representatives the PNI, NU, the Islamic Education Party (Perti), and the Islamic Association Party (PSII). The PKI went to such lengths in

cementing an alliance with these groups that their front was "of a type which involved no insistence on Communist hegemony."[59] It was hoped that together these parties would stand against Masjumi and the PSI. The party's analysis of President Sukarno, to some degree caused by his increasingly vocal attacks on the liberal democratic contract, placed him firmly in the category of the "middle" group, thus compelling the party to gain his support, too. Thirdly, the PKI "infused a new type of nationalism into its propaganda, namely the nationalism of the existing regime."[60]

To attain an aura of respectability vis-à-vis the other major political forces, the PKI undertook to mute its revolutionary demands; this, in turn, led to spectacular gains in its relations with the PNI, NU, and Sukarno. In making demands of a cabinet or government, or over the matter of its composition, the party tried hard to be reasonable.[61] Feith has remarked that the unprecedented extension of PKI support "involved not merely public proclamations but also the imposition of some degree of restraint on its supporting labor organizations."[62] Given the party's lessening of rhetoric and threats of labour and economic disruption, it seemed that the PKI's reentry into the political mainstream was irresistible even for the other political parties. The outcome of this policy reorientation could be seen as early as late 1952:

> The measure of the P.K.I.'s success in establishing its nationalist respectability could be seen from the fact that on August 17 [1952], the seventh anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic, the P.K.I. had positions of great influence in celebration committees throughout the archipelago. Just twelve months earlier the P.K.I. leaders had been arrested on the grounds that that they were planning to overthrow the state![63]

In no other area of political life of liberal democracy was Communist success with its "united front from above" more evident than in

its alliance with the PNI. Owing to several socio-economic and cultural factors that exceed the bounds of discussion of this study, the PNI was to some degree a natural ally of the PKI.[64] Moreover, from a political perspective, the PNI-PKI alliance was a product of the Indonesian liberal democratic contract. It had become evident to PNI leaders early in the life of the contract that the PNI's position as the preeminent political party was seriously threatened by the electoral success of Masjumi in the 1951 regional elections in Jogjakarta, the heartland of Javanese civilization — Central Java — whence the Nationalists drew almost all of their support.[65] The possibility of national elections was, therefore, a daunting prospect for the PNI. To prevent what was expected to be a disastrous election, the PNI delayed holding the exercise when it was in a position of power in cabinet. In the meantime, it actively searched for allies and, naturally, the support that the Communists (and the Java-based NU, which broke away from Masjumi in 1952) offered was duly accepted.

The consolidation of the PNI-PKI alliance was effected after the elections act was passed in April 1953, and was largely a by-product of the Masjumi-PNI rivalry. Indeed, almost immediately after the legislation passed, the political parties began their quest for the "winning" platform, which led to a dangerous political polarization. The Masjumi advocated an Islamic state, while the PNI propounded erstwhile revolutionary ways that focussed on nationalism. These demands were mutually antagonistic and made it difficult to contain preelection political irresponsibility and, later, to respect the electorate's decision. This was especially the case since many of the nation's extra-political cleavages came to be reinforced by the appeals of Javanese-

centred "nationalism" and "continuing revolution" on the one side, and, on the other, by the need for an Islamic state advocated most stridently by orthodox Muslims in Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), Aceh, and West Java.

In their efforts to sway the voters, neither the PNI nor Masjumi were reasonable. For example, accusations by a radical PNI leader that Masjumi was assisting the efforts of an armed band, Darul Islam, which was terrorizing West Java, prompted a Masjumi leader to respond equally tactlessly, "In Indonesia at the present time there is a cold war between Islam on the one hand and on the other those who call themselves Islamic and aren't."[66] In September 1953 the PNI chairman stated that his party desired to cooperate with "the extreme left and the extreme right."[67] In October 1954 the PNI-led cabinet of Sastroamidjojo lost a smaller party's crucial support and had to rely entirely on the PKI to stay in power. The PNI repaid the favour when its chairman issued the order to all of its branches to "establish close relations with the P.K.I.," stating, "I am confident you will carry out this task faithfully."[68]

When the September 1955 parliamentary election returns were announced in March 1956, the success of the Communists' alliance with the PNI and NU was immediately and unmistakably obvious.[69] The PKI not only polled the fourth largest number of votes nationwide, after PNI, Masjumi, and NU, but it also secured a territorial base in Central and East Java upon which it could count for solid support, resources, and adherents. The PKI obtained 88.6 per cent of its vote from Java, the population of which represented 66.2 per cent of the country's total.[70] In Java, the PKI obtained 74.9 per cent of its vote from Central and East Java, where 45.6 per cent of the Indonesian population lived.[71] The PKI was second in East Java and Central Java, after the PNI.[72] In the seven residencies in East Java, the PKI came first in two (Kediri and Madiun), second in

one (Bodjonegoro) and third in two (Besuki and Surabaja).[73] In the seven residencies in Central Java, the PKI placed first in three (Surakarta, Jogjakarta, and Semarang) and third in the rest (Pati, Kedu, Pekalongan, and Banjumas).[74] However, the PKI's success in West Java was abysmal: in Greater Jakarta, the PKI was a poor fourth. That the PKI had made such an unprecedented showing in Central and East Java nonetheless affirmed its role as a major actor in Indonesian politics.

The parliamentary returns were not mere happenstance: the party seemed to enjoy similar support in the Constituent Assembly election returns (held in December 1955).[75] General voter trends indicated a rise in PNI support and PKI support in Java. Meanwhile, the Masjumi continued to fare poorly in Java, thus making it more a representative of the outer islands, primarily Sumatra.[76]

"The very electoral successes the Communists had achieved in 1955," Lev asserts, "contained the seeds of destruction for the united national front policy."[77] The PKI drew most of its support from the same areas as did the PNI and NU — Central and East Java. Thus, despite PKI claims that it had achieved its success at the expense of Masjumi, PNI leaders in particular, reassessed their relationship with the Communists. Nevertheless, by 1956 the PKI's political fortunes seemed irreversible: very little could be done by PNI or NU to alter the situation. By 1956, the PKI stood triumphant over the parties with which it had previously allied:

> It was without competition as a well organized, unified, active, and spirited political party. The PNI, NU, and Masjumi,...were under attack for their inability to govern, for the deterioration of their party organizations, for their corruption; their demoralization was progressive.[78]

The PKI did not rest in such opportune conditions, but chose to

intensify its appeal to the Indonesian people. Programmatic revisions designed to widen the party's appeal to all elements in society were issued. For example, in July 1956 Aidit stated on behalf of the PKI, "We also agree to cooperate with the anti-imperialist landlords, but at the same time we fight to reduce rents for rice lands, and to ensure that the landlords do not exploit the peasants too much."[79]

Again, it was in the context of elections that the PKI's policy yielded it the most success. Regional elections for representative councils in the provinces and second-level districts (kabupaten) were staged from June to December 1957 in Java and South Sumatra.[80] The 1957 elections constituted a "great leap forward" for the PKI.[81] In the first election, for the district of Greater Jakarta, the PKI rose from its fourth place showing in 1955 to second place, supplanting the PNI. The next election, held in Central Java, witnessed a rout of the PNI and all other parties at the hands of PKI. In thirty out of the thirty-four second-level districts [kabupatens] of Central Java, Lev states, the PKI increased its vote proportionally more than any other major party.[82] In East Java the pattern of increased PKI support at the expense of the PNI was repeated. Although NU remained the most popular party, the PKI displaced PNI from second place, which was much better than its third place finish in 1955.[83] In West Java the PKI also enjoyed some success, displacing the PNI from second place. In nearly all of the twenty-three second-level districts, Communist strength increased.[84] Although this pattern was repeated in the South Sumatran elections, the main impact of the 1957 election was that the PKI emerged as Indonesia's largest party, at least in those parts of the country that staged elections. Lev has succinctly concluded,

> the PNI had slipped in less than two years from first place to third in the five districts considered. Masjumi and the NU had declined, but retained their relative positions in the provinces. The ominous thing for these last two parties was less the fact they had declined slightly than that the PKI had made such a startling advance. What was most disturbing was that the PKI was the only party to have increased its support since 1955. It was a growing party, while the others were apparently shrinking; and all the evidence pointed to the likelihood of the PKI continuing to grow and the others continuing to shrink.[85]

With regard to the other extant political forces, the party's cultivation of President Sukarno began in 1952. However, this "important and striking change in the party's attitude...has never been admitted or explained."[86] Again, as was true of its relations with the PNI, the success of the PKI's efforts to ally itself with the President was, in part, a consequence of Sukarno's own needs. Sukarno had personal reasons to dislike the liberal democratic style of politics and its leading spokesmen. Not only had they deprived him of the preponderant position of leadership embodied in the 1945 Constitution, but these same liberal politicians were insulting his own concern for Indonesia by not fulfilling the promises of the revolution and independence. By 1952 he was no longer expressing hope that each successive cabinet would set the nation on course; rather he began to voice his opposition to their programmes and composition. On 10 November 1952, for example, he attacked "those who act as if the national revolution were completed...who don't mention the words 'national revolution' any more."[87] On the matter of West Irian, the only part of the Netherlands Indies that had not been transferred to the Republic by the Dutch in 1949, he urged a renewed commitment to its attainment. When the Wilopo cabinet curtailed the President's powers and resources during its term in power, the incident could not but reinforce the President's desire to agitate against the liberal democratic contract.[88]

While President Sukarno was moving independently into a collision with liberal democracy by 1952, the PKI increasingly drew his support on the mutual concern of Indonesian nationalists — West Irian and sundry political and economic remnants of Dutch "imperialism" embodied in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the Round Table Conference agreements,[89] both documents being part of the transfer of sovereignty agreement of 1949. Sukarno had, as early as 17 August 1950, declared that West Irian

> is not a trifling question, this a is major issue.... This is a national task for us which cannot be evaded: Because we have pledged that we will fight till the end of time as long as one part of our country — however small that part may be — is not yet freed.... We will continue fighting, we will keep on fighting whatever may come until West Irian has been returned to our fold.[90]

The return of West Irian eluded Indonesia in 1950, and throughout the period of liberal democracy. After futile attempts to negotiate with the Dutch, and repeated failures at the United Nations to force the Dutch to accede to Indonesian demands, Sukarno became more strident in reasserting Indonesian control of the disputed territory. From the perspective of the PKI, a profoundly useful political environment had been created within which it could agitate and secure adherents.

The PKI's "lusty use of nationalism"[91] conveyed more than the message that the party was the foremost nationalist group. The PKI's ardent support for the Republic, the West Irian cause, and "of almost every proposal put forward by President Sukarno," served an ulterior motive:

> The P.K.I....endeavoured to remove suspicion as to its nationalist integrity, and by ultra-nationalist agitation to enter the mainstream of Indonesian nationalism and to become identified as the staunchest defender, along with Sukarno, of the Indonesian Republic.[92]

In April 1956 the unilateral abrogation by Indonesia of the Netherlands-Indonesia Union, and the RTC agreements, thus lent the impression that

the Communists had facilitated what were in essence the actions of other actors to defend Indonesian interests.

Thus, the PKI's "united front from above" had provided it with an unrivalled power position within the framework of the liberal democratic contract. Liberal democracy had permitted the PKI to secure an identifiable territorial base, which may have allowed it to govern Indonesia in any future elections. Ironically, it had also opened up the possibilities for the party to weaken the performance of liberal democracy as a form of government for Indonesia and, hence, make the transition to a "People's Democracy" easier. The PKI's adept cultivation of positions of extremism among established political parties not only furthered its fortunes as a party, but permitted it to enhance the growth of its supporting apparatus located in the "united front from below."

The "United Front from Below"

The "united front from below" was designed to permeate the whole of Indonesian society and to create from amongst the divisions in the "masses" a firm, united base of party support. This front was to comprise

> the workers' front, the peasants' front, the cultural front, the youth front, the students' front, the women's front, the poor urban people's front, the ex-armed fighters' front, the peace front, the Irian struggle front, the parties' united front, and the national industrialists' front.[93]

The consequence of welding significant segments of society was that "the PKI leaders set the party the task of uniting the masses through the Party's own mass organizations [organisasi massa — ormas]."[94] Primary emphasis, therefore, had to be placed on enlarging the party first, such that the party's own front organs could pursue a parallel programme of expansion. By building the party, the leaders purposely chose to

accumulate for themselves and their organization the statelike qualities of government and, in conjunction with its national united front, adherents. After 1951 the party was to take advantage of the polity's tolerance for its mobilization and collective action programmes. By 1957 the success achieved in acquiring government, people and, at election time, territory, was to set the basis upon which the party would attempt to assert its sovereignty.

The PKI apparatus has been called "a quasi-government with branch agencies."[95] Van der Kroef has argued that, with Aidit in control, the party undertook to forge

> an organizational weapon — something which Aidit was fond of expressing by means of his slogan "Membolsewikkan PKI" ("Bolshevize the PKI!"): establishment of better cadre control, more thorough and continuous ideological training, development and routinization of effective internal administrative procedures, imposition of a sense of individual subordination and party discipline, a constant reevaluation of tactics, and the creation of new fronts and organizational conduits as they became necessary.[96]

The penchant for building an organizational weapon occurred both at the national level and the regional level. In July 1950, when Aidit undertook the task of reestablishing party organization, its active branches were to be found only in Java and Sumatra. By October 1950 other branches were reactivated in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Timor. Several months later, in May 1951, Aidit declared that party organizations were also being erected in Nusatenggara.[97] Less than a year later, the PKI could claim Madura and Maluku as sites of partybuilding. The party's geographical growth was consciously planned in accordance with the two membership drives that it launched in March 1952 and March 1954.

At the beginning of 1952, Hindley states, there were 7,910 full and

candidate members of the PKI.[98] The party's plan in March 1952 was to ambitiously expand its membership to 100,000 within a six-month period and hence create a "mass party."[99] As early as May 1952, the PKI claimed 100,000 members.[100] At the end of 1952, the number of members was 126,671; by March 1954, 165,206.[101] Aidit optimistically stated in May 1954 that "it will not be simply luck if PKI at the end of this year is a Party with a million members and candidate members."[102] By October 1954 there were half a million members and candidate members, and by February 1956 one million members were claimed.[103] The PKI had met with phenomenal success. Its huge organization constituted the citizenry of a rival government.

The organizational structure of the PKI shared "some basic functional equivalents [of] the structure of a national government."[104] Corsino states that "in the workings of the party apparatus certain key functions...[were] performed: law-making, law-enforcing, and law-adjudicating functions":

> The national congress served as a combination of a constitutional convention and highest legislature.... The central committee was a kind of parliament with a built-in executive: the politbureau. The various departments as well as the secretariat of the central committee, being directly controlled by the politbureau, performed the functions associated with the executive departments of regular governments. The control commission performed some judicial functions for the PKI's constituency.... The central committee, of course, "passed laws" while the politbureau [was] ...the highest [administrator] directing the execution of such "laws."[105]

These functions came to be implemented on a local level as well, in consonance with the Party's increasing membership and organizational needs. The Party advanced a five-tier organizational scheme. Each of the top four tiers had its separate organizations, committees, and conferences. The lowest level of organization was called a group and

usually consisted of approximately ten people who lived or worked closely together. The organizational scheme is illustrated in Table 1. In July 1956 the party had a branch in about 34 per cent of the 21,047 villages in Java, and a subsection in almost seventy per cent of the 1,449 ketjamatans.[106] The PKI struck deep roots wherever it could.

TABLE 1
PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL SCHEME

Level of organization	Organization structure
1. Provinces(including Jakarta and Jogjakarta)	Major District Party organizations, conferences and committees, or Island(s) organizations, conferences, and committees
2. Districts/Autonomous regions	Party Section organizations, conferences, and committees
3. Subdistricts	Party Subsection organizations, conferences, and committees
4. Factories, mines, villages, offices, businesses, schools, and other institutions	Major Party Branch organizations, conferences, and committees
5. Groups	

SOURCE: Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia. Its History, Program and Tactics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), pp. 166-171.

To give the organization and its adherents coherence, the party established its own school system, coordinated through the Central Committee's Department of Culture (Departemen Kebudayaan), and published various Marxist-Leninist tracts. Both of these activities are illustrations of collective action. The school system was instituted both at the national and regional levels. The pinnacle of the party's

educational enterprise was a "people's university," established in Jakarta, which also had branches in provincial capitals. Party central schools (Sekolah Partai Central), schools under major district committees (Sekolah Partai CBD), schools under subsection committees (Sekolah Politik), and "out-of-school" courses for groups (Kursus Rakyat) were also established.

Party members, students, and all Indonesians alike could obtain Communist publications in ever-increasing numbers and variety. Van der Kroef remarked in 1965, while the PKI still existed, that "no single political party in Indonesia is so intensively concerned with publishing its views as is the PKI."[107] The party's notable publications included Red Star (Bintang Merah); PKI Bulletin (PKI-Buletin), which in January 1955 was renamed Party Life (Kehidupan Partai); the weekly New Era (Zaman Baru), based in Surabaya; translations of the Cominform journal For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!; several low quality Central Committee and major branch committee publications; and the appearance in mid-1954 of the English-language journal Monthly Review, renamed the Review of Indonesia in January 1957. While the party had enjoyed success in the exercise of disseminating printed material, nowhere was this more evident than in the growing influence of the party newspaper, People's Daily (Harian Rakyat), published in Jakarta.

The party daily was first issued on 1 July 1951 with 2,000 copies. The daily's circulation grew over the years. Table 2 illustrates this phenomenon. In February 1957 Harian Rakyat had attained a circulation of 60,000 compared with a total circulation of 75 daily newspapers in Indonesian of 747,250.[108] In relation to the size of its readership, Harian Rakyat was unrivaled by other parties' papers. In January 1956,

when circulation for Harian Rakyat was 55,000, the comparable figures for other newspapers were: "48,000 for the socialist newspaper Pedoman, 40,000 for PNI's Suluh Indonesia, 38,000 for the independent but pro-PNI Merdeka, and 34.000 for Masjumi's Abadi."[109]

TABLE 2
HARIAN RAKYAT CIRCULATION

Date	Circulation
October 1953	12,500
February 1954	15,000
January 1955	23,000
January 1956	55,000
March 1956	58,000
February 1957	60,000

SOURCE: Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 77, and 82.

The PKI also undertook to educate, primarily, its own cadres in the classics of Marxism-Leninism. Under the direct influence of Aidit, in March 1951 the Central Committee arranged to begin the translation of Communist classics, chiefly those of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. Intensive translation programmes were launched in both 1952 and 1953, and the PKI publishing company, Jajasan "Pembaruan", was established to disseminate the material.

Thus, these features of collective action, coupled with the party's huge and deeply-rooted organizational structure, amounted to

> ...a complex apparatus having a hierarchical structure and performing functions akin to those of a sovereign government. It operated its various agencies from the national to the village levels, and sought to consolidate (and indoctrinate) its vast constituency as a government would. The PKI in this sense was no ordinary political party. Even if it was legal and operated with the consent of the government, it was a virtual government by itself.[110]

From 1951 to 1957, in its efforts to secure adherents through its united national front strategy, the PKI was extremely successful. Although the largest political parties such as PNI, Masjumi, and, later, NU also possessed a wide net of allied social groups, the PKI alone attempted to create fronts that went beyond mere allies of the party. Notwithstanding the fronts' habitual assertions that they were "non-partisan" and "non-Communist,"

> their organizational structure...is closely modeled after the PKI's and the latter's principle of organizational "democratic centralism"...the top leadership of the fronts consists of PKI members or known fellow-travellers, and...known cadres are in command in the critical lower echelon positions.[111]

The PKI was the only political party, therefore, that had its own members leading fronts or groups with which it was allied. No other party employed a strategy that would instill in its allies as much commitment and loyalty to it as did the PKI. The party's ormas included all major social groups and especially those classes that the united front strategy considered to be the most revolutionary.

The PKI's "united front from below" was a political constellation that included workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, youth, students, and women. It is inappropriate here to discuss in detail each of the fronts erected by the PKI for these groups; nonetheless, their growth, as ancillaries to the PKI "state-within-a-state," confirms the theoretical supposition that the party secured large numbers of adherents. The labour front,[112] the All Indonesian Central Labour Organization (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia — SOBSI), was not only large (see Table 3), but also strategically placed in the economic structure: SOBSI's affiliates were present "in all major phases of the country's production and services processes [which made it] better balanced, and

potentially more dangerous, than other non-Communist or anti-Communist labor federations."[113]

TABLE 3
SOBSI MEMBERSHIP

Date	Claimed membership
1949	220,000[a]
1952	1,561,750[b]
January 1955	2,661,970[c]

a. Donald Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy in Indonesia 1948-1959," The Australian Outlook 13 (December 1959):254.

b. Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia. Its History, Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: University of the British Columbia, 1965), p. 203.

c. Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 135.

The Communist peasant organization, the Indonesian Peasant Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia — BTI), also enjoyed large increases in membership (see Table 4). In terms of the BTI's penetration of society, it had branches in 84 per cent of the 162 kabupatens in Indonesia, and subbranches in 18 per cent of the 43,249 villages in 1955.[114] In late 1957 it had subbranches in 32 per cent of all villages.[115]

TABLE 4
BTI MEMBERSHIP

Date	Claimed membership
Early 1953	240,000
September 1953	360,000
March 1954	800,000
April 1955	2,027,500
End of 1955	3,315,820
September 1957	3,390,286

SOURCE: Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 165-166.

The youth front, People's Youth (Pemuda Rakyat), was alone among PKI fronts in that it was openly a branch of the PKI, as stated in both organizations' constitutions.[116] Thus, the immensity of the youthfollowing (see Table 5) was very important to the PKI. Other, more specialized youth groups, such as the League of Indonesian High School Youth (Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia — IPPI), and the Concentration of Indonesian University Student Movements (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia — CGMI), fared poorly in numerical terms. A similar experience befell the League of People's Culture (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat — Lekra) that, as a petty bourgeois front of about 6,000 persons, nevertheless brought "a wide range of cultural workers,...into contact with PKI and into work of benefit [to] the Party."[117]

TABLE 5
PEMUDA RAKYAT MEMBERSHIP

Date	Claimed membership
November 1950	30,000
November 1952	46,598
June 1953	70,319
July 1954	202,605
June 1955	450,000
End of 1955	616,605
End of 1957	800,000

SOURCE: Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 188-191.

Rounding out the PKI's "united front from below" was the women's front, the Indonesian Women's Association (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia—Gerwani). In tandem with other PKI front organizations, Gerwani's membership grew relentlessly from 1950 to 1957 (see Table 6). Gerwani's roots struck deeply in Java, where in June 1956 it had branches in all

kabupatens and large towns, organizations in 40 per cent of all ketjamatans, and approximately 5,000 subbranches at the urban neighborhood and village level.[118]

TABLE 6
GERWANI MEMBERSHIP

Date	Claimed membership
1950	500
December 1951	6,000
June 1953	40,000
March 1954	80,000
September 1955	400,000
December 1955	500,000
June 1956	565,147
December 1957	671,342

SOURCE: Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 203-204.

A striking aspect of the growth in membership in the PKI and its fronts was its rapidity. While the larger numbers of adherents could only bolster the party's chances of winning elections, there was the danger that its newly won converts were only superficially commited to the party's ideals. Thus, at one level, the PKI state-within-a-state was quite formidable. However, the real strength of the party could not possibly measure up to its apparent strength: it was impossible to have socialized and institutionalized such large numbers so quickly. The "united front from below" suffered from the perverse effects of being too successful; the large influx of members necessitated later party drives to increase the ideological quality of its and its fronts' members.

The Thwarted Chances of Communist Power: The Collapse of Liberal Democracy 1956-1957

The liberal democratic contract quickly unravelled after the 1955 election returns were translated into the composition of a new cabinet. The election returns clearly indicated the dangerous polarization that had occurred between the Java-based nationalists and the (mainly) outer island Muslims during the election campaign. The results also reaffirmed the necessity of coalition building among the parties. The PNI polled 8,434,653 votes; Masjumi, 7,903,886 votes; NU, 6,955,141 votes; and the PKI, 6,176,914 votes. In the 257-member DPR, the PNI was apportioned 57 seats; Masjumi, 57; NU, 45; and the PKI, 39. As long as Parliament remained the channel through which conflict was managed, and the liberal democratic political norms were respected, post-election politics were a contest among these four parties.[119] Unfortunately for the parties, pressures on liberal democracy came to be exerted not only from amongst themselves, but also by President Sukarno and the Army.

Pressure on Liberal Democracy from the Parties

More so than the other parties, Masjumi had in its own estimation fared the least best at the polls. Indeed, it had suffered a sharp reversal in political fortunes. An eminent party leader and former Prime Minister, Burhanuddin Harahap, expected Masjumi to win 40-50 per cent of the parliamentary seats.[120] Not only had Masjumi not performed as expected, but its archrival, the PNI, had taken over first place while the NU had near-evenly split the Muslim vote with it. To add to its problems, Masjumi's erstwhile ally in the provisional Parliament, the PSI, was resoundingly defeated; a valuable source of support had vanished. Only reluctantly, therefore, and with assurances that the PKI

would not be permitted cabinet representation, did Masjumi agree to enter the cabinet in coalition with the PNI and NU in March 1956 under the premiership of the PNI leader, Ali Sastroamidjojo.

Matters became worse for Masjumi once it was in the cabinet. Illustrative of this was that "Ali Sastroamidjojo [acquired] for PNI a dominant position in the coalition cabinet despite the fact that Masjumi had an equal number of seats in Parliament."[121] In time the PNI came to control the Speakership of Parliament, the Chairmanship of the Constituent Assembly, and many jobs in the civil service, including diplomatic postings: "Whether in the ministries at home or the diplomatic missions abroad — Ali Sastroamidjojo got rid of Masjumi supporters whenever he could."[122] Results from the December 1955 Constituent Assembly elections, when 520 seats were contested, showed that the PNI had secured 117; Masjumi, 112; NU, 91; and the PKI, 80.[123] It became clear that Masjumi had little chance of implementing Islam as the basis of the Indonesian state in the Assembly's deliberations on a permanent constitution. In short, the current form of liberal democracy, one that functioned on the basis of proportional representation, made it difficult for the interests of the lesser populated regions of the country to be represented. As such, Masjumi objected to the absence of regional representation when it failed to gain a majority, and expressed the desire to change the contract. In this regard, pressure was exerted on liberal democracy by parties representative of the outer islands.

Pressures on Liberal Democracy from Extra-Contract Challengers

Additional pressures on Indonesian liberal democracy were exerted by political forces that operated primarily at the margins of the contract.

For instance, President Sukarno voiced his dismay over party infighting about the composition of the new cabinet when it became evident that the PKI was to be excluded. Despite PNI's efforts to include the Communists, Masjumi warned that it would "create a situation under which communism cannot breathe and under which there is no scope for communism."[124] Apparent flexibility on the part of the PKI -- whose chairman, Aidit, stated in early 1956 that "it is the duty of the PKI to participate in a cabinet but in the present circumstances, participation is not an absolute necessity for the PKI"[125] -- permitted a resolution of the problem. Thus, the President concluded that liberal democracy was an inadequate form of government for Indonesia.

At the inaugural address to the new cabinet on 26 March, the President argued, "We must not think that with the installation of the new parliament, the gate to heaven has been opened which we can enter jointly."[126] Furthermore, he "expressed the hope that the new parliament would set to work on the basis of a genuine democracy, but to him the genuine democracy was not the Western parliamentary democracy." He proposed as an alternative form of government, not one based on individualism, as in the West, "but on the system of mutual assistance (gotong royong), as members of a big family."[127] Later, on 2 April, he decried "a democracy in which to overpower the other party and to get the most votes is the only thing that counts," adding, "this must be altered into a democracy based on gotong royong."[128] The articulation of an alternative conception of the social contract increasingly became the subject of Sukarno's pronouncements throughout 1956, especially as liberal democracy continued to deteriorate, while the actions of the Army accelerated the process.

From late 1956, the Army's renewed political activity was ostensibly based on its concern for the rampant corruption that had beset the new cabinet. On 13 August the Foreign Minister was arrested by the territorial commander of West Java, Colonel Kawilarang, on grounds of corruption. The Foreign Minister was subsequently cleared of all complicity by a commission, composed chiefly of his fellow cabinet ministers. However, on November 16 and 19, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, the Assistant Chief-of-Staff of the Army, attempted a coup d'état in West Java. The attempt failed utterly, but later revelations that Lubis had the support of officers in West Java, including Kawilarang, the territorial commanders of Kalimantan (Colonel Abimanju) and North Sumatra (Colonel Simbolon), and the former territorial commander of East Indonesia (Colonel Warouw), suggested that this outburst of military dissatisfaction was based on more than a dislike for civilian corruption.

According to van der Kroef, the Army, or at least significant divisions within it, had become "a weathervane for other and deeper grievances in national life."[129] Thus, when the "13 August Affair" was over, an opportunity had been created for the expression of grievances related not only to corruption but also to the country's mounting socio-economic and political problems.[130] Chief among the former was the increasingly obvious economic reality that Java was consuming the wealth produced by the outer islands, a fact that served to reinforce the geographic identity of the large political parties. On the outer islands, for example, local grievances centred on the sharing of export earnings.[131] To alleviate these problems, the authorities in the outer islands, with the approval of the relevant Army officers, began to set policy themselves in early 1956.

The condonation, even encouragement, of the regional acts of defiance against the central government by parts of the Army related to "the opinion [that] had come to prevail in many levels of army leadership [by 1956] that interference by the military in political matters was virtually a sacred duty."[132] Moreover, Army activism was in reaction to

> sharply divergent political opinions...in particular as regards Communism and the position and ideology of the PNI; and...a general dissatisfaction with the course of public affairs, including the...general election, corruption in government, economic stagnation and alleged inadequacies in the supply services of the armed forces.[133]

The parties' ability to uphold a liberal democratic contract and preserve their privileged place in the political arena was further weakened on 28 October 1956, when Sukarno asserted,

> In November 1945 -- Let us be frank -- We made a most serious mistake. We suggested the formation of Political parties.... That was one of the mistakes of November 1945. Now it is taking its toll. Just look at the situation. Quite apart from the disease of ethnic and regional loyalties we are afflicted by the desire of the parties which, alas, makes us forever work against one another.... Let us act together now to bury all the parties.[134]

In place of "free-fight liberalism," Sukarno suggested to the newly installed Constituent Assembly on 9 November that it introduce "Guided Democracy" (Demokrasi Terpimpin). He argued that

> the implementation of [the] democratic conception 'one vote for every citizen' does not yet guarantee justice in every field, and certainly not in the field of economy...our democracy must see to it that one group should not be exploited by another. This means that, for the time being, our democracy must be a guided democracy."[135]

Leading liberal democratic politicians countered Sukarno with reassertions of faith in democracy and fear of the rise of dictatorship,[136] and the Sastroamidjojo cabinet proceeded to act against the Army officers involved in the "13 August Affair." The rejuvenated defence of liberal democratic norms and institutions, however, did not

lessen the reality of strong external opposition. A notable parliamentarian reported in December 1956 that "the present situation is the beginning of a catastrophe" because "the armed forces are no longer convinced that under the present system of government the Indonesian people can be adequately protected from danger."[137] However, the Premier reaffirmed the principle of civilian control over the military and the necessity for the armed forces to abstain from interfering in politics.[138]

Factions of the Army, repulsed by Sastroamidjojo's "formalistic thinking," began acting decisively in December 1956 to pull down liberal democracy. On 20 December the Water Buffalo Division Council (Dewan Divisi Banteng) took over the administration of Central Sumatra, and on 22 December the Elephant Division Council (Dewan Divisi Gadjah), headed by the territorial commander of North and Central Sumatra, Colonel Simbolon, announced that it had "severed connection with the central government in Jakarta," and that it no longer recognized "the present government of the Republic of Indonesia."[139] In a Jakarta-orchestrated counter-coup that saw the active armed participation of PKI cadres and members of its fronts, Simbolon was displaced from power. The situation returned to normal in North Sumatra by late 1956, only to erupt in further fighting later in 1957.

The damage had been done, however, to the delicate coalition cabinet. Masjumi could now act to overcome its futile post-election dilemma:

> Since Masjumi [had been] permanently handicapped by the existing rules of the democratic game, they decided to ask for a change in the rules [through their proposals of reform which featured the creation of a second, territorially-based, parliamentary chamber, which the Java-based parties and politicians resisted], failing which, they [abandoned] the game of democracy entirely.[140]

One last attempt by Masjumi to preserve the imperilled democracy and their once unchallenged supremacy within it was a proposal to establish an extraordinary cabinet headed by Hatta, the Sumatra-born, non-party, Vice-President (until 1 December 1956) of revolutionary fame.[141] When Hatta refused, Masjumi's proposal undermined confidence in the legitimacy and utility of democracy as it appeared that the party believed fame was a more valid source of political authority than the people's mandate.[142] By late December a Masjumi conference urged the party to withdraw its support of the cabinet, which it did on 9 January 1957. Shortly thereafter the PNI stated that PKI support "would certainly be welcome."[143] The Sastroamidjojo cabinet and liberal democracy collapsed after two months, surviving only on the goodwill of the Communists, but not before the country was wracked by further revolts, in East Indonesia (2 March) and South Sumatra (9 March), and calls for secession were heard from Kalimantan and even East Java.[144]

The Communist Party as the Alternative Party

Throughout the period of parliamentary democracy, the PKI remained committed to the norms and institutions of liberal democracy, despite its own growing association with President Sukarno and his antiparty attitudes. Towards the end of the period, the party was intensely aware that if fanatically anti-Communist Army leaders, such as Lubis and Simbolon, undermined liberal democracy, the free political environment in which it had amassed the adherents and resources that constituted a state-within-a-state would end. The Communists, having rejuvenated their political standing in the 1955 election, were well within reach of political power, perhaps in the form of a toehold in the cabinet. As Lev has stated, however, "the concern about the PKI which its showing in the

general elections had aroused among leaders of other parties was increased a hundredfold by Soekarno's demand for a four-party cabinet."[145] The party's very success made its progress from a marginal actor to a full-fledged contender for power increasingly difficult to attain. Nonetheless, the PKI had adhered to "the rules of the game" and emerged victorious in the regional elections of 1957. The PKI would surely have won any future general elections and probably would have proceeded to form Indonesia's first-ever majority government. The collective ability of the parties to wage an election campaign, however lacklustre, and stage popular elections in a divided and, at times, chaotic political environment was a testimony to their own beliefs. By this time, however, "the situation was no longer meaningfully parliamentary. The parties were not in control of the country."[146] President Sukarno's declaration of a State of War and of Siege on 14 March 1957 simultaneously terminated the liberal democratic contract, (temporarily) ended the salient role of parties in Indonesian political life, and ensured his and the Army's rise to power. Moreover, the termination of liberal democracy left the Communist Party searching for new ways to take power.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY: ARMY INITIATIVES AND COMMUNIST RESPONSES, 1957-1962

From 1957 to 1959 the implementation of what came to be called Guided Democracy meant the rewriting of the Indonesian social contract. The norms and institutions of liberal democracy were besieged by the initiatives of the Army and President Sukarno, who jointly desired a return to the corporatist ideology embodied in the defunct 1945 Constitution. In their mutual desire to transform the social contract, Sukarno and the Army met with stiff resistance from the political parties, especially the PKI, and the parties of the outer islands, chiefly Masjumi and PSI. In the wake of the PKI's quest for sovereignty in late 1957, and Masjumi's and PSI's support for the PRRI-Permesta rebellion beginning in February 1958 on the outer islands, the Army's efforts to build for itself a legitimate place in political life were intensified. Although the Army met with success during the course of 1959 — especially in its coercive effort to reinstitute the 1945 Constitution — to transform itself into the "proper" political form of a functional group and to force the PKI into a state of retarded political existence, differences with President Sukarno arose that made inevitable

its decline in power. Faced with renewed Communist vigour and drive towards the end of 1962, and aware that its legal power base (the State of War and of Siege and, later, the State of Danger, which conferred sovereignty) was temporary, the Army leadership constructed alternative ideological conceptions and institutions that would preserve its grasp on power. Throughout this period, the two main contenders, the Army and the PKI, sustained their mutually antagonistic quest for resources and adherents — a process that revealed the important ideological and organizational impact each had on the other.

