REGULATION OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT: A TEST OF NORDLINGER'S THEORY USING THE CASES OF AUSTRIA, LEBANON AND MALAYSIA

A Thesis Submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts

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July 12, 1977

ABSTRACT

The thesis is a test of Eric Nordlinger's Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Nordlinger's theory of how communal conflicts are regulated puts emphasis on the ability of elites to overcome hostility at the nonelite level in order to voluntarily regulate communal conflict among themselves. If there is structured elite predominance and political security of elites with respect to second-rank leaders, elites are able to act on conflict regulating motives in order to regulate conflict through six conflict regulating practices. An alternative model, which puts emphasis on the issues and on nonelite characteristics, is presented.

The theory is tested using case studies of Austria, Lebanon, and Malaysia, three of the six cases Nordlinger uses to illustrate the theory. These case studies suggest that conflict regulation occurs in a manner more often closer to the alternative model than to Nordlinger's model.

RÉSUMÉ

Le but de la présente thèse est de vérifier la théorie proposée par Eric Nordlinger dans son ouvrage Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies ("Règlement des conflits dans les sociétés divisées"). Cette théorie sur la manière dont sont réglés les conflits communautaires fait ressortir la capacité des élites à surmonter l'hostilité au niveau non-élite dans le but de régler en connaissance de cause les conflits communautaires. Lorsque prédominent des élites structurées et que, par rapport aux leaders de deuxième rang, elles jouissent également de stabilité politique, ces élites peuvent agir sur les motivations réglant les conflits; c'est ainsi qu'elles peuvent les régler au moyen de six différents modes de règlement. Un modèle alternatif est proposé, lequel souligne surtout les différends ainsi que les caractéristiques des non-élites

Il est procédé à la vérification de la théorie de Nordlinger par son application aux trois (Autriche, Liban et Malaisie) des six cas qu'il a utilisés pour illustrer sa théorie. D'après l'étude de ces cas, il semblerait que le règlement des conflits se produirait d'une façon plus conforme au modèle alternatif qu'au modèle de Nordlinger.

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INTRODUCTION

Recently, communal conflicts, rather than class conflicts, have been the most bitter, enduring conflicts. As these conflicts have begun to appear at a time when social scientists thought communal conflicts had disappeared, theories to explain the regulation of communal conflicts have only recently begun to be developed. Nordlinger has presented the only full-scale, comprehensive theory which sets out to explain how intense communal conflicts are regulated within open, democratic regimes.[1] While the theory appears to be plausible, it needs to be tested.

First a straightforward statement of the theory will be given. Then some peculiar features of the theory, which are not apparent in the summary of the theory, but which make the theory distinctive, will be considered. The theory has an interesting thrust which, although glossed over in the summary, will be brought out in a discussion of the underlying theory. Case studies of Austria, Lebanon, and Malaysia will be used to point out some severe defects in the theory.

Formal Statement of the Theory

Nordlinger has presented a theory to account, not for the causes which bring about and intensify communal conflict in divided societies, but for regulation once a conflict has become severe. Conflict in divided societies is seen as a

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[1] The other major writers in the area of communal conflict are: Barry, Daalder, Esman, Lehmbruch, Lijphart, Lorwin, McRae, Mayer, Pinard, Rose, Steiner, and van den Berghe.

political problem; concentration is centered on a critical role for political elites. Instead of the usual theories of homogeneity, consensus, moderate partisanship, crosscutting divisions, or social trust used to account for relative communal harmony, Nordlinger accords elites the ability to rise above an existing conflict in order to contain the conflict while maintaining an open regime.

The scope of Nordlinger's theory includes open societies in which there are existing intense conflicts.[2] Regimes are open when power is relatively diffused between the elites and the nonelites. Communal divisions refer to ascriptive criteria including racial, tribal, religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences.

The absence of widespread violence and governmental repression constitutes a successful regulatory outcome. Regulation has failed when widespread violence occurs in the form of a civil war with a death toll running into many thousands; when an open regime becomes closed as the dominant conflict group uses the agencies of social control to repress, imprison, or slaughter members of the opposing segment; when one conflict group uses its control of the government, army, or police, at least to partially eliminate the opposing conflict group mem-

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[2]The six cases Nordlinger uses to illustrate the theory are: in Belgium, the church-state conflict of 1830 to 1958, the class conflict of 1880-1920, and the linguistic-territorial conflict between Flemings and Walloons from the 1950's to the present; the Netherlands' 1890-1917 church-state conflict; the Second Austrian Republic from 1945 to 1965; the nineteenth century Swiss conflict between Protestant and Catholic cantons; the conflict in Lebanon between Christians and Moslems since its independence in 1943; and in Malaysia, the Malay-Chinese conflict in existence since Malayan independence in 1957.

bers or leaders, outlaw its conflict organization, jail its leaders, or place other debilitating restrictions upon its nonviolent pursuit of the conflict; when 300 to 400 people have lost their lives in any single "instability event," or when more than 1,000 people have died over a consecutive five-year period as the result perhaps of a series of riots, sporadic outbreaks of terroristic violence, guerrilla clashes, a small-scale civil war, or any combination of these.

Nordlinger lists six conflict regulating practices.

Stable Government Coalition Such coalitions are formed prior to elections with the avowed aim of conflict regulation.

Principle of Proportionality The basic characteristic is that all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength.

Mutual Veto Government decisions cannot be taken unless they are acceptable to all major conflict organizations.

Purposive Depoliticization Conflict group leaders agree not to involve the government in public policy areas which impinge upon the segment's values and interests.

Compromise Compromise is the mutual adjustment of conflicting interests and values. Compromise may be limited to a single issue; it may involve mutual adjustment on two or more issues, or each party to the conflict may realize practically its entire objective with respect to some different issue.

Concession In order to be effective, a concession must be made on the part of a stronger group.

Nordlinger does not claim that when one of the six practices is implemented by elites, regulation will always follow; he does suggest, however, that when conflict regulation does succeed, one or more of the practices are employed. Thus, no causal relationship between the practices and regulation is suggested. The role of the practices remains ambiguous.

Through structured elite predominance and political se-

curity of elites, leaders are able to play a central role. Structured elite predominance may take one of four forms: 1) apolitical quiescence; 2) acquiescent attitudes to authority; 3) patron-client relationships pyramided to the national level; or 4) mass parties with extensive organizational capabilities. Politically secure leaders are able to take the risks necessary to regulate conflict. There are risks involved which are greater than the risks associated with allowing a conflict to smolder. Secure leaders are able to assume the nonelites' support for their actions.

Elites are motivated to engage in conflict regulating behavior by the following:

1. An external threat or danger will submerge internal conflicts.
2. The belief that an intense conflict and its actual or possible consequences will detract from the economic well-being of the leaders' segment or conflict group.
3. The acquisition or retention of political power.
4. The high value elites place upon the avoidance of bloodshed and suffering within their own segment.

These motives, experienced by the elites, bring the elites to supersede the existing hostility at the nonelite level. While only the elites experience the conflict regulating motives, they are able to enforce them on the nonelites through structured elite predominance.

Conciliatory attitudes on the part of elites, necessary for conflict regulation, come about in four ways. First, when a conflict in which no one group predominates is present for two or more generations and the leaders of the group place a high value on the attainment of government offices and power,

conciliatory behavior tends to be repeated and regularly rewarded. Second, conciliatory attitudes are likely to emerge when the elites of a state with a relatively low standing on the international power ladder are experiencing external pressures while an internal conflict is taking place. Third, the desire to avoid conflict in order to maintain economic prosperity may encourage conciliatory attitudes. Fourth is the presence of a stable, balanced distribution of power, with no party in a position to command a majority.

These conciliatory attitudes are developed as a result of conciliatory behavior being rewarded with conflict regulation. As repetition of this reward system occurs over one or two generations, conciliatory attitudes, defined as "stable, internalized, behavioral predispositions, take on a life of their own."[3] These attitudes continue to shape elite behavior even after the conditions which originally brought about their development have been altered.

Elites, due to structured elite predominance and political security with respect to second-rank elites, are able to regulate intense conflict in divided societies despite the nature or intensity of the existing conflict. Nonelite variables such as nonelite attitudes toward conflict regulating practices, nonelite beliefs and feelings toward the nation, nonelite feelings of being crosspressured, crosscutting divisions at the nonelite level, and segmental isolation are all rejected.

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[3]Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Harvard University: Center for International Affairs, 1972), p. 59.

Nordlinger concedes that socio-economic modernization is one nonelite hypothesis which is important.

> "In Chapter I it was said that regulation of intense conflicts could be studied without first inquiring into those conditions which gave rise to the conflict's intensity. It is only here, at the end of the study, that the assumption becomes awkward. Socio-economic modernization does have an impact upon nonelites in deeply divided societies which reduces the chances of realizing regulatory outcomes."[4]

Modernization increases the level of social mobilization, politicization, and political participation. Violence is more likely to occur and to be more serious. A competitive situation regarding economic rewards is created as individuals become more similar. This competition for economic rewards, which is particularly fierce in the public sector, is carried on through segmental channels. By giving rise to increasing expectations, modernization creates a sense of relative deprivation. The resulting frustration is focused on the opposing segment. Linguistic issues become extremely important as the number, extent, and importance of school and university places, jobs in the modern sector, public employment, urban areas, and geographical mobility are all important.

The above consequences of modernization come together in growing urban areas. Urbanization escalates the conflict and brings individuals together so that they can more easily engage in violence. The competition for economic rewards is more intense in cities. Relative deprivation is readily experienced as contrasts among groups are visible. Language con-

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[4]Nordlinger, p. 111.

flicts are carried out in urban settings.

On the surface, the theory appears to be plausible. It seems reasonable that elites are the ones who regulate conflict. Among a population, someone must act as the representatives and it seems likely that these individuals will be the established elites. It is tautologically true that if elites are willing to regulate a conflict, if elites are politically secure with respect to second-rank elites, and have the support of nonelites, then they will be able to regulate a communal conflict. Furthermore, it seems reasonable that compromise and concessions would act to regulate a conflict and that modernization would make it more difficult for a conflict to be regulated.

The Unconventional Thrust of the Theory

Now although Nordlinger's theory may be summarized in the above manner, the presentation overlooks the unconventional thrust of the theory. There are some peculiarities about the theory which appear only when the underlying theory is considered. The underlying theory consists of ideas which can not be brought out in a surface treatment of the theory and which make up the distinctive aspect of the theory, the part of the theory which will actually be tested using the three case studies.

Nordlinger explicitly rejects the nonelite hypotheses of political culture, crosscutting cleavages, and segmental isolation. It is unusual to reject these currently accepted hypotheses. Another commonly considered nonelite characteristic,

mobilization, the ability of a group to organize because of such factors as communication or concentration of the members of a group in one area, is never mentioned, implying that Nordlinger would not accord it much importance.

Another distinctive feature of the theory is that the role of issues is played down. A consideration of the nature of the issues involved would greatly alter the nature of the theory. The regulation of conflict, while maybe accompanied by some of Nordlinger's practices, may possibly be accounted for by the resolution of, mitigation of, or lack of interest in the issues. In turn, the variation in intensity of a conflict may follow, in part, from the importance accorded the issues.

The nature of the issues, besides the importance given to them by the population concerned, may help to explain whether a conflict may be contained at all. Rose has specified three characteristics which render an issue bargainable or nonbargainable: whether it involves a zero-sum conflict, whether it involves private or collective goods, and whether competing claims are stated as absolute values or advanced as demands for more or less of something.[5]

Characteristics of the issues involved in communal conflicts are neglected by Nordlinger. It seems that the nature and intensity of the issues should be treated as factors which may vary over time or from case to case because such

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[5]Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 397.

factors may determine if it will be possible for elites to regulate a conflict.

It may appear that issues are considered because of the inclusion of compromise and concession as two conflict regulating practices. Although compromise and concession are included, they are grouped together with the other four conflict regulating practices which are procedural in nature. As they are not given any extra weight, it is implied that conflict regulation is possible without a resolution of the issues--one of the other four practices would suffice just as well. Compromise and concession are on a par with conflict regulating practices such as purposive depoliticization which entails a complete disregard of the issues. The decline or intensification of grievances does not seem to be crucial. If compromise and concession are of some importance, why is the nature of the issues neglected?

Another way it may appear to the reader that nonelite characteristics and issues are considered is the attention given to modernization. Although the role of nonelite characteristics and issues is covered in the consideration of modernization, the section on modernization is tacked onto the tail of the theory. The minuscule space devoted to modernization--6 pages of a 120-page monograph--makes it appear as though the role of modernization were added as an afterthought. In any case, the reader is given the impression that modernization either makes conflict regulation merely more difficult, making matters harder yet still possible for

elites to control, or that the processes involved in modernization do not occur very often.

The processes which Nordlinger only considers as byproducts of modernization in non-European modernizing countries are more general phenomena which may go a long way in accounting for conflict moderation. Processes such as the mobilization of groups to facilitate fighting, variations in the intensity of competition regarding issues such as national language and economic rewards, movements to urban areas, and feelings of relative deprivation are not limited to non-European modernizing countries. They are processes which occur in other countries also; in going through changes, many countries experience these processes.

It would seem that the processes involved in modernization are more widespread and that these processes could have been incorporated into the theory so as to give them a more central role rather than mentioning them after the complete theory had already been presented.

Thus, the role of nonelite characteristics and issues is played down. Fluctuation in neither nonelite characteristics nor the intensity of the issues is seen as important variables determining whether a communal conflict will be regulated.

> "One possible objection to the problem's general formulation here and the selection of cases in particular is that the intense conflicts are taken as given and their general causes and contexts not considered. Is it not virtually impossible to generalize about the causes of conflict regulation without taking into account the economic, social, political, or organizational and attitudinal variables which are closely related to the conflict's emergence and intensification? Is this not putting the cart before the horse? My reply to the latter question

> is 'yes,' but the former question receives a decidedly negative response."[6]

The above quote is one more indication, given by Nordlinger himself, that he has played down how a conflict is generated. It seems that a consideration of the causes of a conflict may help in determining what measures should be needed if it were to be regulated.

A third feature of Nordlinger's theory is that, while non-elite characteristics and issues are neglected, elites are given excessive attention. Nordlinger states that only elites are able to regulate communal conflicts. It seems reasonable, as mentioned above, that among a population, some individuals must act as representatives and that these individuals usually are the established elite.

There seems, however, to be a second implication. That is the idea that elites are able to act as an autonomous group separate from the nonelites. It is also implied that elites have been successful in regulating communal conflicts, irrespective of the issues and of nonelite characteristics.

The idea is presented that elites, given one of four necessary motives, are able to regulate conflict. The four motives, external threat, economic well-being, political power, and avoidance of bloodshed, are to be experienced by the elites. Nonelite attitudes are not given attention. It is not specified that elites and nonelites must concur. For at least two of the motives, political power and economic well-

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[6]Nordlinger, p. 15.

being, the interests of the elites and of the nonelites could easily diverge, making it difficult for elites to control nonelites. As nonelite motives are not mentioned, the emphasis remains on the elites. The impression is given that elites will be able to act on motives which are experienced independently of nonelites.

Although a small group of elites may reach an agreement on the issues involved, will it be able to succeed in regulating the conflict if the nonelites do not have sentiments in accordance with the elite attitudes? It would be possible to construct an alternative theory which would begin with a consideration of when nonelites will go along with elite efforts at conflict regulation.

The attention given to the development of conciliatory attitudes is one more indiciation of the heavy emphasis which is put on the role of elites. While nonelites continue to see the issues involved as important, elites are seen as able to develop and work on their own conciliatory attitudes as distinct from nonelite sentiments.

Nordlinger says that elites develop conciliatory attitudes by having conciliatory behavior rewarded with conflict regulation over a period of one or two generations. Once this has occurred, the conciliatory attitudes take on a life of their own. Nordlinger, however, does not present any evidence to support the idea. Even if there were such a case where conflict regulation were continually rewarded over a period of one or two generations, would it be possible for elites, work-

ing on these conciliatory attitudes, to control a conflict? It seems that the conflict may become so intense that elites are not able to control it, whether or not they are willing.

The six conflict regulating practices are accompanied by a disclaimer which says that there is no causal relationship between the practices and conflict regulation. The attention devoted to them, however, would seem to suggest that they are a central part of the theory. The central position given to the practices supports the idea that the elites are able to play a crucial role independently of nonelites. By putting emphasis on conflict regulating practices, elite motives, and the way in which the elites control nonelites, Nordlinger belittles the role of nonelites.

Another implication, along with the primary role accorded elites, is that elites frequently come to want to regulate communal conflicts. Is it the case, however, as Nordlinger suggests, that most conflicts can be regulated primarily by elite efforts? It will be shown that communal conflicts in open, democratic regimes tend to be moderated in other ways, by factors which do not rely on elite voluntary actions.

Another assumption made in the theory is that elites are often politically secure with respect to second-rank elites[7]

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[7]While Nordlinger has presented a theory as to when elites predominate over nonelites, he does not present a theory to account for when elites are politically secure with respect to second-rank elites. In order for the theory to be complete, this aspect would have to be developed. An attempt at such a theory might suggest that elites are not as frequently secure with respect to second-rank elites as Nordlinger suggests.

and that they can often control nonelites through structured elite predominance.

In saying that he is presenting six cases to demonstrate a theory which applies to a particular universe of countries,[8] it would seem that there are many, many countries to which the theory would apply. But are there numerous countries where communal conflicts have been regulated in open, democratic regimes? It seems doubtful that even another six could be cited as examples.

There is, however, one instance in which the emphasis on elites is justified. Elites themselves, rather than nonelites, may be responsible for a conflict. In such a case, termination of the conflict only requires that the elites control their own conflict. If the conflict is restricted to the elite realm, exclusive attention to elites would be justified. Nordlinger, however, makes the assumption that there is a high level of nonelite antagonism which the elites are able to control.

In order to show the distinctive thrust of Nordlinger's theory, two models of communal conflict regulation may be constructed. Nordlinger's theory tends toward the first camp:

Type I:

1. There is a high level of antagonism at the nonelite level.
2. There is no strong national identity; the cleavages present in the society coincide; the groups are unfavorably segmented; and the ability of the groups to mobilize them-

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[8] "Its theoretical universe is circumscribed by two criteria: existing intense conflict and open regimes." Nordlinger, p. 6.

selves remains at a steady, high level.

