F R E N C H A T T I T U D E S T O B R I T I S H I M P E R I A L I S M: 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 4

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"French Attitudes to British Imperialism, 1898 - 1904."

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M.A. Thesis,

A study of the evolution of French attitudes to England from the Fashoda crisis in 1898 to the Entente Cordiale in 1904. The relationship between French foreign policy towards Britain and French imperialism is examined, with particular emphasis on the role of Théophile Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Eugène Etienne, head of the colonial group. Focusing on African problems, especially concerning Egypt and Morocco, the development of the Entente Cordiale is analyzed within the larger context of the formation of rival alliance systems in post-bismarckian Europe.

The role played by newspapers and public opinion is also examined, with special attention to the factors involved in the formation of collective psychology. Also looked into are the writings of authors specialized in British affairs.

FRENCH ATTITUDES

TO

BRITISH IMPERIALISM

1898 - 1904

M. A. THESIS

Presented by

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FRENCH ATTITUDES TO BRITISH IMPERIALISM

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The problems of understanding how nations perceive one another are fascinating although relatively unexplored, especially for the period previous to 1914. The present study attempts to fill part of this gap by examining the evolution of French attitudes to Britain prior to the formation of the Entente Cordiale in 1904.

I have not attempted to show how Frenchmen perceived the English nation as a whole. Rather, I have concentrated on 'British Imperialism' taken in the larger sense to mean the British presence in world affairs, most especially where France was involved. I have concentrated on the African problem, as it was the region where French and British interests were opposed more vitally. I have not dealt with the Near or Far East, considering that these questions were in the main secondary, at least so far as the French were concerned. Their preoccupations at the time were mostly centered on Africa, more specifically on the Northern, Western and Nilotic regions. Thus the main basis of the present study is Anglo-French competition in Africa from the time of the Fachoda crisis of 1898 up to the making of the Entente Cordiale, within the larger context of the formation of rival alliance systems in Europe.

Essentially, I have tried to show how various individuals and groups of people in France reacted to the British imperial drive of the period. I have studied the problem from two approaches. The first deals with the evolution of French external policy towards Britain as it tied in with French imperialism. In fact, this has meant a concentration on the Foreign Affairs officials, career diplomats and most notably, Théophile Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs during this whole period. I have also studied the reactions of the only pressure-group which had a continuing interest in foreign affairs, the 'Parti Colonial' and its leader, Eugène Etienne. The first part thus deals with those who were involved in the decision-making processes of foreign policy and those who sought to bring to bear their direct influence on its formulation. The second part examines those who also had some effect on foreign policy, but in an indirect way, It deals with the relationship between the press and public opinion with special attention to the factors involved in the formation of collective psychology. Finally, I have examined the writings of authors specialized in British affairs. Thus I have tried to cover as best as possible the whole spectrum of French attitudes from those of the responsible ministers of state down to those of the mass of Frenchmen, from well-articulated views to the more intangible currents of opinion.

At this point I feel I should give an idea of the bibliographical difficulties encountered. We are not in France, so there is no need to dwell on a certain lack of primary sources. As far as the diplomatic and colonial aspects of the matter are concerned, various studies have eliminated many problems in those areas. Unfortunately there are not many of them and I have had to rely on some of them more considerably than I would have preferred. More serious, however, is the lack of available material concerning the evolution of opinion during these years. There are few works of value as far as newspapers are concerned. In fact, the only papers available in North America for this period are Le Temps and Le Figaro. There is no question about the quality of these papers, but when one considers that around 1900 Le Temps had a circulation of barely 60,000 to Le Matin's near-million, it is surprising to find no collection of this paper on the whole North American continent. Moreover, there are no collections of any of the popular mass newspapers such as Le Parisien or Le Soir.

Where periodicals and contemporary writings are concerned, the Bibliothèque Nationale is well-stocked and there is ample material as yet unresearched. The main problem however, lies in the difficulty of estimating their impact. I have only tried to give some indications of the importance

of these sources in the second part.

At this point I wish to express my sincere thanks to the many persons who have helped me in carrying on with this work and to my patient typist, Mrs. Marie Walker.

PART 1.

DIPLOMATS AND COLONIALISTS

I. THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Born amidst the disastrous Franco-German War and the bloodbath of the Commune of 1871, the Third Republic of France was an unstable proposition from the first. Most Frenchmen were shocked by the German victory which marked the end of France's continental supremacy. Their resentment expressed itself in the 'revanche' spirit which remained the essential basis of French attitudes to Germany for the whole period from 1870 to 1914. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine made it unlikely that the French would forget their humiliation for some time to come. Yet 'la revanche' varied in intensity and at times disappeared almost completely from public life. The solidity of the Bismarckian system discouraged any worthwhile opposition while serious internal political crises gradually captured the immediate attention of most Frenchmen.

In the last decades of the Nineteenth Century, the political scene of the Third Republic was dominated by the moderate Republican Party. The events of 1870-71 had largely discredited both the more extreme forms of left-wing republicanism and the right-wing Bonapartists. The Right was further weakened by the division of the Royalist forces, whose failure to settle their differences prevented any hope of a restoration.

In 1879, the Republicans had split between the conservative Opportunists, led by Gambetta and Ferry, and the

reformist Radicals, led by Clémenceau, Floquet and others. The Opportunists, despite the opposition of the other political groups, initiated a series of imperialist adventures which were largely successful, especially under Ferry [1]. Popular hostility and the other political groups swept the Opportunists from office, but the imperial expansion continued nonetheless. The elections of September 1889 confirmed the Republican control of the Chamber while successive ministries attempted to retain power through various combinations of moderate, conservative and radical republicans.

It was against this political background that the Boulanger crisis and its abortive 'coup d'état' erupted in 1889, fed by an upsurge of 'revanchard' nationalism. Boulangism had barely subsided when the Panama Scandal of 1892 undermined confidence in the Republic with its implications of corruption in high republican circles. The other major developments of the period were the movement towards Socialist unity and the shift to the left by the Trade-Union movement, centered around the Confédération Générale du Travail (C.G.T.). These developments failed to have a major impact before 1905, however, mainly because of ideological differences which Socialist leaders like Jaurès, Briand and Millerand were unable to reconcile.

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1. Sept. 1880 to Nov. 1881, Feb. 1883 to Mar. 1885.

In the midst of these social and political uncertainties , the Dreyfus affair burst unto the scene in 1897. The crisis had its origin in the condemnation of Capt. Alfred Dreyfus, convicted in 1894 of having sold military secrets to Germany. Most Frenchmen were satisfied of his guilt until Lt. Col. Picquart of the intelligence service discovered that the evidence against Dreyfus had been forged by another officer, Maj. Esterhazy. Emile Zola and Clémenceau took up the cause, but Esterhazy was acquitted by court-martial. Zola then published an open letter to the President of the Republic, "J'Accuse", accusing several high army officers of conspiring to condemn Dreyfus despite his innocence, and of shielding the guilty officers in the name of army prestige. Zola was tried and convicted, but another officer involved in the conspiracy, Col. Henri, committed suicide shortly after admitting his guilt, which prompted Esterhazy to flee to England. These developments made a new trial inevitable.

In the meantime, however, the individuals implicated by the Affair had disappeared into the background as the political, social and religious overtones of the crisis overshadowed the question of Dreyfus' guilt. In the ensuing confrontation, Republicans, anti-clericals and left-wingers formed the basis of the Dreyfusard movement whereas nationalists, anti-semites and right-wingers formed the anti-Dreyfusard group. The struggle divided all of France into two hostile camps as

demonstrations and violent clashes raised the threat of a civil war.

The crisis was finally ended by the formation of a Radical-Socialist ministry under Waldeck-Rousseau which took strong measures to tone down the conflict. Dreyfus was again tried at Rennes in August 1899 and found guilty but "with extenuating circumstances". President Loubet shortly after pardonned Dreyfus, yet he was not fully exonerated until 1906.

The subsidence of the crisis found the Radical-Socialists, moderate left-wingers, in strong control of the government for the next six years until January 1905. They proceeded to strike back at their anti-republican adversaries by a series of measures aimed directly at the two main anti-Dreyfusard strongholds: the Church and the Army. This struggle to impose Republican authority culminated in the Separation of Church and State in 1904-05, while General Louis André, War minister from 1900 to 1904, carried out an intensive reform program in the Armed forces.

This then was the general picture of French domestic preoccupations in the period we are studying. 'Radical' Republicans, insecure about their power basis, were striking at their political adversaries with a variety of measures designed to last for some time. In view of the importance of these problems for the Radicals, it is not surprising that few of them

were ever preoccupied with France's external policy [2], preferring to leave it in the hands of her skilled diplomats. Most were little more concerned with the problems of colonial expansion, having faith in the capacities of her brilliant colonial figures such as Galliéni and Lyautey.

The legal foundation of the Third Republic was the Constitution of 1875 which had sought to establish a working balance between the power of Parliament and the privileges of the Executive power. By 1879, it had clearly failed to do so and the failure put the executive at the mercy of the elected representatives. Combined with the multiplicity of political parties, its result was chronic ministerial instability. [3]

At times, this could be offset by stable combinations, such as the one on which the Combes Ministry (1903-1905) rested. Continuity of policy was also possible when a single man managed to keep the same post under successive ministries. Such was the case with Delcassé, who survived five different ministries (June 1898 - June 1905). Consistence was also possible when a series of men professed the same political orientation, such as

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2. On this subject, see Bertha Leaman, French Foreign and Colonial Policy under Radical-Socialist Party control, 1898-1905, Chicago, 1938.

3. See Appendix 1, and J. Ollé-Laprune, La Stabilité des Ministères sous la Troisième République, Paris, 1962.

the ministers of colonies who, from 1895 on, were mostly members of the French Parti Colonial. The period we are studying was therefore one of unusual stability.

One should be careful, however, and keep in mind that the Foreign Affairs and Colonial Ministries were not domestic ones, and as such were not subject to the same pressures as, say, the Ministries of the Navy or of Finance. This was the more so as the years 1898 to 1905 were dominated by domestic crises in which external and colonial affairs were, if not forgotten, very much in the background. But this was a long-standing fact in French politics, as an earlier commentator had pointed out:

> Tenez pour certain que la politique extérieure ne préoccupe pas du tout la France et n'y sera la cause d'aucun grand évènement. Les gouvernements peuvent faire ce qui leur plaira, si ce sont des folies, on ne les y soutiendra point, si ce ne sont que des sottises, on les sifflera sans colère, et sans les renverser pour cela, si d'ailleurs ils sont bons à quelque chose pour les affaires intérieures du pays, les seules qu'il prenne au sérieux. [4]

Preoccupation with domestic affairs was also the main reason for parliamentary indifference to problems of foreign policy. There were very few debates on the subject in the Chamber and they were mostly limited to the question of relations with the

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4. Guizot to Lord Aberdeen, 16 September 1849 Lettres de M. Guizot à sa famille et à ses amis, Paris, 1884, pp. 270-272.

Vatican, which had much more to do with domestic religious policy than with external affairs. This lack of interest resulted in an almost total absence of control by Parliament over foreign policy and the policy-makers. External affairs were thus squarely in the hands of the minister charged with the portfolio, especially as the Cabinet was also uninterested and generally left the minister to act as he wished within his area of competence. This could have important results if the minister, in turn, was uninterested in domestic affairs. Such turned out to be the case for Delcassé:

> As foreign minister Delcassé was impatient with the triviality of parliamentary debates, and his interest in internal affairs during his term of office was usually confined to their repercussions on foreign policy. His very lack of involvement in internal politics was perhaps one of the reasons for the length of his survival at the Quai d'Orsay. [5]

As far as the political parties were concerned, indifference to external affairs was also dominant and was maintained until the 1905 Moroccan crisis. The Radical-Socialists, for their part, were mainly supported by the petite-bourgeoisie and this fact dominated their political orientation:

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5. C. Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale, London, 1968, p. 59.

> Owing his social and economic position to the Revolution, the Radical-Socialist possessed an intuitive fear of the downfall of the Republic. As a result he devoted himself to the task of republicanizing the institutions of France, particularly the church and the army. It is not surprising that the Radical-Socialist thus absorbed in domestic politics, which was of primary importance to him, had no thought of foreign affairs. [6]

The combination of these factors had important consequences in the development of French foreign policy. By their lack of interest in external affairs, French politicans left the minister solely responsible for its implementation. In itself this was not very different from other countries going through periods of internal stress. It was, however, to have very important consequences in view of two factors which had a primordial bearing on French foreign affairs during the whole period of 1898 to 1905. The first was the unusually lengthy stay in office of Théophile Delcassé. The second was the intense preoccupation with external affairs of the Parti Colonial, one of the most important political pressure-groups of the period.

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6. Leaman, op. cit., p. 4.

II. DELCASSE AND FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

During the period 1871-1914, French foreign policy was torn between two currents of opinion: one continentalist, the other colonialist. For both, the treaty of Frankfurt was the starting-point of French policy. France had been weakened by defeat, she was diplomatically isolated in Europe by Bismarckian diplomacy and she was more or less living under the German shadow. These factors they agreed on. Where they differed was on the means by which France could offset this disadvantage.

For the continentalists, Europe was the key. Thus all French resources should be concentrated in France proper, more specifically on "la ligne bleue des Vosges". Any diversion of French energies to imperial expansion was folly, if not criminal, since it could only weaken France in the critical European areas.

To the colonialists, this was a short-sighted argument which failed to take into consideration the fact that France was also a world power and as such could not isolate herself on the European continent. Indeed, her strength was in large part a result of her extra-european activities. Colonial expansion, whatever its short-term cost, could only strengthen France in the long run.

The continentalist outlook tended to be supported by the Foreign Affairs officials at the Quai d'Orsay, while the

colonialist outlook was mostly expressed by members of the various bureaux concerned with the formulation of French colonial policy.[7] In a very general sense, one could argue that the French reaction was the means by which the world's third power sought to keep its place among the first two. To the continentalists, it was necessary to follow the German example - an essentially European policy based on a strong army. To the colonialists, the solution lay in the British example - an extra-european orientation supported by a strong fleet.

A clear-cut policy decision was never actually made on the question, but by the time Delcassé came into office several factors had contributed in giving the colonialist outlook an edge over the continentalist. Perhaps the most important among these was the attitude adopted by the French armed forces. The Navy, obviously, was enthusiastically colonialist because of the important role it would then be called on to play. The Army was divided on the question. The old field-marshals, who had fought the Prussians as young men, were naturally more preoccupied with offensives in Alsace than with expansion in Senegal. But a sizable group of the military, in view of the career possibilities offered by colonial service and the military experience it provided, eventually became hesitant about

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7. From 1871 to 1893, the Under-Secretariat for the Colonies. From 1893 on, the Ministry for Colonies.

supporting policies which confined French soldiers to idleness in garrisons. Other factors also contributed to convert the army to imperialism:

> Decorations and rapid promotions made a great appeal to the lower ranks, while nationalism and the spirit of rivalry - above all with the British - which were more strongly felt by the Navy and the Army than by the average citizen, also played their part in making officers and men in the armed services fanatical supporters of the policy of colonial expansion. [8]

Even at the Quai d'Orsay, the traditional narrow-mindedness of diplomatic officialdom was profoundly altered by the arrival of several very able diplomats such as the Cambon brothers Jules and Paul, Camile Barrère and others. A growing realisation of the importance of extra-european problems also made its mark. The final shift to a colonialist outlook was assured when Delcassé was named Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Théophile Delcassé, [9] born in 1852 at Ariège in the Pyrenees, was an emotional "meridional", a faithful follower of Gambetta and thoroughly imbued with romantic patriotism. [10]

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8. H. Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871-1914. Myths and Realities, New York, 1964, p. 166.

9. The best biographies of Delcassé are C.W. Porter, The Career of Théophile Delcassé, Philadelphia, 1936, and the more recent C. Andrew, op. cit. .

10. His own choice of an epitaph was "For France, everything, always!"

His early career was that of journalist with the Gambettist La République Française and Le Paris, where he became an acknowledged expert on foreign and colonial affairs. The general tendency of his articles and his only published work (Alerte, Où allons-nous!, Paris 1882 - protesting the British occupation of Egypt.) had given him a somewhat anglophobe reputation.

Elected as representative of his native constituency of Ariège in 1889, Delcassé's first speech in the Chamber was a long and carefully prepared statement explaining his views on the general orientation of French foreign policy. He defined his position towards England and the possibility of an English alliance as follows:

> Je suis certainement un ami sincère et éclairé des Anglais, mais pas jusqu'au point de leur sacrifier les intérêts de la France... Vous pouvez être certains que les Anglais, en bon politiciens qu'ils sont, n'estimeront que des alliés qui savent se faire respecter et qui prennent leurs propres intérêts à coeur. [11]

Delcassé's first official position was that of Under-Secretary for colonies, which he occupied from 18 January to 25 November 1893. It was Delcassé's efforts that raised the Under-Secretariat to the status of a full-fledged Ministry.[11a]

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11. Journal Officiel, (Chambre), Nov. 7, 1890.

11a. See: F. Berge Le Sous-Secrétariat et les Sous-Secrétaires d'Etat aux Colonies, Paris, 1962.

Delcassé thus became the first French Minister for the Colonies, a significant fact, and occupied the post from 30 May 1894 to 14 January 1895. This was a crucial period in Delcassé's career and perhaps the most important in the development of his policy towards England.

First, because in the major problems he was faced with in Siam, West Africa and the Nile, England was always France's opponent. Secondly because Delcassé's strong anti-British stand on these questions and his energetic support of French imperialism gained him the support of the colonial group, the only political group interested in foreign affairs. The political capital to be gained from such support was obvious, especially as Delcassé had managed to cultivate his public image accordingly. During the Siamese Question of July 1893, for example, Delcassé was opposed to the government's policy and threatened to resign, quite aware that the proposition was unacceptable. As he wrote his wife:

> Their problem is obvious. Since they know that public opinion considers me the man who insists on not giving way to John Bull, they can guess the outcry by the press on learning of my resignation, which would be quite rightly attributed to my refusal to agree to a surrender. [12]

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12. Delcassé to his wife, 27 July 1893, cited in Andrew, op. cit., p. 33.

It may have been good politics to appear as an opponent of the English but Delcassé was equally aware that one of the cornerstones of Gambetta's foreign policy had been the Entente with England and he seems to have generally been faithful to the Gambettist position. The main problem was, since 1882, the continuing British occupation of Egypt. Delcassé may have been open to the idea of a rapprochement with England, but he was in no way prepared to accept the permanence of the British position in Egypt.