The Foundation of a New Social Contract: Sukarno's Konsepsi and the Army's Revolutionary Heritage

When a State of War and of Siege (Regeling op den Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg — SOB) was declared by President Sukarno on 14 March 1957, one day after the Sastroamidjojo cabinet had succumbed to the pressure exerted by the military forces on the outer islands, de facto power was conferred on him and on the Army. Each of the seven territorial commanders (panglima) was vested with the powers of Regional Martial Law Administrators, and were only nominally placed under the control of Nasution, the Chief Martial Law Administrator and Army Chief-of-Staff. Hence, there was no disguising the reality that the central government's control over the outer islands had been severely weakened and the TNI central command's authority over its officer corps was almost non-existent.

That liberal democracy brought Indonesia "perilously close to warlordism,"[1] meant an opportunity had been presented to each actor, Sukarno and the Army, to build Indonesia according to its vision. The zeal with which each actor attempted to remodel Indonesian political life

can be understood to be a consequence of their exclusion from formal, or sufficiently powerful, political roles during the previous contract. In this regard there was much common ground between Sukarno and Nasution. In erecting a new contract, the former drew upon his earlier criticisms of liberal democracy while the latter, under the pressure of the success of his and his organization's arch-enemy -- the Communists -- attempted to build organizational forms that would supplant the power not only of the PKI, but of all political parties. Together, these two actors seriously threatened the political parties by creating a new political identity -- the functional group -- and elevating a new set of aims, options, bases of solidarity, and collective action for legitimate political actors: conditions that were inimical or ill-suited to the interests of the parties.

Although President Sukarno chastised liberal democracy and its negative features almost from the moment it began to function in Indonesia, his views were considered neither alarming by the parties nor did they receive much support in the polity.[2] The situation changed dramatically, however, when the composition of the first elected cabinet provoked Sukarno to declare his support for a gotong-royong cabinet in March 1956[3] and, late in October 1956,[4] for Indonesians to "bury the parties."[5] Sukarno had chosen a suitable moment to take the initiative:

> By late 1956 there was widespread receptivity to proposals for political reorganization in Indonesia, including feelings that parliamentary democracy was a failure and unsuitable to Indonesian conditions.... far-reaching proposals for political restructuring could find enthusiastic support.[6]

Undaunted by negative party reactions to his plea to "bury the parties,"[7] yet sufficiently politically cautious to avoid being considered dictatorial, Sukarno undertook to elaborate his thinking about an

alternative political order.

The breakthrough came on 21 February 1957 when the President presented his konsepsi, or conception.[8] The President began with the demand that

> We [have] to set up an altogether new building. We should not only pull down the pillars, the roof, the walls; we should pull down everything — not excluding the foundation — and lay a new foundation, erect a totally new building, that is, the new-style governmental structure of the Republic of Indonesia.[9]

Sukarno targeted, in particular, "'western parliamentary democracy', not only for the 'idea of opposition', the abuse of which led to lack of leadership and stability, but also for its foreignness: 'an imported democracy...not an Indonesian democracy...not a democracy which accords with our soul'."[10]

Sukarno went on to make two concrete proposals that could serve as the basis of a new order. First, he reiterated his earlier call for a gotong-royong cabinet, to which he added that "all members of the family should eat at a single table and work at a single workbench,"[11] especially since Indonesia could not "continue to ignore a group which received the votes of six million human beings in the elections."[12] The second proposal made was more far-reaching and injurious to the parties for it denied them the very sectional basis in the population upon which they drew their support: Sukarno advocated a National Council (Dewan Nasional) which signified "a large family relationship."[13] Just as the cabinet was to be a reflection of Parliament, Sukarno argued, the National Council was to be a reflection of society. Thus, it would have "a composition which includes the entire Indonesian people without discrimination against any group,"[14] divided into two categories: functional groups (golongan fungsionil), and representatives of the

regions. Hence, "the Council was not to be a party body but was to be representative of functional groups — workers, peasants, intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, religious organizations...the armed services, youth organizations, [and] women's organizations."[15] Whereas the parties in general evinced displeasure at being deprived of their power bases, the armed forces, especially the TNI and its central command under Nasution, could not but give support to the notion of functional groups as the basis of legitimacy for their own political activity.

Since the days of the revolution the TNI had yearned for a formal role in the nation's politics. Indeed, from its very inception, the TNI styled itself "as unique among the armies of the world, never having been created as an instrument of the state, the army claimed for itself a role which [transcended] the purely military and [extended] to ~~all social,~~ political and economic fields."[16] The TNI's supposition that it "naturally" deserved a political role was reinforced by three main features of the revolutionary struggle. First, the failure of civilians to give direction to Indonesia's limited military efforts compelled the TNI to rely on its own leadership. Second, the necessity of the TNI to act against the Communists at Madiun in 1948 (where Nasution took personal charge of the Army's counter-drive) and Darul Islam throughout West Java beginning in 1948, to preserve the Republic, gave the Army a special claim to a future political role. Third, it was the TNI that continued the military struggle against the Dutch in late 1948 and throughout 1949, long after the Republic had been overrun and its top politicians had been captured by the Dutch in 1948. In particular, the military struggle in 1948-1949 served to reinforce the TNI's claim to power.[17] As the armed struggle with the Dutch petered out during the

course of 1949, and Indonesian independence appeared attainable through a combination of diplomatic and military policies, the TNI looked forward to a bright political future,[18] confident with its perception that it was its "military efforts which ultimately brought about the Dutch recognition of Indonesia's independence."[19]

From the perspective of the party politicians who inherited the Republic after December 1949, however, the TNI was merely one claimant to power among many armed military units. Indeed, with 16 major "Republican Armed Organizations" in existence in May 1949,[20] it was difficult for the civilian government to grant a privileged position to any one group. Thus, during the period of liberal democracy, military organizations were excluded from the political arena unless they could take the form of a political party -- an unthinkable proposition for the TNI -- otherwise they were considered "state agencies."[21] In this capacity the TNI was treated as a plaything of the rival parties,[22] and suffered from financial neglect. Meanwhile, the Army was still called upon to defend the Republic from the Darul Islam in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi, and from armed remnants from the Republic Maluku Selatan in Seram.[23]

It was not long before opposition began to be heard from within the Army about the treatment meted to it under liberal democracy. The former Chief-of-Staff, Nasution, having lost his position over a clash between the PKI-PNI and Masjumi-PSI on Army reorganization in October 1952, attacked all political parties:

> The factor which has been of decisive importance in the matter of relations between the military and political leaders during the short life-time of this Republic is internal politics, that is, the efforts of the politicians to establish a complete control over the army. Indeed our army was born before the political parties. Indeed the battalions, regiments and divisions of the army and its general staff existed before there was a Minister of Defence.... Indeed it was armed units which pioneered the

> [seizure] of power, civil as well as military power, in the first stages of our revolution.[24]

When Nasution launched the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaaan Indonesia -- IPKI) in May 1954 to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections, not as a party but as a "movement," the organization endorsed "Sukarno's claim that the Revolution was still unfinished, and [advocated] radical nationalist positions.... [while it] expressed hostility to the conflict of parties and 'isms' on which [it] blamed the general spiritual and political crisis."[25] The country's problems, it was argued, could be resolved by a return to the 1945 Constitution.[26]

With the obvious congruence in thought between Nasution and President Sukarno by the mid-1950s, a firm basis was laid for their duumvirate under the conditions of the SOB. The nature of the Sukarno-Army alliance, however, was tempered by Sukarno's feelings about the proper role of the military; his reservations about the Army's "correct" place in political life were to lay the basis for later differences with Nasution. For example, Sukarno asked the Army on 29 March 1957 "not to play with politics."[27] Earlier, Sukarno had clarified his conception of the armed forces' role when he declared on 17 August 1953 that

> armed forces are the state's apparatus, are weapons, are tools, once again, they are tools. This weapon must always be sharp, must always be sakti (power), regardless of whoever holds the weapon -- as long as it is in the hands of the state.... Anyone in the armed forces practising politics must be blamed outright, for such action means a break in the service due from him.[28]

Thus, the wedding of Sukarno's konsepsi and the Army's revolutionary heritage after 14 March 1957 was to some degree one of convenience; the President needed to legalize the coups staged by the renegade officers to keep intact the country he had helped create, while Nasution needed

Sukarno's authority and prestige simultaneously to expand the central command's control vis-à-vis the officer corps and to thwart the Communist drive for power.

The practical effects of the new political alliance became evident soon after the SOB was declared. On 9 April 1957 a new cabinet was appointed by Sukarno. Kahin has remarked that "the inauguration of this cabinet has diminished the role of both Parliament and the political parties in approximate proportion to the considerably increased role of the President and the Army."[29] Significantly, the Karya (Work) cabinet was led by a non-party politician, Djuanda, and, for the first time to such a large extent, the Prime Minister selected individuals as ministers who had no party affiliations.[30] The Karya cabinet was not the equivalent of the gotong-royong cabinet as sketched in the President's konsepsi, although "it was a step in prizing the formal machinery of government away from party influence,"[31] and, hence, a step in the direction of creating corporatist institutions.

The second of the President's konsepsi proposals -- to establish a National Council -- was realized in May 1957; the occasion also marked the more or less formal beginning of Guided Democracy in Indonesia.[32] From the perspective of the parties, there was a particular reason to look upon this development with reserve. In consonance with his conception, the President legitimized the role of functional groups in the Council: "these...were categorized as labour, peasants, youth, former armed revolutionaries, national entrepreneurs, artists, journalists, women, Angkatan 1945 [Generation of 1945], religious scholars, and citizens of foreign extraction;"[33] the functional group representatives totaled 21 out of a Council membership of 45. The most

alarming aspect of the Council's composition was not the inclusion of the Chiefs-of-Staff, at least from the vantage point of the PKI, but rather the aggressive undermining of the parties' control over their own ormas. Reeve has observed that "almost all the 'functional' representatives were drawn not from party leaderships proper but from party mass organizations.... As was becoming clear, Sukarno's plan was to detach these ormas from the parties and to draw them together on the bases of common 'functional' interests and of commitment to his own grand vision."[34] This scheme damaged the PKI more so than other parties which placed less emphasis on building a wide net of social support groups.

It had become apparent by mid- to late 1957 that Sukarno and the TNI had been very successful in their reconstruction of the social contract. Lev has written that "the public perceived the Kabinet Karya, Soekarno, and the National Council as collectively constituting the Government, formalities notwithstanding."[35] The notion of /functional group representation especially antagonized the parties, for it explicitly "rejected underlying assumptions that the populace could adequately express its needs and aspirations through the party system or that at least party leaderships could use the parliamentary framework to negotiate successfully, conflicting demands."[36] A final blow against the party system in 1957 seemed to come in November when Sukarno recommended the Council as "material" for a new constitution to the Constituent Assembly, probably in an effort to break its year-long stalemate on the issue of the ideological basis of the state.[37] Following an exceptional burst of anti-party activities at the hands of the President, ably supported by the Army, the initiative now lay with the parties.

Party Reactions to Early Guided Democracy Initiatives, Late 1957-Mid-1958

The undoing of the liberal democratic contract throughout 1957 prompted several parties to react in a dramatic fashion. The responses from the PKI in December 1957, and from Masjumi and the PSI from February 1958 onward, were motivated by the same concern to reverse their dwindling political fortunes. Thus, for the PKI the actions of December 1957 (see below) amounted both to the reassertion of its claim as the foremost nationalist group in society and, more profoundly, a cautious acquisition of sovereignty in an effort to reaffirm its distinctiveness from all the other political forces. For the Masjumi and the PSI, their actions in support of the regional rebellions signalled their commitment to the interests of the outer islands, their dislike of Communism and President Sukarno, and, significantly, their desire to add the basis of territorial representation to the liberal democratic contract.[38]

With very little advance warning of its magnitude, Indonesia was rocked in early December 1957 by the illegal seizure, at the hands of SOBSI and of the PNI's labour federation (Kesatuan Buruh Kerakyataan Indonesia — KBKI) of the plants and offices of every major Dutch company in the archipelago, with the latter apparently taking the lead.[39] "In a matter of a few days," Schmitt has observed, "the movement spread across the whole country. For a while it seemed the government had lost its power to direct events."[40] The ostensible reason for the fury was the inability, for the fourth time, of the Indonesians to secure the necessary votes in the United Nations General Assembly in support of a resolution calling on the Netherlands to recommence discussions on West Irian. With the PKI fresh from huge regional election victories, yet threatened by recent Army and Presidential drives to deprive it of its

claim to power, the Indonesian diplomatic defeat presented an unprecedented opportunity for the party to attempt to make a judicious transition from a decaying political order to a new one.

Confident that its actions would be seen as part of the regime's own agitation campaign to secure West Irian, which had begun in mid-1957,[41] the Communists joined in. When the wave of strikes and seizures ended, the government declared that it had not engaged in "nationalization" (for which it had no law), nor had it "confiscated" the properties; it was merely exercising "supervision."[42] Van der Kroef has taken this to be an admission by the government "that it had been unable to control the forces of extremism that it had unleashed with its [own] campaign."[43] The PKI's salient role in the events was an attempt to reinvigorate the two tactical changes effected in the early 1950s that still held any prospects of Communist power, now that the parliamentary road was blocked — to subscribe to the regime's own brand of nationalism, and to curry the favour of Sukarno. Thus, PKI actions were "a bid to regain the initiative as a widely popular and truly nationalistic organization."[44] The immediate consequences were precisely what the party had desired:

> This move won the PKI wide acclaim and it appeared that the West Irian issue would be a means by which the PKI could develop mass support. In fact, soon after the seizure of Dutch property, the PKI and other radical nationalists had organized the Central Action Committee for the liberation of West Irian. The aim was to channel the national fervour against the Dutch through an organization led by the PKI.[45]

On a more important level, the PKI acted as a cautious revolutionary contender. Aidit, in his explanation of the events, succeeded in keeping the PKI's actions distinct from other nationalist forces, and also alternative claims to power alive: "The workers took over the imperialist enterprises not in their own personal interest but to hand them over to

the Republic of Indonesia, whose government was not yet a government of the working class."[46] The assertion of sovereignty was very brief, but of sufficiently long duration to indicate that alongside the Indonesian government there was a powerful actor that could convulse the nation into turmoil and pose itself as a powerful alternative source of authority. The PKI, clearly, wished to convey this message, but acted cautiously in the exercise of its sovereignty, aware that it faced ascendant rival political forces.

The regional rebellions that began in February 1958 with PSI and Masjumi connivance were far more threatening in nature to the Indonesian state, Sukarno, and the army central command in the short-run than the brief Communist actions of December. Since the defection of Masjumi from the Sastroamidjojo cabinet early in 1957, the party had taken up political positions that increasingly brought it into conflict with the Javanese political parties, with Sukarno (whose advocacy of Communist entry into the cabinet angered the party), and — through its association with the regional military officers who spearheaded the drive against the central government — with the Army central command in Jakarta. It was the government's acceptance of the Communist fait accompli of December 1957 that greatly exacerbated tensions between Masjumi-PSI and the evolving political system.

The flight to Sumatra of the two parties' leading political and economic personalities in early 1958 served as the catalyst to the declaration on 15 February of a rival government to the Republic of Indonesia.[47] The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia — PRRI) was declared in North and Central Sumatra and North and Central Sulawesi, and was

supported by the regional military authorities in those areas, Masjumi and PSI, plus limited official and unofficial American, British, and Taiwanese support. Its programme was the Charter of Common Struggle (Piagam Perjuangan Permesta), whence the rebellion derived part of its name. The response of Jakarta was swift and decisive: military action coordinated by Nasution ended the armed threat within two months (although the PRRI lingered until 1961 under its new name, United Republic of Indonesia, Republik Persatuan Indonesia).

By mid-1958 the Indonesian political parties had reacted to the reality of Army and Presidential ascent in their country. Unfortunately, the net benefits of their dramatic actions were to accrue in the short- and long-run to the Army. By attacking Dutch economic concerns to reaffirm its nationalistic credentials, the PKI served additionally to expand the Army's control over the country. As Anderson has written, "quite suddenly" in 1957 the Army

> took control of the bulk of the advanced sectors of the economy.... [And] for the first time it obtained the financial means to attach the officer corps firmly to itself and to give the military as a whole a corporate economic interest quite distinct from that of every other sector of Indonesian society. For the first time since 1942, the major economic resources of the nation were now under unified local control.[48]

The fact that officers who were appointed to administer the many estates and enterprises had to sever their formal relations with the Army, meant that even when the SOB was no longer in effect, the TNI still exerted a preponderant hold over the economy.[49] It would have seemed in 1957 that the Army was the real victor in the duel with the PKI.

The actions of Masjumi and PSI, ironically, served the interests of the Nasution-led Army, the President (who had publicized his disfavour of these two parties), and the PKI. The President saw his two most

outspoken critics silenced by their treachery and the stigma of defeat, while the Army weakened and defeated its dissident regional elements. From the perspective of the Army, its role in Indonesian political life now seemed to be without bounds. However, it still had to contend with the reality of a strengthened PKI, which also benefited from the destruction of the "comprador" PSI and Masjumi.

The Army as the Pioneer of Guided Democracy 1957-1960

The Army's determination to act against the political parties, and especially against the PKI, was enhanced by the fallout of the events of December 1957-April 1958. The Army had set out as early as April 1957 to define for itself a legitimate place within political life. In this undertaking the Army had to challenge the opposing political forces on three matters: establishing for itself a basis of popular support which, ineluctably, brought it into conflict with the parties; implementing measures that curbed or retarded the capacity of the parties either to mobilize support or enact collective action; and creating for itself a formal position within the governmental structure.

The Army leadership was encouraged by the attainment of formal representation in the Karya cabinet and in the National Council and sought to consolidate support for itself by acquiring adherents.[50] In its quest for supporters, the Army's choice of tactics and organizational forms was undoubtedly influenced by two current political phenomena: Sukarno's increasingly vociferous advocacy of the functional group concept, and the PKI's success in building in all but name a nation-wide net of Communist-dominated functional groups located in the "united front from below." Thus, the Army acted like Sukarno by raiding the mass

organizations of the political parties.

On 17 June 1957 Nasution established the first of several civil-military "Cooperation Bodies" (Badan Kerja Sama -- BKS), the Youth-Military Cooperation Body (BKS-Pemuda-Militer -- BKSPM). The Body consisted of Army officers and personnel who circumvented the parent party structures and worked directly with members of the mass organizations, including the youth fronts of the PNI, Masjumi, NU, and the PKI.[51] Pauker has written that at the first anniversary of the [BKSPM] "it was announced that Cooperation Bodies Between Youth and Army had been set up in all parts of the country except Atjeh (North Sumatra), West Sumatra and Celebes."[52] Clearly, the Army was not only keen on acquiring a popular following, but it also meant to establish its influence throughout the archipelago.

Naturally, the parties themselves were offended by the Army's aggressiveness but could do little to slow the proliferation of the BKSs. Soon a BKS-Labour-Military (BKS-Buruh-Militer -- BKSBUMIL) was established, which was followed by a Press-Military Contact Bureau (Biro Kontak Pers-Militer), a BKS-Peasant-Military (BKS-Tani-Militer -- BKSTAMIL), and a BKS-Women-Military (BKS-Wanita-Militer -- BKSWAMIL). By the middle of 1958, eight such bodies were in existence.[53] The Army had succeeded in having its cooperative endeavours legitimized by the establishment on 25 June 1958 of the State Ministry for Civil-Military Cooperation.[54]

The second major Army thrust in obtaining a broad basis of popular support was a consequence of the PKI's own actions in December 1957. The party's attempt to channel nationalist fervour over West Irian through the PKI-led Central Action Committee for the Liberation of West Irian

forced the Army to preempt the Communists by establishing on 17 January 1958 a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (Front Nasional Pembebasaan Irian Barat — FNPIB). On that date the Army "announced that all initiatives of veterans, workers, farmers and youth groups in connection with the struggle for West Irian would be channeled into" the FNPIB.[55] When Nasution appointed himself the Front's chairman, it became evident that the Army would countenance neither popular control nor Presidential prerogative over the West Irian cause. Nasution's determination to make the FNPIB the basis of an Army quasi-government is clear from the fact that

> Territorial commanders were instructed to establish branches of the National Front in their areas. In various parts of the country the Army Chief of Staff presided himself in the following months over the installation of the local commanders as National Front chairmen. On August 2, 1958, the Army announced that following a review by the National Council and by the cabinet of the position of the National Front it had been decided to strengthen the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian. It was to be known thereafter by its abbreviated name Front Nasional and be built into a "guided mass movement" based on the Cooperation Bodies between the Army and Youth, Workers, Women, Farmers, Religious Leaders and Veterans. The Army Chief of Staff remained chairman of the Front Nasional. The statement added that by strengthening the National Front "any attempts to revive conflicts among various groups can be prevented."... The Army Chief of Staff announced that within six months [from 15 August 1958] branches of the National Front were to be installed in all districts.[56]

The BKSs and the FNPIB seemed to hold out the promise of real power accruing to the Army. Although these organizational innovations placed the parties on the defensive, the Army was not overwhelmingly successful with its political inventions. Yong has asserted that "the end result of it all was that the BKS activities largely consisted of working conferences and meetings."[57] Two factors prevented the BKSs and the FNPIB from becoming viable political forces. One factor related to the low quality of the Army officers in charge of the BKSs: "Many officers

succumbed to the temptations of civilian office and quickly came to resemble the party politicians."[58] Another factor had to do with the Army's underestimation of the parties' control over their ormas: the Army

> had great difficulty in making BKS member organizations pay more than lip-service to the idea that they should channel their activities through the BKS. The youth BKS had constant troubles with its member ormas, some continuing to assert their separate identities and activities, others trying to break away.... The labour BKS had continuing trouble with its constituent ormas and the peasants BKS found PKI-affiliated ormas publicly asserting themselves as the leaders of the peasant functional category.[59]

The political hopes of the Army as embodied in the BKSs were dealt a near-crippling blow by the PKI which, "after a year's experience [with the BKSs],...declared that it would avoid further involvement in the cooperation bodies, and other parties were similarly inclined."[60]

Despite the difficulties with the FNPIB and the BKSs, the Army had created a powerful claim over many and diversified aspects of Indonesian political, economic, and social life by mid-1958. As a political entity, the Army was more unified than ever, having rid itself of its dissident elements by April 1958. Additionally, its success was propelled by the fervent nationalist drive over West Irian, which it controlled through the FNPIB. In dropping the term "for the Liberation of West Irian" from its Front, the Army sought to give the appearance that it possessed national interests beyond this one issue. Nasution confidently asserted in 1958 that "if I followed the dictates of my heart...I'd suppress all political parties,"[61] aware that in their place and that of parliamentary democracy, the FNPIB, the National Council, and the functional groups could possibly step in. The domestic policing role that the Front had assigned to itself -- "of destroying internal enemies and subversive groups"[62] -- threatened all parties, especially the PKI, whose most

fundamental principles included "class struggle." Strengthened by his enhanced political position, Nasution declared on 10 November 1958 that henceforth "all other veterans organizations [excluding its own, LVRI] were [now] forbidden."[63] Thus, the PKI's front, Perbepsi, dissolved on 30 April 1958; it seemed that the party had lost a powerful resource — a paramilitary force useful in times of political crisis. By late 1958 it was not surprising that the Army was using the FNPIB and the BKSs as the springboard for a new governmental structure of its own making.

The Army's desire to launch a new governmental structure was prefaced by a renewed attack on the collective actions and capacity for mobilization of the parties — a process which had begun earlier in 1957. The Army's anti-corruption drive, which intensified in April 1957, succeeded in discrediting top NU, PSI, and other party politicians (with the notable exception of the PKI)[64]. This anti-party measure was followed by Nasution's 27 May 1957 regulation that compelled all persons and organizations to account for the origin of their property.[65] Throughout the regional election campaigns of 1957, the Regional Martial Law Administrators were empowered to "prevent excesses and disorder," and, later, disrupted the proceedings of regional legislative assemblies.[66] More devastating actions were to follow in 1958.

On 9 August 1958 Nasution instructed all governmental agencies to report the political affiliations of all senior civil servants.[67] This was a horrifying proposition to NU and PNI which depended upon bureaucrats sympathetic to them to finance and promote their causes.[68] On 5 September 1958 Nasution banned those branches of the Masjumi, the PSI, the Protestant Party, and IPKI which had given active support to the PRRI-Permesta.[69] Lastly, on 22 September 1958 general elections

scheduled for 1959 were "postponed." The widespread expectation that the PKI would easily emerge victorious, and hence make Indonesia the first country ever to vote the communists into power, alarmed not only the Army, but also the party politicians who went along with the measure.[70] Political initiative had passed from the hands of the parties. They had willingly eroded the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy and the liberal democratic contract by continuing the process of political disintegration. While the PKI sufferred the most from this measure, at another level, the whole party system was weakened as it could no longer renew its legitimacy.[71]

Having built a somewhat stable political foundation with the BKSs and the FNPIB, and having deprived the liberal democratic parliamentary system and its adherents of relevance and purpose, the Army erected a new social contract from late 1958 to mid-1960. In the course of these political developments, Sukarno was used both as a shield and as a tool by the Army to facilitate it in its own plans. For example, it was in part due to the pressure exerted by Sukarno, at the behest of the Army, that the National Council acceded in November 1958 to the latter's demand for participation in the envisaged new Parliament and in a restructured National Front. A final list of functional groups was settled by the Council which anchored the Army legally in all aspects of the formal political system of Guided Democracy. The list of functional groups included the Armed Forces; this category included the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, veterans and local security bodies. The most significant aspect of the inclusion of the Armed Forces as a functional group was that "the Armed Forces had worked themselves into the very grain of the theoretical basis of Guided Democracy, [and] the solution to the Army

leadership's search for a constitutionally-based, political role" was drawing to a close.[72]

The parties in the Constituent Assembly, which were being asked to legislate themselves into political marginality, balked at the suggestion. The Army, however, was not to be stalled by legal and constitutional niceties, and Nasution warned that "we shall see that the national leader will open sufficient channels [for the army] as there is no other way because otherwise, like the volcano, Mount Merapi, erupting suddenly, trouble may occur."[73] The parties soon relented in the face of Army demands and informally acquiesced in a cabinet-sponsored plan that called for a return to the corporatist 1945 Constitution and the representation of functional groups, which were to be seated in the DPR and the People's Deliberative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat—MPR), as envisaged in the 1945 Constitution. It was agreed that half of the seats in the future DPR were to be held by the functional groups. The parties did succeed, however, in reducing the number of Armed Forces' seats from a proposed 25 per cent of all DPR seats to 35 of 260, or 13.5 per cent.[74] Typical of Indonesian liberal democracy, the parties in the Constituent Assembly reneged on the cabinet's proposals on three separate votes and threatened to upset the Army's drive for power. Following the Constituent Assembly's decision in May 1959 to recess, Nasution banned all political activity from 3 June until after Sukarno returned from abroad.[75] Thus, "Nasution stepped into the breach to rescue the 1945 Constitution [as he] was apparently determined that the army should take the credit and reap the political benefit of pushing the 1945 Constitution through."[76] It was Sukarno, however, who finally abolished the Constituent Assembly and reinstituted the 1945 Constitition through

his decree of 5 July 1959.

The new institutions of Guided Democracy were built quickly after the events of July 1959; the Army's formal role was realized in all of them.[77] In the Kerja (Work) cabinet, announced on 9 July, the Armed Forces held 12 positions out of 42, including Nasution as Minister of Defence and Security.[78] The cabinet's programme was set out on 17 August by President Sukarno in a speech entitled "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution" (later renamed the Political Manifesto [Manipol]; Manipol-USDEK was later used as the basis of state policy).[79] In his Presidential Decree no. 7/1959 on "The Conditions for the Simplification of the Political Parties," Sukarno starkly set out the conditions for the continued existence of political parties in Indonesia, a move that clearly favoured the Army:

> Every party had formally to accept the 1945 Constitution, the Panca Sila, and the Manipol USDEK, [and] had to have a membership of at least 150,000 in sixty-five districts, and must not receive assistance from outside the country. The President was empowered to dissolve any party which opposed the principles of the state, or was involved in — or did not condemn — rebellions."[80]

As a consequence, the PSI and Masjumi were banned; only ten political parties continued to function, all living under the constant threat of dissolution. Additional places for the Armed Forces were created on the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung —DPA), and on the National Planning Board (Dewan Perancang Nasional — Depernas) among whose 77 members were 51 golkar representatives and no formal party representatives.[81] When the Parliament was suspended in March 1960, and replaced by an appointed 283-seat DPR-GR (where the initials GR stood for Gotong-Royong) and the new Provisional People's Deliberative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara — MPRS), the Army was again represented.

In further anti-party moves, Presidential Decree no. 13/1960 of 5 July 1960 compelled political parties to register for official recognition; this included disclosing sensitive details, by 31 December 1960, about their constitution, total of branches and members, the name, age, and occupation of each member, and accounts of their funds, receipts and expenditures.[82] Decree no. 14/1960 of 12 July

> announced that within the new appointed parliament, the DPRGR, the parties were to be organized into four categories, called the Nationalist, Islamic, Christian, and Communist 'groups.' These four would face a single golkar 'group,' which was divided into four 'sub-groups': Armed Forces; religious; spiritual development; and material development. This was clearly the basis for future 'simplification'.[83]

Presidential Decision no. 5/1960 on 23 September announced the restructuring of regional DPRs, whereby half the seats would go to parties and half to golkar.[84] Additionally, the Army increased its direct influence over civil administration during 1960.[85]

Between 1957 and 1960 the Army and Sukarno attempted to reduce the political parties to mere appendages of the new political system of Guided Democracy and succeeded in doing so. The attacks against the parties were most sharply felt by the only successful and growing member among them, the PKI. Thus, in establishing the new social contract by supplanting the parties, the political architects of Guided Democracy were, in one sense, singling out the Communists for discrimination. During the period from mid-1960 to 1962 the intensity of the Army-led campaign to suppress the collective activities and mobilizing potential of its rivals was directed almost solely at the PKI.

The Communists' potential for mobilization, whether in the form of electioneering, parliamentary activities, or work among veterans groups, was severly curtailed. The Army also sought to suppress Communist

collective activity with its martial law powers.[86] The Army's powers of censorship,[87] for example, were used frequently to suspend Harian Rakyat,[88] cut its circulation,[89] permanently ban Politbureau and SOBSI journals,[90] and end labour agitation. The last example of Army prohibition of party activity was the delay (of several weeks) it caused the Communists in holding their Sixth National Congress in Jakarta in September 1959. The event was significant not for its effects, but for its intent, as it underlined the TNI's commitment to attack the party in all areas of political life, including its most prestigious gatherings. The PKI was under a great deal of pressure to transform its identity, aims, options, bases of solidarity, and collective effort to mesh more smoothly with the political fabric of the Guided Democracy social contract.[91]

Communist Strategies: The Alliance with Sukarno, Ideological Reformulations, and New Forms of Collective Effort

As the authoritarian nature of Guided Democracy became evident, the aims of political actors had to be those of Sukarno's. Only by siding with the President and by vocalizing his radicalism about Indonesia's "continuing revolution" could an actor achieve the requisite identity of Guided Democracy. By "returning to the rails of our revolution," as Sukarno declared Indonesia had done in 1959, the bases of solidarity became not narrow interests located somewhere in the electorate, or in this or that class, but rather comprised the whole of the Indonesian nation or "family." Consequently, the collective efforts of the actors no longer related to autonomous organization-building in the form of a political party, but now became channeled into the state's (that is, the President's) grandiose foreign policy and internal planning schemes.[92]

Thus, from 1957 to 1962 the touchstone of collective efforts invariably related to the campaign to wrest West Irian from Dutch control. Insofar as Sukarno represented the fount of ideas of Guided Democracy — that is, decided the legitimate actors' identities and options, clarified the nature of the contract's aims, bases of solidarity and collective effort — then the increasingly intimate ideological and tactical embrace of the President between 1957 and 1962 by the Communists constituted an attempt to make a successful transition from a decaying contract to a new one.

The support lent to Sukarno by the PKI was to be the first, and strongest, bridge built in the transition period. The PKI's relations with Sukarno were already strong before 1957. However, when the first major threats to liberal democracy were heard from Sukarno in his "bury the parties" speech, even the PKI voiced its muted opposition to the scheme. By the time Sukarno delivered his konsepsi amidst the dramatic events on the outer islands in February 1957, when the threat to liberal democracy had grown immeasurably, the PKI gave its support to the President's corporatist ideas. That a gotong-royong cabinet, premised on corporatist ideals (the "family principle"), blatantly violated the PKI's commitment to class struggle, did not deter Aidit from giving the conception his party's approval.[93]

Later, in 1958, when it became apparent that the Army attempted to monopolize Sukarno's ideas,[94] the PKI both lent the President its support and subtly reminded him of his deviation from PKI cabinet representation by calling for a "100 per cent implementation of the konsepsi."[95] The PKI lent its support in the drive to crush the PRRI-Permesta rebellion and some of its most outspoken and dangerous enemies in the Army. The Communists even reversed their initial opposition (which had resulted in

the suspension of Harian Rakyat) to Presidential Decree no. 6/1959, which prevented them from translating their electoral victories of 1957 into the composition of regional councils, and later called the President's act "a glorious victory for the party."[96] A virtue was made of necessity when the Army acted to reimplement the 1945 Constitution, and the "PKI became one of the chief advocates of the [document], solidly supporting the course which it knew to be inevitable."[97]

With the foundation and organizational rudiments of Guided Democracy in place by mid-1960, "the PKI could congratulate itself that it had stayed on the right side of the government in a period of rapid political changes, and...had become an accepted part of the agencies of an increasingly monolithic and autocratic state."[98] Its success up to that point could be attributed to its almost unreserved support for Sukarno from 1957 to 1960. The party's success after 1960, however, could be attributable to the demands placed on Sukarno by the evolving political situation. As Reeve has argued,

> as party influence was reduced from 1959 to 1960, the area of agreement between Sukarno and the Army leadership shrank correspondingly,...[and since] Sukarno lacked an organized mass following to promote his vision of what Indonesia should become.... the PKI was his strongest backer.... Of the three surviving big parties, the PKI could offer the best organized mass support of the more radical themes of the President's speeches, particularly on foreign policy.... [Thus] the PKI and the President needed each other for protection against the Army.... Nasution's hostility to the continued role for the parties and the Army's particular harassment of the PKI forced Sukarno to formulate a rationale to defend their existence. This he did in [July] 1960 with a new formula, 'Nasakom'.[99]

The acronym Nasakom defined the unity of the three forces that Sukarno perceived to be dominant in Indonesian society: Nationalism (Nasionalisme), Religion (Agama), and Communism (Komunisme).[100] The concept of Nasakom, especially when it became a state doctrine (on 17

August 1960), preserved a political role for the Communists even if it was in contradiction with the President's own earlier anti-party formulations.

