

Parti Pris?
Minority Representation in Québec Provincial Politics

by

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ABSTRACT

Are minorities well represented in the Québec provincial legislature? Looking at the 2003 and 2014 elections and their related 2001 and 2011 electoral maps, this study demonstrates that in spite of improved minority participation and representation, most minority groups face obstacles in formal provincial politics. Québec's electoral map disadvantages diverse urban areas with consequences for the total number of ridings where minorities are numerous enough to influence the outcome of the election. Ridings where the visible minority population exceeds 35% are minimally three times more likely than other ridings to have a PQ or CAQ/ADQ visible minority candidate, however, few minority PLQ/QLP candidates run in ridings with large minority populations. Parties seldom nominate minority candidates in safe ridings and minorities are less involved in left-leaning Québec nationalist parties. The representation of all visible minority groups, and increasingly Quebecers of British descent, are the most undermined by these patterns.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Recent debates have shown the experience of diversity is a contentious issue in contemporary Québec: the *Commission Bouchard-Taylor* on “Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences” and the dispute surrounding the adoption of the “Charter of Québec values” have outlined the tensions between the majority group and the inclusion of minorities in the public sphere (Maclure, 2011). While remaining a minority in the Canadian state, Quebecers of French descent have since the Quiet Revolution established their dominance over Québec’s economic and political life (Balthazar, 1995; Laczko, 1995), and they enjoy majority privileges in the province (Juteau, 2004).

Consequently, policy measures specific to Québec have been implemented to handle majority-minority relations following the priorities of Quebecers of French descent. For example, language laws require immigrants to school their offspring in French and instead of adhering to Canadian multiculturalism, Québec favours an “interculturalist” approach, which implies the majority group benefits from the inputs and inclusion of minorities, rather than being one group among others (Iacovino & Sévigny, 2011). Partly due to this political context, various minority groups, regardless of their specific origin, tend to display analogous voting patterns in Québec provincial politics (Clarke & Kornberg, 1996; Bilodeau, 2013; Pedersen, 2013).

In order for minorities to have their say in the legislative process and fully participate in the debates concerning their place in Québec society, formal political representation in the National Assembly appears essential. This is why this research aims at studying the relationship between minorities and political representation according to the following axes of investigation: given the territorial basis of Québec’s plurality electoral system, how does electoral geography impact minority participation and representation? Is there a rural/urban bias in the drawing of ridings in Québec? Are minorities underrepresented, as candidates and in the legislature?

If minorities are sufficiently concentrated in a riding, they are believed to be empowered to elect a candidate of their choosing. They do not require to form a majority of the population to do so as evidence suggests a share of only 35% is sufficient for them to substantially influence the outcome of elections, at least in the American context (Lublin, 1997). However, the drawing of ridings in Canada is thought to systematically disadvantage the representation of urban areas by diluting their voting power in overpopulated ridings (Pal & Choudhry, 2007; Forest, 2012), with subsequent impact on the representation of minority groups that are clustered in urban

environments. The replication of this phenomenon in Québec provincial politics can be expected to have significant impact on minority presence in the legislature, as fewer minority-rich ridings can mean fewer minority candidates and in the end, fewer minority representatives.

Political involvement requires time, energy and skills. The challenges experienced by immigrants are often presented as an explanation as to why minorities participate less in the political process than their share of the polity's population would indicate (Simard, 2003; Bird, 2005; Andrew et. al, 2008). But while being pervasive in Canadian literature on minorities, the conflation of immigrant and minority does not always hold true as an increasing number of minority Quebecers were born in the province. The political participation of minorities might vary according to generational status. If minorities are not showing up as candidates for provincial elections, impediments to their representation must lie elsewhere in the political process than in the electoral system. Portraying the minority status of candidates to monitor minority participation seems crucial, as much as portraying the minority status of elected representatives: if minorities are present on the ballot but are not elected, it could be imputed as much on their riding being uncompetitive as on the bias of voters.

The next chapter reviews the literature on concepts of political representation and specificities of provincial politics in Québec. The third chapter concentrates on the demographic characteristics of Québec provincial ridings for the 2001 and 2011 electoral maps, with an emphasis on the concentration of minority groups in over or under-populated ridings. The fourth chapter details the minority status of candidates to the 2003 and 2014 elections and the influence of riding demographics, while the fifth chapter explores minority candidates' electoral performances, with a focus on inter-party variations. The portrait of whom ends up being elected to the provincial legislature follows. Finally, on the basis of prior findings, the sixth chapter aims at bringing responses to the issue of minority political representation in Québec.

CHAPTER 2: ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION

In representative democracies, electors assert their preferences by voting. The prevailing electoral system then converts these votes into elected representation: the function of the electoral system is thus crucial for democracy to happen. However, no electoral system is perfect, and every one of them has its advantages and disadvantages, notably with regards to the representation of minorities (Horowitz, 2003; Bird, 2005; Forest, 2008).

The electoral system in place in Québec and the rest of Canada is inherited from British Parliamentaryism. Members of the legislature are elected in territorially-bounded ridings after they received a plurality of votes, thus the term plurality system, or first-past-the-post. This electoral system can either favour or hinder the representation of minorities depending on the constitution of electoral districts. The salience given to principles of community representation, equality of votes and other geographical factors are all intertwined to produce ridings that will enhance or dilute the political power of minority voters (Horowitz, 2003; Loewen & MacKenzie, 2013).

If minorities are sufficiently spatially concentrated, ridings can be drawn as to encapsulate what can be, on a case-by-case basis, considered a “community of interest.” This subjective assessment must take account of geographical contiguity, compactness and voting patterns to determine if the minority group is a legitimate community of interest deserving of a riding. Literature on this issue from the United States, where the electoral system is analogous to the one present in Québec and in Canada, indicates that when minorities from a group or a coalition of groups equivalent to 35% or more of the population of an electoral district, they can influence the outcome of the election substantially and can typically elect a representative of their choice (Cameron, C., Epstein, D. & O’Halloran, S., 1996; Lublin, 1997; Forest, 2012). While the Canadian guidelines concerning the drawing of electoral districts includes support for the preservation of “communities of interest”, the framing of minorities as voluntary immigrants explains why few attention has been given to minority influence ridings in Canada, as opposed to the United States (Forest, 2012), where the representation of racial minorities in legislative bodies is intrinsically related to such districts (Lublin, 1997; Forest, 2008).

The representative chosen by minority constituents can either be a member of the minority group or an individual who is not, but still caters to the needs and interests of this minority group. The first case refers to descriptive representation, where members of a legislature correspond to the demographic portrait of the population it represents. The second case, however, refers to

substantive representation, where members of a legislature support various interests according to their salience in the population it represents (Courtney, 2001a; Banducci, S. A., Donovan, T. & Karp, J. A., 2004; Forest, 2008). While the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, the measurement of descriptive representation is easier and (arguably) less subjective. Several studies have described the ethno-demographic composition of legislatures where the plurality system applies. In Canadian federal politics or in Québec municipal politics, as elsewhere in the Western world, some visible minorities and other ethnic minorities are consistently under-represented in legislative bodies relative to their share of the polity's population (Black, 2000; Tossutti & Najem, 2002; Simard, 2002; Bird, 2005; Pal & Choudhry, 2007; Andrew, Biles, Siemiatycki & Tolley, 2008; Black, 2012; Forest, 2012).

Preserving the spatial integrity of “communities of interest” is just one factor among others that can be considered when drawing riding boundaries. The principle of the equality of votes presupposes all ridings should have the same amount of electors. Voters of overpopulated ridings see the weight of their vote undermined whereas voters of underpopulated ridings see their vote carry more power. In other polities, the principle of the equality of populations applies. The logic is that as non-citizens also require the services and representation of elected officials, equal riding populations guarantee that all individuals have the same access to a member of parliament, regardless of their ability to vote (Courtney, 2001b).

In Québec as in the rest of Canada, persisting patterns of unequal population across ridings have been present over time, under the form of a rural advantage over urban areas (Pal & Choudhry, 2007; Loewen & MacKenzie, 2013). This situation is not without consequences for the political power of minorities. In Canadian federal politics, for example, visible minorities, whom live for the most part in urban areas, are more likely to inhabit overpopulated ridings. On the other hand, Aboriginals, whom are concentrated in northern and sparsely populated areas, tend to live in underpopulated ridings (Forest, 2012).

Finally, geography and prevailing administrative boundaries also impact the drawing of ridings and the persistence of population imbalances. Members of the legislature typically visit their constituents in the course of their job. Sparsely populated northern ridings and isolated areas must therefore be of a practical size for this task. Also, existing administrative boundaries relate to communities of interest dealing with their member of the legislature, such as administrative regions, regional county municipalities (RCMs) or municipalities whom can press for keeping

their riding in existence in spite of its inadequate population. Combined with members of the legislature desiring to retain their jobs, ridings tend to be persistent through time. Consequently, the redistribution process, where new ridings are drawn, is usually associated with an increase in the number of seats in the legislature (Courtney, 2001a).

The previous issues of representation common to most democracies with a plurality electoral system is intertwined with the specificities of Quebec provincial politics. The divisive debate on the national future of Québec continues to define election outcomes and patterns of political involvement. Due to a purported tension between minorities and the Québec nationalist movement, most minority groups are shown to massively support parties in favour of Canadian unity. This explains why ridings composed of substantial minority populations tend to systematically support the Parti libéral du Québec/Quebec Liberal Party (Clarke & Kornberg, 1996; Bilodeau, 2013; Pedersen, 2013).

Other factors affect participation in provincial politics. Challenged minorities, especially immigrants, tend to participate in greater number in proximity politics, at the municipal level, for example. As provincial or federal politics require energy, time and a grasp of the subtleties of the political context, involvement of recent minorities whom came with immigration can be expected to be lower (Simard 2003, Andrew et. al, 2008). Specific minority communities have specific interests and therefore approach politics differently: not all minority groups participate in formal politics the same way (Bird, 2005).

In short, the plurality electoral system in place in Québec has several implications for the representation of minorities. Spatially concentrated minorities can be empowered to elect a representative of their choosing if they are grouped within a riding. The measurement of descriptive representation within a legislative body is the easiest way to monitor minority representation and population equality across ridings is an imperative that is challenged by areal and isolation constraints, current administrative boundaries and the hardships coming with the elimination of existing ridings. The assessment of these issues pertaining to representation is crucial to the portrait of minority participation in Québec's political arena.