Delcassé, however, disappeared from governmental office during the period 1894-1898 and only surfaced again as Minister of Foreign Affairs with the second Brisson ministry. During this interval, he had strengthened his ties with the Parti Colonial and some evidence of its growing strength is given in the fact that Delcassé obtained the office as the candidate of the Parti [13]. He had also formulated the main ideas on which he was to base French foreign policy until 1905. Essentially, it was a double-pronged policy. One one hand, he would consolidate France's continental position and form a coalition centered around France to counter German preponderance. On the other, he would pursue French expansion in Africa, especially in the Mediterranean areas. Delcassé's policy was thus a mixture of

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13. Ibid, p. 53.

the colonialist and continentalist outlook. He often used colonial affairs to further his continental aspirations, and vice-versa.

Papers dealing with Delcassé's career as Foreign Minister often start off with the Fashoda crisis, seemingly failing to notice the importance of his activities as minister for the previous three months, which offer an understanding of the principles of his policy. They are also of some importance because they strengthened France's diplomatic position and managed to win Delcassé the confidence of the French foreign service. [14]

The first of these diplomatic moves were the negotiations started by Jules Cambon, ambassador in Washington, which ended the Spanish-American conflict and strengthened France's position in the Mediterranean. With Camille Barrère, ambassador in Rome, Delcassé negotiated a Franco-Italian commercial accord, (21 November 1898), raising the possibility of a rapprochement between the two countries. Finally, with Paul Cambon, ambassador in Constantinople, he managed to preserve France's religious protectorate in the Ottoman Empire against German pressures. Combined with France's economic interests, the protectorate had often proved to be a very useful diplomatic tool in the Near East.

In all of these questions, the common element is the

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14. On these questions, see Andrew, op. cit., pp. 78-86.

Mediterranean, which reveals the basis of Delcassé's extra-european policy:

> The imperial vision which was to dominate the development of his foreign policy was of a Greater France built around the shores of the Mediterranean, with an African hinterland stretching southward to the Congo. The single-mindedness with which he and some of his collaborators pursued this vision made them acutely, sometimes pathologically, suspicious of the Mediterranean ambitions of other powers. [15]

There were two main centres of French interest in the Mediterranean: Egypt and the Algerian-Tunisian region with its natural extension area in Morocco. From 1898 to 1904, the French gradually abandoned their hopes for the Eastern Mediterranean where they were opposed at every step by the British. Their ambitions eventually centered in the Western Mediterranean, with the tacit approval of the British who found it to their advantage to divert the French with compensations in Morocco.

The other parts of the French Empire also had their part to play in Delcassé's diplomacy. But their importance was secondary. During his career as a journalist and deputy, Delcassé had been an ardent supporter of French expansion in Madagascar and the Far East. By 1898, he had altered his beliefs and had come to share the opinion of a growing part of the groupe colonial which believed that French imperial efforts should be

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15. Andrew, op. cit. pp. 86-87.

concentrated in Africa. Delcassé's shift to this opinion was the result of a serious study of naval matters which he had carried on from 1894 to 1898. This study had converted him to the theories of the Jeune Ecole and was a determining factor in the policy he adopted toward England and France's Mediterranean ambitions.

The Jeune Ecole was an influential body of French naval thinkers which included several admirals, Touchard, de la Granière, Reveillère, and some authoritative journalists such as Etienne Lamy and Gabriel Charmes. The essence of their thought was that naval wars of the future would not be decided by heavy-slugging bouts between slow battleships but by raiding and commerce-destroying effected by large numbers of fast cruisers and torpedo-boats ("guerre de course"). The Jeune Ecole had a great impact on French Naval policy, and was not ignored by the other naval powers, especially England, where the "Guerre de course night-mare" was very much taken into consideration by naval policy-makers. [16] It was obvious that the Jeune Ecole theories were essentially aimed at British naval and commercial supremacy.

Delcassé's own conversion to these opinions was the main basis for his change of opinion regarding French imperialism outside of Africa, since the French Navy could not hope to rival

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16. See A.J. Marder, British Naval Policy 1880-1905; The Anatomy of British Sea Power, New York, 1940, Chapter VI, pp. 84-104.

the Royal Navy in specific areas. Indo-China and, to a certain degree, Madagascar were thus in fact militarily indefensible because their supply-lines to France were essentially naval. The African possessions also suffered from this drawback, but they were thought to be much more self-reliant. These were the accepted corrolaries of the Jeune Ecole doctrine.

The gradual centering of attention on Africa ("Lachons l'Asie, prenons l'Afrique") by Delcassé and some colonialists was also the result of a conviction that Indo-China and Madagascar were economically unviable and would always be little but a drain on French resources. Also involved was the new ethos of African imperialists which was based on "a growing belief that French North Africa was unique among the empires of the world" and "the myth of a Mediterranean empire, which would be an indissoluble part of the French metropolis" [17]. But in North Africa, the nemesis was England. In the clash of the two imperialisms, Britain had often got the better end of the bargain, letting "the gallic cock scratch empty sands". In the end, British naval power had most often proven itself to be the decisive factor, and was to do so again very soon.

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17. Andrew, op. cit., p. 88

III. IMPERIALISM AND THE 'PARTI COLONIAL'

French Imperialism since 1870 had been very different from its British counterpart. While the English were setting up colonies on the main commercial routes and establishing themselves on the key strategic points of the globe, the French were apparently content to channel their imperialist energies into areas of little significance. Far from it: the French were pushing imperialism as hard as they could, but with a different approach. The reason was simple:

> Comparatively, France lacked the colonists, overseas merchants and investors to emulate the British kind of Empire; but it was comparatively strong in the military and cultural resources for expansion. If the French were to build an empire at all, it had to be the kind of empire they could build. Throughout the century, France's typical imperial agents had been soldiers, technicians and teachers rather than merchants and colonists: the exportable surplus of its standing army and efficient education, not those of its economy. [18]

This essential difference explains some of the French criticisms of British imperialism, and vice-versa. A sizable group of the French colonialists did argue that France should follow in the British footsteps but the French economy was too self-sufficient and their overseas trade and shipping were never

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18. R. Robinson, from the Introduction to H. Brunschwig, op. cit., p. IX.

developed enough to form the basis of a commercial empire.

The French form of imperialism [19] was based on what were called "foyers de rayonnement", or "Centres d'expansion". These "foyers" were the nuclei of the French possessions overseas which served as launching-pads for future expansion in other areas.

Thus in the 1890's, the French settlements in Cochin-China and the Tonkin had been expanded into Indo-China which struggled to push into Siam and Southern China. The French were also busy "pacifying" Madagascar which formed the basis of French influence in the Indian Ocean, just as their possessions did in the Pacific. The French had for the moment abandoned any serious efforts for their American possessions, Guyane and a few Caribbean islands.

But all of these were the secondary objectives of the imperialists. The main effort was to be concentrated in Africa. From early outposts in Algeria, Senegal and West Africa, the French vigorously pushed into the African interior, seeking to link up their various possessions, in spite of the Sahara obstacle.

French modern imperialism first started in these directions during Jules Ferry's stay in power (1880-1885).

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19. For the best study of modern French imperialism, see S.H. Roberts, History of French colonial Policy, 1870-1925, London 1929.

Bismarck, eager to divert French attention from Alsace-Lorraine, encouraged Ferry in his imperialist adventures. Ferry was well aware of the importance of this support and managed to use it to his fullest advantage. Secure on the continent, he undertook an aggressive imperial policy which created the basis of the modern French empire. This was not without its negative results, however, especially concerning Anglo-French relations. There was little Britain could do except protest, because of the menace of a continental coalition of naval powers against her. There were other implications of Ferry's policies:

> There must...be counted among the lasting results of Ferry's international policy the fact that an Anglo-French estrangement, which began shortly after the military intervention in Egypt (1882), was made worse and persisted for nearly two decades. Moreover, the loss of the race for Tunisia was a factor in influencing Italy to ally herself with Germany and Austria. [20]

In Ferry's time, the colonial movement was just getting started and there was no organised propaganda movement. Defending his policy in the Chamber, Ferry had to build up an acceptable rationale for Empire-building. On July 28, 1885, after the fall of his cabinet, he explained his 'system of colonial policy', which was founded on three essential ideas: the trade argument, the humanitarian argument and the political argument.[21]

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20. T. Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, New York, 1944, p. 196.

21. See Brunschwig, op. cit., pp. 76-81.

The trade argument was that of the investment and market potential of French overseas possessions. If Ferry's earlier justifications of imperialism had been mostly founded on national prestige, he realized that the economic argument was much more powerful, especially in an Assembly predisposed toward economic and financial interests. The humanitarian argument was the 'mission civilisatrice', the French equivalent to the 'White Man's burden'. This stipulated that France had a 'mission' to bring to the underdeveloped countries the salvation of French culture and Christianity. The political argument was simply that France could not stand back idly while other nations carved themselves vast empires in Africa and Asia. In doing so, she would abdicate her status as a great power.

These ideas were later taken up and expanded by the colonialists, for whom Ferry was the founding spirit of modern French imperialism. If the colonial movement had been ill-managed during Ferry's time, it soon became one of the most influential political groups of the Republic, and all-powerful in foreign and colonial affairs. Yet the 'Parti Colonial', as it became known, was not as well structured as one would imagine:

> Using the word 'party' in its modern sense, there was never any 'French Colonial Party'. The movement had no executive committee, no organized sections, no clearly defined program, no electoral platform and no discipline. It simply represented a section of public opinion which embraced people of different political

> tendencies and irrespective of whether they were concerned with the economic value of colonies... Regarded as a group, the colonial party included a large number of persons and associations... The most influential--that is, those influencing policy--were the colonial group in the Chamber and Senate, the Comité de l'Afrique Française and the Union Coloniale Française.[22]

The parliamentary colonial group was the most influential organism of the Party, having a direct say in external and colonial affairs. The 'groupe colonial' was the only political group which showed any sustained interest in foreign policy from 1892 to 1905. And indeed only the imminent danger of war provoked by the German threat persuaded some of the non-colonialists to take a closer look at foreign affairs. This preoccupation of the colonial group with external affairs may seem to contradict the fact mentioned earlier that parliamentary debates on the subject were rare. The contradiction is only apparent as the colonial group generally believed that such subjects were best avoided in public in order not to "arouse the hostility and suspicion of foreign powers"[23]. They understood perfectly well the potentially explosive distinction between 'official' and 'non-official' statements in these matters, especially when the susceptibilities of foreign powers were involved. So while

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22. Brunschwig, op. cit., p. 106.

23. Andrew, op. cit., p. 54.

public debates were rare, the behind-the-scenes influence of the group was no less important. Most of its members came from the Centre but it had representatives from all political parties except for the extreme right and left. Its influence can be gathered from the fact that its membership increased from 91 in 1892 to about 200 in 1902, which represented about a third of all the deputies in the Chamber. Equally decisive was the fact that there was no group of 'anti-colonialists' in the Chamber which could counterbalance the predominance of the colonialists. Even the Socialists, opposed to military and economic imperialism, were convinced of the rightfulness of the 'mission civilisatrice', which they saw as an extension of the 'messianic' revolutionary tradition of France.

The Comité de l'Afrique Française, formed in 1890, was a group of colonialists intent on making French as much of Africa as possible. The movement, as others in many countries, was born of a reaction to the Anglo-French convention of 1890 which had seemed to threaten the spread of French influence in Africa. The Comité hoped to counter this menace, partly by organizing expeditions but mainly by creating a body of public opinion ready to support French imperialism in Africa. It was never a rich body, nor a numerous one. It was not strongly supported from commercial and financial quarters, since it was "essentially political in character and its main appeal was to the

nationalism of the middle class " [24], Its influence, however, was very great:

> The great bulk of the money received (by the Comité) was spent on propaganda. This propaganda was clearly successful. Public opinion was passionately aroused wherever national rivalries brought France up against its neighbours. Public opinion accepted the policy of expansion even when it criticised the colonial administration for its faults. The committee's method for rousing public opinion (publications, banquets, public meetings, etc.)... was certainly well adapted to the social conditions of the period. This is shown by the fact that it worked. [25]

The main organ of the Comité was its excellent publication, the Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française.[26] It became known as one of the world's foremost journals on colonial affairs. It contains the best articles written on British imperialism at the time and was a severe critic. It was fairly objective, however, and it did not seek sensationalism to a wide extent.

The success and influence of the Comité encouraged the formation of many other such groups and journals. There were formed, for example, the Comité de l'Asie Française (1901), the Comité du Maroc (1904), the Comité de l'Océanie Française (1905) and a great number of leagues, institutes and associations

24. Brunschwig, op.cit., p. 113.

25. Ibid., p. 117.

26. The Bulletin is unfortunately unavailable in North America, despite its importance.

all devoted to the principles of French imperialism. A great many of these groups had their own publications which thoroughly covered the news in their areas of interest. Writing on the formation of the Comité de l'Asie Française, its chairman, Eugène Etienne, set out the main reason why such groups were necessary and threw some light on Anglo-French rivalry:

> It is essential that the French public should obtain this necessary information (on colonial affairs) from French sources; that, wherever we have important interests, we should cease relying on the British information and ideas which encircle the world and which, with a unity, a persistency and a discipline one must admire, state the facts in such a manner as to lead astray and weaken the wills of those who are serving the national policies of countries other than Britain. It is also essential that, in the struggle to open and develop new markets, our industrialists and traders should not have to depend on their rivals for information, and should have the support of a public opinion which is at once informed, favourable and active. [27]

Etienne knew very well, however, that since 1893 the economic aspect of the colonies was in the hands of the Union Coloniale Française, a "federation of the leading French business houses with interests in our colonies." [28] A fairly wealthy body compared to the other colonialist organizations (as business-minded groups often are), it had more than 1,200

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27. Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Francaise, Jan.1901 cited in Bunschwig, op.cit., p. 118.

28. Ibid., p. 120-133.

members in 1900. During the period from 1892 to 1903, it sponsored over 400 meetings, received more than 30,000 letters and was the most active of all colonial groups. It had its own library service and an influential periodical, La Quinzaine Coloniale.

The Union held monthly meetings and dinners at which spoke such notable personalities as Delcassé, Etienne, Emile Levasseur [29], Paul Vidal de Lablache [30], and offered bursaries to students of colonial affairs. The Union encouraged emigration to the Colonies, subsidized any worthwhile colonial enterprise and periodically summoned colonial congresses or banquets which attracted parliamentarians, geographers and other colonial groups. The Union was also influential in the creation of a 'Colonial League of Youth' in 1897 and the 'Federation of Colonial Youth of French Agricultural Schools' in 1899.

The various colonial groups shared the same basic principles, yet a rift gradually emerged between the colonialists over the proper direction of future colonial efforts. In the 1890's, the Union Coloniale became dominated by French colonial business interests which were much more in favor of developing

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29. Emile Levasseur (1828-1911), one of the most well-known economists of the period, noted for his historical approach to economics.

30. Paul Vidal de Lablache, eminent geographer, founder of Human geography.

existing possessions than in expanding into new territories. The Union drained some support from the Comité de l'Afrique Francaise, which represented the other school of thought. In a way, the two groups were only representative of their basic interests. Since the Comité d'Afrique's preoccupations were mainly political, they were naturally concerned with expanding French territorial influence over as large an area as possible. The Union's economic preoccupations, on the other hand, made it believe that dissipating French resources in a great many projects did not make France any stronger or wealthier. Only by organizing effectively those areas already under French control would French expansion be profitable. There was some tension between the opposing groups, but this did not filter out of the colonial 'entourage', nor does it seem to have had any adverse effect on the public's attitude. Actually, the conflicts within the Colonial Party were carefully toned down, especially in the face of imperial competition from other nations, more specifically England.

The colonialist's feelings towards the British were varied. On the whole, the school of thought represented by the Comité was more anti-British because of the opposition and conflicts that resulted from its advocacy of active imperialism. The Union and its followers, on the other hand, were more interested in enjoying the fruits of these conquests and thus

played down the antagonisms that could lead to a conflict with Britain. There was never any clear-cut advocacy of a particular policy by specific groups, however, since they were as fairly opportunistic as any political pressure group. In fact there is much less interest in trying to find out exactly how these groups reacted to specific events than in understanding the intangible nature of their influence. Their role was important because it was largely a matter of behind-the-scenes pressure politics, except where public opinion was concerned. But even public opinion was only concerned and interested by the barest superficialities. The colonial groups were important because they made policy-makers aware of their importance. Whenever Delcassé had a crucial decision to make, he had to keep in mind the possible reactions of these groups. In any event, we can get a fairly accurate picture of the colonialists' ideas and influence by examining the role played by Eugène Etienne,[31] acknowledged leader of the colonial party during the whole of the period we are studying. Etienne's thoughts on these matters are even more interesting in the light of the fact that he seems to have consistently avoided any definite attitude which would have alienated any sizable part of the colonialists. His writings reflect the whole spectrum

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31. Eugéne Etienne (1844-1921), despite his enormous influence, incredibly only has two books written about him. One was printed in Algeria, the other in Germany! See the bibliography, (Villot and Sieberg).

of colonialist thought, which sometimes makes for contradictions, but does not prevent him from being the most important colonialist figure in pre-war France after Ferry.

Eugène Etienne was a French Tunisian and was first elected as representative of Oran in 1881.[32] Under-Secretary for the Colonies in 1887, and again from 1889 to 1892, Etienne gradually became known as the leading French expert on Colonial affairs. Earlier a Gambettist like Delcassé, he was a faithful follower of Ferry's principles. His sustained interest in Colonial matters made him for more than thirty years the driving spirit behind French imperialism. Chairman of the colonial group in the Chamber of deputies, Etienne was also the leader of the Republican faction on which the Combes Ministry was based, from 1903 to 1905. Etienne was chairman of the Comité de l'Afrique Francaise, the Comité de l'Asie Française and the Comité du Maroc. His political influence was thus considerable. The Times once noted that "Mr. Etienne is one of the most prominent personalities in French politics, and has perhaps greater authority in colonial questions than any living Frenchman."[33] More important, "his views on such subjects are generally

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32. At the time, Algerian deputies already sat in the Chamber.

