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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT:  
THE INTERSTATE DIMENSIONS OF SECESSION AND IRREDENTA IN  
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, A CRISIS-BASED APPROACH

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October, 1993

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

@ David Carment, 1993



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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

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**TITLE:** The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: The Interstate Dimensions of Secession and Irredenta in the Twentieth Century, A Crisis-based Approach

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## Abstract

One of the most challenging issues for students of international relations is the interstate dimension of ethnic conflict in both its secessionist and irredentist forms. This thesis contributes to an understanding of the interstate dimension of ethnic conflict in three ways. First, the thesis provides a **more precise delineation of the causal relationship between ethnic and interstate conflict**. Second, the thesis **develops a model** to identify the conditions under which ethnic conflict is most likely to lead to interstate conflict. Third, and finally this thesis provides insight into a **theory and policy for management and resolution of ethnic conflict**. The results of this research are used to identify the international conditions and actions that affect the dynamics and resolution of ethnic conflict. From that perspective, the central goal of this inquiry is to lay the groundwork for **preventive peacekeeping**.

The inquiry unfolds in five stages. First, a formal model, specifying the precise causal relationship of the selected variables and their interaction effects, is presented. Second, two cases (Somali irredentism and the Indo-Sri Lankan crisis) are used to test the assumed linkage. Third, aggregate data from the International Crisis Behavior Project data base, for the period 1918-1988, are used to test the explanatory power of variables derived from the combined framework. Fourth, two additional cases (Thai Malay separatism and the Balkans War) are used to test the most relevant propositions from the previous phase. Fifth and finally, based on the degree of support for propositions from both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the model is refined. Policy relevant and theoretical contributions are presented in the light of the findings. Directions for further research also are discussed.

## Abstrait

Une des issues la plus contestee par les etudiants de relations internationales est le conflit ethnique, et les dimensions internationales, dans ses deux formes, secessioniste et irredentiste. Cette these contribue a une comprehension du conflit ethnique de trois facons. Premierement, cette these pourrait une description plus precise de relations causales entre le conflit ethnique et international. Deuxiemement, cette these developpe une explanation pour identifier les conditions sous lesquelles le conflit ethnique est le plus en mesure de mener au conflit international. Troisiemement et finalement, cette these pourrait une apercu d'une theorie et politique de l'administration du conflit ethnique. Les resultats de cette recherche sont utiles pour identifier les conditions et actions qui affectent le dynamiques et les resolutions du conflit ethnique. Du cette perspective le but central de cette enquete est de surmettre un travail, de base cette enquete se deroule en cinq phases.

Premierement, un modele formel qui specifie la relation causale precise des variables choisis et des effets de leur actions reciproques est presente. Deuxiemement, deux cas sont utilises pour examiner les liasons assumees. Troisiemement, la rassemblement du data de la crise internationale et le projet data base du comportement pour la periode de 1918-1988 sont employes, pour examiner le pouvoir de variables tires des structures fointes. Quatriemement, deux cas supplementaire sont utilises pour examiner les propositions les plus a propos de la phase precedente. Cinquiemement, et finalement base sur le degre de soutien de propositions des deux analyses quantitatif et qualitatif, le modele est raffine. Politique a propos et theorique sont presentees selon les contributions. Directions pour recherches supplemnetaires sont aussi discutees.

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Dedicated to my family, new and old.



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**Chapter 1**

**Ethnic Conflict, The Neglected Interstate Dimension**

*The conflicts which are of global concern involve deep issues of ethnic and cultural identity, of recognition and of participation that are usually denied to ethnic minorities in addition to issues of security and other values that are not negotiable (Burton 1987: 5).*

*Nationalism, taken by itself, is both in logic and experience, a principle of disintegration and fragmentation which is prevented from issuing in anarchy not by its own logic but by...the configurations of interests and power between the rulers and the ruled and the competing nations (Morgenthau 1957: 481-491).*

*The government is best which pays least attention to ethnicity (van den Berghe 1987: 353-354).*

### **1. Ethnic Conflict - The Neglected Interstate Dimension**

One of the most challenging issues for students of international relations is the resurgence of ethnic conflict in the modern era. There is widespread feeling, popular and academic, that the political and economic interests of states, along with imperatives of the international system, furnish both the underlying causes and ongoing issues for most serious conflicts. This outlook, however, grossly underestimates the impact of certain kinds of identity and community (Ryan 1988). Such a perspective also fails to address the roots of "protracted ethnic conflicts" (Smith 1986: 65). More precisely, multi-ethnic environments have become a seemingly permanent feature of politics, both within and between sovereign states. The absence of research on the interstate dimension of ethnic conflict reveals that **theory and policy have lagged behind emerging reality** (Gurr 1992; Midlarsky 1992; Smith 1993a).

While studied primarily at the domestic level, ethnic conflict also frequently creates interstate "spillover effects" (Chazan 1991; Heraclides 1991). The implications of ethnic conflict for international relations, however, are not well understood (Smith 1986; Ryan 1988; Azar 1990). The strife in Eastern Europe and throughout the Third World, for example, opens a range

of interstate possibilities that is difficult to comprehend. On the one hand, protracted regional conflicts and intervention in civil wars represent traditional and perplexing connections between the domestic and international levels (Ryan 1990a; Heraclides 1991). On the other, human rights issues, development assistance, and refugee situations constitute relatively unfamiliar and increasingly important sources of interstate conflict.

Conventional in origins or otherwise, ethnic conflicts often prove to be both **sustained and bitter**. Participants are prepared to "sacrifice their lives and inflict violence on each other." Theoretical and policy concerns become more pressing, because "rational, peaceful solutions" seem far from obvious (Smith 1986: 61). All of these matters are very important to the conduct of interstate and transnational relations in an era of rapid and even unpredictable change.

Both theoretical and practical objectives motivate a study of the interstate dimensions of ethnic conflict. From a scholarly point of view, it is clear that **the present neglect of ethnic strife within the field of international relations should be rectified**. Second, **a more precise delineation of the causal relationship between ethnic and interstate conflict is needed**. Thus, a primary objective of this inquiry is **to develop a model** to identify the conditions under which ethnic conflict is most likely to lead to interstate conflict. Third, and finally a study of the interstate dimensions of ethnic conflict will have broader relevance to a **theory and policy for management and resolution of ethnic conflict**. The results of policy-oriented research could be used to identify the international conditions and actions that affect the dynamics and resolution of ethnic conflict. From that perspective, the central goal of this inquiry is to lay the groundwork for **preventive peacekeeping**.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from this introduction, this chapter contains four sections. Section two briefly examines the problems associated with the study of ethnic conflict in international relations. Section three specifies, in the context of current views on ethnic conflict, the guiding principles for this inquiry. Included in this section is a brief presentation of the approach taken in the thesis. Explanatory variables are examined and potential linkages discussed. A more detailed and formalized theory is provided in chapter three. Section four includes a summary of the meaning of ethnic conflict as it relates to its interstate dimension in both its irredentist and secessionist forms. A formal definition of each, is provided. Section five is a brief description of subsequent chapters including methodology,

## *2. Impediments to Progress*

### *2.1 Policy, Ethnic Conflict and the International Domain*

Despite the apparent need, policy-related research on the interstate dimensions of ethnic conflict is rare. There are several impediments to progress in the field. These are, current conflict resolution techniques, the number of potential cases and security-related issues. The central problem is the **absence of effective conflict resolution techniques in conflicts where collective identity is salient**. This is particularly true in which the actors involved are not only states but communities that often lack the commitment to finding peaceful solutions. Recent events in Yugoslavia underscore this point. When the integrity of the Yugoslav state was first challenged by popularly backed secessionist surges in Slovenia and Croatia, a signal was sent out to the international community that the status quo inherent in the East-West balance of power would no longer suffice as a source for conflict management. Initially, Yugoslavia was a situation to which the European Community and other western states did not respond well. Only

as the central government in Belgrade delegitimated itself by military action did international actors begin to move slowly from the hope of a harmonized settlement to recognizing Slovenian, Croatian, Macedonian and Bosnian claims to statehood. The Balkan region now stands in international judiciary limbo with external actors aligned behind the principle of self-determination for Yugoslavian minorities but unsure how this process of recognition might reflect on similar conflicts elsewhere and of the effectiveness of traditional methods of conflict management, including sanctions and peacekeeping. More precisely, the regional crisis has called into question basic international axioms such as the inviolability of boundaries and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.<sup>2</sup>

A related problem is **the large number of potential cases**. One only need consult a current "geopolitical map" to realize the potency of ethnic conflict. Of the 184 states in the international system only a small number are ethnically homogenous. According to some estimates, there are over five thousand ethnic minorities in the world.<sup>3</sup> Recent assessments by the Minorities at Risk Project (University of Maryland) indicate that ethnic groups are currently involved in at least 80 protracted conflicts throughout the globe. At least 240 ethnic minorities are involved in low-intensity struggles for self-determination (Gurr 1992).

A third policy impediment touches upon the need to redefine the meaning of **international security** (Posen 1993) in particular for those states of the world in which the major objection by state leaders against refocusing our attention on ethnic conflicts is that this intrusion is a potential threat to the leadership, integrity and sovereignty of many states.<sup>4</sup> Ethnic conflicts do, as Posen (1993) argues, constitute a different kind of security dilemma for states. As it will become evident in chapter three and in the case studies, ethnic affinities and cleavages



are potential sources of insecurity for states and ones that are not easily resolved through "conventional" deterrent techniques.

To summarise, there are several obstacles to policy development. In the context of the concerns noted above, one goal of this thesis is to understand why states become involved in ethnic strife. The development of a new theoretical approach to state involvement in ethnic conflict may provide insight into how such strife can be peacefully managed and successfully resolved.

## ***2.2 Theoretical Impediments to Progress***

A significant barrier to theoretical development is the apparent lack of consensus as to **the assumed causal link** between ethnic conflict and interstate conflict. How does ethnic conflict become internationalized? Is it generated internally and then externalized as some theories would suggest (Welsh 1993)? Do ethnic conflicts weaken state structures, inviting external intervention (Cooper & Berdal 1993)? Or does the process involve a more subtle and complex series of interactions. Presumably, a theory should be capable of encompassing these potential linkages. Consider for example, an early study on the subject. Suhrke and Noble (1977) concluded, in their assessment of eight diffusionist ethnic conflicts, that domestic ethnic conflicts did not comprise a significant source of interstate conflict. More recently, political scientists have begun to reassess this initial result and have concluded that ethnic conflicts may lead to violent and often unmanageable interstate conflict (Heraclides 1991; Carment 1993).

A second theoretical restriction is posed by the **disparate approaches, units and levels of analysis** used in the study of ethnic conflict. Usually, theories of international relations view

ethnic conflict as an epiphenomenon - a byproduct of the interaction between the processes of state building and an anarchical system structure (Weiner 1992). A theory should allow for these processes and the impact they have on relations among states, but it also should be able to account for the potentially important role of domestic factors.

The fact that domestic variables are not meaningfully integrated into mainstream international relations research is not deliberate but arises from "paradigmatic blind spots" (Stavenhagen 1987) because of international relations' system oriented focus.<sup>5</sup> This problem becomes particularly acute when existing knowledge about domestically generated ethnic conflict is brought to bear on the study of interstate conflict, a relatively unexplored area for international relations.

A second theoretical problem is that general theories of conflict including those derived from **realism and neo-liberalism** are not well suited to explain the international dimensions of ethnic strife. In the light of the vicissitudes noted above, what is required is a reevaluation of the assumptions of these dominant paradigms and their strengths and weaknesses in explaining current changes in the international system (James 1993). These are briefly examined below.<sup>6</sup>

## ***2.3 Conventional Wisdom and Ethnic Conflict***

### ***2.3.1 Neo-Liberalism and the Vulnerable State***

Among the proponents of a neo-liberal approach, Jackson and Rosberg developed the idea of the inhibited state as a way of explaining the maintenance of African boundaries (Jackson & Rosberg 1982). They argue that the common vulnerability of African states to internal ethnic turmoil and their weakness in general, restrains them from supporting efforts to change their

boundaries. African states bolster these norms because there is a common interest in the support for international rules and institutions that derives from an accepted mutual vulnerability. The concept of the inhibited state is similar to Keohane's (1986) notion of specific reciprocity in which the behaviour of each state is contingent on that of others.

Presumably, each state cooperates given a common interest - the fear of balkanization - in which all of Africa's boundaries might be doubted. To neo-liberals, conditional cooperation of this kind emerges if the future interests (fear of balkanization) and not just immediate interests (intervention by other states) are at stake. A similar view is provided by Horowitz (1985: 275) who argued "[T]rans-border ethnic affinities more often promote restraint in supporting separatists or intervention in behalf of a central government fighting to suppress separatism. Fear of contagion and domino effects is widespread." Internal cleavage is a signal of the incompleteness of the solidarity task and a threat to the unity of the state, hence the sensitivity with which such states frame their foreign policy objectives (Jenkins & Kposowa 1992).

Thus the perception that ethnic conflict is a threat to the security of states can, according to neo-liberal interpretations, translate into real security dilemmas for certain states. Multi-ethnic states care if other states defect or do not cooperate in resolving these shared security dilemmas. Neo-liberal approaches are most concerned to explain the process of defection among weak states, that is, the process of support for ethnic struggles in other states. Cheating or defection requires verification and sanctioning of cheaters. In general, regimes and international institutions are viewed as the means in which to monitor cheaters to ensure that reciprocity will emerge.<sup>7</sup>

The neo-liberal interpretation is useful for explaining the absence of intervention by weak states in ethnic strife. There are also several shortcomings to the explanation. First, the approach fails to explain the widely varying policies of individual states, both weak and strong, outside Africa (the Balkans, South and Southeast Asia), as well as some states within Africa. For example, despite their presumed sensitivity to involvement in ethnic strife, the multi-ethnic Balkan states are now engaged in intense and destructive conflict. To cite just a few examples within the African context, the subsystem has been witness to recurring Somali irredentism, conflicts between Chad and Libya, the Sudan, African support for Islamic secessionist movements outside, and South Africa's ongoing regional destabilization.

If neo-liberal assumptions about the inherent sensitivity of multi-ethnic states are correct, it would be difficult to explain why many ethnically diverse states become involved in ethnic conflicts. The inherent weakness in the neo-liberal argument is in assuming a state's behaviour is primarily a function of a state's relations with other state-centres. This view tends to underestimate the importance of domestic politics in its relation to **transnational ethnic affinities** as a second source of explanation. For states experiencing domestic disorder because of ethnic strife, foreign relations become a very important extension of domestic policies. It can be postulated that many states find themselves involved in an ethnic conflict precisely because of strong transnational ethnic affinities. In other instances, it may be opportune for a state to intervene in the internal affairs of a weak highly divided state. In fact, due to domestic concerns and transnational affinities, an ethnically oriented foreign policy is a **deeply imbedded characteristic of most states** in the system. This assumption will be formalized, and tested further, in the thesis.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, the neo-liberal approach is not easily generalized to those states that are less ethnically diverse. Are strong ethnically homogenous states expected to behave as predicted by neo-liberalism? Are they more likely to be belligerent? Are states with internally harmonious relations more adventurous in their foreign policies? Are regimes as effective in conflicts involving ethnically homogenous states? On these questions, neo-liberalism is silent, but within this thesis, attempts will be made to answer them.

### *2.3.2 Realism, Anarchy and the Security Dilemma*

The assumption that the anarchical international system and resulting state interactions furnish the causes for most wars and conflicts in the system is also at odds with the dynamics of ethnic strife. The most recent realist account has been provided by Mearsheimer (1990) who suggests that the appeal to chauvinistic ethnic sentiment is no more than the result of a need of a country's leadership to mobilize the population in the face of a threatening international environment. Alternatively, if a state loses its ability to regulate an ethnic conflict, the problem becomes a structural security dilemma (Posen 1993) because it could invite external intervention. Thus, ethnic conflict poses a security dilemma along two dimensions: states that act out aggressive behaviour as a consequence of cleavages within states and transnational ethnic affinities; and states whose internal weakness leads to efforts to defend itself from this external involvement. In either case, as this thesis will show, within ethnic conflict settings, the security dilemma is not an inherent part of the system structure as suggested by conventional assumptions of realism but results from concerns that are domestically generated when specific sources of insecurity for states, namely ethnic cleavages and ethnic affinities, are present. Leaders of multi-

ethnic states may be pressured by political opponents or more directly by the masses to act on these linkages that can, sometimes, be perceived as a threat by the leaders of other states and, in other instances, become a real source of insecurity for all states, when cleavages and affinities are great enough to invite external involvement.

Geopolitical analyses have also been used to account for state breakdown and ethnic mobilization. For example, in assessing the collapse of the Soviet Union, Waller (1992: 43) argues, "[O]ne source of a political regime's legitimacy in territorial states is conquest. Yet as such states grow larger they encounter other states hence increasing the cost of expansion. As these costs increase so does the probability of overextension, or...foreign policy failure. The primary outcome of foreign policy failure is the delegitimation of the regime in power at the time of the foreign policy failure. Delegitimation creates an opening in the political process for opposing factions." Viewed from either conventional realist perspectives or geopolitical concerns, ethnic conflict is viewed as an outcome resulting from a state's search for security in the international environment. At best, this view is only half correct. State involvement in ethnic conflict also derives from concerns that transcend a state's external security. As it will be shown, ethnic affinities and ethnic cleavages, factors that link the domestic-international domains, also play vital roles in providing opportunities for states to become involved in ethnic strife. Ethnic conflict also encompasses a much broader set of concerns. That is, states do not always become involved in an ethnic conflict because it is a direct threat to their external security. In both its collective and individual guise, involvement in ethnic strife also involves, for example, **transnational ethnic affinities, domestic pressures and humanitarian concerns.**

Consider in this context, international involvement in Somalia. Whether this international action constitutes an exception to the rule, or an example of the kinds of external involvement that will arise in the future is widely debated, but the clan-based turmoil in Somalia does not form a direct security threat to the United States or to most member states participating in the UN action.<sup>9</sup> The involvement is, in part, a reflection of a desire to provide humanitarian assistance, resolve the anarchy within Somalia and to restructure the state. All of these policies are normative concerns facilitated by the actions of the United Nations.

The assumption of the state as a rational unitary actor is also troubling. Realist emphasis on states behaving rationally in terms of external, structural features of the international system probably understate the importance of domestic affairs in shaping national policy and rational behaviour. Regime leaders take accountability seriously and must consider how their actions will play at home even if an adventurous foreign policy ultimately is expected to prove successful (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson & Woller 1992; James 1993).

A foreign policy would also expect to accommodate the desire to satisfy ethnic constituencies that can threaten a regime's survival. Given the key role of appeals to ethnic sensibility in the political strategies of many national leaders, it is essential to assess the impact of this factor at the level of the international system (Premdas 1991). Jurisdictional concerns of decision makers in the domestic arena should be integrated with the constraints imposed by the international level.

In brief, interstate conflicts, with an ethnic basis, may not be caused by system structure, but instead by the interaction of domestic variables. Thus, ethnic conflicts may not be governed by a law of international politics. It may be possible to prevent or discourage such strife by

addressing its sources at the domestic level. Unless the domestic aspects of ethnic strife are taken into account, perspectives which envision state behaviour as being understood at the level of system structure alone, may be limited.

On the other hand, the structure of the international system and its key attributes determine for states the boundaries within which they can act (Brecher 1993; Posen 1993). What states choose, how they choose it, and why they choose is determined by **internal processes**. The inquiry now turns to a brief examination of the variables that may be useful in addressing these concerns.

### ***3. Towards an Approach in Understanding Ethnic Conflict***

#### ***3.1 Problem Questions***

There are six questions relevant to this inquiry:

- (a) What types of ethnic conflict have an interstate dimension?**
  
- (b) Which states become involved in interstate ethnic conflict and why?**
  
- (c) Under what conditions is ethnic conflict most likely to lead to interstate conflict and crisis?**
  
- (d) What factors influence the substantive content of decision making processes in ethnic conflict foreign policy settings?**



**(e) What are the political and other characteristics of interstate ethnic conflicts and how do these influence decision makers' choices?**

**(f) Under what conditions will an interstate ethnic conflict result in the use of force?**

In answering these questions, a theory of interstate ethnic conflict begins with a set of definitions and assumptions about ethnic groups, states, and the environment in which they interact. These assumptions serve as the basis from which substantive theory regarding interstate ethnic conflict can be deduced. The criteria for selecting these assumptions are that they have considerable empirical support in research on ethnic strife.<sup>10</sup>

**(a) The international system is composed of a hierarchy of multi-ethnic states of varying degrees of diversity;**

**(b) States are the primary actors in the system;**

**(c) States behave rationally, but this rationality is bounded by domestic considerations that foreign policy makers subsume in the decision-making process;**

**(d) There is an emergent normative world order;**

(e) **Ethnic conflict is conditioned by the intersection of state building, a systemic imperative and nation-building, a normative concern.**<sup>11</sup>

The implications these assumptions have for this inquiry are discussed below.

### **3.2. *Ethnicity Defined***

Before proceeding to the main argument of this thesis it is necessary to define ethnicity. The critical features of an ethnic group are that it is **ascriptive and exclusive**: its continuity depends on the maintenance of a boundary based on values and identity (Barth 1969: 14). Ethnic identification can attach itself to one or more of six different criteria, including (1) **race** – shared phenotypical features such as pigmentation, stature and facial or hair type; (2) **kinship** – assumed blood ties and alleged ancestry such as generally are claimed by clans, tribes and occasionally entire nations; (3) **religion** – as a leaven of social allegiances, not as a formal belief system about ultimate essences; (4) **language** – as a vehicle of communication and symbol of ethnic and cultural identity; (5) **customary mode of livelihood** – examples include the Javanese and Bengali who preen themselves as the bearers of customs and cultures superior to those of their neighbors; and (6) **regionalism** – in which groups of people are united because of a distinct geographic region (Rothschild 1981: 86-87).<sup>12</sup>

Ethnic conflict has many sources. Some scholars argue it is a psychological result of the exploration for a permanent "primordial" identity (Smith 1993a) in which ethnic identities are created or recreated because of shared historical or cultural experience (Gurr 1992). Others view ethnic conflict as a result of tensions between groups whose identities are evoked in situations

to advance their material and political interests (Hechter 1975; Thompson 1989). In general, domestic ethnic conflict arises if ethnic identification is maintained as a basis for collective action. Collective action results from historical struggles for autonomy and self-determination or as a result of recent outgrowths of current political processes that provide the rationale for ethnic mobilization (Olzak & Nagel 1982). These processes take place in both "old" and "new" states. Ethnicity also encompasses affect-laden behavior (Boucher, Landis & Clark 1987). As it will become clear in later chapters, in conjunction with structural arrangements (including institutions) affect-laden behavior can increase the salience of ethnic identity in elite decision making. An important implication of this argument is that leaders of states will be expected to act, within their means, on transnational ethnic affinities and to take advantage of opportunities presented by internal ethnic strife. (Gurr 1992). Under specific conditions, noted below, such interactions can lead to interstate ethnic conflict.

### ***3.3 The Domestic - Interstate Nexus***

Existing perspectives that presume to explain interstate ethnic strife fail to take into account the interactions between two important domestic variables, a state's ethnic composition and its institutional makeup. These variables are derived from an alternative outlook on the involvement of states in ethnic conflict.

Central to the new approach is the idea that the state is more than a unified actor that reacts to domestic strain by projecting it into the external system. Instead, the state is regarded as a rational actor constrained by both internal and external forces. As James (1993) observes, "it should come as no surprise that domestic considerations affect the rational state's pursuit of

foreign objectives." Several studies reveal that foreign policy can be explained, at least in part, by domestic politics.<sup>13</sup> For instance, Ostrom and Job (1986) establish that, domestic political factors -- particularly the president's standing in public opinion polls -- seem to have the greatest effect on decisions by the US to use force. In an investigation of regime change and its relationship to foreign policy performance, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller (1992) find that leaders are well-advised to consider the dispersion of preferences and interests among constituents, because a failed venture in foreign policy can lead to reduction or even loss of power.

While existing studies establish that foreign policy decisions are influenced by domestic constraints, the potential role of ethnicity remains largely unexplored. More specifically, interaction effects between ethnic composition and political structure may affect foreign policy. It would be especially useful to identify which states, if any, are likely to pursue ethnically-oriented foreign policies and how that might affect interstate conflict.

### *3.4 Ethnic Conflict from a Two-level Perspective*

An alternative way of looking at state involvement in ethnic conflict is to focus on two levels of interaction. The descriptions provided below are a brief overview of the variables and potential linkages examined in greater detail in chapter three.

The first set of interactions pertains to decision making among elites and the way in which masses influence these decisions.<sup>14</sup> The second set of interactions focuses on how preferences might be affected by opportunities within the system. It is assumed, in all cases, that an elite will choose specific foreign policy objectives (i.e. involvement in a secessionist conflict

or an irredentist claim) rationally.<sup>15</sup> The basic argument is that, an ethnically-oriented foreign policy cannot be read off from structure alone. As in most foreign policy decision making structures, whether at the domestic or international system level, influence the formation of a decision maker's preferences (Meadwell 1992). At the domestic level, decision making involves risk and sources of uncertainty that are internal to the state, referring to the constraints and opportunities presented by ethnic groups and political institutions. As they are briefly described below and in greater detail in chapter three, domestic structural factors represented by ethnic composition and institutions are assumed to be fundamental in the formation of decision making preferences.

### *3.5 Ethnic Composition: The Affective Factor*

The feature that distinguishes interstate ethnic conflict from those interstate ethnic conflicts that are not ethnically generated is the assumed presence of affect within the decision making process (Heraclides 1991). Ethnicity, a tool available for political mobilization, is high in affect.<sup>16</sup> Although it is tempting to make the inference, ethnicity's emotional roots do not make it irrational (Connor 1978; Horowitz 1985: 132-135). It is, of course, difficult to reconcile identity-based behaviour that contains an affective component with instrumental theories of interstate conflict. Two points are worth noting. First, affect acts as both a constraint and an opportunity. Second, affect is not just a primordial drive within elites; it also is distributed within the group (Meadwell 1991).

As this thesis will show, to determine when and if affect will be salient in influencing elite decision making, it is necessary to examine the formal ethnic structure of the state in

relative rather than absolute terms. Elites are positional players seeking to optimize their power relative to the leaders of other ethnic groups. So it is important to assess how the affective component of ethnic group behaviour influences elites in decision making. When ethnicity is a salient aspect of the political process, elites will try to obtain outcomes favorable to their ethnic group and therefore act on instrumental motivation.

Decision makers are assumed to be strategic in looking for answers. They prefer to appease ethnic groups whose support is believed to be crucial over the long term. In making any kind of foreign policy decision, mass support is essential when inter-elite competition is extensive. In most foreign policy-settings, as Tsebelis (1990: 163) demonstrates, while short-term differences between elite behaviour and mass aspirations are not uncommon, they cannot persist, "especially if issues are considered important. Elites have to explain their behaviour and persuade the masses or they will be replaced by more competitive rivals." Elite-mass behaviour is a two-way street. For example, as will become evident further on in this thesis, when making a decision to become involved in ethnic strife, elites of multi-ethnic states would prefer to formulate foreign policies that appeal to their ethnic constituency, even at the expense of other groups, if such groups exist (there are some states in which a single ethnic group dominates the political process). Leaders do so to mobilize followers and potentially increase their share of power.

In making decisions to pursue a belligerent foreign policy, for example, leaders of multi-ethnic societies must gamble that their policy is large enough to prove to the people of their ethnic group that their security will not be sacrificed, but measured enough to avoid an all-out war or confrontation with non-supportive ethnic groups.

### ***3.6 Institutional Design - The Political Factor***

As it will be shown in this thesis, political institutions create a second set of domestic constraints. In the present context, **institutional constraint** focuses not only on the political regime (i.e. the members of the elite who make state decisions) but also the much broader, underlying patterns of political authority and constitutional structure. In some states, overall institutional constraint is low by virtue of the elites not being elected to office by popular vote or holding power through coercion (i.e. military regimes, one-party states, control models and some patron-client situations). In other states, constraints are higher by virtue of the elite having been elected democratically and depending on some constituency for support. Of course, there is a great deal of variation between ideal types. As it will be shown, in many instances, political constraints evolve through coups, political collapse and controlled political transition (often between the onset and termination of a conflict within or between states).

### ***3.7 Interaction Effects and Projected Behaviour***

The main assumption of this thesis is that, political constraints and opportunities are hypothesized to interact with ethnic composition in shaping the outcomes of interstate ethnic conflict. Elites are assumed to become involved in an ethnic conflict because of the presumed consolidating role of affect. Depending on the interaction effects between variables and potential domestic payoffs, **elites will have more or less motivation to formulate conflictual or peaceful foreign policies towards ethnic strife**. In certain situations, the elites of some states may be more inclined to using force.<sup>17</sup> The kinds of constraints acting on state elites, and their interaction effects, accounts for difference in behaviour. In chapter three, these interaction

effects are explored and developed more thoroughly. Mediating variables are examined and the relationship is formalized into a model.

At this point, however, it is important to familiarize the reader with the meaning of ethnic conflict as it relates to its interstate dimensions. In the next section, the meaning of interstate ethnic conflict, including the concepts of secession and irredenta, are discussed. Formal definitions of both, along with the proposed criteria for case selection are presented.

#### ***4. Interstate Ethnic Conflict***

##### ***4.1 A Crisis-based approach***

***The international conflicts growing out of [this] nationalism were of two kinds: conflicts between a nationality and an alien master and conflicts between different nations over the delimitation of their respective boundaries (Morgenthau 1957: 481-491).***

This inquiry focuses on the military-security aspects of interstate ethnic conflict. This is a reasonable point of departure for a study concerned with the dynamics and processes of interstate ethnic conflict. The tentative state of knowledge regarding these interactions also requires an inquiry that begins with reasonably well understood kinds of interstate ethnic conflicts. This inquiry uses a simple, twofold typology of secession and irredenta.

The term interstate ethnic conflict is used to describe those conflicts which arise as a consequence of either: a domestic secessionist-type ethnic conflict in which external states and other international actors are drawn into a conflict with the state in question or its allies because of transnational affinities or opportunities presented by internal cleavages; or an irredentist type



of ethnic conflict in which two or more states enter into a crisis over an irredentist claim made salient by ethnic affinities or internal cleavages.<sup>18</sup>

The choice of secession and irredenta as the defining characteristics of interstate ethnic conflict is important as much for what it excludes as for what it includes. Generally, but not always, the states involved will be territorially adjacent. As Siverson & Starr (1991) have argued, since so few states can project their military across the globe, borders are integral to involvement. Indeed, they are a defining characteristic of irredentist conflicts and many secessionist conflicts.<sup>19</sup> Of these conflicts many, but not all, are dyadic.

In addition, the definitions do not include those ethnic conflicts that are domestically situated and have an international dimension (of which there are many) but do not lead to interstate conflict. Nor does it include those ethnic conflicts that have no international dimension (of which there are few). For an exhaustive examination of some of the domestic and economic dimensions of ethnic conflict, the reader should consult Gurr (1992) and de Silva and May (1991).

This inquiry relies on a specific class of hostile, conflictual, interstate interactions known as "crises". They are military-security conflicts that take place at the international level (Brecher 1993). One key advantage of using a crisis-based approach is that it focuses exclusively on conflicts that are already internationalized. The task of identifying interstate ethnic conflict is therefore simplified by virtue of a pre-existing threshold. Thus, in response to the question: "How do we determine whether an interstate ethnic conflict is a crisis?" the answer would be whether it fulfils three criteria:

(a) The case must fulfil the definition of a foreign policy crisis for at least one state. A foreign policy crisis is:

A situation with three individually and collectively sufficient conditions, deriving from changes in a state's internal or external environment. All three perceptions are held by the highest-level decision-makers of the actor concerned: a threat to basic values, awareness of finite time for response to the value threat and a high probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988).

(b) The case must be an international crisis which is defined as a disruption in process and a challenge in the structure to the international system.<sup>20</sup>

(c) The case must fulfil the working definition of an interstate secessionist or irredentist conflict:<sup>21</sup>

An interstate secessionist conflict is the formal and informal aspects of political alienation in which one or more ethnic groups seek a reduction of control or autonomy from a central authority through political means. The state-center and/or secessionist group will seek out and obtain external support, enhancing internal cleavage and disruption leading to interstate conflict. Such conflicts may or may not involve (1) the use of force and (2) politically mobilized, well organized, ethnic insurgency movements.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, secessionism leads to an interstate ethnic crisis in four non-mutually exclusive instances:

(1) When ethnic groups refuse to recognize the existing political authorities, they can trigger a foreign policy crisis for the state in question (internal challenge leading to external involvement); and (2) trigger foreign policy crises for the state's allies leading to international crisis; (3) invite external involvement based on transnational ethnic affinities (including threats of involvement) of one or more state interlocutors supporting the secessionist group triggering an international crisis; and (4) invite external involvement of one or more states based on ethnic affinities supporting the state-centre triggering an international crisis.

For example, the crisis over Bangladesh took place from 25 March to 17 December 1971. In mid-February 1971, a decision was made by the military rulers in West Pakistan to suppress the growing fervor of East Bengal nationalism. Military personnel were posted to the East. On 1 March, president Yahya Khan postponed the opening of the assembly. This was protested by the Awami League which launched a non-cooperative movement on the 6th. The UN approached by Bangladesh in March 1971 declared the matter an internal matter for Pakistan but could not disregard the effect the war was having on Muslims in eastern India and Hindus in Bangladesh. While fighting raged over the spring and summer an estimated nine million refugees fled from Bangladesh to Bengal. On 21 November the Indian Army crossed into West Pakistan already at war with Bangladesh. Indian forces overwhelmed the Pakistani troops in seceding territory. The war ended on 17 December 1971 with Pakistan's surrender and the emergence of a new sovereign state on the Indian subcontinent (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988: 295).

#### **Irredentist Conflicts:**

By definition, irredentist conflicts are already interstate ethnic conflicts because an irredentist conflict is the claim to the territory of an entity - usually an independent state - wherein an ethnic ingroup is in a numerical minority. The original term "terra irredenta" means territory to be redeemed. It presumes a redeeming state, as well as such territory. The redeeming state can be an ethnic nation-state or a multi-ethnic, plural state. The territory to be redeemed is sometimes regarded as part of a cultural homeland, as part of a historic state, or as an integral part of one state. The claim to territory is based on transnational ethnic affinities and is conditioned by the presence of cleavage between the minority ingroup and its state-centre.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, an irredentist conflict leads to interstate ethnic crisis in three non-mutually exclusive ways: (1) by triggering a foreign policy crisis for one or more states through an internal challenge supported by the redeeming state, (2) external threats made by one or both states; (1) and (2) can trigger (3) foreign policy crises for allies of the two states.

For example, throughout the 1950's, Great Britain had attempted to create a viable political structure that would include Brunei, Sarawak, Sabah, Singapore and Malaya. All of these states had majority Muslim Malay populations sharing a strong cultural and religious heritage. Plans for a Federation of Malaysia conflicted with the territorial claims of the Philippines and especially the Muslim-Malay state of Indonesia. In February 1963, Indonesian President Sukarno announced that Indonesia opposed a Malaysia Federation. Indonesia set about disrupting the ethnic and political cohesion of the fragile federation through a policy of "confrontation" which included covert military incursions into West Malaya. On 11 July, the Federation was formalized, triggering a foreign policy crisis for Indonesia. In response, Indonesia requested that the Federation be delayed until a UN monitored election could be held to determine the interests of the people. On 14 September 1963, the results indicated that people's preferences lay with a Malaysia Federation. Indonesia responded by refusing to endorse the results. On 17 September the new state of Malaysia severed diplomatic ties with Indonesia and the Philippines and sought and obtained international support. For example, the International Monetary Fund withdrew its offer of promised credit to Indonesia. Afterwards, the crisis faded with both sides claiming victory. (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988: 262; see also chapter seven of this thesis).

Having presented key definitions, concepts and potentially important explanatory variables, the chapter now turns to a brief description of the remaining thesis chapters and methodology.

## ***5. Chapter Outline and Methodology***

In this study, consideration is given to the impact of ethnic conflicts on interstate conflict through both **qualitative assessment (case study methods) and quantitative testing**. Using statistical and case study methods, inferences will be made and propositions tested by measuring the behaviour of states in ethnic conflicts on three dimensions: (a) **the propensity of states to develop and implement ethnically oriented foreign policies**; (b) **interactions leading to protracted interstate conflict and future crisis escalation**; and (c) **the decision by elites to resort to the use of force in interstate ethnic conflict**. Because of such comparisons, although based on populations of statistical data and case study samples, the potential for accurate prediction is enhanced. **Cases that challenge the assumptions of the model are an explicit part of testing.**

### ***5.1 Chapter Outline***

Including this introductory chapter, there are nine chapters in all. Chapter two presents a critical assessment of theoretical approaches to interstate ethnic conflict. Each of these approaches represent a specific class of theories that differ from those briefly examined in this chapter. Each purports to explain why states become involved in ethnic conflicts and how such conflicts can be resolved. Each is central to the model subsequently developed in chapter three because they provide insight into important explanatory variables. Three sets of theories are examined. They are, conflict extension, conflict interaction and conflict transformation.

Chapter three uses a deductive approach building on the ideas introduced briefly in this chapter and the approaches developed in chapter two. Key explanatory variables, such as ethnic

composition and political constraint, are identified and their interaction effects assessed. Contingency factors, including ethnic affinities and ethnic cleavage are also examined. A model is developed in order to determine: (a) the types of states that pursue an ethnically oriented foreign policy; (b) variables that account for interstate ethnic conflict and crisis; and (c) variables that account for protracted interstate ethnic conflict, future crisis escalation and the use of force. Thirteen propositions, relating to anticipated behaviour, are formulated and presented.

Chapters four and five comprise case study research. The task of chapters four and five is twofold. The main purpose is to operationalize the variables utilized in the model, that is, demonstrate their explanatory effectiveness. Second, propositions developed in chapter three will be tested in order to refine the model. The method of structured-focussed comparison will provide the means for making valid inferences about the presumed causal linkage and the interactive effects between the selected variables. Two cases, one secessionist and one irredentist have been selected. Both are interstate ethnic crises.

In chapter four, the secessionist case chosen is the Indo-Sri Lanka Crisis of 1983-1990 in which the Indian government sent a "peacekeeping" force into Sri Lanka to prevent that state's Tamil secessionist conflict from spilling over onto Indian soil. This case provides an opportunity to examine interactions between institutionally constrained, ethnically diverse states.

Chapter five examines Somalia's recurring irredentist crises. No less than seven international crises are related to Somalia's quest for a "Greater Somalia", the most notable being the Somalia-Ethiopian war of 1977-1978. This chapter determines how changes in institutional constraints in combination with ethnic affinities can account for interstate ethnic conflict in protracted settings. The case is notable because the most intense period of interstate

conflict occurred when ethnic cleavages in Ethiopia were very high and Somalia's military junta was in the process of consolidating power.

The goal of chapter six is to test the propositions using aggregate data from the International Crisis Behaviour Project. Contingency tables and loglinear methods are used to test the proposed relationship. Irredentist and secessionist crises are identified and variables operationalized. The model is then refined based on confirmation or rejection of the propositions.

In chapters seven and eight, the model, based on the findings in chapter six, is reassessed. These chapters follow on the heels of aggregate testing because they are studies of cases that either do not fit the current conceptual and definitional parameters of crisis research or are, as yet, unresolved. For example, in chapter seven, all the factors necessary for interstate ethnic conflict are present yet it did not result in crisis. Thus, the task of this chapter is to develop a basis for external validity, that is, test the propositions, using a case that challenges the model. By examining this case, inferences can be made about the presumed causal linkage. By comparing those cases that resulted in crisis with one that did not, additional information about the conditions necessary for the resolution of interstate ethnic conflict is obtained.

More specifically, chapter seven examines the Thai-Malay secessionist conflict in southern Thailand in which a minority Malay community has, since the turn of the century, sought secession from Thailand. It has been selected not only because it exhibits all the important elements of an interstate ethnic conflict, which has not resulted in violence, but also because the conflict encompasses both irredentist and secessionist dimensions. Both factors, while not unique, may provide insights for model development and conflict management.

The second task, carried out in chapter eight, is to speak to the future through the in-depth study of a current and unresolved ethnic conflict. This chapter extends the study of crisis research beyond the temporal domain of the aggregate data (1988) which could enhance an understanding of interstate ethnic conflict and crisis in the post Cold War era. Simply put, the evolving international system is witnessing a renewed and vigorous revival of ethnic conflicts. Extending the study to the post Cold War era, a period in which there has been significant system transformation (including the collapse of one superpower), may provide insights into how much domestic politics influence interstate ethnic conflict, independent of systemic factors such as superpower rivalry and inter-client war. For example, the theoretical contributions of this inquiry, including model development, should be capable of explaining current and potential subject matter as well as past events. In order to enhance validity, propositions developed in chapter three will be the basis for re-testing.

In chapter eight, the Balkans conflict has been selected for analysis. This conflict also exhibits irredentist and secessionist characteristics. The conflict has been selected for a number of reasons. First, its complexity of multiple actors, issues and crises should prove useful for model development. The key issue is to develop a model that is useful in comparing cases across the temporal domain and one that is capable of prediction using the variables developed in this thesis, rather than relying on system change and disruption as a source of explanation. Second, from a policy perspective, the case presents a challenge to the international community. An understanding of this conflict may provide insight into the future of ethnic conflict management and resolution.



In chapter nine the findings are summarized. Policy relevant and theoretical contributions are presented in the light of these findings. Finally, directions for further research are discussed.

## ***5.2 Methodology***

First, theories of international ethnic conflict are reviewed to set the stage for a deductively derived approach that combines their strengths. This synthesis will lay the groundwork for developing a model and determining which variables should be examined. Thirteen propositions about the presumed causal linkage are developed.

Second, a qualitative approach, based on two case studies, is used to refine the model and operationalize the variables. This will provide the means for making valid inferences about the presumed causal linkage and the interactive effects between the selected variables. Propositions are designed to evaluate linkages that account for foreign policy formation, protracted conflict, future crisis escalation and the use of force.

Third, aggregate data from the International Crisis Behaviour Project will test the model for those separatist and irredentist ethnic conflicts that lead to interstate conflict. Such testing and selection have been used in crisis-based research and will be the basis for this research as well.<sup>24</sup> Both actor and system level data are tested. Cases for the period 1918-1988 are selected and assessed. A refined model based on an evaluation of the propositions in steps two and three will be presented.

In step four, two cases are examined in detail. By linking these cases through variables common to the previous cases, the causal links within the model will derive greater

independence from the built-in assumptions of the data-set and the assumptions of crisis-based research. Both reliability and validity will be enhanced. In all, the four in-depth cases cover four regions, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe. By comparing cases across time and space the model may derive greater validity, which may lead to a more accurate evaluation of potential future cases.

## Notes

1. Attempts should be made to anticipate and prevent future ethnic conflicts through preventive diplomacy and preventive peacekeeping. Preventive diplomacy entails identifying the conditions necessary for the successful resolution of ethnic conflicts by focussing on issue areas that are of common interest to the adversaries. Preventive peacekeeping, on the other hand, focuses on identifying the conditions necessary for the triggering of ethnic conflicts. These conditions may be domestic as well as systemic and are necessary but not sufficient conditions for peacemaking. Preventive peacekeeping is seen as the development of early warning techniques for anticipating and predicting the outbreak of ethnic conflict into the international sphere. The use of collective force is a measure of last resort but is also integral to conflict resolution. Finally the development of conflict resolution strategies and techniques are necessary. The work of International Alert (1993) is notable because it focuses on liaison and consultation between the academic community (including information scientists and regional experts) and the United Nations.

2. According to Schwartz "[T]he current humanitarian intervention in Somalia has compelling justification. It is directed against a devastating famine. It will not oust a democratic government but try to create one where there is now anarchy. A major source of leadership has been the UN Secretary-General." Schwartz (The Globe and Mail 8 December 1992: A 15).

3. United Nations University Report on Ethnicity and Development (1987). See also Gurr (1993) for other estimates.

4. "The international community still places a higher priority on state sovereignty than on human rights. Before the Gulf War, Iraq's atrocities against its own people, including the Kurdish minority were largely ignored. The UN forcibly intervened, only after Iraq invaded another sovereign state, Kuwait" Schwartz, (The Globe and Mail 8 December 1992: A 15).

5. In general, studies of ethnic conflict focus on individual motives and ethnic group behavior, but within the international relations literature there has been less focus on the impact ethnic conflict has on the political system (see Posen 1993).

6. A third paradigm, world systems theory, has tended to overlook the military and geo-political dimensions of ethnic conflict, concentrating instead on the way in which economic dependence engenders competition among ethnic groups within developing societies (Thompson 1989). As Nagel and Whorton argue, "[T]his paucity of insights into ethnic conflict appears to stem from the logic of world systems theory with its emphasis on economic structures and processes and preoccupation with class as the central cleavage and source of conflict within and across states and its failure to incorporate military and geopolitical competition into the general specification of the world system competitive model." (Nagel & Whorton 1992: 3).

7. In this instance, the OAU and to some extent the United Nations, have been promoted as regimes which can facilitate cooperation among multi-ethnic states. First, as documented by Haas, the OAU has not been an effective instrument in inducing cooperative behaviour among

African states (Haas 1983). Even Jackson and Rosberg concede that cooperative behaviour and non violent interaction among the African states has more to do with tacit agreement among the major external actors to not become directly involved in African ethnic strife (Jackson & Rosberg 1982).

8. It is most often apparent in overt conflictual relations between states, but is present in many other instances. Foreign aid, immigration policy, and trade issues are a few examples.

9. It is true that the United States has a naval base in Somalia and that there are potential oil reserves in Somalia but these are balanced by the international community's genuine desire to resolve the internal clan-based conflict. See chapter four, section 2 on Somalia. Countries contributing to the military mission include: United States, Canada, Belgium, Britain, Egypt, France, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (The Globe and Mail 7 December 1992).

10. While it is true that the international system in this century has been witness to significant structural changes (from multipolar, to tight bipolar, to loose bipolar to polycentric) there is one seemingly permanent condition in the international system and one emergent feature. This inquiry rests on the "self-evident" assumption that the system is anarchical. An anarchical system in this sense simply refers to a hierarchy of states in the absence of world government. Within this environment, power, status and capabilities are distributed unevenly among states. Conflict is a reality of an anarchic political system and states will be implicitly involved in this conflictual process. The system is also witness to an emergent world order, a society of states bound together by a loosely-based set of norms, values and institutions designed to facilitate cooperation among states and bring order to a conflictual anarchical system. The normative world in which states operate has long aspired to recognize the rights and aspirations of minorities - in the form of newly emergent nations or more vaguely in their rights to self determination. State building - a consequence of an anarchical system - and nation building - a normative aspiration - are two processes that are rarely convergent. On the one hand, through various UN principles, the international community promotes self-determination for minorities which in turn can disrupt the internal affairs of states and occasionally entire regions. On the other hand, international interaction is based on principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of states within the established international system. Ironically, interstate ethnic conflict is at the intersection of these conditions. That is, rarely are the aspirations of minorities and respect for territorial and political integrity mutually compatible.

11. Ethnic conflict and state disintegration are not synonymous. That is, properly managed and channelled through appropriate institutions, ethnic conflict can have a positive impact on inter-ethnic relations. Thus, while interstate conflict may be conditioned by state disintegration through the intervention of external parties to a conflict, domestically situated ethnic conflicts themselves usually result from processes of state and nation building.

12. Determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for ethnic conflict at the domestic level is intricate. These conditions are most likely a combination of economic, political and psychological factors. The primary antecedents to conflict can vary from case to case. Ethnic

conflicts can arise when ethnic groups are geographically concentrated in backward or advanced regions (Horowitz 1981, 1985) when class reinforces ethnic cleavages (Hechter 1986), when the size and number of groups within states is relatively equal (de Silva 1982, 1991), when resource mobilization among groups is unequal (Olzak & Nagel 1986), when the labour market is split along ethnic lines (Bonacich 1980), with differential activity of elites (Smith 1981, 1986), and in response to uneven state policies (Chazan 1991).

13. Recent examples include Ostrom and Job (1986), Putnam (1988), James (1988), Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry (1989), James and Oneal (1991), Morgan and Campbell (1991), Morrow (1991), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) and Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller (1992).

14. It is assumed that each state ultimately is represented by a single leader with no independent policy preferences. The leader's objective is simply to achieve a foreign policy that will be attractive to constituents.

15. The term 'rational', as used in this study, denotes behaviour that is appropriate for achievement of specific goals in a given situation.

16. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines affect as: "[I]nward disposition, feeling, as contrasted with external manifestation or action; intention..disposition, temper, natural tendency...feeling towards or in favor of".

17. Equally important for this analysis is how states respond to ethnic conflict. Generally speaking states involved in recurring episodes of violent ethnic conflict tend to develop and maintain institutions specialized in the exercise of coercion and to develop elite political cultures that sanction the use of violence. To the extent that coercive strategies lead to conflict outcomes favorable for the political elite, their preference for those strategies in future is reinforced. Alternatively when they have unfavorable outcomes non-coercive strategies will characterize future conflicts. Frequent success in the use of state-organized violence for national consolidation and the suppression of internal challenges leads to the development of police states. Post revolutionary states such as the Soviet successor state that face internal resistance in the immediate aftermath of revolution tend to become police states. On the other hand frequent success in the use of reforms, concessions and displacement to manage internal challenges leads to the development of institutions and norms of democratic rule. Democratic states are unlikely to rely mainly on coercion in response to internal challenges (Gurr 1980).

18. With the exception of a perceptive article by Myron Weiner comparative analyses of irredenta are rare. Weiner's model, while useful for assessing some variables does not allow useful comparison between irredenta and secession. See Weiner (1971). The most recent contribution on irredenta and international politics by Chazan et. al. does provide insight into this relationship (Chazan 1992).

19. Three of the four of the in-depth cases in this analysis focus on dyads and territorially contiguous states. A fourth (the Balkans conflict) involves multiple participants in which two of the participants, Slovenia and Serbia are not contiguous. However many of the interstate ethnic conflicts in this study (including those used in statistical analysis) have crisis actors that are not territorially contiguous. 80% of the crises used in statistical analysis are either single or two-actor crises. In brief, territorial contiguity is not necessary for a state to enter into conflictual relations with another state or to experience a foreign policy crisis, but the majority of cases do involve territorial contiguous states. See chapter six for a list of cases and analysis.

20. For a full definition of international crisis see: Brecher & Wilkenfeld (1988).

21. In the absence of a foreign policy crisis an international crisis cannot occur, however the reverse is not true, a foreign policy crisis can take place without it leading to an international crisis. Interstate ethnic crises are a particular kind of interstate crisis. Additional conditions are required for them to take place, that is, they must fulfill the conditions specified for either a secessionist or irredentist conflict.

22. Wood (1981) uses the word "secession" instead of "separatism" because, in his view, the former, is a more precise term referring to a demand for formal withdrawal from a central authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status. Separatism on the other hand covers all aspects of political alienation which features a desire for the reduction of control by a central authority. Since the latter definition applies to many cases where ethnic groups seek decreased state control over ethnic political affairs, separatist movements can become secessionist movements when ethnic groups refuse to recognize the existing political authority. To Wood secessionist represents the opposite of nation building in which political actors withdraw their loyalties, activities and expectations from a jurisdictional centre and focus them on a centre of their own. This inquiry uses secession as a synonym of separatism which has a much broader meaning. Gurr uses the term in the sense intended here: "...to signify any strong tendency within an identity group to attain greater political autonomy." See: Gurr (1993: 21). This definition would include the anti-colonial struggles (violent and nonviolent) of groups within a newly independent state (Indonesia, Algeria) as well as the more well known insurgencies (Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh). See also Heraclides (1991).

23. Theoretically, ethnic linkages are not a condition for irredenta, for claims can be based solely on territory, but in reality many irredenta are mixed and disputes about the nature of the claim usually involve mobilization of groups based on the principles of reuniting ethnic kin. For this reason, and because the focus of this thesis is an assessment of ethnic factors conducive for interstate conflict, irredenta are defined as territorial and ethnic in nature in which there is an attempt to detach land and people from one state in order to incorporate them in another, as in the recurrent rival claims to Kashmir by India and Pakistan. By definition, irredentist conflicts can readily become internationalized as they usually involve two or more states in conflict over a specific territory. Undoubtedly there will be some resistance to these definitions and to more than a few of the cases selected for this study. While many of these conflicts have important dimensions that extend beyond the ethnic conflict typology and definitions developed here (East-

West conflict for example) they also contain significant elements of ethnic conflict within them. For example, Rothman (1992) has argued, convincingly that the Arab-Israel conflict exhibits a powerful ethnic element that is irredentist in nature. Similarly the secessionist cases were chosen in accordance with current research on the subject.

24. There are at least three advantages to using crisis-based data to evaluate the propositions developed in the thesis. First, although crises are by definition conflicts, not all such cases necessarily lead to war. Indeed, many crises are managed successfully without recourse to violence. Hence the data capture a broad range of interstate behaviour, including that which falls short of war but nevertheless reveals a significant level of conflict. Second, the data provide, among other important indicators, the number of states involved, the nature of the threat, and the issues over which the case arose. Such information is vital in determining whether the conflict is ethnically based. Finally, the crisis data focus specifically on conflicts that take place at the interstate level. Thus conflicts of either the ethnic or non-ethnic variety that have not yet produced international crises are not included.

## Chapter 2

### Overview and Approaches, Understanding the Interstate Link



*Without denying the authentic emotional energy that they invest in, and draw from their rediscovered ethnicity, one may nevertheless suggest that these subelites return to their roots less for cultural sustenance than for organizational leverage (Rothschild 1981: 87).*

### ***1. Overview and Approaches - Understanding the Interstate Link***

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the various theories that explain the international dimensions of ethnic strife. Each identifies potentially important causal linkages between ethnic conflict and interstate conflict and all are central to this inquiry. Each contribution is scrutinized and classified into one of three separate, theoretical categories designated as approaches:

**Conflict Extension;**

**Conflict Interaction;**

**Conflict Transformation.**

Each approach is assessed in terms of its theoretical and conceptual strengths and weaknesses; the types of ethnic conflict examined; units and levels of analysis; and implications for ethnic conflict resolution and management. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the implications these approaches have for this inquiry.

### ***2. Conflict Extension - The Management of Diffusion***

Explanations that examine the relationship between ethnic conflict and involvement by external actors are known as theories of conflict extension (Suhrke & Noble 1977; Heraclides

1991). The theoretical objective of conflict extension is to determine the linkage between internally generated ethnic strife (eg. secessionism) and international conflict. Presumably, having chosen the variables that explain the process of diffusion (Starr 1991), conflict extension approaches can more readily determine the factors necessary for ethnic conflict **containment and management**. In other words, conflict extension explains how ethnic conflicts can be successfully prevented from spreading (Hill & Rothchild 1993). Two levels of analysis are deemed central to this approach.

At the state level of analysis, the central objective of conflict extension theory is to explain the motivations and goals of external states in response to ethnic strife and the impact this intervention has on the spread of conflict. Conflict extension is essential to this inquiry because it specifies **why states choose certain kinds of foreign policies** when faced with ethnic strife in another state. Explanations as to the role played by the state as interlocutor to an internal ethnic conflict are given primary consideration.

A second goal of conflict extension is to **identify the system level conditions** associated with the processes that link the involvement of states in the internal affairs of other states. Proponents of conflict extension ask: what are the structural properties that facilitate the diffusion of domestic ethnic conflict to interstate conflict? A third goal of this approach is to figure out the **appropriate means for preventing the spread of ethnic strife**. In this respect, conflict extension approaches are based on the assumption that current international norms including principles of self determination for minorities can be improved along with existing techniques of conflict management (Ryan 1990a).

## *2.1 External Involvement in Secessionist Conflicts*

Nearly all secessionist conflicts with origins inside a state have an important international dimension (Heraclides 1991; Chazan 1992; de Silva & May 1991).<sup>1</sup> In turn, the actions of states external to a conflict greatly influence the dynamics and resolution of a secessionist conflict. Depending on the motivations of the external actors, external involvement can cause an ethnic conflict to spread through **encouragement and diffusion** or it can prevent it from spreading by concerted efforts of **suppression**. More accurately, two variables have purported to explain the motivations of decision makers of states external to an ethnic conflict. On the one hand, **instrumental motivations** (unrelated to, or in the absence of, ethnic ties) are put forward to account for the goals and objectives of actors external to a secessionist conflict (Suhrke & Noble 1977). On the other, **affective motivation** is used to explain why states become involved in ethnic strife (Suhrke & Noble 1977; Smith 1986: 75; Chazan 1992).

For example, from the point of view of states at the decision making level, instrumental motivations for involvement in ethnic conflict include: (a) international political considerations; (b) economic gain; (c) domestic politics; and (d) military interests (Heraclides 1990).

According to proponents of the conflict extension approach, instrumental perspectives often fall short in explaining the behavior of all the actors within an ethnic conflict (Heraclides 1990). Sometimes, elite decision making is also imbued with a powerful affective component including: (a) a shared sense of historic injustice; (b) shared identity; (c) religious affinity; (d) common ideological principles; (e) or a degree of inchoate racial-cultural affinity. Affective motivations also include humanitarian considerations that can operate without ethnic affinities (Heraclides 1991). However, it is often difficult to detect whether humanitarian motivations are

in part influenced by instrumental concerns.<sup>2</sup> For example, US threats of involvement in Yugoslavia, though motivated by humanitarian concerns, are also designed to prevent the conflict from spreading (See Chapter 8).

According to conflict extension approaches, states rarely intervene solely on the basis of affective motivations. In other words, instrumental motivations persist on their own as sources for foreign policy orientation, affective motivations infrequently do (Heraclides 1991). Thus, motivations for third party intervention can range from pure instrumental to a mix of instrumental and affective. (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 1-15; Heraclides)

Setting aside for the moment, the conceptual problems associated with the dichotomy of instrumental and affective variables, **the idea is compelling**. The argument suggests that instrumental motivations alone may not be sufficient in accounting for the diffusion of ethnic conflict. Transnational affinities may also be important determinants of involvement.

A second important aspect of this approach is that the mix of instrumental and affective motivations will determine the **substance and level** of third party involvement. External states provide goods for use by either the state-centre or the secessionist movement as decided by their affective and instrumental orientations. These goods can range from funds, sanctuary or access, each of which are linked to potential escalation in a conflict and therefore increased diffusion. For example, Heraclides finds that the diffusion of a secessionist conflict is directly linked to the type of goods made available. Not only is a secessionist conflict more likely to succeed with tangible external assistance but it is also more likely to lead to interstate conflict when, for obvious reasons, these goods are in the form of military assistance.

A critical point, made by Heraclides is that, affectively-derived support is likely to be low-level. Groups sharing ethnic affinities are expected to at least provide political and diplomatic support but rarely do they provide more.

In contrast, support that is instrumentally determined is usually much broader in scope and often more tangible. For example, a state may provide sanctuary and military support to an ethnic insurgency to destabilize a region or take advantage of internal cleavages in a neighboring state, concerns that may transcend affective motivations.

The relationship between affect and instrumental motivations is illustrated through a seven-step progression. In those conflicts where an external state's instrumental motivations are predominant, higher support levels (six and seven) are expected:

1. Simple transactional involvement;
2. Humanitarian involvement;
3. Non-military involvement;
4. Military involvement without the inclusion of personnel;
5. Foreign combat under a secessionist command;
6. Direct military support for the state-centre on a limited scale;
7. Full-scale military intervention in civil war (invasion, war).

(Heraclides 1991:49).

It is evident from this progression that instrumental motivations tend to favor the state-centre. That is, most states in the system are concerned about preventing conflict diffusion. On

the other hand, when motivated by affect, states pursue interventionist strategies that are demonstrative of support without a commensurate threat to their own security. For example, affectively motivated states are more likely to intervene at levels one, two and three. The costs of involvement are low, yet the state is assured of expressing an act of solidarity.

In brief, states are motivated by affective and instrumental concerns, but instrumental concerns are likely to lead to increased levels of direct involvement by an external state. In turn the greater the external involvement the more likely that state structures will be supported and sustained. States that intervene to protect state structures are unlikely to do so solely because of affectively oriented decision-making. In other words, intervention by a third party in the defeat of a secessionist movement is linked to perceived gains or potential losses on the broader foreign policy front.

Implicit in this approach is the assumption that whether motivated by affect or instrumental concerns, state intervention is a rational calculation. Even when motivated by affect, elites still allow for the costs of involvement. The assumption is that demonstrating solidarity with an ethnic group has **low cost implications**. That is, decision makers can practice diplomacy "on the cheap". States may become involved by applying political or diplomatic pressures, especially when they are unwilling or incapable of providing resources. In these instances support will fall on the low end (one, two and three) of the following progression. This involvement is unlikely to lead to a transformation of state structures:

1. An expression of humanitarian concerns;

2. A call for a negotiated settlement between the central government and rebels without jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the state;
3. A call for open-ended peace talks between the two parties;
4. A clear statement that the secessionists have the right to self determination;
5. Recognition of the secessionist movement as a state (Heraclides 1991: 48).

During the Cold War examples of level four were infrequent and level five rare. This is because, according to conflict extension approaches, there is a desire among states to maintain regional and international stability. Even when an internal conflict involved a diversification of issues and protagonists there was the potential that a radical solution entailing complete separation of a state would be counterbalanced by more moderate power sharing solutions and conflict management by one or both of the superpowers or the United Nations. For example, between 1945 and 1989 only Bangladesh had successfully managed to challenge the status quo and this almost entirely due to Indian intervention. India's role was decisive and derived from broad foreign policy considerations that included, the preexisting hostile relationships between India and Pakistan, the weakness of the Pakistan government and the international publicity given to the refugee problem. A critical factor for success was geographical; the people of Pakistan were in reality already separate.

At this juncture, the analysis of dichotomous motivations in the formation of foreign policy raises two questions. Are certain systemic factors conducive to the spread of ethnic conflict, while others are less so? What factors might be associated with this process? For

answers to these questions the inquiry now turns to an analysis of the structural conditions viewed as important from the conflict extension perspective.

## *2.2 Structural Conditions and the Diffusion of Ethnic Conflict*

According to conflict extension proponents, two structural factors determine whether an ethnic conflict is important to the system. They are, the **scope of involvement (the number of parties involved)** and the **nature of the international relations** arising from such involvement. The scope and nature of the conflict form together to create a continuum of increasing complexity and increasing conflict (Suhrke & Noble 1977). Accordingly, the more new conflict is generated among the larger number of parties, the greater the multiplier effect and the more disturbing the conflicts would be. Therefore, the greater urgency attached to their suppression. Of these, conflicts that are centrally connected to broader patterns of **competitive international relations** are deemed to have the greatest potential for expansion (eg. the confrontation between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus). The international system is, therefore, likely to devote a great deal of energy to their management. Similarly, cases leading to **simple conflict expansion** in which two or more states are competitively involved are also likely to attract attention. However, they are deemed less urgent because they are not directly linked to competitive relations at the system level and involve fewer issues (eg. Iranian support for the Kurds of Iraq as a prelude to the Iran-Iraq war);

On the other hand, **equilibrating conflicts** that rarely lead to direct military confrontation are likely to receive less attention from the international system. Their potential for diffusion is low because the issues involved are of less importance to the system (eg. Thai support for ethnic



insurgents in Burma). Similarly, those conflicts in which the state in question is successful in the **containment** of the conflict are the least threatening and therefore receive the least attention (Muslim separatism in the Philippines) (Suhrke & Noble 1977).<sup>3</sup>

Of these, the first two are the most formidable because any kind of external involvement exacerbates internal tensions that in turn kind lead to greater competitive relations among states in the international system (Premdas 1991). Exacerbation and prolongation arise when new participants enter the conflict as the conflict spreads to several issue areas. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a clear example of competitive conflict expansion; six wars and a protracted conflict are evidence of increased intensification, greater complexity and enlargement. Viewed from this perspective, ethnic conflicts that are not linked to broader issues are unlikely to comprise a significant component of international conflict (Midlarsky 1992).

Structural analyses do provide insight into why such states are likely to engage in such policies and the kinds of support expected. However, a main assumption is that diffusion is dependent on the presence of a high level of competition among states in the international system. That is, the approach may be time dependent. During the Cold War, conflicts had the potential to spread because of the inherent competitive relations between the East and West. An important implication of this approach is that, during this period, some ethnic conflicts were diffuse, because the structure of the international system prohibited conflict between the superpowers but not among client states. Both sides of the Cold War may have supported (or suppressed) ethnic struggles to further their broader foreign policy objectives (Moynihan 1993). A central question that remains unanswered is how and why do ethnic conflicts persist in the absence of this competition?

Seen as an integrated package of structure and decision making motivations, conflict extension approaches tend to underemphasize the explicit linkage between structural conditions conducive for diffusion and affective and instrumental motivations of decision-making. The approach specifies the motivations of decision-makers of individual states that choose to become involved in an ethnic conflict but fail to give an accurate account of how the evolving system structure interacts with the motivation and interests of individual states and how in turn such conflicts influence the system. The problem is in part due to the mix of motivational decision-making inherent in ethnic conflicts. Motivations and interests may arise from **domestic considerations** as much as the structural conditions associated with them. For example, instrumental motivations may relate to larger systemic, regional considerations and domestic interests while affective motivations relate to a particular set of issues within a conflict. They may be context dependent.

Clearly though, ethnic conflict when it does occur, is a product of a behavioral constellation in which instrumental considerations and affective linkages overlap. Less clear, in accounting for diffusion, is the precise linkage between these variables. Related to this is the potential role that domestic politics play in influencing the decision by elites to enter a conflict. A crucial but missing component of these analyses is consideration of the **interaction effects between masses and elites** and the role that affect may play in influencing group and individual decision-making. For example, while elites may be motivated largely by instrumental concerns and broader foreign policy considerations, affective motivations, even when symbolic and ideological, may play an important role in influencing mass behaviour.

A second issue is that, conflict extension focusses on the interactions between states involved in secessionist-based ethnic conflicts only.<sup>4</sup> The problem of case selection is evident. It is not clear if inferences drawn from the study of secessionist conflict can be applied to irredenta.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the approach is important because it makes an explicit link between different types of motivation and expected outcomes in ethnic conflict settings. To this extent, conflict extension is central to this inquiry.

### ***2.3 Implications for Ethnic Conflict - Management or Resolution?***

On the issue of ethnic conflict management, conflict extension approaches take their cue from existing assumptions about international law and order (Miall 1992). In brief, the conventional wisdom holds that ethnic conflicts are managed but not necessarily resolved through the proper use of international law and force (Ryan 1990a). The management of ethnic conflict is based on certain international legal norms and a court to interpret and to apply these.<sup>6</sup> Member states contribute forces for this purpose and make decisions based on majority rule. The consequence of this approach is a concept of the common good interpreted by the powerful, both at the domestic and international level (Burton 1987).

In general, this approach holds that: (a) a scarcity of resources renders human conflictual relations inevitable; (b) ethnic conflict can be defined in objective terms because of this scarcity; (c) conflict is a win-lose process in its outcome; (d) a state's relative power and bargaining power determine proportions in win-lose outcomes; and (e) aggressive behaviour can be countered with rewards and punishments (Rothman 1992; Homer-Dixon, Boutwell & Rathjens 1993).

Minority struggles are said to threaten the cohesiveness of states, the security of regions (Birch 1989). Consider for example, the West Irian crisis of 1961. It derived from a dispute over West New Guinea, which could be traced back to Indonesian independence in 1949. The conflict reached crisis dimensions following an Indonesian decision to remove West Irian from Dutch control. The Indonesian leader, Sukarno, appealed successfully to the USSR for political and military support. In response, a new Dutch plan stressed self-determination for the Papuans. In September 1961 the Indonesian government implemented a small-scale infiltration into West Irian. Active participation by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, along with an announcement by President John F. Kennedy of the US' intention to seek a solution, persuaded the Netherlands to drop its demand for Papuan self-determination. According to an agreement signed by the Netherlands and Indonesia on 15 August 1962, the UN would supervise the evacuation of Dutch military forces and take over administration of the area until it could be handed over to Indonesia, not later than 1 May 1963 (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988: 237). Although the conflict over West Irian was prevented from leading to war, it remains unresolved.

Proponents of this approach argue that, existing techniques of conflict management be improved in combination with continued international involvement in ethnic conflicts (Ryan 1990b). For example, Ryan calls for a reassessment of the UN's role as a peacekeeper suggesting that it should pursue more active mediation, intervention and utilize sanctions and embargoes against delegitimized states (Ryan 1990a).

With respect to the process of diffusion, this approach emphasizes the fundamental role of the 1947 UN Human Rights Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, associated with the post World War II decolonization process

(Moynihan 1993). Occasionally, this and other UN declarations of self-determination are cited as support for a minority's claims about historical injustice or threats to identity.<sup>7</sup> In general, the international community has been willing to recognize the self-determination of peoples as a bulwark against "imperialism" but not at the cost of disrupting the integrity of the state-system. Parts of UN Resolution 1514 reveal the inherent dilemma in granting self-determination:

(2) All peoples have the right to self determination...

(4) All armed action of repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and fully their right to complete independence...

(6) Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (Moynihan 1993: 151).

Studies of attempts at ethnic conflict management by "third party" mediators, underscores the complex problem in finding a balance between rights to self-determination and maintaining the integrity of states. For example, in their examination of five failed domestic "Peace Accords" (Canada, Cyprus, India, Sri Lanka and Sudan) Samarasinghe and de Silva suggest that without the presence of a third party, the potential for transforming existing state structures is minimal (only Canada's miscarried Meech Lake Accord did not have a significant international element) (Miall 1992; de Silva & Samarasinghe 1993). Third party involvement has the potential to do two things. As the West Irian crisis exemplifies, external involvement can partially reduce levels of conflict between secessionist groups and the state-centre when there is support for the state-centre. If, on the other hand, one side of the international community supports self-determination

while the other supports the state-centre, then the possibility of **conflict diffusion** is greatly increased. The latter is a more accurate description of the Yugoslavian case and other post-Cold War scenarios because of the potential for involvement by external actors on both sides of the ethnic issue.

In brief, principles of ethnic conflict management served a specific purpose during the Cold War, a period which was perceived in the west as a Manichean struggle of right versus wrong. Within this struggle, international instruments were developed to hold in check the expansionist aims of some states and to prevent ethnic conflicts from spreading. Maintaining international stability was a system-wide concern (Suhrke & Noble 1977; Brecher 1993; Moynihan 1993). In contrast, today's struggles often consist of impossibly competing ethnic identities and mutually incompatible dreams of national self-determination. Within this matrix of competing claims, the conventional wisdom persists in the belief that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value, are compatible.<sup>8</sup>

The following section is an assessment of an alternative approach to interactions between system and state as a contribution to this inquiry.

### ***3. Conflict Interaction - The Encouragement of Ethnic Struggle***

Another set of linkage-oriented theories assesses the **interactive processes** that arise between dissatisfied nationalist groups and the international system. While based on sources in need of more rigorous expression, interaction approaches are central to this investigation. The trans-systemic link in this approach emerges from the **encouragement** the international community

provides for the self-determination of ethnic minorities (Mayall 1990). Some proponents of this approach argue that such groups are fighting for a just cause and deserve to prevail (Birch 1989). Others are motivated by a desire to identify "minorities at risk" (Gurr 1992). There are two aspects to the process of interaction. At the state level, interactive approaches examine the way in which state development interacts with ethnic group rebellion. Why, they ask, do ethnic groups rebel against state structures? A second level of inquiry is determination of how the system interacts with state level processes. How, they ask, does the system encourage internal strife?

### ***3.1 State Level Explanations - Ethnic Group Rebellion***

Proponents of the interactive approach assume that the modern state has become **globalized though not homogenous** (Burton 1986; Azar 1990; Gurr 1992; Smith 1993a). The development of state structures within multi-ethnic states has led to a sense of exclusion and failure in the social and political world which amounts to the systematic denial of the aspirations of particular ethnic groups. Ethnic conflict arises from this sense of exclusion. Intervention and violence are likely (Vayrynen 1991).

There are two reasons for this. First, unlike states, ethnic groups have neither diplomats nor armies and therefore have to gradually escalate their conflicts through violence. Second, armed-struggle is the result of an ethnic group's quest for identity, positive group distinctiveness and ingroup cohesion (Heraclides 1989; Gurr 1992). It is a means of challenging the existing order. For the state-centre seeking outside assistance - **reactive violence** (aimed to defend the entitlement of the state, - ie. rights and resources) is a likely instrument of internal policy. For

rebellious ethnic communities - **proactive violence** (which aims to appropriate new entitlement, which the group has not previously enjoyed) is a likely instrument for mobilization. Such actions will include an international dimension to the extent that both sides will seek outside support to achieve their goals (Vayrynen 1991).

In brief, interaction approaches identify the disjuncture between the development of the state and the processes of ethnic struggle as the primary causal mechanism leading to internationalization. As in the extension approaches, conflict is an enduring and endemic feature of a system comprising multi-ethnic states that are at various stages of economic and political development. However, interaction theorizing also suggests that the dynamics of ethnic strife are dependent on the structure, characteristics, and strategy of the ethnic groups themselves in combination with the traits, policies and external alliances of regimes confronting minority challenges. What this approach offers is a reversal of the extension approach. Rather than giving primary, explanatory power to external actor motivations, the **interests, behaviour and characteristics of the actors within the state in question (both state-centre and ethnic groups) are central** (Gurr 1991, 1992).

Identification of these conditions is an important beginning for model development. Presumably, both external motivations for involvement as examined by the extension approach and internal domestic factors are important in the study of internationalization.

### ***3.2 System Level Interactions - The Search for Global Legitimacy***

Conflict interaction approaches also emphasize the fundamental difference between external involvement based on **affective and instrumental** motivations of outside actors. These



motivations have both a direct and indirect impact on the encouragement of ethnic conflict. With respect to the affective dimension, several factors are worth noting. First ethnic groups recognize that internationalization of their demands can both simultaneously encourage internal mobilization and weaken the saliency and effectiveness of the state by creating international forums for substate grievances. This legitimization process is supported by the existence of supranational organizations, which provide a forum for subnational ethnic claims. Specifically, international organizations can promote ethnic mobilization to the extent that they provide human rights support, which lends a legitimacy to self-determination claims (Horowitz 1985).

This interactive process is embodied in the assumption that demands by ethnic groups for self-determination can, and sometimes will, produce responses from the international system (Gurr 1992). The cases of Biafra, Ethiopia and Somalia illustrate this. In each instance, ethnic groups, threatened with human rights abuses drew the attention of a variety of monitoring groups including United Nations bodies, private organizations such as Amnesty International and church groups (Premdas 1991).

Instrumental factors relate to the differential bearing that trade and economic development assistance have upon various ethnic groups within a state (de Silva & May 1991). Consider, for example, the role that OECD development assistance played in fomenting tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lanka. Several industrialized states including Canada, West Germany and Great Britain were involved in developing the Mahaweli dam project, in territory considered to be important to the Sri Lankan government for colonization and to local Tamil farmers as important to their livelihood. As a consequence, this aid project indirectly led to an increase in tensions between these two groups and was an important factor in the mobilization

of a dormant rural Tamil population in favor of an independence movement (Carment 1992).

Or consider the world sympathy evoked from the riots, deaths, human rights violations and the growing Tamil problem incurred after elections in 1977, 1981 and 1983. The net effect of the violence was to transfer international Tamil sympathy into action that in turn led to inquiries and field visits by various international human rights organizations (Amnesty International 1982).

In brief, interaction theorizing is compatible with conflict extension approaches in several respects. First, it suggests that an important condition for interstate conflicts be that it involve weak states that are having difficulty maintaining the status quo (weak system-maintenance functions). In both instances, these are porous states experiencing problems with nation-state building, inviting external involvement. Second, variations in conflict intensity will be determined by the kinds of relations between centre and minority group and the kinds of actors that are likely to become involved in such conflicts (Gurr 1992).<sup>9</sup>

Interactive approaches are critical of the conventional wisdom fundamental to the extension approach. On the one hand, interaction approaches recognize that ethnic conflict management can provide stability in the name of the common good, **if the state is deemed to be the legitimate political authority to exercise control over their peoples.** On the other hand, in the absence of state legitimacy - coercion becomes common place. In such cases, new techniques of conflict resolution are necessary.

### ***3.2 Implications for Conflict Resolution - A New Paradigm?***

Interaction approaches rest on the assumption that the international community can and should be involved in such conflicts not only to address the specific problems of conflict

diffusion but to eliminate the underlying causes as well (Azar & Burton 1986; Azar 1990; Burton 1990; Rothman 1992; Smith 1993a). With respect to conflict resolution, this approach argues that: (a) human relations are dominated by an exchange of social goods that increase in supply with consumption; (b) conflict is subjective because of hierarchies of values that alter perceptions and alter relationships; and (c) conflict is perceived as a win-lose situation but can have positive-sum outcomes for those involved (Rothman 1992).

Not surprisingly, proponents of this approach argue that current practices of ethnic conflict management are insufficient for the resolution of ethnic strife. According to Burton (1986) the traditional processes of power bargaining and mediation are **an additional reason for conflicts to become protracted.**

Burton argues that, it is power-based conflict management techniques that lead to temporary settlements without tackling the underlying issues. Consider in this context, the ongoing attempts to manage the conflict in Cyprus. Peacekeeping forces have tended to institutionalize the conflict making resolution more difficult. The main focus is on the nature of the conflict and how to resolve it by understanding the parties involved.<sup>10</sup> On this point, Azar made the distinction between human needs and interests. He argued that many conflicts are protracted because they involve **non-reducible and often non-negotiable values such as ethnic identity** (Azar 1990).

The main sources of ethnic conflict are questions of identity, effective participation, security and other basic needs - social goals that unlike material resources are not scarce. The primary distinction in this regard, is between values that are not negotiable and interests that can be traded. Classical thinking suggests that conflict is only about

interests. There are three important aspects here. First, values have a large affective component (Boucher, Landis & Clark 1987). Second, values, because of their level of abstraction, serve as organizing principles for most other concepts. As Boucher, Landis & Clark (1987: 21) argue, "[T]here is little that cannot be seen as an exemplar of a particular value. One could then postulate that when differences in value are made salient, the stage is set for inter-ethnic conflict".

According to the interaction approach, to address the problems associated with value-based conflict, efforts at resolution must operate outside power and interest-based bargaining relationships and outside of state institutions (Azar 1986). Ethnic group leaders must be allowed to voluntarily explore without commitment to arrive at solutions (Azar & Burton 1986). Decentralized mediating structures that focus on functional cooperation, are presumed to be necessary in order to promote cooperation and shared values over time.<sup>11</sup>

In sum, the interactive approach calls for nothing short of a complete paradigm shift in not only the way ethnic conflict is perceived, but also in the way in which states, individuals and communities interact. The capacity of current international institutional arrangements to resolve these problems is questioned. Finally, the approach assumes that resolution of ethnic conflicts can be achieved once underlying causal mechanisms are identified, namely problems associated with values and identity. In this sense, the interactive approach is relatively optimistic about the possibility of resolving strife in which ethnicity is salient.

If correct in its assumptions, current instruments of ethnic conflict management and resolution (including mediation, peacekeeping and sanctions) may need to be reassessed. There are several impediments to progress in this direction. First, armed conflict is often an acceptable

choice to leaders of ethnic groups if the alternative is loss of power, assimilation of the group or at worst genocide (Carment 1993). Second, ethnic conflicts involve overlapping issues that tend to be reinforcing. The move towards conflict in one area (eg. resources) exacerbates conflict in another area (eg. territory). Third, ethnic leaders are often carried along by the fervor of the groups whose support they seek. Therefore ethnic conflicts can become more protracted, formidable and potentially more violent than their non-ethnic counterparts. A related problem is the potential resistance among state elites who may feel that conciliation with minorities is at odds with their own developmental and security-based goals.

It is also important to recognize that states and other external actors including the UN will continue to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Power, status and capabilities will continue to be distributed unevenly among states. Conflict is a reality of a changing political system and states will be implicitly involved in this conflictual process. Most states will continue to possess the means of coercion needed to repress rebellion and contain ethnic strife. The leaders of these states, whether legitimate or not, should be included in negotiations for this reason. Of course the future has become even further complicated now that strong nuclear states are ridden with internal dissent.

From a theoretical perspective, the interaction approach does provide a compelling argument for reexamining the ways in which ethnic strife is managed by the international community, by suggesting that state level changes, including ethnic struggles arise from the **inability of whole systems to confront and solve them.**<sup>12</sup> Consequently, the legitimacy and authority of the present system, may be undergoing a transition and international institutions may be less effective over the short term. The resulting tensions between and within states has in

many ways become inextricably woven into a worldwide crisis of authority in which current norms cannot keep pace with changes in the issues and actors that are evolving at a much faster pace (Vayrynen 1991).

On one level, **states**, as the primary actors in the system, are undergoing **transformation** as a consequence of internal changes induced by ethnically mobilized groups. Concurrently, there is **issue transformation**, the alteration of the international political agenda arising as a consequence of changes in the system. Both processes have led to **rule transformation**, an attempt to redefine the norms which states are expected to follow in their mutual relations. Many theorists argue that this current crisis of authority can be resolved through a civilizational process often equated with liberalism (Russett 1990). Within the ethnic conflict domain the move to **democratization will be beneficial - if and only if - there is a change in the current norms that dictate the way in which states interact.**

To conclude, the interaction model suggests that the roots of ethnic conflict lie in the fabrication of new identities and the triggering of old identities that belie state boundaries. Several factors have contributed to this process. The role of the international system in this process is important. The coincidence of nation-building and state building is a crucial turning point in the transition from a nation-state to an ethnic-state construct. The presumed consolidating process of nation-building rests on the same ideological base that serves as launching point-for ethnic mobilization - that of self-determination. The capacity of current international institutional arrangements to resolve these problems is questioned. Finally, the approach assumes that resolution of ethnic conflicts can be achieved once underlying causal mechanisms are identified namely problems associated with values and identity. In this sense,

theories of conflict interaction processes are relatively optimistic about the possibility of resolving strife in which ethnicity is salient but the prescriptions offered remain to be realized.

#### *4. Conflict Transformation - Domestic Unrest and State Cohesion*

A third set of theories, known as **conflict transformation**, attempts to relate domestic and foreign conflict systematically (Suhrke & Noble 1977; Vayrynen 1991). Other than studies carried out by Suhrke & Noble (1977) and Carment et. al. (1992), the majority of research on conflict transformation has not focussed on ethnic conflict specifically, but its assumptions are appropriate for understanding the linkage between domestic ethnic conflict and interstate conflict. This state-centric approach, which connects events at the domestic and international levels, also has been called "conflict linkage", "conflict-cohesion", "diversion" and "projection" (James 1987). When a state beset by internal conflict enters into a conflict with another state, internal coherence is expected to increase because those within the state will put aside their differences in order to pursue the higher goal of avoiding national invasion. Conflict transformation offers a less sanguine assessment of ethnic conflict diffusion. The conclusion is that, instead of being resolved, conflict is usually transformed by **redefining the actors, issues or modes of operation**.<sup>13</sup> An original conflict, such as domestic unrest threatening an insecure government, can be transformed and possibly even intensified at an interstate level. Thus, transformation theory provides an alternative explanation for the linkage between ethnic strife and international conflict. For instance, in an irredentist conflict an elite may attempt to transform domestic strife into interstate ethnic conflict by laying claim to territory of an entity -- usually an independent

state -- in which their ingroup is in a clear minority. This interpretation clearly emphasizes instrumental rather than affective motivations among leaders.

The linkage between internal and external conflict is a time-honored metatheory within the international relations literature. For example, Lenin (1951) argued that imperialism serves to divert the masses attention away from class struggle. Other structural arguments suggest that economically dependent states are more war prone. For example, Wright (1942) among others, argued that domestic security needs are often addressed through war. Coser developed the idea of the conflict cohesion thesis; war is the opportunity for a state ridden with antagonisms to overcome them. However, the majority of political science research has found little or no support for the thesis.

The gap between theory and empirical research is even more problematic because evidence from a large number of historical cases suggests that decisions for war are frequently influenced by domestic political interests of political elites facing internal challenges. For example, Lebow's 1981 study of 13 Brinkmanship crises over the previous centuries found that they were initiated by elites sense of domestic political vulnerability in the hope of buttressing their political positions at home (Lebow 1981).

Levy and James argue that much of the explanation for these discrepancies can be found in flaws in the quantitative literature. For example, the limited temporal domain of most of the quantitative studies may be problematic, while other problems can be attributed to coding inconsistencies (Levy 1989; James 1987).

To summarise, the bulk of empirical research on conflict transformation has not been guided by any coherent theoretical framework. For example, Stohl's (1980) exhaustive study of



conflict cohesion found that the continuing lack of a theoretical foundation has worked against the accumulation of evidence.

**The primary problem in assessing the conflict-linkage thesis is understanding the differences between types of linkage.** For example, there is the internal impact on external conflict and an external impact on internal conflict. According to Zinnes (1980), Levy (1989) and James (1987) a theoretical and empirical distinction must be made between these linkages. There are several distinct causal mechanisms: (1) the internalization of external conflict in which weaker states invite intervention. For example, Gurr concludes that external intervention exacerbates internal conflict to the extent that the poorer the nation, the more invidious the inequalities, and the more dependent the state is, the more susceptible to violence internally (Gurr 1980) and; (2) The externalization of internal conflict involving: a) shift in the dyadic balance of power or; b) external intervention.<sup>14</sup>

The problem of conceptualizing the linkage between external and internal conflict has been difficult because; as noted above, the results of research have largely been inconclusive or contradictory. For example, results of research on the conflict transformation hypothesis suggest that, there is no single clear relationship between internal and external conflict that holds across time and space; an explicit linkage thesis is unsupported in empirical work so far. Structural conditions in the international system may also affect the direction of conflict, that is, conflict is expected to be more pronounced in dependent states. Among these states there does appear to be a reciprocal relationship, ie domestic conflict may lead to external conflict, which may further increase domestic conflict or reduce internal conflict (Wilkenfeld 1968; Skocpol 1979; Levy 1989).

In brief, the process is more likely dynamic, interactive and multi-causal but the methods employed are static, one way and univariate. When the internal conflict measures are taken with other attributes of nations such as governmental structure, population diversity or demands, and instability, then a relationship appears to exist (Wilkenfeld 1973; James 1987).

The main problem in using the transformation thesis to explain all interstate ethnic conflicts is that most of these conflicts are not unidirectional. Occasionally, internal weakness invites intervention. Based on the research to date **it is difficult to accept the hypothesis that internal threats are solely responsible for interstate ethnic conflicts.** External interests and ethnic affinities may also play important roles in influencing behaviour.