CHAPTER 3: RIDING CHARACTERISTICS

The riding is the basic unit of representation in a constituency-based plurality electoral system. In Québec, the *Commission de la représentation électorale* (CRE) draws riding boundaries with the aim of ensuring the effective representation and the equality of votes of electors, with respect to “natural communities” (which are bonded by either geography, demography or sociological factors) (DGEQ, 2014). Despite this array of explanatory factors, the question of what constitutes such a “natural community” is a complex one, made of a great deal of subjectivity and competing interpretations. It is also illustrative of the salience of representing communities of interest in Québec electoral geography in addition to individual voters. In the process of reconciling these different goals, the number of voters in ridings crafted by the CRE can deviate as much as 25% from the mean riding population (the quotient), or even more with proper justification (DGEQ, 2014).

The resulting ridings can indeed be dramatically different from one another, either by population count or demographic composition. When minorities compose a sufficient share of a riding’s population, they are empowered to elect the representative of their choice. The concentration of minority groups within underpopulated or overpopulated ridings also has implications for systemic under or overrepresentation (Pal and Choudhry, 2007; Forest, 2012).

Given this relation between ridings and minority representation, the following section portrays the variations in the characteristics of Québec provincial ridings in the 2001 and 2011 electoral maps.

Methodology

Riding socio-demographic data for the 2001 and 2011 provincial electoral maps come respectively from the 2001 and 2011 Canadian censuses. The data was compiled by the *Directeur général des élections du Québec* (DGEQ) and is available online for the 2011 map¹. While not readily accessible online, data for the 2001 map was easily retrieved by sending an email to the DGEQ.

Comparing two cross-sectional datasets assembled ten years apart appears adequate to discern potential trends. In this case, variables of interest include total population, mother tongue,

¹ <http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/english/provincial/electoral-map/socioeconomic-files.php>

religion, aboriginal identity and visible minority status. Only for the three last ones, data quality and comparability might have been affected by changes in the Census methodology (Statistics Canada, 2011). For 2001 data, these variables come from the mandatory long form Census which was filled by a representative sample of Canadian households. However, in 2011, these variables were measured in the National Household Survey, which was voluntary. Uneven response rates across regions might have affected the validity of the data. It is thus advised to be cautious when paralleling 2001 and 2011 data for the religion, aboriginal identity and visible minority status variables.

Language is a prime indicator of ethnic identity in Québec (Weinstock, 2011). Therefore, mother tongue was privileged over ethnicity as a measure of the ethnic composition of ridings. Data related issues have also guided this choice. If ethnicity data is available in both the 2001 Census and the 2011 National Household Survey, respondents answering more than one ethnic identity were double-counted in the data compiled for Québec provincial ridings. For example, a respondent giving “French-Canadian” as his or her ethnic identity was counted twice, in both the “French” and the “Canadian” categories. This compilation form rendered impossible a portrait of all ethnic identities making up a riding and led to the choice of language as a proxy measure.

This analysis also requires the use of diverse visible minority identities. Visible minority underrepresentation has been shown to be widespread to most polities in the Western world (Bird, 2005). Also, the inclusion of the main religion groups was deemed interesting due to the salience of the debate surrounding the wearing of ostensible religious symbols for civil service workers prior to the 2014 elections. The “Charter of Québec values” is alleged to have sparked and/or revealed intercommunal tensions.

This study concentrates on the representation of minorities, many of whom are non-voting immigrants. While the CRE draws ridings with the equality of voters as a guiding principle, this study looks at Québec provincial ridings from the equality of population standpoint, which supports all individuals, enabled to vote or not, should have equal access to an elected official (Courtney, 2001b). A central aspect of this analysis thus revolves around the total population quotient and each riding’s deviation from it. The population quotient is calculated by dividing the total population of the province at a given year by the number of ridings in the corresponding electoral map.

$$\text{Population quotient} = \text{Total population} / \text{Number of ridings}$$

The population deviation from the quotient is expressed as the ratio of a riding's population over the population quotient.

$$\text{Population ratio} = \text{Individual riding population} / \text{Population quotient}$$

Population Quotient and Deviation

If the population of Québec increased between the 2001 and 2011 census, the number of provincial ridings remained stable at 125 (DGEQ, 2014). As Table 3.0 shows, the mean riding population (or quotient) increased accordingly. The table also indicates a high mean deviation from the quotient in both 2001 and 2011, despite a non-negligible 2.0% improvement in the 2011 map. While remaining within the scope of the allowed 25.0% deviation, a high mean population deviation tells how access to a representative varies across ridings.

Table 3.0: Population deviations in the 2001 and 2011 Québec electoral maps

	2001	2011
Mean riding population (quotient)	57900	63224
Mean deviation	10752 ($\pm 18.6\%$)	10505 ($\pm 16.6\%$)
Largest riding (% deviation)	Bourassa-Sauvé (+32.2%)	Saint-Laurent (+35.6%)
Next largest riding	Laurier-Dorion (+32.1%)	Nelligan (+27.3%)
Smallest riding (% deviation)	Îles-de-la-Madeleine (-77.9%)	Îles-de-la-Madeleine (-79.8%)
Next smallest riding	Gaspé (-39.3%)	Gaspé (-40.1%)

The two largest ridings by population in both the 2001 and 2011 electoral maps are located on the densely populated and mostly urban island of Montréal, while the two least populated ridings are in the low density and mostly rural Gaspésie-Îles-de-la-Madeleine administrative region. This potentially hints at a systemic underrepresentation of urban areas, a phenomenon often highlighted for ridings at the Canadian federal level (Pal & Choudhry, 2007; Forest 2012).

Table 3.0 also highlights that both the largest and smallest ridings by population exceed the prescribed population quotient by more than 25.0% in 2001 and 2011. The geographical isolation of the Îles-de-la-Madeleine, which have no land connexion with the rest of Québec, has legitimized in practice the archipelago's exceptional population deviation (DGEQ, 2014).

However, the vast and rural Gaspé riding is remarkably underpopulated with regards to the CRE guidelines. This exception can be inferred to be due to the area being one of those “natural communities.” The various overpopulated ridings on the island of Montréal can hardly be thought of in the same way. The population on the island of Montreal being highly diverse and mobile (Statistics Canada, 2011), the extent of overpopulation and the inconsistency between which riding is the most overpopulated between the 2001 and 2011 maps are seemingly symptomatic of a persisting systemic underrepresentation of urban areas in the drawing of Québec provincial ridings.

To confirm this assumption, Table 3.1 illustrates the mean population ratio by broad regions. If the island of Montréal category is self-explanatory, the other “regions” require brief explanation due to variations in administrative boundaries not necessarily matching the shape of ridings. The Rest of Montréal Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), Québec City CMA and Other CMAs regions include any riding fully or partly within the CMA territories, excluding the island of Montréal. Northern and peripheral regions are understood as any non-CMA riding fully or partly within the Abitibi-Témiscamingue, Côte-Nord, Gaspésie-Îles-de-la-Madeleine, Bas-Saint-Laurent, Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean and Nord-du-Québec administrative regions. All ridings not included in these categories were classified in the Rest of Québec region.

Table 3.1: Mean population ratio by region for the 2001 and 2011 Québec electoral maps

Region	2001		2011	
	Ridings	Mean Ratio	Ridings	Mean Ratio
Island of Montréal	28	1.12	28	1.07
Rest of Montréal CMA	30	1.07	32	1.05
Québec City CMA	14	1.01	15	0.99
Other CMAs	18	0.99	18	0.99
Northern and Peripheral	16	0.74	14	0.76
Rest of Québec	19	0.94	18	1.01
Total	125	1.00	125	1.00

For both 2001 and 2011, population deviation from quotient is significantly higher on the island of Montréal and the rest of Montréal CMA. Meanwhile, northern and peripheral regions have a much lower mean population ratio. Québec City CMA, other CMAs and the rest of Québec have ratios closer to the provincial average. The island of Montréal is much more diverse than the rest of Montréal CMA and any other CMA, and it constantly has a higher population

ratio than any other region in both 2001 and 2011. It can thus be deduced that minorities are impacted by the urban disadvantage in the drawing of provincial ridings in Québec.

The bias against urban ridings, namely, the island of Montréal, acts in parallel to the bias in favour of rural, northern and peripheral regions. Given the concentration of minorities in urban areas and the mostly homogenous demographic portrait of rural and peripheral ridings, the variations in access to an elected official stemming from population imbalances as well as the number of ridings in which minorities are numerous enough to influence the outcome of an election can be expected to have an effect on minority political participation and representation

Minority Groups and Under/Overpopulated Ridings

Given this urban/rural bias in the drawing of Québec provincial ridings, it could be expected that the spatial concentration of some groups benefits or hinders their descriptive representation. The confluence of population deviation from quotient and the share various groups have in a riding's population is therefore of utmost interest.

Significant correlations between proportions of given groups and population ratios can be observed in Table 3.2. Between the 2001 and 2011 electoral maps, all visible minority identities, those with a non-official language mother tongue and the Muslim religion group display moderately positive correlations significant at 0.001. This indicates a persisting bias against these minority groups whom are mostly concentrated in overpopulated ridings. A slight improvement is perceptible with weaker correlations in 2011, especially for the Black and the Other visible minority identities. On the other hand, the correlation is slightly stronger for the West Asian visible minority identity.

Persistently over the decade, visible minorities and Muslims appear to be the most disadvantaged. As around 92% of visible minorities and Muslims lived in the Montreal CMA as of the 2001 Census and a little more than 89% did so as of the 2011 Census (Statistics Canada), the convergence of urban concentration and riding overpopulation seems confirmed. The earlier mention of a decrease in the average riding population deviation between 2001 and 2011 might be reflected in the weaker correlations for these groups in the 2011 electoral map, but a slightly increased dispersion of these groups outside the Montreal CMA could also yield a part of the explanation. In the 2001 electoral map, both English mother tongue and the No religion group had weak to moderate positive correlations significant at 0.001. These two groups can also be

assumed to be concentrated (although less than previously mentioned groups) in the Montreal CMA. With the 2011 electoral map, this correlation became weaker and declined to lower levels of significance, which would support the lessening of the bias against urban areas in 2011.