It was the President's own stepped up campaign to bring West Irian "into the national fold" in 1961-1962, with the PKI in immediate tow, that consolidated the latter's identity as the foremost Indonesian nationalist actor, helped it fulfill the national aim, and permitted it to engage in nationwide collective efforts.[101] On 19 December 1961 Sukarno's issued his "command" to the nation to prepare for general mobilization. The hysterical and jingoistic environment presented the PKI with a great opportunity and "in the early months of 1962 no party outdid the PKI in articulating a quality of reckless daring that would somehow manage to bring West New Guinea into the Indonesian fold."[102] Diplomatic actions and mass PKI-led campaigns, rather than military acts, eventually secured the transfer of sovereignty of West Irian and permitted the Communists and Sukarno, and not the Armed Forces, to acquire for themselves the prestige of the event. Thus, when a Dutch-Indonesian agreement that would allow the transfer of West Irian to Indonesian administration on 1 May 1963 was signed on 15 August 1962, Sukarno also decided (in October 1962) to rescind martial law at that time. The real import of the event was that the PKI had achieved everything it had aimed for vis-à-vis acquiring a new identity and basis of solidarity: "The PKI enhanced its reputation for patriotism and national devotion in an atmosphere where these qualities were all-important in winning prestige and public acceptance."[103]

The direct alterations that the PKI made with respect to its formal ideology were as important as its attempts to be associated with

Sukarno's actions and ideas. It is in this area of political life of Guided Democracy that the PKI attempted most concretely to assume a new identity, new aims and options, and redefine its bases of solidarity and the nature of its collective effort. Here,

> efforts to mesh party theory and tactics with the various concepts of Sukarno's mystagoguery and of the Indonesian state ideology [were] dictated not only by tactical considerations of the appeal to the masses of such a union of concepts, but also by the watchful eye cast by the military on all ideologies that might be interpreted as contrary to official policy.[104]

The party's adaptational process progressed in two clearly discernible steps and pivoted around the changes to the official party constitution that were effected at the September 1959 and April 1962 National Congresses.

There were three important matters with which the party dealt in its constitutional changes of 1959 — the foreign nature of its ideology, the treachery at Madiun, and the role of class struggle — all potential liabilities in the face of an ascendant, anti-Communist Army. In his Report of Changes in the Communist Party Constitution,[105] M. H. Lukman declared that "we state now, for example, 'All the work of the PKI is based on Marxist-Leninist theory.' We mention the theory only as Marxism-Leninism, and we do not mention the names of the great pupils of Marx, Engels and Lenin,...Comrade Stalin and Comrade Mao Tse-tung."[106] Thus, some of the alien offensiveness of the PKI's theory was quickly cut away. On the matter of Madiun, Lukman had this to report:

> In reviewing the birth of our Party as the heir and continuation of the heroic and revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people, with the heroic evidences of the people's struggle, the Preamble to our Constitution now includes additionally the rebellions and revolts which had a history of opposing Dutch colonialism and Japanese military occupation.[107]

The "Madiun Affair" was now interpreted as the "Madiun Provocation," when

reactionary elements tricked the progressives and Communists into self-destruction. Lastly, on the matter of the role of class struggle, the PKI argued that

> theoretically, advancing the matter of the possibility of transition to Socialism by peaceful means, means.... that we Marxist-Leninists do not tie ourselves down with the problems of the form, the methods, and the means of effectuating the revolution.[108]

Thus, the party held out only the possibility of a peaceful transition; the theorists and the tacticians alike preferred greater choice. Taken together, the three changes brought the PKI closer to the style and content of Guided Democracy, prudently distancing the party from problematic theoretical positions.[109]

The stepping stone to the 1962 constitutional changes was the PKI endorsement of the concept of Nasakom. The party declared the trilogy of forces to be "the most important consequence for all supporters of the Political Manifesto and Usdek," and broadly warned the Army of its newly won protection, asserting that "it is also clear that anti-Communist actions taken by anyone, whatever the form may be, are contrary to the broad lines of the State policy of the Republic of Indonesia, and are an act of hostility against one of the major groups of the Indonesian people."[110] With its position strengthened, the PKI easily met the demands of "The Conditions for the Simplification of the Political Parties," which included acceptance of Pancasila, the first principle of which included "belief in God."

The PKI response to Presidential Decrees no. 7/1959 and no. 13/1960 was timely in that the requisite constitutional changes — acceptance of the Political Manifesto/USDEK and Pancasila — were carried out in the brief time period permitted by the authorities on 31 December 1960 (which

was also the deadline for compliance with the decrees' terms).[111] To the constitution's preamble was added a lengthy passage:

> The PKI accepts and defends the constitution of 1945 as the basic law of the Republic of Indonesia. In its preamble are mentioned the desire of the People of Indonesia to live free, united, sovereign, in justice and prosperity and the Pantjasila as the foundation of the nation; it [the PKI] wants to develop a just and prosperous society in accordance with the nature of the people of Indonesia, and to base its work program on the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia and its details as determined by the First Session of the MPRS to serve as the outline for the course to be taken by the Republic of Indonesia.[112]

The essence of the PKI's theoretical shift was summarized by the assertion made by Aidit in 1959 that "class interests must be subordinated to the interests of the nation,"[113] and was reaffirmed in December 1960 when the Central Committee concluded that "in carrying out the national struggle we must hold firmly to the basic principle: place the interests of class and of the Party below the national interest, or place the national interest above the interests of class and of the Party."[114] In more general terms, as van der Kroef has written, "concepts like 'People's Democracy' and even 'Socialism' and 'Communism' were given a specific Indonesian context, the first being made synonymous with gotong royong, the second and third being described as adapted to 'Indonesian conditions'."[115] In order to advance its political fortunes within the context of "Indonesian conditions" after the constitutional changes, the party had to ensure the fidelity and unity of its auxiliaries, while attempting at the same time to recover from the anti-party effects of the Army's organization building.

Since the PKI had been placed on the defensive by the Army's initiative to build for itself a base of popular support, a reactive strategy was put into place to retain control of the people and resources

already under party control. The first signs of the party's realization that its adherents were the target of the Army came at a party conference held between June and July 1958. The call was issued, in connection with the ongoing "Three Year Plan for Organization and Training," (1956-1959) to enhance party discipline and knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, and to solidify central control. These measures were designed to protect the now threatened Communist state-within-a-state. That the intensification of Marxist-Leninist education among party cadres was emphasized more so than in the past, and given primary emphasis in the new "Three Year Plan for Training and Organization" (1959-1962, unveiled in September 1959), is indicative of the seriousness with which party leaders appraised Army advances. These same sentiments also found a place among the 1959 constitutional changes that reflected "increased concern with organizational discipline and ideological purity."[116]

Amidst all the changes, however, one aspect of the PKI's nature remained constant: the party gave the unequivocal sign that no matter how intensely the party took "on the protective coloration of its ideological environment,"[117] it remained fundamentally an ideological alternative to both the Indonesian government and Sukarno. The party's signal was given in September 1958. Aware that some of its members had been co-opted into governmental or quasi-governmental agencies, the party warned that "there is a growing possibility that these important political appointments and posts can, within certain limitations, have an ideologically corrupting influence among the cadres."[118] Additionally, the fact that the PKI had given Guided Democracy and the Kerja cabinet its support was, in part, to blame for the "cadres [having assumed] an attitude of ideological passivity."[119] However, the editorial continued,

> the problem arises as a consequence of the interpretation that is being placed upon our Party's position, an unjustifiable and unreasonable interpretation that really clouds and besmirches what should be an accurate appraisal of our true position, which is no matter what the present government arrogates to itself, or pretends to be, it is definitely not a people's government, and no matter if that government even appears to be firm and stable, it is still capable of adopting measures that are injurious to the masses.[120]

To further distinguish the party from all other political actors, the article continued:

> Some of our cadres are evidently forgetting that no matter how peacefully one's progress along the road toward Socialism may be, the actual fact [of] the matter is that the road is the road of revolution and it must be conceived in terms of the principles underlying class struggle. And to this end, we must train, instruct, organize, and mobilize the masses effectively and extensively into revolutionary forces.... Let us just remember that the more offices and posts we can put our people in, and the more various such posts or positions are, the closer we are to the time when the people will truly govern. So as you can see our efforts to discourage ideological backwardness or timidity are, in effect, part of the larger scheme of things and have ultimate references to the coming struggle.... With the strengthening of the Party ideology there will follow an equally strong guarantee that a responsible and loyal people will be won over in the days ahead.[121]

The problem in applying the above prescription to Indonesian conditions in 1960 was that the party's traditional means of collective activity had been blocked by the suffocating presence of martial law restrictions. If the commitment to "struggle" was to materialize at all, the PKI had to create new forms of collective activity. From 1960 to 1962, therefore, the party attempted to manoeuvre through a process of "reality testing."[122] The underlying principle of the new form of activity was to employ the PKI's mass organizations as tools that would let the party (without being directly involved, and hence, vulnerable) press its own demands, and, hopefully, continue its attraction of adherents and accumulation of resources. Thus, the party undertook to disrupt the Army's organizational schemes, and to acquire a renewed

political salience with respect to other political forces.

The strategy of "reality testing" was first applied in 1960 to resist the Army's and the state's plans to create nationwide youth and labour golkars; it was necessary in the interests of party advancement to place the Pemuda Rakyat and SOBSI in possible jeopardy. The attempt to create a youth golkar in February 1960 was explicitly based on the government's desire "to break the hold of parties on Indonesia's youth."[123] Fortunately for Pemuda Rakyat, resistance to the scheme was shared with other youth ormas, thus distributing evenly any retribution from the government or Army. In any event, all the large youth ormas emerged unscathed and (formally) unassociated with the Youth Front (Front Pemuda) that was created in August 1960.[124]

On the matter of the government's desire to create a labour golkar, the United Organization of Indonesian Workers (Organisasi Persatuan Perkerja Indonesia — OPPI), however, SOBSI largely stood alone. The proposal had originally elicited Harian Rakyat's response that it resembled "Hitler's Arbeitersfront,"[125] especially since it was predicated upon the Labour Minister's belief that "the labor movement should be free from international influences."[126] At a labour conference held in July 1960 it was SOBSI, not the PKI, that continued the polemic. The proposal was found to be "fascistic in character and [contained] compulsory elements."[127] In more diplomatic terms, SOBSI argued that such an idea was in conflict with the 1945 Constitution and international law to which the Indonesian government subscribed.[128] Even in the face of pressure from the Army's BKSBUMIL,[129] and attacks from other political parties,[130] SOBSI sustained its opposition to OPPI.[131] The results of this venture in "reality testing," the riskiest to date, were summarized

by Aidit in April 1962 when he "claimed the failure of OPPI as one of the PKI's greatest successes in recent years."[132]

Having stalled the drive to create organizations based on the concept of golongan karya, the PKI and its fronts pressed in 1961 and 1962 to reassert the political salience of the PKI. Belgian actions in the Congo in 1961-1962 presented the pretext for SOBSI's rejuvenation in the sphere of labour agitation. Throughout July and August 1961, for example, a wave of "unofficial strikes" spearheaded by SOBSI affiliates swept Belgian property in North and East Sumatra.[133] Presaging the PKI's campaign against feudalism in 1963 and 1964 was the outburst of peasant unrest in November 1961, instigated by the SOBSI mainstay, the Union of Plantation Workers of the Republic of Indonesia (Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia — Sarbupri). This new form of collective activity helped reassert the PKI's credentials as a tenacious revolutionary contender. Taken together with the other changes the party had made with respect to its aims, options, bases of solidarity, and collective action, the PKI at its Seventh Special National Congress in April 1962 could look confidently to a future role in pressing the anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist concerns of Indonesia's "continuing revolution." Moreover, the path to its own style of revolution after 1962 was not as encumbered by the pervasive influence of the Army which, since 1959, had suffered political reversals at the hands of Sukarno.

The Army in Retreat and Differences with Sukarno 1959-1962

From the outset, the relationship between Sukarno and the Army leadership was an alliance of expediency. Between 1959 and 1962 the duumvirate grew apart in two major ways. First, Sukarno compromised on

the role of political parties in the context of Guided Democracy, and therefore resisted letting the Army expand to a size commensurate with its aspirations. Second, on the more profound question of the direction that the "continuing revolution" should take after 1959, there were sharp disagreements.

Several consequences followed from the President's curbing of the Army's place in national life, and especially Nasution's role, and his attempt to direct the course of the revolution. First, the PKI came to enjoy Presidential patronage in regard to positions in the state. Second, a healthy environment within which it and its fronts could flourish was secured. Third, and most importantly, the recurrence of a divided leadership by 1962 heralded tantalizing prospects of real power.

The alterations effected to martial law legislation by Sukarno in December 1957 marked the first of a long series of measures enacted by the President to apply the brake on the Army's anti-party campaigns and to ensure his own power. The significant change made in 1957 related to the conferring on Sukarno of the powers and title of "supreme" "State-of-War Administrator," a position "which under the [March] 1957 law," van der Kroef writes, "had been shared by the heads of the military services."[134] Later, in December 1959 all regional commanders were made directly responsible to Sukarno.[135] With regard to the TNI's innovations on the organizational level — the EKSs and the FNPIB — the President interfered extensively. On the first anniversary of the EKSPM in 1958, for instance, Sukarno "expressed less than complete satisfaction with its activities."[136] The FNPIB drew the President's ire in particular, especially after its quasi-governmental pretensions were revealed by its August 1958 name change. At the time, Sukarno attached an honcurary

council to the Front, consisting of himself and other civilian protégés,[137] while enjoining in other measures to control Army-dominated bodies.[138] Sukarno's public criticism of the FNPIB on 17 August 1959 was harsh:

> As for the FNPIB, I frankly say that I am not very satisfied with its actions. Do not let the FNPIB day by day become more and more just a body with the least interest in West Irian! Do not let it deal with other things which do not directly concern the struggle for West Irian, for instance, shipbuilding and shipping concerns.... The FNPIB...must concentrate its efforts upon arousing and stirring the masses for the struggle for West Irian.[139]

Just as the FNPIB had preempted the PKI-led Central Action Committee for the Liberation of West Irian, Sukarno's announcement of a new Front Nasional on 13 January 1960 undermined the Army's organization, which was finally dissolved in 1961.

Even when the Army was represented within the government, and partially responsible for the direction of its policy, Sukarno's interference was pervasive. Sukarno's offer of the Defence and Security portfolio in the Kerja cabinet to Nasution came with the insistence that he resign his post as Army Chief-of-Staff. Nasution, naturally, rejected the President's plans and secured the post anyway, but not without suffering the disruptive presence of a Sukarno-appointed arch-rival in the position of Junior Defence Minister. To add to his travails, the Air Force's assertions of autonomy and its unwillingness to take orders from an Army officer weakened Nasution by "limiting the powers of the Ministry of Defence which thus became hardly more than an administrative unit, instead of [a] united command of all services."[140] Sukarno, "to strengthen the position of the service Chiefs-of-Staff vis-à-vis Nasution," included them in the cabinet as ministers ex officio in a cabinet revision in February 1960.[141] To add a final insult to the Army

and Nasution "Soekarno got in a blow by calling the air force the apple of his eye and [promised] it new equipment."[142]

Several key policy decisions made by the government, and often crafted in part by Nasution or other Army officers, were altered by Sukarno to serve his purposes. Often these changes benefited the PKI. Illustrative of this was Sukarno's personal intervention on behalf of the PKI to facilitate staging its 1959 National Congress, despite Army efforts to quash the gathering. Also significant was Sukarno's crucial alteration of the original conditions, in part drafted by Nasution, for the continued existence of political parties. Whereas the body charged with this responsibility initially called for the banning of all parties that had been or were currently engaged in rebellion (the PSI, Masjumi, and the PKI), Sukarno changed the conditions such that only parties "at present" (in 1959) were to be banned.[143] Nasution attempted to reverse the effects of his own policy, which now favoured the PKI, by futilely urging Masjumi to denounce the PRRI in 1960 before it was too late.[144] Lastly, when the military commanders in South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi banned the PKI and its fronts in their respective areas in August 1960, it was Sukarno who made possible an early lifting of the ban in South Sumatra and South Sulawesi.

The surrender of the last PRRI elements in February-April 1961; the capture of the Darul Islam leader, S. M. Kartosuwirjo, on 4 June 1962; and the 15 August 1962 West Irian settlement totally undermined the basis of the SOB and the continued predominance of the Army in national political life. Commensurate with the Army's decline in importance was Nasution's decline in prestige and power. Once again, the intricate manoeuvres of Sukarno precipitated the power shift. In June 1962 Sukarno

accepted a plan to establish the position of Commander of the Armed Forces (Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata — PANGAB), with Nasution filling the post. Ostensibly, the creation of PANGAB was to expedite the further integration of the Armed Forces and ensure a coordinated policy among the services. Nasution readily accepted the post of PANGAB and turned the post of Army Chief-of-Staff over to Yani. Thereafter, in Nasution's own words, Sukarno launched into a "coup from above":

> Sukarno now declared that the new hierarchical structure...would consist of the supreme commander — himself — on top of the structure with full operational powers, assisted by a chief of staff of the armed forces (Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata, or KASAB).... All service chiefs were to be elevated from chiefs of staff to commanders of their respective services and placed directly under the command of the president."[145]

Within nine months of Nasution's replacement, Sukarno replaced the commanders of South Sumatra and South Kalimantan, presumably as part of a wider campaign to redress the political balance in favour of the PKI. Nasution's loss of control over the Army was compounded by the loss of his seat on the Assisting Board to the Supreme War Authority (Badan Pembantu Peperti) on 1 July 1963.

Perhaps the most fundamental reason for the lack of continued accord between Sukarno and Nasution was their very different conceptions of the "revolution." In the early days of Guided Democracy it soon became apparent that Nasution placed an emphasis on order and stability as the proper environment for longer-term programmes of which the

> most important is the Overall Development Plan [1961-1969] which will aim at leading towards the three goal frameworks of our revolution: a Unitary State, a Just and Prosperous Society, and to be friends with all nations; basically to create a Just and Prosperous Society. It is aimed at building a Just and Prosperous Society.[146]

The commitment to Indonesia's economic development was evident not only in the government portfolios the Army controlled — production,

agriculture, communications, health, internal affairs, and veterans affairs — but in the Army's own efforts through its creation in early 1961 of the Bodies for the Fostering of Functional Potentials (Badan Pembina Potensi Karya — BPPK).[147]

In contrast to the Army's policy of quiet and patient national development was the impatient cacophony of Sukarno's "revolution." For Sukarno, revolution meant "a national mood of excitement, drive, mass enthusiasm, and a start on moves towards 'Indonesian socialism'."[148] The image is best summarized by his calls to "construct tomorrow, pull down yesterday" and for "a symphony of construction and destruction," neither of which needed to heed the rationality of economics.[149] Amidst all the ideological verbiage,[150] the recurring message was one of radicalism. The apparent commitment to radicalism both in Indonesia, in the form of anti-feudalism, and abroad, in the form of brazen foreign policy schemes, was especially favourable to the PKI. As Sukarno had reiterated in reference to the "Indonesian Revolution," it had been "from the beginning,...a 'Left Revolution, a People's Revolution.'"[151] He also spoke out, in connection with the propagation of Nasakom, against "Communist phobia." Increasingly it was this vision of revolution and of Indonesia's character that gained ideological ascendancy during the first half of the 1960s.

In such a charged atmosphere, with its obvious permissiveness towards the PKI, it became contingent upon Sukarno to draw figures from the party into the various bodies and agencies of the state. By 1962, therefore, the PKI was represented in the DPR-GR (where "with about 55 to 60 followers the PKI had become one of the largest, if not the largest, party bloc"[152]), in the MPRS, on the Depernas (where one of three deputy

chairmen, Sakirman, was a PKI official), on the DPA (where Aidit and Lukman had seats), in the National Front, and in the cabinet (on 9 March 1962 Aidit and Lukman were given positions without portfolio, largely of an advisory nature). The PKI's hold on its territory in Central and East Java remained firm despite Presidential Decree no. 6/1959 which threatened to undo the party's 1957 election wins.[153] Party members became the deputy heads of three regions (West Java, East Java, and Jakarta), the heads of eight autonomous regions in East Java,[154] and mayors of Semarang, Surakarta, Tjirebon, and Surabaya.

More important for the party was its own growth as well as that of its fronts. In 1959 Lukman reported that the PKI had a membership of more than 1.5 million,[155] of which more than half were declared to be peasants.[156] By October 1962 the party was claiming membership of 2 million.[157] The party's auxiliaries also experienced terrific growth. SOBSI grew from 2,732,909 members at the end of 1959,[158] to 3,277,032 in 1962.[159] The peasant front, BTI, in April 1959 claimed a membership of 3.5 million (or 14 per cent of all adult peasants).[160] When statistics were released in July 1962 the staggering growth of the organization was confirmed: 5,654,974 members (25 per cent of the total adult peasant population), were organized through subbranches in 43 per cent of all peasant villages, in 84 per cent of all ketjamatans, located in virtually 100 per cent of all kabupatens.[161] Pemuda Rakyat's membership increased from 1.2 million in July 1958,[162] to 1.25 million in September 1961,[163] and to a high of 1.5 million in early 1963.[164] Finally, Gerwani's membership of 700,000 at the beginning of 1960[165] increased to 1,120,594 in December 1961, and 1.5 million in January 1963.[166] Hindley has estimated that between July 1959 and October 1962, the membership of the

four major PKI fronts rose from 7.8 million to over 11.0 million.[167] The Communist state-within-a-state seemed to have recovered completely from the Army siege and, indeed, had come to command at least the nominal loyalty of an ever larger section of the polity.

From Within the Confines of Guided Democracy: The PKI's Future Prospects

In 1962 the PKI could commend itself for having withstood the only real and concerted threat to its political existence since 1948, in the form of the Army, while undergoing a fundamental and complex transformation far more significant than the changes it made in 1951. In fulfilling both of these tasks, the party, in fact, facilitated the blunting of the strong anti-party measures of 1959 and 1960, and helped reformulate the social contract of Guided Democracy as it appeared in its Nasakom guise. No longer was Guided Democracy based on functional groups exclusively, but from 1962 it rested on an uneasy combination of the parties and their ormas, united in Nasakom, and Army-inspired golkars. As Reeve has argued, by early 1963 "the ideology of Guided Democracy became split in two," with the Army monopolizing the golkar concept and the PKI asserting its hegemony within Nasakom.[168] Thus, ensconced in the state apparatus and protected by Nasakom, the PKI after 1962 sought to advance the revolution on two fronts: on the anti-feudalist and anti-imperialist stages erected by Guided Democracy itself, and in all areas of Indonesian life where the Army attempted to mobilize support for the concept of golkar. Thus, having suffered attacks from both the state and Army up to 1962, the party increasingly counterattacked these two targets between late 1962 and 1965 as it moved from a reactive to a mobilizing strategy.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLARIZATION OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY: NASAKOM VERSUS GOLKAR LATE 1962 TO LATE 1964

Between late 1962 and late 1964 the struggle between the TNI and the PKI intensified and became essentially a contest over the very nature of Guided Democracy. By 1962 it was evident that the social contract of Guided Democracy contained two mutually incompatible streams or sets of elements. In one instance, the collection of corporatist concepts and institutional features centred around the notion of golongan karya (golkar) was being advanced by the TNI. Countervailing pressure was being applied most stridently by the PKI, with the lesser parties of PNI and NU in tow, to establish a Nasakom-oriented Guided Democracy and to repeal the harsh anti-party measures that were enacted in 1959 and 1960. In the series of clashes that ensued between the adherents of these two visions of the political order, one is witness to political conflict between a declining political actor, the TNI, and an ascending political actor, the PKI. Accordingly, the strategies employed by each actor reflect their shifting status with regard to the social contract itself. That is to say, as the Army's resources and capabilities came to be increasingly depleted or weakened by, chiefly, the PKI in its offensive

strategy, the TNI had increasingly to revert to a reactive strategy to protect those same political goods.

A discussion of the Army's government-building activites and the refinement of its ideological basis will constitute the first part of this chapter. This will set the stage in part two for a discussion of the developments between late 1962 and late 1963 when the Army's incipient government attempted to have its "programme" of economic stabilization adopted by the government of Sukarno and Djuanda. The failure to adopt a U.S.-sponsored stabilization plan, largely at the hands of Sukarno -- in turn, at the behest of the PKI -- was the first indication that the Nasakom half of Guided Democracy would become the predominant aspect of the social contract. A discussion of the PKI's attempts to make itself the determining factor of the social contract, through a multifaceted "revolutionary offensive" launched in late 1963, will comprise the third section. Between late 1963 and late 1964, the TNI state-within-a-state and its Communist counterpart clashed over a variety of issues, each attempting to steer the polity in its own direction. By the end of 1964 the Army seemed to be in general retreat, while Sukarno's favouritism towards the PKI, combined with its thrusts to assert its sovereignty, moved Guided Democracy markedly in the direction of Nasakom.

The Army's Government-Building and Conceptual Refinement Initiatives 1958 To Early 1963

The political aspirations of the TNI and its leadership in March 1957 far outstripped the Army's preparedness for assuming the weighty role assigned to it under the SOB. Legitimizing the reality of its involvement with a conceptual framework or ideological base, which would

also perpetuate that wide-ranging political role indefinitely, was the primary task facing the Army leaders in 1958. Therefore, the TNI leadership utilized, primarily, the Army Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat — SESKOAD), and its Doctrine Committee (established by Nasution in 1958) to articulate and inculcate a concept of government within the officer corps. Thus, in rapid succession, the "Middle Way" concept of 1958 gave way to the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, which in turn provided the basis for the Civic Mission programme unveiled in 1962.

Having arrived in 1962 at what seemed to be a viable basis for government, the TNI set out to ensure that, in the transition from martial law to civilian politics, Civic Missions would be practised by its civilian supporters at all levels of the state, society, and economy. To ensure the likelihood of this outcome, the Army tried to have a national development scheme, sponsored by the United States, adopted as national policy. Since the success of the Civic Missions depended upon the nation's commitment to economic development, the TNI's advocacy of its programme and the U.S. plan marked an attempt to have its own favoured form of collective effort and aims imposed on the Indonesian state. To back its plans, the Army protected its past strongholds in the economy (the state enterprises) and in the regions with new forms of organized coercion. Ultimately, what held the whole Civic Mission scheme together, however, was the Army's ability to convince the state elite (top members of the government and the bureaucracy), particularly Sukarno, of the worthiness of national economic development.

Under conditions of martial law, the Army had developed organizations before it developed a rationale for their existence. In

the TNI's quest to find some degree of popular support, Nasution rushed to subvert party ormas. By mid-1958 a multitude of BKSs, operating in conjunction with their umbrella organization, the FNPIB, littered the Indonesian political landscape. In their numbers and in their scope, as well as in the renaming of the FNPIB in August 1958, these Army organizations hinted of a much broader role than that suggested by the Army's on-going demands for functional group status, a place in the administrative, executive, and legislative branches of the government, and in the diplomatic corps. The first real ideological justification for the Army's aspirations was given in November 1958.

Nasution's November 1958 speech on the TNI's "Middle Way" (Jalan Tengah)[1] galvanized the Army into a search for an ideological justification of its present and future role. In essence, Nasution proclaimed that the TNI was not about to typify either of the two Army "types" then in existence in the world: "We do not and we will not copy the situation as it exists in several Latin American states where the army acts as a direct political force," Nasution declared; "nor will we emulate the Western European model where armies are the dead tools [of the governments] or the example of Eastern Europe."[2] The Middle Way consisted of steering between the temptation to seize power and the pitfalls of civilian dominance of the Army that had so antagonized the TNI during the 1950s.[3] The concept of the Middle Way was crude and necessitated future philosophical refinement; this process occurred between 1958 and 1962.

The development of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare (Perang Wilayah) and Territorial Management (Pembinaan Wilayah) became a major preoccupation of the TNI and consolidated the Army's vision of the

character and direction of the "continuing revolution." Perhaps more importantly, the ongoing development of the Doctrine occasioned the parallel development of an apparatus designed to implement it. Not surprisingly, the body initially responsible for the concept of Territorial Warfare, the Inspectorate-General of Territorial and People's Warfare, also created the TNI's incipient governmental apparatus: Section V of the Army General Staff (Staf Umum Angkatan Darat — SUAD V). In contrast to other armies, which possessed the orthodox structural features relating to intelligence (SUAD I), operations (SUAD II), personnel (SUAD III), and logistics (SUAD IV), the TNI created a section relating to territorial affairs (SUAD V). Among the concerns of SUAD V were the BKSs and the FNPIB, which were established under its aegis. After the advocacy of the Middle Way concept, Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management became the focal point of SUAD V activities. In this connection, SUAD V was ably assisted by the Army Doctrine Committee at SESKOAD, which, throughout 1960-1962, elaborated these concepts.

The concept of Territorial Management represented, at base, a vision of the revolution, to which Indonesia had "returned" by 1959. As such, the concept of Territorial Management, which was to be practised during peacetime, was more important than Territorial Warfare, a form of struggle that Indonesia was to wage against a foreign enemy, but that never eventuated during Guided Democracy. The preparations for Territorial Warfare were to be laid through a vigourous and nationwide Territorial Management scheme, even if the possibility of war occurring was minimal. Thus, the Army derived the benefits of playing a penetrative and nationwide role in Indonesian life at all times. Ostensibly, the programmatic concern of Territorial Management, as

elaborated in 1962, was to ensure that "all national potential is utilized in a total fashion,"[4] where national potential was defined as "the military, political-economic-social, spiritual, and civic (or people's) fields."[5] Not only was Territorial Management designed to create the necessary "war motivation" in the spiritual field, but as suggested by the references to "ensuring stability,"[6] the concept was to be applied against "antagonistic elements": "Individualism and liberalism; international Communism; negative religious fanaticism; atheism; isolationism; autarchy; and chauvinism."[7] Communism was labelled an "aggressive ideology"[8] that "considers its state to be only the starting point for the launching of a 'universal mission' whose ultimate objective is mastery of the entire world."[9]

The warning against the PKI was put very starkly by SESKOAD and presaged an inevitable confrontation with the party after the SOB was lifted: "For the agitators, in the negative meaning of the word, and die-hards who support these antagonistic elements," SESKOAD warned, "forceful measures must be taken and, if necessary, they must be isolated and eliminated."[10] In this regard, the Army had a ready-made indoctrination programme:

> At best elimination of these hostile elements so that they can be replaced with our own national ideals and foundations;...[and] at least, reduction and limitation of their respective strengths and spheres of influence so that they can be supervised and controlled easily, [or] to establish immunity against the penetration of foreign ideologies capable of creating disruption, revolt, and subversion.[11]

SESKOAD reaffirmed a golkar interpretation of Guided Democracy by asserting that "we have in our Pantjasila and in our revolutionary ideals, one basis and objective for our revolution, one national mission. There is no need for anything else."[12]

The concepts of Territorial Management and Territorial Warfare had an operational aspect as well. Special military training courses and indoctrination drives became a major part of SESKOAD's activities.[13] Significantly, when the Doctrine was officially recognized as national policy by the MPRS in late 1960, the indoctrination drive was extended "by getting a substantial number of senior civilian officials to understand the relationship between Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, hoping that this would create enough consensus between civilian and military authorities to help them close ranks."[14]

In particular, the TNI attempted to fashion what Pauker has called "a pattern of government"[15] between civilians and military figures that would endure in the post-SOB era. Here, the Army's indoctrination and cultivation efforts focussed on the Four-in-One bodies (Tjatur Tunggal) located in all seventeen military commands in the country. Decisions about Territorial Management were taken by the Tjatur Tunggals, which consisted of a committee of four people: the territorial military commander (chairman); the civilian governor; the chief of police; and the district attorney. Since the chairmanships would revert to the civilian governors with the termination of the SOB, SUAD V organized interdepartmental "Orientation Courses on Security Problems," which at the end of 1962 had indoctrinated 300 senior officials, the governors presumably among them, in the concepts of Territorial Management and Territorial Warfare.[16] Not surprisingly, the Army's own indoctrination efforts, were "subtly intertwined with but clearly distinguishable in political intent from the official propaganda of the Sukarno regime,"[17] that is, "the doctrine was generally phrased in the current language of Guided Democracy, except that there was no mention of Nasakom."[18]

Indeed, the Doctrine was premised upon the destruction of Nasakom.

By 1962 there was a series of developments that necessitated a more active implementation of the kinds of ideas represented by Territorial Management and Territorial Warfare than mere indoctrination courses. Of primary importance was the fact that by July 1962 Sukarno would no longer tolerate aggressive Army drives and initiatives designed to supplant the parties in the name of the 1945 Constitution.[19] To compound the inevitable curtailment of the Army's political activity and contractual reformulation, Sukarno decided in October 1962 that the SOB would be lifted on 1 May 1963. With successes on the military and political fronts, it was also an opportune moment to demobilize the Armed Forces, especially the mammoth 350,000-man Army. It was becoming difficult to afford the bloated military establishment. According to Nasution himself, in the 1962 "routine budget," the military "absorbed 53 per cent of the entire revenues of the State."[20] While the Army was expected to heed the economic needs of the state and revolution, the character and direction of the revolution made the TNI uncomfortable with the future.

The rise of the concept of Nasakom, and the failure of the Army to have itself directly incorporated into the evolving social contract through the adoption of concepts such as Nasakomil (Nasionalisme-Agama-Komunisme-Militer) or Polkar (Politik-Karya), did not bode well for the Army's decidedly different vision of the revolution. As the military commander of West Java, and commander of the Siliwangi Division, General Adjie stated in the early 1960s, "anti-Communism was not compatible with the 'political etiquette' of the Sukarno regime and therefore the Army had to compete with the Communist Party without confronting it openly."[21] The solution to the Army's rapid displacement from the commanding heights

of the social contract was the Civic Mission programme.