For example, internal problems beset the states of South Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa. Occasionally many of these states experience levels of domestic order that surpasses the threshold in which the externalization of its conflict would be conducive for cohesion. Ethnic conflicts may also divide a state's elites, thus making decision making difficult and prolonging a crisis or plunging a country into a protracted conflict with the consequence of inviting external intervention.

However, conflict transformation theory does offer some possible explanations of why ethnic conflict results in diffusion. Presumably, some ethnic conflicts associated with high levels of violence - in particular protracted secessionist conflicts involving guerrilla movements - may be met with an immediate response by an elite with support from allies. Moreover, it can be argued that regime stability may have an impact upon the likelihood of the externalization of ethnic conflict - **the weaker the leadership of the state the greater the possibility that external conflict will ensue.**

#### *4.2 Implications for Conflict Resolution - Making the Connection*

Despite the lack of empirical support for the argument and an ambiguous unidirectional causal link, conflict transformation is important to this inquiry because it specifies a connection between domestic pressures, international conflict and the security interests of states. As Azar and Moon (1988) have argued, research on ethnic conflict must recognize that the security needs of states beset by ethnic strife are fundamental to the process of internationalization. For example, states experiencing ethnic turmoil face pervasive domestic fragility and elites whose security needs are much different from those of the populations they control. This weakness can lead to interstate conflict when an ethnically-based organization fosters and exacerbates a conflict for its own ends, or when a state loses the legitimacy or ability to act as regulator of a conflict. In either instance, external intervention is likely. In the former case, a state may intervene to support the ethnic organization against the state-centre and in the latter case to prop up the government. Thus, understanding linkage politics requires an understanding of the **multiple threats elites face such as systemic vulnerability, and socially produced threats such as communal fragmentation and protracted conflicts** (Posan 1993). These threat dimensions do not merely exist as separate entities, they are closely intertwined and generate spillover effects.

This argument touches upon the need to redefine the meaning of international security, in particular for those states of the world in which the major objection by state leaders against refocusing our attention on ethnic conflicts is that this intrusion constitutes a potential threat to the leadership and integrity of many states. A theory should be sensitive to these concerns, but it must also make explicit the international ramifications of domestic ethnic conflict including the changing face of sovereignty and minority self-determination.

A second strength of the approach is that certain structural features within states may be conducive to externalization. That is, elites facing high levels of institutional constraint may be more sensitive to the interests of groups whose support they seek and therefore choose war for reasons different from their low-constraint counterparts. As it will become clear in later chapters, elites do so, because under certain conditions, external conflict serves an important functional and potentially positive role for them. This functional role is specified by a causal link between domestic and interstate conflict. It suggests that under certain conditions internal turmoil will lead to international conflict and have a positive impact on internal cohesion.

This argument points to a radical departure from the assumption that conflict can be resolved. Instead conflict is transformed into new modes of operation (externalized). Therefore new issues become salient and the conflict spreads.

As noted in the conclusion on conflict interaction - there is usually a lag-time in which new states develop the capacity to deal effectively with domestic conflict. It makes sense that ethnic conflict will be especially salient during periods when elites are sensitive to internal pressures (such as new regimes and new states). In brief, by highlighting the importance of internal constraints on state security, conflict transformation is relevant in the study of current ethnic conflicts.

There are also problems. The primary difficulty is that the causal direction suggested by externalization is at odds with many cases of ethnic conflict. Indeed many ethnic conflicts lead to interstate conflict not because of "push factors" but because of "pull factors". More specifically, states external to a conflict are drawn in or actively pursue intervention. A related

problem, as pointed out above, is that many states beset by ethnic conflict have multiple centers of loyalty. That is they are multi-ethnic states in which externalization is unlikely to generate civic cohesion or regime loyalty. In this respect, Coser (1956) expressed externalization as a function of degrees of cohesion within a society. Once below a threshold of cohesion, externalization becomes counterproductive. Coser suggested that the relationship is curvilinear, such that cohesion may be so low that externalization is not viable. Deeply divided, multi-ethnic states are unlikely to engage in diversion. Therefore conflict cohesion may be more likely at moderate levels of cohesion but not at very high and very low levels where it is likely to be counterproductive. Ultimately elites are so divided that the use of diversion mechanisms is no longer feasible.

A final and important criticism is the absence of an objective (veridical) relationship between the internal and the external conflict. The internal conflict need not be objectively related to the external one. This is the very basis of conflict transformation and is at odds with conflict extension and interaction approaches that argue that conflict linkage are directly linked. This linkage can be specified through affective motivations among decision-makers or by the support garnered from transnational ethnic groups.

### ***5. Conclusions - Toward Synthesis***

The primary goals of conflict extension theory are twofold. At the state level of analysis the goal is to explain the motivations and goals of external states in response to an ethnic conflict and the impact this intervention has on the diffusion of conflict. The second goal is identification of structural properties associated with diffusion. Instrumental variables are put forward to

account for the goals and motivations of actors external to ethnic conflicts. In addition, affective variables are also used to explain why states become involved in ethnic strife. Identification of these variables suggests that states may act for reasons other than that are not purely instrumental. The mix of instrumental and affective motivations will in part determine the level and tangibility of third party involvement.

Conflict interaction processes arise between dissatisfied nationalist groups and the international system. Theoretically speaking, the trans-systemic link in this approach emerges from the encouragement the international system provides for ethnic minorities. The primary contributions of interactive theorizing are also twofold. First it identifies the disjuncture between the development of the state and the processes of self-determination as the primary causal mechanism leading to internationalization. Second, the absence of a centralized and legitimized power in an anarchic system is identified as conducive for interstate ethnic conflict.

For example, denial of a separate identity, absence of security and effective participation are seen as conditions that facilitate rebellion among ethnic minorities within states. At the system level, the aspirations of minorities are blunted by a systematic denial of ethnic groups by the international system and the manipulation of ethnic communities by external parties to achieve other goals.

Conflict transformation attempts to relate changes in domestic and foreign conflict systematically. The theory suggests that elites will externalize an internal conflict by identifying a common external enemy. Domestic cohesion is said to increase when the society puts aside its differences in order to face the larger external threat. The two conflicts need not be related.

The preceding theories raise several points worth considering. Each of the preceding theories provides insight into one aspect of the relationship between ethnic conflict and international conflict. To this extent, they inform a possible theory of ethnic conflict and its international dimensions. Individually they also lack crucial explanatory power. First, a theory that explains the link between ethnic conflict and international conflict should be capable of explaining the role of the interaction between affect and instrumental interests as highlighted by conflict extension and interaction theory. Second, a theory should be capable of explaining how a state pursuing an ethnically-oriented goal might respond to the international system and how in turn ethnic strife is conditioned by different domestic structures as highlighted by interaction theory. Finally, a theory should explain the interaction between elite and masses and the potential explanatory power of domestic variables as exemplified in the conflict transformation approach.

In the subsequent chapter a model is developed, that takes these diverse theoretical points of view into account.

## Notes

1. On the distinction between secession and separatism in this context, see Heraclides (1991) and Chapter one. For the purposes of this inquiry the term secession is a synonym for separatism. Heraclides defines secession as a special kind of separatism involving states. "It is an abrupt unilateral move to independence on the part of a region that is a metropolitan territory of a sovereign independent state...In secession there is a formal act of declaration of independence on the part of the region in question" (Heraclides 1991: 3).
2. "Some international lawyers argue, however, that there should be a doctrine of "humanitarian intervention". Foreign powers could intervene when a government was inflicting extreme abuses on its own people. Two possible precedents from the 1970's: India evicted a West Pakistani army that was brutally oppressing East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); Tanzanian troops ousted from Uganda the murderous regime of Idi Amin." (Schwartz The Globe and Mail, 8 December 1992: A 15).
3. Heraclides provides a less elaborate typology but one which shares some theoretical logic with the preceding. Competitive conflict expansion relates to Heraclides' notion of "international civil war" in which both parties receive external state support (Cyprus). The case of "holy alliance" where there is universal or great power support for the Centre is similar to simple conflict expansion (for example Soviet Union support for the Iraqi government against Kurdish activity); a "concert" where third parties attempt to find a peaceful solution is akin to simple conflict containment (Malaysian and Thai cooperative efforts) and "abstention" that is, refusal to become involved at all occurs in conflict equilibrating cases where external involvement by a third party is negligible (Muslim secessionists in the Philippines). In the latter case the international Islamic link was inherently weak because of cross-cutting interests among the Muslim elites. US involvement is notable because its relationship to the conflict is part of a broader-set of interests including support for the Philippine government as part of a continuing containment policy. (Suhrke and Noble 1977: 215-222; Heraclides 1991: 46).
4. Suhrke and Noble (1977) examine one case of irredenta namely the Turkey-Greece confrontation over Cyprus.
5. For example, Suhrke and Noble (1977) examine eight cases, seven of which are secessionist and six of which involve developing states under siege from an independence movement. In all but one case examined by Suhrke & Noble, Islam constitutes a significant component of transnational ethnic affinity, a fact the authors recognize as having important implications for greater internationalization. Only one of the cases in either the Heraclides or Suhrke & Noble approaches, constitute conflicts within the dominant system (Cyprus) an irredentist conflict. The others involve regional conflicts at the sub-system level which have not had a substantial impact beyond the sub-system level.
6. For a discussion of the history of the evolution of international norms towards minorities from the League of Nations onward see: Moynihan (1993).



7. Another example would be Article 1 of both the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, drawn directly from UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (Declaration of Decolonization, 1960): "By virtue of that right they [self-designated minorities] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." (Moynihan 1993: 150).
8. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali An Agenda For Peace (17 June 1992). (Moynihan 1993: xiv).
9. A typology derived from the kind of conflict is both a strength and weakness, because while it permits an ad hoc examination of all minorities who share a distinctive and persistent collective identity, parsimonious theory building is hampered.
10. See Azar & Burton (1986). This approach emphasizes third party mediation and facilitation, experiments of which have been carried out in Cyprus by trying to bring representatives of the two conflicting parties nominated by the President (Greek-Cypriot) and the Vice-President (Turkish-Cypriot).
11. There also must be equality of decision-making. The underlying assumption is that bargaining between parties can take place so that needs are played off against interests and that parties involved are conscious of their outcomes. Resolution occurs when there is an outcome which fully meets the needs and interests of all parties. It is a self-sustaining approach and is oriented towards problem solving (Azar 1990).
12. "Its Time to Bring Peacekeeping up to Date" in The Globe and Mail 19 February 1993.
13. This type of theorizing can be traced to Coser (1956). According to his sociological analysis, when transformed from domestic to international conflict societal stability is maintained. While conflicts at different levels of aggregation are not necessarily related, it is possible to alleviate internal strife by focusing on an external adversary.
14. Analytically distinct from these linkages are those conditions that can lead to war especially in democratic states See; (James & Oneal 1991, 1990, Ostrom & Job 1986) in which the US uses external force during an election year or during times of stagflation.

## Chapter 3

### A Model of Interstate Ethnic Conflict

*The most stubborn facts are those of the spirit not those of the physical world and one of the most stubborn facts of the spirit remains nationalist feeling - at different scales (Gottman 1951).<sup>1</sup>*

### *1. Ethnic Conflict - Where Affect and Politics Meet*

This chapter has three interrelated goals. The first is to identify the actor-level variables that differentiate the types of states that formulate ethnically-based foreign policies. The second objective is to identify the conditions under which an ethnically-based foreign policy leads to interstate ethnic conflict and crisis. The third and final objective is to determine the conditions in which interstate ethnic conflicts and crises result in the use of force, protracted conflict and future crisis escalation. In order to respond to these concerns, a model is developed. General hypotheses, developed from the model, are presented for subsequent testing.

As shown in the previous chapter, within ethnic conflict settings, the decision to formulate and carry out an ethnically-based foreign policy, whether it relates to secessionist or irredentist strife, arises from domestic concerns. For example, conflict extension approaches suggested that elite decision making is heavily influenced by domestic instrumental and affective motivations. Conflict transformation approaches also underscore the important role that domestic pressures play in influencing leaders' choices. Thus this analysis takes as its point of departure, the interplay between domestic actor-level variables as constraints (or opportunities) on decision making. In turn, how these decisions are played out in the international arena is determined by the array of international constraints (and opportunities) that impinge upon a decision maker's ability to implement a foreign policy decision. It is argued that the state is much more than a unified actor. The state is a constrained rational actor limited by what it can do by both internal and external forces.<sup>2</sup> In making choices, decision makers are influenced by affective and

instrumental motivations, but they must also consider the dispersion of preferences and interests of the constituent elements that make up the domestic affairs of the state as well as international opportunities (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson & Weller 1992). This kind of decision making process is known as a two level or "nested game" because of the equal importance of domestic and international constraints and opportunities. (Putnam 1988; Tsebelis 1990).

In contrast to the conflict extension approaches presented earlier, it is argued that at the domestic level, **both the choices of elites and masses**, and their interaction effects, are important. This process becomes even more complex in multi-ethnic societies because elites, as strategic actors, must allow for the behaviour and interests of their own and other ethnic groups. When the range of choices is extended into the international arena, elites must adapt their strategies to additional constraints and opportunities. Elites will choose (as if interacting in two different games) from available alternatives to maximize their "satisfaction". Thus, variation in outcomes can be explained by differences in opportunities at the domestic and international levels, rather than in terms of the norms and rules of domestic culture or individual personalities. According to Putnam (1988: 434), "the unusual complexity of this two-level game is that moves that are rational for a player at one board...may be impolitic for that same player at the other board. Nevertheless there are powerful incentives for consistency between the two games."

Accordingly, an actor-level theory of ethnic foreign policy formation is composed of two tiers or levels of interaction. The first one describes the processes of decision making of state elites to explain the specific route taken by decision makers to selecting a certain policy option and the resulting preference ordering of policy options. The analysis focuses on substantive

aspects of the choice. A state's foreign policy is said to be "ethnically-based" when ethnicity is the most salient component within its conflictual or cooperational relations, as expressed in, for example, foreign policy statements and actions. Deciding if ethnicity is the most salient aspect of an interstate conflict is difficult since, as it has been shown, states may act on a variety of impulses including instrumental concerns that are only remotely related to an ethnic conflict. This study relies on extensive in-depth cases in order to assess the explanatory effectiveness of the variables, and inter-coder reliability checks in order to determine if ethnicity is shaping foreign policy choices. For the purposes of this inquiry, a state external to a conflict expressing or acting out support for a state-centre or a minority group is said to have an ethnic foreign policy. Support may be expressed as diplomatic recognition, the transfer of arms, facilitating the support of insurgents, financial aid, the provision of sanctuary and direct intervention (see section two, chapter two). The state-centre in turn will have an ethnic foreign policy if its internal conflict influences and shapes its relations with one or more states. The second stage of interaction identifies the variables that furnish opportunities for states to become involved in interstate ethnic conflict. It is argued that, elites will pursue these objectives rationally. From this perspective, preferences are a function of the decision maker's role as leader within a specific institutional framework and ethnic group. Moreover, it portrays elites as essentially non self-sufficient individuals who are responsive to their environment, adapting to the influence of mass sentiment. Elites must be able to order their alternative goals and strategies in consideration of both domestic and international constraints. At the national level, domestic ethnic groups pursue their policies by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies (Putnam 1988). At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own

ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments (Putnam 1988). This means that elites will seek to optimize preferences in light of other actor's preferences and options. Sometimes, due to international and domestic constraints, which can work at cross-purposes, the choices made may be sub-optimal and unsuccessful.<sup>3</sup>

The basic argument is that an ethnically-oriented foreign policy cannot be read off from structure alone. Instead, structures influence the formation of a decision maker's preferences (Meadwell 1992). Decision making involves risk and sources of uncertainty that are internal to the state, referring to the constraints and opportunities presented by ethnic groups and political institutions as well as international opportunities and constraints. This study begins with an examination of the impact that two actor-level variables, ethnic composition and institutional structure, have on the formation of elite preferences for involvement in an ethnically-based interstate conflict.

The analysis is broken down into three stages. The first stage examines the roles of ethnic composition and institutional constraint in the formation of ethnic foreign policies. These stage one interaction effects are then assessed in the light of mediators, two variables that are necessary for an ethnic conflict to become an interstate ethnic conflict. These variables are, transnational ethnic affinities and ethnic cleavage. In the third stage, the types of states that are likely to use force in such interactions are identified. A methodological benefit of this approach is that it produces hypotheses that can be tested.

### *1.1 Institutions and Ethnicity*

The domestic sources that determine the emergence of an ethnically-based foreign policy may be similar to both the developing world and industrialized world. Thus, while it might be useful at one level to categorize states according to the conventional, developing/industrialized, weak/strong, dichotomies, a more useful way would be to examine the way in which ethnic and political structures influence the behaviour of states in response to internal and external challenges. As documented by Morgenthau (1957), Huntington (1968), Skocpol (1979), Gurr (1980) and Brecher (1993) among others, the state evolves in response to pressures, whether induced internally or externally. For the purposes of this analysis, internal crises often arise when environmental constraints are too great for political institutions to deal with them effectively. For example, Morgenthau (1957) discusses how nationalism acted as force for the integration and disintegration of European states after the Second World War. Similar processes are occurring again in the developing world and Eastern Europe. However, an exclusive focus on the penetration of the state and the resulting tension between the need for strong authority and institutions and increased demands for participation may be incomplete. Quite often the state does not mainly respond to, or resolve crises, as they arise from the environment but it is the state's actions that are directly accountable for their occurrence in the first place (Brass 1991). Quite often, the state does not merely respond to crises, produced by uneven ethnic mobilization and social change, but is itself the leading force providing differential advantages to regions and ethnic groups.

Sources that might account for the importance of these exigencies on an empirical level include, the formal ethnic representation in the institutions of the state, the pattern of change in

these structures and the degree of dispersion or concentration of ethnic groups within these structures. These factors can affect institutional governance, capacity and behaviour (Tsebelis 1990). Recognition of these factors represents a fundamental rethinking of the role of states in relation to multi-ethnic societies. There are, of course, regions such as North America, Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia, where institutional penetration can be considered relatively high. On the other hand, South Asia and most certainly the Middle East and Africa have a mixed record with respect to the governance and the management of ethnic political pressures. In sum, institutions play an important constraining role within developing and industrialized states although the precise role they play will vary from state to state.

A second set of constraints concerns the relationship between state and society. Despite the apparent misplaced reverence for social order and state autonomy, Huntington's analysis is notable in this regard, because of its shift towards separating the economic and political realm, which was not a focus of earlier structural-functionalist approaches (Huntington 1968). Moreover the state's pervasiveness in domestic affairs as investigated by Huntington and Hill & Rothchild (1993) among many others, suggests that societal constraints are no less extensive in industrialized states as in developing states.

Competition among elites for public office makes their decisions responsive to the aspirations of the masses. This elite can sometimes represent a single ethnic group. In other instances there are vertical channels between the elites and masses they represent (Rothschild 1981). Lacking strong institutions and class divisions, ethnic composition will directly shape and influence state behaviour. For example, the emergence of modern authoritarianism in Africa stems from a series of interrelated phenomenon that arose out of the colonial legacy (most states



were conceived in violence, there was little transformation in the economy and, the local ethnic elite's commitment to the western imposed structures was low). The absence of confrontations and conflicts between classes prevented the growth of liberalism with its ideological and legal emphasis on individual rights and liberties. The European models of democracy dissolved quickly as alien arrangements. When there was a convergence of interests between the newly emergent classes it was to end colonization but these goals became fragmented by ethnic loyalties. The consequence of this was the formation of patron-client relations and the development of personal rule resulting in a state based on personal authority and coercion. The political system was structured not by institutions but by politicized ethnically-based patron-client relationships. The African state had become a non-autonomous arena for ethnic rivalries.

Historical perspectives suggest that the political configuration of ethnic groups and the degree of constraint they exercise over the state and its decision makers is determined in part by colonial experience (Horowitz 1985). The case of colonial Sri Lanka illustrates this. In this case, plantation linkages focused on the procurement of Indian Tamil labour and the development of indigenous commercial interests who could satisfy the demand for labour. The movement of the Sri Lankan economy from one oriented towards ethnically homogenous subsistence production to one where the main interests were the development, control and access of export markets was marked by increasing ethnic stratification throughout the production system. The plantation economy restructured economic competition in Sri Lanka in a way that emphasized ethnicity as a form of group organization and as a basis for mobilization. Urbanization and nationalism exacerbated these divisions (Moore 1985).

To conclude, this inquiry begins with the assumption that the state is domestically constrained. Constraints can take two forms, one is constituted by the interplay between ethnicity and politics mediated through institutions. When class and other bases of mobilization are weak, ethnic elites depend on direct support from their ethnic constituency and in turn elites seek to control and influence these groups. The second occurs when elites often lack the capability to control these groups in economic or political terms and come to rely on manipulative behaviour that emphasizes the direct mobilization of groups based on their ethnic identity.<sup>4</sup> In the following sections, it will become evident how these structural arrangements influence the formation of foreign policies.

## *2. Ethnic Composition - The Affective Variable*

As it was shown in chapter two, decisions for involvement in ethnic strife encompass affective motivations and instrumental concerns. Ethnicity as described by Heraclides (1991) and others, is an available tool for political mobilization and as argued in chapter two, carries with it a high affective component. Of course, it is difficult to reconcile identity-based behavior that contains an affective component with instrumental theories of interstate conflict. The presence of affect in decision making does not mean that elites will necessarily act on emotional impulses alone. Nor does it mean that decisions of elites will be irrational (making choices that are beyond their means) (Horowitz 1985: 132-135; Connor 1987: 204-207). Elites will act within their means to carry out a decision. However, since elites must play at two levels, the domestic and the international, it is not always possible to achieve optimal outcomes. That is, a decision

designed to provide support for a leader at home, may as a result, lead to undesired consequences on the foreign policy front.

Rational choice approaches to ethnic conflict in the field of comparative politics provide some insight into the role of affect in ethnic nationalism. (Meadwell 1991). Rather than utopian longing for reunification, ethnic behaviour is seen as based largely on political interests. Strictly speaking, rational choice approaches to ethnic mobilization are not theories of ethnically oriented foreign policies, but they could be. Rational choice is often viewed as an economically-based analysis of behaviour but it is, in reality, richer than this. Efforts to construct an explanation of interstate ethnic conflict do not focus on economic factors but instead on how an ethnic group reacts to a state or group dominance, problems of mobilization and the effects of repression. Rational choice approaches also explain the formation of new identities, mobilization processes and the option of resistance to subordination. Frequently, the existence of an ethnic political movement depends on an elite with skills and resources to sustain a movement. Rational choice arguments suggest that ethnic ideologies are resources to be mobilized by elites. This connection provides an important and viable explanation for understanding the relationship between affect and elite decision making. The argument presented here is that, affect, which psychologists assume to be at odds with reason, can be subsumed into a rational choice approach if the ethnic composition of a society is taken into account. As discussed above, ethnicity can constrain policy makers and simultaneously provide opportunities for political advancement.

This study argues that affect plays an important role in shaping foreign policy decisions; within ethnic conflict settings, because it provides a link between elite and mass behavior. Thus, affect is not just a primordial drive among elites but also is distributed among the group

(Meadwell 1991). As it will be shown, sometimes, affect can constrain leaders, especially if mass sentiment influences directly, the decisions leaders make. In other instances affect provides elites with an additional tool for political mobilization (Smith 1993a). In either case, at the domestic level, elites are positional players, trying to optimize outcomes that are favorable to themselves (ie staying in power) relative to the elites of their own ethnic group and the elites of other ethnic groups. Elites are also trying to optimize outcomes favorable to their ethnic group and therefore are also acting on instrumental impulses. In this context, the most important question facing a decision maker is: "[I]f I make a foreign policy decision considered favorable to my ethnic group, what are the long and short-term ramifications of this decision for my own political standing vis a vis my ethnic group, the other ethnic groups within the society and relations with other states?"

Decision makers are strategic in looking for answers. Decision makers would prefer to appease those ethnic groups whose support is crucial over the long term. Mass support is especially crucial when inter-elite competition is extensive. As Tsebelis has shown, short-term discrepancies between elite behaviour and mass aspirations are not infrequent, however "such a discrepancy cannot exist for a long time, especially if issues are considered important. Elites have to explain their behaviour and persuade the masses or they will be replaced by more competitive rivals" (Tsebelis 1990: 163).

Although concerning the formal composition of multi-ethnic societies, Horowitz's model of ranked and unranked societies provides some insight into a possible conceptual linkage between affect and elite decision making. As Horowitz notes, at least one type (ranked) is concerned with the interactions between ethnic groups that rarely exist in the real world

(Horowitz 1985). Ranked ethnic systems are those in which class and ethnicity converge and therefore mobility opportunities are synonymous with ethnic membership (Rwanda-Burundi). Pure ranked systems are rare because there is, to some degree, an overlap between ethnicity, class and political arrangements, processes associated with economic and political restructuring (Rothschild 1981).

Unranked systems differ in their origin, structure, operation and disintegration from ranked systems (Horowitz 1985). Ranked systems are likely to be dominated by a single ethnic group, economically and politically and mobility opportunities are likely to be low. In unranked societies individuals within ethnic groups are more mobile and consequently vie for economic and political control. Unranked systems are those where class and ethnicity are cross cutting. Therefore, mobility is derived from alternative sources including occupational rank, urban/rural splits and economic backwardness of the region. Sometimes, societies exhibit both ranked and unranked characteristics. Consider the example of Sri Lanka in which there were not only inter-ethnic divisions between the Sinhalese and Tamil but intra-ethnic divisions based on caste within the two groups. Because of these multiple cleavages there are both lower caste Sinhalese and Tamil groups that are economically weak. In unranked multiethnic societies, ethnic mobilization usually leads to inter-ethnic competition and conflict (Olzak & Nagel 1986).

In transitional societies, where demographics can largely determine changes in political power, as it did for Malaysia in the mid-1960s for example, the potential for ethnic mobilization and conflict is high. This is particularly true when political power is not coterminous with economic power. A single ethnic group may dominate the policy-making process at the national level and be confronted by challenges from other groups.<sup>5</sup>

The ideal types provided below, assume that ethnicity is a salient aspect of the domestic political process. In some instances, of course, cross-cutting cleavages, such as class, will undermine the salience of ethnicity as a basis for political mobilization (Olzak & Nagel 1986). In other instances, ethnicity is the primary basis of political mobilization. In an objective sense, groups also differ in their size, political power, economic wealth, demographic patterns, degrees of dispersion or concentration and territoriality. In any case, elites are faced with a decision to either build on existing patterns of ethnic mobilization in order to achieve specific objectives or to downplay them for fear that this will undermine the support they require from specific ethnic groups. Two ideal types of domestic ethnic arrangements are presented, those states in which a single ethnic group is dominant within the political process and those in which the political process is characterized by ethnic diversity. Following a brief discussion of both, institutional ideal types are presented separately, and then the interactions of the two variables, institutions and composition, are discussed.

### ***2.1 Ethnic Domination - Achieving Optimal Outcomes***

If the individual can improve (through force or democratically) his/her standing within their own group while not being dependent on the support of other groups, then that leader is said to represent a dominant ethnic group, compared with other groups within the state. Such patterns will result in outcomes that are optimal for the dominant ethnic group. In the foreign policy domain and assuming decision makers are acting rationally, the argument is that elite-mass behaviour is a two-way street. Elites would prefer to formulate foreign policies that appeal to their ethnic constituency even at the expense of other ethnic groups. Political elites do so in

order to mobilize their followers and potentially increase their share of power. In dominant settings, an ethnic group claims control over the decision process on issues concerning other groups. Institutional mechanisms for enforcing conflict management between groups are underdeveloped. There will be a blurring of issues such that foreign policy issues of an ethnic character will take on special significance in the domestic arena. Agenda setting and jurisdiction over issues are usually in the hands of an elite who will try to connect issues of concern to them and their ethnic group.

In some instances, when inter-elite competition within a dominant ethnic group is high, elites will often introduce new issues that will discredit their opponents thereby creating new avenues of securing power. This phenomenon of elite-initiated conflict has been written on extensively in both industrialized state-settings (Tsebelis 1990) and developing state-settings (Sklar 1979). In other instances, elites will rely on the manipulation of mass sentiment. Indeed, sometimes, elites may be prevented from pursuing conciliatory or accommodating strategies with other ethnic groups by overwhelming mass sentiment (Tsebelis 1990).

## ***2.2 Ethnic Diversity - Sub-optimal Outcomes***

In ethnically diverse settings intra-ethnic elite-mass configurations are more important. Processes similar to the dominant case are likely to take place but the outcomes will be different. Outcomes (including foreign policy decision making) are likely to be sub-optimal. This is because, in diverse settings, elites who face competition from elites of other ethnic groups may rely extensively on their support and compromise is more likely.<sup>6</sup>

To summarise, ethnic composition consists of two ideal types, those in which a single ethnic group is dominant in the decision making process (dominant) and those in which no single ethnic group is dominant (diverse). The former is likely to occur in those cases where there is a high degree of ethnic homogeneity within the society (eg. Somalia) but not always.<sup>7</sup> There are, of course, those heterogenous societies in which one ethnic group becomes preponderant (eg. Iran). In diverse cases, elites are dependent on the support of more than one ethnic group and in turn pursue policies focused on the mobilization of groups on the basis of ethnic and cross-cutting identities. Elite-mass arrangements within these societies are efficient (they will attempt to improve the condition of almost all of the groups within a society, eg Ivory Coast).<sup>8</sup> In contrast, states dominated by a single ethnic group are redistributive (they will seek to improve the conditions of one group in society at the expense of another, eg. Turkey).

### ***3. Institutional Arrangements - The Political Variable***

More determinate predictions regarding those states where ethnicity coincides with other forms of political mobilization can be made only after examining a second kind of constraint as constituted by institutional configurations (including electoral and parliamentary arrangements). Of course, institutional arrangements vary from state to state, but the fundamental concern here is how institutional arrangements impose limitations on what elites can do. All leaders, no matter what the regime, come to depend on support from a particular group in order to gain power and be successful. In some instances, coups are the dominant institutionalized form of changes in political power (Jenkins & Kposowa 1992). In other instances, support is garnered from established political processes (i.e. elections).



For the purposes of this inquiry, institutional constraint focuses not on the regime (the members of the elite who make state decisions) but the much broader, underlying patterns of political authority and constitutional structure. These patterns encompass three dimensions: a) executive constraint (ranging from seizure of power to competitive elections); b) executive regulation (ranging from unlimited authority to legislative parity); and c) regulation of participation (ranging from no formal institutional arrangements to formally institutionalized) (Gurr 1974, 1989, Morgan & Campbell 1991).

### *3.1 High Institutional Constraint - Influencing the Leaders*

In some states, institutional constraints are high by virtue of the elite having been democratically elected or chosen, for example, through hereditary selection, and therefore dependent on a specific constituency for support (eg. India). These states are said to be constrained to the extent that the decision maker's decision making ability is highly institutionalized. Of course, there is a great deal of variation between the ideal types presented here and typically political constraints evolve through coups, political collapse and controlled political transition often between the onset of a conflict and its termination (Dixon 1989).

An analysis of foreign policy formation with respect to institutional configurations may be superfluous. After all, foreign policy decision making, (especially during periods of interstate conflict, crisis and war), unlike domestic policy is presumably less resistant to the vagaries of public opinion. However, if elites play in the electoral arena as constituted by federal or consociational arrangements, for example, then the masses are influential in the decision making process, including foreign policy.<sup>9</sup>

### *3.2 Low Institutional Constraints - Creating Control*

In some states, overall institutional constraint is low by virtue of the elites not being elected to office by popular vote or having seized power through force or coercion (eg. Nigeria). These include military regimes and one-party states. In states that have little or no experience in managing ethnic tensions, and constraints are low, hegemonial exchange and its more coercive variant, the control model, is usually the alternative (Lustick 1979; Rothchild & Chazan 1988). Hegemonial exchange is a statist response to manage the overt aspects of intergroup ethnic conflict. Elites both bargain for the distribution of resources and control the population through patron-client relations. When present, electoral politics are less influential in influencing elite behaviour.

Control models differ from hegemonial-exchange models to the extent that there is a superordinate ethnic group in power (eg. Zaire). The elites of these groups have developed the techniques of coercion, depoliticization and cooption in order to maintain power. Control becomes institutionalized and usually arises when the state is faced with imminent collapse.<sup>10</sup> Control approaches arise as a result of a military coup. Military coups occur, of course, most often in those multi-ethnic societies that exhibit porous civil-military boundaries. Africa and Asia are notable in this regard (Jalal 1990; Baxter & Rahman 1991; Ganguly 1991; Rizvi 1991; Hill & Rothchild 1992).

If the relationship between elite and masses in societies where constraints are institutionalized can be seen as a nested game between parliamentary politics and electoral politics, the same cannot be said of low-constraint states. This is because the masses play a less direct role. Elite-generated conflict is concentrated within the military itself rather than between

the masses and the elite. For obvious reasons, elites who have a monopoly of power in low constraint situations presumably rely on non-institutional devices for the control and management of conflict between groups (Lustick 1986).

The strategies of constrained and unconstrained elites in dominant and diverse settings in shaping confrontational and peaceful foreign policies are described below.

#### *4. Interaction Effects - Shaping Foreign Policy Choices*

The investigation now turns to an examination of how political constraints and opportunities interact with ethnic composition in the formation of foreign policy. It is argued that, depending on the interaction effects between variables, certain elites will have greater preference for policies leading to confrontation because of the potential domestic payoffs that such policies will garner. In other instances, the mix of domestic variables will serve to inhibit these strategies and shift elite preferences towards more peaceful measures. The assumption is that elites play at two different levels - the domestic and the international and must consider the payoff structures of both (Putnam 1988: 434). For the present investigation it is assumed that a state is represented by a single leader and this individual has no independent policy preferences, but seeks simply to achieve a foreign policy that will be attractive to his/her constituents.

The study presented here focuses on the decisions of one state. Interactions with another state will be taken into account following this initial analysis. This is done because it is conveniently analytical to decompose the decision making process into two stages. The first stage is the interaction between elites and their constituency as made up by domestic political

arrangements and ethnic composition. Stage one interactions in turn affect the second stage, which refers to the implementation of ethnic-oriented foreign policy in response to international opportunities and the resulting potential conflicts that arise therein.

Certain principles govern the interaction effects at the first stage. These principles are acted out according to what Putnam has called "win-sets" (Putnam 1988). A win-set at stage one is defined as all the successful foreign policy strategies that would "win", that is, be considered successful by the masses. The first part of this analysis concerns stage one win-sets. The size of a stage one win-set is governed by several factors and for obvious reasons the interaction effects at stage one have important implications for determining whether an ethnically oriented foreign policy strategy will be pursued and be deemed successful. Simply put, stage one win-sets influence a state's calculation of the cost-benefit ratio in pursuing involvement in an ethnic conflict.

Figure 3.1 shows, the variation in win-set size, in terms of these interaction effects, ranging from a maximum for low constraint ethnically dominant states to a minimum for high constraint ethnically diverse states. Each is considered in turn.

Insert Figure 3.1 Here

FIGURE 3.1

WHICH STATES AND WHY?

THE INTERACTION OF ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT ON FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES

ETHNIC COMPOSITION

		Dominant	Mixed
I N S T I T U T I O N A L  C O N S T R A I N T S	L O W	Ia  MAXIMUM	Ib  MODERATE
	H I G H	IIa  MODERATE	IIb  MINIMUM

#### *4.1 Low Institutional Constraint - Dominant Ethnic Group*

The first set of interaction effects to be considered is the relationship between low institutional constraints in dominant and diverse settings (Types Ia and Ib respectively). The analysis begins with these arrangements because of the presumed simplicity in the relationship between elite and masses. In cases where constraints are low, first stage win-sets are large because the costs of not pursuing involvement are low. The only formal constraint on elites in these cases is the bureaucracy or military. Assuming the elite will have come to power through force (eg. Libya, Somalia) they will be dependent on a narrow band of support from specific groups (the military, bureaucracy) which are comparatively free of domestic pressures. The relationship between the military and the elite is therefore an important but not enervating constraint. Indeed, compared with constrained elites, these leaders are more able to manipulate the size of their stage one win-set. This is because in low constraint settings, affect has an important function in influencing the political conduct between decision makers and the overall population.

For example, in Type Ia cases there is a dominant ethnic group controlling an ethnically homogenous military that will mobilize the population through the manipulation of group symbols in order to pursue foreign policy goals. Consensual procedures in the formation of foreign policy decisions, if present, are likely to be rubber-stamp operations and power is likely to be heavily concentrated. In terms of autonomy, the state elite is assumed to be relatively immune to domestic pressures. In a sense, it is an oversimplification to categorize a foreign policy as either elite or mass led, obviously an ethnically-based foreign policy cannot continue long without both leadership and mass support. Nevertheless, in some cases, elite action,

independent of the masses, is decisive in shaping outcomes. When the elite are immune from domestic pressures, such is the type Ia case there will be a greater tolerance for any gaps between elite and mass preferences.

In the absence of democratic pressures, these elites have an extra resource with which to mobilize support, namely, affect, a political device that has low-cost implications. Type Ia expresses a high preference of the elite to the extent that the elite lead and the population follows. Ethnic issues including those related to foreign policy are portrayed as redistributive (any benefits accrue to the dominant ethnic group) but not in the sense that they threaten the power base of the elite. This is largely because elite/mass interactions will be used to promote elite interests. Elites in a low constraint situation would not pursue an ethnic foreign policy if it constituted a threat to their power. When constraints are low and ethnic composition is dominant, an elite is unlikely to face legitimate and significant criticism at home for pursuing an external involvement leading to confrontation. Therefore, the pursuit of an ethnically-oriented foreign policy is an optimal strategy. The perceived benefits of involvement are concentrated in the hands of the elites. Elites will be the only individuals capable of exerting influence on the formation of foreign policy. Therefore, the win-sets at stage one are large and the maximum that can be possibly obtained (see Figure 3.1).

In Type Ia cases, elites are not constrained domestically but they are constrained internationally; consequently the main problem facing elites in these cases is to manage potential resistance such policies will engender in the international arena rather than at home. The primary constraint facing these leaders is the array of factors shaping the implementation of confrontational policies. In an international context Type Ia elites will pursue involvement if it

means achieving specific goals in the international arena. The payoffs in this case are situated in the international arena rather than the domestic arena. Such a policy may be heavily imbued with an ideology but it need not be inherently aggressive. The utility that these elites will derive from pursuing an ethnically driven foreign policy depends on international constraints rather than domestic. If elites are acting rationally their choice will allow for several factors including their capabilities, power discrepancy, alliance structure and so forth. In other words, the main factor influencing the decision to become involved in ethnic strife in Type Ia cases is the international cost/benefit ratio that in turn, is shaped by external constraints and opportunities. In such cases, elites will be more concerned about maximizing their gains and reducing their losses within the international arena. In interactions with other states, international constraints and opportunities are paramount in shaping optimal outcomes.

An elite will attempt to shift public opinion in favor of certain policies that h/she favors in order to pursue to his/her conception of the state's interest in the international context. The absence of internal constraints can actually strengthen an elite's international position because there is a relative absence of uncertainty about domestic politics that in turn could strengthen an elite's resolve in the international arena. In this instance, being able to control domestic outcomes can be achieved through a "forced" convergence of interests between a national leader and the state on whose behalf he/she represents. Lowering the levels of domestic uncertainty has important implications for interactions with other states.

Elites in unconstrained situations are in a better "bargaining" position with those whose power is dispersed. The former are less prone to involuntary defection because they can control domestic political outcomes. On the other hand unconstrained elites who do not have to worry



about the ramifications an ethnic foreign policy has for the masses, might be more tempted to "voluntarily" defect because of the low political costs. In other words unconstrained elites in dominant settings behave as rational maximizing egoists as represented in the game of prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod 1977, 1984). Their behaviour approximates realist accounts of state behaviour (realist variant).

#### ***4.2 Low Institutional Constraint - Diverse Ethnic Groups***

In diverse low constraint settings (Type Ib), issues important to the masses of a specific ethnic group are unlikely to generate interest among elites because the magnitude of payoffs is low. If the military is of a different ethnic group than the majority population or if the elite is representative of more than one ethnic group (diverse) then it would be impolitic to pursue a confrontational ethnic foreign policy unless the opportunities to do so provided both international and domestic benefits. The size of the stage-one win set will be smaller and outcomes at stage one will be suboptimal. There are two reasons for that conclusion.

There is even less incentive for pursuing an ethnically oriented foreign policy because of the potential political ramifications it may have in the domestic arena (counter-coups). But also, making ethnicity a salient aspect of foreign policy is risky because it could incite potential enemies within the state to seek support from neighboring states. If no such risks are present, an ethnic foreign policy is likely.

Unlike Type Ia states, these states are not immune to involuntary defection. Their ethnic diversity increases the chance that the leaders of an ethnic group cannot or will not cooperate on certain policies. At the international levels this makes these states more vulnerable to

defection on agreements. Therefore states Ib support means to monitor and control defection (including international rules and institutions that derives from an accepted vulnerability - neo-liberal variant). Their behaviour approximates the concept of the inhibited state that Jackson and Rosberg use to describe in the maintenance of African boundaries (Jackson & Rosberg 1982).

For Ib states inhibited behaviour can be countered by "reverberation" inherent in foreign policy implementation. Normally, rational-choice approaches require that the structures of issues and payoffs be specified in advance (Putnam 1988: 454). Reverberation, in this case refers to the way in which preferences are unintentionally altered by external pressures.

Consider, in this context, recurring Iraqi threats against the low constraint ethnically diverse state of Iran over disputed territories after the Iranian revolution. In this instance, perhaps unintentionally, Iraqi threats reverberated within Iran's domestic political scene, increasing support for the new Iranian regime domestically. Iran's capacity for carrying out foreign policy objectives exceeded the level than would be normally expected for a multi-ethnic state because the Iraqi threats could not generate substantial internal opposition. In other words, Iraqi pressures on Iran may have been counterproductive - "international pressure reverberates negatively if its source is generally viewed by domestic audiences as an adversary rather than an ally" (Putnam 1988: 456).

Normally, Type Ib expresses a moderate preference for involvement by an unconstrained regime. However the phenomenon of "reverberation" demonstrates how these preferences can be altered. Reverberation can increase an elites' domestic win-set so that elites derive a greater amount of utility from an interstate ethnic conflict than they normally would.

### *4.3 High Institutional Constraint - Dominant Ethnic Groups*

Accurate predictions concerning the strategies chosen by elites in high constraint situations and the potential size of their stage one win-sets can be made only after more extensive interactive effects are considered. The politicians of these states are simultaneously constrained by the ethnic affinities of their constituency - that is the decision maker's supporting coalition and formal institutional arrangements. Foreign policy decisions regarding secession or irredenta are particularly acute in democratic societies in which the degrees of internal constraint upon decision makers are expressed in terms of party formation, electoral politics and cabinet composition (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992).

In high constraint situations, the size of the stage one win-set is small to begin with. Preferences for belligerence are modest because in order to be considered successful, an ethnically oriented foreign policy must satisfy several additional conditions in comparison to low constraint states. These factors will, in turn, influence potential interstate ethnic conflict. Elites will be "hamstrung" in the pursuit of foreign policy goals by the competing interests of various groups-including ethnically based ones. According to Morgan & Campbell (1991 191): "[C]onstraints should be greatest when competition is highly institutionalized. Well-organized permanent parties that compete in a systematic fashion provide a ready outlet for opposition to a leader and constitute a focal point around which opposition can form"

In Type IIa cases (high institutional constraints) where the elites are representative of a single and "like-minded" ethnic group (dominant), elites go along with the ethnically oriented sentiments of the population for fear that if they do not, they will be replaced by other leaders. Concern about involuntary defection will be paramount. In this case, as opposed to Type I cases,

the elite follow and do not lead. "Like-minded" refers to those cases where ethnic foreign policy is a homogenous issue in which even political opponents offer "all purpose" support. This support is crucial to expanding the stage one win-set. Indeed, Type IIa elites may go along with an ethnic foreign policy even if it appears irrational in the international arena (there may be a threshold as to how much cost is borne), if it promises payoffs domestically to all elites (Putnam 1988). Elite's will seek to enhance their position in the stage one game by increasing their political resources through side payments (increases in power and influence) or by minimizing potential losses (an electoral loss). For example, a head of government may seek the popularity that he expects to accrue to him if he pursues a politically rewarding foreign policy. Indeed, viewing the elite as an individual without preferences opens the possibility that his constituents and political opponents may be more eager for an aggressive ethnic foreign policy than she/he is.

The main problem facing these leaders is to manage the discrepancy between their constituents' and political opponents' expectations and the outcome. A leader must be aware of the choice of oppositional tactics, which are influenced heavily by ideology, a sense of historical injustice, perceived grievance, or a threat to values that justify a future society. Elites are more likely to be successful if they channel these interests into objectives that they wish to achieve.

Another way of describing the behaviour of a Type IIa state is to argue that elites persist with involvement when the benefits are primarily situated in the domestic arena even though the costs may come at the international level. Empirical instances of Type IIa, in its dominant form, are rare, largely because most states that have some kind of institutional constraints are rarely dominated by a single ethnic group that is supportive of most policies (Japan, Iceland and

Germany perhaps being notable exceptions). The implications for newly democratizing states dominated by a single and "like-minded" ethnic group (the newly created members of the CIS and the Balkan states for example) are explicit. Past cases, including confrontations between Greece and Turkey (1967, 1973) would suggest that high constraint states are not immune to aggressive ethnically-oriented foreign policies under certain conditions (see section 5 below).

#### ***4.4 High Institutional Constraint - Diverse Ethnic Groups***

In Type IIb cases a leader will face very different incentives and constraints when the constituency is composed of members of several different ethnic groups (diverse). In Type IIb cases, when an elite relies on support from a constituency composed of several different ethnic affinities - a foreign policy based on ethnicity will be unlikely, if and only if, these parties can withstand the pressures of outbidding. The size of the stage one win set will be the minimum of the four types examined and preferences will be the lowest of all. This is particularly true if the use of force is used against members of a group having an ethnic affinity with some members of the constituency. Using ethnicity for political gain is a risky strategy because one's supporters can easily become divided. Elites promote self-policing policies that downplay ethnicity as a source of foreign policy. In addition, institutional constraints will reduce the opportunities for pursuing risky foreign policies even further (Morgan & Campbell 1991).

Specific kinds of Types IIa and IIb (outbidding) arise when a leader is faced by a constituency composed of only a part of a single ethnic group. Political competition may become intense through multiparty ethnic factionalism. A kind of extreme hypernationalism is likely to emerge from some leaders whose interest is in "outflanking" the other political parties. In this

case, an ethnic foreign policy is "heterogenous" to the extent that there is greater factional conflict on this issue. For example, Downs (1957) has shown that political parties in two party systems tend to be imitative and ideologically immobile. Both strive to appeal to as many different viewpoints as possible including moderate views.

On the other hand, multi-party systems strive to accentuate ideological "product differentiation" (Downs 1957: 141) New parties stressing an aggressive ethnically -oriented foreign policy may emerge when there is a great deal of similarity between two moderate parties. All other things being equal, multi-party systems give birth to involvement in ethnic strife. In the Type IIb case for example, the initial size of the stage one win-set is small because of institutional constraints, but elites will often seek to increase its size by initiating issue-based conflict through the processes of inter-elite confrontation (Tsebelis 1990).

As noted by Horowitz and Tsebelis, special interest ethnic parties are most prevalent where there are internal imperatives of the ethnic group and external imperatives of the ethnic group in relation to others (Kenya, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Yugoslavia). In Nigeria, for example, the major party systems were based on three ethnic cleavages during the periods of democratic rule (Sklar 1980). Studies of Sri Lankan politics suggest that attempts at non-ethnic multi-partyism will be displaced by ethnically based parties (Horowitz 1985; de Silva & Samarasinghe 1993). If there are two groups with only one party each, then the distances between them are minimal and conflict can be brokered. If on the other hand, each group is represented by more than one party, then outbidding occurs.

Occasionally multiethnic parties are able to withstand outbidding processes. For example, during the 1960s, the Indian Congress Party maintained control because it was able to evolve

a minimally successful compromise to language issues, over-represented in state cabinets the group with the stronger flank party and allowed a Sikh to lead the party between 1956-64, and it had representation at the state and national level (Brass 1974, 1991; Nayar 1966).

In the Type IIa outbidding case, the shift to a one party state occurs, for example, when a democratically elected multiethnic party succumbs to parties on one or both sides (Zambia, Kenya). The single ethnic parties hold out the prospect that the original multiethnic party, unable to satisfy either side will be left with a shrunken base (Horowitz 1985).

In both instances, to maintain support, leaders of an ethnic group may strive to be the best representative of an ethnic group (Horowitz 1985). Such competition in Type IIa and Type IIb cases could lead to a more aggressive foreign policy than would be expected. The political party with the greatest interest in an ethnic foreign policy will also have the most extreme position on that issue. If other parties (including that of the government) can oppose the most extreme position then an ethnic foreign policy is almost sure to be played down. In other words the stronger the state in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, the stronger its position to oppose an extreme ethnic foreign policy (or alternatively impose an extreme one).


The relative size of the four win-sets are displayed diagrammatically in Figure 3.2.

Insert Figure 3.2 Here

A state's preference for a foreign policy leading to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict is reflected in its win-set size. MAX represents the maximum outcome for a state in choosing involvement in an ethnic conflict and MIN represents the minimal outcomes that would

FIGURE 3.2  
CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

PREFERENCE STRUCTURE AS A FUNCTION OF WIN-SET SIZE



- Ia - High Preference
- Ib - Moderate Preference
- IIa - Moderate Preference
- IIb - Low Preference

\* Outbidding in states IIa and IIb increases the win-set and preference for conflict.



be acceptable. Outcomes become contracted as the interactions between ethnic composition and institutional constraints take effect, so that state IIb, under normal conditions is least likely to find an outcome that is agreeable to all its constituents and is therefore unlikely to pursue one. It has a low preference for choosing involvement. Outbidding increases the win-sets for Type IIa and IIb states. The unconstrained states Ia and Ib have a broader range of outcomes that would be considered satisfactory to the masses and therefore have high and moderate preference for belligerence. Accurate predictions concerning differences between states Ib and IIa are difficult. Both are expected to fit between the two extremes. Ib states are constrained by their diversity while IIa states are constrained institutionally. Both are labelled as having moderate preferences, though outbidding can increase the preferences of state IIa.

Having examined stage one interaction effects a general hypothesis can now be developed with respect to stage one win-sets:

*General Hypothesis 1: The preference for foreign policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict is a function of the interaction between ethnic composition and levels of institutional constraint on elites such that:*

***P1 Type Ia unconstrained - dominant states have a high preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict;***

***P2 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a moderate preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict;***

*P3 Type IIa constrained - dominant states have a moderate preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict;*

*P4 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict;*

*P5 If outbidding is present states IIa and IIb will increase their preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.*

## *5. Conditions Necessary for Interstate Ethnic Conflict and Crisis*

### *Affinity and Cleavage*

This analysis provides insight into which states shape their foreign policy strategies through the interaction between ethnic composition and political constraints. The argument sketched out above attempts to show that in specific instances, elites must attend to the domestic political ramifications of their decisions in choosing foreign policy actions. The analysis also provides some insight into which states will engage in confrontational policies. The larger the win-set at stage one, the more likely a conflictual ethnic foreign policy will be implemented.

However, the analysis does not specify mediating variables that have an important impact on the size of a stage one win-set that increase the chances of a state initiating a conflict leading to crisis, or alternatively, inviting intervention because of internal weaknesses. What factors will affect the size of the stage one win-set? For an ethnic foreign policy to result in interstate

conflict and crisis, the most important set of factors are a state's own ethnic characteristics and those of other states and ethnic groups. As noted in the definitions of the interstate dimensions of secessionist and irredentist crises in chapter one, two elements that distinguish these kinds of conflicts from non-ethnic crises are: the presence of transnational ethnic affinities and ethnic cleavage. The reason these variables are important to initiating an interstate ethnic conflict is because they shape the security issues that are important to elites and masses. The perception that an ethnic group is threatened in another state can in turn lead to a real security problem when that threat is acted out. Elites are then faced with the decision whether to support or defend that ethnic group, which has implications for interstate conflict. In turn masses may pressure elites to act on these concerns. The problem is particularly acute when hypernationalist leaders pressure governments to act on transnational affinities. Even if the extremist leaders do not want violence they may not be in a position to restrain followers who do. Therefore, there is the potential for escalation and protractedness in certain situations. Thus for a state to pursue an irredentist claim or involvement in secessionist strife, ethnic cleavage and affinities provide opportunities to be exploited, by some leaders, increasing the probability of interstate conflict and crisis. On the other hand, a state beset by internal cleavages and possessing ethnic affinities, provides an opportunity to be exploited. Therefore, these states may be more cautious. Thus, internal disruptions and transnational links can inadvertently increase involvement. In either case, affinities and cleavages are part of a structural security dilemma for both states that are difficult to overcome. If these assumptions are correct, then interstate ethnic conflicts have the potential to lead to prolonged and escalated tensions and protracted conflict. The reasons for this are discussed below.

For low constraint states less immune to domestic pressures, the strategic aspects of the foreign policy decision making process at the domestic level are less important than the international opportunities available to elites to realize certain objectives. For highly constrained elites affinities and cleavage will heavily influence their strategies if they have domestic implications. After all, these elites must be sensitive to the interests of their constituents, even if these interests lie beyond a state's border. These factors can further constrain elites to the extent that their choice of policies and the costs of not acting are increased. On the other hand, an experienced leader should be able to maximize the benefits of these opportunities - that is exploit them, if they mean an increase in popularity at home or denounce them, if they are potentially threatening.

In a complex and interdependent world there is of course a myriad of international factors that can reverberate negatively or positively on a state's win-set. The factors delineated below are an extension of the affective dimension discussed earlier. They are highly visible characteristics.

### ***5.1 Ethnic Affinity - The Affective Link To Interstate Conflict and Crisis***

Ethnic affinities relate directly to the problem of sovereignty, that is, how the authoritative claims of states and their ability to implement such claims have changes concerning international activities. Efforts to control the flow of people, culture and resources, and to assert authority are significant in interstate ethnic conflicts. Quite often, authority is not defined solely in terms of territory, partial sovereignty exists and will shape the size of a state's win-set. In essence, within ethnic conflict settings, transnational ethnic affinities are a salient aspect of

relationships between states. Not only do elites of a state view ethnic affinity as an opportunity to be exploited; specific groups on whom elites rely for support also see these international ethnic affinities as potentially useful.

Transnational ethnic affinities exist among most groups in the international system, especially among groups that have undergone diaspora (eg. Russians living in the Ukraine and the Baltic states, the Tamils of South India, the Chinese of Southeast Asia) (Taylor & Jodice 1983; Neilsson 1985; Gurr 1992). However, defining transnational ethnic affinity is difficult as there is more than one way to establish ethnic identity (Rothschild 1981; Horowitz 1985; Smith 1993a; see also the definition in chapter one). Race, religion, tribal (kinship) and linguistic cleavages may not coincide so that international ethnic affinity in one area (linguistic) may be at odds with another area (kinship) (Chazan 1991). Moreover, elites will often play up certain transnational identities (pan-Arabism as opposed to Islam for example) in order to reduce the salience of others. In sum, while an ethnic group may share a common ethnic link with an ethnic group across a border within another state this does not sufficiently guarantee mutual interest.

However, the greater the number of affinities (linguistic, race, religion) between an ethnic group in two or more states, the stronger the proposed link between them (high affinity). The more that linguistic, racial, religious and tribal identities converge the greater the potential transnational ethnic affinity and thus the greater potential that either an ethnic group will seek external support on the basis of these links. Elites of both sides within the state (state-centre or minority group) use these links to their advantage. Occasionally, elites may be carried along by the fervor of mass ethnic sentiment entailed by these links (Chazan 1991). Moreover, mutual interests are strongest for those groups that have high international ethnic affinities and where

the "other group" is seen as an enemy of the supporting state. The "other group" or "out group" in this instance can be the state-centre or an ethnic minority.

If affinities are not promising for a convergent mutual interest then a state is less likely to pursue an ethnically oriented foreign policy strategy and the group or state in question is less likely to pursue ethnically based support. The size of a state's win-set cannot be enlarged and conflict and crisis is less probable. Future escalation is unlikely unless these identities change.

### *5.2 Ethnic Cleavage - Divide and Conquer*

Intimately interlinked with transnational ethnic affinities is the concept of ethnic cleavage (Shih 1992). Cleavage refers to the degree of divided political loyalties among the ethnic groups within a state.<sup>11</sup> For example, ethnic groups that aspire to self-determination but are willing to work through existing political institutions and procedures would be characterized as having a lower level of cleavage than those who seek to transform the political status quo either through force and/or through external assistance. For intervening states, cleavage provides an opportunity to be exploited. For the state in question, cleavage is an obvious domestic constraint. Cases where loyalties are divided occur within a state that has weak system maintenance functions, weakened institutions and political parties based on ethnic groups. In this instance, the elites of an ethnic group pursuing secessionist policies will actively seek external support and goods as will the state-centre.

Low levels of cleavage between ethnic groups occur within a state that has developed strong institutions, political capacities for the management of ethnic tensions and cross cutting

cleavages that weaken the capacity for mobilization on the basis of ethnicity. The interactions between cleavage and affinity are discussed below.

### *5.3 Interaction Effects - Shaping Costs and Benefits*

When convergent loyalties exist in the absence of affinities, either the ethnic group or the state-centre will not be receptive to external support or intervention. When confronted with an internally cohesive state sharing few affinities a potentially intervening state is unlikely to initiate an ethnically based conflict since the stage one win set cannot be increased or decreased by doing so.

In those cases where ethnic affinities are present and cleavage is not present, support may be forthcoming from external ethnic states as shown in chapter two. But support will be expressed in non-tangible diplomatic terms in an effort to probe authority structures and bolster support at home (Heraclides 1990). Doing so, could increase a state's win-set if the issue of affinity becomes highly politicized.

Presumably, those cases in which affinities are absent but cleavage is present attract support at all levels and from all kinds of states, including those that have little or no ethnic affinity. The absence of ethnic affinities do not provide an opportunity for external states to achieve foreign policy objectives but cleavages do. Therefore there is some incentive for elites to politicize the issue and increase the stage one win set.

When divided loyalties exist in combination with high ethnic affinities the outcome is potentially explosive. Protracted conflict and future escalation are probable.<sup>12</sup> All parties may seek to exploit the potential gains that can be garnered from these external links. The situation

is set for an ethnic group to be very receptive to external support and intervention and will actively seek it. Though interstate conflict is more likely, states may be inhibited in using force in such situations. For a state already seriously divided, using force against another state may not be possible.

On the other hand, the size of the stage one win-set for all those involved could be dramatically increased if the ethnic conflict can be controlled within limits. If this occurs, then states may not be interested in resolving the conflict. Since it provides specific benefits to certain elites, they may be more interested in its prolongation and future escalation.

The logic for irredentist cases is similar. In the case of an irredentist group that is to be retrieved by an intervening state there are also two possibilities. On the one hand, the elites may express great apprehension about annexation. Even assuming ethnic affinities are strong, the retrieving state may contain a composite of ethnic groups so that a decision in favor of irredentism will not necessarily be a decision resulting in ethnic self-determination much less domination by the new state (Horowitz 1991). Secession might be the preferred alternative of most ethnic leaders in separatist regions. This is because, for an irredentist claim to be translated into action there must be an ethnic group that is receptive to this claim and elites who see their interests as best being served in the newly incorporated state.

Similarly, for a state to become involved in secessionist strife there must be a minimum level of openness by the elites of groups whose support is being sought. Of course, the nature and tangibility of this support may vary across several dimensions. Higher levels of support would be expected for those cases that have both high levels of ethnic affinity and cleavage.



In those instances where the state is in virtual collapse, loyalties may be so greatly divisive that even factions within a movement vie for power and leadership with one another often to the detriment of the goal they seek. There are potentially wider opportunities for leaders of the secessionist movement than there would be inside an annexed region (Horowitz 1991). Of course, leadership interests are not always dominant. Leaders are sometimes overruled by mass sentiment.

In either case, there is a great deal of resistance from the state-centre to external involvement. High levels of cleavage can, for reasons of security, exacerbate an irredentist and secessionist conflict because elites of an external state may want to continually press their claim bolstering support for them at home. High levels of ethnic affinity provide an additional incentive for doing so. The general hypothesis based on these factors is as follows:

*General Hypothesis 2: Interstate ethnic crises that are conditioned by high levels of cleavage and affinity present additional opportunities and constraints such that:*

*P6 High cleavage increases the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict;*

*P7 High cleavage increases the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions;*

*P8 High affinities increase the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict;*

*P9 High affinities increase the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions.*

#### **6. Identifying States that Use Force in Interstate Ethnic Crises**

Identifying states that use force, entails identification of the kinds of interaction between states. Interstate ethnic conflicts like all interstate interactions operate according to basic principles:

1. States have mechanisms available to them that would allow them to enforce their foreign policies. For example, states can manipulate ethnic divisions within other states and reinforce transnational ethnic affinities through material and diplomatic support;
2. The leaders of a state will be penalized if they fail to protect their ethnic groups (domestic constraints) or if they pursue objects beyond their means (international constraints);
3. Ethnic affinities and cleavages create a security dilemma for states that can under certain conditions lead to an escalation in tensions;
4. States can anticipate what other states do, based on a "reading" of their opponent's constraints and commensurate win-set size;

5. Low-constraint states can choose not to initiate interaction since the domestic costs of doing so are low;
6. States will attempt to manipulate another state's stage one win-set through their own behaviour with the knowledge that the players might meet again;
7. For a multi-ethnic, institutionally constrained state, the best strategy is the one that depends directly on the strategy the other player is using and, in particular, whether this strategy leaves room for the development of cooperation;
8. An effective strategy for maintaining security depends on the characteristics of a state, but also on the nature of the other strategies with which it must interact.

The central issue of whether a state will use force is determining the extent to which there is a discrepancy between elite and mass preferences. Sometimes elite action is decisive in causing conflicts to become violent. Figure 3.2 indicates why this is so. The relative sizes of stage one win-sets shown in Figure 3.2 indicate that low constraint state elites face the widest range of choices in seeking involvement in the ethnic affairs of another state. Keeping in mind that the size of the stage one win-set shapes the propensity for using force, the use of force in interstate ethnic conflict is most probable for interactions involving Ia low constraint (dominant) states and lowest for IIb high-constraint (diverse) states with Types Ib and IIa between.

Since the behaviour of these states is inhibited primarily by international constraints, rather than domestic constraints, confrontations involving Type Ia states will depend on the international benefits that involvement in an ethnic conflict provides. The expectation of small constraints in both environments creates policies of intransigence, that is a non-aversion to the use of force. These states would be expected to behave according to realist accounts of state behavior, that is, pursue interests that have an international payoff such as reclaiming territory. Interstate ethnic crises involving these states could become the most violent if the international payoffs are commensurate.

From a different perspective, the causal mechanism linking domestic structure to conflict behaviour for unconstrained and diverse states focuses almost entirely on the various ethnic segments that impinge on an elite's hold on power. Thus, the only constraints that should operate on such decisions are those that operate through a leader's perceptions of how the decision will affect his ability to remain in power (which is presumably of some interest to all but the most entrenched dictators) and his state's security. However, in the absence of institutions, ethnic groups will find it very difficult to mobilize against leaders, short of the use of force. Since military regimes have a comparative advantage in the use of force, ethnic opposition will be relatively weak as compared to high constraint states unless external military support is forthcoming.

All other things being equal, low-constraint elites in diverse settings do have to worry about the implications an aggressive ethnic foreign policy might have for its own ethnic groups, relative to unconstrained elites in dominant settings. This explains why so few low-level crises in African interstate politics escalate to open warfare. For example, Collins (1973) suggested that

fear of ethnic disorder is a sufficient condition for inhibiting conflict between states in Africa. When conflict does arise it is because these states experience greater instability or sensitivity to disorder (Jenkins & Kposowa 1992). For African state elites, foreign relations are an extension of domestic policy that serves to inhibit overt aggressive behaviour for fear of repercussions at home. Thus the ramifications of domestic disorder leads to general and nonviolent conflict among these states (Collins 1973).

In conflicts involving high constraint states, the potential for conflict with another state will affect the strategies and choice of tactics of both elites. For example, in conflictual relations between two constrained, multi-ethnic states the elites of each state have an interest in minimizing the other side's win-set, that is, ensure that another state does not formulate an aggressive foreign policy against it, but with respect to their own win-set their motives are mixed. When ethnicity is politicized it becomes a double-edge sword. On the one hand the larger the win-set, the more capable is a state in carrying out its foreign policy objectives including ethnically-based ones. On the other hand, under certain conditions enlarging the win-set could make its own position weaker. For a constrained dominant state (IIa) enlarging the win-set through outbidding for example may lead to dangerous and potentially irreversible aggressive behaviour and domestic political calamity. This is because regime type and ethnic composition are highly visible characteristics of states. The elites of another state will seek to exploit the advantages these characteristics make available to them, including transnational ethnic affinities and political divisions.

In other words, highly constrained states are more vulnerable to domestic political threats than low constrained states. Add to this the compounding effects of ethnic composition and it

becomes clear why counter-aggression may be inhibited. It would be expected that doubly constrained states would be cautious in confrontations with similar states. If ethnicity does become a salient issue, both sides will try to resolve their differences through negotiation or maintenance of the status quo. This may be more difficult if cleavages and affinities are strong. In that, foreign policy decision makers are strategic players, they must consider the ramifications of their decisions not only for the domestic arena but the international arena as well.

Elites must also consider the long term ramifications that hostile policies engender, including unanticipated reverberations. Strategy selection and strategy change are therefore determined by their preference structures. How does a very large domestic constraint influence preferences? The presence of large domestic political costs decrease the attraction of strategies that involve the use of force (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992).<sup>13</sup> This is because in interstate ethnic interactions an elite's best strategy is not independent of the strategies used by other elites. Elites engage in safety strategies that minimize domestic costs (Maoz 1990). Therefore, a constrained multi-ethnic state rarely engages in violent behaviour towards a neighboring state for fear of repercussions at home. More likely, support may be expressed in low level political tactics (ie in diplomatic terms) or it may be covert rather than open and militaristic (Heraclides 1990). Outbidding will of course change the preference structure and decrease the possibility that interactions will be peaceful. Confrontation and violence will be likely.

A general hypothesis based on the following can be stated thus:

*General Hypothesis 3: Interstate interactions leading to the use of force are a function of the types of states involved such that:*

*P10 Type Ia low constraint - ethnically dominant states have a high preference for the use of force (realist variant);*

*P11 Type Ib low constraint - diverse states have a moderate preference for the use of force (neo-liberal variant);*

*P12 Type IIa constrained - dominant states have a moderate preference for the use of force;*

*P13 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for use of force.*

## **7. Conclusions**

Determining which states will become involved in interstate ethnic strife is a matter of a priori reasoning and empirical investigation utilizing concepts and a model constructed from them. This chapter has developed a deductively derived model based on the interactions between two variables, ethnic composition and institutional constraint, and the assumption that each set of interactions results in decision-making and implementation costs to elites. The conceptual analysis focuses on the model, which begins with a ranking of elite preferences for involvement in ethnic strife, according to four ideal types. This method of analysis helps clarify the underlying logic and the presumed linkages of the model, but it remains to be seen (through case study and quantitative testing) whether the presumed linkages are valid interpretations of reality.

More specifically, the model in this thesis uses a game theoretic approach in which four explanatory variables were identified. The model attempts to link processes that occur within the actor-level of analysis, as a consequence of the interactions of these variables with patterns of conflict that take place between states, a system-level concern. The model begins with a micro-level, decision-based approach at Stage 1. Although this extra dimension of analysis is risky, because it may transform what is a theory of interstate ethnic conflict to a theory of foreign policy, the additional insights are useful for differentiating between types of states that are likely to formulate ethnically-based foreign policies. On the other hand, Stage 1 is logically incomplete unless incorporated into a broader theory of strategic interaction between states, which occurs at Stages 2 and 3. The analysis suggests that, participants in an interstate ethnic conflict may deliberately seek the consequences of confrontation and the use of force. Although the model is presented as a succession of dis-aggregated stages, for purposes of clarity, it is quite possible that all three stages will occur simultaneously. That is, foreign policies may be formulated and implemented in the midst of an interstate conflict or crisis and force may be an aspect of this policy.

In all, there are three stages to the model. The relationship among the three is displayed diagrammatically in Figure 3.3. At Stage 1, four ideal types of states result from the interactive effects of the independent variables, each with different preference structures for involvement in ethnic strife. Stage 2 indicates that for a foreign policy to lead to interstate conflict and crisis two additional variables must be included, namely affinity and cleavage. These two variables represent a security dilemma for states, because elites will face the decision on how to address them if they pose a problem for their own internal political situation or how to act on them if



they are pressured by extremists to do so. For those states facing high domestic costs because of institutional constraints and ethnic diversity, the use of force is the least attractive choice in finding a solution to the dilemma because it would most probably have domestic repercussions and exacerbate that state's security dilemma. When cleavages and affinities are high, then protracted conflict and crisis escalation are more likely because the elites of states are more likely to choose to initiate a conflict in an attempt to address its security weakness. At Stage 3, interactions between states involving the use of force show that low-constraint ethnically dominant states (Type Ia) have a higher preference for force than do high constraint ethnically diverse states (Type IIb) because of low domestic costs. Types Ib and IIa fit between these two extremes.

The model is dynamic. It can account for incremental changes in a state's foreign policy as a consequence of changes in institutional structure and composition, as well as changes in relations between states as a result of changes in cleavages and affinities. The dynamic aspects of the model will become more apparent in chapter five. The assumptions of the model also suggest that linkages between behaviour at the actor level and the system level are fundamental to understanding interstate ethnic conflict. Finally, the model provides a means of developing an index of foreign policy preferences for involvement in ethnic strife and the use of force. It may have predictive and explanatory power, which has theoretical and policy-related implications. These are explored in detail in later chapters.

Insert Figure 3.3 Here


FIGURE 3.3

A MODEL OF INTERSTATE ETHNIC CONFLICT

STAGE 1-PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

STAGE 2-CLEAVAGE AND AFFINITY

STAGE 3-INTERACTIONS



The biggest difference between this approach and other game theoretic models is the manner in which this approach considers the domestic alternatives available to an elite and the addition of cost-related concepts, such as security, at the international level. This "unbundling" process is similar to the idea of two-level games used to describe processes of international negotiation. From this model, a series of propositions is developed that are compatible with the assumptions of current understanding of ethnic conflict involvement and institutional constraints. In its basic form, presenting interactions between composition and institutional constraint only (Stage 1), the model is useful for determining states that are likely to pursue conflictual and peaceful foreign policies when ethnicity is salient. In its more complex forms (Stage 2 and Stage 3) the model is useful for understanding the kinds of security issues, such as transnational ethnic affinities and cleavages, that increase the potential for interstate conflict and crisis and the use of force.

The model incorporates several new factors. They are: the interactive effects of ethnic composition and institutional constraints on the propensity for involvement in ethnic conflict; consideration of domestic costs associated with involvement; and the concept of elite-initiated conflict in constrained and unconstrained settings. A paradoxical, yet important conclusion that can be drawn from this model is that, conflict between relatively homogenous democratized states or states undergoing internal political transformation, could increase because of the problems they in dealing with their constituencies (Russett 1990; Huntington 1991). For example, the elites of some states may be pressured to act on a perceived threat to the security of an ethnic group, engendered by ethnic affinities. Cleavages provide additional opportunities to act.

The model highlights several significant links between domestic ethnic politics and interstate ethnic conflict, including:

**The paradoxical fact that institutional arrangements in combination with multi-ethnic constituencies may weaken a state's international position while strengthening decision makers at home;**

**The potential reverberations that transnational ethnic affinities, cleavage and outbidding have within the domestic arena;**

**The opportunities that high levels of cleavage and affinity provide for intervening states in addition to the constraints they impose on states that can lead to security dilemmas;**

**The propensity for high levels of cleavage and affinity to result in protracted interstate conflict and future crisis escalation because of domestic pressures on elites to act on perceived or real ethnic insecurities;**

**The divergence of interests between institutionally constrained elites and institutionally unconstrained elites in diverse and dominant settings;**

**The propensity for doubly constrained elites to be more cautious in their confrontations with other states;**

**Differentiation among types of interstate ethnic conflict involving the use of force;**

In the next two chapters, two in-depth case studies, India's involvement in Sri Lanka's secessionist conflict and Somali irredentism are examined. These cases operationalize the variables presented in this chapter and test the presumed linkages.

## Notes

1. Quoted in Knight (1984: 520).
2. This is consistent with the views of critics of rational choice who have emphasized the well known limits to rationality and the ongoing debate as to what constitutes the legitimate scope of inquiry for foreign policy and how much deviation from rationality is appropriate. Simon (1985) articulated this problem in his discussion on bounded rationality and substantive rationality.
3. The term rational denotes behaviour that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation. Substantive rationality refers to behaviour adjudged to be optimally adapted to the situation. Procedural or bounded rationality refers to behaviour that is adaptive within the constraints imposed by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker. This difference defines the gap between political psychologists and rational choice approaches. The latter emphasize external environmental conditions as constraints, while the former accentuates the capacities of decision makers as sources of foreign policy. In this thesis rationality refers to finding the most efficient means under a given set of circumstances to accomplish a specified set of objectives. The decision maker must be able to comprehend the nature of the objective and the characteristics of the environment in which the objective arises (Maoz 1990, James 1993).
4. In those states where ethnic identity is the primary form of political organization, this process can lead to, for example: a) horizontal stratification where no single ethnic group is dominant; b) a hegemonial exchange processes where there is interethnic cooperation at the elite level; c) patron-client relationships where a single ethnic group is dominant but there is intense intra-ethnic and interethnic rivalry; or d) vertical stratification where one ethnic group is dominant and mobility is bad (Horowitz 1985).
5. Rothschild's vertical, parallel and reticulate models are similar in this context (Rothschild 1981). The reticulate model more closely approximates the ethnic composition of most states because ethnic groups and social classes "cross-populate each... [and]... each ethnic group pursues a wide range of economic functions and occupations [to the extent that] a certain amount of over-representation and under-representation of ethnic groups within economic classes and political power clusters is possible-indeed likely" (Rothschild 1981: 81).
6. There are, of course, those societies in which decision-making is not dominated by a single ethnic group (Malaysia), those in which elites must heed the ramifications of singling out a single ethnic group within a multi-ethnic constituency (India) or those in which the salience of ethnicity as a political tool is weakened by alternative and cross-cutting forms of identity and mobilization (pre-1988 Yugoslavia).
7. Unless otherwise noted, country examples are drawn from data developed in Chapter 6 and refer to the state's present characteristics.
8. In theory, all states should exhibit redistributive and efficiency arrangements. However, in reality, due to the compounding problems associated with multi-ethnic competition and conflict,

most states exhibit characteristics tending towards efficiency or redistribution. As will become evident in the next section problems of efficiency and redistribution, are particularly acute in those multi-ethnic societies in which political institutions are weak to begin with.

9. "...[V]isible politics - that is politics designed to be watched (and approved) by the masses has an ideological and polarized character." (Tsebelis 1990: 167).

10 . Hegemonial exchange models, on the other hand, are transitional models with the aim of building more durable societies. For example, hegemonial exchange in the Ivory Coast is based on the redistribution of economic resources in order to limit the perception of relative deprivation. According to Rothchild & Chazan (1988) the application of the principle of redistribution can reinforce positive ingroup perceptions and behaviour. In this case there is tradeoff between political management and economic efficiency because of conflicting ethnic demands.

11. Recall the definition of a crisis-based interstate ethnic conflict, in which crises can be triggered by internal sources as well as external sources. Cleavage represents an internal challenge to a regime and hence is intimately interlinked with the triggering of a crisis. When cleavage is high, crisis is probable.

12. Edward Azar's (1978: 41-60) definition of protracted conflicts is useful in this context: "Protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high - the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity."

13. Highly constrained leaders bear a higher cost/benefit ratio than low constraint leaders therefore they should be more constrained in their ability to choose violent strategies.

## Chapter 4

### The Indo-Sri Lanka Crisis, The Disintegration of Paradise



*Quotas racially applied in the work place or on campus do not work. They rip societies apart; so does linguistic separatism or historical revisionism in pursuit of ethnic self-esteem. Scholars or politicians who promote such policies based on the romantic notion that ethnic groups should use state power to preserve their distinct identities should be sent to Sri Lanka to witness the fallacy of their theories (McGowan 1993).<sup>1</sup>*

*I do not care what New Delhi, London or any other country says. How quickly and effectively I can exterminate the militants is the crux of the problem (Hector Jayewardene, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister, Thimpu Peace Talks 1986).<sup>2</sup>*

### ***1. Introduction - The Disintegration of Paradise***

The Indo-Sri Lanka crisis is characterized by a complexity of issues, perceptions of adversaries and decisional tasks that emanate from internal as well as external sources. These indicate that deeply-divided societies can influence decisions by outside actors to become involved in an internal conflict. India's involvement in Sri Lanka's domestic protracted ethnic conflict was twofold. On the one hand, India's direct involvement consisted of acts of compellence, mediation and physical intervention in an attempt to transform the highly-centralized Sri Lankan unitary state into a decentralized federalized state. On the other hand, indirect Indian involvement consisted of an increase in the flow of materials and weapons from India to Sri Lanka in support of the Tamil insurgency, and the training of Tamil separatists on Indian soil.

To understand the linkage between these two apparent contradictory patterns of Indian behavior this inquiry will examine the issues and events of the conflict by focusing on the model developed in chapter three. In the first section, the historical and political background of Sri Lanka's protracted ethnic conflict is examined. In the second section, Indian involvement in the conflict is analyzed using a crisis-based framework. The pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods

are presented. In the final section, the implications of the conflict are assessed. The variables used in the model are briefly analyzed and the hypotheses are tested.

## *2. Assessing the Ethnic Factor - Sri Lanka and India*

### *2.1 The View from Sri Lanka - Dominance or Diversity?*

Sri Lanka's population of 18 million is composed of six different ethnic groups. The latest census (1981) indicates that about 75% of Sri Lanka's population is Sinhalese, Buddhists who speak Sinhala. The second largest group is formed by the Sri Lankan Tamils (Tamils of Sri Lankan citizenship who, according to the 1981 census, comprise 13% of the population). Sri Lankan Tamils are predominantly Hindu and speak Tamil. The Sri Lankan Tamils have traditionally occupied the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. For example, about 95% of Jaffna District in the Northern Province is Tamil. The percentage of Tamils in the Eastern Province varies from 33% in Batticaloa District to 70% in Trincomalee. The remaining ethnic group important to this inquiry are the Indian Tamils (Tamils of Indian citizenship who have traditionally worked the plantations). They comprise 5% of the population. The remaining 7% of the population is made up of Tamil speaking Muslims, Malay immigrants and "Burghers", descendants of European colonists.

Although dominance in the political and social life of Sri Lanka has played an important role in shaping a Sinhalese world view, relations with South India have been significant. The usefulness of these historical perceptions for this inquiry lies not in their accuracy but in the veracity with which these views are held by Sinhalese elites and masses (McGowan 1993). This relationship exhibits several characteristics. The first is the perception that Sinhalese are a

threatened people in which they, not the Tamils of Sri Lanka, are the minority. Surrounded by an overwhelming Hindu Tamil majority (52 million including South India), the Sinhalese have over time developed a reverse psychology of superiority in which the Sinhalese people claim lineage to the Aryans of northern India. In turn, this historical legacy is related to the idea that Sri Lanka is an island conquered by the Buddha in order for Buddhism to flourish. The primacy of Buddhism on the island and the function of political leadership to overcome threats to the Buddhist order are two historical perceptions deeply imbedded in the collective unconscious of the Sinhalese people of Sri Lanka. Myths of Sinhalese cultural primacy have been bolstered by interpreters of ancient mythology that Buddhists have proprietary rights over the island.

Second, the Sinhalese have had a 2500-year history of political and religious affairs in which the sacred Sinhalese Buddhist texts describe the Southern States of India as the main oppressors of the Sinhalese people.<sup>3</sup> The identity of India as an external and threatening force is the most salient aspect of historical relations between India and Sri Lanka.

Third, like India, the political system in Sri Lanka is elitist and personalized. The politics of Sri Lanka belong to a select few of either a "plantocracy" or an English educated elite. The mass welfare schemes and state patronage system of the Sri Lankan government have not translated into the kinds of participatory democracy that is commonly associated with welfare states (Moore 1985). Decision-making remains highly centralized and controlled by an elite group of Colombo-based politicians (Moore 1985; Carment 1987).

Fourth, the Sri Lankan political system exhibits aspects of institutional incompleteness. An illustration is the transformation that the Sri Lankan constitution has undergone over the past twenty years. These changes reinforced the powers of the president and the unitary political

system while more recently attempts have been made to devolve power to provincial councils. The failure of devolution to take hold after the death of President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1993 means that regional politics remains subservient to that of Colombo.

Congruence among Sri Lankan elites with respect to the historical interpretation of Indo-Sri Lanka relations cannot be interpreted as an absence of conflict among Sri Lanka's decision makers. Differences among Sri Lanka's elites have consistently focussed on how to deal with the Tamil separatist movement, Indian involvement in the conflict, and relations with the chauvinist sangha (the influential Buddhist clergy).

In sum, these historical and social elements combine to create a centralized system based on identity politics that has been ill-prepared for the political mobilization of Sri Lanka's minority Tamils. Despite inheriting a legal and constitutional system emphasizing individual rights and liberties, democracy has since become equated with quotas, applied in the government or on campus (McGowan 1992; de Silva 1993). Initially there was inter-ethnic convergence of elite interests during the 1920s but that goal was to end colonization.<sup>4</sup> Subsequent elite interests became fragmented along ethnic lines after 1956, when ethnic nationalists swept into power on promises to restore Sinhalese superiority. The consequence of this was the development of preferential policies and ethnically-based, patron-client relationships.

Historical perspectives on ethnic conflict suggest that the political configuration of ethnic groups and the degree of constraint they exercise over the state and its decision makers, is determined in part by colonial experience (Horowitz 1985). Similar processes occurred in colonial Sri Lanka. Here, colonial plantation linkages focused on the procurement of Indian Tamil labour and the development of indigenous commercial interests who could satisfy the

demand for labour. The movement of the Sri Lankan economy from one oriented towards ethnically homogenous subsistence production to one where the main interests were the development, control and access of export markets was marked by increasing ethnic stratification throughout the production system. The plantation economy restructured economic competition in Sri Lanka in a way that emphasized ethnicity as a form of group organization and as a basis for mobilization. Urbanization and nationalism exacerbated these divisions (Moore 1985). The early years of Sri Lankan independence were witness to inter-elite cooperation between Tamils and Sinhalese politicians but this form of cooperation slowly disintegrated as leaders of both ethnic groups discovered that they could more easily achieve office by focusing on the interests of their own ethnic group.

## *2.2 The Origins of Sri Lanka's Protracted Ethnic Conflict*

The beginnings of Sri Lanka's protracted ethnic conflict can be traced to the political mobilization of the Tamil minority in the early 1940s. During the formative years of Sri Lanka's independence, Tamil political organization was subdivided into basic groups: leadership representing the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils known as the Tamil Congress (which had until 1948 worked closely with the United National Party - UNP), and the Ceylon Workers Congress, (CWC), representing the interests of the Tamil plantation workers, who by 1946 formed over half the Tamil population of the island. Together the Tamils formed a large enough electorate to gain political representation for their sub-groups in the legislature.

In 1949, a breakaway group of Tamil Congress members, under the leadership of S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, formed the Ceylon Tamil State Party or the Federal Party, with the aim

of "creating an organization for the attainment of the freedom of the Tamil speaking people of Ceylon" (Kodikara 1985: 195). From the beginning the Federal Party's secessionist demand focussed on the existence of a definite territorial claim along existing regional boundaries. Had the Tamils not had a majority of the population in any of the provinces it is not likely that there would have been as much interest in secessionism. The crucial factor was that as early as the forties, Tamil leadership had become mobilized on the premise that a separate state could operate independently without doing unacceptable harm to its access to resources. This view was tempered by the economic linkages the Tamils of Sri Lanka shared with India.

Several acts of the national legislature enhanced Tamil solidarity. Most important was the Sinhala only legislation in 1956, making Sinhala the only official language. The use of quotas in university admissions was introduced in the 1970s. The 1972 proposal that Sinhala be considered the sole official language and Buddhism be accorded the "foremost" place in Sri Lanka resulted in dissension of all federal level Tamil representatives in the legislature. In that same year, the Federal Party, Tamil Congress, CWC and two other smaller parties (the Elathamir Ottumai Munani and the All Ceylon Tamil Conference) joined together to create the Tamil United Front in response to what was perceived to be hostile legislation. An increase in Sinhalese colonists in Tamil-dominant agricultural areas exacerbated these tensions. In 1975, the Front openly espoused the cause of a separate state and renamed itself the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).

The sharp discrimination against Tamil university applicants in 1977, which substantially reduced the proportions of Tamils in many universities led to riots in the same year (Kearney 1985). This factor played a key role in the rapidly rising militancy of Tamil youth who, affected

by university admission, turned towards violent and often indiscriminate tactics. These students eventually organized themselves as guerrilla units: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Eelam Peoples's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), The Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Student's (EROS) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO).<sup>5</sup>

Factors that lay outside the government's direct control contributed to the advancement of a Tamil separatist state.<sup>6</sup> An often-overlooked factor was the world sympathy evoked from the riots, deaths, human rights violations and the growing Tamil refugee problem from 1977 onward. The immediate effect of the violence was the terror it created among Sri Lankan civilians especially the Tamils and the subsequent increase in support from South India for the separatist cause. In 1983, the Sri Lankan government imposed a sixth amendment to the Constitution "prohibiting any person from supporting, espousing, promoting, financing, encouraging or advocating whether in or outside of Sri Lanka, the establishment of a separate state within Sri Lanka; Persons acting in contravention of this prohibition were made liable for civic disability for a period not exceeding 17 years. If such a person were to be a member of the Parliament, he would lose his seat in Parliament" (Mohan 1985: 297). This legislation was directed mainly at Tamils living in South India. Like their counterparts in Sri Lanka, South Indian Tamils had also undergone an ethnic resurgence in the 1950s. Their role in the Sri Lankan conflict is primary.