The French mother tongue category shows a strong negative correlation with population deviation from quotient, significant at 0.001 in the 2001 electoral map, indicating a strong bias in favour of Francophones, who form large majorities of the population in several rural ridings. The 2011 electoral map drastically reduces this correlation, also pointing to a diminution of the rural advantage. French mother tongue speakers form the majority of Quebecers not only numerically but also in terms of access to resources (Laczko, 1995; Juteau, 2004). Quebecers of French descent have shaped their province's state apparatus in their favour (Balthazar, 1995), thus this strong correlation might point to a bias toward the majority group rather than an urban/rural discrepancy.

Table 3.2: Correlation between the population ratio of 2001 and 2011 Québec provincial ridings and the relative share of various groups within their population

	2001	2011
Visible minority	0.4846***	0.4102***
<i>Black</i>	0.4248***	0.3063***
<i>Arab</i>	0.4276***	0.3980***
<i>Latin American</i>	0.4195***	0.3210***
<i>South and East Asian</i>	0.4101***	0.3824***
<i>West Asian</i>	0.2980***	0.3150***
<i>Other</i>	0.4614***	0.3381***
<i>Multiple minorities</i>	0.4098***	0.4034***
Aboriginal identity	-0.2014*	-0.2751**
Mother tongue		
<i>French only</i>	-0.7972***	-0.3015***
<i>English</i>	0.3209***	0.1901*
<i>Non-official languages</i>	0.4000***	0.3110***
Religion		
<i>Roman Catholic</i>	-0.3607***	-0.3338***
<i>Muslim</i>	0.4573***	0.4136***
<i>Jewish</i>	0.1418	0.0925
<i>No religion</i>	0.3280***	0.1854**

* = significant at 0.05 ** = significant at 0.01 *** = significant at 0.001

Also worth mentioning, there is a weak negative correlation between Aboriginal identity and population deviation, significant at 0.05 in 2001 and at 0.01 in 2011. As Aboriginals mostly live in rural or sparsely populated areas, they are more likely to live in underpopulated ridings, a pattern also found at the Federal level (Forest 2012). If riding redistribution already favoured the Aboriginals in 2001, it did slightly more so in 2011.

Figures 3.2 to 3.11, in the Appendix, support these conclusions by illustrating through scatterplots the dispersion of ridings' share of mother tongue, visible minority and aboriginal identity groups by population ratios. Figures are paired by minority groups to ease comparisons between the 2001 and 2011 electoral maps.

To further strengthen the argument of a biased map concentrating minority groups in overpopulated ridings, Table 3.3 shows the share of the population of each group that lived in either an under or overpopulated riding in 2001 and 2011. In 2001, a little less than two-thirds of Quebecers lived in an overpopulated riding, which is comprehensible given the lower population of under-quotient ridings. No single group, except the Aboriginals, had a majority of its population concentrated in underpopulated ridings. Even the advantaged French only mother tongue group had more than 60% of its population in an over-quotient riding, leading to extrapolate urban mother tongue speakers of French are not spared by the urban disadvantage. The most striking evidence for the concentration of minorities in overpopulated ridings is highlighted by the fact that more than 85% of all Quebecers with visible minority identities, speaking a or many non-official language(s) as a mother tongue and who are of the Muslim or Jewish faith lived in overpopulated ridings in the 2001 electoral map. The concentration of English mother tongue speakers in overpopulated ridings is also noticeable.

A lower share of the total population lived in an overpopulated riding as of the 2011 electoral map, highlighting the higher average population of underpopulated ridings. The Aboriginals' concentration in underpopulated ridings is stronger in 2011 whereas mother tongue speakers of French are more evenly spread between under- and overpopulated ridings. While Quebecers with visible minority identities, a mother tongue other than French and a Muslim religious affiliation are still obviously concentrated in over-quotient ridings, it is to a much lesser extent than in 2001, especially for the Jewish religious group. The Arab visible minority group lags behind other visible minority identities and is the last remaining group for which more than 80% of the members live in an over-quotient riding.

Table 3.3: Relative share of groups living in over or under quotient 2001 and 2011 Québec provincial ridings

	2001		2011	
	Over quotient	Under quotient	Over quotient	Under quotient
Total population	64.7%	35.3%	56.2%	43.8%
Visible minority	89.4%	10.6%	73.4%	26.6%
<i>Black</i>	86.6%	13.4%	67.7%	32.3%
<i>Arab</i>	92.9%	7.1%	80.4%	19.6%
<i>Latin American</i>	86.0%	14.0%	69.1%	30.9%
<i>South and East Asian</i>	91.4%	8.6%	76.4%	23.6%
<i>West Asian</i>	91.1%	8.9%	73.5%	26.5%
<i>Other</i>	89.5%	10.5%	67.2%	32.8%
<i>Multiple Minorities</i>	88.1%	11.9%	72.8%	27.2%
Aboriginal Identity*	48.6%	51.4%	34.7%	65.3%
Language				
<i>French Only</i>	60.8%	39.2%	53.5%	46.5%
<i>English</i>	77.5%	22.5%	59.8%	40.2%
<i>Non-Official Langue</i>	85.1%	14.9%	70.6%	29.4%
Religion				
<i>Roman Catholic</i>	62.2%	37.8%	54.0%	46.0%
<i>Muslim</i>	91.2%	8.8%	77.8%	22.2%
<i>Jewish</i>	97.5%	2.5%	58.2%	41.8%
<i>No religion</i>	70.1%	29.9%	58.5%	41.5%

* In the 2001 Census, Aboriginal Identity is one ethnicity categories among others. In the 2011 National Household Survey, there is a separated question for Aboriginal Identity. This methodological difference might affect comparability.

All things considered, the systemic bias against urban ridings negatively impacts the access to a representative of most language and religion minority groups, and all visible minority identities – especially the Arabs. Despite a significant improvement between 2001 and 2011, the overconcentration of minority groups in overpopulated ridings persists. While Quebecers with Aboriginal identity live in majority in underpopulated ridings, French mother tongue speakers do not, but are advantaged compared to the whole population.

It is needless to add that population imbalances can be extrapolated to hurt minority representation. Not only do minorities have lesser access to their member of the National Assembly (MNA), but concentrating in ridings with higher populations necessarily means minorities form a sizeable share of the population of fewer ridings, and thus can influence the choice of fewer representatives.

Minority Influence Ridings

A minority influence riding is generally understood as having minimally 35% of its population composed by a minority group or a coalition of minority groups. Ridings with this concentration of minorities are believed to empower these to elect candidates of their choosing (Horowitz, 2003; Forest, 2012). Minority influence ridings, on the basis of language demographics and visible minority status, are detailed in Table 3.4. Due to similarities in voting patterns for all minority groups (Pedersen, 2013, Bilodeau, 2013) and a relatively low share of the province’s population, broad categories such as “visible minority” is not broken down into its constituent identities.

Between 2001 and 2011, the rise in the non-official language mother tongue and visible minority population was paralleled by a subsequent increase in the number of minority influence ridings. A stagnating English mother tongue population led to the loss of one influence riding between the two electoral maps, and in 2011, influence English mother tongue ridings became, on average, more underpopulated. However, in 2001 as in 2011, 80% of non-official language minority influence ridings and 100% of visible minority influence ridings were overpopulated. This points to a potential for drawing more minority influence ridings.

The number of minority influence ridings is therefore increasing, but the overpopulated character of these remains constant, they thus only partly improve the power minorities are given to influence the outcome of an electoral race within their riding, with consequences for descriptive representation.

Table 3.4: Minority influence ridings in the 2001 and 2011 Québec electoral maps

Group share of riding population		2001		2011	
		Ridings	Over quotient	Ridings	Over quotient
English-only mother tongue	Over 35%	6	83.3%	5	40.0%
	Under 35%	119	56.3%	120	50.0%
Non-official language mother tongue	Over 35%	10	80.0%	15	80.0%
	Under 35%	115	55.7%	110	45.5%
Visible minority	Over 35%	4	100.0%	10	100.0%
	Under 35%	121	56.2%	115	45.2%

The population of Québec provincial ridings varies a lot, and not in a random manner. Northern and peripheral ridings tend to be systematically underpopulated while ridings on the island of Montréal are most likely to be most overpopulated. This impacts minority

representation as most minorities live in the Montréal area: proportion of minorities within a riding is positively correlated with riding population, and large majorities of minority groups inhabit overpopulated ridings. The power of minority voters and their equal access to a MNA is thus threatened. Moreover, the number of ridings where minorities are numerous enough to influence the outcome of the election is smaller than it could be: minority influence ridings are almost all overpopulated.

The electoral map has structural imbalances hindering an optimal representation of minorities. But is it reflected in minority participation in the political arena? The question of whether minorities run for elected office, and in what kind of riding they do so, requires attention.

CHAPTER 4: MINORITIES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

Minorities cannot be represented if they do not run for office. However, several minority groups face impediments to become involved in the political process (Simard, 2003; Bird, 2005; Andrew et. al, 2008). It is thus crucial to find out if minorities participate in formal politics: are they part of the pool of candidates, and if they do, in what kind of riding? The following sections bring responses by portraying the candidates to the 2003 and 2014 Québec provincial elections.

Methodology

This chapter examines the minority status of candidates to the 2003 and 2014 elections. The choice of these two elections stems from their analogous electoral results as they both yielded a majority Liberal government (DGEQ, 2014). Moreover, the decade-long time span between them provides a good baseline for comparisons, particularly because the number of visible minorities rose significantly during this period.

Identifying membership in a minority group is a fraught process. For this project, we assigned gender, ethnic identity, and visible minority status (based on Census categories) to candidates in the 2003 and 2014 Québec provincial elections. Such classification was limited to cases where we could obtain a photograph, and sufficient, reliable biographical information. (92.7%, or 1,009 out of 1,089 candidates were classified for all categories). When such elements were present, we classified candidates using combination of that information along with the etymological roots of the candidate's family name(s). Every candidate was allocated identities independently by at least two coders. Coders discussed any disputed classifications with each other to arrive at a consensus, and if this proved impossible, the candidate was discarded from the dataset. While this method has subjective elements, it is one used commonly in research on minority representation (Simard, 2002; Tossutti and Najem, 2002; Mateos, 2007; Black, 2012).