Since the TNI regarded itself as more than a tool of the state, it maintained an interest in the experiences of several foreign armies that behaved in a similar manner.[22] The attempts of the TNI to mimick or duplicate the features that it found favourable in the practises of these other armies, most notably the Yugoslavian example, were sharpened by its own struggle with the Darul Islam in West Java. There, throughout the period from 1948 to 1962, the Siliwangi Division consciously attempted to go beyond a purely military victory by supplementing the peace with constructive and developmental ventures designed to benefit the local populace. Efforts were made to improve canals and irrigation systems, rebuild schools, mosques, houses, and so forth; all these measures were enacted to win the people to the Army's side. Soon, the experiences of the Siliwangi Division were applied on a nationwide scale:

> The argument was developed that if national defence policy relied on a concept of popular resistance (perlawanan rakyat) [derived from the Doctrine of Territorial Management and Territorial Warfare], then community development (pembangunan desa) was needed not only in areas stricken by the rebellions of past years but everywhere in the country.[23]

An additional influence on the TNI's conceptual development was the United States. As early as 1953 the U.S. National Security Council had envisaged military training to the TNI and assistance to "moderates...on the right," "to prevent permanent communist control" of Indonesia.[24] With the rise to prominance of the PKI in the 1957 elections and the ban of the Masjumi and PSI in late 1960, responsibility for countering the Communists fell mainly to the Army. From the perspective of the U.S., as expressed by the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff in 1958, "the only non-Communist force with the capability of obstructing the...PKI" was the Indonesian Army; therefore, Nasution was to be given "encouragement" "to carry out

his 'plan' for the control of Communism."[25] One form of assistance related to helping the Army leadership develop the concept of Civic Missions.[26] According to Scott, "the Kennedy administration aided the Indonesian Army in developing Civic Mission or 'civic action' programs" by establishing in Jakarta a special U.S. MILTAG (Military Training Advisory Group) "to assist in the implementation of SESKOAD's Civic Mission programs."[27] In a 1964 memo from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, it was revealed that U.S.

> aid to Indonesia [in the form of the MILTAG]...we are satisfied...is not helping Indonesia militarily. It is, however, permitting us to maintain some contact with key elements in Indonesia which are interested in and capable of resisting Communist takeover. We think this is of vital importance to the entire Free World.[28]

The U.S. aid to the TNI did not simultaneously benefit the Indonesian state; rather, by expediting the TNI's acquisition of a corporate entity, and knowledge of economics and administration through SESKOAD courses, the Americans participated in building of a state-within-a-state. By 1962, the TNI, in terms of being statelike, had one advantage over its Communist rival: it had a strong link to a powerful external state actor.

Moreover, in 1962 the TNI convinced the government and the other services of the Armed Forces to accept and legitimize its Civic Mission programme.[29] Henceforth, the civic missions were to be known as the Work Operation of the Armed Forces (Operasi Karya Angkatan Bersendjata). The acceptance by the Indonesian state of the concept of Civic Missions was a profoundly fortunate development for the TNI. The need perceived by the Army to have these ideological formulations accepted, and to ensure its own political livelihood after May 1963, was reflected by the deployment at the end of 1962 of one-third of the Army's 140 battalions, in all seventeen military commands, to engage exclusively in Civic Missions.[30]

Several organizations were created to defend the implementation of the Civic Mission programme and, more broadly, Territorial Management. The Siliwangi Division took the lead in 1962 by establishing a military presence at the ketjamatan level by creating small command posts, or Military Rayon Commands (Komando Rayon Militer — KORAMIL).[31] The KORAMIL had as their first task, according to Adjie, the prevention of "mental unrest."[32] Soon, several thousand non-commissioned officers were appointed in West Java to represent the Army in the capacity of bintara pembina,[33] and to train and indoctrinate local officials in the TNI's nationwide Civil Defence organization (Pertahanan Sipil — HANSIP), which was established in June 1963. Once again, a firm link bound the provincial civilian governors to the TNI — they were appointed heads of the regional HANSIP headquarters.[34] Rounding out the components of the coercive and protective apparatus that shielded the Civic Missions were the civilian "regiments" (baladhika-karya) located in the Army-dominated state enterprises.[35] Further preparations for the return of civilian control included the creation of SUAD VI. This branch of the incipient parallel governmental apparatus was designed to coordinate the activities of "military officers who had received civilian positions by virtue of the Army's functional group status."[36]

Given the intellectual and organizational creativity displayed by the TNI over the period from 1958 to mid-1963, it was seemingly well prepared for the return of civilian rule. However, in its effort to compete with the adherents of Nasakom, the TNI's development of an all-encompassing, total, set of ideas tended to exhibit

> ...a curiously hollow character, a circling about a center that was not there. They appeared as a search for a formula that would somehow provide a single social meaning.... [yet they] did not provide the clarity of purpose essential to give meaning to

the army's broader role.[37]

Indeed, as the soldiers and officers moved from the martial sphere to the realm of Civic Missions, their resentment toward essentially civilian undertakings grew; incompetence and a lack of enthusiasm were manifested in the projects entrusted to the military. The Civic Mission programme was, nonetheless, a creative and ingenious adaptation to circumstances, tailored neatly to suit one particular set of political conditions. It was, in fact, the very uniqueness of the circumstances for which the Civic Missions were designed that made them a failure as a strategy of political survival.

Above all else, the most striking feature of the Army's strategy was that it was contingent upon the actions of others. In this sense, and despite appearances, the Army was quite vulnerable. In order for Civic Missions to succeed, there had to be a national commitment to economic development. If this condition held, the TNI would be justified in placing exclusive emphasis on a development-dependent strategy. Inside the country, Sukarno had given his commitment to national economic development, concretely in the Overall Development Plan inaugurated in 1961, and verbally through his reiteration of a reorientation toward economic activities with the conclusion of the West Irian campaign.[38] Outside the country, the U.S. government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pledged financial and technical assistance. The TNI's assessment of the situation by 1962, that the revolution was moving away from a preoccupation with the anti-imperialist struggle, seemed plausible.

The Army could, therefore, declare its commitment to Civic Missions, as a collective effort, with the specific aim of development in mind.

The TNI's plans seemed to promise a reasonable chance of success. However, as developments in 1963 were to prove, the Army had declared itself so emphatically for one interpretation of the "continuing revolution" that it was unprepared for any deviation from the path that it had anticipated.

Whither the Indonesian Revolution? Choosing a "Programme" in 1963

The year 1963 was a decisive year for Indonesia and Sukarno. It was to be expected that Sukarno would have to select one of two diametrically-opposed paths as the course that Guided Democracy and the Indonesian state would follow. Pressures had been exerted upon him by the U.S. and the Army throughout 1962 to give his commitment to economic development. Meanwhile, the PKI and its allies agitated for a Nasakom interpretation of Guided Democracy. Through the greater part of 1963, no decision was made; Indonesia pursued both paths with half-hearted commitment. The economic stabilization plan was enacted while the framework of yet another anti-imperialist struggle, this time over the establishment of Malaysia, was being laid. When Sukarno did make his decision in August-September, it was for profound reasons that related to the very nature of Guided Democracy — reasons that the PKI had grasped and would manipulate to its advantage later.

Sukarno's importance as the arbiter between contending forces in the social contract of Guided Democracy grew markedly after 1962. Increasingly, he was petitioned by the TNI and the PKI to adopt what amounted to "programmes" for the Indonesian state. Sukarno was pressured by the U.S. and the TNI to adopt an economic stabilization plan. By objective standards, Indonesia certainly needed to pay more attention to

its financial and economic affairs, a point made by the Humphrey report that was presented to Sukarno in August 1962.[39] Additional pressure was applied by Nasution himself when he specifically urged the execution of a food and clothing programme.[40] The blame for the failure of this programme in the past, Nasution argued, had to be placed unequivocally on the "state leadership," meaning Sukarno.

For the PKI's part, Aidit had much advice to offer the President. The creation of a Nasakom cabinet, and the attendant radicalization of the country that it would entail, initially preoccupied the PKI in its counsel to Sukarno. Aidit, for example, grimly stated on 17 December 1962 that "rejection of NASAKOM would mean a denunciation of the peaceful way to socialism and lead to dissension inside the nation, and the peak of this dissension would be an internecine war."[41] The party's campaign to create a Nasakom cabinet even had the unprecedented support of the PNI, and its radical offshoot, the Partindo.[42] At another level, the PKI attacked the Army's governmental apparatus[43] and its development "programme" directly.[44] In a major declaration in February 1963, Aidit mocked the economic stabilization scheme as ill-suited and even hazardous to Indonesia, given the belief that "the enemy number one and the most dangerous enemy of the Indonesian people at the present time is US imperialism,"[45]:

> Thus, the real way out of Indonesia's economic difficulties is not by begging for loans from abroad or making the Indonesian people the servants of foreign capital invested in Indonesia, but by the development of a national economy that can stand on its own two feet.[46]

That "the PKI had nothing to gain from an improvement of the living conditions of the masses" was certainly a motivating factor behind its opposition, for "it would have diminished its opportunity to mobilize

them for its purposes."[47]

The effect of these two sets of advice on Sukarno was mixed. As Penders and Sundhaussen have suggested, Sukarno actually pursued policies more or less based on both "programmes."[48] With regard to the economic stabilization plan, he enhanced the nation's ability to coordinate economic activities by dissolving the BKKSs in May and channelling their resources and expertise into the National Front. Additionally, the President approved Djuanda's negotiations with the U.S. and the IMF, and allowed the implementation of fourteen harsh regulations on 26 May.[49] The regulations had immediate and painful consequences:

> Fares and tariffs rose by 300-500 per cent, increasing the burden on the populace, and the Jakarta cost of living index rose between May and July by some 7.6 per cent. This rallied almost every political grouping to the banner of the communists who could thus accelerate their attacks on the cabinet.[50]

There were also political consequences to be borne in mind in that

> pursuing the economic rehabilitation programmes would entail observing economic and political restrictions imposed by the aid-giving West, as well as calling back into the administration the American-trained economists and technocrats who largely belonged to or sympathized with the banned rightist parties.[51]

Notwithstanding the factors that militated against the "programme," Indonesia appeared to be succeeding in reversing its downward economic spiral by mid-1963.[52]

Developing in a parallel fashion with the stabilization "programme" were the PKI-favoured initiatives that promised a radicalization of the social contract. Sukarno had spoken officially on 19 December 1962 of the rescission of the SOB in the year ahead, adding that he would act "in accordance with the Indonesian people's desire that revolutionary people's forces be given a part in the consummation of efforts to achieve the objectives of the Indonesian revolution."[53] At approximately the

same time, the President had given his approval to Subandrio, the Foreign Minister and head of the Central Intelligence Body (Badan Pusat Intelijens -- BPI), to use the BPI to stage intelligence operations into North Kalimantan as part of the government's policy of "confrontation" over the establishment of Malaysia.[54] While a start was made in "opposing" Malaysia,[55] Sukarno's commitment to foreign policy adventures did seem muted throughout early and mid-1963 and received less attention than the economic stabilization plan.

While the leadership at the policy level seemed stalemated on the question of which "programme" ought to be accepted as state policy, the changing internal balance of forces hinted of a swing toward the PKI. The series of appointments that Yani initiated to consolidate his position among the officer corps led to a "decline in the army's unity and effectiveness as a political organization."[56] In contrast to the inner weakening of the TNI, the PKI benefited from its representation on three extra-constitutional bodies created by Sukarno: the Consultative Body of the State Leadership (Musjawarah Pimpinan Negara), established in March 1962; the Consultative Body of Assistants to the Leadership of the Revolution (Musjawarah Pembantu Pimpinan Revolusi), created in January 1963; and the Supreme Operational Command (Komando Operasi Tertinggi), which replaced the TNI-dominated Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian (Komando Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian Barat). In a reorganization of the Supreme Operational Command in July 1963, Sukarno acted to weaken Nasution and increase his own power over the Army.[57] The most significant aspect of these organizations was that they "conferred a greater respectability on the PKI and a narrow interpretation of Nasakom" that favoured only the strongest political parties.[58]

When on 17 August 1963 President Sukarno declared himself for the radical "programme," he did so from an unrivalled position of political strength. His importance to Indonesia was acknowledged by all major political actors, and especially the TNI and the PKI, which made him the object of their respective campaigns to influence state policy. Ultimately, Sukarno was the fulcrum of the balance between the Army and the Communists. His status was institutionalized on 20 May 1963 when the MPRS named Sukarno President for Life.[59] Speaking from this position of unassailable strength, Sukarno simultaneously abandoned all further commitments to economic stabilization and embraced risky ventures abroad.

In his Independence Day speech of 1963, Sukarno rejoiced in the "fact" that "our Nation is not a Nation that is 'already too far gone with the wrong form', that we are not a Nation too far gone with the wrong structure — not a Nation whose social structure is already difficult to alter," and placed his faith in the "mainstays of the Revolution" — the workers and peasants — to eventually increase national production.[60] The efforts of the Army and other services of the Armed Forces in helping to raise production through the Civic Missions were noted as an aside.[61] Sukarno took the opportunity to insult Nasution personally by not reading his "Supplement Concerning Civic Missions."[62]

Just as the "Supplement" went unread and its ideas and thrust remained printbound, the Army's Civic Missions became devoid of wider social meaning. Indeed, the Army's theoretical concepts and strategy had been rendered utterly obsolete by the political developments of August-September 1963. Not only had the President scuttled the economic stabilization plan, but he also jeopardized the Army's continued

existence as a fighting force when in September he formally declared a policy of konfrontasi against Malaysia, such that it could be "gobbled raw."[63] Sukarno had thrust the TNI into a delicate situation: in confronting Malaysia, the TNI would have to face the British — a power far more committed than the Dutch to defending its Asian interests — and in this case no aid (arms or otherwise) would be forthcoming from the U.S., which had much closer relations with London than with The Hague, or the Soviet Union, which was still owed just under $1 billion for the arms Indonesia received during the West Irian campaign.

This did not deter the President, who perceived the struggle against Malaysia to be only one aspect of a larger global conflict between the OLDEFOS (Old Established Forces, consisting of the Western countries) and the NEFOS (Newly Emerging Forces, basically Asian, African, Latin American, and Socialist countries). The creation of Malaysia was interpreted as a "neo-imperialist" plot to "encircle" Indonesia. With Sukarno's guidance, "the Revolution in its NEFO aspect was to continue indefinitely the destruction of the old order, while domestic economic and social issues remained unresolved. The delay of revolutionary rewards, however, [was] part of the Revolution's 'romanticism.'"[64]

At least one reason for Sukarno's decision to opt for konfrontasi, of course, was to check the Army's power, as Anderson has suggested:

> It was not merely that the army had greatly increased its power and inner cohesion [between 1957 and 1963]. In addition, the long-maturing, intimate ties between the army and the United States had clearly given the regionally dominant foreign military power a dangerous point d'appui deep within the Indonesian state. As Sukarno perceived it, this penetration imposed significant limits on the sovereignty of the Indonesian nation and on its ability to manage its internal affairs with maximum autonomy. Furthermore, the army's control of the former Dutch enterprises had now put it into a directly antagonistic relationship with the popular sector — the workers and peasants employed in the mines, plantations, and other major commercial enterprises. Sukarno

> thus increasingly came to feel not only that his personal position was threatened, but that the original goals of the nationalist movement were endangered.[65]

Whereas the considerations of the balance of power, the Army's relations with a foreign power, and the resources and capabilities that it had built up since 1957, are certainly important in explaining the major shift in Indonesian politics in 1963, attention must be paid to the nature of the social contract of Guided Democracy.[66] Far more important in explaining Sukarno's actions in August-September was the very nature of Guided Democracy:

> Only those programs that did not threaten the elite could be attempted seriously, and these frequently were in the realm of foreign affairs.... [largely due to the fact that] the social force mobilized by the PKI could not be matched by any of the other parties, by the army, or even (in organizational terms) by President Soekarno.... it was necessary — taking the broadest view of social conflict — to limit the PKI's opportunities to use its power fully. By containing the truly radical PKI, the elite whom it challenged, both party and non-party, was able to maintain its hopes for the future.[67]

The ramifications of Sukarno's decision to follow the inevitable path that took the revolution abroad, and was designed to deflect the PKI from internal concerns, were felt immediately in the internal power structure and in the shift of the ideological content of Guided Democracy. During a cabinet shuffle in November 1963, for instance, Nasution was excluded from the newly formed cabinet presidium. Furthermore, the Department of the Attorney-General and the junior Ministry of Veterans Affairs were detached from the Ministry of Defence, thus depriving the Army of influence over the important portfolio of law and loosening its control over a useful resource in times of political emergency. To the horror of the Army, in September 1963

> all [ten] parties gave public endorsement through the Front Nasional to a set of proposals including a call for a team of assistants to the President 'with a Nasakom pattern', the

> 'nasakomization' of regional executive and legislative bodies, the withdrawal of the ban on party membership for high civil servants and reversal of the 1959 anti-party measure on regional heads.[68]

Although temporarily unsuccessful in their quest to implement their proposals, the vociferousness of the parties' demands added to the Army's worries.

An Indirect "Revolutionary Offensive": Communizing the State Late 1963-Late 1964

Following Sukarno's lead, the PKI moved between February and September 1963 to accommodate itself to the anti-imperialist struggle. The party's all-encompassing strategy centred on an ingenious theory of the state, designed between September and December 1963, which took advantage of the state elite's movement toward leftist and radical positions. In this regard, the PKI superseded even Sukarno's rhetoric and imparted to the "crush Malaysia" campaign a distinctly Communist orientation; this bias soon pervaded all aspects of the official Indonesian position, including the Army's perception of its role in the conflict and in the revolution. The party's exertions on the external front, however, were only part of its more important plans oriented exclusively to internal affairs. The intention of the party's "revolutionary offensive," already apparent in the party's "domestication" of the Indonesian state elite in connection with konfrontasi, was to press for the adoption of Communist ideas, at the expense of all other forms of thought, in important areas of life: artistic, cultural, and ideological. Rather than move against its chief enemy directly by seeking positions of power within the state, the party sought to push the state elite further to the left, leaving the Army

vulnerable not to its attacks, but to Sukarno's. The gains that the party made against the Army were, at the level of resources, balanced by its losses in the countryside associated with its unilateral action campaign. What prevented even greater losses was Sukarno's predilection to preserve the gains made in the name of Nasakom at the state level.

That the PKI's prospects could be dramatically enhanced by Sukarno's inflammatory statements of August-September 1963 was initially lost upon the party. When Malaysia was formally established on 16 September, before the outcome of the United Nations-sponsored plan to determine the interests of the people of North Kalimantan was known, it was the PNI that initially took the lead in attacking British and Malayan diplomatic posts in Jakarta. Mirroring the events of December 1957, the PKI and its youth and labour fronts reacted swiftly to the PNI's action and joined in the destruction of British and Malayan properties and in the seizure of British enterprises. The "crush Malaysia" campaign accelerated as a consequence of these actions and retaliatory measures taken by Malaysia. By 21 September diplomatic relations between the two countries had been severed, and the Indonesian political scene had undergone a profound transformation. The PKI urgently needed to formulate a new strategy; it could safely discard the unpromising national front strategy and give salience to more ambitious plans.

It can be said that the PKI's strategy of the late 1963 to 1965 period was derived from Aidit's theory of the state.[69] Aidit's conception of the Indonesian state, originally publicized in September 1963, was a farsighted and ingenious interpretation of the nature of Guided Democracy. The Communist leader recognized that Guided Democracy was split between the forces of golkar and Nasakom, the adherents of each

having ensconced themselves in the state apparatus. Aidit's insight thus penetrated the veneer of official ideology that held that the Indonesian state and people were united on fundamentals. Rather, it perceived the truth of the social contract: "the ideology [of Guided Democracy] had developed such unresolved inconsistencies that, despite the great pressures for conformity to it, most groups could find some parts of the ideology to which to attach their own interests."[70] According to PKI formulations, there existed within the state and government a "pro-people" ("popular") aspect and an "anti-people" ("anti-popular") aspect. The President, the PKI and its fronts, and sundry other political parties and their affiliates were identified as the major upholders of the former, while the Army leadership and its civilian, religious, and secular allies were specified as the key defenders of the latter. Significantly, the neat cleavage in the state and society that Aidit perceived meant that the "middle forces" "had tended to disappear in the analysis," and this presaged the polarization of Indonesian politics in the years ahead.[71]

This theory of the state contained the inherent prescription to strengthen and consolidate the popular element of state power, that is, to shift the social contract in a leftward direction. In so doing, however, Aidit was not confident of unhindered success, and counselled in September 1963,

> on the basis of an analysis of Indonesian society and of the Indonesian revolution, the Constitution of the CPI stresses that the Indonesian revolution is a protracted and complex one. To be able to guide the revolution, the CPI must carry the people's revolutionary struggle forward by using the tactic of advancing steadily, carefully and surely. In the course of the struggle, the CPI must consistently oppose two trends: capitulationism and adventurism.[72]

The party's guide to action had as its foundation an essential

conservatism, which translated into an unwillingness to embark upon risky or unilateral ventures that exceeded the desires of other members of the "popular" coalition of forces. This did not mean that the party would avoid dynamic actions or decisive assertions of its prerogative as a revolutionary actor, but rather that respect would be given to generally-acknowledged limits on political behaviour. Furthermore, the caution demonstrated by the Communists proved to be inversely proportional to the increasingly radical direction of events as set by Sukarno himself. For example by December 1963, when it had become apparent that konfrontasi and the associated trend of domestic radicalization would not recede in the forseeable future,[73] the tone of party pronouncements became acutely belligerent. Aidit contemptuously declared that "the conceptors and ministers responsible for the '26th May, 1963' deviation should feel very lucky if they are not hanged, if they are only inflicted bodily punishment and if they are only dismissed from their positions as senior officials or ministers for their unforgivable sin."[74] Later, on 23 May 1964, Aidit warned the party's enemies to

> "calm down and think twice," pointing out that if they were unable to smash the Party in 1948 when it had no more than 10,000 members, they would be even less successful now that "the Indonesian Communist Party has a lot of experience, has a total membership of more than 2.5 million, and its cadres have been trained in the theory and practice of the revolutionary struggle."[75]

The substance of the PKI's strategy to enhance the power of the "popular" aspect in Indonesia was given clarification by the December 1963 party announcement to unleash a "revolutionary offensive in all fields."[76] Both the ideological cast and the operational aspects of the "offensive" indicated a strengthening of the PKI as a statelike entity. With regard to the ideological character of the "offensive" — its

phraseology and programmatic nature — it was evident that Sukarno's increasingly close ideological and political fraternization with the Communist Chinese had been duplicated in the PKI's own ideology.[77] In September 1963 "Aidit came down strongly and unmistakably on the Chinese side" in the current polemic between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China.[78]

For the most part, the nature and intensity of the PKI-CPC relationship remains indeterminate; the only tangible benefit that accrued to the party was that the massive Chinese "Foreign Languages Press" facilitated the translation and dissemination of PKI propaganda at home and abroad. The most immediate benefits of the alliance were similar to those that the Army secured through its association with the U.S.: the ability of the Indonesian actor to formulate policies and to attain its goals through an ideology were greatly enhanced by the assistance of a foreign state actor. The Chinese could offer advice on revolutionary strategies and tactics and use their relationship with Sukarno to benefit the party. From a theoretical perspective, the fact that the party consolidated a relationship with a foreign state actor meant the strengthening of the PKI itself, for it acquired the resource of revolutionary experience, albeit Chinese.

The expression of anti-imperialism, in the conduct of konfrontasi, was among the first party initiatives where the ideological refinement was to register. The party's adoption of a Chinese vision of revolution was, in the first instance, a means by which it could convert the political advantage of the leftward shift of the Indonesian state into a consolidation of Communist hegemony within Nasakom and over the state. The party was not, therefore, satisfied with the fact that the execution

of konfrontasi was "the first time [that] a Communist-initiated tactic with its attendant symbols and ideology [had become] an official Indonesian policy norm."[79] By superimposing a uniquely Communist outlook on an undertaking of the Indonesian state, only the PKI stood to gain in the long-run. The Communists attempted to take command of the Malaysian dispute just as they had attempted to do in the West Irian campaign. However, in contrast to its strategy in 1957, the party in 1963 did not seek to capture the nationalist mantlepiece, but to Communize Indonesian nationalism.

The immediate task for the PKI in December 1963, when it appeared safe to make the Malaysian issue the object of sustained party attention, was to alter the perception of the conflict in the eyes of Indonesians. The party's intention, as Mortimer has argued, was to avoid escalating the Malaysian dispute into an armed struggle.[80] Rather, to strengthen "its hand in internal politics at the expense of its rivals and enemies" and to avoid letting them exercise their monopoly over arms, the PKI had to use its absolute advantage in revolutionary ideology to inculcate a radical mood and thus subjugate the TNI in an indirect manner.[81] That this was the party's intention can be perceived by the way in which Aidit spoke of Malaysia and generalized its significance:

> People may argue about where the focus of the world revolution is today. But the fact is that at the present the most acute anti-imperialist struggle is in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia where the sound of gunfire has not stopped since the end of World War II.
>
> Conditions both objective and subjective are very favorable in Southeast Asia. The Communists and other revolutionaries in Indonesia should feel fortunate and happy that we are in such an area. We are in the forefront of the struggle against world imperialism.[82]

Imparted to the struggle against Malaysia, therefore, was an emphasis on

its global significance. The affinity of Sukarno's Indonesian revolution and the planetwide NEFOS-OLDEFOS struggle to the PKI's current views initiated a process of "convergence" between the official state ideology and the Communists' world outlook.

The initial official Indonesian response to Malaysia was quite circumspect. In September 1963 the Indonesians concentrated on the specifics of the dispute, repudiated "provocative public statements" made by Malaysian leaders, and expressed indignation at the failure of Britain and Malaysia to properly implement the rights of self-determination for the North Kalimantan people. Contrariwise, by the end of 1963, as van der Kroef has illustrated, "a somewhat broader and transcendent view came to be adumbrated in Jakarta: the 'confrontation' now appeared to be conceived of in terms of the supposedly 'unfulfilled' objectives of the Indonesian Revolution."[83] Indeed, by 1964 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, in language that indicated the increasing convergence of official and Communist viewpoints, that the establishment of Malaysia attempted "to subvert, to deflect from its course and to contain the Indonesian Revolution, because that Revolution is pledged to the complete and final eradication of colonial and imperialist domination."[84] By the beginning of 1964

> the central fact of political life...was that the nation and all its major and minor power centers were following or were made to follow the major foreign policy objective of the PKI, and that a revolutionary illuminism now no longer would serve as the domestic catechism of official ideology but was to be exported throughout Southeast Asia in line with the country's self conceived destiny.[85]

Even the Army felt the pressure of the Communist assault on the values of the Indonesian state and its institutions. On 7 January 1964, for example, Yani declared in a speech before SESKOAD that Indonesia "was

now changing from a previous defense concept 'based on her own national territory' [the Doctrine of Territorial Management], to a new concept which included 'international elements,' specifically in the form of 'the country's responsibility and contribution towards security and stability in Southeast Asia'."[86] Yani's statement clearly indicated the irresistible nature of the Communist drive — it had so easily and quickly begun the subversion of its archenemy's own ideology and separate identity. This feat was all the more impressive in that the ideology had been meticulously built up over the years by Nasution and the U.S., and was the major wellspring of the Army's distinctive political character. Later, Nasution, too, could be heard to urge "to break through the 'encirclement' imposed by Indonesia's enemies, [and] to eliminate 'imperialist vestiges' in the countries surrounding Indonesia."[87]

When the favourable conduct of konfrontasi appeared to be threatened by Sukarno's negotiations with the U.S. Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, in Japan in January 1964, the PKI swiftly asserted its sovereignty to correct this deviation. On 17 January 1964, the day that Sukarno and Kennedy conferred in Tokyo, Aidit warned that "it is our obligation to avoid efforts which have the nature of compromise."[88] One day later the PKI and its fronts attacked British holdings. In West Java, sixteen British rubber, tea, and coffee plantations were seized by Sarbupri, and within two days SOBSI and Pemuda Rakyat members took over Shell and Unilever offices and installations in Jakarta. These dramatic actions were significant because they were enacted in defiance of government regulations. Thus they were genuine examples of parallel sovereignty.[89] The assertion of sovereignty was also important because it clearly indicated that the party remained an alternative power contender: it was

"the first occasion when it appeared to challenge the president directly over the conduct of foreign policy."[90] Later, when Sukarno reemphasized the importance of heeding government regulations, Sarbupri disregarded the warning and seized British-owned estates in South Sumatra in March 1964.[91] These were the unmistakable signs that the PKI had

> changed the direction of Indonesian foreign and domestic policies decisively in the party's favour, [presenting] it with opportunities so promising that the leadership began to comprehend for the first time since the introduction of Guided Democracy how they might achieve power within the terms set by that system.[92]

The Communist initiative to supplant alternative modes of thinking with its own symbols and revolutionary verbiage intensified as konfrontasi wore on. In March 1964 the Foreign Minister, Subandrio, stated, "Indonesia is now engaged in offensive revolutionary thinking, not just in revolutionary thinking," and that "this type of revolutionary thinking should become the basis of Indonesia's domestic and foreign policy."[93] Indicative of the state's embracing of PKI norms was the fact that Subandrio permitted the PKI entry into his department[94] by appointing Communists, or known fellow-travellers, as ambassadors.[95] Even Sukarno, who appeared to have exhausted his own ability to ideologize,[96] began to adopt Communist concepts.[97] In March 1964 he declared that "the 'crush Malaysia' campaign will be fruitful only if all efforts are based on offensive revolutionary thinking."[98] Perhaps the most remarkable victory for the party was Subandrio's pronouncement on 7 July 1964 that "there is no cause for fear that Indonesia will become Communist, but on the contrary, the other way around, we will Indonesianize the 'Com' element prevailing in the community."[99] This statement, made in the context of ideological and value convergence, says van der Kroef, was made "entirely in accord with PKI strategy":

"precisely to the extent that the non-Communist element believes that the Communist party ceased to be a threat a major tactical advantage has been won by the party."[100]

The other main component of the Communist programme of December 1963 was to undertake a revolutionary offensive in the countryside. At one level, the party's support for ongoing spontaneous seizures of land—unilateral actions, or aksi sepihak — by poor peasants was in defence of existing legislation. Two laws, the Sharecropping Law (Undang-undang Perjandjian Bagi Hasil — UUPBH) of November 1959, and the Basic Agrarian Law (Undang-undang Pokok Agraria no. 5/1960 — UUPA), which was passed in September 1960, were promulgated as part of the "continuing revolution's" attack on feudalism.[101] However, since provisions of both laws assigned the power of execution to local government heads or officials, and thus beyond the control of Jakarta or Sukarno, their implementation was hindered by incompetence, corruption, and patron-client relationships.[102]

The judicious linkage the party made between its actions and Sukarno's words provided a second layer of protection for its offensive. Tornquist has argued that "the dominant communist tendency was to refer to Sukarno every time they did something."[103] In this case, at the PKI National Conference on 5 July 1964, when the aksi sepihak campaign secured formal party support, the argument was made that the campaign was designed to implement "President Sukarno's appeal that the masses must also carry out 'revolutionary gymnastics'."[104] Even the operational aspects of the endeavour were cautious in nature:

> Unilateral actions are beneficial both to the Government as well as to the broad mass of village inhabitants; these actions must therefore be capable of winning the sympathy and support of more than 90 per cent of the village inhabitants and the non-reactionary state officials.[105]

In short, the party aimed to prove that its actions were "relatively innocent and directed at defending or implementing the land reform laws."[106]

At a more profound level, the party's unleashing of a class struggle in the guise of land seizures was a monumental undertaking, intended to supplement its success at the elite level by demonstrating its preponderant power resource located amongst the peasants — the PKI peasant front, the BTI. The activation of the BTI presented the party with the opportunity to use one of its largest power resources, to reaffirm its own uniqueness as a revolutionary contender, and to press its sovereignty in the countryside. Indicative of the wider significance of the offensive was the party's "Four-Year Plan of Culture, Ideology and Organization." The plan was unveiled on 17 August 1963 well before the unilateral actions received party endorsement and was originally intended to continue the ideological and educational training of PKI cadres. In December it underwent a transformation as the party broadened its scope to include the peasantry.[107] The changes effected and the new nuances given flagged the party's desire to be seen as an alternative contender. The peasants were embraced as revolutionaries in an unprecedented way:

> We must never for a moment forget that the implementation of this Plan must be closely linked with the line of consolidating our Party's integration with the peasants.... This means that our cultural work must <u>in the first place</u> be aimed at raising the cultural level of the peasants and arousing the peasants' spirit and joy in the struggle. This means that our ideological work must <u>in the first place</u> be aimed at further integrating the thoughts of all party cadres with the peasants and at strengthening the proletarian ideology of the cadres who work among the peasants.[108]

Later, in July 1964, Lukman stated

> although our party must with all its strength tug at and cultivate the national bourgeoisie so that it remains in the united front with the working class, nevertheless at no time can

> it sacrifice the unity of the worker and peasant. This means that, whatever the reaction, and however great the violence attending the work of the party among the peasants, we cannot be in the least vacillating in our vanguard role of protecting and leading the peasants.[109]

As Lukman added, the national bourgeoisie "forms an additional ally, meaning one not so important as the peasantry."[110]

The party's ideological shift to the peasantry occasioned a tangible change in the nature of the BTI. In the past, the BTI had undertaken only limited initiatives among the peasantry, embarking on so-called "small but successful" actions throughout the 1953-1963 period, which aimed at meeting the peasants' everyday needs.[111] During this period the BTI was built not for the purposes of revolution in the countryside, but rather to provide the party with a constituency and a popular base. Moreover, in elections the peasantry was expected to vote as a bloc for the party. However, in the significantly different conditions of Guided Democracy, with its lack of elections, a passive and non-militant peasantry was ineffectual in helping the PKI's power chances.[112]

The PKI's plans to employ the BTI in its revolutionary offensive was profoundly significant. By aiming to mobilize a previously latent resource, the party wished to demonstrate its own organizational and ideological grip on a significant proportion of the Indonesian population, as well as to enhance its stature as a statelike entity by assigning itself a demanding new policy: the BTI would become an alternative source of authority. Margo Lyon has argued that

> while a local BTI organization might be viewed as cooperative in nature, the fact that it was in practice organized in the interests of its own members meant that it represented, at least in the area of land matters, a polarization of interests in rural society and therefore the introduction of an alternative definition of authority. As political organization tended to foster a division of the village on basic economic lines,...the village government could be seen as administering primarily the

> interests of the landholders and therefore as representing one realm of authority. The BTI cadres and their followers, on the other hand, represented an alternative authority based on different ideas of land distribution, thereby creating a situation in which the more traditional authority could be perceived as no longer legitimately administering the interests of the village population.[113]

Thus, in the Communist strongholds of Central and East Java, the PKI attempted to assert its sovereignty against the establishment. The magnitude of the venture was publicized by Aidit himself when he informed the party that the BTI had attained a membership of 7,099,100, "or more than 25 per cent of the adult peasant population," organized in nearly 50 per cent of all agricultural villages.[114] The aksi sepihak campaign, in short, was an exercise of statehood. In this sense, the revolutionary offensive in the countryside was far more meaningful than the party's efforts at the elite level of the state.