### *2.3 The View From India - The Politics of Identity*

India's ethnic politics is an important but neglected aspect of the Sri Lankan conflict. India is an ethnically mixed society that has proved relatively successful in managing ethnic tensions. Political decisions in India have rarely been made without allowing for the differential impact they have on other ethnic groups. Initially, India's inherited parliamentary structure was thought to be unsuitable to such an ethnically diverse society. Pre-independence mechanisms had been developed for separating Hindu/Muslims, upper/lower castes and ethnic minorities; and the colonial period itself was a critical factor in explaining the sensitivity of Indian elites to ethnic group demands. For example, the British gave official preference to the Bengali language and Urdu in the north, they provided separate concessions to Sikhs and Muslims, and patronized the non-Brahmin movement (Brass 1991). After independence the Indian government adopted Hindi, in an attempt to displace Urdu. The government also adopted pluralist policies in relation to major language and cultural movements, recognizing especially most of the large language groups among whom major mobilizations had developed for the creation of separate linguistic states (Kohli 1990). The weak status of Hindi in the early years of independence and concern over secessionist movements among linguistic groups, provided the basis for the linguistic reorganization of states. Simultaneously, the Congress party took measures to insure that linguistic reordering carried out in the mid-1950s would not legitimize secessionist demands. Nor would the government tolerate regional demands based upon religious differences (Brecher 1959).

Although the Congress government met with considerable success in confronting language issues through linguistic federalism, more recent governments have been less successful in managing the political demands of non-Hindu and tribal minority groups.<sup>7</sup> Since the breakup



of a unified Congress party in 1967, India has undergone significant political transformations including a decline in order and authority, erosion of vertical patterns of fealty, a lost capacity to influence the political behavior of communal political parties and the increasing use of force in internal and external affairs (Kohli 1990).

During the period of rapid growth in Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka, the Indian political process experienced a parallel political transformation. The Indian political landscape changed from one dedicated to the principles of unity, order, and secularism - a model of a dominant and strong centralized and somewhat autonomous state - to a state dependent on the mobilization of ethnic groups for support at the regional level. India's elites became increasingly constrained by a diverse and clamoring multi-ethnic population. How exactly, India's policy towards its own ethnic groups led to a crisis with Sri Lanka is related to three factors.

Initial Indian involvement in Sri Lanka stemmed from the Government of Sri Lanka's decision to not extend citizenship to Indian Tamil plantation workers. The government contended that despite their long residence they were still affiliated with their country of origin. By 1964, there were an estimated 975,000 "stateless" persons in the country. Agreements in 1964 and 1974 between the two governments led to the return of many but not all of the Tamils to India. The agreement had the net effect of establishing a precedent for future relations with Sri Lanka on the Tamil issue.

The second factor was the delicate political balance between governments of Tamil Nadu and the Congress Party (I). Since the 1950s, the Congress Party has never been in a position to win the state of Tamil Nadu on its own. The two major Tamil Nadu parties, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) have

looked to Congress for support and in turn the Congress party is equally dependent on them to consolidate its own position at the state level. Given traditional Tamil Nadu sympathies for the Sri Lankan Tamils, the issue has been important to Congress. For example, Indira Gandhi's astute political manoeuvring through the 1970s and early 1980s found her forging alliances first with the DMK and then the AIADMK. From 1980 until her death, Mrs Gandhi continued support of the AIADMK and its leader M.G. Ramachandran because of his ability to contain the more militant brand of Tamil nationalism espoused by the DMK.

In order to retain a toehold in South Indian politics, the Congress Party often found itself being tested on its foreign policy relations with Sri Lanka. The conflict in Sri Lanka not only provided significant political mileage for leaders of the AIADMK and the DMK but for Congress as well. For its part, the AIADMK called for active mediation in the Sri Lankan conflict, while the DMK pursued a more hard line approach. It demanded that the Sri Lankan government grant full autonomy to the Tamils (Sivarajah 1990).<sup>8</sup>

The third factor, has been "informal" linkages between Tamils across the Palk Straits including economic and military support. The most flagrant example was the establishment of rebel training camps in Tamil Nadu state in South India. Training was frequently provided by Indian ex-servicemen and members of India's foreign Intelligence Agency (Research and Analysis Wing - RAW) (Khory 1992).

Collectively these factors amounted to increasing involvement in Sri Lankan domestic affairs. On the one hand, the Indian government perpetuated a public image as active mediator concerned with finding an agreement that was amicable to parties on all sides of the issue. Less apparent was the complex ethnic political game that Congress was forced to play. One that

would, on the one hand, ensure its political longevity in the South and, on the other hand, maintain its regional preeminence elsewhere.

### ***3. The Pre-Crisis Period - July 25 1983 - June 4 1987***

#### ***3.1 Indian Intervention - The Pre-Crisis Period Begins***

In July 1983 the Indian Government chose to become an intermediary between the Sri Lankan government (UNP) and the TULF. The Indian decision to intervene followed in the wake of post-election riots between Sinhalese and Tamils of 24 and 25 July 1983. At this time the demand for regional autonomy over separation was a tactical calculation by Sri Lanka's Tamil leadership. The claim for a separate state during the fifties engendered hostility from the Indian government, which had taken legislative steps in its own country to placate the separatist Dravidanadu movement in Tamil Nadu. India was also being confronted by other separatist groups and was not sympathetic to the Tamil cause.

The subsequent transition of Tamil demands to a separate state and the beginnings of Sri Lanka's foreign policy crisis on 25 July 1983 can be identified with the material and ideological support that the DMK government of Tamil Nadu was providing to the separatists and the direct intervention of the Indian government in Sri Lanka's domestic affairs.<sup>9</sup> India's leader, Indira Gandhi recognized Tamil separatist demands as affecting India's own interests, specifically in the great number of Tamils fleeing to India but also in the influence the ethnic conflict was having for similar insurgencies in India. The stated interest of India's leaders was to prevent Sri Lanka's internal strife from escalating to a degree that might lead to involvement of extra-regional powers (Kodikara 1990).<sup>10</sup>

### *3.2. Escalation and Counterinsurgency*

During the 1983 riots, Sri Lanka's President Junius Jayewardene sought military assistance from the United States, Britain, Pakistan and Bangladesh to meet the growing insurgency (Rao 1988). In a 5 August 1983 statement designed to placate Sri Lankan concerns, Indira Gandhi addressed the Indian Parliament stating that India "does not pose any threat to Sri Lanka nor do we want to interfere in its internal affairs. We want the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka to be preserved".<sup>11</sup> Following Mrs Gandhi's speech, the Indian government asserted its regional preeminence by pronouncing the "Indira Doctrine". It said:

India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region, unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by any outside power. If external assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should look first within the region for help.<sup>12</sup>

In response to this announcement by the Indian government, Jayewardene warned that if Sri Lanka felt there was a threat from India it would turn to the United States, Britain and others for military aid. Sri Lankan sources revealed that the President was in fact worried about an Indian invasion (Manor & Segal 1985).<sup>13</sup> Yet only several weeks later President Jayewardene agreed to prepare the ground work for a settlement between the Sri Lankan government and the TULF to be negotiated through the good offices of the Indian government. There are two significant reasons for Jayewardene's change in strategy. The first is the discouraging response from the western powers to Sri Lanka's request for military assistance.<sup>14</sup> The second factor was India's behavior towards Sri Lanka, which made it clear that it would not tolerate direct foreign intervention in a matter considered an Indian concern.

Sri Lanka's central concern at this time was Tamil militant activity in India (a fact that the Indian government officially denied until November 1986). Indira Gandhi's reluctance to

discourage the Tamil militants had been a major irritant in Indo-Sri Lankan relations.<sup>15</sup> Sri Lankan government officials perceived that Mrs. Gandhi was acting under pressure from the Indian Tamils.<sup>16</sup>

A second problem for Sri Lanka was the inability of the Sri Lankan government to contain the separatist movement within its own borders. Efforts by the Sri Lankan government to control the separatist movement led to a heightening of tension between Sri Lanka and India. For example, in 1984 the Sri Lankan government introduced a surveillance zone to stop the unauthorized movement of people between India and Sri Lanka. In that same year ten Indian fishing vessels were detained for violating Sri Lankan fishing rights. In response the Indian government mobilized its powerful navy to convince the Sri Lankan government that the detention of Indian citizens was unjustified. The UNP's subsequent prohibition of fishing off the Mannar (north-west) region prompted the outflow of eleven thousand Tamil fishermen to Tamil Nadu (de Silva C.R. 1985).

Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother in 1985, moved swiftly to placate growing discontent among Sri Lanka's decision makers. Among the dissenters, Sri Lanka's then prime minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa, insisted that if India removed its support the militant struggle would collapse.<sup>17</sup> In response, the Indian government took decisive action to ensure the Sri Lankan government of its honest intentions. On 29 March 1985, the Indian coast guard intercepted a boat carrying guns and explosives to Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka.<sup>18</sup> The Indian government also applied pressure on the government of Tamil Nadu to remove Tamil militants from their training bases. At India's urging two rounds of talks were held at Thimpu, Bhutan in July and August 1985. Present at these talks were the heads of the five major militant

organizations, the TULF and Hector Jayewardene the President's brother representing the government of Sri Lanka. These negotiations like those before ended in failure, in part because the Sri Lankan government, while advocating peaceful negotiation had increased its attacks on the Tamil guerrillas that only served to push moderate Tamils into the militant organizations. Equally damaging was the refusal of the Sri Lankan government to agree to the Tamil demand of merging the Northern and Eastern provinces. During an interview at these talks Hector Jayewardene was quoted as saying:

I do not care what New Delhi, London or any other country says. How quickly and effectively I can exterminate the militants is the crux of the problem.<sup>19</sup>

President Jayewardene also voiced his frustration with increased Indian intervention.

When asked if the negotiations were a way of buying time, Jayewardene said:

Now we are acquiring arms and getting our soldiers trained. We are getting ready for decisive military action.<sup>20</sup>

Once again Jayewardene approached the United States to come to Sri Lanka's aid in solving the ethnic crisis. But he was informed that the United States had cut its annual aid package to Sri Lanka in half, due partly to an effective Tamil lobby in Washington.<sup>21</sup> In voicing his unhappiness with the American response, Jayewardene said: "I am very happy that I have been abandoned. I do not trust a single power".<sup>22</sup>

On 8 November 1986, in a coordinated move with the Tamil Nadu government and the Tamil Nadu police, the Indian government arrested known militants and their leaders and confiscated their arms and ammunition in a statewide crackdown.<sup>23</sup> However, this response did little to persuade the Sri Lankan government of India's neutrality on the Tamil issue. In fact those arrested were released the same day.<sup>24</sup>

Also in November of 1986 the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting was held in Bangalore. The major objective of this meeting was to seek a modus vivendi between Tamil insistence on the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces and Sinhalese opposition to it. The so called "December 19th proposals" called for administrative linkages between the two provinces and a devolution of power to these provinces.<sup>25</sup> Both sides were agreeable to the proposals. The perception of the Sri Lankan government was that it would continue to pursue a military solution against the militants while using the proposals as a negotiating position for further talks.

By the beginning of 1987 the dominant Tamil rebel group, the LTTE, was carrying out a plan to take over civil administration in the north, which it already had under its military control. At the same time the Sri Lankan government imposed a blockade on the supplies of fuel and other essential commodities to the Jaffna peninsula while simultaneously picking up military action in the north and east.<sup>26</sup>

Within weeks of the Sri Lanka effort to eliminate the Tamil rebels, the Government of India warned the Sri Lankan government against taking further military action against the rebels. In a message delivered to President Jayewardene on 10 February 1987 Prime Minister Gandhi warned that India was suspending its good offices and demanded that Colombo lift the economic blockade of Jaffna and affirm its commitments to the December 19th proposals. "If these steps were not taken and the military option was continued", Gandhi concluded, the fighting "will be prolonged" and the "situation will escalate".<sup>27</sup> Jayewardene's immediate reaction to this threat, was to issue two of his own warnings to the LTTE, suggesting that hostilities should cease in the north and the east, the lifting of the embargo would be conditional upon observance of a 10

-day cease fire. When this cease-fire was violated by the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army launched a full-scale military campaign involving over 3,000 troops in a land, air and sea assault on the Jaffna peninsula. By the end of April 1987 the battle for Jaffna had begun.<sup>28</sup> By May, despite the failure to round up the leaders of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army was enjoying unprecedented success against the Tigers (Pfaffenberger 1988).

### *3.3 From Pre-crisis to Crisis*

By most accounts civilian casualties in the assault (mostly Tamil) were high. Some estimates placed the civilian death toll at the end of May 1987 as high as 500, prompting Gandhi to once again issued a warning to Jayewardene: "The time to desist from military occupation of Jaffna is now. Later may be too late".<sup>29</sup> On 3 June 1987 the Indian government sent relief supplies to the people of Jaffna in a flotilla of 19 fishing boats flying the red cross flag. Colombo rejected the supplies and blocked the Indian flotilla's entry into Sri Lankan waters. Again the Government of India condemned the Government of Sri Lanka's actions, warning that it would not remain an indifferent spectator to the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. At this time, Tamil militants inflamed the situation by slaughtering 29 Buddhist monks on their way to an ordination ceremony. Indian newspaper editorials called for an armed invasion of Sri Lanka (Pfaffenberger 1988). On 4 June 1987, five Indian Air Force supply planes escorted by Mirage 2000 fighter jets entered Sri Lanka's airspace and dropped relief supplies in and around Jaffna. The Government of Sri Lanka condemned the Indian air drop known as "Operation Eagle" as a "naked violation of our independence" and "an unwarranted assault on our



sovereignty and territorial integrity".<sup>30</sup> Relations between Sri Lanka and India had reached the crisis stage.

#### *4. The Crisis Period - 4 June 1987 - 27 July 1989*

##### *4.1. Sri Lanka capitulates to Indian demands*

Within hours of hearing of the airdrop, Jayewardene launched a full-scale diplomatic protest officially condemning the Indian action. Surprisingly, Colombo did not call for a U.N. Security Council meeting, nor did it boycott the SAARC meeting held in July of that year. Instead, Jayewardene, believing that his options were limited, signed an Accord with Gandhi in Colombo on 29 July 1987. The Accord embodied the principles of the "December 19th proposals".<sup>31</sup> The Tamil militants, specifically the LTTE, were not signatories to the Accord but agreed to a ceasefire.

As before when faced with Indian threats, Sri Lanka's perceived options were deemed to be few. In a 24 September 1987 meeting with representatives of the Canadian Government in Sri Lanka prior to his departure to the Commonwealth Countries Head of Government Meeting (CCHOGM) in Vancouver, President Jayewardene confirmed this view. He pointed out that the terrorists would have never gotten as far as they did without Indian support. He also said that India's "quasi-invasion" in early June was totally unjustified, a deep shock and was instrumental in his willingness to sign the Accord in the form he did. It occurred to him that India was coming in and "it was better they come in with him than against him."<sup>32</sup>

In addition, the government of Sri Lanka agreed to the departure of its security forces from the north and east and to a referendum on the issue of devolution to be held in the near future (de Silva 1993). For its part, India would provide a 16-19,000 man Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to whom the Tamil rebels would turn over their weapons. Upon arrival on Sri Lankan soil the IPKF began establishing bases near every major militant camp or office in the Jaffna peninsula. Just as the Accord was announced, three Indian navy frigates appeared off the coast of Colombo, well within helicopter range of the presidential palace. At this time, Jayewardene attempted to put Indian military dominance in perspective by invoking an historical analogy:

...India is a big power in the region. We have been friends with India for 2,500 years. There have been 70 invasions during this period by small Indian states. Now India is one unit - a big difference. This leads us to the realization of a practical situation in the region - that India is the most powerful nation in the Indian Ocean. We must still be independent in our thoughts, in our foreign policy. And India will not mind anything we do unless it impinges on her own security and safety. But the whole world accepts India's preeminence in this part of the world. The US would not lift a finger to help me without first consulting India.<sup>33</sup>

In reflection of the serious discontent with the Accord, an attempt was made on Jayewardene's life 18 August 1987 within the grounds of Sri Lanka's parliament. Speculation at the time lay with the Sinhalese left, possibly the JVP. The attack seemed to galvanize the President's decisions-making, he believed he had little alternative to forging ahead in collaborating with India to end the conflict - retreat now was unthinkable.

Quite soon after the bombing, Jayewardene set about discrediting those within his government who opposed the Accord. The most notable of these was Premadasa, who had been a vocal critic of Indian involvement from the beginning. In the newspapers Jayewardene attacked

Premadasa's widespread network of patronage. Premadasa remained a critic of Indian intervention but refrained from seeking to split the government at this time.<sup>34</sup>

Given the fact that the Indian government had taken over from the Sri Lankan army in the north and east, the view from India of recent events was surprisingly optimistic. For the Indian government, unlike the Sri Lankan government, there was no time pressure to complete the Accord. The Indian government expected a settlement with the LTTE within six weeks. Within that period the IPKF would have departed.

From the Sri Lankan perspective, Indian support for the LTTE, overt or covert, was seen as support for the only group capable of forcing the Sri Lankan government into political compromises. Although the Government of India did not support Tamil Eelam (independence) it could not easily endure assault on the Sri Lankan Tamil community, which would ultimately compromise its legitimacy within South India. The Sri Lankan view was that Indian boldness as guarantor of peace was a step beyond good offices mediation. The Indian decision to take on the LTTE was based on the belief that the Indian army was capable of meeting any LTTE challenges and the belief that the LTTE did not have widespread support among the Eastern Province Tamils. The Indian Government believed at this time that the IPKF was still welcomed by Sri Lankan Tamil community.<sup>35</sup>

The lack of cohesive leadership within the Sri Lankan government was emphasized again by the conspicuous absence of the government in the negotiations between the Tigers and the IPKF. This absence provoked indignation among the Sinhalese nationalists in Jayewardene's cabinet and fuelled the fires of widespread Sinhalese discontent against the Indian government. Equally significant was the time pressure placed on the Sri Lankan government to resolve the

domestic crisis. The Government had to pass the legislature through parliament, hold a Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the Provincial Councils Bill and hold Provincial Council elections all before January 31 1987. The IPKF was to have withdrawn before this time. Jayewardene's highly personalized decision-making, tempered by the assault on his life, cabinet defections and Sinhalese opposition to the Accord, led him to believe that he had to find a political solution before the Indian government's stated intention of IPKF withdrawal (Samarasinghe & Liyanage 1993).

Jayewardene also spoke harshly of the role of Buddhist priests whose political action against the Accord, he said, went against the Buddhist aim of saving life. Jayewardene said rather than turning to them for advice, he would jail outspoken Buddhist leaders. The Buddhist clergy who historically were a source of advice in the decision-making process, had become increasingly alienated from the presidency.

By late September 1987, the Indian government's attitude towards the LTTE had changed only slightly while that of the Sri Lankan government showed strains under pressure from Sinhalese extremists. Indian perceptions played down the growing number of clashes between the IPKF and the LTTE. The Indian government cited the psychological difficulties of the LTTE to convert to a peacetime role. The Sri Lankan government, on the other hand, found itself increasingly isolated from the Sinhalese people. When the UNP managed to get the Provincial Councils bill through Parliament, a second bomb ripped through a Colombo market killing 31 people and Gamini Jayasuriya, one MP who opposed the Accord left the government rather than vote for the bill.<sup>36</sup>

By the beginning of November 1987 the LTTE was able to bring civil administration to a standstill in the Northern and Eastern Provinces by killing 100 or more of its rivals. In contrast, the IPKF gave the appearance of complete disarray denying allegations of strengthening its peacekeeping contingent while maintaining complete "neutrality".

It should be noted that the Accord, as it was designed, was an agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Government of India. The LTTE on whose agreement the peaceful transfer to the Provincial Councils hinged, was not a signatory. Thus a crucial flaw in the Accord was that it was dependent on a group that was not a participant in the peace talks (de Silva 1993). Both Jayewardene and Gandhi realized that, since the LTTE refused to lay down their arms and negotiate, they would have to be eliminated. Having obtained from the Indian government, an agreement that it would quickly depart after having removed the threat of the Tigers, Jayewardene agreed to an increase in the number of IPKF forces on Sri Lanka soil. In a joint press conference 9 October 1987 India's Defence Minister and Jayewardene said "the days of gentle persuasion were over". The amnesty would be lifted from the LTTE and the IPKF would be increased to 20,000 troops. Jayewardene's political future was riding on that decision.<sup>37</sup>

By December 1987 the IPKF was involved in major search and destroy operations in Batticaloa and Mulavattu in northeast Sri Lanka. The IPKF was, however, incapable of removing the Tigers from Jaffna peninsula, and had become involved in a stagnating military operation, at the cost of 100 million dollars and 500 dead IPKF soldiers.

#### *4.2 Loss of Autonomy and Internal Cleavage*

By 1988 two significant changes had occurred in the Indo-Sri Lanka crisis. First, the Sri Lankan government had become isolated from the day to day decision making process regarding the Tamil insurgency. Second, while the Sri Lankan government acquiesced to Indian demands, both the Sri Lankan opposition parties and more importantly the JVP had taken up opposition to the Accord and Indian "occupation". This transformation invoked a steady increase of anarchy and terrorism in the south and the spectre of a government seemingly helpless to prevent it. The prolonged Indian presence in Sri Lanka was therefore not only conditioning the response patterns of the Sri Lankan government and the JVP, but was also contributing to the increase in intensity of directed hostile internal acts ( Samarasinghe & Liyanage 1993). JVP violence influenced, not only the perceptions of Sri Lanka's decision-makers towards India as the hostile aggressor, but also the gravity of the crisis situation - the unity and fabric of Sri Lankan society were being destroyed within by a force that identified as its main oppressor the Indian Government.

For its part the Indian Government through various tactics had succeeded in marginalizing Sri Lankan participation in the north and east and had solidified its military position by doing so. Two events underline the extent to which the Indian government was in control.

Since July 1987 the Sri Lankan Army had been confined to barracks. A year later in July 1988 the Government of India announced that the direction of the Joint Operations Command (JOC), whose responsibility it was to stop the Tamil insurgency, would from now on rotate among the commanders of the India Army, Air Force and Navy to give coordination to the various branches of the armed forces, the police and the special task force (STF). Until the retirement of its first commander, Ranatunga, the JOC was led separately from the regular

armed forces. This restructuring meant that the IPKF had assumed the principal responsibility for suppressing the Tamil insurgency and that the India Army was effectively in control in the northern regions of Sri Lanka. By this time the IPKF constituted five divisions or approximately 70,000 troops ( Mathews 1989).

On 30 August 1988, Prime Minister Gandhi sent a message to President Jayewardene, that the IPKF were sufficiently confident of the security situation in the north and east for Gandhi to advise holding the Provincial Council Elections.<sup>38</sup> Gandhi also noted that the TULF and the ex-terrorist groups who had signed the Accord (all but the LTTE) would participate in the elections.<sup>39</sup>

By 16 September 1988 the Government of India announced a five-day unilateral cease-fire in the north and east to enable the LTTE to lay down their arms and lend support to the Accord. This move followed a controversial announcement to the effect of a cease-fire on midnight 8 September by All India Radio even before Jayewardene could announce the decision that the Northern and Eastern Provinces would be merged, as determined in the Provincial Council elections. Many Sri Lankan cabinet ministers first heard the news through All India Radio. The Sri Lanka Government was humiliated by these controversial moves. On 5 September after being notified that a major Tiger basecamp had been destroyed, Jayewardene signed an agreement to merge the Northern and Eastern Provinces.<sup>40</sup>

1988 was also a year of presidential elections. In the elections Jayewardene was succeeded by Premadasa as President. The rise to power of Ranasinghe Premadasa signalled an escalation in verbal hostilities between Sri Lanka and India. For example, at the 10 January 1989 installation ceremony of the President, at the nation's most sacred Buddhist shrine, the

Temple of the Tooth, in the former Royal Capital of Kandy surrounded by Buddhist monks, Premadasa announced that his priority was to resolve Sri Lanka's conflicts. He asked the JVP to rejoin the political process. On relations with India he sounded the following nationalist note:

Whatever the cost, I will not surrender an inch of Sri Lankan territory. Whatever the cost I will not surrender a shred of our sovereignty. We should not and will not create situations that provoke or invite intervention.<sup>41</sup>

#### *4.3 Renewed Tensions Between India and Sri Lanka*

On 1 June 1989 Premadasa selected an obscure religious ceremony to deliver a declaration announcing his intention to ask the Indian government to withdraw "as far as possible" the entire IPKF (now 45,000) from Sri Lanka by 29 July 1989. The President said: "After July 29, the IPKF has no authority whatsoever over even one inch of my land".<sup>42</sup> It was characteristic of Premadasa that he made the announcement in the presence of leading Buddhist prelates in order to lend the appearance of religious sanction. Significantly, the decision was made without the benefit of Cabinet consultation, its rhetoric shaped in order to appease the JVP demand for the IPKF withdrawal and thereby refurbishing his nationalist credentials.

The risks of this strategy were apparent to Premadasa. A refusal of the Indians to go within a reasonable time limit would reveal the hollowness of the President's power. Over-hasty compliance would thrust the President and the Sri Lankan Army on the tender mercies of Tamil and Sinhalese insurgents. Naturally the Government of India was incensed by Premadasa's unilateral decision arguing that it was in violation of the bilateral agreement enshrined in the original Accord. For Gandhi the stakes were suddenly higher as well. Giving into Premadasa's



unilateral demand would be an embarrassment he could ill afford in an election year. When Gandhi pressed Premadasa for consultations on the pull out, Premadasa responded: "What Consultations? If India says that it cannot withdraw the 45,000 troops before the end of July, I order them to confine themselves to barracks."<sup>43</sup>

On 7 July 1989 Premadasa reimposed a state of emergency across the nation. The previous order had been lifted in January after it had been in operation for six years. After two years of being confined to barracks the Sri Lankan Army was back on patrol.

#### *4.4 Post Crisis - 27 July 1989 - present*

On 27 July the JVP launched a campaign of protest directed against the failure of the IPKF to comply with Premadasa's order to leave the country by 29 July 1989. On the diplomatic front Premadasa was sending clear signals to India. His cultivation of the Buddhist clergy paid off when some 3,000 monks joined a July nationalist rally in Colombo. The speakers at the rally denounced both the Indian presence and the Accord.<sup>44</sup>

On 15 July 1989 Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Wijeratne announced a "misunderstanding" between Sri Lanka and India on the withdrawal issue. Wijeratne said that Premadasa would be flexible on the deadline if India agreed on a phased pullout and gave some assurance on dates; recognized Premadasa as commander in chief and announced a cessation of hostilities with the LTTE. The Indian Government responded by rejecting Premadasa's latter two conditions and responded in turn that the IPKF would not withdraw until the devolution package was in place. In response, Premadasa dropped the second demand and retained the third and added that India should announce a token withdrawal of troops immediately. At this point there was considerable

speculation about Indian military movements off the coast of Colombo. The HMS Vikrant (carrier) was standing outside Sri Lankan waters. One hundred air troops were flown in to protect the High Commissioner amid reports that a full air squadron was ready to leave from Agra Air Force base at short notice to fly in commandos who had been shifted to Agra from bases around India. These rumors were intended to impress upon Sri Lanka how vulnerable it was if a war of words between the two countries turned into armed clashes.

On 27 July 1989 a joint communique was issued simultaneously by the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka which read: "the President of Sri Lanka has requested the Prime Minister of India to recommence the withdrawal of the IPKF. The withdrawal will recommence on 29 of July."<sup>45</sup> Later that week India made a token withdrawal of several thousand troops.

In a strange turn of events, given that many of his decisions were made in secrecy, Premadasa let it be known that he could not make a final decision on the phased withdrawal of the IPKF without taking into consideration advice from his cabinet and the views of the opposition in a two-day debate in parliament. This uncharacteristic fondness for collective decision making reflected the expectation that a diplomatic defeat in the ongoing negotiations with India was all but inevitable and the corresponding desire of the President to represent the setback as the wish of parliament and cabinet.

The key issue for Premadasa was to not link the IPKF withdrawal to the granting of greater devolution to the provincial governments. It is clear from his previous statements on devolution, Premadasa believed that as a sovereign nation, Sri Lanka would not be told how to conduct its parliamentary affairs. In contrast to Premadasa's position the Government of India's

position was that, once a devolution package could be devised, then an IPKF withdrawal could take place.

When the cabinet and parliament talks ended on 11 August the President advised his personal envoy Bradman Weekaroon to pursue talks in Delhi and they agreed on a timetable hoping to complete the removal by February 1990 at a rate of 1500-1600 personnel per week. The two governments could not, however, agree on withdrawal and implementation of devolution.

In September 1989 Sri Lanka's 21 political parties assembled in Colombo to propose remedies to the current crisis. This meeting, designed to placate the disgruntled opposition, demonstrated in some critics eyes, the irrelevance of Parliament. The LTTE attended; however the JVP did not (Samarasinghe & Liyanage 1993). At these talks Premadasa was under pressure to abolish the presidency in favor of a provisional government answerable directly to parliament.

An agreement between India and Sri Lanka, reached 20 September 1989, provided for an observer group consisting of the Sri Lankan Army Commander and the Indian Commander of IPKF to report on violations of the cease-fire and report consequential action. The agreement furthermore specified that there would be a phased handover from the IPKF to Sri Lankan forces in the north and east supervised by Provincial Councils, the Government of Sri Lanka and the Government of India.<sup>46</sup>

By the beginning of 1990, the political situation in Sri Lanka was on shaky ground. The anti-Accord sentiment among the Sinhalese opposition remained strong and India's frequent miscalculations continued to bedevil its military operations in the north and east. Premadasa remained suspicious of Indian intentions. JVP opposition in the south was effectively quelled by

February 1990 but not without a cost. Though beginning a phased pullout, Indian troops were still entrenched in the north. Over the next thirteen months of talks in Colombo, Premadasa made significant concessions to the Tigers. In June 1990, four months after the Indian troops completed their withdrawal, war broke out again in the north, and the councils designed to give autonomous government to the Tamils were abolished. By 1991, India was now formally out of the picture having suffered at least one serious effect of the conflict. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated on 21 May 1991 and was succeeded by opposition leaders dedicated to complete Indian withdrawal from the conflict.

#### *4.5 Aftermath and Summary - The Battle Continues*

Throughout 1991 and 1992 a multiparty parliamentary committee began to consider ways to offer Tamils alternatives to supporting the Tigers. A plan was devised with the proviso that the Northern and Eastern Provinces would not merge. More power would be devolved to the north and the east, to protect minority Muslims living in the region. The plan was contingent on Tamil agreement to abandon merging the north and the east.<sup>47</sup> The agreement generated significant hope among the participants for a peaceful solution to the conflict. The assassination of President Premadasa on 1 May 1993, possibly by Tamil Tigers, was a significant blow to the plan. In less than a two week period, assassins had struck down the country's president and the only other man to challenge him, opposition leader Lalith Athulathmudali.<sup>48</sup> Since then, Sri Lanka's domestic protracted conflict has suffered two setbacks. The government is in disarray and leaderless and the Indian government has shown that it is unwilling to mediate the conflict. Without external mediation and without concerted international effort to resolve the conflict,

there is little hope that Sri Lanka's conflict will be resolved quickly (de Silva & Samarasinghe 1993).

To briefly summarize, India's somewhat contradictory behaviour resulted in the dispatch of "peacekeeping" troops to Sri Lanka while providing tacit support for Tamil rebels. These decision making patterns are best explained with the nested game discussed in the previous chapter. Recall that what may be impolitic for leaders at the international level may be appropriate at the domestic level. Supporting the Tamil rebels had important domestic ramifications for India's leaders. Yet, India's decision makers were also concerned about the conflict spreading. Hence, their mixed motives and resulting strategy. This idea is advanced further in the section below.

## ***5. Explaining the Variables and Testing the Hypotheses***

In this section the variables identified in chapter three are identified and assessed in the light of the events described above. Explanations of variables concerning Sri Lanka are followed by explanations for India. This is followed by testing the propositions developed in chapter three.<sup>49</sup>

### ***5.1 Sri Lanka***

#### **(a) Ethnic Composition**

Sri Lanka is a moderately diverse state characterized by the balancing of a large ethnic group (Sinhalese) against smaller ones (Sri Lankan Tamils, Tamils of Indian descent and Muslim minorities). There are two points worth noting. First, within Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese make up

a clear majority. However within the region, including South India, the Sinhalese are not only distinct but also a clear minority. This latter view has been used by Sinhalese elites to advance the cause of Sinhalese nationalism, often at the expense of Sri Lankan minorities. The second point is that Sri Lankan politics have undergone a significant transformation from intra-ethnic elite cooperation to Sinhalese domination in the decision making process. This transformation coincided with the arrival of electoral politics after Sri Lankan independence. Several domestic policies were carried out by Sinhalese leaders to advance the interests of the Sinhalese people while simultaneously stimulating Sri Lankan Tamil claims to autonomy, culminating in a clear break between Tamil and Sinhalese leadership over the issue of Tamil secessionism.

#### (b) Institutional Constraints

Although a parliamentary democracy, Sri Lankan politics exhibit institutional incompleteness. Sri Lankan elites are not fully constrained by their institutions. This is manifest in the significant changes that the Sri Lankan constitution has undergone since independence, including issues concerning official languages and changes to a unitary state structure. More generally, the Sinhalese peoples have not exerted substantial pressure on their leaders (Moore 1985). Policies are more often implemented by elites to counter the strategies of other political leaders. Attempts at multi-partyism and regularized political competition are in evidence but elite commitment is low. Fragmentation became a commonplace feature of the political arena. The most reasonable explanation in accounting for the absence of effective consensus-oriented institutional arrangements in Sri Lanka is derived from Tsebelis' notion of nested games as it

pertains to the domestic arena. This problem is exacerbated by consistent outbidding by Sinhalese political leaders, usually trying to gain office based on their nationalist credentials.

(c) Ethnic Cleavage

For obvious reasons, levels of cleavage in Sri Lanka are very high. However, during the crisis period, an unprecedented descent into disintegration took place as a result of two factors, the Tamil insurgency in the north and the JVP insurgency in the south. Both constituted direct threats to the Sri Lankan regime.

(d) Ethnic Affinities

Ethnic affinities between the Sinhalese and India's minorities are low. This is because the Sinhalese are Theravada Buddhists who speak and write a language that exists only in Sri Lanka (Sinhala). On the other hand, Sri Lanka's minority Tamils form two levels of affinity. First, there are a substantial minority of India citizens living in Sri Lanka, many of whom became refugees during the conflict and fled to India. Sri Lankan Tamils on the other hand, share a common language, culture and religion with the Tamils of South India. For obvious reasons they are the main link to Indian involvement.

## 5.2 *India*

### (a) Ethnic Composition

As many scholars have noted, the presence of alternative barriers to mobilization, primarily caste, language and urban/rural splits, has, until recently, weakened the salience of national identities based on Hindu nationalism. (Brass 1991). At the same time, India is a highly diverse secular state, whose national leaders have managed the pressures of their multi-ethnic constituencies through federal structures. In this context, South India has always played an important role in Indian politics. It has been shown that long-term support from Tamil Nadu, a linguistically defined state, has been crucial to the political longevity of the Congress party. So that, at one level the structuring of India's political system would appear to be at odds with a foreign policy based on ethnicity. However, the salience of several additional and compounding factors, made such policies imperative. According to Brass (1991), India is a society that contains multiple levels of political arenas and hierarchies of loyalties to cultural categories. At the level of the village and its surrounding jati, the local aspect of caste may provide a basis for political organization and social conflict. The unit of loyalty and political action may then become the caste category or caste cluster or a coalition of related castes. At the national level, caste becomes virtually ineffective as a basis for sustained political mobilization for the available caste categories. Therefore, regional ethnic identities are important to India's federal government. Politically defined linguistic states such as Tamil Nadu are an important aspect of the Indian government's political balancing of regional interests. As this study has shown, this kind of arrangement can also influence foreign policy.



### (b) Institutional Constraints

India is also a parliamentary democracy, one that has shown success in providing appropriate constraints on elected elites (Brass 1991; Kohli 1990). More precisely, India's institutions are designed to prevent any one ethnic group from achieving dominance over another. Its federalist approaches do so by scattering power territorially, decentralization and group autonomy, assigning to different groups the right to select domestic issues of concern to them. The central concept behind these structural approaches is to create the conditions necessary for conflict resolution between ethnic groups on permanent basis. The use of force in resolving the Sri Lankan problem is central to this inquiry because it is an extension of India's domestic communal problems. The greatest threat to military intervention in India is communal unrest. India's potential for a military coup could come because the army has taken a greater role in assisting civilian authority at the domestic and interstate level. The present policy of the central government in dealing with secessionist forces directly, of which the Sri Lankan case is an example on the foreign policy front, has weakened the independent bases of power and the autonomy of the Indian government (Kohli 1990).

### (c) Ethnic Cleavage

In the context of this analysis, it is Sri Lanka's internal strife that is significant, because it provides an opportunity for India's leaders to appease the interests of South Indian Tamils. Nevertheless, this low cost approach was not entirely successful. India's internal cleavages were enhanced as result of its failed foreign policy. The most direct manifestation of this, was the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

(d) Ethnic Affinities

Due to its ethnic diversity, India's ethnic affinities are very high, not only with Sri Lanka but other states as well. As explained above, it is the Tamil connection that is worth noting in this context.

### *5.3 Testing the Hypotheses*

Testing focuses on those propositions that, for the reasons noted above, relate to institutionally constrained ethnically diverse states.

General Hypothesis 1: The preference for involvement in an ethnic conflict is a function of the interaction between ethnic composition and levels of institutional constraint on elites such that:

P4 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for policies that lead to involvement in interstate ethnic conflict.

Partially supported. It would be difficult to imagine the foreign policies of any state not being affected by internal strife. Yet in the case of Sri Lanka, a general resistance to Indian involvement is evident. On the other hand, Sri Lankan leaders did engage in mediation with members of SAARC and in other international fora. This is because normally, Sri Lankan elites would not be expected to derive much utility in pursuing a confrontational ethnically oriented foreign policy because of the domestic costs in doing so. Such behaviour could lend legitimacy to the Tamil cause. The interesting aspect of Sri Lanka's foreign policy is that, an interstate crisis erupted thirty years after separatism became an issue and four years after the internal

conflict became violent. During this period, Tamil leaders were isolated from Sri Lankan politics and Sinhalese elites became dominant in the decision making process. The idea of reverberation, outlined in chapter three, explains this transformation and how preferences for confrontation with Tamil separatists and India were reinforced over time. In this context, threats of external involvement reverberated within Sri Lanka's domestic political scene, influencing not only domestic support for a belligerent Sri Lankan foreign policy but the preference among the masses for elites who were confrontational with the separatists.

For India, the domestic costs of not pursuing involvement in Sri Lanka's internal conflict were also high and were formulated late in the game. In choosing involvement, India's decision makers had to consider its domestic ramifications, entailed by regional politics. Faced with potential loss on the electoral front, India's decision makers assumed that the costs of involvement were lower than not being involved at all. They then decided to provide support in two ways, initially through tacit support for the Tamil insurgents and through direct intervention. During this period India also attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict.

In brief, the analysis indicates that an ethnically diverse and institutionally constrained state was averse to formulating confrontational ethnic foreign policies. When present, policies are likely to be late in coming and designed to appease to as many domestic interests as possible. Why then, did the internal conflict lead to confrontation between India and Sri Lanka. The answer is presented below.

P5 Outbidding in states IIa and IIb increases the preference for policies leading to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

Supported. The evidence indicates that constrained elites in both federated and unitary state structures are not immune to outbidding. There is clear evidence that outbidding among Sri Lankan elites, led to direct confrontation with India. The interesting aspect of outbidding in the Sri Lanka case is that it occurred not just between elites of the major parties, but also among elites within the same parties. Consider for example, efforts by Premadasa to escalate the conflict with India. Such behaviour was designed to bolster support at home in his run for the presidency.

Of equal interest is the importance of regional outbidding exemplified in India's decision to intervene. Two regional parties, whose support was crucial to the national government (AIADMK and DMK) directly influenced India's preference for direct involvement and its decision to allow tacit support for the rebels on Indian soil.

**General Hypothesis 2: Interstate ethnic crises that are conditioned by high levels of cleavage and affinity present additional opportunities and constraints such that:**

The main issue in testing these hypotheses is in determining the extent to which affinities and cleavages shaped elite perceptions of security threats and how they are translated into real concerns about state security. For example, Sri Lankan leaders had long-viewed the connection between the Tamils across the Palk Straits as a threat to the security of the Sinhalese people, which in turn provided a platform for acquiring extra-regional support to fight the insurgency. That the Buddhist clergy played a role in creating fears of Indian dominance is significant. When

the Sinhalese government imposed a political solution on the Tamils of Jaffna then the problem became a real security issue for the Indian government, which for the reasons cited above, it could not ignore.

**P6 High cleavage increases the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict.**

Supported. The period from which India threatened direct involvement (1983) to withdrawal of the IPKF (1990) is lengthy. Indeed, from crisis onset to crisis termination, cleavages within Sri Lanka increased substantially and prevented the IPKF from obtaining one of its objectives (to secure the north-east for council elections). Internal cleavages, represented by the JVP and Tamil insurgencies made resolution of the interstate conflict more difficult. The inability of Sri Lankan forces to deal effectively with the Tamil separatists provided an additional incentive for India's decision makers to intervene directly in the hope of orchestrating a solution that would be in their interests.

**P7 High cleavage increases the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions.**

Supported. There are two reasons for this. First, during the crisis period, Premadasa, faced with a growing insurgency in the south, escalated the conflict through threats directed at the Indian government. In the light of the evidence, these threats appeared to be designed for domestic consumption. Second, Sri Lanka's internal conflict is not yet resolved to the satisfaction of the four parties with an interest in the conflict, namely South Indian Tamils, the Tamils of Sri

Lanka, the Indian government and the Sri Lankan government. The potential for renewed interstate conflict is evident from the assassinations of Sri Lanka's opposition leader and president, both of whom favored Tamil autonomy.

P8 High affinities increase the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict.

Supported. For reasons cited above, high levels of affinities between the Tamils of South India and Sri Lanka provided an additional reason for the conflict to become protracted. This is because the government of Tamil Nadu was implicitly involved in providing material support to Tamil rebels. Without such support, which included training for rebel leaders, it is conceivable that the conflict would have been resolved much sooner, making Indian intervention unnecessary.

P9 High affinities increase the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions.

Partially supported. The Indo-Sri Lankan conflict reinforced the bonds between Tamils in two ways; first, with the refugees that fled to India and second by providing sanctuary and support for the rebels. Since these two issues remain unresolved, the potential for future escalation remains.

General Hypothesis 3: Interstate interactions leading to the use of force are a function of the types of states involved such that:

P13 Type IIb constrained - diverse have a low preference for force.

Partially supported. The use of force in this context refers to the interstate kind. Force was not used by India against the Sri Lankan regime but it was used against the Tamil rebels. There is evidence to suggest that India was constrained in using force against the state of Sri Lanka, but it did everything short of that in trying to achieve its domestic and international objectives, including imposing a solution of regional autonomy on the Sri Lankan government. One issue that is clear is that within India and Sri Lanka, elites were very good at manipulating the symbols of ethnic confrontation for their own purposes. Normally, it would be expected that within institutionally constrained states, there would be a divergence between elite and mass preferences, that is, elites may be more reluctant to pursue confrontational policies than the masses. In the Sri Lanka case at least, the fear of the physical security of the Sinhalese people was utilized by all Sinhalese parties, to the extent that the hypernationalist opposition SLFP, accused the government of not doing enough to protect Sinhalese interests against Indian intervention. Ultimately many moderate Sinhalese politicians paid the price for negotiating with the Indian government. Thus, the capacity to regulate the conflict internally was severely hampered by Sinhalese intransigence. Fortunately hypernationalist extremists in Sri Lanka did not achieve power. Had they, the potential for direct interstate war would have been much greater.

Also, India's elites could not allow Sri Lankan aggression against Tamil civilians in the north to go unchecked because it was having an impact on politics in South India and its own security situation there. Therefore the solution of sending "peacekeeping" troops to Sri Lanka was a compromise that would appease both the Sri Lankan government and South Indian Tamils. In sum, this measure was perceived as aggressive by the Sinhalese opposition whose main interest was in escalating the conflict. To outflank the opposition, the more moderate nationalist UNP was forced to engage in nationalist rhetoric, that in turn, made finding a negotiated solution difficult. The ultimate result was to make ethnic accommodation a long drawn-out process, in which India, along with the Sri Lanka Tamils became identified as the main source of Sinhalese insecurity.

In conclusion, this chapter has served two purposes. The first was to assess the usefulness of the four variables, and their linkages, in explaining an interstate ethnic conflict in a secessionist setting. The results indicate that ethnic diversity and institutional constraints possess the capacity to explain an elite's decision to become involved in a secessionist conflict. The variables, affinity and cleavage also appear to be valid sources of explanation. There were three stages in the Indo-Sri Lankan crisis that relate directly to the stages within the model. At stage 1, both states exhibited apprehensiveness in formulating foreign policies that would lead to confrontation. Judging from the evidence, this was primarily a result of their ethnically diverse characteristics. Less apparent, especially for Sri Lanka, is the constraining role that institutions were assumed to play in inhibiting ethnically-based foreign policies. The reasons for this are twofold. Prior to crisis onset, Sinhalese hypernationalism was already in evidence. Consistent outbidding among Sinhalese politicians at Stage 2, whose efforts to build domestic support on



the presumed threat from India and the Tamils of Sri Lanka, led to a kind of belligerence that belies its small-state status. This is evident in the kinds of speeches given by Sri Lankan leaders, but more concretely, the consistent refusal of Sri Lankan leaders to participate in the regional attempts at conflict resolution and their escalation of the conflict in 1987 when the Sri Lankan army was dispatched to the north and began its campaign of terror against Tamil civilians. These last two actions ultimately resulted in a spiralling of tensions between the two states and Stage 3 interactions. At Stage 3, neither state was predisposed to using force against the other, this is especially true for India, which could have easily taken formal control of Sri Lanka, and perhaps, facing fewer domestic constraints it might have. As a result, India chose an alternative and ultimately less successful strategy to protect Tamil civilians living in Sri Lanka and to prevent the conflict from spilling over into South India. In sum, the linkages between the various stages of the model appear to apply to this case with two exceptions. First, it is difficult to determine, from the evidence provided, the exact role that institutions played in foreign policy formation and second it is not yet clear if, in fact, high constraint states are indeed less belligerent. For example, India found more covert ways of achieving its objectives. This may be true of democratic states in general.

The second task of this chapter was to test the propositions from the model. Modest support for the model was obtained. In brief, five of the seven propositions tested in this chapter find support. Although it is dangerous to generalize from one case, it appears that institutionally constrained, ethnically diverse states face domestic and international pressures that lead them to explore avenues of conflict management, including mediation. When outbidding is present, then confrontation seems more likely.

Less conclusive is whether these states are likely to use force. Force appears to be a choice of last resort, when outbidding, cleavages and the potential for diffusion are very high. This does not mean, however, that force will necessarily lead to a resolution of the conflict especially if there are multiple interests to be satisfied.

With respect to India's geostrategic interests, the evidence suggests that India's stated goal of preventing major involvement was a "red herring". India's primary interests lay in meeting domestic demands. As early as 1983, the United States and other western forces had made it clear they would not come to Sri Lanka's aid. For its part, the Soviet Union was not in a position to become involved in an extra regional conflict.

A second conclusion that is evident from this analysis is that states that have an affective stake in the conflict make poor peacekeepers. Foreign policy objectives are likely to work against one another, outcomes are likely to be sub-optimal and objectivity will be difficult to maintain. In attempting to satisfy multiple interests, India's peacekeeping effort ultimately proved to be unsuccessful.

In the next chapter, interactions between states involved in irredentist strife are examined. The general findings from these two chapters are then reassessed using aggregate data in chapter six.

## Notes

1. Quoted in The Straits Times 17 May 1993. McGowan is author of Only Man is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka (1992).
2. Asiaweek 15 July 1986.
3. The Dipavamsa (1959).
4. Class politics has always played an important role in Sri Lankan politics but has dissipated over time. For example the left of centre Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) was formed out of several urban-based radical parties and has always had a strong chauvinist element. The Ceylon Worker's Congress represented the interests of Indian Tamil plantation labour. For a more detailed examination see: Moore (1985).
5. The LTTE is the only remaining Tamil insurgency movement, having effectively removed other rival groups in bloody internecine fighting between 1986-1989. Unlike the leaders of the LTTE the leaders of the EPRLF decided to participate in Provincial Council elections.
6. In response to these separatist demands, the Second Republican Constitution of 1978 contained some measures to win back the Tamils but others that clearly favored the Sinhalese:  
Art. 2 - The Republic of Sri Lanka is a unitary state.  
Art. 3 - The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14. Art. 18 The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Art. 19 The National Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala and Tamil. Art. 20 (1) The Official Language shall be the language of Administration throughout Sri Lanka. Provided that Tamil is the language of Administration for the maintenance of public records and the transaction of all business in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Statistical Abstracts of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Colombo: Department of Census and Statistics, 1977, 1981).
7. For example, the Sikhs of Punjab have mobilized religiously, politically and institutionally. The Congress government has not handled the situation with a consistent response (Nayar 1966). On the other hand the Assamese militant actions of Naga and Mizo tribal groups attract disproportionate attention, considering that they constitute only a fraction less than 2 percent of the tribal population of the country as a whole (Brass 1990, Weiner 1987).
8. Both the AIADMK and the DMK called for some form of Indian intervention, UN mediation and self-determination for Sri Lankan Tamils. The more moderate AIADMK had to play the ethnic game in order to prevent the DMK from capitalizing on its inaction. For example, Ramachandran pressured the Indian government to issue Indian passports to some of the rebel

leaders in order to facilitate their movement within India and the global community. For a full analysis of the Tamil connection see: Khory (1992).

9. Between July 1983 and January 1985 the Sri Lankan government announced that 356 civilians had died as a result of clashes between Tamils and Sinhalese. Monthly totals of dead including civilians and soldiers in 1986 numbered in the 300's from January to March and then jumped to 842 in June. Furthermore India could not ignore the thousands of refugees flowing into Indian territory as a result of the violence. By 1986 Tamil Nadu had become the home for 125,000 Tamil refugees. Asiaweek 1 June 1986.

10. At issue was India's concern that the Soviet Union and the United States would become involved. By attempting to isolate the Tamil ethnic issue, India was reaffirming its commitment to Indian Ocean Security as "security manager of South Asia".

11. Parliamentary Debates, (Lok Sabha, August 5, 1983) quoted in Rao, V. (1988: 421).

12. Quoted in Rao, Chandrasekhar R.V.R. (1985: 63).

13. The Hindu 19 August 1983.

14. The U.K. and the U.S. declined Sri Lanka's call for military assistance (Jayewardene was turned down again by the U.S. after having a made visit there in 1984). However former British SAS commandos working for a security organization called the Keenie Meenie Services (KMS), helped train the island's anti-terrorist force. Israel's Mossad also assisted Sri Lanka's counter-insurgency training, (diplomatic relations with Israel had been severed in 1970), while Pakistan responded with arms and military training for the Sri Lankan army. See: Rao, V.P. (1988).

15. The Globe and Mail 22 February 1988.

16. Gandhi had an election coming up in 1985 and Congress preferred an electoral pact with the ruling AIADMK which was seeking to make political mileage out of the Tamil issue, to the point of demanding that the Indian government take direct military action against Sri Lanka. The rebels were allowed to build up arsenals of arms in Tamil Nadu, run training camps and ship military hardware across the Palk straits. Retired Indian officers trained the militants in guerilla warfare. Rao, V.P. (1988).

17. Asiaweek 23 November 1986.

18. Among the weapons confiscated were Soviet-made AK 47's, mortar, grenades and SAM missiles valued at Sri Lanka Rs. 800,000,000. See: Kodikara (1987).

19. Asiaweek 15 July 1986. During the period of the Thimpu talks, Sri Lanka purchased four helicopter gunships from Pakistan and eighteen gunboats from China. 230 "trainees" were sent to Pakistan for military training. Jayewardene also received cabinet approval in August for a new 10,000 strong Auxiliary Force. See also India Today 31 August 1985.

20. India Today 15 December 1985.
21. The Hindu 6 June 1986.
22. South September 1987.
23. Asiaweek 23 November 1986.
24. Asiaweek 23 November 1986.
25. In this arrangement the ethnic percentage of the Tamils would go up to 48%, Muslims to 37% and that of the Sinhalese would drop to 14% ensuring a Tamil majority in the Eastern Province but not an absolute majority. Institutional linkages would also be established between the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
26. The Hindu 3, 10, 11 February 1987.
27. The Hindu 12 February 1987.
28. During this time, Jayewardene was faced with a growing insurgency threat in the south aimed at assassinating political moderates. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) originally an ultraleftist organization (responsible for the 1971 insurgency which claimed 10,000 lives) emphasized the politics of Sinhalese chauvinism. One Sinhalese youth spoke ominously of a "final solution to the Tamil problem". See The Washington Post 24 April 1987.
29. The Hindu 29 May 1987.
30. Colombo lifted the embargo and ceased military operations against the rebels. At the time, political opinion insisted that Gandhi must have given the Sri Lankan president the option of accepting the Indian ultimatum or facing an armed Indian invasion. In conversation with Canadian officials later in the year Jayewardene confirmed this. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) interviews, Ottawa, September 1989.
31. The main principles of the Provincial Councils are these: to widen regional participation in government and devolve authority in matters of agriculture and industry, education and culture, internal law and order, and land settlement in each province. There would be three tiers of authority - national, provincial and local. As is to be expected the national government would retain widespread powers in defence, foreign affairs, state monetary policy, the judiciary posts, customs, foreign trade, ports and aviation, broadcasting and citizenship. Parliament would continue to be elected by districts every six years on a basis of proportional representation. There would be no change in the office of an elected presidency every six years.
32. Interviews with Canada's representatives in Sri Lanka (CIDA Ottawa, October 1989). The lesser publicized demands of the Accord imposed upon Sri Lanka by the Government of India had implications that went beyond resolving the ethnic conflict. These demands were seen by

Jayewardene's military advisors as a violation of Sri Lankan independence. They were: An agreement and an exchange of letters between Jayewardene and Gandhi requiring: 1 - the dismissal by Jayewardene of all foreign military advisors (Israeli military advisors and mercenaries attached to the British firm KMS would have to go); 2 - the absorption of the Sri Lankan paramilitary forces into the regular army; 3 - guarantees that Trincomalee and two nearby radio installations (VOA and Deutsche Radio) would not be made available for military purposes. The Indian government seemed to think that the size of the VOA operation - 18 acres - indicated that it was not for civilian purposes only; and 4 - A joint Indo-Sri Lankan operation of an adjoining oil storage depot near Trincomalee. Trincomalee had, for all intents and purposes become a port for the Indian navy. For the full text of the Accord see: de Silva (1993).

33. South September 1987.

34. The decision making process was still very much in Jayewardene's control. For example, Jayewardene was asked why his Foreign Minister was not aware of the Accord agreement until the day of the signing on July 29, Jayewardene replied: "Nobody was aware. It was strictly controlled by myself". South September 1987.

35. By this time in the crisis it had become clear to Jayewardene that the agenda setting power and creation of a time frame for IPKF withdrawal was seen to be beyond the reach of the Sri Lankan government. Sri Lankan decision making at this time must be considered in the light of India's two main foreign policy objectives - reasserting its role as South Asia's security manager and preventing the export of Tamil secessionism. Until these two objectives had been achieved Sri Lanka would remain a hostage to Indian political interests.

36. Later in the year the JVP assassinated the UNP chairman on a Colombo street. The JVP had begun a campaign of terror against the UNP - directing letters of threat to party officials and municipal authorities identified with the UNP - instructing the recipient to announce his resignation by public advertisement in the local newspapers. As many as 100 officials who failed to take the hint were assassinated while others left Sri Lanka. Kataragama in the South of Sri Lanka had become a hotbed of JVP activity. Jayewardene became convinced that the LTTE and the JVP were working together to assassinate him. The Sri Lankan political system had become a fragile house of cards. During this time both Gandhi and Jayewardene were nominated for the Nobel Peace prize for their efforts in the Accord.

37. On 9 November 1987 a split decision was handed down by Sri Lanka's supreme court upholding overall constitutionality of government sponsored legal measures for Accord while withholding approval of specific measures. The decision deepened the political woes of the Sri Lankan government as it confronted the challenge of ramming the package through Parliament. For two weeks the supreme court had been hearing petitions for and against a 13th amendment to the Constitution to allow for the Accord proposals. By a narrow margin of 5 to 4 the court ruled in favor arguing that proposals were consistent with the constitution and that the proposals will not require approval by a nation-wide referendum. The court also said that clause 154G of the 13th amendment dealing with the delegation and withdrawal of powers to provincial councils would require a national referendum and two thirds vote parliamentary majority (de Silva 1993).

38. Elections for the Provincial Councils were held in all the other provinces in April and June of 1988. The election for the Northern and Eastern province were scheduled for November 1988. Of the 71 seats contested in both provinces all went to Tamil groups who had reached an agreement with the IPKF. The active but weakened LTTE did not contest the elections.

39. The Indian government was sending a very strong message to the Tamil population that this was their last chance. They vote now or the IPKF will pull out and leave them to the "tender mercies" of Ravi Jayewardene (the Presidents son whose name became associated with the excesses of the special task force - Green Tigers - originally drawn up in 1983 to suppress the Tigers in the North and East, then operating in the South against the JVP and since withdrawn in order to provide support for government leaders in Sri Lanka). The Green Tigers became the principal beneficiary of clandestine training from Israel and Britain. Its anti-insurgency activities eventually reverted to the Sri Lankan police force.

40. On the one hand the Indian "takeover" in the North and East of Sri Lanka was seen as a threat by most of Sri Lanka's decision-makers. On the other hand the Indian involvement allowed Sri Lanka's decision-makers to turn their sights on the growing JVP insurgency in the South. The JVP, despite its small size (10,000 active members), determined the political agenda for 1988. All of the Universities and most of the schools, many factories and even Colombo (September 12) had been shutdown by the terrorist activities of the JVP. By October 1988, 18 hour shoot to kill curfews had been imposed in most of the towns and cities. On 2 October 1988 the JVP carried out a daring pre-dawn raid. Over one hundred JVP militants carried out an attack on a military training camp in Kurunegala some 100 kilometres North East of Colombo. This attack was a major blow to Sri Lankan national security and marked a dangerous phase in the southern campaign to topple the government.

45. South February 1989.

42. India Today 15 July 1989.

43. India Today 15 July 1989.

44. Premadasa became obsessed with the IPKF withdrawal and abandoned any pretence to diplomacy. Premadasa is best remembered among JVP sympathizers for having visited imprisoned militants following the 1971 uprising. He never denounced the JVP by name.

50. CIDA communique 1989.

46. On 29 September 1989 yielding to pressure from the opposition which became increasingly alarmed at the nations descent into anarchy, President Premadasa called off government paramilitary forces in a unilateral three day truce with the JVP, operating in the Sinhalese parts of the country thus extending an already shaky ceasefire between the IPKF and the LTTE which began September 20. In November the STF succeeded in killing the JVP's three top leaders. On November 22 the ruling Congress party was ousted from its majority position at the Lok Sabha.

The possibility of the IPKF coming home at the deadline seemed less remote given the that the agreement would be nullified by an Indian coalition government.

47. The Economist 5 September 1992. This latest peace plan was close to what was being advocated in 1957 between the Tamil Federal Party and the Sri Lankan government. That plan fell apart when President Senanyake's Buddhist nationalists came to power in 1956.

48. Asiaweek 12 May 1993. Athulathmudali was assassinated 23 May 1993. In August 1991 Athulathmudali, a former UNP member, led a failed impeachment against his rival accusing the president of abuse of power. He then formed the Democratic United National Front and under Sri Lanka's council system could have had power equal to that of the president.

49. Please see Chapter 6 in which these variables are coded on the dimensions described here.



## Chapter 5

### Somali Irredentism, In Pursuit of Greater Somalia

*... We shall take up arms. Let all perish! We shall take up arms. Let all perish! We shall not delay in recovering our missing parts. We are filled with discontent and fury and shall take up arms. A person robbed of his property wastes no time recovering it. He never enjoys conversation or social entertainments. We shall have no time for gossip and luxurious conversation, but shall take up arms to restore our missing property...<sup>1</sup>*

### ***1. Introduction - In Pursuit of "Greater Somalia"***

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the usefulness of the model in an irredentist setting, namely Somalia's aspirations to a "Greater Somalia" which would include Djibouti, the North Frontier District of Kenya and above all the Ogaden on Ethiopia's border with Somalia.<sup>2</sup> The recurring ability of Somali elites to unite divided clans in order to pursue irredentist claims is nothing short of profound. Indeed, to the extent that external confrontation becomes a basis for consolidation of power rather than a constraint, Somalia's ethnic homogeneity provides an opportunity that is unavailable to leaders of most multi-ethnic societies. For example, since obtaining independence in 1960, Somalia has been involved in seven irredentist-based crises in the region.<sup>3</sup> Of these, the Somalia-Ethiopian conflict has been the most violent and protracted. There are several reasons for this.

First, the conflict presents a complexity of issues, but one in which the ethnic character of Ethiopia and Somalia, including affinities and cleavage, is central. These states are "prototypical". The interesting aspect of the conflict, is that the two antagonists fall on opposite ends of the ethnic spectrum. On the one hand, Ethiopia is a diverse, ethnically divided state and has experienced no less than three internal ethnic upheavals. The most notable of these being the Eritrean and Tigrayan secessionist struggles.<sup>4</sup> After the anti-monarchical revolution of 1974 had caused the upsurge of competing regional nationalism - 14 states in Ethiopia were in a state of

armed insurrection affording Somalia an opportunity to realize the long-held aim of liberation (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988).

On the other hand, Somalia is a religious and linguistic homogenous state whose clan-based struggles for identity, shift according to the external pressures placed upon the country. Somalia's political system has experienced persistent internal turmoil, but in the face of external adversity, Somali elites have proved successful in mobilizing clans on the basis of a national identity (Makinda 1992). Pan-Somali nationalism has been the country's unifying and legitimizing principle and "every Somali leader has been judged by his willingness and ability to pursue the goal of a 'Greater Somalia'" (Makinda 1992: 26). In brief, the idea of a "Greater Somalia" has an important political dimension, which is at once internally beneficial and externally divisive.

As to the key political variable utilized in this study, namely the degree of political constraints on decision makers, the two states have undergone similar transformations. By the time of the 1977 war, both states had become highly centralized military-authoritarian regimes.

A second important aspect of the Ethiopian-Somalia conflict is the regional context within which it has unfolded. Writing in 1977, Suhrke and Noble suggested that the multi-ethnic characteristics of African states heighten their feelings of vulnerability leading to a restrained policy toward boundary disputes (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 13). By extension, African governments pursue restrained policies towards ethnic conflicts in other states. Simply put, the multi-ethnic character of African states is a deeply embedded characteristic of African foreign policy. Running counter to these assumptions is, of course, Somalia's aggressive behavior in staking claims to Ethiopian territory but also Somalia's key role in the Eritrean struggle for

independence. If the assumptions of this thesis are correct, this belligerence can be explained by the ability of Somali elites to exploit both domestic and international opportunities.

A third aspect of the conflict, is the tendency to overemphasize the role played by external actors, notably international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN), but also the major powers and the superpowers. To be sure, external involvement has tended to exacerbate the conflict. For example, the most intense phase of the conflict centered on the Horn of Africa and its internationalization after the fall of Ethiopia's emperor, Haile Selassie. This period witnessed the transformation of Somalia into an ally of the United States, and Ethiopia, long an ally of the West, into a Soviet ally. Western analyses of the conflict stress the importance of US military assistance to Somalia as having encouraged territorial claims on Ethiopia's Ogaden and Kenya's Frontier District. However, this view treats the war in the Horn of Africa as a discrete event and underestimates the autonomy of local, national, social and political forces in the region. While the superpowers strongly influenced the escalation of tensions in the region, they have been neither the source of nor the solution to the conflict (Selassie 1984). For example, at the international level, the Cold War did give Somali elites some leverage to obtain substantial economic and military assistance from the superpowers. This leverage did allow Somalia's national leaders to suppress critics and detain opponents by balancing and playing on clan interests and rivalries. However, after the decline of East-West tensions in the 1980s, the region experienced three more confrontations between Somalia and its neighbors all at the hands of Somalia's military leadership.

The suggestion that geostrategic interests are paramount, also underestimates the relationship between the current internal conflict in Somalia and its irredentist goals. For

example, by the late 1980s, the external leverage by which Somali elites maintained power was on the wane and internally their hold on power had weakened due to rivalries between and within clans. By the 1990s, historical animosities and clan loyalties had come to dominate political, social and economic life in Somalia. The irony, is of course, the fact that the internal cohesiveness that served Somalia's leaders well during its international struggles has now become a source of major internal divisiveness. Somalia itself now faces a secessionist struggle in the north, although almost everyone in Somalia speaks the same language and worships the same God.<sup>5</sup> About ninety-eight per cent of its six million people are ethnic Somalis and virtually all are Sunni Muslims.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, the importance of the conflict can be understood in terms of its legacy. The decline of Somalia's internal cohesiveness is a direct consequence of its regional ambitions (Selassie 1984).

To assess the implications of all of these factors, the analysis of Somalia irredentism uses an approach that examines several key interstate crises. This permits an analysis of "peak points" in the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict as indicators of a much broader process of interstate ethnic strife. It also provides an opportunity to determine if changes in institutional constraints have an effect on interstate behaviour.

Four crises are examined, but primary attention is given to the events and decisions leading up to and including the crisis of 22 July 1977 to 14 March 1978. Somalia-Ethiopia confrontations preceding the war involved minor clashes along the northern border. Similarly, crises that followed on the heels of the war were also of low intensity. Though all of these crises resulted in the frustration of Somali objectives, the war of 1977-78 has been the only time in

which Somalia has been on the verge of successfully reclaiming its territory through force. Why this crisis resulted in war is a matter of conjecture. In part, the difference in this pattern of behavior can be explained by the ethnic and institutional characteristics of the two main protagonists. For example, during the second administration of Abdirashid Ali Shermarke relations between Ethiopia and Somalia improved considerably, the Somali government withdrew its support for secessionist groups in Ethiopia (notably Eritrea) and temporarily set aside its own territorial claims. This changed with Marxist-led coups in Somalia in 1969 and in Ethiopia in 1974, after which relations between the two states immediately deteriorated.

The analysis is composed of five sections. First the historical and political aspects of the conflict are examined. Political and ethnic components about Somali and Ethiopian behavior are presented. Second, an analysis of the series of crises from the period of Somali independence up to 1977 is presented. In the third section the events of the crisis-war of 1977-78, including decisions taken, are examined. In the fourth section, the ramifications this crisis-war has for Somalia's irredentist goals and internal cohesion are assessed. Implications for Somalia's deterioration in the 1990s are also presented. In section five, key explanatory variables are examined and the propositions are tested.

## ***2. Historical and Demographic Aspects of the Conflict***

### ***2.1 Somalia - Clan Fealty and the National Interest***

Traditionally, Somali clans have played two apparent contradictory roles, presenting a united face against external threats yet reverting to mutual discord when the threat is vanished. Clan lineages have continually played an important role in Somali politics. Somalia's social and

economic activities, and its political organizations, have traditionally stemmed from lineage systems based on one of the six major clan families - Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Issaq and Rahaniwan. The six groups are further split into smaller clans and patrilineal kinship groups. These groups are divided even further into dia-paying groups varying in size from a few hundred to few thousand (Gorman 1981, Makinda 1992).

As is usually the case, colonization acted as a catalyst first to the birth, and then to development of unity among Somali clans. The impact of colonialism on Somalia was threefold. First, during the colonial period, Somalia was under the control of four different parties, Italy, France, Britain and Ethiopia. The Italians were the first of the European powers to establish their presence in the area. Ethiopia, which had managed to maintain independence from the colonial powers by defeating the Italians in 1896, had long been an important actor in the region. Through a series of agreements, signed between 1885 and 1935, Ethiopia had successfully manoeuvred to wrest significant pieces of Somali territory from the British and Italians. Fearful of Ethiopian designs, the Somalis sided with the British and under a series of agreements making it a British protectorate, opened its borders to British settlement. These agreements would later provide the basis for Somali claims over disputed territory (Sauldie 1987: 17).

In 1897, various legal protocols between England and Italy were drawn up in order to settle the boundaries between the respective areas under Italian, Ethiopian and British control. These legal boundaries, firmly in place at the turn of the century, did not correspond to demographic reality (Sauldie 1987). Hundreds of thousands of Somali, mostly nomadic, herdsmen of the Ogadeni clan (a sub-clan of the Darod family), found themselves under the

sovereignty of Ethiopia. For its part, Ethiopia had assumed that sovereignty over the Somalia nation was its right, a claim that was often made in the past (Drysedale 1964).

By the 1920s, Ethiopia, Britain and Italy were able to extend their influence deep into Somali territory. Resistance to Ethiopian interference and colonial domination took the form of a series of Somali "holy wars" led by the "Mad Mullah" Sheik Mohammed Abdille Hassan (Drysedale 1964). These campaigns, directed primarily against the British, had the net effect of drawing support from the clans from all of Somalia's regions. External support in the struggle was provided by the Italians looking abroad for further imperial outlets. For Italy, Somali warlords were strategic allies in their goal to depose the Ethiopian leader, Haile Selassie I, who had come to power in 1930. Thus, a sense of Somali "nationhood" developed out of the exigencies of colonial divide and rule policies. In turn, traditional animosities between Somali clans were set aside to face the higher goal of threats from colonial control.

## ***2.2 Ethiopian Expansion - The External Threat***

The second development in Somali unity is the instrumental role Ethiopian expansionism played in engendering a sense of external threat. The notion of an Ethiopian "state" replete with myth and legend, dates back as far as three thousand years but the history of modern Ethiopia begins with the ascendancy in 1889, of Menelik II of Shoa (Haile Selassie's father) to the throne of the Ethiopian kingdom. Initially, Ethiopia consisted of a small highland kingdom limited to the Shoan, Tigrayan and Gonadrin highlands. The rulers of this kingdom were of Christian origin (Coptic) and spoke a language (Amharic) that made it distinct on many counts from its neighbors. At this time, the bulk of territory occupied by Muslim Somali herdsmen was not



under Ethiopian suzerainty. Through European aid and Ethiopian guile, and conquest Menelik was able to consolidate most of the territory now found within the boundaries of present-day Ethiopia (Selassie 1984). Two areas that fell under Ethiopian control were the Haud (northern part of the Ogaden) and the Ogaden proper, territories that were occupied by Somali herdsmen. From the Ethiopian perspective, Menelik was seen as an heroic figure, but to the Somalis his conquest marked the beginning of their subjugation and loss of national autonomy.

This perception was first played out in 1935 when Italian and Ethiopian forces clashed at Wal Wal in the Ogaden, only 60 miles from the border with Somalia (Drysdale 1964). Eritrea was also used as a launching pad during the Italian invasions of Ethiopia. When Ethiopian resistance was squashed by the Italians (bolstered by 40,000 Somali warriors), part of its territories were annexed to Italian Somaliland. The Italians consolidated these interests and created the "Italian Empire of East Africa", incorporating Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia.<sup>7</sup> De jure recognition to Italy's conquest was then granted by the European powers (Gorman 1981). The subsequent collapse of Italian influence in the region in 1941, resulted in the return of some territories to Ethiopia including the Ogaden, the return of Haile Selassie to the throne, and more importantly the return of Ethiopian regional ambitions to regain lost territories in the remaining parts of Italian East Africa.<sup>8</sup>

At this time, most of the Somali population was divided into three distinct territories: the former Italian East African Colonies; Somaliland under British control and Somali areas in Ethiopia. The idea to secure self-determination for all Somalis was a process borne from the 1947 UN Human Rights Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, associated with the post-World War Two decolonization process (Drysdale 1964).

In 1949, at Somalia's urging, the country had been placed under UN trusteeship with Italy as the administering authority (Drysdale 1964).

Surprisingly, the idea of self-determination for all Somalis was first raised by Ethiopian leaders believing that the Ogaden Somalis would prefer Ethiopian citizenship to secession (Drysdale 1964: 83), followed by a series of United Nations meetings in which the British suggested uniting all three areas into one state.<sup>9</sup> The idea did not meet with the approval of all the members of the Security Council: the Soviet Union refused to endorse the deal (Sauldie 1987; Moynihan 1993). Consequently, only Italian held territory, excluding the Ogaden, would be reunited with the British protectorate.<sup>10</sup> To complicate matters, a bilateral agreement between Britain and Ethiopia confirmed Ethiopian control over the Haud region (Drysdale 1964). The agreement also granted grazing rights to Somali tribes in that area. For their part, Somalis in the Ogaden had clung to the hope of ultimate diplomatic action by the British. A last ditch effort by the British to purchase the grazing lands of the Ogaden's protectorate clans was also rejected by Selassie (Farer 1976). Still, by most accounts Ethiopian leaders were concerned at this turn of events: the union of the two territories was, in their view, a step towards "Greater Somalia". An Ethiopian government official expresses his concern in the Voice of Ethiopia: "Ethiopia has fought and will fight, if need be, to preserve her integrity."<sup>11</sup>

Thus, in the period preceding independence, relations between Ethiopia and Somalia were tense. Somalia consisted of some but not all of the territory occupied by the Somali people. Many Somali elites felt betrayed by British indifference to the Somali plight. But above all its boundary dispute with Ethiopia had still not been peacefully resolved.

### *2.3 Independence - the Development of Pan-Somali Nationalism*

The third effect of colonization was the subsequent impact it had on the leaders of post-independent Somalia. When Somalia was granted independence in July 1960, they were faced with the prospect of uniting two vastly different colonies each having their own language, judicial and legal systems.<sup>12</sup> In an attempt to overcome these difficulties and the particularities of a clan-based culture, Somalia's leaders framed a constitution stressing Somali nationalist struggle as the defining characteristic of its political and social history. The leading institutional expression of Somali nationalism was the Somali Youth League (SYL) whose members included religious leaders, representing all of the main clans. They were united by a desire to transcend clan rivalries and to forge a political nation which would be both the embodiments of Islam and a vehicle for secular progress (Farer 1976).

The Somali struggle aimed at extending the boundaries of the new state to include the missing Somali communities in Ethiopia, the French Territory of Afars and Issas (Djibouti) and Northern Kenya. But it was the claims against Ethiopia that were of special significance to Somalia's new leaders. There are two reasons for this. First as shown, the border between Ethiopia and Somali had never been delineated clearly. Second, the Somalis in northern Kenya - the Dagoodiya and Harti - were not of clans that were central in the Somali domestic power structure. In contrast the Darod and Ogadeni clans of the Ogaden were important segments of Somali society. So important that in 1948, after the withdrawal of British forces from the Ogaden, several SYL supporters demanding self-determination for Somalis, had been killed by Ethiopian forces believing that Somalia was on the verge of a territorial takeover (Farer 1976). Ten years later, it would become the responsibility of the SYL, then a full fledged political

party, to merge Italian Somaliland with British Somaliland and more importantly to form the first government of an independent Somali state.

Indeed, at independence the Constitution of Somalia based on principles of parliamentary democracy, contained as one of its objectives the eventual realization of what came to be called "Greater Somalia" (Sauldie 1987: 17). The constitution held that "the Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means the union of all Somali territories" (Laitin & Samatar 1987: 138). At the same time, the Somalia Government published a more aggressive manifesto reiterating the claims to a "Greater Somalia" but also charging that the agreements signed between Britain and Ethiopia violated previous treaties Britain had signed in 1885, granting protection to northern Somali tribes (Sauldie 1987). Less than a month before Somalia's independence on 3 July, the Ethiopian Government announced that the 1954 agreement would become invalid upon Somalis independence. There was much evidence to support the Ethiopian case. First, the past treaties, conventions and agreements were ambiguous, confusing and ineffective. Second, the Somali case lost much of its edge after the Republic signed along with 33 other African states the Charter of the OAU in 1963. Article III of the OAU's Declaration of 21 June 1964, stated that the border problems in Africa constituted "a grave and permanent factor of dissension" and that the OAU members "pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievements of national independence" (Sauldie 1987: 24).<sup>13</sup>

In effect, this meant that Somalia agreed to give de facto recognition to the existing boundaries though it did not recognize them within its own constitution. (Sauldie 1987). So when the Somali Republic came into being in 1960, and the transfer of power was being effected, the leftist government under Somali Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, declined to accept

the rights and obligations as a successor to the various Anglo-Ethiopian agreements. Shortly after Somali independence, border clashes broke out between Somali tribesmen and Ethiopian forces, and the first of five crises between independent Somalia and Ethiopia was triggered. This crisis and the ones that would follow can ultimately trace their origins to the inability of the former colonial powers and the international community to develop a coherent and effective policy on the issue of border demarcation in the Horn of Africa. However, the direct causes of these initial conflicts are associated with Somalia's internal political search for national identity and its brief dalliance with democracy.

### ***3. Post-Independence Confrontations***

#### ***3.1 The Politics of Irredenta***

The linkage between Somalia's political and ethnic configuration and its belligerent activity is primary. The most notable aspect of this linkage is the changing faces of Somalia's institutional structure and its confrontational policies. For example, Somalia's post-independence experimentation with democracy resulted in a series of border clashes with its neighbors. In contrast, confrontations with Ethiopia after the rise to power of the Somali military in 1969, take on a decidedly more aggressive tone.

By most accounts, Somalia's political system was a model of Third World inspiration. Its chief strength was the clan-based system of domestic politics. This informal system, paradoxically, found expression in a unitary constitution. Though formally a liberal democracy, kinship ties remained the means for marshalling entire clans that, sometimes, numbered hundreds of thousands. This was not without its problems. Prestige, usually accorded with age and rank,

became anathema to the government's stated goals of regional equality, development and modernization. This was compounded by the over-representation of southern Somalis in the government. For example, the SYL party had its origins in the south. Advancement within the bureaucracy and the recruitment of individuals into the political process fell largely on the shoulders of older, wealthy southern clansmen who had lived through colonization and had tasted defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians. Both the president and prime minister were from the south (Laitin & Samatar 1987). Initially, there was great fear among northern Somalis of southern domination. The two main opposition parties - the Somali National League (with an Issaq base) and the United Somali Party (with a base of Darod and Dir) were both from the north.

Thus political parties were formed along regional clan fissures, which served only to compound the problem of national unity. For example, only one year into independence, a Darod clan leader allied with Issaq clan members to depose the president, himself a member of the Hawiye clan (Laitin & Samatar 1987). In addition, an unsuccessful 1960 coup led by northern middle-rank officers indicated problems of unity within the army.<sup>14</sup> Faced with potentially debilitating domestic divisiveness, Somalia's leaders set about framing a coherent foreign policy of reclaiming Somali territory, in the belief that such action would be the best way to achieve internal unity. Somalia's leaders pursued this goal on two fronts, through diplomatic channels such as the UN and the OAU and through covert support for secessionist movements in areas adjacent to the Somalia Republic.

Of the three regions contested by Somalia (Djibouti, Ogaden and the North Frontier District in Kenya) the latter two provided the best opportunity to achieve reunification on the diplomatic and military front. There are three reasons for this. First, for some time the French

had been firmly ensconced in Djibouti.<sup>15</sup> The French also had a strong regional ally in Ethiopia. Confrontation with Djibouti would in effect mean confrontation with superior French resources (both political and military). In the event of war, the vastly under-equipped Somali army would no doubt be firmly defeated and Somalia's elected leaders would have to face the consequences of defeat.<sup>16</sup>

Second, Kenya, itself was on the verge of achieving independence and its leaders had shown initial disinterest in the regions claimed by Somalia. For their part, the British were in some ways sympathetic to Somali claims in Kenya (Drysdale 1964). To compound the image of Kenyan weakness in the region, the British were more concerned about protecting British expatriates in Kenya proper.

Third, Ethiopia was in the process of undertaking provocative and potentially destructive policies towards Muslims in the Ogaden. Assimilationist policies had already been adopted by the Ethiopian government in the 1950s. Assimilation, understood as the promotion of Amharic cultural integrity, was designed in part to elevate the political and social structure of Ethiopia's Christian community to a national standard. Furthermore, Ethiopia had a parliament but no political parties through which Somali frustrations could be vented. To make matters worse, Somali clansmen in the Ogaden were being constantly harassed by Ethiopian forces, reinforced by Selassie's threats to suspend free movement into traditional grazing areas (Farer 1976: 82-83). Finally, there was the opportunity afforded by Selassie's politically weak position. In 1960 a failed coup against Selassie, led by a group of Imperial Bodyguard officers, indirectly strengthened Somalia's hand (Farer 1976; Henze 1991).

Thus, at independence Somalia's regional objectives focussed primarily on exploiting the weaknesses of Kenya and Ethiopia. After repeated diplomatic failure to bring to the world's attention the complexities of their dilemma, Somalia diverted their energies to help liberate the Somali regions. Initially, Ethiopia was the militarily superior power, which would mean that, at best, Somali clansmen, often interspersed with Somali guerrillas, could harass Ethiopian troops but not defeat them. Sanctuary and support for the Ogaden "freedom fighters" were provided by the Somali government. Troops and paramilitary forces remained parked on both sides of the disputed frontiers. Somali guerrillas, masquerading as nomads, wandered back and forth and carried out periodic attacks on Ethiopian military units. As a result, the first Somali intrusions were brief probes designed to determine Ethiopian military weaknesses and bolster support for the government at home. When military units did clash in 1960, the first international crisis between Somalia and Ethiopia was triggered. A confrontation with the newly-independent Kenya in 1963 and a second crisis with Ethiopia in 1964 would soon follow. These are discussed below.

### ***3.2 Post-Independence Interactions***

On 26 December 1960, 7000 members of the West Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), essentially guerrillas trained and supported by Somalia, surrounded an Ethiopian police garrison and launched an attack. The Ethiopian response to the threat to territory was the mobilization of its military units and air force. Faced with superior forces, the guerrillas were forced to retreat. At that time, Somalia protested the action to Ethiopia and appealed to the All-African People's Conference (the precursor to the OAU established in 1963) but did not acquiesce to



further Ethiopian threats to desist (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988). Clashes and sporadic violence along the border continued into the new year when Ethiopian forces bombed northern Somalia. In response, Somalia delayed oil shipments to Ethiopia. On 5 February there was a small Somali incursion into Ethiopia (Farer 1976).

In passing judgement on the issue, the All-African People's Conference of 1961 voted heavily in favor of Ethiopia and efforts were made to reach a settlement between the two states. Despite these and other efforts, clashes between WSLF guerrillas and Ethiopian forces, continued periodically into the summer and fall and gradually declined over the course of the next several years.<sup>17</sup>

### *3.3 Crisis in Kenya - Exploring Opportunities in the Horn of Africa*

The post-independence crisis with Ethiopia set the tone for Somalia's relations with its neighbors. With the Ethiopian failure still on their minds, Somalia's leaders turned to the situation in Kenya. In Kenya, a British fact-finding mission in October 1962 found that 87 per cent of the 400,000 Somalis living in Kenya's North Frontier District (NFD) favored union with Somalia. The British government, fearing the consequences that accepting the findings would have for British expatriates in Kenya, refused to endorse it (Sauldie 1987: 25). During the period in which Kenya was granted full independence in 1963, the Somali National Assembly voted 70 to 14 for a break in diplomatic relations with Britain (Farer 1976). For its part, Kenya adopted counterinsurgency techniques borrowed from the British, restricted the movements of the nomads into "population centers", and sought and obtained military support from British forces in Kenya to deal with the shiftas (bandits) (Farer 1976: 80). Kenya's newly-elected leader Jomo Kenyatta,

worried that Somalia would invade the NFD, placed his troops on full alert and declared a state of emergency. On 29 December 1964 Kenya sealed its border with Somalia. Ethiopia, worried about the implications Somali success would have for its own border dispute, sought out and obtained a secret mutual defense treaty with Kenya. The treaty would not be publicly revealed until after Selassie's death (Sauldie 1987: 27).

In response, there was little Somalia could do apart from providing sanctuary and perhaps a modest amount of military hardware. Its army was not prepared for invasion, no armor, little fuel, antiquated weapons and a handful of poorly trained officers (Farer 1976). As a result, the revolt died. It soon became clear that as long as Kenya's ethnic leaders in Nairobi remained united on the Somali question, the Somalis in the NFD would never manage to secede on their own. To assist the secessionists, Somalia would need new weapons and looked to China and the Soviet Union for support. Until Somalia was stronger, the Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia would have to wait. Under the circumstances, mediation seemed the more appropriate course of action. In February 1964, Kenya requested that the dispute be mediated by the Organization of African Unity but that process ended without success. On 4 March 1964 Kenyan elections were held and this time the Somali secessionists agreed to participate in exchange for some degree of local autonomy. By mid-1967, a Zambian initiative to mediate the ongoing conflict succeeded when Kenyan and Somali leaders promised to cease provocative acts and restore normal relations (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988).<sup>18</sup>

### *3.4 Crisis in the Ogaden, Phase Two - Prelude to Change*

By 1964, several internal and external changes had taken place in the region. First, Somalia's democratic leaders were under increasing pressure from political opponents to resolve the "Greater Somalia" question. In part, much of the parliamentary debate on the issue was rhetorical belligerence to outbid Somali opponents, but there was also genuine concern for the plight of Somalis in the Ogaden (Farer 1976). By 1963, the inhabitants of the Ogaden had come out in open revolt against the Ethiopian government (Sauldie 1987). Somali nomads, who had never been taxed by the Italians or the British, were made to pay tax on their livestock to the Ethiopian treasury. Second, this was the period in which the Soviet Union entered the picture with a generous offer of arms and training designed to equip a 20,000-strong army for use against Ethiopia, which had been receiving military aid and equipment from the United States. Finally, a new government had been elected in Somalia, one that had adopted an openly aggressive stance in pressing Somali claims. Prime Minister Abdirazak Haji Hussein (1964-1967) a key opponent to Shermarke had achieved the office of president based on promising to resolve the Ogaden problem and with Soviet armaments in hand, he and Somalia's prime minister, resolved to do so through a combination of force and diplomacy (Sauldie 1987).

Thus a crisis for Ethiopia was triggered on 7 February 1964 when Somali military forces reportedly carried out a mass attack on the Ethiopian frontier post at Tog Wajeleh. Ethiopia responded through resistance at the border and called for an immediate meeting of the OAU. A strong protest by Ethiopia's Foreign Minister was sent to the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Addis Ababa. At the OAU meetings, Emperor Haile Selassie addressed a message to all Heads of African states informing them of the incident. Military clashes reportedly continued until 10 February. The Ethiopian retaliation on the 8th and military action on Somali territory triggered

a crisis for Somalia. On the 9th, Abdirazak responded by declaring a state of emergency throughout Somalia. Through dispatches sent to the OAU, Abdirazak accused Ethiopia of penetration into Somali territory. Somalia perceived correctly, the OAU members as supportive of Ethiopian claims.