This technique does not draw explicitly on the self-identification of candidates (which would require a survey or interviews), and relies on a mix of primordialist and constructivist views of identity (Satzewich & Lioudakis, 2007). The use of family name and ancestry (based on biographical information) as indicators of ethnic affiliation and visible minority status is relatively primordialist. Judgements based on candidates' photos and other information by the coders is closer to a constructivist position because it rests on the perception of their identity. When the bibliographic information comes from candidates themselves, it also reflects their self-

identification (or more precisely, their self-presentation) and arguably also represents a constructivist position (Waters, 1990).

All information on candidates in the 2014 election was found on political party and local newspapers websites. Information on candidates in the 2003 election came from a diverse array of sources, including the website of the National Assembly of Québec, local newspapers websites, local newspapers microfilms and major daily newspapers databases.

All parties that ran candidates in at least a third of ridings are included in the analysis of the 2014 elections; those include the Parti libéral du Québec/Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ/QLP), the Parti québécois (PQ), the Coalition avenir Québec (CAQ), Québec solidaire (QS), Option nationale (ON), the Parti vert du Québec/Green Party of Québec (PVQ/GPQ) and the Parti conservateur du Québec – Équipe Adrien Pouliot (PCQ – EAP). For the 2003 elections, due to the scarcity of information on candidates from smaller parties, only the PLQ/QLP, the PQ and the Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ) are included in the analysis. For comparison purposes, the CAQ is considered the successor party of the ADQ (Forest, 2013).

The calculation of a proportionality index (PI) allows comparison of minority presence in each party with regards to the group's share of the provincial population. The proportionality index consists of a ratio of the share of a group within an entity's total members (the party or the legislature, for example) over the group's share of the total population (of the province of Québec, in this case).

$$\textit{Proportionality index (PI)} = \textit{Group share of an entity's members} / \textit{Group share of the total population}$$

In the previous section, mother tongue was used as a baseline for riding socio-demographic characteristics due to the lack of riding-specific usable Census data on ethnicity. If it proved suitable to compare riding-level population deviation ratios, it is improper to compare the subtleties of a candidate's individual ethnic affiliation with group prevalence in the broader population. As a practical matter, "ethnic status" in this study refers to European national origin: British/British Isles, French, or other European (e.g., Italian, Portuguese, and the like). French-origin Quebecers are the majority ethnic group, while the others are considered minority.

Provincial-level single and multiple ethnicity responses were retrieved in the 2001 Census Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) and the 2011 NHS PUMF. Responses were assigned to different ethnic groups on the basis of a low estimation (strictly inclusive of responses exclusively matching a given ethnic category) and a high estimation (inclusive of all responses matching partly or fully a given ethnic category). These categorizations are described in Table 4.0 in the Appendix. The reliability of those estimations of the ethnic ancestry of Quebecers is indeed questionable as it is calculated on the basis of subjective definitions inferred from varying ethnic self-identification categories, supplemented by the application of controls according to mother tongue and visible minority status. In spite of this inherent subjectivity, estimates of the population of French descent yielded by this method roughly fit the ones made in the extensive set of genetic studies of Québec's population. Such studies are numerous and reliable as Quebecers of French ancestry are subject to the "founder effect" as they descend from a limited amount of original settlers (Laberge et. al, 2005).

Statistics Canada advises against comparing ethnicity responses across censuses due to methodological and definitional variations between them (Statistics Canada, 2011). Despite this additional limitation, the ethnic group membership estimations appeared more or less stable between the 2001 and 2011 Census, and variations match with more or less acuity the natural growth and migration rates of each group (Termote & Thibault, 2008).

Minorities as Candidates

Looking at descriptive minority representation and the capacity of minority voters to select candidates of their choosing first necessitates to examine whether or not parties did run candidates with minority status.

Women

Women have been the focus of most research on candidates in Quebec, so for comparative purposes, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the proportion of women candidates by party for each election.

In relative terms, the share of women candidates increased slightly overall between the 2003 and 2014 elections (for parties with available data). However, when looking at the three major parties' PI, the portrait becomes less optimistic; women have made no progress in a little more than a decade for both the PLQ/QLP and the ADQ/CAQ (for which the index slightly

declines). On the other hand, the PQ registers a slight improvement, and notably, QS reaches perfect proportionality when women candidates are compared to their share of the population. All of these results are consistent with the DGEQ (2014b) most recent inquiry on female participation in politics which drew a portrait of stalling improvement for women in the past decade and thus reinforces the claim the dataset in use for this research is valid.

Table 4.1: Women candidates in the 2003 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by sex	Women	% Women	PI*
PLQ/QLP	125	35	28.0%	0.55
PQ	125	43	34.4%	0.67
ADQ	125	33	26.4%	0.52
All parties	375	111	29.6%	0.58

* Women formed 51.19% of Québec’s population as of the 2001 Census.

Table 4.2: Women candidates in the 2014 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by sex	Women	% Women	PI*
PLQ/QLP	125	35	28.0%	0.55
PQ	124	46	37.1%	0.73
CAQ	122	29	23.8%	0.47
QS	124	63	50.8%	1.00
ON	116	29	25.0%	0.49
PVQ/GPQ	44	17	38.6%	0.76
PCQ – EAP	59	8	13.6%	0.27
All parties	714	227	31.8%	0.62

* Women formed 50.96% of Québec’s population as of the 2011 Census.

Ethnic Minorities

Let’s turn now to candidates identified as belonging to an ethnic minority group, whom are here labeled as “ethnic minorities” in its furthest-reaching sense, which is Quebecers of non-French descent (the conceptualization of ethnic categories is summarized in Table 4.0, in the appendix). Note that the denominators for this category are higher than for subsequent unique ethnic categories, as they include candidates with more than one ethnic identity and candidates for whom the only agreement was the minority character of their ethnicity.

Table 4.3 and 4.4 indicate how Quebecers who are members of a minority ethnic group are underrepresented among the candidates for all parties in the 2003 and 2014 elections, with the

exception of the PVQ/GPQ. While the PI range overlaps when comparing the 2003 and 2014 elections, it appears the fate of ethnic minorities has improved over the decade. In relative terms, looking at the three major parties, the number of ethnic minority candidates has increased as it has in Québec's population. While the PLQ/QLP is often favoured or perceived to be favoured by minority groups (Bilodeau, 2013; Pedersen, 2013), its share of minority candidates is average for both the 2003 and 2014 elections. Surprisingly, the ADQ and the CAQ are the leading major parties for those two elections, presenting significantly more minority candidates, although not enough to reach proportionality in the population. The right-leaning economic policies put forward by these parties were found to match with greater accuracy than for other parties the political opinions of some ethnic minority groups (Bilodeau, 2013), which might explain this unexpected result.

Table 4.3: Ethnic minority candidates in the 2003 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by ethnic identity	Ethnic minorities	% Ethnic minorities	PI*
PLQ/QLP	120	16	13.3%	0.47 – 0.58
PQ	115	10	8.7%	0.31 – 0.38
ADQ	99	14	14.1%	0.50 – 0.62
All parties	334	42	12.6%	0.45 – 0.55

* Ethnic minority is here understood as a broad category including any Quebecer whose ancestry is not French. They formed between 22.9% and 28.1% of Québec's population as of the 2001 Census.

Table 4.4: Ethnic minority candidates in the 2014 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by ethnic identity	Ethnic minorities	% Ethnic minorities	PI*
PLQ/QLP	124	20	16.1%	0.44 – 0.57
PQ	123	13	10.6%	0.29 – 0.37
CAQ	119	24	20.2%	0.55 – 0.71
QS	120	18	15.0%	0.41 – 0.53
ON	116	18	15.5%	0.42 – 0.55
PVQ/GPQ	44	27	61.4%	1.67 – 2.16
PCQ – EAP	57	10	17.5%	0.48 – 0.62
All parties	703	130	18.5%	0.50 – 0.65

* Ethnic minority is here understood as a broad category including any Quebecer whose ancestry is not French. They formed between 28.4% and 36.7% of Québec's population as of the 2011 Census.

The PQ is lagging behind all other parties in both the 2003 and 2014 elections, despite a relative increase in the number of ethnic minority candidates which was nonetheless insufficient

to keep up with the minority growth in the population of Québec. Keeping in mind the purported tension between the Québec nationalist movement and minorities (Clarke & Kornberg, 1996), it appears that the two other parties supporting Québec sovereignty, QS and ON, are also under the average for their share of ethnic minority candidates, although faring better than the PQ.

Overall, this portrait of candidates according to ethnic minority status reveals pervasive sub-proportionality across all parties, except the PVQ/GPQ, for both the 2003 and 2014 elections, despite a slight relative improvement. Significant variations between parties point to a greater minority presence in right-leaning parties and a lower minority presence in left-leaning and Québec nationalist parties. The PVQ/GPQ exception might be explained by the disproportional amount of their candidates being in the diverse Montréal CMA or as a consequence of being the sole non-Québec nationalist left-leaning party in the political spectrum.

The portrait of the majority group, Quebecers of French descent, mirrors obviously opposite tendencies. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the over-proportionality of the majority group in all parties for both the 2003 and 2014 provincial elections, with the exception of the PVQ/GPQ.

While the relative share of French descent candidates declined between both elections, a steeper decline in the whole population led the over-proportionality to remain stable or to increase slightly. This over-proportionality is less pronounced in right-leaning parties, as opposed to Québec nationalist left-leaning parties, for both the 2003 and 2014 elections, an expected conclusion with regards to prior claims about ethnic minority candidates.

Now that the largest ethnic binaries have been described, looking at specific minority groups might provide precious insights on the nature of the sub-proportional presence of minority candidates in Québec provincial elections.

Table 4.5: French descent candidates in the 2003 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	French descent	% French descent	PI*
PLQ/QLP	116	104	89.7%	1.16 – 1.25
PQ	113	105	92.9%	1.20 – 1.29
ADQ	99	85	85.9%	1.11 – 1.19
All parties	328	294	89.6%	1.16 – 1.25

* The proportionality index is calculated for both the high and the low estimate of the French descent population. They formed between 71.9% and 77.1% of Québec’s population in the 2001 Census.