33. The Times, 21 April 1903.

endorsed by all parties in the country" [34]. And Etienne was anything but a silent advocate of French expansion. He spoke at innumerable banquets and meetings and wrote on external affairs in a great number of newspapers and periodicals. An important part of these writings concerned England and the most significant of these will be subsequently examined. [35]

One of Etienne's favorite sayings was that in order to be respected in Europe, France must make herself respected outside of Europe. An astute observer, he had always been interested by Britain and saw that following the British example would not, in some aspects, be a bad choice for France. He especially appreciated what he saw as the long-term plans which guided English policy:

> Toute position sur la route de l'Inde, disait Lord Castlereagh au Congrès de Vienne, doit nous appartenir et nous appartiendra. C'est en vertu de cet axiome que l'Angleterre a pris possession du Cap et de l'Ile Maurice en 1815, d'Aden en 1839, de Périm en 1857, de Chypre en 1878, de l'Egypte en 1882: admirable example d'intelligence politique et de persévérance dans la conduite des affaires. Posons en principe que nulle influence autre de la nôtre ne doit porter atteinte à notre prépondérance dans toute l'étendue de la Berbérie, et préparons-

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34. The Times, 2 July, 1903.

35. See Appendix 3 for a list of Etienne's most important writings on England.

> nous par tous les moyens en notre pouvoir à réaliser cette prétention.[36]

Actually, Etienne tended to make too much of British far-sightedness and French short-sightedness. One reason for this was that he had realized the gravity of the French mistake in abandoning Egypt to Britain in 1882. He too was seeking means by which the French could challenge this position. Unlike Delcassé, however, he believed that all parts of the French Empire, if not all equally worthwhile, were at least well worth keeping. This belief was largely due to his understanding of the importance of the Anglo-French struggle for colonial supremacy. For example, Etienne believed that the value of Madagascar for France lay mainly in the presence of nearby English settlements.

> La grande île africaine fait face à l'empire britannique dans l'Inde et à la côte orientale d'Afrique; elle permet de surveiller l'Angleterre dans l'Océan Indien.[37]

Etienne was far from being an anglophobe, in the contemporary sense of the word. He was just very aware of her power and suspicious of her intentions, especially as they affected France's own imperialist ambition. Etienne believed

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36. Bulletin de Comité de l'Afrique Française, april 1903, cited in Sieberg, op.cit., p.200.

37. La Politique Coloniale, 25 april, 1896.

that the proper solution to the Anglo-French difficulties should be resolved through negotiated compromise and not by open conflict for which France was evidently ill-prepared. This was made quite clear by the showdown at Fashoda.

IV. THE FASHODA CRISIS AND THE BOER WAR

Since 1882, the Egyptian Question had become one of the main extra-European preoccupations of the Quai d'Orsay. The continuing British occupation, replacing Anglo-French Dual Control in January 1883, had always been of dubious legality and was an affront to French pride, besides being a living memento of the short-sightedness of her policy-makers. On realizing their mistake, however, French politicians had determined to challenge the British position and in the end decided that the solution lay in the Sudan, which had been evacuated by the Egyptians in 1884-5. There were other advantages. An effective French occupation would open the possibility of linking up France's possessions in the Congo and East Africa.[38] It would also block the British 'Cape-to Cairo' dream.

In 1893, Delcassé, then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, sought to force the British to fulfill their pledge to end their occupation of Egypt. The method decided upon was to send a small military expedition to establish itself on the headwaters of the Nile, at Fashoda, where it would threaten to interfere with the Nile's water-supply. This was the origin of the Monteil and Liotard missions which eventually failed but

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38. The plan was graduàlly abandoned because of more promising possibilities in West Africa.

were then replaced by the Marchand mission which set out from the French Congo in February 1896 and disappeared for two years in the tropical jungle. Other missions were sent out from Abyssinia but failed to rendez-vous with Marchand and had to turn back.

The British, for their part, had tried in 1894 to assign the region to Germany or Leopold of Belgium but were frustrated by Franco-German collaboration on the matter. Since subtler approaches failed, Grey [39] declared in March 1895 that a French advance into the Bahr-el-Gazal would be regarded as an 'unfriendly act' by the British government. Finally, the British decided to re-establish direct control of the region and a strong Anglo-Egyptian army under Kitchener began working its way methodically up the Nile in March 1896.

Gradually, however, the Nile ceased to be a major international preoccupation for the French. The Anglo-Russian clash in the Far East was for the moment much more fraught with potential difficulties. Also alarming was the apparent Anglo-German rapprochement represented by Chamberlain's private approaches to the Germans and his public utterances (Birmingham speech, March 1898). The Anglo-German agreement

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39. Edward Grey (1862-1933), then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Later British Foreign secretary from 1905 to 1916.

on the eventual partition of the Portuguese African Colonies (30 May 1898) was even more significant. It effectively preempted any support Germany would have been inclined to give France over the Nile question, as it had often done in earlier colonial problems.

Meanwhile, Marchand's small column had reached Fashoda in July 1898 after many delays and hardships. Incredibly enough, successive French governments since 1896 had never reexamined the changed circumstances which could affect the Fashoda expedition, such as the British decision to send an army up the Nile. The matter was only discussed by the French government after Marchand's arrival at Fashoda. [40]

The Colonial group, however, was very much preoccupied with the mission and the conditions necessary for its success. From the first, the Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française argued that German diplomatic support was necessary and that failing to secure it would inevitably condemn the Fashoda expedition to failure. [41] When they realized that German support was not forthcoming, they even considered the idea of compensating England in other colonial areas for agreement to

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40. F. Faure, 'Fashoda, 1898', Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, 1955, LXIX, p.30.

41. The French greatly overestimated Germany's strategic interest in keeping Suez open.

let Marchand occupy the Bahr-el-Gazal. The British were far from interested, especially as Kitchener's victories over the Dervishes (Omdurman, 2 September) removed the last obstacle to Fashoda, which he finally reached on September 25. Meeting with Kitchener, Marchand refused to evacuate without specific instructions from the French government. The British were adamant about Marchand leaving the Nile but Delcassé refused to comply until he had received Marchand's report on the situation.

In the light of the diplomatic isolation of France over the Fashoda affair, Delcassé reconsidered his views on the Marchand expedition. His previous policy had been aimed at bringing the Egyptian question before an international conference. That he would fail to accomplish this was now quite clear. At best, he could seek British compensation elsewhere.

Meanwhile, the domestic scene in France had greatly changed. Since the beginning of 1898, events in the Dreyfus affair had evolved with great rapidity. By September, the affair was in its climactic phase. Newspapers were full of accusations and recriminations between 'dreyfusards' and 'anti-dreyfusards' and violent street clashes threatened to erupt into serious disorders, possibly civil war. At the same time, interest in the changing Sudan situation began to rise. The leaders of the colonial movement alerted French opinion to the importance of the British advance and the danger of a

Marchand-Kitchener clash [42]. Etienne wrote a lengthy article in La Dépêche Coloniale which was reprinted in various French newspapers. He argued that the important matter was not the British victories in the Lower Sudan, but rather the necessity of examining the entire future of Egypt and of initiating serious diplomatic negotiations between France and England on the question. Colonel Monteil, now retired and devoting all his time to colonial affairs, stated to enthusiastic listeners that the purpose of the Marchand expedition was identical to that with which he had been entrusted in 1893, the establishment of a French claim on the Upper Nile by effectively occupying some part of it. Robert de Caix, a leading spokesman for the Comité, warned the government that the colonialists were expecting a clash and would not back down. [43]

On 26, October, Captain Baratier arrived in Paris with an optimistic report from Marchand on the situation at Fashoda. He was enthusiastically received at the gare de Lyon by a crowd of supporters. A great number of them were anti-dreyfusards and fervent nationalists, an indication of the extent to which the domestic and the international crises were interrelated. The

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42. For the interrelationship of the Fashoda crisis and the Dreyfus Affair, see R.G. Brown, Fashoda Reconsidered, Baltimore, 1970.

43. Ibid., p. 86-87.

Ligue des Patriotes, a rightist group, had organized this demonstration of between 3,000 to 7,000 supporters. Nationalists and colonialists shared the rostrum and Etienne's speech was accompanied by various chants from "Vive l'Armée" to "Nous resterons à Fashoda!" [44]

The atmosphere was becoming very tense, especially as French and British newspapers were engaged in violent diatribes against one another. On 28 october La Dépèche Coloniale asked that France declare war on Britain rather than humiliate herself by recalling Marchand. On the 29th, many French newspapers published a manifesto drawn up by Etienne and signed by deputies of the groupe colonial which demanded that any Franco-British attempt to settle the Egyptian question should first be debated in the Chamber. On the same day, the Ministry for the Colonies forwarded Marchand's report to the Quai d'Orsay with the proposition that it should be used to wrestle concessions from the British. Bombarded by so many demands, it is not surprising that Delcassé's conduct of policy became somewhat 'erratic'. [45]

President Faure, aware that French diplomacy had overstepped her resources, assumed the responsibility of the

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44. Le Temps, 27 Oct. 1898.

45. Brown, op. cit., 115-6.

gesture [46], and on November 3, the new Dupuy cabinet voted for Marchand's unconditional recall. There was really no other way out of the crisis. France was totally unprepared for war. The divisions caused by the Dreyfus affair, her inability to challenge British sea-power, compounded by the absence of Russian support, made this quite clear. Especially as the British were "willing to go to the limit if necessary."[47]

Even after the evacuation of Fashoda the British continued their military and naval preparations, convincing many Frenchmen that Britain was planning a preventive war on France. The rumours were aggravated by the remarks of the British ambassador to Paris, Sir Edward Monson. He accused the French government of pursuing a "policy of pinpricks which, while it can only procure an ephemeral gratification to a short-lived ministry, must inevitably perpetrate accross the Channel an irritation which a high-spirited nation must eventually feel to be intolerable."[48]

French political groups reacted differently to the Fashoda humiliation. Most Republicans saw the crisis as proof of the necessity of coming to an entente with England on such

46. Delcassé already under much criticism, did not want to be held directly responsible.

47. W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2nd edition, New York, 1951, p. 563.

48. Ibid. p. 564.

matters. They included J.L. de Lanessam, founder of a short-lived 'Entente Cordiale Society' in 1897, and M. Ribot, a well-known politican. Many of France's diplomats, such as the Comte de Chambordy, d'Estournelles de Constant and Paul Cambon also shared the belief. In this matter, the Socialists and the Radicals were in agreement.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the antidreyfusard nationalists were surprisingly opposed to Anglo-French conciliation and instead called for an entente with Germany. Their leaders, Maurras, Déroulède and Cassagnac even accused England of starting and financing the 'dreyfusard conspiracy' to weaken France. Cassagnac commented that "if Germany is an object of hatred, it is for a definite past which can be effaced....But England's hatred against us is inextinguishable, England is the enemy of yesterday, tomorrow and forever." [49]

The obvious obstacle to reconciliation with Germany was Alsace-Lorraine. Delcassé had tried to come to an agreement with the Germans [50], but he realized that the problem was insoluble for the moment. And recent research seems to indicate that as early as 1890, Delcassé was gradually coming

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49. Cited in Langer, op.cit., p. 566.

50. Ibid., p. 567-9.

to accept the necessity of a rapprochement with England. A letter of his dated October 6, 1895 contains the following statement:

> I hope that they (the British) realized that the desire of an entente with England, which I had very freely expressed from the beginning of my term of office, arose not from a feeling of weakness, but from a general political idea. [51]

It seems that from 1898, Delcassé's general policy was aimed at establishing some sort of compromise with England, at least in the colonial sphere. Fashoda had clearly demonstrated the weakness of French naval resources and in colonial activities this could eventually prove to be disastrous, more so as the effectiveness of the Franco-Russian alliance had been tested and found wanting. Some indication that Delcassé wanted a rapprochement of the three powers can be traced as early as December 1898 when he reacted in the following way to a Russian wish that Britain should eventually collapse:

> What an error! What blindness...For both Russia and France, England is a rival and a competitor whose conduct is often harsh and extremely disagreeable. But England is not an enemy, and above all, England is not THE ENEMY...If only Russia, England and France could conclude an alliance against Germany! [52]

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51. Cited in Brown, op.cit., p.122.

52. Ibid., p.123-4.

Such was probably the long-range orientation of Delcassé's policy, but the realization of such a wish was still far off in the future, especially as Delcassé remained convinced that French pretensions in Egypt had not been ended at Fashoda.

More suprising, in the light of their previously aggressive position, was the attitude of the colonialists. After having criticized Delcassé for a short while, most of them reconsidered their stand and more or less abandoned the Egyptian problem. The main reason for this change was their growing interest in Morocco and the need they saw to settle the question in France's favour as soon as possible. As Paul Bourde wrote to Etienne on October 27, 1898:

> L'erreur de notre diplomatie est de croire qu'elle maintient le statu quo au Maroc. Elle y maintient en effet un statu quo, mais c'est celui de notre influence. Tandis qu'elle reste stationnaire, les autres croissent. Il y a dix ans, le Maroc était une question à régler entre nous et l'Angleterre. Aujourd'hui elle est à régler avec l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne. Dans dix ans elle se réglera contre nous si nous manquons l'occasion aujourd'hui.[53]

The importance of Morocco for the colonialists even made them revive the idea of a Franco-German entente on colonial matters. As Robert de Caix explained: "Experience (Fashoda) has clearly demonstrated that in isolation neither France nor Germany has any chance of persuading England to concede a claim of any importance."[54] Yet such an entente in no way seemed to

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53. Cited in Sieberg, op. cit., p. 120.

54. 'La Leçon de Fashoda', BCAF, Nov.1898, cited in Andrew, op. cit., p. 51.

contradict an Anglo-French agreement. To de Caix, it even strengthened it:

> Whilst actually considering (a Franco-German colonial entente) more necessary than ever, we can nevertheless state that we are in favour of an arrangement with England. England will be all the more inclined towards this arrangement if she finds our diplomacy stronger and more flexible in its movements and less preoccupied by continental fears and anxieties. [55]

This dual theme of continental security and colonial forwardness was an old theme of French diplomacy. What is new was the suggestion that this could be established by securing the support of England and Germany at the same time. This theme was soon dropped however, not only because of the question of Alsace-Lorraine, but because Germany became just as serious a competitor as England in colonial affairs, especially regarding Morocco. Compromise with one power was possible. Compromise with two would only leave France empty handed. More important, an entente with Germany would necessarily bring out the problem of Alsace-Lorraine, while an agreement with England was free of such continental matters. As Etienne put it in January 1899:

> Sur le continent européen où de graves problèmes...sont en suspens, les deux pays (France et Angleterre) ne

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55. 'Les relations de la France et de l'Angleterre', BCAF., February 1899, ibid.

> sauraient trouver matière à conflit et, sans nul doute, une entente amicale peut provoquer des solutions équitables et pacifiques. Mais il est indispensable de parler avec une entière franchise. Deux grosses questions sont en suspens: la question d'Egypte et la question du Siam. Que l'Angleterre se décide à les examiner avec la ferme volonté de ne pas sacrifier les intérêts et les droits de la France, et si les deux nations trouvent dans un accord durable un surcroît d'autorité et de force, il est permis d'affirmer que la paix du monde sera assurée. [56]

To be entirely frank, Etienne should have substituted 'Morocco' for 'Siam' and explained that the colonialists were less interested in Egypt than in its value as bargaining power for the Moroccan question. Indeed, after Fashoda, the principal objective of Etienne and other leading colonialists was to persuade Delcassé to come to an arrangement with England which would guarantee the French possession of Morocco. This would be done by an entente based on mutual compensations in Africa, Morocco for France and Egypt for England. This was not suggested by generosity on their part. On the contrary: the colonialists believed it was better to swallow the Fashoda pill, especially as Egypt began to pale in light of the prospects they had in mind for Morocco. For them, the problem lay less in making the English accept the proposition than in persuading Delcassé to undertake the negotiations. Paul Bourde explained his views to Etienne in October 1898:

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56. La Dépêche Coloniale, 17 Jan. 1899.

> M. Delcassé is courageous and patriotic, but I fear that the difference between the interests at stake has not sufficiently impressed itself on him. On the one hand there is Egypt, lost through our own folly and where the only favourable course now open to us is to acknowledge our defeat, and the regions of Central Africa, which can be put to no practical use. On the other hand, there is one of the finest countries in the world with thirty million hectares of usable land (half the area of France) and the possibility of one day having there fifteen to twenty million of our compatriots. And this country is at our gates, on our national sea (sic)--it is not a colony, it is a part of France herself. The advantages for us are incontestable. [57]

For the moment, however, Delcassé was still struggling with the international implications of Fashoda. For the British, Fashoda was a clear illustration of the feasibility of 'Splendid Isolation' and added proof that naval supremacy was THE important factor in world affairs. The French humiliation was duly noted in the European chancelleries, while Britain's confidence was soon to be shattered in the ordeal of the Boer war.

An approach to the Sudan question was made on 21 March 1899 by an agreement which established French and British spheres of influence in the area. French influence was recognized in the Congo basin north of the Belgian possessions, while British influence was recognized in the Nile basin. But the problem was still far from solved since the French considered that

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57. Bourde to Etienne, 27 oct 1898, cited in Andrew, op.cit., p. 106.

the questionwas not the legality of the British occupation (which they argued was quite illegal), but when the British would evacuate as they had earlier promised.

One of the more important results of the Fashoda crisis was that it led Delcassé to decide that, in the future, Russia should be expected to provide France more positive support. The reshaping of the Dual Alliance was accomplished by Delcassé's visit to St. Petersburg in 1899 and by chief of staff meetings in July 1900 and February 1901. Relations between the Republic and the Tsarist Empire, never that cordial, had recently been deteriorating. The French were abandoning their faith in the power of the Russian alliance to help them solve the Alsace-Lorraine problem. Moreover, the Tsar's disarmament proposals which led to the Hague Conference had not been well received in France. Many feared that the conference would be based on a reaffirmation of the Treaty of Frankfurt. Indeed, Delcassé only guaranteed French participation when he was assured that political questions would not be brought up. [58]

The main motivation behind the reshaping of the Alliance was the apparent imminent dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the implied threat of German domination of 'Mitteleuropa'. Franz-Joseph was 68 years old in 1898 and had

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58. See Langer, op.cit., pp. 585-6.

no direct heir, so there was a very real possibility of a 'War of the Austrian Succession' and of a Russo-German struggle for preponderance in the Habsburg Territories once he passed away. Charles Benoist, constitutional historian, believed like Delcassé that the Germans were aiming at Mediterranean supremacy through the Habsburg lands. Germany's 'Weltpolitik' would certainly be better served by basing her fleet on the Mediterranean:

> Germany already has an outlet to the sea in the north and now she wants an outlet to the south--for the principal reason that the North Sea leads nowhere, whereas the Mediterranean leads everywhere, being at the centre of the commercial world. Through this outlet to the south, Germany would become a central and universal power. [59]

German statesmen were not yet that far-reaching however. Most of them still believed that their security rested on the Triple Alliance or at least the Austrian part of it. But what Delcassé believed is more important than actual fact. His fear of the Mediterranean ambitions of Germany, strengthened by German policy in the Near East (Baghdad Railway), was the main reason for restructuring the Alliance:

> His purpose in redefining the aim of the alliance as the maintenance of the European balance of power was to prevent the irruption of Germany into the Mediterranean. His aim in making the

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59. C. Benoist, 'L'Europe sans l'Autriche', Revue des Deux-Mondes 15 Nov. 1899, p. 246.