Somalia viewed the UN as a more favorable forum for its objections and therefore on 10 February, Somalia requested a meeting of the Security Council, if the OAU failed to end the border dispute (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988). Secretary-General U Thant, appealed to the parties to settle the dispute peacefully and a cease-fire was agreed upon on 16 February but did not hold. The crisis ended on 30 March 1964, when a formal agreement for a cease-fire, achieved through the good offices of the Sudan. A joint border commission that favored the status-quo was established; that is, no changes were to be made to the existing border. Ethiopia had once again succeeded in preventing Somalian objectives from bearing fruit.

### ***3.5 Political Change and Reconciliation***

After four years of independence and three international crises, Somalia's irredentist goals were frustrated on every front. Within Ethiopia, Selassie's position had never been stronger. The internal ethnic divisiveness that would later tear Ethiopia apart had been firmly repulsed by the strong central government and powerful Ethiopian army. Furthermore, Somalia had failed to capture the world's attention on the Somali plight. African leaders consistently aligned themselves behind Kenyatta and Selassie. The government's irredentist objectives in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti had earned the country a reputation as a regional pariah and, apart from its ties with the Soviet Union and the Arab states, Somalia was becoming increasingly isolated in

the diplomatic sphere. Yet Somalia stood firm in its commitment to a "Greater Somalia". During this time a key decision was made because of these failures. Somalia's leaders realized that it was futile to press their irredentist claims in the light of the objections raised by the OAU and the UN. Instead it was decided that secessionist movements with the goal of "self-determination" rather than unification would be nurtured. Both the UN and the OAU recognized "self-determination" as a legitimate basis for struggle and it was hoped that this strategy would prove more successful on the diplomatic front.

Somalia would continue to pursue its irredentist goals but support would be hidden behind the guise of "anti-colonial" struggle on all fronts. Though Somali support was essential to the growth of these movements, Somali leaders would continually deny that it was directly involved in what it viewed as domestic "struggles for liberation". For example, amid the hostilities with Ethiopia in 1964, the OAU passed a resolution reconfirming the colonial boundaries. In response, the Somali National Assembly passed unanimously its own resolution, declaring that the OAU stance "shall not bind the Somali Government" and that it sought a resolution of the conflict through "peaceful means" (Laitin & Samatar 1987: 138).

For three more years, until Abdirazak was defeated in elections by Shermarke, both border disputes continued periodically to boil over. For instance, in 1966, about 1750 Somalis were killed on the border between Kenya and Somalia. Then with the return of Shermarke as president in 1967, Somalia's aggressive foreign policy made an abrupt about face.

When Shermarke was elected the President of the Republic of Somalia in June 1967 he chose as prime minister, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal a member of the Issaq clan. Shermarke had come to power on the basis of two criticisms of the government in Mogadishu. First, he

censured Abdirazak's government for its failure to win international support for the Somali cause. Second, he pressed the government for insufficient militancy on the Somali issue. Both claims were designed to bolster Shermarke's nationalist and military credentials because Somali support for "Greater Somalia" was still widespread and dissension within Somalia's military was now apparent (Farer 1976: 91). Shermarke's militancy was counterbalanced by Egal's more even-handed approach. This was due, in part, to the fact that Egal, unlike his predecessors, was an Issaq, with fewer ties to the Ogaden. As an Issaq, Egal had a firm distrust of the Darod clan's pan-Somali objectives.<sup>19</sup>

Consequently, Egal sought a rapprochement with Ethiopia as best he could within the limited means available to him.<sup>20</sup> First, a series of meetings was held with the OAU throughout 1967 and 1968. At these meetings Somalia agreed to restore friendly relations with Kenya. This included reopening diplomatic relations, encouraging growth and trade and in discussing the possibility of a larger East African federation comprising Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti (Sauldie 1987: 29).<sup>21</sup> For example, on 28 October 1967, a summit involving Nyerere of Tanzania, Obote of Uganda, Kenyatta of Kenya and Egal of Somalia led to the "Arusha understanding" in which both sides agreed to end hostilities on the Kenya border. Relations with Ethiopia on the other hand remained less promising because of Selassie's insistence on maintaining assimilationist policies in the Ogaden. Violent encounters between Ethiopian security forces and WSLF forces continued through the rest of the decade and into the seventies.

#### *4. Institutional Transition*

##### *4.1 War Clouds in the Horn of Africa*

Any hope of reconciliation with Ethiopia through democratic means came to an end on 15 October 1969, in a coup that toppled the Somali government. In the coup, Shermarke was assassinated, and leadership of the government under Egal was replaced by a Supreme Revolutionary Council headed by Major General Mohammed Siad Barre (later President Barre). A political apparatus under Barre's leadership called the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was established in 1976. For the purposes of this inquiry, the importance of this political transformation is twofold. In effect, the rise to power of the Somali military meant the temporary cessation of any form of peaceful resolution of the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Barre's generals, who were also his clan allies, were pressing for a military solution to the issue. Earlier defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians had led to an upsurge of clan antagonisms within the army as each group sought scapegoats to explain its past failures (Makinda 1992). Barre was an astute political player and knew that pan-Somali nationalism would provide the appropriate vehicle for assuaging the military's concerns. Indeed, Barre had risen through the ranks of the army on the basis of his nationalist and regional ambitions and like the leaders before him (except Egal) Barre was a member of the Darod clan with strong ties to the Ogaden.<sup>22</sup> In times of domestic turmoil, Barre proved successful in pitting one clan against another. Alliances and interests were aligned according to clan lineages and to ensure allegiance, the army heavily recruited from Ogadenis.

Thus, an aggressive policy of arming Somalia was borne from the need to reunite the clans and satisfy nationalist ambitions. Initially the plan worked. By the mid 1970s social

cohesion within Somalia had improved. Clan differences remained, but the government's effective handling of the threat of a 1973 famine silenced many critics (Gorman 1981). Even when there was dissent, Somalia's new military government was relatively insulated. Operating through the SRSP, Barre maintained an autocratic, centralized system which sought to replace clan loyalties with revolutionary allegiance to the nation through "scientific socialism" (Makinda 1992). Resistance to the Junta's domestic policies (including increases in taxes, the transmigration of thousands of drought stricken Somali herdsman and harassment of religious leaders) was matched by an equal mixture of force and policies designed to develop widespread support, such as public health and immunization programs (Farer 1976: 94-97).

Barre's ascent to power is also significant because relations with the Soviet Union and its Arab allies (notably the United Arab Republic) had become stronger than ever. This was due less to the Council's stated goals of "scientific socialism" than to the declining amounts of financial aid the Somalia government was receiving from the west.<sup>23</sup> As noted, the Soviet Union was instrumental in the buildup of Somalia's military to the extent that the 1969 coup was possible. Despite having a population one-seventh the size of Ethiopia and far fewer resources, the quality of Somalia's armed forces now matched or exceeded those of Ethiopia on the Ogaden front.<sup>24</sup> Although, Ethiopia's army was larger and its air force more advanced, at least half of its armed forces had to be used against the growing secessionist threat in Eritrea (Gorman 1981). It was within this context, the combination of advantageous external opportunities and internal pressures that, the decision to step up support for the WSLF was made.



#### *4.2 The Pre-Crisis Period 21 February 1977 - 22 July 1977*

By 1973, famine, caused by perennial droughts and the deteriorating political situation, had taken its toll on Ethiopia. The Ogadenis were among those most affected by the drought. Selassie's failure to alleviate the effects of the drought provoked further internal unrest and Somali outrage. Entering 13 years of independence, Somalia had emerged on the regional scene as an influential and relatively cohesive state whereas its chief enemy, Ethiopia was faced with collapse from within.<sup>25</sup> Into this matrix of political changes entered a new set of opportunities and constraints for Somalia's leaders. In 1974, Selassie was deposed and in his place a military revolutionary council known as the Dergue came to power. In 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as the leader of the Dergue, having eliminated many of his rivals, and having increased urban repression by killing protestors against his regime (Selassie 1984). The coup paralleled two transformations in the region. First, there was a remarkable realignment of regional and international forces. Although both sides were initially inclined toward Moscow - Somalia's more than Ethiopia's - that fact could not induce them to seek out and obtain a negotiated solution to their problems. The leaders of these two countries were less skilled as negotiators than fighters. If anything the rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia increased, because Somalia, the traditional ally of the Soviet Union now believed that Ethiopia was gaining financial and military support at its expense. On 27 May 1977, Somalia warned the Soviet Union that increasing aid to Ethiopia would endanger Somalia's relations with all Soviet-bloc countries. The break in Soviet-Somalia relations was already a fait accompli when, in late 1977 during the height of the war with Ethiopia, Somalia broke its treaty with the USSR and expelled all Soviet Advisers.

The second effect of the rise of the military in Ethiopia was the impact it had on the WSLF and Somali leaders. With Ethiopian collapse imminent, both decided to redouble their efforts to achieve their goal.<sup>26</sup> Since independence, the Somalis of the Ogaden had fought for reunification with Somalia, but over time the WSLF leaders, having developed organizational capacity, became less convinced that reunification was the best choice. From the WSLF perspective, the general weakness of the Ethiopian government and brutally repressive acts directed against Ethiopian minorities made an independent WSLF-led state both desirable and plausible. By the time of the Ethiopian coup there was considerable rancor among Somali rebels, who numbered around 6,000, about the question of unconditional union with Somalia (Gorman 1981). Barre responded by reorganizing the WSLF, so that its efforts would be coordinated with those of the Somali regular army. In effect, this meant permitting regular troops to "resign" and to join the WSLF in order to bring the WSLF back on course (Laitin & Samatar 1987). In sum, after the coup, Somalia lost its superpower ally, but it was already well armed and was on course to make the WSLF a far more formidable force.<sup>27</sup>

By early 1977, WSLF forces took advantage of the movement of Ethiopian troops from the Ogaden to Eritrea. That conflict was also beginning to boil over and Ethiopian now faced a potential war on two fronts. On 21 February 1977 independent sources in Nairobi confirmed that hostilities had broken out in the disputed Ogaden frontier but could not confirm whether Somali forces were involved. Somalia denied involvement, saying that it had "always advocated the peaceful settlement of problems of any nature" (Legum & Lee 1979: 69). Simultaneously, the Republic of Djibouti was faced with impending independence and Somalia accused Ethiopia of planning an invasion of Djibouti. By May 1977 Ethiopia was blaming "Somalia trained

infiltrators for attacks on the Addis-Ababa-Djibouti railway" (Legum & Lee 1979: 69). In mid-June, the WSLF reported that it had killed 352 Ethiopian soldiers and captured 176 in a skirmish in the mountains near Harar. Several days later on 19 June, several small towns in the Ogaden were subsequently captured, yet Ethiopia had yet to react to what was already in evidence - Somalia's forces, not just the WSLF, were carrying out these attacks.

By most accounts, initial attacks on Ethiopian territory were carried out by WSLF forces designed to confuse the enemy as a prelude to full invasion. The WSLF had succeeded in destroying railway bridges, capturing waterholes and laying siege to small towns. For example, within weeks of the attacks, Dire Dawa, Ethiopia's third largest city and an important rail, industrial and commercial centre, was under attack and on the verge of collapse. The WSLF actions effectively split Ethiopia's 20,000 strong armed forces in the Ogaden, cut off from each other and unable to maintain a constant flow of supplies. Ethiopia blamed the sabotage on Somalia, just when Nairobi claimed that 3,000 regular Somali troops had attacked one of its border posts, at Ramu, and that 13 men had been killed in the fighting there (Legum & Lee 1979: 33). Somalia denied the charge. In fact, Somali troops had crossed the area to make a new thrust into Ethiopia there. Nevertheless, the incident led a suspicious Nairobi to take the side of Ethiopia (Sauldie 1987: 45).<sup>28</sup> It also had the net effect of discouraging the western powers, staunch allies of Kenya, from supporting Somalia, in the early months of the war. With the Soviet break in relations immanent, Barre had been banking on western support and it was now no longer clear that this support would be forthcoming.

On 21 July just two days prior to the Somali invasion, Ethiopia had rejected a tentative peace plan proposed by the OAU. The proposals called for a six mile-wide demilitarized zone

along the existing Ethiopia-Somalia border and an end to hostilities (Sauldie 1987: 46). But in the eyes of the Dergue the plan did not effectively deal with the issue of the Somali-trained WSLF. Any hoped-for act of OAU mediation thus proved abortive.

By Somali accounts initial success against the Ethiopian regime had been carried out by the WSLF on its own accord, but the subsequent decision to escalate the conflict was taken by Barre (Laitin & Samatar 1987: 141). In essence, Ethiopia was a country on the verge of disintegration as the Dergue became preoccupied with Eritrea. This element provided an opportunity for Barre to realize Somalia's long-held goal. Pressed by his general staff to build on the gains made by the WSLF, Barre made the decision to prepare for invasion. On 22 July 1977 Somalia's armed forces mounted a full scale attack on the Ogaden, thus triggering a foreign policy crisis for Ethiopia.

#### ***4.3 Crisis and War in the Ogaden 22 July 1977 - 14 March 1978***

On 23 July 1977 Ethiopia claimed that an all-out Somali attack was launched against its territory. Although Somalia continued to deny involvement (a pretence maintained until 13 February 1978 when Somalia openly committed its regular forces), US spy satellites later confirmed that "this was no simple desert skirmish on the order of previous Ethiopia-Somali confrontations" (Legum & Lee 1979: 32). An unprecedented number of tanks, aircraft and army battalions were in evidence, though it is difficult to reconstruct the exact numbers involved. The Ethiopian response was twofold: Ethiopian representatives appealed to the United Nations and again to the OAU to halt the fighting in the Horn of Africa and Mengistu appealed for external military assistance. Addis Ababa was then deluged by support from Eastern bloc countries.

International arms were shipped in from Romania, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. "Vietnamese delegations arranged the sale of US war surplus equipment and Israeli pilots allegedly flew in spare parts and ammunition for Ethiopia's American-made equipment" (Legum & Lee 1979: 33). Greek mercenaries, reportedly also came to the aid of Ethiopia (Sauldie 1987: 48).

On 24 August renewed efforts at mediation by the OAU again ended in frustration; this time the Somali delegation refused to participate because representatives of the WSLF were not allowed to participate. The OAU Secretary-General William Eteki Mboumoua said that the OAU did not recognize the WSLF as an African liberation movement. The Somali delegation accused the OAU of "ignoring the major interest on which the OAU Charter is based...the liberation of African territories still under colonial domination and oppression" Legum & Lee 1979: 70).

In early August, Somali forces had control of over 80 percent of the Ogaden a fact that even Ethiopia's leaders were admitting (Sauldie 1987: 47). By early September Addis Ababa reported that a "fierce and bloody battle" was being fought around Jijiga, the base for Ethiopian tanks east of Harar (Legum & Lee 1979: 33). On 7 September both countries severed diplomatic relations and Ethiopia mobilized its civilian reserve. Both states were now clearly engaged in open war. On 14 September Jijiga fell, aided by the mutiny of Ethiopian soldiers and American equipment left behind by panicky Ethiopian soldiers. Around that time the WSLF leader Abdullah Hassan Mohammed was quoted in The Economist as saying: "[T]here will be no compromises, no settlement...We are going all the way to the Awash [a river near the capital] and we don't intend to stop until we get there".<sup>29</sup> Somali forces then set their sights on Harar the strategic gateway to Addis Ababa.

Throughout October the WSLF, now fully supported by Somali troops, tanks and aircraft, increased its size to 20,000 men. It was around this time that the Soviet Union pulled out its support for Somalia. On 19 October, USSR Ambassador in Addis Ababa, Anatoly Ratanov declared that it had "officially and formally" stopped the supply of arms to Somalia, "its main African military client since a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, was signed between them in 1974" (Legum & Lee 1978: 71). In turn, the Soviet Union was now providing Ethiopia with "defensive weapons to protect her revolution" (Legum & Lee 1978: 71).<sup>30</sup> In fact, the bulk of military aid was coming from both the USSR and Cuba. Cuba already had a significant presence in Angola and was now in the process of integrating its troops into Ethiopian front-line units. Reports spoke of at least 1,500 Soviet military advisers and 3,000 Cuban soldiers backing the now 60,000 Ethiopian troops in the south-east of the country (Sauldie 1987: 51; Legum & Lee 1978: 72).<sup>31</sup> This infusion of support marked the turning point in the war and the end of relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union.<sup>32</sup> On 12 November Mogadishu revoked the Friendship treaty and expelled all Soviet advisors from the capital.

In their desperate attempt to capture Harar, Somali forces had become overstretched. As a result, Somali supply lines were now open to air attack from Ethiopian MIG fighters. Northern Somali cities were also being bombarded. In response, in late January 1978, Somalia protested to the OAU calling for the organization to condemn the Soviet Union and Cuba and other Warsaw Pact countries for their interference. The call for support was also a plea to the western powers, notably the United States, who had remained silent on this surprising turn of events. The United States was concerned about the alarming Soviet presence in the region and set about cautiously resolving the issue. US President Carter began to devise a means of preventing a

possible invasion of Somalia. He did so belatedly, by channelling US military aid to Somalia through Somalia's Middle East allies (notably Egypt) (Legum & Lee 1978). But that support came well after Ethiopian success in the Ogaden. Carter also called on both sides to end the conflict peacefully.<sup>33</sup>

In the light of Somalia's weakness, the Soviet-orchestrated counterattack was predictable and swift. Command of the Ethiopian counterattack was passed to Vassily Petrov a Deputy Commander of the Soviet ground forces, and Arnaldo Ochoa, a Cuban who had served in Angola in 1976. Both set out to regain the lost territories. Jijiga was the first major city to be recaptured by the Ethiopian forces on 5 March 1978. That month coincided with the Ethiopian victory against the Italians in 1896. By then most Somali forces had been driven back or had undertaken "tactical withdrawals" to their points of origin prior to the war. A third of the Somali forces were reportedly killed. Four days later, on 9 March, Ethiopian victory was assured when Mogadishu broadcast a statement: "The big powers have suggested that the problem of the Horn of Africa be solved peacefully and that all foreign troops withdraw, and that Somalia withdraw her units, at the same time promising that the rights of Western Somalia will be safeguarded, the Central Committee of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party has decided that Somali units be withdrawn" (Legum & Lee 1978: 35). On 15 March the Barre regime announced that all its regular forces had been withdrawn and that it was willing to accept a cease-fire. In response, the Dergue refused to accept a cease-fire until Somalia publicly renounced for all time any claims to the Ogaden, Kenya and Djibouti and confirm with the OAU and the UN that it recognizes the international border between Ethiopia and Somalia (Sauldie 1987: 55).

The WSLF also refused to accept the cease-fire, it had been defeated in the battle but had not surrendered. WSLF leader Abdullah Hassan Mohammed said: "The masses will continue to wage war until complete success, no matter how long or how many sacrifices it takes" (Legum & Lee 1978: 35). Despite this bravado, designed primarily to shore up support for Somalia at the impending cease-fire talks, the war was over.

#### *4.4 Post-War Phase and After - 15 March 1978 - Present*

The main effect of the war was to intertwine regional and domestic conflicts effectively. At the regional level, the immediate post-war period was characterized by a series of important realignments in the region. The United States, though never openly committed to support for the WSLF and wary of Somalia's connections with international terrorism sought to strengthen its relations with Mogadishu. For example, on 21 March 1978 Washington renewed its economic development programs and began discussions for future military aid to Somalia. In return the United States obtained access to Somali ports and airfields in early 1979 (Selassie 1984). This occurred against a backdrop of regional events including, a Treaty of Friendship between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union, including provisions of military aid, and an appeal from Djibouti for help to defend itself against an alleged Ethiopian plot to overthrow its government (Selassie 1984).

Somalia's internal situation was also transformed as a result of the war. There were two major consequences. First, the Barre regime was threatened by an abortive coup in April 1978. The coup signalled serious dissatisfaction among various clans with the turn of events. Officers of the Majerteen clan who led the failed coup, sought refuge in Ethiopia and subsequently



formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The onset of Somalia's spiral into disintegration at the hands of clan leaders is clearly a legacy of this failed coup.

The second change came in 1979 when a new Somali constitution was introduced. Somalia formally renounced all claims to the Ogaden for itself, instead stating support for the liberation of Somali "territories under colonial oppression" (Selassie 1984). This had the net effect of establishing a basis for detente with Ethiopia and undermining any legitimacy the Barre regime may have had with those who still clung to the dream of a united "Greater Somalia". As a result the internal turmoil in Somali increased, but Somalia still supported the WSLF. This led directly to a foreign policy crisis for Somalia on 5 December 1980 and ending on 29 June 1981, in which Ethiopia threatened Somalia if it did not formally agree to cease support for the WSLF, which continued incursions into the Ogaden.

By then it was no longer clear that Barre had control of the WSLF or other political groups. For example, on 30 June 1982, in an alliance of convenience with the Dergue, the SSDF challenged the government in a foreign policy crisis for Somalia. In the fighting that ensued until August 1982, the Mogadishu government accused the Libyans and Ethiopians of financing the renewed hostilities in the Ogaden. Somali forces infiltrated Ethiopian territory and attacked a town 100 kilometres inside Ethiopia (Henze 1991). In response, the SSDF, almost certainly with Ethiopian support, occupied two border towns (Balambal and Galdogol) from which they could not be dislodged. There were several skirmishes. After declaring a state of emergency in the border regions, Mogadishu reported that a supply of defensive equipment from the United States had helped in preventing the crisis from escalating (Laitin & Samatar 1987).<sup>34</sup> After realizing the futility of trying to match the massively armed Ethiopians, Somali forces withdrew.

#### *4.5 Legacy - The Disintegration of Somalia*

In 1988, under great pressure from the United States, Somalia signed a peace accord with Ethiopia. The accord called for the demilitarization of the common border and effectively amounted to Somalia's renunciation of its claims to the Ogaden region. When the Accord was signed, a guerilla challenge to the Barre regime mounted by the Issaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) signalled the onset of Somali civil war in the north (on 18 May 1991 the SNM leadership openly declared a secessionist "Republic of Somaliland") (Makinda 1992). The Accord was also rejected by the Ogadenis who felt that Mogadishu had abandoned them. By the late 1980s opposition to the Barre regime broke down along clan lines. The military, which had been united in its struggle against Ethiopia, now became the domain of specific clan interests and militias. In addition to the Issaq dominated SNM, there was the Majerteen dominated SSDF, the Hawiye of central Somalia who controlled the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Ogadenis of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).

In August 1989 Barre responded to clan pressures in two ways. Repression against the civilian population continued, but Barre also agreed to work on a new constitution, emphasizing UN monitored multiparty elections to be held in February 1991. A constitution review process was under way into late 1990 when Barre's support that had already been weakened severely by clan conflict, collapsed. On 23 January 1991 Barre's militia admitted defeat and Barre's Darod party, the Somali National Front (SNF) was toppled. Into this vacuum entered a coalition of USC, SNM and SPM forces, which deposed the leader and replaced him with a "national salvation committee".<sup>35</sup>

The defeat of Barre merely accelerated the disintegration of Somalia for several reasons. First, the opposition forces had only one thing in common, the defeat of Barre. Barre had managed to stay in power because of the inherent weakness and disunity of his opponents. With few allies, Barre was no match for these clans. Second, when Barre was overthrown, power was immediately assumed by the Hawiye-led USC, a group that remains deeply opposed to the SNM and SPM. The USC, under its leader General Aideed, automatically assumed power making a unilateral appointment of an interim President without consulting the other groups.

The struggles that have since ensued are a reflection of clan-based politics at its most basic level. That is, in the absence of any kind of pretence to institutions, the struggle for power and survival has been determined by weapons and clan alliances. To return to a point made at the outset of this inquiry, Barre's loss of power is related to the recurring desire by Somali leaders to mobilize and unify Somalis on the basis of national identity during periods of relative harmony. It is ironic that, perhaps, nothing short of another invasion of the Ogaden will bring the country back together again. Reflecting on Somalia's struggles for identity since independence, it seems somehow normal that in 1993, Somalia's fate would again be decided by outsiders.<sup>36</sup> Ultimately, however, Somalia's future lies in the hands of Somalia's clan leaders.

To conclude, the recurring ability of Somali elites to unite divided clans to pursue irredentist claims suggests that, external confrontation is a basis for consolidation of power for ethnically homogenous societies. In the absence of constraints, elites of ethnically dominant states are likely to act upon international opportunities to obtain their goals and are more accepting of forceful measures. The evidence for this is the opportunity provided by affinities and cleavages within Ethiopia and the changes in government in both Ethiopia and Somalia

before the war. To be sure, after the 1977-78 war, Somalia's political system experienced increasing internal turmoil. In 1988 this level of internal divisiveness proved too overwhelming even for Somalia's military-authoritarian regime to withstand. Obviously there is a limit to which clan fealty can be a basis for achieving foreign policy objectives. Although the idea of a "Greater Somalia" was internally beneficial for Somali leaders, successive failures in achieving this goal proved to be, in the final analysis, internally divisive.<sup>37</sup>

Prior to the war of 1977, Ethiopia and Somalia were highly centralized military-authoritarian regimes. This transformation appears to have made the elites of both state more resilient to internal pressures. However, the multi-ethnic characteristic of Ethiopia appears to have heightened its sense of vulnerability leading to a foreign policy, including the creation of the OAU Charter, designed to restrain Somalia. By extension, the absence of such concerns among Somalia's military leaders did not lead to restrained policies. In brief, Somalia was, at independence, a parliamentary democracy that paradoxically did not show as much restraint as expected. The military coup of 1969, increased levels of belligerency. Absent were concerted attempts at conciliation.

Such changes allow tests to be carried out on Somali behaviour in both its high constraint and low constraint periods. In contrast, Ethiopia remained a low constraint state throughout, beginning with the Selassie monarchy and the equally authoritarian Dergue regime that followed. Therefore, an examination of Ethiopia provides an opportunity to explain the behaviour of a low constraint, ethnically diverse state.

## *5. Explaining the Variables and Testing the Hypotheses*

### *5.1 Somalia*

#### (a) Ethnic Composition

Somalia's ethnic configuration presents a challenge to the typology presented in this analysis. Under the "subjective" definition provided by Barth (1969) and the "objective" version in Rothschild (1981) given in chapter one, clan-based divisions are sufficient to constitute differences among ethnic groups. Thus at one level each clan does constitute a distinct ethnic group while at another level the Somali peoples also make up a distinct ethnic group. This apparent contradiction is not a contradiction at all, but merely underlines the inherent malleability and situational fluidity common to all ethnic identities (Olzak & Nagel 1982). The implications of a clan-based society are significant. Many scholars have noted that the basic characteristic of such a society is its inherent instability. Depending on the nature and context of a particular political matter (Laitin & Samatar 1987: 158) "the segments of a clan unify temporarily, to deal with an imminent emergency only to splinter off into antagonistic subsegments when the emergency abates". This process of segmented unification need not occur at the interstate level. As noted in this analysis, specific clans were united on internal political matters as well as issues of foreign policy. With respect to the interstate dimension, Somalia is an ethnically homogenous state and Somalia's leaders have relied on their society's linguistic, cultural and religious homogeneity to mobilize the population, an opportunity unavailable to the leaders of ethnically diverse states. This mobilization process is based on shared symbols, the most important being the concept of "pan-Somali nationalism".

## (b) Institutional Constraints

Somalia's institutional arrangements are also influenced by clan-based politics. After independence, Somalia was a parliamentary democracy in which political parties were based on clan fealty. Initially, the intersection of clans and political parties provided an additional constraint on any single clan group from becoming dominant. Accepted standards of measurement (Gurr 1990) indicate that, institutional constraining mechanisms, including executive constraint, regulation of participation and regulation of executive selection (see chapter six for details) were strong during the formative years of Somali independence.

This changed with the coup of 1969. Of course, the sources of militarization are multiple. Arguments that emphasize state planning and intervention, as well as economic slumps, may have some validity. However, an important defining characteristic of Somalia's democracy was the constitutionally embedded idea of pan-Somali nationalism. Successive failures to realize this goal led to a loss of legitimacy for popularly elected government. The army then became a custodian of the national interest.

Compared with the multi-ethnic states of sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia has experienced fewer coups and these have come as result of a different set of factors.<sup>38</sup> In most African states, the pivotal role of the military is due to the fear of an unstable ethnic situation. Military coups occur most often in those societies which exhibit porous civil-military boundaries and in Somalia's case, clan fealty appears to be the link between this boundary. The recruitment of specific clans into the military led to their over-representation and resulting breakdown of the military along clan lines.

For obvious reasons, elites who have a monopoly of power in low constraint situations rely on non-institutional devices for the control and management of society. Internally, coercion became more widespread in Somalia. Externally, war with Ethiopia provided an opportunity to unify Somali society and to maintain Barre's hold on power.

(c) Ethnic Cleavage

During the crises analyzed in this chapter, levels of cleavage in Somalia were low. There are two reasons for this. First, there has been a high level of inter-elite commitment and cooperation between political and clan leaders and the ability of elites to play off clan interests and rivalries when necessary. To be sure, the aborted coup of 1978 indicated that elites were dissatisfied with the Barre regime, but dissent had not yet trickled down to the masses. This is because the Barre regime maintained a monopoly on power and had stepped up repressive acts. As Muller and Weede (1990: 627) have argued, extremely brutal authorities can discourage all forms of group resistance. When the army began to break up along clan-based lines in 1988, competition among clans was no longer restricted to clan leaders.

(d) Ethnic Affinities

Like the Sinhalese discussed in the previous chapter, Somalis consider themselves a distinct ethnic group. For this reason, Somalia's affinities with other states are low. However, the presence of Somalis outside Somalia provided the incentive for staking claims to territory. An important aspect of this claim is the varying importance Somali elites have attached to different regions. For example, the Ogadeni and Darod of the Ogaden are central to the power structure of Somali politics, whereas the Somalis of Kenya and Djibouti less so. This fact has also shaped the interests of Somali leaders whose support derives from specific clans. Leaders

of clans who have a strong link to the Ogaden (Barre) have shown a greater interest in irredentism than have those whose clans do not have this level of affinity (Egal).

## *5.2 Ethiopia*

### (a) Ethnic Composition

Ethiopia is a moderately diverse state composed of ethnic groups of different religions and cultural affiliations. The most notable fissure is the division between the numerically dominant Amharic speaking Christian (Coptic) community and Ethiopia's minorities. Assimilationist policies were implemented by the Selassie regime to bring to minorities uniformity of language and culture. These include the Somali peoples of the Ogaden, the Oromo, the Tigrayan and Eritrean, though there are others. Eritrea is significant because that region joined Ethiopia only after concerted international effort in the 1950s and against the interests of the Eritrean peoples. In 1993, Eritrea became an independent state.

### (b) Institutional Constraints

For the period examined here, institutional constraints in Ethiopia are low. There was a parliament under the Selassie regime but no parties to contest elections. Repression against minorities, including the Ogadeni, was widespread. With respect to the 1974 coup, Huntington's (1968) fundamental proposition about military intervention is pertinent. He argued that the most important cause of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect the social characteristics of the military. This appears to be the case for Ethiopia in which in which there was a politicization of social forces and institutions. In this case, the profession of unitary



scientific socialism adapted by the Dergue embraced all aspects of social life. Nowhere is Afro-Marxist ideological inflexibility more apparent than on the issue of political negotiations with ethnic separatist movements. All draw from Lenin (1951) on this issue. Class struggle must be preeminent and therefore all national movements are denied legitimacy. Ethiopia's economy and society were reorganized according to dictates of scientific socialism. This process generated constraints in the political arena because the Dergue concentrated state power in the hands of elites at the expense of Ethiopian minorities.

(c) Ethnic Cleavage

For reasons noted above, Ethiopia has a very high level of internal cleavage. Before the war of 1977, no less than 14 provinces were in a state of armed insurrection. The Tigrayan, Oromo and Eritrea and Somali struggles have been active since the 1950s.

(d) Ethnic Affinities

Although, there are many different ethnic groups in Ethiopia, few of these share a high level of ethnic affinity with ethnic groups in other states. A notable exception is the Somalis of the Ogaden.

### ***5.3 Testing the Hypotheses***

General Hypothesis 1: The preference for foreign policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict is a function of the interaction between ethnic composition and levels of institutional constraint on elites such that:

P1 Type Ia unconstrained - dominant states have a high preference for policies that lead to involvement in interstate ethnic conflict.

Supported. After the coup, the only formal constraint on Somali elites was the military. But Barre proved effective in recruiting heavily from his own clan group in order to strengthen his support. He also used pan-Somali nationalism as a group symbol in order to pursue foreign policy goals. Thus, there were few domestic barriers to elite preference for confrontation. At the international level, several factors induced the persistence of Somali irredentism. The Soviet Union was a staunch ally until midway through the war; Somalia had a very potent army and had developed strong linkages with the WSLF. Finally its main opponent, Ethiopia, was weakened internally. The only notable international constraint on Somalia was the lack of support provided by the OAU (until Barre's selection as head of that organization). Barre offset this constraint by joining the Arab League and seeking new alliances. It is notable in this regard that, once internal dissent in Somalia became much stronger, and Somalia lost its ally in the Soviet Union (a strength not replaced by the United States) Somalia slowly dropped all claims to its irredentist goals, though Ethiopia did not desist its destabilization of the Barre regime. As noted, there is a limit to which even ethnically homogenous military states can withstand internal pressures.

P2 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a moderate preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

Partially supported. Under Selassie, Ethiopia's relations with Somalia were a central part of its general foreign policy platform. The interesting aspect of Ethiopian foreign policy formation, was the mixed strategy Ethiopia exercised in its relations with Somalia, which is expected of

diverse states. During the formative years of Somali independence, international efforts were made to resolve the conflict peacefully. Ethiopia initiated this process through the effective manipulation of international legal protocols, which included the formation of the OAU. But Ethiopia also sought a military buildup and repressed its ethnic minorities. These were intended to place Ethiopia in a better "bargaining" position with Somalia by preventing the possibility that internal cleavages would invite external involvement.

P3 Type IIa constrained - dominant states have a moderate preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

Partially supported. The limited period under which Somalia was a democracy allows some inferences to be made. Apparently elected Somali elites did as much as possible to unite a divided Somalia through peaceful means. Under the leadership of Egal, an Issaq who perceived fewer benefits from this policy, a rapprochement with Ethiopia was carried out. The central question is whether there was a disparity or gap between elite and mass aspirations. In other words was there a difference between mass and elite preferences that would account for a more restrained Somali foreign policy? The evidence for assessing this linkage is not overwhelming, because it appears that escalation of the crises, which occurred when Somalia was a democracy, was elite-led. On the other hand, there is some evidence indicating that, political parties did compete to be the best representatives of the Somali interest, the most symbolic being pan-Somali irredenta. Leaders competed on the basis of their nationalist credentials and were judged on this basis. Their legitimacy derived in part from achieving the goal of uniting all Somalis and

in turn this had implications for clan-based unity. What made this system particularly effective during the democratic phase was that, political leaders could obtain "a balance of power" among the clans, which would reduce the need to use foreign policy objectives for obtaining internal unity. When this power-balance fell out of synch, largely because Barre recruited heavily from his clan-group, then uniting the clans, through external confrontation, became more of a necessity. The unfortunate aspect of this process, is that eventually the process of achieving clan-based unity, which served Somalia during its first decade of independence, eventually became the basis for undermining Somalia's fragile institutional structure.

P5 Outbidding in state IIa and IIb increases the preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

Partially supported. The period in which Somalia was a democracy suggests that its political leaders were judged on their ability to unite all Somalis. However it is difficult to determine if outbidding greatly effected the choices leaders made. The best indicator is, perhaps, the leaders that the Somali peoples chose. The first three Somali leaders were dedicated to finding a negotiated solution, but also supported an insurgency movement in Ethiopia.

General Hypothesis 2: Interstate ethnic crises that are conditioned by high levels of cleavage and affinity present additional constraints and opportunities such that:

P6 High cleavage increases the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict.

Partially supported. Although there may be other reasons for the sustained conflict between the two states, including US-Soviet rivalries and the support the military aid they provided to both states, Ethiopia's internal unrest does appear to be associated with a sustained 30 year period of protracted interstate conflict. At least three internal conflicts erupted within Ethiopia, which facilitated repeated Somali attempts at territorial retrieval. When cleavages also appeared in Somalia's fragile clan structure in the 1980s, two more crises occurred between the two states.

P7 High cleavage increases the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions;

Supported. The evidence indicates that as Ethiopian cleavages increased, Somalia continued to press its advantage. The main issue here as above, is that Ethiopia constituted a threat to Somalia from the outset because of its historical claims to the Ogaden. Thus, Ethiopia constituted a perceived and real security dilemma for Somalia at independence. One implication of this is that, conventional safeguards, including the ability of the African community to control both Ethiopian and Somali belligerence, were not very effective, because the states of the OAU also had internal problems that reduced their ability to prevent Somali aggression. For example, both Djibouti and Kenya expressed an understandable reluctance to become involved in the issue. Only after several crises-wars did an alliance between Ethiopia and Kenya emerge. The point is that when cleavages and affinities are high, conventional restraints, such as international laws and norms backed by international organizations, such as the OAU may be ineffective at

moderating interstate ethnic conflicts. This may be especially true when one state, such as Somalia, chooses aggressive leaders and can mobilize its population in terms of a perceived external threat.

P8 High affinities increase the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict.

Partially supported. Affinities between Somalis of the Ogaden and Somalia were strong among some clans. It is clear from the evidence that some Somali elites were concerned about the plight of Somalis in the Ogaden and this link led to direct support for the WSLF. This support increased internal divisions within Ethiopia providing additional incentives for future invasion. The central concern in this instance, is whether states are able to regulate protracted conflicts when affinities are high. The evidence shows that the rules developed for finding cooperation between the two states were too one-sided in favor of Ethiopia. In other words, Ethiopia could impose assimilationist policies on Somalis in the Ogaden internally, while also manipulate international rules (OAU Charter) in its favor. The guarantees for the safety of the Somali minority in Ethiopia were insufficient enough to prevent Somali elites from making an issue of their plight and then taking actions to address that plight.

P9 High affinities increase the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions.

Supported. The decision by Barre to fully support the WSLF in the early 1970s signalled the potential for future interstate conflict. However, Barre's clan was one of the groups having the greatest ties to the Ogaden and he heavily recruited from that clan.

General Hypothesis 3: Interstate interactions leading to the use of force are a function of the types of states involved such that:

P10 Type Ia low constraint - ethnically dominant have a high preference for the use of force.

Supported. Before the war of 1977, Somalia's international opportunities presented themselves on three fronts: a favorable military balance with Ethiopia; a supportive ally in the WSLF, and a war in Eritrea. In terms of the model, the three stages were as follows: At stage 1, both states exhibited apprehensiveness in formulating belligerent foreign policies that would lead to confrontation. Judging from the evidence, this was primarily a result of Ethiopia's ethnically diverse demography and Somalia's weak status as a new state. Nevertheless, Somali leaders did at the outset rely on the issue a "Greater Somali" as basis for acquiring domestic support. At stage 2 the presence of high levels of affinity and cleavage within Ethiopia, provide an opportunity for Somalia to initiate a conflict with Ethiopia. The persistence of cleavages provides recurring opportunities for Somalia to escalate the conflict. At Stage 3, each state had prepared to use force against the other, this is especially true for Somalia which, after Barre came to power, set about acquiring arms. Perhaps, facing fewer domestic constraints at this stage,

because of his control of the military, Barre could use force. In response, Ethiopia was intransigent which, as expected, ultimately resulted in war. Ethiopia's internally divisiveness prevented it from doing nothing more than defending itself. The last three crises are ultimately the result of Somali internal divisiveness and represent interactions leading to policies of moderation for both sides. In other words, the leaders of both states weakened by internal pressures were unable or unwilling to re-escalate the conflict to war again.

P11 Type Ib low constraint - diverse states have a moderate preference for the use of force.

Partially supported. Initially, Ethiopia did use force, but not for interstate purposes. Its main concern at the time was managing its various internal conflicts. Thus, the conditions for Ethiopia to project its power beyond its borders was hampered by domestic constraints. When Ethiopia did use force it was defensive. Once the Barre regime was weakened after the coup of 1978, Ethiopia took a more aggressive stance, supporting several incursions into Somali territory. There is a very good reason why Ethiopia promulgated the conflict with Somalia. As mentioned earlier, Ethiopia and Somalia constituted threats to each other at the outset of Somali independence. Both states had diplomats, alliances and representation in international organizations. In contrast the WSLF had neither an army nor representation in international organizations, and therefore had to gradually escalate their conflict through the use of violence with the aid of the Somali government. The power and legitimacy of the Ethiopian government gradually weakened, the rules in which to manage the conflict became increasingly less useful,



and consequently, the ability of the two states to find a solution to the problem came down to only one answer, the use of force.

P12 Type IIa constrained - dominant states have a moderate preference for the use of force.

Partially supported. In the 1960s, institutions appear to have moderated Somali fondness for force. All of the interstate conflicts during this period were border skirmishes. Despite this, it would have been expected that Somalia would have made greater effort at managing the potential for escalation. Instead Somalia set about accumulating weapons to reclaim the territory by force. The reasons for this are twofold. Prior to crisis onset, Somali hypernationalism was already in evidence. With consistent outbidding among Somali politicians, Somalia made up a threat to Ethiopia at the outset. This is evident in the attempts at finding both a military and negotiated solution to the Ogaden problem. The former action, which included support for the WSLF and confrontations with other states, ultimately resulted in a spiralling of tensions between the two states. The situation appears to have been exacerbated by leaders who built upon pan-Somali hypernationalism in order to achieve certain domestic goals such as uniting the clans. Such leaders were also convinced that, the existence of their Somali brethren in the Ogaden was at stake. Thus the perceived security issue of the Ogadenis became a symbol for creating a Somali ethnic identity, which Somali leaders were skilful at manipulating. It was also a source of tension between the two states. The combination of increasing tensions and an uncompromising Somali world-view made finding a cooperative solution difficult. As a result, what was, at one time, a

perceived problem of security for Somalis in the Ogaden became very real issue of security, one that was difficult to de-escalate.

In conclusion, five of the eleven propositions find support while the evidence for the remaining six propositions is less conclusive. While it is difficult to generalize based on one case, institutional constraints themselves do not appear to have the complete effect assumed. Judging from Somali behaviour, institutionally constrained dominant states will formulate belligerent foreign policies and will do so much earlier compared to high constraint diverse states when confronted by an issue perceived as security issue at the outset. In this case, the plight of the Somalis in the Ogaden created a structural security dilemma for both states that was very difficult to resolve within the parameters of existing international norms and rules and within one crisis. The convergence of mass and elite aspirations on the issue of a "Greater Somalia" appears to have compounded the problem. This may be an indication of the skillfulness with which Somali leaders could manipulate mass sentiment. It is possible that inter-party policies during the democratic phase did not differ on the issue of a "greater Somalia" and therefore intransigence rather than compromise was more likely. Within ethnically dominant institutionally constrained states, elites appear to show greater solidarity on foreign policy issues, including decisions to use force.

On the other hand, levels of cleavage and affinity do appear to have an impact on protractedness and future escalation. Combining this evidence with the evidence from the previous chapter, it appears that, high constraint states of both the diverse and dominant variety are not as immune to using force as expected. However, the elites of these states appear to favor support for insurgency movements rather than direct state to state confrontation.

In the next chapter the propositions of the model are tested on the population of interstate ethnic crises. Among other things, this testing may provide more conclusive support for the propositions and provide insight into the willingness of constrained states to use force as a means of managing interstate tensions.

## Notes

1. In August 1963, Mogadishu Radio broadcast a Somali poem calling for all Somalis to be reunited. This is part of the translated text. (Drysdale 1964: 15).
2. In actuality the Ogaden consists of two separate areas in eastern Ethiopia. The southeast comprises the Ogaden proper. Here the large majority of people are Somalis of the Ogaden clan a group with close ties to the Darod clan. In the northeast area known as the Haud is a key seasonal grazing area for Somalis of the Dir and Darod clans.
3. The Ethiopia-Somalia Crisis of 1960; The Kenya-Somalia Crisis of 1963-64; Ogaden I of 1964; Ogaden II of 1977-78; The East Africa Confrontation of 1980-81; Ogaden III of 1982 and the Ethiopia-Somalia Crisis of 1987. See: Brecher & Wilkenfeld (1988).
4. The remaining conflict of note is the Oromo Liberation struggle. It has garnered less external support than the Eritrean and Tigrayan struggle but has led to an effective insurgency movement since the overthrow of Selassie in 1974. See: Makinda (1992).
5. The Issaq clan of the north comprises about 20% of Somalia's population. Under the leadership of Abd ar-Rahman Ahmad Ali Tur, the Issaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) proclaimed the breakaway "Republic of Somaliland" on 18 May 1991.
6. "The Somalis are Sunnis, adhering to the Shafiite school of Islamic jurisprudence, and their Islam is characterized by saint veneration, enthusiastic belief in the mystical powers of charismatic roving holy men, and a tenuous measure of allegiance to sufi brotherhoods." By language and history the Somalis are not Arabs, only recently has a relationship been formed between the Arab states and Somalia. (Laitin & Samatar 1987: 45).
7. In 1941 the empire collapsed with the Italian defeat. The British subsequently took over Eritrea, administering it until 1952, when the United Nations reached an agreement on its future. After much debate, it was decided that Eritrea would be federated with Ethiopia. Eritrea was important to Ethiopia, because it provided an outlet to the sea. For details on the Eritrean conflict see Heraclides (1991) and Suhrke & Noble (1977).
8. On the eve of the Italian invasion in 1935, Selassie issued a proclamation reading: "Italy proposes a second time to violate our territory...Soldiers, gather round your Chiefs and thrust back the invader. You shall have lands in Eritrea and Somaliland". (Bhardwaj 1979: 90).
9. In 1950 Ethiopia laid claim to 40,000 additional square miles of Italian Somaliland territory (Farer 1976: 81).  
  
. In 1957 the decision over what to do with Italian Somaliland was handed over to the United Nations General Assembly. When it became clear that the General Assembly would be unable to make a decision, because neither party could agree on the terms of reference, Ethiopia rejected the principles of self-determination for the Somali people. In 1959 the 14th session of

the United Nations and the last one prior to Somalia's independence also failed to obtain an agreement from the two parties (Farer 1976; Sauldie 1987:16-23).

11. Quoted in Drysdale (1964: 105).

12. The best example of differences between the two former colonies at this time was the ratification of the Somali constitution. In the south (formerly Italian Somaliland) the constitution was approved by a substantial majority but received less than 50 percent support in the former British colony. In December 1961 there was an attempted military coup in the north led by officers hoping to break up the union. The coup failed but indicated the fissures between the north and south (Laitin 1987: 72).

13. Ethiopia had taken the lead in creating the OAU, championing Ethiopia's position as leader of African decolonization and independence. This action served Ethiopia well because it denied Somalia the opportunity to find broad African support for its territorial claims (Henze 1991).

14. Since independence southern clans had occupied most of the senior government posts including senior positions in the military (Makinda 1992).

15. For an analysis of Somalia-Djibouti relations see: Farer 1976: 81-88.

16. A referendum held in 1958 on the issue of maintaining strong ties with France or granting autonomy to the Somalis of Djibouti resulted in the defeat of the idea of union with Somalia (Farer 1976: 87). In turn, the Somali government continued to fight with the French on the diplomatic front, as well as through the press and radio. In 1967 the results of a second referendum were announced in which the Somalis of Djibouti voted against independence.

17. Efforts at reconciliation were also made at the 1961 Non-aligned Conference (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988).

18. This did not mark the end of the conflict. In fighting in 1966, 1700 Somalis were reported killed and during the Somali invasion of the Ogaden in 1977, Somali troops were accused by the Kenyan government of invading the NFD. On the diplomatic front, the conflict over Somalis in the NFD continued into the 1980's (Sauldie 1987: 26)

19. As an Issaq from the north, Egal was a member of a clan which did not have good relations with Mogadishu. They had complained that more than 90% of the Somalia's development took place in the south.

20. At this time, the Arab states which had been firm supporters of Somali objectives were defeated in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and could not be relied upon for support. The Kremlin as well was taking a more distanced approach to the conflict after the 1967 war and could not be counted on for support in the event of armed conflict. The closure of the Suez canal also threatened Somalia's economy. Finally US aid to Somalia was contingent on it obtaining a multilateral arrangement with its neighbors. Thus temporary reconciliation with Ethiopia and Kenya would have to be arranged (Sauldie 1987: 28).

21. The concept of East African Federation would not be seriously considered for another ten years (Sauldie 1987).

22. The Darod clan is divided into Dolbahante, Majerteen, Marehan and Ogadeni. Barre's mother was an Ogadeni and Barre had strong ties to two other clans, the Dolbahante and Marehan. Most of his inner cabinet and advisers were drawn from these three clans (Makinda 1992).

23. For example in the early sixties, Somalia was receiving aid packages from Britain and the US, equivalent to 8 million dollars annually. This paled in comparison to the 32 million offered by the Soviet Union. The European Community remained a donor through the 1970's (Farer 1976: 98).

24. The United States had long been an important ally of the Selassie regime after World War Two. In part, the United States had tried to fill the vacuum left by the departure of the British and Italians by supporting Ethiopia as a regional force and linchpin for anchoring American policy in the Horn of Africa. This was enforced through military and economic aid and the use of naval and air facilities. Neglect by the US government of Ethiopia's internal conflicts indicated how much the policies of the United States were guided by external factors namely confrontation with the Soviet Union. The decision in 1973 to end Ethiopia's relations with its long-time ally Israel complicated the situation but also served as an indicator of changes yet to come. (Selassie 1984).

25. In order to press its advantage, Somalia joined the Arab League in 1973. This was a major political feat for a country whose inhabitants, although Muslim, were neither Arab nor spoke Arabic. The prospects of financial aid from OPEC-members increased markedly. President Barre was also made chair of the OAU in 1974 and was able to influence more African leaders that way (Sauldie 1987: 38).

26. There were in fact a number of insurgent groups operating in the Ogaden, the Somali-Abo Liberation Front (SALF) an offshoot of the WSLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) but it was the WSLF that remained preponderant (Gorman 1981: 64).

27. It was also around this time that potentially large oil reserves were said to exist beneath the surface of the Ogaden, thereby providing an additional incentive for reclaiming the territory (Sauldie 1987).

28. Ironically around the same time, on 20 July 1977, Somalia and Kenya had agreed to a set up a commission " to restore peace tranquility and peace...and to intensify constant contact which would promote bilateral cooperation in commerce, culture, communications and exchange of official visits" (Sauldie 1987: 45).

29. The Economist 8 October 1977.

30. Soviet support in the region was by no means confined to the Ogaden front, support for Ethiopia was also provided in its struggle against Eritrean secessionists (Heraclides 1991).

31. There is considerable discrepancy about the number of foreign and local troops on Ethiopian soil. For example, Mogadishu claimed that the number of Russian and Cuban forces in Ethiopia totalled 20,000. Addis Ababa claimed that Somalia had never deployed more than 17,000 troops in the war. Somalia claimed it had deployed 25 brigades of 1,200-2,000 men. Regardless of the actual numbers, Somalia was outnumbered by a ratio of about 3 to 1. See: Legum & Lee (1978).

32. In a massive sea and air transport, the Soviet Union brought over US \$1 billion worth of equipment to Addis Ababa: MIG fighter aircraft, heavy and light tanks, multi-barrelled rocket launchers, artillery, small arms, ammunition, vehicles, medical supplies, food and petroleum (Legum & Lee 1978: 34)

33. At that time, Barre called on his nation in a speech given in Mogadishu: "Death is sometimes preferable to life and the Somali nation will never accept to live under colonialism no matter what form" (Sauldie 1987: 54).

34. Again as a consequence of internal challenges to the Barre regime, relations between Ethiopia and Somalia flared again in a foreign policy crisis for Somalia beginning 12 February 1987 and ending two months later in April 1987.

35. During this time the USC remained severely divided as result of civil war between two factions of the Hawiye clan, one led by General Mohammed Aideed and the other by Ali "Diesel" Mahdi Mohammed (The Globe and Mail 13 February 1993).

36. In 1992, UN relief agencies were engaged in an operation to provide famine relief for Somalis caught in the disintegrating internal situation. Beginning in December 1992, the agencies were assisted in their mission by a US led 15 country "peacekeeping" operation intended to keep the warring clans apart and to bring stability to the country. The US decision to send troops to the country focussed on three concerns, humanitarian assistance, the strategic value of potentially large Somali oil reserves and a potentially important strategic military installation at Berbera (The Globe and Mail 7 December 1992; 1 January 1993).

37. For purposes of brevity, interactions between Somalia and Ethiopia are assessed for purposes of testing. However, Somalia's relations with Ethiopia appears to have influenced its relations with other states. Notable, in this context are the two interstate crises between Kenya and Somalia which were far more restrained. This can be explained, in part, by Kenya's multi-ethnic character and moderate levels of institutional constraint.

38. According to Johnson, Slater & McGowan (1984) of the 45 majority ruled states in Africa, 25 have experienced coup d'etat between 1960-1982. There have been 56 attempted coups and 102 reported coup attempts. Since independence, military coups have occurred in nearly half of Africa's states. Why has the military intervened so often? Most approaches give careful consideration of the military as a corporate entity in which ethnic cleavages play an important

role (Nordlinger 1972). Africa has been witness to two waves of military interventions. Ethnic plurality and competition accounted for the early independence coups; those in the 1970s were rooted in ethnic political competition.



**Chapter 6**

**Aggregate Data and Interstate Ethnic Conflict**

*Knowledge will best be gained when those with the "traditionalist skills for evaluating the patterns within individual events, those with the "behaviouralist" training in the analysis of general patterns, and those with the skills of the axiomatic theorist communicate in an effort to move the discipline forward (Bueno de Mesquita 1985: 122).*

## ***1. Introduction - Aggregate Data and Interstate Ethnic Conflict***

### ***1.1 The Merits of Quantitative Methods***

In chapters four and five an anomaly was identified. Institutionally constrained states were found to have a greater propensity for using force in crisis situations than was anticipated. Given the physical limitations on doing many case studies to explain this anomaly, a quantitative approach is used to retest the propositions developed in chapter three. This approach is based on the assumption that an evaluation of many cases can be advantageous, when the data are appropriate (Brecher 1993). To determine if the anomalous behaviour holds for the population of interstate ethnic crises, aggregate data developed from the International Crisis Behaviour Project will be used to retest the propositions. In subsequent chapters, inferences drawn from aggregate testing will be used in cases that do not fit the general pattern of association.

This chapter begins with a brief examination of the meaning of a quantitative approach in the study of ethnic groups and interstate conflict. The second part is a **spatial and temporal** account of the cases used in aggregate testing. Differences among states within certain periods and regions are identified. The implications these differences have for the assumptions of the model are discussed. The third section is an examination of the variables used in this study and their operationalization. In the fourth section, the general hypotheses and individual propositions are tested. The chapter concludes with a general summary of the results and ramifications for the model.

## *1.2 Ethnic Groups and Interstate Conflict - The Research Record*

Since the present study is cross-national, and highly contingent on aggregate data as evidence, an examination of the advantages and limitations of a quantitative approach using aggregate data is imperative. This section begins with a brief recognition of the merits of a quantitative approach with some basic justification for using it.

It is not the intention of this chapter to debate the relative merits of quantitative and case study methods, since this thesis uses both to refine and test the model. Indeed, the thesis is based upon the assumption that neither method alone is the best method of inquiry (Brecher 1989, 1993). An understanding of the interstate dimensions of ethnic conflict will best move forward when both approaches are utilized. However, there are some fundamental reasons why aggregate data can, in many instances, be superior to "small N" research.<sup>1</sup> More than one international relations scholar has noted that case studies abound in isolation meaning that they lack fundamental theoretical underpinnings from which generalizations can be drawn. This problem is particularly acute in the kind of study in which complex relationships between ethnic group behaviour at the state level of analysis and interstate behaviour are to be illuminated. For example, Table 6.1 identifies six recent case-study analyses of similar phenomena, the international aspects of ethnic strife.

Insert Table 6.1 Here

No less than **40 different causal variables** are identified in these approaches, with only two of the investigations (Suhrke & Noble 1977; Heraclides 1990) employing similar

methodological and theoretical assumptions. These similarities were examined in chapter two. At least three identical cases are examined by more than one investigator. Only the Gurr and Heraclides inquiries attempt a systematic analysis, comparing many cases along similar dimensions. Not surprising however, are the **disparate theoretical and policy-related conclusions** offered by all of these scholars. These differences have been examined in chapter two.

An examination of Table 6.1, indicates that there is a problem in **comparability of data**. Two issues are relevant here. First there may be different procedures in gathering data by the investigators. Nowhere is this more evident than in the meaning and identification of ethnic groups. Perhaps the mode of analysis that offers the greatest potential for measurement of ethnic group political behaviour is the cross-national public opinion survey. However, these kinds of studies suffer from some basic problems; the most significant concerns the different meanings of the common questions from culture to culture. Even with the best survey designs, only a few countries can be studied in this way. Consequently, this examination relies on more extensive, indirect measures that are suitable in assessing the aggregate behaviour of political systems and ethnic groups.

A second problem is one of **functional equivalence**; do the indicators tap the same underlying dimensions across time and space? Concepts such as ethnic affinity can have different meanings under similar circumstances (for examples of these differences, see section 3 on operationalizing the variables and the section on affinity in chapter three). One way to address this problem is to select a measurement for a phenomenon and then use external validation procedures to determine if the variable is equivalent across time and space.

Two final but not insignificant problems are those of **reliability and validity** (Babbie 1979). These problems of measurement have been addressed in two ways. Through initial operationalization of the variables in chapters four and five in order to determine their face validity and through the use of widely accepted statistical indicators. Statistical testing uses indirect indicators throughout, most of which have been developed by investigative teams using inter-coder techniques that ensure a high degree of reliability (ICB, Polity II and Minorities at Risk). Nevertheless, the use of secondary data does constitute a threat to reliability. When data are incomplete, substantive narratives, profiles and related information drawn from various data sets facilitate the comparative analysis and development of variables and case selection.

**Validity**, whether the indicator captures the full meaning intended, can also be problematic. Chapters four and five showed that a variable, such as institutional constraint, may have multiple meanings. In this case, a single all-encompassing indicator may be inappropriate. Therefore, composite or multiple indicators are used (see section 3 on operationalization of institutional constraint).

In brief, statistical testing relies on information that has been externally validated and deemed reliable through extensive case work, including the two preceding chapters. In addition, all data are summarily coded so that operationalization procedures and criteria for selection are explicit and open to scrutiny.

TABLE 6.1

## APPROACHES TO ETHNIC CONFLICT AND ITS INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS

## PART A - Conflict Extension Approaches

Heraclides, A. (1990, 1991).

CASE	TYPE	ICB	CAUSAL VARIABLES	UNITS
Katanga 1960-63	Secessionist	yes	geographic contiguity, religion, diffusion, SP involvement.	States. NGO's. groups.
Biafra 1967-70	Secessionist	no	violence, dependence.	" "
Sudan 1961-72	Secessionist	yes	geographic contiguity, religion, ideology.	" "
Kurds ongoing	Irredentist/ Secessionist	no	religion, decolonization, geostrategic interests.	" "
Bangladesh 1971	Secessionist	yes	religion, dependence, geographic contiguity.	" "
Moro ongoing	Secessionist	no	geo-strategic interests,	" "
Eritrea ongoing	Secessionist	no	protracted conflict, religion.	" "

TABLE 6.1

Suhrke, A. &amp; Noble, L. et. al. (1977).

CASE	TYPE	ICB	CAUSAL VARIABLES	UNITS
Northern Ireland	Secessionist	no	narrow scope, religion.	states
Cyprus	Irredentist	yes	wide scope, protracted conflict, SP interests.	states system
Kurds	Secessionist/ Irredentist	no	regional instability, religion, protracted conflict.	states system
Lebanon	Irredentist/ Secessionist	yes	regional instability, multiple issues, pc.	system
Eritrea	Secessionist	no	ideology, Islam, geographic contiguity.	states system
Kazakhs in China	Secessionist	no	high power discrepancy, religion, narrow scope.	state
Moro	Secessionist	no	high power discrepancy, religion.	state

TABLE 6.1

Part A (cont.)

Ryan, S. (1990).

No cases examined specifically but conditions for inter-state ethnic conflict are:

1. System Level

- a) decentralized power in anarchic system.
- b) self-determination as key legitimizing principles.

2. State Level

- a) incompatibility between the ideology of nationalism and national minorities.
- b) Wilsonian postulate - multi-ethnic states threaten system stability.

3. Conditions necessary for inter-state ethnic conflict:

- a) affective links mixed with instrumental interests.
- b) power balancing between states-leads to spiral effect.



TABLE 6.1

Part A (cont.)

de Silva, K.M. and May, R. et. al. (1991).

CASE	TYPE	ICB	CAUSAL VARIABLES	UNITS
Bangladesh	Secessionist	yes	nation-building strategies.	states
Punjab	Secessionist	yes	power discrepancy, diaspora.	states groups
Afghanistan/ Pakistan	Secessionist	yes	migration, weak states, geo-strategic location.	states
Sri Lanka	Secessionist	yes	power discrepancy, push-pull factors.	states groups
Thailand	Secessionist	no	Islam, push-factors, geographic contiguity.	groups states
Papua New-Guinea	Secessionist	yes	decolonization, power discrepancy, human rights.	groups
Burma	Secessionist	yes	geo-strategic interests, location, pc.	states

TABLE 6.1

## Part B - Conflict Interaction Theories

Rothman, J. (1992)

CASES	TYPE	ICB	CAUSAL FACTORS	UNITS
Arab/ Israel	Irredentist Secessionist	yes	relative deprvtn. conflicting values	groups

Chazan, N. et. al. (1991).

Alsace	Irredentist	yes	economic-policy, centralization.	states
Post-WWI Europe	Irredentist	yes	nationalism, economic factors, boundaries.	states
Turkey	Irredentist	yes	diaspora, Islam.	states
Africa (multiple)	Irredentist	yes	instrumental-affective, NGOs.	states

TABLE 6.1

Part B (cont.)

Azar, E. & Burton, J. 1986 (no specific cases):

- a) denial of separate identity;
- b) absence of security;
- c) absence of effective participation.

Smith, A. 1986, 1993a, 1993b. (no specific cases):

- a) growth of intelligentsia;
- b) rational state dominated by an ethnic;
- c) nationalist ideology;
- d) development of artificial nation-state;
- e) inter-state turmoil.

Gurr, T. R. et. al. (1992) (multiple cases):

80 groups of 240 in the Minorities at Risk study are engaged in intercommunal conflict between 1945 and 1989. Of these about 50 constitute interstate conflicts. Gurr is dealing with the universe of protracted ethnic conflicts rather than a distinct subset of secessionist or irredentist crises.

Conditions necessary for inter-state conflict:

- a) contagion, imitation, transnational minorities;
- b) regime repression - state building, economic development; reactive and pre-emptive intervention;
- c) logistic assistance, proactive intervention as an instrument of interstate conflict, ideological grounds, humanitarian grounds.

TABLE 6.1

## Part C - Multiple Approaches

Midlarsky, M. et. al. (1992)

CASE	TYPE	ICB	CAUSAL FACTORS	UNITS
Africa	Secessionist Irredentist	yes	diffusion, triangulation.	groups states
Sri Lanka	Secessionist	yes	religion, ideology.	groups states
Iran/Iraq	Irredentist	yes	state-building, personality.	state
Lebanon	Secessionist Irredentist	yes	geopolitics, hegemonic stability.	state
Falklands (non-ethnic)	Irredentist	yes	conflict transformation.	states
All	Secessionist	-	alliances, contiguity, rivalry.	states
World War I (Macedonia/ Bosnia)	Irredentist	no	major power interests, state modernization.	states
Peru	Secessionist	no	alliances, rivalry, absence of US int.	states
South Africa	Secessionist	no	democracy, group rights, demonstration effects.	groups state

Posan, B. (1993)

No specific cases studied. The main source of interstate ethnic conflict is the security dilemma brought about

### 1.3 Gathering the Evidence

Collecting information on interstate conflicts that have irredentism or secessionism as one of their defining characteristics is not a simple task. At present, there are a number of varied datasets and research projects to draw on. Each is considered in turn. Early research on the linkage between societal characteristics and interstate conflict draws heavily from the conflict transformation literature (see chapter two). These studies are less concerned with phenomena under study here than the general relationship between societal stress and interstate conflict (including, for example, riots, demonstrations, coups, social revolutions, guerilla warfare, assassinations and general strikes). Building on this early research, Terrel (1971) Hill (1978) and Rosh (1987) developed similar indices of social cleavage intended to measure the relationship between domestic and international conflict. Only the Rosh index of ethnic cleavage approximates the kind of variables of interest to this investigation. However, all three research projects explain only the relationship between domestic cleavage and levels of military effort, including military expenditures, which is not the focus of this inquiry.

One approach that might be useful, had it included measurements of domestic political and ethnic behaviour, is the "Overt Military Intervention File" developed by Herbert Tillema. The file is designed to measure all authoritative military operations that directly involve a state in foreign combat or unilaterally and irrevocably commit regular military forces to combat should such resistance be met (Tillema 1989: 181). The file contains data on 591 instances of overt military intervention within 269 armed conflicts since World War Two. On the one hand, the file is useful because of its breadth of coverage including interventions that have ethnic strife as their source. For example, Tillema shows that 40 civil

and regional conflicts attracted major foreign military intervention. Seven of the 40 conflicts were of national liberation by colonial peoples, 16 of the 40 took place along internal or cross-border lines of "ethnopolitical" cleavage. Almost all of the countries that intervened in these 23 ethnic conflicts were Third World regimes (India, Libya and Pakistan for example).<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, since the data are concerned only with overt military hostilities rather than the broader concept of interstate conflict, comparative analysis is difficult. This fact, and the absence of comprehensive domestic variables, makes the data set useful only for developing inter-coder reliability.

Singer and Small's analysis of civil conflict in Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (1982) is also a potential candidate for selection since it covers both international and domestic conflicts. It too provides a potential basis for inter-coder reliability. The domestic side of the data is primarily concerned with internal civil war and therefore not of central interest to this inquiry. Indeed of the 56 civil and extra-systemic wars fought between 1945 and 1980 only 22 (40%) are concerned with issues of ethnic group political autonomy (Gurr 1990). Clearly the sample size is not large enough to facilitate the kind of analysis needed here.

Finally there is the data that has been compiled by Gurr et. al. In this instance, there are two relevant datasets: the Minorities at Risk Project data (MRP) and Polity II data. The first is useful for describing the internal "ethnopolitical" characteristics of states, while the second is useful for understanding the institutional characteristics of all states in the system. But the data from both do not capture the breadth of behaviour desired (namely interstate and domestic

characteristics). These datasets are used for ensuring reliability of measurement and for coding on the domestic variables used in this analysis.

In sum, the present inquiry relies on data gathered for internationally recognized and reliable data sets including the Minorities at Risk Project and Polity II. However, data within the International Crisis Behaviour Project will be the basis for testing. There are three reasons for this. First the case descriptions and profiles are essential for coding purposes since each describes, in detail, the actors involved, the circumstances and nature of the conflict and its outcome. The dataset comprises both system-level and actor-level data. The data span the period 1918-1988. For extensive discussions of the system and actor level data see: Brecher (1993) and Brecher & Wilkenfeld et al. Crises in the Twentieth Century, Volumes I II and III (1988, 1989).

Second, the data are very good for assessing the proposed relationship because they provide a range of cases as well as dependent and control variables far in excess of data that focus exclusively on war. Although crises are by definition conflicts, **not all conflicts necessarily lead to war**. Indeed, many crises are managed successfully without recourse to violence. Therefore the data capture a broad range of interstate behaviour, including that which falls short of war, but nevertheless reveal a significant level of conflict. The data also provide, among other important indicators, **the number of states involved, the nature of the threat, and the issues over which the conflict arose**. Such information is vital in determining whether the conflict is ethnically based.

Finally, the crisis data focus specifically on conflicts that take place at **the interstate level**. Conflicts of either the ethnic or non-ethnic variety that have not yet produced international

crises are not included. This is not without its problems. Many prominent domestic ethnic conflicts are by definition excluded (Irish and Quebec separatism for example). For example, of the seven domestic cases examined by Suhrke and Noble, two are found in the ICB dataset (Cyprus, Lebanon). Similarly Heraclides' study includes eight cases, of which three produced foreign policy crises for one or more states (Katanga, Sudan, Bangladesh). Of all of the cases presented in Table 6.1, 21 are found in the ICB dataset (more if the 50 interstate conflicts within the Gurr dataset are included).

Thus, the ICB dataset is not an exhaustive list of ethnic conflicts having an international dimension, but it does constitute **the population of interstate ethnic crises** over a specific period (1918-1988). The population size is large enough and the spatial and temporal characteristics representative enough, to justify its utilization. For example, a comparison of the Overt Intervention File and the ICB data set shows that over 67% of overt interventions are also found in the ICB data. Of the conflicts that include one or more foreign overt military interventions which each sustain one hundred or more combat fatalities (N=47) 95% are found in the ICB data. These positive results are a useful basis for external validation and indicate that the cases selected do have face validity.



#### *1.4 Case Selection - The Characteristics of Interstate Ethnic Strife*

A two-stage content analysis for each crisis was carried out utilizing the working definition of ethnicity and the typology of interstate ethnic crises provided in this section. Initially, each crisis was coded based on whether ethnicity was deemed to be a salient factor in the conflict. Those crises considered to not be ethnic conflicts were coded (3). A second coding was carried out on the remaining cases, using the full interstate ethnic crisis criteria provided below. Secessionist conflicts were coded (1) and irredentist conflicts were coded (2). Cases in the system-level data and actor-level data were coded in this way. In the event that there was some doubt or ambiguity about the face validity of the conflict, it was coded a non-ethnic conflict.<sup>3</sup>

The conditions necessary for an interstate ethnic crisis were provided in chapter one.

They are reproduced here:

(a) The case must fulfil the definition of a foreign policy crisis for at least one state. A foreign policy crisis is:

**A situation with three individually and collectively sufficient conditions, deriving from changes in a state's internal or external environment. All three perceptions are held by the highest-level decision-makers of the actor concerned: a threat to basic values, awareness of finite time for response to the value threat and a high probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988).**

(b) The case must be an international crisis which is defined as a disruption in process and a challenge in the structure of the international system.

(c) The case must fulfil the working definition of an interstate secessionist or irredentist conflict:<sup>4</sup>

### **(1) Secessionist**

**An interstate secessionist conflict is the formal and informal aspects of political alienation in which one or more ethnic groups seek a reduction of control or autonomy from a central authority through political means. The state-center and/or secessionist group will seek out and obtain external support, thereby enhancing internal cleavage and disruption leading to interstate conflict. Such conflicts may or may not involve (1) the use of force and (2) politically mobilized, well organized, ethnic insurgency movements.**

**Thus, secessionism leads to an interstate ethnic crisis in four non-mutually exclusive instances:**

**(1) When ethnic groups refuse to recognize the existing political authorities they can trigger a foreign policy crisis for the state in question (internal challenge leading to external involvement); and (2) trigger foreign policy crises for the state's allies leading to international crisis; (3) invite external involvement based on transnational ethnic affinities (including threats of involvement) of one or more state interlocutors supporting the secessionist group triggering an international crisis; and (4) invite external involvement of one or more states based on ethnic affinities supporting the state-centre triggering an international crisis.**

### **(2) Irredentist**

**By definition, irredentist conflicts are already interstate ethnic conflicts because an irredentist conflict is the claim to the territory of an entity - usually an independent state - wherein an ethnic ingroup is in a numerical minority. The original term "terra irredenta" means territory to be redeemed. It presumes a redeeming state, as well as such territory. The redeeming state can be an ethnic nation-state or a multi-ethnic plural state. The territory to be redeemed is sometimes regarded as part of a cultural homeland, as part of a historic state, or as an integral part of one state. The claim to territory is based on transnational ethnic affinities and is conditioned by the presence of cleavage between the minority ingroup and its state-centre.**

**Thus, an irredentist conflict leads to interstate ethnic crisis in three non-mutually exclusive ways: (1) by triggering a foreign policy crisis for one or more states through an internal challenge supported by the redeeming state, (2) external threats made by one or both states; (1) and (2) can trigger (3) foreign policy crises for allies of the two states.**

Insert Table 6.2 Here

Table 6.2 provides a list of the **system-level cases** chosen for testing. Each case is coded according to its system crisis number, name, its ethnic conflict type, trigger date and termination date. For comparative purposes, the overall frequencies of secessionist conflicts (coded 1); irredentist conflicts (coded 2); and non-ethnic conflicts (coded 3) are listed in Table 6.3. Of the 390 international crises from 1918 to 1988, 63 cases or 16% of the total were defined as secessionist in nature; 103 cases or 26% of the cases were defined as irredentist, with the remaining 57% of cases (N=224) as non-ethnic.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, 43% (166 of 390) were considered to be interstate ethnic crises.

Insert Table 6.3 Here

## ***2. The Spatial and Temporal Domains of Interstate Ethnic Conflict***

### ***2.1 Preliminary Analysis - Patterns and Trends***

Table 6.4 provides data relating to the spatial and temporal domains of these ethnic conflicts.<sup>6</sup> The spatial domain refers to the five major geographic regions - **Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North and South America** (with no cases occurring outside these geographic regions, ie. Australasia).<sup>7</sup> The temporal domain refers to the three main periods recognized as possessing specific and shared characteristics. The period (1) 1918-1939 refers to the inter-war multipolar period following the termination of World War I, and prior to the onset

TABLE 6.2

SYSTEM LEVEL DATA:  
SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES

NO.	CRISIS NAME	TYPE	TRIGGER DATE	TERMINATION DATE
7	TRANSCAUCASIA	2	22/12/17 -	99/99/99
19	BALTIC INDEPENDENCE	1	19/11/18 -	11/08/20
22	TESCHEN	2	15/01/19 -	28/07/20
25	HUNGARIAN WAR	2	20/03/19 -	03/08/19
28	THIRD AFGHAN WAR	1	24/04/19 -	08/08/19
31	SMYRNA	2	15/05/19 -	29/07/19
37	BESSARABIA	2	01/05/19 -	02/03/20
40	AALAND ISLANDS	1	05/06/19 -	20/10/20
43	CILICIAN WAR	1	20/01/20 -	20/10/21
52	PERSIAN BORDER	2	19/05/20 -	26/02/21
55	GREECE-TURKISH WAR I	2	22/06/20 -	09/07/20
58	VILNA I	2	12/07/20 -	20/09/20
61	VILNA II	2	08/10/20 -	29/11/20
63	GREECE-TURKISH WAR II	2	06/01/21 -	12/09/21
75	AUSTRIAN SEPARATISTS	1	12/05/21 -	21/06/21
76	ALBANIAN BORDER	2	07/07/21 -	18/11/21
78	BURGENLAND DISPUTE	2	29/08/21 -	28/12/21
83	GREECE-TURKISH WAR III	2	26/08/22 -	15/09/22
89	RUHR I	2	22/01/23 -	27/09/23
92	CORFU INCIDENT	2	31/08/23 -	29/09/23
95	RUHR II	2	29/04/24 -	30/04/24
98	NEJD-HIJAZ WAR	2	01/09/24 -	19/12/25

NO.	CRISIS NAME	TYPE	TRIGGER DATE	TERMINATION DATE
101	MOSUL LAND DISPUTE	2	09/10/24 -	15/11/24
107	GREECE-BULGARIA FRONT	1	19/10/25 -	15/12/25
116	ALBANIA	2	28/11/26 -	11/11/27
155	CHACO I	2	05/12/28 -	12/09/29
180	MUKDEN INCIDENT	2	18/09/31 -	28/02/32
185	CHACO II	2	18/06/32 -	12/06/35
190	LETICIA	2	08/09/32 -	25/05/33
195	SAUDI-YEMEN WAR	2	18/12/33 -	20/05/34
235	BULGARIA-TURKEY I	2	06/03/35 -	10/03/35
236	BULGARIA-TURKEY II	2	03/08/35 -	31/08/35
255	REMILITARIZE-RHINE	2	07/03/36 -	16/04/36
265	MARANON I	2	01/11/35 -	30/11/35
295	ALEXANDRETTA	2	09/09/36 -	23/06/39
301	CZECH MAY CRISIS	2	19/05/38 -	23/05/38
305	POLISH ULTIMATUM	2	13/03/38 -	19/03/38
313	POSTAGE STAMP CRISIS	2	15/08/37 -	10/12/37
315	ANSCHLUSS	2	12/02/38 -	14/03/38
321	MUNICH	2	07/09/38 -	31/10/38
323	DANZIG	2	21/03/39 -	06/04/39
327	CZECH ANNEXATION	2	14/03/39 -	15/03/39
329	NOMONHAN	2	28/05/39 -	15/09/39
331	MEMEL	2	15/03/39 -	22/03/39
540	TRIESTE I	2	01/05/45 -	09/06/45
590	JUNAGADH	2	17/08/47 -	24/02/48
592	KASHMIR I	2	24/10/47 -	01/01/49
600	PALESTINE PARTITION	2	29/11/47 -	17/12/47

NO.	CRISIS NAME	TYPE	TRIGGER DATE	TERMINATION DATE
610	INDONESIA INDEPEND. I	1	29/09/45 -	25/03/47
611	INDONESIA INDEPEND. II	1	21/07/47 -	17/01/48
640	ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE	2	15/05/48 -	20/07/49
645	HYDERABAD	1	21/08/48 -	18/09/48
667	INDONESIA INDEPEND. III	1	19/12/48 -	27/12/49
670	SINAI INCURSION	2	25/12/48 -	10/01/49
680	PUSHTUNISTAN I	1	01/03/49 -	05/10/50
760	TELMUTILAH	2	15/03/51 -	14/05/51
763	PUNJAB WAR	2	07/07/51 -	31/08/51
785	BURMA	1	08/02/53 -	15/10/54
790	INVASION OF LAOS II	1	24/03/53 -	30/06/53
800	TRIESTE II	2	08/10/53 -	05/12/53
870	PUSHTUNISTAN II	1	27/03/55 -	30/11/55
890	GOA I	2	10/08/55 -	06/09/55
1000	IFNI	1	23/11/57 -	31/03/58
1050	WEST IRIAN I	1	01/12/57 -	31/12/57
1060	SUDAN-EGYPT BORDER	2	09/02/58 -	25/02/58
1070	TUNISIA-FRANCE II	1	08/02/58 -	17/06/58
1071	TUNISIA-FRANCE III	1	31/05/57 -	27/06/57
1080	LEBANON-IRAQ UPHEAVAL	1	08/05/58 -	31/10/58
1100	CAMBODIA/THAILAND	2	24/07/58 -	06/02/59
1180	SHATT AL ARAB I	2	28/11/59 -	04/01/60
1200	GHANA/TOGO BORDER	2	01/03/60 -	01/04/60
1220	ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA	2	26/12/60 -	31/12/61
1240	CONGO-KATANGA I	1	05/07/60 -	15/02/62
1260	MALI FEDERATION	1	20/08/60 -	22/09/60

NO.	CRISIS NAME	TYPE	TRIGGER DATE	TERMINATION DATE
1290	KUWAIT INDEPENDENCE	2	25/06/61 -	13/07/61
1330	PUSHTUNISTAN III	1	19/05/61 -	29/01/62
1370	WEST IRIAN II	1	26/09/61 -	15/08/62
1377	GOA II	1	11/12/61 -	19/12/61
1379	MAURATANIA/MALI	2	29/03/62 -	18/02/63
1395	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER I	1	26/09/62 -	15/04/63
1401	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER II	1	15/05/64 -	08/11/64
1402	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER III	1	03/12/64 -	25/08/65
1403	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER IV	1	14/10/66 -	26/09/67
1460	MALAYSIA FEDERATION	2	11/02/63 -	05/08/63
1465	RWANDA/BURUNDI	1	21/12/63 -	30/04/64
1470	MOROCCO/ALGERIA BORDER	2	01/10/63 -	04/11/63
1480	NIGER/DAHOMEY	2	21/12/63 -	04/01/64
1500	KENYA/SOMALIA	2	13/11/63 -	04/03/64
1520	CYPRUS I	2	30/11/63 -	10/08/64
1550	OGADEN I	2	07/02/64 -	30/03/64
1570	CONGO II	1	04/08/64 -	17/12/64
1590	RANN OF KUTCH	2	08/04/65 -	30/06/65
1591	KASHMIR II	2	05/08/65 -	10/01/66
1610	RHODESIA'S UDI	1	05/11/65 -	27/04/66
1620	GUINEA REGIME	1	09/10/65 -	31/12/65
1690	SIX DAY WAR	2	17/05/67 -	11/06/67
1710	CYPRUS II	2	15/11/67 -	04/12/67
1782	SHATT AL ARAB II	2	15/04/69 -	30/10/69
1799	WAR OF ATTRITION I	2	08/03/69 -	28/07/69
1800	WAR OF ATTRITION II	2	07/01/70 -	07/08/70

NO.	CRISIS NAME	TYPE	TRIGGER DATE	TERMINATION DATE
1870	PORTUGUESE INV. GUINEA	1	22/11/70 -	11/12/70
1890	BANGLADESH	1	25/03/71 -	17/12/71
1910	CHAD-LIBYA I	2	24/05/71 -	17/04/72
1935	UGANDA/TANZANIA I	2	20/10/71 -	25/11/71
1940	UGANDA/TANZANIA II	2	17/09/72 -	05/10/72
1942	NORTH-SOUTH YEMEN I	2	26/09/72 -	28/11/72
1960	IRAQ INVASION/KUWAIT	2	20/03/73 -	08/06/73
2030	OCTOBER YOM KIPPUR WAR	2	05/10/73 -	31/05/74
2035	S. YEMEN-OMAN	1	18/11/73 -	11/03/76
2040	CYPRUS III	2	15/07/74 -	24/02/75
2060	MOROCCAN MARCH	1	16/10/75 -	14/11/75
2063	SAHARA	2	14/11/75 -	14/04/76
2103	EAST TIMOR	1	28/11/75 -	17/07/76
2110	LEBANON CIVIL WAR I	1	18/01/76 -	30/09/76
2115	IRAQI THREAT	2	09/06/76 -	17/06/76
2160	UGANDA CLAIMS	2	15/02/76 -	24/02/76
2180	OPERATION THRASHER	1	22/02/76 -	30/04/76
2181	OPERATION TANGENT	1	20/12/76 -	31/03/77
2182	MAPAI SEIZURE	1	29/05/77 -	30/06/77
2200	NOUAKCHOTT I	1	08/06/76 -	08/06/76
2211	NAGOMIA RAID	1	09/08/76 -	30/11/76
2220	AEGEAN SEA	2	07/08/76 -	25/09/76
2350	SHABA I	1	08/03/77 -	26/05/77
2372	RHODESIA RAIDS	1	31/08/77 -	14/08/78
2390	OGADEN II	2	22/07/77 -	14/03/78
2393	NOUAKCHOTT II	1	03/07/77 -	31/07/77



NO.	CRISIS NAME	TYPE	TRIGGER DATE	TERMINATION DATE
2470	CHIMOIO/TEMBUE RAIDS	1	23/11/77 -	22/03/78
2476	FRENCH HOSTAGES	1	25/10/77 -	23/12/77
2520	CHAD-LIBYA II	2	22/01/78 -	27/03/78
2525	LEBANON CIVIL WAR II	1	07/02/78 -	20/02/78
2570	SHABA II	1	11/05/78 -	30/07/78
2600	NORTH/SOUTH YEMEN II	2	24/02/79 -	30/03/79
2625	AIR RHODESIA INCIDENT	1	03/09/78 -	31/10/78
2666	TAN TAN	1	28/01/79 -	31/03/79
2710	CHAD-LIBYA III	2	15/04/78 -	29/08/78
2725	GOULIMIME TARFAYA RAID	1	01/06/79 -	25/06/79
2729	RAIDS ON ZIPRA	1	12/02/79 -	31/05/79
2730	RAIDS ON SWAPO	1	06/03/79 -	28/03/79
2731	CHAD-LIBYA IV	2	12/04/79 -	10/11/79
2960	ONSET IRAN-IRAQ WAR	2	17/09/80 -	19/11/80
2970	LIBYA INTERV. GAMBIA	1	27/10/80 -	07/11/80
2995	EAST AFRICA CONFRONTN.	2	05/12/80 -	29/06/81
3000	CHAD-LIBYA MERGER	2	06/01/81 -	16/11/81
3010	PERU/ECUADOR	2	22/01/81 -	02/02/81
3050	NIGERIA/CAMEROON BRD.	1	16/05/81 -	24/07/81
3070	COUP ATTEMPT-GAMBIA	1	30/07/81 -	31/01/82
3095	POLISARIO ATTACK	1	13/10/81 -	09/11/81
3150	LEBANON WAR	1	05/06/82 -	17/05/83
3155	OGADEN III	2	30/06/82 -	31/08/82
3180	LIBYA THREAT-SUDAN	2	11/02/83 -	22/02/83
3190	CHAD/NIGERIA CLASHES	2	18/04/83 -	02/07/83
3210	CHAD/LIBYA VI	2	24/06/83 -	11/12/84

NO.	CRISIS NAME	TYPE	TRIGGER DATE	TERMINATION DATE
3250	BOTSWANA/ZIMBABWE BRD.	2	08/11/83 -	21/12/83
3260	SUDAN/ETHIOPIA BORDER	2	20/11/83 -	20/02/84
3275	BASRA-KHARG ISLAND	2	21/02/84 -	11/07/84
3510	BURKINA FASO/MALI BRD.	2	20/12/85 -	18/01/86
3500	EGYPT-LIBYA TENSIONS	2	23/11/85 -	03/12/85
3530	CHAD/LIBYA VII	2	10/02/86 -	99/05/86
3570	REBEL ATTACK-UGANDA	1	19/08/86 -	20/09/86
3610	CHAD/LIBYA VIII	2	12/12/86 -	11/09/87
3630	PUNJAB WAR SCARE II	1	15/01/87 -	19/02/87
3640	SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA BDR.	2	12/02/87 -	99/04/87
3645	SYRIAN INT. LEBANON	2	15/02/87 -	06/04/87
3650	WESTERN SAHARA	2	25/02/87 -	04/05/87
3670	NIGERIA-CAMEROON BDR.	2	02/05/87 -	26/09/87
3680	INDIA INT. SRI LANKA	1	03/06/87 -	30/07/87

TABLE 6.3  
 INTERSTATE ETHNIC CRISES: FREQUENCIES  
 SYSTEM LEVEL

	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
SECESSIONIST	1	63	16.2	16.2	16.2
IRREDENTIST	2	103	26.4	26.4	42.6
NON-ETHNIC	3	224	57.4	57.4	100.0
		390	100.0	100.0	

ACTOR LEVEL

	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
SECESSIONIST	1	117	14.2	14.2	14.2
IRREDENTIST	2	227	27.5	27.5	41.7
NON-ETHNIC	3	482	58.3	58.3	100.0
		826	100.0	100.0	

of World War II; (2) 1945-1962 refers to the period recognized as bipolar and (3) 1963-1988 corresponds to the period known as polycentric (see Brecher, James & Wilkenfeld 1988).<sup>8</sup> By examining these three periods separately it may be possible to determine if there are similarities or differences among them. For example, the period after the First World war was characterized by irredentist strife and nation building in Europe. Similar patterns occurred in Asia, Africa and the Middle East after World War Two.