Table 4.6: French descent candidates in the 2014 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	French descent	% French descent	PI*
PLQ/QLP	122	104	85.2%	1.19 – 1.35
PQ	121	110	90.9%	1.27 – 1.44
CAQ	114	95	83.3%	1.16 – 1.32
QS	118	102	86.4%	1.21 – 1.36
ON	110	98	89.1%	1.24 – 1.41
PVQ/GPQ	40	17	42.5%	0.59 – 0.67
PCQ – EAP	56	47	83.9%	1.17 – 1.33
All parties	681	573	84.1%	1.17 – 1.33

* The proportionality index is calculated for both the high and the low estimate of the French descent population. They formed between 63.3% and 71.6% of Québec's population in the 2011 Census.

The oldest non-aboriginal minority community, the population of British descent, is more often than not combined with the French descent population in studies of political representation in Canada. As previously mentioned, the increasing marginalization of those of British descent, as well as the provincial state apparatus being designed to favour French descent individuals (Laczko, 1995, Juteau, 2004), call for a Québec-framed analysis to treat this group as a minority community not to obliterate important nuances.

Table 4.7 and 4.8 show the gap between the French descent and the British descent population when it comes to run for provincial elections. Candidates of British descent are in greater sub-proportion in 2003 than in 2014, and while the group's population has remained more or less stable, a relative increase in candidates from this group has led the PI to extend beyond perfect proportionality when it comes to upper estimates of this group's population. This general improvement in the share of British decent candidates hides steep inter-party variations and is mostly driven by the high share of British descent candidates for the PVQ/GPQ.

Surprisingly, the PLQ/QLP, reputed to receive an overwhelming support from this community (Pedersen, 2013), runs British descent candidates in sub-proportions to their share of the whole population, with a decrease in proportionality between 2003 and 2014. Unexpectedly, the ADQ had a clear over-proportionality of British descent candidates in 2003, and despite a relative decline, the CAQ still runs a sufficient amount of candidates from this group to claim proportionality to its share of the whole population in 2014. Due to the tensions between this group and Québec nationalist endeavours (Clarke & Kornberg, 1996), the very low PI for the PQ matches expectations, despite a significant improvement between 2003 and 2014, which

nonetheless remains insufficient to reach the average for all parties. ON also has low proportionality, but not QS.

Table 4.7: British descent candidates in the 2003 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	British descent	% British descent	PI*
PLQ/QLP	116	5	4.3%	0.61 – 0.90
PQ	113	1	0.9%	0.13 – 0.19
ADQ	99	7	7.1%	1.01 – 1.48
All parties	328	13	4.0%	0.57 – 0.83

* The proportionality index is calculated for both the high and the low estimate of the British Isles descent population. They formed between 4.8% and 7.0% of Québec’s population in the 2001 Census.

Table 4.8: British descent candidates in the 2014 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	British descent	% British descent	PI*
PLQ/QLP	122	4	3.3%	0.45 – 0.70
PQ	121	3	2.5%	0.34 – 0.53
CAQ	114	6	5.3%	0.73 – 1.13
QS	118	5	4.2%	0.58 – 0.89
ON	110	3	2.7%	0.37 – 0.57
PVQ/GPQ	40	14	35.0%	4.79 – 7.45
PCQ – EAP	56	0	0.0%	0.00 – 0.00
All parties	681	35	5.1%	0.70 – 1.09

* The proportionality index is calculated for both the high and the low estimate of the British Isles descent population. They formed between 4.7% and 7.3% of Québec’s population in the 2011 Census.

In sum, the proportion of British descent candidates has increased between the 2003 and 2014 elections to reach proportionality to the whole population. However, this improvement is mainly driven by the smaller Montréal-centered PVQ/GPQ while the community’s party of predilection, the PLQ/QLP, has witnessed a decrease in its PI. The ADQ and the CAQ consistently do better than their counterparts among the major parties, and the tensions between the British descent community and the Québec nationalist movement is confirmed.

Tables 4.9 and 4.10 examine the presence of candidates who are of European descent but who have neither French nor British ancestry. This group will be called of “Other European Descent” (OED) for the purpose of this study. Due to vaguer census categories, as explained in the Appendix in Table 4.0, the estimates of this group’s share of Québec’s population is rather

wide-ranging, and thus limits the interpretability of the proportionality index. However, broad tendencies can be drawn.

Table 4.9: Other European descent candidates in the 2003 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	OED	% OED	PI*
PLQ/QLP	116	3	2.6%	0.19 – 0.43
PQ	113	0	0.0%	0.00 – 0.00
ADQ	99	5	5.1%	0.38 – 0.84
All parties	328	8	2.4%	0.18 – 0.39

* The proportionality index is calculated for both the high and the low estimate of the European descent other than French or British Isles population. They formed between 6.1% and 13.5% of Québec's population in the 2001 Census.

Table 4.10: Other European descent candidates in the 2014 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	OED	% OED	PI*
PLQ/QLP	122	8	6.6%	0.40 – 1.16
PQ	121	1	0.8%	0.05 – 0.14
CAQ	114	5	4.4%	0.27 – 0.77
QS	118	6	5.1%	0.31 – 0.89
ON	110	3	2.7%	0.16 – 0.47
PVQ/GPQ	40	4	10.0%	0.61 – 1.75
PCQ – EAP	56	7	12.5%	0.76 – 2.19
All parties	681	34	5.0%	0.30 – 0.88

* The proportionality index is calculated for both the high and the low estimate of the European descent other than French or British Isles population. They formed between 5.7% and 16.5% of Québec's population in the 2001 Census

OED candidates are severely sub-proportional to their share of the population in 2003, and despite a relative doubling of their numbers in 2014, remain in sub-proportion. Once again, it is believed OED candidates are more likely to be PLQ/QLP supporters (Pedersen, 2013), a tendency that is not reflected in the portrait of candidates in 2003 when the ADQ had by far the best proportionality index. While the CAQ's index decreases in 2014, the PLQ/QLP rises to an expected proportionality. The other major party, the PQ, had no OED candidates in 2003, and only 1 in 2014, leaving the party with the lowest proportionality index for both elections. Once again, the tension between minorities and the Québec nationalist movement can be extrapolated

to explain this remarkable absence of this group within the PQ's candidate pool. While ON also does poorly, QS matches the overall average proportionality index.

The tendency of OED candidates to be right-leaning may explain their greater presence in the PLQ/QLP, the ADQ, the CAQ and the PCQ – EAP. Yet the PVQ/GPQ has a higher than average proportionality index for this minority group, also present in greater numbers in the Montréal CMA, where this party runs most of its candidates. Nonetheless, the patterns regarding OED candidates are similar to those for ethnic minorities as a whole.

Visible Minorities

Lastly, visible minorities, one of the most severely challenged minority group in North American societies (Bird, 2005). In Québec, as elsewhere in Canada, the confluence of visible minority status and immigrant status spans both a recent history of visible minority prominence and persistent otherization and discrimination (Simard, 2003; Andrew et. al, 2008). Conventional wisdom holds that visible minorities give most of their electoral support to the PLQ/QLP (Bilodeau, 2003).

Compared to other minority groups, visible minority candidates are generally not present in proportion to the provincial population in either 2003 or 2014, but are not necessarily worse off than the minority groups discussed above. See Tables 4.11 and 4.12. Although a decline of the proportionality index over the decade between both elections is a worrisome sign of stagnation, even steeper than the one seen with women, the relative number of visible minority candidates has increased, but has not kept pace with the group's increased share of the whole population. Among the major parties, this decreased PI is paralleled by both the PLQ/QLP and the PQ, but the CAQ's visible minority proportionality index is substantially higher than was the one of the ADQ. The PLQ/QLP consistently has an under-average PI for both the 2003 and 2014 elections. While the PQ does the best of all parties in 2003, it does the worst in 2014. All other Québec nationalist parties have under-average indexes for visible minority candidates.

The PVQ/GPQ is the only party with an over-proportionality of visible minority candidates, but once again, its Montreal-centered character could well explain this observation. The right or left leaning character of parties does not seem to influence the PI as it does for other minority identity groups.

Table 4.11: Visible minority candidates in the 2003 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by visible minority status	Visible minorities	% Visible minorities	PI*
PLQ/QLP	117	4	3.4%	0.49
PQ	109	7	6.4%	0.92
ADQ	99	4	4.0%	0.58
All parties	325	15	4.6%	0.66

* Visible minorities formed 6.98% of Québec's population in the 2001 Census.

Table 4.12: Visible minority candidates in the 2014 Québec provincial elections

Parties	Total by visible minority status	Visible minorities	% Visible minorities	PI*
PLQ/QLP	125	6	4.8%	0.44
PQ	124	4	3.2%	0.29
CAQ	122	9	7.4%	0.67
QS	124	6	4.8%	0.44
ON	116	5	4.3%	0.39
PVQ/GPQ	44	6	13.6%	1.24
PCQ – EAP	59	3	5.1%	0.46
All parties	714	39	5.5%	0.50

* Visible minorities formed 11.00% of Québec's population in the 2011 Census.

Minority Candidates and Riding Demographic Characteristics

Now that the extent to which minorities are involved in the political arena has been laid out, the influence of riding demographic characteristics comes into play in Tables 4.13 to 4.15. Note that only visible minorities and English mother tongue minority groups (the latter being used as an imperfect proxy for British descent) are included in this section, due to the limitations of ethnicity Census data at the provincial riding level.

The probability ratio to party indicates the extent to which a candidate is likely to have minority status in ridings with a specific minority group population, as compared to the likelihood of a candidate having minority status for the party as a whole. In the case where ratios are equal regardless of minority group population, it is as likely to find a candidate holding a minority status in any riding regardless of its demographic composition. When the ratio is smaller for ridings with a lesser minority population and the ratio is higher when the minority population also is, a higher concentration of minority population has incidence on the likelihood of a candidate to hold minority status. As minority groups forming a sufficient share of a riding's

population detain influence over the choice of their representative, it would be assumed that ratios be higher in ridings with more minority population.

For both the 2003 and 2014 elections, ridings with a visible minority population exceeding 35%, thus qualifying as “influence” ridings (Forest, 2012), are minimally three times more likely than the average riding to have a PQ, ADQ or CAQ visible minority candidate. The smaller parties replicate the pattern of the PQ and the CAQ by presenting more minority candidates in ridings with a larger visible minority population. The relationship does not hold for the PLQ/QLP for neither 2003 nor 2014: in both elections, there was not a single visible minority PLQ/QLP candidates in ridings where visible minority population is over 35%. Given that visible minorities vote mostly for the PLQ/QLP (Bilodeau, 2013), it does not appear they are enabled to elect a candidate of their own minority identity category when they form an influential share of a riding’s population. This might hint to the practice of nominating minority candidates as sacrificial lambs in unsafe ridings while nominating non-minority candidates in ridings deemed safe.