> duration of the Dual Alliance no longer limited to the life of the Rival Triple Alliance was to ensure that it would still be in force after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. [60]

Less important in the long run but just as significant was the extension of the alliance to cover the contingency of a war with England by either of the two powers. It was agreed that if England attacked Russia, France would mobilize 100,000 men on the Channel and provide the threat of invasion. If England attacked France, Russia would mobilize 300,000 men on the borders of India and Afghanistan [61]. Besides preventing another Fashoda humiliation, this anti-English note made some contribution to the coming Entente Cordiale. To make possible the Russian part of the agreement, French loans were made available which permitted the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent railway, a direct threat to India. The resulting fear of the Russian menace was one of the reasons which drove the English statesmen to seek an entente with France, who would then be expected to keep her ally peaceful. But this development was still somewhat off into the future. It is possible that Delcassé had not yet fully made up his mind about the entente and merely wanted to make the British more amenable.

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60. Andrew, op.cit., p. 132.

61. See DDF. I, XVI, 208, chap.6 and DDF II, III, annexes 1-3.

The most likely explanation is that the reshaping of the alliance was a diplomatic precaution in the event of a failure of the proposed rapprochment. [62]

These negotiations were undertaken as it became apparent that a war in South Africa was imminent. The war was the culmination of a long series of crises between Boer and English settlers in South Africa. In the end, the desire for independence of the Boer republics proved incompatible with British designs for the South African regions (and gold mines). Their mutual intransigence made an open conflict inevitable.

The absence of any meaningful outside support for the Boers assured that the British would prevail in the end, yet they suffered a humiliating series of defeats in the early stages of the war. Building up their strength, however, the British gradually broke down the Boer resistance. The Boers reverted to guerilla warfare while the British carried out a "scorched earth" policy and interned Boer women and children in infamous concentration camps. By these harsh measures the Boers were overcome and a peace treaty was signed at Vereeniging in May 1902.

From the beginning of the conflict, however, the British aggression had roused the anger of European opinion:

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62. See: J.F. Parr, Théophile Delcassé and the practice of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1898-1905. Moret-sur-Loing, 1952.

> Continental opinion was violently hostile and roundly declared the whole business a predatory enterprise pure and simple. The great, greedy British Empire was making no bones about attacking two valiant little republics simply in order to seize their gold mines. It was high time, said the press in more than one continental country, to put an end to British agression and to deal the Empire a telling blow. Everywhere there was talk of a continental coalition, of a union between Russia, France and Germany which would prove irresistible. [63]

Such a coalition had been proposed by Muraviev, the Russian foreign minister, and Delcassé approved of the principle on February 28, 1900 [64]. He proposed that the Germans take the initiative [65], but they refused to assume the responsibility of such an unfriendly act toward England and, more important, insisted on a preliminary guarantee of existing frontiers. While few French politicans were ready to challenge the German position in the foreseeable future, none were prepared to risk their political lives by publicly abandoning Alsace-Lorraine. The German conditions were extremely important, since Delcassé became convinced that any understanding at all with Germany would necessarily have to be based on a prior entente

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63. Langer, op.cit., p. 652.

64. Andrew, op.cit., pp. 158-79.

65. E. Bourgeois, G. Pagès, Les Origines et la Responsabilité de la Grande Guerre, Paris, 1921, p.281ff.

guaranteeing German possession of Alsace-Lorraine [66]. The impossibility of such a move was one of the most important factors in deciding Delcassé to seek an entente with England. For the moment, however, other rumours hinted at the possibility of conflict between France and England. On 11 November 1899, Cambon wrote to Delcassé, warning that there was some possibility that once the British had extricated themselves from South Africa, they would try to pick a fight with France. Such a move would be very popular, considering the anti-French feeling in England.

Although such a scheme lost much of its fearfulness due to the sapping of British strength and the changed agreements of the Dual Alliance, the threat could not be discounted lightly. Sir Charles Dilke, English expert on foreign affairs, confirmed this possibility to French statesmen and was very much believed.[67]. More so when Chamberlain's Leicester speech of November 30 called for "a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two greatest branches of the Anglo-Saxon race." [68]. There was the crux of the matter. Delcassé was not so much worried by England, but by the possibility of an Anglo-German combination

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66. Andrew, op.cit., p. 173.

67. See Andrew, op.cit., p. 116-7.

68. For a French reaction, see Cambon to Delcassé, 1 Dec. 1899, DDF 1, XVI, No. 16, p. 26-9.

and its implications. His most immediate concern, however, was to eliminate any causes of friction which could eventually become a 'casus belli' for England. As he admitted in a newspaper interview in December 1899:

> I can only see one reason why the English might want to make war on us. In anticipation of a possible--and formidable--coalition of European fleets, England might desire war in order to destroy our own fleet before it became even stronger than it is now. But such a war is not so easy to make as one imagines. A war like that is never made without a pretext, and we shall never supply a pretext... [69]

After Fashoda, Delcassé's policy thus contained many contradictory elements. On one hand, there was his 'general political idea' of an Entente with England and its first concrete step in the Nile-Congo agreement; on the other, his persistent challenge to the British position in Egypt combined with the new anti-British aspects of the Dual Alliance and his part in the attempted intervention in the Boer War. There is thus some reason to believe that Delcassé was not always the anglophile his apologists have made him to be [70], and his general orientation towards the entente was not quite as direct as

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69. Le Temps, 16 Dec. 1899.

70. For a good example, see A. Mévil, 'Delcassé and the Entente Cordiale', The National Review, July 1908.

has often been supposed.

Etienne and the colonialists were evidently not silent on the question of the Boer conflict, although their interests were not directly involved. But even though they were pro-Boer, they were opposed to the principle of French intervention in the conflict. South Africa was apparently too far removed from French territories to be worth more than verbal protests. What they had in mind was to exploit the British predicament by pressing forward French pretensions elsewhere. An article by Etienne in Le Figaro, "L'Angleterre devant l'Europe", gave a very good summary of the colonialist position:

> Après avoir subi plus de vingt ans l'hégemonie allemande, (l'Europe) va-t-elle se courber sous les audacieuses prétentions de l'Angleterre? Que le Transvaal succombe et l'infatiguable Albion pourra sans péril, et sur de plus vastes théatres, renouveler ses impitoyables agressions!...Mais si la France ne peut et ne doit pas intervenir dans ce sanglant conflit, n'a-t-elle pas des intérêts à défendre, des droits à faire respecter? Pourquoi ne pas entamer avec notre puissante voisine une conversation diplomatique, qui sera d'autant plus efficace qu'elle sera plus prompte? L'Angleterre n'a-t-elle pas toujours, depuis vingt ans, usé, abusé des difficultés de notre situation en Europe pour nous arracher des territoires qui nous appartenaient sans conteste...? [71]

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71. Le Figaro, 7 Nov. 1899.

This article provoked an immediate answer from Salisbury, who replied that Etienne's insinuation that members of the British cabinet had personally profited from the conflict was completely unfounded.[72] For Etienne however, this question was quite secondary to his proposal of profiting from British weakness. A successful step was taken in this direction by the occupation of the Tuat oasis on the Moroccan-Algerian border.[73] The move was daring enough, but no further actions of the sort were attempted, mainly because of the fear of a possible reaction by the other colonial powers.

If the French government, pushed on by the colonialists, was quite willing to make the most out of the South African situation, it was not yet ready to risk alienating the British too strongly. The French newspapers had already been quite malicious enough. Also involved in the matter was the success of the Paris World Exhibition which was to open in April 1900 and which depended for its succes on a certain amount of good-will between the great powers, even if only on an official basis. Yet for once, the gracious smiles and

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72. Salisbury's reply was printed in the Times of 10 Nov. 1899, p. 7. Etienne's counter-reply followed in Le Figaro, 12 Nov. 1899.

73. See J. Ganiage, L'Expansion coloniale de la France, Paris, 1968, pp. 221-3.

handshakes exchanged between Frenchmen and Englishmen at the Exhibition were symbols of a great and barely perceptible change that was taking place. Its result would be the Entente of 1904.

V. THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

Within the period of 1898-1901, Lord Salisbury's foreign policy [74] had been partly based on collaboration with Germany. The August 1898 agreement on the eventual partition of the Portuguese colonies in Africa was one instance of the implementation of this policy. The November 1899 agreement on the Samoan Islands had been another, although Bulow's negative response to Chamberlain's Leicester speech and the 'Bundesrath' affair threw some cold water on the warmth of their relations. The nadir of this Anglo-German friendship was reached between October 1900, when they agreed to defend the integrity of the Chinese empire (Yangtse agreement), and May 1901, when negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance fell through. The Germans, overconfident about the British desire for an alliance, had insisted that England ally herself with the Triple Alliance, and not just with Germany. This Britain would not agree to, refusing to risk war for Balkan problems. Also decisive was the German insistence on building their great navy and their belief that, in the end, it did not really matter because an alliance between England, France and Russia

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74. See J.A.S. Greenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, London, 1964.

was totally out of the question. They were right, but only up to 1901.

These diplomatic moves were well-known, especially in France. The French ambassador Noailles commented in May 1900 that the threat of a rapprochement between the greatest naval and military powers was a grave menace to France: "Trafalgar and Sudan are joining hands" [75]. Delcassé further believed that England and Germany had decided to oppose together the French advances in Morocco. In fact, most of the French diplomats believed that the English were secretly trying to make Morocco a British sphere of influence [76]. There were some grounds for this suspicion. Chamberlain had discussed the possibility of such a agreement with the Germans from 1898 to 1901. The role of 'Kaid' Maclean [77] and Walter Harris [78], combined with the fact that the Sultan liked to surround himself with British servants, did little to allay French suspicions. Neither did the persistent rumours of British railway and telegraph projects in Morocco [79].

75. DDF i, XVI, No. 139.

76. See A.J.P. Taylor, 'British Policy in Morocco, 1886-1902', English Historical Review, LXVI, 1951.

77. 'Kaid' Maclean, English military adventurer, rose to be commander-in-chief of the Moroccan forces and an intimate advisor to the Sultan.

78. Walter Harris, the Times' correspondant in Morocco, close to the Sultan and often used as an English agent.

79. On the French suspicions, see Andrew, op.cit., pp. 186-7.

But while Delcassé's suspicions of British intentions could be overshadowed by his 'idée générale' for an entente, he had no such reservations regarding his suspicions of Germany. Moreover, he was awakening to the possibility of isolating Germany on the continent, much as France had been by Bismarck's diplomacy. One means by which Delcassé hoped to accomplish this was to form a coalition to detach the other powers of the Triple Alliance from Germany. There was little hope that he could achieve this with Austria, and it did not really matter in the light of her anticipated break-up. Italy was a much more vulnerable target, especially as it happened to suit Italian desires to gain more latitude in their policy-making.

The first step to a Franco-Italian rapprochement had been accomplished by the November 1898 commercial accord which ended a long tariff war between the two countries. The next major step was taken in December 1900, when France recognized an Italian sphere of influence in Libya and Italy did the same for French pretensions in Morocco. Thus the North African differences which had separated the two countries for a long time were liquidated. The decisive step was taken in November 1902, barely a few months after Italy had renewed her membership in the Triple Alliance. In an ultra-secret exchange of letters, the Italians virtually guaranteed their neutrality in the event of a Franco-German conflict . This was totally contradictory

to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Alliance. For all practical purposes, it meant that Italy no longer considered herself bound by its obligations and could jump either way in the event of a war between France and Germany. [80]

Things were going rather well for Delcassé. The Anglo-German negotiations had broken down and he had successfully detached Italy from the Triple Alliance. The isolation of Germany was taking shape. Much less happy, from his point of view, was the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 1902 [81], which put an end to British isolation. In view of the Russo-Japanese antagonism in the Far East, French support to Russia was greatly weakened since France could not intervene in any dispute without England doing the same. The problem was less one of Anglo-French relations than one of a 'credibility gap' between French engagements towards Russia and the support she could actually give. Despite a Franco-Russian declaration to the contrary on March 20, this was the low point of the Dual Alliance in the pre-war period. Delcassé further became convinced of the necessity to seek an entente with England to counterbalance the effect of the Anglo-Japanese

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80. See Livre Jaune: Les Accords franco-italiens de 1900-1902, Paris, 1920.

81. See I.S. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. London, 1966.

treaty, all the more so since his Moroccan policy was now in great danger. He had the support of Italy, but he refused to negociate with the Germans, probably believing that they would again insist on a preliminary guarantee of existing frontiers, as they had done during the Boer war. By November 1902, he had also failed in his negociations on the matter with the Spanish who were reluctant to risk antagonizing the British.

To pursue his Moroccan policy, he was now resigned to agree with the colonialists and seek some sort of compromise with the British on the question [82]. Quite happily for him, the early successes of revolt led by the pretender Bou Hamara led the English to believe that Morocco was sliding into anarchy and that Britain would be unable to prevent the French from establishing their control on the area [83]. The stage was then set for the negotiations which were to follow shortly.

But the Entente was a more deeply-rooted development than a simple diplomatic exchange. Its immediate roots went back to 1900 at the height of the Boer controversy. While mutual recriminations were at their highest pitch, some efforts had been made at reconciliation by at least some segments of the two countries.

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82. See Andrew, op. cit., p. 197-200.

83. See G. Monger, The End of Isolation, London, 1963, pp.133-4.

The first step was taken by a number of English businessmen resident in France, under the leadership of Sir Thomas Barclay [84]. President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris, he organized a tremendous 'goodwill propaganda campaign'. With the approval of Salisbury and Delcassé, he organized a visit of more than five hundred members of the British Chambers of Commerce to the Paris Exhibition in 1900. The French Chambers of Commerce returned the visit and this was soon followed by visits from members of Parliment. Working together with d'Estournelles de Constant [85], Barclay began rounding up support for an arbitration Treaty between France and England [86], to remove any causes of friction and to refer any disputes between the countries to the Hague Tribunal. Thus any disputes would be out of the reach of emotions such as had been unleashed during the Fashoda and Boer episodes.

The Arbitration Treaty was signed on October 14, 1903, though it had little more diplomatic significance than other similar treaties of the period, such as the Anglo-German one of 1904. The French reactions were nevertheless very favourable and the Treaty was generally regarded as the

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84. Sir Thomas Barclay, (1853-1941), International lawyer, domiciled in Paris. See Thirty Years of Anglo-French Reminiscences, London, 1914.

85. D'Estournelles de Constant, (1852-1924), former diplomat, a leading advocate of the Entente.

86. See Barclay, op.cit., pp. 346-53.

preliminary of better things to come. In a debate on the subject on 19 November 1903, Paul Deschaune, a French deputy, commented:

> Est-il besoin d'indiquer ce qu'une France alliée de la Russie et amie de l'Angleterre peut faire pour le maintien de la paix générale, pour l'intérêt des deux nations, et pour son propre avantage. Quant aux relations de l'Angleterre et de la France, certes plus d'une question grave pèse encore sur elles, mais aucune ne se présente à l'heure qu'il est sous un aspect inquiétant ou aigû ; aucune ne saurait être mise en balance avec la somme encore énorme d' intérêts solidaires qui lient les deux peuples, ni avec les rivalités auxquelles ils ont à faire face. [87]

'Rivalités' was the key word. For both France and England, the attitude of Germany became the deciding factor in making them strive for an entente. For France, it was the German threat to Morocco and the apparent inability to come to any sort of an agreement without first sacrificing Alsace-Lorraine. For their part, the English were rapidly developing a deep hostility towards the German 'Weltpolitik' which they felt could not be carried out without striking at their own interests. Their suspicion that Germany was really out to divide as best she could the other powers only added to this hostility. It eventually assumed proportions which surpassed

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87. E. Lémonon, La Politique Britannique et l'Europe, Paris, 1912, p. 358.

simple naval or imperial tensions. The French observers in England were not blind to these developments. Cambon commented: "The English draw nearer to us in proportion as they feel the hostility between their country and Germany grow and become more acute." [88]

Other changes were certainly just as significant. In 1902, Lord Salisbury retired and was replaced by Lord Lansdowne, who was much more amenable to France than had been his predecessor. More important, Queen Victoria had died in 1901 and was succeded by a very francophile heir, Edward VII. [89] As Prince of Wales, he had spent much of his time either in Paris or Biarritz. He liked the French as a people and had formed many attachments with both the social aristocrats (Jockey Club) and with leading personalities of the Republic such as Gambetta and his followers. Personally popular among the French, the fact that he was now King of England had a great effect in awakening feelings towards rapprochement between the two countries. This influence had all the more impact because of the importance attributed to him by the French policy-makers:

> French statesmen believed that English foreign policy was in the hands of three

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88. DDF 2, III, no. 137.

89. See Sir S. Lee, King Edward VII, 2 vol. London, 1927, and Sir P. Magnus, King Edward the Seventh, London, 1964.

> men, Edward VII, Chamberlain and Lansdowne--probably in that order of influence. Barrère believed that King Edward VII 'personally directs the foreign policy of Great Britain', and most Frenchmen were later to believe that the King had been the English architect of the Entente. [90]

Edward had been in favour of an entente between France and England for some time, both for political and personal reasons. His first opportunity to be of some influence came at the end of a Mediterranean cruise in the spring of 1903, when he visited France for the first time as the King of England.