Insert Table 6.4 Here

An examination of Table 6.4 reveals that the polycentric period was **most prone** to the outbreak of interstate ethnic conflict - by a margin of twice that of each of the other two periods. Of the remaining 48%, the inter-war period and the bipolar are almost equal in the distribution of ethnic conflicts. Not surprisingly, the majority of ethnic conflicts during the inter-war period were centered in Europe, a time of nationalist upheaval and territorial transition. This was also a period in which there were few states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia (Chazan 1991). For example, there are 25 European cases (57%) for this period compared to only 2 cases between 1945 and 1962 (6%) and 4 cases (5%) in the polycentric period. This transition suggests that regions, in which there are many new states, are more susceptible to interstate ethnic strife.

For example, the weak states of Africa have been witness to the majority of international crises overall (38%) with all 64 occurring in the latter half of this century. The African states

TABLE 6.4  
INTERSTATE ETHNIC CRISES: SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DOMAIN

PERIOD	REGION					
	ASIA	M.E.	AFRICA	EUROPE	S.A.	
1928-1939	3 (7)	11 (25)	-	25 (57)	5 (11)	44 (100) (26)
1945-1962	17 (47)	8 (22)	9 (25)	2 (6)	-	36 (100) (22)
1963-1988	7 (8)	19 (22)	55 (64)	4 (5)	1 (1)	86 (100) (52)
	27 (17)	38 (23)	64 (38)	31 (19)	6 (3)	166 (100)

Numbers in parantheses are percentages.

also make up the bulk of cases during the polycentric period (64%). The Middle East has experienced the second highest level of ethnic turmoil - 38 of 166 cases (23%). The bipolar period (1945-1962) experienced its greatest number of ethnic conflicts in Asia (47%) a period in which most of the states of Asia gained independence. The 17 Asian crises that occurred during this period contribute to an overall total of 27 Asian interstate ethnic crises (17% of the total). The remaining conflicts took place in South America, with 5 of the 6 territorial conflicts occurring between the two major wars. This final result can be inferred from Tables 6.5 and 6.6 which provide the spatial and temporal characteristics of secessionist and irredentist conflicts respectively.

Insert Table 6.5 Here

For example, Table 6.5 indicates that more than 90% (57 of 63) of secessionist conflicts occurred after 1945 with the majority of these, (60% or 38 of 63) during the polycentric period. Again, Africa has witnessed the greatest number of secessionist-based ethnic conflicts with 51% (32 of 63 cases) coded as secessionist. Asia follows with 27% (17 of 63 cases) secessionist cases, trailed by the Middle East 16% (10 of 63) and Europe with 6% of the cases (or 4 of the 63).

TABLE 6.5

INTERSTATE SECESSIONIST CRISES: SPATIAL-TEMPORAL  
CHARACTERISTICS

PERIOD	REGION				
	ASIA	ME	AFRICA	EUROPE	
1928-1939	1 (17)	1 (17)	-	4 (66)	6 (100) (10)
1945-1962	12 (63)	2 (11)	5 (26)	-	19 (100) (30)
1963-1988	4 (11)	7 (18)	27 (71)		38 (100) (60)
	17 (27)	10 (16)	32 (51)	4 (6)	63 (100)

Insert Table 6.6 Here

Table 6.6 reveals that Africa is slightly preferred as the location of states making irredentist claims 31% (32 of 103), followed closely by the Middle East with 27% cases (28 of the total); and Europe with 27 cases. Not surprisingly, Europe reverses the relationship found in Africa, the Middle East and Asia over time. Of those irredentist crises occurring during the multipolar period more than half (55%) took place in Europe. Rounding out the totals, Asia has been witness to 10% of irredentist crises (10 cases of the total) and South America 6% (6 of the total).

The significance of these results is threefold. First, they appear to be valid. For example, the findings are in agreement with those of the Minorities at Risk Project (MRP). MRP finds that Africa has the largest number of groups subject to relatively severe discrimination (Gurr 1992: 20) and that the potential for minority-based conflict in Africa is high - "...once violence begins, it often escalates to very high intensity." (Gurr 1992: 29). Within the Third World in its entirety, half of all minorities (89 of 179) are separatist with the Middle East and Asia having minorities with the highest levels of involvement in political conflict (Gurr 1992: 28). On the other hand, Latin and South American minorities have substantially the lowest levels of all dimensions of political action since 1945 (Gurr 1992: 29). The quiescence of minorities in these regions is consistent with the observation that South America has produced the fewest ethnically based ethnic crises during this period. MRP also found that since 1945, minorities in western democracies have the highest non-violent political behaviour and below average levels of rebellion which is consistent with the results presented here (Gurr 1992: 28).<sup>9</sup>



TABLE 6.6

INTERSTATE IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
SPATIAL-TEMPORAL CHARACTERISTICS

PERIOD	GEOGRAPHIC REGION						
	ASIA	M.E.	AFRICA	EUROPE	S.A.		
1928-1939	2 (5)	10 (26)	-	21 (55)	5 (14)	38 (100)	(38)
1945-1962	5 (29)	6 (35)	4 (24)	2 (12)	-	17 (100)	(17)
1963-1988	3 (6)	12 (25)	28 (58)	4 (8)	1 (2)	48 (100)	(48)
	10 (10)	28 (27)	32 (31)	27 (26)	6 (6)	103 (100)	

## *2.2 Variations in Time and Space*

These results are also significant in two crucial areas. As noted, the frequency of ethnic conflict varies by time and period. Certain periods, clusters of states and possibly entire regions, appear to be more susceptible to interstate ethnic conflict than others. For example, the post-World War Two period is characterized by a growth of conflicts in Asia and Africa. In fact these regions account for more than **half the crises in total**; 75% of the crises during the bipolar period and 72% of the crises after 1962. In contrast, Europe accounts for 56% of the crises during the inter-war years, but only 5% after 1962.

This finding has important implications for the model. Thus far, assumptions about preference formation, and the propensity for using force have been made independent of time and place. This may explain why the model has not been able to determine, conclusively, why the leaders of some constrained and ethnically diverse states develop confrontational policies and use more forceful techniques of crisis management than would be expected. In other words, states with poor "system maintenance functions" may be more "prone" to interstate ethnic conflict than others. The regimes of new multi-ethnic states, whether constrained or not, may be more susceptible to ethnically-based security dilemmas, than the regimes of established states. This idea is given attention in section 4 of this chapter.

The number of states within the system also varies across time and region. For example, there were fewer states in the system during the inter-war years, compared to the bipolar and polycentric periods. The post-Second World War phase of decolonization introduced many new and weak states into the system, which for obvious reasons, increases the potential number of

ethnic affinities between states and ethnic cleavages within states (Calvert 1986). Thus, the potential for increases in interstate conflict may be a function of these factors which impinge on a state's security. Simply put, as discussed in previous chapters, affinities and cleavages, provide opportunities for internal disruption or external involvement leading to interstate conflict. To place this in the framework of the model, as the domestic and international opportunities for states to pursue their ethnic foreign policy objectives increase, the greater the potential for ethnically-based security dilemmas and the more likely that interstate ethnic conflict will be generated. Research on ethnic strife supports these conclusions.

For example, as Chazan et. al. (1991) argue, there have been three great waves of state building, each following the collapse of empires: South America in the 19th century (the Spanish Empire); Europe after World War I (Russia, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Turkey); and Asia and Africa after World II (Belgium, Holland, France, Britain and Portugal). All of these systemic transitions were associated with the creation of new states through irredentist turmoil and secessionist strife. Eastern Europe was one of the most effected regions after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Similar processes occurred in Africa and Asia because of decolonization (Calvert 1986; Azar & Moon 1988) but unlike the elites of the new European nations; the leaders of African and Asian states were faced with three compounding problems which enhanced their perception of insecurity. The borders they had to defend were far more arbitrary, (increasing transnational affinities between states); their societies were usually more diverse in composition; and few leaders had experience in building inclusive civic and democratic cultures. In essence, the security threats of these states were as much internal as external (Azar & Moon 1988).

In brief, these very weak states may be more prone to involvement than would be predicted by examining their institutional constraints alone. As suggested in previous chapters, internal cleavage and transnational affinities can enhance a state's insecurity. The absence of interstate ethnic strife in South America supports this conclusion. Although homogenous, these states also have lower levels of internal cleavage and very low levels of transnational affinities, conditions which were identified in chapters three, four and five as necessary for interstate ethnic conflict (see for example Chaco I in Table 6.14, and McClintock 1992).

As chapters four and five indicate, the political systems of ethnically diverse and institutionally constrained developing states are also prone to outbidding (India, Sri Lanka) which can enhance the potential for interstate conflict. On other occasions, through the processes of reverberation, the leaders of these states (Sri Lanka) make decisions as if they were in control of a single dominant ethnic group which can enhance confrontation between the state-centre and minority ethnic groups.

On other occasions, new states experience levels of domestic order (Somalia, Ethiopia) that divide a state's elites thus making decision making difficult and prolonging a crisis or plunging a country into a protracted conflict with the consequence of inviting external intervention.

In brief, regional instability or the number of states, simply provide additional opportunities for interstate ethnic conflict. It is the internal characteristics of the states themselves in conjunction with cleavages and affinities that will determine whether states will pursue such opportunities. **As the number of weak states in the system increase, the potential for interstate ethnic conflict also increases.** New regimes faced with internal stability may not

be as successful in managing ethnic tensions as those that have had a chance to develop. In this context it is important to note that the system is currently in a fourth systemic transition, following the break up of the Soviet Union. If the above evidence is correct, the potential for interstate ethnic conflict **should increase** as a consequence of the number of new states in the system.

### *2.3 The Major Powers and Interstate Ethnic Conflict*

An alternative view suggested by Rosh (1987) is that, on average, ethnic conflicts escalate to crises because they take place in regions that have important geo-strategic value to old states, such as the U.S., the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom. This could be the case for the inter-war period, because of the proximity of the conflicts to the major powers (see below and Chazan 1991). And for the period after 1945, in which nuclear weapons prevented the main non-ethnic conflict (the Cold War) from being violent, the superpowers became involved in proxy wars, the ethnic conflicts of allies and clients in geo-strategically salient and insecure regions.

The suggestion that interstate ethnic strife can be explained by external major power involvement runs counter to the model developed here, and merits further examination. Table 6.7 provides some answers to these questions.

Insert Table 6.7 Here

TABLE 6.7  
 CRISIS ACTORS IN INTERSTATE ETHNIC CRISES

PERIOD	NUMBER OF CRISIS ACTORS				
	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+	
1928-1939	18 (41)	18 (41)	3 (7)	5 (11)	44 (100) (26)
1945-1962	12 (33)	19 (53)	1 (3)	4 (11)	36 (100) (22)
1963-1988	35 (41)	29 (34)	17 (20)	5 (5)	86 (100) (52)
	65 (40)	66 (40)	21 (12)	14 (8)	166 (100)

The first to be considered is the number of crisis actors. Table 6.7 shows the number of crisis actors over the three periods. Seventy-nine percent of the 166 crises involved one or two crisis actors. 39%, single actor crises, over the three periods and 40%, two crisis actors.

The results also indicate that single actor crises were as likely to occur during the interwar period than after. Others are dyadic crises (especially those during the polycentric period). Most irredenta are dyadic conflicts initiated by the threats to territory of one state toward another (eg. India-Pakistan, Chad-Libya).<sup>10</sup> Secessionist conflicts, on the other hand, usually involve internal threats to a regime. Therefore it is not surprising that the data comprise a sizable number of single-actor crises.

Judging from the lower percentages of multiple-actor crises, these conflicts appear to spillover into crises for the allies of the main participants only occasionally. Thus, the potential for major powers to be crisis actors in these situations appears to be relatively low. To the extent that a larger number of multiple actor crises would be expected as a result of major power involvement, the geo-strategic argument finds less support. Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 may prove more conclusive in resolving this debate.

Insert Table 6.8 Here

Table 6.8 indicates whether, in fact, the major powers are likely to become involved in interstate ethnic crises.<sup>11</sup> The results are not particularly supportive of the argument that interstate ethnic conflicts are associated with of great power or superpower involvement. For example, a minimum of 63% (multipolar) and maximum of 88% (polycentric) of interstate ethnic

TABLE 6.8  
MAJOR POWER INVOLVEMENT

PERIOD	LOW-NO	HIGH	
1928-1939	28 (63)	16 (37)	44 (100) (26)
1945-1962	34 (95)	2 (5)	36 (100) (22)
1963-1988	76 (88)	10 (12)	86 (100) (51)
	138 (83)	28 (17)	166 (100)



crises had very low or no involvement by the major powers. This suggests that such conflicts do not attract as much major power interest as suggested by Rosh. The Indo-Sri Lanka case, in which major power involvement was low, tends to support this conclusion. The Somalia-Ethiopia case also shows that direct major power involvement is likely to be low. Although, in this case, the Soviet Union was instrumental in providing armaments and logistic support to Ethiopia, the United States remained aloof until after the war of 1977-78. It is possible, given the evidence, that these conflicts have their own dynamics independent of geo-strategic and major power concerns (Holmes 1989). As noted by conflict extension arguments in chapter two, low levels of major power involvement, reflects their concerted effort to prevent conflict diffusion. Major powers tend to intervene only if there is the potential for conflict expansion to the dominant system. This may mean that the security issues, represented by transnational affinities and cleavages are perceived as less threatening to external actors. Thus, it is possible that conventional measures of regional and global insecurity such as geo-strategic salience do not capture the full meaning of ethnically-based security dilemmas. Tables 6.9 and 6.10 provide some insight into this view.

Insert Tables 6.9 and 6.10 Here

Tables 6.9 and 6.10 assess the geostrategic salience of secessionist and irredentist conflicts. Table 6.9 indicates that no secessionist conflict was salient to the global system or the dominant system. Only 5 (8%) were salient to more than one subsystem (eg. Indonesian

TABLE 6.9  
 INTERSTATE SECESSIONIST CRISES: GEOSTRATEGIC SALIENCE  
 SALIENCE\*

PERIOD	ONE	TWO+	
1928-1939	3 (50)	3 (50)	6 (100) (10)
1945-1962	18 (95)	1 (5)	19 (100) (30)
1963-1988	37 (97)	1 (3)	38 (100) (60)
	58 (92)	5 (8)	63 (100)

\* No salience beyond subsystem level.

TABLE 6.10

## INTERSTATE IRREDENTIST CRISES: GEOSTRATEGIC SALIENCE

PERIOD	SALIENCE			
	ONE SUBSYSTEM	MORE THAN ONE SUBSYSTEM	DOMINANT SYSTEM+ SUBSYSTEM	
1928-1939	26 (68)	11 (30)	1 (2)	38 (100) (38)
1945-1962	17 (100)	-	-	17 (100) (17)
1963-1988	43 (90)	3 (6)	2 (4)	48 (100) (48)
	86 (83)	14 (14)	3 (3)	103 (100)

independence). Irredentist crises show broader salience to several sub-systems and to the dominant system (East-West) 3% of the total, but again none is salient to the global system.

What conclusions are possible based on this evidence? First, taken together, all the distributions indicate that interstate ethnic conflicts may possess characteristics, such as **perceptions of security based on affinities and cleavage independent of geo-strategic salience**. To be sure, during the Cold War, as long as the character of the international political system was shaped by superpower bipolarity, the dangers of intervention and the tendency for peripheral conflicts to acquire an East-West dimension militated against overt involvement by the major powers. Yet, all three periods appear to share the characteristics of low major power involvement and low geostrategic salience, so it may be erroneous to assign too much importance to the elements of order within the Cold War (Cooper & Berdal 1993). This pattern is similar for both irredentist and secessionist strife through the three periods.

Second, the pattern of national upheaval and interstate ethnic strife that occurred first in Europe and to a lesser extent in South America, appears to also have taken place among the new states, first in Asia, and the Middle East and then in Africa after 1962. Although interstate ethnic conflict appears to have occurred in different regions at different times, the processes (internal and external) associated with such conflict may be similar across time and space.

In conclusion, the evidence does not identify the constellation of variables associated with the onset of interstate ethnic crises, but this process does appear to occur in the absence of direct major power involvement. It is possible then, as this thesis has argued, that interstate ethnic conflicts are characterized by a set of interactions and properties that can be partly understood from a **new perspective**, one in which factors that relate to the perceived insecurity

of the states directly involved are given explanatory power. In the following sections, this assumption will be assessed.

### *3. Operationalization and Description of the Independent Variables*

#### *3.1 Institutional Constraint*

As argued in chapter three, institutional constraints influence the kinds of decisions that elites make when confronted with an interstate ethnic crisis. Chapters four and five indicated that institutions have an influence on the substantive aspects of decision making (eg. Sri Lanka, India). In other instances low levels of institutionalization shape mass-elite interactions leading to different decisions (Somalia, Ethiopia). The political system variables selected for this study are ordinal measures designed to capture both the breadth and depth of institutionalization identified in chapters four and five. Justification for using institutional constraint as an independent variable was provided in chapter three. Briefly, institutional constraint is used because it measures the extent to which the political system enables the masses to influence political elites. There are of course multiple ways in which this occurs and therefore more than one indicator is used.

Data for the political systems of each individual state is taken from Polity II data assembled by Gurr et. al. (1990). The data are arranged so that the cases correspond with "polities" defined as the basic political arrangements by which national political communities govern their affairs (Gurr 1974, 1983, 1990) and the data are presented as characterizing a given polity for its duration. A polity persists as long as there are no significant changes in these

political arrangements. The crisis actors are coded to the value the polity assumed on the variables at the time of the crisis. In the event that there is a change in polity between the onset and termination of a crisis, coding is specified for the polity prior to, or at the onset of the crisis.<sup>12</sup> Each variable directly measures differences in political constraint: degree of decisional constraints designed to measure the independence of executive authority (XCONST); executive regulation of the chief executive designed to measure executive recruitment (XRREG); and the regulation of participation (PARREG) designed to measure the extent of political competition and opposition. Descriptions of each category for each of the variables are presented in separate tables. The descriptions of each category are taken directly from the Gurr (1990) Polity II Handbook. Sometimes, (ie the intermediate category) no additional information is provided.

Country examples, taken from the data used in this analysis, are provided as examples for each category. Caution should be used in interpreting them as constraints change over time. For a more precise assessment of the polity that a state assumed at a given time see Table 6.14.

Insert Table 6.11 Here

Table 6.11 refers to the variable measuring executive constraint, (XCONST) the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. A seven-category scale is used.<sup>13</sup>

TABLE 6.11

XCONST: Executive Constraint

- 1) Unlimited Authority - There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (Dahomey, 1963):
  
- 2) Intermediate Category (Syria, 1967):
  
- 3) Slight to Moderate Limitations on Executive Authority - there are some real but limited restraints on the executive (Indonesia, 1963):
  
- 4) Intermediate Category (Pakistan, 1951):
  
- 5) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority - the executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints (Mauritania, 1962):
  
- 6) Intermediate Category (Cyprus, 1974):
  
- 7) Executive Parity or Subordination - accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity (United Kingdom, 1961):

Insert Table 6.12 Here

Table 6.12 refers to executive regulation, (XRREG) the way in which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power (Gurr 1990). Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of domestic political constraints.

Insert Table 6.13 Here

Table 6.13 refers to the extent of participation regulation (PARREG). Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when and whether and how political preferences are expressed. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension.

Upon inspection of these categories it becomes evident that within any given polity, regime type and political constraints are **not synonymous**. For example, pre-1989 Soviet Union would code high on at least two of the variables in terms of constraints on executives (XRREG and PARREG) but the regime was clearly not a democracy. Similarly, an autocratic regime characterized by familial executive selection shows higher levels of constraint than the concept authoritarian would imply. In other words the three variables selected tap into the concept of institutional and political constraint in a different way than the dichotomous treatment by regime type.<sup>14</sup>



TABLE 6.12

XRREG: Executive Regulation

1) Unregulated - changes in executive occur through forceful seizures of power (Yemen, 1962):

2) Designational/transitional - Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (ie one party systems or rigged multiparty systems) (USSR, 1938):

3) Regulated - Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession (Saudi Arabia, 1966) or competitive elections (India, 1971).

TABLE 6.13

PARREG: Participation Regulation

- 1) Unregulated Participation - political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations (Czechoslovakia, 1919):
  
- 2) Factional or Transitional - there are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level (Bangladesh, 1971):
  
- 3) Factional/Restricted - polities which oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and restriction (Turkey, 1974):
  
- 4) Restricted - some organized political participation without intense factionalism but significant groups, issues and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process (Sudan, 1983):
  
- 5) Regulated - relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion (Belgium, 1936).

Coding of the institutional constraint variables for each crisis actor is provided in Table 6.14 along with the actors name the crisis name and each actor's triggering entity. The three constraint variables were selected among other possible choices, because it was believed that each would measure a different aspect of constraint and thus together capture a fuller meaning of the term. The frequencies, tend in part, to bear this out. The frequencies of XCONST, XRREG, PARREG are provided in Tables 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17. Examining the frequency distributions for each institutional constraint variable provides some insight into the "average" type of state. For example, Table 6.15, indicates that the majority of executive constraints fall on either ends of the distribution with a more modest number of cases falling in the slight or limited categories. Very few states (less than 16) are found in one of the intermediate categories. It does appear, however that the "average" state has slight or low constraints on its leaders. Executive regulation on the other hand appears to tap a different measure of constraint, since of its three categories, over 50% of the states fall into the highest category, regulated, while far fewer have unregulated political systems. The third variable, regulation of participation, also appears to measure constraint differently than the other two. For example, 40% of the cases fall into one category, namely those states that have restricted participation. Taken together, the evidence from the frequency tables suggests that each variable is tapping a different aspect of constraint. The correlations of the independent and mediating variables in Table 6.24 also provide support for this conclusion. For example, XCONST and XRREG are more strongly correlated (.61) than they are with the variable PARREG (.25).

Insert Tables 6.14, 6.15, 6.16, 6.17 Here

### *3.2 Ethnic Composition*

An index that measures the ethnic composition of a state is constructed to tap the internal demographic and ethnic characteristics of each crisis actor. As demonstrated in chapters four and five, variations in ethnic composition, in conjunction with institutional constraints, are associated with differences in behaviour between states in ethnic conflict settings. In operational terms, the relationship between institutional constraints and interstate conflict is contingent on its ethnic composition. Note that under this definition, a contingency factor is not a mediator or covariate. Ethnic composition does not mediate the relationship between domestic political constraints and foreign policy preferences; it moderates that relationship (Babbie 1979). That is, the preference for a certain kind of ethnic foreign policy is the result of the interactive effects of ethnic composition and institutional constraints.

Chapters four and five were used to operationalize this variable in the context of case study research. As shown in chapter four, a state can be characterized by a diverse number of ethnic groups and also exhibit the characteristics of cleavage (India). Similarly, some states may have only a few ethnic groups but the divisions between these groups may be fractionalized (Sri Lanka). This study intends to tap into these two constructs separately. A state's ethnic composition, whether diverse or homogenous is **not synonymous** with its level of cleavage though they may be related. Composition is a structural characteristic of a state. Thus, the index of ethnic composition (**CMPSTN**) measures the diversity of ethnic groups in terms of the

TABLE 6.14

ACTOR LEVEL DATA - SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
 INSTITUTIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

NO.	ACTOR CODE	CRISIS	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	AFF	TRIGENT	
7	UNK	2	TRANSCAUCASIA	5	3	3	2	3	3	365
7	TUR	2	TRANSCAUCASIA	7	3	2	3	2	1	365
7	USR	2	TRANSCAUCASIA	3	1	3	4	5	1	640
7	GER	2	TRANSCAUCASIA	5	3	2	1	5	1	640
19	USR	1	BALTIC INDEPENDENCE	2	2	4	4	3	1	366
19	EST	1	BALTIC INDEPENDENCE	7	3	5	2	4	3	365
19	LIT	1	BALTIC INDEPENDENCE	7	3	4	2	4	3	365
19	LAT	1	BALTIC INDEPENDENCE	7	3	2	3	4	3	365
22	CZE	2	TESCHEN	7	3	1	4	3	1	290
22	POL	2	TESCHEN	7	3	2	1	1	0	315
25	HUN	2	HUNGARIAN WAR	1	1	4	2	1	0	220
25	CZE	2	HUNGARIAN WAR	7	3	1	4	3	1	310
25	HUN	2	HUNGARIAN WAR	1	1	4	2	1	0	220
25	RUM	2	HUNGARIAN WAR	3	3	3	1	3	1	310
28	AFG	1	THIRD AFGHAN WAR	1	3	3	3	3	1	200
28	UNK	1	THIRD AFGHAN WAR	7	3	2	3	2	1	700
31	ITA	2	SMYRNA	5	3	3	1	1	4	350
37	USR	2	BESSARABIA	3	1	3	4	5	1	360
37	RUM	2	BESSARABIA	3	3	3	1	3	1	365
40	SWD	1	AALAND ISLANDS	7	3	5	1	1	0	375
43	FRN	1	CILICIAN WAR	7	3	2	2	3	4	640
52	IRN	2	PERSIANBORDER	1	1	1	4	2	2	365
55	TUR	2	GREECE-TURKEY WAR I	1	1	1	2	3	3	350
58	POL	2	VILNA I	7	3	2	1	1	0	368
58	LIT	2	VILNA I	7	3	4	2	2	3	290
61	LIT	2	VILNA II	7	3	4	2	2	3	290
63	TUR	2	GREECE-TURKEY WAR II	1	1	1	2	3	3	350
63	TUR	2	GREECE-TURKEY WAR II	1	1	1	2	3	3	350
63	TUR	2	GREECE-TURKEY WAR II	1	1	1	2	3	3	350
63	TUR	2	GREECE-TURKEY WAR II	1	1	1	2	3	3	350
75	AUS	1	AUSTRIAN SEPARATISTS	7	3	2	1	1	0	345
76	ALB	2	ALBANIAN BORDERS	1	1	1	3	2	1	345
76	YUG	2	ALBANIAN BORDERS	5	3	2	4	4	2	339
78	AUS	2	BURGENLAND DISPUTE	7	3	2	1	1	0	310
83	GRC	2	GREECE-TURKEY WAR III	3	3	3	1	1	4	640
89	POL	2	RUHR I	7	3	2	1	1	0	365
89	GER	2	RUHR I	5	3	2	1	1	4	997
89	NTH	2	RUHR I	7	3	5	2	1	0	997
92	GRC	2	CORFU INCIDENT	1	1	3	1	1	4	325
95	GER	2	RUHR II	5	3	2	1	5	4	220
95	FRN	2	RUHR II	7	3	5	2	3	4	260
98	SAU	2	NEJD-HIJAZ WAR	1	3	4	1	2	4	672
101	UNK	2	MOSUL LAND DISPUTE	7	3	5	3	2	1	640

TABLE 6.14

ACTOR LEVEL DATA - SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
 INSTITUTIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

NO.	ACTOR CODE	CRISIS	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	APF	TRIGENT	
101	TUR	2	MOSUL LAND DISPUTE	3	2	4	2	3	3	200
107	GRC	1	GREECE-BULGARIAN FRONT	1	1	4	1	1	4	355
107	BUL	1	GREECE-BULGARIAN FRONT	3	2	3	3	5	1	350
116	YUG	2	ALBANIA	5	3	2	4	4	2	997
116	ALB	2	ALBANIA	1	2	4	3	2	1	345
116	ITA	2	ALBANIA	1	1	1	1	1	4	345
155	BOL	2	CHACO I	3	3	3	3	1	2	150
155	PAR	2	CHACO I	3	1	3	1	1	0	145
180	JAP	2	MUKDEN INCIDENT	7	3	3	1	1	0	705
180	CNA	2	MUKDEN INCIDENT	1	2	3	1	5	4	740
185	BOL	2	CHACO II	3	3	3	3	1	2	150
185	PAR	2	CHACO II	3	1	3	1	1	0	145
190	PER	2	LETICIA	1	2	4	3	2	2	100
190	COL	2	LETICIA	1	2	3	1	2	0	135
195	SAU	2	SAUDI-YEMEN WAR	1	3	4	1	2	4	678
195	YEM	2	SAUDI-YEMEN WAR	1	3	4	3	5	3	670
235	TUR	2	BULGARIA/TURKEY I	3	2	4	2	3	3	355
235	BUL	2	BULGARIA/TURKEY I	1	3	4	2	2	1	640
235	BUL	2	BULGARIA/TURKEY II	1	3	4	2	2	1	640
255	RUM	2	REMILITARIZE-RHINE	3	3	3	1	3	1	260
255	FRN	2	REMILITARIZE-RHINE	7	3	5	2	3	4	260
255	UNK	2	REMILITARIZE-RHINE	7	3	5	3	2	1	260
255	BEL	2	REMILITARIZE-RHINE	7	3	5	3	2	1	260
255	CZE	2	REMILITARIZE-RHINE	7	3	1	4	3	1	260
255	POL	2	REMILITARIZE-RHINE	3	2	4	1	1	0	260
255	YUG	2	REMILITARIZE-RHINE	1	3	4	4	4	2	260
265	PER	2	MARANON I	1	2	4	3	2	2	130
295	TUR	2	ALEXANDRETTA	3	2	4	2	3	3	220
295	FRN	2	ALEXANDRETTA	7	3	5	2	2	4	640
295	FRN	2	ALEXANDRETTA	7	3	5	2	2	4	640
295	FRN	2	ALEXANDRETTA	7	3	5	2	2	4	640
295	FRN	2	ALEXANDRETTA	7	3	5	2	2	4	640
295	FRN	2	ALEXANDRETTA	7	3	5	2	2	4	640
301	CZE	2	CZECH MAY CRISIS	7	3	1	4	3	1	260
301	GER	2	CZECH MAY CRISIS	1	2	4	1	1	4	315
301	UNK	2	CZECH MAY CRISIS	7	3	5	3	2	1	260
301	FRN	2	CZECH MAY CRISIS	7	3	5	2	2	4	260
305	LIT	2	POLISH ULTIMATUM	1	2	4	2	3	3	290
313	HON	2	POSTAGE STAMP CRISIS	3	2	3	2	5	0	93
313	NIC	2	POSTAGE STAMP CRISIS	1	2	4	2	1	0	91
315	AUS	2	ANSCHLUESS	5	3	2	1	5	0	260
315	GER	2	ANSCHLUESS	1	2	4	1	1	4	305
321	USR	2	MUNICH	1	2	4	4	3	1	315
321	FRN	2	MUNICH	7	3	5	2	3	4	260
321	UNK	2	MUNICH	7	3	5	3	2	1	260

TABLE 6.14

ACTOR LEVEL DATA - SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
 INSTITUTIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

NO.	ACTOR CODE	CRISIS	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	AFF	TRIGENT	
321	CZE	2	MUNICH	7	3	1	4	5	1	995
323	POL	2	DANZIG	1	1	1	1	1	0	260
327	CZE	2	CZECH ANNEXATION	7	3	1	4	3	1	260
329	USR	2	NOMONHAN	1	2	4	4	3	1	740
329	JAP	2	NOMONHAN	7	3	3	1	1	0	712
331	LIT	2	MEMEL	1	2	4	2	3	3	260
540	YUG	2	TRIESTE I	1	1	1	4	4	2	997
540	UNK	2	TRIESTE I	7	3	5	3	2	1	345
540	USA	2	TRIESTE I	7	3	5	3	1	1	345
590	IND	2	JUNAGADH	7	3	5	4	3	3	996
590	PAK	2	JUNAGADH	1	3	2	3	3	2	750
592	IND	2	KASHMIR I	7	3	5	4	3	3	770
592	PAK	2	KASHMIR I	1	3	2	3	3	2	750
600	SYR	2	PALESTINE PARTITION	5	3	1	3	4	4	996
600	UAR	2	PALESTINE PARTITION	7	3	3	1	2	4	996
600	IRQ	2	PALESTINE PARTITION	3	3	3	2	4	3	996
600	LEB	2	PALESTINE PARTITION	3	3	3	3	5	4	996
610	NTH	1	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE	7	3	5	2	1	4	996
610	INS	1	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE	1	2	1	4	3	2	210
611	NTH	1	INDONESIAN INDEP. II	7	3	5	2	1	0	996
611	INS	1	INDONESIAN INDEP. II	7	2	1	4	3	2	210
640	UAR	2	ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE	7	3	3	1	2	4	997
640	IRQ	2	ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE	3	3	3	2	5	3	997
640	ISR	2	ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE	7	3	5	2	4	1	997
640	JOR	2	ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE	1	3	2	2	4	4	997
640	LEB	2	ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE	3	3	3	3	5	4	997
640	SYR	2	ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE	5	3	1	3	4	4	997
645	IND	1	HYDERABAD	7	3	5	4	3	3	996
667	INS	1	INDONESIAN INDEP. III	1	2	1	4	4	2	210
667	NTH	1	INDONESIAN INDEP. III	7	3	5	2	1	0	850
670	ISR	2	SINAI INCURSION	7	2	1	2	4	1	200
670	UAR	2	SINAI INCURSION	7	3	3	1	2	4	666
670	UNK	2	SINAI INCURSION	7	3	5	3	2	1	666
680	AFG	1	PUSHTUNISTAN I	1	3	4	3	4	1	770
680	PAK	1	PUSHTUNISTAN I	3	3	4	3	3	2	700
760	ISR	2	TELMUTILLAH	7	3	5	2	4	1	652
760	SYR	2	TELMUTILLAH	7	2	3	3	4	4	666
763	IND	2	PUNJAB WAR	7	3	5	4	2	3	770
763	PAK	2	PUNJAB WAR	4	3	2	3	3	2	750
785	BUR	1	BURMA	7	3	5	3	5	1	713
790	LAO	1	INVASION OF LAOS I	1	1	1	3	5	4	816
790	FRN	1	INVASION OF LAOS I	7	3	5	2	2	4	816
800	ITA	2	TRIESTE II	7	3	5	1	1	4	345
800	YUG	2	TRIESTE II	3	2	4	4	4	2	997
870	AFG	1	PUSHTUNISTAN II	1	3	4	3	4	1	770

TABLE 6.14

 ACTOR LEVEL DATA - SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
 INSTITUTIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

NO.	ACTOR CODE	CRISIS	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	AFF	TRIGENT	
870	PAK	1	PUSHTUNISTAN II	5	3	2	3	3	2	700
890	POR	2	GOA I	1	2	4	1	1	0	750
1000	SPN	1	IFNI	1	1	4	2	2	3	996
1050	NTH	1	WESTIRIAN I	7	3	5	2	1	0	850
1060	SUD	2	SUDAN-EGYPT BORDER	1	1	4	5	2	3	651
1070	TUN	1	TUNISIA-FRANCE I	3	2	4	2	1	4	220
1070	TUN	1	TUNISIA-FRANCE I	3	2	4	2	1	4	220
1071	TUN	1	TUNISIA-FRANCE II	3	2	4	2	1	4	220
1080	JOR	1	LEB.-IRAQ UPHEAVAL	3	3	4	2	4	4	996
1080	LEB	1	LEB.-IRAQ UPHEAVAL	3	3	3	3	5	4	995
1080	UNK	1	LEB.-IRAQ UPHEAVAL	7	3	5	3	2	1	996
1080	USA	1	LEB.-IRAQ UPHEAVAL	7	3	5	3	1	1	996
1100	CAM	2	CAMBODIA/THAILAND	1	2	4	2	2	1	800
1100	TAI	2	CAMBODIA/THAILAND	1	1	4	3	4	1	811
1180	IRQ	2	SHATT AL ARAB I	1	1	3	2	5	3	630
1180	IRN	2	SHATT AL ARAB I	1	3	4	4	3	2	645
1200	GHA	2	GHANA/TOGO BORDER DISP.	1	2	4	4	5	3	461
1220	ETH	2	ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA	1	1	4	3	5	2	520
1240	BEL	1	CONGO-KATANGA I	7	3	5	3	2	1	996
1240	CON	1	CONGO-KATANGA I	3	3	3	4	5	3	995
1240	CON	1	CONGO-KATANGA I	3	3	3	4	5	3	211
1260	SEN	1	MALI FEDERATION	3	3	4	4	3	2	432
1260	MLI	1	MALI FEDERATION	3	2	4	5	3	2	433
1290	KUW	2	KUWAIT INDEPENDENCE	3	3	4	1	1	4	645
1290	UNK	2	KUWAIT INDEPENDENCE	7	3	5	3	2	1	645
1330	PAK	1	PUSHTUNISTAN III	1	1	4	3	3	2	700
1330	PAK	1	PUSHTUNISTAN III	1	1	4	3	3	2	700
1330	AFG	1	PUSHTUNISTAN III	1	3	2	3	4	1	770
1370	INS	1	WEST IRIAN II	3-	2	3	4	4	2	210
1370	NTH	1	WEST IRIAN II	7	3	5	2	1	0	850
1377	POR	1	GOA II	1	2	4	1	1	0	750
1379	MAU	2	MAURATANIA/MALI	5	2	4	2	3	3	432
1395	SAU	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER I	1	3	4	1	2	4	678
1395	JOR	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER I	3	3	4	2	4	4	678
1395	UAR	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER I	3	2	4	1	2	4	670
1395	YEM	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER I	5	1	3	3	5	3	670
1401	SAU	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER II	1	3	4	1	2	4	651
1401	UAR	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER II	3	2	4	1	2	4	670
1401	YEM	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER II	5	1	3	3	5	3	996
1402	SAU	1	YEMEN/CLUSTER III	1	3	4	1	2	4	678
1402	UAR	1	YEMEN/CLUSTER III	3	2	4	1	2	4	670
1402	YEM	1	YEMEN/CLUSTER III	5	1	3	3	5	3	996
1403	SAU	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER IV	1	3	4	1	5	4	996
1403	UAR	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER IV	3	2	4	1	2	4	670
1403	YEM	1	YEMEN WAR-CLUSTER IV	3	1	2	3	5	3	996



TABLE 6.14

 ACTOR LEVEL DATA - SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
 INSTITUTIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

NO.	ACTOR CODE	CRISIS	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	AFF	TRIGENT	
1460	MAL	2	MALAYSIA FEDERATION	7	3	5	5	5	3	850
1460	MAL	2	MALAYSIA FEDERATION	7	3	5	5	5	3	850
1460	INS	2	MALAYSIA FEDERATION	3	2	3	4	4	2	997
1460	INS	2	MALAYSIA FEDERATION	3	2	3	4	4	2	996
1465	RWA	1	RWANDA/BURUNDI	1	2	3	3	4	4	996
1465	BUI	1	RWANDA/BURUNDI	3	3	2	2	4	1	545
1470	ALG	2	MOROCCO/ALGERIA BRD.	1	3	4	1	5	4	600
1470	MOR	2	MOROCCO/ALGERIA BRD.	3	3	4	3	1	3	615
1480	DAH	2	NIGER/DAHOMEY	1	1	2	4	3	3	436
1480	NIE	2	NIGER/DAHOMEY	3	2	4	5	5	2	434
1500	KEN	2	KENYA/SOMALIA	5	3	4	5	4	2	520
1520	CYP	2	CYPRUS I	1	3	2	3	4	3	640
1520	GRC	2	CYPRUS I	7	3	4	1	1	4	352
1520	TUR	2	CYPRUS I	7	3	5	2	3	3	352
1520	TUR	2	CYPRUS I	7	3	5	2	3	3	350
1520	GRC	2	CYPRUS I	7	3	4	1	1	4	640
1520	TUR	2	CYPRUS I	7	3	5	2	3	3	352
1550	ETH	2	OGADEN I	1	1	4	3	5	2	520
1550	SOM	2	OGADEN I	7	3	1	1	1	1	530
1570	BEL	1	CONGO II	7	3	5	3	2	1	996
1570	CON	1	CONGO II	5	2	4	4	5	3	995
1570	USA	1	CONGO II	7	3	5	3	1	1	996
1570	USR	1	CONGO II	3	2	4	4	3	1	997
1590	IND	2	RANN OF KUTCH	7	3	5	4	3	3	770
1590	PAK	2	RANN OF KUTCH	3	3	2	3	3	2	750
1591	IND	2	KASHMIR II	7	3	5	4	3	3	710
1591	PAK	2	KASHMIR II	3	3	2	3	3	2	750
1591	IND	2	KASHMIR II	7	3	5	4	3	3	770
1610	ZAM	1	RHODESIA'S UDI	3-	3	3	4	3	3	552
1620	GUI	1	GUINEA REGIME	3	2	4	4	1	2	995
1690	UAR	2	SIX DAY WAR	3	2	4	1	2	4	666
1690	ISR	2	SIX DAY WAR	7	3	5	2	4	1	651
1690	JOR	2	SIX DAY WAR	3	3	4	2	4	4	666
1690	USR	2	SIX DAY WAR	3	2	4	4	3	1	666
1690	SYR	2	SIX DAY WAR	1	2	3	3	4	4	666
1690	USA	2	SIX DAY WAR	7	3	5	3	1	1	365
1710	CYP	2	CYPRUS II	1	1	1	3	4	3	640
1710	GRC	2	CYPRUS II	1	1	4	1	1	4	640
1710	TUR	2	CYPRUS II	7	3	5	2	3	3	352
1782	IRQ	2	SHATT AL ARAB II	1	1	3	2	4	3	630
1782	IRN	2	SHATT AL ARAB II	1	3	4	4	3	2	645
1799	ISR	2	WAR OF ATTRITION I	7	3	5	2	4	1	651
1800	UAR	2	WAR OF ATTRITION II	3	2	4	1	2	4	666
1800	ISR	2	WAR OF ATTRITION II	7	3	5	2	4	1	365
1800	USR	2	WAR OF ATTRITION II	3	2	4	4	3	1	666

TABLE 6.14

ACTOR LEVEL DATA - SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
 INSTITUTIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

NO.	ACTOR CODE	CRISIS	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	AFF	TRIGENT	
1870	GUI	1	PORTUGESE INV-GUINEA	3	2	4	4	1	2	441
1890	BAN	1	BANGLADESH	7	3	2	2	3	3	770
1890	IND	1	BANGLADESH	7	3	5	4	4	2	770
1890	PAK	1	BANGLADESH	3	3	2	3	3	2	996
1890	PAK	1	BANGLADESH	3	3	2	3	5	2	750
1910	IBY	2	CHAD-LIBYA I	1	1	4	2	2	4	483
1910	CHA	2	CHAD-LIBYA I	1	2	4	5	3	3	995
1935	UGA	2	UGANDA/TANZANIA I	1	1	4	5	5	3	510
1935	TAZ	2	UGANDA/TANZANIA I	3	2	4	5	3	2	500
1940	UGA	2	UGANDA/TANZANIA II	1	1	4	5	4	3	996
1940	TAZ	2	UGANDA/TANZANIA II	3	2	4	5	3	2	996
1942	SYE	2	S/N YEMEN I	5	2	3	1	1	3	678
1942	YEM	2	S/N YEMEN I	3	1	3	1	5	3	681
1960	KUW	2	IRAQ INVASION/KUWAIT	3	3	4	1	1	4	645
2030	UAR	2	OCT. YOM KIPPUR WAR	3	2	4	1	2	4	666
2030	ISR	2	OCT. YOM KIPPUR WAR	7	3	5	2	4	1	997
2030	USR	2	OCT. YOM KIPPUR WAR	3	2	4	4	3	1	666
2030	SYR	2	OCT. YOM KIPPUR WAR	2	2	3	3	4	4	666
2030	USA	2	OCT. YOM KIPPUR WAR	7	3	5	3	1	1	997
2035	MUS	1	S. YEMEN AND OMAN	1	1	1	3	1	3	681
2040	CYP	2	CYPRUS III	6	3	2	3	5	3	995
2040	GRC	2	CYPRUS III	1	1	4	1	1	4	640
2040	TUR	2	CYPRUS III	7	2	3	2	3	3	352
2060	SPN	1	MOROCCAN MARCH	1	1	4	2	2	3	600
2060	MOR	1	MOROCCAN MARCH	1	3	4	3	1	3	230
2063	ALG	2	SAHARA	1	2	4	1	3	4	600
2063	MOR	2	SAHARA	1	3	4	3	1	3	615
2063	MAU	2	SAHARA	3	2	4	2	3	3	996
2103	INS	1	EAST TIMOR	3	2	4	4	5	2	996
2110	SYR	1	LEB. CIVIL WAR I	2	2	3	3	4	4	996
2115	SYR	2	IRAQI THREAT	2	2	3	3	4	4	645
2160	KEN	2	UGANDA CLAIMS	3	2	4	5	4	2	500
2180	RHO	1	OPERATION THRASHER	7	3	4	4	3	1	996
2180	MOZ	1	OPERATION THRASHER	2	2	4	4	3	3	552
2181	BOT	1	OPERATION TANGENT	7	3	5	3	1	1	552
2182	MOZ	1	MAPAI SEIZURE	2	2	4	4	3	3	552
2200	MAU	1	NOUAKCHOTT I	3	2	4	2	3	3	996
2211	MOZ	1	NAGOMIA RAID	2	2	4	4	3	3	552
2220	GRC	2	AEGEAN SEA	5	3	5	1	1	4	640
2350	COP	1	SHABA I	1	2	4	5	4	3	996
2350	ANG	1	SHABA I	3	2	3	5	5	3	490
2372	ZAM	1	RHODESIA RAIDS	3	2	4	4	3	3	552
2390	ETH	2	OGADEN II	3	1	4	3	5	2	996
2390	SOM	2	OGADEN II	1	1	4	1	1	1	530
2393	MAU	1	NAUAKCHOTT II	3	2	4	2	3	3	996

TABLE 6.14

ACTOR LEVEL DATA - SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
 INSTITUTIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

NO.	ACTOR CODE	CRISIS	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	AFF	TRIGENT	
2470	MOZ	1	CHIMOIO/TEMBUE RAIDS	2	2	4	4	3	3	552
2476	FRN	1	FRENCH HOSTAGES	7	3	5	2	2	4	996
2476	ALG	1	FRENCH HOSTAGES	1	2	4	1	3	4	220
2520	IBY	2	CHAD-LIBYA II	1	2	4	2	2	4	483
2520	CHA	2	CHAD-LIBYA II	1	1	3	5	5	3	996
2525	SYR	1	LEB. CIVIL WAR II	2	2	3	2	4	4	660
2570	ANG	1	SHABA II	3	2	3	5	5	3	490
2570	COP	1	SHABA II	1	2	4	5	4	3	996
2570	FRN	1	SHABA II	7	3	5	2	2	4	996
2570	BEL	1	SHABA II	7	3	5	3	2	1	996
2570	USA	1	SHABA II	7	3	5	3	1	1	996
2600	SYE	2	N/S YEMEN II	3	1	4	1	3	4	678
2600	YEM	2	N/S YEMEN II	3	2	3	1	3	3	681
2625	RHO	1	AIR RHODESIA INCIDENT	7	3	4	4	3	1	996
2625	ZAM	1	AIR RHODESIA INCIDENT	3	2	4	4	3	3	552
2666	MOR	1	TAN TAN	1	3	4	3	1	3	996
2710	FRN	2	CHAD-LIBYA III	7	3	5	2	2	4	620
2710	IBY	2	CHAD-LIBYA III	1	2	4	2	2	4	220
2710	CHA	2	CHAD-LIBYA III	1	1	3	5	5	3	620
2725	MOR	1	GOULIMIME-TARFAYA	1	3	4	3	1	3	996
2725	ALG	1	GOULIMIME-TARFAYA	1	2	4	1	3	4	600
2729	ZAM	1	RAIDS ON ZIPRA	3	2	4	4	3	3	552
2729	ANG	1	RAIDS ON ZIPRA	3	2	3	5	5	3	552
2729	RHO	1	RAIDS ON ZIPRA	7	3	4	4	3	1	551
2730	ANG	1	RAIDS ON SWAPO	3	2	3	5	5	3	560
2731	IBY	2	CHAD-LIBYA IV	1	2	4	2	2	4	483
2731	CHA	2	CHAD-LIBYA IV	1	1	3	5	3	3	620
2731	FRN	2	CHAD-LIBYA IV	1	2	4	2	2	4	620
2960	IRN	2	ONSET IRAN-IRAQ WAR	1	2	3	4	3	2	645
2970	GAM	1	LIBYAN INTERV. GAMBIA	3	2	3	3	3	2	995
2995	SOM	2	E. AFRICA CONFRONT.	1-	2	1	1	2	1	997
3000	FRN	2	CHAD-LIBYA V	7	3	5	2	2	4	620
3010	PER	2	PERU/ECUADOR	1	3	5	3	2	2	130
3010	ECU	2	PERU/ECUADOR	5	3	2	3	2	2	135
3050	NIG	1	NIGERIA/CAMEROON BRD.	1	1	4	5	5	2	471
3050	CAO	1	NIGERIA/CAMEROON BRD.	3	2	4	5	3	2	475
3070	SEN	1	COUP ATTEMPT-GAMBIA	1	2	3	4	3	2	420
3095	MOR	1	POLISARIO ATTACK	1	3	4	3	1	3	996
3150	LEB	1	LEBANON WAR	3	3	3	3	5	4	666
3150	SYR	1	LEBANON WAR	2	2	3	3	4	4	666
3150	ISR	1	LEBANON WAR	7	3	5	2	4	1	652
3155	SOM	2	OGADEN III	1	2	4	1	2	1	530
3180	SUD	2	THREAT TO SUDAN	2	2	4	2	2	4	620
3180	UAR	2	THREAT TO SUDAN	3	2	3	1	2	4	620
3180	IBY	2	THREAT TO SUDAN	1	2	4	5	2	3	2
3190	CHA	2	CHAD/NIGERIA CLASHES	1	1	3	5	3	3	475
3190	NIG	2	CHAD/NIGERIA CLASHES	7	3	3	5	5	2	483

TABLE 6.14

ACTOR LEVEL DATA - SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST CRISES:  
 INSTITUTIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

NO.	ACTOR	CODE	CRISIS	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	AFF	TRIGENT
3210	CHA	2	CHAD/LIBYA VI	1	1	3	5	3	3	620
3210	FRN	2	CHAD/LIBYA VI	7	3	5	2	2	4	620
3210	IBY	2	CHAD/LIBYA VI	1	2	4	2	2	4	220
3250	BOT	2	BOTSWANA/ZIMBABWF BRDR.	7	3	5	3	1	1	552
3260	SUD	2	SUDAN/ETHIOPIA BORDER	2	2	4	5	5	3	530
3275	IRQ	2	BASRA-KHARG ISLAND	1	2	4	2	4	3	630
3275	IRN	2	BASRA-KHARG ISLAND	1	2	3	4	3	2	645
3275	KUW	2	BASRA-KHARG ISLAND	3	3	4	1	1	4	630
3275	SAU	2	BASRA-KHARG ISLAND	1	3	4	1	2	4	630
3510	MLI	2	BURKINA FASO/MALI	1	2	4	5	3	2	439
3510	BKF	2	BURKINA FASO/MALI	1	1	4	4	4	2	432
3500	UAR	2	EGYPT-LIBYA TENSIONS	3	2	5	1	2	4	996
3500	IBY	2	EGYPT-LIBYA TENSIONS	1	2	4	2	2	4	651
3530	FRN	2	CHAD/LIBYA VII	7	3	5	2	2	4	620
3530	CHA	2	CHAD/LIBYA VII	1	1	3	5	3	3	620
3530	IBY	2	CHAD/LIBYA VII	1	2	4	2	2	4	220
3570	UGA	1	REBEL ATTACK-UGANDA	1	1	4	5	4	3	996
3610	CHA	2	CHAD/LIBYA VIII	1	1	3	5	4	3	620
3610	IBY	2	CHAD/LIBYA VIII	1	2	4	2	2	4	483
3630	IND	1	PUNJAB WAR SCARE II	7	3	5	4	4	3	770
3630	PAK	1	PUNJAB WAR SCARE II	3	2	4	3	3	2	750
3640	SOM	2	SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA BDR.	1	2	1	1	3	1	530
3645	SYR	2	SYRIAN INT. LEBANON	2	2	3	3	4	4	996
3650	MOR	2	WESTERN SAHARA	1	3	4	3	1	3	615
3650	ALG	2	WESTERN SAHARA	2	2	4	1	3	4	600
3650	MAU	2	WESTERN SAHARA	1	1	4	2	3	3	600
3670	NIG	2	NIGERIA-CAMEROON BDR	1	1	4	5	5	2	471
3680	IND	1	INDIA INT. SRI LANKA	7	3	5	4	4	3	780
3680	CEY	1	INDIA INT. SRI LANKA	5	3	3	3	5	1	750

TABLE 6.15

## FREQUENCIES: EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINT (XCONST)

LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
LOW	1	118	34.3	34.3	34.3
LOW-INT	2	14	4.1	4.1	38.3
SLIGHT	3	85	24.7	24.7	63.1
SLGHT-INT	4	1	0.3	0.3	63.4
LIMITED	5	21	6.1	6.1	69.5
LMTD-INT	6	1	.3	.3	69.8
PARITY	7	104	30.2	30.2	100.0
-----		344	100.0	100.0	

Standard Deviation: 2.48; Mean: 3.62

TABLE 6.16

FREQUENCIES: EXECUTIVE REGULATION (XRREG)

LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
UNREG	1	57	16.6	16.6	16.6
TRANS	2	112	32.6	32.6	49.1
REGULATED	3	175	50.9	50.9	100.0
		344	100.0	100.0	

Standard Deviation: .75; Mean: 2.34

TABLE 6.17

FREQUENCIES: PARTICIPATION REGULATION (PARREG)

LABEL.	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
UNREG	1	28	8.1	8.1	8.1
TRANS	2	32	9.3	9.3	17.4
FACT	3	71	20.6	20.6	38.1
RESTRCTED	4	141	41.0	41.1	79.1
REGULTED	5	72	20.9	20.9	100.0
		344	100.0	100.0	

Standard Deviation: 1.16; Mean: 3.57

population of each ethnic group within a state relative to the overall population of the state. Each ethnic group within a state was identified on the basis of the following criteria provided in the definition of ethnicity given in chapter one. It is reproduced here:

**The critical features of an ethnic group are that it is ascriptive and exclusive: its continuity depends on the maintenance of a boundary based on values and identity (Barth 1969 p. 14). Ethnic identification can attach itself to one or more of six different criteria, including (1) race – shared phenotypical features such as pigmentation, stature and facial or hair type; (2) kinship – assumed blood ties and alleged ancestry such as generally is claimed by clans, tribes and occasionally entire nations; (3) religion – as a leaven of social allegiances, not as a formal belief system about ultimate essences; (4) language – as a vehicle of communication and symbol of ethnic and cultural identity; (5) customary mode of livelihood – examples include the Javanese and Bengali who preen themselves as the bearers of customs and cultures superior to those of their neighbors; and (6) regionalism – in which groups of people are united because of a distinct geographic region (Rothschild 1981 p. 86-87).**

Singular measures designed to tap ethno-linguistic or religious heterogeneity have been developed by Taylor and Jodice (1983), Banks & Texter (1963), Haug (1967), Grove (1974), Neilsson (1985) Gurr (1992) and Hill & Rothchild (1992). However, for the purposes of this inquiry it was decided to decompose the term, ethnic into two components: ethno-linguistic groups (consisting of parts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6); and religious groups (part 3) thereby capturing the full meaning of the definition.

The term diversity means that the more ethnic groups (including linguistic and religious differences) a state possesses, the more diverse it is. However, the conceptualization of diversity by simply counting the number of ethnic groups has one deficiency; it fails to tap the relative size of each ethnic group. If raw measurements of ethnic diversity were to be used it would be



The term diversity means that the more ethnic groups (including linguistic and religious differences) a state possesses, the more diverse it is. However, the conceptualization of diversity by simply counting the number of ethnic groups has one deficiency; it fails to tap the relative size of each ethnic group. If raw measurements of ethnic diversity were to be used it would be assumed (erroneously) that countries with the same number of ethnic groups will have the same degree of ethnic diversity. For example a state with four ethnic groups of the same size possesses greater diversity than a state with one dominant ethnic group and three smaller ones (Shih 1991).

For example, the proportions of the four groups in state A are respectively .25, .25, .25 and .25 and in state B they are .10, .10, .10, and .70. Presumably state B should score lower on a scale of diversity than should state A. If this analysis is to be able to distinguish meaningfully between these two different types of diversity both the number of ethnic groups and their size will determine the degree of ethnic diversity (Shih 1991).

Accordingly, the measurement of diversity developed here is a combination of the formulas developed by Shih (1991) and Taylor & Hudson (1972):

D=Diversity

$$D = (D_1 + D_2)/2$$

$D_1$  is the measurement for religious groups;

$$1 - \sum_{i=1-p} \frac{n_i^2}{N^2}$$

where  $n$  is the size of the  $i$ th religious group,  $N$  is the total population of the state and  $p$  is the number of religious groups.

$D_2$  provides a formula for tapping ethno-linguistic diversity called an indicator of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (see Taylor & Hudson 1972; and Taylor & Jodice 1983: 72).

$$D_2 = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{(n_i)^2}{(N)^2}$$

where  $N$  is the state's total population and  $n_i$  is the population of its  $i$ th ethno-linguistic group.

To compute the individual scores for each state in the dataset, data were drawn from the 1990, 1991 & 1992 CIA World Factbooks, which provide comprehensive data on a state's total population and the percentage of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups within the state. Additional data were drawn from Shih (1991); World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett 1982); World Almanac and Book of Facts (various years); and Taylor & Hudson (1972). An interval score for each state was then created and cross referenced with scores developed by Shih (1991).<sup>15</sup> The interval data was then converted into ordinal data. There are two reasons for this. Unlike polity changes, changes in population occur much more slowly. Shih (1991), among others has demonstrated empirically that relative population changes are fairly balanced, so that a state's ethnic composition in 1970 will resemble that in 1990. To account for the very real possibility that some ethnic groups have undergone slower or more rapid population change compared with other groups and the total population of the state, an ordinal index was chosen. Interval data because of their precision, are useful only for making comparisons over a specific period (Babbie 1979). For the purposes of this study, relative population changes apply only to

In essence, because it is "less precise", an ordinal index is more forgiving in terms of population changes over time. Thus, for example, a state that is in conflict in 1971 (India-Pakistan) will have the same ranking when it is in conflict in 1988 (India-Sri Lanka). The ordinal data were rank-ordered from 1-5 and are provided in Table 6.18.

Insert Table 6.18, 6.19 Here

Coding of the variable CMPSTN for each crisis actor is provided in Table 6.14. The frequencies for CMPSTN are provided in Table 6.19. Assessing the valid percentages of each category for the variable CMPSTN, it becomes clear that other than the highest level of diversity (5), there is a relatively even distribution for each category with the mean falling roughly at the moderate level of diversity.

### ***3.3 Mediating Variables***

#### ***3.3.1 Ethnic Cleavage***

In chapter three it was argued that internal ethnic cleavage and ethnic affinities can enhance the possibility of the outbreak of conflict between states by creating the perception of a security dilemma that elites might act on to bolster their support at home or alternately be pressured to act on by other elites and their ethnic constituencies. It is argued that **ethnic affinity and cleavage are mediators or covariates because they influence foreign policy choices leading to interstate ethnic conflict.** The first variable to be selected is an index of ethnic cleavage designed to measure a phenomenon conceptually similar to ethnic composition.

TABLE 6.18

CMPSTN: Ethnic Composition

(1) Dominant - a homogenous state characterized by the dominance of a single ethnic group (eg. Japan, Iceland, Sweden, Poland or Kuwait);

(2) Moderate-dominant - a relatively homogenous state characterized by the dominance of one ethnic group along with one or more small minorities with less than 10% of the total population (Libya);

(3) Moderate - a state characterized by the balancing of a large group against slightly smaller groups totalling less than 20% in population (Sri Lanka);

(4) Moderate-diverse - a state characterized by the balancing of one or more large groups against several slightly smaller groups that together exceed 20% of the population (Zaire);

(5) Diverse - a heterogenous ethnically mixed state in which no ethnic group is numerically dominant and in which there are multiple linguistic and religious divisions. This occurs when many groups of relatively equal size are balanced against one another (Uganda) ;

TABLE 6.19

## FREQUENCIES: ETHNIC COMPOSITION (CMPSTN)

LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
DOMINANT	1	72	20.9	20.9	20.9
DOM-MOD	2	90	26.2	26.2	47.1
MODERATE	3	86	25.0	25.0	62.1
MOD-DVRSE	4	63	18.3	18.3	80.4
DIVERSE	5	33	9.6	9.6	100.0
		344	100.0	100.0	

Standard Deviation: 1.26, Mean: 3.31

Recall that the index of composition (CMPSTN) does not take into account the degree of perceived difference among ethnic groups. Measurements of cleavage do. For example, Raymond Gastil (1979) devised ordinal scales to measure the national consciousness, political inequality and individual repression of ethnic groups throughout the world. Similarly, Terrel (1971) created an index of social cleavage, and Hill (1978) an index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation. All of these studies are designed to tap the phenomenon of linguistic and cultural heterogeneity and the degree to which groups consider themselves as a people.

In other words an index of cleavage is different from an index of composition to the extent that it measures a socio-political structural characteristic including national consciousness, rather than an internal demographic characteristic. The underlying idea is that the greater the degree of ethnic consciousness the greater the possibility of internal ethnic cleavage (Rosh 1987). And the greater the degree of repression directed towards these minority groups the greater the degree of ethnic cleavage (Gurr 1992).<sup>16</sup> Such an index is an ordinal scale in which low levels of cleavage are a reflection of relative harmony between ethnic groups and high levels of open conflict, repression and high ethnic consciousness (See also Hill and Rothchild 1993).

An index of ethnic cleavage (CLVGE) was developed by Rosh (1987) taking data from Gastil (1978) for states with more than two ethnic groups. The minorities within each state were measured by Gastil on three dimensions: ethnic minority consciousness, political inequality and individual repression on a ten point scale. The first step was to devise a weighted average of the individual measurements of ethnic minority consciousness, political inequality and individual repression for each ethnic group within a state.

The weighted average for each minority was obtained by the group's population relative to the total population. Weights were assigned based on the percentage of the total population that each individual group comprised. For example, a state with an ethnic group comprising 40% of the population but scoring 10 on the individual repression scale would be assigned a higher score of 12, based on a weighting scheme found in Rosh (1987). Similar weighting procedures were carried out for all the ethnic groups in each state on the other two dimensions. For example, Sri Lanka scores high on the cleavage scale (5) even though it has only three main ethnic groups. This is because, according to Gastil, around 20% of Sri Lanka's population, the Tamils, score very high on the composite scale. The case study in chapter four, supports this conclusion. Similar results were accurate for the Ethiopian case as well.

A composite index for each state was then devised by adding the interval scores for national consciousness, political inequality and individual repression. This index ranged in score from 10-35 and is found in Gastil (1978, 1985). Since the index developed by Rosh accounts for only 40 of the states in the dataset, similar indices were developed for the remaining states, using information provided in Gastil (1985) and Shih (1991). For ease of comparability with the other measurements in the data set, the interval data were converted to ordinal data, rank-ordered from 1 to 5.

To ensure validity of the ordinal measurement over time, since consciousness, and repression vary within a given state, each individual ordinal CLVGE score was transformed by a combination of three ICB variables - Mass Violence, Social Unrest and Government Repression. These variables specify whether mass violence, social unrest and government repression were low, normal or high within a state during a crisis. If a state experienced higher

than normal levels of unrest and higher than normal levels of mass violence and higher than normal levels of regime repression, as specified in the ICB dataset, then the score was increased by one point to a maximum of 5 on the scale. Five represents the kind of turmoil experienced by Sri Lanka and Ethiopia during their crises, which means that it approximates civil war (see Tables 6.20 and 6.21).

In brief, a cleavage score of 3, for example, could be increased to 4 if all three ICB measurements were higher than normal, but no score could exceed the maximum of 5. By taking into account levels of turmoil within a society during a crisis - a more accurate measurement of cleavage is developed for a state at any point in its history.

Finally, to ensure that the variable was measuring what it was designed to measure - correlational analysis for a random sample of a subset of states (N=30) was carried out with variables developed by Gurr (1992). These variables measure political and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities. Cross indexing - an external validation procedure - showed 75% agreement in coding - providing support for an index designed like this. The rankings for the variable CLVGE are presented in Table 6.20 and their frequencies in Table 6.21. Table 6.21, shows a modest bell-shaped distribution around the mean. It appears that the bulk of states have moderate to low cleavages. There are only 15% of the cases in the highest category, which is, perhaps, not surprising since this approximates civil war. Table 6.24 indicates a moderate positive correlation between CLVGE and CMPSTN (.46) suggesting that as ethnic diversity increases, so too does ethnic cleavage.

Insert Tables 6.20 and 6.21 Here



TABLE 6.20

CLVGE: Ethnic Cleavage

(1) No Cleavage - low or no ethnic minority consciousness, ethnic political inequality and individual repression (Guinea)

(2) Low Cleavage - individual repression, ethnic inequality and minority consciousness occur only among a few small groups (France);

(3) Moderate Cleavage - repression, inequalities and ethnic consciousness in evidence; occasional societal unrest and politicized ethnic rivalries likely (Tanzania);

(4) Moderate-High Cleavage - high levels of repression and ethnic consciousness against more than one minority; occasional societal unrest leading to inter-ethnic violence (Iraq)

(5) High Cleavage - mass violence likely, repression widespread, ethnicity is highly politicized, inter-ethnic struggle leading to collapse of state imminent (Sri Lanka).

TABLE 6.21

## FREQUENCIES: ETHNIC CLEAVAGE (CLVGE)

LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
NONE	1	69	20.1	20.1	20.1
LOW	2	73	21.2	21.2	41.3
MODERATE	3	96	27.9	27.9	58.7
MOD-HIGH	4	56	16.3	16.3	85.5
HIGH	5	50	14.5	14.5	100.0
-----		344	100.0	100.0	

Standard Deviation: 1.32; Mean: 2.84

### 3.3.2 *Ethnic Affinity*

The second mediating variable to be considered is ethnic affinity (AFF). As shown in chapters four and five, affinity measures the ethnic links between states. In chapter three, it was argued that the greater the number of affinities (linguistic, tribal and religious for example) between an ethnic group in two or more states, the stronger the proposed link between them. The more that linguistic, religious and tribal identities converge, the greater the potential transnational ethnic affinity and thus the greater potential that either an ethnic group will seek external support based on these links. Elites of both sides within the state (state-centre or minority group) use these links to their advantage and may perceive that their state's insecurity stems from these affinities. Sometimes, elites may be carried along by the fervor of mass ethnic sentiment entailed by these links (Chazan 1991). Somalia, for example, has a low level of affinity with its neighboring states because the majority of its ethnic group reside in Somalia. Somalia approximates the idea of a "nation-state". Ethiopia, in contrast is characterized by higher levels of affinity because many of its ethnic groups are dispersed among neighboring states (including the Somalis of the Ogaden).

Anderson (1967) Gastil (1978) and Neilsson (1985) developed measurements of separated ethnic groups. For example, Anderson's analysis of irredentism identifies the location and number of ethnic groups relative to the state making the irredentist claim. It suffers from a small number of observations and is not used because it applies only to irredentist cases.

Neilsson (1985) on the other hand, classifies 614 political units into 5 categories according to how ethnic groups are dispersed. States with dispersed ethnic groups sharing several

common characteristics (language and religion for example) are said to be high on the affinity scale (Lebanon). Those with a small number of dispersed ethnic groups sharing few characteristics are lower (Japan). The Neilsson typology covers the range of states in this analysis and was used in the creation of the variable AFF. The categories are identified in Table 6.22. The frequencies are provided in Table 6.23. The frequency table indicates that most states in the system have at least low levels of affinity. Only 7% of the states in this study had no or very low levels of dispersal (single nation states). The bulk of cases are found in the moderate to high categories, in which at least one ethnic group resides in more than one state.

To ensure validity, a sample of the variable AFF was cross indexed with the variable "SEGMENTS" from the Minorities at Risk Project. That variable is designed to measure the number of adjoining countries in which there are other segments of the ethnic group, a slightly different concept. It is also a five-point scale: (0) no adjoining countries, (1) one adjoining country; (2) two adjoining countries; (3) three adjoining countries and (4) four or more adjoining countries. This cross-indexing procedure based on a random sample of 30 cases provided 65% agreement meaning that states that were characterized by high or low levels of affinity generally had commensurate levels of ethnic group segmentation. Evidence from Table 6.24 indicates that the variable CMPSTN is modestly positively correlated with the variable AFF (.14) and less so with the variable CLVGE (.11).

Coding of the mediating variables for each state is provided in Table 6.14.<sup>17</sup> Having identified, explained and operationalized the independent and mediating variables, the chapter now turn to testing the proposed relationships.

Insert Tables 6.22, 6.23 and 6.24 Here

#### ***4. Testing the Propositions***

##### ***4.1 General Hypothesis 1 - The National Interest or the Rational Interest?***

General Hypothesis 1 states that the preference for foreign policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict is a function of the interaction between ethnic composition and levels of institutional constraint on elites such that:

P1 Type Ia unconstrained - dominant states have a high preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict;

P2 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a moderate preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict;

P3 Type IIa constrained - dominant states have a moderate preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict;

P4 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict;

P5 If outbidding is present states IIa and IIb will increase their preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

TABLE 6.22

AFF: Ethnic Affinity

(0) None - no or very low levels of ethnic dispersion among states (Japan):

(1) Low Dispersal - a small number of the majority ethnic group are dispersed among a few states but the majority reside in a single state (Albania):

(2) Moderate Dispersal - a state which is composed of ethnic groups not dispersed among other states and ethnic groups dispersed among a few states (Ivory Coast):

(3) Moderate-High Dispersal - a state in which the majority is dispersed among a few states and the minority ethnic groups are dispersed among many states (Malaysia):

(4) High Dispersal - a state composed of ethnic groups all dispersed among many states (Lebanon).

TABLE 6.23

FREQUENCIES: ETHNIC AFFINITY (AFF)

LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
NONE	0	25	7.3	7.3	7.3
LOW	1	71	20.6	20.6	27.9
MODERATE	2	56	16.3	16.3	44.2
MOD-HIGH	3	97	28.2	28.2	72.4
HIGH	4	95	27.6	27.6	100.0
		344	100.0	100.0	

Standard Deviation:1.29, Mean: 2.48

TABLE 6.24

## CORRELATIONS: INDEPENDENT AND MEDIATING VARIABLES

	XCONST	XRREG	PARREG	CMPSTN	CLVGE	AFF
XCONST	1.00	.61**	.25**	-.07	-.11*	-.20**
XRREG	.61**	1.00	.24**	-.14**	-.15**	-.09
PARREG	.25**	.24**	1.00	.02	-.20**	.07
CMPSTN	-.07	-.14**	.02	1.00	.46**	.14**
CLVGE	-.11*	-.15**	-.20**	.46**	1.00	.11*
AFF	-.20**	-.09	-.07	.14*	.11*	1.00

\*Sig. p le .05; \*\* p le .01.



All of these propositions except for Proposition 5 can be tested in a direct way using the variables constructed here. The ICB data, including the case profiles, do not provide the information necessary to determine whether outbidding was present at the time of crisis. This proposition has been set aside for case study testing in chapters four, five, seven and eight.

Taken together, the first four propositions argue that as institutional constraint and diversity increase, the elites of these states have a lower preference for policies that lead to involvement in interstate conflict. It is argued that increasing levels of constraint on elites serve as a break on involvement in ethnic conflicts such that the more diverse a state is and the more institutionally constrained a state is, the less likely elites will pursue decisions in way that would have negative repercussions for their political and ethnic constituencies. More specifically, it was argued that the payoffs that accrue to a state are commensurate with its stage one win set such that Type Ia states have win-sets that are larger than those of IIb states. Types Ib and IIa fall between these two extremes.

Diversity and institutional constraints influence, directly, the kinds of risk-acceptance and risk-avoidance that would be anticipated among increasingly sensitive states. If this is an accurate depiction of behaviour, it would be expected that measurement can be undertaken that can account for this anticipated difference. One way to measure risk-acceptant or risk-avoidant behaviour, in this context, is to determine whether some of these states seek to reduce the tensions between them. Presumably, the elites of institutionally constrained states, whose constituency is ethnically diverse, must consider the potential domestic implications that prolonged and potentially debilitating interstate conflict might have for their ethnic group and their own political standing.

In contrast, the elites of ethnically dominant, low constraint states may be **concerned less with conflict reduction**, especially if a specific set of foreign policy objectives such as territorial acquisition or the support of an ethnic secessionist movement remains unfulfilled. This is the behaviour typified by Somalia against its neighbor, Ethiopia, as demonstrated in the preceding chapter. For example, from the outset of its independence, Somalia experienced no less than five interstate ethnic crises with Ethiopia, in efforts to regain the disputed Ogaden. The first two crises were triggered by Somali supported insurgencies in the Ogaden, and gradually escalated to full-scale war in 1977, when Somalia was under a military-authoritarian government.

Alternatively, ethnically diverse and constrained states are associated with behaviour **that would typify conflict avoidance** - that is the pursuit of paths to conflict management and resolution that are more benign than their unconstrained counterparts. The Indo-Sri Lanka crisis, described in chapter four case exhibited some of these characteristics. For example, both India and Sri Lankan elites explored alternative ways of resolving the conflict before and during the crisis, including several SAARC-mediated peace conferences.

In brief, the behaviour of diverse and institutionally constrained states, like that of India and Sri Lanka, would be expected to be associated with higher levels of conflict reduction. Determinate predictions regarding states Ia and Ib are more difficult, but their behaviour would be expected to fall between the two extremes since they have partial constraints (either ethnic diversity in the case of Ib states or institutional constraint in the case of states Ia) influencing their preference structures.

In order to learn if this is an accurate generalization, testing focuses on the propensity of certain types of states to be involved in conflicts associated with a reduction in tensions. The

independent variable CMPSTN was combined, separately, with the three measurements of institutional constraint (XCONST, PARREG and XRREG) to create the four classifications of states (Ia; Ib; IIa; IIb).

Each of the four independent variables were divided as close to the median as possible and collapsed into two categories of high and low each. The decision rule for collapsing categories was largely determined by the face validity of the scheme; however every effort was made to ensure that the procedure was empirically informed and did not significantly alter the assumptions of the model.<sup>18</sup>

The dependent variable is the trichotomy OUTESR (escalation, no change or reduction in tensions). OUTESR assesses the legacy of the conflict. It measures the effect of crisis outcome on the tension level among the adversaries after the crisis terminates. The variable was dichotomized along the following lines.

- (1) No-change or escalation in tensions
- (2) Reduction in tensions.

Type Ia states should be associated with lower levels of tension reduction; Type IIb states higher levels of tension reduction; states Ib and IIa should fall between the two extremes. Since the analysis can result in fair number of tables, only the patterns of association for the combinations of XCONST and CMPSTN are reported. The results for combinations of CMPSTN with XRREG and CMPSTN with PARREG had measurements of association similar to the ones reported here.

Table 6.25 reports the results. Measurements of association for the population are provided. As McCloskey (1985: 167) observes, when working with a population of cases, there

is "no problem of inferring the characteristics of the population from the "sample". The characteristics are the characteristics of the population." Buchanan (1988: 188-189) notes  $\text{Gamma} > 0.2$  and Somer's  $D > 0.1$  as the commonly accepted thresholds for inferring a relationship.

Insert Table 6.25 and 6.26 Here

The second row of Table 6.25 reports the number of cases and percentages (in parentheses) for each type of state resulting in conflict reduction. The impact of constraints on executives in the reduction of tensions can be inferred by comparing percentages across the row. For example, states in which constraints were high (IIb) are more likely to be involved in tension reduction, compared to their low constraint counterparts (Ia). The pattern is in the assumed direction with IIb - highly diverse and institutionally constrained states - (61% reduction) and Ia - highly dominant and unconstrained states - (48% reduction) falling at opposite ends of the spectrum. States IIa and Ib are between these two extremes as expected.

The measurements of association for this table are slightly below the accepted threshold for accepting the general hypothesis. However it does appear that **constrained ethnically diverse states are more likely to be involved in conflicts that lead to conflict reduction.** From another perspective, the less diverse a society is, and the lower the institutional constraint on its decision-makers, the more likely such states will pursue paths of recurring conflictual behaviour

TABLE 6.25

## ESCALATION OR REDUCTION IN TENSION

	TYPE OF STATE				
	Ia	Ib	IIa	IIb	
ESCAL	48 (53)	57 (49)	30 (46)	24 (39)	159 (47)
REDUCT	44 (48)	60 (51)	35 (54)	38 (61)	177 (53)
-----					
	92 (27)	117 (35)	65 (19)	62 (19)	336 (100)

Gamma .13; Somer's D .09.

TABLE 6.26

## ESCALATION OR REDUCTION IN TENSION BY TYPE

## SECESSIONIST

	TYPE OF STATE				
	Ia	Ib	IIa	IIb	
ESCAL	13 (57)	25 (47)	4 (27)	10 (40)	52 (45)
REDUC	10 (44)	28 (53)	11 (73)	15 (60)	64 (55)
-----					
	23 (20)	53 (45)	15 (13)	25 (22)	116 (100)

Gamma .23; Tau-b .13; Somer's D 13.

## IRREDENTIST

	TYPE OF STATE				
	Ia	Ib	IIa	IIb	
ESCAL	35 (51)	32 (50)	26 (52)	14 (40)	107 (49)
REDUC	34 (49)	32 (50)	24 (48)	23 (62)	113 (51)
-----					
	69 (31)	64 (29)	50 (23)	37 (17)	220 (100)

Gamma .08; Tau-b .05; Somer's D .06.

in which future tensions remain at least the same as they were during the crisis or become higher.

Measurements were taken on the two types of ethnic conflict separately. Table 6.26 reports the findings for secessionist and irredentist conflicts. The table indicates that the propositions find partial support in both cases. In both types of ethnic conflict, I**b** states do appear to be involved in strife leading to conflict reduction more often than I**a** states. For example, in the secessionist conflicts, conflict reduction involved 60% of I**b** states, compared to 44% of I**a** states. In irredentist conflicts, 62% of I**b** states were involved in conflict reduction compared to 49% for I**a** states. However, only the secessionist pattern has measures of association (Gamma .23 and Somer's D .13) that would allow a firm rejection of the null hypothesis.

The patterns of states between the two extremes are less conclusive. The exception in both types of conflict appears to be type I**IIa** states which do not fall between the two extremes. These ethnically homogenous but institutionally constrained states are the most likely to seek conflict reduction within secessionist cases.

In general, the evidence is not overwhelming. An overall pattern is evident but does not find the crucial statistical support required. Interpretation of the results require a theoretical rather than a statistical assessment. For example, irredentist cases exhibit an increase in tensions to 49% of the cases across the board save the most constrained and diverse states, which exhibit a pattern similar to both the original relationship and secessionist conflicts (39%). This result is not surprising, since irredenta differ in the kinds of claims being made on states. More specifically, recent research has shown that states within irredentist conflicts attribute a higher

perceived threat to territory than do their non-ethnic and secessionist counterparts (Carment 1993). These conflicts are also characterized by higher levels of violence (Carment 1993). The reason for this is that, irredenta involve interstate threats to territory and also basic values, threats that may be less salient in secessionist conflicts. **Territorial claims are unlikely to be easily resolved within the boundaries of one crisis (India-Pakistan, Chad-Libya, Ethiopia-Somalia), therefore, the tendency for irredentist conflicts to result in an escalation in tensions over time.** That the result for the most diverse and highly constrained states does not depart from the original result is significant. It suggests that despite the threat to territory these states are constrained in their pursuit of recurring conflictual behaviour.

In conclusion, the first four propositions find only partial support. The pattern is in the assumed direction, especially for differences between the two extreme types, but measurements of association are less conclusive. One possibility, discussed below, is that in general, interstate ethnic crises are conditioned by additional factors that have ramifications for ethnically diverse states. Alone, ethnic composition and institutional constraints may be insufficient in accounting for future escalation. More specifically, ethnic affinities and internal cleavages may play an important role in shaping outcomes. The chapter now turns to answering this question.

#### **4.2 General Hypothesis 2 - One State's Constraint is Another State's Opportunity**

General Hypothesis 2 states that, interstate ethnic crises conditioned by high levels of cleavage and affinity present additional constraints and opportunities such that:

**P6 High cleavage increases the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict;**



P7 High cleavage increases the probability of prolonged or escalated tensions;

P8 High affinities increase the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict;

P9 High affinities increase the probability of prolonged or escalated tensions.

For a state's ethnic foreign policy to result in interstate conflict and crisis, the most important set of factors, are its own ethnic characteristics and those of other states and ethnic groups. As noted in the definitions of secessionist and irredentist crises in section 2, two elements that distinguish these kinds of conflicts from non-ethnic crises are: the presence of transnational ethnic affinities and ethnic cleavage. Affinities and cleavage heavily influence the strategies of elites if they have domestic implications. Decision makers may perceive that these factors constitute a security dilemma for their state or for the ethnic group whose support they depend on. Elites must be sensitive to the interests of their constituents, even if these interests lie beyond a state's border. These factors can constrain elites to the extent that their choice of policies and the costs of not acting are increased. On the other hand, an experienced leader can probably maximize the benefits of these opportunities - that is exploit them, if they mean an increase in popularity at home or denounce them, if they are potentially threatening.

Cleavages are high within a state that has weak system maintenance functions, weakened institutions and political parties formulated on the basis of ethnic groups. When divided loyalties exist in combination with high ethnic affinities the outcome is potentially explosive. When both factors are high, a perceived security dilemma is likely to lead to action by one or both sides.

Consider in this context, the Somalia-Ethiopia case, in which Ethiopia was characterized by high internal ethnic cleavage. Affinities between the Somalis of the Ogaden and Somalia were strong. Before independence, Somali leaders built their support based on retrieving the Ogadeni. Thus, at the outset, Somalia was a source of insecurity for Ethiopian leaders. Prior to the 1977 war, Ethiopia was so divided, that 14 states within Ethiopia were in a state of insurrection. The most notable of these, the Eritrean, Tigrayan and Oromo secessionist conflicts demanded the attention of the Ethiopian army. This division provided an opportunity for Somali leaders to realize their long-held irredentist goal. Judging from the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict, ethnic affinities and cleavages can enhance opportunities for states to prolong a conflict, escalate tensions and build on the insecurities of other states.

In general all parties may seek to exploit the potential gains that can be garnered from these external links. External support for an insurgency, (between the Tamils of South India and Sri Lanka for example) is crucial if the struggle is expected to be successful over the long term. In this case, the situation is set for an ethnic group to be very receptive to external support and intervention and will actively seek it, as the Indo-Sri Lanka case demonstrates. Though, this conflict produced only one crisis, relations between India and Sri Lanka did have an impact on Sri Lanka's internal turmoil, plunging that state into an unprecedented decline and prolonged internal disruption.

In order to test the propositions, the two dependent variables protracted conflict (PC) and the variable OUTESR, were selected.<sup>19</sup> OUTESR as noted above, refers to the legacy of the conflict, whether it resulted in a reduction in tensions, no change or an escalation in tensions.

Protracted conflicts are those interstate conflicts characterized by the kind of behaviour

described by Azar (1978: 41-60) as "...hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high - the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity."<sup>20</sup>

Both of the dependent variables were dichotomized. The two variables cleavage and affinity used to test the presumed relationship were also dichotomized so that cleavages and affinities were categorized as being either "high" or "low".<sup>21</sup> Recall, from chapter three that cleavage and affinity are mediating variables, influencing the kinds of choices states make when confronted with an interstate ethnic conflict and a security dilemma. For example, the presence of high cleavage and high affinity has an important impact on the size of any kind of state's stage one win-set. They increase the chances of a state initiating a conflict leading to crisis, or alternatively, invite intervention because of internal weaknesses.

High level of cleavages and affinity are therefore expected to be associated with conflicts that are protracted and do not lead to conflict reduction. Analysis of the impact that affinity and cleavage have for each of the four types of states was carried out, but are not reported here.<sup>22</sup> For purposes of brevity, and to test the propositions, the impact of affinity and cleavage on the entire class of interstate ethnic conflicts are presented.

Tables 6.27 and 6.28 report the results of the relationships. Separate tables for secessionist and irredentist cases are not reported. The results were similar in both cases and the measurements of association were as strong.

Insert Tables 6.27 and 6.28 Here

TABLE 6.27  
 PROTRACTED CONFLICT BY ETHNIC CLEAVAGE

	ETHNIC CLEAVAGE		
	LOW	HIGH	
NON-PC	78 (55)	89 (44)	167 (49)
PC	64 (45)	113 (56)	177 (51)
-----			
	142 (45)	202 (59)	344 (100)

Gamma .21; Tau-b .11; Somer's D .11.

CONFLICT ESCALATION OR REDUCTION BY ETHNIC CLEAVAGE

	ETHNIC CLEAVAGE		
	LOW	HIGH	
REDUC	76 (56)	93 (46)	169 (51)
ESCAL	60 (44)	107 (54)	167 (49)
-----			
	136 (41)	200 (60)	336 (100)

Gamma .18; Tau-b .10; Somer's D .10.

TABLE 6.28  
 PROTRACTED CONFLICT BY ETHNIC AFFINITY

	AFFINITY		
	LOW	HIGH	
NON-PC	90 (60)	77 (40)	167 (49)
PC	62 (40)	115 (60)	177 (51)
	-----	-----	-----
	152 (44)	192 (56)	344 (100)

Gamma .37; Tau-b .19; Somer's D .19.

ESCALATION OR REDUCTION BY ETHNIC AFFINITY

	AFFINITY		
	LOW	HIGH	
REDUC	91 (60)	78 (42)	169 (50)
ESCAL	60 (40)	107 (58)	167 (50)
	-----	-----	-----
	151 (45)	185 (55)	336 (100)

Gamma .35; Tau-b .18; Somer's D .19.

The results from Table 6.27 support propositions 6 and 7. The percentages are in the anticipated direction and the measurements of association are strong enough to reject the null hypothesis in one case (PC) and approach significance in the latter (OUTESR). For example, 56% of the conflicts in which cleavage are high result in protracted conflict, compared to 45% for those protracted conflicts in which cleavages are low. Similarly, high cleavages appear to also effect the probability that tensions will not be reduced. For example, less than half (46%) of the conflicts in which cleavages were high resulted in a reduction in tensions.