The concentration of visible minority candidates in ridings with a greater visible minority population was higher in 2003 than in 2014. If the ratios for the PQ and the ADQ were higher than 6 in 2003, in 2014 only QS has a ratio in excess of 4 for ridings with a visible minority population higher than 35%.

Nonetheless, except for the PLQ/QLP, ridings with a larger share of visible minorities are more likely to have visible minority candidates, a consistent trend between the 2003 and 2014 elections. The same pattern can be found in British descent candidates with regards to the share English only mother tongue have in a riding’s population, mostly when looking at the PLQ/QLP, the ADQ, the CAQ and the PVQ/GPQ. If the PVQ/GPQ’s base being in the Montreal area can once again explain the salience given to British descent candidates, all other parties where the relationship stands are more right-leaning and proponent of Canadian unity, which could explain the greater sensitivity to run British descent candidates in ridings with a higher English-only mother tongue population.

The presence of minority candidates is thus generally related to the demographic composition of ridings. The capacity of minorities to vote for a representative with a minority background in influence ridings is enhanced for supporters of all parties except the PLQ/QLP: ironically, most influence ridings elect PLQ/QLP candidates.

Table 4.13: Minority candidate probability ratio, by party, for the 2003 Québec provincial election

Group share of riding population		PLQ/QLP	PQ	ADQ
Visible minority	Over 35%	0.00	11.72	6.25
	Under 35%	1.00	0.56	0.75
English mother tongue	Over 35%	5.81	1.00	4.69
	Under 35%	0.84	0.00	0.89

Table 4.14: Minority candidate probability ratio, by party, for the 2014 Québec provincial election (major parties)

Group share of riding population		PLQ/QLP	PQ	CAQ
Visible minority	Over 35%	0.00	3.47	3.38
	Under 35%	1.08	0.81	0.72
English mother tongue	Over 35%	10.09	0.00	9.43
	Under 35%	0.76	1.04	0.68

Table 4.15: Minority candidate probability ratio, by party, for the 2014 Québec provincial election (minor parties)

Group share of riding population		QS	ON	PVQ/GPQ	PCQ – EAP
Visible minority	Over 35%	6.25	3.33	3.26	0.00
	Under 35%	0.54	0.86	0.42	1.08
English mother tongue	Over 35%	0.00	0.00	1.91	0.00
	Under 35%	1.05	1.00	0.93	0.00

In summary, between 2003 and 2014, the number of women candidates has remained stagnant, the number of ethnic minority candidates slightly increased and the number of visible minority candidates soared, but only to keep pace with the increase of this group’s population. Candidates of all minority identities are in sub-proportions compared to the provincial population and a greater number of them are found in right-leaning and Federalist parties.

The proportion of a minority group within the population of a riding is related to the likelihood of having a candidate with minority status. Ridings with a visible minority population exceeding 35% are at least three times more likely than other ridings to have a PQ or ADQ/CAQ visible minority candidate. English mother tongue influence ridings are minimally four times more likely to have a British descent PLQ/QLP or ADQ/CAQ candidate. The demographic characteristics of ridings are thus related to the presence of minorities on the ballot.

But running for elected office does not guarantee a successful race. Do minority candidates have the same odds of becoming MNA than their majority counterparts? This

question, essential to the assessment of descriptive representation in legislative bodies, shall be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5: MINORITIES IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Another major component leading to the representation of minorities is how well minority candidates perform during elections. Do they run in competitive ridings and do they gather the support of both their minority identity group, other minority groups and the majority group?

Up to now, the sex, ethnicity and visible minority status of candidates for an elected position in the Québec legislature has been outlined, as were the odds of minority candidates being nominated in ridings where minority voters are influent. This new chapter examines the demographic characteristics of the members of the National Assembly of Québec (MNAs) with the aim to confirm or infirm prior assumptions on the potential of minorities to reach elected office in provincial politics.

Methodology

This chapter has for methodological basis the prior assignation of minority identities to electoral candidates and the estimates of Québec's ethnic composition, as described in Chapter 4. The electoral results of candidates in the 2003 and 2014 Québec provincial election were retrieved from the DGEQ's website².

On the basis of the relative success rate of candidates to the 2003 and 2014 provincial elections (which are concealed in Table 5.0 and 5.1, in the Appendix), a ratio of minority candidates success rate with regards to the party as a whole indicates if members of specific minority groups had equal chances to win a riding as compared to other candidates of the same party. This additional layer of analysis allows to unveil if minority candidates were presented in less competitive ridings, nuancing the previous numerical portrait of minority group presence within parties.

The relative success rate of candidates is calculated as follow. It can be calculated for candidates of a specific minority group and/or running for a specific party:

$$\text{Relative success rate} = \text{Number of candidates who won} / \text{Total number of candidates}$$

Below is the formula used to calculate the ratio of minority success rate by party:

² <http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/english/provincial/election-results/general-elections.php>

$$\text{Group Success Ratio} = \text{Group success rate} / \text{Party success rate}$$

Minority Success Ratio

In 2003, Table 5.2 shows that visible minority candidates were, across all parties, those who had the smallest chance of having an electoral victory, dragging down odds of electoral success for ethnic minorities as a whole. Neither were women or other ethnic minority groups disadvantaged when looking at all parties.

However, the party by party breakdown of ratios tells another story for the 2003 election. Women are slightly advantaged in the PLQ/QLP, and are most disadvantaged with the ADQ. Only for the PLQ/QLP are candidates of French descent not advantaged by a significant margin over candidates of other groups; actually, only minority candidates for the PLQ/QLP register a success ratio higher than average. If visible minorities are still disadvantaged within the PLQ/QLP, they are much closer to the party's average success rate, and compared to the PQ and the ADQ, are far more advantaged. The success rate ratio of the various minority groups for both the PQ and the ADQ is seldom higher than 0, indicating most candidates with minority status for those parties had close to no chance of winning the ridings where they ran. These findings not only support the assumed affiliation of minority groups to the PLQ/QLP (Pedersen, 2013; Bilodeau, 2013), but also points to minority candidates in other parties, the PQ and the ADQ, running in less competitive ridings.

Table 5.2: Group success ratio, by party with MNAs, in the 2003 Québec provincial election

Parties	Women	French descent	Ethnic minorities	British descent	OED	Visible minorities	All Candidates
PLQ/QLP	1.03	0.98	1.23	1.64	1.64	0.82	1.00
PQ	0.97	1.26	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
ADQ	0.94	1.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
All Parties	1.03	1.12	0.64	1.16	1.13	0.40	1.00

The portrait differs somewhat in 2014. Table 5.3 illustrates how women lost their slight advantage over other candidates by registering a non-negligible disadvantage when all parties are considered. The prior lead of the PQ on the matter is lost in 2014 as women candidates for this party have the comparably lowest success rate ratio of all parties. While the success rate is also

lower for women running in elections under the PLQ/QLP banner, women running for the CAQ and QS actually had greater odds of success than their male counterparts.

The fate of ethnic minorities improves between 2003 and 2014, especially for visible minorities. While their disadvantage is growing in the PLQ/QLP, and the 0 success rate ratio is maintained for the CAQ, visible minority candidates running for the PQ had more or less the same odds of winning the riding they ran into as other candidates, that is a significant improvement compared to 2003. The low number of QS MNAs explains the very high success rate ratio of visible minorities for this party.

In 2014, British descent and OED candidates continue to be most favoured within the PLQ/QLP. If the latter also reach other candidates success rates for the CAQ, it is not the case for British descent candidates and for the PQ or QS. Overall, OED candidates maintain their slight advantage when all parties are considered, but the British descent candidates' success rate ratio diminishes.

Table 5.3: Group success ratio, by party with MNAs, in the 2014 Québec provincial election

Parties	Women	French descent	Ethnic minorities	British descent	OED	Visible minorities	All Candidates
PLQ/QLP	0.92	0.96	1.16	1.34	1.34	0.60	1.00
PQ	0.72	1.05	0.64	0.00	0.00	1.03	1.00
CAQ	1.15	1.17	0.23	0.00	1.11	0.00	1.00
QS	1.31	0.81	2.30	0.00	0.00	6.89	1.00
All Parties	0.86	1.06	0.75	0.49	1.18	0.59	1.00

These findings on the success rate of minority candidates add nuances to the previous conclusions on the varying presence of minority candidates across parties. Notably, the PQ not only presents few minority candidates but they also have fewer chances of winning a riding than the other candidates of this party, and while the ADQ and the CAQ shone by the large number of minority candidates within their ranks, they faced much lower odds of winning. Minority candidates have the most chances of winning when running for the PLQ/QLP, while the PQ gives increasing credence to visible minorities and the CAQ, to OED candidates. The lack of successful British descent candidates outside of the PLQ/QLP hurts candidates from this group to the extent its overall electoral success ratio is, as of 2014, lower than the one for visible minorities.

Minority Representation

Proponents of descriptive representation hold that the composition of a legislature should mirror the composition of the population it represents. If it is not a guarantee of a substantive and effective representation of minority interests (Thomas, Loewen & MacKenzie, 2013), aiming at having a legislature made up of members having group identities that are proportional to the ones found in the broader population is commonly seen as a worthy normative goal.

Women

The underrepresentation of women in the legislatures of the Western World has been the subject of several studies (Andrew et. al, 2008). Tables 5.4 and 5.5 confirm this prevailing tendency for women to be represented in sub-proportionality to their share of the population, and surprisingly, the proportionality index for women representation declined between 2003 and 2014. This finding is corroborated by the DGEQ (2014b).

Table 5.4: Women representation in the Québec legislature after the 2003 election

Parties	Total by sex	Women	% Women	PI
PLQ/QLP	76	22	28.9%	0.57
PQ	45	15	33.3%	0.65
ADQ	4	1	25.0%	0.49
All parties	125	38	30.4%	0.59

Table 5.5: Women representation in the Québec legislature after the 2014 election

Parties	Total by sex	Women	% Women	PI
PLQ/QLP	70	18	25.7%	0.50
PQ	30	8	26.7%	0.52
CAQ	22	6	27.3%	0.54
QS	3	2	66.7%	1.31
All parties	125	34	27.2%	0.53

In 2003, the PQ had the highest relative share of women while the ADQ had the lowest. The tendency for left-leaning parties to be more favourable to women than right-leaning parties is observed in the literature (Glasberg & Shannon, 2011) and seems to be confirmed here. In 2014, however, all major parties had a comparable share of women among their representatives, the CAQ having a slight negligible lead over the PQ and the PLQ/QLP. The overtly feminist QS was

the only party to have a greater share of women among their representatives than in the whole population, but this also stems from the comparably smaller number of their MNAs.