Almost from the outset of the offensive, events became uncontrollably violent. Unfortunately for the PKI and the BTI, the campaign proved disastrous. There were primarily two reasons for the political fiasco. First, the PKI and the BTI revealed organizational weaknesses by failing to control their own cadres and to provide guidance to the peasants under their control. In a number of villages, especially in the Communist strongholds of Central and East Java, the cadres had become unreliable; they did not respect party rules or injunctions to correct the deteriorating situation; even Aidit acknowledged this fact.[115] More significant was the lack of direction at the highest levels of the PKI: "The communists hesitated and did not follow a clear line.... [while] no one stopped those members who participated in confrontations, neither was any decisive attempt made to step in and lead them properly."[116] For their part, the peasants apparently interpreted

the PKI's endorsement of their actions as a signal to intensify and expand their seizures beyond the limits that existing legislation permitted. Fairly or unfairly, blame for the worst aspects of the campaign was placed squarely upon the Communists.

The second major aspect of the offensive was that it provoked a strong conservative backlash among the orthodox Muslims and served to reinforce vertical, and not class, cleavages in the villages.[117] In some instances, the PKI's appeal to the poor peasants succeeded in uniting them in an explicitly acknowledged class struggle against feudal landlords. In most cases, however, the Communists' cautious offensive, combined with spontaneous actions by some of the peasantry, prompted an anti-class counterattack.' The Muslims, especially in East Java, made the aksi sepihak an issue about Islam and sought to draw whole communities together against the PKI and the BTI.[118] Thus, the intensely anti-Communist reaction of the landlords, in alliance with their peasant clientele, prompted the Minister of Agriculture on 13 June 1964 to ban all peasant activities,[119] and Leimena, in his capacity as Acting President, to formally disapprove of the aksi two days later;[120] in July the national press was forbidden to report on rural conflicts.[121]

Despite the government's measures, the confrontations spread throughout Java and Bali. Even Sukarno's indirect support for the aksi and the Communists on 17 August failed to reverse the polarization in the countryside.[122] Throughout September 1964 it appeared that the PKI and the BTI were losing the offensive in the countryside. Together they attempted to exert greater control over the peasants.[123] However, the success of the Muslim counteroffensive was acknowledged by the BTI and Aidit in November. That there was chaos in the countryside and that the

peasants had been split was difficult for the Communists to accept.[124] In December Sukarno presented the PKI and the BTI with the opportunity to abandon their offensive in the name of Nasakom unity.[125] Although the Communists readily accepted the offer, their enemies remained on the offensive and carried it into 1965.

The implications of the Communist rural defeat were twofold. First, the party's assessment of its resources and its own status as a statelike entity had to be reevaluated and devalued. Ultimately, the party's enormous nominal support in the countryside proved to be a liability in the party's larger two-pronged offensive against the state elite. The BTI's potential to act as the leading vehicle of rural revolutionary action was shattered and even the party's assumed capacity to direct its fronts was disproven. The assertion of sovereignty had brought unexpected consequences as it fostered the development of a new, anti-Communist "rule of law" in the countryside. That the party endured a year of turmoil and failed to take decisive control of its own and BTI cadres, meant that it could not effectively alter the operational mode upon which the peasant front was built. Thus, the rural Communist constituency was undisciplined in nature and unwilling to act en masse in accordance with its putative government's instructions. In this regard, the Communist state-within-a-state failed in its own defence.

A second consequence of the rural defeat was that the party had to rely less on one form of collective action — that of a mass character— in favour of a much greater emphasis on elite politicking at the national level. The burden of the revolution had been placed on the shoulders of the leadership and its relationship with Sukarno. Initially, this second-best strategy succeeded immensely throughout 1964 as the trend

toward convergence intensified, and the strongest actions against the Army were not taken by the party, but by Sukarno.

The Army in Retreat in 1964: The Consolidation of the PKI-Sukarno Alliance

Throughout the course of 1964, the Army's endeavours to remain leader of the golkar interpretation of Guided Democracy and to push the social contract in that direction met with failure on two accounts. First, Army-sponsored civilian initiatives in artistic, cultural and ideological matters, which were explicitly designed to gather wider support for its views and to weaken the Communists, were foiled by vehement PKI opposition in concert with Sukarno's endorsement of Communist positions. Second, in the realm of military-civilian and military matters, the TNI's own expertise was overridden by Sukarno's desire to ensure that he remained in control of Indonesia's armed forces, especially in the operational and organizational facets of konfrontasi. These two developments paralleled the ongoing political process in the countryside: the year 1964 was also one of polarization at the elite level. At the end of 1964, therefore, two power blocs stood in contention for state power.

As part of the TNI's wider plans to ensure its political livelihood after martial law had been lifted, SUAD V implemented schemes throughout the early 1960s to build a collection of civilian organizations to assist it in the execution of Civic Missions. Its intention was to use the Army's preponderant influence in state and nationalized enterprises to erect organizations that embodied a corporatist philosophy. In turn, these Army strong points were to act as magnets, attracting larger numbers of people from elsewhere in the state and economy where the TNI's

power was weaker. The ideological formulation for these plans was a refinement of two ideas. The corporatist notion of the family principle — discussed by Sukarno in the late 1950s and explicitly recognized in the 1945 Constitution as the organizational principle of the national economy — was integrated with the Army's self-conceived role of enacting karya, to create a new civilian-oriented formulation: karyawan (member of a functional group). As Reeve has stated, inherent in the concept was the assumption that

> both manager and worker performed a function and were therefore karyawan who should cooperate in a family-like harmony.... [The Army] thus tried to define out of existence the class-based antithesis between labour and the 'capitalist bureaucrats', the PKI's name for the military managers.[126]

Strengthened by the cabinet's endorsement of the new concept in May 1960, SUAD V raced to erect the organizations that would embody its civilian-adapted ideology.

In January 1961, Unions of Karyawan Forces (Persatuan Tenaga Karyawan — PTK) were established in most nationalized enterprises and in May 1961 they were placed under the control of a Central Coordinating Body of PTKs. The Army's desire to use these newly formed organizations as a major resource for its state-within-a-state was evident from the ambitiousness with which they attempted to acquire adherents; wherever labour organizations or party ormas existed, pressure was exerted on them to dissolve themselves and join the PTKs.[127] A major step toward enhanced indirect Army control over society was taken in December 1962 when the Central Coordinating Board transformed itself into the Union of Indonesian Socialist Karyawan Organizations (Serikat Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia — SOKSI) and proclaimed that it would seek "to expand to all other golkar/ormas groupings."[128] When SOKSI failed to gain

admittance into the Front Nasional, on the grounds that "SOKSI itself sought to rival the Front,"[129] a massive campaign was undertaken throughout 1963 to expand its constituency in preparation for the inevitable struggle against the PKI and to influence the Front Nasional by populating it with its own constituent organizations. The proliferation of karyawan organizations was impressive and came at the expense of the political parties through the detachment of their ormas, or at least of their members. By 1963 there were karyawan bodies for agricultural students (Tertasi), farmers (Kertasi), intellectuals (Getsi), women (Gerwasi), and youth (Pelmasi, PPII, and SOKKAPPMI).[130] Thus, in November 1963, with a claimed membership of 7,500,000 shared among 146 member organizations, and with diversified support from members of the state elite, including the bureaucracy and the Army, the stage seemed set for a SOKSI-PKI confrontation.[131]

However, just as the TNI's Civic Missions were rendered obsolete by political developments, so too were SOKSI's aspirations to carry out the "karya revolution" that would finally "bury the parties" in the service of "historical necessity"[132] (see below). An alternative means by which to advance the ideas contained in the concepts of karyawan and golkar had to be found. In this case, the Communists provided the catalyst: to match the PKI's programme of convergence, the Army's civilian supporters and organizations were obliged to launch their own counteroffensive by trying to influence the values and ideas of the state elite, including Sukarno.

The most obvious manifestation of the contention between the two blocs was in the form of three polemics, or debates, that raged during 1964. They pertained, at one level, to artistic, cultural, and

ideological matters respectively. At another, more important, level, the three polemics were a fight over the very nature of the evolving social contract: "These debates were a fight for the ideology itself, to determine which groups would have the power to interpret the ideology of Guided Democracy, and therefore to impose their interpretations on the losers."[133]

Although the TNI, SOKSI, and their other civilian supporters had been disadvantaged by developments at the formal policy level of the state, they zealously initiated an anti-Communist artistic drive on 17 August 1963. The ensuing debate was over the issuance on that day of a Cultural Manifesto (Manifes Kebudayaan), which embodied an intellectual dissatisfaction with the mass character of art under Guided Democracy. The Manifesto's adherents decried the lack of individual artistic responsibility and denounced the political character of current works. Such notions met the immediate opposition of Lekra (the PKI's cultural front) and the PKI. The grounds for Communist disapproval had been laid most clearly by Aidit, who urged that "art for art's sake" was wrong; the Indonesian revolution needed "art for the people."[134] The dispute between the opposing groups climaxed in March 1964 when plans to create the Union of Indonesian Writer Karyawan (Persatuan Karyawan Pengarang Indonesia -- PKPI), based on the Manifesto, were unveiled. The hypocrisy of the artists, who acted as "the proponents of freedom from political considerations" but wished to enjoy the protection of SOKSI and SUAD, embroiled the two sides in a bitter polemic.[135] Wild accusations were traded about the political intentions and sympathies of members of both sides. Eventually, matters became so uncontrollable and divisive that Sukarno banned the Manifesto on 8 May "as being an 'addition' to Manipol

and as seeming to doubt the Revolution."[136] Not only had the Communists scored a victory over its enemies at the ideological level, but in the "retooling" campaign in the Indonesian Journalists Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia — PWI), the Islamic University Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam — HMI), the Front Nasional, cultural organizations, and in some educational institutions that ensued, its opponents were purged.[137]

Even before the effects of the first polemic had run their course, the second polemic began.[138] Once again, two levels of struggle unfolded: one related to the particular issue, in this case the importation of American films, and another related to the higher ideological struggle and the ties between the Army and its foremost external ally, the U.S. The effects of the ban on the Cultural Manifesto provided the PKI and Lekra with the incentive to urge stronger action against American films than did the government's own policy of reducing their dissemination in Indonesia. A series of boycotts and demonstrations and the call for the dissolution of the American Motion Picture Association of Indonesia (AMPAI), led by the Command for the Boycott of American Imperialist Films, initially failed to convince the Trade Minister, Adam Malik, to take stronger action.

When the Minister finally terminated AMPAI's activities in August, he also called upon the Command to cease its actions, hinting that it had links with foreign powers and was potentially "anarchist."[139] However, the Command, renamed the Action Committee, accelerated its demands and encouraged others to join it. In this vein, the United States Information Service (USIS) library was attacked in Jogjakarta on 15 August and other measures were taken against U.S. interests by the PKI

and its fronts. Other significant victories for the PKI were attained in September 1964 when visits by Indonesian officials, students, scholars, and members of the military to the U.S. for purposes of training were stopped, and in early December when USIS libraries were ransacked with impunity by elements of the PKI and its fronts in Jakarta and Surabaya. The pro-Malik forces gathered support for their cause too, as the process of alliance building intensified. Eventually, the film issue was forgotten and supplanted by a vaguely expressed but deep-seated mutual antagonism, articulated by the leading spokesmen of each bloc. This polemic was never resolved, but rather came to be subsumed by the last polemic.

The third polemic, consistent with the trend to clash over the nature of Guided Democracy, pertained to the ideology of the social contract per se. Early in 1964 the opponents of Nasakom realized that just as the Communists could base their arguments and actions on the schizophrenic nature of the social contract and, importantly, Sukarno's own thoughts, so, too, could they. In the hands of the anti-Nasakom forces, Sukarno's formulations were shorn of their radical aspects and distorted to "dilute the Marxist overtones of Guided Democracy ideology."[140] A compilation of the President's conservative and corporatist ideas formed the basis of the ideology of "Sukarnoism," around which grew a nationwide press campaign conducted by the anti-Nasakom forces throughout the latter part of the year. Late in October 1964, SOKSI declared that it would urge the MPRS to ratify Sukarnoism as the "Doctrine of the Pancasila Revolution,"[141] undertaking simultaneously to have the karyawan concept integrated with this corpus of thought. The explicitly anti-Communist thrust of Sukarnoism was evident from the

headlines of the Sukarnoism press (an indication of the degree to which the polity was polarized): "Confrontation against the PKI is the same as confrontation against Malaysia" (Revolusioner); "Choose Sukarnoism or Aiditism" (Garuda); and, in an editorial in Karyawan about the PKI, "Does it still have the right to live?"[142]

As mere words, Sukarnoism remained relatively harmless to the PKI and Nasakom forces; the situation changed, however, when the ideology took an organizational form on 9 November. Then, the Body for the Support/Spreading of Sukarnoism (Badan Pendukung/Penyebar Sukarnoisme—BPS) was established and for the first time united the diverse anti-Communist forces in society under one formal umbrella organization. Ironically, the polarization that occurred at the end of 1964, and which was accelerated by the founding of the BPS, was fully consistent with Aidit's theory of the state. Arrayed on the right as one bloc were the Army, the Navy, senior officers in the Police, SOKSI, members of the executive of the Front Nasional, IPKI, Murba, PSII, the conservative wing of the PNI, the Catholic party, HMI, and ministers in the cabinet. Facing them were the PKI, its fronts, the radical wing of the PNI, Partindo, the Pemuda Rakyat, PWI, and also some members of the cabinet, including Subandrio.

The ultimate aim of each bloc was to have Sukarno decide the fate of the BPS in their favour. The PKI wanted to "crush" Sukarnoism, with the President's approval,[143] while SOKSI desired that Sukarno accept "the Doctrine for Karyawan" as his own.[144] Owing to the size of the alliances that had been built over the issue, the potential violence with which each bloc threatened the other, and the evaporation of any middle ground between the two extremes, Sukarno's response would be a clear signal as

to which interpretation of Guided Democracy would prevail. Ominously, the President's response would also marginalize a large segment of the polity and weaken the position of its spokesmen and representatives in the government and state. It is with this appreciation of the crucial nature of Sukarno's decision, to dissolve the BPS on 17 December, that one can understand the events of 1965. Then, the anti-Communist forces were collectively declining:

> The BPS had brought together a formidable conservative political alliance, but that alliance was stuck in a position of acute political vulnerability, without recourse to a separate ideological basis with which to defend itself against the aggressive left-wing interpretation of Nasakom.[145]

To complete a general understanding of the situation in Indonesian politics at the end of 1964, some consideration must also be given to the Army's own political fortunes during the course of the year. In the realms of military and military-civilian matters, the Army's ability to exercise its own expertise was hindered by Sukarno's interference. In the military sphere, Sukarno's discomfort with the Army's control over coercive resources was reflected in his appointment of Air Vice Marshal Omar Dhani to lead the Alert Command (Komando Siaga — KOGA), which was formed on 16 May 1964 as part of konfrontasi. Given that the conflict with Malaysia was essentially a ground operation, Sukarno's action was particularly bitter for the TNI. Later, when the KOGA appeared to be failing in its tasks, a new Area Alert Command (Komando Mandala Siaga— KOLAGA) was formed by Sukarno in September, acknowledging the inability of an Air Force officer to conduct ground operations; appointed as Dhani's First Deputy Commander was Army Major-General Suharto.[146] Also in September, a "modified state of emergency" was declared in Indonesia in response to British military threats.[147] Again, Sukarno asserted

himself against the Army central command. The positions of the Regional Dwikora Executive Authorities (Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah—Pepelrada) were created on 14 September and filled by the regional commanders (panglima) in accordance with Sukarno's orders.[148] However, as Sundhaussen observed, "in all except four relatively unimportant provinces the panglima were appointed as Pepelrada and they were responsible directly to Sukarno, thus by-passing the Army headquarters."[149]

As a result of "retooling," Yani's undoing of Nasution's work to enhance Army cohesion, and Sukarno's increasing political stature, the TNI itself was by late 1964 a less formidable foe of Communism. Feith observed in August 1964 that

> of the vigorously anti-Communist regional commanders of 1960-62 only two are still in their posts, Colonel Jusuf of South Sulawesi and Brigadier General Adjie of West Java. And of these two, Colonel Jusuf [was] overshadowed by the growing power of the inter-regional commander for East Indonesia, now Brigadier General Rukman, and Brigadier General Adjie had made it clear that he no longer supports anti-Communist positions in a way which implies criticism of the President.[150]

The Army's diminishing power as a military organization, and as a distinct political contender, was largely the work of Sukarno. Therefore, it is not surprising that the largest of the Army's civilian organizations, SOKSI, suffered the same fate in 1964.

Typical of Sukarno's style, his efforts to curb the growth of SOKSI and to limit its role in political life involved making it conform to legislation and governmental policy that was inherently restrictive. By the second half of 1964, it had become apparent that SOKSI was threatened with extinction; the argument that only party-affiliated ormas should be permitted to engage in Front Nasional and ormas activities was gaining popularity among government officials. Ministerial endorsement of this

line of reasoning in August 1964 heralded government action that would be against SOKSI's interests. The first blow to SOKSI was Presidential Instruction no. 002/1964, which prohibited the creation of new labour organizations after 8 September 1964 and came at a time when SOKSI was attempting to reorganize its constituent PTKs in the state enterprises. Notwithstanding SOKSI's arguments against the provisions of the Instruction, its activities were limited by the regulation.[151]

A second, potentially more damaging, threat was embodied in Presidential Decree no. 193/1964. This measure regulated which organizations were to gain membership in the Front Nasional. The Decree prompted Nasakom forces to take advantage of the fact that the karyawan organizations already in the Front were technically "unaffiliated," given the Front's rejection of SOKSI admission in 1963.[152] Thus, "the left-wing forces pressed for a 'simplification' of the members of the Front based on the Decree, arguing that only the party-affiliated ormas had the right to be members."[153] In 1960 the defeat of the parties seemed imminent with the implementation of the golkar concept; by 1964, however, it was the golkar and karyawan forces that were threatened. Consistent with the reactive strategy that had been forced increasingly on the Army and its civilian allies since 1963, SOKSI and its constituent elements created the Joint Secretariat of Golkar Organizations Within the National Front (Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi-organisasi Golongan Karya Anggota Front Nasional) in October 1964. Only by banding together and accommodating themselves to ascendant political forces could SOKSI and its members stave off dissolution.

The neutralization by the government of the Army's largest civilian anti-Communist resource was as significant as the PKI's parallel loss of

the BTI's revolutionary potential. By no means, however, did the Army's and PKI's similar experiences with their largest constituent resources equalize the power chances of each. The prospects of revolution or counterrevolution in 1965 had to be carefully weighed.

The Balance of Forces in 1964 and the Paths of Revolution and Counterrevolution

While the Communists faced a groundswell of militant Muslim opposition in the countryside, the Army and its civilian backers experienced negative ideological developments at the state-elite level in 1964. Moreover, the advice of the conservatives on the direction of the revolution and Guided Democracy was rejected by Sukarno in December 1964. Thus, Sukarno had opened the door of opportunity for the PKI, a consequence that followed from both the process of convergence practised by the PKI, and by Sukarno's own initiative. Throughout the year, Sukarno had freely sided with the PKI on all major issues of state. As well, he had actively contributed to the sense that events were getting out of hand by not rejecting invocations such as that made by the Justice Coordinating Minister in September 1964: "there were laws that not only could be, but must be, broken in the service of the Revolution."[154] Putting the whole social contract to a test, the essence of the PKI strategy, was wilfully condoned by Sukarno. The developing revolutionary situation had entered a new, and higher, form: for the first time, PKI views were articulated and implemented at the highest levels of the social contract, and actions by the PKI and its fronts to forcefully implement them in the polity were not prevented.

With unprecedented elite support and an even larger constituency, consisting of 18 million persons or 17.5 per cent of the total population

(according to figures released in June 1964[155]), the transition from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome appeared possible. The Communists had consciously and steadfastly acquired adherents and resources. They had altered their aims, options, and collective actions, and partially shifted their base of solidarity toward the largest portion of the population, the peasants, or they had forced the adoption of these contractual features on other members of the polity, especially the state elite. The PKI offensive strategy was a complete success in all but two respects. First, there was the nagging defeat and worsening situation in the countryside. Second, as Brackman has commented, by late 1964

> every conceivable "functional" group in Sukarno's guided democracy [had] its PKI counterpart either above or below ground. If an exception makes the general rule, the exception [was] the PKI's failure since Madiun to develop a legal paramilitary front.... If the Party could gain direct control of the armed forces, or failing in that, neutralize the army's effectiveness by encouraging "war lordism" or by subverting ill-paid troops, the Party would be on the threshold of power.[156]

The logic of acquiring the one outstanding resource — the tools of coercion — did, indeed, motivate the PKI in 1965. During the year the party's movement to acquire arms, although consistent with the theoretical framework, must be understood in the context of its other actions in accordance with the general formula of revolution to which the party subscribed. Although the road ahead pointed toward Communist initiatives vis-à-vis the acquisition of coercive resources in 1965, the PKI was sensitive to the fact that one-half of its programme — the aksi sepihak — had failed in 1964 and that, as far as it was concerned, the pro-people aspect of the state had to be strengthened and consolidated further. Moreover, the support it gained from Sukarno did not obviate sharp differences with him.

While relations with the state elite did not form the exclusive

means by which to advance the revolution, to the party's enemies Sukarno's support for the PKI was pushing Indonesia ineluctably toward Communism. Thus, in the calculus of revolution, the PKI combined Sukarno's support with its own drive to move the state to the left, while trying to minimize the effects of the turmoil in the countryside. In the calculus of counterrevolution, the anti-Communists were compelled to strike against the PKI and Sukarno, whose acquiescence in Communist demands was felt to be the major factor behind their worsening lot. During the following year, the anti-Communists searched for a "decelerator," while the PKI pressed for an accelerator in the form of the Fifth Force; the latter actor was, however, far less compelled to stage a decisive event in times of political fortune, than were its opponents in times of political misfortune.

CHAPTER V

THE LAST YEAR: REVOLUTIONARY STATE LEADERSHIP, THE "RED DRIVE," AND REACTION

The year 1965 proffered boundless possibilities for the development of a revolutionary situation in Indonesia. With regard to the social contract, the PKI state-within-a-state was a rising power, propelled by the revolutionary offensive it directed at the state elite, and by Sukarno's uninhibited endorsement of its internal and external policies. The very success in 1964 of these tactics for revolution guaranteed their continuity in 1965; each tactic, however, had to be more intensely implemented. That the PKI did not attain more formal power positions within the state or government in 1964 was immaterial to its leaders' assessments of their power chances, because it had forced the expulsion of its enemies from important places in the state and in significant extra-state bodies. Ultimately, such developments were beneficial to the PKI as they shifted the balance of forces incrementally in favour of the pro-people aspect of the state.

The wisdom of the PKI's alliance with Sukarno was to be proven again and again in 1965 as the President adopted an explicitly Communist notion of state leadership. As the President moved leftward, he tried to ensure that the rest of the country followed by severing political, economic,

and military ties with the West and the Soviet Union in favour of a "Djakarta-Peking axis." These developments disadvantaged the TNI, whose relations with the United States came to be jeopardized, and, more importantly, forced upon it a kind of revolutionary identity which was incompatible with it. Complementing the pressure on the Army exerted from "above" was the PKI's "red drive" from "below."

The implementation of Aidit's theory of the state had given the party the additional insight that it could achieve power not by attacking its enemies through frontal attacks, but by isolating them politically. In this capacity, the party and its fronts directed the polity and groups within it into a quickening revolutionary mainstream, exposing its opponents as diminishing and disconnected islands of reaction. Thus, the PKI intended to acquire allies and to deprive the Army of its civilian backers, thus denying it adherents and channels of political expression. Amidst the "noise" of the Communists' red drive, the Army's voice could not be heard, and the TNI could not but accede to the irresistible Nasakom-ization of the social contract.

It was also very difficult for the Army leadership to resist the joint Sukarno-PKI demands for a "Fifth Force," consisting of armed workers and peasants. The efforts of the PKI in 1965 to secure a military wing represented, in theoretical terms, an accelerator and the culmination of its state-building activities. If the vigilance of the forces of reaction had been high in 1964, the PKI's proposal for arms raised its enemies' sense of apprehension to new levels. The plan for a Fifth Force made the Army aware that without domestic allies, secure external ties, or a sympathetic President, the intensification of the revolutionary situation, and hence the transition to a revolutionary

outcome, could occur in a mere matter of time. To prevent this, the Army had to stage a decelerator that would strike first at Sukarno, whose position facilitated the success of the PKI, which constituted the secondary enemy.

Sukarno and the Nasakom-ization of the Indonesian State: The International Realm

One of the prevailing characteristics of Indonesian political life in 1965 was Sukarno's concern for the international dimension of his country's revolution. During that year, in all major aspects of the state's international relations — political, economic, and military— Sukarno acted to ensure that relations with the "imperialist" West and its international organizations, as well as with the Soviet Union, were either severed or put under great pressure. In April 1965, the President outlined the internal consequences of his international policies, and urged the country to seek self-reliance and to emulate the economic policies of North Korea. As the domestic scene adjusted to the new state policies, it became evident that the Army would be the least able to adapt to the changes. Thus, the President's actions heralded the complete political marginalization of the TNI as the new, more radical revolutionary identity that the polity was assuming, was rejected by the Army leadership.

On 1 January 1965 Indonesia announced its intention to withdraw from the United Nations.[1] This development, although not entirely unexpected, signalled that Indonesia was exiting the world order so as to enable it to "build the world anew." Jakarta had hoped that its actions would be a signal to other countries, considered to be members of the Newly Emerging Forces, to join it. That no other state was willing to sacrifice its

representation in the U.N. for the Indonesian cause did not slow Sukarno's growing association with those countries that remained outside the international body: the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.[2] From the perspective of domestic politics, the development was favourable only to the PKI and other radical Nasakom supporters. However, tangible domestic consequences were not felt until April, when the President argued in favour of self-reliance in all spheres.

In his address to the third general session of the MPRS on 11 April, Sukarno stated that the "national democratic" phase of the Indonesian revolution was complete. Despite being censured by the PKI, which found the President's claim groundless and inimical to its unfinished anti-feudal and anti-imperialist programmes, which (theoretically) should be implemented first in preparation for socialism, the President argued that "Indonesian Socialism" had begun.[3] The best way to ensure the success of the second stage of the revolution was, for Sukarno, to "throw the wheel around" (banting stir) and to "stand on one's own feet" (berdiri diatas kaki sendiri — berdikari).

Practically, the President exhorted his country to strive for complete self-sufficiency. However, more profoundly, as Hauswedell has argued, the berdikari policy "was an attempt to isolate his domestic political opponents from their foreign imperialist and revisionist supporters."[4] Thus, on the world stage not only were economic ties revised to favour a leftist interpretation of the Indonesian revolution, but cultural and educational policies, military defence doctrines, and acquisition of armaments were also made to reflect Sukarno's emphasis on a genuine people's revolution.[5] Among the first signs of the President's

seriousness about the implementation of his ideas of self-sufficiency was the opening of the new National Defence Institute (Lembaga Pertahanan Negara) in Jakarta in May 1965. The Institute's purpose was not merely to provide another rival to SESKOAD, but to create an alternative basis upon which to erect a wholly new kind of military establishment and military thinking.

Consequently, by July the Army newspaper, Berita Yudha, reported that "certain Socialist countries" had ceased selling arms to Indonesia, thus guaranteeing the obsolescence of the Army's (mainly) Soviet armoury.[6] Furthermore, the framework for Atomic, Bacteriological, and Chemical Warfare had been established. This development marked the increasingly intimate nature of Indonesian-Chinese military cooperation and prompted Aidit to declare that "we shall smash Western domination in the scientific and technical field."[7] While the TNI appeared to be losing contact with its main external link, the United States, the PKI was reaping the rewards of closer relations between its main external ally, Communist China, and the Indonesian state.

Another salient aspect of the President's declaration of berdikari was that the terminology that he used, the policies that he wished to implement in its name, and the future that he envisaged, were all borrowed from Aidit's earlier pronouncements regarding the "correct" style of revolutionary leadership.[8] In December 1963, for example, Aidit had asked "What is the use of a revolutionary leader if he cannot bring about an improvement in the appalling living conditions of the people, if he is not skilled at veering the steering-wheel from right to left in the matter of the people's living conditions[?]"[9] In April 1965, Sukarno not only adopted this idea as his own, but expanded its meaning to include

many more areas of state policy than merely the economy.

The culmination of Sukarno's new revolutionary style of leadership on the external front was marked by his declaration on 17 August 1965 that "we are now fostering an anti-imperialist axis."[10] By this he meant the newly proclaimed "Djakarta-Pnompenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis," which would serve as the framework for Indonesia's evolving foreign policy. This alliance would serve as the basis of a new political order and — judging from Indonesia's decision in August to withdraw from the IMF, the World Bank, and Interpol — a new economic and international policing order as well. While Sukarno avoided breaking all economic and political ties with the West and the Soviet Union,[11] he was keen to point Indonesia's way forward. His radical vision of self-reliance, although weakly implemented by the government through internal policies, was an unequivocal endorsement of one set of political forces over another.

The PKI and the Nasakom-ization of the Indonesian State: The "Red Drive"

Like the initiatives in foreign policy undertaken by Sukarno in 1965, the ones he launched or approved during the year with respect to domestic politics were no less decisive: they constituted a natural supplement to the international dimensions of Nasakom. From January to September, he oversaw or allowed a rising revolutionary wave to overwhelm and threaten elements and groups of the anti-Nasakom forces. Millions of Communist cadres, in their "red drive," acted to close the gap between the government's declared policy and the PKI's immediate programme.[12] Owing to the similarities between the policy and the programme, the general perception in domestic circles was that opposing the Communists amounted to opposing the government and Sukarno.[13] With the convergence

between the action programmes of the Indonesian state and the PKI statelike entity, the primary objective of the latter became to act faithfully in the name of Sukarno. For good reason, it was felt that the anti-people aspect of the state would finally be vanquished.

From the onset of 1965, Indonesian Communists were heartened not only by the news that their country had withdrawn from the U.N., but also by the desire expressed by leading members of the state elite (Sukarno, Subandrio) to intensify the revolution at home. Subandrio had spoken ominously on 4 January when he declared that

> 1965 is a year of crystallisation of the forces of the Indonesian Revolution. Do not be astonished when I say that in 1965 there may be friends of our struggle who are weak, and whom we are forced to leave behind, because they can no longer keep up with the progress of the Revolution.[14]

Within one day, the activities, ormas, institutions, and members of the political party Murba, which had led the BPS campaign in 1964, were "frozen" by Sukarno.[15] This development was profoundly important: it signalled the end of the ideological argument that had commenced in 1960 with Sukarno's advocacy of Nasakom. Murba, and individuals associated with it, such as Ministers Malik and Saleh, had been among the most outspoken defenders of Sukarno's konsepsi in 1957, and had actively solicited support for the President's corporatist ideas throughout the period of Guided Democracy.[16]

No clearer signal could have been given by Sukarno that he endorsed Nasakom against its opponents. He removed the last constraints to the complete Nasakom-ization of the state by banning the BPS press in February, thus terminating the printing rights of twenty-nine newspapers,[17] and by adopting all-party demands for the withdrawal of the ban on regional heads, for measures weakening central control in the

regions, and for the Nasakom-ization of the leadership of the regional executive bodies.[18] Additionally, in a cabinet shuffle in March, two ministers associated with Murba (Malik and Saleh) were demoted.[19] For the remainder of the year, the President generally abstained from taking further decisive actions against his, or the PKI's, opponents. Rather, he withdrew to let the forces from "below" continue the Nasakom-ization of the state and to let it be "Murba-ized" (diMurbakan), that is, purged of its non- or anti-Communist elements.[20]

The PKI's "red drive" was launched in response to the signals emanating from the highest levels of the state in early 1965.[21] The Communists' actions were mainly indirect and difficult to measure as indicators of their "power chances." Their strategy was to infuse the affairs of the state with their symbols and slogans, and to give the impression that the situation was sliding inexorably toward a revolutionary outcome. In short, it was necessary to create the appearance that the state's power had come unstuck.

One objective of the Communists' red drive was to complete the destruction of civilian organizations sympathetic to, or associated with, the Army. After the suspension of Murba, the major remaining targets included the conservative wing of the PNI, NU, PSII, Perti, IPKI, and the HMI. Slowly, leadership changes that favoured the leftists were effected throughout the course of 1965 in the Perti, Partindo, and IPKI parties.[22]

The major victories scored during the year involved the PNI and NU executives: in each case, Sukarno helped the PKI to neutralize its opponents. In August, for example, Sukarno demanded the "retooling" of the PNI, which meant the expulsion of Hardi and other conservative politicians who refused to cooperate with the PKI.[23] Although the NU was

not "retooled," the President gave notice to the party that he would like to see it, too, Nasakom-ized, if necessary by "purifying" its leadership.[24] The last organization targeted by the PKI was the HMI. In September the PKI, Pemuda Rakyat, and the Front Pemuda turned their attention to this last bastion of outspoken civilian support for the Army. The call to ban the HMI was so intense that Aidit urged its destruction, even after Sukarno had expressly vetoed this option.[25]

Further efforts to isolate the Army and to push the state to the left included actions against the United States. In this connection, Sukarno's pronouncements and foreign policy protected the PKI from accusations that its actions were illegal or illegitimate. Therefore, the Communists sustained their attacks against the USIS and forced the government to take over its library in Jakarta on 15 February 1965. On the same day, 160,000 acres of U.S.-owned rubber plantations were seized in North Sumatra, again precipitating a crisis for the government.[26] Soon, the party became more daring: on 18 February the U.S. consulate in Medan was stormed; and later in the month, U.S. enterprises were seized by party and front cadres.[27] Once again, the cadres of the PKI chose to attack a foreign target to demonstrate their potential for sovereignty. This time, however, "it confronted only a mild repetition of the official resistance it had met in its actions against British enterprises in 1963 and 1964."[28] Ultimately, and indicative of the degree to which the PKI statelike entity had supplanted the power of the legal Indonesian state, the reason cited for the withdrawal of the American Peace Corps in April was "the Indonesian government could not guarantee the safety of U.S. personnel and property involved."[29]

Slowly, and imperceptibly, the PKI was coming to dominate the state

and polity. Under the guise of the main slogan of 1965 — "Progressive-revolutionary national unity with Nasakom as its axis" (Persatuan progressip-revolusioner berporos Nasakom)[30] — the party extended the Nasakom-ization programme. Indoctrination sessions, which "became a must for ministries and government officials,"[31] and legislative decrees that "tried to make Nasakom an accepted fact, a 'living reality' in political life,"[32] highlighted the increasing convergence of thinking between the PKI and the state. Practical proposals, such as that made by the Minister of Internal Affairs to have representatives of the Nasakom forces appointed to the executive councils of all provincial governors, although never implemented, suggested imminent formal PKI representation in government.[33] Indeed, in May a leader of the Pemuda Rakyat became the Minister for Electricity and Energy. In the newly created National Defence Institute, Aidit and Njoto were appointed professors in Marxism, thus furthering the prospects of turning an ideological advantage into an organizational one.[34] In the important field of law, orthodox concepts of justice were supplanted by "progressive" and "unconventional" criteria, to which even the highest authorities subscribed.[35] Lastly, in celebrations marking twenty years of Indonesian independence, the PKI's slogan on the general line of the Indonesian revolution became an official slogan for the first time.[36] Most clearly, the languages of the state and the PKI had become almost indistinguishable.[37] It seemed that the PKI would soon be ruling the country by acclamation.