He arrived on May 1 and the first reception was somewhat cool. As he rode through the crowded Champs-Elysés, he was met with cries of 'Vive Marchand', 'Vive Fashoda' and 'Vive les Boers'. That same night, he attended a performance at the Théatre-Français, where he made a favourable impression by greeting a French actress with: "Mademoiselle, I remember applauding you in London where you represented all the grace and spirit of France" [91]. The next day, he attended a military review at Versailles and was afterwards cheered when he arrived at the Hotel de Ville. He again made an agreeable impression by recalling his previous visits to Paris: "I will never forget my visit to your charming town and I can assure you

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90. Andrew, op.cit., p. 195.

91. S. Lee, op.cit., vol.2, p. 238.

that it is with the greatest pleasure that I return to Paris, where I have always felt as if I were at home." [92]. The afternoon was spent at the Longchamps races with his Jockey Club friends and in the evening he attended a state banquet at the Elysée Palace where he made his best impression with another warm speech:

> It is scarcely necessary to tell you with what sincere pleasure I find myself once more in Paris, to which, as you know, I have paid very frequent visits with ever-increasing pleasure, and for which I feel an attachment fortified by so many happy and ineffaceable memories. The days of hostility between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent. There may have been mis-understandings and causes of dissension in the past; but that is all happily over and forgotten. The friendship of the two countries is my constant preoccupation and I count on you all, who enjoy French hospitality in their magnificant city, to aid me to reach this goal. [93]

His past associations with the French were paying off. By the time he left Paris, the cheers had become 'Vive Edward!'[94]. The visit had proven a huge sucess. And it was due in no small

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92. P.J.V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale, London, 1969, p. 165.

93. Cited in S.B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2nd ed. rev., New York, 1966, vol 1, pp. 153-4.

94. For Monson's comments on Edward's visit, see Monson to Lansdowne, 8 March 1903, B.D. VI, appendix 1 (b), pp. 763-8.

part to Edward's ability, charm and popularity. Public opinion on both sides of the Channel was forgetting past differences and starting to consider the advantages of better relations between the two countries. Delcassé was also influenced by these developments:

> It was, above all, Edward's attitude which convinced Delcassé that an agreement with England was possible. And it was Edward who by his personal popularity in France did most to prepare French opinion for the new course in French foreign policy. [95]

But soon, the question of Germany's interest in Morocco surfaced again with the formation in February 1903 of a Moroccan Association which demanded that Germany seize a foothold in Morocco. The Germans had already developed a substantial commercial interest in Morocco which rivaled that of the French [96]. These developments increasingly worried Delcassé. Etienne was equally concerned. In an attempt to smooth the ground between France and England, he wrote an article in the National Review [97] which restated his previous thoughts on these matters in a very conciliatory attitude and reaffirmed his belief in the possibility of a Moroccan-Egyptian exchange.

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95. Andrew, op. cit., p. 209.

96. See Barclay, op. cit., p. 276.

97. Etienne, 'The Colonial Controversies between France and England', the National Review, 1 July 1903.

Not willing to let it go at that, he then went to London and had a long talk with Lansdowne during which he assured him that he was in agreement with any offer Delcassé might be making in future negotiations. He again expressed the hope that some understanding could be reached concerning Morocco. He also gave his views on the advantages of a rapprochement, which Lansdowne was certainly glad to hear:

> At the conclusion of our conversation, M. Etienne expressed his belief that the most serious menace to the peace of Europe lay in Germany, that a good understanding between France and England was the only means of holding German designs in check, and that if such an understanding could be arrived at, England would find that France would be able to exercise a salutary influence over Russia and thereby relieve us of many of our troubles with that country.[98]

While Lansdowne may have had his reservations about the 'German menace', he was obviously interested in the 'Russian' aspect of the Entente. The conversation also showed that, in Etienne's mind, the 'Entente' was more than just an agreement giving France a free rein in Morocco. He was equally aware of the wider implications of the Entente.

On July 6, President Loubet and Delcassé arrived in England, returning Edward's visit. It was an enormous success and the enthusiastic crowds everywhere symbolized the enormous

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98. B.D. II, No. 356, p. 293.

change that had taken place in English public opinion since 1898. As Cambon later remarked to Delcassé, "That coldness, that reserve which ordinarily characterises the English had for a moment disappeared... Never, for fifty years, had the head of a foreign state been the object in this country of such ovations and, if the fact was striking in London, it seemed to me all the more significant in a small quiet provincial town such as Dover, where the whole population emerged from habitual calm to demonstrate warm sympathy toward France and its representatives."[99]

Behind the scenes, talks had already started between Delcassé and Lansdowne. On 11 July, Le Temps echoed Delcassé's optimism by stating that "the Anglo-French rapprochement is an accomplished fact". This was in part an attempt by Delcassé to influence opinion and prepare it for the rapprochement he knew was coming fairly soon.

The decision to go ahead with negotiations reflected the basic difference between French and English foreign policy: "In England the decision to seek an Anglo-French entente was in a real sense a cabinet decision. In France it rested on a personal decision by Delcassé on which even the Prime Minister had far less influence than a man who was not even a member of the government, Eugène Etienne"[100]. Despite these differences,

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99. DDF.3, No. 384, p. 502.

100. Andrew, op.cit., p. 212.

the negotiations between Cambon and Lansdowne got under way on 1 October on the basis of an exchange of respective interests in Egypt and Morocco. Working out the details took some time, but agreement on the essential items was reached fairly quickly. [101]

While it is not my intention to go into the details of the negociations, there are some important aspects which can be pointed out. For Delcassé, although the Moroccan question was of vital importance, the primary aim was the 'Entente' itself. To a certain extent, the negotiations and settlements were probably less important than the 'rapprochement' implied between the two countries. To achieve this, it was felt that a complete and total liquidation of possible sources of tension was necessary. It was further necessary that they be settled directly between diplomatic representatives and not by the 'Traité d'Arbitrage', so that negotiations could be completely satisfactory to both parties. In a sense, these specific questions were what had been missing from the Anglo-German negotiations, which could only come to an agreement on very general terms. Cambon had rightly concluded that a settlement of specific disputes would be more popular with the British and their Foreign Secretary. [102]

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101. For the details of the negociations and settlements see Rolo, op. cit.

102. Rolo, op. cit., p. 270.

Much has been made of the importance of the outbreak in February of the Russo-Janapese war in the Entente negotiations. In fact, the Entente had already been nearly finished by then and the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East merely hastened the conclusion of the agreement.

Signed on April 8, 1904, the 'Entente Cordiale' was a complete settlement of colonial differences, based on an Egypt-Morocco barter. In essence, France recognized the British occupation of Egypt, while England recognized French interests in Morocco and pledged diplomatic support for their realization. Secret articles also envisaged the breakdown of Moroccan independence and its eventual partition between France and Spain. The agreement also settled the long-standing disputes concerning Newfoundland, Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides.

Reaction to the Entente was varied. Certainly the most vocal commentators were the colonialists. Etienne was jubilant: "Nous obtenons, ce qui est considérable et presque inespéré, d'avoir les mains libres au Maroc...L'arrangement franco-anglais est excellent, Sachons le reconnaître. Sachons surtout en profiter." 103 Not one to lose his head, he also kept in mind the greater significance of the Entente and the important role France would now be called on to play in

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103. Lémonon, op. cit., p. 359.

Anglo-Russian relations. In a speech on 3 November, he commented:

> Nous avons, il faut le dire, le répéter, l'affirmer, nous avons, nous, la volonté d'être plus attachés que jamais à ceux qui sont nos amis et nos alliés. Nous sommes aussi les amis de l'Angleterre...et nous désirons fortifier notre entente avec elle, parce que nous avons le sentiment, l'espoir, qu'un jour notre pays sera lui-même assez persuasif et peut-être assez fort pour amener à son tour l'entente entre l'Angleterre et la Russie. [104]

The Entente marked a completely new beginning in Anglo-French relations. The first links of the 'impossible combination' had been forged. In fact, the Entente was not as revolutionary as it appeared. It was the German challenge and pressures to break it down that eventually made an alliance out of the colonial settlement. But just as important as the diplomatic rapprochement was the change in public opinion which accompanied the Entente on both sides of the channel. The hatred which separated France and England in 1898 was no longer there. And this is where the fundamental change had taken place. To understand it, it is necessary to take a closer look at the mechanisms of opinion in France and the evolution of that opinion throughout the period we have examined.

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104. La Petite Gironde, 18 April 1904.

PART 2

SCHOLARS, JOURNALISTS AND OPINION

I. THE CLIMATE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PRESS

At the end of the nineteenth century, the general trends of French opinion were not considerably different from those of the other European powers. The only obvious distinction would be the xenophobic nationalism inherited from the recent trauma of the Franco-Prussian war. In general, the basic patterns of public opinion were more similar than dissimilar in the whole European continent which was in great part due to the development of a strikingly new form of communication which transformed the political and social scene of Europe during these years. This was the advent of the inexpensive mass newspaper, whose tremendous impact at the time can only be compared to that of the more recent development of television.

At the end of the 19th century, several factors contributed to the rise of this new medium. Chief among these were the new technological industrialism and the resulting urbanization, which provided both the machinery for producing vast quantities of newsprint and a large number of people in a limited area to read them.

Improved communication systems permitted a faster, more accurate gathering of information and made possible more reliable distribution systems. High-speed presses soon made it feasible to publish daily 10 , 12 and 20-page newspapers

where publishers had been previously hard-put to print four pages. Besides these technical improvements, several other factors contributed to the growth of the French newspapers. One of these was the fairly recent universal suffrage and the concurrent interest of eligible voters in political affairs, which the papers kept them well informed of. The new school system reduced illiteracy considerably and as more people could read, and not only in the cities, newspapers of every sort flourished.

In France, the tradition of quality - most especially in the literary and political fields - was still very much alive in the early attempts at introducing mass newspapers, such as when Millaud started Le Petit Journal, the first true French mass newspaper, whose circulation rose to about 700,000 in 1880. At that time, there were about 2000 newspapers and journals in all of France. By 1900, the number had more than doubled and Paris alone supported about 250 newspapers and a great deal of the journals and periodicals.

A great part of the success of these papers lay in the fact that the new technology made it possible to sell a much bigger paper for considerably less than had been possible a few years earlier. Some idea of this can be obtained from the following graph (abstracted from Manévy):

WEEKLY AND DAILY NEWSPAPERS (POLITICALLY-ORIENTED)

	1881	1899
5 centimes	23	60
10 centimes	24	51
15 centimes	15	11
20 centimes	7	4

The decline of the more expensive newspapers is also apparent. Manévy cites the example of the Matin which considerably increased its circulation when it reduced the price from two sous to one sou. [1]

The most widely - circulated newspapers at the time were five Parisian dailies: Le Petit Journal, Le Petit Parisien, Le Matin, Le Journal and l'Echo de Paris. These five papers, with a total circulation of over five million around 1900, represented La grande presse which followed the rules that had previously assured American dailies their huge success: enormous printings, wide coverage of various fields, a great deal of publicity and stressed political neutrality.

The success of these papers was often a mixed blessing, as one French scholar pointed out:

> Par leur immense succès, les cinq "grands" parisiens...étouffent la presse d'opinion. Sous une apparence d'information objective, ils véhiculent en fait le plus plat des conformismes, sûr garant de l'ordre établi et des intérêts de la

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1. R. Manévy, La Presse sous la Troisième République Paris, 1955, p. 19.

grande bourgeoisie qui les finance. [2].

The question of editorial content of the newspapers raised here had been previously dealt with when the Loi Tinguy had been voted in 1850. Part of this legislation stipulated that all newspaper articles had to be accompanied by their author's name. Journalists could no longer hide from the public under the guise of 'editorialism' and had to be much more careful in their presentation of the facts. They also became well known to the public, who could attach a name to series of articles. As a consequence, journalism served as a stepping-stone to many political careers. Such was the case for Delcassé who, as Foreign Minister, carefully cultivated his relationships with the press.

Partly because of the Loi Tinguy and partly due to the wish of the papers to attract as wide a readership as possible, some French papers had gradually shifted their orientation from analyses of political situations to more or less objective presentation of news. These newspapers became known as the journaux d'information, of which the most successful were l'Echo de Paris (1884) and Le Matin (1884), previously mentioned. Another paper, Le Temps, went even

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2. C. Dupeux, La Société Française: 1789 - 1960 Paris, 1964, p. 192.

further in this direction, but its small elite readership and its privileged links with the government made it a special case.[2a]

While these developments were in progress, a great number of the French newspapers remained of the journal d'opinion type which was in many ways different from the journal d'information.

The journeaux d'opinion tended to have small, restricted circulations as they catered to partisan groups, supported a definite political orientation or were specialized in a certain field such as literary criticism. Being devoted to non-commerical ends, they made only limited efforts to widen their scope and bring in more readers. Many of these papers were largely subsidized by political parties, pressure-groups and special interests whose mouthpieces they often became. Most periodicals also tended to fall within this category.

For these papers, objective presentation of news was secondary to its detailed interpretation and discussion. This was the type of reporting expected by their readers and in fact, it was the type of reporting that had always dominated before the advent of the "grande presse". The special political and social climate of France assured their continuing existence but their influence on the masses came to be more marginal. Their main interest lies in the varied presentations of opinion

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2a. See Andrew, op.cit., pp. 67-8.

they offer and these shall be briefly explored in the next section.

For the moment, we shall look into some particularities of the French press which were of importance to the development of French attitudes in this period.

For various reasons, advertising in the newspapers never developed in France as it had done in other countries, and consisted mostly of classified advertising of the petite annonce type which only brought in meagre revenues. The only other income would be brought in by subscriptions and newsstand sales, but these would rarely be substantial enough to meet the costs of producing the paper. In their attempts to solve their money problems most papers found it necessary to resort to certain questionable practices:

> Many (French newspapers) were subsidized by parties or special interests. Publicity was sold to those who wished it. A politican paid for good publicity at so much a line. Favourable reviews in art, music and literary sections were sold the same way. Foreign governments bought favourable publicity for their policies. Bismarck, in his diaries, boasted of the sums paid to win a friendly French Press; and the Communists in 1917 released official tsarist documents disclosing the large sums paid to Havas, Paris and provincial papers, from 1905 to 1917.[3]

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3. X.E. Olsen, The History Makers: The Press of Europe from the beginning to 1965, Baton Rouge, 1966, p. 175.

The susceptibility of the Press to "unsolicited contributions" was well-known and a favourite instrument of pressure-groups because of its potential effect on public opinion. And if internal pressure-groups used these methods, it was no less the case for other nations. In the period we are studying, the best documented case of foreign attempts to influence French opinion is that of Russia.

Through A. Raffalovich, their agent in Paris, the Russians spent considerable sums in order to persuade French opinion that the Franco-Russian Alliance and the enormous French capital investments in the Russian economy were worthwhile. Later indiscretions hint at some of the methods used:

- Comme il est impossible d'acheter tout le monde, il faudra faire une sélection, prendre le Temps, l'Echo de Paris, le Journal, le Petit Parisien, quatre ou cinq journeaux de province.
  - Raffolovich to De White, 13 Oct.1901.

- Contre 50,000 francs, on vous promet un concours sérieux pendant six mois dans la partie financière du Petit Journal, du Figaro, du Matin, du Français, etc. Il ne s'agit pas de neutralité, mais d'un service sérieux, consistant à remonter le courant et à éclaircir le public.[4]
  - Raffalovich, 26 oct 1901.

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4. Cited in L,Abominable Vénalité de la Presse, Paris, 1931,pp. 5-7.

NOTE: in 1905, Raffalovich was bribing the French press at the rate of 200,000 francs a month!

To compound these tendencies, most newspapers used the same news souree: the Havas agency. On news of a local source, Havas had little control. But national or international news items originated mainly from Havas. Only occasionally would a single paper manage to break out an important non-local story. Even the smaller provincial papers, who could not afford Havas' regular service, were provided with abbreviated wires in return for their third and fourth pages which Havas sold to advertising clients. Thus Havas not only controlled most of the French news communication system, but also a large part of its advertising as well. And Havas' sources of financing were just as 'varied' as those of the French newspapers:

> Havas was paid by French Govemments to provide news that would support their policies and to conceal any that was adverse. It was also paid by foreign governments to provide news which would give them a favorable press in France and in southern European countries where Havas had newspaper clients. [5]

When considering public attitudes to external affairs, it is important to keep these factors in mind, for in the long run, the response of the public depended a great deal upon the attitude of the news distributors themselves. The susceptibility of the French press to outside influences no doubt affected the public's outlook on these matters. Yet

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5. Olsen, op.cit., p. 17.

these influences were limited by the fact that they could only be brought to bear on the long run, and were not very effective in swaying short-term developments.

There are also other factors which can serve to analyze the long-term developments of public opinion. Certainly very relevant is the study of opinion through the behaviour patterns some historians have called "collective psychology". This is the attempt to discover what forms the basis on which public opinion rests, to discover the individual through the patterns of his group.

It is, after all, one of the aims of public opinion studies to define the attitudes of average individuals. But average individuals leave little trace of their thoughts, and it has been the unfortunate tendency of many historians to equate public opinion with series of newspaper clippings.

However, recent studies in social psychology have shed some light on the basic mechanisms involved in the formation of group attitudes. Combined with an inquiry into the type of information that was available to the majority, these studies should elucidate the general trends of opinion. [6]

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6. For a more detailed discussion of these problems, especially concerning international relations, see the parts on 'Collective Psychology' in Introduction à l'Histoire des Relations Internationales, P. Renouvin, J.B. Duroselle, Paris, 1964.

In most forms of group behaviour, it has been observed that the presence of a competing group tends to make individuals exagerate the characteristics that indicate their belonging to their own group. The individual seeks the security found in the sense of belonging to his group and instinctively feels that the group will only accept those that conform to the accepted group norms. The less secure the individual is, the more he will tend to maintain a high degree of conformity to the basically non-rationalistic cultural patterns that distinguish his group from others. Thus when two groups are in competition with one another, there is a tendency to downplay their common aspects and exagerate their differences.

On the individual plane, these tendencies are further emphasized by the fact that independent objective or critical judgements tend to be contradictory to the group norms. And since the uninformed or misinformed rely for their part on irrational and emotional prejudices rather than on objective criteria, their knowledge remains at a rather primitive level. Complex problems and situations are reduced by the individuals to their simplest expression and thus are gradually formed what are known as the 'collective images' of the group.

A 'collective image' could be defined as an idea on a given matter that is shared by the great majority of the group. Readily identifiable by any member of the group, a

collective image is the result of the various social processes of standardization and simplification that dominate the formation of group attitudes.