3. The issues are zero-sum, over collective goods, and the demands are stated as absolute values.

4. Elites are able to act on their own motivations which may differ from those of the nonelites.

5. Elites are able to act on their personal conciliatory attitudes--attitudes which the nonelites may or may not have.

6. Elites are secure with respect to second-rank elites.

7. Elites control nonelites through a system of structured elite predominance.

8. Even in these circumstances, elites can regulate communal conflict within open, democratic regimes.

An alternative approach would take the following form:

Type II:

A. Either it is the elites themselves who are most agitated about the issues so that they are the ones who must regulate conflict; or

B. Nonelites are highly agitated about the issues so that

1. Most communal conflicts can not be regulated through an open, democratic regime.

2. Nonelite characteristics such as national identity, cross-cutting cleavages, segmental isolation, mobilization, nonelite attitudes toward the other group and toward the elites' efforts at conflict regulation are important in terms of whether conflict regulating efforts on the part of the elites will succeed.

3. The types of issues involved are significant in determining whether the conflict can be regulated at all within an open regime.

4. Elites are unable to regulate conflict when their motivations and attitudes differ from those of the masses because they are unable to feel secure or to get nonelite support.

5. When a communal conflict is regulated, it is because the intensity of the issues has decreased, because some favorable change has occurred in one or more of the nonelite characteristics, or because a compromise, trade-off, or concession has been made, allowing elites to regulate the conflict.

Testing the Theory

In order to evalute the theory, a test needs to be made. This will be done using case studies of three of the six countries which Nordlinger uses to illustrate the theory. The three cases--Austria, Lebanon, and Malaysia--were chosen on the basis of availability of modern social science literature regarding the conflicts and because one of the conflicts, that in Lebanon, and possibly the one in Malaysia also, has not been regulated within an open, democratic regime.

Although Nordlinger used six cases to support this theory, thorough case studies were not done. "These six cases--they are not treated extensively enough to call them case studies--..."[9] While Nordlinger has covered only the following material, the bibliography shows that there is much more available.

Austria:

1. Alfred Diamant. Austrian Catholics and the First Republic. 1960.
2. Charles A. Gulick. Austria from Habsburg to Hitler. 1948.
3. G. Bingham Powell, Jr. Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility: An Austrian Case Study. 1970.
4. Rodney Stiefbold. Elites and Elections in a Fragmented Political system. forthcoming.
5. William T. Bluhm. "Nation Building: The Case of Austria," American Political Science Review. September, 1958.
6. Frederick C. Engelmann. "Austria: The Pooling of Opposition," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. 1966.
7. Frederick C. Engelmann. "Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition." American Political Science Review. Volume 54, 1959.
8. K. Liepelt. "Esquisse d'une Typologie des Electeurs Allemands et Autrichiens," Revue Française de Sociologie, janv-mars, 1968.
9. Frank A. Pinner. "On the Structure of Organizations and Beliefs: Lagerdenken in Austria," Paper delivered at

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[9]Nordlinger, p. 14.

American Political Science Meetings, Chicago, 1967.
10. Peter Pulzer. "The Legitimizing Role of Political Parties: The Second Austrian Republic," Government and Opposition, Summer, 1969.
11. Herbert P. Secher. "Coalition Government: The Case of the Second Austrian Republic," American Political Science Review, September, 1958.
12. Rodney Stiefbold. "Segmented Pluralism and Constitutional Democracy in Austria," in Norman Vig and Rodney Stiefbold, eds., Politics in Advanced Nations. forthcoming.
13. Rodney Stiefbold, et. al., eds. Wahlen und Parteien in Osterreich. 1966.

Lebanon:
1. Michael C. Hudson. The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon. 1968.
2. Leonard Binder, ed. Politics in Lebanon. 1966.
3. Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," Comparative Politics, January, 1969.
4. Iliya Harik. "The Ethnic Revolution in the Middle East," Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Meetings, New York, 1969.
5. Michael W. Suleiman. "Elections in a Confessional Democracy," Journal of Politics, 1967.

Malaysia:
1. Milton J. Esman. Administration and Development in Malaysia: Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society. 1972.
2. Jean Grossholtz. "Integrative Factors in the Malaysian and Philippine Legislatures," Comparative Politics, October, 1970.
3. R. S. Milne and K. J. Ratnam. "Politics and Finance in Malaya," Journal of Commonwealth Studies, 1965.

As his references show, Nordlinger did not really look at the cases very closely. Considerably more thorough research of the available literature was carried out in order to present the following analyses of the three cases.

The causes of the conflicts and the manner in which they are dealt with will be considered in order to determine the validity of Nordlinger's theory. It will be shown that the general thrust of the theory is not valid. Specifically, non-elite characteristics and issues will be shown to be important in determining whether it is possible for a conflict to be

regulated. The extent to which elites are able to regulate a communal conflict will depend on variations in nonelite characteristics and issues. It is more difficult for elites to control second-rank leaders and nonelites than suggested by Nordlinger. It will be shown that Nordlinger has not presented a theory which adequately defines when elites are able to control nonelites.

In contrast to the idea given by Nordlinger that many communal conflicts are regulated by elites in open, democratic regimes, it will be shown that conflicts are either unregulated, are regulated within closed regimes, or, in the few cases where communal conflicts have been moderated, this has been done through changes in nonelite characteristics and in the intensity of the issues involved rather than exclusively through elite efforts.

AUSTRIA

Introduction

First a description of the conflict in Austria will be given. Then its causes will be outlined. A discussion of the way in which the conflict was resolved will follow. The conclusion will assess Nordlinger's theory with respect to the case of Austria.

Description of the Conflict

The First Austrian Republic was formed after other independent nations separated from the Habsburg Monarchy. The Christian Socials and the Socialists, neither wanting to be identified with the depressed economy after World War I, formed a coalition government. The coalition lasted until October, 1920, when the Christian Socials took over the main control of the government.

Conflict developed between the two groups who had distinctive ideologies. The Socialists, or Austro-Marxists, derived their ideas from Marx and were divided into two factions. The Revolutionary Socialists, whose leading theorist was Otto Bauer, favored an outright proletarian revolution. They valued democracy merely as a stepping stone to the anticipated revolution. The Linz Program of 1926 stipulated three conditions under which the bourgeoisie would provoke them to revolt. Thus, the Revolutionary Socialists were prepared for the revolution, the time of which was to be set by the government.[1]

[1]Although the Christian Social government did, in fact,

The more moderate Social Democratic faction, headed by Karl Renner, was content to work for social programs within a democracy and to form a coalition government with the Christian Socials. During the 1920's the revolutionary faction of the Socialist Party was dominant.

Just as the Socialists had outstanding theorists whose thought came from Marx, the Catholics of the Christian Social Party also had developed ideas of how a society should be run. The theorists included Karl von Vogelsang, Adam Muller, Ignaz Seipel, and Othmar Spann. Spann's ideas may be considered an important interpretation of the major points in Austrian Catholic social thought of the time.

Spann proposed a corporative reorganization as a remedy for the evils of individualism in society. Three fundamental laws were to be followed. First, the component parts of society would be treated as organically unequal because their contributions to society, though equally indispensable, were of many kinds. Second, some members of society would be considered more valuable than others. Third, the basic components of the new society would not be isolated individuals but gemeinschaften which would be hierarchically arranged but not centrally controlled. They would form an organic order, not a mass of mechanically arranged atoms characteristic of capitalism and democracy.

Because support for the Christian Social Party came from

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impose all three of the conditions, the proletarian revolution never did materialize.

groups as diverse as peasants, small shopkeepers, office workers, and big businessmen, the Party's policy was not always precise. It did stand for devotion to the Church and hostility to the Socialists who were seen as godless revolutionaries. Catholic support for the replacement of democracy with an authoritarian state along the lines specified by the Austrian Catholic theorists was present during the First Republic.

Both parties had paramilitary groups which were active during the interwar period. The two groups clashed in July, 1927. Some members of the Catholic Heimwehr who had taken two lives in a clash with the Socialist Schutzbund six months previously were acquitted. When the verdict of the jury became known the next morning the infuriated workers marched to the House of Parliament. The workers stormed the Palace of Justice and set it on fire. The police killed 94 workers and injured 500.

In March, 1933, the Socialist Schutzbund was dissolved by the government and weapons were systematically seized. A year later the police were ordered to search Schutzbund headquarters in Linz. The decision of the local leaders to resist produced a full-scale civil war. Vienna trams stopped running, the agreed signal for a general strike. The general strike, however, did not come. After three days the Socialists surrendered. The official number of government forces dead was 102 with a total of 314 Austrians dead and 805 wounded. The Socialists estimated there were 1500 to 2000 dead and 5000 wounded.

For the Socialist Party the fighting meant a complete defeat and the outlawing of its party. All members of the Vienna Provisional Diet, seventy Socialists who had been members of the National Assembly, and all presidents of the Socialist cultural societies were sent either to prison or to concentration camps. Political arrests amounted to 38,000; 106,000 houses were searched between March, 1933, and December, 1934. As the Parliament had dissolved itself through a technicality in 1933, Chancellor Dollfuss proclaimed a new constitution with the ratification of a Concordat with the Vatican in May, 1934.

After 1934 the Catholic-Socialist conflict disappeared because the Socialists had been greatly weakened by the Catholics' use of force and because the issue of a Nazi threat gained prominence. German Nationalists, who had supported the Christian Social Party, began to drift into the Nazi camp.

> "In the German National election of March 5, 1933, the Hitler-Hugenberg group polled 52 percent of the electorate. Nazi successes in the Catholic areas of Germany must have been particularly shocking to the Austrian Christian Socialists, who could see the handwriting on their own wall. The local elections of 1932 had already indicated that Austrian sentiment as well as German was moving in a 'Brown' direction. In Vienna the National Socialists had polled over 200,000 votes (a sharp contrast with the mere 27,000 they had received in 1930) and therewith captured fifteen seats in the Landtag, fourteen of them formerly held by Christian Socialists. In addition, Christian Social majorities in Lower Austria and Salzburg had been destroyed by the Nazis.... The identification of German nationalism with Nazi ideology, together with the soaring popularity of the combination in the face of political and economic decay, galvanized the Christian Socialists into action to preserve what was left of their power position."[2]

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[2]William T. Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State (New Haven: Yale Univer-

Encouraged by the recent German Nazi successes, the National Socialists scored a success in the Vienna city elections in April, 1932, winning fifteen seats--only four less than the Christian Socials, who lost badly. Support for National Socialists came from people who left the Pan-German Party which had formed a bloc with the Christian Social Party and from the Christian Social Party itself. Thus, the Catholics were left with an inadequate parliamentary majority of one vote. The Nazi movement after 1930 was a threat to the Christian Socials.

In July, 1933, following mounting Nazi terrorist acts backed by propaganda from Radio Munich, the Nazi Party was banned by the Austrian Government.

> "Nazi propaganda continued unabated. In January large stocks of explosives were seized at the house of the commander of the Vienna Nazi motor-corps. Nazi organizers poured in from Germany. In March a terror wave followed with bombs exploding in telephone booths and on railway lines; the Nazi minister, Frank, forced his way into Vienna and publicly threatened Dollfuss; Germany imposed a duty of 1,000 marks on all those who wanted to spend their holiday in Austria, in order to ruin the tourist industry; a Free Corps of Austrian Nazis, 3,000 strong, was organized in Bavaria; day by day Radio Munich wildly abused the Austrian Government."[3]

Arrests were made of 1142 Nazi officials including 387 civil servants and 81 mayors. Many more went underground while the majority of the top-rank leaders fled to Munich. There were a number of very active Nazis in the civil service including a Nazi underground of one thousand in the Vienna police force. The pervading climate of uncertainty caused a number of persons

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sity Press, 1973), p. 34.

[3]E. H. Buschbeck, Austria (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 136.

to play both sides. Many supported the government and clandestinely kept some contact with the illegal Nazi Party, just in case.

In an attempt by the German and Austrian Nazis to take over the government, Chancellor Dollfuss was assassinated in an unsuccessful putsch during July, 1934. Dollfuss was replaced by Karl Schuschnigg who was Chancellor until 1938 when the Anschluss took place.

In 1945 Austria was liberated and then occupied for ten years by the Four Powers. A second coalition government headed by the Social Democrat Karl Renner was initially established under Soviet sponsorship. This time the coalition lasted until 1966 when the Catholics peacefully assumed control of the government, followed by a Socialist administration. The Second Republic has lacked the sort of conflict which characterized the First Republic.

The following arrangements were established during the Second Republic. There were two extra-parliamentary devices which directed the coalition government--the coalition pacts and the coalition committee. The coalition pacts were formulated by the government leaders after every election. The decision to submit a government bill was made by the cabinet, which met every Tuesday. During the Republic this decision was usually a formality as was the passage of the bill in parliament. In the coalition commitee, which met on Mondays, decisions were reached by the party leaders. These decisions were passed onto the party ministers. Passage of bills was

thus ensured.

Proporz was a system by which cabinet and administrative posts were distributed between the parties according to the number of votes received in the preceding election. The top positions within an agency or a nationalized industry were assigned to people of specific parties. Sometimes all top positions would be filled by one party. This led to the hiring of members of only one party for a whole ministry or industry.

The mutual veto was also established outside the coalition committee by Renner. In response to Soviet pressure, Renner allocated the Ministries of the Interior and of Education and Information to the Communists. To counterbalance this, he developed the device of attaching two undersecretaries, representing the other two political parties, to serve under each minister as watchdogs.

Causes of the Conflict

In order to explain why a conflict reaches the level of people fighting one another, two components may be considered: the reasons why the groups are in opposition and, given that, how it is that the groups have the ability to fight each other. The following fourteen factors will cover both components in explaining why fighting occurred during the First Austrian Republic.

1. Lack of a national identity allowed the two groups to pursue partisan interests oblivious of the possible destruction of the Austrian nation.

During the interwar period Austria lacked a unique national

identity. After the breakup of the Habsburg Monarchy, Austrians had anticipated a union with Germany but were kept from this by the Treaty of Saint Germain. The country's first name, German Austria, reflects the uncertainty about its identity which persisted throughout the interwar period. "It was the part," as Clemenceau said, "that was left over after the other nationalities had quitted the country of which for four centuries they had been members."

> "The interpretation published in 1930 of the aims of elementary education stressed the need for children to be brought up to act in the spirit of the Volkstum--and what was meant was German, and not a specific Austrian, Volkstum."[4]

Because of this lack of a national identity, the Socialists and Catholics had no reason to value the interests of the nation as a whole above their own partisan interests. This allowed them to be unconcerned about the possible destruction of the country which might result from their fighting.

2. Lack of influence during the Monarchy contributed to the militancy of the Socialists.

During the Habsburg Monarchy the Socialists were not allowed much participation in the government. Although there was a Reichsrat, the members were either appointed by the Monarch or elected by the propertied class. Universal suffrage was not granted until 1907, following the extension of universal suffrage in Hungary and even then the Monarchy retained extensive power. Universal suffrage itself was limited to elections

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[4]Karl R. Stadler, Austria (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1971), p. 144.

for members of parliament. Members of provincial diets and of city councils were not elected by general suffrage until after Austria became a republic. The 87 of 516 representatives in parliament who were Socialists were not able to accomplish a great deal because of conflict among the various nationalities in the empire.[5] Socialist influence was also restricted because the government was not yet fully democratic. In March, 1914, the Reichsrat was adjourned altogether.

Similarly, social legislation did not flourish during the Monarchy. In 1885-1887 a series of reforms, most of them modelled on the German legislation, were introduced.

> "Its enactment was preceded and followed by a wave of persecution against the workers' associations. In January, 1884, martial law was proclaimed for Vienna and vicinity. This was the signal for general action against Socialist organizations all over the country. Vienna remained under martial law for more than seven years."[6]

The laws, even when passed, were very widely evaded, or flatly disregarded, and most of them did not apply at all to home workers who contributed a substantial proportion of the labor force.[7]

This exclusion from power, including the late introduction of universal suffrage, lack of ability to influence policy, and a paucity of effective social legislation, encouraged the Socialists to become militant.

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[5]Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), I, p. 33.

[6]Ibid., I, p. 183.

[7]C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 633.

3. Because the Socialist Party in Austria did not experience a split after World War I, the more moderate Socialists were not in a position to form a coalition with other moderate parties as they might have.

While in other countries a split occurred between Socialists and Communists after World War I, Austria is distinctive in that the Communist Party never gained the support of more than a minuscule proportion of the population.

> "The Austrian Social Democratic Party, as it existed in 1918-19, was definitely a left-wing party, in the sense that its most active and influential leaders, Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler, were well on the left, and even its moderate leaders, after Victor Adler's death in 1918, such as Karl Renner, Karl Seitz, and Friedrich Austerlitz (1862-1931), the formidable editor of the celebrated Arbeiter Zeitung, stood far to the left of those of the German Majority Socialists. In Vienna especially the hold of the Social Democratic Party on the workers was immensely strong, not only politically, but also culturally and in every aspect of social life. Viennese Socialism, much more than German, was an entire way of living; the activities of the Party penetrated into everything--into music, drama, travel and holidays, education and sport, no less than into political and Trade Union affairs. The workers' great Vienna daily, the Arbeiter Zeitung, edited by Austerlitz, was much less a newspaper than a daily journal of opinion in which every sort of issue, cultural as well as political or economic, was freely discussed at an astonishingly high cultural and literary level. The culture was indeed essentially German-Austrian, and the roots of the Party were in the German-Austrian section of the people. But that, after the dissolution of the old empire, was a source of strength rather than of weakness. Above all, in Vienna, as the Communists soon discovered, the hold of Social Democracy on the workers was much too strong to be shaken off."[8]

Because the moderates remained in the Party, and because the center of gravity in the Party was to the left, the moderates were not available to compromise with other parties, had there been any moderate ones.

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[8] G. D. H. Cole, Socialist Thought: Communism and Social Democracy 1914-1931 (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1958), I, p. 225.

4. The international climate at the time reinforced the militancy of the Socialists.

The militancy of the Socialists was reinforced by events in other countries. The prospect of revolution, inspired by the Bolshevik success, attracted the Socialists in Austria as it did the Socialists and Communists in other countries. The already existent militancy of the Socialists was accentuated by the international climate.

5. The large size of Vienna contributed to the militancy of the Socialists.

It has been determined that workers in large cities tend to be more radical. Lipset cites the communication factor as the reason.