In this regard, the President did not stop the PKI. At the forty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the PKI in May, Aidit openly proclaimed the ties between his party and the President. During the ceremonies, emboldened by Sukarno's exhortation during the ceremonies to the party to

"go ahead, onward, onward, onward, never retreat,"[38] the leadership publicly acknowledged previously undisclosed support.[39] Moreover, Aidit seized the opportunity to call for a "still fiercer revolutionary offensive in all fields."[40] In one sense, this merely meant the intensification of actions against the anti-Nasakom forces, the interests of the United States, and the Indonesian state. More importantly, Aidit had launched a new, more risky venture: to acquire arms for the PKI and to directly attack the Army. Since party analyses of the balance of forces had indicated the strengthening of the pro-people aspect of the state, a basis had been laid for the procurement of arms, in a measured and cautious fashion, commensurate with the PKI's wider success vis-à-vis the state and polity.[41] In its quest, the party had ensured that it had the constant backing of Sukarno and, in the period of August-September, took the initiative in the establishment of the party's military wing.

The Fifth Force: Arming the Revolution

In terms of a developing revolutionary situation, the primary development of 1965 was the PKI's attempt to acquire the resource of coercion. In pursuing this objective, the PKI stated its desires openly and even thanked the Chinese for their support,[42] assured that it would not be dismissed by other power centres as in the past. However, between October 1964, when the BTI had proclaimed its desire to acquire arms for its members, and August 1965, when Sukarno hinted that he would establish a "Fifth Force" (in addition to the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Police), the Communists' proposal had undergone a profound change. The party had retreated from its original position to acquire immediately a standing army of 10 or 15 million members, to a slower acquisition of military might in the form of the "Fifth Force" -- a project that was eventually

usurped by Sukarno and declared as his own. Either way, the PKI's plans split the Armed Forces, just as the issue of Nasakom had caused a schism in the polity, and the respective services were compelled to unequivocally declare their positions. In the end, only the Army stood firmly against the plans of Sukarno and the PKI.

The Chairman of the BTI, Asmu, had initiated the Communist call for arms in October 1964, declaring it necessary to the conduct of konfrontasi.[43] The idea had not been regarded as preposterous, like the Communists' calls for arms in the 1950s.[44] Sukarno himself had conferred in November with the Communist Chinese to secure arms for use in the konfrontasi, for the 21 million volunteers of the National Front.[45] Thus, from the outset of their venture, the Communists had found common cause with Sukarno.

The Communist proposal had an immediate and damaging effect on the Army. A meeting of senior Army leaders on 13 January related not so much to the Communists' acquirement of arms, which still remained a distant prospect, as to Yani's seeming complacency in the face of the threat and his willingness to accede to Sukarno's desires.[46] The meeting, according to Crouch, failed to resolve the difference of opinion in the highest ranks of the Army on how to meet the PKI's challenge. This outcome "put the army at a considerable disadvantage in day-to-day maneuvering with Sukarno and the PKI,"[47] and while the Army vacillated, the PKI pressed the issue further. On 14 and 17 January, Aidit declared that "no less than 5 million organized workers and 10 million organized peasants are ready to take up arms."[48] On 12 February Sukarno endorsed the PKI Chairman's call, adding, however, that the plan would proceed only "if necessary."[49]

Henceforth, Sukarno began to overtake the Communists in their plans to establish a military wing. It may be claimed that the Communists permitted this to occur for several reasons. First, a spontaneous Navy strike on 2 March by the Revolutionary Progressive Officers' Movement signalled that Nasakom forces operated within the Armed Forces.[50] The Movement attempted to oust the Navy Commander, Rear-Admiral Martadinata, who was notorious for his cooperation with the Army. The PKI's cultivation of the Navy had created a hitherto unknown cleavage — one of an ideological nature — within the armed services. The party could also be confident that its drive to influence the Police and Army, not the least through a publication drive,[51] was working: Communist thinking became evident in military publications.[52] Additionally, the PKI was given open and legal access to the Armed Forces in the form of ideological indoctrination courses, and it was a routine matter for top Communists to address and propagandize before audiences at SESKOAD, SESKOAL, SESKOAU (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Udara — Navy Staff and Command School), and the National Defence Institute.[53] The bedrock of Communist influence in the Armed Forces, nonetheless, remained the soldiery itself. In the 1955 and 1957 elections, the Communists asserted,[54] 30 per cent of the Armed Forces members had voted for the PKI. The PKI was confident that its support had not diminished since the 1950s.

Indeed, at an Army gathering in April, there were more signs that the Army was faltering under the pressure of Sukarno and the PKI. Again, there was a split within the ranks of the officers: some argued in favour of arming the masses and introducing political commissars into the Armed Forces; others vociferously opposed these measures. Even on the central

issue of the meeting -- the Army's evolving military strategy -- there was division. Thus, both the old Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and the newer "offensive revolutionary" thinking were accepted as current Army strategy.[55] As Sundhaussen has argued,

> the lessons of the seminar were bitter for the army leaders. It had been clearly demonstrated that at least at the national level the Army had almost completely lost its operational freedom. It could not attack the PKI,...nor were the officers even capable of rallying in their own defence without Sukarno stepping in and confining them to his policies.[56]

Meanwhile, Sukarno was pressing the Armed Forces to endorse the proposal of arming the workers and peasants. On 23 May Sukarno spoke of the necessity of eradicating "communist-phobia" from the Armed Forces,[57] and in late May acted to implement this idea. On 31 May Sukarno spoke of Chou En-lai's offer, made in November 1964 (and reaffirmed in February and April 1965), to arm the people as a Fifth Force, and requested the armed services to submit plans for accomplishing this task.[58]

From both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary perspectives, Sukarno's call was extremely important. For the Army, the Fifth Force was a less threatening proposition than Aidit's call in January for the immediate arming of millions of Communist cadres. Moreover, the threat of a rival army diminished with the realization that it would take a considerable amount of time before the Fifth Force could be moulded into an effective military organization. The Army also became aware that it was Sukarno, not the PKI, who posed the greater immediate threat. For the PKI, the acquisition of arms was delayed, but was almost guaranteed by the President's sponsorship of the Fifth Force. Furthermore, the threat of military coup, which the party was keen to publicize so as to diminish its possibility,[59] became a very dangerous proposition for the Army, given Sukarno's incontestable alliance with the Communists. The

revolutionary accelerator had been slowed, but the Communists were assured that it would eventuate.

The creation of a Fifth Force, however slow, still posed a threat to the Army as the President did not clarify who would eventually control the organization. The most pressing matter for the Army was to respond to the proposed Fifth Force. The Army would have preferred to give a negative response, but given the political climate in the country, that alternative would have incurred too much opposition, and possibly substantiated charges that the Army harboured unpatriotic elements.[60] Pressure on the Army leadership to clarify its position increased after the Air Force commander, Dhani, unequivocally urged the creation of a Fifth Force on 4 June.[61] Dhani undertook immediate measures within his service to lend to the idea a tangible dimension (training of members of PKI fronts under Air Force auspices began outside Jakarta in July[62]) and an ideological thrust (courses in Marxism were given at SESKAU and in provincial Air Force units beginning in June[63]). By mid-June the Navy commander gave his service's extraordinary consent,[64] and elements of the Police, especially in East and Central Java, were sympathetic to the scheme.[65] Eventually, Yani broke the Army's silence and gave support to the Fifth Force, but only under extreme conditions: "If the NEKOLIM [Neo-colonial imperialist forces] [attack], the whole Indonesian people will be armed, not only the workers and peasants."[66]

Through the summer of 1965, the issue of the Fifth Force remained unresolved. Neither side appeared willing to take decisive action: Sukarno avoided implementing the measure; the Army was silent. In the slow shifting of the balance of forces, however, Sukarno's Independence Day speech strengthened the hopes of the PKI. On 17 August, the

President referred to "the concept which I launched about the fifth force" and promised a decision about it soon. He gave two broad indications that he would agree to the creation of the Force. First, he attacked the Army's economic position, declaring that

> if the corruptors and swindlers of state wealth continue with their truly anti-republic and anti-peoples "operations", then do not be startled if one day the struggle between groups will flare up and burn away the luxurious lives of these corruptors and swindlers![67]

Second, the President aired his disapproval of the Army's reluctance to declare its position vis-à-vis the Fifth Force:

> Those who were progressive yesterday are possibly retrogressive, anti-progressive today; those who were revolutionary yesterday are possibly counter-revolutionary today; those who were radical yesterday, are possibly soft and resistless today.... Even if you were formerly a bald-headed general in 1945, but if you split the revolutionary national unity today, if you create disorder in the NASAKOM front now, if you are an emeny of the main pillars of the revolution today, then you have become a force of reaction!... heed my words when when I say that the main criterion for a revolutionary is <u>oneness between word and deed</u>.... every time I propose a new idea there are always a number of reactions which, I am sorry to say, are sometimes influenced by Old Established Forces textbooks.... The facts are that the defence of the state demands a maximum of effort from us all while, according to Article 30 of our 1945 Constitution: <u>Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defence of the State</u>."[68]

Together, these ideas put the Army on the defensive in an unprecedented fashion. To add to its problems, the President's words encouraged the <u>Nasakom</u> forces to agitate ever more vigorously for their goals. By September 1965 the country was approaching a showdown.

The PKI was given two powerful incentives in August 1965 to redouble its revolutionary strategy. First, the party released its last membership lists that revealed the continuous and seemingly unstoppable growth of the Communist constituency.[69] The Communist strategy of retaining its legal, loyal, and obedient standing in the polity had won

it 27 million members: 3.5 million (PKI); 3 million (Pemuda Rakyat); 3.5 million (SOBSI); 9 million (BTI); 3 million (Gerwani); and 5 million (Lekra).[70] Accounting for overlapping membership, the Communist supporters numbered approximately 20 million persons, or approximately one-fifth of the total Indonesian population. Recognition of its tremendous size, in conjunction with the second incentive — Sukarno's speech — provided the setting for the anarchical conditions in Indonesia in September.

On 17 August, Aidit declared that the goals that the party had set for itself in 1965,[71] including attacking the "capitalist bureaucrat"-"economic dynasty" union, could be reached "fully and radically with speed, if the revolution is concrete."[72] This statement signalled the party's desire to accelerate the destruction, and not merely isolation, of its remaining enemies, especially those civilians who benefited from Army protection in the economy. Indeed, on 27 August, Aidit raised the stakes by warning

> the blows that have recently been delivered on an increasing scale to the counterrevolutionary forces are only one warning to the adventurers that if they try to oppose the current of the popular masses they will not destroy the Indonesian people but instead will themselves be cast into oblivion.[73]

On 4 September, so as to avoid such an outcome for itself, the party again publicized the threat of a military coup.[74] With the economy wracked by hyperinflation,[75] Subandrio promised that "the operation against the kabir [kapitalis-birokrat — capitalist bureaucrats, the PKI's term for military officials with positions in the economy] will be launched soon." To that, Aidit added, on 14 September, that the workers should prepare to "launch the 'remove the cancer' and 'extract the parasite' actions."[76] The campaign against the party's domestic enemies

appeared to peak in late September, when the headquarters of the Pemuda Rakyat demanded the public execution of "economic criminals,"[77] and with Aidit encouraging workers in state enterprises to "take over, take over, and again take over."[78]

In sharp and dramatic contrast to the revolutionary exhortations that threatened to force the complete disintegration of state power, Yani declared, for the first time on 27 September, the Army's firm opposition both to the Fifth Force and to the Nasakom-ization of the Armed Forces.[79] The Army leadership was swimming against the strong current of the wider social contract. Indonesians prepared themselves for the outcome of the impasse.

The Army Destroys the Social Contract: The Decelerator Against Sukarno and the Communists

The events of 30 September-1 October have been the subject of intense academic study.[80] With regard to this study, it is important to emphasize the nature of the social contract of Guided Democracy in its most mature form and to assess the prospects of the transition from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome. Furthermore, attention must be paid to the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the PKI state-within-a-state in 1965. One must also understand the Army's position within the context of the turbulence of the Nasakom-ized social contract, its ties to the civilian sphere, its resources, and its sources of assistance. Taken together, these considerations will present a theoretically-enriched understanding of the so-called "abortive coup" in Indonesia.

In its late phase, the social contract of Guided Democracy united the largest organized following in society (the Communist constituency)

with the unrivalled and seemingly infallible spokesman of the state elite (Sukarno). That both proffered genuinely revolutionary visions of Indonesia's future meant that the transition from the developing revolutionary situation in the country would intensify and lead ineluctably toward a revolutionary outcome. In short, the PKI state-within-a-state was becoming the Indonesian state, and Sukarno was increasingly pointing its direction. For a revolutionary actor like the PKI, neither a better social contract nor a more opportune alliance of forces could be found.

Relative to other actors or organizations in Indonesia at the time, the PKI seemed monolithic, unstoppable, irresistible, and a paragon of organizational adaptability. Indeed, the PKI had acquired or was in the process of acquiring all the accoutrements of state power. These included sovereignty (although limited, it was used increasingly in 1964-1965 to force actions otherwise unacceptable to the legal government); territory (despite the Muslim upsurge, Central and East Java were unmistakable Communist strongholds); adherents (approximately one in five Indonesians openly sided with the Communists); government; and the small beginnings of a military establishment.

That the PKI had elements of each of these resources, empirically speaking, does not necessarily mean that these were of high quality. Were the PKI's millions of constituents, for example, uniformly socialized and steeled to fight for the Communists in all situations? As McVey has argued, in the late period of Guided Democracy, there was tremendous pressure on ordinary Indonesians to declare their support for the left or the right, such that any newly proclaimed sympathies were motivated out of fear.[81] Additionally, as suggested in reference to the

rapidity of the Communists' growth in the period of liberal democracy, success in and of itself is attractive but may breed opportunism rather than loyalty. With respect to other resources, the governmental structure of the PKI and the BTI proved inadequate in the execution of policy in the countryside. Lastly, in the realm of military resources, only small steps had been taken to create a Fifth Force, and this alone gave the party cause to act cautiously: the party had opted to "slow" its accelerator. That the party was not really interested in precipitating a military conflict with the Army is evident from the fact that the President was allowed to take the initiative in creating the PKI military wing. In fact, the party would have preferred to ride the revolutionary tide of Indonesian society, to provide merely loose leadership, and to keep the onrush of activity pointed in the right direction.

Standing in the way of the revolution, the Army was concerned that as an independent actor it would perish in the face of the PKI's red drive. The Army's position in Guided Democracy had been eroded throughout the year. For example, the PKI had almost completely ruptured all the Army's ties to the civilian sphere and strove in September to complete the process. For the Army, which had from the very onset of its political ascent to power in 1957 struggled to create links between itself and civilians, this prospect spelt doom. Civilian support for its cause had been punctured, and some of its largest enterprises in the civil sphere had either been toppled and destroyed (BPS, Operasi Karya) or were on the verge of marginalization (HANSIP, SOSKI, the Joint Secretariat). The Army's stock of resources had already been badly depleted by 1965. However, the Fifth Force proposal, unlike any of the previous threats that the Army had faced, could not be overcome by the

Army's genius for organizational creativity. The Army leadership, it seemed, had nearly exhausted its ability to remain a distinct political entity.

Yani's declaration on 27 September reaffirmed the TNI's resistance to all encroachments on it, yet no constructive alternatives were provided. This omission was not, however, an oversight on the part of the TNI leadership: senior officers were aware that the purposeful attempt by the PKI and the BTI to apply their sovereignty in the countryside had yielded the opposite outcome. There now operated in the countryside a new, militant anti-Communism. If the largest organization in the country, the BTI, could not control this force, then neither could the President. The emotions that had prompted the declaration of a jihad (holy war) against the Communists in May-June 1965 indicated that a new rural power resource had been created and it was fully the Army's intention to use the Muslim fury against the PKI.[82]

The TNI could also be comforted by the fact, generally unknown to Indonesians at the time,[83] that its relations with the United States were expanding, despite the policy of berdikari and the worsening of relations between the Indonesian and American governments. The belief that U.S. aid to Indonesia had been terminated is understandable, given the fact that "funding of the Indonesian military (unlike aid to any other country) [was treated] as a covert matter" by the American government.[84] In fact, military aid for Indonesia totalled $39.5 million between 1962 and 1965, and only $28.3 million for the period 1949 to 1961.[85] Moreover, in July 1965 a secret contract was signed whereby 200 light aircraft would be delivered to the TNI, not the Air Force. Again, in early 1965 the number of American military or military-affiliated

personnel in Indonesia actually increased in the Military Assistance Program and in the MILTAG.[86] Perhaps the strongest link binding the United States and the TNI was the American military training that the latter received:

> While about 250 Indonesian officers had been trained in the United States by 1958, the figure rose in 1962 to 500 and by 1965 had soared to 4,000. This meant that at the time of the 1965 coup ".... one-third of the Indonesian general staff had some sort of training from America and almost half of the officer corps."[87]

It is clear that, in its struggle against the PKI state-within-a-state, the TNI was not bereft of support; its past links with the Americans gave it confidence in the face of threatening domestic politics.[88]

In contrast to the kind of open and obvious confrontation that was expected to occur between the PKI and the TNI, the events of 30 September-1 October are extremely unclear and, to this date, no unequivocal evidence has emerged to implicate the PKI in any way. Briefly, on 30 September members of the September 30 Movement (Gerakan September Tigapuluh — Gestapu), allegedly including members of the Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani, abducted and murdered seven members of the TNI Central Command, including Yani. The butchery occurred at Halim airport, where the Air Force had provided military training to members of the PKI's fronts. The conspirators proclaimed their actions to be "an internal army affair" and a preemptive strike against a "Council of Generals," which was charged with planning a coup against Sukarno. A decree was issued to the effect that the government was dissolved, and assurances were given that the President (who during the course of 1 October arrived at the conspirators' base at Halim airport) was in protective custody. During the course of 1 October, when it became apparent that the Army was rallying around the second deputy and

commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD), Suharto, and the news spread that Nasution had escaped death, the President attempted to assert control over the Army. However, Suharto blatantly disobeyed the President's orders to relinquish control of the Army to a new appointee and proceeded to near-bloodlessly crush the Gestapu. The President dissociated himself from the whole affair and departed for Bogor. By the end of the day, the Gestapu affair was over.

While the Movement was active, its public statements had not indicated a Communist plot. Given the argument about the state of the social contract in September, and the central command's firm rejection of the Fifth Force proposal on 27 September, it is not improbable that the Movement had been "an internal army affair" by "progressives" to bring the Army in line with the social contract. While the PKI had led the red drive that characterized Indonesian politics in 1965, it could not possibly have controlled all the forces with which it was allied.

The basis for military action against the PKI was being prepared, despite the unclear nature of Communist involvement in Gestapu. Revelations that Aidit had been present at Halim and Harian Rakyat's endorsement of Gestapu on 2 October (the day after the Movement had been crushed) were the flimsy grounds upon which the Army took military action against the PKI. Even these facts do not substantiate the accusation of PKI complicity. While at Halim, Aidit had no contact with either the President or the intriguers, and it is not known whether he or the President were even aware of the massacre. Furthermore, Harian Rakyat was only one of two newspapers to appear in Jakarta on 2 October; such an act could not have happened without military permission. These and other hints that the Army, or the faction centred around Suharto, had had

foreknowledge of a movement against the central command, suggest that the TNI had seized the opportunity to stage a decelerator.[89]

That the Army acted against Sukarno first, and not the PKI, is the clearest evidence that a decelerator was staged. The chief target of the TNI had to be the President because it was he who had permitted the PKI to operate and had forced the Army into a corner. Suharto was openly defiant of Sukarno in the crucial hours of 1 October and proceeded to bring Jakarta under military control whilst destroying the Gestapu. Later, when the bodies of the generals were exhumed before television cameras and Indonesians were exposed to the brutality of the victims' treatment, clearly, the intention was to "put the President in the wrong."[90] That Sukarno had been at Halim was widely known in the days after 1 October. This campaign was necessary to break the power grip that the President exercised over the people and elements within the Army. Only when Sukarno's power had been deflated could the TNI consider acting against the PKI, its second target.

After Gestapu it was extremely easy for the Army to dismantle the defenceless PKI state-within-a-state. The PKI leadership was totally unaware that within the space of a few months, it and its huge organization would vanish from the Indonesian political scene: no plans of any kind had been laid to resist the growing anti-PKI fury and no orders were given to its constituency. In early October, Politbureau members attended cabinet meetings regularly and evinced no alarm about the turn of events. The PKI did not act like a revolutionary actor that had failed to stage an accelerator. It believed that Sukarno would rescue it from any difficulties, a tactic that probably would have saved it had the Army targeted it first. By mid-October, however, the social

contract had been cast anew: the Muslims, who acted from "below," were now in open alliance with the Army, which acted as the sole new state elite from "above." The Army was free to proceed against the PKI as it wished (which it did by condoning, and contributing to, the murder of at least 500,000 members), since it possessed the popular base upon which to erect its right to rule (the millions of Muslims in Java and in the outer islands who had the same objective as the TNI). The Army had plotted its survival well and, in the end, it was not merely the possession of arms that had ensured this outcome. The Army had had the good fortune, the will, and the intelligence to seize an opportunity that lent to the destruction of not one enemy, but two.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this study has been, specifically, to understand the failure of revolution in Indonesia in the mid-1960s. As well, this study has attempted to understand, generally, the phenomenon of revolution from the political perspective of Tilly and Aya. Based upon the Indonesian case, it is appropriate to draw general conclusions about revolution, and about how our comprehension of such occurrences is either increased or decreased by the perspective adopted. It is desirable, therefore, to draw some conclusions about the failed revolution in Indonesia, as well as to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the political perspective and its relevance to other examples of revolution or failed revolution.

Understanding the Indonesian Experience

Employing the Tilly-Aya perspective on revolution reveals a great deal about the Indonesian experience. First, the concept of "social contract" helps us understand why some actors remained important in Indonesian politics while others were marginalized. Second, that concept also helps us understand the changing nature of political conflict between 1949 and 1965. Third, through an examination of the transformation of the nature of political conflict, it enables us to

appreciate the dynamic relationship between the TNI and the PKI. Fourth, the political perspective reaffirms the importance of support, from the top levels of the state, to the success of a revolutionary contender. That is to say, the Indonesian case indicates that the support of a strategically-placed individual, like President Sukarno, may be necessary to make the transition to a revolutionary outcome. Fifth, the failed Indonesian revolution also indicates how advanced a revolutionary situation must be to ensure the transition to a revolutionary outcome.

Between 1949 and 1965, there was a transformation in the number and kinds of actors on the Indonesian political stage. The concept of the social contract helps us understand this phenomenon. From 1949 to 1957, a melee of parties dominated Indonesian politics. However, within the space of only three years, the Army and Sukarno succeeded in reducing the power and the number of parties. Until 1965, Indonesian politics was dominated by only three actors: the PKI, the TNI, and Sukarno. How could such a sudden alteration in the number and kinds of political actors occur?

The rise to power of the Army and the President in the late 1950s was intimately bound up with the revolutionary process and, in fact, their acsession to power marked an attempt to thwart the Communist revolution. As the liberal democratic contract disintegrated, and the Communists benefited from the chaos and crisis of authority, it was inevitable that extra-contract challengers would emerge to confront the PKI. Only through the conceptual device of the social contract can one come to comprehend the wider significance of the events from 1949 to 1957. The contest was not merely between radical nationalists and development-oriented politicians, as has been argued by others. That

argument does not explain why corporatist norms and corporatist institutions appeared in Indonesia after 1957.

The collapse of liberal democracy drew into the power struggle new actors, while eliminating others, not merely because the social contract was disintegrating, but also because the President and the TNI altered the very form of political conflict. That is to say, part of the reason for the marginalization of parties was that the transformation of the nature of political conflict left them without a purpose. It was necessary for the Army and the President to confront the power of the parties without embarking upon the risky exercise of physically destroying them. In short, the new duumvirate had to devise a strategy that would allow it to rule, notwithstanding the popularity of the PKI. By 1957, the PKI was the world's largest nonruling communist party, and it was fiercely nationalistic, loyal, and extremely popular. Thus, it was inconceivable to think of destroying the PKI militarily. To understand why the Army and the President acted as they did in attempting to counter the Communists, and destroy the other parties without using force, the concept of social contract is eminently useful.

After 1957, from the perspective of the Army, the nature of political conflict had been altered to the detriment of the PKI and other political parties. The TNI created a whole new contract whereby the kind of conflict which the PKI preferred — parliamentary — was excluded. In this sense, the TNI did not have to worry about the accumulated resources of the party as these would not be permitted a role in the kind of conflict the Army envisaged — that among "family" members, resolved through "discussion" and "consensus." Therefore, the subsequent fall of the parties, and the rise of the Army and Sukarno, had to do with the

changing nature of political conflict from a parliamentary guise to a corporatist guise. The ability to adapt to new forms of conflict was the criteria by which an actor was either pushed off or remained on the political stage.

After 1957, the PKI realized that its resources were not as important as its ability to adapt to the changes being effected in the social contract. Rather than succumb to the TNI's vision of political conflict, however, the PKI copied the Army by making conflict a matter of the nature of the contract itself. Again, one is witness to a remarkably nonviolent, yet potentially explosive, situation. Between 1957 and 1965 the contenders avoided using their accumulated resources in their confrontations, preferring either to safeguard or expand them. The struggle was, to a large degree, more than a mere competition to acquire more and more resources, although this aspect of the TNI-PKI rivalry was still important. Rather, the two contenders more consciously atempted to create new social contracts using their accumulated resources.

It is evident from the strategies to transform the social contract, used by both the PKI and the TNI between 1957 and 1965, that these two actors had a powerful impact on each other. Use of the political perspective in this study shows that there existed a dynamic relationship between the Army and the Communists. In contrast to other studies of the TNI and the PKI, which examine each actor separately out of autonomous impulses, this study shows that the basic strategies, tactics, and aims of the two actors were determined to a significant degree by each others' presence. It has already been noted that with respect to countering the PKI's strength in 1957, the Army was compelled to devise an alternative to the military coup. The fundamental alterations made by the Army to

the social contract was an inevitable reaction to PKI power and not an example of the TNI's self-proclaimed aversion to staging coups. In this instance, the TNI adapted to the political conditions created by the PKI.

Between 1957 and 1962, it was the PKI that was compelled to adapt to the power of the Army. The PKI reformulated its ideology, embarked upon new forms of collective effort, and consolidated an alliance with Sukarno for no other reason than to bend to the prevailing conditions in the political environment. These three changes would not have been effected in the absence of the Army's overarching political presence. Thus, it is quite evident that the political interaction of the TNI and the PKI was dynamic in nature. It is incomplete to study each actor separately. Furthermore, to the degree that these two actors dominated Indonesian politics between 1957 and 1965, a correct understanding of events requires an examination of the TNI-PKI relationship.

Coexisting with the PKI and the TNI, of course, was President Sukarno. Others have emphasized his importance and it is difficult to understate that importance, especially after 1957. However, the political perspective in this study highlights one aspect about the President that other approaches or studies may underestimate. After 1960 the President's support grew in importance to the PKI. Throughout the period from 1960 to 1965 the Communists tried ever harder to win favour with the President. The alliance with the President had become so important to the party by 1965 that it subordinated itself to Sukarno. The Fifth Force proposal, for instance, was usurped by Sukarno and the PKI did not resist. It is significant that by 1965 the success or failure of the PKI's revolutionary venture rested to an extremely large degree in the hands of the President. Sukarno's support, and his

strategic position as the nation's undisputed leader, conferred on the PKI a legitimacy that may not have been attainable through the party's own efforts. Thus, the Indonesian case illustrates that, notwithstanding the immense size of the PKI and its fronts, its power chances depended upon top-level support, centred in one man. Unfortunately for the Communists, their alliance with Sukarno caused dangerous fissures in the power structure.

The very success of the Communist enterprise created for it many enemies. The President's actions against the BPS and Murba alienated a large portion of the state elite, including the Army, and threatened their continued existence. The PKI and the BTI incurred the wrath of the Muslims by undertaking what were construed to be anti-Muslim activities in the countryside. Thus, in 1965, for the first time in post-independence Indonesian politics the grounds had been laid for a second, parallel, social contract. The Communists, in attempting to make themselves the new rulers of the country, and by drawing upon their own constituency for popular support, helped to consolidate the "anti-popular" leadership in the state (the supporters of the BPS) while providing it with a popular base upon which to rule (the Muslims). No longer was conflict about the nature of the social contract, as had been the case between 1957 and 1964 when the PKI and the TNI both attempted to recreate the social contract to favour themselves. Conflict now pivoted on which social contract would prevail in the polity. In this manner, Indonesia in 1965 came to resemble the situation in Russia in 1917 when there existed a state of "dual power."

The need to have their own social contract prevail was just as compelling to the Army (and its sympathetic allies in the state elite).

and the Muslims, as it was for the PKI and Sukarno. Each power bloc was faced with the need to stage a decisive event as the rise of the two contracts necessitated a showdown. The resolution of this particular impasse favoured the counterevolutionary forces. The PKI knew that to make the transition to a revolutionary outcome, it was necessary to have in place all the resources it had accumulated since 1951, plus a military arm. The TNI knew that to stop the Communists, it was necessary only to rally the latent support of the Muslims against only two people: Sukarno, as the representative of the state, and Aidit, as the representative of the Communist constituency. In essence, these two individuals had kept the prospects of the revolution alive. Without their efforts, the exertions of 27 million PKI supporters were meaningless. In this case, it was easy for the TNI to spot, or stage, its opportunity to act against the PKI state-within-a-state by discrediting Sukarno and Aidit.

The absence of an "accelerator," or at least an effective one (which the Fifth Force was not), and the use of a "decelerator" prevented the transition from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome. On one level, it did appear that Indonesia was about to make the transition to a revolutionary outcome in late 1965. The state's power appeared to becoming "unstuck," especially in the control of the economy and in the ideological temper of the polity. Moreover, the PKI commanded the nominal support of one-fifth of the population and the actual support of the President.

In other respects, however, the PKI's attempts to precipitate a revolutionary outcome in 1965 verged on adventurism. While the party aspired to isolate the Army politically, and to destroy its civilian supporters, it had effected only a minor split in the Army's own inner

cohesion. The Army was a unified actor in September 1965 and its monopoly on arms was still intact. The PKI's plan to have the TNI damaged or destroyed militarily in the conflict with Malaysia, certainly the intention of the PKI's Fifth Force proposal which aimed at the escalation of the conflict, had not come to fruition. The PKI's confidence, based on its own size and Sukarno's support, imprudently led the party to believe that the Army was prepared to be swept aside without an armed confrontation. If the party had been armed, or the Army had its monopoly of arms destroyed in the konfrontasi or broken by a fully-developed counter-military (the Fifth Force), only then would the revolutionary situation have been sufficiently mature to allow for the transtion to a revolutionary outcome. However, it did not turn out that way at all.

Understanding Revolution and Counterrevolution

Paramount among the strengths of the Tilly-Aya political perspective of revolution are the consequences that follow from the distinction made between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome. Given that a revolutionary situation is a necessary condition for a revolutionary outcome, but not a sufficient condition, the observer of revolutionary phenomena is compelled to focus attention on what factors facilitate the transition to a revolutionary outcome. That is, in contrast to approaches taken in other disciplines, the political perspective strains to find the precise determinants that make the transition not only possible, but probable, and hence more predictable. The political perspective facilitates the empirical and scientific study of this form of human behaviour. It follows that insights derived from one case study can increase our understanding of other revolutions.

The distinction drawn between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome also increases one's understanding of revolution by the use of empirical indicators. The focus on resources — government, adherents, territory, arms, and sovereignty — means that the progress of a revolutionary actor can be empirically gauged because each resource, with the possible exception of sovereignty, can be quantified. Thus, we can gain reliable and valid insights about the intensity of a revolutionary situation and the power chances of a revolutionary contender by examining its acquired resources. As our understanding of the situation in empirical terms grows, our ignorance diminishes correspondingly: reality can be better grasped and comprehended through a more empirical approach than a less empirical one.

That is not to say that the political approach explains the entirety of a revolutionary phenomenon. Rather, by placing resource-accumulation at the centre of the study, and within the context of a social contract, the political perspective uses measures of government, adherents, territory, arms, and (less reliably) sovereignty, to indirectly assess qualitative factors also present in revolutions, such as mass grievances. In short, the size of a revolutionary contender changes depending upon the state of the polity. Where there are no grievances, there are no accumulated resources, and no revolutionary contenders. When, however, a revolutionary contender has accumulated many resources, there must have been prior grievances against the government or some other powerful actor in the polity. That is to say, the focus on resources gives one a handle on other, qualitative, factors that contribute to a revolutionary situation. The concept of a social contract is, therefore, very meaningful as it includes within the analysis factors that might not be

addressed, or may be assumed, as in other approaches.

The concept of social contract is important not only in helping to assess the qualitative aspects of a revolutionary situation. It is, moreover, useful in explaining why there are fewer revolutionary outcomes than revolutionary situations. Stated alternatively, the concept of the social contract helps us understand why there are more military-type regimes than revolutionary-type regimes. In the Indonesian case, the Army attempted to undo the bases of Communist political support by devising a social contract totally unsuited to the PKI. That is, the TNI attempted during the period from 1957 to 1963 to create new aims, options, and a new identity for all political actors. The PKI could not possibly have survived as a revolutionary contender had the Army's social contract taken root: the PKI could not transform itself into a functional group as this would have eliminated, by definition, the principle on which it was built — class struggle.