A well-known form of collective image is the national stereotype, the representation of a whole nation by an individual who presumably gathers unto himself all of the attributes of his group. Its dominant feature is always the deliberate exageration of the particular quality or, more often, the despised fault which is being illustrated. A stereotype is rarely permanent, but changes along with public attitudes to represent new or different patterns of behaviour.

The particular interest of national stereotypes lies in the fact that they are shared by a large proportion of individuals and that they represent the sum knowledge of the less informed individuals who make up the majority of a group. Stereotypes are thus one of the best indications of public attitudes, taken in the large sense, to other nationalities.

So far as the British were concerned, the fertile French imagination was never at a loss to find an adequate stereotype. Indeed, even in the brief period we are dealing with, their succession and variety are most entertaining. To name but a few of the most appreciated, there was the well-known John Bull and his Bulldog, the British Lion, the eternal 'Perfide Albion' and an anonymous collection of paunchy

imperialists and lanky naval officers who extended English commerce to the far points of the globe.

As some important Britons became well-known in France, they were changed into caricatured versions of themselves which in turn became stereotyped. Such was the case with the self-righteous 'Miss Chamberlain' and her trusty umbrella who served to represent the more hypocritical aspects of British Imperialism for far longer than Chamberlain's actual presence in these affairs.

There were various different ways the same stereotype could be presented, depending on the current situation or the prevailing mood of public opinion. 'Perfidious Albion', for example, was sometimes represented as a clumsy old hag in ill-fitting togas who could do little more than draw feelings of sympathy. At more critical times, however, she would assume a ruthless and menacing form dragging bloody souvenirs of her past victories over the kind and gentle Marianne (the epitome of Noble France).

These stereotypes are of great importance in the development of public attitudes towards other nationalities because they fix in the public mind certain definite characteristics that are deemed representative of the people who are the target, in jest or in earnestness. These images are especially effective in the form of caricatures directly connected to a particular event where the two people are on uncertain or hostile terms with one another. [7]

Stereotypes, because of their simplicity, are excellent vehicles for propaganda. In the case of a hereditary enemy, the other nationality is represented as the very incarnation of evil whose only aim is to destroy the Nation. The hatred of the 'other people' is then an important factor in the making of national solidarity. The 'other' may change often, according to the circumstances, as national sentiment is often manipulated by those in power to give the policies they have adopted the appearance of popular support.

The crucial factor here is the question of the quality of information that is available to the public. If the public is led into emotional or irrational patterns of thought by irresponsible journalism or by a misrepresentation of the facts, public opinion will be all the more susceptible to various forms of propaganda. This is accentuated by the fact that the natural tendencies of the public are not oriented towards a calm and logical discussion of the facts.

In this sense, the spectacular rise of the 'grande presse' may obscure some of the less reputable features due to the commercial nature of its development. These can be resumed in two, conservatism and sensationalism, which seem to be less

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7. See J. Lethève, La Caricature et la Presse sous la III ^{o} République, Paris, 1961.
During the Boer war, for example, several caricatures in the French press provoked nasty incidents with England.

the result of a deliberate policy than the implications of the mechanism of finding and keeping a large number of readers. One should not forget moreover that newspapers are in the business of presenting 'News', which is only one particular form of information (i.e. current developments).

The topics covered by the 'grande presse' were those that interested the wide public and were essentially the same as those covered by today's mass newspapers: scandal, crime, spectacular incidents, trivia, entertainment, sports and advertising.

In order to be as 'neutral' as possible and thus attract the widest readership, mass newspapers rarely discussed important or controversial developments except in the most superficial or roundabout way. Their editorial outlook seldom challenged publicly-held beliefs but generally favoured the traditional, conservative values.

The public was rarely interested in abstractions and doctrines which did not lend themselves easily to illustrations and headlines. But if these ideas could be represented by individuals, be they heros or vilains, the public's interest was aroused, hence the basis for the spectacular presentation and dramatization of important problems, often altering their true significance.

The end result was that mass newspapers published a great deal of exciting, but irrelevant items and often presented

only the most sensational aspects of the more important topics. In the long run, these tendencies distorted the public's outlook and turned them away from the real issues.

If these general trends were true for internal developments they were even more so for external affairs. The general public was rarely interested in developments within other countries except so far as his own was involved. This self-interest always remained the essential basis of national attitudes towards other countries:

> Quand on parle de l'opinion française, il ne faut, à vrai dire, se faire aucune illusion ni sur l'objectivité, ni sur la continuité, ni sur l'homogénéité de ses jugements. L'opinion que se forme toute nation sur les pays étrangers n'est au fond rien de plus qu'une des formes morales de sa défense nationale. Par le moyen de cette opinion, chaque nation défend ses intérêts supposés (c'est-à-dire estimés véritables à chaque moment donné). Le primat de l'intérêt détruit donc l'objectivité.[8]

The diversity of opinion betrayed the passionate character of public attitudes, its fundamental subjectivity. Changes in public opinion expressed changes of interests and emotions rather than reasoned evolution. This was especially true of foreign affairs where, in reaction to the outsiders, the 'pseudo-national' character was often exagerated

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8. C. Corbet, L'opinion française face à l'inconnue Russe (1799 - 1894), Paris, 1967. p. 9.

disproportionately: "l'amour-propre se dissimule d'ordinaire chez les individus, mais il s'épanouit voluptueusement au niveau des consciences nationales, du fait qu'écrivains et publicistes s'attirent à bon compte des applaudissements en grattant le prurit nationaliste". [9]

This was possible because the general public had always been fairly ignorant of the workings of foreign affairs. In the period we are studying, even the better informed citizens were more caught up in domestic problems. This is not to say that the French thought foreign affairs unimportant, but that as individuals they did not see what role they could play in its day-to-day developments.

> The man in the street in France had at best an inadequate understanding of the questions involved in the foreign affairs of his country, and he was usually content to leave them to the experts. Perhaps this resignation was due as much to a feeling of powerlessness as to indifference, for he became intensely concerned when there was a danger of war...Leadership in the formation of public opinion in regards to foreign affairs came, for the most part, from the executive, the administration, parliament, and the newspaper press". [10]

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9. ibid. p. 467.

10. Carroll, E.M., French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870 - 1914, New York, 1931, p. 5-6.

However, as we have previously seen, the decision-making powers of these organizations, in regard to foreign policy, were concentrated in a small group of select individuals like Delcassé, Etienne and a few others. They had the advantage, however, of the wholehearted support of public opinion:

> Behind the incoherence...one finds a public opinion where apparent ebbs and flows are illusory. Actually public opinion was strongly united. In its deepest and most unconscious reflexes, it was the most profoundly patriotic public opinion that contemporary France had known...
>
> There was a general accord on the need for France to take her place in the world, on the palpable superiority of Western civilization, on the new greatness that the conquest of Africa brought to the nation and on the benefit that the blacks would derive from French rule. [11]

In the end, the very thrill of imperialism seems to have fixed itself on the French mind: "the pride of standing in the front ranks of the nations which were shaping the world of the future, the delight in ruling and the excitement of competing with foreign rivals: this is what gripped the public imagination". [12]

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11. H. Brunschwig, "French Exploration and conquest in Africa from 1865 to 1898", Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. Edited by L.H. Gann and P. Duigan. Cambridge, 1969. Vol. 1 , p. 162.

12. ibid. p. 104.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRESS

In the previous section, we have examined the general conditions of the press and public opinion in France at the turn of the century, mostly concentrating on the impact of the mass newspapers. Many of the 'journeaux d'information' fell within this category, but practically none of the 'journeaux d'opinion' did.

The essential difference between the two is that the 'journal d'information' was a large profit-oriented enterprise in the business of distributing news, whereas the 'journal d'opinion' tended to be a more modest establishment mainly devoted to upholding a particular social or political philosphy.

Actually, the problems of the Press we have previously outlined held true for both forms of papers, but were more or less important according to each type. For example, the problem of lack of editorial content was certainly not the case for the 'journeaux d'opinion', whereas susceptibility to control by pressure-groups was very much more so. In any case, the 'journeaux d'opinion' were not a homogenous group as they not only represented all the shades of the political spectrum, but were also representative of the various social strata. The aristocratic leftist could find a particular paper suited to his tastes just as well as the monarchist street cleaner. The

readers of a 'journal d'opinion' were distinguished then not so much by their greater sophistication, but by their particular social or political standpoint.

So far, we have only examined the French Press in a fairly general way, purposely avoiding specifics in order to gain a comprehensive picture of its workings. We will now take a closer look at the evolution of the press and try to sort out its varied response to a few of the highlights of Anglo-French relations during these years.

If previous to the 1890's most newspapers had been fairly well intentioned towards Britain, it had been mainly because of the greater preoccupation with Germany and the 'revanche'. The German menace lost some of its immediacy, however, in the face of enthusiasm for colonial expansion and the resulting concern with Britain's intentions. While French leaders revived the Egyptian Question in the mid-1890's and initiated the first French advances to the Upper Nile without much preoccupation for public opinion, the opposition of Great Britain soon made it imperative to gather a strong body of opinion behind these undertakings. The various bodies of the Parti Colonial became, as we have seen, the moving spirit behind this 'education' of opinion.

These pressures on opinion were at first only marginal in their effect, as is indicated by the fact that

Grey's formal warning of 1894, regarding French advances towards Egypt, elicited barely a peep out of the French Press. [13]

Indeed, even by the spring of 1898, a discussion had yet to appear in any newspaper on the possible implications of the Marchand expedition for Franco-British relations. Occasional 'situation reports' on the mission merely suggested that since Kitchener would only reach the Upper Nile after Marchand, Britain would then be forced to compromise on the question. [14] Such shallow thinking even by reputable newsmen, shows a lack of proper coordination in the early efforts to influence opinion. By September, however, many of the papers had become aware of the awkward situation France had placed herself in and began to seek various solutions to the dilemma. On the whole, the climate was moderate as both the right-wing press (Le Soleil, le Gaulois, l'Eclair, La Patrie) and the important moderate papers (Le Matin, le Temps, le Figaro) adopted a conciliatory attitude. The time had come, according to writers in these newspapers, to solve a problem which had embittered Franco-British relations since 1882. [15]

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13. See Carroll, op.cit., p. 167-8.

14. Le Temps, Jan. 13, 1898.

15. R. Airé, "L'opinion publique en France et l'affaire de Fashoda", Revue d'Histoire des Colonies, XLI, (1954) p. 345.

These last-minute approaches did little to appease the immediate outcry of English opinion upon the arrival of Marchand at Fashoda. The English government, supported by the leading English newspapers, insisted that there would be no negotiations on the question before Marchand had been ordered to withdraw.

The French Press, caught up in the Dreyfus Affair, was stunned by the vigorousness of the British response. The moderate Journal des Débats observed that "(Depuis Omdurman)...la presse française a observé une attitude de courtoisie parfaite envers l'Angleterre...On lui répond de l'autre coté de la Manche par une explosion de rage et de haine." [16]

Le Temps declared that "(Le gouvernement anglais) ne peut ignorer qu'en suivant la ligne des principaux journeaux anglais, il provoquera nécessairement un renversement complet de l'attitude conciliante que l'opinion publique lui a manifesté jusqu'à ce jour." [17]

The key to the French outrage was the evident unwillingness of the British to come to terms on a basis that would recognize that Marchand's expedition counted as much as Kitchener's. Before the full outburst of the crisis, opinion in France would probably have accepted to negotiate for

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16. Journal des Débats, Sept. 20, 1898.

17. Le Temps, Oct. 6, 1898.

compensation elsewhere, but the uncompromising attitude of the British prompted even the moderates to a firmer stand. Early in October, Le Matin headlined:

"NON! LA SEULE REPONSE DIGNE DE LA FRANCE!" [18]

in response to the suggestion of Marchand's unconditional recall. On October 10, Le Temps echoed these feelings by praising Delcassé's 'sang-froid' in his dealings with the British and pledging "l'appui de toute la France unanime". [19]

Meanwhile, the Fashoda problem had been caught up and entangled with the Dreyfus affair in the rightwing nationalist press. Praising the nobleness of Marchand's exploits and wholly supporting the aspirations of French imperialism, La Libre Parole, l'Autorité and Le Gaulois bitterly attacked the 'Dreyfusard agitators' for endangering such a worthy undertaking by their unpatriotic activities. [20] Mme Adam, writing in La Nouvelle Revue added the emotional afterthought: "le commandant Marchand est l'expression complète de notre race; il est notre porte-drapeau". [21]

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18. Le Matin, Oct. 5, 1898.

19. These articles were no doubt partly inspired by Delcassé himself.

20. Arié, loc.cit., p. 350.

21. La Nouvelle Revue, vol. 114, p. 718.

Opposing any concessions to the British, the right-wing press turned against Delcassé when his proposal to recall Marchand in return for other compensations became public knowledge. Déroulède [22] writing in La Patrie, labelled Delcassé a 'traitor' who had sold out completely to the 'hereditary enemy' and was behaving more like a 'foreign minister of French affairs than a French Minister of Foreign Affairs' [23]. Rochefort, in the Intransigeant held that the Quai d'Orsay was a breeding-ground of Dreyfusards and that French Foreign policy was being manipulated by the 'International Dreyfusard movement'. [24]

The left-wing press, only marginally preoccupied with foreign problems, favored a soft and agreeable approach from the beginning. Typical was an article by Maurice Roldes in La Petite République, who criticized the nationalists for appealing to the 'national interest' as a magic formula rather than presenting a rational explanation of French policy on the Nile. He further argued that the views of the nationalists would lead France into 'the most criminal of adventures', war with Britain. He concluded by an appeal to the socialists of the two countries

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22. Déroulède had recently reorganized the Ligue des Patriotes.

23. La Patrie, 17 Oct. 1898.

24. L'Intransigeant, 22 Oct. 1898.

to renounce the conflict on the Nile as an unjust struggle between "two capitalist minorities" [25]. Le Siècle termed the Upper Nile project 'Senseless' and demanded Marchand's immediate recall [26], while Clémenceau's l'Aurore argued for a conciliatory line towards Britain:

> "le fait brutal est que la France ne peut penser à se lancer dans une guerre pour la possession de quelques marais Africains alors que les Allemands sont cantonnés à Metz et à Strasbourg". [27]

By the middle of October, France's weak bargaining position had become obvious and the newspapers close to the government began to prepare public opinion for the inevitable capitulation imposed by Britain's unyielding stand.

Le Matin published a 'despatch from London' on October 19 which described Fashoda as a "marshy and unhealthy village", but held that France should not yield her claims in the Upper Nile. On 25 October Le Temps wrote that France should be willing to withdraw, "pourvu que la courtoisie soit observée envers elle et que la question ne soit pas arbitrairement isolée d'autres". On 29 October, the Journal des Débats held that there was no reason why Marchand should not be withdrawn

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25. La Petite République, 21 sept 1898, cited by Brown, op.cit. p. 107.

26. Arié, op. cit., p. 353.

27. L'Aurore, 25 Oct. 1898.

"if we are paid for it."

In effect, these papers were now arguing along the same lines as they had been two months earlier, before the eruption of the crisis. But much water had flowed under the bridge since then and early in November, the French government recalled Marchand without any engagement at all from Britain.

Not since 1871 had France been so humiliated and the outburst of the press was immediate. The rightwing press, which had favored a strong stand throughout the crisis, was the most violent. Cassagnac wrote in the Autorité :
"Fashoda va devenir dans notre histoire plus atroce que Crécy, Agincourt, ou Sedan " [28]. Lucien Millerorge, an important figure in the Ligue des Patriotes, wrote: "désormais, l'Angleterre a la France comme ennemi irréconciliable. Le duel sans merci est commencé:" [29]

Some moderate papers, alarmed at these outbursts, tried to cool down the temper of opinion. Le Matin declared that "l'honneur national n'est jamais en jeu dans les entreprises coloniales. Elles ne représentent qu'une politique d'affaires:" [30] Le Temps and the Journal des Débats regretted that such a state of affairs had come about and wondered about future relations

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28. Autorité, 9 Nov. 1989.

29. La Patrie 4 Nov. 1898.

30. Le Matin, 4 Nov. 1898.

between the two countries [31]. Other moderates were less detached, but in general, the tone was not as violent as could have been anticipated.

More surprising was the reaction of the left. Jaurès took the lead in blaming the French, rather than the British government because of the assurances they had given Parliament that the expedition would provoke no international complications.

In the vengeful atmosphere of those November days, an unusual proposition generated much interest: the project of a rapprochement with Germany which originated, strangely enough, from the right-wing press. For several months, many French newspapers sporadically supported the project [32], but the discussions were mostly carried on by the nationalist papers l'Autorité, l'Echo de Paris, le Gaulois and La Liberté. The moderate press remained somewhat indifferent, although Le Figaro did play an important role in the early winter of 1899 when a short exchange of articles with the Kolnische Zeitung attempted to iron out the difficulties of a Franco-German rapprochement. The problem of Alsace-Lorraine and the unwillingness of the Germans to support the French in Egypt

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31. Articles on Nov. 4, 5 & 6.

32. See Carroll, op. cit. pp. 176-181.

proved to be unsoluble obstacles. Moreover, the 'revanche' spirit was still a strong factor in public opinion and it would take more than a few newspaper articles to counter the effect of the previous thirty years of ill-will.

Nevertheless, the antagonism towards Britain was also very real and soon erupted once more when it became apparent, in the fall of 1899, that a war in South Africa was in the making. An entente with Germany was again proposed by several newspapers and serious attempts were made to establish a continental coalition against England. [33]

Attacks against Britain burst out in full bloom in most newspapers, fueled by still-fresh memories of Fashoda. The articles on the Dreyfus affair in the British press did little to help matters. And although the whole continental press was equally virulent, the French articles were the ones most often reprinted in Britain. As Cambon wrote to Delcassé:

> On peut faire observer que les journeaux allemands, autrichiens, russes on italiens ont été aussi violents que les nôtres; mais cela importe peu si l'on ne relève ici que les attaques de la presse française et si l'on nous rend responsable de l'hostilité génerale que la politique anglaise rencontre en Europe. [33a]

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33. See Part I, p. 58-60. Rumours of a coalition were encouraged by the visit to Paris of the Russian Foreign Minister, Muraviev, in October.

33a. P. Cambon (ambassador in London) to Delcassé, 11 Nov. 1899 cited in Sieberg, op.cit., p. 29.