> "A large plant makes for a higher degree of intraclass communication and less personal contact with people on higher economic levels. In large cities social interaction is also more likely to be within economic classes. In certain cases the working-class districts of large cities have been so thoroughly organized by working-class political movements that the workers live in a virtual world of their own, and it is in these centers that the workers are the most solidly behind leftist candidates, and, as we have already seen, vote most heavily."[9]

As Vienna's size had been determined by the size of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was disproportionately large for the Austrian Republic. Out of 87 countries surveyed for 1955, Austria ranked fourteenth in terms of primacy of urban structure, following 12 developing countries and Hungary, the other center of the Monarchy.[10] Two million people, one-third of Aus-

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[9]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959), p. 267.

[10]The measure of primacy used was the percentage of the population of the four largest cities residing in the largest

tria's population, lived in Vienna during the First Republic. Most of the industrial activity was located in Vienna.

6. The industrial structure contributed to the diffusion of the radical ideology of the Socialists.

As noted above, it has also been shown that workers in large factories tend to be more militant than workers in small plants. The large size of the industries, along with the large size of Vienna, contributed to the diffusion of the radical socialist ideology. Half of the workers were employed in factories with more than 100 workers.[11] Austrian industry was also highly unionized. In the International Federation of Trade Unions the Austrians occupied a high position. In1928 Austria was in third place after Germany and England, but preceding France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Sweden.[12]

7. The close link which the Austrian Catholic Church had with the conservative Monarchy led to a conservative state church.

The Roman Catholic Church was a solid supporter of the Habsburg Monarchy. The church, in turn, was able to exercise a great deal of power.

> "This immense power of the church was based on several factors. The backward cultural condition of the rural masses; the colossal donations given by the dynasty which

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city of the country. Surinder K. Mehta, "Some Demographic and Economic Correlates of Prime Cities: A Case for Revalution," in Gerald Breese, ed., The City in Newly Developing Countries (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 301.

[11]Austrian Federal Press Department of the Federal Chancellery, The Austrian Yearbook 1930 (Vienna: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitäts-buchhandlung, 1930), p. 136.

[12]Gulick, I, p. 266.

> made the Roman Catholic Church of the monarchy the most opulent in Europe; the imposing splendor of the Church which developed a great religious art, the brilliancy of the empire; the establishment of humanitarian and educational institutions; its constitutional privileges by which it influenced, to a large extent, the legislature; the broader and more international perspective of its leading elements which far surpassed the mentality of the representatives of the Protestant churches and were factors which with others, contributed to the exceptional power and authority of the Roman Catholic Church."[13]

The peasants were especially controlled by the Church through its immense landed estates which held the bulk of the peasant population in its material dependency.[14] Although the peasants became hostile to the Monarchy as a result of the losses they suffered during World War I, they did not lose their ties to the Church. These persisted throughout the First Republic.

8. Because the Christian Social Party did not develop support among workers, Christian Social identity was not tempered by democratic ideas as it might have been.

The ideas of the Christian Socials originated in the Romantic program of the nineteenth century which called for an authoritarian, corporative order for state and society. The program was for "a Christian Monarchy with an Emperor by the Grace of God at its helm; respect for spiritual and temporal authority; the proper stratification of society; respect for tradition; for established privileges; for nationality and property.[15]

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[13]Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 155.

[14]Ibid., p. 156.

[15]Edgar Alexander, "Church and Society in Germany: Social and Political Movements and Ideas in German and Austrian Catholicism, 1789-1950," in Joseph N. Moody, ed., Church and Society:

Although there were Catholic trade unions which issued the strongest pro-democratic statement to come from the Catholic camp, the social thought of the trade union movement also included the idea that the dissolution of society was proceeding at a rapid rate and could be arrested only by a corporative reorganization of state and society. The Catholic trade unions were formed in an unsuccessful attempt to attract support from the Socialist trade unions.

In contrast to the Catholic Center Party of Bavaria, the Christian Social Party never became a mass party, representative of all strata of the Catholic population of Austria. Because the Church supported the government and political Catholicism did not appeal to the working class, the Party never managed to attract the main body of Catholic workers, as did the Center Party.

> "Consequently, when social movements developed in Austria they never gained decisive influence on Political Catholicism, in contrast to the developments in Germany in the line Ketteler-Hitz-Brauns-Segerwald, by means of which the social and political momentum of the Catholic workers was organized in the Christian Trade Unions. Nor did the Christian Social Party succeed in starting a self-reliant political movement according to the pattern of historical and political realism set by the Center Party with its definitely anti-authoritarian democratic principles and its constructive parliamentary activity."[16]

As the Christian Social Party was never forced to incorporate democratic ideas, the concept of an authoritarian state prevailed.

9. Because the two groups were territorially segregated,

Catholic, Social, and Political Thought and Movements, 1789-1950 (New York: Arts, Inc., 1953), p. 477.

[16]Ibid., p. 478.

there was a lack of crosspressures.

As there was an urban-rural division between the two groups, there was a lack of crosspressures. Austrians were encapsuled in one party or the other. For votes the Christian Social Party depended on the peasants and the small shopkeepers and officer workers of the rural towns. Socialists were mainly industrial workers and intellectuals in the cities. Two-thirds of Vienna's population supported the Socialist Party.[17]

10. Paramilitary groups, formed because Austria's borders were threatened and because of a restricted federal army, gave the two parties the ability to fight each other.

The Heimwehr, which became the Catholic paramilitary group, was a product of the first uneasy years of the Republic. It began as an uncoordinated chain of emergency self-help organizations which sprang up all over Austria in the winter of 1918-1919 to keep local law and to protect the frontiers of the new republic. The provinces of Styria and Carinthia were especially threatened by Yugoslavian claims to border areas. The fact that Socialists were sometimes found in the Heimwehr ranks indicates the nonpolitical nature of the initial group.

The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1919 restricted Austria to a federal army of 30,000. The lack of both an adequate federal army nor even a strong civil authority kept these local forces in existence when the first months of crisis after the war had passed.[18] The federal army was sympathetic to the Heimwehr,

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[17] Julius Braunthal, The Tragedy of Austria (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1948), p. 89.

[18] Gordon Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy: The Story of Chan-

who could in some places help themselves to arms from army depots.

By the early 1920's Heimwehr organizations existed on a regular provincial basis. By 1923 they had abandoned their non-political origins and were loosely united as an anti-Marxist force. Although the Heimwehr was on the extreme right, it was strongly opposed to the Nazis. It represented a definitely Austrian brand of fascism without pro-German leanings.[19] From October, 1928, onwards the Heimwehr attempted a fascist coup four times.

In response to the Heimwehr and because there was no effective federal army to restrict them, the Socialists formed the Schutzbund in 1923. This paramilitary group was trained and organized on a national basis. The Schutzbund sought protection against a Habsburg restoration in Hungary (the Emperor Charles had led two vain attempts in March and in October of 1921) and against the possibilities of dictatorship on two of its borders (Mussolini's March on Rome and Hitler's Munich putsch of 1923). After 1926 the Socialist Party had to arm itself anyway for Bauer's defensive-offensive revolution.[20]

11. A military imbalance produced a situation conducive to conflict.

The Catholics were aware of the fact that they were much

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cellor Dollfuss of Austria (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1961), pp. 64-65.

[19]Walter B. Maass, Assassination in Vienna (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), p. 14.

[20]Shepherd, p. 66.

stronger militarily than their rivals and would almost certainly win if a trial of strength occurred.[21] The Socialists made repeated efforts in the years between 1927 and 1934 to persuade the Christian Socials to agree to disarm. Christian Social counterproposals were always coupled with demands, such as cessation of opposition in Parliament, which the Socialists felt they could not accept. This imbalance of military power produced a situation in which the stronger group had no motivation to cooperate with the weaker.

12. Italian support of the Catholics intensified the conflict.

At first the Heimwehr was financed almost entirely from domestic sources, but later Mussolini supplied both funds and ideological inspiration. These funds paid for arms, ammunition, and uniforms, as well as five schillings per man per day of active duty.[22] Italy also served as an example in the formation of a corporative government.

13. The peasant support for the Christian Social Party allowed big businessmen to run the party in a conservative manner regardless of the peasants' views.

Because peasants tend not to be politically sophisticated, parties supported primarily by peasants have often been directed by elites. This was the case in Austria where conservative businessmen formed the elite of the party. Had the peasants been in control of their own party, and given that they were

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[21] Mary Macdonald, The Republic of Austria 1918-1934: A Study in the Failure of Democratic Government (London: Cambridge University Press, 1946), pp. 10-11.

[22] Alfred Diamant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 95.

in a revolutionary mood after the war, they might have formed a coalition with the Socialists. There were worker-peasant coalitions at the provincial level. At the national level, however, the Socialists were confronted with a party represented by businessmen.

14. The jury system was highly biased toward the Catholics. This lowered support of the Socialists for the regime, and stimulated radical action.

> "Relations between peasants and workers were poisoned by frequent clashes between units of the Heimwehr and of the Schutzbund in small provincial towns. Workers were sometimes killed in such clashes, while the accused, tried by provincial juries, were acquitted."[23]

This is what happened in 1927. A jury acquitted the men who, a few months previously, had fired into a group of Socialists and killed a man and a boy. The event once again demonstrated the conservative bias of the provincial courts. When the verdict of the jury became known the next morning the infuriated workers left their shops and marched to the House of Parliament. The multitude stormed the Palace of Justice and set it on fire. The police killed ninety-four workers. The event revealed that the police were firm in their loyalty to the government and would shoot workers when ordered to do so. As a result of this the Socialists increased the strength of the Schutzbund as a means of self-defense.[24]

Resolution of the Conflict

In order to explain how a conflict is resolved, two com-

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[23] Braunthal, p. 92.

[24] Ibid.

ponents may be considered; how the issues which brought the groups into opposition are treated, or how the violence alone is stemmed while the hostility remains. The following fifteen factors will explain how the issues salient during the First Republic were virtually resolved by the time Austria regained independence in 1955.

1. The possibility of Anschluss acted to unite the two groups already in 1938.

In 1938 Austria was invaded by Germany. The Socialists had offered to help the Catholic government resist the move. When a final showdown with Hitler came, Socialist functionaries in the Vienna factories sent a collective letter to Chancellor Schuschnigg promising active cooperation with the government in seeking an independent Austria. The government, afraid to arm the opposition, had declined the offer. As a last effort to show Austrian opposition to the Anschluss, Schuschnigg had proposed a plebiscite.[25] The government and the illegal Socialists were prepared to come to an agreement; Austria was ready to present a united front against the National Socialists.[26]

> "Thus, paradoxically, in this last mass movement of old Austria, the enthusiasm of the workers for the Austria of Dr. Schuschnigg merged with their enthusiasm for democracy and for their old party flag. During the last days the streets of Vienna were filled with mass demonstrations for Austrian liberty, hailing Schuschnigg and at the same time shouting the old Socialist slogans and singing the old party songs. Suddenly, as had never been the case

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[25] It ran: Are you in favor of a free and German, an independent and social, a Christian and united Austria?

[26] Mary Antonia Wathen, The Policy of England and France Toward the Anschluss of 1938 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1954), p. 171.

> before, Socialists, Communists, Catholics, Heimwehren, monarchists and the police marched side by side. Never had the Nazis been so weak in Austria as at the very moment of the Anschluss."[27]

Hitler refused to allow the plebiscite to take place.

> "There can be no doubt as to the outcome if the plebiscite had in fact been held, for after much hesitation even the leaders of the socialist underground and the free trade unions advised their followers to cast a positive vote--not for Schuschnigg, as they pointed out, but against Hitler."[28]

Thus, even before the Anschluss took place, the Socialists and members of the Christian Social Party had begun to unite in opposition to the possibility of a union with Germany.

2. The Socialists and Catholics came into contact during their mutual concentration camp experience during World War II.

Positive support for an independent Austria began between Socialists and Catholics together in concentration camps and among those in the resistance movement.

> "Politicians concerned with the Schuschnigg regime as well as left-wing Socialists had been put into concentration camps immediately after the Anschluss. Some were released after one or two years, many remained imprisoned throughout the war; but this common experience of comradeship in gaol was to become a powerful factor cementing unity between men of very different political creeds, when the task of building a new Austria rose after the collapse of the Nazi system."[29]

By the summer of 1943 most people, of whatever party, seemed to have reached the same point--they wanted an independent Austria.[30] Agreement on this issue, achieved in reaction to

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[27]Franz Borkenau, Austria and After (London: Faber and Faber, 1941), pp. 295-296.

[28]Stadler, p. 149.

[29]Buschbeck, p. 152.

[30]Elisabeth Barker, Austria 1918-1972 (Coral Gables:

the Anschluss, served as a starting point in bringing the two groups together.

3. In order to deal with the overwhelming problems of day-to-day living, a coalition government was formed in 1945.

In 1945, at the time of Four Power liberation, the Austrian economy was in a shambles. Everything, including food, clothing and shoes, coal, and gas, was in short supply. The population subsisted on a daily ration of 400-800 calories. In July, 1945, out of 1,000 babies born alive there were 421 who died within a short period.[31] In this state of affairs a second coalition government between the Socialists and the People's Party (previously the Christian Social Party) was established. There was a political motive to cooperate; neither side wanted to be identified with the unpopular actions which would be necessary to take in order to deal with the dreadful situation. Although there had been a coalition formed after the First World War, it lasted only two years, while the second coalition lasted until 1965 when the People's Party peacefully formed a single-party government. While the first coalition had been overwhelmed by disintegrating forces, the second coalition was reinforced by supportive factors. The coalition government gave the two parties a positive experience of the advantages of working together to solve the country's problems.

University of Miami Press, 1973), p. 129.

[31] Franz Nemschak, Ten Years of Austrian Economic Development, 1945-1955 (Vienna: Association of Austrian Industrialists, 1955), p. 11.

4. The possibility that Austria might be split during the Four Power occupation united the population.

> "Moreover, the threat that the country might be divided into an eastern half occupied by Soviet troops and a western half occupied by the western powers did much to weld all Austrians into a genuine community for better or worse. At home the awareness that such tendencies had to be opposed gave them, even at this moment of material and physical weakness, an astonishing strength and unity. The most immediate and most ardent wish of everyone was, naturally enough, the withdrawal of occupation troops of the four great powers and the full restoration of Austria's sovereignty."[32]

Austrian unity developed in response to the very real threat to the country's independence and unity resulting from the occupation. While the external pressure exerted by Germany and Italy during the interwar period had worked to further split the two political parties, the threat of an east-west division served to unite the two groups because it worked as a threat to each group equally.

5. The two groups were united to end the occupation because of its material cost at a time when Austria was least able to afford it.

The four big powers--France, England, the Soviet Union, and the United States--each occupied a section of Austria with the central district of Vienna being jointly controlled from the time of liberation in 1945 until 1955. There was one member of the occupation forces for every twenty Austrians. The occupation cost the Austrians a great deal.

> "At the end of 1945 there were still some 350,000 Allied Troops in Austria--200,000 Russians, 65,000 British, 47,000 Americans, and 40,000 French, according to an American estimate--which produced Renner's famous metaphor of

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[32]Kurt Waldheim, The Austrian Example (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd., 1973), p. 52

> the 'four elephants in a boat.' Their maintenance cost Austria dear, not only did the Russians and the French live off the land, which further aggravated the food situation, but the Austrian government also had to supply the forces with local currency; in August 1945 it was 10 million schillings for the Russians alone. One of the last acts of Renner's Provisional Government was an extremely hard-hitting Note to the Allied Council on 29 November; it said in effect that the number of occupation troops was determined, not in accordance with Allied security needs, 'but rather according to reasons of military balance of the Allied Powers,' and Austria should surely not have to bear the costs."[33]

The Austrians were united in their desire to end the occupation and its attendant cost. Because of the need to present a united front against the occupation, the two groups learned how to work together. After ten years of occupation, the two groups had developed an ability to work together which survived after the occupation was terminated.

6. The desire to benefit from Marshall Plan aid brought the two groups together during the occupation.

Because of the material needs of the country after World War II and because of the need to present a united front to the United States, the two sides were brought together in order to benefit from Marshall Plan aid. During 1948-1952 one-third of the net investment in Austria was financed by European Recovery Plan counterpart funds.[34]

7. The Catholics had been discredited by their complicity with the Nazi regime.

The Catholic regime was unable to stop the Anschluss. After the Anschluss had occurred, it went along with it.

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[33]Stadler, pp. 63-64.

[34]Bluhm, p. 86.

> "The parish priests were further authorised by the Archbishop to hoist the swastika flag--the Archbishop had already ordered the swastika flag to be hoisted on the high spire of the Cathedral of St. Stephen--and to peal the church bells at the conclusion of Hitler's plebiscite address to the Austrian people (at Vienna on April 9). The Cardinal, on the following day, ostentatiously queued at the polling booth and gave the Nazi salute as he entered."[35]

The ready cooperation with the Nazis on the part of Catholic religious leaders left the Catholics with the need to make amends for their complicity. The Party consciously played down its clerical heritage. The Austrian Catholic hierarchy responded to the desire of the Party to avoid close connections with the Church by forbidding for the first time the active participation in political activities by all clerics.[36]

8. The Socialist Party was moderated by a shift from the dominance of revolutionary socialists to social democrats within the Socialist Party due to the disappearance of the membership of the left wing.

After 1934 the Revolutionary Socialists had been able to maintain an underground organization. The Nazis, using government files on underground socialist cadres, stopped this activity. Large numbers of leaders and activists were put in concentration camps. The right wingers, who had repudiated the Revolutionary Socialists, withdrew to private life and were only minimally molested.[37]

> "Socialist Jews, whether they were of the right or left wing (and almost invariably they stood on the left) of

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[35] Braunthal, p. 112n.

[36] William B. Bader, Austria Between East and West 1945-1955 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 44.

[37] Bluhm, p. 61.

> the party, were either hounded out of the country or murdered. At the same time the right-wing Socialists such as Adolf Schaerf, Karl Renner, and Oskar Helmer--men who came to dominate the party after 1945--survived the war with little difficulty."[38]

The disappearance of the prominent Jewish element had a devastating effect on the left wing. The size of Vienna's Jewish community was reduced from 176,034 in 1934 to 9,049 in 1951. Until 1934 half of the Executive Committee of the Party had been Jewish.[39]

9. The Socialists were moderated by the residence of some members in other countries during the war.

Some Socialists sought exile in countries such as Sweden and England. Experiences outside Austria worked to moderate the Austrian Socialists' views.