The results from Table 6.28 also support propositions 8 and 9. Here however, the results are more pronounced and the measures of association are stronger. For example, 60% of the cases in which affinities were high resulted in protracted conflict, compared to 40% when affinities were lower. The results are very similar for the relationship between affinity and tensions. In this instance, 60% of the cases in which affinities were low, resulted in lower tensions compared to only 42%, when affinities were high. Higher cleavages and affinities do appear to be associated with protractedness and increases in tension.

In general, the results provide support for all four propositions and suggest that cleavages and affinities are important components in shaping the kinds of behaviour of states in interstate ethnic conflicts. There are two implications of these findings. First, high cleavages and affinities appear to magnify differences in tensions and protractedness by an appreciable degree. The evidence suggests that those crises in which affinities and/or cleavages are high may be far less manageable than those in which affinities and cleavages are not present or are very low. When transnational affinities become salient, conflict resolution could become a very complicated task because of the multiple connections between ethnic groups across borders. Such conflicts may

become structural security dilemmas when cleavage and affinities become the main source of a state's insecurity (such as Sri Lanka and Ethiopia).

Second, both affinities and cleavages have the potential (as the Indo-Sri Lanka demonstrates) of dragging states into a conflict by providing additional opportunities to act. The problem becomes more acute when there are many states with strong ethnic affinities. Consider for example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which has transformed the 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation into a new Russian diaspora. **This situation represents a potential threat to stability among and within the Soviet successor states.** Right-wing political groups in Russia pose as defenders of the national rights of the diaspora and may pressure the Russian government to act on these linkages (Kolsto 1993). Whether or not these actions will lead to Stage 3 interactions involving the use of force is, in part, determined by institutional and ethnic configurations. The analysis now turns to that question.

#### ***4.3 General Hypothesis 3 - Resorting to Force - The Paradox of Constraint***

General Hypothesis 3 states that, interstate interactions leading to the use of force are a function of the types of states involved such that:

**P10 Type Ia low constraint - ethnically dominant states have a high preference for the use of force;**

**P11 Type Ib low constraint - diverse states have a moderate preference for the use of force;**

P12 Type IIa constrained - dominant states have a moderate preference for the use of force;

P13 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for the use of force.

Propositions 10, 11, 12, 13 argue that as institutional constraints and ethnic diversity increase, states should be increasingly averse to the use of force in ethnic conflict settings. More specifically, it was suggested that states Ia would employ a wide range of strategies to achieve their foreign policy goals including violence. Alternatively, low constraint elites in mixed ethnic settings (Ib) and high constraint states in dominant settings (IIa) do have to be more concerned about the implications an aggressive foreign policy might have. For example, the elites of states Ib must consider the domestic ramifications an aggressive policy might have for their ethnic groups as well for groups in other states. The elites of IIa, though constrained institutionally are constrained less by their state's ethnic homogeneity. Finally IIb states should rely increasingly less on the use of force and greater acceptance of negotiation, including arbitration and mediation, when involved in an ethnic conflict.

As tested in chapters four and five and noted at the outset of this chapter, Propositions 12 and 13 were not fully supported. The use of force was a component of the foreign policy of India, an institutionally constrained and ethnically diverse state. Similarly, during the period in which Somalia was a democracy, it too used force, though the conflict never escalated beyond border skirmishes. At the same time, both states made continual efforts at peaceful resolution of the conflict. For example, the Indian government sought out several negotiated settlement



between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil rebels, though all of these ended in failure. Efforts to resolve Somalia's border dispute through the OAU and the UN also ended in frustration. The case-study evidence indicates that whether ethnically dominant or diverse, institutionally constrained states will use force but under specific conditions. There are several reasons that explain why they do so and these are discussed below. Nevertheless, aggregate testing may provide evidence that is supportive of the propositions. The overall evidence will be explored more thoroughly, following the testing of the propositions.

In the following analysis, testing is used to find out the interactive effects of institutional constraints and ethnic composition on decisions leading to force. The results from previous testing suggest many new questions. What role does cleavage play in shaping decisions to use force? What about affinity? Determining the relationship among such variables is potentially complicated. If the three components of institutional constraint (XCONST, PARREG and XRREG) and ethnic composition are each recorded in two separate categories, six tables are obtained. As additional variables, such as cleavage and affinity are included in the cross-classification tables, the number of tables and cells rapidly increases and it is difficult to unravel the associations among the variables by examining only the cell entries. To maximize the potential information that can be gained from the interactive effects of institutional constraint and ethnic composition, several changes in procedure are in order.

First, a special class of techniques called logit (derived from loglinear modelling) has been formulated for the analysis of categorical data. These models are useful for uncovering the potentially complex relationships among the variables in a multi-way crosstabulation. These will

allow inferences to be made about the presumed relationship that do not violate the assumptions of the model.

Second, collapsing of categories is necessary. Even with the large number of cases, there are instances of cells containing very few cases (See for example the frequencies of the variable XCONST). The decision rule for collapsing categories was largely determined by the face validity of the scheme (Agresti 1990). Every effort was made to ensure that the procedure did not significantly alter the results of the preceding analyses.

Third, the testing is designed to test the full interactive effects of the model. The two independent variables and mediating variables are treated as separate categoricals. This procedure allows the interactive effects between composition and institutional constraint to be fully explored. In brief, a log-linear analysis is useful when the number of explanatory variables prohibits the use of crosstabulations. In those cases where tables will assist in clarifying the relationship, contingency tables are used.

To test the proposed relationship, the analysis examines the kinds of crisis management techniques used by states as an indicator of force. The dependent variable, **CRISMG**, was dichotomized according to the kinds of crisis management anticipated into: (1) "Force" encompassing violent crisis management techniques and; multiple crisis management techniques including violence; and (2) "Negotiation" encompassing negotiation, adjudication and arbitration, mediation; non-military pressure; military non-violent; and multiple - no violence. If the assumptions of the model are correct, it would be expected that states that are institutionally constrained and ethnically diverse will use force the least as suggested in P13. Alternatively, P10

suggests that the crises of low constraint and ethnically dominant states should show higher percentages of force.

To evaluate the relationship in a manner that can be reported succinctly, a series of loglinear analyses were conducted on each of the institutional constraint variables (XCONST, XRREG and PARREG) and then each in combination with the variable CMPSTN to test for interaction effects. This is done for two reasons, First it has long been argued that institutional constraints alone can reduce a state's propensity to use force. There is a lengthy literature on the subject between democracy and peace (e.g. Morgan & Campbell 1991; Russett 1990). In the context of interstate ethnic conflict, an analysis of institutional constraints alone may be useful to determine the explanatory power of ethnic composition. This procedure allows inferences to be made about the impact, if any, the addition of ethnic composition has on the relationship.<sup>23</sup>

For each test the dependent variable is the dichotomous variable CRISMG. Because this method can result in a fairly substantial number of coefficients in a given equation, one simplifying procedure was adopted. The independent variables XCONST, XRREG, PARREG and CMPSTN were collapsed into a trichotomy, the values of which are associated with the categories of low, medium, and high.<sup>24</sup>

The coefficients estimated from the log linear analyses provide an indication of the direction and strength of the relationship between a variable and the probability of forceful crisis management technique. Positive coefficients indicate that increases in non-forceful crisis management techniques are associated with increasing levels of constraint.<sup>25</sup> Negative coefficients indicate that a decrease in constraint is associated with non-forceful crisis management techniques. Contingency tables that include the proportion of cases involving the use of force

for each category of a crisis actor are also presented. These provide easily interpretable indications of the effect of each variable.

#### *4.3.1 Institutional Constraints and The Use of Force*

The first analysis is for institutional constraints alone.<sup>26</sup> By isolating the impact that institutional constraint has on the use of force, comparison can be made with the results, which include the interactive effects of ethnic composition and institutional constraints. The results are reported in Table 6.29.

Insert Table 6.29 Here

Table 6.29 presents the results of the logit analyses examining the relationship between each institutional constraint variable and the percentage of states using force as a crisis management technique. **The results of these tests are not particularly supportive of the assumption that institutional constraints alone reduce the use of force.** The coefficients are generally in the opposite direction expected for low constraint and moderate constraint states indicating that the probability of the use of force increases slightly as institutional constraints increase. The exception appears to be for medium constraint states on the PARREG variable, indicating that moderate levels of constraint decrease the likelihood of the use of force. None of the coefficients approach statistical significance.

The relationships are somewhat easier to visualize in Table 6.30

TABLE 6.29

LOGIT REGRESSION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE ON  
CONSTRAINT VARIABLES

	VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR
XCONST	LOW	-.10	.07
	MEDIUM	.08	.08
XRREG	LOW	-.12	.09
	MEDIUM	.08	.08
PARREG	LOW	-.06	.09
	MEDIUM	-.10	.07

None are statistically significant at the .05 level

Insert Table 6.30 Here

This table reports for each independent variable, the percentage of crisis actors of each type that used force as a crisis management technique. Participants in the low constraint categories are less likely to use force than medium and high constraint states. These results are not easy to interpret. It is obvious that they do not constitute support for the assumption that high constraint states are less apt to use force. In general, the evidence suggests a weak relationship. Institutionally constrained states are not as pacific as the literature would suggest. If the propositions are correct, the introduction of ethnic diversity should dampen this relationship.

#### ***4.3.2 Institutional Constraints, Ethnic Composition and the Use of Force***

Tables 6.31 and 6.32 present the results of the analyses in which the variable CMPSTN is included in order to test the propositions. It becomes clear that an interesting pattern emerges. The logit analyses indicate that there are some consistent interaction effects between institutional constraints and ethnic composition that are statistically significant at least in the low constraint category for XCONST XRREG and PARREG.

Insert Tables 6.31 and 6.32 Here

TABLE 6.30

PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE USING FORCE AS  
A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST	59 (45)	58 (54)	53 (51)	170 (49)1
XRREG	24 (42)	59 (53)	87 (50)	170 (49)2
PARREG	29 (48)	98 (46)	43 (60)	170 (49)3

Statistics are based on the 2\*3 tables from which they were drawn.

- 1 Gamma  $-.08$ ; Tau-b  $-.05$ ; Somer's D  $-.05$ ;  
 2 Gamma  $-.05$ ; Tau-b  $-.02$ ; Somer's D  $-.03$ ;  
 3 Gamma  $-.14$ ; Tau-b  $-.07$ ; Somer's D  $-.07$ .

TABLE 6.31

LOGIT REGRESSION OF CRISIS MANGEMENT TECHNIQUE:  
 INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION

	VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR
XCONST	LOW	-.09	.08
	MEDIUM	.07	.08
	CMPSTN	.03	.07
	LOW * CMPSTN	.14	.10*
	MED * CMPSTN	.01	.08
XRREG	LOW	-.10	.10
	MEDIUM	.07	.08
	CMPSTN	-.10	.08
	LOW * CMPSTN	.22	.09 *
	MED * CMPSTN	-.10	.08 **
PARREG	LOW	-.04	.10
	MEDIUM	-.13	.07**
	CMPSTN	.01	.06
	LOW * CMPSTN	.22	.09*
	MED * CMSPTN	.01	.06

\* p < .05; \*\* p < 0.1.



TABLE 6.32

PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE USING FORCE AS  
A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE

## COMPOSITION AND CONSTRAINT

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST W/DOM.	30 (51)	24 (51)	24 (43)	78 (48)1
XCONST W/DIVERSE	29 (40)	34 (57)	29 (60)	92 (51)2
XRREG W/DOM.	14 (59)	26 (49)	38 (45)	78 (48)3
XRREG W/DIVERSE	10 (30)	33 (56)	49 (54)	92 (51)4
PARREG W/DOM.	14 (58)	46 (46)	18 (47)	78 (48)5
PARREG W/DIVERSE	15 (42)	52 (47)	25 (74)	92 (51)6

Statistics are based on the 2\*2\*3 tables from which these are drawn.

- 1 Gamma .10; Tau-b .06; Somer's D .6;
- 2 Gamma -.27; Tau-b -.15; Somer's D -.15;
- 3 Gamma .15; Tau-b .08; Somer's D .08;
- 4 Gamma -.22; Tau-b -.12; Somer's D -.12;
- 5 Gamma .09; Tau-b .05; Somer's D .05;
- 6 Gamma -.34; Tau-b -.18; Somer's D -.18.

The logit analysis in Table 6.31 indicates that, as institutional constraints decrease and as a society becomes less diverse, the more likely it will use force. It is difficult to say however whether such states are more likely to use force compared to high constraint ethnically diverse states. For example, strongest support for propositions 10 and 12 is on the variables XRREG and PARREG and to a lesser extent on the variable XCONST.

In contrast to propositions 11 and 13, as states increase in diversity and institutional constraint, states are more willing to use force. It appears that ethnic diversity does have a compounding effect, but in the opposite direction proposed.

Of primary interest are the two extremes - low and high constraints. These relationships, which can be more easily seen in Table 6.32, suggest that the assumptions of the model are supported for low constraint states in dominant settings. The evidence suggests that as institutional constraints on leaders decrease among ethnically dominant states, the propensity for using force increases. This evidence provides support for P10, but one which is not statistically significant. In excess of 50% (a minimum of 51% and a maximum of 59%) of ethnically dominant and low constraint states relied on the use of force in ethnic conflict settings. Increasing institutional constraint reduces the probability of the use of forceful crisis management techniques for ethnically dominant states as argued in P12 but again the evidence is not overwhelming.

The most surprising result is for the high constraint ethnically diverse states. The tables for diverse states, all of which are statistically significant and indicate a very strong relationship, suggest that high constraint ethnically diverse states are more likely to use force as a crisis management technique than low constraint ethnically diverse states. This is a tentative rejection

of the original propositions P11 and P13. For ethnically diverse states, moving from low political constraints to high political constraints on any of the three variables almost doubles the likelihood that the relationship will result in the use of force.

The general results are less conclusive. On the one hand, low constraint ethnically dominant states do prefer to use force. On the other hand, diversity and constraint also appear to enhance the preference for force. There are several reasons why this may be so. The next section is devoted to explaining why.

#### *4.4 Explaining the Relationship - Power Status, Cleavage, Affinity and War*

One possibility that must be considered is that, there may be other variables affecting the force/no force relationship. A list of testable explanations would be quite long but several are worth considering. These include a state's power status, levels of cleavage and affinity, and whether the crisis occurred during a war. This final explanation argues that the preference structures of high constraint ethnically diverse states are highly dependent on interaction processes. That is, high constraint, diverse states use force only when faced with particular strategies and only under certain circumstances. Each of these ideas is given further consideration.

##### *4.4.1 Power Status - Do Diverse Lions Roar?*

The first concerns the ability of states to project their power. States with high power-status are those with the ability to project power and use force more readily, when it is in their interest. The ability to project power is especially salient in conflicts between states that are

geographically contiguous such as irredenta. Consider in this context, India's involvement in various regional conflicts (Kashmir, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka).

Many of the moderate or high power-status states, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and India, fall into the high constraint, ethnically diverse category (Table 6.14) and this could account for the anomaly. Many scholars have noted that the major powers have substantially more leeway in deciding when and how to participate in disputes (Brecher 1993, Russett 1990).

However, not all of the major powers score high on all three measurements of constraint and the diversity scale (France and the USSR for example, Table 6.14). Second, an analysis of the major powers as crisis actors from Section 2 above, indicates that few major powers were crisis actors.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, major powers do tend to be more war prone than minor powers (Morgan & Campbell 1991). If the assumption that power status affects the relationship is correct, it would be expected that the relationship should hold only for high power-status states. To determine whether the power-status of states is skewing the results presented above, the data are reanalyzed using power-status as a control variable. If power status has a limited effect than the relationship should remain relatively unchanged for both minor and major powers.<sup>28</sup> The results are presented in contingency Table 6.33.<sup>29</sup>

Insert Table 6.33 Here

TABLE 6.33

PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE USING FORCE AS  
A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE:  
COMPOSITION AND CONSTRAINT

LOW POWER STATUS

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST W/DIVERSE	26 (42)	26 (58)	11 (50)	63 (49)1
XRREG W/DIVERSE	28 (28)	25 (58)	30 (53)	63 (48)2
PARREG W/DIVERSE	12 (57)	41 (54)	8 (47)	61 (54)3

HIGH POWER STATUS

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST W/DIVERSE	3 (27)	8 (53)	18 (66)	29 (55)4
XRREG W/DIVERSE	2 (50)	8 (50)	19 (58)	29 (55)5
PARREG W/DIVERSE	2 (67)	2 (21)	10 (48)	17 (35)6

Statistics are based on the 2\*3\*3\*2 Tables from which they were drawn.

- 1 Gamma -.20; Tau-b -.11; Somer's D -.10;
- 2 Gamma -.24; Tau-b -.14; Somer's D -.14;
- 3 Gamma -.14; Tau-b -.07; Somer's D -.08;
- 4 Gamma -.47; Tau-b -.30; Somer's D -.27;
- 5 Gamma -.07; Tau-b -.07; Somer's D -.06;
- 6 Gamma .28; Tau-b .15; Somer's D .15.

Evidence from testing the effects of high and low power-status suggest that it has only a minimal impact on the relationship. Low power-status appears to suppress the relationship slightly. Two of the tables for low power-status from which the statistics are taken have measurements of strong association. The overall percentages for high constraint, ethnically-diverse smaller powers are not sufficiently different from the original relationship (Table 6.31) to infer that status is playing a singular role. At least one of the relationships is stronger for low power-status states than in the original relationship (PARREG). The other two variables in the low power-status category are also consistent with the original relationship.

In the high power-status category the relationship is reversed for at least one of the variables (PARREG), unchanged for XRREG and slightly stronger for XCONST. The lack of consistency in the results across the three variables indicates that high power-status is not as good an indicator of the use of force in ethnic conflict settings as assumed.

Considering the evidence thus far, a theoretical rather than empirical analysis may be necessary. The most notable point is that ethnic diversity in combination with institutional constraint does not appear to inhibit states from using force.

While it may be true (although the evidence does not bear this out) that high institutional constraints alone will reduce the likelihood that a state will use force it is apparently not the case that ethnic diversity in combination with institutional constraint will necessarily reduce a state's proclivity for forceful crisis management techniques. The above results suggest a more intricate underlying pattern, in that, the use of force may also be contingent on the domestic and international factors that impinge upon an elite's decision to use force.

#### *4.4.2 Cleavages and Affinity - Making the Connection*

Although not part of the original set of hypotheses, the problem raised by the use of force by ethnically diverse high constraint states requires attention. Perhaps, increases in ethnic cleavage and affinity affect the presumed linkage. The evidence from the case studies shows that, constrained elites in multi-ethnic societies are highly sensitive to their constituency and to potential exploitation by other states. Presumably, an institutional structure and diverse ethnic society impose additional constraints on a decision maker's freedom of choice. Conventional wisdom holds that with regard to decisions for the use of force, institutional constraints push states toward peace. Additional constraints such as internal cleavage and affinities may push these states even further to seek out non-forceful solutions. There are several reasons why internal cleavages and affinities will constrain a multi-ethnic state.

First, ethnic cleavage and ethnic affinity are highly visible characteristics that make these states very vulnerable to exploitation. Second, aware that they are vulnerable, the leaders of these states should make every effort to ensure that they are not the victims of exploitation. High internal cleavages can enhance the potential for exploitation as can high affinities. Therefore, these states would be expected to not pursue provocative measures in their relations with other states. Third, high internal cleavages, would be expected to have a debilitating effect on a state's ability to project power. Consider the example of Ethiopia. In constant turmoil from the outset, and aware of its vulnerability, its leaders sought out a peaceful solution to its border dispute with Somalia. Testing of General Hypothesis 1 indicated that high constraint diverse states were more likely to pursue conflict reduction.

In sum, high internal cleavages and affinities present additional costs to leaders of high constraint states. Leaders of highly diverse states have even an additional cost imposed on them. Using force in such situations could lead to disastrous results. Due to their sensitivity, these states are more likely to seek out non-forceful measures to resolve the security dilemma imposed on them by their internal cleavages and affinities. Testing for General Hypothesis 2, indicated that high cleavage and affinities enhance the potential for protracted conflict and future conflict escalation. For example, recall that during the crisis period, Sri Lanka's Prime Minister, Premadasa, faced with a growing insurgency in the south, escalated the conflict through threats directed at the Indian government, including threats to use force. However, force was never used. Nor did India use force directly against the Sri Lankan regime. High levels of affinity between the Tamils of South India and Sri Lanka provided an additional reason for India to be careful in its dealings with the Sri Lankan government.

To test this assumption, logit analyses were carried out using the variable CLVGE as a control variable. The logit results for high levels of cleavage are reported in Table 6.34. Percentages are reported in contingency Table 6.35.

Insert Tables 6.34 and 6.35 Here

The evidence from these tables indicates that **high cleavages tend to suppress the use of force by institutionally constrained states as expected**. Indeed, their introduction influences all ethnically diverse states, but the effect is most pronounced for high constraint states. Three of the tables show acceptable measurements of association. For two of the institutional constraint



TABLE 6.34

LOGIT REGRESSION OF CRISIS MANGEMENT TECHNIQUE:  
 INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION  
 CONTROLLING FOR CLEAVAGE

	VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR
XCONST	LOW	-.06	.08
	MEDIUM	.03	.09
	W/LOW CLVGE	-.05	.08
	W/HIGH CLVGE	.15	.08
XRREG	LOW	-.12	.10
	MEDIUM	.11	.09
	W/LOW CLVGE	-.02	.10
	W/HIGH CLVGE	-.07	.10
PARREG	LOW	-.08	.10
	MEDIUM	-.10	.08
	W/LOW CLVGE	.06	.10
	W/HIGH CLVGE	.02	.07

None are statistically significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6.35

PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE USING FORCE AS  
A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE:  
COMPOSITION AND CONSTRAINT

CONTROLLING FOR  
HIGH ETHNIC CLEAVAGE

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST W/DIVERSE	23 (40)	33 (61)	11 (42)	67 (49)1
XRREG W/DIVERSE	27 (28)	29 (55)	30 (54)	67 (49)2
PARREG W/DIVERSE	14 (47)	46 (48)	7 (58)	67 (49)3

CONTROLLING FOR  
LOW ETHNIC CLEAVAGE

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST W/DIVERSE	6 (40)	1 (17)	18 (78)	25 (57)4
XRREG W/DIVERSE	2 (50)	4 (67)	19 (56)	25 (57)5
PARREG W/DIVERSE	5 (17)	6 (38)	18 (82)	25 (57)6

Statistics are based on the 2\*3\*3\*2 Tables from they were drawn.

- 1 Gamma .14; Tau-b .08; Somer's D .08;
- 2 Gamma .25; Tau-b .15; Somer's D .17;
- 3 Gamma .09; Tau-b .04; Somer's D .05;
- 4 Gamma .60; Tau-b .38; Somer's D .38;
- 5 Gamma .06; Tau-b .02; Somer's D .02;
- 6 Gamma .77; Tau-b .50; Somer's D .55.

variables there appear to be a slight curvilinear relationship (XCONST and XRREG), but in general, high cleavages do appear to have an effect on the elites of high constraint states. In contrast, when cleavages are low, the two extremes show that high constraint diverse states use force much more often than their low-constraint counterparts. The most pronounced differences are for the variables PARREG and XCONST.

Insert Tables 6.36 and 6.37 Here

High levels of affinity (shown in Tables 6.36 and 6.37) have, perhaps a stronger effect. Like cleavage, high ethnic affinities tend to decrease the potential for ethnically diverse states to use force. For example, when affinities are low, high constraint ethnically diverse states show a greater propensity for using force than when affinities are high (increases of a minimum of 13% for XCONST and 18% for XRREG). Five of the six measurements of association are statistically significant.

The results suggest that high constraint, ethnically diverse states are less likely to use force when cleavages and affinities are high. However these states still appear to use force more often than their low constraint counterparts under both conditions.

In essence, **additional conditions are required to reduce the probability that elites of institutionally constrained ethnically diverse states will use force.** Affinities and cleavage appear to mediate the relationship so that the use of force becomes less attractive. The probability that an ethnically diverse and constrained state will resort to force is reduced, if it has domestic implications. High cleavages and high affinities serve to reduce the potential for

TABLE 6.36

LOGIT REGRESSION OF CRISIS MANGEMENT TECHNIQUE:  
 INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION  
 CONTROLLING FOR AFFINITY

	VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR
XCONST	LOW	-.10	.08
	MEDIUM	.11	.08
	W/LOW AFF	-.009	.07
	W/HIGH AFF	.06	.08
XRREG	LOW	-.13	.10
	MEDIUM	.12	.08
	W/LOW AFF	-.05	.09
	W/HIGH AFF	.09	.08
PARREG	LOW	-.02	.10
	MEDIUM	-.11	.07
	W/LOW AFF	.17	.10
	W/HIGH AFF	-.05	.07

None are statistically significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6.37

PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE USING FORCE AS  
A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE:  
COMPOSITION AND CONSTRAINT

CONTROLLING FOR  
HIGH ETHNIC AFFINITY

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST W/DIVERSE	14 (35)	10 (46)	7 (50)	31 (41)1
XRREG W/DIVERSE	5 (26)	13 (50)	13 (42)	31 (41)2
PARREG W/DIVERSE	3 (30)	21 (38)	7 (64)	31 (41)3

CONTROLLING FOR  
LOW ETHNIC AFFINITY

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST W/DIVERSE	15 (46)	24 (63)	22 (63)	61 (58)4
XRREG W/DIVERSE	5 (36)	20 (61)	36 (61)	61 (58)5
PARREG W/DIVERSE	46 (46)	31 (54)	18 (78)	61 (58)6

Statistics are based on the 2\*3\*3\*2 Tables from they were drawn.

- 1 Gamma .22; Tau-b .12; Somer's D .12;  
2 Gamma .16; Tau-b .08; Somer's D .08;  
3 Gamma .38; Tau-b .18; Somer's D .18;  
4 Gamma .23; Tau-b .13; Somer's D .13;  
5 Gamma .20; Tau-b .11; Somer's D .11;  
6 Gamma .38; Tau-b .21; Somer's D .20.

the use of force by high constraint diverse states but not enough to provide support for P13. The question of why these states use force more often than proposed, remains. There is one further possible answer to this question.

#### ***4.4.3 Intra-war Crisis - Finding Cooperation During Peacetime***

As argued above, there are domestic reasons why force will be less attractive to ethnically diverse states. On the other hand, ethnically diverse constrained states must also shape their strategies in response to the strategies of other states. Conflicts that escalate to war will, for example, influence the strategies of a constrained state. When faced with the decision to use force against a state with fewer visible political costs (an ethnically dominant and low constraint state) that decision will depend on the strategy of the state with fewer visible political costs. The latter has substantially more leeway in deciding what to do. Elites in unconstrained situations are in a better "bargaining" position with those whose power is dispersed. There are three reasons for this.

First, they are less prone to involuntary defection because their low constraint ethnic homogeneity allows them to control domestic political outcomes. Second, a belligerent ethnic foreign policy has fewer domestic ramifications for elite-mass interactions. Among other things, the leaders of these states do not have to worry about re-election. Third, if in a cooperative situation, low constraint ethnically dominant states might be more tempted to "voluntarily" defect because of the low political costs. In brief, the decision to resort to force is contingent on how cooperative is the state with fewer costs. This idea was given a fuller analysis in chapter three.

If the state with fewer visible costs uses force, then a high constraint, ethnically diverse state would also be expected to use force in order to avoid further exploitation. In contrast, interactions involving two high constraint ethnically diverse states should be more peaceful. The fear of exploitation by both sides should push these states towards cooperation. Knowing that both are vulnerable, they would seek out various agreements to avoid direct violent confrontation. This idea is similar to the neo-liberal argument of "specific reciprocity", discussed in chapter one to explain the absence of inter-state war in Africa, but it is also different. States with high institutional constraints and multi-ethnic societies are more vulnerable by virtue of their ethnic affinities and cleavages; outbidding is likely, as is political party formation along ethnic lines. All of these factors can heavily influence the substance of foreign policy. The leaders of these states are in essence more susceptible to "involuntary defection" from cooperation than other states, but also face much higher costs for doing so. This idea was given a full exploration in chapters three and four. Recall, for example, that India did use force, but not directly against the Sri Lanka government. Had India's government been a military regime, the possibility of war with Sri Lanka would have been much higher. Or consider Ethiopia's interactions with Somalia. War came only after both states were under control of authoritarian-military regimes.

In brief, force will be a defining characteristic of the strategies of ethnically diverse constrained states in conflict with certain types of states. They will choose force as either a pre-emptive measure to avoid exploitation or in response to the use of force by a state which faces fewer costs. Situations in which high levels of force are used by both sides approximate war. What if such conflicts were excluded from the analysis? Would high constraint states behave

differently? The assumptions of the model indicate they would. That is, in non-war situations, when faced with the choice of no force or force, these states should consistently choose non forceful measures.

The inclusion of crises that occur during war (intra-war crises) in the analysis thus far, may be enhancing the results for high constraint and ethnically diverse states. It is possible that propositions 11 and 13 of the model hold only for those conflicts that do not occur during war. While ethnically diverse states may use force, they should be less inclined to do so in conflicts that do not escalate to war. In order to test this assumption, propositions 11 and 13 were re-tested on data that did not include intra-war crises. The results for ethnically diverse states are presented in Table 6.38.<sup>30</sup>

Insert Table 6.38 Here

Contingency Table 6.38 reports the percentage of ethnically diverse states that use force as a crisis management technique in non-intra-war crises. The results are very strong on two of the variables (XCONST and XRREG) and less so for PARREG. For example, on the XCONST variable, only 25% of high constraint ethnically diverse states used force compared to 42% of the low constraint diverse states. For the variable XRREG, 28% of the high constraint states resorted to force compared to 58% for low constraint states. The variable PARREG is less conclusive and suggests a slight curvilinear relationship. Two of the measurements of association are well above the thresholds for accepting the propositions.



TABLE 6.38

PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE USING FORCE AS  
A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE:  
COMPOSITION AND CONSTRAINT

## NON INTRA-WAR CRISES

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
XCONST W/DIVERSE	36 (42)	3 (33)	9 (25)	48 (36)1
XRREG W/DIVERSE	11 (58)	13 (36)	13 (28)	37 (36)2
PARREG W/DIVERSE	3 (27)	29 (41)	5 (24)	37 (36)3

Statistics are based on the 2\*3\*3 Tables from they were drawn.

- 1 Gamma  $-.31$ ; Tau-b  $-.15$ ; Somer's D  $-.15$ ;  
 2 Gamma  $-.35$ ; Tau-b  $-.20$ ; Somer's D  $-.20$ ;  
 3 Gamma  $-.14$ ; Tau-b  $-.07$ ; Somer's D  $-.07$ .

In sum, the evidence is supportive of propositions 11 and 13, but only for those conflicts that take place outside of war. As constraints increase on ethnically diverse states, the elites of these states have a lower preference for using force in non-war situations. The results suggest two things. The assumptions of the model are appropriate but under certain conditions. The behaviour of constrained, ethnically diverse states appears to be of two kinds, very low levels of belligerency outside of war, but during war, these states are equally if not more belligerent than other states.

This is because for a multi-ethnic state, the best strategy is the one that depends on whether its opponent's strategy leaves room for the development of cooperation. For example, states can manipulate ethnic divisions within other states and reinforce transnational ethnic affinities through material and diplomatic support. This is why such states are presumed to be more vulnerable. To avoid exploitation, such states may either initiate violence to avoid a larger threat or may retaliate for the use of force by rivals who do not face a relatively high domestic cost. Such interactions occur most often between states that are on opposite ends of the institutional and ethnic spectrum.

This final assumption cannot be tested directly using the data as it is now configured. In order to fully test interstate interactions, the state that triggered the conflict (TRIGENT in Table 6.14) if indeed it were a state, as some conflicts can be triggered internally, would have to be coded on each of the independent variables. Testing would then focus on the behaviour of not only the crisis actor alone, but also the behaviour and characteristics of the crisis actor vis a vis the characteristics of the state with which it was in conflict. For example, high constraint ethnically diverse states may be less likely to engage in violence than are mixed dyads. Evidence

from Chapter 5 supports this assumption. Further research may provide support for this assumption. In Chapters 7 and 8, the issue is explored more thoroughly.

The evidence that institutionally constrained and ethnically diverse states behave differently depending on the source of the threat has two important implications. First, the assessment has focussed on the force/no force relationship only. **Though multi-ethnic constrained states may be averse to using direct force, especially against similar states, it is likely they will try to achieve their objectives in more subtle and possibly more covert ways.** For example, consider India's support for the Tamil insurgency, a fact the government denied until 1987.<sup>31</sup>

A second implication concerns the issue of sudden polity change and institutional transition. **The new regimes of multi-ethnic states may be more susceptible to involvement and the use of force.** Testing did not focus specifically on this relationship, but evidence from section 3 indicates that new states are more prone to involvement in interstate ethnic crises. New regimes of multi-ethnic states faced with a potentially destabilizing border conflict or ethnic insurgency may use force as a pre-emptive measure to minimize potentially negative reverberation. Alternatively, internal pressures may push new leaders towards decisions they would not otherwise choose. Fearful of being replaced, these leaders may choose involvement as means of shoring up their domestic support. Statistical evidence bears this out. For example, in Table 6.39, 60% of new regimes of ethnically diverse states experienced crises within their first five years (Malaysia, India, Indonesia).

Insert Table 6.39 Here


TABLE 6.39  
 ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND REGIME DURATION

	REGIME DURATION		
	< 5 Years	> 5 Years	
DOMINANT	59 (40)	103 (51)	162 (47)
DIVERSE	86 (60)	96 (48)	182 (53)
	145 (43)	199 (58)	344 (100)

Gamma .21; Tau-b .11; Somer's D .11.

FIGURE 6.1

A REVISED MODEL OF INTERSTATE ETHNIC CONFLICT



This compares to 48% for regimes of five years or longer. This result was obtained by crosstabulating the variable measuring regime duration (DURREG) and CMPSTN.<sup>32</sup> The evidence indicates that new regimes of multi-ethnic states are susceptible to involvement in interstate ethnic conflict.

### ***5. Conclusions - Conditions for Cooperation***

In conclusion, 12 of 13 Propositions, comprising 3 General Hypotheses were tested. Variables designed to measure ethnic composition and institutional constraint were designed and tested. Of the three institutional constraint variables, it is notable that the two moderately correlated variables, XCONST and XRREG most closely approximated the assumptions of the model, with greater deviations found for the variable PARREG. These are only three of the many measurements in the Polity II dataset. Others may reveal more favorable results.

Of the General Hypotheses, General Hypothesis 2, relating to the impact that high ethnic cleavage and affinity have on protracted conflict and conflict reduction, found the strongest support. Four propositions were tested; all were statistically significant.

General Hypothesis 1, relating to the rank ordering of foreign policy preferences, found only partial support. Though the relationship was in the anticipated direction, each of its four propositions lacked a measurement of association to make a valid inference. Testing of proposition 5 on the importance of outbidding was set aside for case study testing. Case studies indicate that outbidding does influence the foreign policies of institutionally constrained states.

The results for General Hypothesis 3 were mixed. Two of the propositions (P10 and P12) relating to ethnically dominant states were partially supported (in the appropriate direction but

lacking the appropriate measurement of association) while two propositions relating to ethnically diverse states (P11 and P12) were initially rejected. The implications of each finding are considered below.

General Hypothesis 1 argues that depending on the interaction effects between variables, certain elites have greater motivation to pursue involvement in secessionist or irredentist strife because of the potential domestic payoffs that such policies will garner. In other instances, the mix of domestic variables serves to inhibit these strategies and shift elite preferences. The hypothesis was tested on only one dependent variable, the willingness of a state to risk prolonging or escalating tensions. It was found that there were differences among types of states on this variable. Diverse and constrained states appear to be more risk-averse to the extent that they are involved in conflicts leading to interstate ethnic conflict reduction more often than other types of states. Measurement on other variables, may produce more favorable results. One point worth noting is that different types of states may shift their preferences when confronted with different strategies and different kinds of states. As suggested in Section 4.3.3, high constraint states may interact differently together than in mixed dyads. Conflict reduction may be even more likely when diverse high constraint states interact.

In General Hypothesis 2, the variables "ethnic cleavage" and "ethnic affinity" were tested. These variables influence foreign policy preferences such that they are considered necessary for an interstate ethnic conflict and crisis (See Chapter 3). It was argued that high levels of both provide additional constraints and opportunities so that protracted conflict is more likely. Tension reduction was also expected to be less probable. The variables were tested on the entire population of interstate ethnic conflicts and then by type of conflict (secessionist and

irredentist). The evidence suggests that when cleavages and affinity are high, there is a greater probability that the preferences of all states will be shifted leading to increases in protracted conflict and tension. Security dilemmas at this stage are likely to be real (rather than perceived to be real) by virtue of the presence of these two additional factors. The results for individual types of states did not deviate appreciably from this pattern.

General Hypothesis 3 argued that certain states have greater proclivity for belligerence than others. Low constraint, dominant states were expected to have a high preference for using force and this may be the case. Less clear is the other extreme. It was found that, high constraint ethnically diverse states are as belligerent, if not more, than any other kind of state. Reasoning for this conclusion was provided in the previous section. Additional conditions were found to be necessary for such states to reduce violent interstate conflict. First, somewhat paradoxically, high cleavages and affinities were associated with a reduction in the use of force. This is paradoxical because, as found in Hypothesis 2, high cleavages and affinities have an impact on protracted conflict and tension reduction. It appears then, that within protracted conflicts, force will not always be a component of the foreign policies of diverse, constrained states. Even within such settings the leaders of these states may be making efforts to find peaceful solutions.

A second condition, identified in testing was "room for cooperation", an interactive process. In non-war conflicts, the assumptions of the model were found to be accurate: these states do use force less than the others. It is argued that the use of force by ethnically diverse and constrained states, is contingent on the strategy of the other state. So for example, if state A (a diverse-constrained state) provides support for a secessionist movement in state B, whether or not state A uses force to achieve this goal will depend on how state B responds and this



response is in turn dependent on its internal characteristics. Of course if force is not used, these states will usually find alternative means of achieving their foreign policy objectives in order to address the source of their insecurity.

A third condition is one of "regime duration". Judging from the spatial and temporal characteristics of interstate ethnic conflict, the regimes of new states, especially multi-ethnic states, appear to be more susceptible to involvement. This finding was supported by statistical evidence suggesting that for the regimes of diverse states, of five years or shorter duration, there is a higher probability of involvement in an ethnic conflict. Further research should concentrate on two areas: examining how diverse states under new regimes find ways to resolve irredentist and secessionist issues; and the ways in which the conflicts of new regimes of more ethnically homogenous states escalate to crisis.

It is difficult to say if each of these conditions are sufficient enough to increase cooperation for diverse but unconstrained states. It is possible that the leaders of these states will be less sensitive to the strategies of other states and more sensitive to their own internal characteristics. In view of this, the interaction condition is not included for P11. P11 and P13 are altered to:

**P11 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a low preference for force if:**

**cleavages are high or;**

**affinities are high or;**

**the duration of the regime is five years or longer.**

**P13 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for the use of force if:**

It is difficult to say if each of these conditions are sufficient enough to increase cooperation for diverse but unconstrained states. It is possible that the leaders of these states will be less sensitive to the strategies of other states and more sensitive to their own internal characteristics. In view of this, the interaction condition is not included for P11. P11 and P13 are altered to:

P11 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a low preference for force if:  
cleavages are high or;  
affinities are high or;  
the duration of the regime is five years or longer.

P13 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for the use of force if:  
cleavages are high or;  
affinities are high or;  
there is room for cooperation or;  
the duration of the regime is five years or longer.

The revised relationship is pictured diagrammatically in Figure 6.1

Insert Figure 6.1 Here

In summary, constrained-diverse states are more likely to pursue cooperative relations but under restrictive conditions. The main concern is preventing such states from becoming involved in ethnic conflicts that lead to war. In war they are likely to be equally belligerent. The exact circumstances may, of course, vary between conflict type. An irredentist conflict may have a higher probability of escalating to war than does a secessionist conflict because of the higher perceived threat to security (Carment 1993).

On the other hand, identifying the conditions necessary to prevent low constraint states from belligerent behaviour is somewhat more difficult. Recall that these states face fewer internal costs. They are more likely to use aggression to resolve their security dilemma. Their behaviour is more likely to approximate realist accounts of state behaviour. High cleavages and affinity have less of an impact on their behaviour. Tests that compare the behaviour of these states with the behaviour of states in non-ethnic conflicts might prove illuminating. In the following chapters, the conditions necessary to achieve cooperation among these states are examined.

## Notes

1. Since no single case will comply with all the assumptions of a model, the evaluation of many cases is preferred. This is particularly true when the model employs many variables. Furthermore, statistical analysis using aggregate data is built upon methodological assumptions that are completely explicit, thus facilitating the evaluation of the appropriateness of the technique used. Several other advantages of aggregate data are also obvious. Compared to other sampling techniques, aggregate data encourages parsimony because of its reliance on probability theory. Aggregate data can more readily be used in cross-sampling techniques in order to examine the various attributes of political systems over time. More specifically, aggregate data can be applied to univariate, multivariate and factor analyses. Thus, not only can aggregate data be used for descriptive purposes but it also allows correlational analysis that is open to specific and precise criticism including questions of reliability and validity. Since the primary goal of this chapter is to draw valid inferences about a particular kind of relationship between more than two variables, aggregate data analysis is a practical addition to case study (Brecher 1993).
2. See Gurr (1990) for an analysis of the Tillema data.
3. In the event that the case exhibited both secessionist and irredentist characteristics, the case was coded on the basis of the highest value threatened in consultation with a colleague familiar with research on ethnicity. In order to ensure intersubjective agreement, a random sample of 75 cases was recoded by a second individual. The second coding scored 80% agreement, prior to consultation.
4. In the absence of a foreign policy crisis an international crisis cannot occur, however the reverse is not true, a foreign policy crisis can take place without it leading to an international crisis. Interstate ethnic crises are a particular kind of interstate crisis. Additional conditions are required for them to take place, that is they must fulfil the conditions specified for either a secessionist or irredentist conflict.
5. Two of the major upheavals of the period 1918-88 were excluded from this study. Crises occurring during World War II and the Korean Wars (I, II, III) were coded as non-ethnic. They were coded non-ethnic on the following basis: ethnicity is not a factor in the triggering of the conflict or in any of its phases from escalation to reduction. Example "The Cod Wars". Disputes over fishing rights in waters contiguous to Iceland precipitated a crisis for the UK and Iceland from 23 November 1975 to 1 June 1976. For full details see Carment (1993) and Brecher & Wilkenfeld (1988).
6. Measurements of association are not presented in this initial analysis as the intention is descriptive (propositions are not tested) in order to determine if any general patterns exist.

7. The variable GEOG was initially grouped into 18 regions according to where the crises took place. These 18 regions were then recoded into the 5 regions presented here. Due to the small number of crises that occurred in North and South America, these two separate regions were coded along with Latin America as a single region. In reality all of the crises occurred in South or Latin America.

8. For a precise analysis of these definitions see: Brecher, James and Wilkenfeld (1988). The reason for excluding data ranging from the onset of World War Two and its termination is that these crises were deemed not to fulfil the conditions of any of the working definitions and hence were not interstate ethnic conflicts (see endnote 6).

9. To some the absence of ethnic strife in Latin and South America is an anomaly. See: Holsti, K. J. "Armed Conflicts in the Third World: Assessing Analytical Approaches and Anomalies" (unpublished paper, 1993). See also: McClintock, C. "Communal Strife in Peru: A Case of Absence of Spillover into the International Arena" in Midlarsky, M. The Internationalization of Communal Strife (1992).

10. The variable CRACTR was recoded so that a crisis with four or more actors appears as "Four +" in the Table.

11. In order to determine great power and super power involvement a variable "Major Power Involvement" (MPINV) was created. For cases preceding WW II, MPINV was composed of the dichotomous variable GPINV, wherein great power involvement was considered low when more than two powers had no or low involvement or none were crisis actors. Great power involvement was considered high when one or more of the powers were crisis actors or at least one great power was highly involved. The variable SPINVM was similarly dichotomized, that is when one or more of the superpowers was a crisis actor or both were highly involved non-crisis actors then involvement was considered high.

12. Others have coded a particular variable as the mean of the onset and termination values for that variable (Maoz & Abdolali 1989). This is a good strategy. However since this inquiry is primarily concerned with the behaviour of various polities during crisis, selecting values at onset makes more sense. At any rate, since three scores in some cases are being used, a small error in one of the variables will have little or no effect on the overall measurement. In some instances, a country was coded as undergoing a polity change or interruption (88, 77, 66 in the Polity II Handbook). This information was transformed to the variable that most closely approximated the polity at the onset of the crisis. In other instances polity data was not available for the country either because it was not yet a recognized state (Cyprus I) or the data was not available (Dahomey). In these cases information was drawn from other sources including, The Handbook of International Crises Vol's I, II and III.

13. Caution should be used in interpreting the cited country examples since the coding will vary, of course, for each country over time. Gurr et. al. use the term "intermediate category" for which no further explanation is provided.

14. To satisfy the curious, external validation procedures were carried out using the ICB variable REGIME. The coefficient for XCONST and the ICB variable REGIME is .60.

15. This procedure was adopted to account for cases that did not appear to have face validity or posed an operational dilemma. For example, Somalia has many kin-based ethnic groups at the domestic level. But in terms of the components provided, Somalia is very homogenous. Somalia was coded as an ethnically dominant state (1). This finding corresponds to the Shih (1991) finding and the findings of chapter five (see especially section 5 of chapter five).

16. Conceivably the variable also taps into the intensity of potential separatism. For example Neilsson and Jones (1988) provide a list of ethnic groups according to the degree of mobilization; unmobilized, latent, early phase of political mobilization, mobilized as insurgent movements and mobilized as political movements.

17. Correlations were carried out on the independent variables XCONST, XRREG PARREG and CMPSTN and the mediating variables, CLVGE and AFF. Table 6.24 reports the results. Note for example the high correlation between XCONST and XRREG (.61) and the smaller correlation of the two with the third measurement of constraint PARREG (.25 and .24). These correlations suggest that PARREG is tapping into a slightly different variant of institutional constraint. Similarly, CMPSTN correlates strongly with CLVGE and less so with AFF (.46 and .13 respectively). Not surprisingly, the more diverse a society becomes the more likely it will exhibit signs of ethnic cleavage and moderately higher ethnic affinity levels. This can be inferred from the modest positive correlation between CLVGE and CMPSTN. Also of interest, is the lack of strong correlation between the measurements of institutional constraint XCONST and CMPSTN which suggests that these variables are tapping into different dimensions of a state's political and ethnic structure.

18. Readers can refer to the frequency tables for the following procedure. The combination of XCONST and CMPSTN was carried out along the following lines: XCONST and CMPSTN were dichotomized as close to the median as possible resulting in balanced distributions: A state is coded Type Ia if XCONST is equal to or less than 3 and CMPSTN is equal to or less than 2; Type Ib if XCONST is equal to or less than 3 and CMPSTN is greater than or equal to 3; Type IIa if XCONST is greater than or equal to 4 and CMPSTN is equal to or less than 2 and; Type IIb if XCONST is greater than or equal to 4 and CMPSTN is greater than or equal to 3. Admittedly this static combination of the independent variables does not test their interaction effects to their full extent. This procedure is carried out in later testing.

19. The trichotomous variable PC was collapsed into two categories (1) non-pc and (2) pc (including long war pc).

20. The ICB Project defines protracted conflict in a similar way but does not include the condition of open warfare (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988).

21. The reader can refer to the frequency tables for this procedure. The variables CLVGE and AFF were divided as close to the median as possible. CLVGE was recoded with the two lowest variables (1,2) as "low" and (3,4,5) as "high". Similarly, AFF was recoded with (0,1,2) as "low" and (3,4) as "high". This resulted in distributions that were relatively equal in both cases.

22. The results indicated that high affinities had a pronounced effect on accentuating differences between states. For example, when affinities were high, 75% of diverse and institutionally constrained states (IIb) were involved in protracted conflicts. In contrast, 58% of the dominant and low constraint states were involved in protracted conflict when affinities were high. High cleavages enhanced the potential for protracted conflict for all states. For example, 58% of the diverse and institutionally constrained states were involved in a protracted conflict when cleavages were high. For low constraint dominant states the result was 60%. Similar patterns were found on measurements on the variable OUTESR. In both cases, the addition of high cleavage and affinity into the relationship enhanced the possibility of protracted conflict and future escalation for diverse states.

23. The results that are presented for General Hypothesis 3 include intra-war crises, although testing was also carried out excluding intra-war crises. There is no a priori reason imbedded in the model for their exclusion at the outset of testing. If a diverse constrained state behaves differently in war and non war settings, presumably that is an important finding and worth knowing. The results for testing without intra-war crises are including in section 4.4.

24. Of course the variable XRREG did not need to be trichotomized as it is already coded that way. The proliferation of categories in the multivariate analyses (for CLVGE and AFF) also dictated that categories be collapsed. Even with the large number of cases in the study, there are instances of cells containing very few cases. The decision rule for collapsing categories was largely determined by face validity of the scheme; however every effort was made to ensure that the procedure did not significantly alter the results of the analyses that were conducted on the original categories and in the previous analysis, that is the categorization was empirically informed. XCONST was recoded so that 1,2 =low; 3,4,5=medium; 6,7=high. PARREG was recoded so that 1,2=low; 3,4=medium; 5=high. CMPSTN was recoded so that 1,2=low; 3,4,5=high. The contingency tables referring to "diverse" are for the highest category unless stated otherwise.

25. The first coefficient displayed is for low constraint states using force and the second coefficient is for moderate constraint states using force. Two parameter estimates (coefficients) and associated statistics are displayed for the constraint variable since it has three categories. The estimates for the third parameter - high constraint states using force - is the negative of the sum of the first two coefficients. In other words, the coefficients must sum to 0 across the categories of a variable.

26. The tables also display the standard error for each estimate ( $\lambda$ ) The ratio of the parameter estimate to its standard error (Z values) is used to test the null hypothesis. For sufficiently large sample sizes the test of the null hypothesis that the parameter estimate ( $\lambda$ )

is 0 is based on this ratio, since the standardized lambda is approximately normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 if the model fits the data. Lambdas with Z values greater than 1.96 in absolute value can be considered significant at the 0.05 level

27. Major powers defined in this context include the five great powers of the inter-war years and the two superpowers after 1945.

28. Powers status - "POWSTA" is measured on a four point scale from small to superpowers. The variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable so that (1) minor powers included: small and minor powers and (2) major powers included: major and superpowers.

29. Separate testing of secessionist and irredentist cases was carried out. The results were found to not differ significantly from the original relationship and are not reported here.

30. Results for ethnically dominant states are not presented, since they did not differ significantly from the original relationship.

31. Of course even less constrained states adopt such behaviour. Ethiopia's attempt to destabilize Somalia during the 1980's by providing sanctuary to Somali secessionists is indicative.

32. The variable DURREG was dichotomized into regimes that were (1) five years or newer and (2) regimes that were over five years in duration.



**Chapter 7**

**Thai Malay Separatism, Managing Interstate Ethnic Conflict**

*The southern region of Thailand is a demarcation line between the Buddhist mainland and the Malay-Muslim world of Southeast Asia. Thus the centrifugal forces that are manifest in the case of the Muslim-Malays of South Thailand can, at the same time, be viewed as a result of the centripetal tendency of the Malay geo-cultural phenomenon. The ethnic ties, cultural links and historical roots are exerting themselves, in defiance of political boundaries superficially imposed on them.*<sup>1</sup>

*Democracy is important but if by practising certain aspects of democracy we run the risk of causing chaos in our party and country, we have to choose our country and party above democracy (Dr. Mahathir, Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1993).*<sup>2</sup>

### ***1. Introduction - Managing Interstate Ethnic Conflict, The Pursuit of the Stag***<sup>3</sup>

Malay Muslim minority separatism, centered on the southern Thai provinces of Pattani and Yala, offers an interesting contrast to the cases presented in this study.<sup>4</sup> Next to the Moro of the Philippines, the Malay of Thailand have been one of Southeast Asia's most vocal and least assimilated Muslim minorities. Precisely why the Thai Malay have developed secessionist tendencies, despite a relatively accommodative central government, may be associated with international trends and patterns of relations among the Southeast Asian Islamic community (Che Man 1990, Chaiwat 1993). Since the mid-fifties, when Islam in Southeast Asia entered a phase of heightened politicization and Malaysian irredentism intensified, the southern provinces of Thailand have become associated with separatist violence (Che Man 1990, Chaiwat 1993). By the end of the 1980s, Thai Malay leaders succeeded in obtaining several important political and economic concessions from the Thai government. Violence in these provinces was subsiding.

Conflict between state-centre and minority is on the rise again, this time taking on a revived religious and transnational dimension (Chaiwat 1993). However, despite the presence

of significant international linkages, the Thai Malay secessionist movement has yet to produce an interstate ethnic crisis between Thailand and Malaysia.

Most research on Thai Malay secessionism traces the roots of the conflict to poor cultural and political relations between the Malay community and nationalist Thai regimes (Forbes 1989, Suhrke 1989, Pitsuwan 1985, Chaiwat 1993). Therefore, conventional research on the Thai Malay issue, locates the primary causes of the conflict at the domestic political level. The decline in violence in the southern provinces is viewed as a function of improved relations between the state-centre and its marginalized minorities.

It is the conflict's international dimension, however, which offers a less conventional perspective. Indeed, some aspects of this conflict offer evidence that affective links are crucial for an ethnic separatist movement to prosper and grow. The Islamic states of the Middle East have, beyond training Thai Malay militants, provided substantial ideological support for their cause. Linguistic, religious and cultural affinities between the Malay populations of Malaysia and Thailand have also been significant.

During the 1960s and 1970s, friction between the two states over the issue of Thai Malay autonomy was mediated by cooperative efforts to manage an additional threat. In this case, the threat of a communist insurgency acted as both the catalyst for cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia and for a vigorous Thai Malay political movement. The general pattern of association appears to be this. When the communist insurgency was at its zenith, confrontation between the two states was minimized. As that threat subsided, so too did the Thai Malay insurgency, which derived much of its material and logistic support from the communists.<sup>5</sup>

The goal of this inquiry is to determine why these processes resulted in minimized interstate ethnic conflict and in what ways these processes challenge the assumptions of this thesis.

Apart from this introduction, the chapter consists of five sections. The next section traces the emergence of Thai Malay secessionism and its linkages with regional conflicts, including a Malaysian communist insurgency. In the third section, key domestic and international actors are identified. The fourth section is devoted to an examination of two formative "near crisis" periods in Thailand-Malaysia relations.<sup>6</sup> In the fifth section, key explanatory variables are assessed and the revised propositions are tested. Suggestions for improving the model are presented.

## ***2. Thailand's Malay Community - Politics on The Periphery***

### ***2.1 The Roots of Secessionism***

Measured against the spectrum of states ranging from diverse to complete ethnic homogeneity, Thailand's ethnic composition reflects a moderately diverse society but one governed by Buddhists of Thai descent. According to ethnolinguistic criteria, the Thai constitute 60% of the population, the Lao-related people another 25%, and the remainder includes hill tribes in the North, ethnic Chinese, Thai Muslims and not counting the ongoing influx of refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia, communities of Vietnamese, Hmuong and Khmer along the Thai border (Suhrke 1981). Despite this range of diversity, however, there is a great deal of religious homogeneity among most of these ethnic groups. When measured in terms of religious identity, for example, the Buddhist occupy a dominant position in excess of 95% of the population. Language, on the other hand tends to crosscut the religious dominance of Thai

Buddhists so that Thailand is a more ethnically diverse country than its religious composition would indicate.

In view of this uneven ethnic balance, Thailand's Malay population is unquestionably a distinct minority on the periphery of Thailand's political, economic and geographic spheres. The language, religion and culture of this small minority are all different from the rest of Thailand. Estimates of the total Thai Malay population range from 1.4 million to 1.5 million, which is slightly less than 4% of Thailand's total population of 56 million.<sup>7</sup> However, within the four southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Satul and Yala, where they are most heavily concentrated, the Malay form the dominant ethnic group (Suhrke 1989).<sup>8</sup>

A number of theories have been put forward to account for the rise of secessionism in the region, including variations on the themes of relative deprivation (Brown 1988), religious revivalism (Chaiwat 1993), historical (Forbes (1989), statist (McVey 1984) and core-periphery relations (Pitsuwan 1985, Suhrke 1989). In reality, several related factors, including demographic, socio-cultural and economic conditions, have produced an ethnic consciousness among the Malay-speaking Muslims in Thailand.<sup>9</sup> First, most Thai Malay have tended to remain in the province where they were born; net migration to Buddhist-dominant provinces tends to be very low for Malay Muslims (Suhrke 1989). Therefore, the Malay are a geographically concentrated group.

Most Malay within the region come from rural smallholder farms or coastal fishing villages. Most Malay occupy the traditional rural sector, favoring land cultivation and cash crop production including rice paddy and rubber tapping. On the other hand, the Buddhist population of these provinces, which includes Thai as well as Thai-Chinese, is predominately urban and

mobile (Anurugsa 1984). The ethnic Chinese have become a central rather than a peripheral minority in Thailand. Located in urban centers, possessing power by virtue of their economic importance and usually well educated, the Chinese - at least the elite - are typically active participants in the national political process. In contrast to the Malay, the Chinese have been less resistant to assimilation into Thai mainstream culture and politics (Suhrke 1981). Typically, the Malay are under-represented in the civil service as well as the private sector so that urban-rural lines of cleavage between Malay and non-Malay are reinforced by divisions in income, language and religion. This economic and political balance has remained relatively unchanged at least since the 1950s (Suhrke 1989, Brown 1988).

Available aggregate data indicate that the Thai Malay have occupied the lowest economic rung among the three ethnic groups in the region, although Yala province does constitute an exception.<sup>10</sup> In general, however, rural poverty in the south is the highest in Thailand (Suhrke 1989) and it is in the poorer of these provinces, namely Pattani, that Malay secessionism has been most resilient and vociferous. These demographic and geographic characteristics explain, in part, the development of Malay ethnic consciousness; but other factors, including Thai national development policies are also noteworthy.

## ***2.2 The Military of Thailand - Centralization and the Policies of Intolerance***

Successive Thai regimes have approached the Muslim issue from two angles, the implementation of policies towards all Thai Muslims and specific policies directed toward the Thai Malay. Since the late 1950s the central government's policy towards Thai Muslims has been relatively flexible. Efforts have been made by most Thai regimes to recognize the religious

freedoms of Muslims in the constitution at both the national and provincial level (Forbes 1982, Suhrke 1989). These policies are in recognition of the fact that the total population of all Muslims in Thailand is nearly double that of the Malay in the southern provinces. Bangkok's treatment of the Malay, on the other hand, has been less than consistent, ranging from policies of forced assimilation during the 1930s and 1940s to recognition of minority rights from the 1960s onward. For example, when the military-nationalist government of Pibul Songkhram came to power for the second time (1948) the Thai Malay established the first of several important international linkages. Fearing that the nationalist policies of Pibul would eliminate their religious and political power, Malay religious leaders sent a petition to the UN requesting that the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat be allowed to secede and join the newly-constituted Federation of Malaya (Thomas 1989, Forbes 1982). Efforts at unification with Malaysia had been pursued since 1902 when Thailand's King, Chulalongkorn, formally annexed the three southern provinces (Gopinath 1991) but it was not until Malaysia was on the verge of achieving federation that these demands were taken seriously by Thailand and the international community.

When Pibul's regime quashed the request and arrested the leading signatories, discordant relations between the central government and Malay dissidents became firmly entrenched (Forbes 1982). Many Malay religious leaders and wealthy Malay fled to Kelantan in northern West Malaya. After that, pressure applied by a concerned international community, led primarily by the British government, did result in a slight relaxation in tensions between the central government and Malay elites.<sup>11</sup> These external pressures consisted of directives from London

which merely conveyed to Bangkok that "Whitehall expects a just solution of Patani's case" (Jones 1948: 4-5).

Thereafter, efforts at forcible assimilation were abandoned in favor of an uneasy combination of accommodationist and integrationist strategies including the dropping of compulsory attendance at Thai primary schools and the promotion of the use of Thai over the Malay language (Brown 1988, May 1990). For example, Islamic law was once again applied in matters of marriage and inheritance where both parties were Muslims. Furthermore, an Advisor on Islamic Affairs, a Central Islamic Committee and Provincial Islamic Committees were created to assist the Thai government on issues particular to the Thai Muslims (Thomas 1989). Since then, religious freedom has been permitted to the extent of allowing Islamic law to apply in matters of family and inheritance contracts and the southern Muslims have maintained private Islamic schools (*podok*) to teach in the vernacular and local history, in addition to Arabic and the Islamic religion (Forbes 1989).

### *2.3 Elite Interests - Spanning the Border*

For most Malay elites however, the changes brought about by the central government were ineffective. The expansionist and centralizing policies of the Pibul regime had already undermined the legitimacy of local Malay elites, forcing them to pursue alternative, and often more violent, paths to autonomy (Brown 1988). Thailand's nationalist policies shaped Malay behaviour in three ways. First, traditional Malay elites perceived themselves as leaders of a marginalized community within someone else's homeland (Suhrke 1989). Leadership of the Malay nationalist movement shifted from traditional Malay elites, living in Pattani, to wealthy



and conservative religious leaders who had escaped persecution to nearby Kelantan and Kedah in Malaysia.

Second, the traditional authority structures of the Malay political and religious elites had become severely eroded by both Thai centralization and by challenges from the younger, more educated Thai Malay.

Third, material and political linkages between Thai Malay and a concerned international Islamic community were established.<sup>12</sup> The importance of these connections to the development of Malay insurgency is examined below.

### *3. Domestic and Regional Interests*

#### *3.1 The Beginnings of Insurgency and the Importance of Affinities*

The decades between World War Two and 1960 were a time in which Malay elites in Thailand pursued irredentist strategies rather than secessionist goals. This objective related directly to the ongoing plans to create a federated Malaysia consisting of West Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and Singapore. Most Malay elites in the northern border regions of Thailand sought unification with a federated Malaysia partly in an effort to ensure ongoing material and political support from Kelantan province and partly because of the shared history of the region. Without substantial assistance from the rulers of Kelantan province in West Malaya it is unlikely that Malay nationalism would have begun with such enthusiasm and optimism. Kelantan is also an obvious choice for support for two other reasons: a common dialect and linkages to dynastic ties in the past. Kelantan is one of the most orthodox states in Malaysia; and orthodoxy,

according to Suhrke (1977) implies, special concern for a situation in which fellow Muslims are governed by non-Muslims as in southern-Thailand.

During this period, a Thai Malay party, with strong links to Kelantan, was created. The Gandingan Melayu Patani Raya (Association of Malay of Greater Patani, GAMPAR) was a leftist political organization with the specific goal of uniting all Malay Muslims living in Thailand and Malaya (Gopinath 1991).<sup>13</sup> It was leaders of GAMPAR that designed the pan-Malay doctrine during the Pibul regime. Around the time of Malaysia's federation in 1962, the idea of a pan-Malay state, that would include parts of Thailand, was firmly discredited due to Malaysia's confrontation (konfrontasi) with Indonesia (1963-1965). Indonesia had played an important role in providing support to the Kelantan irredentist movement and the failure of Indonesia's confrontational policies to generate substantial support within West Malaya, had the net effect of isolating Kelantan Malay from mainstream Malaysian politics. In turn, GAMPAR did not receive the kind of support from the Malaysian government necessary to sustain its growth. Instead, it sought out and obtained support from the politically isolated leaders of Kelantan province.

Thus, by the mid-1960s, Malaysia's new government had only a minor interest in the Thai Malay situation. There were two reasons that Kuala Lumpur did not share Kelantan's enthusiasm. First, the particularist ties between Kelantan and the Thai Malay were not widely shared by other Malay (Farouk 1984).<sup>14</sup> Second, Malaysia was faced with an ongoing communist insurgency and looked to Thailand for support. These issues are examined below.

### *3.2 Transition to Secession and Interstate Cooperation*

Soon after the formation of GAMPAR it became evident that neither the international community nor the newly-established Malay Federation would openly support reunification.<sup>15</sup> Tensions between the traditional elites favoring unification with West Malaya and younger more progressive Malay students, favoring secessionist goals, began to undermine the effectiveness and unity of the Malay nationalist movement. It was not until both groups abandoned the strategy of irredentism for autonomy that the Malay nationalist movement regained its lost momentum (Farouk 1984).

Several distinct secessionist organizations emerged on Thailand's political map, each group having different goals, leadership and strategies. Although, by some counts, there are at least six (and possibly eight) distinct political groups, three are notable (Anurugsa 1984). The first to be formed, in 1960, was the Barisi Revolusi Nasional (BRN) under the leadership of Tengku Abdul Jalal in Kelantan. The BRN was a creation of conservative Malay Muslim leadership, initially espousing pan-Malay objectives. According to Gopinath (1991) the BRN's original goal was to remove the four Muslim provinces from Thailand and then, if successful, to incorporate them into a wider state within the Malaysian Federation.<sup>16</sup> The leaders of the BRN favored the creation of a new state which would combine socialism with Islamic principles. Its leaders had important affiliations with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM).<sup>17</sup>

In 1963, Indonesia's *konfrontasi* policies split the BRN. In part, confrontation raised questions within Islamic Southeast Asia about Malaysia's foreign policy orientation, especially its relations with Britain and other western powers. Indonesian support for Thai-Muslim secessionists was based on both ideological and ethnic grounds, that is, to liberate Malay ruled

by conservative, "Old Established Force" governments (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 207). In 1965, those Thai Malay leaders who supported Indonesia's confrontational and Islamic world view split from the BRN and formed the Parti Revolusi Nasional (PARNAS). Throughout the decade and into the 1970s PARNAS operated in unison with the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) while the more conservative Islamic elites formed the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (National Liberation front of Patani, BNPP).

The BNPP was created together with traditional and religious elites living in Kelantan, although much of its support derived from overseas Malay students in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan (May 1990). Today, the BNPP remains an Islamic organization and its political objectives are to liberate all Muslims, including the Thai Malay, and to establish a sovereign state of Pattani (Gopinath 1991).<sup>18</sup> The BNPP maintains close relations with the Islamic Secretariat, the Arab League and the Palestine Liberation Organization (Gopinath 1991).

A third secessionist group, The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was established in 1967 and grew to be one of the most influential and militant secessionist organizations, largely because of material support from Libya and Syria and ideological support from Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.<sup>19</sup> Although the PULO began as a loosely organized insurgency movement and not a political organization, it evolved, 20 years later, into the most internationally active Thai Malay secessionist group (Gopinath 1991). It remains active today, although its members now number less than a thousand. Its main feature, as is common among militant organizations, is extensive reliance on external support from outside sources without which it could not persist. For example, the leadership of the PULO is centered in Mecca and

much of the recruitment of members has, until recently, been carried out there (Thomas 1989).

While the BRN represents pan-Malay interests and the BNPP is a religious and conservative organization, PULO remains primarily a militant insurgency movement. Together, these organisations applied pressure on the government in Bangkok. In concert with the CPM, they would pose a considerable obstacle to cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia.

### *3.3 Thailand's Government - Preventing Insurgency*

In the 1960s the Malay nationalist movement did not pose a serious risk to Thai security. Potential linkages between the PULO and communist insurgents were, however, a growing concern. Since some Malay activities were connected implicitly to this issue in the southern region, the Thai government acted forcefully against any hint of Malay insurgency (Alpern 1974).<sup>20</sup> In turn, support for the rebels in the form of arms shipments from Kelantan ensured a growth in the militancy of these movements. Although the CPM, which operated out of southern Thailand, posed a more serious threat to Thai-Malaysian relations at this time, the secessionist movement remained a constant source of irritation between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. Both the Thai and Malaysian governments had reason to fear a CPM-Thai Malay alliance (Thomas 1977).

For the Malaysian government of the day, a communist insurgency movement, operating out of southern Thailand, represented a considerable deterrent to its plans for the political unity of its disparate ethnic groups within the Malaysia Federation (Thomas 1977). The Thai government, on the other hand, could not risk losing favor with Malaysia's leaders by ignoring

the CPM, for fear that the Malay card would be used against it.<sup>21</sup> Mutual insecurity in two separate issue-areas, led to a convergence of interests between the two governments.

Thai leaders were convinced that, as long as a communist threat to Malaysian political stability existed, formal support for Thai Malay secessionism would remain at low-levels. In turn, any confrontation between Thailand and Malaysia would be to the CPM's gain and thus the communist's strategy had been, precisely to provoke such a development (Suhrke 1977).

This process of provocation would lead to intensification of the Thai Malay movement, as its own supporters sought to take advantage of the deep wounds opened up by the CPM. By the late 1960s Malaysia was on the verge of internal political collapse and the dream of a separate Thai Malay state seemed closer.

### *3.4 Malaysia's Ethnic Politics - Divided Interests before the Emergency*

Domestic ethnic politics played a significant role in influencing the foreign policies of both Thailand and Malaysia. Initially, internal threats reduced, rather than increased tensions between the two states. It did so in two ways. First, the anti-communist stance of successive Malaysian governments had distinct anti-Chinese overtones. Malaysia's pro-west foreign policy was largely a result of the internal threat posed by Malaysia's large Chinese communist community.

Second, policies of preference developed for Malay accentuated differences among Malay and non-Malay both within and outside of Malaysia. Believing that Malaysia's pro-Malay orientation would eventually include them, Thai Malay secessionists stepped up their activities against the Thai central government. Instead, these threats resulted in increased collaboration

between the two governments. Both ideas are examined below. As noted above, the CPM was primarily a Chinese organization and since the Chinese constituted some of Malaysia's population, the Malaysian government could not afford infiltration of the CPM into Malaysia through Thailand. That the Chinese minority in Malaysia had a firm hand in influencing Malaysia's foreign policy was clear. Malaysia had, for example, consistently refused to join SEATO because Malaysia's Chinese leaders saw the organization as essentially an American device designed to contain China (Thomas 1977).<sup>22</sup>

The 1969 communal riots in Malaysia provided the catalyst for renewed Thai Malay-CPM collaboration and a positive shift in relations between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. Sensing an opportunity to exploit a weakened Malaysian regime, the CPM stepped up its infiltration along the border. As a result, formal border operations were established jointly by the Malaysian and Thai governments. Since 1952, the year the CPM retreated into the jungle along the Thai border, there had been, small-scale, joint border operations. However, during the 1969 Malaysian emergency, a Thai-Malaysian Communist Suppression Command was established to conduct joint operations against the terrorists in the border provinces. In the same year, the Thai government placed the four southern provinces under martial law. The Thai government remained hard-pressed, however, in convincing its own peoples of the necessity of the joint border operations.

On 7 March 1970, Thai and Malaysian military units established a new border agreement, which would allow "hot pursuit" in each other's territory.<sup>23</sup> In May 1972, a joint Thai-Malaysian border command was established in a further effort to suppress terrorist movements from one side of the border to the other. Differences over strategy were quickly

resolved as a coup d'état in Bangkok brought a staunchly anti-communist government to power. The new regime was prepared to allow Malaysia forces expanded operation in southern Thailand. When the Vietnam war culminated in 1975 with a communist victory, Bangkok's fear of Vietnamese expansion grew, which ironically led to increased pressure from Thai nationalists to dissolve the border agreement with Malaysia. Bangkok ignored these pleas.

A massive joint operation against the CPM started in 1977. In effect, both governments believed that eradication of the CPM would also mean a decline in the activities of the Thai Malay insurgents who relied extensively on the communists for logistic and material support. In 1979, relations between Thailand and Malaysia worsened, largely because Thai nationalists could not reconcile the need for Malaysian troops on Thai soil with the need to address Thai security needs. At this time, the Malaysian government sought to reassure the Thai government that it had suppressed all irredentist claims to southern Thailand. In a meeting with Thai government officials, Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister was quoted as saying:

While this is an internal matter for Thailand, I would like to state categorically that we have nothing to do with this movement. The Malaysian government would not tolerate any Malaysian assisting, or collaborating in any way with this small group of people. We would regard such action by any Malaysian citizens as subversive and we will not hesitate to deal with them firmly (Pitsuwan 1985: 175).

The near-crises that ensued as a consequence of worsening Thai-Malaysian relations are examined below. First, however, it is necessary to identify the regional and extra-regional actors with an interest in the conflict.



### *3.5 The Kelantan Link and The Growth of Islamic Conservatism*

Ironically it was the pro-Malay, communal policies undertaken by Malaysia's governing party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) that had an effect opposite to those voiced by Malaysia's leaders. Malaysia is, constitutionally, a Muslim state, to the extent that Islam is the official religion. But in reality, Malaysia is an ethnically diverse state composed of Malay, Chinese and immigrants of Indian descent. Although the Malay in Malaysia do not constitute a numerical majority, they have, since 1969, enjoyed special constitutional and political privileges as bumiputra (sons of the soil). No province within Malaysia has been more vociferous in defending the rights of the bumiputra than Kelantan.

The development of a pro-Malay and staunchly Islamic state on their southern border had a powerful demonstration effect on Malay elites in the Pattani region. In 1969, the leader of the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP or PAS) openly discussed the prospect of an alternative Malay nation - comprising the Malay states of Malaysia and those of southern Thailand - "should Malaysia collapse as a country" (Farouk 1984: 245). PAS leaders in Kelantan, for example, were vociferous in their support of the Pattani Muslims (Suhrike 1977). Kelantan was (and is) the home of Malaysia's political conservatives and PAS was the primary political instrument through which these leaders expressed their views on the Thai Malay issue (PAS ruled Kelantan from 1959 until 1978 and returned to power in 1989).

For example, in 1970, Datuk Seri Mohammed Asri, a senior official in Malaysia's National Front cabinet and later leader of Kelantan, suggested in the local papers while in opposition that the struggle against Thai rule was a "holy one" and deserved support from Muslims the world over (Pitsuwan 1988b). While also serving as Chief Minister for Religious

Affairs in the UMNO, Datuk Mohammed Asri commented that "the request for autonomy with specific conditions for the four provinces as put forward by the freedom front seem credible if well received".<sup>24</sup> Judging from the lack of reaction from the central government to his comments, it is unclear whether the minister was voicing official Malaysian policy on the issue.

The general response from Bangkok, however, was more direct. The government expressed concern over the foreigners acting on behalf of separatists in the Middle East (Pitsuwan 1985). For example, the Thai government commented publicly on the connection between the Kelantan leader, Datuk Asri and his Libyan connections. According to one Thai official: "In November 1977, when it was assumed that Datuk Asri was in London, our intelligence sources confirmed that he was in Mecca and Tripoli trumpeting the PULO's cause" (Pitsuwan 1988b: 340). Thailand's English-language daily The Nation, also identified Malaysia as a prime supporter of separatists. Similar claims appeared in other Thai dailies (Gopinath 1991, Chaiwat 1991).

During the 1970s and 1980s Bangkok had relied on both of the Muslim nations of ASEAN, Malaysia and Indonesia, to support Thailand in international circles against the activities of the separatist movements. (Pitsuwan 1988b). In fact, Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand personally sought and obtained Indonesian and Malaysian support for Thailand to contain the damages done by the propaganda efforts of the separatist elements at international forums (National Security Council Document on Policy toward the Malay Muslims, 1978: 14). ASEAN solidarity produced results. The PULO, which had been the most vigorous in its public relations abroad, had failed to capture any official attention of the various Muslim bodies where both Malaysia and Indonesia were present.<sup>25</sup> At times, however, it was

difficult to interpret the exact message Kuala Lumpur was trying to convey to Bangkok. On the one hand, the Government of Malaysia distanced itself from the Thai Malay issue. On the other hand, Malaysia's Islamic community expressed solidarity with the Thai Malay. For example, Seri Abdul Aziz bin Zain, Vice President of the Muslim Welfare Organization of Malaysia was quoted in 1977 as saying:

The Malay in South Thailand had nourished a resentment to what they considered the forcible incorporation of their homeland into Thai-speaking Buddhist Thailand. For more than a century Thailand had been trying to assimilate their Malay subjects through their policy of national integration, which required a citizen to have Thai education, Thai names and to adopt Thai culture. These efforts were considered by the Muslims as an attempt to suppress their identity, Malay customs, Islamic religion and culture. And nothing concrete was done to help them overcome their economic, social and educational problems (Pitsuwan 1988b: 341).

The above comment is illustrative of the concern expressed by some Malaysian leaders after the consolidation of power under the UMNO. In effect, this political change brought the Thai-Malay question into comparative perspective. The development of a vigorous government policy to improve the economic well-being of bumiputra through strategies of economic and political rebalancing had become the main platform of the UMNO after the 1969 emergency. The primary goal of these policies, collectively known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) was to bring the Malay peoples into the modernizing, commercial, industrial and educational sectors of Malaysian society, an area long dominated by Malaysian Chinese. An important offshoot of the NEP, was the effect it had on the Thai Malay expatriates who had become political activists in Malaysia. The NEP and its pro-Malay emphasis, induced many Malay to support conservative pro-Malay opposition parties. Parties, such as PAS, sought to make political gains by emphasizing the Thai Malay problem to an even greater extent than the official government.

The net effect of this outbidding was a dovetailing of platforms between the UMNO and its Islamic party opposition in the north, such that the UMNO government rarely renounced the PAS position publicly. The leaders of Malaysia knew that pan-Malay sentiment was popular with voters in that region. For example, a 1977 poll of Malaysian attitudes towards the Muslim problem in southern Thailand indicated that a majority supported a policy of active Malaysian governmental intervention in favor of the Malay Muslims (Gopinath 1991: 139).<sup>26</sup>

Thus, official relations between Thailand and Malaysia in the 1970s, though cordial, were heavily influenced by regional politics. Thai Malay leaders sought to make political gains within Malaysia, where their ideas were well received. They also began to explore support within the international Islamic community. New connections were cultivated. Each of these potential linkages are examined below.

### ***3.6 Pan-Islam and International Linkages***

Indonesia, a state with strong ethnic affinities with the Thai Malay, was an obvious first choice for support. After all, confrontation had played an important role in Thai Malay politics during the 1960s. However, Sukarno's policy of support for the Thai Malay did not persist after Indonesia's new leader, Suharto came to power in 1965. Secessionist movements in East Timor, West Papua, Aceh (Sumatra) and the South Molluccas, among others, made the Suharto government extremely sensitive to pursuing an aggressive ethnically based foreign policy, for fear of obvious repercussions at home. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said when he returned from the Islamic Conference at Kuala Lumpur in 1974. "We cannot have a separate

state for every minority in a country " (Suhrke 1977: 207). Thai Malay secessionists would have to look further abroad for support.

The rise of Islamic nationalist movements in other parts of the world (notably the Sudan, Philippines, Pakistan, Iran, India) inspired the local Thai Malay elites to look to the Middle East and North Africa, the centers of support for Islamic movements around the world. The resurgence of Islam in these and other regions worked to the advantage of the secessionists. Initially, their cause became known through international awareness and human rights monitoring (Gopinath 1991). For example, Malay Muslims in exile (mostly in Saudi Arabia) and students in Saudi Arabia, were instrumental in organizing external and international opposition to Thai policy. Separatist meetings were held during the Haj season (Farouk 1984), and Saudi Arabia, Libyan and Syria served as primary sources of training for PULO leaders (May 1990).

Muslim organizations also served as sources of support for the Thai Malay (Farouk 1984). Initially, the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held disparate views of the Pattani issue. Formally, communiques that included any reference to the problem were excluded from the conference (Suhrke 1977). Informally, there were discussions of imposing an oil embargo against Thailand (Gopinath 1991), and discussions of the problem of Muslim minorities all over the world (Gopinath 1991 Chaiwat 1991). By the 1980s the issue of Pattani was an important item on the agenda of the Islamic Summit Conference and the PULO was receiving considerable support from the Muslim World League (Saudi Arabia's official government organ for rendering assistance to Muslims around the world) (Gopinath 1991). Instances of social, educational, and religious assistance have also been documented (Gopinath 1991).<sup>27</sup>

Finally, it is important to include China and Vietnam as potential sources of support for the Thai Malay cause. Both were involved in the region because the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the CPM were actively engaged in supporting various elements of the Pattani separatist movement.<sup>28</sup> In the atmosphere of ideological confrontation between the then-communist bloc of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea) and the ASEAN states, the Malay insurgents and the CPM (and to a lesser extent the CPT) were of particular interest to all regional actors. Both were found to be effective weapons in destabilizing the national governments and undermining the positive effects of intra-ASEAN relations.

When the conflict in Indochina culminated in Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in 1978 and the subsequent Sino-Vietnam war of 1979, the struggle to exert influence over the whole of Southeast Asia led these states to seek allies in the Malay peninsula, namely, the CPM and the Malay separatists.<sup>29</sup> How exactly this process generated substantial conflict between Malaysia and Thailand is the subject of the next section.

#### ***4. Tension Escalation***

##### ***4.1. Near Crisis Phase I - 1976-1981***

The period from 1976 to 1981 marked a decline in relations between Malaysia and Thailand. Constant squabbling over control of the border relating to the management of the CPM problem could not be easily resolved because of the Malay issue, which moderated the security interests of both states.<sup>30</sup> Under the agreement of 1970, Malaysian troops could enter Thai areas in "hot pursuit" of the CPM, but Thai forces could not enter Malaysia in pursuit of Malay insurgents, a fact that led to protest within Thailand (Anurugsa 1984). In their efforts to

eliminate the CPM, Malaysian forces had often crossed the Thai border. One such incident served to trigger a series of threats and counter-threats between the two governments.

In May 1976, when Malaysian security forces indiscriminately killed, wounded and arrested Thai citizens (mostly of Chinese origin) without Thai consent and stayed on Thai soil for another 14 days, the Thai government accused the Kuala Lumpur government of "showing no trust and displaying an unfriendly attitude toward their Thai hosts" (Foreign Relations Committee Report, 11 June 1976). In response, the Malaysian Home Affairs Minister Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie said:

To protect our national interests and indeed our survival, we will have to regard that part of Thailand as hostile and the ramifications of such an attitude must not only be understood but accepted by all.<sup>31</sup>

Still rueful, Bangkok prepared for the day when Malaysia could not be expected to support Thailand in the international community on this issue. As the report by the Special Committee on the Study of the Situation in the Three Southern Border Provinces (1979: 86) put it to the full parliament in December 1979, "Thailand will face many problems if and when political factions with nationalist leanings come to power in Malaysia". The report concluded that for Thailand to maintain its sovereignty, the Thai Malay and CPM issues would have to be solved quickly, with or without Malaysian support.

Under pressure from Bangkok to withdraw by January 1980, the Malaysian field forces had stepped up their operations against the CPM.<sup>32</sup> The communist insurgents, were forced to disband into small units and abandoned their long established sanctuaries in Narathiwat and Yala. The net result of this action was that Malay Muslims, including elements and sympathizers of the PULO, moved in to fill the vacuum.

Thus, a potential international crisis between Malaysia and Thailand began with a series of internal violent acts initiated by the PULO and culminating in an exchange of threats between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. At the root of this conflict was the issue of resolving the communist insurgency problem at the height of Vietnamese expansionism in Southeast Asia.

Four domestic and violent events took place between 1976 and 1981 (Chaiwat 1987). At least one event constituted a threat to the Thai regime but did not lead to a foreign policy crisis for Thailand. A bomb attack during the royal visit to Yala province on 22 September 1977 is believed to have been indirectly linked to the downfall of the Thanin Kraivixien's administration (Forbes 1980: 22).<sup>33</sup> The attempt to assassinate the king and his royal family led to the resignation of the prime minister in the same year (Anurugsa 1984). The four remaining acts were of lesser scope and intensity.

Another sixteen violent minor acts occurred over the same period. In all there were 21 acts of violence resulting in at least 221 civilian casualties (Chaiwat 1987).<sup>34</sup> The secessionist rebels in each of the four major incidents were directly or indirectly connected with the PULO, and all acts occurred in Yala province (Chaiwat 1987, see also Forbes 1987).<sup>35</sup> The four main events were:

1. 22 September 1977 - a bombing undertaken by members of the PULO, Sabilallah and Black December during the royal visit to Pondok in Yala province - 47 casualties (no deaths reported);
2. 14 December 1977 - a holdup/shooting of a local casino - 18 casualties (10 deaths reported);



3. 6 October 1979 - a bombing of a railway station in Yala - 9 casualties (no deaths reported);

4. 21 February 1981 - a shooting of travellers on a road in Yala - 25 casualties (15 deaths reported).

Three patterns can be ascertained from the 21 events. First, the terrorists showed a willingness to attack and kill Thai Buddhist civilians, a notable change in strategy from previous behaviour. Second, efforts by the PULO to extend the campaign to Bangkok became extensive. A third discernible pattern was the growing threat of transnational terrorist attacks, including attacks on foreign government targets in Thailand and Thai government targets in other countries (Forbes 1987).

One question, central to this inquiry is why this period witnessed an increase in violent strategies. The advantage of viewing these events some 20 years later is that two patterns can be discerned. The more notable of these is the parallel course of events relating to the activities of the CPM, most notably a rise in its activities and a subsequent decline around the same time. It is the behaviour of the CPM that provides the first clue why the Malay separatist insurgency also peaked and then declined during this period. A second and related clue is the rise to power in 1976 of a civil authoritarian government in Thailand. This regime ruled without popular participation, brushing aside many problems that had been the concern of the previously democratically elected government of Seni Pramoj (Pitsuwan 1985). The three year democratic regime of Pramoj, who was elected in 1973, had brought about a change in tactics in the struggle of the Thai Malay. Political protests based on notions of equality, freedom and

guaranteed rights became the rallying cries of the Thai Malay leaders. In 1974, Bangkok had installed troops in the area. Massive demonstrations, including riots in 1975, helped raised awareness among Malay masses and served as constant sources of friction between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.<sup>36</sup> After the riots of 1975 several new secessionist groups emerged on the scene (mostly offshoots of the PULO) and sabotage activities increased. When the Thai military took control of the southern area, protest and violence became the preferred path to liberation, followed by equally oppressive governmental measures and more PULO violence (Pitsuwan 1985).

Coupled with the CPM, the PULO found that they could generate a great deal of political instability and violence in the region that was otherwise beyond their means (Anurugsa 1984). In 1978, the Thai government under Kraivixien, embarked on a policy of re-integrating the Malay community into Thai society, which led to a worsening of the situation. Not surprisingly, the Thai Cabinet put security policy, including suppression of the separatists and maintaining territorial integrity, as the most immediate concern, ranking ahead of improved administrative policy, conversion of the Malay into a Thai-speaking group and economic development (Anurugsa 1984).