What is important about the TNI challenge to the PKI is not so much the particular concepts it devised or organizations it created, but rather the general strategy it pursued: the Communists had to be eliminated by destroying their reason for existence. Thus, in one manoeuvre, the TNI attempted to totally destroy the PKI by supplanting the options and aims embodied in the parliamentary road to power, and its parliamentary identity. Unfortunately for the TNI, the Communists realized that more than one actor could attempt to revise the social contract. As is true of other revolutionary contenders, the PKI proved far more dynamic than the military actor in accommodating itself to pressures that threatened its existence.

Ironically, it is this dynamism that explains why revolutions are

rarer phenomena than military-led counterrevolutions. The PKI's strategy during the period 1963 to 1965 illustrates this point. By taking advantage of Sukarno's vision of revolution, the PKI survived the pressures of the early Guided Democracy contract. The party went on to expand the one contractual feature that allowed it to function freely—collective efforts of a mass nature associated with the West Irian campaign — into the basis for a whole new social contract. Thus, between 1963 and 1965, the PKI transformed the social contract in five respects, altering the aims of actors (the fulfillment of revolutionary goals), their options (to engage in revolutionary undertakings), their identity (revolutionary criteria supplanted commitments to harmony and development), the bases of solidarity (the peasants and workers were proclaimed the pillars of the revolution), and collective efforts (to "complete" the Indonesian revolution). Like the TNI, the PKI attempted to force upon its chief rival a contract which was incompatible with it. The PKI's strategy culminated in its attempt to deny the identity of the Army through the Fifth Force proposal. Importantly, it is the matter of an actor's identity that is at the very crux of the phenomenon of counterrevolution.

In any contest between a revolutionary contender and a counterrevolutionary military, the former has one advantage that eludes the latter: there exists the option to change one's identity from a peaceful contender to an armed movement, or vice-versa. A military actor, on the other hand, can aspire to surround itself with non-military organizations, such as the TNI did, but at base it has only one identity: it is the monopolizer of arms. Thus, when a revolutionary contender attempts to acquire weapons it also directly attacks the existence of the

military actor by denying its identity. Had the Fifth Force come into existence, the TNI, which had already been forced to abandon its real aims, options, and preferred bases of solidarity and collective efforts, would have ceased to exist as an actor.

The Indonesian case illustrates the dilemmas faced by all military establishments that oppose revolutionary contenders. Military actors, like revolutionary contenders, prefer to have a social contract in place that favours them. Ideally, both types of actors would also prefer to have all five components of a social contract (aims, options, identity, bases of solidarity, and collective effort) suited to their interests. In adapting to changes in a social contract, or to alterations of its components, the revolutionary actor has an inherent advantage. The revolutionary contender can keep its revolutionary intentions and its identity alive in either a military guise or a peaceful guise, as indicated by the PKI's success in recovering from its military defeat at Madiun. When, however, the social contract is attempted to be altered by a revolutionary contender against the interests of a military actor, the latter does not possess the option of changing its identity. In such cases, the incentives to use its monopoly of weapons is extremely high for a military actor. It is for this basic reason that counterrevolutions are more prevalent than revolutions.

While a revolutionary contender may have the advantage of being able to transform its identity, the prospects of making the transition from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome are quite limited. To make the transition, the revolutionary contender must possess a governmental structure, adherents, territory, some measure of sovereignty, and arms. Since the acquisition of the latter resource is

the same as denying the military's identity, it is doubly difficult for the military to accept. From the perspective of the military, it is more desirable to prevent the revolutionary situation from reaching this point of development. Yet, from the revolutionary contender's perspective, without arms the transition to a revolutionary outcome is impossible, notwithstanding all the other accumultated resources.

In this regard, the Indonesian case is unusual. The PKI's progress, from 1949 to 1965, is paradigmatic of the progress that any revolutionary contender must make, with respect to the accumulation of resources and the creation of a social contract suitable to a revolutionary actor. All the components necessary to make a revolution succeed were present in the Indonesian case (except an effective accelerator and fortune) and for this reason, despite the PKI's eventual failure, it can be said that this case study tells us as much about revolution as it does about counterrevolution. Rarely does one find a more mature or self-confident (to the point of adventurism) revolutionary contender as the PKI.

Likewise, rarely does one find a better example of the process that all militaries must go through in a contest with a revolutionary contender than the TNI's strategy of 1957-1963. Most militaries never permit a revolutionary actor to become as powerful as the PKI, and this is another reason why counterrevolutions are more common than revolutions. Despite the TNI's assertions of being unique, the fact that it staged a decelerator and seized power reaffirms the commonality of all militaries: they all possess the same identity as monopolizers of arms. Thus, the TNI's efforts to cope with the Communists is also paradigmatic of the process of counterrevolution.

The Indonesian case is, therefore, extremely useful in the

theoretical appreciation not only of revolution, but of its understudied counterpart — counterrevolution. Given that the political perspective approaches the phenomenon of revolution from an empirical angle, the benefits of which we are already familiar with, it is extremely easy to understand the phenomenon of counterrevolution using the same theory. The possibilities of counterrevolution occurring increase as resources are taken from a non-revolutionary actor by a revolutionary actor. Since the quantity of resources acquired by a revolutionary contender indirectly measures the qualitiative aspects of the situation in a polity (mass grievances, lack of consensus, and so forth) that may contribute to a revolution, the lack of resources informs us about the qualitative aspects of the weakening actor (his psychological state) and about his propensity to stage a coup. In both cases, the area of ignorance about the reality of the situation is diminished by the utilization of empirical indicators in connection with the concept of social contract.

In the final analysis, however, the political perspective on revolution still suffers from several weaknesses. First, the approach does not lend itself to parsimony. At the very centre of the study is a concern about tactical alliances between members of the state elite and contenders, and intricate manoeuvres that make possible the ascent to power of a revolutionary contender. In short, the approach emphasizes the importance of detail. The price of the approach is a very lengthy study. It is inherent, however, to proceed slowly if the primary benefit of the theory — that reality is gauged accurately — is to be attained.

A second major weakness of the approach is that rarely in political life are revolutionary situations permitted to develop to the extremes of the Indonesian case. That is to say, only rarely is it necessary to

employ a short-run time perspective (which centres on the acquisition of arms) to understand a given situation, as revolutionary contenders only infrequently reach this stage of development. Two factors militate against the full development of a revolutionary situation, and hence the application of all the elements contained in the approach. First, militaries almost always intervene in politics at a point well before a revolutionary contender has achieved the strength the PKI did. Second, leaders like Sukarno who govern for long periods and possess the power to rule virtually unquestioned are very rare. There can be no doubt that Sukarno's political attitudes greatly affected the PKI's power chances and sustained them in times of difficulty.

A third weakness of the theoretical approach is that fortune partially explains why a revolutionary situation either stalled or went on to develop and produce a revolutionary outcome. While great strides have been made to measure the progress of a revolutionary contender empirically through a focus on its resources, in relation to its standing vis-à-vis the social contract, little light has been shed on the actual transition to a revolution or a counterrevolution. The role of fortune in counterrevolution is disturbingly large in the Indonesian case. It is important to note, however, that the mere possession of good fortune is insufficient to bring about a revolution or a counterrevolution. Ultimately, an actor must exercise its will and intelligence when the opportunity presents itself. Overall, the strengths of the political perspective outweigh the weaknesses as this study of the failed Indonesian revolution abundantly shows.

ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I

1. See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978); and Rod Aya, "Popular Intervention in Revolutionary Situations," in Statemaking and Social Movements, eds. Charles Bright, and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1984).

2. For references to these concepts see Tilly, pp. 189-222; and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 91-105.

3. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia"s New Order in Historical Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983):482-483.

4. Ibid., p. 485.

5. Stan Taylor, Social Sciences and Revolution (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 151.

6. Ibid., p. 11.

7. Ibid., p. 51.

8. Aya, pp. 323-324.

9. Taylor, p. 53.

10. Ibid., p. 89.

11. Taylor, p. 115.

12. A revolution is identified as a "rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its politcal institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies." Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 264.

13. Aya, p. 320. See also Tilly, p. 193.

14. Taylor, p. 115.

15. Ibid., p. 135.

16. Ibid., p. 145; emphasis in original.

17. Ibid., p. 147.

18. Ibid., p. 135.

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19. Aya, p. 322.

20. Ibid., p. 325.

21. See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

22. Aya, pp. 332-333.

23. Ibid., p. 333.

24. Ibid., p. 334; emphasis added.

25. Johnson, p. 91.

26. George S. Pettee, The Process of Revolution (New York: Harper Bros., 1938), p. 91, quoted in Johnson, p. 98.

27. Johnson, pp. 98-99.

28. Tilly, p. 194.

29. Taylor, p. 145.

30. Tilly, p. 189.

31. Ibid., p. 192.

32. Ibid., p. 192; emphasis in original.

33. See Huntington, pp. 266-274.

34. Tilly, p. 208.

35. Ibid., pp. 193-194.

36. Taylor, p. 145.

37. Tilly, p. 217.

38. Taylor, p. 133.

39. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road To Power, Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).

40. Among other these ancillary works is included C. L. M. Penders, and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution. A Political Biography (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985); Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," 2 pts. Indonesia 11

(April 1971):131-176, and 13 (April 1972):147-181; Baladas Ghoshal, The Role of the Military in Indonesia (Madras: Madras University Press, 1980).

41. For an interesting exception, see Guy J. Pauker, ed., The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. Memorandum Rm-3312-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1963).

42. Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).

43. Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Its History, Program and Tactics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1965).

44. Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 400.

45. Ibid., p. 15.

46. Olle Tornquist, Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia (London: Zed Press, 1986), p. 240.

47. Sheldon W. Simon, The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta and the PKI (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).

48. Antonie C. A. Dake, In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking 1959-1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).

49. MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982).

50. David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, An Alternative to the Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

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1. See David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 58-107.

2. See Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Company, 1982), pp. 2-5.

3. B. R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983):480.

4. See Sukarno, "The Pantja Sila"; and "Preamble to the 1945 Constitution," in Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965, eds. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 40-49, and pp. 49-50.

5. Reeve, p. 85.

6. Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica, vol. I, (Djakarta: Bulan-Bintang, 1953), p. 56, quoted in Reeve, p. 82.

7. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Sukarno's Indonesia, A Review Article," Pacific Affairs 46 (Summer 1973):269-288; Peter Hastings, "The Guide in Profile," in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 7-15; and J. D. Legge, Sukarno. A Political Biography (London: The Penguin Press, 1972), pp. 149-180.

8. Reeve, p. 86. See also B. R. O'G. Anderson, Java In A Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 168-169, 188, and 301-302; George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 168-169; and Legge, pp. 206, and 217-218.

9. Reeve, p. 88.

10. Anderson, "Old State, New Society," p. 481.

11. See Reeve, pp. 76-81.

12. See A. K. Pringgodigdo, The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice, trans. Alexander Brotherton, Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1957); and Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government and Press During Guided Democracy. Hull Monographs On Southeast Asia, no. 4 (Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, The University of Hull, 1971), pp. 42-44.

13. Reeve, p. 90.

14. See Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 446-469.

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15. For general analyses of Sukarno, see C. L. M. Penders, The Life and Times of Sukarno (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974); and Edo Quiko, "The Rise and Fall of Sukarno: A Brief Analysis of Indonesia's Political Development, 1949-1965," Asian Profile 5 (October 1977):463-474.

16. See Pringgodigdo, pp. 21-28, and 42-47.

17. See the following speeches, all by Sukarno: "Five Years of Indonesian Independence," United Asia 4 (1952):19-26; "Indonesia Takes Stock," Far Eastern Survey 21 (October 1952):142-144; and "The Crisis of Authority," and "Electioneering and National Unity," in Feith and Castles, pp. 74-78, and pp. 78-81.

18. A. H. Nasution, "Unity of Command"; and Zulkifli Lubis, "Militarism and Civilianism," in Feith and Castles, pp. 416-420, and pp. 420-425.

19. See Oey Hong Lee, p. 44; and Kahin, Nationalism, p. 464.

20. Pauker has written that "An official publication of the Indonesian Ministry of Information issued in February 1950 listed as active in May 1949, 41 parties in Java, 4 in Sumatra, 27 in East Indonesia and 10 in Borneo, a total of 82 Indonesian parties, besides some 15 Dutch, Chinese and Arab political organizations still active at that time. Another publication of the Ministry, issued in July 1951, gave information on 27 parties of which 5 were classified as based on religion, 14 as based on nationalism, 6 as based on marxism, and 2 as representing minority groups. A similar publication issued in August 1954 listed 23 parties of which 18 had parliamentary groups." See Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 27 (September 1958):134. Moreover, when Indonesia's first parliamentary elections were held in September 1955, "172 parties and independent candidates entered the contest," M. P. Walker, "Indonesian Elections and Party Development, 1954-1955," (M.A. thesis, Berkeley, 1957), p. 32, quoted in Goh Cheng Tiek, "Why Indonesia's Attempt at Democracy in the Mid-1950s Failed," Modern Asian Studies 6 (1972):228. President Sukarno had to summon no less than "74 party leaders" in early 1957 to inform them of the dissolution of parliamentary democracy; cited in Goh, p. 243.

21. Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953; A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia. Monograph Series. Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1958), p. 210.

22. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. xi.

23. Goh, p. 226.

24. Ibid.

25. Pauker, "Role," p. 139.

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26. George McT. Kahin, "The New Indonesian Government," Far Eastern Survey 19 (22 November 1950):210-211.

27. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia — The First Five Years of Independence," United Asia 6 (June 1954):133.

28. Ibid., p. 134.

29. George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia's Strengths and Weaknesses," Far Eastern Survey 20 (26 September 1951):161.

30. Ibid.; emphasis in original.

31. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities," The Australian Outlook, 21 (December 1967):274, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 8.

32. Robert van Niel, "Indonesian Political Developments," Far Eastern Survey 22 (June 1953):87.

33. Ibid.

34. See Boyd R. Compton, "The Indonesian Election Law," Far Eastern Survey 23 (April 1954):62-64, and "The Indonesian Electoral Law, II," Far Eastern Survey 23 (May 1954):74-77.

35. Quoted in Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia (London: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 235, cited in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, n. 29, pp. 36-37.

36. Anderson, "Old State, New Society," p. 483.

37. Bruce Glassburner, "Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia, 1950-57," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (January 1962):125. See also Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 48-57, for a discussion of political parties and business.

38. See the statement at the PKI's Fifth National Congress, held in March 1954, when its parliamentary identity was reaffirmed, in Oey Hong Lee, p. 215. See also Mochtar Lubis, "The Indonesian Communist Movement Today," Far Eastern Survey 23 (November 1954):161-164.

39. See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, "The Communist Revolt in Java: The Background," Far Eastern Survey 17 (17 November 1948):257-260; and George McT. Kahin, "The Communist Revolt in Java: The Crisis and Its Aftermath," Far Eastern Survey 17 (17 November 1948):261-264.

40. Donald Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy in Indonesia 1948-59," The Australian Outlook 13 (December 1959):254.

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41. Ibid.

42. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism Under Aidit," Problems of Communism 7 (November-December 1958):17.

43. Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," p. 255.

44. Feith, Wilopo, p. 83.

45. Ibid.

46. Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," p. 255.

47. MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), p. 75.

48. Ibid., p. 76.

49. See Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in Communist Strategies in Asia, ed. Doak Barnett (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. 149-162.

50. See D. N. Aidit, "A Semifeudal and Semicolonial Society," in Feith and Castles, pp. 247-251.

51. D. N. Aidit, "Fly High the Banners of 'Land to the Peasants' and Fight for One Victory after the Other," Review of Indonesia, Supplement (June-July 1959):12, quoted in Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-63, (Los Angeles: University of California, 1964), p. 38.

52. See D. N. Aidit, "Indonesia's Class Structure," in Feith and Castles, pp. 251-257.

53. D. N. Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution (Djakarta: n.p., 1957), pp. 62-63, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 40.

54. Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the PKI Central Committee, Mengapa Front Nasional, (Djakarta: n.p., 1957), p. 7, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 41.

55. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 42.

56. Aidit, Indonesian Society, p. 57, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 45.

57. PKI, Program PKI (Djakarta: n.p., 1954), pp. 21-22, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 47.

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58. D. N. Aidit, "Bersatulah untuk Menjelesaikan Tuntutan2 Revolusi Augustus 1945," report to the fourth pleno session of the PKI Central Committee in July 1956, in Pilihan Tulisan, vol. II (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1959-1960), pp. 44-45, quoted in Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-59. Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 75; and the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the PKI Central Committee, Mengapa Front Nasional, p. 5, quoted in Lev, Transition, p. 76. See also D. N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 72-80, on the united national front strategy; and D. N. Aidit, "For National Unity," World Marxist Review 3 (February 1960):21-26.

59. Feith, Wilopo, p. 90.

60. Ibid. See Corsino, pp. 129-134, for a discussion of the PKI's use of nationalism during the 1950s.

61. Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," p. 262.

62. Feith, Wilopo, p. 90. Hindley gives as evidence of Communist goodwill the restraint exercised by SOBSI, the PKI's labour front organization, which was held to have a major factor in the country's decreasing labour disruptions: "In 1950 7,784,271 man hours were lost due to strikes compared with 3,719,914 in 1951, 878,911 in 1952, and 4,812,090 in 1953." Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," n. 1, p. 255.

63. Ibid., p. 89.

64. See Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World Part II (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1956), pp. 309-311, and 344-346; Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia. Its History, Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), pp. 55-63; Feith, Wilopo, pp. 93-100; Hindley, Communist Party, pp. 236-255; and McVey, "Indonesian Communism," p. 158.

65. See Feith, Wilopo, n. 25, p. 95, on the Kediri residency council elections of 1946, and the Jogjakarta regional elections of 1951.

66. Quoted in Feith, Wilopo, p. 161.

67. Quoted in van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, p. 344.

68. Quoted in Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," p. 264.

69. See Irene Tinker and Millidge Walker, "The First General Elections in India and Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 25 (July 1956):97-110, for a general discussion of the elections.

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70. Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1957), p. 62.

71. Ibid.

72. As calculated from Table 4 in Feith, Elections, p. 78.

73. Hindley describes the organizational structure of the Indonesian state as follows: "Indonesia is divided into provinces, the provinces into residencies, and the residencies into kabupatens. In 1960 there were 209 kabupatens in Indonesia, including 80 in Java. Each kabupaten is divided into several kewedanaans, and these in turn into ketjamatans. in 1960 there were 2,936 ketjamatans in Indonesia, including 1,455 in Java. The average ketjamatan in Java contained 15 villages or groups of hamlets." Hindley, Communist Party, p. xvii. These rankings in East Java, and the ones for Central and West Java, and Jakarta, are calculated from Table 6 in Feith, Elections, p. 85.

74. "The PKI had an absolute majority of council seats in the municipalities of Semarang, Surakarta, and Salatiga and in the kabupatens of Bojolali, Klaten, Semarang, and Sukohardjo." Lev, Transition, n. 42, p. 91.

75. These results can be found in Feith, Elections, pp. 65-72.

76. Ghoshal has written that "the election results revealed the regional character of the parties. The major support for the parties like PNI, NU and PKI came mainly from Java. Respectively almost five and a half million and six million of the PKI and NU votes were from Java as against seven million for PNI and four million for Masjumi. Their support in the outer islands was quite insignificant. On the other hand, Masjumi's stronghold was in outer provinces. More than 50 per cent of the Masjumi members chosen for Parliament gained their seats in the electoral districts of the outer provinces. As against this, the PNI's percentage was 21 per cent, NU's 18 per cent, and PKI 10 per cent." Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 43.

77. Lev, Transition, pp. 79-80.

78. Ibid., p. 81.

79. Harian Rakyat, 10 July 1956, quoted in Donald Hindley, "The PKI and the Peasants," Problems of Communism 11 (November-December 1962):30; emphasis by Hindley.

80. Elections were also staged in South, East, and West Kalimantan in early 1958; the results can be found in Lev, Transition, n. 69, p. 101.

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81. Lev, Transition, p. 90; see Hindley, Communist Party, map 1, p. 226, for a visual representation of PKI territory, and A. van Marle, "Indonesian Electoral Geography under Orla and Orba," in Indonesia After the 1971 Elections, ed. Oey Hong Lee (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 37-59 for more details.

82. Lev, Transition, p. 93.

83. Lev has written that "The PKI won majority control of seven second level disticts, an increase of five [from 1955]...In Surabaja, a major industrial city and the provincial capital, the PKI nearly won a majority, while the PNI vote fell drastically." Lev, Transition, p. 94.

84. Ibid., p. 95.

85. Ibid., p. 101.

86. Feith, Wilopo, n. 20, p. 92.

87. Ibid., p. 100.

88. The measures found to be anathema to Sukarno are detailed by Feith, in Wilopo, pp. 100-101.

89. A discussion of these agreements can be found in Amry Vandenbosch, "The Netherlands-Indonesia Union," Far Eastern Survey 19 (11 January 1950):1-7.

90. Sukarno, "Dari Sabang Sampai Merauke," in Dibawa Bendera Revolusi, vol. II (Djakarta: n.p., 1965), p. 114, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 16.

91. Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," p. 261.

92. Ibid., pp. 263-264.

93. Harian Rakyat, 16 August 1951, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 56.

94. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 56.

95. Corsino, p. 97.

96. Justus M. van der Kroef, "D. N. Aidit — Indonesian Architect of Success and Failure," in Leaders of the Communist World, ed. Rodger Swearingen (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 60.

97. D. N. Aidit, "Garis-Garis Pokok Perdjuangan Ideologi Didalam PKI," Bintang Merah (15 May-1 June 1951):265; and D. N. Aidit, The Birth and Growth of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1958), p. 38,

cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 70.

98. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 70.

99. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, PKI-Buletin (7 March 1952):3-6, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 74.

100. Sudisman, "Peladjaran Fundamentil Selama 32 Tahun Berdirinja PKI," PKI-Buletin (20 May 1952):12, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 74.

101. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, PKI-Buletin (May 1953):78-81, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 74.

102. D. N. Aidit, "Perkuat Persatuan Nasional dan Perkuat Partai!" in Pilihan Tulisan, vol. I (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1959-1960), p. 297, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 80.

103. D. N. Aidit, For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! (19 November 1954):2; Bintang Merah (February-March 1956):112, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 80.

104. Corsino, p. 99.

105. Ibid.

106. Amir Anwar Sanusi, "The Results of the First Three-Year Plan," mimeographed, (Djakarta, 1959), p. 3, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 163.

107. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 182.

108. Harian Rakyat, 4 February 1957, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 91.

109. Harian Rakyat, 21 January 1956, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 82.

110. Corsino, p. 102.

111. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 221.

112. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Labour Movement, Its Development and Prospects," United Asia 5 (August 1953):223-231, for a discussion of the early efforts of parties, including the PKI, to organize the workers.

113. Ibid., p. 204; see also John E. Moes, "Trade Unionism in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 28 (February 1959):17-24.

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114. Harian Rakyat, 5 April 1955, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 165.

115. Suara Tani (January 1959):6-7, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 166.

116. See S. Surgoso, "The Communist Movement and the Youth — Indonesia," World Marxist Review 4 (November 1961):66-68.

117. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 186; the figure is in van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 217.

118. Gerwani, Meluaskan Aksi-Aksi untuk Memperkuat Tuntutan Hak-Hak Wanita-Anak-Anak dan Perdamaian (Djakarta: n.p., 1956), pp. 26-27, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 204.

119. The results are taken from Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, Table I, p. 42. The fifth place party was the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia — PSII), which obtained 1,091,160 votes, or a mere 2.9 per cent of the national vote.

120. Dawn (Karachi), 24 September 1955, quoted in Goh, p. 233.

121. Goh, p. 234.

122. Feith, Decline, pp. 462-481, passim, quoted in Goh, p. 235.

123. Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 54.

124. Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), 21 March 1956; Abadi (Djakarta), 7 January 1957, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 50.

125. Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 51.

126. Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), 27 March 1956; Suluh Indonesia (Djakarta), 2 January 1957, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 52.

127. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

128. PIA, 3 April 1956, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 53.

129. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 26 (April 1957):49.

130. On Indonesia's economic malaise throughout the 1950s, see Everett D. Hawkins, "Prospects for Economic Development in Indonesia," World Politics 8 (October 1955):91-111; Benjamin Higgins, "Indonesia's Development Plans and Problems," Pacific Affairs 29 (June 1956):107-125; Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stability and Development (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957); Justus M. van der Kroef,

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131. Cited in E. Pauker, "The Failure of a Democratic Experiment: Indonesia, 1955-1958," (M.A. thesis, Berkeley, 1962), p. 114, quoted in Goh, p. 239. Goh states additionally that "A New York Times report said on 25 December [1958] that from January to September [1956], 71% of the country's foreign exchange was earned by Sumatra." Ibid., n. 41, p. 239.

132. Van der Kroef, "Instability," p. 54.

133. Ibid., p. 53.

134. Soekarno, Indonesia, Pilihlah Demokrasi Jang Sedjati (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1956), pp. 11-12, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, pp. 56-57, and n. 41, p. 76.

135. Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), 12 November 1956, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 59; emphasis by Ghoshal.

136. See Mohammad Natsir, "Restoring Confidence in Democracy," in Feith and Castles, pp. 89-94.

137. Quoted in van der Kroef, "Instability," p. 50.

138. Van der Kroef, "Instability," p. 51.

139. Quoted in van der Kroef, "Instability," p. 51.

140. Goh, pp. 240-241.

141. Sukarno and Hatta personified the two major sets of political opinion in Indonesia; the former was the main representative of Javanese power and revolutionary values, while the latter was the chief representative of the outer islands and promoted a vision of revolution that centred on economic development. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Sukarno and Hatta: The Great Debate in Indonesia," Political Quarterly 29 (July-September 1958):238-250.

142. Ibid., p. 241.

143. Java Bode (Djakarta), 11 January 1957, quoted in van der Kroef, "Instability," p. 52.

144. Van der Kroef, "Instability," p. 60.

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145. Lev, Transition, p. 81.

146. Ibid., p. 102.

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1. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia — The First Five Years of Independence," United Asia 6 (June 1954):136.

2. See David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 112-115, on Sukarno's anti-liberal democracy activities during the 1950s; and J. D. Legge, Sukarno. A Political Biography (London: The Penguin Press, 1972), pp. 240-278.

3. Sukarno's call was based on his desire, expressed in January 1955, to see in Indonesia a gotong-royong democracy. Java Bode (Djakarta), 22 January 1955, quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, "'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 26 (August 1957), n. 6, p. 114.

4. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 467-469.

5. See Sukarno, "Let Us Bury the Parties," in Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965, eds. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 81-83.

6. Reeve, p. 108.

7. For the major party reactions, see Legge, Sukarno, p. 279.

8. See Feith, Decline, pp. 538-555; and Reeve, pp. 116-118.

9. Guided Democracy, A Volume of Basic Speeches and Documents (New Delhi: n.p., 1959), p. 20, quoted in Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Company, 1982), p. 79.

10. Text in H. A. Notosoetardjo, ed., Proses Kembali Kepada Djiwa Proklamasi 1945. Apakah Demokrasi Terpimpin Itu? (Djakarta: Joint Publication of Lembaga Penggali dan Penghimpun Sejarah Revolusi Indonesia-Badang-Pemuda, 1959), p. 87, quoted in Reeve, p. 117.

11. Dewan Nasional (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1957), p. 25, quoted in Feith, Decline, p. 542.

12. Ibid.

13. Notosoetardjo, p. 90, quoted in Reeve, p. 117.

14. Notosoetardjo, p. 90, quoted in Reeve, pp. 117-118.

15. Legge, Sukarno, p. 284.

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16. Baladas Ghoshal, The Role of the Military in Indonesia (Madras: The University of Madras, 1980), p. 5.

17. See T. B. Simatupang, "The Role of the Military in Stabilization of Southeast Asian Nations, With Special Focus on Indonesia," (Unpublished paper), Jakarta, 1970, p. 15ff, quoting from Laporan dari Benaran, quoted in Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 42.

18. See C. L. M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution. A Political Biography (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), pp. 71-77.

19. Sundhaussen, pp. 45-46.

20. Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 27 (September 1958):133.

21. See Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 77-127; and Sundhaussen, pp. 51-79, for the TNI in this capacity.

22. Especially important in this regard was the "17 October Affair." See Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia no. 11 (April 1971):143-157; Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 81-90; Sundhaussen, pp. 62-79; and Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, pp. 25-29.

23. See MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), pp. 64-67, on the Darul Islam and the Republic of the South Moluccas.

24. A. H. Nasution, Tjatatan2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1955), p. 108, quoted in Ghoshal, Role, p. 4.

25. Reeve, p. 110. See also Penders and Sundhaussen, Appendix 2, "Excerpts from Nasution's IP-KI Campaign Speech," pp. 236-246; and Appendix 3, "Order of the Day, " pp. 247-250; pp. 97-102; and Sundhaussen, pp. 89-90.

26. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 98.

27. Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 60.

28. Quoted in Nasution, Tjatatan2, pp. 38-39, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, pp. 60-61.

29. George McTurnan Kahin, "Indonesia," in Major Governments of Asia, ed. George McTurnan Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1st. ed., 1958), p. 568, quoted in Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided

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Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-59. Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 23; see also J. D. Legge, "Guided Democracy and Constitutional Procedures in Indonesia," The Australian Outlook 13 (June 1959):93-99.

30. Reeve, p. 118. Two individuals who did accept cabinet posts, and were associated with the Masjumi party, were expelled from the party shortly after they made their choice.

31. Ibid.

32. See Roeslan Abdulgani, "Indonesia's National Council: The First Year," Far Eastern Survey 27 (July 1958):97-104.

33. Reeve, p. 113.

34. Ibid., p. 119.

35. Lev, Transition, p. 24.

36. Reeve, p. 121.

37. Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, vol. II (Djakarta: Panitya Penerbit, 1965), p. 293, quoted in Reeve, p. 121.

38. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Trials of Indonesian Democracy," Review of Politics 20 (January 1958):70-96; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 27 (April 1958):49-63; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia II," Far Eastern Survey 27 (May 1958):73-80; and B. H. M. Vlekke, ed., Indonesia's Struggle 1957-1958 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Studies, 1959).

39. See Lev, Transition, p. 33.

40. Hans O. Schmitt, "Foreign Capital and Social Conflict in Indonesia, 1950-1958," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (April 1962):289.

41. See van der Kroef, "Disunited," pp. 59-61; Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-63 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1964), pp. 266-268; Lev, Transition, pp. 33-35; Feith, Decline, pp. 583-585; and Olle Tornquist, Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia (London: Zed Books, 1984), pp. 99-100.

42. See J. Leyser, "Indonesia's Nationalization of Dutch Enterprises and International Law," The Australian Outlook 14 (August 1960):200-210, for later developments.

43. Justus M van der Kroef, "Disunited," p. 59.

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44. Yong Mun Cheong, "The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-59," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7 (March 1976):99.

45. Ibid.

46. D. N. Aidit, The Selected Works of D. N. Aidit, vol. 2 (Washington, D. C.: Joint Publications Research Service 8886), p. 293, quoted in Tornquist, p. 100.

47. See S. Takdir Alisjahbana, "The Grievances of the Regions"; and Sukarno, "There is Something Else behind This Problem of the Regions," in Feith and Castles, pp. 320-325, and pp. 325-327.

48. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983):484; emphasis in original.

49. See McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia no. 13 (April 1972):158-162, on the Army's economic power.

50. See Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in Communist Strategies in Asia, ed. Doak Barnett (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. 167-180, for a discussion of the Army's tactics under Guided Democracy.

51. Lev, Transition, p. 65.

52. Pauker, "Role," p. 141.

53. Yong, p. 98; see Reeve, p. 146, for a list of ten such Bodies.

54. See Lev, Transition, n. 35, p. 65.

55. Pauker, "Role," p. 141.

56. Ibid.

57. Yong, p. 99.

58. Reeve, p. 145.

59. Ibid., p. 146.

60. Lev, Transition, p. 66.

61. Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 294, quoted in Reeve, p. 120.

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62. Manifest Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat Menghadapi Pemberontak-Pemberontak Proklamasi 17 Augustus 1945 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 11, 14, cited in Yong, p. 100.

63. Yong, p. 98.

64. Sundhaussen, p. 132.

65. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 128.

66. Ibid., p. 129. See Sundhaussen, p. 133.

67. Pauker, "Role," p. 141.

68. See Lev, Transition, n. 32, pp. 185-186.

69. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 129. See Lev, Transition, n. 36, pp. 187-188.

70. See Lev, Transition, n. 102, pp. 169-170, for the non-Communist parties' reactions. To avert the predictable postponement, the PKI had gone so far as to deny that it would secure more than a quarter of the votes, a proportion equivalent to its 1957 electoral performance. See Lev, Transition, p. 167, for more on the Communists' self-denial.

71. Lev, Transition, p. 171.

72. Reeve, p. 126. See Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 132-137.

73. This quote is taken from a speech reported in Pos Indonesia (Djakarta), 13 November 1958, quoted in Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 133-134. Adding substance to Nasution's remarks was the acute awareness in Indonesia in late 1958 that military coups seemed in vogue in the Third World: there were coups in Iraq (July), Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand (all in October), and Sudan (November).

74. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 135. See Lev, Transition, pp. 247-250.

75. The ban was lifted on 1 August 1959.

76. Lev, Transition, pp. 272-273.

77. See J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesian Politics under Guided Democracy," The Australian Outlook 15 (December 1961):260-279; and Irene Tinker and Millidge Walker, "Indonesia's Panacea: 1959 Model," Far Eastern Survey 28 (December 1959):177-182.

78. See Sundhaussen, p. 145-146, for more details on the posts secured by the Army and Armed Forces. See also Ruth McVey, "Transformation," p. 151.

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79. See Sukarno, "Returning to the Rails of the Revolution"; and the Supreme Advisory Council, "The Political Manifesto as a General Program of the Revolution," in Feith and Castles, pp. 99-109, and pp. 109-111. The acronym USDEK neatly summarizes the five basic principles of the Political Manifesto: the 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945), Indonesian Socialism (Sosialisme Indonesia), Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin), Guided Economy (Ekonomi Terpimpin), and Indonesian identity (Kepribadian Indonesia). Taking the first letters of each of the five Indonesian phrases gives the acronym USDEK.

80. Sundhaussen, p. 146.

81. Reeve, p. 163. Reeve writes that in 1959 "the term golongan fungsionil was 'indonesianized' into golongan karya (i.e., golkar), the term karya having the senses of 'vocation,' 'creative work,' and 'service,'" p. 148.

82. Reeve, p. 165.

83. Ibid., pp. 165-166.

84. Ibid., p. 166. See McVey, "Indonesian Communism," n. 21, p. 192, for Aidit's later revelations of the cost of this measure to the party.

85. M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 255.

86. See Guy J. Pauker, "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia," Asian Survey 1 (May 1961):26-35, on how the Communists coped with the reality of supreme Army power.

87. See Lev, Transition, n. 56, p. 194.

88. See Tornquist, p. 121; and van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 162.

89. See Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," The American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962):922.