> "In London a precarious attempt to preserve the organizational continuity of Austrian socialism was maintained by the London Bureau of Austrian Socialists, set up by Oscar Pollak, who had been the editor-in-chief of the Arbeiter Zeitung in 1934. The close links established with members of the British Labor Party, as well as the group's belief in subordination of socialist goals to the overriding necessity of victory over Hitler, made it heir to the Social Democratic tradition rather than to the principles of the Revolutionary Socialists. No contact between the London Bureau and the former members of the Socialist organization remaining in Austria existed. The physical and intellectual isolation of the London Bureau from the forces which, in April, 1945, were active in the revival of the Party, rendered it of slight importance in shaping the Party's postwar development. More significant in the long run was the prolonged exposure to the moderate political climate of Great Britain of such prewar Leftists as Oscar Pollak and Karl Czernetz, who returned to influential posts in the Austrian Socialist Party after the liberation of the country."[40]

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[38] Bader, p. 8.

[39] Kurt L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism (New York: State University of New York, 1962), p. 79.

[40] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

Among those who went abroad to escape the Hitler regime the most uncompromising revolutionaries refused to return to Austria at the end of the war, perceiving the hopelessness of their efforts.[41]

10. The Socialist Party was also moderated because the left wing was discredited by the actions of the Soviet Union.

During the Four Power occupation, the Soviets carried off machinery from their section, exploited the area to the fullest, and left the region in an unprofitable state when they left.

> "In April 1945 the Austrian government claimed that the Soviet occupation had cost Austria about $1,250 million. Of this sum about $100 million were actually occupation costs until 1953. The value of Austrian factory machinery and equipment shipped to the Soviet Union in 1945 and 1946 was estimated at about $164 million. Among the Austrian enterprises confiscated by the Russians as 'German external assets' were some of the most important Austrian plants, like the Wiener Locomotive Works; the Glanzstoff Company, which fabricates all of Austrian rayon; all then existing Austrian glass factories; and many others which were operated by the Russian Central Administration of Former General Property (USIA), which the Austrians claim was not run efficiently."[42]

These actions served to discredit the Communist Party and led to the further diminution of the left wing of the Socialist Party.

11. Change in the international climate had a moderating effect on both groups.

Partly as a result of the liberalization of the international Catholic Church after World War II, the People's Party now concentrated on the Republic of Austria rather than on the

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[41] Shell, p. 164.

[42] Hans Kohn, The Future of Austria (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1955), p. 39.

Kingdom of God. The focus of the Socialists also shifted to Austria because of the end of the revolutionary era which had existed during the interwar period.

12. The development of a national identity allowed the two groups to work together as Austrians.

The experience of World War II caused Austrians to reject the idea that they were part of a German state and replace it with an Austrian national identity. Pan-Germans were reduced to saying that Austrians must never hate Germans--a big step from saying that Austrians are also Germans. The new national identity allowed the two groups to work together in solving Austria's problems rather than supporting outside loyalties within Austria as was the case during the interwar period.

13. Newly created crosscutting cleavages have moderated hostility.

During the First Republic the rural-urban cleavage coincided with the division between Socialist Party members and Christian Social Party members. Since then urbanization has proceeded rapidly, increasing the contact between the groups. As of 1961, one-fourth of all Austrians lived in Vienna. Linz, Graz, Innsbruck, and Salzburg had populations of over 100,000. Another eleven per cent of the total population lived in towns with populations of between 10,000 and 100,000.[43]

During the interwar period there was a strong antagonism between Vienna, which always had an identity of its own, and

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[43]Kurt Steiner, Politics in Austria (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1972), p. 49.

the rest of the country. There was antagonism between the parochial outlook of provincials and the cosmopolitan outlook of the Viennese, between the agricultural countryside and the industrial and commercial center, between the peasant proprietor and the factory proletarian, and between Catholicism and Marxist materialism and atheism.

> The establishment of industrial complexes in Upper Austria under the Nazis, the exodus from Vienna during the wartime bombings and from the Soviet occupied eastern part of the country after the war, the settlement of expellees fleeing from the Soviet army, and the more rapid industrial recovery of western Austria because of Marshall Plan aid--all these provided an impetus for a large population shift. In 1932, 3.7 million of Austria's total population of 6.7 million lived in eastern Austria (Vienna, Lower Austria, and Burgenland); in 1961, only 3.2 million of the total population of 7 million lived there. In the interval, the population of Vienna had decreased by 16 percent, that of Burgenland by 9 percent, and that of Lower Austria by 5 percent. All other provinces showed increases, particularly the three western provinces of Vorarlberg (46 percent), Salzburg (41 percent) and Tyrol (33 percent)."[44]

During the First Republic, western Austria was a conservative stronghold, while much of the Socialist strength was concentrated in eastern Austria. With the east-west shift in population, the Socialists have become more evenly distributed. From 1951 to 1961 approximately two million Austrians, nearly one-third of the total population, moved to another city or town.[45]

The east-west migration of people, increased urbanization, and the development of urban centers to rival Vienna's prominence, have all accounted for increased contact between Social-

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[44] Ibid., p. 52.

[45] Bluhm, p. 91.

ists and Catholics. This has produced crosscutting cleavages. Evidence from an Austrian village has been presented by Powell to show that crosscutting cleavages were present in 1967 and that they have been important in minimizing hostility.[46]

Table 1. Social cleavage position and displeasure at the prospect of interparty marriage.

Party	Social cleavage position	Displeased %	N
Socialist	Cumulative	9	57
	Crosscutting	4	51
People's Party	Cumulative	20	10
	Crosscutting	3	34

Table 2. Social cleavage position and distrust of the political opposition.

Party	Social cleavage position	Distrustful of opposition %	N
Socialist	Cumulative	25	44
	Crosscutting	13	45
People's Party	Cumulative	20	10
	Crosscutting	7	28

When measured in terms of displeasure at the prospect of interparty marriage and distrust of the political opposition, it is shown that political hostility is less among those who are crosspressured. This suggests that crosspressures in Austria have had some effect on the moderation of its conflict.

The Powell data were rejected by Nordlinger as insignificant because of the low differences between crosspressured and non-crosspressured Socialist and People's Party members on the two measures of political hostility--percentage point differ-

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[46] G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility: An Austrian Case Study (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 38.

ences of 5, 17, 12, and 13 were cited by Nordlinger. The interesting data, however, are the responses of the Austrians who were not crosspressured. Only 9 per cent of the Socialist Party members would experience displeasure at the prospect of inter-party marriage. Distrust of the political opposition was shown by only 25 per cent of the Socialist Party members and 20 per cent of the People's Party members.[47] The level of political hostility among Austrians in general is low. In each of the four categories, the percentage of those who were crosspressured and expressed political hostility is half of the percentage of those who were not crosspressured and expressed political hostility. So, even though the differences in percentage points between crosspressured and non-crosspressured people are not large, the differences are significant. The Powell data give considerably more support to the crosspressures hypothesis than Nordlinger allows.[48]

It is also significant that half of Powell's sample of Austrian villagers fell into mixed cleavage positions. If this percentage of people in crosspressured positions is an indication of the extent of crosscutting cleavages for all of Austria, it would mean that, given the evidence above showing the effect of crosspressures, crosscutting cleavages is an important factor in moderating conflict in Austria.

14. The nationalization of industries, which occurred for a reason independent of the conflict, was a moderating in-

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[47] Ibid., p. 38.

[48] Nordlinger, p. 95.

fluence on both groups.

> "In 1946 and 1947 the Coalition Government agreed on the nationalization of the banks and a number of key industries. These included coal, iron and steel production, the mining and smelting of other metals, the nitrogen works at Linz, certain sections of the machine and light-metal industry, and the production of locomotives and rolling-stock, the electrical industry, and the production of electric power. There were a number of reasons why both parties approved so large a measure of nationalization. The railways, the post office, and the sale of salt and tobacco had been nationalized under the Habsburgs, and there were compelling arguments for the extension of State control at this stage. Some of the industries now nationalized had been seriously damaged during the war. Some were in process of development on a grand scale but were incomplete. Others again were essential to the national economy but could not be run at a profit. The capital and over-all planning necessary to deal with the situation could not be provided by private enterprise, but part of it at least might be provided by the State. Whatever was done must be part of a co-ordinated plan. The aluminum works at Ranshofen, for example, would become a white elephant unless the necessary electric current were available. These considerations brought the People's Party into accord with the Socialists and Communists."[49]

The issue of economic organization was resolved as an expediency and independently of any ideology. The need to nationalize industries was imposed by the crisis situation following the war and in defense against the Soviet Union. For the Socialists, the nationalization of some industries meant the gain of part of their demands. The Catholics probably learned that nationalization--and, by implication, socialist measures in general--was not in fact as onerous as they previously believed.

15. The Catholics gained the reinstitution of religious instruction in the schools.

While the Socialists gained nationalization of industries,

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[49]Richard Hiscosks, The Rebirth of Austria (London: University Press, 1953), p. 101.

the Catholics also realized one of their demands. In 1945 obligatory religious instruction was reinstituted. The state now provides 60 per cent of personnel salaries for the private Catholic schools which in 1964 were 100 of the 4,300 primary schools, 46 of the 210 higher secondary schools, and 17 of the 31 teacher training institutes.[50] Thus, both the Socialists and the Catholics made gains which had not been possible during the interwar period.

Conclusion

The above analysis, based on more extensive research than that done by Nordlinger, shows that, by and large, Nordlinger's analysis of the case of Austria is incorrect. Although the conflict has been successfully regulated, this has been so for reasons other than those given by Nordlinger. Virtual resolution of the issues involved and changes in nonelite characteristics account for successful conflict regulation.

Nordlinger suggests that conflict in Austria has been regulated through three conflict regulating practices. Coalition arrangements were renewed before each national election up to 1966. Under these arrangements the crucial decisions were made outside the cabinet in the coalition committee made up of a handful of top leaders. Second, the Proporz has been applied to all civil service positions, to the diplomatic corps, and to positions in the nationalized industries. Third, the mutual veto was exercised in the coalition committee.

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[50]Steiner, p. 201.

Elites control nonelites through a mass party system which has been accompanied by a high voter turnout, an extensive network of officers, and a wide range of ancillary organizations. This system of structured elite predominance allows the elites to act on their conflict regulating motives. The first one applicable to the case of Austria is external threat. Nordlinger makes the point that the Grand Coalition and the use of the Proporz principle were responses to the presence of Soviet occupation forces.

> "Recognizing their mutual goals of preventing Russia from carrying off their industrial infrastructure and of avoiding Soviet domination and rapidly terminating both Soviet and Allied occupation required national unity, the leaders of the two Lager were readily motivated to reach a conflict regulating agreement."[51]

A second conflict regulating motive was the economic needs of Austrians in 1945. Both sets of leaders were influenced by the need for postwar reconstruction and the desire to make maximum use of Marshall Plan aid. The third motive is the avoidance of bloodshed. Because of a high potential for civil war, the Grand Coalition was formed.

Nordlinger accounts for the failure of the First Austrian Republic by citing the detrimental effect which Germany's pressure for Anschluss had on Austria.

> "That newly established regime was without a national tradition, nor did it inspire national feelings and loyalties among the Catholics, many of whom adopted a strongly pan-German orientation. In this context Germany's pressures for Anschluss only succeeded in exacerbating the Red-Black conflict. In the 1930's many Catholics certainly preferred to live as Germans to liv-

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[51] Nordlinger, pp. 44-45.

ing alongside the anticlerical Socialists."[52]

Political insecurity on the part of the top leaders of the Socialist Party detracted from conflict regulating efforts.

> "From the Republic's beginning in 1919 the heads of the Social Democratic Party were committed to the democratic regime and the pursuit of their socialist goals through electoral and organizational means. However, the top leaders were very much afraid of being outflanked and of having their party disrupted by a group of high-ranking Socialist leaders with strong left-wing and communist proclivities. This group presented a sufficiently strong challenge to the top leaders' positions and authority to impel the latter to go beyond the reformism in which they believed. In order to bolster their positions and authority the top leaders publicly adopted a revolutionary language, as in their famous Linz party program of 1926, which referred to the expected violence of the class conflict and their own readiness to use force in carrying out their historic mission if confronted with force or illegal acts on the part of the bourgeois Catholics. Although the leaders of the Catholic Lager were not motivated toward a conflict-regulating outcome, the Socialist leaders' pronouncements only succeeded in exacerbating already formidable antagonisms, out of which emerged a short civil war and a (domestic) dictatorship."[53]

There are certain aspects of the Austrian case which seem to fit Nordlinger's model. Between the civil war of 1934 and the establishment of the Second Republic there was a change in the willingness of elites to work together. The role of external threats was very great. Four Power occupation and the Russian confiscation of machinery were uniting forces. At the same time, the ideal of Anschluss with Germany had disappeared as a threat. While the idea of a state composed of members of the German race had greatly declined in popularity in Germany, the Austrians had made considerable progress in shaping

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[52]Ibid., p. 44.

[53]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

a national identity resistant to such a pressure. After World War II, economic motives were also important in bringing the groups together. Not only was there the desire to benefit from Marshall Plan aid, but the extreme war-stricken condition of the Austrian economy demanded attention. Moreover, the elites did in fact institute the three conflict regulating practices which Nordlinger cites.

Now although Nordlinger is accurate in attributing these characteristics to the Austrian case, he was wrong about two points. First, it does not seem possible that the motive of avoidance of bloodshed would have been important in 1945 in terms of elites desiring to avoid a repeat of the 1934 civil war. By the end of World War II and in the face of the damage suffered by Austria in the preceding seven years, the civil war of 1934 must have seemed remote. Second, mass political parties were ineffective in controlling nonelites. Mass political parties were in existence during the interwar period, a period in which Nordlinger describes the Socialist Party as being insecure.

Nordlinger also overlooked the following factors. First, part of the reason that the change in elite attitudes was so important is that the elites were probably more extreme than the nonelites. The leaders of the Catholics were more extremist than their peasant supporters. The leaders of the Socialist Party, although it is difficult to know for sure, were probably also more extremist than their nonelite supporters. Thus, because the earlier conflict was probably an elite conflict,

changes in elite attitudes were sufficient for conflict regulation to take place.

Second, the process by which the elites became willing to compromise is more involved than Nordlinger's conflict regulating motives suggest. There was a change in the make-up of the party leaderships. The left-wing Socialist leaders were physically eliminated so that the more moderate wing of the Party remained to cooperate with the Catholics. Extremist Catholic leaders had been discredited during the Dollfuss regime and by their complicity with the Germans. After 1945, elites were unable to act in the same way they did during the First Republic. This demonstrates the importance of nonelite sentiment in guiding political decisions.

There are additional motives to those mentioned by Nordlinger which caused the elites to cooperate. For many elites common bonds were established during the mutual concentration camp experience. The international Catholic Church became more liberal, moderating the position of the Austrian Catholics. Catholic views were probably also moderated when the Catholics came to realize that nationalization, a fait accompli, was not as bad as they had thought. After nationalization occurred in response to economic demands, and it became evident that socialism was not going to follow, they probably became less worried about social reform measures. Changes in the international climate also affected the Socialists. The decline of anticipation of revolutions everywhere dampened the revolutionary outlook of the Socialist Party. The loss of model regimes

affected both parties--the Catholics lost the Italian model of a corporate state while the Soviet Union ceased to be a model for the Socialists. Distance from the conflict also had a moderating effect. While the conflict was suppressed for seventeen years--during the seven years of Anschluss and ten years of Four Power occupation--the two groups were able to become more moderate and establish a common basis. The experience of exile in Social Democratic countries also moderated the views of some Socialists.

Contrary to the view presented by Nordinger that elites are able to override nonelite hostilities and moderate conflicts on their own, there is no reason to believe that conflict regulation was imposed on nonelites who would have continued to fight without elite intervention. There is nothing to indicate that the attitudes of the nonelites were less moderate than those of the elites. There is some evidence to support the idea that the elites were more extreme, but none that they were more conservative than the nonelites.

Changes in three nonelite variables which Nordlinger explicitly claims are insignificant--national identity, crosscutting cleavages, and segmental isolation--also acted to moderate the conflict. By the time of Four Power liberation, Austrians had begun to develop a unique national identity. Powell's data shows that crosscutting cleavages have acted to moderate hostility. Increased contact between the two groups, due to east-west migration, increased urbanization, and the development of urban centers outside Vienna also occurred.

The two groups, even if they had wanted to fight each other after the war, were in a weakened position to do so. They had both lost their paramilitary groups. The Catholics also lost their Italian support.

Although compromise is one of Nordlinger's six conflict regulating practices, he fails to mention it for the case of Austria. The substantial compromises made between the two groups in 1945 were an essential factor in regulating the conflict. Although there had been a decline in the importance accorded the various issues, the compromises which were made virtually resolved the issues. The Socialists gained nationalized industries and social programs while the Catholics gained religious instruction in schools. While Nordlinger fails to mention these compromises, they were crucial in moderating conflict.

The above conditions brought about a situation in which the elites were able to form a coalition government and institute Proporz and mutual veto. While these alone would not have been able to contain the conflict in 1934 which was controlled only through a closed regime, they did come about in 1945 because of the virtual resolution of the issues and changes in nonelite characteristics. Thus, the way in which conflict was regulated in Austria is closer to the Type II model than to the Type I model.

LEBANON

Introduction

Lebanon, in contrast to Austria, is a case where conflict has never been resolved. While the presence of hostility is continuous, the intensity of conflict has fluctuated. Although it may appear that the 1958 conflict was regulated, the underlying causes of conflict remained so that the conflict reappeared in the 1975-1976 civil war. First a description of the conflict in Lebanon will be given. Then the long-range causes will be outlined. A discussion of the causes of upsurges in the conflict will follow. The conclusion will assess Nordlinger's theory with respect to the case of Lebanon.

Description of the Conflict

There has been continuing conflict in Lebanon between the Moslem half of the population and the Christian half. This fifty-fifty division between Moslems and Christians makes Lebanon unique among the Moslem Arab states of the Middle East. The Christian sects include Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Protestants, Syrian Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholics, and Nestorian Chaldeans while the other half of the population consists of three Moslem sects--Sunnis, Shiites, and Druzes.