Ethnic Minorities

If a pessimistic portrait is drawn for women, ethnic minorities as a whole (any Quebecer of non-French descent) seem to slightly increase their proportion of MNAs and more or less maintain their proportionality to the share of ethnic minorities in the provincial population as show Table 5.6 and 5.7.

Table 5.6: Ethnic minority representation in the Québec legislature after the 2003 election

Parties	Total by ethnic identity	Ethnic minorities	% Ethnic minorities	PI
PLQ/QLP	76	14	18.4%	0.65 – 0.80
PQ	45	1	2.2%	0.08 – 0.10
ADQ	4	0	0.0%	0.00
All parties	125	15	12.0%	0.43 – 0.52

Table 5.7: Ethnic minority representation in the Québec legislature after the 2014 election

Parties	Total by ethnic identity	Ethnic minorities	% Ethnic minorities	PI
PLQ/QLP	69	13	18.8%	0.51 – 0.66
PQ	30	2	6.7%	0.18 – 0.24
CAQ	21	1	4.8%	0.13 – 0.17
QS	3	1	33.3%	0.91 – 1.17
All parties	123	17	13.8%	0.38 – 0.49

If the concentration of ethnic minority MNAs in the PLQ/QLP persists between 2003 and 2014, it is less pronounced in 2014, as minorities are fewer in the PLQ/QLP caucus and slightly more numerous in other parties. Of them, both the PQ and the ADQ/CAQ increased the number of their ethnic minority MNAs between 2003 and 2014, but the ADQ/CAQ remains with the lowest proportionality index.

Table 5.8 and 5.9 show the ubiquity of the majority group, Quebecers of French descent, in the Québec legislature. In 2003, only the PLQ/QLP had MNAs whose sole ethnic identity was not French descent, and the proportionality index for all parties is consequently largely higher than 1. In 2014, the relative share of French descent MNAs remains stagnant in the PLQ/QLP

and declines slightly for the PQ and the ADQ, but stays largely over the proportion of French descent individuals in Québec’s population. Only QS has a proportionality index that spans a range enabling a claim for neither over-proportionality nor under-proportionality.

Table 5.8: French descent representation in the Québec legislature after the 2003 election

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	French descent	% French descent	PI
PLQ/QLP	74	62	83.8%	1.09 – 1.17
PQ	44	44	100.0%	1.30 – 1.39
ADQ	4	4	100.0%	1.30 – 1.39
All parties	122	110	90.2%	1.17 – 1.25

Table 5.9: French descent representation in the Québec legislature after the 2014 election

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	French descent	% French descent	PI
PLQ/QLP	67	56	83.6%	1.17 – 1.32
PQ	29	28	96.6%	1.35 – 1.53
CAQ	21	20	95.2%	1.33 – 1.50
QS	3	2	66.7%	0.93 – 1.05
All parties	120	106	88.3%	1.23 – 1.39

As expected given the success ratio of British descent candidates detailed in the previous section, Table 5.10 and 5.11 indicate only the PLQ/QLP has MNAs of British descent. Within this party, their slight over-proportion to the population in 2003 no longer stands in 2014. Consequently, the overall proportionality of British Isles descent MNAs as compared to the provincial population has substantially declined between 2003 and 2014.

Table 5.12 and 5.13 indicate the findings are totally opposite for OED MNAs. Still concentrated within the PLQ/QLP, they were largely underrepresented within that party and the legislature in 2003. In 2014, after a little more than doubling the number of their representatives, these MNAs come to occupy a share of seats sufficient to claim proportionality to the whole population, both for the PLQ/QLP and the whole legislature. The CAQ’s proportionality index is not far behind, however, OED MNAs remain absent of the PQ and QS.

As an important share of OED Quebecers has their roots in Post-World War II immigration, this evolution could evoke growing political integration and acceptance as well as the coming of second or third generation immigrants in the public sphere.

Table 5.10: British descent representation in the Québec legislature after the 2003 election

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	British descent	% British descent	PI
PLQ/QLP	74	5	6.8%	0.97 – 1.42
PQ	44	0	0.0%	0.00
ADQ	4	0	0.0%	0.00
All parties	122	5	4.1%	0.59 – 0.85

Table 5.11: British descent representation in the Québec legislature after the 2014 election

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	British descent	% British descent	PI
PLQ/QLP	67	3	4.5%	0.62 – 0.96
PQ	29	0	0.0%	0.00
CAQ	21	0	0.0%	0.00
QS	3	0	0.0%	0.00
All parties	120	3	2.5%	0.34 – 0.53

Table 5.12: Other European descent representation in the Québec legislature after the 2003 election

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	OED	% OED	PI
PLQ/QLP	74	3	4.1%	0.30 – 0.67
PQ	44	0	0.0%	0.00
ADQ	4	0	0.0%	0.00
All parties	122	3	2.5%	0.19 – 0.41

Table 5.13: Other European descent representation in the Québec legislature after the 2014 election

Parties	Total by unique ethnic identity	OED	% OED	PI
PLQ/QLP	67	6	9.0%	0.55 – 1.58
PQ	29	0	0.0%	0.00
CAQ	21	1	4.8%	0.29 – 0.84
QS	3	0	0.0%	0.00
All parties	120	7	5.8%	0.35 – 1.02

Visible Minorities

Lastly, visible minorities are the subject of Table 5.14 and 5.15 which illustrate their stark underrepresentation, albeit a slight improvement between 2003 and 2014.

Only present within the PLQ/QLP in 2003, the share of visible minority MNAs was far from being proportional to the share of visible minorities within Québec’s population, both for the PLQ/QLP and for the whole legislature.

The doubling of visible minority MNAs between 2003 and 2014 parallels the growth of this group within the population, thus leaving the PI only slightly improved. A stagnating number of visible minority MNAs for the PLQ/QLP leaves them behind the PQ in terms of proportionality to the broader population. QS’ MNAs of a visible minority status were three time more numerous than in the whole population, but once again, the small number of their representatives qualifies the significance of this figure.

Table 5.14: Visible minority representation in the Québec legislature after the 2003 elections

Parties	Total by visible minority status	Visible minorities	% Visible minorities	PI
PLQ/QLP	75	2	2.7%	0.38
PQ	45	0	0.0%	0.00
ADQ	4	0	0.0%	0.00
All parties	124	2	1.6%	0.23

Table 5.15: Visible minority representation in the Québec legislature after the 2014 elections

Parties	Total by visible minority status	Visible minorities	% Visible minorities	PI
PLQ/QLP	70	2	2.9%	0.26
PQ	30	1	3.3%	0.30
CAQ	22	0	0.0%	0.00
QS	3	1	33.3%	3.03
All parties	125	4	3.2%	0.29

The portrait of minorities at the National Assembly is one of underrepresentation but also of slight improvements over time. Important unevenness persists among minority groups and across parties. Nonetheless, it is important to note the impact of small numbers in this analysis. Due to the relatively low number of minority MNAs, variations of only one MNA can significantly impact the analysis’ conclusions, which must then be taken with precautions. It also prevented the analysis from meaningfully addressing intersectionality concerns, by portraying for example the fate of minority women, or from describing in-group variations, by breaking down visible minority or OED categories.

The success rate ratio shows that visible minority candidates are the least likely to be elected as compared to other candidates from their party, a pattern not paralleled for women and other minority groups. While still suffering a relative disadvantage within the PLQ/QLP, they fare much better than for other parties, especially the ADQ/CAQ. For the PQ, the odds of winning of visible minorities significantly improved between 2003 and 2014, but they remain underrepresented and run in more challenging ridings. While seemingly being sacrificial lambs with less chances of running a successful candidacy than other party candidates, visible minorities still succeeded in doubling their numbers in the National Assembly between 2003 and 2014, albeit remaining in sub-proportion to their share of the provincial population. If the PLQ/QLP remains a vehicle of visible minority representation, so does the PQ in 2014.

As for minority candidates from other groups, it is important to mention OED candidates have a persisting edge over other candidates whereas the success rate of British descent candidates is declining. British descent candidates and MNAs are virtually absent from other parties than the PLQ/QLP and their salience within this party's caucus has declined between 2003 and 2014. OED MNAs, in contrast, have reached proportionality to the provincial population. Although they are widely present in the PLQ/QLP and the CAQ, they remain absent from left-leaning Quebec nationalist parties.

Overall, the PQ has few minority candidates and they have low odds of winning, whereas the ADQ/CAQ has several minority candidates whom have even less chance of winning. Minorities definitely performed better under the PLQ/QLP banner, although the general tendency of increased minority presence in the National Assembly between 2003 and 2014 came with a lesser concentration of minorities within the PLQ/QLP.

Also, the overall success rate of women declined in 2014. The empirical conclusion that women are more favoured by left-leaning parties (Glasberg & Shannon, 2011) stands in 2003 but not in 2014.

While the demographic portrait of candidates bring unsuspected inter-party variations, the leading position of the PLQ/QLP in the representation of minorities is illustrated by the electoral success of those who run for this party. A tendency for other parties to improve their standing in terms of minority representation is also observed. All in all, the fate of minorities has globally improved between 2003 and 2014 in the Québec provincial political sphere.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

As the public debate on the place of minorities in Québec society continues, the empowerment of minorities to affect policy measures and have their words heard through the channels of formal politics is an issue of great concern. The previous chapters inquired about the electoral geography and its distorting consequences for minority participation and representation and portrayed the ethnic background of candidates to Québec provincial elections as well as of those who succeeded in becoming MNAs.

The drawing of electoral boundaries in Québec gives credence to “natural communities”, the definition of which is highly subjective. This element of community representation conflicts with the equality of vote’s principle and causes significant discrepancies in riding populations. The weight of a vote and the access to a representative is thus not the same in all of Québec’s ridings and specific patterns can be observed. In spite of a relative improvement, both the 2001 and 2011 electoral maps perpetuate an urban disadvantage as overpopulated ridings are concentrated in urban areas, especially the island of Montréal and its suburbs, which are at the same time the areas where minority populations are concentrated. On the opposite, northern, peripheral, rural and more homogenous ridings are underpopulated.