90. Ricklefs, p. 257; and Tornquist, p. 121. The seven journals were Bintang Merah, Kehidupan Partai, Ilmu Marxis, Mimbar Komunis, PKI dan Perwakilan, Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, and Review of Indonesia.

91. See Martin Ebon, "Indonesian Communism: From Failure to Success," Review of Politics 25 (January 1963):91-109; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Dilemmas of Indonesian Communism," Pacific Affairs 35 (Summer 1962):141-159.

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92. See for example, Bruce Glassburner and Kenneth D. Thomas, "The Swing of the Hoe: Retooling Begins in the Indonesian Economy," Asian Survey 1 (June 1961):3-12; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Future," Pacific Affairs 32 (March 1959):46-72; Don D. Humphrey, "Indonesia's National Plan for Economic Development," Asian Survey 2 (December 1962):12-21; K. Krishna Moorthy, "Indonesia's Eight-Year Plan," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 July 1961, pp. 62-65; and T. K. Tan, "Sukarnian Economics," in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 29-45.

93. Support for the conception was formally given at the PKI Central Committee Fifth Plenary meeting held in July 1957. See Legge, n. 51, p. 285; Feith, Decline, pp. 589-592; Lev, pp. 17-18, and 75-83; and Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno. Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 68-76.

94. Reeve, p. 120.

95. This call was heard at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the PKI Central Committee (31 March-3 April 1958) and the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the PKI Central Committee (19-21 November 1958). See Lev, Transition, n. 136, p. 229.

96. Quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia. Its History, Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: Univeristy of British Columbia, 1965), p. 111. See Reeve, p. 164.

97. See Lev, Transition, p. 252.

98. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 116.

99. Reeve, pp. 161-162.

100. See Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution. Southeast Asian Studies. Monograph Series no. 8 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 19-22, and pp. 40-41, for discussions of Sukarno's vision of revolution, and the concept of Nasakom, respectively.

101. See R.C. de Iongh, "West Irian Confrontation," in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 102-114; and Corsino, pp. 140-152, for a discussion of the PKI's use of nationalism throughout the 1959-1965 period. See also, Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia, pp. 57-82, for coverage of Sukarno's foreign policy initiatives, and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Nasution, Sukarno and the West New Guinea Dispute," Asian Survey 1 (August 1961):20-24, where the interactions of the Army and Sukarno are discussed.

102. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 263.

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103. Mortimer, p. 196.

104. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 165.

105. M. H. Lukman, Report on Changes in Communist Party Constitution (Djakarta: n.p., 1959), in JPRS 4411, 20 February 1961.

106. Ibid., p. 6.

107. Ibid., p. 15.

108. Ibid., p. 16. Lukman went on to give the formula for the Indonesian Revolution: "Marxism-Leninism certainly does not indicate precisely the same route toward Socialism for all countries during all epochs and under various international conditions.... [With regard to the form, methods, and means] one and all of these depend upon the comparison between the forces of the established class, on the organizational level of the working class and its enemy, upon the cleverness of the working class in attracting allies to its side, participation of the peasants, and taking into account the democratic foundations, the customs and traditions, one and all, of the country." Ibid.

109. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communist Policy and the Sixth Party Congress," Pacific Affairs 33 (September 1960):227-249.

110. "Strengthen National Unity and Avoid Provocations," Review of Indonesia (September-October 1960):4; emphasis in original, quoted in Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 161.

111. See Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 190.

112. "Njono['s] Reaffirmation of the Politbureau Statement Regarding Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 1959," Harian Rakyat, 4 January 1960, in JPRS 8285, 17 May 1961), p. 2.

113. D. N. Aidit, Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Sixth Congress of the PKI, [1959], quoted in Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government and Press During Guided Democracy. Hull Monographs On Southeast Asia, no. 4 (Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, The University of Hull, 1971), p. 219.

114. Reported by D. N. Aidit in Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity! (Djakarta: n.p., 1961), p. 26, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 126.

115. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 191.

116. Ibid., p. 175.

117. Ibid., p. 242.

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118. "Guarding Against Ideological Timidity," Kehidupan Partai (September 19[illegible]51, in JPRS 2782, 15 June 1960, p. 51.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid., pp. 52-54. See also, D. N. Aidit, "Ideological Work in the Communist Party of Indonesia," World Marxist Review 2 (July 1959):24-27; D. N. Aidit, "For National Unity," World Marxist Review 3 (February 1960):23-26; and B. O. Hutapea, "Raise High the Banners of Party Development in the Field of Ideology," Bintang Merah (May-June 1960), in JPRS 4442, 10 March 1961, pp. 21-29.

122. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 264.

123. Reeve, p. 168.

124. See "Indonesian Youth Front Formed," Suluh Indonesia (Djakarta), 16 August 1960, in JPRS 5717, 20 November 1960, p. 63.

125. Basis, no. 11 (August 1960), quoted in Reeve, p. 170.

126. "Guided Press, National Front, Political Parties, and OPPI," Mimbar Indonesia (Djakarta), 23 July 1960, in JPRS 5475, 1 October 1960, p. 20.

127. Ibid.

128. "Proposal for Replacing OPPI with Labor Council," Suara Ibukota (Djakarta), 1960, in JPRS 5718, 2 November 1960, p. 4.

129. See "Non-Communist Labor Organizations Support Single Labor Federation in Indonesia," Pedoman (Djakarta), 5 August 1960, in JPRS 5662, 7 October 1960, pp. 1-2.

130. See "Membership of Leftist Indonesian Labor Federation SOBSI Declines," Pedoman (Djakarta), 9 August 1960, in JPRS 5662, 7 October 1960, p. 3.

131. See the "Implementation of Guided Democracy," Harian Rakyat, 12 August 1960, in JPRS 5719, 12 December 1960, pp. 7-9, on SOBSI statements; and van der Kroef, Communist Party, pp. 209-211.

132. Harian Rakyat, 28 April 1962, cited in Reeve, p. 170.

133. See van der Kroef, Communist Party, pp. 243-244, and 247.

134. Ibid., p. 112.

135. Reeve, p. 171.

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136. Ibid., p. 147.

137. See Yong, p. 100; and Reeve, p. 147.

138. See Lev, Transition, pp. 157-158.

139. Sukarno, Indonesia's Political Manifesto, 1959-1964 (Djakarta; n.p., n.d.), p. 64, cited in Yong, p. 101.

140. Sundhaussen, p. 145.

141. Ibid.

142. Lev, Transition, p. 285.

143. Roeslan Abdulgani, Nationalism Revolution and Guided Democracy in Indonesia (Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973), quoted in Reeve, p. 172.

144. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 145.

145. Ibid., p. 157.

146. A. H. Nasution, Tugas T.N.I. sebagai Golongan Karya dalam Rangka Pelaksanaan Manipol-USDEK (Djakarta: n.p., 1961), p. 7, quoted in Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 149.

147. See Reeve, pp. 181-182.

148. Ibid., p. 161.

149. See Herbert Feith, "Politics of Economic Decline," in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 46-57; J. A. C. Mackie, "The Political Economy of Guided Democracy," The Australian Outlook 13 (December 1959):285-292; J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesia's Government Estates and Their Masters," Pacific Affairs 34 (Winter 1961-1962):337-360; and Mohammad Sadli, "Indonesia's New Economics," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 October 1961, pp. 154-161, on the approach that Sukarno took toward economics and the economic development of Indonesia.

150. See Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders," World Politics 16 (October 1963):79-97; Justus M. van der Kroef, "An Indonesian Ideological Lexicon," Asian Survey 2 (July 1962):24-30; Weatherbee, pp. 19-22, and 33-45; and Jose Arsenio Torres, "The Political Ideology of Guided Democracy," 25 (January 1963):34-63.

151. Quoted in van der Kroef, "Lexicon," p. 28.

152. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 115.

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153. See M. H. Lukman, "Use of the People's Regional Legislative Councils for Defending Democracy and the People's Interests," Harian Rakyat, 5 April 1958, in JPRS DC-403, 28 November 1958, pp. 1-13, for a discussion of the development of Communist territory.

154. See "The Victory of the Indonesian Communist Party," Sketsmasa (Djakarta), 15 February 1960, in JPRS 5295, 11 August 1960, pp. 1-10.

155. M. H. Lukman, Report, p. 1.

156. PKI, Bahan-Bahan untuk Kongres Nasional ke-VI Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1958), p. 53, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 85.

157. Hindley, "Domestication," p. 917.

158. SOBSI, General Report of the SOBSI National Council to the Third SOBSI National Congress (Djakarta: n.p., 1960), in JPRS 7456, 10 February 1961, p. 53.

159. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 139.

160. "Laporan Umum Sidang DPP Pleno II BTI," Suara Tani, Supplement (May-June 1959):29-30, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 166. A discussion of the activities of the BTI is given in Hartojo, "In Regards to the Mobilization and Organization of the Peasants," Suara Tani (November 1959), in JPRS 5299, 11 August 1960, pp. 1-5.

161. Suara Tani (August-October 1962):25, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 169.

162. Pemuda Rakyat, "Laporan Umum pada Sidang Dewan Nasioanl ke-III," (Djakarta: n.p., 1958), p. 13, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 191.

163. Pemuda Rakyat, Setia Mengadbi Kepentingan-Kepentingan Vital dan Tjita-Tjita Revolusi Augustus 1945 (Djakarta: n.p., 1962), p. 50, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 191.

164. Ibid.

165. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 207; see also S. K. Trimurty, "History of Gerwani's Development," Harian Rakyat, 7 June 1960, in JPRS 5298, 12 August 1960, pp. 11-17.

166. Harian Rakyat, 14 December 1961; 11 January 1963, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 208.

167. Hindley, "Domestication," p. 917.

168. Reeve, p. 162.

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1. Nasution's formulation has also been called the "Broad Front" (Front Lebar). See C. L. M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen. Abdul Haris Nasution. A Political Biography (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), p. 133.

2. Pos Indonesia (Djakarta), 13 November 1958, quoted in Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 133.

3. See Baladas Ghoshal, The Role of the Military in Indonesia (Madras: The University of Madras, 1980), pp. 28-29; and Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-59. Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 191-192, for discussions on the Middle Way concept.

4. Guy J. Pauker, ed., The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. Memo Rm-3312-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1963), p. 62.

5. Ibid., p. 55.

6. Ibid., p. 307.

7. Ibid., p. 144.

8. Ibid., p. 59.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 147.

11. Ibid., pp. 147, and 311.

12. Ibid., p. 270.

13. Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," part II, Indonesia no. 13 (April 1972):162-171, covers a discussion of education as a source of central control.

14. Guy J. Pauker, "The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management: Its Origin and Functions," in The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, Memo Rm-3312-PR, ed. Guy J. Pauker (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1963), p. 30.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 31.

17. Ibid., p. 28.

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18. David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 187.

19. Written communication from Nasution, December 1981, cited in Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 144.

20. "Supplement Concerning Civic Missions," in Indonesia 1963: Looking Back over the Year, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1963), p. 45.

21. Pauker, "Doctrine," p. 39.

22. See Pauker, "Doctrine," pp. 7-11, and pp. 34-37, for a discussion of the influence on the TNI of the Yugoslavian, Chinese, and Vietnamese experiences.

23. Ibid., p. 38.

24. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, (Woodbridge, Conn.: Research Publications, 1982), 001191, quoted in Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," Pacific Affairs 58 (Summer 1985):245.

25. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, (Woodbridge, Conn.: Research Publications, 1982), 002386; and Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, (Woodbridge, Conn.: Research Publications, 1981), 367A, quoted in Scott, p. 246.

26. Scott, p. 248.

27. Ibid.

28. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, (Woodbridge, Conn: Research Publications, 1982), 001786 (DOS Memo for President of July 17, 1964; emphasis in original), quoted in Scott, n. 46, p. 248.

29. Pauker, "Doctrine," pp. 43-44. The Body for the Coordination of the Development of First Level Regions (Badan Koordinasi Pembagunan Daerah—BKPD) replaced the Tjatur Tunggal in accordance with Presidential Decree no. 655/1961; they were installed in each province in January 1963. Reeve has commented that the BKPDs "continued to be referred to as Catur Tunggal and to be backed by the martial law administration." Reeve, p. 190.

30. Pauker, p. 42; and Reeve, p. 190.

31. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 175.

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32. Pikiran Rakyat (Bandung), 13 August 1962, quoted in Sundhaussen, p. 175.

33. Sundhaussen, p. 175. "This expression is virtually untranslatable. Bintara = NCO; Pembina = Builder, Constructor." Sundhaussen, n. 44, p. 221.

34. Reeve has added that the establishment of HANSIP, and in its organizational drives to secure volunteers throught the National Front were "ventures [that] remained largely Army-run schemes in which the PKI and its ormas members were excluded wherever possible." Reeve, p. 191.

35. Reeve, p. 220.

36. Ibid., p. 186.

37. McVey, "Transformation," part II, p. 171.

38. See Sukarno's "Economic Declaration," Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia 1963, pp. 69-90; and "The Economic Declaration," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 April 1963, pp. 211-215.

39. United States Economic Survey Team to Indonesia. Indonesia: Perspectives and Proposals for United States Economic Aid (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asian Studies, 1963).

40. See Penders and Sundhaussen, Appendix 5, pp. 254-256.

41. Quoted in Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: Internal Development or External Expansion?" Asian Survey 3 (February 1963):71.

42. Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Its History, Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), p. 277.

43. D. N. Aidit, Dare, Dare, and Dare Again! Political Report Presented on February 10, 1963, to the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, [1963]), p. 8; and Dipa Nusantara Aidit, "Indonesian Communists March Forward for Full National Independence," World Marxist Review 6 (June 1963):12. Aidit singled out for ridicule the Army's concept of Civic Missions. On 16 July 1963 in a speech to the Navy's Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staff dan Komando Angkatan Laut — SESKOAL) — a rival to SESKOAD — Aidit called the idea of Civic Missions "wrong and anti-people." Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily Report, Far East, 24 July 1963, p. rrrl, quoted in Pauker, "Doctrine," p. 46.

44. See Aidit, "Indonesian Communists March," pp. 13-14; and MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

(Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), pp. 142-144.

45. Aidit, Dare, p. 36; emphasis in original.

46. Ibid., p. 34; emphasis in original.

47. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 164.

48. Ibid., p. 165.

49. See "Indonesia's May 27 Reforms," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1963, pp. 600-603.

50. Sundhaussen, p. 168.

51. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 165.

52. See Peter Christian Hauswedell, "Sukarno: Radical or Conservative? Indonesian Politics 1964-65," Indonesia no. 15 (April 1973): 118-121; van der Kroef, Communist Party, pp. 270-271; Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno. Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 263-267; and Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government and Press During Guided Democracy. Hull Monographs On Southeast Asia, no. 4 (Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, The University of Hull, 1971), pp. 105-107, for discussions of the short-lived stabilization plan.

53. Text in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Far East, 21 December 1962, p. rrr 9, quoted in Pauker, "Doctrine," p. 43.

54. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 165.

55. Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution. Southeast Asian Studies. Monograph Series no. 8 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 57.

56. Herbert Feith, "President Soekarno, The Army And The Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey 4 (August 1964):971.

57. Reeve, p. 195.

58. Ibid., p. 215.

59. Ewa T. Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?" Asian Survey 4 (September 1964):1059.

60. Sukarno, "The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution," in Indonesia 1963: Looking Back over the Year, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1963), pp. 31-32.

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61. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

62. Ibid., pp. 45-47.

63. M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 261. The author points out that the Indonesian term "ganjang Malaysia" has often been mistranslated as "crush Malaysia."

64. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia, p. 57.

65. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983):484-485.

66. Lev, Transition, p. 286.

67. Ibid., p. 286, and p. 171.

68. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 6, and 7 September 1963, quoted in Reeve, p. 210.

69. See Mortimer, pp. 132-140; and D. N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 40-43, 80-38, and 124-127.

70. Reeve, p. 209.

71. Mortimer, p. 136.

72. Aidit, Indonesian Revolution, p. 65.

73. See Corsino, pp. 146-149; J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesia: A Background to 'Confrontation,'" The World Today 20 (April 1964):139-147; Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities," Asian Survey 4 (February 1964):687-694; and Donald Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontation in Southeast Asia," Orbis 7 (Summer 1963):336-351, for discussions of the conflict.

74. D. N. Aidit, Set Afire the Bánteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat! Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Enlarged with the Members of the Central Auditing Commission and the Central Control Commission (Djakarta, 23rd-26th December 1963) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 15.

75. Quoted in Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1964: Toward a 'People's Democracy'?" Asian Survey 5 (February 1965):90.

76. Mortimer, p. 371.

77. Feith, "Triangle," p. 977. For a discussion of the relations between Sukarno and the Chinese, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership," Orbis 8 (Summer 1964):332-356; and Corsino, pp. 154-160, for a discussion of the PKI's ideological shift. See Guy J. Pauker, "GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta," Asian Survey 5 (April 1965):171-185, for an interesting analysis of the dynamics of the rivalry between Beijing and Moscow to influence Indonesia. The Chinese, for their part, gave all-encompassing support to Indonesia; see Pien Hsieh, "Sino-Indonesian Friendship Grows Apace," Peking Review no. 17 (26 April 1963), pp. 9-10; "China Supports Indonesia's Efforts to Smash Imperialist Subversion," Peking Review no. 23 (7 June 1963), pp. 14-15; "'Malaysia' — Offspring of Neo-Colonialism," Peking Review no. 40 (4 October 1963), pp. 23-25; "China Supports the North Kalimantan People," Peking Review no. 14 (3 April 1964), pp. 28-29; and "Resolutely Support the Indonesian People's Just Struggle Against 'Malaysia,'" Peking Review no. 37 (11 September 1964), p. 8.

78. Mortimer, p. 227.

79. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power," Pacific Affairs 37 (Winter 1964-1965):359; see also van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 268, and p. 273; and Corsino, p. 152.

80. Mortimer, p. 204.

81. Ibid.

82. D. N. Aidit, "Gerakan Komunis International dan Revolusi Asia Tenggara," in Langit Takkan Runtuh (Djakarta: n.p., 1963), pp. 38-40, quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia: The Mystique of Permanent Revolution," The South Atlantic Quarterly 64 (Winter 1965):10.

83. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Exporting Indonesia's Revolution," Eastern World 18 (July 1964):13.

84. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Indonesia, vol. IV (Djakarta: n.p., 1964), p. 47, quoted in Oey, p. 234.

85. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 294. See van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 379; and van der Kroef, "Exporting," p. 17.

86. Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), 8 January 1964, quoted in van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 373. See van der Kroef, "Exporting," p. 14.

87. Van der Kroef, "Exporting," p. 14.

88. Harian Rakyat, 17 January 1964, quoted in van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 371.

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89. Ewa T. Pauker, p. 1064; see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'," Asian Survey 5 (May 1965):217-232; and Feith, "Triangle," pp. 975-976.

90. Mortimer, p. 240.

91. Van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 372.

92. Mortimer, p. 203.

93. Quoted in van der Kroef, "Exporting," p. 13.

94. Sundhaussen, p. 181.

95. See Feith, "Triangle," p. 974. In January 1964, Djawoto of the Antara news agency was appointed ambassador to China, while in March 1964, Ali Chanafiah of the PKI was appointed as ambassador to Ceylon.

96. Mortimer, p. 205.

97. Ibid., p. 227.

98. Van der Kroef, "Mystique," p. 11.

99. Antara Daily News Bulletin, 8 July 1964, quoted in van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 383.

100. Van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 383.

101. Oey, p. 95.

102. Aidit, Banteng, p. 25.

103. Olle Tornquist, Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 156.

104. Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), 10 July 1964, quoted in van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," p. 221.

105. Aidit, Banteng, p. 135.

106. Tornquist, p. 195.

107. See Aidit, Dare, pp. 86-90; Aidit, Indonesian Revolution, pp. 30-34; Aidit, Banteng, pp. 130-144; and Aidit, "Indonesian Communists March," p. 19.

108. Aidit, Banteng, pp. 130-131.

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109. M. H. Lukman, Untuk Perbaikan Perkerjaan dalam Front Persatuan Nasional (Djakarta: n.p., 1964), quoted in Mortimer, p. 315.

110. Ibid.

111. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Agrarian Reform and the Indonesian Communist Party," Far Eastern Survey 29 (January 1960):5-13; and Donald Hindley, "The PKI and the Peasants," Problems of Communism 11 (November-December 1962):28-36.

112. Donald Hindley, "The PKI and the Peasants," Problems of Communism 11 (November-December 1962):36.

113. Margo Lyon, Bases of Conflict in Rural Java, Research Monograph 3 (Berkeley: University of California, 1970), pp. 48-49, quoted in Corsino, p. 112. See also. W. F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs 39 (Spring-Summer 1966):120, for a similar argument.

114. Aidit, Banteng, pp. 122-123.

115. Tornquist, p. 199.

116. Ibid.

117. See Jacob Walkin, "The Muslim-Communist Confrontation in East Java," Orbis 13 (Fall 1969):822-847.

118. Tornquist, p. 198.

119. Ibid., pp. 196-197.

120. Mortimer, p. 320.

121. Tornquist, p. 197.

122. See Reeve, p. 248; and Mortimer, pp. 320-321, for the substance of the President's remarks.

123. Mortimer, p. 321.

124. Ibid.; and Tornquist, p. 199.

125. Tornquist, p. 199; and Mortimer, p. 322.

126. Reeve, p. 192.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid., p. 219.

131. Ibid., p. 220.

132. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 28 December 1962, and 12 January 1963; and Drs Suhardiman, Rawe-Rawe Rantas Malang-Malang Putung (Djakarta: Biro Penerangan SOKSI, 1963?), pp. 14-15, quoted in Reeve, p. 222.

133. Reeve, p. 225. See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 64-66; and Hauswedell, pp. 128-132, on the polemics.

134. See Deepa Nusatara Aidit, "Party Building and Mass Work," World Marxist Review 5 (September 1962):33; H. Yunus, "Indonesia: Battle on the Cultural Front," World Marxist Review 6 (January 1963):65-67; Aidit, Indonesian Revolution, pp. 24-25; and Njoto, Strive for the Victory of the Indonesian Revolution with the Weapon of Dialectical and Historical Materialism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 1.

135. Reeve, p. 232.

136. Indonesian Herald (Djakarta), 11 May 1964; and Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 5 June 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 232.

137. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Cultural Offensive," The Australian Outlook 18 (April 1964):40-61.

138. See van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," pp. 222-224.

139. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 31 August 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 235.

140. Reeve, p. 237.

141. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 22 October 1964; and Karyawan (Djakarta), 28-30 October 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 237.

142. Karyawan (Djakarta), 24 October 1964; and Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 21, and 26 October 1964, and 12 November 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 238.

143. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 4, 9, 11, and 16 December 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 239.

144. Karyawan (Djakarta), 24 November-7 December; and Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 24 November-2 December 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 238.

145. Reeve, p. 241.

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146. Sundhaussen, pp. 186-188.

147. Mortimer, p. 243.

148. The Dwikora was the People's Double Command (Dwi Komando Rakyat); it called for the intensification of the Indonesian Revolution and the "Crush Malaysia" campaign.

149. Sundhaussen, p. 186.

150. Feith, "Triangle," p. 973.

151. Reeve, pp. 242-243.

152. Ibid., p. 243.

153. Ibid.

154. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 12 September 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 248.

155. Ewa T. Pauker, p. 1058.

156. Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), p. 302.

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1. "Text of Dr. Subandrio's Letter to Secretary-General U Thant Formally Withdrawing Indonesia from the U.N.," News, Views & Features from Indonesia, Special Release no. 194, 29 January 1965.

2. For their part, the Chinese emphatically greeted Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. See "Indonesian People Will Not Tolerate Insults," Peking Review, no. 2 (8 January 1965), pp. 24-25; "Indonesia Quits U.N. — A Just, Correct, and Revolutionary Action," Peking Review, no. 3 (15 January 1965), pp. 5-6; "Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action," Peking Review, no. 3 (15 January 1965), pp. 7-9; "Indonesia Pulls out of the United Nations," Peking Review, no. 3 (15 January 1965), pp. 10-12; and "China Backs Indonesia," Peking Review, no. 5 (29 January 1965), p. 7.

3. On Sukarno's new policy, see Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution. Southeast Asian Studies. Monograph Series no. 8 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 43-44; Lance Castles, "Socialism and Private Business: The Latest Phase," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, no. 1 (June 1965):13; "Survey of Recent Developments," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, no. 1 (June 1965):1-2; and on the PKI reaction, see Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno. Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 169-171; Peter Christian Hauswedell, "Sukarno: Radical or Conservative? Indonesian Politics 1964-65." Indonesia no. 15 (April 1973):127-128. Throughout 1965 Sukarno vacillated on whether or not Indonesia had actually entered the second phase of the revolution.

4. Hauswedell, p. 141.

5. See Sukarno, "Storming the Last Bulwarks of Imperialism," in Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965, eds., Herbert Feith, and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 466-470.

6. Uri Ra'anan, "Indonesia 1965," in The Politics of the Coup D'Etat, eds. William G. Andrews, and Uri Ra'anan (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969), p. 54; Uri Ra'anan, "The Coup That Failed: A Background Analysis," Problems of Communism 15 (March-April 1966):41.

7. Quoted in Ra'anan, "Coup," p. 41.

8. See D. N. Aidit, Dare, Dare, and Dare Again! Political Report Presented on February 10, 1963, to the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, [1963]),pp. 74-85; Dipa Nusantara Aidit, "Indonesian Communists March Forward for Full National Independence," World Marxist Review 6 (June 1963):18-19; and D. N. Aidit, Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat! Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of

Indonesia, Enlarged with the Members of the Central Auditing Commission and the Central Control Commission (Djakarta, 23rd-26th December 1963) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, [1964]), p. 20.

9. D. N. Aidit, Banteng, p. 20.

10. President Sukarno's speech, 17 August 1965, p. 16, quoted in Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 67. See Sukarno, "The Revolution Goes On," in Feith and Castles, pp. 119-122.

11. See Joyce Gibson, "Production-Sharing," 2 pts. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies no. 3 (February 1966):52-75, and no. 4 (June 1966):75-100 for evidence of continued Western and Soviet Bloc contacts with Indonesia during this time.

12. Mortimer, p. 364.

13. Ibid., p. 365.

14. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 5 January 1965, quoted in David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 240.

15. Reeve, p. 240.

16. Ibid.

17. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 182. According to van der Kroef, the BPS media network included "more than 70% of the national press" in Indonesia. Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'," Asian Survey 5 (May 1965):227.

18. Reeve, p. 251.

19. See Crouch, p. 66, and n. 42; and Mortimer, p. 377.

20. See S. M. Ali, "Party Alignments and the Role of the Communist Party," Eastern World 19 (March 1965):7-8, for an interview of Aidit, wherein he assesses his party's power chances.

21. Aidit first used this term on 19 January 1965; see Antonie C. A. Dake, In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking 1959-1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 359.

22. See Hauswedell, n. 117, p. 139.

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23. See Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965. The Year of the Coup," Asian Survey 6 (February 1966):104; Stephen Sloan, A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1971), pp. 29-30; M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 267; and Sundhaussen, p. 182; and J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, 1963-1965," Indonesia no. 10 (October 1970):143-181.

24. Mortimer, p. 379.

25. Dake, pp. 401-403.

26. Van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," p. 218.

27. Lev, "Indonesia 1965," p. 104; and Dr. O. G. Roeder, "The Turn of the US," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March 1965, pp. 544-545.

28. Mortimer, p. 244.

29. MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), p. 142.

30. Hauswedell, p. 126, and n. 61.

31. Ibid., p. 134.

32. Ibid., n. 97, p. 134.

33. Crouch, p. 78.

34. Hauswedell, n. 113, p. 138.

35. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

36. Ibid., p. 135. The slogan was "Finish the National Democratic Revolution towards Indonesian Socialism with the National Front, which has Nasakom as its Axis, the Workers and Peasants as its Pillars, and Pantjasila as its Philosophical Basis!" ("Dengan Front Nasional Berporoskan Nasakom, Bersokoguru Buruh dan Tani, Berlandasan idiil Pantjasila, menjelesaikan Revolusi Nasional Demokratis menudju Sosialisme Indonesia.")

37. Ibid.

38. Sukarno, "Indonesian Communist Party is a Thoroughly Progressive, Revolutionary Party," Peking Review, no. 23 (4 June 1965), p. 14.

39. Mortimer, p. 376.

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40. D. N. Aidit, "Intensify Revolutionary Offensive and First Oppose 'Five Devils'," Peking Review, no. 23 (4 June 1965), p. 9.

41. See Mortimer, pp. 135, and 380, on the party's theoretical assessment of the balance of forces.

42. Aidit's public acknowledgement of Chinese support on 30 January— "I am grateful to those states of the socialist world that have extended support to my proposal of arming the farmers and workers" — was censured in the Indonesian press but was faithfully reported by Chinese news services. New China News Agency, 12 February 1965; and Radio Peking Home Service, 12 February 1965, quoted in Dake, p. 360. Support for the PKI was also given in Peking Review; see "New Page in Sino-Indonesian Comradeship-in-Arms," Peking Reiview, no. 6 (5 February 1965), pp. 8-9; and "Ready to Bear Arms," Peking Review, no. 9 (26 February 1965), pp. 26-27.

43. Van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," p. 222.

44. See Amry Vandenbosch, "The Indonesian Political Scene," Far Eastern Survey 22 (October 1953):148; Robert C. Bone, Jr., "The Future of Indonesian Political Parties," Far Eastern Survey 23 (February 1954):20; Mochtar Lubis, "The Indonesian Communist Movement Today," Far Eastern Survey 23 (November 1954), n. 3, p. 164; and Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), n. 93, p. 344.

45. Sundhaussen, pp. 189-190.

46. C. L. M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution. A Political Biography (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), pp. 173-174.

47. Crouch, p. 82.

48. Antara news bulletins, 14 and 17 January 1965; and Harian Rakyat, 19 January 1965, quoted in Sundhaussen, p. 190. See also Guy J. Pauker, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia. RM 5753 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1969), pp. 38-39; Crouch, p. 87; and Mortimer, p. 381.

49. Harian Rakyat, 12 February 1965, quoted in Mortimer, pp. 381-382; Sundhaussen, p. 190; and van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," p. 230.

50. Crouch, pp. 84-85.

51. Hauswedell, n. 112, p. 138.

52. Hauswedell, n. 109, p. 137. Crouch, pp. 85-86, discusses the split within the Police.

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53. Corsino, p. 103.

54. Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-59. Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), n. 16, p. 82; and Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia no. 11 (April 1971), n. 10, p. 138.

55. Crouch, p. 81. See Achmad Yani, "The Doctrine of Revolutionary War," in Feith and Castles, pp. 464-466.

56. Sundhaussen, p. 192. See also Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 174-175.

57. Reeve, p. 250.

58. Ricklefs, p. 267; Dake, pp. 364-365; and Crouch, pp. 88-91.

59. Mortimer has argued that the PKI exposed publicly the military threat of action against it as a protective measure. See pp. 380. Harian Rakyat aired the story in its 7 May 1965 issue. See also, Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 177.

60. See Aidit's remarks in Dake, p. 360.

61. Crouch, pp. 91-92; Mortimer, p. 382; and Dake, pp. 378-379.

62. Crouch, p. 92; and Ricklefs, p. 267.

63. Mortimer, p. 382.

64. Ibid., p. 383.

65. Ricklefs, p. 267.

66. Pikiran Rakyat (Bandung), 26 June 1965, quoted in Sundhaussen, p. 193. Further discussion of the Army's position is given in Crouch, pp. 90-91, and Oey, p. 229.

67. "Excerpts: Address by President Sukarno on August 17, 1965," News, Views & Features from Indonesia, Special Release no. 205, 24 August 1965. See also, "Survey of Recent Economic Developments," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies no. 2 (September 1965):1; and "A Year of Self-Reliance," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies no. 2 (September 1965):64-67.

68. Sukarno, Reach to the Stars. A Year of Self-Reliance (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1965), pp. 21, 41, and 43, quoted in Sundhaussen, pp. 193-194; emphasis in original.

69. Ricklefs, p. 267.

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70. Mortimer, p. 367. Ewa T. Pauker argues the case for Army difficulties of waging armed struggle against the PKI in these terms. See Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?" Asian Survey 4 (September 1964):1065.

71. Aidit, "Intensify Revolutionary Offensive," p. 10.

72. Harian Rakyat, 17 August 1965, quoted in Dake, p. 394.

73. Harian Rakyat, 31 August 1965, quoted in Mortimer, p. 386.

74. See note 59 above. Harian Rakyat's issue of 4 September 1965 contained a story of an impending military coup.

75. J. A. C. Mackie, "Inflation and Confrontation in Indonesia," The Australian Outlook 18 (December 1964):278-298.

76. Indonesian Herald (Djakarta), 15 September 1965, quoted in John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of KONFRONTASI: 'Crush Malaysia' and the GESTAPU," Asian Survey 6 (October 1966):538.

77. Antara, 25 September 1965, quoted in Sutter, p. 538.

78. Harian Rakyat, 27 September 1965; New China News Agency, 27 September 1965, quoted in Dake, p. 402.

79. Mortimer, pp. 384-385.

80. See Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971); Crouch, pp. 97-134; Dake, pp. 354-423; Coen Holtzappel, "The 30 September Movement: A Political Movement of the Armed Forces or an Intelligence Operation?" Journal of Contemporary Asia 9 (1979):216-240; Michael Leifer, "The Process of Political Change in Indonesia," Asian Affairs 54 (October 1967):264-272; Mortimer, pp. 387-412, "Appendix A: October 1 Affair," pp. 413-417, "Appendix B: Interpreting the Coup," pp. 418-441; Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 178-198; Sloan, pp. 50-73; Sundhaussen, pp. 195-219; Sutter, pp. 534-546; Donald E. Weatherbee, "Interpretations of Gestapu the 1965 Indonesian Coup," World Affairs 132 (March 1970):308-316; W. F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup." Pacific Affairs 39 (Spring-Summer 1966):115-127; and W. F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot? - New Light on the 1965 Events," Journal of Contemporary Asia 9 (1979):197-215.

81. Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," in Tang Tsou, ed., China in Crisis, vol. 2: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 377, quoted in Hauswedell, p. 136.

82. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 173.

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83. One example of the ignorance of the facts can be found in Rudolph P. Hafter, "Twilight in Indonesia," Swiss Review of World Affairs 14 (January 1965):16-20.

84. Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," Pacific Affairs 58 (1985):253.

85. Ibid.

86. See ibid., p. 255.

87. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 377, quoted in Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Company, 1982), p. 303.

88. The Americans also attempted to find a source of support against the PKI within the Police; see Robert H. Bruce, "Foreign Training, Reference-Group Theory, and Paramilitary Behavior During Coups: The U.S. Attempt to Influence the Indonesian Mobile Brigade," Political Science Review 22 (December 1983):365-371.

89. See Scott, pp. 252-257; and "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed," Journal of Contemporary Asia 9 (1979):248-251.

90. Sundhaussen, p. 211.

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