Mount Lebanon, because of its abundance of water and fertile soil at high altitudes, deep ravines and high cliffs, has been the location of persecuted minorities. It has been possible to live in the Mountain, relatively free from the surround-

ing political environment. During the Ottoman Empire, the Mountain served as a refuge for Christians and was given a special status as a millet.

The European powers acted to ensure the security of the Christians on the Mountain in the nineteenth century. The Règlement Organique, signed by France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Turkey, and later Italy in 1861, guaranteed the autonomy of the Mountain. A mutassarifiyah was to be appointed by the Ottoman Porte but approved by the signatory powers. Of all the Turkish provinces, Mount Lebanon enjoyed the greatest amount of stability, security, and prosperity for the remaining years of the Ottoman Empire.

After World War I, Lebanon and Syria were ruled by French Mandate until 1943. In 1920 France formed Greater Lebanon which has lasted until today. The augmentation of Lebanon included the Biqa plain and the coastal strip, areas which were carved out of Syria. This made the size of Lebanon twice that of the original mountain. It also rendered the population almost equally divided between the two main religious groups with six Christians for every five Moslems.

Lebanon gained its independence in 1943 when, in response to British pressure, the French allowed general elections. Immediately following installation, the new government opened negotiations for the effective termination of the French Mandate. In defiance of a statement by the French that they could not allow unilateral changes in the Lebanese Constitution, a special Bill containing the proposed constitutional amendments

was passed. The Bill suggested the removal from the Constitution of all references to the Mandate, the assertion of Lebanon's sovereign state, and the discontinuance of French as a second official language.

> "Returning from hasty consultations with the French National Committee in Algiers, Helleu arrived that very day in Beirut to find the constitutional amendments already in force. The Delegate-General, however, was not prepared to accept the accomplished fact. Upon his order, French Marines and Senegalese troops were sent in the early morning of 11 November to arrest the Lebanese President and his leading ministers in their beds. Forthwith Bishara al-Khuri, Riyad al-Sulh, three other members of his Cabinet, and one prominent Moslem deputy were unceremoniously hurried to the fortress of Rashayya in the Wadi al-Taym region, where they were kept as prisoners. Meanwhile, decrees were issued by Helleu announcing the suspension of the Constitution, the dissolution of the Chamber, and the appointment of Emile Edde as Chief of State."[1]

The French arrest of the President and the cabinet so enraged every confessional community that it created for the first time a consensus for preserving Greater Lebanon. The Christians and Moslems together organized a country-wide strike. Faced with an impossible situation, and in response to British and American pressure, the French reversed their policy.

> "On 17 November General Catroux arrived in Beirut, sent by the Algiers Committee to deal with the Lebanese situation on the spot. Helleu, who had 'unified the whole Lebanese nation against France in a single night,' was immediately recalled from his post. Finally, on 22 November, President Khuri and his fellow prisoners were released from Rashayya and returned to Beirut in triumph. The French Mandate, in effect, was now over."[2]

Since independence the number of political parties has risen to more than twenty. Although they cover a broad poli-

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[1]Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: The Trinity Press, 1965), p. 189.

[2]Ibid., p. 190.

tical spectrum, they may readily be identified as confessional groups. They range from exclusively Lebanese parties such as the Kataeb headed by Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun's National Liberals' Party which advocate reform rather than revolution and have Christian supporters to Arab nationalist parties such as the Moslem Brethren, Arab Nationalists' Movement, and the Baath Party which seek a revolutionary transformation throughout society and are supported by Moslems.

In 1943, at the time of independence, an unwritten agreement was made by President Bisharah al-Khoury and Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh. It must be considered an integral part of the Lebanese Constitution. The National Pact, or National Covenant, consists of four points and contains several of Nordlinger's conflict regulating practices. It was an attempt to balance the two groups. First, Lebanon is to be completely independent and sovereign--it should not be controlled by a Western or an Arab state. Second, Lebanon should have an Arab "face" while remaining culturally distinct. Third, Lebanon should cooperate with all the Arab states, providing that they recognize Lebanon's boundaries. Finally, public offices are to be distributed equitably among the major confessions, although competence should come first in technical positions. A domestic policy which favors one sect at the expense of another, or a foreign policy that brings Lebanon into excessively close relations with any country is to be avoided.

In spite of the National Pact, there has been unrest in Lebanon. Since independence, two civil wars have taken

place involving fighting among paramilitary groups. While the paramilitary groups are attached to individual za'ims (patron elites), the army is unable to mediate disputes because of its relatively small size and because of the possibility that it might split into various confessional groups if it were used.

The 1958 civil war was precipitated by the appeal of Nasserism to the Moslem Lebanese. Contrarily, the Lebanese President made overtures to the West such as refusing to break off relations with France and Great Britain after the Suez Crisis and by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine which the Moslems objected to on the basis that it violated the National Pact. Thus, the Christians felt the Moslems were leaning too heavily toward the Arab world while the Moslems felt the Christians were leaning too heavily toward the West. The attempt by the President to succeed himself and corruption on his part served as a pretext for the war. These factors produced a situation in which acts of violence and sabotage were daily occurrences.

On May 8, 1958, Nasib al-Matni was killed by unknown assassins. Matni was the publisher and owner of a Beirut daily which was critical of Chamoun and his administration. The motive for the murder and the murderer were never discovered. The opposition accused the Government of the crime. Several political groups joined to declare a general strike throughout the country. Within three days trouble had started in the old quarter of Tripoli and the Basta quarter of Beirut--the most important Sunni Moslem strongholds in the country. Although Matni was a Maronite Christian, his newspaper had been backing the predomi-

nantly Sunni opposition. Therefore, his murder provided a convenient excuse for a Moslem insurrection.

On May 9, the opposition United National Front, made up of prominent traditional leaders, met and decided to begin an armed revolt. Kamal Jumblatt, the traditional leader of the Druze Moslems, was chosen to start it in the mountains. After Jumblatt's force of 250 captured eighteen villages, the army intervened at the appeal of Chamoun. After four days of fighting, Jumblatt was forced to withdraw.

In the early hours of July 14, a revolution overthrew the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq; the entire royal family was killed and the body of one of its members dragged in the streets and dismembered. The next day American marines landed in Lebanon. While the Lebanese Army generally had not been used to contain the violence, the presence of the American marines was able to stem the violence to a certain extent. On July 31, General Ruad Chehab of the Army was elected President--an event which signalled the end of a civil war in which 2,000-4,000 people were killed over a five-month period.

The 1975 civil war began when members of the Christian paramilitary Kataeb were murdered by passengers in an unmarked car outside a church where their leader, Pierre Gemayel, was attending a ceremony in a village outside Beirut. The Kataeb assumed this to be an attack by Palestinians and responded by killing Palestinian passengers on a bus returning from a procession celebrating a raid into Israel. The fighting spread throughout the country, resulting in a civil war which produced

60,000 dead and 100,000 wounded by the end of 1976.

The actions of Palestinians inside Lebanon contributed to the conflict. They steadily increased the influx of arms into Lebanon and turned most of the refugee camps into military bastions.

> "Palestinian elements belonging to various splinter organizations resorted to the kidnapping of Lebanese and sometimes foreigners, to holding them prisoners, questioning them, torturing them, and sometimes even killing them. These elements took the liberty of erecting check-points on our major highways and crossroads, stopping traffic, checking the identity cards of passengers, and hampering the normal life of the people. They committed all sorts of crimes in Lebanon, and also escaped Lebanese justice in the protection of the camps. They smuggled goods into Lebanon and sold them openly on our streets. They went so far as to demand 'protection' money from various individuals and owners of buildings and factories situated in the vicinity of their camps."[3]

While the Christians were irritated by the activities of the Palestinians, the Moslems did not oppose them strongly.

Fifty-eight ceasefires were attempted by the Lebanese elites. At the beginning of 1976 a New Lebanese National Covenant was agreed to which included compromises such as the equal division of parliamentary seats between Christians and Moslems, replacing the previous six-five basis; the prime minister to be elected by the Chamber of Deputies rather than appointed by the president; a call for fiscal, economic, and social reform; development in the area of education with the aim of making free instruction general and compulsory and the introduction of a curricula to promote national unity; the strengthening

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[3]Edouard Ghorra, Statement by H. E. Ambassador Edouard Ghorra, Chief of the Lebanese Delegation at the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, October 14, 1976.

of the army; amendments to the naturalization laws; and the strict enforcement of the 1969 Cairo Agreement. Despite these agreements, the fighting continued throughout the year. The violence was finally controlled only through a Syrian occupation in November, 1976, and the introduction of a 30,000-man Arab League peacekeeping force.

Long-Range Causes of the Conflict

Differential segmentation is a situation conducive to communal conflict. The following six characteristics of Lebanese society show that Lebanon is a case of differential segmentation and that there are additional factors which contribute to the conflict-ridden nature of Lebanese society.

1. The two religious groups have extreme cultural differences.

The two groups are distinguishable and have separate value systems.

> "There are a number of 'signs' which distinguish Christians from Moslems and, at times, distinguish the members of one sect from those of any other. Foreign education and bi- or tri-lingualism on the part of a Lebanese, for instance, is a pretty good indication that he is a Christian. If he does not know or does not care to use Arabic, but is proud of his facility in French, it is almost certain that he is a Maronite. The naming procedure is another distinguishing factor. As any Arab knows, there are strictly Moslem names, strictly Christian ones, and few common to both. In Lebanon, one can even spot a strictly Greek Orthodox and some exclusively Maronite ones. When introductions are made, a person listens carefully to detect the name of his new acquaintance and determine how he will behave toward him or in his presence. Not only do the Christians and Moslems have different educational backgrounds, they do not share the same mores or moral standards, either. The Moslems in general do not allow or approve of the mixing of the sexes to the same extent Christian Lebanese do. Christian marriages are monogamous and divorce is difficult, rare, and frowned upon. Among the Moslems, though the situation is changing

> somewhat, polygamy is permitted and divorce is neither shameful nor exceedingly difficult. Both Christians and Moslems are quite aware of the differences and while one side looks upon the other as backward, it itself is viewed as immoral. This situation is not conducive to better understanding and eventual homogeneity. This aloofness is expressed in the lack of social intercourse between Christians and Moslems in particular. It is very strongly evident in the near absence of any interfaith marriages in the country. Such marriages are opposed by the communities, the families of the individuals involved, and the religious authorities, Christian and Moslem alike. Even cases of interfaith marriages within the Christian or the Moslem population are rare, and if a Christian-Moslem marriage takes place, it is not unusual for 'honor killings' (almost always of the girl involved) to follow."[4]

During the French Mandate, the Christians welcomed the French as protectors of their status in Lebanon. In turn, the French favored the Christians by choosing them over the Moslems for civil service jobs. The Christians, especially the Maronites, developed a Western culture. Many Christians learned the French language and attended French schools. The French attempted to develop a Lebanese identity distinct from Arabism by fostering the ideas of "Phoenicianism" and "Mediterraneanism." The first states that Lebanese are racially and culturally Phoenician in origin and thus different from Arabs. Mediterraneanism maintains that Lebanese belong to the same racial group that inhabits the land bounding the Mediterranean Sea and that their culture is Mediterranean rather than Arab. These Christian ties with France have persisted. Thus, the culturall differences between the two groups were accentuated by the French.

2. The two communal groups are segmented.

Communal segmentation is present in a country when each

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[4]Michael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 40-42.

ethnic group possesses its own complete network of cultural and social institutions, its own values and norms, its own organizations, associations and groups to structure its activities in the various areas of social life. While segmentation may have the positive effect of eliminating areas of divergent interests, it also can produce the following conditions which may contribute to the existence of latent conflict by creating divergent interests. Segmentation makes discrimination more likely; it reduces the chances that communal groups will become integrated; it implies the existence of communal institutions and organizations which may oppose the institutions and organizations of other groups; it tends to feed existing hostilities, suspicions, or mistrust; and, because segmentation implies parallel cleavages, divergent interests which are not intrinsically communal will take on a communal character.[5]

The population in Lebanon is segmented because many institutions are related to the various religions. Each religious group that is recognized by the government has its own personal status courts. Cases of personal status are subject to these religious courts and the lawyer handling the case must be of the same religious persuasion. Thus, for official governmental or legal purposes, not only is there no atheism in Lebanon, but each and every Lebanese has to be identified with or belong to a particular sect.

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[5]Maurice Pinard, "Communal Segmentation and Communal Conflict: A New Theoretical Statement," in Ray E. Johnston, ed., The Politics of Division, Partition, and Unification (New York: Praeger, 1976),

Private schools are usually run by a religious sect. Even many of the government schools may be considered confessional as Moslems often predominate. There is a Moslem Boy Scout organization and Christian Boy Scout groups. The Red Crescent is the Moslem counterpart of the Red Cross. The various religious sects maintain their own social and welfare organizations. Contributions to non-denominational causes are either unknown or quite rare. As each political party prints its own newspaper, there is no neutral press.

The population is divided territorially. The Maronites predominate in Mount Lebanon and Zgharta, the Sunnis in Tripoli and Sidon, the Shiites in South Lebanon and the Biqa plain, the Druzes in the Shuf area of Mount Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox in Koura, the mountain east of Tripoli, and each of Beirut's neighborhoods may be characterized as the territory of one specific religious group.

Thus, as the two groups have few common institutions and little interaction, it may be said that they live in separate worlds.

3. Because of economic differences, the two groups are differentially segmented.

The communal groups in a society are differentially segmented when there are economic, status, and power inequalities, whether these inequalities have their roots in class, regional, size or other differences.[6] When such a situation occurs, there is a possibility that these latent grievances may lead

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[6] Pinard,

to the development of communal conflict.

There are several indicators of the disadvantaged position of the Moslems compared to that of the Christians. Christians are generally more literate than Moslems. Educational differences are accentuated by the fact that Christians dominate in private schools and government schools are of a lesser quality. The government schools have always been fewer and are not on a par with the private ones.[7] During the schoolyear 1972-1973 the total number of students in government schools was 298,319 compared to 366,987 in private schools. North and South Lebanon (the Sunni and Shiite Moslem strongholds) together have a population that is almost twice that of Mount Lebanon. Yet Mount Lebanon has 80 per cent as many children in schools as the other two areas combined.[8]

It is far more expensive to send a child to a private school than to a public one. As the Moslems are generally less wealthy and have more children, they have demanded a vast expansion of state schools in order to equalize opportunities for their children. Preferably, they would like to see full assumption by the state of all elementary and secondary school education. The Moslems argue that parochial schools perpetuate religious divisions and prejudice, while a national school system through a unified syllabus, would not only reduce confessional

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[7]"... only 39 per cent of the students in Lebanon attend public schools, compared with 86 per cent in the United States, 80 per cent in Argentina, 90 per cent in Austria, and 90 per cent in Greece." Michael W. Suleiman, p. 31.

[8]Ibid., pp. 32-33.

tension, but also indoctrinate children of different religions in loyalty to a national ideal.[9]

There has also been an inequitable distribution of income. The IRFED Study (Institut International et Recherche et Formation en vue de Développement Intégral et Harmonisé), done in 1960-1961, has shown that the Moslems in general and the Shiite Moslems in particular, who constitute twenty per cent of the population, are the worst off economically. The Moslem regions are less developed than the Christian ones.

> "The regional distribution of manufacturing and mining establishments in the country was as follows: Beirut 995, Mount Lebanon 241, Beka'a 88, South Lebanon 57. The 1960 IRFED Study of the Lebanese economy further confirms this. It divides Lebanon into three districts of varying stages of development. Mount Lebanon, excluding the Chouf region, is the most advanced, and is called the district of 'initial development.' South Lebanon, the Chouf, and southern Beka'a are the regions of 'underdevelopment.' Finally, northern Lebanon, including the Beka'a and the Baalbek Hermel area are the districts of 'non-development' or 'absolute backwardness.' It is interesting to note also that, while Mount Lebanon is the most advanced of all the regions, the Chouf area in it, which is predominantly Druze, is underdeveloped."[10]

Research carried out between 1957 and 1959 on the business leaders in Lebanon revealed that of 207 respondents to a questionnnaire, four-fifths were Christian, while only half of the population is. Furthermore, in the four sections of agriculture, industry, finance, and services, the Christians made up an overwhelming large proportion except in agriculture where there were 6 Moslems compared to 10 Christians.[11]

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[9]Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Baltimore: The French-Bray Printing Co., 1961), p. 31.

[10]Suleiman, pp. 26-27.

[11]Yusif A. Sayigh, Entrepreneurs of Lebanon: The Role of

The IRFED Study attributed the prosperity of Lebanon, in comparison to its neighbors, to commerce, banking, insurance, and tourist trades. This business sector of the economy is Christian-dominated. The Christians of Lebanon benefit from Lebanon's free enterprise system, the most liberal of the Arab states. They feel threatened by the positions of the various Arab nationalist parties regarding the nationalization of industries, redistribution of national wealth, land reform, and the establishment of a theocratic state.

The different interests of the two groups are reflected in the policies of the various political parties. While the Christian parties advocate the continuance of a free enterprise system, the Moslem parties make socialist demands; Moslem demands for welfare programs have been refused by Christian businessmen who would have to pay for them. Thus, the two groups are not only divided institutionally, but also have conflicting interests.

4. The Christians, because of experiences in the past, are especially fearful in the present situation.

The Christians, although they constitute half of the Lebanese population, are surrounded by a sea of Moslems in the Middle East and therefore feel threatened. In 1860 the Druze Moslems massacred 12,000 Christians on the Mountain.

> "The massacres of 1860 have come down to the present generation of Lebanese and other Middle East Christians as an example of what did and could happen again. Within a brief period of three months, some 12,000 people

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the Business Leader in a Developing Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 69-70.

> were killed, crops were destroyed, and churches and monasteries were burned down. In neighboring Damascus, and for no apparent reason, the Christian sector of town was set on fire and 10,000 Christians were massacred."[12]

The Christians are also conscious of the massacre of three million Armenian Orthodox and Catholics carried out by the Turks between 1895 and 1918 because the Armenian refugees fled to Syria and Lebanon where they were sheltered in Christian homes.

In 1861 the Western Powers acted to ensure the safety of the Christians on Mount Lebanon. The French put the Christians in a privileged position during the Mandate period. Although such Western protection has assuaged the continuing feeling of precariousness which the Christians have as a minority in a Moslem area, the fear remains.