In 1980, violent confrontations between PULO and Thai forces ensued when the Malaysian forces withdrew and Thai forces tried to round up both CPM and PULO leaders. Some Muslim villagers were caught in the crossfire and fled to nearby Kelantan and Kedah. At the height of the confrontation 1,178 people took refuge in "refugee camps" inside Malaysia and vowed not to return until their safety could be guaranteed (Pitsuwan 1988b).<sup>37</sup> For its part, Malaysia's UMNO leaders said that the "refugees would not be returned against their wish and

Malaysia would provide them shelter on purely humanitarian grounds" (Pitsuwan 1988b: 337-338). From Bangkok, charges were made that the Malaysian authorities encouraged elements of the PULO to strike at CPM base areas because the latter had informed the Thai authorities of their activities and movements. One observer noted:

Detong [Narathiwat] officials who observed the exodus in April claim they saw Malaysian military vehicles picking up the refugees once they had crossed the border. Border Patrol Police (V) sources claim that since late 1980, Muslim separatists have been wearing jungle fatigues and using tinned rations and equipment similar to those used by Malaysian forces.<sup>38</sup>

In September 1981, the Thai government attempted to settle the refugee issue with Kuala Lumpur. As a gesture of friendship and "a favor to an ASEAN neighbor" the Malaysian government decided to absorb the refugees as had been done previously.

The near-crisis was amicably resolved when a general amnesty was offered to members of the CPM in 1984.<sup>39</sup> In December 1989 an accord between Thailand, Malaysia and the CPM formally ended the CPM's 40 year struggle.<sup>40</sup> The communist threat was considerably diminished along the border after the CPM leaders agreed to lay down their arms in return for Malaysian financial compensation and rehabilitation.<sup>41</sup> One thousand members of the disbanded units decided to settle down in Thailand.<sup>42</sup> With the removal of the CPM from the scene, the activities of the Malay separatist movement also declined in scope and violence, until 1989.

In 1989 a series of internal events triggered a second near crisis for Thailand. In contrast to the first, this conflict was marked by full cooperation between Malaysia and Thailand.

#### *4.2. Near-Crisis Phase II - 1989-Present*

After the demise of the CPM, both the Thai and Malaysian governments could give full attention to the Thai Malay dispute. The year 1989 marked renewed attempts by the popularly elected Chat Thai government to resolve the PULO insurgency in the southern provinces with the assistance of Kuala Lumpur. Under pressure from opposition parties to resolve the question amicably and have the army withdraw from the region, Bangkok devised an economic plan called the Hardpan Barau (New Hope). The plan was implemented as a strategy for the development of tourism, the southern seaboard and a coastal industrial zone. The goal was to strengthen the regional economy and defuse tensions between the Malay and Thai communities.<sup>43</sup> The year 1989 was noteworthy for two other reasons. That year marked a brief revival in violent activities in the Pattani region. Throughout the year attacks by what were then believed to be Thai Malay rebels were carried out on non-Malay teachers, random bombings and kidnappings.<sup>44</sup>

The event is significant to the extent that it signalled a change in leadership among the Thai Malay. The source of this change was a minority Shi'ia sect, with considerable international connections. For example, as part of the New Hope plan the government chose to restore a mosque in Yala province. Between 23 October 1989 and 3 June 1990 followers of the Shi'ia leader, Sorayuth Sakunasantisart, protested the use of government money to renovate the mosque in a series of marches, speeches and mass prayers (Chaiwat 1993). Sorayuth and eight others were alleged to have made defamatory remarks against the monarchy during the rallies.<sup>45</sup> By December 1990 most of the accused had been arrested while the leader, Sorayuth fled to Kelantan where he was reluctantly handed over to Thai authorities.<sup>46</sup>

Given that the dissidents came from a Shi'ia core group, Thai sources believed that event and the 1989 violence was promulgated with the assistance of the Iranian embassy in Bangkok (Chaiwat 1993).<sup>47</sup> The PULO was not implicated in the attacks. If that is an accurate assessment, then it is probable that Muslim minority politics in Thailand are undergoing a significant realignment. A new pan-Muslim movement under Shi'ia leadership would include not only the Malay of the southern provinces but also the non-Malay Muslims centered around Bangkok. The issue of Thai Malay autonomy would, therefore, be second in importance to the larger issue of Muslim religious revivalism.

This internal transformation is also important because of the realignment of international interests in the conflict. There appears to be a shift away from Saudi Arabia to Iran, as the primary external focal point of support. The Gulf War did much to hasten this process. At the beginning of the crisis, many Muslims were pro-Saudi because the country was the biggest sponsor of Thai Malay students. After the war, these students were of the view that Saudi Arabia was a "tool" of the US to destroy Muslims. According to one source, hundreds of young men crossed the border to Malaysia to link with the fundamentalists there, in an effort to serve with Iraq.<sup>48</sup>

These events are of course of great concern to Thai officials because of their potentially broader impact on national security. The Kruzai event was significant because of its implications for an Islamic resurgence independent of traditional Thai Malay political interests (Chaiwat 1993, Gopinath 1991).

The fact that the PULO was not involved in the demonstrations is also significant. In fact, in the past decade, PULO guerilla activity in Thailand and along the border had declined

to almost nothing. For example, on 27 September 1991, 11 Malay rebels (PULO) formally surrendered, saying that their movement was finished.<sup>49</sup> Soon after, talks were initiated, amid sporadic but considerably reduced violence. By this time, the remaining PULO members disintegrated into several small factions, independent of the movement's leaders. A general amnesty similar to the one offered to the CPM, was sought and obtained by several hundred, of the five hundred or so remaining rebels.<sup>50</sup>

In an effort to bring the issue to a close, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok formalised a joint bid in 1991, to suppress the rebels. In the agreement, Malaysia sealed the border to the rebels. Even Kelantan's PAS government was willing to cooperate, calling the matter a concern between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.<sup>51</sup> With the Kelantan government siding against the rebels, the potential for interstate conflict was significantly reduced. Finally, cooperation between the Thai and Malaysian governments had been obtained with perceived gains on all fronts except one. The internal threat posed by the radical leaders of Thailand's Shi'ia community remained.

In conclusion, there were three distinct phases of interactions between Malaysia and Thailand, each marked by peaks and troughs of conflict and cooperation. The first phase was characterised by general receptiveness to the plight of the Thai Malay from specific groups within West Malaya, but a general lack of response from extra regional sources. Conservative and radical Malay political organisations were formed with the specific goal of being incorporated into West Malaya. Their politicisation increased under the centralisation policies of the military-nationalist regimes of Pibul Songkhram. In the years before Malaysia's independence, the international community failed to resolve adequately the issue of Malay

irredentism. The United Nations was not prepared to recognize the inclusion of Pattani province into a greater Malay state.

In the second phase, after Malaysia obtained formal independence, the Thai Malay conflict became a vigorous political issue in the context of Indonesian "confrontation" and a growing concern about communist activities in Malaysia and Thailand. Initially, the leaders of both states were wary that their own internal threats could be used against them by the other as they often were. For example, the CPM sought and obtained sanctuary in southern Thailand, while the Malaysian government rarely denounced the support that Kelantan province was providing to the Thai Malay secessionists. Around this time, the strategy of Thai Malay elites was transformed. Their irredentist goal changed to demands for greater autonomy and a separate state. Levels of violence increased. Various organisations, covering the political spectrum from left to right, were generally supportive of this goal, though their means of achieving it differed. The radical PULO emerged on the scene as the leading insurgent group and cooperated with the CPM in efforts to challenge both state-centers.

When Malaysia's internal threat resulted in the 1969 emergency, the two states arranged for the peaceful co-management of their internal problems. In turn, Thailand's military leaders did not take advantage of Malaysia's internal turmoil. Malaysia would be allowed "hot pursuit" of the CPM into Thai territory, while Malaysia would make efforts to prevent the flow of material and peoples between Kelantan province and Pattani. Working together, the CPM and PULO posed a more formidable opponent to both sides. For example, it would not be until 1989 that the last few members of the CPM would "retire" in exchange for substantial "payoffs". Several years later the PULO also admitted defeat.

As the fallout from the 1969 emergency faded, renewed threats, posed by potential Vietnamese expansion into the region, became a source of concern for both governments and to all ASEAN states. It was during the latter half of this second phase that conflictual relations between Thailand and Malaysia also reached a peak. At issue was the sovereignty of both states. Thailand accused Malaysia of being overzealous in its pursuit of the CPM in Thai territory. Malaysia leaders countered by providing refuge for Thai Malay dissidents. It appears that even alliances designed as a means for preventing interstate ethnic conflict are sensitive to issues relating to sovereignty and trans-border relations.

The third phase was marked by a rapid decline in the CPM threat and with it the Thai Malay insurgency. In its place a different kind of autonomous movement gained in popularity, one that neither Thailand nor Malaysia was fully capable of preventing. Islamic fundamentalism was the outgrowth of three processes. First the identity-based policies, known as the NEP, established by the Malaysian government in the aftermath of the Emergency became an initial source of politicisation for all Malay, including those in Thailand. Second, international linkages between the Thai Muslim and the larger Islamic community provided a basis of support and legitimacy. Third, the internal policies of the Thai government promulgated political resistance among Thai minorities. It is interesting that Thailand's short-lived democratically elected government proved slightly better than the subsequent military regime in managing these tensions. Under the Pramoj government in the early 1970s, Thai Malay politicisation increased. Under the military-authoritarian regime of Kraivixien, however, that politicisation became militant. Persistent attacks by the PULO resulted in the collapse of the Kraivixien government and its replacement by a more open government.



In the final analysis, these trends and patterns indicate that it appears the collapse of communism in Southeast Asia is associated with the decline of class-oriented ethnic struggle and its replacement by more fundamentalist orientations. Perhaps this is because communism in Southeast Asia has always had an ethnic as well as ideological character. Ethnic movements which have made too much of their class-based roots, risk losing their relevance in this era of more basic "primordial struggles".<sup>52</sup>

In terms of the model, only the first two stages are evident. In Stage 1, the interaction of the two variables, composition and institutional constraint, in the case of Malaysia lead to a restrained policy of support for the Thai Malay but in the case of Thailand a more provocative set of policies which lead to Kelantan's direct support for the Thai Malay. In the case of Malaysia at least, ethnic diversity, appears to have had a dampening effect on its support for the Thai Malay. At stage 2, it becomes clear how cleavages and affinities pose a security dilemma for the two states. In this instance, the ethnically-based security dilemma is offset by alternative security arrangements which reduce the scope, salience and intensity of the interstate ethnic conflict. At least two aborted crises are in evidence. Stage 3 interaction effects resulting in the use of force (at least at the interstate level) are not in evidence because of the cooperation between the two states in resolving the communist insurgency issue.

The analysis now turns to an assessment of the key explanatory variables used in this study. The two main actors, Thailand and Malaysia, are examined on four dimensions: ethnic composition, institutional constraint, ethnic cleavage and ethnic affinity.

## *5. Explaining the Variables and Testing the Hypotheses*

### *5.1 Thailand*

#### (a) Ethnic Composition

In relative terms, Thailand is less diverse than Malaysia because its major religious group (Buddhists) constitute 95% of the population. Thailand's main source of diversity is ethnolinguistic. Almost 60% of Thailand's population claim Thai as their first language. The major ethnolinguistic groups in Thailand are on the periphery, politically, geographically and economically. The Thai Malay are distinct in that they are a linguistic and religious minority. They are also distinct from the non-Malay Muslims around Bangkok (Dulyakasem 1984). Roughly 50% of the total Muslim population is concentrated in the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satul where they make up 75% of the population. The two remaining ethnic groups in this region are Thai Buddhists and Thai Chinese. Except for Satul, the Muslims in these provinces are ethnically Malay and speak a Malay dialect similar to that spoken in neighboring Kelantan in Malaysia. Political grievances relating to the status of the Malay are found primarily in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satul. The Pattani region was formally incorporated into Thailand in 1901. In 1909 the Thai-Malaysian border was formally fixed and Malay Muslims became citizens of the new Thai nation-state.

Thailand's nationalist policies (designed at first to assimilate and then integrate the Muslim community) brought the issue of Thai Malay secessionism into comparative perspective. Initially, the Thai Malay were forcibly prevented from having control of their education, language and local politics. On the other hand, the Malay of Malaysia were successful in setting up policies (NEP) that were to their advantage. By the mid 1980s, efforts were being made to

improve the conditions of the Thai Malay so that neither a separate state nor union within Malaysia would be attractive.

(b) Institutional Constraints

In Thailand, military rule is an extension rather than a substitute for civilian politics. Institutional constraints on Thai leaders are low, though the country has had both civilian and military regimes in power. The main difference between the two has been some provisions for public participation during civilian regimes. Military intervention in Thailand occurs most often as a consequence of changes in the social environment (Bienen & Van de Walle 1991; Horowitz 1985). As is evident from this analysis, military governments have performed two functions, maintaining public and political order. Horowitz (1985), among others, has suggested that Thai military intervention and economic performance are directly related, but there appears to be a second link, related to perceptions of internal threats. For example, when the communist and Thai Malay insurgencies were at their zenith so too, was the perceived need for internal security. The lack of constraints on these leaders led to policies of unchecked assimilation. As the internal threats subsided, the conditions that brought military intervention also declined. Within the past decade, there has been a continued effort at military "civilianization" but constraints on Thai leaders remains low.

(c) Ethnic Cleavages

Ethnic minority repression in Thailand is relatively high. Due to the military's strong-arm tactics, violence flares sporadically. There are two reasons for the heightened sense of perceived difference between the Thai-Buddhist community and Thailand's minorities. Like Sri Lanka, the

Thai-Buddhists constitute a distinct ethnic group with low linguistic or cultural affinities to groups within the other regions. This sense of perceived difference initially resulted in a virulent form of military-nationalism during the 1930s and 1940s. After the nationalist revolution of 1932, the Thai government undertook a program of assimilating its minorities. Under the military rule of Pibul Songkhram (1938 to 1957, with a break from 1944-47) the government attempted forcibly to assimilate the Thai Malay. Sharia law was displaced by Thai Buddhist laws in the areas of marriage, dress and diet. Forbes has argued that this period marks the onset of Malay separatist sentiment (Forbes 1982: 1059). Each successive wave of Thai political centralization brought with it rebellion among the Malay elite, whose efforts were to reestablish their authority in the region. Until 1975 most government officials were Thai Buddhists, hence - the dominance of Thais in the political sector. After the mid-1970s violence in the Pattani region, the first of several steps were taken to alleviate the problem through for example, the appointment of a southern Muslim as governor of Pattani. The penetration of the state into areas of education is particularly notable because it caused a shift in the pattern of separatist leaders from traditional Islamic leaders to Pattani youth increasingly conscious of the stiff competition for jobs (Thomas 1989: 75).

#### (d) Ethnic Affinities

Thailand ranks low on the ethnic affinity scale, largely because the Thai-Buddhists, comprising the bulk of Thailand's population, share few linguistic affinities with groups outside of Thailand. In contrast, Thailand's minorities are all ethnic groups from other states, including the Hmuong, Khmer, Malay, Lao and tribal peoples. For the Thai Malay, the strongest link is

to the people of Kelantan province in Malaysia. Both groups share a common dialect, history and culture.

## 5.2 Malaysia

### (a) Ethnic Composition

An important moderating effect on Malaysian nationalism in the northern provinces of West Malaysia, is its multi-ethnic character. Territorial distinctiveness among the Malay is moderate, while the Chinese, and the Indians are more scattered. This fact makes separatism a remote prospect in West Malaysia at least for Malaysia's minorities, but this is not true for East Malaysia in relation to the federation as a whole (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 207). Thus while Kelantan province supports Thai Malay self-determination, the government in Kuala Lumpur has reasons to adopt a more moderate policy because these happen to coincide with the principles of limiting self determination. Even the proposed Federation of Malaysia plan that was to incorporate the Federation of Malaya (West Malaysia, Brunei, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore) would have worked to the disadvantage of the Thai Malay cause, because the plan would have made the new federation even more multi-ethnic. When Singapore went its own way after federation (1965), Malaysia's ethnic political situation remained an uneasy balance between Malaysia's Chinese minority and Malay. After the 1969 emergency, the Malay and Chinese participated in an alliance of convenience within the UMNO, until the UMNO party split in 1987.

#### (b) Institutional Constraints

Since independence, Malaysia has experimented with multi-party elections within a federal constitution. Traditional sultanates, in most of the provinces, play an intermediary role between regional and national politics. Each province has a governor. In reality, though, since 1969, Malaysia's political landscape has been dominated by national politics. Then, leaders of the UMNO developed a policy platform designed to advance the economic and political interests of the Malay peoples, according to the principle of group entitlement. In this sense, the leaders of the UMNO are doubly constrained by the ethnic group whom they represent and by formal institutional arrangements. At times, this has meant that regional policy can and has influenced foreign policy choices. For example, during the 1970s when Kelantan's leaders provided support for the Thai Malay, the government of Malaysia also appeared to be supportive. The fact that some of Kelantan's leaders were also directly part of the decision-making process also had an influence on foreign policy.

#### (c) Ethnic Cleavages

Cleavages within Malaysia were much higher in the 1960s than they are now. This has two reasons. First as noted, the CPM was essentially a Chinese organization; political divisions within Malaysia were not only divided left and right but by ethnic group as well. The 1969 emergency resulted in a wholesale reevaluation of the Malaysian political process. The NEP introduced in the 1970s made identity a salient political issue, but one in which the minority Indian and Chinese groups appear to be acceptant. Why identity politics have not resulted in the kind of protracted communal conflict that afflicts, for example, Sri Lanka, is related to the fact

that neither minority group is geographically concentrated. However, it is also significant that Malaysia's minority communities are willing to be included in Malaysia's political changes. In essence, the fear of a potential left right split in Malaysia politics during the 1960s led to an alliance between conservative factions within Malaysia's three major ethnic groups.

#### (d) Ethnic Affinities

Malaysia's affinities are relatively high, because all the major ethnic groups, have multiple linkages to states within and outside the region. The most notable of these are the Chinese and Malay who populate the entire South East Asian archipelago. The main connection, in this inquiry, is the one between Kelantan and the Thai Malay. These peoples share a common dialect and conservative religious heritage that sets them apart from the rest of Malaysia.

### 5.3 Testing the Propositions

General Hypothesis 1 states that the preference for foreign policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict is a function of the interaction between ethnic composition and levels of institutional constraint on elites such that:

**P2 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a moderate preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.**

**Supported:** Several decisions suggest that Thai leaders had made the Pattani conflict an important component of their foreign policy. First, they relied extensively on their alliance with Indonesia and Malaysia within ASEAN as a means of moderating the potential conflict among

them. This included monitoring and controlling the situation in Pattani province, in concert with the government in Kuala Lumpur and seeking assurances from Malaysia and Indonesia that they would not interfere directly in the Pattani conflict. Bangkok also sought and obtained support and cooperative measures from moderate states in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia) to help reduce the economic and political cleavages within the southern provinces. Also, Thai elites were not averse to using Thai nationalist sentiment to their advantage. To many Thai nationalists, the right of "hot pursuit" granted the Malaysian government marked a weakness of the Thai government and an infringement of the country's sovereignty. In response, the Thai government escalated tensions between Thailand and Malaysia by issuing several ultimatums to Malaysia.

In general, however, the additional threat of a communist insurgency in both states served to moderate tensions between them. Cooperative efforts to manage that conflict, within the framework of formal alliances (ASEAN) and border agreements had positive spillover effects for cooperation on the Thai Malay issue.

P4 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

Supported. Malaysia's leaders have walked a fine line between advancing the interests of their own ethnic group and reducing the negative impact that this policy has on Thailand-Malaysian relations. Consequently, there have been two aspects of Malaysian foreign policy. Formally, Malaysian leaders have been persistent in finding cooperative solutions to the conflict. This is because, West Malaysia's multi-ethnic character makes support for Thai Malay self-



determination politically inappropriate. Second, Malaysia has been until recently, forced to consider the ramifications that such support has for its other internal threat represented by the CPM.

Informally, various Malay leaders at the national and regional level have expressed support for the Thai Malay. Material and political support from Kelantan province are noteworthy in this context.

In sum, the primary sources of tensions between Thailand and Malaysia were domestic. Malaysia's NEP policy served to aggravate the conflict in Pattani, by accentuating the differences between Thai Malay and Thai Buddhists. Thailand's pro Thai centralist policies aggravated the situation. Eventually, Thailand developed policies to help in the development of the Thai Malay by that reducing the attractiveness of secessionism.

The precise role the Malaysian government has played in the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism among the Thai Malay is inconclusive from the evidence provided here. Given that the Malaysian government has persuaded the leaders of Kelantan province to reduce its support for the Thai Malay, it appears that Malaysia's leaders are wary of Islamic fundamentalism. This may be due to the challenges that it poses to Malaysia's policies of economic and political restructuring. In recent years, Malaysia's leaders have distanced themselves politically from Islamic conservatives.

P5 If outbidding is present states IIa and IIb will increase their preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

Partially Supported. There is only indirect evidence indicating that Thailand, during its brief experimentation with popularly elected governments, succumbed to outbidding. Thai nationalists appear to have placed enough pressure on Thai leaders to escalate tensions between the two states. At issue were Thai sovereignty and the movement of Malaysian forces into Thai territory. For Malaysia, outbidding was evident. Members of the UMNO and also PAS leaders from Kelantan helped in influencing Malaysian foreign policy. They did so by placing pressure on the central government to support self-determination for the Thai Malay.

General Hypothesis 2: Interstate ethnic crises conditioned by high levels of cleavage and affinity present additional opportunities and constraints such that:

P6 High cleavage increases the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict.

Inconclusive. From the evidence provided here, relations between Malaysia and Thailand did not constitute a protracted conflict. Levels of conflict between Thailand and Malaysia did vary over the period since Malaysia achieved independence but these changes did not result in crisis or war. On the one hand, Thailand did rely on Malaysia's internal cleavage to advance their own foreign policy interests by harbouring CPM insurgents. The interesting aspect of this conflict is that cooperation was reciprocal. When Thailand supported Malaysia in its fight against the CPM, Malaysia eventually dropped its support for Thai Malay self determination.

P7 High cleavage increases the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions.

Partially supported. Thailand's, internal conflict did heighten tensions between the two states. Only after the Thai government developed economic policies to address the issue of Thai Malay development, did tension between the two states decrease. The key issue is whether high cleavage enhanced the security dilemma for both states leading to an escalation in tensions. The evidence indicates that Thailand's leaders did perceive and act on a threat to their security when Kelantan began to support the Thai-Malay and when Malaysian leaders occasionally expressed support for the Thai Malay. However, this perceived threat to security was offset by two factors. First, the Thai government set about reducing the level of cleavage between the Thai Malay and Thai society through economic and political means. Second, the ethnically-based threat to security was moderated by a second source of insecurity for both states, namely the communist threat embodied by the CPM and CPT.

**P8 High affinities increase the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict.**

Inconclusive. As in testing for P7, there is not enough evidence to conclude the conflict was a protracted one, since a key component, namely, force was absent. Malaysia does have linkages with the Thai Malay, but the strongest shared affinities are those from Kelantan. Therefore, the Malaysian government could moderate its policies on the issue of Thai Malay self determination. A second set of affinities that must be considered are those emanating from the Middle East. Though not part of testing, there is little doubt that transnational linkages from moderate Arab states (Saudi Arabia) and radical Arab states (Iran, Libya) were directly responsible for an

escalation in Thailand's internal conflict. There is however, less evidence indicating whether relations between the two main antagonists worsened as a consequence.

P9 High affinities increase the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions.

Supported. As in the testing for P8, the main linkages are those emanating from extra regional actors, though of course Kelantan also played an important role. Evidence indicates that these linkages were constraints on relations between Thailand and Malaysia but, they were not enervating. Both states could eventually find cooperative solutions to the conflict despite the perceived and real ethnically-based security threats.

General Hypothesis 3: Interstate interactions leading to the use of force are a function of the types of states involved such that:

P11 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a low preference for the use of force if  
cleavages are high or;  
affinities are high or;  
the duration of the regime is five years or longer.

Supported. The use of force in Thailand has been primarily an instrument for domestic control and border security. Since independence, Thai leaders have demonstrated an ability to manage internal cleavages, through various policies including Thai nationalism. The domestic use of

force did not translate into violent conflict between Thailand and Malaysia. Recent policies indicate that Thailand is willing to loosen its centralist policies and pursue economic development as a way of reducing internal cleavages. In turn, these policies have had a positive impact on relations with Malaysia.

On the other hand, abrupt changes in Thai regimes had a deleterious effect on Thai-Malaysia relations. For example under the Kraivixien regime, relations worsened between Thailand and Malaysia, though force was never used between them. The main issue is whether the passing of the Cold War will lead to a removal of the impediments to more direct Malaysian intervention in Thai affairs. This case indicates that, as long as the character of the international political system was shaped by superpower bipolarity, the dangers of the ethnic conflict taking on an East-West dimension were apparent.

P13 Type IIb constrained - diverse states have a low preference for the use of force if:  
cleavages are high or;  
affinities are high or;  
there is room for cooperation or;  
the duration of the regime is five years or longer.

Supported. Because of high levels of affinities and cleavages, force was not a component of Malaysia's foreign policy with Thailand. The evidence also indicates that threats to use force, other than those directed towards the CPM were rare. If in fact, Malaysia was directly supporting the PULO then that must be taken as a more covert aspect of Malaysia's willingness

to use force. The evidence provided here indicates that Kelantan and not the Malaysian government was providing assistance to the rebels.

With respect to regime duration, it appears that the greatest potential for interstate conflict occurred during the formation of the Malaysia Federation in 1962, when Indonesia's confrontational policies resulted in a crisis between the two states but not war (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988). After the post-1969 emergency, relations between Malaysia and Thailand also appeared to be on shaky footing but improved into the 1980s.

In conclusion, nine propositions were tested. Of these, seven found full or partial support and two were inconclusive based on the evidence provided. In general, the evidence from the Thailand-Malaysia case study shows that potential interstate ethnic conflict and the security dilemmas generated by cleavages and affinities can be moderated through shared regional security issues. In essence, this second kind of interaction reduces the salience of ethnic conflict for both parties by providing an alternative (global and regional) perspective through which to view state security. High levels of affinities and cleavages will be less debilitating for ethnically diverse states, if these constraints are counterbalanced by efforts at mutual cooperation in other areas. In this case, alliances and cooperative agreements can reduce tensions between states involved in interstate ethnic conflict when the source of the second threat is perceived as genuine.

Judging from Thailand's behaviour, it appears that even less constrained states can be induced to cooperate when they are internally vulnerable. It is conceivable that had the Thai Malay ethnic conflict been the salient security issue, conflict between Thailand and Malaysia would have been much greater in scope and intensity. The collapse of communism in the region

has led to an important crossroads for Thailand and Malaysia. Thai authoritarianism, had the merit of dampening both the communist and Thai Malay insurgencies. If Thailand should, over the course of the next few years, become a democratic society, alternative paths to resolving the Thai Malay issue will have to be developed. By addressing the Thai Malay economic situation, recent Thai governments have already begun the process of reducing disparities between the Thai Malay community and the rest of Thailand. Similarly, a more open and "permissive" Thai society will also have to find ways in which to engender acceptance among Thai Buddhists for a new wave of Islamic fundamentalism in the region that may occur.

Evidence from this case study and the two previous cases, indicate that, international security regimes themselves play only an indirect role in restraining state adventurism and in moderating ethnically-based security dilemmas. Rather, it is the nature and perception of the second threat that is central. If perceived as genuine, both sides, sensing mutual vulnerability, will seek out cooperation despite potentially debilitating ethnic affinities and cleavages. For example, both previous cases involved states which interacted within formal cooperative security regimes (SAARC, OAU) but neither were successful in preventing the outbreak of interstate ethnic crisis (and war). The difference in this case is that cooperation emerged out of a second threat that was very real to both antagonists (communism in Southeast Asia, Vietnamese expansion). This was clearly not true for Sri Lanka and Ethiopia. For Sri Lanka and Ethiopia, their ethnic conflicts defined and shaped their perceptions of India and Somalia as their chief external antagonists and main source of insecurity.<sup>53</sup>

As for the model, voluntary defection by one or both states can only be reduced when there is mutual vulnerability. A shared security dilemma for both states can induce cooperation.

Involuntary defection, a problem for constrained, diverse states, can be reduced if the elites of these states perceive that it is in their interests to do so. For example, Kelantan represented Malaysia's potential for involuntary defection. Kelantan's support for the Thai Malay could have meant that Malaysia would renege on its reciprocal agreements with Thailand. Pressure (and possibly incentives) applied on Kelantan leaders eventually resulted in their tacit withdrawal from the issue.

In brief, there are three implications that can be culled from this conclusion. First, it appears that a durable form of cooperation can be maintained even after the original threat has dissipated and when the perceived threat is low. Efforts to reduce defection among states seeking to support ethnic groups in others states can be successful under specific circumstances. Here, an alliance structure, based on a shared threat, between the two states served to enhance the attractiveness of cooperation and reduce the ethnically-based security dilemma. Since ethnically diverse constrained states are already oriented towards finding cooperative solutions (this point was made in chapters three and six), the key issue is, therefore, in finding ways in which to restrain less diverse or institutionally unconstrained states. One way, as suggested in this thesis, is to pursue internal change towards diversity and institutional constraint.

This study also indicates that, external mechanisms, possibly alliances, may assist in reducing conflict among states even when the chief threat is internal. For example, the ASEAN states of Southeast Asia are now reevaluating their relationship with non-ASEAN member states. In 1993, Vietnam and Laos were granted observer status at ASEAN Ministerial Meetings and the stage is set to have Myanmar, Cambodia, China and possibly India, also participate in various ASEAN-based cooperative agreements. The key concern is to restructure Southeast



Asian security arrangements to address unresolved issues. Territorial disputes and refugee flows are at the top of the list of concerns.<sup>54</sup>

Second, the elites of minority groups faced with interstate cooperation will, as a consequence, be forced to pursue alternative strategies, strategies that will undoubtedly involve an escalation in violence and increased insecurity for state elites. The evidence for this conclusion are the three phases of strategy and leadership change adopted by the Thai Malay. The first phase was irredentist and political in nature. Regional actors played an important role in perpetuating the conflict. That strategy succumbed to cooperative agreements between the two states and the reduced salience of the ethnically-based insecurities of both states. In the second phase, new radical leaders pursued secessionist and often violent activities. These leaders looked further abroad for support. Conservative Arab states were the primary sources of external support at this stage. Initially that strategy was unsuccessful, but gains were eventually made on several fronts. Thai Malay leaders did obtain a greater degree of economic and political independence. In the third phase, yet to be concluded, a new set of leaders emerged, seeking increased religious autonomy for all Thai Muslims.

The reduction of the physical insecurities of the Thai Malay appears to be related to a decline in overt interstate conflictual relations between Thailand and Malaysia. It remains to be seen, whether or not the growth of Islamic fundamentalism will take root among the Thai Malay and become a source of renewed insecurity for Malaysia and Thailand. Much of what happens next will depend on the ability of the Thai regime to convey the perception to the Malays of Malaysia that it is capable of providing legitimate and tolerant leadership for the Malay of Thailand.

The third implication of this case is the importance of extra regional actors as sources of support for a conflict. The evidence from this case indicates that, this kind of support imposes a constraint on elites that is not easily overcome. International support is directly related to changes in the leadership pools and the strategies of minority groups. These may be evolving at a much faster pace than the coping mechanisms of the state-centre. States that face this kind of internal and external threat to state security may become more common in the post-Cold War era. Elites may come to believe that their own security is threatened and may consequently take action, or alternatively, give way to leaders who are more effective in motivating their followers. In either case, these leaders may seek out external support to address an internal conflict that can in turn create insecurities (both real and perceived) for neighbouring states.

In the subsequent chapter, the assumptions of the model, including the implications from this case, are reassessed. The focus of inquiry is the interaction between states that are ethnically dominant and less constrained.

## Notes

1. Pitsuwan (1985: 259).
2. In 1987 the ruling UMNO party of Malaysia split following a contest for two factions. The result was the formation of a new separate party the Spirit of '46. Dr. Mahathir commented that unbridled Western-style democracy and unlimited freedoms was dangerous, especially for a multi-ethnic country like Malaysia. The Sunday Straits Times (30 May 1993).
3. This is a reference to Rousseau's analogous stag hunt. The implication is that Thailand and Malaysia found mutual cooperation in pursuit of the stag (the perceived "communist" threat) instead of defecting to pursue the hare (involvement in ethnic conflict).
4. The focus of this analysis is the Malay Muslims of the southern provinces of Thailand as distinct from the smaller population of non-Malay Thai Muslims centered around Bangkok and elsewhere. The four southernmost provinces are Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani and Satul.
5. A new and equally formidable political movement, based on Islamic religious fundamentalism, now exists in Thailand. The most notable linkage, in this regard, has been extra-regional support provided by fundamentalist movements in Iran and elsewhere. Until recently, these linkages appeared insufficient to generate a viable secessionist movement in Thailand.
6. These periods are called "near crises" because not all of the conditions necessary for a crisis were present. That is, there was a very low probability that the conflicts would lead to war.
7. See: Suhrke (1989) and Dulyakasem (1984). The higher estimates usually come from the separatists while the lower figure is provided by Thai government sources. The Malay belong to the Shafi'it Sect of Sunni Islam, the predominant sect of Islamic Southeast Asia. A minority of Malay Muslim are Shi'ite. The Malay were converted to Islam in the 14th and 15th centuries A.D. (Che Man 1990: 35).
8. For a brief but informative analysis of Thailand's non-Malay Muslim groups, who are predominately South Asian in origin, see: Forbes, A.D. (1982).
9. According to Astri Suhrke "...the official Thai term for the minority is "Thai Muslims" while members of the minority group usually refer to themselves as "Malay" or "Muslims". The official term expresses the view that these people are Thais who happen to be Muslims; the other terms connote that the people are Malay Muslims who happen to live in Thailand" (Suhrke 1989: 1). The Malays are of the Malayo-polynesian group, while most of the Thai population are Siamese or closely related Lao of the Thai-Kadai group. Malay-Muslims and other Thai minorities are often referred to as "phuak khaek" which literally means strangers or visitors. In this analysis the term Malay and Muslim are used interchangeably to refer to the Malay-speaking Muslim population of Thailand. In addition the place names are based on Thai rather than Malay spelling hence, for example Pattani is used rather than Patani unless specified otherwise in formal names.

10. See for example early census reports indicating above average illiteracy, smaller than average landholding sizes and below average gross provincial product per capita averages within Pattani and Narathiwat. The exception to the rule has been Yala province which has been consistently one of the richest provinces in Thailand because of its large-scale rubber production and tin reserves. See: Meesook, Oey A Study of Disparities in Income and Social Services Across Provinces in Thailand (1978). In terms of ethnic groups, the Thai Chinese which constitute less than 6% of the total population in these provinces are the most economically successful with the Thai Buddhists occupying a middle range holding down employment in government offices but also in agriculture and small business (Dulyakasem 1984).

11. Subsequent irredentist demands, prior to 1945, from Malay leaders received little support from the British (May 1990).

12. The main distinction between the leaders of the two groups can be seen in terms of strategy. The less educated and older separatists had favored an independent Sultanate while the younger students favored an autonomous republic.

13. According to Gopinath (1991) the party's related objectives included: improvement in living standards, education and cultural awareness. The leadership was assumed by the Malay Muslim religious and royal exiles living in Malaya (Gopinath 1991: 137). A second populist organization - The Patani People's Movement (PPM) - was also established at this time (May 1990).

14. Confrontation also brought about a split between those Thai Malays who supported Malaysia and those who supported Indonesia. The line of division followed a split along conservative/radical lines with the latter supporting Indonesia's "progressive" and anti-colonial stance in the conflict.

15. British intervention had helped remove the Malay states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu from Thai control. It had been hoped and anticipated by the Thai Malay of Thailand that British help would likewise liberate the southern region. See: Farouk (1984).

16. This irredentist movement espoused unification of all of Malaya, including Singapore and portions of territory across the Straits of Malacca. The leaders of this organization were arrested in 1961 after staging a revolt - some managed to flee to Malaya.

17. There have of course been some serious splits and changes in leadership within the major movements including a three-way split among the BNP. By the 1990's there were reports of a loose alliance between the PULO and its militant wing the "Putani United Liberation Army" (PULA) (May 1990). Other splinter militant organizations include movements, such as Black December and the United Patani Freedom Movement (Gopinath 1991).

18. The BNPP claimed a guerilla force of 3,000 (Gopinath 1991). Most of the guerilla force was trained abroad in Libya. Weapons were obtained from Indochina after the US withdrawal from Vietnam (Gopinath 1991).

19. Little is known of the two remaining groups the Sabilallah (the Way of God) which emerged in the late 1970's and the Patani Islamic Nationalities Revolutionary party which came into being in 1980 or 1981.. All of the organizations are rural based insurgency movements. After the CPM threat waned in the late seventies, the leftists within the BRN went looking for new allies and found them in the Patani United Liberation organization (PULO).

20. The Thai government often reports a far larger number of separatist groups see: Far Eastern Economic Review October 9 1981. For a full description of the these groups see Thomas (1989).

21. According to one source there was a tacit agreement between Thailand and the CPM, in which the communists agreed to direct their activities at Malaysia only and not to attack Thai officials or stir up trouble among the Malay dissidents in Pattani.

22. As Thomas points out, relations between Thailand and Malaysia were generally good despite Malaysia's reluctance to join SEATO (Thomas 1977).

23. According to the agreement, the term "soldiers" was replaced by "police field forces" in order to circumvent the sensitive question of sovereignty.

24. The Straits Times (18 June 1974).

25. What the PULO could not accomplish officially it could achieve by other means. One effort included the circulation of an appeal during the Islamic Summit Conference held in Mecca in January 1981 (Pitsuwan 1982).

26. The same questionnaire also found that the majority of the Malaysian Chinese, Malaysian Indian and Malaysian Thai-Buddhist viewed the issue as strictly an internal matter for Thailand.

27. The 1990's however, have witnessed a warming of relations between Thailand and the states of the Middle-East with the possible exclusion of Iran and Iraq. Many Thai-Buddhists have found work overseas in the Emirates and Saudi Arabia resulting in more cooperative relations between these states and Thailand. Bangkok has led talks on harnessing international Muslim finance to assist in the development of the southern regions (Farouk 1984). In sum, the international Islamic community's support for Malay separatists appeared to have reached its peak in the mid 80's and is in decline.

28. Of the two parties, the CPM has been by far the most active. For its part the CPT had become a spent force by the 1970's.

29. For a detailed account of these linkages see Pitsuwan (1985).

30. After Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, Khmer forces occupied the border between Cambodia and Thailand. Thai decision makers concerned about this turn of events wanted to ensure that all of its borders, including the one shared with Malaysia, were secure. See: Pitsuwan (1985).

31. Far Eastern Economic Review (18 June 1976: 11).
32. Asiaweek (2 May 1980).
33. The link to the downfall of the regime is but one of many that accounted for that regime's replacement. It does not therefore constitute an event triggering a foreign policy crisis for the Thai regime. The security of the Thai state was never in question nor was it likely that such an event was sufficient to lead to a probability of war between Thailand and any of the external actors, including Malaysia.
34. Higher figures were reported by the Thai government (Chaiwat 1987).
35. According to Chaiwat the related organizations were Sabilallah, Black December, a group calling itself Haj Samese and another group calling itself Dawlaw Taloh (Chaiwat 1987: 10).
36. The cause of the riots was the murder of five Malay Muslims by Thai marines in Narathiwat. On 11 December 1975 Malay Muslims gathered and rioted demanding the punishment of the Marines. 18 Malays were killed by a bomb thrown into the melee (Anurugsa 1984).
37. The issue was considered particularly sensitive to the Malaysian authorities, given that Vietnamese refugees with Chinese background were treated with a "shoot on landing" policy by Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Sri Mahathir (Pitsuwan 1988b).
38. Far Eastern Economic Review (9 October 1981).
39. Straits Times (28 September 1991).
40. Straits Times (28 September 1991).
41. Straits Times (11 February 1993).
42. Straits Times (11 February 1993).
43. Asiaweek (21 April 1989).
44. In October 1990, Parti Islam (PAS) returned to power in Kelantan province. At this time, PAS Kelantan State Commissioner Haji Mohd Amin Bin Haji Yaakub said, in accordance with past PAS policy, that the insurgents would be welcome in Kelantan, if they crossed the Thai Malaysian border. Straits Times (27 October 1990). The Nation (12 June 1989, 25 June 1989).
45. Straits Times (14 August 1991).
46. Bangkok Post (14 July 1991).

47. A resident of the area told a journalist that the people who came to the mosque were not locals but Shi'ia Muslims from Yala, Satul. Shi'ia constitutes a small minority of the Thai Malay population. Of the 2,632 mosques in Thailand, 32 are Shi'ia, most of which are in Bangkok (Chaiwat 1993).

48. Straits Times (22 February 1991).

49. Among those surrendering was 71 year old Haji Sama-ae Yakagi - the highest ranking PULO member ever to have defected to the government. Following the surrender of these separatists, there was railway-station bombing and skirmishes between Thai soldiers and the few remaining PULO members (Straits Times 28 September, 4 October 1991).

50. Estimates of between 150 to 300 active guerrillas have been made, down from the peak of 1800 in 1981. (Straits Times 18 August 1992; 24 February 1993).

51. Under the General Border Committee agreement, joint patrols were established and violence is down considerably. The main concern between the two countries is smuggling of cheap goods and drugs across the border (Straits Times 10 March 1993)

52. There is considerable debate, whether the new wave of Islamic militancy is the result of economic hardship or lack of political legitimacy or both. Responses to the threat of Islamic militancy have taken two basic forms, brutal suppression or political integration with the approaches of many countries falling in between. Syria and Iraq are the best examples of the former while Jordan and Lebanon have allowed Islamists to participate in the electoral process. Egypt and Thailand fall in between.

53. The implication is then that both SAARC and the OAU were designed to advance the interests of only some of the participating states. In this context, consider the overwhelming influence that Ethiopia played in structuring the OAU Charter in response to Somalia's claim on its territories. For Sri Lanka, in relation to its internal conflict, India is its only security threat.

54. The most notable territorial dispute involves the claims made by six countries to the Spratley Islands. There are of course several other issues of importance, including the growing military might of China and Japan; the Cambodian problem and North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The primary aim of ASEAN dialogue and restructuring is to develop multilateral forums for security consultation. This kind of dialogue is known as "preventive diplomacy", the establishment of mechanisms to allow for multilateral preventive action.

## Chapter 8

### The Breakup of Yugoslavia



*Yugoslavia's communists tried for more than forty years to "solve" the national question...[U]ltimately they failed. But their failure was not so much a failure of confederalism, but rather a failure of the concept of limited democracy, of the idea that democracy can emerge out of one-party rule (Ramet 1992a: 279).*

*The most telling fact about the disintegration of Yugoslavia has been the utter predictability of each stage of the butchery. Indeed, the war has evolved in almost a mechanical fashion. The Yugoslav economy collapsed piecemeal throughout the 1980s with the level of ethnic hate rising exponentially as the economic nationalisms of the republic gave way to the blood-and-soil-kind (Robert D. Kaplan in The New Republic 12 December 1992).*

### *1. Introduction - To Balkanize is to Europeanize*

There are two views of the conflict in the Balkans. On the one hand, there is the widely held belief that the collapse of the Yugoslav state in 1991 and the resulting conflict diffusion, is indicative of a general trend in world politics. According to this explanation, ethnic antagonisms grow and prosper, taking on numerous forms - institutional, political, violent, when confronted with the simultaneous tasks of political and economic liberalization. This process of transformation is said to lead to conflict over the short term, including regime breakdown, because of the unleashing of historical antagonisms that lay dormant under the heavy cloak of a centralized and dominant control.

The argument is, perhaps, best expressed by Lerner Cohen (1992: 371) when he writes, "[H]istorically, the potential for ethnic and religious based violence in the Balkans has been most evident during periods of regime crisis and breakdown (for example the last phase of Ottoman control leading to the Balkan wars, the final throes of Hapsburg rule and the collapse and dismemberment of the Yugoslav state in 1941)."

Instrumental in this process of centrifugal disintegration are the dual demons of decentralization, namely - nationalist ideology and party pluralism. Thus, the Yugoslavian

conflict is seen as a violent reshuffling of the deck in the game of deconfederation. More specifically, proponents of this view argue that popular appeal to long-held, but dormant ethnic grievances result in escalation of conflict and violence.

On the other hand, a less widely-held view of the conflict is one that attaches purposiveness rather than inevitability to the systematic unfolding of events in Yugoslavia. This view does not see the evolving crisis as a direct and certain outcome of the collapse of the East-Bloc countries. Nor do the roots of the conflict necessarily lie in centuries old hatred. The seeds of destruction were sown as late as the 1980s with the rise to power of nationalist (as opposed to communist) leaders within Yugoslavia and are directly situated within the process of ethnic group polarization only as recently as 10 years ago (Ramet 1991a). Proponents of this view argue that the primary cause of the conflict is located in the relentless Serbian pursuit of a federated Yugoslavia under Serbian control. Little or no blame is accorded the equally opportunistic measures undertaken by the newly formed Croatian, Bosnian and Slovenian regimes.

Both interpretations are based firmly on implicit assumptions about the causes of ethnic strife and tend to take for granted an important international dimension. The first explanation identifies ancient hatreds as the primary causal factors. Lacking an international controlling force, these deeply-rooted historical antagonisms result inevitably in conflict and war. In reality, however, the Serbs and Croats have never fought a war until now.

The second argument also relegates international factors to a secondary role. Seen from this perspective, the collapse of Yugoslavia is entirely a domestic political problem. By attaching a sense of purposiveness to Serbian hegemonic ambitions, such arguments underemphasize the

unfolding of opportunities in the international arena. Behaving like rational actors, Serbian leaders have responded to international opportunities to maximize their domestic security, most explicitly the security and power of the ruling Serbian party elite.

Faced with these two apparent contradictory explanations of the Yugoslav imbroglio, the task of this chapter is to test the model further to detect the extent to which domestic and international factors condition the behaviour of the various actors in the Balkans conflict. Apart from its current importance to policy makers, the Yugoslavian case is significant for three other reasons. First, like the Thai-Malay case, elements of both secessionism and irredentism are present. However, the relationship between these types of ethnic strife is the reverse of the Thai-Malay case. Whereas irredentist impulses eventually gave way to secessionism in the case of the Southeast Asian conflict, secessionism, heralded by the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, was followed by efforts at territorial retrieval on the part of Serbian and Croatian regimes. Second, unlike the Thai-Malay case, the diffusion of the conflict to the dominant system level looms in the background. Geo-strategic salience is significant.

Third, in terms of ethnic diversity, institutional constraints, cleavage and affinity, the main components of the model, the Yugoslav case is different. The Balkan conflict provides an opportunity to examine ethnically-based security issues from the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum. Yugoslavia was an ethnically diverse state, dominated by a single ethnic group and ridden by ethnic antagonisms. Since its collapse, the former Yugoslavia has undergone a rapid and significant transformation, in only three short years, to become a group of new and ethnically homogenous states where, in all but one (Bosnia), the elites of a specific ethnic group are dominant.

Institutional constraints on the leaders of these new states vary. Before 1989, Yugoslavia was a state with moderate constraints on its leaders. Multi-party elections and referenda since 1990, indicate that in the case of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia at least, there are some constraints on leaders, but in general they are weak.

Why then, despite the appearance of democratic transition, did the leaders of these states behave with such viciousness? The answer, as will become evident from this analysis, is that, in these states political participation and opportunities are defined along narrow bands of ethnic sensibility. Coupled with the deliberate suppression of multiple (non-ethnic) issues and unfolding international opportunities, the result is a perceived narrowing of policy options, leading to inter-ethnic confrontation and war.

To assess this interpretation, explanations of the roles that the independent and mediating variables play in the formation of Yugoslavian foreign policy will be derived from a crisis-based approach. For purposes of brevity, an examination of the events of the conflict will be presented from the perspective of one actor, namely Yugoslavia in both its original and rump-state forms (comprising Serbia and Montenegro). Subsequent testing of the model will include interactions between Serbia and its antagonists.

Apart from this introduction, the analysis is carried out in four parts. In the second section, the historical background to the current conflict is presented. The third section is an analysis of the pre-crisis period, including key decisions taken. The fourth section examines the crisis period focussing on the three crisis theaters - Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. In the fifth and final section, the propositions are tested and the model is assessed in the light of the evidence found.

Faced with the task of disentangling several distinct theater-based crises, namely, the secessionist crises of Slovenia and Croatia, and the Bosnian irredentist/secessionist crisis, one simplifying procedure has been adopted. To maintain the continuity, flow and contextual integrity of the entire Yugoslav conflicts, each of the conflicts will be treated as separate but integral events in the larger Yugoslavian conflict. Phases and periods specific to each crisis will be dis-aggregated for purposes of clarity, although some events occur simultaneously.

In effect, this analysis considers the component parts of the individual crisis/wars within the broader framework of interstate ethnic conflict. This procedure is adopted for two reasons. First, on a theoretical level it is important to see how aspects of the model relate to varying combinations of opportunities and constraints as presented in each specific conflict. Second, the Yugoslav crisis was at first a civil war, albeit a complex one, which became an interstate conflict when Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia became de facto states, processes that occurred while conflicts were underway in each crisis-theater. In this sense, the war in Yugoslavia began as a civil war (forming a foreign policy crisis for Yugoslavia) but escalated to an interstate ethnic conflict (an international crisis) as each of its republics declared independence. On this matter, the reader should consult Ramet (1992b) and Riga (1992) for a detailed discussion of each theater-based crisis and their linkages.

## ***2. History and Background to the Crisis - The Panther and the Lynx***

The failure of Yugoslavia's state leaders to preserve national unity in a post-communist Yugoslavia can be attributed to the presence of several significant factors, including, a society that was never integrated, retaining instead a basic segmentary quality and lacking the infrastructure of a civil society; the existence of socially separate and culturally different systems throughout the republics and provinces and finally widespread economic disparities.

At the same time it would be erroneous to attribute the sources of the conflict to any single structural factor without paying heed to the political ambitions of specific ethnic leaders. There are several reasons for this.

For centuries, Yugoslav politics has been predicated on ethnic nationalism. Until recently any potential sources of ethnic friction were effectively managed through bureaucratic political arrangements (Banac 1984). Formally, Yugoslav socialism was a tight-knit system, in which public opinion and ideology were strictly controlled by an elite bureaucracy (Flere 1991). Yugoslavia never had a tradition of legitimate democratic rule, of the kind that would permit the cultural and social persistence of a Yugoslav, as opposed to particularist, elite (Flere 1991). The only identities that have persisted through times of institutional and regime collapse have been those of religion; and as a source of legitimacy for political renewal, religion has not provided the basis for value-consensus necessary for the establishment of full political regulation.<sup>1</sup>

In brief, Yugoslav politics has always had a major diachronic component, evidenced in the long and distinct histories of its various ethnic groups. Enmeshed with these historical processes has been the monopolization of certain institutions by specific ethnic groups. Finally, and equally important, has been Yugoslavia's demography which has ramifications not only at

the level of Yugoslavia as an entity but also at the level of the various republics and provinces. These historical, demographic and political antecedents are all important components of the present conflict. Each is considered in turn.

### *2.1 The Battlefield of History*

Observers of Yugoslav politics have noted that the processes of integration and disintegration tend to be cyclical. On the one hand, there have been successive efforts by Serbian leaders to bring a unified Yugoslavia under Serbian control. On the other hand, the minorities of Yugoslavia, mainly the Croats, have always sought autonomy from the Serb-dominated centre. Quests for majority status and protection of minority rights have been a dominant feature of Yugoslavia's political landscape, beginning with the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires and the development of Catholicism (Cohen 1992). For example, the contending Ottoman and Hapsburg empires, which asserted hegemony over the various South Slav ethnic groups, between the late 14th and early 16th centuries, maintained control until the early 20th century, through several divide-and-rule strategies, including the segmentation of religious communities.

The northern regions of Croatia and Slovenia fell under Austrian and Hungarian control, adopting Roman Catholicism and the Latin alphabet. The southern regions - Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia came under the Byzantine and later Turkish Ottoman empires, converting to Orthodox Christianity (or in some cases Islam) and using the Cyrillic alphabet (Banac 1984). These two main groups, composed of distinct religions, wrote Rebecca West (1941), are as different as the panther and the lynx. Though they practice different creeds,

Croats, Serbs and Muslims share a common language, Serbo-Croatian - brought about by the unifying efforts of the Austro-Hungarian empire.<sup>2</sup>

Only in the 19th century did Serbia begin to shake off external rule, gaining full independence from the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and maintaining it, until joining Yugoslavia 40 years later in 1918. For its part, Croatia was locked in a shifting union with Hungary but managed to retain its own language and parliament until it joined the Yugoslav federation in 1918. Slovenia lived under German, and later Austrian influence, for most of its history, gaining independence from Austria-Hungary and joining Yugoslavia in 1918. The Montenegrins - ethnic cousins of the Serbs - were never fully subdued by the Turks and managed to maintain self-rule until 1918.

Bosnia, the one state in which Slav Muslims make up most of the population, fell under Turkish rule in 1386. During the years of Turkish rule, the majority of the area's Christians were converted to Islam. In 1870, Bosnia fell under Austro-Hungarian occupation and became a full part of the empire in 1908 and was incorporated into the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. In 1946, it became one of Yugoslavia's six socialist republics.

Finally, Macedonia has been part of the Bulgarian, Byzantine, Serbian and Turkish empires. Incorporated into Serbia between the First and Second World Wars, it became a full federal republic within Yugoslavia in 1946.

The impact of successive waves of external control on these disparate pockets of regional nationalities was twofold. First, the collapse of the Ottoman empire at the end of the 19th century, effectively created oases of Muslim communities within the south half of Yugoslavia. The second effect was the evolution of a Yugoslav dream, elaborated mainly by Croatian



intellectuals at the beginning of the 19th century (Cohen 1992). Both the Serbs and the Croats saw each other as oppressed brothers. The belief was that the two main religious groups, having thrown off their imperial shackles in the late 19th and 20th centuries, could rediscover their commonality and live together under one national roof. A strong supporter of the unity of Slavic groups was the Russian empire, which in the course of its dealings with the then major powers, attempted to superimpose "pan Slavism" over Yugoslavia (Stavrou 1976).

However, the idea of a union of South Slav peoples attracted little popular support except from the Serbs, the largest of all the south Slav peoples who regarded the inclusion of the Croats, the Slovenes and the Macedonians within the borders of an expanded state as the fulfilment of their destiny (Stavrou 1976).

Thus, a unified Yugoslav state, bringing together several South Slav and non-Slav ethnic groups, was created in 1918. Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed to Serbia in 1918. Then, Yugoslavia's borders were established by the Versailles Treaty, but the state did not adopt the name of Yugoslavia until 1929, retaining instead the official name, "the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" (Stavrou 1976: 137). Belgrade became the capital of the new Yugoslavia state. Under the auspices of a constitutional monarchy and unitary government, Yugoslavia fell under Serbian control.

The Second World War served to intensify already existing ethnic tensions and has been at the center of unresolved ethnic animosities since. The primary problems have long been the fierce wartime atrocities perpetrated among the Serbian and Croatian communities.<sup>3</sup> In 1941, after invading Yugoslavia, Germany set up a puppet regime in Croatia under Ante Pavelic, head of the fascist Ustase, which herded Jews, Gypsies and Serbs into concentration camps. In

retribution, royalist Serbia guerrillas, known as Chetniks, destroyed Croatian villages. Serbia had already lost a quarter of its population in the First World War and an estimated 500,000 more during World War Two (Ramet 1992b). In this respect, Tito's communist partisans, who included Serbs, Croats and Muslims, were particularly strong at stemming inter-ethnic rivalry during the war, partly because they promised a future of peaceful coexistence after the massacres of the war.

## *2.2 Ethnic Configuration - Majorities and Minorities*

By the end of World War Two, Yugoslavia's ethnic demography was almost fixed, and the ethnically diverse regions of Croatia and Bosnia became models of peaceful coexistence between Croats and Serbs.<sup>4</sup> Initially, Serbian grievances did intensify when Tito broke off the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia and drew new federal boundaries that left millions of Serbs outside its rule. Since then, the Serbs maintained their status as the most numerous ethnic group in Yugoslavia (36% of the entire population) but they were never an absolute majority (Flere 1991). They compose an absolute majority within Serbia (66%) but not within the province of Kosovo, for example, (only 13%) where their numbers are diminishing (Flere 1991).<sup>5</sup>

Serbs can also be found in all the other former federal units of Yugoslavia. In the 1981 census, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, ethnic Muslims, Albanians and even smaller groups such as Hungarians and Bulgarians were located in all eight federal units (Ramet 1992b). For example, the Serbs constitute roughly 12% of the population of Croatia and 32% of the population of Bosnia.

The same 1981 census suggested that two other trends were also at work. First, there was an increase in intermarriage rates among the Serbs and Croats, indicating perhaps an acceptability of different groups and of social integration of an enduring kind (Gagnon 1992).

Second, ethnic identification, especially in ethnically mixed areas was declining. By some accounts a process of secularization was underway by the early 1980s. This process was strongly associated with the ethnic policies carried out under Tito, which are examined below.

### *2.3 The Politics of pre-secessionist Yugoslavia*

Under Tito, the son of Croat and Slovene parents, Yugoslavia emerged as a federation of six nominally equal republics. Disputes often arose concerning ethnic policy and its instruments. The Tito version of liberalized communism was based on regional pluralism but not political pluralism (Ramet 1992b). In essence, this meant that Yugoslavia would have two core domestic policy principles and one foreign policy principle. In the case of domestic policies these were, self-management (embodied in worker's councils) and brotherhood and unity (the doctrine of ethnic harmony through one-party rule). For example, economic and social reforms were initiated soon after Yugoslavia's break with Moscow in 1948. The development of a national consciousness, derived from the long-held notion of pan-Yugoslav identity and unity, was based on policies of decentralization and liberalization.

On the foreign policy front, the principle of non-alignment became the cornerstone of Yugoslavia's orientation to the East and the West. One of the key purposes of non-alignment derived from domestic concerns, namely to prevent foreign sponsorship of national conflicts in Yugoslavia. An implicit assumption of this foreign policy was that ethnic groups would serve

as links with their kin across the borders and thus help to improve relations with bordering states (Stavrou 1976).

Hence, Yugoslavia's problematic ethnic relations were addressed on two fronts, the domestic and the international. The main political structure was a form of federalism, which resembled a balance of power system, characterized by a shifting pattern of flexible coalitions (Ramet 1992a). Under Tito, notes Ramet (1992a: 277), "[T]he Federal government in Yugoslavia often functioned as primus inter pares in a nine-actor universe..." This meant in theory that the participation of all the ethnic groups in decision-making at the federal level was provided for, and their explicit consensus required unanimous approval through inter-republican committees.

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, there was a shift in decision making from the federation to the republics. A key feature of the federal system in its early years (1962-66) had been the mobilization of all the federal units into the system, which had previously been dominated by Croatia and Serbia. By 1974, Yugoslavia became a de facto confederation of dual sovereignty, when the federal government became a joint committee of the six republics and two autonomous republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and Vojvodina).

Several events precipitated this change. For example, in the summer of 1972, a band of World War Two Ustase boldly undertook the liberation of Croatia, declaring Croatia a sovereign state (Stavrou 1976). Citing meddling by foreign powers as the cause of the movement, Tito announced a crackdown on the two dominant forms of nationalism: Serbian unitarism and Croatian separatism and developed the looser form of Yugoslavian confederalism (Stavrou 1976).

An important feature of this federalism was that all component units, no matter their population, territory or economic power, were equally represented not only in both chambers of the Federal Assembly, but in all Federal decision-making bodies including the presidency of the state (Stanovcic 1992). Until this time, the political landscape had been dominated by Serb-Croat rivalries. Afterwards all the republics began to engage in a pattern of shifting coalitions. Usually the underdeveloped republics allied with Croatia and Slovenia against Serbia on political issues. This system of shifting coalitions held together, largely because of Tito's astute courting of both liberal and conservative factions within the central apparatus. According to Ramet (1992a: 277) "Tito hoped to hold together a "liberal system" not by force but by a common ideology, the ideology of "conservatism". A unified party and dependable instruments of coercion became the two pillars of Tito's nationalities policy (Stavrou 1976).

The main deficiency of Yugoslav federalism was not the apparent distribution of power between the federation and the constituent republics. The real limitation came from the actual participation of the republics in framing policy (Stanovcic 1992). A key deficiency was that the federation's multiethnic configuration and disparate levels of modernization presented successive Yugoslavian regimes with a narrow field of policy options. (Ramet 1992a). The central government in Belgrade was faced with the difficult task of addressing regional economic disparities. That these disparities broke down along the main ethnic lines made the task even more difficult. Nationalist leaders who sought to advance the interests of their specific ethnic group began to emerge on the political scene. According to Ramet, Croatia and Serbia were often allied on economic issues but were consistently opposed on political issues. In turn the underdeveloped republics were allies on economic issues and Slovenia and Croatia were allies

on political issues. For its part, the federal government interested in stability, was inclined to side with the preponderant bloc (Ramet 1992a: 278). This system worked as long as the central government remained the legitimate arbiter of Yugoslavian political and economic issues. When the Yugoslav economy began to falter after Tito's death in 1980, reform-minded, middle-level bureaucrats waged a policy-war against nationalist-conservatives. Serbian nationalists and conservatives, including Slobodan Milosevic, an executive of an energy firm, were at the forefront of this struggle. At the same time, the process of political decay was matched by increasing ethnic polarization. One specific incident stands out as a precipitant to later conflicts.

When Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo province protested the failure of the Belgrade government to establish an effective and coherent economic policy in 1981, Serb leaders used this confrontation as a pretext for seizing land from ethnic Albanians and what is more important, for establishing a manifesto framing the Serbs as an oppressed and endangered people (Ramet 1992b). The manifesto, prepared by members of the Serbia Academy of Sciences, portrayed Serbia as an imperiled victim of an "anti-Serbian coalition" (Ramet 1992a).

In December 1987, conservative communist factions within the Serbian party organization, stage-managed an internal coup, which brought to power Milosevic and ousted most reform-minded politicians from the Serbian party leadership. In 1988 and 1989, the Serbian communist party had also succeeded in gaining power in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro. In the wake of the failure of the Communist Party's elders to assert firm control over the Serbian conservatives, other regional nationalist leaders jumped to take advantage of the new confederalism. This became obvious, when the Yugoslav economy collapsed in 1988 and the federal government's choices were increasingly dictated by nationalist vitriol. In this context of

political weakness, new political agendas began to emerge along ethnic lines from the non-Serb republics as well.

In brief, the ability of the Yugoslav federation to frame coherent policies ultimately failed because of the dominance of the Serbs in the decision making process (Gagnon 1992). The balance of power, which had brought stability to Yugoslavia, collapsed because of ethnic intransigence. In 1989, the Yugoslav Communist Party began fracturing along ethnic lines. The emergence of nationalist leaders, whose chief concern was to advance the interests of their ethnic group, was intimately connected with the failure of Tito's heir, to find a way out of the country's serious economic and political problems. A weak effort to unify Yugoslavia was made at this time. A Croatian and reformist, Ante Markovic was selected as federal prime minister.

Also, the Serb regime had shifted towards coercive measures, in an effort to neutralize and marginalize the main threat to Serbian domination, democratic and reformist appeals to greater representation of minorities. The subsequent efforts to create an enlarged Serbia was to ensure a larger majority of Serbs (who are distributed throughout the republics - 21% live outside Serbia) and by that to secure the continued existence of the conservative ruling party's hold on power and the preservation of the existing power structure (Gagnon 1992).

Yugoslavia had shifted from a society based on balancing engendered by decentralized constitutional arrangements, to one in which ethnic control and coercion were central. Slovenian and Croatian leaders quickly took advantage of the formally decentralized structure of both the Yugoslav Communist party and the state to develop their own strategies for crisis management and reform.

### *3. Pre-Crisis June 1990 - 25 June 1991*

#### *1. The Pre-Crisis Setting*

Multi-party elections were held throughout the country from April to December 1990.<sup>6</sup> By the fall of 1990, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were under noncommunist rule and Macedonia under a coalition government in which the communists were a minority. Only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communists continue to hold onto power. The communists in Serbia had already distanced themselves from Tito, by undertaking a strategy that embraced all ethnic Serbs under the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). In Serbia, the SPS managed to win most of the seats (62%) (Gagnon 1992) and then set its sights on Serbian interests elsewhere especially in Croatia and Slovenia.

There were two points of contention between the new leaders of the republics. The first was the question of who would control the army. More specifically, for Serb leaders with an interest in Slovenia, the question was who would control the Territorial Defense Forces (established by Tito) - the Slovenian Government or the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) which was then under Serbian control.<sup>7</sup>

In Croatia, the main concern was finding a response to the Serbian question, the Serbian minority had already begun to protest against Croatian political dominance. In response, Belgrade managed to engineer the takeover of Croatia's Serbian party (SDS) by hard-line forces in the Croatian region of Dalmatia known as Krajina. Serbs who were willing to negotiate with Zagreb over their status within Croatia were discredited by the SDS and the SPS.



By April 1991, the SDS-led, Croatian Serb minority, armed by the JNA, established numerous enclaves, blocked roads and seized control of the local facilities. In Kosovo, more Albanian riots were followed by a brutal crackdown by the Serbian government.

Serb intransigence signalled a decisive shift in Serbian crisis management strategy. Events in Kosovo and Krajina were characterized by Belgrade as "inter-ethnic fighting" thereby necessitating the immediate intervention of the army. In reality, the SPS wanted to bring all Serbs under one state and used these conflicts as a pretext for intervention. To re-centralize the system, a system that worked to the advantage of the Serbs, Milosevic suggested that force might be necessary. Croatia and Slovenia, by contrast still held to the now crumbling dream that the system could be fully decentralized with the retention of only an economic union and coordination in foreign policy and military matters (Ramet 1992b).

In Croatia for example, the new government led by former communist general Franjo Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Alliance, supported, along with the government in Slovenia, the transformation of the existing Yugoslav federation into a "confederation of sovereign states" (Cohen 1992). For their part, the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia pursued a joint compromise, containing elements of the centralist and deconfederation plans.

Massive demonstrations in Belgrade, condemning Milosevic's policies in April 1991, softened his hard line position. He accepted the principle of confederal arrangement and later agreed to the principles upon which such a compromise would be based (Gagnon 1992). At the same time however, the Serb regime and SDS had stepped up its anti-Croatian rhetoric relying on sensationalist media reports that portrayed the Croats as fascists. Milosevic blamed Germany and Austria as co-conspirators in the Croatian fight for independence.

By May 1991, the Serbs of Krajina, who had opted to be reunified with Serbia in a "referendum", were receiving military and guerilla support from the JNA. This support was used in the first of many attacks on Croatian populations (and uncooperative Serbs) signalling the beginning of "ethnic cleansing".

On 25 June 1991, first Croatia and then Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. With Yugoslavia's territorial integrity threatened, Belgrade issued a warning statement to the Slovenia and Croatian governments calling the republics' actions illegal and ordering the national army (JNA) and police units to seize control posts along Slovenia's borders (Ramet 1992b).

#### ***4. The Yugoslav Crisis - 26 June 1991 - Present***

##### ***4.1 The Slovenian Crisis-Theater - 26 June 1991 - 6 July 1991***

###### ***"Independence if Necessary but Not Necessarily Independence"***

On 26 June 1991, the leaders of Yugoslavia's six republics held a series of meetings designed to avert a crisis. The two chief antagonists - Slovenia and Serbia - showed no sign of compromise.<sup>8</sup> Both Slovenia and Croatia served notice that, unless some inter-republican agreement were reached on a new political formula for Yugoslavia, they would terminate their association with the federation. These statements were said to be, not unilateral acts of secession, but declarations of sovereignty in which the authority of the federal organs, including the army would be recognized.<sup>9</sup> For his part, Milosevic was opposed to outright secessionism but not the idea of a confederation and this view was shared by the large Serbian contingent in the country's military establishment. However, Milosevic maintained the idea that it was crucial that Serbia

retain support for the unity of Serbs and particularly the large Serb community in Croatia and Bosnia. If the self-determination of the other ethnic groups did not infringe on the rights of Serbs to self-determination Milosevic was supportive. If necessary, Milosevic was prepared to transform the borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect Serb minorities.

Sensing the importance of international support, if Milosevic's plans for a greater Serbia were implemented, the leaders of Bosnia and Macedonia despite their preferences, made overtures to the European Community that they would also declare independence (Ramet 1992b).

Operating under instructions from Milosevic, Yugoslavia's Prime Minister, Markovic, called for the Yugoslavia Army to take control of all international borders.<sup>10</sup> Under a 1990 mutual defense pact, Tudjman and Slovenian leaders had agreed to coordinate defense and security policies. Subsequently, when the JNA entered into a ten-day war with Slovenian forces, the Croats did not heed the agreement and remained neutral, for fear that their entry would provoke an escalation of the conflict.

Even without the assistance of Croatia, Slovenian forces managed to defeat units of the JNA. At least 70 Slovenians were killed.<sup>11</sup> At this stage international engagement in the Slovenian crisis was restricted to attempts at mediation in several cease-fires and the imposition of sanctions on what was still the state of Yugoslavia.<sup>12</sup>

Shortly after hostilities began in Slovenia, the European Community (EC) successfully negotiated a cease-fire and an agreement that provided for a three-month moratorium on further moves toward independence by Croatia and Slovenia. The agreement also included EC-sponsored negotiations among the republics about their future. As for crisis-abatement, the war in Slovenia

was effectively over. The JNA forces agreed to a withdrawal from Slovenia (a process completed in October 1991).

By mid-July the JNA had moved to Croatia, where sporadic fighting in Serbian-held enclaves (Krajina and Slavonia) was already underway (Ramet 1992b). The Serb decision to withdraw from Slovenia had two important effects. The first was the spillover of the conflict into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, triggered by the JNA's decision to step up operations in Serb-dominated areas in the two republics. The second effect was the impact that escalation had on Serbian opposition in Serbia. The war had successfully managed to polarize Serbian society and a Serbian civil war appeared imminent.<sup>13</sup> With the JNA firmly behind him, Milosevic's political position remained firm, partly because organization among Serb moderates was in shambles and any hopes of a confederal Yugoslavia dissolved with it. Criticism of Milosevic or the army was portrayed as treason or as an attempt to "split the Serbian nation" (Ramet 1992b).

By this time the Croatian armed forces had built up their strength to a level of 200,000 troops, 350 tanks and 400 artillery pieces. The JNA by comparison had 138,000 troops on active duty, 400,000 troops in reserve, 1,850 battle tanks and 2,000 artillery pieces (Ramet 1992b). By the time the military conflict shifted to Croatia, Yugoslavia's civil war (a foreign policy crisis characterized by internal threats to its integrity) had become a full interstate ethnic conflict.

#### ***4.2 The Croatian Crisis-Theater - 26 August 1991-27 February 1992***

On 12 August 1991, when Croatia looked to Austria and Germany for diplomatic recognition and later received it on 14 January 1992, de facto Yugoslavia no longer existed.<sup>14</sup> A rump-state, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, was all that remained.<sup>15</sup> Sporadic fighting

led by Serbian irregulars, determined to secede from Croatia, spread rapidly as the Serb-dominated JNA laid siege to key Croatian cities, Vukovar and later Zagreb.

On 25 August, Tudjman responded to the JNA offensive by saying that, if the JNA did not stop helping Serb rebels in Croatia and withdraw by the end of August, he would declare the army an occupying force.<sup>16</sup> This statement signalled a decisional shift among Croatian leaders. They were willing to escalate the crisis to a full interstate war.

At this juncture, the government in Zagreb pleaded for international intervention. In response, the EC remained divided. Germany and Austria advocated the immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and expanded EC involvement. Britain and France urged a more cautious approach. The Conference on Security and Cooperation on Europe (CSCE) lacked military forces and could only take action by consensus; NATO declared the crisis to be an out of conflict area and would not take action at this time (Cohen 1992).<sup>17</sup>

By September 1991, Croatia had lost control of large chunks of its territory either through slow advances made by the Federal Army or by the loss of Serb held-territory that seceded from Croatia as enthusiasm for quitting Yugoslavia grew. In a radio interview, Milosevic reinforced the point that Croatian independence was unacceptable "unless the Serbs who live in the republic are permitted to secede".<sup>18</sup> He continued to hold to the argument that the JNA was being used solely to pry the two sides apart.

Throughout the fall, the EC, appointing Lord Carrington as crisis representative, attempted a series of unsuccessful cease-fires.<sup>19</sup> For example, meeting in Montenegro on 17 September Carrington negotiated a cease-fire between Croatian and Serbian forces. The next day, Serbian irregulars broke the cease-fire when Zagreb came under heavy fire from artillery

and aircraft. In reality both sides were using the cease-fires to reinforce their existing positions.<sup>20</sup>

On 5 October both Croatia and Slovenia proceeded to full independence. The implementation of their previous independence declarations had been placed on hold for three months as quid pro quo in the peace negotiations.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, federal army barracks were laid under siege in Croatian cities.<sup>22</sup> By November, Serb dominated forces controlled almost 35% of Croatia. Regions that were ethnically mixed became the preserves of either Serbs or Croats. The embattled cities of Dubrovnik and Vukovar fell under Serbian control. The enfeebled and barely operating Yugoslavian presidency under Stipe Mesic requested that UN peacekeeping troops be sent to Croatia and ordered the army to return to barracks. Both pleas were ignored.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, after four-months of brokered mediation efforts, and at least 15 failed cease-fires, the EC turned its mission over to the United Nations. The UN, which previously remained on the sidelines because of its own divisions about the propriety of intervening in a domestic conflict, successfully negotiated a truce between the leaders of Croatia and Serbia thus signalling a temporary de-escalation of the crisis.<sup>24</sup> The cease-fire called for UN peacekeepers to patrol the one-third of Croatia held by Serbs and called for the restoration of those areas to Croatian control and the right of an estimated 200,000 Croats, who fled during the fighting in 1991, to return home.<sup>25</sup>

By 13 February 1992, the UN Security Council had agreed on plans to send to Croatia a 14,000-member international force (UNPROFOR- the UN Protection Force in Croatia) after the simultaneous withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and Serb irregulars from contested areas.<sup>26</sup> Under pressure from Belgrade, Serb-led forces in Croatia reluctantly agreed to the plan.

Croatian leaders were also concerned about UN involvement. They wanted a six-month deployment of UN forces, arguing that a long-term deployment would allow Serbian irregulars to reinforce control of their territory. It was decided that the UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia was to end 21 February 1993. On 27 February 1992, Milosevic declared the war over. Croat leader, Tujman, ordered the de-mobilization of 20,000 reservists, signalling a decisive de-escalation in tensions in the crisis.

#### *4.2 Re-escalation of the Croatian Crisis - 28 February 1992-present*

After the cease-fire was in place, and peace talks had begun at a permanent conference in Geneva, Milosevic's stance regarding union with Serbians in Croatia softened substantially. He cited the UN intervention as "the beginning of a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis".<sup>27</sup> This transformation can be attributed to two factors. First, Serbia had undergone catastrophic economic difficulties during the war.<sup>28</sup> Faced with increased domestic pressure from hard-line political opponents, the cease-fire provided Milosevic the opportunity to address Serbia's economic woes and his opponents.<sup>29</sup>

Second, international involvement, including recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence, signalled that Serbia would ultimately be portrayed as the aggressor in the Balkan War.<sup>30</sup> World opinion had already shifted against Serbia, and Milosevic was quite willing to leave Croatia's Serbs hanging in the balance to bolster his world image.<sup>31</sup>

Despite constant assurances that he was agreeable to sovereignty for the newly independent state of Croatia, Milosevic became caught in a vortex of a rapidly transforming and ill-planned international policies regarding secession and the self-determination of minorities.<sup>32</sup>

In this sense it is necessary to distinguish between Milosevic's nationalist rhetoric designed for the consumption of the Serbian far right and Serb nationalists in Croatia and his true intentions.

Both Tudjman and Milosevic presented the image that extremists in all camps constituted the greatest threat to the peaceful management of the conflict. This was especially true in Croatia, where the Serbs of Krajina repeatedly failed to comply with the UN agreement. How Milosevic and Tudjman responded to these extreme pressures can be best understood in events that followed the collapse of the UN peace plan 12 months later. These events are discussed below.

On 2 August 1992, President Franjo Tudjman was returned to power in Croatia's first elections since declaring its independence a year earlier.<sup>33</sup> Less than a week later, the Croatian leader was implicated in the deaths of an ultranationalist opposition leader, clamped down on the media, and reduced basic personal freedoms for Croats.<sup>34</sup> Critics accused the leader of running Croatia as a medieval monarch and for practical purposes, Croatia had become an authoritarian state under the former communist general's rule. Centralization gave the leader, increased freedom to pursue his twin strategies of reclaiming Serb-held Croatian territory and obtaining Croat dominated territory in Bosnia. More specifically, Tudjman wanted to press Croatian Serbs to accept the creation of an autonomous Serb region under Croatian control. The Serbs, for their part, wanted to be part of a greater Serbia, which is not adjacent to all the areas of Croatia that they controlled. Faced with upper-house elections in January 1993, Tudjman took a calculated risk that would at once bolster his support at home and take advantage of a supportive international community. An important part of this calculus was Tudjman's adroit playing of the Serbian card.



Realizing that Milosevic's greatest international interest was to portray himself as a "peacemaker", Tudjman calculated - correctly - that attacks on Serb held enclaves would not be matched by reinforcements from Serbia. Thus, on 22 January 1993 Croatia's army launched an offensive to retake territory held by Serbs in southern Croatia's Krajina region.<sup>35</sup> At issue was the important strategic role played by Krajina. It was the crucial overland link between the capital Zagreb and Dalmatia, Croatia's Adriatic coast.

Justification for the offensive into Krajina, which was shielded by UNPROFOR troops, was based on the belief that the UN had failed to oversee the return of Serb-held areas of Croatia to the Croatian government.<sup>36</sup> Tudjman's calculation of the outcome was astute. Milosevic's response and the international community's reaction were weak; UN condemnation of the attack was not matched by any punitive action.<sup>37</sup>

The Croatian offensive against Serb-held territory was also matched by an effort to stake a claim to territory in Bosnia. As Croatian forces in Croatia held fast, their counterparts in Bosnia-Herzegovina had entered a three-way fight for control.<sup>38</sup> The crisis in Croatia had not ended, but merely shifted venues to the most bloody of arenas.

Throughout the spring of 1992 Serb forces had already managed to carve out a substantial portion of territory in Bosnia, including Sarajevo by ignoring a series of cease-fires.<sup>39</sup> Now the Croats were preparing for a third confrontation with Serb forces, this time with Bosnian-Muslims as their nominal allies.<sup>40</sup>

### *4.3 The Bosnian Crisis-Theater - 2 March 1992 - present*

#### *A Conflict Without End*

When an overwhelming number of Bosnians chose independence in that state's 2 March 1992 referendum, the act had the simultaneous effect of triggering foreign policy crises for both Croatia and Serbia and signalling a shift in the winds of war.<sup>41</sup> In the referendum, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs outside of Serb-controlled areas, voted overwhelmingly for a "democratic" independent Bosnia.<sup>42</sup>

Of the three crisis-theaters, Bosnia Hercegovina is the most complex. First, although the Bosnian Muslims are a numerical majority (44% of the population) they do not possess the equivalent political clout and military power of their numerically smaller, Serbian and Croatian counterparts. At crisis onset, Bosnia was led by a coalition government comprised of representatives of all three ethnic groups; the Bosnian SDS, armed with JNA equipment, had already proved successful in stalling any political solution to the future of Bosnia. This stalling tactic was aided by the fact that the majority of the JNA was stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina prior to the conflict and the republic was the site of most of the Federal Army's weapons factories.<sup>43</sup>

As the conflict in Croatia wound down in January of 1992, the SDS had declared an independent "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina" made up of regions that the SDS had taken over during the summer of 1991.<sup>44</sup> Around the time of the referendum, Serbs and Croat forces began fighting in key regions of Bosnia. Serbian guerilla forces threw up roadblocks, around Sarajevo and other cities and began a process of orchestrated terror against dissenters.

From the perspective of SDS rhetoric, the referendum was presented as a threat of Muslim fundamentalists in Bosnia, seeking to perpetrate genocide against Serbs, an argument that pervaded the Belgrade media.

After all, in their view, the Serbs had not agreed to independence according to the principle of three constituent nations.<sup>45</sup> The real concern for Milosevic was in controlling the unpredictable zealotry of the Bosnian-Serb leadership in order to reduce the possibility that their "ethnic cleansing" would bring outside military intervention.<sup>46</sup> This could be best achieved by having a controlling interest in the Bosnian conflict and by staking claims to much of Bosnia.

Again, domestic interests were paramount in this calculation. By portraying itself as the sole arbiter of Serbian politics, in and outside of Serbia, the SPS could justify its continuation and the preservation of the existing power structure. Since Serbia itself is only 65% Serbian, by bringing the 30% of Bosnian Serbs into the political fold, the SPS would be able to increase the total Serbian proportion substantially (aided by the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo). This strategy, combined with the nullification of internal appeals to increased democratization, would in effect, secure the SPS's hold on power for many years to come. In the event that democracy did come to Serbia, the elected leadership would undoubtedly be sympathetic to the Serbian cause. A key ingredient in Milosevic's ability to consolidate his power within Serbia was his ability to appeal to nationalist sensibilities and control the hypernationalism of his allies in Croatia and Bosnia. Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party was the source of supply for the Serb's mobilizing efforts in Croatia and Bosnia, providing them with money, weapons and strategic advice (Glenny 1993).

International response to the violence in Bosnia was muted. Diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed in 1992 reflected an inability by the international community to control the direction of the conflict. The UN had already deployed most of its forces in Croatia and was unwilling to commit more forces to Bosnia.

In March 1992, the leader of Bosnia's collective presidency and leader of the Bosnian Muslims, Itzebegovic, requested weapons for Bosnia's defense and a peacekeeping force for Bosnia. As in Croatia the request was met by foot dragging and series of unsuccessful cease-fires that lasted through the year. In August, the number of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia-Hercegovina rose to 8,000, most of these concerned with ensuring the flow of humanitarian assistance.

On 8 August 1992 the warring factions agreed to a cease-fire to begin talks in Geneva on a constitutional settlement.<sup>47</sup> For his part the leader of Bosnia's breakaway Serbs, Radovan Karadzic vowed to end immediately the shelling of four besieged cities - Sarajevo, Bihac, Gradze and Jajce. Both he and Mate Boban the leader of the self-styled Croatian state of Herzeg-Bosnia favored the canonization of the republic, with the Muslims allocated patches of territory neither the Serbs nor the Croats claimed.

The weakness of this agreement was twofold. First the leaders of the main participants in the conflict were not party to the negotiation process.<sup>48</sup> Second, there remained no international military presence to enforce the pact, only the threat of tighter sanctions and increasing isolation for Serbia.

By December 1992, with no constitutional settlement in sight, international opinion of the conflict had shifted. Most notable was the apparent willingness of the western powers to

intervene in the conflict. For example, President Clinton suggested that he, unlike his predecessor would use force to aid the UN in its humanitarian assistance.<sup>49</sup>

The problem had become even further complicated, as all three factions intensified their hostility towards each other. The alliance that once suited Muslims and Croats against the Serbs, crumbled as clashes between them broke out in the central Bosnian towns of Vitez and Novi Travnik.<sup>50</sup>

Clearly, UN imposed sanctions (including a naval blockade) and condemnation of Serb involvement were having only a partial effect. Oil continued to get to Serbia and heavy armaments were still being used by both sides. The international community had two options. A lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnia government (designed to aid the Bosnian Muslims) or selective air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions or both. Simultaneously, to ensure safe havens for civilians ensnared in the conflict, NATO began to implement plans for the military enforcement of a no-fly zone. The actual enforcement could not take place however until UN Security Council had approved it.<sup>51</sup>

For its part, the US administration had been considering all options except sending ground-troops to Bosnia.<sup>52</sup> The latter plan was rejected as it was thought to be too provocative. It would endanger the peace talks and the lives of aid workers.<sup>53</sup>

In effect, the international community was sending separate signals to Serb leader, Miiosevic, who held a tight reign on Karadzic, resolve the conflict through negotiations or face tighter sanctions. Initially, this strategy worked.

On 11 January 1993, Bosnian-Serb leaders dropped their demands for a separate state and signed a short-lived peace plan (Vance-Owen) giving each of the three ethnic groups control of ten nominally equal "provinces" within Bosnia.<sup>54</sup> Sarajevo would become an open city.<sup>55</sup>

The concession coincided with the arrival of Milosevic at the Geneva Peace Talks and for a time at, least, it appeared that, the long-held dream of a greater Serbia would be achieved. The proposed map of the new Bosnian state showed that both the EC and the US, which was now party to the talks, were willing to allow Bosnia to be redrawn along ethnic lines, with the Serbs controlling almost 70% of the former Yugoslav territory. In effect, territorial boundaries gained through military means were considered legitimate.

On the other hand, the Vance-Owen plan pointedly stated that the Bosnian Serbs "shall not have any international legal personality" meaning they could not forge agreements with foreign states.<sup>56</sup>

On 6 May 1993, the Bosnian-Serb parliament met and rejected the Vance-Owen peace initiative.<sup>57</sup> The parliament decided instead to put the issues to a May referendum that also failed. International reaction was mixed. The rump-Yugoslavia government, bucking under sanctions, cut off aid to Bosnian Serb forces to force them to agree to peace. In Europe, there remained no consensus on whether to lift the arms embargo against former Yugoslavia or to allow the Muslims to defend themselves.<sup>58</sup>

After the failed referendum, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was effectively dead. Lord Owen, representing the EC continued the task of trying to conduct the mediation process, but the role played by Cyrus Vance was passed to UN representative, Norwegian, Thorvald

Stoltenberg. In concert with Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Croat leader Mate Boban, Owen and Stoltenberg devised a plan that would prove more acceptable.