What offended most newspapers was the inequality of the struggle and the ruthless determination that Britain was demonstrating in carrying out her policies. An article in the Petit Journal summed up the feelings of many Frenchmen:

> A la veille du XX^{o} siècle, au lendemain du congrès de la Haye, ce sera un lugubre démenti aux promesses de progrès, à l'adoucissement prétendu des moeurs internationales, que la fin tragique d'un petit peuple qui n'a pas plié devant l'omnipotence de l'empire britannique et qui aura préféré la mort violente à l'humiliation du joug étranger!...En supprimant ce foyer de résistance opiniâtre, l'intolérable tyrannie des Anglo-Saxons comettra un crime de plus sous les yeux des nations impunément bravées.[34]

While no one in France had any doubt about the inevitability of the outcome, the British difficulties provoked enormous enthusiasm for the Boer cause which culminated during Kruger's visit to Paris in November 1900. Le Temps argued that the enthusiasm and sympathy of the Parisians was without any real political significance [35], yet it did betray the deeper emotions of a public which had little else at its disposal to indicate its feelings.

In the end, however, British military might proved irresistible and the Boers were forced to capitulate. The length and difficulty of the struggle, however, was the necessary

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condition

34. Le Petit Journal, 9 October 1899.

35. Le Temps, 20 November 1900.

condition to an Anglo-French rapprochement, as it disillusioned the British and shattered the myth of 'splendid isolation'. The part of the press that remained hostile to Britain had to content itself with vain recriminations about the depredations of Perfidious Albion. But this attitude was mostly confined to certain popular newspapers like Le Petit Journal and the right-wing press.

The moderate section of the press had exercised, for its part, a great deal of benevolence towards Britain ever since 1898. Even at the height of the anti-English agitation, some papers like Le Temps, Le Matin and Le Journal des Débats, had attempted to use their moderating influence in order to prevent Anglo-French relations from becoming too antagonistic. This was partly due to the closeness of their relations with Delcassé and the government, but was also the result of a deeper-felt desire to work towards closer relations between the two countries. The reasons which motivated these efforts were fairly similar to the ones previously examined for the various politicans, colonialists and others. One should add another important factor, the simple fact that the Press was naturally more sensitive to the evolutions of its British counterpart than the other groups we have studied. And while there were some tense and bitter episodes, the French received progressively greater encouragement not only from a gradual softening of the British press towards France, but also from

the growing anti-German feelings that accompanied Germany's drive towards 'Weltpolitik'. [36]

By the beginning of 1903, several moderate newspapers had started advocating a rapprochement with England. The more intangible currents of public opinion were also moving in this direction, as shown by the success of Edward's visit to Paris in early May. The common aversion towards Germany formed the basis of these good feelings. Thus when Anglo-German differences over Venezuela in early 1903 revealed the depth of anti-German feeling in England, The Times commented on the French reaction:

> It is evident from the altered tone of French public utterances respecting England within the past couple of months that the moral of the Venezuelan affair, and of the attitude of the British nation towards Germany, has not been lost upon politicians of all shades of opinion in this country. It is a lesson, therefore, that has been doubly learned, and it is gratifying to find that it has not been lost even on Anglophobe exponents of French opinion...African, Asiatic, and European questions can now be discussed...without animus towards England. [37]

The approaching 'détente' between France and England gradually became a thinly-veiled secret as newspapers started discussing the pros and cons of the various possible agreements.

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36. That the French were well aware of these feelings is well documented. For example, see Cambon to Delcassé, 11 Nov. 1902. D.D.F. 11 No. 480, p. 600-2.

37. The Times, 11 March, 1903.

The activities of the Barclays and the many 'social calls' between heads of state received favorable reviews in all but the most irreducible opponents of England. While the intricate diplomatic negotiations were kept secret, well-informed sources had few doubts about their eventual outcome. When the details of the Entente did become public knowledge, some details were criticized but the general reaction was favorable.

Naturally, critics on both sides of the Channel held that their own negotiators had given up too much for what they received in exchange. In France, some resentment was voiced over the abandoning of Egypt and lengthy discussions appeared in many papers comparing the advantages won in Morocco to the position lost in Egypt. A surprisingly harsh outburst was voiced by those affected by the Newfoundland agreements. The main body of opinion however was won over by the favorable clauses pertaining to Morocco, a tribute to the long efforts of the colonialists to persuade their countrymen of the importance of these regions to France.

The Entente gradually evolved into something quite different, yet it was mainly seen at first as a settlement of colonial differences which had been outstanding for a long time. The Journal des Débats described the new agreements as merely additional assurances of peace [38]; Le Temps stressed the

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38. Journal des Débats, May 11, 1904.

essentially pacific nature of the agreements and held that if the Germans condemned the Entente, it would only be a confession of aggressive designs on their part.[39] But the anti-German tendencies implicit in the Entente did not fail to reveal themselves rather early as various moderate and conservative leaders sought means by which Russia could be included in the agreements.[40] As the République Française wrote, the defeat of Bismarckian diplomacy could not be achieved until England and Russia had settled their differences in Asia: "C'est dans cette direction que nous devons oeuvrer, sans hâte, mais sans interruption."[41]

It is surprising to note how much the willingness of Great Britain to cooperate in these designs was taken for granted in most of the editorials dealing with the long-term implications of the Entente. The tacit acceptance of the British which was inherent in these writings reflected that the Entente was not only an exchange of signatures on an agreement but was the result of a great change of attitudes from a few years previously when such an Entente would have been an absurd impossibility.

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39. Le Temps, May 9-11, 1904.

40. See Caroll, op. cit. p. 204.

41. La République Française, May 13, 1904.

The evolution of attitudes that made the Entente possible was well described by Delcassé himself:

> Un changement dont on a lieu, je crois, de se féliciter, c'est l'état d'esprit qui, en Angleterre comme en France, a rendu possible la signature du traité. Y aurait-on crû, il n'y a pas encore bien longtemps? On voyait alors surtout ce qui divise; aujourd'hui, on considère d'abord ce qui doit unir, et les raisons de vivre en bonne intelligence sont si fortes, les intérêts qui y sont attachés sont si considérables, la conscience que des conflits entre la France et l'Angleterre n'aboutiraient qu'à les appauvrir et à les affaiblir l'une et l'autre est si nette, que, des deux côtés, le sentiment s'est fait jour que ces considérations supérieures doivent présider constamment à l'examen des questions importantes qui existent ou peuvent se poser entre les deux pays [42].

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42. Delcassé, November 3, 1904.
Cited in Lémonon, op.cit. p. 359-60.

III. LEARNED VIEWS ON GREAT BRITAIN

In order to complete this study of French attitudes to Great Britain, it is now necessary to take a brief look at the authors specialized in British affairs who made significant, though often forgotten contributions to the understanding of England in their time. I have termed these men 'britannologues', or 'experts on England'. These writers, professional scholars for the most part, studied the various aspects of British activities and reported their findings to the part of the public interested in their somewhat sophisticated presentations.

The britannologues seldom wrote in the popular press, but they did contribute to the serious French periodicals [43]. They were not always isolated from such groups as the Parti Colonial and some of them had influence in government and financial circles. Several of them had wide-ranging reputations and often addressed various groups such as the Chambers of Commerce or official public functions. Their immediate impact was not as wide-ranging as that of the newspapers, yet their influence was more important in the long run since they addressed themselves to the influential minority in the upper strata of society.

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43. See Appendix 5 for a selection of articles.

Even for the better-known britannologues, it is difficult to trace their intellectual, social or political background as there have been no studies on these authors except for a few scattered articles in some biographical dictionnaries.

It should be noted at this point that it is not our intention to give a complete survey of all the French authors who were specifically interested in Britain from 1898 to 1905. Rather, we have selected a representative cross-section of the various types of works that were published, choosing, where possible, the writers who seemed to be the leaders in their fields. [44]

It is rather easy to identify the most recognized of these authors, yet it is surprising to find that most of them, in their writings at least, paid fairly little attention to the publishings of their fellows. Also notable is the fact that very few of these authors' works have remained relevant to this date. There are several reasons for this, the most important being the fact that scholarly works are the products of specialists dealing with specific subjects in a particular context. And when we observe the series of crises and monumental changes which occurred from 1905 to 1919, it is not surprising

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44. For a complete listing of the Britannologues' works, see Bibliography, 'Contemporary writings'.

to find that Anglo-French relations prior to that period tend to diminish in overall importance.

Generally speaking, French works on Britain and British Imperialism at the end of the XIXth century fell into three main categories. The first were the general, basic studies which sought to explain the more fundamental forces which nature and humanity brought to bear on the Englishman. More detailed and specialized were the works that focused on the nature of British Imperialism and its importance in the scheme of world affairs. Lastly, some works came to grips with problems of a current nature, dealing with the particular situation of British Imperialism in the last years of the century and shedding light on the state of Anglo-French relations.

The first type of writing, the general studies, produced some fascinating insights into the character of the English people and interesting facts about the nature of the Imperialist mentality. On such work is Robert d'Humières' L'Ile et l'Empire de la Grande-Bretagne [45]. It includes, in its first pages, a summary of the principal aspects of the British character:

> La race est vigoureuse, tenace, à la fois idéaliste et réaliste. Comme caractéristiques de l'homme, les plus marquées semblent être le stoïcisme,

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45. Société Mercure de France, Paris, 1900.

> le culte de la véracité, le goût du respect et partant du devoir, la générosité.
> Bref, l'Anglais présente un beau modèle d'individu physique et moral dans une société qui en épouse les besoins et en exhalte les énergies pour un maximum de résultat. [46]

This flattering portrait is tempered by an analysis of the faults common to Britons, the most serious of which he says are their egotism and their puerile ethics which attempt to apply the traditional maxims of individual morality to the collective behaviour of nations. He then goes on to describe how the middle-class notion of 'Fair-Play' has become an important factor in British politics and he refutes the accusations of their harshness in their dealings with subject peoples. Although he is severely critical of the hypocritical philosophy of "money-making", he is overtly in favour of British Imperialism, which he speaks of in terms of a "mission supérieure dévolue à l'Angleterre pour le bien de l'humanité", as the following passage illustrates:

> En affirmant sa tâche civilisatrice, l'Angleterre risque d'avoir raison. Elle a simplement constaté, en débarquant ses ballots et en poussant ses caravanes, son aptitude supérieure à aménager la planète. Et au nom des intérêts de celle-

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46. Ibid. p. 12

47. Ibid. p. 30

> ci, qui contiennent les siens propres, elle revendique cette tâche. Ajoutons qu'à l'impératif moral spontanément engendré par les nécessités de l'heure, un grand poète est venu joindre une esthétique. Votre activité est juste, dit la conscience; elle est belle, répond Kipling". [47]

D'Humières' point of view, as one may well imagine, represented a fairly extremist anglophilia which was not a common occurence in France, most especially where imperialism was involved. A much more sophisticated and comprehensive work, and one that received wide recognition, was Emile Boutmy's Essai d'une Psychologie politique du Peuple anglais au XIX° Siècle [48]. Primarily sociological in outlook, it seeks to explain the distinctive aspects of the British character with a heavy emphasis on political matters. Boutmy first describes (L'Homme en Général) the physical environment and its particular determinisms, explaining how this milieu has nutured certain ideals which stand out consistently in the British character, such as Truth, Beauty and Equity. He shows how these ideals are reflected in various activities such as the Arts, Science and Business.

The next chapter (Le Milieu Humain) is devoted to the make-up of the British people, describing the contributions of races that came from elsewhere and the various ethnic

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48. Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1901.

phenomena produced on the Isles themselves. There follows (l'Homme Moral et Social), a detailed examination of the essentially 'British' traits as reflected in individuals, where a thirst for adventure is counterbalanced by a conservative nature and where a weak sense of social community is offset by strong individual virtues of sympathy and honor.

The last two chapters (L'Homme Politique and L'Individu et l'Etat) deal with the political life of Britain. Examining successively the citizen, the party man and the statesman, Boutmy traces their links with the political institutions and elaborates on the varied relationships between the individual and the State which produce the particularities of Britain.

Boutmy's study is filled with keen insights into the nature of the British people and well defines the political and social atmosphere which provided the basis for British imperialism, although only the last chapters are specifically concerned with this development.

So far as British foreign and imperial policy is concerned , Boutmy essentially explains it as a continuing struggle between two rival schools of thought which alternate in power and thus provoke many of the apparent contradictions in British policy. Both groups have the same objective, which is the continuation and development of British supremacy, but

they advocate different methods by which to reach this aim.

The first group are the 'liberals' such as Peel, Gladstone and others inspired by the Manchester School, who believe that Britain will achieve this supremacy through the quality of her products in a Free-Trade system:

> Ils entendent demeurer les maîtres du monde par la seule excellence d'une production sur laquelle ils concentrent tout ce qu'ils ont de ressources et de soin; leur souverain bien est la paix, qui ouvre à leurs marchandises tous les marchés du monde. La paix, le libre échange et le bon vouloir des nations l'une pour l'autre caractérisent et résument leur façon de conduire leurs affaires. Ils craignent, au lieu de la désirer, une extension de l'Empire, ils y pressentent une source d'embarras nouveaux, des difficultés de chaque jour avec les autres peuples [49]

The other group are the 'tory imperialists' such as Palmerston, Disraeli or Salisbury who seek to achieve British domination in a more direct and tangible way:

> Ils croient qu'on ne doit jamais hésiter à étendre les frontières de l'Empire britannique. Ils y emploient une diplomatie sans scrupule et, au besoin, les armes. Partout où leur intérêt est en jeu, ils le revendiquent comme nous ferions d'un droit consacré par un traité solennel. Ils se font haïr de toutes les nations; ils le savent et s'en font gloire...Un 'splendide isolement' leur est naturel.

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49. Ibid. p. 416-7.

> Au fond, c'est le procédé tory qui a vraiment le coeur de la nation, et, après des intermittences, elle y revient toujours; elle y ramène malgré eux ses hommes d'Etat utilitaires ." [50]

No anglophile, Boutmy's harshest criticism of Britain's external conduct is levelled at some of her 'lone-wolf' traits: "Tandis que nulle part le sentiment de la solidarité nationale n'a plus de vigueur, nulle part le sentiment de la solidarité humaine ou de l'unité sympathique du monde civilisé n'est plus complètement absent." [51]

In the end, he does temper this judgement by noting that these unfortunage tendencies are somewhat offset by a notion of 'christian sentimentality' which has had a positive influence in certain developments such as the abolition of the negro trade and slavery in the earlier part of the century. He believes, however, that this attitude is losing some of its strength as Britain is coming to face stiffer foreign competition than before. This, he feels, bodes no good for the future as Britain is committed to maintaining her supremacy, "at whatever the cost."

Boutmy and d'Humières, representatives of the generalist type of britannologue, were concerned with those

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50. Ibid. p. 418-8.

51. Ibid. p. 422.

basic ideological, social and cultural factors which gave British imperialism its special character. This essentially set them apart from the other types of britannologues who were more concerned with the concrete manifestations of imperialism. Some of them, like Achile Viallate, were interested in Britain as a social force of great significance due to its dominating position on a global scale.

Viallate published two works of special interest. The first, Chamberlain [52], is a masterful biography of the great statesman which explains the impact of his career in the development of British imperialism. In one passage he stresses the all-important necessity of new markets advocated by Chamberlain as the very foundation of his policy:

> L'Angleterre moins que tout autre pays, ne peut s'isoler du monde extérieur. Des relations continuelles avec lui sont pour elle une nécessité même de l'existence. C'est de lui qu'elle tire la plus grande partie de ses subsistances et des matières premières nécessaires à son industrie; c'est dans le monde extérieur qu'elle trouve les marchés sur lesquels elle peut écouler les produits qu'elle fabrique, et qui dépassent en si grande quantité les besoins mêmes de sa population. Pour conserver son bien-être, pour l'accroître, celle -ci a besoin constamment de voir se développer ces marchés. [53]

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52. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1899.

53. Ibid, p. 103.

Viallate then discusses the difficulties created by Free Trade for the development of a proper symbiosis between England and her colonies. Following a long discussion on the problem of Free Trade versus protectionism [54], he delves into Chamberlain's proposals for an Imperial Federation and the problem of tariffs. These questions were again taken up at greater length in his second important work, La Crise Anglaise, Impérialisme et Protection. [55]

In this study, he focuses on the economic factors involved in British Imperialism and explains in detail how the reaction against the increasing costs and diminishing returns of Free-Trade spawned the new Imperialist Movement. After tracing the difficulties of the Empire, he explains the hopes contained in Chamberlain's project of an Imperial Federation:

> En groupant les membres épars de l'Empire britannique, ils assureraient à celui-ci une période nouvelle de suprématie. Si le Canada, l'Australasie, l'Afrique du Sud acceptaient de se fondre avec la Grande-Bretagne dans la Fédération rêvée, quelle coalition serait assez puissante pour résister à un aussi formidable enneni? Sa population fournirait assurément la matière militaire qui commence à faire défaut à la métropole: ses richesses lui permettraient d'entretenir sans aucune gêne une armée et une marine capables de tenir tête aux rivaux les plus orgueilleux; les merveilleuses positions

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54. Ibid. p. 105-116.

55. Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, Paris, 1903.

> stratégiques dont il disposerait lui assureraient la maîtrise incontestée de l'Ocean, qui échappe chaque jour devantage à l'Angleterre. [56]

In Viallate's opinion, however, the insurmountable difficulties involved would forever prevent the realization of this dream. Free Trade had already given the colonies too much independence and their rate of development was not rapid enough to be of real value in times of crisis. England would therefore be constrained to hold the Empire together singlehandedly which would eventually prove to be too much for her limited resources and wealth. In any case, as he points out in the end, the era of Splended Isolation had come to a certain end:

> Au siècle dernier, alors qu'elle était la plus grande puissance coloniale et la première puissance maritime du monde, l'Angleterre s'était détachée peu à peu de la communauté européenne. Toutes ses aspirations étaient tournées du côté de l'Océan: c'était hors de L'Europe qu'elle cherchait des accroissements de territoires et l'emploi de son inlassable activité. Sous l'influence d'événements plus forts que sa volonté, la voilà obligée de se replier de nouveau sur l'Europe. L'Angleterre n'a plus la maîtrise incontestée des mers. Pour défier heureusement les ambitions rivales et résister à une coalition toujours possible, elle serait imprudente de se fier à ses seules forces. Elle devra donc rechercher des amitiés et des

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56. Ibid, p. 300-1.