Significant relationships between the proportion of minority populations and deviation from the average riding population were found, especially for those with a non-official language mother tongue, of the Muslim faith and of a visible minority identity – especially Arabs. The bias also affected the equitable access to a MNA of most minority linguistic and religious groups. These populations are essentially urban and are heavily concentrated in overpopulated ridings. While the correlations are weaker for 2011, it could be as much due to an improved electoral map as to the greater dispersion of these populations outside of the Montréal CMA. On the other hand, Quebecers with Aboriginal identity live in majority in underpopulated rural ridings and the majority group, French mother tongue speakers, also suffer from the urban disadvantage and tend to live in greater numbers in overpopulated ridings, but to a much lesser extent than minority groups.

This overconcentration of minority populations in overpopulated ridings has consequences for the number of minority influence ridings, which are ridings where the minority population, which counts for more than 35% of the riding population, has a decisive influence on the outcome of the election. In both the 2001 and 2011 electoral maps, almost all visible minority

influence ridings were overpopulated in comparison with the provincial quotient. The possibility to draw more numerous visible minority influence ridings remains open. Although the total amount of influence ridings has increased between 2001 and 2011, it has followed provincial trends of increasing minority population, and riding overpopulation remains pervasive. Nonetheless, the pattern does not hold true for English mother tongue influence ridings which tended, in 2011, to be more underpopulated.

Within the constraints of the electoral system hindering the influence of minorities, especially visible ones, do minorities still participate in the electoral process as candidates? Minority candidates were in sub-proportions to their provincial numbers for all major parties in both the 2003 and 2014 elections. An increase in the absolute number of candidates from minority groups has paralleled an analogous increase in their share of the provincial population, but on average minorities are sub-represented among candidates. Surprisingly, the PLQ/QLP ranges in the sub-proportional average in terms of minority candidates, even though most if not all minority groups are more likely to support this party. The ADQ/CAQ nominated more minority candidates than the average and right-leaning parties tend to have more minority candidates than do left-leaning Quebec nationalist parties. The absence of a major left-leaning non-Québec nationalist party might explain why minorities are overrepresented in PVQ/GPQ candidates.

The presence of those minority candidates appears to be related to the presence of minority influence ridings. For all main parties, there were three times more chance of having a visible minority candidate in an influence visible minority riding than in another riding, except for the PLQ/QLP, which nominated no visible minority candidate in an influence riding neither during the 2003 nor the 2014 elections. As ridings with large minority populations tend to systematically elect PLQ/QLP candidates, the possibility that non-minority candidates are given safe ridings, at the expense of the capacity of minority voters to support a candidate from a minority group, must be explored. Moreover, right-leaning parties were overall more likely to have a British descent candidates in an English mother tongue influence riding.

When candidates, minorities also face different odds of winning their riding than other candidates of their party. The success rate ratio indicates how visible minority candidates are the least likely to run a successful race. In spite of a persisting disadvantage in the PLQ/QLP, they fare much worse in the PQ and the ADQ/CAQ. As the visible minority population grew between

2001 and 2011, the number of visible minority MNAs doubled. Their proportions stalled within the PLQ/QLP but improved within the PQ. Interestingly, OED candidates happen to benefit from over-average chances of winning their riding. Their increased numbers as candidates and as MNAs might point to a greater political integration coming with the involvement of second or third generation immigrants. However, candidates of British Isles descent saw their success rate decline between 2003 and 2014. They are virtually absent from other parties than the PLQ/QLP and even within this party, their numbers declined between 2003 and 2014. Their underrepresentation in the National Assembly is proportionally analogous to the one experienced by visible minorities. The fate of British descent Quebecers in provincial politics thus calls for studying this group as a minority even though it forms a majority of the population of the Canadian state.

In simple terms, the 2003 and 2014 elections combined, the PQ had few minority candidates which had few odds of winning and the ADQ/CAQ had several minority candidates which had even fewer chances of winning (which might point to the nomination of “sacrificial lambs”). Minorities performed better with the PLQ/QLP although the party’s hegemony in minority representation is declining. Ethnic minority presence in the National Assembly improved between 2003 and 2014, and minorities sit less and less exclusively under the PLQ/QLP banner. OED MNAs reached proportionality, mainly due to their increased numbers within the PLQ/QLP and the CAQ. They are still absent from left-leaning Quebec nationalist parties, as are most minority groups, seemingly confirming a consequence of the tensions between minorities and the Québec nationalist movement, highly perceptible in PQ and ON candidates but less so for QS.

This research is not without limitations as small numbers frequently have great impact on the analysis results. The combined effect of gender and ethnic categories, the breaking down of visible minority or OED categories in their constituting sub-groups or the participation and representation of First Nations could not be meaningfully investigated due to the shortcomings of working with small numbers. Also, at the origin of this endeavor, it must be reminded that ethnicity matters comport an important part of subjectivity. There are dangers in solidifying ethnic assignments in academic research as it can promote stereotypes or discrimination. However, the striking findings previously described seem to legitimize the need to monitor the

extent to which minorities are allowed or hindered from fully participating and succeeding in formal politics in Québec.

This greater portrait points to a general trend of improving minority representation in Québec formal politics. Left/right cleavages and the national question remain essential in explaining where minorities are likely to get involved. Structural urban disadvantage in the electoral map impedes the voting power of minorities and reduces the number of potential minority influence ridings, which are shown to be more likely to have minority candidates. Future electoral maps could make room for more influence minority ridings and a diminished urban disadvantage which would with few doubts improve the political power of Québec's minorities. Current CRE guidelines for the drawing of ridings offer room for the representation of "natural communities", and giving consideration to Québec's minorities as communities of interest would be doable. If more influence minority ridings are added to the electoral map, the extent to which descriptive representation of minorities will be improved remains uncertain. Such ridings are more often than not safe wins for the PLQ/QLP, but visible minorities are seldom nominated there for the Liberal party.

Visible minorities are subject to more challenges than other Quebecers, and the absence of a racial discourse in Quebec hinders the problem from being tackled. The PLQ/QLP's importance in minority representation, while diminishing, is still major. However, why does not the party run minority candidates in ridings where minorities live? Why does the CAQ nominate a large amount of minority candidates whom end up having fewer odds of being elected?

Future research would gain from untangling how candidates are selected in Québec provincial elections. Most party websites offer the detailed process as to how candidates are selected, but in quest for greater details, we intended to pass an online questionnaire in order to investigate the details of the candidate nomination process with regards to a riding's characteristics and the involvement of linguistic, religious, ethnic and visible minorities, but were met with rebuttal from most of the major parties. Perhaps would subtler techniques, like informal interviews with party officials, allow to unveil practices on the ground? It would definitely flesh out the responses drawn in this research, and elaborate on whether the full inclusion of Québec's minorities is obstructed by a "parti pris."

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APPENDIX

Figures

Figure 3.0: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and French-only mother tongue population (2001)




Figure 3.1: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and French-only mother tongue population (2011)




Figure 3.2: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and non-official language mother tongue population (2001)




Figure 3.3: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and non-official language mother tongue population (2011)




Figure 3.4: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and English-only mother tongue population (2001)




Figure 3.5: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and English-only mother tongue population (2011)




Figure 3.6: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and aboriginal identity population (2001)




Figure 3.7: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and aboriginal identity population (2011)




Figure 3.8: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and visible minority population (2001)





Figure 3.9: Québec provincial ridings by population ratio and visible minority population (2011)



Tables

Table 4.0: Estimation of European ethnic ancestry categories on the basis of the 2001 Census and the 2011 National Household Survey (Higher estimates are inclusive of lower estimates)

Ethnicity responses	No control	Controls		
		French mother tongue	English mother tongue	Not a visible minority
British Isles origins	British, Low			
French origins	French, Low			
Other European origins	OED, Low			
Canadian origins		French, Low	British, Low	
Provincial origins		French, Low	British, Low	
Other single origins		French, High	British, High	OED, High
British Isles only	British, Low			
British Isles and French		French, High	British, High	
British Isles and Canadian	British, Low			
British Isles and other			British, High	OED, High
British Isles, Canadian and other		French, High	British, High	OED, High
French only	French, Low			
French and Canadian	French, Low			
French and other		French, High		OED, High
French, Canadian and other		French, High	British, High	OED, High
Canadian and other		French, High	British, High	OED, High
British Isles, French and other		French, High	British, High	OED, High
British Isles, French and other		French, High	British, High	OED, High
British Isles, French, Canadian and other		French, High	British, High	OED, High
Other multiple origins		French, High	British, High	OED, High

Individual response PUMF files for the 2001 Census and the 2011 National Household Survey were retrieved through the Equinox portal³. Low estimates are based on responses pointing to a single ethnic category (French, British or OED), except for North American identities (i.e. Canadian, Québécois, Newfoundlander) for which a mother tongue control was applied. High estimates assume those of European descent are not visible minorities, and that mother tongue is a prime indicator of identity. For example, if an individual reported being both of British and French descent, was not a visible minority and had English as a mother tongue, he/she was included in the high estimates for British descent individuals.

³ <http://equinox.uwo.ca/>

Table 5.0: Success rate of candidates by minority status in the 2003 Québec provincial election

Main parties	Women	French descent	Ethnic minorities	British descent	OED	Visible minorities	All Candidates
PLQ/QLP	62.9%	59.6%	75.0%	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	60.8%
PQ	34.9%	41.9%	10.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	36.0%
ADQ	3.0%	4.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%
All Parties	34.2%	37.4%	21.4%	38.5%	37.5%	13.3%	33.3%

Table 5.1: Success rate of candidates by minority status in the 2014 Québec provincial election

Main parties	Women	French descent	Ethnic minorities	British descent	OED	Visible minorities	All Candidates
PLQ/QLP	51.4%	53.8%	65.0%	75.0%	75.0%	33.3%	56.0%
PQ	17.4%	25.5%	15.4%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	24.2%
CAQ	20.7%	21.1%	4.2%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	18.0%
QS	3.2%	2.0%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	2.4%
All Parties	15.0%	18.5%	13.1%	8.6%	20.6%	10.3%	17.5%