5. The nationalist movement among the Arabs has been especially strong.

The Christians in Lebanon have been particularly sensitive to the rise of Arab nationalism. The nationalist movement in the region of the Middle East has been particularly strong because there is a common bond of language and religion, because of the one-time existence of an extensive Arab Empire, because the various countries have the common experience of having been members of the Ottoman Empire, and because the area was colonized until a recent date. The strength of Arab nationalism was demonstrated by the union of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic in 1958. Thus, Arab nationalism in Lebanon is reinforced by the nationalist ideas fourishing in other Middle Eastern countries.

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[12]Salibi, p. 12.

6. Moslem Lebanese, who had previously been Syrians, were unwilling to accept Lebanon as a legitimate state because they had been forced to become Lebanese during the French Mandate.

When France formed Greater Lebanon in 1920, the religious composition of the population changed greatly. The Sunni Moslem population was increased almost eight times, the Shiite Moslem four times, while the Maronite Christian population increased only by one third.[13] The Moslems added to Lebanon lived in areas which had been carved out of Syria. Many went from being part of the majority religious group in an Arab country to being part of a minority in a Christian-dominated country. Many of the inhabitants of these areas would have preferred to remain Syrians. They favored inclusion of Lebanon in the Arab government of Syria.

> "In 1920, when the territory of Lebanon was enlarged to include the coastal towns, the Tyre region, and the Biqa, the Moslem majority in the annexed districts found itself at a disadvantage. As Moslems or as Arab nationalists, Sunnites and Shi'ites saw that their incorporation in a Lebanese State under Christian domination meant their permanent separation from the Arab Moslem world. Consequently, Greater Lebanon had no sooner been proclaimed than the two groups raised loud cries of remonstrance, protesting against the new territorial arrangement and clamouring for the immediate union of their districts with Syria. In opposing the establishment of an enlarged and separate Lebanon the Sunnites and Shi'ites could count on some help from the Greek Orthodox, among whom the Christian Arab nationalism of the nineteenth century could still arouse some enthusiasm. They also found support among the Lebanese Druzes, especially at the time of the Syrian Revolt (1925-27) when the Druzes of the Hawran were fighting the French across the Lebanese frontier. The Druzes in Greater Lebanon were too few to have an effective share in leadership; they consequently tried to assert their political importance in opposition. Moreover the Druzes, like the Greek Orthodox, resented the favour shown by the French to the Maronites, and were disin-

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[13] Salibi, p. 169.

> clined to show loyalty to a state in which the Maronites were the dominant group."[14]

The marked resistance of the Sunnis remained undiminished until the end of the Mandate. For a long time prominent Sunnis refused to take part in the management of Lebanese affairs, and those who did were viewed by their coreligionists with great suspicion.

> "The Moslems in Lebanon withheld their loyalty to the country on two grounds: first, they felt that their citizenship in an independent Lebanon threatened to separate them from the Arab-Moslem world; second, Greater Lebanon was associated in their minds with French political control, which they hated."[15]

7. The nature of the Lebanese political system makes it difficult for elites to regulate conflict.

There are several features of the Lebanese political system which make it difficult for conflict to be regulated: the multiplicity of elites, the self-seeking nature of the political culture; and the presidential nature of the system.

While the fractionalized elite system of za'ims prevents the rise of national parties and dampens ideological conflict, it has the following inimical consequences. Because of the multiplicity of confessional groups, political security of the top leaders is problematic. There are no elites who represent either the Christians or the Moslems as such. The top leaders represent only one small segment of the population. Thus, there are other leaders within their own general religious group who may attempt to replace them. For example, a Sunni Moslem will

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[14] Ibid., p. 169.

[15] Ibid., p. 173.

be chosen by a Maronite Christian president to be the prime minister. It does not necessarily follow that leaders of other confessional groups will abide by their decisions, nor even that leaders within their own particular religious group will comply. While the groups may have reasons to compromise, it is difficult to effect any agreements because of the fracti nalization among clans. This is especially true because the elites have independent support bases and control their own individual paramilitary groups.

Because of the self-serving nature of the political culture, it is difficult for the government to act to diminish the differences between the two groups. There is a lack of social and development programs. While the Moslems are in need of such things as public schools, the Christians are unwilling to finance them so that differential segmentation persists.

Widespread corruption on the part of elites throws the political system into question. In 1952 President Khoury was accused of corruption. Chamoun was also accused of corruption in 1958.

> "In nature and scope they were similar to those leveled against the former administration of President al-Khuri. They ranged from personal enrichment by the President, his relatives and friends, to creating unnecessary, lucrative government posts for his followers and friends, embezzlement of public funds, bribery, business deals, corruption and miscarriage of justice, and even protection of prostitution."[16]

It is alleged that Chamoun rigged some 1957 elections in order to secure his political control.

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[16]Qubain, p. 33.

> "Cumulative circumstantial evidence indicates that the elections--by and large--were fraudulent. Even without knowledge of the particular circumstances, the figures themselves seem open to question. For instance, in the Beirut district, government candidates won 10 seats out of 11, while only one member of the opposition--Nasim al-Majadalini--managed to squeeze through. At the same time, it is hard to explain, except by assuming some irregularities, how the two opposition leaders, Sa'ib Salam and Abdullah al-Yafi--traditional deputies for Beirut, highly respected and with a large popular following--were defeated. In Mount Lebanon, all 10 seats were won by government supporters."[17]

After a lull during the Chehab and Helou administrations of 1958 to 1970, corruption again flourished during the Franjieh administration. Because of the widespread nature of political corruption, the confidence of the population in the elites' ability to resolve conflicts was attenuated. Acts of corruption have also precipitated conflicts because the positions of elites have been challenged on the basis of their actions.

Under the constitution the president is invested with such extensive powers that, because the president is always a Maronite Christian, the Moslems have little control over the government. The system of having a Christian president was instituted during the French Mandate. From the standpoint of France, Lebanon stood apart from the Arab countries mainly by virtue of its Christian character. This made it necessary for the president of the Lebanese Republic to be a Christian, especially since the French were there for the purpose of upholding the Christian claims.

The president exercises a great deal of unchecked power. He is elected by the Chamber for a term of six years and is

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[17] Ibid., pp. 56-57.

eligible for reelection only after an interval of six years. He appoints and dismisses all members of the cabinet including the prime minister and all other public officials. He may put into effect by decree any bill which the cabinet considers urgent after its consideration by the Chamber without decision for more than forty days. He has the right to veto bills which only an absolute majority of the total Chamber can override. He may suspend the Chamber for one month in each of its two sessions. The president may also dissolve it completely by decree with the approval of the cabinet which is also appointed by the president.

Although the prime minister acts as a brake on the tremendous power of the president, his authority, by comparison, is feeble. The president has a fixed term of six years while the prime minister may be dismissed at any time. During the first two decades of independence there were three presidents compared to nine different prime ministers. Considering the power of the president, the Christians have had more control of the political process.

The distribution of political positions is based on a 1932 census which showed that there were six Christians for every five Moslems. The seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the four top political positions are allocated according to this census. Since 1932 it is likely that the composition of the population has shifted in favor of the Moslems because the Moslems have a higher birthrate and because more of the emigrants have been Christian than Moslem. Thus, while the com-

position of the country's population has shifted, the political system has not changed in accordance because of its attachment to the 1932 census.

The high degree of power which accompanies the presidency leads the Christians to tenaciously hang onto the position. For the same reason, and because of clan disputes, individual Maronite presidents have also been reluctant to resign at the end of their six-year term. In 1952 President Khoury attempted to amend the constitution in order to be able to succeed himself. Because he had little support, he quietly resigned. In 1958 Chamoun attempted to succeed himself, contributing to the political crisis.

Causes of Upsurges in the Conflict

While there has been continuing conflict in Lebanon, it has been intensified at various times. The situation degenerated into civil war in 1958 and again in 1975-1976 principally because of events outside the country and because of urbanization.

In the 1950's the split between the Christians and Moslems was exacerbated by the rise of Nasserism. A significant part of the Lebanese population, especially the Sunni Moslems, felt sympathetic to Nasser and to his appeals for Arab nationalism and unity.

> "It was during the February recess of the Chamber that Egypt and Syria merged into the United Arab Republic. For Lebanon, the event served only to drive a deeper wedge between the Christian and Muslim communities. As already stated, there was great rejoicing within Muslim quarters and demonstrations of support. Many popular delegations went to Damascus to meet and congratulate its distinguished

> visitor, President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Within certain Muslim groups there was a general air of hopeful expectancy that Lebanon should be next to join the union. But this very idea was anathema to the Christians. They felt that must be avoided at all costs. For union would convert them into a minority group in a predominantly Muslim nation and would lead to the loss of their rights and privileges."[18]

A large number of Moslem Lebanese expressed support of Nasser, especially since Syria, with whom they had close ties, was also identifying with him.[19] Christians in Lebanon feared the growing admiration for Nasser. They saw him as a threat to Lebanese viability and sovereignty.

On the other side, the Lebanese Government's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was seen as a breach of the National Pact and infuriated the Moslem opposition. This was especially true because prior to the acceptance of the Doctrine, the Government refused to break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France following the Suez Crisis in 1956. As the Christians had always looked to the West for support, it was out of the question for Lebanon to break off relations with two major Western nations at the very time when Arab nationalist sentiment was on the rise.

Lebanon was the only country to accept the Eisenhower Doctrine, offered in 1957, which, following the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, offered to provide economic and military aid to any Arab country. Implementation of the Doctrine required that

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[18] Leila M. T. Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 159.

[19] Ibid., p. 128.

the head of state establish the fact that a Middle East country had been attacked by an aggressor under the control of international communism. Opponents of Chamoun interpreted his acceptance of the Doctrine as a breach of the National Pact and as a pro-Western policy.[20] Chamoun was no longer acceptable to Lebanese Moslems--he had overstepped his bounds.[21]

The adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine divided Lebanon into two main groups. The first was composed of the administration and its supporters, a large part of the Maronite community, and the Kataeb who approved of the Doctrine. Another segment, predominantly Moslem, opposed the Government. Arguments were made that Lebanon's adherence to the Doctrine brought it into the East-West conflict in favor of the Western camp and that by accepting the Doctrine, Lebanon was siding with the United States against Egypt and Syria. It was also argued that, because of these two reasons, acceptance of the Doctrine violated the 1943 National Pact.

Acceptance of the Doctrine increased the tension in Lebanon by splitting the population into two hostile groups. Lebanon was brought into the international cold war on the side of the United States. The Egyptian and Syrian governments regarded the Lebanese Government as a member of the enemy camp and as a threat to their own security. Lebanon was subjected to a sustained attack by the Egyptian and Syrian press and

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[20] M. S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: A Documentary Study (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 2-3.

[21] Leonard Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 213.

radio.

> "Following the outbreak of civil war in May 1958, the United Arab Republic, from radio stations in Cairo and Damascus, incited the Lebanese to overthrow the Sham'un regime."[22]

Chamoun had been concerned about the growing support of Nasser. He later said, "If I had not accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine in July, 1958, Lebanon would have been taken over by Nasser."[23] Thus, the attraction to Nasser's Arab nationalism on the part of the Moslem Lebanese was matched by the Christian President's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, further dividing the two groups.

Although primarily external events brought on the civil war, one of the internal causes of the conflict was Chamoun's attempt to amend the constitution in order to succeed himself in 1958. Because of the regional situation, he was able to gain the support of the Kataeb and the Pan Syrian Nationalist Party, two large Christian groups. The attempt at succession gave the Opposition an additional grievance.

External factors again played a major role in the 1975-1976 civil war in the form of the Palestinian population within Lebanon. In 1948 Lebanon had 100,000 Palestinian residents. By 1975 the number had swelled to 400,000. This number must be compared to the number of Lebanese living in Lebanon which is less than three million. More important than the mere increase in numbers was the formation of a Palestinian force separate

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[22] J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 389.

[23] Meo, p. 181.

from the pan-Arab movement. In 1964 the Arab League sponsored the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Under the PLO a Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) was to be organized to provide the Palestinians with the opportunity to share in the Arab effort against Israel. From the beginning the Lebanese Government insisted that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who composed ten per cent of the resident population, could have no PLA in Lebanon.

As Lebanon had such a sizeable Palestinian population, however, the PLA concentrated much of its activity in Lebanon.

> "Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the Head of the P.L.O. until 1968, lived in Lebanon, and it was no secret that the sparsely wooded countryside near his summer residence in the Shi'ite village of Kayfun, which overlooked Beirut, was being used as a training ground for Palestinian commando units under his personal protection. The Deuxième Bureau while it maintained its strict control over the Palestinian camps, was hesitant to clash with Shuqayri and allowed the Palestinian military training to continue in Kayfun, and perhaps also in other restricted areas, in spite of the fact that it was a clear breach of the agreement reached at the Arab summit meeting on the matter."[24]

The refugee camps in the country were turned into fortified arsenals and young Palestinians were trained for commando operations on a large scale.

In 1969 the Cairo Agreement was signed between Yasser Arafat and the Lebanese Army commander which widened the scope of PLA movement in Lebanon and gave the PLO the responsibility for containing its actions. The PLO, however, was unable to control all the various Palestinian factions and the Palestinians took advantage of the agreement. The PLO in Lebanon, with

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[24]Kamal S. Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (New York: Caravan Books, 1976), p. 26.

its attachments to various Arab powers, was able to behave as a state within the State of Lebanon. Because of their mutual support of pan-Arabism, the Moslem Lebanese and the Palestinians fought together against the Christian forces.

Not only have the actions of non-Lebanese groups indirectly exacerbated the Lebanese situation, but groups have directly participated in the fighting in Lebanon. During the civil wars of both 1958 and 1975-1976, the two sides benefitted from support from external sources. A factor which has escalated suspicion and fighting has been the belief by each group that the other is seeking outside help. In both of these conflicts, the two sides saw themselves as fighting something much more threatening than just Moslem Lebanese or Christian Lebanese. In 1958 the Christians were defending Lebanon against Nasser's Arab nationalism while the Moslems were defending Lebanon against Western imperialism. During the recent civil war it was a similar situation. Christians saw themselves as defending Lebanon against radical Arab countries and Palestinians. The Moslems were again defending the country against Western imperialism.

During 1958, the two groups received help from other countries.

> "In one instance during the battle, it was claimed that bodies (killed) of 17 Iraqis, 32 Jordanians, and 55 Bahraynis including a British officer in Arab clothes, were found. In another instance, the bodies of 40 Jordanians."[25]

Other documented participation by outsiders included the infil-

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[25]Qubain, p. 78.

tration of Syrians, Egyptians, and Palestinians, the training of Lebanese opposition members in Syria, the establishment of a recruiting office in Homs, Syria for Syrians to be paid a daily rate to fight in Lebanon, the delivery of 2,000,000 Syrian pounds to the Lebanese opposition on orders of the Syrian Minister of the Interior, and the confiscation by the Lebanese Government of French rifles identical to those used by the Syrian Army.[26] Thus, both the Government and the opposition received aid from non-Lebanese. During the recent civil war the Palestinians and leftists received support from Libya, Iraq, and the Soviet Union in the form of more than $40 million, arms, fighter planes, and volunteer fighters. The Christians were given support by Syria, Israel, and the United States.

Preceding both civil wars, movement of people to the cities acted to bring the groups into contact so that they could fight each other, making the civil wars possible. Lebanon experienced explosive urbanization during the 1950's. Around the coastal cities, and particularly around Beirut, suburbs mushroomed almost overnight, with slum tenements sometimes built to house the village migrants on lands which were legally the property of real estate prospectors or of Christian monastic foundations. Because the outlying rural and tribal regions are predominantly inhabited by Shiite Moslems, the growth of the Shiite suburbs, especially around Beirut, was particularly striking.[27] This migration not only made income differences

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[26]Russell Baker, "U.S. Intelligence Reports on Infiltration into Lebanon are Given to Congress," New York Times, 17 July 1958, p. 9.

[27]Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War, pp. 7-9.

readily apparent, it also put the two groups in positions from which they were able to fight each other.

Before the 1975-1976 civil war, the movement of population again served to facilitate fighting. A juxtaposition of Christians and Palestinians and poor Moslems came about in East Beirut. Because of the growth of the slums due to the movement of villagers to Beirut, especially by Shiite Moslems from southern Lebanon to escape Israeli raids, and the expansion of the Palestinian camps around East Beirut, these groups were mobilized to fight each other.

Conclusion

While in Austria conflict was greatly reduced with the virtual resolution of the issues, in Lebanon the issues have not been adequately resolved so that conflict has remained. Various nonelite characteristics have contributed to the intensity of the conflict.

Nordlinger suggests that conflict in Lebanon has been regulated through three conflict regulating practices. The principle of proportionality, embodied in the 1943 National Pact, applies to the highest elective governmental offices, civil service positions, and the electoral law in that the sectarian composition of each constituency determines the number of deputies to represent each sect. The second practice, mutual veto, exists as a tacit understanding between the Moslem and Christian leaders. The third practice, purposive depoliticization, has two aspects. The governments have refrained from taking on more than a bare minimum of governing

responsibilities in order to avoid touching upon the religious segments' raw sensitivities. Moreover, Lebanese politicians consider it taboo to bring up any issues involving the religious communities in public, especially in the middle of an election.

Nordlinger claims that Lebanese nonelites are controlled through the patron-client system.

> "Each religious sect is structured according to patron-client relationships in which the patrons (or zu'ama') are able to speak and take actions in the name of their supporters. With regard to conflict regulation specifically, the za'im serves 'as a guarantor of the peace; he is able to treat with the heads of different groups and to establish some kind of equilibrium between his community and the outsiders.' And despite the gradual replacement of landowning patrons by commercially based zu'ama', 'sectarian crises are still settled largely through the intervention of the traditional notables, each of whom can calm excited feelings by personal access to his clientele.'"[28]

This system of structured elite predominance allows the elites to act on their conflict regulating motives. The first one applicable to the case of Lebanon is an external threat. The desire to achieve independence from the French Mandate in 1943 acted to unite the two religious groups to conclude the National Pact, which Nordlinger sees as the most important and enduring conflict regulating practice. A second motive is the avoidance of bloodshed. In Lebanon the conflict group leaders have been well aware of the country's explosive potential; they know that even a minor incident involving an insult to one of the religious sects could unleash uncontrolled Christian-Moslem violence. The Lebanese elites are seen as having "exhibited an unusually high degree of responsibility"

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[28]Nordlinger, pp. 81-82.

in their conflict regulating effort.