> appuis. Abandonnant le hautain isolement où elle a pu sans danger se complaire pendant un demi-siècle, il lui faudra se mettre en quête d'alliances, faire plier sa superbe pour protéger ses intérêts. [57]

This conclusion was not too promising for Anglo-French relations, as he implied that if ever Britain came to an entente with France, it would be out of the sheer necessity of survival. For Viallate, Splendid Isolation was the 'natural state' of Britain and any special ties with other countries were seen as signs of weakness. In any event, he believed, Britain had no choice because of the increasing competition from other major powers, especially Germany.

This new challenge to British supremacy was well described by Victor Bérard [58], who wrote many articles on this question in serious French periodicals. He also wrote L'Angleterre et l'Impérialisme [59], a study of the industrial forces and economic interests which led to the resurgence of British imperialism at the end of the century. In this work, he provides some indication of the importance of Joseph Chamberlain and analyses the relationships between politics and the important industrial centres of Birmingham and Manchester.

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57. Ibid p. 303-4.

58. V. Bérard (1864-1931), scholar and politician, author of several works on international affairs. See Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, V. p. 1467.

59. Librairie Armand Colin, Paris 1901.

He is severely critical of the insular conservatism expressed by the "You must buy what we make" attitude of British industrialists, contrasting with the flexibility of other commercial nations [60]. He feels that protectionism and panbritanism are late attempts to reverse the tide and believes that German Rationalism has finally got the better of British Empiricism.

Another writer who was far less pessimistic, probably because of his special experience with Britain, is Jean Carrière. A journalist with several papers including Le Figaro, le Gaulois, Le Temps, but mostly with Le Matin, he was the only foreign correspondent with the British Army during the Boer war. His articles in Le Matin were in the form of letters which he often wrote at the very scene of some important battles. He was friendly with Cecil Rhodes and, more extraordinary, had the opportunity to cross over to the Boer side and meet their leaders. Because of these unusual circumstances, notwithstanding his gifted writing, his articles were in great demand and were reprinted in many continental (and English) newspapers.

Following the end of the conflict, he came back to France, where he wrote more analytical studies on the causes

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60. Ibid. p. 100-117.

61. Librairie Armand Colin, Paris 1917.

and significance of the struggle. He was also very active in promoting the anglo-french rapprochement, in which he certainly played a crucial part by preparing French opinion in a favorable way.

These writings were reprinted in book form in 1917, under the title: L'Impérialisme Britannique et le rapprochement franco-anglais, 1900-1903 [61]. The first part (Avec l'Armée Britannique) is a selection of his articles written in Transvaal with the British and Boer armies.

The second part, l'exaltation impérialiste et la fin de la guerre sud-africaine, contains his writings on the nature of the conflict and the personalities involved, with in-depth studies of Rhodes and Kruger. In his articles, he refutes the argument that the gold mines were the sole motive of the South African War and instead seeks to explain the conflict as the last episode of a century-long struggle between the Dutch and the English in South Africa. Yet he does not absolve the British of all blame. Far from it:

> Quand les historiens anglais nous affirment que le gouvernement anglais n'a pas fait la guerre de 1899 uniguement pour la conquête des mines d'or, ils ont raison. Le gouvernement poursuivait sa politique déja séculaire; politique tenace, et impitoyable: il voulait annexer toute l'Afrique australe.
> Mais quand ces mêmes historiens ajoutent que le gouvernement britannique est pur de toute alliance avec les hommes des mines

> d'or et que ces mines d'or n'ont été pour rien dans la guerre...ils se trompent, et, sans doute, ils sont victimes d'un aveuglement national bien naïf. [62]

Later on, he does make a distinction between the unscrupulous speclators who sought only to profit from the conflict and those that were pursuing the nobler aims of the Empire. Within this last group he places Chamberlain and his new imperial policy, which he compares to the imperial ideal that inspired Rome in ancient times.

Turning to the question of Anglo-French relations, Carrière underlines the importance of the imperialist movement. Somewhat like Boutmy, he draws the distincion between two forms of the English spirit which struggle one against the other. The first one is jingoism:

> La première de ces deux Angleterres ou plutôt de ces deux formes de l'esprit anglais, est la seule qu' à l'heure présente nous connaissions en France: c'est la forme impérialiste, populairement appelée jingoe. C'est celle que nous avons vu se manifester avec frénésie au moment de Fachoda...et surtout dans les préparatifs et au début de la guerre sud-africaine. [63]

He explains how this imperialist movement caused a resurgence of the traditional hatreds which had subsided during the course of the Nineteenth century. It was not the drive to imperialism, which was common to all the Powers, but the spirit in which it was undertaken that provoked the other nations.

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62. Ibid. p. 198-9.

63. Ibid. p. 321.

The England that saw itself destined to lead and regenerate all the peoples of the world is the one that embarked on the struggle in South Africa. The length and difficulties of this conflict, according to Carrière, was one of the most fortunate developments ever to transpire. For it calmed the imperialist fever and gave reason to the 'other spirit' of England:

> L'autre Angleterre, alors, cette autre Angleterre, sympathique, plus nombreuse qu'on ne croit en France, l'Angleterre de John Bright, de Gladstone, l'Angleterre nourrie de culture latine et française, l'Angleterre libérale, en un mot, a repris conscience de sa force et de sa mission, et la voici qui reparaît dans l'histoire, avec d'autant plus d'éclat que le roi actuel est animé de son esprit....C'est la clairvoyance d'Edouard VII qui, a, sinon suscité ce réveil, du moins su montrer la voie nouvelle où lui-même s'est courageusement et noblement engagé. Il ne peut y avoir, à pareille évolution, que profit pour les deux peuples voisins. [64]

Again, we are made aware of the inevitable fact, that for a rapprochement to be possible at all, there first had to be an evolution of attitudes in England to end the more unacceptable tenets of Imperialism and Splendid Isolation.

Carrière, while not completely uncritical, was a strong anglophile and his influence was felt in those critical

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64. Ibid p. 323.

years before the Entente. It was perhaps the work of such men that made the most important contributions to the acceptance of the British by large parts of the French public. For while they did not often address this public directly, their ideas inevitably filtered down through other media. The fact that they introduced a degree of reasoned judgement in attitudes towards the British made their contribution invaluable.

We have here only presented a very brief and incomplete summary of the writings of a few britannologues. Ther were many other important and minor figures. There were also many journals and publishers through which they could express their opinions, so that as a group, these men were in an ideal position to reach a maximum number of important people in France.

There is a direct relationship between the knowledge of foreign countries and the judgement that is made on them. A favorable judgement promotes better understanding and more objective knowledge. A hostile opinion contributes to the growth of ignorance. Fortunately there are always enlightened individuals who persist in their objective convictions rather than follow the general currents of opinion.

So it was with the britannologues, who are inseparable from the evolution of collective attitudes towards

Britain. When Anglo-French enmity was as its strongest during Fashoda and the Boer war, these authors kept up their studies, completely ignored by the mass of opinion and neglected by the policy-makers. At the height of these crises, the contrast between the level-headed discussions of the britannologues and the popular newspapers' irresponsible deformation of the facts is particularly striking. Eventually, however, the britannologues' works and the unpredictable current of events revealed the advantages to be gained from a rapprochement with England. On the French side, the Entente was the result of Delcassé's foresight and the pressures exerted by Etienne and the colonialists. That it was accepted by French opinion is also a tribute to the efforts of the britannologues.

C O N C L U S I O N

C O N C L U S I O N

The Anglo-French Entente had assured France of a free hand in Morocco. In the first months of 1905 the French minister in Morocco, Saint-René Taillardier, presented the Sultan with a program for the military, economic and financial 'reconstruction' of Morocco which was intended to prepare the way for a French protectorate. The Germans, which Declassé had refused to include in his agreements concerning Morocco, reacted strongly. Kaiser Wilhem went to Tangier and publicly recognized the Sultan's independence, emphasizing the German economic interests in Morocco.

The German objectives in challenging the French position in Morocco were threefold. First, they planned to defeat Delcassé's exclusion of Germany from the Moroccan question. Second, they wanted to have Delcassé dismissed from the French government. Third and most important, they hoped that by showing up the British unwillingness to support France, they could bring about the destruction of the Entente.

Two crucial questions were involved in the crisis. The first was the seriousness of the German insinuations that they would use force if necessary. The second was the willingness of Britain to support France. On the first count, Delcassé and most French diplomats were convinced that Germany was bluffing, that Wilhem would not risk his battle-fleet for intangible advantages in Morocco. On the second

question, the British lost no opportunity to affirm their support of France, proposing an exchange of visits by the English and French fleets, while Edward VII's spring Mediterranean cruise, during which he only called at French ports, ended by a week's stay in Paris where he had two well-publicized meetings with Delcassé.

Despite these indications, the French premier, Maurice Rouvier, remained convinced that the German menace was serious and that England, notwithstanding her naval strength, could not provide effective support against a German invasion. His Radical-Socialist colleagues in the cabinet, absorbed in domestic affairs, equally over-estimated the German threats and did not support Delcassé.

In a crucial debate on Foreign Policy in the Chamber on April 19, Delcassé was attacked both by the extreme right and left, while the center remained silent. The foreign minister could have taken this in stride, however, had it not been for the refusal of the colonial group to support him. Etienne and the colonialists, who had always advocated peaceful relations with Germay, had become increasingly worried about the anti-German implications of Delcassé's Moroccan policy and they refused to back him up. Thus faced with the indifference or opposition of French politicans, despite the support of England, Delcassé resigned as foreign minister on 6 June 1905.

The Germans had achieved one of their objectives, but it was to prove their only success.

The international conference on Morocco which met at Algeciras in early 1906 was a major setback for Germany. Not only did Great Britain fully support France, but so did Russia, Italy, Spain and the United States, while only Austria-Hungary and Morocco supported Germany. The privileged status of France was maintained and the Entente emerged unscathed. More important, the German challenge had convinced the new British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, of the importance of the Entente to Britain and of the need to strengthen it further.

Thus Germany failed in her primary objective of dislocating the Entente and only managed to strengthen it. In the face of German opposition, both the French and the English came to view the Entente not only as a fortunate choice but as a necessary one and, in hindsight, one which had perhaps been made just in the nick of time. The desire to strengthen the Entente was concretized in a series of military and naval talks, while the inclusion of Russia in 1907 completed the overthrow of the Bismarckian system which Delcassé had initiated barely nine years before. The ultimate significance of these developments revealed itself at the outbreak of the First World War when Germany found itself

opposed to the Anglo-Franco-Russian Entente, a most remarkable combination when one considers that the international situation in 1898 was dominated by Anglo-French rivalry in Africa and Anglo-Russian competition in Asia.

A P P E N D I C E S

1. French Ministries, 1895 - 1905.

2. 'Executives' of the Groupe Colonial, 1893-1905.

3. A selection of Eugène Etienne's articles on Anglo-French relations.

4. Some contemporary French periodicals available in Montreal.

5. Articles on Great Britain from selected French periodicals.

APPENDIX 1

FRENCH MINISTRIES, 1898-1905

I. President: F. Faure (Jan.17, 1895 - Feb.16, 1899)

2e Ministère Brisson: June 28, 1898 - Oct. 26, 1898

External Affairs: Théophile Delcassé

Colonies : Georges Trouillot

4e Ministère Dupuy: Nov. 1,1898 - Feb. 18, 1899

External Affairs: Théophile Delcassé

Colonies : Antoine Guillain

II. President: E. Loubet (Feb.18, 1899 - Feb.18, 1906)

5e Ministère Dupuy: Feb. 18, 1899 - June 12, 1899

External Affairs: Théophile Delcassé

Colonies : Antoine Guillain

Ministère Waldeck-Rousseau: June 22, 1899 - June 4, 1902.

External Affairs: Théophile Delcassé

Colonies : Albert Descrais

Ministère Combes: June 7, 1902 - Jan. 18, 1905

External Affairs: Théophile Delcassé

Colonies : Gaston Doumergue

II.

Ministère Rouvier: Jan. 1905 - Mar. 1906

External Affairs: Théophile Delcassé

(resigned June 1905)

Colonies : Gaston Doumergue

Source: Le Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, 1899 - 1940

Jean Jolly, ed., P.U.F., Paris, 1960

Vol. 1, p.49-53.

APPENDIX 2

'Executives' of the Groupe Colonial, 1893 - 1905.

Nov. 1893 - July 1898

President: E. Etienne

Vice-Presidents: Prince d'Arenberg, Admiral Vallon,
Jules Charles-Roux (Marseilles)

Secretaries: Saint-Germain, Comte de Tréveneux (Côtes du Nord), Albin Rozet (Haute Marne), Georges Chaudey (Haute Saône).[1]

July 1898 - June 1902

President: E. Etienne

Vice-Presidents: Prince d'Arenberg, J. de Lanessam, Albin Rozet

Secretaries: Gustave Dutailly (Haute Marne)
Louis Henrique, Maurice Ordinaire (Doubs)
Joseph Thierry (Marseille).[2]

June 1902 - 1905

President: E. Etienne

June 1902 - 1905 (Cont'd)

Vice-Presidents: Antoine Guillain (Min. for Colonies, 1898-99), A. Rozet, Gerville-Réache, Jules Siegfried (Le Havre), E. Flandin (Calvados)

Secretaries: Jean Chaumet (Bordeaux) Louis Vigouroux (Haute Loire) Albert Lebrun (Président de la République 1939-40), François Carnot (Côte-D'Or).[3]

Sources:

1. La Politique Coloniale, 25 November, 1893.

2. La Politique Coloniale, 9 July, 1898.

3. Le Temps, 19 June, 1902.

APPENDIX 3

A selection of Eugène Etienne's articles on Anglo-French relations.

La Dépêche Coloniale

17 Jan. 1899 Politique Extérieure.

23 Jan. 1901 Les Dépenses coloniales en France et Angleterre.

19 Mar. 1901 Question d'Indochine.

1 May 1901 La région du Tchad.

1 Oct. 1901 Anglais et Français au Tchad.

Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales

May-Aug. 1898 La Convention du Niger.

Sept.-Dec. 1898 La Conquête du Soudan Egyptien.

Le Figaro

Nov. 7, 1899 L'Angleterre devant l'Europe.

Nov. 12, 1899 Réponse à Lord Salisbury.

Sept. 8-10, 1903 La France et la Situation européenne.

The National Review

July 1, 1903 The colonial controversies between France and England.

Aug. 1, 1904 The policy of France in Morocco.

La Petite Gironde

June 8, 1901	Les litiges avec l'Angleterre.
Dec. 21, 1901	La France, l'Angleterre et le chemin de fer éthiopien.
Jan. 4, 1902	La France au Siam .
June 28, 1902	La France au Tchad.
July 26, 1902	Le Siam.
Jan. 10, 1903	Les délimitations franco-anglaises entre le Niger et le Tchad.
Oct. 3, 1903	Colonies anglaises et colonies françaises.
April 16, 1904	L'arrangement franco-anglais.

Le Petit Marseillais

Apr. 18, 1904	L'arrangement franco-anglais.
June 19, 1904	L'Angleterre et le Congo.
Nov. 21, 1904	L'Accord franco-anglais devant la Chambre.

APPENDIX 4

Some contemporary French periodicals available in Montreal (Bibliothèque Nationale).

Annales politiques et littéraires.

Chronique sociale de France.

L'Economiste français.

L'Illustration.

L'Instantané (1898-1901).

Mercure de France.

Le Monde Illustré.

Le Monde Moderne.

Le Musée social.

La Nouvelle revue.

Les Questions actuelles.

Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*.

La Quinzaine.

La Revue Blanche.

La Revue Bleue.

Revue Britannique.

Revue de France.

Revue de Paris.

APPENDIX 4 (Cont'd)

Revue des Deux-Mondes.

Revue Hebdomadaire.

Revue Politique et littéraire.

Revue Politique et Parlementaire.

Revue Universitaire.

La Semaine.

Newspapers:

Le Journal des Débats

Le Figaro

Le Temps

*Available at McGill University.

APPENDIX 5

Articles on British Imperialism from selected French periodicals.

Le Monde Illustré

"La Guerre Anglo-Franco-Russe" (Imaginary)
10th March 1900.

"Le Président Kruger"
17th Nov. 1900, also articles from 24 Nov. to 1st Dec. on Kruger's visit to Paris.

Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales

G.L. Jaray, "L'Opinion publique et le rapprochement franco-anglais
XVIII, (1904) pp. 593-609.

La Revue Blanche

J. Benda, "A propos de la guerre Sud-Africaine"
XXI, p. 321 (March 1900).

P. Louis, "L'Empire Britanique"
XIX, p. 263 (June 1899).

----- "L'Echec de l'Impérialisme"
XXIX, p. 63 (Sept. 1902).

Revue Britanique

"L'Empire des Mers" May 1898.

"Les Anglais au Transvaal" Dec. 1899.

Revue des Deux-Mondes

Filon, A. "Le théoricien de l'impérialisme anglais (sir J.R. Seely)
June 1898.

Revue des Deux-Mondes (Cont'd)

Leroy-Beaulieu, P.	"L'Empire Britanique au début du XX^{e} Siècle. La crise de L'Impérialisme" July, 1903.
Pinon, R.	"Le Maroc et les Puissances européennes" Feb. 1902.
-----	"Deux forteresses de la Grande-Bretagne: Gibraltar et Malte" June 1903.

Revue de Paris

Bérard, V.,	"Joseph Chamberlain" Dec. 1898.
-----	"L'Angleterre et l'Empire du Monde" Jan. 1899.
-----	"L'Angleterre de le Panbritanisme" Dec. 1899.
-----	"L'affaire sud-Africaine" May 1902.
Dilke, Sir C.W.,	"L'Empire Britannique" Jan. 1898.
d'Estournelles de Constant	"Le Transvaal et l'Europe divisée" March 1900.
Viallate, A.,	"Cecil Rhodes" March 1900.
-----	"Les finances anglaises et la guerre sud-Africaine" June 1902.

Revue Politique et Parlementaire

Goblet, R., "L'arrangement franco-anglais" May 1904, p. 119-41.

Jaray, G.L. "Notre accord avec l'Angleterre et la politique franco-anglaise" June 1904, p. 462-506.

La Revue Hebdomadaire

Carrière, J. "La France et l'Angleterre" May 9, 1903.

----- "Les raisons de Fachoda" Sept. 17, 1904.

Lacour-Gauzet,G., "Le Maître de la mer" Jan. 30, 1903.

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