The combined Serb-Croat plan was devised, despite the objections from Bosnian Muslim leader, Itzebegovic but emerged as the only political solution at hand. Unlike the Vance-Owen plan, the new proposal would guarantee the Croats a land link with Dalmatia and Sarajevo. The capital, Sarajevo would be divided into ethnic enclaves. The Bosnian Serb republic would border Serbia and cover half of Bosnia, the Croatian republic, one-third and the Muslim republic would be landlocked, centered at Sarajevo with a separate enclave around Bihac. The central government would be weaker and there would be no restrictions on Serbs and Croats from seceding again.<sup>59</sup>

Despite, Itzebegovic's personal rejection of the plan, members of Bosnia-Hercegovina's collective leadership (including a lone Muslim delegate) accepted the plan in principle. A possible solution to the Bosnian protracted conflict was at hand. At the peace talks that began 27 July 1993, a revised constitutional plan for the future "United Republics of Bosnia and Hercegovina" was unveiled. The proposal would create a union of three "constituent republics" comprising "three constituent peoples" and "others".<sup>60</sup> A key change in the plan was that at least 31% of Bosnian territory would be yielded to Bosnian-Muslims (they controlled only 15% at the time) The Croats would be allowed to retain 17% of Bosnia and Serbia 52%. The plan also called for a rotating presidency and a weak central government responsible only for conducting foreign affairs. The plan required acceptance from Bosnia's 10-member collective presidency and the Bosnian parliament.

Itzebegovic remained unconvinced. In August 1993 the Bosnian leader indicated that he would not ask the Bosnian parliament to approve the plan. It would be difficult, in his view, to wrest the necessary 15% of the territory from either the Serbs or the Croats. The leaders of the other two groups were also intransigent. Bosnian Serb leader, Karadzic, said that "there will be no more negotiations" on further Serb concessions at Geneva peace negotiations.<sup>61</sup> Thus, the peace talks of August 1993 had two purposes. The first was to convince all three Bosnian leaders and their supporting coalition, to recognise the separation of Bosnia into three distinct republics. The second was to prevent Serb and Croat forces from making gains on the territory they already held. For example, on 24 August 1993 the Bosnian wing of Croatia's ruling party formally proclaimed the Croat state entity "Herzeg-Bosnia".

Serb forces had already been requested to withdraw from areas surrounding Sarajevo. To assure they would comply by 30 August 1993, the deadline for the plan to take effect, US President Clinton had already requested on 30 July that NATO make strike aircraft operational.

As NATO plans for airstrikes moved painfully forward, Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw their forces from around Sarajevo.<sup>62</sup> On 17 August all three warring factions agreed to place that city under temporary UN administration.<sup>63</sup> However, the city of Mostar, designated by the Croats to become their new capital and granted EC protectorate status, became the focal point of renewed conflict between Muslims and Croats. That battle indicated that the Bosnian Croat leadership under Mate Boban was unwilling to cede any of the 30% of territory currently under Croatian control. In response, on 24 August 1993, the Bosnian presidency ordered all conscripts to report for military duty in preparation for renewed violence in Croat strongholds.<sup>64</sup>



Until all three parties comply with all aspects of the peace plan and both Serbian and Croatian forces withdraw from Bosnian Muslim territory in recognition of that group's right to autonomy, the interstate ethnic conflict will continue and the crisis will not end. Given that Bosnia and Serbia are both making preparations to annex territory in Bosnia, the prospects for compliance within the framework of the current peace plan are remote.

#### *4.4 Summary and Post Script - The Promise of a Better Future*

26 June 1991 marked the onset of Yugoslavia's foreign policy crisis. Then, Yugoslavia's already crumbling federal government faced two major internal threats (to territory and to regime, both political acts) comprised of Slovenian and Croatian claims to independence. The military conflict following the onset of the crisis, was at this time a civil war.

After Germany and then the EC recognized Slovenian and Croatian claims to sovereignty, the crisis setting was transformed because of the introduction of these two republics as independent states. The claims to independence of these states and their subsequent international recognition, therefore serve as the triggers to an international crisis and an interstate ethnic conflict.

The conflict in Croatia had decisive spillover effects for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not the least of which, was the forcing of Bosnian leadership (as well as Macedonia) to choose independence or to be incorporated into a truncated Yugoslavia. The entire crisis period is marked by fluctuations in intensity, characteristic of a protracted conflict and since a precise termination point of the Bosnian conflict is not yet evident, it is likely violence will remain a defining characteristic of the conflict in Bosnia.

The initial de-escalation of the interstate ethnic conflict first in Slovenia in June 1991, signalled a termination of a foreign policy crisis for Slovenian leaders. Croatia's leaders then experienced a foreign policy crisis in August 1991 when Croatia territory succumbed to Serbian attacks. That conflict appeared to be winding down until a Croatian counter offensive in February 1992 managed to return some of Serb-held territory to Croatia. Serb forces continue to hold on to at least 10% of Croatian territory that is geographically contiguous with Serbia. Sporadic fighting between Serb and Croatian forces through the fall of 1993 made the dividing of Serb and Croatian-held territory difficult. Both sides continue to be intransigent.

The decisive shift to the Bosnian crisis-theater occurred in March 1992, as both Serbian and Croatian leaders staked claims to Bosnian territory. 2 March 1992 constitutes an escalation in the larger Yugoslavian interstate ethnic conflict, with the direct involvement of Bosnia-Herzegovina and several non-state actors (breakaway Bosnia-Croatian and Bosnia-Serbian self-styled governments). Bosnian declarations of independence, at that time, serve as the trigger for foreign policy crises for both Croatia and Serbia.<sup>65</sup>

The cessation of hostilities between JNA forces and the breakaway republics marks the beginning of a slow, but steady, de-escalation in the crisis through 1993. The Bosnian crisis, in particular, is marked by sporadic attempts at peaceful negotiation, failed cease-fires and international debate over various strategies of conflict management (ranging from sanctions to military intervention). The Bosnian crisis-theater is also characterized by at least two failed peace plans. The effects of the third are inconclusive but optimistic. The defining point in the de-escalation of the interstate ethnic conflict is marked by the compliance of two of the three

Bosnian ethnic groups to a peace plan in July 1993, coinciding with the decision by Serbia leader Milosevic, to desist in his support of the Bosnian-Serbs.

The next step in the peace talks is obtaining agreement among the Muslim leadership on the formal partitioning of Bosnia, including the delicate issue of dividing the territory equitably. Concessions in Serb-held territory in Croatia must also be considered. Some or all of that territory will likely be retained by Serbia against the wishes of some Croats.

At the time of this writing, the larger conflict has the potential to go two directions. One direction would involve Serb compliance, coupled with non-military pressures applied on the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, by the international community and by Serbia's leader Milosevic. Compliance could lead to a negotiated settlement on the Bosnian conflict. Four other issues, not fully addressed in this analysis, have yet to be resolved, Serb persecution of Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonian independence, a war crimes tribunal and refugee flows.

If the Serbs fail to comply on any of these issues, a possible alternative is direct external intervention (possibly military) in the conflict with the potential of drawing in extra-regional states, either multilaterally or individually. In either event, Bosnia will not exist as it does now. The Bosnian Muslims lack the external support and internal political clout, necessary to create a sustainable and viable autonomous state. In short order, both Serbia and Croatian leaders responding to internal pressures and international reluctance for direct intervention will annex their state's respective ethnic republics.

Since this thesis is primarily concerned with identifying the causes of interstate ethnic conflicts, the fact that the Balkans conflict is not yet fully wound down, does not constitute an insurmountable constraint on analysis. Thus the following analysis and testing, as in the cases

before, assess the importance of the variables to the process of the unfolding of the ethnic conflict to an interstate level.

In terms of the model there are three stages of interactions. At Stage 1, an aggressive Serbian foreign policy emerges with respect to the newly created states of Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia. This policy is dependent on the ability of Serb leader Milosevic to build a coalition of forces that is willing to restructure the neighboring states so as to create a "Greater Serbia". At Stage 2, Serb aggression that arises largely from domestic policy concerns, is re-interpreted as a security issue for Serbia because of the perceived threat to Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia. Serb leaders take advantage of the cleavages created by Serb-held enclaves in Croatia and Bosnia and escalate the crisis to war (Stage 3). Clearly this is a case in which Serbia was the aggressor state and was willing to use force to expand its influence. The security issue was problematic for the international community because each ethnic group had made their basis of security, the insecurity of the other ethnic group. Even if the extremists in Serb-held enclaves did not want violence, they knew that intransigence rather than compromise was the best strategy to follow. Compromise by any of the leaders, but especially Milosevic who had come to power on the basis of protecting Serb interests, would have meant a loss of relevance and a loss of power. Thus, Milosevic found himself supporting extremists leading to a narrowing of policy options. The key point is that once extremist leaders of an ethnic group gain credibility, the more moderate leader may find it difficult to maintain control. As is often the case, extremists will either continually outflank their more moderate opponents, eventually gaining power, or take a more direct route to power through assassination.

## *5. Explaining the Variables and Testing the Propositions*

### *5.1 Yugoslavia (original and truncated form)*

#### (a) Ethnic Composition

In the context of this analysis, the most important features of Yugoslavia's ethnic diversity are the facts that all of its ethnic groups including, Croatian, Slovenian, Muslim and Serb, tend towards geographic concentration and that Serbs also constitute significant portions of the populations of other states, including Croatia and Bosnia. As noted above, the Serbs did not make up most of Yugoslavia's population but they were always its single largest ethnic group. Instrumental in shaping Serb dominating, is the fact that the Serb leaders controlled the Yugoslavian Army and Yugoslavia's political apparatus for at least ten years before the outbreak of war. As in the cases before, the presence of transnational ethnic affinities creates a security dilemma for Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia (less so for Slovenia) and have ramifications for the subsequent formation of Serb policy toward each of the seceding states. For example, in relative terms, there are far fewer Serbs to be found in Slovenia and Macedonia compared to Croatia and Bosnia. Thus, the conflict between Slovenia and Serbia was one in which the primary concern was to prevent further decentralization within the Yugoslavian political structure. Efforts to protect, retrieve or even use the small minority of Slovenian Serbs for organizational leverage were second in importance to the larger issue of maintaining Yugoslavian integrity. This may, in part, explain why, Serbia relinquished control of Slovenia (and possibly Macedonia where Serbs are also a small minority) so quickly, compared to the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. The costs of attempting to retain Slovenia were not matched by any perceived benefits to Serb leaders. This does not wholly explain, however, why force was used, but it may help in

understanding why the Slovenian war was so short. Like Croatia, Slovenia had strong ties to the West and its own defense forces. The ties to the West were evident when Germany sponsored Slovenia's transition to independence. Potential confrontation with the West coupled with fewer domestic benefits to the Serb leadership, converged to create a situation of relatively peaceful political transition (considering that the only other successful secession to that date was Bangladesh). Force could be used as long as the international community viewed the conflict as a civil war and an internal affair of the still existing Yugoslavian regime, which it did.

On the other hand, Bosnian and Croatian secessionism is characterized by violent and repeated counter-efforts of retrieval by the Serb regime and internal disruption created by Serb minority leaders. These conflicts more closely resemble the kinds of interstate ethnic conflicts previously presented in this study.

The subsequent political manoeuvring of Milosevic, which included, initial intransigence, participation in peace talks and eventually, sanctions against Bosnian-Serbs, suggest that his strategies on the Bosnian and Croatian fronts were also conditioned by domestic and international factors. But in these cases, Serb leadership had to convince Serb opposition (including hard-liners) that Serbia's actions were sufficient enough to protect Serb interests elsewhere, while also limiting the effects of international condemnation (including sanctions and continual threats of armed intervention).

The Bosnian Croatian conflicts were also characterized by short-lived attempts of second-order secessionism by Serbs in Croatia and Serbs and Croats in Bosnia (minorities within minorities). As a result, there were three simultaneous processes of interstate ethnic conflict. The first comprises the secessions of Yugoslavia's republics. The second is the irredentist struggle,

characterized by the territorial retrieval by the Serb-dominated JNA and irregular forces. The third phase is the simultaneous declarations of independence by the self-styled minority Serb and Croatian governments. A fourth phase, might include the absorption of parts of Bosnia into Croatian and Serb states.

A key factor in the initial escalation of the conflict was the politicization of ethnicity as the primary means of mobilization and the subsequent polarization of political issues on basis of Serb-Croat rivalries. Originally, cohesion with Yugoslavia was maintained through the idea of "panslavism", an idea that had at one time, both domestic and international imperatives. On the one hand, the unity of the South Slavs, under Tito, provided a more coherent internal structure than that before. It served to insulate the region from outside interference and in that way, promised a coherent vision of the future that was better and more peaceful than that which preceded it.

The most important phase in the development of more particularist identities and competing visions of the future among Yugoslavia's various ethnic groups was the decade immediately after Tito's death, in which the confederal structures instituted under his power, gradually ceded more and more power to the republics. The subsequent inability of the leaders of these republics to develop national policy consensus, can be traced to the rise to power of Serb nationalist leaders and the failure of the other republics to pursue policies that would balance this domination. Reformists who held fast to the view that Yugoslavia's constitution and economy could be restructured along existing political arrangements, were discredited by their failure to respond to Yugoslavia's economic collapse. These leaders could not match the populist-appeal of ethnic leaders, nor their political visions that promised for Croatians and

Slovenians a potentially greater role to be played in the Western economic system and for the Serbs, the opportunity to control the destiny of the South Slav peoples.

The balancing against competing claims, which had been effective in the past, largely because the communist leaders of the republics had a common interest in cooperation (to ensure their preservation), succumbed to leaders whose interests were more narrowly defined. The inherent problem in this arrangement is that the potential for intransigence among leaders whose power derives from ethnic sensibilities is very high. At some point, there is, for the leaders at least, greater benefits to be had in whittling away at a decentralized structure, than maintaining them. As the Yugoslavia case exemplifies, these perceptions do not always converge at once. Serbia was the most reluctant of the republics to embrace change, while Croatia and Slovenia clearly less so.

The subsequent collapse of Yugoslavia is, therefore, the result of the defection of Slovenia and Croatian leaders from attempts to find an orchestrated settlement to the larger conflict. It is difficult to state precisely, the extent to which the international community can be identified with this process, but obviously its role is fundamental. Incentives for Slovenian and Croatian defection were provided initially by Germany and then from the European Community.

In turn, the defection of Slovenia and Croatia forced the hands of the remaining non-Serb republics. Without Croatia or Slovenia to protect their interests, through the balancing engendered by the Titoist federal structures, the weaker republics of Bosnia and Macedonia were left with no alternative but also to declare their independence. According to Stavrou (1976: 146), in pre-1989 Yugoslavia "It is a basic assumption among Yugoslav leaders that domestic conflicts invite "someone else to defend socialism" an obvious reference to the Brezhnev doctrine. "In



order for them to retain order and independence they claim it is necessary to control all forms of "harmful nationalism", but specifically separatism and unitarism. Either type could develop and intensify with external support originating in the East as well as in the West". In view of the events of the past four years, the suggestion that some European states have been instrumental in fomenting change, is well founded.

(b) Institutional Constraints

The most interesting aspect of institutional change in the last ten years of Yugoslavia's existence was the gradual turning away from an over arching arrangement of elite-based consensus, in which all republics participated in framing policy, to an increase in inequality among the various republics. Presumably, the former arrangement did possess the means for constraining leaders whose primary interest was in maintaining the status-quo. However, such an arrangement was not designed to facilitate rapid change, especially economic change, in which regional disparities increase dramatically over the short term. Consequently, the economic impact on Yugoslavia's political arrangements had three distinct dimensions all leading to reduced constraints on the leaders of each republic. At the national level, levels of repression and electoral competition appear to have been defined along inter-republic and ethnic lines. Coalitions also broke down along these lines. Finally, policies, appear to have been implemented to advance the interests of specific ethnic groups.

Thus, Yugoslavia's political structures, that were originally designed to be incorporative, became the mechanisms for the exclusion of specific groups and leaders. For example, Milosevic's national party (SPS) came to power through an internal coup. In Croatia and Serbia,

political parties were formed on the basis of ethnic allegiance and parliaments became the domains of demagogues and chauvinists. Despite the appearance of participation regulation and constraints on executives, it is reasonable to assume that during the period of transition, Yugoslavia's republics were not characterized by high levels of institutional constraint.

If this is an accurate assessment, then it appears that, pre-1989 Yugoslavia's political system was on its way to becoming an ethnically-based bureaucratic-authoritarian system, an exclusionary political arrangement led by Serb technocrats and the military in order to bring Yugoslavia more fully into an open market economy. The different phases of change among the republics led, as mentioned above, to different perceptions of economic payoffs to each ethnic group within this structure. For Slovenia and Croatia the payoffs were low. The leaders of these republics, having activated the popular sector through carefully orchestrated elections and referendums, were then faced with the prospect of further unrest among their minorities. To convince potential external support that internal unrest was not so divisive to scare off capital, the leaders of these new states had to present the image of unity and democracy, one that could be most easily achieved through appeals to nationalist identities. In Slovenia, this strategy appears to have been successful (perhaps due to its relative homogeneity). For Croatia under Tudjman, however, internal unrest was followed by even greater repression.

In brief, Yugoslavia's transition to a more open economy was marked by increasing authoritarianism within the Serb-dominated federal political system. The most disturbing aspect of this change is the extent to which ethnic identities became the basis for mobilizing support within Yugoslavia as a whole and within each republic. In general, in states where there have

been attempts at multi-partyism and regularized political competition (but institutional constraints are low) fragmentation is a likely feature of the political arena.

The most reasonable explanation in accounting for the absence of effective consensus-oriented institutional arrangements in these transitional societies, is derived from Tsebelis' notion of nested games as it pertains to the domestic arena. Political elites within these societies participate in two different arenas, the parliamentary and the electoral. The analysis is useful because it accounts for elites who are both representative of the masses and are simultaneously independent actors making deals among themselves. The parliamentary arena is connected to the electoral arena and the situation in the electoral arena effects the payoffs of elites in the parliamentary arena. On the surface it would appear that the most sensible strategy these elites should pursue is accommodation and reconciliation as a consequence of their behaviour being dependant and the potentially debilitating effects of polarization. However as Tsebelis has shown the most preferred strategy of these elites is to be intransigent (Tsebelis 1990: 164). As suggested earlier, conflict is likely to be exacerbated when political elites mobilize their followers to increase their share of power. This is particularly true in those case where the monopoly of representation within a republic is disputed along ethnic lines, as was the case for Croatia and Bosnia.

### (c) Ethnic Cleavages

Before its dissolution, Yugoslavia did have high levels of cleavage, though by some accounts (eg. inter-marriage rates and ethnic identity given in polls) this appeared to be changing slowly. The main source of cleavage has been religion. Language was a second source of

cleavage for Macedonia and Slovenia where Serbo-Croatian is not widely used. In each republic save Serbia and Slovenia, none of the ethnic groups are preponderant.

Thus, under Tito, the constitution invested sovereignty not only in the federal republics but in the nations of Yugoslavia as well. During the 1980s this dual sovereignty came to mean that should one of the republics want to secede, it first had to secure the agreement of the sovereign nations that made it up. In effect, this mechanism was designed to prevent the breaking off of Croatia and Bosnia in which the Serbs are in a minority position. According to the notion of dual sovereignty, the original declarations of independence were illegal because these votes did not have the consensus of all the ethnic nations (Glennie 1993). In contrast, the European Community demands only that a simple majority of constituents vote for independence. Thus, for the EC all three acts of independence (Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia) were legal, though by Yugoslavia's standards they were not.

The extremism among all ethnic groups that resulted from the break-up of Yugoslavia, did not mean that there was intra-ethnic consensus. For example, some Croatian leaders, including Tudjman were willing to offer autonomy to Serb minorities (including local self-management) while those opposed, preferred a hard-line of no compromises. Illegal private Croatian militia began to form in response. For example, the leaders of the Party of Rights, were arrested by Tudjman in part because of the party's use of neo-fascist symbols. These and other opposition leaders were accused of having "considerably contributed to the difficult political and security situation in Croatia" (Ramet 1992a: 261).

In Serbia as well, there were extreme views on both sides of the issue. Milosevic's position was in the middle. Accused of selling out the Serbian interest, Milosevic was forced to

harden his position: "Questions of borders are essential questions of state. And borders, as you know, are always dictated by the strong, never by the weak. Accordingly, it is essential that we be strong" (Ramet 1992a: 264).

For Serbia, the main source of cleavage was not inter-ethnic rivalry but intra-ethnic discord. Milosevic was faced with the prospect of uniting a broad spectrum of Serbian opinion on the conflict, ranging from, far right ultra-nationalist perspectives (which framed the conflict as Croatian/Muslim conspiracy) to more moderate sensibilities, which had as their chief concern the effects of sanctions on the Serbia economy. The latter appear to have surfaced in the early stages of the conflict when mass protests against the Milosevic regime took place. However, as the conflict wore on and Milosevic's position softened, these protests appeared to have diminished. It is unfortunate that the ultra-nationalist views appear to have had a more direct influence on the formation of Serbian foreign policy. For example, Serb intellectuals appear to have played a prominent role in the development of a pan-Slavic doctrine, which was used as the basis for intervention in Bosnia and repression in Kosovo. A key contributor of this manifesto, written in 1986, was Dobrica Cosic a Serbian novelist and fervent nationalist who was expelled from the Serbian Communist Party for opposing recognition of the Bosnian Muslims. Cosic was later elected president of the new Yugoslavia (Serb-Montenegro) on 15 June 1992 (Ramet 1992b).

The most chauvinistic of the Serbian elite remains Voislav Seselj, whose Serbian Radical Party seeks the incorporation into Serbia of all of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, Lika, Kordun, Slavonia and Macedonia. His main objective is to reduce Croatia to "as much as

one can see from the tower of the cathedral in Zagreb. If this is not enough for the Croats, then we will take everything" (Ramet 1992b: 93).

(d) Ethnic Affinities

The presumed positive impact that ethnic affinities have had for the Serb leadership has already been noted. In essence, these linkages provided Serb leaders with the leverage necessary to stake a claim to portions of Croatia and Bosnia. These affinities appear to have also created negative reverberations by enhancing Serb perceptions of insecurity. The most important aspect, in this regard, is the behaviour of Serbian leader Milosevic toward the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia. The evidence indicates that under international pressure for compliance, Milosevic was willing to apply pressure on the Serb breakaway leaders in these republics. The reason for this is that, the extremist strategies of Serb minority leaders, including Karadzic, threatened to draw in extra-regional powers and tighten sanctions on Serbia. Milosevic's response is notable because it suggests that the usefulness of transnational linkages is conditioned by a broader spectrum of foreign policy objectives and domestic concerns.<sup>66</sup>

A second possibility is that Milosevic recognized these leaders (including Karadzic) as potential and unstable adversaries in his plans to control territories outside Serbia. The evidence for this is based on the assumption that eventually, Milosevic will seek the support of Serbians outside Serbia in his plans to restructure the Serbian economy. To do this, the Serb leader will require the compliance of a dependent Serb minority leadership in Croatia and Bosnia.

A second aspect of the positive and negative reverberations engendered by ethnic affinities in this conflict (though not an explicit part of the model) are the linkages between each

ethnic group within Yugoslavia and the various regional actors. Most notable in this regard, has been the Serb-Russian linkage, which ensured Serbia has a flow of oil and arms despite embargoes. Greece has also had perceptible pro-Serbian tilt, throughout the crisis, a result both of Greek-Serbian economic interdependence and of longstanding Greek animosity towards Macedonia. Despite a substantial domestic arms industry and significant stockpiles, arms flowed from Greece and Rumania to Serbia during this time.

The religious and cultural similarities between Slovenia and Croatia and Western Europe may have also provided a basis for ensuring a flow of arms from Germany to Slovenia and Croatia. Finally there are the various linkages between the Bosnian-Muslims and the larger Islamic community. (There have been unsubstantiated rumors that Muslim extremists were fighting in Bosnia on behalf of the more secular Bosnian Muslims).

None of these linkages proved strong enough for full third party intervention, but they have been instrumental in shaping the course of events. Hungary for example, placed its air force on alert during the Croatian war. Then, arms shipments quickly flowed from Germany to Slovenia and Croatia. Albania responded by placing its armies on a state of alert and declared full support for the creation of an independent Kosovo. Bulgaria issued a statement to the effect that the Bulgarian army would not threaten Yugoslav security but would recognize an independent Macedonian state. When Macedonia declared independence, Greece and Albania mobilized their troops along the borders. The fear was that Belgrade would next turn to mass expulsions of Albanians from the province of Kosovo and Macedonia. Bitter disputes with Athens over the independence sought by the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia also created a heightened sense of tension between the two countries.

## *5.2 Testing the Propositions*

General Hypothesis 1: The preference for foreign policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict is a function of the interaction between ethnic composition and levels of institutional constraint on elites such that:

P1 Type Ia unconstrained - dominant states have a high preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

Supported. Presumably, Milosevic would not have pursued involvement in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia (and Kosovo) if he had believed it was a threat to his power. The evidence indicates that Milosevic formulated policies that appealed to his ethnic constituency even at the expense of other ethnic groups. He did so in order to mobilize his followers and to potentially increase his share of domestic power. The subsequent efforts of territorial retrieval must be seen in Milosevic's domestic political situation.

There was a distinct blurring of issues such that, Serbia's relations with the other republics took on an ethnic character. Agenda setting and jurisdiction over the issue of involvement in Slovenia and Croatia were in the hands of a bureaucratic elite who tried to connect issues of concern to them and their ethnic group, to the broader issue of Croatian and Bosnian independence. Thus, secession was portrayed as a conspiracy to overwhelm the Serbian population and intervention was deemed an act in the national interest.

In some instances, when inter-elite competition within a dominant ethnic group is high, elites will often introduce new issues that will discredit their opponents thereby creating new



avenues of securing power. In other instances, elites will rely on the manipulation of mass sentiment. Serb leaders appear to have utilized both processes of securing power within Serbia. For example, political opponents who were considered "soft" on relations with Croatia were either discredited or jailed. Repression in Kosovo appears to have stemmed from similar concerns. Indeed, judging from the evidence, Serbian nationalist rhetoric was so fundamental to policy formation that Milosevic may have been prevented, initially at least, from pursuing conciliatory or accommodating strategies with the other ethnic groups by overwhelming mass sentiment and hard line opposition.

Within Serbia, opposition appears to have been primarily elite-generated and was concentrated within the military. For example, there was considerable opposition to Milosevic to the plan to grant Slovenia and Croatia greater autonomy. Many Yugoslav oriented officers wanted to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia and consequently Milosevic hardened his position on the question of deconfederation (Cohen 1992).

The main problem facing Milosevic was to manage the resistance that the Serb policies engendered in the international arena. The primary constraint facing the Serb leaders was the array of international factors shaping the implementation of confrontational policies. In this instance, the primary constraints on Serb policy were sanctions and the threat of intervention. Neither appears to have been fully successful in deterring Serbia's expansionist policies or from achieving most of their objectives. The failure of all of the members of the international community to comply with the agreement to enforce sanctions was fundamental to Serbia's ability to press its advantage.

On the other hand, the threat of international involvement appears to have presented Serb leaders with a second-best solution. If Serbia could not maintain its control of an integrated Yugoslavia, then it would at least control all that territory in which there were significant Serb populations through proxy-militias established in Serb held enclaves. Of course a key factor was the organizational leverage that Serbia had at its disposal, namely, control of the JNA and well armed and loyal Serb irregulars in Croatia and Bosnia.

P2 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a moderate preference for policies that lead to involvement in an interstate ethnic conflict.

Partially Supported. Using Croatia as an example, it is clear that Croatia was constrained by its ethnic diversity. Therefore, there appears to be three phases of Croatian policy formation. Initially at least there was some reluctance to become involved. For example, Croatian leaders decided not to honor the alliance with Slovenia after it entered a ten day war with the JNA for fear of repercussions at home. After war broke out within Serb-held enclaves, Croatian leader Tudjman pursued policies of intransigence and appeals for international support. These were accompanied by repressive measures against Croatian and Serb opposition and a counter-offensive against Serb forces in Krajina. The third phase was the decision to support Bosnian-Croatian forces. There were two factors that made this third phase possible. The first was the reduction of internal opposition through repression (including retaking Serb-held enclaves). The

second was the absence of a coherent set of international policies that would deter Croatian involvement in Bosnia.

General Hypothesis 2: Interstate ethnic crises that are conditioned by high levels of cleavage and affinity present additional opportunities and constraints such that:

P6 High cleavage increases the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict;

P7 High cleavage increases the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions;

Supported. The evidence indicates that in the case of Croatia and Bosnia, and possibly Kosovo, where cleavages are highest, a political solution to the conflict has been difficult to obtain. The Bosnian crisis, in particular, is marked by sporadic attempts at peaceful negotiation and failed cease-fires. The Bosnian crisis-theater is also characterized by at least two failed peace plans.

P8 High affinities increase the probability of protracted interstate ethnic conflict;

P9 High affinities increase the probability of prolonged and escalated tensions.

Supported. For reasons cited above affinities were a key factor in ensuring that the conflict would be lengthy. Affinities appear to have enhanced, Serb perceptions of insecurity. In response, Bosnian and Croatian secessionism was characterized by violent and repeated, counter-

efforts of retrieval by the Serb regime and internal disruption created by Serb minority leaders. Serb leadership had to convince Serb opposition (including hard-liners) that Serbia's actions were sufficient enough to protect Serb interests elsewhere.

General Hypothesis 3: Interstate interactions leading to the use of force are a function of the types of states involved such that:

P10 Type Ia low constraint - ethnically dominant states have a high preference for the use of force.

Supported. The decision to use force was one that had low-cost implications for the Serb regime. Internal opposition against force was countered through the manipulation of group symbols and repression, while international condemnation was nullified by two processes, circumvention of embargoes and constant control of Serb minority leaders. When, international pressures did appear to have some effect, the Serb regime reined in the Serb minority leaders. Serb leaders were especially effective in building on hypernationalist claims by convincing the Serb population that Serbs could only be safe if the state was provided with the capability to attack and defeat its rival states in which Serbs were a minority. The final logical step in this process was the acting out of an aggressive campaign against Croatia and Bosnia. That this process was elite led can be determined by examining the views of Serbs before and after the war. Evidence is available (Grdesic 1991:111) that there were some gaps between public and elite

opinion (for both Croatia and Serbia) prior to the war but this gap closed as the war continued on.

P11 Type Ib unconstrained - diverse states have a low preference for the use of force

if:

cleavages are high or;

affinities are high or;

the duration of the regime is five years or longer.

Inconclusive. The evidence in this case rests on the assumption that Croatia was, at first, reluctant to become involved in Slovenia's secessionist struggle and the apparent willingness to pursue internationally negotiated settlements. As before, once internal opposition to Tudjman had been reduced then, it became possible to use force. It is also significant that Croatia's democratic system fell to increasingly greater authoritarian measures as the conflict in Croatia wore on. This process may show that newly democratized regimes faced with high levels of internal cleavage will become increasingly centralized when confronted with an external threat.

### ***5.3 Conclusions***

In conclusion, six of the eight of the propositions find support. One is partially supported and one is inconclusive. The general evidence points to three general conclusions.

First, it appears that leaders whose states are ethnically dominant and institutionally underdeveloped face a different set of opportunities in pursuing foreign policy objectives than their more constrained and diverse counterparts. The international policies implemented in this

conflict, designed to deter these states, may be less effective than presumed. In these situations, elites may become adept at manipulating mass opinion in order to bring it in line with their own foreign policy objectives. More specifically, sanctions and international condemnation may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for the management of conflicts involving low constraint ethnically dominant states. This does not necessarily mean that force is the only alternative to preventing such states from escalating a conflict. There is also the failure by many outside states to comply with the sanctions on Serbia and Croatia as an important element in continuing the conflict.

Would forceful intervention have resulted in a shorter, less intense conflict? The implications of the model are that it would have. On the other hand, knowing that such states will behave in this way provides a basis for anticipating and identifying other potentially belligerent states.

A second conclusion is that ethnically divided states attempting to make the simultaneous transition to a more economically open and democratic system will succumb to politics of intransigence, confrontation, hypernationalism and conflict if the political system is arranged along ethnic lines and one ethnic group is allowed to become dominant. That is, leaders of ethnically-based political parties will, over the short term, lack the capacity, to widen the policy agenda to encompass non-ethnic issues. When other bases of mobilization are weak, ethnic elites depend on direct support from their ethnic constituency and in turn elites seek to control and influence these groups. Related to this, is the experience of the ethnic groups at peaceful cohabitation. Judging from the evidence in all of the cases, past bloodshed does appear to shape group perceptions of insecurity. History is more than just background to an event, it provides

the building blocks for ethnic leaders to stake a claim to power. Myth-making and the dredging up of past events become symbols around which ethnic groups coalesce which make inter-ethnic violence appear just, honorable and legitimate. Yet at the same time it would be erroneous to assume that history is responsible for the bloodshed in Yugoslavia. As this study has tried to show, a perceived narrowing of interests around ethnically-based economic and political issues only within the past ten years resulted in the rise to power of nationalist elites who relied almost wholly on mass support. This kind of mass support is especially crucial when inter-elite competition is extensive, as it was between Yugoslavian reform minded liberals and nationalist conservatives. As Tsebelis has shown, short-term discrepancies between elite behaviour and mass aspirations are not infrequent, however "such a discrepancy cannot exist for a long time, especially if issues are considered important. Elites have to explain their behaviour and persuade the masses or they will be replaced by more competitive rivals" (Tsebelis 1990: 163).

On the other hand, if elites are dependent on the support of more than one ethnic group they are also more likely to pursue policies focused on the mobilization of groups based on ethnic and cross-cutting identities. Elite-mass arrangements within these societies are likely to be efficient (they will attempt to improve the condition of almost all of the groups in a society and attempt to pursue the unanimous support of a society). In contrast, societies, such as Yugoslavia, in which one group becomes dominant, are more likely to be redistributive (they will seek to improve the conditions of one group in society at the expense of another).

The key problem raised by these issues is not one of preventing one ethnic group from becoming preponderant, Yugoslavia's federation carried out that task for 40 years until Tito's death. The Yugoslavia conflict focuses on a different problem, and that is in finding a way to

ensure the commitment of the other less preponderant groups to either "opt-in" (stay within the state) in order to improve the existing political arrangements or to "opt-out" peacefully. Given the right international and domestic incentives, which may or may not include democratization and more liberal trade, ethnic groups and states may be amenable to both strategies. Unfortunately, in the Yugoslavia case there were too few incentives for Slovenia and Croatia to stay in and too many for them to defect.

A third conclusion, is that, the complexity of the conflict, in which external states were divided on the issues of involvement on an immense scale, cannot be repeated without further disaster. For example, the international community was divided at the outset on the issue of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. There were also differences in the implementation of specific peace plans and on decisions to use force. These divisions were also deeply felt within the UN, the EC and NATO and in each case influenced the effectiveness of these institutions. The inability of the international community to reach consensus and frame policies on some of these basic regional security issues does not bode well for future ethnic conflict management. The potential for defection from consensus oriented multilateral agreements (including decisions to recognise secessionist movements) is now very high. There are different reasons for this, but two are worth noting. One is that the security interests of external states will vary according to each ethnic conflict. Consensus will be more difficult to obtain for this reason. For example, Greece may be reluctant to support a NATO bombing of Serb forces if it should invade Macedonia. For Holland (for example), this issue may be of less interest. This view differs, of course, from the assumption that, during the Cold War, ethnic conflicts needed to be managed, as their diffusion represented a potentially destabilizing effect on East-West relations. In this



case, there was a sense of collective responsibility to respond to regional conflicts based on the fear that such conflict will draw in the major powers or lead to regional instability. This may still be the case for some conflicts, but the absence of a "Cold War mentality" may influence and alter a state's decision's to act in harmony with others.

The second point concerns the issue of legitimacy. The inability of the international community to confront and resolve the Yugoslavian conflict suggests that there is a current crisis of authority in the international system. Yugoslavia is a crisis in which new issues of interstate relations emerged as a consequence of internal changes within states. These issues, far out-paced the international rules and norms that the international community has in its possession to manage them.

Lacking a revised over-arching framework of policies on ethnic conflict management and resolution, the potential for another "Yugoslavia" is high. These new rules or amendments must address the conduct of states external to a conflict and must be formulated on the basis of the internal changes that states are experiencing (including democratization) and must encompass questions of internal intervention and deligitimated sovereignty.

In the final chapter a revised set of conditions based on these findings and those of chapter seven are assessed. Conclusions and directions for future research are presented.

## Notes

1. For an analysis of different explanations that could account for the collapse of Yugoslavia's political system, including modernization and Marxist interpretations see Flere (1991).
2. The Globe and Mail 19 June 1993. There are exceptions. In Slovenia the principal language is Slovene and in Macedonia the principle languages are Macedonian and Albanian.
3. The official government estimate until 1990 was 1,700,000 with the bulk of those being Serbian. More recent estimates suggest a figure of 1,000,000 war casualties and indicate that much of the deaths were the result of German military operations, a typhus epidemic and Chetnik-Ustase campaigns. See Ramet (1992a: 255)
4. The major exception being the exodus of Italian and German minorities after World War II from different regions in Yugoslavia (Flere 1992).
5. Albanians comprise 20% of Serbia's population while Hungarians the remaining 4%. The decline in Serbs in Kosovo is due to the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo-regarded as the birthplace of Serbian nationhood and statehood - a predominately Albanian populated area. Percentages of the dominant ethnic groups within the other states are as follows: Croatia - Croats 77%, Serbs 12%; Bosnia and Hercegovina - Slav Muslims 44%; Serbs 31%, Croats 17%; Slovenia - Slovenian 90%; Montenegro - Montenegrin 68%, Muslims 13%, Albanian 6%; Macedonia - 60%, Albanians 18%, Turks 4%. (Source: The Globe and Mail "Yugoslavia: the roots of the conflict" March 7, 1992).
6. The Globe and Mail 11 December 1990.
7. The 860,000 strong Territorial Defence Force was designed to counter outside attack and would be joined by the 200,000 strong regular armed forces. As Slovenia and Croatia prepared to secede, the Serb-dominated army handed out heavy weapons, including artillery to Serb irregulars. Though the United Nations imposed an arms embargo imposed in 1991 the number of weapons showed no sign of drying up. Major external suppliers of arms included Germany (arms manufactured in both East and West Germany); and many weapons from the US (from a 1951-57 aid program), Czechoslovakia (pistols), and Russia (tanks) (The Globe and Mail (14 July 1992).
8. Croatia had already adopted a new constitution in 1990, one in which Croatia was referred to as the sovereign state of the Croats and other nations living in Croatia but not explicitly recognizing the Serbian community (Cohen 1992).
9. Various countries initially rejected the new republics' declaration of independence including

the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Romania, Poland and Hungary.

10. Both the EC and the US issued statements on June 25 1991 stating that they would not recognize the republics if they should vote for secession (The New York Times June 25, 1991). When the external allies of Slovenia, Croatia as well as Macedonia and Bosnia which later declared independence threatened intervention then the crisis became fully internationalized. Only then were the internal disruptions sufficient enough to threaten regional instability. Hungary for example placed its air force on alert during the Croatian war; Arms shipments quickly flowed from Germany to Slovenia and Croatia; Albania responded by placing its armies on a state of alert and declared full support for the creation of an independent Kosovo. Bulgaria issued a statement to the effect that the Bulgarian army would not threaten Yugoslav security but would recognize an independent Macedonian state (Ramet 1992a: 267).

11. At this time Slovenia had yet to gain recognition as an independent state. In November 1992 Germany and Austria were the first external actors to recognize Slovenia. The Globe and Mail 11 November 1992.

12. United States halted trade with all six Republics under a generalized system of preferences. Sanctions imposed by the European Community applied only to Serbia and its ally Montenegro (The Globe and Mail 7 December 1991). None of these sanctions prevented the illegal shipment of arms. For example a Canadian, Anton Kikas, a Croatian by birth, was captured by the JNA. on September 1 1991. His chartered aircraft was found to be carrying 18 tonnes of Singapore made SAR-80 rifles. Both Greece and Albania began to consider mobilizing their troops along their borders at this time. The fear was that Belgrade would next turn to mass expulsions of Albanians from the province of Kosovo. Bitter disputes with Athens over the independence sought by the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia also created a heightened sense of tensions. (The Globe and Mail 21 June 1992; 12 December 1992).

13. The Economist 5-11 June 1993.

14. In early December 1991 Yugoslavia's President Mesic formally abandoned his post declaring "I have fulfilled my duty, Yugoslavia no longer exists" (Cohen 1992: 374). The United States recognized in April, the independence of Croatia and Slovenia along with that of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15. Macedonians had already voted for a looser association with Yugoslavia.

16. The Globe and Mail 26 August 1991.

17. NATO eventually altered its constitution so that they could provide military assistance to nonmilitary multilateral organizations (leading to the July 1992 deployment of naval forces in the Adriatic Sea to assist in sanctions against Serbia.

18. The Globe and Mail 24 September 1991.
19. In August 1992, Lord Carrington was replaced by Lord Owen as the European Community envoy for peace talks established in Geneva.
20. The Globe and Mail 18 September 1991.
21. The Economist 5 October 1991.
22. The Globe and Mail 24 September 1991.
23. The EC, which was still attempting to manage the crisis, insisted that no peacekeeping troops would be set until a permanent cease-fire was in place. There had been discussion of sending a European peacekeeping force composed of the Western European Union (a group of nine nations belonging to NATO and the EC. Constitutionally Germany would not have been allowed to participate in a military activity outside its borders. and the plan fell through (The Globe and Mail 18 September 1991).
24. For their part, Serb and JNA leaders faced the twin prospects of UN condemnation and European support for Zagreb. When the cease-fire took effect between 6 and 10 thousand people had died. At least 900 people were killed in the battle for Vukovar. (The Economist 14 December 1991).
25. The Globe and Mail 29 January 1993.
26. The New York Times 14, 15, 18 1992.
27. The New York Times 29 February 1992.
28. Prices in May 1992 were 1,915.7% higher than in May 1991 and the inflation rate stood at 80.5% (Ramet 1992b).
29. Serbian general elections were held 21 December 1992. Amid accusations of fraud, Milosevic was returned to power, defeating his chief opponent, Prime Minister Milan Panic a transplanted California millionaire, by a margin of 57% to 33% (The Globe and Mail 22 December 1992).
30. In August 1992, the UN formally expelled rump Yugoslavia from the General Assembly (Cohen 1992).
31. Leader of the Croatian Serbs, Milan Babac was later assassinated and replaced by a more compliant Goran Hadzic.
32. Admittedly, the larger Yugoslav crisis was first a civil-war containing within it smaller civil-wars. At crisis onset, neither the UN nor the EC had policies specific to the case of intervention in civil-war. Once Slovenia and Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina became de

facto independent states (holding elections and garnering international recognition) intervention then became an issue of resolving an inter-state crisis (including the attendant war-time atrocities and refugee problem).

33. Tudjman's governing Croatian Democratic Union won 57% of the vote of the 120 seat parliament. 3.5 million Croats in and outside of Croatia were eligible to vote. (The Globe and Mail 4, August 1992).

34. Beginning in August of 1991 Croatian guerilla groups began committing atrocities against Croatian Serbs. These groups, unlike the Serbian ones, were not allied to the ruling party and sought to remove Tudjman from power. On balance the volume of atrocities was significantly less than Serbian ones. Serbian abuses included "physical maltreatment and "egregious abuses against civilians and medical personnel" in battle. The Yugoslav army was accused of attacking civilian targets with Serbian forces. See Helsinki Watch "Letter to Milosevic" 21 January 1992 and The Washington Post 17 January 1992.

35. The Globe and Mail 13 February 1993.

36. The Globe and Mail 29 January 1993. International response was varied. Russia declared the Croatian attacks as unacceptable while in the West, the response to the offensive was generally lukewarm (condemnation without reprisals) The Globe and Mail 29 January 1993. Rump Yugoslavia placed its army on a higher state of combat readiness but did not attack. The Globe and Mail 26 January 1993. The UN called for the withdrawal of Croatian forces and condemned the attacks on UN held territories. One western diplomat summarized the dilemma for the UN this way: "The international community has got itself in a somewhat awkward situation here. It's difficult to call this aggression because Croatia is not attacking Serbia but rather its own territory" The Globe and Mail 27 January 1993.

37. The UN considered a resolution by France that would allow the use of force and the introduction of heavy weapons. At the same time the Security Council agreed to seek the establishment of an international court to punish war criminals in the former Yugoslavia. The Globe and Mail 19 February 1993.

38. On 6 April 1992, the EC had extended diplomatic recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina. With recognition, economic sanctions and trade benefits, removed in December 1991 were reinstated.

39. The New York Times 19 April 1992.

40. Since the war started in Bosnia, fighting between Croats and Muslims had been some of fiercest, including car bombings, hostage-taking, rape and mutilation. Part of the reason for this conflict was the Muslim refusal to give up areas allotted to Croats under the Vance-Owen plan.

41. In 1971 Tito had elevated the Muslims to the status of Yugoslav "nation". In Bosnia-Herzegovina three constituent "nations" were said to coexist. Before any constitutional changes

regarding secession could be made, all three communities in Bosnia would have to agree, which they did not.

42. It is important to note that a year earlier on 18 March 1991 Croat, Serb and Bosnian-Muslim leaders met in Lisbon and had already agreed to a set of ethnically based cantons which might have turned Bosnia into the entity envisioned in the Vance-Owen plan 18 months later. Under pressure from Serb hard-liners the Bosnian leader, Itzebegovic renounced that agreement.

43. The New York Times 3 March 1992.

44. In an agreement reached 18 March 1992, Bosnian-Muslims, Serbs and Croats agreed to a plan that would transform Bosnia-Herzegovina into an independent country divided into three ethnically defined regions (The New York Times 19 March 1992). On 7 April the agreement fell through as air strikes on predominately Croatian-held territory were ordered by the JNA (The New York Times 8 April 1992). At the same time, Bosnia mobilized its Guard and reserves and President Itzebegovic (a Bosnian-Muslim) assumed command of the Guard (The New York Times 4 April 1992).

45. In reality, the Bosnian Muslims were among the most secular in the world.

46. Russian leader, Yeltsin had already made it clear that Serbia would no longer receive arms from Russia. On 27 April 1993 this decision was formally announced (Glenny 1993).

47. The Globe and Mail 28 August 1992.

48. Since his state remained internationally unrecognized Mr Karadzic was not present (The Globe and Mail 28 August 1992).

49. The Globe and Mail 30 July 1993.

50. The Globe and Mail 26 November 1992.

51. The Globe and Mail 6 December 1992. Achieving consensus among the NATO member states was painfully slow.

52. Earlier in the year the United States had rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan as being unfair to the Muslims. Under the new Clinton administration that policy was reversed. Meanwhile the UN deployed 700 (later 8000) troops to Macedonia in an effort to prevent the outbreak of hostilities there (The Globe and Mail 15 December 1992).

53. On 19 February 1993 UN Peacekeepers were given the mandate to use force if necessary to defend themselves under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. In reality the 7,500 strong force already had a wide mandate to use force if anyone impeded its troops from achieving their objectives.

54. The acceptance of the deal was conditional upon acceptance by the 81 member assembly of the self-styled breakaway Serb state. The Globe and Mail 15 January 1993.

55. As before, the Croatian leader Mate Boban and Muslim leader Itzebegovic were receptive to the idea of the plan - comprising - a cease-fire plan, a political agreement as well as a map reorganizing the former Yugoslav republic into 10 separate regions under a central government. Karadzic's willingness to sign the agreement came after only immense pressure from Milosevic. The Globe and Mail 10 January 1993.

56. The Globe and Mail 13 January 1993.

57. The International Herald Tribune 7 May 1993.

58. Attempting to shift the responsibility, Bosnian-Serb leader Karadzic accused Germany of expansionist aims. Germany which privately supported the lifting of the arms embargo was accused of being "the most responsible for pushing Yugoslavia into the chaos" The Globe and Mail 23 June 1993.

59. The weakness of the Muslim community at the negotiating table and on the battlefield was painfully apparent. For several months prior, Serb-Croat relations had warmed considerably. Karadzic constantly warned of the creation of an Islamic state in Europe. It can only be assumed that this latest plan was achieved after much war weariness on all sides. In many ways it resembles the plan agreed to prior to the outbreak of war.

60. The Globe and Mail 27 July 1993.

61. The Globe and Mail 24 August 1993.

62. Amid the meetings, Greece a member of NATO spoke up in favor of Serbia and would veto military action against them.

63. The Globe and Mail 17 August 1993.

64. The Globe and Mail 25 August 1993.

65. There is considerable debate as to whether states external to the conflict - Germany, the US, Turkey, Greece, Hungary and Albania - were crisis actors. Though in some instances the military of these states were placed on higher than normal alert, only one of the three conditions necessary for a foreign policy crisis were present in all cases - threat to values, but not finite time or probability of war. There is not enough evidence to conclude that the perceptions of these actors were imbued with a higher than normal sense of short time or probability of war.

66. It may be that these affinities were too vague to begin with. This view finds support from a Belgrade political scientist who comments, "[O]ur concept of Serbian ethnicity is linked with orthodoxy, but not with any cultural and historical totality which is much broader and which is generally accepted [elsewhere] in Europe" (Ramet 1992a: 264).

## Chapter 9

### Conclusions, Taming the Untamable?



*If we consider international relations as a whole - as a body of thought over the centuries, as a collection of research findings, as a conventional wisdom, as a set of disciplined propositions about the world and the way it works - then we find that a message is waiting for us. It is a distinctive message about behaviour in the world and ipso facto, about how to approach and analyze conflict (Banks 1986).*

### **1. Introduction - Taming the Untamable?**

Interstate ethnic conflicts, comprise only a small portion of world politics, but ones that are nevertheless not well understood. This inquiry has attempted to contribute to an understanding of these phenomena, using both case-study methods and aggregate-data testing. Although the cases used in aggregate testing and detailed study differ, in several important respects, they point to some general characteristics of interstate ethnic conflict that have a bearing on theoretical and policy-related deliberations about its resolution and management. Four cases were presented in detail, covering: four regions (South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe); states ranging from homogenous to diverse ethnic composition; and secessionist and irredentist-based conflicts extending from minor violence to full-scale war. The case-studies focused on interstate conflicts between some of the world's major religious communities, including Buddhist (Sri Lanka, Thailand), Christian (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Ethiopia), Hindu (India, Sri Lanka) and Muslim (Malaysia, Somalia, Bosnia). The aggregate data encompassed an even broader spectrum of ethnolinguistic groups and world religions. One tentative conclusion, evident from the case studies and aggregate testing, is that, interstate ethnic conflict, whether it results in a crisis that leads to war or a crisis that results in future cooperation, is not a culture-specific phenomenon. That is, state aggression cannot be wholly explained by

examining ethnic group norms about violence. Hypernationalism, "ethnic cleansing", forced assimilation, genocide and divide and rule; All these may be the root causes of the most vicious of disputes within states, but they are not sufficient conditions to ensure that a violent domestic ethnic conflict will become a violent interstate conflict.

A second conclusion, evident from this study, is that, interstate conflict with an ethnic basis may not be caused by system structure. Rather interstate ethnic strife is related to variations in the constellation of political and ethnic constraints that impinge on a leader's foreign policy choices. Ethnic cleavages and affinities also appear to shape the kinds of foreign policy choices leaders make, by presenting additional internal and external sources of state insecurity. **An implication of this conclusion is that, it may not be possible to explain all aspects of interstate ethnic strife with "laws" of international relations that assume the state is a hard-shelled, rational, unitary actor. Domestic politics is very important to the generation of interstate ethnic conflict. Indeed by understanding the link between domestic and interstate conflict, it may be possible to prevent or discourage interstate ethnic strife by addressing its sources at the domestic level and by reducing the salience of affinities and cleavages as additional sources of state insecurity.**

What might such an approach, designed to reduce, manage and discourage the overt aspects of interstate strife, look like? This concluding chapter briefly examines this question in four parts. In section two, propositions developed from the model are summarized. In section three, the results, including those, which were not anticipated, are assessed with respect to the goals of this study. In the fourth and final section, the implications of this research for interstate ethnic conflict reduction and management are presented.

## **2. The Model**

In chapter three, a model of interstate ethnic conflict was developed to respond to six questions:

- (a) What types of ethnic conflict have an interstate dimension?**
- (b) Which states become involved in ethnic strife and why?**
- (c) Under what conditions will ethnic conflict lead to interstate conflict and crisis?**
- (d) What are the factors that influence the substantive content of decision making processes in ethnic conflict foreign policy settings?**
- (e) What are the political and other characteristics of interstate ethnic conflicts and how do these influence decision makers' choices?**
- (f) Under what conditions will an interstate ethnic conflicts result in the use of force?**

To respond to these questions, propositions were derived from a model, encompassing three stages of interactions. These propositions were used as the basis for identifying the

processes that lead to interstate ethnic conflicts in both secessionist and irredentist settings. It was argued that existing perspectives that assume to explain interstate ethnic strife, fail to consider the interactions between two important domestic variables, a state's ethnic composition and its institutional makeup.

Central to this approach is the idea that the state is not a unified actor that reacts to domestic strain by projecting it into the external system. Instead, the state is regarded as constrained by both internal and external forces. More specifically, interaction effects between ethnic composition and institutional structure shape the substantive content of foreign policy choices on ethnic conflicts. It was argued that an elite will choose specific foreign policy objectives (i.e. involvement in a secessionist conflict or an irredentist claim) through structures that influence the formation of a decision maker's preferences. Decision making involves risk and sources of uncertainty that are internal to the state, referring to the constraints and opportunities presented by ethnic groups and political institutions. In fact, ethnicity is a primary component in the formation of foreign policy preferences.

Political institutions were put forward as a second set of domestic constraints. In the present context, institutional constraint focuses not only on the regime (i.e. the members of the elite who make state decisions) but also the much broader, underlying patterns of political authority and constitutional structure.

A deductively-derived model was developed on the assumed interactions between these two variables. Four ideal types, based on these interactions, were presented as different kinds of states that will respond to ethnic strife in different ways. Institutional constraints and opportunities were hypothesized to interact with ethnic composition in shaping the outcomes of

interstate conflict. Depending on the interaction effects between variables and potential domestic payoffs, elites will have more or less motivation to formulate conflictual or peaceful foreign policies towards ethnic strife. In certain situations, the elites of some states may be more inclined to use force. A General Hypothesis (1) was presented as a way of determining if differences existed among the four ideal types. General Hypothesis 1 argues that depending on the interaction effects between variables, certain elites have greater motivation to pursue involvement in secessionist or irredentist strife because of the potential domestic payoffs that such policies will garner. In other instances, the mix of domestic variables serves to inhibit these strategies and shift elite preferences.

A second pair of variables, namely, ethnic cleavage and affinity were presented as mediators that shape a state's preference for involvement in an ethnic conflict by posing as internal and external sources of state insecurity. It was argued that, both can influence an elite's preference such that additional opportunities and constraints impinge on their choices. In Hypothesis 2, conflicts in which affinities and cleavages are high were hypothesized as more likely to lead to protracted conflict and future escalation.

A third General Hypothesis (3) was developed from the previous two hypotheses, to identify which states are likely to use force for achieving their objectives. It was argued that low constraint-ethnically dominant states have the highest propensity for using force, while high constraint-ethnically diverse states were argued to have the least propensity for using force.

The model has three stages of interactions. At Stage 1, four ideal types of states result from the interactive effects of the independent variables, each with different preference structures for involvement in ethnic strife. At Stage 2, for a foreign policy to lead to interstate conflict and

crisis, two additional variables must be included, namely affinity and cleavage. These two variables represent a security dilemma for states, because elites will face the decision on how to address them if they pose a problem for their own internal political situation or how to act on them if they are pressured by extremists to do so. For those states facing high domestic costs because of institutional constraints and ethnic diversity, the use of force is the least attractive choice in finding a solution to the dilemma because it would most probably have domestic repercussions and exacerbate that state's security dilemma. When cleavages and affinities are high, then protracted conflict and crisis escalation are more likely because the elites of both states are more likely to choose to initiate a conflict in an attempt to address their perceived security weaknesses. At Stage 3, interactions between states involving the use of force suggest that low-constraint ethnically dominant states (Type Ia) have a higher preference for force than do high constraint ethnically diverse states (Type IIb) because of low domestic costs. Types Ib and IIa fit between these two extremes. Subsequent aggregate testing of Stage 3 interactions, found that an aggressive state (ie Ia) is one that is willing to use force to expand its influence. A state primarily interested in defending its own security (IIb) is not necessarily an aggressor. The idea is controversial because, as the Indo-Sri Lanka case shows, it is often difficult to identify the aggressor state. In this instance, neither state, according to the model would be labelled as aggressive, because both were primarily defending their own security. On the other hand, as the Ethiopia-Somalia case shows, the aggressor is more clear-cut. Still in other cases the blame is diffuse (Yugoslavia) because most participants (Serbia, Croatia) were aggressive.

The model can also account for incremental changes of a state's foreign policy because of changes in institutional structure and composition, as well as changes in relations between

states because of changes in cleavages and affinities. The dynamic aspects of the model were most apparent in chapter five that examined changes in Ethiopian and Somali institutional constraints in accounting for changes in belligerent behaviour.

The biggest difference between this approach and other game theoretic models is the manner in which this approach takes into account the domestic alternatives available to an elite and the addition of cost-related concepts, such as security, at the international level. This "unbundling" process is similar to the concept of two-level games used to describe processes of international negotiation.

In general the interactions of the variables showed:

**The paradox that institutional arrangements in combination with multiethnic constituencies may weaken a state's international position while strengthening decision makers at home;**

**The potential reverberations that transnational ethnic affinities, cleavage and outbidding have within the domestic arena;**

**The opportunities that high levels of cleavage and affinity provide for intervening states, beyond the constraints they impose on states;**

**The propensity for high levels of cleavage and affinity to result in protracted interstate conflict and future crisis escalation;**

**The divergence of interests between institutionally constrained elites and institutionally unconstrained elites in diverse and dominant settings;**

**The propensity for doubly constrained elites to be more cautious in their confrontations with other states.**

**Differentiation among types of interstate ethnic conflict involving the use of force.**

In its basic form, presenting interactions between composition and institutional constraint only, the model is useful for determining states that are likely to pursue conflictual and peaceful foreign policies when ethnicity is salient. In its more complex form, including the mediating variables, affinity and cleavage, the model is useful for identifying the conditions necessary for interstate ethnic conflict and crisis.

There are also some areas in which the model could be improved or developed for future research. First, it is possible that measuring a state's ethnic composition as an indicator of the link between elites and masses may be too indirect. Variables, that measure the direct relationship of an elite to his/her political constituency, should be developed. For example, sometimes, elites represent a dominant ethnic group, but that group is highly divided between two and more constituencies. In turn, this relationship will affect the way the political process is played out, especially if institutional constraints are high and ethnicity is the basis for political mobilization.

A second area that should be addressed, is the way in which the interactions between elite



and mass preferences are measured. For example, in some societies, crosscutting cleavages are an important way of counteracting the effects of internal cleavage. In these societies, ethnicity may be less of a basis for political mobilization and therefore, ethnically-based foreign policy formation may be less likely. It might be possible to measure, through surveys for example, differences between elite and mass preferences to find out if there is a convergence on certain foreign policy issues.

Third, the variables affinity and cleavage appear to have important explanatory power in their own right. Testing could be devised that measures, for example, the impact these variables have on the propensity of violent interstate ethnic conflict. That is, studies could treat these variables as structural conditions, which influence a states security dilemma and determine whether states behave differently based on the presences of affinities and cleavages alone.

A fourth area of study continues where this model is incomplete, learning about the impact that ethnic conflicts have on the system. This study has focussed mainly on the impact that certain variables have on interstate ethnic conflicts. Treating ethnic conflict as the independent variable, to measure, for example, differences in interstate violence, severity and impact will most likely yield interesting results. Comparing the cases selected for this study with non-ethnic crises would also provide additional insights regarding basic differences between types of interstate ethnic conflict and non-ethnic conflicts.

Fifth, the model should make more explicit, the role of external actors in resolving or escalating a conflict. There are two reasons for this. First, this study has focused mainly on dyads, yet many cases involve multiple actors, including the superpowers and the United Nations. It is important to understand the behaviour of these actors as important elements in the

promulgation and resolution of ethnic conflict. It is also important to know how and why geographically distant states provide support for an ethnic conflict. This study has focused primarily on why the main antagonists become involved, but not the levels of support expected from extra-regional actors.

Finally, efforts should be made to continue aggregate data testing of interstate ethnic conflicts using a crisis-based approach. There are several reasons for this, but the primary reason is the breadth and depth of the data. By extending the range of interstate conflicts to include those that do not result in war, crisis-based data provides additional insights into state interactions that lead to the use of force. Since it is possible that interstate ethnic conflict will increase in the future, by virtue of the increasing number of weak states in the system, it is vital that identification be made of those conflicts that are most likely to result in war. This is especially important because many potential cases include states that possess nuclear weapons.

### ***3. The Findings***

Chapters four and five served two purposes. The first was to assess the usefulness of the four variables, and their linkages, in explaining an interstate ethnic conflict in secessionist and irredentist settings. That is, they served to operationalize the explanatory variables as a way of setting the stage for aggregate testing. Chapters four and five also set out to test the three General Hypotheses using the crisis-based interactions of those states involved in secessionist and irredentist conflicts. The results from case study research were generally supportive of the three hypotheses and the propositions developed from them.

For example, in chapter four, India's involvement in Sri Lanka's internal conflict was

examined. It was found that India, an ethnically diverse and institutionally constrained state, did not use force directly against the Sri Lankan regime but it was used against the Tamil rebels. There is evidence to suggest that India was constrained in using force against the state of Sri Lanka, but it did everything short of that in trying to achieve its domestic and international objectives, including imposing a solution of regional autonomy on the Sri Lankan government. **India's elites could not allow Sri Lankan aggression against Tamil civilians in the north to go unchecked because it was having an impact on politics in South India.** Hence the solution of sending "peacekeeping" troops to Sri Lanka was a compromise that would appease both the Sri Lankan government and South Indian Tamils.

Judging from the behaviour of India and Sri Lanka, institutionally constrained, ethnically diverse states do appear to explore other avenues of conflict management, including mediation. **When outbidding is present, then confrontation seems more likely.** Less conclusive is whether these states are likely to use force. Force is a choice of last resort when outbidding, cleavages and the potential for diffusion are very high. This does not mean, however, that force will necessarily lead to a resolution of the conflict especially if there are multiple interests to be satisfied.

A second conclusion, from this chapter, is that states that have an ethnic link to the conflict make poor peacekeepers. For these states, **servicing two masters - the domestic and the international - can result in policies that may be optimal at the domestic level but sub-optimal at the interstate level.** Foreign policy objectives are likely to work against one another, **interventionist strategies are likely to be constrained by domestic considerations, and objectivity will be difficult to maintain.** In attempting to satisfy multiple interests, India's

peacekeeping effort ultimately proved to be unsuccessful.

Chapters four and five also underline the importance of understanding the interactions between states as they undergo internal political and ethnic changes. For example, as cleavages within Sri Lanka increased the potential for conflict escalation and protracted interstate conflict also increased. In chapter five, the Somali case provided an opportunity to examine an ethnically dominant state in which constraints were initially high but then became low because of a military coup. Less conclusive evidence was found regarding the role of institutional constraints in ethnically dominant states. By themselves, they did not appear to have the complete effect assumed. Judging from Somali behaviour, **institutionally constrained-dominant states will formulate belligerent foreign policies and will do so much earlier compared to high constraint-diverse states. Within these states, elites appear to show greater solidarity on foreign policy issues, including decisions to use force.** On the other hand, as in the Indo-Sri Lankan conflict, high levels of cleavage and affinity did have an appreciable impact on protractedness and future escalation.

The evidence also suggests that low constraint states will pursue belligerent policies. In tracing the interactions between Somalia and Ethiopia from Somali independence onwards, it was found that Somalia's institutional changes were associated with changes in its decisions to use force. For example, the period in which both Ethiopia and Somalia were under the control of military regimes was also characterized by interstate war.

It was also found that Somalia's internal disintegration greatly affected its capacity to implement its foreign policy objectives. When specific clans were united on internal political matters and also issues of foreign policy, Somalia was a formidable state. Faced with the

prospects of failure in achieving its goal of a "greater Somalia" the various Somali clans appear to have turned inward and upon themselves. A direct legacy of the war of 1977 is Somalia's current internal crisis in which the north is attempting to secede from the south.

Another aspect of this case study, which emerges in the latter two cases as well (it could also be argued that the India-Sri Lanka case has irredentist overtones) is that, initially at least, constrained elites will choose to support insurgency movements rather than direct state to state confrontation. That is, **support for a secessionist movement has lower cost implications than irredenta for certain states.** There are two reasons for this. First, unlike the findings of Heraclides (1991) which argued that affective links will generally lead to low levels of support, this does not appear to be the case judging from the evidence found in this study. Affective linkages can result in more than diplomatic (eg. military) support for a secessionist movement when cleavages are high. Both the leaders of the secessionist movements and the supporting states will use these links to advance their own interests. A crucial point comes when, the leaders of secessionist insurgencies no longer rely exclusively on external state support. In those cases a secessionist struggle becomes viable and self-sustaining and the irredentist goal a secondary consideration.

A second reason, relates to the way in which **the international system provides incentives for external states to support secessionist movements over irredentist strategies.** The former can be framed in "anti-colonial struggles of liberation and self-determination" a strategy that finds legitimacy within, for example, the Charters of the UN and the OAU.

There are two areas in which further research is required, based on the evidence found in these case studies. The first is **assessing the shifting pattern of payoffs to elites in**

interactive settings. This could be more fully exploited by examining the interactions between states using more explicit game theoretic assumptions of behaviour. The key point is that interactions between states are dynamic and multifaceted. The assumptions of the model indicate that there is room to move away from static-based approaches. The second refers not only to the above cases, but the last two cases and statistical testing as well. Variables should be incorporated that measure the impact of regime change (especially from low to high) on the propensity for confrontational behaviour. It has long been assumed that democratic states are less belligerent, depending on whom they fight. Less known is the change in behaviour that results from sudden institutional change. The evidence from this thesis indicates that new regimes are less likely to be able to cope with cleavages and affinities and the potential for interstate conflict is high.

Chapter six set out to test statistically the hypothesis developed in chapter three. Specific variables measuring different aspects of institutional constraint were assessed together with a variable measuring ethnic composition on 344 secessionist and irredentist interstate ethnic conflicts for the period, 1918-1988. Of the three institutional constraint variables, it is notable that the two moderately correlated variables, executive constraint and executive regulation, most closely approximated the assumptions of the model with greater deviations found for the variable participation regulation.

General Hypothesis 1, relating to the rank ordering of foreign policy preferences, found only partial support, though the relationship was in the anticipated direction. The hypothesis was tested on only one dependent variable, the willingness of a state to risk prolonging or escalating tensions. It was found that there were differences among types of states on this variable. Diverse

and constrained states are more risk averse to the extent that they are involved in conflicts leading to interstate ethnic conflict reduction more often than other types of states. Measurement on other variables, may produce more favorable results. One point worth noting, is that, different types of states may shift their preferences when confronted with different strategies and different kinds of states. **High constraint states may interact differently together than in mixed dyads. Conflict reduction may be even more likely when diverse high constraint states interact.** A possible change in statistical testing using ICB data would entail examining interactions between the state that is the source of threat (coding on all dimensions for it as well) and the crisis actor. This is not an unsurmountable task and will be the focus of future research. Support for this approach is evident when comparing interactions between India and Sri Lanka and Somalia and Ethiopia. In the former case, repeated attempts to prevent the conflict from escalating were explored prior to crisis onset. On the other hand Somalia, despite its high constraints, pursued confrontation at the outset, in part because of the perceived poor treatment that Ogaden Somalis were receiving under the low-constraint Selassie regime.

General Hypotheses 2, relating to the impact that high ethnic cleavage and affinity have on protracted conflict and conflict reduction, found the strongest support. In general, the variables ethnic cleavage and ethnic affinity influence foreign policy preferences such that they are necessary for an interstate ethnic conflict and crisis. **High levels of both provide additional constraints and opportunities so that protracted conflict is more likely. Elites are likely to perceive higher levels of insecurity and may choose to act on them consequently. Tension reduction is also less probable.** The variables were tested on the entire population of interstate

ethnic crises and then by type of conflict (secessionist and irredentist). The evidence suggests that when cleavages and affinity are high, there is a greater probability that the preferences of all states will be shifted leading to increases in protracted conflict and tension.

General Hypothesis 3 argued that certain states have greater proclivity for belligerence than others. Low constraint, dominant states were expected to have a high preference for using force and this appears to be the case. Less clear is the other extreme. The statistical evidence shows that high constraint ethnically diverse states are as belligerent, if not more, than any other kind of state in war and non-war situations. Power-status had only a minimal impact on the relationship. Additional constraints such as internal cleavage and affinities did however, push these states further to seek out non-forceful solutions. There are several reasons why internal cleavages and affinities will further constrain a multi-ethnic state.

First, ethnic cleavage and ethnic affinities are highly visible characteristics, which make these states very vulnerable to exploitation. Second, aware that they are vulnerable, the leaders of these states might make every effort to ensure that they are not the victims of exploitation. High internal cleavages can enhance the potential for exploitation as can high affinities. Therefore, these states would be expected to not pursue violent provocative measures in their relations with other states. Third, high internal cleavages, would be expected to greatly affect a state's ability to project power. Consider the example of Ethiopia. In constant turmoil from the outset, and aware of its vulnerability, its leaders sought out a peaceful solution to its border dispute with Somalia.

In sum, high internal cleavages and affinities present additional costs to leaders of high constraint states. Leaders of highly diverse states have even and additional cost imposed on



them. High ethnic affinities also tend to decrease the overall potential for ethnically diverse states to use force. The results indicate that, high constraint, ethnically diverse states are less likely to use force when cleavages and affinities are high. However these states still appear to use force more often than their low constraint counterparts under both conditions.

**In essence, additional conditions were found to reduce the probability that elites of institutionally constrained ethnically diverse states will use force.** Affinities and cleavage appear to mediate the relationship so that the use of force becomes less attractive for some states. The probability that an ethnically diverse and constrained state will resort to force is reduced, if it has domestic implications.

Ethnically diverse constrained states must also shape their strategies in response to the strategies of other states. Conflicts that escalate to war will, for example, influence the strategies of a constrained state. When faced with the decision to use force against a state with fewer visible political costs (eg. an ethnically dominant and low constraint state) that decision will depend on the strategy of the state with fewer visible political costs. The latter has substantially more leeway in deciding what to do. Elites in unconstrained situations are in a better "bargaining" position with those whose power is dispersed. There are three reasons for this. **First, they are less prone to involuntary defection because their low constraint ethnic homogeneity allows them to control domestic political outcomes.**

Second, a belligerent ethnic foreign policy has fewer domestic ramifications for elite-mass interactions. Among other things, the leaders of these states do not have to worry about re-election. Third, if in a cooperative situation, low constraint ethnically dominant states might be more tempted to "voluntarily" defect because of the low political costs. In brief, the decision to

resort to force is contingent on how cooperative the state with fewer costs is.

If the state with fewer visible costs uses force, then a high constraint, ethnically diverse state would also be expected to use force to avoid further exploitation. In contrast, interactions involving two high constraint ethnically diverse states should be more peaceful. The fear of exploitation by both sides should push these states towards cooperation. Knowing that both are vulnerable, they would seek out various agreements to avoid direct violent confrontation.

In sum, testing found that additional conditions were necessary for such states to reduce conflict. First, high cleavages and affinities were associated with a reduction in the use of force. A second condition, identified in testing was "room for cooperation" an interactive process. This assumption also found support in chapters four and seven. Neither of the conflicts resulted in war, because the more vulnerable state always sought out cooperative measures.

If cooperation is not reciprocated then there is a greater chance that the conflict will escalate to war and it may even be initiated by the more vulnerable state. Thus, in non-war conflicts the initial predictions of the model were found to be accurate; ethnically diverse high-constraint states do use force less than the others. **It is argued that the use of force by ethnically diverse and constrained states, is contingent on the strategy of the other state.** So for example, if state A (a diverse-constrained state) provides support for a secessionist movement in state B, whether or not state A uses force to achieve this goal will depend on how state B responds and this response is in turn dependent on its internal characteristics. Of course if force is not used these states will usually find alternative means of achieving their foreign policy objectives. In the Thai Malay case, for example, Malaysia eventually dropped its support

for the minority group in Thailand because of reciprocal cooperation from Thailand.

A third condition is "regime duration". Judging from the spatial and temporal characteristics of interstate ethnic conflict, **new regimes, especially in multi-ethnic states, may be more susceptible to involvement.** This finding was supported by statistical evidence suggesting that for the regimes of diverse states, of five years or shorter duration, there is a higher probability of involvement in an ethnic conflict.

On the other hand, identifying the conditions necessary to prevent belligerent behaviour of low constraint and dominant states is somewhat more difficult. Recall that these states face fewer internal costs. Their behaviour is more likely to approximate realist accounts of state behaviour. High cleavages and affinity have less of an impact on their behaviour. Tests that compare the behaviour of these states in chapters seven and eight proved illuminating.

For example, in chapter seven, the evidence from the Thailand-Malaysia case study indicated that potential interstate ethnic conflict can be moderated through shared regional security issues. In essence, this second kind of interaction **reduces the salience of ethnic conflict** for both parties by providing an alternative (global and regional) perspective through which to view state security. High levels of affinities and cleavages will be less debilitating for ethnically diverse states, if these constraints are counterbalanced by efforts at cooperation in other areas. In this case, **alliances and cooperative agreements can reduce tensions between states involved in interstate ethnic conflict when the source of the second threat is perceived as genuine.**

Judging from Thailand's behaviour, it appears that even less constrained states can be induced to cooperate when they are internally vulnerable. It is conceivable that had the Thai

Malay ethnic conflict been the salient security issue, conflict between Thailand and Malaysia would have been much greater in scope and intensity.

Evidence from this case study and the two previous cases, indicate that, regimes themselves play only an indirect role in restraining state adventurism. Rather, it is the salience of the second threat that is central. If perceived as genuine, both sides, sensing vulnerability, will seek out cooperation. For example, both previous cases involved states that interacted in a formal cooperative security regime (SAARC, OAU) but neither was successful in preventing the outbreak of interstate ethnic crisis (and war). The difference here is that cooperation emerged out of a second threat that was commonly shared and potentially debilitating to both antagonists (communism in Southeast Asia, Vietnamese expansion). This was clearly not true for Sri Lanka and Ethiopia. For Sri Lanka and Ethiopia, their ethnic conflicts defined and shaped their perceptions of India and Somalia as their chief external antagonists.

As for the model, voluntary defection by one or both states can be reduced when there is mutual vulnerability. Involuntary defection, a problem for constrained, diverse states, can be reduced if the elites of these states perceive that it is in their long term interests to cooperate. For example, Kelantan represented Malaysia's potential for involuntary defection. Kelantan's support for the Thai Malay could have meant that Malaysia would renege on its reciprocal agreements with Thailand. Pressure (and possibly incentives) applied on Kelantan leaders eventually resulted in the their tacit withdrawal from the issue.

In brief, there are three implications that can be culled from the Thai Malay case. **First, it appears that a durable form of cooperation can be maintained even after the original threat has dissipated.** Efforts to reduce defection among states seeking to support ethnic groups

in other states can be successful under specific circumstances. In this case, an alliance structure, based on a shared threat, between the two states, served to enhance the attractiveness of cooperation. Since ethnically diverse constrained states are already oriented towards finding cooperative solutions, the key issue is, therefore, in finding ways in which to restrain less diverse or institutionally unconstrained states. One way, as suggested in this thesis, is to **pursue internal change towards diversity and institutional constraint.**

This study also indicates that external mechanisms, possibly alliances, may assist in reducing conflict among states even when the chief threat is internal. **Related to this point is differentiating between the security threats of the regime and the general population. The two do not always share the same security concerns; occasionally, the population does constitute the main internal threat to a regime.** The key point is to focus on issues of security that are shared by elites and masses within states as well as between states. Shared security concerns may be the best way to prevent interstate ethnic conflict. To date, there are few security issues that engender this kind of sharing between masses and elites, although environmental problems and economic development are often cited as sources of inter and intrastate cooperation. Working with this kind of cooperation is the important international monitoring of human rights abuses that may help push elites further in this direction (Cooper & Berdal 1993; International Alert 1993).

A second conclusion from this case study is that, the elites of minority groups faced with interstate cooperation will, therefore, be forced to pursue alternative strategies, strategies that will undoubtedly involve an escalation in violence. The evidence for this conclusion are the three phases of strategy and leadership change adopted by the Thai Malay. The first phase was

irredentist and political in nature. Regional actors played an important role in perpetuating the conflict. That strategy succumbed to cooperative agreements between the two states. In the second phase new, more radical leaders pursued secessionist, and often violent activities. These leaders looked further abroad for support. Conservative Arab states were the primary sources of external support at this stage. Initially that strategy was unsuccessful, but gains were eventually made on several fronts. Thai Malay leaders did obtain a greater degree of economic and political independence. In the third phase, yet to be concluded, a new set of leaders emerged, seeking increased religious autonomy for all Thai Muslims. **The importance of transnational ethnic affinities in this process is fundamental. They can be used beneficially** (for example, Saudi Arabia provided economic support for the Thai Malay, once Thailand dropped its assimilationist policies) and they can be sources of insecurity (Iran's alleged involvement in the violence). The key issue is to provide incentives that reduce the salience of the latter while promoting the former.

Related to this (and also found in the Yugoslavian conflict) is the **importance of extra-regional actors as sources of support in a conflict.** The evidence indicates that this kind of support imposes a constraint on elites that is not easily overcome. As the Thai Malay case shows, international support is directly related to changes in the leadership pools and the strategies of minority groups. These may be evolving at a much faster pace than the coping mechanisms of the state-centre, discussed below.

Chapter eight examined the current Balkans conflict. Several conclusions were made based on the evidence found. First, **it appears that leaders whose states are ethnically dominant and undergoing institutional transition face a different set of opportunities in**

pursuing foreign policy objectives than their more constrained and diverse counterparts. The international policies implemented in this conflict, designed to deter these states, may be less effective than presumed. The key issue, as in the Thailand-Malaysia case, is finding incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation that do not lead to the involvement of extra-regional actors. More specifically, sanctions, mediation and international condemnation may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for the management of conflicts involving low constraint ethnically dominant states.

A second conclusion is that ethnically divided states attempting to make the simultaneous transition to more economically open and democratic systems will succumb to the politics of intransigence, confrontation and conflict if the political system is arranged along ethnic lines and one ethnic group is allowed to become dominant. That is, leaders of ethnically-based political parties will, over the short term, lack the capacity, to widen the policy agenda to encompass non-ethnic issues. When other bases of mobilization are weak, ethnic elites depend on direct support from their ethnic constituency and in turn elites seek to control and influence these groups.

The key problem raised by the Balkans conflict is finding ways to ensure conflict reduction within the state rather than having secessionist minorities leave. Given the right international and domestic conditions, which may include democratization, more liberal trade and incentives for interethnic cooperation secessionist minorities may reduce their demands for autonomy. Unfortunately, in the Yugoslavia case there were too few incentives for Slovenia and Croatia to stay and too many for them to defect.

A third conclusion, is that, the complexity of the conflict, in which external states were

divided on the issues of involvement on an immense scale, cannot be repeated without further problems. For example, the international community was divided at the outset on the issue of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. There were also differences in the implementation of specific peace plans and on decisions to use force. These divisions were also deeply felt within the UN, the EC and NATO and in each case influenced the effectiveness of these institutions. **The inability of the international community to reach consensus and frame policies on some of these basic regional security issues does not bode well for future ethnic conflict management. The potential for defection from consensus-oriented multilateral agreements (including decisions to recognise secessionist movements) is now very high.** There are different reasons for this, but two are worth noting.

One is that the security interests of external states will vary according to each ethnic conflict. Consensus will be more difficult to obtain for this reason. For example, Greece may be reluctant to support a NATO bombing of Serb forces if it should invade Macedonia. For Holland (for example), this issue may be of less interest. This view differs, of course, from the assumption that, during the Cold War, ethnic conflicts needed to be managed, as their diffusion represented a potentially destabilizing effect on East-West relations. In this case, there was a sense of collective responsibility to respond to regional conflicts based on the fear that such conflict will draw in the major powers or lead to regional instability. This may still be the case for some conflicts, but the absence of a "Cold War mentality" may influence and alter a state's decision's to act in harmony with others. This suggests a paradox, in that the Cold War provided elements of order whose disappearance has altered the context within which military intervention is possible and yet perhaps less desirable from the perspective of some states. In other words,



if the potential for an ethnic conflict to become diffuse to the dominant or global system is now much lower because of the end of the Cold War, then why intervene at all?

This question relates to the issue of legitimacy, not only for individual states, which want the world to perceive them as global leaders, but also for collective international organizations. **The inability of the international community to confront and resolve the Yugoslavian conflict indicates that there is a current crisis of authority in the international system.** Yugoslavia is a case in point in which new issues of interstate relations emerged as a consequence of internal changes within states. These issues, far out paced the international rules and norms that the international community has in its possession to manage them.

**The absence of a revised overarching framework of policies on ethnic conflict management and resolution is intimately linked to changes in thinking about the nature of state sovereignty, which includes the conduct of states external to a conflict and internal changes that states are experiencing (including democratization).**

On the one hand, the passing of the Cold War, has removed the impediments to an examination of these factors. At the same time, the collapse of communism has ushered in a volatile period of political experimentation in which, over the short-term at least, domestic ethnic conflicts are likely to increase. The sudden overthrow of authoritarian regimes has been accompanied by ethnic tensions. This is as true in Africa as it is in Europe. In at least some of these cases, the potential for interstate ethnic conflict is very high (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Sudan, Angola and the Ukraine, for example).

#### *4. Conditions for Interstate Ethnic Conflict Reduction*

##### **"Putting the Fire Out Before the House Burns to the Ground"**

The overall evidence indicates that internal ethnic diversity in combination with institutional constraints is a viable choice for reducing levels of interstate ethnic conflict. Both conditions lead to mutual vulnerability among states so that the potential for belligerence is reduced. The presence of these two conditions will reduce the concentration of power among elites so that they will think twice about involvement in secessionist and irredentist strife. There are however, two problems associated with this conclusion.

First, ethnic diversity does not mean that domestic conflicts involving these states will be more easily resolved; rather conflict reduction is a more practicable goal in these societies. The key issue is finding an internal "balance of power" among ethnic groups within states (such as pre 1980 Yugoslavia) which will not promote or lead to insecurities for potentially intervening states.

The implication, is that, societies that attempt to address their diversity through redistributive policies that favor one ethnic group, while perhaps politically astute for some elites at the domestic level, stand a greater chance of becoming involved in interstate ethnic conflict, if one ethnic group becomes preponderant. All of the states examined in the case studies pursued some kind of "distributive policy" that favored one ethnic group over another, but only two of the conflicts (Ethiopia-Somalia and Yugoslavia) resulted in direct interstate violence.

**The second problem is managing political transition.** The evidence indicates that states undergoing political transition, or new states, are most susceptible to involvement. This is especially true for newly democratized states. The key issue here is to encourage alignments

based on interests other than ethnicity and reducing disparities between groups so that dissatisfaction among ethnic minorities declines. For new states, their multi-ethnic character, compounded by internal cleavage and transnational affinities may prove too overwhelming for fragile institutions to manage. When political parties are aligned along ethnic interests, ethnically diverse and institutionally constrained developing states, are prone to outbidding which can enhance the potential for interstate conflict. Occasionally, new states experience levels of domestic order that divide a state's elites thus making decision making difficult and prolonging a crisis or plunging a country into a protracted conflict with the consequence of inviting external intervention.

**A third issue relates to the "peacekeeping" mindset, which was prevalent during the cold war and has carried over into the 1990s.** The reluctance of policy-makers to move away from reactive peacekeeping and towards more preventive measures is having serious repercussions for the international community's legitimacy and effectiveness. Evidence from the Yugoslavia case has already established that, in the absence of a coherent policy on the issue of ethnic conflict management, the interests of individual states are likely to work against one another.

**Clarity of objective is fundamental.** This objective must entail three phases: preventive diplomacy in the first phase; peacekeeping and military force in the second phase; and post-conflict-resolution and management in the third phase. Too many resources have been expended on the second phase and not enough on the first and third phases. This study has attempted to address problems relating to the first phase of preventive peacekeeping, but it also has implications for the remaining two.

Taking all the evidence from this inquiry together, there are at least twenty basic mechanisms that can result in conflict reduction and resolution at the interstate level:

**1. Phase One (Before Interstate Violence Breaks Out)**

**(a) creating proliferating points of power that reduce the salience of ethnic affinities at the interstate level;**

**(b) raising the salience of cooperation based on non-ethnic or intra-ethnic conflict;**

**(c) raising the salience of the long-term implications of interstate ethnic conflict (regional disruption) over short-term (domestic) concerns;**

**(d) encouraging alignments between states based on interests other than ethnicity;**

**(e) reducing internal cleavages within states through the reduction of disparities based on international incentives (trade and aid);**

**(f) developing policies of preventive diplomacy which entails identifying the conditions necessary for the successful resolution of ethnic conflicts by focussing on issue areas that are of common interest to the adversaries;**

**(g) encouraging transition to systems in which institutional constraints are durable and which encourage mobilization on the basis of cross-cutting cleavages (this need not be equated with democratization);**

**(h) identifying those states and regions which are most susceptible to involvement in violent interstate ethnic conflict;**

**(i) developing early warning systems (such as the model here) for objective third party mediators. These systems recognize that the most propitious and cost effective time for managing ethnic differences is before violent interstate ethnic conflict breaks out;**

**(j) promoting and improving human rights monitoring systems that will reduce the salience of affinities as a basis for supporting armed minority struggle;**

**(k) improving existing international laws and regulations on sanctions for states that pursue involvement in interstate ethnic strife.**

## **2. Phase Two (After Violence Breaks Out)**

**(a) providing guidelines for the international community to follow regarding the recognition of secessionist minorities and irredentist struggles and sanction states that do not follow these guidelines;**

**(b) providing international incentives for the peaceful secession of ethnic groups based on mutual gain for the state-centre and the minority (based on the assumption that secession will result in the destruction of a state through violence);**

**(c) developing objective criteria for the international community to follow on issues of third party mediation and violent interstate ethnic conflict in both secessionist and irredentist settings;**

**(d) including all participants in the conflict in the negotiation process;**

**(e) providing an internationally organized peacekeeping force as a legitimate deterrent for the reduction of violent interstate ethnic conflict.**

### **3. Phase Three (Post-Violence)**

**(a) assuming that the conflict has not resulted in the destruction of one or more states, use resolution techniques operating outside external state interference, allow the main antagonists to arrive at solutions at their own pace;**

**(b) examining alternative bases of alignments that involve concessions by the state pursuing external involvement;**

**(c) utilizing mediating structures that focus on functional cooperation in order to promote cooperation and shared interests over time;**

**(d) making security issues salient to both elites and masses as the basis for cooperation between states.**

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