Although a relatively rapid rate of modernization in Lebanon has had deleterious consequences for conflict regulation, elites are seen as actively regulating conflict through porportionality, mutual veto, and purposive depoliticization. Because the nonelites are controlled through a patron-client system, the elites are able to act on their motives of an external threat and avoidance of bloodshed.

Now while Nordlinger gives the reader the impression that Lebanon is a case where communal conflict has been regulated, in view of the recent civil war, this obviously is not the case. Even before the monograph was written, there was an earlier instance of conflict regulation failure. The 1958 civil war, with a death toll of 2,000-4,000, qualifies as a failure by Nordlinger's standards. It is surprising, to say the least, that Nordlinger puts so much emphasis on the 1943 National Pact, mutual veto, and depoliticization. Fifteen years after independence and in spite of the conflict regulating practices, a civil war, which Nordlinger fails to mention, occurred and was resolved. Because the reader is given the impression that conflict has been regulated by the 1943 National Pact, it is particularly misleading to omit the 1958 civil war. While the existence of the conflict regulating practices remained constant, it is necessary to look elsewhere for variables which explain the end of the civil war.

The above analysis, based on wider reading than Nordlinger covered, shows that the failure to regulate conflict in Leba-

non through an open regime may be accounted for by the intractable nature of the issues and by nonelite characteristics, both factors which Nordlinger has minimized. The issues of Lebanon's status among the Arab countries and the disadvantaged position of the Moslems have persisted. Differential segmentation, the underlying cause of the two civil wars, has remained. The situation in the area surrounding the country also continues to contribute to turmoil in Lebanon. While in Austria the change in the European situation after World War II had a favorable effect in allowing Austria to resolve its conflict, the political situation in the Middle East has aggravated the conflict in Lebanon.

While the nature of the issues has impeded conflict regulation, there also are nonelite characteristics which have made the situation in Lebanon unstable. Differential segmentation has persisted. In contrast to the Austrian case where segmentation exists but groups are more equivalent, differential segmentation has been a serious impediment to conflict regulation. In a situation of communal segmentation, loyalties to the communal group tends to be especially strong. Mobilization is facilitated by the extensive network of communal organizations. Communal conflicts tend to be generalized in that any conflict between individuals or organizations of different communal groups become communal conflicts and government measures tend to become politicized as the communal groups clash over them.[29] All of these conditions have been present

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[29]Pinard.

in Lebanon.

No national identity is fostered in Lebanon. The paucity of public schools does not allow this so that the Christians maintain a Western identity while the Moslems identify with Arab nationalism. Because the two groups see the other as seeking support from outside Lebanon, each side considers itself to be fighting a force much stronger than just Lebanese Christians or Lebanese Moslems.

There is a lack of crosscutting cleavages. As the two groups are segmented, the cleavages of religion, class, and region coincide, resulting in a lack of moderation.

There has been increasing contact between the two groups. Before the 1958 civil war there was increased contact between Christians and Moslems, especially in Beirut, due to the urbanization of the 1950's. Contact was further increased before the recent civil war by the movement of Moslems from South Lebanon to the slums surrounding the Christian areas of Beirut and the growth of the Palestinian camps also around the Christian areas. As the two groups came into contact, the income disparities between the groups became readily apparent. The groups were also mobilized to fight each other. Although these results came about as a product of processes other than modernization, they are the same phenomena which Nordlinger allows for only through the modernization process.

The political system has not been conducive to conflict regulation. Contrary to Nordlinger's claim that the Lebanese system of patron-client relations is a means by which the

elites control nonelites, the multiplicity of confessional groups means that there is a large number of elites, making it difficult for the elites to all agree. Rather than composing a system of patron-client relations pyramided to the national level, as Nordlinger suggests, the various elites, who are not arranged hierarchically, represent only small fractions of the population so that dissension within the two major religious groups is frequent. The self-seeking nature of the political culture has also been deleterious in that it has impeded the introduction of social and development programs which might act to reduce conflict.

Fluctuations in the intensity of the conflict, rather than being related to variations in elite behavior as Nordlinger suggests, may be attributed to the fluctuations in threats to Christians which are related to foreign forces, and to the increasing contact between the groups which brings the groups into competition and puts them in positions from which they are able to fight each other. Thus, the importance of issues and nonelite characteristics can be seen in that the conflict's intensity fluctuates with changes in them.

The analysis shows that the Lebanese case comes closer to the Type II model than to the Type I model of how communal conflict is regulated. Rather than concentrating on elite behavior it seems more fruitful to put emphasis on the role of the issues and on the nature of nonelite characteristics.

MALAYSIA

Introduction

While the chapters on Austria and Lebanon gave alternative interpretations to the ones Nordlinger concluded for the two countries, in the case of Malaysia, because of a lack of information, it is unclear what is a reasonable interpretation of the situation. For this reason, a different format of presentation will be used. First a description of the conflict will be presented. Next Nordlinger's interpretation of these events will be given. Some possible alternative interpretations will be discussed. The conclusion will summarize what the Malaysian case suggests.

Description of the Conflict

Malaysia is a country in Southeast Asia. It consists of the Malayan peninsula and the two Bornean states of Sarawak and Sabah which were added in 1963. At the time of colonization in 1786 there were ten states ruled individually by sultans and inhabited by Malays whose religion is Islam and who speak the Malay language. The Malays lived in kampong villages where they worked as padi peasants or fishermen.

Although Malaya's territorial size of 50,697 square miles is comparable to that of England, Malaysia has been very sparsely populated. When the British originally colonized the three states of Selangor, Perak, and Negri Sembilan there were only 70,000 people. In 1824 the entire population of the peninsula (including all ten states) was only 340,000, making the popula-

tion density considerably low at seven people per square mile. The 1971 population density of 140 people per square mile shows that there has been a tremendous growth in the population.

Although the British needed workers, apart from the fact that there were never many Malay men to spare from the villages, the Malays' aversion for organized labor made it impossible for employers to recruit labor among them. Because of this, with the expansion of export trade, the British encouraged immigration. Chinese came during the second half of the nineteenth century as coolies to work in tin mines. Indians came during the early 1900's to work on rubber estates. Immigration was so extensive that the Malays became outnumbered and the country was transformed into a multiethnic society. The 1971 population of 11.1 million was 47 per cent Malay, 34 per cent Chinese, 8.5 per cent Indian, and 10.5 per cent others (Dyaks, indigenous Borneans, and Eurasians).

--Differential Segmentation

As in Lebanon, differential segmentation exists in Malaysia. The three groups are culturally distinct. They are of three different races, three different religions--Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, they speak different languages--Malay, eight major dialects of Chinese, and various Indian languages, and they have distinctive cultures. The groups have separate institutions--schools, religious institutions, and political parties. There has been economic differences among the groups.

> "Economic inequality still exists. As of 1975, the average household income per month was M$310 for the Indians, M$387 for the Chinese, and M$179 for the Malays. Econo-

> mic activities dominated by non-Malays, such as manufacturing, mining, and construction, have an average income per worker of M$3,500 per year; those dominated by Malays, such as agriculture, livestock, and fishing, have an average of M$1,659."[1]

While Lebanon and Malaysia are both differentially segmented, the Malaysian situation has been less conflict-prone because of two features of Malaysian society. First, the three groups have been in complementary rather than competitive occupations. The Chinese were businessmen or worked in tin mines, the Indians worked on rubber plantations, and the Malays were rural farmers. Thus, issues concerning occupational distribution have not been intense. Second, there has been less urbanization than in Lebanon. While in 1960, 27 per cent of the Lebanese population lived in cities of more than 100,000, in Malaysia only 10 per cent did. Furthermore, in Lebanon there is more contact between villagers and city dwellers because there is ready access to the cities and there is a great deal of interaction between the two groups. The kampong villagers of Malaysia have been more isolated. In Malaysia the low degree of urbanization has meant that the Chinese and Malays live in different areas of the country. While 70 per cent of all Chinese lived in cities, less than a quarter of the Malays did.[2] The territorial segregation of the urban Chinese and rural Malays yielded a situation less conducive to conflict than the Lebanese one because the two groups have not been in positions

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[1] Pran Chopra, "Malaysia's Struggle for Survival," Pacific Affairs, 47 (1974-1975), p. 444.

[2] James W. Gould, The United States and Malaysia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 35.

to compare themselves to each other nor to fight each other. So while differential segmentation has existed in Malaysia, its potential danger has been moderated by complementary occupations and territorial segregation.

British policy, although it favored the Malays, was not opposed by the Chinese because they originally intended to return to China. Because of the British colonial policy, complementary occupations, and territorial segregation, there was apparently no communal conflict until 1945.

> "The native Malays looked on both the Chinese and the Indians as rather unwelcome foreigners, but as British policy was biased towards the Malays, no discontent was caused. Preference was given to the Malays whenever possible: for example, only Malays were eligible to enter the Malayan Civil Service, through which in fact Britain governed the country, although the Sultans had a very great degree of autonomy. Few Malays were interested in politics, or of ridding the country of the British presence."[3]

The ethnic groups, however, were to come into conflict over issues later on. Conflict has been over linguistic, religious, citizenship, educational, and economic issues. Post-war relations between Malays and Chinese have gone through several stages.

--Communal massacres immediately following the Japanese withdrawal.

The first major conflict, in 1945, was touched off by the Japanese occupation of Malaya which came about in 1942 when Britain surrendered to the Japanese Imperial Army. Japan's policy was not uniform in its treatment of Malaya's ethnic

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[3]Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966), p. 27.

groups. The Malays continued to perform the routine administrative and policing duties which they had carried out under the British.

> "Malaya, the Japanese left no doubt, was a Malay country. As a matter of policy they were openly favored. The Rulers were generally treated with deference. Administration and the police force remained predominantly Malay and continued to function. Talented or otherwise distinguished young men were offered scholarships at Japanese educational institutions."[4]

On the other hand, the Chinese were subjected to mass executions, arbitrary terror, confiscatory taxation, and compulsory loans. The differential treatment of the two groups was the result of several factors. First, because of the rivalry between Japan and China, overseas Chinese were persecuted. Second, Japan supported nationalist movements in Southeast Asia in the hope of turning these forces against the enemies. In Malaya this meant support for the indigenous Malays. Third, because the Chinese Communists, as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), made up part of the resistance movement, Malay collaboration was cultivated. Japanese policy which catered to the Malays and the role the Malays had played as puppets for the Japanese during the occupation generated antagonism between the Malays and the Chinese.

During the confusion following the Japanese surrender, Chinese guerrilla fighters came out of the jungle and, with or without trial, executed many of those who had collaborated with the Japanese. Initially the reprisals were an attempt to re-

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[4]Karl von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 54.

place the traditional Chinese leaders, who were businessmen and merchants, with Communist leaders. The retaliation against these traditional leaders grew into a full-scale communal riot. While actions were first taken against Malay policemen who had cooperated with the Japanese, these spread to rural areas. After the Chinese abused Malay cultural heritage, mocked the Moslem faith, tortured their victims, mutilated corpses, and imposed non-Malay burial rites, the Malays began to massacre practically any accessible Chinese.[5] The conflict ended only when the British colonial powers returned to Malaya.

--The dispute over the Malayan Union

The next stage in the conflict revolved around British attempts to set up a new political system, the Malayan Union. In anticipation of demands for democratic reforms and eventual self-government, the British decided to prepare the groundwork for a new parliamentary government when they returned after World War II. Because of the introduction of a new political system, new conflict arose over such values as political power. The Malayan Union, which the British introduced, centralized control of the Malayan states by weakening the power of the traditional leaders of the states and included citizenship proposals calling for the inclusion of all persons born in Malaya or Singapore or residing there for ten out of the preceding fifteen years. Citizenship could be acquired after a residence of five years in Malaya or Singapore. This meant that Chinese

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[5]Ibid., pp. 61-63.

would be able to serve in the government, a right previously reserved for Malays, and as institutions became more representative, all would have an equal right to elect the government.

The Malayan Union met serious opposition form the Malays for several reasons: because they enjoyed a privileged position during the previous British rule; because the Malays saw themselves as "sons of the soil" and outnumbered in their own country; because of the inclusion of the largely Chinese Singaporean population; and because the Malay Rulers' loss of power. Malay nationalism, which had suddenly become a political force, centered around the first Malay political party, the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO).

The non-Malays showed little interest in the Malayan Union despite the opportunities it offered for the exercise of political influence and admission to the government service. The Chinese were mainly preoccupied with the restoration of their businesses rather than with politics. Their lack of interest can also partly explained by the fact that forty per cent of the Chinese were born outside Malaya and many had visions of returning to China after having accumulated a fortune. Malay opposition was focused on the British while Chinese political activity remained dormant. Thus, the Malayan Union mobilized the Malays politically for the first time.

--The Federation of Malaya and Chinese reaction

Because of the intense Malay objection to the Malayan Union, and the diffident attitude of the Chinese, the British replaced it with the Federation of Malaya in 1948. The British

restored the power of the sultans. The Conference of Rulers, consisting of the sultans representing each state, was formed. This body's approval was needed for any changes in immigration laws and any major changes in salary schemes for public offices or government reorganization. These subjects were of particular interest to the Malays who feared and strongly opposed any relaxation of immigration laws favoring non-Malays. Thus, the sultans were given the responsibility of protecting the interests of the Malays.

The Malays were to be given preferential treatment by the British. A government report stated:

> "The Malays live in a country in which they, owing to the influx of foreign immigrants, are already numerically inferior. It is important to emphasize that the Malays have no alternative homeland, while the remainder of the population, with few exceptions, retain in varying degrees a connection with their country of origin, and, in very many cases regard that country and not Malaya as the primary object of their loyalty and affection."[6]

A legislative council was created to which a majority of Malayans was appointed. The racial balance, however, was two Malays for every Chinese.

Citizenship was much more restricted than under the Malayan Union. Malays were automatically citizens. The non-Malays could also become citizens if they normally spoke Malay and followed Malay customs (highly unlikely for Chinese and Indians); or were permanently resident in Malaya, having been born in the federation of a parent born there; or if their fathers were federal citizens at the time of their birth. Others could

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[6] Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 79.

apply to become citizens if they were born in the Federation and had lived there for eight of the twelve years before the application. Aspiring citizens had to know Malay or English and settle permanently in the country. Under these citizenship provisions many Chinese and Indians were excluded. Large numbers of non-Malays spoke only Chinese or an Indian language, many were recent immigrants, and many expected to eventually return to their homeland.

Although Singapore had been included in the Malayan Union, it was excluded from the federation. The resulting population distribution was: Malays, 49 per cent; Chinese, 38½ per cent; and Indians 11 per cent. The Malays had already ceased to have an overall majority and inclusion of Singapore would have meant that the Chinese would have a majority.

The effect of federation was to make Malaya a Malay country under British rule. The demands of Malay nationalism had been satisfied. The Chinese, who had not reacted strongly to the Malayan Union either way, did respond to the modifications embodied in the Federation because of their reduced status from that in the Malayan Union and because by 1948 the rapidly changing political situation in China caused many Chinese to rethink their plans for returning to China, causing them to become more aware of their status in Malaya. They organized a multiracial council which presented three demands: (1) reunion with Singapore, (2) an elected legislature in Malaya, and (3) equal rights for all races. Strike support from many Chinese groups stopped business in Singapore. Despite the protest the

federation was instituted in February, 1948. While the Malayan Union had mobilized the Malays, the Chinese were mobilized in opposition to the Federation of Malaya.

--The Communist uprising: communal or communist?

The second major conflict, a Communist uprising, began in 1948 and involved mainly Chinese Malayans. By January, 1960, when the twelve years of emergency regulations ended, the guerrilla insurrection had cost the lives of 2,473 civilians, 1,865 members of the police, home guard, and military services (Commonwealth and Malayan), and 6,698 terrorist members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).

The insurgency may or may not be interpreted as a communal conflict. While the major studies of the Malayan guerrillas, those by Pye and O'Ballance, do not reveal communal concerns, there is some evidence to support this viewpoint. Although a bid was made to form a non-Malay regiment of 3,000 to fight the guerrillas, a mere 75 enlisted. There was no substantial Chinese opposition to the guerrillas. A generally held view was that some Chinese were Communist insurgents, many more Communist collaborators, and most others were fence-sitters waiting to find out who the victors would be.

> "'Terrorism in Malaya is solely the work of the Chinese Communists and ... it could be easily crushed if the rest of the Chinese population would cooperate more fully with the authorities. The blame for continued activities of these terrorists must therefore be attributed indirectly to the other Chinese,' wrote a prominent Malay law student in London to the Times in September, 1948."[7]

On the other hand, there is evidence to support the argu-

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[7]Von Vorys, pp. 88-89.

ment that the guerrilla movement was basically non-communal. First, the MCP was a continuation of the MPAJA. They had retained the stocks of weapons from the resistance period and had already been mobilized. The activities of the old MPAJA could easily be resumed.

Second, economic discontent among the Chinese squatter population was a factor. The Communist guerrillas gained support among the squatter villages of Chinese which were established in the remote rural areas during the Japanese occupation.

> "The squatter problem was the product of unemployment during the slump of 1932-34 and later in the time of the Japanese occupation of 1942-45. Unemployed Chinese took upland for food cultivation to support themselves and their families. Because they had no permanent title to the land (usually no title at all) they chose to settle in remote and inaccessible areas at the jungle edge."[8]

Because of the British discrimination in favor of Malays in the civil service, education, land ownership, citizenship, and suffrage, there was growing discontent among the Chinese. The rural Chinese population in Malaya amounted to more than one million. Of these 60,000 were active guerrillas. Many Chinese in squatter villages, about 500,000, worked with the Communists.

Third, the guerrilla movement may be seen as part of a worldwide rebellion. The International Communist Party Asia Youth Conference met in Calcutta in February, 1948.

> "At this point the MCP received new instructions from Moscow through contacts at the Communist Youth Conference in Calcutta in February 1948. Russia had broken with the war-time allies and her global strategy now required that troubles should be fomented in the Far Eastern colonial dependencies of Britain and other European powers so as to divert their military sources and also weaken their

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[8] J. M. Gulick, Malaysia (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 111.

> economic strength. The MCP, like other communist parties in South-East Asia, was summoned to revolt."[9]

Within a few months Communist revolts in Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, and Hyderabad, were added to the preexistent ones in Indonesia and Vietnam.

> "The moderate policy was renounced at a meeting of the Central Committee in March 1948, and the Party prepared to pursue the 'Chinese line' in an attempt to emulate the tactics of the Chinese Communist Party, which was then in the process of securing its victory in China through military action. About three months elapsed between this meeting of the MCP Central Committee and the full-scale initiation of guerrilla war by the Communist military units. Extensive preparations for guerrilla operations were made in this period, and the party appeared to have gone underground by stages, the top leaders being the first to vanish into the heart of the Malayan jungles."[10]

Hence it is possible to interpret the conflict as either communal or non-communal. While both seem plausible, it is very difficult to tell which one is applicable. In any case, the conflict was ended through the use of force by the British,

--The Alliance

The next stage was an alliance between Chinese and Malay elites in which a compromise was worked out. A trade-off of Malay political power for Chinese economic power was made. In the 1955 elections the Alliance, a coalition of the UMNO, Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), won an overwhelming majority. After the election the Alliance demanded full independence within two years. The demand was met by the British and August, 1957, was set as

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[9] Ibid., p. 111.

[10] Means, pp. 76-77.

the date for independence.

Before independence the Alliance agreed on a bargain. Some special rights for Malays were to be maintained. These included the reservation of key posts in the armed forces and the police, Malay to be the national language, Islam to be the state religion, acceptance of the sultanates with a Malayan Head of State to be rotated among the state sultans, a proportion of four Malays for every non-Malay in the administrative branch of the civil service, and constituency boundaries drawn to favor the rural areas dominated by Malays. The non-Malays gained rights of residence, economic and religious freedom, and improved conditions for obtaining citizenship including the provision that all non-Malays born in Malaya after independence would be citizens. Elections would not be held until 1959 so that they might benefit from these concessions. Because of the changed citizenship laws, the non-Malays were able to anticipate eventual equality. Thus, the Malays' special privileges were preserved while the political position of the non-Malays was to be improved.

This compromise, which favored the Malays, was possible because of unusual circumstances. Due to the disenfranchisement of the Chinese, there was no true representative of the Chinese nonelite concerns. The businessmen, who had an economic interest in the bargain, did not have mass support among the Chinese. As the Chinese were largely disenfranchised and as the Alliance successfully campaigned on the issue of the Communist insurgency, the Chinese were not a viable opposition. The bargain

ing power of the Chinese was weakened by the Chinese character of the guerrilla movement and their rather ambiguous commitment to the political process.

> "According to the Annual Report for 1950 the total number of Federation citizens reached 3,275,000 of which in round figures 2,500,000 were Malays, 500,000 Chinese, and the remainder Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese. Some 350,000 of the Chinese acquired citizenship by 'operation of laws' and 150,000 by application. Nearly three years later, after further relaxation of qualifications there still remained 433,000 Chinese who, although they met the birth qualifications, did not bother to register and another substantial group which did not wish to apply. Indeed, as many saw it, and Malays were inclined to point out, the record was hardly conclusive to support the claim that the Chinese saw in Malaya their new homeland."[11]

The bargain was possible also because of the desire to achieve independence from Britain. It was further facilitated by the Emergency. The Chinese businessmen, who were in rivalry with the Chinese Communists, needed to ally themselves with the Malays. In the interest of ending the disorder, the MCA was to have been an effective answer to the challenge of the MCP.

The Alliance has experienced difficulties. In 1958 the MCA went through a change in leadership. At the Central General Committee in March, 1958, a young group within the party, which was closer to the rank and file, nominated Lim Chong Eu as its candidate for the presidency. He ran against Tan Cheng Lock, a member of the old guard and a wealthy businessman. Lim Chong Eu became the new president of the MCA. All other important positions in the MCA also went to members of the new group. The old guard had been represented in the Alliance Government and were people in whom the leaders of

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[11] Von Vorys, pp. 89-90.

the UMNO had trust. To UMNO's surprise and concern, the leadership of MCA passed into the hands of the younger group.

In 1959 a dispute arose when the allocation of constituencies to Malay, Chinese, and Indian candidates was made for the first election since independence. When the parties could not agree on the numbers, the UMNO restored the old guard of the MCA when it insisted on the prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, selecting the candidates for the MCA. Some MCA leaders, who did not command the confidence of the MCA rank and file, were given safe Malay constituencies. By pushing in a large number of its own candidates, the UMNO was able to assume a firm control over the party.[12]

The result of the UMNO's actions with respect to the MCA was extreme dissatisfaction within the Chinese community, especially among the non-English-educated Chinese who formed a large majority. The old guard allowed the UMNO to control the Alliance. Being dependent on the UMNO for their position in the MCA and lacking a popular base among the Chinese, these leaders were in no position to assert an equal position for the MCA within the Alliance.[13] The Alliance has been dominated by the UMNO with the MCA and the MIC of only secondary importance.

The MCA has not been able to increase its support among the Chinese. As more Chinese gained citizenship, the number

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[12]R. K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 32.

[13]Ibid., p. 33.

of Chinese-dominated constituencies increased. In many of these constituencies opposition parties claimed the votes of the newly enfranchised Chinese. Opposition party support has increased along with the increase in the number of Chinese voters.

The 1964 election temporarily arrested the erosion of MCA support. Prior to the election, Indonesia and the Philippines waged a policy of confrontation against the 1963 formation of the Federation of Malaysia which included the Bornean states of Sarawak and Sabah. The Alliance campaigned as the one party that could defend Malaysia against Confrontation. The tactic was especially effective in getting Chinese votes. The recent slaughter in Indonesia of tens of thousands of Chinese--many of them entirely unconnected to Communist activities--and the continuing persecution of three million other Chinese people, was the incentive which led large numbers of Chinese to vote for the Alliance. When the Confrontation ended, the Alliance again lost its Chinese support base.

--The erosion of Alliance support and the 1969 riots

In the 1969 elections the opposition parties did fairly well for the first time. Two Malay opposition parties and two Chinese opposition parties agreed to split the opposition vote. Because of their unexpected successes, the opposition Chinese parties staged noisy victory parades in celebration of the election results. In response, the Malays planned a victory parade on the next day.

Some of the Malays in the parade lived in Kuala Lumpur. Parts of the city were thickly populated by Malays who recently

migrated from the countryside, often from villages in other states, and who lived in poor conditions. Many were unemployed and were able to see the contrast between their poverty and the wealth of some Chinese. They lived isolated from the rest of the city under conditions reminiscent of the village and retained the values of the village. Added to this base group were rural Malays who were brought into the city specifically to celebrate the election results.

The UMNO parade disintegrated into a riot between Malays and Chinese. Before the riot was quelled a few days later, the official government number of deaths was 178. Other sources put the figure higher than 800.

> "The official Government figures of number killed during the first few days of the rioting was 178. This undoubtedly is an underestimate. Obviously the exact numbers of dead will never be known but even a conservative estimate puts the figure at over 800. Some foreign observers and correspondents suggest that the number goes into four figures, and this is possible; rumor in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore had it that 'at least 2,500 died', and this, without doubt, is an exaggeration."[14]

--Containment under an open regime through elite action?

Following the 1969 riots, emergency rule was decreed for twenty-one months. Parliament was allowed to resume in February, 1971, only after amending the consitution to include a ban which prohibits uterrances or printed statements which appear to question (1) the special position of the Malays, (2) Malay as the national language, (3) citizenship rights of any ethnic group, nor (4) the rights and sovereignty of the Malay Rulers.

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[14]John Slimming, Malaysia: Death of a Democracy (London: John Murray, 1969), pp. 47-48.

The Parliament was also required to pass a constitutional amendment which permitted the head of the Conference of Rulers to reserve a place for Malays at postsecondary institutions in the areas of study where the number of Malays was disproportionately small--sciences, medicine, and engineering.

Having identified Malay economic grievances as the cause of the riots, the government launched a new economic program. Thousands of new jobs were to be created in order to bring about economic and political stability. Unemployment, highest in villages, averaged about nine per cent. Programs to deal with unemployment and rural poverty were announced. These included a crash program for training the unemployed in industrial skills, a new Capital Investment Committee charged with speeding the rate of industrialization, special government incentive awards to industries willing to locate in depressed rural areas, the opening of new land schemes to speed land settlement and to absorb the jobless in agricultural activities, and government initiatives in industrialization including participation in the establishment of industries.[15] Thus, the government made an effort at addressing itself to the issues by improving the position of the Malays.

The Alliance was expanded to become the National Front including nine political parties. Thus, the only political parties outside the coalition were Chinese opposition parties. In the August, 1974 parliamentary elections the National Front won

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[15]Felix V. Gagliano, Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath (Athens: Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 13, Ohio University, 1971), p. 26.

93 per cent of the seats and 62 per cent of the vote. More than half of the Chinese voted for the Chinese opposition parties. Thus, the nonelite Chinese interests appear to have not been accommodated in the coalition.

Recently there have been incidents of renewed guerrilla activity. It is unclear, however, how severe this activity has been. The government has considered them serious enough to institute the Essential Community Self-Reliance Regulations in 1975 which were modelled after those used during the 1948-1960 Emergency.

Nordlinger's Interpretation

Nordlinger uses three of the conflict regulating practices to explain conflict regulation in Malaysia. The first is stable government coalition. The Alliance Party is noted as an example. Second, purposive depoliticization in Malaysia has taken the form of an "avoidance model--public discussion of conflict-laden communal issues is avoided. The third conflict regulating practice is compromise which in the Malaysian case is the 1957 bargain.

Nordlinger cites three elite conflict regulating motives for Malaysia. First, the Chinese political leaders were concerned with the maintenance of Chinese economic predominance. Thus, the Chinese traded a share of economic values for political power. The second motive is the acquisition or retention of political power. Nordlinger gives this as the reason for the formation of the Alliance. The third motive is the avoidance of bloodshed.

> "In Malaysia the likely possibility of major outbursts of intercommunal violence prompted both Malay and Chinese leaders, but especially the Malay to form the Alliance and to continue it down to the present. Indeed, the 1969 Alliance Election Manifesto explicitly states that the Alliance exists in order to forestall the realization of those widespread fears of 'an irreversible process of disintegration with all the consequential carnage too heinous for anyone to envisage."[16]

There are two factors underlying this motive. The first is that the motive appears to be most likely "when the possibility of widespread violence is most probable. And it would seem that the danger appears closest when ... there have been recent sporadic outbreaks of rioting and violence, as in Lebanon and Malaysia." A second factor is mutual deterrence. In Malayia both the Chinese and Malays are strong enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, and both sides recognize and appreciate this possibility.

Elite predominance in Malaysia is explained in terms of politically acquiescent or deferential attitudes on the part of both the Malays and the Chinese. The segregation of Malays and Chinese has also contributed to conflict regulation. In Malaysia, Chinese and Malay farmers growing the same crop in the same district will have no communication and perceive themselves as having nothing in common except the institutions imposed upon them by the regime. The two major race riots broke out in cities where the Malays and Chinese were not spatially isolated.[17]

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[16] Nordlinger, p. 51.

[17] As Nordlinger does not specify which two race riots, it is difficult to know to what he is referring.

Although a relatively rapid rate of modernization in Malaysia, as in Lebanon, has had deleterious consequences for conflict regulation, elites are seen as actively regulating conflict through a coalition, depoliticization, and compromise. Because the nonelites are politically acquiescent, the elites are able to act on their motives of economic well-being, political power, and avoidance of bloodshed.

Alternative Explanations

There are two possible alternative interpretations of the Malaysian case. Although they are radically different, given the extent to which data is available, they are both possible. First, there is the possibility that conflict has not been regulated within an open regime. The more than 800 deaths during the 1969 riot, using Nordlinger's definition, constitute a failure to regulate conflict. It is possible to view the political system as a closed regime because of the twenty-one months of emergency regulations and the ban on discussion of sensitive issues since then. There is also the possibility that the recent communist activity may also constitute a new communal conflict.

Going on the assumption that communal conflict has not been regulated within an open regime, what are the reasons for this failure? The elites have been unable to control nonelites. Although Nordlinger claims that both the Malay and Chinese elites predominate through political acquiescence, this does not appear to be the case. The rivalry between the MCA's Chinese businessmen and the Chinese Communists suggests that the elites

were not so capable of controlling the nonelites. Rather than being submissive, the Chinese were excluded from the political process. The nature of Chinese elite control is questionable also in view of the lack of strong Chinese opposition to the Communist guerrillas during the Emergency and that more than half of the Chinese vote in 1974 went to parties outside the National Front. It is also problematic whether the Malay nonelites have been controlled through political acquiescence. It is possible that the Malays supported the UMNO because the Party was successful in upholding their privileged position.

Failure of conflict regulation may also be due to the unusual, temporal circumstances under which the 1957 bargain was made. The Emergency, the call for independence, and the predominantly Malay electorate were all temporary phenomena. When these conditions disappeared, and the Chinese realized a growth in the number of citizens while the Malays did not experience a commensurate increase in economic power, the bargain became less defensible.

The second possible alternative explanation is that communal conflict has been successfully regulated in a relatively open regime, but not for the same reasons Nordlinger suggests. The regime may be considered as a fairly open regime--after all, elections are held, parliament meets, and the head of state is elected. Furthermore, perhaps the 1969 riot was not a major riot. It would be possible to raise the allowed threshold of number of people killed in a riot in order to encompass it in Nordlinger's model.

Even if the Malaysian case is to be treated as a case of successful conflict regulation, other factors besides Nordlinger's elite behavior may be decisive. Nonelite characteristics and the nature of the issues may account for conflict regulation. First, territorial segregation and occupational segregation, two nonelite variables, may have been crucial in moderating conflict. Because the groups have remained largely segregated, both territorially and occupationally, conflict has not been particularly severe. In fact, the 1969 riot occurred when territorial segregation began to break down and unemployed Malay youths moved to Kuala Lumpur. The groups have not been in competition with each other to a great degree.

Conflict regulation may also be accounted for by the temporal nature of the issues involved when violence has occurred. The first conflict, that between the Malays and Chinese after the departure of the Japanese and before the return of the British may be seen as retaliation for compliance with the Japanese during the occupation. Since the source of the 1948-1960 Emergency remains problematic, it is possible that the guerrilla movement may have been purely communist-inspired. This is an especially convincing argument considering the role of the extant MPAJA cadres, that the guerrillas themselves do not cite communal grievances as a motive, and the role of the Calcutta International Communist Parry Asia Youth Conference in 1948. The 1969 riots may be seen as the result of rural Malays being brought into Kuala Lumour specifically for the post-election celebrations. This was an unusual instance

of mobilization of the Malays. Thus, it could be argued that when violence has occurred, this has been only because of temporal factors rather than because of enduring communal issues.

Conclusion

Because of a lack of data and the recency of the 1969 riot, there is no way of knowing which interpretation of the Malaysian case is most accurate. While Nordlinger's treatment of Malaysia may be correct, there are two additional, equally plausible, interpretations which are consistent with the Type II model of how communal conflicts are regulated.

There are two points which may be safely made about Nordlinger's analysis of Malaysia. First, although the 1969 riot constituted a case of conflict regulation failure, it is never mentioned. This point may not be devastating to the general theory, however, because it would be possible to account for the riot by simply raising the threshold for the allowed number of people killed in one riot. Furthermore, it may be argued that the regime again became open following the 1969 riot. The second, more important point, is that Nordlinger is wrong about the ability of elites to predominate through political acquiescence.

Only six years have passed since parliamentary government was restored in February, 1971. This is not enough time to assess whether conflict has been regulated. Final judgment on the effectiveness of conflict regulation will have to wait until it is possible to determine to what extent conflict exists and to what degree the regime is open.

CONCLUSION

In the introduction two ideal types of how communal conflicts are regulated were presented. Case studies of Austria, Lebanon, and Malaysia were presented in order to evaluate the two models. Nordlinger's theory tends toward Type I. The first two cases, however, belong to Type II. The third case, Malaysia, may be evaluated as suggesting either Type I or Type II as the method by which conflict has or has not been regulated. Because these cases, half of the cases Nordlinger uses to illustrate his theory, tend toward Type II, the applicability of the theory is called into question.

How do the various points of the alternative theory compare to the three cases? First, in Austria, the one case in which communal conflict was unquestionably regulated within an open regime, the elites were responsible for regulating what may be regarded as their own conflict. Elite conflict regulating behavior was crucial, not in overcoming hostility at the nonelite level, but because it was imperative that the elites be the ones to resolve their own conflict.

Of the three cases, at least one, Lebanon, and possibly also Malaysia, has not been regulated within an open regime. In Lebanon the recent civil war was ended only when Syrian troops occupied the country. After the 1969 riots in Malaysia, emergency regulations were instituted for a period of twenty-one months and a ban on public discussion of sensitive issues was amended to the constitution. There have not, in fact, been many cases where communal conflict has been regulated

within an open, democratic regime, suggesting that Nordlinger's theory does not have wide applicability.

In all three cases nonelite characteristics were important. It was shown that in Austria the newly developed national identity, newly created crosspressures, and increased contact between the groups had a moderating effect on nonelite hostility. In Lebanon the cleavages of religion, class, and region coincide. The two civil wars occurred when the nonelites became mobilized after there was a movement of people to the cities. In Malaysia the cleavages of race, religion, language, and class coincide. While there has been a situation of differential segmentation similar to that in Lebanon, the groups have been both territorially and occupationally segregated. The 1969 riots, in fact, took place when territorial segregation began to break down.

The nature of the issues has been important in determining whether conflict regulation will succeed. In Austria the issues of the nature of the economy and of the political system and the role of the Catholic Church were virtually resolved so that the elites were able to regulate what little hostility did remain after World War II. In Lebanon the issues of Lebanon's place among the Arab countries and the lack of government programs to alleviate the disadvantaged position of the Moslems have persisted. After the 1969 riots in Malaysia, the elites addressed themselves to what had been determined as the root cause of the disturbance, the high rate of unemployment and the generally low economic level among the Malays.

There is no evidence from any of the three countries that elites were able to act on their own motives because of structured elite predominance. In two of the countries, Lebanon and Malaysia, the elites have had trouble controlling nonelites. As the patron-client system and political acquiescence have eroded, they have not been replaced by another method of nonelite control. There is no reason to believe that in Austria the elites had attitudes which were more moderate than the nonelites. Thus, it seems problematic whether elites are able to control nonelites and whether elites are able to regulate a conflict while nonelites wish to prolong it.

The case studies show, contrary to Nordlinger's theory, that communal conflicts are not often regulated within open, democratic regimes. When they are, resolution of the issues involved or changes in nonelite characteristics seem to be more decisive than elite behavior.

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